SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

October 26, 2009 

LETTER FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Data Provided to the Government of Iraq on U.S. Reconstruction Projects Lacked 

Clarity (SIGIR 10-002) 

This report responds to concerns raised by the President of the Iraq Board of Supreme Audit 

(BSA) that duplicate project and payment data is being reported in U.S. Government 

management information systems. While the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) analysis of the system’s data did not identify duplicate projects or payments, the data 

provided to the Government of Iraq (GOI) was unclear and gave the appearance of duplicate 

projects and payments. SIGIR’s analysis reinforces the need to maintain clear and accurate data 

on U.S. Iraq reconstruction projects and illustrates the issues that can arise when unclear data is 

provided to GOI representatives or other reconstruction project data users. SIGIR conducted this 

review during September 2009 as a nonaudit service. 

For a discussion of our report scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For a list of acronyms used, see Appendix B. For audit team members, see 

Appendix C. For the SIGIR mission and contact information, see Appendix D. 

Background 

In a meeting on August 25, 2009 between the President of Iraq’s BSA and SIGIR, the President 

provided information developed by BSA1

 indicating that duplicate project and payments were 

recorded in U.S. reconstruction project data. This reconstruction data was provided to BSA by 

the Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development. 

The information that BSA provided to SIGIR showed what appeared to be duplicate records2

 and 

payments for U.S. Iraq reconstruction projects. SIGIR determined that this information came 

from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS).3

 U.S. government organizations 

 

1

 BSA information was in the form of an internal document along with three spreadsheets. 2

 In this report, we use the term record to refer to both projects and task orders in IRMS. 3

 The Project IDs listed for each record in the BSA spreadsheet were identical to the Unique Requirements Identifier 

generated in IRMS to identify individual records. 
2 

located in Iraq maintain IRMS to provide a common operating picture for U.S. reconstruction 

projects in Iraq.4

The BSA identified 480 records on completed Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects or 

task orders having a total reported value of $1.2 billion dollars. Our analysis showed the records 

were for reconstruction projects completed by the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers – Gulf Region Division (GRD) in Iraq’s 

provinces of Basrah, Baghdad, and Al Anbar.

Analysis Shows the Data in IRMS Is Unclear 

Information GOI provided to SIGIR gave the appearance that duplicate projects and payments 

existed. Table 1 provides examples of task order information that gives the appearance of being 

duplicate projects and payments. 

Table 1—Data Appears to Show Duplicate Projects and Payments 

Project 

ID 

Actual 

Start 

Actual 

Completion Status Total Cost Ministry Project Name and Description 

63098 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete $2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63102 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63100 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63097 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63101 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63105 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63096 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63103 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63095 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

63099 06/25/03 03/13/04 Complete 2,940,311.00 Communication Replace telephone switch sites to 

restore Baghdad telephone service

Total $29,403,110.00 

Source: BSA data as of August 25, 2009. 

 

4

 On November 6, 2003, the Congress passed the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for 

the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan,” Public Law 108-106. Section 2207 of the Act requires the Director of 

the Office of Management and Budget to report on the proposed uses of the funds on a project-by-project basis and 

to continue to report quarterly on the uses of these funds in order to monitor Iraq reconstruction project and funds. 
3 

For the 480 records in the BSA information, we identified 286 records that did not have 

sufficient specificity in IRMS to identify them as unique activities. Using the IRMS data we 

identified 14 unique contract numbers that corresponded to the 286 records. Four contracts were 

overseen by USAID (consisting of 264 records), and10 contracts overseen by the GRD 

(consisting of 22 records). Table 2 identifies the contracts and number of records associated with 

the records that appeared to be duplicate entries. 

Table 2—Records Appearing to Have Duplicate Information 

Contract No. No. of Records Responsible Agency 

EEE-C-00-03-00018 214 USAID 

SPU-C-00-04-00001 46 USAID 

DOT-I-01-03-00004 2 USAID 

AFP-A-00-03-00005 2 USAID 

W917BK-06-P-0072 2 GRD 

W91GXY-06-C-0013 2 GRD 

W91GXY-06-C-0032 2 GRD 

W914NS-04-D-0009 2 GRD 

W914NS-05-M-2037 2 GRD 

W91GXQ-06-M-0063 2 GRD 

W916QW-04-D-0011 4 GRD 

W914NS-05-M-2039 2 GRD 

W91GXY-06-D-0002 2 GRD 

W914NS-05-M-2041 2 GRD 

TOTAL 286

Source: SIGIR analysis of IRMS data as of September 10, 2009. 

We also compared the BSA and IRMS data we obtained with agency financial reports and 

contract data. The agency data came from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Financial 

Management System (CEFMS) and USAID’s Phoenix Accounting System.5

 We verified that 

the financial systems contained data for each of the 14 unique contracts we had identified by 

reviewing the associated task orders and voucher data. Our review of this information showed 

no evidence of multiple payments regarding a single or specific project in IRMS.6

 The financial 

data we used in our review was not part of the information provided to BSA. 

 

5

 CEFMS is an automated financial management system used by GRD, and Phoenix is USAID’s core financial 

management system that manages and tracks funds. 

6

 Time constraints for this review did not allow the review team to conduct a more detailed analysis of the contract 

files to identify the possibility of any duplicate payments. 
4 

Our analysis also showed the remaining 194 of the 480 records to be unique records. 

Information obtained from IRMS such as the obligation amount or project district allowed us to 

identify these records as unique. 

SIGIR’s comparison of the BSA information to the IRMS data showed that IRMS entries were 

duplicated across multiple categories—such as obligation amount, project name, and 

description—just as was noted by BSA. We were able to resolve the duplication issue only after 

receiving clarifying information from the reporting agencies. According to USAID and GRD 

officials, this apparent duplication occurred because when a project or task order involves 

multiple similar activities it is a common practice used by reporting agencies to enter each of 

those activities as a separate record in IRMS.7

 They also explained that in some cases, when 

accounting data is not available for each specific activity, the reporting agency will evenly divide 

the cost among the activities and enter the same cost for each activity in IRMS. They stated that 

in such cases, while some information will appear duplicative, the project description, location, 

and other reported information should provide sufficient detail to differentiate among the 

individual records. However, we found this was not always the case since 286 of the records we 

reviewed did not have sufficient specificity to identify them as unique activities. Consequently, 

absent further explanation, the data did give the appearance of containing duplicate project 

payments. 

Using additional information and other data systems, SIGIR determined that the IRMS contained 

no duplicate projects or payments among the projects covered by the reconstruction information. 

Nevertheless, this case further illustrates, as SIGIR has previously reported, the importance of 

having clear and accurate IRMS data. 

Prior Audits Show IRMS Deficiencies 

In a previous report, SIGIR noted that IRMS data lacks consistency, accuracy, and completeness.8 

In addition, IRMS does not include complete project data from all agencies involved in 

reconstruction activities because the executing agencies were not regularly entering their data into 

IRMS.9

 The Department of State and GRD concurred with these findings. SIGIR has issued six 

reports on the transfer of completed U.S.-funded projects to the GOI since January 2006. One of 

the critical elements of the asset transfer process is the project reconstruction data in IRMS. In 

an April 2009 report,10 we discussed the unreliability of data in IRMS and pointed out that Iraq 

Transition Assistance office was using this data to prepare a monthly report to the GOI on 

transferable assets. However, because the IRMS data is unreliable, the data provided to the GOI 

is also undependable. 

 

7

 An example of multiple similar activities would be replacing telephone switches at multiple locations. 

8 Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

(SIGIR 08-021, 7/26/2008). 

9 Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations (SIGIR 08-013, 4/28/2008). 10 Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability (SIGIR 09-016, 

4/26/2009).
5 

Conclusion 

The IRMS data provided to the Board of Supreme Audit lacked clarity and appeared to show 

duplicate project and payment information regarding U.S. reconstruction projects. This occurred 

as a result of how the data was presented to BSA and the limited specificity it provided regarding 

the reconstruction records. Although SIGIR found no multiple payments or records, the 

appearance of duplication illustrates the need to provide better quality control of reconstruction 

data provided to the Government of Iraq and other database users. The Board’s concerns and the 

results of SIGIR’s analysis reinforce our previous findings and recommendations. 

We are providing this information for your action as you see appropriate. We would appreciate 

receiving any views you have on this matter at your convenience. We acknowledge and 

appreciate the cooperation and assistance provided by the agencies during our review. If you 

have any questions about this review or need assistance in addressing these issues, please contact 

Nancee Needham at (240) 553-0581, ext. 3793 or email nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil. 

Thank you for your continued support of SIGIR. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

 Deputy Chief of Mission for Assistance Transition 

 U.S. Secretary of Defense 

 Commander, U.S. Central Command 

 Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

 Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

 Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

 Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division 

 Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development 
6 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

In September 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated 

Project 9031 to addresses data quality in the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) 

and the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) concerns over duplicate payments and data problems 

identified in IRMS. This review was performed by SIGIR under the authority of Public Law 

108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors 

general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work during September 

2009 in Baghdad, Iraq. This work was performed as a nonaudit service as defined by section 

1.33 of generally accepted government auditing standards.11 This report is provided for 

management’s use and is consistent with the information provided at our meeting held with the 

Iraq’s Board of Supreme Audit on August 25, 2009. 

To determine whether the BSA spreadsheets contained duplicate records or payments, we 

obtained financial documents and contract data from the following management information 

systems: IRMS, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Financial Management System (CEFMS), 

and U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Phoenix Accounting System. 

• IRMS is a management reporting system for reconstruction projects funded by U.S. 

agencies operating in Iraq. 

• CEFMS is an automated financial management system that is intended to provide timely, 

accurate, and comprehensive financial information for all of management, especially at 

the program and the project management level, through interface with other information 

system programs. 

• Phoenix is USAID’s core financial management system, which manages and tracks 

funds. It provides critical business functions such as a general ledger, cost accounting, 

budgeting, program operations, and reporting 

The August 2009 BSA documents consisted of 480 records. From those documented resources, 

we accessed IRMS and retrieved information by project name, description, fund type, contract 

number, executing agency, and total funds obligated for each project entry. By comparing IRMS 

data with records provided in the BSA spreadsheets, we matched records that contain duplicate 

information such as obligation amount, project name, and description. 

To check for multiple payments, we accessed IRMS and retrieved contract numbers for each 

identified duplicate record; we then obtained detailed reports on obligation disbursement and 

financial information for each contract from USAID’s Phoenix financial system and CEFMS. 

Finally, we examined each contract’s line item, or task order and voucher amounts, and 

compared them with IRMS data. 

We also held discussions with officials from USAID, the Department of State, and GRD and 

reviewed prior audit reports. 

 

11 Government Auditing Standards: July 2007 Revision (GAO-07-731G, 7/2007). 
7 

In addition, we reviewed prior Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reports; Report on 

Material Existence Performed at Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) on Iraq Infrastructure 

Reconstruction Phase I Contract No. E-C-00-03-00018-00 and Phase II Contract No. SPU-C00-04-00001-00 (DCAA Report No. 213-205R10320003, September 11, 2005), and Report on 

Purchases Existence and Consumption—FY 2005 Bechtel National, Inc.–Iraq Infrastructure 

Reconstruction Contract USAID Prime Contract Nos. EEE-C-00-03-00018-00 and SPU-C-00-

04-00001-00 (DCAA Report No. 4281-2005D10320002, Revised, September 23, 2005). Both 

reports disclosed no deficiencies in Bechtel’s purchasing practices or property controls in 

performing USAID contracts. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We relied on IRMS to access project and task order information because it contained the most 

complete data on reconstruction efforts. We also obtained financial data from USAID’s Phoenix 

financial management system to review USAID contracts payments and used the CEFMS system 

to review GRD payments under contracts. The IRMS data, to the extent possible, was 

crosschecked with CEFMS, Phoenix, and financial management information from individual 

projects. During prior work, SIGIR has assessed IRMS and reported on its weaknesses. One 

report states that limitation in the data’s completeness and accuracy continues to exist. We 

believe that the steps taken to cross-check the data provides assurance that the data presented in 

this report are reasonable for the purpose for which it is used. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports and relied on them to conduct this report: 

SIGIR Audits 

GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 

05-028, 1/24/2006. 

Audit Report on Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 06-006, 

4/29/2006. 

Audit Report on U.S. Agency for International Development Management of the Transfer of Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 06-007, 4/29/2006. 

Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, 

SIGIR 06-017, 7/28/2006. 

Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq,

SIGIR 07-004, 7/25/2007. 

Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations SIGIR 08-013, 4/28/2008. 

Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of Iraq Reconstruction Management System,

SIGIR 08-021, 7/26/2008. 
8 

Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability, SIGIR 

09-016, 4/26/2009.

DCAA reports 

Report on Material Existence Performed at Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) on Iraq Infrastructure 

Reconstruction Phase I Contract No. E-C-00-03-00018-00 and Phase II Contract No. SPU-C00-04-00001-00, DCAA Report No. 213-205R10320003, 9/11/2005. 

Report on Purchases Existence and Consumption—FY 2005 Bechtel National, Inc. – Iraq 

Infrastructure Reconstruction Contract USAID Prime Contract Nos. EEE-C-00-03-00018-00 

and SPU-C-00-04-00001-00, DCAA Report No. 4281-2005D10320002, Revised, 9/23/2005. 
9 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

BSA Board of Supreme Audit 

CEFMS Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division 

GOI Government of Iraq 

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

 
10 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This nonaudit service report was prepared and the review conducted under the direction of David 

R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the review and contributed to the report include: 

Ziad Buhaissi 

W. Dan Haigler 

Walt Keays 

Nancee Needham 

 
11 

Appendix D—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Danny Kopp 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil