COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-09-00406-CR

JAMES LEON HUDDLESTON APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 10 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

Appellant James Leon Huddleston appeals following his guilty plea to 

driving while intoxicated and challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence. He contends in two points that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying the motion to suppress because his detention was not 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

based on reasonable suspicion and because the manner in which the police 

conducted a blood draw was unreasonable. We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

At 2:45 a.m. on July 5, 2008, the police received a concerned-citizen call 

about a white Ford Ranger that had been parked beside the road, with its lights 

on, for more than an hour. When Officer C.A. Bain arrived at the scene, he 

observed the white Ford Ranger on the shoulder. Officer Bain testified that he 

believed this was a dangerous situation because it was unusual for a vehicle to 

be parked in that location at that time of night and because there had been 

several vehicle burglaries in the area. Officer Bain approached the vehicle and 

noticed that the vehicle’s engine was running, that its lights were on, and that the 

driver’s side window was partially rolled down. He also discovered Huddleston 

asleep in the driver’s seat with two beer cans within reach. Officer Bain 

examined the surrounding area to determine the presence of any weapons and 

turned the vehicle off in case Huddleston startled when waking. After waking 

Huddleston, Officer Bain smelled alcohol on Huddleston’s breath and observed 

that Huddleston had bloodshot, watery eyes. Huddleston explained his location 

by stating that he had been called into work and was waiting for the gates to 

open. 

Officer Bain asked Huddleston if he had been drinking, and Huddleston 

said that he drank two 24-ounce beers around 6:00 p.m. the previous day. 

Officer Bain testified that Huddleston appeared disoriented and confused about a 
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beeping sound from his vehicle. Officer Bain then requested that Huddleston 

step out of the vehicle, and Huddleston stumbled when exiting. Officer Bain 

requested that Huddleston perform several field sobriety tests (FST), and 

Huddleston illustrated multiple signs of intoxication before he refused to continue 

the test: three clues on the HGN and five clues on the ―walk and turn‖ and the 

―one-leg stand.‖ Prior to the FSTs, Huddleston informed Officer Bain of a prior 

back injury.

Upon completion of the FSTs, Officer Bain detained Huddleston and 

subsequently spoke to his mother over the phone about possible medical 

conditions. Huddleston’s mother confirmed the back injury but informed the 

officer that Huddleston had no current medical conditions that would affect an

FST. Officer Bain arrested Huddleston for driving while intoxicated. 

Officer Bain transported Huddleston to the jail for a blood draw in the ―intox 

room.‖ Officer Bain read Huddleston the required DIC-24 warning and requested 

a breath sample, and Huddleston refused the request. Officer Bain then

prepared a search warrant affidavit in order to obtain a blood sample as evidence 

of the crime of driving while intoxicated. He presented the affidavit to a local 

magistrate, and Officer Bain took Huddleston to the intox room‖ after the 

magistrate signed the search warrant.

Officer Ben Singleton drew Huddleston’s blood. Officer Singleton testified 

that the ―clean room‖ at the Fort Worth Police Department was used solely for 

blood draws during that weekend, that it contained a phlebotomy chair, and that it 
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was consistently cleaned with a bleach and water solution before and after each 

draw. He testified that he was qualified to perform venipunctures within the 

scope of his employment because he had completed a blood-draw training 

program, and he testified that he conducted Huddleston’s blood draw according 

to his training. There is no evidence in the record establishing that Officer 

Singleton acquired a medical history from Huddleston.

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

We give almost total deference to a trial court’s ruling on questions of historical 

fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of 

credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact 

questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 

673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. 

State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

IV. Reasonable Suspicion

Huddleston contends in his first point that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to suppress because there was no reasonable 

suspicion to detain him. The State responds that Officer Bain’s initial contact 

with Huddleston was a valid consensual encounter and that Huddleston’s 

continued detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.
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A. Applicable Law

1. Consensual Encounter 

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of 

interactions between police officers and citizens: encounters, investigative 

detentions, and arrests. State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). Unlike investigative detentions and arrests, which are seizures for Fourth 

Amendment purposes, an encounter is a consensual interaction that the citizen is 

free to terminate at any time. See Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 302–03 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The dispositive question is whether the totality of the 

circumstances shows that the police conduct at issue would have caused a 

reasonable person to believe that he was free to decline the officer’s requests or 

otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439–40, 

111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991); State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the 

encounter, the police-citizen contact is merely a consensual encounter and does 

not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 

194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98, 

103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d at 679. 

Circumstances that may indicate that a police-citizen interaction is a 

seizure, rather than a consensual encounter, include the threatening presence of 

several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of 

the person of the citizen, or use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
6

compliance with the officer’s requests might be compelled. United States v. 

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Absent some 

such evidence, however, otherwise inoffensive conduct between a citizen and a 

police officer cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. Id.

2. Reasonable Suspicion

―No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter becomes a 

seizure.‖ State v. Woodard, No. PD-0828-10, 2011 WL 1261320, at *4 (Tex. 

Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2011). ―Generally, however, when an officer through force or 

a showing of authority restrains a citizen’s liberty, the encounter is no longer 

consensual.‖ Id. ―This is the point at which an encounter becomes a detention 

or arrest, both of which are seizures under the Fourth Amendment.‖ Id. ―Thus, 

Fourth Amendment scrutiny becomes necessary.‖ Id.

A temporary investigative detention is permissible provided the officer has 

a reasonable suspicion that the individual has engaged in criminal activity. See 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968). Reasonable 

suspicion exists when an officer has specific articulable facts that, when 

combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to 

conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in 

criminal activity. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

B. Discussion

In State v. Priddy, this court reversed a trial court’s grant of a motion to 

suppress and held that the police officer’s initial encounter with Priddy was a 
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consensual police-citizen encounter that transitioned into an investigative 

detention supported by reasonable suspicion. See 321 S.W.3d 82, 87–88 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d). There, the officer received a dispatch that 

Priddy had just left a hospital and appeared to be intoxicated. Id. at 84. The 

dispatch also provided the officer with Priddy’s name, the make of her vehicle, 

and the direction of her travel. Id. The officer located Priddy’s vehicle fifteen 

minutes later in a business area of town, legally parked but still running with its 

lights on. Id. The officer parked behind Priddy’s vehicle, turned his spotlight on, 

and ran the vehicle’s license plate. Id. When the officer approached Priddy’s 

vehicle, he saw Priddy inside, eating a hamburger. Id. When Priddy rolled down 

the window at the officer’s request, the officer smelled the odor of alcoholic 

beverages and observed that Priddy had glazed and bloodshot eyes. Id. We 

concluded that the officer’s initial interaction was not illegal because the officer 

had not engaged in a show of authority that would lead a reasonable person to 

believe she was not free to terminate the encounter. Id. at 87–88. We further 

concluded that once Priddy rolled down her window and the officer noticed her 

glazed and bloodshot eyes and smelled the odor of alcoholic beverages, ―the 

voluntary encounter became an investigative detention based upon reasonable 

suspicion that [Priddy] had been driving while intoxicated.‖ Id. at 88.

Similar to Priddy, Officer Bain was justified in approaching Huddleston’s 

vehicle and inspecting the situation. A citizen reported at 2:45 a.m. on July 5, 

2008, that a white Ford Ranger had been parked on the side of the road with its 
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lights on for more than an hour. Officer Bain was dispatched to the reported 

location and observed the described vehicle. Officer Bain did not know whether 

someone in the vehicle was in distress, but the circumstances warranted further 

investigation. We conclude, as we did in Priddy, that Officer Bain’s initial 

interaction with Huddleston was a consensual police-citizen encounter that did 

not implicate the Fourth Amendment.2 See id. at 87–88. 

Officer Bain could not temporarily detain Huddleston beyond the initial 

encounter, however, without reasonable suspicion. See Woodard, 2011 WL 

1261320, at *4. In the early morning hours following the July Fourth holiday, 

Officer Bain arrived at the scene to see a vehicle parked on the side of a busy 

roadway, with its lights on, its engine running, and Huddleston sleeping inside 

with two beer cans within reach. Immediately after waking Huddleston, Officer 

Bain noticed Huddleston’s disorientation, his bloodshot and watery eyes, the 

odor of alcohol on his breath, and his instability when he exited the vehicle. 

Based on a totality of the circumstances, Officer Bain had sufficient articulable 

facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that Huddleston had been engaged in 

criminal activity. See Priddy, 321 S.W.3d at 87–88; see also Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 

 

2Huddleston does not point to any evidence that Officer Bain made a show 

of authority that would lead a reasonable person to believe he was not free to 

discontinue the encounter. Indeed, Huddleston does not acknowledge the 

possibility of a consensual encounter in his brief, despite the trial court’s 

conclusion of law that Officer Bain’s initial contact with him was a consensual 

police-citizen encounter.
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492. He was therefore justified in temporarily detaining Huddleston to conduct 

further investigation.

We hold that Officer Bain’s initial approach and contact with Huddleston 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was a consensual police-citizen 

encounter and that the initial encounter escalated into an investigative detention 

supported by reasonable suspicion. See Priddy, 321 S.W.3d at 87–88. 

Accordingly, we overrule Huddleston’s first point.

V. Blood Draw

In his second point, Huddleston asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to suppress because the manner in which his 

blood draw was conducted was unreasonable. Specifically, Huddleston urges 

that this case is governed by our prior opinion in State v. Johnston, in which we 

held that the manner in which the blood draw was taken was unreasonable 

because, among other things, there was no inquiry into Johnston’s medical or 

general health condition. See 305 S.W.3d 746, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2009), rev’d, 336 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Huddleston argues that the present appeal is identical to Johnston in all 

material respects and that because the police officers made no inquiry of his 

medical history, the blood draw was not medically acceptable. Indeed, Appellant 

argues that the ―only difference‖ between this case and Johnston ―is that the trial 

court erroneously overruled the motion in this cause and the trial court correctly 

granted the motion to suppress in Johnston.‖ Johnston, however, was recently 
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reversed by the court of criminal appeals. See State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 

649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

In relevant part, the court of criminal appeals held:

Here, the court of appeals was incorrect to conclude that the 

officers’ failure to inquire into Johnston’s medical history and follow 

up on her condition subjected Johnston to an unjustified risk of 

medical harm, thereby supporting a ruling that the draw was 

unreasonable. The [United States] Supreme Court has taken into 

account the existence of specific medical conditions that may create 

an unjustified risk, trauma, or pain in ruling that blood-draw tests, 

when used on the general population, are reasonable. So there is a 

presumption that venipuncture blood-draw tests are reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment, despite recognized medical 

anomalies and exceptions that may render the administration of 

such a test unreasonable. Thus, the failure to make an inquiry into 

an individual’s medical history before drawing blood and to conduct 

a follow up examination does not render blood draws per se 

unreasonable, as the court of appeals intimated.

Implicit within Schmerber is that each suspect bears the 

burden of showing that a venipuncture blood draw is not a 

reasonable means to obtain a blood alcohol level assessment as to 

him or her, individually. And in the absence of any record evidence 

showing that a venipuncture blood draw would not be reasonable in 

a particular case due to a verifiable medical condition, we will 

presume that the choice to administer such a test is reasonable. A 

DWI suspect, naturally familiar with his or her own medical history, is 

in the best position to identify and disclose any peculiar medical 

condition that could result in risk, trauma, or more than de minimus 

pain if a blood draw were to be performed.

Id. at 659–60 (discussing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 

S. Ct. 1826, 1836 (1966)).

Huddleston does not point to any evidence that a venipuncture blood draw 

was not a reasonable means to obtain a blood alcohol level assessment as to 

him individually. He instead relies exclusively on our previous holding in 
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Johnston. Because we are bound by the court of criminal appeals’s contrary 

holding in Johnston, we overrule Huddleston’s second point.

VI. Conclusion

Having overruled each of Huddleston’s two points, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

ANNE GARDNER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 4, 2011