Department of Homeland Security
 

DHS Involvement in OCDETF 


Operation Fast and Furious 


OIG-13-49 (Revised) March 2013
 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

March 22, 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 The Honorable John Morton 

Director 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

The Honorable David V. Aguilar 

Deputy Commissioner 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

FROM: 	Charles K. Edwards 


 Deputy Inspector General 

SUBJECT: 	 DHS Involvement in OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious 

(Revised), OIG-13-49 

Attached for your action is our revised final report, DHS Involvement in OCDETF Operation Fast 

and Furious (Revised), OIG-13-49. The original report contained several typographic errors, 

which we have corrected in this revision. Please see the attached errata for details. 

We incorporated the formal comments from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the final report. We also incorporated comments from 

the Department of Justice, to which we provided a courtesy copy of our draft report because 

our report mentions DHS employee perceptions of Department of Justice activities. 

The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. Your office concurred with all recommendations. As prescribed by the 

Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for Office of 

Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, 

please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) corrective action plan, 

and (2) target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible 

parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current 

status of the recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, the 

recommendations will be considered resolved but open. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing copies of 

our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation 

responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Deborah Outten-Mills, 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254-4015. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1 


Background ........................................................................................................................ 3 


Results of Inspection .......................................................................................................... 8 


Part One: ICE Headquarters Did Not Learn About Operation Fast and Furious 


Methodology Until December 2010, and enior DHS Officials Did Not Learn of It Until 


March 2011 .................................................................................................................. 8 


Part Two: HSI Arizona Staff Learned of ATF Weapons Smuggling Investigation That
 

Became Operation Fast and Furious, but the HSI SAC Did Not Understand
 

ATF’s Methodology ..................................................................................................... 18 


Several Factors Influenced the Decision to Dedicate an HSI Special Agent to
 

HSI Arizona Placed a Special Agent on Operation Fast and Furious, Did Not Provide 


Oversight Necessary to Prevent His Participation in Activities that Violate ICE Policy,
 

CBP Had Minimal Involvement in the ATF Investigation and OCDETF 


Operation Fast and Furious and Was Not Aware of the Flawed Investigative 


OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious........................................................................... 40 


Recommendation ....................................................................................................... 45 


and Did Not Attempt to Improve the Investigative Methodology ............................. 45 


Recommendation ....................................................................................................... 58 


Recommendation ....................................................................................................... 60 


Methodology .............................................................................................................. 60 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis................................................................ 61 


 

 

 

 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ................................................... 64 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ...................................... 66 


Appendix C: ICE/ATF Memorandum of Understanding............................................ 68 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report....................................................... 78 


Appendix E: Report Distribution ............................................................................... 79 


 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Abbreviations
 

AECA Arms Export Control Act 

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

AUSA Assistant United States Attorney 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DSAC Deputy Special Agent in Charge 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FFL Federal Firearms Licensee 

HSI Homeland Security Investigations 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ITAR International Trafficking in Arms Regulations 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

OBP Office of Border Patrol 

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

OFO Office of Field Operations 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

RAC Resident Special Agent in Charge 

ROI Report of Investigation 

SAC Special Agent in Charge 

USAO U.S. Attorney’s Office 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had minimal involvement in the Organized 

Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Operation Fast and Furious. Our review of DHS 

involvement in the operation determined that senior DHS officials in Washington, DC 

had no awareness of the methodology used by the task force to investigate Operation 

Fast and Furious until media reports were published in March 2011. These reports 

asserted that while investigating an international weapons smuggling ring, task force 

members used a dangerous methodology in which they observed suspicious weapons 

purchases, but took no effective action to seize the weapons. As a result, weapons were 

smuggled to Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Similarly, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) headquarters officials did not learn about the methodology 

until December 2010, when the operation was almost over. A Homeland Security 

Investigations Arizona official informed Homeland Security Investigations headquarters 

officials that two of these weapons were found at the scene of the murder of a U.S. 

Border Patrol Agent. However, the officials did not inform ICE headquarters staff that a 

Homeland Security Investigations special agent participated in the operation. 

In December 2009, Homeland Security Investigations Arizona personnel first obtained 

information about the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives investigation 

that later became Operation Fast and Furious. They learned that the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives was investigating a suspected international weapons 

smuggling ring. However, Homeland Security Investigations Arizona personnel did not 

inform ICE headquarters about the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives’ investigative methodology while the operation was underway. Most 

Homeland Security Investigations personnel in Arizona who received information about 

the investigation recognized that the task force was using a flawed methodology, which 

was contrary to ICE policy and practices for weapons smuggling investigations. 

However, the Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent in Charge did not draw 

the same conclusions about the operation from that information. 

When the investigation was certified as Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

Operation Fast and Furious, the Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent in 

Charge agreed to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ request that 

he dedicate a Homeland Security Investigations special agent to the operation. He did 

so to ensure that smuggling statutes were enforced. Also, the Homeland Security 

Investigations Special Agent in Charge knew that the U.S. Attorney’s Office strongly 

supported the operation, and ICE headquarters had directed its staff to cooperate with 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The task force was primarily 

staffed by personnel from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, but 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

other law enforcement officers from state, local, and Federal agencies participated, as 

well. 

During Operation Fast and Furious and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives investigation that preceded it, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives requested that Homeland Security Investigations not pursue investigative 

leads to identify and stop weapons smugglers. Senior Homeland Security Investigations 

Arizona staff complied, and the leads were not investigated. 

The Homeland Security Investigations special agent assigned was involved in some of 

the investigative activities that allowed weapons to be lost and ultimately smuggled into 

Mexico even though he was aware that those activities might violate ICE policy. 

However, he believed that his role was to cooperate with the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and to coordinate enforcement activities with U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Homeland Security Investigations. His 

activities were documented in reports of investigation and approved by Homeland 

Security Investigations group supervisors. However, the Homeland Security 

Investigations Special Agent in Charge and other senior leaders did not read the reports 

and did not direct the special agent to change the methodology or his activities 

supporting the methodology. 

We have concerns that the Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent in Charge 

did not understand the flawed investigative methodology, and that Homeland Security 

Investigations Arizona did not pursue viable investigative leads, which we describe more 

fully in the report. We made three recommendations for improvement in these areas. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force’s Operation Fast and 

Furious 

This report examines the DHS role in planning and executing the Organized 

Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Operation known as Fast and 

Furious, and whether the Department’s activities complied with DHS policy and 

practices. Operation Fast and Furious has been subject to intense congressional, 

Federal, and public scrutiny due to the investigative methodology that allowed 

weapons to be illegally smuggled to criminal organizations in Mexico. The 

Operation Fast and Furious task force included staff from the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Internal Revenue Service; and 

state and local law enforcement agencies. Of these, ATF contributed the most 

resources. 

Operation Fast and Furious arose from an ATF investigation that focused on 

suspected “straw purchasers” in Phoenix, Arizona, whose newly acquired 

weapons were being smuggled to Mexico. A straw purchaser of a weapon is 

someone who buys a weapon on behalf of someone else, but not as a gift. Straw 

purchases of weapons are unlawful. When seeking to purchase weapons from a 

Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL), individuals and businesses that are licensed to 

sell firearms, a prospective buyer must complete a form 4473. That form 

requires the buyers to confirm that they are purchasing weapons on behalf of 

themselves, not someone else. Providing false information that the weapon[s] is 

for the purchaser, and not someone else, is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). 

Under the methodology used in the investigation and later OCDETF Operation 

Fast and Furious, investigators conducted surveillance of FFLs to observe sales to 

suspected straw purchasers; investigators then followed the purchasers and 

weapons to a residence or business, and ended surveillance. As a result, the 

investigators lost the ability to track or seize the weapons. Once surveillance 

stopped, the weapons could be, and were, transferred to others and transported 

elsewhere. 

The straw purchasers observed during the initial ATF investigation and later 

during OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious made multiple purchases of weapons 

favored by Mexican drug trafficking organizations. ATF believed that the 

weapons were being purchased on behalf of a smuggling ring that was 

transferring the firearms to a violent Mexican drug trafficking organization. By 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the end of the operation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) indicted 20 straw 

purchasers who had acquired more than 1900 weapons. 

Approximately 567 of the weapons bought by the suspected straw purchasers 

were later recovered by law enforcement agents in Mexico and the United 

States, leaving approximately 1,430 missing. Of the 567 seized, only 105 were 

seized as a result of the operation’s initiative. The remaining 462 were seized by 

law enforcement officers who happened upon them in the course of their 

normal duties. In December 2010, two of the weapons were found at the site 

where Office of Border Patrol (OBP) Agent Brian Terry was murdered. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed the 

role of DOJ agencies in Operation Fast and Furious, including ATF and the USAO. 

DOJ organizations maintain much of the historical information about Operation 

Fast and Furious. The DOJ OIG had authority to review DOJ documentation and 

data, as well as interview DOJ employees with knowledge about the operation. 

The results of their review were included in the September 2012 report, A 

Review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters, that provides 

an in-depth account of the facts related to DOJ involvement and lead role in the 

operation. 

Our review does not assess the propriety of ATF or DOJ activities related to 

Operation Fast and Furious. To assess whether DHS activities that supported 

Operation Fast and Furious complied with DHS policy, we obtained related email 

messages and conducted interviews with DHS staff members about their 

knowledge and understanding of Operation Fast and Furious. However, as part 

of our fieldwork, we did not solicit opinions from DOJ staff regarding their 

reaction to statements made by DHS staff since our intent was only to determine 

DHS officials’ interpretation of information, regardless of its accuracy, that led to 

decisions related to Operation Fast and Furious. 

DHS Mission to Protect the Borders by Detecting, Preventing, and Investigating 

Illegal Smuggling 

A primary mission of the Department is to protect U.S. borders and prevent 

illegal goods and merchandise from crossing them. CBP interdicts smuggled 

goods at the ports of entry and between them. HSI investigates smuggling 

violations, including weapons smuggling. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

CBP Mission and Organization 

CBP has three components responsible for stopping contraband from crossing 

U.S. borders. The CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for 

securing the ports of entry, and the OBP secures the borders between the ports 

of entry. The CBP Office of Air and Marine supports border aerial and marine 

border security. 

An integral aspect of securing the ports of entry is to enforce the immigration 

and customs laws. OFO officers inspect the people, vehicles, and merchandise 

destined to enter or exit the United States though the ports of entry. OFO has a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ICE that delineates roles and 

responsibilities for both agencies. When OFO officers encounter contraband, 

they notify HSI special agents to investigate the circumstances. When any 

Federal law enforcement agency seeks enforcement action at the ports of entry, 

it must request the support through ICE. OFO monitors ten ports of entry in 

Arizona. Port Directors are responsible for the operations at each port. 

OBP patrols the international borders between the ports of entry to detect and 

prevent goods and people from crossing the border illegally. OBP also assists 

OFO at ports of entry when additional personnel are required. OBP has an MOU 

with ICE that governs their interaction. ICE must notify OBP to coordinate any 

investigative activities between the ports of entry. OBP splits Arizona into two 

sectors, Yuma and Tucson, which together are responsible for the operations of 

ten OBP stations in Arizona. OBP Sector Chiefs are responsible for the activities 

of their agents. 

HSI Mission and Organization 

HSI is the ICE directorate responsible for investigations, international affairs, and 

intelligence gathering related to the ICE mission. ICE maintains a headquarters 

staff that provides support to the 26 HSI field offices throughout the United 

States. A Special Agent in Charge (SAC) leads each HSI field office. 

An HSI SAC is responsible for the HSI staff working in the Phoenix offices, as well 

as staff in eight other offices in Arizona. Those offices have leaders that report 

to the SAC. A Deputy Special Agent in Charge (DSAC) leads the HSI Tucson office; 

Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC) lead the Douglas, Nogales, Sells, and 

Yuma offices; and Resident Special Agents in Charge (RAC) lead the field offices 

in Flagstaff and Casa Grande, Arizona. HSI criminal investigators are called 

special agents. Lower-ranking special agents report to supervisory special 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

agents, who are called group supervisors. Group supervisors in turn report to 

ASACs or RACs. We refer to the SAC throughout the Report as the HSI SAC and 

to his staff as HSI Arizona staff. 

Figure 1: HSI Phoenix SAC Field Offices 

SAC DSAC ASAC RAC/GS 

Phoenix (1) Phoenix (1) Phoenix Phoenix (14) 

- Tucson (1) Tucson (3) Tucson (8) 

- - Douglas (1) Douglas (5) 

- - Nogales (1) Nogales (5) 

- - Sells (1) Sells (4) 

- - Yuma (1) Yuma (4) 

- - - Flagstaff (1) 

- - - Ajo (1) 

- - - Casa Grande (1) 

Source: ICE 

SACs are accountable for the actions of their offices. They have responsibility for 

overall internal resource allocation within their offices and management of their 

offices’ relationships with other agencies and departments. A SAC informs the 

Director and Assistant Director of Operations to serious issues the SAC believes 

require headquarters attention. The DSACs are responsible for daily oversight of 

their office’s investigations. To transmit operational issues to headquarters, 

DSACs and ASACs report to the desk officer who works within the Operations 

Directorate. ICE headquarters officials expect SACs to resolve issues that arise 

within their field offices, but will provide assistance when necessary. 

HSI Legal Authorities for Weapons Smuggling Cases 

HSI has enforcement authority for a broad range of statutes including those that 

define and criminalize the illegal exportation of weapons. Section 38 of the Arms 

Export Control Act, as amended (AECA) and the International Trafficking in Arms 

Regulations (ITAR) govern the importation and exportation of defense-related 

articles and services, including the types of weapons purchased by the suspects 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

in Operation Fast and Furious.1

 AECA and ITAR require that exporters obtain a 

license to transport the weapons across the U.S. borders. Some of the weapons 

that were the subject of Operation Fast and Furious were transported to Mexico 

without appropriate licenses in violation of AECA’s provisions. The ITAR explicitly 

grants ICE and CBP the authority to inspect, investigate, detain, and seize 

weapons that violate AECA, including the weapons that were the focus of 

Operation Fast and Furious. 

In 2006, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 

Act of 2005, which established a new customs statute, 18 U.S.C. § 554, 

Smuggling Goods from the United States. ICE staff members said that ICE has 

exclusive jurisdiction to investigate this customs violation. The statute makes it a 

crime to fraudulently or knowingly export or facilitate the exportation of goods 

in a manner that violates U.S. statutes and regulations. The statute carries a 

maximum sentence of ten years incarceration.2

 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits 

certain individuals, including illegal aliens, from transporting or shipping 

firearms and ammunition in interstate and foreign commerce, or receiving any 

such items which have been so shipped or transported. 

HSI special agents, CBP OFO officers, and OBP agents possess more authorities 

than ATF and local police to protect the U.S. borders. Under the “border search” 

exception to the Fourth Amendment, customs and border officials may conduct 

routine searches of individuals and vehicles at or near the border for 

merchandise or evidence related to the importation or exportation of 

merchandise, including firearms, without probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion. In addition to the border search exception, Federal statutes grant HSI 

special agents, CBP OFO officers, and OBP agents the authority to search 

individuals without probable cause at the border.3 

OCDETF Operations 

The OCDETF program was established in 1982 to identify, disrupt, and dismantle 

major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. Federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies, including ICE and ATF, work together on OCDETF 

operations, and the USAO provides oversight. OCDETF committees across the 

country can certify investigations for OCDETF funding. To obtain certification, an 

agency must propose to the committee an investigation or operation that has 

one or more drug trafficking organizations as its target. Weapons smuggling 

1

 22 U.S.C. § 2778; 22 CFR §§ 120-130. 


2

 18 U.S.C. § 554 Smuggling of Goods from the United States.
 

3

 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1467, 1496, 1581, 1582.
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

investigations may also receive OCDETF certification if the proposal links the 

weapons smuggling ring to one or more significant drug trafficking organizations. 

To be certified as an OCDETF operation and receive OCDETF funding, an 

investigation must be pursued as a task force that includes several agencies. 

Title III Electronic Surveillance Wiretaps 

The OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious used Title III electronic wiretaps, which 

allow Federal, state, and other investigative and law enforcement agencies to 

intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications to further a criminal 

investigation. An investigating or law enforcement official seeking a Title III 

wiretap must receive judicial authorization. Such officials submit an application, 

including an affidavit, to DOJ’s Office of Enforcement Operations, which reviews 

all wiretap applications to ensure that each application meets statutory 

requirements and DOJ guidelines. If the application meets the requirements, 

and the Attorney General or his designee authorizes it, an Assistant United 

States Attorney (AUSA) will forward it to a Federal judge for approval.4 

Results of Inspection 

The results of our review are presented in two parts. Part One provides an 

overview of the extent to which senior ICE and DHS officials became 

knowledgeable of the planning and implementation of Operation Fast and 

Furious. Part Two includes specific details of related events that occurred 

between DHS staff in field locations and ATF staff members, and the extent to 

which the Department complied with DHS policies and procedures for weapons 

smuggling investigations. 

Part One: ICE Headquarters Did Not Learn about Operation Fast and Furious 

Methodology Until December 2010, and Senior DHS Officials Did Not Learn of It 

Until March 2011 

ICE headquarters officials received their first indication of the OCDETF operation 

and its flawed methodology after OBP Agent Terry was murdered and two 

weapons recovered at the scene had been purchased by Operation Fast and 

Furious suspected straw purchasers during the course of the investigation. The 

HSI SAC informed ICE headquarters officials that the weapons recovered at the 

4

 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, Pub. L. 90-351, Title III, governs 

the procedures and requirements for obtaining wiretap orders in the United States. The law was codified 

in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) states that the Attorney General or his designee, such as 

the Deputy Attorney General, may authorize the submission of wiretap application. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

crime scene were linked to the OCDETF operation, and he characterized HSI 

Arizona involvement as “tangential.” An ICE headquarters official appropriately 

advised the HSI SAC to provide all of the information he had to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which was investigating the murder. 

In March 2011, after several media reports criticized Operation Fast and Furious, 

the DHS Secretary began to seek information about it and any involvement by 

DHS components. She worked with ICE headquarters to learn the facts of 

Operation Fast and Furious and details about ICE policy and practices related to 

weapons smuggling investigations along the Southwest Border. 

The DHS Secretary did not learn about Operation Fast and Furious, its flawed 

methodology, or that ICE had assigned an HSI special agent to the task force until 

mid-March 2011. The ICE Director did not learn of the operation until January 

2011 when ATF scheduled a press conference, and he did not learn of the flawed 

methodology until March 2011. Likewise, the HSI headquarters officials did not 

know about the operation’s methodology until that time, though they were 

aware that HSI Arizona had a special agent assisting the task force in December 

2010. 

By the time the DHS Secretary received information about ICE participation in 

the task force, the DOJ OIG had already begun its review of Operation Fast and 

Furious. Neither ICE headquarters officials nor the Secretary spoke with anyone 

from DOJ OIG about the operation. The Secretary’s and ICE officials’ actions 

were appropriate. 

Murder of OBP Agent Terry Provided ICE Headquarters Officials With the First 

Information About the Operation’s Flawed Methodology 

On the morning of December 15, 2010, HSI Arizona learned that OBP Agent Terry 

had been murdered by suspects that he and others with him were attempting to 

apprehend. That afternoon, the HSI special agent assigned to the Operation Fast 

and Furious task force informed his group supervisor that “the firearm used to 

kill [Border Patrol Agent] Terry” had been purchased by one of the operation’s 

suspected straw purchasers in January 2010. At 5:29 p.m. that evening, the 

group supervisor sent an email message to his ASAC and DSAC explaining what 

he had learned from the HSI special agent about the firearm. The DSAC 

forwarded the email message to the HSI SAC and stated, “[t]his is why you don’t 

let that many guns walk.” 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In another string of messages that night between the group supervisor and his 

ASAC, two DSACs, and the HSI SAC, the group supervisor wrote that three 

weapons had been recovered at the scene of the murder. Two were traced to a 

straw purchaser who was a suspect in the operation, but the results on the third 

weapon were unknown. Later, ICE management was informed correctly that 

only two weapons were found at the scene and forensic tests could not 

determine if either was the murder weapon. The group supervisor also wrote 

that the AUSA had been made aware of the situation. In another email message, 

he wrote “[a]nd this is exactly what I said would happened [sic] when you let 

that many guns walk.” His ASAC also wrote in an email message, “[t]hat is why 

we shouldn’t let guns walk!” 

At 7:05 p.m., the HSI SAC informed his supervisor, the Assistant Director of 

Operations, in ICE headquarters that weapons at the murder were linked to 

OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious. In the email, he characterized HSI 

involvement with the operation as “tangential”: 

ICE has been tangentially involved in the case since many
 

weapons that have been seized in HSI cases have been 


traced to sales at [a Phoenix, Arizona, FFL] and straw 


purchasers that ATF has already investigated. Our efforts 


to work these targets have been thwarted because of the 


ATF OCDETF case. 


The Assistant Director of Operations informed her supervisor, the Executive 

Associate Director of Operations. The Executive Associate Director of Operations 

instructed the HSI SAC to provide all the information he had to the FBI, which 

would be responsible for the investigation. 

The Secretary visited OBP Arizona offices on December 17, 2010 to support the 

OBP staff and to assert to the USAO and to the FBI that DHS wanted an 

aggressive investigation and prosecution. The Secretary did not visit with ICE 

personnel in Arizona. U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke traveled with her from 

Phoenix to the offices she visited and attended the meetings with OBP 

personnel. However, Burke and others did not inform her about the connection 

between the weapons recovered at the scene of the murder and the OCDETF 

operation. They did not mention Operation Fast and Furious. 

The HSI special agent on the operation acted appropriately when he informed his 

chain of command about the connection between the firearms found at the site 

of OBP Agent Terry’s murder and the operation. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

We question the HSI SAC’s use of the word “tangential” to describe HSI’s 

involvement in the operation. Just a few weeks earlier, as we describe later in 

our report, the group supervisor of the HSI special agent on the operation had 

described the special agent’s role in the indictment phase of the operation as 

“fully involved.” Additionally, the HSI special agent had worked full time on the 

operation since its inception. He had conducted surveillance, interviews, and 

monitored wiretaps with the rest of the operation’s staff. The proposal that 

established the operation named him and an ATF agent as co-leads. The HSI SAC 

should have provided ICE headquarters officials with a more thorough and clear 

account of the role his office had in the operation. 

The ICE headquarters officials acted appropriately, especially when the HSI 

Executive Associate Director of Operations directed the HSI SAC to provide all 

information available to the FBI special agents who were investigating the 

murder. 

HSI Arizona Special Agents Assisted with the Arrest of 20 Operation Fast and 

Furious Suspects; Subsequently the HSI Special Agent on the Operation Stopped 

Work on Operation 

The grand jury indicted 20 Operation Fast and Furious suspects on January 19, 

2011. The indictment did not include any substantive charges of the AECA or 18 

U.S.C. § 554 smuggling statutes for the actual transportation of weapons across 

the border to Mexico. However, the indictment included one charge of 

conspiracy to smuggle weapons. The HSI special agent on the task force assisted 

with the first string of arrests on January 25, 2011, as did other HSI special agents 

and CBP personnel who previously had no knowledge of the case. 

The HSI special agent assigned to the operation documented the arrests on 

January 31, 2011. He resumed his work with HSI Arizona and left the OCDETF. 

DHS Headquarters and ICE Headquarters Assess DHS Involvement After Press 

Articles Criticize Operation Fast and Furious 

The DHS Secretary, the ICE Director, and other senior ICE headquarters 

officials said that they learned about the flawed methodology in 

Operation Fast and Furious when news articles about the operation 

began to appear. We found no evidence that the DHS Secretary, ICE 

Director, or other senior officials were aware of the Operation Fast and 

Furious methodology prior to publication of the news articles. The DHS 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary began to seek information from ICE in early March 2011. The 

ICE Director’s office assisted with asking questions and determining the 

ICE role in Operation Fast and Furious. They worked together to 

understand the facts of the case. 

After making initial inquiries, the ICE Director instructed staff members to 

review ICE emails in response to congressional requests for information. 

A team of ICE staff interviewed HSI Arizona staff who had knowledge of 

Operation Fast and Furious. The team concluded that HSI Arizona had 

not knowingly allowed weapons to cross the border into Mexico during 

Operation Fast and Furious, and that HSI policy and practice was never to 

allow known and uncontrolled loads of weapons to be transported across 

the southern border. The team concluded that HSI Arizona staff had 

been misled by ATF with regard to the operation’s methodology. Our 

findings differ in that we believe HSI Arizona senior staff had the 

information available to conclude that ATF had opportunities to seize 

weapons that were destined for Mexico. Despite that, the DHS Secretary 

and ICE Director acted appropriately to the initial indications that ICE may 

have been involved in the flawed operation. 

The DHS Secretary Initially Did Not Receive Complete Information About ICE 

Involvement in the Operation 

After articles about Operation Fast and Furious began to appear in the press, the 

DHS Secretary began to inquire about ATF’s methodology and its relation to the 

straw purchasers who bought the weapons recovered at OBP Agent Terry’s 

murder site. Beginning on March 5, 2011, she asked ICE to answer questions 

about Operation Fast and Furious. HSI Arizona and ICE headquarters both drafted 

answers. The answers did not inform the Secretary that ICE had placed an HSI 

special agent on Operation Fast and Furious. The Secretary’s office was not 

satisfied with the initial answers and required more information. This exchange 

continued for several weeks. 

During her morning briefing on March 5, 2011, the Secretary asked that the 

Southwest Border HSI SACs answer some questions to prepare her for a meeting 

with the U.S. Attorney General, which was scheduled for March 8, 2011. The 

questions were sent to ICE headquarters staff, which forwarded them to the HSI 

Phoenix SAC and other SAC offices. The email message stated, “[i]n preparation 

for a meeting with the AG, S1 is asking HSI to reach out to the SWB [Southwest 

Border] SACs to see if we can weigh in on the matter involving ATF guns 

smuggling investigations.” S1 is a term commonly used in DHS to refer to the 

www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department’s Secretary. “AG” is a reference to the U.S. Attorney General. The 

Secretary and two key staff members said that the meeting between the U.S. 

Attorney General and the Secretary was cancelled. Her schedule confirms that 

she did not attend; instead, lower level staff attended the meeting. They did not 

discuss Operation Fast and Furious. Instead, they discussed protocols for 

communications between DHS and DOJ. DOJ had concerns that the Secretary and 

her staff were contacting DOJ staff for information inappropriately. 

The Secretary’s March 5, 2011 questions included the following: 

•	 Had ATF allowed any weapons to be taken into Mexico as part of ongoing 

or previous investigations, and if so were they controlled deliveries 

coordinated with CBP? 

•	 Had ATF been conducting investigations into the purchasers of the 

weapons linked to the murders of OBP Agent Terry and ICE Special Agent 

Zapata prior to the murders? [ICE Special Agent Zapata was murdered in 

Mexico in February 2011.] If so, did ATF ever knowingly allow the suspects 

to transport weapons into Mexico? 

•	 What were ATF’s standard practices when it suspected an investigation’s 

subjects were smuggling weapons out of the country? How did ATF 

prevent the weapons from being illegally exported? 

The HSI Arizona SAC received these questions and responded to the HSI Arizona 

desk officer at headquarters late in the evening of March 7, 2011. Before they 

returned their response, the ICE Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, prepared 

answers, which he transmitted to the ICE Deputy Director, who forwarded the 

response to the ICE Chief of Staff. We did not locate an email that transmitted 

the responses to the Secretary’s office. The answer to the first question 

discussed the requirements for Federal agencies to allow weapons to cross the 

border and stated that according to the ICE/ATF MOU, ATF would need to notify 

ICE before the weapons were moved across the border. The answer then stated 

that an informal polling of HSI Southwest Border offices: 

... revealed no instances when ATF knowingly abrogated this MOU and/or 

violated current federal law by willingly allowing USML weapons to 

transit the international border, specifically, in the instance of the cases 

related to the homicide of DHS personnel, into Mexico. 

The response to the second question stated that ICE was working with ATF to 

obtain more information related to the purchases of the weapons linked to the 

murders of ICE Special Agent Zapata and OBP Agent Terry. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ICE headquarters’ response to the third question was that ATF was compelled to 

advise ICE and CBP when it conducted investigations targeting international arms 

smuggling organizations. It continues, “[h]owever, this protocol does not 

preclude the unintentional release of weapons given to targets domestically who 

then, unbeknownst to ATF, carry them travel [sic] out of the U.S.” 

On March 8, 2011, the HSI SAC provided the ICE headquarters desk officer with 

answers to the questions. His email message stated the following: 

•	 ATF knew or should have known that weapons that they had identified 

were being smuggled into Mexico; 

•	 CBP probably was not notified of any loads of weapons passing through 

the ports of entry as “uncontrolled deliveries;” 

•	 HSI had been aware that ATF allowed cold convoys of weapons to be 

transported to Mexico in 2007, and on at least two occasions the 

deliveries were compromised; 

•	 HSI learned that the ATF investigation’s subjects were responsible for 

smuggling hundreds of weapons to Mexico, and ATF was adamant that 

any enforcement action would jeopardize their attempt to get a Title III 

wiretap; 

•	 ATF received contemporaneous intelligence of weapons sales during 

Operation Fast and Furious, and had identified the locations where 

weapons were stored pending transit to Mexico; 

•	 ATF put into eTrace information from all weapons sold in four FFLs, which 

blocked HSI from conducting investigations of any weapons sold by those 

stores;5 

•	 The purchaser of the weapon linked to the murder of OBP Agent Terry 

was the subject of Operation Fast and Furious; and 

•	 HSI Arizona cannot comment on ATF standard practices, but it appears 

that ATF does not give priority to preventing weapons from being 

exported illegally to Mexico. 

5

 In comments to our report, DOJ said that ATF put information from all weapons purchased by Operation 

Fast and Furious suspects into the Suspect Gun Database. The ATF case agent did not authorize release of 

information on the guns in that database. As a result, when HSI special agents requested information on 

weapons purchased by Operation Fast and Furious suspects, they did not receive information in response. 

The HSI investigations were impeded as a result. As a general matter, entry of information about weapons 

into the eTrace system does not automatically trigger a mechanism to prevent the dissemination of the 

information. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The answers did not mention that HSI Arizona assigned an HSI special agent to 

participate on the OCDETF. 

The Secretary had additional questions transmitted through ICE Director Morton 

on March 8, 2011, as follows: 

1.	 What licenses are required by law enforcement to ship export firearms 

from the United States to Mexico, and does ICE have a role in that 

process? 

2.	 What language in the ICE/ATF MOU requires ATF to notify ICE of efforts 

“to export or let guns walk across the border;” and had ICE ever received 

such a notification? 

3.	 Did ICE have any prior contact with ATF over the guns identified at the 

scene of OBP Agent Terry’s death or ICE Special Agent Zapata’s death? 

4.	 Does ICE policy allow firearms “to walk” domestically or internationally? 

In response to the Secretary’s questions, the ICE Chief of Staff provided draft 

answers to one of the Secretary’s advisors shortly after receiving the questions. 

The answers to questions 1, 2, and 4, were full paragraphs. The answers 

provided a full explanation of the weapons laws, the ICE/ATF MOU, and ICE’s 

position that no firearms may be transported across the international border. 

However, the response to question 3, regarding any prior contact with ATF over 

guns identified at the scene of OBP Agent Terry and ICE Special Agent Zapata’s 

death, was, “No.” 

The advisor told us that he informed ICE headquarters officials that they needed 

to provide more facts to explain what they thought happened in the ATF 

investigation, and “why we are convinced that we did not knowingly allow these 

guns into Mexico.” Specifically, the Secretary’s advisor sent the following email 

message to the ICE Director and the Chief of Staff on March 10, 2011: 

S1 is exceptionally concerned about the ATF issues. She wants to 

make sure that, at any level, we had no knowledge of the specific 

purchase that may be related to Terry. She may also want a 

general briefing on how our agents interact with ATF in these type 

cases in the past. Do you guys mind taking a deep dive on this and 

making sure we had no advance knowledge on this one? 

The ICE Chief of Staff responded that ICE was gathering more information and 

she would call the advisor when she had more complete answers. We were not 

able to interview the ICE Chief of Staff, who left DHS employment during the 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

course of our review. We did not locate an email message with responses to this 

question. 

On March 12, 2011, DHS headquarters requested additional information from 

HSI field offices to include summaries of how HSI received information and what 

actions it took on the cases. DHS headquarters also wanted to know about any 

leads that ATF provided to HSI and what actions HSI took on those leads. In 

addition, the HSI field offices needed to explain how they coordinated the cases 

with CBP. HSI Arizona senior leaders surmised that DHS headquarters wanted to 

review how HSI typically handled firearms cases. HSI Arizona compiled a 

detailed list of more than 50 cases. It also included summaries of email 

messages from 2008 and early 2009 that documented problems the HSI Arizona 

field offices had with ATF, including instances in which ATF’s operational tactics 

allowed weapons to cross into Mexico without appropriate licenses, 

notifications, or coordination with the Government of Mexico. In those 

messages, ICE articulated that it would not allow weapons to be transported into 

Mexico without following the statutorily required processes and ensuring the 

weapons could be safeguarded. 

To learn more about HSI involvement in Operation Fast and Furious, HSI 

headquarters officials read the reports of investigation (ROI) that the HSI 

special agent had drafted to document his work on Operation Fast and 

Furious. ICE headquarters sent the following questions about the reports 

to HSI Arizona on March 13, 2011: 

•	 Provide details about the seizure of weapons that were actively being 

transported to the international border of Mexico? 

•	 What investigative techniques were used on the suspect who had 

purchased the weapons found at the scene of OBP Agent Terry’s murder? 

•	 Was ICE aware that individuals within ATF disputed the Operation Fast 

and Furious methodology while the operation was underway? 

•	 Was HSI involved in the surveillances that terminated when a vehicle with 

weapons parked at a residence? What happened to the surveillance? 

The HSI ASAC that supervised the HSI special agent on the operation and his 

group supervisor provided a draft response to his chain of command: 

We were aware that there was a dispute within ATF over the 

operational philosophy of the operation; we had the same 

concerns in the January 2010 meeting when we stated we would 

not let guns walk south. The issue seems to have been that ATF 

and the USAO did not want to do anything to jeopardize the wire 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

they were writing and both ATF and the USAO insisted that we not 

interfere... yes, we were aware but were not directly involved. 

The HSI ASAC provided ICE headquarters with answers to some of the 

questions a few hours later on March 13, 2011. In the email message the 

ASAC said that HSI Arizona “had no knowledge period of ATF walking 

guns, they were clear on our (HSI) and the SAC’s stance on this.” He 

provided the details related to seven domestic seizures the task force 

made that the HSI special agent on the operation had recorded in ROIs. 

His email message also stated: 

•	 The sole HSI special agent assigned to Operation Fast and Furious 

did not believe that the task force surveilled the suspect who 

purchased the weapons found at the scene of OBP Agent Terry’s 

murder; 

•	 The sole HSI special agent did not participate in many of the 

surveillances; he documented in TECS some, but not all of the 

surveillance work he conducted. 

•	 Generally, once weapons went to a residence, surveillance 


terminated. 


ICE Assembled a Team to Assess HSI Involvement in Operation Fast and 

Furious 

In June 2011, ICE headquarters assigned a team to collect more 

information about Operation Fast and Furious in response to 

congressional requests for information. The team said that it reviewed 

6,000 email messages. In January 2012, three ICE headquarters staff 

traveled to Arizona to interview HSI Arizona personnel who were 

knowledgeable about Operation Fast and Furious. 

The team did not document its findings in reports or briefing papers. 

However, team members said that they concluded that ATF had misled 

ICE to believe that the investigation would be conducted competently. 

HSI assigned the HSI special agent to the task force in an attempt to 

cooperate with ATF and the USAO. 

The ICE headquarters team did not review as many messages as we did. 

It did not have the important messages that assisted us in our interviews 

with HSI Arizona staff. As a result, the team’s findings differ from ours. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

However, it appears that the team made a good faith effort to collect the 

important facts. 

Conclusion 

Each DHS, ICE, and HSI headquarters official that we interviewed stated 

they did not learn about the operation’s flawed methodology until the 

media reports started to raise concerns. The email messages we 

reviewed indicate the same. In March 2011, as the media reporting 

intensified, the DHS Secretary and ICE headquarters officials sent multiple 

requests for information that indicate they did not know HSI had a special 

agent participating on the operation and that the operation’s 

methodology was flawed. They acted appropriately in response to the 

information being published. 

Likewise, ICE headquarters acted appropriately when it established a 

team to review thoroughly the circumstances of HSI participation in the 

task force. Our findings differ, but it appears the team made a significant 

effort to discover the facts. 

Part Two: HSI Arizona Staff Learned of ATF Weapons Smuggling Investigation 

That Became Operation Fast and Furious, but the HSI SAC Did Not Understand 

ATF’s Methodology 

The ATF Phoenix field office began an investigation of several suspected straw 

purchasers on October 31, 2009. HSI special agents in Arizona learned about 

ATF’s investigation in November and December 2009 while conducting two 

investigations to determine the sources of weapons being smuggled into Mexico. 

ATF agents informed the HSI office that the weapons HSI was investigating were 

related to an ongoing ATF investigation of weapons purchased by suspected 

straw purchasers. ATF and, according to interviews with some HSI Arizona staff, 

the AUSA requested that HSI terminate their ongoing weapons smuggling 

investigations, and refrain from further efforts to identify the smuggling ring’s 

transportation cell.6

 The HSI SAC agreed to the request largely because of the 

AUSA’s support of ATF’s case. 

As some HSI Arizona field office staff members learned more about the ATF 

investigation, they conveyed to other HSI Arizona staff their concerns about the 

6

 In its comments to our report, DOJ stated that USAO maintains that it did not request that ICE refrain 

from its investigations. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

investigation’s methodology, in which ATF investigators would discontinue 

surveillance without seizing the weapons. HSI policies and procedures for 

contraband smuggling investigations prohibit losing contraband, especially when 

the contraband is firearms. HSI Arizona senior leaders and special agents tried to 

influence ATF’s plan to further the investigation and stop weapons from being 

transported to Mexico. However, ATF did not revise its strategy, and it 

continued with its original plan for investigating the weapons smuggling 

operation. 

HSI Arizona supervisory staff assigned a special agent to assist ATF in November 

2009; however, the HSI special agent had minimal participation in the ATF 

investigation, and did not document any investigative activity until he became 

more actively involved in the investigation in mid-January 2010. 

The HSI SAC said he did not understand the full extent of ATF’s methodology 

until December 2010, a year after ATF began its investigation. The HSI SAC said 

that until then he did not know that ATF had the opportunity to stop weapons 

from being smuggled to Mexico. 

HSI Policies and Practices Require Contraband to be Continuously Monitored 

Until Seized 

HSI policy allows special agents to delay the immediate seizure of evidence in 

order to learn more about a criminal organization. The procedures for delaying 

seizure are stated in the U.S. Customs Special Agent Handbook, USCS-HB-98-01, 

Ch. 15, April 3, 1997. The handbook indicates that a special agent must follow 

extensive procedures anytime a special agent wants to delay immediate seizure 

of newly discovered contraband. The handbook identifies a delayed seizure as a 

controlled delivery. The handbook lists rules for conducting controlled 

deliveries. The handbook does not specifically state that special agents must 

continue surveillance of contraband until they seize it, although every HSI special 

agent that we asked understood that to be the policy. However, the handbook’s 

extensive requirements for the conduct of controlled deliveries and the absence 

of any terms that would allow special agents to stop surveillance preclude 

stopping surveillance without seizing the contraband. 

The handbook requires significant planning for controlled deliveries, including 

notification and approval from ICE headquarters as well as coordination with law 

enforcement agencies in areas through which the controlled delivery would 

pass. The handbook also notes that planning controlled deliveries requires 

“strict attention to resource allocation” because controlled deliveries “can 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

require the dedication of substantial personnel and equipment” and 

“surveillance activities can be lengthy and geographically broad.” Special agents 

are directed to use aerial surveillance if it is needed. The handbook requires that 

a senior special agent “will direct the surveillance and ensure frequent 

communication with the originating, transited, and receiving offices.” It also 

states that the SAC at the destination point “is responsible for providing 

resources and ensuring the security of the contraband to its destination.” When 

a controlled delivery has reached its destination, the case agent should report 

the additional searches, arrests, and seizures that occurred. 

The handbook allows for special types of controlled deliveries. It addresses cold 

convoys, which can be used when law enforcement agents discover contraband 

without being noticed by the suspect associated with the contraband. HSI 

special agents may delay seizure and allow the suspect to proceed to a 

destination within the United States “while under surveillance by special 

agents.” Additionally, special agents may allow contraband to be imported or 

exported under very tightly controlled circumstances. 

Significantly, the handbook contains exacting notification procedures if 

contraband is lost, including immediate notification to the nearest Office of 

Internal Affairs and the Director of Investigative Operations (known as the 

Executive Associate Director or Operations), or the duty agent if the loss occurs 

after normal business hours. Within 24 hours, the SAC must send a 

memorandum to the Director of Investigative Operations that explains the 

circumstances of the loss and provides 17 other data points. 

At the time of Operation Fast and Furious, HSI did not provide specific training 

for conducting investigations of smuggling rings that illegally transport weapons 

to Mexico. However, every HSI staff member we interviewed told us that HSI 

teaches its special agents not to conduct activities that would allow contraband 

to be lost from government control. That is true for all contraband, and 

especially for weapons. 

HSI Arizona staff explained, and their email messages confirmed, that when 

enforcing the weapons smuggling statutes, they are extremely serious about 

adhering to the mandate not to lose weapons. They explained that they have 

been using the same case methodology for almost all investigations of weapons 

smuggling to Mexico for years. HSI Arizona special agents will surveil weapons 

suspected of being contraband until the special agents can either confirm that 

the weapons are not contraband, or seize the weapons. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Discontinuing surveillance of suspected straw purchasers and losing high caliber 

weapons is abhorrent to every HSI special agent we spoke with about the issue. 

They will not drop surveillance of suspect weapons. When HSI has evidence to 

charge a person suspected of involvement in weapons smuggling, HSI will charge 

them and “flip” them, a law enforcement practice in which special agents 

persuade a suspect to assist the investigation. If HSI special agents have strong 

suspicions about a person suspected of weapons smuggling, but do not have 

evidence to charge them, HSI will talk with them to get more information. 

ICE/ATF MOU Outlines Roles to Resolve Conflicts Between the Agencies 

ICE and ATF maintain jurisdiction to investigate multiple weapons violations, 

which creates a potential for an investigation of the same subject to be initiated 

by both agencies. In these circumstances, either the agencies will agree to work 

together, or one agency must terminate its investigation. 

To minimize the challenges that can arise in resolving these instances, in June 

2009, HSI signed an MOU with ATF that established protocols for deconflicting 

and cooperating on weapons investigations. The MOU states that: (1) the 

agencies should exchange information and assist each other; (2) issues between 

HSI and ATF should be resolved at the lowest levels; and (3) SACs should be able 

to manage issues at the field level. The MOU also provides a mechanism for 

raising conflicts with ATF to ICE headquarters when resolution cannot be 

reached at the field office level. 

ICE headquarters officials said that they specifically negotiated the notification 

terms so that ICE could ensure that violations of AECA and 18 U.S.C. § 554 would 

be investigated when appropriate, and ICE could prevent weapons from being 

smuggled into Mexico. ICE and ATF Directors hosted a conference in November 

2009 to encourage adherence to the MOU and improve cooperative efforts. 

ATF Directed HSI to Abandon a Weapons Smuggling Investigation 

On November 21, 2009, the HSI Tucson DSAC office opened a weapons 

smuggling investigation after it received information about the seizure of 41 

weapons in Naco, a Mexican town that borders Arizona. The Mexican Customs 

authority, Aduana, had seized an AR-15 and 40 AK-47 style firearms from a 

vehicle on the Mexican side of the Naco port of entry. The Mexican Government 

requested that the HSI Assistant Attaché staff assigned to the American 

Consulate General in Hermosillo, Mexico enter eTrace queries on the weapons. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ATF maintains eTrace, which is an electronic system that accredited law 

enforcement agencies may use to request firearms information from ATF’s 

National Tracing Center. An eTrace request prompts the center to compile 

information about a weapon’s manufacturer, place of first sale, and initial 

purchaser. The information can be useful for investigations that involve a 

weapon. The MOU between ICE and ATF allows ICE to submit queries through 

the eTrace system to obtain information on specific weapons related to ICE 

investigations. 

HSI never received the results of the eTrace queries on the weapons seized in 

Naco because, as it learned later, ATF had blocked the information. HSI special 

agents learned that ATF entered the weapons linked to the ATF investigation in a 

“Suspect Gun Database,” which alerted the ATF case agent to eTrace queries 

made on the investigation’s suspect weapons. The ATF case agent blocked 

eTrace responses. 

On November 23, 2009, the HSI Hermosillo staff notified the HSI SAC of the 

seizure, and HSI’s initial investigative activities, which identified leads to Tucson, 

Arizona. In response, the HSI SAC contacted ATF senior leaders in the ATF 

Tucson field office. HSI and ATF Tucson field office staff agreed to share 

information related to the seizure. HSI special agents in the Tucson field office 

began to investigate the leads. 

On November 25, 2009, an ATF Phoenix senior leader wanted HSI to abandon its 

investigation of the 41 Naco weapons because ATF already was investigating the 

purchaser, who it believed was a straw purchaser. The ATF Phoenix office gave 

the message to an ATF Tucson staff member, who told an HSI Tucson special 

agent. The HSI Tucson special agent forwarded the ATF Tucson staff member’s 

comments about the ATF Phoenix investigation in an email message to the HSI 

SAC, and other HSI Arizona senior leaders. The Tucson ATF agent said that he did 

not know how the Phoenix ATF office had identified the suspected straw 

purchasers and that ATF Phoenix agents were being “vague.” However, the ATF 

ASAC for the case suggested that ATF brief HSI Arizona staff on the case and 

coordinate activities. 

Two HSI Arizona staff members said that the AUSA also directed HSI Arizona staff 

to stop the investigation of weapons seized in Naco. They did not provide the 

date or the circumstances in which they learned of the instruction from the 

AUSA. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The HSI SAC learned more about the case from a telephone call he received on 

November 25, 2009, from the ATF Phoenix ASAC. The ATF Phoenix ASAC said 

that the seized weapons were linked to a case that was approximately two 

weeks old. ATF thought that several straw purchasers were responsible for 

several hundred weapons going to Mexico. ATF wanted to schedule a meeting 

with HSI to talk about the seizure and determine roles for the investigative 

agencies. The HSI SAC summarized the conversation in an email message that he 

sent to senior HSI staff in Arizona and the HSI Assistant Attaché in Hermosillo. 

Later that day, HSI special agents in Hermosillo interviewed the occupants of the 

car from which the 41 weapons were seized. ATF agents in Hermosillo did not 

attend the interview. However, the ATF Tucson field office agents assisted HSI 

Tucson special agents in additional investigative activities of the Tucson 

residence that was linked to the Naco seizure. 

HSI Arizona Field Office Staff Develop Concerns About ATF’s Investigation 

HSI Arizona staff developed concerns when ATF briefed its investigation to them 

on November 30, 2009. HSI staff from Hermosillo, Mexico and the HSI Tucson 

DSAC office, ATF Tucson field office agents, and U.S. Marshal’s Service agents 

attended in person. The ATF Phoenix agents who led the investigation of the 

straw purchasers joined the briefing by teleconference. 

An HSI special agent summarized the meeting in an email message, which he 

sent to the HSI SAC and other senior leaders. The summary stated that ATF 

Phoenix agents initiated an investigation in late October 2009 upon receipt of 

information from an ATF source. The investigation focused on a group of straw 

purchasers who had purchased numerous high caliber rifles from FFLs in the 

Phoenix area. ATF had identified the suspects’ telephone numbers and 

addresses, and a vehicle repair shop thought to be a storage location for the 

weapons before they were transported to Mexico. ATF said that it had been 

communicating with an HSI special agent in Phoenix for assistance with 

investigating the suspected transportation cell at the vehicle repair shop, 

although ICE subsequently learned that this information was incorrect. ATF 

asked HSI special agents to call ATF before contacting any individuals identified 

through eTrace queries. 

During our interviews, some HSI staff members who attended the meeting 

provided more information. They said that during the meeting they learned that 

ATF was stopping surveillance without seizing the weapons. ATF had said that it 

followed straw purchasers from the FFL to a vehicle repair shop. Once there, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 23 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ATF stopped surveillance. ATF did not care where the guns went after they 

arrived at the shop, according to one HSI staff member. The ATF methodology 

did not adhere to HSI policies and procedures for contraband smuggling 

investigations. Three HSI Arizona staff said that ATF’s methodology violated HSI 

training. An HSI staff member commented about how obvious it was that ATF 

was allowing weapons to be smuggled to Mexico. Another HSI staff member 

said that he had an “overwhelming feeling of concern” because ATF’s plan did 

not seem to include a strategy or activities to stop weapons from going to 

Mexico. 

During the meeting, HSI staff tried to influence ATF to modify its investigative 

plan to reduce the likelihood that weapons would be lost. The HSI special 

agent’s summary of the meeting stated that HSI special agents suggested that 

ATF initiate surveillance of the vehicle repair shop and take other investigative 

methods to establish probable cause that the business or its employees were 

involved in weapons smuggling. ATF staff said that the agency was attempting to 

obtain funds to install a surveillance device at the vehicle repair shop, but had 

not yet received the funds. HSI offered to provide a surveillance device of its 

own. HSI asked ATF to call HSI for assistance if surveillance indicated that 

weapons were leaving the vehicle repair shop. In response to HSI’s suggestions, 

ATF agents said that that they already were working with an HSI special agent in 

Phoenix to determine whether the suspects were using vehicles to transport the 

weapons to Mexico. During their interviews with us, HSI Arizona special agents 

and their chain of command said that ATF’s claim that it had been working with 

HSI Arizona to investigate the transportation cell was false. 

HSI special agents and senior staff who were aware of the conflicts with ATF 

regarding the Naco seizure were concerned that ATF did not respond to HSI’s 

suggestions to improve its investigative plan and activities. An HSI Arizona ASAC 

who attended the meeting sent an email message to the HSI SAC, and other HSI 

Arizona senior leaders and agents. The ASAC’s message stated, “I think the 

consensus of those of us on the call was that ATF is not working vigorously 

enough to track the weapons and ensure the guns aren’t going south. They have 

260 + guns still unaccounted.” The HSI ASAC who wrote the message said that 

ATF did not seem to be tracking the weapons beyond the vehicle repair shop. 

The ASAC was especially concerned about the investigation because it had 

allowed 41 high-caliber weapons to be transported through his area of 

responsibility and smuggled across the border. He said that the volume of 

weapons being investigated was “scary” and only worsened over time. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 24 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Three HSI Arizona staff said that the fact that ATF surveilled suspicious sales and 

followed straw purchasers from the FFLs to the vehicle repair shop clearly 

conveyed that ATF had opportunities to take enforcement action to stop the 

weapons from being sold and from being smuggled into Mexico. One said it was 

obvious that ATF was letting “guns walk.” However, the HSI SAC and another 

senior leader stated that they did not interpret the information received from 

ATF about the investigation the same way. Rather, they thought that ATF merely 

learned about the sales after the fact by reviewing the FFLs’ records of 

completed weapons transactions. The HSI SAC stated that he did not learn that 

ATF had advance notice of the suspect sales until a year later, in December 2010. 

On December 1, 2009, the HSI senior special agent discussed the ATF case with 

the ATF lead case agent. She told him that ATF intended to conduct a long-term 

investigation using a Title III wiretap, and intended to obtain OCDETF 

certification. 

Some HSI Arizona Staff Concluded That ATF Had Opportunities to Seize 

Weapons, but Did Not 

As a result of the Mexican Aduana’s seizure of weapons in Naco, HSI learned the 

following facts about ATF’s investigative plan: 

•	 Several suspected straw purchasers had purchased more than 260 

weapons; those that had not been seized already were to be smuggled to 

Mexico; 

•	 ATF intended this to be a long-term OCDETF investigation and it sought to 

obtain a Title III wiretap; 

•	 ATF had conducted surveillance of at least some of the sales and followed 

the suspected straw purchaser and the weapons to a vehicle repair shop; 

•	 ATF dropped surveillance at the vehicle repair shop, which would allow 

the weapons to be smuggled into Mexico without government 

knowledge; 

•	 At least 41 weapons had been transported to Mexico, and ATF did not 

have a strategy to prevent more weapons from going to Mexico; 

•	 ATF did not want HSI to work independently on the weapons seized in 

Naco; and 

•	 ATF had not notified HSI of its investigation until after Aduana, the 

Mexican customs authority, requested HSI assistance and cooperation in 

investigating the weapons seized in Naco. 

From these facts, some HSI Arizona staff concluded that ATF had the ability to 

stop the weapons from being transported to Mexico, yet, ATF’s methodology 

www.oig.dhs.gov 25	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

allowed the weapons to be lost and transferred to criminals. The methodology 

violated HSI policy and training. The HSI SAC said that he did not realize the 

extent of the problem, but he was concerned that weapons in an ATF 

investigation had been transported to Mexico. HSI Arizona senior leaders and 

special agents tried to influence ATF’s plan to further the investigation and stop 

weapons from being transported to Mexico. They suggested alternative 

surveillance methods and offered assistance. However, ATF did not incorporate 

HSI’s ideas. 

In addition to being concerned about ATF’s investigative methodology, HSI 

Arizona staff were concerned that ATF had not alerted them to the investigation 

earlier. The ICE/ATF MOU recognized ICE authority in weapons smuggling 

investigations and required ATF to notify HSI “timely” when it encountered 

investigative leads that would fall within HSI authority. Since October 31, 2009, 

ATF had suspected the straw purchasers were smuggling weapons to Mexico. 

However, ATF did not notify HSI about the investigation until November 25, 

2009, more than three weeks after the investigation began. Additionally, HSI 

only learned about the ATF investigation when ATF became concerned about an 

HSI investigation of some of the suspect weapons. HSI Arizona staff said that 

ATF violated the ICE/ATF MOU. The HSI SAC said that he did not raise that 

concern to ATF because he cannot force ATF to work with HSI. Also, because the 

AUSA agreed to support ATF’s investigation of crimes that are solely within HSI 

jurisdiction, there was nothing he could do about it. 

HSI Special Agent Assigned to Assist ATF Initially Was Not Given Duties or 

Provided Information Related to the Investigation 

In late November 2009, HSI Arizona assigned a new HSI special agent to assist 

ATF with its investigation of the weapons seized in Naco; initially, however, ATF 

did not give the HSI special agent work or provide him with information about 

the investigation. The HSI special agent had worked with ATF for eight years as a 

regulatory inspector before joining HSI in 2008. An HSI group supervisor 

directed the HSI special agent to open a case file on the Naco seizure, and 

communicate and coordinate with ATF on this aspect of its investigation. The 

HSI special agent said that he never had an opportunity to open a case file for 

the Naco seizure because he did not have any information or investigative 

activities to report. 

Although the HSI special agent was assigned to the investigation, a more senior 

HSI special agent communicated with ATF about its investigation. The senior 

special agent had been an HSI liaison to ATF in the past, and had conducted 

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

successful HSI investigations of weapons smuggling to Mexico. HSI considered 

the more senior special agent to be a subject matter expert on investigations of 

weapons smuggling to Mexico. During the first week of December 2009, the HSI 

senior special agent was the primary point of contact with the ATF case agent. 

The senior HSI special agent was not able to obtain detailed information about 

the ATF investigation. 

HSI Arizona senior leaders expected ATF to request assistance with surveilling 

the vehicle repair shop, but ATF never made a request. The HSI special agent 

and HSI did not conduct surveillance of the vehicle repair shop because it would 

have been improper to work on ATF’s case without a request from ATF. Because 

of ATF’s insistence that HSI not proceed with investigation of the Naco seizure, 

ATF’s refusal to provide eTrace information, and ATF’s reluctance to request HSI 

assistance, HSI Arizona abandoned its efforts to find the smugglers responsible 

for the 41 weapons discovered in Naco. 

HSI Initiated a Second Smuggling Investigation, Which Was Related to the ATF 

Investigation 

The circumstances of another seizure of weapons indicate that ATF did not 

involve HSI in planning the operation, or provide HSI with information about the 

investigation in a timely manner. Because of work that HSI and the Douglas 

police department had conducted with a confidential informant, on December 9, 

2009, the Douglas police department seized nine AK-47 style rifles and nine 30­

round magazines after stopping a vehicle that had been traveling at a high rate 

of speed toward a port of entry. HSI entered eTrace inquiries for the weapons, 

and intended to open an investigation of the weapons with assistance from ATF. 

However, later that day, HSI learned that the weapons had been claimed by ATF 

as a part of the same investigation that tracked the suspected straw purchasers 

who bought the weapons seized in Naco, and ATF had blocked the eTrace results 

again. 

HSI Arizona dispatched its senior special agent and the special agent to discuss 

the Douglas seizure with ATF Arizona staff on December 10, 2009. While 

returning from the meeting with ATF, the two HSI Arizona special agents 

discussed concerns that ATF had not arrested any suspects yet. The HSI senior 

special agent also discussed different investigative strategies HSI would take if it 

were the lead agent on the case. Upon return to the office, the HSI senior 

special agent summarized in an email message what they had learned from the 

meeting with ATF: 

www.oig.dhs.gov 27 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 The HSI and ATF agents had discussed conducting an interview with the 

source of information related to the Douglas seizure; 

•	 ATF had identified the smuggling ring’s organizational head and 24 

suspected straw purchasers; 

•	 The straw purchasers had purchased, from 4 different FFLs, 

approximately 300 weapons that had “presumably been smuggled to 

Mexico;” 

•	 There had been a third seizure in Nogales of six of the weapons
 

purchased by the suspected straw purchasers;
 

•	 ATF did not have much evidence to link the weapons to a specific drug 

trafficking organization; 

•	 ATF did not have information about how the weapons were being 

transported into Mexico; however, ATF had identified a business at which 

the smuggling ring obtained vehicles; and 

•	 ATF sought to certify the investigation for OCDETF funding and intended 

to establish a Title III wiretap. 

The HSI senior special agent sent the email message to his group supervisor, who 

forwarded the message to another group supervisor involved in the Naco 

weapons seizure. 

HSI Arizona staff members were concerned about the expansion of the ATF 

investigation. In response to the email message, an HSI senior official forwarded 

the email message to the HSI SAC and other HSI Arizona senior leaders. One of 

the HSI ASACs wrote “[o]n a sarcastic note – with the 42 in Naco, Son., and now 

the 9 here in Douglas, ATF is down to only 250 (give or take) unaccounted.” 

The HSI SAC said he remembered the basic contents of the message, and that at 

that time, he was frustrated. He said that at the time he thought, “[i]f ATF is 

conducting an investigation of all of these guns, how is it that they are showing 

up at Mexican ports of entry?” 

Other HSI special agents were concerned by the email message as well. One HSI 

Arizona staff member said that from what he learned from this message and the 

Douglas seizure, this was “gun walking.” Another HSI Arizona senior leader said 

that he knew then that ATF was identifying straw purchasers and not doing 

anything with them. He said that ATF should not have dropped surveillance of 

the straw purchasers after they obtained weapons. 

An HSI Arizona staff member said after he read the email message, he was 

concerned that ATF was engaged in the same flawed methodology that they 

www.oig.dhs.gov 28	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

used in 2007 and 2008 when ATF allowed weapons to be smuggled into Mexico 

without adequate controls to ensure that the weapons were interdicted before 

reaching criminal organizations. HSI Arizona had stopped one load of weapons 

from crossing the border, and advised ATF not to allow other loads to cross. 

On December 11, 2009, the HSI senior special agent who had communicated 

with ATF about the investigation learned more facts that concerned him when 

he spoke again with the ATF lead case agent. The HSI senior special agent 

summarized the conversation in an email message that he sent to his group 

supervisor, who forwarded it to the HSI SAC and other HSI Arizona senior 

leaders. The email message included the following information: 

•	 ATF added almost 200 additional guns to its suspect gun database within 

the last day, which brought the total number of weapons purchased by 

suspected straw purchasers to approximately 500; 

•	 On December 10, 2009, 50 weapons related to the investigation were 

seized in Mexicali, Mexico; 

•	 The straw purchasers were making multiple purchases at the same FFLs; 

and 

•	 The owner of one of the FFLs that sold the weapons to the straw 

purchasers was nervous about liability and planned to meet with ATF and 

the USAO staff. 

One of the HSI senior leaders who received the email message replied to all of 

the original message’s recipients, “I’m speechless. Even the owner knows this 

ain’t right, and ATF apparently doesn’t get it.” The HSI SAC replied that HSI 

should enlist the confidential informant who assisted with the Douglas seizure 

(confidential informant). The confidential informant could assist ICE in 

conducting a cold convoy to identify the facility where the weapons were stored 

prior to being smuggled to Mexico. Another HSI senior leader responded that 

HSI special agents already had scheduled a meeting with the confidential 

informant the following week to discuss securing assistance with a cold convoy. 

From the weapons seizure in Douglas and the ensuing conversations with ATF, 

HSI learned that: 

•	 24 suspected straw purchasers had acquired approximately 500
 

weapons, and 200 were added to the list in one day;
 

•	 Approximately 100 already had been seized by law enforcement either in 

Mexico or in transit to Mexico; 

•	 The same straw purchasers were making multiple purchases; 

•	 ATF did not know how the weapons were being transported to Mexico; 

www.oig.dhs.gov 29	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 ATF did not have much information to link the weapons smuggling ring to 

a specific drug trafficking organization; 

•	 One of the FFLs was nervous about its liability; and 

•	 USAO must strongly support the investigation because an AUSA was 

going to talk with the FFL. 

Those facts led several HSI Arizona staff members to conclude that ATF had the 

ability to stop some of the sales, but did not. 

The HSI SAC said that ATF deceived him into thinking that its investigative 

technique relied entirely on post-sales information. He said that ATF Arizona 

senior leaders had told him that ATF was obtaining the list of straw purchases 

from review of firearms purchase documentation and from research of weapons 

seized in Mexico. Also, after Operation Fast and Furious was exposed in the 

media, he came to believe that ATF had stopped the vehicle with the weapons in 

Douglas earlier on the same day that the Douglas police department stopped it; 

he also believed that ATF did not inform HSI that it had stopped the vehicle.7 

Doing so would have alerted the HSI SAC to the fact that ATF’s investigation was 

more than a review of post-purchase weapons sales documents. 

The HSI SAC said that he did not inform ICE headquarters of the issues with ATF 

because he did not know that ATF was able to stop the weapons from being 

smuggled to Mexico. He said that during December 2009 he was managing what 

he thought were simply deconfliction issues with ATF at the local level in 

accordance with the ICE/ATF MOU. 

ATF and the AUSA Resisted HSI Plans To Assist by Investigating AECA Violations 

HSI tried again to improve ATF’s investigative plan by proposing to conduct a 

cold convoy in which HSI special agents would monitor the transport of suspect 

weapons. HSI had learned that the weapons smuggling organization wanted to 

transport two loads of weapons from a Phoenix storage location to the Douglas 

port of entry. HSI developed a plan to use the confidential informant to talk with 

the smuggling ring members and learn the details of their plan to transport the 

weapons. If HSI knew the timing and locations, HSI could observe the suspects 

7

 In comments to our report, DOJ said that HSI personnel’s understanding of the facts was inaccurate. 

DOJ said, “ATF conducted surveillance of a weapons purchaser and alerted local Phoenix police to the car 

he was driving. The police stopped the vehicle, only to let the purchaser/driver go because he claimed 

the weapons as his own. Hours later, the Douglas police stopped a different vehicle driven by another 

driver but which contained nine of the firearms purchased by the individual stopped in Phoenix earlier 

that day.” 

www.oig.dhs.gov 30	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

as they loaded weapons into the vehicles and follow the vehicles to the Douglas 

port of entry, where CBP would know to stop the cars and seize the weapons. 

HSI special agents would charge the drivers with AECA violations, which carry a 

maximum ten-year sentence. They would use the charge as leverage to pressure 

the vehicles’ occupants to provide information about the smuggling ring. 

During the week of December 14, 2009, the HSI Arizona senior special agent and 

the HSI special agent met the confidential informant. They did not invite the ATF 

lead case agent to the meeting. The HSI senior special agent said that it would 

have been inappropriate to bring an outside agency to the initial meeting with 

the confidential informant. Two other HSI Arizona staff told us that they agreed 

with his assessment, and two others disagreed. During the meeting, the HSI 

special agents determined that the confidential informant was suitable and 

willing to work with them. 

According to HSI Arizona staff, ATF became more concerned about HSI 

involvement in the investigation when it learned that HSI interviewed the 

confidential informant and that HSI wanted to identify the transportation cell by 

conducting a cold convoy. Four HSI Arizona staff members familiar with the 

situation said that when the ATF lead case agent learned that HSI had 

interviewed the confidential informant without her, she became angry. She 

informed her chain of command. On December 17, 2009, the ATF ASAC for the 

investigation called the HSI senior special agent’s ASAC and said that ATF had 

concerns about the cold convoy plan and concerns that the ATF lead case agent 

had not been invited to the interview with the confidential informant. The HSI 

ASAC responded that HSI would tell ATF of any HSI plans that were related to the 

ATF investigation. 

Later in the afternoon of December 17, 2009, an HSI ASAC sent an email 

message to the ATF ASAC to suggest that they meet with their case agents to 

“work this thing out.” The HSI ASAC said, “[h]ave your agent bring her case file 

and we will bring ours so that we can deconflict and talk about agency interests 

etc...” The HSI ASAC sent an email message to the HSI SAC and other senior 

leaders to inform them of the proposed meeting, which would be scheduled in 

January 2010. In an email message dated December 18, 2009, the HSI SAC said 

that he would not attend the meeting, but wanted to coordinate HSI’s message 

before the meeting with the HSI staff who would attend. The understanding that 

issues should be resolved at the lowest level was reflected in the message, which 

said that the ASACs should attempt to resolve the problem “without having to 

raise it to a higher level.” 

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In the message exchange, one HSI Arizona senior leader expressed his desire to 

have an open exchange of information with ATF and to include HSI in future, 

coordinated plans: 

My intent is to go to the meeting with my GS [group supervisor] 

and case agents, with case file in hand...Hopefully, we can compel 

reciprocity. I think it comes down to whether they are willing to 

bring Phoenix HSI on board with what they have so we can 

pursue a coordinated effort. 

With regard to ATF hesitance to use the confidential informant, three HSI 

Arizona staff said that ATF wanted to obtain a Title III wiretap, but having a 

confidential informant would undermine ATF ability to obtain one. Using an 

informant would have taken time and not allowed ATF to exhaust other normal 

investigative procedures quickly, they said. Title III wiretaps generally are not 

granted unless normal investigative procedures reasonably appear to be unlikely 

to succeed or to be too dangerous. 

In addition to ATF resistance to the HSI plans, four HSI Arizona staff members 

said that the AUSA directed HSI not to use the confidential informant to pursue 

the transportation cell. 

HSI suspended work on the controlled delivery until it met with ATF to devise a 

plan that each agency and the AUSA supported. The meeting to resolve the 

controlled delivery issues occurred on January 15, 2010. Six HSI staff members 

attended the meeting. The highest ranking was an ASAC who served as the HSI 

spokesperson at the meeting. Several senior leaders in ATF attended, but the 

ATF case agents did not. The AUSA who had been working with ATF on the 

investigation attended, as did a representative from DEA. 

During the meeting, the HSI ASAC did not urge that HSI use the confidential 

informant to assist with a controlled delivery. Instead, he offered to facilitate 

ATF’s use of the confidential informant and agreed that HSI would not continue 

to pursue a controlled delivery unilaterally or otherwise seek assistance from the 

confidential informant. His remarks surprised some HSI colleagues who thought 

that his statements reversed HSI goals to pursue the smuggling organization’s 

transportation cell. With this offer, HSI effectively gave up a strong investigative 

lead for identifying the individuals who smuggled weapons into Mexico. 

The HSI ASAC proposed that HSI pursue another lead for identifying the 

transportation cell. DEA provided HSI the lead after initially providing it to ATF. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 32 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The AUSA and ATF agreed to this proposal. We discuss the HSI investigation of 

the DEA lead later in our report. 

The HSI Special Agent Began to Participate in the ATF Investigation and 

Obtained More Information That Confirmed the Flawed Methodology 

In mid-January 2010, ATF began to engage the assistance of the HSI special agent 

who HSI Arizona senior leaders had tasked with helping ATF with its 

investigation. The HSI special agent eventually moved to the OCDETF office 

space that the ATF investigation’s case agents and management used. During 

January 2010, the HSI special agent learned that ATF sometimes received 

information about prospective sales from FFLs in advance of the sales. He also 

received information that showed that ATF had surveilled suspected straw 

purchasers’ weapons purchases, but seemingly had not taken enforcement 

actions. He opened a case file in TECS, the electronic information system HSI 

uses to document and track investigations. Using information received from 

ATF, he drafted his first ROI, which he completed on January 22, 2010. 

Before he submitted the initial ROI, the HSI special agent prepared a draft 

version that contained more details about what he had learned about the ATF 

investigation. On January 12, 2010, he sent this version to an HSI colleague. It 

stated that that the investigation began with the ATF case agent’s review of FFL’s 

sales documents, which revealed multiple purchases of high-caliber firearms by 

four individuals and indicated possible straw purchases. In November 2009, 

according to the draft report, ATF agents observed 2 separate weapons 

purchases of 10 AK-47 style rifles by 2 of the suspected straw purchasers. The 

draft report also states that in November and December 2009, the Mexican 

government seized 85 weapons that had been purchased by the investigation’s 

suspected straw purchasers. That draft version does not mention any efforts by 

ATF to stop the suspects or seize the weapons. 

The HSI special agent did not include the information about surveillances and 

seizures in the final version of the ROI that he entered into TECS on January 22, 

2010. The HSI special agent said he does not remember why the report does not 

contain the more specific information, but it is possible that ATF requested that 

he not include it in the official report. 

In reviewing the draft version with us, the HSI SAC agreed that the draft’s 

description of surveillance indicated that ATF’s investigation involved more than 

post-purchase reviews of FFL sales documentation. He said he was concerned by 

the document and would have liked to have known what happened to the AK-47 

www.oig.dhs.gov 33 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

style rifles. However, he had not received the draft ROI when it was written, and 

the information about the surveillance was new to him. 

The HSI SAC said that if he had been provided the full details that were present 

in the draft version, it might have corrected his misperception about ATF’s 

investigation. However, the information he received was that the ATF 

methodology consisted simply of a review of FFL sales records and that ATF did 

not have the opportunity to take enforcement action. The draft version confirms 

that the investigation started with a review of the forms, but also states that by 

at least January 12, 2010, the date of the draft report, ATF observed suspected 

straw purchasers make additional purchases without taking any enforcement 

actions. 

The HSI special agent’s group supervisor and the HSI senior special agent also 

had not seen the draft version until we reviewed it with them. The group 

supervisor and senior special agent said that they had already known that ATF 

had advance knowledge of suspicious sales and that it dropped surveillance 

prematurely. Therefore, they were not surprised by the information contained 

in the draft version. ATF had told them in December 2009 that it had surveilled 

purchases and stopped surveillance without seizing the weapons. ATF had also 

said that some of the weapons were recovered in Mexico. The HSI special agents 

knew that ATF had opportunities to stop the weapons from being smuggled, but 

did not take action. 

ATF Proposal to Obtain OCDETF Certification for Its Investigation Supplied 

Additional Information About ATF’s Methodology 

On January 25, 2010, the HSI SAC and two subordinates received the proposal to 

certify the ATF investigation as an OCDETF operation. The proposal named the 

HSI special agent and an ATF agent as co-case agents for the operation. Case 

agents are the leaders for an investigation, and make day-to-day operational 

decisions for the case. The committee meeting to vote on the proposal was 

scheduled for January 26, 2010. The HSI SAC said that he did not read the 

proposal and did not attend the committee meeting. The OCDETF 

representative read it but did not attend the committee meeting; his colleague, 

who also received the proposal, attended instead. 

The OCDETF proposal stated that the operation’s goal was to identify and arrest 

members of a specified weapons trafficking organization cell based in the United 

States and to gather information on the Mexican drug trafficking organization 

that directs it. Investigative tools mentioned in the proposal include tracking 

www.oig.dhs.gov 34 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

devices, Title III wiretaps, and other surveillance. The proposal also stated that 

the investigation had already identified 17 straw purchasers, “who have 

purchased a large amount of AK-47 style rifles and pistols... since September 

2009.” They were identified through a source of information, FFL record checks, 

and surveillance operations. Surveillance had revealed two storage locations for 

the purchased weapons. The proposal stated that ATF agents believe that the 

weapons were being hidden in vehicle compartments and transported through 

the ports of entry. Without providing the total number of suspected weapons 

seized, the proposal noted that there had already been six seizures in the United 

States and five seizures in Mexico. 

A number of staff noted problems with the proposal and several said that HSI 

should not have signed it, given those problems. Four HSI Arizona staff members 

said that the proposal was flawed because it linked the weapons smuggling ring 

to a single Mexican drug cartel, which could not be accurate. The proposal 

noted seizures of weapons in various locations in Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. 

The recovery locations were in territories of various drug cartels, not just the one 

mentioned in the proposal. HSI staff also stated that in their experience, 

weapons smuggling rings do not work for just one cartel; instead, they will sell to 

anyone interested in buying the weapons. One staff member said that he 

thought that by linking the weapons to a single drug trafficking cartel, ATF had 

falsified its proposal to receive OCDETF certification and funding.8 

The HSI SAC had assigned staff to read OCDETF proposals and contact HSI staff 

who should be aware of them. Although he had not read the proposal, the HSI 

SAC agreed that the widespread seizure locations indicated that the weapons 

smuggling ring was not working for a specific cartel. The HSI SAC said that the 

January 15, 2010 messages he received informing him of seizures in El Paso 

(which we discuss in the next section of this report) undercut the ATF theory that 

the cartel members named in the proposal were linked to the smuggling ring. 

Before the proposal arrived, the HSI SAC had already decided to participate on 

the OCDETF operation and to dedicate a special agent to the investigation on a 

full time basis. However, if the HSI SAC had read the proposal, he might not 

have maintained the belief that ATF had identified the straw purchasers after 

weapons sales by reviewing FFL purchase records and obtaining information 

about weapons that were seized. The proposal stated that ATF used three 

methods for identifying straw purchasers: FFL purchase records, sources of 

information, and surveillance. If ATF received information from surveillance and 

8

 In its report, A Review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters, DOJ OIG did not 

conclude that there was any fraudulent conduct related to the preparation of the OCDETF proposal. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 35 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

sources of information other than purchase records, it had the opportunity to 

seize weapons. The seizures mentioned in the proposal might have indicated 

that ATF had engaged in proactive enforcement; however, HSI Arizona staff 

already knew that the seizures were not orchestrated in advance by ATF. 

Instead, Mexican and state and local law enforcement agencies had made the 

seizures without advance information from ATF. However, because the HSI SAC 

had not read the proposal, his understanding of the ATF methodology remained 

unchanged. 

HSI Received Additional Information Related to the ATF Methodology 

In January 2010, the HSI SAC and other senior leaders learned that some of the 

weapons purchased by the ATF investigation’s suspected straw purchasers had 

been recovered in Texas. The HSI SAC and senior leaders received an email 

message on January 15, 2010, that said that on January 13, 2010, HSI had seized 

2 AK-47 style rifles and 4,000 rounds of ammunition at the Ysleta port of entry in 

Texas. The next day, an ATF intelligence officer contacted an HSI intelligence 

officer to request information about the seizure. The ATF intelligence officer 

said that the seized weapons had been purchased in Phoenix on the same day 

that they had been seized. Additionally, the weapons were related to an 

ongoing investigation conducted by HSI and ATF in Phoenix. 

Later on January 15, 2010, the HSI SAC received another email message related 

to the seizure at the Ysleta port of entry. That message mentioned that seizure 

and another at a house in El Paso, Texas, where officers seized 42 weapons. The 

message said that on January 12, 2010, DEA had provided information to ATF 

that weapons purchased in Phoenix would be transported to El Paso. ATF had 

been closely monitoring El Paso weapons seizures since then, and 42 weapons 

were seized on January 14, 2010. One of the operation’s suspected straw 

purchasers had purchased all of the weapons. 

These email messages indicate that a person who ATF had already identified as a 

straw purchaser had recently purchased again. The straw purchaser obtained 42 

weapons and transported them to another state within the same day. After 

identifying straw purchasers, ATF did not stop them from continuing to purchase 

large numbers of weapons and transporting them to other states, and ultimately 

to the Mexican border. The messages also indicate that ATF was not 

communicating with HSI about the case. ATF had known for days that weapons 

might be transported to El Paso, but did not inform HSI. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 36 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

HSI SAC Discovered the Operation’s Flawed Methodology When He Received a 

Briefing Paper from the ATF SAC 

The HSI SAC said that he first learned that the Operation Fast and Furious 

investigative methodology was flawed on December 3, 2010, as the task force 

prepared for grand jury indictments and a press conference. The ATF SAC sent 

an Operation Fast and Furious briefing paper to the HSI SAC to assist the HSI SAC, 

who needed a summary to send to senior ICE leadership. The briefing paper 

stated: 

Agents believe that from October 2009 to October 2010, agents have 

documented that this organization spent approximately 1.25 million 

dollars in cash at various Phoenix area [FFLs] to acquire in excess of 1,900 

firearms. The firearms are then being trafficked to Mexico using false 

compartments in various vehicles through various international Ports of 

Entry in Arizona and Texas... To date over three hundred firearms and 

over fifty pounds of marijuana have been recovered by agents in addition 

to the numerous firearms and narcotic seizures in Mexico related to this 

investigation. 

The HSI SAC said that this was his first indication that ATF was not taking every 

precaution to stop weapons from crossing the border to Mexico. He said that 

the statement that weapons were trafficked through ports of entry by means of 

compartments in cars indicated that ATF must have had specific knowledge that 

weapons were being smuggled to Mexico. He said that he had not been aware 

of that during the course of the operation. 

The HSI SAC forwarded the briefing paper to others but did not mention his 

concerns. Instead, he provided it to an HSI DSAC and asked that HSI Arizona staff 

deconflict names of subjects listed on the briefing paper to ensure that their 

indictment and arrest would not affect any HSI cases. The DSAC forwarded the 

briefing paper to an HSI ASAC and stated that in addition to the deconfliction, 

“...we also need to make sure we are staying well represented in all of this. 

Given the scrutiny on HSI/ATF relations, and in particular the relationship here, I 

anticipate lots of eyes on this from HQ.” 

The HSI special agent’s group supervisor replied, “[the HSI special agent] has 

been working on this with ATF. He is fully involved in this and all of the suspects 

and info are in TECS.” The HSI staff members did not express any concern or 

surprise in their response to the briefing paper. Instead, HSI Arizona senior 

www.oig.dhs.gov 37 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

officials continued to coordinate with ICE headquarters to schedule ICE officials’ 

attendance at an upcoming press conference to announce the indictments. 

Some of the phrases in the briefing paper were almost identical to wording in 

the OCDETF proposal, which stated, “[a]gents believe that... The firearms are 

then being trafficked to Mexico using non-factory compartments in various 

vehicles through various Ports of Entry (POEs) in Arizona and Texas.” 

The HSI SAC had not read the OCDETF proposal, and so he would not have seen 

the wording. Had he read the proposal before approving the assignment of the 

HSI special agent to the operation, or if someone had alerted him to the 

language, he might have realized that the investigative methodology violated HSI 

policy, training, and practices. 

In a case summary that the HSI special agent sent to his group supervisor on 

December 7, 2010, he wrote that, “[a]s of August 2010, this organization has 

purchased an estimated 1,916 firearms... Of these purchases, 316 firearms have 

been recovered domestically and 188 have been recovered in the Republic of 

Mexico.” According to the summary, 1,412 firearms still had not been 

recovered. 

HSI SAC and Two Others Did Not Understand that ATF Had Ability to Stop 

Weapons Smuggled into Mexico 

The HSI SAC and two other HSI Arizona senior leaders said that prior to receiving 

the December 3, 2010 briefing paper, they thought that ATF was conducting a 

historical investigation, one in which ATF received purchase documentation after 

the sales had been completed. One said that he was not fully aware of the 

methodology, but that HSI had an “inkling” of it. The three said that they did not 

learn about the faulty methodology until December 2010, a year after they first 

learned of ATF’s investigation. 

Upon review of the email messages from December 2009 that we discussed 

earlier in the report, the three HSI senior leaders said that when read together, 

the messages provided information showing that ATF had opportunities to stop 

the weapons, but did not take action. The messages indicated that: 

•	 Suspected straw purchasers made multiple purchases of unusually large 

numbers of weapons sought by Mexican criminal organizations, AK-47 

style rifles and pistols; 

•	 ATF had advance notice of at least some of the sales and conducted 

surveillance of the purchases; 

www.oig.dhs.gov 38	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 ATF terminated surveillance prematurely in a manner that was contrary 

to HSI policies and training, and the weapons were lost to government 

scrutiny; and 

•	 ATF had been tracking at least 500 weapons, and in December 2009, 

approximately 100 had already been seized by government authorities in 

Mexico and the United States. 

However, the HSI senior leaders said, given the high volume of email messages 

about a wide range of investigations that they received in December 2009, they 

had not pieced the information together and had not understood the problems 

with ATF’s methodology. 

HSI Arizona Staff Recall Discussing ATF’s Methodology with the HSI SAC 

During interviews in Arizona, 14 HSI staff members said that in December 

2009 they knew that ATF was compiling a list of straw purchasers and not 

doing enough to track the weapons and stop them from crossing the 

border. They all said that the facts caused them concern. One described 

the investigative methodology as “gun walking” and another described it 

as a “train wreck.” Four HSI Arizona staff members said that they had 

discussed these concerns with the HSI SAC. Three HSI Arizona staff 

members said that they had told the HSI SAC that HSI should not place a 

special agent on the OCDETF investigation. However, they said, the HSI 

SAC was not persuaded. 

Some speculated that the HSI SAC did not take some arguments seriously 

because two staff members had not been able to foster good 

relationships with ATF in the past. However, three senior leaders, 

including the HSI SAC, said that they did not remember the conversations 

about problems with ATF’s methodology or with assigning an HSI special 

agent to Operation Fast and Furious. 

Similar concerns about ATF’s methodology in prior weapons smuggling 

investigations gave some HSI Arizona staff insight into ATF’s methodology 

in Operation Fast and Furious. Five HSI special agents said that the 

methodology ATF was employing in the case that became Operation Fast 

and Furious was similar to the methodology ATF used in its investigations 

in 2007 and 2008. The HSI SAC and other senior leaders were aware that 

in those years ATF conducted weapons smuggling investigations that 

allowed or attempted to allow weapons to be transported through the 

ports of entry and into Mexico. Weapons had been lost, presumably to 

www.oig.dhs.gov 39	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Mexican criminal organizations. The HSI SAC had informed HSI 

headquarters of ATF’s activities in August 2009, and a DSAC provided 

more information to HSI headquarters in January 2009. Yet, the two 

senior HSI Arizona leaders said that the prior problems with ATF 

investigations did not affect their consideration of the facts in this 

investigation. 

Conclusion 

The substantial amount of information about ATF’s methodology, which was 

distributed among a number of HSI Arizona staff and officials, clearly indicated 

that the ATF methodology was dangerous and did not adhere to ICE policy. 

Numerous HSI Arizona staff who had received the information came to that 

conclusion. We have concerns that the HSI SAC, who also had the information, 

did not determine that procedures used during the task force operation were 

contrary to ICE policies. 

The ICE organizational structure and reporting requirements accord each field 

office SAC with significant responsibilities. The SACs must possess excellent 

judgment to direct their staff, even in dangerous, contentious, and rapidly 

changing circumstances. However, the HSI SAC did not fulfill the requirements 

of his position with regard to Operation Fast and Furious. 

Several Factors Influenced the Decision to Dedicate an HSI Special Agent to 

OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious 

In late December 2009 or early January 2010, ATF asked HSI to dedicate a special 

agent to the investigation once it was certified as an OCDETF operation. ATF said 

it needed an HSI special agent on the operation to contact an appropriate HSI 

field office for coordination with CBP if ATF identified attempts to transport 

weapons across the border. The ICE/ATF MOU requires ATF to notify HSI when it 

needs interdiction assistance at the ports of entry. 

As discussed earlier in the report, the HSI SAC said that he did not realize that 

ATF had advance notice of sales and opportunities to interdict the weapons and 

had no reason to avoid working on the OCDETF operation. He decided to 

cooperate with ATF’s request before he received the OCDETF proposal for the 

following reasons: 

•	 ATF said it needed a single point of contact for coordination and
 

deconfliction;
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 40	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• HSI has sole authority for illegal export of weapons and accordingly HSI 

needed to be involved to learn more about the investigation and to 

develop plans to stop the weapons from being smuggled to Mexico; 

•	 The USAO was firmly in support of the investigation; and 

•	 The ICE Director instructed the HSI field offices in strong terms to 

cooperate with ATF, and the ICE/ATF MOU stated that issues with ATF 

should be resolved at the field level. 

We discussed the reasons for dedicating an HSI special agent to Operation Fast 

and Furious with the other HSI staff in Arizona and ICE headquarters. Everyone 

we spoke with agreed that participating in or assisting with the operation was 

advisable in order to enforce the AECA statute. As law enforcement agents who 

believe that their agency has sole authority to enforce AECA and 18 U.S.C. § 554, 

all of the HSI special agents strongly supported the obligation to enforce those 

laws. Some said that dedicating a special agent to the operation might provide 

them with more information, and therefore a greater likelihood that HSI would 

be in position to enforce AECA and the new statute. However, others said that 

HSI should have worked the smuggling violations separately by using the 

confidential informant and other smuggling leads that could be identified from 

ATF’s investigation of straw purchasers. Conducting the smuggling investigation 

was especially important because they believed that ATF had allowed weapons 

to cross into Mexico in the past, and the special agents did not want to allow 

that to happen again. Most agreed that the USAO’s support for the operation 

was a strong incentive to participate in the operation. They feared that the 

USAO might be less supportive of future HSI investigations if HSI did not agree to 

join the OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious. Also, the USAO is typically the 

arbiter in disputes between agencies. They said that HSI needed to abide by the 

arbiter’s decisions. 

Despite these reasons, some HSI staff members understood that ATF was 

engaged in a dangerous operation that was allowing weapons to be smuggled to 

Mexico. They did not think HSI should have cooperated with ATF by supporting 

the operation. However, the HSI SAC said he did not understand the operation’s 

methodology, and did not question cooperating with ATF. 

Conclusion 

By January 2010, the HSI SAC had received enough information to understand 

the investigative methodology ATF employed in the investigation that became 

OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious. Yet, he said he did not “put the pieces 

together” until almost a year later in December 2010. Without understanding 

the methodology and in light of the desire to enforce the smuggling statutes and 

www.oig.dhs.gov 41	 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the USAO’s support of ATF’s investigation, the HSI SAC’s decision to place a 

special agent on Operation Fast and Furious was reasonable. 

HSI Arizona Attempted to Investigate One Aspect of Weapons Smuggling Ring’s 

Transportation Cell, but Abandoned Another 

At the meeting on January 15, 2010, with ATF, USAO, and DEA, the USAO and 

ATF agreed to allow HSI Arizona to pursue a DEA lead that was connected to a 

part of the smuggling ring that transported the suspect weapons to Mexico. The 

investigation terminated quickly when the suspect stopped using his telephone. 

Later, HSI learned that the suspect died. 

The HSI special agent’s group supervisor also tried to revive ICE efforts to use the 

confidential informant to obtain information necessary to conduct a cold convoy 

and identify other members of the smuggling ring’s transportation cell. His 

supervisor, the ASAC who has since retired, refused the group supervisor’s 

proposal. The HSI SAC and an ASAC said that they thought the confidential 

informant could not be used by law enforcement. Documents reveal, and other 

HSI staff said, that HSI agreed to provide the confidential informant to ATF 

during the January 15, 2010 meeting. HSI never pursued that opportunity and 

does not believe that ATF pursued it either. As a result, the transportation cell 

was not hindered by investigative efforts, and presumably continued to ship 

weapons to Mexico illegally. AECA and 18 U.S.C. § 554 smuggling statutes were 

not enforced. 

HSI Began Investigating the Transportation Cell, but Stopped When the Subject 

Disappeared 

In the January 15, 2010 meeting, ATF and the AUSA had agreed that HSI would 

open an investigation based on information from a DEA wiretap. The 

information indicated that two individuals were obtaining weapons from the 

Operation Fast and Furious subjects and transporting the weapons to Mexico. 

Shortly after the January 15, 2010 meeting, an HSI Arizona special agent 

submitted the wiretap application and conducted other investigative activities. 

As HSI waited for the application to be approved, the telephones in use went 

silent. HSI later learned that one of the suspects was killed before the Title III 

affidavit was approved by DOJ. The HSI case agent said that the other suspect 

and his family became scared and stopped all involvement with weapons 

smuggling. As a result, HSI was not able to investigate the transportation cell 

with that suspect. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 42 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

HSI Arizona Senior Leaders Refused to Reconsider Using the Confidential 

Informant to Pursue the Domestic Transportation Cell 

After the January 15, 2010, meeting, the HSI special agent’s group supervisor 

attempted to reinvigorate the HSI effort to work with the confidential informant 

to conduct a cold convoy or to gain intelligence. The confidential informant 

could assist HSI Arizona to obtain detailed and valuable information about the 

transportation cell associated with the weapons smuggling ring. HSI Arizona also 

had planned to use information to conduct a cold convoy. HSI Arizona special 

agents would observe smuggling ring members load weapons into vehicles. HSI 

would follow the vehicle to the border and coordinate with CBP to seize the guns 

at the ports of entry. HSI would charge the vehicles’ occupants with a violation 

of AECA, and use the possible ten-year maximum penalty as leverage to get 

them to provide information and to cooperate with the investigation. 

After the January 15, 2010, meeting with ATF, the AUSA, and DEA, the HSI group 

supervisor asked his ASAC to reconsider the decision not to work with the 

confidential informant. According to the group supervisor, the ASAC refused his 

request. We were unable to interview the ASAC, who has since retired and 

declined a voluntary interview with us. 

When we asked other HSI Arizona senior leaders to explain why HSI did not 

attempt to obtain more information on the transportation cell or conduct the 

cold convoy, three HSI Arizona staff members said that the AUSA supported 

ATF’s direction that HSI not pursue the confidential informant. Two leaders said 

the confidential informant was not viable. They could not remember much 

about why the confidential informant was unviable or when the decision was 

made. They said that it likely was a decision by the group supervisor made in 

coordination with his ASAC. However, two others said that HSI could have used 

the confidential informant to get information about the transportation cell, 

regardless of the confidential informant’s viability. 

The former HSI ASAC declined our request for a voluntary interview, but we 

interviewed the group supervisor. He and the HSI senior special agent, who had 

interviewed the confidential informant, said the confidential informant had 

some issues but none that would render the confidential informant unviable. 

They were not aware of any decision that the confidential informant was found 

unviable. Some suggested that the HSI Arizona senior leaders had given up the 

investigation in another attempt to “get along with ATF.” 

www.oig.dhs.gov 43 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Two email messages indicate that the source had issues, but was still a viable 

source of information as of January 22, 2010. A message between HSI Arizona 

senior leaders dated December 11, 2009, states that the confidential informant 

“has issues,” but they are “not insurmountable.” A message dated January 22, 

2010, confirms that in the January 15, 2010 meeting with ATF, HSI agreed to 

coordinate a meeting between the confidential informant and ATF. That 

message seems to indicate that the confidential informant was viable. 

As we mentioned earlier in this report, HSI special agents believe that their 

agency has sole authority to enforce two statutes that prohibit weapons 

smuggling, AECA and 18 U.S.C. § 554. As law enforcement officers responsible 

for investigating violations of those statutes, HSI staff members told us that they 

feel obligated to conduct those investigations and enforce the law. Additionally, 

HSI staff members realized that the ATF investigation’s suspected straw 

purchasers had acquired an extraordinary number of weapons and it appeared 

that they would continue to make weapons purchases. At least two members of 

HSI felt it was incumbent upon them to use the confidential informant to help 

them identify and arrest the members of the transportation cell. 

HSI Arizona staff said that after the January 15, 2010 meeting, ATF did not ask 

HSI for assistance with scheduling a meeting with the confidential informant. As 

far as HSI staff members know, ATF never pursued the lead to identify the 

transportation cell. Had HSI wanted to ensure that the smuggling statutes were 

enforced it would have directed the HSI special agent assigned to the task force 

to influence ATF to pursue that transportation angle through Operation Fast and 

Furious. However, the HSI special agent’s chain of command did not direct him 

to pursue the lead. 

Conclusion 

The HSI special agent’s chain of command should have taken a more active role 

to ensure that the lead was pursued. Instead, they complied with ATF’s request, 

supported by the AUSA, that HSI not use the confidential informant to identify 

the transportation cell. The special agent’s chain of command did not direct the 

HSI special agent to pursue the lead on the task force. As a result, HSI was not 

able to ensure that AECA and 18 U.S.C. § 554 were enforced, and the weapons 

continued to flow to Mexico as the task force observed suspected straw 

purchasers acquire more. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 44 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation # 1: 

We recommend that the Director of ICE assess whether HSI Arizona senior 

leaders fulfilled their duty to enforce the weapons smuggling statutes for which 

DHS maintains jurisdiction. 

HSI Arizona Placed a Special Agent on Operation Fast and Furious, Did Not 

Provide Oversight Necessary to Prevent His Participation in Activities That 

Violate ICE Policy, and Did Not Attempt to Improve the Investigative 

Methodology 

After HSI Arizona senior officials decided to participate in the OCDETF that would 

conduct Operation Fast and Furious, they determined to assign the HSI special 

agent to the operation. HSI senior officials said that ATF had requested him, and 

they knew he would cooperate with ATF better than some other HSI special 

agents who had more experience working jointly with ATF. However, due to 

several factors, including the HSI special agent’s lack of familiarity with HSI 

weapons smuggling investigation procedures, and absence of HSI oversight and 

direction, he was not able to fulfill some HSI objectives. 

The HSI special agent did not receive much oversight or guidance from his HSI 

chain of command. His group supervisors were aware that he was involved in 

activities prohibited by ICE policy. However, they did not report the problem to 

more senior management because they believed that HSI Arizona senior leaders 

were aware of the problems and chose to do nothing about them. The HSI SAC 

and other senior leaders did not inquire about the HSI special agent’s activities. 

Without much guidance from HSI, the HSI special agent conducted investigative 

activities with other task force members and followed the direction of the ATF 

lead case agent. Some of the activities would not have been permissible under 

ICE policies, training, and practice. 

HSI Assigned the Special Agent Who Had Been Assisting ATF’s Investigation to 

Participate on Operation Fast and Furious 

HSI Arizona senior leaders decided to appoint the HSI special agent who had 

been assisting ATF with its investigation on Operation Fast and Furious. Before 

joining HSI, the HSI special agent worked as an ATF inspector where he 

specialized in firearms regulations. HSI hired him as a special agent in May 2008. 

At the time of his placement on Operation Fast and Furious, the HSI special agent 

www.oig.dhs.gov 45 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

was not familiar with ICE procedures for conducting weapons smuggling 

investigations. Additionally, he had never worked in a task force environment 

before. Despite his limited tenure and experience, his group supervisor was 

instructed to direct the special agent to open a case and assist ATF on its 

investigation in November 2009. Once the investigation was certified as an 

OCDETF operation, HSI Arizona placed the special agent full time on the OCDETF 

Operation Fast and Furious. 

We heard several competing ideas about who made the decision to assign the 

HSI special agent to the operation. Moreover, HSI personnel disagreed about 

whether this decision was made independently. HSI personnel said that the HSI 

SAC, a former HSI DSAC, a former HSI ASAC, group supervisor, or some 

combination thereof made the decision. It appears that the former HSI ASAC 

made the decision to assign the HSI special agent to the operation. The ASAC 

has since retired and declined our request to interview. We also understand that 

two other special agents were considered for the position initially. The HSI 

special agent’s group supervisor said he advised against placing the HSI special 

agent on the operation, but the ASAC rejected his argument. 

HSI Arizona staff provided several reasons for dedicating the HSI special agent to 

the operation. ATF had requested the HSI special agent specifically and already 

had a good working relationship with him. In addition, he had worked as an ATF 

inspector for eight years prior to becoming an HSI special agent. He was 

knowledgeable about weapons laws and regulations, and he knew the ATF 

culture. It would be easier for him to work with ATF because he was someone 

ATF already knew and trusted. 

However, some HSI Arizona staff members said that the reasons for placing the 

HSI special agent on the operation were also reasons not to assign him. HSI 

knew that ATF policies and practices deviated significantly from their own, and 

had knowingly allowed weapons to cross into Mexico in the past. If HSI wanted 

to ensure that the operation enforced the smuggling statutes and weapons did 

not cross into Mexico, HSI needed to assign a special agent who could argue 

persuasively that the ICE policies and practices for weapons cases should be 

adopted. However, given his background, it was unlikely that the HSI special 

agent would be able to do that. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 46 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The HSI Special Agent Was the Only HSI Special Agent Significantly Involved in 

Operation Fast and Furious 

The HSI special agent was the only HSI staff member to support Operation Fast 

and Furious on a full time basis. After 20 suspects were indicted in January 2011, 

other DHS employees assisted with arrests. They were not involved in the 

flawed surveillance methodology or other activities that contravened HSI policies 

and practices. 

The HSI special agent worked full time on the operation from its inception. He 

documented his involvement in 33 ROIs. However, he was involved in additional 

investigative activities that he did not document in ROIs. ATF special agents 

wrote the majority of the ROIs, which the HSI special agent could not access. 

Not producing two different reports of the same investigative activity is a typical 

law enforcement practice. Producing differing reports of the same activity could 

cause problems with the pretrial discovery process. Accordingly, some of the 

special agent’s activities were documented in ATF ROIs. We do not have access 

to those ATF ROIs and can only review the special agent’s 33 ROIs to understand 

his activities on the operation. The 33 ROIs and our interviews with the HSI 

special agent indicate involvement in: 

• Deconflicting cases; 

• Coordinating with CBP to stop weapons from crossing the border; 

• Monitoring Title III wiretaps; 

• Conducting physical surveillance; 

• Questioning suspects; 

• Obtaining border crossing records; 

• Arresting suspects once the indictment was issued; and 

• Attending some team meetings. 

These activities provided him with awareness of the case methodology, as well 

as the volume and types of suspect weapon purchases. 

The HSI Special Agent Deconflicted HSI Cases with the Operation Although 

Deconfliction Needs Were Minimal 

The HSI special agent received requests to deconflict HSI investigations with the 

operation. He would have more opportunities to deconflict had the parallel HSI 

investigation of a transportation cell member in Mexico been successful. 

However, as we discuss elsewhere in this report, the investigation terminated 

when the telephone of the suspect stopped transmitting calls and the ability to 

receive information about his activity stopped. Had the investigation continued, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 47 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the HSI special agent would have served as the deconfliction point for overlap 

between this case and Operation Fast and Furious. Due to the termination of 

that investigation, there were few intersecting cases to deconflict. The majority 

of his deconfliction efforts were to coordinate ATF and CBP activities. 

The HSI Special Agent Coordinated with CBP to Stop Weapons from Crossing 

the Border, but Followed ATF Direction, Which Ignored Investigative Leads 

One of the key duties HSI senior leaders assigned to the HSI special agent was to 

prevent weapons from being smuggled to Mexico when specific information was 

available that the weapons were being transported to the border. The 

interdiction of a known weapons smuggling attempt occurred only once during 

the operation. The HSI special agent coordinated with CBP, which interdicted 

the weapons in the vehicle. 

In February 2010, the HSI special agent helped coordinate the seizure of 

weapons that he believed were being transported to Mexico. He learned that a 

weapon acquired by a straw purchaser was being transported from Tucson 

toward the Mexican border. The HSI special agent contacted nearby ports of 

entry to request an outbound inspection of the suspect vehicle, and he and a 

CBP OFO officer followed the weapon to interdict it. The HSI special agent later 

received information that the weapon was being transported through the 

Tohono O’odham nation, which maintains special gates that allow tribal 

members to cross the border into and out of Mexico. OBP monitors the gates. 

Accordingly, he coordinated with OBP to stop the vehicle. 

OBP stopped the vehicle in the Tohono O’odham nation and searched it. OBP 

seized 40 AK-47 style firearms, 1 A/R style firearm, and 43 magazines from the 

vehicle. Tucson ATF agents were interviewing the suspects already when the HSI 

special agent and the CBP OFO officer arrived at the scene. One of the suspects 

admitted to having transported weapons across the border five or six times 

previously. The HSI special agent did not question the suspects. He was not 

comfortable speaking up or attempting to flip these suspects because ATF was 

already at the scene conducting interviews. 

ATF and the HSI special agent did not arrest the suspects because they were 

deemed too far from the gate to charge them with a weapons smuggling 

violation. ATF did not try to flip the suspects or get them to cooperate, which 

was a mistake, according to three HSI staff members. It also would have been 

possible to place a recording device on the suspects to obtain incriminating 

information from co-conspirators within the transportation cell. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 48 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The decision not to pursue available investigative leads resulting from this 

seizure resulted in missed opportunities to identify co-conspirators and the 

transportation cell that was smuggling weapons to Mexico. 

The HSI Special Agent Monitored Title III Wiretaps and Was Required to Vet 

Actionable Information through ATF 

The HSI special agent was aware that the same straw purchasers were making, 

or at least intending, to make repeated purchases of weapons. 

In March 2010, a consensually monitored recorded call captured a conversation 

between a cooperating FFL staff member and one of the suspected straw 

purchasers. The two discussed a prospective sale of firearms. During the 

conversation, the FFL staff member said to the suspect that he had been a good 

customer given that he already had purchased so many weapons. The suspect 

said that he wanted to purchase multiple AK-47 style firearms, and he inquired 

about the cost of two additional firearms that were available for purchase. 

Further, he said that a friend was also interested in purchasing weapons. 

ATF did not authorize the HSI special agent to make independent decisions on 

follow-up investigative activities for wiretap intelligence. Instead, ATF required 

that he listen for actionable intelligence to vet with his ATF counterparts. As a 

result, he could not take unilateral action to pursue identification of the 

suspect’s “friend,” a likely co-conspirator. 

The HSI Special Agent Participated in Physical Surveillance that Was 

Terminated Prematurely 

The HSI special agent participated in visual surveillance of suspected straw 

purchases that ATF terminated prematurely, according to ICE policies and 

practices. He also said that he might have been involved in additional, similar 

surveillance activities. He told us that he could not recall each surveillance 

activity with specificity. 

The HSI special agent said that generally, when the task force surveillance teams 

received advance notice of a suspicious firearms sale, they would establish 

surveillance at the FFL. After the transaction, the team would follow the vehicle 

transporting the suspected straw purchaser and firearms to a residence. The 

surveillance team would lose visual contact when the suspect would park in a 

www.oig.dhs.gov 49 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

garage and close the garage doors. The surveillance team would continue to 

observe the residence until ATF’s lead case agent terminated the surveillance. 

In other specific instances, the task force terminated surveillance without seizing 

weapons or arresting suspects. In May 2010, an ATF agent on the task force 

monitored a series of conversations on a suspected straw purchaser’s telephone. 

She immediately provided the content of the calls to mobile surveillance units 

that were observing that suspect. The HSI special agent participated in one of 

the mobile surveillance units and was privy to the content of the suspect’s calls. 

The first conversation confirmed that an unidentified male wanted to purchase 

15 Draco firearms and 7 AK-47 style firearms from the suspect immediately. The 

suspect then called an FFL and requested to purchase 8 Draco firearms and 7 AK47 style firearms. In a third call, the FFL staff member confirmed the suspect’s 

plans to make additional weapons purchases for the following week. 

After the mobile surveillance unit observed the suspect leave the FFL with what 

appeared to be long gun boxes, there was a fourth intercepted call in which the 

unidentified male and the suspect agreed to meet. The mobile teams 

discontinued surveillance following another call in which the suspect and the 

unidentified male expressed concern that they were being followed. 

Surveillance was discontinued despite knowing that other records indicated that 

the suspect had already made multiple suspicious purchases of weapons in 2010, 

4 of which had already been recovered in Mexico. 

In June 2010, task force members, including the HSI special agent, conducted 

mobile surveillance of a suspected straw purchaser, after receiving advance 

notice about his intent to purchase a .50 caliber firearm from an FFL in Arizona. 

The team established a perimeter around the FFL and observed two men load 

boxes into a truck bed. The team followed the truck once it left the FFL. While 

following, the team lost visual contact of the truck for approximately ten 

minutes. Upon regaining visual contact, the truck bed was empty and 

surveillance was discontinued. The HSI special agent performed a license plate 

query and determined the truck’s owner. The truck owner was indicted in 

January 2011; however, we did not find any evidence of additional attempts by 

the task force to talk with the vehicle’s owner or locate the .50 caliber weapon. 

All of the HSI employees with whom we discussed the issue agreed that under 

ICE policy and practice, ATF should not have terminated surveillance in these 

cases and that ATF was not doing enough to prevent the weapons from being 

smuggled to Mexico. They said that ICE policy was to continue surveillance until 

special agents could seize the contraband. HSI would continue surveillance long 

www.oig.dhs.gov 50 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

enough to prove that there was intent to move the weapons across the border 

at which point HSI would interdict them and arrest the suspects. HSI might 

attempt to flip the suspects to get information about other members and leaders 

of the criminal organization. However, despite the fact that the OCDETF 

proposal named the HSI special agent as a co-case agent, the ATF manager and 

the ATF co-case agent directed the operation’s investigative activities. 

In Operation Fast and Furious, the HSI special agent learned that indefinite 

surveillance was considered too labor intensive and required too many resources 

given such a large pool of suspected straw purchasers. He never heard of a 

triggering event or threshold at which ATF would start to make seizures. 

Additionally, ATF continued surveillance of the same straw purchasers without 

making any arrests, because ATF intended to issue an indictment of all suspects 

at the same time when the operation concluded. 

Ending the surveillance before seizing the weapons eliminated the task force’s 

ability to prevent criminal organizations from receiving the firearms. In addition, 

it eliminated the ability to identify the transportation cell because the task force 

members were unable to watch the transport of the weapons. This resulted in 

missed opportunities to enforce the weapons smuggling statutes and allowed 

the individuals transporting the weapons to Mexico to avoid criminal charges. 

The HSI Special Agent Participated in Surveillance That Resulted in a Seizure 

In August 2010, the ATF lead case agent received information from an FFL about 

an impending sale of 9 AK-47 style firearms by a suspected straw purchaser. The 

HSI special agent, ATF lead case agent, and other task force members established 

mobile surveillance at the FFL where the sale was expected to occur. The team 

observed the suspect’s vehicle exit the FFL parking lot approximately 30 minutes 

after the surveillance team had arrived. They also observed two additional 

suspects enter the vehicle while it was parked at the FFL. The task force 

members following the vehicle lost sight of it momentarily, but located it 

abandoned at a nearby park. They initiated contact with two male subjects, who 

they located near the abandoned vehicle. Approximately an hour later, the HSI 

special agent and the ATF lead case agent arrived at the scene and interviewed 

the suspects. One admitted that he purchased the firearms that were in the 

abandoned vehicle and he planned to sell them on an online retail website. He 

said that he planned to sell the weapons only to Arizona residents who “are not 

bad people.” He also admitted that he had previously purchased and sold 29 

firearms. ATF seized the firearms from the vehicle, but did not make any arrests. 

The HSI case file did not contain evidence that the task force attempted to flip 

www.oig.dhs.gov 51 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the suspects or use other investigative techniques to obtain information from 

them later. The subjects were indicted in January 2011. 

The decision not to pursue investigative leads from this seizure resulted in 

missed opportunities to identify co-conspirators and intelligence that could have 

identified the transportation cell that was smuggling weapons to Mexico. 

The HSI Special Agent Was Not Allowed to Participate in All Internal Meetings 

Thereby Reducing Opportunity for HSI Input on Operational Strategy 

The OCDETF proposal named the HSI special agent as a co-lead for the operation. 

However, he did not lead the case. The ATF co-lead case agent and her chain of 

command would not allow him to make operational decisions. The HSI special 

agent said that the ATF lead case agent would entertain ideas he suggested but 

she often did not solicit his opinion or invite him to strategy meetings. 

Some HSI special agents said that although task forces may name co-leads, in 

practice one of the co-leads actually leads the investigations while the other 

takes orders. They said that, realistically, investigations cannot be led by two 

special agents. Two HSI Arizona employees said the HSI special agent might not 

have been invited to these meetings because the ATF agents may have also 

planned to discuss unrelated ATF cases in which the HSI special agent was not 

involved. Other HSI employees speculated that he was not invited because it 

allowed ATF to maintain control and influence over the investigation. 

The HSI special agent’s ability to modify the ATF methodology and make 

decisions was restricted. Eliminating the HSI special agent’s presence at some of 

these internal meetings reduced or eliminated the possibility of devising case 

strategy that incorporated HSI opinions and methodology. HSI did not achieve 

its objective to place the HSI special agent on the operation to influence the 

course of the investigation. 

The HSI Special Agent Conducted Interviews to Further the Investigation 

The HSI special agent participated in at least three interviews of suspected straw 

purchasers during the course of the investigation. Although the interviews did 

not produce significant actionable information, they indicate efforts to obtain 

substantive intelligence on suspected straw purchasers and co-conspirators, and 

attempts to flip suspects to further the investigation. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 52 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In May 2010, the HSI special agent assisted in an interview of one of the 

suspected leaders of the smuggling ring at the Lukeville port of entry. The 

interview followed CBP’s seizure of an AK-47-type, high-capacity drum magazine 

loaded with ammunition, 9 cellular telephones, and miscellaneous documents 

from a vehicle that the suspect attempted to drive through the port of entry and 

into Mexico. During the interview, the suspect provided information about the 

activities of an alleged cartel member that he had planned to meet in Mexico. 

The suspect agreed to cooperate with the investigators. The ATF lead case agent 

provided her with contact information, and the suspect agreed to call her when 

he returned from Mexico. 

The ATF lead case agent made the decision to let the suspect go; she did not 

consult the HSI special agent. The suspect did not initiate contact with the ATF 

lead case agent. Records indicate that the team continued surveillance of the 

suspect in July 2010 because he had also become involved in criminal activity 

related to narcotics. Additional criminal charges related to narcotics smuggling 

would have enhanced the potential penalties against the suspected straw 

purchaser. 

In October 2010, the HSI special agent and other members of the task force 

interviewed a suspected straw purchaser regarding his recent weapons 

purchases. The suspected straw purchaser admitted to purchasing 20 AK-47 

style firearms previously. He also said that he typically sold them to another 

male, which yielded profits. Despite these admissions, the suspected straw 

purchaser also said he never bought firearms for re-sale. The ATF lead case 

agent told the suspected straw purchaser that the interview would be forwarded 

to the USAO for consideration for prosecution. 

The HSI Special Agent Obtained Border Crossing Records of Suspects, but They 

Were Not Used to Further the Investigation 

As early as January 24, 2010, the HSI special agent began querying the border 

crossing records of suspected straw purchasers. He obtained border crossing 

records of suspects on at least six occasions throughout the course of the 

investigation. He received assistance from a CBP officer to conduct the border 

crossing checks. The HSI special agent obtained the dates, locations, crossing 

method, license plate numbers of crossing vehicles, and the corresponding 

vehicle registration information of suspected straw purchasers. 

The HSI special agent’s first set of border crossing checks included the records of 

24 persons crossing from Mexico into the United States over the previous 12 

www.oig.dhs.gov 53 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

months. There were positive responses on six persons. Then, on February 19, 

2010, the HSI special agent and the CBP officer queried the border crossings of 

suspects again. The results of this query revealed that three of the persons 

queried in the first report had continued crossing into the United States from 

Mexico during the interim period. Only one border crossing check returned zero 

border crossings. The HSI special agent’s last request for border crossing checks 

occurred in December 2010. 

HSI special agents would be interested in queries that reveal suspects crossing 

the border often because it could indicate that the suspects could be transferring 

weapons to Mexico. The majority of crossings were made by persons in the 

main target’s immediate family only. The HSI special agent relayed this 

information to ATF but the information, he said, seemed to “fall by the wayside.” 

In its comments to our report, DOJ said that ATF used this information to try to 

further the investigation. However, the HSI special agent said that he thought 

that ATF did not use the information. Apparently, ATF had not informed him of 

the activities that arose from the information. 

The HSI Special Agent and Other HSI Personnel Assisted With Arrests After the 

Indictment Was Issued 

After OBP Agent Terry was shot on December 14, 2010, and Operation Fast and 

Furious suspect weapons were recovered at the murder scene, ATF prioritized 

the arrest of Operation Fast and Furious suspects. Following the indictment of 

20 suspects, 4 search warrants and 17 arrest warrants were issued on January 

25, 2011. Law enforcement agents from HSI Arizona, ATF Phoenix, other Federal 

agencies, and state and local agencies executed the warrants. The HSI special 

agent assisted with the arrests, as did some other HSI Arizona employees. We 

also spoke to one CBP OFO officer who also acknowledged that he participated 

in these arrests. They said that they had not conducted other work on the 

operation and did not have knowledge of the methodology at the time the 

operation was underway. 

HSI Special Agent’s Group Supervisors Attempted to Remove Him from the 

Task Force 

As we discussed, the HSI special agent’s group supervisor and the senior special 

agent argued against placing the special agent on Operation Fast and Furious, 

according to five HSI employees. Both attempted to remove the HSI special 

agent from the task force later. In February 2010, after the HSI special agent 

began working on the operation, his group supervisor attempted to persuade his 

www.oig.dhs.gov 54 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ASAC to remove the special agent from the task force. The ASAC declined our 

request for a voluntary interview; however, email messages confirm that the 

group supervisor made the request to the ASAC. The HSI SAC said that he was 

not aware of the group supervisor’s request to remove the HSI special agent. 

In August 2010, the HSI special agent’s group supervisor transferred to another 

position within ICE. The special agent was assigned to a new group supervisor 

and a new ASAC. The new group supervisor was the senior special agent who 

had expertise in weapons smuggling investigations and had interviewed the 

confidential informant with the special agent. The new group supervisor and his 

new ASAC decided to ask more senior HSI leaders to take the HSI special agent 

off Operation Fast and Furious. However, HSI Arizona senior leaders decided not 

to remove the HSI special agent because the investigative activities were almost 

over, and the task force was preparing for indictments. 

In October 2010, ATF requested that the HSI special agent continue working on 

the OCDETF to assist ATF with another weapons smuggling operation that had 

ties to an ongoing HSI investigation. In an October 28, 2010 email message, the 

HSI special agent’s group supervisor told his ASAC that he did not want to lose 

staff to ATF again, and that he thought that the HSI special agent was not the 

right person to monitor ATF and ensure HSI priorities were taken into account. 

The group supervisor and ASAC decided not to have the HSI special agent 

continue with the OCDETF after Operation Fast and Furious concluded. 

The HSI special agent’s group supervisors had initially argued against joining the 

Operation Fast and Furious task force. Later, they argued to remove the sole HSI 

special agent on the task force, but were unable to persuade HSI Arizona senior 

leaders. The group supervisors’ chain of command in HSI Arizona are responsible 

for the decisions not only to participate but also to maintain participation, 

despite the group supervisors’ arguments to the contrary. To his credit, the HSI 

SAC told us that he was responsible for any negative outcomes from HSI 

participation on the task force. 

The HSI Special Agent’s Group Supervisors Provided Minimal Guidance, and the 

HSI Special Agent Relied on ATF Guidance 

During his assignment to Operation Fast and Furious, the HSI special agent 

received little guidance from his chain of command. His group supervisor 

initially instructed the HSI special agent to notify him if he was aware of firearms 

moving into Mexico. However, the HSI special agent engaged in only passing 

www.oig.dhs.gov 55 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

conversations with his group supervisors about the case sporadically throughout 

the duration of the operation. 

Both of the HSI special agent’s group supervisors distanced themselves from the 

case when more senior management overrode their arguments not to 

participate on the task force and rejected requests to remove the HSI special 

agent from it. They believed that participating in it was wrong, and they did not 

want to be involved with it. In avoiding the case, they also distanced themselves 

from the HSI special agent assigned to it. 

The HSI special agent’s first group supervisor felt that his chain of command 

found his complaints and concerns about ATF and the operation obstructive, and 

that raising more issues would damage his credibility with them. After his ASAC 

denied his request to remove the HSI special agent, the group supervisor 

stopped raising concerns. The better course of action would have been to advise 

the HSI special agent and continue raising the activities that violated ICE policy to 

management. However, doing so may have had an adverse affect on HSI Arizona 

management’s assessment of him. His predicament was difficult, and his 

reasons for distancing himself from the case were understandable. 

The HSI special agent’s second group supervisor replaced the first in August 

2010, when the operation’s investigative activities were coming to a close. He 

had argued against participating in the operation and had tried to get permission 

to remove the HSI special agent from the task force. When senior leaders 

rejected his request, he also distanced himself from the case to the extent that 

he could. Again, it would have been better if he had mentored the HSI special 

agent and notified his chain of command of instances when the activities 

violated ICE policy. However, the new group supervisor’s reasons for retreating 

are understandable. 

The HSI special agent said that he knew that HSI did not approve of the 

methodology ATF employed, but HSI also placed him on the task force to “get 

along” with ATF. The HSI special agent realized that if he advocated for changes 

to the methodology, ATF would have perceived it as his failure to “get along.” It 

was also important for him to cooperate with ATF so he still would be allowed to 

participate and receive information about the operation, which he could share 

with HSI. 

The HSI special agent’s two group supervisors did not provide much guidance or 

request information regarding the status of the operation. Throughout the 

duration of the operation, the HSI special agent requested approval of ROIs that 

www.oig.dhs.gov 56 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

discuss operational developments. However, his group supervisors did not 

provide substantive guidance, ask follow up questions regarding the ROIs’ 

questionable content, or intervene after receiving the ROIs. Occasionally, his 

group supervisors returned an ROI back to him to correct format, grammar, or 

spelling errors. Usually his group supervisors signed the ROIs quickly, which 

indicated that they had reviewed and approved the content. 

The HSI group supervisors’ chain of command did not read the ROIs, inquire 

about the HSI special agent’s activities, or attempt to guide the operation. As a 

result, HSI did not meet its stated goal to monitor the case or improve the 

investigative methodology. 

Because of the HSI special agent’s limited experience and his chain of 

command’s overall indifference toward the execution of the operation, he relied 

on direction from the ATF lead case agent and the ATF chain of command, 

instead. He could not change the operation’s methodology by himself. As a new 

investigator and a new HSI employee, he was less familiar with HSI investigative 

practices than other more experienced staff. He had received HSI training 

related to contraband smuggling techniques and policies. However, he did not 

have the investigative experience to speak with authority, and the ATF lead case 

agent and her chain of command did not allow him a decision-making role. As a 

result, the task force continued to use the same investigative methodology; it did 

not follow all viable investigative leads; and suspected straw purchasers 

continued to buy weapons that were transported to criminal organizations. 

HSI SAC offices send regular reports of significant cases to HSI headquarters, and 

the HSI SAC Phoenix included short summaries of Operation Fast and Furious in 

its reports. However, the case summaries for Operation Fast and Furious did not 

discuss methodology or other substantive details. As a result, HSI headquarters 

did not have information about the methodology used during Operation Fast and 

Furious. Without knowledge of the problems, HSI and ICE headquarters did not 

consult with DOJ to improve the operation. HSI and ICE headquarters officials 

did not learn about the methodology used in Operation Fast and Furious until 

after OBP Agent Terry’s murder. 

Conclusion 

The placement of the HSI special agent on Operation Fast and Furious reflects 

the HSI SAC’s desire to accommodate ATF. However, the HSI SAC should have 

communicated with his staff to monitor the HSI special agent’s activities and 

www.oig.dhs.gov 57 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ensure that the operation identified smuggling activities and violations. The HSI 

SAC also should have directed the HSI special agent’s chain of command to 

communicate with the HSI special agent and ATF task force management. It was 

the HSI SAC’s decision to approve the placement of a special agent on the task 

force, and we agree with him: he bears the responsibility for the HSI special 

agent’s participation in activities that violate ICE policy and procedure. 

The HSI special agent’s first group supervisor should have monitored the HSI 

special agent and reported up the chain of command each time he was asked to 

engage in activity that violated ICE policy. However, we understand that the 

group supervisor interpreted management’s statements and actions as a desire 

to place him on the task force regardless of the operation’s methodology. The 

group supervisor’s effort to remove the HSI special agent from the task force was 

commendable. Because of what he saw as a diminution in senior leaders regard 

for his professionalism, he did not attempt to make changes to the HSI special 

agent’s activities or the ATF methodology. He also did not attempt to persuade 

his management to make other changes to HSI participation on the operation 

again. His actions were appropriate, given the situation. 

The HSI special agent’s second group supervisor’s actions also were appropriate. 

The HSI special agent’s investigative activities on the operation ended shortly 

after the second group supervisor gained his position. The second group 

supervisor reported his concerns about the operation to his new ASAC. He and 

his ASAC attempted to remove the HSI special agent from the operation, but 

their suggestions were refused 

Recommendation #2: 

We recommend that the Director of ICE determine whether the HSI SAC office’s 

management of Operation Fast and Furious, which allowed an HSI special agent 

to participate in investigative activities that violated ICE policy and practice, 

adhered to ICE standards for its senior leaders. 

ICE Released Policy That Should Prevent Similar Problems in the Future 

In 2009 and 2010, ICE had not developed policy to guide field office SACs when 

they experienced serious concerns with other agencies. However, ICE 

recognized the gap after it learned more about Operation Fast and Furious. It 

published a new policy, Accountability Requirements for Enforcement Operations 

Involving Contraband and Other Sensitive Items, on February 21, 2012. The new 

www.oig.dhs.gov 58 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

policy provides direction to SACs when their staff work on interagency task 

forces and become aware of decisions that contravene ICE policy. Specifically, 

the policy states: 

HSI routinely participates in joint or multi-agency investigations 

led by other law enforcement agencies and are subject to external 

agencies’ operation decisions. If these decisions conflict with HSI 

policies and procedures, the HSI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) 

must be immediately notified. The SAC in turn will contact his/her 

counterpart advising of the conflict and potential for withdrawing 

HSI resources. The SAC will then notify HSI Headquarters... HSI 

Headquarters will determine any further appropriate response, 

including whether continued participation in the joint 

investigation should be curtailed. 

The policy also restates other ICE policy not “to allow or facilitate uncontrolled 

cross-border movement of any dangerous contraband, including firearms...” 

The policy should prevent similar circumstances from developing in the future; 

however, there are two areas of vulnerability. To be effective, ICE and HSI 

headquarters officials must support the policy and the HSI field office staff that 

encounter the types of problems addressed by the policy. In 2008 and early 

2009, HSI Arizona staff had notified HSI headquarters officials that ATF was 

allowing firearms to be smuggled to Mexico. HSI headquarters officials 

dismissed the field’s concerns quickly and assumed that the ICE/ATF MOU would 

resolve any conflicts. Yet, the ICE/ATF MOU and the ICE Director’s message put 

the responsibility for conflict resolution on the field office. The HSI SAC had tried 

to influence ATF, but could not and should not have been expected to change 

ATF policies. HSI and ICE headquarters officials should have engaged on the 

issues in Arizona more intensively. In the future, ICE and HSI headquarters 

officials should continue to monitor the relationship between ATF and HSI 

Arizona field offices and engage with ATF headquarters if ICE is impeded from 

enforcing the statutes for which it has authority. 

To be effective, the new policy also should directly address the ICE/ATF MOU 

clause that establishes an expectation for ICE field offices to be able to resolve 

conflicts without headquarters assistance. Our jurisdiction is limited to DHS 

entities, and we cannot judge ATF’s actions. However, given the level of concern 

we noted during this review and the DOJ OIG’s report of ATF’s performance in 

Operation Fast and Furious, we conclude that ICE and HSI headquarters officials 

www.oig.dhs.gov 59 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

should have been more involved in resolving issues between HSI and ATF, at 

least between the HSI and ATF Arizona field offices. 

Recommendation #3: 

We recommend that the Director of ICE enhance ICE policy, Accountability 

Requirements for Enforcement Operations Involving Contraband and Other 

Sensitive Items, to ensure that the language in the ICE/ATF MOU does not 

continue to foster an expectation that HSI SACs resolve all conflicts with ATF in 

the field. The language of the policy should be modified to state that the duty to 

report conflicts covered by the policy overrides the ICE/ATF MOU language, 

which may seem to place the responsibility on SACs to resolve all conflicts at the 

field level. 

CBP Had Minimal Involvement in the ATF Investigation and OCDETF 

Operation Fast and Furious and Was Not Aware of the Flawed 

Investigative Methodology 

CBP Arizona officials in OFO and OBP were not aware of the investigative 

methodology employed in Operation Fast and Furious. The OFO Assistant Port 

Director said that what he knows he learned from the media. He said the 

operation was a “betrayal” and posed a risk for his staff. Likewise, the Deputy 

Chief Patrol Agent with whom we spoke said that it is quite “disturbing” that 

OBP was not aware of the operation when it was underway. 

Neither organization participated in the operation’s task force. Their staff 

occasionally interacted with Operation Fast and Furious task force members, or 

provided minimal support, but were not involved in investigative techniques that 

allowed weapons to be lost and ultimately to be smuggled into Mexico. When 

OFO and OBP leaders learned about the huge number of weapons that were 

allowed to travel through their areas of responsibility, they were angry. The 

operation left their staff and the public vulnerable, and OBP felt the effect when 

its agent, Brian Terry, was murdered and weapons lost by the operation were 

discovered at the scene, dropped by the criminals who killed him. 

We discuss OFO and OBP involvement with the operation briefly in the sections 

above that describe the HSI special agent’s activities on the operation. OFO 

provided border crossing information to the HSI special agent, who had 

requested the data. OFO commonly provides border crossing information to 

other agencies, and there was nothing unusual about the request that would 

www.oig.dhs.gov 60 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

have alerted CBP to the flawed investigative methodology. The names of the 

individuals whose border crossing records were checked did not have any 

significance to the OFO officer who provided the records. 

An OFO officer also assisted the HSI special agent on the operation to navigate 

the roads of southern Arizona when the HSI special agent pursued the weapon, 

which was being transported toward the Mexican border. The OFO officer 

observed the investigative activity in the Tohono O’odham nation, but had no 

reason to develop concerns. OBP agents responded to his request to stop the 

vehicle that drove onto the Tohono O’odham nation. OBP stopped the vehicle 

and seized the weapons that were in it. The operation appeared to run normally 

and according to the MOU’s mandate that OBP assist HSI when requested. 

OFO officers stopped a vehicle attempting to cross the Lukeville, Arizona, port of 

entry into Mexico. OBP assigned an agent to assist OFO at the Lukeville port of 

entry. The OBP agent assisted with processing information from the stop. OFO 

officers discovered ammunition during their inspection of the vehicle. OFO did 

not attend the interview of the vehicle’s occupants and did not have reason to 

be concerned about the investigative activity. 

Conclusion 

The activities that brought CBP employees in contact with Operation Fast and 

Furious did not provide them with an understanding of the methodological 

problems. The employees conducted their work according to routine 

operational procedures. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated technical comments from ICE and DOJ. We have made changes to 

the report where appropriate. We also analyzed formal comments from ICE 

regarding our recommendations. We provide the formal comments and our 

analysis below. Additionally, ICE formal comments, in their entirety, appear in 

appendix B. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 61 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation # 1: 

We recommend that the Director of ICE assess whether HSI Arizona senior 

leaders fulfilled their duty to enforce the weapons smuggling statutes for which 

DHS maintains jurisdiction. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with Recommendation 1. “ICE concurs with the 

recommendation that it must assess whether its HSI Phoenix senior leaders 

fulfilled their duty to enforce the weapons smuggling statutes of the United 

States for which DHS maintains jurisdiction. ICE will review its past practice and 

make determinations where modifications are required.” 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation will remain resolved and open pending our 

receipt of ICE’s determination of whether HSI Arizona senior leaders fulfilled 

their duty to enforce the weapons smuggling statutes for which DHS maintains 

jurisdiction. 

Recommendation #2: 

We recommend that the Director of ICE determine whether the HSI SAC office’s 

management of Operation Fast and Furious, which allowed an HSI special agent 

to participate in investigative activities that violated ICE policy and practice, 

adhered to ICE standards for its senior leaders. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with Recommendation 2. “ICE concurs with the 

recommendation that it assess whether the HSI SAC office's management of 

Operation Fast and Furious, which is alleged to have allowed an HSI special agent 

to participate in investigative activities that violated ICE policy and practice, 

adhered to ICE standards for its senior leaders. ICE will review its policies and 

practices and will conduct refresher training as needed.” 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation will remain resolved and open pending our 

receipt of ICE’s assessment of the HSI SAC’s management of Operation Fast and 

Furious and report of any corrective actions taken. 

Recommendation #3: 

We recommend that the Director of ICE enhance ICE policy, Accountability 

Requirements for Enforcement Operations Involving Contraband and Other 

www.oig.dhs.gov 62 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Sensitive Items, to ensure that the language in the ICE/ATF MOU does not 

continue to foster an expectation that HSI SACs resolve all conflicts with ATF in 

the field. The language of the policy should be modified to state that the duty to 

report conflicts covered by the policy overrides the ICE/ATF MOU language, 

which may seem to place the responsibility on SACs to resolve all conflicts at the 

field level. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with Recommendation 3. 

“ICE concurs with the recommendation that the agency review the 

aforementioned policy to determine where such changes could be made. This 

policy will remain Law Enforcement Sensitive and will not be made available to 

the public.” 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation will remain resolved and open pending our 

receipt of the enhanced ICE policy. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 63 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

In February 2012, Representative Michael T. McCaul asked that we review the extent to 

which DHS and its components were involved in OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious. 

Our objectives were to determine DHS involvement in planning and implementing 

Operation Fast and Furious, and the extent to which the Department complied with DHS 

policies and procedures for weapons smuggling investigations. 

We conducted our fieldwork between April and December 2012. During that time, we 

conducted interviews of 41 officials within DHS, ICE, and CBP, and one interview of a 

state and local law enforcement officer who was familiar with the operation. 

Specifically, we interviewed 3 officials from DHS headquarters offices, including 

Secretary Napolitano, 11 ICE officials from various ICE and HSI headquarters offices, 

including Director Morton, and 25 ICE staff members who worked in the HSI Arizona 

field offices and the Hermosillo Assistant Attaché’s office during the course of the 

operation. We interviewed three CBP officials in Arizona. 

We reviewed applicable laws, regulations, memoranda of understanding, and policies 

related to preventing, detecting, and investigating international weapons smuggling. 

We also reviewed ICE internal interim reports, ROIs, OCDETF proposal materials related 

to Operation Fast and Furious, and documents related to the internal ICE assessment of 

Operation Fast and Furious. We also reviewed email messages sent to or received from 

DHS personnel that DOJ OIG collected during its review of Operation Fast and Furious. 

We obtained copies of hundreds of thousands of email messages, which we searched 

for relevancy. Among those were the email accounts of eight employees in HSI Arizona 

offices for the period of September 1, 2009 through June 30, 2011. Using a list of 44 

search terms, we retrieved messages related to the scope of our review. Similarly, we 

retrieved the email accounts of five officials in ICE headquarters for the period of 

January 1, 2009 to April 31, 2011. We used 32 search strings with 196 search terms to 

collect all relevant messages. We also read all messages sent and received between 

certain DHS or DOJ employees during four key date ranges within that same period. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 64 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

We plan to conduct a third search of email messages from the accounts of two officials 

within DHS headquarters. We will limit the search to email messages sent and received 

between January 1, 2009 and April 31, 2011. Due to time constraints, we were unable 

to initiate these searches prior to our report’s publication. If the documents produce 

additional information relevant to our findings, we will issue an addendum to this 

report. 

Given that Operation Fast and Furious was conducted in a task force environment, we 

also provided a copy of our draft report to DOJ for comment. 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council 

of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 65 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

u.s Oc:parhn,mt gf lIor ... ,lwld s..cunty 

oo 12 SUter, sw WIIshln81"" IX' :!O~~6 

u.s. Immigration 

and Customs 

Enforcement 

January 17.2013 

EMORA Dill.1 FOR: 

FRm l: 

ACling Exec · ... ·-..;;s~sociate Director. Management and 

Administrntion 

S BlEeT: Draft Report substantive commcn ts for OIG Projcct No. 12-126: 

"Of·IS In\'o!vcmcnl in OCDETF Opcmlion Fnst lind Furious" -

For OffiCUlI Use Onl)' 

U.S. lmmigration llnd Customs Enforcemcnl (ICE) npprcciatcs Ule opportunity to provide 

substantive comments on OIG's Drnft Report 011 "OilS involvement ill OCDE I1~ Operation Fast 

nnd Furious. " 

If you have nny questions. please contact l\lichael t>.loy. OIG Portfolio r>. lanager. at 202-732· 

6263. 

Attachment 

wwwlcep.ov 

www.oig.dhs.gov 66 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

Substantive comments for OIG Draft Report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, firearms and 

Explosives (ATfHed Operation fast& Furious 

U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) concurs WIth the three recommendations, set rorth by 

the U.S Departrnentof Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG) In Part Two of the Draft 

Report on DHS Involvement In the Orgamzed Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Operation 

Fastand Funous (the Report) 

Recommendation 1: Assess whether HSIArlzona senior leaders fulfilled their duty to 

enforce the weapons smuggling statutes for which DHS maintains jurisdiction. 

ICE concurs wrth the recommendation that It must assess whether ItS HSI PhoeniX senior leaders fulfilled 

their duty to enforce the weapons smuggling statutes of the United Stales for which OHS maintains 

jurisdiction. ICE wilt review its past practice and make determinations where modifICations are required. 

Recommendation 2: Determine whether the HSI SAC office's management of Operation Fast 

and Furious, which allowed an HSlspecial agent to participate In Investigative activities that 

violated ICE policy and practice,adhered to ICE standards for its senior leaders. 

ICE concurs with the recommendation that it assess whether the H51 SAC office's management of 

Operation Fast and FunDus, which is alleged to have allowed an HSI special agent to participate in 

irrvestlgabve acwlties that ..... olated ICE policy and practice, adhered to ICE standards for ItS senior 

leaders ICE WIll r6V1ew its pol icies and practices and WItt conduct refresher training as needed . 

Recommendation 3: Enhance ICE Policy "Accountability Requirements for Enforcement 

Operations Involving Contraband and other Sensftive Items" to ensure that the language in the 

ICElATF MOU does not continue to foster an expectation that ICE SACs resolve all conflicts with 

ATF in the field. The language of the policy should be modified to stale that the duty to report 

conflicts covered by the polley overrldos the ICEIATF MOU language, which may seem to place 

the responsibility on SACs to resolve all conflicts at the field level. 

ICE concurs with the recommendation that the agency review the aforementioned polICY to determine 

where such changes could be made 

 

www.oig.dhs.gov 67 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

Appendix C 

ICE/ATF Memorandum of Understanding 

f>IFMQR AND(jM Qf (jNPERSTANQlNQ 

Between 

US. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

and the 

Bureau of A1cohol. Tobacco. Fireanns and Explosives 

I. Scone und l)uO?ose 

111;s l ... lemorandum of Understanding (MOU) is intended to fornlalize a partnership to 

promote effective. coordinated and collective law enforcement efforts both nationally and 

internationall y between the Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco. Fircamls and Explosives 

("All;" or "Agency") and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE" or 

"Ageney"XcoUcctivcly rcfcrrcd to as "Agencies") by the collaborativc use of both 

Ag,,-ncics' invcsti gative authorities. By working as partners, ATF and ICE will continue 

to be successful in the light against those l>ersons and criminal organizations invo lved in 

violent crime. ' n iC following sections articulate the proC(;dur~ to be followed by both 

Agencies in accord with the authorities veslcd in tlletn by Congress. Our mutu.11 goal is to 

keep the public and tile United St:ttes safe by using those tools given to both Agencies 

either through statute or regulation and which arc viul to tlle effective control of tlle 

domestic and international trafficking offU'Carms. ammunition. c.xptosives. weapons and 

munitions. To more cffectively utilize Federa l investigativc reso urces .. TF and ICE arc 

committed to enforcing the statutes and regulations within eaeh agency's juriSdiction 

while 311he same lime working in partnership and in support of each other. In those 

situations where the Ag",-neics' respective mission efforts coincide, this r..·IOU will serve 

to coordinate how both will pursue their in\'estigations cooperatively to optimize the use 

of resources ilnd minimize duplication of efforts. 

Title 28. United Slates Code. § 599A establishcs An : 3 5 an agency within Ihe 

Department of Justice (DOJ). ATF's investigative jurisdiction is quite broad and 

includes thl,; <ldministr .. tion lind enforcement of fi reamls lind explosives laws and 

regulations, to include investigating Federal crimes in\'olving the possession. licensing. 

transporting. sale and receipt of fireamlS. explosives and .. mmunition in interstate or 

foreign commerce. 

ICE was crc .. ted purslt.1nt to the Homeland Sccurit)' Act of 2002 1 

• Pub. l.. to. 107-2%, 

11 6 StOll. 2135 (2003). which transferred to tlte Agency the investigative authorities of the 

U.S. Customs S(''l'Vice and tile Immigration & Naturali 7..il lion Service. Numerous provisions 

throughout the U.S. Code either t.'Xprcssly or implicitl y authorize ICE to 

enforce export laws. including those reb ted to export offirearms and explosives. 

I Rererences 10 the Homeland Secunty Act of'2002 lI1eJude the associate.:! Department or HomelAnd 

Seam!}' Reorgaru2lltlOn Plan or Novernber 2S, 2002, and the ReorgalllZRhon Plal\ Morufimbon for the 

Ikparbnent or Homeland &elmty of January 30, 2003. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 68 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

'111e authorities and statutes upon which ATF and ICE exercise jurisdiction arc contained 

in Annex One to Ulis agrc",ncnL which is full y incorporated by referem:e herein, 

'11lis 1\10U supersedes boUt the "Memorandum of Agreement and Investigati vc 

Guidelincs. Customs and BATF." signed May 15. 1978. and the "l\ lemorandum o f 

Understanding Between thc Bureau of N eohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the 

Immigration and Naturaliz.1tion Service Regarding the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." 

signed August 23. 1989 and September 7. 1989. 

II. Int elli gence and Information Shari ng 

A. ICE shal\ report to the appropriate ATF fi eld office in a timely manner any 

intellig(.'t1ce received relating to attempted or planned violations of Federal 

fircanllS and explosives laws/regulations within the investigative j urisdiction of 

ATF. including fireanns and c;'l:plosivcs trafficking. and violations of laws or 

regulations by Federal Fire.lnns Licensees (FFLs) andlor Federal Expl osive 

Licensees and Permitees (FELs). violations of Section 38 of the Anns Export 

Control Act and 27 CFR P:1I1 447. and infomlation received from or about FFLs 

or FELs. ICE will infonn tile recipient of any restrictions on the use of th e 

intelligence. 

B. ATF shall report to the appropriate ICE field offi ce in a timely n13nncr any 

intell igence rel..'e ived relating to the illegal e.xportation. allempted exportation. or 

planned exportation of any item on the United States Munitions List. including 

c.xport transactions by FFLs and FELs 10 non· licensces. ATF will inform the 

recipient of any restrictions on Ule usc of the intelligence. 

C. ICE agrees eTrace is the preferred method for tracing fircamls. howcvl.." ICE 

l>crsOlUlCI ma y contlet ATF at the local level when nccessary. Based 0 11 the 

Agencies' arrangement set forth in the l\lenlorandum of Understanding Regardin g 

die eTr:lcc lnlcmct Based Firc.1fm Tracing AppliC:ltion. cffe<.:li ve tvL1rch 24. 2006. 

A1FIICE "eTrace 1\100" (Annex Two). ICE <Ig.rees to cont<lct ATF prior to 

initiation of any independent fireamls investigation based on fircann tracing 

da ta/intelli gence obt<lined via eTrace. 

D. Infollllation concerning the registration status ofi\lational Fireanns Act. 26 U.S.C. 

Chapler S3 (NFA) wea pons shall be open 10 inspection by. or disclosure to. olIicers 

and employea! of a Federal agenc)', including ICE. whose ollieial duti es requ ire 

such inspection or disclosure. »ursu.lnt to 26. U.S.C. § 6 103. no disclosure of 

registration status may be made to Stale or loca l ollicia ls unless they have been 

deputized by the United States f\.1:II"S hals Service. ICE. as well as any agency 

receiving l\ffA infomlation from ICE. must agree to appropriately safeguard such 

information as spec ified in 26 U.S.C. § 6 103. 

2 

www.oig.dhs.gov 69 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

E. Wl1en the recipient of inlelligence is apprised of an ongoing invesligation by the 

Agent:y reporting the intelligence, Ihe recipient will lake 3ppropriale steps 10 

ensure thallhc usc of such i.ntcllig""llce does nOljcopardizc the invcstigalion. 

1lI. Qeneml Inye"'i eoljye (ll! jde!jne<; 

A. '111e Agencies recognize the inherenl and shared responsibility to operale 

collaborative!y in order to ensure the mutua! success of the activities of both 

Agencies in support of the nalion's security. '111 is r-.. IOU is nol intended 10 confer 

or grant authority to either Agency. but ralher the purpose ofihc OU is 10 

slrCngthen the p3rtncrship bctWC(,l1 the Agencies. 

B. For purposes of this 1\ IOU, "investigation" me.1ns a documenled systemalic 

inquiry or CX3min31ion into a11egation.<; of l... imina! violations with intent to 

prosecute those identified, 111 is sh311 not include investigations deemed by each 

Ag'''llcy to be inlernal in nalure . 

C. During an investigation it may become apparent to the initiating Agency thai 

ATF and ICE have a shared interest \\ith respect to the case or parts thereof. The 

Agencies agrce to coordinate all pertinent and necessary information concerning 

fircamlS/explosives investigations implicating bou, ATF's and ICE's authorilies. Z 

In furtherance of onicer and public safety. the initiating Agency will makc cvcry 

cffort for d,,'COnniction to occur. particularly when there is any indication Ulat thc 

investigation might coincide wilh Ihe other Agency's concurrent clforts. The 

deeonniction should occur at th e local level and in a timely manner to avoid 

oonfusion and improve coordination betwcen U1C 3gcncies. 

I , Upon eslablishing Ulal lircamls and/or explosives-related violations have 

been iden tified during an ICE in\'estigation. ICE Hcld offices will notify 

and invite participation by Ule appropriate ATF field oOice(s) prior 10 

further invcstigative action. 

2. Upon establishing Ulal cusloms or illunigration violations have been 

identified during an ATF investigation. ATF field offi ces will notify and 

invite participation by U1C appropriate ICE field offi cc(s) prior to furth " ... 

investigative action. 

D. If an Agency declines to participate in 3n investigation, the investigation will 

continue by the initiating Agency at its own discretion. wiUlin UI31 Agency's 

appropriatejurisdiction and wilh Ihe full cooperation of the other Agency. The 

Agencies agree Ulal a declination to pal1icipale in a particular investigation under 

th e terms of this r-.. IOU will be communicated to the oUler Agency as soon as 

possible and at the appropriatc field level. 

) For eXllIl1p1o:!. no mailer wlueh agl!ncy IS ill\'esbgatlllg. ICE and ATF ",,11 work together 10 ensure sllccessful Fedcml prosecution if a case has elementi refjIQrulg proof of alienage or proof of the 1111er.>(atc 

ncxu:sofa firearm. 

3 

www.oig.dhs.gov 70 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

E. Forfeiture proceeds derived from joint investigations will be handled in 

accordance WiUl rules and procedures governing the lead Agency in the 

corresponding investigation. Asset sharing requests will be considered in c.1ch 

joint investigation where there is substantive p:nticipation by the OUlcr Agency. 

F. At the completion of a joint investigation, if appropriate, the matter will be 

referred to the United States Attorney for a detcnnination as to which violation(s). 

if any, should be prosecuted. Case rep011s and the infonnation contained therein 

lI1ay not be disclosed. except as required by law. or by policies al)proved by the 

Attorney General or thc Secretary of I Jomcland Security to any third party 

without UIC prior consent of the ori ginatin g Agency. 

G. Notification as described in this section shall not alter ei ther Agency's interna l 

reporting requirements. 

rv. Specifi c Investigative Guide lines 

A Recognizing that the regulation and inspection of the fireanns industry is within 

the sole purview of ATf'. ICE must coordinate all activities invo lving FFL.s. FELs 

and gun shows with the loca l ATF office and invite ATF to particip.1te. "111is 

includes, but is not limited to. the gathering or reviewing of or Obtaining 

infonnation contained in records rela ting to :my fire:lnns or explosives 

tr:msactions by FFLs lind FELs as well as conducting outrc.1ch activities. If ATF 

declines or calmot acconunodate the request within a reasonable time, ICE ma y 

proceed without funher coordination. 

B. Recogni zing that all invCCl tigative activi ties at the Pons of En try. borders and their 

functional equiva lent must be coordinated through ICE, ATF will notify and 

coordinate with Ule local ICE fie ld offi ee when it is anticipated that an investigation 

will have an lCE- related violation. Further, if during the course of 

an investigation. ATF anticipates the need for assistance in conducting 

inspections, detentions. or seizures of interna ti onal shipments, ATF will notify Ule 

loc.1 l ICE office and invite ICE to p:lnieipate. I f ICE declines or cannot 

accommodate the request wiUlin a reasonable IX-TIod of time, ATF may proceed 

without further coordina lion. 

y SQ!!n;C;S o Oufo rlDO'j o u 

A. In Ule event either an ATF or ICE special agent introduces their confidential 

infomlant (Cl) to the other Agency during ajoint investigation. the Agency which 

introduced the CI will maintain control of that CI for the duration of that specific 

joint investigation and will follow its departmental procedures for handling Cis. 

B. Duplicatiyc and excessive rewards to infOlmants will be avoided. In joint 

investi gations. every effort should be made for ATF and ICE to agree on th e 

www.oig.dhs.gov 71 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

payment of a sIngle reward Regardless of whIch Agency fumishes the funds.. the 

Agency responsible for the mfonnant will have: the right to make payment if 

deslTl~d. No rewards wll1 be offered or paid to an FR.. FEL or theIr employee(s) 

for mfonnallon conl:Hned m records requlIed to be maintained under Federal 

fireanns and explosIves Inws and regulations. 

C. ICE Will not authorize any FFL andior FEL or theIr (,'mploycc(s) to conduct (l 

transactIOn WIth the knowledge or a reason to beheve II would be a violation of 

Federal firearms or e.xplosives laws or regulations. 

DICE pernuts an Informant to work with another ngency If ICE is d ireeting the 

mformant or If the mfonnnnt IS pnmnnly supporting an ICE investigation, the 

operalion of lind inform,lIion from lhe infonnant must comply with ICE and 

Departmenl of Homeland &cunty (DHS) guidelines and be subj(:ctcd 10 ICE 

sUltablhty parameters. 

E A IT permlt<; an mformant to wori:: wIth another agency If A TF IS directing lhe 

mformant or If the Informant IS pnmanly support ins an ATF investi gation. the 

operatIOn of and infon\llliion from the mformnnt must comply with ATF and 

Department of Justice (DOl) gUidelines and be subjected to A 1F s uit.1bility 

parameters. 

F In cases where A IT is conductin g an investigation and Its confidential informant 

IS Illegally In the United States. ATF will be responsible for apply ins 10 ICE for 

approval of the proper parole documentation. 

yl ConDie ! Reso1uljo u 

A The Agenclcs are cOnlmitted to close coopcratiolL Efforts to resolve interagenc)' 

conflIcts Will begm at the lowest possIble level The NatLonal Ile.1d<luarters 

clements rely on the sound Judgment of A n= and ICE SpecIal Agents III Charge, 

who should be able to en$urc deconniction of activities in the field. 

B In those Instances where COml)eting eqUltlCS prcvenl the field clements from 

reachIng a mutually satisfactory conclUSion on any mailer under the purview of 

this MOli, each Agency will promptly refer the matter to theIr appropriate 

headquarters elements (or resolution The ICE Director. OOice of In vestigations, 

and the A TF AssIStant DIrector. Flcld Operations. WIll serve as the adjudicators 

for COnflict resolutions. 

VI! Cgu sll'Siou 

A. ThIS MOV IS en"'ectIVe upon the date of the last sIgnature by the authorized 

r~rCSenlal!Ve of each Agency and shall remaU"l. In effect untIl tcnninate<l by 

either Age ncy. 

5 

www.oig.dhs.gov 72 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

B. 'I1lis l\fOU m .. ), be amended or modified only by wriUc.1l agreement and onl y by 

an authorized representative of ATF and ICE. 111e amt,.1ldment or modification 

shall I.1ke effect on the date of the last signature. 

C. ATF or ICE may Ic.-rminate their p3rticipation in this ? IOU at any time afier 

giving 30 days writlen notice of their inlent to withdraw to the other Agency. 

I). Nothing in th is MOU is intended to conflict with current law or n:gulation or the 

i~ti"es of the pOlrties. If any teml of this OU is inconsistent with such 

authority. then Ihat lenn shall be invalid. but the remai ning terms and conditions 

ofthis ?fOU shall «:main in fu ll force and effect. 

E. 111is ~IO is an intema l arrangement between the Agencies and does not create 

or confer any right or bc.1lefit on any other JX-'1'Son or parly. priv3tc or public . 

F. Each Agency is responsible for any expenses it incurs .15 a result of acti vities 

under this MOU. Nothing in this ~fO is meant to imply that Congress will 

appropriate funds for activities under this ~IO . 

Kenneth 

~ r.. felsoll 

Acting Director As sistant Secretary 

BUTC3U of Alcohol. Tob3cco. u.s. Immigration 3nd Customs 

Fire.1nns :lnd Explosives (ATF) Enforcement (ICE) 

LMJ~ Uk:;; 

Date Date~~109 

6 

www.oig.dhs.gov 73 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

Annex Onc- Legal A uthorities 

A. Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco. Fircanns and Exptosivcs 

ATF's invcstigative jurisdiction is quite broad and includes the administra tion and 

enforcement orflreamls nnd explosivcs laws and regulations. to include 

investigating fcder:ll crimes invo lvi ng the possession. liccnsing. transporting. sale 

and receipt offirearnls. explosi\·es and ammun ition in interstate or foreign 

commerce. 

I. Title 28. United Stales Code. § 599A establishes A'I1:: as an agency within the 

Dcp.111ment of Justice (001) and del egates to ATF through the Attorney 

General the responsibility to investigate: 

a. criminal and regulatory violations of the Federal firearms, explosives, 

arson. alcohol. and tobacco smuggling laws: and 

h. anyotller function related to the investigation of viole III crime or domestic 

terrorism that is delcgatcd to the B Urc.1U by the Attorney General. 

2. Additionally. pursuant to Title 28. Code of Fe<1ernl Rcgulations§ 0. 130. the 

Attorney General. the Deputy Attomey General and the Director of A TF arc 

directed to in\'(''Stigate. administer. and enforce the Jaws re lated to alcoho l. 

tobacco. firearms. explosives and arson to specifica lly include exercising 

these functions and powers under the following legal authorities. abbreviated 

for the purpose of this OU. 111cse :mthorities. in P;lrL ;Ire ;IS fo llows, but ;Ire 

Not limited to: 

3. 18 U.S.c. chapters -l-O (explosives) and 44 (the Gun Control Act also known 

as GCA). which include. but are not limited to: 

a. In v e s t i got Ion s a 6'iq!qtjqnvQ(J 8 US C §§ 84?UI awl 9'?IgJ 

"llicre are cel1ain categories of persons whom Congress has 

deemed ineligible to possess explosives and fircamufammunition. 

These violations fall within the Federal explosives Jaws and the 

Gun Control Act for whieh lhe authority 

To investigate has specifica lly been delegated to A TF. 

b. RevuWltno q(federql ffl'eqmls (,ICem ees (fFt.d 

II 'Ille regulation of the fire.1nns industry is within the sole purview 

of ATF. '111e statutes nnd regulations relating to the inspection of 

a FFL's records and inventory are very specilic to ATF and arc 

authorities not shared "ith :my other Fed(;,Tal agency. Sec 18 

U.S.C. § 923 (8) and 27 FR Part 478. Any misuse of the FFI... 

their employee(s). or any of the records required to be kept by 

7 

www.oig.dhs.gov 74 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

the FFL may put their license at risk and subject them to crimina l 

and administrative action. 

c Rgerdql/Q/1 QCEedeml £wlnS/ve..y I ir gmw£ and & nl!lttgg \' ( EEl 51 

Ill. ATF is responsible fo r administering the regulatory provisions. 

including the licensin g of dealers. users. manufadurcn and 

importers of explosives as well as the storage of explosives. 

Additionally. ATF Offi cers have the right of entry and 

exami nation of required records. pl3ces of storage. as well as 

inventory. ~ 18 .S.C. §§ 843 and 846 and 27 CFR Part 555. 

Any misuse of th e FEL. their employcc(s). or any of the records 

required to be kept by the FEL rna)' put their license at risk and 

subject them 10 c".';mina l and administrative action . 

4. 26 U.s.C Olaptcr 53 (N:ltional Firearms Act also known as r-..1"fA): 

5. Section 38 of the Anns Export Control Act. as amended. 22 U.S.c. § 2778 

(relating to the importation of items on the U.S. Munitions Impol1 List). 

except violations relating to cxl>011ation. in transit. tempor.uy iml>Ol1. or 

temporary export transactions: 

6. Any ofTcnse relating to the primary jurisdiction of the Bureau of A.lcohol. 

Tob.1cco, Fireamls and Explosives that the United Sl.1tcs would be obligated 

by a 111ultilateral trea ty either to extradite Ule alleged oll"ender or 10 submit the 

case for prosecution if the offender wen: found within the territory, of the 

United States: 

7. Subject to the limitations of3 u.S.C. § 301. exercise the authorities of the 

Allomc), Gencra l under section 38 Or Ule Anns Export Control Act. 22 .S.C. 

§ 2778. relating to U1C importation of dcfense articles :md defense services. 

illc luding those authorities sci forth in 27 CFR part "'4-7. 

B U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcem'.'nl 

ICE was created pursuan t to Ute '4Imeland Security Act of2002 J. Pub. L. No. 

107-2%. 116 Stat. 2 135 (2003). which transferred to the Agency the investigative 

authorities of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigra tion & Naturalization 

Service. Numerous provisions throughout the .s. Code either expressly or 

implicit I)' authorize ICE to enforce CXl>ort Jaws. ICE's aUlhorities. abbrevi ated 

for purposes of this MO • include. but are not limited to: 

l References 10 !he Homeland Sccunry Act 01'2002 Include! the associated Depart menl of Homeland 

Sectmly Reorgarlll8liOn Plan ofNovembcr 25,2002. and Ihe RC0fK8ml81iOn Plan MocbficallOfI ror the 

DcpllrtlllCli1 of Homeland SccUl'lry of January 30, 2003. 

8 

www.oig.dhs.gov 75 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

1. As customs offi c(:rs. ICE agl.:nts have lhe i1uthority to enforce l.."X port laws. 

including those pertaining to fireanns. As a general matter. the border search 

exception to the Fourth Amendmt.'TLt pcmlits customs oOicl;.'J's to conduct 

se:lfche:'i for merchandise, including fireanns. It the border. the functional 

equival<.:nt of the border. or the extended border wi thout a warrant and without 

probnble cause. 

2. "Illrough tile Anns Export Control Act (AECA) and its imp lementing 

regulations. the International Trallicking in Anns Regulations (!TAR). ICE is 

granted: 

a. Authority to inspect tile loading or unloading of any vessel. vehicle, or 

aircraft for the pUrpo5C of ensuring obs(;rvance of the ITAR. 22 C.F.R. 

§ 127.4: 

b. Authority as the sole investigativc ag(.'TIcy to enforce violations o f 

IT AR export provisions. barring foreign counterintelligence mailers. 

22 C.F.R. § 127.4; 

c. Authority to deuin or seize an)' export or atlempted export of defense 

articles. contrary to the ITAR. 22 C.F.R. § 127.4: 

d. Aut h 0 r i 1 Y to inspect records required to be maintained by the 

Directorate of Defense Tradc Controls (DOTe), Department of State. 

22 C.F.R. § 122.5(b); 

e. Authority to investigate violations of the e.'\port provisions of22 

C.F.R § 127. 1. including violations of registration requirements as 

n.:quin.:d by the DOTe. 22 C.F.R. § 127.4. 

3. Under the Export Administration Act (EAA) and its implementing 

regulations. the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). which continue in 

efTcct through Executi vc Ordcrs and Federal Register Notices issued pursuant 

to thc International Emergency Economic Powers Aet (IEEPA), ICE has the 

authority to invcstigate. detain or seize any export or attempted export of dualuse commodities (or "Commerce Control List" commodities). 

a. ICE has authorit), to employ the LEEPA. in relation to the illegal 

export of sporting shotguns regulated by the Department of 

Commerce. nnd enforcement of sanctions against terrorist and drug 

tralTicking organizations regulated by the Department of Treasury. 

Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

4. 'Ille USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthoriz.1tion Act of 2005. Pub. L. 

10. 109- 177. 120 Stat. 192 § 311 (2006). codified a new statute. Smuggling 

goods from the United St:ltcs. at 18 U.S.c. § 554. :md added related seizure 

and forfeiture Jaws for such merchandise und(.-'(" 19 U.S.c. § 1595a. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 554 was codified in the Customs chapter of Title 18 (Olapler 27). 

9 

www.oig.dhs.gov 76 OIG-13-49 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

It is understood by the Agencies that if the statutory and regulatory audlOrities change. 

dlC Annex of Leg a! Authorities ma y be amended:at the agreement of the parties. at a 

level lower than the Dir~ctor and Assist.1n1 Secretary. if desift;.'Cl by either agency but that 

such ch ange does 110t. of itself. inva lidate the MOU. if acceptable to both agencies. 

10 

 

www.oig.dhs.gov 77 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Douglas V. Ellice, Chief Inspector 

Elizabeth A. Kingma, Senior Inspector 

Lindsay K. Clarke, Inspector 

Isabelle M. Gama, Intern 

www.oig.dhs.gov 78 OIG-13-49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Component Liaison 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives 

www.oig.dhs.gov 79 OIG-13-49 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To expedite the reporting of alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any 

other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) programs and operations, please visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov 

and click on the red tab titled "Hotline" to report. You will be directed to complete and 

submit an automated DHS OIG Investigative Referral Submission Form. Submission 

through our website ensures that your complaint will be promptly received and 

reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: DHS Office of Inspector General, Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline, 245 

Murray Drive, SW, Building 410/Mail Stop 2600, Washington, DC, 20528; or you may 

call 1 (800) 323-8603; or fax it directly to us at (202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.