RENDERED: NOVEMBER 5, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-1208-MR

CHRISTOPHER G. TEAGUE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CR-00050

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND McNEILL, 

JUDGES.

CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE: Christopher G. Teague (“Teague”) entered a 

conditional guilty plea to drug charges and the Webster Circuit Court sentenced 

him to a one-year term of imprisonment. Teague now appeals from the Webster 

Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence seized in the case 

which was collected from another individual’s residence. We affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2019, the Webster County grand jury indicted 

Teague for first-degree possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), 

possession of synthetic drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of 

marijuana. On January 1, 2020, Teague filed a motion to suppress certain evidence 

collected from the site of his arrest and the circuit court held a suppression hearing 

on February 6, 2020. 

Todd Jones, Chief of the Providence Police Department, testified that 

on September 4, 2019, he responded to a complaint of loud music coming from a

residence located at 419 South Broadway in Providence, Kentucky at 

approximately 11:00 a.m. Chief Jones was familiar with the residence and its sole 

owner and occupant, Louis Wayne Mitchell. Chief Jones and Mitchell knew each 

other from church and a recovery center. Moreover, Chief Jones testified that he 

had been at Mitchell’s residence five days before to arrest two other individuals 

who had been caught trespassing on the property. Chief Jones testified that

Mitchell had indicated to him that Mitchell had been having problems with other 

people taking advantage of him and entering his home without his permission. He 

requested that Chief Jones check on his residence when he was in the area because 

of the problems with unwanted guests. Moreover, Chief Jones testified that 

Mitchell had told Chief Jones to feel free “to go in and see who’s in there” any
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time that he was in the area. Mitchell further indicated to Chief Jones that, while 

Mitchell still owned the residence, he discontinued residing at the home out of fear

because of the constant trespassers and other issues with the property.

Chief Jones further testified that, when he arrived at Mitchell’s 

residence in response to the noise complaint, he noticed the odor of marijuana

permeating the area several feet before he even arrived at the structure of the home. 

Chief Jones knocked on the door and was met by Teague, a person with whom he 

was also familiar. Chief Jones testified that Teague immediately stated something 

to the effect of “it is Todd Jones” and slammed the door. Chief Jones heard 

rustling inside of the residence and opened the door. When he did so, Chief Jones 

saw two additional men – Robert Jackson and Michael Grey. In plain view near 

the men were several still-smoldering marijuana cigarettes, various items of drug 

paraphernalia, and a baggie with a cut corner containing methamphetamine. The 

evidence was collected, and Teague, Jackson, and Grey were each arrested and 

charged with drug offenses.

Jackson testified next. He testified that he was “pretty close friends” 

with Mitchell and that he had known Mitchell for about four or five years. Jackson 

further testified that, on the day in question, Mitchell had invited Jackson into his 

residence. Jackson further testified that five to ten minutes before Chief Jones 

arrived at the residence, Mitchell had left the residence to obtain a pack of 
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cigarettes and had instructed Jackson not to let anyone inside of the residence and 

to lock the door to the residence if Jackson left before Mitchell returned. Jackson 

further testified that he had been at Mitchell’s residence many times before while 

Mitchell was not home to watch the home and make sure that people did not come 

into the residence.

Teague was the next witness to testify and stated that he had known 

Mitchell for virtually his entire life. Teague also testified that Mitchell had invited 

Teague into his home and had permitted him to be at his residence until Mitchell 

returned from getting cigarettes from Mitchell’s mother’s home. Teague 

additionally indicated that he had previously been at Mitchell’s residence when 

Mitchell was not there. At the end of the hearing, the trial court took the matter 

under advisement but later subpoenaed Mitchell to testify before ruling on the 

suppression motion.

On March 5, 2020, the trial court conducted a second hearing wherein 

Mitchell was the only witness. Mitchell testified that he had previously requested 

that Chief Jones keep an eye on his house but only concerning one specific person 

– Aaron Conrad – who was continually trespassing on his property. He further 

testified that, on September 4, 2019, Jackson, who was his next-door neighbor, 

came to Mitchell’s home around 8:00 a.m. or 9:00 a.m. Mitchell testified that he 

stayed with Jackson for a while but then told him that he needed to leave his home 
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to run an errand. Mitchell stated that he consented to Jackson remaining at his 

home if Jackson agreed to lock the front door when he left Mitchell’s residence. 

Mitchell also said that he told Jackson that he was in charge of the house. Mitchell 

testified that neither Teague nor Grey were at his home when Mitchell left to run 

his errand and that he did not invite those two individuals to his home. Thereafter, 

Mitchell indicated that he went to a pawn shop and was gone for approximately an 

hour. Mitchell testified that none of the individuals had previously rented the 

residence from him or spent the night at the residence. However, Mitchell testified 

that Teague had visited his residence before. 

At the end of the second hearing, the trial court gave both parties time 

to submit arguments and supporting authority on the matter. Teague filed a brief in 

support of his motion to suppress, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in Mitchell’s residence as Jackson’s guest and that Chief Jones’s 

warrantless entry into the residence was unlawful. The Commonwealth filed a 

memorandum in opposition to the motion to suppress, arguing that Teague did not 

have the standing necessary to challenge the search of a home in which he had no 

ownership or possessory interest. The Commonwealth also argued that the 

warrantless entry was lawful because Chief Jones had Mitchell’s consent to enter 

his residence.
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On July 8, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to 

suppress and holding that all three defendants, including Teague, had not met their 

burden of establishing standing to challenge the search. The trial court explained:

By his own testimony, Mr. Teague testified he just 

‘stopped by the residence on his way to the store.’ There 

has been no evidence submitted that Mr. Teague had any 

possessory interest in the property and no evidence Mr. 

Mitchell or (Mr. Jackson) granted him permission to be 

present. Based on the relevant law discussed below 

regarding standing and the relevant facts submitted, the 

Court finds Defendant Christopher Teague has no 

standing to challenge this search and his motion is 

DENIED.

The trial court further found that even if Teague had established his 

standing to claim a Fourth Amendment violation, he would not have been entitled 

to suppression of the evidence because Chief Jones had Mitchell’s consent to enter 

his residence.

On September 3, 2020, Teague entered a conditional guilty plea to the 

charges of first-degree possession of a controlled substance, possession of 

synthetic drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In exchange for Teague’s 

plea, the Commonwealth dismissed the marijuana charge. Teague waived a 

separate sentencing hearing and was sentenced per the Commonwealth’s 

recommendation to one year of imprisonment. 

This appeal followed. 
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ANALYSIS

An appellate court’s review of the denial of a motion to suppress 

involves a two-step process. First, the appellate court must determine whether the 

trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Warick v. 

Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276, 287 (Ky. 2019). If so, they are conclusive. Id.

Next, the appellate court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the trial 

court properly applied the law to those facts. Id. 

Teague’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in its 

determination that Teague did not have standing because he did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in Mitchell’s residence. As noted by Teague in 

his brief, our Supreme Court recently reminded “the bench and bar that a 

‘standing’ analysis is improper under Fourth Amendment substantive law.” Id. at

280. The logic is that all criminal defendants subjected to a search or seizure by 

law enforcement officials technically have “standing” to bring a Fourth 

Amendment challenge. Id. at 280-82.

Thus, the determination of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation 

requires consideration of the merits of the claim. Id. at 283. The first step in the 

analysis is to determine “whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 

‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been 

invaded by government action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
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omitted). As discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. 

Carter:

a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an 

expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his 

expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has a source 

outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to 

concepts of real or personal property law or to 

understandings that are recognized and permitted by 

society.

525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Thus, the individual must establish both that he had 

an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and that that 

expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Smith v. 

Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979)

(citations omitted).

In sum, the Carter Court emphasized that “the extent to which the 

Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.” 

Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S. Ct. at 473. While “an overnight guest in a home 

may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present 

with the consent of the householder may not.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S. Ct. at 

473.

Turning to applicable Kentucky case law, the Kentucky Supreme 

Court decision in Ordway v. Commonwealth, while decided before Warick and 
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couched in terms of “standing,” discussed the concept of an individual having a 

“legitimate expectation of privacy” in a specific premises. 352 S.W.3d 584, 592

(Ky. 2011) (citation omitted). As in this case, the defendant in Ordway claimed 

that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a residence owned by another 

individual – specifically, his girlfriend. Id. In its analysis, the Court noted that, 

while the record indicated that the defendant regularly visited the residence, no 

evidence existed that the defendant “legally resided” with his girlfriend, “enjoyed 

unrestricted access” to her residence, possessed a key to the residence, or paid any 

bills associated with the residence. Id. Consequently, the Court determined that 

“no evidence was presented to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. 

Therefore, [the defendant] cannot now complain of a Fourth Amendment 

violation.” Id. (citations omitted). 

In this case, based on the foregoing discussion and standards, Teague 

cannot claim a Fourth Amendment violation because he did not have a reasonable 

or legitimate expectation of privacy in Mitchell’s residence. Teague admitted that 

he did not live at the residence and there was no evidence that he kept belongings 

there or that Mitchell even knew Teague was at his residence or had consented to 

him being there on the day in question. Like the defendant in Ordway, Teague did 

not have unrestricted access to Mitchell’s residence, he did not have a key to the 

residence, nor did he pay any bills associated with the residence. Further, unlike 
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the defendant in Ordway, there was no evidence that Teague even occasionally 

spent the night or kept any belongings at Mitchell’s residence. Because the 

defendant in Ordway could not complain of a Fourth Amendment violation, neither 

can Teague in the case sub judice.

Teague further argues that Ordway is distinguishable because the 

Ordway defendant’s connection to the property in that case was “attenuated,” and 

that Jackson, by virtue of being the “caretaker” of Mitchell’s home, would have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the living room and such expectation would 

flow to Teague as Jackson’s guest. We disagree. First, the record contained no 

evidence that Teague was Jackson’s guest at all, as Jackson never indicated that he 

had invited Teague to the residence. Further, by his own testimony, Teague stated 

that he just “stopped by the residence on his way to the store.” Moreover, we 

disagree with Teague’s characterization of the defendant’s connection to his

girlfriend’s residence in Ordway as being “attenuated.” Rather, we find it to be far 

more compelling than any connection that either Jackson or Teague could claim to 

have with Mitchell’s residence. While Ordway kept belongings and spent the night 

at his girlfriend’s residence, no evidence was presented that either Jackson or 

Teague had ever stored anything or spent the night at Mitchell’s residence. 

Ordway, 352 S.W.3d at 587, 592. 
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Moreover, even if one could describe Jackson as the “caretaker” of

Mitchell’s property for however brief a period during the events of that day, the 

Fourth Amendment does not automatically apply. In Hawley v. Commonwealth, 

435 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Ky. App. 2014), a panel of this Court held that Hawley could 

not challenge the search of his grandfather’s home and garage, even though 

Hawley had occasionally spent the night at the residence to protect it from breakins and had otherwise served in a caretaking role in terms of mowing the yard and

working in the house. Id. The Court determined that “[b]ecause Hawley did not 

have any type of possessory interest in the house or garage, he did not have a 

legitimate expectation of privacy and therefore was precluded from challenging the 

search.” Id. 

Under Hawley, Jackson would have no legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the extremely limited role that he may have played in taking care of 

Mitchell’s residence, and therefore he was precluded from challenging the search. 

Thus, Jackson could not pass on to Teague a reasonable expectation of privacy that 

he did not enjoy. Further, Jackson testified that Mitchell specifically instructed

Jackson not to let anyone else into his residence. Such fact alone would negate any 

implicit authority that Jackson may or may not have been given by Mitchell to 

permit Teague to enter the residence. Given Jackson’s tenuous – albeit tolerated –

status at Mitchell’s residence on that day, Teague was – at best – the guest of a 
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guest. That is a far cry from the “acceptance into the household” referred to by the

Carter Court. 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S. Ct. at 473. Therefore, we affirm the trial 

court as to this issue.

Because we have determined that Teague had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in Mitchell’s home, we need not address Teague’s second 

argument on appeal as to whether Mitchell consented to the search of his 

residence. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Webster Circuit Court’s 

order denying Teague’s motion to suppress.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Wade

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Aspen Roberts

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky