SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

April 27, 2010 

LETTER FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ

SUBJECT: Process for Continuing Invoice Payment for the Development Fund for Iraq 

Needs Attention (SIGIR 10-014) 

This letter addresses issues the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 

identified about the effectiveness of the process established by U.S. agencies with the Ministry of 

Finance and other Ministries within the Government of Iraq (GOI) to facilitate payment of 

invoices for reconstruction contracts funded with the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). Unless 

these issues are addressed these invoices may continue to go unpaid. About $32.3 million in DFI 

invoices remains unpaid, including $24.4 million owed to 11 U.S. contractors, more than 2 years 

after the invoices were submitted to the GOI.1 SIGIR found that: 

• documentation the GOI requires for payment is still unclear and, in most cases, the GOI 

is not responding to submission of invoices for payment; and 

• future U.S. support to the payment process is uncertain because knowledgeable officials 

from the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), who manages the 

invoices for U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), and the Office of the Treasury Attaché at the U.S. 

Embassy in Baghdad, who are currently working to facilitate payment of the invoices, 

have either left or are scheduled to leave Iraq by August 2010. 

JCC-I/A, USF-I/J9,2

 and the Office of the Treasury Attaché provided written responses to a draft 

of this report. JCC-I/A responded that it is not appropriately resourced or chartered to implement 

a diplomatic mission to facilitate payment of the invoices. Nonetheless, JCC-I/A recommended 

that either USF-I/J9 or the U.S. Embassy should be responsible for working with the GOI 

ministries to resolve the invoices. In its response; however, USF-I/J9 had no comments on the 

report and stated that the Office of the Treasury Attaché would provide comments to the report. 

The Office of the Treasury Attaché responded that it will assign staff to continue to work only 

with the Ministry of Finance to facilitate payment after the current staff working with the 

Ministry leave. SIGIR believes this action is a step in the right direction, but continues to be 

concerned that a coordinated plan between USF-I and the U.S. Embassy to resolve these invoices 

with the GOI has not been developed. 

________________ 

1

 SIGIR takes no position on the merits of the unpaid invoices or whether they may be subject to adjustment for 

contractual or other lawful reasons. 

2

 J9 is part of the command staff of USF-I. As discussed in its mission statement, J9 partners with the U.S. Embassy 

to employ political, economic, and information means to assist the Government of Iraq. 
2 

Background 

The DFI was established in May 2003 by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, and recognized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. DFI funds were 

to be used by U.S. agencies for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure 

and other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq. The DFI was funded from export sales of 

petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq. In addition, surplus funds from the 

United Nations Oil-for-Food Program as well as frozen assets were transferred to the Fund.3 

Since July 2004, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has held DFI funds in two accounts for 

the GOI: the Central Bank of Iraq account—known as the main account—and an account 

available to U.S. government agencies for use in administering DFI contracts—known as the 

secondary or sub-account. Bank records show that more than $2.8 billion was deposited in the 

DFI sub-account in 2004 for use by U.S. agencies in contracting for DFI projects. 

Upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority in June 2004 and the transfer of 

sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq, DFI’s administrative responsibilities were 

transferred to the GOI Ministry of Finance. From June 2004 through December 2007, the 

Minister of Finance extended authority and responsibility to several different U.S. government 

organizations to administer the DFI, and JCC-I/A was the last to be extended this authority. 

The Minister of Finance, in a letter4 to the Commanding General, JCC-I/A, agreed to extend 

JCC-I/A’s authority to administer and complete payment of remaining money due on DFIfunded contracts until December 31, 2007. The Minister directed that all DFI contracts were to 

be completed by the end of December and remaining funds transferred from the sub-account to 

the main account within the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In March 2008, as part of its 

close-out actions, JCC-I/A prepared a package of unpaid DFI invoices totaling $53.1 million and 

submitted it to the Minister of Finance for payment. Action has been taken to satisfy several 

unpaid invoices, including the GOI’s payment of $4.0 million to six Iraqi contractors in the JuneOctober 2008 time period; however, most of the invoices remain unpaid. JCC-I/A, on behalf of 

USF-I,5

 and the Office of the Treasury Attaché, on behalf of the U.S. Embassy, have been the 

primary agencies working to facilitate payment of these unpaid invoices by the Ministry of 

Finance. 

Our objective for this report is to review the process being used for paying U.S. contractor 

invoices from DFI funds. 

Process To Accomplish Payment of DFI Invoices Has Been 

Ineffective 

The process established between U.S. agencies and the GOI to facilitate payment of invoices for 

reconstruction contracts funded from the DFI has not been effective. More than 2 years after 

________________ 

3

 See Appendix B for more information on the history of the DFI. 

4

 This letter was undated; however, JCC-I/A acknowledged receiving it on October 7, 2007. 5

 Prior to USF-I being established on January 1, 2010, JCC-I/A managed these invoices on behalf of the MultiNational Force-Iraq. 
3 

JCC-I/A closed out its DFI-administered contracts and submitted a package of $53.1 million in 

unpaid invoices to the Minister of Finance, the majority of the invoices, or $32.3 million 

(60.8%), remain unpaid. Twenty contractors from several countries have unpaid invoices dating 

as far back as 2004 and 2005, including 11 U.S. contractors with unpaid invoices totaling $24.4 

million. However, SIGIR takes no position on the merits of the unpaid invoices or whether they 

may be subject to adjustment for contractual or other lawful reasons. 

Nine different GOI ministries and the Baghdad Amanat6

 have unpaid invoices associated with 

DFI work completed within their area of responsibility. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of 

Housing and Construction are associated with the largest amount of unpaid invoices at $16.5 

million and $4.2 million, respectively, including $16.6 million of unpaid invoices involving four 

U.S. contractors. 

According to U.S. officials, it is unclear what paperwork the GOI requires to process these 

payments, and it is not responding to the submission of invoices for payment. A Ministry of 

Finance official told us the GOI has as a two-tier process for paying DFI invoices: (1) review 

and sign-off by the Ministry responsible for the sector (such as Electricity, Oil, Housing and 

Construction, and Water) in which the work was done; and (2) review and sign-off by the 

Accounts Directorate within the Ministry of Finance. The Minister of Finance has advised U.S. 

government officials that it was critical to ensure the project had Program Review Board 

approval,7 was DFI funded, and that the paperwork specified what percent of the project had 

been completed. However, Iraqi officials have claimed the U.S. is submitting non-DFI projects 

for payment, payment packages that are incomplete, or are not following the proper payment 

process. In some cases, ministries have stated that the paperwork was never received or was lost, 

and that it should be resubmitted, or the ministries did not acknowledge receiving the paperwork 

at all. It appears that follow-up discussions between U.S. and GOI officials are needed to clarify 

these types of issues. 

In lieu of information from the GOI, JCC-I/A developed its own list of documents that should be 

in the payment packages and believes it has made a good faith effort to provide documentation to 

facilitate payment. The documents JCC-I/A has routinely provided as part of the payment 

packages include a material inspection and receiving report, a public voucher for purchase and 

services other than personal, a copy of the contract, and letters in English and Arabic for 

signature by the various ministries approving the invoice. For example: 

• Laudes Corporation has more than $9.9 million in unpaid invoices for life support items 

(including fire protection services, vehicle maintenance, and food service) provided to the 

Baghdad Police Academy in 2005. In a letter dated December 14, 2007, the 

Commanding General, JCC-I/A advised the Minister of Finance that the project was 

100% complete and ready to be processed for payment. The letter also stated the 

Commanding General thoroughly reviewed the payment package and certified that it was 

“accurate, authentic, and complete.” The payment package contained 27 documents 

supporting payment of the invoices. However, the invoices remain unpaid and, according 

________________ 

6

 The Amanat (City Hall) is responsible for municipal services in the metropolitan region of Baghdad. 

7

 The Program Review Board, established by the Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority, was responsible for 

reviewing and recommending expenditures of resources from the DFI. 
4 

to a JCC-I/A official, the GOI has not given any explanation as to why they have not 

been paid. 

• Lucent Technologies has $2.1 million in unpaid invoices for work completed on an 

Advanced First Responder Network System to be used in 15 Iraqi cities. The Minister of 

Finance authorized use of DFI funds for this project in a memorandum dated December 

24, 2005. About one year later, JCC-I/A requested that Lucent be paid for work 

completed to date; however, Lucent was not paid. Subsequently, in a letter dated 

November 25, 2007, the Commanding General, JCC-I/A advised the Minister of Finance 

that the project was 100% complete and ready for payment. The payment package 

contained 28 documents supporting payment of the invoices. However, the invoices 

remain unpaid and, according to a JCC-I/A official, the GOI has not given any 

explanation as to why they have not been paid. 

According to a JCC-I/A official, JCC-I/A has submitted payment packages for all of the unpaid 

invoices to the GOI in several ways. First, in the November-December 2007 time period, JCCI/A submitted three separate DFI payment packages, totaling $53.1 million, to the Minister of 

Finance. JCC-I/A submitted these packages as part of the Minister of Finance’s direction to 

close-out all U.S.-administered DFI contracts and return any remaining DFI funds to the GOI, 

but the GOI took no action on the invoices. Then, in March 2008, JCC-I/A combined the 

separate payment packages into one payment package and submitted it to the Minister of 

Finance. Following this submission, the GOI took some, but very limited action. Last, JCC-I/A 

decided to work directly with each individual ministry associated with unpaid invoices. For 

example, in June 2009, JCC-I/A hand delivered a $16.5 million payment package to the Ministry 

of Interior, which has the largest amount of unpaid invoices. However, as of March 15, 2010, 

JCC-I/A had not heard back from the Ministry of Interior. 

The Office of the Treasury Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq has also participated in efforts to 

get the invoices paid. For example, Treasury Attaché officials participated in an interagency 

meeting on February 14, 2009, to discuss how to re-open the process of getting the invoices paid 

by the Minister of Finance. In addition, Treasury Attaché officials provided e-mails they 

exchanged over the last several years with other U.S agency personnel on actions being taken 

and the status of unpaid invoices. The officials also noted they have held meetings with Ministry 

of Finance officials to discuss the unpaid DFI invoices and provided the summary of such a 

meeting held in May 2008. The officials advised that more recent meetings have occurred, but a 

large number of invoices still remain unpaid. 

Future of the Payment Process Is Uncertain 

Obstacles to accomplishing payment of these invoices are mounting. On the U.S. side, there are 

few personnel remaining in Iraq with historical knowledge of DFI activities. The two most 

knowledgeable officials, one from JCC-I/A, permanently returned to the U.S. in March 2010, 

and the other, from the Office of the Treasury Attaché, is scheduled to leave Iraq in August 2010. 

The JCC-I/A official has not been replaced. In addition, JCC-I/A has had the lead in pursuing 

payment of DFI invoices with the GOI, but as the U.S. military drawdown continues in Iraq, 

JCC-I/A will move from Iraq to Kuwait in June 2010 and then eventually cease to exist. 
5 

At that point, in JCC-I/A’s absence it is unclear who in USF-I or the U.S. Embassy will be 

assigned overall responsibility for processing these DFI payment packages with the GOI. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, JCC-I/A recommended that a coordinated plan be 

developed by USF-I/J9 or the matter should be referred to U.S. Embassy for resolution because it 

is not chartered or resourced to implement a diplomatic mission to facilitate payment of the 

invoices with the various GOI ministries that have unpaid invoices. Although the Office of the 

Treasury Attaché responded that it will continue to work with the Ministry of Finance, neither 

that office nor USF-I/J9 indicated that a coordinated U.S. plan was being developed by either 

office, either individually or jointly, to resolve payment of the invoices with the GOI. 

On the Iraqi side, as with the 2006 Parliamentary elections, U.S. officials stated the March 2010 

Parliamentary elections may bring personnel changes to the various ministries which could result 

in additional challenges to approval of invoice payments for projects with which the new 

officials have no familiarity. Nonetheless, current U.S. and Iraqi officials told us they want to 

accomplish payment of these DFI invoices and are frustrated with the inability to do so. 

Continued engagement between the U.S. and GOI officials will be necessary to keep the process 

moving. 

Conclusions 

More than 2 years have passed since JCC-I/A submitted the original package of unpaid invoices 

to the GOI for payment, yet $32.3 million in unpaid invoices remain. Although SIGIR believes 

JCC-I/A and the Office of the Treasury Attaché have made a good faith effort to facilitate these 

payments with the GOI, the two sides do not appear to be effectively working together to pay the 

invoices in a timely manner. At the same time JCC-I/A’s role in the process will likely diminish, 

and no coordinated plans exist between USF-I and the U.S. Embassy for continuing engagement 

with the GOI. Consequently, SIGIR believes the invoice payment effort is at risk of being 

further delayed at best and at worse not being completed at all. The attention of U.S. senior 

civilian and military officials and Iraqi officials to clarify the documentation needed and provide 

and coordinate enough resources to complete the task is critical to completing the process. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Commanding General, U.S. ForcesIraq jointly: (1) identify and coordinate the activities responsible for working with the Minister 

of Finance on this issue; and (2) have those activities work with the GOI to develop a plan to pay 

the invoices in a timely manner. The plan should include, but not be limited to, clarification of 

documentation needed to close out the invoices and identification of both U.S. civilian and 

military resources and Iraqi resources needed to accomplish this task. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

JCC-I/A, USF-I J/9, and the Office of the Treasury Attaché provided written responses to a draft 

of this report. Their comments are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix E. 

JCC-I/A concurred with the findings of the report but did not concur with recommendation 1 or 

2. In non-concurring, JCC-I/A stated that it believed that continuing its efforts to resolve the 
6 

unpaid invoices will be unsuccessful. According to JCC-I/A, it is not chartered or resourced to 

implement the diplomatic mission needed to facilitate payment of the invoices with the various 

GOI ministries that have unpaid invoices. JCC-I/A further stated that the U.S. Embassy should 

resolve the matter or USF-I/J9 should develop a coordinated plan to address the payment issue 

with individual GOI ministries. However, USF-I/J9 had no comment on the report and stated 

that the Office of the Treasury Attaché at the U.S. Embassy would provide comments to the 

report. 

The Office of the Treasury Attaché did not respond to the report’s recommendations. However, 

the Office of the Treasury Attaché advised SIGIR that it will continue to assign staff to facilitate 

the payment of invoices with the Ministry of Finance. The Office of the Treasury Attaché 

further stated that it will not work with the other ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior and 

Ministry of Housing and Construction, to facilitate payment of the invoices but instead expected 

other agencies to handle working with the other GOI ministries to facilitate payment. 

While we are encouraged by the actions identified by the Office of the Treasury Attaché, we 

continue to be concerned that a coordinated plan to resolve the invoices has not been developed 

by USF-I and the U.S. Embassy. As discussed above, the GOI has a two-tiered process for 

paying invoices that includes the Ministry responsible for the sector in which the work was done 

and the Ministry of Finance. As the Office of the Treasury Attaché only plans to work with the 

Ministry of Finance, the GOI’s two-tier process will require a coordinated effort from USF-I and 

the U.S. Embassy to ensure that the other GOI sector ministries are involved. Therefore, we 

clarified the recommendations in the report to show our intent that USF-I and the U.S. Embassy 

jointly develop and coordinate a plan for resolving the invoices and facilitating payment. We 

also made other revisions to the report based on technical comments provided in the written 

responses, as appropriate. 

 - - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

audit report, please contact David Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (703) 604-

0982/ david.warren@sigir.mil or Glenn Furbish, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector General 

for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

 U.S. Secretary of Defense 

 U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 

 Commander, U.S. Central Command 

 
7 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

In November 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated 

Project 1006, as part of a series of audits on the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), to determine 

the amount of DFI funds distributed to and still in the possession of U.S. government agencies. 

During the course of this audit, it was brought to SIGIR’s attention that the Government of Iraq 

still owed U.S. and foreign contractors for work completed on DFI contracts administered by 

U.S. government agencies. This situation has existed for several years, and the few remaining 

U.S. government officials knowledgeable about DFI and working to accomplish payment of 

these unpaid invoices will be permanently leaving Iraq in the near future. Due to the amount of 

time this matter has remained unresolved and the upcoming loss of key personnel, we decided to 

report on these matters at this time. Our objective for this report is to review the process being 

used for paying U.S. contractor invoices from DFI funds. This review was performed by SIGIR 

under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted 

its work from January through March 2010, primarily in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To accomplish our objective we held discussions with officials from the Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), the U.S. Embassy Office of the Treasury Attaché in Iraq, 

and Iraq’s Ministry of Finance as well as U.S. contractors that have performed DFI work and are 

still owed money by the Government of Iraq. We reviewed prior SIGIR reports on DFI, 

individual DFI contract files maintained by JCC-I/A, and payment packages of unpaid DFI 

invoices developed by JCC-I/A and submitted to the Ministry of Finance on several occasions. 

We also reviewed e-mail correspondence generated by U.S. government personnel which 

addressed problems they were encountering with accomplishing payment as well as actions they 

were taking with the Government of Iraq to assist contractors with unpaid DFI invoices. In 

addition, we reviewed transactional data provided to us by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 

York to verify DFI invoice payments made or not made by the Government of Iraq. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objective. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

In performing this audit, SIGIR obtained computer generated DFI transactional information from 

the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This information was used to verify and crosscheck 

DFI invoice payment data contained in the JCC-I/A contract files. We concluded that the 

computer-processed information was sufficiently reliable and the best available for purposes of 

our audit. 
8 

Internal Controls

In conducting this audit, we reviewed internal controls used by JCC-I/A in managing and 

administering the DFI invoice payment process. We also obtained information from the GOI on 

its payment process. In addition, we examined documents in U.S. agency contract files and held 

discussions with key officials to gain an understanding of the internal controls governing the use 

of DFI. We determined that JCC-I/A’s internal controls were sufficiently reliable to determine 

the payment or non-payment of DFI invoices by the GOI. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following audit and project assessment reports issued by SIGIR: 

Development Fund for Iraq: Policy Guidance Needed To Enhance Accountability of USACEmanaged Funds, SIGIR 10-006, 10/29/2009. 

Falluja Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq, SIGIR PA-08-144, PA-08-145, 

PA-08-146, PA-08-147, PA-08-148, 10/27/2008. 

Attestation to Development Fund for Iraq Cash in the Possession of the Joint Area Support 

Group-Central, SIGIR 08-012, 4/13/2008.

Follow-up on SIGIR Recommendations Concerning the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), 

SIGIR 06-036, 1/29/2007. 

Review of the Advanced First Responder Network, SIGIR 06-020, 7/28/2006.

Administration of Contracts Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq, SIGIR 05-008, 

4/30/2005. 
9 

Appendix B—History of Development Fund for Iraq 

The Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) has its roots in the first Gulf War of the early 1990s. The 

United States froze Iraqi assets in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 661, 

passed after the first Gulf War. Then, in March 2003, Presidential Executive Order 13290 

authorized the use of these funds to benefit the people of Iraq. Similarly, the DFI was created to 

serve as the financial vehicle for channeling revenue, for use to benefit the people of Iraq, from 

three primary sources: (1) proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and 

natural gas from Iraq, (2) surplus funds from the United Nations Oil-for-Food program, and (3) 

assets of the former Iraqi regime frozen by United Nations Member States. For example, the 

Oil-for Food program traded Iraqi oil for goods and services, primarily food, to help alleviate 

suffering to the Iraqi people caused by the United Nations embargo on Iraqi oil exports. Shortly 

after the program ended in 2003, $8.6 billion was transferred from the Oil-for-Food program to 

the DFI. 

The DFI was established in May 2003 by the power delegated by the President of the United 

States, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, to the Administrator of the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. The Administrator oversaw and controlled the establishment, 

administration, and use of the Fund. The DFI was to be used in a transparent manner to provide 

for: (1) humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, (2) economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s 

infrastructure, (3) continued disarmament of Iraq, (4) cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and (5) 

other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq. DFI funds were held in two accounts at the Federal 

Reserve Bank of New York: the Central Bank of Iraq account—known as the main account—

and an account available to U.S. government agencies for use in administering DFI contracts—

known as the secondary or sub-account. Before establishment of the sub-account, more than $20 

billion had been deposited into the main account according to a Congressional report.8

 The subaccount, established in June 2004, had a beginning balance of $800 million, with an additional 

$2 billion deposited into the account during the year. These funds came from the main account 

at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 

Upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority in June 2004 and the transfer of 

sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq, DFI’s administrative responsibilities were 

transferred to the Iraq Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance extended authority to 

monitor and confirm performance, certify and/or make payments, and otherwise administer 

certain DFI-funded contracts and grants on several occasions between 2004 and 2007 to different 

U.S. organizations; the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan is the last organization to 

be extended such authority. The Iraq Minister of Finance ended U.S. stewardship of the DFI on 

December 31, 2007. Both the main account and sub-account holding DFI funds at the Federal 

Reserve Bank of New York currently remain open. Records for the main account were not 

available to us but those for the DFI sub-account showed a balance of $108.6 million, as of 

November 24, 2009. 

________________ 

8

 Rebuilding Iraq–U.S. Mismanagement of Iraqi Funds, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government 

Reform—Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division, June 2005. 
10 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

DFI Development Fund for Iraq 

GOI Government of Iraq 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USF-I U.S. Forces-Iraq 
11 

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the review and contributed to the report include: 

Benjamin H. Comfort 

M. Glenn Knoepfle 

Jason G. Venner 

L. Michael Welsh 
12 

Appendix E—Management Comments 

The following comments were provided by U.S. Forces-Iraq. 
13 

 
14 

 
15 

The following comments were provided by the Office of the Treasury Attaché at the U.S. 

Embassy. 
16 

Appendix F—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone 703-428-1059 

Email hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Danny Kopp 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil