UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4184

LAURA MICHELLE MONTROSE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-98-154)

Submitted: May 15, 2001

Decided: July 27, 2001

Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Tamura D. Coffey, Kevin B. Cartledge, WILSON & ISEMAN,

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr.,

United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Bryce Quine, Third-Year Law Student, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Laura Michelle Montrose was found guilty by a jury of aiding and

abetting bank robbery and armed bank robbery in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2000), bank robbery and armed bank robbery in

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2113(a), (d)(West 2000), and conspiracy

to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West

2000). The court imposed a sentence of 121 months incarceration on

February 17, 2000. This appeal followed. 

Montrose asserts error in the district court’s decision to disallow

impeachment of two government witnesses based on their prior conduct, specifically, a witness’ prior petit larceny conviction and

another witness’ probation violation. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed

by this court for abuse of discretion and are subject to harmless error

review. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir.

1997). The petit larceny in which the government witness was

involved was not shown to be a crime of dishonesty or false statement

and therefore was not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). See

United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696, 698 (4th Cir. 1981). The

court similarly found no dishonesty involved in the second witness’

violation of probation. We find no abuse of discretion in this finding,

but note that even if we concluded otherwise, there would be no

harmful error. The second witness testified he was on probation for

six convictions of breaking and entering and that he had pled guilty

to armed bank robbery and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. In view of this testimony, the impact on the jury of the added

evidence of a probation violation would have been minimal. 

Montrose next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

her conviction. This court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal

under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29;

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v.

2 UNITED STATES v. MONTROSE
Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). Montrose’s conviction

must be affirmed if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the government, is sufficient for any rational jury to find the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In evaluating the

sufficiency of the evidence, we do not review the credibility of the

witnesses, and we assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in

the testimony in favor of the government. Romer, 148 F.3d at 364.

With these standards in mind, we conclude sufficient evidence supports Montrose’s convictions. 

Finally, Montrose avers that the district court erred in its denial of

her motions for downward departure at sentencing on the grounds of

extraordinary physical impairments, delayed mental and emotional

development, extreme vulnerability to victimization in prison, and the

combination of these factors. The denial of a downward departure is

not reviewable unless the district court perceived it lacked authority

to depart on the grounds offered. United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861,

863 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th

Cir. 1990). We conclude the court was aware of its authority to depart

but did not find a departure warranted in this case. 

Accordingly, we affirm Montrose’s convictions and sentence. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. MONTROSE 3