J-A05001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

STEVEN BURDA 

Appellant

v.

ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1609 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2010-26928

STEVEN BURDA 

Appellant

v.

ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1747 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2010-26928 - Seq. 1705

STEVEN BURDA 

Appellant

v.

ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1748 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2010-26928 - Seq. 1706

STEVEN BURDA :

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-A05001-23

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Appellant

v.

ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

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: No. 1749 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2010-26928 - Seq. 1707

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 2, 2023

Steven Burda (Father) appeals, pro se, from the orders,1 entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, in this child support matter. 

After our review, we reverse, in part, and remand with instructions. 

Father and Alla Korenman a/k/a Alla Burda (Mother) were married in 

2010. They are the parents of two minor children, E.B., born in December 

2008, and A.B., born in July, 2010. The parties were divorced by decree,

dated September 14, 2012, which incorporated an arbitration award for child 

support and alimony, payable by Father to Mother.2 See Arbitration Award, 

9/4/12. The arbitration award provided that Father’s child support obligation 

____________________________________________

1 Father filed separate notices of appeal for each docket (Docket Entries 1708, 

1712, 1713 and 1714). The appeal at 1609 EDA 2022 is taken from a June 

1, 2022 order denying Father’s exceptions to the hearing officer’s 

recommendation in child support. The appeals at 1747, 1748 and 1749 EDA 

2022 are also taken from orders entered June 1, 2022 in the parties’ child 

support matter. See infra at 7. This Court sua sponte consolidated these 

appeals. See Order, 8/3/22; Pa.R.A.P. 513. 

2 The arbitration award was entered after three days of hearings, which were 

held on February 22 and 23, 2012, and March 5, 2012.
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could be modified if either party acquired greater earning capacity than that 

determined by the arbitrator. See id. at 15. On October 5, 2012, Father filed 

a “Petition to Vacate Child Support, Alimony and to Address Credits” with the 

Domestic Relations Section of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 

County. The Honorable Wendy Demchick-Alloy summarized the subsequent

procedural history as follows: 

The hearing officer who reviewed the petition found that 

conditions had changed, but rather than vacating [Father’s] 

support obligation, she increased it to $2,002.39 [from 

$1,371.00] per month for the period beginning January 1, 2013 

and continuing indefinitely. [Father] filed exceptions to the 

hearing officer’s report and recommended order and demanded a 

hearing de novo. At that time, the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas had adopted a procedure that gave litigants nonrecord hearings before the support hearing officer and a de novo

[hearing] on exceptions. For reasons that do not expressly 

appear on the record, the court did not hold a hearing or 

adjudicate [Father’s] exceptions. The list of docket entries 

leads the undersigned to infer that one of the reasons is 

the volume of applications filed by [Father],

[3] but none of 

the judges to whom this action was previously assigned 

stated on the record why the court did not hold the de novo

hearing.

Opinion by Judge Demchick-Alloy, 6/16/22, at 2-3 (emphasis added)

(footnote omitted). 

Thereafter, Father filed a complaint in support and, on November 13, 

2014, the support hearing officer held a hearing. The hearing officer 

____________________________________________

3 This pattern has continued since 2012, with over 1,700 entries on this 

docket. We caution Father that, in this context, more is not necessarily better. 

Bombarding the lower court and this Court with applications, some spurious,

many repetitive, has exacerbated delay and confusion in this matter.
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calculated Father’s child support obligation as $1,275.77, approximately $100 

less than the original obligation. Father again filed exceptions, and he 

demanded a de novo hearing with respect to both the 2014 recommended 

order ($1,275.77) and 2013 recommended order ($2,002.39). Again, “[f]or 

reasons that do not appear of record, the court did not hold a de novo

hearing.” See id. at 3 (emphasis added). 

On November 28, 2014, Father filed a petition for reimbursement

pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.26(b) (Support Order. Enforcement. Stay of 

Proceedings. Special Relief) and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f) (Equity power and 

jurisdiction of the court), referring to his 2014 exceptions. Once again, “[f]or 

reasons that do not expressly appear on the record, the court did not 

hold the hearing.” Opinion by Judge Demchick-Alloy, 6/16/22, at 4 

(emphasis added). 

On August 26, 2020, the Honorable Carolyn Carluccio entered an order 

directing a hearing officer to hear evidence with respect to the parties’ support 

obligations from 2013 through 2019 and to file a report and recommended 

order with respect to each of those years. See Order, 8/26/20.4

____________________________________________

4 That order (docket entry 1604) provides, in relevant part:

Effective July 18, 2016, Montgomery County adopted 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.12. Office Conference. 

Hearing. Record. Exceptions Order. Rule 1910.12 sets forth the 

procedure for a child support order and provides for a record 

proceeding before a support hearing officer to receive evidence, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The hearing officer held hearings on March 15, 2021 and June 24, 2021. 

On July 28, 2021, the hearing officer filed a report, which provided

calculations of the parties’ earning capacities, adjustments to the basic child 

support obligation, and deviations for each of the relevant time periods, as 

well as recommended orders, as follows:

Jan. 1, 2013 – Aug. 8, 2013: $1,733.98 /month

Aug. 9, 2013 – Dec. 31, 2013: $1,751.09/month

Jan. 1, 2014 – Dec. 31, 2014: $2,097.56/month

Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2015 $1,684.18/month

Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2016 $1,171.00/month

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hear argument and issue a report containing a recommendation. 

Thereafter, within 20 days after the report is issued, either party 

may filed exceptions to the report or any part thereof.

 * * * 

Within 10 days of this Order, the parties shall submit copies of 

their tax returns from 2013 through and including 2019 [] to the 

Domestic Relations Office. Thereafter, within 30 days, the 

Support Hearing Officer shall conduct a telephone conference [due 

to Covid-19 restrictions] with [c]ounsel/parties to assess the 

status, any discovery requests[,] and the necessity for testimony 

at record proceedings. On the conference call, the Support 

Hearing Officer shall address if an Order can be entered 

“administratively” for some, or all, of the years in dispute without 

the necessity of testimony. It is anticipated that a Report and 

Order will be entered by the Support Hearing Officer within 90 

days of this Order. Following the issuance of the Officer’s 

Report, either party may file exceptions in accordance with 

the Rule.

Order, 8/26/20 (emphasis added). 
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Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2017 $1,076.74/month

Jan. 1, 2018 – Dec. 31, 2018 $1,411.98/month 

Jan. 1, 2019 – May 28, 2019 $1,489.61/month

May 29, 2019 – Dec. 31, 2019 $1,225.63/month

Jan.1, 2020 – Dec. 31, 2020 $ 771.28/month

Jan. 1, 2021– Mar. 5, 2021 $ 903.64/month

Mar. 6, 2021 – Forward [5] $ 969.34/month

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5 The original order read “Effective March 6, 2021 to, and including, December 

31, 2021.” Order, 6/1/22. After Father appealed that order, Judge DemchickAlloy noted a clerical error apparent from the record, specifically, the 

implication that Father’s support obligation would end on December 31, 2021. 

It is well-established that a court may modify or rescind any order within 30 

days after its entry if no appeal has been taken. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. However, a trial court may not ordinarily modify an order 

beyond the thirtieth day after its entry, except as otherwise provided by law.

Although here the amendment was made beyond 30 days and after the filing 

of a notice of appeal, contrary to the general prohibitions of section 5505 and

Rule 1701(a)(1), the court could properly “correct formal errors in papers 

relating to the matter[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1). Courts have inherent power 

to correct their own judgments, even after expiration of the appeal period, 

and this power extends to the correction of obvious or patent mistakes and to 

the amendment of court records. See Fish v. Gosnell, 463 A.2d 1042, 1052 

(Pa. Super. 1983) (where amendment is clerical matter based on face of 

record and no fact finding is required, amendment to order under appeal is 

allowed). Further, despite the general prohibition on modifying orders after 

the appeal period has expired, courts have permitted modification under 

section 5505 in the following circumstances: extrinsic fraud; lack of 

jurisdiction over subject matter; fatal defect apparent on face of record; 

or some other evidence of “extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the 

court.” ISN Bank v. Rajaratnam, 83 A.3d 170, 172 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(emphasis added). 
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Report and Recommended Orders, 7/28/21.6 

Father filed exceptions on August 11, 2021. On May 2, 2022, Judge 

Demchick-Alloy heard argument on Father’s exceptions and, on June 1, 2022, 

entered an order denying those exceptions.

7 On that same date, the court 

entered an order denying Father’s “Preliminary Objections,”8 denying Father’s 

____________________________________________

6 On December 4, 2018, the parties entered into an “Agreed Custody Order.” 

The order provided, in part: “The parties shall have shared legal custody[;] 

Mother shall have primary custody[; and] Father shall have partial physical 

custody [every other weekend and one overnight each week]. Agreed 

Custody Order, 12/4/18. Inexplicably, Father maintains no final custody order 

has ever been entered. See Plaintiff’s Praecipe to Attach to Support 

Exceptions Filed on 8/11/2021, at 2 (Supplemental and Complimentary Issues 

to be Raise[d] on Exceptions, 8/17/21). 

7 That order reads:

AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2022, upon consideration of the 

exceptions to the recommendation of the hearing officer in 

support filed by payor, [Father] (docket seq. no. 1617), and after 

oral argument thereon, all of the exceptions are overruled. 

Order, 6/1/22. That order, effective January 1, 2013, also listed, for the years 

2013 through 2021, the parties’ monthly net income, the payor’s monthly 

obligation, and the percentage of unreimbursed medical expenses for which 

each party was responsible. Id. at 1-7. The order also required Mother to 

provide medical insurance coverage. Id. at 8. 

8 The order reads:

AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2022, upon consideration of the 

application styled as “Plaintiff’s Preliminary Objections to 

Defendant’s Deficient, Defective & Untimely Answer and 

Counterclaim” (docket seq. no. 1665), in the nature of a sur-reply 

to “Mother’s Reply to Father’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 

231 Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.14,” (docket seq. no. 1663), the section 

entitled “Mother’s Counterclaim to Father’s Motion for Sanctions” 

(id. at pp.5-6) is stricken without prejudice to [Mother’s] 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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“Motion for Sanctions” and “Motion for Summary Judgment,”9 and denying

Father’s “Motion for Sanctions for “Mother’s Willful Disobedience.”10 Father 

filed timely appeals from those orders. The court also ordered the Domestic 

Relations Section to audit Father’s account in response to Father’s petition for 

recovery of support overpayment and to reduce his support obligation in 

accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(f)(1) if the audit uncovered an 

overpayment. That order was not appealed.

11

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procedural right to file a motion for sanctions as a separate docket 

entry and in conformity with the state and local rules of civil 

procedure governing motion practice. The remaining requests in 

[Father’s] application are denied.

Order, 6/1/22. 

9 That order provides: “AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2022, upon 

consideration of the application styled as a “Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 

231 Pa.R.C.P. 1915.14” (docket seq. no. 1654) and “Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment” (docket seq. no. 1681), the applications are denied.” 

Order, 61/22. 

10 That order provides: “AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2022, upon 

consideration of the applicable styled as “Father’s Motion for Sanctions 

Pursuant to [] Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4-4(c) and 1915.14 for Mother’s Willful 

Disobedience to Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4-4(b)(2) [and] Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4-4(b)(3)” 

(docket seq. no. 1691), the application is denied.” Order, 6/1/22.

11

 By letter dated August 17, 2021, the Domestic Relations Section informed

Father that as of that date, there was an overpayment of $3,867.84. See

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(g)(1) (“Order in Effect. If there is an overpayment in an 

amount in excess of two months of the monthly support obligation and a 

charging order remains in effect, after notice to the parties as set forth below, 

the domestic relations section shall reduce the charging order by 20% or an 

amount sufficient to retire the overpayment by the time the charging order is 

terminated. The notice shall advise the parties to contact the domestic 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father raises eleven issues for our review, which we have summarized 

as follows: 

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in:

1. Denying Father’s motion for default judgment;

2. Denying Father’s preliminary objections to Mother’s answer 

and counterclaim;

3. Failing to schedule a hearing on Father’s motion for sanctions 

for Mother’s defective pretrial statement;

4. Failing to rule on Father’s motion for sanctions where evidence 

showed Mother violated provision 5 of 2/24/15 order;

5. Overruling Father’s objections during the May 2, 2022 hearing;

6. Ignoring law and legal process (contempt/sanctions) where 

evidence showed Mother violated provision 5 of 2/24/15 order;

7. Ignoring law and legal process by “making up numbers for 

support calculation purposes—or pulling numbers from thin 

air—for support exceptions hearing” where there was no 

support for such and allowing Mother reimbursement for 

activities/memberships going back to 2013;

8. Adopting master’s recommendation;

9. Making Father pay for “wild and unnecessary activities or cost 

of memberships to synagogue or community center” going 

back to 2013;

10. Refusing to listen to Father’s argument and “simply siding 

everything with the Mother” without any finding of facts;

____________________________________________

relations section within 30 days of the date of the mailing of the notice if either 

or both of them wishes to contest the proposed reduction of the charging 

order. If either party objects, the domestic relations section shall schedule a 

conference to provide the objecting party the opportunity to contest the 

proposed action. If neither party responds to the notice or objects to the 

proposed action, the domestic relations section shall have the authority to 

reduce the charging order.”).
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11. Allowing Mother not to file pretrial statement and permit 

Mother’s exhibits despite Father’s objections.

Appellant’s Brief, at 8-11 (reworded for clarity).

The standard governing our review of a child support order is follows:

[T]his Court may only reverse the trial court’s determination 

where the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will 

not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court 

absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to 

sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides 

or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the 

record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of 

partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, discretion has been abused. 

In addition, we note that the duty to support one’s child is 

absolute, and the purpose of child support is to promote the child's 

best interests.

M.E.W. v. W.L.W., 240 A.3d 626, 634 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, this Court

must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by 

competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, this Court must 

defer to the trial judge who presided over the proceedings and 

thus viewed the witnesses firsthand.

When the trial court sits as fact[-]finder, the weight to be assigned

the testimony of the witnesses is within its exclusive province, as 

are credibility determinations, [and] the court is free to choose to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. [T]his Court 

is not free to usurp the trial court’s duty as the finder of fact.

Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). See also Brotzman–Smith v. Smith, 650 A.2d 
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471, 474 (Pa. Super. 1994) (assessment of credibility of witnesses is within 

province of trial court and court is free to weigh evidence presented).

“The principal goal in child support matters is to serve the best interests 

of the children through the provision of reasonable expenses.” E.R.L. v. 

C.K.L., 126 A.3d 1004, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Generally, a court determines child support using the support 

guidelines. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1 to 1910.16-7 (subsequently amended 

eff. Jan. 1, 2022). “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that the guideline 

calculated support obligation is the correct support obligation.” Pa.R.C.P. 

1910.16-1(d); see also Ileiwat v. Labadi, 233 A.3d 853, 861 (Pa. Super. 

2020). Cf. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d)(1) (“The presumption is rebutted if the 

trier-of-fact concludes in a written finding or states on the record that the 

guidelines support amount is unjust or inappropriate.”).

Preliminarily, we emphasize that appellate briefs must conform in all 

material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court may quash or 

dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to comply with the Rules. Id. “When 

issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, [or] when the briefs 

are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a Court will not 

consider the merits thereof.” Branch Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 

A.2d 939, 942-43 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Although this Court may liberally construe materials filed by a pro se

litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. Id.
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“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with 

citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Umbelina v. 

Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting In re W.H., 25 A.3d 

330, 339 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Further, if the 

defects in the brief of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal may be 

dismissed. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Although Father raises eleven issues, he devotes one paragraph for each 

issue, a total of three and one-half pages,

12 to support these claims in the 

Argument section of his brief. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18-21. After our 

review, we find Father’s first three claims waived. The extent of each of the 

arguments on those issues consists of Father’s restatement of the issue, a 

claim that “It’s a no brainer[,]” and a reference for this Court to “N/T[.]”13 

See Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19.14 

____________________________________________

12 Father’s tenth and eleventh issues are addressed in one paragraph. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 21. 

13 The record before us includes approximately 1,800 pages of transcripts from 

2011 to 2018. 

14 This Court has noted that, while willing to liberally construe materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, an appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage 

because he lacks legal training. O'Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 

680, 682 (Pa. Super. 1989). And, as our Supreme Court has explained: “[A]ny 

layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some 

reasonable extent, assumes the risk that [his] lack of expertise and legal 

training will prove [his] undoing.” Id. (citations omitted).
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An appellate brief must support the claims presented with citation to 

and discussion of pertinent legal authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c). 

Instantly, Father does not refer to the place in the record that would support 

his claims. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(c) provides:

Reference to record. If reference is made to the pleadings, 

evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing 

in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate 

connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the 

place in the record where the matter referred to appears (see Rule 

2132) (references in briefs to the record).

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Moreover, Father does not develop an argument or offer 

any authority in support of his claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “This Court 

will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an 

appellant.” Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 584 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted); J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Assoc., 56 A.3d 402, 

411 (Pa. Super. 2012). Father’s failure to develop these issues on appeal with 

citation to relevant authorities constitutes waiver of these claims. See Irwin 

Union National Bank and Trust Company v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103

(Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining Superior Court will not act as counsel and will 

not develop arguments on behalf of appellant; when deficiencies in brief 

hinder our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may deem 

certain issues waived); Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super 2006) 

(explaining arguments not appropriately developed with citation to relevant 

authority are waived on appeal). Father’s first three claims, therefore, are 

waived.
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In his fourth issue, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying him a procedural right to “be heard” on his motion for sanctions. 

Specifically, Father claims that he was entitled to oral argument on his motion.

This claim is meritless. 

Father’s claim stems from his literal reading of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a), 

which states that in all civil matters before any tribunal, every litigant “shall 

have the right to be heard, by himself and his counsel, or by either of them.” 

Id. However, this Court has interpreted section 2501 of the Judicial Code as 

a guarantee of “an individual’s right to self-representation in civil matters.” 

See Delaware Valley Landscape Stone, Inc. v. RRQ, LLC, 284 A.3d 459 

(Pa. Super. 2022); see also Barrett v. M&B Medical Billing, Inc., 291 A.3d 

371 (Pa. Super. 2022). The language in section 2501(a) does not require oral 

argument before the court for every motion filed. 

Further, Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 211 states: “Any 

interested party may request oral argument on a motion. The court may 

require oral argument, whether or not requested by a party. The court may 

dispose of any motion without oral argument.” Pa.R.C.P. 211 (emphasis 

added). The Explanatory Comment to Rule 211 provides:

Current Rule 211, if read literally, confers on a party the right to 

argue any motion before the trial court. However, the Superior 

Court and the Commonwealth Court have both held that any right 

to oral argument conferred by Rule 211 is only a qualified 

right subject to judicial discretion. See Gerace v. Holmes 

Protection of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. 1986); 

City of Philadelphia v. Kenny, 369 A.2d 1343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1977). To remedy any confusion between the text of the rule and 

actual practice supported by appellate precedent, Rule 211 has 
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been amended to provide that a party has the right to request oral 

argument [] and gives discretion to the trial court to require oral 

argument, whether requested or not, or to dispose of any motion 

without oral argument.

Pa.R.C.P. 211, Explanatory Comment (emphasis added). We find no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s disposition of the motion without argument.

Father also claims the court erred in denying the motion on its merits. 

Father filed his motion for sanctions on January 27, 2022, claiming Mother 

willfully failed to comply with the trial court’s February 24, 2015 order. That 

order, an interim custody order, provided, in relevant part: “Pending a final 

custody order, Defendant-Mother shall not make any decisions regarding the 

[C]hildren that would affect Plaintiff-Father financially.” Order, 2/24/15. 

Father sought sanctions for Mother’s non-compliance from the date of the 

2015 order, to the date of his 2022 motion, averring that “as of the date of 

this filing, there is no final custody order”—despite the fact that a final “Agreed 

Custody Order” was entered on December 4, 2018. See supra n. 5.

15

 Mother 

filed a detailed and “reasoned opposition” to Father’s motion for sanctions. 

See Opinion by Judge Demchick-Alloy, 8/3/22 (1749 EDA 2022), at 3.

On March 4, 2022, the court scheduled a hearing on Father’s motion for 

May 2, 2022. On March 29, 2022, the court entered a second scheduling 

order, restating the May 2, 2022 date for a one-day hearing on Father’s motion 

____________________________________________

15 On April 15, 2022, before a decision was rendered on his motion for 

sanctions, Father filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” seeking judgment 

in his favor and against Mother in the amount of $174,000, which represented 

the sum of $2,000 per month from February of 2015 through April of 2022. 

Father requested oral argument on this motion as well. 
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for sanctions and scheduling argument on Father’s “Petition for Recovery of 

Support Overpayment” and his “Exceptions to the Recommendation of the 

Hearing Officer in Support Retroactive to 1/1/2013.” See Order, 3/29/22. 

From our review of the record and the trial court’s opinions, we piece 

together the following: On May 2, 2022, Judge Demchick-Alloy heard 

argument on several motions. Despite the fact that the two scheduling orders 

listed a hearing on Father’s motion for sanctions, and argument on Father’s 

other two motions, it appears the court declined to hear argument on Father’s

motion for sanctions. The court noted that all of the evidence required to be 

presented had been presented before the support hearing officer and, thus, 

was already filed of record. Additionally, the court also specified in its opinion 

that the evidence presented to the hearing officer was sufficient for 

disposition, on the merits, of Father’s motion for sanctions. See Opinion by 

Judge Demchick-Alloy, 8/3/22 (1749 EDA 2022), at 3. See also Opinion by 

Judge Demchick-Alloy, 8/3/22 (1748 EDA 2022), at 6-9. The February 2, 

2015 order ceased to have effect on December 5, 2018, when the court 

entered a final agreed custody order. Thus, the February 24, 2015 order 

provided that for the years 2015-2018, Mother could not claim expenses that 

would increase Father’s support obligation. Substantively, the court found 

Mother did not violate that order. Judge Demchick-Alloy states that in 

response to Judge Carluccio’s order for a hearing on the parties’ support 

obligations for those years, evidence produced has been made part of the 

record and “facts of record led to the conclusion that the hearing officer did 
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not allow [Mother] to use activity expenses to increase [Father’s] child support 

payments for the year 2015 through 2018.” Id. at 15. Upon our review, we 

agree with the trial court’s reasoning, and we discern no error or abuse of 

discretion. M.E.W., supra; Mackay, supra. 

Additionally, with respect to this issue, Father baldly asserts in his 

argument that “Mother clearly admitted that she violated the order,” and that

he “clearly showed that Mother violated [] provision 5 of the Order[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief, at 19. Father’s assertion is not at all clear to this Court. 

In her reply to Father’s motion for sanctions, Mother stated:

It was never the intent of this single line within the Interim 

Custody Order to require that Mother permanently keep the 

children in day care, a summer camp for preschool children, and 

the same activities long-term. . . . It is unreasonable that Father 

demands that the children’s activities do not change as they age 

from 5 and 7 years old (in 2015)[]. Mother’s adjustments on 

activities as required based on age-appropriate activities should 

not be a cause for sanction. 

Mother’s Reply to Father’s Motion for Sanctions, 2/25/21, at 1-2. This is 

certainly reasonable and, notably, Mother listed the expenses for the 

Children’s activities, which, based on her modifications, reduced the amounts 

requested for child support for “for all years other than 2015 (which was the 

first year when both children had childcare).” Id. at 3. Mother also noted 

that this has been FURTHER reduced by [the support hearing officer’s] 

determination[.] In effect, Mother’s decision and updates to the Children’s 

activities ha[ve] REDUCED Father’s financial obligation.” Id. We are unable 

to discern how Father interprets this as an admission. 
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Father’s fifth issue, that the court “acted in [a] bias[ed] and prejudicial 

manner, overruling all objection of the Father during the May 2, 2002 

hearing,” is also waived. Once again, Father’s argument on that issue consists 

of a verbatim restatement of the issue, followed by two bald assertions:

There are more than dozens of instances, as pointed out in 

transcripts. Appella[te] court, after reading the transcripts, will 

see how the legal abuse took place against the Father for the 

purpose of rewarding the Mother. This is unfortunate. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 19-20. That is the extent of Father’s argument. Father 

provides no legal analysis or citation to authority, makes only a general 

reference to the “transcripts” without specific citation to the record, and offers 

no discussion as to how the court abused its discretion in overruling his 

objections. Essentially, Father presents a blanket claim that the trial court 

chose to “reward” Mother. 

We repeat that we will not act as counsel and develop arguments on 

Father’s behalf, “nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an 

argument[.]” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citation omitted). Since Father has failed to cite record support for his 

argument, he cannot obtain relief. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c); J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc., 

supra. Father’s mere assertions fail to provide this Court with any meaningful 

argument and, thus, precludes this Court’s meaningful review. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2101, 2119(a)-(c); see also Krauss, supra. Therefore, this issue is waived. 

Milby, supra.
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For these same reasons, we find Father’s claims in issues ten and eleven 

waived. See Appellant’s Brief at 11, 21.

In his sixth issue, Father reargues issue four. We have considered and 

disposed of that issue above. See supra at 14-18.

Next, we examine, together, Father’s seventh, eighth, and ninth issues. 

In each, Father challenges the trial court’s support calculations and asserts

the court erred or abused its discretion by “pulling numbers from thin air” 

where “nothing was supported by the income, expenses, or documents 

presented by Father and/or Mother,” and “allowing Mother to collect 

reimbursement of all of her activities or memberships she has done going back 

9 years, to [the] beginning of 2103 . . . without any de novo review[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief, at 10, 20-21 (emphasis added).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.11 governs the relevant 

support proceedings in this case:

Rule 1910.11 Office Conference. Subsequent Proceedings. Order

(a)(1) The office conference shall be conducted by a conference 

officer.

* * *

(c) At the conference, the parties shall furnish to the officer true 

copies of their most recent federal income tax returns, their pay 

stubs for the preceding six months, verification of childcare

expenses and proof of medical coverage which they may have or 

have available to them. In addition, they shall provide copies of 

their income and Expense Statements in the forms required by 

Rule 1910.27(c), completed as set forth below.

* * *
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(d)(1) The conference officer shall make a recommendation to the 

parties of an amount of support calculated in accordance with the 

guidelines.

* * *

(f) If an agreement for support is not reached at the conference, 

the court, without hearing the parties, shall enter an interim order 

calculated in accordance with the guidelines and substantially in 

the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e). Each party shall be 

provided, either in person at the time of the conference or by mail, 

with a copy of the interim order and written notice that any party 

may, within twenty days after the date of receipt or the date of 

the mailing of the interim order, whichever occurs first, file a 

written demand with the domestic relations section for a hearing 

before the court.

* * *

(i) If a demand is filed, there shall be a hearing de novo

before the court. The domestic relations section shall 

schedule the hearing and give notice to the parties. The 

court shall hear the case and enter a final order 

substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e) 

within sixty days from the date of the written demand for

hearing.

(j)(1) Promptly after receipt of the notice of the scheduled 

hearing, a party may move the court for a separate listing where:

(i) there are complex questions of law, fact or both; or

(ii) the hearing will be protracted; or

(iii) the orderly administration of justice requires that the hearing 

be listed separately.

(2) If the motion for separate listing is granted, discovery shall be 

available in accordance with Rule 4001 et seq.

Note: The rule relating to discovery in domestic relations matters 

generally is Rule 1930.5.

(k) No motion for post-trial relief may be filed to the final order of 

support.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.11(a)(1), (c), (d)(1)-(2), (f), (i), (j), (k) (emphasis added).
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“[U]nder Pa.R.C.P. 1910.11[,] a litigant has an absolute right to his/her

day in court should it be desired.” Warner v. Pollock, 644 A.2d 747, 751 

(Pa. Super. 1994). “A de novo hearing is full consideration of the case anew. 

The reviewing body is in effect substituted for the prior decision maker and 

redecides the case.” Id. at 750 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “Once one of the parties demand[s] a [de novo] hearing each would 

be entitled to litigate as if it were the first proceeding.” Id. See also 

Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d 995, 1000-03 (Pa. Super. 2003) (explaining 

under Rule 1910.11, any party to support action may file written demand for 

hearing de novo before trial court after court has entered support order based 

upon domestic relation officer’s recommendation; Rule 1910.11 grants parties 

absolute right to de novo hearing on issues surrounding support order and 

parties must be permitted to present evidence in support of respective 

positions); Asin v. Asin, 690 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1997) (Rule 

1910.11 grants parties absolute right to de novo hearing on issues 

surrounding support order). 

Here, the lack of de novo review of Father’s 2013 and 2014 exceptions,

upon demand and without explanation, is a recurring theme in Father’s 

arguments and in the trial court’s recitation of the procedural history in this 

case. See Judge Demichick-Alloy’s Opinion, 6/16/22, supra at 2-4.

At the hearing before the master in support on December 12, 2012, the 

master acknowledged that the “next level is a de novo hearing.” N.T. 
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12/10/12, at 4.16 At the conclusion of the hearing, the master stated: “if you 

don’t agree with my decision, you have 20 days to file [e]xceptions.” Id. at 

91. Father timely filed exceptions on February 6, 2013. 

At a status conference on October 31, 2014, the Honorable Rhonda Lee 

Daniele acknowledged support exceptions were never decided, stating: “So 

it’s clear to me that, generally, support exceptions are still on the table.” N.T. 

Status Conference, 10/31/14, at 39. See also id. at 48 (Judge Daniele 

stating: “We have support exceptions that have been filed.”). Noting that 

she anticipated Father would file additional exceptions, Judge Daniele stated: 

“If exceptions are filed to the master’s order that’s entered in two weeks, then 

I will schedule one hearing, and hear everything from the original exceptions 

petition, up to an including the date of our hearing.” Id. at 52. The court 

also noted that there were “pending” support exceptions, and, rather than 

address those, the court deferred those, anticipating additional exceptions. 

Id. at 58 (Judge Daniele stating: “[I]t doesn’t make any sense to hear one 

set of exceptions, when we know we’re going to be faced with another one 

shortly thereafter.”). 

At a subsequent status conference on January 13, 2017, Judge Daniele 

again acknowledged Father’s 2013 and 2014 exceptions remained 

outstanding, and explained: 

____________________________________________

16 Generally, a hearing before the master is not a record hearing and a court 

reporter is not provided. Father, however, filed a request to have a court 

reporter and paid the fee himself. 
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I determined that we were going to proceed with the hearing on 

support exceptions until I got some type of pleading, it may 

have been a petition, it may have been another appeal from 

Mr. Burda, indicating that I shouldn’t be hearing the

support exceptions, because there were other matters on 

appeal. . . . [I]n an abundance of caution, I entered an 

order, canceling the support hearing and also indicating 

that I would hear no other issues in this case until there 

was absolutely nothing pending in the appellate courts. [] 

I determined that nothing would proceed in the meantime until all 

appeals were out of the appellate courts, and between appeals,

reconsideration of denials of appeals, either by the Superior Court 

quashing them or denying them or whatever, and thereafter, 

petitions to the Supreme Court, to take appeals to the Supreme 

Court, and petitions to reconsider filed with the Supreme Court, 

it’s taken two years to have all matters concluded, finally, 

in the appellate courts of Pennsylvania. . . . These support 

exceptions go back to a recommendation of a support master that 

were confirmed as a court order on January 18, 2013. 

Status Conference, 1/13/17, at 4-9. Judge Daniele then stated on the record 

that she would schedule a hearing at some future date, and she entered an 

order on the record pertaining to discovery. Id. at 10-12; see also id. at 12 

(“So, if I schedule a hearing in June, all income received up until June, ten 

days before the hearing, is to be produced to each other ten days in advance 

of the hearing and bring it to court with you.”); id. at 13-14 (“Docket Entry 

No. 402 is the actual support exceptions that [Father] filed, and that’s the 

discovery order that I just entered pertaining to those support exceptions.”); 

id. at 15 (“Docket Entry No. 827, Father filed support exceptions to the 

November 18, 2014, support exceptions. Obviously, that is also going to be 

included in the ultimate exceptions hearing.”); id. at 17 (“So, it all boils down 

to support exceptions that will be heard by me and a discovery order that you 
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now both have, directing each of you how to go about conducting discovery 

and directing each of you to comply with the discovery requests of each other 

pertaining to support issues.”); id. at 19 (“Okay. Enough. Produce the 2012

[tax returns]. I’ll hear all of this as argument as part of the support 

exceptions.”); id. at 32-33 (“By filing the [custody] appeal, you’re [(Father)]

the one that delayed the entry of a final custody order and the hearing of your 

support exceptions[.]”). 

Although Judge Demchick-Alloy correctly indicates in her June 16, 2022 

opinion that reasons do not expressly appear on the record as to why no 

hearings were held on the 2013 and 2014 exceptions, after careful review of 

the transcripts, we conclude that the breakdown resulted from a combination 

of factors, namely Father’s pending appeals, Judge Daniele’s attempt at 

maintaining some type of order to the morass of filings and petitions before 

her, as indicated above, and the subsequent change, in 2016, of local 

procedure on support exceptions. 

That change in local procedure, wherein the Montgomery County Court 

of Common Pleas adopted “the alternative hearing procedure of Pa.R.C.P.No. 

1910.12,” was noted at the outset of Judge Carluccio’s 2020 order. Pursuant 

to Rule 1910.12, the court directed the hearing officer to review the record 

for the years 2013 through 2019 and issue a report and noted that, thereafter, 

either party “may file exceptions in accordance with the Rule.” Order, 

8/26/20. Accordingly, the hearing officer issued a report, Father filed 

exceptions, and Judge Demchick-Alloy, pursuant to Rule 1910.12, “heard 
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argument on those exceptions on May 2, 2022,” see Opinion, 6/16/22, at 

3 (emphasis added), and entered an order denying those exceptions. See

Order 6/1/22. 

In her June 16, 2022 opinion, Judge Demchick-Alloy explained that 

Judge Carluccio’s 2020 order directing a hearing before the support hearing 

officer was a result of a change in local procedure: “[T]he Montgomery County 

Court of Common Pleas had adopted a procedure in which litigants receive a 

hearing of record before the support hearing officer, but not a hearing de 

novo for exceptions.” See Opinion, 6/16/22, at 4 (emphasis added). This 

change was made pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.10,

which provides, in relevant part: 

Rule 1910.10. Alternative Hearing Procedures

(a) The action shall proceed as prescribed by Pa.R.C.P. No. 

1910.11 unless the court by local rule adopts the alternative 

hearing procedure of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.12.

(b) The president judge or the administrative judge of the Family

Division of each county shall certify that all support proceedings 

in that county are conducted in accordance with either Pa.R.C.P. 

No. 1910.11 or Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.12. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.10(a), (b) (emphasis added). The Explanatory Comment

summarizes the differences in the two alternative procedures:

The procedure set forth in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.11 provides for a 

conference before a conference officer, a conference summary 

and entry of an interim order for support calculated in accordance 

with the guidelines, and a right to demand a hearing de novo 

before a judge. The hearing must be heard and the final order 

entered within 60 days of the written demand for hearing. 
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The alternate procedure, as set forth in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.12, 

provides for a conference before a conference officer, a record 

hearing before a hearing officer, and issuance of a report and 

recommendation in which exceptions may be filed within ten days. 

The court must hear argument and enter final order within 

60 days of the filing of exceptions.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910, Explanatory Comment (emphasis added).

Montgomery County Local Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.10 states: “The 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas adopts the alternative hearing 

procedure of Pa.R.C.P.No. 1910.12.” Rule 1910.12 provides:

If exceptions are filed, the interim order shall continue in effect. 

The court shall hear argument on the exceptions and enter 

an appropriate final order substantially in the form set forth in 

Rule 1910.27(e) within sixty days from the date of the filing of 

exceptions to the interim order. No motion for post-trial relief 

may be filed to the final order. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.12(h) (emphasis added). The 2020 order specifically stated 

that “[f]ollowing the issuance of the Officer’s Report, either party may file 

exceptions in accordance with the Rule.” Order, 8/26/20 (emphasis 

added).

17

 That reference is to Rule 1910.12(h). Unresolved, however, are 

Father’s 2013 and 2014 exceptions, which were filed prior to the 2016 change 

in procedure, and wherein Father filed a demand for a de novo hearing. See

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.11(i) (“If a demand is filed, there shall be a hearing de novo 

before the court.”). 

____________________________________________

17 Judge Carluccio’s order, directing proceedings before a support hearing 

officer (for the years 2013 through 2019), clearly intended to consolidate and 

expedite this protracted matter. 
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Moreover, because there is no transcript of the May 2, 2022 argument

before Judge Demchick-Alloy, this Court is unable to discern whether the 

format of that hearing prejudiced Father in any way. See Capauno, supra

(court’s decision precluding husband from offering testimony and evidence at 

de novo hearing following decision of conference officer in child support action 

constituted reversible error; trial court’s purported unwritten policy of not 

permitting presentation of evidence at de novo hearing at odds with Rules of 

Civil Procedure governing support actions, and although court heard 

arguments from husband’s counsel and from husband, these arguments were 

not substitute for evidence). Though confident Judge Demchick-Alloy had 

before her the complete domestic relations file,

18 and acknowledging that

Father has had numerous opportunities to be heard, we nonetheless conclude 

that the circumstances of this case, where Father filed exceptions and a 

demand for a de novo hearing prior to the 2016 change in local procedure, 

compel a remand.

19

____________________________________________

18 See Groner v. Groner, 476 A.2d 957, 959 (Pa. Super. 1984) (Rule 

1910.11(i) does not contemplate reliance upon record as substitute for de 

novo hearing).

19 We recognize that this procedure may ultimately yield the same results, and 

we advise Father that pursuing litigation for the sake of litigation is not in 

Children’s best interests.
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We reverse the court’s order denying Father’s 2013 and 2014 exceptions 

only, and we remand with instructions.20 Upon remand, the court shall hold 

a de novo hearing in compliance with Rule 1910.11(i), limited to Father’s 

exceptions filed on February 6, 2013 and November 21, 2014 (docket entries 

402 and 827, respectively), and only to those specific exceptions that have 

not been rendered moot as a result of subsequent proceedings. The court 

shall issue any appropriate orders in accordance with Rule 1910.11 and 

1930.5 (relating to discovery in domestic relations matters), and, if 

necessary, order either party to reimburse the other, as may be appropriate. 

Reversed in part; case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/2/2023

____________________________________________

20 We specify that our remand is limited to the 2013 and 2014 exceptions. 

Any objections Father has to the trial court’s resolution of support for the years 

2015 through 2019, without de novo review, was proper as those calculations 

were for year subsequent to the change in the local court rule. Moreover, 

those claims are waived for failure to develop an argument and failure to cite 

to any legal authority. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20-21 (Father arguing that 

court was “simply making up numbers,” and “took the lazy-way-out,” and 

claiming court and domestic relations office performed “judicial magical 

calculations.”).