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THE RESURGENCE OF AL–QAEDA IN IRAQ

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 12, 2013

Serial No. 113–96

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D., senior fellow, Saban Center for Middle East 

Policy, The Brookings Institution ....................................................................... 6

Ms. Jessica D. Lewis, research director, Institute for the Study of War ............ 23

Michael Knights, Ph.D., Lafer Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 102

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown 

University ............................................................................................................. 116

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 8

Ms. Jessica D. Lewis: Prepared statement ............................................................ 25

Michael Knights, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 104

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 118

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 144

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 145

(1)

THE RESURGENCE OF AL–QAEDA IN IRAQ 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific) presiding. 

Mr. POE. Committee will come to order. The witnesses will be 

seated, please. Just so you know, as a former judge, I like starting 

on time, and I start on time. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. 

Al-Qaeda is back in Iraq. 

Would somebody shut the back doors? 

From the Summer of 2012 to the Summer of 2013, al-Qaeda in 

Iraq was responsible for 24 major suicide bombings and 8 prison 

breaks. The prison breaks allowed al-Qaeda to free their fellow killers who were captured. Many of these operatives have turned up 

on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria with intent to cause chaos and 

anarchy and to kill people. Jail breaks, massive suicide attacks, 

and assassinations are the norm. 

Not since 2008 has it been this bad. I would direct your attention 

to the screen. There should be a chart up on the screen that shows 

the—I am going to hold it up. So maybe you can see this one better. It shows the massive spike in killings from 2008 and then how 

now in 2013, it has even gotten worse, gotten worser. 

One of the most frustrating parts about this is that the al-Qaeda 

in Iraq is the same bunch of killers that the United States special 

forces took apart from 2007 through 2011. 

Prime Minister Maliki, a close friend of the Iranian regime, 

didn’t want our help anymore. He is suffering the consequences. 

And now he wants help once again. He talks out of both sides of 

his mouth while trying to cozy up to the United States. He cozies 

up to the Iranians at the same time. 

Prime Minister Maliki came here dragging the sack in November, wanting more American taxpayer money. He wanted attack 

helicopters and all sorts of advanced equipment. But is that what 

he needs to go after al-Qaeda? Does he have other reasons for 

wanting this type of equipment? 

2

Maliki has centralized power, alienated the Sunnis, brought back 

the Shia hit squads. This, in part, has allowed al-Qaeda to return 

to be back in Iraq. 

What Maliki needs is a new strategy to fight al-Qaeda. This includes doing a better job of reaching out to the Sunni population 

so they feel like he represents all Iraqis, not just 1 group. 

The chaos next door in Syria is not helping at all. Al-Qaeda in 

Iraq gave birth to al-Qaeda in Syria. And the groups essentially act 

as the same. Their goal, it seems, is to establish an extremist area 

that spans the entire region of the world in that area. 

This problem is not going away. Over the past 2 years, we have 

heard from the administration al-Qaeda is on its last legs or it is 

defeated. It doesn’t seem that is the case. Over the world, al-Qaeda 

affiliates are gaining size and strength. Many continue to follow 

commands from core al-Qaeda in Pakistan, as I call them, the 

Benedict Arnold ally of the United States. That would be Pakistan. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is creating a troubling trend. The United States 

doesn’t have the luxury of turning our back on the situation. Sectarian war in Iraq would be a disaster for the entire region and 

American national security. 

Containing Iranian influence in the region is a top priority. AlQaeda reestablishing a safe haven to plan and launch attacks outside the region is unacceptable. And it is a threat to American security. Maintaining the free flow of oil to the global market out of 

Iraq is essential; in fact, some way that al-Qaeda in Iraq could hit 

the Iraqi oil infrastructure to weaken Baghdad. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq has little to lose and everything to gain. They 

are alive, and they are well. 

We are here today to learn from our experts about al-Qaeda in 

Iraq, its resources, its strategy, its tactics, and what we are going 

to do about it, if anything. I look forward to the testimony. 

And I now yield time to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, from 

California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Judge, thanks for your convening these hearings. 

And thanks for starting on time. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq reached the height of its destructive capacity in 

late 2006 and early 2007 before it was largely decimated by a counterterrorism campaign, by coalition troops and Iraqi security forces, 

which basically means our troops. The organization was weakened 

to a fraction of its members and its capacities. 

In the past 2 years, al-Qaeda in Iraq has regrouped, regained capacities, and expanded in the areas from which it was expelled during the latter stages of the Iraq war in 2008. The result has been 

perhaps 8,000 deaths this year in a revitalization of al-Qaeda in 

Iraq. 

One of our witnesses, Dr. Pollack, says in his testimony that in 

2013, Iraq is on track to experience a 100 percent increase in violent deaths when compared to 2012. And 2012 was no walk in the 

park. 

There is a cycle of violence in Iraq where AQI targets Shia communities and the Iraqi Government responds with massive security 

sweeps against Sunni regions that eliminate some extremists but 

also lay the groundwork for AQI recruiting in the future. AQI was 

largely decimated when we left in 2011. Now its ranks have 

3

regrown to at least a couple of thousand fighters, according to most 

reports. 

In July 2013, al-Qaeda in Iraq successfully attacked the prison 

Abu Ghraib, leading to the escape of 500 prisoners, most of which 

were people we put in that prison for terrorism. That builds a case 

for perhaps helping Prime Minister Maliki. And he wants American weapons. And his biggest argument is that we should give him 

American weapons because his enemies hate us. The problem is his 

friends hate us, too. And his friends in Teheran are more dangerous to us than his enemies in Fallujah. 

Now, Maliki’s argument goes something like this. He holds office 

today solely as a result of various actions taken by the United 

States, some of which were mistakes. And since, therefore, he is 

our product, therefore, we have to protect him and do whatever he 

wants. And, therefore, he is ‘‘one of the good guys,’’ no matter who 

he allies himself with today. The fact is allegiance to Teheran is 

only a bit less than Assad’s allegiance to Teheran. But Maliki’s argument goes something like this. Since he has been the beneficiary 

of a series of American mistakes in the past, we have a legal duty 

to continue to make mistakes for his benefit in the future. 

If we are going to provide him with weapons, there ought to be 

at least 4 conditions. The first is that he start trying to reach a 

compromise with at least some elements of the Sunni community. 

He has taken provocative actions against Sunnis, such as postponing elections in Sunni regions and forcing prominent Sunni politicians out of the government. He shouldn’t be seeking the best 

deal he can for the Shiite community. He should be seeking a peace 

that would benefit not only him but the United States. And he 

needs to allow proper Sunni representation in his government. 

Second, if he wants our weapons, he ought to pay for them. People involved in foreign policy seem to be so focused on foreign policy that whether we get paid for the weapons or not is, at most, 

a footnote. The fact is Iraq has plenty of oil now. We will have even 

more oil in the future. They have got enough cash to pay for the 

weapons now. And they can certainly borrow in the international 

markets. And, at a very minimum, they can agree to pay us later 

in cash or in oil. 

Third, he has got to stop Iranian flights over his airspace into 

Syria. Now, he will say, ‘‘Well, then give me an air force.’’ We don’t 

have to. All he has to do is authorize the Saudi, the Turkish, or 

the American Air Force to ensure that his airspace is not used 

wrongfully by Iranian thugs transitioning to Damascus so they can 

deploy and kill many innocent people and some non-innocent people in Syria. 

And, finally, he has got to focus on the hostages from Camp 

Ashraf and the human rights of those in Camp Hurriya, also 

known as Camp Liberty. These are international responsibilities 

that he has. 

So if there is no penetrating analysis, the argument will be we 

created him; therefore, he is a good guy, he is in trouble; therefore, 

we give him weapons for free. That is the default position of our 

foreign policy. My hope is that through this hearing and other 

forms, we are able to penetrate a little bit more deeply. 

I yield back. 

4

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will recognize the 

gentleman—the gentle lady? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Yes. 

Mr. POE. The gentle lady from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is all about timing. 

Mr. POE. Perfect timing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, as we know, so much as been going on with the resurgence 

of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Just last month, our Subcommittee on the Middle East on North Africa held a hearing on U.S. policy toward Iraq 

as we tried to establish what the administration’s strategic goals 

and objectives are in Iraq. And the most common theme and cause 

for concern that came up throughout our hearing was the threat 

posed by the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Unfortunately, as we have seen in many of our other hearings 

this year, al-Qaeda is resurgent throughout the Middle East and 

North Africa, not just in Iraq. The grim reality is that al-Qaeda is 

on the rise. It continues to be a grave threat to U.S. national security, despite the administration’s assessment that it is on the run. 

It has now been 2 years since we withdrew all U.S. forces from 

Iraq, leaving behind a fragile Iraq that perhaps was not ready to 

become stable. Since our departure, we have seen a drastic increase 

in sectarian violence at levels not seen since 2008, with over 7,000 

civilian deaths so far this year. Leaving Iraq with so much uncertainty caused irreparable repercussions to our regional and national security interests, not to mention all of the sacrifices made 

by our brave men and women in uniform. 

The administration’s failure to find a mutually agreeable resolution to extend our presence in Iraq has severely weakened our influence in the country and left a vacuum that is currently being 

filled by forces who seek to harm us and our allies. 

On one side, we see a growing Iranian influence in Iraq as the 

regime in Tehran strengthens its ties with the Maliki government. 

Nowhere is this more evident than with the unwillingness of the 

Iraqi Government to halt the Iranians from using Iraqi airspace to 

ship Assad and his regime weapons, supplies, and even Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC, members to fight along Hezbollah 

and Assad’s forces. 

On the other hand, we have seen a dangerous rise in extremism 

as we witness a clear resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI, also 

known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, and other 

groups, due to the fact that the Iraqi security forces are struggling 

to combat these extremists and their government is not willing to 

be tough on the Iranian regime. 

AQI took advantage of the uncertain security situation created 

there by U.S. disengagement in Iraq, and reemerged stronger and 

more popular than before the surge. Viewed as a theater of jihad, 

Iraq, along with Syria, has been among one of the top destinations 

for foreign fighters who seek to engage in jihad. These foreign 

fighters pose a serious threat to our national security, that of our 

regional allies and beyond, and may soon be able to create a large 

safe haven that spans from Syria to Iraq due to the instability and 

lack of security in both countries. 

5

Not only do these fighters threaten our European partners, 

where many of these foreign fighters come to train, to wage jihad, 

and then take what they learn back to their home countries, they 

also threaten our friends and allies in the region like Israel, Jordan, the UAE, who all fear that the extremists will soon turn their 

attention toward them. 

It is important for the administration to not lose sight of what 

is going on in Iraq and the region. Instead, it must strategically implement clear, constructive, goal-oriented policies that are geared 

toward advancing U.S. national security interests in the long run. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentle lady. 

The Chair will now recognize other members for 1 minute. The 

Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. 

Two years after the U.S. forces departed Iraq, al-Qaeda’s influence and capabilities have grown significantly, particularly in the 

Sunni communities. The number of civilian casualties continue to 

rise. And al-Qaeda in Iraq remains a destabilizing force in the region through its support of terrorist networks. Iraq is in danger of 

becoming a failed state. And our national security interests are undermined by the growing insecurity of the Maliki government. 

I look forward to hearing from our panel of experts on the recommendations on how U.S. can play a strategic role in defeating 

al-Qaeda in Iraq. Thank you. And I yield back, sir. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is no secret I have been very critical of this administration. 

And Iraq, as a veteran of Iraq, somebody who was there a number 

of times, I saw, frankly, the bravest political move I think in 50 

years, the surge in Iraq, doing it in opposition to what many on 

Capitol Hill demanded of the President. The President decided to 

surge, send a message to the bad guys that not only is America not 

leaving. We will never be defeated on the battlefield. And we are 

doubling down our commitment to Iraq. Unfortunately, this administration completely threw away that gain when we completely 

withdrew from Iraq. I think it is one of the most embarrassing and 

shameful foreign policy decisions that this administration has 

made. And I will continue to remain critical of it. 

When America retreats from the world, chaos follows. And when 

American retreats from Iraq, chaos follows. And what we are seeing was an American retreat followed by chaos. So I am interested 

in finding out how we can stay engaged, despite the difficulties we 

see there. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made part of the record. I ask that each witness remember that 

I like to start on time and quit on time. You have 5 minutes. I will 

introduce each of the witnesses and then give them time for their 

opening statements. And, once again, the members do have copies 

of your prepared remarks. 

6

Dr. Kenneth Pollack is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for 

Middle East Policy. Dr. Pollack began his career as a Persian Gulf 

military analyst at the CIA and has served twice on the staff of the 

National Security Counsel. He has also been a senior research professor at the National Defense University and director of the National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Jessica Lewis is the research director at the Institute for the 

Study of War. Prior to joining the Institute for the Study of War, 

she served 8 years on the active duty as an intelligence officer for 

the United States Army. Her military career includes 3 deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, where she served as tactical, operational, and theater-level commands. She has twice been awarded 

the Bronze Star medal for her impact on operations. Ms. Lewis, as 

a side note, thank you for your service in the military. 

Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy specializing on Iraq and the Kurdistan 

Regional Government. He has worked almost exclusively on Iraq 

for the last 15 years, working in every Iraqi province and most of 

the country’s 100 districts as an adviser to government, military, 

reconstruction agencies, and the oil sector. 

Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program 

at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and the research director for the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the 

Brookings Institution. Dr. Byman previously served as a professional staff member with both the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States—that is the 9/11 Commission—

and the joint 9/11 inquiry staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. 

We have an excellent group of panelists today. And we will start 

with Dr. Pollack. You have 5 minutes. 

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. POLLACK. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, Congressman 

Sherman, distinguished members, thank you very much for affording me this great honor in addressing you today on this extremely 

important topic. 

I would like to focus my remarks on the strategic context that 

has produced the resurrection of al-Qaeda in Iraq in the expectation that my very able colleagues will be better able to handle the 

tactical aspects and the technical aspects of that resurgence. 

I would simply like to make 4 remarks about what we are seeing 

in Iraq. First, the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq is not the malady itself. 

It is a symptom of the malady. The real problems in Iraq are the 

problems of Iraqi politics. It has been the problem ever since 2003. 

From 2003 until 2006, as a result of our catastrophically mishandled early reconstruction of Iraq, Iraqi politics were a mess. 

They enabled the infiltration of al-Qaeda into Iraqi society, pushed 

the Sunni tribes into the arms of al-Qaeda and other Salafist 

groups and built the foundation for the heavy terrorist campaign 

insurgency that we faced in Iraq during that period of time. 

7

It is not a coincidence that from 2007 until at least 2010, during 

the period of the surge, Iraqi politics turned in a very different direction. They moved in a very positive direction, toward greater inclusiveness, toward greater democratization. It is no coincidence 

that, as a result, al-Qaeda in Iraq was enormously marginalized. 

The Sunni awakening was a critical element of that, but it was 

only 1 element of that larger process. 

And it is also no coincidence that beginning in about 2011, as 

Iraqi politics faced a very significant downturn following the removal of American troops from Iraq that, once again, we have seen 

a resurgence of al-Qaeda’s activities, its ability to recruit, its ability 

to insinuate itself, and its acceptance within the Sunni community 

of Iraq. 

There has been a tendency to ascribe al-Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence to Syria. And there is no question that the Syrian civil war 

has contributed to this state of affairs. 

From 2009 to 2010, however, while Iraqi politics were doing quite 

well, there was no shortage of jihadists coming from Syria, but 

there was simply no acceptance in Iraq. And so we cannot attribute 

the problems entirely to Syria. It is true that the Syrian civil war 

has helped re-radicalize the Iraqi population. It has empowered 

Iraqi extremists. But it is only part of what is going on. 

Second, the obvious follow-on from my first point that the rise of 

al-Qaeda is primarily a function of the problems in Iraqi politics 

should lead us to a focus on Iraqi politics as the real solution to 

that problem. Certainly greater counterterrorism assistance, more 

proficiency with counterterrorism will help, but it will help primarily to treat the symptom. Unless we are willing, unless the 

Iraqis are able to deal with their political problems, the symptoms 

will recur. And they could recur in a far more virulent form. And, 

therefore, it is incumbent upon us to help the Iraqis deal with their 

political problems if we are to eradicate al-Qaeda in Iraq once 

again. And this focuses on bringing the Sunnis back into the government and rebuilding the power-sharing arrangement that the 

United States brokered as part of the surge in 2007–2008. 

Third, the upcoming elections in Iraq could turn Iraq in a more 

positive or a potentially much more negative direction. In particular, if Sunnis and other Iraqis who feel marginalized believe 

that they have political recourse to address their grievances, they 

will be far less likely to support both actively and passively groups 

like Iraq. But, unfortunately, the opposite is also true. And if the 

elections produce an outcome that Sunnis and others believe has 

further alienated them, made it more difficult for them to address 

their grievances through the political process, it is likely that they 

will more closely embrace al-Qaeda and other radical groups and 

the violence will worsen. 

And, finally, it is important to remember that while American influence in Iraq has waned and has waned quite considerably, it is 

not nonexistent. We still do have levers of influence with the 

Iraqis. And, what is more, we could rebuild our influence further, 

in particular, by conditioning our aid in exactly the manner that 

Congressman Sherman described in his opening remarks. There is 

a great deal that the Iraqis still want from us. And all of that that 

Iraq wants from us is a source of leverage, a source of leverage that 

8

we could be employing without a dramatic increase in our actual 

funding of Iraq but that could, nevertheless, make a very important 

impact on Iraqi politics and, therefore, on al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]


86007a-1.eps
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86007a-2.eps

For this reason, it will be difficult even to meaningfully reduce the levels of violence in Iraq 

without addressing Iraq's fundamental political (and, to a lesser extent, economic and social) 

problems. Iraq will never be peaceful, prosperous and free of the scourge of AQI and groups 

like it until Iraq's leaders properly grapple with those underlying problems and forge reasonable 

compromises to allow the country to move forward. The converse is also true. The longer that 

Iraq's fundamental political problems are allowed to fester; the longer that Iraq's bad, old 

political culture is allowed to hold sway; and the longer that Iraq's leaders obsess over how to 

beat their adversaries rather than fixing what ails the nation, the worse the violence is likely to 

get and the stronger that groups like AQI are likely to grow. In the end, as they hope, these 

groups might succeed in pushing the country back into civil war. 

AI-Qaeda in Iraq 

The initial rise of AQI and the other Salafist groups was a product of the many mistakes of the 

United States after the fall of Saddam. The United States invaded, toppled the totalitarian 

dictatorship of Saddam Husayn and put nothing in its place. In so doing, Washington created a 

failed state and a security vacuum. These circumstances quickly spawned widespread organized 

and unorganized crime, terrorism, an insurgency among the Sunni tribes of Western Iraq who felt 

threatened by the ham-fisted American efforts to create a Shi'a-Kurd dominated government, 

and eventually an inter-communal civil war in 2005-2007. 

Indeed, the creation of a power vacuum in Iraq did what it often does, and has done in places like 

the former Yugoslavia, Congo, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere: It enabled 

various criminals, sociopaths and opportunists to lash out at their rivals and use pre-existing 

(even long-dormant) differences as causes to mobilize support and employ violence. This in turn 

prompted other groups to take up arms to defend themselves, setting off a fear-based spiral of 

attacks and reprisals that pushed the country into all-out civil war. AQI and its ilk took 

advantage of the security vacuum and the fear it inspired to become a dominant force among 

Iraq's Sunni population by 2006. 

AQI has both home grown and foreign elements. It was founded by foreign al-Qaeda operatives 

who entered Iraq in the wake of the US. invasion to kill both Americans and Shi'a. They 

insinuated themselves with the Sunni tribal community of Western Iraq, which had been badly 

alienated by the Bush Administration's disastrous mishandling of the post-invasion 

reconstruction. During that time, many Sunni Iraqis believed that the United States had handed 

the Iraqi government to the worst elements among the Shi'a-warlords, extremists and thievesexpressly to crush the Sunni population. Believing they had no other allies and nowhere else to 

tum, many Sunni Iraqis saw the foreign al-Qaeda operatives with their combat experience, 

expertise, weapons and money as heaven-sent to help them in their hour of need. The Sunni 

tribal community largely embraced al-Qaeda as allies in their fight against the Shi 'a militias and 

the Americans, who seemed in Sunni eyes to be aiding and abetting those militias. 

Consequently, AQI's initial, mostly foreign cadre, quickly gained numerous local recruits. Over 

time, AQI became a largely Iraqi affair. One of its goals was to drive the Americans from Iraq to 

reclaim the territory for the Muslim world as part of al-Qaeda's larger aspiration of creating a 

new Islamic Caliphate to rule all Muslim lands. Another was to slaughter, convert or expel the 

Shi'a, whom al-Qaeda's rabid Sunni Salafists regard as apostates and heretics who must be 

2 
10


86007a-3.eps

cleansed from the land to create a pure, Sunni Islamic state. AQI, both its foreign and domestic 

personnel, set about these goals with a vengeance. 

Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize that AQI was actually only one of many Sunni 

insurgent/terrorist/militia groups operating in Iraq against the Shi'a, the Americans and to a 

lesser extent, the Kurds. At the height of Iraq's civil war, dozens of groups like the 1920s 

Revolution Brigade, Ansar al-Sunnah, Jaysh ai-Muhammad and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa 

Naqshbandia (JRTN). Many, but not all, of these groups embraced the same Salafist theology as 

AQI, but all of them espoused the same virulent Sunni chauvinism. To a considerable extent, we 

have come to use the term "AQI" as a shorthand term describing a wider range of violent Sunni 

extremi st groups. 

For several years, primarily from 2004 to 2007, these Sunni groups helped wreak havoc upon 

Iraq and the American forces deployed there. They formed the core of the Sunni order of battle 

against the Shi'a in Iraq's horrific civil war. They also constituted the bulk of the insurgency 

against the United States presence. 

The partnership between the Salafi jihadists and the Sunni tribal community ofTraq was never an 

easy one, however. The Sunni tribes were never as religious as the Salafist zealots, and certainly 

they did not care for the fundamentalism imposed by their new allies on parts ofTraq that they 

came to control. Their excesses always rubbed most Sunni tribesmen the wrong way. Arguably 

of greater importance, al-Qa'ida in Iraq had turned the traditional tribal hierarchy upside down. 

When they entered Iraq, their first recruits were the dispossessed of Iraqi tribal society-the 

misfits, the outsiders, the lowest men on the totem poles. As al-Qa'ida grew in power, these 

were the men who benefitted most in power, wealth and prestige. They lorded it over the 

shaykhs, dismissing the millennia-old hierarchy of the region. Moreover, while their losses to 

Shi'a militias, especially in Baghdad, had convinced the traditional Sunni hierarchy that the civil 

war needed to end, not so al-Qa'ida and the other violent fanatics who were willing to fight on to 

the last, even if that meant the extermination ofTraq's Sunni community. 

Not surprisingly, by 2006, many Sunni tribesmen and many more of their shaykhs had had it 

with al-Qa'ida. They tried to evict the terrorists on their own but failed. Meanwhile, the US. 

Marines, charged with the pacification of Anbar since 2004, had already begun applying lowintensity conflict tactics intended to divide the tribes from the terrorists. American personnel 

began reaching out to the tribal shaykhs to try to reconcile with them, offering them protection, 

services, resources, even bribes if they would throw off the terrorists, insurgents and militias. 

For the Sunni shaykhs, it was that combination of threat and opportunity that moved them. They 

increasingly foresaw that the longer that al-Qa'ida and other Salafi groups were able to hold 

sway in Anbar and Salah ad-Din, the harder it would be to evict them and the more that they 

would reshape Iraqi Sunni tribal society to suit themselves, to the detriment of the traditional 

power structure. And by observing the Marines, seeing the consistency oftheir behavior and 

their determination to reach out to the Sunni community, the shaykhs concluded that they finally 

had a real partner who they could rely on to break al-Qa'ida, extirpate it from Sunni society and 

return them to their traditional status. Thus was born the Anbar Awakening which started in late 
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2006 but gathered tremendous steam from the further application of those same tactics to the rest 

of the country. 

Perhaps the least understood element of that story, however, was the reintegration of the Sunnis 

into the wider Iraqi state and society. It was not just that the Marines (and later, the entire U.S. 

mission) promised to protect and aid the Sunni tribes against al-Qa'ida and the other zealots. It 

was also, that the Americans promised to protect the Sunni community against the Shi'a as well. 

Thus, one of the most important shifts that occurred as part of the "Surge" was that the United 

States went from being the enablers of the Shi'a to the defenders of the Sunnis. In the past, 

American forces had largely stood idly by while Shi'a militias and death squads slaughtered the 

Sunnis, drove them from Baghdad and other towns-often under the camouflage of the 

government's own security services. As a result of America's shift to population security during 

the Surge, the Sunnis saw American troops stop the Shi'a conquests cold. American troops 

prevented the Shi'a militias from consummating their victory in the Battle of Baghdad with a 

final slaughter of the remaining Sunnis holed up in the Mansur district, the last remaining Sunni 

enclave in the city. 

More than that, the United States promised-and then made good on those promises-to force 

the Shi'a and Kurdish leaders to give the Sunnis a place at Iraq's table again. Sunni political 

leaders were given cabinet posts and other high-rankingjobs. Sunni fighters were re-integrated 

into Iraq's security forces, most notably as the "Sons of Iraq" but most importantly as ordinary 

soldiers and commanders in Iraqi field units as part of the refonn of the ISF. Indeed, some units 

composed largely of Sunni troops and officers would later play key roles in the government 

campaigns to break the power of Jaysh al-Mahdi. The United States also brought goods and 

services to a Sunni community that had been denied them by the Shi'a (and Kurdish) warlords 

and chauvinists since 2003. At first, these were furnished by American military forces 

themselves, but later, as Sunni leaders regained their political influence, by Iraq's nascent 

government itself. Suddenly, the Sunnis had a reason to cooperate with the government of Iraq 

and to try to build a new Iraqi state, rather than tear it down. 

Thus, what broke AQI in 2007-2008 was the major effort, undertaken as part of the Surge 

strategy, to actually address Iraq's problems. The shift to a population security strategy in 

particular suppressed the violence, broke the links between the militias/insurgents and the Iraqi 

people and allowed American officials to forge a new power-sharing arrangement among Iraq's 

various ethno-sectarian groups. This in turn ended the sense of alienation among the Sunni 

community and allowed for the creation of a new political process. That, not more aggressive 

special forces or more powertul weaponry, were what crippled AQI and the other Salafist groups 

by turning Iraq's Sunni population against them. Mao Zedong once famously observed that the 

guerrilla is like a fish that swims in the sea of the people. The best way to kill the fish is to turn 

the sea against it. The Surge of2007-2008 turned the sea ofIraq's Sunni tribal populace against 

AQI, and the result was their rapid collapse and sutlocation. 

By 2009, AQI and its Salafist brethren were etlectively defeated AQI had been reduced to a 

few small cells hiding in the caves of Jabal Hamrin mostly just trying to survive and unable to 

mount meaningtul attacks. For most Iraqis, AQI had become little more than a bad memory, 

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easily put out of their minds as they contemplated what seemed to be Iraq's hard, but brighter 

future. 

The Rebirth of AQI 

Of course, even then Iraq was still a far way from stability, tranquility, prosperity or true 

democracy. In an absolute sense, it remained a mess. But in a relative sense, it had made 

enonnous progress. It was finally headed in the right direction. And it had taken some 

remarkable steps forward, steps that had seemed impossible even three years before. 

Looking back, Iraq may have reached its political, military and economic apex in 2009 and early 

2010. In 2009 Iraq held provincial elections, and in 2010 national elections, that had resulted in 

stunning victories for those parties considered the most secular, the most vested in improving 

governance and services, the least tied to the militias and the least sectarian. They also handed 

equally stunning defeats to the parties most closely tied to the militias and the civil war. Indeed, 

the militias-Sunni and Shi' a-were withering, as were the vast majority of terrorist groups. 

Violence and deaths were way down. Secular, peaceful, nationalistic Iraqi leaders (including 

Sunnis like Osama al-Nujayfi and Rafe al-Issawi) were emerging and becoming dominant 

figures in government. There was a widespread feeling that everyone had to play by the 

democratic rules and no one could get caught subverting the will of the Iraqi people or even 

being too corrupt. 

All of this progress was very real, but it was also very fragile. Like a bone that had been 

fractured but was now mending, it needed a cast to protect it, hold it, and allow the bones to knit 

together and become strong. That role was played by the United States, in particular by our 

military forces in Iraq. During that time frame, it became an increasingly symbolic role as the 

drawdown in troop strength meant that we did less and less of the actual provision of security for 

Iraqis, but it was an absolutely critical role. 

As long as American forces remained, Iraqis did not fear the re-emergence of the security 

vacuum or the widespread use of violence by any group (including whichever group controlled 

the government, thereby giving it by far the greatest capacity to use violence against its rivals). 

It also meant that Iraq's political leaders had to abide by the democratic rules of the road laid 

down by the Americans. This enabled good Iraqis to act constructively, and prevented the bad 

ones from acting too destructively. Iraqis could assume that the future would be better, not 

worse, and make decisions based on their hopes, not their fears. 

The problems began after Iraq's 2010 national elections. The elections themselves were 

wonderful-the best yet. Iraqis voted overwhelmingly for Ayad Allawi's mostly-Sunni Iraqiyya 

and Maliki's overwhelmingly Shi'a State of Law coalitions, the two groups seen as most secular, 

least sectarian and least tied to the militias. Of the two, Iraqiyya garnered slightly more votes. 

But Maliki refused to believe that he had lost, insisting that the vote had been rigged (perhaps by 

the Americans, his aides claimed) and refusing to allow Allawi to take the first turn at forming a 

government. Then he pressured Iraq's high court to rule that he could get the first shot at 

forming a government, which deadlocked the entire political system. And the United States (and 

the UN) went along and said nothing. Rather than insist that Allawi be given the first chance, as 

is customary in most democracies and as was clearly what was best for Iraqi democracy. The 

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US did nothing. Ten months of political backstabbing followed, and in the end, the Iranians 

forced Muqtada as-Sadr to back Maliki, uniting the Shi'a behind him. At that point, the Kurds 

fell into place, believing that the prime minister had to be a Shi'a, and Iraqiyya's chances were 

finished. 

It was also a defeat for Iraqi democracy. The message that it sent to Iraq's people and politicians 

alike was that the United States under the new Obama Administration was no longer going to 

enforce the rules of the democratic road. Washington was not going to insist that the will of the 

people win out. America was willing to step aside and allow Iraq's traditional political culture of 

pay-offs, log-rolling, threats and violence to re-emerge to determine who would rule the country. 

It undermined the reform of Iraqi politics and resurrected the specter of the failed state. 

Having backed Maliki for prime minister simply to end the embarrassing political stalemate, the 

Administration compounded its mistake by lashing itself uncritically to his government. No 

matter what Maliki did-good, bad or indifferent-Washington backed him. Whether it was out 

offear of being criticized for allowing him to remain in office in the first place, or sheer lack of 

interest and a desire to simply do what was easiest and required the least effort on the part of the 

US, the Administration applauded and overlooked everything he did. Maliki certainly did some 

good. He was not all bad. But he also did some very bad things-things that were highly 

subversive ofTraqi democracy. Among the worst was to thoroughly politicize the ISF, ousting 

huge numbers of the competent, apolitical officers that the United States had worked so hard to 

put in place and replacing them with people loyal to him, regardless of their credentials. Very 

quickly, the ISF went from an apolitical force that most Iraqis trusted, to a servant of the Maliki 

government deeply distrusted by those outside the prime minister's camp. 

In 2011, with US. elections in sight, the Obama Administration decided to end its military 

commitment to Iraq. Technically, the Administration was willing to keep roughly 3,000 troops 

in the country, and technically it was the Iraqis who were unwilling to meet our legal needs to 

stay. But these are technicalities that do not bear up on closer examination. The 3,000 troops 

were a far cry from the 20-25,000 troops that the US. military felt were needed to keep the peace. 

Few Iraqi politicians were willing to fight for such a meaningless presence. Similarly, there 

were other ways that Washington might have handled the legal issues surrounding an American 

follow-on force, but the White House made clear it was uninterested. 

The withdrawal of the last US troops in December 2011 re-opened Iraq's security vacuum 

Perhaps just by a crack, but it was enough. Over the next two years the security vacuum forced 

the doors open wider and wider. It wasn't so much that when the US left there was nothing that 

could enforce law and order, it was the fear of all Iraqis-particularly their leaders-that the 

American departure would mean that violence was once again an option. And as it always does, 

that fear drove the parties to pre-empt one another to gain the advantage of surprise. 

It was the prime minister who moved tirst. We don't know Maliki's motives, but it seems that 

while he was in Washington in December 2011, before the last American soldier departed, his 

aides claimed that various Sunni leaders were plotting to mount a coup against him as soon as 

the Americans were gone. So he deployed troops and tanks outside the homes ofthree key Sunni 

leaders and arrested hundreds oflower-ranking Iraqiyya otlicials. When Sunni Vice President 

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Tariq al-Hashimi fled, Maliki had an arrest warrant issued in absentia, "confessions" (quite 

possibly coerced by torture) by Hashimi's bodyguards implicating him personally were 

broadcast on Iraqi TV and then Iraq's captive courts tried, convicted and sentenced him to death 

in absentia. 

A series of similarly frightening moves followed over the next 18 months. Although his 

opponents insist that Maliki had always intended to make himself the new despot of Iraq, the 

evidence suggests something different, although perhaps no less dangerous. Maliki was driven 

by genuine fear. Fear that all of his rivals were out to get him. He wasn't necessarily wrong 

about that. For many of them, if they could have overthrown him or killed him, they probably 

would have. But because he was the prime minister, the head of the government itself, Maliki's 

intentions were meaningless. All that mattered were his actions, and these were deeply 

subversive of Iraqi democracy, undermined all of the factors that had brought about Iraq's 

resurrection in 2007-2009 and revived the four problems that had produced the descent into civil 

war, and enflamed the Kurdish issue to boot. 

As a Shi'a Islamist, Maliki was always most suspicious of the Sunnis. Then, when Iraqiyya 

bested him in the 201 0 elections, it seems to have convinced him that he had been right all along 

and the Sunnis-all of whom seem to be crypto-Ba'thists in his mind-were his greatest threat. 

So it was against the Sunnis that he came down hardest. Between his attacks and their 

counterattacks, many Sunni leaders were arrested or driven from politics. They lost their 

positions and their patronage networks. Many promises to the Sunni community were never 

honored. And the Iraqi military ceased to be apolitical guardians of the people, and became 

instead loyal executors of the prime minister's particular agenda. 

To the Sunnis, Maliki was tearing up all of the promises that they had won from the Americans 

and from him. They felt they were again being deprived of their fair share of political power and 

economic resources. They felt that once again, Shi'i chauvinists were in charge of the 

government and were using its apparatus, particularly the security services, to wage a sectarian 

war against them. They increasingly came to believe that they had no peaceful, political 

recourse to address their grievances, let alone secure their legitimate aspirations. Once again, 

they felt that they had no choice but to fight. And so, various Sunnis began to discretely reach 

out to their old terrorist friends again By 2012, al-Qa'ida in Iraq was back from the dead, 

conducting coordinated nation-wide bombings, contesting control of parts of Diyala province, 

killing scores or even hundreds at a time. 

The Impact of the Syrian Civil War 

To hear it from many Iraqi officials, the increase in terrorist attacks across Iraq over the past two 

years has been entirely the product of the Syrian civil war The Syrian civil war has 

unquestionably contributed to the problems of Iraq, but this claim is not just overstated, it is 

potentially dangerous. Focusing on spillover from the Syrian civil war is convenient for the Iraqi 

government to shift blame away from its own mistakes. Stemming spillover from Syria into 

Iraq-difficult in its own right-will not get at the real causes of the problem. It could raise 

expectations artificially, and when they inevitably crash because the violence does not abate, this 

could exacerbate popular unhappiness with the government. Alternatively, it could cause the 

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Iraqi government to take precipitous action to deal with spillover from Syria (like intervening in 

the Syrian civil war) that could instead undermine Iraq's own fragile stability. 

The impact of spillover from the Syrian civil war has affected Iraq in several different ways. It 

has meant a flow of Salafi fighters, weapons, money and other supplies into the Sunni tribal 

lands of Iraq from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis and other Gulf Arab states have been using Iraq as 

a conduit to help the opposition in Syria, which is predominantly Sunni. From the Saudi 

perspective, this makes sense in two ways. In an immediate sense, the Sunni tribes of this area 

span the borders from northern Saudi Arabia to western Iraq to eastern Syria. Thus, these tribes 

provide an excellent delivery network for supplies from Saudi Arabia into Syria. However, at a 

broader level, the Gulf Arabs recognize that the Iraqi tribesmen are keeping some portion of the 

men and materiel to help them in their own fight against Baghdad. The suppliers generally see 

this as a bonus. As one well-connected Saudi explained it, "We see the Syrian civil war and the 

(coming) Iraqi civil war as the same and we will treat them as the same." From Riyadh's 

perspective, there are Iranian-backed Shi'i governments in both Syria and Iraq that are 

oppressing their Sunni populations-Sunni populations that Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab 

states feel increasingly determined to support. 

The wider impact of the Syrian civil war has also exacerbated the Sunni-Shi'a rift in Iraq by 

conjuring the possibility that in a new Iraqi civil war, the Sunnis could expect greater help from 

the Sunni Arab states than they did the first time around. As I noted earlier, one reason that the 

Sunni tribal leadership partnered with the U.S military to launch the Awakening was their 

realization that the Shi'a were winning the Iraqi civil war, driving the Sunnis from Baghdad and 

surrounding towns, and threatening to ethnically cleanse the Sunni community from the Tigris 

and Euphrates river valleys. They understood that they needed American help to prevent such a 

catastrophic defeat. Today, there are no Americans to turn to if a new civil war goes as badly as 

the first, so the Sunnis have had to go looking for new allies. 

The mobilization of the Sunni Arab world brought about by the Syrian civil war has seemed to at 

least some Iraqi Sunni leaders to have provided an answer to that dilemma. Thus, although 

Iraq's Sunnis no longer have the Americans to protect them, many now believe that they have 

the entire Sunni world to support them. In their minds, their struggle against Maliki has gone 

from one in which they were the underdogs in a fight against a much larger Iraqi Shi'a 

community, to one in which they are part of a vast Sunni army mobilizing to crush the puny 

Shi'a apostasy. 

What is to be Done? 

What this history should made clear is that the problems ofIraq produced and enabled the rise of 

al-Qaeda in Iraq. AQI did not cause the problems of Iraq (although it unquestionably did 

exacerbate them). 

When the Sunni community has felt threatened by the Shi'a-dominated government-in 2004-

2006 and again since 2011-AQI and other Salafist groups have found receptive audiences 

among the Sunni tribes. Initially, they were embraced. Today they seem more tolerated. Both 

work for AQI. Many Sunnis remember the bad old days when AQI and the Salafists ruled over 

swathes of western Iraq. But they fear the Shi'a-dominated government intends to oppress or 

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even slaughter them, and so they provide both passive and active support to the Salafi st groups. 

Passive support by allowing the terrorists to operate without alerting the authorities. Active 

support because a slowly increasing number ofTraqis are again joining AQI, JRTN and other 

groups and/or providing them with money, explosives and weaponry. Some do so to fight back 

against what they see as their Shi'a oppressors. Others because they hope that doing so will 

force the Shi'a leaders to compromise and return to the power-sharing arrangement worked out 

by the Americans during the Surge. 

Thus, addressing the rise of al-Qaeda, halting and reversing it, will mean addressing Iraq's 

underlying political problems and particularly the renewed alienation ofTraq's Sunni tribes. 

Until that is accomplished, anything else will be merely treating the symptoms, not the 

underlying disease. And no matter how hard we or the Iraqi government may battle the 

symptoms, if they do not cure the underlying disease, the symptoms will recur, quite possibly in 

ever more virulent form. 

However, the United States government is not the government of Iraq. It is not even guiding the 

government of Iraq. Thus, an important question for this Committee is what the United States 

might be able to do about this situation? How can the United States help guard its interests in the 

stability of Iraq? 

And that is not easy to answer. Frederick the Great once said that diplomacy without arms is like 

music without instruments. In today's world, we might add things like trade, economic aid, 

technical assistance and other aspects of soft power to the Soldier-King's 18th Century notion of 

diplomatic instruments. Yet even by that measure, the United States has dramatically fewer 

assets to call upon to advance its Iraq policy than it had in years past. The end of the American 

military presence, the dramatic reduction in American aid to Iraq, and the increasing influence of 

Iran in Iraq all mean that the United States will find it far more difficult to guide Iraq's course. 

Consequently, one of the most important tasks for the United States if we are to help Iraq address 

both the symptoms and the problems is to forge new instruments that will provide us with new 

leverage to replace what we have lost 

Creating New Sources of American Influence 

The key to increasing American influence in Iraq moving forward is conditionality. Virtually all 

American assistance to Iraq should be conditioned on Iraqis doing the things that the United 

States needs them to do, which in every case is likely to be something that is in the long-term 

interests of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi nation, albeit not necessarily in the short-term interests 

of various Iraqi politicians. Conditioning assistance means linking specific aspects of American 

activities to specitic, related aspects of Iraqi behavior. It also means tying wider aspects of 

American cooperation with Iraq to the general course of the Iraqi political system. Ultimately, 

the United States must condition the continuation of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship on the 

willingness of the Iraqi political leadership to guide their country in the direction of greater 

stability, inclusivity and effective governance. 

Operationalizing the Strtttegic Framework Agreement Ultimately, the greatest source of 

American influence in Iraq is the provision of additional assistance in a vast range of different 

areas-from military support and weapons sales, to capacity building, education, almost every 

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aspect of economic refonn, and a slew of major diplomatic matters. The foundation for this 

future cooperation is a little-known but critically important document known as the Strategic 

Framework Agreement (SF A), which the United States and Iraq signed in late 2008. It is 

important not to make too much of the SFA. It is nothing but a framework; an empty shell for 

the United States and Iraq to flesh out as they see fit over the years-but which neither side has 

filled out as intended. There is little more than general exhortations regarding the broad types of 

aid that could be provided, without any specification oftime, dates, quantities, or other details. 

Having failed to do so for so long, it is now vitally important that the United States work with 

Iraq to transfonn the SF A from a theoretical framework into a functioning program. A key 

challenge will be reconciling U.S. and Iraqi expectations for the SFA and finding creative ways 

to use it to pursue these critical aims in an era of sharply declining resources. The United States 

will have to think creatively about how to provide valuable assistance without the need for largescale American financing. Moreover, as Iraq's oil revenues increase over time, Iraq should be 

able to pay for more of its reconstruction needs. Therefore, the real value added from the 

American side will be insight and advice on how best to employ those resources rather than 

adding in more resources-something that neither the administration nor Congress has any 

interest in providing. 

Consequently, the United States should focus the assistance it provides to Iraq under the rubric of 

the SF A primarily on capacity building by providing technical advice, consulting services, and 

technology and knowledge transfers to key areas of the Iraqi economy. The United States must 

now consider both how it can be most effective in this role and how it can maintain the leverage 

to encourage Iraqis to build a transparent and accountable government when America is no 

longer putting up large amounts of its own money for projects. 

There are, fortunately, a number of areas of the Iraqi economy both inside and outside the SFA 

where the United States can deliver tangible added value at a relatively low financial cost These 

include: 

• International engagement and mediation on issues such as Iraq's Chapter Vll UN 

obligations, including annual reparations to Kuwait and disputes over the Iraq-Kuwait 

maritime boundary (which have the potential to hamper Iraq's primary oil export route 

through the Persian Gulf), dialogue with Iraq's northern neighbors, especially Turkey, on 

regional water-sharing agreements, and the protection ofTraq's oil revenues from legal 

claims relating to actions of the fonner regime, something that ifleft unaddressed could 

hamper long-term investment in the oil and gas sector; 

• Fonnation ofajoint economic commission under the SFA, which, when requested by 

Iraqis, could serve as a central oversight body to coordinate, monitor, and provide 

technical expertise for reconstruction and capital investment proj ects initiated with Iraqi 

funds; 

• Technical advice, knowledge sharing, and technology transfer to vital areas of the Iraqi 

economy and society such as improved domestic water efficiency and management and 

agricultural development and productivity; 

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• Legislative actions to create a business environment that encourages Western business 

investments. 

Conducting Counterterrorism Operations 

Assistance with Iraqi counterterrorism operations falls into a similar category. The Iraqis have 

made clear that they want American assistance, and that creates leverage. It is certainly true that 

Iraq could benefit from American assistance in its CT etTorts, especially as the threat from AQI 

and other Salafist groups expands. Thus, there is a legitimate reason to provide such assistance. 

However, we should never lose sight of the critical point that counterterrorism operations is a 

poor means of countering terrorism, and that eradicating the resurgent terrorism problem will 

require the same kinds of etforts to address Iraq's fundamental political, economic and social 

problems as were made in 2007-2009. CT assistance can help, but it cannot solve the problem of 

terrorism. 

In addition, it may be useful for the United States to continue to assist Iraq's own CT efforts both 

as a means of keeping AQI and other Salafist terrorist groups in check and as a way of 

maintaining some oversight of how the Iraqi government employs its elite counterterror 

formations. Iraq's highly-trained CT units have often been used to round up rivals (and brand 

them as terrorists). Thus, greater American oversight of their operations could only be beneficial. 

American Arms Sales to Iraq. It is critical that the United States be willing to provide Iraq with 

major arms purchases. Ideally, the United States should furnish every aspect of Iraqi military 

equipment, from mess kits to main battle tanks and everything in between. As long as Iraq 

desires them (which it currently does) and can afford them (which it increasingly can), such arms 

sales, when provided by the United States, could be inherently stabilizing if managed effectively 

and in tandem with political reform in Baghdad; it could also help stabilize the region by 

preventing the emergence of an aggressive Iraq that would pose a threat to its neighbors. In 

addition, arms sales represent yet another source of influence with the Iraqi leadership since they 

are items Baghdad greatly desires. Consequently, these sales should be considered from a 

strategic perspective, not a commercial one and from that perspective, they are not just desirable 

but critical. Indeed, one of the most important lessons of the Arab Spring and Mubarak's fall has 

been the tremendous utility American arms sales can have in the Middle East. 

As with all American interactions toward Iraq in future, however, Washington's critical 

consideration when weighing arms sales to Iraq must be their impact on Iraq's domestic politics. 

Again, such sales can be extremely helpful in this area, as I discuss below. However, they can 

also be destabilizing if mishandled. Moreover, they too represent a critical element of American 

leverage with Iraq. In particular, American arms sales to Iraq should be conditioned on 

continuing improvement (or at least no significant deterioration) in Iraq's civil-military relations. 

The Iraqi military should understand that Washington's willingness to provide the arms they so 

desperately want will be possible only to the extent that the ISF stays in its lane and stays out of 

politics. So too should the government understand that American arms sales-among other 

things-will be jeopardized by efforts to politicize the ISF. Finally, because the KRG is terrified 

that the central government will imagine it has a military "solution" to their dispute once the ISF 

is armed with American tanks and fighter-bombers, Washington must lay down clear red lines to 

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both sides regarding what is pennissible. Furthermore, the United States should extract 

guarantees from the government that it will not invade the Kurdistan region, except perhaps in 

the highly unlikely event that the Kurds use their own forces to attack other parts ofTraq 

Bolstering the Sources of Restraint 

It is also important to recognize that, as bad as things have gotten, all is not lost in Iraq. Despite 

the resurgence in violence-and in the perpetrators of violence like AQI-and the reemergence 

of the many factors that pulled Iraq into the vortex of civil war in 2005-2006, Iraq has not yet 

returned to a state of civil war. Indeed, given how bad things have gotten, what is striking is that 

Iraq is not worse off than it already is. Three unexpected, interrelated factors have emerged to 

slow Iraq's reemergent violence in 2013. 

The Tmnians. According to a range of Iraqi sources, Iran believes that it has its hands full with 

Syria and does not want to open up another front in the grand Sunni-Shi 'a civil war that many 

Sunni extremists are now stoking. The Iranians apparently recognize that they are not 

benefitting from fears of a wider sectarian conflict and are trying to prevent one from 

emerging-which is precisely what would happen if civil war resumed in Iraq. Moreover, 

Tehran no doubt recognizes that a civil war on its doorstep would be particularly dangerous 

because the spillover could easily affect Iran's own fractious minorities and fragile internal 

politics. 

Other Iraqis report that Tehran sees a new civil war in Iraq as being potentially deleterious to its 

currently enviable position within Iraq. Unless the Shi'a could win a quick, overwhelming 

victory in a new civil war, the status quo is preferable to any other outcome for them. In any 

other scenario, Iraq would be torn by fighting and the Shi 'a dominated government would likely 

lose control of parts of Iraq. Much better, from Tehran's perspective, to have the Shi'a in 

nominal control over the entire country-in part to enable Iran to move supplies across it to their 

allies in Syria. 

The Kurds. The Kurds have never been more than half-hearted citizens of the modern Iraqi 

republic, having attempted to distance themselves from-or cut ties completely with-Baghdad 

on a half-dozen occasions since the fall of the Ottoman empire. This desire has sharpened 

markedly among the leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since the unfulfilled 

Erbil agreement of 2013, which defined a road-map for all parties in return for agreeing that Nuri 

al-Maliki would remain prime minister. By early 2013, KRG President Mas'ud Barzani, seemed 

committed to a precipitate move toward secession so furious had he become with Maliki, and so 

enchanted by new economic and political opportunities created with Turkey as a result of both 

Erdogan's Kurdish policy and the Syrian civil war. Kurdish otlicials openly discussed a 

declaration of independence that year or the next 

Thus, it was a dramatic turnabout when in the spring of 2013, as the violence between Sunni and 

Shi' a intensified in Arab Iraq, that Barzani suddenly came down to Baghdad to play peacemaker. 

Kurdish sources suggested a variety of reasons for Barzani' s change of heart. First, the TurkishPKK ceasefire included provisions for PKK tighters to redeploy from Turkey to the KRG. 

Making this work is critical to Barzani both to bolster his status as the leading figure among all 

Kurds, and to cement his relationship with Erdogan and the Turks, which in turn is critical for 

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Kurdistan's future hopes of autonomy and eventual independence. Barzani needed the rest of 

Iraq to remain quiet while he took in the PKK to placate the Turks. 

However, Barzani and his KDP have also been deeply concerned about their position within 

Kurdish internal politics. lalal Talabani, the president ofIraq and head of the rival PUK suffered 

a stroke in late 2012 from which he has not recovered. Most Kurds expect he never will. But the 

question of who will succeed him as head of the PUK has been an open question with a variety 

of candidates vying behind the scenes. Here as well, Barzani and his trusted lieutenants 

concluded that they needed peace in the rest of Iraq to ensure that the PUK comes out in the right 

place---with a leader Barzani can work with, ifnot dominate. 

Meanwhile, Barzani's term as president of the KRG was running out. He called elections for 

September 2013 and then fought a bruising battle with the opposition to have the KRG 

constitution altered to allow him to serve as president for an additional two years. The 

September KRG elections returned the KDP as the largest party with 38 seats, but Gorran, the 

main Kurdish opposition party, claimed 24 seats, besting the PUK's paltry 18. These results 

raise the possibility that Gorran might be able to take over the PUK's territory, which would then 

threaten the KDP's dominance within the KRG. Again, Barzani felt that he did not need a fight 

with Baghdad during this delicate period of intense internal machinations. 

Fear of Losing. Finally, as Iraq seemed to be lurching back to civil war in the spring and 

summer of2013, important figures among both Sunnis and Shi'a called into question the 

desirability of pursuing belligerent courses of action for a simple reason: they might lose. 

As I noted earlier, some Sunni tribal leaders see the mobilization of the Sunni world against the 

Shi' a threat as being a critical change since 2006, one that could bring them victory in a new 

Iraqi civil war. Others are not so sure. When confronted with promises of aid from the Gulf 

Arabs, some Sunni leaders have apparently demanded, "how many battalions will the Bahrainis 

send?" A battle is going on among the Sunni leaders over whether to roll the dice of war and 

risk the fate of their community on the evanescent promise of a Sunni Arab world that has done 

little concrete to help in Iraq for decades. 

As for the Shi'a, they know that they were on the brink of victory in 2006, but they too fear the 

mobilization of the Sunni world and what this could mean in a new Iraqi civil war Moreover, 

Iraqi Army formations have performed poorly in various confrontations with the Kurds and 

Sunnis over the past year Kurdish Peshmerga forces have repeatedly out-maneuvered Iraqi 

formations in a series of shadow battles. Several Iraqi Army brigades have effectively broken 

down into their separate ethno-sectarian components and rendered combat ineffective. Thus, 

Maliki seems equally unsure that he would win this time. 

Finally, Maliki also faces new divisions within the Shi'a camp that threaten to undermine his 

ability to use force to bring either the Kurds or Sunnis to heel. In particular, the Sadrists have 

again split from his coalition. There has never been any love lost between the Prime Minister 

and Muqtada, but in the past the Iranians had put tremendous pressure on the Sadrists to support 

Maliki. During the summer of2012, Sadr defied Iranian wishes and broke with Maliki 

13 
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altogether, at least for now. However, Tehran has managed to turn this to its advantage by 

helping to forge a new ISCI-Sadrist coalition to counterbalance Maliki. 

In truth, the Iranians have never liked Maliki. They remember his role in helping the Americans 

crush their militia allies in 2007-2008 and believe (probably correctly) that Maliki hates them 

and would like to build a strong Iraq able to stand up to Iran. Tehran has repeatedly looked for a 

more pliable alternative to Maliki but have yet to find one, and so must grudgingly continue to 

rely on him. Building up an alternative Shi'a coalition to Maliki's State of Law serves Tehran's 

interests by keeping Maliki weak and keeping all of the Shi'a dependent on Iran as the fulcrum 

ofTraqi Shi'a politics. The result is that Maliki has been left with a divided power base, and 

many Shi'a rivals willing to side with the Sunnis and Kurds to oppose him. That too has forced 

him to throttle back his confrontational approach to Iraq's other communities. 

The Impending National Elections 

It is against this backdrop that Iraq will hold national elections in 2014 to choose a new 

parliament and a new prime minister. These elections offer an opportunity for the United States 

and other like-minded countries to help Iraq deal with their internal political problems and so 

deal with the underlying sources giving rise to the new wave of terrorism gripping Iraq. 

Unfortunately, they also hold the potential to do the opposite: dramatically worsen Iraq's 

political problems, which could only greatly exacerbate the violence and possibly push the 

country back into civil war. 

His protests to the contrary notwithstanding, it is widely expected that Prime Minister Maliki 

will run for parliament and seek to remain prime minister. (He has already had Iraq's highest 

court strike down a newly-passed law that set a two-term limit on the prime minister and 

president His opposition fears that if Maliki secures a third term, he will never step down. In 

fact, many worry that ifhe believes that he will lose, Maliki will rig the election or declare 

martial law and suspend it altogether. So far, the prime minister has given no indication that he 

would do so, but many of his closest advisors insisted that the 2010 elections had been rigged 

against him (by the United States-a ludicrous claim given that the US. Embassy in Baghdad 

staunchly supported Maliki). Certainly no one can rule out the possibility that if the Prime 

Minister's coterie believed that the vote were being rigged against him, they might try to fight 

fire with fire 

On the other side, Iraq's opposition also has a great deal riding on the election. For them, it is a 

crucial test In their eyes, it will establish whether there truly is a way to handle Maliki through a 

peaceful, political process and whether politics more generally are a viable path to achieve the 

political, economic and security needs of their communities. For the moderates, it is critical that 

the elections demonstrate that such an alternative is possible. For the extremists, ifMaliki 

wins-legally or illegally-they will use it to claim that the peaceful, political course is a dead 

end and violence the only way to defend themselves against a "dictatorial" prime minister. 

Consequently, the national elections could be the last push needed to send Iraq over the cliff of 

renewed civil war. These fears loom especially large because, historically, Iraqi elections have 

more often hurt its democratic development than helped. In 2004 and again in 2005, in the midst 

of the security vacuum, misbegotten elections demanded by the United States empowered the 

14 
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worst elements in Iraqi society, enflamed the sectarian fears, and hastened the country's descent 

into all-out civil war. In 2010, national elections should have been a major step forward, as the 

Iraqi people voted overwhelmingly for the parties considered most secular and least tied to the 

militias. The problem came afterwards. Once the United States failed to enforce the rules of the 

democratic process, it became a free-for-all, with Iraqi political leaders falling back on their 

worst habits and producing a government in a way that compromised democracy and set-up the 

problems to come. 

Still there is other evidence worth considering. Iraq's provincial elections in 2009 rewarded the 

political parties that stood for secularism, democracy, the rule of law, and an end to conflict. But 

they were held in the warm afterglow of the Surge and at time when large numbers of American 

troops remained in Iraq. Thus, many fear that they merely represent the exception proving the 

rule. 

Finally, in April 2013, Iraq held provincial elections again and they turned out very well. There 

was little to no vote tampering. No one claimed that the vote was rigged or voting suppressed. 

The government did not shut down the elections, and even held them (albeit three months later) 

in the Sunni-dominated provinces where unrest has been greatest. Moreover, the results were 

striking: The Prime Minister's coalition lost big and the rival Shi'a parties of ISCI and the 

Sadrists (both hewing to a more moderate line than in the past) did surprisingly well. Thus, this 

year's provincial elections suggested that Iraq could hold elections without American forces 

present and get both a good process and a good result that all parties would honor without 

resorting to violence. That is definitely a hopeful sign. Wejust do not know ifit is enough. 

That uncertainty is why it is so important for the United States to rebuild its influence in Iraq and 

employ it to help the Iraqis address their internal problems-political especially, but eventually 

economic and social as well. There is reason for optimism. We did it before, albeit with a vast 

toolkit of resources to draw upon, something we lack this time around. There are also forces in 

Iraq trying to push the country in the right direction, but they are not strong enough. There is 

some time, but it is impossible to know how much. Now is not the time to throw up our hands 

and say that it is too hard. As former Ambassador Ryan Crocker used to say, everything about 

Iraq is very hard, and it is very hard all the time. But try we must because the rising terrorist 

violence in Iraq and the specter of renewed civil war threatens America's interests just as it 

threatens Iraq's. 

15 
23

Mr. POE. Ms. Lewis? 

STATEMENT OF MS. JESSICA D. LEWIS, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, 

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 

Ms. LEWIS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Chairman, Mr. 

Ranking Member, and distinguished members. It is an honor to 

speak to you today. And I thank you as well for your service. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent. As you have mentioned levels of 

violence in Iraq this year compared to 2008 according to multiple 

sources, the pattern of car bomb attacks attributed to al-Qaeda in 

Iraq compared to early 2007, these attacks are not haphazard; instead, demonstrating clear patterns and operational intent as well 

as a sophisticated military bureaucracy that can design, resource, 

and execute phased military campaigns. It is necessary to observe 

their capabilities and organization as well as their expressed goals 

in order to estimate what threats al-Qaeda may pose to governments in the region and ultimately to U.S. interests. 

The two al-Qaeda campaigns I will discuss are the Breaking the 

Walls campaign from July 2012 to July 2013 and the ongoing Soldiers’ Harvest campaign. The testimony I provided reports extensively on the former to support the conclusions I will address here. 

The first, the Breaking the Walls campaign, was executed primarily through al-Qaeda in Iraq’s signature weapons system, the 

vehicle-born improvised explosive device, or VBIED, which is a 

highly specialized and signature car bomb. The campaign involved 

2 main objectives: To reconstitute the veteran al-Qaeda network in 

prison in Iraq, as mentioned; and to target Shia civilians in order 

to stoke a sectarian war. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was successful at both. 

Two prison attacks resulted in mass prisoner release, including the 

most recent Abu Ghraib attack. The wave of car bomb attacks 

against Shia civilian attacks escalated dramatically in February of 

this year. And by May, there were indications of Shia militia remobilization in Baghdad. The waves of car bombs showcased alQaeda in Iraq’s robust supply chain and specialized weapons skills. 

The second campaign, the Soldiers’ Harvest, involved 2 new objectives to target the Iraqi security forces directly and to establish 

control of terrain in Iraq as well as Syria. The Iraqi security forces 

are now targeted in their homes as an intimidation tactic. They are 

also being targeted through combined arms attacks upon security 

compounds, particularly in Kirkuk and Anbar provinces. The attacks upon hardened facilities are complex, involving car bombs, indirect fire, small arms fire. And they represent al-Qaeda’s contests 

for control of terrain in Iraq. 

As of November 2013, there are indications of al-Qaeda’s moving 

to establish control in southern Anbar province, in Diyala province, 

and northern Babil province, along with multiple locations in Syria, 

including northern border towns in areas around Aleppo City. 

The control of terrain serves more than a military purpose. AlQaeda in Iraq’s goals include governance, which also extends to 

Syria. In April 2013, the organization’s leader, Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi, announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq 

and al-Sham, referring to Iraq and Syria. This indicates not only 

that Al-Baghdadi’s goal is the establishment of an Islamic emirate 

24

but also that he envisions his emirate as transnational, spanning 

territory in Iraq as well as Syria. 

It is likely that al-Qaeda’s military resurgence in Iraq was made 

possible because of the war in Syria as well as political conditions 

in Iraq, but given the attention that al-Qaeda continues to direct 

to attacks in Iraq, it is also likely that al-Qaeda’s military achievements in Iraq have allowed it to assert greater control over territory and organizations in Syria. 

As the moderate opposition in Syria falters, al-Qaeda in Iraq 

stands to gain without rivals to limit its advances on that front. In 

Iraq, the Iraqi security forces are mobilized to fight al-Qaeda, but 

their operations are not succeeding. And al-Qaeda’s operations are 

driving security force response. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence poses a direct threat in the region 

in 2 ways that I see. First, al-Qaeda establishes control of terrain. 

It does so at the expense of state legitimacy, which extends conditions of lawlessness from Syria to Iraq and further threatens Turkey, Jordan, and other states in the region. 

Second, al-Qaeda’s campaign against Shia civilians and holy sites 

in Iraq escalates regional sectarianism and necessarily invokes Iranian concern. In this way, al-Qaeda in Iraq accelerates other regional threats. 

Aside from associated threats to U.S. interests that are physically located in the region, the greatest threat that al-Qaeda in 

Iraq poses to U.S. security today is the military professionalism of 

the foreign fighter network, as mentioned, which connects alQaeda’s affiliates globally. Foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria today 

are learning al-Qaeda in Iraq’s style of warfare and potentially 

forming strong bonds. As these fighters return to Africa, to 

Chechnya, to Europe with experiences and relationships in hand, 

they will pose new threats. They may precipitate attacks in the 

West. 

At this time, al-Qaeda in Iraq has not voiced the intent to target 

the U.S., which has been interpreted to mean that it should be a 

lower-priority terrorist threat. While it is likely that the broader alQaeda network benefits from al-Qaeda in Iraq’s success, which 

should concern us, it is also important to recognize that al-Qaeda 

in Iraq is not solely operating as a terrorist organization. It is operating like a military vanguard. And it is necessary to evaluate the 

threat to the region and to the U.S. that an al-Qaeda-led emirate 

in Iraq and Syria may pose. Conditions point to their increased 

strength over the coming year, making this goal a greater concern. 

I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis follows:]

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COi)eI' Art?y Maggw ObniIJ!Il. 

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of 

this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any 

means, electronic or mechanicaL including photocopy, recording, or any 

information storage or retrieval system, vvilhollt permission in writing froTTl 

the publisher. 

©20I3 by the Ins.titute for the Study of War. 

Published in ?,0[3 -in the United States of America hy the Institute for the 

Study ofV·lar. 

1400 16th Street 1\l"\./{ Suite 515 Washington, DC ~0036. 

http://www.understand-ingwar.org 
27


86007b-3.eps

JESSICA D. LEWIS 

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 14 

AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT 

THE BREAKING THE WAllS CAMPAIGN, PART I 
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

TE'~~i<..i' D. L"wi~ i,. the R"~('(1.nh Dir("c:tor at TSY,'. Te~"k:'_~()inE'2 -:-S\,,- in the ~1.nnmer of '2012 follo'.ol1ng eighi: Vf',lr~ of ~eT'\'k(' on ActlVe 

a.'i nll lllldhge'l..:e olllcer no ,hI" U S. ~'\.t·ml' Her mHiLary co:ref'r Lnckde~ 3.~ motJlhs deplo)ed io "bere 

intc11igt':lce ~llppOn: to oper'J.tlona"L, t~e~J.t{'J· (;orr:rnd_lld~. Slw hd~ tv.icc Lt'E'll 

UpO:l opel'auon~. jcs"lca adciiLion?lly ~ervcd on l()m'~ in (rcrma:n and the UnlLed SUlle< 

counter-terrOrlsm 11l1alvst. 

the lead ard~ li eel fell lSW', technolog" and In: a ~lraleg) 

0.iwrl'i 111 T r~1(c: portfolio, .Te~~ic,,- ~p(,Cl:-\li7t'~ -n d,i"i vi~uiili7'l.t-on, network ,m'l]y~i~, ,m:J il1t-::llist'nce ~uppnrt to oper;rcion,il She is 

charung a cO"L'~e to "d-vance IS\·\C\ ~ignalure "n"lylical r.1elhodologie~, and Lo .cevolJUonj<le Lhe conduct of in'.ellig'encc from open ~Ol1rce~, 

In P<I::-tic.d<lr, ,;h(' ~eeb t'J incoT}.)l .. n-ak the- :um..:tion of <:;uly W;',IllU:5 lute lS\\'\ T<:.o:-loll.;ll wo~.k. 

She h~" also authored se~eral 01 inciud'llg "AI it, O:):eclhf'~ 

(It ;\L-01 Ghra;b", "from p",",",' ,,[,'"''''''''''''' 

remollilue. 

R('"i~t,ll1(f''' "Triiq'~ ~t'd,l~lan 

Jf'~~ic,. hold~ a B .• 'L in SlraLE'gic & T nlft';la( 1<::'na1 Hj~t 01'}' and T nlet'na\ional RelaUon,. Cn-:tTI "\!"Te< Pryinl and ~.n lI.r .J\.. in ;;)(l'(lleg;~ T n!r,llige!:rc 

room /\rneri(",11( Military Ulliy~::-~ity. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

Abund,mt t1Mllb TO Dr , KimbeTly i'_lld T'rederick K,lg,lr for their mell~o";11P ilnd thousl~t leader,_nip ,h",'e ~ally yedr,", Sp~Clal tn')l1i;, a, 

for bUl1dbg-the mm, In''ighl~'ul ror,len,po",,'\, 

Stephen W'icken, Sam "\fyer, ""'V,UO<"DqurH<n, 

H:(h-.fiH'tb il"d 1'.1icll,v,j T<ehr,mi. fell' tlleir crnltivp en('rh,.-j{'~ ,md ~kv()tinll. C\nd 

ill;' SIncere tha,'lh La _2',..aron ",zee.,e ~md N:!.al:;gJe Obr:Wln. 

rep0rt 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS \fTDDTT fAST srCUR-;-TYRr,T'orn [4 i I\T -Q.A.l'DA T~ IRAQ Rf,S"(JRGTyr: jr,SSICA Tl. T l"\nS I sr,T'Tr,"\mr,l{ ,,01:::\ 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 07 

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 09 

METHODOLOGy ............................................................................................ l' 

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN: "BREAKING THE WALLS" ........................................ 13 

THE NEXT CAMPAIGN: "SOLDIERS' HARVEST" ............................................. 20 

AQI'S MILITARY ORGANIZATION ........................................................ 21 

WHAT WE KNOW................................................................................ 30 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 32 

NOTES .......................................................................................................... 34 

MAPS & CHARTS 

MAP OF IRAQ ............................................................................................ 06 

IRAQ CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ....................................................................... 08 

VBIED ATTACKS OVER TIME ....................................................................... 13 

PHASE I: PROOF OF CONCEPT ............... .. . ....................................... 14 

PHASE II: THE GREEN LINE .................... .. . .................................. 15 

PHASE III: THE PUSH TO BAGHDAD ............................................................ 17 

PHASE IV: THE AOI SURGE ........................................................................... 18 

AQI STATE VISION MAP ................................................................................ 19 

IRAQ VBIED CAMPAIGN IN SYRIAN CONTEXT ............................................. 22 

VBIEDS VS. SVBIEDS JULY 2013-JULY 2013 ................................................ 24 

AREAS OF INTEREST FOR AQI VBIED OPERATIONS .......................... 25 

TOTAL VBIEDS PER MONTH VS. TOTAL VBIED VS. VBIEDS IN WAVES .......... 27 

PHASES I-IV BAGHDAD ............................................................................... 28 

AQI ATTACK & SUPPORT ZONES .................................................................. 32 
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MAP 1 I IRAQ 
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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 14. 

AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT 

THE BREAKING THE WAU.S CAMPAIGN, PART I 

By jessica D. Lewis 

A l-Qaeda in Iraq 1S resurgent. AI-Qaeda in Iraq (A.QI) reached its apex of territorial control and 

~estructive capahility in late ~oo6 and early ~oo7, before the Surge <'Ind the Awakening removed the 

organization from its safe hav('ns in and around Baghdad. I Subsequent operations pursued AQI northward 

through Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Mosul, degrading the organization over the course of 2007-2008 

such that only a fraction of its leaders, functional cells, and terroristic capabilities remained and were 

concentrated in Mosu1.~ As of August 20T3, AQJ has regrouped, regained capabilities, and expanded into 

areas from which it was expelled during the Surge. 

AQI in 2013 is an extremely vigorous, resilient, and 

capable organization that can operate from Basra to 

coastal Syr-ia. This papertracesAQT's revlval in Iraq since 

July 2012, when the organization launched a year-long 

operation they named the "Breaking the Walls" campaign. 

Thi~ campaign cons1sted of a serles of 24 TTlajol' vehicleborne improvised explosive device (VB lED) attacks 

and eight prison breaks that demonstrate the evolution 

of AQI's military capability over that time (See Part 2 

of this report, which describes these attacks in deta-i1). 

VBIEDs had been the signature attack type of AQI from 

2006-2008.' Since May 2013, AQl has consistently 

exceeded the number of VB1ED attacks per month [hat 

it condl1cted in J1l11C 2007, while sustaining operations 

in Syria as \vel1. 

The "Breaking the Walls" caTTlpa-ign ended on July ~T, 

2013, when al-Qaeda in Iraq successfully breached the 

prison at Abu Ghraib, Ie-adi ng (Q the escape of 500 or 

more prisoners;l the TTlajority of whoTTl were detained 

during' the Iraq i/{ar for tE'rrorist act-jvities.~ The Uniled 

States has reacLed by reaffirming the $10 million bounty 

placed on Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, the leader of AQI, 

whom of-ficials said was b.::a.sed -in Syria in August ~013.G 

Targeting AQT's leader, ho"",ever, will not be E'ffective in 

halting the organization's grm.,:th. AQI is no louger a 

small cadre based around a single leader, but rather an 

effect-jve reconstituted 1l11}-itary organization operating 

in Iraq and Syria. 

The United States ha~ also agreed to provide counterterroriSln support to the government of Iraq. As a senior 

State Department official said, the United States wants 

Iraq to "h;:l\'e the inforTTlat-ion to be able to map the 

network, to get at its financing'. and to be vcry precise in 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

its targeting, because Iraqi forces are under threat and 

they're liabl~ to TTlake TTlistakes such as going at the threat 

in a symmetrical way, round-ing up too TTlany people, 

targetiug the wrong person, which makes the whole 

problem worse.'·7 Yet the AQI network has grown robust 

o"erthe past fourteen months, and TTlappingthe network 

and -its finance'> TTl.::ty not suffice to halt its expansion. 

A senior U.S. administration official noted the 

unexpected growth ofAQl's suicide bombing campaign. 

Briefing on August 15, 2013, he stated that "Over the last 

two ye<lrs, we've had an average of about 5 to 10 suicide 

bombers a month, in 20II and 2012 .... '.ve've seen over 

the labt 90 days the suicide bomber numbers approach 

about 30 a month, and we still suspect most of those are 

cOTTling in from Syria. 

AQI's path to war was not ahrupt, however. Violence 

began to escalate in June 2012 just before the start of 

the "Breaking the WalJs" campaign. CasuaJty level~ in 

Traq have risen significantly over 20[2-2013, cal1sed 

primarily by AQT's v'BIED attacks. The overall violence 

level in Iraq inJulY2013 'Nas commensurate with wartime 

Ievell> last obst'lved in Iraq in April 2008. Total monthly 

fatahties at the end of Jl11y ~013 exceeded 1,000 for 

the first t-ime since that date, according to the United 

Nationsj-\.<;sistance Mission- Lraq (UNA1ll).~ 

AQJ has been able to grow not only because of -its safehavens and recruiting grounds in Syr-ia, but also because 

it has replenished its veteran manpower through 

prison breaks inside of Iraq. The "Breaking the W,JIs" 

campalgn -involved a total of eight complex attacks 

upon Iraqi prisons, two of wh-ich successfully freed 

hard-core veterans who had likely participated in AQl's 
32


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Iraq Civilian Casualties 

2007-2008 VS. 2013 

, 

1!i1,,,,q(l.>Il,Cu,,·,L"crl 

·,I, ..... GOVT.CI'IKIA 

"1'''q,andCG~iI,..,r,,~~ 

"CO<litcn(e~t 

~,/:J"' .. ~jl ~~i' .. /' .w>~l''Jl .jp\.j$<$ vi' cfl~o.l if':~ ,;><.<"" ,,/.,..1' .p.r!',#';1' .,<!P -1-"'''' ~,if' "jIfl' eft -¥,,,rJ> ,;/'6' 

signatlHe VBIED network during the period 2006-

~007.IO This study will focu:::. upon AQT's use oFVBIEDs 

throughout the "Breaking the Walls" campaign as the 

prIncipal indIcator of AQl's growing organizational and 

operational capacitylnside Iraq, even lfsuicidc bombers 

flow into the country frOTn Syria. 

Astudyofthe success of the "Breaking the Walls" campaign 

ehlcidates The renewcd capability of AQT's military 

organization. VBIEDs require an extensive planning 

and logisticrtl structure. and the VB1ED waves witnessed 

in 2012-2013 showcase the development ofa force -level 

planning effort within AQT's military organization to 

orchE:strate simultaneous attacks involv-ing Tnan~ cells. It 

is critical to estimate AQl's combat power in order to 

assess [he level of threat AQI represents to [he Iraqi state 

and further to U.S. interests. 

The "Breaking the Walls" caTnpaign supported AQT's 

expressed operat-ional objf'ctives (0 retake territory that 

it had formerly controlled and to establish governance in 

parts of Iraq and Syria. VBIEDs enhanced AQrs overall 

operations by overwhelTnlng Iraqi Security Forces and 

degrading' popular confidence in their ability to protect 

the population. AQI accomplished its ~012-2013 goals 

sufficiently alld announced a new 2013-201,1. campaign 

named "The Soldiers' Harvest," on July 30,20[3.]] 

Iraq Secur-ity Forces USF') and Shi'a Tnilitant groups 

have mobilized in response to AQ,l's attacks.i

" ISF 

has also mobilized on several occasions to address the 

predominantly Arab S11nn1 anti-government pTmest 

Tnovel11ent ,hat has been active since December 2012.I'J 

The ISF launched ne",,: operations into western Anbar, 

northern Diyala, and other province~ in May 2013 in 

pursuit of AQT. This operation, as well as the ISF's 

"Revenge of the Martyrs" call1paign in August 2013, Tnay 

widen the gap between the Maliki government and Iraqi 

Sunni Arabs. [4 'The "Revt"uge of the lvlartyrs" campaign 

'in particular also resulted in mass arrcsts. 

The addition of alternate gecurity measures in .Baghdad, 

including the deployment of plain-clothed intelligence 

personnel and increased seClu'ity patrols, likewise nms 

the r1sk ofhe-ing counter-productive for Iraq's security, 

should marginal security gains in Baghdad come at 

the price of insurgency outside the capital. These 

opcrations, furthermore, have limlted potential to 

counter AQI because the ISF is not effectively pursuing 

the orgallization throughout its depth inside lraq. 

For example, AQI III August 2013 projected VBIED 

opcrations from the southern Baghdad belts as effectlvely 

as froTn tlw northern belts, but only the forTner are 

contested by 1Sf. 

The threat of insurgency has also increased because 

of the growing l'eglOnal sectarian dynamic emanating 

FroTn Syria; the longstallding political alld eronOTnlC 

gTievances of Iraqi Sunni Arabs; the -instances of"101ent 

confrontation betweeniSF and protesters in 2013; and 

the mobilization of Shi'a militias. These conditions 

have provided AQI with aTnple opportunity to exploit 

a pri.ncipal vulnf'rability of the Mahki government, 

namely the perceived ('xdus ion of the Sunni from the 

polItical process. Even though most Iraqi Sunni Arabs 

still veheTn<:"ntly reject AQI. the terrorist organization 

may bf' able to drive a wccdge between the population and 

the state. They will succeed if they are able to counter 

Maliki's majoritarian political strategy by producing new 

cleavages in the nat-ional governTnc:nt ah~ad of elections 

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86007b-9.eps

in 2014 and shatter popular confidence in the ISF, upon 

which Maliki has relif'd for his strong-man image since 

the Basra ('ampaign ln 2008. 

General Ray Odierno, comTnander of U.S. iorces-Traq 

desrribed AQT'f> goals -in June ?,OTO. when its rapahilities 

were minimal. He noted, "al-Qaeda in Iraq .. hasn't 

changed. They want complete failure of the government 

in Iraq. They want to establish a caliphate in Iraq. 

He contlnued. "Now, that's a tall task for theTn now, 

as compared to maybe it was iu 2005 or '06. But they 

still sustain that thought process .. And it has nothing to 

do with the United States. ·~{ou know, they COlltinue to 

look around lhe world for safe havens and &[lTIctuaries. 

And what they look for is ungoverned territories. And 

so what they want. .. is to form an ungoverned terntory 

or at least pieces ofnngoverned territory, 'inside of Iraq, 

that they can take advantage of.'·1\) 

Control of territory in Iraq remains one of AQl's goals 

in ~013, but AQI also seeks to govern in Syria as wel1.'7 

AQI d~clan~d itself the IIJw'lIc State mlmq QJld aI-S!wm (ISTS) 

in April QOI3, an expansion of its historical political 

identity now to include Syria. At a teaching tent in 

Aleppo. Syria during· its RaTnadan fair, ISTS dlsplayed a 

map of its eTnirate with no border between Iraq and Syria 

as part of a wider al-Qaeda caliphate stretching from 

North Africa to the eastern frontier adjoining IranY 

AQI has been instrumental in the S)Tian conflict. By 

studying known instances of SVBIED attacks in Syria, 

one sees AQI has operated there alongside the Syrian alQaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra since at least Df'cember 

2cOll.'~ AQI had initially supported Jabhat al-Nusra by 

reversing the flow of fighters and resourcf'S that once 

streamed into Iraq from Syria.?O 

The growth of the two franchises created competition. 

AQI declared in April 2013 rhat Jabhat al-Nusra was 

subordinate to the Islamic St(lte of Iraq and Sham. Jabhat a1-

Nusra rejected AQT's leadership, declaring fealty to 

al-Qaeda core directly.·" Al-Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri directed that the two affiliates operate in their 

separate geographic zones and put hoth organizations 

on probatlon as franchlf;es.~2 Al-Baghdadl at first flatly 

rejected rhis instruction and reinforced his singleorganization vision. Since June 2013,'<.' rhe fWO 

organizations have apparentlyovlCrcome the"ir differences 

and often choose to cooperate ta('tical1y ingid~ Syria. 

AQl's military. governance, and social investment in 

Syria has increased. since this time, most recently through 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

a combined arms attack upon Minna.k.h alrbase north of 

Aleppo."""" through an offensive in northern Latakia,'<5 

and the sponsorship of a Ramadan social O1Jtrcach 

program in Aleppo in August "),0 13. ~G 

AQI also drastically "increased WrED attacks in Iraq 

in 2013 .. As of August 2013, AQl's new operation, 

"the Soldiers' Harvest," has increased the frequency 

and vOluTne of VBTED waves and also incorporated 

spectacular attacks upon critical infrastructure, such 

as the Urn Qasr port at Basra. ~f AQl wiil aha likely 

continue to target hardened ISF facilities ,"' .. ith complex 

attacks involving WTEDs now that it has tested "its 

greatest complex operational ability. AQT's success in 

Iraq at the expense of thf' ISF will add rdative strength 

to the organization in SFia. AQI would then prosper 

"in a deteriorating security environTnent that transcends 

state boundaries.?8 

BACKGROUND 

Characterizing the evolution of al-Qaeda in Iraq's 

mllitary capabilities requires ::m understand-ing of 

the state of play in Traq after the withdrawal of U.S. 

forces in December 2011. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)'s 

operational capability had been degraded three years 

prior by Coalition Forces, Iraql Security Forces, and 

local security eleTnents known as "Sahwa" who took up 

arms to drive ont al-Qaeda and prevent their return,29 

in the spring of 2010, U.S. and Iraqi forces "either 

picked up or klned 34 out of the top 42 al-Qaeda in 

Traq leaders, and by June of '2010 the organization had 

'"lost connection with Lal-Qaeda Senior Leadership] in 

Pakistan and Mghanistan:'30 

By ::; OTT , AQI was still able to conduct attacks, but the 

organization V·las isolated. disrupted, and did uot pose 

an existential threat to the state. From September 2010 

to December <;;011, monthly fatalities in Iraq fitabilized 

in the 300-400 rang·e, according· to Iraq Body Count 

databasE', which provides historical datac()vE'ring this time 

period.':;c This range establishes a baseline for "normal" 

violence levels <IS reported from open sources, o.ga"inst 

which to cOTnpar~ obserV<ltlO1IS of security conditions in 

post-war Iraq. 

The resurgence ofAQI followed two trends: first, the rise 

of internal. Iraqi Sunm political disenfranchisement 

after the departure of U.S. forces, and second, the 

escalation and radicaliz:ation of the Syrian conflict. 

Immediately after the withdrawal of U.S. h-nces in 

~---~---~----- -----
34


86007b-10.eps

December 20II, lraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 

arrested and tortured the bodyguards of Sunni Vice 

PT'esidem Tariq ai-Hashemi on the grounds that he 

had supported terrorismY Hashemi ultiTnately ned 

the country and was sentenced to death in absentia, 'j"j 

Violent activities rose following the departure of U,S, 

Forces-Iraq (USF--T) and the Hashemi arrest, although 

ant" cannot t"stablish the causal relationships betwef':n 

these contemporary events, 

Fatalities rose above 500 for the month of January 

2012, with two attacks on January 5 and January 14 

most like1y responsible for the overall increase. \~ These 

attacks -inv01ved multiple strikes, including Tnany 

suicide attacks, upon Shi'a civilian targets in holy cities 

including Karbala, Nasiriya, and Kadhimiyah, and 

also Sadr and Basra during the Sh-i'a l'el1gious 

observance Arba"een. Other altacks documented 

in early 2012 include a Jarge wave of explosions on 

February 23 that struck Baghdad, Basra, and Salah adDin. >;J Thls wave primarily targeted haqi Police and 

governTncnt -institutions, and it appeared to involve 

vehicle-borne improvised explosive dt'vices (VBIIDs). 

AQI eYldently had an enduring ability to coordinate 

spectacular attacks, includlng the use ofVBIEDs, in the 

post-USF-I per-iod. 36 

The rise in attacks in Iraq paralleled attacks in Syria in 

ways that ~how- the overall involveTnent of al-Qaeda (AQ) 

senior leadership with the reconstitut-ion of AQI and its 

Syrian offshoot, Jabhat al-Nusra. VBIf.Ds detonated in 

Aleppo and Damascus in Syria on February 10 and 13, 

20l3.')7 A newly announ'.ed al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat 

al-Nusra, claiTned credit for these attacks -in a formally 

produced video.~.s This coincided with a landmark 

statement by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri calling 

for Muslims in the region, spedfical1y Iraq, Jordan, 

Turkey, and Lebanon. to support the Syrian oppositionYI 

AQI algc) launched a media campaign on February 24, 

2012. just afrt'r Its VEIED attacks inside Iraq. AQI 

announced a campaign to strlke ml1itary headquarters 

on behalf ofSunn-i prisoners -in Iraq du ring a 33-minute 

speech demonizing Shi'a Islam and the goverument of 

lraq,10 This distincrly sectarian speech typifies AQl's 

strategic voke and disposhion in post-war Iraq before 

the c~:nnpaig'n of nttacks detailed in this report. 

AQI also executed sig'n-iflCant operations targeting' 

Iraqi Security Forces (lSf) in early 2012. 1to"t notably. 

AQI launched a sophisticated raid on ISr units in 

Haditha, Anbar on March 4, 2012. AQI assassinated 

10 

two police commanders in their homes and seized a 

police checkpoiut. killing 27 ISF personnel in total, 41 

AQI claImed ned it for the Haditha attack and described 

the operation in detail in a ITlessage posted to jihad-i,;t 

forums "hartly therea[tel'.1~ AQI recorded the incident 

in a video illustrating how multiple AQI units surprised 

ISF by masquerading as Iraql naTiona1 police. +J AQI 

also launched a wave of :;;6 attacks across the country 

on March 20, likely to disrupt and discredit the Iraqi 

government before the Arab League Summit on l.iarch 

27-29, 2012,-1-+ AQI claimed credit for this wave of 

attacks as wel1. 1 ;J 

Overall vlolence began to increase sharply in June 

2012, at which point Agence France Press (ArP) began 

to track Jaily casualties in lraq in detail. A_FP casualty 

records identified June 13 and June 16 as h1gh-casualty 

days coinciding with ITlultiplc bOITlb-ings.1" The dataset 

of violent events that the: author curated for this study 

documt'uts an additional SVBIED on June 4. 2012, 

'i·,rhich targeted "(he offices of ,he Shl'a Endowment in 

Dah al-MuadhaTn, Baghdad. AQI claimed credit for the 

attacks on June 4 and June 13.1~ The June 4, 201~ event 

produced a massive number of casualties for a single 

attack, an estimated 2[,5 (26 kil1ed/I90 w01JTIded).+R 

This attack further demonstrates dIe capability and 

intent of AQI to deliver large-scale VBIEDs. Multiple 

VEIEDs incurring fewer casualties preceded this attack, 

and slml1ar attacks contin1Jcd into early July 2012. 

AQI emir _i\bu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced on July 

21, 2012 the start of '\vhat he called the "Brealung the 

\;\lal1s" campaign. "Breaklng the Walls" began just after 

Ramadan, and three da~<; af'Ler a f"fri1ed as'lassinat-ion 

attempt against Bashar al-l\Esad that killed important 

Jnembers of his inner security circle. In a recorded 

spet':ch, Baghdadi described his intent to "target the 

pressure points of the Safavid project.'·49 This m('ssage 

may be understood to target Maliki's government. but 

AQI's message at the start of the 2012-2013 campaign 

also reflected its broader lntent to establish governance 

ill Iraq and Syri.:l. 

* Open 30ut'CC rE'po['ling lv.~ not t'esolv",cl :he melhod or lhe al1ack, 

with Syri,m ,'titte medic, as~ertmg it \""-d~ a ~uicid(' bomber and compet11lg sources suggew_llg it remotely detonated ':'ED or VBIED. Ll'wa 

aI-islam (LO daimed the attack Rnd from sub~eqllent events i~ a more 

likely perpetrator than Lhe free S:,rian .-\rm~·, v,hich also claimed ll. 

Thi~ paper do('~ no~ presumE' e'tabE~h a correlation or (,iilJ~Rtion 

between the~e event~, but rather temporill pro-.::imity, 

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35


86007b-11.eps

The simultaneous detonation of many VBIEDs against 

civilian targf'ts in Iraq became an .immediate hallmark of 

AQT's "Breaking the "Valls" campaign. This VBlED wave 

plll"nomenon bad been typical for AQT d u t'lng the height 

of the Iraq war, and it appear') that AQI reconstituted 

this core competf>ncywell before July 2012. Based Oll the 

sheer volume of attacks ar the start of the campaign, it 

also appears that the early VDIED waves were schedu1ed 

and planned well in advance. AQ.Ilikely capitalized upon 

veteran expertibe achieved while fighting U.S. Forces 

during the Iraq ,,,Tar and Assad's forces in 'the Syrian 

'Var to amplify lethal effects in 2012;-2013, part-icularly 

through the utilization of V BIEDs. 

U.S. officials described how, by August 20I2, al-Qaeda 

inside ofSynahad evolved from "disparate, disconnected 

units" and was "building a network of well-organized 

cells" ,hat "are now communicating and sometimes 

cooperating on missions, with a command-andcontrol structure evolving to match more sophisticdted 

operations in places like Traq and Afghanistan."'"o The 

officials stated that "The units are spreading from city 

to city, with veterans of the lraq insurgency employing 

thelr expertise ill bomb- builJing to carry out more than 

two dozen attacks so far. They estimated the number 

of fighters in Syria at a couple bundredY The level of 

organizational capacity indicated by this assessment 

sets the foundation for this study. AQI ha<; re-emerged 

as a military force in Iraq and Syria. and it is critical 

to understand what capabilities the organization has 

regenerated in Iraq in order to assess the threat that AQl 

now presents to the region. 

METHODOLOGY 

Detecting AQJ~ Signature 

Estimating the combat power and organizational culture 

of secret organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 

may be approacheJ through detailed analysis of the attacks 

they perpetrate. This study consider<; the violent events 

in Iraq thnt are documented -in unclassified sourcf'S tor 

what they indicate about AQI's renewed organizational 

capacity. Closely examining the pubJic record of violent 

events, particu1arly the use of "spFctacular attacks" in 

Traq in 201'2-2013, enab1es us to draw concluslons about 

AQI's broader operations. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.QRG 

AQI executed a \vide array of attack types frornJuly 2012 

to July 2013 during the "Breaking the Walls" campaign. 

These at1:.ack types indude small arms nre, indirect 

fire (TDF) vi~ mortars and rocket-propelled grenades 

(RPC), improvised explosive devices (lED), suicide 

bombers (SVEST). vehicle- borne improvised explosive 

devices (VBTED). and a subset, SUIcide vehicle-borne 

improvised explosive devices (Si/BTED). VUTEDs are the 

most complex: attack type within this set, characterized by 

the rewiring of a yehide into a traveling high-yield bomb 

rather than the placement of an explosive parcel "Within 

or outside of a "ehicle.;)~ All of these attack types were 

used for combined arms effects during theJuly 2013Abu 

Ghraib and T;-~ i prison attacks, anJ all of them appeared 

in dIspersed fashion across Iraq thr011ghout the course 

of the previow, year. 

A hbnket study of attacks in Traq difficult because 

violent events are habitually underreported. Attribution 

is another challenge, as AQI was not the only group 

conducting .attacks 'in Iraq during this time period. 

Other groups operating in Traq today -include Ansar 

al-Islam, Shi'a militias, and likely Jaysh Rijal alTariqah al-Naqshabandia a Ba'athist militant 

organization. 'i" All of these organizations are known 

to use small arms. TDF, and TEDs, and in some cases 

they are also suspected of suicide attacks and car-borne 

explosions. 

Violent events in certa-in loca1es, furthermore. might bf' 

attributed to popular uprising rather than AQl.~'i This 

becomes a leg itimate consideration in light of the antigovernment protest movement, whkh began in Def'ember 

20[2 after Prime Minister Nouri al-Mal-iki attempted to 

arrest Rafia aJ-Issawi, a leading Sunni national political 

figure. The protest movement continued at least through 

Sq)tember 20[3. when this report was published. As 

more violent actor,> take up arms -i11 Traq, at1ack patterns 

of established groups become obfuscated, as the groups 

begin to overlap and rf'act to one another. Nevertheless, 

it is possible to lsolate coherent attack slgnatures for 

AQT w-ith-in thE' available data. This study wl1l focus 

specifically upon one of AQJ's classic signatures, waves 

ofvehide-borne explosive improvised devices (VBIED). 

The VBTED waves of the "Breaking the -Vlans" campaign 

an" identif'ted and characteriLed in Part IT of this report. 

Once attributed, these attacks may be used to evaluate 

AQI's operational capacity, depth, and targeting 

strategy. 

11 
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86007b-12.eps

Spotting VBIED Wailes 

VBLEDs constitute the most u5crulAQl fingerprint for 

several reasons. Fin.t, VBTEDs are generally the most 

lethal attack type, and therefore the most consistently 

reported publically.· Second, V BIEDs are the most 

complex attack type, which best illustrates the full capacity 

of AQ,I's chain. Thud, V"BIEDs have historically 

been as AQT'I' sign.::ttu re .::tHack type. ,<> 

Although it is likely that AQT bears sole responsibility for 

all VB LEDs in Lraq, it is worthwhile to challenge and reprove this assessment, particularly given [hat i~.1lSdr a1-

TslaTTl, another Salafist group, claimed cred-it for S\lBTED 

attacks in Traq over the course of~O[2.J7 Although \TSTED 

attacks are a core competency for AQl, other groups can 

adopt this technique, and therefore each V BlED attack by 

itself is only a mod~ratc slgnal that AQT 1S responslble. 

A stronger signal emerges ill the detection of multiple 

coordinated VBIED attacks. AQI's signature massing 

ofv"'BIEDs over the course of the "Breaking the ""~alk' 

caTTlpaign will be reff'rred to here at; a "\'BIED wave," and 

defin~d for the purposes of this study as the detonation 

of six or more VBIEDs on a giVf:Ll day in Iraq. ~ AQI has 

,1aiTTled credit for ",everal such VBIED waves sin('.e the 

launch of the caTTlpaign, beginning with a wave of 30 

VBLEDs that detonated onJuly 23, 20I2. just tv.-o days 

after the announcement of the "Breaking the W<ills" 

caTTlpaign.5 h 

.. ,THIED identii-icatirm from public ~ource~ involvE'~ ii qualit,!tive ii~­

~e~~ITIent of E';l.(.h incineH!: ,mel the cnntext in wbich it occurred. Not 

all ,Ht<Lck~ th,le :ir(' r('porteel in llE'W~ medlil :'-~ "Ci'l' bomb~" are techllicall: VBIEDs. For example, an/whem'e Exp:o<he Device (,UD). or 

~uck: bomb. is nO[8 YBIED, but an assas~inaL1on lechnique deslg:led 

[0 cargel the occupancs ora vehicle. A genuine car bomb. li.ke~~:~e. is 

~1 bomb tint i~ placpd in it vehide in order to targl"t til(' OCWPdnt~. By 

contTii~'. even though they ,ire ohen reported Cdr bomb,. \'BJED~ 

dll""t'ct ex:01o.'lv<:, po¥er e,,"ternally, u",u:illy to infhct ill"." camii!tle~ 

~ign;ll.(an[ structural damage. This reql\lre~ thong-hlrd desIgn, ""hlch 

i~ why VnIE:U~ are characlerized ~5 a highly cechnical opcr311on. 

t The '.hl'e~hold ot'~h ,-'BlED ?\\;lcls was chos'Ol". through holislic <,.$-

~e~~ITIent to be the rninimlJm volume of i'. VBTED clu~ter that oth1"r-

"rise b01"e charactnistl('s suggestive oforcnestration by a central YBIED 

command. Clmters of five or les~ V.31EDs_ by contrast. appeared to be 

feasibly organiLed by a smgle VBIED cdl as~igneci to a parllcwar geographic are, •. or <litE'rnately ,I co-occurrence of ~ing:eton VBTE0~ thitt 

were not nE'c('.'~,\rily ~ynchl"oni7eci. 

12 

This study will examine the "Breaking the Walls" 

campaign ill detaH, particularly the VBLED waves that 

characterize this campaign. These waves can be broken 

down ror the of analysis -into foul' "Phases" of 

the campaig·n. phases were not announced, but 

rather assessed by observing qualitative and quantitative 

d1fferences in attack patterns over tlme. The waves of 

VBIED attacks across these phases w-ill be evaluatF:d for 

theirg'eographic spread, target selection, overall volume, 

and lethality. The YBIED waves will be cOll3ider~d in 

the context of individual VBIEDs that occurred outside 

of the ~4 VBIED waves as well other explosive events, 

such as IEDs and S\-,' ESTS, in order to refine an overall 

characterization of their complementary use by AQL 

Part I of this report will address these waves in aggregate 

to describe phase changes that illustrate organizational 

growth within AQI, and a detailed examination of the 

individual waves is available in Part 11. 

In order to estimate lethality, the volume of the VBIED 

waves ·wi.ll be compared to dally casualty records 

TTlaintained by Agence rrance-Presse (AFP). AFP 

data provides a conservative and specific C:"stimate for 

casualties, and as cmnpared to other casualty data sets, 

represents a cautl0Uf> min-imum b011nd. The AFP dataset 

begins to provide daily casualty records froTTl violent 

evellts in August 2012. Casualty insights prior to this 

date will be drawn from Iraq Body Count database, whose 

records begin in 2003."° The principal data set for the 

\'iolent events considered in this study is proprietary and 

derives from sources, including J'{afionai iraqi 

of Alada Press, Afllraq Ne;1}s £1gensv . 

on1me Trag B01, Count (TBe) database. 

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN: "BREAKING THE WAllS" 

The Architects of "Breaking the 1-4i:lls" 

AI-Qaeda in Traq's "Breaking the WaHs" C'aTTlpaign began 

on July 2I, 20I2 and ended on July ~3, 2013. During 

that time, AQI executed 24 VB1ED waves that showcased 

the Technical, logistical, and training capac-ityunderlying 

AQT's VBIED prograTTl. The en}istmenlofthese functions 

to deliver sYllchronized VB lED waves across Iraq reveals 

the pr~sence of a robust and speciahzed VB1ED planning 

capahility within /\QI's military organization. The STyle 

of execution of the VBIED waves deTTlonstrates the 

gl'mvth of the V BLED organization in terms of its skilled 

leadership, its support to combined arms attacks, and Its 

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86007b-13.eps

VBIED ATIACKS OVER TIME 

1 .TULY 2012 - 31 OCTORFR 2012 

1 NOVKMHF.R 2012- 7FFHRITi\.RY2013 

N FF.RRr,'\RV 2013 -l='i'f.\Y 2013 

hi 1\'L\Y 2013- 31 .JT-;JY 2013 

}'.:; 

2D 

ahil1ty over time to train ~mal1 effective teams. 

The following section will identify four pha<;es of the 

"Breaking' the Walls" campaign based upon the patterns 

and characteristics of the VB lED waves and prison 

a(tacks perpetrated bY.1\Ql between July 21, 2012 and 

July 23, 2013. The four phases demonstrate centralized 

planning and d-ircction ofv'BTED waves; the growth of 

AQl's YB1ED capability; and the presence of multiple 

high-functioning VE1ED cells in Iraq by the end of the 

campaign. The f01l1' phases constitute an a'>seSSTnent of 

AQT'" battle plan and adaptation during the "Breaking 

the Walls" campaign. 

PHASE j, Proof of Concept ond Capability 

The first phase of "Breaking the Walls" began inJuly 2012 

and ended in September 2012. This phase constItuted 

AQT's proof of concept and capability to exenJtc repeated 

large-scale VBTED waves across haq. The VUTED \II/aves 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

on July ~3, 201.2 and September 9, 2012, involving 30 

and '2 I VBTEDs spread over a wide geograph-ic area, were 

the largest and farthest spread among the waves across all 

four phases. They served, therefore, to demonstrare the 

depth and breadth of AQrs ability to operate. They also 

ind-icate the presence of a VBTED construction facility and 

technical experts with the available materiel to generate 

many VBlEDs. Furthermore, they indicate the level of 

command and control already in placevvithinAQI's 'lB IF: D 

apparatus, ;1S the orchestr;1tion of so many VBTEDs on one 

day required effective communication to a very large team. 

It also required a plan. Ln thi"i case, the plan arrayed attacks 

dehberatdy by proYince so that the whole of nOllllcITl Iraq 

and Baghdad would feel the effects. 

The two large \fEIED waves . .:lS well as sevt'ral smaller 

wayes and dusters of attacks between them. generally 

oriented on the northeastern front with a heavy density 

in K-irkuk City. Be-callse the targeting strategy varied 

13 
38


86007b-14.eps

between civilian, mihtnry. and governTI1ent targets, this 

geographic orientation does not necessarily evidence a 

clear operational intent. Rather, it lnay serve to illustrate 

the physical point of origin oftlle early'FBTED campaign, 

assessed to have been more centrali'led then than -it is 

now, particularly in terms of VB lED construction. 

Phase 1 constituted an ilnpressive show of force, but not 

yet exceptionally f0C11sed operationa1 planning. This 

contrasts w1th patterns ohsE'rved in later phases. 

The early waves of the "Breaking the Walls" caTI1paign 

involved a large fighting force in addition to the 

explosive attac.ks. Very few of (he early VBIEDs were 

dOClnnented as sUlclde attacks, which suggests that the 

dr-ivers of the attack vehicles required an exit strategy. 

Drivers were likely deployed as part of teams to spot 

targets and aid in recovery. A wave of 30 VBIEDs, 

like that "'Iltnessf'd on September 9, 201'2, therefore 

involved potentially many times TI10re fig'hters, in 

addition to a vast VBIED construction apparatus and 

organizational leaJership. This observation points 

iTI1TI1ed-iate1y to a critical requlrement for comTI1and and 

14 

control that was successfully fulfilled at the beginning 

of the "Breaking the "\V-alls" campa-ign. It also point~ to 

sophist-ic<'lted caTI1pa-ign planning, which deliberately 

shifted operational objectives from the beginning to the 

end of the ·'Breaking the Walls" campaign. 

The geography of the early attacks was also widespread, 

stretching frOTTl Baf;ra in the south to l\i[osul in tlle north 

(see Part II for further details). This raises the question of 

wherher the original fighting force was galliered together 

and then dIspersed for attacks; or engaged remotely at 

various locations with guidance to synchronize attacks on 

a given day. The initial wide spread of attacks may lend to 

the impression that localized teams were established early 

onin the campaign, but rigor must be applied to this Idea. 

The requirement to generate 30 VBTEDs and to prepare 

a deployable force for a specific mission with targeting 

guidance, training, and rlC'ady-made VBIEDs would take 

much time, but these early waves involved long periods 

oftiTI1e In between attacks to"reset," COTI1men&ura(e with 

these constraints. It is instead plausible that the greatest 

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39


86007b-15.eps

initial constraint for the VBIED organization was 

technical expertise, and this expertise, if limited to few 

persons, would suggest centralized YBTED planning, 

construction, and training. 

In addition to VBIED waves, Phase 1 also 

incorporated four prison attacks against the Baghdad 

Counterterrorism Directorate; a police headquarter!' 

detaining TO AQT personnel-in H-ibhih, Diyala; the Taj-i 

Tasnrat prison, which was subsequently struck several 

tunes; and the Tikrit Tashrat prison. The attack against 

the Tikrit Tadlrat prison on September 27, 20[2 in 

parti('lIlar involved ,lBTEDs among other capahilitie~, 

including mortars. SVESTS, and small arms. This 

highly ~uccessful complex attack, which would have been 

planned from an echelon above the ... maller "\FETED cell 

organizations, secured the escape of 100 prisoners, 47 

of whom were reportedly AQI affiliates on death row. 

Apparent from a break in attacks is that AQI engaged 

in a "strategic pause" after this prison hreak in order to 

absorb new human nf'tworks into its organizat-ion. 

PR4SE II: The Green Line 

Phase TThegan in Novemher 2012 and ended in February 

~O[3. It began with an operational pause in VBTED 

and prison activity, This l1'lay be explained by several 

conclitions: first and foremost, AQI received into its 

ranks the fugitwes of the Tikrlt Tashrat prison, which 

likely required reorganizat-ion and restructuring wi1hin 

AQl. The marked increase in VBIED activity observed 

in later waves depended upon a rise in human capacity, 

suggc-sting that this event triggered new organizatlonal 

growth within AQT's m-ilitary. Tt may also have produced 

a shift in the leadership of AQl's VB1E.D operation. 

which assumed a distinctly different character in me 

later Phase III. The pause in VBIED activity may also 

ind-ieate a defenslve requirement to protc:rt against TSr 

counter-terrorism efforts in the wake of the prison 

break. NeY~rtheless, as the month of October 2012 

coincided "'lith Ejd al-Adha, AQI still managed to 

conduct slgn-ifIcant attacks. including small, clustered 

\13IED activity on October 15, 2012 and October 27. 

2012,. Sad I' City was struck mure rhan any other location 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 15 

----------- ------------------------ ----
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86007b-16.eps

in these two dusters in conjunction with the religious 

holiday (s('e Parr Ll for more detail). 

Phase 11 focused many attacks upon civilian and 

governTnent targets along the Gre'e'n Line separating 

rraq-i Kurdistan from the rcst of Iraq, coinciding with 

an escalation in tensiou between the Government 

of Iraq and Iraqi Kurds. This tension ignited over 

the establishTnent on October 3[, 20[2 of the Tigris 

Operations COTnTnand, encoTnpasslng Salah ad-Din, 

Kirblk, and Diyala provinces and placing ISF in close 

proximity to Kurdish territories. G, Kurdish re"ponse was 

uncoTnpromising. Anwar T-Taji, the Undersecretary of 

the Ku rdistan PeshTnerga M-inistry, stated on NoveTnber 

G that the Iraqi Army would not be allowed to enter 

Kurdish territories. G

" Shortly afterwards, on November 

8, the KUTdistan parliaTnent rejected Mahki's decision 

to create the Tigris Operations COTnTnand. b3 "phase IT 

of AQ.l's "Rreakiug the \Valls" was accordingly oriented 

on Kirl.-uk, reflechug a deliberate targeting strategy to 

exploit a critical .. ·ulnerability oftlle Iraqi governTnent. 

This targeting strategy was not manifest to the same 

e-xtent as in those attacks observed ill Phase L The waves 

in Phase IT w!Cre signifIcantly STnallel" clos~r together in 

tiTne, and in many cases involved wen-chosen individual 

targets such as Kurdish political facilities. Phase 11 

therf'fore demonstrated tighkr operational focus, but 

also TI10re -imponantly a teTnporary reduction -in the 

overall sca1e of the VInED activity" It is possible that 

this decrease was the result of a fundamental resource 

limitatJon; however, there are also indicators [hat AQl's 

"VeIED activity was reorganized dlJring this period. 

NaTI1ely, Phase IT deTnonstrates a pattem of sTnal1er waves 

of VB1ED attacks that hegins to suggest the presence 

of independenr VB1ED cells that had not been clearly 

vislble during Phase T. 

ExaTn-in-ing the' clmters of'lRIED attacks that 

occurred during period, sig'nificant groupings of 

attacks below tIle ·'wave" rhreshold occurreJ onJanuary 

16 and 17,2013. OnJanuary 16, three VBIEDs clustered 

in Klrkuk and Tuz KhurTnatu struck facilities associated 

w-ith the KDP and PUK, y-ielding very high casualties. 

Thf'se attacks may reasonably be attributed to one cell 

opcratlllg with t1~ intent to exploit ethnic tenSlOn. On 

January '7, four '!BIEDs struck in Karhala and Hilla in 

southern Iraq, targeting' Shi·a clv-ilians. These attacks 

may also be attributed to a single cell, and very likely a 

different one, intent on this mission to exploit 'Sectarian 

tension. The s-ignature's of these two attack clmten; point 

16 

to two different cells on account of the neal' simultaneity, 

geographic disparity, aud divergent target selection ~f 

the two VRIED clusters. These cells appear capable of 

conducting Tnuhiple siTnultaneous V-nTED attacks in 

close proximity · .... ithout g'uidance to coordinate attacks 

with adjacent cells. 

The tight control evidenced by these small attack dusters 

poillts to the self-contained capability of a VBIED cdl 

byJ:muary ~013. Based on the pre~ence of VB lED waves 

indicative of coordination across multiple teams in 

addition to indlVidual VB1ED dusters after this date, 

-it appeal'S that a VBIED cell may at times deterTnine its 

O\.vn Tnlssion am] acquire V-nIEDs without assignTnent, 

which would suggest that the VEIED construction sites 

are also forwarJ deployed by this rime. This represents a 

hy grO\vth step in AQT's evolution during the "Breaking 

the \Valls" caTnporign. The combined occurrence of 

independent VB1ED cell activity and synchronized 

attacks across many cells would come to typify later 

phases. It does not follow that \TBIED construction teams 

are necessarily part of VBIED ce11s. but construction 

sites and their logistics require some form of protection 

that VBIED cell personnel may assist with providing. If 

lnst~ad '1BIED cells have no role in this site protection 

mission, protection must instead be assigned to other 

AQI demeuts. such as local security battalions, because 

protectiou of these sites IS an operational requlrf'ment. 

Moreover, the leadership that had been in place to 

plan elaborate VBIED waves during Phase 1 apparently 

paused, particularly in January 2013, when no VBIED 

waves occurred that exceeded fiye VBIEDs on one day. 

The leadership's plnnning re-eTnerged profoundly 

during Phase 111, which underscores the assessment that 

Phase 11 si.gnifies a transformation period of the VBIED 

force at the leader 1eveL This transformation might also 

have involved the manning, training, and deployment 

of additional VBIED celis, given that the overall volume 

and frequencyofcoordinateJ VBIED waves subsequently 

lncreased. 

VBIED attack waves occurred on Nove'Tnber 14, 

November '2.7, NoveTnbcr ~9, and Dccember T7, '2,OT~. 

These waves occurred in quicker succession, were 

relatively few in number, and consequently Incurred 

fewer overall casualties than the' attacks -in Phase T. In 

fact, the four VBlED waves in Phase IT cUTnulatively 

anlOunted to roughly the same number of VBiEDs 

witnessed within one wave onJuly 23 or September 9. 

Thl?' ah-ility to s)'nch roniu ~ttacks -in more rapid fashion, 

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41


86007b-17.eps

and in particular to reset for repeatable attacks upon 

Kirkuk, appeared to be the focus of continued Phase II 

\!BTED wave activity while the rest of the VBTED force 

reorganized, Phase 11 also concluded with a pair of 

prison attacks, including a second attempt <it Tilji base. 

PHASE 111, The Baghdad Campaign 

Phase TTT began in February ~013 and ended in May 

'4013, Phase III shifted the nation -wide V13IED campaign 

to Baghdad with large VBIED waves striking at a steady 

tempo of 30 day intervals. This geographical change 

and stab-ilize'd rate of attack; demonstrate the return of 

the v"BlED planning cell, not only to coordinate hig'hly 

wphisticated VB1ED waves, but also now to direct 

action elem_ents to mass upon a particular objecuve. 

Fu rthermore, some of the Baghdad wave::. -in Phase TTT 

include as many as 20 VTIlEDs in Baghdad on a given 

day, suggesting the requirement for three cells to deliver 

the observed attack volume, and perhaps more in a surge 

capacity. Th-is high concentratlon oflocal-ized attacks over 

several months also suggests the pres('nce of mult-iple 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

VB lED construction sites on the outskirts of Baghdad, 

A preceding mini-wave on January 22, which consisted 

of three VBTEDs in Taji, Mahmud-iyah, and Shula, 

may mpport placing t,'I,'O such cells in the belts around 

Baghdad. if so, the -first projected force from Taji or 

Tarmiyah -in the northern Baghdad belts. and the second 

projected from Mahmudiyah in the southern belts. 

The likely location of the third cdl does not, however, 

emerge from the data. HistoTlcal support zones for AQI 

would suggest thatJisr Diyala and ,-\rab.Tabour southeast 

of Baghdad are possible rand-idates. G4 

The attack patterns in Phase III also point to 

complementary geographic dusters within (he attack 

data. Strilce patterns within the main '/BIED waves 

outhne threoF distinct .:lttark zones with-in Baghdad: one to 

the north, one to the southeast, and one to the soulhwest 

within the city. This pattf'rn validates the assessment of 

three separate VBIED cells operating in the- Baghdad 

vicinity at this time. To strike similar targets at regular 

intervals four months -in a row suggests that AQT enjoyed 

17 
42


86007b-18.eps

incredible freedom of maneuver at this time, which 

poinTs to the Baghdad belts as the optnual environment 

from wh1ch to launch attacKS upon Baghdad. 

There was no operational pause after Phase n, likely 

because Phase 11 functioned in many ways as a strategic 

pause III VBIED plannIng. Phase III appeared. to 

capitalize upon the launch of the anti-government 

protest movement nn December !?,6, ~Ol~ and the first 

violent dash between lSF and protesters near Fallujah on 

January 23. 2013. Phase III applied maximum pressure 

to TSF in Baghdad by targeting 8h1'a communities in 

an apparent effort 10 demonstrate TSF's incapacity, and 

thereby to stoke the resurgence ofShi'a militias. Such an 

environment of uncontrolled violence has the pote ntial 

to threaten the integrity of state security in Iraq, which 

trans1ates directly to strategic gains for AQT in its declared 

pursuit of a caliphate. The V BlED wave on February 17, 

2013 demonstrated the full shift of the national VBIED 

campaign to Baghdad, a Trend that lasted until the end of 

May :),013. By the end of May -;;013, Shi'a mllitias were 

once again actively engaged in violence in Baghdad, S3 

18 

PHASE Ill: TheAQISurge 

After May15, 2013, the YBIED campaign quadrupled in 

fr(,quency and remained focused upon Shi'a targets in 

Baghdad. Nearly half of the v'"BTED waves documented 

in this study oc('urrecl during thifl last quarter of the 

campaign. Four additional observations serve to explain 

AQI'~ acceleration. 

Drda)'ing thr Tslamic State ofTraq and Sham 

The Syrian provincia1 capital or al-Raqqa feU to the 

opposition on .March 4, 2013."" AQI had likely been 

operating in Syria alongside Jabhat al-Nusra wen before 

this, but their role may have intensified as a1 H.aqqa 

loomed as a near victory. Soon after, al-Raqqa becamE' a 

throne forJabhat al-~usl'a andAQ,l along'side the secular 

opposition, and it is likelythatAQI shifted military assets 

1n Syria to secure this seat of governance, to recruit, and 

to advance further -into Syria's military battlefronts. (,; 

Abu Bah aI-BaghdadI declared the islamic State afiraq and 

(II Sham on April 8, 2013 followlng th1S military victory. "H 

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86007b-19.eps

AQI STATE VISION MAP (SOURCE: MEMRI, 2006) 

The U.S. State Department assessed as of July 2013 that 

aI-Baghdadi is personally in Syria, which 1& reasonable 

giYen this govern ance disposition. h" This dof's Dot imply 

that the military command of AQI has shifted to Syria, 

however. A strong military operating hase near the T raq-i 

capital, which has long he en a pri.ncipal attack zone, 

would be an optimal configuration for AQI's military 

cOllunand. 

Al-Baghdadi also declared lhat the Syrian al-Qaeda 

affiliate Jabhat al-Nmra was subordinate to the Islamic 

Slate of Iraq and al Sham. This announcement did 

not gain ready acceptance by Jabhat ~l-Nusra in Syria. 

The Syr-ian al-Qaeda affiliate rejectf'd al-Baghdad-i's 

leadership, declaring its independent affiliation to 

al-Qaeda core.;Q AI-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri 

resolved the d-ispute w-ith guidance on June 9, :;:013 to 

the two groups to reTTlain separate and operating in their 

respective geographic zones, namely Iraq and Syria. 7I AlBaghfladi rejected this guidance on June 14, affirming 

his intent to pursue an Islamic state -in Iraq and Syria:'" 

,A.QI may have sought to -increase attacks during this 

period in order to demonstrate capability aud legitimacy 

to the al-Qaeda core grouptng. 

[SF Fires on Protesters in HawUa 

A major -inflC'ction occurred in Iraq on April ~3, ~OI3, 

however, that may have caused AQJ's military presence 

to shift back to Iraq as a main effort. On April 23, ISF 

surrounded an anti-government protest s'it--in camp in 

Hawija and conducled a search and raid. 73 ArTTlC'd men 

inside the camp fued back, and a clash ensued which 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

claimed the lives of over 20 civilians in the camp and 

wounded over100 others ,74 The response across the autigovernment protest communlty was explosive. Clashes 

ensued he1ween ISF and al'TTled gunmen reportedly part 

of the neo-Ba'athist organization Jaysh Rijal a1-Tariqah 

al-Naqshabandia (jRTN) , JRTN sei?;ed temporary 

control of S1l1eiman Beg until tribal1eaders brokered a 

deal with local of-flcials to end i,he flghting·. 7'i The arTTled 

men in the protest camp at Hawija were likely not AQl. 

While Hawija falls along a likely axis of support for AQI, 

it is more likely that the camp housed militant elements 

of the nationalistJRTN, whose platff:-.rm TTlore directly 

coincides "vith the character and grievances of the Sunni 

protest movement. lr ii> unlikely that AQl's fortunes 

had slufted to the degree that the organizatlOn 'would be 

welcoTTle in a Sunni Arab f'aTTlp in Iraq hy that tiTTle. 

Addit-i0nal dashes follow-ing the one in Haw-ija occurred 

in Mosul and Fallujah, and several tribes in Anbar 

announced the formation of a tribal army to repel 

attackers, including the Iraqi ArmyJG The inflection 

also p-iqued ethnic tensions in Kirkuk, as Kurd-ish 

officials announced that Peshmerga forces would deploy 

"to fill the [security] vacuums ... especially around the 

city of Kirkuk."FThis inflec.tion OCCUlTed immediately 

following the April '7,0 Provinc-ial elections, from which 

Anbar and Ninewa were excluded ostensibly for security 

reasons. 7G This created another opportunity for AQI to 

amplify operational effects to exploit the gap between 

Iraq's Sunn-i Arnbs and the stnte. It is likely that so many 

redundant opportunities caused AQI to double down on 

its efforts in Iraq. lvlaximi?iug force to target [he Shi'a 

in Baghdad indicates AQT's principal strategy remained 

focused upon ignit-ing a CIvil war 11lat would TTlobihze the 

segments of the SunniA.rab commuuity already teetering 

ou the edge of au uprisIng. 

The Extremist Regional Sectarian Fare-Off 

Shi'a militant activity in the region also coincided \,rith 

this phase change in AQI's ',1BII:D operatiou, On April 

30, ~OI3, Hezhollah le~del' Hasan Nasrallah overtly 

announced the organization's role in the Syrian civil 

war, stating that Hezbollah ·'wHl not let Syria falL 

Jabhat al- Nusra, Syria's al-Qaeda affiliate, responded by 

declaring Hezhol1ah TTlilitants in Syria -its top priority.so 

These events demonstrate that e;.,.tremist groups on both 

sides of the sectarian divide had faced off in Syria. They 

also influenced the mobilization of Shi'a lllilitias in Iraq 

to the heneFIt of AQT. 

19 
44


86007b-20.eps

AOI RAMADAN 2013, ALEPPO (SOURCE: HALAB) 

On May 4" the Iranian-sponsored Shi'a militant group 

in Iraq, A.sa'ib -,-1\11J al--Haq (AAH) held a massive rally 

-in Baghdad. AAH had also recently made -its presence 

known in Syria as part of the Ahu al-Fadl aI-Abbas 

Brigade (AFAB). HI A1.AH leader Qais al-Khazali called on 

members at the Baghdad rally to maintain readiness. R2 

This event constituted a signifl,anr measure of AQT's 

ability to provoke a response, and AQJ may also have 

increased operational rempo in order to mass on this 

objective. 

Othrr Consideration.<. 

Yet another factor may have influenced AQI's battle 

plan in lvJay 2013. Abel aI-Malik al-Saadi, a senior 

Sunni cleric active within the anti-government protest 

rnovernent. announced on T\.1ay 13 that he wou1d form 

a 'Commlssion of Goodwin' to begin negotiations with 

the Maliki government on behalf of protesters from 

all six provinces. A, The protests had become dlvid<~d 

he'tween reconciliation and insurgency innuences since 

the beginning of1ihy ~OT3, and protesters -in Salah adDin and Anbar demonstrated favor toward al-Saadi's 

initiarivc. ~4 'I'he cessation ofpratests would have directly 

undercut AQI's political strategy; -it -is possihle that AQT 

in('reased attacks in order to mobilize TSF to blork this 

effort. 

But contemporaneous events alone do not explain this 

phase change. AQT greatly increased the frequency and 

sophistication of its V---nTED operations at th1s time, 

indicating that added resources and organizational 

grov,rth were installed months earlier. In most cases, 

20 

attacks occurred weekly, indicating an increased ability 

to 3ustain attacks in repeatable fa:;hion. This escalation 

demonstrates AQT's refl1iement of its ability to rf:cover 

and reset after attacks and the estahlishment 'Jfmultiple 

fixed sites for preparing and staging YBIEDs, 

furthermore, the waves occurring during the last quarter 

of the "Breaking the Walls" campaign (May 2013 - July 

20[3) often achieved casualty levels in excess of 300, 

most with fewer than 12 VTITEDs per wave. Thi:'llndicates 

that the lethality of individual VBIEDs increased over 

tiniE, and emphasizes iluproved construction, ilnproved 

execution, and reorientation pr-imarilyon civilian targets. 

The organizat-ional growth may also hE' a direct result 

of the Tikrit Tasfirat prison break, which repLenished 

AQI with new veteran manpower, potentially for use in 

Iraq and Syria. The source of AQrs amplified tnaterial 

resources are as of yet llnexpla-ined. Phase TV of the 

"Breaking the Walls'· campaign concluded with the final 

two prison attacks on July 21, 2013, The Abu Ghraib 

prison attack rcsn1ted in the escape of500 prisoners and 

thE' death of68 TST' troops. Tlle attack upon Taji prison 

was the third unsuccessful attempt over the course of 

the campaign. AQI then declared the conclusion of 

"Breaking the \o\Talls." 

E.tfech of the attack onAbu Ghraib 

The effect, of the Abu Ghraib prison attack upon 

Traq hav(" heen profound. first, it permitted 3 hug"e 

manpower infusion to AQl, five times greater than 

that produced by the fikrit Tasfirat prison break 

in Sr.ptember 2012, assessed in this report to have 

significantly enhanced AQT's operational capability in 

2013, This manpower infusion may now be directed 

toward Syria as well. for safe haven as well as operatioual 

deployme nt. Though ISF has conducted operations to 

the north and west of Baghdad to interdict AQT, He it is 

likely that most of the prisoners are still at large and 

will become a part ofthf' fighting force by !:!014. 

Additionally, this prison break demonstrated to the Iraq 

population that AQ,I can hTeak hardened TSF defenses. 

Even though Abu Chraib may he considered the least 

defensible prison facility for a number of reasons, this 

wa~ still a shockIng victa'ry for AQl, which was also able 

to match T8F ln a sustained firefight for a number of 

hours. This success gave significant advantage to AQT 

by demonstrating its capacity to the rest of the al-Qaeda 

network. it also supports the legitimacy of AQI as a 

political entlty in Syria by showcasmg its military mlght 

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86007b-21.eps

and operational initiative on the Iraq FronL This success 

has Jikely contributed to AQl't> operations inside Syria, 

where their operational initiative as "vell as governance 

strategy may now be observed north of Aleppo. 33 

AQT's operations at the end of "Breaking the \V~al1s," 

especially the attack upon the Abu Ghraib prison, 

de-mand an aggressJVe ISF response, though the Iraqi 

government must be equally careful not to trigger Sunni 

popular backlash. If the ISF is able to mount effectivE' 

counterterrorism operations to ref'stablish security 

in Baghdad, to clear the Baghdad belts, and to regain 

momentum to project force into the provinces, the Iraqi 

government may be able to regain enough legitimacy 10 

consolidate gains, Targeting the AQI cells producing 

these VBIED artaeks should be a top priority because 

&u('"h attacks are lnflicting more civilian casualties than 

any other AQI operation, and const-itute a principal 

threat to Iraqi stability at present. 

If the ISF instead conducts blind search and raid 

operations into Sunni neighborhoods and communlties 

that result in mass arrests, the governlnent may 

precipltMe a Sunni insUI'gency, JRTN, defected ISF 

units, and departed Sahwa could amplify this revolt, 

and effecti"ely negate the advance of the ISF. Aside from 

crafting a more effective counterterrorism. strategy, it 

is imperative that the Iraqi govenllnent reconcile antIgovernment protestors to the state. There must be a 

healthy perspective ofSunni participation in governance 

among the Arab population if Iraq is to emerge from the 

threat of al-Qaeda, 

THE NEXT CAMPAIGN: "SOLDIERS' HARVEST" 

AQI announced the start of a new campaign on July 

30, 2013, claimiug the VBIED wave on July 29 as the 

inauguralatta~kofthe "Soldiers' Harvest" campaign,ii7 As 

of September I, 2013, there have been fiye large v'"BIED 

waYf'S followingtlle conclusion of the "Breakingthe Walls" 

campaign, on July 29, August 6, August 15, and AU,gust 

20, and August 28, 2013, These waves focused upon 

Baghdad and sOl1thern Iraq. D11ring this first month, 

AQI has also struck critical -infrastructure, specifically 

the portofUm Qasr near Basra, ~t\This suggests thatAQI 

may escalate to strike more heavily protected facilities 

over the course of the next campaign, 

Forecasting how else AQI will prosecute the 2013-

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

2014 campaign requires a study of the other elements 

of AQl's military organization, how they relate to 

AQI's governance strategy, and how th'is re1ationship 

translaLes to new operat-ional objectives. It also requ-ires 

a parallel study of Iraqi Security Forces, Maliki's 

scheme of maneuver, and hm".' AQI will pJa n to disrupt 

national electlons in ~OI4, The new campaign wl1llike1y 

capitalize upon A<--lT's amplified VDIED capability and 

continue its integration into attacks targ-eting hardened 

government facilities. Prison attacks and ~pectacular 

attacks targeting Shi'a civilians \¥ill likewis(' continue. 

Po1it-ical assasSlnations of Sunni as well as Shi'a figures 

willlikcly escalate as Baghdad becomes more permissive 

for AQI at the expense of ISF, 

Outside of Baghdad, AQI will likely begin to operate 

''fith impunity "in villages where its control becomes 

palpable. Tn northern Diy-ala, southern Baghdad, 

northern rul.bar, and Samarra, AQI may begin to project 

security battalions into urban areas, causing populatlOns 

to displace. Population displacement will serve as the 

principa1 indicator that AQ,Ihas reestablished condit-ions 

that reflect the state of play in Iraq before the Surge, 

AQI'S MILITARY ORGANIZATION 

This study seeks to interpret VBIED wave patterns over 

time for what they indicate of AQl's organizational 

evolutIOn into a profes~ional military force, Maintaining 

a hig'h volume of attarks at short and regular "intervals 

demonstrates measurable growth in capacity to plan, 

operate. and sustain multiple YBI£D cycles, revealing a 

broader array oftechuical expertise as well as increasingly 

sophisticated operational design. VBIEDs and prison 

breaks do not encompass the whole of the "Breaking the 

\-Valls" campaign, AQl's 2012-2013 campaign likely also 

involved dedicated operations to establish and secure safe 

havens. Nevertheless. the V13IED campaign demonstrates 

how wen AQI reconstituted as a fighting force in thc wake 

of U,S, withdrawaL It dispels the possibility that AQI 

remained a small network of disparate fighters loosely led 

by a central political personage, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 

As such, it reduces the expectation that removing' onc 

key leader wi.ll defeat al-Qacda in Iraq, 

Instead, AQI's campaign showcases the depth of a multiechelon military organization v.nth well-estah1ished 

cOlnTTland and control that can des"ign and implement 

coordinated attacks across the whole of Iraq, This 

21 
46


86007b-22.eps

~llDDLt L\S 1 SLCUlHl Y R.i:'l:'0Rl J± i Ai -Q/iLD~\ l~ ~.kAQ RtSL;.RGL'J l I ,J.tSSlCA D. ~:":WlS i S.tVl.t \l.l:3tR 20I3 

The Iraq VBIED Campaign in Syrian Context 

December 2011- August 2013 

ATJCr 1 lSF RevellE;e Clftbe ll'larty:';;' Campaign 

,;~,~";;:[J;F;}~~~~~Ir·"' 'J'R R,~~,'" 'L"""" 'l-Q~", ,t.ti> 

A.PR ~F""R Rnrl Huh, ~J hcenmc 1\<?-,t Ill:":; Ie 

'1:AR. 4"- A1 R:,.qq«fMb< fufueuP{iMi:tI(J:~ 

MAR 2 Rllh \~ 11l.~rH11{~1 I"lwil. r C[\~~'11l2: 1111< 

JA,\ RL'"lCJ drcn~IY~ 11, T)~my)n 

""OV Rebel :m1i-aircrd ;:[lp~bility dowbps 

organization 

alnong teams as 

unconstrained conununication 

as unconstrained access to hUlnan 

("apa("ity and materiel. Thi& negates the assumption 1hat 

the Syrian ("ivil war caused AQI to neglect the Iraq front. 

Instead. AQI seized the initiative ill. Iraq as it gained 

ground iu SYrIa. Al- Baghdadi is nm,,",' capitalizing upon a 

pOf'.ition ofm-ilitary strength -in order to assert initiative 

on both fronts. 

The most impressive and visible aspect of AQI's new 

TTlilitary organization is its reconstituted operational 

art. AQI maintained the initiative in Iraq througllOut 

the ·'Breaking the Walls" campaign, particularly from 

February 2013 - July 2013. This initiative bears a 

di~tinctive op.:rational· de&ign signature' at the force-level 

as well as the vTSIED organizational leveL The force-level 

planning element is assessed to have de~igned [he prison 

attacks. while the VB lED planning team designed VBlED 

waves and provided support to force-level operat-ions as 

22 

dire("ted. 

+ Prison Attacks 

+.12+ VBIEDS + 6+ VBIEDS 

3+ VBIEDS 

New year 

e Ramadan 

Indicative of this operational art. AQI maintained its 

initiative while reacting to events in Syria; to the actions 

of political figures in Iraq; and to the operations of 

Iraqi Security Forces. The organization explo-ited the 

creation of the anti-government protest movement, 

the clash between protesters and lSF at Hawija, and 

other unpredicted opportunities to their gain. And 

yet -it appears that these event& merely solidified AQT"s 

campaig'n plan for" Breaking' the Walls." The assessed four 

phases of the ·'Breaking the "Valls" campaign described in 

this report align with a shockingly symmetrical planning 

calendar that TTlay very well have progressed with min-imal 

disturbance for the entire year, at least where VBIED 

waves and prison attacks were concerned (For more on 

this. see Part II of this report). 

The principal action arm leveraged by AQI to inflict 

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human casualties in Iraq in 20I2-20I3 appeared 

to have been the VBIID organization, VBIEDs also 

struck military and pohtkal targets, but particularly 

-in Baghdad, the v'TITED campaign followed. a class-ieal 

2006-2007 model of striking civilian targets in Shi'a 

Clud mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad. What is perhaps a 

new phenomenon the synchronizatlon of these attacks 

1.',hh attacks in the north, south, and west of Tr.:tq. This 

sug'g'ests that VB lED operations have evolved to include 

not only a campaign plan, but also the capability to train, 

resource, and deploy VBIED teams as part of a unit. 

It is possihle that the reconstitution of AQT's WTED 

capacity carr-icd over directly through veteran technical 

experts [rom the origina12ooj network, which may mean 

that the VBIED capacity developed ahead of the re'>t of 

AQT's military- organ1zation -in 2012. It is also clear that 

AQT additionally executed many TED, IDF, and AED 

attacks that were likely prosecuted by other teams apart 

from VBIED cells. It has been suggested throughout this 

study that AQI \-vill attempt to re-establish local emirates 

in conjunction with the declaration of the TIlwmcStnteoflraq 

and af-Sham, and that these emirates would require local 

security elelnents. The presence of emirate structures 

bUllt to exeCU1:e attacks was validated when ISF' detalned 

the AQI Deputy V{adi ofnortherTl Baghdad on April 13, 

20I3,s,> 

SVEST attacks were also -increasingly reported during 

the last quarter of "Breaking the \-Valls," TTlallY as part 

of complex attacks, The VBIED dataset also shows a 

significant iucrease in SVBIED activity beginning in 

April 2013. These attacks do not overwhelm non-suk:ide 

AQI DETAINEES, 2013 (SOURCE: Al GHAD PRESS) 

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attack incidence, but they <ire nevertheless important 

to track for sf"veral reasons. First, suicide attacks are 

an lndicator of forC'lgn nghter actlvlty, and the rise in 

suicide atta(,ks in T raq sugg'csts that foreign fighters are 

again flowing into Iraq from Syria. Second, the rise in 

suicide attacks indicates another organizational shift 

within AQT in order to ('apitalize upon attack types that 

C<in only be exe(,uted with suicide bombers - namely 

SVESTs. VBl.EDs likely require less organizational 

adjustment to absorb suicide drivers, though optimizing 

their lethal potential requires new thought. 

Negating the consolidation ofloeal emirates -in Iraq will 

depend upon the renewed cooperation of Arab Sunnis 

with the ISF and Maliki's government. The departure of 

Sahwa from their posts In the wake of the Abu Ghraib 

prison breakwou ld he an alarming slgn to the contrary.l 0 

Destroying /\QT's \!BlED capahility. on the other hand, 

requires a direct approach by the ISF to dismantle and 

destroy the VBIED command and its component celis. 

TSF maydo this byreplicadng Coalition Forre operations 

to destroy the Baghdad \TJ3IED cells in Rusafa and 

Karkh in 2oo7,c>l These operations involved aggre%lVe 

interdictlOn of VBIF.D factories as well as the erection 

of concrete barrlers in Baghdad to limit vehicular 

mob-ility. 

In 20I3, the ct'lls are more likely 10cateJ in the Baghdad 

helts rather than the city center, '" hich may provide 

new opportunities to interdict "long pl'lTTlary and 

secondary lines of communication into the city. This 

strategy may cause AQ.I to increase targeting of ISF at 

checkpo-ints. It may also came AQI to respond -in other 

ways, either by atteTTlpting to shift operat-ions to the city 

ceuter or increasingly to rely upon SVESTs, Both of 

these responses would degrade AQl's ability to operClte, 

however, and reduce their present momentum. They 

may also be TTlitigated through early anticipation and 

planning againstAQl'~ next move. 

Combal Power of VB lED Ceil, 

The ability to forecast AQT's tactical and operational 

planning also requires considerate thought for how 

the V1HED enterprise is organized, Observiug VBIED 

, .... -aves drives provides key insights into the shape of the 

organization that plans, resources, and executes VBIED 

attacks. A very large wave, such a" those v.·itnessed on 

July 23, 2012 and September 9, 20I2, demonstrates 

exceprionCll logistics and depth of technical expertise 

across the organizatlon carrying out The attacks (see 

23 
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VBIEDs VS .. SVBIEDs JULY.2012-JULY2013 

addhional information on the waves disC'llssed in this 

&ectioll in Part IT of this report). Theseelement5 of control 

require both centralized support and decentralized 

execution, which frames a core question concerning 

which organizational model best describes the institution 

re~pons-ihle. A 1lighl)' centralized organization that 

prepares VGlEDs and deploys fighters may be regarded 

as less organized, less capable, and less resilieLlt than one 

tlJat is merely centrally guided, comprised of multiple 

&elf-containf'd cells that are capablf' of independent 

operations with minimal support. All of August 2013, 

AQl's VBIED wave pattt"rn suggests AQI has developed 

a V ~IED organization involving two echelons - one to 

plan, &upport, and communicate; and one to con&truct 

and deploy VBIEDs. 

The ,,'RIED waves at the end of the "Breaking the "'la11s" 

campaign were highly controlled, of a con&istent interval, 

and high yield. indicative of continued thoughtful 

planning, but also the presence of high-performing 

forward-deployed teams capable of executing the plan 

-in rf'peatable Fashion. For example, the VBIED wave& 

that focused attacks upon Baghdad on May 15. May 20, 

May 27. and May 30, 2013 were not likely dependent 

upon a cr:Iltral command for all manner of support in 

f'xecut-ionj this lnkrval does not allow timf' for tealTIS 

to g'ather and disperse, for central leadership to provide 

traiuiug and specific guidance, or for new fighters to 

24 

IIlSV81ED 

err. The more l.ikely scenario involves multiple teams 

already refined in thei.r execution receiving instruction 

to atta,k on a given day and executing with little further 

managem.ent 01' interference. 

In order to maintain this volume of attacks at dose interval, 

these teams were also likely able to access VBlEDs from 

multiple construction sites. This hypothesis 1S supported 

by "the -improbahil-ity that one v'BIED facility wa& able to 

maintain the throughput required for the waves seen in 

the later stages of the campaign. Whereas the July 2012 

and S~ptember 2012 v--SIED Vv-aves required a high onetime volume. such that the \-'BIEDs lTI-ight have he en 

manufactured centrally over time and then staged; the 

pattern of attacks towards the end of the campaIgnsuggests 

a system more akin to multiple assembly lim,s for mass 

production. The pace ofaHacks is determined in part by 

the pace of VB lED construction, and the paee ofattaeks 

drastically increased. Decentralized VB lED construction 

is also eaSler to mask and harder to -interdict, and it is 

an observable 1ndicator of the e:..panded organizational 

depth of AQl's VB lED activity, 

Expanding this idea further. the apparent shift in the 

VBlED consrruction system is one possible I;;xplanatlOn 

for the overall shirt in VBTED waveform ohserved over 

the course of the "Breaking the Vlalls" campaign. The 

pattern began ill Phase I as few high amplitude waves 

spanlling a WIde geographic footprint, and it shifred 

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50


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by the final phase to many successive smaller .vaves that 

were focused geographically. This waveform may depend 

upon many factors. to include plannlng g1.1idance to 

accoTTlplish phased operational ohjectives, resource 

limitations. and available combat power, but the ratedetermilling step for the VBlED capability is foremost 

V~TED construction. Tncreased 'lInED constnlct1on 

ma~ have been the principal reason For the sh1ft over the 

course of the ·'Brea.king the \Valls" campaign to enable 

AQI to mass attacks upon .Baghdad in 2013. 

In addition to ready access to VBIF.D construction sites, 

forward deployed VBTED cells at the variety estiTTlatcd 

in the SUlTlTner of 'J,013 required a degree of internal 

organization to perform minimum key functions: to 

communicate with a higher headquarters: to receive 

and deploy fighters; to recelve and deploy VBTEDs; and 

to spot and designate specific targets. The footprint of 

individual V.BIED rells may be traced in the attack data 

based upon evident geographic dusters, though it does 

not follow that these high performing Tcams are tethered 

to local geography in every case. VV-hat a teaTTl lacks in 

local familiarity it must recover in preparation, and the 

characteristic V BlED cells observed in this study are 

capable of surging to new attack zones rather than bcing 

restricted to a Tl1aX1TTlUTTl radius of attack. 

The idea that VBIED cells may not be geographically 

delimited eTTlerges with the caTl1paign swing to Baghdad 

in February '7,013. Th-is nationwide consolidat-uon of 

VBIED combat power indicateg a surge role for V.BIED 

cells that had been operating far from Baghdad prior 

to February 2013. Almost no VBIEDs are documented 

in this study bf'tween February '7 and April '4, 2013 in 

Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din provinces, withill. 

or outside of VBLED waves. A.rtacks in Kirkuk resumed 

on April [5, 20[3 in a wave that synchronlzed attacks 

with effects in Baghdad. The hiatus -in northern VBTED 

activity. like the January 2013 break in VBIF.D waves, is 

not yet fully understood. These c.ells may have shifted to 

Baghdad, shifted. to Syna, or been disrupted by the TSf 

or -internal constraints. However, bc('ause they preceded 

a drastic rise in VBIED wave activity in Baghdad in May 

2013, they may reasonably be considercd as indicators 

of a growth step in the AQT V"""BTED organization and 

ev-idence that cells can lift and shift ft reo 

Rather than -ident-irying v"'BIED cells exclusively based 

on geography, VBIED cells may instead be bounded 

26 

by feasible attack volume: It is clear from the data that 

smaller clusters of V.BIED~ wirh common geography 

occur frequently betwef':n v'BTED waves. The OCC1Hrence 

otsmull clustered ,TBTED act-iv-ity is a key -insight into the 

presence of V BlED cells. For example, as the graph above 

depicts. the high oycrallievel of VB lED activitycontinued 

in January '4013 despite the temporary break 111 VBTED 

wave act-ivity. Th-is suggests that V13TI:D cells were capable 

of mounting iude pendent gToupings of attac.k.s without 

guidance to synchronize with other teams. It is also clear 

eVldence of the presence of a centralized VBTED wave 

pbnning elt"Tnent that was absent only during this t-iTTlf' 

before resuming operations in February 2013, 

VB lED constructioll sites are a critical ,'ulnerability of 

the VBIED organization because they are not mobile 

like VBTED cells. and because they are laden with 

high visibility TTlaterial resources, such as Tnany cars, 

components, and explosive'S. It is not yct clear what 

explosive material comprises most VBIEDs, though the 

high voluTne of attacks suggests a steady supply chain. 

One report froTTl Traqi Police in Najafin December 2012 

indicated that a VEIED was seized containing two men 

and a large amount of TNT and C4. <)'< Another report 

from the Tigris Operations Command on August 20, 

20[3 -indicated that a raid on a VBTED factory included 

ammonium and C+YJ Still another police raid in 

Salah ad-Din all August 20, 2013 reported seHure of 

an explosives fa,tory 1n Sule1man Beg that involved 37 

containers or DDT, TNT, and ?,O motorcycles.,?1 These 

are isolated reports at this time, though thc nature ofthc 

explosives is a criticallillc of inquiIJr for further stlldy. 

Tt i, important to establish how AQT procures exp10sive 

material in order for the TSF to disrupt logistlC"s 

* To re-engage the definition of a VBlED "waye" as six or more VDIED 

attacb. \,·hic~ theoreticclly ..-epre.'ien':s coordinat:on .'lcros~ multiple 

c("lk one VBIED (;ell :, therefore not ("~tirmltE·d to deploy moT"(' th,m 5 

\'BT~D~ 0:1 one d'lY. This thre~hold i~ reiiwnable becim~e the oetoniltion 

of 5 VBIED, hk:4Cly requirr.'~ a team of 5-TO fighteY'~ in :Klditioll to ~upPOlt slaJLmdlcFldership. EITccllVe ot"pnlLatiom ~arger than thh require 

further .<'Llbd:vl.<.ion becau~e of the dictale~ or "pa:l of comrol. A funcllOnalleam Ihi~ ~ia~ l~ therefore an effeclhe uniL of measure for a ba~ic 

\""BTED (.1,,11. for t1-:e purpo~e~ of fr,uning the d,ttd. it l~ u~eful to dentl!)' 

~m,l11er \'BlED chBler, a~ having ~tr..l(;tllre ,mn me,ming even when they 

do not mvoiv~ the ~ligh orgal1i7ation or ,1 \''BTED '\"·'ive." Orgdni7ing a 

VIEE:D \~a.\'e oj' filOrf> [run 5 \/BIED~ is Lhel"t'i'ore comldered Lo require 

coordina~lOn acro~~ cel1~. Recent reporl~ from the Iraqi Counler-TerrorioD. Ta~k Force d~o l:ldlcated on August 21. 2013trut the; conduded 

,1 r,ud on a IG-m,m VBl2:D ce;t operating IVO B'Jghd,tci. 

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TOTAL VBIEDS PER MONTH 

tot-l:lli VGIEDEi ~r fl17'iM.h~ 

exp~ wfth:apoiyhom.~1 

tnanl$filrie: e-XDr~l~ .11"e'four 

pbaSisiofthaVBIED M'iy!palgll. 

TQTAll WIEDS VS VBIEPS IN WAVES 

supporting spectacular explosive attacks. 

The fact that these cells are also responsive to centralized 

guidance to synchronize attacks further -indkate-s the 

professional-ization of the V"BIED organization. It is 

unclear how they communicate. though lSf' has reported 

cOll.fi~cating motorcycles with forged documents upon 

site explO1tation;~'i and security hattalions at least 

reportedly receive instruction by couriel'.9c AQI has also 

lately warned Syrian jihadist organizations to exercise 

com~null.icatioll.s security as a principal lesson learned 

from fightlng Americans -in Iraq. ~7 Neverthe1ess, hecause 

the eaTly waves of the "Breaking the Walls" campa-ign 

bear a top-down quality as compared to later V,laves. it 

becomes apparent both that the AQl VB LED command 

has developed new organizational depth over the last 

year; and that a distinct planning vision is stm driving 

VHlED waves as of August 2013. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

YB!EIl$ It!. wa\i'€$'~ _oS: IJ£,tEDS orJ;a 

gwe~, day or mPM .are com~,rtl":f-l;~ 

totat VB.t~OS pe.r ~Qnth in·o~r to 

is6Jat~ :t'kicgntl'tJi.:tIMf \(BI'ED ~ivitv 

J~>t~'Ri' QfvstEb WflvM. 

The enumeration of VBlED cells is critical to the 

f'stiTTlat-ion or AQrs cOTTlbat pOWf'r. FurtherTTlore, it is 

necessary to understand how to match lSF operational 

design to eradicateAQl's VHlED capability. for example, 

the lSF search and raid opcradoninto northern Baghdad 

on August lj., 2013 may have had the potent-i31 to disrupt a 

\'BlED cell in the vicinity of the northern Baghdad belts; 

hov.,rever, YBlED waves continued without interruption 

in August 2013. ThJS is likely due to the prese-nce of 

additional VTIlED cells projecting atta,ks in Baghdad 

froTTl the southern belts. The tota1 voluITIe ofv--SIEDs 

occuring within "waves" from .Februal; 2013 to August 

2013 also clearly indicates the presence of multiple 

operational cells that cannot each produce a full wave 

ofVBIEDs in isolation. A wave -involving TO or TTlore 

VBlEDs may he cstimat("d to involve a minimum of two, 

and li1:.ely thl'ec VBlED cells. The iHtacks mentlOned 

below are dic;cussed in further detail -in Part IT of this 

report. 

27 
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Baghdad 

The dense geog-raphic clustering into three distinct 

zone!'; of Baghdad and the overall high volume of attacks. 

usually III excess of 12 VBIEDs per wave, suggest there 

may be thrt:'e ct:'lls conducting attacks in the city as of 

August ")'OT3. There appears to be a northcrn Baghdad 

attac.k wne extending from Shula in the northwest to 

Sadr City in the northeast; along with a southeastern 

zone and a southwestern zone. Cons-ider-ing the relatl\1t:' 

perTTl-issihility of the Baghdad belts, these cells may be 

operating on the periphery of Baghdad, to the north, 

south, and somhwest, where AQI had enjoyed sanctuary 

historically.']!! One or both of the southern belt celh may 

also be responsib1e for attacks in downto .... n Baghdad, i~ 

Karrada and Sadoun, particularly. 

Perhaps the best illustration of the presence of multiple 

cells operating in Baghdad, and In particular from The 

southern helts, -is the spread of the Baghdad attacks on 

July 20, 20I3, the day before the prison attacks upon 

Abu Ghraib and Taji base. These attacks largely avoided 

the traditional northern. zone. ThIs spread indi.cates 

that the northern cell was not in play that day, likely 

because it had been re-tasked to support one or both 

prison attacks onJuly '7,1, ?,C[3. 

AQT had an operational presencc -in Baghdad froTTl the 

beginning of the .. Breaking the Walls" campaign. The day 

before [he very large July 23, 20I2 wave, a smaller wave 

of seven VBTEDs struck a TI11mher of locations. Thrce 

of tho~e V"""BTEDs detonated -in Malnnoudiyah, south of 

Bag'hdad, which is a possible area of interest for further 

study to detect one of the southern belt VBIED cells. 

Northern Baghdad neighborhoods such as Sadr City, 

Husse-in-iya, and Ur wert:' struck as part of the first large 

July 23. 20I2 \A'ave the following day. which may indicate 

that multiple staging areas had emerged in the yiciuity of 

Baghdad from The early days of the campaign. 

it is important to cOll.sider the full spectrum of possible 

locations for VBIED cells, .'Uld VBIED construction sites 

par<icularly. m order to foC'1's collect10n of -intelligence 

to cOTlfirTTl or deny. Tt -is espNlal1y -important at this time 

to understand the depth of AQJ in the southern belts 

because ISF counter-AQI operations in the northern 

zone "'till fail if not synehronlzed with operations in the 

southern zones. They will also fa-ilifthey target the local 

Sunni population and not the hig'h-performing VBIED 

teams perpetrating attacks in Baghdad. Instead, if the ISF 

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is able to disrupt the logistics of the VBIED apparatui>, 

and to block their avenues of approach to Baghdad, the 

operations may be able to dampen the societal effects 

of \'TITEDs 10ng enough to generate dOTnestic policy 

chang'es, 

Ji/orthem iraq 

Next to Baghdad, Kirkuk Clty and its environs were 

slamD1ed with \!BlED attacks at -intense periods at the 

beginning of the "Breaking the Walls" campaign. Nine 

VBIEDs detonated in Kirkuk on July 23, 2013, along 

v.ith two VBIEDs in Tuz Khurmatu to the south of the 

city. Three addit-ionalVBTEDs detonated in Muqdadiyah, 

south ofTuz Khurmatu, with further attacks in Baquba, 

Diyala. Again based upon estimated volume of attacks 

in each location, this VBIED wave appeared to involve 

a large number of fighters operating in the northeast of 

Iraq. This northern grou p ofVBIEDs within theJ uly 23, 

2012 wave cmnpared to four VBlEDs that detonated in 

Baghdad that day, and the three aforementioned VBIEDs 

south of Baghdad in Mahmoudiyah the day b~fore. 

Thc relative density of attacks in the }Iorth dissipated 

by September 9, 2012. Attacks in the North generally 

matched Baghdad attacks undl February 2013, when 

northern activity generally ceased for two months. 

Northern attacks resumed in April 2013 to a lesser 

degree. As of August 2013, it appears that there is still a 

cell conducting attacks in K-irkuk city Dnd Tuz Khurmatu. 

Because the volume is low and the rate inconsistent, it 

is possible that the same cell is responsible for attacks 

in Kirkuk, northern Salah ad-Din, possibly southern 

Salah ad-Din, and evt'n Mosul. The assignment of a 

wide geographic assignment to one cell may be feasible, 

particularly if the \fRIED cell and the consrructioll site 

are based along the road that connects Kirhlk CIty to 

Baiji, or Tuz Khurmatu to Tikrit, Furthermore, lhe 

northernmost east-west route between Baiji and Kirkuk 

forms the southern boundary of the Za'ab triangle which 

stretches northwest to Mosul. This region had also been 

anolher historic support zone for AQL,19 

By contrast, it docs not appear that there is a VBTED 

cell operating in Diyala at this time. The last V.BIED 

documented in Diyala province was defused by ISF 

on June 13, 2013. T00 Given that \!BTED attacks had 

concentra1ed at various points in the early campaign 

in the Diyala river valley, it now appears that AQI has 

regained control of [his support zone. A report from 

the Tigris Operations Command on August 20. 2013 

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indicated that operations ill the Hamrin Mountains area 

beginning in northern Diyala had resulted in the arrest 

of 48 personnd, S1X vehicles. 23 motorcyrles, a v'"BTED 

factory, a training camp. and ?,l rifles. IOI It is possible 

that this had been a command and control node within 

AQI's support zone, and potentially that which had 

played a principal role at the beginnlng of the "Breaking 

the \\Talls" cam pa-ign , when VBTED operations were 

likel~ more centralized. It is not yet clear how this ISF 

operation will affect AQl's combat power, but VRIE.D 

waves continued in Baghdad on August 20 and 28, 

~O[3·"02 

.MosuI 

Single VRIEDs detonated intermittently in Mosul 

throughout the campaign until June 10, 2013, ahead of 

provincial elf'ctions on JUTIe' 20, 2CI3.IO~ On June 10, 

three v13IEDs detonatcd in Mosul, synchronized with 

attacks in Tuz Khurmatu, Kirkuk, ancl Baghdad. T" .... o 

days later, ISF defused two "V""BIEDs in East Mosul. 'OJ. 

This might suggest that a cell might have ftJrmed in close 

proximity to Mosul. but attacks do not duster again in 

Moml as of the time of this report. fhis suggests first 

that the northern VBIED cell that likely covers Kirkuk 

and northern Salah ad D-in also covers Mosul and Tel 

Mar as n.eeded. It may also sugg'est that Mosul began as 

a permissive support zone for AQl, and thus that the 

organization, as In (he Diyala River Valley, did not need 

or want WTED attacks within ihe-ir support zone. 

ihbar 

A VRIED cell in £\nbar also appears among the original 

constellation of actors at the beginning of "Breaking 

the \Ar~alls.'· although the cell participate'd m-inimally 

in synchronized ";,\faves. Only one VBTED detonated 

in A..nbar on July 23, 2012, and none detonated on 

Scpternber 9, 2012. However, a cluster of three 'lBIEDs 

in Ramadi and Fallujall occurred on September 13, 2012, 

Clusters of lora 1 VBTEDs occurred aga-in on September 

24-, 2012 and May I, 2013, again of{.:;et in timing from 

the main wave .. The apparent trend of independent 

('ell activity and minimal participation in synchroniud 

waves continued thl'oug'h August '20T3. As of the t11TIE' 

of this report, the .A.nbar V BLED cell never participated 

in a coordinated y'BIED ';'I."ave with more thall one 

\?TITED. This may -indicate that the ce11 has difficult, 

(,ommun-icatingwith the rest of the v"'BTED organization, 

or that it suffers from some other constraint. It may also 

be unresponsive to tasking. 

2. 
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Southern Iraq 

AQl has deliberately targeted Shi'a population centers in 

s011thern Iraq since the beginning of the "Breaking the 

'Valls" campaign. Th-is -is a partirularly impressive feat, 

g'iven the gTeat distance between the support zone needed 

to construct a VBIED and the attack zones ob"erved. 

From September 9, 2012 om ... rard, AQI struck Basra, 

Amara, Tmam al-Sharqi, Nasiriyah, Diwaniya, Najaf, 

Karbala. and 5hi>a communities south of Baghdad. 

VBIEDs began to clusrer there in late December 2012, 

and clusters occurred several times before the February 

2;013 push to Baghdad began. The southern cell appeared 

to participate in this push to Baghdad. 

On June 16, 2013, a wave of nine VBIEDs struck 

most of these locatIons in southern Iraq. A "iimilar 

wave happened again on July '4, 2013. Because this 

concentration does not usually occur. it tS reasonable 

to assess that the southern VB lED cell and the sonthern 

Baghdad beJt cells interoperate, such that the southern 

Baghdad belt cells assist in waves di.rected at r.itic& in 

southern Traq; and lhat the southern Traq cell assists 

in attacks upon Baghdad from the southern belts, This 

hypothe"iis accounts for the volume of attacks in southerll 

Traq on June 16, 2013 and July 14, 2013, which exceed 

thE' estiTTlated capab-il-ity ofa single cell. Tt -is possihle hut 

unlikely that the southern belt cells are solely responsible 

for thf' attacks in southern Iraq. lustf'ad, there is likely 

an additional cell, possi.bly located in Tskandriyah or 

MUGsayih in northern Bahe1, or Arah Jahour north of 

\Va8it, that covers the souilieru zone, 

Southern Salah ad-Din 

Like MosuL only single \'BTEDs occurred in southern 

Salah ad-Din provincE' throughout the "Breaking the 

Walls" campaign. Single Y Bl.EDs occurred in the cities 

of Samarra. Balad, Taji, or Tarmiyah in cOlljunction 

with TTlost of the Phase T waves, and several independent 

VTITIDs detonated -in if>olation during Phase fT. This 

early pattern does not indicate the presence of a selfcOlltained V.BIED cell capable of conducting multiple 

"independent att.acks. FurtherTTlore, the largest observed 

duster of four VBTEDs in Taj-i occurred as part of the 

September 9, 2012 wave, and YBIEDs never dustered 

in this region again as of Augus( 2013. In fact, the last 

VBTED documented 111 southern Salah ad Din oCClured 

on June 9,20[3 in Taji. IO.) G-iven that this rf'gion key 

terrain for the northern approach to Bas'hdad, it is more 

likely that AQI has decided not to strike this area with 

30 

VBl.EDs than thatAQl is limited from doing so. For the 

same reason, this region is critically important for lSF 

to clear and protect in order to re-establish securiTy in 

Baghdad. 

WHAT WE KNOW 

This study has raised many possibilities and many 

questions about the disposition of al- Qaeda in Iraq 

today. Tt is therefore necessary to take -inventory of the 

facts, assessments, and remaining unknowns at lhis 

time. 

Facts 

Tt -is a fact that AQT announced the heginning of the 

"Breaking the 'Nalls" campaIgn on July 21, 2012 and 

its euJ on July 23, 2013. It i"i further known that AQ.l 

has claimed credit for numt;rous attacks in Iraq over 

the course of the same period, induding many of the 

\!DIED waves and prison breaks identified in this study, 

attributed them to all overarching campaign plan, and 

even published a statistical report to credit themselves 

with mf'asure~ of their performance: 

Tt is a fact that violence levels in Traq in ~013 by various 

measures, including documented casualty totals and the 

volnme of VBIEDs documented in this study, compare 

to wartime levels when the U.S. military was thoroughly 

eHgaged in the fight. Tt is a fact that VBTEDs were chiefly 

responsible for the rise in casualties from December 

20n to August 2013. It IS a fact that they wen~ often 

synchronIzed to strike on the same day at 10cations 

that were somet-imes geographically concentrated and 

sometimes widespread. 

It is a fact that AQl's military organization is capable 

of other attacks besides VBIEDs, including lEDs, 

* On Allg .. ]~t T:~, 2OT3, AQT pub1i~lwd;, c;imp;lign upd,'-te in it~ 

rr.ijit'!T-Y pt'riodlc,il, "'l.l-Nab,l." AccQrdmg to SITE Tntdl:genl'c 

Group, AQltook invenLory of tLS f'lltacko from .November '26, '2011 to 

November 15, QOT'2, docume:l1iilb" 4,500 operatIOns broken down 

b: reglOll and lype. The st.~Us'ic. JllAQI'~ periodical l1aVl'." not been 

fully rompdri"d to tho,c clocumi"ntcd in thi~ ~tucy, b'Jt the number 

:)f"'\lBTED da~ch l.blln~d by AQT during thi, period gn'atly exceed 

thooe dOl.urr:ented from open ,CURe,'. 

"ISIL Cla,r.J.~ 4,500 Opel';luom in One-Year Period III Imq, Give~ 

Stall~l1c~," tran.l?lLed and publhhed b l SITE InLelligence Group, 

Augmt [3, '20[3· 

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SVES'IS. indirect nrc, and direct fire. and that all of 

these capahilities have more than once been brought to 

bear upon a single tactical objective to achieve combined 

anns effects. The attack on the Abu Ghraih pr-ison is 1.he 

most visible and most recent example to demonstrate 

tIlis capahility. 

It is therefore a fact that AQl hils reconstItuted as a 

TTl-ilitary organization capable or planning, directing. 

and resollrcing the attacks documented in 1his study. 

AQI capitalized upon a position of military strength in 

Iraq to project llot ouly lethal force into Syriil, but aho to 

exert governance and cOlltrol in Syria under 

the banner oFthe T,lamicStatc 

~4ssessme nts 

It -is assessed that AQI m('ans to assert governance and 

control of territory also in Iraq. It is possible that AQl 

already controls territory in the vicinity of northern 

Dlyala province, the Thar Thar desert area northwest of 

Baghdad, theJazeera desert west of TikI' it, and the Za'ab 

triangle spanning' northern Salah ad~Din, southern 

Ninewa, and western Kirkuk. AQI likely maintains 

unrestricted access into Syria across the western Jazeera 

de~ert, and sanctuary and training· may be established 

there. 

It is also asse<;sed thatAQlleaves the protection of these 

areas to other military and security elements outside the 

v~IED organ-izat-ion, wh-ile this high-performing team 

and signature weapons capab-ility are brought to bear 

to spearhead an offensive campaign plall in Iraq. This 

campaign has bCf'n succes<;ful both in stoking sectarian 

violence in Iraq and in demonstrating out.wardly the 

inability of th" TSf' th Ut> far to prOlect the populat-ion 

fromAQl's attacks. 

its implementation to include spectacular attacks against 

critical infrastnlcture as well as cOlnplex attacks upon 

hardened TSF facilities. 

It is assessed thatAQT's WIED operations are not the only 

mililar~ capability developed by AQI over tlle course of 

the ·'Breakingthe Walls" campaign< Thousands of violent 

events, including SVEST attacks, lEDs. small arms fire 

cngagements. and indirect Fu'e, have been documented 

and as of yet not analyzed Fully. They l-ikely contain rich 

insight into the shape of the overall military organization 

as well as its rdationship to the security apparatu<; which 

undergirds AQT's burgeoning governance initiative:'> in 

Traq.!o<o 

Unknowns 

Tt i~ unknown at this time how AQT supplies "'BlED 

attacks. V£IEDs require basic components, including 

vehicles, explosive material. and detonation triggers, 

among other niche components. Several reports from 

TSF interdiction operations indicate that rn ilitary grade 

explosives, and not homemade explosives or munitions, 

comprise thf' explosive content of YBIFDs. This would 

suggest that AQI's supply chain for explosIve attacks 

beglTls 0utside of Traq, which would fo11mv that AQI 

requires funding, and not supplies, in order to sustain 

operation<;. 

If this is iudeed the case. it unknown how AQI funds 

v13TED attacks, though domestic and regional criminal 

act-iv-jtiefi, such as kidnapping, extortion, and theft, 

suspected. 

The personalities and relationships which comprise 

the human networks operating withIn AQI's military 

organization an" also unknown from open sources. 

It is also unknown hov .. ' VBIED cells communicate 

It is assessed thatAQl's Y.BIED capability has grown over with central leadership in order to coordinate VBIED 

the course of the last 12 months in three critkal ways. waves, though couriers are suspected. It is unknown 

First, the organization likely 1l0W performs decentralized how they communicate. The veteran AQT network 

v'BIED construct-ion operat-ions, with TTlult-iple VBTED may generally be regard('d as sparse communicators, 

factories deployed hTn.vard close to prim;iry attack zones. based upon AQl's historical behaviors. In addition, a 

Second, the organization now likely cOlltains multiple recent prisoner statement claims that instruction~ and 

independently funrt-ioning VBIED cells that are capahle funding are provided by courier.!')' This demonstrates 

of mounting their own attacks. These cells can also one oFthe most remarkable qual-itieo;; orthe VBIED wave 

commullicate with higher military echelons and arc phenomenon described in this report. It showcases a 

responsive to centralized guidance to coordinate attacks dependency upon communicatlOns tradecraft that may be 

on a single day or in support of a single opf'ration. interdicted ifisolated and under~tood. Thesetwocrit-ical 

Third., the v'BIED org'anization still appears to engage requirements, namely fman('e and comTTlunications, 

central leadership that specializes in V£IED wave constitute key opporhlllities to disrupt AQl's VBlfD 

~~~.l~~~~_~~_~~~~ote~~~~nd i~~.:...n..!: ~~~~~~~~p_~tlOn,_. _____________ _ 

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The locations of the forward VB lED cells, forwardVEIED 

construction sites, and central \'BIED If'adersh-ip ar{' yet 

unknown, but the adjacent map depicts named areas of 

interest for these location'> [hat Inav focus collection for 

further rf'flTIeTIlent of the assessTIl~nts ddivcred in this 

study. The hypotlH:"sls of TIlany v""BIED faC'tories has lately 

been corroborated by ISF reporting on site exploitation 

during the "Rf'venge of the Martyrs" security operation 

in Northcrn Baghdad. rod 

32 

Advising Iraqi Secul'iiY "Forces 

It is necessary for ISF to reduce the VBIED th reat in 

Iraq in order to preserve the state against the threat 

of al-QaeJa. VBIEDs are the single highest source of 

casualties in Iraq. Reducing \lBIEDs requires targeting 

high confidence locations and d-isrupting oper>J.tional 

flows. Reducing- VETEDs will not reduce AQT's forcelevel military command or planning capacity. In fact, 

one can expect that reducing VBIEDs will translate to 

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~llDDLt L\S 1 SLCUlHl Y R.i:'l:'0Rl J± i Ai -Q/iLD~\ l~ ~.kAQ RtSL;.RGL'J l I ,J.tSSlCA D. ~:":WlS i S.tVl.t \l.l:3tR 20I3 

an increase in other attack types, such as SVESTI>, Giyen 

that the VUTED eHon -is not demonstrative1y drlwn by 

suicide attacks. this would not an easy transition for 

AQI to accomplish, although the increase of "iuicide 

bombers in the summer of 2013, originating from 

Syria, suggests that the organization is already increasing 

this capab-ility. I09 DisruptingAQI to this degree may shift 

the momentum of the coullter-terrorism fight in Iraq in 

favor ofISF. 

Reducing the military command of AQT likely means a 

focused desert operation. Dill this operat-ion should not 

attempt to dear the Jazeera Desert that forms western 

Ninewa and Anbar provinces, ],0 Instead, attacks should 

he focused ·upon regions such as Thar Thar, The Za'ah 

Triangle, and Hamrin where AQT has been known to 

establish command and control previously. and from 

which to project into urban centers.'" !vleanwhile, it 

1s imperative to protect Baghdad. Focused operations 

to pursue \!TITED cells and local security battalions in 

the Baghdad belts. to the north and south of Bag·hdad. 

an:- advi.sed. It is also ilnperative to increase security of 

Iraq's prisons, especially Taji, wlnch has been attacked 

multiple times without success. 

Focused operatIOns upon the Baghdad belts will likely 

cause attacks to swell in northern Iraq, name1yin Ninewa 

and Kirkuk provinces. Particularly in Kirkuk. it is 

necessary to address coullter-terrorism in a cooperative 

manner with Kllrdish Peshmerga forces. AQI has Jikely 

targeted Kirkuk in order TO exacerbate ethnk violence 

rather than to establisll safe haven, but tllf' overlapping 

presence of JRTN amidst protest camps represents a 

redundant threat to ISF. JRTN is also likely mobilized 

in Nlnewa, particularly in MOlmL The pTes~nt security 

situation in Mosul, whicll involves mult-iple threat 

streams apart from AQI. must be studied in greater 

detail. 

Aboye all, it is necessary to reduce the threat of 

-insurgency in Iraq as counter-terroriSTTl operations 

increase. A counter-terrorism strategy that propels 

a Sunni uprising or even a Federalism effort will 

cripple 1ST. Furthenllore, hisrory has shown that the 

successful defeat of AQT principally occurred at the 

hands of Iraq's Sunni Arahl';. Likewise their alienation 

from the state will condemn ISF to fight all at once a 

terrorist threat, a secular Insurgency, and a sectarian 

r1vil war. This had been the nature of thc war in Iraq 

-in ~006. This is the nature of the war in Syria today. 

It is imperative that such a crisis be averted in Iraq lest 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

the battlefronts of Iraq and Syria merge. 

CONCLUSION 

It is critical to the development of U.S. policy options to 

addrf'ss the security situation ueated by AQT -in Traq and 

Syria to understand that it is both necessary and possible 

to interdict this threat. Interdiction depeLids -first and 

foremost upon expert intelligence and operational 

design, both of which the V.S. ('an prov-ide -in mentorship 

as the veteran force which lately assisted ISF in the near 

defeat of AQI. It is foremos( necessary that ISf mount 

effecti.ve opcratiollS to disrupt AQl's attacks upon the 

population if the legitimacy of the statf' 1S to endure. 

v"""BIEDs are AQI's most lethal and specialized attack 

vector, and it should be targeted and defeated first. 

Second, defeating AQI depends upon the active 

participation of Traq's Arab Sunni populatlon in 

national defense, which ultimately drove AQT From its 

strongholds in western and northern Iraq in 2007-

2008. This population is instead teeteringoll. rhc edge of 

an uprislng as of August 2013 for lack of opportunity to 

part-ir-ipatE' -in national governmf'nt exacerbated by recent 

mass arrests in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison break. 

l'he U.S. must ensure mat support which is offered to the 

government of Iraq to counter AQI will not l11crease this 

risk of popular insurgency. Tn fact. it should be a precondition of any proffered security support that Maliki 

reconcile v'lith the and-government protest movement 

so that it participates as an enfranchised vartywithin the 

Traqi state. 

Third, it -is necf'ssary that the government of Iraq 

approach the containment of AQ). in conjunction 

with Kurdish security forces, given the- assessed strong 

prel'>ence of Ac;.2.T along the Green Line. AQI -is effectively 

exploiting the territoria1 gap between the two erstwhile 

rival security forces, and this gap must be refined as a 

seam rhat is synchronously approached by ISF and the 

Kurdish Peshmerga 'if AQI is to be di.slodged from this 

linear stronghold. If AQ,T is inst('ad allowed to increase 

in the east, it will realize its potential to d('velnp l:nultiple 

centers of gravity in Iraq and Syria and thereby become 

much more difficu1t to defcat. 

Prime Minister Maliki. has claimed nov·" on multiple 

occasions that AQl represents a real threat to his 

government.i)·" Taking inventory of the effects of 

AQI's initiative, attacks again&t the population have 

caused Shi'a militias to remobilize. Attacks against ISF 

33 
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installations have succesi>fully damaged facilities and 

s~cured the release of hundreds of prisoners, most of 

whom are vcteran AQI flghters and leaders. Atta{"ks 

against Sahwa lTIay cause thelTI to abandon their posts 

in the midst of a broader domestic potential for a new 

Sunni uprising. Attacks against port facilities in iraq's 

s01.th may d~grade Iraq's 1ndustrial base, or threaten 

it enough to affect outside -investment. \i\,h-ile the 

international community muses over the potential for 

the Syrian civil war w achieve broader effect~ upon the 

region, it IS also necessary to obsenre the effects of AQI's 

resurgence in Iraq, which reduct's the potent-ial for Traq 

to buttress reg'ional stability against the Syrian tide. 

The resurgence of al-Qaeda in iraq and Syria also 

presents a direct threar to U.S. interests illlraq and the 

region. AQI has 110t expressed the intent to target U.S. 

interests. but it has delTIonstrated till." eapability and 

will to target government installations which c.ontain 

U.S. citlZens as well as critical infrastructure tethered to 

U.S. corporate 1nterests. Furthermorc, as an al-Qaeda 

afFd-iate, AQI f'undalTIentally supports the broader a1-

Qaeda network with potential sanctuary which may very 

well serve to support attacks again.st the West. It is VItal 

to "(J.S. nat10nal ~ecurity That AQI be prevented from its 

goal to establish a caliphate in I rag and Syria. 

34 WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 
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86007b-35.eps

NOTES 

2. DOD Ne~~s Briefing wjt~ Gen. Odierno f!'Om the 

Pentagon. Presenter: Co:nmande:r, U.S. Forces-Iraq Gen. 

R1iYlllond OdierYlo, June 04., 2010, ht~p:!/w",r<",'.d('fen::.e.gov/ 

transcripts/transcript .as px ?t.~-,allscriptid =- 4632. 

3. "Iraq Unrest: Eid a1- Fitr bomb attacks ki1; dozens," BBG, 

August II, 2013, available online at http://''' .... w,bbc.co.ukl 

ne',,;s/world -middle- edst - 236 51828. 

4. 'Al-Qaeda d~~11S att~ck,ollAbu C"~raib an~ ~ajL 

and declares the 11bcmtlon of500 prtSoners, a1 

Mada Press, July 23. 2013. 3v3hable online at hctp:/I 

v;'Wv •. :lhnddapl'e,,:,.condar/ncw::./I5539!%D8%A7"!oDg 

%8,±.%Dg%82%D8%A'7%D8%Bg%D8%AF%D8%A 

9 -%D8 %AA % D8%AA %D8%AB %Dg%86%Dg%8g-

% D8%A7%Dg%84-';foDg7037%D8%AC%Dg 

%S8%Dq%8S-%D8%flg%D9%34%Dg%8g-

%D8%B3%D8%AC%Dg%86%Dg%8A-

%D8%A7%D8%A8%Dg%88-%D8%BA. 

:3. Jessica Le ... vis. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq's "Breaking the Walls" 

Cll1npaignAcblevt'''' itOl O'ojechveOl at Abu Ghrdib-20I3lr:lO~ 

Update i130," 1mtitute for the Study ofWa, July 28. 2013, 

available online at http://is~~ i rag. blogspoLrom/20 I3/07/alqaeda-in-iraqs-breaking- walls.html. 

6. "u. S. Condellln TcrrorlOlt Attacks in Iraq and Pledges 

to Hdp COIEbat al-Qaeda," U.S. State Departmer::t Pre::.::, 

Statement. ddivued by spokespersonJen Psali. August 10. 

~oI3, available or.line at http://w·;vw.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 

ps/20~3/08/2I3032; .htm. 

7. "BaCKground flricflllg-on U.S.-Iraq Political 

and Diplomatic Jec Meeting and the U.S.- Traq 

Bilate-ra1 Relationship UncleI' (-"e Strategic Framework 

A!:,JTeement:Augu;,t 15. 2;OI'3, acce;,;,ed Septe"mber 7. 

2013 J.nd available a~ http://'''''''''I,n;,v.~Late.g-ov!:dpu/pn/ 

ps/:w 13/08/-,;; I3I8?,.htm. 

8. "Baclcgro-,mcl Briefing on U.S.-Iraq Political 

i1::ld Diplomdtic.lCC Meeting and the U.S.-Iraq 

Bilateral Relatiomhip Under the Strategic Frounework 

Agreement."Augu81 IS, 201'3, accessed September 7, 

2013 and ay.:dlabk at http://www.state.goy/-r/pa/p-rs/ 

ps/2o~3108/213182.htm. 

g. "Iraq: July deadhe::.t TIlonth in years as violence kills oyer 

1,000 people, VN reports." PN Nevvs Centrc-, August I, 

20T3, available online at http://www.un.org/appslne.ws/ 

"ton·.asp'?NewdD~4554oi;:.U!;qCw5LVAto ; "lrdq dedth toll 

'top~ 1,;00' inJ1.1~y. rlighest in yean," BBC Ne"ws. Augu::.t 

1. 2013. http://www.bbc .. co.uk/news/world-middle-eastWWW,UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

23531 834. 

10. Jessica Lewis, "Al-Qaeda in Traq's <OBr'eaKing the V{a;ls" 

Camp.:J.ignAchieves its Objectivcs at Abu Ghraib-2;oI3lraq 

Upd,ltc #30," lm,tiiuce {or the Study of War, July 28. 2;013. 

available online at http://is,,viraq.blogspot.com/2013/07/,'l1-

qaeda - 1 n - i raqs -b reall ng-wal1 s. h t m 1. 

II. "NC'",\, statement from tl-~e Islamic State of Iraq and £1.1-

Sham: 'O:!"l ~he Battle of the 'len Day::.' in Re::,poIl~e to the 

Di::.placernent of Ahl ai-SUll.Ilah' "July 30, 2013. orig"inally 

posted ~o al-Shamikh for'..l~n. re-posted toJihado:og>. 

netJ1l1y 30. 2013. ayai2.3.ble or.line at http://jihadology, 

net/20 13/07/3 o/new-::.tatement -from -the-l",lamic-::.tllteof-iraq -and - al-::.ham -on -the - battle- of-the -ten-day::.-in-

['esponse- [0-1 he-d isplacement-of--ah I-al-sunnah/. 

12, Jessica Lewis. A.hmed }\Ii, and Kimberly Kagan, "Iraq's 

;,ec~ari,ln o..Ti"is reigT'.lteOl a::. Slu'a militia;, execute ciYihan~ 

and remobIlize, IS1,V. Ju~e 1, 2013, available onJiIle at 

http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/20 I 3. 106/20 ]3- i raq- u pdate23 -sadrists-and-asaib. htm l'rq -AAH. 

13. Stephen W:'cken, "haq Update If 52 - Demonstration,~ 

Agai..'Ylst Malijci lliter hSa\vi Bociyguard Arrest. ,. ISW, 

December 27.2012. available online at http://wv,,.w. 

undentandingwar.org/backgrounderliraq -upclate-:52-

demon:sirations- ag'ainl>t -lllillilci - after- io,~dwi -hodyguardJ.Tre~t. 

]4. Kelly Edwards, "Prison br{'ak and violence levels 

demand Maliki sccurity response: :;OJ3 Iraq Update ;'1"31:' 

lSW, AUIo,J"C",t :::3.2013. ayailahle online at http;/liswiraq. 

bJ og-::.pot. com/20 131 OS/prison - bl'eak- and -violence -levelsdellland.htr.ll: "Security Operations Fail to Stop Viole:1ce 

in Anbar as AI-Qaeda in Iraq Goes 0:1 the Offc-:-;s1ve," 

Mu::.:.ngo, on Iraq, J:.lne 27, 2013, :lYdilable online <it http:// 

mu~ing·::ioniraq. blog-::.po:. corn/2 0 13/ 06/ seCl1l"ity- operJ.tionsfail-to-stop. htmJ. 

T5. DOD Ne\\s ilrieflngv.ith Gen. Odierno from the 

Pentag'on, Pre~ente"r: COlnmander. U.S. Forcel;-iraq Gen. 

Raymond Odicrno, June 04.,2;010. http·II......,.."'" .... de:femie.gov/ 

tra nsc t'l pts/transcr i pt .aspx ?tra merl pt Id = 46 3 2. 

It). DOD News Briefing with Gen. Odierno from 

Pe:!"ltac"On, Pre~enteI: COlnmander. U,S. Forceo,-lrag Gen. 

RaYln~:!"ld Oaierno, June 04 .. ~OlO. http·llw"." .... defemie.govl 

transct'ipts/tran::'cript .asp" ?transcri ptid=- 4632. 

17. Valet'ie S"ybala, "Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colors in 

Syria," lSW, August 1. 2013. availahle online at http:lh.,,,,-'w. 

understandingwar. org/hackgTounderl aL -qaecia -shows -itstruIC-colors-syt'ia. 

18, Ha~ab News, August 3, 20T3 photo gal1ny, .:J.yailable 

online at http://photo.halclhnewOl.comng'ullery~'.'!oD9%SI 

%D8%B9%D3%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%~"7%D3%A 

A-%D8%A7%Dg%84%D8%AE%Dg%8A%Dg%8:)'%D8%A 

35 
60


86007b-36.eps

NOTES 

9-%D8%A7%Dg%B4 %D8%AF%D8%Bg%Dg%B8%Dg%8 

A%D8%Ag-%Dg%8I%Dg%8A-%D8%AD%Dg%BA-%D8 

%A7%Dg%8+ %D9%8:~%D9%84 %DS%A7%D8%B3%D8% 

Ag - 3 -8 -2 0 I3&lang~ en. 

19. "Suicide Cur Born b Kills At Least 4:4 In Darnascus," 

CNN, D('cer.:lbcr 23, 20 II, available online at http.;'/www. 

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9-%D8%A7%D9%S4 %D8%AF%D8%Il9%D9%S8%D9%8 

A%D8%Ag-%Dg%81%Dg%8A-%D8%AD%Dg%8A-%D8 

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as 

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WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 
61


86007b-37.eps

NOTES 

be Aiding' al-Q~aeda'$_A.mbitiolls in Syria. Analysts say," 

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37 
62


86007b-38.eps

NOTES 

article&id" 11 04 f): ansar- al- islam - claims-s u icide- bom bingin-i!"'aq-s}!'ia -border-crossing- town&xatid=;:j Ihadistnews<emld=880. 

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38 

Croup, April 8, 2013: http://www.m.emri.org/repol'~/ 

en/0/0/0/0/O/O/'7 11 9· h tm 

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bay%EI %B3 % 8Da -foundation -for-media -productionpre;,enb -it -nev-.'-andlO -mel:>sdge- {rom -Jabhat-alnu%E1%Bg%A3rah,,-abu-mu%F.l%B8'Y0-<-1I..5amm_ad-al-jawlalli-al-golani-about-the fields ·of-al-sham/. 

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7:;:. "lSI Leader Take'S I'Ssue with ZawahiTi Letter in Alleged 

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himl. 

75. "Tuz mayor announce'S the return of Iraqi Army forces 

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%Dg%82%D8%A7%D8%AG%D9%8S%D9%82%D8%A7% 

Dg%8S_%D8%A7%Dg%84_ %D8%B7%Dg%88%D8%B2_ % 

Dg%SA%D8%Bg%Dg%84 %Dg%86_ %D8%AF%D8%AE'% 

D9S'o88%Dg%8~_ %08 %'\701,)°9%84 %08%AC% Dg%8A % 

D8%B+_%D8~'oA7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%BI%D8%A7% 

Dg%82%D9%8"--%D8%AS%Dq%84%D9%39_%D9%86% 

D8%A7%D8%AD%Dg%8A%D8%A9_%D8%B3%Dg%S'1% 

Dg%8A%09%85%LJ8%A7%Dg%8o_%LJ8%A8%09%8A% 

D9%83_ %D8%B3%Dg%84%D9%8S%D9%8A%D8%A7_% 

D9%88%D8%AS%D8%BS%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9_% 

D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A9_%D9%3S%D8%AF%D9%86% 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 
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NOTES 

D9%8A%Dg%8A%D9%86_%D8%A8%Dg%82%D8%B5% 

D9%81_%D8%AC%Dg%88%Dg%8A 

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al-m on itor. com/pu 1 se/ or-igi-r.a 1 s/?, 0 1 3/0 5/hassan -nasra Hahspeech - hezbolLlh -syrid .htlL l. 

80. Hanin Chaddal', "The im.minent Hezbollan-Nu:::.ra 

War: Lebanon wili become al-Nusm's alternative bettdefield," 

Now, May 15, ?,oT3, available on~ine at https://now.mmedia. 

mel1bl en! commentaryanalysis/the -im:n lnent -hel bollah81. Will Fulton,Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, "Iranian 

Strategy in Syria," AJoint Report by AErs Cr-itical Threats 

Project & Institute for the Study of War, May 20q, aVinlahle 

online at http·//v,'I,\w,"Gnder::,tanding,\'aI'.org/::.ites/de1ault/ 

fi les/T 1'al1 ianStratC'grinSria - [MAY. poL 

S'l, . .lessicn Lc."vis, "Ai-Qaeda in Iras's "Breaking the \Va~ls" 

Campaign.L<\i:hieve6 its Objectives dt Abu GhTilib-~013lraq 

Update #30," Imtitute for the Study onl{ar, July 28, 2013, 

available online at http:.!/iswil'a'l.blogspot.coml20:3/07/alqa<:>da - i n - i 1'a'1s-b real i ng- wa :1s. h tm 1. 

83. Stephen Wid~en. "20I3 Iraq Upd,lte .f.'2;0: Pre6idency 

ana Protest!:> TurnA~tention to Negotiation," IS'i/Ii", May 

17,201'3, available online at nttp://is.v:raq.blogspot. 

com!'l,OI3/o5/~OT3 -i t'aq - u pd2re-'l,O-presidency -and .htm 1. 

3+. Stephen Wicke::"! dnd Ah:ned &i, "2CI3haq Upuat.e 

-"r18B: Protester" DiVIded a::. Kurds Hand 1Liliki a Ufeline." 

ISW, Maf 3. ~OI3, available online at http://~swiraq. 

b1ogl'pot.com/?,OT3/o5/?,OT3 -imq-update-18b- pJ'otcs~et'l'-

36. Kelly Edwards, "PrIson bTcak and violence levels 

demand l\b!iki secul'lty response: 20I3 Iraq Update #3~:' 

ISW, August 13, '2013, availabl<:> online at hnp·l/is\>vit'aq. 

blog.~pot. cmll/:;:: 0 13/03 !pri60n -Lreak- and -violence-level~­

demand,html. 

86, "ISIS PI'esents Details ofTts Role in Capture of 

WWW,UNDERSTANDINGWAR,ORG 

Minnag-h Ail base, The ~fLddle East Middle East Medil.l 

R<:>sea1'ch Tnstitute (MET\"fRI), Aug'Jst 10, ~0:3, available 

online at http:/h .. r"",>,.memri.org/report/en/print7342,hem. 

87, "New blatement from the lsl:llllLc State of Iraq aed alSham: 'On ~Il{· Battle of the 'Ten Days' in Response to the 

Displacement of Ahl al-Sunnah'," Ju1r 30,2013, originally 

posted to al-Shamikh forum. re-posted toJfr~adologT' 

netJuly 30. 2013. available Oluille at http://jjhadologT' 

net/20 13/ 0 7/3 O/ne\v-::.tatement -from - tr~e-i::;lamic-stateof-iraq-and- al--sham-on -the-battle- of-tll{'-ten-da}s-inresponse- to -the- displaceme.nt- of- ahl-al-sunnail/, 

88. "Urge~t.,Car hOII'_b explodes at Um Qa::.r port," All 

ofIraq new!:> .Ag·ency, Augu;;;t 17, 2013, available onlu"le at 

http:// WWVIl. all i t'aq news .co m/ (' n/i ndex. p Ii p? opt ion -= conLCO 

ntent&vie:w= article&id = 39 540 :urgent -car-bomb- explodesiit -um -qil61·-portR.catid = 36: securitr&l cemid = 37, 

89. "Deputy Bag-hdad Governor Reveab Ili!;, Operations' 

Details to al-Ghad Pre~s and Admits leadmg the operation to 

raid the Justice- Ministry" a1-Ghad Press. August T2, QOT3. 

Trim". OmJ.I' Abdullah, Acce~~ed O:cl August 12;.2;013 http:'!! 

alghadpre~::..com/ar/Ne,v!;,Detaib.aspx?NewsID=1716 i 

go. Jessica Lewis, "Al-Qaeda in Iraq's "Bre.;tking the Vola lis" 

Campaign Achieves its Objectives at Abu Ghra-ib---QOT3 Iraq 

Upddte .f.'30,'· lmtitute for the Study of War, July 28. ~oI3. 

available online at http://iswiraq.olog-spot.com/:;:013/07/alqaf:da - in - i raqs-b1'eaking-walls. htm:. 

9T. Kimber1y Kagan, "HO"INThey Did It: Exe(,-;'lting 

the Winnii'-f; Str<:ttegy in haq," The Weekly Standard, 

V0113, No 10, November 19, :;:007, available online 

at http://wwVv.week!).standard.com/Content/Pub! icJ 

A rtic 1 ('sl 0 ° 0/0 ool 0 T 4/ 346)'2 19o. asp '?pg= T1.'. 

92. "Police in Naja{ ;,eize a car bomb. ane6t two in6ide it," 

National Iraqi New!;, Agency, December 23, 2012, avai~able 

on I inc at http://www. n it~anews,c.om/ eng] ishlNewLDetails. 

asp'?ar95_VQ=GFFDMJ" 

93. "'IigTis Operation" COlllmand kills 5 miEtdnt" and 

arre~ted 116, Nct:ionaliraqi New!;, Agency, Aug;nt :;:0, :;:013. 

available 0~11ine at http://wwvv.ninanews.com/english/:--rewL 

Detai1s"asp'?a~'95_ VQ=0J H LI D. 

9+. "A pldnt for the rnanufactuTL"Lg of explosives found 

east ofTlkri~," National IratIi News Agency. August 20. 

~OI3, ava:lable on:ine at htcp://w\'\,w.ninanews.com/ 

engl~sh/NcwLDerails.asp?ar95_VQ=CJHMGH. Ahr!led 

Hu~sein, "TIle <1ITe"t of a car bOlnb cell re6pon~:ble for recent 

bombing's," AI Sumaria. Augu~t 21, 2013. ilvailable online. at 

http://'"''w'01, alsumaria. ty/news/81 28 S/%D3 %A7%D9 %8+ % 

D9%8~%D8%A8% D8%B6- %D8%B9%Dg%84 %Dg%8g-

%D8%AE%Dg%84 %Dg%8A%D8%A9-

%Dg%85%D8%AE<J·bD8%Al\.%D8%B5%D8%Ag39 
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NOTES 

% D8%A8% D8%.1-\1-\ %Dg%81 %D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%AE-

%D8%A7%Dg%8'1,%D9%8S%D8%Bl'%D9%83%D8%A8% 

D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4/ar 

95. "fl:lglldac1 OC conducts wide "ecurity operation 

in Baghdad:' ~AJI Iraq New:. Agency, Augud 4., 2012, 

available online at httpI·www.al::raqnev...s.com/t:n/index. 

ph p '? option ~ C0111_contCTI t& v1e·w~ar,-1c1e& id - 3 897 r. bagh da 

d - oc-wag'eo.-v.ide- o;ecurity-operatioll - in -bag'hdad&catid = 3 b: 

:.ecurity&Itemid"'37. 

96. "Deputy Baghdad Governor Reveals Operations' 

Details to a:-Gnad Press and Admits leading the operation to 

raid the Ju:,tice Minilitry", al-Gllad Pre.;;". Augu"t I2. ~OI3. 

Tran~. OUlar Abdullah. i'u:ce",:scd on August l~, 20]3 http:// 

a:ghacip!'ess.comiar/NewsDeta,ls.aspx?NewsID=: 7 1 6 J 

97. "al-Mada PTei'S, August ~6, ~01'2" available online 

at http:// .... -..wl.aLTJ]adapre:;,~.colIl/ ddnew:;/J7083/% D9 

%82%D8%A7%D8%Bg%D8%AF'%D8%A9-%D8% 

A7%D9%84%DB%B9%DB%BI%D8%A7%D9°{'8~-

% D8%AA %D8%AF% 08~'o B9% Og%88- % 1)8% B2% 09%85 

%D9%8A~/oD9°h84 %D8%A7%D8%_AA. %D9%87%D8%A7-

%D8%A7%Dg'%84 %D8 %fl3,%Dg%88~{,D8%B1 %Dg%8A % 

Da%A7%D8%AA 

98. Farook A11med, "BaekgrouncleT #-.;;8: i\blt-i-Nationa1 

DjyiiS:on-Center':; Operationt; during' the 2007-2008 

T::-oop S1,.1TJo:·e,'· ISvV: April 2008, available online at b.ttp:11 

www.understandjngvva 1'.0 rg!oac kgr0 u nde 1'1 m u] t i - na t io nald ivis ion -% [?, % 80 % 93 -cen r e t'% E -.;; % 8 0%99s-ope ra t ionsau ring - 2 007 - 20 0 8-troop-" urge. 

99. Eric Harn:'lton, "Iraq Report: March 2003 - March 

2008: The Fight For Mosul," TS'f and tl--:e "\Veek!} Standard, 

availab1e online a: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/ 

def"'-J.it/file-;/reports/lraq %2 OReport %20 8. pdf. 

100. "Car bOlllb deact::'vated in Diyaln," Nalional Iraq 

News Ageno:" June 13, 2013, available online at http:// 

www.l1inanews.com!c-n 1£1 is hi N ews_Oeta ils .asp '? a l'g 5-

VQoGIGlFH. 

101. "TlgTis Operation:. Command kills :5 InilitfiIlt::. and 

arrested 1 [6," National I !'agi Ncw~ Agency, August 20. 2013, 

availab1e online at http://wwv.i.ninanews.com/eng1ish/Ne\vs_ 

DetJ.ih .. \::.p 'rar95_ VQ=GJHLlD, 

102. "Toll ri-;e'l IVIaiunudiyah suicide bOlllbmg to 14 dead 

a.nd wounded," al-Mada Press, A,,lgust 28,20]3, availa.ble 

on1ine at http·//www.almadapress.com/ar/news/J7227/%D8 

%A7%D8'X)BI%D8%_ .. 4.A%D9%8I%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D8 

%AD%D8%BS%Dg%8A%D9%84·%D8%A9_%D8%AA';;oD 

g%8!%D8%AC%Dg%SA .. %D8%BI_%DS%A7%D9%84%D 

g%85%D8%AD%D9%85%Dg%88%D8'1oAF%Dg%8A%D8 

%A9_%D8%A7%Dg~Jo8+%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%~~<\'%D8 

%AD%D8%A7%D8% Bl C/o Dg%8A_ '}oD8'}f.AS. 

103. Ahmed Ali. "The Ninewa and Anbar Elections 

40 

and the Future ofhaq's Sunnt Leadership," ISVl,June 

21. 20]3, availab1e on1ine at http://iswiraq.blogspot. 

com!2 0 I 3/06/2013 -iraq -update - 2 5-ninewa - and - anbar. 

htlIll·?q~election. 

104. "2 Cal" bombs defused in Mosul," All ofTraq 

News Agency, June 12, 20!3. available on1ine http:// 

'INW''''. alliraqlc.e·ws ,COlll! enlindex. php'r option ~ COlIL 

conrent&view~ artide&ld = 35 bgI: 2 -car-bOInhs -defused -inmo::.ul-&catid=36· :.ecurity&Iternici=37. 

lOS. "Cal' bomb explodes in northern Baghdad," All of 

iraq Ne,"vsi~.gency,.June 10, ~0I3, available online at http:// 

'N ...... "N. alliraqnewt.> ,coIn/en/index, php ';)option ~ com_content 

&vie\\'=ar~ide&id = 35567: car- born b- explode!;-in -northernbag'hdad -&o:atid =-36 :seO:clrit) &T rem id =-37. 

106. "Deputy Baghdad Governor Reyeals his Operatio:cis' 

Detaih to al-Ghad Pre~;, dnd Adlllit~ leading' the operdtion to 

raid the Ju:otice Ministry'·, aI-Chad Pre$t.>, August 12, 2013. 

Trans. OmarAbd'..lllan. Acces~ed on August l~, ~013 http:// 

alghadprcss.comiarlNewsOera-ils.aspx?Ne-ws[ 0=17TO J 

107. "Deputy flag'hdnd Goyernor Reveal::. hi::. Operation:;' 

Detail:o to lil-Chad Pre% and Admit31ead:cng the operation to 

raid theJ'..lstice Minist~'}", ai-Chad Press, August 12, ~0;3. 

Trans. OmaT Abd-ulla~1. Accessed on August T'.:;, ':;013 l1ttP:!/ 

dlg-hadpre~:; ,corrj driN ew:.Details. aiSpx '? New::. lD= 17 Ib 

108. Kelly Edwards, '·PTi::.on break and yiolence level-:< 

demand Maliki seo:uritr response: 2013 Iraq Update #32," 

ISW, Augc~st 13. :;:0'3, avaih::'le online at "b.ttp:/liswiraq. 

blog'::,poLlom!20 I3/ 03/prit.>on -breaJ,;:-,-md -.. :iolence -le:el::.-

de::nand.h~ml. 

109. Background flnefing on IT.S.- Iraq Political and 

Oip10matk.JCC Meet-ingand the U.S.- Iraq BilateTal 

Relation;,hip Under the Strategic Framework AgreeDlent. 

Special Brieflng, Senior Adnllni:.tration Official, 

Washington, DC, August 15, 2013, http://www.state.gov!r/ 

no. "Security cralkduwIl operation on the iraqi-Syrian 

border in /kbar province," National Iraqi New::. Agency, 

June 9, 2013, ava:lable o"line athttp://www.ninanews.com/ 

eng1 ish/Ncws_Oe:ails.asp'?a r95_ VQ=G[ F:J KK. 

Ill. j'U.S,-fldcked Lraqis Rdid Calllp and Report Killinggo Insurgentt.>, New York Times, :tvlarch 24 .. ~OO:5, 

availa.ble online athttp://\Vww.nytllnes.colll!200S/03/24/ 

internationallm ldd1('east/24i raq. htm 1'?pagewanted "2~r=0. 

II2, "haq Pri.'lle Mini:.ter Warn:; Again~t Tdldili Thought," 

Shufaqn<l, March 24., 2013, available OlJline al http:// 

c:1.shafaq na.com/{~om pallen ~/k2/ itendi,~629- iraq i-prim\':-

m in i~tC'r- mal ili-warl1s-against- tain ri-thought, htm 1 ; "! raqi 

PM Fear:. Spillover of the Suian Cri;,iti." :llkabiYd. /u.ne 

24, ~ol'3, available online 1it http://engil$h,dlarubiya.net/ 

en/News/m idd le-east/20 I 3/0G/24'/T raq i- PM -Mal iki-afraidWWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 
65


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NOTES 

of-Syrian-crisis-spillover.html; "Iraqi PM 1'\Tarns of Syrian 

Crisis Spillover," alJa/,eera, February 2B, '2013, ayaihb1e 

online at ht:p:/lenglish.alarabiya.net/en/Ne'lNs/n:ddd:eeaOlti,::!O 131 0 6/24'/ Iraqi -P M - Malil~i - afraid - of-S)'Tian -critli 'lspillover.html: "Syria Crtsis SpiLlo'lel' ""oeries Iraq. Press 

TV, August IB, 20]3. available online at http://www.presstv. 

ir/detail/~oI3/o8/18/319:;;83!,syria- cr:sis-spillover-woniesiraqi. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 41 
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Cover Art ~y Maggw OonwlIl. 

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of 

this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any 

means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any 

information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from 

the publisher. 

©2013 by the Institute for the Study of War. 

Published in 20[3 in the United States of America by the Institute for the 

Study of War. 

1400 16th Street NVV, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036. 

http://www. understandingwar. org 
68


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JESSICA D. LEWIS 

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 15 

AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT, PART II 
69


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

COllt:ter-~(rror:sm £.ll,'IlYSt. 

impad 

~Laff o[~~cer. and 

Jt'.,~ica direct." tl-::o i'e~eRrch progt''1l'1.. She ~o ab,) l ~e lead ;:;r::l::iLect fC'!' lS\"'''~ technolog'. 

a: Qaerl'i 111 T TaC] pol'tfnlie" Tes~i('" "T!E'l';~{;i7t,~ :1' d,ita vi~u:dw;JTlor:, JletwQTk ;nliily~i~, and illt",lli!,(eltl.-C InlppOt't to oP'''';Ltioll,ll 

charLlnr, a cour~e to ad<<o.nce 1S\'\", ~igna1un,: ,.na:yllcal medlOdo]o~ie" aad co revoluuonit:e the conduct 01' i:lteiiigence trom open f,OurCE'~. 

In pi{rticu1itr, ~he ~e",b to jllcorporate tilT -:-\;:.no::tioll of e;-.Ily WdTll:n~: lt~ IS\\'\ Iegio:l<,l work. 

Slw hm, also iluchol'l"d several of [SW's Lraq 

at Abu Ghraib", "frQT'] "P1'ote~~ \fov'CInE'nt 

rellwl::iUze. 

indud:ng ",\1 

R{'~i~t;ince", "-:-rdq\ ~f'l:t,l'-l(lll 

Je~sici'l hold~ a B.S. in S!ratPgic 8: TnlE'!'n(ltion;,; TTj~to~'yil-nd Tnl{"t'nil.iion,~,l Rehtljon~ Crom-'Neq p,.:Jint iwd ,in l\.f, \, in Strategic T!:(elligerce 

from Alllerir;m \filit'iT)-- Univer~lty, 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

Abund,mt ,h,mb; to Jr" KimbeTly 'lld Fn"dt"rick K'igim for tneir mellton~l;p imd thou~ht lnll:lenhip :ht"'e miil1Y yt'oIn" SpeCial th:mb a, 

lllmL m<J.ghU'ul on po",- war Iraq, I would paLicuic,rl:, 

Sam \Vyer, ,no ,""" ".D,","'''', for their crE'ativf' en<'rh,.-Je~ ,md aE'votinn, "nd aj,w to H"l"ie{'tl G,IT:lt)lllr, who will 

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an informed undersracding of :nilitat'T attain through reliable resea:-ch, trustea. analysis, and lnnovati':e educat-:'on. lSW 

committed ~o inlproving tI-:e nation's <1bility to execute military ope!'aLions and t'f'~pond to emerging th !'f'ats in ora.:.t' to a('hi~'ve 

U.S. ::"_Tc;teg'ic objectivetl. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS \fJDDT r fAST srCURTTY Rr,T'ORT [5 I AT -QAr,DA T'I TRAQ RrSURGT'IT, PART TJ I jrSSTCA D. J F",TIS I OCTODl',R ~OI::l 

MAP OF IRAQ ............................................................................................... 06 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 07 

PHASE 1: PROOF OF CONCEPT AND CAPABILITy ......................................... 08 

PHASE 2: THE GREEN LINE ........................................................................... 12 

SPECTACULAR ATTACKS: 16 JANUARY 2013 ............................................... 15 

PRISON BREAKS: 3 AND 5 FEBRUARY 2013 .................................................. 16 

PHASE 3: THE PUSH TO BAGHDAD ............................................................... 16 

PHASE 4: THE AQI SURGE ............................................................................ 20 

PHASES OF THE 'BREAKING THE WALLS' CAMPAIGN ................................... 27 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 27 

APPEND~:METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 30 

NOTES .......................................................................................................... 32 
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MAP 1 I IRAQ 
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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 15 

AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT, PART II 

By Jessica D. Lewis 

This report is a continuation of a previous publication entitled "AI-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part 1." Part I of this report put forth the assessment that al-Qaeda in 

Iraq (AQI) has reconstituted as a professional military force capable of planning, training, resouTcing, 

and executing synchronized and complex attacks in Iraq, in particular waves of Vehicle-Borne Improvised 

Explosive Devices (VBIED), and combined arms attacks involving VBIEDS, mortars, suicide bombers, 

and small arms fire. This assessment derives from careful study of the ~4 \!BlED waves and 8 prison attacks 

observed during AQI's "Breaking the Walls" campaign from July 21, 2012 to July 23, 2013. This report will 

describe these events in detail in order to provide the necessary tactical evidence to support the strategic 

and operational assessments presented in Part 1. 

This continuation will focus upon the geography, 

volume, interval, and selected targets which characterize 

the individual waves and prison attacks. Careful study of 

the individual attacks supports the estimation of AQI's 

cOTl1bat power applied to VBTED operations in ~OI~-

2013. Part 11 will also show how the four phases of the 

., Breaking the Walls" campaign that are described in 

Part I were derived and assessed. It will provide further 

insight into the evolution of AQT's Tl1ihtary organization 

over the same time period. The primary object of Part 

11 will be to explain AQl's battle plan and adaptation 

over the course of the "Breaking the Walls" campaign. 

The paper observes how AQT eTl1ployed VBTEDS, its 

historical signature and current weapon of choice, to 

increase operational momentum in Iraq and establish 

the initiative at the expense ofthe Iraqi Security Forces. 

Part IT will also establish the key indicators of the 

presence and reactivity of AQT's VBIED planning cell 

and its distinction from the force-level planning cell 

assessed to be responsible for combined arms attacks 

upon prisons. 

Part IT uses the definitions and key terTl1S that are 

established in Part 1, including VB1ED, VB1ED wave, and 

VB1ED cell. A VBIED is distinguished by its design to 

project explosive power outside of a vehicle. VBTEDS are 

identified in context either to kill Tl1any people outside 

of the vehicle; as a battering ram to achieve structural 

damage; or in select instances to assassinate a person in 

another vehicle. By contrast, car bombs and sticky bOTl1bs 

are sTl1all parcel bOTl1bs placed on or in a car in order to 

target its occupants. A VBIED is therefore considered 

to be a much more sophisticated weapon, requiring 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

explosives expertise and autoTl1otive expertise to re-wire 

a car as a traveling high-yield bomb. 

A VBIED wave is an observed phenomenon often 

repeated by AQI in 2012-2013, in which many VBIEDS 

are detonate on the saTl1e day. Throughout the "Breaking 

the Walls" caTl1paign, these waves often struck Tl1ultiple 

cities on the same day, which provides insight into the 

miniJnuJn cornJnand and control mechanisrns in place 

to direct and coordinate attacks. For the purposes of 

both Part T and Part IT, the threshold for distinguishing 

aVBlED "wave" as opposed to other groupings of attacks 

is six VBIEDS in a single day. This serves to isolate 

the distinction between coordinated VBTED activity at 

a national level and VBTED activity that Tl1ay be Tl10re 

decentralized. Likewise the methodology to isolate 

VB lED attacks and to evaluate VBlED waves presented in 

Part T applies also to Part IT. The Tl1ethodology described 

in Part T is re-printed in Appendix A of this report. 

Part 1 of this report described the presence of a national 

VBTED organization within AQT's Tl1ilitary that designs, 

resources, and directs VBTED waves. Decentralized 

components of the national VBlED organization are 

called "VBlED cells." VBIED cells are not assumed to 

have been present for the duration of the "Breaking the 

Walls" caTl1paign. Rather, a principal object of this Tl10re 

in-depth study will be to observe key indicators that 

decentralized VBlED cells are active, where they may be 

active. and when they may have eTl1erged. The disposition 

of independent VBTED cells, which Tl1ay correspond 

with increasingly decentralized VBIED construction, 

is a measure of the operational depth of AQT's military 
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organization. Individual VBIED cells that can operate 

without guidance but reJnain responsive to tasking are 

difficult to defeat corporate1y. Destroying one ce11, or 

even communication among across echelons, does not 

destroy their aggregate lethal capability. 

Part 11 will also discuss indicators of the presence of 

two echelons of planners within AQI's military, one 

that speciflcally pertains to VBTED operations, and 

one that incorporates VBTEDS into combined arms 

attacks. This observation yields a key assessment that 

AQI has reconstituted as a military organization typified 

by its operational planning, as opposed to a disrupted 

and leader-centric terrorist organization. The VBTED 

command, assessed to be a national-level asset within 

AQI's military structure, is further assessed to possess 

its own planning capability, its own supply ehain, 

and its own training apparatus to propagate technical 

expertise. The overarching military command, assessed 

to design and direct combined arms attacks, appears 

sometimes to task the VBTED command with su pport to 

these complex attacks, for example the prison attacks of 

2012-2013. This report will explore the phases of the 

"Breaking the Walls" campaign for what they indicate of 

the objectives and planning c.11lture of these two military 

headquarters. 

PHASE 1: PROOF OF CONCEPT AND CAPABILITY 

The wave on July 23, 2012 was the flrst to draw 

international attention to AQl's "Breaking the Walls" 

campaign. A wave of seven VBIEDS, however, detonated 

the day prior, on July 22. 2012 and was actually the flrst 

wave of the campaign. This wave consisted of two clusters 

of events in Mahmoudiyah south of Baghdad and Ramadi 

and additional singleton VBIEDS in Mosul and Najaf. It 

is unclear at this time if these two waves were staggered 

deliberately. Given the assessment offered in Part T that 

the organizational structure of AQI developed over the 

course of the campaign, it is possible that the July 22, 

2012 wave and theJuly 23,2012 wave were meant to be a 

single wave, but were inadvertently offset in time. 

30 VBTEDS detonated onJuly 23,2012, striking civilian, 

ISF, and government targets. Most of the VBIEDS 

detonated across northern Iraq in MosuL Kirkuk, 

Diyala, Salah ad Din, and Anbar. Tn comparison, only 

four of the VBTEDS detonated in Baghdad, with one just 

north in Tarmiyah. Additionally, a simultaneous spike 

in other explosive events also occurred onJuly 23,2012, 

and some of these attacks may have been part of a larger 

coordinated strike by AQT. Tn particular, two waves of 

house-borne IEDs (HBIEDs) detonated in Sharqat and 

Taji.' Violent events were not observed to duster on any 

other day in July 2012, suggesting that these HBTED 

events were also orchestrated to occur on the same day as 

the VBIED wave. Wave 2 may therefore provide an early 

indication of a force-level planning effort within AQl's 

military to synehronize disparate lines of operation. Tt is 

worth noting that VBTEDS were several times observed 

to correlate with spikes in other types of attacks during 

the early months of "Breaking the Walls," but that VBIED 

waves began to occur independently and generally to 

assume their own character and focus in February 2013 

in conjunction with the start of Phase Ill. 

The AQT operatives who executed the VBTED wave were 

likely not the same operatives who executed the HBTED 

attacks. This assessment is based on several observations. 

First, VBIEDS constitute a highly technical operation 

requiring automotive as well as explosives expertise, 

and the combination is specinc to this highly-focused 

attack type. Second, VBIED preparation sites have niche 

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requireJnents, naJnely a car repair shop than can be 

converted into a VBIED factory. Third, because this is 

the largest VBTED wave documented in this study, it is 

therefore reasonable to regard this wave as an illustration 

of AQl's maximal effort applied to YElEDS. This 

suggests that other activities occurring outside of this 

wave were performed by teams with no VBTED capability. 

It has also lately emerged as an assessment in September 

2013 that HElED attacks are now used deliberately to 

displace populations from areas where AQI seeks to exert 

contro1.~ As such, the HBTED attacks on July '.:;3, 2012 

may demonstrate AQT's early push to control terrain in 

Taji and Sharqat, though more importantly to amplify 

the effects of a national wave of attacks. 

Wave 3' 16 August 2012 

An interval of 24 days separated Wave'.:; from Wave 3. 

This wave was much smaller overall, consisting of only 6 

YBlEDS, butit appeared to produce a considerably higher 

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casualty-to-attack ratio than Wave 2: The effectiveness 

of the VBIEDS in this wave may indicate that the targets 

for this wave were more carefully selected, that the 

smaller wave was easier to control for maximum effect, 

or that the first wave ofYBlEDS and prison breaks had 

already generated lessons learned that were employed in 

Wave 3. The limited size also indicates that this wave did 

not require a full planning effort like the waves on July 

23,2012 and September 9,2012. 

The Wave 3 distribution may serve to isolate the attack 

zones selected by AQT faT emphasis or shaping. Three 

of the VBTEDS that detonated on August 16, 2013 

struck targets in or near Kir1..11k. The others exploded 

in Baghdad, Kut, and Taji. Additional explosions that 

* Tht' total (.<i,'u,iltie, recorded byAFP 011 Augu"t 16 exceeded 200 (63 

KWI49 WIA). One of lhe VBIEDS in Kirkuk and lwo of lhe IED~ 

in Baghdad. in Sadr City and Zafaramyah re~pectively. appeared most 

rE'~pon~ible for the filt'llitie~. 
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day detonated in Kirkuk, Hawijah, Tuz, Baqubah, 

Baghdad, Tikrit, and Tal Mar. This spread suggests that 

AQT maintained operational depth in northeastern Traq 

at the beginning of the "Breaking the Walls" campaign. 

It also sug'g'ests that the YBIED logistics and stag'ing' 

effort were also located in the northeast, along with the 

headquarters of the VBTED command containing the 

planning cell. 

A small cluster ofVBTED attacks occu rred the day prior, 

on August 15, 2012, comprised of three YBIEDs in 

Baqubah and Muqdadiyah. The cluster on August 15 may 

have been planned and executed in conjunction with 

the August 16 attacks as a two-phased operation. One 

of the YBIEDs in Muqdadiyah reportedly exploded near 

the house of an Interior Ministry intelligence officer.:' 

Additionally, gunmen attacked two police checkpoints in 

Baqubah. 1 The attacks' geographical dispersion validates 

the hypothesis of an eastern headquarters for the early 

YBIED command, possibly centered on or north of 

Muqdadiyah in the Diyala river valley. Muqdadiyah 

had been the site of one of the longest standing VBTED 

factories and significant AQI command and control 

centers in late 2007." 

Two prison attacks also occurred in the interim, 

involving YBIEDs among other attack methods. AQI 

struck the Baghdad Counter-terrorism Headquarters on 

July 31, 20[2, inflicting 65 casualties and claiming credit 

on August 13, 2012. G The attack upon the Taji Tasfirat 

Prison on August I, 20I2 incurred over 30 casualties. 7 

This pair of prison attacks established the relationship 

between the VBTED campaign and the prison attack 

campaign. The grand scale of these sequential efforts 

suggests a strong linkage between the YBIED planning 

cell and the force-level planning cell at the beginning of 

the campaign. Accordingly, the VBTED waves and prison 

attacks, which each required significant prior planning, 

were likely not planned separately, but together, before 

"Breaking the Walls" was announced. This coincides 

with the assessment that a centralized organization is 

less sophisticated and more vulnerable than one that 

sub-divides by specialty and develops greater operational 

depth, which will be observed as a growth step within the 

YBIED organization in later phases of the campaign. 

WavE' 4: 9 September ~OI~ 

Wave 4 greatly expanded the geography of the attacks. 

Wave 4 extended attacks to Basra and other southern 

cities, as well as Tal Mar in the north. This wave stands 

10 

out among others in the" Breaking the Walls" set as one 

that was dearly intended to demonstrate the ability to 

launch attacks anywhere in Iraq, including' southern 

Shi'a strongholds. An interval of 24 days separated 

Wave 3 from Wave 4, replicating the VBIED recovery 

cycle between Waves 2 and 3. Wave 4 consisted of 2 [ 

VBIEDS. The total casualties recorded in Iraq that day 

exceeded 526 (76 KIA, 420 WIA), which is the single 

highest casualty-yield day within this data set. Wave 4 

was a second very large wave and the most deadly, again 

indicating' that targ'et selection and execution improved 

the lethality of individual YBIEDS as part of a larger 

wave. The VBIEDS causing the highest casualties were 

in Maysan province, Kirkuk, Amara, and Sadr City, 

which are Shi'a majority areas. 8 The attack in Maysan 

targeted civilians near the Imam al-Sharqi shrine. 9 

Mos t of the attacks were again geographically concentrated 

in close proximity to Muqdadiyah, in Baghdad, Baqubah, 

and Kirkuk. Taji was targeted more prominently than in 

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the previous wave, thoug'h VBIEDS in Taji inflicted more 

material damage than human casualties. These VBIEDS 

may therefore have reinforced a push to establish control 

in Taji. Additionally, this wave sustained VBIED activity 

within Kirkuk city. In addition to VBIEDS in the city 

center, a VB lED struck the parking lot outside the 

state-owned North Oil Company as well as Iraqi Army 

soldiers west of the city.IO VBIED attacks upon critical 

infrastructure targets were not commonly observed 

during the "Breaking the Walls" campaign, but they 

signify a critical vulnerability of the state and are as of 

September 2;013 assessed to be a potential objective of 

the AQl's new 2;OI3-20I4 campaig'n. 

Smaller VB lED clusters followed on September I3 and 

24, which appear unconnected to the September 9 wave. 

These attacks repeatedly struck Fallujah and Ramadi. 

most often targeting the lSF. In one notable exception, a 

suicide bomber targeted a primary school in Hit. Anbar, 

killing 4 children and wounding 8. 11 AFP data does not 

indicate that these attacks otherwise generated significant 

casualties. These VBIED clusters demonstrate that the 

AQI campaign in Anbar diverges from that in the east: 

Independent activity occurs outside of VB lED waves and 

in high enough volume during this period to suggest that 

an independent VBlED cell was already in place in Anbar 

at this time. Such a VB lED cell would likely involve 

independent leadership, and possibly also independent 

VBIED construction, to prepare and execute attacks if 

not assigned and resourced by a higher command. 

Wave 5: 30 September 2012 

The significance of Wave 5 is that it occurred immediately 

after the attack upon the Tikrit Tasfirat prison on 

September 27, 2012, in which VBIEDS played a 

supporting role. The attack upon the Tikrit Tasnrat 

prison was highly successful. Over 60 ISF were killed 

or wounded and 100 prisoners escaped, including 47 

AQI death row inmates. I2 The attack involved VBIEDS, 

silenced weapons, explosive belts, and hand grenades, 

and reportedly began from inside the prison. This was 

a well-planned and well-executed operation in which 

VBIEDS played only a minor role. AQI claimed credit 

for this attack."J 

The Tikrit Tasfirat prison attack occurred one week after 

'" AFP data additionally points to moderately hig'h casualtie~ on 

September 7. '2012, wluch is une).-plained b;r available data on explosive 

event~ at thi~ time. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

the September 19, 2012 attack on the Hib Hib police 

directorate, where 10 AQI leaders were reportedly 

detained. This attack involved suicide bombers and 

small arms fire. I1 AQl also claimed credit for this attack. I

" 

The larger attack upon the Tikrit prison involved the 

integration of VBIEDS as combined arms complements 

to degrade infrastructure in support of small unit tactics 

and large scale prisoner ground movements. Wave 5 

occurred three days after the Tikrit Tasnrat prison 

break. Wave 5 consisted of 13 VBIEDS, the majority of 

which targeted Baghdad and Taji, with additional attacks 

in Baquba, Kut, Fallujah, Hit, and Mosul. AFP casualty 

records indicate relatively low total casualties in Iraq 

that day, and none of the VBIEDS are reported to have 

inflicted high casualties individually. 

Several of the VBIEDS in this wave appeared to target 

the ISf, in Mosul, Hit, Baghdad, and Kut. The lSF is 

generally a harder and smaller target than civilians in 

public places, which may account for the low casualties. 

11 
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Although it would seem logical that AQI would target 

the lSF as a defensive reaction to new lSF operations 

lalJnched in the wake of the prison break, it is unlikely 

because none of the VBIEDS detonated in the vicinity of 

Tikrit. Consequently. we should hypothesize instead that 

the VB lED organization was not able to reset quickly in 

the Tikrit zone; that this VBIED wave was a diversion to 

protect prisoner escape; or that the wave is not directly 

related to the prison break. AQI claimed credit for the 

wave, indicating that the ISF had been targeted in a "bill 

of blood" for recent execution of Sunni prisoners. rG 

PHASE 2: THE GREEN LINE 

Wave 6: 14 November 2012 

A 45-day interval separated Wave 5 from Wave 6. Wave 6 

was a smaller wave, consisting of 9 VBIEDS detonating 

in Kirkuk. Baquba, Baghdad. and also the southern 

provinces. Kirkuk sustained three YBIEDS targeting 

civilians. One of them reportedly targeted the KPD 

headquarters in Kirkuk. The VBIED in Baghdad struck 

the central neighborhood of Karrada, which was the 

third time this neighborhood near the Green Zone 

was targeted in the early months of the "Breaking the 

Walls" campaign. 17 Launching successive attacks upon 

Karrada demonstrates that AQI can project attacks 

into the heart of the city despite the presence of lSF. 

The southern provinces of Wasit and Babel were also 

struck. This geographic spread suggests that AQI had 

begun to extend persistent V BlED lines of effort into 

three regions: Kirku.k, Baghdad, and southern Iraq by 

November 2012. 

Kirkuk appeared to remain the main effort. The targets 

in Kirkuk were likely selected to exploit ethnic tension, 

while the Baghdad and southern VBIEDS targeted Shi'a 

COlnlnunities to stoke sectarian tension on the eve of the 

Muslim New Year.r~ Striking targets in southern Iraq. 

while witnessed during Phase I, was still uncommon 

during Phase 11. This wave contained only the second 

YBIED to strike Babel during the "Breaking the Walls" 

campaign. It contained only the fourth to strike in the 

vicinity ofKut in Wasit province. It is therefore unlikely 

that separate cells had formed to focus upon southern 

Iraq targets by this time. It is more likely that AQI 

operatives dispatched from another location and staged 

in the southern Baghdad belts to execute this wave. 

Separately, a very large SVBIED targeted the military 

installation at Taji on November 6, eight days prior 

12 

to this wave. This attack inflicted significant casualties 

for a single YBIED.I~ The SYBIED targeted a group of 

Iraqi Army recruits gathering outside the gate to load 

onto buses. Taji base has sustained several off-cycle 

independent attacks over the cou rse of the "Breaking the 

Walls" campaign. Among military installations, it is the 

hardest and most frequently struck with YBIEDS. This 

indicates both the significance of Taji base to AQI as a 

main objective and possibly also its proximity to one or 

more of AQl's principal support zones. AQI combined 

arms operations directed against hardened facilities may 

be planned at the force-level rather than by the VBIED 

organization itself, given that they involve other weapon 

systems besides YBIEDS. 

WaDes 7 & 8: 27 & 29 November 2012 

An interval of '4 days separated Wave 6 from Wave 7. 

This interval constitutes a dramatic reduction in the 

recovery time between YBIED waves. It is possible that 

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smaller elements were assigned primary responsibility 

for Phase II execution, leading to the false perception 

of faster recovery. Wave 7 consisted of 8 VBTEDS. Two 

of the VBTEDS exploded in Kirku'k, one specifically in 

front of the PUK Youth Union headquarters. Three 

additional VBIEDS exploded in Baghdad, another two 

in Mosul, and one in RaTnadi. One of the Baghdad 

VBTEDStargeted the Ali Basha Shi'a mosque and inflicted 

significant casualties. The Mosul VBIEDS targeted an 

Iraqiyya MP and an Iraqi Police patrol, on the northeast 

and northwest of the city, respectively. AQT's attac'k zones 

in Mosul therefore shifted geographically. Previously, 

during Wave I and Wave 3, three attacks per wave focused 

upon the southwest and southeast quadrants of Mosul. 

Once again, only a single VBTED detonated in Ramadi 

during this synchronized wave. Six other singleton 

VBIEDS detonated in Ramadiand Fallujah at other times 

during Phase 11. The most organized VBIED effort in 

Anbar occurred two months prior, four days after Wave 

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4. On September 13, a small VBIED duster consisting 

offour VBIEDs struck civilian and government targets in 

Fallujah and Ramadi. oo An AQT cell in Anbar was likely 

executing VBTED attacks during this tiTne; however, 

this cell does not appear to be effectively synchronized 

with centrally directed VBIED waves or routinely able 

to construct and deploy Tnore than one VBTED at a 

time. With the exception of a cOTnplex attack upon a 

government compound in Ramadi on January 15, 2013 

involving VBIEDS, lEDS, SVESTS, and Direct Fire, 

none of the VBTED attacks in Anbar during Phase IT 

incurred more than 4 casualties." Most focused upon 

the harder to target lSF, which may contribute to the low 

casualty count. 

Wave 8 o('.curred two days later on November 29, 2012, 

consisting of 6 VBTEDS. AFP data also indicates that 

more than 250 casualties (5°/200) occurred on that 

day. VBIEDS detonated in Mosul, Baghdad, Fallujah, 

Hilla, and Karbala. In contrast to previous attacks that 

13 
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appear to emanate from east of the Hamrin Mountains, 

this small wave was west-leaning. The VB lED attacks 

upon Hilla and Karbala drove the casl1ahies up, as they 

inflicted aCOTnbined total ofl~o casualties (~4/96). This 

attack pattern is interesting because it suggests several 

possible configurations of the VB lED organization 

at this time. It is possible that the VBIEDS in Wave 8 

originated with teams gathered at a central location and 

then dispatched for attacks. It is also possible that the 

Baghdad, southern Iraq, and Anbar teams were semipermanently or permanently deployed forward with 

their own VB TED construction capabilities by this time. 

We see evidence of this forward-deployed disposition 

of groups later on, and this is the first VB lED wave in 

which that disposition is possible. The organizational 

transition to multiple VBIED construction sites may 

therefore have occurred during Phase II. 

Wave 9: 17 December 20HZ 

An interval of 18 days separated Wave 8 from Wave 9. 

This interval initially appears to signal a longe'r recovery 

time, but it was interrupted by a significant mini-wave 

on December 16, which included a substantial strike 

against the PUK headquarters in Jalula, northeast of 

Muqdadiyah, a conte'ste'd area along the Green Line'.~~ 

The attack upon a satellite PUK headquarters clearly 

represents AQl's intent to exacerbate ethnic tensions, 

and it also points back to Hamrin as a principal support 

zone'. It furthe'r de'monstrate's that AQI focuse'd its 

targeting along the Green Line. characteristic of Phase II, 

through smaller VBIED clusters as well as synchronized 

VBIED waves. 

Wave 9 consisted of 9 VBIEDs, and AQI claimed credit 

for this wave. 23 Three of the VBIED attacks occurred in 

Baghdad, four occurred in Salah ad Din, and additional 

e'Ve'nts occurred in Mosul and we'stern Diyala. The' 

VBIEDS in Balad and Tuz Khurmatu appeared to 

inflict the highest casualties. Two of the Baghdad attacks 

occurred to the west of the city for the first time. Three of 

the' Salah ad Din attacks occu rre'd in a de'libe'rate' striate'd 

pattern, with one VBIED each in Samarra, Balad, 

and Tikrit. The VBIED attacks along the northern arc 

likewise occurred at precise and distant intervals, with 

one' VBIED each in Diyala, Tuz Khurmatu, and Mosul. 

It is difficult to discern a new cell configuration from this 

pattern, but new and highly defined targeting guidance 

is visible, almost as if it were drawn on a map. 

December presented AQI with several new campaign 

14 

opportunities. First, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani 

suffered a catastrophic stroke on December 17, ~Ol~.~-J. 

Talabani had served as a stabilizing force to mollify 

ethno-sectarian strife in Iraq. His removal from Iraqi 

politics might have created a gemline opportunity for 

AQI, but Maliki seized it first. On December ~o, ~Ol~, 

PM Nouri al-Maliki targeted for arrest the Minister 

of Finance, Raft al-lssawi, one of the four remaining 

Sunni national political figures."3 This event ignited a 

nationwide predominantly Sunni Arab anti-government 

protest movement that endures past the publication date 

of this report. It does not appear thatAQI fully absorbed 

these changes operationally until January 20[3, after 

the conclusion of pre-planned attacks upon Kurdish 

political targets. AQI immediately adjusted its messaging 

to target Sunni protesters, however. 

AQI executed a small VBIED cluster on 31 December 

~O[2, for which it claimed credit while' issuing advice' 

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to Sunni protesters to abandon Maliki's government. ~b 

This VBIED cluster dispersed over a wide area, with S 

\lBIEDS striking Kirkuk, Balad Ruz, Khalis, Baghdad, 

and Babel. 'While this cluster does not meet the th reshold 

for a full VBIED wave, it was likely coordinated at least 

loosely to target Shi'a populations in these locations. 

Targeting Shi'a communities in order to stoke sectarian 

violence that overwhelms the ISF and results in the 

further disenfranchisement of the Iraqi Arab Sunni 

community is a principal theme of AQl's "Breaking the 

Walls" campaign, and it dominates AQI's VBIED wave 

targeting in ~OI3. If this \-'"BIED cluster was a reaction 

to current events rather than a pre-planned attack, AQI 

was capable of quickly shifting attacks to these specific 

locations, indicating the enduring presence of an active 

\-'"BIED support zone in the Diyala area. 

SPECTACULAR ATTACKS: 16 JANUARY 2013 

A 30-day interval separated Wave 9 from a small cluster 

of four spectacular \-'"BIED attacks on January 16. 

This interval stabilizes for the duration of Phases n -

Ill. Between January ~oI3 and May ~OI3, there was 

consistently a 3D-day intenral between attacks. Mter 

May IS. the \-'"BTED waves suddenly became much more 

frequent. Two of the \-'"BIEDs on January 16 inflicted 

significantly high casualties. One YBIED struck a KDP 

motorcade near the KDP offices in Kirkuk, claiming 

1~3 casualties (33!I90). The other struck PUK offices 

in Tuz, claiming 45 casualties (5/40). These attacks 

correspond with AFP's high casualty daily total, at ~89 

(49/~40). They resonate as the crescendo attacks of the 

ethnically orientated Phase n. AQI claimed credit for 

both, taking care to specify that a Libyan fighter targeted 

the KDP headquarters, and an Iranian fighter targeted 

the PUK.~7 This is a noteworthy message, indicating a 

desire to demonstrate use of foreign fighters to al-Qaeda 

core. It is likely that these fighters began in Syria, not only 

because the fight there has been drawing' international 

attention from al-Qaeda, but also because the foreign 

fighter ratlines to Iraq ran from Damascus at the height 

of the Iraq War. 28 

AQI also claimed credit for the suicide bombing on 

January IS that targeted and killed MP lfan Sa'doun 

al-Issawi in Anbar. In this statement, AQI celebrated 

the cooperation among military and security units 

to accom plish coordinated attacks, highlighting the 

careful selection of targets and the demonstrated ability 

to "siJnultaneously and in a coordinated manner, 

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[pound] a number of strongholds. This artifact 

validates several core asseSSJnents, including the 

organizational distinction between military elements, 

such as \-'"BTED cells, and local security battalions; as well 

as the deliberate planning and command and control 

functions performed by AQI in order to synchronize 

\-'"BIED attacks. 

Additionally. a separate trend in VBTED attack dusters 

becomes visible in January ~013. Apart from the small 

cluster of five YBIEDS that occurred on December 

31, there were four other clusters consisting of 4-5 

VBIEDS each in January 2013. Each appears to have its 

own character and its own timing, which indicates the 

emergence oflocalized YBIED cell activity that had been 

indiscernible prior to this point. Furthermore, these 

VBIED dusters demonstrate the ability of a \-'"BIED 

cell to synch ronize \-'"BIED attacks internally at a small 

scale. The YBIED cluster on January S included attacks 

in Karbala, Kanaan, Hilla, and Moml. The attacks in 

Karbala and Hilla were likely executed by the same cell. 

Similarly, the aforementioned cluster onJanuary 16 was 

tightly oriented upon the Green Line, with attacks on 

Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu, and Baiji. These attacks also 

appear to be the work of a single cell. 

In a separate cluster on January If, five YBIEDS 

detonated in Karbala, Babel, and Dujail. Dujail is oddly 

plaeed geographically in this cluster, but like the other 

attacks that day, it targeted Shi'a pilgrims. Tn this case, 

the pilgrims were en route to the Al Askari mosque in 

Samarra. 30 This attack was actually a YBIED pair, and it 

is documented as the highest casualty event in this wave. 

AFP data indicates that this was a second high casualty 

day with 149 casualties (29/120). In still another small 

cluster onJanuary~, three VBIEDS struck in the vicinity 

of Baghdad. An additional southern cluster occurred on 

February 8, striking Kadhimiyah, Karbala, and Babel. In 

sum, based upon visible separate efforts, it appears that 

decentralized VBIED capabilities existed in the north, 

near Baghdad, and in the south at this time. 

Comparing this decentralized pattern to the pristinely 

appointed config'uration of Wave 7 demonstrates a core 

shift in the national YBIED organization. New cells 

likely deployed forward by this point, and the VBIED 

cells appeared to contain a level of planning expertise 

and independent access to VBIED construction sites. 

This new pattern may also indicate that the national 

YBIED planning cell went offline for a time, for one of 

several reasons: either because it experienced some form 

15 
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of disruption; or because it was further reorganizing; or 

because it focused on planning future VBIED attacks 

in Iraq, such as the next pair of prison attacks and the 

rapidly approaching caTI1paign for Baghdad; or because 

it was active instead on the Syria front: 

PRISON BREAKS: 3 AND 5 FEBRUARY 2013 

Phase IT also conchlded with a pair of prison attacks. The 

attack on Kirkuk Tasflrat prison on February 3, ~013 

involved an SVBIED painted as a police vehicle and 

three snicide bombers dressed as police. This attack was 

unsuccessful, but reportedly inflicted over 130 casualties. 

AQI c1aiTI1ed credit for this attack, which reportedly 

involved a team oflranian, Saudi, and Tunisian fighters. t 

Again, foreign fighters may have arrived via Syria. The 

attack on Taji Tasflrat prison incurred 21 casualties. Tt 

was also unsuccessful in breaching the prison. This is 

the second time that Taji Tasfirat prison had been hit 

with a complex attack in order to free prisoners, and it 

was at least the third tiTI1e that the installation has been 

targeted with VBIEDS. 

The TI10st sig'ni-ficant aspect of these prison attacks is 

the application of VBIEDS as a supporting effort to a 

combined arms attack involving multiple functional 

teaTnS within AQT. The planning cell for prison attacks 

likely exists at an echelon above the VBlED organization. 

The VB lED organization, possessing specific technical 

expertise, specialized requirements, and a distinctive 

planning signature, appears to have been tasked by a 

higher echelon to provide support to prison attach. This 

higher headquarters likely leverages information and 

derives support from various specialized combat teams 

within AQI. The prison attacks witnessed thus far include 

VBlED, SVEST, TED, Tnortars, and sTI1all arTI1S -fire 

components. It also evidently recruited and dispatched 

foreign fighters to support the effort. Outside of support 

to prison attacks, the greatest incidence of cOTnbined arTI1S 

So holilted report~ indiciited thilt 26 Army officen defected from the 

3rd Regiment. 12th Divi~ion forces staLloned III Ha ..... iJa. "26 arm: 

omcer" ~plit in Kirkuk iind Dijlil Operiltion" Commilnd declined the 

News," Shafaq News.JanuaryI8, 2013. available online aL hLtpj/www. 

shafaaq .com/ en/ archive/ 4814 - 2 6-army-officers -split -111 - kirkukand-dijlil-operation~-comm,md-declined-the-new.,.html. 

i AQI did not de~cflbe thi~ aLLack a~ a break, but rather a~ a 

,ucce~"ful complex ilttilck upon a heilclquilrter" invoh·ing 

VBIEDS. SVESTS, ~mall arms, and hand grenades. "lSI Claims 

SuiClde Bombings. R.'l.id 111 KirkukAmong 32 Claimedattack~," SITE 

IntelligencE' Group, Milrch T9, 20T3. 

16 

attacks recorded in this dataset occurs in June and July 

2013, most visibly before, during, and after the final pair 

of prison attacks onJulY21, 2013. 

TEDs, IDF, and sTI1all arTI1S fl re are likely core cOTI1petencies 

associated with AQT's priTI1ary TI1aneuver units. AQI 

named four battalions following the attack upon an IP 

checkpoint north of Haditha, Anbar in March 2012, 

so one can assess confldently that they existed froTI1 the 

spring onwardY They are likely geographically based and 

fixed upon fundamental security objectives to consolidate 

and expand AQl's control of territory. This study of 

the VBIED caTI1paign within "Breaking the Walls" does 

not explore the operations of these security battalions; 

however, prison attacks featuring VBIEDS also feature 

their involvement, and the functional relationship among 

these llTIits and AQT's bl1dding governance apparatus 

warrants future studyY The terrain defended by these 

security battalions will become the best indicator ofAQl's 

physical support zones over time. 

PHASE 3: THE PUSH TO BAGHDAD 

Wane 10: 17 February 2013 

A 30-day interval separated the VBIED events on 

January 16, 2013 from Wave 10, though this VBlED 

wave occurred only two weeks after the twin attacks 

upon Taji and Kir'kuk prisons. At least 7 VBIEDS 

detonated on February 17,2013, all in Baghdad, which 

is a first time occurrence within the "Breaking the Walls" 

caTI1paign. AQT also claiTned credit for this wave.~~ 

These attacks uniforTI11y targ'eted the capital's Shi'a and 

mixed neighborhoods, including Sadr City, Kamaliya, 

Saidiya, Karrada, Husseiniya, and Arnin, confirming 

the sectarian orientation of the wave. It is difficult to 

discern froTn reporting which VBTEDS inflicted the 

highest casualties, butAFP's daily casualty total is on the 

lower bound of the Phase III VBlED waves, with 150 

total casualties (23iI'.n), consistent with the relative size 

of the wave. 

The Baghdad VBlED campaign, beginning with this wave, 

appears to consist of attacks in three distinct geographic 

grouping's, naTI1ely, one to the north in Sadr city; one to 

the south in Saidiyah, and one to the southeast near Jisr 

Diyala, that likely indicate the presence of three cells. 

One of these cells also TI1aintains responsibility for attacks 

in central Baghdad, in Karrada, Sadoun, and the Green 

Zone. No other explosive events occurred in Baghdad in 

conjunction with this wave, which is important to note. 

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This suggests that the VBIED planning effort began to 

direct wave operations independently of the combined 

arms and multi-functional force. 

Waves 11 &12, 19 & 29 MOI'ch 2013 

A 30-day interval separated Wave 10 from Wave II. 

At least 20 VBIEDS detonated on March 19. 2013. 

generating the largest VBTED wave since Phase I.' AFP's 

daily casualty total exceeds ~3~ (56/~26), but reporting 

does not point to a particular YBIED or other attack that 

is chiefly responsible for the high casualties. Rather, all 

appeared to achieve a small number of casualties that 

collectively arrived at this total. AQI claimed credit for 

this wave, associating it as the tenth anniversary of the 

U.S.-led invasion of Traq. All but three of the VBTEDS 

in Wave II were placed in Baghdad. Within Baghdad, 

~ Five of the 20 VBIEDS were interdlcted by lSF. Other explo~ive 

event~ abo appE"lrE'd to ~pikt' on M,lr(;h J9. 20J3. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

attacks occurred across a wide array of neighborhoods, 

appearing to distract ISF attention from anyone 

neighborhood by striking a maximum number of 

independent sites. The VBIED attacks in Baghdad 

formed three clusters along the north, southwest, and 

southeast of the city. Once again, the geographic spread 

indicates that multiple Y BlED cells acted in unison to 

project attacks into Baghdad from different points of 

origin in the Baghdad belts. Two of the attacks outside of 

Baghdad detonated south of the city in lskandriyah and 

Mussayab. These attacks may have been launched from 

a cell in Mahmudiyah that projected into Baghdad's 

southwest quarter. Another VBTED occurred in Baiji, 

north of Tikrit, and it may be attributed to another 

cell operating farther north. This wave was followed by 

a small cluster of five VBTEDS which detonated across 

Baghdad on the following day, March ~o, ~0[3. 

A significant small wave of six VBIEDS also occurred on 

29 March 29, 2013, generating 232 casualties in Iraq 

17 
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that day (22/IIO) according to AFP's daily count.~ All of 

them targeted Shi'a mosques on a Friday, which accounts 

for the very high casualties. All but one VBlED were 

located in Baghdad, in the neighborhoods ofZafaraniya, 

Qahira, Binook, Jihad, and Talabiya. The last mosque 

VBIED detonated in southern Kirkuk. These are not the 

only VBTEDS or explosive attacks to target Shi'a mosques 

during "Breaking the Walls," but it is the single most 

deliberate sectarian strike within the campaign. Wave 12 

is also the first full YBIED wave to occur on a Friday, 

indicating that AQT deliberately planned this wave in 

'" AFP dab indicales very high casualties on Mal'ch IT, ':;OJ3 lhal al'e 

une::l.-plained by YBIED wave data. It appears that a single SVBIED 111 

killing-5-peoplE'J 

18 

order to maximize effects to stoke sectarian violence. 

Wave 13' 15 April 2013 

A 27-day interval separated Wave 12 from Wave 13. Wave 

13 consisted of at least 16 VBTEDS, corresponding to 

the highest daily casualty count since September 2012 

according to theAFPdata. Nine of the VBIEDS detonated 

in Baghdad, which represents a significant reduction in 

number from Wave IT. The others occurred along' the 

northern arc tracing the GreenLine, as well as in Fallujah. 

This suggests that various surge elements participating 

in Baghdad du ring Wave 1 [ resumed normal operations 

outside ofBag'hdad du ring Wave 13. Additionally, a sing'le 

report that the lSF interdicted a team that was building a 

YB1ED in Samarra raises the possibility that additional 

cells were forming and embedding themselves into new 

forward locations during this time. 31 

The YBIEDS along' the Green Line arc occurred in Tuz 

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Khur-rnatu, northern Baquba, and Kirkuk, suggesting 

once again that the VBIED cell had greater freedom 

of movement and ability to stage attacks in that area. 

Because the TSF condl1cted operations into this area in 

early June ~OI3, AQT and possibly other violent actors, 

such as JRTN, had established a strong and detectable 

presence in the area.:':5 

Attacks into the northern quadrant of Baghdad appear 

to have paused during this wave, an important anomaly 

that indicates that the northern VBTED cell near 

Baghdad was disrupted in some way or that missioned 

elsewhere during this wave. One can deduce the cell's 

absence beeause the Baghdad attaek waves normally 

occur in distinct and repeatable geographic clusters to 

the north, southeast, and southwest of the city. Sadr City 

still sustained an attack, which may indicate that this key 

Shi'a neighborhood was approached from the south, 

since that neighborhood falls within reach of the Jisr 

Diyala cell. The Sadr City VB lED in this wave inflicted 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

the greatest recorded cas ualties among the set. Another 

VB1ED in this wave targeted Shi'a MP Bahaa al-Araji 

on Route Irish near Abbas Ibn Firnas Square in western 

Baghdad. 36 VBTEDS are not typically used to conduct 

assassinations as part of the VBIED waves observed in 

this study, and the anomaly stands as a reminder that 

AQT's operational planning also consists of determining 

how in particular the VBTEDS are used. 

VBTEDs persisted in Baghdad after this wave over the 

course of the following several days. One targeted Iraqi 

Police in Tarmiyah on April 16 andApril~4, supporting 

a theory that Tarmiyah is a possible launch site for the 

northern Baghdad cell. Two VBTED attacks occurred 

in Abu Ghraib on April If, the first time this location 

appears in the data set. Given the retrospective insight 

that Abu Ghraib prison would be attacked on July 21, 

~013, this early VBTED clustering provides an early 

indication of potential pre-conditions. One struck 

governlnent offices, and another struck an LA patrol, 

killing 8 Traqi soldiers. Shortly thereafter, four VBTEDS 

struck police and Sahwa targets in Fallujah and Ramadi 

on May 1,2013, the most cohesive attac.k upon targets in 

Anbar in this dataset. 

Wave 14: 15 Mqy ~013 

A 3D-day interval separated Wave 13 from Wave 14. 

Wave 14 consisted of at least 12 VBIEDS. Nine of the 

VBTEDS detonated in Baghdad, one detonated in 

Tarmiyah, and two detonated in Kirkuk. Two of the 

Baghdad VB1EDS struck in Khadimiyah, where the ISF 

reportedly interdicted two additional VBIEDS. This is 

the first in a series of successive VBTED strikes focused 

upon Khadimiyah in May ~013. Khadimiyah is the site 

of a premier Shi'a shrine in Baghdad and constitutes key 

political terrain for the competitive arrayofShi' a political 

and militant factions.:J7 It had during various phases of 

the Iraq war represented a sectarian battleground, as 

Sunnis displaced and Shi'a communities consolidated. 

It was a premier VBlED target to stoke the revival of 

Shi'a militias in early 2013. 

Asai'b ahl al-Haq (AAH), an Tranian-backed militant 

offshoot of Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), 

established political offices in Khadimiyah in June 

2012.:>R This neighborhood has since reemerged a 

battleground for intra-Shi'a political competition, 

which has also turned violent as Shi·a militias mobilize 

further. OnJune 2, 2013. AAH elements opened fire on 

Sadrist key leader Hazem al-Araji, killing a member of 

19 
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his party."" This event shows that.A.AH had resumed an 

armed presence in Khadimiyah by early June. Another 

sign of AAH's 2013 re-mobilization was a political 

rally held near Sadr City on May 4. 10 This event predated Wave 14, but it likely occurred in response to the 

previous three months of focused V BlED attacks upon 

Shi'a communities across Baghdad as well as the overt 

mobilization ofShi'a militantgrou ps forthe fight in Syria 

as Hezbollah's participation in the siege of al-Qusayr 

intensified. 4 ! Meanwhile, ISF launched operations on 

May 16 to pursue AQI in western Anbar"~ in response 

to AQT's May 4 assault upon an TSF convoy carrying a 

platoon of Syrian regime forces that had fled into Iraq 

via the Rabiya border crossing in order to escape Syrian 

rebels. AQI claimed credit for this attack, which killed 

48. 1 :1 These operations mobilized elements of Maliki's 

new Al-Jazeera and AI-Badia Operations Command, 

the JBOC, created in February 2013. H Despite AQl's 

demonstrated security presence in the Jazeera, the ISF 

chose a poor time to prioritize secu ring remote areas 

while Baghdad's security rapidly deteriorated. 

The VBIED wave on MayI5, 2013 marked the transition 

between Phase 3 and Phase 4, generally following the 

pattern of the Phase TTT attacks. 

PHASE 4: THE AQI SURGE 

Wave 15: 20 May 2013 

The VBTED trend in Baghdad dramatically escalated the 

following week and has not abated as of September 2013. 

A 5-day interval separated Wave 14 from Wave 15. Wave 

15 consisted of 17 VBTEDs. Three discrete and localized 

efforts were synchronized in this wave, pointing to VBTED 

cells in Baghdad, along the northern zone, and during 

this wave in Salah ad Din. Seven VBIEDS detonated in 

neighborhoods across Baghdad, Kadhimiyah among 

them, clustering' in the same three sectors of Baghdad 

observed in prior waves. The attacks in Baghdad all fell 

along the outskirts of the city in close proximity to sites 

that had been struck in the weeks prior.-±5 

Four of the VBTEDS detonated in towns in Salah ad 

Din province, including' Balad, Samarra, Tikrit, and 

Baiji, suggesting the presence of an additional cell in the 

area, whether temporarily or permanently. One of the 

VBTEDS in Balad reportedly targeted a bus full ofTranian 

pilgrims travelling' to the Shrine of Imam Mohammed. 1b 

Four more VBIEDS detonated in the south, in Basra 

20 

and Hilla in Babel province. An additional VBTED in 

Wasit was dismantled prior to detonation. The VBTED 

in Babel province targeted the Shi'a Wardiya mosque 

and inflicted high casualties. 1i The southern wave points 

to the establishment of a new southern front, with a cell 

operating out of Tskandariyah, Mussayib, or Salman 

Pal. 

Wave 16: 27 May 2013 

A 7-day interval separated Wave 15 from Wave 16. Wave 

16 consisted of 16 VBTEDS. 15 of the VBTEDS detonated 

in Baghdad, and one detonated in Mada'en, just to its 

southeast. Kadhimiyah was struck for the third week in 

a row, elevating the stakes for Shi'a militant revival. AFP 

data indicates that there were 245 casualties (58II87) in 

T raq that day. This wave targeted the same neighborhoods 

that were struck the two weeks prior and additionally hit 

targets in Sadoun and Sadr City. 

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Waves 14, 15, and 16 occurred in rapid succession, 

suggesting that the planning and preparation for 

subsequent waves began before the preceding wave 

concluded. This begins to form an image of a YBIED 

cell with subordinate teams that can alternately plan and 

attack in successive waves, one firing while the other 

reloads. This hypothesis is supported by the observation 

that not all of the teams operating in Baghdad attacked 

as part of Wave 15; it appears that many more attacked in 

V\I~ave 16. This further signifies that the VBTED cells in 

Baghdad had not only becoTIle large enough to support 

alternating teams, but had also each acquired logistical 

and engineering support to generate at least 5 YBIEDS 

a week for many weeks. This cellular formation would 

easily perTIlit the integration of new teaTIlS in training, 

which had likely become a sustained effort by this point 

in the YBIED campaign. 

There also appear to be heavy follow-on VBTED attacks 

in Baghdad on May 28 and May. There were sustained 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

attacks in Baghdad every day from May 27 ~ 30. The 

number of daily VBIED attacks is an important threshold 

by which to compare present and historic trends; in 

February 2007, Baghdad was struck with an average of 

three YBl.EDS a dayY Additionally, a YBl.ED targeting 

the Samarra Mosque detonated on May 25,2013.49 The 

Samarra Mosque bombing in February 2006 had been 

the principal incendiary attack that TIlobilized the Shi'a 

militias in Iraq to cleanse Sunni areas. 

Wave '7' 30 May 2013 

A 3~day interval separated V\I~ave 16 from V\I~ave 17. V\I~ave 

17 consisted of 10 VBTEDS, six of which detonated in 

Baghdad, two in Mosul, one in Kirkuk, and one in 

Ramadi. AFP data indicates a daily casualty total of 

131 (35 KIA! 96 "WIA), which is lower than the other 

waves in Phase N. The Baghdad events occurred in the 

neighborhoods of Sadr City, Binooq, Karrada, Bayaa,. 

Maghrib, and immediately south of Baghdad. 

This wave is TIlost significant because it is the second 

VBl.ED wave within a week in Baghdad. which would 

appear to double the frequency of attac.ks. However, 

because no VBIED wave occurred the following week, 

it appears instead that this wave was essentially an 

aberration. All three Baghdad cells would normally have 

conducted this wave on the following Monday, but it 

was likely accelerated, perhaps to test the organization's 

capabilities. Tt did not occur again in Baghdad during 

"Breaking the Walls." 

The appearance of Mosul in Phase I V is important 

to note, because it persists for several weeks after this 

wave. VBTEDS in this MOS11l cluster targeted ISF and 

likely reflect AQT's intention to deter Sunni Arab voter 

turnout. The single YBIED event in Ramadi confirms 

that the cell there was operating at a different pace, but 

was perhaps responsive to tasking by the VBTED planning 

teaTIl in this instance. The ISF operations into western 

Anbar and the Jazeera that started on May 16 evidently 

did not disturb the YBIED activity in Ramadi. 

Waves 18 & 19' 7 & 10 Ju"e 2013 

A 9~day interval separated V\I~ave 17 froTIl V\I~ave 18. 

Wave 18 was a coherent SYBl.ED wave on June 7. with 

six SYBIEDS detonating in Ramadi, Muqdadiyah, 

Alharoniyah northeast of Baquba, and Baghdad and 

another non~descript VBTED in Taji. This TIlini~wave 

departs even further from the pattern, with only one 

21 
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attack in Baghdad. Tn fact, it suggests an independent 

and event-driven SYBlED operation coordinated 

outside of Baghdad. This is the first time in the dataset 

that multiple SVBTEDS were recorded in one day. It is 

possible that SVBTEDS were more regular prior to this 

wave and simply underreported as such. 

The following attack on Monday, June 10 also occurred 

outside of Baghdad, nearly uniformly in the north. Wave 

19 consisted of 9 YBlEDS and a number of additional 

explosive events. AFP documents 330 casualties (78/252) 

that day. VBTEDS detonated in Mosul, Tuz Khurmatu, 

and Dibis in Kirkuk province. Additionally, another 

cluster of SYBlEDS occurred in Kirkuk, Mosul, Tanak 

west of Mosul, and Madaen southeast of Baghdad. The 

colocation of the VBTED and SVBTED attacks in Mosul 

and Kirkuk negate the theory of a separate SVBTED cell 

in either location. 

Whether SYBlEDS are conducted by normal YBlED 

22 

cells or developed separately is an important question. 

SYBlEDS are not just YBlEDS with suicide bombers to 

drive them; they are fundamentally different technical 

operations involving redundant triggers and more 

sophisticated support teams. Regardless of whether June 

2013 signified an uptick in SYBlED activity or just in 

SYBlED reporting, it is important to note that the June 

7 andJune 10 waves involved clusters ofSVBTEDS. Hit 

is a genuine increase in SVBTED activity, it may signify 

that foreign fighters were again routing to lraq, possibly 

from Syria. 

VBTED and SVBTED attacks in Mosul began to increase 

significantly at the beginning of June 2013. A number 

of singleton YBlED attacks are noted in the dataset 

across several sectors of Mosul. Rescheduled provincial 

elections in Ninewa and the political vulnerability of 

leading Arab Sunni politicians such as Osama al-Nujaifi 

may have drawn particular attention from AQl. The 

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attacks mostly targeted ISF, which might undermine the 

incuTTlbent provincial council. 

Wave 20: 16June 2013 

A 5-day interval separated Wave 19 from Wave 20. Wave 

20 consisted of 10 '!BIEDS and 4 other explosive events. 

AFP indicates adaily total ofl88 casualties (33iI35) that 

day. With the exception of one VBTED which detonated 

southofMosul, all of the VBIEDS in this wave occurred in 

southern Traq. They also occurred in pairs: two '!BTEDS 

detonated in Basra; two VBTEDS detonated in Nasiriya; 

and two VBTEDS detonated in Kut. Additionally, single 

VBIEDS detonated in Najaf, Mahmudiyah, Mada'en, 

and Mosul. This wave confirms that there was a '!BlED 

cell by this tiTTle dedicated to attacks in southern Traq. It 

also appears that one or both of the southern Baghdad 

cells supported this wave, which involved no attacks in 

Baghdad proper. 

Focusing on southern Traq during this wave reflects AQT's 

deliberate intent to target pilgriTTls during the Shabaniyah 

festival at Karabala onJune 25, 2013. ISF took extensive 

precautions to protect civilians ahead of this event. 30 

Attacks did not occur in Baghdad and Karbala, which 

TTlay indicate TSF defenses were successful. SiTTlilarly, as 

ISF reportedly seized an AQI camp northwest of Kirkuk 

in Dibis district onJune 19, it is possible that a portion 

of the northern VBIED network was also disrupted at 

this tiTTle. r,l The TSF reTTlained in Anbar after operations 

in the western desert through provincial elections on 

June 20, perhaps causing similar disruption. Apparent 

TSF gains began to deteriorate within a month, however. 

Two VBTEDS struck Dibis and another Tuz on July 

II, the same day that another pair of VBIEDS struck 

Ramadi and Fallujah. The VBIED in Ramadi was a 

suicide attack. <;2 Tuz was the biggest blast in this wave, 

killing over 30 Traqi Police and destroying 12 houses.;)~ 

The Dibis VBIEDS wounded 10. 51 

A series ofSVEST attacks also occurred June 16-19. The 

first detonated in an internet cafe: in ATTlin, Baghdad. 55 

The following day, an SVEST targeted a police station 

near a polling center in Fallujah. 56 This event preceded 

provincial elections in Anbar, rescheduled for June 20, 

2013. On June 18, an SVEST targeted a TTlosque in the 

al-Qahira neighborhood of Baghdad, with a total of 87 

casualties (30 KW57 WlA)Y The fourth was a targeted 

assassination of SheiJili Younis al-Rammah in Mosu1. 38 

The cOTTlbined increase in SVBTED and SVEST attacks 

observed in June points to the increasing integration 

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of foreign fighters into AQT's operations on the Traq 

front. Foreign fighters were historically designated for 

suicide operations in Iraq by al-Qaeda in 2006. 59 Based 

upon this precedent, foreign fighters may be viewed as 

national-level assets that must be organized in transit 

and dispatched to the field by a central cOTTlTTland. Their 

increasing presence highlights the human resource role 

of the AQT military command structure. 

Meanwhile, Sahwa in Diyala threatened a collective 

resignation due to irregular salary payments on June 

20, 2013.00 The salary payments were likely not the 

issue, as Sahwa withdrawal is a priTTle indicator of AQT 

intiTTlidation. Another indicator is the targeting of 

high-value Sahwa leaders, which had already occurred 

in Khaneqin onJune 7 with the attempted assassination 

of Sheikh AhTTled al-Karkoshi, the TTlayor of Saadiya 

district. G[ Diyala had not been struck with VBTEDS since 

April 15, 2013, which viewed in light of these other 

indicators suggests that AQT had developed a strong 

23 
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presence in northern Diyala well beforehand. Indeed, 

the Dijla Operations Command conducted operations 

into Hamrin from June II-22, further demonstrating 

that AQI is exerting control over this terrain. 

Wave 21: 24june 2013 

An 8-day interval separated Wave 20 from Wave 2I. Wave 

21 consisted of 10 VBIEDS. One VBIED detonated in 

Mosul, another in Kirk-uk, and the remainder detonated 

in Baghdad. The VBIEDS in Baghdad resull1ed their 

normal distribution. indicating the involvement of 

three cells projecting into Baghdad from the north, 

s011theast, and southwest. AFP recorded a daily casualty 

total of 183 (35 KTA /148 lNTA). This wave signifies the 

reengagement of the Baghdad cells on their primary 

target set. AQl's operations in Baghdad appeared to 

have paused for the three weeks prior in June 2013. 

Meanwhile in Kirkuk, the 12th Iraqi Division under the 

24 

Dijla Operations Command arrested Khalen Mafraji, 

leader of the anti-governll1ent protest sit-in in Kirkuk 

onJune 21. 2013.102 AQI executed two VBIED attacks on 

June 23 in Tuz Khurmatu and central Kirkuk that might 

have intended to exacerbate the protest movement's 

opposition to the TSF, evident since the clash that 

occurred within the protest sit-in near Hawija on April 

23, 2013. The VBIED in Tuz Khurmatu incurred 50 

casualties (19 KW21WIA).Gc; 

Additionally, AQI executed singleton VBTEDS in Anbar 

province on June 22-23, in Saqlawiyah north ofFallujah 

and Qaim. Both attacks targeted ISF. In Saqlawiyah, 

an SVBIED targeted a police checkpoint, and then 

additional forces reportedly bombarded the checkpoint 

with ll10rtars and light weapons for one hour. 51 The 

VB1ED in Qaim targ'eted an Iraqi Army convoy.b5 This 

attack aligns with the launch of ISF operations on June 

22 into Rawa, Anbar to track down those responsible for 

an TED blast on Rawa bridge the day prior. 66 

Wave 22: 2July 2013 

An 8-day interval separated Wave 21 from Wave 22. Wave 

22 consisted of 14 VBIEDS that fell into three regional 

clusters: Baghdad, Ninewa, and southern Traq. The 

wave occurred on a Tuesday, which is off-cycle from 

the typical Sunday/Monday weekly attack pattern that 

typihed Phase IV. In Baghdad, eight VBIEDS detonated 

in neighborhoods across the city, including SOll1e atypical 

locales on the western side of the city, such as Shula and 

Hurriyah. Othe:rv.rise, the neighborhoods commonly 

struck were unfailingly struck again, in Kall1aliya, Shaab, 

and southern Baghdad. AFP recorded a daily casualty 

total of 293 (57 KIA! 236 WIA), which is a fairly high 

casualty rate for a slnaller wave. 

Three VBTEDS also detonated in Muthanna, Maysan, 

and Basra provinces in southern Iraq. Muthanna and 

Maysan were not often struck throughout the campaign. 

The Muthanna VBIED inflicted ll10re casualties than the 

rest, but not by ll1uch. Generally, each VBTED achieved 

30 total casualties. This string of very effective VB1EDS 

suggests that the same teams that had conducted prior 

waves in the south were also responsible for these attacks. 

Two SVBTEDS were also intercepted in Ninewa, one 

south of Mosul and another near Tel Afar. The SVBIED 

in Tel Mar reportedly involved a tank. 57 

The new targets and off-cycle hits do not necessarily 

signify a shift in targeting strategy; rather, they suggest 

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either displacement from normal attack zones by TSF, 

attempts to broaden the attac.k zone ahead of Ramadan, 

or shaping operations to prepare for impending attacks. 

Ramadan began one week later on July 8, 2013. AQT's 

operations ahead of Ramadan tended to be more 

deliberate, as we saw at the genesis of the" Breaking the 

Walls" campaign. 

There were also two SVESTS onJuly 1 in Diyala, one in 

Baquba and another in Muqdadiyah. These operations 

validate the observation at AQI had purposefully shifted 

YBIED attacks away from the Diyala river valley. It is 

possible that ISF operations, Sahwa activities, and local 

law enforcement applied enough pressure to reduce 

VBIED operations, which has historically resulted in a 

surge in SYEST activity. However, because Muqdadiyah 

has higher value as a C2 node, and because indicators 

of intra-tribal rivalry and population displacement 

were occurring in the area, b8 it is more likely that the 

decline in YBIED activity since April 2013 indicates 

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the reconsolidation of AQT's stronghold in northern 

Diyala. 

Wave 23' 14 July 2013 

A 12-day interval separated Wave 22 from Wave 23. This 

interval is almost double that of the previous 8 VBTED 

waves. Wave 23 onlyconsistedofg YBIEDS, all of them 

oriented onsouthernlraq. This suggests that the Baghdad 

VBTED cells were out of play for the third consecutive 

week. This tidal ebb at the beginning of Ramadan signals 

an imminent and larg'e attack. Given the retrospective 

insight that AQ,1 would conduct a dual prison attack on 

July 21, it is worthwhile validating this observation and 

assessing whether the Baghdad cells stood down in order 

to prepare for the capstone operation the following' week. 

YBIEDS detonated in Basra, Karbala, Kut, Suwayra, 

Jabala, and Nasiriya, which may have exceeded the lethal 

capability of the southern VBTED cell. This was only 

the third time in a year that Nasiriya had been struck 

25 
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with a '!BlED, but as it also occurred the week prior, 

it generated a lTIore direct response by the TSF, which 

announced the capture of the cell responsible for the 

Nasiriya VBIEDS onJuly 22. 2013. h~ One can conclude. 

therefore, that the cell in Nasiriya was not a displaced 

Baghdad cell. 

Tn the lTIeantilTIe, a nUTl1ber of singleton VBTEDS 

detonated in early July in Mosul. OnJuly 3. one VBIED 

and two SVBIEDS detonated in MosuL On July 10, an 

SVBTED detonated in southern Mosul. This trend of 

interTl1ittent Mosul VBTEDS continued into the flnal 

VBIED wave of the ·'Breaking the Walls" campaign on 

July 20 which otherwise struck only in Baghdad. The 

June 20 VBTED targeted an TA convoy east of Mosul 

and appears disconnected froTl1 the rest of the set, which 

was focused on the prison attacks. One can conclude 

from this pattern that the cell acting upon Mosul was 

operating on an independent progralTI and in response 

to different stiTl1uli. 

A rise in reported SVEST attacks also occurred at 

the beginning of RalTIadan. SVESTS detonated in 

Muqdadiyah on July II; in Mussayab on July 14; in Mosul 

onJuly 15; again in Mosul on July 17; and onJuly 19 in 

Muqdadiyah, Mosul, and Hilla. 

Wave 24: 20 Ju/y 2013 & Twin Prison Attacks 

A 6-day interval separated Wave 23 froTl1 the flnal wave, 

Wave 24. Wave 24 consisted of 9 VBIEDS, all of which 

struck targets in east and west Baghdad, principally in the 

saTl1e places previously observed. Bllt the attacks largely 

avoided the northern zone of the city. This OTl1ission 

likely indicates that the northern Baghdad VBIED 

cell engaged in the Abu Ghraib or Taji prison attacks, 

though there may also have been VBTED cells in Anbar 

and Salah ad Din in close proxiTl1ity that could have 

supported those events. The VBIED wave onJuly 20 may 

reasonably be assessed to complement the prison breaks 

on July 21. First, they inflicted a heavy total casualty 

count. Second, they occurred on a Saturday, which is 

atypical for the Phase IV pattern. The VBIED wave was 

likely choreographed as a diversion from the twin prison 

breaks upon Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons, which would 

occu r the following night. 

On Sunday evening, July 21,2013. AQT attacked the 

hardened facilities at Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons 

with combined arms tactics. 70 The perimeter at Abu 

Ghraib was breached by VBTEDS"T assaulted by AQT's 

26 

ground battalions bearing small arms and mortars,7'< 

interior-breached by SVESTS, and reinforced by 

synchronous riots inside the prison: TSF returned 

fire into the morning', killing an unknown number 

of AQI fighters and 71 prisoners and incurring 68 

casualties of their own.~ Despite their efforts, over 

500 prisoners escaped Abu Ghraib that night.7~ 

An estiTl1ated 12 VBTEDS were used between the two 

prisons. Abu Ghraib and Taji. /1 The perimeter at Taji was 

* Several reports indicate that the prisonel'~ imide ~.-\bu Ghl'aib were 

in contact ..... ith the AQI organizatlon on the outside prior to the 

iltt'l(:k. Suad,td ill-Sillhy. "In~ight- Ir,'q security force~ outmiltched a~ 

2013. 

inslght-idUKBREgbToX420130730. 

t AFP llldicate.<, a combllled daily casualty total coverlllgJuly 21-22 of 

214 (95 KIA/ TT9 '\>1A). 

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PHASES OF THE 'BREAKING THE WALLS' CAMPAIGN 

22 23 

" , '" '" 

'R 

1 

'" 12 

113 I'd 

2:0 

1 

not breached, and no prisoners escaped, though some 

sources indicate that more VBIEDS were used there than 

at Abu Ghraib. 73 The total number of VBIEDs implies 

that more than one VBlED cell supported the Abu 

Ghraib and Taji operations, very likely a total of three 

cells. The operation obviously required coordination of 

subordinate cells by the central VB lED planning cell. 

This is particularly true, given the assessment that two 

additional cells perpetrated the VBlED wave on July ~o, 

20!3· 

Most importantly, the operation demonstrates the 

necessary presence of the force-level planning cell, 

which tasked VBTEDS to support a complex, specialized, 

and atypical operation. The Abu Ghraib prison attack 

was a full-fledged military operation, conducted by an 

organization that had reconstituted as a military force 

rather than as a militant network. Moreover, it was a 

planned operation orchestrated to conclude the yearlong" Breaking the Walls" campaign and free the prisoners 

who could provide cadre to the AQ organization. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

CONCLUSION 

Taking inventory ofVBTED attacks in this way enables a 

tactical review of AQl's application of available combat 

power to maximize the effects of planned attacks. 

At an operational level, it is necessary to evaluate the 

planning thought process behind the attacks that have 

been documented over the ~OI~-~OI3 period. VBIED 

waves are not an environrnental condition, nor a 

disorganized and frenzied attack phenomenon, but a 

highly organized and meticulously planned military 

operation with forensic signatures that can be tracked. 

Part I of this report places this observation in the 

context of AQT's expressed strategic goal to establish 

a transnational caliphate in Traq and Syria. Part T also 

explores the possibility that the tactical footprint of AQI 

in Iraq relates directly to its operations in Syria. 

Within Traq, it is possible to use this material in order 

to track, observe, and counter AQl's national VBIED 

campaign. Destroying the VB lED organization will 

not destroy AQT's military capability in Traq or Syria, 

27 
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but it may provide vital opportunities for the Iraqi 

government to consolidate its forces and overturn AQT's 

present operational momentum. The location ofVBIED 

construction sites, the method of comlnunication frOJn 

the national VBIED organization to VBIED cells, 

and AQT's steady explosives supply chain are critical 

requirements that may be targeted to great effect. 

Targeting the military headquarters of the VBlED 

command that generates plans for VBIED waves will 

not degrade independent VBTED cell activity at this 

point, but it may degrade access to suicide bornbers, 

finance, and other resources. It may also be Ineasured 

in the disruption of the VBIED wave phenomenon. 

Tt is advisable for Traqi Security Forces first to protect 

Baghdad by clearing possible VBTED construction sites 

in the Baghdad belts north and south of the city. 

It is also possible to evaluate future VBIED waves by 

comparing them to those observed in 2012-20[3 to 

determine if the frequency or lethality is increasing, if 

the targeting strategy or geography apparently shifts, 

or if the patterns described in this study shift in other 

ways. August and September 2013 have witnessed the 

continuation ofVBTED waves as well as the introduction 

of VBIED attacks against critical infrastructure, such as 

the Urn Qasr port facility, as described in Part 1. Part 

I expresses the requirement to determine what new 

operational objectives AQT has identified for its new 

campaign, the "Soldiers' Harvest." While this campaign 

may not be principally defined by VBIED waves and 

prison attacks, as the "Breaking the Walls" campaign is 

assessed to have been, it will clearly continue to involve 

AQI's weapon of choice as a means to maintain the 

initiative against the ISF and to stoke sectarian violence. 

It may become apparent that AQI's efforts to establish 

territorial control in parts of northern and central T raq 

diverge from the VBIED trend, such that AQI's efforts 

to displace populations occur in different regions from 

those where they conduct VBIED attacks, It is important 

to recognize that the VBTED campaign directly supports 

this effort to control ground, and by continuing VBIED 

attacks, AQl's opportunity to establish control of terrain 

increases. 

This conclusion points back to the assessment of a forcelevel military command that incorporates VBIEDs into 

a broader military strategy. It may become visible over 

the course of further study that the VBTED command 

in Iraq is tasked at times to support VBIED attacks 

and combined arms attacks in Syria, both of which 

28 

have been observed and referenced in Part 1. VBIEDS 

have been observed in Syria since December 2011. 7

G It 

may also becorne apparent that the Traq VBTED waves 

of 2012-2013 correspond to events in Syria as well as 

Iraq, and that the mutual rear support provided to AQI 

by its presence in both countries directly enabled the 

exponential grov.rth of the VBTED supply chain observed 

in 20T2-20T3. 

How AQI is fighting in Iraq provides critical insight 

into what capabilities it rnay yet bring to bear in 

Syria. Three of the signature capabilities that now 

are hallmarks of AQI's contemporary military force 

include deployable VBIEDS; combined arms attacks; 

and VBTED waves. "While deployable VBTEDS and 

combined arms attacks involving VBIEDS have been 

observed in Syria, VBIED waves have not yet been 

documented, though this is another subject for further 

study. VBTED waves are not expected to present 

themselves to the same degree in Syria for several 

reasons. First, the principal objective of the 2012-

2013 VBIED campaign in Iraq was to stoke sectarian 

violence by targeting vulnerable Shi'a civilians who 

were otherwise living in peace. In Syria, Alawite and 

Christian communities have long been actively engaged 

in a civil war and therefore targeted by other means. 

Tn this wartirne context, al-Qaeda affiliated grou ps are 

optirnizing their VBTED firepower by focusing upon 

regime military and government targets. Second, the 

conflict in Syria already has a sectarian dimension 

and therefore al-Qaeda groups do not need to stoke 

it in order to create space for the kinds of chaos and 

authority vacuums on which theycustomarilycapitalize. 

Rather, the loss of regime control especially in the 

northern and eastern provinces has allowed al-Qaeda 

groups to enter existing vacuums. Consequently, AQT 

has attempted to establish governance in rebel held 

areas of northern Syria, sponsoring social services and 

expressing its vision for the Tslamic State in Traq and 

Sham in rnore palatable terrns. VBTED waves would be 

counter-productive to this messaging and governance 

strategy. 

AQI is unmistakably brutal, and its influence and 

control within rebel-held zones is challenged, 

not only by Syrian opposition elements, but also 

potentially by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian al-Qaeda 

affiliate. Miscalculations in the use of vicious tactics 

like population-focused VBTEDS have the potential 

to alienate AQI from the Syrian opposition and 

thus erode their opportunity to control terrain and 

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populations. However, ifAQI perceives that itis losing 

influence with the population to competing groups, 

AQI may attempt to reverse these developments 

through YBIED waves comparable to those observed 

in Iraq. The application of VBIED waves, either 

against pro-regime minority elements or against antiregime or neutral populations, would undercut the 

legitimacy of the moderate opposition and maintain 

conditions of violence that enhance AQI's position. 

AQT may begin to consider this requirement after 

the latest formation of an alliance among' influential 

rebel groups on September 25, 2013, which may be 

viewed as an attempt by opposition groups to limit 

AQT's potential to establish control near Aleppo. 77 

This forecast leads to an important final conclusion 

about the operational utility of YBIED waves. YBIED 

waves are designed to start a war. If necessary during 

war, they have the potential to separate the population 

from the insurgency. The Assad regime's populationcentric counterinsurg'ency strategy, typified by its 

year-long aerial bombardment campaign against the 

Syrian population, has generally driven the wedge 

between the population and the government. Tn this 

context, AQl's potential to use terrorism against the 

population generates a grave hypothetical issue for the 

Syrian opposition. The most dangerous scenario for 

the U.S. in Syria is for the Syrian moderate opposition 

to face two enemies both bent on alienating' them from 

the Syrian population. If Assad continues his aerial 

bombardment campaign, and if AQI concurrently 

launches VBTED waves against any population in Syria, 

they will collectively decimate the moderate opposition 

and strengthen each other as opposing forces in the 

process. The fact that AQI has not yet done so suggests 

that they are not threatened enough by the moderate 

opposition to resort to VBIED waves in Syria. In order 

to maintain the possibility that relatively moderate 

forces will prevail in Syria, it is necessary to preclude 

AQT's ability to target the population. 

It is therefore vital to the prosecution of a U.S. strategy 

for Syria to understand AQI's VBIED tactics and 

organization in Traq, from which the organization 

may launch YBIEDS into Syria. AQI will use YBIEDS 

to cultivate a protracted war because this condition 

is essential to its growth as a military organization 

protecting an emerging al-Qaeda emirate. AQT adds 

capacity to the broader al-Qaeda network in the 

process. The YBIED command is a strategic-level asset 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

within AQI's military, but it can be defeated tactically 

by targeting VBTED construction sites and command 

and control nodes in Iraq. This is extremely difficult 

because AQI now likely has many such sites and can 

shift to new locations when pursued. The U.S. military 

has, however, succeeded in this mission before. 

Destroying AQI's VBIED capability presently rests 

squarely on the shoulders of the Iraqi Security Forces, 

whose recent desert operations and urban search and 

raid operations have failed to achieve this effect. Tt 

is imperative for U.S. national security objectives in 

Iraq, Syria, and in its counter-terrorism campaign to 

advise and assist the Iraqi Security Forces in this effort 

with precise information and oversight. The Maliki 

government is proceeding' with mass arrests and Shi'a 

militias are mobilizing. The United States has only a 

narrow window to provide precise assistance to and 

leverage the Traqi Security Forces before the security 

problem becomes one not only of destroying VBTED 

factories, but also managing the instability generated 

by the spiraling escalation and interaction of Iranianbacked Shi'a militias and AQT. Otherwise, the United 

States will lose permanently the gains it made in T raq in 

2007, and Iraq will become a front in an increasingly 

regional conflict. 

29 
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APPENDIX METHODOLOGY 

DetectingAQJ's Signature 

Estimating' the combat power and organizational 

culture of secret organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq 

(AQI) may be approached through detailed analysis 

of the attacks they perpetrate. This study considers 

the violent events in Iraq that are documented in 

unclassified sou rees for what they indicate about AQT's 

renewed organizational capacity. Closely exaTTlining 

the public record of violent events, particularly the 

use of "spectacular attacks" in Iraq in 2012-2013. 

enables us to draw conclusions about AQl's broader 

operations. 

AQI executed a wide array of attack types from July 

2012 to July 20[3 during the "Breaking the Walls" 

campaign. These attack types include small arms fire, 

indirect fire (IDF) via mortars and rocket-propelled 

gTenades (RPG), improvised explosive devices 

(lED), suicide bombers (SVEST), vehicle-borne 

improvised explosive devices (VBIED), and a subset. 

suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 

(SVBIED). VBIEDs are the most complex attack 

type within this set, characterized by the rewiring 

of a vehicle into a traveling high-yield bOTTlb rather 

than the placement of an explosive parcel within or 

outside of a vehicle. 5:! All of these attack types were 

used for combined arms effects during the July 2013 

Abu Ghraib and Taji prison attacks, and all of them 

appeared in dispersed fashion across Iraq throughout 

the course of the previous year. 

A blanket study of attacks in Iraq is difficult because 

violent events habitually underreported. 

Attribution is another challenge, as AQI was not the 

on ly grou p conducting' attacks in Iraq du ring this time 

period. Other groups operating in Iraq today include 

Ansar aI-Islam, Shi'a TTlilitias, and very hkely Jaysh 

Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia URTN), a Ba'athist 

militant organization. 5-" All of these organizations are 

known to use small arms, IDF, and IEDs, and in some 

cases they are also suspected of suicide attacks and 

car-borne explosions. 

Violent events in certain locales, furthermore, might 

be attributed to popular uprising rather than AQI,53 

This becomes a legitimate consideration in light of 

30 

the anti-government protest movement, which began 

in December 2012 after Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki attempted to arrest Rafia al-lssawi, a leading 

Sunni national political figure. The protest movement 

continued at least through SepteTTlber 20[3, when 

this report was pubhshed. As more violent actors take 

up arms in Iraq, attack patterns of established groups 

become obfuscated, as the groups begin to overlap 

and react to one another. Nevertheless, it is possible 

to isolate coherent attack signatures for AQT within 

the available data. This study vvill focus specifically 

upon one ofAQI's classic signatures, waves of vehicleborne explosive improvised devices (VBIED). The 

VBIED waves of the "Breaking' the Walls" campaign 

are identified and characterized in Part IT of this 

report. Once attributed, these attacks may be used 

to evaluate AQl's operational capacity, depth, and 

targeting'strateg'y. 

Spotting VBJED Waves 

VBIEDs constitute the TTlost usefl11 AQT fingerprint for 

several reasons. First, VBIEDs are generally the most 

lethal attack type, and therefore the most consistently 

reported publically" Second, VBIEDs are the most 

complex attack type, which best illustrates the full 

capacity of AQI's supply chain. Third, VBIEDs have 

historically been assessed as AQI's signature attack 

type. 50 

Although it is likely that AQI bears sole responsibility 

for all VBIEDs in Traq, it is worthwhile to challenge 

and re-prove this assessment, particularly given that 

Ansar aI-Islam, another Salafist group, claimed credit 

for SVBIED attacks in Iraq over the course of2012Y 

Although VB lED attacks are a core competency 

for AQT, other groups can adopt this technique, 

* VBlED identlncation from pubhc sources lllvolves a qualitative 

ii~~E'~~ment of e,l(;h incident and the l:ontext in whkh it Ol:l:urred. Not 

bomb. i~ not a \'BIED. but an a~~a~~inallon technique deslgned to 

t<lrget the Oll:UP'lllt~ of "I vehide. A genuine C<lr bomb, hke .... ri'e, 1, "I 

bomb that i~ pLtced in a vehicle in order to target the occup,mt~. By 

conLrast. even Lhough the:> are often reported as car bomb~, VBlED~ 

diTE'ct E'xplo~ive pOV.'?T extern,illy, u~ually to mflid ma~~ (;,i~ualtie~ OT 

~igniilcanL ~tructural damage. This requires thoughLful de~ign. which 

i~ why VBlED~ are lharacterized a~ it h1ghly technical operittion. 

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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY 

and therefore each VBIED attack by itself is only a 

moderate signal that AQI is responsible. 

A stronger signal emerges in the detection of multiple 

coordinated VBLED attacks. AQI's signature massing 

ofVBTEDs over the course of the "Breaking the Walls" 

campaign will be referred to here as a "VB lED wave," 

and defined for the purposes of this study as the 

detonation of six or more VBLEDs on a given day in 

Traq.' AQT has claiTned credit for several such VBTED 

waves since the launch of the caTnpaign, beginning 

with a wave of 30 YBLEDs that detonated on July 23, 

2012, just two days after the announcement of the 

"Breaking the Walls" campaign. 58 

This study will examine the "Breaking the Walls" 

campaign in detail, particularly the VBTED waves that 

characterize this campaign. These waves can be broken 

down for the purposes of analysis into four "Phases" 

of the campaign. These phases were not announced, 

but rather assessed by observing qualitative and 

quantitative differences in attack patterns over time. 

The waves ofVBIED attacks across these phases will be 

evaluated for their geographic spread, target selection, 

overall volume, and lethality. The VBIED waves will 

be considered in the context of individual VBTEDs 

that occurred outside of the ~4 VBTED waves as well 

as other explosive events, such as TEDs and SVESTS, 

in order to refine an overall characterization of their 

complementary use by AQl. Part 1 of this report will 

address these waves in aggregate to describe phase 

changes that illustrate organizational growth within 

AQT, and a detailed examination of the individual 

waves is available in Part IT. 

In order to estimate lethality, the volume of the 

YBlED waves will be compared to daily casualty 

records maintained by Agence France-Presse (AFP),59 

AFP data provides a conservative and specific estimate 

for casualties, and as compared to other casualty data 

'" The threshold of ~b. VBIED allacb wa~ cho~en through holi~lic 

<I~~e~~Illent to be the IlliniIllUIll volume of ii YBIED du~ter th<lt 

otherVvise bore chiir<lcteri~tic~ of orche~triltion by a central 

VBIED command. ClusLers or less VBIED~, by contrml, 

'lppeared to be fe,L"ibly org,mi7ed by ,1 ~lllgle '/BTED cell a~~lgned to a 

particular geographic area, or alternatel;- a co-occurrence of singleton 

VBIED~ that were not neu""anly ~Yll_cluonized. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

sets, represents a cautious minimum bound. The 

AFP dataset begins to provide daily casualty records 

from violent events in August ~OI2. Casualty insights 

prior to this date will be drawn from Traq Body 

Count database, whose records begin in ~003. Go The 

principal data set for the violent events considered in 

this study is proprietary and derives solely from open 

sources, including National iraqi News Agen~y, al Sutnaria 

}'lews, af Mada Press, All iraq }I/ews Agen~y, and the online 

Irag Bo& Count (TBC) database. 

31 
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NOTES 

anAQI 

Bushra Juhi and Sman Salaheddin, 

Iraq attach klll103." July 23, 201'2, AP. available online at http:// 

news. yahoo. com/coordinated - iraq- attach-hU-10 3 - 1 '2 04 53104. 

h1ml : "3 House~ belonged to men north of Tikril lown," 

Jui" 23. NINA. available 

2. K,Heem Raheem, "Gunmen kill 16 rnember~ of Shi'ite 

Eg8 '2 OSB2 0 13 09 04 '? feedT) pe = RSS &feedN ame=[o pN ews& Ullll_ 

'au Tl.e=dlvr.lt&utm_mt'diurn=twitter&dlvrit=992 637. 

4. "2 Polict'rnt;'n bll.,.d, '2 wounded 10 DiYida," NINA, Augmt 15, 

2012, hLlp:llwww.ninanews.com/english/NeWLDetail~.a~p.?ar95_ 

VQ-CDDDFH. 

5. Eric Hamillon. "DecemberOperal.ion~ in Muqdadiyah," Imlitule 

for the Study of War, January 2008, available online at http:// 

W\V\V. u ndent,indi nb'VIar .org/~ite~/ derau It/n le~/ report~/ Der.:em ber_ 

Operation.Llll_Muqdadiyah.pdf: Er1C Ham1lton. "OperatlOn 

Raider Harvt',t: E,t,lbh,hing Ll"ting St'cunty in Northt'rn DiY,ltl," 

Imlltule for the Sludy of "'Nar. January 7,2008. available online 

at http://,,,cv,w. understand1ngwar .org/sites/ default/files/reports/ 

Oper,ltion %20 R,dd er%20H,u'Vest. pdf. 

6. "lSI Claims Raid at Anu-Terror Unit 1n Baghdad." SITE 

20TQ, 

at hllp://alliraqnew~.comiindex.php?opl1on=com_contenl&view=a 

rtide&ld-48432 <em1d-8 7. 

7. "Baghdad Operation~ announces the death of three gunmen 

rtryingl to ~tornm Cl pri,on north of BaghdCld whale," Irag New" 

Augu~t 2. 20T2, http://w .... r ..... iljeer.m.net/inp/view.a~p·?TD=4024. 

8. "\OVave of ;lttilo::h .kill~ 88 in Iraq," AFP, SepteIIlber 10, 2012, 

aV<Lilable online at hltp://www.lhenews.com.pl/at.ticle-E:i702E:iWave-of -altac.k~-.kill ~ -8 8-in -Iraq. 

g. "Ca~uallies from Ali Sharqi 2 cat· bomb explosion increa~ed up 

to 127 killed, wounded, NINA, September g, 2012. fl\.ailable online 

at http:// ..... '\\'W.nlnanew~.com/Engli~h/NewLDet;til~.a~p?ar95_ 

VQoGDGJEI. 

TO. ""\".,r'iVe of attach kill~ 88 in 

available online at 

Wave-of -att;lch- ki II~ -8 8-in - I rag. 

AFP, September TO, 20T2, 

II. "Suicide bomber targets a primary school, 

in Anb'lr. NINA, St'ptt'mber 24. 2012, ,lvall;lble at 

www.ninanew~.comiEngli~h/New~_Detail~.a~p.?arg5_VQ=GDJFJD. 

32 

T2. "Al-Qaed;t (;b.im~ ;ltt,l(;K on the pri~on in Tikrit and 

recognil:e~ the blling' of Five," ~AJ Sumaria News, October 

12, 2012, http://WW ... · .• ll..umana.tv/nt.w~!64792/%D8%A7 

%Dg%84%Dg%82%D8%A7%D8%Bg%D8%AF%D8%A 

9- %D 8 %AA%D 8 %AA % D 8 %AS %D9% S 6%D 9% 8 9 - %D 

8 %A 7% Dg % 8+ % Dg %8 7% D 8 '.'IoAC% Dg % 8 8 % Dg %8 5-

O/',D8 %Bg%Dg% 84 %Dg%8g - %D 8 %B3%D 8 %AC %Dg %86-

%D8%AA%Dg%83%D8%BT%Dg%8A%D8%AA-%D 

g%88%D8%AA%D8%Bg%D8%AA%D8%BI%Dg% 

8, - %D8 %A8% D9 % 8 5%D 9 %8 2 %D 8 %AA %D 9%84-

%D8%AE'YoDg'Yo8S/'ir. 

13. "lSI Cla1ms Tasfirat Prison Break in Tikl'lt," SITE Intelligence 

Group, October n, 20T2. 

14. "Tigri, operation~: the <lttack on the poho::e heCldguClrten in 

HibHibwa~ intended to~muggleTo le,tder~ ofal-Q,leda," September 

Ig, 2012, fl\.ailable online at hlLp://wwv..a1sumaria.tv!~AJsumariallew~/ 48T 45/T riiq%20~er.:urity%20neW'>/,u. 

15. "lSI Clallm Three-Man Suicide Ra1d on Police HQin Diyala, 

36 Othl"r Att'lr.:h," STTE Tntl"lligencl" Group. NOVl"mber 27, 20T2. 

16. "lSI Clalms V'/a ... e ofAllacb on 9/30," SITE Inte1hgence Croup, 

Or.:tober 5, 20T2. 

17. "Breaking News --Seven civilian~ wounded in a car bomb 

explo~ion in KirKUk," N,ltional 

14. 2012. a ... ailable onlllle at htli"//ww'o.n.,"","w,.,,,m/enghM 

NewLDt't'lil".a'p?'lrg5_ VQ=G El EH K; 

News Agency, November 14, 2012. ava1lable onhne at http:// 

www.ninanew~.(;Qm/engli~h/NewLDet,db.,t~p?arg5_VQ=GETEJL; 

Christine Hauser. '~-\t Least 20 D1e in Series of Bomb AlLacb 

111TOUghout Traq," 111t' New York Time" November 14, 2012, 

available online at hltp://wvvw.nytimes.com/20121I1/IS/world/ 

middleeast!lraq-attacks.html. 

18. "Iraq bombing~ kill 19 on eve of Mu~lim new 

News Egypt, November 14, 2012, available online at 

d ,ii lynew~egypt. com! 20T 2!n /J 4/i raq- bombi ng~ - kill-Tg - 0 n -eveof-mu~lim-new-:vear/. 

Tg. "Suicide bomber Kilh 3T ,tt iirmy b,t~e near Baghd,td," Reuter~, 

No ... ember 6, 2012. ava1lable online at http://www.reuters.com! 

,lrticle/2OT2!n!06/m-iriiq-violencl"-idUSBRE8A50CF20T2n06. 

20. "A..nbar police: the car bomb west of Ramadi was 

New~-,tse(;ond (;"1' bomb in Fallujiih," Nation<ll Traqi New~ Agency, 

September 13.2012, a ... a1lable online at http://ww"I.I.ninanews.com/ 

Engli~h/NewLDet,nl~."~p?iirg5_YQ=GDHGEK: "Brl";tking Nl"w~ 

--- car bomb e""ploded III FalluJah:' NatlOnal Iraqi Nev.s Agency, 

September 13,2012, av;ulable online <It http://WW\\·.nin;lllew~.co:ml 

Engli~h/NewLDel<Lik<Lsp'?ar95_YQ=GDHFU: "Bt-ealing Nl"w~ 

--- car bomb exploded III Ramadi." September 13. 2013. ava1lable 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 
98


86007b-74.eps

NOTES 

online http:// ... 'WW.ninanew~.com/Engli~h/Nf''w~_Detail~. 35. Ciimpaign ch,l~e armed gTOUp~ in 

June 11. 2013, available onhne 

http://ww\. ••.• llllraqnew .•. com/en/index ,php ?option=com_con 

asp'?ar95_VQ=GDHfLL. 

iit 

QT. Duraid Adn,m, "Sunni LnvrnilKer in Tr,lq i~ Killed in a Suicide te nt&v iew=arlicle&id= 3 5 03 0: ~ec ur it y- force~ - 01'- dejla- knight~­

campaign-chasing-armed-groups-in-dlyala&catid-36:secunty<e 

mid=37, 

2013, avmlable online 

lawmaker-and-~unlll-leader-.kllled-lll-~uicide-bomblng.hlml. 

22. "Bre,lking New,' - A C,iT bomb explode~ in DiY'lla province," 

Nalional 

" 

New~ .. \gene}'. December 1o, 2012. available online 

YQ=GfDKFE: "12 people killed. 75 hurt in a ~E'rie~ of ,Ht,l(:h in 

Iraq." RT. December 16, 2012. ii'l-ailable online at hup:!/rL.com/ 

nE'\v~/lille/20T2- T2-r6/. 

'23. "lSI Clmms V'lave of Attacks in Revenge [or Imprisoned Sunnl 

1Nomen," SITE Tntelhgence Group, DecE'rnber 20, '20J'2. 

J9, '20T2, ,waibble online iit 

backgrounde r/weekly-iraq- update- 51. 

#51." ISW, December 

25. "DE'mon~tr,ition~ Ag'lln~t M"liki After h~,i\vi Bodygu,ud 

~,.i,.rrest," IS"W. December 27, 2012, available onlllle at http:!'/ 

w ..... "W. undent an dingwar. org/backg rounder/J r,lq-upd,lte- 5 2-

demon~tl'at io ns-agai nsl- m al iki - afte t·- i ~sawi -bodyguard - arre~l. 

26. "lSI Claim" Vy'ave O[Att'lCh. Advi,e~ Sunnl Prote,'ton in Ir,lq," 

SITE Intellig'ence Gt·oup.January 7. 20T3. 

27. "lSI Claim" Suicide Bombing". R,lld in Kirkuk Among 32 

Claimed.,.i,J.tacks," SITE Intelligence Group. March 19,2013. 

28.Jo,eph Felter, Brian Fl,hm,m, "Al-Q,l'lda'" Foreign Flghter" in 

Iraq: A Fir~t Look at the Sinjar Record~." V,re~t Point 

Terrorism Center. December 19,2007, available onlllle at 

tiirpley. net! doc~/CTCForeign Fighter. T9. Deco 7, pdf; El inbeth 

O'Bagy. "Jihad III Syria." ISW, September 2012, available onlllle at 

http://W\\w, undentandingwiir, org/reporUjihad -~yri'l, 

29. "lSI ClaimsA~sa~~inaLion oflraqi MP ls~awi, Strikes llliw.bar," 

SITE Intelligence Croup,J,mu,lry 20, 20T3, 

pilgrlm~, 

dail;. ~tar, com .lb/N ew~/M iddle- Ea~l/' 20 I 3/Jan -17/ 20 258 5-lraqlofficials-car- bomb-.blls-+-shiite-pllgrims,aslu:#axzz212SClIib, 

31. "lSI Claims go-Man fuud in Hadllha. Kllling' DOt:em," SITE 

Intelligence Croup, March 16,2012. 

32. "lSI Gl'I,e~ Report of 40 ~-\1tack~ III Baghdad. Including 

'Wedne~day 1000""ion,'" SITE Intelligence Croup, July 16, 2012, 

33. "lSI ClaUllS "\Ta,,e ofBombing~ III Baghdad," SITE Intelhgence 

Croup, February 17,2013, 

34· 

IB, 2013, <lvaibble online <It 

36. Iraq Body Count Database, accessed August 30,2013, aval1able 

online at http://WW.N.irilqbodywunt.orgldiltiib;l~e/download/ibcinCldenL~,php, 

37, "Kadhimiyilh," 

38, Sam Wyer, "The Resurgence of A~a'ib Alll al-Haq." ISW, 

December 20T2, ,iVaibble online ,It http://wwv.',undentimdingwiu', 

orgl sites!default/l1.1es!ResurgenceoLA.AH. pdf. 

39. Ahmed Ali, "2OT3 Iriiq Updiite #23: S"dri~t~ ,md A~ai'b Al-Hiiq 

Fight for Baghdad," IS'V. June 11,2013, a"ailable onhne at http:// 

i~wiraq. blog~ pot, com/ 2 013/ 0 6/ 2 0 13 -iraq -upd<lt e- 2 3 - ~adri~ t~­

(Lnd-as(Lib,html?q=araji/ 

+O,.Je"ica Le ..... i", Ahmed Ali, imd Kimberly Kagan, "Iraq'" ,ect,lTlan 

cri~i~ reignite~ as Shi'a militia~ executE' civilian~ and t'emobili"e," 

ISV'/, June 1, 2013. avmlable online at http://is''''-iraq,blog~poL 

(;om/QOT3/ Oo/iriiq~-~ect'lTi<ln-cri~i~-reign ite~- a~. htm I ?q= M aY+4. 

41. Je~~ica LeWl~. A.hmed ~AJ1. Kimberly Kagan. "lraq'~ ~ectanan 

n'i~i~ reignite~ a~ SI11"ii militiii~ E"xecutE" civili,m~ imd remobili7e," 

IS\,I/, June I, 2013. avallable onlinE' at htlp://iswiraq.blog~pot. 

1.0m/20 [3/ 06/iriiq.'-,ect'lrian-cri~i,,-reign ite,- a~. htm I, 

42. Hamt:a "Iraq launche~ operation agaimt al-Qaeda in 

Anb,lr de,'ert, A,hiirq al-AwMt, Miiy 27,20[3, iivaibble online at 

http://www.aawsal.net/20 13/ 05/article553 0328 7. 

+3. "lSI Cbim~ iittiick on Triiqi-Syriill1 Mllitary Convoy in Anbiir," 

SITE Intelligence Group. March II, 2013. 

++, Stephen "Tieken imd Ahmed Ali, "20T3 Tr,lq Updilte #TO: 

Ten~ion~ on the border and in parllament," March 8, 2013, avallable 

online at http://iswiraq, blogspot. coml 2 013! 03/2 013-1raq-updateTO-ten~ion~-on -border. htm I '?q =~yrian, 

+5.JesslcaLewis,AhmedAli, and Kimberly Kagan, "Iraq's sectanan 

(;ri~i~ reignite~ a~ Sh1"ii militiii~ execute dvili,m~ iind remobili7e," 

InsLltuLe [or the Study o[ \Alar. June 1. 2013, a"ailable onlllle at 

http:/h~wlraq.blog~pot,com/~eilTch?q=Shi'a+mlhti"~, 

Cllie~ Raise fears of Renewed 

Sectilri,m Confhct," The Mily 20, 20T3, av,lllable 

online at http://www.n)tl1nes.com/2013/05/21/world/rniddleea~t/ 

b<lghdad -baHiI-ir<lq- bombing~,htIlll? _r=2 &, 

4B. General Da"id H. Petraeus, of General David 

Petriieu,' to Congre,,~ on the Sltu,ltion in Iraq, Council on Forelgn 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 33 
99


86007b-75.eps

NOTES 

49. Je~~ica Lewh, Ahmed ~-\li. Kimberly Kagan. "Iraq'~ ~ectarian 

Crlsis reigmtes as Shi'a militias execute chnlians and remobilize," 

Kirku"k," Al 

%A8%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D9%8S%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A% 

D8%Ag-%DS'Yo..-\7%D8%B4%D8 u/o.A..E%D8%A7%D8%BS-%D8% 

A.8%D8'XAA%Dg%81%D8%AC%Dg%8A%D8%Bl-%D8%B3%D 

g'Yo8A'YoD8%A7"1oD8%BT%D8'YoAA%Dg%8A%Dg'Yo8b-'YoDg%85 

o/"Dg%81%D8%A..E°/c,D8?1L.<\.E%D8%A<\%Dg%8.AJar. 

ISV{, June T, '20J3, iwaililble online ,it http://i~wir'lq.blog~pot. 55. "Killing n and wounded 28 other~, it ~uicidE' 

cOill/2013/o6/iraq~-secLarian-crisls-reigniLes-as.hlml. in eastern }J Sumarla News. June 16. 2013. 

50."Se(;urity alert ,mnounc:ed in Niijaf preparing to Shilbanip. 

.. }Jl of June 20, 2013, available 

content &view= article&id = 3 6 268; ~ ec unt}' -alert - announced -Innajaf-preparing-to-,h<lbaniy<-l-pllgrirnage&c<ltid-36:~et.urity<ern 

id-37 

51. "To find the C<lrnp of the hlarnit. St<lte of Iraq northwe~t of 

%Bg%D8%AB%Dg%88%D8%BI-%D8%Bg%Dg%84%Dg%8g-

%D 9 % 8 5 % D 8 % B 9 % D 8 % B 3 % D 9 % 83% D 8 %B 1-

%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-

%Dg%84%D8%AF%Dg%88%Dg%84 %D8%Ag- %D8%A7%Dg% 

84%D8%Bg%DS%Bl%D8°,{,A7%Dg%S2-. 

52. --Police stalion in Rarnadi i~ ~ubjected to three consecutive 

~uiC1de attach," NatlOnal iraqi New~ Agency. July 11. 2013. 

av,dl<lble online at 

% Dg%8+- % D 8 '.'10 A B"Io Dg'lo8+ '.'10 D 8 'loA 7'.'10 D8"1oAB% D 8 '.'10 A 9 -

%D 8 % Bg o,{,D 9 % S 6 %D 8 %A7 %D 8 %B 5 %D 8 %B 1-

'loDS'loB+%DS%Bl%DS%B7%DS%Ag-

%D 9 %8 8 %D 8 %A5%D 8 %B 5%D 8 %A7%D 8 %~-\.8 %D 8 %.-\9-

'loD S 'loA/, % D 8 % Bl % D 8 %A8 %D 8 %Bg %D 8 %Ag-

%D8'loA2%D8%AE%D8"1oBI"IoDg'lo8A%Dg'lo86/,ir 

Kil1edA..cro~s "The New York Tunes. July 11, 2013. available 

dOlens-kllled -acrN~- iraq .html'? _r- O. 

53. "UrgE'nt···34 TP~ killed, injured m TU7 Khurrnatu," All of 

Iraq New~ Agenc). July II. 2013. available online at hllp:!iwww. 

alliraqnews. coml en/lndex. php '?O phon-corn_content & view-art 

icl e&id - 3 7 5 I 2: u rgen t3 4-i p~- kill ed - i n ju red - i n -t u 7-khu I'm ,ltu-

&calid-36:~ecurity&ILemld-37 "Breaking News - 3l people, 

induding polH.:emen, killed ,md woundE'd in car bomb in TU7 

Khurmalu." Nalional Iraql Ne ..... s Agenc;, Jul:- II. 2013, available 

onhne at http://\\ww.llln<lnE'W~.t.orn/E'ngh,h/NE'WLDet<lih. 

asp'?ar'95_VQ-GTLGME. 

54. "Two C<lr bornb~ go off in Deb~ area, of Kirkuk," Nation,tl 

Tt'aqi New~ Agency. July n, 2013, <Lvaibble online at hllp:!!www. 

ninanews.com/eng'lish/NewLDetail~.a~p'?arg5_VQ-ClLHE£ 

""\Voundmg elght peoplE', two car bomb~ detonated noTthwe~t of 

34 

online at http://"WW\\,.'11~um'Hia.tv/new~/77853/%Dg%85%Dg%8 

2%D8%A-\'%Dg%S4-II-%D8%B4%D8%~-\.E%D8%B5%D8~lru\7-

%D9%88%D8%AS%DS%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A 

g- 28-"10 D 8%A 7% D8'loAE'.'Io D8% BI% Dg'lo8A'lo Dg%8 6-

%D 8 %A8 %D 8 %~~-\. %D9% 81 %D 8 %AC %Dg %8A %D S %Bl-

%D8%A7%Dg%S6%D8%AA%DS%AD/'lr. 

56. "Breaking Ne .... s -- Suicide bomber blows himself up. LargeLlng 

police neiir pollmg centE'r," N,ltiol1iil Triiq New~ Agency, June 17, 

2013, available online al hLtp:!/www.lllnanews.com/engh~h/New..­

Det<lih.a~p'?<lrg5_VQ-OlHDIH. 

57. "UrgenL. .. Death loll of Baghdad Suicide bombing climb~ 

further to 87 de'ith,. injurie,'," All of Iraq New, Agency, June [S, 

2013, available online iit 

toll-of-baghd'ld-~uicidE'-bombing-clirnb~-further-to-87-dE'ath~­

in J ul'les-&caud - 36: securil y&Itemid -37. 

58, "He"d ofthel Triiq unined /bloc, four ofhi~ brother~ killed in a 

sUlcide bombing ~oulh of Mmul." NallOnallraq Nev.sAgency. June 

[g, 20[3, ,iv,iilablE' onlme at http://"WW\\·.l1in,mew~.com/engli,,h/ 

News_Detaih.a~p'?arg5_VQ-GIHHEK; "II penom killed. injured 

southern Mosul, All of Iraq News Agency, June Ig, 2013, avallable 

online <It http://v,, ... vw,,tlliraqnew~,com/en/index.php'?option-com_ 

conlenl&vlew-arlicle&id- 3615 2 :11- person ~ -kdled -in juredwuthern - mo,'ul- &c,ltid-36: ,ecu rity& T tern ld-37. 

59. Joseph Felter. Brlan Fi~hman. '~'\.I-Qa'lda·s Forelgn Fig'hters in 

Tr'lq: A Fint Look ,it the Sinjar Ret.ord"," "'Ne,t Point Combatmg 

Terrol'lsm Center. December 19, 2007, available online at hUp:// 

tarpley. net! docs/OTCForeignFighte r.lg. Dec07. pdf 

60. "Dl;.-ala Awakening Lhreaten 'collectively to re~ign' in 

the event .. irregular payments Icontinuel," .'\.I-Mada Press, 

%Ag -% D 8%A F% Dg%8A % D8%A7% Dg%84 % Dg%8g-

%D S %A.A%Dg%8 7%D8%AF%D 8 %AF - %D S %AS %D8%A7% 

Dg%8+%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A ... -\%Dg%S2%D8%A7%Dg% 

8+"IoD8%Ag-%D8"1oA7'·'IoDg%8+%D8"1oAC'.'IoDg%85%D8"1oA7%D 

S%Bg%Dg%8A%D8%Ag. 

61. "Director of' Saadiya county in Di}ala." National 

Iraqi News Agency, June 7. 2013, online at http://www. 

ninanew~. com/ engh ~h/N ew~_Det'llk'l~p ?,ug 5-VQ- GTFGMF, 

62. "Popular CommilLee~ in Kll'kuk gn'e a deadline lo the army 

until tomorrow to rele,l~e it~ coordin,ltor Khalen Miifraji," N,ltlOniil 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 
100


86007b-76.eps

NOTES 

Traqi New~ 

63. "Urgent -- Cil~uilltie~ ofTu7 Khurmiitu bombing~ hit 50 death~, 

23, 2013, available online 

7T. KarE'E'm RilheE'rn ,ind Zi"l iii-Sinjar)" "TOP NDl,lS: Al-QaE'da 

miliLants flee Iraq jail in violent mass break-oul.'· Reuters, Jul;- '22, 

'2013, av,ulable onhne at http://rnobilt'.reuter~.comhTtidehdUSB 

REg6] 09120I30722 '( irpc=932. 

,lt 72. Rlh.,.ern Sillman, Ned Parber, "The Cn'at E,'C,lPt': How 

enl&view=arlide&id=364oI:urg'enlca~uallle~-Or-lul-khurmalu- al-Qaeda broke hundred~ of bad 

bombings-hit-So-deaths-injunes-&catid=36:secunty<emid=37. notOrlOUS Jail-and what it means 

64. '~.-\. ~uiclde car bomber kllh one policeman, wounds raUl' olher~ 

in Anbar province," National Iraqi Ne','{s ~4.gency, June '23, 2013, 

ilv,tibble online ilthttp:/h..,."vw.ninilnew~.com/enKli~h/New~_Detilib. 

asp'?ar95_ VQ~CllEfl. 

65. "'2 ~oldiers killed, 3 wounded eii~t of Qil'im," N,itionill Tr'iqi 

Ne",s Agency. June 2'2. '2013, m,ailable onhne at hllp:iiv.ww. 

ninanew~.com/english/NewLDetaib.a~p?ar95_VQ=GnDn: 

66. "Military operatlOn to trackdown gunmen launched in~A..nbar," 

All ofJraq New~ Agency, .June '22, '20T3, iiViiibble online at http:// 

wv.w. alliraqnev. ~. com! e n!inde .... php '?o ption = com_content &viev. 

= ilrtic1e&id= 3634 6: IDllitilry-operiition -to-trilck-down-gun menlaund1E'd-in-anbar-&calid=36,~ecurit)'&Tlemid=37· 

67. "iSoldlenl kill ii,'uiude bombt'r itryingl to detonatt' a boobyIt'apped tank," National T['aqi New~ Agency, July 2, '20Tg, available 

on11ne http://wwlN.nlnane ... ·s.com/engh ~h!N ews_Detail ~. 

ii~p'?ilr95_VQ=GUqD. 

68. "Humain iannouncesl the formatlon of a cell 'Muqdadiyah 

al Sumariii 

%D 8 %BI%D 9% 8A- %D 9 %8A %D 8%Bg %D 9% 84 %D 9% 8 6-

%D8%AA%D8%B4%Dq%83%Dg%8A%Dq%8+-

'Yo D8%AE 'YoD 9 '.'10 84 % Dg%8A 'YoD 8'YoAg - % D8%A7% D8%-

B2%D9°1c)85%D8%Ag-%D8%A7%Dg%84%Dg~Ic)85%Dg%8'2 

%D8%Af%D8%A7%D8%AF%Dg%8A%D8%Ag-%D9%84! 

ar; "The return of more than 60 displaced families to their 

homes in Muqdadiya," al Sumaria TV, .July 17, '2013, available 

%D9%8S%D9%86-6o-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B'%D8%Ag-

% D 9 % 8 6 % D 8 %A 7 % D 8 % B 2 % D 8 %AD % D 8 %Ag-

%D9%84 %D9%8S%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8+ %D9% 

87'.'IoD8%A7-'YoDg%8T%Dg'Yo8A-%Dg%82/iir: "Mutliiq discu~~e~ 

Covernor the pro"ince'~ securiL:" service~ siLuaLlon," 

Triiql New~ Agency, July 22, 20T3, ilviulilble online 

http;! Iwwv..ninanev.s.coml englhh/New~_Detail ~ .a~p '?ar9 5-

VQ"o'JDFMH. 

69. "The maslerm111d ofNa~iri}ah's bombing's arrested 111 Baghdad," 

NatiollAlr"qlNe",·~Agency,.July'2'2, 2013, ;lVail"ble online at http:// 

www.ninanews.comienglishiNewLDetails.asp?at.95_"VQ=GJDEJL. 

70.Je~~l(;iI Le ... i~, "AI-Qiledil inlr"q'~ 'Bre"klllgthe \0\",,11,' Cilmp"ign 

Achieve~ il~ Objeclive~ at Abu Ght'aib-'2oTg Traq Upd<t.le "go," 

ISW. July '28. 2013, available online at http:/h~wlraq.blogspol. 

com/'20T3/07/ill-qiiedii-in-lraq~-bTeiLk:Jng-willb.html. 

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 

Augu~t 5. '20T3, av,tibble online ,it httr"!;'~do"i"np,,li,y. 

73. "Between 500 to TOOO e~capees from Abu Ghr,db priwn, 

of them from al-Qaeda.·· National Iraqi New~ 

20T3, aViiibble online at httl";!.~<.mn",,,w,.cc,m!,n",,,h! 

Detaih.a~p'(arg5_VQ=GJDEFI. 

74. Monil Miihmood and PeteI' Beaumont, ·"Al-Qiedii rilids on Traqi 

prisons raise fean of return to cl"il v.ar; claim~ that attackers v.ere 

helped by gU<lrd~ lll~lde Abu Chr<llb, a~ Inore detiollb emerge of 

'2g, '20T3, aVitibble online 

iTilqi-prisons. 

75. "Iraq: hundreds escape fromAbuChraib jail: Ten police ofGcer~ 

killE'd il~ ~UiCldE' bomber~ dTove Cilr with explo~ive~ lllto 

prison gate~ on Baghdad out~kirls"· Pre~~ in Baghdad, 

July 2'2, '20[3, iivililablIC onlint' iit http://wv.w.theguiirdlan.com/ 

wol'id/2OT3/jul/'2'2/il·aq-p[·i~on-atlacb-kill-do/en~. 

76. ··SuiClde Cir Bomb Kill~ At Lt'ii,'t +4 In Dilmii,'CU,," CNN, 

December 2g, 20n. available online al hup;//www.cnn. 

comi'201liI2/'23!",·0r1d/measti~yr1a-bombing.<.. 

77. Valerie S.qbala, "The I~lamic }J.liance Ernerge~," ISVl, 

September '25, '2013, available online at http://is,,,·syria.blogspot. 

comi'2oTg/og/the-i~lamic-'illi,mce-emerge~,html. 

35 
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102

Mr. POE. Dr. Knights, you have 5 minutes. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KNIGHTS, PH.D., LAFER FELLOW, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. KNIGHTS. It is an honor to appear before you this afternoon. 

I clearly remember the first moment that I felt that al-Qaeda was 

making its comeback in Iraq. In July 2011, security forces found 

in the desert district of Rutba the corpses of 3 prominent sheikhs, 

3 brothers, who had been beheaded by al-Qaeda and their bodies 

booby-trapped to prevent a prompt burial, a sign of disrespect. I 

camped in that desert area just a year beforehand, spending a 

memorable 4th of July there. 

It is my firm belief that al-Qaeda’s resurgence was both predictable and preventable, but, just as firmly, I believe the counterterrorism situation in Iraq is recoverable. 

This is a rare problem in that we know exactly how to fix it. We 

defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq just 5 years ago, comprehensively dismantling their network’s propaganda campaigns. In the coming 

years, the United States can help Iraq to do it again. 

Put simply, Iraq needs to do 2 things. The Iraqi Government 

needs to make the right political choices during the next parliamentary term. And the Iraqi military needs to turn back toward 

population-focused counterinsurgency. It wasn’t easy last time. It is 

going to be even harder this time with Iraqi brigades, rather than 

U.S. brigades. 

The good news is that today’s al-Qaeda in Iraq is vulnerable. It 

is expanding rapidly. It is conventionalizing. I knew a New York 

Times report from I think a couple of days ago talking about alQaeda convoys of 40 vehicles moving around in the desert. Well, 

that is very scary for Iraqis, but I will bet to an AC–130 targeteer, 

that is quite a tempting target. 

As they conventionalize, they expose themselves to attack. And 

try as they might, al-Qaeda in Iraq cannot resist the urge to control territory, to tax populations, to impose Islamic scripture on the 

locals, to kill and insult local power brokers, and to fight with other 

insurgents. It is already over-reaching. It is already alienating 

Iraqis. 

And also al-Qaeda in Iraq has only succeeded because the Government of Iraq has made egregious errors in the last couple of 

years. Al-Qaeda in Iraq still has no positive manifesto for how it 

would run Sunni parts of Iraq or Syria or anywhere else. It is 

wholly reliant on the Iraqi Government, continuing to make grievous political mistakes in its treatment of the Sunni Arabs and in 

its counterinsurgency operations. 

My experience in Iraq, whether it is the Mahdi Army militia or 

whether it is al-Qaeda, is that these groups only expanded because 

others let them. They only expanded because they exploited others’ 

mistakes, not because they were so great themselves. They are certainly not 10 feet tall. We beat them before, and we can do it again. 

So the stage is set for a major new counterterrorism campaign 

undertaken by Iraq if the Iraqi Government could embrace this opportunity. What should be our role, the U.S. role, in helping them 

to defeat al-Qaeda again? 

103

Well, Iraq cannot kill its way out of this crisis. Unfortunate evidence of this was shown in 2010. We killed al-Qaeda’s 2 senior 

leaders. They had been making a lot of mistakes. Their successors 

have made very few. 

Al-Qaeda has a strong believable narrative at the moment. And 

this is what we have got to break down. This narrative is that an 

Iranian-backed, Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad is determined to collectively punish the Sunni Arabs and that the only 

force capable of resisting the government and avenging the Sunnis 

is al-Qaeda. This narrative has to contain fewer seeds of truth than 

it does today if al-Qaeda in Iraq’s growth is to be checked. 

What can the U.S. do? Well, the first thing we can do, which 

doesn’t require a lot of money, weapons, or troops, is to help the 

Iraqi Government to stop making mistakes by using our voice persistently and at moments of leverage, like the government formation process that is going to come in 2014. We need to encourage 

them to hold punctual, free, and fair elections, to undertake judicial reforms to de-Baathification, counterterrorism laws, a modernized prison system, and also some kind of landmark rehabilitation 

of the major persecuted Sunni Arab leader, such as Rafi al-Issawi, 

that the U.S. Government has defended in the past from legal 

threats and charges against him and should do so again. 

Most importantly, the U.S. should stay engaged. By staying engaged in Iraq, by paying attention to the details of Iraq’s politics, 

the U.S. can reduce the Sunni Arab perception, in Iraq and elsewhere, that Iraq is being ceded to Iran in some diabolical great 

game. That is not the case. The U.S. still has a lot of influence in 

Iraq and should continue to use its voice as well as to provide behind-the-scenes counterterrorism support. 

I yield back to the chair. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knights follows:]

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The Resurgence of AI-Qaeda in Iraq 

Dr Michael Knights 

Lafer Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Testimony Submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, NonProliferation and Trade, and Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

December 12,2013 

Chairman Poe and Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Trade and Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and North Africa, it is an honor to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the 

resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

The subject of AI-Qaeda in Iraq is one that has been close to my heart throughout the last decade. 

Like others I was disheartened to watch the group grow from 2003-2006 and relieved to see it crash 

and burn in 2006-2009. I was saddened but not surprised to watch it rebound strongly from 2010 

onwards. Indeed since the autumn of 201 0 I have been telling all who would listen that the group 

was poised to make a comeback. 

Since 2004 I have worked in all the Iraqi provinces and most of the country's hundred districts, 

including some of those where AI-Qaeda is strongest I have worked alongSide the Iraqi security 

forces, the u.s. military and the reconstruction community as they battled AI-Qaeda. It is my firm belief 

that AI-Qaeda's resurgence was both predictable and preventable. 

Just as firmly, I believe that the counter-terrorism situation in Iraq is still recoverable. We defeated AIQaeda in Irilq just five years ilgO, comprehensively dismantling their networks and propilgilndil 

campaigns. In the coming years the United States can help Iraq to do It again. 
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The Resurgence of AI-Qaeda in Iraq 1 

By the middle of 201 0, AI-Qaeda in Iraq was dead on Its feet. The organization suffered critical 

setbilcks in late 2006 ilnd eilrly 2007 ilS Sunni Arub tribal militiils - the Silhwil (Awilkening) - turned 

against AI-Qaeda. In parallel the U.s.-led military effort protected the Sahwa and executed high-tempo 

remorseless counter-terrorism operations that ripped AI-Qaeda in Iraq to pieces. The group's foreign 

volunteers and money started to dry up. AI-Qaeda cells began to process of disintegrating into local 

criminal franchises that now kidnapped and extorted to pay their salaries rather than fund insurgency. 

In April 2010 AI-Qaeda in Iraq lost Its two most senior leaders - AQI emir Abu Omar ai-Baghdadi and 

war minister Abu Ayyub ai-Masri - and stood in the verge of "disintegration" according to the US 

commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno. In a press conference on June 4, 2010, Odierno noted: 

"Over the last 90 days or so, we've either picked up or killed 34 out of the top 42 AI-Qaeda In Iraq 

leaders." 

In the summer of 2010 new leadership was announced by the Islamic State of Iraq (lSI), the protocaliphate and umbrella movement led by AI-Qaeda in Iraq. The new lSI emir was named as Abu Bakr 

ill-Bilghdildi ill-Husilyni ill-Qurushi (aliils Abu DUil), iln lruqi Sillilfist from Silmurru who received 

doctorate in IslamiC jurisprudence before 2003 and was detained in Camp Bucca until his release in 

2009. The new lSI war minister was named as AI-Nasir Li-Din Allah Abu Sulayman, a figure about 

whom little is known (he is rumoured by press reporting to be a Moroccan Arab-Afghan and a former 

detainee). 

By early 2012 it was clear that the deaths of AQI's senior leaders were a watershed event that 

unfolded just as the movement sought to find a new way to operate In Iraq. Numerous processes 

hilve unfolded since AI-Qiledu's defeilt in 2006-2009, including the releilse of large numbers of 

experienced militants from u.s. detention facilities, changes In the balance of foreign and Iraqi fighters 

within the movement, the withdruwill of u.s. forces, ilnd determined ilttempts by AI-Qiledil in Irilq to 

learn from its mistakes. These changes crystallized in the year after the deaths of Abu Omar alBaghdadi and Abu Ayyub ai-Masri, culminating in a successful re-Iaunch of the movement in April 

2011 ilnd a significilnt recovery of operiltionill spilce within Irilq's Sunni Arub communities. The 

movement appears to have rationalized its near-term objectives and synchronized its propaganda with 

the mounting concerns of Iraq's Sunni Arabs. 

1 The following three paragraphs are an updated precis of a piece I first wrote in early 2012 when I assessed that 

the resurgence of AI-Qaeda in Iraq had been underway since the spring of 2011. See Michael Knights, Back with a 

vengeance: AI-Qaeda in Iraq rebounds, in IHS Defense, Security & Risk Consulting, February 24, 2012. 
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86007c-3.eps

The metrics of AI-QJedJ in Imq's resurgence me undeniJble2 

In 2010, the low point for the AI-Qaeda effort in Iraq, the movement's signature attacks like 

car bombings declined to an average of lOa month and multiple-city coordinated attacks 

occurred only two or three times J yeJr. 

In 2013, so fm there has been In Jvemge of 71 CJr bombings J month Jnd J multiplelocation strike every 1 1 days. 

Suicide opemtions me on the IncreJse too: in 2010 these hJd dropped to In avemge of six per 

month, and this average was maintained throughout 2012. In 2013, so far there has been an average 

of 22 per month. According to u.s. government officials providing background briefings in October 

2013, the uptick has been mostly driven by foreign jihadists who entered Iraq via Syria." 

This IJst metric is PJrticulmly disturbing becJuse it shows thJt young jihJdist volunteers dmwn to the 

Syrian conflict are willing to be played into Iraq, where suicide operations are more regularly 

undertaken than in Syria. Even taking into account the relative ease with which terrorist groups can 

mJnipulJte Jnd shJpe the psychology of young volunteers once they me physicJlly in the conflict 

lone, It IS remarkable that such would-be "martyrs" are more than willing to leave the Iconic theatre of 

SyriJ Jnd go to next door Imq to die. AI-QaedJ is clemly succeeding in convincing its own opemtors 

that Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are one continuous conflict zone. Indeed, on July 9, 2013 AI-Qaeda car 

bombs detonated in areas spanning from Beirut to the Iranian border with Iraq, an operation AI-Qaeda 

websites coined "From Beirut to the Diyala," referring to the river in eastern Iraq4 

Irnpact of the AI-Qaeda Resurgence in Iraq 

AI-QJedJ's resurgence in Iraq is undenlJbly dJmJging to u.s. interests in Iraq, in the broJder region, 

and potentially in the homeland security environments in Europe and the United States. 

In Iraq the accelerating pattern of anti-Shiite bombings is rekindling sectarian revenge attacks.' 

Retaliation has begun slowly, in part because of the "conflict fatigue" felt by Iraqi communities. At the 

low pOint of violence in IrJq in eJrly 2011, the country suffered Jbout 300 mJjor security incidents J 

month. Throughout 2013, the monthly total of incidents has regularly topped 1,200. But this is stili 

well below the 6,000-plus incidents that were reported each month during the darkest days of the 

civil war-like conditions in late 2006 and early 2007. What this tells us is that violence in Iraq remains 

largely limited to attacks undertaken by small militant cells, whilst the general population continues to 

stay uninvolved and civilian-on-civilian ethno-sectarian violence is still relatively rare. If this dynamic 

2. My metrics are drawn from liaison relationships with the Iraqi Security Forces and various private security 

companies still operating in Iraq. I maintain a private database to catalogue Significant Activity (SIGACT) data. 

3 See senior U.S. State Department official's comments during the October 30,2013 conference call entitled: "Iraqi 

Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Washington and the U.S.-Iraq Partnership under the Strategic Framework 

Agreement." 

4 See the Islamic state of Iraq's propaganda video, "From Beirut to the Diyala," July 28, 2013, at 

http://I.'vww.voutube.com!watch?v=tVW1Axk6K\.vk 

5 The following section draws on my October 3,2013 BBC piece, "Iraq's Never-Ending Security Crisis," see 

http://VlfWw . W<1 sh i ngton i nstitute.org/po I icy-a na !vsi sl view Ii rJqs-never -en d i ng-secu ritv-crisis 
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86007c-4.eps

changes, violence in Iraq will undergo a step-change that could tear the society apart again - but this 

time with no us. military to step in. 

Will civiliilns continue to lilrgely sit out the conflict7 Neilrly two years of intensified AI-Qiledil milSScasualty attacks and sectarian massacres are beginning to severely test Shia patience, resulting in 

growing evidence of revenge attacks on Sunni mosques, preachers and civilians. Sectarian tensions in 

the region, particularly those emanating from the crisis in Syria, and domestic Iraqi politics provide 

background drivers for the strengthening of local militant groups, many of whom act as "agents of 

influence" for Iran's intelligence services. In Baghdad, the epicentre of sectarian tension, the Shiadominated security forces collude with low-profile retaliatory actions by Iranian-backed groups like 

Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the followers of the radical Shia cleric, Moqtada Sadr. And to many Sunnis 

in Baghdad, the Iraqi security forces appear to be the ultimate Shia militia, corralling Sunnis into 

ghettoized neighbourhoods, where they are subject to repressive policing and economic isolation. 

Sectarian attacks on the Sunni minority are even accelerating in Basra, the oil-rich province in the 

"deep south" of Iraq. In the last six months an average of 25 Sunnis have been killed there each 

month, with some corpses dumped with notes explaining that they were killed in retaliation for the 

Increasing number of al-Qaeda bombings In Basra. So Within Iraq, AI-Qaeda's resurgence IS making 

the country less stable and cohesive, splitting apart Sunni and Shia powerbases, whilst Iran's influence 

grows stronger. 

In concrete terms, AI-Qaeda in Iraq is making certain key economic projects untenable, making the 

us. economy more vulnerable to oil shocks. One example is the US-backed Haditha-Aqaba pipeline 

that will need to run through AI-Qaeda's new desert emirate in Anbar province. Likewise the us.-

backed effort to get Basra oil and gas flowing through Turkey will require driving a new pipeline 

through AI-Qiledil heilrtlilnds northwest of Lilke Thilrthilr in the Jilziril ilreil ilnd into the terrorist hub of 

Mosul in the north. This undermines the US goal of helping Iraq to develop three export pipelines 

versus the current single export hub to the Gulf ilnd the Strilit of Hormuz, which is threatened by Iriln. 

The Syrian crisis is strengthening AI-Qaeda in Iraq, and Iraqi militants are, in turn, complicating Syria's 

future pilth. Operilting ilS the Islilmic Stilte of Irilq ilnd AI-Shilms (ISIS), AI-Qiledil in Iraq hils ilmbitions 

to dominate the Salafi terrorist scene In Syria. AI-Qaeda In Iraq wants to expand, to be adjacent to 

Lebanon and the Mediterranean, Israel to the West and Turkey in the north. The Islilmic world that AIQaeda harkens back to was frequently led by a major caliphate based In Baghdad, dominating the 

world bridge between Asia, Africa and Europe. This is what AI-Qaeda wants to rebuild. Sudan, 

Afghilnistiln-Pilkistiln ilnd Somilliil were fine ilS temporilry hideouts, but they ilre not symbolic centres 

for Islam. Libya and even Yemen are likewise peripheral to the Arab civilization in historical terms. In 

Irilq ilnd the ildjilcent Syriiln ilnd Lebanese conflict zones, AI-Qaedil Ciln clilim to be fighting on the 

front line of the Sunni-Shiil sectilriiln conflict, directly confronting whilt they portruy as lrun's proxies in 

the Iraqi and Syrian governrnents plus Hezbollah. The most attractive possible centre for an AI-Qaeda 

cilliphilte is thus lruq - operutionillly, politicilily ilnd culturully. This is why AI-Qiledil's operations in Irilq 

and Syria have such dangerous potential, touching so rnany ring states - Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, 

Isrilel, Iriln, ilnd Saudi Ambia. 
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More broadly there is the issue of returnees from the Iraq-Syrian jihad and the effect they could have 

on security in North Africa, the Gulf, and Western countries. Whilst the threat from jihadist returnees 

can be overstated - many die in conflicts, some isolate their jihad abroad from their lives at home - it 

IS clear that well-trained, blooded AI-Qaeda fighters are dangerous people to have wandering the 

world. Such fighters can act as a magnet for terrorist recruitment in regional and Western nations due 

to the respect shown to them by young Muslims. They are repositories of obscure military knowledge 

on bomb-making, operational planning and counter-surveillance. Thus they can potentially serve as 

the anchor for new terrorist cells wherever they put down roots. 

A final aspect of the resurgence of AI-Qaeda in Iraq is the potential for the movement to attempt 

expeditionary strikes against the US homeland and overseas interests beyond Iraq. The evolution of 

the Yemen-based AI-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) springs to mind, recalling how a 

muscular local affiliate of AI-Qaeda's senior leadership decided to initiate attacks directly againstthe 

United States to raise its profile. AI-Qaeda in Iraq is a movement whose horizons, ambitions and 

operations are broadening by the day. How soon before they decide to further raise their profile, and 

their claim on the Syrian jihad, with international attacks? Possibly never - after all, AI-Qaeda in Iraq 

has been a fairly Insular terrorist group for many years 6 - but the prospect cannot be discounted and 

should not be overlooked. Recalling the 9/11 attacks, it is clearly not preferable that a major AI-Qaeda 

terrorist franchise be allowed to develop safe havens within large ungoverned spaces adjacent to 

Europe, North Africa and Asia. And it is notable that due to the u.s. commitment to withdrawn from 

Iraq, the country has an unfortunate and unique status, for now at least: it is practically the only place 

in the IslJmic world where u.s. armed drones CJnnot or will not openly opemte. 

Vulnerabilities of AI-Qaeda in Iraq 

The good news is that we defeated AI-Qaeda In Iraq before, just five years ago. We studied AI-Qaeda 

in Iraq and identified its vulnerabilities, which were numerous. Today's AI-Qaeda in Iraq differs in 

some regards but is still critically vulnerable to a smart U.s.-Iraqi joint counterterrorism campaign. 

A Portrait of Today's AI-Qaeda in Iraq and its Vulnerabilities 

Even without access to classified information it is possible for an experienced Iraq expert to fuse 

together open source data and discussions with Iraqis to paint an accurate picture of today's AI-Qaeda 

in Iraq The movement is IrJqi-led but tJking in more foreigners every month, viJ the SyriJn conflicti 

AI-Qaeda in Iraq remains focused like a laser on themes that matter to the Sunni Arabs such as 

6 Setting aside some attacks into Jordan in 2005, AI-Qaeda in Iraq has always been a predominately inward-looking 

movement and this tendency has deepened since 2010. Though Iraqis have been involved in acts of international 

terrorism in recent years (notably in the Jordan in 2005, the UK in 2007 and in Sweden in 2010), AQI was at most 

tangentially involved in the latter two cases. In Iraq, AI-Qaeda has eschewed anti-foreign targeting since January 

2010, undertaking practically no attacks on Western targets in Iraq, ostensibly because the greater threat to the 

Sunni Arabs is now posed by Iran and the Shia. 

7 See senior U.S. State Department official's comments during the October 30, 2013 conference call entitled: IIlraqi 

Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Washington and the U.S.-Iraq Partnership under the Strategic Framework 

Agreement." 
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86007c-6.eps

prisoners but it still has no positive agenda for running the Sunni Arab parts of Iraq. Thus it is largely 

reliant on the Iraqi govemment continuing to make grievous political mistakes in its treatment of the 

Sunni Arabs and in its counter-insurgency operations. 

Since 2010 AI-Qaeda in Iraq has been self-funding through organized crime rackets involving kidnap 

for ransom, protection payment from large Iraqi companies, plus trucking, smuggling and real estate 

portfolios. At the present time extortion of commercial enterprises is rapidly accelerating, particularly in 

remote desert areas where the security forces can offer no real protection at present.s Foreign funding 

may be increasing, attracted by boosted operational activity and sectarian tensions across the region. 

The movement is still small, numbering in the hundreds, but is expanding rapidly and trying to 

recentralize command and control. This is creating greater communications traffic, larger numbers of 

terrorist meetings, and rivalries. AI-Qaeda in Iraq is attacking greater numbers of targets and harder 

targets every month, all of which are expanding its operational footprint, its financing needs, and its 

thirst for fighters, vehicles, and explosives. AI-Qaeda has started to show interest in controlling areas 

again: initially in the open military occupation of small town centres or police stations for minutes or 

hours, and the issuance of "night letters" in some Sunni towns to restrict un-Islamic activities like 

barber's shops, music shops and alcohol vendors.' 

As these pOints suggest, AI-Qaeda in Iraq is undergoing an ambitious re-expanslon that will naturally 

create added vulnerabilities which may be exploitable. Firs~ the movement is undertaking so many 

more interactions per day than it did in 2010 that is increasingly vulnerable to communications 

intercepts, "threat finance" analysis, and network analysis. Until recently AI-Qaeda in Iraq only needed 

to spread the world every few months that a multi-city attack was expected on "Day X" and the local 

cells would participate as they saw fit. Now this is a weekly phenomenon, involving many more hubs, 

and every logistical requirement of the terrorist network has been multiplied. AI-Qaeda In Iraq IS also 

in danger of over-reaching, as it did in 2005-2006 when it sought to develop mini-caliphates in Iraqi 

towns and impose limits on Iraqi lifestyle, such as a ban on cigarette smoking. Iraqi Sunni Arabs are 

growing resentful of AI-Qaeda again as they grow more powerful: the movement is scaring Sunni Arab 

political leaders in Iraq, challenging tribal leaders for local control, and taxing growing numbers of 

Iraqis. The stage is set for a return of the Sahwa and intelligence-led special operations, if the Iraqi 

government can embrace the opportunity. 

The u.s. Role in Defeating AI-Qaeda (Again) 

A u.s.-led coalition defeated AI-Qaeda in Iraq in 2005-2009. We know it can be done. The challenge 

now is to understand what parts of the successful formula are still applicable, and which ones the u.s. 

can support In the post-Withdrawal environment. 

3 Anecdotal conversations with multiple Iraqi national security officials suggest that AI-Qaeda is now capable of 

taxing local businesses as a standard practice in rural Anbar, as was the case back in 2005. 

9 See a treatment ofthese issues in Michael Knights, "Yes, Iraq is Unravelling," Foreign Policy, May 15, 2013, at 

http:// \NWW" Wrl sh i ngton i nstitute.org/po I icy-a na Ivsi sl view! ves-iraq -is-LJ n ravell.D.g 
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The first observation I will offer is that Iraq cannot kill its way out of this crisis. Successful counterterrorism or counter-insurgency efforts cannot succeed if the enemy recruits faster than they are 

dispatched. Once again we need to drain the swamp of AI-Qaeda recruiting in Iraq. 

In 2007-2009 the Iraqi conflict lost its luster for many would-be jihadists (in Iraq and abroad) 

because it appeared to be a tawdry, confused struggle with no clear narrative to sustain the 

enthusiasm of Sunni Arab militants. Militant groups split, fought each other, and seemed to be more 

interested in organized crime and internal squabbling than fighting the coalition and Iraqi government. 

Now we have seen the return of a clear narrative - that an Iranian-backed Shiite-dominated 

government in Iraq that collectively punishes the Sunni Arabs, and that the only force capable of 

resisting the government and avenging the Sunnis is AI-Qaeda. This narrative has to contain fewer 

seeds of truth than it does today if AI-Qaeda's growth in Iraq is to be checked. 

Draining the Swarnp of AI-Qaeda Recruitrnent 

Splitting the reconcilable Sunni Arabs from irreconcilable militants will require a number of strategiclevel political steps to be completed. All have the ultimate objective of making Sunni Arabs in Iraq feel 

less isolated and less desperate, and thus less susceptible to support AI-Qaeda passively or actively. 

One is the punctual execution of free and fair national elections in Iraq on April 30, 2014. The u.s. 

Government seems to have strongly cautioned the Maliki government to stick with the electoral 

timeline and has signaled that the us. will pay close attention to the implementation of elections and 

post-electoral government formation. This IS job number one for the us. government and this 

promising start should be maintained throughout what will perhaps be a yearlong effort (based on the 

249-day process in 2010)' Perceptions of a stolen election, of Iranian meddling, or of non-inclusive 

government Without Sunnl Arab participation would gift the terrorists With a further propaganda coup. 

On the other hand a positive propaganda coup might be secured by the government if the terrorism 

charges against Rafi al-Issawi, a top moderate Sunni politiCian and Minister of Finance, can be rapidly 

quashed. The United States has intervened on Issawi's behalf before concerning the charges against 

him and should do so again. 

During the next Iraqi government term (2014-2018) the counter-terrorism environment would be 

best-served by the success of a social peace initiative with a scope similar to South Africa's "Truth and 

Reconciliation" programme or the de-Nazification programme in Germany. Though all countries are 

different and no model can be replicated, the purpose of mentioning these precedents is to 

demonstrate that they can succeed. Blanket de-Baathification in Iraq is an ongoing grievance for 

Sunnis and strengthens their recruitment potential amongst experienced mid-aged militants and the 

younger relatives of purged Baathists. Judicial reform of counter-terrorism law and modernized prison 

system might also reduce AI-Qaeda recruitment potential. Indeed the movement has reaped 

significant rewards from Sunni Arab despair at the conditions and legal treatment faced by the large 

Sunni Arab prison population. 

Energetic, well-publicized u.s. engagement In Iraq can also serve the counter-terrorism effort. AIQaeda is strengthened by the very real perceptions held by Iraqi Sunni Arabs that Iran is winning in 
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Iraq, whilst the United States has lost interest (at best) or has traded Iraq to Tehran in some 

Machiavellian deal (at worst). This perception also no doubt plays into the calculations of external 

funders of AI-Qaeda and other Sunni Arab militant groups in Iraq. Only by staying engaged in Iraq, 

treating Iraq as the high PriOrity It should be, and paying attention to Iraq can the perception of Iranian 

influence be offset. 

Ongoing well-publicized defence sales and military cooperation are also useful ways to signal U.S 

comrnitment, especially if larger numbers of Sunni Arabs are reintegrated to the armed forces. Indeed, 

the Iraqi armed forces, and particularly the Iraqi Army, remains a corner of Iraq where nationalism is 

relatively pronounced and which could be rebuilt Into an institution that would give Sunnl Arabs 

greater hope. Any efforts taken to rebuild the Iraqi rnilitary through U.s.-supported professional military 

education will help on this count, including visits to the u.s. National Defense University, International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) grants, plus Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorisrn, Demining, and 

Related Programs. 

Operational and Tactical Counter-Insurgency 

In 2005-2009 the United States and Iraq cracked the code when it carne to reducing the local 

recruiting pool of militant groups and severely disrupting their local freedorn of rnovement and 

operational security. The method was population-focused counter-insurgency, which saw local 

paramilitaries (Sahwa) paid to fight AI-Qaeda whilst the u.s. and Iraqi forces lived amongst such 

comrnunities to protect civilian and the Sahwa. Since 2009, the Iraqi governrnent progressively 

demobilized the effort, stopping the pay of Sahwa, arresting sorne and taking weapons perrnits from 

others, and allowing their security forces to detach from local communities and use a dragnet 

approach of mass arrests against Sunni Arabs. If this sounds alrnost illogical and entirely self-defeating, 

this IS because It was a critical unforced error by the Iraqi governrnent. 

Rebuilding the Sahwa is one plank of a new population-focused counter-Insurgency in Iraq - possibly 

the most irnportant one. After years of dorninance AI-Qaeda was decimated by the Sahwa in a period 

of months in Rarnadi in late 2006 and early 2007w As a rnovement, AI-Qaeda is terrified, deep 

down, of the Sahwa because it was so brutally effective against them. Even the Shia-Ied government 

in Baghdad recognizes the efficacy of the Sahwa, though they have found it extraordinarily difficult to 

stomach the idea of armed pararnilitaries, often led by former insurgents, operating in or near crosssectarian areas. 

The key will now be to convince Baghdad to put the rnost credible and influential local sheikhs in 

charge again, not Baghdad-selected cronies selected purely to buy Prime Minister Maliki some local 

influence. That means getting Ahmed Abu Risha buck into the top SpOt." Then cornes the hard work 

of re-hlrlng, reissuing weapons permits and getting pay Issued to the fighters. This has proven very 

10 For an excellent granular examination of the U.S.-Sahwa partnership, see Bill Ardolino, Fallujah Awakens 

(Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2013). 

11 There has been extensive speculation in 2013 that Abu Risha will return as the head of Iraqis Sahwa. For a 

sample see Mushreq Abbas, Iraq to reinstate Sahwa forces, AI-Monitor, August 27,2013, see http;//www.almonitor.comipuisE/origina!s/2013/08/iraq-revive-sahwa-qaeda-sunni-protester<;.htmi 
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difficult since the United States stopped running the progamme, suggesting we need to train the Iraqis 

to run such a programme more effectively, potentially including advisors stationed in Iraq who have 

the freedom of movement to get out to deepest darkest AnbJr, Baghdad, Diyala, Nineveh, Kirkuk, 

Sillilh ill-Din ilnd Bilbil. 

Reform of the counter-terrorism law is also required, to make it harder for the wrong Sunnls to be 

rounded up and held for the wrong reasons. Draft reforms to the Counter-Terrorism Law very been 

debated in parliament and they focus on tightening up the process by which arrest warrants can be 

served in Iraq, which currently only requires two anonymous tip-offs and is widely abused by the 

security forces. The draft law also envisages a selective amnesty for long-term detainees against 

whom no case hJS been brought. Whilst It may seem counterintuitive to strengthen counter-terrorism 

by weakening counter-terrorism law, this is exactly whJt needs to happen in Iraq due to the mJjor role 

that ineffective and draconian counter-terrorism powers plays In bolstering AI-Qaeda's recruitment. '2 

Population-focused counter-insurgency is a difficult skillset to learn - or re-Iearn in Iraq's case - but 

there is a strong case that the Iraqi military should readopt a more open policy towards Sunni Arab 

communities. This meilns not only supporting the Silhwil but illso ending the collective punishment of 

such communities through economic blockades, excessive checkpointing, and blanket arrests. The 

Iraqi security forces need to return to neighborhood-level combat outposts and reintegrate into 

communities. Units need to ensure a reasonable degree of ethno-sectarian balance in their officers. 

These developments are all probably years away but a good start could be made relatively quickly if 

the Iraqi government decided to embrace the proven formula of population-focused counterinsurgency. As the world's premier practitioner of this approach, the us. military is uniquely qualified 

to build these techniques into its mJjor security assistance effort in IrJq, being that such tJctics are 

every bit ilS vitill ilnd demilnding ilS the tilsk of ilbsorbing U.S. equipment. 

In the sphere of propilgilndil AI-Qiledil in IrJq is deft ilt reminding Sunni Arilbs illl the reilsons why 

they fear Shiites, Kurds and the Iraqi government But AI-Qaeda itself could be highly vulnerable to 

attack by propaganda or Information Operations. As previously noted, the organization is almost hardwired to over-reJch in terms of geogruphic scope, ilmbition ilnd rivillry with locill Sunni ArJb 

community leaders. Though it has adopted a relatively restrained approach since 201 1 vis-a-VIs Iraqi 

Sunni ArJbs, the gloves are coming off as AI-QaedJ feels more secure in Iraq. In remote desert areas, 

AI-Qaeda in Iraq murders local community leaders and seeks once again to impose aspects of Shari'a 

law. In Syria we see the Islamic State of Iraq and AI-Shams (ISIS) operating in the same manner. The 

United Stiltes Ciln help Irilq to undertilke more effective Informiltion Operutions using stilte mediil ilnd 

U.s.-supported media such as AI-Hurra television. 

Sunni ArJb leilders in IrJq hilve reilcted to the resurgence of AI-Qiledil in WilyS thilt point to the 

beginnings of a new antl-AI-Qaeda effort, If the opportunity IS grJsped. Though such leaders could 

hilve stuck with the ilnti-government protests thilt were building momentum in Murch 2013, they 

12 For an introduction to these themes see Michael Knights, Rebuilding Iraqis Counterterrorism Capabilities, 

Policywatch 2112 (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 31, 2013), at 

http://vvvl/w.washingtoninstitute.om/poiicy-an<Jlysis/view/rebui!ding-irags-counterterrorism -CU Dr.! b i I ities 
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86007c-10.eps

have instead begun to draw closer to the Iraqi governrnent, in part because Prirne Minister Maliki has 

been eclipsed by a graver danger to the status of Sunni Arab leaders in Iraq. So frorn top to bottorn, 

there is a growing desire arnongst Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians and citizens to undercut AI-Qaeda In Iraq 

before It IS too late and the challenge becornes Insurrnountable. Arnerlca's role IS to continue uSing ItS 

considerable convening power to get Sunni Arab politicians around the table with Iraqi governrnent, 

highlighting the synergies in their views on the resurgence of AI-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Hard Counter-Terrorisrn: Kill and Capture 

Though I have argued that Iraq cannot kill its way out of this crisis, there is nonetheless a pressing 

need for "hard counter-terrorisrn" capabilities to kill and capture irreconcilable AI-Qaeda operatives. In 

counter-terrorisrn, the hilrd rniliturized edge of the process is itself broken down Into il set of subprocesses: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Develop (F3

EAD). These distinctions are quite useful 

in pinning down Irilq's weaknesses ilnd lruqi requirernents that the us governrnent is well-postured 

to fulfill. 

Find. This is a key problern for Iraq, with the governrnent having progressively gone "blind" in 

terrns of tirnely targeting diltil since US withdruwill begiln in 2009. One ilspect of the tilrget 

identification of AI-Qaeda is the Sahwa, who are the best rneans of constricting the operational 

security of AI-Qaeda in Iraq, particularly in cities and towns. In the rernote rural and border 

ureas, technicill intelligence becornes increilsingly vitill but the lruq governrnent suffers frorn il 

lack of wide-area surveillance systerns that draw together irnagery Intelligence and signals 

intelligence. Irilq illso needs help collecting financiill intelligence on so-called "threilt finilncing" 

- AI-Qaeda's rnoney flows. On all of these points there is a lot that can be done - and 

hopefully is already being done - to help Iraq to use the systerns it has, to fuse that data with 

US-provided diltil, ilnd to ilnillyze the diltil ilnd creilte tirnely turgeting options, which hils 

historically been a weakness in Iraq. The cost to the United States is twofold: the u.s. 

intelligence cornrnunlty has to open itself up again to an Iraqi intelligence cornrnunity that is 

penetrated to sorne extent by Iranian-backed agents of influence. (Though Iraqi protection of 

u.s. sensitive equiprnent seerns to have been relatively good, so far). And the US 

governrnent probilbly needs to ilccept il degree of risk in pressing the lruqi governrnent to 

accept and protect ern bedded US advisors at a range of lower level counter-terrorisrn hubs 

such as the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Regional Cornrnand Centres in key 

provinces like Anbilr, Bilbil, Diyillil, Kirkuk ilnd Nineveh. 

Fix and Rnish. One of the reasons that Prirne Minister Maliki carne to Washington DC with a 

strong request for Apache attack helicopters and arrned drones is the recognition that Iraq's 

counter-terrorlsrn forces cannot reach suspected terrorist locations with sufficient stealth, 

speed and striking force to kill or capture the targets. This IS particularly the case in rernote 

border ilnd desert ureils in Anbar and Nineveh province, ildjilcent to Syriil. There IS il lot the 

United States can do to support this effort, and this support does not necessarily hinge on 

handing over sensitive killing technologies (Apache, Predator/Reaper). Building up Iraqi 

helicopter ilssilult cilpilcity is vital. Ensuring thilt Irilq's urrned helicopters ilnd fixed-wing strike 
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86007c-11.eps

aircraft are used effectively by Iraqi control centres is another priority area. Keeping Iraq 

supplied with precise air-to-ground munitions like the Hellfire is worthwhile, particularly as 

collateral damage from these small munitions is minimized. But setting technology aside, the 

real opportunity for the United States IS to help Iraq expand and maintain the high-quality 

ISOF. The best way to do this is to help put Iraqi counter-terrorism on a sound legal footing 

with a law that establishes the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) as a ministry that is 

adequately funded and under parliamentary scrutiny, like all other ministries. The present 

quasi-official status of CTS deprives it of a budget of its own and limits personnel replacement 

to offset attrition. u.s. lobbying might help formalize CTS' role under the next government. 

Exploit, Analyze and Develop. One of the defining features of the "industrial-scale" counterterrorism undertaken by u.s. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Iraq was the rapid 

processing of intelligence through Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) of computers and cellphones plus the use of detainee-provided information and biometric and weapons 

intelligence. These inputs, usually derived minutes or hours after a raid, generated new arrest 

warrants on further suspects before news of the initial raids even reached the next level of the 

targeted network. Thus the onion of AI-Oaeda in Iraq was peeled faster than it could grow 

new layers. This is an area where the United States is uniquely qualified to build capacity in 

ISOF and other Iraqi forces. 

Conclusion 

This testimony has argued that the counter-terrorism situation in Iraq is still recoverable. We defeated 

AI-Oaeda in Iraq just five years ago, comprehensively dismantling their networks and propaganda 

campaigns. The United Stiltes Ciln help Irilq to do it ilgilin. The chililenge now is to understand what 

parts of the successful formula are still applicable, and which ones the u.s. can support in the postwithdrawal environment. 

It should be clear that Iraq cannot kill its way out of this crisis, though Baghdad may find this option an 

ililuring misconception. u.s. policy should ilim at guiding Irilq in the direction of holistic secturiiln 

reconciliation and the defeat of AI-Oaeda's narrative that Iraqi Sunni Arabs have no hope of 

acceptance or security in post-Saddam Iraq. Splitting the reconcilable Sunni Arabs from irreconcilable 

militilnts will require il number of strategic-level political steps to be completed. All hilve the ultimilte 

objective of making Sunni Arabs in Iraq feel less isolated and less desperate, and thus less susceptible 

to support AI-Oiledil pilsslvely or actively. The United Stiltes can provide reassurance to Irilq's Sunni 

Arabs by staying engaged in Iraq, treating Iraq as the high priority it should be, and paying attention to 

the country's political developments. The United States should continue to help Sunni Arab moderates 

like indicted Finilnce Minister Rilfi ill-Issilwi to re-enter politics. This creiltes il powerful symbol thilt 

progress is possible. Rebuilding the Sahwa is one plank of a new population-focused counterinsurgency in Iraq - possibly the most important one. 
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86007c-12.eps

In terms of specific security assistance, the United States should support counter-terrorism and judicial 

reforms in Iraq, as well as the Institutionalization of Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service as a line ministry. 

Capacity-building should be maintained and expanded through overt military-to-military ties and 

professional military education, plus covert Intelligence cooperation. U.s.-supported professional 

military education is a vital long-term effort, including Iraqi exchanges with the u.s. National Defense 

University, International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants, plus Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. Iraqi air-mobility and precision strike capabilities should be 

supported by the United States. Intelligence fusion, mission planning and Sensitive Site Exploitation 

(SSE) are areas where u.s. advisors should be engaged on the ground - assuming they are not 

already. 
116

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Byman? 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. BYMAN. Chairman Poe, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you very much for 

allowing me to testify today. 

My colleagues on this panel have handled the domestic situation 

in Iraq well. So, rather than repeat their points, let me focus on 

several of the regional aspects because al-Qaeda in Iraq both is and 

aspires to be a regional movement. 

The conflict raging next door in Syria has proven a huge boost 

to this organization. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was able to relocate part of 

its leadership and part of its cadre to Syria, both to support jihad 

there and also to enjoy the sanctuary that such chaos offers to arm 

and train and organize. Although Syria is often referred to as the 

new Iraq or the new Afghanistan regarding its role in aspiring 

jihadists, in reality, the situation is much worse. The data are 

scarce, but it appears that more foreigners from the West have 

come to Syria in a far shorter period of time than the numbers who 

travel to previous fields of jihad. These fighters in Syria are remarkably well networked with each other and with other jihadist 

causes, especially al-Qaeda in Iraq. Many others are developing relationships while they are in Syria. 

Unfortunately, a number of Arab states and movements, including a number of governments that are allied to the United States, 

share al-Qaeda in Iraq’s view that its fight against the Maliki government is similar to the Syrian Sunni community’s struggle 

against the Assad regime. Both rebels in the eyes of many Sunni 

Muslims are fighting an Iran-backed apostate regime that is brutalizing the Sunni community. 

These states and movements supporting Syrian rebels often use 

al-Qaeda in Iraq and western Iraqi tribes to transfer resources to 

Syria. Naturally, al-Qaeda in Iraq has kept some arms and money 

for itself. Even more important, it was able to convince many volunteers who intended to fight in Syria to stay in Iraq and fight on 

its behalf. 

A number of Sunni states, notably Saudi Arabia, see Iraq as part 

of a strategic competition with Iran. Riyadh fears that Teheran is 

bent on regional hegemony and sees Teheran’s gain of an ally in 

Iraq after 2003 as a huge shift in the regional balance. Undermining Iran’s ally in Iraq and ideally reversing Iran’s gains are motivating these states to support anti-regime forces there. 

As al-Qaeda in Iraq grows, the violence could spill over into the 

region outside Syria. Other states, especially Jordan, are targets 

for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Also, as the organization becomes stronger, its 

ability to strike Western targets outside the region, including in 

Europe but also in the United States, also grows. Unfortunately, 

since U.S. forces have departed Iraq, the United States has done 

its best to ignore the country. Hearings like this are rare moments 

when Iraq is given the attention it deserves. 

Although there are regular diplomatic contacts and I commend 

many administration officials for trying to push Iraq in the right 

117

direction, unfortunately, a deeper level of engagement is required 

if the United States is going to have any chance of dissuading the 

Maliki government from continuing its self-defeating policies, the 

ones that fuel the growth of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

But many of the keys to defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq lay outside 

Iraq. The United States needs to push allies, like Saudi Arabia and 

Kuwait, to stop using Iraq as a transfer point for financing and 

arming fighters in Syria. In addition, Washington should strongly 

discourage their perception that Iraq could be another front in rolling back Iran. Washington should also consider backing secular 

Syrian opposition forces more forcefully in order to ensure that 

jihadist organizations do not completely dominate the opposition in 

Syria as this cross-border relationship has tremendous benefits for 

al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Finally, and given the many problems that are to be expected 

with the Maliki regime, the United States should prepare for the 

problem to get worse. It should take steps to prepare for potential 

spillover from Iraq to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other neighbors as 

well as ensure its own counterterrorism capabilities. And authorities are robust. So the United States can act unilaterally if necessary. 

Thank you very much for this time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

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86007d-1.eps

The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq 

Prepared Testimony before the joint hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittee and the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee of the House Committee on 

F orei gn Affairs 

December 12, 2013 

Daniel Byman 

Professor, Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Foreign Service at Georgetown University 

Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution 

Chairmen Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished 

members of the subcommittees and staff, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a 

particular pleasure to testify in the company of such prominent witnesses, whose work on Iraq 

has shaped my thinking considerably. 

AI Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has seemingly returned from the dead.' On the verge of strategic 

defeat as US. forces departed Iraq, AQI has since regrouped into a large and growing force, 

contributing to the surge in violence in Iraq and the broader region. Although the neighboring 

conflict in Syria partially drives AQI's resurgence, the causes of the group's comeback are much 

deeper. Domestically, the weakness of the Iraqi state - and thus the ability of small, violent 

groups to operate with considerable freedom - has been a persistent problem since the fall of 

Saddam's regime. Politically, the government ofTraqi Prime MinisterNuri al-Maliki made 

progress in restoring faith in Iraq's institutions and establishing order in 2008-2009. However, in 

recent years he has focused on consolidating power and, in so doing, has alienated Iraq's Sunni 

Muslim community. Iraqi security services are now more brutal, more political, and less skilled 

than they were when US. forces departed Iraq in 2011. As the Sunnis became marginalized, 

AQI's popularity again grew. Iraq's neighbors contribute to the problem, sending money and 

volunteers directly to AQI or indirectly to the organization to support its role in the Syrian 

confEct. As the violence spreads, it has taken on its own dynamic. Iraqis trust the security 

services less, and more Sunnis support AQI for revenge or because of a perceived need for selfdefense from the Shi'a-dominated security services or associated militias. This in turn leads the 

I AQI chanj!cd ils mHllC [0 the Islamic Slate in Iraq in 2006 and to the Isbmic Stale ofIr<iq and al-Sh<:Hl1 (lhe laUer 

tenn meanmg greater Syna) m 20 I 1. The group's ney\.- name 1~ often abbrevIated as TSTS. Tn keeping \\lth the 

IJnglwge of this hearing, this paper \vill use AQI to refer to the group 
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86007d-2.eps

regime and the Shi 'a community to view the Sunnis with even more suspicion and in their eyes 

justifies greater regime repression. Unfortunately, none of these problems are abating, and 

several are getting worse. So AQI's power is likely to grow. 

The growing strength of AQI threatens both the United States and Iraq. The 

organization's attacks are destabilizing Traq and risk jeopardizing the oil flow from one of the 

world's largest exporters. Outside Iraq, the violence could potentially spill over into the region as 

AQI's ambitions include Syria and other states like Jordan. Other forms of spillover from Iraq 

such as refugee flows are also dangerous. As the organization becomes stronger, its ability to 

strike Western targets outside the region, including in Europe and the United States, grows. 

Since U.S. forces departed Iraq, the United States has done its best to ignore the country. 

Hearings like this one are rare moments when Iraq is given the attention it deserves. Although 

there are regular diplomatic contacts, the administration has not made Iraq stability a priority 

despite the country's strategic importance and the US. role in worsening a number of the 

country's problems. This must change. Deeper engagement is required if the United States is to 

have any chance of dissuading the Maliki government from continuing its self-defeating policies. 

Many of the keys to defeating AQT, however, lay outside Traq. The United States will need to 

push allies like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to stop using Iraq as a transfer point for financing and 

arming fighters in Syria. Tn addition, Washington should strongly discourage their perception 

that Iraq could be another front for rolling back Iran. Indeed, US and Iran both oppose AQI and 

could work together against it. Washington should also consider backing secular Syrian 

opposition groups more forcefully to ensure that jihadist organizations do not dominate the 

opposition, as this cross-border relationship has tremendous benefits for AQT. Finally, the United 

States must also prepare for the problem to get worse: it should take steps to mitigate potential 

spillover from Traq to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other neighbors as well as ensure its own 

counterterrorism capabilities and authorities are sufficiently robust so it can act unilaterally if 

necessary. 

The remainder of my testimony has three parts. First, I will explain the causes of AQI's 

resurgence and why the danger it poses is likely to worsen. Second, T assess the associated risks 

of AQI's rise, both in Iraq and in the broader region. Finally, I offer several policy 

recommendations for these subcommittees to consider. 

The Return of Al Qaeda in Iraq 

Only five years ago, AQT appeared on the verge of collapse Then-CTA Director Michael 

Hayden declared in 2008, "AI Qaeda is on the verge of a strategic defeat in Iraq" - an assessment 

backed by a plunge in the organization's attacks, a collapse in its ability to hold territory, and 

widespread criticism of the organization from within the broader Muslim world, including from 

many former jihadist supporters 2 

Five years later, the organization is back and, as the chart below indicates, civilian 

casualties in Iraq are again rising3 

2 "CIA Direclor Michael llayden Says AI Qaeda Is on 'Verge- of Defeal inlraq:' Fo'C News, May 30, 200~( 

hUp: /!w \\- \ '\ f()'\nl'w S.C( Irnistl)f\ l200::<;/OS/30':ci il-Ji rcd( If -In :cbac l-h <l\ den -:-;1.1 \, ~-al-qacda-i S-Ol [ -\·,,:rgc-dd'L'at -ill-iraq .I. 

Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, -'The Unraveling: AI-Qaeda's Revolt against Din Ladm," The .Nnt' Republic:. 

June 200g. 

3 Slatislics [rom l)oD/G-OIlPrcss 2003 - .hmc 2013 \vcrL' taken [rom thc Brookinl:{ s Iraq Indc:-... Figures [or JlLIyNoyemher \vere taken hom Umted NatlOlls m Traq. Stai1stlcs for Traq nody Count for 200J - May 20lJ \vere 

simllarly taken from Brooking's Iraq Index. Figures for June-November were taken from United Nations in Iraq. 

2 
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86007d-3.eps

35,000 

30,000 

25,000 

C 

1 

I 2(),OOO 

f 15,000 

U 

10,000 

5,000 

CIvilian Casualties In Iraq, 2003 • November 2013 

2003 2004 2005 2008 2007 2000 2009 20.10 20.11 2012 Jan -

Nov 

2013 Yea, 

Three points on AQT's return deserve particular emphasis. First, as the chart highlights, 

the death toll in Iraq is steadily increasing- even excluding the hundreds of deaths in December 

of this year already and the conservative methodologies used by the data compilers, 2013 is the 

worst year for civilian casualties since 2008. Government officials claim that there are now 

"upwards of 40 suicide bombers per month.,,4 Second, the scope of AQI activity has surgedsomething the chart does not reveal. AQI is doing more than just increasing the volume of its 

attacks. The group now strikes in parts ofTraq from which it had previously been eradicated, 

supports the rebellion in Syria, and conducts bold and operationally sophisticated raids on 

prisons to release its cadre.' Third and perhaps most importantly, AQI again uses insurgent 

tactics, such as holding territory in Iraq and Syria, in addition to terrorism. Although less 

dangerous than it was at the height of the Iraqi civil war, this shift represents a considerable 

grow1h in capabilities 6 

Incomplete state building is one root of the problem. Sad dam ruled largely by terror, and 

his regime was increasingly hollow by the time of its 2003 overthrow. After his fall, Iraq lacked 

institutions that could secure order, provide services, or otherwise fulfill basic government 

functions The Iraqi civil war worsened this problem, empowering militias, destroying what 

'1 Testimony by Brett McCi-urk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and lran, "u.s. Foreign Policy Ton'anllraq:-

Subcommittee on the Middle East and NOlih Africa_ Noyember 13_ 2013. 

\'aiLLahlc ~lLldy, sec "Al-Qacda in Iraq n:surgL'nt: The Breaking the \"Valls Campaign 1,'" 

institulejor the Suu{v q!War, Middle East Security Report 14, September 2013, 

http://Yi,'iyw.uncicrst[mdin€!,Yar.org/site:4dcf:luir/files!AOl-I<.ec;urg-cEt-J (;Se<'t ().pdf 

(, BC~1 Van Heuvdcn, ·'Nc:-..t door [0 Syria, an Al Vacda Linked Group Is Also Gaining Grollnd in Iraq," Washington 

Post, December 7, 20 [J, http://I,vy../""'iv.\Y3s1nngtonpost.com!world/mlddle _ eastlnext-door-to-~'Yna-an-al-qaeda-llnkedgroup-is-also-gaining-ground-in-iraql20 13/12/07/ca9dfd4a-5e 1 6-11 e3-bc56-c6ca9480 lfac _story.htlnl 

3 
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86007d-4.eps

remained of the economy, and further weakening faith in government and security forces. As 

Iraq pulled back from the brink, however, the Iraqi state began to reemerge. At the end of the last 

decade, the army, the police, and government performance all improved - though admittedly 

from a very low bar. The presence of U.S. forces and the associated high-level of engagement 

played an important role in these positive trends. 

Sectarianism also propels AQI's resurgence. In the waning days of the U.S. occupation, 

Iraq held elections that reduced the influence of warlords, and Maliki took action against Shi'a 

militants, apparently committing his government to oppose sectarianism. Since then, however, 

the Maliki government has tried to consolidate power and undermine rivals. Such consolidation 

made the regime increasingly insular, burning rather than building bridges with the Sunni 

community. Promises made to Sunnis who fought against AQI were not honored. Maliki has 

surrounded himselfwith trusted advisors from the Shi'a community and visibly excluded Iraq's 

Sunni Muslims from positions of influence He has politicized Iraq's security forces, making 

them an arm of the regime rather than of the Iraqi state. The security services often collude with 

Shi'a radicals in revenge attacks on Sunni Muslims, and Iraqi Sunnis perceive them as a hostile 

force. Even when they are not part of the problem, the Iraqi security forces are overworked, 

underpaid, and poorly led. Counterinsurgency methods that relied on excellent intelligence and 

winning over the community were abandoned in favor of indiscriminate methods that only 

further alienated Iraqi Sunnis. 7 The alienated population has proven more willing to support, or 

at least tolerate, AQI activities. 

AQI has flourished in this environment. Where once Iraqi Sunnis rej ected its extreme 

ideology and brutal behavior, it now poses as a defender of the Sunnis against the brutality of the 

regime. Those Sunnis who oppose AQI risk being painted as government tools or as willing to 

leave their coreligionists defenseless in the face of growing sectarianism. AQI again began to 

grow in size. Matt Olsen, who heads the National Counterterrorism Center, contends that AQI is 

stronger today than during its 2006 operational peakS 

Iraqi leaders often blame violence in Syria for AQI's resurgence. Indeed, this conflict has 

boosted AQI The collapse of order in Syrian provides a permissive environment for jihadists to 

arm, train, and organize. The fighting, meanwhile, has energized the broader Muslim world. 

Individuals and social organizations have provided arms, hundreds of millions of dollars, and 

thousands of volunteers to various Sunni rebel groups in Syria. Although Syria is often referred 

to as the "new Iraq" or "new Afghanistan" regarding its role in inspiringjihadists and bringing 

them to the battle, in reality it is much worse. Though data are scarce, it appears more foreigners 

from the West have come to Syria in a far shorter period of time than the numbers who traveled 

to previous fields ofjihad9 These fighters are remarkably well networked with other jihadist 

tor n;vic:ws of lhese: ups and dovm, sc:c in particular KCllndh Pollad.,., "lhe Fall and Rise <lnd Fall of lraq:-

Brookings Tmllllllion, July JO, 20 I J, .!llt.D.Ji·YnV..lU2rOokll]Zi.f.~1l1:f::i£illdr/pDl)Crs/2~) 13!Cl7/30-fall-ri:-;c-ralJ-ir.~..9.: 

pollack Michael Knights, "Iraq's Never-Ending Security Crisis," BBe News, October 3, 2013, 

http.J/\\'\\'W . \\' ashinglonillstitule. org/policy -analy SIS/\' ie\v/iraq s-never -ending -securil y -crisi 'j. <llld Michm:::l Knights_ 

"Yes, Iraq is Umaveling.-- Foreign Policy, May 15,2013. h:t')"/!W}\\y.~,ya3hin.gtoninstitl1te,Qr.gLQQli£::.: 

wmh S,S,\ ie\\/ves-il,W-is-uHriJ\ dill;;:. 

8-~:-ATQ~~-d-~-in-T~aq--St~~;~lg~-st-Si~~~~---2006.·· .'Issociated Press, NovL111hcr [4, 2013. 

http://www.usatoday.com/story /news/world/20 13/11 / 14/ shiites-iraq -bomb s-ashoural3 5 24 941 / 

Y Thomas T legghammer,'"lhe Number of Foreign Fighters from burope in Syria is llistorically Unprecedented,'" 

Tras!1;ngfon Post, NovLmhcr 27,2013, htlp://w\\ 'N.\VH::>hmlIlolT[H)si.c{)ln/bl()!!dlTlonh'vc[[Qel\;-[,/20 1 Ji [ ! /27 irj}JHtber-nf ... forClQJ1-fl..:htcrs ... from-ellrGj,c-ln-:-.yna-lS-hl~v)rJcaJlv -1f~Ce"lL~lltr.;d-who-shoulJ-bc:­

\YOITied! 

4 
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causes. Many have ties to AQI already, and many others are developing relationships after 

arriving in Syria. 

AQI also relocated part of its cadre to Syria, enjoying the sanctuary such chaos offers and 

perceiving the struggle there as part of its own broader fight against what it considers apostate 

regimes. Bashar al-Asad deliberately tolerated the creation of networks for sending fighters to 

Iraq to undermine the United States occupation of Iraq after 2003. Ironically, these same 

networks facilitated the flow of fighters (some AQI-affiliated) and arms back into Syria when 

order collapsed there. 

A number of Arab states and movements share AQI's view that its fight against the 

Maliki government is equivalent to the Syrian Sunni community's struggle against the Asad 

regime. Both rebels, in the eyes of many Sunni Muslims, are fighting an Iran-backed apostate 

regime that is brutalizing the Sunni community. Over time, this has created a self-fulfilling 

prophecy. As fighters flocked to Syria to defend their religious communities, it prompted others 

to do so as well: now Shi'a militias from Iraq, the Shi'a Hizballah in Lebanon, and an array of 

Sunni organizations cite each other's presence as proofofa grand regional conspiracy. These 

states and movements supporting Syrian rebels often use AQI and western Iraqi tribes to transfer 

resources to Syria. Naturally, AQI kept some arms and money for itself Even more important, it 

was able to convince many volunteers who intended to fight in Syria to stay in Iraq and fight on 

its behalf 10 

Putting sectarianism aside, a number of Sunni states, notably Saudi Arabia, perceive the 

Syria conflict - and by extension Iraq - as part of a strategic competition with Iran. Riyadh fears 

Tehran is bent on regional hegemony and sees Tehran's gain of an ally in Iraq after 2003 as a 

huge shift in the regional balance. Undermining Iran's ally, and ideally reversing Iran's gains in 

Iraq, motivate these states to support anti-regime forces in both Syria and Iraq. 

In addition to greater access to resources, the Syria conflict also restored AQI's 

credibility. Many jihadists who wanted to focus on the United States or more traditional targets 

had vehemently criticized AQI's sectarian bent and its killing ofSunni Muslims. The Syria 

conflict, however, changed this perception as fighters now mobilize along sectarian lines. 

Spreading throughout the country and broader region, the violence has taken on its own 

dynamic. With each attack, the credibility of Baghdad's Maliki regime declines and its perceived 

need to crack down harder increases. And with each reprisal or mass arrest, support or at least 

toleration of AQI grows. Now a self-perpetuating spiral, past violence drives future violence. 

There is little reason to be optimistic that this cycle of violence will break The Syrian 

war is not likely to abate, and indeed thejihadist role there continues to grow as overall levels of 

violence increase and neighbors continue to meddle. Maliki fears losing his power base in the 

Shi'a community more than alienating Sunnis, and he has resisted US. pressure to open up 

decision-making. The scheduled April 2014 parliamentary elections may even worsen this 

problem. Fear and sectarian rhetoric will probably be used to mobilize supporters, provoking 

hostile reactions from rival communities. In addition, the Maliki government's likely attempt to 

manipulate election results and shore up his base among Iraqi Shi'as may further alienate Sunni 

Muslims. As Sunni Muslims feel increasingly ostracized, such frustrations may translate into 

even broader popular support for AQI inside Iraq. 

The Dangers of a Resurgent AQI 

1<' McGurk, "u. S. F oreigll Policy Toward Iraq." 

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AQT, of course, poses a direct danger to the lives ofTraqis and the stability of the country. 

Its activities helped plunge Iraq into a brutal sectarian war that killed over 100,000 Iraqis 

between 2005 and 2007. Today's levels of violence are high, but the risk that they will grow 

dramatically and Iraq will see massive death tolls and refugee flows is painfully real. Putting 

aside the human cost, Traq is now one of the world's top oil exporters. Unlike several other 

leading producers, it is poised to increase production in the years to come." Increased violence 

potentially jeopardizes its exports. In addition, over 4,000 American soldiers died in Iraq, our 

country spent hundreds of billions of dollars there, and U.S. mistakes during the occupation 

contributed to the country's instability and civil war. Return to civil war or state failure would 

mean this sacrifice was in vain. 

AQI also may be more dangerous this time around because jihadist organizations have 

learned from past mistakes. Under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death at the 

hands of coalition forces in 2006, AQI alienated Iraq's Sunnis by its heavy-handed behavior, 

brutality toward Sunni civilians, and attempts to usurp traditional leaders. Tn Yemen and Syria, 

Al Qaeda affiliates have learned lessons from AQI's past problems and are working more 

hannoniously with local leaders - stances endorsed by the AI Qaeda core. Tn addition, these 

affiliates are providing limited social services in conquered areas, further boosting their 

popularity. Although US. forces killed Zarqawi and the AI Qaeda core was frustrated with 

AQI's sectarianism, it is unclear how much the group has taken its own past mistakes to heart. 

However, the changes by like-minded groups suggest AQT itself may be more careful this timen 

AQI is perhaps the most important Al Qaeda affiliate Indeed, not only has it been 

responsible for the deaths of thousands ofTraqis, it has sponsoredjihadist insurgents next door in 

Syria and played a significant role in bringing groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb into 

the AI Qaeda fold. Tndeed, in Syria it has even tried to establish itself as the dominant jihadist 

group there, leading to conflict with jihadist rivals like labhat al-Nusra. 

AQT's focus on Traq's Shi'a government and population was never in harmony with the 

Al Qaeda's core's focus on the United States and the West Now, however, AQI's sectarian 

focus has become the norm for many groups and extremists, and this agenda has broad support 

among many Sunni Muslims, enabling the group to improve fundraising and recruiting. 13 

Although cynics might say such a development has benefits for US security - when jihadists 

focus on the Shi' a, they are not focused on Americans - in the long-term this is 

counterproductive for US. interests. At minimum, the spread of sectarianism is potentially 

destabilizing to countries with significant Shi' a populations, like Bahrain, Kuwait, and Lebanon, 

as well as Traq. More broadly, sectarianism significantly catalyzes radicalization of both Shi'a 

and Sunni communities, thereby increasing the overall number of extremists and terrorists. 

Indeed, AQI-linked conflict is at the heart of the problem of spillover in the Middle 

East 14 What happens in Iraq does not stay in Iraq it has already helped infect Syria, and the 

11 -'Benoit l' aUCOll, Summer Said, and Sarah Kent, "OPEC Rift Emerging over Iraq Output," Wall Street Journal, 

November 29, 2013, http.!/ollline.w'jj.com/ne\-vs/articles/SB 1 000 1424052702303562904579227632634058104 

12 See Daniel Dym3n, "Breaking the Donds between al-Qa"ida and Its Affiliate Organizations.'- Brookings Analysis 

l)(1per no 27 (August 2(12), hllp.//viw\v.brookings.euu/resean.;h/papers/2012/07/ulqaida-lerrorism-bYlll<lll 

L< (i-cllcivc Ahuo, "The Nc\v Sectarianism: The Arah Uprisings amilhc Rehirth or the Shi 'a-Sull11i Divide" 

(Brookings, 2013), 

http://yV\\\V . brookings. edu/~/media/research/files/paper~/20 13/04/sunni%20shia%20abdo/sunni%20shia%20abdo. pd 

[ 

14 See Damel Dyman and Kenneth Pollack, Things Pall ,qparl: Containing 1he ,)/Jilloverjj'ol!1 an Jruqi Crvil War 

(Brookings, 2007) for my thoughts on this subject 

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furies unleashed by the conflict shape the politics of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other states. 

Sectarian conflict in particular ignites passions of their peoples, increasing tension and religious 

discrimination at home and inspiring some young men to become foreign fighters. These states 

become more fearful and more prone to dangerous interventions as a result. Some of the foreign 

fighters will die, but others will return and radicalize their own populations. 

Refugees can be a particularly dangerous form of spillover. The vast majority of refugees 

are victims of conflict, seeking only protection for themselves and their families. Some, 

however, use the refugee camps as bases, fueling the fight. In addition, militant forces often 

recruit from refugee camps, as unemployed young men with grudges to bear are often ideal 

recruits. Such militarized refugee communities can add fuel to the fire of existing conflicts and 

contribute to new conflicts in their host lands. 15 

The spillover may even go beyond the Middle East. These conflicts are magnets for 

foreign fighters, and hundreds have traveled to Syria to fight from the West - a cause of 

immense concern for America's European allies. Because many go through Iraq, and because 

still others work with groups in Syria like AQI that have links on both sides of the border, AQI's 

growth may pose an indirect terrorism threat to the United States and its European allies. 

Implications and Recommendations 

History haunts American perceptions about any future U.S. role in Iraq. Understandably 

most Americans would prefer to leave this country behind once and for all, but we must 

recognize that U.S. policy toward Iraq has failed to stabilize this critical country and has done 

little to dent the grow1h of AQI. Recognizing the unpopularity of any major U.S role in Iraq 

among the American people, there is still more that can be done. 

The United States' minimal level of engagement, rather than actual policies, hinders 

meaningful impact in Iraq. U.S. efforts to promote better relations between Iraqi Kurds and the 

central government, to push Maliki to refrain from discriminatory policies, to depoliticize and 

improve the security services, and to win over the Sunni community (and in particular former 

anti-AQI fighters) are well-intentioned and sensible. However, these are often implemented 

without engagement at the highest levels, diminishing their impact. 

Beyond increasing the overall level of U. S. engagement, Washington should consider 

several steps. First, the United States should ramp up efforts to aid the non-jihadist components 

of the Syrian opposition. Such steps are fraught with problems -- the fragmentation of the 

opposition, the risk of U.S arms being diverted, the conflicting agendas of U.S allies, and so on 

-- and may not dramatically shift the military balance in Syria. They are nonetheless worthwhile. 

By building up credible alternatives to the jihadists, the United States helps shrink their influence 

and control of territory. In addition, the direct risk to the United States remains low. This is 

valuable for the long-term in Syria, decreasing the odds of a radical regime coming to power or 

that terrorists would control significant swaths of territory. This has consequences not only for 

Syria but also for the country's neighbors, particularly Iraq. The two civil wars are intertwined, 

and reducing the int1uence ofjihadists in one conflict will reduce their int1uence in the other. 

Second, the United States must privately confront its Gulf allies over their support for 

jihadist movements. Much of this support is indirect and not done by regimes. However, these 

regimes tolerate their own citizens' activities in support of jihadists in Syria, ranging from 

15 See Sarah T.lscher. "Collateral Damage: Humamtanan ASSIstance as a Cause of ConflIct,.' Inlernafional .. r..,'ecuril.v, 

28.1 (2003) 79-109 

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rhetorical support to financial backing and the recruitment of foreign volunteers.!6 In the longterm, the growth of sectarianism and the generation of more jihadists is detrimental to our allies' 

security as well as our own. In addition to reducing the power of radicals in Syria, having fewer 

resources transit Iraq would reduce AQI's ability to siphon off support for the Syrian jihad. 

Washington should particularly emphasize that Gulf allies should not try to encourage a "second 

front" against Iran by undermining the Maliki government 

Ironically, the United States may have an ally in Iran for some of its actions. Both 

countries have an interest in opposing Sunni radicalism in the Middle East and Iran, like the 

United States, has a strong interest in Iraqi stability. Should nuclear talks with Iran progress, 

Washington should encourage Tehran to use its influence on Maliki to push him to act 

responsibly. 

The United States must also prepare for the likelihood that the above or other positive 

measures will only achieve limited success or even fail completely. Above all, Washington 

should prepare for AQI's continued growth. As such, the United States military should develop 

different overt and covert packages of counterinsurgency assistance for the government of Iraq --

the levels varying by how willing the Maliki government is to make changes and according to 

the level of threat AQI is perceived to pose.17 Despite the public's ovenvhelming distaste for 

greater involvement in Iraq, the United States may need to playa stronger role, assisting the Iraqi 

government in order to protect US. interests. 

Simultaneously, the United States should prepare for spillover from Iraq. In Iraq during 

the height of the civil war and in Syria since 2011, the scale of the humanitarian tragedy and the 

spread of violence across borders caught the United States off guard. Given the steady escalation 

of this conflict and recent experience in region, there is no excuse for not preparing for another 

round of spillover from Iraq. The United States should try to coordinate Iraqi neighbors to 

prepare for refugee flows, establish contingency plans for cross-border terrorism, and try to stifle 

neighboring state interventions that would only perpetuate conflict 

Finally, the United States should ensure it has the capabilities and authorities to intervene 

unilaterally against terrorist bases in Iraq. To be clear, the ideal approach is that the Iraqi 

government acts on its own. And, in most cases, the terrorists there are focused on the Iraqi and 

Syrian governments and thus pose no immediate threat to the US homeland. But the Iraqi 

government remains weak and often exacerbates the problem, while the risk of AQI to 

Americans and US interests outside Iraq is growing. The United States must ensure it has the 

necessary intelligence and basing infrastructure should direct strikes be necessary. More broadly, 

Congress should pass a new version of the post-91l1 Authorization for Use of Military Force 

(ALlMF) legislation in order to ensure the authority for robust action. 

**************************** 

The mistakes and costs of past US. involvement and the current frustrations with the 

Maliki government are not a reason to completely abandon Iraq. An effective response will 

16 Elizabeth Dickinsoll_ "Playing \yith fire: Vilhy Private Gulf financing for Syria's Extremist Rebels Risks 19l1lting 

Sectm-iun Conl1ict at IIome," Saban Analysis Puper. December 6, 2013. 

http://\\' \\'\-\' . hrookings. cdu/rcscarch/papcrs!20 131 [ 2106-pri v atL:- gLLi f-financi 11 g -sy ri a -c\.LrC111 1st -rchd s-scctariancontliet -dickinson 

l' Earlier tlllS year the United States repol1edly stepped up its covert SUppOl1 for Iraqi countelienorism units, 

vl/orling throlLgh the CIA. AJam Entous_ JlLlian E. BanK'S and SiobluU1 Gorman, "CIA Ramps Up Role in Iraq;' The 

Wall ,,,'freef JOlimaI, March 11,2013. 

http://od:nc.YI:-;i com/ne\Ys/miiclcsiSBl OOG 14241278873247353045783545G 195450 1502. 

8 
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require higher-level engagement with Iraq and more involvement with our regional allies, both of 

which are difficult. The alternative, however, is that terrorism in and emanating from Iraq grows 

in the years to come. 

9 
127

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will yield 5 minutes 

to the chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee, Ms. RosLehtinen, from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are a Texas gentleman. Thank you. But 

then I repeat myself. Thank you. I have caught my breath. So 

thank you so much. 

Well, as the hearing is entitled, as you know, there is a resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. And that has not been the narrative 

from the administration. And, in fact, we hear little about how the 

administration plans on fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq and throughout 

the region. Do you believe that the administration has underestimated the growth, the capacity, the reach of al-Qaeda and its affiliates? And why has it been reluctant, if you agree or not agree, to 

admit that the scope of the danger is far larger than we thought, 

that we’re facing an al-Qaeda that is stronger? 

On Syria, we know that the Syrian conflict has played a role in 

the increase of violence in Iraq, but it is clearly not the driving 

force behind the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq. 

However, with the Iraqi Government’s inability to secure the areas 

around the Syrian border and the instability in Syria seemingly 

unending, we may see al-Qaeda able to establish a safe haven 

across both countries. What steps should we take to combat the 

AQI threat to ensure that they don’t establish a safe haven in the 

Iraq-Syria border? And to what extent has Maliki’s inability to govern in an inclusive way without catering to a sectarian agenda 

helped to create this environment in Iraq that has allowed alQaeda to make these gains? 

Now we have got upcoming elections in Iraq next year. And 

many of us are concerned with the current instability, the distrust 

between the different political groups and religious groups. There 

is a lack of political will to overcome these differences, that these 

elections may bring Iraq to an all-out civil war. 

Are these elections going to be a calming influence, a bringing together, or is it going to be a problem? What can we do to support 

Iraq in this troublesome period? What measures can we take to 

help ensure that these elections will be free and fair and transparent and will result in a peaceful and constructive effort that can 

create an inclusive government, which is what we want, willing 

and capable of maintaining stability and the rule of law in Iraq? 

And we know that Iran’s influence has grown with Maliki. We 

have done so much to try to make that divorce happen, but we 

haven’t seen from the administration any tangible results. 

What leverage do we have left with Maliki when it comes to 

Iran? That is a whole lot of stuff. 

Ms. LEWIS. Madam Chairwoman, I would like to tackle what I 

took away as 3 questions. The first, did we underestimate alQaeda’s resurgence? While we are talking about this topic, there is 

still a narrative that perhaps al-Qaeda has been defeated. 

And I think for me, the principal question is, what is the relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda core? And what 

does that tell us about what will happen to the broader al-Qaeda 

network if al-Qaeda in Iraq becomes stronger in Iraq as well as in 

Syria? And I think that over the course of this discussion, we have 

framed very well that 1 of the principal concerns that connects all 

128

of these things is the draw of foreign fighters globally to the fight, 

which al-Qaeda in Iraq is leading in Syria as well as Iraq. So yes, 

I think that it does make the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And the foreign fighters has been—okay. 

So 1 minute. Have at it, Dr. Byman. 

Mr. BYMAN. I think the reasons why the administration has 

downplayed this to me are relatively clear. I would emphasize 2. 

One is the answers are very, very difficult in terms of actual solutions. U.S. influence is present but limited. And many of the things 

we may try may not work. But, more important, I think there is 

very little domestic support for a strong re-engagement with Iraq. 

And the administration is sensitive, even though that is what is 

necessary if we are going to fix things. It requires taking action in 

Iraq. It requires taking action in Syria. And I think the administration is sensitive to the lack of American public support for that. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. I will tackle 2 points. Back in late 2010, early 

2011, it was extremely difficult to get anyone to take the beginning 

of the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq seriously. And that is the opportunity that we missed here with the administration. At that 

point, nobody wanted to accept that Iraq was not in a fit state to 

handle——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I am out of time. I apologize. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Ranking Member? The Chair will yield 5 minutes to the 

ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

One of the things I learned from this hearing and a host of other 

hearings in this room is that we have to resist the Pentagon’s desire to pivot toward Asia. Given all of the complexities and difficulties of dealing with the Middle East, I can understand why our 

generals weaned on the World War II movies that we all enjoy. 

Living through the great success we had in the Cold War and military confrontation with the Soviet Union long for a conventional, 

uniformed foe and would it be the case that we had this whole Middle East thing all handled and it was time to worry about whether 

Japan got to control a couple of uninhabited rocks in the East 

China Sea. 

The gentleman from Illinois I agree with in part when he says 

it is a bad thing when America retreats, but I would say when 

America gets hoodwinked into fighting and dying for Iran’s allies, 

that is not necessarily a good thing. 

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we foolishly and prematurely 

turned the government over to native governments that were certainly not pro-American. We contrast this to how we not only won 

the war but won the peace in World War II. We did not transfer 

power in Tokyo. We did not transfer power to Bonn until certainly 

the countries were completely pacified. And, second, the government taking over was undoubtedly pro-America. 

I slightly disagree with Dr. Pollack when he says we have got to 

have fairness for the Sunnis or we are going to have continued unrest. I have chanted in the past, ‘‘No justice, no peace,’’ but the fact 

129

is that Saddam demonstrated that 1 community can effectively 

dominate in Iraq and not necessarily a good thing. 

My first question for whoever on the panel can answer it is, how 

much of our money does Maliki get now? How much is he asking 

for? And when I say, ‘‘our money,’’ I mean free food, free weapons, 

military aid, civilian aid. Does anybody happen to have those numbers? 

[No response.] 

Mr. SHERMAN. No one does, but I know our staff will get those 

and supplement the record. I would point out that—and I don’t 

know if anyone has the answer to this question. And that is, is Iraq 

producing all the oil it can or just all the oil it is allowed to under 

the OPEC cartel agreement? Dr. Knights? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Iraq is producing as much oil as it can at the moment. The main restraint on it is the export infrastructure and 

water injection and so on, technical details basically. But they 

should iron a number of those out in the first quarter of next year. 

And then they could be very significantly increasing the amount of 

oil that they produce. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Will they bump up against the OPEC quota? And 

do they plan to produce more than that quota when it is technically 

capable? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. For the moment, they want to produce more than 

that quota until they feel that they have rebuilt the country from 

its decades of disaster. And they will also bump up against the Iranian wish to also come back on the market hopefully from their 

perspective. So we could see a little bit of Iran-Iraq friction. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Lewis or anyone else who has any question. 

You have got Maliki saying, ‘‘Hey, I don’t want thugs and weapons 

flying over my country to kill innocent people in Syria, but I can’t 

control my airspace.’’ Is that true? Does he have not a single operational aircraft? 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Ranking Member, shortly I would have to go 

back and research who does have rotary wing aircraft. I would 

defer to other subject matter experts on the panel if I am missing——

Mr. SHERMAN. Because these Iranian planes, they are like 707s 

from the ’80s, the ’70s. 

Mr. POLLACK. They have no fixed-wing air defenses, fixed-wing 

aircraft. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They have no fixed-wing——

Mr. POLLACK. They could take them down, correct. They do not. 

They are trying to get them as fast as they can. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But there is not a single operational——

Mr. POLLACK. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Rotary propeller, nothing? 

Mr. POLLACK. Rotary they have, but they do not have fighters 

that could actually shoot down jets. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Even the kind of plane that my parents were flying to Europe on in the ’50s. 

Mr. POLLACK. a helicopter would have a hard time getting——

Mr. SHERMAN. When you say, ‘‘rotary,’’ you mean yes, okay. You 

don’t mean propeller. You mean helicopter. 

Mr. POLLACK. I mean helicopter. 

130

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. Helicopter probably doesn’t shoot down a jet. 

I will just point out that they could, of course, invite the United 

States to patrol their airspace. 

And I don’t know if Dr. Knights has a comment. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Just a very quick one, which is that the Iraqis had 

no problem whatsoever closing their airspace to the Turkish Energy Minister just over a week ago. So it is really about political 

will, not whether they can shoot something down. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Where was the Turkish Energy Minister going? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. He was flying into the Kurdish north of Iraq to attend the oil conference. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. 

I want to follow up on some of your comments earlier. When I 

was in Iraq a couple of years, year and a half ago, prime minister—

I asked him the question about the oil and how about paying for 

some of this nation building, military, all the things America is 

doing. And he literally was very vocal about Iraq would not pay the 

United States a dime for helping them liberate their country and 

rebuild their country. So I think that might still be his position. 

I would like to look at this a little bit bigger. No question about 

al-Qaeda is back in Iraq. Maliki, the government, are they playing 

both sides? Are they wanting the United States to help them to defeat al-Qaeda, which is on the rise, no question about it, so that 

we can do their work for them so they can pivot toward Iran and 

Iran come in and Iraq be a new coalition, so to speak, and the 

United States is still the bad guy in the neighborhood? 

I would like your opinion on that. I fear this possibility. So I 

would like to know what you experts think about that. 

Mr. POLLACK. Mr. Chairman, if I could offer some thoughts on 

that matter? It is certainly the case that the Iraqi Government 

would like our help dealing with al-Qaeda. I think that if we offered to take care of al-Qaeda for them, they would be more than 

glad for that. 

It is also the case that Iran wields a great deal of influence in 

Iraq, largely because we have abdicated our influence in the country and Iran has lots of different ways to do so. 

That said, I think it important that in my own experience, both 

watching Iraq and also my own interactions with Prime Minister 

Maliki, I do not believe that this is a man who is an eager ally of 

Iran. In fact, my experience with him is he really dislikes the Iranians. He is very afraid of the Iranians. He is very much an Iraqi 

nationalist. He would like to separate himself from the Iranians if 

he could, but since there is nobody really pushing on the other side, 

he doesn’t feel like he has got a whole lot of help. 

And I also want to be clear he makes a lot of mistakes himself. 

He overreacts. He goes after his internal rivals in an undemocratic 

fashion that has alienated both his internal rivals and their external supporters. And it has left him with little choice but to turn 

to Iran. 

Mr. POE. Anybody else want to weigh in on that with—just briefly, Ms. Lewis? 

131

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I would agree. I think we should consider the possibility that Maliki’s fear of al-Qaeda is driving him 

closer to Iran as we craft what we might do about it. 

Mr. POE. So do you see the scenario that I mentioned as something that we should be concerned about that he is pivoting to 

Iran, wants us to get rid of al-Qaeda with him and then he is 

buddy buddy with Iran? Is that something that we should be concerned about, the United States——

Mr. BYMAN. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. POE [continuing]. Or not? 

Mr. BYMAN. Excuse me. 

Mr. POE. Go ahead, Dr. Byman. 

Mr. BYMAN. Mr. Chairman, we should absolutely be concerned 

about it, but the recognition is what he wants is a high degree of 

independence and autonomy to do what he wants. And right now 

Iran is the dominant power in Iraq. And he can’t do that. We need 

to have our own presence there. And that is an economic presence. 

That is a political presence and a security presence. And then he 

will try to play us off. 

He is a cynical politician. He is ruthless. He is conniving. But 

right now he has to work with the Iranians because he has no 

choice. We need to give him some other options in order for this 

to even be a possibility. 

Mr. POE. All right. The United States is at a point here where—

we all know where we are as far as U.S. involvement. To defeat 

al-Qaeda in Iraq and be an influence in Iraq, are we just there to 

stay? I mean, are we there—is Iraq going to become the 51st state? 

Are we just going to be there forever? 

People I think are concerned, like a lot of Americans, about all 

the money that has gone to Iraq, all those things. So al-Qaeda is 

the problem. We are saying we are going to help them. How long 

is this going to take? Dr. Byman, look into your crystal ball. Help 

us out with this. 

Mr. BYMAN. Sir, I don’t think there is any chance that we are 

going to go in big to Iraq. So the question to me is, are we able 

to restore some influence? Part of that is through arms sales. Part 

of that is through renegotiating diplomatic agreements. Part of it 

is through covert action, intelligence cooperation. We can get something, sir. 

Mr. POE. Does Iraq have the money to buy our equipment or do 

we need to continue just to give it to them? 

Mr. BYMAN. Iraq increasingly has the money, but we want them 

to have our equipment. That is a good thing for us as well as for 

them. 

Mr. POE. All right. Dr. Knights, last comment on this question. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Yes. Iraq is economically not a Bahrain or a 

Yemen or a Jordan, requiring the same kind of military assistance 

to buy our stuff, but they are not a Saudi or a UAE yet either. The 

country is totally wrecked. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you very much. 

The Chair will yield 5 minutes to Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. I welcome the panel. 

132

The chair has circulated a bar chart showing the upsurge in violence in Iraq. Dr. Byman, to what would you attribute this really 

quite stunning increase in the number of civilian deaths in Iraq? 

Mr. BYMAN. Sir, I would say in the big picture, 2 things. One is 

a set of rather disastrous mistakes by the Maliki government ranging from very bad counterinsurgency to politically excluding the 

Sunni community and making them look to al-Qaeda in Iraq as a 

defender. And externally I would say the Syrian conflict has fueled 

radicalism throughout the region and put resources into this area 

in a very dangerous way. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, Dr. Knights, I saw you and Dr. Pollack 

shaking your heads and you, Ms. Lewis. Anything you want to add 

to that? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. From my perspective, I think all those points are 

right: The Iraqi Government policy poor counterinsurgency tactics, 

the Syrian crisis back to back with this one, and the 4th thing, that 

they alienated the United States at the precise moment of withdrawal, preventing a really close intimate intelligence relationships 

but forming. Now we have another chance to start that again after 

Maliki’s visit. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr.—I am sorry if you wanted to comment? 

Ms. LEWIS. Well, Congressman, just very quickly to provide the 

tactical observation that most of those deaths occurred because of 

al-Qaeda’s car bomb campaign, which is actually a very small component of the al-Qaeda broader military organization and can actually be targeted effectively by Iraqi security forces if they could figure out how to do it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. POLLACK. Congressman, just to build on the points by my 

colleagues earlier, in 2007, the United States helped forge a powersharing arrangement, a new power-sharing arrangement, among 

the different communities of Iraq. Unfortunately, since our departure, Prime Minister Maliki but also with some help from his opposition has torn that agreement apart. And that has led to once 

again a resurgence of fear across Iraq, which has pushed the Sunni 

community back into the arms of al-Qaeda, in many cases very 

unwillingly because they remember what it was like in 2006–2007. 

And so they have gone grudgingly. And that at least opens up the 

possibility that we could help the Iraqis once again put that powersharing agreement back together, which I think would go a very 

long way to dealing with the problems. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is very interesting because there is the political aspect of this that has real consequences. 

Mr. POLLACK. Correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But there is also—and I think, Ms. Lewis, you 

were alluding to it. And I would be interested in comments. What 

is the—I mean, we have helped create a security force of 800,000 

in Iraq. What are we getting for that relationship, that investment? 

Are they capable of deterring long-term the threat that is posed by 

al-Qaeda? Dr. Byman? 

Mr. BYMAN. Currently sir, I would say no. I would say that, despite their numbers, despite their fire power, they are pursuing a 

doctrine of, I will say, suppression, rather than counterinsurgency. 

They are going into villages. And they are often systematically arVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:00 Jan 29, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\121213\86007 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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resting or abusing young males. They are not trying to use intelligence to find out who the bad guys are. 

And, to go a little bit further, sir, I would say that this is a problem pushing resources to them right now, which is that they will 

use them in the wrong way. And we need to have a training program that goes along with any arming program. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Which we need to keep in mind given pending requests by Mr. Maliki on his visit. 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One final—I am probably going to get in only 1 

more final question. We were talking about Iran, but I think it is 

really important for an American audience not to conflate Iran 

with al-Qaeda. 

Iran has no love and the Iranian leadership has no love for alQaeda. As a matter of fact, they do view them as a terrorist threat. 

Do they not, Dr. Pollack? 

Mr. POLLACK. Absolutely. The Iranians see al-Qaeda and other 

Salafist groups as very important adversaries. At times, they have 

made tacit arrangements with them. But, by and large, they fight 

them very hard all across the region. And I think that they are 

quite concerned about the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

But what has been interesting is that the Iranians have been 

among those who have been urging restraint on various Iraqi 

groups because they are afraid that this resurgence in violence will 

push Iraq into civil war, something that they don’t want to see either. It is one of these strange areas where our interests and Iran’s 

are at least in confluence. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chair would allow the rest of the panel just 

to comment on that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. POE. You may. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. I think there has been quite a lot of tactical cooperation between the Iranians over the years but ultimately agree 

with Dr. Pollack that they are not aligned strategically. 

Mr. BYMAN. Sir, there is a tremendous anger, both among Bohra 

Shia populations, Bohra Sunni populations, toward each other. And 

the sectarianism of the civil war, the horrific images that are circulated on social media have made it hard for open and closed cooperation and, in fact, have pushed both sides farther apart. 

We saw last month the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon. And it is still a bit murky who was behind it, but the leading 

suspects seem to be Sunni jihadists of the sort linked to al-Qaeda. 

This is a very bad relationship, even though there is tactical cooperation. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Lewis? 

Ms. LEWIS. Congressman, I would just add that I do agree that 

al-Qaeda does represent a huge threat to Iran; in fact, a more direct and immediately proximate one than perhaps we may interpret, and that that should be an opportunity that we consider 

among our levers and relationships with all the countries in the region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the panel. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

134

Mr. POE. The question was asked earlier about assistance to 

Iraq. Staff has provided these figures for the panel and members: 

2011, $1.2 billion; 2012, $300 million; 2013, $142 million. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois,——

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr.——

Mr. POE [continuing]. Iraqi veteran. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, to the panel, thank you for being here. This is—I forget who mentioned it earlier, but it is tragic in my mind that Iraq 

is not discussed more here. I am not going to blame anybody for 

that because I don’t think it is anybody’s fault. I think it is just 

a matter of—you know, it is not in people’s consciousness. I think, 

frankly, Afghanistan is not discussed enough. I think there are too 

many people that think that we still have 100,000 troops in Afghanistan that are taking the fight to the Taliban and unaware of 

the fact that the Afghan Government has actually begun to really 

stand up. 

I want to say—I mentioned this in my opening statement how 

sad it is. I remember I was in Iraq in 2008, after the surge had 

begun. And, you know, you still saw. I flew ISR. So I still saw that 

people were stuck in their homes. They weren’t out walking 

around. 

And then when I went in 2009, a striking thing happened. We 

saw kids out playing soccer. We saw people visiting stores. And 

there was really a feeling that we had turned the corner in Iraq. 

And it was a good feeling. 

And, again, my concern has been that we took that potential victory and we turned it into a complete failure because we decided 

that it wasn’t worth the political points and the political cost. I believe a promise was made in an election to get out of Iraq. And that 

meant we are going to get out and not push hard for a status of 

forces agreement. 

I agree with the chairman in his concern about nation building. 

I do want to point out, however, though, thousands of Americans 

gave their lives on behalf of the Iraqi people. Lots of money was 

given on behalf of the Iraqi people. And at the end of the day, I 

would love to see a successful conclusion in Iraq so in 10 years, we 

can look back and say, ‘‘Maybe we went through a difficult period 

here, but good things happened in the very end.’’

Ms. Lewis, you have produced some outstanding reports regarding this topic. You have been very helpful and insightful in regards 

to the current status of al-Qaeda in Iraq and how the violence has 

reached levels that we haven’t seen since 2008. In light of that fact 

that AQI has established and named specific campaigns, carried 

out a high amount of targeted VBIED attacks, do you believe that 

al-Qaeda, AQI, is more organized, better trained, and equipped 

than ever before? 

Ms. LEWIS. Congressman, I think they are tremendously well-organized, as we have mentioned, largely because of prison breaks 

that have been successful. There are al-Qaeda veterans in the field 

now. And I do think, particularly since September of last year, 

there is a tremendous amount of military wherewithal that is applied to their operations. I think they are leveraging old weapons 

systems that they used before and that they are maximizing the efVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:00 Jan 29, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\121213\86007 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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fects of these car bombs specifically and that if that capability were 

to go away, they would be overall much weaker. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Yes. And we don’t have the threat of American 

troops. And so it gives them kind of a freedom to breathe and operate and plan and coordinate. 

Let me ask the panel. Then I will yield back when I am done 

asking the panel. We will start with you, Dr. Pollack. Can you explain to the American people, explain to us how the threat of alQaeda in Iraq actually is a threat to the American homeland? 

Mr. POLLACK. Sure. I will start by saying that there is obviously 

a direct threat in that al-Qaeda has attacked the American homeland. It is one of the very few groups or nations that has been able 

to do so successfully. What we have learned from Afghanistan is 

that if we allow them to recruit and build up a base, they will bring 

the war to us if and where they can. 

Beyond that, though, we should also keep in mind another point 

that you were getting at, Congressman, which is they were trying 

very hard to create a civil war in Iraq. That is their goal. They 

want a civil war in Iraq. If they create a civil war in Iraq, it is likely to affect Iraq’s oil exports. Iraq is now the second largest producer in OPEC. Much of the expectation of future production in the 

world is going to come from Iraq. That will hurt oil prices globally. 

And that will affect the American economy. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

I will just ask Dr. Knights and Dr. Byman if you don’t mind answering that briefly: The threat to the homeland. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. So just a brief one. We saw with al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula in Yemen that once an al-Qaeda franchise gets 

to a certain level of ambition and size, sometimes it turns toward 

homeland attacks against the U.S. There is a lot of rivalry between 

al-Qaeda and Iraq and rival groups in Syria like Jabhat al-Nusra. 

If you want to raise your profile and be the clear leader, one way 

to do that is to attack the U.S. homeland. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Dr. Byman? 

Mr. BYMAN. I would agree with that and simply add this is an 

organization that poses not only a threat to the homeland but to 

U.S. interests more broadly. And that includes interests in Iraq but 

includes interests in the region. A number of the states are close 

U.S. allies. And it is an enemy of all of them. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

And, just in my brief 10 seconds left, I just want to say to folks 

that are watching this hearing, that is the importance of what we 

are talking about. This isn’t just about wanting to say we won in 

Iraq. This is about protecting the homeland, protecting America, 

and looking back in 10 or 20 years without regrets and not looking 

back and saying that we had an opportunity and we completely 

failed. 

So thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman for his excellent questions. The 

Chair will recognize the gentleman, Mr. Schneider, from Illinois for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, again, thank you to 

the witnesses for being here. 

136

Dr. Pollack, you talked about the goal of al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI, 

being a civil war in Iraq. We have seen this great increase in the 

numbers of civilian deaths. And I have spoken with some of the 

representatives from Iraq. That has not yet turned to sectarian violence. With all of the attacks, you haven’t seen neighbors attacking 

neighbors. 

What do you see—and I will open it to the whole panel. What 

do you see as the reasons why the sectarian violence this time 

around hasn’t gone up commensurate with the terrorism? And 

what are the things we should be watching for to be prepared if 

it does start to turn? 

Mr. POLLACK. Congressman, I think this is an absolutely critical 

question because you are right. These levels of violence could easily 

have pushed the country into civil war already. 

I would identify 3 critical forces of restraint in Iraq, all of which 

have been important but none of which may be permanent, the 

first of which I have already mentioned is the Iranians. For their 

own reasons, they don’t want a civil war in Iraq. They have got a 

civil war in Syria that is consuming them enough. They don’t want 

a second one, especially one closer to home. 

A second one is the Kurds. At different points in time, the Kurds 

have played a more constructive or less constructive role. For now 

and for the past year or so, what we have seen is a Kurdish decision that creating problems in Iraq is problematic for them. And 

they have actually taken a number of important steps to help mollify the violence and to reach out to the government, which has 

been very important. 

And then the last one is that both sides, Sunni and Shia, are 

concerned that if there is a future civil war, they may not win. And 

that is another calculation, I think a critical calculation, which is 

true at this moment, but it may not last. The Sunnis believe that 

they have the help from the wider Sunni world, but they don’t 

know what that means. 

And for the Shia, they know they have got the numbers in Iraq, 

but the Iraqi security forces have performed fairly badly in recent 

months. I think there is great concern on the part of the government about what would happen and how well they would perform 

if there were a larger war. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Lewis, do you want to? 

Ms. LEWIS. Congressman, 2 things I would add quickly are that 

among the car bombs I tracked this past year, 19 of them targeted 

Shia mosques and that this can have a very incendiary effect. 

As well, the majority of those car bombs targeted Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad repeatedly and aggressively. And at some point, 

I am concerned that someone is going to step up to defend those 

neighborhoods. And this is the space that we are talking about that 

to me is actually very small between potential energy for sectarian 

violence and that possibly becoming virulent. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Knights? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. We do see the beginnings of sectarian retaliation 

at very low levels, corpses with letters attached to them explaining 

exactly why they were killed in retaliation, but we are still down 

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ing the height of the civil war. That is because most people have 

not got involved again back into the fighting. 

I put it down to 2 more local reasons: Conflict fatigue. People 

know what a civil war looks like, and they are not sure they would 

win it. Everyone knows they lose from it. And, secondly, the Shia 

now know that the Iraqi security forces retaliate on their behalf. 

So there is a large Shiite militia out there attacking Sunnis, and 

it is called the security forces. 

Mr. BYMAN. Sir, very briefly, I believe we are in a situation akin 

to Syria in early 2012, where we are seeing violence and we are 

seeing it growing and we are seeing a sectarian hue again. And my 

concern is that if you were to have hearings a year from now, a 

year and a half from now, we would be talking about the second 

sectarian civil war raging in the Middle East. 

I think all the trend lines are negative. And the points that my 

colleagues have raised about what is holding us in check I think 

are well-taken, but I am concerned that the direction is very much 

the wrong way. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The fact that this has been growing for so long 

and that it hasn’t gone to sectarian violence, however, I think gives 

us some space to work in. Dr. Pollack, how do we use that space 

to work to make sure that it doesn’t degrade into another conflict, 

like what we are seeing in Syria? 

Mr. POLLACK. Yes. Another great question. And here I would 

focus, Congressman, on these impending elections, which are going 

to be very important for Iraq, which could either push Iraq conceivably into civil war or help pull it back. And there I think the U.S. 

has an important role. First, focus on the process. One of the great 

mistakes that we made in 2010 was that even though we were the 

guarantors and the builders of Iraqi democracy, we didn’t enforce 

the rules of the road. And things came off the tracks. And Iraq 

went in a bad direction. 

A second one, conditionality, which we have been talking about, 

we need to make clear to our—to the Iraqis that our aid is ultimately predicated on their good behavior following the rules and 

then, finally, a willingness to name and shame. The United States 

carries a great weight in Iraq and in the region. And simply standing up and saying that so and so is behaving in a way that subverts Iraqi democracy is a very powerful tool. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. And, with that, I am going to have to give 

you the last word as votes have been called and we have to go. 

Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

As the gentleman mentioned, we are in the middle of some votes. 

That is one of the things that we are supposed to do as Members 

of Congress, to let our voice be known. And so we would be in recess until 2:45. I thank you, all 4 of you, for your patience. We will 

start back at 2:45. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. POE. The committee will come back to order. There are some 

more members come their way. I am going to take the opportunity 

to ask some more questions. And I appreciate your diligence in 

being here and coming back. 

138

How many al Qaeda fighters are there in Iraq? Anybody that 

knows. Ms. Lewis? 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I don’t from my own research. I have 

heard estimates of 3,000 to 4,000 fighters that I believe is oriented 

on Iraq that I don’t have any reason to refute. The attacks that I 

have seen could be achieved by a force of that size. 

Mr. POE. Anybody disagree with that? Dr. Knights? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. No disagreement, but membership of al Qaeda in 

Iraq is kind of like an onion, so many layers. Of that 3,000 to 

4,000, that probably includes everyone including the guys who steal 

the cars, the guys who weld them together, and all the rest of that. 

I think the core of card carriers could be substantially smaller than 

that. It could be in the high hundreds. 

Mr. POE. Where do they get their money? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Okay. So starting——

Mr. POE. Dr. Knights? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. A lot of it is organized crime. When we ripped this 

organization to pieces back in the 2005 to 2009 timeframe, it started the process of disintegrating into organized crime networks, and 

it became self-funding. As Iraq became a sordid place to have a 

jihad, not very inspiring. 

It ceased to get foreign funding, and they started to turn to their 

own means of raising money and that has allowed them to—and 

they have remained running those networks. We are talking about 

real estate, extorting mobile phone companies, running trucking 

companies, exporting oil. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Lewis. 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I agree entirely. I would add that 

there are a few characteristics of their funding that describe this 

further, specifically that it is stable. They have a very stable supply 

chain. They are able to control the rate of their attacks. They aren’t 

chasing money. They have a good system for this. 

What I would also add over in Syria is that it appears that they 

are fighting for control of the border checkpoints on Syria’s northern border with Turkey, and I think they are also trying to seize 

opportunities for resources that are coming into the country. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Byman. 

Mr. BYMAN. I think this is absolutely true. What I would add is 

I think their funding sources are changing. We are seeing hundreds 

of millions of dollars—or billions depending on your estimate—

pouring into Syria, and they are able to extract a percentage of 

that because some of it goes through Iraq. And some of that is 

money, but a lot of it is weapons or in-kind transfers, and they are 

able to siphon that off. 

Mr. POE. The bombings of mosques, for example, are they—do 

they discriminate against Shia and Sunni? And how does the—I 

think, Ms. Lewis, you may have mentioned this. How does the public view the security force’s reaction to whether it is a Sunni or a 

Shia mosque, for example, that is bombed? 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, they are primarily targeting Shia 

mosques. I think I have seen a couple of occasions where we had 

explosive attacks against joint Sunni/Shia prayer sessions in Diyala 

in order to deter that conciliatory behavior. They are specifically 

139

trying to make the Shia feel like they have to defend themselves 

and that the state is not succeeding in this. 

I would actually defer to the expertise that has already been had 

at the panel about the primary fact that that has not actually 

manifested as much as perhaps it might have in former years. But 

ultimately it does make the Iraqi security forces look like they can’t 

do it. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Pollack. 

Mr. POLLACK. Mr. Chairman, I would simply add that in terms 

of public reaction, among the Shia, by and large, there is a great 

deal of pressure on Prime Minister Maliki to crack down even 

harder. And, you know, we have seen large-scale operations into 

Anbar, into Salahadin, into Diyala, to try to go after these guys. 

We look at them and see them as rather indiscriminate, but there 

are a lot of Shia Iraqis who would like to see an even greater use 

of force. 

Mr. POE. Let us focus back on what we need to be doing. What 

is our position? What are we looking for in the future? Where do 

we need to push? Where does Congress need to push, the United 

States need to push? What is in our national security interest going 

forward? 

Now, we know the problem. We know it is increasing, al Qaeda 

is increasing in Iraq. How about some advice here? I want to go 

down the row. You are the experts, so we want to hear what you 

have to say. Dr. Pollack. 

Mr. POLLACK. Mr. Chairman, certainly the United States has influenced, and part of what we need to do is actually employ that 

influence. We have been reticent to do so. The administration has 

not been as engaged either with Iraq or with the Middle East, as 

I would argue that they ought to be, as in the U.S. interest. 

But I will go beyond that and say something that is probably 

quite controversial in these halls, which is that the United States 

needs to manufacture more influence in Iraq, and that may actually require some commitment of additional resources. I would actually argue that we can do a lot more in terms of technical assistance, in terms of simply advising the Iraqis. 

I think that there is a certain amount that we can do that the 

Iraqis can pay for themselves. In fact, quite a bit that the Iraqis 

can pay for themselves. And I am reminded of the relationship that 

we had with the Saudis in the 1970s and ’80s where together, 

using Saudi money and American expertise, we built the oil ports 

of Yanbu and Jubail. We built their telecommunications network. 

We built their road network. 

But at the moment, that is a little bit off into the future. And, 

again, I think even setting that up, using the strategic framework 

agreement between the United States and Iraq, to begin to set that 

up, would be very helpful, because Iraqis will know it is coming 

and they are looking for it. 

But right now they have got some needs. And as Dr. Knights was 

pointing out earlier, the Iraqis are mostly exhausting the resources 

that they have available very quickly. Obviously, if there is corruption in their system, you might be able to extract more. 

But this actually is a moment when some additional assistance 

from the United States, additional resources from the United 

140

States, I think could go a very long way in terms of saying to the 

Iraq people, ‘‘We have not abandoned you. We are still interested 

in Iraq. We have our interests there. We are willing to commit resources, but they are going to be committed to what we need to see 

happen.’’

Mr. POE. Ms. Lewis. We will go right down the row. 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I do think that resources are a valid 

expectation for what would need to be part of——

Mr. POE. Just get a little closer to the microphone, if you would. 

Ms. LEWIS. Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman. The primary deficiency 

that I see is how they are applying the resources that they have. 

I do not see that their military campaign to counter al Qaeda is 

a very good one. I think one of our greatest potential levers is expertise in fighting al Qaeda, and I think that we should make this 

very much about what an effective campaign to counter al Qaeda 

in Iraq looks like, and fashion that into our options. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Knights. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. That is absolutely right. No one is better at fighting al Qaeda in Iraq than the U.S. military. Even now the institutional memory is still there and it is still fresh. One of the dirty 

little secrets of operating in Iraq is that they are not very good at 

doing counterinsurgency in their own country. 

We always thought back in 2003 we made all of these mistakes 

because we are new to the country and that the Iraqis knew it 

much better. In fact, they are worse than we are and they have no 

excuse. And they are worse than we are willfully. They understand 

the country. They just don’t want to do population-focused 

counterinsurgency. 

If they are willing to take our advice, we are able to bring a 

much more thoughtful approach to counterinsurgency/ counterterrorism in Iraq than they would. So I think all of the professional 

military education support we can provide to Iraq, IMET funding, 

OSCI, the security corporation command in Iraq, Section 1206 

funding. 

Any of these things would be pretty well spent. They are quite 

small amounts of money often, and I think they can maintain a 

thoughtful—they can build a thoughtful approach in the Iraqi security forces toward counterinsurgency. They need to—we need to be 

back in there proffering our advice again. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Byman. 

Mr. BYMAN. Mr. Chairman, rather than repeat what my colleagues have said, let me just add two points. My view is that part 

of Congress’ role is to highlight these issues, to force the administration to engage at a higher level. I often agree with specific 

things the administration is doing, but it is being done at the ambassadorial level, it is being done at the deputy assistant level, it 

is being done by individuals who are very well meaning but in 

Iraqi terms don’t have the clout of, say, the Secretary of State or 

the Secretary of Defense. 

And as a result, they believe I think correctly that they don’t 

have to pay attention because the United States doesn’t really care. 

And as my colleagues have said, a lot of the problem is not resources; it is how they use the resources. We have elections coming 

up, and there will be a question of, are these fair elections? There 

141

is a question of, are the security services defending Iraqis, or are 

they the arm of the Shia community? And the administration needs 

to push harder on all of these issues, and I think Congress’ role is 

to highlight them so the administration really has to address them 

one way or another. 

Mr. POE. And the last question has to do, once again, with Iran. 

I know you all are experts on al Qaeda. But should we be concerned of a situation in Iraq that is similar to the one in Syria, or 

you result in civil war, you have got two sides fighting each other, 

and you have the Sunnis and the Shias fighting, and then you have 

outside countries coming in and taking sides, and we know Syria 

is—it is bad on the citizens. They are the ones who lose, the people 

who live there. 

Is that a scenario that could play out, or is that not? Just kind 

of looking into the future if civil war erupts because of al Qaeda’s 

presence and the things that you all have talked about. Dr. Pollack. 

We will go down the row, and it will be the last question. 

Mr. POLLACK. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a very important 

concern. It is one of the great issues of civil wars. Dr. Byman and 

I did a study of civil wars back in 2006 when we were looking at 

Iraq and civil war, and that was one of the great conclusions of our 

work was that this was a very real risk, that an all-out civil war 

would almost certainly suck in all of the neighbors into the fighting 

itself. 

Iran, because of its position, was relatively able to dominate over 

much of Iraq. And if Iraq falls back into civil war, which is a very 

real possibility at this point in time, looking at some point into the 

future, I think that that scenario is one that we absolutely have 

to be concerned about. 

I will simply add, Mr. Chairman, that we have to be equally concerned about our allies getting sucked into an Iraqi civil war. Saudi 

Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, even Turkey—these are not countries 

whose economies and militaries are ready to withstand the stresses 

of a civil war. These are not countries whose political systems can 

withstand that either. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. Ms. Lewis. 

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I agree. I think the primary thing I 

would highlight is that that is exactly what al Qaeda is trying to 

do and why they are stoking sectarian violence—that would set 

them most up for success in trying to establish an Islamic Emirate 

and that they will try to precipitate that end by every way that 

they can think of. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Knights. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Back in 2006/2007 when we had civil war-like conditions in Iraq, I would argue that—and actually they did not really suck in the neighbors. But this time, if we went back into civil 

war in Iraq, it would because things have changed since then. The 

regional context is different. We have the Sunni/Shia conflict, much 

more heightened now. We have a number of Sunni states, like the 

Saudis, the Emiratis, the Qataris, who have been actively involving 

themselves in regional conflicts—Libya, Syria, Yemen, et cetera—

and the U.S. is out. So this time it has got much more potential 

to drag in third parties than it did back in ’06/’07. 

Mr. POE. Last word, Dr. Byman. 

142

Mr. BYMAN. I am not sure I am worthy of that, Mr. Chairman. 

But all I would say is that Iran feels that it has lost ground because of the Syria conflict, that it had a very strong stable ally in 

Syria, and now the situation is fraught and its ally might fall. 

From Iran’s point of view, losing Iraq as well would be a disaster, 

and I think they are prepared to go very hard and very strong, 

should the situation become quite negative in Iraq itself. 

Mr. POE. Well, I want to thank all 4 of you. The testimony has 

been excellent, including your prepared statements. 

And so the subcommittee is adjourned, and thank you once again 

for your help. 

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TTVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

TO: MEMBlmS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be 

held jointly by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and North Affica in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the 

Committee website at WW\V fnrc1gnaffairs.housc.gOv) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, December 12,2013 

1:00 p.m 

The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq 

Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D 

Senior Fellow 

Saban Center for Middle East Policy 

The Brookings Institution 

Ms. Jessica D. Lewis 

Research Director 

Institute forthe Study of War 

Michael Knights, Ph.D 

LaferFellow 

The Washington Tnstitute for Near East Policy 

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D 

Professor 

Security Studies Program 

Georgetown University 

By Direction of the Chairman 
145

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86007m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUB COMMIITEE ON TerrorIsm, NotppfOlifeffllloll, {wd Trade am! Middle E(fs/ (iliff Nor/Ii A/riclI HEARING 

Duy_---"'T.!!h.!!u.!-'l's"'a"'''oL'' __ Dnte, ___ ''''1'''Z;:'''1c=1'''Yl,,3'----__ Room ___ "'1"'1-".72"'--__ _ 

Starting Time ~JI.I1l. ,Ending Time 3:05 p.m. 

Recesses kl (J.;14to~) L-to __ ) L-to __ ) L-to __ l L-to __ l L-to __ ) 

P .. <siding Membcl'(s) 

Cludmlllll Poe ami ClmiTIJulIl Ros-LeMiflell 

CI1eek aI/ oJ111eJol/owiflg II1al apP(J': 

Open Session 0 Exccutlvc (closed) Session D Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

The ResltJ'Kellce ofnl-Qlletla illil'llq 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Rccol'd~tapedl 0 

Stenogmphic Record lLJ 

Reps, Poe, Ros-LehtiJlell, COllI/oil)" Killzillger, Yuho, ScTU/eitlel~ Sftemlll1l, Val'gas, Cot/Oil 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with 011· iftlley al'e nnt members o[fiil! cnmmittee) 

HIlARING WITNIlSSJ<:S: Same as meeting notice atl.ched? Yes IZl No D 

(If "no ", please Usf below and include litle, agency, deparfmeHf, 01' 01'1:al1;Zo';on.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List allY statelllents submitted/or the l'ecOI'd) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME AD.JOlJRNED 3:05 p.lII.