This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8 v. No. 28,760 9 ANTHONY A. GARLEY, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY 12 Karen L. Parsons, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Margaret McLean 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 SUTIN, Judge. 222 Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence, challenging 1 the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a breath-alcohol test. We issued a 2 notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to uphold the district court’s 3 decision. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly 4 considered. Because we remain unpersuaded by Defendant’s assertions of error, we 5 affirm. 6 To briefly reiterate, Defendant’s challenge to the admission of his breath7 alcohol test results is based on a decisi on rendered by this Court in the case of State 8 v. Willie , 2008-NMCA-030, 143 N.M. 615, 179 P. 3d 1223, interpreting a State 9 Laboratory Division (SLD) regulation which is applicable to the administration of 10 breath-alcohol tests. That decision was subsequently reversed by the New Mexico 11 Supreme Court. See generally State v. Willie , 2009-NMSC-037, 146 N.M. 481, 212 12 P.3d 369. As we explained in our notice of proposed summary disposition, we read 13 the Supreme Court’s decision to signify that test administrators need take no specific, 14 affirmative steps to ascertain whether the subject has had anythi ng to eat, drink, or 15 smoke, other than to keep the subject under observation in a manner which reasonably 16 indicates that he or she was not eati ng, drinking, or smoking during the critical 17 twenty-minute period. 183 In this case, the arresting officer appears to have testified that he was in contact 1 with Defendant during the entire twenty-mi nute period of time prior to administering 2 the breath test and that he did not see De fendant put anything in his mouth. [RP 94- 3 95] He also testified that he saw Defendant talking and did not notice gum or 4 anything similar in Defendant’s mouth. [RP 95] From his experience, the officer 5 testified that he was generally able to discern when a person had gum or tobacco in 6 his mouth. [RP 97] We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to support the 7 district court’s discretionary, factual determination that the officer complied with the 8 applicable regulation. See Willie , 2009-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 12, 16 (holding that the 9 ultimate question whether the SLD regulation has been satisfied “is a factual 10 determination to be made by the trial court” in its discretion). The officer could have 11 done little more, short of looki ng in Defendant’s mouth or asking Defendant whether 12 he had anything to eat, drink, or smoke. Insofar as the Supreme Court has expressly 13 rejected any requirement of this nature, id. ¶¶ 11, 15, we perceive no basis for 14 reversal. 15 In his memorandum in opposition, asserti ng that the ask-or-check requirement 16 previously recognized by this Court shoul d not be abandoned, Defendant argues that 17 with the absence of such a requirement, the test administrator cannot be certain that 184 the subject had nothing in his or her mouth prior to the initiation of the observation 1 period which might have remained there. [M IO 2] However, insofar as the Supreme 2 Court has expressly rejected this approach, see id. , we are not at liberty to entertain 3 the argument. See generally State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas , 4 2004-NMSC-009, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 375, 89 P.3d 47 (reiterating that this Court remains 5 bound by Supreme Court precedent). 6 Finally, we understand Defendant to suggest that his own testimony that he had 7 gum in his mouth from the time of his arrest and throughout the subsequent twenty8 minute period should have rendered the breath- alcohol test results inadmissible. [MIO 9 2; RP 121] However, as we previously explained, when reviewing the denial of a 10 motion to suppress, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling 11 rendered below, indulge all reas onable inferences in support thereof, and disregard all 12 evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Stanley , 2001-NMSC-037, ¶ 35, 131 13 N.M. 368, 37 P.3d 85; State v. Jacobs, 2000-NMSC-026, ¶ 34, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 14 127. In light of these principles, Defendant’s testimony cannot support a different 15 result in this case. 16 For the reasons stated in this opinion and in the notice of proposed summary 17 disposition, we affirm. 182 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

__________________________________ 2 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Chief Judge 33 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 3

_________________________________ 4 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 5