New 

New Realities

U . S . A r m y W a r C o l l e g e

C a r l i s l e , P e n n s y l v a n i a

J a n u a r y 2014

Energy Security in the 2010s 

and Implications for 

the U.S. Military

Strategic Studies Institute
Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College i

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic 

level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic-level 

study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis. In addition to analytical and policy-oriented studies, SSI publishes special 

reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences 

and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior 

Army leaders.

This compendium of executive summaries is based on presentations delivered at a conference by 

the same name that was organized by SSI, hosted by the Reserve Officers Association in 

Washington, DC, and funded through the generous support of the U.S. Army War College 

Foundation. The conference – free and open to the public – was held on 19-20 November 2013, and 

featured experts from the policymaking community, academia, think tanks, the private sector, and 

the military services. These individuals gathered together to address the rapidly changing global 

energy supply situation, the social, political, and economic challenges facing consumer states, and 

the subsequent implications for the United States generally and for the U.S. military specifically. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official 

policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military

Conference Executive Summaries

Edited by John R. Deni

January 2014

Cover Photos:

Upper Left: Iraq - A U.S. Army convoy of fuel trucks lines up to fill the fuel pits at the Sahl Sinjar Air Field in Ninawa province, Iraq, Nov. 8, 

2008. Photo By: Lance Cpl. Kelly R. Chase.

Upper Right: Tan Tan, Morocco -- Maj. Sean M. Sadlier (left) of the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office explains the solar power 

element of the Expeditionary Forward Operating Base concept to Col. Anthony Fernandez during the testing phase of this sustainable 

energy initiative here May 19. The ExFOB is designed primarily for use by small Marine Corps units at forward operating bases in 

Afghanistan. Fernandez, a Marine Corps Reservist with a combined 28 years in the Corps, is the African Lion 2010 task force commander 

here. Photo By: Maj. Paul Greenberg.

Lower Left: A two-megawatt solar panel array at Fort Carson, Colorado, produces enough power for 540 homes, and is one example of the 

kinds of tools installations can use to achieve Net Zero energy usage. Photo By: U.S. Army.

Lower Right: Forward Operating Base Waza K'wah, Paktika, Afghanistan - Soldiers from Task Force Currahee, 4th Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division, recover bundles of fuel that were air delivered to Forward Operating Base Waza K'wah in the Paktika province of 

Afghanistan via a C-17 Globemaster III. The fuel was delivered to help sustain members of Task Force Currahee whose only means of resupply is through air delivery. Photo By: Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz.
Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College ii

Contents

Evolving Production

 The Arab Uprisings and MENA Energy Producers – John Calabrese ...................................... 1

 Russia’s Evolving Energy Sector – Theresa Sabonis-Helf........................................................ 3

 Impact of Political Instability on Latin American Sources – David Mares .............................. 5

 The Shale Revolution and the New Geopolitics of Energy – Robert Manning ....................... 7

 The Security Risks and Rewards of Renewable Energies – Karen Smith Stegen .................... 9

 Africa and American Energy Interests – Ian Taylor.............................................................. 11

 Does Nuclear Have a Future? – Jane Nakano ...................................................................... 13

Changing Consumption Patterns

 China’s Burgeoning Demand and its Quest for Resources – Michal Meidan ....................... 15

 New Trade Routes, New Conflicts? – Michael Klare ............................................................ 17

 Prospects for Energy Efficiency – Pramod Khargonekar...................................................... 19

 The Changing Calculus of India’s Energy Security – Tom Cutler........................................... 21

 Energy Demand and the Developing World – Deborah Gordon .......................................... 23

The Military Implications

 Energy, Cybersecurity, and Defense – Christopher Bronk.................................................... 25

 Operational Energy and National Resilience – Paul E. Roege .............................................. 27

 Terrorist Energy Sector Targeting – Robert J. Bunker .......................................................... 29

 NATO and Energy Security – John R. Deni............................................................................ 31

 Operational Energy in Weapon System Life Cycle – Kevin T. Geiss...................................... 33

 The Role of Nuclear Power in Installation Energy – Ronald Filadelfo .................................. 35

 Smart Grids for Operations and Installations – Kenneth A. Loparo ..................................... 37

 Overcoming Challenges from the National Electrical Grid – John Dodson........................... 39

Biographical Notes.................................................................................................................................... 41
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The Arab Uprisings and MENA Energy Producers: Heavy Costs and Ephemeral 

Benefits

John Calabrese

The Middle East’s hydrocarbon resources 

play a vital role in global energy markets 

and will continue to do so for many years 

to come. Meanwhile, the oil and gas sector 

has been, and is likely to remain of central 

importance to Middle Eastern countries 

themselves, whether or not they are 

major producers-exporters.

Looking at the direct and indirect losses 

sustained by three countries which, three 

years after the Arab Spring protests 

began, are still experiencing political 

turmoil and/or conflict – Egypt, Libya,

and Syria – and two countries which 

appear to have benefited from the regionwide upheaval, several things are clear. 

First, the effects of the Arab Spring on the 

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 

region’s energy sector vary greatly by 

country. Second, there are no clear 

“winners” and “losers”, nor are all of the 

setbacks and bottlenecks directly 

attributable to the Arab Spring. Third, on 

balance the Arab Spring’s effects on 

MENA producers have not substantially 

jeopardized U.S. energy security – at least 

not yet.

The target set, timing and frequency of 

attacks, and level of physical damage 

inflicted on the region’s production, 

refining, and transport infrastructure has 

varied widely across the region.
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Furthermore, there are a host of factors 

other than, or in addition to sabotage, that 

have been responsible for the disruption 

of energy production and/or exports, 

including the imposition of sanctions, the 

seizure of energy installations, and offline 

maintenance.

These disruptions – wherever they have

occurred and whatever their causes –

have undermined the ability of producers 

to meet export commitments and fulfill 

rapidly rising domestic consumption 

requirements; worsened their fiscal 

situations by depressing export earnings 

and increasing domestic public 

expenditures; impeded their ability to 

maintain and/or expand production 

capacity; further delayed fuel subsidy 

reforms; and spurred intra-regional 

energy realignments.

At the same time, the Arab Spring 

uprisings have been a major factor 

sustaining high oil prices. This has, in 

turn, fueled Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP) growth in Saudi Arabia, the other

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries,

and Iraq. This financial windfall has 

enabled Saudi Arabia, in particular, not 

just to contain domestic political pressure 

but to conduct a much more assertive 

regional foreign policy – sustaining Sunni 

allies and supporting proxies. However, a 

number of risks and costs offset such 

gains, including the spillover effects of the 

conflict in Syria, the question of whether

and for how long such high levels of 

expenditure can be sustained, the strain 

placed on intra-regional relationships,

and the possibility of “blowback.”

Shale technology and renewable energy 

provide the United States with the 

opportunity to further reduce its reliance

on imported oil. However, even before 

the Arab Spring and the shale revolution, 

the United States had not been dependent

on the Gulf for the physical supply of oil. 

Rather, it depended on the Gulf for price 

stability – it still does, and will continue to

do so. Hence, a strong U.S. commitment 

to Gulf security will remain essential to oil 

market stability for the foreseeable 

future. Neither the Arab Spring nor the 

promise of “energy independence” 

appears to have eroded Washington’s 

willingness to fulfill that commitment or 

the GCC countries’ need for it.

The United States was spared the worst 

case of a post-Arab Spring “price shock” 

partly as the result of its own soaring 

production, coupled with the record-high 

production levels achieved by Saudi 

Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates 

(UAE), and Qatar. These same supplyside factors afforded the United States the 

strategic flexibility needed to push for the 

tightening of sanctions on Iran. 

Nevertheless, there are a number of “over 

the horizon” risks and uncertainties that 

could have implications for American 

security policy and hence the U.S. 

military, including the possible spread of 

unrest to or within the GCC sub-region, 

whether Iraq can overcome the political 

and other challenges that imperil the 

resurgence of its energy sector, when and 

under what circumstances Iranian 

supplies fully return to the market, and 

the policy choices that China and other 

major Asian energy consumers adopt in 

order to ensure that their needs are met.

 
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Russia’s Evolving Energy Sector

Theresa Sabonis-Helf

Oil and changes in 

oil markets are 

more significant to 

the Russian 

economy than 

natural gas, but gas 

is more significant 

in terms of energy 

security 

vulnerabilities. The 

European focus on 

Russian natural gas 

arises from 

individual states’ 

high levels of 

dependency on 

Russia, but also 

from the fact that 

natural gas is the 

single largest 

component of 

European energy 

demand – and 

Russia has the largest reserves in the 

world. Gas remains a regional, rather 

than a global market, as less than 33 

percent of gas is moved in the sea lanes. 

The remainder is moved in pipelines, 

which means long-term commitments to 

suppliers and supply lines. 

Gas is likely to retain regional 

characteristics 

through 2035. 

Europe has two 

opposite fears about 

Russian energy 

behavior. The first 

is that Russia will 

continue and 

intensify the pattern 

seen in the previous 

decade, of 

manipulation of 

energy supply for

political reasons. 

The second fear is 

Source: RIA Novosti

Source: ITAR-TASS
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that Russia will pursue incompetent 

policies at home that reduce its ability to 

supply European gas into the medium 

term future. At the present time, the 

latter is a greater danger, and is 

exacerbated by new European policies 

that seek (in part) 

to address the first 

danger. 

In both oil and gas, 

Russia is coming to 

the end of a set of 

advantages that 

allowed it to reap 

abnormal profits. 

Infrastructure is in 

need of 

recapitalization, 

and fields are 

declining (four 

fifths of upstream 

capital spending is 

focused on slowing 

the decline of older 

fields). These 

factors, together 

with domestic 

energy subsidies, a 

requirement to 

prioritize supply 

for the domestic market, and a high 

federal reliance on revenues from oil, 

leave Russian energy undercapitalized 

even as new pipelines are being built and 

old fields are declining. Into this set of 

considerable Russian challenges, Europe 

is attempting to 

implement the Third 

Energy Package, a set 

of policies that will 

force disaggregation 

of supply, transit, and 

distribution of gas. 

The policies were 

designed to enhance 

competition and 

transparency. 

However, the new 

policies reduce 

Russia’s perceived 

security of markets, 

have caused 

significant tensions 

between Russia and 

the EU, and make the 

problem of 

recapitalization of the 

gas sector even more 

problematic.

Source: Associated Press
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Impact of Political Instability on Latin American Sources

David Mares 

Latin America was once a major energy 

provider to world markets and has the 

potential to become a major exporter of 

oil and natural gas in the next decade. 

Latin American energy resources could 

help further diversify world energy 

markets away from the turbulent Middle 

East, contribute to world economic 

growth by stabilizing and lowering 

international energy prices, and help 

mitigate climate change by supporting the 

turn to cleaner natural gas. Hence the 

impact of Latin American energy supplies 

on the United States is largely indirect –

namely, via global energy markets and 

geopolitics.

But translating that international 

potential into reality requires significant 

investments in exploration and 

production, the development of efficient 

and effective energy markets at home, 

and a significantly improved distribution 

of rents associated with hydrocarbon 

production within Latin American 

societies, not just between Latin 

American governments and public and 

private international oil and gas 

companies. These are significant 

challenges, and of the four major Latin 

American energy producers (Venezuela, 

Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil) only in 

Brazil do they appear likely to be 

successfully addressed.

If Latin American countries are able to 

make the necessary investments and 

overcomes the potential challenges, they 

may be able to tap into an array of 

promising energy resources. For 

example, new discoveries of nonconventional sources – such as heavy oil, 

ultra-deep water deposits, and shale 

deposits – could increase the region’s 

share of global oil and gas production by 

50 percent by 2020, for a total close to 20

percent. Hydropower also represents a 

potentially significant growth 

opportunity. Latin America is second 

only to Scandinavia in terms of 

hydropower potential.

Latin American countries are also 

becoming increasingly interested in nonconventional renewables such as biomass, solar, and wind. The region is a 

leading innovator in bio-mass and a 

significant promoter of these nonconventional sources.

Finally, Latin America is also home to 

some of the most important sources of 

critical elements necessary for 

renewables and other technologies. For 

instance, Bolivia has the world’s most 

significant deposits of Lithium, while 

Chile and Argentina are among the main 

producers globally.

Latin American countries are likely to face 

significant hurdles in achieving 

production goals and leveraging these 

potential resources. Interestingly though, 

guerrillas and criminal organizations are 
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not the major challenge for Latin 

American supply. Instead, a host of other 

issues will comprise the region’s greatest 

challenges.

First, Latin America lacks the investment 

capital and human capital to develop 

these resources and will need to attract 

them from outside the region. Second, the 

environment is an increasingly salient 

issue in Latin America, but most countries 

have not created a transparent and 

credible regulatory structure to govern 

exploitation of natural resources. This 

makes social disruption to production 

more likely and increases risks to 

investors. Third, Latin American 

governments generally have little 

credibility in enforcing property rights, 

whether those are contracts with private 

companies or the nationally- and 

internationally-recognized rights of 

indigenous communities to their cultures 

and environment.

For most countries, energy security 

should mean the efficient use of energy,

not simply cheap energy to be used 

inefficiently. However, Latin American 

governments have a particularly difficult 

time selling this point at home, in part 

because the national markets for

electricity and natural gas are

significantly limited geographically. 

Additionally, national oil companies have 

privileged places in most countries for 

exploration and production1, but they 

tend to have to invest their resources in 

the subsidization of energy at home. One 

 

1

Colombia and Peru are partial exceptions.

of the practical implications of this is that 

the pace of exploration and production is 

slowing in most Latin American countries.

Most often discussions about the 

distribution of rents associated with 

natural resources focuses on the division 

between government and private 

companies. But governments have been 

unable to distribute their share to the 

citizens in ways that promote sustainable 

national development. When citizens 

protest the lack of development,

governments try to get a greater share of 

rents from companies, even to the point 

at which companies cut back on 

investments. A more effective and 

efficient distribution of the rents already 

captured by governments would serve 

everyone better.

In sum, Latin American countries face 

many of the same energy security 

challenges as countries elsewhere, 

especially in terms of managing trade-offs 

among competing goals. Political change 

in many countries across the region has 

to affect the debates regarding trade-offs, 

but Latin American countries must 

modernize their political systems in 

terms of transparency, accountability, and

citizen empowerment – together, these 

will form the most effective antidote to 

radical movements on both the political 

left and right that wait in the wings.
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The Shale Revolution and the New Geopolitics of Energy

Robert Manning

The combination of computer-aided 

horizontal drilling and hydraulic

fracturing (known as “fracking”) 

technology has enormously boosted both 

U.S. production and reserves of tight oil 

and gas, most of it since 2007-8. The 

United States has already become the 

world’s largest producer of oil and gas 

hydrocarbons, is projected to surpass 

Saudi Arabia as the world’s top oil 

producer by 2017, and is expected to 

become a net exporter by 2030.2 There 

are currently ample natural gas reserves 

to meet current U.S. demand for 100

years. Moreover, estimates of 

recoverable shale gas and shale/tight oil

are continuing to be revised upwards.

It is worth noting that shale technology 

continues to improve, with recent 

developments cutting required amounts 

of water in half, improving knowledge of 

shale composition, and increasing the 

production of shale gas and tight oil.3 The 

shale revolution has turned the debate on 

the future of oil on its head: the long 

running argument about whether or not 

we have reached “peak oil” is over. Now 

the issue is whether or not we are 

approaching “peak demand.”

There are several implications of all of 

this for the future of geopolitics and U.S. 

 

2

Elisabeth Rosenthal, “US to World’s Top Oil

Producer in 5 Years, Report Says,” The New York

Times, November 12, 2012.

3

See Oilprice.com, “New Fracking Technology to

Bring Huge Supplies of Oil and Gas to the Market,”

January 16, 2012 available at

oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/New-FrackingTechnology-to-Bring-Huge-Supplies-of-Oil-and-Gasto-the-Market.html.

foreign policy. First, the center of gravity 

of world energy markets is shifting from 

the Persian Gulf to the Western 

Hemisphere (for example, the United 

States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil).4 

Moreover, the bulk of U.S. imports are 

from the Western Hemisphere, with only 

about 10 percent coming from the Persian 

Gulf. 

Second, shale gas and tight oil have 

radically shifted global energy markets 

and redrawn the global energy map 40 

years after the Arab oil embargo. 

Globally, the shale revolution has 

potentially repositioned the United States

vis-à-vis the Middle East and Asia, putting

the United States in a position to 

challenge OPEC (Organization of 

Petroleum Exporting Countries) control 

of oil markets. Additionally, the 

unconventional fossil fuel revolution will 

probably lead to surprise developments 

impacting major oil and gas producers 

such as Iran, other Persian Gulf countries,

and Russia.

Third, domestically the shale revolution 

has strengthened the U.S. economy, 

making it more globally competitive. This 

has dramatically shifted the outlook for 

U.S. energy security and enhanced 

America’s comprehensive national power. 

In turn, this has had a broad foreign 

policy impact. This shift in the U.S. energy 

situation and its bolstering of national 

power come at a moment when American

 

4

See EIA, “Energy in Brief,” Department of Energy,

May 10, 2013, available at

www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/foreign_oil_de

pendence.cfm.
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public opinion is reeling from military 

actions in the Middle East.

While it is and will remain a global oil 

market, more than two thirds of Middle 

East oil is exported to East Asia. 

Essentially, this amounts to a great degree 

of free-riding by those East Asian 

countries on the sea lane security 

provided by the U.S. military. Over time, 

this is likely to cause 

many in the United 

States to raise 

burden-sharing 

questions.

The prospect of 

liquefied natural gas 

(LNG) exports is 

now being debated 

in Congress. For 

some 20 countries 

with which the 

United States has a 

free trade 

agreement, such as 

with South Korea, 

LNG exports are 

included in the 

terms of those 

agreements.

Concerns in some 

quarters about the 

impact of exports on the domestic price of 

gas are overblown.

Energy exports would bolster the U.S.

position in Asia. Japan, South Korea, and 

Taiwan are major gas importers, and 

China is also becoming a major importer. 

America’s ability to bolster Asian allies’ 

energy security would reinforce 

perceptions of U.S. reliability. Meanwhile, 

Russia and Iran – the leading gas 

producers with the largest conventional 

reserves – would be big losers.

Another likely challenge will be a greater 

Chinese role in the Middle East. The 

Chinese are increasingly dependent on 

Persian Gulf oil, and are likely to become 

bigger players in the region. This could 

be a test of the direction of the U.S.-China 

relationship.

Finally, two things to watch for as 

potential political fallout from the shale 

revolution are closer China-Russia 

cooperation, as China expands energy ties 

to Russia to reduce its dependence on the 

Middle East, and also possible RussiaOPEC cooperation.

Source: Energy Information Administration
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The Security Risks and Rewards of Renewable Energies

Karen Smith Stegen

The security rewards of renewable energies 

are manifold and far outweigh the security 

risks. However, risks do exist. Policy makers 

should be both aware of these risks and 

proactive about addressing them. 

In general, the more domestically-sourced 

renewable energies replace imported 

hydrocarbons, the greater the security 

rewards, as renewables will ameliorate the 

security vulnerabilities caused by imports. 

Over the past decades, for example, the 

United States has gone to extraordinary 

lengths to protect hydrocarbon exporters and 

sea lanes in order to ensure a steady flow of 

hydrocarbons to the global economy and 

thereby prevent the economic damage caused 

by oil price volatility. Were renewables 

sufficiently deployed, they could decouple 

economic prosperity from hydrocarbons, 

which would endow the United States with 

greater leeway in its international affairs. 

Other potential rewards, for the United States

or other countries, include diversifying the 

national energy mix, reducing a country’s 

vulnerability to political manipulation, easing 

water shortage tensions through desalination 

(for example, with heat produced via 

concentrated solar power technology), and 

increasing regional independence from 

centralized authoritarian regimes (which, in 

turn, strengthens prospects for 

democratization). 

The risks vary according to the technologies 

and energy sectors under discussion. For the 

transportation sector, there are two methods 

for deploying renewable energies. First, 

biofuels can replace conventional fuels in 

combustion engines. For domesticallysourced biofuels, the disruption risks are 

similar to those of other crops, such as from 

poor weather, but also include new risks such 

as competition from other industries (food, 

fibers, chemicals) and, for second generation 

biofuels, reliance on demand for the primary 

crop. Imported biofuels pose the same risks 

as imported hydrocarbons.

Second, electric motors can replace 

combustion motors; the risks associated 

therein are the same as for several of the 

main renewable energy technologies 

(RETs)—such as wind power or 

photovoltaics (PV)—used in electric power 

generation. Wind turbines, PV cells, and 

many other RETs rely on materials subject to 

current or future availability challenges. In 

2011, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 

assessed the criticality of the materials used 

in RETs and classified five of them 

(dysprosium, europium, neodymium, 

terbium, and yttrium) at the most “critical” 

level in both the short (0-5 years) and 

medium (5-15 years) terms. For the 

transportation sector, as well as for electricity 

generation, dysprosium and neodymium are 

critical.

Both of these materials are rare earth 

elements (REEs): dysprosium is a heavy REE 

used in wind turbines and e-vehicle motors, 

and neodymium is a light REE used in the 

same applications as dysprosium as well as in 

e-vehicle batteries. China supplies over 90 

percent of world consumption of both. Since 

global demand is expected to dramatically 

increase, output from new mines in other 

parts of the world is not expected to alleviate 

shortages. 

Each mineral deposit is unique in its 

composition, necessitating that both the 

mining and processing technologies are 

“custom built,” which can require decades. 

Moreover, both mining and processing are 

costly and pose environmental challenges. 

Thus, whereas many countries may have 

reserves, only some have mining operations 

and even fewer possess refining capacity. In 

short, China’s capacity in REE processing is so 

substantial it would take years for other 
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countries to emulate it. In addition to new 

mines, other measures for overcoming REE 

shortages include recycling and developing 

substitutes, but neither of these approaches 

has thus far produced fruitful results for 

dysprosium or neodymium. Subsea mining of 

deep marine minerals may also offer a new 

source, but it is decades away from 

realization. 

For many years, China was considered a 

reliable REE supplier, but problems have 

emerged. The Chinese government has 

recently shown concern over the pollution 

caused by its REE industry and has 

attempted, for environmental and other 

reasons, such as rogue production and 

smuggling, to gain greater control. 

Meanwhile, Chinese domestic demand for 

REE is soaring. Starting in 2009, China has 

annually imposed export quota reductions, 

not only to protect domestic supply but also, 

as Chinese officials have admitted, to 

encourage the development of end-use 

industries within China. In 2010, the global 

REE industry was worth $1.3 billion, but enduse industries were worth $4.8 trillion. 

The export reductions resulted in 

skyrocketing prices (some increased by 850

percent) and worldwide concern. In 

September 2010, these worries were 

exacerbated when China halted REE 

deliveries to Japan to exert political pressure. 

The combination of political manipulation 

and quota reductions has spurred anxiety in 

importing countries, resulting in the 

promulgation of new legislation by 

governments and the intensification of the 

search for alternatives by industries. The EU, 

for example, has begun stockpiling certain 

minerals, and, in October 2013, the “Critical 

Minerals Policy Act of 2013” was proposed in 

the U.S. Senate. The higher prices have also 

stimulated the re-opening of mines, such as 

the REE Mountain Pass mine in California, 

and plans for new excavations in other parts 

of the world. These operations, however, 

would be imperiled if China took steps to 

lower global REE prices—a tactic that is not 

inconceivable. 

Although the danger of shortages in critical 

materials is relevant for future expansion of 

renewable energies, they would not result in 

energy disruptions. However, shortages 

would pose significant problems for U.S.

manufacturers of RETs and impede the ability 

of the United States to capture the security 

rewards. In addition to the specific rewards 

mentioned above, greater global deployment 

of renewable energies will eventually—not 

just ‘potentially’—re-draw the world map of 

geopolitical power. Just as with 

hydrocarbons, geopolitical power will be 

derived from geography and natural resource 

endowments. For example, in the era of coal, 

the countries that were first to harness coal 

power continue to benefit from being the first 

industrializers; in the oil era, the 

industrialized oil-rich countries still count 

among the world’s major powers. If the 

hydrocarbon era wanes, power and influence 

will be gained by those countries with 

renewable technologies and/or raw 

renewable resources that attain energy 

independence and export dominance (the 

“new winners”). The losers will be the 

countries that lag behind, still bound to 

hydrocarbon supplies and infrastructure.

The goal of every government should be to 

secure the foundations for future stability and 

prosperity. In terms of energy, this means the 

development of industries and infrastructure 

that will allow countries to reap the 

advantages of renewable energies. Policy 

makers should avoid allowing path 

dependencies and lock-ins to hydrocarbons 

to be perpetuated, particularly at the expense 

of renewables. Hydrocarbon-rich countries, 

such as the United States, may be particularly 

challenged to achieve a balance. One 

immediate recommendation would be to 

support the rare earth and other critical 

materials industries in the United States

through national laboratories, research 

funding support, and the passage of 

supportive legislation.
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Africa and American Energy Interests

Ian Taylor

According to the Energy Information 

Administration (EIA), in 2010, 16 of the 

54 countries in Africa were exporters of 

oil: Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, 

South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, the 

Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Chad, 

Egypt, Tunisia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, the 

Democratic Republic of the Condo, and 

Mauritania. Africa’s proven oil reserves 

have grown by 120 percent in the past 30 

years – from 57 billion barrels in 1980 to 

124 billion barrels in 2012. Of note, only 

four of Africa’s oil producers are 

members of the Organization of 

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) –

Algeria, Angola, Libya and Nigeria. 

Although it is estimated that at least 

another 100 billion barrels are offshore 

Africa waiting to be discovered, this is 

likely to be expensive and inconveniently 

located. 

Equally, Africa’s proven reserves of 

natural gas have grown by 140 percent

from 210 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 1980 

to 509 tcf in 2012. Recent further 

discoveries of sizable natural gas reserves 

in Tanzania and Mozambique point to 

significant upward potential for these 

figures.

Many predicted that the United States

would acquire even larger amounts of oil 

from African producers, particularly as 

U.S. national interests demanded that 

there be a diversification away from

sourcing energy from the Middle East.

For a few years, Africa was seen as the 

“new frontier” for American energy 

interests and for a time, this was right –

from 2002, the United States drastically 

increased its imports from established 

producers in Africa, most notably Nigeria, 

Angola, and Algeria, and also crafted 

relationships with new producers like 

Equatorial Guinea and Chad. As 

diversification away from the Middle East 

for energy became a central strategic 

priority, several African nations seemed 

poised to become important suppliers. 

However, these hopes were tempered 

somewhat by the generally insecure 

investment climate, poor governance, and 

corruption that characterized much of oilproducing Africa. Additionally, increasing 

violence in countries such as Nigeria and 

the rise of terrorism across the Sahel (and 

into Nigeria and Cameroon) became more 

of a concern.

The international energy landscape began 

to change most dramatically though 

starting in 2010, as companies unlocked 

tight oil reserves in the United States

through hydraulic fracturing and 

horizontal drilling technologies. 

Interestingly, this coincided with 

increasingly pessimistic predictions 

regarding the long-term supply of energy 

from key African partners of the United 

States, with many observers and analysts

predicting that after 2015, most current 

oil-producing African countries would 

witness a decline in production.

Tight oil and shale gas is likely to radically 

change the dynamics of U.S. strategic 

thinking around energy and particularly 

with regard to Africa. Already, the United 

States has fallen from being Angola’s top

oil customer to its third, and Nigeria is 

exporting 67 percent less oil to the United 

States than it was at its peak. Even if tight 

oil production in the United States only 
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reaches the EIA’s lower projections (1.23 

million barrels per day by 2035), imports 

from Africa will continue to decline. This 

combined with long-term decline in 

affordable and accessible energy in Africa 

means that U.S. security concerns in 

Africa vis-à-vis energy supplies will 

decline. But other issues will likely 

develop. 

The new U.S. oil glut and 

resulting suppressed demand 

for African oil could cause a 

fall in prices to $70-90 per 

barrel by 2020 from current 

levels of $90-$120 per barrel. 

In fragile states highly 

dependent upon oil revenue, a 

price collapse could engender 

far-reaching economic 

instability. Nigeria, already 

plagued by Boko Haram and 

continuous tensions in the 

Niger Delta could be seriously 

affected. Similarly Chad, 

already vulnerable to the 

spread of Al Qaeda in the 

Sahel, may pose as a future 

area of instability.

So, whilst energy security will 

be less of a reason for any U.S.

military presence in Africa, 

broader American interests 

will remain. The fight against 

global terrorist extremism will continue 

and the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will 

likely remain geographic spaces where 

U.S. involvement is inevitable. Central 

Africa remains bedeviled by open conflict, 

both in the eastern Democratic Republic 

of the Congo and more recently in the 

Central African Republic. Although 

neither are intrinsic to a narrow reading 

of American interests, humanitarian 

concerns will stimulate some form of 

American response, although unlikely to 

be similar to recent U.S. activity against

the Lord’s Resistance Army in nearby 

Uganda. Even if the U.S. Africa Command 

is subsumed back into another 

organizational set-up, the U.S. military 

will remain engaged in Africa in some 

form. Indeed, now that the hyperbole of a 

“New Scramble for Africa” is likely to be 

diminished somewhat by the energy 

revolutions in North America and 

elsewhere, a more clear-eyed perspective 

on what the U.S. military is capable of—

and just what it should be doing—in 

Africa, is greatly enhanced. This is 

actually good news for the military’s 

public relations endeavors and, more 

importantly, for its strategic planners.

Source: CIA
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Does Nuclear Have a Future?

Jane Nakano

Nuclear energy will continue to expand 

despite the Fukushima disaster. At the 

beginning of 2011, there were roughly 

440 nuclear reactors around the world, 

generating 370 gigawatts of electricity 

(GWe), providing 14 percent of the global 

electricity consumption. Nuclear energy, 

together with renewable energy, is 

forecast by the International Energy 

Agency to be the world’s fastest-growing 

source of energy. Forecast capacity in 

2030 and 2050—under low and high 

scenarios—are higher than today, 

according to the International Atomic 

Energy Agency.

However, the capacity expansion is at a 

slower rate, except in a handful of

countries. The share of nuclear energy in 

the global electricity generation in 2030 

and 2050 is forecast to be considerably

smaller than today. 

Most reactor construction and planned 

expansion will be in growing economies. 

Among these, China leads the pack –

indeed, 40 percent of global commercial 

nuclear industry construction is in China 

today. Meanwhile, Russia plans to 

increase the nuclear share in power 

generation from 16.5 percent today to 25 

percent by 2030. Elsewhere, there is 

rising interest among those without 

nuclear power generation experience or 

capacity today, especially in the Middle 

East and Southeast Asia. 

Despite this growth and the potential it 

represents for the American nuclear 

industry, current global 

nuclear industry conditions 

amount to a strong 

headwind for the viability of 

the U.S. nuclear industry. 

Several factors are 

contributing to this situation. 

First among them is the rise 

of new suppliers—with 

robust domestic demand to 

back them up. For example, 

in 2009, South Korea made a 

very competitive bid to 

supply four nuclear power 

plants to the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE). 

Additionally, China is 

striving to incorporate U.S. 

and French designs, and to 

market its own advanced nuclear power 

reactors, including so-called Generation

III reactors. 

The second major factor shaping the 

global nuclear power industry is creative 

export marketing models. For example, 

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Russia has sought to use a Buy-OwnOperate model in Turkey, while South 

Korea has pursued this same model in the 

UAE. To some degree, these creative 

export marketing models are a result of 

the fact that the new entrants lack 

capacities like nuclear reactor operation, 

fuel enrichment, and spent fuel 

management (e.g., disposal or 

reprocessing). Unfortunately for 

American nuclear companies, the United 

States has neither a back-end solution –

as seen in its policy of “no reprocessing” 

or a permanent repository solution – nor 

a strong operational component to offer 

to the new entrants.

A third important factor is the distinction 

between sovereign versus market-based 

approaches. Many countries have one 

dominant reactor manufacturer and 

operator. The United States and Japan are 

exceptions to this. The sovereign model 

is beneficial in at least two respects – it 

permits effective advocacy by the head of 

state and it often amounts to a long-term 

commitment and hence offers greater 

geopolitical value. This last point is 

particularly important, since nuclear 

reactor deals are hardly ever purely 

commercial.

Meanwhile, nuclear energy faces mixed 

prospects in the United States. On the one 

hand, there are several positive signs in 

the last couple of years, including 

President Obama’s timely support for 

“safe nuclear” post-Fukushima. 

Additionally, in early summer 2011, the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

concluded there was no imminent risk 

from continued nuclear power plant 

operation and licensing activities and that 

events similar to the Fukushima accident 

were very unlikely in the United States.

The following year, in early 2012, the NRC 

issued a combined construction and 

operation license for two advanced 

pressurized water reactors each in 

Georgia and South Carolina. Also, the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE) announced 

its support for the commercialization of 

small modular reactors by 2022. In 

March 2012, DOE announced two publicprivate partnerships to develop 

deployment plans for small modular 

reactor technologies over the next five to 

ten years. 

On the other hand though, the U.S. nuclear 

industry faces several challenges. The 

problem of spent nuclear fuel

management remains foremost among 

them, as the Yucca Mountain licensing 

battle continues. Additionally, low 

natural gas prices have led to several

premature retirement decisions. For 

example, the firm Excelon recently 

decided to retire the Oyster Creek nuclear 

power plant, even though it was licensed 

to operate until 2019. 

All of this has implications for U.S. 

national security. For instance, some 

argue there is a correlation between the 

competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear 

industry (in terms of manufacturing and 

export) and Washington’s ability to set 

the agenda and lead efforts in the area of 

nuclear nonproliferation. Likewise, there 

may be a correlation between the U.S. 

nuclear industry’s struggle and the future 

of nuclear expertise within the U.S. 

military.
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China’s Burgeoning Demand and its Quest for Resources

Michal Meidan

China’s energy profile is changing rapidly. 

After years of breakneck economic 

growth and ravenous appetite for natural 

resources, the Chinese government 

has committed to putting China on a 

more sustainable development 

path. Beijing has introduced energy 

efficiency goals and policy measures 

aimed at reducing China’s carbon 

footprint by increasing the share of 

non-fossil fuels to 15 percent of the 

Chinese energy mix by 2020 and 

raising the share of gas in the 

country’s energy mix from roughly 

5 percent in 2010 to roughly 12

percent in 2020. 

But even though renewable energy 

and nuclear technology will 

gradually offset demand for coal, 

China’s continued dependence on 

oil and rising demand for gas—that it will 

be incapable of supplying wholly from 

domestic sources—will sustain a high 

dependence on imported resources. With 

China’s domestic oil production 

stagnating, the International Energy 

Agency (IEA) expects its import 

dependence ratio to reach 80 percent in 

2030. 

Beijing has over the past two decades 

made efforts to diversify its 

sources of imported oil, but it 

has only managed to tinker at 

the margins with its heavy 

reliance on the Middle East and 

Africa. China remains 

dependent on six countries for 

over half of its oil supplies: Saudi 

Arabia, Angola, Iran, Russia, 

Oman, and Sudan. And as 

demand for imported oil and gas 

will continue to grow, supply 

security will remain a prominent 

feature of China’s energy 

strategy and its foreign policy 

calculus. Source: Energy Information Administration

Source: Energy Information Administration
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China’s reluctance to rely solely on 

imports has led to heavy investments 

overseas in oil and gas resources, ranging 

from Sudan to Canada, through Iran and 

Iraq. Government 

support for these 

investments has 

benefitted China’s 

commercial actors that 

have sought to become 

globally competitive 

energy producers and 

traders. Yet this has done 

little to enhance the 

country’s supply security: 

Chinese traders behave 

according to market 

dictates for the most part 

and sell the resources 

they produce to the 

highest bidder. 

Aware of the numerous vulnerabilities it 

is exposed to, Beijing is trying to diversify 

not only its supply sources but also its 

supply routes. While the military has 

been promoting the need to secure 

maritime transportation as a means to 

build its naval capacity, Chinese decision 

makers have also sought to build cross 

border pipelines through Myanmar, 

Central Asia, and Russia in a bid to reduce 

oil flows through the Straits of Malacca.

For all its attempts to purchase assets, 

“lock in” resources, reduce reliance on 

maritime transports, and secure sea lanes 

of transportation, no strategy – as Beijing 

and its companies are learning – is 

infallible. The reality remains that much 

of the oil and gas that is vital to China’s 

economic growth will continue to be 

produced in volatile countries, traded on 

international markets, and flow through 

sea lanes that ultimately pass through the 

Straits of Malacca.

The sum of these diversification efforts is 

a growing global footprint. Yet China has 

neither the intention nor the capacity to 

safeguard its interests worldwide. 

Moreover, China is not ready to assume 

the United States’ role as provider of 

public goods such as freedom of 

navigation in international waters, or to 

secure the stability of producer countries. 

Beijing’s preference therefore will remain 

to free-ride on indirect U.S. security 

guarantees. With the limits of this 

preference becoming increasingly 

palpable, China will begin to experiment 

with a model of reluctant and narrowlyfocused participation in third countries. 

This presages an era of rising 

coordination, but also friction, with the 

United States.

Source: Energy Information Administration
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New Trade Routes, New Conflicts?

Michael Klare 

International competition for control over 

vital sources of energy has been a source of 

conflict throughout human history. Conflict 

has arisen from struggles over both the 

major reserves of energy resources and the 

supply routes used to transport energy 

from supplying to consumer countries. 

Protecting such routes has, in fact, been a 

long-standing mission of U.S. military 

forces, especially in the greater Middle East. 

It appears, moreover, that the protection of 

energy supply routes will continue to play

an important role in the strategic planning 

of the major energy-importing nations. 

The strategic importance of international 

energy supply routes derives from the vital 

importance of energy to modern industrial 

economies and the fact that many of the 

world’s major reservoirs of oil (and other 

key sources of energy) are located at some 

remove from the major energy-consuming 

nations and so must be carried to 

consuming nations via an extended, often 

vulnerable network of delivery systems –

oil and gas pipelines, seaborne commerce, 

electrical transmission lines, and so on.

By their very nature, these international 

supply systems are vulnerable to blockage 

or disruption: they are long, relatively 

fragile, and traverse a world with many foci 

of conflict. Much of the world’s traded oil, 

for example, is carried by unarmed tankers 

across the Persian Gulf and through the 

Strait of Hormuz – a narrow oil 

“chokepoint” lined on one side by Iranian 

missile batteries and naval facilities. 

Pipelines, shipping routes, and 

transmission lines are also vulnerable to 

attack from terrorists, insurgents, and 

pirates.

Because of these supply routes’ vital nature 

and vulnerability to attack, their protection 

has long been viewed by importing states 

as a matter of national security. For the 

United States, this perception first arose 

during World War II, when President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt forged an alliance 

with Saudi Arabia aimed at ensuring 

unimpeded access to the Kingdom’s 

massive oil reserves. To ensure the safety 

of the sea routes used to transport Saudi oil 

to the United States and its allies, Roosevelt 

laid the groundwork for a permanent 

American military presence in the Persian 

Gulf area.

Ever since the Roosevelt administration, 

U.S. efforts to ensure the safety of imported 

energy have largely focused on protecting 

the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia to 

international markets. This remains one of 

the principal missions of the U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM), established in 1983 

in accordance with the “Carter Doctrine,” 

which states that the safe flow of Persian 

Gulf oil is a vital U.S. national interest. But 

while the Gulf remains the major focus of 

U.S. efforts to ensure the safe delivery of oil, 

American leaders have also extended such 

operations to other areas, including the 

Caspian Sea region and West Africa. 

Many of the initiatives undertaken by 

American leaders since 1945 to ensure the 

safety of energy supply lines remain in 

effect today. But the global energy security 

equation is now experiencing dramatic 

change. Among the most significant 

changes are:

(1) A shift in the center of gravity of 

world oil consumption from the older 

industrialized nations of the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD) to the developing 

nations of Asia, especially China and India. 

(2) A shift in import dependence 

from existing reserves of oil and gas to 

newly-developed deposits in “frontier” 

regions, such as Siberia, Central Asia, the 

Arctic, and deep-offshore areas. 

(3) A shift in the geological sources 

of fossil energy from readily accessible 

“conventional” supplies to less accessible 

“unconventional” fuels, such as Canadian 

tar sands, Venezuelan extra-heavy crude, 

and hydrocarbons derived from shale 

formations. 

There is no question that these shifts will 

result in alterations to the world’s energy 

supply systems. The question thus arises: 

To what extent (if any) will these changes 

generate new sources of conflict that may 

subsequently involve the application of U.S. 

military power? It is too early to provide a 

definitive answer to this question, but it is 

possible to identify several problematic 

developments:

(1) China, India, and Japan are 

placing increased reliance on military 

means to ensure the safety of their 

seaborne energy trade in the Indian and 

Pacific Oceans. China, for example, is 

expanding its deep-sea naval capabilities 

and acquiring experience in distant sea 

operations. India is also expanding its 

naval capabilities, and has adopted a new 

naval strategy focused on the protection of 

maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean. 

Japan – worried about China’s naval 

buildup – is enhancing its own military 

capabilities. These, and other such 

endeavors, are generating fresh tensions 

among these countries (and their 

neighbors), leading to an increased risk of 

confrontation and crisis in the Asia-Pacific 

region.

(2) Russia, with the largest known 

oil and gas reserves in the Arctic region, is 

enhancing its capacity to defend its Arctic 

energy reserves and associated trade 

routes. This includes the formation of a 

new Arctic combat group and the 

establishment of additional bases along 

Russia’s northern rim. Canada and Norway 

– worried by the Russian military buildup –

are taking comparable steps. Canada, for 

example, has announced plans to build a 

new fleet of ice-hardened patrol ships, 

while Norway has moved its combined 

military headquarters to Bodo, above the 

Arctic Circle.

(3) China, concerned about the 

safety of the pipelines it is building to 

transport oil and gas from Kazakhstan and 

Turkmenistan, is enhancing its ability to 

conduct military operations in Central Asia 

(largely under the auspices of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization). Russia, equally 

concerned over the safety of oil and gas 

pipelines in Central Asia (many of which 

are connected to the Russian oil and gas 

pipeline network), is also bolstering its 

military capabilities in the area. 

Given these developments, it is safe to 

conclude that the establishment of new 

energy supply routes is generating new 

threats to international peace and stability. 

Whether or not these tensions will escalate 

into something more serious cannot be 

foreseen, but they are certainly 

contributing to an expansion of military 

capabilities in areas of potential friction and 

conflict.

For the U.S. military, this implies a possible 

reallocation of forces to ensure the safety of 

the new supply routes and/or greater 

cooperation with other states to achieve 

this objective. It also suggests a need for 

greater international cooperation to reduce 

the risk of unintended escalation of local 

crises and disputes. Finally, it raises the 

question of whether increased reliance on 

renewable sources of energy would serve 

U.S. interests by reducing American

reliance on imported supplies of energy.
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Prospects for Energy Efficiency

Pramod Khargonekar

Driven by global population increase 

(from 7 billion to 9 billion in 2050), 

economic growth and societal needs in 

the developing nations, and continued 

needs of the industrialized countries, 

demand for energy is expected to grow 

significantly in the coming decades. 

While estimates vary and are inherently 

uncertain, the International Energy 

Agency (IEA) estimates that by 2035, 

primary energy demand will grow 

roughly 30-35 percent with most of the 

growth coming from the developing 

countries. As we confront the 

challenges in meeting this increased 

demand, energy efficiency holds 

enormous potential. 

Just in the United States, data from the

Energy Information Administration 

(EIA) suggest that less than 37 percent

of primary energy goes toward useful 

energy services. Many studies have 

been conducted on estimating the gains 

from energy efficiency based on 

technological and economic feasibility. 

The 2009 report on energy efficiency 

from the National Academies 

(specifically, the National Academy of 

Sciences, the National Academy of 

Engineering, and the National Research 

Council) entitled “America’s Energy 

Future,” estimates the potential for 

cost-effective annual energy savings in 

the United States by 2030 to be 

between 30 (conservative) and 35

percent (optimistic). The largest

contribution (more than half) to these 

savings comes from residential and 

commercial buildings. Transportation 

sectors and industry sectors account for 

much of the rest. 

The potential for energy savings can only 

increase with advancements of new 

technologies for building heating and 

cooling, lighting, windows, 

gasoline/diesel engines, hybrid and 

electric vehicles, refining, and production 

of metals (aluminum, steel), cement, 

chemicals, and paper. Beyond these, 

cross-cutting technologies such as 

combined heat and power (CHP), high 

temperature and separations processes, 

materials (nanocoatings, nanoceramics, 

refractory materials, insulation), sensors 

and process controls, electric motors and 

drives also offer great promise for energy 

efficiency gains. 
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Experience over the last three decades 

shows that policy tools are critically 

important for successful adoption of 

energy efficiency technologies and 

solutions. ENERGY STAR labeling, 

appliance efficiency standards, building 

codes, Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

(CAFE) vehicle efficiency standards, 

utility and end-use efficiency programs, 

CHP initiatives, and so forth are excellent 

examples of successful policies and 

programs. 

A report from the California Energy 

Commission in 2007 suggests that energy 

efficiency contributed the equivalent of 

15 percent of annual electricity usage in 

California in 2003, providing compelling 

proof for well-designed policy measures. 

Globally, the IEA estimates that more than 

two-thirds of potential gains from energy 

efficiency remain unrealized.

Despite the compelling case for energy 

efficiency, investments in energy 

efficiency are much lower than what can 

be easily justified on the basis of 

economic gains. This is the so-called 

“energy efficiency paradox.” There are 

three types of impediments or barriers to 

implementation of energy efficiency:

1. Structural

2. Behavioral

3. Availability

Examples include regulatory 

barriers, upfront capital 

investments, split or misaligned 

incentives, fragmented or 

diffused opportunities, 

ownership transfer before 

capturing full benefits, adverse 

bundling, and a lack of 

awareness and education. 

Policy and programs can and 

should be designed to address 

these barriers. 

Expected growth in global 

energy demand will add further 

pressure on energy security. 

From this point of view, energy 

efficiency can be a major tool for energy 

security as it clearly reduces dependence 

on unreliable sources of energy, which in 

turn is likely to have a significant impact 

on U.S. national security. The abovementioned 30-35 percent reduction in 

energy consumption in the United States

can easily offset the increase in energy 

consumption due to population increase 

and economic growth. But strong, welldesigned, and consistent policy and 

programs will be necessary to realize this 

potential.

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

1980198419881992199620002004200820122016202020242028203220362040

Average fuel economy (MPG) 

of new light-duty vehicles

Source: Energy Information Administration. All data after 2011 are 

estimates.
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The Changing Calculus of India’s Energy Security

Tom Cutler

India’s growing demand for energy and 

its quest for energy security impacts U.S. 

national interests in a variety of ways. 

Energy considerations were at the center 

of the transformation of the Indo-U.S. 

strategic relationship in 2005 with the 

announcement of the civil nuclear deal. 

Since then, cooperation in clean energy 

has been a driving force in taking the 

Indo-U.S. energy relationship to a new 

level. Looking ahead, it appears that 

Indian concerns about its energy security, 

including its desire to import U.S. 

liquefied natural gas (LNG), will come to 

the forefront as its growing import 

dependence and America’s growing 

energy self-sufficiency change the 

calculus of India’s energy security. This 

changing calculus of India’s energy 

security will have important implications 

for U.S. military planners. 

Although slowing, India’s annual 

economic growth rate of around 8

percent in recent years has fueled 

dramatic increases in its demand for 

energy. Even though its per capita energy 

consumption is about only one-third of 

Source: Energy Information Administration
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the global average, India is now the 

world’s fourth largest energy consumer. 

India’s demand for energy is expected to 

double over the next 20 years supplied by 

growing consumption of high-ash coalfired power and increased imports of oil, 

natural gas, coal, and uranium. India’s 

import dependence from 2010 to 2035 is 

projected for each of the primary fossil 

fuels as follows: coal’s dependence 

doubles from 16 percent to 33 percent, oil 

jumps from 76 to 92 percent, and gas, 

mostly LNG, grows from 20 to 36 percent. 

Given the sheer scale of India’s energy 

needs – it will become the world’s most 

populous nation sometime in the 2020s –

it is inevitable that its growing import 

vulnerability (which is the crux of India’s 

energy security challenge) will have 

regional and global impacts of military 

significance.

India’s export oriented refinery sector 

could be a supplier of fuel to U.S. forces 

deployed in the region. At the same time, 

India will look to the United States as a 

strategic source of imported LNG and, to a 

lesser extent, coal. Meanwhile, India’s 

energy footprint dominates South Asia, 

where the considerable potential for 

intra-regional trade in natural gas, hydropower, and electricity remains unrealized. 

The precarious state of Pakistan’s energy 

sector represents an unpredictable threat 

to Indian and U.S. interests, especially if 

that nation destabilizes under the weight 

of its energy woes. South Asia has a 

looming energy crisis and long term 

energy security will not be achieved 

without intra-regional cooperation.

Looking outward from South Asia one 

cannot ignore India’s geographic location 

astride the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean 

where 70 percent of the world’s oil trade, 

60 percent of LNG, and 70 percent of coal 

trade is transported, and where some 

predict the United States, India, and China 

will inevitably compete for blue water 

dominance. Indeed, the most important 

military implication of India’s growing 

energy needs is its increased reliance 

upon sea borne trade in energy and 

uncertainties regarding the future U.S.

role as a guarantor of safe passage. 

It is in the U.S. interest for India to be 

energy secure. But India faces many 

difficult challenges and its leadership will 

be under increasing pressure to satisfy its 

growing energy needs. Many of the 

solutions to India’s energy challenges 

require significant domestic political will. 

Controversial issues such as the adoption 

of true market pricing and privatization of

key energy para-statals are all subject to 

the vagaries of India’s vibrant democratic 

process. But as imports rise India can no 

longer insulate itself from world energy 

markets and it will need to develop 

strategic alignments and expand its 

universe of international cooperation to 

enhance its energy security. This includes 

cooperation with the United States and 

the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 

regard to the development and use of 

strategic oil stockpiles and cooperation 

among major consuming nations in the 

event of an oil supply crisis. 

As an emerging energy supplier and as a 

key ally of India with a number of proven 

bilateral mechanisms for energy 

cooperation already in place, the United 

States is well positioned to forge even 

closer civil and military ties to enhance 

mutual energy security.
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Energy Demand and the Developing World

Deborah Gordon

The 2000s generally found energy 

demand leveling off in developed 

countries and taking off in the developing 

world. Between 1970 and 2010, global 

energy demand doubled and began to 

shift from the developed to developing 

regions. The aggregate share of energy 

consumption in the countries that 

comprise the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD)

shrank significantly from 60 percent to 41 

percent, off a much larger base. The 

regions that grew their energy 

consumption most over the past 40 years 

include the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

Future growth trends are expected to 

continue in this direction, with energy 

demand expanding faster in the 

developing world. As the citizens in the 

developing world become more affluent, 

modernization and mobility will increase. 

These trends, in turn, will increase energy 

consumption more rapidly in developing 

nations.

According to the International Energy 

Agency, between 2011 and 2035, world 

primary energy demand is projected to 

increase worldwide at an average annual 

rate of 1.3 percent. The OECD regions are 

expected to grow more slowly than the 

non-OECD. While the OECD currently 

consumes more energy than any other 

region, starting in 2025, it is anticipated 

that Asia in its entirety (including China) 

will demand more energy than the OECD 

nations combined. The share of energy 

consumed in the OECD is projected to 

contract from 40 percent to 32 percent 

through 2035, continuing a downward 

trend that began in the latter part of the 

20th century. China, India, Brazil, 

Indonesia, the Middle East, and Africa are 

among the developing nations that are 

expected to experience the most rapid 

growth in energy demand in the years 

ahead. 

Disaggregating demand by energy 

sources indicates significant changes 

ahead. Looking out to 2035, non-OECD 

nations will dominate energy 

consumption across the board—except 

for nuclear power. Electricity generation, 

powered by renewables and natural gas, 

is projected to increase in the OECD and 

take off in all developing regions. China 

will consume more electricity and coal 

than the entire OECD. Oil, gas, and coal 

consumption are projected to be 

comparable. More gas will flow to the 

developing world than the OECD. The 

developing world will become more 

dependent on oil and gas. As they 

continue to motorize, oil consumption is 

projected to expand across the board in 

all developing regions. Nuclear energy is 

projected to play a relatively small role 

meeting energy outside the OECD. All of 

these changes will play out against the 

backdrop of increasingly dynamic energy 

markets.

These factors all have implications for U.S. 

and developing country security. Overall, 

the developing world is projected to 

become less energy self-sufficient in the 

decades to come. The developing 

countries are planning to invest an 

estimated $23 trillion (2011 dollars) on 

energy infrastructure through 2035, 

nearly twice as much as OECD nations. 

Oil investments are projected to be 
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distributed across all developing 

countries, while gas, coal, and power 

investments will be centered largely in 

Asia’s developing nations. These 

infrastructure investments will likely lock 

in energy consumption patterns through 

the middle-to-end of the century. 

Selecting energy investments wisely will 

be critical, but it will also be difficult. 

Setting electricity aside, many developing 

nations have a long history of massive 

fossil fuel consumption subsidies. In 

2011, these subsidies approached $0.5 

trillion—the majority in the Middle East, 

North Africa, and Asia. 

Taken together, oil and gas will continue 

to dominate energy demand into the 

future. Transportation costs are a 

relatively minor part of the energy supply 

chain making fossil fuels easy to move 

around the globe. A wider array of 

nations will consume oil and gas 

resources while a select few will demand 

coal and nuclear power. As such, oil and 

gas trade will continue to grow—

bolstered by the unconventional 

resources that are being tapped—and 

more suppliers will be vying for market 

share. While increased competition in oil 

and gas markets could ultimately be 

beneficial, growing global energy 

interdependence brings the risk of shortterm supply interruptions. Moreover, 

organizing more market actors could lead 

to oil and gas price volatility, with 

associated energy and economic security 

impacts. 

Geographic choke points for oil and gas 

will not disappear in the future. If 

anything, they could become even more 

concerning. Oil will move as crude and 

petroleum products and natural gas is 

moved by pipeline over land and 

increasingly liquefied moved by maritime 

shipping from continent to continent. By 

2035, for example, a significantly 

increased amount of oil and gas could be 

moving through the Straits of Malacca and 

Hormuz. 

Strategies that focus on reducing energy 

demand will not be adequate to ensure 

security in the future. In a world of 

growing fossil fuel supply availability, 

which is increasingly mobile through free 

trade agreements, reducing domestic 

energy demand will only facilitate energy 

movement. Lower energy transaction 

levels are manageable and can increase 

global security. At higher levels propelled 

by energy deficits in several developing 

nations, however, there are mounting 

risks of disruption due to economic, 

political, infrastructure, and 

environmental sources.

Energy demand in the 2010s and beyond

will have significant impacts on the U.S. 

military. As energy trade continues to 

globalize, it will take more resources to 

maintain energy and economic stability 

throughout the world. Leadership will 

remain critical. At the same time, 

America will need to play an increasingly 

discerning, collaborative, and nuanced 

role in its dynamic and interdependent 

energy future.
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Hacks on Gas: Energy, Cybersecurity, and Defense

Christopher Bronk

Cybersecurity has grown to be a preeminent 

concern for the national security organs of 

the United States government. Within certain 

circles, one need only say “cyber” to indicate 

the topic of cybersecurity. It is an area that 

has become of great interest, but in 

cybersecurity there is also tremendous 

ambiguity. How great is the threat to the 

United States, its overseas interests, the U.S.

economy, and its armed forces? 

Cybersecurity practitioners and experts have 

some idea, but there is a degree of hyperbole 

surrounding the issue and some heads in the 

sand as well.

How cybersecurity issues fit into energy 

security is a more manageable subject of 

inquiry, but it is important to consider what is 

meant by energy security. Writ large, energy 

security for the United States is the capacity 

for U.S. consumers, be they individuals, 

organizations, corporations, or government 

agencies, to gain access to the energy supplies 

they need or want. Foreign embargos, 

tropical cyclonic activity, midstream plant 

disasters, and military action are all potential 

threats to energy security for the United 

States. Energy production in the United 

States is changing, however.

We cannot consider threats to energy 

security without accepting the rise of oil and 

gas production in the United States over the 

last decade. Computer-aided, horizontally 

drilled, hydraulically fractured oil and gas 

drilling has produced a dramatic rise in 

domestic production, now totaling some 7 

million barrels of oil per day and 2.1 million 

cubic feet of natural gas per month. U.S.

production gains provide a degree of security 

from disruptions in international supply, but 

it is necessary to acknowledge that oil is 

traded on a global market, and regional gas 

markets may increasingly become interlinked 

over time. Thus a disruption in the Persian 

Gulf, East Asia, or Africa does not insulate 

prices paid for oil or even gas in the United 

States.

In addition to the supply of energy, which 

also includes other fuels such as coal and 

nuclear, each with their own environmental 

and sustainability issues, there are the 

matters of processing and distribution. This 

composes the remainder of the energy supply 

chain, which among other items includes: gas, 

coal, and nuclear power stations; electricity 

grids; oil and gas refineries; and pipelines. 

The United States should be concerned with 

cybersecurity in energy because as with other 

areas of the global economy, computing has 

been widely adopted in the energy sector. 

For example, supercomputing is a key 

component to seismic analysis; refineries are 

increasingly driven by Supervisory Control 

and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems; and 

the U.S. electrical grid has incorporated 

“smart” elements, including digital sensors, 

meters, and monitoring systems. The 

ubiquitous Internet Protocol interconnects 

many of these computers.

If there were no networked computers in the 

energy sector, discussion of cybersecurity 

issues would be moot. But for decades, 

computation has been deeply incorporated 

into energy exploration, production, 

distribution, and consumption, as well as the 

corporate and managerial activities 

supporting those activities. Thus, there are 

cybersecurity issues for energy. While many 

scenarios posit a massive hack of the 

electricity system and its catastrophic failure, 

there are plenty of other more likely and less 

spectacular energy cybersecurity issues. 

In particular, there are three major cyber 

concerns in the oil and gas sector:

 Theft of core intellectual property;

 Disruption or destruction of physical 

plant and other points of capital 

investment; and,
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 Compromise of communication by 

executive decision makers regarding 

key business decisions.

Recent cybersecurity events indicate that 

these scenarios are very much within the 

realm of possibility. The Stuxnet worm (a 

piece of self-propagating malicious software) 

was ostensibly aimed at an energy target, the 

Iranian nuclear enrichment infrastructure. 

Another worm, Shamoon, spread rapidly 

across the personal computers of Saudi 

Aramco at incredible speed, deleting the 

contents of perhaps as many as 30,000 hard 

drives and also impacting systems at other 

companies.

What such cyber-attacks mean to U.S. energy 

security and the security of energy needed by 

the Department of Defense (DoD) requires 

significant thought. At a global level, the 

United States needd to consider how likely an 

oil or gas disaster produced or facilitated by 

cyber means actually is and what can be done 

to mitigate that threat. For DoD, important 

questions need to be raised about the security 

of computer systems employed in the 

distribution of electricity and fuels from 

major bases to forward deployed elements in 

contact with hostile forces. Of particular 

interest here is the reliance of the services on 

energy management undertaken via the 

DoD’s Non-classified Internet Protocol Router 

Network (NIPRNet), which includes 

connectivity to the public Internet.

In coping with cyber security issues as they 

pertain to energy security matters, there are 

several points of consideration:

1. Recognize that cyber incidents like 

safety or disruption events are not 

just organizational issues but ones of 

potential concern across an extensive, 

interconnected energy supply chain. 

2. Develop trusted third party and 

clearinghouse relationships aimed at 

developing better cyber intelligence 

and analysis. 

3. Produce and constantly refine models 

of cyber risk intelligence merging 

valuation of assets/processes, threats, 

and reasons for potential 

compromise.

4. Consider the cybersecurity 

ramifications as the ‘Internet of 

things’ expands to cover more and 

more infrastructure, including 

hundreds of millions of energyrelated computing devices.

5. Connect the spheres of geopolitics 

and the technical aspects of 

cybersecurity to develop holistic 

models for coping with the 

cybersecurity problem.

These recommendations represent an initial 

thrust of activity, but instituting them will 

require difficult shifts in behavior for 

government and industry. Additionally, it is 

worth considering how cyber incidents can 

play out very quickly. For instance, the 

compromise of the Associated Press’s Twitter 

feed by the Syrian Electronic Army and its 

transmission of a bogus tweet regarding an 

attack on the White House led to trading 

algorithms employed by participants in the 

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) issuing a 

high volume of sell orders. In less than two 

minutes, the value of the NYSE fell by roughly 

$136 billion. The index recovered quickly but 

there were both winners and losers on the 

deal. Although the energy industry may not 

hold a similar sort of vulnerability, we must 

assume that foreign adversaries including 

states and transnational actors will target it. 

Necessary then is deep analysis not only on 

vulnerability, but also on the resiliency of the 

energy supply chain to cyber-attack.
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Operational Energy as a Stepping Stone Toward National Resilience

Paul E. Roege

Army Operational Energy (OE) concepts 

are leading the way toward more 

informed use of energy within the 

military and beyond. Historically, most 

energy management discussions, military 

or civilian, hone in on the single attribute 

of quantity. The natural consequence is 

an inevitable focus on consumption and 

ultimately, performance objectives 

seeking reduction. In truth, this 

commodity view of energy is problematic 

because energy benefits can be quite 

difficult to relate directly to quantity 

consumed. For many, the morning and 

evening commutes are the most energyintensive activities of the day, yet they 

produce no direct value. Occupational 

energy consumption, at least in an office 

environment, may be characteristically 

lower and even then, productivity may 

vary significantly in response to relatively 

small changes in energy consumption 

manifested in lighting levels or room 

temperature. Military operations 

represent an even greater energy analysis 

challenge, recognizing for example that 

transportation and life support often 

require greater total energy consumption 

than ground maneuver itself, especially in 

a dismounted mode.

Energy no longer can be treated simply as 

a commodity to be minimized. Like 

information, energy is a multi-attribute 

entity whose net contribution to 

capabilities and performance depends 

upon how it is managed. Operational 

Energy concepts and analyses have 

produced a useful model to improve 

effectiveness in military operations. 

Specifically, the principle of “energyinformed operations” calls for Soldiers 

and Army leaders at all levels to manage 

energy use to achieve the greatest net 

operational benefit in a given situation. 

This requires an understanding of how 

various attributes such as efficiency, 

energy density and storage capacity 

factor into mission capabilities and 

vulnerability. Translated to decisions and 

behaviors, dismounted Soldiers may 

selectively operate electronic devices; 

drivers may adjust vehicle speed; or 

commanders may specify fuel stockpile 

levels to balance endurance, timing, and 

risk exposure. Implementing this energyinformed concept requires substantial 

individual and organizational 

understanding of energy principles, 

effective techniques, and management 

tools. This new concept has led each of 

the military services to undertake culture 

initiatives with heavy emphasis on 

education and training, but balanced with 

investments in enabling technologies. 

Although focus to date has been on 

deployed operations, the energyinformed approach to OE applies equally 

to global operations at all levels – tactical 

to strategic. This suggests the need to 

engage operational communities that 

have not been central to OE efforts, such 

as space, network, and intelligence 

operations. This expanding perspective 

will bring additional challenges. First, 

many of these operations involve more 

complex technologies and systems, 

therefore complicating the challenge of 

sorting out energy implications and 

decisions. As with most changes, 

organizational aspects promise to be the 

greater challenge. To date, OE principles 

have been implemented within deployed 
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operations, which had been exempted 

from legacy energy management 

programs. Bringing energy-informed 

principles to missions conducted from 

enduring infrastructure will require 

reconciliation of the 

multi-attribute 

energy capability and 

performance model 

with existing 

consumption-based 

installation 

management 

processes.

Ultimately, OE offers 

a prospective 

platform from which 

to launch a broader 

resilience thrust 

within military 

communities and 

beyond. Resilience as 

a concept offers not 

only a means to relate 

energy to outcomes; 

it also represents a useful model to 

address uncertainty and change in a 

dynamic, globalized world. Adoption of 

resilience principles will require a 

difficult mental transition from 

traditional methodologies that seek to 

quantify and definitively disposition risk, 

yielding to more fundamental systems 

analyses and collaborative processes that 

posture the overall system to perform 

well under a broad range of conditions. 

This adjustment inevitably will be 

uncomfortable for some, but most will 

quickly recognize that military operations 

already are not self-reliant; that nearly 

every essential service depends upon 

non-military partners. Teaming on 

energy resilience is simply a next logical 

step, building upon such existing 

community partnerships as those in 

health care and law enforcement. Energy 

is a key element in U.S. economic success, 

social order, and national security. 

Operational Energy and its natural 

outgrowth of resilience offer important 

pathways to align each of these concerns 

through mutually-supporting objectives.

Source: Claire Heininger, U.S. Army
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Terrorist Energy Sector Targeting: U.S. Military Implications

Robert J. Bunker

The very nature of terrorist energy sector 

targeting is problematic because of 

limited definitions of terrorism that focus 

on the political intent (input) that are 

behind the metrics of counting a specific 

attack as a terrorism incident. Based on 

these criteria, the number of global 

terrorist energy sector targeting incidents

is fairly moderate; less than 500 over the 

last 30 years, based on estimated Global 

Terrorism Database (GTD) incidents. 

However, given the increasing blurring of 

armed non-state groups—with organized 

crime, terrorist, insurgent, and other 

attributes—and the fact that organized 

crime and insurgent attacks on this sector 

are largely ignored in the metrics, far 

more energy sector incidents that result 

in ‘terrorist like’ outcomes (outputs)—

like blown pipelines and armed 

assaults—exist. As a result, over 500

insurgent attacks on the energy sector in 

Iraq alone during the allied occupation—

which prominently saw U.S. Army 

involvement—took place between 2005

and 2007, but these were never counted 

in terrorism databases. In fact, according 

to the Energy Infrastructure Attack 

Database (EIAD), since 1980 about 8,000 

incidents have taken place globally, 

making such ‘terrorist’ incidents 

relatively common – and 16-times GTD 

entries. 

Recommended courses of action for the 

U.S. Army span the three levels of 

‘terrorism’ energy sector effects. None of 

these courses of action require Army 

structural or organizational changes. At 

the kinetic level, the current Army 

orientation has strong 

antiterrorism (AT) and force 

protection (FP) protocols 

developed over a decade of 

operations in the Iraqi and Afghani 

theaters. As a result, no new 

courses of action are required for 

mitigating this level of terrorist 

activity. 

Source: Tech. Sgt. Mark Olsen

Source: Oak Ridge National Laboratory
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At the level of disruptive outcomes to 

energy production and distribution—

derived from attacks on the energy 

infrastructure as a system (for example,

aimed at key nodal points), limited 

recommendations exist due to the present 

level of Army critical infrastructure 

protection (CIP) awareness outside the 

continental United States. These 

recommendations focus on the need for 

additional training centered on analytical 

and physical red teaming to help mitigate 

key nodal/systems-focused attacks along 

with the potential for limited troop 

deployment surges to protect critical 

infrastructure under imminent threat. 

At the actual generation of terror 

(political nature of the act) level of effects, 

the recommended course of action is for 

additional training being provided for 

public and press information officers. 

The intent is to further strengthen the U.S.

strategic narrative in order to limit the 

generation of terror and its disruptive 

bond-relationship targeting effects 

directed at allied coalitions, host 

governments, and U.S. and allied citizens. 

While overseas terrorist energy sector 

targeting is in many aspects a ‘non-issue’ 

for the U.S. Army, since it is presently well 

organized, structured, and trained to 

respond to this form of threat, additional 

research and study directed at the 

interrelationship of physical with cyberbased terrorism is warranted. Terrorists 

may very well benefit from the synergistic 

and dual-dimensional nature of physical 

and cyber terrorism, a threat in its own 

right, applied together at the second level 

of concern – that is, one which results in 

physically disruptive outcomes to energy 

production and distribution.

Source: Department of Homeland Security
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An Intergovernmental Approach to Energy Security: The Role of NATO

John R. Deni

As early as 2006, and arguably since the 

1999 strategic concept, the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) has recognized 

that it may have a role to play in energy 

security. At the 2006 NATO Riga summit, 

which occurred not long after the first 

Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, NATO declared 

its support for a coordinated, international 

effort to assess risks to energy 

infrastructures and to promote energy 

infrastructure security. In April 2008, 

during the alliance summit in Bucharest, 

NATO leaders declared their intent to take 

on energy security in a variety of ways, 

including by engaging in energy securityrelated information and intelligence fusion 

and sharing, by supporting consequence 

management, and by supporting the 

protection of critical energy infrastructure.

In 2010, NATO built on the 2008 

declaration with a firmer commitment and 

a formal inclusion of energy security into its 

strategy, or Strategic Concept. In that 

document, NATO declared that 

communication, transport, and transit 

routes on which energy security depends 

require greater international efforts to 

ensure their resilience against attack or 

disruption. The alliance then resolved to 

develop the capacity to contribute to 

energy security, including through 

protection of critical energy infrastructure 

and transit areas and lines, cooperation 

with partners, and consultations among 

Allies.

However, the alliance has struggled to 

move beyond the conceptual when it comes 

to what might be thought of as the 

traditional energy security sphere. The 

primary reason for why the alliance has 

failed to make progress in this traditional 

energy security realm is because there 

remain fundamental divisions among 

member states in terms of attitudes toward 

energy security. Those that want energy 

security on the alliance agenda include 

most of the newer alliance members in 

Eastern and Central Europe, countries with 

vivid memories of life under Soviet 

domination. They are adamantly proenergy in NATO, and they proved 

particularly adept at getting energy security 

onto the agenda at the 2006 Riga summit. 

Unfortunately, their efforts have yet to 

result in a long-term, coherent, practical 

roadmap for what NATO and its member

states should do specifically in this issue 

area.

At the other extreme are several members –

including some older alliance members in 

Western Europe – that remain hostile 

toward alliance involvement in this issue 

area. Some in this camp argue that critical 

energy infrastructure protection is a 

national responsibility, not a NATO 

problem; others believe NATO’s 

engagement in energy security 

unnecessarily militarizes a non-military 

sphere; and still others believe NATO 

involvement in this issue area 

unnecessarily antagonizes Russia. 

Despite these disagreements over NATO’s 

involvement in broad energy security 

issues, the alliance is nevertheless making 

some limited progress in terms of 

operational energy security. For example, 

the alliance developed a Smart Energy 

Team (SENT), which consists of 

representatives from six NATO allies, 

including the United States, and two

partner nations. This effort, funded by the 

NATO Science program, is essentially a best 
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practices experts group whose objective is 

to look at promising technologies and to 

formulate standardization agreements. 

Additionally, NATO established an Energy 

Center of Excellence in Vilnius, Lithuania. 

This organization is currently engaged in 

commissioning several studies on 

operational energy issues, developing an 

operational energy concept in conjunction 

with ACT, and developing training 

programs on operational energy security. 

These two efforts are really the only 

success stories so far in terms of whether 

an intergovernmental approach to energy 

security – as promulgated by and through 

NATO – might prove successful, and, from a 

purely parochial viewpoint, beneficial for 

the U.S. military. The reason for this is 

largely because they both fit more squarely 

within NATO’s traditional focus – that is, on 

the operational efficiency and effectiveness 

of alliance member state military forces.

Whether and how Washington can 

effectively leverage NATO to promote 

operational energy security and ultimately 

its own interests is the subject of ongoing 

discussion. Certainly, it makes great sense 

for the U.S. Department of Defense to 

pursue increased collaboration through 

NATO on operational energy security for 

several reasons. First, as seen in several 

U.S. national security strategies over the 

last decade, the United States prefers to 

fight in coalitions. If that continues to be 

the case, then America will need partners 

both willing and able to deploy and fight 

with it. Helping those partners to reduce 

their operational costs while increasing 

their operational capacity and combat 

capability through greater energy efficiency 

makes it easier for them to participate in 

coalitions.

Second, although the United States does 

more than other allies in terms of 

operational energy security research, 

development, testing, and procurement, 

there are indeed prospects for the U.S. 

military to learn from its allies. British 

development of intelligent power storage 

and management systems, Dutch 

development of photovoltaic solar panels 

and LED lamps, and German work on 

hydrogen fuel cell technology all represent 

potential areas where the United States 

could stand to learn more about what the 

allies are developing and producing.

Third, working with and through NATO 

provides the United States with an echo 

chamber of sorts – a means of propagating 

and amplifying best practices and 

promising technologies. This will become 

increasingly important in the years ahead, 

as the alliance will struggle to maintain

operational and tactical interoperability in 

the absence of operations in Afghanistan. 

In terms of how the United States works 

with and through NATO, there are two 

recommendations in particular. First, 

Washington should focus its operational 

energy security cooperation within NATO 

on those allies with larger militaries and 

larger deployable forces. The allies most 

interested in contributing to operational 

energy security efforts are those for which 

the costs of fuel are a significant deterrent 

to deploying their forces. 

Second, the United States should place 

increased effort on conducting

demonstration events and exercises with 

NATO allies that include operational energy 

scenarios, or ‘injects’, in the language of the 

military trainer. In sum, an 

intergovernmental approach to energy 

security can benefit the U.S. military both 

now and when Washington needs coalition 

partners, provided DoD focuses its efforts, 

remains cognizant of domestic politics, and 

limits what it seeks to accomplish through 

NATO.
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Operational Energy in Weapon System Life Cycle

Kevin T. Geiss

The utilization of energy in operational 

environments is driven by three primary 

considerations: number and type of employed 

military capabilities and the manner of their 

operational employment. Weapon system 

employment decisions comprise the 

preponderance of operational energy 

consumption during the prosecution of 

military campaigns. Future development 

decisions for Air Force platforms 

continuously occur, with operational 

requirements being driven by increased 

threat, advances in research and 

development, shifting geopolitical priorities, 

or existing system limitations providing the 

impetus to initiate new capability 

development. The weapon system 

development cycle can be parsed into four 

phases, depicted below. In order to 

successfully integrate energy considerations 

into the weapon system life cycle, different 

actions must be taken 

in each phase. 

The U.S. Air Force is 

committed to 

providing maximum 

warfighting capability 

in Air, Space, and 

Cyberspace. Energy, a 

key operational 

enabler, is often 

viewed as a logistical 

concern when 

delivering military 

capability. However, in 

order to optimize the 

effectiveness and 

sustainability of 

warfighting capability, energy must be 

considered throughout a weapon system’s 

lifecycle. The existing process for weapon 

system development provides a robust 

framework readily capable of integrating 

energy considerations. 

In the Discover Phase, strategic policy and 

directives from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and identified threats from 

Combatant Commands (CCMDs) determine 

the need for future concepts of operations

(CONOPs) and capabilities. Once developed, 

these requirements are sent to an Air Force 

Major Command (MAJCOM) to begin analysis 

and to determine how to provide the 

necessary capabilities. If existing systems are 

suitable, needs are identified and validated 

through a robust modeling and simulation 

activity. This phase represents the 

opportunity for the greatest impact in 

ultimate operational energy requirements. At 

this point, it is vital to address how a new 

capability would interact with the intended 

system of systems employed throughout the 

proposed CONOPs. An assessment should 

consider the impacts of platform 

contributions on operational energy 

requirements and the 

necessary logistical support

requirements. Focusing on 

underlying CONOPs allows 

for capabilities to be 

scrutinized prior to need 

identification. 

The Identify Phase further 

refines the modeling and 

simulation (M&S) analysis 

activity to better identify the 

necessary capabilities, 

culminating in the 

development of a capability 

gap. Once codified, the 

capability gap is refined, with 

parameters being developed 

for the future Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 

activity. During AoA, a lead MAJCOM 

examines the plausible strategies to fulfill the 

capability gap identified. Next, courses of 

action are recommended for implementation, 

with varying levels of capability and 

associated funding levels. Energy 

Source: U.S. Air Force
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considerations are driven by the identified 

needs and previous CONOPs. Doctrinal 

reviews may identify much more efficient 

methods of addressing capability gaps and 

establish new pathways to examine during 

the alternatives analysis. 

The Acquire Phase begins with the selection 

of a particular course of action, and then 

formal acquisition commences. Acquisition 

begins with the definition of Key Performance 

Parameters (KPPs) and Key System 

Attributes (KSAs). The development of the 

Energy KPP (eKPP) represents the first 

insertion of energy considerations into the 

current Weapon System acquisition process. 

The eKPP includes platform and system of 

system level considerations; both aspects 

require different analyses in order to 

effectively comply with broader Defense 

Department guidance. Currently, the eKPP is 

only required for major defense acquisition

programs; however, all acquisition programs 

should address energy usage. At this stage, 

the system’s operational capabilities dictate 

baseline energy consumption. Without 

dramatic changes to underlying CONOPs, 

energy reductions will require significant 

additional resources. Therefore, energy 

considerations are included in the 

‘tradespace’ of operational capabilities. As 

cost, schedule, and performance concerns are 

identified, Program Managers make 

resourcing decisions to ensure capabilities 

are produced.

In the Operate, Sustain, and Dispose Phase, 

the developed system is procured. The new 

capabilities are used to update operational 

strategies and plans, focusing on future

threats and the CCMD’s ability to mitigate 

them. Decisions such as strategic basing, 

resource prepositioning, and Air Tasking 

Order construction determine the utilization 

of operational energy. Continual reevaluation 

of existing capabilities and threats determine 

future needs and provide grounds for weapon 

system improvements. During this phase, 

reduction in energy consumption is derived 

from improved employment strategies for 

weapon systems. In addition, CONOPs for 

current operations drive the identification 

process for new capabilities. Understanding 

existing capabilities is essential to producing 

a more energy aware Air Force.

Throughout a weapon system’s life cycle, 

modifications may be necessary. Whenever 

this occurs, a reevaluation of existing systems 

must occur. Upgrade decisions initiate the 

development process, with the cycle 

occurring in earnest once more. This process 

is intrusive, with declining weapon system 

availability degrading Air Force operational 

capability. While energy improvements can 

occur, energy considerations rarely predicate 

large scale investment. Energy savings can be 

an ancillary benefit to capability 

improvements. 

Weapon system development is a necessary 

activity for the Air Force. These systems are 

the basis for providing the military capability 

for the Air Force to fly, fight, and win in Air, 

Space, and Cyberspace. In order to enable 

these capabilities, the Air Force must strive to 

achieve and maintain the strategic energy 

advantage in all domains. The existing 

weapon system development process 

provides the necessary framework to achieve 

this outcome. However, decisions are 

currently constrained, ensuring that 

operational capability considerations 

supersede all others. Optimization of energy 

for weapon systems ensures a sustainable 

and supportable warfighting capability. 

Therefore, energy considerations should 

occur at the earliest possible stage, thereby 

providing the greatest optimization 

opportunities. Additionally, once deployed, 

weapon system employment considerations 

provide the greatest potential for immediate 

energy savings. Throughout the process, 

whether identifying new capabilities or 

utilizing existing systems, energy 

consequences are driven by military CONOPs 

and decisions. Understanding the energy 

impacts of these decisions are essential to 

better employing and sustaining an effective 

fighting force.
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Operational Energy Security at the Installation Level: The Role of Nuclear 

Power

Ronald Filadelfo 

In section 2845 of the 2010 National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),

Congress tasked the Department of 

Defense (DoD) to study the feasibility of 

powering military bases with small 

modular reactors (SMRs). The belief was 

that military installations can serve as a 

test-bed for this technology and perhaps 

help jump-start an American SMR 

industry. The resulting feasibility study 

concluded:

 SMRs could help DoD in terms of 

energy security for its installations, as 

well as with various energy and 

greenhouse gas reduction goals.

 Even if a decision is made to proceed, 

it will take about 10 years before a 

SMR could be producing electricity. 

There are many issues that remain to 

be resolved, including the effect a 

nuclear power plant could have on the 

function of the installation.

 Finally, a SMR could be cost effective 

for a DoD installation if some other 

entity picks up the “First of a Kind” 

(FOAK) costs.

Although these findings suggest that the 

SMR-military installation concept is 

worth examining further and perhaps 

entertaining specific proposals, they do 

not imply that DoD should immediately 

pursue a plan to locate a SMR on a 

military facility. Many criteria need to be 

met before that can occur, and it remains 

to be determined if DoD will ever find a 

location that meets all the criteria. The 

feasibility study simply concluded – as 

was its tasking – that this is worth further 

examination. 

Waste disposal is a major issue that 

remains to be solved before DoD – or the 

nation as a whole – can make a serious 

commitment to nuclear power in any 

form, be it commercial-scale or small 

modular reactors. Security is sometimes 

mentioned as a benefit of locating a SMR 

on a military base. However, nuclear 

facilities already employ a great deal of 

security and access control, and although 

location on a military installation 

provides some additional security, in 

reality it is just another “fence line”, and

not a major consideration.

Compatibility with installation missions is 

a major concern for DoD. For example, 

the Department would need to consider 

how close a military housing complex 

should be from a nuclear facility. 

Similarly, DoD would need to determine 

Source: U.S. Army
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the appropriate standoff distance of a 

nuclear facility from a military air station, 

ordnance facilities, or other ranges.

Since completion of its feasibility study, 

DoD has not pursued any SMR projects, 

although the department has not ruled 

this out for the future. Meanwhile, the 

Department of Energy (DoE) is partnering 

with the Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA) and Babcock & Wilcox mPower, 

Inc. to undertake a project at the Clinch 

River site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Under 

this partnership, DoE will pay about half 

of the design and licensing costs. The 

objective is to develop a 180 megawatt 

(MW) facility, which could be operational 

by 2022. If completed, this would be the 

nation’s first operational small modular 

reactor. This project is still in its infancy 

and its successful conclusion is far from 

certain. For instance, Babcock & Wilcox

must still obtain Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission certification for its reactor 

design, which it hopes to have by 2016. 

At that point, the TVA will decide whether 

it wants to proceed with construction of 

the site. It is likely DoD will 

monitor the TVA before 

moving on its own. Given 

the planned timeline for the 

TVA project, this implies 

that DoD is unlikely to 

move forward on SMRs for 

several years, at a 

minimum, despite the 

potential benefits for the 

military specifically and the 

United States more 

generally.

Source: Tennessee Valley Authority
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Technological State of Play: Smart Grids for Operations and Installations

Kenneth A. Loparo

“Smart Grid” refers to the modernization 

of the electricity grid to improve 

efficiency and overall operational 

reliability. A major focus of this effort to 

date has been on technology development 

and deployment, such as the deployment 

of synchrophasors5 in the high voltage 

bulk transmission system and smart 

meters in the distribution network as part 

of Advanced Metering Infrastructure 

(AMI). However, meeting key challenges 

and realizing true opportunities requires 

a total “systems” approach.

As it exists currently, the U.S. electricity 

system includes end-to-end operations 

from supply to demand, including 

generation (centralized, distributed, 

 

5

A synchrophaser is a device that measures the

electrical waves on an electricity grid.

renewable), transmission, distribution, 

storage, and consumption. There are 

several problems with this system today:

1. The electricity grid is a highly 

interconnected system that is prone to 

cascading events through 

state/structure interactions;

2. The grid is also highly vulnerable due 

to primary (environmental, 

equipment malfunctions, loads) and

secondary (protection, operator 

initiated actions) disturbances; and,

3. There is poor situational awareness 

across the grid, as well as a lack of 

controllability.

Source: National Public Radio
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As shown in the figure below, the future 

electricity system will transition to a 

cyber-physical system in which 

integrated sensor, communication, and 

control networks enable improvements in 

situational awareness, operational 

reliability, stability and security, and 

efficiency from supply through to 

demand. These same ideas provide 

opportunities for military installation 

energy security. However, if military 

officials do not properly attend to the 

cyber-physical aspects, such a system can 

also increase vulnerability because of the 

greater reliance on data communications 

and autonomous system operations. This 

has potential implications for the military 

in the context of both homeland security –

that is, protecting the U.S. critical 

infrastructure – as well as the reliability 

of grid connectivity to military 

installations.

Source: Kenneth A. Loparo
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Overcoming Challenges from the National Electrical Grid

John Dodson

America’s transmission system is perhaps 

the weakest and most vulnerable in the 

developed world. Thousands of miles of 

unattended and bare wires with thousands 

of volts pulsating upon them traverse vast 

spans of open space, lacking fences or 

impediments to access in most places. In 

alternating current (AC) systems, 

inherently unstable, a failure attracts more 

current as electrons rush into new paths, 

and may cascade to a dreaded blackout. 

Each U.S. town developed its own utility 

company as a “natural monopoly,” 

connecting to each other with transmission 

only with reluctance. But monopoly 

utilities are best preserved by bottlenecks 

and lack of connectivity. Today, the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 

attempts to weave together the grid the 

United States needs badly but does not 

have, laboring against the formidable 

resistance of the 550 or so local utilities. 

The United States has made remarkable 

progress toward at least regional 

integration in the eastern and western 

portions of country – through so-called 

Interconnects – with the Energy Reliability 

Commission of Texas remaining the lone 

localized holdout. 

Nevertheless, significant challenges 

confront the existing system. Perhaps only 

the victims of catastrophes like Hurricane 

Sandy or the widespread wake-up call of 

the 2003 blackout have even an inkling of 

the real devastation to the economy and 

security of this country such events 

portend. Even fewer are aware of how 

easily a small group of technically savvy

individuals, armed only with chains and 

aluminum balloons, could bring down the 

nation’s grid for days, if not weeks. If that 

small group were slightly larger, and spread 

out nationwide for a synchronized action 

with explosives against key substations 

with components that need a year’s lead 

time to build, and the damage is almost 

unthinkable. It would take months, 

perhaps a year to fully restore prior 

conditions and the economy.

To deal with some of these longstanding 

challenges, over a decade ago, U.S. Army 

General Paul Kern sought to forge more 

effective information sharing among Army 

labs, force innovation within the major 

defense contractors, and permit private 

entities to validate their energy-related 

concepts through projects on Army bases. 

Even before the attacks of 9/11, roughly six

small, innovative companies with patents, 

ideas, and high interest were converging on

various military bases. Together, they 

solved Army problems vis-à-vis energy – at 

the same time, the Army became a 

laboratory for the grid security solution,

which all recognized as one of the two great 

energy challenges for the Defense 

Department and the nation.

In 2009, this group of companies seeking to 

develop solutions to the nation’s electric 

grid security challenge handed over much 

of their work, as well as their lessons 

learned, to the Army Energy Initiatives Task 

Force. One of the critical, original solutions

developed over the years was the concept 

of a municipal or military base-sized 

microgrid, dubbed a MuniGrid, that would 

employ solar, wind, combined heat and 

power (CHP), hydro, and energy storage, 

with a base load source that might be waste 

to energy, geothermal, a small modular 

reactor (SMR), or natural gas, combined 

with legacy systems that might exist on a 

given base. 
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Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College 40

The military MuniGrid would have 

two parallel electrical systems. 

The first would be the original 

existing one, augmented by as 

much local solar, distributed 

energy and storage, fuel cells 

where practical, and smart 

building systems with 

improvements in heat and 

insulation. The second would 

consist of large new utility-grade 

energy systems, existing as tenants 

on the base, which would power

the base as a small part of the 

target 500 megawatt virtual 

generation plant that the 

renewable portfolio of available 

sources would create. The 

objective would be to achieve a 

commercially viable enterprise financed 

with Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 

with regional load centers, as with any new 

generation system. Military PPA’s could 

provide the basic underpinnings of the 

financing, and this system would provide 

true “NetZero Plus” security to first 

responders, as well as an assured black 

start capability for the regional electricity 

grid dispatch authority.

These systems, created on key Army bases 

initially, and receiving subsidies for the 

extra expense at those locations requiring 

higher security (triple redundancy), 

guarded with the intrinsic physical security 

of military bases, could become the secure 

energy nodes for a new organization of the 

national grid. Comprised of about 17 new 

Interconnects, this system would not 

transmit the problems that AC now does 

throughout the two large eastern and 

western Interconnects, which leads to 

blackouts. It would in effect 

compartmentalize the national grid and 

allow the true creation of one coherent 

system, designed along the outline already 

achieved by FERC, but many times stronger, 

more predictable and ten times more 

difficult to break or destroy. 

Each new Interconnect would contain at 

least one military security MuniGrid, which 

would be operating at a profit that would 

not require taxpayer support, other than 

the extant utility costs. The Interconnects 

would have to be part of a national plan,

which could take roughly three years to 

formulate, and which would be the 

beginning of the ultimate restructuring that 

must occur. Stockholders' and ratepayers’

interests would need consideration, and 

achieving success and acceptance at 

grassroots levels would be a daunting 

initial challenge. 

If done in the name of national security, like 

the Interstate Highway System, the 

economic payoff would be transcendent. 

The increase in national security would be 

fully as great. It should begin with Army

MuniGrids, and new connections between 

bases through the grid.

Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military

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Biographical Notes

Dr. Theresa Sabonis-Helf is a Professor 

of National Security Strategy at the 

National War College in Washington, DC, 

where she has taught since 2001. She 

was previously Energy and Environment 

Policy Advisor for projects based in 

Central Asia managed by the Harvard 

Institute for International Development 

and the International Resources Group. 

She has worked as a Visiting Fellow at the 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development and as a Policy Analyst for 

think tanks in the United States and 

Russia. She has published articles on 

climate change policies, post-Soviet 

energy and environmental issues, 

regional and international energy trade, 

and the politics of electricity. 

Dr. John Calabrese teaches U.S. foreign 

policy at American University in 

Washington, DC. He also serves as a 

Scholar in Residence at the Middle East 

Institute (MEI) where he directs a project 

on The Middle East and Asia. He is the 

Book Review Editor of The Middle East 

Journal and General Series Editor of MEI 

Viewpoints. He is the author of China’s 

Changing Relations with the Middle East

and Revolutionary Horizons: Iran's 

Regional Foreign Policy. He has edited 

several books and has written numerous 

articles on the international relations of 

the Middle East, especially on the crossregional ties between the Middle East and 

Asia. 

Dr. David Mares holds the Institute of 

the Americas Chair for Inter-American 

Affairs at the University of California, San 

Diego. Dr. Mares has been Professor of 

the Centro de Estudios Internacionales at 

El Colegio de Mexico, Fulbright Professor 

at the Universidad de Chile and Visiting 

Professor at FLACSO-Ecuador. He is the 

author or editor of eight books, and his 

publications have appeared in English, 

Spanish, French, Portuguese, Italian, and 

Chinese journals.

Mr. Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow 

with the Brent Scowcroft Center on 

International Security at the Atlantic 

Council. He formerly served as senior

strategist, National Counterproliferation 

Center from 2010-2012, and as director, 

long-range energy and regional/global 

affairs, U.S. National Intelligence Council, 

Strategic Futures Group from 2008-2010. 

From 2005-2008, he served as a member 

of the secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, 

Department of State, and from 2001-2005 

he was senior counselor, energy, 

technology and science policy, 

Department of State.

Dr. Karen Smith Stegen is the KAEFER 

Professor of Renewable Energy and 

Environmental Politics at Jacobs 

University and an associated scholar with 

the Bremer Energie Institut, both located 

in Bremen, Germany. Dr. Smith Stegen 

began her energy career over two 

decades ago in the international affairs 

department of a major U.S. energy 

company. Her recent publications include 

articles for Energy Policy and Risk 

Management, and she is a featured 

speaker at numerous industry and 

academic conferences.

Dr. Ian Taylor is Professor in 

International Relations and African 

Politics at St. Andrews in Scotland and 

Chair Professor in the School of 

International Studies, Renmin University 
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Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College 42

of China. He is also Professor 

Extraordinary in Political Science at the 

University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, 

an Honorary Professor at the Institute of 

African Studies, China, and a Visiting 

Scholar at Mbarara University of Science 

and Technology, Uganda. Focusing 

largely on sub-Saharan Africa he has 

authored seven academic books, edited 

another eight, and has published over 60 

peer-reviewed scholarly articles.

Ms. Jane Nakano is a fellow in the Energy 

and National Security Program at the 

Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS). Her research focus 

includes nuclear energy policy and 

technology trends globally, energy 

security issues in Asia, and shale gas 

development in the United States. Prior 

to joining CSIS in 2010, Ms. Nakano 

served with the U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE) and worked as the lead 

staff on U.S. energy engagements with 

China and Japan. She was responsible for 

coordinating DOE engagement in the U.S.-

China Strategic Economic Dialogue, U.S.-

China Energy Policy Dialogue, and U.S.-

Japan Energy Dialogue.

Dr. Michael Klare is a professor of peace 

and world security studies, and director 

of the Program in Peace and World 

Security Studies (PAWSS) at Hampshire 

College. He has written widely on U.S. 

military policy, international peace and 

security affairs, the global arms trade, and 

global resource politics. His several 

books include The Race for What’s Left, 

and his articles have appeared in many 

journals, including Arms Control Today, 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Current 

History, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s, The 

Nation, Scientific American, and 

Technology Review.

Dr. Pramod P. Khargonekar is the Eckis 

Professor of Electrical and Computer 

Engineering at the University of Florida. 

In March 2013, he was appointed by the 

National Science Foundation (NSF) to 

serve as Assistant Director for the 

Directorate of Engineering (ENG). In this 

position, Dr. Khargonekar leads the ENG 

Directorate with an annual budget of 

more than $800 million. Dr. 

Khargonekar’s research and teaching 

interests are centered on theory and 

applications of systems and control. 

Mr. Tom Cutler has nearly 40 years’ 

experience in international energy affairs 

including a 36-year career at the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE). Most 

recently, as Director of DOE’s Office of 

European and Asia Pacific Affairs, he 

played a key role in the launch of a 

number of new initiatives in Europe and 

Asia until his retirement from DOE in July 

2013. Previously, Mr. Cutler managed 

DOE energy policy dialogues with a 

number of countries including Indonesia, 

India, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, 

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Norway, and the 

United Kingdom.

Ms. Deborah Gordon is a senior 

associate in the Energy and Climate 

Program at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace (CEIP), where her 

research focuses on oil, climate, energy, 

and transportation issues in the United 

States, China, and globally. Ms. Gordon 

has served on National Academy of 

Sciences committees and the 

Transportation Research Board Energy 

Committee, lectured widely and given 

keynote speeches, and been featured on 

radio, TV, and in print media. Her recent 

book, Two Billion Cars (with Daniel 

Sperling) provides a fact-based case and 

roadmap for navigating the biggest global 
New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military

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environmental challenge of this century—

cars and oil.

Dr. Christopher Bronk is the Baker 

Institute fellow in information technology 

policy at Rice University. He holds 

additional appointments at the Baker 

Institute Center for Energy Studies, Rice 

University’s Department of Computer 

Science and the University of Toronto’s 

Munk School of Global Affairs. His 

research focuses on cyber geopolitics 

with additional work in innovation, 

knowledge management, international 

politics, and policy related to intelligence 

and international security. In addition to 

significant work in the cybersecurity area, 

he has published on a broad range of 

issues, including broadband and Wi-Fi 

policy, information technology sector 

energy consumption, intelligence and 

information sharing issues, U.S.-Mexico 

policy, and digital diplomacy. 

U.S. Army Colonel (ret.) Paul Roege is a 

lifelong energy aficionado who focuses on 

the role of energy in building resilience at

the community and regional levels. He 

recently spent four years on active 

military duty to establish the Army’s 

operational energy concepts and 

strategies, seeking to use energy most 

effectively toward operational outcomes. 

He substantially influenced the Army’s 

and other military energy strategies, 

including adoption of a concept for 

“Energy-Informed Operations.” He also 

guided Army energy research and 

development thrusts toward more 

integrated, network foci, and advocated 

for the emergent shift toward resilience 

as an overarching concept for energy 

security.

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a Distinguished 

Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at 

the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College. He is also Adjunct Faculty, 

School of Politics and Economics, 

Claremont Graduate University. Dr. 

Bunker has delivered over 200 

presentations, including papers and 

training, to military, law enforcement, and 

academic and policy audiences, including 

U.S. congressional testimony. He has over 

200 publications ranging from edited 

books and booklets to reports, chapters, 

articles/essays, response guidance, 

subject bibliographies, and encyclopedia 

entries in academic, policy, military, and 

law enforcement venues. 

Dr. John R. Deni is a Research Professor 

of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, 

and Multinational (JIIM) Security Studies

at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College. He previously worked 

for eight years as a political advisor for 

senior U.S. military commanders in 

Europe. While working for the U.S. 

military in Europe, Dr. Deni was also an 

adjunct lecturer at Heidelberg 

University’s Institute for Political Science

– he taught graduate and undergraduate 

courses on U.S. foreign and security 

policy, NATO, European security, and 

alliance theory and practice. He is the 

author most recently of the book Alliance 

Management and Maintenance: 

Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, 

as well as several journal articles. 

Dr. Kevin T. Geiss is the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Energy. In 

that role, he is responsible for providing 

oversight and direction for all matters 

pertaining to the formulation, review, and 

execution of plans, policies, programs, 

and budgets for the effective and efficient 

use of energy to support the global Air 

Force mission. Previously, Dr. Geiss 

served as the U.S. Army’s Program 
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Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College 44

Director for Energy Security, where he 

was responsible for the development and 

implementation of the Army Energy 

Security strategy. 

Dr. Ronald Filadelfo serves as Leader of 

the Environment and Energy Research 

Group at the Center for Naval Analyses 

(CNA). The group’s current research 

focus includes the relationship between 

climate change and national security, and 

installation and operational energy issues 

for the military. In 2007, Dr. Filadelfo led 

the analysis and writing team that 

supported the CNA Military Advisory 

Board study of the effects of climate 

change on national security. He was 

recently a member of a National Academy 

of Sciences Naval Studies Board that 

examined the implications of climate 

change for U.S. Naval forces. 

Dr. Kenneth A. Loparo is Nord Professor 

of Engineering in the Electrical 

Engineering and Computer Science 

Department at Case Western Reserve 

University. His research interests include 

stability and control of nonlinear and 

stochastic systems with applications to 

large-scale electric power systems; 

nonlinear filtering with applications to 

monitoring, fault detection, diagnosis and 

reconfigurable control; information 

theory aspects of stochastic and 

quantized systems with applications to 

adaptive and dual control and the design 

of digital control systems; the 

development of advanced signal 

processing techniques for monitoring and 

tracking of physiological behavior. 

Mr. John Dodson is a licensed 

professional engineer and graduate of 

both the U.S. Military Academy and the 

Harvard Business School. With a partner 

he founded Thayer Gate Energy, LLC, a 

non-profit formed to develop the 

MuniGrid, a surety microgrid based on 

wind, solar, biomass and fuel cells, utility 

size storage, and an intelligent energy 

management system. In the mid-1990s, 

under the Public Utilities Regulatory 

Policies Act, he constructed a small 

hydroelectric plant on a tributary of the 

Hudson River; he still owns and operates 

that plant today, selling power into the 

grid now for over 16 years.