J-S69031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.D., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: H.R., MOTHER :

: No. 555 MDA 2016

 

Appeal from the Decree March 10, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Orphans’ Court at No.: Adoptee 47-2015

BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, AND PLATT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2016

H.R. (Mother) appeals the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Northumberland County, entered March 10, 2016, that terminated her 

parental rights to her daughter, A.D. (Child), born in November of 2008. We 

affirm.1

Northumberland County Children and Youth Social Service Agency 

(CYS) became involved with Child in May of 2014, when it received a 

General Protective Services (GPS) referral that local police had responded to 

Mother’s home after she was found unconscious on railroad tracks while 

Child tried to wake her. An investigation revealed that Mother had 

overdosed. CYS placed Child informally with her maternal grandmother 

(Grandmother). 

 



 Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, C.D. 

(Father), who did not attend the hearing, despite notice. (See N.T. Hearing, 

3/10/16, at 3-4). Father did not appeal the termination of his parental 

rights.
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One month later, on June 9, 2014, a GPS report revealed that Mother 

and Child had been in an automobile accident while Mother was under the 

influence. Mother was severely injured. Child was injured but she did not 

require inpatient treatment. Child was in a booster seat that was not 

properly buckled, causing Child to become wedged between the steering 

wheel and the windshield. Mother had taken Child from Grandmother while 

Grandmother slept. 

CYS staff visited Grandmother’s home on July 8, 2014, to find Mother 

present and under the influence. On July 10, 2014, Mother contacted CYS to 

tell them she had been kicked out of rehab and that she did not want Child 

to remain with Grandmother because she and Grandmother had gotten into 

a physical altercation on the previous night. Mother also told CYS that her 

brother was coming from Connecticut and that she intended to leave the 

area with him and Child.

CYS discovered that Mother had discharged herself from the 

rehabilitation facility against medical advice, giving the facility false 

information about having to care for her sick mother and having to take her 

child to school. In addition, CYS learned that a warrant had been issued for 

Mother for her failure to pay certain fines. CYS also learned that Mother did 

have a brother, but that he lived in Massachusetts, not Connecticut.
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The trial court granted CYS’ request and placed Child in the temporary 

legal and physical custody of CYS. Child remained in foster placement at the 

time of the termination hearing in this matter, almost two years later.

CYS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on October 

5, 2015. Mother was incarcerated on November 2, 2015, for a probation 

violation, and is serving a one to two year prison sentence. The trial court 

held a hearing on CYS’ petition on March 10, 2016. Testifying at that 

hearing, in addition to Mother, were CYS caseworkers, Sarah Hepler, Lindsay 

Ruth, Jennifer Donmyer, and Amanda Thomas; CYS family resource worker, 

Kathy George; and Child’s foster mother, J.S. The trial court entered its 

decree terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) on March 10, 2016. Mother filed her 

notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 4, 

2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court entered its opinion on 

May 24, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).

Mother raises the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in determining that [CYS] 

presented clear and convincing evidence that grounds for 

involuntary termination exist?

II. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the best 

interests of [] Child would be served by terminating parental 

rights?

III. Whether the trial court erred in by [sic] denying Mother[’]s 

request for a bonding assessment before it determined that [] 

Child’s best interests would be served by terminating Mother’s 

parental rights?
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(Mother’s Brief, at 9) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent 

evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even 

though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the 

 

2

 No other party to this matter has filed a brief or other pleading or notice in 

response to Mother’s Brief.
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termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are governed 

by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 
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weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(1), the 

person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and 

convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the 

filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrates a settled purpose to 

relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. 

Super. 2003).

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 
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Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D. M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) 

(citation omitted). Also, 

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). 

In regard to incarcerated persons, our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative 

factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist 

under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity 

of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that 

the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

* * *

[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a 

litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question 

of whether a parent is incapable of providing essential parental 

care, control or subsistence and the length of the remaining 

confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent, sufficient to 

provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

2511(a)(2). . . . trial courts must carefully review the individual 

circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how a 

parent’s incarceration will factor into an assessment of the child’s 

best interest. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828, 830-31 (Pa. 2012) (case 

citations and quotation marks omitted).
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The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make 

specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child, but 

our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 

is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).

In her first issue, Mother claims that CYS failed to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that grounds exist for involuntary termination of 

her parental rights. (See Mother’s Brief, at 12). We disagree. 

We have reviewed the record in this matter and find that the record 

contains sufficient evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

subsection 2511(a)(1). We quote the trial court’s findings in that regard, 

with approval:

Six (6) hearings were held in the dependency portion of 

this case dealing with [Child]. If one thing is clear from the 

evidence presented at the hearings and again recounted during 

the hearing on the termination of [Mother’s] parental rights, it is 

the fact that [Mother] has been a total and abject failure at 

addressing her addiction. Despite repeated attempts by [CYS] 

to help [M]other address her addiction, she was repeatedly 

unable or unwilling to complete any program she entered. 

Despite several inpatient and outpatient programs, each saw 

[Mother] unsuccessfully discharged for non-compliance. 
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Upon [Mother’s] discharge from these programs, we find 

her reverting back to her prior addictive behaviors. The record 

is replete with her failures; it is replete to the point of 

redundancy with the occasions that [Mother] was under the 

influence with her contacts with [CYS], be they in person or by 

phone. Perhaps most disturbing and distressing are the 

occasions when she was under the influence during visitations 

with [Child].

We find the statement of one of the caseworkers who 

testified at the termination proceedings to be the most telling 

when she was asked to characterize whether [Mother’s] love for 

[Child] was strong. The caseworker testified, 

“I think it is, but, there’s times that I think 

other things in [Mother’s] life that come to be a 

priority, but she can’t control, that goes over priority 

of [Child].” (N.T. Hearing, 3/10/2016, at 85).

We agree. [Mother’s] addictions, her “binging” of drugs as 

she herself repeatedly admitted were and to this day in the view 

of this [c]ourt, are still her priority. [CYS] helped her attempt to 

get her priorities in order [through] various types of treatment to 

no avail. Even the risk of losing [Child], whom she professes to 

love so much, is not enough for this woman to get her priorities 

in order. This failure to address her addictions has now left her 

to be serving a one to two year prison sentence in a State 

Correctional Institut[ion]. Most telling is that the underlying 

charge for her current sentence is Endangering the Welfare of 

Children. [Child] has been and will continue to be at risk given 

[Mother’s] priority of binging her prescription drugs over 

providing for the safety and needs of [Child]. 

* * *

Part one of the bifurcated analysis required this Court to 

review the conduct of the natural mother in this case. We 

believe we more than adequately set forth in the first section of 

this opinion the complete failings of [Mother] by clear and 

convincing evidence. She has failed to perform her parental 

duties or complete those steps necessary to allow her to perform

her parental duties for a period of at least six (6) months, in this 

case eighteen (18) months[.] 
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(Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/16, at 3-4, 6) (record citation formatting 

provided).

The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

With respect to her second issue, Mother argues that the termination 

of her parental rights would not be in Child’s best interest because her 

incarceration will be relatively brief and she will then be able to once again 

care for Child. (See Mother’s Brief, at 22). We disagree. 

We again quote the trial court, with approval, as it discusses Child’s 

best interests and welfare:

During the termination hearing, this [c]ourt heard the 

testimony of several caseworkers, a resource worker and the 

foster mother as to their observations of the interactions 

between [Mother] and [Child] and most telling the effects of the 

visitation between [Mother] and [C]hild on [Child]. This 

evidence did in fact demonstrate that there is a bond between 

[Mother] and [Child]. It encompasses love, however, it is not a 

maternal bond between [a] mother and [a] child, it is an 

unnatural bond. From our perspective, it is more of a bond a 

familiarity. It is a bond where seemingly the roles have been 

reversed with [Child] assuming the role of maturity and 

[Mother] an almost child-like emotional mind set.

The testimony and observations of all clearly demonstrate 

[Child] keeps an emotional distance from [Mother] during the 

visitations and exhibits a demeanor of reserve and wariness as 

to what to expect. The testimony of the [f]oster [m]other was 

the most telling and most compelling to us. She outlined the 

negative impact the visitations have upon [Child] after her 

visitation with [Mother]. She outlined the acting out behaviors 

of [Child] post visitation. She testified as to the anxieties 

[Child] suffered through when visitations were scheduled with 

[Mother]. On the one hand excited to see [Mother], on the 

other, trepidation as to the condition [Mother] would be in, 

sober or under the influence.
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Finally, the [f]oster [m]other provided testimony of the 

stability and enjoyment [Child] finds in the foster home. We 

understand the [f]oster [p]arents are willing to make this a 

permanent arrangement and [Child] herself looks forward to 

this stability as well. Thus, in our view while a bond may exist 

between [Mother] and [Child] it is not one worthy of 

preservation. 

For all the foregoing reasons, we find it was in the best 

interest of [Child] by clear, convincing and compelling evidence 

to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of [Mother].

(Trial Ct. Op., at 8-9).

The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined 

that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests.

Finally, Mother complains that the trial court erred when it failed to 

order a bonding assessment of the bond between her and Child. However, 

she did not include this issue in her statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, and accordingly, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). 

Moreover, the trial court is not required by the Adoption Act or our case law 

to order a formal bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re 

K.K.R.-S., supra at 533. Mother’s third issue would not merit relief.

Accordingly, we affirm the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Northumberland County that terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2016