[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-16411

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00350-SPC-MRM

MICHAEL ANAGNOS, 

an individual, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

THE NELSEN RESIDENCE, INC.,

a.k.a. Haven of Divine Love, The Nelsen Residence, Inc.,

JEROME VALENTA, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(January 10, 2018)

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

This appeal presents the issue whether an employee seeking to recover 

minimum wages under the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const. art. X, § 24, must 

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prove that his employer is covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 206(a). Michael Anagnos sought to recover unpaid state minimum wages from 

his former housing community, The Nelsen Residence, Inc., and its president, 

Jerome Valenta, premised on the theory that they were an employer covered as “an 

institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or 

defective who reside on the premises,” 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 203(r)(2)(A), 

203(s)(1)(B). At trial, the district court instructed the jury that Anagnos was 

eligible to recover state minimum wages only if his employer was covered under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act. The jury found that The Residence and Valenta were 

not operating a residential care facility and returned a verdict in their favor.

Anagnos argues that the state constitutional Wage Amendment is self-executing

and creates a right to a minimum wage in Florida without regard to the Fair Labor 

Standards Act or the Florida Minimum Wage Act. But the Wage Amendment

provides, by its terms, “the terms ‘Employer,’ ‘Employee’ and ‘Wage’ shall have

the meanings established under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,” Fla. Const. 

art. 10 § 24(b), and states that the “case law, administrative interpretations, and 

other guiding standards developed under the federal FLSA shall guide the 

construction of this amendment and any implementing statutes or regulations,” id.

§ 24(f). We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

In May 2011, Anagnos, who was temporarily wheelchair-bound, applied for 

an apartment at the Haven for Divine Love, which is operated by and located on 

property that The Residence owns in Cape Coral, Florida. Anagnos moved onto the 

property on June 1, 2011, and after his health improved, he began cleaning, 

performing landscaping services, and aiding with repairs on the property.

Valenta lived in Bakersfield, California, and was unfamiliar with the extent 

of Anagnos’s work. Even so, Valenta suspended Anagnos’s rent payments. In the 

second quarter of 2014, Anagnos demanded to be paid, but Valenta refused on the 

basis that The Residence accepted only volunteer services. After Anagnos 

discontinued all work for The Residence and stopped paying his rent, Valenta 

evicted him.

Anagnos filed an amended complaint against Valenta and The Residence for 

unpaid minimum wages and for retaliating after receiving a demand for wages in 

violation of the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const. art. 10, § 24(a), (d), and the Wage 

Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.110. Anagnos alleged that Valenta and The Residence 

“violat[ed] . . . the FMWA because he performed work for [their] benefit . . . for 

which he has never been compensated” and that “[t]he FWMA, via Article X, Sect. 

24(c) of the Florida Constitution, mandates” that employers pay employees the 

state minimum wage. Anagnos sought “to recover . . . unpaid minimum wages, as 

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well as . . . liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees under the 

provisions of Title XXXI, Chapter 448.110 (Florida Minimum Wage Act) and Fla. 

Const. art X section 24.” Anagnos alleged that Valenta and The Residence were his 

“employer . . . within the meaning of the Florida Minimum Wage [sic] act pursuant 

to Section 3(d) of the ‘Fair Labor Standards Act’ [29 U.S.C. § 203(d)].” Valenta 

and The Residence answered that Anagnos was not an employee and raised the 

affirmative defenses that they were exempt from coverage under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213, and lacked sufficient employees to constitute an 

employer under state law, Fla. Stat. § 448.101(3).

Before trial, Anagnos raised a new theory. He argued, in contrast with his 

complaint, that “Article X, Sect. 24 makes no mention of the FLSA” and “the

FMWA’s purported requirement that an employee . . . establish FLSA coverage in 

order to establish entitlement to a remedy for unpaid minimum wages under state 

law is an unconstitutional restriction on Art. X, Sect. 24 of the Florida 

Constitution.” Anagnos also argued that the jury should answer an interrogatory 

about whether “Article X, Section 24, . . . require[s] FLSA coverage.” 

During trial, The Residence elicited testimony that it was not a caregiver to 

the residents of the Haven. Haven residents Bonnie Ribich, Salvatore Carsi, and 

Wilfred Rodriguez testified that they did not receive medical care, counseling, 

meals, or transportation services from The Residence. Rodriguez, who served as 

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the chaplain for The Residence and conducted worship services and Bible studies 

occasionally in the chapel on the property, and his wife, Angelica, denied that they 

provided counseling to the residents of the Haven. Angelica also testified that they 

did not receive a reduction in rent for serving on the board for The Residence. 

Angelica classified the Haven as “just a living facility or . . . an elderly, low 

income place to live” and stated that the facility did not provide care for or services 

to its residents.

Valenta described the Haven as a “hotel motel with efficiency units” that 

were available for monthly rental. When asked about the statement on the Haven 

website, Valenta responded he was unaware that the phrase “residential care 

facility” had a particular meaning “based on some kind of labor law.” He insisted 

that the property served strictly as “an apartment house,” and he denied that The 

Residence provided regular meals or transportation for Haven residents.

The district court instructed the jury “to decide whether the Nelsen 

Residence and Jerome Valenta were employers covered under the FLSA and [the] 

Florida Minimum Wage Act” by virtue of “operating a residential care facility.” 

The district court stated that, if the jury found “that the Nelsen Residence and 

Jerome Valenta were not operating a residential care facility, [it] will not decide 

the issue of Michael Anagnos’s damages.” The district court explained that the jury 

had to answer “special interrogatory number 1A,” which asked, “Do you find from 

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a preponderance of the evidence . . . That the Nelsen Residence and Jerome 

Valenta operate a residential care facility?” The jury marked “no” on the special 

interrogatory, which stated that a negative answer was dispositive of Anagnos’s 

claim for minimum wages. Later, the district court entered judgment in favor of 

The Residence and Valenta and against Anagnos’s claim for unpaid state minimum 

wages.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We generally review for abuse of discretion the denial of a requested jury 

instruction, Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011), 

and of a special interrogatory verdict form, McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 

99 F.3d 1068, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996), but we review de novo whether an 

instruction and verdict form accurately reflect the law, id.

III. DISCUSSION

The resolution of this appeal turns on the meaning of the minimum wage

amendment to the Florida Constitution. Fla. Const. art. X, § 24. “[T]he preeminent 

canon of statutory interpretation requires us to ‘presume that [an enactment] . . .

says . . . what it means and means . . . what it says there.’” Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. 

United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. 

United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)). Because the Wage Amendment is 

written in clear, unambiguous language, we can “begin with the . . . text, and end 

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there as well.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 183). In so 

doing, we give the words in the Wage Amendment their plain and ordinary

meaning. See id.

The Wage Amendment makes plain that employees receive the same 

protection under state law that they enjoy under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Its 

subsection (b) gives its “terms ‘Employer,’ ‘Employee’ and ‘Wage’ . . . the 

meanings established under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and its 

implementing regulations.” Id. § 24(b). Use of the word “meanings” connotes that 

the Wage Amendment incorporates not only the definitions of, but also the criteria 

for coverage as, an employer and an employee under federal law. See Advisory Op. 

to Att’y Gen. re Minimum Wage, 880 So. 2d 636, 641–62 (Fla. 2004). And 

subsection (f) declares an “inten[tion] that case law, administrative interpretations, 

and other guiding standards developed under the federal FLSA shall guide the 

construction of this amendment and any implementing statutes or regulations.” Id.

§ 24(f). That subsection reflects that the Wage Amendment should operate like the 

federal minimum wage law. Id. § 24(f); see Minimum Wage, 880 So. 2d at 641

(“point[ing] out that the . . . amendment . . . incorporates a reference to the entire 

body of law under the FLSA”). 

The Wage Amendment also contemplates the use of implementing 

legislation. It provides that “[t]he state legislature may by statute . . . adopt any 

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measures appropriate for the implementation of this amendment.” Fla. Const. art. 

X, §24(f). Based on that authority, the Legislature passed the Wage Act “to 

provide measures appropriate for the implementation of [section] 24, Art. X of the 

State Constitution.” Fla. Stat. § 448.110(2). The Wage Act provides a specific

minimum wage for all hours worked in Florida and limits it to “[o]nly those 

individuals entitled to receive the federal minimum wage under the federal Fair 

Labor Standards Act and its implementing regulations.” Id. § 448.110(3). The 

Wage Act also incorporates the exemptions and restrictions in sections 213 and 

214 of the Fair Labor Standards Act “as interpreted by applicable federal 

regulations and implemented by the Secretary of Labor.” Id.

The Fair Labor Standards Act requires an employee seeking to collect 

unpaid minimum wages to prove that he was employed by a covered employer.

The Act states that employers must pay the applicable minimum wage to an 

employee “who is . . . employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). An “‘enterprise’ 

means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or 

common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose . . . .”

Id. § 203(r)(1). As pertains to Anagnos, the activities of an employee are “deemed 

. . . activities performed for a business purpose,” if completed “in connection with

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. . . an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally 

ill or defective who reside on the premises . . . .” Id. § 203(r)(2)(A). 

The district court correctly instructed the jury. See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1072.

Anagnos’s entitlement to minimum wages was dependent on his coverage under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Fla. Const. art. X, § 24(b), (f); Fla. Stat. 

§ 448.110(2), (3). Under the federal law and concomitantly the state Wage 

Amendment, Anagnos had to prove that The Residence and Valenta were covered 

employers by virtue of operating a residential care facility. See 29 U.S.C.

§§ 203(r)(1), 203(r)(2)(A), 206(a). The jury found that The Residence and Valenta

did not operate a residential care facility, and Anagnos does not dispute that 

finding on appeal.

We affirm the judgment in favor of The Residence and Valenta.

AFFIRMED.

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