NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

DONNIE ROMONE TWIGGS, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0588 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201801789 

The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Jr., Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee 

Mohave County Legal Advocate’s Office, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

FILED 10-22-2020
STATE v. TWIGGS

Decision of the Court

2 

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Donnie Romone Twiggs appeals his conviction and sentence 

for possession of dangerous drugs for sale. Twiggs argues the State did not 

present sufficient evidence to satisfy the “for sale” element. He also argues 

the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the aggravating 

factor of committing the offense for pecuniary gain. We affirm because 

sufficient evidence supports the conviction and the aggravating factor. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury’s verdict, resolving all reasonable inferences against 

Twiggs. See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 2 (App. 2015). Because the

jury weighs evidence and assesses witness credibility, this court will not 

invade those duties. See State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). 

¶3 On March 7, 2018, Department of Corrections Sergeants J.Y. 

and S.P. followed Twiggs, an inmate at a prison in Mohave County, as he 

walked to his dormitory. Once there, J.Y. and S.P. conducted a strip search. 

As Twiggs removed a sock, six pea-sized paper bindles fell out. Five of the 

six bindles contained a green leafy substance. One bindle was tested and 

proved to be “spice”—a type of synthetic marijuana. Twiggs said he did not 

know what the bindles contained, saying he found them as he walked to 

his dormitory and wanted to find out what they were. 

¶4 At trial, corrections officers testified that spice is a soughtafter drug in prison. Spice costs much more in prison than it does on the 

street. Though spice generally has a depressive effect, it causes some to 

become aggressive. The aggressive effects make spice a danger to guards 

and inmates alike. Corrections officers also testified the way Twiggs’s spice 

was packed is consistent with packaging for sale. The pea-sized bindles are 

used for quicker, more concealed transfers between inmates when sold. 

Typically, one or two bindles in an inmate’s possession is consistent with 

personal use, but more than that indicates the bindles are meant for sale. 

¶5 A jury convicted Twiggs of three counts: (1) promoting prison 

contraband; (2) possession of dangerous drugs for sale; and (3) possession 

of drug paraphernalia. The jury also found, as an aggravating factor, 

Twiggs committed count 2 “as consideration for the receipt, or in the 

expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.” See A.R.S. §§ 13-

701.D.6. After considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
STATE v. TWIGGS

Decision of the Court

3 

the superior court sentenced Twiggs to concurrent sentences of 15.75 years 

for count 1, 18 years for count 2, and 3.75 years for count 3. 

¶6 Twiggs timely appealed his conviction and sentence for count 

2, possession of dangerous drugs for sale. He did not appeal the other two 

convictions and sentences. This court has jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, and -4033.A.1. 

ANALYSIS

I. The State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict 

Twiggs of possession of dangerous drugs for sale. 

¶7 To convict Twiggs of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, 

the State needed to show beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Twiggs knowingly 

possessed a dangerous drug; (2) the substance was in fact a dangerous 

drug; and (3) he possessed the drug “for sale.” See A.R.S. § 13-3407.A.2; Rev. 

Ariz. Jury Instr. Stand. Crim. § 34.072 (5th ed. 2019). “‘Sale’ . . . means an 

exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or prospective.” 

A.R.S. § 13-3401.32. On appeal, Twiggs does not challenge the first two 

elements. Instead, Twiggs argues the State did not produce sufficient 

evidence to establish he possessed the drugs for purposes of sale. 

¶8 This court reviews de novo whether the State presented 

substantial evidence to support a conviction. State v. Watson, 248 Ariz. 208, 

212, ¶ 11 (App. 2020). Substantial evidence is proof “reasonable persons 

could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of 

[Twiggs’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” See State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 

421, 461, ¶ 169 (2016). The issue then is “whether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

State v. Tillmon, 222 Ariz. 452, 456, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). This court considers 

direct and circumstantial evidence when “determining whether substantial

evidence supports a conviction.” Watson, 248 Ariz. at 212, ¶ 11. 

¶9 Here, Twiggs’s spice was packed in pea-sized bindles. 

Prisoners use pea-sized bindles to facilitate quicker, more discrete exchange 

during sales. The amount of spice Twiggs possessed exceeded threefold the 

amount a prisoner would possess for personal use. Spice is in high demand 

in the prison where Twiggs was incarcerated and carried with it a high 

price. The amount of spice Twiggs possessed and how it was packaged is 

sufficient for a jury to conclude he possessed the spice for sale. See Felix, 237 

Ariz. at 283, ¶ 2; see also State v. Jernigan, 221 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 5 (App. 2009) 
STATE v. TWIGGS

Decision of the Court

4 

(“evidence may be completely circumstantial”). We will not second guess 

the jurors. See Williams, 209 Ariz. at 231, ¶ 6. 

II. Because the superior court properly considered the pecuniary-gain 

aggravator, Twiggs suffered no fundamental, prejudicial error. 

¶10 Twiggs argues the superior court erred by considering the 

pecuniary-gain aggravating factor because substantial evidence does not 

support the jury’s verdict he possessed the spice for “pecuniary value.” See

A.R.S. § 13-701.D.6. Because Twiggs did not object at sentencing, this court

reviews for fundamental error. See State v. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 314, 317, ¶ 9 

(App. 2011). Twiggs, therefore, must first prove error exists. See State v. 

Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018). Twiggs must then show either: (1) 

the error went to the foundation of the case; (2) the error took from him a 

right essential to his defense; “or (3) the error was so egregious that he could 

not possibly have received a fair trial.” See id. (emphasis original). If Twiggs

establishes prongs one or two, he must also demonstrate prejudice. See id.

If Twiggs establishes the third prong, he need not make no separate 

showing of prejudice and a new trial must be granted. See id.

¶11 Because the jury found Twiggs possessed the spice for sale—

meaning “an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or 

prospective”—the jury necessarily could find he possessed it for pecuniary 

gain—meaning “as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the 

receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.” See A.R.S. §§ 13-701.D.6, -3401.32, 

-3407.A.2. Substantial evidence supports the presence of the aggravating 

factor, so we find no error, let alone fundamental error, in the superior court 

considering the factor. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm Twiggs’s conviction and sentence.