NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRICIA YEOMANS; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v.
WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC ., a California corporation; WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., a Georgia corporation,

Defendants

- Appellants. No. 20

- 16937
D.C. No. 3:19

- cv - 00792

- EMC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

In re: WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC .; WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,

------------------------------ WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC ., a California corporation; WORLD FI NANCIAL GROUP, INC., a Georgia corporation, No. 20

- 73758
D.C. No. 3:19

- cv - 00792

- EMC

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

NOV 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Petitioners,

v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondent, TRICIA YEOMANS; et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Argued and Submitted September 14, 2021 San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE, SCHROEDER, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. World Financial Group, Inc. and World Financial Group Insurance Agency (collectively, W orld Financial Group ) seek a writ of mandamus to force the district
court to grant their motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of Georgia and appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion to compel arbitration in plaintiffs’ putative class action lawsuit

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and 9 U.S.C. § 16. We deny the mandamus p etition and affirm the district
court’s order denying arbitration.
1
. Mandamus p etition
. On direct appeal, we review the denial of a motion to transfer venue for abuse of discretion, Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc. ,3

211 F.3d 495, 498 ( 9th Cir. 2000); therefore, review in mandamus proceedings is “especially deferential , ” s ee I n re United States , 791 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2015).
While there are no specified time limits for seeking mandamus relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, “ [l]aches might bar a petition for a writ of mandamus if the petitioner slept

up on his rights

. . . . ” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C. , 542 U.S. 367, 379 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted)

. Here, there was no “flurry of activity ”

— for example, a motion to reconsider or a motion for an interlocutory appeal

— after the district court denied World Financial Group’s motion to transfer venue to Georgia.
See i d. I nstead, World Financial Group waited approximately eight months and
then mov ed to compel arbitration. And it was over three months after the district

cour t declined to compel arbitration before World Financial Group file d its Petition
for Writ of Mandamus. This type of delayed action is what “make[s] the application of laches appropriate.” Id.
2
. Motion to Compel Arbitration
. We review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo and the “findings of fact underlying th [at] . . . decision
for clear error.” Lim v. TForce Logistics , LLC , 8 F.4th 992 , 999 (9th Cir. 2021).
“We review a district court’s decision not to sever unconscion able portions of an arbitration agreement for abuse of discretion.” Id. First, the district court did not err in holding that World Financial Group failed to establish that plaintiff Adrian Rodriguez agreed to the arbitration clause,4

see Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc. , 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) , and that
the arbitration provisions were unconscionable , s ee Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co. , 846 F.3d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017). An arbitration agreement is unconscionable
under California law if both subst antive and procedural unconscionability are
present , although they need not be in equal degrees

— more of one makes up for
less of the other. See id. Here, both elements are present . P laintiffs have shown that

t here was surprise in the contracting process, see Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc. , 601 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2010), and that some of the terms were “unreasonably favorable to [World Financial Group,] the more powerful party.” Poublon , 846
F.3d at 1261 (citation omitted) ; see also OTO, L.L.C. v. Kh o , 447 P.3d 680, 693 ( Cal. 2019) (noting that “ the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old

- fashioned bad bargain but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party ”) (quotation marks and citation omitted)

. Moreo ver, given the relatively high degree of procedural unconscionability and multiple unconscionable provisions, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
de clined to sever the unconscionable provisions because the arbitration agreement
lack ed m utuality and “the central purpose . . . [wa] s tainted” with an intent to deter World Financial Group Associates, like plaintiffs, from enforcing their rights under
California law. Poublon , 846 F.3d at 1272 (quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also L im , 8 F.4th at 1005

– 06.5

Finally, it also was not error for the district court to decline to entertain World Financial Group’s request for a jury trial on the parties’ contract formation dispute. O nly “the party alleged to be in default” of the arbitration agreement may demand a jury trial under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) . 9 U.S.C. § 4. Here,

t he par ties alleged to be in default are the plaintiffs, and the general demand for a jury trial in their operative complaint is in sufficient to demand a jury trial under the
FAA because they did not allege the existence of an arbitration agreement in their compl aint. See i d

. ( indicating that “the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same” must be put at issue) ; see also
Burch v. P.J. Cheese , Inc. , 861 F.3d 1338, 1349 (11th Cir. 2017)

. The Petition for Writ of Man damus is DENIED , and the denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration is AFFIRMED
.