Filed 5/19/22 Sweetflower Pasadena v. City of Pasadena CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

SWEETFLOWER PASADENA 

LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF PASADENA, 

Defendant,

INTEGRAL ASSOCIATES 

DENA, LLC,

Real Party in Interest

and Appellant.

 B308897

 (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

20STCP01456)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.

Carlson & Nicholas and Richard A. McDonald for Real 

Party in Interest and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant. 
2

Nossaman, Artin N. Shaverdian, Gabriela S. Pérez, 

Gregory W. Sanders and John J. Flynn III for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 

__________________

SweetFlower Pasadena, LLC filed a verified petition for 

writ of mandate and complaint seeking to compel the City of 

Pasadena to set aside a conditional use permit the City had 

granted to SweetFlower’s competitor, Integral Associates Dena, 

LLC, and to obtain a judicial declaration that Integral was 

ineligible for the permits required to open and operate a cannabis 

retail store in the City. Integral, named in SweetFlower’s 

petition/complaint as real party in interest, filed a special motion 

to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

1

The trial court denied Integral’s motion, concluding none of 

SweetFlower’s claims arose from protected speech or petitioning 

activity. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. SweetFlower’s Petition and Complaint

According to SweetFlower’s petition/complaint, in June 

2018 City voters approved two initiative measures to legalize and 

regulate commercial cannabis businesses within City boundaries. 

(See Pas. Mun. Code, §§ 5.28.010 et seq., 5.78.010 et seq., 

8.11.010 et seq., 17.50.066.) The approved ordinances authorized 

the operation of up to six retail cannabis businesses within City 

limits; included zoning restrictions that required the businesses 

to be at least 1,000 feet from any other cannabis retailer or 

cultivation site and 600 feet from specified “sensitive uses,” such 

1

Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.
3

as any school, park or childcare center; and limited cannabis 

retailers to one per city council district. The initiative measures

authorized the City’s manager or his or her designee to 

promulgate the rules and procedures governing the application 

process for the necessary City permits.

2

a. SweetFlower’s application for a use permit

After a detailed vetting process, the City selected 

SweetFlower as one of six eligible candidates to apply for a 

conditional use permit to operate a cannabis retail store. 

Because zoning restrictions and other limitations in the initiative 

measures meant that fewer than six cannabis retailers could

operate simultaneously in the City, the City adopted a first-inline selection procedure for the six candidates to apply for a 

conditional use permit. Under those rules, permit applications 

would be processed in the order received, with the first completed

application for a permit to operate in a specified council district 

able to “lock in” the available spot for that district. Any changes 

to a submitted application would void the previous application, 

sending the applicant to the back of the line. 

SweetFlower was the first candidate to submit its 

conditional use permit application on June 12, 2019. On June 27, 

2019 the City notified SweetFlower its application was 

incomplete and would not be processed because the location map 

SweetFlower included had not been prepared by a licensed 

surveyor, as required by City rules. On June 27, 2019 

SweetFlower submitted a second application, this time including 

2

Some of the City’s cannabis-related ordinances were 

amended in November 2021. Those amendments, the subject of 

ongoing litigation between Integral and the City in the 

Los Angeles Superior Court, are not at issue in this appeal. 
4

a certification that its location map had been reviewed by a 

licensed surveyor. The City rejected the second application, 

explaining “reviewed by” a licensed surveyor was not the same as 

“prepared by” a licensed surveyor. When SweetFlower submitted 

its third application on July 3, 2019, the City refused to process it 

because the City had already approved Integral’s application for 

the same district. 

b. SweetFlower’s petition/complaint 

SweetFlower filed this lawsuit for a writ of mandate

pursuant to sections 1085 and/or 1094.5 to compel the City to set 

aside Integral’s conditional use permit.

3

SweetFlower alleged the 

City had arbitrarily enforced its own rules by interpreting the 

requirement of a location map “prepared by a licensed surveyor” 

liberally for Integral and more strictly for SweetFlower. 

SweetFlower also alleged City rules required any cannabis 

operator that engaged in nonpublic communications with the City 

during the vetting process be disqualified from eligibility for a 

conditional use permit; Integral’s managing agents privately 

3

In addition to this lawsuit, SweetFlower filed at least three 

other petitions for writs of mandate involving the City’s cannabisrelated conditional use permit decisions. (See Super. Ct. L.A. 

County no. 20STCP00038 [challenging the City’s denial of 

SweetFlower’s own conditional use permit application]; Super. 

Ct. L.A. County no. 20STCP01048 [challenging the City’s 

approval of a conditional use permit for Harvest of 

Pasadena LLC, a SweetFlower competitor]; Super. Ct. L.A. 

County no. 20STCP03212 [challenging the City’s rejection of 

SweetFlower’s request that Integral’s conditional use permit be 

set aside based on a material change of control at Integral].) 
5

contacted members of the City’s selection committee during the 

vetting process; and the City failed to disqualify Integral. 

In a separate cause of action for declaratory relief, 

SweetFlower alleged the City had misapprehended the initiative 

measures, which required the City to deny a conditional use 

permit for cannabis retail to any applicant who “has been denied 

a permit or state license to engage in commercial cannabis 

activity, or has had a permit or state license to engage in 

commercial cannabis activity suspended and not reinstated, or 

revoked, by any city, county, city and county, or any other state 

cannabis licensing authority.” (Pas. Mun. Code, § 5.78.100, 

par. A.) According to SweetFlower, the City interpreted that 

language to apply to jurisdictions within California. 

SweetFlower alleged, and sought a judicial declaration that, “any 

other state cannabis licensing authority” included those in other 

states and, when so interpreted, made Integral ineligible for a 

conditional use permit. 

In its prayer for relief SweetFlower sought (1) a peremptory 

writ of mandate ordering the City to set aside its grant of a 

conditional use permit to Integral; (2) an injunction prohibiting 

Integral from taking any further action in reliance on the invalid 

conditional use permit and prohibiting the City from taking any 

action to process applications by Integral for additional permits 

based on the noncompliant conditional use permit; (3) a judicial 

declaration that Integral is ineligible to apply for additional 

permits based on a noncompliant conditional use permit; and 

(4) a judicial declaration that the City’s business license 

application, as interpreted by the City, violated the initiative 

ordinances. 
6

2. Integral’s Special Motion To Strike

Integral filed a special motion to strike the 

petition/complaint under section 425.16. Integral argued each 

claim was based on oral or written statements made in 

connection with Integral’s application for a conditional use 

permit or the City’s protected activity in reviewing and 

processing Integral’s application within the meaning of 

section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (e)(2). In support of this 

argument Integral cited paragraphs in the petition/complaint 

quoting statements by the City’s planning director, members of 

the zoning board and city council members, all of which were 

made during official proceedings addressing SweetFlower’s 

application and the City’s interpretation and application of the 

licensed surveyor requirement.

4

Integral also cited 

SweetFlower’s allegations that Integral had secretly

communicated with the City during the applicant screening 

process, a rules violation that required the City to disqualify it 

from consideration for a conditional use permit and the 

SweetFlower’s prayer for relief barring Integral from submitting 

further permit applications premised on an invalid conditional 

use permit. Integral also argued SweetFlower could not 

demonstrate any of its claims had merit.

4

SweetFlower alleged the City’s planning director struggled 

to explain to SweetFlower in a zoning board meeting what 

“prepared by a licensed surveyor” meant; the chair of the zoning 

board questioned during that meeting whether other applications

by SweetFlower’s competitors were incomplete under this 

standard; and members of the city council cautioned during 

SweetFlower’s administrative appeal that the same “strict 

standards” should apply to all applications, not just 

SweetFlower’s. 
7

In its opposition to Integral’s special motion to strike, 

SweetFlower argued its claims arose from the City’s failure to 

disqualify Integral and the City’s wrongful approval of Integral’s 

conditional use permit—acts of governance—and characterized 

the quoted statements by City officials and Integral’s private 

contacts with the City as providing context for its claims. 

The trial court denied Integral’s special motion to strike, 

ruling the causes of action arose from the City’s acts of 

governance, not the City’s protected speech or petitioning 

activity. Because Integral failed to carry its threshold burden to 

demonstrate the claims arose from protected speech or petition 

activity, the court denied Integral’s special motion to strike

without addressing whether SweetFlower could demonstrate its 

claims had minimal merit. 

Integral filed a timely notice of appeal from the order 

denying its special motion to strike. 

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review

Section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP 

statute, makes available a special motion to strike certain 

meritless claims early in the litigation: “A cause of action against 

a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of a 

person’s right to free speech under the United States 

Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a 

public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless 

the court determines that the plaintiff has established there is a 

probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (b)(1); see Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 

6 Cal.5th 610, 619-620 [“[a] court may strike a cause of action 

only if the cause of action (1) arises from an act in furtherance of 
8

the right of petition or free speech ‘in connection with a public 

issue,’ and (2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a probability’ of 

prevailing on the claim”].)

Pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (e), an “‘act in 

furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the 

United States or California Constitution in connection with a 

public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or 

writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial 

proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, 

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection 

with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, 

executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding 

authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing 

made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection 

with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in 

furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition 

or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 

public issue or an issue of public interest.” 

In ruling on a motion under section 425.16, the trial court 

engages in a two-step process. “First, the defendant must 

establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected 

by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the 

required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 

demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability 

of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral); 

accord, Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 

1009 (Bonni); Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 

University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) If the moving 

party fails to demonstrate that any of the challenged claims for 

relief arise from protected activity (the first step), the court 
9

properly denies the motion to strike without addressing the 

probability of success (the second step). (City of Cotati v. 

Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80-81; Verceles v. Los Angeles 

United School Dist. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 784.)

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity 

underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062-1063; accord, Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 1009.) Thus, “[t]he defendant’s first-step burden is to identify 

the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that 

that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim 

may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is 

the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a 

step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’”

(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 

(Wilson); see Bonni, at p. 1009 [“[t]he defendant’s burden is to 

identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show 

how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category 

of protected activity”]; Park, at p. 1060 [same].)

A motion pursuant to section 425.16 need not challenge an 

entire cause of action as pleaded in the complaint. (Bonni, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382.) Rather, 

“courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of 

acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in 

a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts 

are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has 

the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Bonni, at 

p. 1010; accord, Baral, at p. 395; Musero v. Creative Artists 

Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 815; see Park, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 [in determining whether a claim arises from 

protected activity, “courts should consider the elements of the 
10

challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those 

elements and consequently form the basis for liability”].)5 

We review do novo an order granting or denying a special 

motion to strike under section 425.16. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 

at p. 884; Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) 

2. The Court Properly Concluded SweetFlower’s Claims 

Did Not Arise From Protected Speech or Petitioning 

Activity 

SweetFlower’s petition for writ of mandate alleged the City 

violated its own rules when it (1) approved Integral’s conditional 

use permit application despite a deficient location map and 

(2) failed to disqualify Integral from the applicant pool after 

Integral made private overtures to the City. SweetFlower’s claim 

for declaratory relief (apart from its request for a judicial 

declaration concerning the meaning of certain language in the 

5

In its written ruling denying Integral’s special motion to 

strike, the court stated, “[T]he true basis for liability and the

gravamen of the petition” is the City’s acts of governance. 

Although the court used the term “gravamen,” the court’s ruling

as a whole, including the language immediately preceding the 

word “gravamen,” reflects a proper focus on the basis for the 

City’s liability in accordance with Baral, and not on the “gist or 

essence” of SweetFlower’s petition/complaint. (Cf. See Bonni, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012 [“[W]e do not suggest that every 

court that has continued to label its approach a gravamen test 

even after Baral has erred. Some courts have invoked the term 

not in the way [defendant] suggests—to determine the essence or 

gist of a so-called mixed cause of action—but instead to 

determine whether particular acts alleged within the cause of 

action supply the elements of a claim [citation] or instead are 

incidental background”].) 
11

ordinance) was essentially the same. Integral contends each of 

these claims arose from protected speech and petitioning activity 

within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) 

and/or (e)(2). 

a. SweetFlower’s claim the City wrongfully approved 

Integral’s conditional use permit 

Integral contends statements by City officials and 

employees discussing the licensed-surveyor requirement in 

official meetings are protected as an act in furtherance of a 

petition and speech activity under section 425.16, 

subdivision (e)(1), and form the basis for most of SweetFlower’s 

claims. While Integral is certainly correct that the statements by 

City officials during official City hearings fit within the definition 

of protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), it is 

the City’s alleged arbitrary application of its rules in granting 

Integral’s application and denying SweetFlower’s, not the City’s 

statements themselves, that is the wrong alleged in 

SweetFlower’s petition/complaint. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

pp. 1063-1064.)

We addressed a nearly identical issue in Shahbazian v. 

City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 823

(Shahbazian). Like SweetFlower, the plaintiffs in Shahbazian 

alleged the City of Rancho Palos Verdes (RPV) had “‘acted 

arbitrarily and engaged in illegal selective enforcement by 

refusing to strictly enforce and follow its own ordinances with 

respect to the Hessers while having previously and at the same 

time strictly enforced such ordinances as to the Shahbazians.’” 

(Id. at p. 828.) RPV moved to strike the complaint under 

section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), contending that claim arose out 

of statements by public officials in connection with a matter 
12

under consideration by RPV. The trial court denied the motion, 

and we affirmed. We explained the Shahbazians’ allegations 

“ar[o]se from [RPV]’s decisions to grant the Hessers a permit for 

their wall (allegedly a violation of local laws) and to deny the 

Shahbazians a permit for their deck. [Citation.] While [RPV]’s 

decisions followed public hearings at which members of the city 

council and [public] employees undoubtedly exercised their free 

speech rights, the Shahbazians’ causes of action do not arise from

(or even allude to) that speech.” (Id. at p. 835.)6

In contrast to the complaint in Shahbazian, SweetFlower’s 

petition/complaint expressly identifies, and at times quotes

directly, statements by City agents and officials made at various 

government hearings. However, none of those statements by the 

City officials or employees comprises the wrongs alleged—the 

decision to grant Integral a conditional use permit and to deny 

the same to SweetFlower. SweetFlower’s claim the City failed to 

hold Integral to the same strict standard as SweetFlower exists 

independently of any of those statements. (See Park, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1068 [“The dean’s alleged comments may supply 

evidence of [discriminatory] animus, but that does not convert 

the statements themselves into the basis for liability. As the trial 

court correctly observed, Park’s complaint is ‘based on the act of 

denying plaintiff tenure based on national origin. Plaintiff could 

have omitted allegations regarding communicative acts . . . and 

still state the same claims’”]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of 

Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 596 [communications from 

6

Integral’s failure to address Shahbazian in both its opening 

brief and reply papers is troubling, especially considering 

SweetFlower’s significant reliance on the case in its opposition 

papers. 
13

the city “that led to and that followed” the alleged breach—the 

city’s refusal to issue a license—were “merely incidental to the 

asserted claims” against the city for breach, interference, and 

unfair business practices]; cf. Rand Resources, LLC v. City of 

Carson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 622 [in claim for fraudulent 

misrepresentation, mayor and city officials’ statements are 

“themselves the ‘wrong[s] complained of’”].)

Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera 

(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211 (Graffiti Protective), cited with 

approval in Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 1065, and discussed at 

length by this court in Shahbazian, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 

pages 833 to 834, reached a similar conclusion. In Graffiti 

Protective the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate 

asserting the City of Pico Rivera violated its own rules by 

awarding a contract to the plaintiff’s competitor without 

requiring the competitor to undergo a competitive bidding 

process. The City of Pico Rivera filed a special motion to strike 

the petition, and the trial court granted the motion. In reversing 

the trial court’s order, the Graffiti Protective court explained the 

complaint did not arise from the City of Pico Rivera’s protected

activity despite multiple statements by city employees quoted in 

the petition: The statements by government officials “assist in 

telling the story,” the court explained, but the claims are based 

not on those statements but on “state and municipal laws 

requiring the City [of Pico Rivera] to award certain contracts 

through competitive bidding.” (Graffiti Protective, at pp. 1215, 

1224; cf. City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 425 

[distinguishing between complaints against a public entity for 

“acts of governance” preceding or following statements by 

government officials, which would not be subject to a special 
14

motion to strike, and a complaint against the officials based on 

their statements themselves, which could be].)

Integral’s reliance on Sugarman v. Brown (2021) 

73 Cal.App.5th 152 (Sugarman) is misplaced. In Sugarman a 

bank’s former board president and chief executive officer sued the 

bank’s lead auditor, among others, contending the auditor’s 

fraudulent misrepresentations attached to the bank’s 10-K 

annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC) had induced him to hold onto his bank 

securities. (Id. at p. 170.) The auditor filed a special motion to 

strike, asserting statements made in a report filed with the SEC 

were protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), as a 

statement made in connection with an issue under consideration 

or review by a government body. The trial court agreed and 

granted the motion after also finding the plaintiff had not carried 

his merits burden. Division Eight of this court affirmed the trial 

court’s order, finding, as to the first step of the two-step antiSLAPP analysis, the representations in the audit report were 

protected activity, and that the plaintiff’s claim for fraud arose 

from that protected activity. (See Sugarman, at p. 173 [“[h]ere, 

the audit report in the 10-K filing clearly ‘forms the basis for’ 

plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claims and ‘“gives rise to [the 

auditor’s] asserted liability”’”].)

Integral’s characterization of its location map and 

application to the City for a permit as protected speech and 

petitioning activity misses the point. Its location map, like the 

bank’s 10-K filing with the SEC in Sugarman, may well be 

speech or petitioning activity, but that is only part of the firststep inquiry. The speech or petitioning activity must also be the 

wrong alleged. Here, the City’s failure to apply its licensed-
15

surveyor rule equally to all applicants is the basis for the City’s 

liability, not Integral’s submission of its map or any statement 

contained in it.

b. The City’s failure to disqualify Integral from the 

applicant pool 

Tacitly acknowledging the City’s decision to approve 

Integral’s application for a conditional use permit is not protected 

activity subject to a special motion to strike, Integral argues 

SweetFlower’s petition/complaint goes “well beyond attacking the 

decision to approve” Integral’s permit application. SweetFlower’s 

petition/complaint also includes a claim the City violated its rules 

when it failed to disqualify Integral from eligibility after Integral 

privately contacted City employees on multiple occasions during 

the screening process. Its private contacts concerning its 

application, Integral contends, is protected activity within the 

meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).

Even assuming Integral’s private inquiries to the City 

during the initial screening process constituted statements made 

in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 

government body (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), that conduct is not the 

basis for the City’s alleged liability. SweetFlower alleged the 

City had a duty under its rules to disqualify any applicant that 

privately contacted the City during the screening process. It is 

the City’s acts (or omissions) of governance, its failure to 

disqualify Integral, not Integral’s private inquiries, that underlie

SweetFlower’s claim against the City. (See generally Park,

supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1060, 1063; Graffiti Protective, supra, 

181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224.) 
16

c. SweetFlower’s request for relief

Relying on dicta in Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. 

(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1062 (Rudisill), a case decided by Division 

Two of this court, Integral argues SweetFlower’s request for an 

injunction barring Integral from using an invalid conditional use 

permit to obtain further permits is a direct attack on Integral’s 

petitioning activity that subjects that “claim” to a special motion 

to strike. In Rudisill petitioners sought a writ of mandate 

directed to the City of Los Angeles and the California Coastal 

Commission, challenging various permit decisions and naming 

several real property developers as real parties in interests. The 

developers filed a special motion to strike pursuant to section 

425.16. The superior court denied the motion, ruling the petition

for writ of mandate was directed to government decisionmaking, 

not the protected activity of the developers in seeking the 

permits. The superior court also sanctioned the developers for 

filing a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion, concluding any reasonable 

attorney would have recognized that the writ petition concerned 

government decisionmaking, not the protected activities of the 

developers. (Id. at p. 1069.) 

In their appeal from the sanctions order (the developers did 

not appeal the order denying their anti-SLAPP motion), the 

developers argued their special motion to strike was not frivolous 

because they reasonably believed, based on some of the 

allegations in the petition relating to their piecemeal methods to 

obtain approvals, the mandamus action had asserted a claim 

against them for their protected conduct. The Rudisill court held 

the motion was not frivolous, the only issue before it. In dicta 

supporting the superior court’s ruling denying the special motion 

to strike, the Rudisill court also observed, in the language 
17

Integral emphasizes, that the petitions for writ of mandate did 

not seek an order directly affecting the developers’ participation 

in the government process “such as, for example, an order 

precluding [the developers] from submitting any further 

permits[].” (Rudisill, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.) 

Integral argues that, by seeking an injunction barring 

Integral from obtaining additional permits based on an invalid 

conditional use permit, SweetFlower has alleged the very claim 

the Rudisill court suggested would be subject to a special motion 

to strike. Integral reads too much into language that simply 

recognizes claims of wrongdoing directed to blocking petitioning 

activity could be subject to a special motion to strike. Here, 

SweetFlower’s request for an injunction, even if directed to 

Integral,7 is not based on Integral’s alleged liability. (See Bonni,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012 [when considering whether a claim 

arises from protected speech or petitioning activity within the 

meaning of section 425.16, the focus is on the “‘“acts on which 

liability is based”’”].) The request for a remedy alone, 

unsupported by a claim for liability, may well be subject to some 

other challenge,8 but it does not create a claim where there is not 

one, let alone subject the remedy to a special motion to strike. 

(See Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 

1177, 1187 [anti-SLAPP motion is properly directed to a cause of 

7

SweetFlower has now clarified its request for an injunction 

is directed to the City only, not to Integral. 

8

SweetFlower’s request for injunctive relief, to the extent it 

encompasses Integral’s activities without any concomitant 

allegations of Integral’s liability, is certainly questionable and 

may well be an appropriate target of a traditional motion to 

strike by Integral. 
18

action, not the relief sought; “‘[i]njunctive relief is a remedy, not a 

cause of action’”]; Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 

154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162 [same].)9

In sum, Integral did not carry its threshold burden to 

demonstrate SweetFlower’s claims arose from protected activity 

under section 425.16. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

denying the special motion to strike. 

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Integral’s special motion to 

strike is affirmed. SweetFlower is to recover its costs on appeal. 

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

9 Although Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, supra, 

179 Cal.App.4th 1177, and this division’s opinion in Marlin v. 

Aimco Venezia, LLC, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 154, were decided 

before Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376, the distinction in those cases 

between the wrong alleged and the remedy sought remains valid 

post-Baral: It is the claim, not the remedy, to which an antiSLAPP motion is properly directed. (See Baral, at p. 395 [antiSLAPP motion is properly directed to “allegations of protected 

activity that are asserted as grounds for relief”; “[t]he targeted 

claim must amount to a ‘cause of action’ in the sense that it is 

alleged to justify a remedy’”], italics omitted.)