IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-0892

Filed November 6, 2019

ALONZO STOKES,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady, 

Judge.

Alonzo Stokes appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 

AFFIRMED.

John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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DOYLE, Presiding Judge.

Alonzo Stokes appeals after the district court denied his application for 

postconviction relief (PCR) in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. We review such claims de novo. See Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 

792 (Iowa 2011). To succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, Stokes must 

show both that his trial counsel breached a duty and prejudice resulted. See 

Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866 (Iowa 2012). A breach of duty occurs 

when counsel’s performance falls below the standard of a reasonably competent 

attorney. See id. Prejudice occurs when counsel’s performance deprives the 

accused of a fair trial. See id. We may affirm the district court’s rejection of 

Stokes’s claim if either element fails. See id.

Stokes alleges the jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of first-degree robbery 

and not guilty of first-degree burglary were inconsistent. He contends he is entitled 

to PCR because his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the 

inconsistent verdicts. The question is whether these verdicts are “so logically and 

legally inconsistent as to be irreconcilable within the context of the case.” State v. 

Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Iowa 2004). They are not. This is not a case in which

the jury convicted a defendant of a compound offense while acquitting on a 

predicate offense. See State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 804, 815 (Iowa 2010) 

(“When a jury convicts a defendant of a compound offense, but acquits the 

defendant on a predicate offense, our confidence in the outcome of the trial is 

undermined.”). As the crimes were marshalled in this case, the elements of firstdegree robbery were included within the elements of first-degree burglary. 
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Stokes argues the jury’s verdicts are inconsistent because there is “no 

dispute” that he entered an occupied residence without permission. But his 

characterization of the evidence is irrelevant; it is for the jury to choose which 

evidence it believes and gives weight. See State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 

673 (Iowa 1993). Even when the defendant concedes to an element of the offense, 

the jury is still required to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. See State 

v. Roe, 642 N.W.2d 252, 254-45 (Iowa 2002) (noting that even a defendant’s

stipulation to an element of a crime “does not thereby eliminate the jury’s duty to 

make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt on each essential element”). 

The court will not interfere with a jury verdict finding a defendant guilty of a 

lesser-included offense and acquitting on the greater offense, even if the evidence 

may have supported a finding of guilt on both offenses. See State v. Stump, 119 

N.W.3d 210, 222 (Iowa 1963) (recognizing that in such cases, the jury may have 

resolved doubt in favor of the defendant or exercised some degree of leniency, 

and concluding that either way, the appellate court may not interfere). Thus, trial 

counsel had no duty to object to the jury verdicts finding Stokes guilty of firstdegree robbery while acquitting him of first-degree burglary. See State v. Graves, 

668 N.W.2d 860, 881 (Iowa 2003) (“Trial counsel has no duty to raise an issue that 

has no merit.”). Because Stokes failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective, 

we affirm the order denying Stokes’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.