Opinion filed March 28, 2018

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

___________

No. 11-17-00274-CV

___________

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.C.I. AND I.V.I., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 106th District Court

Dawson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 16-05-19804

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court entered an order in which it terminated the parental rights of

the parents of Z.C.I. and I.V.I. The mother filed an appeal. On appeal, she 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest 

finding. We affirm. 

Termination Standards and Findings

In a single issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that the evidence is legally and 

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her

parental rights was in the best interest of her children. Appellant specifically argues 
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that the trial court should have considered alternatives to termination, such as 

appointing her as a possessory conservator.

Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2017). To determine on 

appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review 

all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether 

a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). 

To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. 

FAM. § 161.001(b). In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had knowingly 

placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings 

that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, had engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that

endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, and had failed to 

comply with provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions 

necessary for her to obtain the return of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), 

(E), (O). Appellant does not challenge these findings, but she does challenge the 

trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2). Accordingly, we will uphold the order of termination if the 

evidence is sufficient to support the best interest finding. 
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With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

Analysis

The Department of Family and Protective Services originally became 

involved with the two young children in this case when I.V.I. was hospitalized after 

being found limp and unresponsive at home. I.V.I. had suffered chronic subdural 

hemorrhages and required surgery to remove bloody fluid from around her brain. 

Both parents were found “reason to believe for physical abuse” by the Department. 

A monitored return to the mother was attempted after the initial removal; however, 

the children were removed a second time. At the time of the second removal, I.V.I. 

had what looked like a burn on the inside of one thigh and finger-type bruising on

the inside of the other thigh.
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The evidence at trial was undisputed that, while this case was pending, 

Appellant and her boyfriend engaged in domestic violence in the children’s 

presence. Other instances of violence involving Appellant and her boyfriend

occurred while this case was pending. The conservatorship caseworker testified that 

Appellant continued to engage in domestic violence, with Appellant being the abuser 

as well as the victim. Appellant testified that, at the time of trial, she was no longer 

in a relationship with the children’s father or with the violent boyfriend.

The uncontroverted evidence showed that Appellant did not comply with all 

of the provisions of her court-ordered service plan, though she did complete some 

of the required services. In particular, Appellant failed to complete domestic 

violence counseling and failed to attend batterer’s prevention intervention. The 

conservatorship caseworker testified that Appellant was not able to provide a safe 

home for the children, and Appellant seemed to agree with that assessment. For this 

reason, Appellant asked that the children be placed with her father.

The conservatorship caseworker testified that the Department’s goal for the 

children was adoption by the current foster parents. The children’s guardian ad litem

(CASA of West Texas) and the children’s attorney ad litem both believed that

termination of the parents’ parental rights would be in the best interest of the 

children. The children were placed in a foster home after the initial removal and 

were returned to the same foster home after the monitored return to Appellant failed. 

The placement is a foster-to-adopt home. The children are doing very well in that 

home. The foster parents are meeting all of the children’s needs, including I.V.I.’s 

special medical needs. The foster parents wish to adopt the children if the children 

become available for adoption.

Based upon the Holley factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot hold 

that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing

evidence. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The trial court could reasonably have 
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formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in each child’s best interest for 

Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated. We hold that the evidence is both 

legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding. We 

overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

JOHN M. BAILEY

JUSTICE

March 28, 2018

Panel consists of: Willson, J., 

Bailey, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

 

1

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.