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EXAMINING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES 

AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES IN 

THE DODD-FRANK ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 9, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 113–37 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

GARY G. MILLER, California, Vice Chairman 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

Emeritus 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, Chairman 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania, 

Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

AL GREEN, Texas, Ranking Member 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

July 9, 2013 ....................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

July 9, 2013 ....................................................................................................... 27 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JULY 9, 2013 

Gray, Hon. C. Boyden, Boyden Gray and Associates ............................................ 4 

McTaggart, Timothy R., Partner, Pepper Hamilton LLP ..................................... 7 

Merrill, Thomas W., Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law 

School .................................................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Gray, Hon. C. Boyden ...................................................................................... 28 

McTaggart, Timothy R. .................................................................................... 47 

Merrill, Thomas W. .......................................................................................... 66 

(1) 

EXAMINING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES 

AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES IN 

THE DODD-FRANK ACT 

Tuesday, July 9, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Patrick T. McHenry 

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives McHenry, Fitzpatrick, 

Bachmann, Duffy, Grimm, Fincher, Hultgren, Wagner, Barr, 

Rothfus; Green, Cleaver, Maloney, Beatty, and Heck. 

Ex officio present: Representative Hensarling. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Financial Services Committee will come to order. 

Our hearing today is entitled, ‘‘Examining the Constitutional Deficiencies and Legal Uncertainties in the Dodd-Frank Act.’’ 

Without objection, members of the full Financial Services Committee who are not members of this subcommittee may sit on the 

dais and participate in today’s hearing. 

And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the subcommittee at any time. 

We will now proceed with opening statements. And without objection, we will limit it to 5 minutes per side. I will first recognize 

myself for 5 minutes. 

Following the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression, Dodd-Frank was signed into law with a promise that 

never again will the taxpayers be forced to bail out Wall Street. 

Simply put, what we now know is that Dodd-Frank does not work. 

Over the past several months, this subcommittee has attempted to 

dissect section by section the parts of Dodd-Frank that pretend to 

rein in the large interconnected financial institutions which 

brought us to the brink 5 years ago. It also pretends to end ‘‘toobig-to-fail,’’ which is in fact not the case. 

What we have discovered is something to the contrary. In over 

840 pages of law, Dodd-Frank granted an incredible amount of 

power and discretion to the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the 

newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). 

Almost 3 years later, as the law slowly works its way through 

the regulatory process, we discover that Dodd-Frank’s designation 

2 

and resolution processes protect ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ banks, quite to the 

disadvantage of their small bank competition. 

This new economic reality is illustrated when two large credit 

rating agencies continue to single out the eight largest banks for 

a systemic ratings uplift by virtue of their size, interconnectedness, 

and difficulty to unwind, and furthermore their ripeness for taxpayer bailouts in times of trouble. 

As the markets quantify this newly designated safety net, these 

banks experience a lower cost of borrowing, which is the lifeblood 

of financial institutions. Likewise, they do say that cost of borrowing may not exist, and there is debate about that, but the 

World Bank says clearly that there is a cost-of-borrowing advantage. 

Not surprisingly, this impressive and unprecedented power, designed to protect the largest and most interconnected financial institutions, is also being criticized as being unconstitutional. Several 

States, including Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, 

Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia have joined with the National Bank of Big Spring as plaintiffs in its suit against the Department of Treasury, the FSOC, the 

Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau (CFPB). Their claim is that Dodd-Frank violates the Constitution’s separation of powers and its protections afforded 

through due process. Legal scholars are analyzing similar constitutional claims as well. 

Our founders understood that government is imperfect and must 

be kept in check. As a co-equal branch of government, Congress 

has an obligation to interpret the Constitution and to act within 

the bounds of its interpretation when carrying out its oversight and 

legislative functions. 

As James Madison discussed Congress’ rights to interpret the 

Constitution in relation to that of the Judicial Branch, he said, 

‘‘But the great objection is that the legislature itself has no right 

to expound the Constitution; that whenever its meaning is doubtful, you must leave it to take its course, until the Judiciary is 

called upon to declare its meaning.’’ And ‘‘The Constitution is the 

character of the people of the government. It specifies certain great 

powers as absolutely granted and marks out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into 

question, I do not see that any one of these departments has more 

right than another to declare their sentiments on that point.’’ 

Today, we will be declaring our sentiments on that very point: 

the constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank Act. Accordingly, this hearing will examine why certain provisions in Title I and Title II of 

Dodd-Frank may be susceptible to constitutional challenge. We will 

also explore the manner and circumstances in which a party with 

legal interests affected by the Orderly Liquidation Authority could 

challenge the commencement of an—let’s use it in quote marks, 

‘‘orderly liquidation’’—and thereby delay or prevent the liquidation 

from functioning as intended in the Dodd-Frank Act. 

This panel before us today has an impressive background in constitutional law as well as a depth and understanding of the DoddFrank Act. I certainly appreciate the three gentleman here today, 

their willingness to be here. 

3 

We will now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for appearing. 

And I thank the witnesses for the information that they have already provided us. I had an opportunity to peruse your written 

statements, and I am eager to ask a few questions about some of 

the statements that have been made. But I do think that each witness has provided us some thoughtful information. 

With reference to Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank provides a better 

way. Prior to Dodd-Frank, we had in essence two means by which 

we could deal with a systemic crisis, a crisis that involved exigent 

circumstances. These two ways were: one, bankruptcy, which 

works, but it did not work for Lehman; and two, bailouts. Bailouts 

are not the preferred choice because the public somehow thinks 

and, and I agree, that tax dollars ought not be utilized to bail out 

these large institutions. So, we have these two options: bailout; or 

bankruptcy. 

Dodd-Frank is a better way. And it is interesting to note that 

while we may look at some of the challenges to the constitutionality of Dodd-Frank, it is interesting to note that Dodd-Frank 

has not been declared unconstitutional. It is also interesting to note 

that you can challenge any legislation on constitutional grounds if 

you like. The question is, will you prevail with your challenge? Will 

you prevail with your challenge? Thus far, no court has declared 

Dodd-Frank to be unconstitutional. I will go on to add that if you 

are concerned about judicial review as it relates to Dodd-Frank, 

SIFI designation has the means by which judicial review can be 

perfected. The Orderly Liquidation Authority has a means by 

which judicial review can be perfected. 

Now, there may be some argument as to whether or not there 

is enough judicial review or the extent to which judicial review 

should take place, but Dodd-Frank has codified judicial review in 

it as it relates to the designation of an entity as an SIFI, as well 

as when orderly liquidation starts to take place. 

I believe that Dodd-Frank can be mended, I think there are 

means by which we can do so, and I would like to see some legislation that purports to amend it. I may very well support some 

amendments. But I don’t think we should end it, and much of what 

I hear seems to be designed to end Dodd-Frank rather than amend 

Dodd-Frank. Technical corrections are always appropriate when we 

have sweeping legislation. Technical corrections are in order with 

Dodd-Frank, and I would support some of the technical adjustments that may be made. 

One of our witnesses today has gone so far as to say, in terms 

of the substance, that we may have some debate, but that there is 

a means by which technical corrections can be made to Dodd-Frank 

and it would meet what he perceives as the challenge associated 

with the constitutionality of a given section. 

My belief is that we must move forward with Dodd-Frank. We 

must bring the certainty to the market that it richly deserves, and 

I think that we can do so by having these hearings. But at some 

point, we have to move on. If there is no legislation, at some point 

we have to move on and allow Dodd-Frank to function as it should. 

4 

I will now yield the remainder of my time to my colleague, the 

gentlelady to my right. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member. 

And thank you to our witnesses who are here today. 

I am happy to be here to further discuss and evaluate the constitutional basis for the authorities granted to Federal regulators 

under Titles I and II of Dodd-Frank. These two sections collectively 

compromise the enhanced supervision and orderly liquidation authorities within the law. 

In reviewing the submitted testimony from the witnesses today, 

the main concerns appear to be with Title I and Title II. There 

seems to be apprehension that the sections improperly restrict the 

checks and balances created by the Constitution and that certain 

due process rights are violated. I believe that these apprehensions 

are somewhat misguided. With respect to Title I, the designation 

process for enhanced supervision does not simply allow the Federal 

Reserve Board or the FDIC or the FSOC to arbitrarily pick and 

choose which firms to select for greater prudential regulation. Instead, I believe the law creates clearly identifiable processes for 

designation and also provides an opportunity to challenge such a 

determination. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCHENRY. We will now recognize our distinguished 

witnesses. 

Ambassador Boyden Gray is the founding partner of the law firm 

of Boyden Gray and Associates. He was previously Ambassador to 

the European Union and was White House Counsel to President 

George H.W. Bush. He is a graduate of Harvard and the University 

of North Carolina. 

Professor Thomas Merrill is a law professor at Columbia University Law School. He was previously Deputy Solicitor General and 

Clerk to Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun. He is a Rhodes 

Scholar, and a graduate of Grinnell College, Oxford University, and 

the University of Chicago. 

Mr. Timothy McTaggart is a partner in the law firm of Pepper 

Hamilton LLP. He was previously a State banking commissioner 

and a lawyer for the Federal Reserve. He received his undergraduate and law degrees from Harvard. 

I think some of you have gone to universities we have heard of. 

We certainly appreciate your willingness to be here. You all are 

familiar with the lighting system, but green means go; yellow, as 

in traffic, means hurry up; and red means stop. You will have 5 

minutes to summarize your opening statements. 

And we will begin by recognizing Ambassador Gray. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE C. BOYDEN GRAY, BOYDEN 

GRAY AND ASSOCIATES 

Mr. GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss parts of this statute with you. It is true that nothing has yet been declared unconstitutional, but I would say we 

haven’t really had our day in court yet. It may be months before 

we do, but we will, and then we will see what they say. 

5 

If there is any message I want to distill from my written remarks, it is that unconstitutional aggregations of power, which this 

statute represents, at least parts of it on steroids, unconstitutional 

aggregations of government power that deny the checks and balances that are built into our Constitution invite and create equally 

pernicious aggregations of private power. They do this by imposing 

regulatory burdens on smaller entities that are less able to handle 

them than their bigger competitors, and the bigger competitors end 

up not necessarily gobbling them up, but watching the consolidation take place, and the mergers eventually do happen. 

The centralized institutions of government tend to encourage this 

because they want to find willing private parties to implement 

what they want, and what you end up with is a system of crony 

capitalism with no rule of law and greatly diminished opportunity 

for the little guy. And I think if you went back to Adam Smith who 

was conceded to be sort of the architect of our modern miracle of 

free markets, this was Adam Smith’s ultimate nightmare, that the 

private sector would grab ahold of government entities for their 

own purpose. 

Now, I believe this problem is best illustrated by, as you suggested in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, the relationship of 

Dodd-Frank to ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ and to the Orderly Liquidation Authority. Title II, as I understand it from what I have been able to 

sort of get from the participants, and it certainly is backed up by 

what it actually does, was modeled after the AIG bailout, the idea 

being perhaps oversimplified to give the government the discretion 

in a takeover situation to do virtually anything it wants without 

any check by Congress, by the Executive Branch, by even the Federal Reserve or the courts, and it is the court cutout that I think 

maybe bothers me the most, and that is possibly because I am a 

lawyer. 

As the Dallas Fed has pointed out, it entrenches ‘‘too-big-to-fail.’’ 

The whole situation is over before anyone has a chance to react. 

If there is an effort to leak to the public or to third parties that 

have an interest in the proceeding so that they might go into court 

to try to preempt something or get review before it is all over, there 

is a criminal penalty, maybe jail time for anyone who releases this 

information. 

The result is really a bad disadvantage for community banks 

that can’t take the regulatory and the funding advantages that, 

Mr. Chairman, you talked about. So we are going to see a lot more 

community bank consolidation, fewer loans from community banks, 

and that means ultimately—I come from a small town that produced some pretty good banks, a town called Winston-Salem, and 

what happened there is you don’t have any more character loans, 

which even the government acknowledges are far more reliable 

than cookie-cutter loans based on paper checkoffs. This situation 

can only be fixed by untangling this collapse, this separation of 

powers, by restoring proper judicial review. I do not want to live 

in a crony capitalist world. 

I will conclude by saying that it isn’t just Titles I and II that create this problem. If you look at the CFPB, the power grab, the data 

power grab that they are now engaged in, which has certain resonance in other areas, look at the grab for power with respect to the 

6 

auto dealers, and you will see this isn’t just limited to Titles I and 

II; it pervades the entire Act. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gray can be found on 

page 28 of the appendix.] 

Chairman MCHENRY. Thank you, Ambassador Gray. 

I would ask the rest of the panel to pull your microphones closer 

when you speak. They are directionally sensitive. Let’s just say 

that they are not the newest and latest and greatest of technology, 

but they will do. 

Professor Merrill, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS W. MERRILL, CHARLES EVANS 

HUGHES PROFESSOR OF LAW, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. MERRILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks 

to the other committee members for inviting me today. 

The focus of my testimony will be on Title II of Dodd-Frank and 

the constitutional problems that section of the Act creates. I became interested in this about 18 months ago when I was invited 

to participate in an academic symposium on the administrative and 

constitutional problems presented by Dodd-Frank, and since then, 

I have continued to work on this issue. I have a draft article, which 

I have written with Margaret Merrill, and I have taken the liberty 

of attaching that to my statement in its current form. 

The central point that I want to make is that it is true that 

Dodd-Frank has not been declared unconstitutional, but the problem is that it contains very serious constitutional problems. And 

any individual or entity that is opposed to being subjected to an orderly liquidation would have a strong incentive to raise these constitutional issues as a way of trying to increase their leverage with 

the government in the event of an orderly liquidation or to perhaps 

derail it. Those constitutional issues will be very difficult to resolve 

given the procedures that the Act establishes for very minimal judicial review. So my concern is that the constitutional issues will in 

fact work against the purposes of Title II, that Title II will in fact 

be undermined by the raising of these constitutional issues at a 

time when it is least appropriate that they be brought to the fore. 

Most of the constitutional issues relate to the judicial review provisions or the lack of judicial review provisions in Title II. Conventional bank receiverships, which I think was the basic model for 

Title II, are commenced by an administrative appointment of a receiver, but persons aggrieved by that are then given the right to 

go to court within a short period of time, typically 30 days, and to 

seek to have the receivership set aside on any legal or factual basis 

that they wish to advance. This was in fact the way in which the 

House bill that preceded the enactment of Dodd-Frank structured 

the commencement of an orderly liquidation. 

The Senate had a different idea. The Senate decided that the judicial review process should be put before the appointment of the 

receiver rather than after the appointment of the receiver, and you 

could call this ex ante review as opposed to ex post review. The 

problem with the Senate’s approach is that if in fact we are in the 

midst of what might be a financial crisis, or if the firm which is 

to be placed in receivership is systemically different, you can’t have 

7 

an ordinary judicial trial before you create the receivership. This 

would create adverse publicity and would give rise perhaps to a 

run on the bank or to the type of financial panic that Title II is 

designed to prevent. So the Senate in its desire to have ex ante review had a problem with how to structure this review in a way 

that wouldn’t give rise to these concerns. 

So what does the bill, as Congress adopted, the Senate version, 

not the House version, unfortunately, what does the Senate bill do 

in order to prevent the type of adverse publicity and the panic that 

a full scale open judicial proceeding would entail? First, it provides 

that the judicial hearing will take place in complete secret. Second, 

it provides that most stakeholders, creditors, shareholders, bondholders, and most employees receive no notice of the pending liquidation. Third, it gives the District Court only 24 hours in which 

to rule on the petition by the Secretary of the Treasury to create 

a receivership and automatically deems the receivership approved 

within 24 hours if the District Court has not ruled by that time. 

Fourth, it provides that the District Court can only review two out 

of seven legal determinations that the Secretary of the Treasury 

has to make in order to conclude that a receivership is warranted. 

Fifth, it limits the review of these two issues to a highly differential arbitrary and capricious standard. Sixth, it provides for expedited appeal of these two issues only, but says there shall be no 

stay of the receivership pending appeal. 

Now, it is important to acknowledge that the Act does contain 

provisions for judicial review of creditors who have claims. If they 

are dissatisfied with the way in which the receiver or the FDIC has 

resolved the claim they can go to court and seek to have that set 

aside, but it does not contain any provision for judicial review for 

other stakeholders. 

Consider, for example, a pension fund that has a major investment in a systemically significant firm and is upset because it 

thinks reorganization would be more appropriate than liquidation. 

Such an entity gets no hearing and no notice, none administratively, none judicially, none before the receivership is commenced, 

none after the receivership is commenced. This creates, as I detailed in my article and statement, very serious due process, Article 

III problems, and First Amendment problems. You can go to jail if 

you disclose the pendency of one of these secret judicial proceedings. 

I think the solution is relatively simple: go back to the House 

version rather than the Senate version and have the review take 

place after the receivership commences, not before. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Merrill can be found on page 66 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman MCHENRY. Thank you, Professor Merrill. 

Mr. McTaggart, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY R. McTAGGART, PARTNER, PEPPER 

HAMILTON LLP 

Mr. MCTAGGART. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is 

Timothy McTaggart. I thank you for the invitation to appear before 

the subcommittee and present testimony on this important topic. 

8 

I am a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of the law firm 

Pepper Hamilton, where I head the firm’s bank regulatory consumer finance group. I note that my testimony reflects my views 

alone and not those of Pepper Hamilton LLP or its clients, and of 

course, any errors are to be attributable solely to me. 

By way of background, I served as a supervisor functioning as 

the bank commissioner for the State of Delaware from 1994 to 

1999. I served under then-Governor Tom Carper, who became the 

Governor of Delaware after serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, including on what was then called the House Banking Committee. Additionally, I served as counsel to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee prior to my service in Delaware. 

Earlier in my career, after graduating from Harvard College and 

Harvard Law School, I had joined the Legal Division at the Board 

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C. 

The balance of my career has been in private practice in Washington. 

I am going to have to beg the mercy of the chairman. I have attached materials which apparently have not made it into the package. I have a copy. I am happy to submit it as part of the record. 

So, I have attached materials that I prepared with the assistance 

of Matthew Silver on many of the topics that were noticed for 

today. There is a 14-page document which was to be an appendix 

on the constitutionality analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act. Somehow, 

that got separated out. So I am happy to offer it and present it and 

ask that the summary be included in the record as part of my remarks. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. MCTAGGART. At this point, I would offer a few overarching 

comments pertinent to today’s topic concerning the constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions relating to the Financial 

Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Orderly Liquidation 

Authority (OLA). 

My written summary also contains references to similar issues 

regarding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, but I am not 

going to focus on that in this testimony. 

First, the courts have routinely exercised judicial restraint in 

connection with determining whether congressionally enacted legislation is unconstitutional. In the summary that is provided, the 

most recent statistics that we are aware of show fewer than 170 

actions being held to be unconstitutional from 1789 through 2002. 

It is possible that total undercounts more recent activity from the 

end of the Rehnquist court and during the Roberts court, but as a 

matter of historical record, starting with Marbury v. Madison, it 

shows the relatively rare overturning of congressional action 

through the Nation’s history. Moreover, the record shows an absence of economic regulation and statutory frameworks being declared unconstitutional. 

The second point, there are undoubtedly major policy choices embedded and omitted in the Dodd-Frank Act. Of course, the difference in policy choices reflected in the enacted legislation does 

not make the legislation unconstitutional. There may be lingering 

important questions about the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act, 

I have many myself, to address major policy challenges such as the 

9 

‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ issue. But the debate, of course, over the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act does not go to the constitutionality of 

the Act. 

Third, the genius in our American system of government is the 

separation of powers among the three branches and the checks and 

balances among the branches. While we often focus on the executive’s power to veto congressional legislation, for example, or the 

ability of Congress to check the executive power through appropriate oversight, we less frequently focus on the ability of Congress 

to check the Judiciary by enacting legislation which, for example, 

limits the jurisdiction of the courts or sets standards of review to 

be followed by the courts. Congress has the inherent authority to 

limit the time period available for judicial review and to set other 

requirements concerning the standard of review to be applied by 

the courts in reviewing administrative actions. 

So it seems to me the crux of the question being considered by 

the subcommittee is whether the prior Congress, which enacted 

Dodd-Frank, overstepped its bounds in order to do so. From my 

perspective, with respect to the limits on judicial review relating to 

timing and the scope of review in the OLA, I would conclude that 

Congress did indeed ensure and sought to ensure due process was 

afforded to the affected financial institutions. With respect to the 

structural choices made by Congress to create the FSOC, I would 

conclude that Congress did not impermissibly delegate away its authority. 

Now, there are a great many topics, including whether the DoddFrank Act ended ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ or whether the OLA will be a viable alternative to existing Chapter 11 bankruptcy processes for 

bank holding companies, which previously were not included in the 

FDIC’s resolution authority. The bank regulatory agencies perhaps 

would be experts to provide testimony. 

But I am prepared to answer questions, and I thank you for the 

opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McTaggart can be found on page 

47 of the appendix.] 

Chairman MCHENRY. We thank the panel, and we will now recognize Members for questions. 

I will begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes, and I will begin 

with you, Professor Merrill. 

What is required to establish a violation of the due process 

clause contained in the Constitution? 

Mr. MERRILL. As the text of the Constitution suggests, there are 

three basic requirements: you have to show that you have life, liberty or property at stake; you have to show that the government 

is threatening to deprive you of those interests; and then you have 

to show that the government is threatening to do so in a way inconsistent with due process of law. Due process of law means all 

sorts of different things, but in this context, it means a notice that 

the government is going to act adversely against one of those interests and that you have not been given a fair opportunity to present 

your side of the story before the government takes final action. 

Chairman MCHENRY. So now we are looking at the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained within the Dodd-Frank Act. Do you 

think that a party who might be threatened with this resolution of 

10 

the Orderly Liquidation Authority, a creditor, a shareholder, an officer, a director, do you believe that they would have a property interest? 

Mr. MERRILL. Absolutely. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay, so that would be protected under 

due process? 

Mr. MERRILL. Unsecured creditor claims are property, and the 

position of being president of the bank is property, so I think that 

covers the waterfront here. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay. So, in a resolution under the Orderly 

Liquidation Authority, would the State then be depriving the party 

of his or her property interests under this construct? 

Mr. MERRILL. Arguably, with respect to a creditor, you might say 

that we would have to wait to see what happens until the receiver 

resolves the creditor’s claim and the creditor has a right to go to 

court. 

But with respect to a number of stakeholders, let’s take shareholders, for example. Suppose you have a mutual fund or suppose 

you have a State employee pension plan that has invested in one 

of these systemically significant companies and they strongly believe that liquidation is inappropriate, that the company is experiencing a short-term credit crunch, but they could be successfully 

reorganized. 

A shareholder like that is not given any notice under DoddFrank before a liquidation is commenced. They are not given any 

notice or a hearing after the liquidation is commenced. And the 

statute says this company has to be liquidated, and the shareholders have to take the first hit. So very likely a very substantial 

financial interest is going to be wiped out without any notice or any 

hearing, administratively, judicially or otherwise. 

Chairman MCHENRY. So, therefore, the Secretary and the 

FSOC’s decision to send an institution through the Orderly Liquidation Authority denies those individuals of due process because 

it doesn’t give them adequate notice and an opportunity to contest 

the decision? 

Mr. MERRILL. That is my reading, unfortunately, of the way the 

statute is currently drafted. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay. Ambassador Gray, obviously, with 

the work that you are doing, you believe that institutions do have 

a property right and interest and their due process would be violated through the Orderly Liquidation Authority, is that correct? 

Mr. GRAY. That is correct. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay. So do you believe the State would be 

depriving those parties of his or her property interests? 

Mr. GRAY. I believe that is correct. I also believe that it is a cognizable injury to deprive one of the protections granted by the separation of powers. It is a slightly different argument. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Explain that argument. 

Mr. GRAY. It is related, but it is not the same. And it is true that 

there are pieces of separation of powers denial throughout our U.S. 

Code, and especially in the banking industry, but there is nothing 

like this aggregation, the collapsing of all of these issues all in one 

place, due process and separation of powers and non-delegation and 

et cetera, et cetera. So I believe there is more than one ground for 

11 

challenge, and I believe the courts will take notice of this when 

they have the opportunity. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay. Professor Merrill, to your point on 

inadequate notice, why might Dodd-Frank provide inadequate notice? 

Mr. MERRILL. The administrative procession that leads up to a 

decision to commence a liquidation is done in secret, and that is 

the way bank receiverships are done, and that is the way DoddFrank is written for these systemically significant non-bank firms. 

The problem is that if you had an open administrative process, you 

would trigger the type of financial panic that people want to prevent, that people don’t want to have creditors and counterparties 

cashing out and triggering a financial contagion. So there is no administrative notice. 

With respect to the stakeholders, other than the firm itself, the 

statute says that the judicial proceeding to appoint a receiver takes 

place in secret, and it makes it a Federal crime to recklessly disclose the fact that proceeding is taking place. That would include, 

of course, intentionally disclose. 

So there is no way that a shareholder or a creditor or a bondholder or any of these stakeholders will find out about this liquidation until it has been announced that the court has approved the 

appointment of a receiver, and the liquidation at that point under 

the statute has to take place. 

Chairman MCHENRY. My time has expired. We will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

The ranking member asked me to recognize Ms. Beatty instead. 

I will recognize Ms. Beatty for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member. 

And thank you gentlemen. 

Mr. McTaggart, much has been said today, and in your documents, regarding the process by which designation occurs. Specifically, Mr. Gray’s testimony states that it is no great surprise that 

big banks would seek to leverage their size, their interconnectedness, and other qualities to obtain favor from the government. The 

comments appear to suggest that the designation as an SIFI clearly 

confers strong benefits upon the largest institutions, and yet if this 

was the case, we would expect that all large and medium-sized financial institutions would be seeking to be designated as SIFIs. In 

fact, it appears to be just the opposite, that most of the borderline 

financial firms are making efforts to be excluded from the SIFI 

class of firms. 

So the question is, do you believe that SIFI designation is a way 

for big financial institutions to curry favor with the government, 

and if so, why is it that one of our larger insurance companies is 

challenging its non-bank SIFI designation? 

Mr. MCTAGGART. That is a fine and excellent question. With respect to the challenge, the Prudential Insurance Company is, as I 

understand it, acting within the requisite appeal period to challenge its SIFI designation. Importantly, it is not to challenge the 

constitutionality of the functioning of the statute, but the SIFI 

choice that was made and applied to it. So clearly, to the premise 

12 

of your question, in that instance, they do not presumably find it 

beneficial to be designated as an SIFI. 

On the broader question of whether SIFI status conferred the 

special designation, or does it proliferate the ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ question, my personal view is that it is a dramatic change with the enactment of the statute. I think it is pretty clear that institutions 

that previously were of concern 20 to 30 years ago as being systemically important—you think of Continental Bank in Illinois and so 

forth—are not likely to be the ones that would fall within the SIFI 

designation today. So, it has shifted. 

I think the one unspoken comment, but I think it is a critical 

one, from a policy standpoint, is that typically it is not just a single 

institution—and I am speaking as a former supervisor—that gets 

in trouble at once. It might be two or three because they are sort 

of in the same bad investments or other choices. 

So, that is really the challenge I see prospectively for the Fed 

and the Treasury in terms of how they manage and supervise the 

SIFI institutions once the next crisis, whatever it happens to be, 

occurs. I think that is the difficulty. And it is not clear that those 

institutions would be viewing the SIFI designation as a benefit. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentlelady yields back. 

We will now recognize the vice chairman of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I thank the chairman for calling the hearing, 

and certainly, we all appreciate the testimony of the witnesses here 

today. 

In his opening statement, Mr. Green noted correctly that DoddFrank has not been found unconstitutional, but I think two of you 

in your statements said that is as of yet, and it is still early in the 

game. 

Professor Merrill, you outlined in your testimony the ability of 

the courts to review the FSOC’s decisions to subject a company to 

Federal Reserve supervision under Title I. Can you just go through 

again, if you would, the constitutional questions that you have in 

that regard? 

Mr. MERRILL. No, my testimony is only devoted to Title II. I did 

not speak to Title I and the systemic designation under Title I. So 

I have no opinion on that. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. With respect to—you talked about notice and 

the opportunity to be heard. 

Mr. MERRILL. That is under Title II, yes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Okay, Title II. I’m sorry. 

Mr. MERRILL. In my view, the statute makes a fatal mistake in 

trying to push judicial review into this extremely truncated 24-hour 

period between the Executive Branch’s decision to seek an orderly 

liquidation and the court’s issuance of the order approving the orderly liquidation. So the court does not have enough time to consider this, the firm does not have enough time to prepare dissent, 

and as I mentioned, all of these other stakeholders are given no notice at all. In fact, it would be a crime to give them due process. 

So it is sort of like a super due process violation when your rights 

13 

are vaporized and you have absolutely no way of getting any notice 

or an opportunity to have a hearing before that takes place. 

One of the issues the district court has to resolve in this 24-hour 

period is whether or not the company is in default or in danger of 

default, and the statute defines default or danger of default in 

probabilistic terms. It says, it is likely that the firm will not be able 

to meet its obligations; it is likely that its debts will exceed its assets and so forth. 

Can you imagine a company that is resisting orderly liquidation 

being able to mount a defense in 24 hours to show that it is not 

in danger of default, and the type of accounting and actuarial information they would have to develop? And can you imagine the court 

being able to digest that information in 24 hours and make a 

meaningful ruling? I can’t. It seems to me what the statute does 

is it tries to conscript the courts and draw upon their prestige in 

legitimizing this process, which is essentially a total executive process, without allowing the courts to act in a meaningful way or giving parties due process. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. So, professor, why is it then that Dodd-Frank 

might provide inadequate opportunity to challenge the Secretary’s 

determination? Is it entirely that it can’t be done within 24 hours, 

or are there additional reasons? 

Mr. MERRILL. It is partly that it can’t be done in 24 hours. It is 

partly that significant stakeholders are given no notice so they 

can’t show up and participate in the hearing at all. I think the only 

way to really cure this, consistent with the need for confidentiality 

and speed, is to do what is done under bank receivership law, 

which is to give firms and other stakeholders a right to challenge 

it after a receiver is appointed. Receivership law allows you to go 

to court within 30 days. You can raise any issue you want. You can 

challenge the factual base of the receivership. 

Now, it is true that not many firms do take advantage of it. Once 

its receivership has been declared, it is difficult to persuade a court 

to undo it. But I think having that power is critically important because otherwise it is entirely left up to the discretion of the executive as to who they push into this liquidation process, and there 

really isn’t a chance for the courts to act as check on that. And just 

the availability of judicial review, I think, would act as a significant check on potential executive abuse. We can’t assume the executive will always be acting in perfectly good faith here. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. And finally, professor, I think you testified that 

you preferred the Senate version— 

Mr. MERRILL. No, the House version. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. The House version. That was review after receivership. Review after receivership? 

Mr. MERRILL. Yes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. So what Mr. Green said in his opening statement is that the bill could be amended, and there might be amendments which he would be consider which are important. So, in the 

30 seconds I have left, if you or any of the witnesses could tell us, 

if you could propose one amendment which would be most effective 

and most important to Dodd-Frank, what would that amendment 

be? 

14 

Mr. MERRILL. Just go back and look at the House bill that was 

passed in late 2009 or early 2010 and look at the provisions for appointment of receiver and adopt that and take out the provisions 

that the Senate added in 2010. The Senate added this ex ante review with all of these constitutional problems. I think the House 

bill would pass constitutional muster. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I think my time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman MCHENRY. I will now recognize Mrs. Maloney for 5 

minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling 

this hearing, and I also want to thank Ranking Member Green. 

In 2008, when a large financial company was on the verge of failure, regulators had two options in front of them. They could either 

let the company file for bankruptcy, which was what happened 

with Lehman, or they could bail the company out, which happened 

with AIG; and neither turned out to be a good alternative. 

Dodd-Frank gave regulators a third choice by creating an orderly 

liquidation process for large financial companies that is similar to 

the power that the FDIC has with commercial banks. By most accounts, the FDIC performed a vital role in stabilizing our economy 

during this period. Regulators were screaming for the same type of 

authority that would have helped them better manage AIG and 

Lehman Brothers than the two options that we had, which were: 

let it fail; or bail it out. They are both unacceptable. Neither one 

is a good alternative. 

Now, some of my colleagues say that they would simply let large 

companies file for bankruptcy. They can do that now. And I would 

like to point out that we have already tried bankruptcy. We tried 

that with Lehman, and the result was a massive financial crisis. 

And I don’t consider this an acceptable solution. But a financial institution or their creditors can push them into bankruptcy now if 

they so choose. But Dodd-Frank tried to give another alternative 

to help confront a financial crisis. I believe someone called it ‘‘executive abuse.’’ It wasn’t executive abuse. The financial system was 

crashing. Secretary Paulson was begging for some authority to help 

him better handle the crisis. 

So I guess my question to you is if this is about the constitutional authority that we have under Dodd-Frank, under Title II, it 

is really Title II, I would say—and I would like to begin with Mr. 

McTaggart and others if they would like to comment—Title II is 

really an extension of the FDIC commercial liquidation authority 

and powers that they have for commercial banks, and this was already challenged in court and the court upheld the authority under 

the FDIC to manage in a crisis situation. 

I would say in most of the—we were in a crisis situation that 

cost this country $12 trillion; some economists say it is $16 trillion. 

We are still suffering from it. I for one don’t want to go back to 

it. But most economists and most books that have been written 

about the crisis, to tell you the truth I can’t stand to read them 

because living through it once was enough, but if you do read them, 

most of them really laud the FDIC and the role that they played 

in trying to stabilize the economy. 

So, your comments on the constitutionality of Dodd-Frank, Mr. 

McTaggart, please? 

15 

Mr. MCTAGGART. Sure. Those are wonderful observations. 

It is clearly the case that a large part of the Dodd-Frank resolution process is derived from the history and the experience that the 

FDIC has had. I would point out that the bankruptcy process is 

still available and the Orderly Liquidation Authority is an alternative that is to be utilized essentially if there are decisions made 

that the bankruptcy process is not going to be satisfactory by the 

appropriate regulators. 

One point that I would like to just, I guess, correct the record 

on in terms of the orderly liquidation timing, and I have great respect for the courts, including, of course, the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia, they have issued a local civil 

rule to deal with orderly liquidation, and it is not a 24-hour period. 

At least 48 hours prior to the filing of a petition under the Act, 

the Secretary of the Treasury has to provide notice under seal to 

the clerk of the court that the petition will likely be filed with the 

court. Additionally, a petition under the Act by the Secretary of the 

Treasury must contain all relevant findings and recommendations. 

The petition is assigned to the chief judge or the acting chief judge, 

thus the petitions will be directed to someone who has fully reviewed the Act, the related precedent, and has experience on matters under the Act. The financial company named in the petition 

may file an opposition to the petition under seal, may appear at the 

hearing to oppose the petition. Each petition in opposition shall be 

accompanied by a proposed order, thus making a response by the 

judge in a 24-hour period somewhat easier. 

So, again, I am not suggesting that it completely changes the 

timeframe, but it is more than 24 hours. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

We will now recognize the gentlelady from Minnesota, Mrs. 

Bachmann, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BACHMANN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I want 

to thank you also for holding this hearing and for inviting these 

witnesses. This has been an excellent hearing. 

I think my first question will be to Mr. Merrill. I have appreciated your testimony. Again, I would like if you could go back— 

you made comments—to this issue of dealing with how Title II 

would violate constitutional principles when we are dealing with 

uniform bankruptcy law and we are dealing with vesting substantial discretion in the executive to invoke the Orderly Liquidation 

Authority? Could you give us a summation of that again? I think 

this is a very important point, that we need to understand the constitutional vulnerability. 

Mr. MERRILL. All right. I would be happy to respond to that and 

also respond to a couple of points that were just made by Mr. 

McTaggart. 

It is true that most of Title II was borrowed from FDIC receivership law and that the courts have upheld the FDIC’s receivership 

process, whereby there is an administrative appointment of a receiver and then the process unfolds after that. 

The big difference between the FDIC law and Title II is that 

under FDIC receivership law, an aggrieved party can go to court 

and ask the court to set aside the receivership and can raise any 

issue that they want to raise. Under Title II, there is no review 

16 

after the receiver is appointed. That is the end of the game as far 

as stakeholders are concerned, other than ordinary creditors, who 

may get some relief from the FDIC as receivers. 

So the shareholders, the directors, the officers of the company, 

who all have to be mandatorily fired under Dodd-Frank, have no 

way to protect their interests because there is no judicial review 

before or after, under Title II. There is under the FDIC Act. There 

is not under Title II. 

Second, this local D.C. rule that has been mentioned, the D.C. 

court was clearly uncomfortable when it looked at this statute. It 

asked the Secretary of the Treasury to please notify it 48 hours in 

advance so that they could try to get a judge lined up and so forth. 

But that local rule can’t change the basic skeletal provisions of the 

statute, which make it a crime to inform most stakeholders that 

there is going to be a liquidation, no notice whatsoever, which gives 

the judge only 24 hours between the time he sees the government’s 

petition and the time he has to rule and which gives the company 

whatever is left of the 24 hours to try to respond and address the 

issues that the government raises in its petition for liquidation. 

So I think the local rule helps a little bit at the margins, perhaps, but it does not address the fundamental flaws, due process, 

Article III and so forth that this statute creates. 

Mrs. BACHMANN. And, Mr. Merrill, based upon the latter part of 

your answer, would you classify that as a potential vulnerability 

under First Amendment grounds? 

Mr. MERRILL. Yes. The statute says, you can go to jail for 5 years 

for telling the world that the government is trying to liquidate your 

firm. That is unprecedented. I know of no analogy that would sustain that, and I think the court in a proper case where a firm 

thinks that it is improper to be putting it through liquidation, that 

there is some kind of abuse, I am not suggesting there was abuse 

in the past, but in the future there might be, a firm that thinks 

the government is trying to put it through liquidation inappropriately, they can’t leak this to The New York Times or the Washington Post without having the officers of the firm be trucked off 

to jail for 5 years. That is an extraordinary incursion on the First 

Amendment, in my view, and I think the courts would be very uncomfortable with that. 

Mrs. BACHMANN. Mr. Merrill, have you ever seen anything like 

this before in your history, in your academic life and in your practical work that you have done? Have you seen any kind of restrictions and constitutional problems in this vein before? 

Mr. MERRILL. No. I think this is completely unprecedented. I 

think you had some interesting models with which you could work. 

You had the bankruptcy code. You had the FDIC receivership law, 

and for whatever reason, at the last minute, the Senate came up 

with this novel hybrid, which essentially dragoons the court into 

rubber stamping the executive in this highly expeditious fashion 

with no notice, no hearing opportunity that is meaningful, and with 

the stakes being so enormously huge. We are talking about all 

kinds of people having huge financial interests at stake here. I 

don’t think there is anything remotely like it in U.S. law. In fact, 

you can’t—in looking at the Article III issue, I couldn’t really find 

any precedents where the courts had been told that they had to 

17 

rule within 24 hours on highly complicated issues that are very difficult for anybody to figure out in a matter of months. 

Mrs. BACHMANN. Then, you really do have a denial of due process? 

Mr. MERRILL. Yes. Potentially. Again, when the process is ever 

used, I think there will be due process violations. And all sorts of 

stakeholders will have a strategic incentive to raise those constitutional concerns, which will very likely cause the whole process to 

go off the rails and become chaotic. 

Mrs. BACHMANN. I thank you for your observations because I 

think they are stunning. And I think in fact you have even underscored for this committee how important that is. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

We will now recognize Mr. Heck for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I pass. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay. We will now recognize Ms. Wagner 

for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the witnesses for being here with us this afternoon. 

I would like to especially welcome one of my former colleagues from 

the diplomatic team, Ambassador Boyden Gray. 

Welcome. And I will start with you, Ambassador Gray. Once the 

Treasury Secretary invokes the Orderly Liquidation Authority for 

a troubled firm under Dodd-Frank, the district court can only review two, I believe, of the seven determinations made by the Secretary. Is that correct? 

Mr. GRAY. That is correct. It can only review whether the firm 

is a financial firm and whether it is in trouble. 

Mrs. WAGNER. So the other five factors of determination are in 

a way exempt from the court review and the company has no right 

to challenge them? Is that correct, sir? 

Mr. GRAY. That is correct. When this issue first surfaced in 

something I wrote, I don’t know how long ago now, the Treasury’s 

letter to the Washington Post said, there is a huge check in all of 

this, which is that we must find that this entity poses a threat to 

the stability of the United States. That finding is specifically excluded from court review. 

Mrs. WAGNER. So if they are unable to challenge those other five 

factors, what types of concerns does this give you over due process? 

Mr. GRAY. It is a denial of due process not to give someone his 

or her day in court. And it isn’t just that. The Congress is basically 

cut out. You are basically cut out because what finances this is not 

required of you. You have no way of monitoring it because the orderly liquidation, or the Treasury has its own internal taxing 

power effectively to finance all this without any oversight by you. 

So there are multiple problems here. And I think—and you may 

have another question, but I want to emphasize that problems are 

accumulating right now. This isn’t just a difficulty that is going to 

arise when and if this kind of a takeover occurs. We are seeing the 

results of this now as larger institutions get funding advantages 

based on the implicit bailout of what this provision authorizes, and 

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18 

munities like yours, these local smaller banks are having a hard 

time competing and dealing with the regulations. 

Mrs. WAGNER. And in fact, it codified ‘‘too-big-to-fail,’’ is what is 

happening. 

Mr. GRAY. Right. It codifies ‘‘too-big-to-fail.’’ And it perpetuates 

it. So, this is happening today. There is a bigger problem at some 

point, but right now, we have a problem and it needs to be corrected. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Ambassador Gray. 

If I could move on, Professor Merrill, what standard can the 

court use to review the Secretary’s decision that the company is a 

financial company and that it is in default or in danger of default? 

Mr. MERRILL. The statute is quite explicit in saying that the 

court can only ask whether or not both of those determinations are 

arbitrary and capricious. 

Mrs. WAGNER. How would an arbitrary and capricious review of 

the Treasury Secretary’s decision differ from a de novo review? 

Mr. MERRILL. It is hard to say. The arbitrary and capricious language, I think is borrowed from the Administrative Procedures Act, 

which refers to arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. And so ordinarily when that standard is invoked, 

the courts have authority to decide questions of law. It is not clear 

that Dodd-Frank authorizes the courts to review questions of law. 

If that is the case, I think it is quite clearly unconstitutional, for 

that reason among all the other reasons that we discussed. Under 

bank receivership law, and under the House bill that was rejected 

by the conference committee, the court would have de novo review 

powers, which means the court would make the record, the parties 

would submit evidence to the court that they think is relevant, and 

the court would hear witnesses, and the court would decide all the 

legal questions independently of what the agency decided. 

Mrs. WAGNER. And the determination, I assume, is based on the 

merits of its argument? 

Mr. MERRILL. Yes. The huge difference between de novo review 

and arbitrary and capricious, whatever that means without ‘‘not in 

accordance’’ with law being added. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Very quickly, Professor Merrill, how is the court’s 

ability to review the Treasury Secretary’s decision to invoke the 

OLA different from its ability to review the FDIC’s decision to resolve a failed bank under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, for instance? 

Mr. MERRILL. Under the FDIC Act, the court has the power, at 

the behest of any affected person, to set aside the receivership for 

any and all reasons, and to develop a record, and to decide questions independently. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the court is restricted to reviewing these two issues out of seven and only under 

this arbitrary and capricious standard, which we don’t know quite 

what that means, but it sounds very deferential. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Professor. 

I believe my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCHENRY. We will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

19 

Let’s start with the first option available, which is bankruptcy. 

Bankruptcy is not precluded by Dodd-Frank. And I think all of our 

scholars will agree that bankruptcy is still available. But for fear 

that I may be mistaken, if you agree that bankruptcy is still available, would you kindly extend a hand into the air? 

This is sort of like voir dire. 

Okay. Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that all of the members of the panel have 

indicated that bankruptcy is still available. 

In fact, there has to be a determination of the entity, the company, the large company I might add, there has to be a determination that it is either in default or in danger of default. 

Is that a fair statement, Mr. Merrill? 

Mr. MERRILL. That is an accurate statement, yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Default or in danger of default. There also has 

to be, before we get to that determination, involvement of the 

FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and then you have to confer with the 

President of the United States. So we are talking about a time of 

exigent circumstances when we have perhaps what we had in 2008, 

when banks would not lend to each other, when you could not have 

other businesses that could go through the bankruptcy process—go 

to the bankruptcy process and assist a business that was in fact 

in bankruptcy. We do have these extreme circumstances where 

bankruptcy does not prove to be an option. Only after we have justified that there is an extreme circumstance do we then go to OLA. 

Now Mr. Merrill, do you agree with that, that there is this justification process? I know your point is that it is all a part of the 

executive. And I will get to that in just a moment. But that is your 

point, correct? 

Mr. MERRILL. That is right. And I don’t necessarily disagree with 

your characterization— 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Let me continue. So once we do get to the district court, we have rule 85 to contend with. Now, for those who 

are concerned about secrecy, rule 85 indicates that if the petition 

of the Treasury Secretary is granted, then the Secretary has to 

show cause why the veil of secrecy should not be lifted. Do you 

agree that rule 85 does this? 

Mr. MCTAGGART. I am familiar with the rule. Perhaps the other 

panelists are not. But that is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. So rule 85, which applies to the district court that 

the case must be filed in, this is a court of venue and of jurisdiction, so you have to go to this court, this local rule has already 

been promulgated to address the very question of secrecy that has 

been raised. 

Next point before I get to you, Mr. Gray. We will try to get to 

you in just a moment, but there is one other thing that I have to 

do. The ruling of the district court is not the final word. In fact, 

you can appeal from the district court to the next level, which 

would be the appeals court, circuit court, and you can appeal from 

there to the Supreme Court. So the district court ruling is not the 

final word. 

This can go all the way to the Supreme Court of the United 

States of America. And the Supreme Court has supreme authority. 

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20 

fully we will continue to respect them. Now, with reference to the 

process itself of appeal, and of filing the petition, do you agree that 

in major questions of any type, you have constitutional scholars on 

both sides of the issue? It is not unusual to have constitutional 

scholars on both sides of an issue. We just had several cases before 

the Supreme Court recently, with constitutional scholars on both 

sides of the issue. Do you agree, Mr. Merrill, that you have constitutional scholars on both sides of issues? 

Mr. MERRILL. On many issues, you do. I am not sure that there 

are going to be two constitutional scholars on either side of the 

question of whether there is no hearing or opportunity. 

Mr. GREEN. We already have—you do not consider your friend 

sitting next to you a scholar? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. MERRILL. I haven’t heard him speak specifically to the issue. 

Mr. GREEN. I will let you decide who is a constitutional scholar 

or not. Let us just say for our purposes that we have people who 

hold themselves out as experts who will testify on both sides of this 

issue. That will happen. It is happening right now. And until a 

court rules, we don’t have an issue that has been declared unconstitutional. We don’t have any aspect of this law that has been declared unconstitutional. So I appreciate your taking it to court, 

those of you who are litigating. I have no quarrel with your taking 

it to court. I will respect the decision of the courts. But I do think 

that we can’t conclude now that it is unconstitutional. What we 

have are opinions. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Spoken like a well-informed former judge. 

We will now recognize Mr. Rothfus of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Gray and Professor Merrill, in addition to arguing 

that certain provisions of Dodd-Frank may be susceptible to constitutional challenge, you both suggested that basically it is bad 

policy and may fail to achieve the purpose of ending taxpayer-funded bailouts of large complex financial companies. Professor Merrill, 

why might Title II preserve a version of taxpayer funded socialization of losses? 

Mr. MERRILL. I think when you read the fine print of Title II, you 

will find that there is authority for the Treasury Department to 

provide funding to facilitate an orderly liquidation. And the statute 

says that the Treasury has to be reimbursed. The taxpayers are not 

going to be paying for this up front. But in reimbursing the Secretary of the Treasury, you start with the shareholders and then 

the unsecured creditors, and then you file lawsuits against the officers and directors, who might have been responsible to claw back 

their compensation. But if there is still a shortfall, then the statute 

authorizes special assessments to be imposed on major financial 

companies to pay back the Treasury for the funding that it advanced to this liquidation. Those special assessments are really a 

tax by any other name. Those assessments would be passed on to 

consumers in part, or would be taken from shareholders of bank 

corporations that have to pay these assessments. And so, that is a 

kind of socialization of losses of the sort that the bailout regime 

represented. I think it is a perpetuation of that in a different guise. 

21 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you. 

And Ambassador Gray, despite the passage of Dodd-Frank, do 

larger firms, in your opinion, enjoy an unfair funding advantage 

relative to smaller firms? 

Mr. GRAY. There are, I think, nearly a half dozen studies which 

make that point. There is one from Bloomberg that says the advantage is $80 billion-plus a year in terms of profits. I believe the Dallas Fed has gone into some detail about this, identifying somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 basis points advantage. And so I 

don’t think there is any question that there is an advantage. One 

very high ranking official at one of the big Wall Street institutions 

said to me, ‘‘We are not interested in an all-out attack on these provisions of Dodd-Frank because if our regulators knew we weren’t 

going to be bailed out, they would raise our capital requirements.’’ 

So I think there is a general understanding that this is a form of 

bailout. There are, I think as a result perhaps of the questions that 

you are raising here in this hearing and the questions that have 

been raised by the lawsuits, some efforts now to actually raise capital requirements to soften the ‘‘too-big-to-fail,’’ to cut into the ‘‘toobig-to-fail’’ problem. But that in itself is a recognition that there is 

a ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ entrenchment problem that is perpetuated, if not 

deepened, by Dodd-Frank. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Professor Merrill, would you consider the truncated notice window at play with Title II to be extraordinary? 

Mr. MERRILL. Yes. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Would it be fair to call this maybe even a sudden 

death determination? Is that what happens in this truncated process? 

Mr. MERRILL. I am sorry, could you repeat that? 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Can you make an argument that this is almost 

like a sudden death provision? You have 24 hours, or 48 hours basically to respond to the government that is basically going to order 

the winding up of a business. 

Mr. MERRILL. Yes. If there is any kind of contested issue at all 

with respect to danger of default or default, I think it is just completely unrealistic to imagine that the firm has any way to muster 

a defense and present it to the court in an orderly fashion and have 

a meaningful decision on that. I think this is all a charade. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Mr. McTaggart, can you identify any other law 

that allows such a truncated notice window before a company is 

going to be ordered to be wound up? 

Mr. MCTAGGART. I am not sure that I can, but I would note that 

based upon the supervisory process, institutions are not ordinarily 

deteriorating within a 24-hour period. So typically there is going to 

be a matter of perhaps weeks, perhaps a month prior to this final 

decision. I respect your point of view of course with regard to the 

shortness of it. And to respond specifically to your question, I can’t 

reference another framework. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. And Professor Merrill again, if we can take just a 

reminder of some of the stakeholders here, employees of these companies? 

Mr. MERRILL. They get no notice, other than the very top officers. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Pension funds. 

Mr. MERRILL. No notice. 

22 

Mr. ROTHFUS. And ultimately the taxpayers who may have to be 

responsible for any kind of pension liability. 

Mr. MERRILL. Obviously not. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you. 

Chairman MCHENRY. We will now recognize Mr. Barr of Kentucky for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Gray, Mr. McTaggart testified that there was a 

local rule that provided for a notice that the OLA process was to 

be invoked. Do you agree with Mr. McTaggart’s testimony, and can 

a local rule cure an unconstitutional statute? 

Mr. GRAY. I don’t believe so. I have never heard of that being the 

case. I think the local rule is useful because it is a blueprint for 

what is wrong with the statute. But I don’t think it overrules the 

statute or can overrule the statute. There will not be 48 hours or 

72 hours notice, or a length of time for a district court to react, let 

alone 48 hours. There will be 24 hours. That is what the statute 

says. And any notice that goes out to potentially interested parties 

would violate the statute and subject anyone at the court who did 

this to criminal penalty, jail, and financial. So the rule is, as I say, 

useful for the problems it identifies, but I do not think it can solve 

them. 

Mr. BARR. To Ambassador Gray and to Professor Merrill, could 

the government in litigation over the constitutionality of the DoddFrank law, could the government conceivably defend the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that—or by invoking either 

the exceptions clause in article three or by invoking article three, 

section one language conferring to Congress the power to create inferior courts and, by extension, define the contours of the jurisdiction of those inferior courts? 

Mr. MERRILL. I hadn’t thought about that. It would be an interesting argument. The statute doesn’t purport to affect the jurisdiction in the sense you are referring to it, of the courts. It confers 

jurisdiction on the district court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. And it doesn’t say that it is limiting their jurisdiction 

or it is regulating the appeals process. It just simply drastically 

limits the issues that they can consider. I would add in this regard 

that there is a real question as to what sort of relief these courts 

can grant. The statute, as I read it, suggests that the only thing 

the district court can do other than approve the petition is to send 

the case back to the Secretary of the Treasury for more findings to 

support his determination. And then when you appeal to the appeals court and the Supreme Court, there is no stay pending appeal. So what can the appeals court and what can the Supreme 

Court do? I am not sure they can do anything other than send the 

case back to the Treasury Secretary for more findings. Meanwhile, 

liquidation is proceeding apace. So it is not clear that this statute 

gives these courts any authority to overturn the receivership process. 

Mr. GRAY. Could I make one additional point? 

Mr. BARR. Yes. 

Mr. GRAY. Just to respond to something that was said earlier, 

the restrictions on what the district court can look at, only two of 

the five factors—two of the seven, excuse me, that they cannot look 

at five of the factors, that restriction carries on to the Court of ApVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:28 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 082859 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\82859.TXT TERRI
23 

peals and to the Supreme Court. So the appellate courts are as restricted as the district court in that regard. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Gray, you have opined that you have concerns 

about Dodd-Frank potentially violating the separation of powers 

doctrine, and in particular, you have cited the nondelegation doctrine. Can you amplify for the committee your concerns with respect to the nondelegation doctrine? 

Mr. GRAY. I think the nondelegation doctrine is violated here, 

but I don’t think that if that were the only problem I would be 

here, or at least I would have been involved in filing a lawsuit. 

That is a real problem. But what aggravates it so terribly is the 

addition of the restrictions on court review. To look at it from a different angle, courts have, since the Schechter Poultry case, the socalled ‘‘sick chicken case,’’ the courts have never really thrown out 

a statute like the National Recovery Act wholesale in response to 

a nondelegation argument, which is that Congress granted too 

much unguided authority to the Executive Branch. 

What they have done is engaged in a doctrine known as the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, where they construe the statute 

more narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional issues. Now, if 

someone came along and did this, if someone came along for example and said—some judge that we might be before said, there really 

is a Tucker right available to go in and claim not just liquidation 

value but everything you have lost in one of these takeovers, and 

that is a fully available remedy in the court of claims, I don’t think 

that is what the statute means, but if a court tried to construe it 

that way, I would view it is a partial victory. But I don’t think that 

is what is available. I think the drafters of this statute were extremely careful in making sure that no avenue was available to 

raise these issues before they were basically foreclosed in a secret 

proceeding. 

Mr. BARR. My time has expired, but Mr. Chairman, if I could ask 

just one quick follow-up question to Mr. Gray on that. The reason 

why I ask about the nondelegation doctrine is that I wanted you 

to maybe comment on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 

structure as being particularly unaccountable to the Congress in 

that it receives its appropriations from the Federal Reserve instead 

of Congress, and yet Congress has delegated a great deal of rulemaking authority, quasi-legislative power to this agency that is 

otherwise very unaccountable to the Congress. 

Mr. GRAY. That is correct. It has granted huge authority to the 

CFPB. It has said to the House and Senate, you are out of it, the 

funding will come from the Fed, which itself is precluded from 

interfering. You are instructed, not you personally, but the House 

and Senate Appropriations Committees are actually prohibited 

from holding hearings on the budget. I don’t think the Sergeant at 

Arms is going to come and arrest anybody, but that is what the 

statute says. And then it goes on, and this is where, again, separation of powers comes in, it instructs the courts to grant deference 

to the CFPB as though it were the only agency in town that had 

anything to do with financial services. That is a very unusual provision as far as I am concerned. I will defer to Professor Merrill if 

he wants to comment about such a codification of Chevron. But it 

is a peculiar formulation, and it really does tie the hands of the 

24 

courts incredibly in trying to unravel all of this. And of course, as 

I repeat, you have nothing to say. Now, there is a parallel, of 

course, in the Orderly Liquidation Authority in the way the courts 

are specifically precluded from reviewing five of the seven factors, 

et cetera, given 24 hours, all in secret. And again, you are cut out 

because the funding authority is actually a tax, I agree with that, 

is tucked into the bill in the form of an assessment. So you have 

parallels in both. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentleman’s time has expired. We will 

now move to Mr. Cleaver, who is batting cleanup today. 

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

late. 

And I thank the witnesses for being here. I appreciate this hearing, because any time we have a distinguished panel, it provides 

us with an opportunity to learn something that we didn’t know or 

to consider something that we might not have considered. And I 

have had very positive contact with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. We had a rule on the definition of ‘‘rural’’ that a 

number of people were concerned about in the rural areas of Missouri. We communicated with them for a long period of time, and 

then finally they responded in a positive and affirmative way. 

But I am somewhat concerned about, and I think with members 

of the judicial intelligentsia here, I can get an answer, but I am not 

sure that our committee is the right jurisdiction to handle constitutional deficiencies. I am sitting next to a judge, a former judge, and 

I am not sure, I think the Chair may be an attorney as well. So 

I am probably the only one in here who is not. But it would seem 

to me that this would be a matter for the Judiciary Committee. 

This committee did write the Dodd-Frank Act. I was here at all 

those meetings, but I am struggling with how we fit in. Can somebody help me? 

Mr. GRAY. Let me take a quick stab at that. I think the constitutional problems that have been identified here are problems that 

must be cured before you can get a cure for the substance abuse 

of this legislation. You don’t need the constitutional analysis to conclude that this legislation has entrenched or perpetuated or aggravated ‘‘too-big-to-fail.’’ And the consequences of that are not necessarily constitutional, they are economic, and they are personal, 

and they are community-related. And they deprive families in the 

district of the National Bank of Big Springs, Texas, of access to 

services that the firm is no longer going to be able to provide. 

Those are economic harms that fall directly on real people. And 

that is not a constitutional description; that is a description of adversity. 

Mr. CLEAVER. I think you are agreeing with me. We have had 

several hearings on ‘‘too-big-to-fail.’’ And by the way, I happen to 

agree with you, I am very, very concerned about the status of ‘‘toobig-to-fail.’’ I think they have gotten bigger. And the fallout would 

be greater if something happened, we had another economic crisis. 

But I am just questioning the jurisdiction of the hearing because 

I don’t think— 

Mr. MERRILL. If I could respond, Congressman Green made the 

point that on practically any constitutional issue, you can find 

25 

somebody to testify on one side and somebody to testify on the 

other side. And I would agree with you; I don’t think it is this committee’s job to sort of keep score as to whether you think this is 

constitutional or not. 

The problem that I am trying to emphasize is that if and when 

this orderly liquidation process is invoked, there is a very substantial risk that significant stakeholders are going to raise these constitutional objections, and they are going to raise it in a very complicated, difficult, convoluted procedural way, which runs the risk 

that the whole process is going to be undermined by having those 

constitutional questions out there. 

So my suggestion would be to fix the statute to the extent you 

can to eliminate those constitutional problems and increase the 

chance of this statute working. 

Mr. MCTAGGART. Congressman, I would add a few points. I 

guess, obviously, there are policy choices that are embedded within 

the Act. The classic legislative process of two differing views synthesizing and becoming law is the classic legislative process that 

the courts recognize and defer to and give a huge presumption of 

constitutionality as a result of the deliberative process of the Congress. 

I guess I differ with the professor in a couple of respects on the 

policy. With respect to the Orderly Liquidation Authority, from an 

advocacy standpoint, I would rather have the opportunity to make 

my case at that point within the judicial process as contrasted to 

the point that was made under the FDIC resolution authority, 

which is 10 days after the receivership has been appointed and 

within 30 days and so forth. That is like trying to unscramble the 

eggs after the fact. And very few of those lead to any kind of meaningful review, in my opinion. So I think actually the OLA is a better option in terms of if there is a real challenge available from an 

advocacy standpoint, that is when you want to make it in terms of 

the timing. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Thank you. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous 

materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

I would like to thank our distinguished panel for being here 

today to discuss the constitutional deficiencies and legal uncertainties in the Dodd-Frank Act. You certainly have helped illuminate 

this debate. And we thank you for that. 

And without objection, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(27) 

A P P E N D I X 

July 9, 2013 

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Hearing before the 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Financial Services, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

"EXAMINING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES AND 

LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT" 

July 9, 2013 

Statement of Amb. C. Boyden Gray 

I am grateful for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on the 

constitutional flaws inherent in Titles I and II ofthe Dodd-Frank Act. 1 I am counsel to 

several parties in a constitutional challenge to Titles I and II, as well as Title X and the 

"recess" appointment of Richard Cordray to direct the Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau;2 the president of State National Bank of Big Spring, my client in the lawsuit, 

testified before this Subcommittee last year. 3 

But my position on Dodd-Frank's unconstitutional provisions long predates 

the filing of that lawsuit. I have been writing and speaking about Dodd-Frank since its very 

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 

State Nat'/ Banko/Big Spring v. Lew, No. I: I 2-cv-0 1032 (D.D.C. flled June 21,2012). 

The hearing, held on July 19, 2012, was titled Who's In Your Wallet? Dodd-Frank's Impact 

on Families, Communities and Small Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 

Investigations o/the H Comm. on Financial Servs., I 12th Cong. 10 (2012) (statement for the 

record of Jim Purcell, CEO, State National Bank), available at 

http:// financialservices.house.gov I uploadedfIles/hhrg-112-ba09-wstate-jpurcell20120719.pdf. 
29 


82859.002

inception, beginning with a "white paper" published shortly after the bill was signed into 

law,4 followed by many articles, speeches, and debates since then.' 

When President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law, he said that the law 

was based on "clear rules and basic safeguards," and that those rules would "make clear 

that no firm is somehow protected because it is 'too big to fail,' so we don't have another 

AIG."6 I wish that that his assurances were true but, regrettably, they are false. As the 

Dallas Federal Reserve Bank succinctly stated in its 2011 annual report, "[f1or all its bluster, 

Dodd-Frank leaves" the problem of Too Big to Fail "entrenched."7 

It is no mere coincidence that Dodd-Frank both entrenches the Too Big To 

Fail problem and violates the Constitution's system of checks and balances. Rather, those 

two problems are deeply intertwined: by giving regulators effectively unlimited power, and 

by removing the checks and balances that ordinarily prevent the abuse of power, DoddFrank fosters the very conditions that give rise to Too Big To Fail. 

C. Boyden Gray & John Shu, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection 

Act 0/2010: Is It Constitutional?, 11 ENGAGE: THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S 

PRACTICE GROUPS Dec. 20lO, at 1, available at 

http://www.fed-soc.org/ docLib/ 20 lO 1209 _BoydenShuDoddFrank WP. pdf. 

See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray, Congressional Abdication: Delegation Without Detail and Without 

Waiver, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 41 (2013); C. Boyden Gray & Jim R. Purcell, Why 

Dodd-Frank is Unconstitutional, WALL. ST. J., June 22,2012, available at 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052702304765304577480451892603234.html; C. 

Boyden Gray, 'Too Big To Fail' Casts a Long Shadow, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 18,2012, available 

at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news!20121 apr/ 17/ gray-too-big-to-fail-casts-a-Iongshadow/. 

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall 

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 20lO), 

http://www. whitehouse. gOY /the-press-office/ remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wallstreet -reform-and-consumer-protection-act. 

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, CHOOSING THE ROAD TO PROSPERlTY: WHY WE 

MUST END Too BIG To FAIL-Now, 2011 ANNUAL REpORT 21, available at 

http:// www.dallasfed.org/assets/documentslfed/annual!20111arl!. pdf (emphasis added). 

2 
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82859.003

In that respect, Dodd-Frank is just the latest example of a trend that the 

nation has experienced many times: when we collapse the separation of powers and commit 

great authority to regulatory bureaucracies, it inherently favors big businesses over smaller 

ones. This bias against small business owes in part to the fact that bigger businesses are 

better able to shoulder large regulatory burdens-or, as JPMorgan Chase's CEO recently 

characterized Dodd-Frank, the regulatory burden creates a "moat" around big businesses, 

protecting them from competition by smaller aspiring rivals. 8 But the bias also owes to the 

fact that bureaucracy tends to expand its own control by dealing primarily, if not exclusively, 

with an industry's biggest players. No less than Justice Louis Brandeis stressed this, when he 

joined the Supreme Court's decision to strike down the National Industrial Recovery Act, 

the New Deal's central program for coordinating big government, big labor, and big 

business: 

The government's natural bias toward big businesses over small competitors 

can be restrained only by reinvigoration of the Constitution's separation of powers, its 

checks and balances. In the discussion that follows, I will lay out both the problem of "Too 

Big To Fail," which Dodd-Frank was supposed to correct, and Dodd-Frank's core 

constitutional flaws, which have only exacerbated and entrenched Too Big To FaiL 

John Carney, Surprise! Dodd-Frank Helps JPMorgan Chase, CNBC.com (Feb. 4, 2013), 

available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/l 00431660. 

"It was Brandeis's old distaste for bigness-in government no less than in industrysummoned back into the open by his concern that the government had gone out of controL" 

MICHAEL HILTZJK, THE NEW DEAL 282 (2011); see also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. 

BRANDEIS 698 (2009) ("No part of the New Deal went so much against Louis Brandeis's 

beliefs as did the NIRA ... The heart of the NIRA revolved around Roosevelt's belief 

that the crisis of the Depression could revive the spirit of cooperation that he believed 

marked business-government relations during the Great War. ... Everyone had realized 

that the normal rules, such as antitrust laws, made no sense in wartime"). 

3 
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82859.004

I. Dodd-Frank Entrenches "Too Big To Fail," Conferring Upon Big Banks a 

Subsidy Worth Billions of Dollars. 

It is well established that several large financial institutions were seen as "too 

big to fail" prior to Dodd-Frank's enactment, and that their "TBTF" status bestowed upon 

them substantial advantages over their smaller competitors. Simply put, the market believed 

that certain banks were so big and interconnected that the federal government would 

intervene to keep them afloat in times of financial crisis. In other words, these "too big to 

fail" banks were seen as less risky, and their perceived safety enabled these banks to attract 

investment capital more cheaply than their competitors could. 

To be clear, "too big to fail" status was not merely a figment of market 

imagination; rather, it was firmly rooted in national experience, as federal officials 

repeatedly intervened in recent decades to prevent the collapse of particular financial firms. 

In 1995, the Federal Reserve coordinated a rescue of Long Term Capital Management, a 

prominent hedge fund, in order to prevent shock waves from damaging Wall Street. 10 In 

200S, the Federal Reserve bailed out AIG, once again in order to prevent large banks from 

being injured by the company's collapse." 

Indeed, the federal government's implicit protection of "too big to fail" banks 

was so well known that, during the financial crisis of 2007-200S, bank presidents actively 

urged the Treasury Secretary to protect them, particularly as Bear Steams lunged towards 

collapse. As Secretary Paulson later recalled in his memoir: 

10 See, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT IS5-21S (2001); Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It's a 

Short-Tenn Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 200S, at BUl, available at 

http://www.nytimes.com/200S/09 /07 /business/07ltcm.html. 

11 See, e.g., NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF How WASHINGTON 

ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 179-S1 (2012). 

4 
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82859.005

The first call I received was from Lloyd Blankfein, my successor as 

Goldman Sachs CEO .... Lloyd went over the market situation with 

me, providing a typically analytical and extraordinarily comprehensive 

overview, but I could hear the fear in his voice. His conclusion was 

apocalyptic. 

The market expected a Bear rescue. If there wasn't one, all hell would 

break loose, starting in Asia Sunday night and racing through London 

and New York Monday. 12 

In short, the "too big to fail" banks received immense government financial 

and regulatory assistance in times of crisis. I3 But even in times of relative peace, big banks 

enjoyed direct benefits from their "too big to fail" status, in the form of a cost-of-capital 

advantage. That was an immense subsidy in and of itself, as documented by several 

economic studies. I4 In 2011, Moody's estimated that in the U.S. the "too big to fail" subsidy 

amounted to a 50-basis-point cost-of-capital advantage, worth $102 billion.l5 The 

International Monetary Fund, too, found that banks larger than $100 billion (i.e., the preDodd-Frank standard for implicit "too big to fail" status) enjoyed a 50-bas is-point 

advantage. 16 Economists at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank found that banks paid 

"at least $15 billion in added premiums" in merger deals to grow their banks above the $100 

12 HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 106 (2010). 

13 In addition to the aforementioned examples, the banks also lobbied for regulatory 

intervention-e.g., to prevent "short sellers" from decreasing the price of their shares. See 

ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 220 (2010). 

14 In addition to the subsequently mentioned studies, the Bank of England summarized 

several other studies evaluating this trend. JOSEPH Noss & RHIANNON SOWERBUTTS, THE 

IMPLICIT SUBSIDY OF BANKS, BANK OF ENGLAND FINANCIAL STABILITY PAPER No. 15, at 6 

(2012), available at 

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/fs_paperI5.pdf. 

15 ZAN LI, ET AL., MOODY'S ANALYTICS, QUANTIFYING THE VALUE OF IMPLICIT 

GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 14 (2011). 

16 iNCI OTKER-ROBE, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE ToO-IMPORTANTTo-FAIL CONUNDRUM: IMPOSSIBLE To IGNORE AND DIFFICULT To RESOLVE 6 (2011), 

available at http://www .imf.orgl externall pubsl ftl sdn120 III sdn 1112. pdf. 

5 
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82859.006

billion mark. 17 More recently, Bloomberg News calculated that the cost-of-capital advantage 

is worth $83 billion to the too-big-to-fail banks.18 Such studies spurred Senators Vitter and 

Brown to ask the GAO to study the economic benefits that large banks "receive as a result 

of actual or perceived government support. ,,19 

Again, these were the very subsidies that Dodd-Frank supposedly ended. But, 

as the Dallas Fed stressed, Dodd-Frank did not end them-it entrenched them, in multiple 

ways: 

First, Title 1's creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 

turns "too big to fail" status--or, in Dodd-Frank's terms, "systemically important" statusfrom mere implication to actual, explicit government designation. We need not guess which 

financial companies are seen by the government as systemically important, because FSOC 

will tell us. The Connecticut Insurance Commissioner noted this in a recent speech to 

International Insurance Conference's annual seminar: 

Particularly on the life side, where people are buying a product for a 

30- or 40-year promise, you want that financial stability; and if you say 

as a consumer this designation means the company has more 

supervision, that's a good thing. It has more capital. That's really good 

17 Elijah Brewer III & Julapa Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks Pay To Become Too-Big-To-Fail 

and To Become Systemically Important?, 43 J FIN. SERVS. RESEARCH I, 8 (2013), available at 

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/ 1O.1007%2FsI0693-01 1-01 19-6.pdf. 

18 See, e.g., Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?," BLOOMBERG VIEW, 

Feb. 20, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/why-should-taxpayers-givebig-banks-83-billion-a-year-.html; Remember That $83 Billion Bank Subsidy? We Weren't 

Kidding, BLOOMBERG VIEW, Feb. 24, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-

24/remember-that-83-billion-bank-subsidy-we-weren-t-kidding.html. 

19 Letter from Senators Vitter & Brown to Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General of the 

United States (Jan. 1,2013), available at http://www.fsround.org/fsr/ doddJrank/pdfs 

/Vitter-Brown-GAO-Study-Request-on-Megabanks.pdf. 

6 
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82859.007

and, as it's potentially too big to fail, so the government is not going to 

let this company g020 

The Commissioner is right, and the proof is in the pudding: When news broke a few weeks 

ago that GE Capital, AIG, and Prudential had received preliminary "systemic importance" 

designations from the FSOC, their stock prices immediately jumped." 

The second way that Dodd-Frank entrenches "too big to fail" also pertains to 

Title 1. The statute further expands the pre-Dodd-Frank universe of "too big to fail" 

companies by setting the statutory threshold at $50 billion in assets,22 rather than the $100 

billion threshold that previously was seen as the benchmark for implicit too-big-to-fail status. 

Third, Title I also expands too-big-to-fail to include not merely big banks, but 

also "nonbank financial companies" such as insurance companies, hedge funds, and other 

companies not previously assumed to have government backing.23 

Fourth, Title II's "Orderly Liquidation Authority" allows the federal 

government to conduct "back-door bailouts" of too-big-to-fail banks that have invested in 

troubled financial companies. This is effectively a codification of the AIG episode: if a 

financial company faces the possibility of default, and that company's failure threatens big 

banks that have invested in it or are its counterparties, then Title II gives the Treasury 

20 Commissioner Thomas Leonardi's comments were quoted by Gavin Souter, Stability, 

Higher Costs Seen in Systemic Designation for Insurers, BUSINESS INS., June 19, 2013, 

http://www.businessinsurance.com/articleI20130619/NEWS04/130619774. 

21 Ian Katz & Zachary Tracer, AIG, Prudential Named Systemically Important by Panel, 

BLOOMBERG, June 4, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/newsI2013-06-03/u-s-regulatorsvote-to-label-some-non-banks-systemically-risky.html. 

22 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(a)(I), 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (2010) 

(codified at 12 U.s.c. § 5365(a)(I» (setting $50 billion benchmark for bank holding 

companies); see also FSOC, Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank 

Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21637, 21643 (Apr. 11,2012) (setting $50 billion 

benchmark for nonbank financial companies, under Dodd-Frank § 113). 

23 Dodd-Frank Act § 113. 

7 
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82859.008

Secretary and FDIC effectively unlimited power to liquidate (i.e., wind-down or reorganize) 

the company in a way that favors certain stakeholders over others--even treating some 

creditors better than other similarly situated creditors, an abrogation of one of the 

fundamental rules of bankruptcy law24

-and to do so behind closed doors, completely 

hidden from public view. 

II. Dodd-Frank Violates the Constitution's Separation of Powers by Giving 

Effectively Open-Ended Power to Unchecked Regulators. 

It is no great surprise that big banks would seek to leverage their size, 

interconnectedness, and other qualities in order to obtain favor from the government. 

Indeed, that was one of the many great insights that Adam Smith offered in The Wealth of 

Nations: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 

but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 

prices. ,,25 Perhaps the law cannot prevent them from meeting and conspiring, but at the very 

least, Smith urged, "it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render 

them necessary.,,26 

The solution is simple. The Constitution's separation of powers, its system of 

checks and balances, was intended to foster a rule oflaw that would limit government 

officials' discretion to bestow unlimited favor upon particular classes of businessmen or 

other interest groups. 

24 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 21O(b)(4). 

25 ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 

NATIONS, ch. 10, part II (1776). The modem school of "Public Choice Theory," too, offers 

great insight into government officials' incentives in bailing out big banks. See generally J. W. 

Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Government-Controlled Corporations as a 

Mechanismfor Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REv. 1521 (2010). 

26 SMITH, supra note 25, at ch. 10, part II. 

8 
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82859.009

Moreover, the separation of powers was intended to ensure that the 

government would remain fully accountable to the people, as Publius explained in 

Federalist 70: 

It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine 

on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or 

series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one 

to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible 

appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real 

author. The circumstances which may have led to any national 

miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where 

there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and 

kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there 

has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to 

whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly 

chargeable.27 

The Supreme Court reminded us of this most recently in Free Enterprise Fund v. 

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, in which the Court struck down the SarbanesOxley Act's attempt to shelter a new independent agency (i.e., the Public Company 

Accounting Oversight Board, or "PCAOB") within another independent agency (i.e., the 

Securities and Exchange Commission)28 As the Court explained, precedents dating back to 

the New Deal Era had long ago established that Congress could create agencies enjoying 

some independence from the President, by providing that members of independent 

commissions could only be removed "for good cause."29 But those precedents, the Court 

stressed, marked the outer limits of "independence" that the Constitution allows. Sarbanes27 Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton). 

28 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). To be clear, the Court did not specifically hold that the SEC itself 

is an "independent agency"; the SEC's organic statute does not expressly insulate the 

Commissioners from the President's control. Nevertheless, the parties to that case all agreed 

that the SEC Commissioners do enjoy that degree of independence, and the Court therefore 

"decide[d] the case with that understanding." !d. at 3149. 

29 [d. at 3146-47 (citing Humphrey's Executorv. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), United 

States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988». 

9 
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82859.010

Oxley's double layer of independence, by contrast, required the Court to consider "whether 

these separate layers of protection may be combined. ,,30 The answer to that question was, 

emphatically, "no": 

As explained, we have previously upheld limited restrictions on the 

President's removal power .... The Act before us does something quite 

different. It not only protects Board members from removal except for 

good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether 

that good cause exists. That decision is vested instead in other tenured 

officers-the Commissioners-none of whom is subject to the 

President's direct control. The result is a Board that is not accountable 

to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the Board. 

The added layer of tenure protection makes a difference .... This novel 

strncture does not merely add to the Board's independence, but transforms it. 

Neither the President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor even 

an officer whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has full 

control over the Board. 3l 

"The added layer of tenure protection makes a difference"; the PCAOB's 

"novel structure"-its double layer of independence-"does not merely add to the Board's 

independence, but transforms it." This analysis, which led the Court to strike down 

Sarbanes-Oxley's unprecedented independent-agency-within-an-independent-agency (and 

which last week led the D.C. Circuit to strike down a statute delegating legislative power to 

a private corporation32), also counsels in favor of striking down the parts of Dodd-Frank that 

combine multiple forms of independence to create new agency structures insulated from 

oversight by multiple branches of government. As the plaintiffs urge in State National Bank of 

Big Spring v. Lew, that includes the FSOC and the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), as 

well as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). These agencies do not enjoy 

30 Id. at 3147. 

31 Id. at 3153-54 (emphasis added). 

32 Ass'n of Am. Railroads v. u.s. Dep'tofTransp., No. 12-5204, at pp. 11-14 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 

2013). 

10 
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82859.011

multiple layers of independence from a single branch of government, as PCAOB did, but 

they do enjoy layers of independence from multiple branches of government, in a manner 

that far outpaces anything that the Supreme Court has previously approved. 

I have written in detail on the multiple forms of independence that the FSOC, 

OLA, and CFPB respectively enjoy.33 But let me briefly summarize the OLA's and FSOC's 

multiple layers of independence: 

A. OLA 

The OLA is an inter-agency framework administered primarily by the 

Treasury Secretary, who commences an "orderly liquidation," and by the FDIC, which 

carries it out. The Treasury Secretary serves at the pleasure of the president, of course. Of 

the FDIC's board, one member certainly enjoys the traditional hallmark of independence 

from the President: the CFPB Director, who enjoys an ex officio seat on the FDIC board, 

may only be removed "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.,,34 The 

remaining four members-three appointed by the President with the Senate's advice and 

consent, and the ex officio Comptroller of the Currency-are not expressly made independent 

from the President, although they are all appointed for fixed terms and elsewhere in the 

Code are identified collectively as an "independent regulatory agency.,,35 

33 Gray & Shu, supra note 4; see also Second Amended Complaint at ~~ 67-255, State Nat'l 

Bank a/Big Spring v. Lew, No. 12-1032 (D.D.C filed Feb. 13,2013). 

34 12 U.S.C § 1812(a)(I)(B) (placing the CFPB director on the FDIC); Dodd-Frank Act, 

Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(c)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C § 5491) 

(removal). 

35 44 U.s.C § 3502(5) (defining "independent regulatory agency" to include the FDIC); see 

also 12 U.S.C. § 2 (making the Comptroller of the Currency removable by the President 

"upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate"); 12 USC. § 1812 (identifying 

FDIC board members to include the Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of the 

CFPB). 

11 
39 


82859.012

The OLA's multiple layers of independence pertain, instead, to its 

independence from Congress and the courts. Congress exercises no "power of the purse" 

over the OLA process, which is funded instead either by the assets of the liquidated 

financial company or by assessments on the financial sector. 36 

And most importantly, Title II imposes truly draconian limitations on judicial 

oversight. The Treasury Secretary's initial decision to liquidate a company is effectively 

immune from judicial review in the district courts: a court has only 24 hours to hear the 

initial appeal of his liquidation decision, and if the court does not issue a fmal decision on 

the merits before that time limit expires, then the government wins by default37 The public, 

including the liquidated company's bondholders and shareholders, are categorically 

prohibited from even knowing that the liquidation process has commenced, until after the 

case leaves the district court. 38 Once the case leaves the district court, the liquidation process 

cannot be stayed; the FDIC can liquidate the company while subsequent appeals are still 

being litigated,39 which may in practice mean that any appeal will be rendered moot before 

the Supreme Court gets to consider the case, as happened in the Chrysler reorganization. 40 

And throughout all of this, judicial review is truncated not merely in time, but also in scope: 

the courts may only consider whether the Treasury Secretary was arbitrary and capricious in 

determining that the liquidated company was "a financial company" and that it was "in 

36 Dodd-Frank Act § 214(b). 

37 Id. § 202(a)(I)(A)(v). 

38 Id. § 202(a)(I)(A)(iii). 

39 Id. § 202(a)(J)(B). 

40 Indiana State Police Pension Trustv. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009). 

12 
40 


82859.013

default or in danger of default."4! The courts are thus denied even their fundamental power 

to decide whether the Treasury Secretary's decision was unlawful or unconstitutional. 

Finally, creditors are deprived even of their ultimate constitutional backstop, 

the Tucker Act, which traditionally protects the right to just compensation for the 

government's taking of private property .42 They must instead plead their cause to the FDIC 

as receiver, which in turn can limit their recovery to the amount that they theoretically 

would have received had the company been liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 

Code, an utterly hypothetical, alternative-universe framework that offers no meaningful 

right to financial compensation:3 Similarly, if the creditor appeals the FDIC's decisions in 

federal court, then the creditor's recovery is limited to the same artificially capped amount. 44 

In addition to this truly unprecedented combination of independence from 

Congress and the courts, the OLA also incorporates an effectively open-ended grant of 

statutory power. The Treasury Secretary administers statutory provisions that are either 

supremely vague (e.g., the determination whether a company is "in default or in danger of 

default") or altogether lacking in an intelligible principle (e.g., the determination whether a 

company's failure would "have serious adverse effects on financial stability"):' Similarly, 

the FDIC enjoys unfettered discretion to discriminate among similarly situated creditors:6 

and to repudiate any contracts that it deems "burdensome."47 

4! Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(I)(A)(iv). 

42 See generally Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 125-36 (1974). 

43 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(d)-(e). 

44 [d. § 210(d)(2), (e). 

45 Id. § 203(b). 

46 Id. § 21O(b)(4). 

47 !d. § 21O(c)(I). 

13 
41 


82859.014

Anyone of these features, taken in isolation, might be held constitutional 

under the Supreme Court's precedents. But taken together they are unprecedented and 

unconstitutional. And, as the constitutional challenge to Title II further argues, the OLA 

process's combination of draconian restrictions on judicial review and its lack of any 

binding uniformity violates both the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the 

Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause. 

B. FSOC 

The FSOC's independence, like the OLA's, is less a matter of presidential 

oversight than of congressional and judicial oversight. Of the FSOC's ten voting members!& 

one expressly cannot be removed by the President at will (i.e., the CFPB Director), others 

certainly can be removed at will (e.g., the SEC Chairman, who can be removed from the 

chairmanship at will), and others fall somewhere in between (e.g., the aforementioned 

Comptroller of the Currency).49 Nevertheless, the FSOC also has five nonvoting members, 

including three selected by state authorities,50 which raises substantial questions under the 

Constitution's Appointments Clause. 

In any event, the FSOC's primary layers of independence pertain to the courts, 

and to the breadth of its statutory mandate. As with the OLA, the FSOC is not subject to 

meaningful judicial review. Companies designated as "systemically important" cannot 

challenge the legality of the FSOC's determination; rather, they may only question whether 

the FSOC's determination is "arbitrary and capricious."sl Even more importantly, third 

48 !d. § 11l(b)(1). 

49 See supra note 35. 

50 Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(1). 

51 [d. § 113(h). 

14 
42 


82859.015

parties-e.g., competitors who want to prevent a company from being deemed "too big to 

fail" -have no right of judicial review under Title L 

And as with the OLA, the FSOC's statutory mandate is effectively unlimited. 

While Title I specifies some vague factors that FSOC may consider in deciding whether a 

particular nonbank financial company is "systemically important,"52 the statutory provision 

concludes by stressing that its list is non-exhaustive: the FSOC may designate a nonbank 

financial company as systemically important based on "any other risk-related factors that 

the Council deems appropriate."" 

As with the OLA, anyone of these features, taken in isolation, might be held 

constitutional under the Supreme Court's precedents. But taken together they are 

unprecedented and unconstitutionaL 

* * * 

We can be thankful that circumstances have not yet given the Treasury 

Secretary and FDIC an opportunity to fully enforce the OLA,54 and the FSOC is only now 

completing its initial round of systemic-importance designations55 Nevertheless, evidence of 

52 Id. § 1 13(a)(2). 

53 fd. § 113(a)(2)(K). 

54 This is not to say that Title II does not already impart injuries. As the States explain in 

their constitutional lawsuit, Title II's express abrogation of their previous rights as creditors 

is an actual injury that gives them standing to challenge Title II in court. 

55 According to news reports, the FSOC has internally designated GE Capital, AIG, and 

Prudential as the first systemically important nonbank financial companies. Although those 

designations have yet to be finalized, GE Capital and AIG announced last week that they 

will not contest their designations; Prudential will request that FSOC internally reconsider 

its designation. See Kate Linebaugh & Erik Holm, AIG, GE Capital Won't Appeal 'Systemically 

Important'Label, WALL ST. J., July 2,2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO20130702-710096.html. 

15 
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82859.016

what problems can arise from their unprecedented independence can be found in the 

conduct of the other independent agency created by Dodd-Frank: the CFPB. 

First, the CFPB, like the OLA, enjoys complete immunity from Congress's 

power of the purse. (It funds itself by taking hundreds of millions of dollars from the Federal 

Reserve Board of Governors; Congress is prohibited by statute from even reviewing its 

budget. 56) And as this subcommittee knows from experience, the CFPB has not hesitated to 

wield its independence, refusing to comply with the previous Chairman's justified and 

reasonable requests for the CFPB's financial statements and forecasts. 57 

Second, without meaningful oversight by either Congress or the courts, the 

CFPB has had much incentive to interpret its own powers expansively. In a January 24, 

2012 hearing before the House Oversight Committee, Director Cordray announced that the 

CFPB will not attempt to define one of its core statutory terms-"abusive" lending 

practices-through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and instead will define the term on a 

case-by-case, ex post facto basis. 58 More recently, it was revealed that the CFPB has 

undertaken a massive "data grab," either spending millions of dollars on consumer financial 

data purchased from third parties, or by simply demanding that banks to tum data over for 

56 Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(2}. 

57 See Rep. Randy Neugebauer, A $447 Million Consumer Alert, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2012, 

http://online.wsj .coml artic1e/SB I 0000872396390444620 I 04578006182400443070.html. 

58 How Will the CFPB Function Under Richard Cordray: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TAR?, 

Financial Services, and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs of the H Comm. on Oversight and 

Government Reform, 1 12th Congo (2012) (statement of Richard Cordray) ("[W]e have 

determined that [the definition of 'abusive'] is going to have to be a fact and circumstances 

issue; it is not something we are likely to be able to define in the abstract. Probably not 

useful to try to define a term like that in the abstract."). 

16 
44 


82859.017

free. 59 The Chamber of Commerce's recent letter to the CFPB describes the substantial legal 

questions raised by the data grab.60 

Finally, the CFPB has taken steps to expand its authority still further beyond 

its statutory limits, attempting to regulate aspects of auto loans that Title X expressly 

excluded from the CFPB's reach. Despite Title X's prohibition against the CFPB 

"exercis[ing] any rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement or any other authority, including 

any authority to order assessments, over a motor vehicle dealer that is predominantly 

engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, the leasing and servicing of motor 

vehicles, or both, ,,61 the CFPB recently issued a "bulletin" detailing how it will regulate 

"indirect auto lenders. ,,62 

The CFPB's attempt to regulate auto dealers engaged in indirect financing is 

troubling for several reasons. First and foremost, this appears to be a plain attempt to nullify 

Congress's express protection for auto dealers, who certainly will be affected by this 

"exercise" of the CFPB's "authority." Second, the CFPB's decision to implement this new 

policy through a "bulletin," rather than through notice-and-comment rulemaking, subverts 

the regulatory process itself, by purporting to make new law without an opportunity for the 

59 See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, U. S. Amasses Data on 10 Million Consumers as Banks Object, 

BLOOMBERG, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-17/u-s-amassesdata-on-l0-million-consumers-as-banks-object.html; Carter Dougherty, Richard Cordray and 

the CFPB Are Monitoring Your Banking Habits, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 25, 2013, 

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-25/richard-cordray-and-the-cfpb-aremonitoring-your-banking-habits. 

60 Letter from David T. Hirschmann, President and CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to 

Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (June 19, 2013), 

available athttp://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files120 131 061 chamber-cfpb-data-Ietter. pdf. 

61 Dodd-Frank Act § 1029(a). 

62 CFPB Bulletin 2013-02 (Mar. 21, 2013), available at 

http:// files.consumerfinance.gov I f120 1303 _cfpb _march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin. pdf. 

17 
45 


82859.018

public to express its views, and by attempting to prevent regulated parties from directly 

appealing the policy in court. Third, by failing to undertake a public notice-and-comment 

rulemaking, the CFPB offers the public no indication of what its own data and models are; 

consumers and auto dealers are left instead to conduct their business under the shadow of 

the CFPB's black box. Finally, the CFPB's unilateral action offers no evidence that the 

agency is coordinating with the Federal Trade Commissioner and the Federal Reserve 

Board of Governors, as required by Section 1029 of Dodd-Frank.63 

I am aware that Members of this Committee recently wrote to Mr. Cordray, 

expressing their concern over the CFPB's actions, and asking Mr. Cordray for answers to 

specific questions regarding the CFPB's data and methodology.64 I am also aware, 

unfortunately, that Mr. Cordray's response to that letter failed to answer their specific 

questions. 65 And I am aware of other Members' June 20, 2013 letter to the CFPB's Assistant 

Director in the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, raising questions regarding 

the CFPB's auto loan guidance, and I look forward to the CFPB's response (if any) with 

great interest. 

But in all of this, I hope that this Subcommittee, and the Committee on 

Financial Services as a whole, will take the CFPB's conduct as an example of what we may 

expect from Dodd-Frank's other creations, the FSOC and the OLA. When agencies are 

63 Dodd-Frank Act § 1029(e) (requiring FTC and the Federal Reserve to coordinate with 

CFPB's Office of Service Member Affairs to educate service members and their family about 

financial products offered by motor vehicle dealers). 

64 Letter from Rep. Terri A. Sewell, et aI., to Director Richard Cordray (May 28,2013), 

available at 

http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/filesI2013/0S/l30530_cfpb_auto_dealecletter.pdf. 

65 See Letter from Director Richard Cordray to Rep. Terri A. Sewell, et aI. (June 20, 2013), 

available at http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/20l3/06/06-2l-13_CFPB-Letter-on-AutoLending 1. pdf. 

18 
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82859.019

freed from the Constitution's system of checks and balances, when they are not directly and 

fully accountable to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches, those agencies will 

almost certainly attempt to expand their powers, evade judicial review, and produce 

regulatory actions that simply lack the quality of regulations promulgated through the rigors 

of notice-and-comment rulemaking under the watchful eye of congressional and judicial 

oversight. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify on these critically important 

issues. I welcome your questions. 

19 
47 


82859.020

Testimony of Timothy R. McTaggart 

Good afternoon. My name is Timothy R. McTaggart. I 

thank you for the invitation to appear before this subcommittee to 

present testimony on this important topic. I am a partner in the 

Washington, D.C. office of the law firm, Pepper Hamilton LLP 

where I head the firm's bank regulatory and consumer finance 

group. I note that my testimony reflects my views alone, and not 

those of Pepper Hamilton LLP or its clients. Of course, any errors 

are to be attributable solely to me. 

By way of background, I served as the Bank Commissioner 

for the state of Delaware from 1994-1999. I served under thenGovemor Tom Carper who became the govemor in Delaware after 

serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, including on the then 

House Banking Committee. Additionally, I served as counsel to 

the U.S. Senate Banking Committee prior to my service in 

Delaware. Earlier in my career, after graduating from Harvard 

1I19Q87Q99 vi 
48 


82859.021

College and Harvard Law School, I joined the legal division at the 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, 

D.C. The balance of my career has been in private practice in D.C. 

based law firm offices. 

I have attached materials that I have prepared with the 

assistance of Matthew Silver on many of the topics at issue today. 

I ask that the summary be included in the record as part of my 

remarks. 

I would offer a few overarching comments pertinent to 

today's topic concerning the constitutionality of Dodd-Frank Act 

provisions related to the Financial Services Oversight Council 

("FSOC") and the Orderly Liquidation Authority ("OLA"). My 

written summary also contains references to similar issues 

regarding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), 

but I will not focus on the CFPB. 

First, the courts have routinely exercised judicial restraint in 

connection with determining whether Congressionally enacted 

legislation is unconstitutional. In the summary provided today, the 

2 
49 


82859.022

most recent statistics that we are aware of show fewer than 170 

actions being held to be unconstitutional from 1789 through 2002. 

It is possible that total undercounts more recent activity from the 

end of the Rehnquist court, and during the Roberts court, but as a 

matter of historical record starting with Marbury v. Madison, it 

shows the relatively rare overturning of Congressional action 

through the nation's history. Moreover, the record shows an 

absence of economic regulation statutory frameworks being 

declared unconstitutional. 

Second, there undoubtedly are major policy choices 

embedded and omitted in the Dodd-Frank Act. Of course, a 

difference in policy choice as reflected in enacted legislation does 

not make the legislation unconstitutional. There may be lingering 

important questions about the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act 

to address major policy challenges such as the "too big to fail" 

issue, but the debate over the effectiveness ofthe Dodd-Frank Act 

does not go to the constitutionality ofthe Act. 

3 
50 


82859.023

Third, the genius in our American system of government is 

the separation of powers among the three branches and the checks 

and balances among the branches. While we often focus on the 

Executive's power to veto Congressional legislation, or the ability 

of Congress to check Executive power through oversight, we less 

frequently focus on the ability of the Congress to check the 

judiciary by enacting legislation which limits the jurisdiction of the 

courts and sets standards of review to be followed by the courts. 

So, Congress has the inherent authority to limit the time period 

available for judicial review and to set other requirements 

concerning the standard of review to be applied by the courts in 

reviewing administrative actions. 

It seems to me that the crux of the question being considered 

by the subcommittee is whether the prior Congress which enacted 

the Dodd-Frank Act overstepped its bounds to do so. With respect 

to the Dodd-Frank Act limits on judicial review related to timing 

and the scope of review in the OLA, I would conclude that 

Congress sought to ensure that "due process" was afforded to the 

4 
51 


82859.024

affected financial institutions. With respect to the structural 

choices made by Congress to create the FSOC, I would conclude 

that Congress did not impermissibly delegate away its authority. 

There are a great many topics, including whether the DoddFrank Act ended too big to fail and whether the OLA will be a 

viable alternative to existing Chapter 11 bankruptcy processes for 

bank holding companies which previously were not included in the 

FDIC's resolution authority, that the bank regulatory agencies 

would be the experts to provide testimony. 

I am prepared to answer questions, and thank you for the 

opportunity to testify at this hearing. 

5 
52 


82859.025

Constitutionality Analysis of Certain of the Dodd-Frank Wall 

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's Most Significant 

Grants of Regulatory Power 

L OVERVIEW 

1. Dodd~ Frank Act Purposes and Declaration 

The Dodd-Frank Act (the Act or Dodd-Frank) is guided by several broad concepts: 

a. Wall Street must be strictly regulated to prevent systemic risk and to promote fin:.mcial stability. 

b. Large interconnected financial companies are inherently risky. 

c. Excessive leverage leads to systemic risk. 

d. A lack of transactional transparency impeded necessary regulatory control. 

e. Investors lacked information to properly understand the nature of complex risky securities. 

f. Regulators are capable of carrying out the intent of the Act. 

2. Constitutional Issues Under Dodd-Frank 

Several constitutional objections concerning the Act made since its passagel include those related to: 

a.1he l-lnancial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and its powers and board composition, as set forth in Title I of the Act. 

-The FSOC's three main stated goals arc to (1) act as a "systemic regulator," (2) prevent "Too Big To Fail," and (3) prevent 

future "bank bailouts." (See Section 112 of the Act). 

b. ~Thc Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP) and its powers, as set forth in Title X of the Act. 

-The BCFP is tasked with regulating the offering and provisions of consumer financial products or services under the Federal 

consumer financial1aws.1he BCFP is considered an Executive agency, as defined in section 105 of tirIe 5, United States Code 

(See Section 1011 of the Act). One of the BCFP's stated objectives is to protect consumers "from unfair, deceptive, or abusive 

acts1 and practices and from discrimination. "The BCFP may halt a company or service provider from "committing or engaging 10 an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice" with respect to offering or transacting in a consumer financial product or 

service. 

c The resolution authority over "covered'" "financial companies." 

-Title II of the Act is entitled "Orderly Liquidation Authority", which empowers the FDIC to unwind, for example, a failing lun":stment bank or insurance company (i,e. a company designated a "covered" financial company) without forcing it into 

bankruptcy and effectively replacing rhe bankruptcy process. I n making use of the resolution authority provided under Title II, 

the FDIC is to de(ermme that such 3etion IS necessary for purposes of the financial stability of the United States, and not for 
53 


82859.026

the purpose of prescrving thc covered tinancial company, ensure that management and the members 

of the board of directors (or body performing similar functions) responsible for the failed condition of 

the covered nnandal company is removed, not take an equity interest in the entlty, not pay $harehold~ 

ers until all other daims are paid and "ensure that unsecured creditors bear losses in accordance with 

priority of claim provisions stated in (the Act]''' 

3.Judicial Restraint 

There has ahvays been a strong legal presumption that the actions of Congress, and in particular those 

reduced to written law, are constitutional on their face, As of 2002 (the last year of statistics formally 

compiled by the Federal Government and made publicaUy available)~ only about 160 federal laws have 

ever been found by the US Supreme Court to be unconstitutional, in whole or in part - the first such bw 

being the Act of Sept. 24,1789 (1 Stat. 81, § 13) in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (1 Cr.) 

137 (1803). A majority of such decisions since then have involved issues of individual rights. civil rights, 

subversion,> state sovereignty, criminal procedure and/or free speech. Some date from the "New Deal" 

era.1> Few laws ever declared unconstitutional have dealt with general business regulatory matters.' 

a. Courts have often dealt with broad and vague statutes by construing them narrowly so as to avoid constitutional difficulties where possible.s 

II. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS' 

1, Vagueness and Non-DelegationlOArguments: 

UnC()1Htitlltirmal arglfnunt.s: 

FSOC: 1he Act assigns the FSOC the duty of regulating companies whose activities threaten 

"financial stability" - a term that is used dozens of times but left undefined in the Ace The Act 

provides that the FSOC will conduct studies present findings and recommendations to the Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve system so that new rules and regulations establishing "pnIdential 

standards" for regulated companies may be promulgated. Other undcfined tcrms and phrascs include 

what might constitute a "grave threat to the financial stability of the United Statcs," what might 

constitute a company "in danger of default" and what might rise to the level of an event that "could 

create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading among bank 

holding companies and nonbank financial companies, financial markets of the United States, or lowincome, minority, or undcrserved communities." Somewhat vague or undefined "catch-all" terms are 

seen as granting relatively unchecked authority to the FSOC. 

BCFP: 1he power and authority of the BeFP similarly revolves around vague terms such as "unfair," 

"det'Cptive,,,n "abusive," and "discrimination."The BeFP may define such terms and decide how they 

arc applied to financial prodUCES and services. 

Non-delegation: The non-delegation doctrine is derived, in part, from Article I of thc OS Constitution, which states that "[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 

the United States". According to various estimates, the Act requires at least 243 new formal rulemakinb'5 by 11 different federal agencies, with at least 95 by the SEC, 24 by the BCFP and 56 by the 

FSOC, rules which will likely total many thousands of pages.-] 

Comtitutionalityarguments: 

On a practical basis, the likelihood of finding significant provisions of the Act unconstitutional 

because of general vagueness considerations is highly unlikely, especially with regard to the actions of 

the FSOC. FSOC takeovers of companies that afe claimed to be "threats to financial stability"would 

likely o('cur and be challenged during a nnallcial crisis. 13 1hc c.xistence of a crisis would likely place 

substantial pressure on judges who, by and large, are not economists and must rely substantially on 

evidence ali presented to them. 14 The FSOC likely has or y,.·ill make contact .. vlth numerous mainstream economists and financiers who believe that the powers of the FSOC are necessary to srabili7.c 

the economy in time of crisis and Jjkely has or will engage o;uch individuals to develop persuasive 

position papers and evidence. 
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Many reguhtory mandates enactcd (such as found in existing securities laws) contain vague or expansive terms that are later 

defined by bodies such as the SEC. Such mandates are rardy found to have cnnstitutionality problems, particularly if the 

interpretations of tbe regulatory body are, on thei( face, reasonable or at least consistent with the enacting !awes). 

Agencies have made thousands of rules and regulations based on underlying Congressional statutes which (Ontain "open ended" terms. The SEC has well over 100 rules promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (as amended) alone.ls 

As noted by Duke Law Professor Kim Krawiec,lf, the political conditions leading to Dodd-Frank were ripe forwbat could 

be termed responsibility-shifting delegation. Effectively, what Congress may have been trying to do is not delegate power so 

much as to try to "harness the expertise of courts and agencies, provide the flexibility to adapt the statute to cbanging circumstances, or reduce the transaction costs associated with lawmaking"while at the same time avoiding blame for unforeseen 

errors. As noted, in the article: 

Statutes, like contracts, can be more or less complete, but will inevitably have some gaps and ambiguities, which couns or 

agencies must flU. A purposely-incomplete statute is not necessarily bad. Statutory incompleteness may allow lawmakers to 

harness the expertise of courts and agencies, provide the flexibility to adapt the statute to changing circumstances, or reduce 

the transaction costs associated with lawmaking. For this reason, one tends to observe relatively more congressional delegations in highly technical areas that require much expertise and information and in which technology may change quickly. 

Hnandal regulation fits this description on many fronts. 

But lawmakers may also leave statutes incomplete for strategic reasons. \Vhen a statute is particularly salient to organized 

interest groups, the voting public, or both, lawmakers may find it politically advantageous to delegate to another branch of 

govcrnmcllt the authority to fill statuto!), gaps and ambiguities in an attempt to shift responsibility for the negative impacts 

oftaw to other governmental branches. For example, empirical study has shown that Congress delegates more frequently in 

issue areas where it may be hard to claim credit for any benefits of rCb'1.lJation (because they are widely dispersed or barely 

noticed), but mistakes can be salient and catastrophic, such as drug and product safety, workplace safety, and nuclear weapons. 

Alternatively, de!cga6on through an incomplete statute may benefit Congress when powerful interest groups are at odds over 

legislative language, or when the general public's preferences diverge from those of powerful interest groups on a matter of 

high public salience. 

2. Arguments Concerning Limited Ability For Court Interpretation And Review I Separation of Powers Arguments: 

Article 1 Section I of the Constitution gives Congress only those "legislative powers herein granted" and lists those permissible actions 

in Article I Section 8.The vesting clause in Article 11 place:'> no limits on the Executive branch, simply stating that, «The Executive 

Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of Amenca."Thc Supreme Court holds the "judicial Power" under Article III 

of the Constitution and has, by tradition and precedent, the ability (often seen as Constitutional) to review the decisions of the other 

branches of government (since Marbury v. MadiJOn).111.Us, the roles and abilities of each branch of government, as set forth by the 

Constitution in broad terms, are separate and distinct. Further, some have argued that by substantially curtailing court review of Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) proceedings under the Act, the judicial branch is being largely eliminated as a constitutional check 

on the orher hranches of government. 

{'nconst1futiol1al argumenlr: 

Under Title II of the Act, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board, upon two-third<; vote of each respective board, "shall 

consider whether to make a written recomme-ndatlon" as to whether the Secretary of the Treasury should appoint the FDIC 

as receiver for a financial company under the OLA authority established by tbe A<.'.t. 'The Act prohibIts ("ourts from taking "any action, including any action pursuant to the Securities 1m'estor Protection Act of 1970 or the Bankruptcy Code, to 

restrain or affect the [receiver's) exercise of powers or functions ... "The Act additionally limits any claim against the FDIC 

as receiver to money damages, and the FDIC has the power to allow, disallow and determine claims. A daimant may sue in 

U.S. District Court within sixty days, but if the claimant misses the deadline, "the claim shall be deemed to be disallowed .. 

such disallowance shall be final, and the claimant shall have no further rights or remedies with respect to such claim."Title 

n of the Act states that "no court shall have jurisdiction over" any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a 

determination of rights with respect to the assets of the seized entity or any claim relating to any act or omission of the seized 

entity or the FDIC. Shareholders and creditors of a seized company may have no expliCit right to contest a proceeding.l7 
55 


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-~---------.-- --~ .. -.-.. --.. -.. _. __ ._--_. __ ... _ .. _ .. _.-•.... _.- -_ .. _-_ ... _---

The FSOC, a body witb an "executive" role but also with a statutory ability to promulgate its own internal rules and regulations and arguably the ability to propose and implement a wide range of rules impacting finandal companies,18 is composed 

of 10 voting and five nonvoting members (the voting members afC the Treasury Secretary. who serves as the FSOC chair, 

and the heads of the Federal Reserve Board, oec, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, SEC, FDIC, CFTC, FHJ..1\, 

NeUA, and an independent member having insurance expertise; the nonvoting members arc the directors of the newly crcated Office of}1.nancial Research and the Federal Insurance Office along with a state insurance commissioner, a state banking 

supervisor and a state securities commissioner) has the authority to (1) determine which non-bank financial institutions are 

subject to Title II selwre and (2) (ontrol the activities of any financial institution on a two-thirds vote of its members. The 

courts are not authorized ro review whether the FSOC, in making its determinations and conducting its activities. has correctly interpreted the Act. 

The Treasury is authorized to petition the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to seize banks and any 

non-bank financial institution that the government thinks is in danger of default and could, in turn, pose a risk to U.S. financial stability.19 If the entity does not a<::quiesce or consent to the seizure,lfJ the petition proceedings are secret, with a federal 

district judge given 24 hoursl1 to decide "on a strictly confidential basis"22 whether to allow receivership. 

~Ihere is no stay pending judicial review built into the Act. Review of a seizure occurs only if the "board of directors (or body 

performing similar functions) of the covered financial company does not acquiesce or consent to the appointment of the 

(FDIC] as receiver, is limited to the question of an entity's soundness. As stated in Section 202 of the Act, "[o]n a strictly 

confidential basis, and without any prior public disclosure, the [United States District Court for the District ofColumbial, 

after notice to the covered financial company and a hearing in which the covered financial wmpany may oppose the petition, 

shaH determine whether the determination of the Secretary that the covered financial company is in default or in danger of 

default and satisfies the definition of a financial company under section 201(a)(11) is arbitrary and capricious."2J 

Consti tutiollality arguments: 

The Orderly Liquidation Authority for systemically important financial institutions like the FDIC resolution authority, gives 

the FDIC a range of tools to liquidate a large nonbank financial institution, induding bank holding comp-anies14 while also 

mitigating systemic risk. The resolution authority is simply an alternative insolvency regime. 

AJthough in cases of an expedited 24 hour District Court processes, the Act attempts to eliminate stays or injunctions, a party 

can still appeal to a circuit court and ask it to make a determination that the a('tions of the Treasury were arbitrary and capricious. A successful appeal, if given prompt court attention, would serve as a powerful check on the resolution authority of the 

Treasury in case it overreaches. The existence of exigent circumstances coupled with the ability to appeal justifies the abbreviated 24 hour "due process" limitation. 

Faced with a 24 hour dearlline, a court could make default rulings against the Treasury unless the Treasury agrees to waive 

any deadline imposed by the Act and/or agrees to implement a plan that would alJow a financial insritotio!1 to break free 

from government control at a later date without undue difficulty.]n effect. should a court find that the 24 hour limitation in a 

particular instance to be unfair, a court could provide what would amount to a partial injunction in aU but name. 

Faced "\-vith a 24 hour deadline, a court could simply ask the Treasury for a waiver of the deadJine.1his is not dissimilar to 

what is commonly done by Agency staff members when an examiner reviewing an application is faced \v1th h~\ving to make 

a determination within a time frame imposed by statute or regulation and the examiner believes that, given underlying facts, 

additional review is prudent- It is rare that a party will turn down a reviewer's request for a time extension. in part due to risk 

that playing "hardball" could result in an unfavorable outcome. 

Contemplating how best to deal with matters brought before the court under the Act, the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia has adopted Local Civil Rule 85.25 Requirements include: 

(1) At least 48 hours prior to filing of a petition under the Act. the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide written notice 

under scal to the Clerk of the COUrt that a petition will likely he filed with the Court (thus allowmg the court to gear up for 

appropriate action). 
56 


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(2) A petition \lnder Act by the Secretary of the Treasury must contain all relevant findings and recommendations under the 

Act and material must be provided in PDF form on a CD-Rom (thus making review a bit easier than it would be otherwise). 

(3) The petition shall be assigned to the Chief Judge or Acting Chief Judge (thus petitions will be directed to someone who 

has presumably fully reviewed the Act, related precedent and will have experience with matters under the Act). 

(4) The financial company named in the petition may file an opposition to the petition under seal and may arpear at a hearing 

to oppose the pet.ition, The opposition shall be served on the Secretary of the Treasury by the most expeditious means available (thus procedures are in place to allow opposition to petition under the OLA authority to be somewhat rda.xed). 

(5) Each petition and opposition shall be accompanied by a proposed order (thus making a response by a judge in the 24 hour 

period somewhat easier). 

(6) Upon the granting of a petition, the Secretary of the Treasury shall promptly notifY the court of the appointment of the 

receiver. The court shaD then issue an Order to Show Cause to the Secretary of the Treasury as to why the proceedings, or 

any part thereof, shall not be unsealed. 'Ihus, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has good reason why its case should remain 

secret, the United States District Coun for the District of Columbia intends to make all material available to the public. 

The above procedures in Local Civil Rule 8S, in particular item 1 and 6 provide important safeguards to companies and provide for procedural and substantive due process. 

In recent history, a number of federal courts have accepted, without significant constitutional challenge, a stated lack of authority to review matters, in particular with regard to Guantanamo Bay detainees,lo for example by reasoning that the power 

to grant a petition for release of Guantanamo Bay detainees is beyond the Judicial Branch's power as courts do not have the 

power to override immigration laws and force the executive branch to release non-U.S. legal residents held as prisoners into 

the United States. 

In Kucona 'V. Ho/der,130 S.Ct. 827 (2010),27 the US Supreme Court recently noted, in a 9-0 decision, that Congress can, 

via a properly written statute, limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In Kucana. although rh{! Court did not find for the 

government, it did note, "If Congress wanted the jurisdictional bar to encompass decisions specified as discretionary by regulation along with those made discretionary by statute, moreover, Congress could easily have said so."It noted that "[W Jhere 

Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generalJy 

presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exdusion.'" Nken v. Holder 129 S.Ct. 

1749 (2009). Thus the current Supreme Court understands that Congress can dearly limit the right of any court to review actions of an administrative body (the case in question revolved around the reviewability of a decision of the Board ofImmigra~ 

tio]) Appeals of the U.S. Department of Justice} without a violation of any separation of powers doctrine. 

\Vhile the Act provides that the courts are not authorized to review whether the FSOC has correctly interpreted the Act, 

any court would find little in the way of statutory direction against any reasonable interpretation of the terms interpreted by 

the FSOC or the BCFP, especially as the Act specifically provides that courts must apply interpretations of provisions (to the 

extent that an interpretation of the BeFP exists) as if the BeFP "was the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret, 

or administer the provisions of such Federal consumer financial1aw." As per dicta in Kucana, Congress has wide discretion in 

limiting the authority of the courts as long as it does so clearly and unambiguously - and thus a court should respect agency 

interpretations as provided for in the A('t, 

1. Secrecy Argument~: 

The right of due process and judicial review is of modest value unless information and time is available to actually conduct an appropriate process before a decision is reached or at least the parties involved are provided with the ability to contest the actions of the government after the fact. Some have said that the Act permits the Treasury and the FD1C to pO£entially act as a secret legislative appropriator, executive and judiciary aU in one. 

UllcoftStitltfianal arguments: 

A court can extinguish the opportunity for judicial review of resolution authority exercised by the FDIC2~ by not taking action for 24 hours, after which the petition is granted automatically and liquidation may commence. Any party who "reckJes:>ly 
57 


82859.030

discloses" informarion concerning the government's seizure or the pending court proceedings faces criminal fines and five 

years' imprisonment. Certain parties analogi7;c the limited time permitted to decide c-ases under the financial stability provisiom of the An, combined with the SC('fet nature of certain proceedings, to a "star chamber" arrangement. 

Some have suggested that the process required by the Act that involves levels of secrecy and significant amounts of administrative discretion was designed to permit the kind of favoritism seen in the rescue of bankrupt automakers and the AlG 

bailout, with an indirect taxpayer subsidy available as the government loans to favored creditors to be repaid by "assessments" 

on large banks and non-bank financial firms. 

Constitutionality arguments: 

To find someone in violation of a provision of the Act within the power of the FSOC or the BeFP, a court would have to 

make an appropriate finding, such as what might conslitute the "reckless disclosure" of information and what disclosures 

might be protected by existing constitutional rights separate and apart from those legislated by Congress in the t\C(. As many 

of the secrecy related provisions are vague, a court could choose to err on the side of the party disclosing "secret" information. See, i.e., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994)19 (concerning sentencing) that in "'circumstances, where the text, 

structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity ... 

resolve[s] the statutory ambiguity in [the impacted party's1 favor." 

While some have argued that the secrecy and administrative discretion found in the Act would aid in an AJG type "bailout," 

others see that that, at a. minimum, the Act provides a statutory process and framework to consider the future of possible 

AJG-lih issues before a subject company starts to disintegrate. Actions concerning an AlG -like company taken under the 

Act might be seen to have greater legal support than those taken in 2008. 

Existing law and court interpretations allows for secrecy in speciallexigent circumstances (and even "secret laws"), when 

arguably such laws andlor procedures are in the interest of the nation in times of danger, nnancialJO or otherwise.31 Rules and 

regulations under the Act would be, at a mi.nimum published. A'i> noted above) the Act requires at least 243 new formal rulemakings by 11 different federal agencies, with at least 95 by the SEC, 24 by the BCFP and 56 by the FSOC. 

Actions under the OLA authority under the Act afC filed under seal. To make use of the OLA authority provided by the Act, 

a petition would have to be brought to the United States District Court for the District ofCo!umbia. In January, 2011, the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia enacted Rule 85, specific procedures for Dodd-Frank matters before the court. On the government's appointment of a receiver for a company under the OLA authority, the Secretary of the 

Treasury will have to respond to an automatically-generated Order to Show Cause to the Secretary of the Treasury as to why 

the proceedings in the matter, or any part thereof, shall not be made pUblic .l2 Thus, OLA prot:ccdings, absent good reason, 

would likely only be "secret" for a short period of time. 

4. Composition of Board Separation of Power Arguments; Appointments Clause: 

Unmnstitutirmal arguments; 

Various Agencies and boards under the Act are given considerable power - power which under the Constitution should generally reside with the President or by individuals chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 

The Act delegates power to ofUciaJs not selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The FSOC, which makes 

determinations about which financial companies are subject to seizure by the government, includes f,:mr members who are not 

appointed by the President, but rather by groups of state officials, As such, depending on interpretational issues, the composition of the FSOC board may be a violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which states that: 

[the President] shafl nominate, and, by and with fhe Advice and Consent c:.f the Senate, shall appoint Amb055i1dors, otbe! publit Alinis· 

ten and Consuls, judges of tbe ntpTOne Court, and all other Ojficcrs 0/ the United States, "whose Appointmell/J are not herein otber'l1ftse 

provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law 'vest the Appointment oj.wch inferior Officers, as 

they thin} proper, in the President a/one, in the Courts if Law, or in the Hfotil ifDepartments.33 

From 1999 to 2008, a change in the statute governing the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) permitted a 

number ofjudges of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and the Trademark Tria! and Appeal Board to be appOint 
58 


82859.031

ed by the USPTO Director. This arrangement was chaUenged as unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause because the 

appointing party was not the Head of the Department. ] n order to avoid the nisi:; that would result from new challenges to 

many decisions made in that period, Congress passed a 2008 amendment to the statute which specifies that the Secretary of 

Commerce is responsible for such appointments, and permitting the Secretary to retroactively appoint those persons named 

by the USPTO Director. 

In Buckley v. Vafea, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),34 the Supreme Court struck down a provision allowing Congress to name four members 

of the Federal Election Commission on the grounds that it violated the president's appointments power. In Bov.'sher v. Synar, 

478lLS. 714 (1986)]5 the Supreme Court struck down one provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget act 

giving the comptroller general, a congressional official, a role in enforcing the act's spending reduction requirements, 

The director of the BCFP (who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate) is independent of both the Federal Reserve, which houses and provides most of its funding, and the \Vhitc House. The Act precludes the House and Senate 

Appropriations Committees from reviewing the bureau's budget.J~ 

lhere is an open question as to how much legisbti\'c power (re: the various reb'11lations that must be created by executive 

agencies under the Act) Congress may permissibly delegate to the Executive Branch, while not violating separation of powers 

principles, 

Constitutionalityargll11U'1tts; 

It is open to interpretation as to whether the members of the FSOC Board or the BCFP are "inferior Officers" as the Constitution only specifically notes that "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,Judges of the Supreme Court. and aU 

such Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established 

by Law" are not "inferior" OfficersY In the Act, Congress did not see fit to require, "by Law" that members of the FSOC 

Board or the BCFP be appointed with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate" as required for non-inferior Officers and the 

conclusion may be reached that the duties and powers of the members of the FSOC Board and the HeFP were deemed by 

Congress to be that of"infcrior Office:rs."'The voting members of the FSOC Board (the 10 of the 15 members who hold 

voting power) are the Treasury Secretary, who serves as the FSOC chair, and the heads of the I-"'ederal Reserve Board, ace, 

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, SEC, FDIC, CFTC, FHFA, NCUA, and an independent member having insurance expertise and who is appointed by the President18 with Senate confirmation and meets the criteria of the AppOintments 

Clause. 

The BCFP is headed by a Director appointed. by the President with Senate confirmation and is formally an entity within the 

Federal Reselvc.lhe Director of the BeFP appoints the members of the Consumer AdviSOry Board.:;9 

In the 2010 case Free Enterprise Fund't,. Public CompanyA(counting Oversight Board,Of) the United States Supreme Court 

heard a challenge to the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB was 

created as part of a series of accounting reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and exists to register public accounting 

firm<;, establish auditing and ethical standards, conduct inspections of firms, and issue citations when appropriate or deemed 

necessary. An public accounting firms are required to register and maintain a certain standard as required by the PCAOB and 

the PCAOB has expansive powers to govern an entire industry. The PCAOB is composed of five members appointed by the 

Securities and Exchange Commission. In a 5·4 decision, the Supreme Court refused to invalidate the existence or method 

ofappointmenr of the PCAOR. saying the board's mere existence did not violate the Constitution (and in particular the 

Appointments Clause). With some minor modifications pertaining to the possible removal of members of the PCAOB, the 

court permitted the PCAOB to resume business as usual. 

In the context of ~eparatjon of powers questions, there is a significant difference between one branch unilaterally grabbing 

power from another branch and one branch willingly ceding power to another branch to deal with exigent or potentially 

exigent circumstances. The second case (willingly and seamlessly ceding some degree of power) can be seen as not invoking 

separation of powers concerns that are significant or material, due to the fact that the "giving branrh" is losing power voluntarily, can oversee and manage the power to a degree, and can ultimately take back the power if it should desire to do so (for 

example, though a modification or a partial repeal of the Act). 
59 


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5. What if a Portion of the Act Is Found to Be Unconstitutional? 

On January 31, 2011, a portion of The Patient Protection andAJfordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)) as 

amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (PPACA or 

Obanlllcare) was declared unconstitutional in Attorney Get/eral Pam Bondi, ct af v. United Slates Department of Health And Human 

Servias, et al. In a finding by senior federal judge Roga Vinson of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida, it was found that (emphasis added): 

For the reasons stated, I must reluctantly conclude that Congress c.xceeded the bounds of its authority in passing the Act with 

the individual mandate. That is not to say, of course, that Congress is without power to address the problems and inequities in 

our health care system. 'The healrh carc market is more than one sixth of the national economy, and without doubt Congress has 

the power to reform and regulate this market. That has not been disputed in this case.lhc principal dispute has been about how 

Congress chose to exercise that power here. 

Because the individual mandate is unconstitutional-and not severable. the entire Act must be declared void. 

lh~: court found that no injunctive relief was needed, as; 

there is a long-standing presumption 'that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as declared by the court. As a result, the declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of an injunction.' Sa Comm. onjudiciaty ifU.S. House of Representatives 

v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008); accord Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F2d 202, 208 n,8 (D,C. Cir. 1985) ('declaratory judgment is, in a context such as this where federal officers are defendants, the practical equivalent of specific relief such 3.S an 

injunction .. since it must be presumed that federAl officers will adhere to the law as declared by the court") (Scalia,].) 

111C Dodd~ Frank Act was part of a much longer and more collaborative legislative process, where many provisions were either known 

or gradually evolved over several months 41 The Act contains both Section 3; "SEC. 3. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Act, 

an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be 

unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any 

person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby" and Section 542 of Title 3 "Title 3 SEC. 542. SEVERABILITY. If any section 

or suhsection of this subtitle, or any apphcation of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 

remainder of this subtitle, and the application of the provision to any other person or circumstance, shall not be affected. 

In the PPACA ruling,]udge Vinson based the nonseverabiuty decision in part on what he believed to be Congressional intent, as the 

core purpose of the PPACA was to cover more people at lower cost, and given that the invalidation of the mandate that individuals obtain insurance would undermine that core purpose, that Congress would not have passed the rest of the PPACA without the 

mandate. H In the Ruling it is noted that "the severability analysis is 'eased' when there is a severability clause in the statute, such that 

only 'strong evidence' can overcome it. By necessary implication, the evidence against severability need not be as strong to overcome the 

general presumption when there is no such clause." 

As set forth in detail in the PPACA decision: 

Severability is a doctrine of judicial restraint, and the Supreme Court bas applied and reaffirmed that doctrine just this past 

year; "'Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, [courts] try to limit the solutton to the problem: 

severing any 'problematic portions while leaVing the remainder intact. '" Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting OverSight 

Board, - U.S.-,130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161, 177 LEd. 2d 706 (2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Because the unconstitutionality of one provision of a legislative scheme "does not necessarily defeat or -affect the validity of its remaining provisions;' the 

"normal rule" is that partial invalidation is propef.ld. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Where Congress has "enacted a statutory scheme for an obvious purpose, and where Congress has included a series of provisions operating as incentives to achieve that 

purpose, the invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress' overall intent to be frustrated." New York, 

supra, 505 US. at 186 (emphasis added). As the emphasized text sho\\-'$, the foregoing is not a rigid and inflexible rule, but rather 

it is the general standard that applies in the typical case. However, this is anything but the typical case. 

The question of severability ultimately turns on the nature of the stature at issue. For example, if Congress intended a given statute 

to be viewed as a bundle of separate legislative enactment or a series of short laws, which for purposes of convenience and efficiency were arranged together in a single legislative scheme, it is presumed that any provision declared unconstitutional can be 
60 


82859.033

struck and severed without affecting the remainder of the statute. If, however, the statute is viewed as a carefully-balanced and 

dockwork·like statutory arrangement comprised of pieces that all work toward one primary legislative goal, and jf that goal would 

be undennincd if a central part of the legislation is found to be unconstitutional, then severability is not appropriate. As will be 

seen, the £,ets of this case le.:lo heavily toward a finding that the Act is properly viewed as the latter, and not the former. 

1he standard for determining whether an unconstitutional sutumry provision can be severed from the remainder of the statute 

is weD-established, and it consists of a two-part test. First, after finding the challenged provision unconstitutional, the court must 

determine if the other provisions can functiDn independently and remain "fully operative as a law." See rree Enterprise Fund, supra, 

130 S. Ct. at 3161.1n a statute that is approximately 2,700 pages long and has several hundred sections ~~- certain of which hav(' 

only a remote and tangential connection to health care --- it stands to reason that some (perhaps even most) of the remaining 

provisions can stand alone and function independently of the individual mandate. The defendants have identified several proviSJons that they believe can function independently: the prohibition on discrimination against providers who will not furnish 

assisted suicide services~ an "Independence at Home" project for chronically iU seniors; a special Medicare enrollment period for 

disabled veterans; Medicare reimbursement for bOlle-marrow density tests; and provisions devised to improve women's heaJth, 

prevwt aouse, and ameliorate dementia [DeE. Opp. at 401. as well as abstinence education and disease prevention [doc. 74 at 14J. 

And as was mentioned during oral argument, there is little doubt that the provision in the Act requiring employers to provide a 

"reasonable break time~ and separate room for nursing mothers to go and express breast milk (Act § 4207} can function without 

the individual mandate. 

Importantly, this provision and many others are already in effect and functioning. However, the question is not whether these and 

the myriad other provisions can function as a technical or practical matter; instead. the "more relevant inquiry" is whether these 

provisions will comprise a statute that win function "in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress." See Almka Airlines, Inc. 

"U. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685,107 S. Ct. 1476, 94 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1987) (emphasi,> in original).1bus, the first step in the severability 

analysis requires (at least to some extent) that 1 try to infer Congress' intent. Although many of the remaining provisions, as just 

noted, can most likely function independently of the individual mandate, there is nothing to indicate that they can do so in the 

manner intended by Congress.1he analysis at the second step of the severability test makes that conclusion pretty clear. 

At this second step, reviewing courts may look to "the statute's text or historical context" to determine. if Congress, had it been 

presented with a statute that did not contain the struck part, would have preferred to have no statute at alL Sa Free Enterprise 

Fund, supra, 130 S. Ct. at 3161-62. "Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are 

within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." See 

AJaskaAirlineJ, Inc., supra, 480 U.S. at 684. But once again, that presupposes that the provisions left over function in a manner consistent with the main objective and purpose of the statute in the first place. Cf. New York, supra, 505 US. at 187 (unconstitutional 

provision held to be severable where the remaining statute "still serves Congress' objective" and the "purpose of the Act is not 

defeated by the invalidation" of the unconstitutional provision) (emphasis added). \Vhile this inquiry "c-an sometImes be 'elusive'"" 

lFree Enterprise Fund, supra, 130 S. CL at 3161J, on the unique facts of this particular case, the recotd seems to strongly indicate 

that Congress would not have passed the Act in its present fonn ifit had not included the individual mandate. This is btCallse the 

individual mandate was indisputably essential to what Congress was ultimately sedting to accomplish. It was, in fact, the keystone 

or lynchpin of the cnnre health reform effort. 

In response to a later motion to "clarify" filed by the Government,Judge Vinson did not revise any of his conclusions, and restated that 

"[ t]he individual mandate was declared unconstitutionaL Because that "essential" provision was unseverable from the rest of the 

Act, the entire legislation was void. This declaratory judgment was expected to be treated as the 'practical' and 'functional equivalent of an injunction' with respect to the parties to the litigation. This expectation was based on the 'longstanding presumption' 

that the defendants themselves identified and agreed to be bound by, which provides that a declaratory judgment against federal 

officials is a de facto injunction. To the extent that the defendants were unable (or believed that they were unable) to comply, it 

was expected that they would immediately seek a stay of the ruling, and at that point in time present their arguments for why such 

a stay is necessary, which is the usual and standard pfl)cedure. It was not expected that they would effectively ignore the order and 

declaratory iudgment for hvo and one-half weeks, continue to implement the Act, and only then file a belated motino to 'clarify." 
61 


82859.034

---_._--_._-------_._--... 

However, in his March 3,2011 clarifying order,« Judge Vincent did ultimately decide to grant a stay, "conditioned upon the defendants filing their anticipated appeal \vithin seven (7) calendar days of this order and seeking an expedited appellate review. either in the 

Court of Appeals or with the Supreme Court under Rule 11 of that Court."The appeal was subsequently filed.~5 

Using the framework of the PPACA decision and applying it to the Act, a court would likely find tne vast majority of the Act to be 

severable, as (a) most provisions can stand atone (in fact, a number of provisions were derived from separate bills that were later incorporated into the text of the Act), and (b) Congress specifically intended provisions of the Act to be severable. From a Constitutional 

perspective, perhaps the weakest portion of the Act detailed above may be the resolution authority procedures involving an dement 

of secrecy and tight timelines, However, with the "'secrecy" elements removed and the 24 hour court determination deadline stntck 

(or even with a few points ofUntted States District Court for the District of Columbia Local Civil Rule 85 expanded), the Orderly 

Liquidation Authority of the Act would fall significantly closer to level of abilities held by the FDIC prior to the Act (but with a larger 

group of companies being subject to FDIC power), 

ENDNOTES 

Many of such arguments have been made in the article the Dodd-Frani:. Wall Street Reform & Consumer Prot('tlion Act 0[2010: Is It 

Constitutional? by C. Boyden Gray and John Shu and are repeated, noted and/or summari?ed below. The article and other resourc~ 

es are available at httpHwwwJed-soc,org/publications/pubid,2012/pub_detaiLasp. 

2 Sef' Section 1031 of the Act The BeFP does not have the power to dedare an act or practice abusive unless it finds that the act or 

practice (1) materjally interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product 

or service; or (2) takes unreasonable advantage of a consumer lack of understanding of material risks, costs, or conditions of the 

product or service; inability of the consumer to protect its Interests in selecting or using a consumer financial product or servicc; 

and/or the reasonable reliance by the consumer of a party covered by the Act to protect its interests. 

A "'covered financial company" is a company other than an insured depository institution, for which the Secretary of the Treasury 

has determined: 

"(1) the financial company is in default or in danger of default; 

(2) the failure of the financial company and its resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or State law would have seriolls 

adverse effects on financial stability in the United States; 

(3) no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the default of the financial company; 

(4) any effect on the claims or interests of creditors, countcrparties, and shareholders of the financial company and other market 

participants as a result of actions to be taken under this title is appropriate, given the impact that any action taken under this title 

would have on financial stability in the United States; 

(5) any action [taken] would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects, taking into consideration the effectiveness of the action in 

mitigating potential adverse effects on the financial system, the cost to the general fimd of the Treasury, and the potential to in-

-crease excessive risk taking on the part of creditors, counterparties, and shareholders in the financial company; 

(6) a Federal regul:ltory agency has ordered the financial company to convert all of its convertible debt instruments th3t are subject 

to the regulatory order; and 

(7) the company satisfies the ddinition of a "financial company" 

http://\'.'WW.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/046.pdf 

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court decided over 50 cases involving communism and subversion in govemmeneA 

number pertained to specific federal iaws, such as the case of United States v. Robel, 389 US. 258 (1967) where a provision of the 

subversive activities control Act making it unlawful for member of a Communist front organization to work in a defense plant was 

held to be an overbroad infringement of the right of association protected by the First Amendment. 

Such.as the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933 (48 Stat. 113, § 1) concenung the abrogation of gold [the metal] clauses in Government obligatiOns that was struck by Perry 'U, United States, 294 US. 330 (1935), available at http://supreme.justia.coml 
62 


82859.035

us1294/330/. Tn Perry, the plaintiff held government bonds for the payment of principal and interest "in United States gold coin of 

the present standard of value", but 48 Stat. 113, § 1 undertook to nullify such gold clauses in obligations of the United States and 

pay cash only (after the then-current administration had withdrawn gold coins from general circulation). Notably, while the. court 

found the statute unconstitutiona.l, it did not grant the plaintiff the gold he was owed under his bonds or its market value, but only 

the value in ("ash declared by the r"'e-cieral Government (Le. based on the 120 face value of gold coins of the era rather than the $35 

such coins would have on foreign markets or toward the settlement of Government debts abroad), 

7 However, the Supreme Court has weighed in as to the limited level of effective judicial authority that may be granted to parties who are not "Article III" judges. In Northern Pipeline Co. v. Maratbon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the court opined on 

the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which had granted the bankruptcy courts independent jurisdiction over all civil proceedillg-s arising 

under Title 11 or arising in or rdated to cases under Title 11 and all "powers of a court onaw or equity", except for issuing injun{> 

tions against other courts and punishing criminal contempt outside of court (or otherwise punishable by imprisonment). Marathon argued that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power upon judges who lacked life 

tenure and protection against salary diminution (Le. non-Article III judges). 

As a result of the coun's finding that the power granted by the Banknlptcy Act of 1978 to non-Article III judges was unconstitutional, Congress passed a new statute authori·ling federal district courts to effectively "refer" bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy 

courts, and in so called "non-core" proceedings, required bankruptcy courts to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 

law to an applicable district court for de novo review. 

See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v, America.n Petroleum Ins!., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980) (plurality opinion) {invalidating an 

occupational safety and health regulation, and observing that the statute sbould not be interpreted to authorize enforcement of 

a standard that is not based on an '(understandable" quantification of risk); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 

U.S. 336, 342 (1974) ("hurdles revealed in [Schechter and]. W. Hampton,Jr. &Co. v. United States] lead us to read the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional problems"), as cited in the article entitled" Delegation o/Legis/ative Powcr. The History of the Doctrine 

ofNondelegahility" available at http://supreme.justia.com!constitution/article-l!03-delegation-of-Jegislative~power.html. 

The nondelegation doctrine is derived. in part. from Article I of the US Constitution, which states that "[aJlllegislative Powers 

herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of tbe United States". According to various estimates, the Act requires at least 243 

new formal rule-makings by 11 different federal agencies, with at least 95 by the SEC, 24 hy the BCFP and 56 by the FSOC, 

rules which will likely total many thousands of pages. Due to the vagueness and undefined nature of many of the key terms in the 

Act, various agencies, the members of which arc not appointed hy Congress) will have a significant ability to determine a substantial number of final rules. 

10 See posting Dodd-}rank and the Non-Delegation Doctrine, available at http://www.professorbainbridge.comiprofessorbainbridgecom12010/071 doddfrank-and- rhe-nonde1egarion-doctrine. html. 

11 There is a great deal of precedent for the use of "unfair" and "deceptive" standards under Title 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (IS USc. § 45), which declares that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful" and is no more descriptive than the Act, in that it states 

that "the term "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" includes "acts or pr-actices involving foreign commerce that- (1) cause or are 

likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States; or (ii) involve material condut::t occurring within the United 

States." See also bttp:llwww.ftc.gov/privacylprivac:yinitiativeslpromises.htm1. 

12 Sec footnote 11. 

13 See report of January 13, 2011 of the Special Investor General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), available at 

http://wwwsigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2011!ExtraordinaryOAl20Financial%20Assistance%20Provided%20to%20Cirigroup,%201 nco 

pdf, which notes "Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner told SIGTARP that he believed creating effective, purdy objective 

criteria for evaluating systemic risk is not possible, saying "it depends too much on the state of the world at the time. You won't be 

able to make a judgment about what's systemic and what's not until you know the nature of the shock" the economy is. undergoing. He also said that whatever objective criteria were developed in advance, markets and institutions would adjust and "migrate 

around them." And "{t]he Dodd-Frank Act was intended in part to address the problem of institutions that are 'too big to fail.' 
63 


82859.036

Whether it will successfully address the moral ha'l,ard effects ofTARP remains to hI? seen, and there is much imporrant work left 

to be done. As SeuetaryGeithner told SIGTARP, while the Dodd-Frank Act gives the Government 'better tools,' and reduced 

the risk of failures, '[i)n the future we may have to do exceptional things again' if the shock to the financial system is sufficiently 

large. Secretary Geithflcr's candor about the prospect of having to 'do exceptional things again'in such an unknowable future crisis 

is commendable. At the same time, It underscores a TARP legacy, the moral hazard associated with the continued existence of 

institutions that remain 'too big to fail." 

14 Chevron USA" Int. v. Natural Res. De[ Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).]f a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 

specific question, the court must review whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 

15 Current rules promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 are available at http://taft.law.uc.edulCCL/lnvCoRls/ 

index.html 

16 See posting ofJ\Jly 20, 2010 entitled Dodd-Frank Hnaneta! Reform: "1'1! H:lve the !l.1eatless Entrie, Please~ and available at http:// 

www. thefacu!tylounge.org/201 O/07/dodd-frank-forum-iIl-have-the-mea{less-entrA©e~please.html. 

17 It should be noted that the above limitations placed on courts under the Act are not dissimilar to those provided to the FDIC 

under its pre·· Dodd- Frank authority granted under Title 12 of the United States Code and continue to be operative law. The 

resolution authority under the Act for a non-depository systemically important financial institution simply provides alternative: 

mechanisms to reach the same end. The "Orderly Liquidation Authority" which empowers the FDIC to unwind, for example, a 

failing investment bank or insurance company without forcing it into bankruptcy requires the FDIC to determine that such action 

is necessary for purposes of the financial stability of the United States (and not for the purpose of preser\ring the covered financial 

company), not take an equity interest in the entity being liquidated, not pay shareholders until all other claims are paid and "ensure 

that unsecured creditors bear losses in accordance with priority of claim provisions stated in f the Act]''' 

18 The FSOC has made public a proposed rulemaklng whereby an analytical framework would be c"rablished for the designating 

of nonbank financial companies for superviSion by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. See http://W"WW.treasury.gov/ 

initiativesIDocumentsINonbank%20NPR%20final%2001%2013%2011%20formatted%20for%20FR.pdf Under the Act, the 3.11-

thority for the FSOC to promulgate rules may be more limited, perhaps largely to rules of the nature set forth in Section 11(e) of 

the Act "[t]he Council shall adopt such rules as may be necessary for the conduct of the business of the Council. Such rules shall 

be rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice for purposes of section 553 of title 5, United States Code" with the Federal 

Reserve Board being provided with the power to implement rules concerning the substantive criteria to be used by the FSOC. 

19 See definition of"financial company" in Section 201 of the Act. As noted in Section 202(a)(1 )(A)(i) of the Act, "[sJubsequent to 

a determination by the Secretary under section 203 that a financial company satisfies the criteria in section 203(b), the Secretary 

shall notifY the Corporation and the covered financial company. If the board of directors (or body performing similar functions) 

of the covered financial company acquiesces or consents to the app0inrment of the Corporation as receiver, the Secretary shall appoint the Corporation as receiver. If the board of directors (or body performing similar functions) of the covered financial company does not acquiesce or consent to the appOintment of the Corporation as receiver, the Secretary shall petition the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia for an order authorizing the Secretary to appOint the Corporation as receiver." 

20 The Act provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall notifY the FDIC in the case a determination is made to use the resolu~ 

tion authority provided under the Act on a "covered" financi.al company. "If the board of directors (Of body performing similar 

functions) (If the covered financial company acquiesces or consents to the appointment of the [FDIC1 as receiver, the Secretary (of 

the Treasuryl shall appoint the (FDIC1 as receiver. If the hoard of directors (or body performing similar functions) of the covered 

financial company does not acquiesce or consent to the appointment of the [FDIC] Corporation as receiver, the Secretary [of the 

Treasury) shall petition the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for an order authorizing the Secretary to 

appoint the Corporation as receiver. [ ... 111e Secn:tary [of the Treasury] shall present all relevant findings and the recommendation made pursuant to section 203(a) to the Court.lbe petition shaD be filed under seal." 

21 Section 202(a)(1)(A)(v) of the Act states; "PETITION GRANTED BY OPERATION OF LAW- If the Court does not 

make a determination within 24 hours of receipt of the pttition-- (1) the petition shall be granted by operation of law; (II) the 

Secretary shall appoint the Corporation as receiver; and (In) liquidation under this title shall automatically and withom further 

notke or action be (ommenced and the Corporation may immediately take all actions authorized under this title. 
64 


82859.037

22 Section 202(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act states:" DETER.t\1INATION.-{)n a strictly confidential basis, and without any prior public 

disclosure, the Court, after notice [0 the covered financial ('ompany and a hearing in which the covered financial company may 

oppose the petition, shall determine whether the determination of the Secretary that the covered financial company is in default or 

in danger of default and satisfies the definition of a financial company under section 201 (a)(11) is arbitrary and capricious." 

23 Sec footnote 21. 

24 The new OLA resolution authority does not appJy to depository institutions but could be used on the holding company of a depository institution. Othel parts of the Act were designed "to streamline and rationalize the supervision of depository institutions 

and the holding companies of depository institutions". 

25 Available at http://wwv,r.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcdlsites/dcdffiles/DFWSR.pdf. 

26 See http://v..ww.immigrationforum.org/policy/ courts-display/immigration~re1ated··cases -march -201 O-updateiindex.htmL 

27 Available at http://www.supremecourt.gov!opinions/09pdfl08-911.pdf, noting in part that "If Congress wanted the jurisdictional 

bar to encompass decisions specified as discretionary by regulation along with those made discretionary by statute rin the mattel in 

question J, moreover, Congress could easily have said so." 

28 If the United States District COUrt for the District of Columbia the Court is petitioned by the Secretary of the FDIC in a matter of the resolution authority granted in the Act, "If the Court does not make a determination within 24 hours of receipt of the 

petition~ (I) the petition shaD be granted by operation oflaw; (11) the Secretary shall appOint the Corporation as receiver. and 

(Ill) liquidation under this title shall automatically and without further notice or action be commenced and the Corporation may 

immediately take all actions authorized under this tide." 

29 Available at http://www.law.comelLeduisupctlhtmll92-1662.ZS.html; Commentary available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-19991199311993_92_1662. 

30 See C-Span recorded testimony concerning then-secret meetings between Congress and then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 

in the wake of the Lehman disaster and just prior to the passage of the TARP Program - testimony available at http://dailybaiL 

com/homelkanjorskl-asks-paulson-to-describe-his-greatest-fears-from-t.htlTIl. 

31 See, for example, Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 435 E3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), available at http;llbulk.resource.org/courts.govld 

F3/435/435J·"'3d.1125.04-15736.html. The Supreme Court denied a petition for Certiorari. 

The matter involved a lawsuit against various federal agencies and departments as well as against two airlines. Gilmore claimed 

that being required to show identification for a domestic flight was an unconstitutional restriction of his rights to travel, to petirion government, and to speak anonymously. Gilmore also complained about being subject to "secret law" when the airlines and 

government refused to show the directive under which they were requesting ID. 

1he district court hearing the case dismissed Gilmore's complaint with prejudice, in part claiming lack of jurisdiction to hear due 

process arguments. As to other matters, the lower court noted that as the identification policy had been classified as "sensirlve 

security information" and as such did not review any official documentarion of the identification policy (rather, for purposes of 

its jurisdictional ruling, the districr <"ourt assumed, as Gilmore had alleged, that the identification policy was a Security Directive 

issued by TSA). The drcuir court did review material pertaining to the identification in camera and ex parte. but held that there was 

no constitutional violation because air passengers could still theoreticaUy travel without identification if they inste.ad underwent 

the more stringent "secondary screening" search. 

32 Rule 85 requires that "A petition [by the Treasury] under this Act must contain all relevant findings and recommendations under 

the Act, and must be filed under seal. The original and one copy of the petition and a PDF version on a CD-ROM shall be tendered to the Clerk The original and copy of the petition and all related documents shall be submitted securely in an cnvelopelbox 

appropriate to accommodate the documents. The envdopclbox conraining such documents shall have a conspicuous notation as 

follows: "DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL" 

33 Available at http://topics.law.comell.edu/constitution/artideii. 

34 Avallabie at http://www.law,cornell.edu/supctlhtmVhistoricsfUSSC_CR_0424_OOOl_ZS.html. 
65 


82859.038

35 Available at http://wv.,'W.law.comel!.edu/supctlhtmVhistoricslUSSC_CR_0478_0714_ZS.hnnL 

26 However, Congress would have authority should the BCFP require funds in excess of 12% of the Federal Reserve System's operating expenses - the Act authorizes up to $200 million of additional funding per year. 

37 The Constitution does not define the term "inferior Officers." No official "test" has been devised to determine "inferior" status for 

officials that are not a named "Head" of a "Department" or specifically provided for in the Constitution. A more facts and circumstance approach is generally taken, i.e. in Morrison v. Olson. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (available at http://casdaw.lp.findlaw.coml 

cgi-binlgetcase,pl?court",US&vol",,487&invol=654) concerning the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the 

Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which provided for the creation of 3. special counsel to investigate and if appropriate prosecute 

certain high-ranking government officials for ,,;olations of federal criminal laws. In A1orrison, the court stated that "[tJile line 

between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from dear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should 

be drawn. See, c. g., 2]. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 1536, pp. 397-398 (3d ed.1858) ('In the practical course of the 

government there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who arc and who are not to be deemed inferior officers, in fhe 

sense of the constitution. whose appointment does not necessarily require the concurrence of the senate')." In Jt1orriJon, the court 

ultimately held that position in question was indeed "inferior" for purposes of the applicable clause of the: Constitution despite 

the independent discretion to exercise delegated powers affi,rded an independent counsel. in part due to the fact that a party other 

than the President (in this case, the Attorney Genera.!) could remove such officer, the position was temporary, and the officer was 

empowered to petform only certain limited and defined duties. 

38 See http://www.(reasury.gov/initiativesIDocuments/FA~20-%20financiaIStabilityOversigbtCouncilOctober2010FINALv2.pdf. 

39 "In appointing the members of the Consumer Advisory Board, the Director shall seek to assemble experts in consumer protection, 

nnan .. :ial services, community development. mir lending and civil rights, and consumer financial products or services and representatives of depository institutions that primarily serve underserved communities, and representatives of communities that have been 

si.gnificantly impacted by higher priced mortgage toans, and seek representation of the interests of covered persons and consumers, without regard to party affiliation. NM fewer than 6 members shall be appointed \Ipon the recommendation of the rCb>1onal 

Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, on a rotating basis." 

40 Opinion available at hctp:llwww.supremecourr.gov/opinions/09pdfl08-861.pdf. 

41 See, i.e. Dodd-Frank financial regulatory issues discussed in a Pepper Hamilton webinar in late December, 2009 http://www.pepperlaw.com/webinars_update.aspx?ArtideKey=1632 as compared to the final Act signed into law on July 21, 2010. 

42 See Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, by David H.Gans, available at http;lldocs.law.h'WU.edu/stdg/gwlr/issueslpdflGans%20 

76-3.pdf. 

43 The PPACA decision ofJanuary 31, 2011 includes the following: "} note that the defendants have acknowledged that the individual mandate and the ACt's health insurance reforms, including the guaranteed issue and community rating, will rise or fall 

together as these reforms "cannot be severed from the [individual mandate]''' Sec, e.g" DeE Opp. at 40, As explained in my order 

on the motion to dismiss: "the defendants concede that (the individual mandate] is absolutely necessary for the Act's insurance 

market reforms to work as intended. In fact, they refer to it as an 'essential' part of the Act at least fourteen times in their motion 

to dismiss. nllms, the only question is whether the Act's other, non-health-insurance-rdated provisions can stand independently or 

whether they, too, must f:all with the individual mandate.'" 

44 Available at http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Vinson+stay+order.pdf. 

45 Copy of appeal available at http;lldl.dmpbox.comlu/3174287/Notice%200f%20Appeal.pdf. 

we authors wiJh to acknowledge the assistance of their colleagues Gregory Nowak and Stephen Harvey in developing tbe issues in this paper. 

il!lPIlIlr lIami!.ton L,LP 
66 


82859.039

Constitutional Problems Associated with Dodd-Frank Title II 

Thomas W. Merrill 

Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank yon for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss constitutional 

problems associated with the Dodd-Frank Act. My comments are directed to Title II of the Act. 

which establishes a uew "Orderly Liquidation Authority" for systemically significant financial 

firms. This authority is designed to create a new bankruptcy regime for systemically important 

financial companies that will eliminate the need for taxpayer bailouts of financial firms deemed 

too big to fail. 

I am currently completing an article, coauthored with Margaret Merrill, addressing the 

constitutional issues raised by Title II. I have included a copy of the current draft of this article 

as an appendix to this statement. The article considers both the substantive constitutional issues 

presented by Title II as well as the procedural impediments the statute creates for getting these 

issues before a court. 

The fnndamental point I would make is this. Dodd Frank Title II, as presently written, 

raises some serious constitutional questions. Anyone opposed having a financial finn liquidated 

under Title II this could be a director or officer of the firm, or a creditor of the firm - would 

have a strong incentive to raise these constitutional objections as a way of stopping the resolution 

process. Given the novelty and complexity involved in evaluating these objections, this would 

almost certainly lead to delay and confusion, undermining the purpose and efficacy of Title II. 

So I strongly urge the Congress to amend the statute to fix the constitutional problems, if Title II 

is to have a chance of delivering on its promises. 

Fortunately, most of the constitutional problems can be fixed without performing radical 

surgery on the statute. The critical fix is to amend the law to adopt the original House version 

for commencing a liquidation of a financial firm, rather than the Senate version that was 

ultimately approved by the Conference Committee. Briefly put, the House version called for 

administrative appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a distressed systemically significant 

financial firm, followed by a right to go to court to have the appointment of the receiver set 

aside. You can call this ex post judicial review. While the Senate version required the same 

administrative findings, it also required that the appointment of the FDIC as receiver be formally 

made by the D.C. District Court. You can call this ex ante judicial review. 

Ordinarily, there is nothing wrong with ex ante judicial review; indeed, it can offer 

greater protection against government abuse than ex post review. But in the context of the 

1 
67 


82859.040

failure of a systemically significant financial firm, the Senate recognized that you could not have 

anything resembling an ordinary judicial trial before appointing a receiver. The publicity and 

delay would trigger the vcry financial panic that .the orderly liquidation process is designed to 

prevent. 

So what did the Senate do? It tightly constrained the ex ante judicial review. The court 

proceedings are held in camera "on a strictly confidential basis." Only the financial firm is 

informed about the petition to appoint a receiver; other interested parties like employees, 

creditors, and counterparties are kept in the dark. Indeed, anyone disclosing the pendency of the 

court proceedings is subject to criminal prosecution. The court has only 24 hours to rule on the 

petition. It may consider only two out of seven detenninations that must be made to commence a 

receivership. It can review these determinations only under a highly deferential "arbitrary and 

capricious" standard. And if the court fails to rule within 24 hours, the petition is deemed 

automatically granted. There can be no stay of the receivership pending appeal. 

In other words, the Senate's version of ex ante review - which is the version currently 

incorporated in the statute seeks to draw upon the authority of the federal courts before 

ordering the liquidation of a systemically significant financial firm. But in order to do so while 

also preserving the need for speed and confidentiality - not to mention the discretion of the 

executive branch in deciding whether to commence an orderly liquidation - it requires the court 

to act in a very un-judicial manner. The combination of ex ante review with no notice to 

stakeholders, 24 hours to make a decision, and tight constraints on the issues that can be 

considered, creates several serious constitutional problems. 

Perhaps the most obvious is due process. Due process does not always require notice and 

a hearing before someone is deprived of their property. Various emergency situations like a 

health threat - or a threat of a financial crisis - may allow the government to act in a summary 

fashion. But if notice and a fair hearing are not made available before the deprivation takes 

place, the law is crystal clear that there must be notice and a fair hearing promptly afterwards. 

Dodd Frauk, as enacted, provides for a hearing before rather than after the depri vation, but it 

truncates the notice and the hearing to the point where they are effectively meaningless. I cannot 

imagine that the Supreme Court would hold that the government can order the mandatory 

liquidation of a major financial firm without any meaningful notice to affected persons or any 

opportunity to contest the government's decision before or after the process gets started. 

A related problem is Article III of the Constitution. Dodd Frank, not to put too fine a 

point on it, effectively requires the federal courts to rubber stamp the executive decision to 

commence an orderly liquidation process. The court gets 24 hours to rule on what is likely to be 

a highly complex and contested matter, and then is told it must apply a very deferential standard 

of review and must ignore five of the seven legal determinations that the executive must make 

before commencing the liquidation process. The courts will not take kindly to being conscripted 

to act in a manner inconsistent with the proper exercise of the judicial power. 

2 
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A third problem is the First Amendment. Dodd Frank says you can be sent to jail for up 

to five years for disclosing the truth about a civil case brought against you by the government. 

There are of course a variety of circumstances in which judicial proceedings can be kept 

confidential. But they all involve the consent of the parties involved or preliminary 

determinations subject to reversal in later proceedings. Dodd Frank requires that once a receiver 

is appointed by the court, the firm must be liquidated, shareholders must be wiped out, directors 

must be dismissed, responsible officers fired. The appointment of the receiver is the last act by a 

court before all these consequences inevitably follow. And it is crime to disclose this to the 

world. Such a gag rule is unprecedented, and I think would be viewed very skeptically by the 

courts. 

All these problems could be avoided by eliminating the Senate provision for ex ante 

review and restoring the House provision for ex post review. With ex post review, you can have 

administrative appointment of the receiver, preserving the confidentiality and the speed 

necessary to forestall a run on the financial company and the ensning financial panic. The 

receiver can immediately stay all collection actions and preferential transfers and more 

importantly assume or transfer time sensitive qualified financial contracts. All interested parties 

can then be promptly notified, and any party interested in challenging the appointment of the 

receiver can do so in court, without any limitation on the issues presented, the standard of 

review, or the time the court takes to sort out the issues and reach a decision. 

Such ex post review, by affording notice and an opportunity for a full and fair hearing 

after the appointment of a receiver, eliminates the due process problem. It eliminates the Article 

III problem, because the court would be asked to act in a manncr fully consistent with the 

judicial function. And it eliminates any need for a gag rule, and hence any First Amendment 

deficiencies. 

It is probably true, as a practical matter, that once a receiver is appointed a reviewing 

court will be reluctant to unwind the process. But the very availability of such ex post review 

would act as an important safeguard against executive abuse. Making such robust review 

available would serve to constrain the executive to exercise the vast power bestowed on it in a 

responsible manner. As such, it would not only eliminate the constitutional problems I have 

highlighted, but would also provide far more protection for individual rights than Dodd Frank 

does in its current incarnation. 

I thank the Committee for its attention and will be glad to answer any questions. 

3 
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Appendix 
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ALL RIGHIS RESLRVElJ 

DODD-FRANK ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY: 

TOO BIG FOR THE CONSTITUTION? 

Thomas W. Merrill* 

Margaret L. Merrill*' 

Introduction 

The Dodd-Frank Actl is in significant part a response to public outcry over public 

bailouts of financial firms that are deemed too big to fail. In the financial crisis of 2008-09, the 

federal government supplied emergency financial support to many financial firms in order to 

keep them afloat. The fear was that the insolvency of one or more of these firms would trigger a 

chain reaction by creditors, analogous to a run on the bank, which would in turn have ripple 

effects throughout the economy. As it happened, the financial system did freeze up for a short 

time after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy,2 which tipped the economy into a deep recession 

followed by a painfully weak recovery3 

Once the immediate crisis subsided, many perceived that large financial firms and their 

well-paid officers and directors had survived nicely, whereas large numbers of ordinary 

Americans were suffering from the lingering effects of the downturn. The idea that the federal 

government would rescue large financial firms with taxpayer dollars, while ordinary citizens lost 

their jobs and watched their savings evaporate, has produced widespread voter anger. One 

proposition all politicians seem to agree upon, at least publicly, is that never again should 

ordinary folks be taxed to prop up giant financial firms deemed too big to fail by the 

government.4 

• Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School . 

.. Member of the Bar. New York. The authors thank Erik Gerding, Ed Morrison, Henry Monaghan, and 

participants in a conference at Case Western Law School for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft. 

I Dodd.Frank Wan Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111·203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 

[hereinafter cited as DFA I. 

2 The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd·Frank Act, FDIC Quarterly, Vol. 5, 

No.2, 3-4 (2011) at http://www.fdic.govlbanklanalyticallguarterly/2011 vol5 2/Article2.pdf. 

3 The Restoring Financial Stability Act of 20 I 0, S. Rep. No. 111·176, at 43- 44 (2010). ("When Lehman Brothers 

declared bankruptcy, the markets panicked and the crisis escalated. With no other means to resolve large, complex 

and interconnected financial firms, the government was left with few options other than to provide massive 

assistance to prop up failing companies in an effort to prevent the crisis from spiraling into a great 

depression. Despite initial efforts of the government, credit markets froze and the U.S problem spread across the 

globe. The crisis on Wan Street soon spilled over onto Main Street. touching the lives of most Americans and 

devastating many.") 

4 Amendment No, 689 to the Concurrent Budget Resolution on the Budget. Fiscal Year 2014, Can. Rec. 
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In tenns of refonn, there were a number of possible structural alternatives to public 

bailouts of financial Finns deemed too big to fail. One would be to break up large financial 

finns, so that no single finn could be said to be too big to fail. This might be accomplished by 

imposing line of business restrictions, as under the Glass Steagall Act, with companies limited to 

one line of business, such as commercial banking, investment banking, brokerage, or insurance. 

Dodd-Frank's so-called Volker rule5

, which limits the ability of banks to engage in proprietary 

trading, is a limited version of this strategy. Or Congress could impose limits on the maximum 

assets of financial finns, with mandatory divestiture once the limit is reached. Downsizing 

presumably would reduce the risk of single rogue institution bringing the entire financial system 

down when risky bets turn bad. 

Another structural solution would be to impose limits on the debt financial firms can take 

on, as by increasing capital reserve requirements or (in the case of nonbank finns) imposing 

them for the first time. 6 The higher the capital reserve requirements are, the lower the risk of 

insolvency, and hence the lower the need for future bailouts. Higher reserve requirements would 

of course reduce the profitability of the financial sector, which would presumably re-direct assets 

(and talent) to other sectors. From a social welfare perspective, the tradeoff might be worthwhile 

- lower profitability for financial firms in return for lower risk of future financial crises that 

afflict pain on millions of ordinary Americans. 

A third structural solution, which has been advanced by bankruptcy scholars,7 would be 

to amend the Bankruptcy Code to subject novel financial instruments like repurchase agreements 

(repos) and derivatives or swaps to the automatic stay and avoidance provisions of the 

Bankruptcy Code. Interestingly, the law had moved in exactly opposite direction before the 

financial crisis, with special legislation (pushed by the financial industry) exempting these novel 

11 3th Congress (2013-2014) (Senate - March 22, 2013) (the unanimously approved amendment to the Democrats' 

doomed 2014 budget proposal. attempts to minimize the advantage that Dodd Frank otherwise bestows on big banks 

by eliminating subsidies or other funding advantages for Wall Street mega-banks with more than $500 billion in 

assets). 

5 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L No.1 11-203, § 619, 24 Stat. 1376 

(2010) (Dodd-Frank Act). 

6 The Basel Accords that regulate international commercial banks adopt this strategy. Under the recent Basel III 

Accords, , effective as of 2015, common equity that banks must keep on hand will increase from 2% to 4.5% of 

risk-weighted assets, and the so-called "Tier I ratio" will increase from 4% to 6%. As of 2019, banks will be 

required to add a further conservation buffer of 2.5% to both of these metrics. See Patrick Slavik & Boris Cournede, 

Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 844, OECD Publishing 

(2011) at http://dx.doi.orglJO.J78715kghwnhkk;s8-ell. 

7 David A. Skeel & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 Colum. 

L Rev. 152 (2012); see also KENNETH E SCOT[ AND JOHN B. TAYLOR, BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A SPECIAL 

CHAPTER 14 (2012) (urging the adoption of a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with systemically 

significant financial firms). 

2 
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instruments from resolution in bankruptcy.8 Without the shield of the bankruptcy process, the 

logical response of counterparties to these instruments when they sense a financial firm is in 

distress is to race to cash out - exactly the kind of free-for-all that bankruptcy is designed to 

prevent. It is thus plausible that the special exemption from bankruptcy adopted for repos and 

swaps contributed ifit did not cause Lehman's collapse and the panic that followed. 9 Subjecting 

these instruments to ordinary bankruptcy powers might solve the too big to fail problem, at least 

insofar as nonbank financial firms arc concerned. 

These structural solutions - anyone of which could be implemented with a relatively 

simple piece of legislation - were rejected not because they are bad ideas but because they werc 

adamantly opposed by the financial industry. Clearly, financial firms did not want to be 

downsized or de-leveraged. It is less clear why the financial industry opposed reforming the 

Bankruptcy Code to subject novel financial instruments to the automatic stay and avoidance 

provisions. But the conventional wisdom in the industry is that this would unduly interfere with 

the operation of the markets in which these instruments are bought and sold.!O In any event, 

because each of these solutions faced concerned opposition from big finance, they were never 

seriously considered by the Treasury Department - which provided the initial draft legislation 

that became the Dodd Frank Act - or the Congress that adopted it. Firms that are too big to fail 

are too big to be challenged politically. 

Given that these relatively straightforward structural solutions were off the table, how 

could the politicians square the circle between preventing future taxpayer bailouts of large 

financial firms while leaving the prerogatives of these firms essentially untouched? The answer 

is complicated, as revealed at once by looking at the immense length of the Dodd-Frank Act. 

Some of the measures in the Act are designed to improve the regulation of derivatives and other 

complex financial instruments thought to have been inadequately regulated before the financial 

crisis. I I Others are designed to insure better advance warning of systemic financial riskS. 12 Still 

others are designed to beef up consumer information and protection against overly-aggressive 

8 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) (Pub.L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 2:1) 

at II U.S.c. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17); 546 (e)-(g); 555; 559; 560; also see Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 

2005 (Title n. subtitle B of Pub.L. 109-171, 110 Stat. 9), enacted February 8, 2006, with a companion statute, 

Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming Amendments Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-173, 119 Stat. 3601, enacted 

February 15,2006). 

9 Skeel and Jackson, supra note 7, at 164-5. 

10 Id. at 159-162. 

11 See DFA, Title VII, §§ 701-774, (the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010) and Title VUI, 

§§801-814 (Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision) 

12 See DFA, Title T, Subtitle A, §§ III - 123 (Financial Stability Oversight Council) 

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lending and other banking practices. J3 But the fundamental decision not to tinker with the size or 

profitability of large financial firms, or to subject novel financial instruments to ordinary 

bankruptcy processes, created challenging design issues in achieving the fundamental objective 

of eliminating future taxpayer-funded bailouts of financially distressed firms. 

The core of the legislative strategy, which is set forth in Title II of Dodd- Frank, is to 

replace taxpayer bailouts of systemically significant distressed firms with a kind of specialized 

bankruptcy process, which the Act labels "orderly liquidation." This specialized bankruptcy 

regime applies uniquely to bank holding companies and other systemically significant nonbank 

financial firms. J4 (Ordinary banks and savings and loans that take government-insured deposits 

were already subject to the resolution by receivership or conservatorship, and this authority 

includes provisions allowing the receiver to take systemic financial risk into account in certain 

circumstances.Js) Under this new resolution authority, government agencies are given broad 

discretion to decide on a casc-by-case basis that a large nonbank financial firm is in trouble and 

that its failure would pose a threat to the economy. This decision leads to a takeover of the firm 

by a government receiver, typically the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), J6 which 

proceeds to run the company as it resolves claims of creditors until the firm is eventually 

liquidated. Positive-value assets can be transferred to a "bridge financial company" and 

eventually folded into another firm. J7 If financing is required to meet obligations while the firm 

13 See DFA, Title X. §§ 100J - llOOH (Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection) 

14 There are four categories of financial companies that may be subject to the Title II Liquidation Authority under 

the DFA. The first category is bank holding companies. See DFA, Title II, §203(a)(l)(A), §201(a)(lI)(i) and Title I, 

§102(a)(l). The second category is nonbank financial companics or more specifically companies with at least 85% 

of their gross revenue or consolidated assets derived from activities that are financial in nature or incidental to 

financial activity, including the ownership or control of one or more insured depository institutions. See DFA, Title 

II, §203(a)(l)(A), §201(a)(11)(ii)&(iii) and Title I, § 102(a)(4). The tbird category includes subsidiaries of the 

financial companies identified in first two categories, except for those subsidiaries that otherwise qualify as insured 

depository institutions or insurance companies. See DFA, Title II. §203(a)(I)(A) & §201(a)(lI)(iv). The fourth 

category includes entities that qualify as brokers and dealers and are accordingly registered with the SEC and 

members of the SIPC. See DFA, Title II, §203(a)(l)(B)&(C) § 201 (a)(7). 

15 The FDIC is charged with administering the resolution of failed or capital-deficient government-insured 

depositary institutions. The payment of deposits and other creditor claims by the FDIC is generally governed by the 

"least cost resolution rule". See 12 U.S.c. § 1823(a)(4)(A). Under certain circumstances, however, the FDIC is 

allowed to diverge from the priority scheme established by the least cost resolution rule. Specifically, if adherence 

to the rule would have serious adverse effects on financial stability, the FDIC is allowed to disregard least cost 

reso1ution rule and take alternative action in the name of mitigating these adverse effects, including making selective 

payments to non-depository creditors. See 12 U.S.c. § I 823(c)(4)(G). 

16 The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) serves as a trustee under a receivership for covered brokers 

and dealers. DFA § 205. 

17 See DFA, Title II, §210(a)(l)(F) and §21O(h). Specifically any bridge financial company can be used to assume 

the liabilities, purchase assets as well as perform any other temporary function which the FDIC is authorized to 

undertake in § 210(h). /d. at § 21O(h)(B)(i),(ii)&(iii). 

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is wound down, the necessary funds will be supplied by the Treasury.IS The Act nevertheless 

insists that this funding is not a bailout, because any deficiencies will be financed by wiping out 

shareholdcr equity, rejecting claims of unsecured creditors,19 and, if need be, by imposing 

special ex post "assessments" on other large financial firms20 

In addition to its perceived unfairness, a policy of bailing out firms that are deemed toobig-to-fail is objectionable on the ground that it promotes excessive risk taking. When such a 

firm makes risky bets that payoff, the gains are captured by top level management and 

shareholders; but when the firm makes risky bets tum disastrous, the losses are borne by 

taxpayers. 21 This asymmetry creates a moral hazard of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose variety. 

If permanently institutionalized, would likely give rise to too much risk taking by large financial 

firms. 

Title II is supposed to put an end to this moral hazard22 The statute includes a number of 

punitive features designed to deter systemically significant financial firms from engaging in 

excessively risky behavior.23 A distressed firm that goes through the Title II process must be 

"liquidated," its shareholders must be wiped out before creditors take a hit, its directors must be 

fired, and its officers who were "responsible" for the financial distress must be dismissed,z4 

These provisions are designed to assure that the public will not immediately see a firm with the 

same name, and the same personnel, raking in millions shortly after the resolution process is 

over. 

18 1d. at §204(d) and §21O(n) 

191d. at §204(a)(l )&(2). The FDIC, along with other applicable enforcement agencies, are also required to ensure 

"lhat all parties ... having responsibility for the condition of the [failed] financial company bear losses consistent 

with their responsibility, including actions for damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation and other gains 

not compatible with such responsibility." ld. at § 204(a)(3). 

20/d. at §21O( 0); Conference Report on RR 4 J 73 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer Protection 

Act. R Rpt. J J J -517, I J'" Congo 2d Sess. (20 I 0) at 865-66. 

21 The problem is compounded by the fact that creditors of firms deemed too big to fail have little incentive to 

monitor the firm' s behavior or to care whether the firm has a reputation for making prudent and sound and 

investment decisions. See Gary H. Stern and Ron 1. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, 

Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., p. 17-19 (2004). 

22 The statute states that its basic purpose is "to provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial 

companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such 

risk and minimizes moral hazard." DFA, § 204(a). 

23 The FDIC must remove the management and board of directors of any covered financial company it decides to 

unwind pursuant to Title II. [d. at § 206(4)&(5). It must also ensure that shareholders of the covered financial 

company do not receive payment until all other claims as well as the orderly liquidation fund (if such is in fact 

established) are paid in full. Id. at § 206(2). 

24 ld. at § 206(4)&(5). 

5 
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Nevertheless, Title II's orderly resolution process preserves a version of taxpayer-funded 

socialization of losses. This is because the Treasury is authorized to advance funding to a firm 

undergoing resolution under Titlc II, and if, after wiping out shareholders and unsecured 

creditors, the proceeds obtained from selling the firm's assets are inadequate to reimburse the 

Treasury, the statute authorizes the Treasury to impose so-called "risk-based assessments" on 

other large financial firms in order to recoup these monies.25 These assessments are a tax by any 

other name. Whether the incidence of this tax will be borne by the shareholders of the assessed 

financial firms or the public in the form of higher fees for financial services is impossible to 

determine; almost certainly some of both.26 In any event, under Dodd-Frank Title II losses 

created by excessive risk-taking will be borne at least in part by ordinary taxpayers and citizens, 

as under the regime of bailouts now so widely condemned. 

No one seems happy with the complicated compromise embodied in Title II. Small 

financial firms are aggrieved by the provisions that continue to provide an implicit subsidy for 

large financial firms, in the form of the socialization of losses in the event they fail. They argue 

that this implicit subsidy lowers the costs of borrowing to large firms relative to small firms, 

giving them an unwarranted competitive advantage. 27 Managers and investors of big financial 

firms are aggrieved by possibility that they will be wiped out if and when they get into trouble 

sometime in the future. Certainly those who wanted fundamental reform of the financial 

industry are dissatisfied with the statute's preservation of the essential attri,butes of the status 

quo. 

25 DFA, § 21O(n)(9). 

26 Tax incidence analysis reflects·the well established idea that the entity or individual legally obligated to pay a tax 

often does not bear the full economic burden of the tax. This is especially true in situations where the taxpayer is 

abJe to pass the cost of the tax on to third parties through increased market prices. See Jacob Nussim, The Recovery 

of Unlawful Taxes, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 893,901-902 (2009). A logical extension of this analysis is that the more 

monopoly power any taxpayer-entity has the more the taxpayer is able to shift the costs of any taxes assessed 

against it. In the case of any financial institution deemed too big to fail, their market power would suggest that at 

least some of the costs would be shifted to others. 

27 More recent studies have suggested that this advantage is indeed significant. See Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice 

Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, IMF 

Working Paper (May 2012) available at http://www.imf.org/extemaUpubs/ftlwpI20l2lwpI2128.pdf (finding that the 

subsidy to systemically important financial institutions created by the implicit expectation of state funded bailouts 

and otherwise embedded in these institution's credit ratings is as much as 80 basis points). "Small as it might sound, 

O.S percentage point makes a big difference. Multiplied by the total liabilities of the 10 largest U.S. banks by assets, 

it amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of $83 billion a year. To put the figure in perspective, it's tantamount to the 

government giving the banks about 3 cents of every tax dollar collected." Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks 

$83 Billion a Year?, Bloomberg (Feb 20, 2013) available at http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2013-02-20Iwhyshould-taxpayers-give-big-banks-83-billion-a-year-.html. 

6 
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In keeping with Tocqueville's famous adage that "[sjcarcely any political question arises 

in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question,,,28 Dodd-Frank's 

orderly liquidation authority is now the subject of a lawsuit. Eleven state attorneys general have 

filed suit in the U,S. District Court for the District of Columbia charging that Title II violates due 

process, Article III of the Constitution, and the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy 

Clause29 On the merits, the contentions are surprisingly strong. Most of the constitutional 

infirmities in Title II stem from a decision to have the receiver for a systemically significant 

nonbank financial firm appointed by a federal district judge. In order to confer appointment 

authority on a federal judge, and yet also prevent the modern-day equivalent of a run on the 

bank, the statute prescribes a clandestine process in which the district judge is given 24 hours to 

rule on a petition to appoint a receiver; it prohibits the court from giving notice of the 

proceedings to creditors or other interested third parties; and it imposes criminal penalties on 

anyone who publicly discloses the pendency of the proceedings. Moreover, the hapless district 

judge is entitled to consider only two factual issues under a highly deferential standard of review 

in deciding whether to order the liquidation of a major financial firm, and is given only 24 hours 

to do so make the decision, otherwise the petition is deemed automatically granted. For good 

measure, the statute proscribes any stay pending appeaL In effect, the statute seeks to draw on 

the prestige of the federal courts in making the appointment of a receiver, while depriving parties 

with a vital stake in the matter of any notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard, and 

handcuffing the court from acting in a way that is consistent with judicial authority. 

The statute also creates a specialized form of bankruptcy that gives the executive branch 

of the federal government broad discretion to subject some nonbank financial firms to this 

special insolvency regime leading to liquidation, while others go through ordinary bankruptcy, 

which includes the possibility of reorganization. Allowing the executive to pick and choose 

different resolution regimes for firms in the same industry based on necessarily subjective 

determinations of the impact of insolvency on "financial stability in the United States,,30 at least 

arguably violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause3 ! And within the new 

regime of orderly liquidation, the statute gives a fcdcral agency typically the FDIC -- broad 

discretion to depart from the principle that all creditors of the same class should be treated 

28 Alexis de Tocqueville. DEMOCRACY IN AMERlCA. 280 (Philips Bradley ed. 1980 (1835). 

29 Stale National Bank of Big Spring v. Wolin, United States District Court for the District of Columbia. No. J :12-

cv-01032 (as amended Feb. 19,2013) (hereafter "Big Spring 2"d Amended Complaint"). The eleven states are 

Alabama, Georgia, Kansas. Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and West 

Virginia. 

30 DFA § 203(b )(3) 

3t The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish "uniform Laws on lhe subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 

United States." U.S, Const. art l. § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added). 

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equally 32 This too arguably contradicts violates received understandings of uniformity in the 

bankruptcy context. 

These constitutional infirmities could easily have been avoided. Ordinary bank 

receiverships are commenced by an executive appointment of a receiver, followed by a right of 

plenary judicial review - a process that allows all affected interest holders to challenge the 

appointment of a receiver after-the-fact, and permits the reviewing court to function in an 

appropriate judicial manner. This kind of ex post judicial review is undoubtedly constitutional in 

the context of a statutory regime designed to prevent a financial crisis. In fact, the 

Administration's proposed legislation, and the House bill, called for a process for appointing a 

receiver closely modeled on the bank receivership model. For unexplained reasons, however, the 

Senate rejected this model, and substituted the provisions that ended up in the legislation, calling 

for judicial appointment of a receiver coupled with draconian limitations on the authority of the 

court that render the jndicial process virtually meaningless. Thus, the constitutional infirmities 

associated Title II's provisions for appointment of a receiver could fixed simply by amending the 

statute to incorporate the House provisions on appointment, rather than the substitute insisted 

upon by the Senate. 

Whether the arguable violations of the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause 

could be fixed is harder to say. The central objective of Title II is to give the government a new 

tool to avoid bailouts or government takeovers of troubled financial firms. Whether such 

authority can be cabined by predictable rules laid down in advance is debatable. However, the 

loosely-written provision allowing the FDIC to depart from equal treatment of similarly-situated 

creditors3

] could almost certainly have been drafted more narrowly. Of course, in today's 

legislative environment, obtaining these kinds of legislative fixes is may be impossible. Which 

means the issues may have to be confronted by a court. 

We begin by examining the two statutory models for initiating resolution authority that 

served as a backdrop to the Dodd-Frank Act bank receivership law and bankruptcy - and 

summarize the ways in which Dodd-Franks' Title II deviates from both models. We then 

consider various legal avenues for raising a constitutional challenge to Title II, each of which is 

problematic. Part III analyzes the due process and Article III objections to Title II in greater 

detail, including possible strategies for avoiding these difficulties. Part IV turns to the potential 

constitutional issues under the Bankruptcy Clause and the First Amendment. Part V lists some 

32 DFA § 210(b«4). Departures from equal treatment are authorized if the FDIC determines that this "is necessary" 

to maximize the value of the liquidated company's assets, continue essential operations, maximize the value of the 

sale of assets, or minimize losses on the sale of assets. Id. There is no provision for judicial review of such a 

determination. 

33 DFA § 21O(b(4». 

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possible takings issues, and provides an analysis of how impairment of security interests might 

be analyzed under the Takings Clause. A brief conclusion follows. 

I. Title II's Orderly Liquidation Authority 

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth a new "Orderly Liquidation Authority" (OLA) 

designed to serve as a substitute for future government bailouts of financial firms deemed too big 

to fail, in the sense that resolution of their affairs under ordinary bankruptcy law or other 

insolvency laws would threaten the stability of the financial markets. Lehman Brothers is the 

obvious object lesson here.34 To avoid financial panic or various contagions analogous to a [unon-the-bank, the statute assumes that the resolution of these systemically-significant firms must 

occur rapidly and without any advance public notice. Thus, the process of appointing a receiver 

must occur "on a strictly confidential basis" without any public disclosurc35 The 

Administration proposal and the House bill sought to achieve expedition and confidentiality by 

having the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a receiver, subject to ex post judicial review. The 

Senate decided at the last minute that the receiver should be appointed by a judge. In order to 

preserve speed and confidentiality, however, the Senate bill, which was the version enacted, 

prohibits public disclosure of the judicial proceeding and gives the court designated to appoint 

the receiver only 24 hours in which to rule. J6 This clandestine process deprives stakeholders of 

any notice of a process that must lead to liquidation of a major financial firm. And the extremely 

short deadline renders judicial oversight essentially meaningless, given the complexity of the 

matters involved. The Senate substitute is a classic example of an unforced legislative error, for 

it renders the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenge on due process, Article III, and First 

Amendment grounds. 

34 See Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, White 

Paper issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (June 17,2009) available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.ukldlreforming_financiaCmarkets080709.pdf. ("Treasury White Paper" hereafter) ("The federal 

government's responses to the impending bankruptcy of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG were complicated 

by the lack of a statutory framework for avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank financial firms, including 

affiliates of banks or other insured depository institutions. In the absence of such a framework, the government's 

only avenue to avoid the disorderly failures of Bear Stearns and AIG was the use of the Federal Reserve's lending 

authority. And this mechanism was insufficient to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, an event which 

served to demonstrate how disruptive the disorderly failure of a nonbank financial firm can be to the financial 

system and the economy.") 

35 DFA, § 202(a)(l)(A)(iii). 

36 "If the Court does not make a determination within 24 hours of receipt of the petition - (I) the petition shall be 

granted by operation of law; (II) the Secretary shall appoint the Corporation as receiver; and (III) liquidation under 

this title shall automatically and without further notice or action be commenced and the Corporation may 

immediately take all actions authorized under this title." [d. at § 202(a)(l)(A)(v). 

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The OLA process may never be used. It may remain the proverbial musket in the closet 

that the government holds in reserve while arranging workouts with creditors or sales or mergers 

of the troubled firm in lieu of "orderly liquidation.,,37 If used, the OLA process may not be 

contested. The statute specifically invites the directors of a troubled financial firm to consent to 

OLA, and dangles a can·ot in front of directors in the fonn of promised immunity from any 

action by shareholders or creditors for "acquiescing in or consenting in good faith to the 

appointment of the Corporation as receiver.".18 It would take an intrepid director to do battle 

with the Executive Branch over the fate of a financially troubled firm, knowing that any 

diminution in financial value attributable to delay could be challenged in future litigation by 

disgruntled creditors and shareholders, whereas capitulation to the government will result in 

immunity. 

In any event, whether the OLA authority is used or merely threatened, the credibility of the 

governmeut to use the new procedure will depend importantly on whether the relevant actors 

perceive this authority to be constitutional. As we shall see, there are several features of Title II 

that give rise to serious questions on this score. 

The basic model for the OLA process is existing law providing for administrative 

receiverships of FDIC-insured banks. Dodd-Frank takes this bank receivership law and adds to 

it a number of provisions borrowed from the Bankruptcy Code, which is essentially a judiciallysupervised resolution process. As a result, the OLA is an administrative rather than a judicial 

resolution process, but one that hews more closely to the substantive law of bankruptcy than it 

does to the substantive law that governs bank receiverships. Many of the constitutional issues 

raised by Title II stem from the unique provisions tbat govern the appointment of a receiver 

under the OLA. These provisions do not follow the template of either bank receivership law or 

bankruptcy law. Rather, they were adopted by the Senate during the final days of intense 

negotiation in the Senate over what became the final form of law. Accordingly, we begin with a 

brief review of the benchmarks established by bank receivership and bankruptcy law, and trace 

the evolution of the provisions prescribing how an OLA is commenced in the legislative history 

of Dodd-Frank. 

A. Bank Receiverships and Bankruptcy 

By way of background, it will be helpful to say a few words about two existing forms of 

resolution authority bank receiverships and bankruptcy - and in particular how they are 

commenced and the extent to which judicial review is available under each form. 

J7 David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences 

139-40 (2011). 

38 DFA, § 207. 

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Under current practice, banks that become financially distressed are nearly always put 

into a receivership in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acts as receiver 

exercising powers under federal law39 It is theoretically possible for state-chartered banks to 

have a state-appointed receiver, but the FDIC can take over a state receivership if the bank has 

FDIC-insured deposits, which virtually all banks d040 The statutes require either that the FDIC 

be appointed as receiver by the relevant bank supervising agency (such as the Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a federally-chartcrcd bank)41 or that the FDIC appoint 

itself as receiver if the assets of the federal deposit insurance fund are at risk42 Once the FDIC 

assumes control of the bank as receiver, the bank has a short period of time (typically 30 days) in 

which to commence an action in federal district court seeking an order dissolving the 

receivership.43 The statutes authorizing this form of review include no limits on the issues the 

court may consider or the time the court may take in rendering a decision. Further, they appear to 

contemplate that the issues will be resolved on a record made by the court, since there will be no 

administrative record in the ordinary meaning of the term for the court to review. In other 

words, judicial review occurs after the receivership is commenced and is de novo as to both fact 

and law44 

What actually happens in a bank receivership, according to recent descriptive accounts, is 

roughly as follows 45 The appropriate bank regulatory authority (state or federal) sends the FDIC 

39 Conservatorships are also authorized by law, but are rarely used. The basic difference is that under a receivership 

the bank's charter is revoked and its assets and liabilities are transferred to other banks or auctioned off; under a 

conservatorship the conservator takes control of the bank and reorganizes it so that it can resume operations under 

its existing charter. 

4(J See 12 V.S.c. § 1821(c)(4), (5). 

41 See 12 V.S.c. § 1821 (c)(2)(i) (,'The Corporation may. at the discretion of the supervisory authority, be appointed 

conservator of any insured Federal depository institution and the Corporation may accept such appointment.") 

42 See 12 V.s.c. § 1821(c)(4) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, the law of any State, or the 

constitution of any State, the Corporation may appoint itself as sole conservator or receiver of any insured State 

depository institution if ... " certain findings (described in 12 V.S.C § 1821(c)(4)(A)&(B» are made by FDIC in 

regards to the financial insufficiency of the insured State depository institution at issue.) 

43 12 V.S.c. § 1821(c)(7). For any national bank the decision to appoint a receiver is to be determined by the OCC 

at the discretion of the Comptroller. 12 V.S.c. § 191. The OCC's decision to appoint a receiver is generally not 

subject to judicial review. Vnited States v. Morgenthau. 85 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Circuit 1936), cert. denied. 299 V.S. 

605 (1935). In addition to the grounds specified 12 V.S.C § 1821. the OCC may also appoint a receiver upon its 

conclusion that the bank's board of directors consists of less than five members. 12 V.S.c. § 191(2). 

44 See 12 V.s.c. § l821(d)(13)(C) and (d)(l3)(D). 

45 The following summary is drawn from Stanley V. Ragalevsky & Sarah J. Ricardi, Anatomy of a Bank Failure, 

126 Banking L. J. 867 (2009); John L. Douglas and Randall D. Guynn, Resolution of VS Banks and Other Financial 

Institutions 311-77, in Debt Restructuring (Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal et al eds., Oxford V. Press 2011); Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Resolution Handbook (2003). See also David A. Skeel. Jr., The Law and 

Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 723. 727-31 (1998). 

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a "failing bank letter," or the FDIC detennines based on its own infonnation that a bank is in 

distress. The FDIC then sends a "planning team" to the distressed bank to make a confidential 

assessment of its assets and liabilities. Based on this information, the FDIC develops an 

appropriate resolution strategy, most commonly a sale to another bank.46 The FDIC puts 

together an infonnation package about the bank, which is communicated to a list of potential 

bidders identified by the FDIC statT. These bidders sign confidentiality agreements and, if they 

wish, submit bids for the bank or its assets on a secure extranet site. FDIC officials evaluate the 

bids and recommend the least cost resolution to the FDIC Board. If the Board approves, the 

FDIC is officially appointed receiver. The appointment typically occurs on a Friday afternoon. 

Over the weekend, the bank is secured, its books are seized, the locks are changed, and sign age 

is modified; the new bank opens for business on Monday moming47 Subsequently, creditors of 

the failed bank submit claims to the FDIC, which the agency resolves, giving priority to secured 

creditors and depositors. 48 Any creditor dissatisfied with the FDIC's resolution of its claim can 

bring an action in federal court seeking review of the agency's detennination. 49 Such actions are 

occasionally brought, but they are rarely successfu1.50 

Although judicial review of the decision to commence a receivership is expressly 

authorized by statute, banks rarely invoke this authority.51 Indeed, the possibility of judicial 

review is so remote it is not even mentioned in recent descriptive accounts of bank receiverships. 

There are powerful practical reasons why banks would not seek ex post judicial review of the 

appointment of a receiver.52 Once a receivership has commenced, courts are highly unlikely to 

46 The disposition of a failing bank in this manner is often referred to as a purchase and assumption transaction 

("P&A"), because the healthy bank selected by the FDIC agrees to purchases some portion of the failed bank's 

assets as well as assume some portion of the failed bank's deposit and other liabilities. See Ragalevsky & Ricardi 

supra at 877. P&A transaelions made up 34 of the 40 resolutions that were carried out by FDIC from January 2000 

through August 2008. [d. See also Skeel supra note 37 at 122 (noting that P&A transactions are used 54% of bank 

failures). 

47 See RagaJevasky & Ricardi supra note 45 at 885. 

48 See 12 U.S.c. § 1S15(e)(2)(C)(ii). 

49 Id. at § 1815(e)(3) and § 1821(d)(6). 

50 See C. F. Muckenfuss m & Robert C. Eager, Overview of the FDIC as Conservator or Receiver, Gibson, Dunn & 

Crutcher LLP Publication, 6 (2008) available at http://blogs.law.harvard.eduicorpgov/files/200SIl0/092608-

overview-fdicasconvervator-receiver.pdf (noting that cases reviewing FDIC actions as receiver have largely upheld 

the FDIC's approach to the conservatorship or receivorship). See also Skeel supra note 37 at 123, n.8. 

" For examples of post-seizure review, see James Madison Limited v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 

Haralson v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 837 F.2d 1123 (D. C. Cir. 1988); McMillian v. F.D.I.C. 81 F.3d 1041 

(lIth Or. 1996); Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. FDIC, 857 F.Supp. 976, 983 (D.D.C. 1993); DPJ Co. Ltd. v. FDIC, 30 F. 

3d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1994); Nashville Lodging Co. v. FDIC, 934 F.Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1996); FDIC v. Parkway 

Executive Office Ctr., 1998 WL 18204 (E.D.Pa.). 

52 See Skeel supra note 37 at 139. 

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unwind it. This would create a messy problem of how to reverse transfers of deposits and assets 

that have already taken place. It is also unclear what if anything a bank would stand to gain by 

securing a judicial order overturning a receivership. The suit would generate publicity abont the 

regulators' negative assessment of bank's financial condition, causing depositors to flee and 

potential borrowers to look elsewhere for loans. If the bank was not truly insolvent when the 

receivership commenced, it probably would be by the time the court set it aside. Nevertheless, 

even if judicial review is rarely sought, this does not mean it is meaningless. The very existence 

of the right to seek judicial review undoubtedly helps assure that the power to seize banks will 

not be abused for illegitimate ends. 

The major points to note about bank receivership are, first, the process is almost entirely 

administrative. The FDIC runs the show from beginning to end. As noted, banks rarely mount a 

judicial challenge a decision to appoint the FDIC as receiver, and courts play only a minor and 

episodic role in reviewing the FDIC's resolution of claims once the receivership is nnderway. 

Second, the process proceeds in secret until the moment the FDIC seizes control of the bank. 

Bank regulators and the FDIC make no public announcement that a receivership is being 

contemplated and they conduct no public hearings before the seizure is announced. Bank 

officers and directors will know that a rcceivership is imminent, but it is not in their interest to 

disclose this. Potential bidders for bank assets are subject to confidentiality agreements and 

communicate with the FDIC over a secure extra net. This secrecy is justified in the name of 

avoiding public alarru and a run on deposits and the overriding purpose of minimizing 

government losses on deposit insurance. 

Bankruptcy is very different. It is essentially a judicial process. Federal district courts 

have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases governed by Title 11 of the 

U.S. Code.53 District courts routinely refer bankruptcy filings to bankruptcy judges, who are 

considered "Article I" judges rather than Article III judges.54 But bankruptcy judges enjoy 

significant independence and resolve contested matters in the manner of courts, with adversarial 

public hearings featuring sworn witnesses, briefs, and written opinions. Moreover, bankruptcy 

courts are regarded as "adjuncts" to district courts, and district courts have the power to 

withdraw the reference of cases or proceedings from bankruptcy judges, in whole or in part, for 

good cause 55 So-called "core" matters that arise under federal bankruptcy law can be decided 

53 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) 

54 The majority of district courts have standing reference orders in place that automatically refer all bankruptcy 

matters to the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. UTI.@l. Should it want to intervene in any particular bankruptcy 

case, a district court can withdraw the reference order and take the matter away from the bankruptcy court. See;sll 

U.s.C. ill1@. 

55 See 28 U.S.c. § 157(d). See generally Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.C!. 2594, 2603-04 (2011) (summarizing the 

division of authority between district courts and bankruptcy courts under the bankruptcy code). 

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by bankruptcy judges, subjcct to review by district courts under an appellate rev icw standard 56 

So-called "non-core" matters that arise under non-bankruptcy law (such as contract and tort law) 

are subject to de novo review by district courtS.57 Creditors are routinely given actual notice of 

contested matters in bankruptcy proceedings, and they will be heard, either individually or 

through creditor committees, before decisions materially affecting their interests are made. 

In short, bankruptcy is a predominately judicial form of debt resolution. Bankruptcy 

judges operate much like other judges, federal district courts retain control over key decisions, 

and appellate review is available to challenge virtually any judgment reached. Bankruptcy is 

also an open process. Negotiations of course occur among different classes of creditors behind 

the scenes. But all affected parties are entitled to notice and to participate in formal decisions. 

B. IJegislative History of Dodd-Frank's OLA 

The process of commencing an OLA proceeding under Title II of Dodd-Frank does not 

fully conform to either the banking model or the bankruptcy model. The initial draft of what 

became Title II was contained in the Obama Administration's proposed legislation released on 

July 22, 200958 Title XII of this draft, entitled "Enhanced Resolution Authority," was largely 

drawn from existing banking legislation authorizing FDIC receiverships. In keeping with the 

banking model, the Administration draft provided that a receiver would be appointed 

administratively, in this case by the Secretary of the Treasury.59 The draft provided for a system 

of elaborate administrative checks before such an appointment could be made. The Secretary 

had to receive the "recommendation" of the Federal Reserve Board and the Board of the FDIC 

by a two-thirds vote, and the Secretary had to make certain prescribed findings 60 This was the 

origin of the so-called "three keys turning" required to unlock the orderly resolution process61 

56 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). 

5

7 28 U.S.c. § 157(c). 

58 Administration's Combined Draft Legislation for Financial Regulatory Reform" Division D - Improvements for 

Financial Crisis Management, Title XU - Enhanced Resolution Authority ("Resolution Authority for Large, 

Interconnected Financial Companies Act of 2009"), 584-673 (July 22, 2009) at 

http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/filesI252/Dodd-Frank-Act Admn-Reg-Reform-Bill.pdf (hereafter 

"Administration's Combined Draft"). 

59 [d. at § 1203(b) and § 1204(b). 

60 Administration's Combined Draft, § 1203. 

61 This 3 agency or "3-key" endorsement mechanism was previously utilized in Ihe FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 

(FDlCIA). Specifically in order for the FDIC to diverge from the least cost resolution rule required under FDlCIA, 

the Treasury must determine in consultation with the President, following a recommendation for such action by the 

FDIC and FED as sanctioned by a two-thirds vote of their respective boards, that such divergence is justified in 

order to mitigate adverse effects to the financial stability of the economy as a whole. See 12 U.S.c. § I 823(c)(4)(G). 

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The draft also followed banking law in authorizing the seized finn to file a judicial action within 

30 days demanding that the receivership be set aside 62 As under banking law, the 

Administration's draft language did not restrict the reviewing COUlt in tenns of the issues that it 

was allowed to consider in such a proceeding, nor did it put any time limit on that review. The 

Administration was undoubtedly aware that such a right of review is almost never exercised in 

the banking context. Consequently, although it would be of symbolic importance in assuring that 

the new resolution authority would not be abused, it would have little practical impact on the 

resolution process. 

The House version of what became Dodd-Frank, H.R. 4173, largely tracked the 

Administration proposal 63 The House bill followed the Administration draft in providing for 

administrative appointment of a receiver by the Secretary of the Treasury, and in prescribing the 

three keys turning before the Secretary could act.64 Again following the Administration bill, the 

House provided for a 30-day period to seek judicial review after the receivership commenced65 

The Senate had somewhat different ideas. S. 3217, which was proposed by the 

Democratic leadership on April 15,2010, followed the House bill in requiring three keys turning 

before a receiver could be appointed.66 But it lodged the appointment authority not in the 

Secretary of the Treasury but in a special panel of three bankruptcy judges drawn from the 

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, acting on petition by the Secretary of Treasury.67 

The discretion of the bankruptcy panel was, however, tightly constrained. It could consider only 

a single issue before granting or denying appointment of a receiver: whether the Secretary's 

determination that the firm was in default or in danger of default was supported by "substantial 

evidence.,,68 

The only explanation in the Senate Report for adding what might be regarded as a "fourth 

key turning" was that orderly liquidation of nonbank financial firms should be reserved for truly 

exceptional cases. 69 The Report stated that the threshold for triggering OLA should be "very 

62 Administration's Combined Draft. § 1205. 

63 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 11th Cong., I" Sess. §§ 160J et seq. (2009). 

64 H.R. 4173. § 1603(a)(1). 

65 H.R. 4173, § 1605. 

66 S. 3217, U.S. Senate, Illth Cong., 2d Sess. (April 29, 20JO), § 203. 

67 S. 3217, § 202. 

6'Id., § 202(b)(l)(iv). 

69 The Restoring Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Rep. No. 111-176, III" Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 2010) at 2. 

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high," hence, apparently, the rationale for adding "review and determination by a judicial 

panel,,,7o i.e., the panel of bankruptcy judges. One can speculate further about why a panel of 

bankruptcy judges was chosen for this role. Bankruptcy judges havc expertise in recognizing 

when firms are in default or in danger of default, and they have a reputation for independence 

and objectivity. Thus, although not mentioned by the Report, the injection of the panel of 

bankruptcy judges into the appointment process was presumably thought to enhance the 

legitimacy of what was otherwise an executive branch determination to liquidate a major 

nonbank financial firm. 

The introduction of this new threshold condition into the orderly liquidation process 

nevertheless posed a serious practical difficulty relative to the three keys approach advocated by 

the Administration and adopted in the House bill. The three keys the Fed, the FDIC, and the 

Treasury - are all administrative actors, and are conditioned to act in secret, as when banking 

regulators and the FDIC move to declare a bank receivership. Thus, unless there is a leak, the 

administrative recommendations and determinations required by the three keys should not trigger 

a panic in financial markets or a contagion analogous to a run on the bank. Bankruptcy judges, 

in contrast, operate in an open fashion characteristic of traditional judicial processes. How could 

the substantial evidence review required of the panel of bankruptcy judges be brought into this 

process without jeopardizing the confidential nature of the receivership appointment process? 

The answer contained in the Senate bill (although never discussed in the Senate report) 

was the imposition of series of extraordinary constraints on the panel of bankruptcy judges. The 

petition for appointment of a receiver would be filed under seal and the proceedings before the 

panel of bankruptcy judges held "[o]n a strictly confidential basis," with criminal penalties for 

disclosure. 71 Although the financial firm would be notified, creditors, counterparties, and other 

stakeholders would be kept in the dark. The panel would have to rule very quickly within 24 

hours of the filing of the petition.72 The Senate bill did not address what happened if the panel 

failed to make their decision within the requisite 24 hour time period.73 Once thc petition was 

granted, there could be no stays pending appeal to the courtS.74 

70 rd. 

7! S. 3217, supra, §§ 202(b)(l)(A)(iii); 202(b)(l)(C). 

n 1d., § 202(b)(l)(iii). ("On a strictly confidential basis, and without any prior public disclosure, the Panel, after 

notice to the covered financial company and a hearing in which the covered financial company may oppose the 

petition, shall determine, within 24 hours of receipt of the petition filed by the Secretary, whether the determination 

of the Secretary that the covered financial company is in default or in danger of default is supported by substantial 

evidence.") 

73 Id., § 202(b)(l)(iv)(I)&(U). 

"Id. § 202(b)(I)(B). 

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These provisions are jarring if we think of the panel of bankruptcy judgcs as a court. But 

the constitutional issues they present are diminished given the status of bankruptcy judges as 

"Article I" judges. For constitutional purposes, bankruptcy judges are little different than 

Administrative Law Judges in the Executive Branch.75 Thus, the role of the panel of bankruptcy 

judges under the Senate bill was not significantly different from a hypothetical provision 

requiring a panel of AUs in the Treasury Department to determine that there is substantial 

evidence a firm is in default or danger of default.76 Moreover, the provisions precluding any stay 

of the panel's order pending appeal are not terribly different from the judicial review provisions 

under the banking law, which provide for judicial review only after a receivership has 

commenced77 Allowing an appeal without a stay is functionally similar to allowing an appeal 

only after a receivership has commenced. 

There was, however, one important difference in the Senate bill's judicial review 

provisions. Under the Administration proposal and the House bill, there was no limitation on the 

legal or factual issues that could be presented to the court in challenging the appointment of a 

receiver after the receiver was appointed. Under the Senate bill, any appeal to the courts from 

the determination of the bankruptcy panel was to be limited to whether the Secretary's 

determination that the firm was in default or in danger of default was supported by substantial 

evidence. This is a far more restricted right of judicial review than that provided by the bank 

receivership laws, which put no limit on the issues a reviewing court can consider and appear to 

contemplate that the review will be de novo as to both fact and law. Of course, as we have seen, 

the right of judicial review is virtually never exercised in the bank receivership context. Still, a 

right of judicial review is an important safeguard, and limiting review to a single factual question 

under a deferential standard of review is a much weaker form of protection against executive 

abuse than that provided by the banking laws. 

Less than a month after the Senate bill was released, Senator Dodd proposed "for himself 

and Mr. Shelby" - the senior Republican on the Senate Finance Committee who had filed a 

dissenting report to the Senate bill -- a series of amendments to the Senate bill.78 The first of 

75 See Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline Company, 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982) ("It is 

undisputed that the bankruplcy judges ... do not enjoy the protections constitutionally afforded to Art. III judges. The 

bankruptcy judges do not serve for life subjeci to their continued 'good Behaviour., Rather, they are appointed for 

14-year terms, and can be removed by the judicial council of the circuit in which they serve on grounds of 

'incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.' Second, the salaries of the bankruplcy 

judges are not immune from diminution by Congress .. , In short, Ihere is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges created 

by the Act are not Art. III judges.") 

76 Such a provision, if not subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury, might nevertheless give rise to 

objections under Article II. 

7718 U.S.C §1821(c)(7). 

78 CongreSSional Record 111'6 Cong., SA 3739 (May 5, 2010). 

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these amendments made a further critical change in the method of appointing a receiver to 

commence the orderly liquidation process. Rather than have a panel of bankruptcy judges 

appoint a receiver on petition by the Secretary of the Treasury, the amendment provided that the 

receiver was to be appointed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

Now, for the first time, the receiver was to be formally appointed by an Article III judge, not an 

executive branch agcncy or a panel of "Article 1" judges. The modified Senate bill also changed 

the standard of review to be applied by the District Court from "substantial evidence" to 

"arbitrary and capricious," and added that the court was to consider whether the film was a 

"financial firm" as well as whether it was in default or in danger of default.79 No explanation 

was offered for the change. The amendment was adopted and incorporated into the final Senate 

version of the legislation, described as a substitute version of H.R. 4173 80 This revised bill was 

approved by the Senate on May 27, 2010. 81 

The public record is silent as to who proposed that the receiver be appointed by an Article 

III judge or why they thought this was important. Circumstantial evidence suggests at least one 

Senator must have insisted on this unusual fonn of "ex ante review" as a condition of his or her 

vote. Senator Dodd, the Chainnan of the Senate Finance Committee and the floor manager of 

the legislation in the Senate, needed sixty votes to avoid a filibuster. 82 In order to get to sixty, he 

had to count on several shaky Democratic votes plus at least two Republicans, including the 

newly-elected Senator from Massachusetts, Scott Brown83 When the divergent House and 

Senate bills went to the Conference Committee, the House conferees listed as one of the changes 

it wanted the elimination of the Senate's recently adopted provision for ex ante judicial review84 

The Senate refused, without explanation85 The House then insisted on the change,86 but the 

79 Senate Substitute, § 202(a)(l)(A)(iii). 

80 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of2010, Senate Substitute for H.R. 4173, III'" Cong., 2"d Sess. (May 

20.2010). 

81 Congressional Record I 11th Congress, S4560 (May 27, 2010). 

82 ROBERT KAISER, A CONGRESSIONAL ACT, (Alfred A. Knopf, ed. 2013) 

83 See Jia Lynn Yang, Scott Brown's Key Vote Gives Massachusetts Firms Clout In Financial Overhaul, WASH. 

POST (June 23, 2010). 

84 Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, conferee deliberations, Title II, House Proposed Offer to Title II 

(sent to Senate June 17,2010) at 

http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov iFinancialSvcsDemMediaJfile/key _issuesiFi nancial_Regulatory _Refor 

mlTlTLEIC OFFER.pdf 

85 Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, conferee deliberations, Senate Counter Offer: Title II, Orderly 

Liquidation Authority (sent to House on June 17,2010) at 

http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=3&RBID=775. 

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Senate again refused to relent. 87 The House at that point capitulated. A plausible inference is 

that the Senate conferees could not have caved in on the provision for appointment authority 

without endangering the razor-thin margin needed for sixty votes to approve the legislation once 

it emerged from the Conference Committee. Accordingly, the Senate version, calling for 

appointment of the FDIC as receiver by an Article III court, was approved by the Conference 

Committee, adopted by both the House and Senate, and signed by the President.88 

C. OLA As Enacted 

The relevant provisions of Title II, as enacted, can be briefly summarized. 

The internal administrative process that precedes the petition to the District Court for the 

District of Columbia for appointment of a receiver is described by the statute as a "systemic risk 

determination.,,89 The Treasury must undertake an analysis to establish that the triggering 

conditions warranting orderly liquidation have been met. Specifically, the statute requires the 

Secretary to make seven affirmative findings before making a determination to seek a 

receivership: 

1. The financial company must be in default or in danger of default. 

2. The company satisfies the definition of a financial company. 

3. The failure of the financial company would have serious adverse effects on financial 

stability in the United States. 

4. No viable private sector alternative is available to prevent default. 

86 Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, conferee deliberations, House Counter Offer: Title U, Orderly 

Liquidation Authority (sent to Senate on June 23, 2010) at 

http://democrats.financialservices.house.govlFinancialSvcsDemMediaifile/key_issueslFinancial_Regulatory_Refor 

mlConference_ on_HR_ 41 37ITitle_1IITitle_ICHouse_ Counteroffer _6_23_201 O.pdf. 

87 Wan Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, conferee deliberations, Senate Counter-Counter Offer: Title II. 

Orderly Liquidation Authority (sent to House June 24, 2010) at 

http://democrats.financialservices.house.govlFinanciaISvcsDemMediaifilelkey_issueslFinancial_Regulatory_Refor 

mlConference_on_HR_ 41 37lTitle_IIJSenate _ Title_IL CounteroffecRevised_ 6 _24. pdf. 

88 See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act - Conference Report (July 15, 2010) at 

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?rlll :.ltemp/-rlllAUElkn; See also Administration of Barack H. Obama, 

2010, Remarks on Signing the Dodd·Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkgIDCPD-201000617/pdf/DCPD-20 1 000617 ,pdf. 

89 DFA, § 203. 

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5. Any effect of a receivership on creditors, counterparties, and shareholders would be 

"appropriate" given the benefits of a receivership in terms of preserving financial 

stability. 

6. Establishing a receivership would avoid or mitigate the adverse effects on 

stakeholders relative to not undertaking such action. 

7. The company has been ordered by regulators to convert all if its convertible debt 

instruments90 

The statute also adopts the three keys turning that initially appeared in the 

Administration's draft legislation. The Secretary must obtain the written recommendation by a 

two-thirds vote of the members of both the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC before a 

petition is authorized91 The statute further provides that the Secretary must consult with the 

President before filing a petition92 

There is no indication in the statute that the covered firm has any right to participate in 

this administrative process. Conceivably the Treasury could provide by regulation for notice and 

an opportunity to be heard by affected private interests before any petition for appointment of a 

receiver is made, which would mitigate what otherwise would appear to be a deficiency of due 

process.93 But the statute does not require this, the assumption of the need for secrecy would 

seem to preclude this, and there is no sign that such regulations are contemplated. The statute 

does state that the Secretary shall "notify the covered financial company" when he makes a 

determination to file a petition,94 and there could be a gap between the Secretary's notification of 

the "determination" and the filing of the petition in court, which would give the financial 

company time to prepare for the court proceedings. But again, the statute does not require that 

the notification of the determination occur before the filing of the petition, and the concern for 

90 DFA. § 203(b). 

91 Different bodies must provide written recommendations jfthe covered financial firm is a broker/dealer or an 

insurance company, 

92 DFA, § 203(b). 

93 To date, the Treasury Department has not promulgated any regulations regarding how notice of its receivership 

determination must be provided to the failing financial eompany much less whether such notice must also be 

provided to affiliated parties with significant interests at stake. While the possibility of some future regulation along 

these lines is not out of the question, given the Treasury's objection to the 48 hour advance notice requirement for 

any receivership petition to the DC District Court (a requirement contained in the originally issued Local Civil Rule 

85), any rule regarding the provision of advance noticed to anyone implicated by the Treasury's receivership 

decision certainly seems unlikely. See Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific 

Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority, United States Government Accountability Office, Report to 

Congressional Committees (GAO-12-735), 15-16 (July 2012). 

94 DFA. § 202(a)(l)(A)(i). 

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swift and secret action would work against giving the covered firm any realistic period of time to 

prepare to do battle in court. 

Once the executive branch decides that a financial firm should be placed in receivership, 

it files a petition for appointment of a receiver under seal with the District Court for the District 

of Columbia. The statute provides for stiff criminal penalties for anyone who "recklessly" 

discloses the determination to file a petition, the content of petition, or "the pendency of the court 

proceedings.,,95 Creditors and other stakeholders receive no notice and, given the criminal 

prohibition on disclosure, have no way of intervening to defend their interests. If the court does 

not rule on the petition within 24 hours, it is automatically granted.96 In effect, the statute 

contemplates that a covered financial finn will be notified that the Treasury wants it liquidated 

and it is given the balance of 24 hours to review the Treasury petition and findings, prepare a 

rebuttal and file it with the court, and convince the court after a hastily convened hearing to 

reject the petition97 

The statute also severely limits the court in terms of what issues it can consider. The 

court is permitted to consider only the Secretary's determination that the firm is a "financial 

company" as defined by the Act, and his determination that the firm is "in default or in danger of 

default.,,98 Moreover, the court is limited to considering whether these two detenninations are 

"arbitrary and eapricious.,,99 The statute provides that if the District Court finds one or both of 

the Secretary's detenninations to be arbitrary and eapricious, the court must remand to the 

Secretary and afford the Secretary "an immediate opportunity to amend and refile the 

petition."lOo No other relief is mentioned; evidently the Secretary can keep refilling until the 

District Court grants the petition. An appeal is allowed within 30 days to the D.C. Circuit, and a 

petition for certiorari is allowed to the Supreme Court within 30 days of a ruling by the D.C. 

Circuit. 101 But no stay is allowed pending appeal, so the receivership goes forward once the 

petition is granted, even if the firm files an appeaL The statute again limits the issues that can be 

95 DFA, § 202(a)(C) (carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine). 

96 DFA, § 202(a)(t)(A)(v). 

97 The statute directs the District Court for the District of Columbia to adopt rules implementing the provisions for 

appointment of a receiver. DFA, § 202(b). Those rules were adopted on July 6, 20t I. See Local Civil Rule 85, 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia as amended on July 6.20]] (January 19,2011) at 

http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcdJsites! dcdJfilesf20 1 I _LCvR_85_Dodd-Frank_Amended.pdf (hereafter "Local 

Civil Rule 85"). For further discussion, see TAN infra. 

98 DFA, § 202(a)(l)(A)(iii). 

99 DFA, § 202(a)(I)(A)(iv)(I)&(1I)). 

100 DFA, § 202(a)(1)A)(iv). 

WI DFA, § 202(a)(2)A)(i) & DFA, § 202(a)(2)(B)(i). 

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considered by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court: they may only inquire whether the 

findings that the firm is a covered financial firm and is in default or in danger of default are 

"arbitrary and capricious."lo2 The language of the statute is more emphatic in limiting the issues 

that may be considered on appeal, stating that review "shall be limited" to these two issues.103 

Once thc court grants the petition appointing the FDIC as receiver of the covered 

financial firm, the process moves out into the open. The statute describes in excruciating detail a 

special kind of receivership which in some respects resembles an FDIC receivership of a bank, 

and in other respects resembles ordinary bankruptcy, with the FDIC exercising most of the 

powers of a debtor in possession or trustee in bankruptcy.I04 Upon being appointed, the FDIC as 

receiver exercises all the powers of the financial firm, including the power to operate the 

company, hire and fire employees, and retain the services of third-party service providers. lOj But 

the FDIC also acts like a bankruptcy court. It can order a stay of further proceedings to collect 

debts against the covered financial firm, 106 can unwind fraudulent and preferential 

transactions,107 can bring actions to collect monies owed to the firm,108 and considers and 

resolves claims of various classes of creditors against the firm. 109 If any creditor is dissatisfied 

with the FDIC's resolntion of a claim, it can bring a judicial action in the United States District 

Court where the covered financial firm has its principal place of business, and the court will rule 

on the claim. 1 10 There is, however, no requirement of court approval of other significant actions 

by the FDIC, such as the creation of a bridge financial company, the sale of assets, or the final 

liquidation of the covered firm. 

II. Constitutional Challenges: The Who and the When 

A variety of potential constitutional challenges could be made to Title II's statutory 

scheme. The secret, 24-hour proceeding in which the FDIC is appointed receiver by the District 

102 DFA, § 202(a)(2)(B)(iv). 

103 DFA, §§ 202(a)(2)(A)(iv); 202(a)(2)(B)(iv). 

104 See generally Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19Am. Bankr. 

rust. L. Rev. 287 (Winter 2011). 

105 DFA, § 21O(a)(l)(A). 

106 DFA, § 21O(a)(8). 

107 DFA, § 21 O(a)(ll)(A)&(B). 

108 DFA, § 21O(a)(l)(B)(ii). 

109 DFA, § 209 and § 21O(a)(2). 

110 DFA, § 21O(a)(4). 

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Court of the District of Columbia can be challenged as violating due process or Article III. The 

scheme can also be challenged as violating the "uniformity" requirement of the Bankruptcy 

Clause or the First Amendment. Constitutional challenges under the Takings Clause can also be 

imagined, depending on how particular issues are resolved during the receivership. But first we 

must consider who can bring these sorts of constitutional claims and when they might be 

advanced. 

We will discuss three possibilities: (1) raising constitutional claims defensively in the 

proceeding brought by the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint a receiver; (2) tiling an 

independent action under 28 U.S.c. § 1331 to enjoin the receivership once it is approved (but 

before it has taken significant steps to unwind the firm); and (3) filing an action to enjoin the 

appointment of a receiver before the Secretary files a petition to appoint a receiver. This last 

option is essentially the one being pursued in the complaint recently filed by the state attorneys 

general. I II 

Ordinarily, rmsmg constitutional claims defensively would be the least problematic 

course of action. If the government files a legal action in which it demands the defendant's 

person or property, there is no doubt the defendant can raise any constitutional objections she 

may have by way of defense. 112 Standing is clearly established: concrete injury has either 

occurred or is "certainly impending.,,113 Jurisdiction is based on the authority invoked by the 

government in bringing its action. I 14 There is no need to demonstrate a cause of action, since the 

defendant is raising the Constitution by way of defense. The government might try to argue that 

raising constitutional defenses is here impliedly precluded by statute. Specifically, by limiting 

review to whether the two determinations are arbitrary and capricious, the statute impliedly 

precludes consideration of other issues. Given the established canon that implied preclusion of 

review of constitutional questions is not favored, however, it is difficult to see how this would 

succeed. It is well established that Congress must speak with clarity before it cuts off 

constitutional claims, and the Court has said a "grave constitutional question" would be 

presented if such a clear statement of preclusion were ever encountered. I IS Nothing in Title II 

III See Big Spring Second Amended Complaint supra note 29. 

112 Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 

Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953). 

III Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, No. 11-1025 (February 26, 2013). slip op. at 15. 

114 See 28 U.S.c. § 1345. 

115 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,619 (1988). 

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comes close to a clear statement precluding constitutional defenses. J 16 Thus, if and when the 

Secretary of the Treasury files a petition with the District Comt for the District of Columbia 

asking for the appointment of a receiver to liquidate a financial firm, the firm (and possibly its 

officers or directors) can interpose constitutional defenses in response to the petition. 

The peculiar procedures set forth in Title II greatly complicate this conventional 

approach. One problem is notice. Some stakeholders will know about the Secretary's petition, 

namely, the directors and principal officers of the firm targeted for receivership and liquidation. 

But other stakeholders including creditors, counterparties, most employees of the firm, and the 

shareholders of the firm - cannot raise constitutional objections defensively, because DoddFrank makes no provision for giving them notice, requires that the court proceedings be 

conducted "on a strictly confidential basis,,,117 and indeed makes it a criminal offense for anyone 

who is aware of the proceeding to give any third party notice. IIR If there is no legal way to 

obtain notice of adverse action by the government, one cannot defend against it, on constitutional 

or any other grounds. Equally problematic, the district court cannot conceivably give adequate 

consideration to any constitutional defense in 24 honrs. The government will insist that the 

statute requires adhering to the 24 hour deadline, at which point the petition is deemed 

automatically granted and no stay is possible. Further, the government would likely claim, 

action is urgently needed to avert a financial crisis. Faced with a conflict between a strict 

statutory deadline and government warnings of financial crisis, on the one hand, and its duty to 

enforce the Constitution, on the other, what is the court going to do? 

Conceivably, the court could try to solve the problem by invoking the Constitution as 

authority to make modest modifications in the statutory procedures. For example, the court 

could grant a temporary stay of further action on the petition in order to afford an adequate 

period of time to brief and consider the constitutional issues presented. Remember, at this point 

the proceedings are confidential and the papers have been filed under seal. 119 If the court is 

persuaded that the constitutional defenses are serious, it might be willing to grant a short stay, 

perhaps of a few days, in order to give the issues fuller consideration. If after this period of 

expedited consideration the court concludes that the statute is unconstitutional in one or more 

respects, it could order more permanent injunctive relief that would cure the constitutional defect 

116 Other provisions of the Act address questions of judicial review, but they cut off judicial proceedings asserting 

claims against the firm while it is in receivership - except those specifically allowed -- or actions against the FDIC 

in its capacity as receiver - again unless expressly allowed. DFA, 210(a)(9)(D); DFA, 210(e). 

These provisions do not address review of the Secretary's decision to seek to have a receiver appointed. nor 

do they address possible constitutional challenges to the Act or any of its provisions. 

117 DFA § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). 

118 DFA § 202(a)(l)(C). 

119 DFA § 202(a)(l)(A)(ii). 

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and allow the petition to be considered in a manner consistent with constitutional 

requirements. J2O This constitutional ruling would, of course, be subject to appeal by the 

government (including a request for a stay or emergency relief) under the ordinary rules of 

appellate procedure. This solution is problematic, however, because it requires the court 

effectively to re-write statute before deciding whether it is constitutional. Also, it also does 

nothing to provide notice to other stakeholders who may want to raise constitutional objections. 

A second approach might be for any stakeholder who is aggrieved by the appointment of 

a receiver and pending liquidation of the firm to file an independent action in the district court 

seeking to enjoin the receivership on constitutional grounds. Jurisdiction would be based on 28 

U.S.c. § 1331, which applies to actions grounded in the Constitution. Standing would be 

established by the prospective liquidation of the firm or loss of rights or claims having monetary 

value. The cause of action could be based on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which 

provides that "[aJgency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which 

there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."J2J The Secretary's 

decision to petition for a receivership would be final agency action, and Dodd-Frank's draconian 

24 hour time limit and requirement that judicial proceedings remain in camera would preclude 

that statute from affording "an adequate remedy in court." This approach also has the virtue that 

it would be filed immediately after the receivership is established, and so the automatic stay 

powers given to the receiver would be in effect, providing a temporary stabilization of the 

situation and hopefully forestalling financial panic and behavior analogous to a run on the bank. 

Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank appears to eliminate this option, at least for some 

constitutional claims. It says: 

Except as provided in this title, no court may take any action to restrain or affect 

the exercise of powers or functions of the receiver hereunder, and any remedy 

against the Corporation or receiver shall be limited to money damages determined 

in accordance with this title. 122 

This would seem to preclude any action to "restrain or affect" the receiver based on 

constitutional claims in an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, for example, no court 

could entertain an action to enjoin the receiver on the ground that the statute violates the 

uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Power or the Takings Clause. This preclusion of 

review, however, might not affect constitutional claims addressed to the initial proceeding in the 

120 An issue of severability would be presented, at least implicitly. But it seems unlikely that the entire Dodd Frank 

Act should fall on constitutional grounds because of one or more constitutional infirmities in the process for 

appointing a receiver. 

121 APA, 5 U.S.c. § 704. 

122 DFA, § 21O(e). 

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district court to appoint a receiver, including those based on due process, Article III, or the First 

Amendment. These claims challenge the judicial process to appoint the receiver, and so do not 

seek to "restrain or affect" the powers of the receiver once appointed, As to defects in the 

appointment process, a bit of Iitigational jujitsu might be possible by filing a motion under Rule 

60(b) to set aside the final judgment approving the receiver, on the ground that the judgment was 

obtained under procedures that violate the Constitution.123 The Rule 60(b) motion would not be 

governed by the time limits or the gag order of Dodd-Frank,124 and hence would not encounter 

the problems that seem to doom any constitutional defense raised in response to petition itself. 

Still, even if this works for claims directed to the judicial process for appointing a receiver, it 

would not work for other constitutional objections to Title II. 

The third option would be to file an action challenging the constitutionality of the Act 

before the Secretary files a petition to appoint a receiver. Here, standing would likely be the 

most serious problem, particularly if the firm or one of its stakeholders bringing the action 

cannot demonstrate that action by the government is threatened or "certainly impending.,,125 It 

would be necessary to show that the government is seriously contemplating using its OLA to 

appoint a receiver, but that will be difficult if the government is successful in keeping its internal 

deliberations secret. 

Do the state attorneys general stand on firmer footing in being able to mount a challenge 

to Title II before it has been applied to any individual firm? Arguably they do. Although the 

Court has rejected the States' standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal legislation on 

behalf of their citizens through parens patriae suits,126 recent decisions suggest growing liberality 

toward state standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA, where the State sought to challenge the 

government's failure to regulate global warming, the Court spoke mysteriously about States 

enjoying "special solicitude" relative to private parties in determining standing to sue.127 More 

recently, in the Affordable Care Act litigation, serious questions were raised about the States' 

standing, with the Fourth Circuit ruling that Virginia lacked standing to challenge the individual 

mandate. 128 The Supreme Court declined to review this ruling, and went on to consider a wide123 See PRCP Rule 60. 

124 [d. at 60(c)(I) ("A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time--and for reasons [set forth at 

60(b)]( I), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.") 

125 Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, No. 11-1025 (February 26, 2013), slip op. at 15; Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 

126 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 

127 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 

128 Virginia ex el. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4'h Cir. 201 I). 

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ranging challenge to the individual mandate brought by 26 States among otbers, without uttering 

a word about standing. l29 This, of course, does not mean the Court found that the states had 

standing. There were other plaintiffs in the case, including individuals, and the Court may have 

implicitly concluded they had standing to challenge tbe mandate. At least in terms of optics, 

however, the Affordable Care Act litigation lends further support to the idea that state standing is 

to be quite liberally construed. 

The attorney general lawsuit that challenges the constitutionality of Title II of DoddFrank rests on the states' interest in their employee pension funds, which include investments in 

firms that are potentially eligible for liquidation under Title II. Although none of these firms is 

currently threatcd with orderly resolution under Dodd-Frank, the states argue that the statute has 

taken away their federal statutory right to have tbeir interests as creditors treated the same as 

other similarly-situated creditors. 13o They argue that this abrogation of rights is a present 

invasion of a legally protected interest, and hence satisfies the Article III requirement of actual 

immediate injury.13l The statutory right to equal treatment of creditors, however, is one that will 

come into play only when a debtor is in default or in danger of default. If tbe mere existence of 

a debt were enough to confer standing to challenge a change in the legal treatment of creditors, it 

would seem that any person should be able to challenge any change in the law that might 

conceivably affect their interests as creditors sometime in the future. This is clearly not the 

law.132 Also an injury caused by Dodd-Frank's authorization of departures from equal treatment 

of similarly-situated creditors bears no causal relationship to the due process, Article III, and 

First Amendment objections to the statute. m Thus, it is not clear that this alleged injury, even if 

otherwise sufficient to confer standing, would support standing to challenge the constitutionality 

of OLA. So we are doubtful tbat the D.C. Circuit will uphold the states standing to challenge 

Title II, in the absence of some evidence that OLA is about to be invoked in a way that would 

affect tbeir financial interests. 

Finding a cause of action could also become an issue. The APA, to repeat, provides that 

"[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agen(y action for which there is no other 

adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.,,134 If the Secretary has not made a 

129 National Federal oflndependent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 

130 State Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended complaint, 

State National Bank of Big Spring v. Wolin, No, 1 :12-cv-0132 (ESH) (filed Feb. 27, 2013) at 16-19. 

131 Id. at 19-24. 

132 Summers v. Earth Island Ins!., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572-73. 

133 It is not clear that it even implicates the uniformity requirement of the Bankrutpcy Clause, if that clause is 

interpreted to require that debtors be treated uniformly, as opposed to creditors. See discussion infra. 

134 APA, 5 USc. § 704. 

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determination to file a petition, it would be difficult to claim that there is final agency action to 

review. Absent a cause of action under the APA, the cause of action would have to be implied 

directly from the Constitution, as in Bivens and following cases. 135 The Court has been cutting 

back on these implied rights based on the Constitution. Most relevantly, the Court in FDIC v. 

Meyerl36 held that there is no implied Bivens action against a federal administrative agency (the 

FDIC as it happens) as opposed to individual federal officers. This still leaves open the 

possibility of an Ex Parte Young-style action seeking to enjoin federal officers, such as the 

Secretary of the Treasury, for threatening to take action alleged to violate the Constitution. 

There is a debate of sorts, at least in academic circles, about whether an implied right of action 

can be said to exist even in these circumstances. 137 As things currently stand, however, the Ex 

Parte Young cause of action is good law, and we assume the lower federal courts will continue to 

treat it as such unless or until the Supreme Court says otherwise. So on this slender reed, there 

should be an available cause of action for anticipatory relief. 

If the standing obstacle can be overcome, this might be the best of the three options. The 

action would not be subject to the time limits or the notice prohibitions of Dodd-Frank, which 

only come into play after the petition is filed. And it would not be limited by the preclusion of 

actions that seek to "restrain or affect" the powers of the receiver, because the receiver would not 

have been appointed. 

Whichever option is chosen, the government would undoubtedly seek to defeat any 

request for injunctive or declaratory relief on the ground that the firm and its stakeholders will 

suffer no irreparable injury if the constitutional arguments are postponed until after the OLA 

process is complete. The doctrinal vehicle for advancing this argument might be the Tucker 

Act,138 and the established proposition that takings claims can be postponed until after the 

government action is complete, provided all the interests at stake can be fully protected by a suit 

for damages in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. Relevant Supreme Court 

authority, perhaps most notably the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,139 holds that 

Congress will not be presumed to cut off a Tucker Act remedy absent a clear statement to the 

contrary. Dodd-Frank contains language that cuts off any remedy against the FDIC as receiver 

135 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

136 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 

137 See, e.g., John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 989 (2008); Ann Wool handler, The Common Law 

Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 Yale L. J. 77 (1997). 

138 28 U.S.c. § 1491. 

119 Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corporations, 419 U.S. 102,126-127 (1974); see also Ruckelshaus v. 

Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018-1019 (1984); Preseault v. LC.C., 494 U.S. I, 13 (1990). 

28 
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except an action for money damages as authorized by Title II. 140 But the Tucker Act authorizes 

suits against the United States for takings or breach of contract. So perhaps the Tucker Act 

remedy has not been clearly foreclosed by Dodd-Frank. 

The government would likely seek to bolstcr its no irreparable harm argument by claiming 

that all the interests at stake are in the nature of fungiblc financial assets dollars and that such 

interests by their very nature can be vindicated by ex post monetary awards, with interest to 

reflect the time value of money, Creditors who claim their security interests have been violated, 

officers who claim their salaries have been wrongfully clawed back, directors deprived of their 

paid positions - all these aggrieved persons can be made whole by an award of money damages. 

Unlawful action that can be rectified by a payment of money damages is generally regarded as 

not presenting the kind of irreparable harm that justifies mandatory relief. 141 

If the only constitutional questions presented were takings claims and impairment of 

contract claims, and the government's authority were otherwise uncontested, then this argument 

would be well founded. But if the government's authority to proceed in the manner directed by 

the statute is challenged on other constitutional grounds, then an ex post award of money 

damages is not sufficient to vindicate the claim.142 The Due Process Clause says that no one 

shall be deprived of property without due process of law. This generally means, at least when 

conventional property interests are at stake, that a person must be given an opportunity to 

challenge the legal authority of the government before their property is taken.I43 Thus, if a firm 

makes a credible contention that government is seeking to have it liquidated in a manner contrary 

to law, this issue should be resolved before rather than after the government liquidates the firm. 

140 DFA, 210(e) ("[AJny remedy against the corporation or receiver shall be limited to money damages determined 

in accordance with this title.") See also DFA 210(a)(8)(D) ("Except as olherwise provided in this title, no court 

shall have jurisdiction over. .. any claim relating to any act or omission of ... the Corporation as receiver."), By and 

large any claims against the FDIC will involve creditors and others with various rights stemming from their prereceivership relationship with covered financial company that were extinguished or modified when the company 

was placed into FDIC receivership pursuant to the OLA, 

141 See Weinberger v, Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-313 (1982); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 

U.S. 531,542 (1987); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.c., 547 U,S. 388, 391 (2006) ("According to wellestablished principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction". must demonstrate [,among other 

things,] ... that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 

injury ... "). 

142 Even takings claims are subject to this limiting principle. The Takings Clause has been read to mean that the 

government can take property only for a public use. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). If a 

property owner contends the taking is not for a public use, then this issue must be resolved before the taking occurs, 

not afterwards. If the issue is postponed, and the taking is later deter.mined not to be for a public use, then there will 

be no way to correct the constitutional violation. An award of just compensation cannot remedy a constitutional 

right that property not be taken, period. We are not suggesting a tirm could mount a successful public use argument 

against a Dodd Frank receivership. The point is more general, 

)43 E.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U,S. 1 (1990). 

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Once the firm's asscts are sold, and it is liquidated, it cannot be put back together again. Claims 

based on Article III of Constitution, the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, or the 

First Amendment would also seem to be the sorts of claims that cannot be rectified by ex post 

awards of damages. At least as to these sorts of constitutional claims, the firm the government 

wants to liquidate will suffer irreparable harm if the inquiry is postponed until after the 

liquidation is over. 

III. Constitutional Issues - Process Objections 

The prospect of appointment of the FDIC to liquidate a film under Title II would likely 

trigger deep anxiety by a variety of stakeholders of the targeted firm. Creditors would worry that 

they will not get their money back, even if it is secured by collateraL Holders of derivatives or 

swaps would worry that their contracts will be modified or repudiated. Officers and directors 

would worry that they will be out of a job. Shareholders would be distraught at the prospect of 

having their investment wiped out. Each of these groups would have an incentive to bolster their 

position by raising constitutional objections to the OLA process. Arguments conceivably could 

be advanced under Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, under Article III of the 

Constitution, under the Uniformity Clause of the Bankruptcy Power, under the First Amendment, 

and under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We consider in this Part process 

objections that would be brought in the name of due process and Article III. 

A. Due Process 

In order to establish a violation of due process, a claimant must show that he has an 

interest in life, liberty or property, that the government is threatening to deprive him of this 

interest, and that the deprivation will take place without providing the notice or opportunity to be 

heard required by due process of law. 

We assume that all the relevant parties who might feel threatened by the prospect of 

liquidation of a firm under Title II would satisfy the threshold requirement of having a 

"property" interest at stake. Due process property includes money and securities. Thus, 

creditors of all stripes have property for due process purposes in the assets of a debtor firm.144 

Property also includes a paying job, at least if one has an unexpired employment contract that 

makes one more than an employee at wilL 145 Consequently, officers and directors who will lose 

144 See Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (holding that unsecured 

creditor's claim is "property" for purposes of procedural due process). 

145 Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988) ("[AJppelJee's interest in the righl to 

cominue to serve as president of the bank and to participate in Ihe conduct of its affairs is a property righl protected 

by Ihe Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause"); Cleveland Bd. Of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532. 538-41 

(1985). 

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their positions through an exercise of OLA have due process property, provided they are working 

under an unexpired employment contract. It is also undeniable that the actions taken by the 

FDIC in completing an orderly liquidation constitute state action that would deprive these parties 

of their respective interests. 

In assessing what process is due, the Court has tended to treat notice as a requirement 

distinct from other procedural elements. 146 Actual notice by mail or the equivalent is generally 

required for any proceeding that will adversely affect the property rights of an affected party, as 

long as their name and address are "reasonably ascertainable.,,147 This would seem to call into 

question the feature of the statute that makes it a criminal offense to provide notice to anyone 

other than the firm to be placed into receivership.148 Shareholders, counterparties, creditors, and 

officers deemed to be responsible for the financial distress of the firm may have their interests 

compromised or completely wiped out by the mandatory liquidation of Title II, and yet the 

statute makes it a crime to provide them with notice that would allow them to voice their 

objections before that process commences. 

The government would undoubtedly point to bank receiverships, where by tradition no 

formal notice is given before a receiver is appointed and seizes the property. In practice, the 

appointment of a receiver will typically come as no surprise to the bank and its officers and 

directors. 149 As the D.C. Circuit has observed, bank regulators ordinarily will have raised 

concerns about the adequacy of the bank's reserves or other financial issues with bank officers 

over an extended period of time, giving the bank a clear idea of the relevant issues and an 

opportunity to respond, however informally. ISO Whether nonbank financial firms will similarly 

be alerted to the possibility of seizure under Title II through informal communications with 

regulators is unclear; certainly the statute does not require it. And even if the firm has been 

given effective notice, this does not mean notice will be given to creditors and other 

stakeholders, to whom notice is prohibited. 

146 Jones v. Flowers, 547 US 220, 223 (2006) ("Before a State may take property ... the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner notice and opportunity for hearing 

appropriate to the nature of the case.") (internal punctuation and citations omitted); see al,o Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 

U.S. 67. 80 (1972) ("For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties 

whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be 

notified.") (internal punctuation and citations omitted), 

147 Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams. 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983); Mullane v. Central Hanover Brank & Trust 

Co .. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 

148 DFA, § 202(a)(l)(C). 

149 But see David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 Emory L. J. 97, 119 (2010) (noting that in 2009 twenty-one 

banks were closed "without any prior notice by the agency."). 

150 James Madison Limited v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085,1099-1101 (D. C. Or. 1996). 

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The government will inevitably be thrown back on the position that sometimes exigent 

circumstances require that the government act without giving advance notice, as in a public 

health emergency. The government will argue that advance notice to all reasonably ascertainable 

stakeholders cannot be given before a seizure of the firm p!lfsuant to OLA, because this could 

trigger the very financial panic or instability Dodd-Frank is designed to prevent Such arguments 

have been accepted in other emergency contexts, but almost invariably with the caveat that a 

prompt post-deprivation hearing is available in which the legality of the seiz!lfe can be 

challenged and the property restored to its rightful owner if it turns out the seizure was 

unwarranted,151 Justice Jackson, in Fahey v. Mallonee, described bank seizure as a "drastic 

proced!lfe" justified by the "delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving 

credit during an investigation.,,152 But the procedure at issuel53 provided for extensive hearing 

rights, including a full particularization of the reasons for the seiz!lfe, within a matter of days 

after the seizure took place,154 Dodd-Frank's OLA, as amended by the Senate, eliminates the 

right of post-seiz!lfe judicial review routinely available (if rarely invoked) in the banking 

industry. Under Dodd-Frank, creditors who dispute the priority or valuation of their claim as 

determined by the FDIC can seek judicial review, But the government can point to no provision 

in the statute giving a post-seizure remedy to any other stakeholders, which will make it much 

more difficult to justify the absence of notice to these affected persons, 

Beyond notice, due process concerns are also presented by the extremely abbreviated 24 

hour period between the filing of the petition and the automatic granting of the petition required 

by Title II. Realistically speaking, it is impossible to imagine that this is adequate time either for 

t1Je firm to mount an effective defense or for the court to engage in meaningful deliberation about 

the issues presented. 155 To be sure, the only issues the court is allowed to consider are whether 

the Secretary acted in an arbitrary and capricious fashion in determining that firm is a "financial 

151 See, e,g., Mallen, supra, 486 U.S. at 24-41; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 255,253-54 (1947); Coffin Bros, v. 

Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 314-321 (1908). 

'" 332 U.S. at 253-54. 

153 The procedure being challenged in Fahey v. Mallonee was set forth in Section 5(d) of the Home Owners' Loan 

Act of 1933, as amended. See 12 U.S.c. §1464(d). This provision gave the Board of the Federal Home Loan 

Administration the authority to reorganize, consolidate, merge, or liquidate Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 

including the power to appoint a conservator or a receiver to take charge of the affairs of any such association. Id. 

154 332 U.S. at 252-253. 

155 See Kenneth Scott, Dodd Frank: Resolution or Expropriation (2012) at http://media,hoover.orgisites/defauItIfilesfdocumentsfdodd-frank-20120302.pdf. "The Dodd-Frank Act squeezes pre-seizure due process down to the 

vanishing point." [d. at 1. 

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finn" as defined by the statute,156 and whether he acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

determining that tbe firm is in default or in danger of default. 157 But if these elements are 

contested, it is inconceivable that the firm could put together a coherent rebuttal, present it to the 

court, and that the court could digest the issues and render a well considered decision within such 

an extremely compressed time period. This is especially true of the finding that the finn is "in 

default or in danger of default.,,158 This could entail an examination of hundreds of disputed 

accounting issues, many of great complexity. 

The process is made more problematic by the lack of clarity about what the drafters of 

Dodd-Frank understood by an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. The APA directs 

courts to set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law." 159 This standard expressly encompasses questions of 

law as well as fact. Does the omission of the phrase "otherwise not in accordance with law" in 

Dodd-Frank mean that the district COUlt may not review disputed questions of law? Such a 

construction would very likely be unconstitutional. 160 The fundamental objective of the Due 

Process Clause is to assure that the government deprives persons of thcir property only in 

accordance with the law, that is, "due process of law." An attempt by Congress to cut off any 

ability to challenge the lawfulness of a taking of property - at both the administrative and the 

judicial level -- would almost certainly contravene due process. 

The statute's limitation of review to just two of the seven factors that the Secretary must 

consider in detennining whether to petition for appointment of a receiver creates further due 

process problems. The statute requires the Secretary to petition for a receivership if he makes 

seven enumerated determinations listed in the statute. 161 There is no provision for an 

156 DFA, § 201(11). Financial firm means bank holding company. nonbank financial company supervised by the 

Federal Reserve Board, or any company or subsidiary of a company previously determined by the Fed to be 

predominately engaged in activities '''financial in nature." 

157 As defined by DFA, § 203(c)(4), which sets forth four alternative conditions. Some of these conditions, such as 

that a bankruptcy case is likely to be promptly commenced, id. § 203(c)(4)(A), might be provable by documentary 

or testimorual evidence, and could conceivably be resolved in one day - provided the evidence was already in hand. 

But other conditions, such as that the firm "has incurred, or is likely to incur, losses that will deplete all or 

substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable prospect for the company to avoid such depletion," id. 

203(c)(4)(B), would seem to require complex expert witness testimony that would be impossible to rebut or sort out 

in 24 hours. 

m DFA § 203(b)1); 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). 

159 APA, 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A). 

160 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Admirustrative 

Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 943-49 (1988). 

161 DFA § 203(b). 

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administrative hearing on any of the seven issues. The statute provides for judicial scrutiny of 

only two of the seven determinations, in the 24 hour hearing previously described under the 

arbitrary and capricious standard of review. How is it possible for the government to seize and 

liquidate a major financial firm based on five determinations that are never subject to any 

challenge by the targeted firm? Welfare recipients cannot have their benefits terminated based 

on determinations made by social workers that the beneficiary is never allowed to contest. 162 

Why should financial firms be liquidated without any opportunity to contest the legal 

determinations tbat support this action? Some determinations required by Dodd-Frank involve 

discretionary determinations of the legislative fact variety, such as the finding that resolution of 

the firm under ordinary bankruptcy law "would have serious adverse effects on financial stability 

in the United States." 163 But others are highly factual, in the adjudicatory fact sense, e.g., that 

the financial firm has been ordered to convert all convertible debt instruments. 164 Eliminating all 

avenues of challenging these determinations, either ex ante or ex post, seems hard to justify as 

being consistent with due process. 

Is it possible to defend the extremely limited review provided by Title II based on the 

government's paramount interest in preventing financial meltdown? The general due process 

standard for procedural adequacy is the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,165 which focuses 

on three variables: (I) the "private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) the 

"risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and (3) "the Government's 

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 

additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail." The magnitude of the private 

interest at stake will depend on who is bringing the challenge. The firm and its directors and 

shareholders may have the weightiest interests. The statute mandates that any firm placed in an 

OLA receivership must be liquidated and that all shareholder equity must be wiped out before 

other creditors take a hit. Directors are subject to mandatory dismissal. Directors of 

systemically significant financial firms may not elicit as much sympathy from the courts as 

welfare recipients and school janitors,166 but directorships are paid positions and under the statute 

the critical decision that determines whether a director keeps or loses her position is the 

162 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring elaborate hearing before welfare benefits are tenninated). 

163 DFA § 203(b)(2). 

164 DFA § 203(b)(6). 

165 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 

166 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients are entitled to adjudicatory hearing before 

benefits are terminated given "brutal need" eligible recipients have for such funds); Loudermill, supra (school 

janitor with undisclosed criminal record entitled to hearing before termination given importance of employment to 

individual welfare). 

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appointment of receiver. Once this happens, all directors are automatically terminated. 167 

Creditors will have more difficulty arguing that their interest is large, given that Title II gives 

creditors the right to bring a judicial proceeding to determine the validity of their claims, and 

establishes a benchmark for compensation equal to what a claimant would receive in a 

liquidation of the firm.168 Officers who fear they will be dismissed may be met with the 

argument that any consideration of this prospect at the time of appointment of a receiver is 

premature. Dismissal of officers is required only if they are found to be "responsible for the 

failed condition of the covcred financial company,,169 and thus any challenge by officers may not 

be ripe until the FDIC determines thcy warrant dismissal. 

The Government will undoubtedly argue that the procedures prescribed by Title II serve 

governmental interests of the highest magnitude. The very short noticc and rocket-like hearing 

are not designed to save on administrative costs, but to prevent a financial panic or contagion 

analogous to a run on the bank if ordinary judicial procedures were followed. In order to prevent 

future financial crises caused by the collapse of nonbank financial firms that are too big to fail, 

Congress determined that the government must be able to seize and liquidate major financial 

firms in an expeditious, in camera process. Stated in these terms, it is difficult to see how the 

interests of a single firm or its shareholders and directors in avoiding liquidation can be regarded 

as outweighing the prevention of an economic crisis. Forced to choose patent unfairness and 

economic disaster, courts will likely acquiesce in patent unfairness. 

Notice, however, that the Mathews test appears to contemplate a marginalist inquiry. The 

primary question is not whether the totality of the private interest outweighs the totality of the 

governmental interest, but whether "additional or substitute procedural safeguards" would be 

worth more or less than the "fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 

procedural requirement would entail.,,170 In the context of an OLA petition, this implies, for 

example, that the court should ask whether affording a financial firm, say, an additional 24 hours 

to mount a defense (with the proceedings remaining under seal) would be worth more in terms of 

preventing unfairness than the cost to the government and society in terms of increasing the risk 

of financial disaster. There is, of course, no meaningful way in which a court can answer such a 

question. This is a problem associated with the risk-utility due process test of Mathews more 

167 DFA § 206(5). 

168 DFA, § 

169 DFA 206(4). 

170 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 

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generally.17! But posing the question this way would at least increase the odds that the court 

would agree the statute violates due process. 

Given the intractable nature of the Mathews balancing test, especially as applied to such a 

high stakes situation, it is virtually certain that the parties and the court would look to analogous 

processes in order to decide whether Title II comports with due process. In particular, the 

government would inevitably emphasize that existing bank receivership laws allow regulators to 

seize banking companies with no advance judicial process at all. 172 

The problem with this analogy is twofold. First, as emphasized above, the banking 

statutes provide for de novo judicial review after the seizure takes place. Both the 

Administration's proposed version of OLA and the House bill followed this model, and provided 

for unrestricted judicial review after thc seizure of a systemically significant nonbank financial 

firm. The Senate, for whatever reasons, eliminated post-seizure review and substituted the 

extremely limited one-day pre-seizure review limited to just two issues. In so doing, it made it 

far more difficult to defend the statute against a due process challenge. 

Second, the rationale for dispensing with ex ante procedures in the bank receivership 

context depends in significant part on a quid pro quo or waiver argument keyed to government 

deposit insurance. The leading precedent is Fahey v. Mallonee, 173 which presented a 

constitutional challenge to the takeover of federally-chartered savings and loan association by the 

Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 174 Justice Jackson not only alluded to the heightened need for 

public regulation of banks, given their vulnerability to panics and the impact this can have on the 

wider economy. He also rcasoned that the savings and loan in that case was "estopped" from 

challenging the law because it had voluntarily sought a federal charter, knowing that a takeover 

was a possibility if the Bank Board became concerned about its financial condition. As he put it: 

"It would be intolerable that the Congress should endow an association with the right to conduct 

a public banking business on certain limitations and that the Court at the behest of those who 

took advantage from the privilege should remove the limitations intended for public 

protection." 175 

17l See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 1423 

(1981). 

172 12 c.F.R. 30, FDIC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority 

Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (March 15, 2011). 

m 332 U.S. 245 (1947). 

{74 The challenge was grounded in the nondelegation doctrine, but the Court addressed the limited procedural 

protections in its analysis. 

175 332 U.S. at 256. 

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The quid pro quo theme has recurred in more recent cases addressing due proccss 

challenges to various administrative actions taken by bank regulators, often with emphasis on the 

government benefit of deposit insurance, which greatly promotes public confidence in the 

banking system. 176 Ordinary bank receiverships and related summary actions occur in a context 

in which the most significant assets of the insolvent bank - the deposits that have been made by 

its customers - are insured by the federal government. This gives the federal government a very 

large justification for moving quickly and without advance notice to take over an insolvent bank 

in order to limit the government's exposure on its insurance obligations. It also allows the 

government to say that the bank voluntarily assumed the risk of summary action in return for 

taxpayers largely footing the bill for any missteps or even misconduct by the bank. The banks. 

one could say, must take the bitter with the sweet. 177 

This sort of quid-pro-quo argument cannot be easily extended to the nonbank financial 

firms subject to orderly liquidation under Title II.l7S Large non-bank financial firms are not 

chartered by the government, and do not have anything like the close interaction with regulatory 

agencies that characterizes banks. They may be subject to oversight by the SEC or the CFTC, 

but this does not rise to the level of intensity of scrutiny associated with visitorial authority 

regulators exercise over banks. And of course the government does not formally insure funds 

and investments held by clients in these nonbank financial firms. Perhaps TARP and the bailout 

regime could be characterized as one in which the government implicitly guaranteed that 

systemically significant firms will not be allowed to fail. But Title II is designed to eliminate 

such a guarantee to make sure the government will never again foot the bill for any capital 

infusions required by the resolution process. It is much more difficult in this context to claim 

that the government has delivered enough of the "sweet" to say that firms liquidated under Title 

II have voluntarily assumed the risk of getting the "bitter." Consequently, it is implausible that 

the OLA can be justified by the kind of estoppel argument adopted in Fahey v. Mallonee. 

176 FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (rejecting due process challenge to rule requiring automatic suspension of 

bank official indicted for crime); James Madison Ltd. V. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting due 

process challenge to actions by OCC and FDIC declaring bank holding company insolvent and seizing assets); Bd. 

of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys. v. DLG Financial Corp., 29 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting due process 

challenge to preliminary injunction freezing assets of shareholder of corporation for possible violations of Bank 

Holding Company Act); FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.ld 1122 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding capital directive to bank 

was unreviewable and that the administrative process that produced the directive and the enforcement order satisfied 

due process); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9ili Cir. 1991) (rejecting due process challenge to temporary cease and 

desist order requiring restitution of $21 million by bank officer pending administrative review); FDIC v. Haralson v. 

Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 837 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting due process challenge to appointment of 

conservator under statute providing for review only after seizure of assets). 

177 Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974), rejecting a bitter with the sweet argument in the context of a 

due process challenge. Id. at 166-67 (Powell. J.); id. at 177-78, 185 (White J.); id at 211 (Marshall, J.). 

178 See Zaring, supra, 60 Emory L. J. at 129-30. 

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Sadly and ironically, the extremely short notice required by the statute will itself produce 

a litigational advantage for the government that will be extremely difficult to overcome. The 

government can prepare briefs in advance suggesting the sky will fall if a systemically 

significant firm is not placed in receivership immediately. The government can also anticipate a 

due process objection, and can have its briefs, complete with extensive citations to banking cases 

and public health emergencies, prepared well in advance. The financial firm may be caught by 

surprise, and tlnd it nearly impossible to rebut these authorities. The violation of due process 

may itself assure that the due process defense fails. Certainly this will be true for stakeholders 

who receive no notice at all until the receivership is approved. 

The last point to make in connection with the serious due process issues raised by Title II 

is that they were almost certainly avoidable if Congress had simply followed the Administration 

draft and the House bill in providing for administrative appointment of a receiver followed by a 

statutory right to post-seizure judicial review. It is well established that some form of hearing is 

required before a property owner is conclusively deprived of a protected property interest. 179 

That said, it does not necessarily follow that the hearing must occur before the initial taking 

occurs. I80 Specifically, the timing, nature and procedural requirements of any mandatory hearing 

under due process clause will depend on a balancing of the competing interests involved, 

including the importance of the private interest and length or finality of the deprivation at issue, 

the probability of government error and the importance of governmental interests involved, 

including the administrative practicality of providing a hearing ex ante and the sufficiency of 

substitute procedure ex pOSt.18I Given the substantial public interest in avoiding a financial 

panic, and the practical constraints on providing advance notice to the numerous creditors with 

property interests at stake given the need for expedition, it is hard to imagine a court finding ex 

post review unjustified. 

As we have seen, for practical reasons banks only rarely invoke their right to seek postseizure review. But the availability of such review is an important safeguard against executive 

abuse of the enormous power conferred by Title II. Post seizure review eliminates the notice 

problem, because the entire world will know about the appointment of the receiver. And it 

eliminates the need to ram the proceeding through in 24 hours or to truncate the issues so that 

only a fraction of the potential points of legal contestation are subject to review. The Senate 

179 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422. 433-434 (1982); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 

(1972). 

ISO See Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 

680 (1977); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 62 (1919). 

lSI Matthews, 424 U.S. at 339-349 (1976); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-241 (1988). 

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blundered in thinking that a sham review before appointment of a receiver is preferable to a right 

to plenary review afterwards. 

B. Article III. 

The extremely compressed process for obtaining a judicial order establishing an FDIC 

receivership is also vulnerable to challenge on Article III grounds. Indeed, the Article III 

objection may strike an even more sympathetic cord with courts than the due process claim, 

because it implicates the constitutional authority and autonomy of the courts as a separate branch 

of government. 

We hasten to point out that the Article III issue is not the one typically associated with 

bankruptcy laws, as in Stern v. Marshall 182 or Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 

Pipe Line Co.183 In those cases, the Court was concerned with whether the Bankruptcy Courtan Article I tribunal could resolve what were concededly claims of private right under the 

common law of contract and tort subject only to deferential review by an Article III district 

court. The initiation of a Dodd-Frank OLA proceeding, in contrast, would almost surely be 

classified as one involving public rather than private rights. 184 An OLA action is commenced by 

a federal official, the Secretary of the Treasury, and it seeks the appointment of a federal agency 

(typically the FDIC) as receiver. The decision to grant the petition and the standards for 

conducting the receivership are governed by federal, not by state law. The rationale for the 

action is grounded in general considerations of the public interest -- to prevent a contagion or 

panic that would disrupt financial markets and lead to economic distress - not the resolution of 

claims between private debtors and creditors. The receivership will of course result in the 

resolution of numerous private claims, but this is secondary or incidental to its primary purpose. 

Thus, although the Supreme Court has failed to identify any bright line distinction between 

private and public rights, the OLA action seems rather clearly to fall on the public side of the 

line. The Court has repeatedly affirmed that public actions need not be tried in Article III courts; 

Congress has the option of conferring them on either Article III courts or administrative 

tribunals. 185 

182 No. 10-179, June 23, 2011. 

183 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 

184 Thus, we question the analysis in Brent J. Horton, How Dodd-Frank's Orderly Liquidation Authority for 

Financial Companies Violates Article III of the United States Constitution, 36 J. Corp. L. 369 (2011), which 

implicitly treats the appointment of a receiver as a matter of private right for Article HI purposes. 

185 Murray's Lessee v. The Hoboken Land and Imp. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); Crowell v. Benson, 285 

U.S. 22 (1932). 

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Moreover, in contrast to the claims at issue in Marshall and Northern Pipeline, the 

decision to appoint a receiver and initiate a liquidation of a financial firm is formally made by an 

Article III court - the District Court for the District of Columbia -- not by an administrative body 

or an Article I court. The statute says: "If the Court determines that the determination of the 

Secretary [on the two reviewable determinations} is not arbrtrary and capricious, the Court shall 

issue an order immediately authorizing the Secretary to appoint the Corporation as receiver of 

the covered financial company. ,,186 There is no attempt here to transfer authority away from an 

Article III court and give it to some other tribunal. The authority to appoint the receiver is 

formally exercised by the district court. I87 And the statute further elides traditional Northern 

Pipeline-type problems by providing that creditors of the financial firm subject to OLA, if they 

are dissatisfied by the receiver's resolution of their claims, can bring an action in federal district 

court and have their claim resolved there. 188 The statute appears to contemplate that these 

judicial proceedings will be tried de novo, not under a standard of deferential administrative 

review. 

The principal Article III problem we have in mind, rather, is whether a statute that 

severely restricts an Article III court in terms of the time it is given to consider an important 

question as well as the scope of the issues it can consider in resolving the question violates 

Article Ill. (Perhaps this might be called a separation of powers issue, rather than an Article III 

issue, to avoid confusion with Northern Pipeline-style claims.) In effect, the statute calls upon 

an Article III court to make a decision of surpassing importance, both to the financial firm and 

the economy, and yet simultaneously constrains the court to make this decision in such a way 

that it cannot discharge this duty in a manner consistent with the judicial power established by 

Article III. One might say that Dodd-Frank commandeers the court to lend its prestige and 

legitimacy to what is essentially an administrative process without respecting the traditional 

mode and manner in which courts function. 189 In our view, any court told that it must approve or 

reject a petition to establish a receivership to liquidate a huge financial firm, and that it has only 

24 hours to consider the question, will be very uneasy with its appointed role. 

186 DFA § 202(a)(1)(iv) (emphasis added). 

187 The matter is admittedly murkier if the district court fails to act within 24 hours. The statute switches to the 

passive voice and declares that "the petition sball be granted by operation of law" and then adds: "the Secretary shall 

appoint the Corporation as receiver." DFA § 202(a)(I) (v) (I) & (II). At least arguably, the Secretary is the 

appointing authority in these circumstances. 

l88 DFA § 210(a)(4). 

IRQ Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898; New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (principles offederalism do 

not permit Congress 10 commandeer stale governments to aCI as enforcement agents of federal law). 

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One sign of judicial discomfort is found in the D.C. District Court's Local Rule 85, which 

was amended to implement Dodd-Frank's in camera procedure for appointment of a receiver. 190 

The new Rule provides in part that "[aJt least 48 hours prior to filing the petition, the Secretary 

shall provide written notice under seal to the Clerk of the Court that a petition will likely be filed 

with the Court." There is no authority for this advance notice requirement in the statute, 

although presumably the Treasury will attempt to comply with it. The additional 48 hour notice 

is evidently designed to facilitate assignment of a judge to the matter and to allow the judge to 

clear his or her docket for the 24 hour marathon to come. This will relieve some pressure from 

the judge who must decide the matter, although the content of the petition itself, as well as any 

objections by the financial fim1, will not be made available until the 24 hour clock starts ticking. 

Local Rule 85 cannot obviate thc reality that a single judge must decide whether to order the 

liquidation of a systemically significant financial finn in a process that is the equivalent of a law 

schoo! take-home examination. 

The Article III objection is exacerbated by the statute's restriction of the court to 

considering two of the seven threshold detenninations that must be resolved before an OLA 

receivership is established. The court is to consider only whether the Secretary of the Treasury 

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the finn met the statutory definition of a 

"financial company," and whether he actcd arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the finn 

"is in default or in danger of default." The other five statutory triggering conditions are, 

according to Dodd-Frank, not to be considered by the court. Yet the judgment the court is asked 

to render granting a petition to appoint a receiver leading to mandatory liquidation 

necessarily presupposes that all statutory triggering conditions have been met. The court may be 

uncomfortable rendering a judgment that rests on legal and factual detenninations it is not 

empowered to review. Again, the objective of the statute appears to be to draw upon the prestige 

of the court as an independent tribunal to legitimize a process that is actually driven by the 

executive. Courts will not take kindly to being conscripted in this fashion. 

There is little precedent to draw upon in considering the Article III claim. The matter is 

arguably analogous to Rayburn's Case,191 where the courts were asked to render judgments 

subject to revision by the Executive. This was condemned on the ground that it made the 

judgments nothing more than advisory opinions.1n Arguably the same conclusion should follow 

when the Executive renders a decision that the court is asked to incorporate into a judgment, but 

without being given the time or the authority to make an independent detennination of fact and 

190 See Local Civil Rule 85 supra note 97. 

191 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 

192 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 83-90 (6"' ed. 2009) 

(explaining the significance of llayburn' s Case for understanding of the role of Article III courts). 

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law necessary to render a proper judicial judgment. The judicial input in both instances lacks 

substance, and serves only to transfer a measure of judicial prestige to an executive enterprise. 

Justice Douglas once warned that a statute which makes "the federal judiciary a rubber stamp for 

the President" would violate Article III.193 "If the federal court is to be merely an automaton 

stamping the papers and Attorney General presents," he wrote, "the judicial function rises to no 

higher than an IBM machine.,,194 His colleagues disagreed with his interpretation of the statute 

under review, but not with his understanding that such a statute would violate Article III. 

The absence of meaningful precedent to assess the Article III claim is both a strength and 

a weakness. It is a strength insofar as Congress has never before attempted to draw upon the 

authority of the courts while simultaneously constraining their ability to function as a court in 

such a dramatic fashion. The unprecedented nature of the judicial appointment provisions of 

Title II make it suspect. It is a weakness insofar as there is a presumption in favor of the 

constitutionality of duly-enacted legislation, and courts like to draw upon clear constitutional 

language or settled authority before rendering a judgment at an enactment of Congress is 

unconstitutional. 

The provisions authorizing an appeal from a district court order appointing a receiver 

raise further Article III questions. If the district court grants the petition to appoint a receiver, or 

if the petition is granted as a matter of law because the district court fails to act within 24 hours, 

the statute says the decision "shall be final, and shall be subject to appeal only in accordance 

with" the appeal provisions of Title II.195 The Act then adds: "The decision shall not be subject 

to any stay or injunction pending appeal.,,196 If this last sentence is interpreted to mean that the 

Court of Appeals (and the Supreme Court on further petition for certiorari) have no authority to 

enjoin or set aside the decision of the district court once it becomes final, then the "appeal" 

would have no function other than to render an advisory opinion as to whether the district court 

acted correctly. This would be a plain violation of Article III. To avoid this conclusion, one 

must hone in on the word "pending" in the sentence that prohibits any stay or injunction 

"pending appeal." This should be interpreted to mean that no stay or injunction can be entered 

while the appeals are pending, but once the appeals process is final, the appeals court and the 

Supreme Court have authority to enjoin or set aside the district court decision if they conclude 

that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously.197 As interpreted, this creates a strange go193 United Steelworkers of America v. United States. 361 U.S. 39,71 (1959) (dissenting opinion). 

194Id. 

195 DFA. §202(a)(J)(B). 

196 DFA. § 202(a)(I)(B). 

107 We thank Ron Levin for pointing out this problem and its possible solution. 

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and-stop judicial review process, but tbis is little different from the post-seizure review 

provisions of the banking receivership laws, which likewise presume tbat a receivership can start 

and then be stopped on an ex post petition for review to a court. 

If the statute is interpreted as allowing the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to 

overturn a receivership on appeal or certiorari, and it imposes no time limit on the Court of 

Appeals or the Supreme Court in reaching the determination whetber the Secretary's two 

findings are arbitrary and capricious, does this solve tbe Article III problem? It clearly means 

that these two courts would not be dragooned into rendering decisions in a time period too 

compressed to allow them to act in a properly judicial fashion. But it would still leave the 

district court dragooned to act in a manner impossible to discharge in a proper judicial manner. 

And it would limit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court to considering only two of the 

seven factors that determine whether the Secretary must petition for a receivership. As 

previously discussed, this presents an independent due process problem, and might be construed 

as presenting an Article III problem as well, insofar as the Appeals Court and the Supreme COUl1 

are being asked to restrict their review to only a subset of the legal issues that lead to the 

appointment of a receiver. Arguably this too represents an attempt by Congress to exploit the 

prestige of the judiciary while preventing it from discharging its judicial function in a proper 

manner. 

Can the district court avoid any insult to its judicial independence by simply declining to 

rule on the petition, in which case it takes effect by operation of law in 24 hourS?198 This would 

preserve the dignity of the district court, by refusing to lend its prestige to a process that forces 

the court to act in a non-judicial manner. 199 But the financial firm could still appeal, in which 

case the Article III question about limiting the courts to reviewing two of seven determinations 

would still be presented. More seriously, refusing to rule would spare the court at the expense of 

the parties subject to orderly liquidation. Indeed, by declining to participate, tbe court would 

only exacerbate the due process problem. Not only would the parties be denied any post-seizure 

judicial review, they would not even get the extremely abbreviated pre-seizure review provided 

by the statute. Seizure of systemically significant financial firms would take place based on the 

unreviewable say-so of the Executive. 

C. A voidance Anyone? 

198 The Dodd-Frank Act requires the District Court to adopt rules implementing the judicial appointment provisions 

of the Act. See note 97 supra. 

199 Cf. Korematsu v U.S. 323 US 214, 246 (Jackson. J. concurring) (urging that the Court refrain from upholding or 

overturning the use of internment camps to avoid establishing a precedent). 

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Before concluding our consideration of process objections to Title II, another wrinkle 

should be considered, namely, whether the statute cau be coustrued iu such a way as to elimiuate 

the coustitutional problem. The potential avoidauce move here might be to find that although 

Dodd-Frauk severely limits what the court can consider and how it must consider it, the APA can 

step in to supplcment the court's reviewiug authority, and in so doing elimiuate possible due 

process and Article III problems. 

Recall again that the statute requires the Secretary to make seven determinations before 

seeking the appointment of a receiver, and allows the district court to review only two of these 

determinations. Is it possible that a finaucial firm facing the appointmeut of a receiver could 

obtain review of the other five determinatious under the APA without being shackled by thc 24 

hour time limit and the arbitrary and capricious standard of review? The APA provides that 

"[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 

adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.,,2oo This would seem to fit the 

supposed situation, insofar as there is no other adequate remedy in court if the Secretary has 

committed legal or factual error with respect to five of the seven determinations. Indeed, insofar 

as the Dodd-Frank review provisions constrain the court with respect to the two determinations 

made reviewable - imposing a time so short it effectively deprives a firm of any adequate 

remedy in conrt - one could argue that all seven determinations can be reviewed uuder the APA 

because the review process prescribed by Dodd-Frank is plainly not "adequate." 

Can we say the Secretary's decision to file a petitiou is "final agency action?" The 

Snpreme Court has instructed that "two conditious must be satisfied for agency action to be 

'final': First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's decision making 

process ... rand] must not be of a tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must 

be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences 

will flOW.,,201 The first factor would seem clearly to be met. The Secretary's decisiou making 

process culminates in filiug a petition to appoint a receiver; he bows out at that point and turns 

everything over to the court and the FDIC. The second factor is more problematic. In formal 

terms, the court appoints the receiver, not the Secretary. So the "legal consequences" (which are 

considerable) flow from the court's decision to grant the petition, not the Secretary's decision to 

file it. Realistically speaking, however, the Secretary's decision is the one that matters. The 

court has only very limited grounds for rejecting a petition (and then only by remand to the 

Secretary for further findings), aud ouly 24 hours to do so. One way to resolve the matter is to 

focus on the way the statute handcuffs the court by permitting it to review only two of the seven 

determinations that the Secretary must make before filing a petition. As to the remaining five 

factors, the Secretary's decision is the last word. As to these factors, the Secretary's decision is 

200 APA, 5 U.S.c. § 704. 

201 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 

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fully and effectively "final," since the Dodd Frank Act provides for rcview by the court of only 

the other two factors. And the factors that are unreviewable under the Dodd Frank Act are the 

critical ones the financial finn would ask the court to review under the APA. 

A more serious problem is presented by Section 701(a) of the APA, which exempts 

matters from APA review when "statutes preclude judicial review" or "agency action is 

committed to agency discretion by law.,,202 The government would surely move to dismiss any 

action seeking review of the five delenninations (or all seven) under the APA on the ground that 

the statute makes them unreviewable. Absent a constitutional avoidance issue, we would regard 

this as a dispositive objection. The statute does not expressly preclude review of the five 

determinations. It does say, however, that the district court can only consider two 

detenninations. And the appeals court and the Supreme Comt are expressly limited to the two 

detenninations. Courts sometimes say that the inclusion of one type of review should be 

implicitly regarded as exclusion of other types of review,203 and that inference is particularly 

strong under the wording of Dodd-Frank. Once the constitutional avoidance issue is added to the 

mix, however, it becomes a closer call. Given the substantial due process and Article III 

arguments that the Dodd-Frank review provisions are unconstitutional, a court would likely 

strain mightily to avoid such a conclusion by finding that APA review has not been precluded, 

and that APA review can supplement the procedural deficiencies under Dodd-Frank. A sensible 

court would of course seek to harmonize AP A review with the congressional judgment that the 

appointment of a receiver must be resolved quickly and confidentially; so the court would set a 

timetable for APA review that requires considerable dispatch and keeps the matter under seal at 

least until a final judgment is reached. 

The government might also argue that even if review of the five detenninations is not 

precluded by statute, these detenninations are committed to agency discretion by law. One 

common refrain here is that matters are presumptively reviewable as long as there is "law to 

apply.,,204 The five detenninations Dodd-Frank sets out for the Secretary to consider (in addition 

to the two made reviewable by the district court) vary in tcnns of whether they point more 

toward a purely discretionary detennination by the Secretary or the application of law to fact. 

Whether the failure of a financial finn would have "serious adverse effects on financial stability 

in the United States,,205 would seem to be a determination one would want the Secretary of the 

Treasury to make, not an Article III court. On the other hand, whether "a Federal regulatory 

agency has ordered the financial finn to convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are 

102 APA, 5 U.S.c. 701(a). 

203 E.g" Block v. Community Nutrition lnst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). 

204 E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U,S. 592 (1988); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v, Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 

205 DFA, § 203(b)(2). 

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subject to the regulatory order,,206 seems to be abundantly one as to which there is "law to 

apply," As long as at least one contested determination includes debatable issues of law or fact 

of the sort that courts often adjudicate, the committed to agency discretion argument would fail, 

at least in part. Again, the need to avoid deeply unsettling constitutional questions might well tip 

the balance in favor of finding that at least some determinations are not committed to agency 

discretion by law. 

One potential difficulty with using the APA as an avoidance mechanism would arise if 

the financial firm subject to a petition for liquidation did not invoke the APA as a basis for 

review - something easy to overlook if a defense must be organized in less than 24 hours. 

Perhaps the court could raise this on its own motion, in the interest of avoiding constitutional 

difficulties. But it would be desirable for the financial firm to ask the court to review the petition 

under the AP A as well as under the Constitution. 

IV. Constitutional Issues - Substantive Objections 

Dodd-Frank's orderly liquidation authority may bc vulnerable on other constitutional 

grounds that implicate the authority of Congress to mandate the kind of receivership 

contemplated by Title II. This section looks at two possible Constitutional objections - one 

grounded in the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause and another based on the First 

Amendment. 

A. Uniform Laws of Bankruptcy. 

The Constitution confers power on Congress to adopt "uniform Laws on the subject of 

Bankruptcies throughout the United States.,,207 One possible objection to the Dodd-Frank OLA 

is that it does not constitute a uniform bankruptcy regime. Instead, the government is instructed 

to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to subject a nonbank financial firm to ordinary 

rules of Bankruptcy, or to switch the firm over to a different track reserved for systemically 

significant nonbank financial firms. The result is different bankruptcy laws for different 

financial firms, based on a highly discretionary determination by executive branch agencies as to 

which is more appropriate. The fact that Title II contains elements significantly more punitive 

than the ordinary bankruptcy regime makes this discretionary authority especially problematic. A 

distinct uniformity objection to OLA is that the statute authorizes the FDIC as receiver to treat 

similarly-situated creditors differently, if it determines that this is necessary to maximize the 

value of the assets of the firm, initiate or continue operations essential to receivership, or 

206 DFA. § 203(b)(7). 

207 U.S. Cons!. art. I, § 8, cJ. 4. 

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minimize losses,208 As we have seen, the state plaintiffs in Big Spring cite this potcntiallack of 

unifonnity as grounds for establishing their standing to challenge the constitutionality of DoddFrank, 

The reason for the limitation to "unifonn laws" in the Bankruptcy Clause is not entirely 

cleaL209 The leading case, Railroad Labor Executives Assoc. v, Gibbons, 210 construed the 

limitation to mean that Congress has no power to enact a law reorganizing a single debtor. Thus, 

if Congress were to enact a special law prescribing an orderly liquidation procedure applicable 

only to a single non-bank financial firm this could be challenged as an unconstitutional exercise 

of the bankruptcy power under the authority of Gibbons. The question is whether a similar 

conclusion should follow when Congress prescribes a specialized form of bankruptcy for 

financial finns and gives the executive branch broad discretion to apply this specialized regime 

rather than otherwise-unifonn bankruptcy rules on a case-by-case basis. 

In Gibbons, the Supreme Court considered the Rock Island Railroad Transition and 

Employee Assistance Act (RITA), a law passed specifically to address the circumstances of the 

Rock Island Railroad bankruptcy211 Among other things, the law sought to require that the 

railroad's bankruptcy trustee provide certain economic benefits to railroad employees who were 

not hired by other railroad carriers. In considering whether this special law was constitutional, 

the Court addressed two issues. First, whether the Act should be regarded as having been passed 

pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, which requires that laws be "uniform," or could be regarded 

as having been passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which does not include a unifonnity 

requirement. 212 Second, whether the unifonnity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause 

prohibits a bankruptcy law that applies to only one debtor. 

The first issue - whether RITA was enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause or the 

Commerce Clause - was critical, because the Court recognized that "if we held that Congress 

had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we 

would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy 

laws.,,213 It was therefore necessary to determine whether RITA fell within the ambit of the 

'08 DFA, 2JO(b)(4). 

'09 The Federalisl Papers contain only one sentence about the Bankruptcy Power. See The Federalist No. 42 

(Madison) (noting that "[tlhe power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the 

regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may He, or be removed 

into different states, thai the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.") 

'10 455 U.S. 457. 471 (1982). 

'" 455 U.S. at 462-63. 

212 Id. at 468. 

213 Id. at 469. 

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bankruptcy power. After surveying its prior decisions, the Court concluded that the bankruptcy 

power "extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the property of the debtor 

among his creditors.,,2!4 The power "includes the power to discharge the debtor from his 

contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distributc his property.,,2!5 In short, the Court held 

that any law that discharges the contracts and other legal liabilities of a debtor and distributes the 

property among creditors is a law adopted pursuant to the bankruptcy power. Under the rationale 

of Gibbons, Title U of Dodd-Frank would have to be regarded as being adopted pursuant to the 

Bankruptcy Power, and thus is subject to the "uniform laws" requirement. 

With respect to thc second issue, the Court acknowledged that the uniformity requirement 

of the Bankruptcy Clause "is not a straightjacket that forbids Congress to distinguish among 

classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws do not treat 

commercial transactions in a uniform manner.,,2!6 It also acknowledged that Congress could take 

into account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and fashion legislation 

to deal with geographically isolated problems, as it had done in the Conrail bankruptcy.2l7 But 

RITA was a different matter: "The employee protection provisions of RITA cover neither a 

defined class of debtors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular problem of one 

bankrupt railroad. Albeit on a rather grand scale, RITA is nothing more than a private bill such 

as those Congress frequently enacts under its authority to spend money.',218 The Court 

concluded that "[tJhe language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself compels us to hold that such a 

bankruptcy law is not within the power of Congress to enact.,,219 

The Court reinforced this conclusion by examining the history of the Bankruptcy Clause. 

The Clause was added to the Constitution during deliberations about the problem of affording 

full faith and credit to the legal actions of other states. Several states had followed the practice 

of passing private bills to relieve individual debtors, and questions had been raised about whether 

other states were obliged to recognize relief given by these acts. The Court concluded that the 

Bankruptcy Clause was adopted to provide Congress with the power to enact uniform 

214 Id. at 466, quoting Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902). 

215 [d., quoting Hanover National Bank, supra, at 188. 

216 ld. at 469. 

2J7 See Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974). 

218 Gibbons, supra, at 470-71. 

2J9 Id. at 471. 

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bankruptcy laws enforceable among the states, and that "the Bankruptcy Clausc's uniformity 

requirement was drafted in order to prohibit Congress from enacting private bankruptcy laws.,,22o 

In light of Gibbons, it would be unconstitutional for Congress to enact a law providing 

special rules applicable solely to the resolution of a specific nonbank financial firm. The same 

result should follow if Congress delegates authority to the executive branch to adopt specialized 

rules for the re-organization of a single nonbank financial firm. Congress cannot delegate power 

to an agency that will overcome a limitation on Congress's own authority to act.221 Is this DoddFrank? Given the extraordinary discretion that the Treasury Department and allied federal 

agencies have in determining that a financial company should be reorganized under Title II, as 

opposed to general bankruptcy laws, it certainly comes close. Title II's OLA may never be 

invoked, or may be invoked so rarely that it is tantamount to a one-off bankruptcy regime. And 

the decision whether to apply such a regime will left almost entirely to the discretion of the 

executive branch, under a statute that makes most of its determinations unreviewable. 

There is, however, a distinction between Dodd-Frank and a bankruptcy regime that 

amounts to a private bill. After Dodd-Frank, there are two bankruptcy laws for large nonbank 

financial firms one for most nonbank financial firms (the Bankruptcy Code) and the other for 

firms deemed by the executive to be too big to fail (Dodd-Frank Title II). Congress has enacted 

both laws, and they are set forth in the form of general statutes. Congress has further instructed 

the executive to decide, on an ad hoc basis, which of the two packages of bankruptcy rules 

should apply in individual cases. If Congress had set forth clear legal criteria for determining 

when Package A applies as opposed to Package B, and had allowed ordinary judicial review of 

any decision as to which package to apply, we think this would probably be constitutional. After 

all, Congress has legislated different approaches to the resolution of insolvency in different 

industries, like railroads, banks, and insurance companies. This inevitably presents classification 

questions, which have been resolved using ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. 

Dodd-Frank is a less clear case, because the factors for deciding which package of rules 

apply are highly discretionary and, as previously discussed, the provisions for judicial review are 

severely truncated. Congress came close to saying: here is a new package of bankruptcy rules 

for firms that are too big to fail, and you (the executive) decide in your unreviewable discretion 

which firms fall into that category.222 It is difficult to describe this as a "uniform law" of 

no rd. at 472. 

221 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (making this point in the context of a 

nondelegation challenge). 

222 A conslitutional purist might insist that Dodd-Frank gives so much discretion to the executive in this regard that 

it violates the nondelegation doctrine. We do not pursue this inquiry here, because the Court has refused to find a 

nondelegation violation provided Congress has laid down any kind of standard to govern executive decision making. 

E.g., Whitman, supra; Fahey v. Mallonee, supra. Dodd-Frank sets forth seven "determinations" that must be made 

before a receivership is commenced. which is more than enough 10 meet the lax requirements of the contemporary 

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bankruptcy, but it presents a different order of problem from the statute invalidated in Gibbons. 

So the uniformity objection would sail into largely uncharted waters. Given that Dodd-Frank 

sets forth a general regime for resolving the bankruptcy of firms that are too big to fail, and does 

not seek to dictate special treatment for specific classes of creditors in pending cases, we doubt 

that the courts would extend Gibbons to reach this situation. But the argument cannot be said to 

be frivolous. 

What then about the other uniformity problem cited by the plaintiffs in Big Spring: the 

provision of Dodd-Frank that allows the FDIC to treat similarly-situated creditors differently if 

this will maximize the value of the firm's assetS?223 Assuming that Dodd-Frank docs in fact 

contemplate that the FDIC can pick and choose among similarly-situated creditors,224 it is not 

clear that this would constitute a violation of the "uniform laws" requirement. One can have a 

law that uniformly provides for dissimilar or even random treatment of similarly-situated 

claimants. An example might be a bankruptcy law providing that creditors will be selected for 

payment by lottery. We do not suggest that such a law would be desirable. Uniform treatment 

of similarly-situated creditors is unquestionably an important policy of the bankruptcy laws, 

since it critical in overcoming the competitive race among creditors to capture a limited pool of 

assets, which bankruptcy is designed to prevent. 225 Dodd-Frank, by giving the FDIC discretion to 

treat similarly-situated creditors differently, may stimulate a competitive race to influence federal 

regulators to favor one creditor over others. Nevertheless, deviation from sound bankruptcy 

principles does not necessarily equate to a violation of the uniformity requirement. In our view, 

"uniform Laws" means that one debtor cannot constitutionally be singled out for dissimilar 

treatment; but it is probably too much of a stretch to say the Constitution requires that all 

similarly-situated creditors must be treated alike. 

B. First Amendment 

nondelegation doctrine. To be sure, decisions like Fahey have stressed that broad delegations are permissible in part 

because judicial review is available to hold the executive in check, As previously discussed, judicial review of the 

decision to seize a firm and put it into receivership is sharply limited under Dodd-Frank. Whether courts will 

continue to stress the need for judicial review, however, is unclear. See Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Iudicial 

Review, 33 Harv. I. t. & Pub. Pol'y 73 (2010). 

223 DFA, §21O(b)(4). 

224 The statute in fact says that all claimants "that are similarly situated ... shall be treated in a similar manner," 

subject to an exception where the FDIC determines that it is necessary to deviate from equality in order to maximize 

the value of estate assets. DFA, §21O(b)(4). The government argues in Big Spring that the exceptions would apply 

only in narrow circumstances, such as where payment to utilities should be continued to keep the lights on. A 

narrowing construction to this effect would go a long way toward undermining the premise of the states' argument 

about dissimilar treatment of creditors. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, State 

National Bank of Big Spring v. Wolin, No. 1:I2-cv-0132 (ESH) (filed Feb. 22, 2013) at 46-48. 

225 See, e.g .. Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 725, 758 (1984). 

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Dodd-Frank is also vulnerable to challenge because it contains a provision imposing stiff 

criminal penalties on persons who disclose truthful information about pending cases in an Article 

III judicial proceeding. 226 Of course, judicial proceedings are sometimes conducted in camera, 

as when a grand jury considers whether to bring a criminal indictment or the government seeks a 

warrant to search or arrest. And discovery materials or settlement agreements are sometime put 

under seal, as when the parties stipulate to a confidentiality agreement. But the idea that a 

defendant can be criminally punished for disclosing truthful facts about an adversarial judicial 

proceeding the government has brought against the defendant is without precedent. 

One can readily imagine circumstances in which Dodd-Frank's statutory gag rule would 

raise serious First Amendment issues. Suppose a financial firm is notified that a petition has 

been filed to appoint a receiver to liquidate it under Title II. The firm believes that the petition 

has been filed because it is on an "enemies list" established by the President to punish firms that 

have not contributed to his re-election campaign. The firm further concludes that its only hope 

of salvation is to leak the information about the pending receivership to the press, in an effort to 

rally opposition to the move. Dodd-Frank seeks to deter such action by imposing criminal 

punishment of up to five years in prison for speaking out about what is happening. 

A First Amendment test of Dodd-Frank's gag rule may never arise, because typically 

none of the parties to the proceeding to appoint a receiver will have an interest in disclosure. 

Other than the executive branch officials and the court personnel involved, only the officers and 

directors of the targeted firm will know about the proceeding, "and they are probably the last 

ones who would want the petition for a receivership to be disclosed."m This is no doubt true in 

a case where the firm is about to collapse and the government is acting in good faith. But the 

First Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was adopted on the assumption that 

the government will not always be operating in good faith. Obviously, Dodd-Frank's criminal 

penalties for disclosing truthful information about an OLA proceeding could only be challenged 

by someone who proposes to engage in conduct that would give rise to potential criminal 

liability.228 The question is whether its constitutionality would be sustained in such a context. 

226 DFA, § 202(a) (I)(C). 

227 Baird and Morrison, supra note 104 at 298. 

228 Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, No. 11-1025 (February 26, 2013), would appear 10 bar an anticipatory 

challenge to the gag rule by a creditor anxious to receive information about any petition to put a financial firm into 

receivership. 

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The government might attempt to argue that the gag rule is analogous to the rules that 

prohibit witnesses in grand jury proceedings from disclosing their testimony.229 But grand jury 

proceedings are not a final determination of criminal liability. If the grand jury returns an 

indictment, the defendant is free at trial to call relevant witnesses to testify in open court in an 

effmi to be exonerated230 In contrast, once a petition to appoint a receiver is approved under 

Dodd-Frank's OLA, a receivership commences that inevitably leads to mandatory liquidation of 

the targeted finn, as well as other irrevocable consequences such as the elimination of 

stockholder equity and the dismissal of all directors. In this sense, the Dodd-Frank gag rule is 

more analogous to an order closing a public trial, something highly disfavored under the First 

Amendment. 231 

The government may also seek to analogize the gag rule to the rules of secrecy associated 

with proceedings to obtain a search warrant, confidentiality agreements, civil commitment 

proceedings, or juvenile trials. But these secrecy rules can be explained on grounds of consent. 

Government employees involved in judicial proceedings for issuing warrants or orders for 

national security wiretaps can be prohibited from disclosing what goes on in these proceedings, 

because they have explicitly or implicitly agreed to these constraints by accepting public 

employment. 232 Confidentiality agreements are also based on consent, as where parties agree not 

to disclose the existence of a civil action or (more commonly) the settlement of a civil action.233 

Civil commitment and juvenile justice proceedings are also often confidentiaL But here too, 

typically, the party against whom the action is directed fully supports maintaining the 

confidentiality of the proceeding. Given that government employees and parties to lawsuits can 

consent to secrecy, Dodd-Frank's gag rule is presumably justifiable as applied to Treasury 

Department or FDIC officials, as well as court personnel, because these officials have consented 

229 See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble 

Co .. 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 

231l Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (holding that publication of grand jury testimony may not be 

prohibited once the term of the grand jury is over). 

231 In the context of criminal trials of adults, the Court has held that even if the prosecutor and the defendant agree to 

make the proceedings confidential, the First Amendment allows interested third parties (such as the press) to object 

on First Amendment grounds. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, 

Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 

232 See Snepp v. U.S. 444 U.S. 507. 510 n.3 (1980) (holding that the requirement that Snepp get the CIA's approval 

of any memoir he might write prior to its publication was not an unconstitutional restraint on free speech as Snepp 

had voluntarily signed an agreement to that effect both upon the commencement of his employment with the CIA 

and just prior to his departure). 

233 Seattle Times Co. v, Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding protective order prohibiting a newspaper from 

publishing information which it had obtained through discovery procedures did not offend the First Amendment). 

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to preserve confidential information that pertains to their public functions. 234 But threatening 

officers or directors of a targeted finn with criminal punishment for disclosing truthful 

infOimation about a court proceeding in which they have been involuntarily drawn is different. 

When the government brings a civil action against a party, and that party seeks to disclose 

truthful information about the proceeding, there is little precedent suggesting that the party can 

be criminally punished for doing so. 

Perhaps the closest analogy is provided by National Secnrity Letters (NSLs) authorized 

by the Patriot Act. The Act allows the government to issue NSLs requesting records from wire 

or electronic communications service providers as part of an investigation of potential terrorist 

activity, and prohibits the service provider from disclosing that such information has been 

sought. 235 Thc Second Circuit has held that there can be a compelling governmental interest in 

preserving the confidentiality of NSLs. 236 But the court also concluded that relevant First 

Amendment authority requires that any such restraint on speech must be narrowly tailored to 

serve the government's interest in confidentiality. The court further concluded that the 

government must bear the burden of proving, in each case, that there is good reason to believe 

that disclosure of a NSL would jeopardize a national security investigation237 

There are nevertheless significant differences between NSLs and Dodd-Frank's 

nondisclosure requirement. One question is whether the government interest in preserving the 

confidentiality of an OLA petition is as compelling as that in preserving the secrecy of an 

investigation of potential terrorists. If one assumes premature disclosure of an OLA proceeding 

could trigger a financial panic, the answer is presumably yes. A financial panic would be 

devastating to national economy, inflicting damage of a different sort than a terrorist attack, but 

nevertheless something equally to be avoided if at all possible. Another question is whether a 

case-specific justification of the need for secrecy is required by the First Amendment, as the 

Second Circuit held in the context of an NSL. 238 Dodd-Frank includes no requirement of a 

government demonstration of the need for confidentiality in each case in which an OLA 

proceedings is initiated. Congress apparently assumed that confidentiality would always be 

required in order to prevent a financial crisis analogous to a run on the bank. But it is not clear 

this assumption is necessarily correct. One can imagine a case in which a systemically 

significant nonbank financial firm is already known to be insolvent before an OLA proceeding is 

234 See United States v. National Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1955). 

235 18 U.S.c. § 2709 (2000). 

236 John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 878 (2d Cir. 2009). 

2J7 Id. at 883. 

238 John Doe, Inc .. supra, 549 F.3d at 878-881. 

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commenced, in which case the news would already have been absorbed by the market It is not 

at all clear why the gag rule is necessary in such a situation. So perhaps an individualized 

justification of secrecy is required in the OLA context too. 

There is a more fundamental reason why Dodd-Frank's gag rule fails the narrow tailoring 

requirement This is because the government had the option of structuring OLA like an ordinary 

bank receivership, in which plenary judicial review of the decision to appoint a receiver would 

occur ex post rather than ex ante. Putting the judicial hearing after the receiver is appointed 

eliminates any need for secrecy, as well as any need for a rush to judgment and the other 

problems previously considered in connection with a due process or Article III challenge. Once 

again, we see that the Senate's amendment injecting a federal district court into the process of 

appointing a receiver was an unforced error generating constitutional problems that could readily 

have been avoided. 

V. Takings Issues 

We conclude with some takings issues. Title II contains a number of provisions that 

conceivably could give rise to takings claims. It is difficult to speak with any certitude about 

how these might be resolved. Short of outright seizure or destruction of a recognized property 

right by the government, takings claims are resolved under an ad hoc regime that depends 

critically on the specific facts presented.239 We will briefly note some situations that seem 

especially likely to generate future takings claims, and then offer somewhat more complete 

analysis of the largest takings issue looming on the horizon: impairment of secured creditor 

claims in order to avoid taxpayer-funded bailouts. 

Tracking the language of the Constitution,240 takings claims can potentially present four 

issues: Does the claimant have an interest in "private property"? Has the government "taken" 

this property? If so, was the taking for a "public use"? And finally, has the government made 

adequate provision to provide "just compensation" for the taking? 

Of these four issues, the "public use" question is probably the least likely to be contested. 

Most would agree that seizing a firm to prevent or forestall a financial crisis, which is the 

premise for exercising Title II authority, is a legitimate public use.241 To be sure, just because 

239 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 

240 "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an 

overview of these issues, see DAVID A. DANA AND THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS (2002). 

241 The Supreme Court has defined "public" use broadly to include public benefit or advantage. Kelo v. City of New 

London, 545 U.S. 469 (20050; see DANA AND MERRILL supra, at 191-209. 

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the Title IT process as a whole satisfies the public use requirement, it does not necessarily follow 

that every seizure of property undertaken pursuant to a Title II proceeding is also for a public 

use. Still, assuming there is some nexus between the seizure and the purposes of Title II, a 

public use challenge will likely fai1. 242 The "property," "taking," and "just compensation" issues 

are more likely to arise, if and when OLA is used and one or more aggrieved stakeholders elects 

to pursue a takings claim. 

A. Some Possible Takings Claims 

L Assessments. Given its desire to avoid anything resembling a bailout of failed financial 

firms, Dodd-Frank provides that if Treasury funds are needed to support a financial firm during 

the resolution process, these must be repaid. The first source of repayment is the firm's 

stakeholders shareholders are wiped out and unsecured creditors will have their claims 

reduced, if necessary to zero. If this still leaves a debt to the Treasury, then the Act provides that 

the FDIC can impose "assessments" on a broad list of financial institutions.243 Those eligible to 

be tapped include any bank holding company with at least $50 billion in assets, any nonbank 

financial company subject to systemic risk oversight under Title I, and any other "financial 

company" with assets of at least $50 billion.244 

Financial firms that are assessed to pay for the resolution of some other insolvent 

financial firm may claim that this kind of monetary exaction constitutes an unconstitutional 

taking of property. Although the principle has not been enforced by the Supreme Court for many 

decades, there is older authority holding that special assessments disproportionate to any benefits 

conferred are takings. 245 Today, a threshold question would be whether the imposition of a 

general monetary liability of this nature can ever be challenged as a taking. In Eastern 

Enterprises v. Apfel,246 five Justices joining separate opinions thought not; in their view the 

242 Whether a taking is for a public use must ordinarily be resolved before a taking occurs, since if the taking lacks a 

public usc, it should be enjoined. See D. Zackary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L. J. 1280 

(2010). Dodd-Frank's OLA provisions offer no clear way to raise the public use issue before the seizure of a 

financial firm occurs. If a claimant has a legitimate public use objection, this would be an additional constitutional 

reason to condemn the statute. 

243 DFA, § 21O(0)(1)(B). 

2,'. DFA, § 21O(0)(I)(A). 

245 Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898); cf. Louisville & Nashville RR. V. Barber Asphalt Paving 

Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905) (permitting assessments based on general criteria like frontage footing); see generally 

Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 469-73 (1977). 

246 524 U.S. 498 (1998); see id. at 540-42 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 554-

55 (Breyer, J. dissenting). For a defense of the discrete assets limitation, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 

Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 974-78 (2000). 

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Takings Clause applies only to interferences with discrete assets. If the Clause does apply, the 

government would likely argue that liability for such assessments is analogous to a special tax to 

help redress a problem unique to the industry being taxed, such as a tax on chemical feedstocks 

to pay for hazardous waste c1eanups.247 Financial firms that object to paying assessments would 

likely stress the unfairness of forcing them to fund a general public good - avoidance of financial 

crisis -- when there is no required finding that they were at fault or even causally connected to 

behavior that gave rise to the crisis. Whether this would succeed if framed as a takings claim is 

doubtful but not impossible.248 

2. Executive Pay Clawbacks. Dodd-Frank requires the removal of officers of the financial 

firm if they are found to have been "responsible" for the company's financial failure. It also 

permits the FDIC to claw back any compensation they received during the two years prior to the 

start of the receivership.249 The clawback is not limited to "excessive" compensation, nor is 

there any statutory requirement of specific misconduct on the part of the officer that produced 

inflated compensation. To the contrary, the statute instructs the FDIC to weigh the "financial 

and deterrent benefits" of a clawback against "the cost of executing the recovery.,,250 This 

appears to be close to mandating a clawback whenever it would be cost effective to do so, 

without regard to the culpability of the officer or the excessive size of the compensation package. 

Executives subject to such clawbacks might argue that the statute goes far beyond 

traditional notions of avoidable preferences and fraudulent conveyances in bankruptcy, 251 and 

constitutes nothing more than an attempt to expropriate their wealth in order to promote the 

general good of achieving financial stability. The government would likely argue that DoddFrank's executive c1awbacks are consistent with recent c1awback provisions in the SarbanesOxley Act and the T ARP legislation252 and are broadly equitable and fair. The outcome, again, 

247 An earlier version of the Dodd-Frank Act provided for the creation of such a fund, but this was deleted by the 

Senate in order to reduce the perception that the statute contemplated "bailouts." CERCLA or Superfund, as 

originally enacted in 1980, provided for a tax on chemical companies, see 42 U.s.C. 9507(b)(l); this tax, in tum, 

supplied a fund for cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 42 U.S.c. 9611. The tax expired in 1995 and has not been 

reauthorized. 

248 For an analogous argument, albeit in a dissenting opinion, see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-16 

(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that it is a taking to force landlords to accept 

reduced rents based on "tenant hardship" for which they bear no responsibility). 

249 DFA, § 21O(s)(I). 

250 DFA, § 210(8)(2). 

25t See II U.S.C § 547(b)(4)(B) (allowing the trustee to avoid transfers made by the debtor to insiders with one year 

or less of the debtor filing for bankruptcy); but also see § 547(c) (prohibiting a trustee from avoiding a transfer that 

was made to any creditor in exchange for new, contemporaneous value given to the debtor). 

252 See Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the "Clawback" Remedy in the Current 

Financial Crisis, 72 Tex. B. J. 922 (2009). 

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is difficult to handicap, and might turn on what a court concludes is the relevant baseline for 

establishing legitimate expectations about the vulnerability of executives to salary c1awbacks, If 

baseline is that established by the Bankruptcy Code, executive would have a chance of 

prevailing; if more recent legislation is deemed to the relevant baseline, their chances would 

diminish. 

3. Revival of Barred Actions. Dodd-Frank contains an unusual provIsIOn allowing the 

FDIC as receiver to bring tort claims on behalf of the entity in receivership even though the 

statute of limitations has expired.253 The purpose is obviously to allow the FDIC to recover 

funds from former managers and other miscreants perceived to have caused the covered financial 

firm to experience financial losses. The covered claims include "fraud, intentional misconduct 

resulting in unjust enrichment, or intentional misconduct resulting in a substantial loss to the 

covered financial company." Fraud and unjust enrichment are well established common-law 

causes of action; "intentional misconduct resulting in substantial loss" is not, so the exact scope 

of this provision is unclear. The statute of limitations must have expired within 5 years of the 

appointment of the FDIC as receiver in order for the claim to be eligible for revival. 

Persons targeted in these cases may claim that reviving a cause of action for damages 

previously barred by the statute of limitations represents a taking of property. The Supreme 

Court has sometimes said that reviving actions barred by the statute of limitations would be a 

taking/54 but more often has said it is not. 255 Clearly, reviving liabilities previously barred by 

the statute of limitations interferes with the repose these statutes are designed to promote. Not 

surprisingly, perhaps, legislative revivals of liability have been declared uneonstitutional under 

provisions other than the Takings Clause256 Thus, it is difficult to predict with any confidence 

how such an action would ultimately be assessed today under a takings challenge. 

B. Impairment of Security Interests 

253 DFA, § 21O(a)(IO)(C). 

254 William Danzer & Co., Inc. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1925). 

255 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885). In the latter 

case the Court distinguished between actions to recover real or personal property, where the passage of the statute of 

limitations confers a title to property by adverse possession or prescription, and actions to recover of a debt, where 

the statute merely bars enforcement in court. 

256 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (holding that once criminal prosecution is barred by statute of 

limitations, revival of action constitutes an ex post facto law); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,217-19 

(1995) (holding that once action has been dismissed by federal court as barred by statute of limitations, enactment of 

a statute that adopts a longer statute of limitations and seeks to reopen judgments violates Article III). 

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The most significant takings issues potentially implicated by Dodd-Frank involve 

security interests. 257 In the quest to find sources of funding other than tax revenues to prop up 

firms undergoing resolution, the House bill, H.R. 4173, provided that certain secured creditors 

would be required to take a haircut of up to 10 percent of the value of their security interest if 

"the amounts realized from the dissolution are insufficient to satisfy completely any amounts 

owed to the United States .... ,,258 No such provision was included in the Senate bills or the 

version of the statute as enacted. In a tip of the hat to the House, the final version of the Act did 

include a section requiring the Financial Stability Oversight Council to conduct a study as to 

whether secured creditors should be required to take a haircut in future OLA proceedings.259 The 

study, which was completed in July 2011, recommended against amending the law to permit 

impairment of security interests, largely on the ground that the other powers given by the Act are 

sufficient to avoid future taxpayer bailouts without going after secured creditors260 Given the 

Council's advice, a revision of the law permitting impairment of security interests appears 

unlikely for the moment. Nevertheless, there is a very real possibility that Congress will 

demand the impairment of secured creditor rights in some future financial crisis, in the interest of 

avoiding taxpayer liability261 

A security interest is essentially a contingent property right held by a lender in specific 

assets owned by the borrower.262 In terms of conventional property forms, security interests are 

257 Unsecured claims are commonly reduced or disallowed in bankruptcy and other insolvency proceedings. A state 

law that retroactively impaired unsecured creditor rights could give rise to a claim under the Contracls Clause. See 

Ogden v. Saunders. 25 U.S 213 (1827). But for purposes of the Takings Clause, unsecured claims are regarded as 

contracl rights, not property rights, and hence impairmenl by the federal governmenl through bankruptcyproceedings does not give rise to any issue under the Takings Clause. As previously noted, unsecured claims are 

regarded as property for due process purposes. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 

485 (1988). 

258 H.R. 4173, § 1609(a)(4)(D)(iv). The interests covered where short term financial contracts secured by securities 

other than instruments of the United Stales or interests in land. 

25' DFA, § 215. 

260 Financial Stability Oversighl Council, Report to the Congress on Secured Creditor Haircuts (July 2011) at 

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/report%20to%2Ocongress%200n%20secured%20creditor%20haircut 

s.pdf. 

261 Recent academic commentary has argued that secured creditors have insufficient incentives to monitor distressed 

firms, and that eliminating the absolute priority rule for secured creditors would result in better monitoring. See 

Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2249, 2259 (1994). An earlier generation of 

scholars worried that secured creditors were likely to leave insufficient assets in a bankrupt enterprise to satisfy the 

claims of nonadjusting creditors like torts claimants. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy 

Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L. J. 857 (1996). Both Iypes of arguments 

presuppose that security interests are not constitutionally protected by the Takings Clause. 

262 See Baird supra at 2257 ("Security interests under Anglo-American law have always been tied to particular 

assets. A creditor acquired an inleresl in a particular piece of real and personal property and looked to it first to 

obtain repayment.") 

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analogous to executory interests: They are a nonpossessOly future interest that mayor may not 

vest, depending on the happening of a future contingency, namely, the borrower's default on the 

loan. If the loan is repaid in a timely manner, the security interest is released. If the loan is not 

repaid in a timely manner, this gives the security interest holder the right to seize or compel the 

sale of the asset in order to generate funds to repay the loan. 

Under the Bankruptcy Code, security interests are implicitly treated like property rights 

that belong to the secured creditor, although the Code studiously avoids labeling them 

"property." In a liquidation proceeding, a secured creditor is entitled to the full amount of its 

secured claim.263 The trustee in bankruptcy can either sell the property subject to the security 

interest,264 in which case the security interest follows the property, or can sell the property free of 

the security interest,265 with the proceeds of the sale being used to satisfy the secured debt. 266 If 

the value of the asset is equal to or worth less than the unpaid balance due on the loan, thc trustee 

can abandon the property to the security holder. 267 Security interests are subject to the automatic 

stay in bankruptcy, which can potentially impair the value of the security.268 The Code requires 

that the trustee provide "adequate protection" to secured lenders to minimize losses due to the 

stay.269 

Things are more complicated in a reorganization proceeding. Here, the bankruptcy 

trustee (or debtor in possession) can with the approval of the bankruptcy court decide that the 

specific asset in which a creditor holds a security interest is necessary to the success of the 

reorganized firm.27o In this event, the court can decide to keep the asset for the use of the 

reorganized firm. If it does so, however, it must perform a valuation of the asset and give the 

secured creditor a substitute for its property right - a "secured claim to the extent of the value of 

such creditor's interest.,,271 The Code again requires that secured creditors given these 

substitute rights must be given "adequate protection" that they will receive an "indubitable 

263 Dewsnup v. Timm. 502 U.s. 410,417 (1992). 

264 II U.S.c. § 363(b) & (c). 

265 Id. at § 363(1). 

266 Id. at § 363(j). 

267 Id. at § 554. 

268 Id. at § 362. 

269 Id. at § 363( e). 

27°Id. at § 1123. 

271 11 U.S.c. § 506(a). 

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equivalent" to the value of the property in which they previously held a security interest272 By 

allowing the bankruptcy court to substitute other rights of equivalent financial value for the 

security interest, the Code treats security interests as if they are fungible assets equivalent to 

money, and hence as something the court is free to exchange for money. 

As enacted, the Dodd-Frank Act follows the Bankruptcy Code in recognizing the 

distinctive status of security interests, and in particular in recognizing that they are entitled to 

adequate protection without regard to the impact this has on other creditors or on larger 

objectives such as preventing the collapse of a systemically significant firm.273 As in the case of 

the Bankruptcy Code, there is no acknowledgment in Dodd-Frank that security interests are 

property or that the abrogation of security interests in order to enlarge the pot of assets available 

for other worthy ends might raise constitutional questions. 

Notwithstanding its general posture in favor of preserving security interests, Dodd-Frank 

Title II deviates in certain respects from the way security interests are treated in bankruptcy. The 

clearest example concerns setoffs, as when a creditor holds funds of an insolvent debtor which 

the creditor then seeks to take as full or partial satisfaction of an unpaid claim. The Bankruptcy 

Code treats setoffs as a type of secured claim; Dodd-Frank does not. 274 Thus, it is foreseeable 

that some creditor denied treatment of a setoff as a secured claim will argue that this is a taking 

requiring the government to make up the difference by paying just compensation. The question is 

whether this type of deviation from the treatment of security interests in bankruptcy, or other 

reductions in secured creditor rights in the future in response to demands for alternative sources 

of funding of resolutions of systemically significant firms, could be challenged as a taking. 

Under the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, it is reasonably clear that security 

interests are "property" protected by the Takings Clause. The issue arose in a series of 

Depression-era cases under the Frazier-Lemke Act, which allowed farmers to obtain a 

moratorium on foreclosure and to convert mortgaged fmm property into a temporary 

leasehold. 275 The Court stated unequivocally that mortgages are property and that the Takings 

Clause applies. 276 It then offered shifting judgments about whether the moratorium and 

272 11 U.S.c. §§ 362(d)(I); 361; 1129(b)(2)(A). 

213 DFA, § 210(a)(3)(B) ("The receiver shall allow any claim ... which is proved to the satisfaction ofthe receiver.") 

274 DFA, § 21O(a)(7)(B). The Bankruptcy Code does not grant setoff rights per se; creditors' setoff rights are 

governed by state law. See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995). Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code does 

however acknowledge that a creditor has the right of setoff under state law and preserves setoff rights. See II U.S.c. 

§ 553. Section 506(a) treats valid setoff rights as a secured claim. Id. at § 506(a). 

275 11 U.S.C 203(s) (1934). 

276 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,601 - 602 (1935). 

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conversion was a taking. It struck down the initial version of the Act,277 but upheld a modified 

version two years later that shortened the moratorium period.278 In another widely cited 

decision, Armstrong v. United States, 279 the Court again stated unequivocally that a 

materialmen's lien is property protected by the Takings Clause. It held that when the United 

States seized property subject to such a lien with the result that the lien was completely 

destroyed, this was a taking. Most recently, the Court addressed a provision of the Bankruptcy 

Code that exempted certain household furnishings from judgment liens. The Court held that thc 

exemption should apply only prospectively and not to liens in existence when the Code was 

adopted. Relying on its decisions holding mortgages and materialmen's liens to be property, the 

Court reasoned that judgment liens are "property" and that the complete abrogation of a preexisting lien by statute would raise "substantial doubt" under the Takings Clause.28o 

Although the Court's decisions collectively establish that security interests are 

"property" for takings clause purposes, they nevertheless leave many questions unanswered. 

One question is whether the status of security interests as property is subject to prospective 

modification by legislation or regulatory pronouncement.281 There is a strong suggestion in 

Security Industrial Bank, the most recent decision, that prospective override of security interests 

would not be a taking. 282 This might mean, for example, that creditors who obtain setoff rights 

after the enactment of Dodd-Frank Title II cannot claim that the failure to treat these rights as 

property for bankruptcy purposes is a taking, because Title II announced to the world that 

henceforth they would not be treated as such. Setoff rights are close enough to the line between 

property and contract rights (which clearly are subject to compromise or even disallowance in 

bankruptcy) that this kind of re-c1assification may be permissible. It is less clear whether an 

announcement by Congress (or a federal agency) modifying the absolute priority given to 

277 Id. 

278 Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). 

279 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 

2S() United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). 

281 Compare James Stevens Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the 

Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1983) (arguing that 

Congress has complete discretion to modify the priority or other treatment of secured creditor rights under the 

Bankruptcy Clause) with Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REv. 851 (1999) (arguing that 

prospective modification of secured creditor rights that go beyond settled background principles of property law can 

give rise to takings liability). 

282 The Court specifically reserved the issue whether the Act would apply to liens established after the Act was 

passed but before it became effective. See Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. at 82 n.11. But the Court did not 

reserve the question whether a judgment lien established after the Act became fully effective was also susceptible to 

a takings challenge. Thus, the Court implicitly assumed the provision could be applied in a fully prospective 

fashion. 

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security intcrests in bankruptcy would be enough to immunize the government from any takings 

claims arising in security interests created thereafter. At least with respect to interests in land, 

the Court has been reluctant to regard every newly-legislated or regulated land use restriction as 

an automatic qualification of property, such that persons who acquire restricted property in the 

future are automatically barred by the restriction. 283 The Court has acknowledged that property 

rights are qualified by "background principles" of property law, such as the understanding that 

landowners can be barred from engaging in uses that create nuisances 284 Apparently, however, 

only longstanding limitations such as those recognized at common law count as relevant 

"background principles." This leaves considerable uncertainty about how the Court would 

respond to a law that prospectively modified the absolutc priority of security interests. Delays on 

foreclosure have been around a long time and presumably qualify as "background principles;,,285 

subordination of security interests to the need to avoid taxpayer bailouts might be regarded as a 

novelty that does not so qualify. 

Another question is how haircuts of security interests or other modifications in the rights 

of security interest holders should be analyzed in terms of total or partial takings. Armstrong 

holds that the total destruction of a security interest is a taking,286 and this tracks the analysis of 

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councip87 in terms of real estate. But if Congress or the FDIC 

as receiver shaves ten percent off the principal value of a security interest in order to reimburse 

the federal treasury for temporary financing, would this be regarded a total taking of ten percent 

of the security or only a partial taking of ten percent of the security? In the case of land, shaving 

ten percent off the existing acreage is clearly a total taking of the ten percent.288 But imposing a 

use regulation on the land that reduces its value by ten percent is only a partial taking, and is 

typically not compensable. This might suggest, by analogy, that imposing a ten percent haircut 

on secured interest holders would be a taking - especially if the purpose is to generate additional 

revenue for the government. But the matter is obviously debatable. 

283 See, e.g., Lucas, supra (limiting background principles to common law); Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 533 u.S. 

606 (2001) (declining 10 recognize a per se rule that land use regulations in effect at the time of purchase qualify 

property rights); see also Philips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 163 (1998) (holding that regulatory 

requirement imposed on client funds held in trust by lawyers did not qualify common law understanding that interest 

follows principal). 

284 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), 

285 See Forrester, supra, at 881-84. 

286 Armstrong, supra, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 

287 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding regulation that destroys all economically beneficial value of real property is a 

taking unless it tracks the common law of nuisance in the relevant jurisdiction). 

288 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (regulation that permanently transfers 

control over a small cable box on the roof of a building is categorically a taking). 

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Yet more questions are presented about what constitutes just compensation when security 

interests are impaired. For example, must compensation be paid for the time value of money 

when recovery of the equivalent value of secured interest is delayed? Under the Bankruptcy 

Code, the Court has held as a matter of statutory construction that value lost due to delay is not 

compensated.289 But the matter might come out differently when framed as a takings claim 

under the Fifth Amendment. The ultimate valuation question is presented by the standard, 

borrowed from FDIC receivership law,290 that a secured creditor is entitled to recover at least as 

much as would have been obtained in a liquidation291 This gives rise to a question of what 

assumption the FDIC (or a reviewing court) is to make about the state of the economy when such 

a hypothetical liquidation occurs. If Dodd-Frank's OLA only applies to "systemically 

significant" firms whose failure would lead to financial crisis, are we to assume that the economy 

is in a state of financial collapse?292 Does this mean that even if impairment of security interests 

is a taking, no compensation would be owed?293 Or to avoid undue speculation, should the FDIC 

(and the court) take evidence on what the liquidation value would be given state the economy is 

in when the valuation takes place, which, if Title II works as advertised, would not be a state of 

total collapse? 

Conclusion 

The constitutional questions presented by Dodd-Frank's orderly liquidation authority can 

be seen either as a dark portent of an inverted constitutional order, or as a set of relatively easily 

avoided mistakes caused by careless last-minute drafting. 

The dark vision goes something like this. The U.S. Constitution, like American law more 

generally, is designed for a world in which the government is seen as a potential threat to private 

rights, but private rights are not individually significant enough to pose a threat to government or 

society more generally. The Constitution was not designed for a world in which some privateJyowned firms are so "systemically significant" that special rules must be devised to allow the 

government to take them over and operate them if they take on too much risk and are in danger 

of collapse. In order to construct a world in which a central function of the government is to 

289 See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers ofinwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (holding 

that the Bankruptcy Code does not require compensation for the time value of a secured interest). 

290 See 12 U.S.c. § 1821(i) (providing that the maximum liability of the FDIC to a person having a claim against an 

institution is the amount the claimant would have received if the FDIC had liquidated the institution). 

29] DFA, § 21O(d)(2), (3). 

292 Baird and Morrison, supra note 104 at 316. 

29) Cf. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (holding that a taking does not require 

compensation if the claimant would have received nothing in the absence oflhe taking). 

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protect society from firms that are too big to fail, while nevertheless permitting such firms to 

continue to exist, constitutional rules must be fundamentally adjusted. Conventional norms of 

due process, understandings about the proper functioning of courts, limits on the legislative 

power reflected in the Bankruptcy Clause, and even free speech rights must give way. Property 

rights must be dissolved into a general mass of claim-rights, subject to reallocation by the 

government in order to advance its perception of the requirements of the general welfare. If the 

Constitution is supposed to be a bulwark that protects us from government, is Dodd-Frank a 

foretaste of what to expect when the government becomes the handmaiden of a financial 

oligarchy? 

A more benign vision would stress that most of the constitutional problems we have 

identified in Dodd-Frank stem from a single ill-considered decision by the Senate to abandon the 

judicial review provisions in the Administration's draft and the House bill in favor of a novel 

scheme calling for appointment of a receiver by an Art.icle III court. The Administration draft 

and the House bill called for administrative appointment of a receiver, coupled with a right of 

plenary post-seizure judicial review. Had Congress adhered to this conception, which was 

borrowed from existing banking law, it would have eliminated any serious due process question, 

any Article III question, and any need for a gag rule that raises potential First Amendment 

questions. Constitutional issues arising under the Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity requirement 

could have been laid to rest by drafting a more rule-like and less discretionary conception what 

type of firm is eligible for resolution under Title n. And the various takings issues could have 

been avoided or made more manageable by tacking more closely to established common law and 

bankruptcy law precepts about clawbacks, assessments, and the status of security interests. 

These enumerated revisions are relatively minor in the larger scheme of things. They suggest 

that Dodd-Frank's orderly liquidation authority is not too big for the Constitution - if only 

Congress had given sufficient consideration to the Constitution when it drafted this complex and 

far-reaching legislation. 

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