J-A05019-18

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.M.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.A.T., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2603 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered July 12, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000369-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2018

J.A.T. (Father) appeals from the decree that involuntarily terminated 

his parental rights to his daughter, G.M.T. (Child), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b) of the Adoption Act. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm.

Father and A.S. (Mother) are the biological parents of Child, born in 

May of 2013. On May 21, 2015, the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS) received a report alleging that Child was exposed to 

domestic violence and drug abuse in Mother’s care. DHS contacted Father, 

who indicated that he was residing in a halfway house and acknowledged his 
J-A05019-18

- 2 -

inability to care for Child.1 Accordingly, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (OPC) for Child, and Child was placed in foster care through A 

Second Chance. Child remained in foster care pursuant to a shelter care 

order entered on June 2, 2015. On June 30, 2015, following the filing of a 

DHS petition, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent. 

On March 28, 2017, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to Child.2 The trial court conducted a termination 

hearing on July 12, 2017. At the hearing, DHS presented the testimony of 

Tracey O’Donnell and Angienzka Feulner, the Community Umbrella Agency 

(CUS) case managers assigned to Father’s case. Father testified on his own 

behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally delivered its 

ruling terminating Father’s parental rights. The trial court entered its decree 

on that same date. On August 11, 2017, Father filed a timely notice of 

appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its opinion 

on September 19, 2017.

____________________________________________

1 On December 19, 2014, Father was sentenced to 111⁄2 to 23 months in 

prison for receiving stolen property. Father was released in May 2015 and 

ordered to serve five years of probation. 

2 DHS’s termination petition sought to terminate the parental rights of both 

Mother and Father. However, a hearing on the petition to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights was held separately from Father, and the outcome 

of that hearing is not contained in the record. Mother is not a party to this 

appeal, nor did she file a brief in connection with this appeal. 
J-A05019-18

- 3 -

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:3

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by finding, under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b), that termination of [Father’s] parental 

rights best serves the child’s developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare?

Father’s Brief at 5 (trial court answers omitted).4

We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard: 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

____________________________________________

3 Father framed his issues somewhat differently in his concise statement, but 

we find them sufficiently preserved for our review.

4 Although DHS petitioned the trial court to terminate Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), the record 

reveals that the trial court only terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to subsections (1), (2) and (b). Accordingly, we need not address Father’s 

third and fourth issues, which challenge the termination of his parental 

rights pursuant to subsections (5) and (8).
J-A05019-18

- 4 -

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

“In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 

(Pa. Super. 2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and 

convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty 
J-A05019-18

- 5 -

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), (2) and (b). This Court need only agree with the trial court’s 

decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), to affirm the termination. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, we focus our analysis on Section 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
J-A05019-18

- 6 -

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence that the following three 

conditions are met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2), 

due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of 

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

In granting DHS’s petition for involuntary termination, the trial court 

made the following determination:

This [c]ourt heard credible evidence regarding Father’s lack of 

capacity to perform parental duties, and [he] is incapable of 

providing essential care which is necessary for the Child’s 

physical and mental well-being. Both [c]ase [m]anagers . . . 

testified Father repeated [sic] failed to comply with the 

supervised visits with the Child, making excuses that he worked 

a lot of overtime. They both stated Father also made constant 

references to the positive drug screens being tainted and 

alleging he was allergic to cotton and could not submit to 

swabbing for drug detection. Father failed to present current, 

valid prescriptions for his alleged prescribed use of drugs, and 
J-A05019-18

- 7 -

also failed to produce evidence to corroborate his employment, 

and housing.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/17, at 19-20.

The certified record reveals that Father’s actions and inaction have 

resulted in Child being without essential parental care, and Father has failed 

to remedy the conditions that caused the incapacity within a reasonable 

time. DHS established the following objectives for Father: obtain suitable 

housing; participate in a drug and alcohol outpatient program; attend 

parenting classes; attend the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for 

services; obtain stable employment; and participate in weekly family visits 

with Child. 

Ms. O’Donnell, the case manager assigned to Father’s case from May 

2015 through July 2016, testified that Father had a history of drug and 

alcohol abuse. N.T., 7/12/17, at 11. Ms. O’Donnell stated that she referred 

Father to three different drug and alcohol treatment programs while 

assigned to his case, but Father failed to complete any of the programs. Id.

at 12. Notably, Ms. O’Donnell testified that while Father would initially 

participate in the programs, Father would eventually quit because “they 

weren’t working with him or he didn’t like that place, or they couldn’t work 

with his work schedule. He would take drug tests at the drug and alcohol 

places [and] he said that they tainted his drug and alcohol and he wanted to 

go to a different place.” Id. 
J-A05019-18

- 8 -

Further, Ms. O’Donnell testified that she regularly requested that 

Father submit to random drug screens. Father complied only once and 

tested positive for alcohol and benzodiazepines. Id. at 12-13. Ms. 

O’Donnell testified that Father was unable to secure appropriate housing and 

would not cooperate with the service providers assigned to his case. Id. at 

17. Notably, Father refused to sign releases for information and behaved 

aggressively towards service providers. Moreover, Ms. O’Donnell testified 

that Father attended at least one visit under the influence of drugs. Id. at 

21. 

Likewise, Ms. Feulner, Father’s CUA case manager from August 2016 

to the time of the hearing, testified that Father failed to complete his drug 

and alcohol programs. Ms. Feulner indicated that Father was under the 

influence of illicit substances during visits in August 2016, October 2016, 

November 2016 and January 2017. Id. at 33-34. Further, she testified that 

Father was minimally compliant in attending visits with Child, noting that of 

the 23 visits that were offered to Father, Father attended 11 visits, of which 

he was late for five, and failed to appear for 12 visits. Id. at 34. 

Additionally, in January 2017, Father was arrested for aggravated 

assault, robbery, possession of an instrument of crime, auto theft by 

unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property. Father remains incarcerated 

and was scheduled for trial in December 2017. Id. at 50; DHS Exhibit 5.
J-A05019-18

- 9 -

Based on the foregoing, we reject Father’s assertion that the trial court 

erred in terminating his parental rights based on his efforts to fulfill the 

objectives set forth by DHS. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion or 

error of law in the trial court’s determination that termination was warranted 

under Section 2511(a)(2).

We next consider whether the orphans’ court erred or abused its 

discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(b).

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with 

the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).
J-A05019-18

- 10 -

In addressing the best interests and welfare of Child, the trial court 

found:

Both [c]ase [m]anagers presented credible and convincing 

testimony regarding the lack of a parental bond between the 

Father and the Child, and both opined it would be in the best 

interest of the Child to terminate Father’s parental rights. They 

provided testimony of a loving bond that exists between the 

Child and her foster parents. The Child looks to them for safety, 

care, and for all her needs. Father has seen the Child [rarely

during] the last two years, and claims it is all because he was 

incarcerated. However, the record shows otherwise. Both 

[c]ase [m]anagers opined that the Child would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Father’s rights were terminated and that 

termination of Father’s parental rights and adoption would be in 

the best interest of the Child. This [c]ourt agrees with their 

credible testimony and finds Father’s testimony incredible.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/17, at 21. 

Initially, Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his 

parental rights because DHS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him 

with Child, “which was something he desired and was willing to do.” 

Father’s Brief at 15. When reviewing a termination decree on appeal under 

Section 2511(a)(2), we do not consider whether DHS made reasonable 

efforts. Notably, our Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the 

provision of reasonable efforts by the county children’s services agency is a 

factor in termination of the parental rights of a parent to a child. See In 

the Interest of: D.C.D., a Minor, 105 A.3d 662, 673-74, 676 (Pa. 2014) 

(rejecting the suggestion that an agency must make reasonable efforts to 

reunify a child with their parent prior to the termination of parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)). Thus, based on our Supreme Court’s holding 
J-A05019-18

- 11 -

in In the Interest of: D.C.D., a Minor, we find no merit to Father’s 

argument. 

Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s 

primary bond is with her foster parents, rather than Father. Both case 

managers testified that Child refers to her foster parents as “mommy” and 

“daddy.” N.T., 7/12/17, at 19, 35. Further, the record supports the trial 

court’s finding that Child will not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental 

rights are terminated. Id. at 20, 37. It was within the trial court’s 

discretion to accept the testimony of the CUA case managers, and to 

conclude that the benefits of a permanent home with her foster parents 

would outweigh any emotional distress Child might experience if Father’s 

parental rights were terminated.

While instantly Father may profess to love Child, a parent’s own 

feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination 

of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). As 

we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a 

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” 

Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and 

rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental 

duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or 

her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 

856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 
J-A05019-18

- 12 -

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). Where the trial 

court’s determination is supported by the record, this Court must affirm. 

See In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Decree affirmed.

P.J.E. Stevens joins the memorandum.

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of the 

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/18