alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(logo) usbank                                                                                                                                           All of us serving you

 

 

 

Annual Statement of Compliance

Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2015-C25

 

 

 

Re: Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 1, 2015 (the "Agreement") between Banc of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Inc., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association, as Special Servicer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Trust Advisor and U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, Certificate Administrator, Certificate Registrar, Authenticating Agent and Custodian.

 

I, Michael Farrell, a Senior Vice President of U.S. Bank National Association, as Custodian, as a certifying servicer hereby certify that:

 

(1) A review of the activities of the Custodian during the preceding calendar year (the “Reporting Period") and of the performance of the Custodian under the Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

 

(2) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Custodian has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout such Reporting Period.

 

Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings set forth in the Agreement.

 

 

Date: March 10, 2016

 

U.S. Bank National Association, as Custodian

 

 

By: /s/ Michael Farrell 

Michael Farrell 

Senior Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
balance
sheets and statements of operations found on pages 3 and 4 of the Company's
Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 1999, and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,340
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,677
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4,677
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,458
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       190,688
<OTHER-SE>                                    (204,469)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,354
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (4,354)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0

</TABLE>
----

Euro exchange rates (1)

28 December 2006

(2006/C 321/02)

1 euro= 

----

(1)

Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

----
39769.

#### CARR v. STODDARD CLEANERS, INC. et al.

Eberhardt, Judge.

Defendant was sued by Stoddard Cleaners, Inc., Atlanta Laundries, Inc. and Chesterfield Laundry, Inc., separately and answers were filed in each suit denying material allegations. By agreement the cases were tried together before the judge without a jury and each of the plaintiffs recovered. Defendant filed separate motions for new trial on the general grounds and three special grounds which are merely an elaboration of the general grounds. The motions were consolidated by consent of all parties and the motions were all denied. *Held:*

1. In one case (Stoddard Cleaners, Inc.) the defendant had initially contracted to purchase a machine directly from the seller but subsequently asked that plaintiff, Stoddard Cleaners, Inc., assist him by executing the conditional-sale agreement with the seller as to> the machine because of defendant’s credit problems. This Stoddard did, and when defendant defaulted in making payments Stoddard paid off the note involved. Defendant admits he never paid anyone for the machine but contends that there was no promise on his part to pay. The law implies a promise to pay, and there was ample evidence to support this plaintiff’s recovery. *Jennings v. Stewart,*106 Ga. App. 689 (127 SE2d 842).

2. In the second case (Atlanta Laundries, Inc.) defendant claims the bar of the statute of limitation *(Code*§ 3-711), because an invoice introduced by plaintiff is dated more than four years prior to the filing of suit. There is evidence in the record from which the trial judge could find that the date mentioned was inserted merely for accounting purposes and the true transfer date would be within four years of suit. Moreover, defendant stated in his testimony that this obligation was to be paid after a loan from the bank was paid off. The loan agreement *782with the bank was in evidence, and it did not fully mature until August 12, 1958, less than four years before suit was filed.

Decided October 23, 1962.

*Moretón Rolleston, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*King & Spalding, M. H. Blackshear, Jr.,*contra.

3. The third case (Chesterfield Laundry, Inc.) involves a contention on the part of defendant that the machinery (the value of which plaintiff seeks to recover) was not sold by plaintiff but was conveyed to defendant by Carr-Perk Services, Inc., another corporation. There is evidence authorizing a finding that the machinery was in fact the property of the plaintiff, though as an accommodation to defendant and to help him in obtaining credit at the bank plaintiff had allowed the transaction to be handled in this irregular manner. Defendant admitted in his testimony that he knew the status of the title and that he was obligated to pay for the machinery, though he had not done so.

There was no error in overruling the motions for new trial and the judgment is

*Affirmed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Russell, J., concur*
#### § 1.7519-0T Table of contents (temporary).

This section lists the captions that appear in the temporary regulations under section 7519.

## § 1.7519-1T Required payments for entities electing not to have required year (temporary).

(a) In general.

(1) Applicability.

(2) Returns and required payments.

(3) Required payment.

(4) Examples.

(b) Definitions and special rules.

(1) Applicable percentage.

(i) In general.

(ii) Exception for certain applicable election years beginning after 1987.

(iii) Example.

(2) Adjusted highest section 1 rate.

(i) General rule.

(ii) Period for determining highest section rate.

Base year.

(4) Special rules for certain applicable election years.

(i) First applicable election year of new entities.

(ii) Applicable election years ending prior to the required taxable year.

(5) Net base year income.

(i) In general.

(ii) Partnership net income.

(A) In general.

(B) Treatment of deductions and losses.

(C) Partner limitations disregarded.

(iii) S corporation net income.

(A) In general.

(B) Treatment of deductions and losses.

(C) Shareholder limitations disregarded.

(iv) Applicable payments.

(A) In general.

(B) Exceptions.

(C) Special rule for corporation electing S status.

(D) Special rules for certain payments.

(*1*) Certain indirect payments.

(*2*) Payments by a downstream controlled partnership.

(*i*) In general.

(*ii*) Definition of a downstream controlled partnership.

(*3*) Examples.

(v) Special rule for base year of less than twelve months.

(A) In general.

(B) Annualized short base year income.

(vi) Examples.

(c) Refunds of required payments.

(d) Examples.

## § 1.7519-2T Required payments—procedures and administration (temporary).

(a) Payment and return required.

(1) In general.

(2) Return required.

(i) In general.

(ii) Procedure if amount for applicable election year (and all preceding years) is not greater than $500.

(3) Time and place for filing return.

(i) Applicable election years beginning in 1987.

(A) Taxpayers that would otherwise file Form 720 for the second quarter of 1988.

(B) Other taxpayers.

(ii) Applicable election years beginning after 1987.

(A) Return made on Form 720.

(B) Return made on form other than Form 720.

(iii) Special rule for back-up section 444 election.

(4) Time and place for making required payment.

(i) Applicable election years beginning in 1987.

(ii) Applicable election years beginning after 1987.

(iii) Special rule for back-up section 444 election.

(5) Penalties for failure to pay.

(6) Refund of required payment.

(i) In general.

(ii) Procedures for claiming refund.

(iii) Interest on refund.

(b) Assessment and collection of payment.

(c) Termination due to willful failure.

(d) Negligence and fraud penalties made applicable.

## § 1.7519.3T Effective date (temporary).
§ 1.826-6 Credit or refund. ( a ) *Notification required.* In any case where a taxpayer applies for a credit or refund of taxes paid by it in respect of a taxable year for which the taxpayer was the consenting attorney-in-fact of a reciprocal making the election provided by section 826(a), such taxpayer shall give notice to its reciprocal for such taxable year, first, upon applying for the credit or refund; and again, within 10 days from the date on which a final determination is made that such credit or refund has been allowed or denied.
( b ) *Notice form.* The notices required by this section shall include the name and address of the taxpayer and shall be signed by the taxpayer or its duly authorized representative. In addition, there shall be attached to and made a part of each first notice a concise statement of the claim upon which the application for refund or credit is based; and there shall be attached to and made a part of each second notice: ( 1 ) A copy of the notification (if any) received by the taxpayer indicating that the credit or refund has been allowed; and
( 2 ) A statement setting forth the amount of such credit or refund attributable to taxes paid by the taxpayer on income received from the reciprocal, and the computation by which such amount was determined.
( c ) *Manner of apportioning refund or credit.* The taxpayer shall determine the amount of the refund or credit attributable to taxes paid on income received from its reciprocal by reallocating its income and expense items for the taxable year, with respect to which the refund or credit is allowed, in the manner provided by §§ 1.826-3 and 1.826-4 so as to reflect the adjustments (if any) in such items which resulted in the credit or refund of tax for the taxable year. The taxpayer shall then recompute the tax attributable to income received from its reciprocal for such taxable year in the manner provided by § 1.826-5. The district director may require such additional information as may be necessary in the circumstances to verify the computations required by this paragraph.
[T.D. 6681, 28 FR 11126, Oct. 17, 1963]
#### Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company *v.*De Frees.

[No. 21,202.

Filed March 10, 1909.

Rehearing denied December 8, 1909.]

From Superior Court of Marion County (71,237); *John L.'McMaster,*Judge.

Action by Morris M. De Frees against the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company and others. From a judgment- for plaintiff, defendant company appeals.

*Reversed.*

*Frank L. Littleton*and *Taylor, Woods S Willson,*for appellant.

*Florea & Seidensticker,*for appellee.

Montgomeby, J.

Appellee brought this action against appellant and others to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for certain work done by him as subcontractor, upon appellant’s roadbed and right of way. The court made a special finding of facts, upon which conclusions of law were stated, to the effect: (1) That appellee was entitled to a lien upon appellant’s right of way for the sum of $4,666.27; (2) *718that since the right of way upon which such lien rested was in use, and was necessary to the proper and successful operation of appellant’s railway system and the conduct of its corporate business and could not be sold without interference with public rights and interests, appellee was entitled to recover a personal judgment against appellant for said sum, collectible without relief from valuation or appraisement laws. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the conclusions of law.

Appellant duly excepted to the first conclusion of law, and has assigned the same as error in this appeal.

In the case of *Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co.*v. *Brennan*(1910), 174 Ind. 1, this court held that the provisions of §8305 Burns 1908, Acts 1889, p. 257, §6, embraced only mechanics, laborers and materialmen, and did not include contractors, for the reason that contractors are not within the scope of the title to the act, which creates liens in favor of certain classes of persons. The reasoning which excludes contractors from the provisions of the act excludes subcontractors from its benefits, and upon the authority of that case our holding is, that the trial court erred in the first conclusion of law stated. *Fleming*v. *Greener*(1909), *ante,*260.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to restate conclusions of law in favor of appellant, and to render judgment accordingly.
§ 1.6044-4 Exemption for certain consumer cooperatives. ( a ) *In general* — ( 1 ) *Determination of exemption.* Exemption from the reporting requirements of § 1.6044-2 shall, upon application therefor, be granted by the district director to any cooperative which he determines is primarily engaged in selling at retail goods or services of a type which is generally for personal, living, or family use. A cooperative is not exempt from the reporting requirements merely because it is an organization of a type to which section 6044(c) and this section relate. In order for the exemption from reporting to apply, it is necessary that the cooperative file an application in accordance with this section and obtain a determination of exemption.
( 2 ) *Basis for exemption.* For a cooperative to qualify for the exemption from reporting provided by section 6044(c) and this section 85 percent of its gross receipts for the preceding taxable year, or 85 percent of its aggregate gross receipts for the preceding three taxable years, must have been derived from the sale at retail of goods or services of a type which is generally for personal, living, or family use. In determining whether an item is of a type that is generally for personal, living, or family use, an item which may be purchased either for such use or for business use and which when acquired for business purposes is generally purchased at wholesale will, when sold by a cooperative at retail, be treated as goods or services of a type generally for personal, living, or family use.
( 3 ) *Period of exemption.* A determination of exemption from reporting shall apply beginning with the payments made during the calendar year in which the determination is made and shall automatically cease to be effective beginning with payments made after the close of the first taxable year of the cooperative in which less than 70 percent of its gross receipts is derived from the sale at retail of goods or services of a type which is generally for personal, living, or family use.
( b ) *Application for exemption.* Application for exemption from the reporting requirements of section 6044 shall be made on Form 3491, and shall be filed with the district director for the internal revenue district in which the cooperative has its principal place of business.
[T.D. 6628, 27 FR 12799, Dec. 28, 1962]
39578.

#### STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. BENNETT et al.

Decided October 5, 1962.

*725
      *Eugene Cook, Attorney General, Carter Goode, Paul Miller, E. J. Summerour, Assistant Attorneys General, William J. Gibbons, Asa D. Kelley, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, S. B. McCall,*for plaintiff in error.

*Seymour S. Owens, W. E. Bice, James B. Whiddon,*contra.

Frankum, Judge.

The evidence shows that the strip of land condemned did not adjoin a *limited*access highway, and the remaining property of the condemnee from which the strip of land was taken did not adjoin a *limited*access highway. The strip of land did adjoin a highway which was not a limited access highway and was taken for the purpose of improving said highway. The evidence further shows that the highway adjoining the condemnee’s property crosses over a limited access highway (Interstate 75) near her property, and that there are ramps at said crossing for use in entering and leaving said limited access highway.

The charge complained of probably confused and misled the *726jury, in that it may have impressed upon them that they were authorized to award consequential damages on the theory that the condemnee’s land was taken for use as a part of a limited access highway, and that her remaining land would abut a limited access highway, when such was not the case.

The situation is best stated in the ruling of *Central Ga. Power Co. v. Cornwell,*139 Ga. 1, 6 (76 SE 387, AC 1914A 880): “The charges complained of . . . were not warranted by the evidence, and therefore, under the repeated rulings of this court, were erroneous. It is argued that if these charges were erroneous, they were harmless, as the jury only considered the value proved for one purpose, namely, the agricultural value. We have no means of knowing that the jury so limited themselves, and can not say, as a matter of law, that the instructions complained of were harmless. They were probably confusing and misleading to the jury, and require a new trial."

*Judgment reversed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
Exhibit 11

POTASH CORPORATION OF SASKATCHEWAN INC.

COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE
EARNINGS

FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30



|                                                                                 |  |      |             |  |      |  |             | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---- | ----------- |  | ---- |  | ----------- | 
|                                                                                 |  | 2012 |             |  | 2011 | 
|A      Net income as reported ($ millions)                                       |  |      | 1,013       |  |      |  | 1,572       | 
|B      Weighted average number of shares outstanding                             |  |      | 858,888,000 |  |      |  | 854,518,000 | 
|C      Net additional shares issuable for diluted earnings per share calculation |  |      | 16,925,000  |  |      |  | 22,094,000  | 
|                                                                                 |  |     
|IFRS                                                                             |  |      |             |  |      |  |             | 
|Basic earnings per share (A/B)                                                   |  |      | 1.18        |  |      |  | 1.84        | 
|Diluted earnings per share (A/(B+C))                                             |  |      | 1.16        |  |      |  | 1.79        |
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Saul CUADRAS-CAMACHO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-50015.

D.C. No. CR-00-01197-JM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 10, 2002.*

Decided June 14, 2002.

Before RYMER, T.G. NELSON, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Saul Cuadras-Camacho appeals his guilty plea conviction for knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Cuadras-Camacho contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because 21 U.S.C. § 960 is facially unconstitutional in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This contention is foreclosed by our decision in *United States v. Mendoza-Paz,*286 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2002) (concluding that § 960 is facially constitutional).

Cuadras-Camacho also contends that under *Apprendi*the government is required to prove mens rea as to drug type and quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. This contention is foreclosed by *United States v. Carranza,*289 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2002) (concluding that *Apprendi*does not change the “long established rule” that the government need only show that the defendant knew he imported or possessed some controlled substance).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 6722]

Pursuant to section 7088(c)(2) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009 (Division H, Pub. L. 111-8) (“the Act”), and Department of State Delegation of Authority Number 245-1, I hereby determine that it is important to the national interest of the United States to waive the requirements of section 7088(c)(1) of the Act with respect to Bolivia, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and I hereby waive such restriction.

                    This determination shall be reported to the Congress, and published in the                     **Federal Register**                    .                

Dated: July 14, 2009.

Jacob J. Lew,

Deputy Secretary of State For Management and Resources, Department of State.

[FR Doc. E9-18844 Filed 8-5-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-29-P