ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

1945-1950 

by 

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr. 

MIUTARY 1NnRVCTJ::W 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1988 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Fisch, Arnold G., Jr. 

Military government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945- 1950. 

(Army historical series) 

"CMH pub 30-11 "-T.p. verso. 

Bibliography: p. 

Includes index. 

I. Ryukyu Islands-History- 1945-1972. 2. Military 

government- Japan-Ryukyu Islands-History. I. Title. 

II. Series. 

DS895.R98F57 1987 952'.81 87-26985 

CMH Pub 30- 11 

First Printing 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Army Historical Series 

David F. Trask, General Editor 

AdvisOlY Committee 

(As of 10 April 1987) 

Charles P. Roland 

University of Kentucky 

Roger A. Beaumont 

Texas A&M 

Maj. Gen. Robert H. Buker 

Deputy Surgeon General 

Col. Robert A. Doughty 

U.S. Military Academy 

Col. Louis D. F. Frasche 

U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College 

John H. Hatcher 

The Adjutant General Center 

L. Eugene Hedberg 

Ame rican Enterprise Institute for 

Public Research 

Archer Jones 

Richmond, Virginia 

Maj. Gen. Carl H. McNair, Jr. 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command 

Jamie W. Moore 

The Citadel 

Brig. Gen. Richard L. Reynard 

U.S. Army War College 

Donald W. Smythe, S.J. 

John Carroll University 

u.s. Army Center of Militmy History 

Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, Chief of Military History 

Chief Historian 

Chief, Histories Division 

Editor in Chief 

111 

David F. Trask 

Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry 

John W. Elsberg 

Foreword 

The struggle for Okinawa was the last battle of World War II and the 

bloodiest campaign in the Pacific against Imperial Japan. Long before 

the battle ended, U.S. Army ci vii affairs officers began the task of providing essential services for the island's war-torn population. 

This volume is an authoritative account of the Army's military government efforts on Okinawa from the first stages of planning until the 

transition toward a civil administration began in December 1950. It is 

a fascinating history of how a small group of idealistic men with a limited, 

temporary mission saw their numbers and their role expand into a longterm commitment as American strategic considerations changed. The 

story ranges from the strategic planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the National Security Council in Washington to the civil affairs planning 

of the Tenth Army and beyond to the military government teams in the 

field. Although this is a success story, there are certainly lessons to be 

learned from the complex and often difficult interplay of the tactical 

occupation forces, the civil affairs officers, and the Okinawan population. 

With this volume, the Center of Military History continues its history 

of American military government during World War II. That effort began 

with the annotated documentary volume Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become 

Governors in the U.S. Army in World War II series, and continued with 

Earl Ziemke's The u.s. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 

in the Army Historical Series. This volume differs in format from both 

earlier books: it is a concise case history of a unique military government 

experience, augmented by selected documents that provide for more detailed study of current civil affairs concerns. For the uniformed student 

of military government, as for the general reader, this book should offer 

an interesting and instructive account of an often overlooked period of 

American-Okinawan history. 

Wash ington, D.C. 

24 April 1987 

v 

WILLIAM A. STOFFT 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., received the B.A. degree from the State University of New York at Albany. During the Vietnam War he served as a 

communications and crypto-security officer with the U.S. Navy. Subsequently, he received an M.A. degree from the University of Rhode Island 

and a Ph.D. degree from Pennsylvania State University, where he was a 

part-time instructor. Dr. Fisch joined the federal government in 1974 as 

a foreign affairs analyst, and since 1979 he has been a historian with the 

Army's Center of Military History. He is the author of The Department 

of the Army, in the commercial series for American teenagers, KNOW 

YOUR GOVERNMENT. 

VI 
Preface 

This book describes the experiences of American civil affairs officers 

on Okinawa during the years 1945- 1950. It follows these often idealistic 

men as they planned, trained for, and executed their important and unusual military government mission. In a series of stages they moved from 

the serenity of America's universities, through the front lines of the battle 

for Okinawa, and into the turmoil of a devastated and distant island 

society requiring almost total reconstruction. In describing these accomplishments and failures I stress the programs and projects that, taken as 

a whole, constituted the agenda for military government in the Ryukyu 

Islands. The present account, therefore, is to a large extent an administrative history. I have, at times, briefly overstepped the closing date given 

in the title in order to demonstrate the full impact of policies and programs begun in the regime's last months. In a sense it is appropriate that 

the narrative at times looks ahead, because the civil affairs officers who 

served during the military government years, through their actions and 

their programs, had a profound impact on the United States Civil Administration in the Ryukyus. That particular administration, the heir to all 

that the military government personnel accomplished-as well as to all 

their failures-lasted until the islands reverted to Japanese administrative 

control in 1972. 

The book makes no attempt to ignore those areas where military 

government activities were disappointing, most notably in their efforts 

to reach a timely and lasting solution to the land issue on Okinawa. At 

the same time, these defects in no way detract from the very real accomplishments the American administration wrought in the years 1945-1950. 

During that brief period of time military government transformed the 

island society by creating a political and economic environment that 

enhanced the Okinawans' capacity to cope with postwar world realities. 

Throughout much of the narrative, the book traces the tensions that 

existed between those charged with the military government mission and 

the tactical forces whose larger purpose was served by that mission. When 

it came to the allocation of finite resources of shipping space, material, 

and land-especially land-reasonable uniformed officers often disagreed about how these resources should be distributed. The recounting 

of these disagreements, the frustrations, and the inevitable compromises, 

is central to this volume. 

Vll 
The reader may find other features of the story unpleasant, notably 

the account of how certain American servicemen outside the military 

government effort threatened the success of the civil affairs program by 

undermining Ryukyuan-American relations. In the fina l analysis, however, this element was more than offset by the behavior of most American 

servicemen, whose friendly attitude toward the local population contributed to a reservoir of goodwill that fac ilitated the work of the American 

occupation forces. 

In many ways the early American experience in the Ryukyu Islands 

was unique, yet at the same time this case study in military government 

trial and error remains instructive for the student of civil affairs, regardless of time or location. Because of the universality of the civil affairs 

experiences and the subsequent lessons learned, the volume includes a 

number of representative documents that underscore some of the problems faced by military government officers in the field, as well as others 

that highlight American initiatives and policies designed to improve the 

lives of Okinawa's citizens. 

Several of the participants in this story freely shared their knowledge 

and experiences with me, as my footnotes and note on sources attest. 

Two of these men, who also agreed to review the text of the manuscript, 

deserve special mention: Professor Emeritus Shannon McCune of the 

University of Florida and Edward O. Freimuth. Paul Neuland, whose 

own experiences with the American administration of Okinawa date from 

a later period, was nonetheless familiar with the details of the military 

government period and was also kind enough to review the manuscript. 

I want to note the contributions of Edward O'Flaherty, whose partial 

draft on American military government on Okinawa addressed the subject 

before tny own interest in it, and Alfred M. Beck, who likewise preceded 

me and who conducted a portion of the research needed to produce the 

final manuscript. Edward J. Boone, Jr. and Ellen Folkama of the 

MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk, Virginia, were most helpful 

in facilitating my research at that institution. Eddie Reese of the National 

Archives' Modern Military Branch, and Bernard Cavalcante of the Naval 

Historical Center's Operational Archives Branch also willingly assisted 

my research. I am grateful for the patience and skill demonstrated by my 

editor, Mary F. Loughlin. 

In preparing this study I received the welcomed assistance of several 

colleagues at the Center of Military History. Morris J. MacGregor, then 

Chief of the General History Branch, deserves special mention for his 

general supervision of the manuscript and for his numerous helpful suggestions. David Trask, Chief Historian of the Center, and Lt. Col. Richard 

O. Perry, Chief, Histories Division, were the primary reviewers of the 

manuscript, along with Robert Ross Smith and (then Col.) James W. 

VIII 
Dunn. Their suggestions, along with those of John Elsberg, Editor in Chief 

of the Center, and Barbara Gilbert of the editorial staff greatly improved 

the document during its progress toward publication. Linda M. Cajka 

prepared the graphics. Gina D. Wilson faithfully and patiently typed the 

various versions of the draft manuscript, and LaJuan Watson ably assisted in typing the documents. Finally, a very personal expression of 

gratitude goes out to my wife, Dorothy, for her patience, insight, and 

encouragement during the years I worked on this volume. 

Despite the generous contributions of others, the author alone must 

bear the responsibility for the interpretations and conclusions expressed 

in this study, as well as for any errors of fact it may contain. 

Washington, D.C. 

24 April 1987 

IX 

ARNOLD G. FISCH, JR. 

Contents 

Part One 

Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 

INTRODUCTION . . . . 

Chapter 

I. THE GOVERNORS 

Organizing Military Government Training . . 

The Navy's "[vy Leaglle" Civil Affairs Schools 

Civil Affairs Officers and Operation Iceberg. 

II. THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA ... . . . . 

The Ordeal of Japanese Defense Preparations. 

War Comes to the RYllkYlls. . . . . . . . . 

Rejilgee Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Military Government Organization: An Assessment 

Ill. APATHY AND NEGLECT ... 

OkinalVa and PostlVar Strategy 

PostlVar Military Organization 

Ambassadors in Uniform? 

Adding [njllry to [nsllit. . . . 

IV. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 

Reselliement and Repatriation . . . 

The Revival of Edllcation. . . . . . 

Political alld Judicial Rehabilitation. 

V. ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 

Restoration of Agricllllllre . . . . 

The Fishing [lIdllstry Transformed. 

Industry and Commerce 

Changing Employment. 

Fiscal Planning. . . . 

XI 

Page 

3 

7 

8 

12 

15 

31 

33 

38 

45 

60 

69 

70 

72 

81 

87 

89 

89 

96 

102 

121 

122 

132 

137 

144 

146 
Chapler 

VI. TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 

America's Expanded Commitment . 

Revitalized Construction Efforts. 

The Land Issue. . . . . . . . 

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . 

NOTE ON SOURCES. . . . . . . . . . 

Part Two 

Documenting the Military Government Experience 

SELECTED DOCUMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . .. 

Preparing Civil Affairs Officers . . . . . . . . . . 

The Theory Behind a Military Government Program. 

Creating a Local Administration . 

Fostering Political Democracy. . . 

Developing a Land Claims Policy . 

INDEX .. , .. . ....... . 

Tables 

No. 

I. U.S. Army Forces Strength in the Ryukyus, 31 August 1945- 31 

Page 

153 

153 

161 

167 

179 

185 

193 

195 

233 

277 

293 

33 1 

347 

August 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 

2. Livestock Production . . . . . . . . . 125 

3. Retail Price Index, June 1946- June 1948 148 

Charts 

I. Military Government Dual Staff Assignment. . . . . 

2. Military Government Field Detachment Assignments. 

XII 

25 

27 
Maps 

No. Page 

I. T he Ryukyus, Strategic Location in the Western Pacifi c 17 

2. Ryukyu Islands, 1945 32 

3. T he Plan of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

4. Southern Okinawa, 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 

5. Military Government Districts on Okinawa, 30 November 1945. 58 

Illustrations 

Maj. Gen. Allen W. G ulli on . 

General Geo rge C. Ma rshall . 

Admi ral Chester W. Nimitz . 

Okinawa Jima ... . . . . 

The Hagushi Beaches, I April 1945. 

Japanese Soldier Surrenders . 

Military Government Headquarters at Simabuku 

Food Rationing and Distribution. . . 

Dusting With DDT . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 

Laborers Wearing Cast-Off Uniforms. . . . . . 

Surplus Uniform Clothes an Okinawan Craftsman. 

Rebuilding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Standardized Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General Douglas MacArthur a nd Admiral Chester W. Nimitz . 

Typhoon Damage. . . . . . . . . . 

Typhoon " Libby". . . . . . . . . . 

Repatriates Being Sprayed With DDT 

Coming Home 

Camp Costello . . . . . . . 

Repatriation . . 

Rudimentary School Facilities 

Uni versity of the Ryukyus .. 

Koshin Shikiya . .. . .. 

Okinawa Ad visory Assembl y. 

Election Campaigning . . . . 

Okinawan Woman Voting . . 

Executi ve Building, Government of the Ryukyu Islands 

Sugar Cane Press. 

Hulling Rice . . . . . . . . 

Fishing Boats. . . . . . . . 

Refrigerated Fishing Vessels . 

Okinawan Potter 

Salt Production . 

Scrap Metal . . 

xiii 

8 

9 

15 

36 

40 

41 

45 

46 

5 1 

52 

53 

54 

55 

73 

86 

87 

92 

93 

95 

96 

98 

100 

109 

110 

11 2 

114 

120 

124 

130 

133 

136 

138 

140 

143 
Bank of the Ryukyus . . . . . . . . 

GARIOA Rehabilitation Projects . . . 

Okinawans Receive Payment for Land 

All photographs are from the Department of Defense files. 

XIV 

Page 

149 

164 

175 
Part One 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 

THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

1945-1950 

Introduction 

The first sustained American presence in the Ryukyu Islands began 

with Commodore Matthew C. Perry's arri val on Okinawa in May 1853 

and ended with his departure slightly more than one year later. The island 

and its people were a mystery to Perry, who nevertheless sought to use 

them as a lever to pry open Japan, at that time closed to Occidentals. 

The second Ameri can "visitation" began in April 1945 with the last 

bloody battle of World War II. Once aga in, American forces had come 

to the Ryuk yus to use them as a steppingstone to Japan. 

Unlike Commodore Perry, the 20th-century American military commanders and especiall y their military government subordinates could call 

upon the best of contemporary sociological and anthropological sources, 

yet they too encountered much that was bewi ldering about Okinawan 

society. Two characteristics seemed parti cularl y ali en to them: the people's lack of enthusiasm for things military and their intense attachment 

to the land . Li ke Perry before them, these 20th-century Americans came 

with the intention of being visitors, but in the end they stayed for twentyseven years. In the process they not onl y administered the society but 

fundamentall y transformed it as well. 

American forces seized Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, 

to se rve as a forward base for bomber raids aga inst Tokyo and other 

major Japanese cities and as a staging area for the anti cipated invasion 

of the home islands. Okinawa's role as a staging area proved to be brief. 

Onl y six weeks aft er the Okinawa campaign officially concluded, hostilities aga inst Japan ceased. American military forces on the island we re 

then immediately and drasti cally scaled down. The Army placed little 

priority on programs fo r maintaining base facilities and rehabilitating the 

island. As a consequence, the Okinawan economy, struggling to recover 

from the war, stagnated. The onset of the Cold War and the communist 

victory in China, however, led to major changes. Ameri can strategists 

designated Okinawa as a crucial link in a chain of bases to be developed 

by the United States to protect the Philippines, Japan, and other American interests in the Pac ific and the Far East. That decision prompted a 

signifi cant development of Ameri can fa cilities on the islands as well as 

a rev itali zation of the Ryukyuan economy. 
4 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

[n addition to their military duties, American commanders on Okinawa shouldered an anci llary responsibility for administe ring the Ryukyuan population. This mission could not be taken lightly, for it in volved 

both promoting America's national interests in the occupied area and 

meeting America's obligations under international law. Successfully performing these administrati ve tasks was not always easy. Commanders 

and their subordinates in the military gove rnment organization were men 

of varying capabilities who faced complex problems, often in volving confli cts between military priorities and civil affairs obligations. More often 

than not these conflicts went unresolved . As a result, America's military 

gove rnment experiences on Okinawa at times produced a " us" versus 

" them" tension between the tactical commanders and their civil affairs 

subordinates. These tensions emerged, not because one group of military 

offi ce rs was "good" while another was " bad," but because the allocation 

of finite resources and land on Okinawa often required compromises that 

frustrated eve ryone in uniform and sometimes led to failures in communi cation between the two groups. These same tensions also grew up 

between the military occupiers and the indigenous population. 

Following the conquest of Okinawa, the American forces faced an 

uncertain reception from the island's population . Many, ifnot most, Okinawans continued to think of themselves as Japanese subjects and looked 

toward an earl y departure of the occupying troops. Others sought to use 

the American presence as a vehicle for detaching themselves from Japan, 

thereby restoring the Ryukyuan kingdom. Still others-a very fewhoped for annexation by the United States. [nitially, at least, most Okinawans appeared apolitical, desiring nothing more than to be allowed to 

return to their small farms in peace. But as the years passed , they became 

quite vocal in their opposition to the presence of American troops. [n 

particular they resented the fact that American military facilities absorbed 

more and more of their arable land. Fueling this resentment was their 

growing fear that the presence of foreign bases might prompt a communist 

attack rather than deter one. The Americans never successfully convinced 

the Okinawans that they had not become vulnerable pawns in the Cold 

War. This failure, along with an emerging debate over land usage, fed a 

growing desire among the people to revert to Japanese control. 

Strictly speaking, the effective date of the Japanese peace treaty, 28 

Apri l 1952, marked the date that the American command in Okinawa 

changed from military gove rnment to civil administration. During the 

period between the World War~ , the Army War College staff had developed a distinction, reflected in later field manuals, between the two terms. 

The former referred to the exercise of executive, legislati ve, and judicial 

authority in "occupied territory," the latter, to governmental functions 
INTRODUCTION 5 

conducted " in a fri endly country or area," often as a result of a formal 

agreement. 1 The Ryukyus, therefore, technically remained occupied enemy territory with an Ameri can military government until April 1952. 

The Joint Chi efs of Staff, however, anticipated the peace treaty by 

some eighteen months. When preliminary negotiations made clear that 

the treaty wo uld endorse a long-term American presence in the archipelago, they instructed the Far East commander, General Douglas 

MacArthur, to organi ze a civil administration for the Ryukyus. Accordingly, Ameri can civil administration of the islands began on 15 December 

1950.' T itles we re changed- the term military governor, for example, 

became at first simply, gove rnor, later high commissioner- but the principal characters and their duti es remained the same. As they had since 

the invasion, all major figures in the island administration continued to 

be military offi cers. Further softening the lines of demarcation between 

military government and civil administration, the Army invariably used 

the titles military government offi cer and civil affairs officer interchangeably.' 

Although the transition from military government to civil administration involved such semantic changes, many civil administration policies and programs continued to refl ect the philosophy taught to American 

offi cers in military gove rnment classes in the ea rl y years of World War 

II. Much of that philosophy was challenged and even modifi ed over the 

years in response to changes in American foreign policy and to specific 

conditions encountered in the islands. Nevertheless, early emerging military gove rnment poli cies and practices remained the animating forces 

in the American administration. 

The Ameri can administration of the Ryukyus developed progressively. From a relati vely simple conception of military organi zation as a 

vehicle for population and disease control, it qui ckly evol ved into a policy 

of civil administration that demanded a comprehensi ve politico-socio-

'USA, USN, and USAF . ./oim M allllal o/Civil Affilirs/ Mifitary G01'f!fl1lne1l1 (FM4 1-5; OPNAV 

P2 1- 1, and AFM 11 0-7, NAVM AC 2500), 1958, pp. 3-4. See also Earl F. Ziemke. Tile U.s. Army 

in /he Occupation o/GemuIIIY. 1944- 1946 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Mil itary History, 1975), 

note, p. 3. ' Memo, JCS 10 CINCFECOM, II Oel 50 (SM 2474- 50), File CCS 383.21 POA ( 1- 12-45), Sec. 

3. Record G roup 218, M odern Military Branch, National A rchives and Records Service, Washington, 

DC, derived from JCS 12311 14, 4 Oel 50; Appendix D of MSG, G HQ FECOM 10 CG RYCOM. 

AG 091.1 (5 Dec 50 RCA), 5 Dec 50, sub: Di rective fo r United States Civil Administration o f the 

Ryukyu Islands. Freimuth Papers. Sec also USCAR , eMI Affairs ACliI'ilies ill the RYllkjlll ls/(lIIdsjor 

the period eflding 31 December 1952, Vol. I , No. I , p. 120, copy in Cellter or Military History Library. 

USCAR is the U nited States Civil Administration, Ryukyus, the American occupational regime as 

or 15 December 1950. 

lSee, ror example, Joillf Malillaljor CiI'i/ Affairs (FM 4 1- 5), Nov 66; HqDA, Civil Affairs Operatiolls 

(FM 4 1-10). May 62; Cil>;/ Affilirs Operatioll (FM 41 - 10), Aug 67 and Oct 69; and PMG manusc ripts 

on the history or military government training. These sources all use the terms civil arrairs officer 

and military government offi cer synonymously, a practi ce continued in this volume. 
6 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

economic stewardship for a third world country. This transformation 

came about because some military government officers foresaw earl y in 

the occupation that conditions facing them on Oki nawa would require a 

commitment of men and resources beyond anything heretofore contemplated. Well before the strategic decision to retain the Ryukyu Islands on 

a long-term basis necessitated a solid economic and social base for the 

American presence, this small cadre of highly motivated and educated 

officers began to sketch a broad outline for a comprehensive revival of 

society in the archipelago. 

T his volume relates how the Army's military government units, deficient in supplies, training, and experience, and organ ized for a brief 

sojourn in the Pacific Islands, overcame their limitations to administer 

and restructure a destitute island land . In so doing, by what they accomplished and by what they left undone, they bequeathed a legacy that 

continued to affect events in the Ryukyus and in the Orient to the present 

time. 
CHAPTER I 

The Governors 

Before World War 1\ the U.S. a rmed forces shou ldered milita ry government respo nsibilities with the greatest reluctance. Professional officers 

considered civil affa irs assign ments little more than accidents of wa r, 

and, as a result, few became spec ialists in that fi eld . Those who did ga ined 

their expertise thro ugh " hands on" experi ence; no service offered training 

courses in military gove rnment. American commanders dea lt with civ il 

affairs in occu pied territori es as best they could , using ava ilable personnel. 

The Army had ad ministered military government in this ad hoc fash ion 

in a reas as dissimi la r as Mexico, the southern Un ited States (d uring and 

a fter the Civil War), the Ca ribbean, the Phili ppines, the Rhineland, and 

Siberi a. In each of these situations, the Army, large ly unprepared, had 

had to assume military gove rnment responsibilities because of circumstances, but it remained uncomfortable with that role. World Wa r 1\ 

marked the first efforts by the American military to use trained civil 

a ffairs spec ia lists within an organi zed military government staff structure. 

Those efforts resulted from the se rvices' growing awareness of the inevitability of such assignments and the need for better preparation .' Signifi cantl y, both the Army and the Navy a rri ved at those conclusions 

before the White House assigned the principal military gove rnment role 

to them. By the time the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff had conceived strategic 

plans for Operation ICEBERG, the in vasion of Okinawa, both the Wa r and 

Navy departments had se lected the trained civil affairs personnel in expectati on of occupation responsibilities in the Far East and elsewhere. 

I For the evolution of this crit ical awareness, sec U.S. Army, PMGO, History of Training-Military 

Government: A Summary 1939-3 1 December 1944, circa 1945. pp. 3-4, MS in Center of Military 

History (CM H) fi les: History of the Civil Affairs Division. War Department Special Staff. World 

War II 10 March 1946, part L eh. 2, p. 3. MS in CM l-I fi les; Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, 

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Becoll1(' GOI'erllors. United States Army in World War II Series (Washington: 

Depl of Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, [964), pp. 6-7. Volume hcreartcr cit ed as 

Coles and Weinberg. Soldiers ill'come GO\'emors: and Earl F. Ziemke, The U.s. Army ill 'he Oc£:upalioll 

o/GemulII)'. 1944- 1946 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975). pp. 3-8, 17-20. 
8 MILITARY GOVERN MENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Olgani::ing Military 

CUl'emment Training 

In the wake of World War I. various committees at the Army Wa r 

Coll ege had begun to recommend 

preparation of a milita ry gove rnment fi eld manual. But. as late as 

1939 t he Judge Advocate General, 

Maj. Gen. Allen W. G ulli on . had rejected the idea. argu ing t hat his offi ce had alread y produced a fi eld 

manua l on military law whi ch contai ned a chapter on military gove rnment. ' Ea rl y in 1940. fo ll owing War 

Coll ege studies whi ch put mi litary 

gove rnment in a broade r perspecGE'IERAL G LLlO' ti ve. the Arm y Staff urged General 

G ulli on to prod uce a separate. comprehensive civil a ffa irs ma nua l. In res ponse. the Judge Advocate Genera l's sta ff prepared .\lilita'".r Coremm/'11I (FM 27-5)..' Th is volume not 

only introduced poli c ies a nd procedures that we nt we ll beyond the civil 

affa irs section o f the milita ry law ma nual. it also set standa rds and goa ls 

for the Army civ il affa irs o ffi ce rs who se rved during Worl d War II and 

the postwar occupa tio n peri od. 

Many of the precepts set forth in FM 27-5 evidenced the idea lism of 

its a uthors. Milita'".r CorerJ1mel1t d irected that an occupati on shou ld be 

as j ust, humane. a nd mi ld as possibl e, a nd that the we lfa re of the people 

gove rn ed should be the goa l of eve ry civil a ffairs officer. It rejected inj usti ce and harshness as violations o f the Army's honor and as detrimental 

to the goa l of an end uring peace. The ma nua l a lso stipul ated, that insofa r 

as practi cabl e, mi lita ry gove rnment shou ld use indige nous civili an personnel a nd avoid cha nges in ex isting laws, customs, a nd instituti ons. 

T he manual , however. had a dist inctl y lega listic fo cus, an emphasis 

that precluded much consideration of ce rta in practical civil affairs subjects such as medic ine a nd suppl y. Moreover, it was written exclusively 

for the Arm y. Its nomenclature and its refe rences to organi za ti on did not 

apply to the Navy. a lthough the probabi lity of global wa r brought with 

. Army. JAG. Rllleso/Lalld U llI:f{lre(FM 27- 10), Vol. 7 . . \Iilirary La\l', 2 Jan 34. ell . 10. 

JM ifitfirr G"ol'emmelll (FM 27- 5), 30 Jul 40. The manual was re vised in 1943 and published by 

both the War and Navy departments as Ullil£'d SWIC'S Army alld 1\'(11'.1' Maullal o/Military G UI"erl/lI/el/f 

(llId Ow'l tlffitirs (FM 27-5. OPNAV 50E- 3), 22 Dec 43. 
THE GOVERNORS 

it the likelihood of joint military government ventures. Above all , the 

manual's authors ignored another 

probability, that of con fli cting priorities between the civil affairs officers 

and the operational commanders, as 

well as the need to reconcile these 

differences. In fac t, confli cting priorities and the need to reach suitabl e 

compromises with th eir tac ti ca l 

counterparts would later provide one 

of the biggest chall enges faced by 

military gove rnment offi ce rs. 

The War Department provided 

in FM 27- 5 that the personnel division (G- l) of the General Staff 

wo uld bear the re sponsibility for 

milita ry government planning and 

would superv ise, though not actuall y 

, . ~ 

GENERAL M A RSHA LL (/945 "/UI/Ogra"It). 

9 

conduct, civil affairs training. This assignment seemed logical, since the 

Army War College's G- l committees had concentrated on milita ry government du ring the interwar yea rs. In earl y December 1941 the Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G-l , Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, recommended that a 

military government school be established and that the Provost Marshal 

General be charged with its operation ' Army Chi ef of Staff General 

George C. Marshall acce pted Haislip's recommendation and directed the 

Provost Marshal General to establish such a school.' 

General Gullion , who was then serv ing as Provost Marshal General 

as well as Judge Advocate General, selected the University of Virgini a 

as the site for the school. His decision was based on two considerations: 

Charlottesv ille's proximity to Washington, and the University's offer to 

provide fac ilities for only $75 per month-a significant factor, considering the new school's modest budget. On 11 May 1942 the School of 

Military Government opened at Charlottesville with fort y-nine student 

officers in attendance. With guidance from the field manual, Military 

Government, and the active collaboration of the Wa r College committees, 

the facu lty constructed a curriculum based on the assumption that all 

~Mcmo, ACofS, G- I, to Cof'S, 3 Dec 41 . G- 1/ 16308- 1,25 , sub: Training of Personnel for Military 

Government and Liaison. Copy in CMH fi les; Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers Become Governors, pp. 

6- 13. 

SDirccti ve, Cots to AG, CofS/2 1360- 1, 6 Jan 42 and memo, AG to PMG. AG/353 ( 12-3-4 1 )MTA, 9 Feb 42, sub: Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison. Copies in CM H fi les. 
10 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

the student officers enrolled would already be qualified in some relevant 

technical or professional skill. Since the term military government implied all aspects of administration in an occupied area other than those 

of a strictly military nature, numerous political and socio-economic skills, 

as well as other nonmilitary talents, were deemed appropriate qualifications for a successful civil affairs mission. The curriculum stressed such 

aspects of military government as fiscal problems, public health and 

safety, civilian supply, international law as it applied to civil affairs, and 

the fundamenta ls of public administration applicable to occupation situations. It also provided the student officers with a review of earlier 

American and foreign occupation experiences· The military government 

field manual specified that, time and facilities permitting, foreign languages should also be part of the curriculum. Interestingly, Japanese was 

not introduced until the fifth class matriculated. One reason for this 

omission was the lack of qualified Japanese-language instructors; another 

was the early tendency to focus on Europe and North Africa rather than 

on the Pacific. 

The eighth class was the first devoted to the study of the Far East, 

and the staff revised the curriculum substantially. It eliminated foreign 

languages and most of the detailed studies of specific areas. It did, however, establish an Intelligence Section to teach something about the Japanese home islands, and student officers began to contemplate the "Tokyo 

Problem"-an integrated approach to all the major military government 

problems the staff anticipated in an occupied Japan. Other changes included amplification of the supply course and instruction on staff management functions. The staff also instituted a short course in naval 

organization, presumably in anticipation of joint Army-Navy civil affairs 

efforts in the Pacific. The goal of this instruction was to produce highly 

trained but fl exible civil affairs specialists who could function as staff 

officers in a variety of different situations and locations. Following the 

tone set forth in the military government manual, the curriculum was as 

high-minded as it was intensive; nothing in the course of study was likely 

to suppress any idealism the student officers might have brought to 

Charlottesville. 

Originally, the Provost Marshal General designed the school to train 

up to 100 officers in each class, but its capacity soon increased to 150. 7 

As the United States continued to prosecute the war on a global scale, 

'For more on the Charlottesville curriculum, see PMGO, History of Training-Military Gov~ 

ernmcn t, pp. 18- 20; Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers Become Governors, pp. 11- 12. 

7Memo, JAG to PMG, 13 Mar 45, sub: Establishment of the School of Military Government; 

memo , ACofS, 0-1 , REJ 6945 WDGAP 320, 23 Jan 43. sub: The War Dept. Military Government 

Program. Copies in CMH files. 
THE GOVERNORS II 

the growing need for additional civil affairs officers became increasingly 

apparent to the Provost Marshal General. Charlottesville's annual production of 250 graduates was inadequate against a projected requirement 

for nearly 6,000 civil affairs officers by the end of 1944. Even while the 

first class was in attendance, Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, the 

school commandant, suggested to the Provost Marshal General the possibility of training more civil affa irs personnel by establishing additional 

civil affa irs courses at other universities.' The suggestion was timely; on 

23 November 1942 the War Department authorized the Provost Marshal 

General to give reserve commissions to 2,500 men with skills in law, 

engineering, public health , and communications· After an initial month 

of training in basic military and military government skills at the Provost 

Marshal General's School, Fort Custer, Michigan, these reserve officers 

would attend a three-month course at one of ten Civil Affairs Training 

Schools (CATS) that the Provost Marshal established at civilian universities in March 1943. '0 

The Civil Affairs Training School served a purpose different from the 

School of Military Government, a difference reflected in the training 

objectives and the curricula. Most training school students were juniorgrade officers who were expected to function as specialists and technicians 

in field operations and assignments. Consequently, their training stressed 

information, as opposed to theory. Their curriculum centered around 

political systems and attitudes, local government organization, economic 

and judicial systems, public health and welfare, education, and the press 

and propaganda machinery of those areas likely to be occupi ed. There 

was a further emphasis on foreign language proficiency and practical 

approaches to problems likely to be encountered. The Provost Marshal 

expected Civil Affairs Training School graduates to function in direct 

contact with the populace in occupied areas, whereas the more senior 

officers at the School of Military Government were expected to deal with 

their own and with allied staffs." This distinction, at least on Okinawa, 

became far less clear in actual operations: military government officers 

in the Ryukyus, regardless of their civil affairs alma mater, were often 

called upon for both field and staff functions. 

Originally, the program devised for these new ci vii affairs schools was 

devoted almost exclusively to training for the Mediterranean and EuroSM emo, Commandant, School of MG to the PMG, 11 Jun 42, sub: Planning for Mil. Govern ., 

copy in CMI-I files; Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers Become GOI'emors, pp. 12- 13. 

' WDGAP 210.1 ORC, AG 210. 1 ( 11 -23- 42),23 Nov 42. Copy in CMH files. 

IOPMGO, History of Training- Military Government, pp. 20-21 ; John Brown Mason, "Lessons 

of Wartime Military Government Training," The Allnals 0/ the American Academy 0/ Political alld 

Social Science 267 (Jan 50): 185- 186. These courses were latcr reduced to two months duration. 

"PMGO, History of Training- Military Gove rnment, pp. 42, 44- 45. 
12 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

pean theaters. The Provost Marshal General, however, committed the 

school at the University of Chicago to the Far Eastern theater on an 

experimental basis; in 1944 five of the other schools, those at Harvard, 

Michigan , Northwestern , Stanford, and Yale , added Far Eastern 

programs. 

But, regardless of the theater orientation, by early 1943 the fundamental principles guiding the War Department's civil affairs program 

were firmly in place. They were carefully set forth in the Military Government field manual and in the curri cula of the military government 

schools, and the civil affairs personnel necessary to put them into practice 

were in training. These steps represented a major achievement for the 

Provost Marshall General's Office. The War Department was no longer 

as reluctant to become involved with civil affairs. 

The Secretary of War underscored the Army's growing interest in ci viI 

affairs matters when he established the Civil Affairs Division in the General Staff on 1 March 1943. " It quickly became an important special staff 

division with authority to supervise all military government activities 

within the War Department. In addition, its officers came to speak for 

the department when coordinating civil affairs matters with other agencies, including the Navy, which had assigned a liaison officer to the 

division. 

The Navy's "Ivy League" Civil Affairs Schools 

The Navy's program to prepare reserve officers for military government duties developed more abruptly than the Army's. In March 1942, 

sixteen eminent Columbia University faculty members formed the Committee on Emergency Program of Training in International Administration and developed a course in international administration to be offered 

to departments in the executive branch. Members of the committee approached a former Columbia dean, Dr. Joseph W. Barker, then a special 

assistant to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, with an outline of the 

course. Barker liked the idea and forwarded the proposal to Rear Adm. 

Randall Jacobs, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. On 9 June, Vice 

Adm. Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, issued a directive on establishing a civil affairs course and requiring Admiral Jacobs 

" Memo, AG (Maj Gen James A. Vlio) to Col J.H.F. Haskell, AG 014.1 (2-27-43) OB- S- E, I 

Mar 43, sub: Civil Affairs Division, copy in CMH files. Col John Haskell was designated Acting 

Director. 
THE GOVERNORS 13 

to contract with Columbia University for military government instructors 

and facilities." 

The school opened in mid-August 1942 with an initial class of fiftyseven trainees, including twenty-eight civilians selected for commissioning by virtue of having prior qualifications in law, government, medicine, 

or area studies of the Orient. Ten of the twenty-eight were conscientious 

objectors. On 10 September the Navy formally designated the program 

as the "U.S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen's School (Military Government 

and Administration) New York, New York." 

The opening of the Columbia facility underscored the Navy's recognition that it also had a military government function to prepare for, 

although the Navy's focus was on the Pacific, rather than on North Africa 

and Europe. Admiral Horne formalized the Navy's civil affairs commitment on I December 1942 when he directed Capt. Harry L. Pence, who 

had had occupation experience in Trieste after World War I, to undertake 

general supervision of military government affairs. Horne told Pence to 

develop broad policy and provide liaison to the Columbia U ni versity 

school and the Army." One month later the program was given separate 

status under the Chief of Naval Operations and was designated the Office 

for Occupied Areas, with Captain Pence as its head . By January 1943, 

therefore, the Navy had a functioning civil affairs administration activity 

and officer training school." 

Military government in the Ryukyus would benefit little from the area 

studies portion of the Navy's school at Columbia, however, because during the time the school was in operation Taiwan-rather than Okinawawas the perceived objective. Consequently, it was Taiwan's geography, 

institutions, and mores that were scrutinized. Relatively little attention 

was give to the Mandated Islands and virtually none to the Ryukyus. 16 

DU.S Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OCNO), United States Naval Administration 

in World War II, MS in three vols. , 1946, RG 38, Military Archives Division, National Archives 

and Record Service, Suitland, MD. The history of the Navy schools at Columbia and Princeton is 

in Chps. I & II o f Vol. I, part II; Lt Comdr Dorothy E. Richard, USN, The Wartime Military 

Governmelll Period 1945, Vol. I of United Stales Noval Administration of the Trust Territories 0/ the 

Pacific Islands (Washington: Dept. of the Navy. DC NO, 1957), pp. 36- 37, 47; Sidney Connor, "The 

Navy's Entry into Military Government ," The Annals o/lhe Americall Academy afPolitical alld Social 

Science 267 (Jan 50): 9-18; Schuyler C. Wallace, "The Naval School of Military Government and 

Administration," Tlte Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 23 1 (Jan 44): 

29- 33. See also William H. Hessler, "Military Government in the Navy," United States Nallalil/stitllle 

Proceedings 69, No. II (Nov 43): 1471 - 1474. 

"Ltr, VeNO to SuPers, Op-13- D- JS, Serial 195513, I Dec 42, RG 38. 

uThe Office for Occupied Arcas (Op-II X) was subsequentl y redesignated as Occupied Areas 

Section (Op- 50E), and then, on 2 Aug 44, as Military Government Section (Op-13-2). 

t6Richard, U.s. Naval Administration- Pacific Islands. Vol. I, p. 63. The Mandated Islands were 

the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas- territory occupied by Japan after World War I 

under a League of Nations mandate. 
14 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

This fact was particularly unfortunate, since the majority of the military 

government officers who served on Okinawa during 1945- 1946 were 

graduates of the Navy's programs. " 

The Ryukyus were not entirely neglected, however, because the Navy 

did take advantage of considerable prewar anthropological work done 

regarding Okinawa at Yale University. From July 1937 to December 1941 , 

Yale had hosted the Cross Cultural Survey, a project to assemble, translate, and classify maximum information on selected peoples and cultures. 

Prof. George P. Murdock directed the program and was assisted by fellow 

anthropology professors Clellan S. Ford and John W. M. Whiting. " After 

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, both the Office of Naval Intelligence 

and the Army's Military Intelligence Service recommended to their respective departments that the three professors concentrate their work on 

the Japanese Mandated Islands. By late 1942 it became clear to the survey 

team that they could not cover such a large portion of the Pacific region 

and provide information that correlated with the invasion schedule. The 

Navy, therefore, took over the project and in April 1943 commissioned 

the three, assigning them to the military government school at Columbia. 

Murdock, Ford, and Whiting produced eight civil affairs handbooks, 

including one for the Ryukyus. 19 These works became the principal source 

materials for civil affairs planning for the major Japanese-held island 

groups. The Ryukyuan Handbook was an extensive (334 pages) and extremely detailed treatise on practically every aspect of Ryukyuan society 

and history. Not only did it devote space to the usual political, anthropological, and economic concerns such as governmental institutions, social classes, and employment characteristics, it also treated more esoteric 

subjects as inheritance laws, prostitution, and censorship. Although difficult to fault for its scope of coverage, the handbook was based on information at least five years old. Over 95 percent of it had been extracted 

from Japanese sources which displayed the traditional Japanese bias that 

the islanders were backward rustics. Unfortunately, the handbook also 

reflected, perhaps inevitably, the impression that the Ryukyu Islands were 

more primitive and undesirable and the society less developed than it 

actually was. 2• 

I7Lt Comdr James T. Watkins, IV, USNR, Military Government Planning, Xth Army. August 

1944-February 1945, unpublished MS in Watkins Papers, RG 200. Milit ary Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD. 

18S ec Clellan S. Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," The Annals o/the American Acadel1l)1 

of Po/ilieal and Social Science 267 (Jan 50): 175-182. 

"Civil Affairs Handbook. Ryukyu (Looc/1oo) Islands (OPNAV 13-3 1), promulgated 15 Nov 44. 

2OWatkins, Military Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944-February 1945, Watkins 

Papers, RG 200. OPNAV 13-31 at least revealed an awareness that Japanese attitudes toward the 

Ryukyuans had colored the sources ror the handbook. See OPNAV 13-3 1, p. 68. 
THE GOVERNORS 

Meanwhile the Chief of Naval 

Operations' Military Government 

Section-formerly the Office for Occupi ed Areas, in conjunction with 

Princeton University, devised a civil 

affairs co urse lasting e ight weeks 

(compared to thirty-six weeks at Columbia) with less stringent entrance 

requirements. The Princeton facility 

was designed to produce gove rnors 

by the hundreds. The first class of 

447 officers entered the "U.S. Naval 

Schoo l of Military Governme nt , 

Princeton University" on 3 October 

1944 and fo llowed a curri culum emphasi zing the techni cal aspects of 

civi l affairs at the expense of the academic and theoretical. The military 

gove rnment sc hoo l at Co lumbi a 

closed in December 1944; the one at 

Princeton on 17 March 1945 after 

15 

ADM IRAL N I M ITZ 

graduating three classes. These two schools trained a tota l of 1,333 naval 

officers and nea rly 300 Army officers for mi litary gove rnment duties. 

Several of the Columbia and Princeton graduates also attended one of 

the Army's Civil Affa irs Train ing Schools at Chi cago, Stanford, or Harvard, while others received training at the Army's School of Military 

Government at Charlottesville. 

Some of the graduates of the Navy's schools at Princeton and Columbia were eventually assigned to Admiral Nimitz's headquarters to assist 

in planning civi l affa irs activities for Okinawa. And, with few exceptions, 

the offi cers who served with military government on Okinawa in 1945-

1946 were graduates of the Navy's two military government schools or 

the Army's schools at the universities of Virginia and Chicago." 

Civil A.ffairs Officers and Operation Iceberg 

While the Army and Navy military government schools trai ned future 

governors and the armed services and the civilian agencies defined their 

respective roles in civi l a ffairs planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached 

ZISgt J. Bloch. the Mi litary Government on Ok inawa, MS in (sCorn Background Material, RG 

407, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD; Watkins, 

Military Government Planning, Xth Army. August 1944- February 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
16 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

some strategic decisions about the Pacific War. They concluded that an 

invasion of the Japanese home islands, preceded by an intensive aerial 

bombardment, would be necessary to force an Imperial surrender. During 

the spring and summer of 1944 the Joint Chiefs debated the best strateg,ic 

location for the bases to stage air raids on the home islands (see Map f). 

After reviewing relevant military considerations, they decided to proceed 

with an invasion of Luzon, but to bypass Taiwan in favor of a direct 

assualt on Okinawa (Operation ICEBERG). In October 1944 they ordered 

General Douglas MacArthur to invade Luzon in late December and directed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to assault Iwo Jima and Okinawa early 

in 1945. 

Military government planning was an integral part of the tactical preparations for ICEBERG. The assault forces were certain to encounter thousands of Okinawans in the American advance across the island. To 

facilitate combat operations and minimize civilian casualti es, these citizens had to be removed from the front-line areas to collection points 

where care and custody could be provided. In planning for civil affairs 

operations in the Ryukyus, the initial issue to be settled was what contribution each of the uniformed serv ices would make. By direction of the 

Joint Chi efs of Staff, the Navy was responsible for military government 

in captured Japanese island areas." Admiral Nimitz, Commander in 

Chief, Pacific, would therefore assume the role of military governor in 

the Ryukyus. Once the amphibious phase terminated, however, ICEBERG 

would be for the most part an Army effort, with Army troops constituting 

most of the garrison force and civil affairs responsibility delegated to Lt. 

Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., Commanding General, Tenth Army. The 

" law of the land" would be based in the military proclamations issued 

in Nimitz's name and posted in both English and Japanese by civi l affairs 

officers trave ling with the combat troops. But, since the War Department 

was unable to supply sufficient trained personnel to implement the new 

" law of the land" and handle the entire military government assignment, 

that effort, like many other Tenth Army functions, would become a joint 

service endeavor. The War Department provided 183 civi l affairs officers, 

including Brig. Gen. William E. Crist as Deputy Commander for Military 

Government, whi le the Navy provided the remainder of the officersalmost 75 percent. The Navy also provided enlisted men to staff the 

various military government teams. Because of the joint service and concurrent mission aspects, organi zation shifted with the operational phase. 

During the assault phase, General Crist would receive his directions from 

" JCS 81915. 8 Jun 44, File CCS 383,2 1 (4- 21- 44), Sec. I, RG 218, Modern Military Branch, 

National Archi ves and Records Service, Washi ngton, DC. 
THE RYUKYUS 

STRATEGIC LOCATION IN 

THE WESTERN PACIFIC 

rv/ USSR 

I 

I 

o 

CHINA 

HONG KONG 

YELLOW SEA . Pusan . , 

SEA OF JAPAN 

" .~ .. : .. " ", 0 Kobe 

C::S9SS8kl 'l/,a OKU • KYUSHU 

Kagoshlma 'oll ~., 

, ... :g 

" . :: EAST CHINA nP AMAMI 0 SHIMA 

,:.~ . 

SEA .Ii TAIPEI OKINAWA SHIMA 

" 

4040 to Pearl H8~bor 

PACIFIC OCEAN 

" YAP 

MAP I 
18 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

General Buckner. During the garrison phase, however, Crist would drop 

one step further on the command ladder, serving under the direction of 

the Island Commander, Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace, USMC." 

Regardless of their service affili ation, individuals assigned to military 

government headquarters assembled at Schofield Barracks on Oahu. 

Those destined for military government fi eld detachments gathered at 

the Civil Affairs Staging Area, Fort Ord, California. The more junior 

offi cers in the fi eld teams, who had trained earlier in the war at the 

services' civil affairs schools, focused on the functional details of administering and sustaining the civilian population . On the other hand the 

more senior officers at headquarters, who for the most part lacked formal 

military government training, were far less concerned with the details of 

civil administration. They directed their attention to the broader problems of integrating military government into tactical operations, ironing 

out headquarters administrative procedures, and procuring and allocating 

materials and supplies." 

Military government planning began on 15 August 1944 when four 

Army and fi fteen Navy civil affairs offi cers arrived at Schofi eld Barracks 

to constitute the Civil Affairs Section (later, Military Government Section), Headquarters, Tenth Army, under the G- l. A lieutenant commander headed the section, assisted by an Army major. Both men had 

ga ined miltary government experi ence in Italy, but it remained to be seen 

if such experi ence could readily be transferred to the Pacific theater. 

Among those offi cers arri ving at Schofi eld Barracks were Lt. Comdr. 

George P. Murdock and members of his staff who had prepared the 

Handbook on the Ryukyus. By the end of November 1944 the Military 

Government Section had undergone a number of signifi cant changes. It 

was removed from its subordinate position under G- l and became a 

separate staff section under General Crist. The planning staff expanded 

to over forty officers, one-fourth of whom were Army offi cers." 

Interservice rivalry at times hindered planning, but the military govern ment mission on Okinawa would require a high degree of interservice 

DU .S. Army, Panicipotioll in ,lie Okinawa Operatioll, April-Jlllle 1945 (U .S. Army Forces PAO), 

2 vols. , Vol. I, pp. 10- 11 , RG 77, M ilitary Archives D ivision, National Archives and Records Service, 

Suitland, MD; rpt.. Maj Gcn Frank D . Merrill through CINe USAFPAC to the AG in Wash., 3 Sep 

45, sub: Rpt. of Operations in the Ryukyus campaign. Tenth Arm y Action Rpt., Ryukyus. 26 Mar30 JU Il 45, Vol. I, p. I I- XXVII- 2. Copy in CM H Library; rpt, HQ Tenth Arm y to CINe USAFPAC, 

Se ria l No. 002355- 1, 2 Aug 45, sub: Mil. Gove rn . Rpt- Ryukyus Area. RG 407; Roy E. Appleman, 

et aI. , Okill{lW(I: 71,e Last 8mlle (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of M ilitary 

History. 1948). p. 35; Charles S. Nichols, Jr. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in/he Pacific 

(Washington; U.S. Marine Corps. Historical Branch. G- 3 D iv., 1955), p. 268. 

!4Walkins. Military Govern ment Planning, X th Arm y, August 1944- February 1945, Watkins 

Papers. RG 200. 

HTenth Army, Roster of Officers, Mil. Govern. Section, APO 356, 12 Feb 45. Watkins Papers, 

RG 200. 
THE GOVERNORS 19 

coordination and cooperation for success, and accommodations had to 

be reached. In the area of supply, for example, considerable vacillation 

and posturing transpired before the services reached an agreement that 

divided the responsibility for procurement, with the Army providing supplies for the military government headquarters and field detachments, 

and the Navy assuming responsibility for civilian supplies, including medical needs.'· In other areas, such as personnel and administration, procedures and organization were so dissimilar that integration into the same 

organic units proved troublesome. Moreover, because the Army civil affairs graduates were usually older and of higher rank than their Navy 

colleagues, difficulties arose both in Washington and the field ." 

Problems also arose because of the 3,OOO-mile separation between the 

field staff assembled at Fort Ord and the military government headquarters staff at Schofield Barracks. Effective liaison proved to be very 

difficult between planners and those expected to carry out the plans. 

Advance copies of all military government documents were sent to Fort 

Ord for study, but there was little opportunity for an exchange of comments. During late November and early December 1944, Army Col. Willi am A. Boekel served as liaison officer between the two staging areas, 

but he could not close the communications gap. Consequently, the field 

officers were never completely informed of headquarters plans and desires, and officers at headquarters had no clear concept of the difficulties 

the field teams anticipated. 

The planners had only a relatively brief time to do their job. They 

had prepared for the invasion of Taiwan, and when the strategic decision 

was made in the fall of 1944 to substitute Okinawa as the target, they 

had only a few months to devise specific military government plans for 

the islands. Their natural tendency was to translate Taiwan planning to 

Operation ICEBERG, but this only served to skew the projections of available resources and estimates of manpower requirements. In fact, little 

was known about exactly what sort of society and what kinds of resources 

civil affairs officers would encounter on Okinawa. The planners' principal 

source of information was the Murdock team's Handbook, but the material in that reference was hardly current. To an uncomfortable extent 

the planners were forced to devise detailed operations based only on dated 

materials and their barely-developed intuitions for military government. 

The planners, however, did receive guidance from the Pacific commander. Although not formally issued until a month before the actual 

invasion, Admiral Nimitz's political, economic. and social directive for 

!bRichard. Naval Administratioll-Pacific Is/alltis, Vol. I. p. 184. 

!llbid, Vol. I. p. 62. 
20 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

the government of the Ryukyus was widely circulated in draft form within 

Tenth Army headquarters, and operations officers were well versed in its 

provisions when they set about preparing their detailed plans for ICEBERG. 

The directive set forth the duties and limitations of civil affairs activities 

in captured Japanese territories. The records suggest that none of those 

involved in drawing up the Nimitz directive had military government 

training. On the contrary, the officer in charge was a senior submarine 

commander with a collateral specialty in military law. 

The Nimitz directive contrasted in spirit and tone with the military 

government manual and the area handbook. Understandably, Nimitz focused on the American military units, rather than on the civilians. More 

than once he reminded his subordinates that their military mission was 

paramount and that the basic aim of military government was " to facilitate to the greatest extent possible" the task of defeating Japan. "Military 

government," Admiral Nimitz wanted the Okinawans reminded, " is a 

necessa ry part. .. of destroying Japan's power of aggression."" He went 

on to proclaim that military government should be stern but just, while 

making clear that the treatment afforded the islanders would depend on 

how they behaved. Noticeably, his directive failed to make the ethnic and 

social distinctions between the Ryukyans and the Japanese so carefully 

drawn by the authors of the handbook. While Koreans and Taiwanese 

Chinese might be granted special treatment when conditions allowed, 

" ordinary Japanese subjects"-he included the Okinawans in this category-could expect no such preferred treatment. Here his directive was 

at sharp variance with the manual and the handbook. Where the latter 

sources wanted to apply to the islanders most of the rights and privileges 

afford ed liberated peoples under international law, the Pacific commander emphasized the rights and responsibilities of American forces 

against enemy civilians during combat. Despite this emphasis, there was 

much positive advice for military governors in the directive, and much 

practical direction on the conduct of military government operationsdirections that obviously deri ved from a careful reading of the joint military government manual. Nimitz, for example, wanted local government 

machinery, including the courts, to continue functioning and, although 

he left it to the discretion of the Tenth Army commander whether schools 

should be closed or left open, he made it clear that all schools ought to 

be reopened as soon as practicable. 

The extent to which the Nimitz directive influenced military government operations on Okinawa remains unclear. The abbreviated planning 

18Directi ve. CINCPAC- CINCPOA to CG Tenth U.S. Field Army, CINCPAC File AI7- IO/A1(10). 1 Mar 45, sub: Political, Economic and Financial Directive for Military Government in the 

Occupied Islands of the Nanse i Shoto and Adjacent Waters. Fre imuth Papers. 
THE GOVERNORS 21 

phase combined with an unexpectedly large influx of refugees during the 

battle to give military government a distinctly ad hoc flavor at first. 

Nevertheless, the directive was important not only because of its influence 

on operations planning, but also because it marked the earliest and probably clearest exposition of a narrowly focused philosophy of military 

government that would figure prominently in aU subsequent RyukyuanAmerican relations. It represented an extreme expression of one of the 

sides of the argument over military mission versus military government 

that, by the end of the decade, would come to involve members of the 

President's National Security Council. 

The influence of the Nimitz directive was particularly obvious in 

"Operational Directive Number 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army" (short title: GOPER), part of the basic 

plan for the Okinawan campaign prepared by the Tenth Army's operations staff." In GO PER, the Tenth Army operations staff defined the 

military government responsibilities of the commanders of the expedition's major elements. While they referred to furthering national policies 

and fulfilling the obligation of occupying forces under international law, 

they obviously and understandably intended their third objective- assisting military operations-to be paramount. This was made clear when 

they enumerated the commanders' duties in support of the objectives: 

maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing 

interference with mi litary operations, reducing active and passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing local 

resources in aid of military objectives. 

To accomplish these objectives, the operations directive caUed on 

commanders to exercise rigid control over the civilian population. They 

might "demand and enforce from the inhabitants ... such obedience as 

may be necessary" not only for war purposes and the maintenance of law 

and order, but also for proper administraton of the area " under circumstances of hostile occupation." Civilians found in violation of " military 

enactments" were to be surrendered to the military government for trial 

and punishment in exceptional military courts. "Local native courts" 

were to be closed until further notice. 

The Tenth Army planners went on to delineate in general terms the 

types and numbers of military government units to be organized and the 

duties they were to perform. In a separate document, Annex 15 to Operations Plan 1-45 (Tenth Army's comprehensive plan for ICEBERG), they 

set forth in specific terms the table of organization and equipment for 

19Operational Directive No.7 for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army 

(GO PER), 6 Jan 45, Copy in Tenth Army Background Papers, RG 407. 
22 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

each military government detachment and assigned the individual units 

to specific combat organi zationsJO In keeping with Nimitz's order to be 

stern but just, Tenth Army planners outlined in considerable detail the 

commanders' duty in the areas of government, health and welfare, labor, 

commerce and industry, finance, transportation, and construction. If the 

details of these duties would allow a humane and progressive commander 

to begin rehabilitating the Okinawans, they also could be used to justify 

a strict or even arbitrary governance of a conquered enemy. In the end, 

the planners set a course for every phase of Ryukyuan life that could not 

but remind commanders that they were dealing with enemy civilians who 

in the absence of careful control might well disrupt or even subvert the 

progress of the military campaign. 

A third Tenth Army planning document introduced the other side of 

the debate between military mission and military government. Issued by 

officers in the Military Government Section in the form of a technical 

bulletin on 25 February 1945, " Military Government" reflected the training its authors had received in the services' civil affairs schools." Examining in considerable detail the duties and opportunities outlined for 

military government units in Tenth Army's operations directive, these 

officers seized every opportunity to interpret the directive in reasonable 

terms, seeking to limit its application only to those areas and cases where 

absolutely essential. They sought to show civil affa irs officers how to save 

their military commanders from needless confusion and error in dealing 

with civilians and to relieve the commanders of onerous duties for which 

they had little training or interest. Their objective was never in doubt. 

[n their methodical delineation of the civil affairs officers' day-to-day 

duties, they looked to the early restoration of Ryukyuan society with a 

healthy respect for its prewar configuration, if also a somewhat idealistic 

determination to bestow on the islanders the blessings of 20th-century 

democracy. 

In the area of Ryukyuan law, for example, the military government 

planners call ed on civil affairs officers to inventory for the island commander those local laws and ordinances, not specifically abrogated by 

proclamation, that should be modified or suspended. They believed the 

list would prove to be a short one and would consist mostly of law related 

to Japanese militarism and nationalistic cults. Ordinary civil and criminal 

law would continue in force. They also advised the military police on the 

JOAnnex 15 to Tentative OpPlan (Tenth Arm y) No. 1-45,6 Jan 45, Appendix A, RG 407. For 

discussion of the organization and duties of the military government units in ICEBERG, sec chapter 

II. 

31Tcnth Army Military Government Section, "Military Gove rnment," 25 Feb 45, copy in CM H 

files. 
THE GOVERNORS 23 

establishment of exceptional military courts, the manner in which they 

were to be conducted and procedures for bringing cases to trial. They 

looked to the early reopening of local courts (criminal courts first, then 

civil and higher courts), and to that end ordered a screening of the Okinawan judges and lawyers to ascertain qualifications and degree of trustworthiness. Amid the detailed attention to local court procedures, they 

made clear that the exceptional military courts would be used for only 

truly exceptional cases. They looked to the local police for local law enforcement wherever possible and called on civil affairs officers to respect 

property rights and work for their early restoration where they had been 

abrogated. 

The military government planners' ideas of Ryukyuan government 

were clearly spelled out in their discussion of the wartime resettlement 

program and the organization of the emergency resettlement camps they 

knew would be needed to accommodate the homeless and shifting populations in the wake of battle. They admonished civil affairs officers to 

follow local custom in government matters as far as possible. They went 

into great detail on the selection of civilian leaders, counseling officers 

to select tough-minded, skeptical Ryukyuans who, they believed, would 

contribute most to the restoration of civilian law and order. 

In some areas their technical advice appeared at odds with the intentions of the military commanders. For example, Tenth Army directives 

put a halt to most normal communications and closed all schools, but 

the military government planners looked to the rapid restoration of the 

mails and press, even if heavily censored, and made elaborate plans for 

the ea rly opening of schools, organized and operated by islanders under 

a committee of three or more Okinawans with educational experience. 

They stressed that plans for a formal educational system should be in 

place so that schools might open as soon as command permission was 

obtained. 

The planners returned repeatedly to the subject of the resettlement 

camps. They wanted to use the experiences they would gain in these places 

to fa cilitate the restoration not only of local government, but also of local 

construction, industry, agriculture and fishing and an organization of 

civilian labor. They even gave the command's obligation to register the 

people by occupation a broad interpretation. Knowledge of local specializations would, they reasoned, lead to employment in military construction, which in itself would help restore wages and a moneyed 

economy and facilitate the regeneration of the islanders' small industrial 

capacity. In similar tones the discussion of diet, medicine, disease, and 

social regulation revealed a planning group basically sympathetic to local 
24 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

needs and customs and a rmed with a strong humanitarian approach to 

solving problems. 

In many ways tile military government planne rs may have reminded 

their audience of old-fashioned schoolmarms. In didactic tones they outlined a step-by-step proced ure to restore a popu lation largely unknown 

to them. It would not be difficult to imagine the reaction of harried civil 

affairs offi cers forced to read through pages of material beginning "effecti ve planning of operations requires the employment of these basic 

methods: maintenance of advanced estimates and tabular summari es." 

Yet if the planners' earnestness in matters of di et, medi cine, and all other 

things Okinawan tri ed the patience of some of their subord inate civil 

affa irs offi cers a nd sometimes prompted the derision of their contemporaries in the tactical units, it nevertheless was compelling enough to 

fuel the rehabi litation of Ryukyuan society that would take place during 

the next five yea rs. 

Such planning had not been easy. The planners had fa ced the exigencies of a major military campaign and the puzzle of a society of unknown 

loyalty and questionable recuperative capacity. They had also contended 

with the pervasive and, at times, competing needs of the tacti cal forces. 

In January 1945, whil e the " Milita ry Government" bulletin was being 

completed, Tenth Army planners imposed a dual staff relationship upon 

the Military Government Section . The section was split-at least on paper- into a small Tenth Army Military Government headquarters and a 

larger Island Command component. General Crist, as discussed ea rlier, 

served on the staff of the Commanding General, Tenth Army, as well as 

on the staff of the Commanding General, Island Command. In theory, 

milita ry government headquarters was a staff section of Tenth Army for 

purposes of plann ing, but was considered a staff section of Island Command for operations (seeCharll). In reality, the plann ing and operationa l 

aspects of ICEBERG overl apped considerabl y, with resultant confusion and 

perplex ity among milita ry government personnel. " Until the military government fi eld detachments came under the operational control of Island 

Command, which for most teams was estimated to be less than a month, 

they would be directed by the corps or divisions to which they were 

attached. Tenth Army military government planners organized these fi eld 

teams according to the prescription set forth in GOPER. " 

IlLt Wi llard A. Hanna, USN R, untitled M S, Watkins Papers, RG 200; Tenth Army Action Rpt, 

Ryukyus, 26 Mar-3D Jun 45, Vol. I, p. I I- XXVII- I, copy in CMH Library; XXIV Corps Ops Rpt, 

I Apr- 3D Jun 4 5, undated, and Sgt J. Bloch, untitled MS, Island Command Background Material, 

RG 407 . 

.'lOperationa] Directi ve No. 7 for Mi litary Gove rnment of the Commanding General, Tenth Army, 

(GOPER), 6 Jan 4 5. RG 407: Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar-3D Jun 45, Vol. I , pp. 11-

XXVII- I and I I- XXVII- 2. copy in CMH Library. 
CHART I - M ILITARY G OVERNMENT D UAL STAFF ASSIGNMENT 

Tenth Army 

(LTG S. Buckner, Jr.1 

XXIV Corps III Amphibious Corps (Marinel I 

(MG J. Hodgel (MG R. Geigerl 

B-6 B-8 

C-2 C- 1 

G-6-2 G-6 - 1 

G-10-1, 2, 3 G- 10 - 12 

7th Div 96th Div 27th Div 1st Marine 2d Marine 6th Marine 77th Div Div Div Div 

A-4 A - 5 A-6 B- 10 A - 1 A - 2 A-3 

B- 4 B-9 B-5 G-10-15 B-1 B- 2 B-3 

G- 10 - 4 C- 13 G-1O - 8 G-10-16 G- 10- 17 G- 10-19 G-10-1O 

G-1O-5 G- 10-6 G-10-9 G-10-18 G- 10-20 G-1O - 11 

G- 10-7 
26 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN T HE RYUKYU ISLANDS. 1945- 1950 

Organized at Fort Ord, the detachments were of four different types, 

each designed to pe rform a specific function: 

(I) Six "A" teams, each attached to a d ivision and consisting of four 

officers and eleven enlisted men, wo uld operate during the initial assault. 

In addition to serving as each di vision's military gove rnment staff, "A" 

teams wo uld conduct reconnaissance, post military government proclamations, locate civilian food and medi cal suppli es, establish collection 

centers, and evacuate civilians from battl e areas with the aid of the military police. 

(2) Ten "8" teams. each with eight offi cers and nineteen enlisted men, 

were assigned at a rate of one to each di vision and one to each corps. 

These teams were to continue the work of the "A" detachments. As the 

"A" teams moved on with combat forces, the " 8 " teams were to proceed 

with evacuations and to control the collection centers established by the 

"A" detachments. 

(3) Twelve "C" (or "camp" ) teams, consisting of ten offi cers and 

twenty-six enlisted men, wo uld be assigned to the two corps operating in 

the islands. These detachments were to establish and operate a se ries of 

civilian camps fo r refugees. Tenth Army designed each camp to be able 

to handle 2,500 islanders initiall y, and eventually, 10,000. 

(4) Six " 0 " (or "district" ) teams, of twenty-two offi cers and sixty 

enlisted men, we re to be landed on Okinawa during the last assault phase 

or early garrison phase. Their role was to assume military government 

responsibilities at the district level, absorbing the " 8 " teams and controlling the "C" teams within their respective district boundaries, once 

Okinawa was so divided. According to civil affa irs planners, a " 0 " team, 

augmented by a " 8 " team, could administer a civilian distri ct containing 

between 60,000 and 100,000 people. 

Tenth Army planners decided that once on Okinawa, these detachments wo uld be augmented in the fi eld by twenty Navy G-IO dispensaries 

(25 beds, one offi cer and six corpsmen each), six Navy G-6 hospitals 

(500 beds, fift een offi cers and one hundred fifty-eight men each), a quartermaster truck company, a Navy construction battalion, eight Navy N I A 

camp hospital units (each capable of providing tentage and other personnel support for 250 staff and patients), an Army military police battalion, and an undetermined number of Army interpreters. Taken all 

together, these components constitute an impressive array of resources 

and refl ect the seriousness with which Tenth Army planners viewed their 

military government mission. 

Headqua rters, Tenth Army, assigned the military fi eld detachments 

to the various tactical components and scheduled them to land on the 

ta rget in stages. On 17 February 1945 military government components 
28 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

assigned to the XXIV Corps or to its three divisions, the 7th, the 77th, 

and the 96th, arrived on Leyte in the Philippines. The other detachments 

assigned to assault divisions and corps staged on other islands. Military 

government teams attached to the III Amphibious Corps and to the 6th 

Marine Division (Reinforced) staged on Guada1canal; other detachments 

joined the 2d Marine Division on Saipan, the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) in the Russell Islands, and the Army's 27th Division on Espiritu 

Santo in the New Hebrides (see Chart 2). 

Tenth Army's Island Command under General Wallace staged in Hawaii with the Second Provisional Military Police Battalion (later the 52nd 

Military Police Battalion) and with the Military Government Headquarters Detachment under General Crist attached (see table below).3' 

Military Government Teams Comprising the MG HQ Detachment 

A-lOOX 

B-lOOX 

C-3. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, II, 12 

0-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 

G-tO-A, B, C, D. E. F, G 

NIA-I, 2, 3, 4, 5,6,7,8 

These assignments, made during the planning and staging phases, were 

not rigid, nor were they meant to be. The civil affairs planners assumed 

that a number of military government field detachments-especially the 

"B" and medical teams-would be fairly mobile. "A" and "B" teams 

might leapfrog one another depending upon the course of tactical operations. "B" teams would be transferred from one corps or division to 

another as needed. Even semipermanent "C" teams would find themselves under the operational control of whichever tactical unit controlled 

the area where the military government refugee camps were 10cated. 35 

Ultimately, events in the field, such as the rapid American advance across 

the island and the unexpectedly large influx of refugees into American 

lines, dictated a degree of mobility and flexibility for military government 

personnel far beyond anything envisioned by Tenth Army civil affairs 

planners. 

The planners had made an effort to be prepared, but as they discovered, no amount of preinvasion training or planning could have adequately prepared Tenth Army's civil affairs staff for the enormous 

problems they faced on Okinawa during the summer and autumn months 

J.lTenth Army Action Rpt, RyukYU5, 26 Mar-3D Jun 45, Vol. I, pp. 2- 1-2 through 2- IV-6, copy 

in CMH Library; XXIV Corps Ops Rpt, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, undated, RG 407. 

HOperational Directive No.7 for Military Government of the Commanding General, Tenth Army 

(GOPER), 6 Jan 45; The XXIV Corps in the Conquest of Okinawa, MS in three vols, XXIV Corps 

Records, Vol. I , p. 138, RG 407. See also the movement of the peripatetic Det B- IO as outlined in: 

Rpt, CO, Oet 8- 10 (Lt Comdr R. F. Lynch, USNR) to CG, 1st Marine Diy., 6 Jul 45, Sub: Mil. 

Govern. Activities (fm 011400 May to 020001 Jul); rpt, Capt Charles W. Runyan, QMC, AUS, to 

MG HQ )sCom, Okinawa, undated, sub: Hist. orops of the MG Det B- IO in Okinawa. Both rpts in RG 407. 
C I-IART 2- MI LITAllY GOVERNMENT F IELD DETACHMENT ASSIGNMENTS 

During Planning Phase During Operations Phase 

Tenth Army Island Command 

I 

Deputy Commander Deputy Commander 

for for 

Other Staffs Other Staffs 

Military Government Military Government 

(BG W. E. Crist) (BG W. E. Crist) 

Military Military 

Government 

Government 

Headquarters 

Staff 

Detachment 

I I I 

Military Government Field Detachments 
THE GOVERNORS 29 

or 1945 . The magnitude o r these problems stood in sharp contrast to 

military gove rnment's limited mission. objectives. and resources. 

CHAPTER II 

The Battle for Okinawa 

"Loochoo" and "Ryukyu" are, respectively, the Chinese and Japanese 

derivations of the same 7th-century Chinese ideograms which depict the 

archipelago as a "floating horned dragon." "Okinawa" is a term of Japanese deri vation meaning "a rope in the offing." The term properly refers 

only to Okinawa Jima, the largest island in the chain, although it is often 

used to denote Okinawa Gunto-that island plus its immediate outlying 

islands. It is sometimes misapplied to the entire archipelago. 

The people of the Ryukyu Islands, although resigned to the severe 

typhoons that annually sweep their islands, were unprepared for the lelSu 

no bofu, the typhoon of steel, as the American assault on the islands in 

Apri l 1945 has been characterized.' The campaign, which officially lasted 

eighty-two days, was the last battIe of World War II. For Americans, it 

also proved to be the bloodiest of all the Pacific campaigns against the 

Japanese Empire. For the people, the society, and the very land itself in 

that small portion of the empire, the battle was a devastating experience. 

The magnitude of the destruction and the sudden appearance of many 

thousands of hapless civilians meant that long before the battle ended, 

American civil affa irs officers embarked on a military government experiment of unprecedented scope and duration. 

The Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) reach southwest from the Japanese home islands in a 775-mile curvilinear chain to within seventy miles 

of Taiwan (see Map 2). The archipelago, which separates the East China 

Sea from the Pacific Ocean, consists of some 140 islands or islets-only 

thirty or so of which can support permanent human habitation-and 

countless rocks and reefs in major island groupings. Most of the islands 

are the peaks of three distinct mountain ranges rising along the edge of 

the continental shelf. Others are volcanic in origin. Coral formations are 

found on both types. East of Okinawa, the largest of these 

'The spelling of Japanese terms and proper names may vary, depending upon the time period 

and whether they are used in Okinawa or the home islands. The author has attempted to use standard 

Japanese throughout. All diacritical marks have been omitted in this volume. 
CHINA 

MAP 2 

D 

, 

,8 

o 

EAST CHINA SEA 

-\>. 

Miyako I 

Vseyama Retlo 

N 

l:) 

JAPAN 

, 

, 

Amami 0,(jP " Kikai r 

Tokuno r .~ 

\) 

() 

Okino Oaito 

PACIFIC OCEAN 

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

1945 

~h~-'--~,oo MILES 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 33 

islands, the deep Ryukyu Trench falls away sharply to depths in excess 

of twenty-five thousand feet. ' 

Despite their temperate zone location, the islands bask in a semitropical atmosphere because of the Kuroshio (Black) Current which flows 

northward from the North Pacific Equatorial Current, channeling tropical 

waters through the Ryukyus. This current keeps the water immediately 

surrounding the archipelago five to fifteen degrees warmer than the water 

further offshore. The humidity is above 76 percent the year round , and 

life there would be most uncomfortable were it not for the constant sea 

breezes. Naha, Okinawa's capital city, has a mean annual temperature of 

nO(F) and an average of 202 rainy days each year with a mean ann ual 

precipitation level of nearly 83 inches. Rainfall is heaviest during the 

months of May and June. April through October, however, is the typhoon 

season, and, at a minimum, three typhoons strike or closely skirt the 

islands each year; the number has been as high as forty-five.' 

With a land area of some 454 square miles, Okinawa is by far the 

largest of the Ryukyu Islands. The island is sixty miles long and ranges 

in breadth from two to sixteen miles. The northern part of the island, 

north of the isthmus between Ishikawa and Nakadomari, is rugged and 

mountainous, with considerable tree cover. Agriculture there is limited 

to the coastal areas and to small terraces. The central portion of the island, 

south of the isthmus, consists of a hilly, dissected limestone plateau of 

some 50,000 acres, with its highest elevations averaging 500 feet above 

sea level. The land rises gently from this central plain to a hillier 30,000 

acre plateau in the south. This plateau is bounded by steep escarpments 

descending to raised beaches, except at the extreme southern tip where 

the escarpment becomes a sea cliff. Okinawa's irregular terrain, which is 

dotted with hills, ravines, and caves, offers numerous natural defensive 

positions. 

The Ordeal of Japanese Defense Preparations 

Initially, the outbreak of hostilities in China and the Pacific did not 

affect Okinawa. The island had neither surplus food nor a great deal of 

industry to assist the Japanese effort. Its harbor faci lities were unsuitable 

!Unless otherwise noted, the background geographic material in this vo lume is based on the 

following: Office of the Chi ef of Naval Operations, Civil Affairs Halldbook. RYllkyu (Looc/lOo) Is/allds, 

OPNAV \ 3-3 1. 15 Nov 44; M.D. Morris, Okinawa: A Tiger by fhe Tail (New York: Hawthorne Books, 

Inc. , 1968), cited hereafter as Morris, Tiger by the Tail; Earl Rankin Bull, Okinawa or RyltkYII: The 

Floming Dragon (Newark, Ohio; pri va tely pub., 1958); and George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The /-listory 

oj all Island People (Rutland, Vt. & Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958), cited hereafter as 

Kerr, An Island People. 

lDonald P. Whitaker, ct aI., Area Halldbook/or Japall , 3rd cd. (Washington: Government Printing 

Office. 1974). 
34 MILITA RY GOVERN MENT IN T H E RY U KY U ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

for large wa rships, and the airstrips se rved onl y as steppingstones for 

Japanese nights to Taiwan and beyond . The island's main contribution 

to the wa r effort lay in its production of sugar cane. The black sugar crop 

was shi pped to Japan, where it was converted into commercial alcohol 

for torpedoes and engines. Fully one-fourth of Okinawa's culti vated land 

was devoted to sugar cane production.' 

As hostiliti es came closer to the home islands, the Japanese began 

more extensive defense preparations on Okinawa' Following Ameri can 

air strikes aga inst Truk Island in February 1944, Imperial General Headquarler.\· dra fted new plans for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryuk yu 

Islands. On I April Lt. Gen. Masao Watanabe acti vated the Japanese 32d 

Army to be stationed on Okinawa with its headquarters in the suburbs 

of Naha.' At that time the Okinawan defenses were considered secondary 

to the Mari anas defense line, whi ch the Japanese hoped would prove 

impenetrable. But in July 1944 Ameri can forces breached the Mari anas 

line at Saipan, forcing Imperial General Headquarlers to reconsider its 

defensive strategy. In August Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima replaced General 

Watanabe as commanding general of the 32d Army. Ushijima reorgani zed 

the staff, replacing most of the incumbent offi ce rs with talented young 

men from Imperial General Headquarlers. Reinforcements fo r the 32d 

Army, including service and support units, arri ved from the home islands 

throughout the summer and fall of 1944. While the 32d Army augmented 

its manpower, work proceeded on the construction of various defense 

works, incl uding countless concrete pillboxes and fortified positions, tank 

traps, and mine fi elds. In addition, dozens of Okinawa's natural rock and 

coral caves, supplemented by man-made tunnels, were stocked with materi el and fortified . These caves became the basis for an extensive network 

of underground defensive positions. Approximately 20,000 Okinawans 

were conscripted for the Boeilai (Okinawan Home Guard) for labor service and assisted in the construction of airstrips and fortifications. Because time was short fo r the island's defenders and there were not enough 

men to meet construction goals, many women were also pressed into labor 

service- some were obliged to work on airfi eld construction.' T his conscription of so many island women for service away from the home had 

"Morris. Tiger by Ihe Tail. p. 56; David D. Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration 

and Reconstruction," Far Eas/em Quarterly 7 (May 1948): 257. 

}Th is account of Japanese preparations, units, and weapons was taken from the following sources: 

Japanese Monograph No. 83 (Navy): Okinawa Naval Operations, January- June 1945; Japanese Monograph No. 53: 32d Army Operations in Okinawa, March- June 1945; and Japanese Monograph No. 

13 5: Okinawa Operations Record of the 32d Army. March- June 1945 (rev. ed.). Copies in CMH 

files. See also Appleman, Okinawa: The Last Ball/e, pp. 84-96, 483-485. 

bA Japanese army was the equ ivalent in strength to a U .S. A rmy corps. 

7lntcrvicw, Prof. Seigen M iyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83. M iyazato's mother was one such 

conscriptcd laborcr. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 35 

a distinctly negative impact on Okinawa's traditional close-knit family 

life. 

By late March 1945 General Ushijima cou ld deploy a sizable number 

of men and weapons in defensive positions. Additiona l forces-naval 

personnel, communications troops, engineers, and other miscellaneous 

elements- brought the estimated strength of the 32d Army (counting 

home-island Japanese only) to over 77,000 men. To these were added the 

Okinawans: 20,000 Bol'i/ai, 750 male middle-school students organized 

into Tekkl'/.\·II Kinno/ai (Blood and Iron Students Corps) volunteer units 

trained for combat, and thousands of others conscripted as civilians for 

service functions or pressed into se rvice with the 32d Army. Counting 

the BOl'i/ai, the Tl'kkl'/.\"lI units, and the numerous civilian "volunteer" 

laborers, one Japanese source estimated that " . . . almost all Okinawan 

males from 18 to 45 years old were mobilized for combat."· Add itionall y, 

about 600 middle-school girls were trained specifically for medical service. Although the total number of Okinawans mobili zed is open to some 

dispute, observers later agreed that one overall conclusion appears valid: 

the Japanese preparations had a thoroughly adverse impact on most facets 

of Okinawan society." 

Since no accurate records exist of all the Okinawans drafted into the 

32d Army, the exact strength of the Japanese force at the time of the 

American invasion cannot be stated precisely, but it certainly exceeded 

100,000 men . These forces were positioned in anticipation of the American landing, and they were well suppli ed. Once Imperial General Headqllarters recogni zed that the Philippine campaign was lost, most of the 

weapons and materi al originally destined for that sector were sent to 

Okinawa instead. The defensive preparations, of necessity, also included 

foodstuffs and by the end of March 1945 the 32d Army had stockpiled 

enough provisions to sustain its units until mid-September. Although 

foodstuffs had been imported to feed both the civilian population and 

the military, no plans were made to distribute food for civilian use once 

hostilities began. 

In an effort to ease the food shortage, while at the same time improving 

operational efficiency, Imperial General Headquarters decided to evacuate 

Okinawans to the home islands. Before the American assault, some 80,000 

civilians were taken to Kyushu on transports that had brought troops 

and munitions to Okinawa. In another less ambitious, but no less painful, 

population sh ift, the 32d Army relocated approximately 60,000 civilians 

IJapanesc M onograph No. 135: Operations Record of the 32d Army, March- June 1945 (rev. cd.), 

pp. 48- 49. CMH fi les. Sec also Appleman, Okinawa: The Last Baule, p. 4) 5. 

'JSee. for example, Kerr. All Island People, pp. 5, 463-464. Kerr considers the mobilization of 

Okinawan civilians far less thorough than the author of Japanese Monograph No. 135 recalls. 

THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 37 

from the southern half of the island, where the Army intended to make 

its stand, to the rugged, fa r less populated north . About one-half of th is 

number were children and the aged. T he dislocation of so many civilians 

caused conside rable hardship and made matters all the more diffi cult for 

the Ame rican civil affa irs offi cers aft er the campaign ended. But, even 

with 80,000 inhabitants removed to Japan and 60,000 more hiding in 

the northern caves, there were still over 360,000 civilians in potential 

danger in central and southern Okinawa. 

Thus, for months before the American forces landed on their island , 

Okinawans were plagued with total disruption of their peaceful way of 

life, increased pressure on their meager food supplies, family separations, 

arduous forced labor, and relocation. Indi vidual homes and even entire 

vi llages were commandee red to house the swollen Japanese ga rrison. The 

Okinawans resented these disruptions as they resented the attitude of the 

Japanese military, who were unable to communicate in the local Okinawan dialects and who regarded their hosts as " rustics." This touched 

on all things Okinawan. With little thought to cultural considerations, 

the 32d Army had located its headquarters in the historic city of Shuri 

beneath the castle of Okinawa's kings, thereby ensuring Allied destruction 

of this ancient treasure. The Okinawan bureaucracy knew that an attack 

was imminent, but the local government was so thoroughl y dominated 

by home-island Japanese that little was done to protect the island's historic treasures or the ancient archives of the kings.'o The manifestations 

of the 32d Army 's presence left in many nati ve Okinawans a residue of 

ill will aga inst the home-island Japanese." 

The Okinawans, with no tradition glorify ing wa rfare and the warrior, 

insisted, to the consternation of the Japanese, on retaining an indifference 

to things military. Such an attitude was suspect in a society where the 

civilian population had come to exist primarily to feed and outfit the 

military, but those suspicions did not surface suddenly in 1945. Ten yea rs 

earlier Lt. Gen. Torao Ishii, then ga rrison commander, had cast doubt 

upon the Ryukyuans' loyalty when he vehemently denounced the carefree 

attitude of the islands' yo ung men. The Ryukyuans deeply resented his 

public condemnation. Despite their lack of military fanaticism, the Ryukyuans did not think of themselves as fundamentally disloyal to the empire. At the same time, however, they did resent the increasi ng military 

demands for "voluntary" contributions of time and resources- contributions that the Okinawans could ill afford ." For the' most part these 

UlKerr. All Islalld P('oph'. p. 467. 

li lt is a li ngering memory that some Okinawans want to keep ali ve. Sec Prof. Masahide Ola. 

"Remembe r Battle of Okinawa- and Textbook Issue," The Japan Times. 6 Feb 83. p. 14. 

ln cw. Mi yazato with the author. 20 Feb 83. See also OPNAV 13- 31. 
38 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN T HE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

levies were borne stoicall y by the O kinawans; very few became active 

dissente rs. The vast majority of the popu lation remained loyal, if not 

parti cularly enthusiastic abo ut Japa n's foreign adventures. A few Ok inawan nationalists endured, and their movement survived until the American invasion in 1945 . One of their spokesmen, a prefectural li brarian 

from Shimabuku, lost his position in 1940 for publicly denouncing Japan's intensified efforts to assimilate the Ryukyus into a milita ri zed Japan." The libra rian was an exception, however, for by 1940 most 

Oki nawans were responding positively to a decade of propaganda that 

extoll ed the heroi c deeds of Japan's soldiers in China. Ok inawa ns, too, 

were serv ing in most branches of Japan's a rmed services, and some had 

achi eved offi cer rank." 

War Comes III [he Ryukyu.\' 

Beginning in late September 1944 American aircraft and subma rines 

began to tighten a noose around the Ryukyu Islands. Japanese surface 

shipping became extremely hazardo us. B- 29's of the Fourteenth and 

Twenti eth Air Forces and planes of the Navy's fast carri er forces struck 

repeatedly at enemy positions throughout the western Pacifi c. Naha, the 

major population center, came under heavy air attack. On one day, 10 

October, carrier planes struck the city in five separate bombing and strafing raids, leaving a wake of destruction that was nea rl y total. The mayo r 

of Naha, a Japanese sympathi zer named Jugo Thoma, some years later 

described the raid as a " holocaust." " Japanese officials, in what can o nl y 

be rega rded as the height of audacity given their own record, compl ained 

that American planes had indiscriminately struck at military and civilian 

areas ali ke.'· 

Additional raids followed in ea rl y 1945. Shuri- Okinawa's second 

largest city, its ancient roya l capital and cultural center, and the site of 

the 32d Army 's headqua rters-became a major target. Thus, we ll before 

the in vasion , the city and its ancient treasures were destroyed. Most 

residents of the city were left homeless-if they were among the fortunate 

ones who survived. 

I 'Garland Evans Hopkins. The' Slor), o/OkillCllI'lI (Washington: Pri va tely published by the Friends 

of Okinawa. 1947). p. II. 

'~ nt vicw. MiY<.Izato with the author, 20 Feb 83. 

I'M elllnirs (!I"JIII,fO 'I1UJ/lW. Jugo Thoma Memoirs Publishing Assn. (Naha: Hoshi Printing Co .. 

1969): sec also chapter II . Edward O'Flahert y. "American Military Government and Civil Administration. R yukyu Islands. [945- 1972." incomplete MS. copy in eM H files. cited hereafter as O'Flaherty MS. 

"'SWNCC Fi le 36. I Mar 45. Records of the Sec. Army, Asst. Sec. Arm y, RG 335: JCS 126411. 

23 Feb 45. sub: Japanese Complaint of Alleged A ir Bombardment of Non· military Installations in 

Okinawa. RG 218. 
THE PLAN OF ATTACK 

I I I I 

o 5 MilES IE SHIMA 

~ 

III Amph 

XXIV 

PACIFIC OCEAN 

Hegushi 

~ 6 Mar{-)a '* 1 Mar 

~7 

~961') tt Futems 

• 

o· Machinato 

KEISE IS X A Fld 

NAHA 

\I 

Kubo Pt 

Motobu 

Penin sula 

Yonabaru't 

A Fld NAKAGUSUKU BAY 

Naha A Fld 

• ~77 + Minstogs 

MAP] 

Chinen Pt 

:'\ 

~2Mar Demonstration 

f77 
40 M ILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS. 1945- 1950 

T H E HAGUSHI BEACHES. I APR IL 1945 

T he first American troops landed in the Ryukyu Islands at 0804 hours 

on 26 March 1945." T he 3d Battalion Landing Team. 305th Regimental 

Combat Team. 77th Division. assa ulted the beaches of Aka in the Kerama 

Rello (island group). just fifteen mi les from O kinawa . T hree other teams 

followed immed iate ly. By nightfall on 29 March. American forces had 

occupied all the isla nds of the Kerama gro up (see Map J). On L-Day. 

Easter Sunday. I April 1945. Tenth Army combat units assa ulted the 

Hagushi beaches on the west coast of Okinawa itself. " 

The advance elements of mi litary government headquarters. consisting of ten offi cers. including General Crist. and thirteen e nlisted men. 

landed on Okinawa on L-Day. T he second and third elements reached 

the isla nd approximately ten days later: thereaft er. headquarters elements 

arrived at about two-week interva ls. until the rear echelon of two offi cers 

a nd raul' enlisted men landed in mid-May with the rea r echelon. Headquarters. Tenth Army. As previously planned. military government field 

teams came as hore on the isla nd independent of headq uarter's landings. 

T he grea t majo rity of 15-member "A" detachments. such as A-4 with the 

7th Division. landed on I or 2 Ap ril. These teams immediately fanned 

IIFllr a complete dcsl'ription of the hal tit: for Okinawa. sec Appleman. ct. al.. O/.;il/(/\I'(I: '/ 1", I.as! 

/Jall/e: Nichols and Shaw, Okil/mm: I "il'fO/"1' ill 'he Pad/ie: James H. Bclolc and William M. Belote. 

"/)·,,'wtJl/ f~rSl ccl: TIll' IJalfh'.!ill' Okillmnl (New York: I-r"arpcr .lI1d Row. 1970): ... nd Lt. Comdr. Frank 

A. Manson. USN. B{/ult- Rel'orr: I kIm:!' ill 11Il' ParUic. Vol. V of Bailie Report Series (New York: 

Rinehart and Co .. 1949). 

I-For further inlormalion on the selection of the invasion hcachcs. sec Rear Adm. Robert N. 

Colwell. USN R (Ret). " Intelligence <lnd the Oki nawa Battle," Now" W{/r Col/c'ge' RC'l'ie'u' JS (MarApr 85): 8 1- 95. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 41 

JAPANESE SOLDIER EMERGES FROM A CAVE To SURRENDER 

out through the combat zone to collect civilians. Most of the 27-member 

"B" teams, which were to continue and expand the relief efforts of the 

advancing "A" teams, landed on L+ 2 or L+3 and began establishing 

holding areas for displaced islanders. The small but relatively mobile 25-

bed Navy G- IO dispensaries landed with the "A" and "B" detachments 

(G-IO-5, for example, with the 7th Division on 1 April) and began dispensing medical assistance to the Okinawans. The first 36-member "e" 

team- the teams charged with operating the refugee camps- was ashore 

by sundown on 3 April. At that time there were some 45 officers and 125 

enlisted men assigned to military government teams on the island and 

all were immediately involved, for American combat forces advanced 

rapidly during the first few days of the invasion and thousands of noncombatant Okinawans came into the lines.'· 

The 32d Army made no serious attempt to contest the landings. Japanese strategists believed, mistakenly, that if they permitted the American 

ships and troops to concentrate off the Hagushi beaches, the Japanese 

fleet coming down from the home islands could trap and destroy them. 

The American success in sinking the Japanese naval relief force, including 

19XXIV Corps Ops Rpt, Ryukyus, I Apr-30 Jun 45, undated, pp. 93-94 and Figures 23 & 24, 

RG 407; History of Mil. Govern. Ops. on Okinawa I April to 30 April 1945 (L-Day to L + 29), 10 

May 45, Tenth Army Records, pp. 4-5, RG 407. 
42 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

the super-battleship Yamato, shattered this optimistic strategy, and the 

American forces quickly moved inland. Some turned north, but most 

proceeded south toward the main Japanese defensive positions around 

Shuri and Naha.'o As the fighting intensified, particularly in the south, 

casualties, both military and civilian, increased. Many islanders remained 

in hiding in the caves. Weakened by fever and lack of food and conditioned by Japanese propaganda, they refused to emerge when American 

servicemen ordered them out. The GIs, reluctant to enter the caves because of warnings about booby traps and fanatical Japanese holdouts, 

cleared them with explosives and flame throwers. These tactics saved 

American lives, but countless civilians died or were wounded. 

Casualties were extremely heavy on both sides for a single campaign. 

American battIe casualties totaled 49, 151 dead and wounded; there were 

also 26,211 non-battle casualties. Japanese military losses were even more 

staggering, an estimated 110,000 combatants and service troops killed 

and 7,400 captured. These figures include an unknown number of lastminute Okinawan conscripts and civilians. The precise number of civilian 

casualties will probably never be known, but the lowest estimate is 42,000 

killed. In all likelihood, somewhere between one-tenth and one-fourth of 

the civil population perished." 

Bad as was the fighting, it might have been worse had it not been for 

the work of Tenth Army's psychological warfare units before and during 

the invasion. Between 25 March and 17 April, Fifth Fleet carrier planes 

dropped some five million leaflets on the island. Planes were also used 

to distribute the psychological warfare office's newspaper, the Ryukyu 

Shuho, which attracted considerable attention among enemy soldiers and 

civilians alike. Other propaganda tools-such as tank-mounted amplifiers, aircraft with loudspeakers, and remotely controlled radios parachuted behind enemy lines-contributed to the psychological operations 

effort. 22 

The psychological warfare teams' immediate objective was to depress 

Japanese morale so that enemy soldiers would surrender rather than resist. The long-range goal was more ambitious: to promote the idea that 

Okinawans were ethnically and culturally different from the home-island 

Japanese. Consequently, the leaflets and loudspeakers not only told the 

Japanese soldier why and how he should surrender, they also told the 

lOAppieman, Okinawa: Tlte Last Baule, pp. 72-74, 76-77. 

USee Norman D. King, Civilian Casualties ill the Bailie o/Okinawa (Gainsville, Fla.: University 

of Florida. Dept. of Geography. Research and Information Papers, Ryukyu Islands Project Pamphlet 

No. 19, 1972). 

22Appleman. Okinawa: The Last Bailie, p. 34; Report of Psychological Warfare Activities, Okinawa, 15 Sep 45, Fil e 110-39, RG 407. 
EAST CHINA 

SEA 

Irom.n 

MAP 4 

CHIMU 

BAY 

NAKAGUSUKU BA Y 

(BUCKNER BA YI 

SOUTHERN OKINAWA 

1945 

o 3 MILES 
44 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Okinawan citizenry not to be afraid, for they were not regarded as the 

enemy. 

Before Operation ICEBERG, psychological warfa re operations against 

the Japanese had been something of a disappointment. Nimitz's staff, 

which was largely responsible for the ICEBERG psychological warfare planning, judged this operation to be the most successful of the Pacific war. 

Military resistance from the civilian population was negligible, and larger 

numbers of enemy soldiers surrendered earlier in the campaign than had 

been anticipated. 23 Most certainly the success of the psychological warfare 

efforts in the Ryukyus helped reduce the toll of human suffering during 

the campaign for the islands. Unfortunately, the loss of life and property 

on Okinawa in particular still reached immense proportions. 

The first task of military government personnel was to assemble the 

islanders, many of whom were wandering about the battlefield in search 

of food or relatives. The collection camps were very modest affairs, sometimes only a circle of barbed wire and a pit latrine. Many early camps 

lacked even canvas protection from the chilly Okinawan nights. Some 

islanders willingly came forward to surrender; others, conditioned by 

Japanese propaganda to fear the invaders, had to be captured by American assault troops. Many others appeared in camp only as the result of 

military-government detachment searches. The civilians exhibited considerable fear, but no one offered resistance; a stoic sense of resignation 

seemed to prevail. The first "D" (or District) team of 82 members, which 

was capable of administering a civilian population of 60,000 to 100,000, 

did not land until 27 April. Until then, the smaller detachments- high 

on humanitarian purpose, but low on supplies-were very much on their 

own. 

Two teams, B-IO and C- I, typified the activities of military government detachments during the assau lt phase. Attached to the 27th Division, B-IO team came ashore on 9 April and established civilian collection 

centers at Chatan and at the nearby village of Momobaru Aza (see Map 

4). The Chatan facility was particularly spartan-little more than a 

barbed wire enclosure. On I May the team transferred from the 27th 

Division to the 1st Marine Division and immediately established new 

centers at lza (Isa) and at "Berger Beach" near ltoman. Berger Beach was 

particularly busy, processing nearly 13,000 refugees every two weeks during June. " Once rested, fed , and given preliminary medical attention, the 

ll"Psychological Warfare Development And Responses," CINCPAC·CINCPOA Bulletin No. 109-

45,15 May 45, p. 13, Fi le 11 0- 39, RG 407. 

24Rpt, MG Det. B-IO to MG HQ IsCorn, undated. Sub: Hist. of Operations of Mil. Govern. Det. 

8- 10 in Okinawa, File 98JSCI- 5, RG 407. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 

team's civilian charges were transfe lTed to larger temporary camps at 

Koza , Shimabuku , and Naha. 

As with the other camp teams, 

C- I's mission was to establish and 

operate a compound capable of receiving large numbers of refugees 

from the sixteen "A" and "B" detachments operating in the Ryuk yus. 

C- I team came ashore on 4 April 

near Sobe. Some 1,000 former Sobe 

residents came out of hiding that 

first day and placed themselves under military gove rnment ca re. C- I 

established a temporary fa c ilit y 

there, then moved to a permanent 

camp near Koza. Activity was minimal at first, but 225 more refugees 

45 

M,LITARY GOVERNMENT H EADQUARTE RS C A MP ({{ Sliilllahllkll. 

arrived on the 16th and another 300 came in within two days. The detachment's lone interpreter struggled wi th the problem of registering the 

newcomers. The next week brought in more than a thousand new arri vals, 

and by the fo urth week C- I had a total of 3.378 civi li ans under its ca re. 

The number of refugees reporting in continued to increase. By I June, 

144,3 11 civilians- some 40 to 45 percent of the survivi ng populationwere under Ameri can care." 

Rrdilgee Care 

Once the refugees had been gathered into the va rious camps, the civil 

affairs teams' most immediate conce rn was food suppl y. Food had long 

been a problem on Okinawa, even before the war. Most of the land in 

the Ryukyus is moderately fertile at best; only a few areas of more ferti le 

soil exist in central and southern Okinawa and on a few of the outlying 

islands. Okinawans, however, made the most of what they had: rice was 

grown in the fertile, but poorly drained, reclaimed coastal marsh areas; 

sweet potatoes, sugar cane, and green-leaf vegetables were cultivated on 

the upland plains. The sweet potato, first introduced from China, was 

the staple food crop for both men and animals. Sugar cane was the principal cash crop. Traditionall y, and of necessity, as many as 75 percent of 

!~ Lt Gene DcMambro, USNR (Unit Historian), Hist. of Ops., MG Oct. C- l , Fi le 98ISCI-5, 

IsCom Okinawa Background Material, RG 407; Appleman, Okillall'a: The Last Balt/e, p. 417. 
46 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Ryukyuan households engaged in agriculture.'· Despite this manpower 

commitment, however, food had to 

be imported to feed the archipelago's 

population. 

Military gove rnment planners 

knew that the Ryukyu Islands had 

neve r been se lf-suffi cient in food 

production. Beyond that fact, little 

was ce rtain about actual conditions 

on the island. There was no way of 

knowing, for example, how Japanese 

defen se preparation s had affected 

the food suppl y or the extent to 

which American preinvasion bombFOOD R AT ION ING AND D,STR ,B U. in g and shellin g might have deTION IIl1der lI1ilil(l/'.I' gOI'I'I'IIII1<'111 .I'll' stroyed food sources. The planners 

pervisiol1 . had, therefore, prepared for all aspects of a potential food shortage. Each di vision was issued 70,000 civilian rations for emerge ncy feed ing. The ration s, ca lculated with 

Japanese preferences in mind , included rice , nour, dried fish, cooking oil, 

soybeans, and sugar. A regul ar ration contained 1,530 calories, but special 

rations were also prepa red for laborers (2 ,000-2 ,500 calories), nursing 

mothers (2,200 calories), and very small children (782- 921 calories). 

These last two diets included extra calcium in the form of evaporated 

milk, but all of the rations were " devoid of ascorbic acid (vitamin C) and 

deficient in ribonavin (vitamin B2) .... "27 Each division was to land its 

civili an rations in various echelons throughout the assault phase. 

To their great relief, the American forces discovered that there was 

no immed iate food crisis. This was all the more remarkable because the 

defending Japanese forces had thoroughly disrupted agricultural efforts 

by evacuating and/or conscripting for labor so many able-bodied citizens. 

Moreover, in the south, the soldiers of the 32d Army often confiscated 

food from the civilians' meager stores." Despite such confiscations, Okinawan civilians had managed to hide food in the island's coral caves. 

Consequently, one of the military government's immediate tasks was to 

2~ Kara ik > "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration ," p. 257. 

" Lit, CNO 10 CINCPAC, Serial No. 0192413 (SC), Op 13-2/ABM: eh, 18 May 45, sub: Basic 

Diets for the Civilian Population in the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Japanese Outl ying 

Islands, Operational Arch ives, U.S. Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard. 

18Henry Stanley Bennett. "The Impact of In vasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa," 

u.s. Naval Ilistillite Proceedings 72 (Feb 46): 265, 272, cited hereafter as Bennett, "The Impact 

on the Civilians," 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 47 

salvage that food and distribute it through a rationing system. Under 

close military government supervision, the civilian population sought out 

the food caches. They also harvested the remaining sweet potato, wheat, 

barley, and millet crops. Since most of the other crops had been lost 

during the fighting, as had most of the livestock and the fishing fl eet, 

these salvage operations became extremely important. 29 And they were 

successful. Detachment B- I's officers found the native salvage efforts 

"adequate," especially in such items as onions, cabbages, soybeans, and 

the ubiquitous sweet potatoes. Civil affairs officers at C- I team, while 

finding no great quantities of rice, noted that the local fi elds "abound" 

in sweet potatoes and cabbages.'· 

During the battle, 1,402 tons of processed foodstuffs and 2,079 tons 

of harvested crops were salvaged and rationed. Until 2 1 June, the end of 

the assault phase, between 78 and 85 percent of the population, depending 

upon locality, was fed from local sources. Imported rations supported the 

remainder. While hoarding was a problem, the military government 

teams' biggest food problem during the fighting was one of timely and 

equitable distribution. Transportation, or lack thereof, was a major part 

of the food situation." On most of the outer islands, where battle-related 

destruction was far less than on Okinawa, the food situation was less 

senous. 

As the Ryukyus campaign officially ended (2 July 1945), however, 

military government teams found themselves facing a deteriorating food 

situation. During June the field detachments fed an average daily population of 196,000, with only 22 percent of the food being imported. By 

July the figures had risen to 295,000 persons fed daily, with 59 percent 

of the food being imported. In part, these statistics suggest that a growing 

number of civilians came under military government care in the last days 

of the campaign. There were, however, other, more serious reasons for 

the increase. By July the salvaged foodstuffs had been exhausted and 

considerable additional damage had befallen the island's crops. The retaining walls of numerous terraced field s and the intricate irrigation systems developed over the years had been damaged. Once the combat phase 

ended, bulldozers, heavy trucks, and graders, following base construction 

2~ mo, IsCom MG HQ to CG IsCom, 10 Jun 45, sub: History of Mil. Govern . Operations on 

Okinawa, I May to 31 May (L+ 30-L+ 60). Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

XlHist. o f Ope rations o f Mil. Govern . Det. 8 - 10 in Okinawa; Hist. of Ops., MG Det. C- I, File 

98 ISC I-5. RG 407. 

li lt Col John Stevens and M Sgt James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary (March- 14 May 45), 11 Apr 

45 entry; HQ MG Oct. B-9 through chain of command to the Adjutant General, I Apr 45, sub: 

Operations Rpt. Det. 8-9 is reporting on ops. beginning 27 March in Kcrama Retto; and memo, 

Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Geo W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on 

by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period I Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407. See also 

Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus. 26 Mar- 30 Jun 45, VoL I, p. II - XXVII- 5. Copy in CM H Library. 
48 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

plans, continued the destructive work already begun by tanks and artillery. The man-made walls and irrigation ditches, so essential to farming 

on Okinawa, could not be easily replaced. The damage done to island 

agriculture by this necessary development was compounded by theft and 

vandalism on the part of American soldiers. Headquarters, Tenth Army, 

lamented the situation: 

At the outset, an ample suppl y of food was uncovered . ... Substantial losses were 

incurred by the uncontroll ed action of troops and the lack of suffic ient military government personnel to prevent such losses. Losses also incurred in livestock , poultry, . .. farm 

implements and building materials by need less destruction and lack of personnel and 

transportation to salvage such items for Military Government USC, l1 

Military government teams made a maximum effort to have the civilians harvest the crops, but inadequate transport, countless shifts of 

population from one camp to another, and insufficient military government and military police personnel to supervise civili an harvesters resulted in large losses. Many crops, especially sweet potatoes, rotted in the 

fields." T he same detrimental factors, particularly the shifting between 

camps for battlefield or logistic considerations, also left the Okinawans 

with very little incentive to plant new crops. 

Before long the more balanced civili an rations brought ashore by the 

assault divisions proved inadequate to support the growing number of 

Okinawans dependent upon imported rations. Military government teams 

attempted to keep the caloric level in the 1,530- 1,990 range, but the 

nutritional value of the rations often became very questionable. At times 

chocolate was the only available food for several days. One Okinawan 

recalls a week when only butter was distributed in his camp; during 

another week the ration was powdered ice cream, which the Okinawans 

mixed with boiling water and consumed as a tea. During other weeks 

corn meal was suppli ed, but without the eggs or milk to make bread.34 

Because of a world-wide shortage of fats and oils, as well as the dearth 

of farm animals locally, cooking oils and fats so essential to the Okinawan 

style of food preparation soon became very scarce. Military government 

teams found they could provide only about 3 percent of the local demand. 

Military government headquarters begged mess sergeants not to dispose 

of old oils and fats, but to distribute these items to Okinawan employees 

'!Tcnth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar- 30 June 45. Vol. I, p. II - XXVII- 3. Copy in CMH 

Library. 

lJWar Diary of MG Dcl. 8 - 5 (Lt Comdr E. R. Mossman, CO) with the 77th Div. notes that the 

sweet potato crop will be lost ( 15 May 45 entry), RG 407; Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration," p. 259. 

ntcr icw, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 49 

of the various units. Still the demand could not be met, and some Okinawans were reported to have used machine oil to cook their tempura. 35 

With the food situation deteriorating so badly and so quickly, General 

Crist warned civil affairs personnel to avoid using terms such as "concentration centers" when referring to the camps; Tenth Army personnel 

were advised that descriptions of civilian camp conditions would be censored from letters home.'· In late September 1945 all pretense of maintaining the civilian rations at the April level was dropped, and the ration 

was cut in half until more rations could be imported." Nevertheless, 

military government teams somehow managed to provide minimum 

amounts of food to support the civil population, and although the people 

of the Ryukyus experienced hardships and instances of malnutrition, 

actual starvation was averted. The question of food, however, and Okinawa's lack of ability to feed itself, would remain a major concern of the 

American authorities long after hostilities ceased. 

While the principles governing the production and distribution offood 

for a war-devastated people have almost universal application, those governing the provision of medical aid do not. The Army's only experience 

with so many enemy civilians occurred in Europe. There military government medical officers were able to utilize local personnel and facilities; 

once organized and supplied, they carried the burden of civilian health 

care. Conditions and experiences in the Pacific, however, most notably 

on Saipan, convinced the planners that practically all medical care would 

have to be imported and furnished by military government. They greatly 

feared a large number of civilian battle casualties, as well as widespread 

tropical diseases resulting from the poor sanitation facilities on the island. 

Expecting the worst, Tenth Army planners could not hope to provide 

more than minimum humanitarian health care, and that only in the most 

extreme cases. Successful planning for medical facilities was a frustrating 

experience, not only because of limitations on military government assault tonnage, but also because of Tenth Army's inability to obtain the 

type of facilities best suited for civilian medical care. The Saipan experience pointed to the need for mobile field hospitals, but with so many 

commitments elsewhere, the Army was unable to provide this type of 

facility. Military government forces on Okinawa had to make do with 

Navy hospital units, which were far less mobile and adaptable to assault 

lSMG fl yer, undated, but circa 1946-47, sub: Save Fats and Oi ls for the Okinawans, Freimuth 

Papers; interview, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83. 

l6Minutes of Brig Gcn W. E. Crist's stafT officers conference, 12 May 45, Sgt J. Bloch fi les at MG 

HQ and Tenth Army General Orders 311.7 (TAXXAG), 3 Jun 45, sub: Censorship Regulations, RG 407. 

J7HQ, US Naval MG Unit, Okinawa. Directi ve No. 9, 28 Sep 45, sub: Civili an Rations Issue, 

Reduction of, RG 38. 
50 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

conditions. The Commander, Expeditionary Troops, was responsible for 

medical care during the assault phase, while Island Command took over 

for the garrison phase. The Navy provided all medical supplies. 

The military government teams were pleasantly surprised to discover 

the medical situation on Okinawa more favorable than had been anticipated. Cases of malaria were reported, but not in the epidemic proportions expected." But because of the number of people hiding for so long 

in the island's caves, flea and louse infestation affected three-fourths of 

the population. Filariasis and dengue fever were widespread, and an estimated 35 percent of the population suffered from tuberculosis. Medical 

personnel also discovered approximately 150 lepers on Okinawa and sent 

them to the 850-patient leprosarium on small Yagaji (Yagachi) Shima to 

be cared for by two qualified Japanese doctors.J• 

In an effort to control insect-borne diseases and improve sanitation, 

military government teams attempted weekly spraying of islanders' 

houses and shelters with a 5 percent DDT in kerosene solution, while 

latrines were treated with 2 percent sodium arsenite. Islanders who 

emerged from the caves or from their huts had their bodies and bundles 

of clothing liberally dusted with DDT by the first military government 

personnel they encountered. 4• 

During the campaign, the military government's medical facilities admitted over 30,300 civilians and treated a much larger number as outpatients. Toward the end of the campaign, almost 30 percent of the 

civilians encountered by the military government teams required medical 

attention. But, despite these figures and the fact that the 25-bed naval 

dispensaries were overtaxed, underequipped, and undersupplied, the facilities were able to care for the islanders. Only in the rarest cases was it 

necessary that the civilians receive treatment from the hospitals and dispensaries serving the tactical forces. " 

While the medical personnel struggled with their limited resources, 

JlActually. the number of reported cases of malaria rose considerably after the American forces 

arrived on Okinawa, although whether this renected an actual increase in malaria cases or simply 

better reporting is not clear. 

l'Rpt, HQ Tenth Army to Cine USAFPAC, Serial No. 002355- 1, 2 Aug 45, sub: MG Operations 

Rpt, Ryukyus Area, RG 407; cpl, HQ MG IsCom to CO IsCom, 31 lui 45, sub: History of Mil. 

Gove rn. Operations on Okinawa, I Jun to 30 Jun 45 (L+61 to L+90), Watkins Papers, RG 200; 

msg, HQ M G IsCom to War Dept. Gen. StafT, e NO, 30 Apr 45, RG 165, Modern Military Branch, 

National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. 

lnt ew, Miyazato with the author, 20 Feb 83; Hist. of Operations of Mil. Govern. Det. B10 in Okinawa, RG 407 . 

• ILt Comdr James Watkins, Disaster Reli ef Administration: Public Health, MS, Watkins Papers, 

RG 200; rpt, III Phib Corps MG Officer to CG III Phib Corps, I May 45, sub: Operational Rpt on 

Mil. Govern., ICEBERG, RG 407. For a detailed account of medical operations during ICEBERG, sec 

Dr. Donald W. Mitchell, The U.S. Army Medical Service in the War Against Japan, Chp. XIX 

(Occupation of the Ryukyus), circa 196 1. Copy in CMH Medical His!. Branch files. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 51 

DUSTING WITH DDT 

other civil affairs officers addressed the need for clothing and shelter. 

Both were in short supply. Heavy rainfall was a constant throughout most 

of the year, and day/night extremes of temperature were not uncommon. 

Proper clothing and adequate shelter, therefore, were as essential as food 

and medical ca re. 

The amount of clothing salvaged for civilian use varied from location 

to location . In April the 27th Division reported "almost no clothing available [for] these natives and some are nearly naked," while the III Amphibious Corps reported salvaging sufficient clothing to allow a measure 

of modesty, but not enough warm clothes or blankets to provide real 

comfort42 Despite these conditions, pilferage of civilian clothing and 

personal effects by islanders was only a minor problem, remarkable in 

4~ Rpl , Sgl Julius Bloch, MG files to 27th Div., MG Rpt, No.3, 20 Apr 45 and MG Rpt, No. I, 

15 Apr 45, RG 407; hr, Col Frederick P. Todd, CO, 1st Information and Historical Service to Col 

A. F. Clark, Chi e f, Historical Branch, G- 2, WDGS, 29 Nov 45, Chief Hist. File 676 (b), CM H fil es; 

memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gcn W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations 

carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the pe ri od 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407. 
52 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLA NDS, 1945- 1950 

LABORERS Ireoring casl-(~fr /llIi-

.limn.\' mark"d "CI V". 

view of the disintegration of Ok inawa's soc ia l and legal institutions. 

Souvenir hunting by Ameri can servicemen, o n the other hand, took a 

se riou s toll in c ivilian garments. 

During the month that they repo rted 

on a severe lack of clothing, the 27th 

Division indica ted that American 

forces we re guilty of looting homes. 

Capt. Olive r J. Cejka, AUS, of Detachment 8 -6 repo rt ed a "Most 

shameful example of va nda lism ... 

clothing, eve rything thrown out of 

houses" a t Atan ni ya. Very ea rl y in 

the campaign, at Zamal11i Son in the 

Kerama Retto, souvenir hunters had 

also pilfered 75 percent of the Detachment 8-9's store o f salvaged 

shoes and clothing" 

Military gove rnmen t teams a ttempted to mitiga te the sho rtage of civi lian clothing by utilizing surplus and cast-off American uniform parts. 

This practi ce did much to alleviate the situation, but it created a recognition problem. The uniforms we re therefore modifi ed for civili an use, 

a process wh ich included stenci ling the letters "CIV" six inches high on 

shirts, jackets, and trousers." If these uniforms had not been available, 

the clothing situation o n Okinawa wou ld have been even more of a problem. Even so, the shortage of adequate clothing soon prompted a private 

relief effort in Hawai i, where the Okinawa Relief Clothing Dri ve Committee was organi zed under the sponsorship of the Honolulu Council of 

Churches. This committee shipped to Okinawa some 150 tons of used 

clothing. Capt. W. D. Jennings, USN, Chief, Mid-Pacific Department of 

Civil Affairs, provided Navy sea transport. 45 Despite such private efforts 

the clot hing situati on remained unsatisfactory. American uniform parts 

continued to serve as staple clothing for Okinawans, especiall y those em4JRpt, Sgt Julius Bloch, MG fi les to 271h Div., MG Rpt, No.3, 20 Apr 45; MG Rpt, No. I , 15 

Apr 45, RG 407. Sec also Sgl J. Bloch int erview ( 14 Sep 45) wi th Capt Oli ver J. Cej ka , AUS (B-6), 

and rpl, HQ MG Oct. B- 9 (77 th D iv.) th rough the ope rati ons chain o f command to the Adjutant 

General, I Apr 45. sub: Operations Rpt. , RG 407. 

UWatkins working nOle, undated, sub: Civilian Clothing, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

HMilsugu Sakiara, "Ok inawans in Hawaii; An Overview of the Past 80 Years," Uchintllll:JIII: A 

H istory OjOk;IIl1l1'llllS ill Hawaii, Ethnic Studies Program (Honol ulu: U ni versilY of Hawaii , 1981), 

p. 115. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 

SURPLUS UNIFORM clothes an OkinGlvan craftsman making shi-shi figurines 

for souvenirs. 

53 

ployed at military facilities, until 1947 when the Far East commander 

ordered an end to such use'· 

Tenth Army planners had anticipated that a large number of civilian 

dwellings would be destroyed during the fighting, but they could not 

predict with any accuracy the actual extent of the destruction. Military 

government detachments that landed with the 77th Division in the Kerama Retto confirmed the worst fears: the majority of the houses on Zamami Shima were either totally destroyed or badly damaged. Similarly, 

the villages on the small island of Ie Shima, just off Okinawa, were "completely uninhabitable." " The situation was somewhat better on the main 

island where perhaps 11 ,000- 12,000 Okinawan houses survi ved, although 

at least half of these required extensive repairs. The 20 percent of Naha 

" M'g, CG PHILRYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. G 34603 GSCAP, I Apr 47, File: Mcssages-PHILRYCOM Apri l 1947, RG 9, MacArthur Archives. 

<4 1Msgs, I-IQ Det. B- 9 (77th Di v.) through the chain of operations command to the Adjutant 

General, I Apr 45 and 5 May 4 5, sub: Operations Rpt ., RG 407. 
54 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

.... -. R EBU ILDING. Gathering thatch for roofing in selliemeni camps. 

that had survived the October 1944 air raids was destroyed in the invasion . Military government team C-I found only 12 houses left standing 

in Sobe. All suffered some degree of damage, but with no other shelter 

available they were of necessity used to house about 1,000 civilians." 

During the battle for Okinawa, the combatants shelled and burned 

many island dwellings that otherwise wo uld have been available for housing. In some instances, of course, this was done to deny the houses to 

possible enemy snipers. In other instances, however, the evidence points 

to thoughtlessness or spite as the motivating force. In an effort to curb 

what he termed " much indiscriminate and unsupervised burning of native structures," Tenth Army Chi ef of Staff, Brig. Gen. Elwyn D. Post, 

directed that such destruction be restricted'9 

Other buildings-sometimes whole villages-fell victim to Island 

Command's base development plan and its execution. The belief at the 

time was that Japan would not surrender without a sustained aerial bombardment and subsequent invasion. Consequently, bulldozer operators 

" HiS!. of Ops., MG Det C- I, Fil e 98 ISCI - 5, RG 407. 

4?Dirccti ve. Tenth Army CotS to Distributio n, 600.971 (TAACS), 12 May 45, sub: Leiter of 

Instructi ons- Burning of Native Dwellings; di recti ve, HQ )sCorn to Distribution "8" & "0", 

600.97 1 (TDACS), 2 1 May 45. sub: Burning of Native Dwellings, RG 407; Bennett, "The Impact 

. . . on the Civilians," p. 267. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 

STANDARDIZED HOUSI NG being constructed ullder miliwry government 

sllpervision. 

55 

followed plans drawn up months before in Hawaii and leveled hundreds 

of houses to provide room for highways, B-29 air strips, and munitions 

dumps. 'o The base development plan not only increased the housing 

shortage; it also contributed to a growing land-usage problem. 

Military government planners calculated that twel ve refugee camps 

should be built to house some 120,000 civilians, in addition to the military 

gove rnment personnel themselves. Requirements for construction materials were necessarily la rge, with the biggest volume item 1.3 million 

board feet of lumber. Construction needs totaled 30,000 measured tons, 

about half of which a rrived as part of the regularly-a llocated military 

government tonnage; the rest came as part and parcel of the equipment 

and suppli es assigned to the engineer units. But even these building materials were not adeq uate, and the lack of available shipping necessitated 

a local salvage effort to make up the difference. The planners had, however, anticipated that such construction efforts would be performed by 

a Navy Seabee unit. Admiral Nimitz had agreed on I January 1945, but 

the 27th Naval Construction Battalion did not arrive on Okinawa to assist 

the military government specialists until 4 June. " 

Watk in s working nole. "Lack of Shelter," undated. Watkins Papers. RG 200. 

s'Mcmo. Ch ief of Resettl ement Enginee ring (Charles G. Day) to Ope rations Office r, MG HQ 

(sCom, 17 Aug 45. sub: Resettlement Program. Rpt. on, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
56 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Despite the adverse circumstances, the military government succeeded in sheltering Okinawa's homeless on an emergency basis. During 

the eight weeks fo llowing the invasion, this was accomplished with severe 

overcrowding. Some dwell ings whi ch under norma l circumstances wo uld 

have housed five to ten people now sheltered fift y or mo re. Such overcrowd ing made sanitary standards difficu lt to maintain, but at least there 

was shelter from the elements" T he breakthrough of the ma in Japanese 

defense line in late May permitted military government personnel to 

pursue a six-week salvage drive for building materials. They razed aba ndoned vi ll ages that had been overrun in central and southern Ok inawa 

and moved some 3 million board feet of lumber north to construct emergency housing. The program of razing buildings in the south to ship 

lumber north halted when the end of hostilities on the island brought the 

likelihood of resettlement in the south. 

The vast majority of Ok inawans came into contact with civil affa irs 

officers during the assa ult phase of ICEBERG. Despite the circumstances, 

the Okinawans came to appreciate the efforts of the military government 

teams. Medica l personnel were especia ll y effective in forging a stro ng 

bond between the occupation forces and the civilian population. Much 

of this goodwi ll quickly dissipated, however, when the military's need for 

land came into confl ict with th e Ok in awan trad iti ona l view of 

landholding. 

Most Oki nawans wanted nothing more than to return to their land 

to rebuild their homes and resume farming. For a great many, unfortunatel y, this wish could not be fulfilled si nce the level land that was best 

suited for farming was also ideally suited for a irfields, munitions dumps, 

and other military installations. And compounding that loss of agri cu lturalland, to repair areas torn up by heavy eq ui pment, topsoil was scraped 

for fill. In that process, the intricate system of ditches and sma ll dams 

that had controlled erosion for countless years was often damaged or 

destroyed. With the coming of the rain y season, the process of land destruction was completed as topsoil was washed away to sea." 

Although initial construction work supported the tacti cal forces engaged in combat on Okinawa, the ultimate goa l of the base development 

plan for Okinawa and Ie Shima was constructi on of a irfields and other 

fa cilities for the final assa ult on Japan. During the planning phase, Tenth 

~! cmos. Lt C. S. Ford. USNR, to BrigGcn W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern . operations 

carri ed on by the III Phib Corps on Ok inawa Jima du ring the period I Apr to 20 Apr 45, and Ford 

10 eG. MG HQ IsCom. 28 May 45. sub: Mil. Gove rn. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr 

to 28 May 45. RG 407. 

HBcnnctt. "The Impact . .. on the Civilians," p. 270: Karasik. "Oki nawa: Problem in Adm in. 

istration," p. 259: Rpt. ASCOM I MG I-IQ to CG ASCOM 1,3 1 Aug 45, sub: History of Mil. Govern. 

Operations on Ok inawa. t Jul to 31 Jui 45, Watkins Papers. RG 200. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 57 

Army envisioned that after the seizure of the Kerama Retto and Okinawa, 

Phase III of Operation ICEBERG would involve the invasion of no less 

than five additional islands: Okino Daito, Kume, Miyako, Kikai, and 

Tokuno. T hese wou ld then be developed as a ir bases and radar o utposts. 

During the assa ult phase, however, reconnaissance revealed that of the 

five additiona l islands, only Kume was suitable for such development. It 

was taken on 26 June, and the remainder of Phase III was cancelled. 

This cancellation had a considerable impact on Okinawa and Ie 

Shima. Ma ny of the resources o rigi nall y allocated to projects o n the o utlying islands were now brought to Okinawa-eighteen airstrips were now 

planned for Okinawa and four for Ie Shima, instead of the total of ten 

originally intended for these two islands. By the end of May, ten of the 

twenty-two a irstrips were under construction. And, while the construction 

called for in the base development plan fo r Okinawa had not been completed by the end of hostilities, that development had absorbed more and 

more acreage and had reduced civilian habitation to small pockets, mostly 

in the inhospitable north of the island." 

One concerned observer of these developments stated that the tactical 

forces req uired so much of the isla nd for military installatio ns " that practically no space rema ined for the natives."" The a reas assigned to the 

refugees kept changing as the needs of the tactical units expanded . In 

many areas the continual movement of the d isplaced population thoro ughly discouraged th e planting of crops, a nd thus contributed to the 

deteriorating food si tu a tion . Faced with more and more civ ili a ns 

squeezed into small and widely dispersed pockets that could not support 

a rural society, military government teams could barely cope with the 

refugee situation.'· 

Between I April a nd 3 1 August 1945 , changing battle lines and other 

military conside ratio ns necessitated th e relocation of approximately 

250,000 Okinawans, most of who m had to move many times. T he mass 

movements began as early as 6 April when a military government team 

moved some 6,000 isla nders, o n foot , from Sunabe to Shimabuku (see 

Map 4). On 10 April a milita ry gove rnment "B" detachment ordered 

another 6,000 people to move from Chatan to Nodake. To supe rvise th e 

population shifts, Headquarters, Tenth Army, established the Office of 

Resettlement Engineering, with a civilian, Cha rles G. Day, as its chief. " 

Under his direction , the office organized one of the largest of these re-

\~ App man, Okinawa: Th" Lasl Ball/(', pp. 419-42l. 

~\ Ford. "Occupation Experiences 011 Oki nawa," p. 178. 

)o, lsCom MG HQ to CG IsCom. 31 Jul 45. sub: History of Mil. Govern. Opcf<ltions on Okinawa. 

I Jun to 30 Jun 45. and HQ (sCorn Okinawa. 30 Jun 4 5. Actio n Rpt IsCam. Ok inawa 13 Dec 44-

30 Jun 45. RG 407. 

)7Establ ishcd by MG Special Circular No. 4. 24 May 45. Freimu th Papers. 
IE SHIMA 

( 

, 

, , 

",' ~ , 

ISHIKAWA ,'JINUZA ,- ,-

I 

~ 

\ 

KOZA \ 

\..-

--; 

ITOMAN: ' 

I 

MAP 5 

I' CHINEN 

, 

\ 

• 

'MAEBARU 

\ 

, 

D 

HENTONA 

.. 

,\. r-~--

, --' , KUSH I 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

DISTRICTS ON OKINAWA 

30 November 1945 

_ _ _ Districts 

o 3 MILES 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 59 

locations in late May when the entire population of Ie Shima was dispersed to other islands. 58 This move resulted in a particularly large 

amount of ill will toward the American occupiers. 

By the end of the summer, all of the major refugee camps had been 

turned over to the tactical units and the inhabitants had been moved 

northward to a relatively small settlement area, the military government 

area near Jinuza on the northeast coast (see Map 5). The large camp at 

Taira, which housed some 64,000 islanders, had been closed and its inhabitants moved to the Chijuka-Hentona area in the northwest. In late 

June, Tenth Army had determined to evacuate the entire civil population 

of the Motobu Peninsula to create a bivouac area for the III Amphibious 

Corps. With fifty trucks from the 1st Marine Division, military government teams evacuated between 20,000 and 22,000 inhabitants in seventytwo hours. Th is northward movement reached a peak in August with the 

evacuation of the Chinen Peninsula, a movement which used forty trucks 

and two LST's. The military government areas to which these civilian 

refugees were moved comprised only about 10 percent of Okinawa's land 

mass, and of that percentage, perhaps one-half was totally unsuitable for 

resettlement purposes.'· 

Throughout this diffi cult period the Okinawans remained calm and 

cooperative despite their hardships. And there was hardship and suffering. On 22 June, for example, while 88 1 evacuees were being transported 

by truck to Kushi, one truck-with dozens aboard- arrived with three 

dead: two children and one elderly woman.'o 

Under the strain of these abrupt evacuations from existing camps, 

military government planning sometimes broke down. On several occasions, refugees arrived at their new location only to find the camp already 

fi lled beyond capacity and camp authorities unwilling to take them in. 

For the evacuees, these refusals meant many unscheduled hours in the 

backs of trucks during which some of them became dehydrated or ill. 

Consequently, the Deputy Commander for Military Government, General Crist, ordered that no civilians be refused at any military government 

5·Rpt. MG I-IQ IsCom to Lt James Watkins, USNR, 15 Ju145, sub: Rpt on Gene ral Conduct of 

Mil. Govern., Southern Area from I Aprla 15 1u1 45: "Principal Mass Civilian Evacuations," RG 407. 

''Tenth Army Acti on Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar- 30 Jun 45. Vol. I, p. II-XXVII- S. Copy in CMH 

Library; Bennett, "The Impact . .. on the Civil ians," p. 272; memos, Charl es O. Day (Chi ef, e~ 

settlement Engineering) to Ops. Officer, MG HQ IsCom. 17 Aug 45, sub: Resettlement Program, 

Rpt on, and Deputy Commander for Mi l. Go vern. (Col C. L Murray, USMC) to CO, Army Service 

Command I, 383.7 (TDCrV), 8 Aug 45, sub: Movement o f Civilians, Watkins Papers, RG 200. See 

also Annex to Field Orders Nos. 74 and 75, 27th Div., 1 Jul and 5 Jul 45. sub: Evacuation Plan, 

RG 407. 

IIOMemo, Lt Col Glenn MacDonald to the CO, IsCom , 25 Jun 45, sub: Incident Involving Civ ilians 

at G- 13 at Kushi on 22 Jun 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
60 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

location for any reason· ' The problem, however, did not go away. Military 

government personnel at several locations continued to refuse to admit 

additional civilians. In response, truck drivers resorted to "dumping" 

islanders unannounced and then quickly driving off. In one nighttime 

incident, civil affairs personnel dumped many hundreds of stretcher cases 

at the naval hospital at Koza. 62 

Most of the population dislocations were necessitated by the exigencies of battle. The rest represented efforts by military government units 

to meet emergency needs for food and shelter. Nevertheless, the almost 

constant shuffling from place to place of people whose whole culture was 

rooted in the land is one of the more regrettable tasks undertaken by the 

military government detachments. Actually, American forces faced a cruel 

dilemma. Battlefield conditions and the overriding need to clear land for 

essential military use in the continuing war against the Japanese home 

islands vied with the humanitarian instincts and announced directives 

of military government officials and the measures they instituted to provide food , clothing, and shelter to the needy on an emergency basis, even 

against overwhelming odds. In the end such competing objectives frequently became counterproductive. The progressive ideas and admirable 

intentions of those trained at Charlottesville and Princeton would understandably compete with the dominant military mission, the rock upon 

which civil affairs efforts would often founder. As was so typical of American postwar involvement elsewhere, the dominant theme of these hectic 

months of military government on Okinawa was one of overriding compassion and humanitarian concern despite the parallel requirements of 

military necessity in an on-going war. 

Military Government Organization: An Assessment 

The lack of correlated activities between the headquarters staff on 

Oahu and the field teams staff at Fort Ord that first emerged during the 

planning phase continued once both command levels arrived on the island·' Until Island Command assumed direction of most civil affairs 

activities at the end of April, detachments in the field remained under 

Ct'Mi nutes of Brig Gen W. E. Crist's starr officers confe rences, 16 May and 24 May, Sgt J. Bloch 

fi les at MG HQ, RG 407; MG HQ IsCom, Mil. Govern. Circular No. 1,9, 16 May 45, sub: Receiving 

of Civilians, Watkins Papers, RG 200; Bennett, "The Impact ... on the Civilians," p. 273. 

61Sgt J. Bloch interview with Capt Thomas Duncan at Kishaba , 25 Aug 45, Sgt J. Bloch files at 

MG HQ. RG 407. 

lolU Comdr James Watkins, Mi litary Government Planning, Xth Army, August 1944- Feb 1945, 

MS. The general sources for this subsection are the Island Command background materials in RG 

407, espec ially the MS by Sgt J. Bloch entitled "The Milit ary Government on Okinawa," and the 

papers or Lt Comdr James Watkins, IV, in RG 200, especially the untitled MS by Lt Willard A. 

Hanna, USNR, and the MS by Lt Lawrence and (then) Lt Watkins entitled "Supply." 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 61 

corps or division direction only and generally operated with a good deal 

of independence from military government headquarters at Headquarters, Tenth Army. As Operation ICEBERG passed from the conceptual to 

the operational phase, military government headquarters personnel functioned less as a staff section of Tenth Army for planning and more as a 

staff section of Island Command for operations. The Commanding General, Island Command, General Wallace, assumed complete responsibility 

for Okinawa from the Commanding General, Tenth Army, on 30 June 

1945 when organized Japanese resistance collapsed. After that date the 

Deputy Commander for Military Government, General Crist, reported 

solely to the Island Commander (see Chart i).64 

During the course of the tactical operations on Okinawa, certain military government "A" and "B" teams overlapped territories, or jumped 

over one another. Although a certain amount of this form of overlapping 

was anticipated, the somewhat ill-defined relationship of "B" team to 

"A" team became a constant source of friction. Sensing this development, 

many of the tactical units used their relative isolation from military government headquarters to create more flexible arrangements-sometimes 

combining the "A" and "B" teams and recommending to the Island Command that the two team functions be combined in future operations·' 

Regardless of the team structure used, mistakes in the training of 

military government field officers quickly revealed themselves. Although 

highly proficient in such areas as legal or fiscal specializations, these men 

lacked command experience and in most cases even civilian administrative experience. Consequently, those who commanded military government field detachments often were unable to organize their teams 

effectively. Most were naval reservists who found the adjustment to military life difficult. Their lack of acquaintance with military organization-either Army or Navy- and the prescribed command channels 

frustrated their efforts to obtain supplies and other assistance. In addition, neither military government officers nor enlisted men had been 

trained for combat.66 Their lack of familiarity with small arms techniques 

1>400 3 Jul45 Col Charl es Ira Murray, USMC, relieved General Crist as Deputy Commander for 

Mi litary Government. 

6SWar Diary of MG Det. B-5 (Lt Comdr E. R. Mossman, CO), undated entry; memo, IsCom 

MG HQ to Lt James Watkins, USNR. 14 Jul 45, sub: Rpt. on General Conduct of Mil. Govern., 

Southern Area, from I Apr to 15 Jul 45, and memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Cri st, 

21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during 

the period 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45. IsCom background materia l, RG 407. Sec also memo, MG liaison 

officer with the 96th Div. to Chi ef Deputy MG Officer, IsCom, 28 Apr 45, sub: Recommendations 

for Consideration in Planning Next Operation, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

MoMcmo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gen W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations 

carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period I Apr to 20 Apr 45, RG 407; 

memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to CG MG HQ IsCom, 29 May 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in 

northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
62 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

necessary to prevent enemy infiltration left military government camps 

vulnerable to occasional hit and run raids by small groups of Japanese 

soldiers. Consequentl y, military police units, in addition to supervising 

the civilian population of the camps, also had to defend the camps. The 

52d Military Police Battalion, the one unit assigned to Island Command 

for military government duty, became badly overextended and had to be 

augmented by the divisional military police compan ies. Still, civil affairs 

officers could not count on more than one policeman for every 600 civilians in their care on Okinawa." 

The instruction received by the military gove rnment officers was deficient in important areas, and what specialized training they did possess 

proved initially far less of an asset than Tenth Army planners had expected. This is not to imply that these officers did not have considerable 

technical expertise. The composition of Detachment B- IO was typical: 

the senior officer, Lt. Comdr. R. F. Lynch, was a businessman. He was 

assisted by an Industry and Economics Officer (who had a business and 

labor relations background); a member of the Kentucky Bar Association 

served as Legal and Supply Officer; a medical doctor (specializing in 

pediatrics) on loan from the New York City Public Health Department 

served as the Public Health Officer; the former county engineer of Fulton 

County, Georgia, was the Engineering Officer; and a biochemist filled the 

Assistant Publi c Health Officer's assignment.

os Until the cessation of hostilities on Okinawa, few civi l affairs problems arose on Okinawa that 

required such expertise. No legal or fiscal issues needed to be resolved, 

no public safety problems had to be met apart from controlling the circulation of civilians, and no political or economic programs had to be 

devised. Apart from the medical, specialized skills were not needed to 

handle reconnaissance, salvage, and the basic needs of the civilian 

evacuees. 69 

Faced with the reality that their specialties cou ld not be effecti vely 

employed, many "A" and " B" team officers became frustrated , although 

most were finally able to make the necessary psychological adjustment. 

'Yfhc situat ion was made even morc acute by the fact that the bulk of the 52d MP Bn . did not 

arrive on Okinawa until the period 17 Apri l-8 May 45. Tenth Army Action Rpt, 26 Mar-30 Jun 

45, Vol. I, pp. II-XXVII-8 & II - XXVII- 9, copy in CMH Library; memo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, 

to CG MG HQ IsCom, 29 May 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr 

to 28 May 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

b8 Rp!, Capt C. W. Runyan (QMC), AUS, (Oct. Historian) 10 MG HQ IsCom, Oki nawa, undated, 

sub: Hist. of Operations of MG Det. B- IO in Okinawa, Island Command background material, 

RG 407. 

It9Memo, IsCom MG HQ to Lt James Watkins, USNR, 14 Jul 45, sub: Rpt on General Conduct 

of Mil. Govern., Southern Area, from I Apr to 15 Jul 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200; HQ IsCom, 

Historical Record- Island Command, Ok inawa Gunto, Ryukyus, 13 Dec 44- 30 Jun 45, 1 Dec 45, 

RG 407. 

64 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

civilians by L+ IO, rather than the 200,000 expected." Such miscalculations of the number of civilians who would be encountered in different 

sectors of the island jeopardized military government planning in areas 

such as transport and supply, areas in which military government headquarters had already experi enced planning difficulties. 

When military government supply planning was redirected from Taiwan to Operation ICEBERG, the planning section's first impulse was to 

compare the populations of the two targets and to conclude that ICEBERG 

would require approximately two-thirds of the Taiwan estimates. Before 

the actual assault, however, military government headquarters rejected 

this simplistic basis. More pertinent considerations than population indicated a greater rather than a lesser need for civil affairs assistance. A 

greater proportion of the population would be likely to require direct 

relief in military government camps on Okinawa, a higher percentage 

probably would require medical care, and, with less agricultural resources, 

more islanders would have to be fed. Nevertheless, during the turmoil 

associated with the switch in strategic objectives, fewer military government personnel were assigned to ICEBERG than were originally scheduled 

to participate in the proposed Taiwan operation. 

In October 1944 Tenth Army military government headquarters had 

prepared lists of supplies and equipment on the assumption that the Army 

would be solely responsible for supply arrangements on Okinawa. In late 

November, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stipulated that naval facilities would be responsible for supplies, while the Army would be accountable for requisitioning. This hybrid arrangement involved the 

conversion of stock numbers and components and resulted in considerable confusion. The situation was aggravated in December when the system was modified to enable Army units assigned military government 

duties to draw equipment directly from Army sources. Caught in the delay 

and confusion over service responsibility, military government supply 

lists never emerged in consolidated form and remained instead scattered 

among assault shipping lists and maintenance and resupply lists. In addition, although Tenth Army military government headquarters devoted 

considerable attention to calculating the supplies required for civilian 

consumption, far less attention was given to military government operational needs, and a very minimal amount of effort was directed to the 

procurement of supplies and materials for headquarters itself. Consequently, compared to other elements of Headquarters, Tenth Army, mil1!Mcmo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Geo W. E. Crist, 21 Apr 45. sob: Mil. Govern. operations 

carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa lima during the period or 1 Apr to 20 Apr 45; Lt Col 

John Stevens and M Sgt James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary (March- 14 May 45) 11 Apr 45 entry, RG 

407. See also Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," pp. 177- 178. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 65 

itary government headquarters arrived critically short of transportation, 

tentage, mess gear, and the other essentials of field operations. 

Whether for their own headquarters or for civilian needs, civil affairs 

officers found it difficult to secure adequate supplies and the shipping 

space necessary to transport them. Medical supplies, trucks, tarpaulins, 

building supplies, and tools were all needed by military government officers. But then, the tactical forces needed them as well. The invasion 

troops inevitably and understandably got priority. At every turn, plans 

for aiding the civilian population of the Ryukyus had to be adjusted to 

accommodate battlefield requirements. " 

Preliminary supply planning in the autumn of 1944 initially allocated 

to military government approximately 1,500 measured tons of shipping 

which wou ld be " integrated into the various echelons of shipping." Although thus limited, the supplies would provide "minimum subsistence" 

to the native population. " When their inadequacy became apparent, military government officials tried to increase supplies and shipping allocati'ons, but their colleagues in the tactical units argued that they needed 

the space for their own equipment. In the end, civil affairs officers convinced the Tenth Army commander that providing civilian supplies was 

necessary to fulfill his obligations toward noncombatants. He revised the 

quotas, and military government received a revised initial shipping allowance of2,599.9 measured tons, of which 750 were devoted to medical 

supplies. This increase in shipping tonnage was modest considering the 

tasks military government would face on Okinawa. Later requisitions for 

military government would be prepared in blocks for automatic reconsignment during the first six months of operations at the rate of 10,000 

measured tons per month. Each block was calculated to provide for 30,000 

civilians for thirty days. Despite this planning, military government field 

teams- at least for the first two months on Okinawa- were not equ ipped 

to perform at more than a minimal level." 

Those military government suppli es that were del ivered to the secured 

beaches of Okinawa often piled up in mute testimony to yet another 

nagging problem for military government: the lack of adequate transportation ashore. Each field team came ashore with transportation calculated to meet its minimum needs, ranging from "A" detachments with 

one jeep and one truck, to "0" detachments with eight jeeps and seven 

7JFord, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," p. 177. 

74Working memo, I-IQ Tenth Army, ACofS, G- 4, undated- but with an enclosure dld 3 Nov 44, 

sub: Logistic Implica tions, ICEBERG, RG 407. A measured ton, or freight ton, is a volume unit 

usually reckoned at 40 cubic feet. 

lsMcmo, Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, (Ope rations) to CG HQ IsCom , undated, sub: Mil. Gove rn. 

operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, Island Com mand background matcrial, 

RG 407. 
66 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

trucks. Military government headquarters had two jeeps and a single '14-

ton truck. Given the distances involved, the amount of direct relief to 

be supplied and administered, and the conditions of Okinawa's roads, 

these conveyances were wholly inadequate. Some captured Japanese vehicles had been hoped for, but very few could be kept in running order 

for lack of parts. Toward the end of April military government transport 

was augmented by the arrival of the 412th Quartermaster Truck Company. Its fifty trucks eased the situation somewhat, but they often operated around the clock to meet minimum transportation requirements.'· 

Moreover, these particular trucks remained under the control of military 

government headquarters and were not always available when needed in 

the field. Military government field teams were fo rced to beg and deal 

for transportation with the tactical units, who were themselves short of 

trucks." During August and September 1945 two additional truck companies (the 3078th and 3067th Engineer Dump Truck companies) began 

assisting military government by dividing their time between hauling 

rations and road construction. 

The dearth of transportation adequate to distribute military government supplies in a timely manner meant that supply dumps on or near 

the beaches began piling up. Guards had to be posted to discourage 

" moonlight requisitioning" by tactical units, and even by other military 

government field detachments. Despite all precautions, losses at various 

supply points ranged from 5 to 30 percent. 78 

There were other problems in addition to supply and transport, ones 

that caused ill will between Army and Navy personnel. The personnel 

channels and administrative procedures of the two services proved so 

dissimilar that integration into the same organic units produced difficulties. Commanders of military government units lacked authority to 

discipline persons of another service. Ratings were not always comparable 

for identical job assignments, and personnel records were difficult to 

maintain properly. Moreover, friction between Army and Navy tactical 

units infected military gove rnment components and was exacerbated by 

the joint nature of military government operations, operations one author 

found to be replete with "the perpetual, sophomoric inservice rivalries."'· 

7l>Memo. Lt C. S. Ford, USNR. to Brig Gcn W. E. Crist. 2 1 Apr 45, sub: Mil. Govern. operations 

carried on by the III Phib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period I Apr to 20 Apr 45. RG 407. 

71 Rpt. Tenth Army HQ to Cine USAFPAC. 2 Aug 45. AG Serial No. 002355- 1, sub: MG Op· 

erations RpI- Ryukyus Area, RG 407. 

18Rpt. CO, MG Team 8- 6 to CO. Tenth Army MG Section. I Jun 45. sub: History of MG Unit 

8- 6 for the month of May 1945, RG 407. 

7'Morris. Tig£'r by/lie Tail, p. 6 1. Sec also IsCom Circular No. 13, 13 May 45. sub: Ad ministration. 

Watkins papers, RG 200; memo. Lt C. S. Ford, USNR, to Brig Gcn W. E. Crist. 21 Apr 45, sub: 

Mil. Govern. operations carri ed on by til e III Pllib Corps on Okinawa Jima during the period I Apr 

1020 Apr 45. RG 407. 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA 67 

Once military government operations were well underway, Tenth Army's 

official conclusion was that this joint effort was a harmonious success: 

"Army and Navy personnel at Headquarters and on Military Government 

teams were cooperative members of a single organization ... •o In retrospect, this statement was far too simplistic for it understated not only 

the frictions between the Army personnel and their Navy confreres, but 

also the tensions between military government headquarters and civil 

affairs officers in the field . Such interservice rivalry, however, was probably inevitable in such a large joint operation and, in the end, never really 

jeopardized the military government mission. 

Interservice bickering, insufficient supplies, inadequate transportation, inaccurate refugee estimates, questionable training, confusion in 

military government field relationships, and clashing priorities with the 

combat forces all handicapped the civil affairs officers. How well, then, 

did they do in the circumstances in which they had to operate? After 

surveying the first three months of military government operations, Headquarters, Tenth Army, concluded that they were "eminently successful."" 

To a degree this conclusion was justified, since military government, despite all the inherent problems, performed its primary mission successfully. Lt. Clellan S. Ford, USNR, agreed with that judgment by 

characterizing his and others' experiences as "a job rather well done." 

But Capt. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, the chief of the Military Government Headquarters Operations Branch, concluded in July 1945 that "the 

story of military government on Okinawa is one of mismangement, stupidity, and injustice ... . "82 

The truth, however, was somewhere in between these judgments. 

Whatever military government's limitations during the campaign for Okinawa, the surv iving civilian population emerged in remarkably good condition considering the destruction their island underwent. Moreover, the 

primary military government mission was accomplished: the tactical 

forces verified the fact that civilians seldom got in the way of military 

operations, civili an casualties were minimized, and the Okinawan population was fed , clothed, and housed through the efforts of the military 

government teams. What remained to be seen was what shreds of idealism 

remained to inspire rehabilitation measures once the guns finally fell 

silent. 

SU(Conciusion) Tenth A rmy Action Rpt, RyukYU5. 26 Mar-30 Jun 45, Vol. I. p. II-XXVlI-6. 

Copy in CMH Library. 

'·Tcn th Army Acti on Rpt. Ryukyus. 26 Mar- 30 Jun 45. Vol. I, p. II - XXV II-5 . Copy in CMH 

Library. 

11Ford. "Occupation Experiences on Ok inawa," p. 182; Watkins working note directly quoting 

Capt Woodyard , 17 lui 45. Watkins Papers. RG 200. 

CHAPTER III 

Apathy and Neglect 

American fo rces in the Ryukyus settled into the garrison phase of 

operations in September 1945. By then most enemy holdouts had been 

captured, and the wholesale movement of citizens necessitated by the 

command's base development plan had ceased. Extensive relief efforts 

conducted by military government units had averted the threat of starvation and epidemics among civilians. Now that there was time for refl ection and assessment, civil affairs offi cers on Okinawa began to rethink 

the mission of military government in broader terms. Despite problems 

and discouragements encountered during the assault phase, many of these 

men had retained more than a small measure of idealism; given the opportunity and resources, they would eagerly attempt to recreate a peaceful 

Okinawan society. To that end they began to look beyond the post-assault 

relief measures toward a return to prewar social and economic normalcy. 

It was obvious that any restoration would be closely linked to military 

concerns. During the postwar years Ameri can military interest in the 

islands underwent several permutations. Although Okinawa remained important in all American strategic planning, the government's economic 

commitment to the Ryukyus was not so constant, and the military government effort there suffered severely from austere postwar military budgets. A stepchild of the Far East Command, the Ryukyuan command's 

physical and manpower needs tended to receive a lower priority in an 

organi zation where units in Japan and Korea took precedence. In the 

same time period, the command watched its university-prepared military 

government personnel depart. Those who had not only parti cipated in 

the planning for the campaign but had also organized the rehabilitation 

of civilian society were rapidly being demobilized. They were replaced 

by individuals who had neither the intellectual commitment to the job 

nor the singular advantages of their predecessors in education and training. These postwar manpower realities combined with strategic, economic, and social considerations to create fo rmidable tasks for military 
70 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

government during a period that might accurately be described as the 

nadir of American interest in the Ryukyus. 

Okinawa and Postwar Strategy 

In the weeks following the collapse of Japan, the Joint Planning Staff 

looked at the world-wide base sites and divided them into several categories. Some it decided were "primary base areas," those essential to the 

security of the United States and its possessions or necessary to projected 

military operations; others it classified in lesser categories. The Joint 

Chiefs accepted their staff's definitions and coordinated their discussion 

of bases with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as part of the 

process of negotiating with foreign governments to secure the needed 

sites.' As for the Ryukyus, the Joint Chiefs, from the first, included the 

islands in their list of primary base areas, assuming continued American 

control over the islands either by direct sovereignty or at the very least 

through United Nations trusteeship. 

The Department of State questioned this assumption. Secretary James 

F. Byrnes passed on to the new president, Harry S. Truman, his department's conclusion that " political and diplomatic considerations" made 

it necessary to consider the Ryukyus "minor islands which should be 

returned to Japan and demilitarized .'" The secretary's concern for diplomatic considerations stemmed from the ambiguous status of the Ryukyus at the conclusion of World War II. On 26 July 1945 the United 

States, Great Britain, China, and, later, the Soviet Union, agreed at the 

Potsdam Conference that " Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the 

islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor 

islands as we determine.'" In its formal surrender on 2 September 1945 

Japan accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. Its Okinawa 

Prefecture, consisting of Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama Gunto and 

surrounding islands, ceased to exist. But the ultimate status of Okinawa 

remained unclear, and the vagueness of the phrase "such minor islands 

as we determine" contained the seeds of potential territorial discord 

among the interested nations. The military potential of Okinawa's bases 

notwithstanding, Secretary Byrnes sought to minimiz.e the chances of 

'JCS 570/40, 25 Oct 45, CCS File 360( 12-9-42) Sec. 9, and memo, SWNCC to SeeState, 7 Nov 

45, sub: Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements fo r Military Bases and Rights, CCS File 360 

(12-9- 42) Sec. II , RG 218. Actuall y, the JPS also offered definitions for secondary, tertiary, and 

even lesser categories of base sites. 

' DOS Study. enel. to SWNCC 5911 , 24 Jun 46, ABC File 093 (28 Ju144) Sec. IB, RG 165. 

JDepartment of State. Foreign RelaliollS o/rlle United SillIes: The Conference alBer/in (The POlsdam 

Conference) 1945. Vol. II , Document 1382 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 

1475. Foreign Relations oflhe United Siales volumes cited hereafter as FRUS. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 7 1 

international disputes by demilitarizing the Ryukyus and returning them 

to Japanese control. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted quickly and negatively to the Department of State's position. Acting through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, they urged the secretary of state to inform the 

president of their contrary assessment. On 10 September 1946 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed 

the president of the military leaders' "grave concern" over the proposed 

return of the Ryukyus to Japan and urged Truman to review the matter 

further. 4 

Continuing the argument, State officials pointed out to the president 

that retaining possession of the Ryukyus could create diplomati c and 

political problems and would in any event certainly be an economic drain 

on the United States. The military chiefs contended, on the other hand, 

that the secretary of state underestimated the military value of the Ryukyus, especially Okinawa, and that the cost of maintaining the islands 

was minimal compared to the lives and treasure expended in capturing 

Okinawa-or to the cost of recapturing the island again from a hostile 

power. ' 

The debate would take several curious twists and turns as the basic 

assumptions that supported it changed abruptly in the immediate postwar 

years. Both the Joint Chiefs and the Department of State assumed that 

international affairs in Asia would revolve around a democratic China 

controlled by the Nationalists and assisted by American aid and support; 

that America and the Soviet Union would continue to work in approximately the same sort of international cooperation that had characterized 

their wartime partnership; and that decolonization of South and Southeast Asia would come quickly and easily with a number of independent 

democratic nations emerging. All these assumptions proved incorrect, 

although it was not until the late 1940s that the new, harsh realities would 

be fully appreciated ' 

Disagreement over the near- and long-term disposition of Okinawa 

persisted, but remained low-key and generally went unpublicized. The 

secretary of state tended to focus attention on the Japanese question, and 

until 1951 the issue of Okinawa's status remained a corollary to the larger 

' Memo [or the President. encl. to JCS 1619/9. 10 Sep 46, ABC File 093 (28 Ju144) Sec. IB, RG 

165; Sec also James E. Schnabel, The History of the 10il1l Chiefs 0/ SwjJ: The Joim Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, Vol. I (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), pp. 299- 310. 

'JCS 1619119 cncl .. 18 Oct 46, CCS File 360 ( 12-9- 42), sec. 28. RG 218. 

"Robert Scalapino, American-Japanese Relations ill a Changing Era (New York: The Library Press, 

1972), Georgetown Uni versit y Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washingtoll Papers 

Series. No.2, p. 56. 
72 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

issue of a peace treaty between Japan and her former adversa ri es.' The 

Department of State was content to let the War Department administer 

occupi ed territori es. For their part, the Joint Chi efs concentrated on the 

emerging military realities of the postwar period that included America's 

expanded global responsibilities and the potential threat from long-range 

air power. By retaining ex isting ove rseas bases and by securing others, 

they hoped to provide a defense perimeter, as an Army spokesmen put 

it to a congressional aud ience in 1946, "surrounding ourselves with a 

cordon of bases from which our forces may intercept attacking units and 

from which we may launch immediate ... counterblows.'" As a large Fa r 

East outpost, Ok inawa was a strategic link in this "cordon of bases." To 

harden this link the Joint Chi efs committed a large occupation force and 

drew up elaborate base development plans for the island, although the 

particulars of these plans and the size of the force wou ld vary from year 

to yea r with the ebb and flow of international events. 

Postwar Militwy Olganization 

T he last months of the war ushered in a period of rapid change in 

the organi zation of military forces on the Ryukyu Islands. The Joint 

Chiefs originall y assigned both operational control and military gove rnment responsibility for the islands to the Navy, but the fact was neither 

the Army nor the Navy wanted to assume responsibility for the region ' 

Admiral Nimitz argued that since the Tenth Army had in vaded Okinawa 

to stage the planned invasion of Japan, it should assume these responsibilities. Bowing to the Pacific commander's request, the Joint Chi efs, 

on 18 July 19 4 5, ordered control of the islands, excluding certain naval 

facilities, turned over to the Army. This transfer of command, they noted , 

was to be a temporary expedient; once the invasion of the Japanese home 

islands was accomplished, command of the Ryukyus was to be returned 

to the Navy. 'o Effecti ve 31 July, Headquarters, Island Command, Okinawa, was reconstituted as Headquarters, Army Service Command I (AS7Johanncs A. Binnendijk, "The Dynamics of Okinawan Reversion: Case Study of a Political 

Process," PhD d issertation, the Fletche r School of Law and D iplomacy, Tuns Un ive rsit y. 1972, p. 

3 11 ; Albert Sc iga l, "U nited States Poli cy Toward Okinawa, 1945- 1972: A Study of Organizational 

Interaction in Policy-Making," Ph D dissertation, West Virginia Uni versity, 1978, pp. 63- 64. 

MTestimony ofGen Thomas Handy (Acting Ch ief of StafT) in U .S. Congress, House, Subcommittee 

of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings 011 the Military EstablishmCII/ Approprimiol1 /Jill of 

1947, 79th Congress, 2d session, pp. 29-30. 

'JCS 81915. 8 Jun 44, CCS File 383.2 1 (4- 12-44), Sec. I. RG 218. 

'''M'g, JCS to CINCAFPAC & CINCPAC, Nr. V73 DTG 181409Z, 18 Ju145, and memo, Fleet 

Ad m EJ. King to Adm Nimitz. Serial 002009, 13 Aug 45, sub: Command of the Ryukyus, both 

appended to JCS 81911 1. CCS File 383.21 (4- 13-44), Sec. 2, RG 218. 
APATH Y AND N EGLECT 73 

G ENERAL M ACA RTHUR AND ADM IRAL N IMITZ 

COM I), and assigned to Army Forces, Western Pacific." At that time 

the command's milita ry strength totalled some 259,000 offi ce rs and men 

(see Table I). The Commander in Chi ef, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, Genera l MacArthur, assumed responsibility from his headqua rters in Manila 

for milita ry government in the Ryuk yus, although he continued to direct 

what had been for some time a joint service operation with the preponderance of its manpowe r in naval uniform. In July civil affairs personnel 

in the islands included about 2,600 naval offi cers and men (including 

Sea bees) and 279 Army officers and men." 

These a rrangements lasted only seven more weeks. The abrupt surrender of Japan found the Army ill-prepa red to exercise its responsibility 

for milita ry gove rnment on Okinawa. Its few hundred civil affairs officers 

on the island were desperately needed for occupa tion duty with the Tenth 

II MelllO for record. Maj Geo S.J . Chamberli n & Rear Adm Forrest Sherman 23 Ju1 45. sub: 

Control of U.S.-held areas in the Ryukyus. ABC File 384 Ryukyus ( 18 Jul 44), Sec. I A. RG 218; 

HQ ASCOM I. General Orders No. I. 31 Jul 45. sub: Change of Designation of ISCOM, Okinawa 

Base Command . File 98-BC6-0.2. RG 407. 

'!Cmdr Paull-I. Skusc. USN R (Ret), The United States Navy on Okinawa. un published narrati ve , 

3 1 Dec 59, p. 4. Skuse Pape rs. 
74 MILITARY GOVERNM ENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

TABLE I - U.S. ARMY FORCES STRENGTH IN TH E RY UKYUS 

31 AUGUST 1945-3 1 AUGUST 1949 

Dale 

August 194 5 .. 

August 1946. 

August 1947. 

August 1948. 

August 1949 .. 

Officers 

20.502 

1.332 

1.378 

703 

919 

Enlisted 

236.320 

18.561 

15.054 

9.748 

11.538 

Nurses Warrants 

866 1.31 2 

64 59 

46 45 

Total 

259.000 

20.0 16 

16.523 

10,451 

12.457 

Sou rcc: DA. S/r"II,wh '{fh, .. Iml)' (STM-.10). 1 Sep 45. I>, 4: I &p 46. p. 24: I Sq ) 47. p. 10: I SCI) 411. p. 13: I Scp 49. p. 12. 

Army in Korea and with the Eighth Army in Japan. Consequently, the 

Chi ef of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, advised the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, that military government would be a permanent Navy responsibility." On 2 1 September 

1945 the Navy assumed complete accountability for mi litary government 

although the Army retai ned operational control of the islands. Fleet Admiral Nimitz designated the Commanding Officer, Naval Operating Base, 

Oki nawa, Rear Ad m. John D. Price, as Chief Military Government officer 

while Col. Charles I. Murray, USMC, continued in his capacity as Deputy 

Commander for Military Government. " 

The Navy accepted responsibility for mi litary government based on 

the assumption that Okinawa was desirable as a naval base and that the 

Navy would soon be given operational control, since the Army's tenure 

in the Ryukyus was merely temporary. Both assumptions proved false. 

The surrender of Japan not only curtailed Army Service Command I's 

base development plans, it also obviated most of the rationale for deve lopment of Okinawa's naval facilities. Moreover, by early 1946 the Navy 

had more closely examined the anchorages in Buckner Bay and found 

them less desirable than originally thought. " Consequentl y, the Navy lost 

interest in the Ryukyus except as a location for minor facilities. In March 

1946 the Chief of Naval Operations recommended to the Joint Chi efs of 

Staff that the Army not only retain operational control of the Ryukyus, 

but also assume responsibility for military gove rnment. Later the same 

month the Army's Chief of Staff concurred with that recommendation, 

asking only that Navy civil affairs officers continue to serve until suffi-

"Watkins War Diary. entry for 17 Aug 45. Watkins Papers. RG 200: msg. eND to CINCPAc' 

DTG 302 110Z Aug 45. appended 10 JCS 819/ 11. CCS File 383.2 1 (4-13- 44). Sec. 2. RG 218. 

I~G l-IQ C INCAFPAC. Summation No. I . U.S. Army Mil. Govern . Acti vities in the Ryukyu Islands 

for the Months of Jul y- November 1946. p. 3. copy in eMH Li brary: HQ USN MG Unit Okinawa, 

Memo No.7, CO 10 Distribution "A", 29 Sep 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

IS Nakagasuku Bay was renamed Buckner Bay by the occupation forces in honor of Lt Gen Simon 

B. Buckner, Jr .. eG. Tenth Army, who was killed during the Okinawa campaign. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 75 

cient Army pe rsonnel became available.'" Accordingly, o n I Jul y 1946 

the Navy surrende red all administrative authority in the Ryukyus to the 

Army. T he O kinawa Base Comma nd became the Ryukyus Command with 

Brig. Gen. Frede ri c L. Hayden, seni or military offi ce r in the Ryuk yus, 

commanding. Col. William H. Craig, USA, rep laced Colonel Murray as 

the Deputy Com mander for Mil itary Gove rnment. " 

In preparatio n for the transfer of mi litary gove rnment responsibility, 

Army civi l affa irs offi cers began a rri vi ng on Ok inawa in late May 1946. 

By the end of the mon th 73 officers, mostl y second lieute nants, had 

reported . T hese o ffi ce rs, a ll of whom were from military gove rnment 

assignments in Japan, had a measure of on-the-job training, but little or 

no fo rma l instructio n in civi l a ffa irs." Nevertheless, the tra nsition proceeded smoothly. O n I Jul y the adm inistrati on of milita ry gove rnment 

in the Ryukyus south of 30 degree no rth latitude passed from the Navy 

to the Army. 

A comprehensive reorgani zation of Ameri can forces wo uld soon affect 

these command arrangements. As the resu lt of a Joint Chi efs of Staff 

decision in Decembe r 1946 to create more unifi ed comma nds in a reas 

of strategic importance. respo nsibility for a ll Ame ri can la nd , nava l, and 

ai r military ope rations wi thin the Far East a rea fe ll to General Douglas 

MacArthur as Commander in Chi ef, Far East (CINCFE). The Far East 

command superseded U.S. Army Forces, Pacifi c, as the command responsible for mi li tary gove rnment in the Ry uk yu Isla nds, as well as in 

the other a reas assigned to it. Genera l Headquarters, Far East Command , 

and Genera l Headq ua rters. Supreme Commander for the Alli ed Powers 

(SCAP), we re ph ysica ll y combined in Tokyo, and the same staff se rved 

for both headquarters. T he Joint Chi efs of Staff divided authority a nd 

responsibility on the basis of geography a nd fu nctio n. MacA rthur's a uthority as Supreme Commander for the Alli ed Powers remained limited 

to the four ma in isla nds of Japan and a few minor outl ying isla nds where 

he was responsibl e for a va ri ety o f no nmilita ry acti viti es. As Commander 

II'M erno, eNO to JCS. 6 Mar 46. sub: Mil. Govern. Admi nistra tion in the Ryukyu Islands, and 

memo, U.S. Army Cors to JCS. 22 Mar 46. same sub .. both parts of JCS 8 1911 1. 8 19/ 12. CCS Fil e 

383.2 1 (4- 13- 44). Sec. 2. RG 218. 

I1 I-1Q USA FWESPAc' General Orders No. 162. 18 Jun 46. File 98BC6- 0.2. RG 407: James T. 

Walkins. IV. personal di;HY. 4 Ju l 1946. changes in organization rcncclcd Ihe Army's changing role 

in the Ryukyus: Isl and Comm'lI1d hecame ASCOM I on 3 1 Ju l 45. ASCOM I hecame O kinawa Ba se 

Command (O BASCO M) on 15 Oct 45. the SUIllC day that Headquart ers, Tenth Army was inac ti va ted 

o n Ok inawa. OBASCOM was redesign'lled Ryukyus Command (RYCOM) o n 1 Jul 46 as il subordinate command unde r AFWESPAC, which itself was redesignated the Phil ippines-Ryukyus Command (P HILRYCOM) on 1 Jan 47. 

'~Me o. Deput y Commande r for Mi l. Gove rn . to Commandant. NOB. Okinawn. 3 1 May 46. 

sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Acti vities for May 1946. RG 38: interview. Edward O. Freimu th with the 

au thor. 29 Oct 80. 
76 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

in Chi ef, Far East. however, he was responsible primarily for military 

affairs, but for a much broader geographic area.'" 

As of I January 1947 the Commander in Chief, Far East, assumed 

the responsibility formerly held by the Commanding General, Army 

Forces Western Pacific, for military government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

MacArthur designated the Commanding Genera l, Philippines-Ryukyus 

Command as Military Gove rnor of the Ryukyus. Initially, civil affairs 

matters were coordi nated with MacArthur's headq uart e rs through 

SCAP's Korean-Ryukyus Division, which, under MacArthur's deputy 

chi ef of staff, also coordinated civ il affairs activities in Korea. Ryukyuan 

matters, however, quickly assumed a greater importance within the division and economic rehabilitat ion plans began to emerge. By contrast, 

military government affairs in Korea became less important as that country moved toward the establishment of a republi c.' " 

Responding to these realities, MacArthur's headquarters reorgani zed 

its command structure during 1948. On I August the Philippines-Ryukyus 

command was split into the Philippines Command and the Ryukyuan 

Command ." On 6 September MacArthur established the Ryukyus Military Government Section of the Far East Command under Brig. Gen. 

John Weckerling with personnel from the old Korean-Ryukyus Division 

forming its nucleus. " The Ryukyus Mi litary Government Section in Tokyo assisted the administration in the Ryukyus in economic planning, 

including helping to prepare budget requests for military government, 

and in providing political advice when requested. 

Whi le early relief efforts-principall y in the hands of Navy civi l affairs 

officers-were paramount, there was no time to be concerned with budgetary matters. When the Army assumed responsibility for military government on I Jul y 1946, howeve r, th e initia l impetus toward 

rehabilitation had begun- a shift in scope and emphasis that required a 

considerable amount of new fund ing. Recognizing this shift in occupation 

responsibilities, Congress established a Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GAR lOA) fund to assist civilians in the Ryukyus, as well 

as in occupied Japan , Germany, and elsewhere. The initial enactment 

"/h(' Far /:'{w COIII/}I(UIl/. J Jall/ltlfJ' 1947-J() JUII(, /957. Office or the Military History Officer. 

HQ AFFE/ Eighth ArlllY (Rear), 1957. p. 6, Freimuth I'apers. 

'''GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC". StalT Memo No. 52. AG 014. 1 (20 Nov 46) GA. 2 Dec 46. sub: 

Military Govern. in the Ryukyu Islands. Frei muth Papers: HQ AFFE. n/(, Far J';{lsl Command, p. 

12. and G HQ SCAP & FECOM. Sl'I('c/('d Data olllli(' OC'('/I/wfiol/ (!fJapan . June 1950. p. 199. Fi le: 

FECOM. Printed Mat erials. RG 6, MacArthur Archives. 

HQ FECOM. Gcncml Orders No. 18. <) Jul 48. and No. 2 1. 23 Aug 48, File: FECOM. General 

Orders. RG 6, M<lcArthur Archives. 

!!I-IQ AFFE. 'O/(' Fur Has' C011l11lwu/. p. 12. G HQ FECOM. General Orders No. 22. 6 Sep 48. 

File: FECOM. General Orders. RG 6. MacArthur Archives. General Weckerling served in that 

capacity until 8 Aug 49 when Col Robert F. Gle im assumed command of the section. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 77 

was for fiscal year 1947. wi th appropriat ions renewed in each of the next 

ten years. Total appro priations for the Ryukyus under the terms of the 

fund ultimately reached $ 164.5 million.'" Congress intended this money 

not onl y for the general rehabilitation o f Ryukyuan soc iety. bu t also. as 

in the case of American relief programs in the 1930s. to stimulate the 

economy wi th pump-priming projects. T herefore. programs as diverse as 

bu ilding roads and hospi tals. unde rwriting the establishment of industri es. supporting higher education. a nd funding central banks all fell 

withi n the scope of the fund. Initi a ll y some $6 million a nnuall y. the 

Government a nd Rcliefin Occupi ed Areas monies for the Ryukyus. whi ch 

came through MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. rose in la te r years to 

$ 12 million. Contrary to the normal trend. the spend ing of these large 

sums was carri ed out without benefi t of a n eve r-expanding bureaucracy. 

Admin istrative costs. la rgely in the fo rm of sa lari es for Ryukyuan employees. rema i ned modest. Duri ng the years 1947- 1949. for example. such 

expenses amou nted to a me re $6.836." 

MacArthur required the military government headqua rters on Okinawa to keep him ad vised o f signifi cant civil a ffa irs developments." But 

for the most part. Tokyo practiced a policy of "salut:lI"Y neglect" toward 

mi litary government in the Ryukyus. G raduall y. reporting requirements 

were eased. and at no time did Tokyo ever attempt to assume control of 

day-to-day civil affa irs acti vities in the Ryukyu Isla nds. 

This lessening of administrative inte rest in the Ryuky us from above 

was parall eled by a decrease in support for military construction activity 

on the islands. T he ea rl y postwar yea rs saw a red uction in the scope a nd 

military signifi cance of engineers' activities a long wit h the number of 

units a nd men. February 1946 marked the beginning o f a new era in the 

organizat ion of a nd manpower leve ls fo r constructio n troops in the Ryukyus. Initially the Army engineers augmented by Navy Seabees had operated in units under the direct superv ision of the Ryukyus commander. 

prov iding nea rl y a ll the base construction and civi li an rehabi lit ation projects carried out in the islands. T his organi zation. however. had proven 

inadequate in the face of construction difficu lti es brought on by storms 

and other natural disasters occurring ea rl y in the postwar period. and in 

February. therefore. the Corps of Engineers assumed command of all 

:·USCAR. On" '·'.llilin "/c"liI'irh's ill IIII' RYllk,nt/.\·/(lIulsJilr Iltt' Pl'riod Hucling 31/)('('('111/11'1' /952, 

Vol. I. No.1. p.l. copy in CMH Lihrary: OOCSOPS. International and Civil Affairs Direc torate. 

Ryukyuan Affairs Division. nil' Cit'm'ral FlIlld 0(1111' u.s. Ci\'il Admillistratiol/ otflic Rl'lIkl'li Is/aI/d., .. 

15 Mar 69, p. 1. Freimuth Pl'rs. · . .. 

:~ I-l ig h Com missioner of the Ryukyu Islunds (USC AR). CiI'il "'e/Illillis/ratioll o(tJIl' R\'I/k "/t Is/af/tis 

.Iin'lh(' Period I ./ul ... /96610.10./11111' 196 7. Vol. XV. p. 27 1. ('opy in CM H Library. . . 

:<Msg. CINCFE to CG RYCO M, II Mar 47. File; Messages. PHILRYCO M March 1946. RG 9. 

MacArthur Ardli ves. 
78 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

engineering troops. The Army Staff organized the Okinawa Engineer District as one of three (the others included the Philippines and the MarianasGuam districts) in the Western Ocean Division with headquarters in 

California, an a rrangement that would last until 1949 when the engineer 

units on Okinawa would revert to control of the Chief Engineer, Far East 

Command. The new engineer district began administrative operations 

with just 6 officers, 20 enlisted men, and 197 ci vilians. 

The command reorganization coincided with a general demobilization 

of engineer units on Okinawa. Manpower levels declined quickly from a 

pre-February 1946 high of almost 30,000 Army engineers and Seabees. 

In February some 2,000 enginee ring officers and men demobilized; the 

following month sixteen engineer units left for Japan or rotated back to 

the United States. By late spring Okinawa was left with twelve engineer 

units, only four of which were actually engaged in construction activity. 

The rest served in headquarters, maintenance, or utility operations. In 

less than eight weeks the Ryukyuan command lost the greater part of its 

engineer personnel. And the only equipment and construction material 

available to the remaining units was that left by units departing for the 

United States.'6 

Construction rehabilitation continued, but necessarily at a curtailed 

rate. For several months the main construction effort centered on Naha 

harbor, which soon was 92 percent rehabilitated: ships were salvaged; 

five new berths constructed; and the harbor dredged ." After April the 

military significance and scope of construction declined dramatically. 

During the next year the command stressed construction associated with 

military personnel and their dependents. At first they emphasized dependency housing, constructing 190 units by June. They also built a soft 

drink plant. In November they erected a new Ryukyus Command officers' 

club and mess and an auxiliary power plant for Ie Shima. In March 1947 

they reported completing a "swap shop" at the Awase housing area, the 

only new construction of the quarter. 28 As later events demonstrated, the 

command's interest in such construction was a prudent step and rightly 

vied in importance with the more conventional building activities. 

The military construction on Okinawa-or the lack of it- had an 

immediate and profound impact on military government rehabilitation 

efforts. Once the islanders had been fed, clothed, and resettled, it reZ6History of the Okinawa Engineer District, Aug 66, pp. 1- 2, and Information Bulletin: Okinawa 

District Engineer, 20 Jul 45, p. I , in Ofe of History, C of E, File 12 (Occupation of Japan, Korea, 

and Okinawa); OBASCOM, Historical Record February 1946. p. 4, RG 407. 

nOBASCOM, Historical Record February 1946, p. 5, March 1946, pp. 3- 4 , and April 1946, p. 

3, RG 407. 

lIOBASCOM , Historical Record June 1946, pp. 2-3, and RYCOM, Historical Record November 

1946, p. 3, and March 1947, p. 3, RG 407. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 79 

mained necessary to secure employment for them. In the immediate postwar years the Okinawans had nothing to sell except their labor, which 

the American forces were more than willing to use, provided there was 

construction to be undertaken. Even strictly military construction, such 

as airfields and ammunition dumps, therefore, had a direct impact on 

the civilian economy with each and every job generated. Some jobs associated with base construction proved to be especially important to the 

indigenous economy. In the case of Kotaro Kokuba, a successful local 

contractor before the war, American base development enabled him to 

reestablish his firm. By 1949, he was successfully bidding for military 

construction contracts, thus ensuring additional jobs for Okinawans; jobs 

that would otherwise have gone to Japanese or Filipino firms more likely 

to hire and import their own nationals." 

A fair amount of American military construction in the Ryukyus did 

double duty in terms of the local economy. Newly-built roads, bridges, 

and piers, and are-dredged Naha harbor not only meant jobs, but also 

represented faci lities that civilians as well as the military could use. If 

the funding remained intact, therefore, and construction continued, rehabilitation of the islands' economy would proceed accordingly. 

The funds avai lable for base construction worldw ide dwindled 

throughout the period 1946- 1948, however, and projects for Okinawa 

suffered accordingly. In February 1946, Headquarters, Army Forces, 

Western Pacific, estimated that $93 million would be needed to build 

permanent base facilities in the Ryukyus. The War Department pared 

this figure down to $44 million, and Congress actually provided only $31 

million. Entreaties for additional funding met with discouraging results. 

In May 1947 MacArthur revised his construction program downward, 

requesting $77 million for fiscal year 1948, only to be advised that Congress had failed to authorize any additional construction funds for Okinawa. Although Headquarters, Army Air Forces, notified the Chief of 

Engineers, Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, in July 1947 that construction 

of temporary air defense installations could proceed, prospects for 

congressional appropriations were so meager that the outlook for constructing permanent air defense installations on Okinawa was dim.'o 

The tropical storms that seemed so much a part of Okinawan life also 

figured in construction estimates. In an effort to conserve funds, the 

engineers had elected to carry out temporary base ("tybase" ) construction 

programs in the islands. But it soon became apparent that such temporary 

construction could not support the American position on Okinawa with19See Kyoh Katoh, True OkillQI\'QII Spirit: The Life of KOlaro Kokuba (Tokyo: Sanshu Shobo Co., 

Ltd .. undated). 

" Encl. to Ltr, HQ, AAF-A FDIN to OCE, 21 Jul47, Ofc of History, C ofE, File 600.9 (Okinawa). 
80 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

out what the engineers judged to be excessive losses from typhoon damage. Efforts were made to find transferabl e funds in other engineer 

districts, but by the spring of 1948, it was clear to the command that 

unless supplemental congressional funding was approved, the Okinawa 

Engineer Distri ct would be forced to cease operations entirely by August 

or September. 3I 

The resultant efforts to economi ze often ended in fitful starts and 

stops in construction, with a corresponding negative impact on the local 

economy. Contractors found themselves being mobili zed only to be 

qui ckly demobi lized. Shifts of resources from permanent to temporary 

base programs, combined with losses in temporary structures to typhoons 

and the constant redesigning of construction programs, produced cost 

overruns in the Western Ocean Division and the Okinawa Engineer District. The whole situation confounded the Army Staff and frustrated a 

money-conscious Congress in Washington" 

The decline in military construction was worldwide, but the particularly dramatic curtailment of funds for Okinawa refl ected the lowered 

priorities that characteri zed American policy toward the Ryukyus during 

the 1946- 1948 period. These reduced priorities were further man ifested 

in the sharp red uction in the number of U.S. military personnel assigned 

to the island. In August 1946, for example, in the wake of the wholesale 

demobili zation of the immediate postwar period, American servicemen 

in the Ryukyus numbered 2 1,01 6 officers and men (i ncluding 512 assigned 

to military government duties, 4,200 to engineer construction activities, 

and a small conti ngent of naval personnel). In just two years that figure 

had been halved . 

The Joint Chi efs of Staff seemed inclined to focus their attention in 

the Far East on base requirements in Japan and the Philippines, the 

latte r's newly-acquired independence providing an added reason for their 

interest. For its part, the Department of State continued to treat Okinawa 

in the larger context of Japanese-American relations and concentrated 

on the future legal status of the islands. It declined to interject itself in 

11 Memos. Asst Chi ef of Engineers fo r Mi l. Construction to DCSLOG, 0064 28 Apr 48, sub: 

Construction on Okinawa. Chief, Construction Ops. Di v. Mi litary Construction, aCE, to Army 

Comptroller, 4 Jun 48, sub: Transfer o f Funds from Alaska to Okinawa, and DCSLOG to Army 

Comptroller, CSGSPIC2 25532. 11 Jun 48, sub: Transfer of Funds from Alaska to Okinawa, in orc of History, C of E. File 12: msg, CG PHILRYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. S 48037 GSCEO. 10 Jan 48, 

File: PH ILRYCOM January 1948. RG 9, MacArthur Archives. 

HLtr, Brig Gen L.D. Worsham to Office of the Engineer (Brig Gen 1-1.8. Leper), 22 Oct 47, memo, 

Col R.M. Levy. AGD, to HQ FECOM. AG 600.12 (28 Oct 47) CE, 24 Nov 47, sub: Maste r Plans 

and Construction Programs, msg, CINCFE to DA, CS 57524. 22 Dec 47, and msg, Maj Gen Hugh 

J. Casey to DA , CS 58277, 29 120 5Z Jan 48, sub: Constructi on SilUation on Ok inawa, in Ofc of 

Histo ry. C o f E. File 12. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 81 

administrative matters, leaving Okinawa in the quiet backwaters of Army 

concerns. 

Ambassadors in Uniform? 

But quiet backwaters can stagnate. In Okinawa the decline in military 

construction was paralleled by a decline in the overall quality of se rvice 

life in the islands. Between 1946 and 1949 the absence of a meaningful 

occupation, the intense boredom, unrelenting humidity, substandard 

quarters, and dearth of recreational facilities all took their toll on the 

island's garrison. Throughout the Army, among officers and enlisted men, 

the impression developed that only the worst were sent to duty stations 

on Okinawa. In the later 1940s the islands became, as bitter Army officers 

put it, "the end of the Army's logistical line," a junk heap of discarded 

World War II equipment and human cast-offs from the Far East Command. Another observer characterized Okinawa during this period as "a 

place of exi le from GHQ (SCAP) and Japan proper, and for ambitious 

civilians with the Army a 'no man's land.' "33 Indeed, a special report by 

MacArthur's headquarters in March 1949 reaffirmed the rumors, noting 

that personnel assigned to the Ryukyus reportedly were "of lower caliber 

than those assigned to Japan . .. . " 34 Taking up the cry, the Chrislian Cenwry fu lminated aga inst "Godforsaken Okinawa," while Time concluded 

for its national aud ience that "as a major American base . .. Okinawa is 

no credit to America."" Such personnel were clearly a potential source 

of trouble, particularly when assigned to garrison duty in an area where 

close proximity to an unsophisticated, third-world population was unavoidable. Indeed, the spirit and caliber of American forces serving in the 

Ryukyus during most of this period-those "depressed and su llen troops" 

as one senior Army official characterized them- proved more of a burden 

to civil affairs officers than Washington's relative lack of interest.'6 T he 

archipe lago was a relatively constricted arena in which military government planners could develop their program for reconstruction. Success 

depended not on ly upon the dedication of the civil affairs personnel, but 

also upon the good behavior of all American servicemen on Okinawa. 

Then, as now, any uniformed American soldier overseas becomes an am-

'.lThe first quote is from Tillll' 54 (28 Nov 49): 24; the second is from Kerr, An 1.~/{l/1(1 Pi'op/e, p. 

5. 

J'George Pollock, Western North Pacific Trust Territory. special SCAP study, 24 Mar 49, Freimuth 

Papers; see also, Morris. Tiger by the Tail, p. 81. 

')T.T. Brumbaugh. "Godforsaken Okinawa," Chris/iall Cell/ur)/ 67 (7 Jun 50): 700- 701 ; " If Okinawa is not to be Godforsaken ," Christiall Cel/tury 67 (16 Aug 50): 965-967; and Time 54 (28 Nov 

49):24. 

-"'Quoted in Frank Gibney. "Okinawa: Forgotten Island," Time 54 (28 Nov 49):24. 
82 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKY U ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

bassador for his country, whether or not he is conscious of that fa ct. On 

a fairly small island, such as Okinawa, a handfu l of undisciplined se rvicemen could easily undermine a disproportionate share of military government's efforts by generating apprehension and disgust among the 

islande rs, instead of the necessa ry trust and cooperation. 

Unfortunately, a small minority of the troops began to torment the 

civilian population almost as soon as the American forces came ashore, 

with sexual assaults especiall y prevalent. In early May 1945 the Commanding General, Island Command, General Wallace advertised the 

death penalty for offenders in a vai n attempt to curb the instances of 

rape.·

n One week after General Wallace's announcement, two soldiers 

from the 293d Port Company were arrested for attempting to rape three 

Okinawan women. Other incidents followed . In November 1945 an Ok inawan policeman , Koki Sakihara, was shot to death by one of three se rvicemen sought by civilian and military police personnel for abd ucting 

an Okinawan girl.·

l8 

Reports of serious crime continued to plague the command until near 

the end of the decade. Commenting on what they termed "the shameful 

mess" in the islands, Liti' magazine reported that during the six months 

end ing in September 1949 Ameri can servi cemen murdered 29 Okinawans 

and raped 18 others. In that same period, soldiers were also conv icted 

of 16 robberies of civilians and 33 assaults." Rumors and allegations of 

corruption also began to circulate in the command . Some offi cers 

and civilians stationed on Okinawa, including some of those in civil affairs, participated in a variety of illegal acti vities. Most engaged in relatively petty crimes involving the diversion of Army eq uipment and tools 

for their pri vate use or profit. One such indi vidual, a civi lian employee 

of th e Okinawa Enginee r District charged with misappropria ting 

government property, fl ed to Shanghai in February 1948, but Chinese 

authorities apprehended him and extradited him to Okinawa. Others 

became involved in illegal land acq uisitions, usually by entering into 

bogus marri ages with local women or by working through Okinawan 

intermedi aries40 

The American military's racial policies further complicated this do37Minutcs of Brig Gcn W.E. Crist's staff officers conference, 8 May 45. Sgt J. Bloch files at MG 

HQ. RG 407: working note on stafT meeting, 8 May 45. Watkins Papers. RG 200 . 

. I8Memo. 27th Di v. Provost Marshal to 27th Div. Judge Advocate. 14 May 45. sub: Rpt. of 

Investigation, RG 407; Funakoshi Police Rpt. No. 23 (Nov 45) to chi ef, Chinen Police I-IQ. sub: 

Death of a Police [sic) in Line of Duty, Rpt. of, Skuse Papers. . 

jq"Okinawa Junk Heap," Life 27 ( 19 Dec 49): 19-23; sec also Time 54 (28 Nov 49): 24. 

" Msg. CG RYCOM to CG PHILRYCOM. Nr. E 201 41 AlB, 27 Feb 48, File PH ILRYCOM 

February 1948. RG 9, MacArthur Archives; Mikio Higa, Politics (lnd Parties in Postw(lr Okinawa 

(Vancouver: Uni versity of British Columbia, 1963). p. 7: interview, Freimuth with the author, 8 Sep 

82. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 83 

lorous situation . T he Tenth Army had contai'ned a large number o f black 

units. Army and Marinc Corps di visions that assaulted Ok inawa had 

segregated port and amph ibious truck compani es attached. Although no 

black combat units participated in the invasion, the a ll-black 24th Inla ntry arrived in the Kerama Retto from Tinian and Saipan in early 

August 1945. T hese soldiers partic ipated in mopping up operations in 

the Keramas, and then remained to help garrison the occupi ed Ryukyus 

when the Tenth Army redeployed to Korea. T he 24th Infantry was one 

of seven infantry regiments on Ok inawa. It swelled the command 's number of minorit y troops, who a lso se rved in ten amphibious truck companies and live port companies. Other blacks served in three Army Air 

Forces Corps of Engineers aviation batta li ons and one aviation utility 

company." 

In add itio n to the boredom and substandard conditions suffe red by 

all American troops in the isla nds, these men also endured the physical 

and psychological isolation imposed by racial segregation. Segregation, 

in turn , imposed cert a in constra ints on the commands in the field. Bound 

by the Army's racia l policy, fi eld commanders were forced to concentrate 

la rge numbers of bl ack troops, who neither by aptitude nor training belonged in the servi ce, into the small number of black units where the ir 

impact overwhelmed the a ble black soldiers whose abi lities and ambitions 

we re most often ove rshadowed. T he a lways larger number of substandard 

white troops, on the other hand , could be scattered without undue harm 

throughout the ma ny white formations se rving in the ir commands. T he 

reputa tion for crime and misconduct earned by black units in the Ryukyus, therefo re, could be traced to the substandard character of these 

units formed by the Army's racia l poli cies. Certain individuals from these 

units accounted for a disproportionately high percentage of the crimes 

committed against civilians. In Apri l 1946 the Director of General Affairs 

for mi litary gove rnment, Lt. Comdr. James Watkins, IV, USNR, noted 

that "extreme ill wi ll " had deve loped between the blacks and the isla nders 

a nd said that " fea r of cruelty, rape, and violence replaced respect for 

American authority." He admitted that black troops were "by no means 

the o nl y offenders," but in his opinio n they accounted for such a la rge 

number of violent acts tha t he recommended the withdrawal of the blacks 

" to avoid further compromising the American position in the eyes of the 

Ok inawa ns."" 

Watkins' recommendation could not have come at a more inappro-

~1 IJin'("/llry (tlflie /11"/11.1' (!/"thl' VIIi/eli SI(J/C'S (OIl/siC/c' (imlilwlllal / .jmi(s /~(tl/(' United ,..,'{a(C's) (Sec ti on 

II ) AG 46 1 ( I Aug 45) O ll- I-M. pp. SM. 213- 220. 223. 28 1-284. Copy; n CMH L;h,.,y. 

Mc l1l o. Director of General AfTairs to Deputy COlllmander for Mil. Govern .. (, Apr 46. sub: 

Negro Troops- Withdrawal from Qkin.lwa or. Watkins Papers. RG 200. 
84 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS. 1945- 1950 

priate time. The War Department was struggling with the problem of 

how an increased number of black servicemen cou ld be absorbed into 

the Army. Because of the system of segregated units. the Army Staff was 

forced to impose substant ial quotas on the major overseas Army commands." Far East Command. including Okinawa. would have to accept 

more. rather than fewer blacks. 

During August of 1946 the number of black servicemen on Okinawa 

increased by 1.000. The Director for Public Safety linked their arrival to 

a sharp increase in serious crimes on the island. Although there is no 

proof that the new arri vals were the perpetrators. he stated that every 

case of murder. kidnapping. rape. and attempted rape during August 

involved black troops. T he same situation prevailed in October when the 

civil police alleged that black soldiers had committed all violent crimes 

that month. In most instances the gu ilty party could not be identified by 

the Okinawans. and most were not apprehended." 

The Okinawa Base Command did very little to provide opportuniti es 

for positive social contact between the servicemen and the civilians. In 

fact. civi l affairs personnel sought to all eviate the friction by keeping the 

Okinawan population and the garrison forces as separated as possible. 

They restricted civilian resettlement in areas where American troops were 

bivouacked. and strictly enforced non-fratern ization rules'" Living space, 

however. was painfully finite. and a degree of close contact could not be 

avoided. Moreover, military police units on the island were understrength 

and were not always successful in keeping the Okinawans insulated from 

the soldiers. In the northern third of Okinawa, where military police and 

military government roadblocks during 1946 had effectively curbed the 

unauthorized circu lation of servicemen, crimes against Okinawans had 

dropped dramatically. Similar efforts by the undermanned and overworked military and civil police authorities were far less successfu l in the 

more populated central and southern regions of Okinawa" 

Complaints against black soldiers diminished as many of the segregated units were graduall y withdrawn from Okinawa in 1946 and 1947. 

4'Fo r a detail ed examination o f this problem . sec Morris J. MacG regor. Jr. . "'/('Kra/iol/ (!F ,he 

Armed Forn·,\". 1Y4()- 19()5. a vo lume in the DEFENSE STUDIES SERIES (Washington: Dept. of the 

Army, Center of Military History. 1(81). chapter 7. 

44Mcmo. Director of Puhli c Safe ty to Deput y Commander for Mil. Govern .. 3 Scp 46. suh: Rpl. 

of Public Safet y Dept . for the Month of August 1946. Skusc Pape rs; memo. Direc tor of Public Safety 

Dept. to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern .. 3 1 Oct 46. sub: Rpt. of Public Safety Dept. for Ihe 

Month of Octobe r 1946. RG 407. For an cx'lminati on of the causes and eOccts or bl:Jck crime mtes 

in occupied arc:.ls. scc MacGregor. Ill/(')!fa/ion. pp. 208-2 15. 2 19. 

~' Rpl. Deputy Comm:.lnder ror Mil. Govcrn. 10 Commandant. NOB Okin:.lwa and ChicI' MG 

Officer. Ryukyus. I Jul 46. suh: Rpl. of Mit. Govc rn. Acti vities ror the Period From I Apr 45 to I 

Jul 46. Watkins Papers. RG 200. 

~" Lawren Walkin s M S. Rchabilitation: Economic. undatcd. Watkins Papers. RG 200: address 

by Lt Comdr Paul Sku5e 10 :.ln Intelligencc Officcr conrercncc. 15 Jan 47. Skuse Papers. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 85 

The Far East Command inactivated the 1st Amphibious Truck Company 

(Provisional) in November 1946 and in March 1947 redeployed the 24th 

Infantry. the la rgest concentratio n of black soldiers in the Ryukyus. to 

Osaka. Japan. A number or black serv icemen remained on the island. 

however. in abo ut a dozen truck and aviat ion utility compan ies. 

Ironically. considering its assumptions about black se rvicemen. military gove rnment headqua rters soon discovered that the departure of large 

numbers or black soldi ers did not solve the problem of civil-military 

confli ct. Indeed . conflicts between the islanders and members of the replacement units rrom the Philippines proved to be just as numerous. The 

44th Infantry (Philippine Scouts) arrived at Naha on 23 January 1947: 

other Philippine Scouts soon arrived with the 532d AAA G un Battalion. 

the 126 1st Construction Company. and the 335 1st and 3352d Ut ility 

Detachments (1. 500 men each). The Philippine Scouts were stationed 

throughout Okinawa. and within a short time the civil poli ce made the 

same charges against them as had been directed at the black se rvi cemen. 

One week after the 44th Infantry arri ved. the Okinawa n civil police commissioner reported to military gove rnment officials that the regiment's 

commanding offi ce r had insulted uniformed Okinawan police offi cers 

and that the 44th Infantry was "extremely undisciplined. Police members 

and inhabitants a like fee l anger toward these Filipinos trespassing into 

civi lian areas at all times."" It was a lament that would often be repeated 

as the Fi lipinos replaced the black servi cemen in the islanders' perceptions as their principal tormentors. 

If this behavior was unjustifiable. it was to some extent understandable. Many of the Filipino servicemen had experienced. or at least witnessed. atrocities committed by the Japanese in the Philippines during 

the war. It proved difficult for some of these men to curb their resentment 

toward all Japa nese citizens. a resentment that oft en translated into violence aga inst the docile and cooperative Okinawans. This vindictive behavior also served to instill resentment among the local citi zens toward 

all the occupying forces." 

Throughout the two yea rs they remained on Okinawa. the Philippine 

Scouts were accused of numerous crimes aga inst the civil population. 

ranging rrom unauthori zed sea rches and harassment to rape and assa ult. 

The cfliji (governor) of Okinawa Gunto. Koshin Shiki ya. accused the Filipinos-alone or in concert with black se rvi cemen- of 46 violent crimes 

during the period March- May 1947. and he urged that all Fi lipino troops 

4IMCIllO. Okin:.lwa ll Police Dept. Commissioner to Director. Puhlic Sarely. MG. 29 Jan 47. sub: 

An Ameri can Field Ot1iccr's Insult to CP on Duty- Rpt. of.. Skusc Papers. 

4·Tclcon. Cmdr Paul Skusc with the author. 7 Dec 81. 
86 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

TYPHOON DAMAGE. Typhoon "Libby" destroyed the roof of this local government building in October 1948. 

be withdrawn from the island.

4• For the period January- July 1948 the 

chiji reported another 68 violent incidents involving the Philippine 

Scouts, and in late 1949 the Okinawan police commissioner, Kemshin 

Nakamura, reported that since November 1945 four civil policemen had 

been killed on duty by black or Filipino servicemen.'o The American 

Director of Public Safety noted that the crime statistics for the Filipinos 

were worse than those for the black troops they replaced, and he characterized the deployment of the Scouts to Okinawa as the biggest mistake 

the Army made in the Ryukyus in the late 1940s." 

The friction generated between the Filipino servicemen and the civilian population remained a severe hindrance to the orderly reconstruc-

<49Mcmo No. 187, Chiji, Okinawa Gunta to Deputy Commander fo r Mil. Govern., 3 Jun 47, sub: 

Rpt. on Forcible Entries into Civ. Settlements Made by Filipino Servicemen and Recommendations 

on Countermeasures thereof, Skuse Papers. 

iOMemos, No. 186. Chiji, Okinawa Gunia to ACofS , RYCOM, 15 Nov 48, sub: Incessant Offenses 

on Okinawans Com mitted by Filipino Soldi ers, and No. 1314, HQ Okinawa Police Dept. to MG 

Director of Publi c Safety, 14 Oct 49, sub: Rpt. in regard to police members killed in the pursuit of 

their duties, SkU5C Papers. The latter rpt. mentions no killings by white soldiers. 

5lTelcons, Cmdr Paul Skuse with the author, 7 Dec 81 and 29 Mar 82. 
APATHY AND NEGLECT 87 

TYPHOON "LIBBY" destroyed this building on OkinalVa in October 1948. 

tion of Okinawan life until the Philippine Scouts left the islands." Inactivated in May 1949, the 44th Infantry was replaced by the 29th Infantry, and all Philippine Scouts were returned to the Philippines for 

discharge. 

Adding Injwy to Insult 

The capricious forces of nature seemed to underscore the malaise that 

had settled upon the American military in the Ryukyus. Successive typhoons in each of the first four postwar years took an enormous toll on 

native industry, the American occupation, military government reconstruction projects, and-in particular- military housing." In September 

1945 American forces on Okinawa experienced their first typhoon, which 

jlMemo for record, Plans & Ops. Di v. , GSUSA (Maj W.O. Foster), 24 May 49, sub: Rpt. of 

Annual General Inspection, HQ RYCOM. FY 1948. file P & 0 Pacific (Section I, Case I) 1949, RG 

319, Military Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD; msg, CG 

RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. C-I7839 AIAIX, I I Feb 49, File: RYCOM October 1948-July 1949, RG 

9, MacArthur Archives. 

HSee "U.S. Officers on Okinawa Make Huts Out of Packing Cases," U.S News and World Report 

27 (9 Dec 49):32. 
88 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

severely damaged quarters, post exchanges, hospitals, and dispensaries. 

At the same time it destroyed 15 percent of the island's crops. Three 

weeks later typhoon "Louise"-with 120 knot winds-caused heavy damage even to reinforced structures, while destroying 95 percent of the island's tentage. 54 During the years 1948- 1949 five particularly powerful 

storms struck the Ryukyu Islands, at times with wind gusts up to 200 

miles per hour. Typhoons "Libby" (October 1948) and "Della" (June 

1949) together destroyed more than one-half of the fishing fleet and 

caused extensive damage to military and civilian structures alike. Few 

reinforced buildings existed on the island, and the various prefabricated 

structures were designed for much less severe conditions. Aircraft hangers, although stronger, could resist, at the most, gusts of 50-70 mph. " 

Of the three major typhoons that ravaged Okinawa in 1949, "Gloria" was 

by far the worst storm to strike the Ryukyus since the islands had come 

under American control. The storm hit the islands on 22 July with steady 

winds of 175 mph, severely damaging half of all buildings on Okinawa 

and destroying 25 percent of the Army's quonset-type barracks and 50 

percent of the similarly-constructf.d dependent housing. It also thoroughly 

interrupted Air Force communications and even destroyed several hangers and the control tower at the Kadena Air Force Base." Twenty-seven 

civilian fishing craft were sunk, and another twenty-five were beached 

and damaged. Nor was destruction limited to inanimate stuctures: nearly 

50 military and civilian personnel were killed and over 200 seriously 

injured. It would be difficult to overstate the damage done by these frequent and deadly visitors. "Libby," "Della," and "Gloria" collectively 

destroyed nearly $2 million in imported foodstuffs and dealt a near fatal 

blow to the struggling economy." 

American civil affairs officers had to perform against this depressing 

postwar backdrop of official apathy, curtailed funding, decreasing personnel, racial tensions, and the violent forces of nature. Their task was 

not an easy one; but mustering whatever remained of their initial idealism, these men began the restoration of Okinawan society. 

$415Corn , Historical Record September 1945, p. I, and msg, ComGenTen to CINCAFPAC ADV, 

1101 20Z Oct 45, no sub., (sCorn File 988C6-0.2, RG 407; Watkins War Diary, entry for 12 Oct 

45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

HKarl C. Dod, "Military Activiti es of the Corps of Engineers in the Cold War," chapter V, 

unpublished MS, Ofc of History, C of E, cited hereafter as Dod MS. 

)(oHistorical Data, Twentieth Air Force (Far East Air Forces), July-December 1949, Vol. I, pp. 

196- 17, 203. Copy at Office o f Air Force History, mi crofilm A 7723, index 1165. See also Dod MS, 

chapter V. 

)lUSCAR, Civil A.Dairs Activities illfhe RYlikYlils/andsjor fhe Period Ending 31 December / 952, 

Vol. I , No. I, pp. 4-5, copy in CMH Library; O'Flaherty MS, Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER IV 

Social and Political 

Rehabilitation 

From the Japanese surrender in 1945 until the Berlin Blockade and 

.the communist victori es in China in 1948, America's interest in Okinawa 

as a strategic base waned. This lack of interest, both in Washington and 

at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, manifested itself in greatly reduced manpower levels and appropriated funding for the Ryukyus. 

Throughout the Far East Command, apathy, questions, and doubts about 

America's role in the Western Pacific replaced the earli er sense of purpose 

that had characterized the months of base development before Tokyo's 

sudden capitulation. These reductions made the military government mission all the more diffi cult, particularly as the more experienced military 

governors departed, leaving their mission and some of their sense of 

idealism in the hands of untested junior civil affairs officers. 

Despite these handicaps military government officials managed to 

launch a program for reconstructing Okinawan society. It was an ambitious undertaking, for it would have to be executed in the face of fiscal 

and material shortfalls and, at times, the indifference of military commanders. Practical necessity dictated that economic rehabilitation be the 

primary goal, yet it was political and social development, including education, that lay closest to the hearts of many civil affairs personnel. 

Feeding the islanders was not enough; these men came to the Ryukyus 

to inculcate the inhabitants with the principles of democracy, nothing 

less. 

Resettlement and Repatriation 

Before long-range social and political reforms were possible, military 

government headquarters had to convince the operational units to release 

land so that the refugee camps would be dismantled and the population 
90 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

could be resettled into communities.' When hostilities against Japan 

ceased, military government personnel in Okinawa had under their control some 320,000 refugees divided among seven district camps. 

On 20 September 1945 the island commander, General Wallace, authorized military government headquarters to submit recommendations 

for the resettlement of the population. At that time 250,000 civilians 

were encamped north of Route #6 (the Ishikawa-Nakadomari highway)-

an area that prior to the war contained, at most, 40,000 people. Accordingly, military government requested the Navy to release 6,800 acres and 

the Army 4,856 acres south of Route #6. The Navy turned over 5,352 

acres; the Army, 2,792. Relocation began in late October 1945. By the 

end of December resettlement of civilians among the five military government districts of northern Okinawa (see Map 5) was substantially completed, and 46,500 civilians had been relocated south of Route #6. 

Another 125,000 persons were still waiting to be resettled in the south.' 

Since the great majority of the land records were destroyed during 

the battle for Okinawa, it was not always possible to return civili ans to 

their own specific plot of land. Military government's objective, rather, 

was to return refugees to their home districts and provide them with at 

least temporary shelter and some land to cultivate. Although civil affairs 

officers wanted to complete the resettlement program by I January 1946, 

this goal simply could not be accomplished.

3 Not only was there a shortage 

of land, housing, and transportation, but the resettlement on Okinawa 

of civilians from offshore islands added thousands more to the number 

of dislocated individuals and families. 

The progress of resettlement depended not only upon the availability 

of land no longer needed by the military, but also upon the availability 

of renovated or newly- constructed housing for the islanders. By the end 

of March 1946 enough ci vilians had been resettled that three camps 

(Jinuza, Ishikawa, and Maebaru) were closed and their remaining welfare 

functions were assumed by Military Government's General Affairs Department. Headquarters closed the four remaining camps by June.' 

'HQ IsCom, Historical Rccord-IsCom, Okinawa Gunta, Ryukyus, July 1945, I Dec 45, RG 407; 

memo , Deputy Commander for MG to CG ASCOM I, 19 Sep 45. sub: Administrative and Economic 

Measures for Okinawa- Proposals for, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

2Rpts, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB, 31 Dec 45 and 28 Jan 46, 

sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for Novembe r 1945 and December 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 

200. 

JHQ USN MG Okinawa Directive No. 29, 23 Oct 4 5, sub: Resettlement Plan and Policy, File 

A1 7- 10/EF37, Operational Archives. Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard. 

Rpt , Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB and Chief Mil. Govern. 

Officer, 3 1 Mar 46, sub: Rept. o f Mil Govern. Activities for March 1946, Watkins Papers, RG 200; 

MG HQ Memo No.2, I May 46, sub: Dissolution of MG Camps at Koza and Chinen, and MG 

HQ Memo No.8, II May 46, sub: Dissolution of MG Camps at !toman and Taira, RG 260, Mi litary 

Archi ves Division, National Archives and Records Service. Suitland, MD. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 91 

Some 900 people within the camps became a special problem for 

military government headquarters when they claimed citizenship other 

than Japanese. Given the long Ryukyuan history of emigration from the 

archipelago, the presence of these foreign visitors who had returned to 

their island of origin and had been caught by the war should not have 

been such a surprise. Nevertheless, the civil affairs teams had no prior 

instructions about how to handle citizenship claims. Headquarters finally 

promulgated guidelines for processing such claims in early March 1946, 

nearly a year after the American invasion of Okinawa.' The largest number of claims were for Filipino (286), Peruvian (247), or American (206) 

citizenship, but smaller numbers were received for such widely-separated 

nations as Cuba (4) and the Netherlands (6). The policy issues raised by 

the claims for American citizenship eventually reached the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee. The committee urged the Secretary of 

State to repatriate-at their own expense- all Okinawans who could 

prove American citizenship.' 

Processing these claims took valuable time away from what the civil 

affairs officers perceived as higher priority objectives, most notably the 

continuing resettlement effort. On 1 July 1946, for example, 68,000 Okinawans were waiting to be returned to their former villages. Meanwhile, 

50 percent of the land south of Route #6 remained reserved for military 

use and therefore closed to resettlement.' Gradually, as land and resources 

permitted, the remaining refugees were relocated during the rest of 1946. 

Military government officials soon redirected their energies from the 

problem of resettling domestic refugees to the task of absorbing thousands 

of repatriated Okinawans from overseas. Prior to the outbreak of World 

War II, many Ryuky uans, especially Okinawan fishermen and farmers, 

had left to seek a better life in the Japanese Mandated Islands. During 

the war another 15,000 Okinawans had been conscripted into the Japanese armed forces. These conscripts found themselves stranded in Taiwan 

or the Japanese home islands at the end of the war. Those in Japan had 

been joined by some 160,000 Okinawans who had been transported to 

the home islands prior to the American invasion of Okinawa. 

In late September 1945 the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral 

'HQ u.s. Naval MG , Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 122, 5 Mar 46, sub: Citizenship ClaimsFiling Procedures for claims of U.S. Citi zenship. Watkins Paper-5, RG 200. 

"SWNCC 300/ 1, 23 Jul 46, sub: Policy on Repatriation from the Ryukyus of Persons Claiming 

U.S. and Other Foreign Citi zcnships, RG 335. Modern Military Branch, National Archives and 

Records Service, Washington, DC. 

lCINC USAFPAC, Summation No. I, US Army MG Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the 

Months of July-November 1946, p. 47, copy in CMI-I Library; rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. 

Govern . to Commandant, NOB Okinawa and Chief MG Officer, 1 Ju146; sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. 

Acti vities for the Period From 1 Apr 45 to I Jul 46, RG 260, Military Arch ives Division, National 

Archives and Records Service, Suitland, MD. 
92 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

REPATRIATES BEING SPRAVED WITH DDT 

King, set forth his program for the civil administration of the former 

Mandated Islands in the Pacific. He proposed that non-Japanese foreign 

civilians, including Okinawans, be allowed to remain. On I October, 

however, Admiral Nimitz recommended to King that all ali ens in Micronesia be repatriated, not only for security reasons, but also for economic considerations and for administrative convenience. The Chief of 

Naval Operations referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to 

the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. On 22 December 1945 that 

committee decided that Ryukuans were to be considered Japanese, and 

that all aliens who had lived in the Mandated Islands less than ten years 

should be repatriated , except in individual cases recognized by Admiral 

Nimitz. The repatriation process was to begin in January 1946. 

An estimated 23,500 Okinawans then lived in Micronesia. The immediate repatriation of so many people would have hopelessly overburdened both the island's resources and military government's capacity to 

handle such an influx. The Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, Admiral Price, therefore, requested that the repatriation be delayed 

until March. The Commander, Marianas, did not concur, however, and 
SOCIAL AN D POLITICAL REHABILITATION 93 

COMING HOME. Former Japanese destroyer rellirning Okinawan repatriates. 

Admiral Nimitz supported the latter's desire for the earliest possible repatriation from Micronesia.' As the repatriates from Micronesia began 

arriving at Buckner Bay (20,007 in February from the Marianas alone), 

military government headquarters feared that Army commanders in Japan and Korea would follow the Navy's example. Repatriation from those 

countries would swell the population of already overcrowded Okinawa 

by one-third" 

In December 1945 MacArthur reluctantly agreed that Okinawa could 

not handle the thousands of repatriates, but he directed that Ryukyuans 

from islands other than Okinawa be repatriated without delay.lo Later 

the same month the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee stipulated 

that no repatriates could be sent to the Ryukyus from Japan until military 

government was prepared to receive them." MacArthur reiterated his 

determination to send back citizens from Ryukyu islands other than Okinawa, but he did continue to preclude Okinawans such repatriation." 

8Richard , Naval Administrafion-Pacific Islallds, Vol. II. pp. 34-39. 

QWatkins, personal diary, II Jan 46. 

IOSCAPIN 455. 17 Dec 45, sub: Repatriation to Ryukyus. Freimuth Papers. 

" Msg, War Dept. to CINCAFPAC, SCAP. CINCPAC, DTG 22030 1Z, 22 Dec 45, CINCPAC 

Files, RG 38. 

uSCAPIN 558, 5 Jan 46, sub: Repatriation to Ryukyus, and SCAPIN 655, 26 Jan 46, sub: 

Okinawans in Reception Center at Kagoshima , Freimuth Papers. 
94 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Since the more numerous Okinawans remaining in Japan represented a 

significant social and economic burden, MacArthur hoped to return them 

to their native island as soon as possible and he made repeated representations to Admiral Nimitz to begin accepting those individuals. Nimitz, with considerable justification, continued to refuse Okinawan 

repatriates on the grounds that insufficient food and shelter awaited them 

on the main island. So long as the Navy directed civil affairs activities 

on Okinawa, MacArthur had no success in ridding himself of this "burden" in occupied Japan. When the Army took over military government 

responsibilities in the Ryukyus on I July 1946, however, MacArthur's 

headquarters hastily summoned a repatriation conference at Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific. The Deputy Commander for Military Government on Okinawa, Colonel Craig, and three other representatives of 

the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, attended the conference. 

The conferees hammered out a repatriation schedule, the goal of which 

was complete Ryukyuan repatriation from Japan by 26 December 1946." 

Repatriation was to begin on 5 August at the rate of 4,000 per week until 

26 September, and at 8,000 per week thereafter until the program was 

completed." 

The first repatriates arrived in August at Buckner Bay. Military government established two camps to attend to the arrivals' immediate needs: 

the camp at Kuba-Saki, near the landing area, and Camp Costello, about 

three and one-half miles north of Kuba-Saki. Some 139,500 Ryukyuans 

were repatriated from Japan by December 1946, the scheduled date for 

completion of the program. Additional repatriates continued to materialize, however, until the repatriation from Japan totaled 150,388 one 

month later. The program was then terminated, but the end of the program did not mean an end to the problem. " Ryukyuans desiring repatriation from Japan continued to appear throughout 1947 and 1948. By 

the end of December 1947 the number of Ryukyuans repatriated had 

risen to 173,483. Thereafter the monthly totals decreased considerably, 

yet still averaged over 200. Military government headquarters, for example, reported 291 repatriates from Japan during December 1948. FebI 'Memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to CG RYCOM, 27 Ju146. sub: Rpt. on Ryukyus 

Repatriation Conference al AFPAC. and Annex. III (10 Sep 46) to SCAPIN 927, 7 May 46. sub: 

Repatriation. Freimuth Papers. 

14Rcports of General MacArthur. MacArthur ill Japan: 'l'lle Occupatioll: Mili/ary Plw.w!. Vol. I 

Supplement (Washington: Government Printing Office. n.d.), pp. 169-70. 

UMilitary Government Headquarters prepared a final report on the program for MacA rthur. Sec 

Rpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to SCAP through CO RYCOM, 9 Jan 47. sub: Final Rpt. 

on Ryukyuan Repatriation Program (Freimuth was the originator of this rpL). and CINC USAFPAC. 

Summation No.3. US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month of January 1947. 

Freimuth Papers. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 95 

CAMP COSTELLO was one temporary home for Okinawa's repatriates. 

ruary 1949 was the first month in which there were no repatriates from 

the Japanese home islands reported.'· 

Repatriating these Okinawans from refugee camps to their home areas 

was a major accomplishment and a forward step in the social rehabilitation of Okinawan life. The program was a success in that its objectives 

were accomplished: thousands of Okinawans were repatriated from overseas with few mishaps. Only seventeen islanders died from various causes 

during transit; thirty-two were born en route. But unlike the resettlement 

program, the repatriation program initially had a distinctly negative impact on Okinawa's economic recovery. The repatriated islanders brought 

very little back with them in terms of material goods. The clothing, medical attention, housing facilities, and-especially-food required by a 

population swollen with repatriates was significant. Military government 

met the needs through an extensive relief program supported by food and 

lumber shipped from Far East Command sources in Japan. Only after 

the impact of assimilating so many people had been absorbed could military government fully turn to the rehabilitation of Ryukyuan society. 

!6HQ Eighth Army. Mil. Govern. Section, Repatriation Div., Historical Rpt. , December 1947 

and CINe USAFPAC, Summations No. 26 & 28, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus 

for the Months of December 1948 & February 1949, RG 407. 
96 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

REPATRIATION. NelVly relllrned OkinaIVans aIVait transportation. 

The Revival of Education 

Once a modicum of village life had been restored, civil affairs officers 

sought to revive Okinawa's educational system. During the war, education 

had suffered earlier and more pronounced physical and psychological 

disruption than most of society's activities. A year before the American 

invasion the Japanese 32d Army had appropriated many of the larger 

schools to use as headquarters buildings and barracks. School buildings 

were the best constructed buildings on Okinawa-and also the most conspicuous. Requisitioned schools suffered heavy damage from American 

preinvasion bombings and from the subsequent fighting. Moreover, many 

of the older male students were withdrawn from school to serve in some 

military capacity, while hundreds of older girls were withdrawn to train 

as nurses. Not only buildings, therefore, but also many individual educations were shattered by the war. Restoration of the educational system 

meant more than building schoolhouses: it also meant providing the 

teachers and teaching materials necessary for students to resume their 

studies. Military government officers also knew that during the war Japanese schools were instruments of imperial indoctrination. Very few 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 97 

Americans on Okinawa in 1945 understood the Japanese language. Although many Okinawan teachers volunteered, senior military government 

officials believed that such individuals might teach subversive, antiAmerican sentiments if classes were resumed. Because of this fear- which 

proved to be unfounded-and the lack of supplies and facilities, school 

activity was minimal during the earliest days of the occupation. Nevertheless, Okinawan regard for education was well known, and the civil 

affairs teams working among the people understood that a restoration 

program could not be successful until an education system was established. The task of reviving the system would be a formidable one, with 

physical, cultural, and financ ial obstacles to surmount. By overcoming 

these problems within a matter of months, the civil affairs officers demonstrated their determination to revitalize Okinawan education as 

quickly as possible. 

Reconstruction began with the swarming throngs of refugee-camp children, since their undirected presence was a nuisance and in some areas 

a major problem. Some form of directed educational activity was the 

most obvious way to reestablish discipline." To help keep the children 

off the local roads, the commanding officer of a "B" team at Ishikawa 

as early as I May 1945 authorized the construction of a playground. He 

detailed 150 Americans and Okinawans to build it. When it opened just 

three days later, over 1,000 children ages four through eight turned out 

to use it. J8 Following this modest beginning, military government headquarters directed that district commanders establish recreational programs for all children of elementary school age; classes would be 

conducted at these recreational facilities and would stress the fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as handicrafts and 

group play." 

In August 1945 Island Command established a Military Government 

Education Section to determine policy, to develop and coordinate the 

educational program, to furnish shelter for classes, and to provide school 

materials. Although sufficient local instructors volunteered, school supplies were chronically short throughout 1945. Camp honcho, or section 

leaders, selected qualified Okinawan teachers, who were then cleared with 

counter-intelligence. The actual operation of schools remained a function 

of the Education Section until 2 January 1946 when military government 

I1HannaiWatkins, Rehabilitation: Social, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; CINe USAFPAC, Summation No. I, US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the Months of JulyNovember 1946, p. 53. Copy in CMH Library. 

'IMemo, Economics and Industries Officer (8- 8) to Public Welfare Officer, IsCom, 9 May 45. 

sub: Ishikawa Playground- Winder Park, establishment of, RG 407. 

19MG Circular No, 16. 15 May 45, sub: A Preliminary Welfare Program: District Education and 

Recreation, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
98 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950· 

RUDIMENTARY SCHOOL FACILITIES being impected by military government 

officers. 

established the Okinawan Department of Education with full administrative authority under the supervision of the military government education officer. Atsuo Yamashiro, a leading prewar educator on the island, 

became director of the Department of Education-the first Okinawan 

administrative department created by military government. 20 

The school system expanded as rapidly as the availability of teachers 

and facilities would permit. By I October 1945 military government officers had established 72 schools, first through sixth grade, operating on 

a part-time basis with 1,300 teachers and 40,000 pupils. Less than a year 

later the system had expanded to prewar levels: 84 kindergartens (15,400 

pupils), 122 eight-grade primary schools (85,600 pupils), and 18 four-year 

high schools (7,200 students). By December 1948 the school population 

of the Ryukyus reached 210,000 students. At the secondary level these 

pupils could participate in a number of programs, depending upon their 

interests and locality. In November 1945 the 137th Naval Construction 

Battalion had turned over its camp near Gushikawa in the Maebaru Dis2O Hanna/Watkins, Rehabilitation: Social, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 99 

trict to military government. Civil affairs officers promptly converted 

most of its intact quonsets, shops, and equipment into five training 

schools: a teachers normal school, an English-language teachers school, 

a police training school, a mechanical training school, and a cooks and 

bakers school." At first, expedited courses lasting four to six months were 

offered, but the schools quickly evolved into full-scale secondary institutions. The military government Education Section converted another 

former Seabee camp into a secondary boarding school and established 

an agricultural school at Nago on the Motobu Peninsula. Small fishing 

schools were also constructed at the fishing communiti es of Itoman and 

Toguchi. 

By September 1947 approximately 90 percent of the school-age children were receiving some type of formal instruction in over 500 schools. 

Many of these buildings, however, were temporary structures of very rude 

construction." The quality of both the instruction and the physical condition of the schools graduall y improved throughout the late 1940s, but 

the total number of schools had not dramatically changed by the end of 

the decade. In March 1949 military government headquarters initiated 

a scholarship program to send qualified Ryukyuan students to various 

Japanese universities. The candidates pursued degrees in such areas as 

medicine, law, and engineering. Later the same year, with the assistance 

of additional Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funding, headquarters inaugurated a similar program of scholarships to send islanders 

to a number of American colleges and universities. On 22 May 1950 

military government officers established the first university in Ryukyuan 

history. The University of the Ryukyus was organized to resemble an 

American university, and academicians from the Michigan State University, at the Army's behest, agreed to come serve as advisors. The 

institution consisted of twenty-six buildings, erected by a local Okinawan 

contracting company, Kokuba-Gumi, with Government and Relief in 

Occupied Areas funds, on the site of the former castle at Shuri. Its first 

entering class numbered some 560 students. Designed to be the teachertraining center for the archipelago, the university also became a source 

of pride for the Ryukyuan people. 

All academic instruction under American auspices in the Ryukyus, 

whether in kindergarten or, later, the university, was conducted in the 

Japanese language. This was true despite the fact that in December 1945 

!l US MG Directive No. 49, 19 Nov 4 5, sub: Civilian Training Schools, Establishment of, RG 

260. 

l1GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [sic] Islands for the Secretary 

of War, II Oct 47, p. 6, File: SCAP, Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and Ryukyus, 

RG 6, MacArthur Archives. 
100 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

UNIVERSITY OFTHE RYUKYUS 

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Nimitz's successor as Pacific Commander, issued a directive for military government in the Pacific which 

stated in part that "instruction in the English language for natives of all 

ages is a prime necessity, but this is not to be construed as discouraging 

instruction in native languages and culture."" Whatever may have been 

Spruance's motivation for such an order, the practical realities of not 

having sufficient bilingual Japanese-English instructors, instructional materials, or interested students precluded an all-out effort to offer instruction in English, even if the civil affairs officers had been of one mind on 

the desirability of such instruction. 

In point of fact, military government officers debated the importance 

of teaching the English language as a required subj ect; all understood the 

obvious political as well as practical and cultural implications of promoting the use of English in the schools.24 If adopted for general use in 

!lLtr, CINCPAC.CINCPOA to Distribution, Serial: 53855, 12 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. 

Govern., Pacific Ocean Areas, File AI7- IO/A- I(IO), RG 38. 

24$ee Gordon Warner, History 0/ Educalion hi Postwar Okinawa (Tokyo: N ihon Bunka Kagakusha 

Co., Ltd .. 1972). 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 101 

the islands, English could serve as a common bond between the Ameri can 

and Ryukyuan peoples, as well as a conduit for American ideals. On the 

other hand, was this role desirable if the United States did not envision 

long-term retention of the islands? In the period 1945- 1950 no one was 

entirely certain what form the American-Ryukyuan relationship would 

take. Until that relationship was defined , military government in the 

Ryukyus tried to cope with the practical problems of language instruction. 

As two civil affairs officers wrote in the late 1940s: 

The whole problem of language is onc which on Okinawa is particularly difficult. The 

language of the schools remains Japanese, which means, naturally. that ties with Japan 

remain strong. The retention of the Japanese language . . . mayor may not in the long 

run prove desirable. But there was no alternative, since revival of Ryukyuan at this late 

date would be without point, conversion to English impossible without extensive teacher 

training programs, and ill advised without definite commitment as to the future of the 

island.

2$ 

Military government officers did make an effort to train native instructors in the English language by establishing the Foreign Language 

(English) School in January 1946 at Gushikawa. By December 1948 four 

branches of the school were operating throughout the island, but the 

authorities lacked sufficient instructors to train the potential teachers. 

Trained bilingual experts were always needed elsewhere, especially at 

General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. Moreover, the Ryukyuans 

did not exhibit much enthusiasm for English instruction so long as the 

future political status of Okinawa remained unclear. The English-language 

school never had more than 200 trainees enrolled at anyone time, and 

most of these were enrolled in short courses to become qualified as interpreters, rather than teachers.'· 

Whatever may have been Admiral Spruance's wishes, Okinawa simply 

did not have enough bilingual teachers to initiate general study of the 

English language on the island." Even if sufficient numbers of Japanesespeaking English instructors had been available, there remained another 

formidable obstacle to the mastery of English by the population: many 

Okinawan children, whose native tongue was Luchuan (Ryukyuan), would 

first have to master Japanese as a second language before they could begin 

studying English. 

Even without an emphasis on English instruction, the educational 

system of postwar Okinawa certainly prepared the civilian population to 

be a healthier, better educated, and more productive citizenry-no matter 

what political status the Ryukyuans might ultimately achieve. The reHHanna/Watkins, Rehabilitation: Socia l, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

u'O'Flaherty MS, Chapter VII. 

17lntcrview, Freimuth with the autho r, 29 Oct 80. 
102 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

creation of a civilian educational system, therefore, represented a major 

step in reestablishing an orderly, settled existence for the population. 

Political and Judicial Rehabilitation 

Given the scope of the civil affairs mission and the smaller number 

of officers to execute it, headquarters endeavored to shift the burden of 

administering the islands as much as possible into native hands while 

retaining ultimate control. Admiral Nimitz clearly expressed this objective in his basic directive to military government: 

... you will provide for the continuance of essential governmental functions, using local 

inhabitants insofar as feasible and making use of the local governmental machinery so 

far as such use advances . .. the objective of military government.28 

This statement could have been interpreted as a mandate to revitalize 

political life in the Ryukyus. Some of the more liberal-minded officers 

interpreted it as an opportunity to initiate programs in self-government, 

but a more limited conception prevailed in Tenth Army's Military Government Section during the planning phase of ICEBERG and through the 

summer of 1945. General Crist supported a narrower view of the proper 

role for civilian government in areas under military occupation; in such 

cases, he believed that the concept of local government could be applied 

only to small municipalities and lesser units, and he consistently preached 

this philosophy to his staff officers. 29 Even after Crist's departure, his 

viewpoint permeated the atmosphere at the Military Government Section 

for some months, thereby depriving the command of the potential advantages that derive from " indirect control" of occupied areas. Given 

this attitude, it is not surprising that the first steps toward local administration on a camp-wide level came not from headquarters, but from the 

military government teams in the field. 

The initial step toward political rehabilitation, though perhaps not 

perceived as such, was the appointment of the first honcho in the camps. 

These men, refugees themselves, were made responsible for groups of 60 

to 100 of their fellows. Their appointments sprang from battlefield necessity, because of the lack of sufficient civil affairs personnel and interpreters. As the tactical forces turned civilians over to the teams, military 

government officers designated-often on sight- the more energetic or 

authoritative Okinawans to oversee such matters as registration, rationing, and labor detailing. Their range of activity varied, depending upon 

lKCINCPAC MG Directi ve of I Mar 45. See also Leonard Weiss, "U.S. Military Government on 

Okinawa," Far Eastern Sun'ey 15 (Jul 46); 234. 

~" Comdr James Watkins, Rehabilitation; Political. MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 103 

local needs and the inclination of the team commanders. As civilian 

camps were established, many honcho emerged as appointed "mayors," 

responsible for enforcing proclamations on everything from sanitation to 

cultivation, and for resolving the surprisingly few disputes that erupted 

among the OkinawansJO 

Military government officers had difficulty finding qualified islanders 

to help administer the growing number of civilians under their care. In 

most mura (villages, or townships) in the Ryukyus, local officials had 

been fiercely loyal to the government in Tokyo, or in some larger townships, were home-island Japanese. Many of these local officials had been 

withdrawn to Japan in October 1944, but others had remained and sullenly refused to cooperate with the American forces.31 Because of the 

shortage of qualified local leaders, military government officers often 

made use of those former officials who remained-regardless of their 

personal loyalties. This practice was especially true for the islands off 

Okinawa, where the administrative and political machinery remained far 

more intact than on Okinawa itself. Even on Okinawa, former officials 

were utilized to a large degree; for example, the postmaster of Kin mura, 

Mr. Tokeshi, was appointed mayor when the former mayor proved 

uncooperative." 

Perhaps the most striking example was the postwar career of Jugo 

Thoma. During the war Thoma, a native-born Okinawan, headed the 

islands' chapter of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. In occupied 

Japan, a Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction excluded 

certain groups of nationalistic citizens, including those active in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association from participation in government service." But such instructions, directed to the civilian government in 

Tokyo, did not apply to the Ryukyus. In certain instances General 

JO(:INC USAFPAC, Su mmation No. I. US Army MG Activities in the Ryukyu Islands fo r the 

Months of Jul y-November 1946, undated, p. 12, copy in the CM H Library; rpt, CO, Del. 8- 10 to 

CO, 27th Div., 3 May 45; sub: Mil. Govern. Activities (From 091330 April to 011400 May), RG 

407. 

J' Memo, IsCom MG HQ to CO, IsCom, 31 Jul 45; sub: Hisl. of Mil. Govern. Operations on 

Okinawa, I Jun to 30 Jun 45. Watkins Papers, RG 200; memo, Lt Col James I. Martin to Col EB. 

Wiener. MG HQ, 8 May 45; sub: Notes on Occupation and MG Organization of Kin Mura, RG 

407; Morris, Tiger b)1 t/I(' Tail. p. 56. 

l!Mcmo. IsCom MG HQ to CO, IsCom, 31 Ju l 45, sub: Hist. of Mil. Govern. Ope rations on 

Okinawa. I Jun to 30 Jun 45. circular, MG HQ IsCom. MG Circular No. 80, 23 Jun 45. sub: Selected 

Okinawan Civilians for Assisting Mil. Govern., and Watkins/Lawrence, Disaster Reli ef Administration: Organization and Methods. MS, Watkins Pape rs, RG 200; rpl. HQ MG Oct. B-9 10 CO, Tenth 

Army, undat ed. sub: Rpl. of Mil. Govern. Activities in Kerama Retto from 27 Mar to 27 Apr 45, 

RG 407. 

JlSCAPIN 550, 4 Jan 46, sub: Remova l and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public 

Office. Copy in Political Reorielllafion of Japan. September 1945 10 September 1948. Report of Govern ment Section, SCAP (Washington: Government Printing Office, n.d.), Vol. II, Appendix B. p. 

482. Sec also Memoirs of Juga Thoma. Jugo Thoma Memo irs Publishing Assn. (Naha: Hoshi Printing 

Co., 1969), p. I. 
104 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

MacArthur's headquarters questioned the propriety of employing former 

officials such as Thoma in positions of authority on Okinawa; nevertheless, military government officials believed that the shortage of available 

trained Okinawans necessitated using anyone with proven administrative 

skills. Thoma, therefore, became mayor of Naha, a position he held in 

prewar Okinawa.

34 

American preconcei ved impressions about the islanders often colored 

the relations between the military government officers and those Ok inawans who assisted them in administering the island. Having trained 

with handbooks based on biased Japanese sources, civil affairs personnel 

often had low expectations for their Okinawan assistants. Fortunately, 

these negative impressions were soon proved unfounded. Most appointed 

Okinawans performed well, grew more effective as time passed, and thus 

saved the military government teams a considerable amount of time, 

energy, and frustration ." 

Cooperating with the American invaders, however, was often dangerous to these islanders. The remnants of the 32d Army in the hills of 

northern Okinawa considered dealings with the Americans treasonous. 

Japanese soldiers retaliated with a reign of terror against civilian collaborators which featured burnings and decapitations. These punishments 

were often meted out in villages indiscriminately, and many uninvolved 

civilians suffered. The contrast between the avenging Japanese soldiers 

and the Americans rendering medical assistance on a large scale was not 

lost on the Okinawans, much to the further frustration of the Japanese 

guerrillas.

36 

On 2 July 1945 the Ryukyus campaign officially terminated, and one 

day later Col. Charles Ira Murray, USMC, relieved General Crist as Deputy Commander for Military Command, therewith initiating a new phase 

in political reconstruction." Colonel Murray, who had previously served 

as Deputy Chief Military Government Officer in Guam, had some exHlnterview, Freimuth with the author, 29 Oct 80. In 1952 Thoma became chi ef justice for the 

island, and in 1956 he became chief executive of Okinawa. 

nWatkinslLawrence, Disaster Relief Administration: Organization and Methods, MS, Watkins 

Papers, RG 200; memos, Lt C.S. Ford, USNR, to CG MG HQ IsCom, undated, sub: Mil. Govern. 

operations in northern Okinawa from 21 Apr to 28 May 45, and Political Officer (Capt George 

Hopkinson, AUS) to CO, BIOIX. 10 Aug 45, sub: Progress of Military Government: Political Organization, Public Welfare, Religion, and Schools, Rpt. of, RG 407; Ford, "Occupation Experiences 

on Okinawa," pp. 179- 180. 

16HQ IsCom Okinawa, Action Rpt. IsCom, Okinawa, 13 Dec 44- 30 Jun 45, 30 Jun 45, and Lt 

Col John Stevens and MSgt James M. Burns, Okinawa Diary (March-14 May 45), 14 May 45 entry, 

RG 407; Watkins working notes re: civilian casualties, 25 May-2 1 Jul 45, and memo, Lt (jg), R.F. 

Pence, SCt USNR to Col F.B. Wiener, 24 May 45, sub: Japanese Atrocities on Civilians, Effect of, 

Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

l1HQ IsCom, General Orders No. 55, 3 Jul 45, Murray Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center, 

Washington, D.C. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 105 

perience, albeit limited, in politically rehabilitating occupied areas. Under 

Murray, military government headquarters began to devise a tentative 

plan for governmental development. At first, this effort was directed by 

Capt. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, as a function of the Operations Branch. 

In late August this branch was reorganized as an expanded Government 

Department (after 29 September, the Civilian Affairs Department) under 

Lt. Comdr. George P. Murdock, USNR, who as a peacetime anthropology 

professor at Yale University had prepared the Handbook on the Ryukyus 

(OPNAV 13-31). 

In July 1945 military government summoned about 125 prominent 

Okinawans to serve in a Provisional Advisory Assembly. Shikiya Koshin, 

a locally well-known educator, was elected chairman of this assemblage. 

In August the Assembly selected a fifteen-member Okinawan Advisory 

Council to assist and advise the Deputy Commander for Military Government. Of the fifteen islanders chosen, one had been a prominent police 

official before the war, one was the former managing editor of the island's 

principal newspaper, and one a past president of the Naha bar. Five were 

teachers and seven had been members of the preinvasion prefectural 

assembly. Koshin Shikiya chaired the council. Once the Advisory Council 

was established, the Provisional Advisory Assembly was dissolved. Some 

of its members, as individuals, remained influential advisors to various 

military government departments. 

As more and more civilians returned to their former home areas, civil 

affairs officers could re-establish the local shi (city), cho (town), and mura 

(village) as the basis for administration. Although military government's 

goal was to return as soon as possible to the traditional mura basis for 

local government organization, it was not feasible to re-establish the more 

familiar mura system until more citizens returned and local land claims 

were settled. At the top of the administrati ve structure were sixteen military government districts, twelve on Okinawa and four on the outlying 

islands.

38 These last four districts represented military government's token presence in the southern and northern Ryukyus. Because of the shortage of civil affairs personnel and because the southern Ryukyus 

experienced relatively minor military actions, Tenth Army did not at first 

dispatch teams to Miyako and Yaeyama. It would be December 1945 

before military government established a liaison office on Miyako, and 

March 1946 before a resident detachment was established in the southern 

lBelNe USAFPAC, Summation No. I, US Army MG Activities in the Ryukyu Islands for the 

Months of July-November 1946. undated, pp. 3, 14, copy in CMH Library; Watkins, Rehabilitation: 

Political, MS, circular, ASCOM I, MG HQ Okinawa, MG Circular No. 192, 30 Aug 45, sub: Okinawa 

Advisory Council, and ASCOM It MG HQ General Orders No. 13, 30 Aug 45, sub: Organization 

of MG Okinawa, Watkins Papers, RG 200; Karasik, "Okinawa; Problem in Administration," p. 260. 
106 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Ryukyus. Amami Oshima and the smaller islands of the Amami Gunto, 

situated to the north of Okinawa, were not part of the prewar Okinawa 

Prefecture of Japan. When the Japanese surrender ultimately came, however, the Allied Powers removed Tokyo's administrative authority over 

islands south of 30· north latitude, thus placing the Amami Gunto within 

the American-administered Ryukyus. As was the case with the southern 

Ryukyus, Tenth Army initially was unable to spare civil affairs personnel 

for Amami Oshima. That island was administered from Tokyo by Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as part of the Kagoshima Prefecture until 13 March 1946 when a military government 

team from Okinawa finally assumed responsibility." Once all twelve districts on Okinawa (later expanded to sixteen) began functioning on I 

September 1945, they superseded the military government field detachments, which were then abolished. 

In mid-September, while the Okinawan Advisory Council was 

undergoing orientation, a comprehensive plan for a civilian administration emerged at headquarters. Prepared by the Labor Officer, Lt. John 

T. Caldwell, USNR, the plan outlined not only political rehabilitation, 

but also detailed how the stability of a civilian administration would 

contribute to the economic revival of Okinawa.'· Caldwell's memorandum was well received at military government headquarters-except by 

Commander Murdock, whose personality and ambitions clashed with 

Caldwell's. Colonel Murray was not entirely convinced that his headquarters had the necessary authority to implement Caldwell's far-reaching 

proposals. Consequently, Murray sought guidance from the Commanding 

General, Army Service Command 1. 41 Before General Wallace could respond to Colonel Murray's inquiry, the Navy assumed sole official responsibility for military government on Okinawa (2 1 September 1945). 

Consequently, the Deputy Commander for Military Government's request was forwarded by Army Service Command I to the Commandant, 

Naval Operating Base, Okinawa. The resultant delay in implementation 

meant not on ly that Okinawa's political and economic rehabilitation was 

delayed, but also that political restructuring would begin under Navy 

rather than Army direction." 

Whatever organizational details might ultimately emerge, headquarters had made a fundamental decision to expand the civilian administration. On 19 September, just two days before the Navy assumed military 

J'IO'Flahcrty MS, chapter IV; Richard, Naval Administration- Pacific Islands. Vol. II, p. 39. 

~oA copy of Caldwell's tcn-page memo of 12 Sep 45, "A Political and Economic Plan for the 

Rehabilitation of Okinawa" is among the Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

'I nd Command was redesignated Army Service Command I on 31 luI 1945. 

HWatkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 107 

government responsibility for Okinawa, Colonel Murray concluded that 

military government " has progressed to a point where significant improvements require . . . the establishment of a native administration 

•• • • "43 Although Colonel Murray was prepared to move toward such a 

civil Okinawan administration, he continued to make a clear distinction 

between "administering" and "governing." 

The Navy accepted responsibility at a time when many experienced 

reserve officers were being demobili zed and returned to the United States. 

Military government headquarters was no exception. Commander Murdock completed his tour of duty and departed from Okinawa in October 

1945. Lt. Comdr. Francis E. Street succeeded him as director of the 

Ci vilian Affairs Department. There followed a two-month hiatus in longrange planning until Street was demobilized and replaced by Lieutenant 

Caldwell. Caldwell was then in a position to implement his blueprint for 

political and economic rehabilitation. Although he was eligible for detachment and return to the United States, he agreed to remain on Okinawa provided (1) that military government organization move toward 

centralization, and (2) that military government transfer as quickly as 

possible to Okinawans the responsibility for their own affairs. The original 

architect of Okinawa's political rehabilitation was not the principal civil 

affairs officer on the island, therefore, but a reserve Navy lieutenant." 

Caldwell's recommendations stemmed from his stated assumption 

that the islanders " .. . have demonstrated convincingly that they possess 

sufficient indigenous leadership to manage their own affairs in much 

larger degree than is allowed them at present."" He proposed that the 

Deputy Commander for Military Government appoint an Okinawan civil 

governor, to be vested with all powers formerly held by the prewar governor, except those expressly suspended because of military necessity. The 

governor would in turn appoint, subject to military government confirmation, a central administration, which would gradually replace the existing Advisory Council-although Caldwell assumed that many council 

members would become department heads under the new administration. 

Once the new central administration was functioning, local governmental 

organization should then be established along prewar lines, thus setting 

the stage for the withdrawal of all military government personnel from 

the districts. Thereafter, military government policies would be enforced 

HMemo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to CO, ASCOM I, 19 Sep 45, sub: Administrati ve 

and Economic Measures for Okinawa- Proposals for, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

~~Wa tkin s, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

·'Caldwcll's proposal, "A Political and Economic Plan ," is quoted from Watkins, Rehabilitation: 

Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG. 200 
108 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

through the governor and his administration. Caldwell believed that his 

proposals could be enacted within a period of less than three months. 

For the remainder of the Navy stewardship the devolution of political 

functions to the islanders proceeded steadily, if unevenly. Demobilization 

continued to drain away commanders and lieutenant commanders who 

were graduates of the Navy civil affairs schools, thus leaving military 

government increasingly in the hands of untrained replacement ensigns. 4

• 

Moreover, Caldwell's program encountered opposition from officials at 

both headquarters and district levels. Some officers who, according to 

one observer, were jealous of their powers, opposed any shifting of administrative functions to the Okinawans 4 7 Their resistance was effectively squelched, however, in December 1945 when Admiral Spruance 

announced to military government units throughout the Pacific Ocean 

Area a civil affairs policy to be in effect until the establishment of a 

permanent civil government. Most importantly, Spruance specifically directed "the early establishment of self-governing communities."" Lieutenant Caldwell recognized that a greater degree of administrative 

autonomy for the islanders was possible only if the military government 

district functions decreased. Indeed, he looked forward to the time, early 

in 1946, when it would be possible to abolish the district structure and 

to return all military government officers to headquarters. 

In late September 1945 headquarters organized and conducted elections for councilmen and district mayors in the sixteen military government districts. All Ryukyuans- including women for the first timetwenty-five years of age or over were eligible to vote. On 2 January 1946 

the Okinawan Department of Education, the first Okinawan civil department, was created. It emerged from one of the standing committees 

of the Okinawan Advisory Council, as did the other twelve departments 

developed by military government during the first four months of 1946. 

These months were a landmark time for Okinawan political evolution. 

Effective 1 April military government headquarters dissolved its local 

districts and on the following day implemented the mura-based administration, replacing not only all civil affairs district personnel, but also 

the shi and cho basis for local administration. Reflecting a trend toward 

greater centralization of civil affairs, the General Affairs Department 

At the end of January 1946 there were only nineteen MG officers on Okinawa above the rank 

of ensign, Watkins, personal diary; 24 Jan 46 . 

. HWatkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Paper, RG 200 . 

• 8Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPOA to Distribution List, Serial 52855, 12 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. 

Govern., Pacific Ocean Area, File AI 7- IO/A1-l(IO). RG 38. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 109 

KOSHIN SHIKIYA. first appointed chiji oj Okinawa (/946). 

served to oversee the new mura administration; the shi and cho system 

had been directed on the district level" 

The capstone of Caldwell's program for progressive self-government 

was to be the appointment of a civilian governor, or chiji. In mid-April 

headquarters personnel summoned the Okinawan Advisory Council and 

the recently-elected mayors to serve as a nominating committee. These 

men were asked to propose the names of three individuals who were 

qualified to serve as chiji of Okinawa Gunto. Colonel Murray emphasized 

the advisory nature of their recommendations; he would not be bound 

by their selections. The Deputy Commander for Military Government 

was pleased with the committee's first choice, Koshin Shikiya, who was 

duly appointed chiji on 24 April. Kowa Matayoshi was selected as fuku 

chiji (vice governor). At the same time Colonel Murray introduced the 

Central Okinawan Administration to be headed by the chiji. Within the 

administration were executive departments, a court system, city, town, 

HQ USN MG, Directive No. 130, 18 Mar 46, sub: Dissolution of MG Districts on Okinawa, 

memo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern . to Distribution "A," 2 Apr 46, sub: Mura Adminis· 

Iration, and HQ USN MG, Directive No. 58, 4 Dec 45, sub: Township (mura) AdmmlstrationOrganization of, Watkins Papers, RG 200. --
110 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

DKINAWA 

:<I'~w~ff~ 

OKINAWA ADVISORY ASSEMBLV, wilh Chiji Shikiya and Ll. Comdr. James 

T. Walkins I V. 

and village administrations, and an advisory body to replace the Okinawan Advisory Council. The chiji was directly accountable to the Deputy 

Commander for Military Government for the administration of all governmental functions within the Okinawa Gunto in accordance with military government policies and directives. The functions previously 

performed by the Okinawan Advisory Council were thus transferred to 

the chiji and his department heads, all of whom had been members of 

the now defunct Advisory Council. 

The final step in the Navy's plan for political recovery was to revive 

the preinvasion Prefectural Assembly. It was reconstituted to serve as an 

advisory body to the chiji. No new election was held for this new Okinawa 

Assembly; most of the members elected to the last Okinawa assembly 

(1942) had survived the war and were permitted to serve again . Military 

government headquarters appointed others to fill any vacancies. The five 

representatives from Miyako and Yaeyama were excluded, since those 

islands were still being administered separately. The reconstituted assem-
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 111 

bly consisted of twenty-five members. so It convened in Higashionna, 

southeast of Ishikawa near Okinawa's east-central coast, on 23 May. Although the assembly was merely an advisory body, the delegates demonstrated enthusiasm and determination as they and the chiji discussed 

reconstruction plans. Most of the discussion focused on agricultural concerns and on the need to increase farmer productivity." 

With the convening of the Okinawa Assembly, Lieutenant Caldwell's 

plan was implemented successfully, although not as smoothly and logically as it might appear in hindsight." Nevertheless, by 1 July 1946 the 

Ryukyus had a sound foundation for future political and economic development. The Navy civil affairs achievement should not be underestimated. When the Army assumed sole responsibility for military 

government on Okinawa (1 July 1946), the new staff tended to accept 

the existing administrative machinery and political programs." One naval 

military government officer marveled at the "matter-of-course" manner 

in which the Army accepted without question the civil political structure 

that Lieutenant Caldwell and his assistants had begun. 54 

As the evolution of political reforms continued under Army auspices, 

Ryukyuans and military government officers both realized that a centralized civilian government was desirable, but would be difficult to 

achieve because of economic disparity among the islands. In the late 1940s 

the Ryukyus were divided geographically and politically into four provisional governments: one in the Northern Ryukyus, one in Okinawa 

Gunto, and two in the Southern Ryukyus (Miyako Gunto and Yaeyama 

Gunto). In the Northern Ryukyus, the provisional government was largely 

self-supporting in that their economy enabled revenues to nearly cover 

the cost of government. In the Southern Ryukyus, where war damage was 

minimal, the provisional governments were entirely self-supporting. In 

Okinawa Gunto, where virtually all revenue-producing facilities were destroyed, only a small fraction of government's costs was met locally." 

Clearly, it would be necessary for the occupation forces to repair the war 

damage to public buildings, schools, roads, etc., and ameliorate the fiscal 

XlHQ USN MG Directive No. 156,22 Apr 46. sub: Central Okinawan Administration; Creation 

of, Watkins Papers, RG 200; rpt, MG Government and Legal Div.-Okinawa MG Team, undated, 

sub: Popular Election in Okinawa Gunlc, September 1950 [sic], Freimuth Papers. 

S! Working note, The First Session of Okinawa Assembly was held, 10 Jun 46, Watkins Papers, 

RG 200. 

HWatkins, Rehabilitation: Political, MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200; interview, Freimuth, with the 

author,5 Dec 81. 

SJ lnterview. Freimuth with the author. 29 Oct 80. 

~Lt Comdr James Watkins, working note, undated, Watkins Papers. RG 200. 

sSCINC USAFPAC, Summation No.4. US Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the 

Month of February 1947, Freimuth Papers. 
112 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

ELECTION CAMPAIGNING 

disparities among the provisional governments before further steps toward further centralization could be undertaken. 

Once the appointed Central Okinawan Administration (redesignated 

the Okinawan Civilian Administration in December 1946) began to function, the next logical step toward greater civilian self-administration was 

to move beyond appointed officials to duly-elected assemblymen. A general election for local officials had been held throughout the Northern 

Ryukyus in July 1946; at that time no political parties were evident in 

that area. However, the political picture was far more complex on Okinawa, and the wartime impact on its institutions had been greater. Consequently, preparations for elections were slower and more deliberate, 

although there was no opposition to elections from any quarter. In May 

1947 a representative from General MacArthur's Local Government Division visited Okinawa to assist representatives of the chiji and the local 

military government General Affairs Department in restructuring the 

political process.'· As a result of this visit and of subsequent meetings, 

56CINC USAFPAC, Summation No.7, US Army Mil. Govern. Acti viti es in the Ryukyus for the 

Month of May 1947, Fre imuth Papers. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION I 13 

including two sessions with the Okinawa Assembly, military government 

and civilian officials devised new laws for the election of mayors and 

assemblymen. Recognizing the need to establish a procedure familiar to 

the people while preserving strict democratic principles, the drafting officials studied prewar and postwar Japanese law as well as American law. 

The resultant electoral law for the Ryukyus effectively combined these 

three sources." Military Government Directive No.4 of 12 January 1948 

outlined the electoral law. This directive set 1 February 1948 as the date 

for electing mayors, and 8 February as the date for selecting assemblymen. 

Elections in the Southern Ryukyus were slated for March. 

In anticipation of the forthcoming popular elections, a number of 

Ryukyuan political parties emerged during 1947 to represent various interest groups and ideologies. Five parties were formed on Okinawa: the 

Okinawa People's Party (a leftist, labor party), the Okinawa Democratic 

Union (conservative), the Ryukyus Socialist Party, the Okinawa Socialist 

Party (which soon merged with the Ryukyus Socialist Party to become 

the Socialist Party), and the Youth Democratic League. No parties 

emerged in the Northern Ryukyus, but two arose in Miyako in the Southern Ryukyus: the Young Men's Party (or, the Youth's Party), and the 

Social Party- which hoped to shape the Ryukyus' future within the context of continued American administration. Nevertheless, the majority 

of the candidates for mayor and assemblyman ran as independents. 

The people of Okinawa Gunto responded positively to this opportunity to vote. Eighty-eight percent of the eligible men and eighty-one 

percent of the eligible women voted. The elections were orderly, and no 

unusual incidents intervened. Twenty-eight cities, towns, and villages held 

elections for assemblymen; twenty-seven had just enough eligible candidates to fill the vacancies without opposition. In twenty-one mura there 

were no mayoral elections, the incumbents were unopposed. All those 

elected were to serve until the next general election in the gun to, tentatively set for September 1950. Of the fifty-five vacancies for mayor, party 

members filled only six; three affiliated with the Okinawa People's Party, 

and three with the Okinawa Democratic Union. Of the 1, 192 vacancies 

for assemblymen, party members filled only four. Four women were 

elected to assemblies, but none to the office of mayor. 

Military government observers noted two significant features of the 

1948 elections: the orderliness with which they were carried out, and the 

enthusiasm of the newly-enfranchised women." These elections, and the 

)7Rpt, Government and Legal Div.- Okinawa MG Team, "Popular Elections in Okinawa Gunlo 

September 1950," Freimuth Papers. 

58 Ibid.; CINe USAFPAC, Summation No. 16. US Army Mil. Govern. Activiti es in the RyukYU5 

for the Month of February 1948, RG 407. 
114 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

OKINAWAN WOMAN VOTING 

subsequent ones in Southern Ryukyus (March) and Northern Ryukyus 

(June) gave the Army civil affairs officers reason for hope that the Ryukyuan population could indeed effectively administer their own affairs 

within a framework of general American supervision. 

Although political parties played a very minor role in the 1948 elections, a number of individual politicians emerged at that time as influential figures. In March 1948 five of these politicians-Genwa Nakasone, 

Ibi Nakamoto, Kamejiro Senaga, Kanjin Higaonha, and Seiko isei, the 

last three with leftist leanings-attempted to embarass the American authorities and the civilian administration they had created by persuading 

the Okinawa Assembly to resign en masse. The assembly had met only 

sporadically during 1947, and its members concluded that they were being 

ignored since the chiji and military government officers made all the 

decisions affecting life on Okinawa. To a great extent, of course, their 

perception was correct: headquarters still differentiated between native 

administration and self-government. Nevertheless, the decision to hold 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 11 5 

free elections and the popular response to that decision inspired some of 

Okinawa's more ambitious politicians. Many of these individuals realized-even at this early stage in the occupation- that needling the American administration could have its political rewards. 

The deputy Commander for Military Government, Brig. Gen. Frederic L. Hayden, was willing to consider individual resignations, but refused on principle to accept the collective resignation of the Okinawa 

Assembly. After some discussion, the assembly members decided not to 

resign. Thereafter, the assembly met on a monthly basis until October 

1949 when Hayden abolished it to make way for the Provisional Government Assembly." Senaga Kamejiro and his allies failed in their initial 

attempt to disrupt the rehabilitation of ci vilian government. This missed 

opportunity, however, marked the beginning rather than the end of political contention between the military government administration and a 

growing number of vocal Okinawan political figures. 

The emergence of factions critical of the American administration 

inspired military government officers to begin carefully monitoring political developments. Beginning in late 1948 Ryukyus Command's weekly 

intelligence analysis to CINCFE Intelligence (G-2) concentrated on reporting any possible leftist activity. This newly awakened concern about 

potential subversives marked the beginning of a tendency by the command headquarters to characterize those Okinawans most critical of the 

American administration as communists60 

Before the elections for mayors and assemblymen in the Okinawa 

Gunto (February 1948) and the Southern Ryukyus (March 1948), civil 

affairs officers had contented themselves with the modicum of municipal 

and provincial political progress already achieved since 1945. During the 

popular elections of 1948, however, the emergence of leftist political 

groups began to shake whatever complacency existed at military government headquarters concerning political progress. During 1949 and 1950 

members of the Okinawa People's Party and the Democratic Alliance 

Party became more outspoken in their attacks on the American administration. These politicians found instances of disenchantment among the 

!9The title of this new political form ation is signi ficant. By late 1949 the American command 

was thinking about a possible future change from a local "administration" to a more autonomous 

native "government." By describing the new assembly as "provisional," howeve r, military government signal ed to all concerned that although the new body was a step toward that goal, its existence 

was only temporary; further political evolution would follow. 

"'M,gs, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 20948 AlB, 2 Nov 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. 

E20965, AIMG- G, 3 Nov. 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 20981 AlB, 9 Nov 48, CG RYCOM 

to CINCFE, Nr. E 21050 AlB, 28 Nov 48, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 2 1083 AlB, 5 Jan 49, CINCFE to CG RYCOM, 25 Apr 49, and CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. Y 40291 , 24 Jun 49, in 

Files: RYCOM November- December 1948, RYCOM January-February 1949, RYCOM MarchApril 1949, and RYCOM May-June 1949, RG 9, MaCArthur Archives. 
116 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Ryukyuans, and they addressed these frustrations. In July 1949 a concerned State Department official reported that "all is not well among the 

native population." Far Eastern intelligence sources reported anti-American sentiment on the rise in the northern Ryukyus. The political situation 

had deteriorated to the point where officials of the provisional government in Amami Oshima were preparing to submit their resignations to 

the military government6 ' 

Faced with the next round of elections scheduled for the autumn of 

1950, members of the Okinawan Civil Administration began holding 

meetings throughout that gunto to inform the voting population and to 

correct perceived distortions in what the leftist politicians were saying.·2 

Although these nascent political parties were small and still of minor 

influence, about a half-dozen leftist politicians were becoming popular. 

The American authorities were not inclined to underestimate their potential to stir up trouble for the military regime. 

Civil affairs officers prepared for the 1950 elections with a program 

of political education including the use of press and radio. They advised 

the islanders of their rights and responsibilities as voters and made certain 

that the electorate had every opportunity to become familiar with the 

individual candidates. They also began the mundane tasks of drafting 

election procedures, establishing expanded governmental structures, 

mapping districts, and setting election dates. 

On 20 January 1950 military government took a concrete step toward 

a centralized native administration by establishing the Interim Ryukyus 

Advisory Council. The gunto governors and the four gunto assemblies 

chose, with the approval of military government headquarters, the eleven 

members of the council- one member for each 100,000 population. This 

advisory body was the first instance of legislators collaborating on an 

archipelago-wide basis in the postwar Ryukyus. The Deputy Commander 

for Military Government, Brig. Gen. Harry R. Sherman, dictated which 

items were presented to the council for its advice. He selected agenda 

items for their bearing on the Ryukyus as a whole, rather than on any 

single gunt06 3 

In September 1950, elections were held on Okinawa, Miyako, and 

Yaeyama for gunto assemblymen and governors. Before the war, males 

twenty-five years of age and older could vote for their prefectural assem61Ltr, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, DOS, to Deputy Asst. Sec. Army, 29 lui 49, FRUS 

1949. Vol. VII The Far East lIml Australia. part 2, p. 815. 

61C INC USAFPAC, Summation No. 28, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activiti es in the Ryukyus for 

the Month of February 1949, Summation No. 31 (May 1949), and Summation No. 32 (June J 949), 

RG 407. 

6lUSCAR, ell'if Affairs Actillities in rhe Ryukyus lsla"dsjor the Period Ending 31 December 1952, 

Vol. I, No. I , pp. 11 7- 118. Copy in CMH Library. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 117 

blymen, but never before had the Ryukyuans been permitted to elect 

their prefectural leaders." As was the case in 1948, voter turnout was 

heavy. Tatsuo Taira was the first postwar elected governor of Okinawa 

Gunto. He would preside over the Okinawa Gunto Government, which 

replaced the former Okinawan Civilian Administration. It is important 

to bear in mind the semantic exercise that often accompanied the evolution of these early postwar political forms. In the Okinawa Gunto in 

1950, for example, the change in terminology from an "administration" 

to a "government" was not accidental, but was intended to convey to the 

civil population a momentum toward a greater degree of self-government. 

Once elected, the four gunto governors and assemblies functioned according to military government direction.·' Generally speaking, these area 

governments had broad authority and considerable latitude in their activities, so long as their operations remained consistent with military 

government directi ves and ordinances. The deliberations of the gunto 

assemblies appeared to hold promise for the furthering of democratic 

government in the Ryukyus. Still, the assemblymen, however distinguished in local society, were not without their limitations. Some members in particular lacked individual initiative. Consequently, it was often 

difficult to maintain a clear separation of the executive and legislative 

powers, as the assemblies frequently became little more than a stamp of 

approval for the gunto governor.·· 

By 1950, five years after the invasion of Okinawa, military government 

officers had made significant progress toward the political rehabilitation 

of all the Ryukyu Islands. They succeeded in creating a democratic political edifice, yet one that was consistent with Okinawan prewar experiences. Political life was restored on the municipal and provincial levels, 

and a trend toward creating a centralized native administration was begun. On 5 December 1950 General MacArthur left no doubt in Maj. Gen. 

Robert B. McClure's mind that this future step was to be a priority objective for the Ryukyu Command. MacArthur ordered that "At the earliest practicable date provision will be made for the establishment of a 

central government."·7 

I> ~MG Special Proclamation No. 37, 30 Jun 50, sub: Election of Governors and Assemblymen 

forthe Gunto Governments, and MG Ordinance No. 17, 7 Ju150, sub: Election Law for Assemblymen 

and Mayors of Cities, Towns, and Villages, Revised, Freimuth Papers. 

6)MG Ordinance No. 22, 4 Aug 50, sub: The Law Concerning the Organization of the Gunto 

Governments, Freimuth Papers. 

66USCAR. Civil Affairs Activities il/lhe Ryukyu Islallds /or the Period Eliding 31 December 1952, 

Vol. I, No. I, p. 120. Copy in CM H Library. 

b7Maj Oen McClure became military governor of the Ryukyu Islands on 27 Jul 50, but with the 

establishment of USCAR, he became the deputy governor. Brig Gen Harry R. Sherman assumed 

that title on 6 December in an interim capacity. and on 9 December Maj Gen Robert S. Beightler 

became deputy governor. 
118 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Political forms in the postwar Ryukyus evolved as democratic institutions, yet military government officers kept in mind Okinawa's past 

political experiences. In much the same way postwar jurisprudence developed as a curious amalgam of American military and civilian law, 

Japanese statutes, and Okinawan law and tradition. 

The battle for Okinawa had thoroughly dislocated the island's legal 

system. Admiral Nimitz's first proclamation as Military Governor retained the extant Japanese statutes, but terminated the island's court 

system." Military government headquarters drew upon the training and 

skills of the civil affairs officers within the Public Safety and Legal Departments to establish both a local judiciary and a democratic police 

constabulary. Because of the shortage of indigenous judges, headquarters 

personnel reconstituted only fot.:r courts, called Local, or Municipal, 

Courts, by early 194669 These courts began to enforce the existing Japanese laws, while the civil affairs officers planned military government 

courts to enforce its directives and proclamations. Since the civili ans 

quite properly enjoyed a reputation as law-abiding people, the number 

of criminal incidents within Okinawan society remained small, a remarkable fact considering the island's wretched condition in the summer 

and autumn of 1945. Soon after the American invasion, however, a considerable number of petty larcenies involving clothing and food occurred 

at Army supply installations. Since thefts of Army property constituted 

offenses against the American military government, headquarters established courts to cope with the civilian offenders.'o 

Military government headquarters created three types of courts to 

deal with various degrees of offenses. The lowest level was the Summary 

Provost Courts, which tried misdemeanors (petty larceny, curfew and 

traffic violations, blackmarketeering, and prostitution cases involving 

military personnel) and meted out sentences up to one year. During the 

years 1945-1947 these courts averaged more than two hundred cases each 

month . An investigator from military government's Public Safety Department personally handled each case and prepared the charge sheets. 

Lawyers for the Summary Provost Courts came from mi litary government's Legal Department. The second tier of the judiciary was the Superior Provost Court, which tried felony cases and imposed sentences 

from one to ten yea rs. The third and highest court was the Military 

" Navy MG Proclamation No. I, undated, Freimuth Papers. The o riginal tcn so~ca ll ed "Nimitz 

Proclamations" were undated. MG officers dated each as it was posted in each locale as the Ame rican 

fo rces advanced across Okinawa. 

MG Proclamation No.5, 25 Feb 46, clTective I Mar 46, Freimuth Papers. 

7° I.H . Rubenstein, "Magistrate Courts in Okinawa: A Contribution to Justice in the Ryukyus," 

Americall Bar Association JOllmal36, No. 12 (Dec 50): 10 11. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REHABILITATION 119 

Commission, which tried only the most serious felonies and which could 

impose sentences from ten years up to the death penalty. 

Initially, the military government courts dealt with all cases involving 

Okinawans who committed criminal offenses against American military 

or civil personnel and property, no matter now minor the infraction." If 

the long-range objective of creating a self-sufficient, independent Ryukyuan court system was to be realized, the islanders had to become responsible for adjudicating most of the criminal cases. The existing Local 

Courts were too limited in scope and too few in number to insure prompt 

trials for all those who might be accused of petty violations. By 1947 civil 

affairs officers had concluded that a more comprehensive native court 

system must be established by the American administration. 

The acting director of military government's Legal Department, I.H. 

Rubenstein, conducted a study of pertinent Japanese statutes and held 

discussions with the director of Public Safety and with representatives 

of the Okinawan Civilian Administration. The result of these efforts was 

a proclamation establishing a new arrangement of Magistrate Courts with 

jurisdiction over all Okinawans and empowered to impose sentences not 

exceeding six months or a fine of ¥ 1,000, or both.72 These courts, staffed 

by magistrates recommended by the Okinawan Civilian Administration's 

Department of Justice, were to try all misdemeanor cases on Okinawa, 

all petty violations of military government directives, and all violations 

of the Police Offense Regulations as set forth in the 1908 Japanese Home 

Department Ordinance No. 16. Only indigenous Japanese and Okinawans 

fell under the jurisdiction of these courts; citizens of the United States 

and its allies were specifically excluded by the military government 

proclamation. 

The original Magistrate Courts, located in the largest towns of Okinawa's eleven police districts, began proceedings on 25 August 1947. In 

September military government headquarters expanded the program, appointing another fi ve magistrates for the Southern Ryukyus. Very soon 

these courts were averaging over 500 misdemeanor cases and collecting 

¥45,000 in fines each month. Over 90 percent of those accused of petty 

crimes were tried within twenty-four hours of arrest, and more than 15 

percent were acquitted. The efficient and expeditious manner in which 

the island magistrates carried out their responsibilities enabled the Legal 

Department and Public Safety Department to devote more time to the 

more serious offenses. The average case load of the Summary Provost 

7lMemo, Capt Richard E. Haughton, CAe , to Histori cal Subsect ion, ACofS, G-2, RYCOM, 8 

Mar 47, sub: Rpt. of Activities of Military Govern. Ryukyus, during January 1947, File: 98BC6-0.2 

RYCOM, RG 407. 

HMO Special Proclamation No. 19, effective 18 Ju147, sub: Magistrate Courts, Freimuth Papers. 
120 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

EXECUTIVE BUILDING. GOVERNMENT OF THE RVUKYU ISLANDS (/953 

photograph). 

Courts fell from two hundred a month to only twenty-five. Encouraged 

by the success of the magistrate court system, civil affairs officers turned 

to the problem of higher courts. In July 1950 headquarters expanded the 

judicial system by establishing a series of circuit courts and a court of 

appeals. It also formed a bar for the Ryukyuan legal profession and set 

up the Ryukyuan Bar Association, thereby completing the evolution of 

the judicial structure under military government auspices.'3 

Although a few military government pioneers remained on Okinawa 

after 1 950-some in a civilian capacity-the great majority of those who 

began Okinawa's political and judicial rehabilitation were gone before 

the Government of the Ryukyu Islands came into being. They had departed from the islands, but their legacy remained. For the most part 

they left a sound, yet flexible foundation, serving both the civil administrators and the Okinawan population reasonably well until the American 

return of administrative authority to Japan in 1972. 

nUSCAR, Civil AJlairs i" the RYlIkyu Islands/or the Period E"ding 31 December 1952. Vol. I, No. 

1, pp. 128-29. copy in CMH Library. The fo rmation or the circuit courts and the court or appeals 

was announced in MG Special Proclamation No. 38, 13 Jul 50. 
CHAPTER V 

Economic Recovery and 

Rehabilitation 

The evolution of postwar political forms in the Ryukyu Islands was 

closely linked to progress in rehabilitating the economy. Military government's economic mission was initially a very narrowly defined one: to 

prevent disease and unrest detrimental to military operations, Tenth 

Army would make food and supplies available for civilian use. Admiral 

Nimitz had directed military government to exploit available local resources and productivity to the fullest in order to minimize the importation of civilian supplies.' This directive assumed that production 

capabilities would survive the invasion. While this assumption was largely 

true for the northern and southern Ryukyu Islands, it was not true for 

Okinawa with its extensive destruction. 

In December 1945, the Pacific commander liberalized the economic 

policy for the Ryukyus. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance directed the military government to provide for the repair and restoration of damaged 

properties and facilities and to devise a plan for the economic development of the Ryukyus. 2 Early in 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized 

that providing minimal food, clothing, shelter, and medical care was insufficient to discharge the American long-term responsibility to the Ryukyuans. Moreover, such a limited policy was potentially detrimental to 

extended American strategic interests in the region. Consequently, the 

Joint Chiefs endorsed the concept of economic revitalization for the islands and established a goal in March 1946-military commanders were 

'CINCPAC Directive of I Mar 45, Freimuth Papers; Lawrence/Watkins, Rehabilitation: Eco~ 

nomic, unpublished MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. Unless otherwise noted the following four subsections dealing with the restoration of agriculture, industry, fishing, and fiscal planning are based 

on these documents. 

zLtr. CINCPAC·CINCPOA to Distribution, Serial 52855, 12 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval Mil. 

Govern" POA, RG 38; USN Mil. Govern. Okinawa, Memo No. 154, 21 Dec 45, sub: U.S. Naval 

Mil. Govern., PDA, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
122 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

to restore a standard ofliving to the occupied islands equal to the standard 

existing before the war) 

Rehabilitation would not be an easy task. Okinawa's natural resources 

were meager at best, and most means of production-including agricultural land- had been devastated by the fighting or the immediate postinvasion base development. Little remained besides the people themselves, who were eager to return to some sort of constructive activity that 

would help rebuild their shattered society. The salvaging of crops, rebuilding of homes, and construction of roads and dams all had to be 

accomplished. The many competing demands for available labor, however, prompted civil affairs officers to establish and enforce labor regulations, registering and assigning laborers according to posted priorities. 

Because of the relative scarcity of able-bodied men, women and the elderly played a major role in the revival of civilian labor.' 

Restoration of Agriculture 

Faced with a largely agrarian economy, military government's first 

economic goal was the maximum utilization of land resources to promote 

self-sufficiency in food production. Prior to the American invasion, production had been carefully organized by an agricultural organization directed largely by the Japanese central government through the prefectural 

authorities. This association, as was the case with all other organizations 

on Okinawa, had disintegrated during the American invasion. Consequently, agricultural activities initially became the responsibility of the 

local civil affairs team. Once military government districts were formed, 

the district commanders assumed responsibility, and each district had an 

assigned agricultural officer. 

Military government teams and districts sought to organize agricultural production as soon as possible. This task was easier in northern 

Okinawa where many inhabitants remained on their own land, sometimes 

along with refugees from the south who could assist them with the farming. Most farming on Okinawa during the period 1945-1946 was on a 

communal basis. At military government's direction, area rationing 

boards were established to receive all agricultural products for redistribution on the basis of need. When local governments were organized in 

'Msg, WARX SOS I5 to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC-CINCPOA, 16 Mar 46, CINCPAC Fi les, 

RG 3S. 

·Memos, IsCom MG HQ to eG, IsCom, 10 Jun 45 and 31 Ju145, sub: Hist. of MG Operations 

on Okinawa. 1 May to 31 May 45; MG Circular No. 132, 2 1 Jui 45, sub: Local Industry; memo, 

HQ ASCOM 1 to Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern., 383.7 TOGAP, 20 Sep 45, sub: Placement 

of Native Civilians; HQ ASCOM I, Memo No. 31,29 Aug 45, sub: Procedures for Allocation of 

Civilian Labor. All documents in Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 123 

September 1945, military government appointed Okinawan agricultural 

officials to direct planting, harvesting, and distribution under the supervision of district agricultural officers. Many farmers resented the compulsory redistribution of their crops and tried to evade this requirement. 

Other islanders complicated military government agricultural planning 

by engaging in nocturnal pilfering of crops, primarily sweet potatoes. 

To reduce as quickly as possible the necessity for importing American 

agricultural products, military government headquarters directed in January 1946 that all agricultural activities be placed under the centralized 

control of its Agriculture and Industry Department.' Centralized control 

meant better utilization of available land and tools. In March 1946 headquarters organized an Okinawan Department of Agriculture to integrate 

agricultural activities island-wide. Previously, American agricultural experts had served both as supervisors and operators of agricultural activities. Demobilization necessitated the change to a system where 

Americans supervised, but Okinawans implemented the military government program. Gradually, local agricultural associations emerged as nonprofit cooperatives in each mura. In June 1946 military government headquarters chartered the Central Okinawan Agricultural Association to centralize the distribution of agricultural products· In add ition, the 

association manufactured simple farm machinery, loaned or rented this 

machinery, transported agricultural products, and conducted land reclamation projects on a limited scale. Although membership in the association was voluntary, the benefits were so obvious that most Okinawan 

farmers joined. 

Okinawa's staple crop remained the sweet potato. Both man and beast 

depended upon this hardy plant, which could produce two or three crops 

annually and could be planted almost any time of the year. Under military 

government direction, approximately 35 percent of the available agricultural land was devoted to it. 

Rice, the most important cereal, yielded two crops a year but production met only about 30 percent of Ryukyuan rice needs. The battle 

of Okinawa had destroyed many of the paddies and irrigation systems 

necessary for rice cultivation, and these took time to restore. Population 

shifts in the summer of 1945 further disrupted rice production. In July 

military government headquarters reported to Army Service Command 

I that rice had been planted in the Chinen Peninsula, even though the 

area would almost certainly have to be evacuated before the next harvest. 

SHQ USN Mil. Govern., Okinawa, Directive No. 108, 23 Jan 46, sub: Agriculture-Central 

Control of, RG 260. 

'USN Mil. Govern., Okinawa, Directive No. 10, 3 Jun 46, sub: Central Okinawan Agricultural 

Assn., Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
124 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

SUGAR CANE PRESS, FEBRUARY 1949 

The planting had been encouraged "partly to keep the civilians busy and 

to avert the unrest which would follow an order not to plant.'" As a result 

of the destruction and dislocation, the first rice harvest after the American 

invasion was not gathered until December 1945.' 

Historically, the Ryukyus had failed to produce enough soybeans, 

wheat, or barley. Before the battIe of Okinawa the islanders had imported 

one-half the soybeans and one-quarter of the wheat and barley they consumed. Military government emphasized the planting of soybeans, not 

only because they were a good source of protein and fat-both sadly 

lacking in the Okinawan diet of sweet potatoes-but also because soybeans restored nitrogen to the soil, thus reducing the need to import 

fertilizer. Despite military government's best efforts to stimulate sweet 

potato, rice, and soybean production, the Okinawans simply could not 

produce enough food on the avai lable acreage to become self-sufficient. 

Imports of American foodstuffs remained a necessary burden for the 

island's administrators. 

Potentially, the most important commercial crop on Okinawa was 

lMemo, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to eG, ASCOM I, 31 Aug 45, sub: Hist. of Mil. 

Govern. Operations on Okinawa, J Jul to 31 Jul 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

sRpl, Deputy Commander fo r Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB Okinawa, Serial 314, undated, 

sub: Rpt. of Mil. Gove rn . Activiti es for December 1945, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 

TABLE 2-L1VESTOCK PROOUCT ION 

Livestock 1940 1946 

Cattle 22,000 112 

Horses 25,500 899 

Swine 108,426 1,165 

Goats 106,257 1,647 

1948 

3,542 

2,747 

26,969 

14,838 

125 

sugar cane. During the war the Japanese government had required the 

Ryukyuans to produce sugar to convert into alcohol for wartime use. As 

a result, the islands produced 900 percent more sugar than the native 

diet required. The American military government ordered an immediate 

curtailment of production to a level adequate to meet the population's 

dietary requirements. The remainder of the land used for sugar cane 

cultivation was then devoted to raising green vegetables. Sugar cane 

acreage remained negligible until military government made an effort to 

revitalize Okinawa's sugar cane industry as a commercial venture in 

1951.' 

The livestock reserves on Okinawa were even more meager than the 

sparse supply of crops. A comparison of prewar and postwar livestock 

inventories reveals considerable losses (see Table 2)W These severe reductions in the livestock population adversely affected not only the meat 

and milk supply, but also the availability of sorely-needed fertilizer. Military government agricultural officers recognized the immediate need for 

a breeding program based on the importation of hearty stock. By the end 

of August 1946, 45 Hampshire and Berkshire hogs, 33 cattle, and 1,100 

chickens were imported from the United States. Some of these imported 

animals came through the efforts of private charitable organizations such 

as the Hawaii rengo Okinawa kyusai kai (Association in Hawaii for United 

Assistance to Okinawa) which raised $47,000 to purchase and ship 50 

boars and 500 sows to Okinawa." Within two years, continued imports 

plus a successful breeding effort had led to a dramatically higher livestock 

population. 

Although the number of draft and food-producing animals increased 

'ODCSOPS, Ryukyuan Affairs Div., Directorate of International & Civi l Affairs, Economic Plan 

for the Ryukyu Islands (rev. copy), 5 Feb 52, file 1602- 09, RG 319. 

IORpl, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB Okinawa, and Chief MG 

Officer, Ryukyus, I Ju1 46, sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for the Period from I Apr 45 to Ju1 

46. Watkins Papers, RG 200; HQ RYCOM , Summation No. 23, US Army Mi l. Govern. Activities 

in the Ryukyus for the Month of September 1948, RG 407. 

"Ruth Adaniya, "United Okinawan Association of Hawaii," UchillQncllll: A History ojOkilltll\'ans 

in Hawaii, Ethnic Studies Program (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1981), p. 326. 
126 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

dramatically, military government's agricultural program was very much 

a mixed success in the early postwar era. Ci viI affairs agricultural officers 

studied farming conditions, developed an agricultural plan, established 

experimental farming and animal husbandry stations, and imported 

seeds, fertilizer, and breeding stock." Despite this effort, the Ryukyus 

were still not close to self-sufficiency in food at the end of 1948. The 

reasons for this deficiency, many of which were beyond the control of 

military government officers, included the finite amount of arable land, 

the unsuitability of Okinawan land for American mechanized farm machinery, the ever-growing population, and the frequent typhoons-one 

of which destroyed 15 percent of Okinawa's already limited crops in the 

fall of 1945. 

Another problem arose from within the military government organization itself, specifically, the parochial attitudes of most district commanders during the Navy's period of control. Each commander seemed 

concerned only with his own military government district. If headquarters 

tried to enforce a coordinated agricultural program for the entire island, 

the district commander viewed the effort as an infringement on his autonomy. When headquarters finally perceived this problem, it eliminated 

the district structure, thus centralizing agricultural policy and opening 

the way for Okinawan civilian participation on an island-wide basis. 

The principal hindrance to increased farm output, however, was the 

fact that military government agricultural policy did not harmonize with 

other Army objectives on Okinawa during the postwar period. In keeping 

with its overriding military mission, the Ryukyus Command gave priority 

to transportation, utility construction, and base construction over farming. Land, equipment, and available civilian labor, therefore, were all 

channeled into these efforts. Agriculture-apart from the earliest crop 

salvaging efforts- received a lower priority. Moreover, as additional 

acreage was absorbed for bases, the agricultural picture became ever 

bleaker." Despite these realities, agriculture was so basic to the society 

that military government headquarters was determined to revitalize farming. No American program to reconstruct a viable economy in the Ryukyus during the 1940s could succeed without at least a partial restoration 

of prewar agricultural output. 

Relying largely upon their faith in American technology and in their 

own training, military government officers developed optimistic postwar 

12HQ USN MG Okinawa, "The Agricultural Program for Okinawa," 15 Jan 46, Watkins Papers, 

RG 200. 

uShannon McCune, Geographical Aspects oj Agricultural Challge ill the Ryukyu Islands (Gaines~ 

ville, Fla.: Universit y of Florida Social Sciences Monograph No. 54, 1975), p. 16. Cited herearter as 

McCune, AgriclIJlllral Change in the Ryukyu Islands. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 127 

goals for Okinawan agriculture. In the autumn of 1947 MacArthur's headquarters reported to Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall that: 

At present it is estimated that the accomplishments to date and the fulfillment of future 

requirements will make it possible for the first time in its known history for Okinawa to 

reach 90 to 100 percent self-sufficiency in food within the next five years.14 

The expectations were unrealistic given the actual conditions. The program to restore the livestock population made great strides, but farm 

animals numbered only a fraction of prewar levels. I' The crop situation 

was even worse. By 1949 Ryukyuan farm output was at its lowest ebb. I. Four years after the American invasion the islands were still far from 

self-sufficient in food production, and the population remained under a 

rationing system which clearly would not permit any civilians to become 

obese. Military government headquarters kept a close eye on available 

food reserves, which were stored at the Central Subsistence Warehouse 

in Tengan. Reserves there were accounted for not only in terms of weight, 

but also in available calories. For example, in January 1949 the reserve 

amounted to 18,6 15 metric tons, or some 62 billion calories. I' The average 

ration per person per day was about 2,000 calories. 

In September 1949 Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees 

arranged for agricultural economist Raymond E. Vickery to visit the Ryukyus on an inspection mission. Accompanying Vickery were two additional agricultural economists, an agricultural engineer (soil conservation) 

from the Department of Agriculture, a nutritionist from Voorhees' office 

at the Department of the Army, and an agronomist from the University 

of California. Their report was extremely critical. They noted that Okinawa was in a " particularly deplorable state" agriculturally, with approximately one-fifth of its arable land being used for military purposes. 

Charging that the services had used farm land " arbitrarily" and with no 

regard for its economic value, they concluded that postwar agricultural 

reconstruction had been extremely slow, in part because it had been hampered by a lack of adequate policies. I' Although certain of their conclusions affected areas other than farming, the Vickery group's focus always 

remained on food production. To redeem the agricultural potential of the 

archipelago, the group made nine specific administrative recommenda14GHQ SCAP, Politi cal, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [sic] Islands for the Secretary 

of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 10, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Report s, Japan and Ryukyus, 

RG 5, MaCArthur Archi ves. 

UAgricultural Mission to the R yukyus, Agricultural and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus, 

A Report, November 1949, p. I, Freimuth Papers. He reafte r c ited as Vickery Report. 

16McCune, Agricllllllral Change ill the RYllkyu islands, p. 16. 

IlHQ RYCOM MG, Summation No. 27, US Army Mil. Govern. Activiti es in the Ryukyus for 

the Month of January 1949, RG 407. 

,aYickery Report, p. I, Freimuth Papers. 
128 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

tions to the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. Josef 

R. Sheetz: 

- form an indigenous central government, and reduce the autonomous power of the local civilian governments; 

- reorganize military government to provide counterparts for each 

department of the native government, including a competent civil 

administration; 

- re-value the Ryukyuan yen and establish trade channels with Japan 

and other nations; 

- increase land ownership on Okinawa and provide safeguards to 

prevent eviction and excessive rent; 

- modify the "one-mile limit" barring native construction near American billets; 19 

-arrange for the organized migration of islanders, on a volunteer 

basis, to areas outside the Ryukyus; 

- establish a reconstruction finance corporation; 

-establish a farm credit administration; 

-revise the food shipment pattern among the islands and establish 

a new basic ration to replace the 1945 " tentative ration" still in 

effect. 

These recommendations found a sympathetic audience at military 

government headquarters, but their implementation proved to be a slow 

and painful process. Some of the delay could be blamed on the fact that 

several of the proposals transcended the powers of the local civil affairs 

authorities. Despite the Vickery team's thorough research and convincing 

arguments, the Army gave relatively low priority to implementing its 

recommendations. Its proposals fell victim to bureaucratic inertia and 

came to fruition only after considerable delays. When the Ryukyus Command established the United States Civil Administration for the islands 

in the months following the Vickery Report, it included provisions for 

counterpart departments in a centralized indigenous government. But the 

Government of the Ryukyu Islands did not materialize until 1952. 

In other areas, however, military government officials introduced the 

necessary reforms more quickly. The first step toward a native central 

government came with the creation of the Ryukyuan Food and Agricultural Organization in December 1949. 20 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 

I<JFor a discussion of the "one-mile limit" and the problems it enge ndered, see Chapter VI. 

2°MG Directive No. 26, 19Dec 49, sub: Formation of Ryukyuan Food and Agriculture Organ ization, RG 260; USCAR. Civil Affairs AC/j"iries ill the RYlIkyu Islands jor the Period Ending 31 

December 1952, Vol. I, No.1 , p. 99, copy in CMH library. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 129 

first step toward archipelago-wide political cohesion focused on agricultural issues. This organization, which included an Agricultural Administration Bureau and an Agricu ltura l Improvement Bureau, began 

operations on I April 1950. That same month military government headquarters also established the Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund to 

provide loans for a variety of enterprises, including agricultural ventures. 

In addition to its more complicated administrative recommendations, 

the Vickery Report put forward twelve technical recommendations concerning agricultural development. The report urged, among other things, 

that irrigation and drainage projects be undertaken and that much more 

fertilizer be introduced into the island's farming. Most of the technical 

recommendations could be quickly implemented if the necessary funding 

could be found . In most instances, it was. Money was found, for example, 

to foster water resources management. Because Okinawa is totally bereft 

of large rivers and lakes from which to draw water, all irrigation must 

begin with man-made reservoirs, dams, and canals. In the wake of the 

Vickery Report, military government began a series of seventeen land 

development/water resources projects. By the end of 1952 these efforts 

resulted in a 5 percent increase in the area of paddy land for producing 

irrigated rice. 

Increasing production on the finite acres of arable farmland, however, 

meant getting more yield per available acre through the use of fertilizers. 

Okinawa's capacity to produce natural fertilizer had been seriously reduced, primarily because of the loss of so many farm animals during the 

battle for the island. Some potash could be obtained from ashes, but the 

burning of grassy areas to obtain the necessary ash reduced the waterholding capacity of the land, thus resulting in a net loss in farming efficiency-despite the potash produced. Another natural source of fertilizer was the ready supply of "night soil" from the people themselves. 

Initially, military government officers discouraged the use of this traditional fertilizer source, but they soon came to realize that its employment, 

whatever the hazards, would have to be tolerated if many small family 

plots were to be productive at all. " Given the inadequacy of local sources, 

considerable amounts of chemical fertil izer had to be imported. Headquarters, Far East Command, recognized this need and estimated that 

$6, 11 3,600 would be needed for fertilizer over the three fiscal years beginning in 1950." 

21GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [sic) Islands for the Secretary 

of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 10, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and RyukYU5, 

RG 5, MacArthur Archives. 

HFECOM, Estimates for Economic Rehabilitation ofthc Ryukyus Fiscal Years 1950- 1953, 1949, 

p. 15. TAGO Administrative Services Div., Operations Branch, Occupied Area Reports 1945-1954, 

File: Rehabilitation RyukYU5, 1949- 1953, RG 407. 
130 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

HULLING RICE, FEBRUARY 1949 

These efforts to enhance agricultural production met with a modicum 

of success. During 1950, the last year of the military government regime, 

the Ryukyu Islands produced 598,900 metric tons of food crops: " 

Sweet potatoes 510,000 MIT 

Rice 28,500 MIT 

Green vegetables 26,400 MIT 

Black (cane) sugar 11 ,500 MIT 

White potatoes 10,000 MIT 

Small grains 5,000 MIT 

Soybeans 4,500 MIT 

Other legumes 2,000 MIT 

Millet 1,000 MIT 

" M' g. Deputy Gov. Ry. Civil Admin. RYCOM to DEPTAR (SAOOA FAOA) Wash., Nr. R 03712, 

4 Apr 5 1, File: Messages RYCOM April 1951 , RG 9, MaCArthur Archives. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 131 

These were not inconsequential figures, but neither were they of such 

magnitude that the Ryukyus Command could anchor an economic revival 

in them. Imported food continued to arrive in the Ryukyus, not only 

from the United States, but also from Asian exporters of rice and soybeans 

such as Thailand and Burma. 

Because of the large number of Ryukyuans repatriated from Japan, 

Korea, and the Mandated Islands of the Pacific, the human pressure on 

the available farm land, especially on the main island of Okinawa, remained heavy. An agricultural survey revealed that in 1951 there were 

37 farm households for every square kilometer in the Ryukyus, a comparable prewar figure, for the year 1937, was 38.24 Moreover, no matter 

how much fertilizer and irrigated water could be supplied to a given plot 

of farm land, a point of maximum productivity was soon reached. Reality 

prevailed after 1950, and the Civil Administration admitted that " by 

1958 a relative (agricultural) production plateau will be reached."" Staple 

food production could be expected to keep pace with population increases, anticipated at 2 percent per year, but absolute self-sufficiency in 

foodstuffs would not be possible. 

After 1950 agricultural productivity as a whole rose gradually from 

its low point in the late 1940s. The Civil Administration demonstrated 

its commitment to development not only through various irrigation and 

fertilization programs, but also by more effective crop management, and 

more experiments with new seeds, breeds of Ii vestock, and farm implements. Gradually at first, then more and more quickly, the nature of 

Okinawan agriculture changed. For example, sugar cane production, actively discouraged by military government during the later 1940s, as well 

as by the Vickery mission, became a key export item to be encouraged. 

There were two reasons for this dramatic change: the Civil Administration's willingness to temper the hopeless quest for food self-sufficiency, 

thereby making more land available for cane production; and the Japanese 

government's sugar liberalization policy, beginning in 1952, which labeled 

Okinawa sugar as a domestic entity in terms of production and sales to 

the Japanese home islands. The combined impact of these policies was 

a dramatic rise in sugar exports from the Ryukyus from 5,465 metric 

tons worth $1.3 million in 1952, to 116,3 10 metric tons worth $27.5 

million ten years later. And by 1965, 87.5 percent of all Ryukyuan farm 

families were engaged in some activity related to sugar cane cultivation. 

Ryukyuan agriculture changed in other significant ways never envisioned by headquarters staff when they set out to rejuvenate farming in 

2·McCunc. Agricultural Change;1I the Ryukyu/s/allds, p. 19. 

2S USCAR, Civil Affairs Activities;1I the Ryukyuls/ands jor the Period Ending 3J December J952. 

Vol. J, No. I , p. 102. Copy in CMH Library. 
132 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

the archipelago. Agriculture, for so many years the most important enterprise in the islands, declined in scope and significance. Where there 

had been 37 farm households per square kilometer of total land area in 

1951 , that figure decreased to 32.4 families by 1964, and to 25.9 families 

in 1971 on the eve of reversion. At the same time only 31 percent of these 

families were engaged in full-time farming; 69 percent pursued it only 

part-time. A growing number of families tended only token plots of 

land-a form of nostalgic farming. As the level of farm activity steadily 

declined, so did its significance to the Ryukyuan economy. Agriculture, 

the backbone of Ryukyuan economic life before 1946, contributed only 

13.7 percent of the archipelago's gross national income in 1964.'" 

In 1945 military government headquarters had hoped to restore the 

family farm to the center of Okinawan economic life. Four years later 

this goal, as noted by the Vickery Report, had not been reached. Faced 

with the discovery of these realities, the Civil Administration substantially altered the military government agricultural programs and expectations. In the agricultural community, a pattern of more concentrated 

farm production developed, with most family farms remaining small. 

Subsistence farming declined dramatically, and farm households turned 

increasingly to cash crops such as sugar cane or pineapples- two exportable commodities again in demand in the Japanese home islands. 

While the Okinawan regard for the soil remained intact, the changing 

economic realities meant that most Okinawans who continued to till the 

land were farmers only in a sentimental sense of the word. Parents and 

older children alike turned in ever greater numbers to new occupational 

opportunities either directly or indirectly associated with the large and 

seemingly permanent military presence in the islands. 

The Fishing Industry Transformed 

Fishing, as was the case with agriculture, had been a traditional Ryukyuan occupation, though perhaps not so much as one might have imagined. !t is estimated that never more than 9 percent of the Ryukyuan 

population ever engaged in full-time fishing. Before World War II, Japanese fishermen, chiefl y from Kyushu, had dominated the best fishing 

areas in the Ryukyu Islands. With a few notable exceptions, such as the 

town of !toman on Okinawa, Ryukyuan fishermen traditionally limited 

their efforts to the coastal zone around their islands not only because of 

the size of their boats, but also because of their lack of refrigeration. Ice26McCune, Agricultural Challge ill the RYlIkyu /s/allds, pp. 2 1, 26-27, 36, 55, 58, 69. In 1970 the 

gross national income of the islands had increased by more than 250 percent over the 1964 figure , 

but agriculture's share dropped further to a mere 7.66 percent. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 133 

Two FISH ING BOATS aboard former Navy landing craji. 

making facilities in prewar Okinawa were very limited; most fishermen 

had to stay close to shore so as to return immediately with the day's catch 

of tuna and bonito. Fishermen had compensated for the lack of refrigeration before the war by drying and smoking the greater portion of their 

catch. But this method of preservation had its limitations, since without 

sufficient quantities of carbon disulfide the dried fish tended to become 

wormy after a short time. Nevertheless, Okinawan fishermen were often 

able to produce a modest, exportable surplus of smoked skipjack and 

bonito in the form of kalshobushi. Some 100 motorized sampans, of 10-

20 tons, produced 75 percent of the catch , with some 1,500 inshore 

boats- wooden, fifteen feet long, with a sharply raked bow and a raised 

square stern, and powered only by oars-accounting for the remainder. 

The battle for Okinawa temporaril y obliterated Okinawa's commercial 

fishing industry. All motorized boats and 71 percent of the smaller, oarpowered boats were destroyed. Headquarters, Island Command, fearing 

enemy infiltration by sea, banned the use of the remaining craft. The 

wooden boats deteriorated out of the water, and fishing line rotted in the 

sun. During the months of the assault phase, therefore, fishing could not 

and did not help to all eviate the worsening food suppl y situation. 

With the campaign for Okinawa concluded and the danger of enemy 
134 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

infiltration reduced, military government officials began to concentrate 

on the fishing situation. In July 1945 they advised the Island Commander, 

General Wallace, that fishing provided the principal source of animal 

protein in the islanders' diet and that a deficiency now existed. They 

requested that he authorize the use of military-government-registered 

boats, powered only by oars, for fishing." An American fisheries officer 

arrived that same month, but it was not until August that Island Command permitted fishing from inshore boats, and then only along a fivemile stretch of the northeastern coast. No motor or sail-powered boats 

were authorized until November 1945 , and Island Command did not 

grant permission to fish the island's primary fishing grounds until April 

1946. 

Because of the destruction of fishing craft during the fighting, and the 

subsequent deterioration of the remaining inactive boats, military government officers began negotiations with the Navy to secure replacement 

craft. Twenty-four small landing craft, LCVPs, were released to military 

government in November 1945 , and an additional fifty craft-mostly of 

the same type, but also a few larger landing craft, LCMs-in January 

1946. Military government also secured the use of the former torpedo 

patrol boat base at Toguchi in November. Here, the Navy's landing craft 

were converted for fishing purposes. In November 1945 military government officers established a central warehouse at Ishikawa to control the 

distribution of fishing suppli es. Reefers, an ice-making capability, and 

fish-drying facilities were established at Toguchi, which became a major 

fishing center. 

Military government headquarters endeavored to create an organized 

fishing program for Okinawa, much as the centrally-directed agricultural 

design for the island. But a comprehensive program did not evolve until 

the first half of 1946.28 In March, an Okinawan Department of Fisheries 

was created to administer the central supply warehouse. At the same time 

military government organized the Fisheries Association to license power 

boats and operators and to assist in developing the industry. By the end 

of June 1946 native crews under military government supervision were 

operating 65 various converted Navy landing craft and eight reconditioned motorized sampans. By October 1947 nearly 2,000 canoes had 

been constructed by the islanders in response to the easing of fishing 

restrictions. Another 273 powered boats, former American landing craft 

!7Mcmo, Col c. 1. Murray. USMC, to CO, IsCom, 680.42 1 (TDCIV). 24 Jul 45, sub: Request for 

Permission to Engage in Fishing Operations, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

u HQ USN MG Okinawa, Memo No. 170,2 Jan 46, sub: Fisheries, Centrali zation of, and HQ 

USN MG Okinawa, "The Fisheri es Program fo r Okinawa," 15 Jan 46. Watkins Papers, RG 200; 

USN MG Directive No. 7, II May 46, sub: Fishing, USN MG Economic Administrative Order 

No. II , undated, sub: Fishing, RG 38. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 135 

converted for fishing at military government direction, were in operation. 

Although readily available, these craft had their limitations as fishing 

vessels. Not only were their sides too high in many cases for effective 

angling, but also their Gray marine diesel engines did not lend themselves 

well to the very slow speeds necessary for deep-sea trolling. 

Despite the limitations of the ad hoc fishing fleet, the catch rose 

dramatically in the Okinawa Gunto from 409,104 pounds in July 1946 

to 1,565,280 pounds in July 1949. During 1950 the hopes for even greater 

success rested on 65 new fishing vessels constructed with Government 

and Relief in Occupied Areas funds. The boats, built with the needs and 

experiences of the Ryukyuan fishermen in mind, relied not on high-speed 

American diesel engines, but on a much slower, but more economical 

Japanese version . Other reasons for the encouraging statistics were military government's success in constructing ice-making plants throughout 

the Ryukyu Islands to supply the fishing boats and the availability of 

explosives, which the islanders successfully employed to stun and raise 

fish from the depths. 

By 1950 the greatest challenge military government headquarters 

faced concerning the fishing industry was neither a question of vessels 

nor of refrigeration facilities, but one of education and training. The 

traditional coastal fishing techniques and opportunities offered no real 

future for the native industry; Okinawans had to learn new skills in order 

to exploit the opportunities for off-shore fishing formerly monopolized 

by the home-island Japanese. Military government's commitment to restoring the industry, therefore, was a legacy that went beyond mere boats 

and equipment. Under Civil Administration auspices, Japanese experts 

were imported to provide the native fishing industry with technical and 

business guidance. Ryukyuans had to be trained, not only to operate the 

new, larger off-shore boats, but also the expanded shore installations supporting the fishing fleet. Fishermen accustomed to going to sea in the 

morning and returning before nightfall hesitated about staying afloat for 

weeks. 

The prime mover in fostering this new and expanded concept of fishing was the Ryukyuan Fisheries Company, Ltd. , created in 1951 at the 

instigation of the Civil Administration. Capital and management personnel for this enterprise came from the various regional fisheries cooperatives and associations throughout the archipelago. The company 

performed a variety of services, all designed to revitalize and transform 

the industry. In addition to managing the new reefer plants ashore and 

the islands' two new 150-ton refrigerated vessels, the company handled 

the contracting details for obtaining Japanese technical experts, encouraged the construction of new vessels, and sought ways to develop the 
136 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Two I 50-ToN REFRIGERATED FISHING VESSELS ready Jilr .1·ai/inK to 'he of I: 

shoreJishinK KWlInds. 

overseas market for the Ryukyuan catch. But the company's most important task was to reorient the traditional thinking of the local fishermen. 

They now had to look beyond in-shore subsistence fishing to the deepsea commercial potential around their island home and in the seas beyo nd. As the Civil Admin istration summarized both the problem and the 

opportunity: "The resources of the Ryukyu Islands are few and meager. 

Fisheries offer the greatest hope for the future." " Fishing, therefore, like 

agriculture, was to undergo a fundamental transformation- an extensive 

modification that had its roots under military government auspices as 

early as 1947. 

Fishing made a valuable contribution to a more viable Ryukyuan 

economy, but the endeavor wo uld never employ more than a small fraction of the native work force. Indeed, as American technicians introduced 

more improved techniques and motorized craft, fewe r and fewer Ryukyuans were needed to bring in a sizable fish catch .'" The great majority 

!·'USCAR. Civil ;I}/(Iir.\" Activitics ill 11t(' RyukYII l.\'/lIIu/s.lhr III,' Period ~lIdil/x JI Decemh,', 1952. 

Vol . I. No.1. pp. 102- 104. copy in CMH Library. Sec also G HQ SCA P. Political. Social and Economic 

Report on Ryukyus (sic] Islands for the Secretary of War. II Oct 47, pp. 11 - 12. Fi le: SCAP; Government Section. Occupation Reports Japan and Ryuk yus. RG 5, MacA rthur Archi ves. 

"'For a detailed analysis of the lishing industry on Okinawa. sec Shannon McCune and Masak i 

Yamaoka, F"shifiK A(:lil'ilies ill IIil' R)lukyu .\' lalld.~ (Un iversity of Florida. Ryukyu Islands Research 

Project, Research and Information Paper No. 17, D ecember 1972). 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 137 

of the civi lians would seek and find employment outside of Okinawa's 

two traditional occupations in areas more directly related to the American 

military establishment on the island . 

Industry and Commerce 

(ffood production from land and sea sources challenged military government headquarters, the prospects for industrial development were 

even less hopeful. Okinawan industry had progressed little beyond the 

handicraft stage before the American invasion . The great majority of 

Ryukyuans not engaged in farming or fishing participated in a variety of 

cottage industries producing goods for local consumptio n, such as simple 

wooden furniture, pottery, roofing tiles, textiles (l.l"lImliKi. hinKata, and 

kasuri), straw hats and mats, and lacquerware. Prewar industrialization 

in the Western sense of the term emerged only in sugar and salt processing 

and in alcohol production for Japanese military purposes. The battle for 

Okinawa brought a sudden and complete halt to all medium and largescale industry. With the surrender of Japan, the market for Ryukyuan 

sugar and alcohol disappeared. Military government demonstrated no 

interest in reviving sugar and alcohol production, but did make every 

effort to encourage salt reduction works, as well as all forms of handicrafts 

such as rope making, sewing, and blacksmithing. 

During 1945-1946 the task of revitalizing industry on the island was 

a particularly difficult assignment- population concentrations in areas 

not suited for industry, the lack of bui ldings and equipment, and the 

shortage of raw materials. Such obstacles influenced business activities 

throughout the Ryukyus. (n a typical report, in September 1945, the 

Hentona District summarized the enterprises within its boundaries: 

blacksmith shops, barbers, a few sewing projects, some rope making, a 

si ngle tinsmith , some mat-weav ing, three clock repair shops, and an unspecified numbe r of salt reduction efforts under construction." 

In June 1945 a special inspection team from military government 

headquarters investigated the incipient efforts at production and called 

attention to the haphazard, small-scale, and decentralized manufacture 

of consumer articles in the face of growing consumer needs. Civil affairs 

officials established priorities, channeling available labor and resources 

to various industries. Rehousing programs- thatch, rope, and sidi ngreceived highest priority: mat-making, clothing production, sewing projects, and tool and furniture crafting were next in importance, and sou-

"Rpt. Hcntona District to MG HQ. 22 Sep 4 5. sub: A Rpt. of Industrial Development in this 

Distri ct. Watkins Papers. RG 200. 
138 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS. 1945- 1950 

OKINAWAN POTTER 

venir production was in the lowest category." Most laborers were assigned 

to priority projects. yet attempts to revive industry remained small-scale 

and erratic throughout the period. Graduall y. as civilian resettlement 

progressed. control of industrial activity moved from the camp to the 

district level. Since the opportun ities for industrial rehabilitation were 

even fewer than for agricultural production and the need less acute. military government headquarters moved more slowly toward centrali zed 

direction of industry. In November 1945 the Okinawan Advisory Council's industry representative assembled the avai lable Okinawan experts. 

analyzed data on the island's industrial potential. and recommended that 

military government assist in rehabilitating the following modest industries: textiles. dyes (indigo). native cement. wood products (furniture, 

looms). mat-weaving. metal products. chemical products. and lacquer-

'!HQ IsCom MG. Inspection Team $ taO' Study, 13 Jun 45. sub: Manufacture of Essential Consumer Goods. memo. Deput y Commander for Mil. Govern. to Chicf of Industry Branch. 14 Jun 

45. sub: Manufat'turc of Essential Consumer Goods. and MG Circular No. 132.2 1 Ju1 45. sub: Local 

Industry, Policy. Watkins Papers. RG 200. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 139 

ware. 33 Some council proposals called for reconstruction on a larger scale 

than was then practicable, but most were constructi ve because they were 

limited in scope and, therefore, realistically attuned to the island's physical and human resources. In March 1946 the Okinawa Base Command 

established the Okinawan Industry Department to channel military government assistance. Scrap metal from discarded war material greatly assisted Okinawa's metal shops and blacksmiths, as, for example, in the 

production of plows. 

Despite shortages of tools, transportation, and firewood for fuel, the 

islanders were producing measurable quantities of numerous useful items 

by July 1946, especially pottery, cloth, and cooking utensils. One year 

later, licensed industries of various kinds in Okinawa Gunto numbered 

more than 250, although, because of shortages of raw materials and vehicles for transportation, only half were actually producing. 34 

By the end of 1947 military government headquarter's efforts had 

revived a number of cottage industries, but MacArthur's headquarters 

in Tokyo warned Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall not to be 

overly optimistic about industrial development: 

The lack of raw materials, particularly fuel, makes impossible substantial industrial 

expansion . . . . 

It should be stressed again that the Ryukyus as a group have never been completely 

self supporting, and that if the U.S. desires to use [as] much facilities as exist on the 

island chain . .. it will have to be prepared to support to a considerable extent the economy 

of the Island." 

This assessment was intended to be matter-of-fact rather than pessimistic. 

While pointing out the limitations on Ryukyuan industrial expansion, 

the report noted the potential for progress in two general areas-items 

for local consumption and items with export potential. As might be expected, military government focused first on those modest items produced for local consumption. In some areas they registered considerable 

successes. The very necessary production of salt, for example, rose dramatically between 1947 and 1949.'6 The record was less impressive in 

llRpt, Deputy Commander for Mil. Govern. to Commandant, NOB, Okinawa, and Chief MG 

Officer, Ryukyu, I Jul 46. sub: Rpt. of Mil. Govern. Activities for the Period from I Apr 45 to I 

lui 46, Watkins Papers. RG 200. 

l~C INC Far East, Summation No.9, U.S. Army Mil. Govern, Activities in the Ryukyus for the 

Month of July 1947, Freimuth Papers. 

l$GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [sic) Islands to the Secretary 

of War, II Oct 47, pp. 16- 17, RG 5, MacArthur Archives. 

16HQ RYCOM, Summation No. 35, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the 

Month of September 1949, Freimuth Papers. In October 1947 the Ryukyus produced salt at the rate 

of 450,000 pounds annually, a 100 percent improvement over the rate a year earlier, but still a 

fraction of the estimated 8.4 million pounds required annually for food and industrial needs. The 

next year salt production throughout the archipelago reached 387,034 pounds just for the month of 

September 1948. 
140 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

SALT PRODUCTION FROM SEA SALT 

the construction related fields. The quality of Okinawa's clay was very 

good, but without imported presses it would not be possible to produce 

bricks with sufficient tensile strength for permanent buildings. Woodworkers, although hampered by the shortage of lumber, were producing 

some furniture, principally school desks and chairs. Unfortunately, most 

of the wood for these activities had to be imported from the Japanese 

home islands. Sake production resumed in 1947 as a government monopoly. Using only food products that had spoiled beyond possible human 

or animal use, licensed Ryukyuans produced 3,000 gallons per month by 

the autumn of 1947. Military government encouraged sake manufacturing 

because the production costs were very low, while the considerable proceeds from its sale helped defray the cost of local government administrations in the islands." Other significant, albeit small in scale, industrial 

efforts were underway by 1947 in such areas as food processing, ceramics, 

charcoal production, weaving, and metal casting. This last enterprise involved the adaptation and use of scrap aluminum from wrecked aircraft. 

A number of small casting shops produced aluminum pots and pans for 

local use. 

J7Military government received no benefit directly from the sake revenues. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 141 

The ravages of both war and nature provided Okinawan salvage workers with far more than just aluminum. The battle for the island left the 

landscape strewn with hundreds of shattered tanks, jeeps, and field pieces. 

The attack also left the port of Naha clogged with half-sunken vessels. 

The autumn of 1945 brought a new typhoon season with even further 

destruction. A large number of American ships and landing craft soon 

lay broken along Okinawa's eastern coast. To these victims of conflict 

and storm, Headquarters, Far East Command, soon added-however 

inadvertently-hundreds of other damaged vehicles which MacArthur's 

headquarters in Tokyo dumped on Okinawa for ultimate transshipment 

to the United States. Many of these trucks and jeeps were soon forgotten , 

shipping documents were lost, and the ravages of the Okinawan climate 

soon took their toll on the internal and external metal. The resultant 

opportunity for salvage from all of these sources, not only for scrap iron, 

but also for brass and other nonferrous metals as well, meant a potential 

boom for local native entrepreneurs and scavengers.38 

Military government headquarters hoped to exploit this opportunity 

as a means to stimulate local industry, only to be frustrated by the Office 

of War Mobilization and Reconversion. In December 1946 that office 

articulated a policy requiring that all sales abroad of Army-owned ferrous 

and nonferrous scrap be made to individuals willing to ship the scrap 

metal back to the United States. One exception applied to the Ryukyu 

Islands: all scrap metal generated within the Ryukyus Command first had 

to be offered to China under the terms of the China Bulk Sale Agreement. 

In November 1948 Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, Commanding General, 

Ryukyus Command, advised MacArthur's headquarters that Ryukyuan 

scrap was piling up in Shanghai in excess of Chinese needs. He requested 

that the remaining surplus scrap within the command be released to 

military government for the use of local industry, and he noted that if 

the approximately 35,600 metric tons of steel and iron and 8,000 pounds 

of aluminum alloy were shipped back to America, "only ridiculously small 

revenue will accrue to the U.S."'· The Far East commander, in turn, 

relayed Eagles' thoughts to Washington, and in December the Acting 

Secretary of the Army, William H. Draper, Jr. , urged the White House 

to permit the release of Army-generated scrap metal in the Ryukyus Command to the indigenous economy. John R. Steelman, Assistant to the 

President, approved the request on 27 December 1948 on behalf of Presl'Interview, Freimuth with the author, 8 Sep 82. 

" M'g, CG RYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. E 20991 AIMG-E, 10 Nov 48, File: Messages RYCOM 

October 1948-July 1949, RG 9, MaCArthur Archives. 
142 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

ident Truman'o Although this decision did nothing initially to improve 

Okinawa's nascent export program, it was a considerable boost to the 

domestic economy as native metalworkers began using the scrap metal 

to produce such items as farm tools, rice cleaning and rice polishing 

machines, and small hardware items. 

Military government headquarters was under no illusions about the 

significance of such industrial efforts. Important as they were to the local 

welfare, these various industries were not a basis for long-range economic 

development. For example, by July 1948 considerable progress had been 

made in rehabilitating industry. In that month in Okinawa Gunto a number of industries were in operation, including iron works, casting factories, 

woodworks, and tin works. Collectively they employed 1,288 people." In 

September 1949 these employment figures had risen only to 2,058 indi vi duals, 990 in metalworking and 1,068 in woodworking, but these 

figures were for the Northern and Southern Ryukyus as well as for Okinawa Gunto. Military government officers, therefore, made every effort 

to encourage the production of exportable commodities by the industrial 

sector. Military government's decision not to revive sugar cane production on a mass scale-a decision reversed after I 950-created a void in 

the export picture. In 1947 the most promising candidate to fill the gap 

was phosphate rock mined in the Daito Islands. After the rock was 

shipped to Japan, a portion was returned as partial payment in the form 

of badly-needed superphosphate fertilizer. For the next three or four years 

phosphate rock remained the principal export supporting the island's 

importation needs. Other exportable items included coral, cycad leaves, 

and shell, the last of these shipped to Japan to make buttons which were 

then re-exported to the United States. Military government encouraged 

another traditional re-export item, woven hats made from the adamba 

leaf. These hats, similar to the so-called " panama hats" from Latin America, were produced locally in the Ryukyus, finished in Japan, and then 

distributed to other world markets. Unfortunately, a shortage of necessary 

bleaches on Okinawa made expansion of production difficult." 

Far East Command's projections for the Ryukyu export program for 

fiscal years 1950 through 1953 listed nine export items ranging from 

oW Ltrs, Draper to Steelman, 2 1 Dec 48, and Steelman to Draper, 27 Dec 48, Official File, Papers 

of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library. 

41 HQ RYCOM Summation No. 21, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the 

Month of July 1948, Freimuth Papers. 

4lCINCFE, Summation No.9, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month 

of July 1947, and HQ RYCOM, Summation No. 34, U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Activities in the 

Ryukyus for the Month of August 1949, RG 407. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 143 

SCRA P METAL COLLECTED FOR EXPORT 

phosphate rock to lily bulbs, but not scrap meta!.4' Quantities of scrap 

metal continued to accumulate on Okinawa during the late 1940s from 

salvage operations in the coastal waters. Initially, this metal resource was 

available only for domestic use. Because of restrictions imposed by Washington, none of it was available to the Ryukyus Command as an exportable commodity. This picture changed dramatically after 1950 as the 

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion eased the restrictions. The 

Ryukyus Command exported no scrap between 1946 and 1950, 2,550 

metric tons in 1951, and 689,560 metric tons in 1953. By 1955 ferrous 

and nonferrous scrap stood second and third respectively behind sugar 

in importance as export products·4 In just three short years, the byproducts of modern warfare became a significant resource in Okinawa's 

export program. 

HFECOM. Estimates ror Economic Rehabilitation orthe Ryukyus Fiscal Years 1950- 1953. 1949, 

p. 17, TAGO, Administrative Services Div., Operations Branch, Occupied Area Rpts. 1945- 1954, 

File: Rehabilitation Ryukyus, 1949- 1953, RG 407. 

··USCAR, Civil Affairs Activities illlhe RyukYIl/slands!or the Period Ending 31 December 1953, 

VoL I, No.3, pp. 21 -22. Copy in CMH Library. 
144 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Changing Employment 

Military government figures began to register fundamental changes in 

Ryukyuan society in the late 1940s. The monthly figures for September 

1948, for example, show that unemployment within Okinawa Gunto 

stood at 1,284, while the total number of persons employed, including 

those as farmers and fishermen , was 219,588. Of these, 39,569, slightly 

more than 18 percent, worked directly for agencies of the United States 

government. A great majority of the remainder worked as construction 

workers, grounds-keepers, drivers, domestics, and concessionaries in jobs 

indirectly yet closely related to American military housing and base construction and operation. Apart from subsistence farmers, relatively few 

Okinawans were engaged in traditional native trades: 605 in woodworking, 348 in metalworking, and 148 in ceramics." These statistics, typical 

for the years 1947- 1950, underlined the fact that the sustained American 

military presence was changing the economic life in the islands dramatically from its prewar configuration. Fewer Okinawans made their livelihood in agriculture and traditional island trades, while more had become 

employed in light industry and service positions associated with the military facilities. This trend continued well into the 1950s, not merely because it made economic sense to the employees, but also because it made 

economic sense to the Department of the Army. 

In November 1948 General MacArthur advised the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations of employment realities on Okinawa. Noting that 

labor was all the Ryukyuans had to sell, he continued: 

... there are at present several thousand non indigenous civilians, mostly Filipinos, 

employed in the construction, maintenance and operation of military installations at a 

heavy dollar cost to the U.S. far in excess of native labor costs . 

. . . if most of these foreign employees were replaced with native labor paid in yen 

purchased with appropriated funds, it would not only result in substantially lower dollar 

outlay by the U.S., but would enable the purchase of necessary consumer goods with 

dollars thus stimulating all branches of the economy and within a few years reduce substantially the necessity for support under the GARIOA program. 46 

The logic of MacArthur's message was patent, and his suggestion became 

policy, albeit a policy not all that easily implemented. The problem was 

Q RYCOM. Summation No. 23. U.S. Army Mil. Govern. Acti vities in the Ryukyus for the 

Month of September 1948, RG 407. 

~~ sg , CINCFE to DA (CSAD), NT. 65578, 20 Nov 48. sub: Employment of native labor by 

Military Forces in Ryukyus, Offi ce of Asst. Sec. Army. Office of Occupi ed Areas, GARIOA files 

1949, RG 335. Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) funds derived from a special 

appropriation Congress had established in the summer of 1946 when military gove rnment in the 

Ryukyus was transferred from the Navy to the Army. The monies provided supplies and services 

needed to prevent starvation, disease. and unrest among the civilians of American-occupied areas 

around the world. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 145 

primarily one of training, including language training; it was simply faster 

and easier for the American forces to import Filipino nationals already 

trained on everything from construction equipment to dry cleaning machinery than it was to train indigenous operators. This meant that within 

the Ryukyus Command even some positions that might easily be filled 

by Okinawans, such as barber and snack bar employee, were occupied 

instead by Filipinos or Chinese. In January 1948, for example, the Commanding General, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, reported to MacArthur that the concessions on military posts within the Ryukyus 

Command employed approximately 600 native Okinawans, but also 134 

foreign nationals." To put it another way, military government recognized 

that these foreigners-mostly Filipinos-were occupying nearly 20 percent of the jobs within the concessions system; jobs that otherwise would 

be held by Ryukyuans. 

During 1948 the various components of the Ryukyus Command made 

a sincere effort to train Okinawans as replacements for the foreign employees. The command put a special emphasis on heavy construction 

jobs, as well as on administrative skilled and semi-skilled positions. The 

process was a slow one. In March 1949 the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations asked General MacArthur for a breakdown of employment 

figures between foreign and indigenous workers, and further asked " is it 

intended to replace Philippino [sic] civilians by Ryukyuans. If so what 

date ... can this be done?"" MacArthur made his intentions clear when 

he directed that the Army Air Force units within Ryukyus Command be 

the first to replace all foreign employees with native personnel. The target 

date for these units was 30 June 1949, but by the end of April MacArthur 

realized that, despite what he termed " intensive programs" to train Okinawans, the deadline could not be met, and he so informed his superiors 

in Washington.·9 Gradually, the various training programs began to pay 

di vidends as more and more Okinawans secured jobs formerly held by 

imported foreign nationals. The training process continued during the 

Korean War period, by which time it was clear that local labor, rather 

than any tangible product, was becoming the most valuable Ryukyuan 

"export"-as MacArthur had earlier perceived it would. 

Okinawan labor had become what economists term an invisible export, i.e., without leaving the island it became a commodity available for 

sale to a foreign purchaser (the American occupation forces). The foreign 

" M'g, CG PHILRYCOM to CINCFE, Nr. SX 48081 GSASP, 14 Jan 48, File: PHILRYCOM 

January 1948. RG 9, MacArthur Archives. 

Msg, DA ODCSOPS, Civil Affairs Di". to CINCFE, NT. WARX 86 170, 25 Mar 49, Asst Sec 

Army, Office for Occupied Areas, GAR IOA Files 1949. RG 335 . 

• 9Msg, CINCFE to OA, NT. 69550, 26 Apr 49, File: Messages Bluc Binder Series, Ryukyus 1-

6 1, RG 9, MacArthur Archives. 
146 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

exchange returned to the Okinawan economy from its sale was no less 

real or important than revenue generated from the sale of tuna or scrap 

metal. The Civil Administration estimated that no fewer than 72,000 

islanders worked in positions associated with the occupation, yet never 

more than 325 Okinawans-a very small percentage of the island's labor 

force- were directly employed by the Civil Administration itself.'o These 

figures underscore the fact that while the Civil Administration consciously tried not to develop a large payroll of local bureaucrats, the 

American presence created thousands of new employment opportunities. 

During fiscal year 1953, when the Ryukyuan visible and invisible export 

total reached a value of $58, 110,000, approximately $40,6 10,000 was 

from the invisible export of labor by islanders working for American 

individuals or agencies in the Ryukyus. " Such figures were typical for 

the years after 1949. The American occupation had transformed Okinawa's employment picture, and the long-range American military presence meant alternati ve positions for thousands of islanders who would 

not or could not return to traditional prewar occupations. 

Fiscal Planning 

The economic rehabilitation of Okinawan life required not only agricultural and industrial programs, but sound fiscal planning as well. Well 

before the American invasion General Buckner had established the objectives of military government fiscal planning. These were to control and 

stabilize currency, to control all financial institutions, to curtail inflation, 

and to regulate all military government expenditures in the islands." 

The legal tender of the Ryukyus, both before and after the American 

invasion, was the same as that of the Japanese home islands-that is, 

yen notes of the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Taiwan, and the Bank of 

Chosen (Korea). Preinvasion fiscal planning assumed that the economy 

would be disrupted, that no dependable source of currency would exist 

for use by the invasion forces, and that the civilian economy would rely 

on military government to act in lieu of a central treasury- now that the 

islands would be cut off from the central government in Japan. " As a 

SOUSCAR, Civil Affaris Activities illihe Ryukyulslandsjor the Period Ending 30 JUlie / 953, VoLI, 

No.2, p. 3, copy in CM H Library; USCAR Rpt. , Programs and Statistics to the Civil Administrator, 

"The Potential of the Ryukyu Islands," 3 1 Oct 5 1, BC-3024, File 091.3, RG 338, Federal Records 

Center, National Archives and Records Service, Kansas City. 

SI USCAR, Civil Affairs Activities in the R)lukyu Islands/or the Period Emling 31 December 1952, 

Vol. I, No. I, p. 11. Copy in CMH Libarary. 

j~Operational Directive No.7 for Military Government of the Commanding General, Tenth Army 

(short title: GOPER), 6 Jan 45, RG 407. 

slLawrence/Watkins, Fiscal Affairs and Resumption of a Monetary Economy. MS, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 147 

supplemental currency, ¥75 million in Type "B" military yen, a form of 

occupation scrip printed in the United States, was imported to Okinawa 

and declared legal tender on a one-to-one exchange basis with the other 

yen notes in circulation. 54 Military government served as the custodian 

and funding agent for the "B" yen, both for the combat forces and for 

military government programs. 

During the first two months of the occupation American servicemen 

did not need to have currency, since even such items as candy, cigarettes, 

and toothpaste were issued free of charge. The first "B" yen payment to 

the troops was made in June 1945." There was also no reason to introduce 

currency into the civilian sector. With everyone working together, being 

moved about frequently, and sharing collectively (albeit, sometimes involuntarily), the resumption of a monetary economy on Okinawa would 

have led to even greater chaos. Consequently, for the first few weeks 

laborers were paid in kind, usually with K-rations. On the smaller islands, 

like Iheya and Kume Shima, some money continued to circulate because 

the economy there was far less disrupted than on Okinawa. Money, however, never played a major role in the subsistence economies of the outlying islands. To the extent that money was used on islands other than 

Okinawa, the impact was not entirely salutary. Because of the scarcity of 

goods throughout the Far East, inflation set in across the region. Japan's 

growing inflation was felt in the Northern Ryukyus; that of Taiwan in 

the Southern Ryukyus. 

On I June 1945 military government experimented by reintroducing 

a monetary economy on one island, Zamami Shima, in the Kerama Retto. 

All gainfully employed civilians received ¥ I per day, and were permitted 

to supplement their food ration with purchases from a central store. 

Military government officers fixed-and heavily subsidized-prices on 

basic consumer goods, for example, ¥ I for a gallon of kerosene, and 50 

sen for a bar of all-purpose soap. Smuggling and black marketeering undermined this effort to some extent." Nevertheless, the experiment encouraged military government headquarters on Okinawa to begin 

thinking about an eventual return to a full-scale money economy for the 

entire Ryukyus. 

)·Memo. Tenth Army AG (Col J.S. Garfield) to CINCPOA, 18 Oct 44, sub: Military Currency 

Requirements, ICEBERG, Records or War Dept., Civil Affairs Div., RG 165. See also Belmont 

Faries, "Military Currency: The 8-Yen, 1945- 1958," From tile Dragon's Dell: Official Publication of 

the RyukYIi Philarelic Specialist SocielJ', Ltd. 12, No.2 (June 1980): 52-58. 

HLawrence/Watkins. Fiscal Affairs and Resumption or a Monetary Economy, MS, Watkins papers, RG 200. 

Tenth Army Action Rpt.. RyukYU5, 26 Mar-30 Jun 45. pp. II-XXVII-4 & II-XXVII-5. Copy 

in CM H Libarary; memo, Economics & Industry Officer to CO, MG Det. B-10I -X on Kume Shima. 

10 Aug 45, sub: Rpt. or Activities, Economics and Industry. Kume Shima, RG 407. 
148 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

TABLE 3- RETAIL PRICE INDEX, JUNE 1946- JUNE 1948 

Item Jun 46 Dec 46 Jun 47 Dec 47 Jun 48 

Rice 100 150 257 252 300 

Sweet Potatoes 100 262 250 225 500 

Fresh Fish 100 260 280 420 900 

Dried Bonito 100 200 242 314 471 

Cigarettes 100 333 350 500 433 

Source: Bank of the Ryukyus, Finance and Economics (Naha: privately published, 1956), p. 128. 

In March 1946, in an effort to abolish caches of old yen notes, military 

government headquarters declared only the "B" yen and the new Japanese 

yen to be legal tender in the Ryukyu Islands. Old imperial yen, exchanged 

during April, disappeared from circulation. On I Maya monetary economy was restored on Okinawa with the dual currency system, but under 

the strictest of wage and price controls. In the same month military government established a centralized banking facility on the island with the 

somewhat pretentious title of "The Central Bank of Okinawa." Its capital 

was subscribed by the Okinawa Department of Finance and mura governments through a military government loan. Initially this facility did 

little more than serve as a depository of funds and as an agency of the 

civilian government for paying employees' salaries." 

Despite the stringent regulation of wage and price controls, including 

two currency exchanges (April 1946 and March 1947), inflation took hold. 

In a sense this inflation arrived during the period 1946-1948 in the parcels 

and bundles carried by thousands of Okinawans repatriated from the 

Japanese home islands. Repatriates were officially authorized to bring 

back no more than ¥ I,OOO per individual, but many smuggled in much 

larger amounts. Before long too many yen were chasing too few goods, 

initiating a chaotic inflationary spiral that persisted throughout 1947-

1948, even though free trade was still officially prohibited" The inflationary spiral resulted not only in a thriving black market, but also in 

the fixed retail prices of principal consumer items. (See Table 3.) 

In 1948 military government officials moved decisively to control the 

inflation. On 4 May they created the Bank of the Ryukyus to consolidate 

all existing financial institutions in the Ryukyus, to regulate the money 

flow, and to provide reasonable loan opportunities for business. The military government administration subscribed to 51 percent of the insti-

)10'FJaherty MS, Chapter V. 

lIBank of the Ryukyus, Tell Year History 0/ the Balik of the Ryukyus (Naha: privately published 

by Matsuda Yushidestu. 1962), pp. 4-5, cited hereafter as Balik a/the Ryukyus; interview, Freimuth 

with the author, 13 Nov 80. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 149 

BAN K OF THE RYUKYUS, Head Office (1953 photograph). 

tution's capital stock, with the remainder divided among the guntos of 

the archipelago. The bank drew its managerial personnel from each area, 

so that the citizens of each island group might feel they were sharing in 

the benefits of the bank. Originally capitalized at ¥ I 0,000,000, the bank 

performed its functions well, providing the Ryukyus with commercial 

banking facilities. By 1952 it had expanded to twenty branch offices with 

a capitalization of ¥20,000,000 and assumed the responsibility for administering not only the domestic banking, but the foreign exchange program as well." In July 1948 military government conducted Okinawa's 

third currency conversion, which established the Type "B" military yen 

as the sole legal tender in the Ryukyus. Japanese yen, which could no 

longer circulate legally, had to be converted under penalty of law. 60 The 

total amount converted was ¥665,443,283- four times the amount of 

money originally circulated twenty-seven months earlier. At last the Ryukyus had a unitary currency system. Since Japanese yen could no longer 

legally circulate, smuggling was made more difficult, although it was not 

entirely eliminated .• ' These steps, together with the adoption of a balanced yen budget for the administration, gradually brought downward 

pressure on the inflationary trend. With these policies implemented, mil59USCAR, Civil Affairs Activities in tile Ryukyu Islands for the Period Ending 31 December 1952, 

Vol. I, No. I, pp. 74-75, copy in CMH Library; Bank o/the RyukYlIs, p. 6. 

60MG Special Proclamations No. 29 and 30, 21 lui 48, Freimuth Papers. 

61 Smuggling had always been a way of life for some Ryukyuans. particularly among those in the 

Southern Ryukyus nearest Taiwan. 
150 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

itary government officers felt confident enough to reestablish the free 

enterprise system in October. They eliminated all price controls and rationing, except on food and certain surplus Army supplies. Their action 

instantly transformed the black market into a white market, thereby causing some initial confusion within the civil population." 

The restoration of free enterprise appears to have motivated the small 

industrial sector toward greater production. This motivation did not immediately translate into across-the-board increases in production figures 

because typhoon winds damaged many industries that autumn and winter. Still, business enthusiasm rekindled and inter-island trade slowly reactivated. Between January 1949 and October 1950, a period of less than 

two years, the native administrators issued approximately 19,000 new 

business licenses for various enterprises with a combined capital base 

exceeding five billion yen. 6J Although the shortage of raw materials continued to limit productivity, the civilian population was patently eager 

to produce and distribute more consumer products. Military government's determination to implement a responsible fiscal program of currency regulation and loan opportunities created an economic atmosphere 

in which that eagerness could be successfully expressed. 

With the resumption of a free market system in the islands, headquarters staff recognized that more than moral support would be necessary if new enterprises were to succeed: the American administration 

on Okinawa would have to guarantee both the opportunity for business 

loans in the short term and the likelihood of a sensible tax structure in 

the future. Military government officers established the Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund in April 1950. An instrument of military government, and later the Civil Administration, the fund extended loans for 

between five and ten years for housing, public utilities, agriculture, commerce, and industry. Most of Okinawa's sugar mills and refrigeration 

plants under construction or planned during this period were built with 

these loans. The Bank of the Ryukyus, as trustee, administered the fund, 

which extended loans on a first come, first served basis-usually at 6 or 

7 percent per annum interest rates. Capitalization for the fund came from 

Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Funds. In October 1959 the 

Civil Administration, recognizing that an era in the rehabilitation of the 

islands was ending, rechartered the Ryukyus Reconstruction Finance 

Fund as the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation. 

A viable tax structure is an integral part of any sound fiscal policy, 

6ZNobuo Takaramura. "Reconstruction and Development of the Okinawan Economy with Emphasis upon Monetary Methods," MBA thesis, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 

1957, pp. 14- 24. 

"Bank oflhe RYllkyus, pp. 3, 8. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION 151 

and military government officers were anxious to begin collecting taxes 

as soon as possible, since the revenue was sorely needed to cover part of 

the cost oflocal governmental programs in the archipelago. But the prewar 

Japanese system of taxation was one of the many casualities of the battle 

for Okinawa. Economic life on the island had been so utterly devastated 

that any thought of a cash economy-much less of taxes-was out of the 

question. On many of the outlying islands, however, physical destruction 

during the American assault had been considerably less than on Okinawa. 

To the extent that economic life survived in Amami, Miyako, and Yaeyama Gunto, it was possible to revive some of the former Japanese tax 

laws as soon as domestic trade resumed. In the Kerama Retto, military 

government began an early exercise in taxation, not only as a source of 

revenues, but also as a means of controlling inflation. Beginning in the 

summer of 1945, civil affairs officers fixed prices and wages, the latter 

ranging from ¥.80 per day for a common laborer to ¥ 1.30 for professionals. On I September, military government began taxing family income 

at the rate of 70 percent of income in excess of the cost of living." So 

successful was this program that taxes were sufficient by the end of September to cover the cost of local government programs within the Kerama 

Retto. 

In April 1947 headquarters believed that the money economy had 

recovered to the point where a partial tax program could be attempted 

on Okinawa. With the approval of military government, the civilian gunto 

government compiled a budget incorporating the anticipated tax revenues, but covering any possible deficits with the proceeds from the local 

sale of Government and Relief in Occupied Areas imported goods. This 

arrangement proved to be a prudent precaution. Military government did 

not record any revenue from taxes on Okinawa until June 1947, and then 

these funds amounted to ¥494,870-only about twice what the gunto 

government received that month from court fines. This figure contrasts 

with the monthly income of¥ 12,843,275.17 from the sale of Government 

and Relief in Occupied Areas trade goods."' The monies collected by 

taxation on Okinawa did not even cover operational expenses for the 

civilian government until 1952, when a more comprehensive tax program 

came into effect. Even then only administrative costs could be met; the 

capital budget for rehabilitation and recovery still depended upon American subsidies."" 

Initially, military government made no attempt to unify the tax strucurrcncy exchange rpt., MG Fiscal Officer to CINCPAC MG. 4 Sep 45, RG 407. 

6sGHQ CINCUSAFPAC. Summation No.8, Mil. Govern. Activities in the Ryukyus for the Month 

of June 1947, Freimuth Papers. 

66Takaramura. "Reconstruction and Development of the Okinawan Economy," p. 50. 
152 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

tures for the four gunto governments. Separate and disparate gunto taxation systems existed until the last months of the military government 

regime. This delay in unifying the tax structure appears to have been less 

a matter of bureaucratic inertia than a recognition that the economic 

fortunes remained different and uneven in the various guntos. In June 

1950 military government took the first step toward unifying the tax when 

headquarters staff imposed uniform tax rates on the sale of designated 

goods and services throughout the islands. In August headquarters directed that corporate income tax rates be made uniform throughout the 

archipelago and, in December 1950, decreed the same adjustment be 

made to individual income tax rates. 07 A significant part of military government's fiscal legacy to the Civil Administration, therefore, was a 

tested, evenly administered system of taxation. 

The economic revitalization of Ryukyuan society in the years following the war must be counted among the most challenging efforts of American military government. Okinawa, in contrast to other enemy territories, 

was physically devastated and bereft of political and economic institutions to serve as foundations for societal rehabilitation. Yet American 

civil affairs officers were able quickly to transform this rubble, restoring 

the islands to a semblance of their prewar condition. Not content with 

this accomplishment, the military governors then launched an ambitious 

program to promote economic self-sufficiency in the Ryukyus, something 

the island people had never enjoyed in the past. Any such program faced 

intimidating odds. Their work was always of necessity subordinated to 

the primary military mission and was often the victim of waning American interest, diverted by crises elsewhere. The first military governors 

had little more than their sense of idealism and a sketchy knowledge of 

the land and its people to guide them in their task. Later civil affairs 

officers, however, could draw on economic, agricultural, and fisheries 

experts for assistance in their planning. The economic measures they 

initiated in the late 1940s successfully created a fragile but promising 

base upon which a relatively more self-sufficient economy might be 

developed. 

'lUSCAR, Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands/or the Period Ending 31 December 1952, 

Vol. I, No. I , p. 65. Copy in CMH Library. 
CHAPTER VI 

Transforming Okinawa 

The rehabilitation of Okinawa during the 1940s was one of American 

military government's most remarkable ach ievements. It might appear 

that this transformation occurred along a smooth continuum beginning 

during the battle for Okinawa and ending with the extensi ve. programs 

of the American Civil Administration in 1950, but, as described earlier, 

it did not. Once initial steps had been taken to ease the privations of 

Okinawa's civilians and to lay a rudimentary fo undation for general economic, political, and social rehabilitation, progress in civil affairs came 

to a virtual halt. By mid-1946 frustrated military government officials 

had begun to encou'nter apathy and neglect among political and military 

leaders in Washington and Tokyo. For more than two years, military 

government in the Ryukyus was relegated to a "business as usual" status 

with a corresponding diminution in civil affairs initiatives. Only with the 

emergence of the Cold War and the rise of communist strength in the 

Far East did Washington renew its interest in Okinawa as a strategically 

important forward base. This renewed interest, fi rst manifested in early 

1949, had profound implications for military government plans and policies. In the end it enabled civil affairs officials, now armed with the 

necessary resources, to exceed their earlier, modest rehabilitation efforts 

and to initiate programs that would truly transform the island's society 

and economy. 

America's Expanded Commilmenl 

Whatever limitations the Ryukyu Islands had in terms of natural resources, the main island of Okinawa possessed one valuable asset-its 

strategic location. Its capital, Naha, was only 970 air. miles from Tokyo, 

830 from Seoul, 390 from Taipei, and within easy range of central and 

southern China-even points in Manchuria. American military forces 

had fought to take Okinawa in one of the bloodiest battles of World War 

II specifically because of these geographic realities. Assessments of Oki-
154 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN T HE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

nawa's strategic importance altered dramatically in the immediate postwar years. As the United States began acquiring bases in Japan and Korea, 

military facilities in the Ryukyus became neglected, and both they and 

the local economy suffered accordingly. But if the need for strong defenses 

seemed remote after the war, Okinawa's geographic potential remained 

unchanged, and events occurring in several parts of the globe in 1948 

combined to convince the Truman administration of the continuing importance of strategic air bases in the islands. 

The spirit of friendship and cooperation between the United States 

and Russia did not survive World War II. The Berlin Blockade in 1948 

and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia marked the lowering of an 

Iron Curtain across Europe. On the other side of the world, the advance 

of communist forces across northern China convinced many in the West 

that the communists sought to extend their hegemony over the Far East. 

In June 1948 General MacArthur, the Far East commander, warned 

Washington that communist successes in China raised the specter of Soviet access to air bases from which it could threaten Japan. Reassessing 

the image of the Ryukyus in the light of this threat, he strongly favored 

retaining and developing the Okinawan bases. ' Reiterating MacArthur's 

dark scenario, U.S. Air Force officials noted that Sino-Soviet air operations from the Shanghai area could easily mount an attack against the 

now sparsely defended Ryukyus.2 

Military realities in the Far East were also being discussed in the 

National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that if China 

fell , Taiwan might also be occupied, thus threatening Japan from a previously safe quarter. In such a situation Okinawa's neglected military 

facilities, so near to Taipei, took on new significance. In October 1948 

the council recommended to President Truman that the United States 

retain Okinawan facilities on a long-term basis and develop these "and 

such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be 

necessary in the Ryukyu Islands.'" Significantly, the National Security 

Council paper, NSC 13/3, which was approved by Truman and became 

official policy on 6 May 1949, also included a statement that, while not 

so central to the thinking of the president's military advisors, certainly 

'Msg, MacArthur to Under Sec. Army (William H. Draper), 7 11.94-9- 1648, 12 Jun 48, PRUS 

1948. Vol. VI The Far East lind Australia, p. 8 19; msg, CINCFE to DA, Nr. C-65590, 20 Nov 48, 

sub: Strategic estimate, CCS File 383.21 Japan (3- 13-45) Sec. 20, RG 2 18. 

2/-1islory oj7iw!l/lil!lh Air Force (AF-DS-U3A) I July through 31 December 1950, Histori cal Office, 

Twentieth Air Force (Capt Richard Bergman), 24 Mar 5 1. Copy at Office of Air Fo rce Histo ry, 

mi crofilm M7004. index 1184; HQ RYCOM, Annual Historical Rpt. for 1950 to CINCFE, Feb 51. 

AlA 314.7, p. 20, File Histori cal Report-RYCOM (29th Inr. Regt.) 1950, RG 407. 

JNSC 13/2, Report By the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respec t to 

United States Poli cy Toward Japan, 7 Oct 48 with separate recommended paragraph 5 subm itted 

on 26 Oct 48. FRUS 1948, Vol. VI The Far East and Allstralia, pp. 858-62 and 877. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 155 

loomed large in the minds of his political subordinates whose concern 

remained focused on relations with the Japanese and on the political and 

economic implications of a sustained military presence on Okinawa. The 

Department of State had accepted the need for military facilities in the 

Ryukyus for a protracted period, but in order to "establish political and 

economic security" in the islands, as the wording of its proposed amendment to NSC 13/2 had stated, the United States should "promptly formulate and carry out a program ... for the economic and social wellbeing . .. of the natives," a program that would lead to the "eventual 

reduction to a minimum" of Okinawa's deficit economic condition.' Officials in the Department of State were driven to insist on this ambitious 

program for very practical reasons. They, along with their colleagues in 

the defense establishment, had come to realize that a sustained and expanding military presence in the Ryukyus was incompatible with existing 

procedures for funding military government efforts in the islands. Unlike 

the home-island Japanese, whose economic infrastructure had survived 

the war in far better shape than Okinawa's, the citizens of Okinawa were 

in no position to underwrite occupation costs, even if the United States 

wished to oblige them to do so. True, military government officers had 

devised a system of income taxes and payroll deductions, admi nistered 

by local officials, to cover the cost of labor and materials used in local 

indigenous government programs, but apart from their willingness and 

ability to supply labor for such projects, the Ryukyuans lacked the capacity in the foreseeable future to materially support their own 

reconstruction . 

Since the surrender of Japan, military officials in Washington had 

argued that the Ryukyus were Japanese, were a part of occupied Japan, 

and that the costs of work by American forces, including military government, which benefitted the occupied area should be supported as far 

as possible by nonreimbursed commodities, materials, and services provided by Japanese themselves through Headquarters, Far East Command, 

in Tokyo. Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., outlined 

this position quite clearly in a letter to Assistant Secretary of State Charles 

E. Saltzman in August 1948: 

... U.S. appropriated funds cannot be expended in an occupied area for indigenous 

materials and labor which are employed for the benefit of any such occupied area. In 

such cases, the costs of such items constitute occupation costs and, therefore, are chargeable against the indigenous economy. The Department of the Army has, heretofore, considered that the Ryu kyu Islands, as a prefecture of Japan, remain a legal responsibility 

~NSC 13/3, 6 May 49. The NSC paper is Quoted in FRUS 1949, Vol. VII The Far East and 

Alll'lralia, Part 2. pp. 730- 36. Sec also JCS 1380 series, especially the appendix to JCS 1380/62, 9 

May 49, pp. 464-465, file: CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13- 45) sec. 21, RG 218. 
156 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

of the Japanese Government. and hence has assumed . . . that appropriated funds could 

not be used to pay for indigenous Japanese materials and labor utilized for the benefit 

of the Ryukyu Islands.' 

Although Army officials reali zed that Tokyo's recovery remained fragile 

during the late 1940s, they were also convinced that the Japanese were 

more than able to contribute to the cost of military government. In fact 

in fiscal year 1951 alone Japan would provide $297 million for the support 

of the American occupation forces in the home islands· 

Department of State officials, however, were not so concerned with 

economic matters, but were looking ahead to relations with a soon-to-be 

sovereign Japan. They were aware that the language in the forthcoming 

peace treaty would grant the United States administrative control over 

the Ryukyus for an indeterminate period, while leaving open the question 

of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the islands.' A sovereign Japan 

could hardly be expected to provide material support for an American 

occupation of an area over which it retained only an implied sovereignty 

at best. The obvious short-term solution was for the United States to 

assume that portion of the burden now borne by the Japanese citizens. 

Essentially, the Department of State sought to have this commitment 

expressed at the highest level when it proposed that the National Security 

Council endorse a pay-as-you-go policy designed to free occupied Japan 

from the burden of underwriting Okinawan occupation costs. President 

Truman approved such a formula on 6 May 1949 as an amended paragraph five to the NSC policy statement on Japan and the Ryukyus: 

. . . the United States national policy toward the Ryukyu Islands . . . requires that the 

United States Armed Forces and other government agencies stationed therein pay their 

way to the extent necessary and practical . . . that these Islands must then no longer be 

financially dependent upon or obligated to any other occupied area. M 

General MacArthur, who was especially concerned with the economic 

and administrative ramifications of occupation costs, had been espousing 

a similar position since 1947. His headquarters had been obliged to underwrite the occupation costs for the Ryukyu Islands without reimbursement, an administrative and economic burden on the home islands. The 

Far East commander always considered that the rehabilitation of Japan 

was his primary duty, and he sought relief from the drain on the Japanese 

people imposed by his obligations to the military government efforts on 

Okinawa. Ideally, MacArthur wanted a new funding policy established 

Ltr, Draper to Saltzman. 18 Aug 48. File: P & 0 014.1- TS (Section I) (Cases I), RG 31 9. 

6U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations, Hearings: Appropriations/or Foreign Aid 

for the Fiscal Y('(lr Ending Jlllle 30. 1951. 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950. pp. 489. 539. 543. 

Tfhe term "residual sove reignt y" was first enunciated by John Foster Dulles at the 195 1 San 

Francisco Peace Treaty Conference. but was not included in the treaty itself. 

' NSC 13/3. 6 May 49. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 157 

under which the armed services and other government agencies on Okinawa would seek separate, direct appropriations from Congress for their 

particular programs.' Acceptance of the Department of State's position 

by the National Security Council, therefore, represented a victory for 

MacArthur as well as for the economy of Okinawa. 

But the Department of State's interests in the island clearly transcended questions of economic policy or MacArthur's administrative burdens. Important political considerations were also involved in a policy 

that looked to a protracted American presence on Okinawa. State was 

particularly insistent on achieving the "economic and social well-being" 

of the occupied islands as a prerequisite for political stability among the 

population-an environment the president's advisors argued was essential to both the long-term success of the American base policy and American diplomatic relations with Japan. In essence, the Department of State 

posited and President Truman accepted the proposition that the success 

of America's Far Eastern policy depended in large measure on military 

government programs fostering political stabilization on Okinawa. Failure to do so might threaten American bases with social and political 

upheaval born of Cold War pressures in Asia. 

Whatever the limitations of the land with its meager natural resources 

and of a population with little to sell but its labor, a viable economic and 

social base would now have to be created that went beyond restoring 

prewar levels of development. Continued, and expanded, American aid 

would be necessary to launch such energetic programs. The United States 

would somehow have to prime the pump, since Okinawa itself- never 

self-sustaining, even in prewar days-had neither the human nor the 

material resources necessary to reshape itself into a society along the lines 

the president, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs felt 

necessary. 

The National Security Council position boded well for the Ryukyuan 

economy, but it also ushered in a period of intense soul-searching in 

Washington and the Far East Command over the wholly inadequate physical and economic conditions in the islands. In May 1949 the Department 

of State sent anthropologist Douglas L. Oliver from its Office of Far 

Eastern Affairs to survey the situation in both Japan and the Ryukyus. 

Oliver, though mindful of the strides made by military government programs in the immediate postwar period in the Ryukyus, was extremely 

critical of the lack of progress during the next three years. He detailed 

the failures of the command both in terms of military preparedness and 

' See msg, SCAP (MaCArthur) to JCS, C57842, 8 Jan 48. See also, msg, CINCFE to CG RYCOM , 

I Apr 49, File: RYCOM April 1- 15, 1950, RG 9, MacArthur Archives. 
158 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

the program for social and economic development. Oliver's report moved 

his superiors at the Department of State to draft a new directive for the 

command, which they sent along to the assistant secretary of the Army, 

expressing the hope that such a document, distributed to all echelons of 

the island's military government, would go far in meeting the need for 

"steady progress." '· 

The Army leadership in Washington responded to the Oliver report, 

with its dire tone, by sending Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. 

Voorhees in September on an unannounced inspection trip, ostensibly to 

examine the damage caused by typhoon Gloria. Voorhees was primarily 

responsible within the department for matters pertaining to occupied 

areas. He obviously intended to investigate not only physical damage, 

but also the conditions described by Oliver, by the Army's Inspector 

General in March 1949, and by the popular media." His inspection confirmed the deplorable state of facilities on Okinawa. Even the rubble 

generated by the typhoons could not mask the effects of some three years 

of Washington's relative bureaucratic neglect in practically every area of 

American endeavor on Okinawa, from military construction to military 

government economic planning. Voorhees acknowledged that the only 

real progress made in restoring a prewar standard of economic development on Okinawa had been planned and undertaken some years before 

with a minimum of financial and material support from the Far East 

Command in Tokyo. His acceptance of these realities was significant 

because it indicated that the Department of the Army was ready to accept 

the Department of State's assessment: something was wrong with the 

administration of the island bastion and something had to be done to 

revitalize its defenses and its social and economic base. 

Unlike previous investigations, the Voorhees trip and a subsequent 

visit by Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins in October produced immediate results. Collins replaced the incumbent Commanding General, 

Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, with Maj. Gen. Josef 

R. Sheetz. Sheetz, whose most recent assignment was as chief military 

government officer in Korea, was well known in the Army and the press 

as an energetic officer (Time described him as a ".convivial hustler")." 

He was almost immediately joined by Maj. Gen. Alvin C. Kincaid, who 

assumed command of the Twentieth Air Force on Okinawa in June and 

IOLtr, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, DOS, to Deputy to Asst SecA, 29 Jul 49, FRUS 

1949, Vol. VII The Far EaSf and Australia, Part 2, pp. 815-6. 

I'Ryukyus Command and Unit Historical Reports- 1949, p. 2, File "Command Rpt.-Ryukyus 

Command Pt. # 1 1949," RG 407. Reporting on conditions in March 1949, the Army's Inspector 

General, Maj Geo Louis A. Craig, noted that li ving conditions and recreational facilities for American servicemen on Okinawa were far below accepted Army standards. 

12Time 54 (28 Nov 49):24. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 159 

who also enjoyed an activist reputation in military circles. Both men 

possessed clear mandates to rehabilitate their respective areas of the island bastion. 

Sheetz began by recruiting a force of 60 to 80 military government 

planners from the Far East Command staff in Toyko to assist him. He 

said he wanted them to act "as a kind of junior SCAP for Okinawa." To 

all members of his new command he announced: "you are ambassadors 

without portfolio of the United States Government." And to the press 

he observed: "the United States had more than a strategic interest in the 

islands. It carries with it the moral responsibility of a Christian people 

to others."" 

Sheetz enjoyed considerable support from MacArthur's headquarters 

in Japan and from the Army Staff in Washington. He presided over the 

initiation of an expanded construction program that included $22 million 

for military housing, with procurement of materials and services being 

made as far as possible in the Ryukyus. He made the stipulation so that 

the program, although designed for military purposes, would serve to 

stimulate the civilian economy as well. Sheetz was also able to take advantage of increased appropriations in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds to stimu late economic rehabilitation through 

expanded military government programs. 

Sheetz undertook a number of economic initiatives within his command. He secured a trade agreement with Far East Command under 

which the Ryukyus might purchase $9 million of goods in exchange for 

Japanese purchases of Ryukyuan goods-a measure intended to retain 

the powerful Far East commander's support for the program's particulars 

by insuring increased economic development in both occupied areas. 

Sheetz also declared his intention to carry out the recommendations of 

the agricultural mission led by Raymond E. Vickery and welcomed a 

financial and general economic team from MacArthur's headquarters to 

help him devise a coordinated economic and fiscal plan for the islands. 

After less than one month on the job Sheetz could report to General 

MacArthur that: 

In my opinion, the conduct of the troops is improving. The local nati ve officials are 

demonstrating that they can handle the added responsibilities which we are passing to 

them progressively. The native people 3re anticipating an improvement in their economic 

conditions. In short, Sir, although we have barely scratched the surface on the things to 

be done, I am confident that we 3rc on the right track.14 

While Department of State officials welcomed Sheetz's moves, they 

uQuoted by Frank Gibney in "Okinawa: Forgotten Island," Time 54 (28 Nov 49):24, 

I·Ltr, Maj Gen J.R. Sheetz to MaCArthur, 25 Nov 49. VIP File No. 20-Sheetz. RG 10, MacArthur 

Archives. 
160 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

were also pleased to note that a draft directive which had originated in 

their Far Eastern Affairs Office was being widely circulated." Addressed 

to the Far East commander on 30 November, the draft directive reaffirmed MacArthur's responsibilities for the administration of the Ryukyus and referred to the proposed "new" government in the area as the 

"U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands." The directive set 

forth a number of semantic changes. The title military governor, for example, became simply governor, but the individuals occupyi ng this post 

and their duties remained unchanged. All principal figures in the island 

administration continued to be military officers. The Army continued to 

use the terms military government officer and civil affairs officer interchangeably, further blurring the distinction between the military government years and the emerging concept of a civil admi nistration. The 

directive spelled out as a general policy the idea that the economic and 

social progress ordained by the president in May was to be achieved " to 

the maximum extent by the efforts of the Ryukyuans themselves." The 

directive also called for broadening the base of self-government "through 

legislative, executive and judicial organs established in accordance with 

democratic principles" and for adopting basic laws "promulgated by 

elected representatives." Finally, the directive looked to a cultural and 

educational program that fostered the arts and sciences and enlightened 

civil consciousness "with due regard for the existing culture." 

The Department of State officials also called for an " indirect" administration that would operate through Ryukyuan governmental authorities. 

To that end they listed in some detail the development of civilian government, beginning at the local or muni cipal level with the appointment 

of native counterparts to the principal officers of the military government. 

The directive also outlined the legal, economic, educational, and technical 

changes needed to transform the Ryukyuans into a modern, democratic 

society. 

In discussing the relationships that were to prevail between the Americans and the islanders, the directive broke new ground. It called for 

authorizing local poli ce, in the absence of military police, to arrest and 

detain members of the armed forces when observed in the commission 

of a felony. It ordered that members of the armed forces and their dependents be made aware of the basic objectives of military government, 

so that a " mutual feeling of friendship and respect is fostered between 

the natives and U.S. personnel." To that end and in view of the acute 

shortage of arable land to support the local economy, it called on the 

'$Memo, Asst. SccState for Far Eastern Affa irs to SecStatc , 12 Dec 49, FRUS 1949, Vol. VII The 

Far East alld Australia, Part 2, pp. 912- 913. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 161 

armed forces to keep their use of such land to an "absolute minimum 

consistent with the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives."" 

General Sheetz would use the provisions of this draft directive to guide 

his military and societal reforms. General MacArthur did not issue a 

formal directive until 5 December 1950, almost a year later." By that 

time experiences with military government had dictated minor changes 

in the draft, but the Far East Command remained true to the basic policies 

suggested by the Department of State. The command recognized and 

retained the dual obligation to update and maintain strategically important military facilities whi le encouraging and supporting the development 

of the Ryukyuan economy and society. When these obligations fostered 

mutually exclusive programs, achieving an acceptable balance was the 

responsibility of the civil affairs officers. 

Revitalized Construction Efforts 

The Department of the Army recognized that it would take more than 

energetic military government leadership to rejuvenate Okinawa." Carefu lly designed military construction programs, especially ones that would 

provide jobs for and facilities within the civilian sector, and the appropriated funds to carry out these programs were also needed. Under Secretary Voorhees dispatched a number of experts in various fields to devise 

the necessary plans. One group of skilled Army, Air Force, and civ ilian 

engineers, headed by Army Brig. Gen. George J. Nold, Assistant Chief 

of Engineers for Military Construction, conducted a thorough study of 

military construction requirements on the island in October 1949. The 

Nold mission developed a master plan with a special emphasis on typhoon-resistant structures utili zing reinforced concrete and concrete 

block construction. Typhoon Gloria had convinced the engineers that, 

given the excessive annual losses from storm damage, the United States 

could no longer depend on temporary construction in the Ryukyus.19 

Many of the Twentieth Air Force's temporary structures that had not 

lloproposed directive, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Nov 49, annex to memo, Asst. SecStat e for Far Eastern 

Affairs to SecState, 12 Dec 49, FRUS 1949, Vol. VII Tlte Far East and Allstralia, Part 2, pp. 913-

917. 

'7The Ryukyuan Command was officially redesignated the U.S. Civil Administration of the 

Ryukyu Islands on 15 December 1950. See Memo, JCS 10 CINCFE, SM-2474-50, II Oct 50, File 

CCS 383.2 1 POA (1-12-45), Sec. 3, RG 2 18. The memo derived from JCS 1231 / 14, 4 Oct 50; GHQ 

FECOM, Directive AG 091.1 (5 Dec 50) RCA, 5 Dec 50. sub: Directive for the United States Civil 

Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers. 

"The National Security Act of 26 July 47 had redesignated the War Department as the Departmcnt of the Army. 

"Col T.A. Lane, CE, "Construction on Okinawa," Military Engineer 44. No. 302 (Nov-Dec 52): 

418. 
162 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

been destroyed by Gloria's high winds had been so badly twisted and 

damaged as to be unsafe. Their subsequent demolition had to be added 

to the storm's destructive toll. Temporary construction was proving to 

be economically shortsighted- Far East Air Forces estimated that between September 1945 and Gloria's aftermath more than $10 million had 

been spent restoring essential t empora ry structures damaged by 

typhoons. 2• 

The Nold mission emphasized joint-use projects, such as roads, 

bridges, utilities, and harbors that would benefit both the military establishment and the local economy. This was not the first instance where 

Army planners developed programs for road and bridge construction on 

Okinawa, but the Nold mission represented something significantly different: for the first time military construction efforts on the island were 

to focus on facilities that would not only clearly serve the military mission, 

but at the same time would actively stimulate local civilian economic 

activity by providing jobs, water, power, and improved transport for native laborers and products. In November the Far East commander approved the mission's specifi c recommendations for construction. 

To devise a military construction program along the lines recommended by the Nold mission, Under Secretary Voorhees sent a team of 

economic planners and budget expediters under Robert A. Martino and 

Lt. Col. F. C. Norvell to Okinawa in November. The team developed 

plans for numerous joint-use projects. Roads, harbor facilities, public 

utilities, and military housing were all to be rehabilitated. At the same 

time, Martino and Norvell concentrated on giving Okinawa a face lift, 

ameliorating its image as a physical junk pile. The vast acreage of rusting 

vehicles and other equipment dumped on Okinawa by the Far East Command in Tokyo would be rehabilitated; the "junk" vehicles and equipment would be reclassified as scrap to be shipped back to the United 

States or surveyed and turned over to the civilians as scrap for recycling 

in local industries. The efforts of Voorhees, Nold, Martino, Norvell, and 

many others resulted in an integrated military construction programone in which even strictly military construction would stimulate the civil 

economy-under the direction of the District Engineer, Okinawa Engineer District." 

These ambitious plans could not come to fruition , however, until 

Congress provided adequate monies from the special Government and 

WMaj Gen James B. Newman, Jr., USAF, "Air Force Construction on Okinawa," The Military 

Engineer 42, No. 287 (May- June 1950): 172. 

llMsg, DA Conference IT No. 2839 to Conferees. 23 Nov 49, orc of History, C of E, Fi le 12; 

USCAR, 01',.1 Affairs Actilrities ill the Ryukyu Islands /or the Period Ending 31 December 1952, Vol. 

I, No. I, p. 5, copy in CMH Library. Sec also "MG Officials Set Plans to Beautify Okinawa," Slars 

alld Stripes. Pacific ed., 14 Nov 49. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 163 

Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) fund and from military construction 

funding. Before fiscal year 1950 all Government and Relief in Occupied 

Areas procurement for Okinawa came directly from the United States. 

Beginning with 1950, however, Congress directed that, whenever possible, 

supplies for the Ryukyus reconstruction program should be procured in 

Japan. It did this because Japanese traders had been having difficulty 

with foreign sales due to Japan's lack of diplomatic status and the economic rehabilitation of Japan was viewed in Washington as an American 

responsibility. Congress, therefore, insisted on a "double use of the dollar" approach to reconstruction on Okinawa; that is, insofar as possible, 

the American occupation officials on Okinawa were to spend appropriated funds in the Japanese marketplace. For fiscal year 1950 civil affairs 

planners anticipated spending over $19 million in Japan for men and 

material committed to Ryukyu construction, thereby enabling the Congress to take appropriated funds from one pocket to put into another, 

through the "double use of the dollar" concept. 

Despite this careful planning, the question remained whether Congress would in fact appropriate the necessary funds. In May 1949 President Truman wrote to Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House 

Committee on Appropriations, in support of increased expenditures for 

the Ryukyus: 

Only by the continuance of this program could we expect the people in those areas 

eventually to become self-supporting. I feel that provision of an amount adequate to carry 

on the [GARIOA] program ... at the level requested will, in the long run , reduce the 

overall cost of accomplishing our occupation responsibilities.22 

Later that autumn, Pentagon officials also began to lobby Congress 

on behalf of the expanded Ryukyuan military construction program. Because of the sense of near emergency surrounding the Okinawa budget 

request, Congress took the unusual step of agreeing to the funds for the 

year quickly without a lengthy prior justification process. To aid that 

step, the Pentagon's representatives agreed to submit the necessary rationale later. 23 In January 1950, Under Secretary Voorhees provided part 

of that rationale and defended appropriations not only for that fiscal year 

but also for subsequent years. Noting that "facilities of all kinds on Okinawa are extremely poor and inadequate," Voorhees outlined the Army's 

plan to use Japanese and Okinawan labor and materials to redeem this 

situation." His proposals coincided nicely with the will of Congress, 

which responded with an initial combined Army-Air Force military reHLtr, Truman to Cannon, 26 May 49, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman 

Library. 

Blanc. "Construction on Okinawa," p. 419. 

NLtr. Voorhees to Cannon , 16 Jan 50. File: Office of the Military Secretary, RG 5, MacArthur 

Archives. 
164 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

• • 

•• •• •• •• -

GARIOA REHABILITATION PROJECTS. Naha Cily IValer supply ;yslem IVilh 

housing development in background (/953 photograph). 

construction budget of approximately $74 million for fiscal year 1950. 

Within a matter of weeks the lawmakers in Washington also authorized 

$25 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds. " Subsequent appropriations increased the initial funding for fiscal year 1950 

considerably and gave the engineers hope that funding for construction 

in later fiscal years would be assured.'· In January this hope was realized 

when Congress authorized an additional $37.8 million in Government 

and Relief in Occupied Areas funds through fiscal year 1952 and authorized construction, much of it housing construction, to proceed." 

In June 1950 the Ryukyus Command solicited bids for the rehabilitation of Okinawa's Bucknerville water system, and, for the first time, 

solicited bids from Japanese contractors. American, Filipino, and Japanese contractors all bid competitively on the fixed price (lump sum) contracts, which were drawn to American standard specifications." With a 

few exceptions, Japanese contractors underbid their competitors, and 

most Filipino and American contractors withdrew from the Okinawan 

market by the end of 1950. Regardless of which national group held the 

~} Lanc, "Construction on Okinawa." p. 419: msg. Voorhees to MacArthur. WAR 95 122. 5 Oct 

49. sub: Constructio n on Okinawa. Ofc o f History. C o f E. Fi le 12; memo. Asst. Sec State for Far 

Eastern Affairs to Sec State. 12 Dec 49, FRUS 1949. Vol. VII The Far East lind Australia, Part 2, 

p.912. 

~"' Hi story of the Okinawa Enginee r Dist ri ct. Aug 66. p. 2: memo. Chi e f o f Engineers (Maj Gcn 

Lewis A. Pick) to Directo r of Logisti cs, GSUSA. 8 Feb 50, sub: Defense of the Army's Fiscal Year 

195 1 Construction Program . Ofc of History. C of E. Fi le 12. 

"RYCOM HiSlorical Rpl" 1950. PP. 2-3. RG 407. 

!-Ibid .. pp. 4-9. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 165 

principal contracts, the local population began to benefit from the construction boom as thousands of Okinawans, especially after November 

195 1, were hired to assist with the construction programs on the island. 

The construction boom and the opening of bidding to everyone 

spawned the growth of at least two indigenous Okinawan construction 

firms. Founded before the war, the Kokuba-Gumi (company) in 1949 

became the first Okinawan prime contractor to beat out Japanese and 

Filipino competitors for a major joint-use construction project, the Chibana Bridge. This successful undertaking led to the award of other military construction projects for the company and its president, Kokuba 

Kotaro, including numerous roads on American bases, the Makiminato 

(Machi nato) Ordnance Work, and the American military hospital in Chatan Son. A second construction firm , the Oshiro-Gumi, soon joined in 

the economic expansion, thereby facilitating the task of military government economic planners by assuring more local jobs and consumer 

revenues. " 

Despite interruptions and the shortage of men and equipment caused 

by the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the rehabi litation of buildings, 

runways, roads, harbor facilities, and utilities continued without serious 

pause. Okinawa was on its way to becoming a major island bastion in 

the American network of overseas bases. In addition to its large contingent 

of construction troops, the Ryukyus Command included a number of 

combat units, including the 29th Infantry, at a peace-time strength of 85 

officers and some 2,000 men, and the 97th Antiaircraft Artillery G roup, 

consisting of the 22d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion and the 65th 

AAA Gun Battalion. More important, the command played host to the 

Twentieth Air Force, whose rapidly expanding components included the 

22d and 307th Bomb Groups, the 19th Bomb Wing, Medium, and the 

51 st Fighter Interceptor Wing. These units, along with the 6332d Air 

Base Wing, the 529th Aircraft Control and Warning Group, and the 93 1 st 

Engineer Aviation Group were deployed at Okinawa's two major air facilities, Kadena Air Base and Naha Air Base. JO 

The continually enlarging presence of air units in the islands set the 

priority for construction. In July 1950 Far East Air Forces made $2.5 

1~ h Katoh, Tf/f(' Okinawan Spirit, pp. 6 1-63; interview. Freimuth with the author. 1 May 85. 

_1IIAt the conclusion of World War II, Army Air Force units on Okinawa were part of the Eighth 

Air Force. whi ch joined the war in the Pac ifi c after V-E Day. In June 1946 the 1st Air Division 

succeeded the Eighth Air Force, units of which remained on Okinawa as components of the I sl Air 

Division. On I Dec 48 the Th irteenth Air Force transferred. less personnel and equ ipment. from 

Ihe Phi lippines to Okinawa and succeeded the 1st Air Division. whi ch was inactivated. In mid-May 

49. the Twentieth Air Force transferred. less personnel and equ ipment. to Okinawa. and the Thi rteenth Air Force returned to the Philippines. Thirteenth Air Force units on Okinawa then became 

components of the Twentieth Air Force. Histori cal Data. Twentieth Air Force. July-December 1949. 

Vol. I. p. I. copy at Office of Air Force History. mi crofilm A7723. index 1165. 
166 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

million available for expansion of runways and hardstand extension and 

maintenance at Kadena. It also earmarked $2 million for the rehabilitation of Yontan, Bolo, and Futema auxiliary airstrips with the construction of new runways, taxiways, and service aprons. " This construction 

marked the beginning of a growing Air Force presence on Okinawa that, 

with periodic expansions and contractions, would remain even after reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan a generation later. 

Although air base construction won highest priority, General Sheetz 

was particularly mindful of the connection between troop morale and the 

relationships with the islanders, and between troop morale and improved 

housing and recreational facilities for servicemen and their dependents. 

He wanted to emphasize this area of construction in 1950, and both the 

Ryukyus Command and the Twentieth Air Force featured a high proportion of recreational facilities and troop housing projects in their plans 

for that fiscal year. Included among these projects was an innovative 

program that involved a high concentration of local civilian employees. 

At the beginning of fiscal year 1950, the Ryukyus Command demonstrated ingenuity in combining the need for more military housing with 

military government's efforts to rebuild the local economy. The terrible 

storms of 1949 had severely damaged numerous structures and created an 

acute housing shortage for the services. General Sheetz had no extraordinary funds to rehabilitate these dilapidated buildings except Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds, but these monies could legally 

be used only to support military government programs to directly benefit 

the Okinawan economy-the funds could not be employed to rebuild 

desperately needed military housing. The Ryukyus Command's expedient 

was to declare 438 battered quonset huts as surplus, to be released to the 

Ryukyuan native government. Once this transfer was accomplished, Government and Reliefin Occupied Areas funds could be 'used to rehabilitate 

the quonsets, using local labor and materials. The refurbished units could 

then be rented back to the military forces, thereby achieving both original 

objectives: creating additional housing for American servicemen, while 

at the same time providing both funds and employment for the local 

economy." 

To expedite this program, military government headquarters chartered a quasi-governmental corporation, the Okinawa Housing Corpol' Hislory Twelllieth Air Force (AF- DA- V3AJ I July throllgh 31 December 1950, Historical Office, 

Twentieth Air Force (Capt Richard Bergman), 24 Mar 5 1, microfilm roll M7004, index 1184; Histo rical Data, Twenti eth Air Force, Jan- Jun 50 , Vol. I, pp. 392-3, 413-5, micro film A7224, index 

15 12. Both at Office o f Air Force History. 

n u .S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings: Appropriations/or Foreign Aid 

for lhe Fiscal Year Ending JUlie 30. 195 1, 81 sl Cong., 2d sess., 1950, p. 542; Itf, Comptroller Gen of 

the U.S. (W.L. Morrow) to Sec Army, 8 - 114950 , 17 Aug 53, Freimuth Papers. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 167 

ration, and released the quonsets to that corporate entity. By March 1950, 

thirty-two additional rehabilitation housing and recreational projects involving the services of local artisans and laborers had been developed.J3 

The new construction, along with other command initiatives to make 

life more enjoyable for servicemen, including establishment of an islandwide bus service for the troops, American banking facilities, and even a 

privately-owned local English-language newspaper, all began to transform 

popular attitudes toward assignment to the islands. Along with the increased workload and the quickened tempo of construction and rehabilitation came a growing sense among officers and men alike of the 

importance of their mission. Okinawa was no longer a quiet backwater 

of the Far East Command. General Sheetz could report a marked improvement in morale in 1950, a transformation made complete some two 

years later when a survey revealed that the island had come to be considered a welcome duty assignment by officers and men of the Far East 

Command." The civil population benefitted in at least three ways from 

the transformation of service life on the island. The Okinawan economy 

derived considerable gain from the use of the roads, utilities, and harbor 

facilities that resulted from the expanding building effort. At the same 

time, thousands of Okinawans were hired to assist with the construction 

boom on the island. Finally, as more and more military personnel gladly 

accepted duty on the island, the civilians were exposed to fewer of those 

malcontent servicemen whose attitude had caused so much misery just 

a few years earlier. 

The Land Issue 

These benefits were purchased at dear cost to the traditional Ryukyuan way of life. As discussed earlier, the physical configuration of the 

islands was such that the same arable soil that supported the growth of 

rice and sweet potatoes was the only land appropriate for airfields and 

ammunition dumps. From the first days of the occupation, therefore, a 

competition over land had existed between those officials charged with 

creating a strategic base for military operations and those assigned to the 

care and rehabilitation of Okinawan society. President Truman's approval 

of NSC 13/3 had continued, not ameliorated, tensions between the strategic mission and the military government effort. The National Security 

Council program had imposed a mandate both to renew and expand the 

languishing base construction and to create a socio-economic foundation 

" RYCOM Historical Rpt., 1950, pp. 1-9, RG 407. 

14 Ibid.; Lane, "Construction on Okinawa," p. 420. 
168 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

that would support a long-term American presence. Revitalized base construction clearly would have an impact on a local economy. Both Congress 

and the military chiefs in Washington assumed that this impact would , be favorable, as appropriated funds created new jobs and improved the 

Okinawan standard of living. Perhaps even the civil affairs officers on 

the island were not fully aware of the adverse impact the base build-up 

would have, not only on local land use and therefore on local employment, 

but also on Ryukyuan-American relations in general. In fact, rather than 

improving relations, the National Security Council program only served 

to heighten the tug of war over land use, with the tactical forces seeking 

to absorb more and more acres for additional facilities while military 

government officials sought release of land already occupied by the military. It was an unequal contest; in every case civilian needs had to give 

way to the command's overriding military mission. The land issue that 

resulted from the appropriation of civilian holdings, no matter how economically favorable it might have seemed for the islanders, created a 

negative image of Americans in the minds of many Okinawans, so much 

so as to overshadow and eventually undermine many of the progressive 

programs undertaken by civil affairs officers. The question would sour 

Ryukyuan-American relations for years to come. 35 

Recognizing that 20 percent of the land under cultivation before the 

American invasion was now behind barbed wire or under concrete, General MacArthur admitted that military government was substantially burdened in its efforts to promote agricultural growth. On I July 1946 only 

11 ,000 acres of farm land had been in production on the island of Okinawa; by the end of 1947 that acreage had risen to between 40 and 

45,000- a remarkable increase and no mean triumph for military government's agricultural program. However, another 35,000 acres, at least 

70 percent of it arable, remained within the confines of military bases." 

In February 1948 James H. Boulware, a consultant in the Natural 

Resources Section of General MacArthur's headquarters, had recommended that units in the Ryukyus and elsewhere be directed to reevaluate 

their needs for agricultural land and that nonessential parcels of land be 

released for agricultural use." Subsequent efforts by General Sheetz and 

)SPasstime-KeYSfOlle News, Okinawa, Japan, Vol. 8-9, 1- 15 May 82, item: "Naha Suit Aginst U.S. 

Forces Land Use Starts." As recently as 1982, for example, the mayor of Naha sued the Japanese 

government in an effort to remove American installations from municipal land occupied without 

lease. }6GHQ SCAP, Political, Social and Economic Report on Ryukyus [sic] Islands for the Secretary 

of War, 11 Oct 47, p. 9, File: SCAP; Government Section, Occupation Reports Japan and Ryukyus, 

RG 5, MacArthur Archives. 

l1Memo for record, James H. Boulware, NT. 309 (20 Feb 48) A, 20 Feb 48. sub: Agricultural 

Conditions in the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 169 

others on Okinawa resulted in the release of some acreage by the Army 

and Navy, but very little. In mid-1950 military reservations still occupied 

over 17 percent of Okinawa's territory." And this token shift in land 

usage from military to civilian priorities would be more than wiped out 

by the impact of the Korean War. By 1954 military installations and their 

supporting areas once aga in occupied 26 percent of Okinawa's total land 

area. 

Statistics alone did not reveal the full nature of the problem. Once 

the soil had been graded and paved over or oiled for use as a road, 

hardstand, or airstrip, fertility suffered considerably, and it was extremely 

difficult, if not impossible, to make the ground once again workable with 

hand implements. The American military presence, therefore, not only 

affected the bucolic nature of Okinawan society, it altered the nature of 

the soil itself. 

In an effort to increase the amount of land under cultivation, civil 

affairs officers were able from the first to convince commanders of some 

military installations, including Kadena Air Force Base, to permit farming within the installations' boundary fences. Although statistics on how 

many additional acres were farmed as a result of these efforts are not 

exact, it is unlikely that the number was very great. And, after 1948, when 

another American action established and enforced the so-called "onemile limit," even this modest effort was undermined. 

Since the beginning of the garrison phase of operations Army officers 

had imposed sundry restrictions upon civilian use of land directly adjacent to military installations and housing areas. One such restrictionone of the more galling to the civilians and more injurious to the agricultural effort-was the "one-mile limit" which prohibited any native 

structure within one mile of any dependent housing or military billet of 

100 or more soldiers. The prohibition, which was prompted by General 

Eagles' concerns about health and sanitation, was reiterated in a succession of military government directives and was enforced, sometimes very 

reluctantly, by the native police.39 The public rationale for this particular 

distance was that one mile was estimated to be just outside the flying 

range of a mosquito. The fact that a mosquito need not fly to travel 

between native huts and American billets, since the larvae, borne in the 

run-offs of sudden rains, could easily penetrate within a one-mile radius, 

did not seem to be a consideration in drafting the restrictive directives. 

JI"Land Usc in 1950, Okinawa Gunto," RYllkyus Statistical Bul/elill, No.6, June 1950, p. 57, 

Fre imuth Papers. 

19MG Directive No.3, 18 Jan 49, sub: Building Permits; MG Directive No. 17, 17 Jun 49. MG 

Ordinance No. I, Change I, 13 Jul 49, and memo, Chief of Public Safety Section (Paul Skuse) to 

Acting Director, Government and Legal Dept. (Lt Col Andrews), undated, sub: History of the So~ 

Called "One Mile Limit," SkU5C Papers. 
170 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

In trying to enforce the one-mile limit in the name of san itation, 

Headquarters, Ryukyus Command, was working at cross purposes with 

the Military Government Section's goal of achieving maximum agricultural output. In certain less fertile sections of Okinawa the arbitrary limit 

was hardly noticed, but in the more intensely farmed areas, such as the 

Nakagami District in central Okinawa, it proved to be a real detriment 

to farming. In that particular district, well over half the land under cultivation fell within the one-mile limit. Tools and crops had to be carried 

over greater distances than would otherwise be necessary. Moreover farmers, who without the restriction could live nearer their plots, were now 

crowded into swollen settlement areas further away from their farms. In 

retrospect, it could be argued that the one-mile limit, designed to improve 

the overall sanitary situation on the island, might have had the opposite 

effect in some areas of Okinawa. 

In September 1949 the Vickery agricultural mission emphatically condemned the one-mile limit's adverse effects on agricultural productivity. 

Questioning the necessity for such restrictions, the group urged that "the 

restricted zone be drastically reduced."'o Despite the Vickery group's 

recommendation, the one-mile limit was neither eased nor eliminated for 

several more months. Nevertheless, the native Okinawans continued to 

test the restriction by trying to build closer than permitted to military 

facilities. Especially after a typhoon's visitation, during the confusion of 

civilian salvage efforts, the islanders invariably attempted to move their 

sundry structures nearer to American installations. 

Moreover, acquisition of land for military purposes flew in the face 

of the islanders recently acquired concept of land ownership. The notion 

of private ownership for the masses was less than a half-century old when 

the Americans arrived to establish bases on the islands. In earlier centuries a feudal system had prevailed under which the king allocated lands 

among his loyal nobles and organized the distribution of arable land 

among the villagers. Periodically, kings would adjust allocation of land 

to accommodate increases in population or equalize the tax burden 

among the villages. Gradually, the concept of land ownership developed 

in the urban areas of Naha and Shuri, where permanent buildings and 

business establishments were not adaptable to such adjustments and 

where the kings retained control of land to support their retinue. Elsewhere, land continued to be reallocated periodically, although a trend 

developed that left ancestral homesites in the hands of the same extended 

family groups." 

40Vickery Report, p. 22, Freimuth Papers. 

'''Clarence J. Glacken, The Great Loochoo: A SlIId)1 o/Okinllwa" Village Life (Berkeley and Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 124, 126. 
t 

TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 171 

In 1899 Tokyo had enacted an Okinawa Prefecture Land Reform Law 

which, along with initiating the last official redistribution of land, also 

ushered in the popular notion of land ownership for the masses for the 

first time in Ryuky uan history." Once established, the concept of private 

ownership quickly became deeply rooted in the Okinawan psyche. Since 

previously only the nobility or wealthy urban merchants owned land, land 

ownership became an important symbol of status. If at all possible, rural 

families sought to own rather than rent land. More important in a rural 

society where the extended family was the focus of daily life, plots of 

land that could be handed down from generation to generation served as 

concrete links to the entire family, past, present, and future. 

The Okinawan view of the soil differed widely from traditional American ways of evaluating real estate. In America, farms or ranches were 

often measured in hundreds or thousands of acres and such land was 

usually viewed as a business asset to be bought or sold as circumstances 

warranted. On Okinawa, where arable land was far less abundant, farm 

plots were not measured by the acre, but by the lsubo, a measure equivalent to 3.6 square meters, or approximately 36 square feet. Each tiny 

plot, however infertile, was psychologically important to the Okinawan 

farmer, who would never consider selling his land- his ancestral homesite 

and, in many cases, his ancestors' resting place- unless under the direst 

of circumstances. 43 To sell one's land was to lose a large measure of one's 

sense of identity. 

Most military government officials were sensitive to Okinawan attitudes toward the land and to the inevitable feelings of rootlessness experienced by Okinawans displaced by the base development program. As 

early as September 1945 the command's deputy commander for military 

government had raised the issue of land usage on Okinawa with his superior." Rear Adm. 1.0. Price's response clearly pledged the American 

forces to restore to civilians "as much of the area of Okinawa as is possible" and ordered civil affairs officers to indicate those areas desired for 

release for civilian use. His one caveat: the release of land was " subject 

to the approval of the Commandant."" Whatever land proposals military 

government officials might develop, therefore, remained subject to veto 

if, in the judgment of the tactical commanders, the land was needed by 

their units to carry out their military mission. 

Military government used the Price statement as a starting point for 

SCA , Study of the Land Problem in Okinawa, I Oct 55, Appendix I, pp. 1- 2, Freimuth 

Papers. 

HMorris, Tiger by Ihe Tail, p. 78. 

44Ltr, Dep Cmdr for MG to CG ASCOM I, 19 Sep 4 5, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

4sMemo, Commandant, NOB. to Deputy Commander for MG, 23 Oct 45, Serial 2320, Sub: 

Administrative and Economic Measures for Okinawa, Proposals for, Watkins Papers. RG 200. 
172 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

the eventual consideration of land claims. Headquarters issued a proclamation to the islanders promising to protect their " property rights."'· 

Although the term was clear in American law, the exact meaning of property rights was open to several confusing interpretations on Okinawa. A 

great deal of the confusion was caused by American ignorance of Okinawan property law and evidence of ownership. In December 1945, eight 

months after the American invasion, military government headquarters 

directed district commanders to assemble and preserve property records." This delay was understandable. Attempts to resettle the thousands 

of displaced refugees from military government camps to their home areas 

did not begin until October 1945. Moreover, so long as hostilities continued, civil affair officers were overwhelmed with responsibilities considerably more pressing than searching for property records. 

Once the search began, the results were disappointing. The American 

air raid of 10 October 1944 and the battle for the island had destroyed 

the Okinawa Prefectural Office in Naha, the police station, city hall, tax 

office, and post office. The great majority of their records, including, of 

course, deeds and real estate tax records, were lost along with the buildings 

themselves. Moreover, very few individual householders succeeded in 

preserving their own property records. To make matters worse, the evidence suggests that as American forces approached various other towns 

and ,villages, retreating Japanese units systematically destroyed the records. Such was the case in Nago, Onna, and other towns. Military government officers did, however, find some official records and newspaper 

archives extant in Nago, as well as some civil and police records in h oman." Taken as a whole, therefore, the land ownership picture created 

by the surviving documentation was very incomplete. 

The task of digesting such property records as could be found fell to 

the newly-created Real Estate Branch of the Okinawa Engineer District. 

Working with military government's General Affairs Department, the 

Real Estate Branch surveyed and delineated boundaries and prepared 

maps of tract locations. In February 1946 officers from the General Affairs Department of military government headquarters began to respond 

with what little they had in the way of land records to the increasing 

number of Okinawa title claims. Under the supervision of the General 

Affairs Department of the Okinawan Advisory Council, each mura appointed a mura land claims committee of five residents and for each aza 

(village section) an aza land claims committee of ten residents. Land 

SN MG Proclamation No. I- A, Articl e IV, 26 Nov 45, Watkins Papers, RG 200. 

41HQ USN Mi l. Govern" Okinawa, Di recti ve No. 63, 6 Dec 45, sub: Land Records- Assembling 

and Preservation of, RG 260. 

4'Bennc tt, "The Impact . .. on the Civilians," pp. 268. 270. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 173 

claimants lacking real documentation, a majority of the landowners coming forward at this time, could submit a declaration of ownership, along 

with a description of the land in question and the signatures of two 

witnesses who were neighbors. In those instances where the landowner 

had died, the next of kin could file for title 49 

These early claims were for the mere recognition of ownership. In 

those instances where American military facilities occupied the land in 

question, recognition of the owner's residual right to the land was about 

all he could hope to achieve. Despite whatever military government officers may have wanted, Headquarters, Island Command, had no intention of discussing compensation for such land usage in 1946, since the 

American point of view held that such land had been taken as an act of 

war and that under the Rules of Land Warfare no compensation was 

required.

50 The civil affairs officer's responsibility was to convince the 

tactical commanders that this position could be counterproductive for 

the occupation, since it might well lead to Ryukyuan-American estrangement. It was not an easy task, and it was complicated further by the fact 

that some military government officers failed to appreciate local attitudes 

toward private property, sharing instead the tactical commander's lack 

of awareness of what a time bomb the land use issue could be. 

Not all the land of Okinawa had been in private hands before the 

American invasion, of course. Certain parcels, particularly in and around 

the urban areas of Naha and Shuri, were public lands belonging to one 

agency or another of the Japanese government. Military government 

headquarters concluded that for the time being this land should not be 

released for private settlement. Its ultimate disposition would necessarily 

remain in doubt pending the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan 

and the Allied Powers. Until then, former property of the Japanese government and other unclaimed real estate and personal property became 

the responsibility of the Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian 

within Headquarters, Ryukyus Command. As of 1948 that office administered 2,243 parcels of land on Okinawa and another 84 on Oshima with 

a combined area of 1,339,044 tsubo (approximately 5,356,200 sq. yds.)." 

Such was military government's policy concerning private and public 

land claims. Although the system was inadequate, it was a commitment 

by military government headquarters to restore much of Okinawa's land 

to its proper owners. That commitment proved virtually impossible to 

HQ USN Mil. Govern .. Directi ve No. 121, 28 Feb 46. sub: Land Claims. Preparation of data 

concerning, Watkins Papers , RG 200. 

SOHiga, Politics ill Posfll'llr Okinawa, p. 42. 

S'Rpt, HQ RYCOM MG, Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian, 1948. TAGO Occupied 

Area Rpt.. File: Property- Ryukyu 1948, RG 407. 
174 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

keep during the late 1940s because of the inherent disparity between the 

landowners claims and the armed forces perceived need for land. By 1950 

the clamor for reimbursement for land usage threatened to make the 

American policy based on its interpretation of land taken as a legitimate 

consequence of war untenabl e. That clamor was expressed in the face of 

an increasing American need for land associated with base expansion in 

the Cold War era. It centered on the Real Estate Branch of the Okinawa 

Engineer District, which was responsible for making land appraisals and 

any other preparations necessary to initiate additional acquisitions. The 

branch proceeded with these tasks despite a lack of information about 

prewar land va lu es and th e absence of reli able Okinawan land 

appraisers. " 

While Okinawa's farmers raised the issue of land ownership and rental 

fees, tactical commanders continued to maintain that under the Rules of 

Land Warfare American forces were not legally obliged to compensate 

Okinawan landholders for the use of their land. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

however, were not interested in legal haggling, but rather in seeing that 

the Ryukyus Command secure the uninterrupted use of whatever land 

was necessa ry to sustain the American faci lities in the islands. Accordingly, in October 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the necessity 

of paying rentals for privately owned land. 53 Their willingness to end the 

argument was reflected in the directive for the U.S. Civil Administration 

issued by General MacArthur to the Ryukyuan commander, Maj. Gen. 

Robert B. McClure, on 5 December 1950. MacArthur ordered McClure 

to protect Okinawans from loss of property without due process, to give 

priority to land title determinations, and to pay rent for private property 

used by American forces before July 1950. Yet if some civilian landowners 

took hea rt from this statement, others must have been dismayed by 

MacArthur's further direction to McClure to secure title to any "real 

estate ... required permanently by the United States Government by 

pllrchase or throllgh condemnation" if necessary." Obviously, the 

accretion in American property holdings was to continue, and quite possibly in a manner that avoided any controversy about rental fees by permanently depriving the Okinawan landowner of any title whatsoever. 

Despite General MacArthur's commitment to deal forcefully but fairly 

with the land problem, its ultimate resolution proved elusive because so 

many different issues were involved. For example, the Far East comHWiliiam W. Vincent. U.S. Army Engineer Div., West Pacific. Summary of the U.S. Real Es tate 

Program in the Ryukyu Islands. 13 Sep 7 1. p. 2. Freimuth Papers; Morris. Tiger bJ' 'he Tail, pp. 73-

75. 

HJCS Directi ve 1231114.4 Oct 1950, RG 218. 

~Appe nd ix D, GHQ FECOM, Directi ve AG 091. 1 (5 Dec 50) RCA. 5 Dec 50. sub: Directi ve 

for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Freimuth Papers. Emphasis added. 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 175 

OKINAWANS RECEIVE PAVMENT FOR LAND acqllired by u.s. armed forces at 

Yontan. 

mander directed that Ryukyuans be paid rent for their property used by 

American forces prior to July 1950, but what constituted fair compensation? The Real Estate Division, formerly the Real Estate Branch, struggled with this question for some time and, with assistance from appraisers 

from the Hypothec Bank of Japan, proposed rental figures only to have 

them rejected by the dissatisfied owners." 

Many other Okinawan landowners resisted selling their tracts to the 

Americans. Condemnation, however, was an unpopular procedure considered by many nothing more than an American "land grab," and, in 

the end, the command tried to work out a program of 20-year leases with 

the landowners. Based on fee appraisals conducted by the Hypothec Bank, 

which fortunately possessed a good deal of data on prewar Okinawan 

land values, the Real Estate Division reached appraisals totalling approximately $10 million for 39,000 acres. They then calculated rentals 

for fiscal years 1951 and 1952 based on 6 percent of appraised value." 

HThe political dissatisfaction with the American failure to compensate landowners for requisitioned land during the period 1945-1950 grew gradually and reached confrontational proportions 

years later. At that point correcti ve action had to be taken and Congress approved a Department 

of the Army proposal that some $21 million be paid to landowners retroactively-as a "debt of 

honor," despite the exoneration of American liability by Article J9(b) of the Peace Treaty of 1952. 

:l6SCAP, Study of Land Problems in Okinawa. I Oct 55, p. 6, Freimuth Papers. 
176 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Despite these efforts very few leases were concluded, since many landholders felt the compensation was inadequate, and almost all of them 

resented the idea of leasing their holdings for twenty years- a large number of the next generation's productive years. 

In the face of continued civilian intransigence, the Ryukyus Command 

threatened to disavow any legal liability for the compensation of landowners whose land had been occupied before the effective date of any 

peace treaty with Japan. At the same time, it reviewed the land holdings 

at issue and raised the appraisal of the real estate by 60 percent, with a 

corresponding rise in the rentals offered. This carrot and stick approach 

failed to satisfy the owners, who once again declined to negotiate voluntary extended leases, even at the new, higher rentals. The civilian Government of the Ryukyu Islands, in total frustration over the land impasse, 

threatened to abandon all further attempts to negotiate leases on behalf 

of the American administration. This threat was only a prelude to what 

would become another decade of acrimonious debate over this perennial 

problem. 

The legacy of the unresolved land issue proved a bitter one. The most 

fundamentally disturbing aspect of the issue in the perception of the 

civilian population was the American failure, from the earliest days of 

the occupation, to understand the role of land and land ownership in 

Okinawan society. To the military a few tsubos of marginally fertile land 

represented a second-rate piece of real estate, while to the landowner 

those same tsubos meant far more than meager livelihood; they also represented status, self-respect, and family heritage. 

The difference in the American and the Okinawan perceptions of the 

land was further exaggerated by the Ryukyuan practice of diversified land 

holdings- a custom sure to strike most Americans in agriculture as curious. Farmers in the United States, by and large, seek to acquire relatively 

larger plots of land, and to have these plots contiguous. Such an arrangement facilitates the use of bulky but efficient farm machinery. Okinawan 

farmers, by contrast, usually had several small plots, often widely separated one from another. This type of land distribution made eminent 

good sense on a crowded island beset by typhoons. Such an arrangement 

permitted each farmer to have a share of the best land, as well as the 

worst; the most hilly or dry, as well as the most level and watered. Such 

a practice was not only fair, it was also prudent, because a rampaging 

typhoon was less likely to strike all of anyone farmer's widely scattered 

holdings. What American military personnel often failed to perceive when 

they required a man to surrender a small plot ofland-a minor percentage 

of his total holdings, after all-was the fact that any given plot might be 
TRANSFORMING OKINAWA 177 

a farmer's only good land, or the only tract with crops that might survive 

this year's typhoons. 

Many in the American military demonstrated this lack of sensitivity 

involving land issues. One of the most glaring examples involved the 

master plan for land acquisition which included a proposal to acquire 

land near Koza Shi to extend the Army's Awase Meadows Country Club's 

golf course." Thus valuable crop land was appropriated for an eighteenhole course. Many former landowners were bitter over this apparent exercise in misplaced priorities, notwithstanding the obvious need for some 

American recreational facilities on the island. Their bitterness surprised 

the Americans operating the golf links, since the previous owners could 

earn considerably more money working on the course than they ever could 

from farming the same land. Once again, a narrow economic perspective 

prevailed. Apparently few, if any, Americans considered the possibility 

that the former owners might have been happier retaining their status in 

Okinawan society as independent farmers. Instead, Okinawan families 

were supposed to be content making more money as caddies and bartenders for the permanent contingent of foreigners camped on their soil. 58 

In the seemingly straightforward process of acquiring some acres, the 

American military had also reduced the proud former owners to servant 

status. 59 

During the years of the military government administration, a large 

number of Okinawans in various walks of life found their existence 

changed in much the same way as these landowners; that is, they found 

themselves financially better off because of the foreign presence, but 

sometimes at the cost of diminished social status. Thus, the American 

military establishment in the Ryukyu Islands had a profound impact, not 

just on the land and the landowners, but on the island's social orderincluding the traditional concepts of status. The military build-up of the 

late 1940s and beyond altered the face of Okinawan life dramatically, 

and marked the beginning of the end for an ancient culture based primarily on small agriculture, fish ing, and cottage industries. For better or 

worse the overwhelming majority of Okinawans had by then traded the 

land and the sea for a new way of life. 

For a number of reasons, some economic and some psychological, 

American military officials fai led to reconcile divergent outlooks toward 

the land and what the soil represented to the two cultures. This failure 

57Master Plan for Land Acquisition, 1954, USCAR records, File 601.53-"Leases and Loans," 

RG 260. The Air Force also had an extensive golf course near Kadena Air Force Base. 

S8Cadd ies on Okinawa were always women during the 19405. 

''There were exceptions: a tiny minority of former landowners became vcry rich as the result of 

Okinawan-American land transfers. 
178 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

left a legacy of mistrust and ill will toward the uninvited American guests 

and provided the first impetus to the idea of reversion to Japanese control. 

Curiously, by the time the American tenure in the Ryukyu Islands 

ceased, the painful land issue had done more than accelerate the drive 

for reversion: it had also produced some decidedly positi ve results. In a 

very real sense, as the Okinawan people moved out of farming and into 

light industrial and service-oriented occupations, many lost their psycological links with their rural heritage. Their society was transformed 

into one more capable of meeting the challenges of the late 20th century. 

This painful change had been brought about as more and more islanders 

found employment and a new way of life because of the construction and 

operation of the American bases. The Okinawan economy emerged from 

the occupation more diversified, sophisticated, and flexible than in prewar days. The American requirement for land on Okinawa, therefore, had 

not only turned its citizens against the American presence, it had also 

turned them into more productive Japanese nationals once reversion was 

secured. 
CHAPTER VII 

Summary and Conclusion 

The account of America's military government efforts in the Ryukyu 

Islands is a textbook study in theory and practice, in trial and error. In 

some crucial ways the exercise was unique, or very nearly so. The American tenure in the Ryukyus was a singular effort-no United Nations or 

Allied presence intruded. In the 1960s the Japanese government in Tokyo 

voluntarily began to contribute financially to some of the programs in 

the islands, most notably in the areas of public health and educationlong-range concerns that would have a direct impact on Japanese society 

when the islands ultimately returned to Tokyo's administrative control. 

But during the years of American military government administration, 

the civil affairs officers on the scene were conscious of being very much 

on their own. Within occupied Germany there were Allied governments 

to be consulted and foreign zones to be regarded. Even in postwar occupied Japan, which was also an exclusi ve American stewardship, Douglas MacArthur and his staff could hardly ignore the interests of the 

Department of State and a host of other American agencies in the performance of their duties. In contrast, not even the military governor in 

the Ryukyus- whether Admiral Nimitz or General MacArthur-ever set 

foot in the archipelago during the military government years. Preoccupied 

with more immediate concerns as perceived in their respective headquarters, they were obliged to scrutinize conditions on Okinawa from a 

distance and to leave events in the hands of the deputy military governor 

on the scene. 

In at least two other ways the American occupation experience in the 

Ryukyu Islands was unquestionably unique. The first consideration concerns the totality of the destruction visited upon the island of Okinawa; 

not only physical destruction, but also the obliteration of the most basic 

features of the island's economy and society. Following World War II, no 

other society on enemy soil experienced the utter desolation experienced 

by the citizens of the largest Ryukyuan island. Certainly, no one can deny 

the devastation suffered by the citizens of Dresden, Hiroshima, and Na-
180 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

gasaki, yet the fact remained that within the occupied German and Japanese societies- however, traumatized and destitute they were-there 

existed both human and physical resources that remained intact. There 

was in these other societies not only a certain level of productive capacity, 

but also a vital human element in the person of doctors, bureaucrats, and 

other professionals and entrepreneurs. With the surviving physical assets 

firmly in American hands, these important individuals soon emerged to 

assist the conquerors with the administrative tasks. By contrast neither 

physical nor human infrastructure remained on Okinawa after the summer of 1945. The totality of the physical destruction was patent; compounding this reality was the fact that virtually all of the admin istrative 

machinery and professional positions on Okinawa had been in the hands 

of home-island Japanese. The great majority of the Japanese either withdrew from the archipelago in the face of the imminent American assault, 

were unwilling to cooperate with the foreign overseers, or were of questionable loyalty to the new administration. The military government regime therefore had to function with a minimum number of able, local 

leaders-leaders on an island much of whose terrain largely resembled a 

moonscape. The occupation was also unique in the American experience 

because of its longevity. The Army directed affairs in the Ryukyu Islands 

for twenty-seven years, through the military government years and the 

period of the Civil Administration. By comparison, the American tenure 

in occupied Germany and Japan was relatively brief. 

Both the Army and Navy prepared and trained civil affairs officers 

for this unique exercise. Many of the new trainees brought not only technical experience to the islands, but also a sense of high purpose. For the 

first few months military government's limited role in Operation ICEBERG 

and the desolation encountered on Okinawa gave little opportunity to 

exercise technical expertise, except for medical and organizational skills. 

As the months and years passed, however, the military government function in the Ryukyus changed and expanded. From the comparatively 

uncomplicated, albeit difficult task of population control and disaster 

relief, the mission grew to one in which the military government officers 

became totally responsible for the administration and future development 

of an area that in later years would be termed a "Third World country." 

Consequently, any assessment of military government's success in the 

Ryukyus during the period covered by this study must be made at two 

distinct time intervals-once after the first few months ashore, and again 

in December 1950, after five years of expanding commitment to the future 

of Okinawan society. 

Achievement is most easily measured in terms of how well the military 

government officers met the Okinawans' material needs for food, security 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 181 

from harm, shelter, and rudimentary medical care. Despite interservice 

carping, insufficient supplies, and a host of other problems, the civil 

affairs detachments succeeded admirably in fulfilling their short-term 

mission. Their actions clearly saved both American and Ryukyuan lives 

and facilitated the task of the tactical forces. Notwithstanding these successes, there still were losses. One unexpected casualty of those first few 

months on Okinawa was the sense of idealism held by many of the civil 

affairs officers. Several of these men, as a result of their training at Charlottesville, Columbia, or Chicago, came ashore with a much broader concept of military government's role than merely feeding and caring for the 

refugees of battle. These men were determined to be nation-builders who 

carried not only medicine and DDT in their baggage train, but also law 

books and constitutional forms of government. Some of these men became cynical when they discovered that they could not immediately employ their specialized skills and that the tactical forces regarded the 

military government mission as less important when compared with 

either combat operations or the base development plan. They were particularly embittered by the competition for land that emerged between 

the tactical commanders and military government headquarters-an unequal contest which they quickly realized could not be won so long as 

the senior military commander necessarily valued airfields and supply 

depots above civilian village restoration. 

The surrender of Japan brought a renewed ray of hope to these men. 

The base development plan virtually ceased, and the two armed services 

released some 8,000 acres for civilian resettlement. Okinawa's military 

governors, mostly Navy officers, dusted off their plans for nation-building. Armed with a Joint Chiefs of Staff mandate to restore the island's 

prewar standard of Ii ving, they developed programs for economic as well 

as political rehabilitation. The more ambitious military government mission, which the military commanders with their focus on the larger military mission neither understood nor appreciated, was begun. 

The burst of enthusiasm was short lived. With the Japanese Empire 

defeated, the rationale for extensive Okinawan bases evaporated like the 

island's morning mists. The whole raison d'etre for an American military 

presence seemed to disappear. Facilities construction ground to a virtual 

standstill, as the great majority of engineer troops withdrew to new assignments elsewhere. Washington drastically curtailed funding for most 

projects on the island, thereby drying up the Okinawan economic recovery. Trained and experienced civil affairs officers, somewhat disillusioned, 

departed and were replaced by Army officers directly from the United 

States or from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. The earlier officers 

left their plans and programs for economic and political rehabilitation, 
182 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

but without backing from Washington there was little the relatively unseasoned replacements could accomplish. After a sixteen-month period 

(April 1945-July 1946) that must be described as American civil affairs' 

finest hour, military government's fortunes waned. The next period, almost three years, was characterized by apathy and neglect from both 

Washington and MacArthur's headquarters in Japan. 

Clearly, this period was the lowest ebb of the military government 

years in the Ryukyus. Official Washington largely ignored the archipelago. 

Army officials focused their attention on base requirements in Japan and 

the newly-independent Philippines. If the Department of State thought 

about Okinawa, it was always in the broader context of Japanese-American relations and· the future status of the island under international law. 

As a consequence of this period of relative indifference, Army programs 

on Okinawa languished, chronically short of both funding and direction 

from Washington. 

The island became the dumping ground of the Far East Command, 

a handy out-of-sight repository for MacArthur's rusting bulldozers and 

jeeps, as well as for disfavored individuals and units. The word quickly 

spread throughout the services: avoid Okinawa as a duty station, since 

it was nothing but a backwater with miserable housing and very few other 

facilities. This assessment hardly exaggerated the situation on Okinawa, 

where the already run-down physical plant took a particularly heavy beating from typhoons during the late 1940s. 

Since no strong impetus for reform emerged from within the Ryukyus 

Command itself, these deplorable conditions might have persisted indefinitely had not external developments reshaped the American role on 

Okinawa. The onset of the Cold War in Europe and the concomitant 

communist advances in China focused General MacArthur's attention 

once again on Okinawa as an American forward base. Both the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council were responsive to 

MacArthur's warnings about the new Sino-Soviet threat to Taiwan and 

Japan. Their response was NSC 13/3, approved by President Truman in 

May 1949, which committed the United States to an energetic program 

of base development and economic rehabilitation. 

NSC 13/3 also reintroduced the Department of State as a concerned 

observer of events in Okinawa. It was a State Department official, Douglas L. Oliver, whose critical impressions of the military government situation on the island awakened the Army's determination to overcome 

the results of three years' neglect. Subsequent visits by Under Secretary 

of the Army Tracy Voorhees and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins 

confirmed both the extensive typhoon damage and the disturbing lack 

of military government initiative. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 183 

After the long period of collective neglect, the Army, the Department 

of State, and the Congress all contributed to the dawn of a new era in 

the islands. General Collins installed a new Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Maj. Gen. Josef Sheetz, who quickly revived a spirit of 

idealism among the civil affairs officers. The Department of State prepared a new draft directi ve for General MacArthur that interpreted the 

spirit of NSC 13/3 in such a way as to promote Ryukyuan economic and 

social well-being, as well as greater autonomy. The Congress, for its part, 

authorized nearly $75 million for an expanded construction program and 

another $25 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas funds 

for military housing and a variety of joint-use projects such as roads and 

harbors. As expected, the revitalized base construction program provided 

many new jobs for the civilian population. Suddenly, Okinawa was a 

beehive of activity. This time the Army chiefs intended nothing less than 

to build a strong military bastion against the spread of communism and 

to create a socio-economic structure that would support a long-term 

American presence. The determination, the plans, and the funds-everything seemed to be in place to accomplish this desirable transformation. 

On balance, the five years of military government must be judged a 

qualified success. Under military tutelage the Ryukyuans progressively 

moved toward local self-government and began to enjoy one of Asia's 

highest standards of living. But neither of these realities could stifle the 

islanders' growing desire to return to Japanese administrative control. 

The nub of the tension between the Americans and the Okinawans was 

the control and use of arable land. Most civil affairs officers had come 

to appreciate, even if they did not fully understand, the people's psychological attachment to the land. Consequently, these officers tried through 

a number of measures to respond to local expectations regarding the land. 

They also came to understand that the policies enunciated by the National 

Security Council in 1949 merely exacerbated the tension between the 

needs and priorities of the tactical forces and the military government 

mission. To pursue the base development plan, the tactical commanders 

needed many additional acres, yet at the same time the civil affairs officers 

continued to seek the release of land already occupied by the military. It 

was an uneven contest which military government headquarters could 

not hope to win. The expectations of the newly invigorated Ryukyuan 

society concerning the land issue, therefore, would never be fully met. 

The land issue remained unresolved as the military government years 

drew to a close. It lingered like a festering sore, a poisoner of AmericanRyukyuan relations and a dissonant counterpoint to military government's many positive achievements. Ifmilitary government's accomplishments became the legacy left to the Civil Administration after 1950, the 
184 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

land issue was also an unfortunate part of that legacy. It ultimately undermined American efforts to imbue the Okinawans with American democratic ideals. Ironically, it also fed the larger reversion issue, becoming 

one of the major reasons why in 1972, a century after Okinawa first 

became Japanese territory, the island reverted to Tokyo's rule. Before that 

reversion, American policies, especially those developed after 1948, had 

transformed Okinawan society from one centered on agriculture to a 

service economy dependent to a considerable extent on the American 

military establishment. It was a remarkable transformation, a socio-economic leap of perhaps a century or more, yet one accomplished in the 

span of a few short years. At the same time, for many Okinawans, this 

transformation meant shattered hopes for land ownership or radically 

altered social status. These effects, however unintentional on the part of 

military government officers, became realities that could not be reversed 

or erased by the act of reversion. 
Note on Sources 

Typhoons have wrought considerable destruction in the Ryukyu Islands over the centuries, and it was a typhoon in 1945 that destroyed 

many records about the earliest months of military government in Okinawa. Those records had been gathered by a three-member team of the 

I st Information and Historical Service, AUS, a combined public affairs 

and history unit, for the express purpose of preparing a monograph about 

military government activities in the Ryukyus. The documents and notes 

that did survive the typhoon, along with the accounts of the later years, 

became part of the Tenth Army and Island Command's historical record. 

Eventually, these documents made their way to warehouses in Alexandria, 

Virginia, and then to their final resting place in Suitland, Maryland. 

Official Archival Material 

The majority of the official records used to prepare this volume are 

in the permanent custody of the Military Archives Division, National 

Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland. Record Group 407 

(RG 407) contains the most important documents for the early story of 

military government in the Ryukyus, the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917- , Reports Files, 1945- 195 1 which cover military 

government operations in occupied areas. There are several significant 

files in this collection, but the most valuable are the background papers 

of Island Command, Okinawa (98ISC 1-5), including the notes, interviews, and partial manuscript on military government by Tech. Sgt. Julius 

M. Bloch (Ph.D., Harvard), who was with the 1 st Information and Historical Service team on Okinawa; the Island Command, Okinawa, Action 

Report, 13 December 1944-30 June 1945 (98ISCI- 0.3); the Ryukyus 

Command Historical Record (98BC6- 0.2); and the Headquarters, Military Government, Island Command, Recommendations for Consideration in Planning Next Operation (98ISCI-5.01). 

The late Prof. James T. Watkins, IV, formerly with the Hoover Institution, served as a Naval Reserve lieutenant commander on Okinawa 

for sixteen months. As official historian for the military government 

fo rces during the Navy "year" (2 1 September 1945-1 July 1946), he gath-
186 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

ered together a large collection of orders, directives, draft manuscripts, 

staff studies, memoranda, photographs, news clippings, and working 

notes. These unclassified papers constitute an invaluable source of information on the Navy's role in military government operations on the 

island. Prof. Watkins' papers are available at Suitland on six rolls of 

microfilm in RG 200. 

The Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World 

War II (RG 260) include a large subsection identified as the Records of 

the United States Civil Administration, Ryukyu Islands, and Predecessor 

Commands. This valuable collection consists of over 1,300 Hollinger 

boxes of records, but, unfortunately, only a very small portion of the 

record group has been declassified for use by the general public. 

A number of Joint Chiefs of Staff documents shed light on the decision 

to undertake Operation ICEBERG, as well as on the subsequent strategic 

planning for postwar Asia-including the long-term administration of 

the Ryukyus. These records (RG 218) are available through the Modern 

Military Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, 

D.C. The unclassified records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's involvement with military government considerations are available at the same repository in RG 353. 

A number of record collections outside of the National Archives system proved to be useful. The collected papers and documents of General 

Douglas MacArthur held at the archive of the MacArthur Memorial in 

Norfolk, Virginia, were the most valuable of these collections (especially 

RG 5 and RG 9), simply because the assembled materials dealt with so 

many different aspects of the American presence in the Ryukyus. The 

author found the files of the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Kingman Building, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, particularly rich in information about the postwar base development, facilities 

construction, and the land issue. For similar information about facilities 

expansion by the Air Force on Okinawa, the writer turned to the histories 

of the 1st Air Division and the Twentieth Air Force, both of which are 

on microfilm at the Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, 

Washington, D.C. Finally, the files of the Operational Archives Branch, 

Naval History Division, Washington (D.C.) Navy Yard, provided preliminary insights into the Navy's nine-month military government tenure in 

the Ryukyus, although most of the relevant Navy records have been transmitted to Suitland, Maryland, where they may be found in RG 38 and 

RG 260. 
NOTE ON SOURCES 187 

Private Collections 

For the most part, the documentary record of the American military 

government effort in the Ryukyus is now deposited in governmental repositories, either federal or-in the case of the MacArthur Memorialmunicipal. However, a few veteran "Okinawa hands" have preserved 

private aggregations of papers for personal reasons. In addition to official 

documents, these collections often contain valuable memos, working 

notes, photographs, and other more obscure items which, without the 

cooperation of the individual holders, might well have escaped historical 

scrutiny altogether. 

Of the personal papers examined by the author, two are particularly 

noteworthy. Paul Skuse, former Director of Public Safety on Okinawa 

and now retired in Arizona, has retained a number of documents on that 

particular subject. Commander Skuse, who went to Okinawa with the 

Navy in 1945, joined the Civil Service in 1946, and remained in Okinawa 

until 1958, was kind enough to share these materials with the author. By 

far, however, the most extensive and most valuable private collection of 

Ryukyus materials belongs to Edward O. Freimuth. Mr. Freimuth, now 

retired and living in northern Virginia, spent twenty years (1946-1966) 

on Okinawa, arriving as an Army lieutenant and remaining as a civilian. 

He became head of the General Affairs Department and ultimately served 

as the principal liaison official between the U.S. Civil Administration of 

the Ryukyus (USCAR) and the nati ve Government of the Ryukyu Islands 

(GRI). During that time he amassed a large quantity of documents about 

the American tenure in the Ryukyus. Much of this material consists of 

esoteric memos, reports, and staff studies, which flesh out the impressions 

created by the more forma l documents in the governmental repositories. 

Interviews 

Personal recollections, whenever these are possible, do much to enhance the written record of historical events in which the principals participated. The men who took part in administering military government 

on Okinawa have forgotten certain details of the 1945-1950 period on 

the island. Such information that has been retained, however, enriches 

the historical picture considerably. As always when using personal recollections which may have been colored by time and events, the interviewer must check all oral statements against the records to seek 

veri fication. 

The author found four interviewees particularly informative for the 

light they could shed on particular events. By far the most valuable re-
188 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

source person was Edward O. Freimuth, mentioned above, whose tenure 

on Okinawa spanned not only the military government era, but also the 

years of its legacy. The writer interviewed Mr. Freimuth on six occasions, 

and several others times by telephone. In each case he demonstrated his 

first-hand knowledge on a variety of relevant subjects, but especially in 

the areas of Ryukyuan-American relationships, the land problem, and 

Okinawan political parties. In addition to providing information about 

places and events, Mr. Freimuth suggested individual names for possible 

questioning, thus enabling the author to contact two of the other three 

principals he interviewed. 

Former Naval Commander Paul H. Skuse was the military government's Director of Publi c Safety during the period 1946- 1949. He graciously permitted the author to interview him over a three-day period at 

his home in Arizona. During that first visit, and at a subsequent meeting 

in Freimuth's home, Skuse described in colorful terms his experiences 

on Okinawa. 

Prof. James Watkins, IV, now deceased, consented to a number of 

telephone interviews from California. His understanding of the Navy's 

contributions to military government were very useful, and in talking 

with him the author began to sense some of that spirit of idealism that 

motivated so many of the early civil affairs officers on Okinawa. 

Prof. Seigen Miyazato, a native Okinawan, was thirteen years of age 

when the Americans invaded his island. He soon found himself in a 

military government camp at Taira on the Motobu Peninsula. During his 

interview he provided valuable insights, especially in the following areas: 

the impact of Japanese defensive preparations on the civilians, the dislocation resulting from population shifts from the south to the north, and 

the early food and sanitary conditions under the military government 

regime. 

Printed Material 

The secondary materials found especially helpful by the author have 

been cited throughout the volume, but special attention should be drawn 

to certain works in a variety of areas. For general information about 

Okinawan life and history, the author principally relied upon George H. 

Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutland, Vt. & Tokyo: 

Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958), M.D. Morris, Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail 

(New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1968), and the Chief of Naval Operations' Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands, OPNAV 13-

31, 15 November 1944. 

Robert Ross Smith has written an important book for those partic-
NOTE ON SOURCES 189 

ularly concerned with the strategic debate leading to the American invasion of the Ryukyus: Triumph in the Philippines (Washington: Dept. of 

the Army, Office of Chief of Military History, 1963). For those individuals 

who are interested in the battle for Okinawa itself and its immediate 

aftermath, the author found three volumes and one article significant. 

Roy E. Appleman, et aI., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington: Dept. 

of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), Charles S. 

Nichols, Jr. , and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3 Div., 1955), James 

H. Belote and William M. Belote, Typhoon of Steel: The Battlefor Okinawa 

(New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1970), and Henry 

Stanley Bennett, "The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa," u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings 72, No.2 (February 

1946). 

Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg's Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become 

Governors (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military 

History, 1964) contains background information on the evolution of military government training, especially concerning the Army's School of 

Military Government at the University of Virginia. The story of the Navy's civil affairs schools at Columbia and Princeton emerges from Lt. 

Comdr. Dorothy E. Richard's The Wartime Militwy Government Period, 

1942-1945, Vol. I of the series United States Naval Administration of the 

Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 

Office of the CNO, 1957). 

Not many of the men who served in military government in the Ryukyus were moved to take pen in hand to tell their own story. Those few 

that did attempt to relate some of their experiences include Clellan S. 

Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," The Annals of the American 

Academy of Political and Social Science 267 (January 1950); David D. 

Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," 

Far Eastern Quarterly 7 (May 1948); and Leonard Weiss, "U.S. Military 

Government on Okinawa," Far Eastern Survey 15 (July 1946). Shannon 

McCune, the first civilian Civil Administrator under USCAR, is a geographer whose books Geographic Aspects of Agricultural Change in the RyukYll Islands (Ga inesv ille: University of Florida Social Sciences 

Monograph No. 54, 1975) and The Ryukyu Islands (Harrisburg, Pa.: 

Stackpole Books, 1975) are valuable resources for information on Okinawan agricultural development, but do not directly address military government agricultural policies in detail. One individual, Vern J. Sneider, 

was able to survive the trials and tribulations of his fellow civil affairs 

officers and still retain his sense of humor. His The Teahouse of the August 

Moon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1951) and The KingJi'om Ash-
190 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

tabula (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960) remain a delightful satirical 

look at military government's foibles. 

Two volumes from the Japanese point of view are worth noting for 

their value in describing American-Ryukyuan relations and the evolution 

of Okinawan political sophistication: Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in 

Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963), and 

Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-u.s. Relations 

(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970). 

Finally, the author found useful a number of printed materials that 

have not been published and are not generally available to the public. In 

January 1971 the U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 

directed Mr. Edward W. O'Flaherty, then Special Assistant for Ryukyuan 

Affairs in the International and Civil Affairs Directorate, ODCSOPS, to 

write a monograph entitled "American Military Government and Civil 

Administration, Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1972." Mr. O'Flaherty began this 

project, but for a number of reasons, never finished. What emerged was 

a partial manuscript of fourteen brief chapters. The manuscript is deficient in several respects, but when used with caution, provides insight 

into many of the problems faced by the military government regime. For 

information on the postwar build-up of military installations on Okinawa, 

the author turned to another internal manuscript by Karl C. Dod: "Military Activities of the Corps of Engineers in the Cold War." This manuscript, like the O'Flaherty one, must be used with caution. It is held by 

the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

Nobuo Takaramura's MBA thesis, "Reconstruction and Development of the Okinawan Economy with Emphasis upon Monetary 

Method" (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1957) presented 

an overview of the evolving American economic policies to rehabilitate 

postwar Okinawa. Mr. Takaramura was head of the Ryukyu Development 

Loan Corporation in its early years and later served with the World Bank. 

The Office of Military History Officer, Headquarters, American Forces 

Far East/Eighth Army (Rear) produced a summary entitled "The Far East 

Command, I January 1947- 30 June 1957" (1957), which enables one to 

follow the relationship between MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo and 

the civil affairs officers on the ground in the Ryukyus. 
Part Two 

DOCUMENTING 

THE MILITARY 

GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE 

Selected Documents 

While American military government tenure on Okinawa was unique 

in a number of ways, the civil affairs officers there grappled with problems 

that were hardly endemic to the Ryukyu Islands. Many of the situations 

these men encountered, whether issues of administrative procedures, public welfare, or resources management, were the same type that any American military government mission, at any given time or locale, might 

reasonably expect to face. Not surprisingly, therefore, a representative 

sample of the documents produced during America's military government 

experience on Okinawa not only imparts the unique flavor of operations 

in the Ryukyus, but also underscores for the reader the persistent nature 

of military government problems and concerns'* 

·Becausc of space limitations. certain of these documents have been reproduced with minor 

deletions as indicated . Otherwise. these documents appear without historical editing. Except for one 

title. sic has been omitted. 

DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 195 

Preparing Civil Affairs Officers 

Historically reluctant after 1900 to become involved in civil affairs 

operations, the Army before World War II tended to regard such functions 

as falling within the narrow, legal confines of the Judge Advocate General's application of the rules of war. Gradually, an appreciation of the 

complex nature of military government activities in the age of modern 

warfare led, by the time of the American invasion of Okinawa, to the 

Army's leaders issuing more comprehensive instructions for civil affairs 

officers. 

1. FM 27-10, Rules of Land Wm!are, 1 October 1940. 

(Source: Judge Advocate General's Office) 

Prepared by the Judge Advocate General's Office, this field manual reflects the pre-World War II legalistic concept of the military government 

function within the American Army. In one brief chapter, "Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory," the Judge Advocate General deals with the whole question of civil affairs operations: 

CHAPTER 10 

MILITARY OCCUPATION AND GOVERNMENT OF ENEMY TERRITORY 

271. Military occupation.-Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 

placed under the authority of the hostile army. 

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 

established and can be exercised (H.R., arl. 42). 

272. Occupation, question of fact.-Military occupation is a question of fact. 

It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the invader has rendered 

the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that 

the invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his own authority 

for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded. 

273. Does not transfer sovereignty.-Being an incident of war, military occupation confers upon the invading force the right to exercise control for the period 

of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, but simply 

the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty. The exercise 

of these rights results from the established power of the occupant and from the 
196 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

necessity for maintaining law and order, indispensable to both the inhabitants 

and to the occupying force. 

274. Distinguished from invasion.-The state of invasion corresponds with the 

period of resistance. Invasion is not necessarily occupation, although it precedes 

it and may frequently coincide with it. An invader may push rapidly through a 

large portion of enemy country without establishing that effective control which 

is essential to the status of occupation. He may send small raiding parties or 

flying columns, reconnoitering detachments, etc., into or through a district where 

they may be temporarily located and exercise control, yet when they pass on it 

cannot be said that such district is under his military occupation. 

275. Distinguished from sUbjugation or conquest.- Military occupation in a 

foreign war, being based upon the fact of possession of enemy territory, necessarily implies that tbe sovereignty of the occupied territory is not vested in the 

occupying power. The occupation is essentially provisional. 

On the other hand sUbjugation or conquest implies a transfer of sovereignty. 

Ordinarily, however, such transfer is effected by a treaty of peace. When sovereignty passes, military occupation, as such, must of course cease; althougb the 

territory may, and usually does for a period at least, continue to be governed 

through military agencies which have sucb powers as the President or Congress 

may prescribe. 

276. Occupation must be effective.-It follows from the definition that military 

occupation must be both actual and effective; that is, the organized resistance 

must have been overcome and the forces in possession must have taken measures 

to establish law and order. It is sufficient that the occupying army can, within 

a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within 

the occupied district. It is immaterial by what methods the authority is exercised, 

whether by fixed garrisons or flying columns, small or large forces. 

277. Presence of invested fort immateriaI.-The existence of a fort or defended 

area within the occupied district, provided such place is invested, does not render 

the occupation of the remainder of the district ineffective, nor is the consent of 

the inhabitants in any manner essential. 

278. Proclamation of occupation.-In a strict legal sense no proclamation of 

military occupation is necessary. On account of the special relations established 

between the inhabitants of the occupied territory and the occupant by virtue of 

the presence of the invading force, the fact of military occupation, with the 

extent of territory affected, should be made known. The practice of this Government is to make this fact known by proclamation. 

279. Commencement of occupation.-In the absence of a proclamation or similar notice the exact time of commencement of occupation may be difficult to 

fix. The presence of a sufficient force to disarm the inhabitants or enforce submission and the cessation of local resistance due to the defeat of the enemy's 

forces determine the commencement of occupation. 

280. Cessation of occupation.-Occupation once acquired must be maintained. 

In case the occupant evacuates the district or is driven out by the enemy, or by 

a levee en masse, and the legitimate government actually resumes its functions, 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 197 

the occupation ceases. It does not cease, however, if the occupant, after establishing his authority, moves forward against the enemy, leaving a smaller force 

to administer the affairs of the district. Nor does the existence of a rebellion or 

the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease unless the legitimate government is reestablished or the occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion 

or guerrilla operations. 

ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY 

281. Necessity for military government.-Military government is the organization through which a belligerent exercises authority over the territory of the 

enemy invaded and occupied by him. The necessity for such government arises 

from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions 

on account of the military operations or occupation. 

282. Duty to restore law and order.-The authority of the legitimate power having 

in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in 

his power to restore, and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 

respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country (H.R .. arl. 

43). 

283. Functions of government.-All the functions of the hostile governmentlegislative, executive, or administrative-whether of a general, provincial, or 

local character, cease under military occupation, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader. 

284. Nature of government.-It is immaterial whether the government established over an enemy's territory be called a military or civil government. Its 

character is the same and the source of its authority is the same. It is a government 

imposed by force , and the legality of its acts is determined by the laws of war. 

During the military occupation it may exercise all the powers given by the laws 

of war. 

285. The laws in force.-The principal object of the occupant is to provide for 

the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency 

and the success of its operations. In restoring public order and safety he will 

continue in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws of the occupied territory 

which do not conflict with this object. These laws will be administered by the 

local officials as far as practicable. All crimes not of a military nature and which 

do not affect the safety of the invading army are left to the jurisdiction of the 

local courts. 

286. Power to suspend and promulgate laws.- The military occupant may suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military 

service demand such action. 

287. Nature of laws suspended.- The occupant will naturally aiter or suspend 

all laws of a political nature as well as political privileges and all laws which 

affect the welfare and safety of his command. Of this class are those relating to 

recruitment in occupied territory, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, 

the right of suffrage, the freedom of the press, the right to quit or travel freely 

in occupied territory. Such suspensions should be made known to the inhabitants. 
198 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

288. Nature of laws promulgated.-An occupant may create new laws for the 

government of a country. He will promulgate such new laws and regulations as 

military necessity demands. In this class will be included those laws which come 

into being as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes 

and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the 

country and the protection of the army. 

289. Prohibition as to rights and rights of action.-It is especially forbidden * * * to declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the 

rights and rights of action of the nationals of the hostile party (H.R., art. 23, last 

par.). 

290. General restrictions imposed; commercial relations.-The occupant has the 

unquestioned right to regulate commercial intercourse in the occupied territory; 

that is, he may prohibit entirely or place such restrictions and limitations upon 

such intercourse as he considers desirable for military purposes. 

291. Censorship of press and correspondence.-The military occupant may establish censorship of the press and of telegraphic and postal correspondence. He 

may prohibit entirely the publication of newspapers or prescribe regulations for 

their publication and circulation especially in unoccupied portions of the territory and in neutral countries. He is not required to furnish facilities for postal 

service, but may take charge of them himself, especially if the officials of the 

occupied district fail to act or to obey his orders. 

292. Means of transportation.- The military occupant exercises authority over 

all means of transportation, both public and private within the occupied district, 

and may seize and utilize them and regulate their operation. 

293. Regulation as to taxes.- If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects 

the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the state, he shall do so, as 

far as is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in 

force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate government 

was so bound (H.R. , art. 48). 

294. When existing rules may be disregarded.-If, due to the flight or unwillingness of the local officials, it is impracticable to follow the rules of incidence 

and assessment in force, then the total amount of the taxes to be paid may be 

allotted among the districts, towns, etc., and the local authorities be required to 

collect it as a capitation tax or otherwise. 

295. Surplus may be used.- The first charge upon the State taxes is for the 

cost of local maintenance. The balance may be used for the purposes of the 

occupant. 

296. What included in taxes, tolls, etc.-The words "for the benefit of the state" 

were inserted in the article to exclude local dues collected by local authorities. 

The occupant will supervise the expenditures of such revenue and prevent its 

hostile use. 

EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE POPULATION 

297. Right to enforce obedience.- The occupant can demand and enforce from 

the inhabitants of occupied territory such obedience as may be necessary for the 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 199 

security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and the proper 

administration of the country. 

298. Oath of allegiance forbidden.-It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of 

occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power (H.R., art. 45). 

299. Must respect persons, religious convictions, etc.-Family honor and rights, 

the lives of persons, * * * as well as religious convictions and practice, must be 

respected (H.R. , art. 46). 

300. United States rule.- The United States acknowledges and protects, in 

hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; the persons of inhabitants, especially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. 

Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished. 

301. Reciprocal obligations of inhabitants.-In return for such considerate treatment, it is the duty of the inhabitants to carry on their ordinary peaceful pursuits; 

to behave in an absolutely peaceful manner; to take no part whatever in the 

hostilities carried on; to refrain from all injurious acts toward the troops or in 

respect to their operations; and to render strict obedience to the officials of the 

occupant. As to neutrals resident in occupied territory, see paragraphs 397-399. 

302. Limitation as to services of inhabitants.- * * * Services shall not be demanded from * * * inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. 

They shall be * * * of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the 

obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country. 

Such * * * services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander 

in the locality occupied * * * (H.R., art. 52). 

303. General right to requisition services.-Services of the inhabitants of occupied territory may be requisitioned for the needs of the army. These will 

include the services of professional men, and tradesmen, such as surgeons, carpenters, butchers, bakers, etc.; employees of gas, electric light, and water works, 

and other public utilities; and of sanitary boards in connection with their ordinary functions. The officials and employees of railways, canals, river or coastwise steamship companies, telegraph, telephone, postal, and similar services, 

and drivers of transport, whether employed by the State or private companies, 

may be requisitioned to perform their professional duties so long as the duties 

required do not directly concern the operations of war against their own country. 

304. Restoration of general conditions.-The occupant can requisition labor to 

restore the general condition of the public works of the country to that of peace; 

that is, to repair roads, bridges, railways, and as well to bury the dead and collect 

the wounded. In short, under the rules of obedience, they may be called upon 

to perform such work as may be necessary for the ordinary purposes of government, including police and sanitary work. 

305. Construction of forts by inhabitants, etc.-The prohibition against forcing 

the inhabitants to take part in operations of war against their own country 

precludes requisitioning their services upon works directly promoting the ends 

of the war, such as construction of forts, fortifications, and entrenchments; but 

there is no objection to their being employed voluntarily, for pay, in this class 
200 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

of work, except the military reason of preventing information concerning such 

work from falling into the hands of the enemy. 

306. Information about enemy by inhabitants.-A belligerent is forbidden to force 

the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army 

of the other belligerent, or about its means of defense (H.R .. arlo 44). 

307. Interpretation of the foregoing article.-This article was reserved by Germany, Austri a, Japan, Montenegro, and Russia, because it was believed that it 

would contravene the pre-existing general rule and practice of the nations permitting impressment of guides. 

308. Impressment of guides.-Article 44 (par. 306) is generally construed as 

prohibiting the impressment of guides from the inhabitants in an occupied territory. This is the construction placed upon it by the United States. In a war 

against any power reserving the article the impressment of guides is not 

prohibited. 

OFFICIALS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY 

309. Oath of officials.- The occupant may require such offi cials as are continued in their offices to take an oath to perform their duties conscientiously 

and not to act to his prejudice. Every such official who declines to take such 

oath may be expelled; but, whether they do so or not, they owe strict obedience 

to the occupant. 

310. Salaries of officials.- The salaries of civil officials of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory and continue the work of their offices, 

especially those who can properly continue it under the circumstances arising 

out of the war-such as judges, administrative or police officers, officers of city 

or communal governments-are paid from the public revenues of the invaded 

territory, until the military government has reason wholly or partially to dispense 

with their services. Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles 

are always suspended. 

311. Removal of civil officials.- By virtue of his powers of control the occupant 

is duly empowered to remove officials of every character. He will on principle 

remove political officials. Any official considered dangerous to the occupant may 

be removed, made a prisoner of war, or expelled from the occupied territory. 

312. Punishment of civil officials.-Acts of civil officers that are harmful or 

injurious to the occupant will be dealt with under the laws of war. Other wrongs 

or crimes committed by them will be punished according to the law of the land. 

TREATMENT OF ENEMY PROPERTY 

313. Destruction and seizure of.- It is especially forbidden * * * to destroy or 

seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war (H.R., arlo 23, par. (g)). 

314. General rule as to war right to seize and destroy property.-The rule is 

that in war a belligerent may destroy or seize all property of whatever nature, 

public or private, hostile or neutral, unless such property is specifically protected 

by some definitive law of war, provided such destruction or sei zure is imperati vely demanded by the necessities of war. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 201 

PUBLIC PROPERTY 

315. Real property of a State.- The occupying State shall be regarded as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State and situated in the occupied territory. 

It must safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in accordance 

with the rules of usufruct (H.R., art. 55). 

316. Occupant's disposition of such property.-The occupant does not have the 

absolute right of disposal or sale of enemy real property. As administrator or 

usufructuary he should not exercise his rights in such wasteful and negligent 

manner as seriously to impair its value. He may, however, lease or utilize public 

lands or buildings, sell the crops, cut and sell timber, and work the mines. A 

lease or contract should not extend beyond the conclusion of the war. 

317. State real property susceptible of direct military use.- Real property of a 

State which is of direct military use, such as forts, arsenals, dockyards, magazines, 

barracks, railways, canals, bridges, piers, and wharves, remains in the hands of 

the occupant until the close of the war, and may be destroyed or damaged, if 

deemed necessary, in military operations. 

318. Property of municipalities, etc.-The property of municipalities, that of 

institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, 

even when State property, shall be treated as private property. 

All seizures of, destruction, or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art, science, is forbidden and should be made 

the subject of legal proceedings (H.R., art. 56). 

319. Authorized treatment.- The property included in the foregoing rule may 

be utilized in case of necessity for quartering the troops, the sick and wounded, 

horses, stores, etc., and generally as prescribed for private property. Such property must, however, be secured against all avoidable injury, even when located 

in fortified places wh ich are subject to seizure or bombardment. 

320. Movable property.- An army of occupation can only take possession of 

cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, 

depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable 

property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations (H.R., 

arlo 53, par. I). 

321. Two classes of movable property.- All movable property belonging to the 

State directly susceptible of military use may be taken possession of as booty 

and utilized for the benefit of the invader's government. Other movable property, 

not directly susceptible of military use, must be respected and cannot be 

appropriated. 

322. Property of unknown ownership treated as public property.- Where the 

ownership of property is unknown- that is, where there is any doubt as to 

whether it is public or private, as frequently happens- it should be treated as 

public property until ownership is definitely settled. 

PRIVATE PROPERTY 

323. Must be respected- Private property ••• must be respected (H.R., arlo 

46, par. I). 
202 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

324. Devastation.- The measure of permissible devastation is found in the 

strict necessities of war. As an end in itself, as a separate mea.sure of war, devastation is not sanctioned by the law of war. There must be soine reasonably 

close connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the 

enemy's army. Thus the rule requiring respect for private properiy is not violated 

through damage resulting from operations, movements, or combats of the army; 

that is, real estate may be utilized for marches, camp sites, construction of 

trenches, etc. Buildings may be used for shelter for troops, the sick and wounded, 

for animals, for reconnaissance, cover defense, etc. Fences, woods, crops, buildings, etc., may be demolished, cut down, and removed to clear a field of fire, to 

construct bridges, to furnish fuel if imperatively needed for the army. 

325. American rule.- This rule (respect for private property, etc.) does not 

interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially 

houses, boats or ships, and lands, for temporary and military use. 

326. Confiscation.-Private property cannot be confiscated (H.R. , art. 46, par. 

2). 

327, Booty.-All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of 

war, primarily to the government of the captor. 

Prize money whether 011 land or sea can now be claimed only under local law. 

328. Private gain by officers and soMiers prohibited.-Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their position or power in the hostile country 

for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. 

329. PilIage,-PilIage is formally forbidden (H.R., arl. 47). 

330, Seizure and devastation of private property.-Private property can be 

seized only by way of military necessity for the support or other benefit of the 

army or of the occupant. All destruction of property not commanded by the 

authorized officer, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a town or place by 

assault, are prohibited under the penalty of death or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate to the gravity of the offense. 

331. Private property susceptible of direct military use.- All appliances, whether 

on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the 

transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots 

of arms, and, generally, all kinds of ammunition of war, may be seized, even if 

they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed 

when peace is declared (H.R., arl. 53, par. 2). 

332. What included in rule.-The foregoing rule includes everything susceptible 

of direct military use, such as cables, telephone and telegraph plants, horses and 

other draft and riding animals, motors, bicycles, motorcycles, carts, wagons, 

carriages, railways, railway plants, tramways, ships in port, all manner of craft 

in canals and rivers, balloons, airships, airplanes, depots of arms, whether military or sporting, and in general all kinds of war material. 

333. Destruction of such property.-The destruction of the foregoing property 

and all damage to the same is justifiable if it is required by the exigencies of the 

war. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 203 

334. Submarine cables.-Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory with 

a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute 

necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed when peace is 

made (HR., ar1. 54). 

REQUISITIONS 

335. Requisitions.- Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from 

municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They 

shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not 

to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations 

against their own country. 

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the 

commander in the locality occupied. 

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt 

shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible 

(HR., arl. 52). 

336. What may be requisitioned.-Practically everything may be requisitioned 

under this article that is necessary for the maintenance of the army, such as fuel, 

food, forage, clothing, tobacco, printing presses, type, leather, cloth, etc. Billeting 

of troops for quarters and subsistence is also authorized. 

337. Method of requisition in g.-Requisitions must be made under the authority 

of the commander in the locality. No prescribed method is fixed, but if practicable requisitions should be accomplished through the local authorities by 

systematic collection in bulk. They may be made direct by detachments if local 

authorities fail for any reason. Billeting may be resorted to if deemed advisable. 

338. The amount taken.- The expression "needs of the army" was adopted 

rather than "necessities of the war" as more favorable to the inhabitants, but 

the commander is not thereby limited to the absolute needs of the iroops actually 

present. The object was to avoid reducing the population to starvation. 

339. Fixing prices- The prices of articles requisitioned will be fixed by agreement if possible, otherwise by military authority. The prices of commodities on 

sale may also be regulated and limits placed on the hours and places of trading. 

All authorities agree that it is good policy to pay cash if possible and to take up 

receipts as soon as possible. 

340. Method of enforcing.-If cash is paid, coercion will seldom be necessary. 

The coercive measures adopted will be limited to the amount and kind necessary 

to secure the articles requisitioned. 

CONTRIBUTIONS 

341. Contributions.-If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above article 

(art. 48; see par. 294), the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied 

territory, this shall only be for the needs of the army or of the adminstration of 

the territory in question (HR., ar1. 49). 

342. Methods of levying contributions.- No contribution shall be collected except 

under a written order and on the responsibility of a commander in chief. 
204 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

The collection of the said contribution shall only be effected as far as possible 

in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes in force. 

For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the contributor (H.R., art. 

51). 

COLLECTIvE PUNISHMENTS 

343. Penalty for individual acts of inhabitants.-No general penalty, pecuniary 

or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible 

(H.R. , art. 50). 

344. Above article does not prevent reprisals.-Reprisals by the occupant for 

violations of the laws of war or breach of the occupant's proclamations or regulations by enemy individuals not belonging to the armed forces are not prohibited by the above article. (See par. 358.) 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 205 

2. FM 27-5 (OPNAV 50E- 3), United States Army and Navy Manual of 

Military Government and Civil Affairs, 22 December 1943. 

(Source: War and Navy Departments) 

Moving well beyond the limited scope of chapter 10 of FM 27-10, this 

joint War and Navy Department publication draws heavily upon the 

conventions of the Hague Conferences and treats in a comprehensive way 

the broad issues and situations likely to be faced by military government 

officers: 

SECTION I 

GENERAL 

1. MILITARY GOVERNMENT- CIVIL AFFAIRS. 

a. Military Government. The term "military government" is used in this 

manual to describe the supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the 

lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory, or allied or domestic 

territory recovered from enemy occupation, or from rebels treated as belligerents. 

It is exercised when an armed force has occupied such territory, whether by force 

or by agreement, and has substituted its authority for that of the sovereign or 

a previous government. Sovereignty is not transferred by reason of occupation, 

but the right of control passes to the occupying force, limited only by internationa I law and custom. The theater commander bears full responsibility for military government. He is, therefore, usually designated as military governor, but 

may delegate both his authority and title to a subordinate commander. 

b. Occupied Territory. The term "occupied territory" is used to mean any 

area in which military government is exercised by an armed force. It does not 

include territory in which an armed force is located but has not assumed supreme 

authority. 

c. Civil Affairs. The term "civil affairs" is used to describe the activities of 

the government of the occupied area and of the inhabitants of such an area 

except those of an organized military character. "Civil affairs control" describes 

the supervision of the activities of civilians by an armed force, by military 

government, or otherwise. The term "civil affairs officers" designates the military officers, who, under the military governor, are engaged in the control of 

civilians. 

• • • 

3. OCCASION FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT. Military government 

must be established either by reason of military necessity as a right under internationallaw, or as an obligation under international law. In this connection, 

attention should be gi ven to the following considerations: 

a. Military necessity may require an armed force to establish military gov-
206 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

ernment to assist in the accomplishment of its military objective. The right in 

such cases is recognized by international law. 

b. As the military occupation of enemy territory suspends the operation of 

the enemy's civil government, it is an obligation under international law for the 

occupying force to exercise the functions of civil government in the restoration 

and maintenance of public order. Military government is the organization which 

exercises these functions. An armed force in territory other than that of an enemy 

likewise has the duty of establishing military government when the government 

thereof is absent or unable to maintain order. 

c. These reasons, concurrently as well as singly, may dictate the establishment 

of military government. 

d. Military government is not confined to belligerent occupation. Military 

necessity may require its establishment in such areas as the following, with or 

without the consent of the existing or a prior government: 

(1) Allied or neutral territory which has been dominated or occupied by the 

enemy. 

(2) Technically neutral or allied territory actually unfriendly or hostile. 

(3) Genuinely allied or neutral territory, the occupation of which is essential 

to a military operation. 

(4) Domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation or from rebels 

treated as belligerents. 

4. OBJECT OF CONTROL. The object of ci vii affairs control through military government is to assist military operations, to further national policies, 

and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law. This 

assistance is rendered by maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying 

forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing 

local resources in aid of military objectives and carrying out governmental policies of the United States which usually are predetermined. Further, the efficient 

conduct ofa military government as a part of one military operation will promote 

military and political objectives in connection with future operations. 

5. DEGREE OF CONTROL. The occupant may demand and enforce from 

the inhabitants of the occupied area such obedience as may be necessary for the 

purposes of war, the maintenance of law and order, and the proper administration of the area under the unusual circumstances of hostile occupation. In return 

for such obedience, the inhabitants should be granted freedom from all unnecessary or unwarranted interference with their individual liberty and property 

rights. Under military government the degree of control maintained by the occupying forces varies greatly according to the relations which have previously 

existed between the government of the occupying forces and the government of 

the territory occupied, the existing attitude of officials and inhabitants, the projected military operations, and current military, political, economic and other 

pertinent circumstances. In the territory of an enemy, rigid control of civil affairs 

is necessary if the objectives of military government are to be achieved. In 

neutral, allied, or domestic territory, sufficient cooperation from the officials 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 207 

and inhabitants may be obtained to permit greater latitude for action by local 

officials under broad policies and general supervision of the occupying forces, 

particularly in those governmental fields least important to the military forces 

in current or pending operations. In any territory, as conditions approach normal, 

the control exercised by a military government will be relaxed, the supervision 

of the occupying force will become less direct, and supreme authority will finally 

be released to a recognized sovereign power. 

6. PERIOD OF CONTROL. The period of time during which military government or civil affairs control is maintained will vary, depending on whether 

military operations are continuing, the use or nonuse of the area as a base for 

future operations, whether the territory is belligerent or otherwise, the degree 

of cooperation of the inhabitants, the national policy regarding the future position of the territory, and other military and political considerations. As long 

as military operations continue, some degree of control will be necessary. Military 

government may extend beyond such operations until it achieves the ends of 

national policy toward which the operations are directed. 

7. AUTHORITY FOR CONTROL. Military government is exercised by virtue of and in accordance with rules of international law. Authority for the exercise 

of such control is derived from the mere fact of occupation or from some form 

of agreement such as an armistice, a convention, or a treaty. The more important 

of these rules are set forth in the military manuals of the leading civilized countries and in international treaties, such as the Hague Convention No. IV, 1907 

(Annex Sec. III). The rules which govern the armed forces of the United States 

are set forth in the War Department manual FM 27-10. While the Hague rules 

apply legally only to enemy territory, as a matter of policy they are generally 

applied to other territories occupied by United States forces. 

8. EXERCISE OF CONTROL A COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. The exercise of civil affairs control is a command responsibility. In occupied territory 

the commander, by virtue of his position, has supreme legislative, executive, 

and judicial authority, limited onl y by the laws and customs of war and by 

directives from higher authority. 

9. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES IN THE CONDUCT OF CIVIL 

AFFAIRS. 

a. Military Necessity. The first consideration at all times is the prosecution 

of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the 

primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. So long 

as the operation continues, it is the duty of the commanding officer to exercise 

such control and to take such steps in relation to the civil population as will 

attain the paramount objective. 

b. Supremacy of Commanding Officer. It follows from the basic principle of 

military necessity that the theater commander must always have full responsibility for military government. 

c. Ovil Affairs Jurisdiction. The paramount interest of the combat officer is 

in military operations. The paramount interest of the civil affairs officer is in 

dealing with civilian relationships of concern to the commander. Such interest 
208 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

will be expressed in restoring law and order and in returning to the civilian 

population certain facilities or services and restoring living conditions to normal, 

insofar as such activities will not tend to interfere with military operations. 

Whether interference with military operations will result shall be determined by 

the commanding officer after giving consideration to the recommendations of 

his combat and civil affairs officers. 

d. Economy of Personnel. Since efficient control of the civilian population 

and mobilization of local civilian manpower will lessen the need for garrison 

forces, adequate civil affairs personnel will in the long run prove an economy. 

The stimulation and supervision of production and use of local resources will 

likewise make savings in shipping and supply. All plans and practices of military 

government should be adopted with this in view and at least the minimum 

necessary number of Army and Navy personnel trained in civil affairs be provided. The duties of civil affairs officers should be confined wherever possible 

to supervision. 

• • • 

g. Treatment of Population. (1) International law requires and military necessity dictates just and reasonable treatment of the inhabitants of occupied 

territory to minimize their belligerency and obtain their cooperation. The cooperation of the inhabitants, where it can be secured, is of direct advantage to 

the occupying forces in maintaining public order and accomplishing the objective 

of military government. While the welfare of the inhabitants should be considered also for humane reasons and should be safeguarded as far as military requirements permit, the primary purposes of just treatment are to facilitate the 

military operations and to meet obligations imposed by law. Proper treatment 

will be of direct benefit to the occupying forces in preventing chaos, promoting 

order, and in the procurement of labor, services, and supplies. It will have a 

favorable influence upon the present and future attitude of the population toward 

the United States and its allies. It will provide incentive to populations of other 

territories to accept our future occupation. Such a policy, however, should not 

affect the imposition of such restrictive or punitive measures as may be necessary 

to accomplish the objectives of military government in any area, but especially 

in one in which the population is aggressively hostile and engages in active and 

passi ve sabotage. 

(2) The treatment of the population of any occupied territory will vary, depending upon the attitudes of the people toward the occupying forces; their 

degree of cooperation with these forces; the degree of their industrial, economic, 

political and moral development; and the political, diplomatic, and military 

policy of our government toward the government of the territory occupied. The 

civil affairs officers should become fully informed concerning the local population and their customs, institutions and attitudes, and should direct military 

control in the light of the local situation and requirements. In considering the 

treatment of populations in occupied areas, the following factors should be taken 

into account: 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 209 

(a) Generally, less restrictive measures will be necessary in dealing with nationals offriendly or non hostile countries than with nationals of enemy countries. 

(b) The taking of hostages, the imposition of collective fines, or the carrying 

out of reprisals become military necessities in some situations though such measures should only be taken as an unavoidable last resort to induce a hostile 

population to desist from unlawful practices. Such actions are usually an indication of weakness of the occupying forces and of ineffective control of the 

inhabitants. Careful consideration should be given to the question of determining 

whether such devices will serve as a deterrent or aggravate an already difficult 

situation. (See FM 27- 10.) 

(c) Force may be used to the extent necessary to subdue those who resist the 

authority of military government or to prevent the escape of prisoners or persons 

suspected of crime. Persons accused are entitled to a fair trial before the imposition of punishment. The theater commander has the power to provide immediate trial, when an example is necessary. Sentences of military courts should 

be proportionate to the offense and the need for a deterrent effect. The maximum 

punishment should not be awarded automatically. The nature of sentences to 

be imposed and whether they should be carried out in public, depends in part 

upon the customs and habits of the population and the types of punishment 

which have been found most effecti ve in the particular locality. 

h. Retention of Existing Laws, Customs, and Political Subdivisions. Local 

officials and inhabitants of an occupied territory are familiar with its laws, customs, and institutions. To avoid confusion and to promote simplicity of administration, it is advisable that local laws, customs, and institutions of government 

be retained, except where they conflict with the aims of military government or 

are inimical to its best interests. In general, it is unwise to impose upon occupied 

territory the laws and customs of another people. Any attempted changes or 

reforms contrary to local custom may result in development of acti ve or passive 

resistance and thereby handicap the operation of military government. For similar reasons it is advisable, if possible, to retain existing territorial divisions and 

subdivisions. Laws and customs in one political division of a country may differ 

widely from those in another and the inhabitants therefore may be accustomed 

to the decentrali zation of governmental authority which usually parallels such 

divisions. 

i. Retention of Local Government Departments and Officials. (1) Offices 

which are unnecessary or detrimental to military government will be temporarily 

discontinued or suspended by the military commander as military governor. In 

some areas this may be the case with entire departments or bureaus of the 

government. 

(2) Such legislative bodies as are still in existence wiil usually be suspended. 

Supreme legislative power is vested in the commanding officer in the theater of 

operations. 

(3) Usually it will be necessary to remove high ranking political officials from 

office. This action will include the removal of the nominal and actual heads of 

the national government, cabinet ministers, and the heads of principal political 
210 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

divisions. No permanent appointments to such positions should be made by the 

military governor without approval of higher authority because of the political 

implications of such appointments. While membership in unfriendly partisan 

organizations or political parties may not by itself be cause for removal, such 

officials as have been active leaders of such organizations will ordinarily not be 

retained in office, nor will other officials who prove to be unreliable or untrustworthy. Willful failure of retained local officials to perform their duties satisfactorily should be regarded as a serious offense against the military government. 

(4) So far as practicable, subordinate officials and employees of the local 

government should be retained in their offices and made responsible for the 

proper discharge of their duties, subject to the direction and supervision of civil 

affairs personnel. 

(5) In some areas the native population may have had very limited participation in government because of the domination of a foreign power. In such 

areas civil officials may have fled when invasion takes place, or it may be inexpedient or unsafe for them to continue in office, even if they remain. In territories 

of this sort it may become necessary for military government to train native 

personnel to take over certain positions. 

(6) Civil affairs personnel should as far as practicable deal with the inhabitants 

of occupied territory through such officers and employees of the local government 

as are retained or appointed. When an official is removed, a replacement should 

be sought from among the inhabitants who by training and experience is qualified 

to take over the duties of the office. In the selection of officials, careful consideration should be given to their reliability, their willingness to cooperate with 

the military government, their positions in the community, as well as their other 

qualifications for the particular position. Appointments from a political faction 

or clique, regardless of their friendly sentiment, should be avoided, except in 

unusual circumstances. In some circumstances it may be determined that the 

duties of the position can better be performed by a representative of the military 

government. 

(7) Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of the 

military government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or 

negotiations with, any local political elements except by directions from higher 

authority. 

(8) So far as possible, civil affairs officers should confine themselves to supervision and avoid assumption of the duties of the operating head of a political 

subdivision or of a department of government. 

(9) It may be advisable to provide protection for persons who continue in, or 

are assigned to, local public office. They may be accused of disloyalty by some 

inhabitants of the area. Their persons and property may be threatened or 

endangered. 

(10) Civil affairs officers and personnel, as representatives of the United States 

government, should keep their relations with local officials and inhabitants on 

a strictly official basis, avoiding unofficial social relationships. All personal fa-
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 211 

vors or gifts which may be oITered by civilians are to be refused unless authorized 

by higher authority. 

j. Political Prisoners. Persons imprisoned by the previous government for 

political or racial reasons only should be released after investigation, unless 

directed otherwise by higher authority, with warning that political activity on 

their part, during the period of military government, will not be tolerated. 

k. Economics, The basic economic policy of United States military government is twofold: first, to revive economic life and stimulate production in order 

to reduce to a minimum the needs of the area for United States and allied 

assistance and to develop the area as a source of supply for further operations, 

and second, to use available goods and services as efficiently as possible for the 

satisfaction of military and civilian needs. Corollaries of this basic policy include 

the following: 

(I) An equitable distribution of necessities, such as food, fuel, medicine, and 

clothing, should be instituted as quickly as possible. To this end it will be necessary to reestablish, to some degree at least, public utilities, transportation, 

communications, and trade. It will often be necessary to enforce controls, which 

mayor may not be the same as those in effect before occupation, over various 

aspects of economic life, including prices; over marketing by rationing, by measures to bring hoarded goods out of hiding, and by suppression of black markets; 

over imports and exports; over money and banking. The reestablishment of 

communications will normally require the instituting of censorship. At times 

military governments will have to engage actively in some types of economic 

activity in order to assure that the armed forces and the population receive at 

least a minimum of necessary goods and services. 

(2) Such plans as may be practicable should be laid in advance for the resumption of production, especially in agriculture, fishing, and manufacture, but 

also in mining, forestry and the service trades. Preliminary decisions must be 

reached as to which types of economic activity are most important. 

• • • 

12. FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS. The chief function of 

the civil aITairs officers during hostilities is to further the mission of the combat 

forces in every way possible. As areas are successively occupied he will assist by 

controlling the civil population so that it will not interfere with military operations. He will help reconstitute civil administration so that local resources in 

manpower and in strategic material may be utilized to further military operations 

as authorized by the laws of war. His task may embrace a wide variety of activities, since the responsibilities of his commanding officer may range all the 

way from controlling a few simple functions of government in a small isolated 

rural region or a primitive island or group of islands, to controlling the many 

and complex functions of government in a large, densely populated, industrialized, continental area. In the occupation of such territories for a considerable 

period of time, the civil aITairs officer will in most cases be concerned with the 

following and other activities: 
212 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

a. Political Government and Administration. The supervision, or even, in rare 

instances, the actual admi nistration of the chief political offices of the government, such as, for example, the offices of the chief executi ve, ministers, cabinet 

officers, secretariats, and other high ranking executive or administrati ve officials 

on the national, provincial, or municipal levels. 

b. Maintenance of Law and Order. The preparation, issuance, and enforcement of proclamations and ordinances regulating the conduct of the inhabitants; 

reestablishment of the old police force or the creation of a new one, supplemented 

by military police, marines or shore patrol; prevention, detection and prosecution 

of crime; maintenance of public order and security of persons and property; 

regulation of relations between our forces and the inhabitants . . . 

• • • 

SECTION VI 

PROCLAMATIONS, ORDINANCES, 

ORDERS, AND INSTRUCTIONS 

35. INITIAL PROCLAMATION. 

a. Issuance. While not mandatory under international law, as soon as practicable after commencement of an occupation, the theater commander, or an 

authorized subordinate, should issue to the inhabitants of the occupied territory 

a proclamation informing them of the fact of occupation, the extent of territory 

affected, and the obligations, liabilities, duties, and rights of the population under 

military government. Generally, this proclamation will have been prepared in 

advance and in accordance with directives from higher authority. Where occupation of a large area is proceeding by stages, it is proper to state that the 

proclamation will be applicable in adjacent areas as they are occupied. 

b. Form and Character. (I) The proclamation should be brief and in simple 

terms. It should be published as widely as possible in English and in the languages 

of the occupied area . Any translation should be idiomatic, clear, and concise. 

(2) The tone and character of the proclamation will vary in different territories 

and will depend upon a number of factors. Among them will be: the military 

and political objectives to be attained in the occupied and other territories; the 

strategic situations; the existence or nonexistence of a recognized government 

on the ground or in exile; the composition and disposition of the occupying 

forces whether American or allied; the attitude of the inhabitants; historical and 

psychological considerations; and the extent to which control over civil affairs 

must be exercised in the particular territory. It is probably adv isable to address 

the people of a major enemy firmly and bluntIy,:but the language should not be 

vindictive or needlessly offensive. In other territories, inhabited by a nonhostile 

popUlation which is being freed from enemy domination, the proclamation will 

be more friendly in character and may emphasize deliverance from a common 

enemy. 

(3) In occupations of neutral or allied territory, lately held by an enemy, a 

manifesto may also be issued by the legitimate government supporting the oc-
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 213 

cupation and calling upon officials and inhabitants to cooperate and to obey the 

rules laid down by the commanders of such forces. Such manifestos are not 

legally necessary, but are issued to promote cooperation of the population with 

the occupying forces. In occupations of this type, the theater commander will 

usually clear such manifestos with the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

c. Contents. The initial proclamation will vary in content according to the 

circumstances of the occupation. The important items to be covered are the state 

of affairs which exists, a definition of the area and peoples to which the proclamation applies, the extent to which the civil administration will be affected, 

the manner in which the inhabitants are to conduct themselves, and the measures 

which will be resorted to by the military government. It is impracticable to 

outline the contents of proclamations for all types of occupations. In definitely 

hostile territory the proclamation should, in general, cover the following points: 

(1) Declaration of the Occupation. This is formal notice of the fact of occupation and of the territory in general over which the military government 

assumes jurisdiction. 

(2) Purpose and Policy of the Occupation. It may be advisable to include a 

statement as to the purpose and policy of the occupation. Political objectives 

should be included only pursuant to instructions from higher authority. 

(3) Supremacy of Military Authority of Occupying Forces. This is an essential 

prerequisite to the administration of any military government. It should be 

announced that a military governor has been appointed and that political ties 

with and obligations to the enemy government, if any, are suspended. It should 

be announced that inhabitants will be required to obey orders of the theater 

commander and his subordinates and to abstain from all acts or words of hostility 

or disrespect to the occupying forces. 

(4) Retention of Laws and Officials. It should be announced that, unless the 

military authority directs otherwise, local laws and customs will continue in 

force, local officials will continue in office, and officer and employees of all 

transportation and communication systems and of public utilities and other 

essential services will carry on with their regular tasks. 

(5) Treatment of Inhabitants. Assurance should be given that persons who 

obey the instructions of the military authority have nothing to fear and will be 

duly protected in their persons, property, family rights, religion, and occupation; 

and that those who commit offenses will be severely punished. 

(6) Resumption of Usual Occupations. Inhabitants should be instructed that 

they must continue or resume their usual occupations, unless specifically directed 

to the contrary. This will assist in the maintenance of law and order and restoration of normal economic conditions. 

(7) Detailed Rules of Conduct. It is advisable to put the population on notice 

that further proclamations or ordinances will specify in detail what is required 

of the inhabitants and what is forbidden them to do. 

(8) Miscellaneous. Other matters may be covered, if circumstances warrant. 

Proclamations published by previous military governments may also serve as 

useful guides. 
214 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

(d) Publication. Proclamations may be published by posting, publication in 

newspapers, broadcasting, or any other practicable method available in the particular territory. It may be advisable to publish them in the same manner as 

legal notices are published in the occupied area, or to create a new official 

publication devoted exclusively to actions of the military government and to 

provide that proclamations and ordinances become effective when they appear 

in such publication. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 215 

3. Memo, MG Gullion (PMG) to ACofS, G-3, 11 Jan 43, sub: University Training Program for Officers of the Specialist Reserve Section, 

Officer Reserve Corps. 

(Source: Copy in Center of Military History files) 

With endorsements and five tabs, this memo outlines the proposed curricula for the School for Military Government at Charlottesville, the Civil 

Affairs Training Schools (CATS), and the Provost Marshal School at Fort 

Custer. Many of the earlier military government officers on Okinawa, as 

well as in other American-occupied areas, received training along the 

lines set forth in this memo: 

January II, 1943 

MEMORANDUM for The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. THRU: Commanding 

General, SOS. THRU: Chief, Administrative Services, 

SOS. 

Subject: University Training Program for Officers of the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps. 

I. The procurement authority of November 23, 1942 (WDGAP 210.1 

ORC, AG 210.1 (11-23-42) ), as amended by authority of November 27, 1942 

(AG 210.1 PR-A-A), authorizes the Provost Marshal General to recommend for 

commissions 20 lieutenant colonels, 30 majors and 2450 captains and lieutenants 

(a total of 2500) in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps, at 

a rate of not to exceed 300 per month. It is contemplated that this procurement 

objective will be reached during the calendar year 1943. The 20 lieutenant colonels and 30 majors and not in excess of 325 of the other authorized officers will, 

when and as commissioned, attend the School of Military Government, at Charlottesville, Virginia, for sixteen weeks' courses during the year 1943 and, upon 

the completion of such courses, will be returned to an inactive status if assignments are not then available. The other officers commissioned under this authorization are to constitute a reserve pool of specialists for future employment 

in the military governments of occupied areas. 

2. The procurement authority further provides, as to all the 2500 officers, 

that they 

"will be called to active duty promptly by The Adjutant General as 

requested by The Provost Marshal General and assigned to a course in military 

government, upon the completion of which they shall revert to an inactive 

status," 

3. As above indicated, not in excess of 375 of the 2500 authorized officers 

will attend the Charlottesville School. As to the remaining officers, it is intended 

to earmark each for probable eventual duty in some general overseas area and 
216 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

then to call each temporarily to active duty for some brief instruction in military 

government and the background of the general area for which he will have been 

earmarked. Such instruction would in each instance be for a period not to exceed 

six weeks. Not only is such instruction indicated by the procurement authority, 

but without it these officers would enter upon important active service overseas 

without any special training whatsoever. 

4. As already pointed out, it will not be possible to provide training at the 

Charlottesville School for more than 375 of these officers during the year 1943. 

ft will be feasible, however, to arrange with a group of colleges and universities 

to furnish such training by farming out these officers in small groups from time 

to time for instruction in military government and backgrounds of the general 

areas involved. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

(a) That the principle of "farming out" these reserve officers to a group 

of college and universities for periods not to exceed six weeks be approved and 

(b) That The Provost Marshal General be authorized to engage in the 

necessary preliminary discussions to accomplish this objective, all final arrangements and agreements to be consummated by the duly authorized agencies of 

the War Department. 

Allen W. Gullion, 

Major General, 

The Provost Marshal General. 

Subject: University Training Program for Officers of the Specialists Reserve 

Section, Officers Reserve Corps. 

SPTRS 210.1 (1 -11-43) 1st Wrapper Ind. JAN 18, 1943 

WAR DEPT., HQS SERVICES OF SUPPLY, TRAINING DIVISION, 

Washington, D.C. 

To: Provost Marshal General, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. 

(THRU: Chief of Administrative Services). ATTENTION: Colonel Miller. 

The basic communication is returned without action for inclusion of a 

detailed training plan and program of instruction in accordance with the results 

of the conference attended by the Deputy Director of Training, Training Division, Services of Supply, and Colonel Miller, Office of the Provost Marshal 

General. 

1 Incl. 

By Command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL: 

/s/ W. L. WEIBLE 

Brigadier General, G.S.c., 

Deputy Director of Training, S.O.S. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 217 

SPMGW 210.1 2nd Wrapper Ind. KLV/eak 

Office - Chief of Administrative Services, S.O.S., Washington, D. c., 

January 18, 1943. 

TO: The Provost Marshal General. Attn: Colonel Miller. 

lsi J. M. R. 

Incls. nlc 

SPMGW 353 2nd Ind. 

WD, SOS, Office of The Provost Marshal General, Washington, D.C., 

Feb. 6, 1943. 

TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G- l. THRU: Chief, Administrative Services, 

SOS. THRU: Director of Training, SOS. Attention: General Weible. 

1. The basic communication, returned by first wrapper indorsement for 

inclusion of a detailed training plan and program of instruction, must be read 

in connection with a memorandum of January 23, 1943 (Tab "A") from the 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, in order to 

make plain the relation of the particular portion of the military government 

training program here involved to the total program. 

The total program is designed to make available, by December 31, 1944, 

approximately 6,000 officers possessing certain desired skills and training. The 

memorandum of January 23, 1943, indicates their general classifications as 

follows: 

~ Graduates of the School of Military Government (who will comprise 

the top general administrative personnel), to be produced at the rate of 150 per 

each sixteen-weeks' course, or a total of 450 per year. Considering those officers 

already graduated from the School, this portion of the program should make 

available approximately 1,000 by December 31, 1944. 

b. Junior officers (of occupational police) now being trained at Fort Custer, 

Michigan, at the present rate of 1200 per year. The total output by December 

31, 1944 should approximate 2500. 

£: The remaining 2500 officers (to produce the 6,000 total) are described 

as follows by the memorandum referred to above. 

"c. The Provost Marshal General has been authorized to recommend 

for appointment in the Specialists Section of the Officers Reserve Corps 2,500 

civilians having special skills in civil government. These individuals are to be 

appointed at a rate of not more than 300 per month and upon appointment are 

to be called to active duty and given a basic course of military training followed 

by a suitable course of Military Government at some civilian institution, upon 

the completion of which they will be returned to an inactive status if there is 

no immediate need for their services in an active theatre. Complete details of 

this program have not been worked out by The Provost Marshal General and 

submitted for approval." 

The details of the program referred to are the same details called for by the 

1st Indorsement of the Deputy Director of Training, SOS, to which the following 
218 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

is responsive and " in accordance with the results of the conference" referred to 

therein. 

2. The general training program agreed to at said conference contemplates 

a two-months' course of basic military training at Fort Custer, Michigan, to be 

followed by a two-months' course of instruction in military government, particularly in the backgrounds of special areas of potential occupation, at a number 

of civilian colleges and universities. The details of this general program are the 

matters called for by the present reference. They will be discussed under two 

headings, viz. timing and curriculum. 

3. Timing. It is necessary to bear in mind the successive steps in the training program which will, within the briefest possible time limits, produce the 

desired number of adequately trained officers. Three stages are involved, which 

will be dealt with in the following order: (!!) selection and processing, (Q) basic 

training at Fort Custer and (c) instruction at civilian colleges. 

(!!) Selection and Processing. The selection of officers possessing the 

necessary qualifications will be difficult for a number of reasons. Many special 

skills and a variety of refinements under some of them must be recruited, including experts in public works and utilities, public health, safety and welfare, 

fiscal affairs, education, communications and economics. In certain of these 

fields, the available supply of qualified personnel is today very limited. Serious 

competition for these meager supplies must be expected from such civilian agencies as the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (Governor 

Lehman). The most difficult situation, however, will arise from the fact that The 

Provost Marshal General's procurement authority establishes an age range of 

35 to 55 and a maximum rank, with few exceptions, of Captain. This combination of high age and comparatively low rank will make the selection job most 

difficult. 

Furthermore, it must be remembered that, after selection by the Provost Marshal General, the processing mortality will be high. The experience of 

the Military Government Division of the P.M.G.O. in commissioning civilians 

for the School of Military Government under the existing procurement authority 

has disclosed that less than 60% of those selected are ever actually commissioned. 

Finally, since the other portions of the military government personnel 

program have been planned upon a two-year basis, the selection and training of 

the specialists pool should be geared to this time limit. This imposes a maximum 

time factor upon the selection and processing phases here under discussion. 

The foregoing factors have been reduced to the time table appearing 

herein as Tab "B" . Its production estimates, however, are based upon the assumption that some relief will be afforded from certain of the handicaps noted 

above. The inevitable alternatives will be either a relaxation of desirable and 

necessary standards or a failure to meet the following schedules. As appears from 

Tab "B", the recruitment program can meet the specifications indicated above 

and have sufficient numbers of Reserve Officers available for the end college 

training by August 15, 1944. 

(Q) Basic training at Fort Custer. Allowing six weeks for processi ng, 100 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 219 

student officers will be available to enter Fort Custer on May I, 1943. A like 

number will enter on June I, July I and August I, and thereafter groups of 150 

will enter on the first day of each succeeding month until the full 2500 have 

been absorbed. This procedure will produce a student group of 200 from June 

I to September I, 1943; a student group of 250 in September and thereafter 

groups of 300. The facilities at Fort Custer will be ample for these purposes. 

(~) Instruction at civilian colleges. As will be later indicated the background instruction to be given in the college courses should cover five general 

areas. The unanimous opinion of all concerned is that no student group should 

exceed 50 student officers. Furthermore, the college training program must be 

geared to the productive capacity of the Selection Board and must be completed 

as nearly as possible by December 31, 1944. 

Giving effect to the foregoing factors requires that six (6) colleges be 

employed in the program and that the various courses be conducted at the times 

and in the distribution shown on Tab "C". 

The number of institutions competent to provide the necessary training is definitely limited. A careful investigation of the field discloses that twentyeight (28) colleges and universities are equipped to participate in the program. 

They are listed on Tab "0". 

4. Curriculum. Two curricula must be provided, viz. for (!!) Fort Custer 

and (2) civilian colleges. Inasmuch as the training program is a novel venture, 

sufficient flexibility should be retained at this time to make possible such minor 

adjustments as experience may prove to be desirable. 

The Charlottesville School has developed a general pattern of instruction that, it is believed, should be followed as nearly as possible in the new 

training program. This should be done not only because the Charlottesville 

method is believed to be sound, but because the adaptation of its essentials to 

the present program will create a desirable uniformity in all instruction given 

to military government personnel. 

The Charlottesville instruction is divided generally into two parts- (I) 

that relating to the general principles of military government which are applicable 

and important regardless of the particular area of occupation and (II) the study 

of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupation. Under (I) are included such 

topics as Army organization and staff functions, the international law and American regulations relating to military government, the experiences and practices 

of the United States and other nations in the actual operation of military governments and the general principles of public administration. Included under 

(II) are matters concerning the institutions, customs and practices of particular 

areas and the language thereof. 

It is proposed to allocate to the Fort Custer training those portions of 

the instruction embraced in (I) above and to the civilian colleges and universities 

those portions embraced in (II). 

A brief explanation for the desirability of such an allocation should be 

made. In the first place, it will be very difficult to establish in six separate colleges 

a satisfactory course of instruction embracing the general principles making up 
220 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Part I of the Charlottesville curriculum inasmuch as persons trained in certain 

of the topics are not usually found on college faculties. On the other hand, there 

is already in operation at Fort Custer a Department of Military Government, 

which is furnishing the instruction in its two schools for occupational police 

(officers and enlisted) upon the same topics which should be included in the 

present curriculum. It will be an easy matter to augment the existing faculty at 

Fort Custer and to furnish the instruction in that way. Furthermore, this procedure should result in a betterment of the existing Military Government faculty 

at Fort Custer. Finally, since only one hour per day, or a total of 48 hours for 

each course, will be devoted to this instruction, it will not materially reduce the 

time allotted to basic military training. 

With the foregoing remarks in mind, the two proposed curricula are now 

discussed: 

a. Fort Custer. Tab "En sets up a proposed curriculum for 8 weeks of basic 

military training. It has been prepared by the Military Police Division of the 

P.M.G.O. and, with one exception, it is self-explanatory. 

The noted exception is the reservation of 48 hours for the Director, 

Military Government Division. These 48 hours are allotted for instruction in 

the general principles of military government referred to above. The course of 

instruction to be furnished during these 48 hours has been prepared after consultation with the Charlottesville School and is in substantial conformity with 

the treatment of the subject matters involved by the Charlottesville School. See 

Tab "F". 

It should be noted that the curriculum covers 8 weeks instead of two 

months. This will leave two to three days at the end of each course for final 

processing and travel from Fort Custer to college courses beginning on the first 

day of the following month. 

!!: Colleges and universities. The training to be provided here is essentially 

the backgrounds of certain general areas of probable occupation. The most feasible grouping of the areas of study are believed to be five , namely: 

(1) Germany and Western Europe 

(2) Germany and Southeastern Europe 

(3) Italy and the Mediterranean 

(4) Japan and Southeastern Asia 

(5) The Southwest Pacific 

The curriculum would consist of three basic sub-divisions described as 

follows: 

(1) Special Instruction in the characteristics and conditions of the area. 

This would consist of (a) lectures, supervised project work and discussion relating 

to the people, their physical environment, their ways of living, their institutions 

and customs, as they affect problems of military government and (b) lectures 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 22 1 

and assignments concerning major recent events and developments which explain the relation of the area to the causes of tbe war. 

A more detailed description of the subject matter to be covered in this part 

of the curriculum would include the following features: 

Place. The location of the region with reference to adjacent regions and why 

that location is significant; access to the area by roads, railroad, water, air; 

distinguishing features of transportation in the area; climate, temperature, rainfall and some of the results which may be expected from extremes; the means 

for guarding against these results; the soil of the area, whether covered or barren; 

types of crops, fertility, topography, altitudes, minerals; effects of technological 

changes on the natural resource base, such as cultivation for export, mining 

development, construction of railroads, airports, etc.; water supply and its problems; irrigation; general relation or effects of the presence or absence of natural 

resources upon food, dress and activities of the people. 

People. The racial composition of the people of the area, and where these 

races have come from; whether there is a movement of the population, from 

where and to where; analysis of birtb and death rates and knowledge of resulting 

pressures; analysis of principal causes of death rates; linguistic, racial, religious 

and other groupings; status and caste relations and some of the specific problems 

emerging; influence of the stronger social, racial, color, religious or other groups 

on domestic politics and on international relations; special points of friction 

which must be watched. 

How They Make a Living. What the basic natural resources are and their 

extent; the dominant industries and other economic activities based upon them; 

types of special skills and institutions based on dominant industries and kind 

of international trade; recent changes in the local economy resulting from technology, war, colonial policies, tariffs, etc.; the labor supply- its amount, skill, 

treatment, freedom, wage rates, organization, political activity; presence or absence of a labor movement; the professional and managerial groups in the community, their size, recruitment, status and influence; the ownership of land, size 

of tracts, tenancy, terms of holding, changes in holdings, peculiarities of land 

law; effect of government upon the daily life- taxation, public utilities and services, government ownership and regulation, government monopolies, subsidies, 

tariffs, social security; financial control within the community, banking groups, 

control by corporations, political effects (e.g. Japan), representation of foreign 

financial interests. 

How They are Governed. The presence or absence of colonial government; 

the degree of local self-government and administration; the positions, number 

and authority of local officials, their selection and their relation to central government; the subdi visions of government organization, the relation of central 

and local units; the role of elections, tradition or status in the selection of officials; political parties or groups, their types of organization and methods; party 

programs, leaders and slogans, their racial and social foundations, their intensity 

of feeling; the Civil Service, its selection and training, presence or absence of a 

" spoils" system; its status and influence in the community; its stability; the 
222 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

possibilities of its use in occupied zones; significant features of the judicial and 

legal systems, forms of punishment, authority of courts, etc.; government finance, 

sources of revenue and principal objects of expenditure by local and central 

governments; peculiar methods, forms and objects of taxation; the role of invisible government; place of distinctive individuals and their leadership. 

How They Live. The characteristics of family life and the resulting effects 

upon the community; religions and their social and political influence; religious 

influences affecting local life and customs; e.g. diet, ceremonies, the relation of 

the sexes, and the use of special places and objects of worship; the schools and 

what they teach, general and technical; the control over the educational system; 

the degree of literacy; the availability of popular education; reading habits, libraries, newspapers, magazines, radio; censorship and control of the press and 

education; the major popular classics, other books; the distinctive features of 

local architecture, arts, music, dress, sports, diet, etc.; special accomplishments 

in literature, arts and sciences; accomplishments of particular pride; use of 

money, barter, wages, price understandings; sanitation and living conditions. 

Historical Background and Contemporary World Affairs. The essentials of 

the historical relations of the area to other adjacent or related areas and to the 

United States. 

(2) Language training. All officers who have a speaking or writing ability 

in a useful foreign language will be given speaking practice in that language; all 

other officers will be given intensive instruction (for speaking) in one of the 

fo llowing languages: German, italian, French, Japanese, Malay and Melanesian 

Pidgin. 

(3) Special application of civilian specialty to military government situations. This part of the curriculum will consist of (a) lectures and conferences on 

the relationship of technical, professional and other lines of specialized knowledge to military government organization and (b) lectures and conferences on 

special situations and problems in technical, professional and other lines of 

specialization which will be encountered in the area for which the officers are 

being prepared. 

The distribution of total hours involved among the three general topics 

just discussed appears on Tab "G". 

RECOMMENDA nONS: 

1. That training for two-months' periods begin at Fort Custer on May 1, 

1943, with 100 students, to be followed by monthly groups as set out in column 

(4), Tab "8". 

2. That instruction in colleges in the five general areas, indicated herein, 

begin on July 1, 1943, and be carried out in six institutions in student groups 

of 50 each, as indicated in Tab "C" . 

3. That the six colleges to be designated for this purpose be selected from 

the list set out in Tab "0" . 

4. That the curriculum for Fort Custer, set out in Tabs "E" and "F", be 

approved. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

5. That the curriculum for colleges, set out in Tab "G", be approved. 

/s/ Allen W. Gullion, 

Major General, 

223 

The Provost Marshal General. 

TAB "A" 

WDGAP 320 

January 23, 1943 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5 

SUBJECT: The War Department Military Government Program 

1. Paragraph 5 of FM 27-5 sets forth the policy of the War Department 

with respect to the exercise of Military Government in occupied territory. Paragraphs 6 and 8 fix the responsibility for the preparation of plans and determination of policies and the supervision of instruction and training of the 

necessary personnel upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l. Paragraph 7 prescribes the policy to be pursued with respect to the procurement of personnel 

for the exercise of Military Government. The procurement of this personnel is 

also a function of the Personnel Division, G-l. 

2. The present program of the War Department contemplates the training 

of a considerable number of enlisted men, junior officers and senior officers of 

the Army at schools currently under the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal 

General and the commissioning of a considerable number of civilians skilled in 

various phases of civil government in the Specialists Section of the Officers 

Reserve Corps with a view to giving them additional training in the various 

aspects of Military Government. The details of the program are as follows: 

a. The School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, has 

been established, and courses of instruction extending over a period of approximately four (4) months are being given to officers drawn from the service commands and units of the field forces and to a limited number of civilians who 

have been commissioned in the Specialists Section of the Officers Reserve Corps. 

The capacity of this school is 150 students. 

b. A school for junior officers and enlisted men is being opened at Fort 

Custer, MiChigan, under the Provost Marshal General for the training of approximately 1,200 junior officers during the current year. The number of enlisted 

men to be trained has not yet been definitely determined. 

c. The Provost Marshal General has been authorized to recommend for 

appointment in the Specialists Section of the Officers Reserve Corps 2,500 civilians having special skills in civil government. These individuals are to be 

appointed at a rate of not more than 300 per month and upon appointment are 
224 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

to be called to active duty and given a basic course of military training followed 

by a suitable course in military government at some civilian institution, upon 

the completion of which they will be returned to an inactive status if there is 

no immediate need for their services in an active theater. Complete details of 

this program have not yet been worked out by The Provost Marshal General 

and submitted for approval. 

The training of the personnel listed in ~, Q and ~ above will be under the guidance 

of the Training Division, Services of Supply, and supervised by the Personnel 

Division, G- I, as contemplated by paragraph 8, FM 27- 5. 

3. The disposition of graduates of the Schools of Military Government will 

be determined by the requirements of active theatres and of the desires of field 

force commanders with respect to the establishment of Civil Affairs Sections in 

their Headquarters within the continental limits of the United States. Where an 

appropriate assignment can be found for graduates this Division will direct their 

assignment to duties for which they have been trained. Where an appropriate 

assignment is not available for officers and enlisted men detailed to the Schools 

from units of the Army they will be returned to units of the field forces where 

they will remain until their services are required. Where appropriate assignments 

are not available for those officers appointed directly from civil life they will be 

returned to an inactive status upon completion of training and will remain 

available to the War Department until their services are required. 

4. For details concerning the origin of the basic program, and particularly 

the establishment of the School of Military Government, attention is invited to 

G-3/41983 , March 5, 1942, subject: "Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison" , and to file AG 352 (912-3-410). 

Incls. 

Memo to G- l fr G-3, 11 19. 

File AG 352. 

mlr 

lsi M.G. WHITE 

Brigadier General, 

Assistant Chief of Staff 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

TAB "E" 

Proposed Eight Week Program for Specialists 

to be Commissioned in Officers Reserve Corps 

for Specialists Duty in Occupied Countries 

SUBJECT 

Basic and General 

I. Orientation Lecture and Definition of Military Terms 

2. Qualifications and Responsibilities of officers 

3. Close Order Drill 

4. Defense Against Chemical Attacks 

5. Duty of Officers "Off Duty" 

6. Extended Order Drill 

7. Military Sanitation and First Aid 

8. Interior Guard Duty 

9. Exterior G uard Duty 

10. Inspections 

II. Leadership and Discipline 

12. Map and Aerial Photo Reading 

13. Marches and Bivouacs 

14. Military Courtesy, Customs of the Service 

15. Safeguarding Military Information 

16. Organi zation of Army 

17. Uniform and Equipment 

Total 

Police Instruction 

I. Field Tri ps: 

Div. C. P. 

M. P. Company 

Plant Protection 

2. Military Training 

3. Office of P.M.G. 

4. Organization of Corps of M.P. 

5. Prisoners of War 

Total 

Weapons 

I. Anti-Aircraft Firing Rifle 

2. Bayonet 

3 Carbine 

225 

HOURS 

2 

2 

16 

3 

I 

4 

6 

2 

2 

3 

3 

20 

4 

8 

2 

4 

3 

85 

4 

2 

4 

6 

I 

2 

2 

2 1 

3 

I 

4 
226 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

SUBJECT 

4. Field Demonstration, .50 Cal. and 

.30 Cal. machine gun and 60 MM Mortar 

5. Fire Orders and Control 

6. Grenade 

7. Infantry Weapons, characteristics 

8. Machine Gun, Cal. .30 (L. & H.) and Cal. .50 

9. Pistol and Revolver cal. .45 

10. Rifle, cal. .30 (MI & 03) 

II. Shot Gun 

12. Technique of Rifle Fire 

13. Thompson Sub-machine Gun, cal. .45 

14. 60 MM Mortar 

Total 

Tactics 

I. Combat Intelligence 

2. Combat Orders 

3. Counter Intelligence 

4. Defense Against Air Borne Troops 

5. Defense Against Air and Mechanized Attacks 

6. Employment of Chemicals 

7. Entrenchments and Camouflage 

8. Estimate of the Situation 

9. Medical Services in the Field 

10. Mission and Functions and Arms and Services 

II. Outposts 

12. Reconnaissance and Security 

13. Scouting and Patrolling 

14. Signal Communications 

15. Supply 

16. Staff Duties 

Total 

Criminal Investigation 

I. CNI, FBI, POI, ONI 

2. Codes 

3. Drugs 

4. Fingerprints 

5. Handwriting Identification 

6. Sabotage Methods 

Total 

HOURS 

4 

I 

3 

4 

10 

10 

10 

2 

3 

10 

2 

67 

2 

I 

2 

2 

2 

I 

2 

I 

2 

4 

2 

2 

4 

4 

6 

4 

41 

2 

2 

I 

2 

I 

10 

18 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 227 

SUBJECT HOURS 

Law and Administration 

I. Army Postal Service I 

2. Articles of War (to include 104 A.W.) 6 

3. Basic Law 2 

4. Charges and Specifications I 

5. Classification I 

6. Company Administration to include Military Correspondence 4 

7. Military Arrests I 

8. Military Jurisdiction 2 

9. Procedure During Trial 2 

Total 20 

Physical Training 

I. Judo 12 

2. Physical Training 24 

Total 36 

SUBJECT 

Proposed Eight Week Program for Specialists 

to be Commissioned in Officers Reserve Corps 

for Specialists Duty in Occupied Countries 

SUMMARY 

Basic and General 

Police Instruction 

Weapons 

Tactics 

Criminal Investigation 

Law and Administration 

Physical Training 

Review and Examination (2 hours per week) 

Open Time (4 hours per week) 

Reserved for Director, Military Government Division 

Total Number of Hours 

"See Tab "F" 

HOURS 

85 

21 

67 

41 

18 

20 

36 

16 

32 

48" 

384 
228 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

TAB "F" 

Distribution of 48 hours of Military Government 

Instruction - Fort Custer 

Hours (60 Min.) 

Lectures Practical Work. 

Army Organization and Staff Functions 

War Department organization; general staff; 8 

tactical organization; rear areas; special staff 

functions; military orders; staff and command 

procedure; reorganized army. 

Legal Instruction 

Practice of military war tribunals, including 

jurisdiction and procedures. 

Military Government. (General) 

Law of Military Government (FM 27-10, 

Chapters 6, 10, 11 and other relevant 

paragraphs); organization and practice of 

military government (FM 27- 5); application of 

basic principles to concrete situations. 

Military Government (Experiences) 

A study of past and present experiences and 

practices of the United States and other 

countries. 

Public Administration 

Public Safety, Public Health, Public Welfare 

and Relief, Labor, Public Relations, Banking 

and Currency, General Administration, 

Problems in Military Government, general 

principles of Public Administration. 

2 

4 

11 

8 

13 

2 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 229 

TAB uG" 

CURRICULUM for COLLEGES and UNIVERSITIES 

1. Special 

instruction in 

Characteristics 

and conditions of 

general area 

2. Language training 

3. Special 

application of 

civilian specialty 

to military 

government 

Lectures or other Class 

Room Work 

84 hours 

96 " 

12 

192 

" 

Supervised 

Project Work Total 

168 hours 252 hours 

24 

192 

" 

96 " 

36 

385 
230 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

SUBJECT 

TAB "H" 

Proposed Eight Week Program fo r Specialists 

to be commissioned in Officers Reserve Corps 

for Specialist Duty in Occupied Countries 

Basic and General 

HOURS 

I. Orientation Lecture and Definition of Military Terms. 3 

2. Qualifications and Responsibilities of officers. 3 

3. School of Soldier, Squad, Platoon and Company. 40 

4. Defense against Chemical Attacks 5 

5. Military Sanitation and First Aid 8 

6. Guard Duty including Security and anti-sabotage measures 14 

7. Inspections 8 

8. Leadership and Discipline 3 

9. Map and Aerial Photo Reading 10 

10. Military Courtesy, Customs of the Service 4 

II. Safeguarding Military Information 2 

12. Organization of Army, CMP, MP, PMC, to 

include Organization T/O and Com. Zone. 12 

13. Un iform and Equipment 3 

Total 11 5 

Weapons 

I. Infantry Weapons, characteristics I 

2. Pistol and Revolver Cal. 45 10 

3. Rifle, Cal. 30 (MI and .03) carbine 10 

4. Thompson Sub-machine Gun Cal. 45 4 

Total 25 

Tactics 

I. Counter Intelligence 

2. Defense against Air Borne Troops 

3. Defense against Air and Mechanized Attacks. 

4. Employment of Chemicals 

5. Signal Communications 

6. Supply System 

Total 

Law and Administration 

I. Army Postal Service 

2. Articles of War (to include 104 AW) 

2 

4 

4 

3 

6 

8 

27 

I 

6 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

SUBJECT 

3. Military Law 

4. Military Correspondence and Army Regulations 

5. Staff Organization and Functions 

6. Medical Service, American Red Cross 

U.S. Public Health Service 

7. Rules of Land Warfare 

8. Prisoners of War 

9. Utilization of Economic Resources in War 

10. Relations of Military Forces with civil 

populations, Ordnances Military Commissions 

and Military Requisitions 

II. Evacuation of civilians 

Total 

Training 

Physical Training 

Methods of Training 

Examination (Training Inspections) 

Total 

Summary: 

Basic and General 

Weapons 

Tactics 

Law and Administration 

Training 

Reserved for Ass't Commandant 

Reserved for Director, Military Government Div. 

Total 

23 1 

HOURS 

18 

12 

8 

6 

3 

3 

3 

10 

8 

78 

24 

3 

16 

43 

115 

25 

27 

78 

43 

48 

48 

384 

DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 233 

The Theory Behind a Military Government Program 

As the date for Operation ICEBERG drew closer, Tenth Army planners 

developed specific instructions for the military government headquarters 

and the field detachments. These plans, together with two directives from 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, applied the central principles derived from 

the field manuals and civil affairs courses to the particular military government challenges anticipated on Okinawa. 

4. Operational Directive Number 7 for Military Government of the 

Commanding General Tenth Army (Short Title: GOPER), 6 January 

1945. 

(Source: National Archives and Records Service Suitland, Md., 

RG 407) 

Despite its curious title, and the fact that the derivation of its short-title 

(GOPER) remains obscure, this directive is a comprehensive document 

detailing the composition and function of the military government detachments, providing guidance on various aspects of civil affairs administration-such as currency regulation and education, and assigning 

personnel and material to the various military government field teams: 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE) 

) 

NUMBER 7) 

Military Government; Short Title: GOPER 

6 January 1945 

I. OBJECT: The object of Military Government is to assist military operations, to further national policies, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying 

forces under international law. This assistance is rendered by maintaining order, 

promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military 

operations, reducing active and passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of 

local civil adminstration, and mobilizing local resources in the aid of military 

objectives. 

2. RESPONSIBILITY: 

a. Command: 
234 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

(I) Function: Military Government is a function of command. Each 

commander is responsible for military government operations in the area under 

his control. 

(2) Channels: Military government personnel attached to a command 

will be under the direct command of the commanding officer of the unit to which 

they are attached. Military government staffs may use direct channels of communication for technical subjects. 

(3) Transfer of Command: Initially the Commander Expeditionary 

Troops will be responsible for all military government operations. On order from 

Commander Expeditionary Troops, direct responsibility for and command over 

military government personnel and operations will pass to the Island 

Commander. 

b. Policies: 

(I) General Limitations: 

(a) International Law and Military Necessity: The subordinate commanders are delegated such powers of government as international law and military necessity may require. 

(b) Rules of Land Warfare: Commanders will carry out their duties 

in accordance with the laws and customs of war on land. 

(c) Directives from Higher Echelons: Procedure with respect to MG 

operations in any area under the CG, TENTH Army will be in accordance with 

the policies laid down in directives or orders from higher echelons and in accordance with those here set forth. Military Government staffs for all echelons 

under the CG, TENTH Army will prepare necessary plans for civilian control 

within their respective areas in accordance with policies established herein. 

(2) Degree of Control: 

(a) General: Commanders under the TENTH Army may demand 

and enforce from the inhabitants of the occupied area such obedience as may 

be necessary for the purposes of war, the maintenance of law and order, and the 

proper administration ofthe area under the circumstances of hostile occupation. 

In return for such obedience, the inhabitants shall be granted freedom from all 

unnecessary or unwarranted interference with their individual liberty and property rights. The degree of control to be maintained by the TENTH Army will 

vary according to the attitude of officials and inhabitants, the projected military 

operations, and current military, political, economic, and other pertinent circumstances, Rigid control of civilians will be exercised to accomplish objectives 

of military government. As conditions approach normal, the control exercised 

by military government will be relaxed. 

3. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL: 

a. In the assault phase, Military Government staff, detachments, teams, 

and units with tactical forces will be under the command of the Commander 

Expeditionary Troops. Military Government operational teams and detachments 

may be attached to subordinate units, and when so attached will be under the 

direct command of the subordinate commander concerned. 

b. In the garrison phase, the Island Commander has responsibility for 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 235 

military government, which will be operated by the Deputy Commander for 

Military Government. 

c. Military Government personnel (Army and Navy), are organized into 

headquarters, operational teams, and detachments as follows: 

(I) Military Government Headquarters (Appendix #1) 

(2) Divisional "A" Detachments, each of 4 officers and II enlisted 

men. (Appendix #11) 

(3) "B" Detachments, each of 8 officers and 19 enlisted men. (Appendix #111) 

(4) "C" Detachments, or Camp Teams, each of IO officers and 26 

enlisted men. (Appendix #IV) 

(5) "D" Detachments, or District Teams, each of 22 officers and 60 

enlisted men. (Appendix #V) 

(6) Special detachments, made up of personnel assigned in accordance 

with duties to be performed. 

d. In addition, the following are type units, both Army and Navy which 

may be assigned to duty for military government operations: 

(I) MP Units 

(2) QM Truck Cos. 

(3) MP Criminal Investigation Units 

(4) G-2 Hospitals 

(5) G-4 Hospitals 

(6) G-6 Hospitals 

(7) G-7 Dispensaries 

(8) G- IO Dispensaries 

(9) G- 14 Dispensaries 

(10) G-17 Malaria Control Units 

(II) G-18 Epidemiological Units 

(12) N-IA Camp Components 

(13) N-4A Camp Components 

(14) N-4C Camp Components 

(15) N-5C Camp Components 

( 16) Construction Battalions 

4. OPERATIONS: 

(Army) 

(Army) 

(Army) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

(Navy) 

a. Military Government Headquarters: At the direction of the CG, 

TENTH ARMY, the Military Government Section, Hq TENTH ARMY, will be 

augmented by such personnel, assigned for Military Government duties in the 

area, as may be necessary to enable it to operate as a staff section exercising 

control over all military government activities under the Area Commander. If 

Hq TENTH ARMY should leave the area, the augmentation portion of the 

Military Government Section, Hq TENTH ARMY, will remain in the area as 

the continuing military government staff of the Area Commander and as such 

will, under his direction, control and supervise the activities of the military 

government in the area. While together, the two parts of the Military Government 

Section, Hq TENTH ARMY, will operate as a unit. 
236 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

b. Military Government "A" Detachments: The "A" detachments attached to divisions will remain under divisional control until completion of the 

operation. "A" detachments conduct military government reconnaissance, and 

assist in the following civilian functions: control; establishing civilian collection 

points separate from but adjacent to prisoner of war collection points; posting 

proclamations and issuing civilian relief supplies available to the division . In 

addition they may act as military government staffs for the division commanders. 

At the direction of the Expeditionary Troop Commander they may be transferred 

to the control of the Island Commander. 

c. Military Government "B" Detachments: These detachments are attached to corps and divisions and perform duties within the areas of units to 

which assigned. When the "A" detachments are required to advance, "B" detachments will continue the emergency military government work begun by the 

"A" detachments. "B" detachments will normally remain in the area to which 

initially assigned and at the discretion of the next senior commander may be 

relieved from units to which assigned and used for military government duties 

in the areas uncovered by the advance. 

d. Military Government "C" Detachments: The principal mission of the 

"C" detachment is that of establishing and operating civilian camps. These 

detachments will land under corps and Army control and are capable of providing 

initially a camp for 2500 people, which later may be expanded to a capacity of 

10,000. 

e. Military Government "0" Detachments: These detachments will be 

landed at the target during the late assault phase or the early garrison phase, 

and will take over the military government duties at the district level, absorbing 

the "B" teams and exercising control over the "C" teams within their districts. 

A "0" team after absorbing "B" teams is capable of administering a civilian 

population of between 60,000 to 100,000 people, and in addition can supervise 

any civilian camps located within the district. 

f. Special MG Detachments: Whenever required by the peculiarities of 

the situation, as when a remote area is to be governed, special MG detachments 

may be constituted, or standard detachments may be subdivided. 

g. Other Units: Navy Medical and CB, and Army MP and quartermaster 

truck units will arrive on the target to work in conjunction with the detachments 

listed above. Normally they will not be used for other than military government 

assignments. 

5. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION: (See Appendix VI, MG Supply 

Responsibilities) 

a. Military Government Detachments: Supplied all classes through normal channels hy units to which attached. 

b. Civilian: 

(I) Class I: 

(a) Initial: Assault Divisions or Separate Combat Teams will mount 

out with civilian rations as directed. Number of rations prescribed will depend 

on tonnage allocations and estimated need for such rations at the target. For 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 237 

components of civilian ration for this area see Appendix VII (Table of Basic 

Ration - Subsistence for Civilians). 

(b) Resupply: Will be from captured local food stocks and civilian 

rations landed from maintenance shipping. 

(c) Issue of Military Rations to Civilians: In emergencies, commanders may authorize the issue of military rations to civilians. 

(2) Class II - (Clothing): 

(a) Emergency stocks of civilian clothing will be landed in early 

maintenance and resupply shipping subsequent to the assault. Gratuitous issue 

to cover minimum essential civilian requirements may be made in early phases 

of the operation. At the earliest possible date, gratuitous issue will cease. Clothing 

and materials therefore will then be furnished to civilians only through trade 

stores, civilian commercial channels or in direct payment for services rendered. 

Exceptions may be made in cases where eligibility for free issue has been determined by Welfare Department. 

(3) Economic Supplies - (Agriculture, Fishing, Trade Goods, etc): Will 

be landed on scheduled maintenance shipping in accordance with estimated 

requirements and assigned tonnage allocations. Small initial gratuitous issue may 

be made. The bulk of such supplies will be sold through the medium of trade 

stores or local commercial channels. 

(4) Engineer: Will be furnished in accordance with the Base Development Plan. Special engineer equipment and supplies included as organic 

equipment with MG units and detachments will be shipped and landed with the 

respective units. 

(5) Medical and Sanitary Supplies: Initial supplies accompany Military Government Medical Units. Resupply by block Shipments in maintenance 

shipping. 

c. Storage and Issue: 

(I) Service Units of the tactical Commands and IsCom are responsible 

for landing Military Government supplies, for storage in unit or IsCom Dumps 

and for issue to MG units and installations on request of SMGO. MG supplies 

will be handled by the appropriate Technical Service charged with comparable 

classes and types of Military Supplies. 

(2) Military Government personnel will be responsible for opening 

and operating Civilian DP's (distribution points) at Camps or other locations 

as required. 

d. Transportation: 

(I) MG units will use organic transportation and/or assigned transportation units to the greatest extent practicable for all MG activities. 

(2) Captured transportation will be turned over to MG units to reinforce organic transportation unless urgently required for combat operations. 

(3) MG transportation requirements over and above (I) and (2) above 

will be furnished by tactical units or IsCom. 

e. Water: 
238 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

(1) Initially facilities will be established to provide water for civilians 

on the basis of 1 gal. per civilian per day. 

(2) Purification Units are organic equipment with MG "C" and "0" 

Teams for this purpose. 

(3) As a reserve against possible lack ·of surface water, distillation 

equipment will be landed from early echelon shipping, to provide 1 quart of 

distilled water per day for estimated number of civilians. 

(4) IsCom will establish facilities capable of furnishing supply of potable water for civilians in camps on the basis of 4 gals. per person per day 

during the garrison phase. 

f. Evacuation: Civilian casualties will be evacuated through the tactical 

evacuation system to MG Medical installations. 

g. Miscellaneous: 

(1) Local Resources and Salvage: Maximum utilization of local resources and salvaged equipment are essential to carry out the MG plan. Prompt 

and continuous reconnaissance by all MG personnel will be made to uncover 

and report usable supplies and equipment from civilian and captured enemy 

sources. The following captured enemy military supplies and miscellaneous civilian salvage not required for emergency military use will be made available by 

commanders for civilian use: 

(a) Foodstuffs, 

(b) Clothing, 

(c) Medical supplies, 

(d) Fishing gear and equipment, 

(e) Hand tools and agricultural implements, 

(f) Building materials, 

(g) Stray livestock and poultry. 

Control and issue of such materials will be effected through military government 

units. 

(2) Levels: Levels for all classes of civilian supply will be announced 

by IsCom after occupation of the target area and a survey of local resources. 

(3) Markings: MG Supplies will be marked to indicate service responsible for handling and will bear additional distinctive markings to identify 

them as MG supplies. 

6. GOVERNMENT: 

a. Legal Affairs: Commanders will discharge their level responsibilities 

of military government through their military government units. 

(1) Proclamations, Orders and Ordinances which establish military 

government and govern the population will be delivered to appropriate military 

government units at the mounting area. 

(a) Immediately upon entering the target area, commanders of leading assault units will cause to be posted basic proclamations establishing and 

announcing military government. 

(b) Thereafter, commanders will formulate and announce such other 

enactments and orders as may be necessary. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 239 

(c) Civilians violating military government enactments will be 

turned over to the military government for trial and punishment. 

(2) Court Administration and Supervision: Commanders may request 

Expeditionary Troop Commanders or Island Commanders to establish Exceptional Military Courts. Until further orders local native courts will be closed. 

(3) Property Custodianship and War Claims: 

(a) Military government will keep accurate records of all property 

requisitioned or otherwise taken into custody. Tactical commanders requisitioning property will conform to military government procedures so that similar 

records can be maintained. 

(b) Civilian claims against United States forces will be forwarded 

to military government headquarters with all available information. Claims will 

be processed and paid as directed by Island Commanders or higher authority. 

b. Political Affairs: 

(I) Public Safety: Military government units will assist commanders 

to: 

(a) Supervise the establishment and maintenance of law and order 

among the civilian population. 

(b) Supervise and control necessary civilian fire and air-raid 

defense. 

(c) Establish control over penitentiaries, prisons and civilian concentration areas. 

(2) Civilian Circulation Control: Military government units will assist 

commanders in the control of displaced persons. 

(3) Evacuation of Civilian Population: Evacuation movements of civilian population will be effected as ordered by the Commander, Expeditionary 

Troops. 

(4) Local Government: Local government will be established as the 

situation permits. 

(5) Postal Service: Initially, communications among civilians will be 

stopped and may later be established by order of the Area Commander. 

(6) Censorship: Military Government units will take necessary action 

to prevent civilians under their control from communicating with enemy civilians. During garrison phase, civilian censorships will be responsibility of the 

Island Commander. 

c. Information: 

(I) Press and Radio: All press, radio, and other releases concerning 

military government will conform to policies and directives issued by the Expeditionary Troop and Island Commanders. 

(2) Cultural Institutions: 

(a) Religion: All political and nationalistic Shinto practices will be 

barred, and Shinto temples will be closed; individual religious observances either 

in non-Shinto temples or elsewhere will be permitted if they do not jeopardize 

public order. 
240 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

(b) Arts and Monuments: Properties and objects of cultural value 

will be protected and preserved as the military situation permits. 

(c) Education: Emergency educational-recreational programs may 

be undertaken; a more formal and permanent educational system may be instituted as soon as conditions permit. 

7. HEALTH, WELFARE, AND LABOR: 

a. Public Health: Medical care and public health work for civilians will 

be carried on by Military Government units to the extent required to prevent 

interference with military operations and meet minimum humanitarian needs. 

When circumstances warrant, requests will be made through channels upon the 

appropriate services of the tactical forces or Island Command for assistance or 

supplies. 

(I) Civilian Medical Care: 

(a) Collection and evacuation of civilians: (see paragraph 5 f). 

(b) Civilians in urgent need of hospitalization or out-patient treatment will be sent to hospitals or dispensaries, designated for military 

government. 

(c) Hospitals and dispensaries designated for military government 

will work in close cooperation with the surgeon of the units to which they are 

attached. 

(d) Native medical personnel, institutions and salvaged enemy medical and sanitary supplies will be used exclusively for the treatment of civilians. 

(e) During assault, reconnaissance will be made promptly of native 

communities and refugee groups to determine extent of civilian casualties and 

adequacy of community or group resources for handling sick and wounded. 

(2) Preventative Medicine: 

(a) Such measures will be taken as are practicable and urgently required for control of communicable disease among civilians. 

(b) So far as possible, persons suffering from communicable diseases 

will be segregated and treated in accordance with standard public health quarantine procedures. 

(c) In the assault, reconnaissance will be made promptly of native 

communities and refugee groups to determine prevalence of communicable diseases and measures required to prevent their spread. 

(3) Sanitation: 

(a) Supervision will be exercised over sanitary quality of water supplies furnished to camps and over community water supplies not supervised by 

other engineers. 

(b) Supervision will be exercised over sanitary conditions in native 

communities, at civilian collection points, and in civilian camps. 

(c) During the assault, recon naissance will be made promptly of 

native communities and refugee groups to determine unsanitary conditions 

which are likely to result in disease outbreaks. 

b. Welfare: As directed by commanders, military government personnel 

will: 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 241 

(1) Establish and operate civilian collection centers in combat and 

rear areas, assembly points and camps on temporary or permanent sites. 

(2) Distribute civilian type rations available to the responsible commander, where local food supplies are inadequate. (See Par. 5 b (1) (c)) 

(3) Issue minimum relief supplies, including cash where advisable, for 

destitute civilians in communitites outside of camps. 

c. Labor: 

(1) Through their MG detachments and teams, commanders will assemble and process native civilian labor for assignment to employing units of 

the combat and service forces as rapidly as conditions permit. 

(2) Available labor will be allocated in accordance with priorities set 

by the Island Commander. 

(3) Among other responsibilities, employing units will furnish transportation and guards as required, meals which occur during working hours, and 

water. 

(4) As conditions stabilize in rear areas and during the garrison phase, 

employing units will keep time records and arrange with appropriate disbursing 

officers for payment in accordance with instructions to be announced by IsCom. 

8. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY: 

a. Captured Enemy Supply and Salvage: (See Par. 5 g) 

(1) Captured Transport - (See Par. 5 d (2)): Captured vehicles of new 

design or equipped for Special Military purposes will be cleared through intelligence agencies. 

(2) Control and issue of such materials will be effected through military government units. 

b. Restoration of Native Agriculture, Fishing, Trade & Industry: During 

the garrison phase, military government will be responsible for the restoration 

of civilian commerce and production, on a supervisory basis, to provide maximum local output and distribution of essential items in order to maintain minimum standards among the population. The specific duties will be: 

(1) To supervise and control the restoration of trade channels, supplemented when necessary by military government trade stores; to estimate imported supplies required to make up deficits in local production; to encourage 

essential industrial production and take necessary steps to minimize inflation 

and provide rationing control. 

(2) To plan and supervise an agricultural program covering allocation, 

conversion, and use of land so as to obtain maximum production of the most 

essential crops. 

(3) To permit the resumption of fishing as soon as clearance is obtained, and to supervise fishing operations. 

9. TRANSPORTATION, UTILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION: 

a. Restoration: Through military government detachments and teams, 

commanders will: 
242 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

(I) Survey civilian transportation, utilities and construction conditions and facilities. 

(2) Undertake, using local materials and labor, the restoration and 

necessary expansion of: 

(a) Local water supplies, 

(b) Minimum shelter for civilians. 

b. Supervision: Through military government detachments and teams, 

commanders will arrange for: 

(I) Utilization by military government of civilian and assigned military transport and communications facilities. 

(2) Erection of necessary military government installations, including 

camps, hospitals and headquarters. 

10. FINANCE: 

a. Occupational Fiscal Policy: 

(I) Objectives: The fiscal policies of the Commanding General will 

seek to attain tbe following objectives: 

(a) To provide for tbe combat forces and military government an 

adequate supply of currency; to control and stabilize currency and otber mediums of excbange. 

(b) To control tbe operation of all banks, trust companies, exchanges, and otber financial institutions. 

(c) To provide centralized control of all military government expenditures and of all local government expenditures within the area. 

(d) To control inflation by the orderly attainment of the objectives 

listed above. 

(e) To provide accurate reports for higher authority on tbe cost of 

military government and tbe use of military yen currency and American dollars 

by military government and the armed forces; to provide centralized control of 

accounts and records and uniform accounting policies for military government. 

(2) Currency: 

(a) Circulation: 

1.. Supplemental Military Yen Series B will be legal tender, in 

addition to regular yen currency, and will circulate with, and be interchangeable 

one for one witb regular Japanese yen. 

2. Japanese military yen will not be legal tender and will be confiscated and turned over to military government. 

3. U.S. dollars will not be legal tender and will not be allowed to 

circulate. When found on the target, subordinate commanders will direct tbeir 

seizure. Suitable receipts will be given. 

~. Exchange Rates: The provisional rate of exchange will be ten 

Supplemental Military Yen Series B to one U.S dollar. This rate will be used 

exclusively for pay of military and naval personnel and for accounting purposes. 

5. Proclamations: Subordinate commanders will post currency 

proclamations immediately upon occupying an area. 

(b) Supply of Yen Currency: 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 243 

L The Commanding General, TENTH Army, will control all yen 

currencies used by the occupying forces. 

2. Requirements of yen currency, in accordance with estimates 

submitted by-the type commanders will be secured from military government 

headquarters on the target. 

(c) Shipment and Transfer: 

1. Currency may be transferred from one military disbursing officer to another of any service. Funds may be drawn from, or turned over to, 

military government. 

~. All receipts of yen currency from military government and all 

transfers between accountable finance officers of different services will be reported by both parties to the War or Navy Department as may be appropriate. 

1. Subordinate commanders effecting shipment of currency will 

be responsible for its security in transit. 

(d) Conversion: 

.!.. Prior to landing, Navy disbursing officers or commanding officers who have been designated as fiscal representatives aboard ship will convert 

U.S. dollars into yen currency in amounts sufficient to provide unit commanders 

with requirements of their personnel. 

~. On the target, limited conversion of U.S. dollars into yen may 

be made by appropriate disbursing officers at the request of unit commanders. 

(e) Enemy Assets: Commanders will seize all enemy stores or currency in their areas and turn them over to military government. 

(f) Foreign Exchange: All foreign financial transactions of any kind, 

including all exports and imports of currency and securities, are prohibited except as may be permitted by regulations issued by military government. 

(g) Payment of civilian labor will be made by the using command. 

(h) Accounting: 

.!.. Military disbursing officers will report monthly to military government all currency transactions, whether in yen or U.S. dollars, making a 

separate report for each type of currency. 

~. Military disbursing and finance officers will report all receipts 

and expenditures of yen on their accounts current in dollars at the established 

rate of exchange in order that earmarked dollar accounts established by the 

Treasury Department may be credited and charged. Supporting documents will 

show the yen and dollar amounts involved in each case. 

1. Military government will maintain centralized accounting control, in terms of yen, over: 

a. Currencies whether used for military or civil administration 

purposes. 

b. Military government expenditures and receipts. 

i . All advances of yen currency will be evidenced by receipts . 

.?. Subordinate commands will be required to furnish supporting 

data to enable military government to make reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

on the overall costs of occupation of the area. 
244 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

2.. Detailed accounting instructions will be issued by military government in a technical bulletin. 

b. Native Fiscal Institutions: 

(I) Closing of Fiscal Institutions: All financial institutions, including 

banks, postal savings offices, mutual loan companies, and credit cooperatives, 

will be closed. Their assets and records will be guarded, and institutions will be 

kept closed until reopened under conditions prescribed by military government. 

(2) Enemy assets found in financial institutions will be segregated and 

placed under guard. 

(3) No access will be allowed to assets located in financial institutions 

except under regulations prescribed by military government. 

(4) A moratorium on the collection of taxes and the recovering of debts 

will be declared. 

(5) All exchanges will be closed and remain closed until re-opened 

under conditions prescribed by military government. 

c. Public Finance: 

(I) Subordinate commanders will insure that tbe records and assets 

of public agencies are protected and placed under guard. 

(2) All public finance officers, tax collectors and other finance officials, 

when found, will be turned over to military government. 

(3) Military government will assume control of public finance in the 

area. 

11. REPORTS: 

a. During the assault phase Corps Commanders will report daily to the 

Army in brief form by dispatch the military government situation in their areas. 

These reports will be submitted in duplicate; will cover the period 0001-2400; 

will be due at 1200 daily; will be prepared by the SMGO of the reporting unit; 

will be classified "SECRET" ; and will contain the reference "Par. II, GOPER." 

They will cover: 

(l) Location of military government detachments in their sector. 

(2) Number and location of all civilian men, women, and children 

under care of military government and, specifically, of those being fed from 

military supplies. 

assigned. 

(3) Number and location of civilian laborers requested and number 

(4) Location and extent of serious communicable diseases. 

(5) Salvage in the hands of military government. 

(6) General status of military government operations. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 245 

b. Special matters of an urgent character regarding military government 

will be made the subject of immediate special reports to Army Headquarters. 

By command of Lieutenant General BUCKNER: 

OFFICIAL: 

/slJ. S. GARFIELD 

Colonel AGO 

Adjutant General 

E.D. POST 

Brigadier General GSC 

Chief of Staff 
246 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX NO. I 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS: 

Personnel: 

(a) Officers: In addition to a CMGO, his deputy andlor executive, officer 

personnel will be provided in sufficient numbers to perform the following functions: 

Legal 

Public Affairs 

Information 

Public Health 

Public Welfare 

Labor 

Commerce and Industries 

Transportation, Utilities, and Construction 

Fiscal 

(b) Enlisted Men: Enlisted men will be provided as required, for assignment to the various headquarters departments. 

II Equipment: In addition to authorized personal equipment (Army: TIE 21; 

Navy: Functional Component J 15-A for ElM and Functional Component 

Jl5-B for officers) equipment will be provided so as to make the headquarters 

staff a self-sustaining unit in the field. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 247 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX NO. II 

"An Detachment 

(I) Personnel 

TITLE NUMBER 

Lt. Colonel 

Major 

Captain 

Captain 

TOTAL COMMISSIONED 

Technician, Grade 4 

Technician, Grade 4 

Corporal 

Technician, Grade 5 

Technician, Grade 5 

Private 

Private 

TOTAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL 

AGGREGATE 

(2) Major Items of Equipment: 

ITEM 

Carbine, cal. 30, complete 

Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete 

Truck, 114 ton, 4 X 4 

I 

I 

I 

I 

4 

1 

2 

1 

2 

3 

11 

15 

Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 X 4 weapons carrier w/winch 

Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2w, cargo 

Trailer, I ton, 2w, cargo 

Paulins, canvas, 20' X 40' 

Tent, command post, complete 

Typewriter, portable 

MOS 

196 

673 

669 

055 

345 

675 

320 

DUTY 

Mil. Gov't Off. 

Public Safety Off. 

Medical Off. 

Engineering Off. 

Sanitary Tech. 

Medical NCO 

Military Police 

Clerks 

Driver 

Messengers 

Interpreters 

NO. 

13 

2 

I 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 
248 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX NO. III 

"B" Detachment 

(l) Personnel 

TITLE NUMBER 

Lt Colonel 

Major 

Major 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

TOTAL COMMISSIONED 

Technical Sergeant 

Staff Sergeant 

Staff Sergeant 

Sergeant 

Technician, Grade 4 

Technician, Grade 4 

Technician, Grade 4 

Technician, Grade 4 

Technician, Grade 5 

Technician, Grade 5 

Technician, Grade 5 

TOTAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL 

AGGREGATE 

(2) Major items of equipment. 

ITEM 

Carbine, cal. 30, complete 

Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete 

Truck, 114 ton, 4 X 4 

8 

2 

2 

I 

2 

I 

I 

I 

I 

2 

3 

3 

19 

27 

MOS 

194 

194 

631 

356 

213 

673 

196 

415 

055 

345 

320 

Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 X 4, weapons carrier wlwinch 

DUTY 

Mil. Gov't Off. 

Public Safety Off. 

Medical Off. 

Asst. Public Safety Off. 

Asst. Medical Off. 

Engineering Off. 

Legal Officer 

Economics and 

Industry Officer 

Salvage NCO 

Salvage NCO 

Intelligence NCO 

Labor Supervisor 

Stenographer 

Medical NCO 

Sanitary Tech. 

Transmission Tech. 

Clerks 

Drivers 

Interpreters 

NO. 

24 

3 

2 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

ITEM 

Trailer, 114 ton, 2w, cargo 

Trailer, I ton, 2w, cargo 

Paulins, canvas, 20' x 40' 

Tent, command post, complete 

Tent, Squad, M 1942, complete 

Typewriter, portable 

NO. 

I 

I 

2 

I 

I 

2 

249 
250 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX NO. IV 

"c" Detachment, Camp Team 

(I) Personnel 

SPEC. SERIAL 

TITLE NUMBER NO. OR MOS DUTY 

Major (I) (9120) Camp Commander 

Captain 

Ass't Camp Comdr. (I) (9120) Ass't Camp Cmdr. 

Public Safety (I) (9000) 

Supply (I) (4000) 

First Lieutenant 

Public Safety (2) (9000) Supervises camp area 

of 5,000 persons 

Supply (Ass't.) (I) (4410) Ass't Supply Off. 

Cons. Engr. (I) (7110) Supervises Cons. 

Sanitary Eng. (I) (7960) Supervises San. 

Second Lieutenant 

Mess Supervisor ill (4110) Supervises Mess 

TOTAL COMMISSIONED 10 

First Sergeant (I) (585) Chief NCO 

Staff Sergean t, 

Clerk (I) (502) 

Mess (I) (824) Supervises refugee 

mess 

Cons. Foreman (I) (059) Supervises refugees 

in camp cons. 

Utility Repairman (I) (121 ) Supervises inmates 

in camp repair 

work 

Carpenter (General) (2) (050) Supervises Maintenance 

Electrician (I) (078) 

Mechanic, auto 

wheel veh. (I) (727) San. work and maintenance of latrines, etc. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

TITLE 

Water supply tech. 

Sergeant, 

Commissary Steward 

Carpenter (Gen) 

Technician, Grade 4 

Technician, Grade 5 

T/4 Cook 

TIS Cook 

TIS Clerk 

TIS Driver 

Interpreter 

TOTAL ENLISTED MEN 

AGGREGATE 

SPEC. SERIAL 

NUMBER NO. OR MOS 

(I) (727) 

(I) (819) 

(I) (050) 

(2) (060) 

(2) (060) 

(6) (055) 

(2) (345) 

ill (320) 

26 

36 

251 

DUTY 

San. work and maintenance of latrines, etc. 

Refugee food distribution 

The above camp is organized to provide administrative and technical personnel for supervision of the operation of a camp for civilians. 

(2) Major items of Equipment 

Item 

Carbine, cal. 30, complete 

Gun, submachine, cal. 45, M9 

Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete 

Truck, 114 ton, 4 X 4 

Trailer, 114 ton, 2w cargo 

Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 X 4, weapons carrier wlwinch 

Truck, 1 112 ton cargo, 6 X 6, wlwinch 

Trailer, I ton, 2w, cargo 

Paulins, large wlhandle 

Tent, hospital, ward, II' X 50' X 16' 

Tent, pyramidal 

Tent, storage, 13' X 20' X 17' 

Cups, drinking, enameled 

Plates, metal, enameled, soup 

Blanket, wool, OD 

Range, Army, field, No. I 

Cots, folding, canvas 

Pumps, water, bail, ponton 

Water Purification Set, complete 

No. 

32 

3 

I 

3 

I 

I 

I 

I 

10 

30 

3 

12 

4800 

4800 

200 

10 

110 

100 
252 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Item 

Trailer, water, 250 gal. 

Typewriter, portable 

No. 

3 

2 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 253 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX NO. V 

"0" Detachment - District Team. 

(1) Personnel 

TITLE 

COMMISSIONED 

Lt. Colonel 

Major 

Major 

Major 

Major 

Major 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Captain 

Lieutenant 

Lieutenant 

Lieutenant 

Lieutenant 

Lieutenant 

Lieutenant 

QUANTITY MOS DUTY 

Chief 

Ass't Chief & Pub 

ReI 

SECTION 

All Sections 

All Sections 

Military Courts Legal 

Headmen Supervisor Labor 

& Labor 

Procurement 

Chief 

Chief 

Native Courts & 

Claims 

Ass't Headman 

Supervisor & 

Labor 

Procurement 

Assistant 

Assistant 

Chief 

Chief 

Transp. & Utilities 

Chief 

Assistant 

Ass't Headmen 

Supervisor & 

Labor 

Procurement 

Assistant 

Assistant 

Chief 

Construction 

Public Safety 

Medical & Sanit. 

Legal 

Labor 

Public Safety 

Medical & Sanit. 

Public Welfare 

Commerce & 

Industry 

Engineer 

Fiscal 

Public Safety 

Labor 

Medical & Sanit. 

Public Welfare 

Agriculture 

Engineer 
254 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

QUANTITLE TITY MOS DUTY SECTION 

Lieutenant Salvage Engineer 

Lieutenant Sanitation Engineer 

TOTAL 22 

ENLISTED PERSONNEL 

Technical Sergeant 2 (059) Construction Engineering 

Foreman 

Staff Sergeant (814) Mess Sergeant General 

Staff Sergeant I (821) Supply Sergeant General 

Sergeant 5 (356) Labor Supervisor Labor 

Tech.Grade 3 2 (821) Storekeepers Economics 

Tech.Grade 3 2 (194) Salvage NCO Engineering 

Tech.Grade 4 2 (213) Stenographers General 

Tech.Grade 4 I (213) Stenographer Legal 

Tech.Grade 4 3 (213) Stenographers Welfare 

Tech.Grade 4 2 (409) Medical Technician Medical 

Tech.Grade 4 2 ( 196) Sanitary Technician Medical 

Tech.Grade 4 I (055-213) Statistical Clerk Economics 

Tech.Grade 4 2 (624) Finance Clerk Finance 

Tech.Grade 4 2 (727) Filter Operator Medical 

Tech.Grade 4 ( 1766) Radio Operator Transp. & 

Utilities 

Tech.Grade 4 I (1648) Radio Technician General 

Tech.Grade 4 2 (0 14) Mechanic General 

Tech.Grade 5 2 (055) Clerk General 

Tech.Grade 5 2 (055) Clerk Legal 

Tech.Grade 5 4 (060) Cook General 

Tech.Grade 5 I (835) Supply Clerk General 

Tech.Grade 5 4 (320) Interpreter General 

Private 15 (345) Driver General 

TOTAL 60 

AGGREGATE 82 

(2) Major Items of Equipment 

ITEM NO. 

Carbine, cal. 30, complete 76 

Pistol, automatic, cal. 45, complete 6 

Truck, 114 ton, 4 X 4 8 

Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 X 4, weapons carrier wlwinch 5 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

ITEM 

Truck, I 112 ton, 6 x 6, cargo 

Trailer, 114 ton, 2w, cargo 

Trailer, I ton, 2w, cargo 

Paulin, large 

Range, field, M 1937, 2 unit, comp

lete 

Safe, field 

Tent, squad, M 1942, complete 

Pumping and Hypochlorinating Unit 

Typewriter, portable 

255 

NO. 

2 

6 

4 

10 

I 

I 

12 

2 

10 
256 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX NO. VI 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES 

The responsibility for obtaining and arranging for delivery of all equipment 

and supplies for Military Government rests with ComGenPOA. 

Organizational equipment, including tents, for Army Units assigned for use 

of Military Government will be provided by the Army. 

Military Government personnel assigned to the Staffs of Army or Marine 

Units will be furnished living and messing accommodations, office equipment 

and supplies, and essential transportation by the Army or Marine Headquarters 

to which assigned. 

Camp and office equipment, including tents, housekeeping gear and transportation for the Military Government refugee camp units and other Military 

Government installations wi ll be requisitioned from and suppli ed by 

ComServPac. 

Hospitals and camp units for housing medical personnel for use in Military 

Government will be requisitioned from and supplied by ComServPac. 

Construction material for housing, water supply, electric services, etc., including hospitals, for the use of civilians will be requisitioned from and supplied 

by ComServPac. 

Construction work incidental to Military Government activities will be the 

responsibility of the Island Commander. 

CinCPOA will furnish construction personnel for the supervision of the 

construction of refugee camps and shelter. 

All consumables required for the relief of civilians and all trade goods intended for sale to civili ans will be requisitioned from and supplied by 

ComServPac. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 257 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

of 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL TENTH ARMY 

APPENDIX VII 

TABLE OF BASIC RATION - SUBSISTENCE FOR CIVILIANS 

Food requirements for MILITARY GOVERNMENT are based on a standard ci vilian ration of: 

I. Composition of Civilian Feeding Ration: 

Quantity Protein Fat Carbohydrate 

Ounces Item Calories grams Grams grams 

14 Rice 1,224 30.0 1.0 29 1.2 

3';' Beans, soy 350 28.0 9.0 35.1 

';' Fat/oil 120 0.0 14.28 0.0 

1 Fish, canned 50 5.9 2.6 0.0 

';' Sugar 80 0.0 0.0 14.0 

';' Salt 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 

20 1,824 63.9 26.88 340.3 

Milk supplement figured at ';' oz. evaporated milk per child & nursing mother. 

2. Estimated quantities for 1000 destitute civilians for 30 days: 

Net Wt. Gross WI. 

ShortTons No. Short Ship Tons 

Item Edible Basis Unit Units Tons 40 cu. fl. 

Rice 13 100 Ib bag 262 13.15 16.875 

Beans 3'/, 100 Ib bag 66 3.28 4.562 

Fish, canned 1 Case 45 1.53 1.721 

or meat 

Fat/oil ';' 37# Can 27 .61 0.757 

Sugar ';' Case of 6 17 .53 0.362 

10 Ib bags 

Salt ';' Case of 6 17 .53 0.362 

10 Ib bags 

Milk, evaporated 1/20 Case of 48 2 .06 0.063 

14';' oz cans 

Milk, dry 1140 Case of 6 2 .04 0.065 

5 Ib cans 

TOTAL 18 33/40 19.73 24.767 
258 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

5. HQ Tenth Army, Tentative Operations Plan 1- 45, Annex 15, 6 January 1945, Military Government Plan. 

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., 

RG 407) 

Annex 15 defers to GOPER for statements on broader issues of military 

government policy, while providing more specific details about operations. It assigns the various military government field teams to their 

respective operational units, and also details what constitutes the civilian 

rations the assaults units will carry with them: 

HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY 

Office of the Commanding General 

APO 357 

ANNEX 15 

TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 1-45 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

6 Jan 1945 

1. OBJECT: See TENTH Army Operational Directive Number 7, Military 

Government, short title "GO PER". 

2. RESPONSIBILITY: See "GO PER" 

For table of population uncovered as progress lines are reached, see Appendix 

1. 

For map of progress lines and population uncovered, see Appendix 2. 

3. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL: See "GOPER" 

a. Organic military government personnel (Army and Navy) will be constituted into headquarters, operational teams and detachments as follows: 

(I) Military Government HQs. 

(2) 6 Division "A" Detachments 

(3) 10 "B" Detachments 

(4) 13 "C" Detachments or Camp Teams 

(5) 6 "D" Detachments or District Teams 

(6) Reserve of 5 officers and 19 enlisted men. 

b. In addition, the following units will be assigned for military government 

duties: 

(I) I MP Bn 

(2) I QM Trk Co. 4124 

(3) I Construction Battalion 

(4) 3 MP CI Sections Type BI or BJ, T/O & E 19-500 

(Army) 

(Army) 

(Navy) 

(Army) 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 259 

(5) 2 G-2 Hospitals (No personnel) (Navy) 

(6) I G-4 Hospital (No personnel) (Navy) 

(7) 6 G-6 Hospitals (expanded to 500 beds) (Navy) 

(8) 20 G- IO Dispensaries (expanded to 24 beds) (Navy) 

(9) 3 G-14 Dispensaries (No personnel) (Navy) 

(10) 5 G-17 Malaria Control Units (Navy) 

(II) 2 G-18 Epidemiological Units (Navy) 

(12) 6 N IA Camp Components (Navy) 

(13) 6 N5C Camp Components (No personnel) (Navy) 

c. For assault lift, see Appendix 3; for echelonment of subsequent lifts, see 

Appendix 4. 

4. OPERATIONS: See "GOPER" 

a. The following military government units are attached to organizations 

as follows. They will join the organization to which attached at the mounting 

area and be landed at the target with the assault echelons. 

XXIV Corps - - - - - - - - B-6 Detachment 

B-7 Detachment 

C-2 Camp Team 

3 G-IO Dispensaries, Nos. 1,2, & 3. 

I G-6 Hospitals, No.2 

U nit of 5 officers and 19 

enlisted men attached for 

movement only from mounting 

area to target. 

7th Division - - - - - - - - A-4 Detachment 

B-4 Detachment 

2 G- IO Dispensaries, Nos. 4 & 5 

77th Division - - - - - - - - A-5 Detachment 

B-9 Detachment 

2 G-IO Dispensaries, Nos. 6 & 7 

C-13 Camp Team 

96th Division - - - - - - - - A-6 Detachment 

B-5 Detachment 

2 G-1O Dispensaries, Nos. 8 & 9 

III Amphibious Corps- - - - - B-8 Detachment 

C-I Camp Team 

I G-IO Dispensary, No. 12 

I G-6 Hospital, No. I 

1st Marine Division - - - - - A-I Detachment 

B-1 Detachment 

2 G- IO Dispensaries, Nos. 17 & 18 

2nd Marine Division - - - - - A-2 Detachment 

B-2 Detachment 

2 G-IO Dispensaries, Nos. 19 & 20 

6th Marine Division - - - - - A-3 Detachment 
260 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

B-3 Detachment 

2 G- IO Dispensaries, Nos. 10 & II 

81st Division - - - - - 2 G-IO Dispensaries, Nos. 13 & 14 

27th Division - - - - - - B- 1O Detachment 

b. Military Government 

Headquarters. 

5. SUPPLY: See "GaPER" 

a. Class I (Civilian Rations) 

2 G-IO Dispensaries, Nos. 15 & 16 

Headquarters will be at TENTH Army 

(1) Initial: 7th, 77th and 96th Divisions; and 1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine 

Divisions will mount with 70,000 rations for civilians consisting of: 

Rice - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 61 ,250 Ibs. 

Beans, soy - - - - - - - - - - 15,309 lbs. 

Fat/Oil - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2,191 Ibs. 

Fish, canned - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4,395 Ibs. 

Sugar- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2, 191 lbs. 

Salt - - - - - - - - - - - 2, 191 Ibs. 

(2) Water: 

(a) Purification Unit (7.5 GPM) I per "C" Team. 

(b) Hypochlorinating & Pumping Unit (Portable) 2 per "D" Team. 

(c) Distillation Unit wlTanks (250 GPH) 5-lst Echelon 

(d) Purification Unit (7.5 GPM) 12- lst Echelon 

(3) Reserves: Thirty (30) days rations for 100,000 civilians will be held 

in the Marianas by Commander Forward Areas and a like amount held on West 

Coast both subject to call in emergency by Commander Expeditionary Troops 

or Island Commander. 

b. Class II (Civilian): 

(I) Clothing: In maintenance and resupply shipping. 

(2) Economic Supplies: In maintenance and resupply shipping: Trade 

Goods, Agriculture Supplies, and Fishing Equipment. 

(3) Medical and Sanitary: Medical Supplies and Sanitary Supplies in 

maintenance and resupply shipping. 

c. Class III: Any Army or Navy Class III Distribution Points. 

d. Class IV: Engineering: Included in Base Development Plan. 

e. Storage: See Base Development Plan. 

f. Markings: Standard Army and Navy markings will be used for Military 

Government Supplies. Additional distinctive markings in the case of Armysupplied items will consist of one-half inch green dots spaced in eleven-sixteenth 

centers, horizontally and vertically, three inches wide and at least six inches long 

on four sides of the containers or boxes. Navy-supplied items carry distinctive 

letters in red, six inches high: "For Civilian Use", on four sides of the containers. 

6. GOVERNMENT: See "GaPER" 

a. In later phases of operations, when conditions permit, six military government districts will be established generally paralleling existing local political 

subdivisions. (See Appendix 5 for district boundaries and headquarters). 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 261 

Two provisional districts will also be established as follows: 

I. KERAMA RETIO 

2. The "Eastern Islands," i.e., The Islands of IKE, TAKA, HENZA, HAMAHIKA, TSUGEN, and KUTAKA. 

b. In the garrison phase the eight districts mentioned above will be administered by IsCom, APO 331. 

7. HEALTH, WELFARE, AND LABOR: See "GOPER" 

a. For locations of permanent camp sites during garrison phase, see Appendix 6. 

b. For permanent locations of G- 6 hospitals and G- I 0 dispensaries during 

garrison phase, see appendix 6. 

8. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY: See "GOPER" 

9. TRANSPORTATION, UTILITIES, and CONSTRUCTION: See "GO PER" 

10. FINANCE: See "GO PER" 

II. REPORTS: 

a. During the assault phase Corps Commanders will report daily to the 

Army in brief form by dispatch the military government situation in their areas. 

These reports will be submitted in duplicate; will cover the period 0001-2400, 

will be due at 1200 daily; will be prepared by the SMGO of the reporting unit; 

will be classified "SECRET"; and will contain the reference "Par. II, "GOPER". 

They will cover: 

(I) Location of military government detachments in their sector. 

(2) Number and location of all civilian men, women, and children under 

care of military government and, specifically, of those being fed from military 

supplies. 

(3) Number and location of civilian laborers requested and number 

assigned. 

(4) Location and extent of serious communicable diseases. 

(5) Salvage in the hands of military government. 

(6) General status of military government operations. 

b. Special matters of an urgent character regarding military government 

will be made the subject of immediate special reports to Army Headquarters. 
262 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

6. CINCPAC-CINCPOA to CG Tenth U.S. Field Army, CINCPAC File 

AI7-IO/A1-1(10), I March 1945, sub: Political, Economic and Financial 

Directive for Military Government in the Occupied Islands of the Nansei 

Shoto and Adjacent Waters. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

In this broad-ranging directive, Admiral Nimitz asserts his authority as 

Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, directs that all instructions be 

issued in his name, outlines the mission of military government on Okinawa, and specifically orders certain steps taken to accomplish that 

mission. 

Cincpac File 

AI7-IO/AI-I (10) 

(910) 

Serial 00825 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief 

From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific 

Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 

To: Commanding General, Tenth U.S. Field Army. 

Subject: Political, Economic and Financial Directive for 

Military Government in the Occupied Islands 

of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters. 

POLITICAL DIRECTIVE 

1 MARCH 1945 

I. The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean 

Areas will be the Military Governor of the islands of the Nansei Shoto and 

Adjacent waters occupied by the forces under his command. The Military Governor will be the supreme authority and will possess all rights, powers and responsibilities vested in the Commander of an occupying force in time of war by 

international law. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and 

Pacific Ocean Areas will exercise his authority as Military Governor through 

the Commander Expeditionary Troops, and through the Area, Sub-Area and 

Island Commanders duly established. 

2. You will establish Military Government in the occupied islands of the 

Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters in the name of Commander in Chief, United 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 263 

States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. You will possess all rights, powers 

and responsibilities vested in you by international law as the Commander of an 

occupying force in time of war, subject to the proclamations, orders and directives issued by Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific 

Ocean Areas. This authority will include the authority to take all measures 

deemed by you to be necessary or desirable in the execution of your military 

mission. You may in your discretion delegate to subordinate members of your 

command, in whole or in part, the authority herein granted you, and you may 

authorize such subordinate members to subdelegate such authority to their 

subordinates. 

3. The objective of your military government will be to facilitate to the 

greatest extent possible the accomplishment of your military mission. 

4. Administration by Military Government will be stern, but just. In your 

treatment of the local population, the degree of severity to be exercised will be 

determined by the conduct and the attitude of the people and their willingness 

to co-operate with the military authorities. 

5. The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean 

Areas will issue an appropriate proclamation declaring that: 

(a) Japan's aggression and its attack upon the United States have forced 

the United States to wage war against Japan. 

(b) Military occupation and government of these islands is a necessary 

part of the military operations and of the process of destroying Japan's power 

of aggression and the Military class which controls the Japanese Empire. 

(c) Treatment of the Japanese people during the occupation will depend 

in large measure upon their behavior. 

You will desseminate and enforce the contents of the foregoing proclamation by 

such means and on such occasions and under such circumstances as may be 

appropriate. 

6. Koreans and Formosan Chinese are regarded by the United States as 

having a status different from that of ordinary Japanese subjects, and may be 

given preferential treatment if military considerations permit. 

7. You will take such steps as are necessary or proper for the prompt 

restoration and maintenance oflaw and order and for the punishment of offenses 

against the military Government and for such other matters as circumstances 

may require. To that end you will establish exceptional military courts and the 

jurisdictions and procedures thereof, subject to: 

(a) The Proclamations, Orders and Directives issued by Commander in 

Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 

(b) The United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government 

and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5; OpNAV 50E- 3). 

(c) War Department Basic Manual, Rule of Land Warfare (FM27-10). 

(d) Civil Affairs Manual, Procedure for Military Government courts 

(OpNAV 13- 23). 

8. You may suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations 

which interfere with the furtherance of your objectives. 
264 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

9. You will remove from office all high ranking or policy making officials. 

You will also remove from office all other officials, government employees, police 

and other persons who cannot be relied upon to perform their duties satisfactorily 

under your administration. 

10. Subject to the foregoing, you will provide for the continuance of essential government functions, using local inhabitants insofar as feasible and 

making use of the existing local government machinery so far as such use advances or is not inconsistent with the objective of the military government. You 

will also, so far as is feasible , use the techniques of administration with which 

the local populations are familiar. 

II. You will in your discretion activate the local courts and permit them 

to function under your supervision and subject to such regulations as you may 

prescribe. 

12. You may move civilian populations in whole or in part and place them 

in restricted areas or refugee camps, if military considerations or the interests 

of such civilians so requires. 

13. You may intern civilians whose activities may in any way endanger 

the success of your operations, according them treatment compatible with the 

terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners 

of war insofar as it is adaptable to civilian internees. Under special arrangement 

with the Japanese government, entered into at the outbreak of war, civilian 

internees (as distinguished from refugees or other civilians whose movements 

may be restricted for reasons of military necessity or of their own welfare) may 

not be required to perform work other than that involved in the care and maintenance of internment camps. 

14. You will detain and suitable intern diplomatic and consular officials 

of countries at war with the United States or any of its Allies pending further 

instructions from Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific 

Ocean Areas. Diplomatic and consular officials of neutrals will be taken into 

protective custody and their presence will be promptly reported to Commander 

in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. All practical 

measures will be taken to protect the health and welfare of such neutral officials. 

15. In conformity with directives separately issued by Commander in 

Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas you will assume 

control of censorship of the press, printing, publications, mails, wireless, radio, 

telephone and cable, as may be necessary. 

16. You will prohibit the dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultranational ideology and propaganda in any form. 

17. You will dissolve all Japanese patriotic or secret societies, such as the 

Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political 

Society and their affiliates, and you will prohibit all political activity except such 

local activity as may facilitate the administration of military government. 

18. You will refrain from any public expression of opinion concerning the 

future status of the Emperor or the institution of the Emperor and instruct the 

forces under your command to the same effect. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 265 

19. You will permit freedom of religious worship consistent with military 

security, the maintenance of law and order, and the provisions of paragraphs 16 

and 17 above. 

20. You will close educational institutions or permit them to remain open, 

in your discretion. Whenever schools have been closed it would be desirable that 

they be re-opened as soon as security conditions permit. 

21. Civilian nationals of the United Nations interned by the Japanese will 

be identified and reported in order that their presence may be communicated 

to their respective governments. They may be placed in protective custody or 

restricted residence, if you deem it desirable. All practical measures will be taken 

to protect the health and welfare of such civilians. 

22. Your responsibility for the property of the United Nations (other than 

the United States) and their nationals, shall be the same as for the property of 

the United States and their nationals. Within such limits as are imposed by the 

Military situation you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and 

protect such property. 

23. All property belonging to the Japanese Government, the Japanese Imperial Family, the Japanese Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Japanese 

Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and property belonging to any country 

with· which any of the United Nations are at war will be treated as having the 

status of public property. Such property will be controlled directly or indirectly 

as military requirements may dictate, subject to use thereof as you may direct. 

If there is doubt as to the public status of any property (e.g. property of quasiofficial companies) adequate records will be kept of any such property taken or 

utilized to facilitate later settlement of any legitimate private claims. 

24. You will restrict the production and consumption of narcotic drugs to 

medicinal and scientific purposes, insofar as feasible. 

25. You will seize and preserve for information and use all government 

records, records of quasi-governmental agencies, and records of Japanese or 

Japanese-sponsored political, patriotic or secret societies. 

26. You will protect and preserve all historical, cultural, and religious objects, so far as military expediency permits. 

27. For the purpose of facilitating and advancing your mission by the 

prompt settlement of meritorious claims you are authorized to appoint or cause 

to be appointed a claims commission, or commissions, each composed of one 

or more officers as the case may be to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine and 

make payments, where accepted by the claimant, in full satisfaction and in final 

set.tlement of claims on account of damage to or loss or destruction of private 

property both real and personal, or personal injury or death of inhabitants of 

the area occupied by the forces under your command when such damage, loss, 

destruction or injury is caused by U.S. Army, Navy or Marine Corps forces, or 

individual members thereof including civilians attached thereto where such 

claims arise from noncombat activities of such forces: Provided, that all such 

claims shall be paid in supplemental yen, or other yen currencies made legal 

tender by this or subsequent directives, and provided further, that no claim 
266 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

against the occupying forces shall be processed for payment from United States 

funds nor be made a charge against the Treasury of the United States. You will 

make such regulations as you may deem necessary for processing of claims, the 

rules and procedure to be observed by Claims Commissions and such procedure 

as you may deem necessary for appeals and reviews as to any claim rejected or 

awards made. The provisions of the act of2 January 1942 (55 Stat 880; 31 U.S.c. 

224d) as amended by the act of 22 April 1943, (57 Stat 66) provisions of the 

act of 3 July 1943 (Public Law 11 2, 78th Congress) shall not be invoked for the 

settlement of claims arising as a result of non-combat activities of the forces 

under your command in the occupied Islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent 

Waters. 

ECONOMIC DIRECTIVES 

28. You will initiate such economic measures as deem expedient in the 

furtherance of your military mission. 

29. The basic economic policy to be followed in the occupied islands of 

the Nansei Shoto is to develop maximum use of existing resources and productive 

facilities for the following purposes: 

(a) To support the military occupation and military operations. 

(b) To assure food and other essential supplies for the civilian population 

to the degree necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to your 

objectives. 

(c) To minimize the importation of civilian supplies. 

30. You will take such steps as you can, consistent with military objectives, 

to prevent or to minimize inflation. 

31. You will establish such system or systems of rationing and price controls as you think may be required. You will make such use of existing machinery 

for these purposes as you deem feasible. 

32. You will take vigorous measures to prevent black market operations 

and hoarding. 

33. So far as practicable you will establish wages at the level prevailing 

shortly prior to occupation by our military forces, taking into consideration, 

however, the extent to which inflation and changes in currency values may have 

reduced purchasing power. 

34. Wages may be paid in kind. 

35. Prices at which imported civilian supplies are sold will be consistent 

with the current domestic internal economy regardless of landed cost; however, 

you may prescribe such prices as you deem desirable in order to recruit labor, 

stimulate production, combat inflation and otherwise aid in the achievement of 

your objectives. 

36. You are authorized to furnish the civilian population, to the extent 

necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to your objectives, with such 

supplies as are available. Except when essential for purposes of emergency relief 

these supplies will be offered for sale under military control and if possible 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 267 

through commercial channels. If you consider the distribution through commercial channels inadequate, you may establish and operate through personnel 

selected by and responsible to you, general trading stores for the sale of such 

supplies. You may deliver imported civilian supplies in bulk to appropriate 

indigenous organizations or consignees under conditions which you may set and 

the execution of which you should supervise, assuring yourself that profit margins 

are kept within prescribed limits and that supplies actually reach the ultimate 

consumer in accordance with the rationing and price controls which you 

establish. 

37. You will require such distribution agencies as you may designate: 

(a) To distribute, sell, or use supplies in accordance with the policies 

prescribed by you. 

(b) To adhere to such prices as you may establish. 

(c) To regulate the distribution of supplies, including locally produced 

supplies, by rationing or such other methods of control as you may prescribe. 

38. Except in unusual circumstances, you will require payment in legal 

tender for civilian supplies you may provide. 

39. You may exercise such supervision and control as you deem necessary 

over civilian production and distribution of materials endeavoring insofar as 

practicable to employ methods with which the civilian population is familiar. 

40. You will supervise and control all exports and imports, merchandise 

may move into or out of any given territory only with your permission. 

41. You will, so far as practicable, initiate efforts to restore and develop 

production of food and other products which will make the population less 

dependent upon imported supplies and may furnish necessary supplies as provided in paragraph 36 for this purpose. 

42. You are authorized to adopt a system of licensing industry and trade 

similar to the system to which the local inhabitants have been accustomed, 

insofar as such a system may be of value to you in controlling industry and 

trade. You are authorized to fix appropriate fees for such licenses. 

43. You will have control, in cooperation with the harbor authorities, of 

warehouses, ferries, boats used as living quarters and other craft used in connection with civilian waterborne operations in this area. 

44. You will take control, to the extent you deem necessary, of the railways, 

postal, telegraph and telephone services, radio and other government 

monopolies. 

45. You will restore to use public utilities and transportation facilities, to 

the extent which you may deem essential to accomplish your objectives. 

46. You will encourage agricultural production and particularly the production of fresh vegetables, with a view to making the area, so far as possible, 

independent of imported food supplies. 

47. Because of its potential value in supplying essential foodstuffs, you will 

take special measures so far as are consistent with military operations, to reestablish and develop the fishing industry, and you will exercise such control as 
268 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

you deem feasible of the resulting catch and assure its equitable distribution 

among the population at fair prices. 

48. You may establish such hours and conditions of labor as you think 

necessary or believe desirable to protect health or permit maximum efficiency 

of labor, taking into consideration those prevailing shortly prior to occupation 

by our military forces. 

49. Enemy nationals will be used as laborers in accordance with internationallaw, as established in the Annex to the Hague Convention Number 4 of 

October 18, 1907, embodying the regulations respecting the laws and customs 

of war on land. Subject to the provisions of the paragraph following, enemy 

nationals may be required to engage in work "of such a nature as not to involve 

them in the obligations of taking part in military operations against their own 

country." They may, however, be so employed on a purely voluntary basis for 

pay. For other projects enemy nationals may be hired or requisitioned with pay 

in accordance with the aforementioned Annex of the Hague Convention. 

50. Civilian enemy nationals who are interned may not be compelled to 

work except in the administration, maintenance and management of their camps. 

51. You will make to the Commander in Cbief, United States Pacific Fleet 

and Pacific Ocean Areas, as soon as practicable after occupation of each of the 

several areas, estimates of the minimum quantities of supplies and equipment 

required to restore public utilities, industry, fishing, agriculture, storage facilities, 

postal services, shipping port facilities for ocean going vessels and other services 

to tbe extent which you may deem essential to accomplish your objectives. Your 

report should be subdi vided in such a manner as to indicate the detailed supplies 

and equipment required. 

52. You shall file with the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific 

Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas as soon as practicable after occupation, a complete 

statement on the economic conditions which you have found giving further 

attention to: 

(a) Fishing Industry. 

(b) Phosphate Industry. 

(c) Sugar Industry. 

(d) Agriculture. 

(e) Other industries essential to the civilian economy or to the war effort. 

53. Supplemental military yen (type B) issued pursuant to military proclamation (hereinafter referred to as supplemental yen) and regular yen currencies in the possession of Military Government will be used in the occupied islands 

of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters. Regular yen currencies will include currencies whicb are now legal tender in the area, and notes of the Bank of Tai~an 

and of the Bank of Chosen. Supplemental yen will be declared legal tender by 

proclamation and will be interchangeable at par without distinction with regular 

yen currencies by the local population or by personnel of the armed forces is 

probibited except on a one for one basis. 

54. Any Japanese military yen issued for circulation in any territory occupied by Japanese forces will not be legal tender in the occupied islands of 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 269 

Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters and will not be acceptable or interchangeable 

with supplemental yen and regular yen currencies. 

55. U.S. dollars will not be permitted to circulate in the occupied islands 

of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters. All local holders of U.S. dollars will be 

required by proclamation to deposit such dollars with the Military Government 

against receipt. If it is considered advisable, local holders of gold coin and bullion, foreign exchange, foreign currency which is not legal tender in the area, 

and foreign securities may be required to deposit against appropriate receipt all 

or part of their holdings of such property under such terms and conditions as 

are deemed advisable. The subsequent disposition of or payment for such dollars 

and other deposits will be a matter of later policy determination by higher 

authority. 

56. The provisional rate of exchange to be used exclusively for pay of 

military and naval personnel and/or military and naval accounting purposes will 

be 10 supplemental yen, and/or regular yen currency, to the U.S. dollar. Transactions at any other rate will be prohibited. A general rate of exchange may be 

furnished later. 

57. All foreign financial transactions of any kind, including all exports and 

imports of currency and securities, will be prohibited, except as permitted under 

regulations issued by the Military Government of the occupied islands ofNansei 

Shoto and Adjacent Waters. Army Finance Officers and Navy Disbursing Officers may, however, be authorized to accept U.S. dollars from personnel of the 

armed forces in the area, and from other authorized personnel of the armed 

forces in the area, for conversion into supplemental and/or regular yen currency 

at the established rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source 

of such U.S. dollars. Except for military or authorized personnel, no requests 

by holders of yen currency or deposits, for exchange of such currency or foreign 

exchange, will be allowed except in accordance with official exchange regulations 

issued by you. Such exchange regulations must be approved by Commander in 

Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas before becoming 

effective. 

58. Upon occupation, all banks, security exchanges, and other financial 

institutions will be closed by proclamation. The assets and records of such institutions will be placed under appropriate guard; and as soon as practicable, 

an inventory will be taken by the Military Government. 

59. Closed financial institutions may be reopened as soon as such action 

is deemed practicable and desirable and under such terms as you may establish. 

60. No financial institution or branch thereof will .be permitted to reopen 

except upon the following terms and conditions; 

(a) That appropriate measures have been taken to insure that the institution is satisfactorily controlled, and that all undesirable personnel have been 

removed. 

(b) That such general limitations are placed on all withdrawals as you 

deem necessary. 
270 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

(c) That withdrawals from the new deposits be permitted free of restriction, except for such limitations as you deem necessary. 

(d) That all accounts and assets in financial institutions owned or controlled by the following be blocked and be used or otherwise dealt with only as 

you may permit: 

I. Enemy governments and agencies and instrumentalities thereof. 

2. Government operations controlled directly or indirectly by the 

enemy. 

3. All persons, including political organizations and societies, regarded 

by you as hostile and dangerous to military security and organizations and business enterprises owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons. 

4. All absentee owners and holders, including neutral and United Nations governments or authorities, and organizations and business enterprises 

owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such owners and holders. 

(e) That access to safe deposit boxes or vaults be allowed only after a 

proper system of supervision has been instituted. 

(f) That no government or private banks or agencies issue bank notes or 

currencies except as specifically authorized by the Commander in Chief, United 

States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 

61. If found practicable and desirable, you may designate, under direct 

military control and supervision, a suitable bank, or any branch thereof, or any 

other financial institution satisfactory to it, as its agent. When satisfied that such 

bank or other financial institution for its official business in yen transactions 

only and, if necessary, by making yen credits available, place such bank or other 

financial institution in a position to finance other financial institutions for the 

conduct of their business. 

62. You will issue regulations prescribing the purposes for which credit 

may be extended and the terms and conditions governing the extension of credit. 

If banking facilities are not available, it may establish such credits or make such 

loans as it deems necessary for essential economic activities. These will be restricted to yen credits and loans. You may require as collateral any or all the 

assets of a borrower, or of the directors of a borrowing institution, and may 

accept as collateral obligations of the Japanese Government and its subdivisions. 

63. You will maintain existing laws and regulations for the assessment and 

collection of revenues in the manner and to the extent you consider desirable. 

You may raise such additional contributions for the administration of the area 

as are consistent with international custom and usage. 

64. You will control the budgets of government units and agencies and 

their expenditures in the manner and to the extent you consider practicable and 

desirable. Payment of interest or principal on Japanese Government obligations 

will not be allowed unless specifically authorized by the Commander in Chief, 

United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Local public issues may be 

serviced if deemed practicable and desirable. 

65. A general moratorium will be declared by proclamation. You may lift 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 271 

same in whole or in part when such action is considered warranted in the light 

of conditions prevailing in the area. 

66. The Military Government will include in its functions the control of 

all funds to be used by forces within the occupied islands of Nansei Shoto and 

Adjacent Waters, other than U.S. dollars the disbursement of which will be under 

the control of Army Finance Officers and Navy Disbursing Officers of your 

forces. The Military Government will maintain such accounts and records as 

are necessary to indicate the supply, control and movement of all currencies and 

other funds as well as financial data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations and activities involving participation of military 

forces. 

a. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of yen currencies for the 

pay and other cash requirements of military and naval components in the area, 

the Military Government will supply supplemental yen or regular yen currency 

from currency on hand, and will record the debit against the Military and naval 

forces concerned. 

b. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of yen currencies for ci viI 

administration, the Military Government will supply supplemental yen or regular 

yen currency from currency on hand and will record the debit against itself. 

c. The records of the Military Government will indicate in all cases the 

currency in which receipts were obtained or disbursements made by Military 

Government. 

67. Basic accounting instructions, supplemental to the foregoing directive 

will be issued separately. 

c.w. NIMITZ 
272 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

7. CINCPAC-CINCPOA to Distribution List, CINCPAC File A 17-

IO/AI - I(lO), 12 December 1945, sub: U.S. Naval Military Government, 

POA 

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., 

RG 38) 

In December 1945 Admiral Raymond A. Spruance reiterates what constitutes the military government mission in the Pacific Ocean Areas. In 

this directive the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, declares, among 

other things, that instruction in the English language "is a prime necessity" for the local populations: 

Cincpac File 

A 17- IO/A I- I (10) 

Serial: 52855 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief 

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific 

Ocean Areas. 

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST. 

Subject: U.S. Naval Military Government, Pacific Ocean Areas. 

12 Dec 1945 

1. Military Government in the Pacific Ocean Areas was established by 

reason of military necessity in furtherance of our military objectives. Its stated 

mission was: 

(a) To relieve the tactical forces of the necessity for administering the 

affairs of the civil populations. 

(b) To make available to our forces the labor and economic resources of 

the area. 

(c) To maintain law and order among the civilian populations. 

(d) To administer emergency relief. 

(e) To restore the civilian populations to the highest degree of self-sufficiency that the exigencies of the military situation would permit. 

2. With the cessation of hostilities, Military Government continues to administer the occupied territories until such time as a permanent civil government 

has been provided by duly constituted authority. During the interim, it shall he 

the mission and duty of the U.S. Naval Military Government to give effect to 

the announced policies of the United States by: 

(a) The physical restoration of damaged property and facilities. 

(b) The continued improvement of health and sanitation. 
DOCUMENT[NG THE EXPER[ENCE 273 

(c) The early establishment of self-governing communities. 

(d) The institution of a sound program of economic development of 

trade, industry and agriculture along lines which will ensure that the 

profits and benefits thereof accrue to the native inhabitants and 

which will assist them in achieving the highest possible level of economic independence. 

(e) The establishment of an educational program adapted to native capabilities and to local environment and designed to assist in the early 

achievement of the foregoing objectives. 

3. Mi[itary Government is a command function and the responsibility for 

the accomplishment of its mission devolves upon the several Area, Atoll and 

Island commanders within the limits of their commands. The principles herein 

set forth are to he considered as a general guide for the commanders concerned 

subject to modifications made necessary by conditions peculiar to a particular 

locality. 

RESTORATION OF DAMAGED PROPERTY 

AND FAC[LlTlES 

4. Cincpac despatch 280133 of November 1945, authorized and directed 

the transfer to Militaty Government of certain materials, supplies and equipment 

to be utilized for present and future construction and for sale as trade goods 

through Military Government through USCC Trade Stores. It is desired that 

such materials be employed in the physical rehahilitation of the area and for the 

restoration of the facilities necessary to the re-activation of trade, industry and 

agriculture. [ncluded within the purview of the despatch are those materials 

necessary for the construction of permanent governmental facilities such as 

administration buildings, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, trade stores, and warehousing, as well as quarters for government personnel in outlying localities such 

as YAP and PONAPE. Area commanders are directed to review the present and 

future needs of their areas with respect to these and similar features to the end 

that materials currently availahle may be allocated to a building program to be 

initiated when availability of labor and other considerations permit. [n this 

manner it is anticipated that the need for future appropriations for island government may he held to a minimum. 

5. Concerning the sale of materials for the reconstruction of private dwellings and the restoration of facilities for trade, industry and agriculture, it is 

recognized that the type and volume of items required will vary in different 

localities according to the needs of the inhabitants and their ability to buy. 

Cincpac serial 40414 of I November 1945, gave area commanders discretionary 

powers in establishing the load-factor to be applied to sale process of trade goods 

in offsetting landed costs. The same discretion will be employed in arriving at 

the selling price of materials transferred for purposes of sale. [n this connection 

the Navy has designated by the Foreign Liquidation Commission as the agency 

within the POA for the disposal of certain types of surplus property by donating 
274 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

to charitable institutions. In making such disposal consideration should be given 

to the donation to missions, churches and similar charitable institutions of such 

surplus materials declared to be within this category as may be suitable and 

available for their purposes. 

HEALTH AND SANITATION 

6. The current program for improvement in health and sanitation shall be 

continued and shall be extended to newly occupied areas. It is desired that the 

facilities of the Medical Training Center on GUAM be utilized to the utmost 

for the training of native medical practitioners and native nurses. Institutions 

in hygiene and sanitations shall be included in the educational program. U.S. 

Pacific Fleet Letter No. 53L45 delineates the responsibility of Military Government with respect to the practice of preventative medicine. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF SELF-GOVERNING COMMUNITIES 

7. It is desired that the inhabitants of the occupied territories be granted 

the highest degree of self-government that they are capable of assimilating. They 

shall be encouraged and assisted to assume as much as possible of the management of their own affairs and the conduct of their own government. Local governments, insofar as practicable, should be patterned on the politico-social 

institutions which the inhabitants have evolved for themselves. Military Government ordinances and regulations should give due weight to local traditions 

and customs. Legislation and its enforcement machinery should be held to the 

minimum requisite to the preservation of peace and order, the maintenance of 

property rights, the enforcement of measures for health and sanitation and those 

laws respecting trade, industry and labor which are essential to economic wellbeing. 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

8. Indiscriminate exploitation of the meager natural resources of the area 

is to be avoided. Trade and industry should be encouraged along lines which 

directly benefit the native inhabitants by providing for their physical needs and 

material well-being and which are of a nature and on a scale such that ultimate 

ownership and management can be transferred to native hands. The establishment for the profit of aliens, of enterprises which tend to maintain the native 

economy at the level of cheap labor and those which do not permit the nati ves 

to enjoy the fu ll benefits of their own labor and enterprise shall not be tolerated. 

9. The U.S. Commercial Company has been designated as the Federal 

agency for the purpose of providing trade goods, purchasing and marketing 

handicraft and copra, and for the conduct of such other commercial enterprises 

as may be appropriate. This is an interim arrangement until such time as the 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 275 

native inhabitants of the various localities are in a position to carry on these 

functions on their own account. In the Marshalls, the trade stores on certain 

atolls have been sold to native co-operatives. It is desired that this practice be 

continued where ever practicable. 

10. In those areas in which the inhabitants are agriculturally minded, they 

should be encouraged and assisted in bettering their method of agriculture and 

in increasing the yield. In other areas where the natives are not agriculturally 

inclined, consideration shall be gi ven to the importation of trees and plants 

which, while requiring little cultivation will effect an augmentation of the food 

supply or will provide materials for native construction and handicraft. The 

services of the USCC agriculturalists are available to Area Commanders for the 

above purposes. 

EDUCATION 

II. The type and extent of educational facilities will vary in different localities according to local needs and the native capability for assimilation. The 

primary consideration is a system which will benefit the many and which will 

assure a progressive development of each community along lines which will raise 

the native standards by improvement in health and hygiene, by betterment in 

methods of food production and in the nature of food supply, and which will 

equip the natives for the conduct of their own government and the management 

of their trade and industry. 

12. Educational programs shall foster and encourage instruction in the 

native language and history and in native arts and crafts. Instruction in the 

English language for natives of all ages is a prime necessity but this is not to be 

construed as discouraging instruction in native languages and culture. Vocational 

training in trades, skills, agriculture and home-making as suited to the particular 

locale should be included in all curricular Texts and educational materials should 

be appropriate to the local environment, should be geared to the capacity of the 

nati ves to absorb and should be calculated to effect the aims of the system as 

enumerated above. 

13. The establishment of agricultural experimental and demonstration on 

projects is anticipated at a future date. These projects should be utilized to assist 

in education in agriculture and animal husbandry. The U.S. Naval Military 

Government Medical Training Center of GUAM will soon be available for the 

training of native corpsmen and nurses aides. Educational facilities on GUAM 

can be made available for the higher education of those individuals who demonstrate a capability and adaptability for advanced work and who should be 

considered as a potential source of teachers and government officials. 

R. A. SPRUANCE 

DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 277 

Creating a Local Administration 

One of military government's objectives, as set forth in the early directives, was to transfer as quickly as possible the administrative burden 

for the Ryukyu Islands from the civil affairs officers to responsible Okinawans entrusted with implementing the military government program. 

The four directives that follow provide for the creation of an indigenous, 

local bureaucracy in the areas of education, industry, fisheries, finance, 

commerce, the courts, and political administration. 

8. HQ USN MG Okinawa, Directive No. 86,2 January 1946, sub: Okinawa Education System. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

HEADQUARTERS 

U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

OKINAWA 

2 January 1946 

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 86 

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government 

To: Distribution "A" 

Subject: Okinawa Educational System 

1. Educational affairs insofar as they concern actual operation of the schools, 

including planning of curriculum, preparation of texts, appointment and removal 

of principals and teachers and otber personnel, inspection of schools, allocation 

of personnel, maintenance of records, and general administrative detail are 

bereby placed under an Okinawan Department of Education, staffed by Okinawans but supervised at the Headquarters level by Military Government personnel who retain final discretion. In otber words, strictly educational matters 

of the type which in other communities would normally fall within the jurisdiction of a public department of education and a local school board will now 
278 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

come under the jurisdiction of an Okinawan native Department of Education. 

District Commanders will retain responsibility for furnishing school shelter, for 

cooperating locally in the educational program, and for providing for the physical 

welfare of teachers and pupils; they will be kept informed of all educational 

developments which are not mere routine. Communication and authority will 

be maintained directly between Headquarters and the schools without intermediate staging through district offices. 

2. The organization of the department will be as fo llows: 

HEADQUA RTERS EDUCATION SECTION 

Ed uca tion Officer 

I 

OK INAWA N DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

Di rec tor of Education 

[ 

[ HEADQUA RTERS OFFICE [ DISTR ICT SCHOOLS 

I I I 

District Superint endent 

I 

TEXT COM PILATION STAFF SECRETARI ES INSPECTION STAFF LOCAL SCHOOLS 

General Ed itor General 

Secretary 

Chid Inspector Principal 

[ 

PR INT ING OFFICE 

Chief Printer 

3. The assignment of duties is as follows: 

a. The Headquarters Education Office will work directly with the Okinawan Director of Education, handling matters of supply from Military 

Government so urces and checking on all matters of poli cy and 

procedure. 

b. The Director of Education will coordinate the activities of the Okinawan 

headquarters staff with the activities of the local schools and will exercise 

general supervision over the educational system. 

c. The Text Compilation Staff will plan school curriculum and prepare 

standardized text materials. 

d. The Secretariat will maintain complete school records, direct the submission and compilation of reports from local schools, and conduct 

correspondence concerned with educational affairs. 

e. The Printing Office will reproduce and distribute text materials prepared 

by the Text Compilation Staff. 

f. The Inspection Staff will visit local schools regularly, report on local 

conditions and make recommendations to the school principals and to 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 279 

the Director of Education. It will pay particular attention to matters of 

efficient use and allocation of personnel. 

g. The District Superintendent will coordinate the activities of the schools 

in his district and maintain liaison with headquarters and with the District Military Government Office. 

h. The School Principal will be responsible for proper and effecti ve administration of his school in accordance with policy announced from headquarters, for the performance of his teachers, the maintenance of 

discipline, the compilation of records, the submission of reports, and 

general administrative detail. 

4. The procedure for appointment and removal of Okinawan personnel will be 

as follows: 

a. The Director of Education will be appointed or removed in accordance 

with the majority vote of the Okinawan Advisory Assembly. 

b. The members of tbe beadquarters staff will be apppointed or removed 

by the Director of Education. 

c. The District Superintendents will be appointed or removed by the Director of Education after conferring with the District Mayor. 

d. School Principals will be appointed or removed by the Director of Education acting on tbe recommendation of the District Superintendent. 

e. Local teachers and staff members will be appointed or removed by the 

District Superintendent acting on the recommendation of the school 

principal and with the cognizance of the Director of Education. 

f. Personnel may be transferred from one school to another or from one 

district to another by the Director of Education acting upon the advice 

of tbe school inspectors and other members of the headquarters staff. 

5. This announcement will not greatly affect the immediate staff or operation 

of schools already organized but is a guide for future expansion and development. 

6. In connection with this announcement of a native Department of Education, 

District Commanders are instructed to give all possible assistance to local scbool 

principals in securing adequate school shelter. Three steps are recommended: 

first, that all school buildings now standing but used for other than educational 

purposes be made available as soon as possible for school use; second, tbat local 

schools be permitted to make use of quonset buts and other shelter which has 

been abandoned by military units nearby and turned over to Military Government; third, that temporary shelter of frame and canvas be provided wben other 

shelter is unavailable. 

7. General educational policy is restated below for the guidance of all 

concerned: 

The present program is to provide eight grades of elementary school education for all children of the six to fourteen age group, attendance to become 

compulsory when school facilities are adequate to provide for all; the minimum curriculum amounts to three hours of instruction per day six days 

per week in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Provision is being made at 

Headquarters for adequate if not voluminous text materials and for a grad-
280 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

ually expanding program to include material on a greater variety of subjects 

and for more advanced students. Kindergartens and higher schools are to 

be developed and are now being developed as facilities permit. 

lsi Royal Firman 

ROYAL FIRMAN 

By direction 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 281 

9. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 134, 15 March 1946, 

sub: Okinawan Departments of Agriculture, Industry, Fisheries, Finance, 

and Commerce-Organization of. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

HEADQUARTERS 

U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

Directive Number 134 

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government 

To: Distribution "A". 

15 March 1946 

Subject: Okinawan Departments of Agriculture, Industry, Fisheries, Finance 

and Commerce - Organization of 

1. To expedite the rehabilitation of Okinawa's economy the following Okinawan Departments are hereby established: 

a. Department of Agriculture 

b. Department of Industry 

c. Department of Fisheries 

d. Department of Finance 

e. Department of Commerce 

2. Each Department shall be headed by an Okinawan Director, who shall 

operate under the direct supervision of the Economics Department, Military 

Government. The Director shall be appointed or removed by Military Government on the recommendation of the Okinawan Advisory Council. 

3. The Director of each of the Departments specified in paragraph one (1) 

shall recommend policies and measures to the Economics Department, Military 

Government. Policies and measures approved by Military Government shall be 

issued through the General Affairs Department, Military Government, to the 

mura soncho for execution. 

4. Each of the Departments shall be organized into bureaus, as specified 

below. The heads of the bureaus of each Department shall be appointed and 

removed by the Director of that Department. Officials within each bureau including section chiefs, shall be appointed and removed by the head of the bureau, 

subject to the approval of the Director of the Department. 

5. The organization of each of the Okinawan Departments shall be as 

follows: 
282 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

a. Agriculture 

(1) Plan of organization 

Mi li tary Gove rnment, 

Economics Department 

Ok inawa Department of General 

Agric ulture, Director Crops 

Animal - In dustry 

Land - Planning 

Mlira Ex periment 

Soncho - Stations 

---1 Forestry 

Agri cu lt ural - Engineeri ng 

(2) The Okinawa Department of Agriculture shall be organized into 

the following bureaus: 

(A) General Crops - shall deal with problems relative to rice, sweet 

potato, sugar cane, soybean, vegetable culture, and other crops. 

It shall collect data on yield of each of these crops and mainta in 

constant vigilance against plant disease epidemics. It shall recommend schedules of spraying or dusting of plants and seeds, 

as such needs arise. 

(B) Animal Industry - shall deal with all problems relative to cattle, 

horses, swine, goats, and poultry. It shall include a Chief Veterinarian and a number of Assisting Veterinarians to inspect 

livestock, to recommend slaughtering of hopelessly diseased animals, and to take general precautionary measures for the prevention of animal disease. The bureau shall also be responsible 

for planning a program of animal breeding. 

(C) Land Planning - shall survey all arable land and seed stocks 

available and determine the acreage to be planted to each crop. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 283 

It may also recommend specific land for specific purposes. It 

shall work out plans for crop rotation, seed harvesting and planting, so as to achieve maximum productivity. 

(D) Experiment Station - shall be charged with the supervision of 

existing experiment stations and the planning of new ones. All 

research programs carried out at experiment stations shall originate with the bureau upon approval of the Director Okinawa 

Agriculture Department. 

(E) Forestry - shall be cha rged with the supervision of forest nurseries, forest-tree seed collection, reforestation programs, and 

the surveying of all timber lands of Okinawa. 

(F) Agriculture Engineering. - shall have supervision over mechanical equipment, hand tools, and irrigation systems used in 

agriculture. It shall make recommendations regarding the methods of plowing, harrowing, cultivating, and irrigating the soil, 

and of spraying crops. It shall design tools to increase the efficiency of Okinawan agriculture. 

b. Industry 

(I) Plan of organization 

Military Government 

Economi cs Departmcnt 

Okinawa Department of r--i Producti on 

Industry. Di rector 

H Distribution 

H Plan ning 

General '-- Admin istrative 

Mu ra 

Affairs 

Soncho 

(2) The Okinawan Department of Industry shall be organized into the 

following bureaus: 

(A) Production - shall be charged with the stimulation, development, and general supervision of Okinawan industry so as to 

achieve the optimum utilization of available resources. It shall 

survey production possibilities and recommend the establish-
284 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

ment of new industries and the employment of more efficient 

methods and techniques in existing industries. It shall recommend, when necessary, the allocation to be made of scarce raw 

materials, equipment, and other materials to ensure the most 

effective use of existing resources. 

(B) Distribution - shall be concerned with the distribution of industrial products. In particular, it shall recommend an equitable 

allocation of items produced by Okinawan industry. 

(C) Planning - shall be responsible for assembling statistical information and preparing reports, studies, and recommendations 

concerning Okinawan industry. 

(D) General Administrative Affairs - shall be responsible for personnel and clerical services and all other matters pertaining to 

the internal administration of the Department. 

c. Fisheries 

( I) Plan of organization 

Military Government. 

Economics Department 

Okinawan Department of rl Production 

Fisheries. Director 

H Distribution 

H Planning 

Genera l "- Administrative 

Mura Affairs 

Soncho 

(2) The Okinawa Department of Fisheries shall be organized into the 

following bureaus: 

(A) Production - shall be responsible for the stimulation, development, and general supervision of fishing output. It shall recommend the allocation to be made of fishing supplies and 

equipment, including boats, in order to maximize fishing 

output. 

(B) Distribution - shall be concerned with the distribution of fish. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 285 

In particular, it shall recommend an equitable allocation of the 

fishing catch. 

(C) Planning - shall be responsible for assembling statistical information and preparing reports, studies, and recommendations 

concerni ng fis hing. 

(D) General Administrative Affairs - shall be responsible for personnel and clerical services and all other matters pertaining to 

the internal administration of the Department. 

d. Finance 

(I) Plan of organization 

Military Government. 

Eco nomics Dcpartmcnt 

rBanki ng 

Section 

Okinawa Department of - Financial 

Finance. Director - Managemcnt I-

~ 

Treasury 

Section 

Taxati on r- Section 

Mura H Revenue f-- Soncho Monopoly - Sect ion 

l{Planning 

(2) The Okinawa Department of Finance shall be organized into the 

following bureaus: 

(A) Financial Management - shall be responsible for the general 

supervision and administration of Okinawa's financial system, 

exclusive of taxation and monopoly aspects. It shall exercise this 

function through the fo llowing two sections: 

(I) Banking section - shall be responsible for the development 

and supervision of the banking system, the development and 

supervision of a credit system, the regulation of the money 

market, and the supervision and control of the money supply. 

(II) Treasury section - shall be responsible for the integration 

and final preparation of the budgets of each of the Okinawan 

Departments and for the settlement of their accounts. 
286 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

(8) Revenue - shall be responsible for developing and administering Okinawa's revenue system through the following two 

sections: 

(I) Taxation section - shall be responsible for the assessment and 

collection of internal and external taxes, including customs 

duties, and for the apportionment of the receipts therefrom. 

(II) Monopoly section - shall be responsible for the control and 

management of public and other monopolies, unless the jurisdiction for such is explicitly assigned elsewhere. 

(C) Planning - shall be responsible for the assembling of statistical 

information and the preparation of reports, studies, and recommendations relating to finance. 

e. Commerce 

(I) Plan of organization 

Military Government. 

Economics Deparlment 

Okinawa Department of r- Domestic 

Comme rce. Director CO J11J11CITC 

I-- Foreign 

Trade 

I-- Prices and 

Rationing 

Mura H Planning Soncho 

Genera l L- Admin istrative 

Affairs 

(2) The Okinawa Department of Commerce shall be organized into 

the following bureaus: 

(A) Domestic Commerce - shall be responsible for the promotion 

of domestic commerce. It shall develop and supervise distribution arrangements, paying special attention to the establishment of wholesale outlets, retail stores, and markets for highly 

perishable foodstuffs. It shall be responsible for developing and 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 287 

promoting business standards and practices in the interests of 

the public welfare. 

(B) Foreign Trade - shall be responsible for the development and 

promotion of foreign trade. 

(C) Prices and Rationing - shall be responsible for developing and 

administering price and ration controls. Wherever necessary, it 

shall recommend ceiling prices and ration restrictions. 

(D) Planning - shall be responsible for assembling statistical information and preparing reports, studies, and recommendations 

relating to commerce. 

(E) General Administrative Affairs - shall be responsible for personnel and clerical services and all other matters pertaining to 

the internal administration of the Department. 

/s/ Royal Firman 

ROYAL FIRMAN 

By direction 
288 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

10. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 144,29 March 1946, 

sub: Okinawan Courts, Establishment of. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

HEADQUARTERS 

U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

Directi ve No. 144 

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government 

To: Distribution "A" 

Subject: Okinawan Courts, Establishment of 

29 March 1946 

Enclosures: (A) USN Military Government Special Proclamation No.5. 

(B) USN Military Government Legal Administrative Order No. I. 

(C) USN Military Government Legal Administrative Order No.2. 

(D) Roster-Summary Provost Court Officers. 

I. Enclosure (A) established a system oflocal courts for trials ofOkinawans 

committing minor offenses under local law. The jurisdiction of such courts is 

indicated in Article II thereof. Enclosure (B) directs that all violations of Special 

Proclamation Nos. 3 (curfew) and 4 (unauthorized circulation) shall likewise be 

tried by such courts. 

2. Offenses agai nst local law of a more serious nature, as well as violations 

of Military Government Proclamations 1-10 and the Special Proclamations, will 

continue to be tried by Exceptional Military Courts. Enclosure (D) contains a 

list of current Summary Provost Court Officers and the Judicial Districts for 

which they are responsible. Superior Provost Courts and Military Commissions 

will be convened as the need arises. 

3. In order to obviate jurisdictional Questions which might arise, attention 

is directed to para. 4a of enclosure (B), which indicates that the new "Judicial 

Districts"-seven in number-are identical in extent with the recent Military 

Government Districts. It should also be borne in mind that the police districts 

of the Okinawan Police Department are of like extent. 

4. The establishment of Okinawan courts raises certain Questions of the 

division of functions between such courts and Exceptional Military Courts. 

Therefore, the following considerations and procedures will govern: 

(a) Okinawans arrested, whether by civilian or military police, for all 

offenses referred to in paragraph 1, above, will be taken to the District Okinawan 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 289 

police station, and listed on the "blotter" maintained there. The cognizant Procurator (prosecutor) will prepare the necessary charges and transmit them to the 

Clerk of the Court for docketing. 

(b) Okinawans arrested, whether by civilian or military police, for all 

other offenses (see para. 2 above) will be taken to the District Okinawan police 

station and put on the Summary Provost Court "blotter" by a Military Police 

"desk sergeant" who will be stationed there. A Military Police Officer or enlisted 

man appointed by the Provost Marshal will prepare formal charges, notify the 

cognizant Summary Provost Court Officer of the pending case, and serve as 

prosecutor before the Summary Provost Court. 

(c) In all cases of doubt as to whether trial should be by Okinawan court 

or by Summary Provost Court, the Summary Provost Court Officer will make 

the decision. In his discretion, names will be transferred from the civilian to the 

military "blotter" and vice versa. 

5. The Okinawan courts will be kept under strict observation and supervision by Summary Provost Court Officers. Offenses not properly triable by the 

Okinawan courts and cases in which there is an apparent irregularity may and 

should be transferred at any stage of the proceedings to the Summary Provost 

Court. 

6. The jurisdiction of the local courts established herein is, in essence, that 

exercised by police chiefs under the Japanese system. If successful, the new 

system will be expanded at the earliest practicable time into a full-fledged judicial 

department, with courts of higher and appellate jurisdiction. The latter step, it 

is believed, will greatly reduce the work of the Summary Provost Courts. 

7. Camp Commanders and Area General Affairs Officers will give conspicuous public posting to enclosures (A), (B), and (C). 

ROYAL FIRMAN 

By direction 
290 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

11. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 156, 22 April 1946, 

sub: Central Okinawan Administration, Creation of. 

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., 

Watkins Papers, RG 200) 

HEADQUARTERS 

U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

22 April 1946 

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 156 

From: 

To: 

Deputy Commander for Military Government 

Distribution "A" 

Subject: Central Okinawan Administration, Creation of. 

References: (a) CinCPac-CinCPoa Itr to Commanding General Tenth Army, 

Serial 00825, dated 1 March 1945. 

(b) CinCPAC-CinCPOA Itr Serial 52855, dated 12 December 

1945. 

(c) CNOB Itr to Deputy Commander for Military Government 

Serial 2320, dated 23 October 1945. 

(d) Military Government Proclamation # I, Ryukyus. 

1. References (a) and (b) authorized and directed the establishment of the 

highest practicable degree of native government in the Ryukyus. Reference (c) 

directed the Deputy Commander for Military Government, Okinawa, to proceed 

to establish a centralized responsible administration of Okinawans for the performance of all governmental functions. 

_ 2. In accordance with the above, a central Okinawan administration is 

hereby established. 

3. The central Okinawan administration shall be headed by a chief official 

to be known as the Chiji and shall comprise the following: 

a. administrative departments as authorized. 

b. a court system. 

c. township, town and city administrations (mura, machi and shi). 

d. an advisory body to replace the present Okinawan Advisory Council. 

4. The Okinawa Chiji shall be responsible directly to the Deputy Commander for Military Government for the proper performance by the central 

administration of all governmental functions in Okinawa Gunto in accordance 

with Military Government policies and directives. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 291 

5. Directives will be given to the central administration by the Deputy 

Commander for Military Government. The several Military Government departments which exercise cognizance over governmental functions and services 

may employ direct channels to the respective Okinawan departments for technical and informational purposes. 

6. The relationship between civil courts and provost courts will continue 

for the time being in accordance with existing proclamations, orders and 

directives. 

7. Effective upon the formal appointment and inauguration of the Chiji, 

the functions performed by the Okinawan Advisory Council are transferred to 

the Chiji and his department heads. 

8. The Okinawa assembly, omitting for the present the representative from 

Miyako and Yaeyama, is reconstituted for the purpose of providing the limited 

function of advice to the Chiji. The term of the present membership is extended 

until such time as elections are authorized. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment from Military Government. 

9. The Chiji, with confirmation of the Deputy Commander for Military 

Government, appoints and removes department heads. Until such time as elections are authorized, the Chiji, with confirmation of the Deputy Commander 

for Military Government, will also appoint and remove the headmen of mura, 

machi and shi. -- -- - 10. Under authority of Reference (d), which is the Military Government 

Proclamation that concerns the effect of local law, the Okinawan administration 

will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of existing law except where 

expressly modified by Military Government enactment. It shall be the responsibility of the Chiji and his departments to bring to the attention of Military 

Government those provisions which by reason of existing circumstances are 

inapplicable and require amendment. 

/s/ C. I. MURRAY 

/t/ C. I. MURRAY 

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps 

DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 293 

Fostering Political Democracy 

A number of the civil affairs officers who served on Okinawa in the 

1940s brought with them a sense of political idealism. For them, mere 

material relief in terms of food, shelter, and medical care was not enough; 

part of the military government mission was to inculcate the islanders 

with a sense of American political democracy. Democratic elections in 

the Ryukyus were held as early as September 1945, but it was not until 

February 1947 that the Philippines-Ryukyus Command requested the 

services of a Political Advisor (POLAD) from MacArthur's headquarters 

to help establish sophisticated and efficient electoral mechanisms. Ultimately, the American goal was to prepare the islanders to move beyond 

a mere administrative role to full-fledged local self-government. The fruit 

of these earlier military government efforts was the creation of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in February 1952. 

12. MG Special Proclamation No. 23, 15 October 47, sub: Political 

Parties. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

As political activity in the Ryukyus revitalized, military government 

headquarters published a statement defining political parties and setting 

forth their duties and limitations: 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SPECIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 23 

POLITICAL PARTIES 

TO THE PEOPLE OF 

THE ISLANDS OF NANSEI SHOTO AND ADJACENT WATERS 

SOUTH OF THIRTY (30) DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE 

WHEREAS it is deemed desirable to promulgate rules and regulations to 

govern political activity in the Ryukyus through political parties in order to 

assure fair and honest election in the Ryukyus. 

NOW THERFORE I, FEDERIC J. HAYDEN, Brigadier General, United 
294 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

States Army, Chief Military Government Officer of the Islands of Nansei Shoto 

and Adjacent Waters of Thirty (30) Degrees North Latitude, do hereby proclaim 

as follows: 

Article I 

DEFINITIONS 

For all purposes relating to this Proclamation, "election" includes a general, 

special or primary election. "Candidate" means an individual whose name is 

presented at an election for election to a political office. "Contribution" includes 

a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value. 

"Expenditure" includes a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, 

of money, or anything of value. "Political party" includes any committee, association or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for 

the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates. 

"Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, and any other organization or group of persons. 

Article II 

DUTIES OF POLITICAL PARTY 

Every Ryukyuan political party in the Ryukyus shall: 

a. Keep a detailed and exact account of all contributions received and 

all expenditures made 'by such political party, and shall file a verified copy thereof 

with the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and Military Government on the 15th day of each month for the preceding month. 

b. Provide the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and 

Military Government with a complete and current list of its officers and executive committee members. 

c. Formulate and furnish the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and Military Government with a written statement of the purpose of 

the political party, and also its program and platform. 

d. Publicly announce the names of all candidates that it supports and 

so inform in writing the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and 

Military Government. 

e. The accounts of contributions and expenditures, list of officers and 

executive committee members, purposes, program platform and candidates of 

a political party staff for a period of two years from the date of filing constitute 

a part of the public records of the Headquarters of the local civilian administration and shall be open to public inspection. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 295 

Article III 

RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTY 

No Ryukyuan political party through its officers or members shall: 

a. Utter any speech or circulate any printed or written matter for political 

purposes which is hostile or detrimental to or which criticizes the policies of 

any of the Allied Nations towards the Ryukyus or the policies of Military Government towards the Ryukyus or Ryukyuans or criticizes those acts of any local 

civilian administration which it performs at the direction of Military 

Government. 

b. Conspire or attempt or abet or advise to violate or violate the penal 

provisions of the applicable election laws when they are promulgated. 

c. Libel or slander any candidate or other person. 

d. Advocate the violation of any law, Proclamation, Directive, order or 

regulation of Military Government. 

e. Receive or accept any contribution from a bank or corporation in 

connection with the election of any of its candidates. 

f. Make or offer to make any bribe to any person either to vote or 

withhold his or her vote or to vote for or against any candidate. 

Article IV 

PUBLIC POLITICAL MEETINGS 

Ryukyuan political parties may conduct public meetings, public assemblies 

and other public gatherings, whether indoors or out-of-doors, for the purpose 

of furthering their political campaigns. 

Article V 

GENERAL 

Nothing in this Proclamation shall be construed to prohibit a peaceful petition for the enactment, repeal or amendment of any law, ordinance or Proclamation, Directive, order or regulation of Military Government nor shall it 

preclude fair discussion of the fitness of any Ryukyuan public official. 

Article VI 

Rescinded (MG Sp Proc #32) 

Article VII 

POWER TO MAKE ORDERS 

The Deputy Commander for Military Government may make such orders 

or regulations as he may deem necessary to effect the purpose of this 

Proclamation. 
296 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Article VIII 

TRANSLATION 

In case of any conflict or ambiguity between the English text of this Proclamation or any other proclamation, order or regulation issued under my authority, and any translation thereof, the English shall prevail. 

Article IX 

EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Proclamation will become operative on the 15th day of October 1947. 

Gi ven under my hand this 15th day of October 1947-. -

lsi FREDERICK L. HAYDEN 

It I FREDERICK L. HAYDEN 

OFFICIAL: 

lsi William H. Craig 

WILLIAM H. CRAIG 

Colonel, Infantry 

Brigadier General, United States Army 

Commanding General, Ryukyus Command 

Chief Military Government Officer 

Deputy Commander for Military Government 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 297 

13. MG Ordinance No. 17, 7 July 1950, sub: Election Law for Assemblymen and Mayors of Cities, Towns, and Villages Revised. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

This comprehensive civil affairs pronouncement is a textbook study in 

how to hold a series of elections. While certain features of the ordinance 

reflect situations and attitudes peculiar to the Ryukyus-such as deciding 

between two candidates for an Electoral Administrative Committee post 

by lot if they both had the same number of votes-most of the provisions 

of the ordinance have wide applicability for those interested in how to 

organize and conduct fair elections: 

MG ORDINANCE 

NUMBER 17 7 July 1950 

ELEETION [sic) LAW FOR ASSEMBLYMEN AND MAYORS OF CITIES, 

TOWNS AND VILLAGES REVISED 

Section I 

General Provisions 

Article I 

I. The mayors and assemblymen of cities, towns and villages shall be 

elected by the electors from among such persons as are qualified to be elected 

to the office, at either a General or Special election. 

2. General elections for the office of Mayor shall be held once every four 

years on the first Sunday in September. General elections for the offices of 

Assemblymen shall be held once every four years on the second Sunday in September. The foregoing shall apply to all cities, towns and villages with the exception of Taketomi Cho, Yaeyama Gunto, in which town both elections shall 

be held on the second Sunday in September. Special elections shall be held when 

required, in accordance with Articles XLII and XLVII of this Ordinance. Notwithstanding other provisions of this paragraph, the term of office of Mayor and 

Assemblymen shall extend until such time as their successor shall have been 

elected and inaugurated. (Change #3) 

Article II 

I. Any person who, being twenty years of age or upward, has been a resident 

of a city, town or village for six consecutive months, shall have the right to vote 

at the election of assemblymen and mayor of the City, Town or Village. The 

legal residence of any person in any city, town or village shall not be affected 

or impaired where such person is required by reason of his employment by a 
298 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

municipal government to take up temporary residence in a city, town or village 

other than that which he claims as his residence. (Change #4) 

2. a. Any person who, having been a resident of a city, town or village 

for six consecutive months and having been compelled to move out as a result 

of emergency or an act of God, has lost his right to vote at the election of 

assemblymen and mayor of the city, town or village, and any repatriate from 

abroad who, after returning, has been a resident for less than six months, may, 

upon the application to the Electoral Administrative Committee, acquire the 

right to vote notwithstanding the residential requirement. 

b. Any person who is permanently resettled in accordance with a Government sponsored resettlement program, upon application to the Electoral Administrative Committee not later than five days prior to the date of election, 

shall acquire the right to vote and have his name entered in the Supplementary 

Register of Electors notwithstanding the residential requirements of paragraph 

1 above and the provisions of paragraph 4, Article XVII of this Ordinance. 

(Change #6) 

3. Such person as has acquired the right of voting in accordance with the 

provision of the last preceding paragraph shall not have the right of voting which 

he may possess in the city, town or village of his last domicile. 

4. The period of six months contemplated in the first paragraph of this 

article shall not be interrupted by the creation, dissolution, union or division, 

or the alteration of the boundary of a city, town or village. 

Article III 

1. Any person who, being twenty-five years of age or upward, possesses 

the right to vote shall be qualified to be elected to the officer of mayor or office 

of assemblyman of the city, town or village in which he resides. 

2. The age contemplated in the first paragraph of this article shall be 

computed as the day on which the General and Supplementary Registers of 

Electors become conclusive. 

3. Any incompetent, quasi-incompetent any prisoner serving a sentence, 

or any probationer during the term of his probation, shall not have the right to 

vote or the right to be elected to any public office. 

4. An Electoral Administrative committeeman, clerk of the committee, 

officer of a branch poll, presiding officer of election, a paid officer of a city, 

town or village who is currently serving in election affairs shall be disqualified 

for being elected to the office of assemblyman or mayor of the city, town or 

village within the area in which he is acting at that time. 

5. A public procurator, a police officer and a revenue officer while in office 

shall be disqualified for being elected to the office of assemblyman or mayor of 

a city, town or village. 

Article IV 

The affairs relating to the election in a city, town or village shall be administered by its Electoral Administrative Committee. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 299 

Article V 

I. If an event has occurred which necessitates holding an election of assemblymen or mayor of a city, town or village, an election shall forthwith be 

held. 

2. The election of mayor or assemblymen shall not be held within 30 days 

prior to the day of expiration of the term of office of the incumbent mayor or 

assemblymen. 

3. Forty-five days prior to the day selected for a General or Special election, 

the Electoral Administrative Committee shall give public notice of the date of 

the election and shall use every available medium to give this notice the widest 

possible pUblicity. The legal campaign period shall comprise a period of twenty 

consecutive days prior to and including the day of election. (Change #4) 

4. The Electoral Administrative Committee shall, on or before the tenth 

day before the day of an election, give public notice of the polling station, including branch polling stations, which shall be understood whenever in this law 

the same expression appears, the day and hours fixed for the poll, and the number 

of assemblymen to be elected in the event an election of assemblymen is 

scheduled. 

5. In cases in which branch polling stations have been set up, additional 

public notice shall be given of the areas served by such branch polling stations. 

6. The poll at a branch polling station shall be taken on the same day and 

during the same hours as that of the election meeting. 

7. If it is impossible to take the poll or it is necessary to take another poll 

on account of an Act of God or an emergency, the Committee shall appoint 

another day and cause a poll to be taken; in this case, public notice shall be 

given of the location of polling stations and the day and hours fixed for the poll, 

on or before the fifth day before the date of election. 

Section II 

Electoral Administrative Committee 

Article VI 

Each city, town or village shall have an Electoral Administrative Committee. 

An Electoral Administrative Committee shall be composed of five 

committeemen. 

Article VII 

I. The Electoral Administrative committeemen shall be elected by the city, 

town or village assembly from among the persons who have the right to vote at 

the election of city, town or village assemblymen. 

2. When the election contemplated in the preceding paragraph is held, the 

assembly shall also elect as many supplementary committeemen as there are 

committeemen. 

3. If a vacancy occurs in the office of a committeeman, the chairman of 
300 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

the committee shall choose a committeeman to fill such vacancy from among 

the supplementary committeemen in conformity to the following order: 

a. When they have been elected at different times from each other, the 

person who has been elected first shall be chosen. 

b. Where they have been elected at the same time, the person who has 

polled the greatest number of votes shall be chosen. 

c. Where the votes are equal, such person as is determined by lot shall 

be chosen. 

d. And if there still remains an unfilled vacancy, a Special election shall 

be held. 

Article Vlll 

Committeemen and supplementary committeemen shall be elected every 

other year, and shall hold office until their successors come into office. A supplementary committeeman who fills the vacancy of a committeeman shall hold 

office during the remaining term of his predecessor. 

• • • 

Article XI 

A meeting of the Electoral Administrative Committee shall be called by its 

chairman; if the demand for calling a meeting is made by a committeeman, the 

chairman shall call it. 

Article XII 

1. At a meeting of the Electoral Administrative Committee, no business 

shall be transacted unless three or more committeemen are present. No chairman 

or committeeman shall take part in such proceedings of the committee as may 

concern the personal interests of himself or of his parent, grandparent, spouse, 

child, grandchild, or brother or sister; provided, however, that he may attend 

and speak at the meeting upon obtaining the consent of the committee. 

2. If the number of such committeemen as are qualified to take part in 

the proceedings at a meeting of the committee has come to be less than the 

number specified in Paragraph 1, in consequence of the exclusion as provided 

in the preceding paragraph, the chairman shall provisionally choose the persons 

to make up the deficiency in the number of committeemen from among such 

supplementary committeemen as have no connection with the business to be 

transacted thereat in conformity to the order mentioned in Article VII, paragraph 

3. The same shall apply in a case where the number of committeemen present 

has come to be less than the number specified in the preceding paragraph because 

of other unavoidable circumstances. 

Article Xlii 

All proceedings at a meeting of the Electoral Administrative Committee 

shall be decided by majority vote; in the case of an equality of votes, the chairman 

shall have the deciding vote. 
DOCU MENTING THE EXPER[ENCE 30 1 

[n the case contemplated in the last preceding paragraph, the chairman shall 

not have the right to vote as a committeeman. 

• • • 

Section III 

Register of Electors-General and Supplementary 

Article XVII 

I. The privilege of voting at any election shall depend upon the appearance 

of the elector's name in a General or Supplementary Register of Electors. 

2. The Electoral Administrative Committee shall prepare a General Register of Electors as of July 15 of each year and shall hold the General Register 

open to the inspection of the public at the office of the city, town or village for 

fifteen days thereafter. 

3. [f any person feels that an omission or error exists in the General Register of Electors, he may file an objection with the Electoral Administrative 

Committee within the period during which the Register is open for inspection. 

The Committee shall thereupon make a decision upon the objection within five 

days from the date on which the objection was fil ed. Any person dissatisfied 

with the decision of the Committee may bring an action in the Circuit Court 

within seven days from the date of such decision. Should the decision of the 

Electoral Administrative Committee agree with the objection, or should the 

decision of the Circuit Court so require, the Committee shall forthwith amend 

the General Register of Electors and give public notice of the same. The General 

Register of Electors shall become conclusive on August 31, by which date the 

Circuit Court will without fail render its decision in all pending cases which 

have been filed under the provisions of this paragraph. The General Register 

shall be kept intact until August 30 of the following year. 

• • • 

Section [V 

Election 

Article XIX 

I. The presiding officer of election of a city, town or village shall be the 

chairman of the Electoral Administrative Committee and shall take charge of 

the affairs relating to the polli ng. 

2. The superintendent of a branch polling station shall be appointed by 

the presiding officer of election of the city, town or village from among the voters 

and he shall take charge of the affairs relating to the polling in the precinct served 

by that station. 
302 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

3. The presiding officer of election or the superintendent of branch polling 

station shall vacate his office if he has lost his right to vote. 

• • • 

Article XXI 

The ballot paper shall be substantially like Appendixes Band C hereof. 

Article XXII 

An elector shall proceed to the polling station in person and vote after 

identifying himself. If identification is difficult, the presiding officer of election 

shall cause him to take an oath. And such person who refuses to take an oath 

may not vote. 

Article XXIII 

An elector shall, at the polling station, write in his own hand the name of 

one candidate on the ballot paper and deposit it in a ballot box. The name of 

the elector shall not be entered on the ballot paper. 

Article XXIV 

In case of voting, Kanji, Katakana, Hirakana or Romaji shall be used. The 

braille described in Appendix D may also be used. 

Article XXV 

I. No person whose name is not entered in a General or Special Register 

of Electors may vote; no person who is ineligible to be listed in the Register or 

who has lost the right to vote on the day of election may vote. 

2. Any person who cannot write the name of a candidate in his hand may 

not vote. 

Article XXVI 

I. The denial of a vote shall be decided by the presiding officer of election 

with the advice of inspectors. 

2. If an elector against whom the decision has been made by the superintendent of branch polls raises objection thereto, the superintendent shall cause 

him to cast a vote provisionally. 

3. With respect to the ballot described in the preceding paragraph, an 

elector shall be caused to put the same in an envelope which shall be substantially 

like Appendix "E" hereof, seal the envelope, write his full name thereon in his 

own hand and deposit the same in a ballot box. 

4. The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall apply to an elector 

whose vote has been challenged by an inspector of the poll. 

Article XXVII 

I. On the day of election the polls shall be open for voting continuously 

from 7 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 303 

2. When the hour for closing the polls has arrived, the presiding officer 

of election shall, upon announcing this, close the entrance of the station and 

after the completion of the casting he shall close the ballot box. No person shall 

be allowed to vote after the closing of the ballot box. 

Article XXVIII 

I. At any time after the election date has been announced and before 

election day, an elector who has a certificate to establish his inability to proceed 

to polling station owing to illness, wound, pregnancy, crippleness or baby birth, 

may demand the ballot paper and envelopes from the respective presiding officer 

of election, which shall be known as a voter's absentee ballot. 

2. A certificate stating facts which support the issuance of the absentee 

ballot mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be prepared only by a doctor, 

dentist or midwife. 

3. Further, an absentee ballot shall be issued in the fo llowing cases: 

a. When a person is to be in service at a Military Installation. 

b. When a person is to be in sea-service or engaged in fishing away from 

his place of residence. 

c. When a person is to be taking charge of affairs relating to polling away 

from his residence. 

4. In the cases listed in paragraph 3 above, the elector shall bring forward 

a certificate from one of the following persons: 

If he relies on subparagraphs a. or b. of the preceding paragraph, a certificate from the captain or his employer. 

If he relies on subparagraph c. of the preceding paragraph, a certificate 

from the head of the respecti ve office. 

Article XXIX 

In case demand is made pursuant to Article XXVIII, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall examine the electors' register and give the elector an 

absentee ballot and two envelopes at once if satisfied that the reason shown by 

the elector is sufficient. 

Article XXX 

As soon as the absentee ballot and envelopes have been received in accordance with the provision of Article XXIX, the elector shall write in secrecy in 

his hand the name of a candidate on the absentee ballot, put it in the envelope, 

seal it, place this envelope, in another envelope, sign the outer envelope and 

hand it to the presiding officer or the superintendent of the polls. 

Article XXXI 

I. The presiding officer or the superintendent of polls shall receive the 

envelope, describe the date and place of voting and sign his name on the back 

of the outer envelope, and preserve it until the day of the election, at which time 

the presiding officer shall, in the presence of other committeemen, open the 
304 M[LITARY GOVERNMENT [N THE RYUKYU [SLANDS, 1945- 1950 

outer envelope and deposit the sealed inner envelope containing the absentee 

ballot in the ballot box. 

2. The presiding officer or the superintendent or polls shall prepare a document indicating the number or absentee ballots issued and returned, shall attach 

thereto the outer envelopes or all ballots returned, shall sign his name thereto 

and annex it to the record or election or the record or polling. 

Article XXXII 

When the presiding officer or election is satisfied that it will be impossible 

ror an island or any other outlying place to return the ballot box on the day or 

election, he may determine an earlier date or voting in such place and direct the 

superintendent or the branch polling station to send the ballot box, record or 

poll, and Registers or Electors by the day or counting or ballots. 

Article XXXlll 

Prior to the counting, public notice or the date or the counting shall be given 

by the presiding officer. 

Article XXXIV 

I. The presiding officer shall, on the day or polling, or the rollowing day, 

open the ballot box with the attendance or inspectors and count the total number 

or votes and voters. 

2. Arter the counting described in the last paragraph is finished, the presiding officer shall examine the votes described in the second and rourth paragraphs or Article XXVI, acceptance or which shall be decided by the inspectors. 

The presiding officer shall examine the votes with the inspectors. [n the case or 

a tie vote, the presiding officer shall decide the issue or acceptance. 

3. [r counting is impossible through a calamity or due to any unavoidable 

circumstance, the presiding officer shall appoint another day and give public 

notice thereor. [n this case, ir it is necessary to change the counting place he 

shall gi ve public notice thereor. 

• • • 

Section V 

Candidates and Elected Persons 

Article XXXIX 

I. A person who intends to be a candidate shall file notice to that errect 

with the presiding officer or election within the twenty day campaign period but 

in no event later than the third day prior to the date or election. (Change #4) 

2. [r a person whose name has been entered in either the General or Supplementary Register or Electors intends to cause another person to become a 

candidate, he may, upon obtaining the consent or that person and within the 

period described in the preceding paragraph. similarly file notice or recommendation or that person. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 305 

3. In a case of the election of a mayor, a person who files notice of his 

candidacy or notice of recommendation of a candidate shall effect the same 

under the joint signatures of thirty electors. 

4. A candidate shall not withdraw from his candidacy unless notice thereof 

is filed with the presiding officer of election. 

5. When such notices as are prescribed in the preceding four paragraphs 

have been filed with him, or when the death of a candidate becomes known to 

him, the presiding officer of election shall forthwith give public notice thereof. 

6. When an assemblyman intends to be a candidate for mayor or when a 

mayor intends to be a candidate for assemblyman, he shall not file the notice 

described in the first two paragraphs unless he has resigned from the office of 

assemblyman or mayor. 

Article XL 

A person who has polled a plurality of valid votes shall be elected. If, in 

determining the elected person, an equality of votes is found to exist, the presiding officer of election shall, at the election meeting, determine him by the 

drawing of lots. 

Article XLI 

If a successful candidate declines to accept office, dies, or becomes ineligible 

to assume office, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall meet and substitute in his place the candidate who received the next largest number of votes 

and is otherwise qualified. 

• • • 

Article XLIV 

I. When the elected persons have been determined, the presiding officer 

of election shall forthwith give such persons notification of their having been 

duly elected. At the same time he shall give public notice of the full names and 

addresses of the elected persons, and shall report the full names and numbers 

of votes polled by each candidate, and such particulars as are concerned with 

the election to the Chief Executive of the Provisional Government. (Change #2) 

2. If there exists no person duly elected or if the number of the persons 

elected at the election of assemblymen is less than the whole number of the 

assemblymen to be elected thereat, the presiding officer of election shall forthwith give public notice thereof, and at the same time submit a report thereof to 

the Chief Executive, the chairman of Electoral Administrative Committee and 

the mayor. (Change #2) 

Article XLV 

1. In a case where a duly elected person declines to accept office he shall, 

within ten days from the day on which he receives a notification of his having 

been duly elected, file notice thereof with the presiding officer of election. 
306 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

2. If an elected person fails to file, within a term described in the preceding 

paragraph, a notification of his declination to accept office, he shall be deemed 

to have accepted office. 

3. Any paid official or municipal contractor who has been duly elected to 

the office of mayor shall file notice of his resignation from office, or of his having 

ceased to be the person who has a contract for work with the respective local 

body or any other person who has received a mandate from the mayor for work 

paid for by the local body concerned, or as manager, partner, or director thereof. 

If he fails to file notice within the terms prescribed in the first paragraph he 

shall be deemed to have declined to accept office. 

• • • 

Section VI 

Actions 

Article L 

1. If an elector or a candidate for the office of assemblyman or mayor has 

an objection to the validity of an election or of the election of any person, he 

may file a protest with the Electoral Administrative Committee within fourteen 

days from the day of election, with regard to an election, and otherwise from 

the day on which the public notice described in Article XLIV has been given. 

2. In this case, the Electoral Administrative Committee shall determine 

the issue within fourteen days from the day of receiving the objection by a 

document stating the reasons therefor and delivered to the person objecting. 

3. Any person who is dissatisfied with the determination described in the 

preceding paragraph may appeal to the Circuit Court. 

Article LI 

In cases in which a violation of provisions relating to election has been 

committed, the Electoral Administrative Committee or the Court shall, if and 

only if it is substantive and affects the result of the elections, determine that the 

whole or a part of the election shall be void. 

Article LII 

An elector or candidate who considers the election of a person null and void 

in accordance with the provision of Article L may within twenty days from the 

date of announcement provided for in Article XLIV, bring action against the 

elected person as defendant in the Circuit Court. 

Article LIII 

When the decision on appeal described in Article LI has become conclusive 

and effective, the Circuit Court shall notify the same to the Electoral Administrative Committee concerned. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

Section VII 

Election Campaign 

Article LIV 

307 

I. No election campaign shall commence prior to the legal campaign period 

as prescribed in paragraph 3, Article V. (Change #4) 

2. No election campaign office may be established by anyone other than 

a candidate or the person who recommends a candidate, or in case several persons recommend a candidate, their representative. 

3. When the person mentioned in the preceding paragraph establishes or 

changes an election campaign office, he shall immediately notify the Electoral 

Administrative Committee. 

Article LV 

I. Three election campaign offices may be established for each candidate. 

2. No election campaign office shall be established within one cho or about 

120 yards from a polling station. -

3. Resting places or places of like character shall not be established for 

the purpose of election campaign. 

4. When election campaign offices are found to be established contrary to 

the provisions of the 2nd paragraph of this Article or when election offices are 

found to be established in excess of the number authorized under paragraph I, 

the Electoral Administrative Committee shall immediately order such offices to 

close. 

Article LVI 

No election campaign shall be conducted until the notice of recommendation 

of a candidate or announcement of candidacy under the first or third paragraph 

of Article XXXIX has been made. 

Article LVII 

No person shall carry on house-to-house visiting for the purpose of obtaining 

votes or of aiding or preventing the obtaining of votes. 

Article LVIII 

No person shall conduct an election campaign by making use of his position 

especially related to children, pupils or students of schools under the age of 

twenty. 

Article LIX 

No official mentioned in Article III, paragraphs 4 or 5 shall conduct an 

election campaign. 

Section VIII 

Election Expenses 
308 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Article LX 

1. A candidate shall appoint a person to be responsible for disbursing 

election campaign expenses to be known as a responsible disburser. This does 

not prevent a candidate from himself becoming a responsible disburser, nor a 

person who has recommended a candidate (in case there are several such persons, 

their representative) from appointing with approval of the candidate a responsible disburser or from himself becoming a responsible disburser. 

2. A candidate may relieve his responsible disburser by notice in writing. 

This rule shall apply also to a disburser appointed by a person who has recommended a candidate. 

3. A responsible disburser may resign by notice in writing to the candidate 

and the person who has appointed him. 

• • • 

Article LXII 

Expenses of an electi<:>n campaign shall not be paid by any person other 

than a responsible disburser, except expenses involved in preparation for candidacy and those paid without any understanding of the candidate or the responsible disburser. This rule shall not apply to a person who has obtained the 

written approval of the responsible disburser. 

Article LXIII 

Amounts paid out for any of the following purposes shall not be considered 

expenses of election: 

1. For ships, horses, and vehicles used by a candidate. 

2. For concluding business of an election campaign remaining after the 

date of election. 

3. Expenses other than those paid out by or with the understanding of 

the candidate for whom notice has been given under Article XXXIX or the 

responsible disburser. 

4. For preparation for candidacy other than expenditures made by or 

with the understanding of the person who has become the candidate or responsible disburser. 

Article LXIV 

A candidate who has accepted any contributions for his election campaign 

shall immediately inform the responsible disburser of the amounts, the sources, 

the kinds and other details of the contributions. Receipts accepted prior to the 

notification of candidacy shall be reported to the responsible disburser immediately after the notification. 

• • • 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 309 

Article LXVII 

The responsible disburser shall keep books in which all expenses and receipts 

relating to election campaign shall be recorded. 

Article LXVIII 

1. The expenses of elections campaign for each candidate shall not exceed 

the amount specified in the following items: 

a. The amount obtained when the total number of electors registered on 

the final voters' list, divided by the number of persons to be elected, is multiplied 

by 5 Yen. 

b. Deleted (Change #5). 

2. The Electoral Administrative Committee shall publish the amount determined upon under the preceding paragraph as soon as the date of election is 

announced. 

Article LXIX 

1. Within fourteen days from the day of election, the responsible disburser 

shall submit reports on the expenses and receipts relating to election campaign 

to the Electoral Administrative Committee to which notification under the third 

paragraph of Article LIV has been made. 

• • • 

Article LXXIII 

The chief clerk of a political party or any other organization which recommends or supports a candidate shall prepare books under Article LXXII and 

state the expenses and receipts of its election campaign. 

Article LXXIV 

In case the expense of election paid for a candidate exceed the amount 

published in accordance with the second paragraph of Article LXVIII, the election of the candidate shall be invalid except when the candidate and the person 

who has made the recommendation have paid due attention to the appointment 

and supervision of the responsible disburser or the person who takes over the 

duties of the responsible disburser and there can be found no wilful evasion of 

the law in the expenditure of campaign funds on the part of the responsible 

disburser or the person who takes over his duties. 

Section IX 

Punitive Rules 

Article LXXV 

Any person who has effected by fraudulent process the insertion of his name 

in the voters' list or who has made a false declaration under the second paragraph 

Article XXII shall be liable to a fine of not more than 2000 Yen. 
310 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Article LXXVI 

Any person who has committed an act falling under any of the following 

items shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than three years 

or a fine or not more than 30,000 Yen: 

1. When money, goods, or other presents, or public or private employment has been given to an elector or to a canvasser, or when such gifts have 

been proposed or promised or when entertainment has been provided, for the 

purpose of causing a candidate to be elected or preventing him from being 

elected. 

2. When, with the objects mentioned above, irrigation, tenancy, credit 

or contributions to a shrine, temple, school, company, guild or local body in 

which an elector or canvasser is interested have been issued to influence an 

elector or canvasser. 

3. When anything mentioned in paragraph I of this Article has been 

delivered to an elector or a canvasser for the purpose of compensation for voting 

or carrying on an election campaign or for declining to do either or for persuading 

others to do so. 

4. When a voter has received or demanded offers or accepted proposals 

of presents or entertainment mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article, or 

yielded to the forms of persuasion or asked for such forms of assistance as are 

mentioned in the second paragraph. 

5. When, with the object of inducing the acts mentioned in paragraph 

I to 3, a person has made, proposed or promised offers of money or goods to 

election canvassers; or when an election canvasser has received, demanded or 

accepted such offers. 

6. when a person has acted to persuade or mediate between others to 

accomplish the acts mentioned in the preceding items. 

When any person in charge of election affairs has committed a crime mentioned in this Article, he shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more 

than four years or a fine of not more than 40,000 Yen. This rule shall also apply 

to any police officer who has committed these crimes. 

Article LXXVII 

Any person who has committed one of the following acts shall be liable to 

confinement or servitude for not more than five years: 

When, with the object of obtaining material benefits, a person has, on behalf 

ofa candidate, committed against a large number of voters or election canvassers, 

or caused them to commit, one of the acts mentioned in paragraph one to three, 

five or six of the preceding Article. 

Article LXXVIII 

Any person who commits any of the following offenses shall be liable to 

confinement 'or servitude for not more than four years or a fine of not more 

than 40,000 Yen. 

1. A person who has committed one of the acts mentioned in paragraphs 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 311 

1 and 2 of Article LXXVI toward a candidate or toward a person who contemplates becoming a candidate for the purpose of dissuading him from candidacy, 

or toward an elected person for the purpose of persuading him to decline the 

election. 

2. A person who has committed an act mentioned in paragraph 1 of 

Article LXXVI for the purpose of compensating a candidate for having withdrawn his candidacy or having refrained from becoming a candidate or an elected 

person for having declined election, or having mediated or persuaded for such 

purpose. 

3. A person who has accepted or demanded offers or entertainment as 

described in the preceding two items or has yielded to the persuasion described 

in the first item. 

4. A person who has acted to mediate between others to accomplish or 

attempt to accomplish the acts mentioned in the preceding items. 

When any person in charge of the affairs of an election has committed a 

crime mentioned in this Article in connection with that election, he shall be 

liable to confinement or servitude for not more than five years or to a fine of 

not more than 50,000 Yen. The same rule shall apply when a police officer has 

committed an offense under the preceding paragraph. 

Article LXXIX 

Any goods or benefits received in consequence of acts mentioned in the 

three preceding Articles shall be confiscated. 

Article LXXX 

Any person who, during a campaign, commits any of the following offenses 

shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than four years or a fine 

of not more than 40,000 Yen or both: 

1. Any person who subjects an elector, a candidate, an intended candidate, a canvasser, or an elected person to an act of violence, intimidation or 

abduction. 

2. Any person who by force or fraud interferes with a political meeting 

or speech, or who by fraudulent or other unlawful means obstructs the exercise 

of the right to vote. 

3. A person who threatens an elector, candidate, prospective candidate, 

canvasser or elected person with the loss or impairment to him of irrigation, 

tenancy, credit or contributions, or of the loss or impairment thereof to a shrine, 

temple, school, company, guild, or local body in which he is interested. 

Article LXXXI 

1. A person in charge of election affairs who wilfully neglects to discharge 

his duty or obstructs wilfully the exercise of the right of election by the abuse 

of his authority shall be liable to confinement for not more than four years. 

2. Any person in charge of election affairs who requests an elector to reveal 

the name of the candidate for whom he intends to vote or has voted shall be 
312 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

liable to confinement for not more than six months or to a fine of not more 

than 5,000 Yen. 

Article LXXXII 

A person in charge of election affairs who reveals the name of a candidate 

voted for by an elector shall be liable to confinement for not more than two 

years or to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen. The same rule and penalty shall 

apply regardless of the truth of the statement. 

Article LXXXIII 

A person who unlawfully interferes at a polling station with the voting of 

an elector, or who uses any device to discover the name of the person voted for, 

shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not 

more than 10,000 Yen. 

Article LXXXIV 

A person who commits violence against or threatens an election official, or 

who disturbs the peace at a polling station, or who seizes, damages, or defaces 

a ballot, a ballot-box, or an election document, shall be liable to confinement 

or servitude for not more than four years. 

Article LXXXV 

1. A person who assembles a mob and induces it to commit an offense 

mentioned in the first item of Article LXXX or in the preceding Article shall 

be liable as follows: 

a. The principal leaders shall be liable to confinement or servitude for 

not less than one year and not more than seven years. 

b. The leaders shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not less 

than six months and not more than five years. 

c. A person who has knowingly joined such a mob to add to its influence 

shall be liable to confinement or servitude for not more than one year and to a 

fine of not more than 5,000 Yen. 

2. A person who has knowingly formed a mob or joined it for the purpose 

of committing an offense against any provision of the first paragraph of Article 

LXXX or of the preceding Article and has disobeyed more than three times any 

order of police officers or officials of the election to disperse shall, if he is leader, 

be liable to confinement for not more than two years, and, if only a member, 

to confinement for not more than one year and to a fine of not more than 2,000 

Yen. 

Article LXXXVI 

A person who, in an election demonstration, continues to assemble a mob, 

conduct a procession or parade, use fireworks, bonfires or torchlight, beat bells 

or drums, sounds conches or bugles, raises flags, or use other similar devices, 

after having been warned by a police official to desist, shall be liable to confinement for not more than six months or to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 313 

Article LXXXVII 

A person who, with the object of inducing other persons to commit any of 

the acts prohibited by this Ordinance, incites them by means of speeches, newspapers, magazines, circulars, placards or other such devices shall be liable to 

confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not more than 10,000 

Yen, provided that in case a newspaper or magazine is found guilty of such acts, 

the person registered as the editor or who has taken the place of the editor shall 

be liable to the aforesaid punishment. 

Article LXXXVIII 

1. A person who commits any of the following offenses by means of 

speeches, newspapers, magazines, circulars or placards, shall be liable to confinement for not more than two years or to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen 

or both. In case of newspapers and magazines, the proviso of the preceding 

Article shall apply. 

a. For the purpose of being elected, or causing a candidate to be elected, 

to publish knowingly a false statement of fact about his rank, position, occupation or career. 

b. For the purpose of preventing the election of a candidate, to knowingly 

publish any false statement of a material fact. 

2. An editor or publisher who discriminates between opposing candidates 

with respect to advertisements in his newspaper or magazine shall be liable to 

confinement for not more than two years, or to a fine of not more than 20,000 

Yen or both. 

Article LXXXIX 

1. A person who votes, knowing that he is not a Qualified elector, shall be 

liable to confinement for not more than one year, or to a fine of not more than 

10,000 Yen. 

2. A person who votes by assuming the name of another, or by other 

fraudulent means, shall be liable to confinement for not more than two years or 

to a fine of not more than 20,000 Yen. 

3. A person who knowingly uses a counterfeit ballot, intending it to be 

mistaken for a legal vote or who manipulates votes for the purpose of causing 

a false count shall be liable to confinement or servitude, for not more than three 

years, or to a fine of not more than 30,000 Yen or both. 

4. Any election official who violates the provisions of this Article shall be 

liable to confinement or servitude for not more than five years or to a fine of 

not more than 50,000 Yen or both. 

Article XC 

Any inspector who fails to discharge any of the duties provided in this 

Ordinance without justifiable reason shall be liable to a fine of not more than 

5,000 Yen. 
314 . MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Article XCI 

Any person who violates any of the provisions of Article LVI to LVIII or 

disobeys an order given in accordance with paragraph 4, Article LV is liable to 

confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of not more than 10,000 

Yen. 

Article XCII 

Any person who establishes election offices in excess of the number authorized by paragraph I, Article LV or who violates the provisions of paragraphs 

2 or 3 of Article LV shall be liable to a fine of not more than 7,000 Yen. 

Article XCIII 

Any person who violates the provisions of the first paragraph of Article LV 

or Article LIX shall be liable to confinement for not more than six months or 

to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen. 

Article XCIV 

Any person who, having the duty to make reports or to give notice in accordance with the third paragraph of Article LIV fails to do so shall be liable 

to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen. 

Article XCV 

Any person who, contrary to his duty, violates the provisions of one of the 

following items shall be liable to confinement for not more than six months or 

to a fine of not more than 5,000 Yen. 

I. One who neglects to hand over the account, contrary to Article LXXI. 

2. One who, contrary to Article LXVII neglects to prepare the books or 

to keep them completely, or who enters a false statement in the books. 

3. One who, contrary to the first paragraph of Article LXIX neglects to 

make reports or makes false reports. 

4. One who, contrary to the first paragraph of Article LXX fails to keep 

books or documents. 

5. One who enters a false statement in the books or documents to be 

preserved under the first paragraph of Article LXX. 

Article XCVI 

Any person who pays expenses of election contrary to the provision of Article 

LXII shall be liable to confinement for not more than one year or to a fine of 

not more than 10,000 Yen. 

Article XCVII 

Any person who, contrary to the provisions of Article LX neglects to make 

a report or makes a false report shall be liable to a fine of not more than 50,000 

Yen. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 315 

Article XCVlII 

A responsible disburser or a person who acts for him who pays expenses of 

an election in excess of the amount published in accordance with the second 

paragraph of Article LXVlII shall be liable to confinement for not more than 

one year or a fine of not more than 10,000 Yen. 

Article XCIX 

An election shall be invalid when, in connection with the election, a candidate has been convicted of violating the provisions of this Section, or the 

person who controlled and managed his election campaign has been convicted 

of violating the provisions of Articles LXXVI to LXXVII except when the person 

elected has taken proper care in the selection and supervision of the person who 

controlled and managed his election campaign, and the acts were done without 

his knowledge or against his orders. 

Article C 

The period of the statute of limitations and the term of prescription shall 

be one year for the offenses described in the third and fourth paragraphs of 

Article LXXXIX, and shall be six months for other offenses described in this 

Section. 

Article CI 

Any person who commences an election campaign prior to the campaign 

period provided for in Section I, Article V, paragraph 3 shall, upon conviction, 

be sentenced to confinement at hard labor for not more than one year or a fine 

of not more than 10,000 Yen, or both; any candidate whose campaign shall have 

been so commenced shall be ineligible to be elected to any office at the forthcoming election. (Change #4) 

Article CII 

I. This Ordinance shall come into force on the day of its promulgation 

provided, however, that the General and Supplementary Registers of Electors 

heretofore prepared and declared conclusive by the Electoral Administrative 

Committee of each city, town or village in accordance with the direction of the 

Provisional Government, and the appointments and decisions of such committee 

shall be deemed to be valid and effective. 

2. Supplemental rules necessary for the administration of this Ordinance 

shall be provided by the Chief Executive so for as are consistent with the same. 

(Change #2) 

• • • 
316 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

BY DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR: 

A TRUE COPY: 

R. C. HOUSTON 

CWO, USA 

lsi John H. Hinds 

It I JOHN H. HINDS 

Brigadier General, US Army 

Deputy Military Governor 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 317 

14. Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, 29 February 1952, sub: 

Establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands; and Civil 

Administration, and Ordinance No. 68, 29 February 1952, sub: Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

Taken together, these two pronouncements were the basis for local selfgovernment in the Ryukyus, and represent the culmination of earlier 

military government steps toward such an administration. The constitution (CA Ordinance No. 68) details the procedures by which the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will exercise the broad powers enumerated 

in Proclamation No. 13, and until publication of Executive Order 10713 

(1957) was the sole source for the powers and jurisdiction of the local 

indigenous government. 

29 February 1952 

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION PROCLAMATION NO. 13 

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT 

OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

WHEREAS it is deemed desirable to establish a Government of the Ryukyu 

Islands in order to further the economic, governmental and social well-being of 

the Ryukyuan people, 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ROBERT S. BEIGHTLER, Major General, United 

States Army, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, do hereby proclaim as 

follows: 

Article I 

There is hereby established the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, including legislative, executive and judicial organs. 

Article II 

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands may exercise all powers of government within the Ryukyu Islands, subject, however, to the Proclamations, Ordinances, and Directives, of the United States Civil Administration of the 

Ryukyu Islands. 
318 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Article III 

The legislative power of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be 

vested in a Legislature elected by the People of the Ryukyu Islands. The Legislature, in the exercise of its legislative power, shall be independent of the 

Executive and Judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The 

Legislature is authorized to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 

for carrying into execution the powers of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, 

including the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, as 

well as make grant-in-aid authori zati ons to the other governmental units within 

the Ryukyu Islands. The First Session of the Legislature shall convene on the 

first day of April 1952, in Naha, Okinawa, and thereafter shall meet in regular 

session as prescribed by law. 

Article IV 

The executive power of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be 

vested in a Chief Executive, appointed by the Deputy Governor, pending the 

time such office shall become elective. The Chief Executi ve shall , from time to 

time, give to the Legislature information on the state of the Government, and 

shall recommend for its consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary 

and expedient. He shall have power to convene the Legislature in special session. 

He shall be responsible fo r the administration and functioning of the necessary 

administrati ve governmental departments as authorized by legislative action, 

and shall make appointments of necessary personnel to such departments subj ect 

to the approval of the Deputy Governor. Provided, however, that no one who 

advocates the overthrow of government by force or violence, shall be permitted 

to serve as an official or employee of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

The Deputy Chief Executive shall be appointed by the Deputy Governor, pending the time such offi ce shall become electi ve or shall otherwise be determined. 

In the event of absence or inability on the part of the Chief Executive to perform 

his duties, or in the event of a vacancy in such office, the Deputy Chief Executi ve 

shall perform such duties. (CA Proc # 17) 

Article V 

The jud icial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be the 

Court of Appeals of the Ryukyus, the Circuit Courts, the Magistrate Courts, 

heretofore established and such other courts as may be established from time 

to time. Courts, in the exercise of their judicial power, shall be independent of 

the Executi ve and Legislative organs of government. The judges of the Court of 

Appeals shall be appointed by the Governor. The judges of the Circuit Courts 

and of the Magistrate Courts shall be appointed by the Chief Executi ve subject 

to the prior approval of the Deputy Governor. The Deputy Governor, may, in 

his discretion, rev iew, approve, remand, suspend, commute, remit or otherwise 

mOdify or set aside any decision, judgment or sentence of any court. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 319 

Article VI 

The basic liberties of democratic countries, including freedom of religion, 

speech, assembly, petition and the press, and security from unreasonable search, 

seizure, and deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, 

shall be guaranteed as far as is consistent with the public welfare. 

Article VII 

The Deputy Governor reserves the right, in the event of necessity, to veto, 

prohibit, or suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations enacted 

by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any civil government or agency of 

any such government; to order the promulgation of any law, ordinance or regulation he may deem advisable; and to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise 

of full authority, in the Ryukyu Islands. 

Article VlIl 

Upon the effective date of this Proclamation, the Provisional Central Government heretofore appointed and instituted shall adjourn and dissolve, provided that all lawful legislative, executive and judicial acts performed by the 

Provisional Central Government shall remain in force and effect until amended, 

repealed or superseded by acts of the respective organs of the Government of 

the Ryukyu Islands established by this Proclamation. Provided, however, all 

appointments heretofore made to Executive and Judicial positions in the Provisional Central Government shall continue in full force and effect with regard 

to similar positions in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

Article IX 

Subject to the provisions of the preceding Article, CA Proclamation No. 3 

of I April 1951 , "Establishment of Provisional Central Government," and the 

provisions of any other Proclamation, Ordinance and Directive in connict herewith, are rescinded. 

Article X 

This Proclamation will become effective on the first day of April 1952. 

Given under my hand this 29 day of Feb. 1952. 

BY DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR: 

ROBT S. BEIGHTLER 

Major General, U.S. Army 

Deputy Governor 
320 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

CA ORDINANCE 

NUMBER 68 

PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 

OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

Section I 

General 

Article I 

29 February 1952 

The area of political and geographical jurisdiction of the Government of 

the Ryukyu Islands shall constitute and include those islands, islets, atolls and 

rocks and territorial waters within the following boundaries: 

28· North Latitude, 124· 40' East Longitude; thence 

24· North Latitude, 122· East Longitude; thence 

24· North Latitude, 133· East Longitude; thence 

27· North Latitude, 131 · 50' East Longitude; thence 

27· North Latitude, 128· 18' East Longitude; thence 

28· North Latitude, 128· 18' East Longitude; thence 

to the point of origin. 

Article II 

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall have its capital in Naha City, 

Okinawa Shima, and shall not be changed to any other locality except by referendum which the total vote cast comes to seventy per centum of the total 

number of qualified electors as determined by the last General and supplementary Register of Electors. Provided that, in the case of a state of emergency, the 

seat of the government may be changed to ensure continued operation of the 

Government and the safety of its members, records, and allied matters. 

Section II 

Status, Duties and Rights of the 'People 

Article III 

I. A Ryukyuan shall be a natural person whose birth and name are registered in a family register in the Ryukyu Islands, provided that no family register 

shall be transferred into the Ryukyu Islands without authority of the Deputy 

Governor and no person who is a national of any fo reign state other than Japan 

or who is a stateless person may be registered except in accordance with the 

provisions oflaw; provided, however, that the Government of the Ryukyu Islands 

is empowered to enact suitable laws for the creation, operation and maintenance 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 321 

of a voluntary family register specifically for foreigners to the same general extent 

and with the same effect as may exist under prevailing law for Ryukyuans; 

provided further; that the creation of, or entry, in such a register for foreigners 

shall not, of itself, confer status as a Ryukyuan, a legal entrant into, or a resident 

of the Ryukyu Islands. 

2. The duties of a Ryukyuan toward the Government of the Ryukyu Islands 

of which he is a part shall be that of assuming the general responsibilities of 

representative government, that of aiding in the maintenance of law and order, 

that of taking part in civil affairs, that of casting the ballot at all elections and 

that of paying taxes duly established and meted out to him. 

3. No person shall have the right to vote in any election for public office 

or to hold any public office through either election or appointment who has 

been adjudged incompetent or quasi-incompetent, or who has been sentenced 

to imprisonment and has neither finished the execution of such punishment or 

has legally ceased to undergo the same, or who has been placed upon probation 

by a duly constituted court and has not completed the term of his probation. 

4. No person who advocates, or who aids or belongs to, any party, organization, or association which advocates the overthrow by force or violence 

of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or of the United States shall be permitted to run for or hold any public office of trust or profit. 

5. The rights ofa Ryukyuan toward the Government of the Ryukyu Islands 

shall be that of using in common with others the property and establishments 

of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and of the city, town or village in 

which they reside; the right of seeking public office; the right of participating 

in public election and the right of petitioning for general and just cause. 

Article IV 

Furthermore, a Ryukyuan shall have the right of exercising the initiative 

and referendum for the enactment, amendment, or abolition of laws; and that 

of initiating procedures for the recall of legislators, either severally or jointly, as 

provided for by law. 

Article V 

1. The rights of the people toward the Government of the Ryukyu Islands 

shall be that of obtaining protection of life, real and personal property and effects 

according to law. 

2. All of the people shall be respected as individuals and held equal under 

the law. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the 

extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. 

Article VI 

I. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall 

receive any privileges from the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or from any 

municipal or other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands, nor exercise 

any political authority. 
322 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

2. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. 

3. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any municipal or other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands shall refrain from religious education 

or any other religious activity. 

Section III 

Executi ve Branch 

Organization and Operation 

Article VII 

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall have an Executive Branch 

composed of the Chief Executive, Deputy Chief Executive and its administration 

which shall be so organized as to personnel, structure, and function that the 

affairs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall be coordinated, effected, 

and executed to maximize its benefits for the inhabitants. 

Article VIII 

All executive and administrative offices, departments and instrumentalities 

of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and their respective functions, powers, 

and duties shall be allocated by law within not more than twelve and not less 

than seven offices of departmental status in such manner as to group related 

functions within one office so far as practicable. 

Article IX 

The Chief Executive shall, within his jurisdiction, coordinate affairs of the 

Civil Administrator as affecting city, town or village governments, and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, as fall within his powers under proclamation, 

directives, ordinances, or laws. 

Article X 

No person shall be Chief Executive or Deputy Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands who has not attained the age of 35 years and 

who has not been a resident of the Ryukyu Islands and domiciled therein for a 

minimum period of five years and whose family Register has not been maintained in the Ryukyu Islands for a similar period. The Chief Executive and the 

Deputy Chief Executive, shall not, while in such office, hold any other position 

or office under the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, or any other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands, or under any foreign government. Nor, 

shall the Chief Executive or the Deputy Chief Executive or any other officials 

or employees of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands be personally interested, 

directly or indirectly, in any contract with said government or department or 

agency thereof. Nor, shall any person who has been convicted of bribery, perjury 

or any crime involving moral turpitude, be eligible to hold the office of Chief 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 323 

Executive, Deputy Chief Executive or any other office or position of trust or 

responsibility in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

Article XI 

The Chief Executive shall, at the commencement of each session, give to 

the Legislature information by message, of the condition of the Government of 

the Ryukyu Islands and shall recommend such measures as he shall deem expedient. He shall accompany his message with a statement of all money received 

and paid out, subject to his order or the order of the treasurer or other official 

charged with such responsibility in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, with 

vouchers therefor; and at the commencement of each regular session, present 

estimates of the amount of money required by taxation for all purposes. The 

Chief Exexecutive shall present to the Legislature such additional messages as 

he shall deem advisable from time to time. 

Article XII 

The Chief Executi ve may, on extraordinary occasions, convene, at his own 

instance, the Legislature; but when so convened, it shall enter upon no business 

except that stated in such call for such session, or as shall be broadened by him 

to include other matters which he shall deem expedient. 

Article XIII 

Every bill passed by the Legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Chief Executive. If he approves the bill he shall sign it, and thereupon it shall become a law; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to 

the Legislature, which shall enter the objections at large upon its journal and 

proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members 

present and voting, agree to pass the bill, it shall be referred to the Deputy 

Governor of the Ryukyu Islands for final action thereon. But in all cases, the 

vote in the Legislature shall be determined by yeas and nays to be entered on 

the journal. Any bill which shall not be returned by the Chief Executive within 

fifteen days after he receives it, excluding Sundays and Holidays, the same shall 

be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature by its 

adjournment, prevents the return of such bill, in which case it shall not be a law. 

However, the following shall be applicable to bills appropriating money or providing revenue: Every bill passed by the Legislature making appropriations of 

money or raising revenue, embracing distinct items, shall before it becomes a 

law, be presented to the Chief Executive; if he disapproves the bill, or any item 

or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval with 

his reasons therefor to the Legislature; but all items not disapproved shall have 

the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any 

item so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds majority of 

the Legislature and approved by the Deputy Governor. 
324 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Article XIV 

The Chief Executive shall be responsible for the promulgation of a law. He 

may establish detailed rules and regulations necessary for the execution of a law 

enacted by the Legislature, if so delegated by law. 

Article XV 

A system of civil service for the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall 

be established in accordance with the provisions of law which shall control such 

responsibilities as appointment, promotion, and retirement which fall within the 

provisions of such system. 

Article XVI 

The Chief Executive shall perform such administrative and executive responsibilities in accordance with the powers as set forth under Article IV of 

Civil Administration Proclamation No. 12, "Establishment of the Government 

of the Ryukyu Islands," dated 29 February 1952. However, such powers shall 

be exercised independently of the powers granted to the Legislature or to the 

Judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

Article XVII 

The Deputy Chief Executive shall perform such executive and administrative functions as shall be delegated by the Chief Executive, furthermore, in the 

event of absence or inability of the Chief Executive to discharge the powers and 

responsibilities of his office, the same shall devolve on the Deputy Chief Executive during such period. 

Section IV 

Legislature 

Organization and Operation 

Article XVIII 

The Legislature shall be composed of twenty-nine members to be elected 

by the people of the Ryukyu Islands in accordance with the provisions of law. 

The presiding officer of the Legislature shall be elected by and from among the 

members of the Legislature. 

Article XIX 

The Legislature is authorized to make all laws which shall be necessary and 

proper for carrying into execution the powers of the Government of the Ryukyu 

Islands, as set forth in Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, "Establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands," dated 29 February 1952, or 

as shall be delegated to it by the Deputy Governor. The Legislature, in the 

exercise of its legislative power, shall be independent of the Executive and Judicial organs of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The style of the acts of 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 325 

the Legislature shall be: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the Government of 

the Ryukyu Islands." 

Article XX 

The Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall convene in 

regular session at the seat of the government in Okinawa on the first Monday 

of April of each year. The Chief Executive may convene the Legislature whenever, 

in his opinion, the public safety or welfare shall require it. It shall be his duty 

to convene it, on application in writing of one-fourth of the members thereof, 

and for cause stated in which written application. 

Article XXI 

Every member of the Legislature shall be present within the Legislative 

chamber during sittings of the Legislature and shall attend the regular meetings 

of the standing committees or of select committees of which he is a member, 

unless excused or necessarily prevented. A majority of the members of the Legislature shall constitute a quorum for purpose of transacting business. In case a 

smaller number than a quorum of the Legislature shall convene, they are hereby 

authorized to send the Sergeant-At-Arms of the Legislature, or any other person 

or persons, by them authorized, for any and all absent members as the majority 

of such members shall agree, at the expense of such absent members, respectively, 

unless such expense for nonattendance shall be paid as the Legislature, when a 

quorum is convened, shall judge sufficient; and, in that case, the expense shall 

be paid out of monies appropriated by the Legislature. 

Article XXII 

No person shall be a member of the Legislature who shall not have attained 

the age of 25 years and who has not been a resident of the Ryukyu Islands and 

domiciled therein for minimum period of fi ve years and whose family Register 

has not been maintained in the Ryukyu Islands for a like period. No person 

shall, while a member of the Legislature, hold any other position or office under 

the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or under any Gunto Government or 

other governmental unit within the Ryukyu Islands, or under any foreign government except as provided for in Article XXXIX of Civil Administration Ordinance No. 57, dated 18 December 1951. Nor shall any person who has been 

convicted of bribery, perjury or any crime involving moral turpitude be eligible 

for membership in the Legislature. 

Article XXIII 

Members of the Legislature shall, except for offenses in flagrante delicto, 

be privileged from arrest during the session and for ten days before and after 

the session unless such arrest is sanctioned by the Legislature. For speeches, 

debate, or reports made in the Legislature or in a committee thereof, a member 

shall not be called to account in any place except the Legislature. 
326 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Article XXIV 

No act of the Legislature shall embrace more than one subject and that shall 

be expressed in the title. However, if any subject shall be embraced in an act 

which is not so expressed, the act shall be void only as to so much thereof as 

shall not be so expressed, and no law shall be revised, or amended, by reference 

to its title only. 

Article XXV 

The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and cause the same 

to be published from time to time and all bills and resolutions shall be described 

therein. The following shall be contained in the journal: 

a. Messages from the Chief Executive. 

b. Titles of all bills, and the title and text of all resolutions. 

c. Every vote taken by yeas and nays, and a brief statement of the context 

of each petition, memorial or paper presented to the Legislature. 

d. A true and accurate account of the proceedings of the Legislature. 

Article XXVI 

The Legislature shall name such standing committees, and from time to 

time such select committees, as it shall determine; but each shall consist of not 

less than three members, to be authorized in a manner as the Legislature shall 

establish. At the adjournment of each regular or special session of the Legislature, 

the chairman of the respective committee shall deliver to the Secretary of the 

Legislature, the record book of such committee proceedings, and it shall be the 

duty of the Secretary of the Legislature to preserve the same among the archives 

of his office. The chairman of each standing committee shall cause to be kept 

for the purpose, a record of every meeting of the committee wherein shall be 

entered the following: 

a. The time and place of each committee meeting, and every hearing 

had before the committee. 

b. The attendance of members of the committee at each meeting thereof. 

c. The name of the person or persons appearing before the committee, 

and the interest represented by him. 

Article XXVII 

1. The Legislature shall determine its own rules of procedure. However, 

all bills must go through three reading processes, but each reading process must 

be made on a separate day, unless, in case of urgency, by a vote of three-fourths 

of the members present taken on each bill, this requirement may be dispensed 

with. 

2. No items under consideration will be unduly delayed by the Legislature 

in its deliberations, or held in committee beyond a reasonable length of time. 

3. The Legislature is hereby vested with authority to conduct investigations 

and to order the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and to order the production of books and papers or documents, before the Legislature as a whole or 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 327 

before any committee thereof. In such cases, the provisions of law concerning 

the inquiry of witnesses, as stated in the Code of Civil Procedure and subsequent 

modification by competent legislation shall apply mutatis mutandis with the 

exception of those provisions relating to detention or administrative fine. Any 

witness thus ordered to appear before the Legislature as a whole or before any 

committee thereof may be paid per diem expenses as determined by the Legislature or as provided for by law. 

4. Conduct of members, witnesses and visitors during sessions of the Legislature shall be controlled by the Speaker, as prescribed by the Legislature. 

Misconduct and violations of lawful orders of the Legislature shall be punished 

as provided for by law. The Legislature may punish its members for disorderly 

behavior, and, with the concurrence of three-fourths of the members elected 

thereto, expel a member. Persons, other than members of the Legislature, who 

hold the authority of the Legislature in contempt may be tried by court action. 

5. Any member of the Legislature may introduce a bill or a resolution. 

However, such bill or resolution may be prepared by the Chief Executive, Deputy 

Chief Executive, or by any official, agency, activity or by a citizen's group or 

private individual. 

6. Enactments by the Legislature shall be made by a majority vote of the 

members present, a quorum being present at the time of such enactments. 

7. A session of the Legislature shall be open to the public, provided that, 

on a motion of three or more members, a resolution for holding a secret sitting 

has been adopted by the majority of two-thirds or more of the members present, 

a secret session may be held. 

Article XXVIII 

Members of the Legislature shall receive salary and required travel and 

operational expenses as provided for by law. However, no per diem shall be 

allowed members of the Legislature for days they are absent from Legislative 

sessions and for days during which the Legislature is not in session, unless on 

authorized business. The salaries, travel and operational expenses of the Chief 

Executive, the Deputy Chief Executive, the members of the Court of Appeals 

and other courts, as well as of other employees or officials, of the Government 

of the Ryukyu Islands, shall be provided for by law in accordance with budgetary 

limitations. 

Section V 

Courts 

Organization and Operation 

Article XXIX 

The governments, the inhabitants, and all persons present within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands unless otherwise excepted shall 

be governed in their relations with the jUdiciary of the Ryukyu Islands by the 
328 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

provisions of Civil Administration Proclamation No. 12, dated 2 January 1952, 

titled: "Ryukyuan Court Systems." 

Article XXX 

The Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government of the Ryukyu 

Islands shall exercise no additional governmental powers concerning the Judicial 

System except as specified in Civil Administration Proclamation No. 12, dated 

2 January 1951, entitled: "Ryukyuan Court Systems." 

Section VI 

Relationship with Municipal Government 

Article XXXI 

Regulations concerning organization and operations of municipal governments shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principals of self government. 

Article XXXII 

Tbe municipal governments shall have assemblies as their deliberative body. 

The mayors, the members of the assembly, and such other local officials as may 

be determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within each 

municipality. 

Article XXXIII 

Municipalities shall have the right to manage their property, administration, 

financial activities, and affairs and to enact their own by-laws in accordance 

with law. 

Article XXXIV 

Unless otherwise prohibited the Government of the Ryukyu Islands may 

exercise its power over a municipality when such action is in the specific interest 

of the inhabitants of the geographic area of tbe Government of the Ryukyu 

Islands. No elected municipal official may be removed except for cause and in 

accordance with due process of law. However, the Government of the Ryukyu 

Islands shall have the power to bring action in mandamus in the appropriate 

court against a person who fails or refuses to execute the provision of a law 

which he is charged to administer. 

Section VII 

Sundry Provisions 

Article XXXV 

1. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands shall engage in no foreign affairs 

except through the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 329 

2. The followiog Ordinances and Directives of Civil Administration are 

rescinded or amended as indicated: 

a. CA Directive Number 5 of 22 May 1951 is hereby rescinded. 

b. CA Directive Number 6 of 22 May 1951 is hereby rescinded. 

c. MG Ordinance Number 22 of 4 August 1950 is hereby amended by 

the rescission of paragraph 2b of Article IX; and Article XI. 

3. Legislative, executive and administrative actions performed in accordance with the Ordinances and Directives rescinded or amended by the preceding 

paragraph prior to the effective date of this Ordinance shall remain in force and 

effect until modified, rescinded or superseded by the appropriate branches of 

government. 

Article XXXVI 

The effective date of this Ordinance shall be 1 April 1952. 

BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR: 

JAMES M. LEWIS 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army 

Civil Administrator 

DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 331 

Developing a Land Claims Policy 

Okinawa's finite land resources became an issue early in the American 

occupation. Who really owned the land? And, irrespective of ownership, 

how should the land best be used? These questions emerged as persistent 

problems during the years 1945-1950 and beyond. At times the land issue 

caused heated competition between tactical commanders and military 

government officers as both sought acreage to promote their respective 

programs. More importantly, the land problem remained a frequent 

source of alienation between the Okinawan people and the American 

forces. Before these issues could be successfully addressed, the fundamental questions of land ownership on the island had to be confronted. 

It was the type of issue that could easily arise in any occupation situation, 

but it was particularly troublesome on Okinawa because of the intense, 

local, emotional attachment to the land. 

15. HQ USN MG Okinawa, Directive No. 63, 6 December 1945, sub; 

Land Records - Assembling and Preservation of. 

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., 

RG 260) 

This directive instructs the commanders of the various military government districts to collect and preserve land records, but excludes from this 

effort the documents of title held by individual land owners: 

HEADQUARTERS 

U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

OKINAWA 

A12-1 

6 December 1945 

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 63. 

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government. 

To: Distribution "A". 

Subject: Land Records - Assembling and Preservation of. 
332 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

1. District Commanders are directed to assemble, identify, and provide for the 

safekeeping of all available public records relating to the ownership of land. The 

place of storage of such records will be reported to this Headquarters. 

2. This directive does not include documents of title in the possession of individual land owners. 

lsi Royal Firman 

ROYAL FIRMAN 

By direction 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 333 

16. HQ USN MG Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 121,28 February 1946, 

sub: Land Claims, Preservation of data concerning. 

(Source: National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md., 

Watkins Papers, RG 200) 

Military government headquarters addressed the problems of displaced 

individual landowners by authorizing a land claims committee within 

each Okinawan township to investigate claims by former owners or their 

heirs. 

HEADQUARTERS 

U.S. NAVAL MILITARY GOV'T 

RYUKYUS ISLANDS 

DIRECTIVE NUMBER 121. 

From: Deputy Commander for Military Government 

To: Distribution "A" 

Subject: Land Claims, Preparation of data concerning. 

28 February 1946 

1. In preparation for determining land rights on Okinawa, the General 

Affairs Department shall be responsible for assembling all pertinent data. 

2. Under the supervision of the General Affairs Department, Okinawan 

Advisory Council, the soncho of each mura shall appoint a mura Land Claims 

Committee of five residents and for each ala an ala Land Claims Committee 

of ten residents. - -

3. Land owners shall submit to the ala LCC a declaration of ownership 

with a description of the land claims. Accompanying each declaration will be 

the signatures of two witnesses who are former neighborhood land owners. A 

land owner shall not have as a witness anyone for whom the land owner himself 

has previously been a witness. 

4. The ala LCC shall investigate all claims and report on the same to the 

soncho. In investigating land claims the ala LCC may, if necessary, consult with 

the LCC of other ala. -

5. The muraLCC shall be charged with investigating and recording all 

public lands and all land whose ownership can not be established by claims of 

the former owners. It will report on the same to the soncho. In investigating 

land titles, the mura LCC may, if necessary, consult with the LCC of other mura. 

6. The sOiiChO may direct the LCC, either in the mura and in an ala, to 

investigate the status of any particular tract. - - --

7. Arbitral committees of five members shall be established by the soncho 
334 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

one for the mura and one for each aza. Disputed titles shall be submitted to the 

appropriate arbitral committee. -

8. Where the owners are dead or missing, the next of kin shall file claims 

in the name of former owners. In the absence of all relatives, the mura LCC 

shall be investigated and report to the soncho. --

9. A central arbitral committee of ten members shall be established by the 

General Affairs Department. Okinawan Advisory Council, with the Director of 

the Department as chairman ex officio. Disputes as to land formerly belonging 

to the prefectural government or to the Imperial Japanese Government and 

disputes as to land titles which, requiring consultation between the LCC of two 

or more mura, cannot be established by such consultation shall be submitted to 

the General Affairs Department, Okinawan Advisory Council. 

10. All data received by the soncho shall be filed in the mura office subject 

to scrutiny by General Affairs Department, Okinawa Advisory Council. Maps 

showing the location of the land claims as established by the LCC shall be 

forwarded by the soncho to the General Affairs Department, Okinawa Advisory 

Council. 

/s/ ROYAL FIRMAN 

/t/ ROYAL FIRMAN 

By direction 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 335 

17. MG Special Proclamation No. 22, 7 October 1947, sub: Acquisition 

of Land for Public Purposes. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

As the American requirement for land grew, Brig. Gen. Frederic L. Hayden initiated the controversial practice of acquiring additional acreage 

by condemnation proceedings, despite the opposition of the Okinawans: 

SPECIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 22 

TO THE PEOPLE OF: 

ACQUISITION OF LAND 

FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES 

THE ISLANDS OF NANSEI SHOTO AND ADJACENT WATERS 

SOUTH OF THIRTY (30') DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE 

WHEREAS it may be deemed necessary to acquire land by condemnation 

proceedings for public purposes in order to promote the general welfare of the 

people of the Ryukyus; 

NOW THEREFORE, I, FREDERIC L. HAYDEN, Brigadier General, 

United States Army, Chief Military Government Officer of the Islands ofNansei 

Shoto and Adjacent Waters south of thirty (30') degrees North Latitude, do 

hereby proclaim as follows: 

Article I 

DEFINITIONS 

In this Proclamation and for all purposes relating thereto, an Acquiring Authority 

is any duly authorized Ryukyuan public agency or privately owned public utility, 

which shall have the power to exercise the rigbt of eminent domain to acquire 

any land or easement therein in the Ryukyus for the accomplishment of a public 

purpose. Public Purpose means the construction, maintenance and operation of 

public buildings and works for the benefit of the general civilian public, such as 

schools, parks, roads, playgrounds, reclamation, flood control and irrigation projects, railroads, telephone, gas, electric and other similar public services. 

Article" 

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS AUTHORIZED 

Whenever any Ryukyuan public agency or privately owned public utility has 

been, or hereafter shall be, authorized as an Acquiring Authority to acquire any 

land or easement therein, which shall be needed in connection with a public 

purpose, and shall be unable to obtain same by purchase and acquire a valid 
336 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

title thereto, such Acquiring Authority, if it be a public agency, shall be conferred 

such power, or in the name of the local civilian administration, for the acquirement by condemnation of said land or easement. However, where such Acquiring 

Authority is a privately owned public utility, then condemnation proceedings 

shall be instituted in its own name. Where such condemnation is instituted by 

an Acquiring Authority which is a public agency, it shall be the duty of the 

Department of Justice of the local civilian administration to institute and conduct such proceedings upon the request of such Acquiring Authority. In all such 

condemnation proceedings, just compensation shall be paid for such lands or 

easements therein so obtained. 

Article III 

JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS 

The jurisdiction of such condemnation proceedings is hereby vested in the civilian courts where the land which is sought after to be condemned or any part 

thereof is located or situated, regardless of the value of same. 

Article IV 

IMMEDIATE POSSESSION 

Whenever an Acquiring Authority causes proceedings to be instituted for the 

acquirement by condemnation of any lands or easements therein, it shall immediately upon the institution of such proceedings have the right to take immediate possession of said lands, and proceed with such public purposes thereon 

as authorized. 

Article V 

ACQUIRING AUTHORITY DESIGNATED 

The Chiji of each local civilian administration in the Ryukyus is hereby empowered to designate who is an Acquiring Authority under this Proclamation 

which shall be subject to approval of Military Government. 

Article VI 

POWER TO MAKE ORDERS 

The Deputy Commander for Military Government may make such rules and 

regulations as he may deem necessary for the purpose of the administration of 

this Proclamation and for the procedure and practice in condemnation suits. 

Article VII 

TRANSLATION 

In case of any conflict or ambiguity between the English text of this Proclamation 

or any other Proclamation, order or regulation issued under my authority, and 

any translation thereof, the English shall prevail. 

Article VIII 

EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Proclamation will become operative on the 7th day of October 1947. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 

Given under may hand this 

7th day of October, 1947. 

lsi FREDERIC L. HAYDEN 

It I FREDERIC L. HAYDEN 

337 

Bridagier General, United States Army 

Commanding General, Ryukyus Command 

Chief Military Government Officer 

OFFICIAL: 

lsi William H. Craig 

WILLIAM H. CRAIG 

Colonel, Infantry 

Deputy Commander for Military Government 
338 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

18. HQ RYCOM MG, Directive No. 19, 7 April 1948, sub: Ryukyuan 

Property Custodian. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

Harkening back to Admiral Nimitz's Proclamation No.7, which ertablished the office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian, this military government pronouncement expanded the powers of that office and expands 

the scope of the Custodian's activities to include all categories of property, 

including land subject to seizure with due compensation: 

MG DIRECTIVE 

NUMBER 19 

SUBJECT: Ryukyuan Property Custodian 

TO: All Chijis of Local Civilian Administrations 

Section I 

General 

1. Establishment and Regulations. - Pursuant to United States Navy Military Government Proclamation No.7, entitled "Custodian of Property", there 

has been established a section in Headquarters, Ryukyus Command, Military 

Government, APO 331 , known as the Office of Ryukyuan Property Custodian. 

The following regulations are hereby prescribed for the administration of the 

Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian. 

Section II 

Interpretations 

1. In this Directive and for all purposes relating thereto, a " person" includes any individual, association, partnership, trusteeship, corporation, administrator, assignee, conservator, executor or heir lawfully living or existing 

within the following boundaries: Thirty (30) Degrees North One Hundred 

Twenty Six (126) Degrees East, thence Twenty Four (24) Degrees North One 

Hundred Twenty Two (122) Degrees East, thence Twenty Four (24) Degrees 

North One Hundred Thirty Three (133) Degrees East, thence Twenty Nine (29) 

Degrees North One Hundred Thirty One (131) Degrees East, thence Thirty (30) 

Degrees North One Hundred Thirty One (131) Degrees Thirty Minutes (30') 

East, thence to the point of origin. 

will: 

Section III 

Performance of Duties 

1. In the performance of his duties, the Ryukyuan Property Custodian 

a. Oetermine what property is to be taken into custody persuant to the 

aforesaid United States Navy Military Government Proclamation NO.7. 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 339 

b. Take custody of property and deliver a "Certificate of Custody" to 

the then occupant or possessor thereof; or, if such property is unoccupied or 

abandoned, post a copy of such certificate thereon. 

c. Release property, requiring physical control to a person claiming interest therein, upon receipt from such person acknowledging that such release 

is without prejudice to blocking control or future vesting by the United States 

Government. 

d. Effect a complete release to a person claiming an interest in property 

requiring control, when it is determined that the United States Government has 

no vestible interest therein. 

e. Release property requiring physical control to persons currently in 

possession of such property, but having no claim or title thereto, provided such 

persons are able to continue maintenance and safekeeping . .. . 

f. Place property in the physical possession of persons or governmental 

agencies, other than agencies of the Government of the United States of America, 

through lease agreements andlor contracts of custody. 

g. Sell or otherwise dispose of property which because of its nature cannot be properly safeguarded, or which is rapidly deteriorating in value. 

h. (1) Drop from accountability by means of an Inventory Adjustment 

Report (WD AGO Form No. 444) in accordance with War Department TM 38-

403 "Station Supply Procedures", and instructions in current War Department 

circulars, property not found by physical check, which is either actually missing 

or reported missing due to minor operational losses, entry under wrong nomenclature, or undiscoverable posting errors. After a full and complete investigation has been made of each case, the present appraised value will be used 

to determine the amount of the loss. These losses will not exceed 3% per month 

for the duration of control, and will not exceed 40% of the total value. In case 

of accounts consisting entirely of personal property, other than cash and securities, ¥ 125.000 or less, may be dropped, provided that the evidence establishes 

the best interest of the United States Government are fully protected. 

(2) Submit to a Board of Officers appointed under the provisions of 

par 4, AR 35-6640, dated 16 April 1947, for action on all other property which 

cannot be handled by the Inventory Adjustment Report. 

i. Take such action as is deemed necessary to safeguard, preserve, protect, and insure the effective and profitable use of property taken into custody. 

l sI William H. Craig 

WILLIAM H. CRAIG 

Colonel Infantry 

Deputy Commander for Military Government 
340 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

19. MG Ryukyu Islands, MG Directive No.1, I February 1950, sub: 

Central Committee, Determination and Certification of Land Title. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

This ordinance directs the governor of Okinawa to create a "Central 

Committee to Determine Land T itle" to coordinate and standardize the 

work of the mura, or township, land claims committee and to anticipate 

problems and to make recommendations to headquarters on land issues 

before they got out of hand: 

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR 

OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

MG DIRECTIVE 

NUMBER I 

APO 331 

I February 1950 

SUBJECT: Central Committee, Determination and Certification of Land Title 

TO: Chiji of Okinawa Gunto 

WHEREAS, need has arisen to designate responsibility in determination 

and certification of land title in Okinawa, 

NOW THEREFORE, it is directed that: 

Responsibility in unifying, standardizing, and administering the work of 

Mura Land Claims Committees presently effecting determination and certification of land title in Okinawa is placed in the Chiji of Okinawa effective 3 

February 1950. 

The Chiji will submit to the Military Governor, within 15 days from date 

of this Directive, an outline of plans for: 

I. Formation of a Central Committee for Determination of Land Title. 

I! is suggested that: 

a. The committee be representative of the land owners of various 

districts within Okinawa. 

b. The immediate objectives of the committee be: 

(I) To coordinate, unify and standardize the work undertaken by 

various mura land claims committees pursuant to Military Government Directive No. 121, 28 February 1946, subject: "Land 

Claims, Preparation of Data Concerning." 

(2) To seek out problems and make recommendation concerning 

determination and certification of land title. 

c. Further objectives of the committee will be to seek out problems 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 34 1 

and make recommendations concerning rights accompanying land ownership -

more specifically, limitations upon: 

(I) Amount of agricultural land one person may own. 

(2) Sale price an owner may demand of an assigned tenant. 

'(3) Rent an owner may charge an assigned tenent. 

(4) Eviction of assigned tenant. 

BY DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR: 

HARRY B. SHERMAN 

Brigadier General, USA 

Deputy Military Governor 
342 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

20. HQ MG Ryukyu Islands, Special Proclamation No. 36, 14 April 

1950, sub: Certification of Land Title. 

(Source: Freimuth Papers) 

By April 1950 the filing of land claims and the hearing of disputes was 

largely completed. Military government headquarters, therefore, directed 

that all claims be filed no later than 30 June; that certification of title 

begin in the case of uncontested claims, and that all subsequent claims 

and all contested titles be turned over to the appropriate circuit court for 

disposition: 

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS 

APO 719 

SPECIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 36 

CERTIFICATION OF LAND TITLE 

TO THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA GUNTO 

WHEREAS, during the course of the past three years, claims of land owners 

on Okinawa have been submitted to Aza Land Claims Committees, as required 

by Military Government Directive No. 121 , dated 28 February 1946, subject: 

" Land Claims, Preparation of Data Concerning," and 

WHEREAS the sonchos have appointed an arbitral committee of five members in each mura and aza who have heard disputes for the purpose of determining valid claims, and 

WHEREAS the sonchos of each mura have reported to the Okinawa Civilian 

Administration that the filing of land claims and hearing of disputes is sufficiently complete to proceed with the issuance of certificates evidencing title to 

land; 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, J. R. SHEETZ, Major General, United States Army, 

Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, desiring to encourage and assist in 

the determination and certification of land title and to sponsor the administration of justice in the settlement of all problems relating to the use and ownership 

of land, do hereby proclaim that the people of Okinawa shall proceed to completion with the program of determination, certification and registration of title 

to all land on Okinawa. 

ARTICLE I 

All declarations of land ownership required to be filed by Military Government Directive No. 121, dated 28 February 1946, shall be filed with the Aza 

Land Claims Committees on or before 30 June 1950, which date shall be the 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 343 

final date for filing claims with the Mura or Aza Land Claims Committee. 

Thereafter, claims to land ownership will be prosecuted in the form of legal 

action in the appropriate district of the Circuit Court. 

ARTICLE II 

Representatives of the Central Committee for Determination of Land Title 

established by Military Government Directive No. I, I February 1950, shall 

examine the files of all Mura Land Claims Committees to determine the accuracy 

of filing, investigating and mapping of all claims submitted. When the Central 

Land Claims Committee is satisfied that this work of the Mura Committees has 

reached standard requirements, it will issue to the Mura Land Claims Committee 

blank Certificates of Title and instructions to proceed with the certification 

program. 

ARTICLE III 

I. Upon receipt of the blank certificates, the Mura Land Claims Committee, with assistance of the Aza Committees, will proceed, with claims not 

contested, to fill in the blank certificate from data contained in the claimant's 

original claim to ownership and from the claimant's statement concerning the 

name of the person from whom he or she acquired ownership and date of acquisition. The claimant's original chart describing location of subject property 

will be transcribed to the certificate, with discrepancies noted. Thereafter the 

completed certificate of ownership (except for validating signatures) will be 

placed in a file open to public inspection for a period of thirty (30) days, during 

which time any opposing claimant shall have the opportunity to file with the 

Mura Land Claims Committee written notice of claims which he may wish to 

assert to the same parcel ofland. Each Mura Land Claims Committee shall make 

public in advance, the designated period of notice. 

2. In the event that more than one claim is filed to any parcel ofland, no 

Certificate of Title will be issued, but all claimants will be notified by the Mura 

Land Claims Committee of the dispute concerning the title, the names of all 

claimants involved, and the necessity for bringing action in the appropriate 

Circuit Court to determine ownership. A copy of this notice to the claimants 

will be filed in the Land Registry in lieu of a Certificate of Title and will remain 

in such Registry until a court order determining title has become final, at which 

time a valid Certificate of Title shall be issued to the true owner as determined 

by the Court. 

ARTICLE IV 

I. After public notice and inspection, the certificate, provided It IS not 

opposed nor contested, will be approved, signed and sealed by the soncho of the 

mura and delivered to the claimant owner. 

2. Three notification copies of the original certificate will be prepared. The 

first copy will be clearly marked across its face "Land Registry Office," the 

second "Tax Collection Office," the third "Central Land Office," and each will 

be delivered by the soncho to its respective designated office. 
344 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

ARTICLE V 

Thereupon the signed certificate will be recognized as evidence oflegal title, 

unless a prior or paramount title should be determined subsequently by regular 

judicial procedure in a court of proper jurisdiction, in which event the title so 

determined by the Court shall take precedence over the contested certificate 

issued by the mura soncho. 

ARTICLE VI 

I. In the event of a contest of validity of title by a person who maintains 

to have title paramount to the recognized owner of the land, the contestant shall 

institute an action in the Circuit Court and the true ownership of the land shall 

be determined by regular court proceedings and issuance of a court order. 

2. In such circumstances, the clerk of court in which proceedings are instituted shall transmit written notice to the Land Registry Office, the Tax Collection Office, and the Central Land Office that such action is pending. This 

notice shall be attached to the Certificate of Title in the files and shall constitute 

notification to all persons that litigation is pending and that title to such land 

is in question. 

3. The court order in settlement of a title dispute shall state, as a matter 

of record, the true owner of the land as determined by the Court. 

4. If the title currently recognized is invalidated by the final court order, 

an entry will be made in the land registry, and the Certificate of Title shall be 

marked "Invalid" with reference to the authority contained in the court order 

and date. Thereon, a valid certificate of title shall be issued by the Land Registry 

Office pursuant to said court order. 

5. The subject of assessing costs of the proceedings shall be within the 

discretion of the court. 

ARTICLE VII 

It shall be the duty of the landowner, upon receipt of a new Certificate of 

Title to register it in the Land Registry Office. 

ARTICLE VIII 

In the absence of any claim or assertion of ownership to a particular parcel 

of land, or in event the owner fails to appear to take deli very of certificate to 

title, subject land will be placed in custody of the Soncho of the respective area, 

in trust for the absent owner. 

ARTICLE IX 

Administration of land in the custody of the Soncho or his appointed representative shall be in accord with the following procedures: 

I. All land taken into custody will be reported, within thirty days, to 

the Central Land Office. Maps of the land will accompany the report. 

2. The land will be utilized for the best interest of the owner and the 

increment therefrom will be protected for this benefit by the Soncho as trustee 

or administrator. 

3. The Soncho is empowered with authority to perform fully as trustee 

or administrator in the utilization and administration of the land. He shall not 
DOCUMENTING THE EXPERIENCE 345 

allow the doing of any acts on the land which would tend to lessen the value of 

the owner's interest in said land. 

4. The Soncho, or his appointed representative, shall be accountable as 

trustee for the owner. He shall collect revenue and make disbursements for taxes, 

maintenance and improvement of property. Disbursements on any particular 

parcel of land, however, will not exceed the revenue therefrom, nor will an excess 

of revenue from one parcel be applied to another parcel, except in payment of 

taxes. Taxes levied on property producing no income, or insufficient income, 

will be paid out of the trustee's reserve account of accumulated income; such 

payments will be in the form of a loan and will be charged to the particular 

property account. Thereafter, the loan for taxes will constitute a lien against the 

property until paid by the owner or his successor. 

ARTICLE X 

1. The Land Registry Offices will be reestablished and perform their normal function within the framework of the Government and Legal Department, 

Okinawa Ci vilian Administration. They will enter land title records in permanent 

official books and issue certificates of title in accord with established procedure. 

The Registries will be located in or near the buildings occupied by the Magistrate 

Courts. 

2. A complete new set of land registration books will be instituted in each 

Land Registry Office and all certificates of title, issued in the current land title 

program by the Sonchos of the respective muras, will be registered in their 

particular Land Registry Offices. Henceforth, a copy of every document which 

effects a conveyance, transfer, release, encumbrance, or hypothecation of any 

interest in any parcel of land on Okinawa, or which effects a change in the legal 

relations in or to any parcel of land on Okinawa, shall, within thirty (30) days 

after its execution, be filed in the appropriate Land Registry Office, which office 

shall cause notification copies to be forwarded to the Tax Collection Office and 

the Central Land Office. 

ARTICLE XI 

There will be established within the Okinawa Civilian Administration a "Central Land Office" which shall maintain a central file of all data pertaining to 

land in Okinawa Gunto and establish authentic maps indicating land ownership. 

It shall coordinate the work of the Mura Land Claims Committees and also 

recommend uniform procedure to be followed by Land Registry Offices. It shall 

review custody reports of land administered by the various Sonchos, and make 

recommendations concerning the use and management of land in custody and 

revenue derived therefrom. Documents issued in procurement of land by government agencies will be channeled through the Central Land Office, which will 

record the procurement. 

ARTICLE XII 

The Mura and Aza Land Claims Committees, appointed pursuant to Directive 

No. 121,28 February 1946, will complete all of their duties and be deactivated 

and dismissed 28 February 1951. Owner's original claims to land ownership, 
346 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

bound in convenient volumes, together with maps and other pertinent land data 

will be transferred to the Central Land Office. 

ARTICLE XIII 

Any person who knowingly or wilfully accepts a Certificate of Title based on 

fraudulent assertions, or who wilfully makes any false statement or claim in 

connection with the issuance of a Certificate of Title, will be subject to a penalty 

not to exceed ¥ 50,000 or two years' imprisonment. 

Gi ven under my hand this 

14th day of April 1950. 

/s/ l. R. Sheetz 

l.R. SHEETZ 

Major General, United States Army 

Military Govenor of the Ryukyu Islands 
Index to the Narrative 

"A" teams. See IInder Field teams. 

Agricultural Administration Bureau, 129 

Agricultural Improvement Bureau, 129 

Agriculture, 34, 45- 48, III , 122-32 

Agriculture and Industry Department, 123 

cash crops, 45-46, 124-25, 127, \30-3 1, 132 

Central Okinawan Agricultural Association, 

123 

Central Subsistence Warehouse, 127 

decline of, 131 -32 

district organization of, 122-23. 126 

food crops, 45-46, 123-24, 126, 127, 130-31, 

132 

productivity, 46, 48, 126-32 

Ryukyuan Food and Agricultural Organization, 128-29 

Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund, 129 

Vickery Report, 127- 28, 129, 132 

Agriculture and Industry Department, 123 

Air bases, fields, and strips. See also Construction; Land use. 

Bolo, 166 

Futema, 166 

Kadena, 88, 165, 166, 169 

Naha, 165 

Yontan, 166 

Air Forces (numbered) 

Eighth, 16511 

Thirteenth, 16511 

Fourteenth, 38 

Twentieth, 38, 158, 161, 165, 16511, 166 

Air Wings 

19th Bomb, Medium, 165 

51st Fighter Interceptor, 165 

6332d Air Base, 165 

Aka, Kerama Retto, 40 

Amami Guntc, 106, 151 

Ameri can-Okinawan relations, 4, 52, 56, 177-78 

and GOPER directi ve, 21 

and Nimitz directive, 19-21 

racial problems, 81- 87 

and State Department directive, 160- 61 

Armies 

Japanese, 32d, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41- 42, 46, 96, 

104 

U.S. 

Eighth, 74 

Tenth, 48, 49, 53, 61, 83 

chief of sta fT, 54 

commanding general, 16, 18, 741/, 146 

Armies-Continued 

U.S.-Continued 

Tenth-Continued 

in invasion of Okinawa , 40-44, 56-

57 

and Island Command, 72, 73 

and military government. See Military Government Section, Headquarters, Tenth Army. 

Army, Department of 

Inspector General report, 158 

and revitalization of Ryukyus, 126, 144, 158 

Army, Japanese. See Armi es, Ja pa nese, 32d; 

Boeitai; Imperial Gel/era/ Headquarters; Tekketsu Killllotai. 

Army, Secretary of. See Draper, William H., Jr. 

Army, U.S. 

military government. See Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands; Military Government Section, Headqua rte rs, Tenth 

Army. 

Military Intelligence Service, 14 

Army, U nder Secretary of. See Draper, Willi am 

H., Jr.; Voorhees, Tracy S. 

Army Forces, Western Pacific, 63, 73 

Army Forces, Western Pacific, Commander of, 

76 

Army Service Command (ASCOM) I, 75n 

and Island Command, 72, 73, 74 

and land policies, 170, 171, 172 

in rehabilitation role, 106, 123 

Army War College, 4, 8, 9 

ASCOM L See Army Service Command (ASCOM) I. 

Awase, 78, 177 

" B" teams. See under Field teams. 

" B" yen. See Currency. 

Bank of Chosen (Korea), 146 

Bank of Japan , 146 

Bank of the Ryukyus, 148- 49, 150 

Bank of Taiwan, 146 

Banks, 146-48, 175 

Barker, Dr. Joseph W., 12 

Battalion Landing Team, 3d, 305th Ref, 40 

Battalions 

Army 

22d AAA Automatic Weapons, 165 

52d Military Police, 62 

65th AAA Gun, 165 
348 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

Battalions-Continued 

Navy. See also Seabees. 

27th Naval Construction, 55 

J 37th Naval Construction, 98 

Berger Beach, 44-45 

Boeitai, 34, 35 

Boekel, Col. William A., 19 

Bolo auxiliary airstrip. 166 

Boulware, James H. t 168 

Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr., 16. 18,7411, 146 

Buckner Bay, 74, 7411, 93, 94 

Byrnes, James F., 70,71,91 

"e" teams. See under Field teams. 

Caldwell, Lt. John T., USNR, 106, 107, 108, III 

Camps (civilian), 23, 26. 28.44- 60.89- 9 1 

Berger Beach, 44 

Chatan, 44 

Costello, 94 

Ishikawa, 90 

lza, 44 

Jinuza, 59, 90 

Koza, 45, 60 

Kuba-Saki, 94 

Maebaru,90 

Momobaru Aza, 44 

Naha,45 

Shimabuka, 45 

Taira, 59 

Cannon, Clarence, Me, 163 

Cejka, Capt. Oliver J' I AUS. 52 

Central Bank of Okinawa, 148 

Central Okinawan Administration, 109- 10, 112 

Charlottesville. See School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Va. 

Chatan, 44, 57 

Chicago, University of, 12 

Chief of Engineers. See Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Raymond A. 

Chief of Naval Operations. See King, Fleet Adm. 

Ernest J. 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Collins, General 

J. Lawton; Marshall, General of the Army 

George C. 

Chiji (Governor) of Okinawa G unto. See Shikiya, Koshin. 

China, 71, 154 

China Bulk Sale Agreement, 141 

Chinen Peninsula, 59,123 

Christian Celllury, 81 

CINCFE (Commander in Chief, Far East). See 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. 

Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (£oochoo) Islands 

(OPNAV 13-3 1), 14, 1411, 18, 19, 105 

Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), 11 - 12, 15 

Cold War strategy, 3, 4, 153-55, 182 

Collins, General J. Lawton, 158, 182, 183 

Columbia University, 12, 13, 14, 15, 181 

Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). See 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. 

Commander in Chief, Pacific. See Nim itz, Fleet 

Adm. Chester W. 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. 

See MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. 

Committee on Emergency Program of Training 

in International Administration, 12 

Compani es 

1st Amphibious Truck (Provisional), 85 

293d Port, 82 

412th Quartermaster Truck, 66 

3067th Engineer Dump Truck, 66 

3078th Engineer Dump Truck, 66 

Congress, U.S., 76-77, 79, 80, 162-64, 168, 183 

Construction, 55, 56-57. See a/so Land use. 

contractors, Okinawan, 97, 99, 164- 65, 171 

Nold mission, 161 -62 

in postwar rehabilitation, 78-80, 159, 161-66 

Corps (numbered) 

Army, XXIV, 28. 63 - 64 

Marine Corps, III Amphibious, 28. 51. 59. 63 

Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army 

construction, 77-80, 161-67 

Okinawa Engineer District, 78, 80, 172, 175 

Real Estate Division (Real Estate Branch), 

172, 175 

Western Ocean Division, 80 

Costello, Camp, 94 

Courts, 11 8-20, 123. See also Laws and statutes. 

Craig, Col. William H., 75, 94 

Crist, Brig. Gen. William E. 

directives, 49, 59 

staff positions, 16, 18,24,61, 61n 

Cross Cultural Survey, 14 

Currency, 146- 49 

«D" teams. See under Field teams. 

Daito Islands, 70 

Day, Charles G., 57 

Divisions 

Army 

7th. 28. 40 

27th. 28 . 44. 5 1. 52 

77th. 28. 40. 53 

96th. 28 

Marine Corps 

1st (Reinforced). 28. 44. 59 

2d. 28 

6th (Rein forced). 28 

Draper, William H., Jr., 141 , 15 5 

Dresden, 179 

Dulles, John Foster, 156n 

Eagles, Maj. Gen. William W., 141 , 169 

Economic development. See also Agriculture; 

Construction; Currency; Fiscal planning; 

Fishing industry; Industry; Land use; Oliver 

Report. 

Education, 20, 23, 96-102 

bilingual instruction, 96-97, 99-102 

Department of Education, 97-98 
INDEX 

Elections, 108, 112- 15, 116, 11 7 

Employment, 144- 46 

Far East Air Forces, 162, 165-66 

Far East Command, 69, 81, 85, 101, 104, 162. 

See also MacArthur, General of the Army 

Douglas. 

apathy toward Ryukyus, 89, 153, 162 

Local Government Division, 11 2 

rehabilitation programs, 129, 142- 43, 155, 159 

repatriation program, 95 

Ryukyus Military Government Section, 76 

Field teams (Military Government field detachIllems). 24. 26. 28. 40-41 . 44-45. 47. 60-63 

"A" teallls. 26. 28. 4 1. 45. 6 1. 62. 63. 65 

"B" teallls. 26. 28. 4 1. 44. 45. 47. 52. 57. 6 1. 

62 -63. 97 

"C" teallls. 26. 28. 4 1. 44. 45. 47. 54 

"D" teallls. 26. 28. 44. 63. 65 

"G- IO" c~ s. 26. 28 

"N IA" lea rns. 26. 28 

Fifth Fleet, 42 

Fiscal planning, 146-52 

Fisheries Association, 134 

Fisheries, 'Okinawan Department of, J 34 

Fishing industry, 132-37 

Food. See also Agriculture; Fishing industry; 

Land use; Resettlement (civilian). 

Japanese stockpiling, 33, 35- 37, 46 

post-invasion relief, 42, 45-49, 64-66, 67, 90 

rationing, 46, 47-48, 49-50, 147 

ford, Lt. Clellan S., USNR, 14,67 

Foreign Language (English) School, 101 

Futema auxiliary airstrip, 166 

"G-IO" teams (Navy). See under Field teams. 

GARIOA. See Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Fund. 

GOPER. See Operational Directive Number 7 

for Military Government of the Commanding General Tenth Army (GO PER). 

Government and Relief in Occupied Areas 

(GARIOA) fund 

Congress creates, 76-77 

for economic revitalization, 135, 144, 150, 151, 

159, 183 

for milita ry construction, 162-64, 166 

for scholarships, 99 

Government of the Ryukyu Islands, 120, 128, 

176 

Groups 

Air Force 

22d Bomb, 165 

307th Bomb, 165 

Army 

97th Antiaircraft Artillery, 165 

529th Aircraft Control and Warning, 165 

93lst Engineer Aviation, 165 

Gullion, Maj. Gen. Allen W., 8, 9, 10- 11 , 12 

Gushikawa, 98, 101 

Hagushi beaches, 40, 41 

Haislip, Brig. Gen. Wade H., 9 

349 

Handbook. See Civil Affairs Handbook. Ryukyu 

(Loochoo) Islands. 

Harvard University, 12, 15 

Hawaii rengo Okinawa kyusai kai, 125 

Hayden, Brig. Gen. Frederic L., 75, 11 5 

Higaonha, Kanjin, 114 

Higashionna, 11.1 

Hiroshima, 179 

Hokkaido, 70 

Honolulu Council of Churches, 52 

Honshu, 70 

Horne, Vice Adm. Frederick J., 12, 13 

House Committee on Appropriations, chairman, 

163 

Hypothec Bank of Japan, 175 

ICEBERG. See Operation ICEBERG. 

Ie Shima, 53, 57, 59, 78 

(heya, 147 

Imperial General Headquarters. 34, 35-36 

Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 103 

Industry 

efforts to organize, 137-43 

and exports, 139, 141 , 142- 43, 159 

and free enterprise system, 150 

and typhoon damage, 150 

and U.S. scrap metal policies, 141-42 

Innation, 148-49 

Interim Ryukyus Advisory Council, 116 

lnterservice rivalry, 18- 19,64-67,72-75 

Isei, Seiko, 114 

Ishii, Lt. Gen. Torao, 37 

Ishikawa, 90, 134 

Island Command 

and ASCOM I, 72, 7511, 10611 

civil affairs duti es, 50, 60 

commanding general See Wallace, Maj. Gen. 

fred c., USMC. 

and Military Government Education Section, 

97, 99 

Military Government Section. See Military 

Government Section, Headquarters, Tenth 

Army. 

and Navy, 72-75 

Iloman, 99, 132 

(za,44 

Jacobs, Rear Adm. Randall, 12 

Japan 

invasion of, 16 

peace treaty of 1952, 4 

repatriation of civilians from, 91-94 

and Ryukyuan sovereignty issue, 155-57, 163, 

178, 183-84 

Sino-Soviet threat to, 182 

Japanese Mandated Islands, 13, 13n, 14,91-92, 

13 1 

Japanese military forces. See Armies, Japanese, 
350 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945- 1950 

Japanese military forces-Continued 

32d; Boeitai; Imperi al General HeadQuarters; Navy, Japanese; Tekkelsll Kinnota;, 

Japanese-Okinawan relations, 33-38, 46, 96, 

104. See also Japan, and Ryukyuan sovereignty issue. 

Jennings, Capt. W. D., USN, 52 

Jinuza. 59, 90 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

chairman of. See Leahy. Fleet Adm. William 

D. 

and civil administration,S 

and early military government, Ryukyus, 64, 

70, 7 1" 72, 74, 75 

Joint Planning StafT, 70 

and Operation ICEBERG, 7, 15-16 

and rehabilitation, Ryukyus, 92, 121-22, 174 

and Ryukyus and the Cold War, 72, 154, 157, 

181, 182 

Joint Planning Staff, 70 

Judge Advocate General. See Gullion, Maj. Gen. 

Allen W. 

Kadena Air Force Base, 88, 165, 166. 169 

Kerama Rello, 40, 52, 53, 57, 83, 151 

Kikai, 57 

Kincaid, Maj. Gen. Alvin C., 158-59 

King, Fleet Adm. Ernest J., 74, 92 

Knox, Frank, 12 

Kokuba, Kotaro, 79, 165 

Kokuba-Gumi, 99, 165 

Koza, 45, 60 

Kuba-Saki, 94 

Kume Shima, 57, 147 

Kushi, 59 

Kyu,hu, 35, 70, 132 

Labor. See Employment. 

Land use. See also Agriculture; Construction; Resettlement (civilian). 

attitudes toward, 4, 170- 7 1, 176-77 

conflicting priorities, 126, 167-69 

legal claims, 90, 168, 168", 172-77, 175" 

"one-mile rule," 128, 169-70 

Real Estate Branch, Okinawa Engineer District, 172 

Ryukyuan Property Custodian, Office of, 173-

74 

Vickery Report, 127-28, 129, 132 

Laws and statutes. See also Courts. 

electoral, 11 2-13 

inventories of, 22 

Japanese statutes, 11 8, 17 1 

military law, 22. See also Rules of land warfare. 

rules of land warfare, 173, 174 

Leahy, Fleet Adm. William D., 71 

Legal system. See Courts; Laws and statutes. 

Legal tender. See Currency. 

Life, 82 

Local (Municipal) Courts, 118, 11 9 

Lynch, Lt. Comdr. R. F., 62 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, J 6, 

101 , 104, 179 

agriculture programs, 127, J 29, 168 

and Amami Gunto administration, 106 

assumes command, Ryukyus, 73-75, 76, 77 

and civil government, 5, 11 7, 160, 161 , 182, 

183 

economic programs, 127, 139, 144- 45, 154-

59, 183 

and land use, 174,175 

on sovereignty issue, 136-37, 154 

McClure, Maj . Gen. Robert 8.,117, 174 

Maebaru, 90 

Magistrate courts, 119-20 

Makiminato (Machinato) Ordnance Work, 165 

Marianas, 92-93 

Marshall, General of the Army George c., 9 

Martino, Robert A., 162 

Matayoshi, Kowa, 109 

Michigan, University of, J 2 

Michigan State University. 99 

Micronesia, 92-93 

Military Commission (court), 11 8- 19 

Military Govemmellt, 8, 811, 9, 12,20 

" Military Government" (technical bulletin), 22-

24 

Military Government, Deputy Commander for. 

See Craig, Col. William H.; Crist, Brig. Gen. 

William E.; Hayden, Brig. Gen. Frederic L.; 

Murray, Col. Charles I., USMC; Sherman, 

Brig. Gen. Harry R. 

Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands, 

180. See also Military Government Section, 

Headquarters, Tenth Army. 

Caldwell plan for civil administration, 106-08, 

109, III 

and Central Okinawan Administration, 109-

10 

Civilian Affairs Department, 105, 106, 107 

Civilian Affairs Department, director of. See 

Caldwell, Lt. John T., USNR; Murdock, Lt. 

Comdr. George P.; Street, Lt. Comdr. Francis E. 

and civilian governance planning, 102- 17 

court systems. See Courts. 

Education Section, 97, 99. See also Education. 

elections, 108, 11 2- 15, 116, 117 

General Affairs Department, 83, 90 

General Affairs Department, director of. See 

Watkins, Lt. Comdr. James, IV, USNR. 

Legal Department, 11 8 

and iocalleaders, 102, 103-05 

missions, conflicts in, 69, 89, 177-78, 180-84 

Public Safety Department, 118, 119 

Military Government Section, Headquarters, 

Tenth Army. See also Military Government 

of the Ryukyu Islands. 

created, 18, 19 

creation of military government districts, 105-

06 

dual staff of, 24 
INDEX 

Military Government Section, Headquarters, 

Tenth Army-Continued 

Education Section, 97, 99 

field teams. See Field teams. 

idealism of planners, 22, 60, 63, 181 

initial planning, 16, 18-29. 121 

and Island Command, 60, 97 

mission. conflicts in, 4, 9, 19-22, 69-70 

Nimitz directive, 19- 21 

Resettlement Engineering, Office of, 57 

Military government training programs, 7 

Army schools, 9- 12 

manuals, 8 

Navy schools, 12- 15 

Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. See 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; 

Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester W.; PhilippinesRyukyus Command, commanding general. 

Military Intelligence Service, 14 

Miyako, 57, 70, 105, 110, 11 6-17, 151 

Momobaru Aza, 44 

Money. See Currency. 

Murdock, Lt. Comdr. George P. 

Civil Affairs Halldbook, 14, 1411, 18, 19, 105 

Cross Cultural Survey. 14 

Director, Civilian Affairs Department, Military Government, 105, 106, 107 

Murray, Col. Charles I., USMC, 74, 75, 104, 105, 

106, 107, 109 

"N 1 A" teams (Navy). See under Field teams. 

Nagasaki, 180 

Nago, 99, 172 

Naha, 33, 38, 42, 45, 58, 78, 153, 170, 173 

Naha Air Base, 165 

Nakagasuku Bay. See Buckner Bay. 

Nakamoto, Ibi, 114 

Nakamura , Kemshin, 86 

Nakasone, Genwa, 114 

National Security Council (NSC). 21 , 154, 167-

68, 182-83 

NSC 1312, 155 

NSC 1313, 154, 167, 182-83 

Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, commander of. 

See Price, Rear Adm. John D. 

Navy, Japanese, 41 - 42 

Navy, Secretary of. See KnOIt, Frank 

Navy, U.S. See also Seabees. 

civil affairs training schools, 12- 14, 15 

Mid-Pacific Department of Civil Affairs, 52 

military government administration, 72-75, 

92- 111 , 126 

military gove rnment responsibilities, 7, 16-19, 

64-67, 72-75. See also Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 

Naval Intelligence, Office of, 14 

Occupied Areas, Office for, 13 

Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester W., 15, 179 

and Army-Navy responsibilities, 55, 72, 74 

and courts and statutes, 11 8 

military government planning directive, 19-2 1 

351 

Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester W.-Continued 

and rehabilitation, 102, 121 

and repatriation, 92, 93, 94 

Nodake, 57 

Nold, Brig. Gen. George J., 161 -62 

Northwestern University, 12 

Norvell, Lt. Col. F. C, 162 

NSC 1312, 155 

NSC 1313, 154, 167, 182-83 

Occupied Areas, Office for (Navy), 13 

Okinawa Advisory Council, 108, 110 

Okinawa Assembly, 110- 11 , 11 4- 15 

Okinawa Base Command. See Ryukyus Command. 

Okinawa Democratic Union, 113 

Okinawa Gunto Government, 11 7 

Okinawa Housing Corporation, 166-67 

Okinawa People's Party, 113 

Okinawa Prefecture, defined, 70 

Okinawa Prefecture Land Reform Law (Japanese), 17 1 

Okinawa Relief Clothing Drive Committee, 52 

Okinawa Socialist Party, 113 

Okinawan Advisory Council, 105, 106, 108, 109, 

110, 138. See also Central Okinawan Administration. 

Okinawan Civil Administration, 11 6, 11 7, 11 9. 

See also Central Okinawan Administration; 

Okinawa Gunto Government. 

Okino Daito, 57 

Oliver, Douglas L., 157-58, 182 

Oliver Report, 157-58 

Onna, 172 

Operation ICEBERG 

assault phase, 56, 57, 64 

initial planning for, 7, 16, 19-2 1,24 

and psychological warfare, 44 

Operational Directive Number 7 for Military 

Government of the Commanding General 

Tenth Army (GO PER), 21-22, 24, 26. 28 

Oshiri-Gumi, 165 

Pacific Commander. See Nimitz, Fleet Adm. 

Chester W.; Spruance, Admiral Raymond A. 

Pence, Capt. Harry L., 13 

Perry, Commodore Matthew C, 3 

Philippine Scouts. See Regiments, 44th Infantry 

(Philippine Scouts). 

Philippines Command, 76 

Philippines-Ryukyus Command, 751/ 

commanding general, 76, 145 

Police 

local constabulary, 86, 11 8, 160- 61 

military, 22-23, 62, 84 

Political parties, Okinawan, 11 3-16 

Post, Brig. Gen. Elwyn D., 54 

Potsdam Conference. 70 

Potsdam Declaration, 70 

Prefectural Assembl y. See Okinawa Assembly. 

President, U.S. See Truman, Harry S. 
352 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, 1945-1950 

President, U.S., Assistant to. See Steelman, John 

R. 

Price, Rear Adm. John D., 74, 92, 171 

Princeton University, 15 

Provisional Advisory Assembly. 105 

Provisional Government Assembly. 11 5 

Provost Marshal General. See Gullion, Maj. 

Gen. All en W.; Civil Affairs Training 

Schools (CATS). 

Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Custer, 

Michigan, II 

Public Health, 11 , 23-24, See also Resettlement 

(civilian). 

clothing crisis, 51- 53 

and field teams, 26 . 28. 4 1 

hospital funding, 77 

and the one-mile rule, 169- 70 

sanitation and medical support, 49- 51 , 62, 65 

Refugees. See Resettlement (civilian). 

Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 305th, 40 

Regiments 

24th Infantry, 85 

29th Infantry, 165 

44th Infantry (Philippine Scouts), 85-87 

Repatriation. See Resettlement (civilian). 

Resettlement (civili an). See also Agric ultur ~ 

Construction; Land use. 

citi zenship claims, 91 

land and housing shortages, 53- 60, 90 

property records destroyed, 90, 172 

rerugee camps, 23, 26 . 28. 44- 60. 89-91 

relocation plans, 63- 64 

repatriation, 91- 95 

Resettlement Engineering, Office of, 57 

"Residual sovereignty," 156, 15611 

Reversion. See Japan, and Ryukyuan sovereignty 

issue. 

Royall, Kenneth C., 127, 139 

Rubenstein, I. H., 11 9 

Rules of land warfare, 173, 174 

Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation. See 

Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund. 

Ryukyu Islands 

geography of, 31-33 

strategic importance of, 70-72, 80, 89, 153-

59 

typhoon damage, 79- 80, 87, 88, 126, 158, 161 -

62 

RYllkYIl SJlUizo, 42 

Ryukyuan Bar Association, 120 

Ryukyuan Fisheries Co., Ltd., 135-36 

Ryukyuan Food and Agricultural Organization, 

128- 29 

Ryukyuan Reconstruction Finance Fund, 129, 

150 

Ryukyus, University of, 99 

Ryukyus Command, 7511, 78, 94, 11 5, 16111 

and agriculture, 126 

and centralized government, 117- 20, 128 

Ryukyus Command-Continued 

Commanding General. See Eagles, Maj. Gen. 

William W. ; Hayden, Brig. Gen. Frederic L.; 

Sheetz, Maj. Gen. Josef R. 

and construction projects, 164, 165, 166, 183 

and land use, 170, 172-74 

as Okinawa Base Command, 75, 76, 139 

and rehabilitation, 139, 141 . 143. 154, 158. 

159- 60, 182 

Ryukyuan Property Custodian, Office of, 172-

73 

and U.S. Civil Administration, 128, 12811, 160, 

161n 

Ryukyus Military Government Section, Far East 

Command,76 

Ryukyus Socialist Party, 113 

Saipan, 34, 49 

Sakihara, Koki, 82 

Saltzman, Charles E., J 55 

Schofield Barracks, Oahu, 18, 19 

School of Military Government, Charlottesville. 

Va.,9, II, 15 

Schools, Okinawan. See Education. 

Seabees, 26, 55, 59, 73, 77, 78, 98 

Senaga, Kamejiro, 114- 15 

Sheetz, Maj. Gen. Joser R., 128, 158, 159-61 , 

164-67, 168- 69, 183 

Sherman, Brig. Gen. Harry R., 11 6 

Shikiya, Koshin, 85, 109 

Shikoku, 70 

Shimabuku, 38, 45, 57 

Shuri, 37, 38, 42, 99, 170, 173 

Sobe, 45, 54 

Social Party, 113 

Socialist Party, 11 3 

Spruance, Admiral Raymond A., 100-102, 108, 

121 

Stanford University, 12, 15 

State, Assistant Secretary of. See Saltzman, 

Charles E. 

State, Department of, 70- 72, 155, 159- 61, 182, 

183 

State, Secretary of. See Byrnes, James F. 

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 70, 

71, 91, 92, 93 

Steelman, John R., 141 

Street, Lt. Comdr. Francis E., 107 

Summary Provost Courts, 11 8, 119-20 

Sunabe, 57 

Superior Provost Court, 11 8 

Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP). 

See MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. 

Taira, 59 

Taira, Tatsuo, 11 7 

Taiwan, 13, 16, 19, 34, 91, 147, 182 

Taxation, 150-52 

Tekketsu KinflOlai, 35 

Tenth Army. See IInder Armies, U.S., Tenth. 
INDEX 

Tenth Army Military Government. See Military 

Government Section, Headquarters, Tenth 

Army. 

Thoma, Jugo, 38, 103- 04 

Time, 81, 158 

Toguchi.99 

Tokeshi, Mr. (postmaster), 103 

"Tokyo Problem," 10 

Truk Island, 34 

Truman, Harry S. 

approval ofNSC 13/3, 182 

and military construction, 163. 167 

and military governance roles, 7 

and occupation of Ryukyus, 70, 71 , 154, 156, 

157 

and scrap metal policies, 141 -42 

Tukino,57 

Typhoons, 31, 79-80, 87-88, 126 

"Delia," 88 

"Gloria," 88, 161-62 

"Libby," 88 

"Louise," 88 

United Nations, 70, 179 

Unired Slales Army and Navy Manual o[ Military 

Government and Civil Affairs (OPNAV 50E3),8n 

U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 

128, 160, 16111, 180, 183 

and civilian property rights, 174 

and rehabilitation programs, 131 -32, 135- 36, 

146, 150, 152, 153 

U.S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen's School (Military Government and Administration), 12-

14 

U.S. Naval School of Military Government, 15 

USCAR. See U.S. Civil Administration of the 

Ryukyu Islands. 

Ushijima, Lt. Gen. Mitsuru, 34, 35 

353 

Vickery, Raymond E., 127-28, 131 , 159, 170 

Vickery Report, 127-28, 129, 132 

Virginia, University of, 9, II, 15 

Voorhees, Tracy S., 182 

inspection trip, 158 

and military construction, 161, 162, 163 

and Vickery mission, 127 

Waliace, Maj. Gen. Fred C., USMC, 18, 28. 6 1. 

82,90, 106, 134 

War, Secretary of, 12 

War College, U.S. Army, 4, 8, 9 

War Department, 9, 72, 79 

Army StafT, 7, 8, 10, 80, 84 

Civil Affairs Division, 12 

ci viI affairs officers, II, 12, 16 

War Mobilization and Reconversion, Office of, 

141, 144 

Watanabe, Lt. Gen. Masao, 34 

Watkins, Lt. Comdr. James, IV, USNR, 83 

Weckeriing, Brig. Gen. John, 76 

Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Raymond A., 79 

White House, The. See Truman, Harry S. 

Whiting, John W. M., 14 

Wickersham, Brig. Gen. Cornelius W., II 

Wings. See Air Wings. 

Woodyard, Capt. Edward L., USN, 67, 105 

Yaeyama Gunto, 70, 105, 110, 116, 151 

Yagaji (Yagachi) Shima, 50 

Yale University, 12, 14 

Yamashiro, Atsuo, 98 

Yamato,42 

Yon tan auxiliary airstrip, 166 

Young Men's Party (Youth's Party), 113 

Youth Democratic League, 113 

Zamami Shima, 53 

Zamami Son, 52 
PIN: 062132- 000