NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: COEPTIS EQUITY FUND LLC,

 Debtor,

------------------------------

COEPTIS EQUITY FUND LLC,

Appellant, 

 v. 

GINA R. KLUMP,

Appellee.

No. 23-60003

BAP No. 22-1138

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Gan, Brand, and Spraker, Presiding

Submitted March 13, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: S. THOMAS, MCKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Debtor Coeptis Equity Fund LLC (“Coeptis”) appeals the Bankruptcy 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 15 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Appellate Panel’s decision to affirm the bankruptcy court’s order approving 

compensation to the Subchapter V trustee (the “Compensation Order”). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). Because the parties are familiar with the 

facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our 

ruling. We affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion an order granting or denying 

compensation. In re Mednet, 251 B.R. 103, 106 (9th Cir. BAP 2000). When 

awarding compensation, a bankruptcy court must consider the nature, extent, and 

value of the services rendered and may not award compensation for services which 

were unnecessarily duplicative, not reasonably likely to benefit the estate, or 

unnecessary to the administration of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3–4).

In opposing the Compensation Order, Coeptis contends that the Subchapter V 

trustee should not be compensated for actions taken after Coeptis was removed as 

debtor-in-possession or for actions the trustee took in order to convert this case to 

Chapter 7 because, according to Coeptis, removal and conversion were improper. 

As we held in separately filed memoranda dispositions, the bankruptcy court did not 

abuse its discretion in removing Coeptis as debtor-in-possession and converting the 

case to Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

compensation in these matters.

Coeptis also contends that the trustee should not be compensated for its efforts 
3 

to sell two properties belonging to the estate because one of the properties (the 

“Stockton Property”) could have been sold for a higher price and the other property

(the “Denham Springs Property”) was sold unnecessarily. At the time of the 

trustee’s motion to sell the Stockton Property, creditors had filed for relief from the 

bankruptcy stay in order to proceed with foreclosure on the property. The court’s 

order allowing the trustee to sell the Stockton Property ensured that the sale proceeds 

would accrue to the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, rather than the individual 

creditor. Coeptis did not provide any evidence to support its claim that the Stockton 

Property could have been sold for a higher price. The sale of the Stockton Property 

was therefore “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 

330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I).

As to the Denham Springs Property, Coeptis contends only that there was “no 

good reason” for the trustee to proceed with the sale of the property. The trustee 

provided a reason, indeed, a good one: counsel for a lender had informed the trustee 

that it would seek relief from the bankruptcy stay, presumably to commence 

foreclosure. Coeptis has not supported its argument that the sale was unnecessary. 

Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the Compensation Order.

AFFIRMED.