DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Annual Review of Mission Performance 

United States Coast Guard (FY 2006) 

OIG-08-30 February 2008

(Revised) 
 

 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 February 28, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report presents the annual review of the U.S. Coast Guard’s mission performance, as required 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002. It is based on 

interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, 

and a review of applicable documents. 

The analysis herein has been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and has been 

discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report will 

result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of 

those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................1 

Background............................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................................. 3
 

Growth in Total Resource Hours Has Leveled Off ...........................................................................3 

Coast Guard Experienced Difficulty Maintaining Readiness and Operational 

Capability of Marine Assets..........................................................................................................4 

Mission Performance Leaves Room For Improvement................................................................5 

Barriers to Improving Performance Still Exist ..................................................................................6 

Performance Measures Are Not Always Measurable or Clear..........................................................8 

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................9 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Non-Homeland Security Missions as Reported by the Coast Guard .......................10 

Appendix B: Homeland Security Missions as Reported by the Coast Guard ................................20 

Appendix C: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ...........................................................................28 

Appendix D: Management Comments to the Draft Report............................................................29 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to this Report ............................................................................32 

Appendix F: Report Distribution ..................................................................................................33 

Abbreviations 

ATON Aids-to-Navigation 

C3 Command, Control, and Communication 

DR Defense Readiness 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

LMR Living Marine Resources 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

P.L. Public Law 

PTFMC Percent Time Fully Mission Capable 

PWCS Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 

SAR Search and Rescue 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

This report presents our annual review of the U.S. Coast Guard’s mission 

performance as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. To address 

the Act’s requirements, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s reported resource 

hours used to perform the various homeland security and non-homeland 

security missions, as well as reported performance goals and results, from FY 

2001 through FY 2006. 

Although we did not verify the accuracy of Coast Guard data, this data shows 

that total resource hours have increased in every period from the baseline of 

pre-September 11, 2001, through FY 2005 and then decreased slightly (less 

than one percent) in FY 2006. The Coast Guard’s mission performance leaves 

room for improvement because it did not meet performance goals for three of 

its missions – Undocumented Migrant Interdiction, Defense Readiness, and 

Marine Safety. In addition, the Coast Guard missed its target performance 

goals by less than one percent for three non-homeland security missions: Search 

and Rescue, Aids-to-Navigation, and Living Marine Resources. The Coast 

Guard’s performance measures are not always measurable or clear. The Coast 

Guard acknowledged there are limitations to some of the measures it uses and is 

working to improve several metrics to better reflect actual performance. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard experienced difficulty 

maintaining readiness and operational capability of aging marine assets. The 

Coast Guard also faces major barriers to improving or sustaining its mission 

performance, including major asset decommissioning and displacement, 

limited and finite assets to respond to crises, and challenges with the delivery 

of key Deepwater assets. 

The Coast Guard concurred with our draft report regarding: growth in 

resource hours, difficulty maintaining readiness and operational capability of 

marine assets, and existing barriers to improving performance. The Coast 

Guard concurred in part to our conclusion that performance measures are not 

always measurable or clear. In contrast, the Coast Guard did not concur with 

our conclusion that mission performance leaves room for improvement. The 

Coast Guard’s comments to our report are incorporated into the body of this 

report, as appropriate, and are included as Appendix D. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 1 
 

Background 

Coast Guard Missions. Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 20021 

defines the Coast Guard’s missions as either non-homeland security missions 

or homeland security missions as follows: 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

• Search and Rescue (SAR) 

• Aids-to-Navigation (ATON) 

• Ice Operations 

• Living Marine Resources (LMR) 

• Marine Safety 

• Marine Environmental Protection 

Homeland Security Missions 

• Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) 

• Drug Interdiction 

• Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 

• Defense Readiness 

• Other Law Enforcement 

In addition, Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 prohibits the 

Secretary from substantially or significantly reducing the missions of the 

Coast Guard or the Coast Guard’s capability to perform those missions, 

subsequent to transfer of the Coast Guard to DHS. 

Resource Hours. The Coast Guard uses resource hours – generally the 

number of flight hours (for aircraft) and underway hours (for boats and 

cutters) dedicated to a specific mission – to determine the amount of time that 

is expended in each of its non-homeland security and homeland security 

mission areas. During our review, we analyzed the total number of resource 

hours reported by the Coast Guard prior to September 11, 2001,2

 through FY 

2006. We did not, however, verify the resource hour data reported by the 

Coast Guard, nor did we validate that the Coast Guard had accurately 

classified resource hour use for each mission. We assessed total resource 

hours for the 11 individual missions in order to identify the changes in each. 

Performance Goals and Results. The Coast Guard uses outcome-oriented 

performance goals and measures to assess results of each Coast Guard mission 

1

 Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002, Section 888 directs the Inspector General to conduct an annual review that 

assesses the performance of all Coast Guard missions, with a particular emphasis on non-homeland security missions. 

2

 The Coast Guard-calculated baseline (annual average based on eight fiscal year quarters preceding September 11, 2001) from which 

changes in resource hours since the September 11, 2001, attacks could be estimated. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 2
 
 

in achieving current year goals, and to report past performance. For example, 

the performance goal for Drug Interdiction is to reduce the flow of illegal 

drugs entering the U.S. via non-commercial maritime shipping sources, and its 

corresponding performance measure is the removal rate for cocaine that is 

shipped via non-commercial maritime means. Performance results provide 

information that enables the President, Department, Congress, and the public 

to assess the effectiveness of the Coast Guard’s mission performance and 

stewardship of resources. Managers and executives use performance results 

to help gauge performance against resources appropriated by Congress for 

each Coast Guard mission, which are aligned with the Department of 

Homeland Security’s strategic goals. Performance measures are also used to 

monitor actions, such as the number of incursions into the U.S. Exclusive 

Economic Zone, and enable executives to make decisions regarding future 

priorities. We did not verify the accuracy of the reported performance 

measure results. 

Results of Review 

Growth in Total Resource Hours Has Leveled Off 

Total Coast Guard reported resource hours have significantly increased since 

the baseline period, with increases in every period through FY 2005 and then 

a decrease by less than one percent in 2006, as depicted in the chart below. 

Some of the FY 2006 decrease in resource hours is the result of the Coast 

Guard’s decision to permanently withdraw eight 123’ Island Class Patrol 

Boats (123’ patrol boats) from service on November 30, 2006, due to 

structural design and performance problems. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

 Re source Hours-All M issions 

0 

100000 

200000 

300000 

400000 

500000 

600000 

700000 

800000 

900000 

baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours

Homeland Security Missions 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 3
 
 

Prior to FY 2001, the non-homeland security missions represented the largest 

percentage of resource hours within the Coast Guard. Following September 

11, 2001, the Coast Guard dedicated a larger percentage of resource hours to 

homeland security missions than for non-homeland security missions. After 

an initial drop in non-homeland security resource hours in FY 2002, the nonhomeland resource hours increased through FY 2006 bringing total nonhomeland security hours to approximately 16% above baseline levels. The 

percentage of resource hours dedicated to homeland security grew until FY 

2004 and decreased marginally in FY 2005 and again in FY 2006. 

Assessments of Coast Guard reported resource hours for all missions, and 

individual non-homeland security missions and homeland security missions, 

are included in Appendices A and B. 

Coast Guard Experienced Difficulty Maintaining Readiness and 

Operational Capability of Marine Assets 

A Coast Guard official testified that the agency experienced difficulty in 

maintaining the readiness and operational capability of its cutter fleets, 

including the 270’ (commissioned between 1983 and 1991), and 210’ 

(commissioned between 1964 and 1969). These vessels have, on average, 

been in service for 30 years, are nearing the end of their useful service life, 

and are increasingly expensive to repair. Further, in September 2006, the US 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that as ATON assets 

continue to age, their condition is declining, though not precipitously.3 As a 

result, we conclude the Coast Guard may experience difficulty sustaining 

resource hours necessary to meet ever-increasing homeland security mission 

requirements and its traditional non-homeland security mission requirements. 

The Coast Guard measures the time that its cutters, icebreakers, patrol boats, 

tugs, and buoy tenders are fully mission capable, known as Percent Time 

Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC). The PTFMC measures the absence of 

deficiencies in mission critical equipment, which causes a major degradation 

or loss of a primary mission. For example, the 13 - 270’ medium endurance 

cutters were fully mission capable 51% of the time during FY 2006. Table 1, 

on the following page, shows the Coast Guard’s calculation of the percentage 

of time each asset class of cutters was fully mission capable for FY 2006. 

3

 GAO-06-979, Coast Guard Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; 

Effect on Mission Performance Appears Mixed. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 4
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1. Percent Time Fully Mission Capable as Reported by the Coast 

Guard, FY 2006 

Coast Guard Cutters 

No. of 

Assets 

Percent of Time 

Fully Mission 

Capable 

FY 2006 

378’ High Endurance Cutter (WHEC) 12 43% 

282’ Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) 1 56% 

270’ Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) 13 51% 

213’ Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) 1 64% 

210’ Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) 14 64% 

420’ Icebreaker (WAGB) 1 80% 

399’ Polar Class Icebreaker (WAGB) 2 12% 

123’ Patrol Boat (WPB) 8 16% 

110’ Patrol Boat (WPB) 41 57% 

87’ Coastal Patrol Boat (WPB) 65 70% 

179’ Patrol Coastal Boat (WPC) 5 67% 

240’ Seagoing Buoy Tender/Icebreaker (WLBB) 1 0% 

225’ Seagoing Buoy Tender (WLB) 16 52% 

175’ Coastal Buoy Tender (WLM) 14 75% 

160’ Inland Construction Tender (WLIC) 4 41% 

100’ Inland Construction Tender (WLIC) 1 93% 

75’ Inland Construction Tender (WLIC) 8 72% 

100’ Inland Buoy Tender (WLI) 2 63% 

65’ Inland Buoy Tender (WLI) 3 93% 

140’ Icebreaking Tug (WTGB) 9 77% 

75’ River Buoy Tender (WLR) 12 61% 

65’ River Buoy Tender (WLR) 6 91% 

65’ Small Harbor Tug (WYTL) 11 67% 

Total 250 

 Source: U.S. Coast Guard 

Mission Performance Leaves Room for Improvement 

The Coast Guard reported it is not meeting all of its performance goals despite 

a substantial increase in resource hours since FY 2001. For FY 2006 the 

Coast Guard has been more successful in meeting its goals for its homeland 

security missions, meeting three of five (60%) goals, compared to meeting 

two of six (33%) goals for non-homeland security missions. However, three 

of the four performance measures for non-homeland security missions, where 

goals were not achieved, were statistically insignificant. For example, the 

Coast Guard reported for FY 2006, it saved 85.27% of mariner’s lives where 

the goal was 86%; there were 1,765 collisions, allisions, and groundings for 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 5
 
the ATON mission, although the goal was 1,748 or fewer; and finally the 

Coast Guard reported 96.6% of fisherman were complying with regulations 

where the goal was 97%. 

Of the 11 Coast Guard missions (six non-homeland security and five 

homeland security), the Coast Guard reported it met its performance goal for 

all six years surveyed for just one mission: Marine Environmental Protection. 

The Coast Guard first established a performance measure for the Marine 

Safety mission in FY 2003 and met its goal in three out of four years since a 

goal was established. In addition, the Coast Guard only developed a riskbased performance measure for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 

mission in FY 2005 and met its goal in 2006. Six of the remaining missions 

did not consistently meet the goals during the same six-year period, including 

LMR, SAR, Ice Operations, Drug Interdiction, Undocumented Migrant 

Interdiction and Other Law Enforcement. Lastly, Defense Readiness has not 

met its goals for any of the six years. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the failure of the Coast Guard to meet a 

performance goal is not necessarily indicative of underlying performance 

problems. When higher priority threats arise, the Coast Guard shifts 

resources. As a result, missions that “donate” resources to deal with higherpriorities can temporarily experience lower performance. We agree this may 

impact mission performance for periods of time, such as the impact of the 

removal of eight 123’ cutters on the Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 

mission and the resultant shifting of assets to cover for these removed cutters. 

However, the Coast Guard establishes the goals they want to achieve and they 

need to work to achieve these goals. 

Assessments of reported performance goals and results for all Coast Guard 

missions, and individual non-homeland security missions and homeland 

security missions, are included in Appendices A and B. 

Barriers to Improving Performance Still Exist 

The Coast Guard faces three major barriers to improving or sustaining its 

mission performance: 

1. Major asset decommissioning and displacement, 

2. Limited and finite assets to respond to crises, and 

3. Challenges with key Deepwater Assets. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 6
 
 

 

Major Asset Decommissioning and Displacement 

The slight decrease in total Coast Guard reported resource hours between FY 

2005 and FY 2006 can be somewhat attributed to the poor performance of the 

123’ patrol boats. Per a Coast Guard official, the November 2006 removal of 

these assets from service will impede missions, including the Coast Guard’s 

Undocumented Migrant Interdiction mission. As a result, the Coast Guard is 

currently short 25,000 patrol boat mission hours. To compensate for this 

capability gap, for FY 2007, the Coast Guard reports it plans to shift 87’ patrol 

boats and buoy tenders to South Florida on an as needed basis and multi-crew 

some 110’ patrol boats. 

Limited and Finite Assets To Respond To Crises 

The Coast Guard has a limited and finite number of assets, and therefore 

available resource hours, to respond to an extended crisis. With no additional 

reserve assets for use in catastrophic situations, the Coast Guard must use 

resource hours normally dedicated to other missions to respond to crises and 

to meet often changing mission priorities. One of the reasons the Coast Guard 

has not been able to meet its goals for asset availability is the Deepwater 

acquisitions program, which has continued to encounter difficulties, most 

recently in the acquisition of the Fast Response Cutters. These cutters are 

scheduled to replace the Coast Guard’s aging patrol boat fleet. Also the 

Rescue 21 program4

 has been plagued by delays, technical problems, cost 

escalation, and a delay in full implementation, which has slipped by five 

years. 

Challenges with Key Deepwater Assets 

While some Deepwater assets have been delivered, others have encountered 

significant problems that have created a number of challenges for the Coast 

Guard. These challenges include delivery delays and loss of operational 

capabilities. For example, the Coast Guard is assessing alternatives as a result 

of the delays with the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. In addition, design 

problems associated with the National Security Cutter and the Fast Response 

Cutter will potentially hinder future operations. The Coast Guard is taking a 

variety of actions to address these challenges, such as relying more heavily on 

existing assets, making plans to purchase off-the-shelf assets, and planning 

corrective structural modifications. 

4

 Rescue 21 is a program that will assist the Coast Guard in carrying out the SAR and all the other missions the Coast 

Guard performs by providing an advanced command, control, and communications (C3) system. According to Coast 

Guard officials, this new C3 system will be more robust, more reliable, and more capable than the current system. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 7
 
 

Performance Measures Are Not Always Measurable or Clear 

Performance measures can be weakened when they involve the Coast Guard’s 

reliance on data or estimates received from outside sources. However, the 

Coast Guard presumes that government-owned data is of sufficient rigor to be 

used in drawing performance conclusions. For example, both states and the 

Army Corp of Engineers provide data in support of the Coast Guard’s Marine 

Safety mission performance. However, the Coast Guard does not test the 

reliability of this data because it considers it a fair presumption that 

government-owned data is of sufficient rigor to be used by other agencies. 

Also, estimates based on intelligence data and economic conditions of 

Caribbean countries affect performance measures for the Undocumented 

Migrant Interdiction mission. For this reason, the Coast Guard is changing its 

performance measure in FY 2007 for the Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 

mission. 

Performance measures can also help managers evaluate related performance. 

For example, the ATON performance measure is based on the five-year average 

of collisions, allisions, and groundings, which is also related to Marine Safety. 

Because research has shown the majority of maritime accidents occur as a result 

of human error, a more accurate measure of ATON performance may be the 

percentage of fully operational and properly positioned aids-to-navigation. 

In August 2006, the GAO reported that although Coast Guard performance 

measures are generally sound, the data is not always clear.5

 For example, 

GAO reported for performance measures related to domestic ice-breaking 

operations, the Coast Guard measures success based on the annual number of 

days waterways are closed because of ice. However, this measure actually 

reflects closures of only one critical waterway – St. Mary’s River, a 

connecting channel between Lakes Superior and Huron, which acts as a 

thoroughfare for international shipping. As a result, the measure could 

confuse users and might cause them to conclude that performance is better or 

worse than it actually is. The Coast Guard is working to resolve these 

inconsistencies in measurement reporting, but notes that these inconsistencies 

do not substantially impact the level of performance asserted by the Coast 

Guard. 

Some of the performance measures that the Coast Guard has in place, and the 

data behind them, may not always be comprehensive, practical, or accurate. 

The Coast Guard’s actual performance and the standards by which some of 

these are based may not present an accurate account of whether the Coast 

Guard is performing its missions successfully. The Coast Guard acknowledged 

5

 GAO-06-816, Coast Guard Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities 

for Improvement Exist. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 8
 
there are limitations to some of the measures it uses, and is working with DHS 

and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to improve several metrics to 

better reflect actual performance. 

Conclusion 

The aging and deteriorating fleet of cutters and patrol boats will continue to 

negatively affect the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its mission performance 

goals. As a result of challenges with the Deepwater acquisition program, new 

assets have either been delayed or cancelled. The Coast Guard recognizes these 

challenges and is taking action to strengthen the Deepwater acquisition program 

and its technical and management oversight. Although we have not tested the 

actions the Coast Guard is taking in the Deepwater acquisitions program, it 

appears, when fully implemented, these actions will put the Coast Guard on 

track to restoring its readiness to perform its non-homeland and homeland 

security mission in a timely, effective, safe, and efficient manner. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 9
 
Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Non-Homeland Security Resource Hours as Reported by the Coast Guard 

After an initial drop in non-homeland security resource hours in FY 2002, the 

total non-homeland resource hours have increased through 2006, exceeding 

the baseline by 16%. 

N on H omeland Security R esource H ours 

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

0 

50,000 

100,000 

150,000 

200,000 

250,000 

300,000 

350,000 

400,000 

Baseline 

Fisca l Ye a r 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

After the increase in FY 2001, the total resource hours dedicated to nonhomeland security missions decreased through FY 2003, then increased in FY 

2004, and continued through FY 2006. The significant increase in resource 

hours from FY 2004 to FY 2005 is largely attributed to major SAR efforts in 

the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In FY 2006, non-homeland security hours 

represented approximately 45% of resource hours. 

Performance Goals and Results. The Coast Guard has been more successful 

in meeting its goals for its traditional non-homeland security missions. The 

Coast Guard met its goal for every year during the period of FY 2001 through 

FY 2006 for the Marine Environmental Protection mission. The Coast Guard 

had similar success with its ATON mission where it met its goal for five out 

of the six years (FYs 2001-2005). The Coast Guard did not meet its FY 2006 

performance goals in four of six non-homeland security mission areas. 

However for the SAR, ATON, and LMR missions, the performance shortfalls 

were insignificant; the Coast Guard failed to meet its goals by less than a 

percentage point in these areas. 

The Coast Guard’s ability to meet performance goals for its Marine Safety 

mission decreased from its baseline of an average 1,317 down to an average of 

1,277 in FY 2005. However, this average increased to 1,400 in FY 2006. The 

Coast Guard reported that recreational deaths and injuries have been added 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 10
 
Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

into the performance measure for the Coast Guard’s successful 

accomplishment of its Marine Safety mission, which could explain why the 

average has increased in FY 2006. The Coast Guard also reported 

implementation of a proposed towing vessel inspection regulation should help 

decrease the five-year average. Yet, the towing vessel inspection regulations 

have not been promulgated. 

Specific performance goals and results for each of the non-homeland security 

missions from FY 2001 through FY 2006 are summarized in the Table 2. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 11
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Table 2: Coast Guard Reported Non-Homeland Security Missions Performance Goals and Results 

Non-Homeland Security 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Performance Measure 

Search/Rescue Goal 85% 85% 85% 85% 86% 86% Percentage of mariners in 

imminent danger saved Actual 84.2% 84.4% 87.7% 86.8% 86.1% 85.27% 

Result ×

Not met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

×

Not met 

Aids to 

Navigation 

Goal 2,261 2,098 2,010 1,923 1,831 1,748 or 

Fewer 

Five -year average 

number of collisions, 

allisons, and groundings 

Actual 2,215 2,098 2,000 1,876 1,825 1,765 

Result √

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

Ice Operations Goal 8 2 8 2 2 2 (avg) 8 

(severe) 

Limit the number of days 

critical waterways are 

closed due to ice to 2 days 

in an average winter and 8 

days in a severe winter 

Actual 7 7 7 4 0 0 

Result √

Met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

Living Marine 

Resources 

Goal 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% Percentage of fishermen 

complying with federal 

regulations 

Actual 98.6% 97.3% 97.1% 96.3% 96.4% 96.6% 

Result 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

Marine Safety 

Goal 

NA NA 1,543 1,513 1,317 1,280 5-year average annual 

fatalities and injuries 

Actual 

1,651 1,332 1,307 1,293 1,277 1,400 

Result 

NA NA 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

Marine 

Environmental 

Protection 

Goal 

47 45 43 41 20 19 or less 

Five -year average number 

of U.S. Coast Guard 

investigated oil spills greater 

than 100 gallons and 

chemical discharges into the 

navigable waters of the U.S. 

per 100 million short tons of 

chemical and oil products 

shipped in U.S. waters 

Actual 

40.3 35.1 29.4 22.1 18.5 16.3 

Result 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

Subtotal: 

Non Homeland 

Security Goals Met 

4 of 5 3 of 5 6 of 6 4 of 6 5 of 6 2 of 6 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 12
 
 

Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Non-Homeland Security Mission: Search and Rescue 

The SAR mission responsibilities include minimizing the loss of life, personal 

injury, and property loss and damage in the maritime environment by 

rendering aid to persons in distress and property associated with maritime 

transportation, fishing and recreational boating. 

Resource Hours. Resource hour levels for the SAR mission increased in FY 

2001, decreased during FYs 2002 and 2003, and then slightly increased in FY 

2004, as illustrated in the chart below. The decrease during FY 2002 and FY 

2003 was expected due to the responses to the events of September 11, 2001, 

with more resources directed to homeland security missions, such as PWCS. 

However, in FY 2005, SAR showed a significant increase, attributable to the 

Coast Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina, approaching baseline levels. 

SAR resource hours dropped 20% again in FY 2006. These current levels are 

within 28%of baseline levels, the lowest amount of hours in the last six years. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Search and Rescue Resource Hours 

0 

20,000 

40,000 

60,000 

80,000 

100,000 

baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Performance Goals and Results. The SAR mission performance measures 

are based on the percentage of mariners’ lives saved. In FY 2001 and FY 

2002 the goal of saving 85% of mariners in distress was not obtained, 

although it fell just marginally short of the goals, as shown in Table 2. 

However, since then, the goal was attained in FY 2003 through FY 2005 and 

fell marginally short in FY 2006. Coast Guard officials stated that a review of 

SAR data does not indicate a specific reason why the goal was not achieved, 

but contributing factors include delays in fielding improved SAR capabilities 

(Rescue 21) and the uncontrollable variables such as weather, location, 

incident severity, and life saving devices on board, that influence the number 

and outcome of SAR incidents. Coast Guard Mission Analysis personnel also 

stated that the Coast Guard is receiving more calls for complex rescue cases 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 13
 
Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

because private towboats are assuming what once was considered easy Coast 

Guard rescues. 

Non-Homeland Security Mission: Aids-to-Navigation 

The ATON mission is a means for the Coast Guard to mark the waters of the 

United States and its territories to assist boaters in navigation and alert them to 

obstructions and hazards. 

Resource Hours. Resource hour levels for ATON tracked similar to the SAR 

mission -- they increased in FY 2001, decreased during FY 2002 and FY 

2003, increased slightly in FYs 2004 and 2005, and decreased again in FY 

2006. This resulted in levels falling to approximately six percent short of the 

baseline level, as illustrated in the chart below. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

ATON Resource Hours 

0 

20,000 

40,000 

60,000 

80,000 

100,000 

120,000 

140,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

ResourceHours 

Performance Goals and Results. The Coast Guard showed progress in the 

ATON mission for FYs 2001 through 2005; however, the organization did not 

meet its goal in FY 2006 by less than one percent. This mission, which is 

measured based on a five-year average number of collisions, allisions, and 

groundings, has been successful in accomplishing its established goals for five 

of the last six years. According to performance reports, the five-year average 

number of distinct collision, allision, and grounding events continues to 

decline. The Coast Guard attributes its success in this area to reorganization 

of service delivery processes at every level of the organization. In addition, 

the waterways management organization as it exists now harmonizes other 

activities, including vessel traffic services, bridge administration, and 

domestic ice breaking. The goals for this mission area, however, remain 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 14
 
 

Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

problematic in that they use the number of allisions, collisions, and 

groundings as a performance indicator, although the majority of marine 

casualties are related to human error and not ATON. Leading indicators of 

ATON program performance include the availability of ATON and failure 

rates among various ATON. 

Non-Homeland Security Mission: Ice Operations 

Ice Operations is responsible for icebreaking activities in the Great Lakes and 

Northeast.6

 This facilitates the movement of bulk cargoes carried by regional 

commercial fleets during the winter months. Domestic icebreaking is 

normally conducted for SAR and other emergency situations, prevention of 

flooding caused by ice, and facilitation of navigation. 

Resource Hours. As illustrated in the chart on the next page, resource hours 

for Ice Operations steadily increased through FY 2004 and took a sharp 

decline in FY 2005 and again in FY 2006, bringing it within approximately 

40% of FY 2004 levels. Hours declined sharply in FY 2005 to 11,398 hours, 

down 39% from FY 2004, and decreased once again in FY 2006 to 6,877 

hours. Baseline levels were at 11,935, with FY 2004 levels at 17,552, 

representing an overall increase of 47%. However, in FY 2005 the mission 

had a major decline in resource hours, ending in levels almost five percent 

below baseline levels. These are not unusual fluctuations since this mission is 

dependent on ice accumulation, which fluctuates on a yearly basis. As of FY 

2006, resource hours were 43% below baseline levels. 

6

 In addition to domestic ice operations, the Coast Guard operates the only U.S.-controlled icebreakers capable of 

operations in the polar regions. The Coast Guard operates these cutters and is reimbursed for their operation and 

maintenance by the National Science Foundation. Resource hours for polar operations are included in the chart; 

however, only Coast Guard-directed domestic ice operations performance goals are measured. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 15
 
Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Ice Operations Resource Hours 

0 

5,000 

10,000 

15,000 

20,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. The success of the Ice Operations mission 

is measured by days of waterway closures: no more than eight days of closure 

for winters considered severe and two days of closure for winters considered 

average. The Coast Guard met the established goals in FY 2001 and FY 2003 

(both severe winters), and again in FY 2005 and 2006 (average winter), as 

shown in Table 2. The goals were not attained in FY 2002 and FY 2004 

(average winters). Since the Coast Guard achieved its goal in both severe and 

average winters, it appears that the type of winter is not the deciding factor in 

whether the Coast Guard meets its goals. There were no closures of critical 

waterways recorded in FY 2006 due to ice. 

Non-Homeland Security Mission: Living Marine Resources 

LMR is responsible for federal LMR regulations and enforcing domestic 

fisheries laws. 

Resource Hours. After the events of September 11, 2001, resource hour 

levels for LMR showed a significant decrease in FY 2002. In FY 2003, the 

levels began to increase, but still were 26% below baseline levels. 

The resource hours then increased again in FYs 2004 through FY 2006, 

resulting in levels within nine percent of baseline levels, after a low of almost 

38% below baseline levels during FY 2002, as illustrated in the chart on the 

next page. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 16
 
Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

LMR Resource Hours 

0 

20,000 

40,000 

60,000 

80,000 

100,000 

120,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Performance Goals and Results. The LMR mission measures its successes 

by determining the percentage of fishermen complying with domestic federal 

fisheries regulations. The goals set for this mission were met in FYs 2001, 

2002, and 2003, but were not achieved in FYs 2004 through 2006, as depicted 

in Table 2. The Coast Guard fell short of its goal by 0.4% in FY 2006. There 

has been an overall decline in actual compliance since FY 2001. Per Coast 

Guard Officials, complex, ever changing fisheries regulations in the northeast, 

particularly when combined with days at sea restrictions, produced strong 

incentives to violate the regulations, contributing to a steady increase in 

violations. Several years of poor economic conditions in the shrimp fisheries 

and effects of the 2005 hurricane season also created a strong incentive for the 

fishing industry to disregard regulations. 

Non-Homeland Security Mission: Marine Safety 

Marine Safety is responsible for providing safe, efficient, and environmentally 

sound waterways for the myriad of commercial and recreational users. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 17
 
Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Resource Hours. We analyzed resource hour data for FYs 2005 and 2006 

because the Coast Guard did not report hours for this mission prior to 2005. 

The Marine Safety mission is personnel intensive and is largely carried out 

without using Coast Guard aircraft, cutter, and boat assets. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

 M arine Safety Resource Hours 

0 

10000 

20000 

30000 

40000 

50000 

60000 

70000 

80000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Performance Goals and Results. The Coast Guard measures the success of 

the Marine Safety mission by comparing five-year average annual fatalities 

and injuries. The Marine Safety mission accomplished its goals in FY 2003 

through FY 2005, but did not meet its goal in FY 2006, as shown in Table 2. 

The Coast Guard did not establish goals in FYs 2001 and 2002. The Coast 

Guard reported it ambitiously set its goal of no more than 1,280 deaths or 

injuries for FY 2006 (actual 1,400) based in part on anticipated towing vessel 

regulations that were not yet implemented. Completion of these regulations, 

as well as proposed changes to requirements for safety/survival systems and a 

requirement that fishing vessels have a current safety decal, are expected to 

favorably affect future results. The Coast Guard also is now reporting 

recreational injuries and deaths, as reported by States. According to Coast 

Guard officials, this also has contributed to why the Coast Guard has not met 

its goal. 

Non-Homeland Security Mission: Marine Environmental Protection 

The Marine Environmental Protection is to prevent the introduction of 

invasive species, stop unauthorized ocean dumping, and protect against 

accidental oil and chemical spills. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 18
 
 

Appendix A 

Non-Homeland Security Missions 

Resource Hours. We only analyzed resource hour data for FYs 2005 and 

2006 for the marine environmental protection mission because the Coast 

Guard did not report resource hours for previous years. Traditionally, this 

mission is personnel intensive and is largely conducted without using Coast 

Guard aircraft, cutter, and boat assets. 

Marine Environmental Protection Resource Hours 

0 

1000 

2000 

3000 

4000 

5000 

6000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. Marine Environmental Protection’s 

successes are measured by the five-year average annual oil spills and chemical 

discharges. The Coast Guard has been successful in reducing the number of 

incidents year to year, thus accomplishing its goals for the entire five-year 

period. As depicted in Table 2, the mission has been so successful that the 

Coast Guard reduced its goal by over 50% in FY 2005 (from 41% to 20 %), 

which it still met. The Coast Guard also met its goal in FY 2006, reducing its 

goal from a five-year average of 20 oil spills and chemical discharges to 19 or 

less. The Coast Guard attributes the decrease to many initiatives including a 

more thorough assessment of the skills of merchant mariners employed as 

members of a ship’s engineering watch, as well as a more uniform policy for 

ensuring compliance with the international safety management code that 

governs routine ship operations such as cargo transfers and ship fueling. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 19
 
 

 

Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

Homeland Security Resource Hours as Reported by the Coast Guard 

Overall total resource hours for homeland security missions increased through 

FY 2004, then slightly decreased in FY 2005, and again in FY 2006. 

However, the FY 2006 level is still significantly (231%) above baseline 

levels, as depicted in the chart below. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Hom e la nd S e cu rity Re so urce Hou rs 

0 

50,000 

100,000 

150,000 

200,000 

250,000 

300,000 

350,000 

400,000 

450,000 

500,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fisca l Ye a r 

Resource Hours 

Resource hours for some individual homeland security missions increased 

while others decreased. When compared to the baseline, Ports, Waterways, 

and Costal Security (PWCS); Defense Readiness; and Undocumented Migrant 

Interdiction showed significant increases while Drug Interdiction and Other 

Law Enforcement showed decreases. Specifically, through FY 2006, PWCS, 

Defense Readiness, and Undocumented Migrant Interdiction increased a total 

of 1,023%, 602%, and 129%, respectively, while Drug Interdiction and Other 

Law Enforcement showed decreases of 23% and 36%, respectively. 

Homeland Security Performance Goals and Results. The Coast Guard 

continues to experience difficulty in meeting its homeland security 

performance goals. The Coast Guard was not successful in meeting some of 

its goals for its homeland security missions, as illustrated in Table 3. The 

Coast Guard did not meet its goal for Defense Readiness for any of the six 

years surveyed. Additionally, the Coast Guard failed to meet its 

Undocumented Migrant Interdiction goals in four out of the six years 

surveyed. The Coast Guard achieved its goals in FY 2002 and FY 2004 for 

this mission. For Drug Interdiction and Other Law Enforcement, the Coast 

Guard achieved its goals in three of the six years reviewed. For PWCS, the 

Coast Guard did not establish a goal until FY 2006 and met its goal that year. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 20
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

Performance goals and results for the five individual homeland security 

missions, from FY 2001 through FY 2006, are summarized in Table 3. 

Table 3: Coast Guard Reported Homeland Security Missions Performance Goals and Results 

Homeland Security 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Performance Measure 

Ports, Waterways, & 

Coastal Security 

Goal 

No 

Measure 

No 

Measure 

No 

Measure 

No 

Measure 

Measure 

Baselined 

14% Reduction in the Coast 

Guard PWCS Risk Index that 

is attributable to Coast Guard 

combating maritime 

terrorism activities 

Actual 

3.4% 18% 

Result 

√

Met 

Drug Interdiction 

Goal 

15% 18.7% 20.7% 15% 19% 22% Removal rate for cocaine that 

is shipped via noncommercial maritime means 

Actual 

11.7% 10.6% 16.3% 30.7% 27.3% 22% 

Result 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

√

Estimated 

-Met 

Undocumented 

Migrant Interdiction 

Goal 

87% 87% 87% 87% 88% 89% Percentage of undocumented 

migrants who attempted to 

enter the U.S. via maritime 

routes that are interdicted or 

deterred 

Actual 

82.5% 88.3% 85.3% 87.1% 85.5% <89% 

Result 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Estimated 

-Not Met 

Defense Readiness 

Goal 

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Percentage of time that Coast 

Guard assets included in the 

Combatant Commander 

Operational Plans are ready 

at a Status of Resources and 

Training System rating of 2 

or better 

Actual 

67% 70% 78% 76% 69% 62% 

Result 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

Other Law 

Enforcement 

Goal 

202 202 202 202 200 199 Number of incursions into 

U.S. Exclusive Economic 

Zone 

Actual 

212 250 152 247 171 164 

Result 

×

Not Met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

×

Not Met 

√

Met 

√

Met 

Subtotal: Homeland 

Security Goals Met 0 of 4 1 of 4 1 of 4 2 of 4 2 of 4 3 of 5 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 21
 
 

Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

Homeland Security Mission: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 

The Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission is to prevent 

and protect against maritime security threats, reducing America’s 

vulnerability to those threats, and minimizing the adverse consequences of 

maritime security incidents that do occur. 

Resource Hours. Resource hours for PWCS rapidly increased in response to 

the events of September 11, 2001, resulting in a 1,220% increase over 

baseline levels by FY 2003.7

 In FY 2004, the levels increased slightly by four 

percent over FY 2003 levels, decreased by three percent in FY 2005, and 

decreased again in FY 2006. Even with the decrease, the mission still showed 

an increase in resources at a level 1,023%, or 11 times greater than the 

baseline. The chart below shows this rapid increase in resource hours. This is 

by far the largest user of resource hours of any Coast Guard mission area. 

PWCS Resource Hours 

0 

50,000 

100,000 

150,000 

200,000 

250,000 

300,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. Prior to FY 2005, the Coast Guard had not 

established performance goals for the PWCS mission. In FY 2005, the Coast 

Guard established a new risk-reduction performance measure to demonstrate 

PWCS performance. This risk-based performance measure involves the 

scoring of high-consequence maritime terrorist attack scenarios with respect 

to threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The Coast Guard met its goal for 

FY 2006 for this mission. The Coast Guard attributes this success to new or 

enhanced initiatives aimed at improved maritime risk reduction including: a 

7

 Prior to FY 2001 and the subsequent formal establishment of the PWCS program, resource hours were collected under 

a variety of categories that were used to establish the baseline. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 22
 
 

Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

comprehensive update to Operation Neptune Shield;8

 verification of 78% of 

the previously uninspected vessel fleet for security compliance; operational 

testing of explosive screening technologies for ferries; enhancement to the 

Maritime Law Enforcement Academy facility and curriculum; promulgation 

of Maritime Sentinel;9

 convening of the National Maritime Recovery 

Symposium;10 and implementation of the Maritime Security Risk Analysis 

Model enabling local, regional, and national assessment of infrastructurefocused security risk. 

Homeland Security Mission: Drug Interdiction 

The Coast Guard’s Drug Interdiction mission is key to combating the flow of 

illegal drugs to the United States. The Coast Guard’s mission is to reduce the 

supply of drugs from the source by denying smugglers the use of air and 

maritime routes in the Transit Zone, a six million square mile area, including 

the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific. The Coast Guard is the 

lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction and shares responsibility 

for air interdiction with U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

Resource Hours. The Drug Interdiction mission area had a significant 

reduction in resource hours through FY 2003, resulting in a 43% decrease 

from baseline levels. However, the number of resource hours showed a 

moderate increase of 11% from FY 2003 to FY 2004 and a slight 3% decrease 

in FY 2005, followed by a significant increase of 26% in FY 2006, resulting 

in a net decrease of 23% below baseline levels. These changes are shown in 

the chart on the next page. 

8

 Operation Neptune Shield is the Coast Guard’s internal plan to identify, prevent, and protect facility and vessel 

operations with the potential for material consequences from a terrorist attack. 

9

 This is Coast Guard’s strategic plan to combat maritime terrorism.

10 The National Maritime Recovery Symposium aims to identify issues and alternative solutions to improve federal 

government and industry plans supporting national recovery efforts after a "national transportation security incident."
 

The symposium, comprised of members from DHS and the Department of Transportation, was held at the Maritime 

Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies in Linthicum, Maryland in August 2006. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 23
 
 

Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours 

0 

20,000 

40,000 

60,000 

80,000 

100,000 

120,000 

140,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. From FY 2001 through FY 2003, Drug 

Interdiction mission success was measured by the percentage of cocaine 

seizures. Starting in FY 2004, performance was measured by the cocaine 

removal rate. The mission area failed to accomplish its goal in FYs 2001 

through 2003, but did accomplish its goal in FY 2004 through 2006, as shown 

in Table 3. The Coast Guard considers several external factors, such as 

intelligence and interagency cooperation, as vital to the Coast Guard’s Drug 

Interdiction mission. These efforts enable Coast Guard commanders to best 

position assets for anticipated interdictions. 

Homeland Security Mission: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 

The Undocumented Migrant Interdiction mission responsibilities consist of 

enforcing immigration laws at sea. To fulfill its responsibilities, the Coast 

Guard conducts patrols and coordinates with other federal agencies and 

foreign countries to interdict undocumented migrants at sea, denying them 

entry via maritime routes to the United States, its territories, and its 

possessions. 

Resource Hours. As illustrated in the chart below, there was a moderate 

decrease in Undocumented Migrant Interdiction resource hours in FY 2001, 

but resource hours began to increase in FY 2002. FY 2003 saw a significant 

81% increase in resource hours, and a significant increase from FY 2003 

through FY 2004 by an additional 40%. This resulted in an overall increase of 

153% in FY 2004 from the baseline. However, resources were down slightly 

for FY 2005 and decreased again in FY 2006, but were still above baseline 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 24
 
Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

levels by 129%. Coast Guard officials attributed the decline of available 110’ 

cutters and the November 2006 removal of eight 123’cutters as affecting FY 

2006 missions. 

Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Resource Hours 

0 

10,000 

20,000 

30,000 

40,000 

50,000 

60,000 

70,000 

80,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. The Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 

mission successes are measured by the percentage of migrants interdicted or 

deterred, based on intelligence estimates of the number of migrants who 

would attempt entrance, via maritime routes, into the United States if there 

were no enforcement. The mission area accomplished its goals in FY 2002 

and FY 2004 but failed to do so in FYs 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006, as 

depicted in Table 3. 

The Coast Guard reported it will implement an improved performance 

measurement in FY 2007 that will be based on an independent program 

evaluation. 

Homeland Security Mission: Defense Readiness 

The Defense Readiness mission is to provide essential capabilities to support 

national security and national military strategies. Resource hours primarily 

depict the execution of these defense missions, while the performance goals 

and results measure the Coast Guard’s readiness to perform the mission. 

Resource Hours. Resource hours for Defense Readiness increased through 

FY 2006. Resource hour levels increased by 516% through FY 2003, slightly 

decreased by 6% from FY 2003 to FY 2004, and then increased again in FY 

2005 and FY 2006 to the highest level for Defense Readiness, bringing the 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 25
 
Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

total number of hours to more than seven times the baseline levels. These 

changes in resource hours are shown in the chart below. 

Defense Readiness Resource Hours 

0 

10,000 

20,000 

30,000 

40,000 

50,000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. Success of the Defense Readiness mission 

is measured by the percentage of time that Coast Guard assets included in the 

Combatant Commander Operational Plans are ready with a Status of 

Resources and Training System rating of 2 or better. The Coast Guard failed 

to meet the established goals for this mission in FY 2001 through FY 2006. 

The Coast Guard primarily attributes the shortfall in meeting its performance 

target to an aging cutter fleet and limited annual reserve training time that 

precluded the rapid accomplishment of both personnel and unit training 

requirements for Port Security Units. FY 2006 also marked the Coast Guard’s 

assumption of duties associated with air intercept support for defense of the 

National Capital Region. 

Homeland Security Mission: Other Law Enforcement 

Living Marine Resources covers foreign fishing incursions into the United 

States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The DHS Other Law Enforcement 

mission encompasses law enforcement operations that are not related to 

foreign fishing incursions. 

Resource Hours. The resource hours for the Other Law Enforcement mission 

have fluctuated between the baseline and FY 2006. The mission performance 

showed a decrease through FY 2002, an increase in FY 2003, a decrease in 

FY 2004, an increase in FY 2005, and finally a decrease in 2006, resulting in a 

level 36% below the baseline levels. The chart below depicts these 

fluctuations. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 26
 
Appendix B 

Homeland Security Missions 

Other Law Enforcement Resource Hours 

0 

1000 

2000 

3000 

4000 

5000 

6000 

7000 

8000 

9000 

Baseline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Fiscal Year 

Resource Hours 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard Reported Data 

Performance Goals and Results. The Coast Guard measures the Other Law 

Enforcement mission success in limiting the number of foreign fishing vessel 

incursions into the EEZ. The Coast Guard failed to accomplish this mission’s 

goal in FYs 2001, 2002, and 2004; but reached its goal in FYs 2003, 2005, 

and 2006. The Coast Guard attributes much of its success in this program to 

its good working relationship it has developed with Mexican fisheries 

enforcement personnel in recent years. A majority of the incursions are made 

on the Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard continued its efforts, with increased 

success in FY 2006 to monitor, detect, and interdict foreign fishing vessel 

incursions into the EEZs of the Western Central Pacific and along the 

maritime boundary line with Russia in the Bearing Sea. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 27
 
Appendix C 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Section 888(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs the Inspector 

General to conduct an annual assessment of the Coast Guard’s performance of 

all its missions, with a particular emphasis on non-homeland security 

missions. The objective of this review was to determine the extent that 

resource hours and performance results and targets for each Coast Guard 

mission have changed from prior to September 11, 2001, through FY 2006. 

We reviewed the following GAO reports and testimonies: (1) Coast Guard 

Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally Sound, but 

Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-816; (2) Coast Guard, 

Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future Challenges, 

GAO-06-448T; and (3) Coast Guard Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation 

and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission 

Performance Appears Mixed, GAO-06-979. 

We analyzed the total number of resource hours reported by the Coast Guard 

prior to September 11, 2001, through FY 2006, and obtained the FY 2006 

PTFMC for its cutters, icebreakers, patrol boats tugs, and buoy tenders. We 

did not attempt to verify the resource hour data or the percentage of time fully 

mission capable reported by the Coast Guard, nor did we attempt to validate 

whether the Coast Guard had accurately classified such data. We assessed 

total resource hours for the 11 individual Coast Guard missions to identify the 

changes in each. 

We analyzed performance targets and goals to determine whether the goals for 

each of the Coast Guard’s missions had been accomplished. We obtained 

information on performance targets and goals from the Department of 

Homeland Security FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, the FY 

2008 Coast Guard Budget in Brief, and specific updates provided by the Coast 

Guard. Lastly, we held discussions with Coast Guard mission analysis 

personnel to obtain information on why the Coast Guard did not meet its 

performance targets for certain missions. 

We conducted our review between October 2006 and March 2007 under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

the Quality Standards for Inspections, issued by the Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). 

We would like to extend our appreciation for the cooperation and courtesies 

extended by the Coast Guard to our staff during the review. 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 28
 
Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 29
 
Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 30
 
Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 31
 
Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Washington, DC Office 

Richard T. Johnson, Director 

USCG and Maritime Security Operations Division 

Boston, MA Office 

Maureen Duddy, Audit Manager 

Brian Lynch, Auditor in Charge 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 32
 
Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Audit Liaison 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

USCG Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Annual Review of Coast Guard Mission Performance 

Page 33
 
Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any kind of criminal or 

noncriminial misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

•	 Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600 Attention: 

Office of Investigations – Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410 

Washington, DC 20528 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.