STATE OF MOK TAhii, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

DONNIE NOLAN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM. D~str~et Court of the Th~rteenth Judlc~al District, 

In and For the County of Yellowstone, 

Honorable G Todd Baugh, Judge Presiding 

COGNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Vellssa Eduards, 4ttomey at Law. Billmgs, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Honorable M~ke McGrath, Attorney General; Mlcheal S. 

Welienstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Dennis Paxinos: County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

Subm!ttcd on Rr~efs. July 25. 2002 

Decided January 30,2003 

Filed: 
ChicPdusticc Karla '4, Gray delivered the Opinion of the Co:iri. 

y1 Donnic Nolan appcals from ihc judgment rind senirslce entered bj the Thirteenth 

Judicial District Coiln, Yclicv~stone County, on a jury verdict coni.ictiny hirn of criminal 

endangermei~t and resisting an-cst. We afirin. 

72 LVe address the following restated issues: 

13 1. Did the District Court en by instructing the jury on flight? 

74 2. Did the District Coun en by improperly considering Nolan's poverty and social 

relationships in determining his sentence? 

BtICKGROLTD 

75 On December 9; 1998, the State of Montana charged Nolan by information with the 

felony offenses of assault on apeace officer andcriminal endailgerment. The case proceeded 

to a jury trial at which the following factual information was elicited through testimony. 

116 During the early morning hotirs of December 6, 1998? Billings Police Department 

Officer Shawn Finnegan observed a vehicle traveling 52 miles an hour in a 35 mile-per-hour 

specd zone. Finuegan activated the overhead lights and siren on his patrol car, but the driver 

did not pull over. Instead, the driver continued driving at high speed through a residential 

neighborhood. Fimlegan was unable to safely match the other vehicle's specd because of the 

ice and snow on the road and the parked ears on both sides of the street. The speeding 

vehicle proceeded past bvo stop signs without slowing and eventually crashed into innltiple 

parked vehicles, which brought it to a stop. 
77 Dcnise Biiggio ran from the passenger side of :ha: crashcd vckicle, screaming and 

crying. Her face ~vas bloodied. After tending to Boggiil: Fifinecan - observed that no one else 

\+-as in thc vehicle, Boggio told Finnrgan that "iolan was the driver: and deseribcd him and 

his clothing. Nolan and Boggio had argued while driving, he had hit her and she was scared 

because of his driving: but he had not responded to her requests to be let out of illc vehicle. 

78 Cindy Johnson \+as asleep in her home, located near the crash scene, \+hen she was 

awakened by the sound of someone coming in her front door. She got out of bed and 

encountered Yolan-a stranger to her-in her house. Fle was bleeding and stated that someone 

was trying to kill him. When Johnson said she was going to call the police, Nolan told her 

not to do so, saying that he had been trying to sell drugs to the person who tried to kill him. 

Johnson called the police, but Nolan left the house before officers arrived. 

79 Shortly thereaftcr and near the same area, Officer David Dierenfield spotted Kolan 

and asked to talk to him. Nolan told Dierenfield he was not cvbo they were looking for and 

asked to be left alone. Dierenfield then told Nolan he was under arrest and asked him to 

remove his left hand from his coat pocket. Xolan kept hrs hand in his pocket and began to 

walk towards Dierenfield. After several orders to show his hands, Nolan continued to walk 

towards Dierenfieid wit11 his hand in his pocket. Dierenfield drew his weapon and moved 

behind his patrol car for cover. As he continued towards Dierenfield, Kolan said "Go ahcad 

and shoot." Eventually llolan removed his cmpty !land from his pocket. Diererificld again 
told Xohan he was under rrrrest, but Xoian turned and walked away. Diererifleid hotstcrcd 

his v/er:.pon and fo!?oived Yoian, rvha began to rdn. 

4: 10 When DicrcnfieId caught Xoian, the two men fought, both of ihen~ slipping on thc ice. 

Nolan broke free and ran. Diereniield caught him, and the two fought again. Several other 

officers arri~vec! and %%ere able to s~ibdue and handcuff X~oIan after pepper-spraying him. 

During the altercation, Dierenficld received cuts and serapes to his knuckles and knee, and 

one of his fiitgernails was partially tom off. 

71 1 Thejury ultimately eonvictedXolanof criminal endangerment, a felony; but could not 

agree on a verdict on the felony charge of assault on a peace officer. Instead, the jury 

returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest. 

7/12 Nolan did not appear at his original sentencing hearing; and the District Court issued 

a warrant for his arrest. Nola:: was arrested severa! months latcr in southern California and 

returned to Montana. On May 8,2000, the District Court sentenced him to five years in the 

Montana State Prison on the criminal endangerment conviction and six months in the 

Yellowstone County Detention Facility on the resisting arrest conviction, with the sentences 

to run concurrently. The District Court listed numerous reasons for its sentence. Nolan 

appeals. 

DISCIISSION 

7113 1. Did the District Court err by instructing the jury on flight? 
'i(i 1 - ""7 a' 4 714 ,4fier Nolan's trial> we deteimined in State ~L,, Arfnl/> 1911 .A r ~9 J, +6: 297 ?v,lont. 

. . l i 1,: lib. 991 P.2d 922: qi 36. ?ha: flight insrructions improperij- iqcct argiimenl into a trial 

.. , court's instmctia~~s and that si!ch comment sboltl be iimlted :.J counsel. XKe concluded that, 

"in future cases," even where evidence of flight has becn ~ropedy admitted, a flight 

instrtction should not be gicen. finil, u5 46,48. 

115 In the present case, Nolan objected to the State's proposed fl~ght instruction on the 

grounds that the instruction was not timely filed and the circumstances did not uarrant a 

flight instruction. The District Court overruled the objections and instructed the jury as 

follows: 

If you are satisfied that the crime charged in the information has been 

committed by someone, then you may take into consideration any testimony 

showing, or tending to show, flight by the defendant. This testimony may be 

considered by the jury as a circumstance tending to prove a consciot:sness of 

guilt, but is not sufficient of itself to prove guilt. The weight to be given such 

circumstance and the significance if any, to be attached to it_ are matters for 

the jury to determine. 

Nolan asserts entitlement to the application of Hall to his case 

716 Our general rule is that an appellant must show that an objection mas made at trtal on 

the same basis as the crror asserted on appeal. See State v. Davis, 2000 MT 199,T 38,300 

Mont. 458,1138,5 P.3d 547, lj 38 (citations omitted). Requiring a defendant to raise the issue 

in the district court through a specific objection gibes the prosecution and the trial court the 

ability to maid or correct the purported crror. Unvis, bj 38. 
717 Since Hall; we have rejecieci--on three occasions-appcll:i~~ts' arguments against a 

flight instruction when the proper and spccific objction was not made at trial. See llavis> 

$7 38-39; State v Baker, 2000 hi1 ?(IS, 7;: 29--?!3,301 "clan?. 408, T;tl29-3ii, I5 P.3$27% 2": 

29-30; State v. I~~ctterz, 1399 lClT 295,T 67,297 Mont. 127, f 67,991 P.2d 939,T 67. Yvlien 

the defendant does not raise a "'finil-tyc" abjection to the flight instraction during thz 

settlement of instn~ctions in district court, appellate review of that claim is waived. Davis, 

7 39. Nolan concedes he did not raise the proper objection at trial. 

718 Here, however, unlike the defendants in Davis, Baker and Hatterz, Nolan asserts 

entitlement to consideration of his f-lnll-related claim on appeal pursuant to 5 46-20-701(2), 

MCA. Section 46-20-701(2), MCA, allows a claim of error based on constitutional rights 

to be raised on appeal even when not objected to at trial fthe appellant establishes the error 

u-as prejudicial and "tltle right assei-ted in tlre claim did not exist at the time of trial and has 

been determilled to be retroactive in its ilpplication[.]" Nolan contends his citnstitutional 

rtght to a fair trial was v~olated by the giving of the fllght ~nstruction and the error was 

prejudicial. We need not consider these contentions, however, because 9 46-20-701(2)(a), 

IMCA, applies only where the right asserted "has been determined to be retroactive in its 

application." \lie stated without equivocation in Ifall that our ruling that flight instructions 

should not be given applied only to "future trials." Hall, vli 46,18. In other u-ords, the ruling 

bvas prospective, not retroactive, in its application and Nolan's trial occurred before that 

decision. 
719 We concindc that Kolan svsived his right to raise a Hail-related objection on appeal 

tinder Davis, which requires that the proper objection be made at trial. \Vc fu-ther conclude 

that Nolan has not ax? the requirements of 5 46-20-701(2)(a), MCA1 for raising a claimed 

constitutional error on appeal to which objection was not made at trial. Ii:e hold, therefore, 

that Nolan has not established emor in the District Court's giving of the flight inshuction. 

720 2. Did thc District Court en by improperly considering Kolan's po~erty and social 

relationships in determining his sentence? 

721 The District Court sentc~lced lljolan to five years for criminal endangcmlcnt and six 

months for resisting arrest. Under 5 45-5-207(2), MCA, the maximum sentence for criminal 

endangerment is ten years. Under 3 45-7-301(3), MCA, the maximum sentence for resisting 

arrest is six months. Thc sentences are within statutory parameters. Nolan nevertheless 

contends his sentence :,iolates S 46-18-101(3)je), MCA, and his constitutional due process 

rights. We address each contention in turn, mindful that \uc review- criminal sentences for 

legality only, confining our review to whetl~cr the sentence is within statutory parameters. 

Our review of constitutional questions is pleilary. State v. Pvitchett, 2000 MT 261,Iq 6,27, 

302 Mont. 1,711 6,27, 11 P.3d 539, $7 6, 27. 

$122 Section 46-IS-lOl(S)(c), MCA, which is part of Montana's correctional and 

sentencing policy, provides, "Scntencin_g practices must be neutral with respect to the 

offender's race, gender, religion: national origin, or social or economic status." Nolan 

contends the record indicates his sentence was based on the prohibited factors of "social or 
economic status." We note that the statute does not &fine "econornii status," nor does either 

.* . . p"y c!early do so, Nolan apparently equates "cconornic status to rndrgency or polrefly and, 

Tor pnvosees BF this opinion only, vie will do the same. 

723 Nolan presented the testimony of three witnesses during the sentencing hearing. The 

thrust of the kstirnor~y was that Nolan needed counseling, no? prison. In addition, each of 

Nolan's witnesses, including Boggio, testified in some fasbion that Nolan is a good father, 

Neither the State nor the District Court inquired about this subject during Boggio's 

testimony. After Nolan's second witness, Cherise Lynn McArthur, testified that Kolan was 

a good father, the court inquired how many children Nolan has, and MeArthur responded "I 

believe he has five-four?" On cross-exan~ination, the State also inquired about the number 

of Nolan's children. On cross-examination ofNolan's third witness, Cassandra Vargas, the 

State asked how many children Nolan has, and S'argas responded ""Un;, five---six, actually, 

I'm sony." Almost immediately thereafter, the State asked Vargas whetller Kolan supports 

any of the children, and she stated "not that I know of." The transcript reflects that Vargas 

then laughed. Nolan also gave a lengthy statement to the court and talked about how much 

he loves his children and they love him. The court inquired about the extent to which he 

supports the children and Nolan's various answers reflect that the support, if any, is sporadic. 

He also acknowledged a 540,000 hospital debt on which he has paid nothing. 

724 In its written sentencing order, the District Court listed numerous reasons for the 

sentence imposed, including the violence of thc felony offense at issue, Kolan's 25 traffic- 
rciatcd convictions, 2 prior felon; convictions involving violence, and the nuineraus 

opportunilics previously git-en %!an to be a rssponsible, lam--abiding citizen. In addition, 

coufi onsid.-.red that "wi.i?i;- employed [Xoian] fi3ili.d to he n.sp;_miihii. to.jardi pagng 

any debts including non-support for the number of dependents." 

'. 

725 Nolan argues the District Court rclied on his poverty as a factor in sentenslug in 

violation of 9 46-1 S-101(3)(c), MCA. 12s set forth abo~~e, therecord does not support this 

argument. While the court notedNolanls failure to pay his debts, the record does not indicate 

that poverty was a factor. As a general matter; failure to pay debts does not equal poverty. 

Moreover, the court's obsewation that Nolan did not make payments toward his debts was 

expressly limited to times when Kolan was employed. We conclude the District Court did 

not rely on Nolan's alleged poverty in violation of 3 46-1 8-101(3)(c), MCA. 

qj26 Nolan also contends Iris scntcnce violates 5 36-18-101(3j(c), MCA, because the 

District Court focused on his "social status" by inquiring about such things as the number 

of children he had fathered out of wedlock. His contention is without merit. 

727 First, Nolan did not object to the inquiries at the time they were made, as required by 

Rule 103(a)(l), M.R.Evid. Second, Uolan opened the door to the court's inquiries by 

presenting both witness testimony and his own statement regarding being a good father and 

loving his children. Having done so, he cannot now complain that the court inquired furtl~er 

into those subjects. Finaiiy, the court's sentencing order, from which this appeal is takcn, 

does not mention or rely on the number of Nolan's children. LVe conclude the District Court 
did not rely or, ";olaii's social status in violatioii 0" 46-1 8-10 L(2)(<), "IlcA, in snlcncing 

Xola:1. 

. , . . 

"28 \ire ne.xttur11 iio]an's c!a!m t~ai his sentence r~c!.tes his consliiidonai dxil process 

rights. He first asserrs the District Court's viola~ion of 5 46-!5-IDl(?)(c)~ klCAt resulted in 

a violation of his due proccss righb, Having derermincd above that the coult did not violate 

S 46-1 8-1 01 (3)(c), MCA, we need not address this contention further. 

729 Nolan also makes a broader due process argument, hou~xer. Quoting from Stnte v 

Fai-veil (1984), 207 Mont. 483, 497, 676 P.2d 168. 176 (citation omitted), he asserts the 

court's consideration of his "financial background in setting. . . a sentcnce [was] so arbitrary 

or unfair as to be a denial of due process." He also relies on I'ritclzctt, ljsi 35, 37, u here vVe 

held that a defendant's due process rights were >iolated when the district court record led us 

to conclude $lie sentence was based on indigency. Farrell and Pi-ifchert are readily 

distinguishable. 

530 in Farvell, the defendant was convicted of theft of public assistance funds and was 

given the maximum ten-year sentence, all suspended. Farrell, 207 Mont. at 487, 676 P.2d 

at 171. The sentencing court stated that it was imposing the maximurn sentence, suspended, 

because it did not think the defendant could pay the restitution imposed in less than 10 years. 

lirrrell, 207 hlont. at 394,676 P.2d at 174. The defendant appealed the sentence. 

73 1 lVe stated in Fcivueil our belief that his due process rights might have been violated 

because indigency may have been the sentencing criterion, which would infringe on the 
fi~iindan~ental fairness protected by due process rights. Fiiurzil, 207 Mont. at 498, 676 P.Zd 

at 177 (citation omittcdj. ""Due process r-equircs only that indigcncy or poverty not be used 

as !he touchstone fir imposing the ma:i.imum a!lovgablc piiaisi?mt.nt." F~~n-gli, 207 Mort. 

at 499, 675 P.2d at 177. 

732 in Pritciieti, the delrcndant was convicted of burgiary and given the li,axirnun32C-year 

sentence, all suspended. Pritchetr, 7 26. The record revealed that the person who prepared 

the presentenee iilvestigation report explicitly recommended the sentence "[tlo giw the 

Defendant adequate time to pay off the restitution." Prirclzett, S 3. We determined that, 

while the sentencing court did not expressly state it was doing so, sufficient evidence of 

record supported a conclusion that the length of the sentence was based on the defendant's 

indigency, thus violating his due process rights. Pritchen, 717 30, 34-35. 

533 In significant contrast to Fai-i-ell and Yriichett, Nolan did not receive the maximuin 

sentence for his felony offense and his sentence did not include restitution. Moreover, it u-as 

clear in Farrell and Pritclzett that those defendants' indigency was the "touchstone" for 

imposing the maximum allo\vable punishment. Here, the District Court listed numerous 

reasons for its sentence, including a criminal record of violent felony offenses. Only one of 

the considerations was that Nolan did not pay his debts "while employcd" and, as discussed 

above, failure to pay debts while employcd is not equivalent to poverty or indigency. Finally, 

it is clear in this case that the passing refkrence to Xolan's failure to pay his debts was not 
"tl~e touchstone" of his sentc~~ce, We c6nclude that Nolan's duc process rights were nor 

333 Having found no statutory or constitutional violation, we hold thc District i'nur: did 

not err in sentencing holan 

*I35 Affirmed. 

We concur: