UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5163

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DELRAY JENNETTE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:02-cr-00060-RBS-1) 

Submitted: April 10, 2009 Decided: May 4, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Keith Loren 

Kimball, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, 

Richard D. Cooke, William D. Muhr, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Delray Jennette appeals a thirty-five month sentence 

imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised release. 

Jennette argues on appeal that the district court erred in 

determining his revocation sentence by considering factors not 

permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006). We affirm. 

 We will not disturb a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release unless it is “‘plainly 

unreasonable’ with regard to those § 3553(a) factors applicable 

to supervised release revocation sentences.” United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). We must initially 

determine whether the revocation sentence is unreasonable, a 

process that includes procedural and substantive components. 

See id. at 437-38. A revocation sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if the district court took into account the Chapter 7 

policy statements and the applicable factors in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006). Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. The sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the court stated an appropriate 

basis for imposing a sentence within the statutory maximum. See

id. Only if we determine that the sentence was unreasonable do 

we proceed to the question of whether the sentence was plainly 

unreasonable. See id. at 438. 

 While a district court “ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

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imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider 

the Chapter Seven policy statements as well as the statutory 

requirements and factors applicable to revocation sentences 

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(e). Chapter Seven of the 

Guidelines provides, “at revocation, the court should sanction 

primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into 

account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying 

violation and the criminal history of the violator.” USSG 

Ch. 7, Pt. A(3)(b). Section 3583 approves consideration of a 

majority of the factors listed in § 3553(a), omitting only two. 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Included among the omitted factors is the 

need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 

offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 

 The district court’s observations regarding the 

seriousness of Jennette’s offense and need to provide just 

punishment were relevant to other required considerations, 

including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant,” adequately 

deterring criminal conduct, and protecting the public from 

further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). The court emphasized Jennette’s apparent 

refusal to abide by the terms of his supervised release, a 

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factor relevant to Chapter Seven’s policy that a revocation 

sentence should focus on the breach of the court’s trust. 

Moreover, the district court expressly considered the factors in 

§ 3553(a) that are applicable to revocation sentences. 

Therefore, Jennette’s sentence is not unreasonable, much less 

plainly so. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED