UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 12-452 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (February 3, 2014) Plaintiff Lawrence Rosenberg submitted Freedo m of Information Act requests to various federal agencies seeking, among ot her things, records rela ted to the raid of Agriprocessors, Inc., meatpacking plant and the subsequent prosec ution of Sholom Rubashkin whom Plaintiff represents. Dissatisfied with the agencies’ resp onses to his request, Plai ntiff filed suit against United States Immigration and Customs Enforcemen t, the United States Marshals Service, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and th e Federal Bureau of I nvestigation. On July 22 and 23, 2013, the Court granted the Motions to Di smiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment filed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and the United States Marshals Service. See Order (July 22, 2013), ECF No. [64]; Order (July 23, 2013), ECF No. [ 66]. On August 11, 2013, the Court granted in part the FBI’s Motion for Summary Judgment and de nied in part the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, but held in ab eyance the parties’ motions as to the adequacy of the agency’s search and the agency’s applica tion of Exemption 7(D), as well as the agency’s application of

LAWRENCE ROSENBERG, Plaintiff,

v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al. , Defendants.2 Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E) on a specific set of pages identified by the Court. See Order (Aug. 11, 2013), ECF. No [69]. The Cour t requested supplemental briefi ng on the applic ation of the exemptions held in abeyance. Id. Presently before the Court is the FBI’s [ 71] Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1 the documents submitted to the Court for in camera review, the relevant legal author ities, and the record as a whol e, the Court finds the FBI has demonstrated that it conducted an adequate search for potentially responsive documents and has justified its redaction of information pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) on all but one of the pages identified in the Court’ s August 2013 Order. The Court further finds that the FBI has justified its redaction of information on all ex cept fifteen of the page s on which it invoked Exemption 7(D) in addition to Exemptions 6 a nd 7(C). Finally, the Court finds the FBI has justified its redaction of information that it with held pursuant to Exemp tion 7(E). Accordingly, the FBI’s [71] Renewed Motion for Summary J udgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Furthermore, the FB I’s [47] Motion for Summary J udgment and Plaintiff’s [51] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgmen t, portions of which were prev iously held in abeyance, are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Sholom Rubashkin managed a kosher meatpacking company in Postville, Iowa, named Agriprocessors, Inc., which at one point employed over one t housand individuals. United States

1 Def.’s Notice of Filing ( Vaughn Decl.), ECF No. [46]; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF Nos. [47]; Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. (“Pl.’s Cr oss-Mot.”), ECF Nos. [50, 51]; Def.’s Reply & Opp’n to Pl.’s Cross-Mot. (“Def.’s Reply”), EC F Nos. [55, 56]; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. [57]; Pl.’s Suppl., ECF No. [60]; Def.’s Re sp. to Pl.’s Suppl., ECF No. [61]; Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. [71]; Pl.’s. Opp’n, EC F No. [74]; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. [78].3 v. Rubashkin , 655 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2011). In May 2008, Immigration and Customs Enforcement raided the plant, and arrested nearly four hundred employees for immigration violations, bringing crim inal charges against most of the arrestees. Id. at 854. “Around that time,” the United States Attorney’s Office in th e Northern District of Iowa informed Mr. Rubashkin that he was the target of a federal in vestigation for financial and immigration crimes. Id. Mr. Rubashkin was arrested in November 2008 and charged by indictment with 163 counts, including fourteen counts each of bank and wi re fraud, and sixty nine counts of harboring undocumented aliens for profit. Mr. Rubashkin was eventually convicted of seventy one counts of bank, mail, and wire fraud, money laundering, and false statements to bank, in addition to fifteen counts of willful viol ations of orders of the Secretary of Agriculture. Id

. Relying on documents obtained through a Freedo m of Information Act request submitted prior to his trial, Mr. Rubashkin subsequently moved for a new trial, or for discovery, which the trial court denied. Id. at 856. The Eighth Circuit affirm ed the denial of Mr. Rubashkin’s motion for a new trial, as well as his underlying conviction an d sentence on September 16, 2011. Id. at 869. By letter dated September 28, 2011, Plaintiff, an attorney who repr esents Mr. Rubashkin and his wife and their children, submitted a Freedo m of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the FBI seeking, among other things: (1) “any and all information relating to the raid of Agriprocessors, Inc., a meatpacking plant in Po stville, Iowa, on May 12 , 2008 (“the raid”) and the subsequent prosecution of Sholom Rubashki n”; (2) “any and all information relating to actions proposed to take place in year 2000 against Agriprocesso rs, Inc., as documented in the Des Moines Register’s August 6, 2011 article, ‘Immigrant Raid Halted in 2000 on Election Fear, Ex-Agent Says’”; (3) “any and all information rela ting to any actions cons idered to take place against Iowa Turkey Products, Inc. of Postville, IA”; (4) “any and all information relating to the4 class action case Salazar v. Agriprocessors, 527 F. Supp. 2d 873 (N. D. Iowa 2007)”; and (5) any and all documents reflecting communications be tween “any government agency or official” and over 101 individuals regarding Mr . Rubashkin or Agriprocessors . Hardy Decl., Ex. A (Pl.’s FOIA Request), ECF No. [46-1], at 2-8. Th e Plaintiff’s request included 39 numbered paragraphs outlining his specific requests. See id. The FBI acknowledged the Plaintiff’s request by letter dated October 5, 2011, assigning the request number 1174698. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3. 2 The FBI advised the Plaintiff that it would search the “indices to [the FBI’s] Central Records System for the information responsive to this request.” Id. ; Hardy Decl., Ex. B (10/5/11 Acknowledgmen t Ltr.). Two weeks later, the FBI notified the Plaintiff that it located 1,223 potentially responsiv e pages. Hardy Decl., Ex. C (10/19/11 Ltr. FBI to Pl.). The le tter advised the Plaintiff that if all of the potentially responsive pages were to be released, the Plaintiff would owe the FBI $112.30 in duplic ation fees to receive a paper copy or $20.00 to rece ive the release on a CD. Id. The FBI did not receive a response to its October 19, 2011, letter from the Plaintiff, and did not produce any documents in response to the request. The Plaintiff filed suit on March 23, 2012. On September 7, 2012, the FBI processed the pages identified as potentially re sponsive to the Plaintiff’s reque st. Hardy Decl. ¶ 11. Of the 1,233 pages initially identified, 257 were found to be duplicates. Second Hardy Decl., ECF No. [55-1], ¶ 8; Hardy Decl. ¶ 4. The FBI released 39 pages in full and 322 pages in part. Hardy Decl. ¶ 4. One hundred and fifty five pages were withheld in their entir ety pursuant to various

2 The Court shall refer to the FBI’s or the Plaintiff’s Statemen t of Material Facts (“Def.’s Stmt.” or “Pl.’s Stmt.”), or directly to the record, unless a statement is contradicted by the opposing party, in which case the Court may cite to either party’s Response to the Statement of Material Facts (“Resp. Stmt.”).5 FOIA exemptions. Id. The remaining 450 pages were withheld because they are court materials sealed by the United States District Cour t for the Northern District of Iowa. Id.
B. Procedural Background The parties filed cross-motions for summary j udgment in the first pa rt of 2013. The FBI argued that it had conducted an adequate search for documents potentially responsive to the Plaintiff’s FOIA request and that it properly withheld certain in formation from Plaintiff pursuant to FOIA exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7( E). Although the Court granted summary judgment on several of the FBI’s arguments, the Court found that the FBI had failed to demonstrate that it conducted an adequate search for potentially re sponsive documents, and also failed to justify why certain information was redacted pursuant to FOIA exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E). See Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), ECF No. [70], at 9- 12, 15-21, 23-26. Consequently, the Court ordered the FBI to supplement its motion for summary judgment regarding the adequacy of its search and its application of FOIA exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E) to justify specific redactions in certain responsive documents. See Order (Aug. 11, 2013), at 2. In addition, because the Court found the Plaintiff did not fully articulate his challe nge to the FBI’s invoc ation of Exemption 7(D) until his reply brief, the Court provided th e FBI an opportunity to supplement its showing as to the use of Exemption 7(D). See Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 22-23; Order (Aug. 11, 2013), at 2. The FBI filed its pr esent Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in response to the Court’s August 11, 2013, Order requ esting supplemental briefing. II. LEGAL STANDARD Congress enacted FOIA to “pie rce the veil of administrativ e secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citation omitted). Congress rema ined sensitive to the need to achieve balance between these6 objectives and the potential that “legitimate governme ntal and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information.” Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n , 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). To that end, FOIA “r equires federal agencies to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for specific categories of material.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy , 131 S.Ct. 1259, 1261–62 (2011). Ultimately, “discl osure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.” Rose , 425 U.S. at 361. For this reason, the “exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, and must be narrowly construed.” Milner , 131 S.Ct. at 1262 (citations omitted). When presented with a motion for summary judg ment in this context, the district court must conduct a “de novo” review of the record, wh ich requires the court to “ascertain whether the agency has sustained its burden of demonstr ating that the documents requested . . . are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.” Multi Ag. Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agriculture , 515 F.3d 1224, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Th e burden is on the agency to justify its response to the plaintiff’s request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “An agency may sustain its burden by means of affidavits, but only if they contain reas onable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not calle d into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Multi Ag Media , 515 F.3d at 1227 (citation omitted). “If an agency's affidavit describes the justifica tions for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency's bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U .S. Dept of Defense , 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “Uncontradicted, plausible affidav its showing reasonable specificit y and a logical relation to the7 exemption are likely to prevail.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State , 641 F.3d 504, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Summar y judgment is proper when the pleadings, the discovery materials on file, a nd any affidavits or declarations “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). With these principles in mi nd, the Court turns to the merits of the FBI’s renewed motion for summary judgment. III. DISCUSSION The FBI seeks summary judgment on the groun ds that it conducted an adequate search for responsive documents and properly withheld information pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(D) and Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E) on the pages identified by the Court in its August 2013 Order. 3 The Court begins it analysis with a discussion of the adequacy of the FBI’s search for documents before turning to the specific exemptions invoked by the FBI. A. Adequacy of the FBI’s Search “An agency fulfills its oblig ations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was ‘reasonably calculate d to uncover all relevant documents.’” ValenciaLucena v. U.S. Coast Guard , 180 F.3d 321, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). “At summary judgment, a court may rely on [a] reasonabl y detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averri ng that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild , 641 F.3d at 514 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The agency cannot limit its search to only one

3 Because the applicability of Exemption 7(C) in this context depends in part on the content of the documents, the C ourt previously ordered the FBI to provide it with unredacted copies of the responsive documen ts the FBI withheld or produced in redacted form to the Plaintiff.8 or more places if there are a dditional sources that are likely to turn up the information requested.” Valencia-Lucena , 180 F.3d at 391 (citation and inte rnal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the adequacy of a search is “determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency , 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In its August 2013 Memorandum Opinion, the C ourt found the two declarations prepared by David Hardy averring to the adequacy of the FB I’s search lacking in se veral respects. First, neither Hardy declaration demonstrated that the FBI’s search was “tailored to the nature” of the Plaintiff’s request. Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 11. Specifically, the Court noted that while declarations stated that the FBI searched it s Central Records System (“CRS”) for responsive documents, it did not aver that the CRS is the onl y collection of files likely to contain responsive documents. Id . Moreover, even when Plaintiff challenge d the adequacy of the FBI’s search for emails, the FBI did not assert in the Second Har dy declaration that the FB I searched all systems of records “likely to possess the requested information.” Id. In addition, the Court found that neither Hardy declaration “even attempts to esta blish that the requested communications between the FBI and various third parties prior to or after the raid are likely to be found in the [CRS].” Id. at 12. With its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, the FBI now submits a third Hardy Declaration that offers a more complete justif ication of the adequacy of the FBI’s search. Accordingly, the Court finds that the FBI has now provided suffici ent evidence that its search was adequate. As explained in the FBI’s fi rst two sworn declarations, the FBI conducted a search of the CRS utilizing the “phonetic sounds of the last, middle, and first names relating to Sholom Mordechai Rubashkin, Agri processors Inc., and Iowa Turkey Products Inc. Hardy Decl.9 ¶ 12, 18; Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 5. “The FBI also used the plaintiff's date of birth to facilitate the identification of responsive reco rds.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 18. The CRS “enables the FBI to maintain all information which it has acquired in the course of fulfilling its mandated law enforcement responsibilities” and includes “a dministrative, applicant, crim inal, personnel, and other files compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Id. ¶ 12. The files are indexed according to “main” entries, that is, “the name corresponding with a subject of a file,” and “reference” entries, which reflect “a mere mention or reference to an i ndividual, organization, or other subject matter, contained in a document located in another ‘main’ file on a different subject matter.” Id. ¶ 13. After Plaintiff filed suit, the FB I conducted a search for any cross -references to Agriprocessors Inc. or Sholom Mordechai Rubashkin, in additi on to the ‘main’ files search it had already completed. Id. ¶ 19. Importantly, in the Third Hardy Declaration, the FBI explains that “[b]ased on the nature of the records sought by plaintiff, the CRS is the only FBI system of records where responsive records would reasonably reside absent additi onal information pointing to records that may reside outside the CRS.” Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 6. The FBI explains that the records Plaintiff sought to access pertain to “a sp ecific law enforcement raid and subsequent prosecution,” which the FBI characterizes as “criminal investigative records.” Id. Such records “would be indexed in, and retrieved by, a search of the CRS.” Id. Most importantly, the FBI explains, “ there was no factual basis for the FBI to conclude that responsive records w ould reside in any databases or systems other than the CRS” and, furthermore, “the records located by the FBI through its automated search of the CRS also provided no indication that other potentially responsive records would exist in any other database or system, including the Electronic Surveillance (“ELSUR”) indices.” As a result, the FBI concludes, by searching the CRS in this case, it10 “performed a search for res ponsive records in the only syst em where such records would reasonably reside.” Id. Finally, the FBI declares that a ny relevant third party communications “would logically be indexed in the criminal inves tigative file involved in this case,” thus “the searches of the CRS that the FBI performed wo uld have likely uncovered documents indexed to any third party involved in the records at issue.” Id. ¶ 7. Although the FBI does not offer th e strongest justification for the adequacy of its search, the Court finds the FBI has now sufficiently show n that all files reasonably likely to contain responsive materials were searched. See Mobley v. C.I.A. , 924 F.Supp.2d 24, 44 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding FBI’s justificati on of search adequate, if “thin,” wher e the FBI averred that “[g]iven the broad search of the comprehensive CRS system and the ELSUR indices . . . [the FBI's acting FOIA chief] determined that there is no reasonabl e basis to conclude that responsive records are reasonably likely to be located by further searches of shared drives.”). Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Plai ntiff first contends that the FB I contradicted its own “implicit premise that criminal investigative records are retained only in the CRS” when it stated that “information on subjects whose electronic and/or voice communications ha ve been intercepted as a result of . . . electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI are separately maintained in the FBI’s ELSUR database.” Pl.’s Opp’n. at 2. Moreover, Plai ntiff argues, the Third Hardy Declaration “does not exclude the possibility that responsive documen ts are likely to exist in the hard-copy files or on the hard drives of the agents involved in investigating Sholom Rubashkin and/or Agriprocessors, Inc.” Id. Plaintiff thus faults the FBI for not searching for records in these locations. Plaintiff, ho wever, misconceives the Third Ha rdy Declaration. The FBI’s declaration does not state that criminal investig ative records are retained only in the CRS. It states that the CRS is the only system where responsive records would reasonably reside , absent11 additional indicators that would point to potentially respon sive records in other locations. But the FBI avers that it found no fact ual basis in Plaintiff’s detail ed FOIA request that would indicate potentially resp onsive records residing outside the CRS . Moreover, none of the records located in the search of the CRS in any way i ndicated that records re sponsive to Plaintiff’s request would potentially be found in another lo cation, and, in particular, in ELSUR. Plaintiff does not contest these assertions in the Third Hardy Declaration and they are entitled to a “presumption of good faith.” SafeCard Services, Inc. v. S.E.C. , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s asserti on, the Third Hardy Declaration does exclude the possibility that records potential ly responsive to Plaintiff’s reque st are reasonably likely to be found in locations outside the CRS. In any even t, Plaintiff offers no reasoned argument for why a search of “hard-copy files, hard drives, or th e ELSUR or other databases” would likely locate responsive documents. 4 “Absent some reason to believe that [these locations] are likely to

4 Plaintiff does argue that the FBI uniquely possesses the key piece of information bearing on whether responsive material is maintained in ELSUR database: whether Mr. Rubashkin and/or Agriprocessors were subject to ‘electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI.’ If so, by the FBI’s own description, informa tion pertaining to such surveillance would be available in the ELSUR database. Yet despite its unique knowledge, the FBI has refused to st ate whether it conducted electronic surveillance on Mr. Rubashki n and/or Agriprocessors. Pl.’s Opp’n. at 3. Consequently, Plaintiff c ontends, the Court still has no way to make a determination as to whether th e ELSUR contains documents res ponsive to Plaintiff’s request. Id. However, in so arguing, Plaintiff ignores the f act that the Third Hardy Declaration explicitly states that based on the factual nature of Plaintiff’s request and the informa tion in the responsive records retrieved from the CRS, “there was no indication that other potentially responsive records would exist in any other da tabase or system, including . . . ELSUR .” Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 6 (emphasis added). The Court fi nds that the Third Hardy Declar ation sufficiently addresses and resolves Plaintiff’s concern that there may be do cuments responsive to Plaintiff’s request in the ELSUR.12 contain responsive materials, [P laintiff’s] arguments are insuffi cient to require the FBI to conduct further searches. Mobley , 924 F.Supp.2d at 44. See also Valencia-Lucena , 180 F.3d at 325 (“[T]his court has required agencies to make mo re than perfunctory sear ches and, indeed, to follow through on obvious leads to discover requested documents.”) (citation omitted); Campbell v. U.S Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“As the relevance of some records may be more speculative than othe rs, the proper inquiry is whet her the requesting party has established a sufficient predicate to justify se arching for a particular type of record.”). Plaintiff next argues that the FB I’s refusal “to search hard-co py files, hard drives, or the ELSUR or other databases” “merely because info rmation in one database, the CRS, did not point toward those other separate sources” is “simpl y wrong” because the reas onableness of a search “is judged by ‘the method of the search rather th an its results.’” Pl.’s Opp’n. at 3. However, Plaintiff misinterprets the meaning of this well-worn rule. It is true that the adequacy of a FOIA search is not to be judged by its results, but only in so far as a plaintiff may seek to measure a search’s adequacy based purely on the number of re sults obtained or the nature of the results. See Iturralde , 315 F.3d at 315 (finding the failure of an agency “to turn up one specific document in its search does not alone render a search inadequate”); Ancient Coin Collectors Guild , 641 F.3d at 514 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that agency search was inadequate because “it turned up only a few emails”). On the contrar y, courts have consistently held that the results of a search are relevant in so far as the conten t of the responsive record s may indicate potentially responsive records in other unsearc hed locations. For example, in Campbell v. U.S Dep’t of
Justice , the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held th at even though “the FBI started with the reasonable assumption that only a CRS review w ould be necessary . . . that assumption became untenable once the FBI discovered information s uggesting the existence of documents that it13 could not locate without expanding th e scope of its search.” 164 F.3d at 28. In particular, “some of the Bureau's documents suggest[ed]—thr ough administrative annot ations and express references in the text—that searching [other re cords systems] would have identified additional information.” Id. at 27. Thus, it was not improper for the FB I in this case to consider the results of its search of the CRS to determine whether it had searched all lo cations where potentially responsive records were reasona bly likely to be located. Plaintiff’s final argument is that the FBI ma kes no attempt to square its assertion that “any relevant communications between third part ies . . . would logically be indexed in the criminal investigative file” maintained in the CRS with its own admission that the fruits of electronic searches are ma intained in the ELSUR database, or with the possibility that responsive records remain in hard-copy files or on hard drives. Pl.’s Opp’n. at 4. This argument is no more than a reiteration of Plaintiff’s first argument this time applied to records of third party communications. As the FBI’s search of the CRS —the database most lik ely to contain these third party communications—did not uncover any record indicating that potentially responsive records could be found in other locations and Plaintiff has offe red no reasoned argument to the contrary, the Court finds the FBI searched all files reasonably like ly to contain records of third party communications. In short, the FBI conducted a broad search for potentially respons ive records in the database most likely to contain such records and had no factual basis—before or after conducting that search—to believe that responsive documents were likely to be found in any other location. All of Plaintiff’s challenges to the adequacy of the FBI's s earch for responsive records are insufficient to defeat the FBI's entitlement to su mmary judgment on this issue. Accordingly, the Court finds the FBI’s search was reasonably ca lculated to uncover all responsive documents.14 See Oglesby v. Department of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that in order for a search to be found adequate an agency's affida vits should show “that the search method was reasonably calculated to uncover a ll relevant documents” and “identify the terms searched or explain how the search was conducte d” and “explain in its affidav it that no other record system was likely to produce re sponsive documents.”). B. FBI’s Withholdings In its August 2013 Memorandum Opinion an d Order, the Court granted summary judgment in the FBI’s favor with respect to th e FBI’s withholding of information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3, and, in most cases, Exempti ons 6 and 7(C), and 7(E). The Court, however, held in abeyance the parties’ motions with respec t to the FBI’s application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) on twenty-seven specific pages, the FBI’s application of Exemption 7(D), and the FBI’s application of Exemption 7(E) on five specific pages. The C ourt requested the FBI supplement its Motion for Summary Judgment in respect to the withholdings held in abeyance. The FBI subsequently filed the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment presently before the Court. In response to the FBI’s Renewed Motion, Plaintiff continues to contest the FBI’s invocation of FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). The Court has reviewed in their entirety the approximately 250 pages on which the FBI invoked ex emptions that the Cour t held in abeyance in its August 2013 Order. The Court reviewed these pages in their redacted, unredacted, and, where applicable, newly revised versions. The Court now addresses the propriety of each exemption in turn. 1. Exemptions 6 and 7(C) FOIA Exemption 6 provides that an agency may withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which woul d constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of15 personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Similarl y, Exemption 7(C), in relevant part, permits an agency to withhold “records or information co mpiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement record s or information . . . could reasonably be expected to c onstitute an unwarranted inva sion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). “The courts have construed this provision as permitting exemption if the privacy interest at stake outweighs the public's interest in disclosure.” Nation Magazine , Washington
Bureau v. U.S. Customs Service , 71 F.3d 885, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As the Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the records at issue in th is case were compiled for law enforcement purposes as required for Exemption 7(C) , the Court has “no need to c onsider Exemption 6 separately because all information that would fall within th e scope of Exemption 6 would also be immune from disclosure under Exemption 7(C).” Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In response to the parties’ pr ior cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court reviewed
in camera the pages on which the FBI invoked Exempti ons 6 and 7(C). The Court found that on twenty-seven specific pages “the FBI redacted information describing actions taken (or not taken) by third parties that doe s not appear to identify any thir d party whose identity might be protected by Exemption 6 or Exemption 7(C).” Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 16. Therefore, the Court ordered the FBI to either revise its redact ions or provide a supplemental explanation of the use of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) with respec t to the pages identified by the Court. Id. The Court found the FBI was otherwise entitled to summary judgment with respect to its use of Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 17. In the Third Hardy Declaration accompa nying the FBI’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, the FBI explains that it reviewed the pages identifi ed by the Court and “determined16 additional information could be segregated for rel ease, but only to the extent that release of the information would not reveal the identity of the third party.” Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 10. As to Rubashkin-934 and Rubashkin-935, however, the FBI maintained all redactions because “the mosaic effect of disclosure of pieces of informa tion could potentially lead to the identification of the third parties.” Id. ¶ 10 n. 2. The FBI attached the revised version of the pages at issue to the Third Hardy Declaration. See Id. , Ex. A. Plaintiff argues that, despite the revisions, the FBI continues to withhold “extensive information” that could not be used to identify a third party. Pl.’s Opp’n. at 5. Finally, Plai ntiff argues that summary judgment should not be granted in favor of the FBI because “the FBI provi des no further details or explan ation regarding the information it continues to withhold under Exemptions 6 and 7( C)” in contravention of the Court’s Order. Id. at 4-5. The Court finds that the FBI has properly re vised its redactions on all except one of the twenty-seven pages identified by the Court in its August 2013 Order. On Rubashkin-793, the Court finds that the FBI has cont inued to redact information that would not identify a third party protected by Exemption 6 or 7(C). Specifically, the Court finds that the following information in the fourth paragraph on Rubashkin-793 would not identify a third party and thus must be released to Plaintiff: (1) th e word immediately preceding the non- redacted phrase “He compared his” in the second line; (2) the six words in the third line immediately following the non-redacted phrase “ads to that of someone”; and (3) the five words in the sixth and seventh lines immediately following the non-redacted phrase “is the only person.” Otherwise, the Court agrees that the FBI has properly revised the pa ges identified in the Court’s August 2013 Order such that only informati on that could identify a third party protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C) is redacted. The Cour t disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument that, in17 violation of the Court’s August 2013 Order, “the FBI provides no further details or explanation regarding the information it continues to withho ld under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).” The Third Hardy Declaration states that the FBI released information “to the extent that release of the information would not reveal the identity of the third party.” Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 10. The logical understanding of this declaration is that the redactions the FBI ma intained on the pages at issue withheld information that iden tifies third parties. The Court’s in camera review of these pages confirms this understand ing. Moreover, for Rubashkin- 934-935, the only two pages where the FBI did not release additional information, the FBI explains that it maintained these redactions because “the mosaic effect of disclo sure of pieces of information could potentially lead to the identification of the third parties.” Id. ¶ 10 n. 2. Accordingly, the Court finds the FBI has offered sufficient justification fo r the redactions it has maintained. See Am. Civil Liberties
Union , 628 F.3d at 619 (“If an agency's affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency's bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.”). The court finds the FBI’s redactions pa rticularly appropriate a nd necessary to protect the privacy interests of third parties given the small community in which the crime that is the subject of Plaintiff’s FOIA request took place. See Concepcion v. F.B.I , 606 F.Supp.2d 14, 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (upholding the re daction of information under Exemption 7(C) “that could possibly identify [the source], including da tes and places where he/she has been”); Singh v.
F.B.I. , 574 F.Supp.2d 32, 49 (D.D.C. 2008) (upholding the redaction of information that “would allow a person familiar with the facts and circumstances of the investigation to identify the individuals”); Alirez v. NLRB , 676 F.2d 423, 428 (10th Cir. 1982) (f inding that deletion of names18 and other identifying data pertaining to small group of co-workers was simply inadequate to protect them from embarrassment or reprisals because requester could still possibly identify individuals). In addition, the Court notes that on Rubashki n-323, the FBI cited only Exemptions 6 and 7(C) even though in the Hardy Declarations, this page is listed as a page on which information has been withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(D). See Hardy Decl. ¶ 46 n.19; Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 12. Upon the Court’s in camera review of this page, the Cour t confirmed that Rubashkin-323 contains information that would reveal the identity of and info rmation provided by an individual whom the Court finds spoke to the FBI with an implied understa nding of confid entiality (as explained in the following section). Accordingly, the Court finds all of the information withheld on Rubashkin-323 to have been properly withhe ld under Exemption 7(D). Likewise, the Court finds the information listed as withheld pursu ant to both Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) on Rubashkin-934 and Rubashkin-935 , was properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(D), as explained in the following secti on. As for the remaining info rmation on Rubashkin-935, which the FBI withheld only under Exemption 6 and 7( C), upon further consideration, the Court agrees with the FBI that the information currently redacted, if released, would lead to the identification of the third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in the FBI’s favor as to all informati on withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C), except for the information outlined above on Ruba shkin-793, which the Cour t orders the FBI to release to Plaintiff. 2. Exemption 7(D) In regards to an agency’s invocation of Exem ption 7(D) to protect the identities of, and information received from, individuals who provide d information to the agency and/or local law19 enforcement during the course of the investigation into the crimin al activities, the D.C. Circuit has held that Where . . . the records at issue were ‘compiled by criminal law enforcement authorit[ies] in the course of a criminal investigation,’ they are covered by Exemption 7(D) if producing the record s ‘could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential s ource’ or ‘information furnished’ by such a source. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). The agency invoking Exemption 7(D) bears the burden of proving that it applies, and with respect to the FBI, it is not enough for the agency to claim that all sources pr oviding information in the course of a criminal investigation do so on a confidential basis. Roth , 642 F.3d at 1184. “When no express assurance of confidentiality exists, courts consider a number of factors to determine whether the s ource nonetheless ‘spoke with an understanding that the communication would re main confidential.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano , 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993)). The relevant factors in clude “‘the character of the crime at issue,’ ‘the source’s relation to the crim e,’ whether the source received payment, and whether the source has an ‘ongoing relationship’ wi th the law enforcement agency and typically communicates with the agency ‘only at locations and under conditions which assure the contact will not be noticed.’ Id. (quoting Landano , 508 U.S. at 179). “The nature of th e crime investigated and informant’s relation to it are the most important factors in determining whether implied confidentiality exists.” Singh , 574 F.Supp.2d at 50 (citing Landano , 508 U.S. at 179-80). “The pertinent question is whether the violence and risk of reta liation that attend this type of crime warrant an implied grant of confidentiality for such a source.” Mays v. Drug Enforcement Admin ., 234 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In the first Hardy Declaration, the FBI explained that the indi viduals at issue in this case “were interviewed under circumstances in which an assurance of confiden tiality may be implied since the individuals were repor ting on fraudulent financial activiti es concerning the plaintiff and others,” and “[i]f the interviewee’s identities were to be released, it would likely subject them to20 harassment or reprisal.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 46. The entirety of Plaintiff’s argument regarding Exemption 7(D) in his cross-motion was that the FBI “redact[ed] significant portions of documents, including entire paragraphs that appear to sweep in non-exempt information regarding the long-completed in vestigation and prosecution of Mr. Rubashkin that FOIA required the FBI to segregate and di sclose.” Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 11- 12. It was not until his reply brief that the Plaintiff challenged the adequacy of the FBI’s showing that the interviewees were implicitly assured that their identities would remain confidential. As a result, the Court provided the FBI an opportunity to respond to the new argum ent in the Plaintiff’s reply before the Court determined whether the FBI is entitled to summary judgment regarding its use of Exemption 7(D). In its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, the FBI now argues that “given the character of the crime at issue (involving long term incarcera tion [and financial fraud]), the source’s relation and proximity to the crime, the circumstances under which they were interviewed, and the risk assumed by these individuals, it is reasonable to conclude that these individuals would have provided the information under an implied promise of confidentiality.” Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-11. Specifically, the FBI argues that although the individuals who provided informa tion were not paid sources, “the y were in a position to obtain valuable information due to their access and close proximity to the criminal elements involved in these crimes.” Third Hardy Decl . ¶ 11. As the information thes e individuals provided “aided in the conviction of perpetrators who were expose d to severe penalties, including long term incarceration,” they assumed an “inherent risk” “ by providing information to law enforcement in this context.” Id. Furthermore, the FBI asserts, “the info rmation provided by these individuals is singular in nature and it is reasonable to infe r that given their access and close proximity [] it was21 provided with the inherent understanding that neith er their identities, no r the information they provided, would be disclosed to the public. Id. The FBI concludes that “given these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that these individuals would reasonably fear that disclosure of their identity would place them in danger and/or would likely subject them to harassment or reprisal.” Id. Plaintiff responds that the FBI does not offer any developed f actual or legal arguments to demonstrate that it has met the Landano factors for establishing that the individuals the FBI seeks to protect were implicitly assured confidentiality . Pl.’s Opp’n. at 6. Plaintiff contends that the FBI only offers “conclusory assertions that the alleged crimes involved fraudulent financial activities and that the interviewees we re interviewed under circumstan ces in which an assurance of confidentiality may be implied.” Id. These assertions, Plaintiff argues, are insufficient to discharge the FBI’s burden. Id. Plaintiff is correct that “[u]nder our case la w, agencies invoking a FOIA exemption must provide a specific, detail ed explanation of why the exemption a pplies to the withheld materials.” Roth , 642 F.3d at 1185 (citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). “Reviewing documents in camera is no ‘substitute for the govern ment's obligation to provide detailed public indexes and justif ications whenever possible.’” Id. (quoting Lykins v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Neverthe less, courts in th is circuit have recognized “that there are occasions when extensive public justifica tion would threaten to reveal the very information for which a FOIA exemption is claimed.” Lykins, 725 F.2d at 1463. “Although in such a case an agency is still required to provide as much public explanation as it can without ‘giving away the information it is trying to withhold,’ it may supplement its explanation by making the documents available for in camera review.” Roth , 642 F.3d at 118522 (quoting Lykins , 725 F.2d at 1463-64). Here, while the FBI has made review of this case particularly difficult by sweeping se veral distinct categories of in formants into its broad brush explanation of their implied assu rance of confidentiali ty, the Court still finds that the FBI has generally struck an appropriate balance, explaining to the extent it can in the Third Hardy Declaration why it has concluded that certain sources provided information under an implied assurance of confidential ity and then relying on in camera judicial review to confirm its conclusions. The Court finds th is balance particularly approp riate in light of the small community in which the financ ial fraud was perpetrated. The Court notes at the outset that every in stance in which the FBI has invoked Exemption 7(D) to justify its withholding information it has also invoked Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Exemption 7(D) is more expansive than 7(C) becau se it covers “records or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authorities in the cour se of criminal investigations if their release could reasonably be expected to di sclose the identity of, as well as information provided by , a confidential source.” Computer Prof'ls for Social Responsibil ity v. United States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Ex emption 7(C) only prot ects the disclosure of identifying information. Accordingly, the Cour t shall first consider the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 7(D). Having undertaken a thorough in camera review of the informati on withheld by the FBI pursuant to Exemption 7(D), the Court concludes that for most, but not all, of the redacted documents where the FBI has invoked Exemp tion 7(D), the FBI has met its burden of establishing that the individuals whose identi ties and information the FBI withheld provided information to the FBI under an implied assuran ce of confidentiality. Th e Court recognizes that this is not a case where the violent nature of the crime at issue—for example, homicide, drug23 trafficking, gang-related crime, terrorism, or government overthrow —“characteristically supports an inference of confiden tiality” that a court can generically apply to all informants. Landano , 508 U.S. at 177. Here, the crime about which the informants were providing information was a non-violent financial crime. Still, the Court finds that th e severity of the crime and the close association that certain informants had with Mr. Rubashkin, Agriprocessors, or Mr. Rubashkin’s fraudulent activity permit a reasonabl e inference that for these informants “the communication in all likelihood would not have b een made if confiden tiality had not been assured.” Ortiz v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services , 70 F.3d 729, 734 (2nd Cir. 1995) (quoting Brant Const. Co., Inc v. U.S. E.P.A. , 778 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Keys v. United States Dep’t of Justice , 830 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concluding an implied assurance of confidentiality arose, in part because “it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances that its absence would impair [def endant's] ability to elicit the information.”). Specifically, as the FBI averred in its Third Hardy Declaration, these informants provided information about a financial fraud perpetra ted by Mr. Rubashkin that resulted in his incarceration in federal prison for a term of twen ty-seven years. Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 11; Hardy Decl. ¶ 27. While the length of the incarcerati on or even the potential for incarceration was unknown to the informants at the time they provi ded information to the FBI, Mr. Rubashkin’s lengthy sentence reflects the seve rity of the crime about which the informants were providing information. Indeed, Mr. Rubashkin was convicted of 86 counts of financial fraud and related offenses. See Hardy Decl. ¶ 27. The Court takes judicial notice that Mr. Rubashkin—for whom Plaintiff in this case is Counsel—was convicted of several counts each of bank fraud, loan and credit application fraud generally, wire fr aud, frauds and swindl es, money laundering, and violations of an order of th e Secretary of Agriculture. United States v. Rubashkin , 655 F.3d 849,24 855 (8th Cir. 2011). Among his many costly fr auds, Mr. Rubashkin de frauded First Bank Business Capital out of nearly $30 million. Id. Mr. Rubashkin also regularly used many Agriprocessor’s employees and other individuals to perpetrate his fraud over a nearly decadelong period. Id. at 853. Courts have found informants to have spoken under implied assurances of confidentiality when they pr ovided information about simila rly severe non-violent financial crimes, for example, an investigation into a suspect who had committed crimes of “racketeering activity, wire fraud, money laundering, loan sharking, extortion, obstructi on of justice, aiding and abetting, securities fraud, and embezzling funds from a labor organization.” Wolfson v. U.S. , 672 F.Supp.2d 20, 33 (D.D.C. 2009); see also McQueen v. United States , 264 F.Supp.2d 502, 522-24 (S.D.Tex. 2003), aff’d, 100 Fed.Appx. 964 (5th Cir. 2004) (c onfidential informant who provided information pertaining to the crimes of w illfully attempting to evade federal diesel fuel excise taxes and conspiracy to commit such an offense is entitled to a “categorical presumption of implied confidentiality,” because this “par ticular kind of tax fra ud-involving big dollars, complex operations, vast numbers of transactions, and many people-is not qualitatively unlike other crimes . . . such as organized crime, loan sharking and gambling, and bribery” that courts have found entitled to a categorical presumption of implied confidentia lity). Even if the severity of the financial crime at issue here is not su fficient in and of itself to sustain a blanket presumption of confidentiality as to all indivi duals who provided information to the FBI about the financial fraud, the Court finds that the crime is nevertheless of such a severity that those who were in close personal and professional relationships with Mr. Rubashkin and/or Agriprocessors or were closely associated w ith the fraud and provided damaging information would reasonably fear reprisal or harassment if the fact that they were providing information to the FBI was revealed. See Shrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 74 F.Supp.2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 1999),25 aff’d in pertinent part & rev’d in part on other grounds , 254 F.3d 162 (D.C. Ci r. 2002) (finding that crimes of passport fraud and contempt of Congress merit an inference of implied confidentiality where th e informant reported “facts known only by those involved in the same criminal enterprise” as the criminal involved in the passport fraud and contempt of Congress); Cofield v. City of LaGrange, Georgia , 913 F.Supp. 608, 618-619 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding an implied assurance of confidentiality in voting rights investigation because those questioned were individuals “closely associated with decision makers in local or state government and whose livelihoods or personal safety might be in jeopardy if their contact with the Department of Justice was disclosed); see also Canning v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 567 F.Supp.2d 104, 111-112 (D.D.C. 2008). The Court is further inclined to find implied assurances of confidentiality in light of the fact that documents released to Plaintiff by the FBI, see Rubashkin-874, indica ted that those who publicly spoke out against Mr. Rubashkin and Agri processors subsequently received threats. See McQueen , 264 F.Supp.2d at 523-24 (finding in the alternative that re questor’s prior threats and ability to harm witnesses justified a finding of implied assurances of confidentiality). Accordingly, the Court holds that the FBI properly withheld information pursuant to Exemption 7(D) on the following pages: Rubas hkin-5-10; Rubashkin-21 -29; Rubashkin-39-42; Rubashkin-52; Rubashkin-55-57; Rubashkin-61- 62; Rubashkin-65-69; Rubashkin-78-79; Rubashkin-90-93; Rubashkin-97-101; Rubashki n-104-110; Rubashkin-12 3-136; Rubashkin-148- 151; Rubashkin-167-170; Rubashkin-181-18 8; Rubashkin-230-241; Rubashkin-308-309; Rubashkin-312-313; Rubashkin-316-322; Ruba shkin-324-340; Rubas hkin-383-389; Rubashkin447-450; Rubashkin-558-561; Rubashkin-645 5 -647; Rubashkin-650-66 2; Rubashkin-667-668;

5 The Court notes that the FBI did not act ually invoke Exemption 7(D) on Rubashkin645, however, the Court believes this was inadverten t since this page is the first page of an26 Rubashkin-700-714; Rubashkin-727-728; Ruba shkin-740-746; Rubas hkin-769-773; Rubashkin775-777; Rubashkin-818-825; Rubashkin-852-855; Rubashkin-864-872. In addition, the Court finds the FBI properly withheld information pur suant to Exemption 7(D) on Rubashkin-933-941 because the redacted information would identify an individual who, at the outset of the interview with the FBI, explicitly expressed serious co ncerns about the individual’s identity and the information provided being revealed. See Roth , 642 F.3d at 1185-86 (“we think it obvious that most of these individuals provided informati on under an express or implied assurance of confidentiality. The documents [at issue] convey informati on provided by two sources who “specifically requested [that] their identities not be disclosed because they f eared reprisal.”). The Court grants summary judgment in the FBI’s fa vor with respect to the FBI’s withholding of information pursuant to Exemption 7(D) on the page s listed above. The Cour t also finds that on the pages listed above the FBI properly invoked Ex emptions 6 and 7(C) to redact information that would identify third parties protected under these exemptions. 6 For several documents, specifically, Rubashkin-142-147; Rubashkin-738-739; Rubashkin-880; Rubashkin-924, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 7(D) “because the limited amount of information that the FBI withheld based on

interview with an informant which the FBI ha s otherwise sought to withhold pursuant to Exemption 7(D).

6 At no point during this litigation has Plai ntiff challenged the FBI’s application of Exemption 7(C) to redact identifying informa tion of third parties, except for information pertaining to Chief Judge Linda Reade, whic h the Court resolved in its last opinion, see Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 17-22, and except to argue th at the FBI has redacted more information than would actually identify a thir d party, Pl.’s Cross-Mo t. at 11; Pl.’s Opp’ n. at 4-5. Plaintiff has not and does not “dispute the privacy intere sts of the third parties mentioned in the documents at issue in this case w ould be compromised by disclosure of the withheld information, and does not suggest the release of the info rmation would advance any significant public interest.” Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 17.27 this rationale also implicates personal privacy interests and thus falls within the scope of Exemption 7(C),” which the FBI simultaneously invoked. Roth , 642 F.3d at 1185. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in the FBI’s favor with respect to the FBI’s withholding of information pursuant to Exempti ons 6 and 7(C) on these pages. However, the Court finds that on Rubashkin-778-792 the FBI did not meet its burden of establishing that the individuals whose informati on was redacted provided information to the FBI with an implied assurance of confidentiality. Nothing about the circumstances in which these individuals were interviewed or about their relationship to the crime indicates that they would not have provided information to the FBI wit hout an understanding that their information and identity would remain confidentia l. Accordingly, the Court deni es summary judgment to the FBI and grants summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor as to the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 7(D) on these pages. The Court does find, however, th at much of the information on these fifteen pages was properly withheld pu rsuant to Exemption 7(C), which the FBI simultaneously invoked. Thus, the Court orders the FBI to release all information on these fifteen pages, except for the information that identifies third partie s protected under 7(C). An Appendix identifying the information to be released to Plaintiff on th ese fifteen pages is attached to this opinion. 3. Exemption 7(E) Exemption 7(E) authorizes an agency to withhold records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law 5. U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). In response to the par ties’ prior cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court held that the FBI had met its burden of showing that Exemption 7(E) applied, except as28 to the information redacted from Rubashki n-56, Rubashkin-139, Rubashkin-157, and Rubashkin734-735. The Court found it “unclear . . . how th e information on these [five] pages reflects internal FBI methodology, or how the disclosure of this information would enable perpetrators to alter their behavior and thwart det ection.” Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 25. In its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, the FBI maintains th at its invocation of Exemption 7(E) on these pages was proper. De f.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. at 13. Specifically, as to Rubashkin-734-735, the FBI argue s that the redacted information was properly withheld because it Pertains to a specific questionnaire pr epared by an FBI [Special Agent] who was involved in investigating allegatio ns of potential obstruction of justice. This questionnaire contains specific que stions, the rational e for a particular question, and recommendations to be followed by [Special Agents] conducting the interrogation. This questionnaire was cr eated as an investig ative tool to be used exclusively in the investigation of potential obstruction of justice allegations that surfaced in the investigation of plai ntiff’s client and others, and exposes the very information [the] FBI deems releva nt in investigating these types of offenses. 7 Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 15. The FBI further declares that “criminals could predict investigative questions, and [ ] adjust thei r responses and behaviors to avoid detection or mislead investigations.” Id. Plaintiff faults the FBI’s expl anation for “merely assert[ing ], without explanation, that disclosure of these questions could somehow ‘permit[] criminals to predict investigative questions, and to adjust their responses a nd behaviors to avoid detection or mislead

7 In its August 2013 opinion, the Court noted that while the FBI invoked 7(E) because the list of questions revealed techniqu es “used in the investigation of financial crimes ,” the document clearly indicated that the list of questions were formulated to investigate potential obstruction of justice charges. Mem. Op. (Aug. 11, 2013), at 24. In the Third Hardy Declaration, the FBI explains that it inadvertently claimed that the investigative technique related to financial crimes because the main investigation related to financial crimes, but that, in fact, the technique at issue related to obstruction of justice crimes. Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 15 n. 3.29 investigations.” Pl.’s Opp’n. at 7. Plaintiff further argues that “the FBI acknowledges that these questions were tailored to the specific allega tions against Mr. Rubas hkin and others in one specific case,” thus, it “remains unclear how disc losure of these questi ons might contribute to some future obstruction of justice crime.” Id. The Court finds the FBI has now met its burde n of establishing that 7(E) exempts the series of questions withheld on Rubashkin-734-735. Release of the redacted questions would disclose what the FBI deems relevant to investig ating obstruction of justice cases. Furthermore, the redacted information includes the FBI’s rati onale for one particular question as well as recommendations of follow-up questions. As for the risk of circumvention of the law if the FBI’s investigative technique is disclosed, the Court notes that “a highly specific burden of showing how the law will be circumvented” is not required; instead, “exemption 7(E) only requires that [the agency] ‘d emonstrate[ ] logically how th e release of [the requested] information might create a risk of circumvention of the law.’” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS , 562 F.3d 1190, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting PHE, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice , 983 F.2d 248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Here, the FBI has l ogically and reasonably explaine d how releasing what the FBI deems relevant to obstruction of justice investigations would allow criminals to “adjust their responses and behavior to circumvent the la w.” Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 15. As the FBI's declaration sets out the type of questions involved and reasonabl y explains how disclosure of these questions could create a risk of circumvention of the law, the Court concludes that the records were properly withhe ld under Exemption 7(E). See American Immigration Lawyers
Ass’n v. U.S. D.H.S , 852 F.Supp.2d 66, 79 (D.D.C. 2012) ( upholding agency’s withholding pursuant to Exemption 7(E) of Immigration and Customs Enforcemen t questionnaire used by site inspectors to document their personal observa tions because the information withheld would30 provide “guidance” to those looking to circumve nt the law, which would thwart future law enforcement efforts). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in the FBI’s favor as to the withholding of information on Rubas hkin-734-735 pursuant to Exemption 7(E). As to Rubashkin-56, Rubashkin-139, and Ruba shkin-157, the FBI assert s that redactions were necessary to “protect information pertaini ng to various FBI investig ative techniques and/or procedures used by the FBI in conducting criminal and national security related investigations, including mechanisms available pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).” Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 16. Specifically, the FBI explains that the BSA mandates that “a report and records of reports are exempt from disclosure under sec tion 552 of Title 5” of the FOIA. Id. The FBI further explains that “[a]lthough the nature or the types of reports which can be ob tained pursuant to the BSA are known to the public, to sp ecifically identify the particular information withheld in these records would reveal information which is intended to be protected pursuant to . . . the [BSA].” Id. The FBI concludes that “[r]evelations as to the specific techniques a nd/or procedures would constitute a violation of the BS A and would risk circumvention of the law by providing criminals with insight about the particular to ol(s) under the BSA used by the FBI.” Id . In its Reply brief, the FBI argues in the alternative that this information would properly be exempt under FOIA Exemption 3 as the BSA explicitly exempts from FOIA disclosure “re ports and records of reports” created pursuant to the BSA. Plaintiff argues that the FBI’s support for its withholding information on these three pages is insufficient because the FBI “does not provide any factual support for its barebones assertion that these materials are protected by the Act.” Pl.’s Opp’n. at 8. Plaintiff faults the FBI for “not even identify[ing], in generic terms, the information redacted or the type of report involved, even though the FBI acknowledges that “the nature or type of reports which can be31 obtained pursuant to the [Act ] are known to the public.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiff argues, “the FBI does not explain how disclosure of the red acted information would permit circumvention of the law or evasion of FBI investig ative efforts in future cases.” Id. The Court finds the information withhe ld on Rubashkin-56, Rubashkin-139, and Rubashkin-157 is most firm ly exempt under Exemption 3. 8 FOIA Exemption 3 exempts from disclosure information “specifically exempted fr om disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), if that statute . . . requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discre tion on the issue.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The BSA specifically states that “a report [created pursuant to th e BSA] and records of reports are exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.” 31 U. S.C. § 5319. Here, the FBI seeks to withhold records of reports created pursuant to the BSA. See Berger v. I.R.S. , 487 F.Supp.2d 482, 496 (D.N.J. 2007), aff’d , 288 Fed.Appx. 829 (3rd Cir. 2008) (fi nding that information “derived or extracted directly from [BSA] reports” was proper ly withheld under Exemption 3). Accordingly, the Court finds this information to be pr operly withheld pursuant to Exemption 3. While the FBI did not raise Exemption 3 as a justification for withholding information on these three pages until its Reply brief, the Court finds the FBI has not wa ived raising Exemption
3. In Cuban v. SEC , 795 F.Supp.2d 43, 61-63 (D.D.C. 2011) , the district court found information withheld by the Securities and Exchange Commission to be properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 3 even t hough the agency did not invoke Ex emption 3 until its motion for

8 The Court notes that in its August 2013 memorandum opinion and order, the Court found certain bank reports and records of bank repor ts exempt pursuant to 7(E). The Court finds these reports and records of re ports would also be exempt fro m disclosure under Exemption 3, however, in their pleadings leading up to the Co urt’s August 2013 Order, the parties did not raise Exemption 3 as a basis for withholding this information. The Court now finds that this information is more firmly exempt under Exemption 3.32 reconsideration. The district court was willing to consider Exemption 3’s applicability in part because the exemption had been raised prior to the commencement of any appellate proceedings. 795 F.Supp.2d at 61, 62 (citing Williams v. F.B.I. , No. 91-cv-1054, 1997 WL 198109, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1997) (“the polic y militating against piecemeal le gislation [wa]s less weighty where the district court proceedings [were] not yet complete.”). Fu rthermore, the plaintiff, in its opposition to defendant’s motion for reconsidera tion, had had an opportunity to respond to the defendant’s late invocation of Exemption 3. Id. at 62. Finally, and most importantly, the district court explained that courts “cannot overlook the importance of protecting information in the suspicious activity reports, especially when it is e xplicit in the statute that the information should not be disclosed,” id. , and noted that “there is no rule that prohibits the district court, sua sponte [,] from applying the law in order to achieve a just result.” Id. at 61 (quoting Williams , 1997 WL 198109, at *2). Similarly, here, the FBI raised the applicability of Exempti on 3 in its Reply supporting its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and thus pr ior to the completion of the district court proceedings. Moreover, the FBI’s initial Renewed Summary Judgment brief and the Third Hardy Declaration discussed in detail how the BSA exempts the information at issue here from FOIA disclosure. See Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. at 14-15; Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 16. In his Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff specifically engages the FBI’s argument about the applicability of the BSA’s exemptions and contends that the FBI has failed to present suffi cient factual support for its asser tion that the redacted materials are protected by the BSA. See Pl.’s Opp’n. at 8. While the FB I’s discussion of the BSA was initially offered as a justification for the applicability of Exemption 7(E), the FBI’s argument regarding the applicability of th e BSA’s exemptions as a basis fo r Exemption 3 is no different.33 Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff had an opportuni ty to respond to the argument that is the foundation of the FBI’s i nvocation of Exemption 3. 9 In light of this, and the BSA’s clear command that records of BSA repor ts shall not be disclosed, the Court finds it appropriate to consider the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 3 “in order to achieve a just result.” Williams , 1997 WL 198109, at *2. Accordingl y, the Court gran ts summary judgment in th e FBI’s favor as to the withholding of information on these th ree pages pursuant to Exemption 3. C. Segregability Finally, the Court must consider whether the FBI has released all reasonably segregable information to Plaintiff. FOIA instructs that “[a]ny reasonably segregab le portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Mead Data Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[N]on-exempt portion s of a document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwine d with exempt portions.”) . In the Third Hardy Declaration, Mr. Hardy avers that “after extensive re-review of the documents at issue, I have determined that no additional reasonably segregable portion of the material is releasable beyond those pages re-reviewed and releas ed herein.” Third Hardy Decl . ¶ 8. “The [FBI’s] conclusion on a matter of law is not sufficient support for a court to conclude that the self-serving conclusion is the correct one.” Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp. Ltd. v. United States , 534 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, upon its extensiv e review of the documents at issue in this

9 The Court notes that it is firmly established in this Circuit that the BSA is a proper basis for invoking an Exemption 3 withholding. See, e.g., Marcusse v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Information Policy , --- F.Supp.2d---, 2013 WL 4505292, *8 (D.D.C. 2013); Cuban , 795 F.Supp.2d at 61-63. Accordingly, a ny viable dispute Plaintiff would have with the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 3 would relate to the applicability of the BSA to the information withheld. As the Court notes above, Plaintiff already engaged this argument in his Opposition to the FBI’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.34 case, the Court finds the FBI has now produced to the Plaintiff all reasonably segregable, nonexempt information, except for the limited informa tion the Court has specifi cally identified in this opinion as non-exempt and th us releasable to Plaintiff. Mead Data , 566 F.2d at 261 n.55 (“[A] court may decline to order an agency to commit significant time and resources to the separation of disjointed words, phrases, or even sentences which taken separately or together have minimal or no information content.”). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the FBI’s [ 71] Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the FBI’s [47] Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s [51] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, portions of which were previously held in abeyance, are DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, the FBI’s motions for summary judgment are GR ANTED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion DENIED as to the adequacy of the FBI’s search. The FBI’s motions are also GRANTED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion DENIED as to the information th e FBI withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) on twenty-six of the pages iden tified in the Court’s August 2013 Order. 10 However, the FBI’s motions are DENIED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion GRANTED as to the specific information identified in this opinion as imprope rly withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) on Rubashkin-793. The Court orders the FBI to re lease this information to Plaintiff by no later than February 13, 2014 . The FBI’s motions are also GRANT ED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion DENIED as to the information the FBI withheld pursuant to Exemptions 7(D) and 6 and 7(C) on all pages except for Rubashkin-778-792. The FB I’s motions are DENIED and the Plaintiff’s

10 As to the withholding of information on Rubashkin-323, the Court grants the FBI’s motions for summary judgment a nd denies Plaintiff’s cross-moti on pursuant to Exemption 7(D) instead.35 cross-motion GRANTED as to th e withholding of informati on on Rubashkin-778-792 pursuant to Exemption 7(D). However, the FBI’s motio ns are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion DENIED as to the withholding of information pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) on these fifteen pages. The Court orders the FBI to release to Plaintiff the information on these pages which does not identify a third party pr otected under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) ( see attached Appendix) by no later than February 13, 2014 . Finally, the FBI’s motions are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion DENIED as to the information withheld pursuant to Exemption 3 and 7(E). An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE36 APPENDIX The Court orders that th e following information be RELEASED on the following pages:

 Rubashkin-778

o Fifth full paragraph : all text except for the first two sentences of the paragraph, and names and related pronouns of third part ies protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-779

o First partial paragraph, the third, fourth, fifth full paragraphs, and the final partial paragraph : all text except for the names, related pronouns, and relationship titles of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-780

o First partial paragraph, first, second, and fourth full paragraphs, and the final partial paragraph : all text except for the names, related pronouns, and professional titles/job identifiers of third partie s protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Third full paragraph : all text except for the first three sentences and names, related pronouns, and relationship titles of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-781

o First partial paragraph : all text except for the last sentence of the paragraph and identifying pronouns of third parties pr otected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph : all text except for the first eleven words of the last sentence of the paragraph, and names and related pr onouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Fourth full paragraph : all text except for the final twenty-one words of the last sentence, and names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-782

o Fifth full paragraph : all text except for the second sentence of the paragraph and names of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-783

o First partial paragraph, and the first and second full paragraph : all text except for names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph : all text except for the last six words of the partial paragraph and names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 637 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-784

o First partial paragraph : all text except for the first word of the partial paragraph; the second full sentence of the partial paragr aph; the seventh and eighth words of the last sentence of the partial paragraph; a nd names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph : all text except for the last se ntence of the paragraph and names and related pronouns of third parties pr otected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Second, fifth, and sixth full paragraphs : all text except for names and related pronouns of third parties protecte d by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-785

o First paragraph : all text except for the first sent ence of the paragr aph and the third word in the sixth line of the paragraph. o Second paragraph: all text except for the entire first line of the paragraph; the second through fifth words in the third line of the paragraph; the fourth through sixth words in the seventh line of the paragraph; the entire ninth and tenth lines of the paragraph; and names and related pronouns of third parties protec ted by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Third paragraph: all text except for the second sent ence of the paragraph; the last three words in the tenth line of the paragrap h; the entire fourteenth and fifteenth lines of the paragraph; and names, related pr onouns, relationship and professional titles, and identity data of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph: all text except for the last ni ne words of the second line of the partial paragraph; the entire last line of the partial para graph; and names and related pronouns of third parties pr otected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-786

o First partial paragraph: all text except for the first partial sentence of the paragraph; the ninth word in the fourth line of the paragr aph; the first two words in the fifth line of the paragraph; the last sentence of the pa ragraph; and names, related pronouns, and professional titles/job identi fiers of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph: all text except for the first sentence of the paragraph; the fifth through tenth word in the sixth line of the paragraph; the first two words in the seventh line of the paragraph; the last thr ee words in the eigh th line of the paragraph; the last three words in the ninth line of th e paragraph; the first two words of the tenth line of the paragraph; and names, rela ted pronouns, and professional titles/job identifiers of third parties prot ected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).38 o Second full paragraph: all text except for the entire sixth and seventh lines of the paragraph; the last sentence of the para graph; and names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph: all text except for name s, related pronouns, and relationship and professional titles of thir d parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-787

o First partial paragraph: all text except for names a nd related pron ouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph: all text except for the entire fourth and fifth line of the paragraph; the first five wo rds of the sixth line; the en tire seventh and eighth lines; the first word of the ninth line; the sixth sent ence of the paragraph; the entire fifteenth line of the paragraph; the firs t four words in the sixteent h line of the paragraph; and names and related pronouns of third part ies protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Second full paragraph: all text except for names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph: all text except for the first two sentences of the partial paragraph; the fifth and sixth sentences of the partial paragraph; and names, related pronouns, and professional and relationship titles of third pa rties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-788

o First full paragraph: all text except for th e third through tenth words in the second line of the paragraph; the third through seventh words in the sixth line of the paragraph; and names and related pronouns of third parties protec ted by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Second full paragraph: all text except for the s econd sentence and names and related pronouns of third parties pr otected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Third full paragraph: all text except for names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph: all text except for names a nd related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-789

o First partial paragraph: all text except for nam e s, related pronouns, and professional titles/job identifie rs of third parties protecte d by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph: all text except for th e second through eighth sentences of the paragraph and names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).39 o Second full paragraph: all text except for the fifth sentence of the paragraph and names, related pronouns, and professional titles/job identifiers of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-790

o First full paragraph: all text except for the third through eighth words in the first line of the paragraph; the first five words of the fifth line of the paragraph; the last three words of the seventh line of the para graph; the first eight words of the eighth line of the paragraph; the la st sentence of the paragraph; and names, related pronouns, and professional titles/job id entifiers of third parties pr otected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Second full paragraph: all text except for the last six words of the first sentence of the paragraph and names and related pr onouns of third pa rties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Third full paragraph: all text except for the fourth through ninth words of the first sentence; the last two words in the third line of the paragrap h; the last four words in the fourth line of the paragraph; the entire last line of the para graph; and names and related pronouns of third parties pr otected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph: all text except for the entire second line of the paragraph; the last three words in the fourth line of the paragraph; the entire fifth line of the paragraph; and names, related pronouns, a nd professional titles of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-791

o First partial paragraph: all text except for names a nd related pron ouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph: all text except for fourth through seventh words in the fifth line of the paragraph; the last seven words of the sixth sentence of the paragraph; and names, related pronouns, and professional titles/job identifiers of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Final partial paragraph: all text except for the last six words of the first line of the paragraph; the first four words of the sec ond line of the paragraph; the last two words of the fourth line of the paragraph; the first three words of the fifth line of the paragraph; the eighth and ninth words in th e eleventh line of the paragraph; the last ten words in the seventh sentence of the paragraph; the first three words and the seventh through tenth words in the fifteenth line of the paragraph; and names, related pronouns, and professional titles/job identi fiers of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

 Rubashkin-79240 o First partial paragraph: all text except for the last nine words of the sentence and names, related pronouns, and professional titles of third pa rties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o First full paragraph: all text except for names and re lated pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Second full paragraph: all text except for the last ei ght words of the second line of the paragraph; the entire last three lines of the paragraph; and names and related pronouns of third parties protecte d by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Third full paragraph: all text except for names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C). o Fourth full paragraph: all text except for names and related pronouns of third parties protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).