The H onora ble A nn Aldrich , U nited States District J udg e for the N orthern District of O hio, * sitting by des ig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0016n.06 F iled: Janu ary 8, 2007 No. 05-2649 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
CH ER YL HU G HES, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. GENERAL M OTORS CORP ORATION, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EASTE RN DISTRICT OF M ICHIGAN

O P I N I O N

Before: K

ENNEDY and GIBBONS , Circuit Judges; and ALDRICH, District Judge. * ANN ALDRICH, DistrictJudge. Pla int if f- a pp e lla nt C he ry l H ug he s ( “ Hu g he s” ) a

pp e a ls the district court’s g rant of summar y judgment in favor of

defe ndant-a

ppellee G ener al Motors Corporation (“GM”) on Hug hes’s claims of employ ment discrimination and re taliation in violation
o f 4 2 U. S
. C
. § 1 9 8 1 (“ § 1 9 8 1 ”) , T i t l e V I Io f t h e 1 9 6 4 C i v i l R i gh t s Ac t(“ T i t l e V I I ”) , a n d t h e A ge Di sc ri min a tio n in

Em plo y me nt A c t ( “ AD EA ” ). Hu g he s' s f e de ra l c omp la int

or ig ina lly i n c l u de d s tate law cla ims for discrimination, but beca use the district cour

t declined to exerc ise sup p l em en t al jurisdiction over those cla ims, they wer e re solved in Michiga n state cour

t. Be cause those state law c laims, for di scrimination and re taliation on the basis of ag e, sex andNo. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

2 rac e, we re resolved in GM’s favor i n state court on the s ame set of operative facts, issue pre clusion bars Hughes' s fede ral c laims on appea l, save for one set of claims. The statute of limit ations for § 19 81 c la ims is f

our ye ars , a s o pp os e d to the thr e e y e ars fo r H ug he s’ s Mi c hig an s tate lawc la ims
. Jones v . R.R. Donnelley

& Sons Co. , 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004) ( holding that the statute of limitations for a ctions broug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discrimination on the basis of rac e in employ ment is four y ear s); Mich. Comp. L aws § 600.5805(10) (200 2 ). Ther efor e, bec ause H ug hes filed he r complaint in fede ral c ourt on September 24, 2002, the only claims that have not be en re solved by the Michig an cour

ts are those under § 1981 f o r GM’s a ctions betwee n September 24, 1998 a nd September 24, 1999. Be cause summary

judgme nt was prope rly

g rante d to GM on all of Hug hes’s c laims, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt i s AF F IRM ED
. I. Hug hes, an A frica

n-Amer ican woma

n over f orty y ear s of ag e, wa s hired by GM in Fe bruar

y 1995, at t he age o f

3 9 , a s ana s s o c iate e n g in e e r . O v e r a p p r o xim a te ly

th e n e xt s ix ye ar s , H u g h es worke d at GM, in various depar tments, until her te rmination in Aug ust 2001. Hug hes has a lleg ed that she wa s repe atedly

discriminated ag ainst on the basis of her a g e, ra ce, a nd sex, bot h in terms of differ ent positions for which she a pplied, and in her

alleg edly disparate pay

as compa red to young er,
ma le and /or wh ite wo rk e rs . Be cause of the effe ct of the resolution of her state law c laims for employ ment discrimination and reta liation on the basis of ag e, sex, and rac e in the Michig an state courts, a s d es cr i b ed inf ra Section I I I .A., the only

alleg ed discrimination re levant to this claim is that which took place be tweenNo. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

Joint Ap pend ix (“J.A. ”) 16 16, num bers 6 4 thro ug h 7 0. 1 J.A. 1616

- 17, num

bers 7 1 thro ug h 7 9. 2 J.A. 292- 94. The two position s no t filled until afte r H ug hes’s transfer w ere 7 2 an d 7 3 o n h er 3 list, w hile the can celled position w as num ber 7 6. J.A. 1616
. 3 Se pte mbe r 2 4, 19 98 and

Se pte mbe r 2 4, 19 99 on

the ba sis of he r ra c e . Spe c if ic a lly , H ug he s a lle g e s, first, that there wer e six teen positions to which she applied during that time frame , wher e a position for whic h she wa s qualified wa s instead filled by someone white, a

nd that she wa s not c h o s en for tho se po sit ion s b e c a

us e of he r ra c e , and , se c on d, that sh e wa s pa id le ss tha n sim ila rl y sit uate d w hit e
co-w orker s beca

use she wa s black. Withr e s p e c t t o h e r

f a il u r e to p r o mo te c la im , H u g h e s a p p li e d f o r s e v e no f th o s e p o s itions prior to her transfe r into the T ruck G roup fr om the Tec hnical Assistance Group in Nove mber 1998. 1 GM , w hic h w ou ld b e the on ly so ur c e of

e vid ence for wh ic h in div idu a ls w e re hir e d into t ho se posit io n s , if an y , w h a t th e ir r a c e s w e r e , an d w h e n th o s e in d iv id u a ls w e r e h ir e d , h a s s tated on the
re c or d that it c ann ot fi nd that inf or matio n. Th e re fo re , it is i mpo ssi ble to t e ll whe the r t he ind ivi du a ls hired for those positions, i f any , wer e white, we re qua lified, wer e more q u al i fi ed t han Hug hes, or
wer e hire d afte r Hug hes had tra nsfer red in Nove mber 1998, when Hug hes was no longe r elig ible for
c on sid e ratio n f

or tho se po sit ion s. Hu g he s app lie d to the oth e r nin e po sit ion s pri or to he r t ra ns fe r i nto the Vehic le Sy

nthesis Analy sis Si mulation (“VSAS”) division in J uly 1999. Acc ording to GM’s

2 discovery response s, two of t hose posi tions wer e not filled until after Hug hes’s July

1999 transfe r,
and on e of the m wa s c anc e lle d. Ac c or din g to G M, Hu g he s p ro ba bly wo uld no t ha ve be e n e lig ibl e 3No. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

J.A. 292- 95. 4 J.A. 239. 5 J.A. 610, 93 2, 978. 6 J.A. 934. 7 Rele vant in cr eas es wer e 6.2 pe rc ent /$2 75 m ont hly (J .A. 938) , 2.1 per cen t/ $95 monthl y (J .A. 8 943), 4. 7 p ercent/$2 10 m onthly (J.A. 947), 6. 0 p ercent/$3 10 m onthly (J.A. 980), and

3. 78 percen t/$200 m on th ly ( J.A
. 9 82 ). 4 for the othe r six positions because she had spent less than one y ea r i n her position at the time. 4 Howeve r, GM has no infor mation on which individuals we re hired into those positions, if any , what their ra ces w ere , and when those individuals were hir ed. The ref ore, it is impossibl e to tell whether the individuals hired for those positions, if any , wer e white, wer e qualified, wer e more qualified than Hug hes, or we re hire d afte r Hug hes had tra nsfer red in July

1999, wh i ch wo u l dhave r emoved he r fr om c on sid e ratio n f

or tho se po sit ion s. Wit h respe ct to Hug hes’s pay , she alleg es that her sa lary at the time was be tween just over 80 perc ent to just less than 88 perce nt of the “ma rket ra te” f or her position. She also alleg es that 5 she wa s paid less than simi l ar ly situated white individuals in the Technic al Assistance Group a nd in V SAS
. Ho we ve r, be tw e e n Se pte mbe r 24 , 19 98 and Se pte mbe r 24 , 19 99 , a ll of the ind ivi du a ls 6 to whom H ug hes compar es herse lf rec eived only one salary incre ase, like Hughe s . Hu gh es’s inc re a se wa s 10. 3 pe rc e nt of he r sa lary , for an ad dit ion a l $400 pe r m on th. No ne of the ind ivi du a ls 7 to w h ic hH u g h e s c o mp ar e s h e r s e lf r e c e iv e d a la r g e r in c r e a s e in

s a la r y th ans h e d id , e it

h e r by pe rc e nta g e or

a c tua l amou

nt. 8 II.No. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

T he ap pl i c abl e st a tut e of li mit a t i on s fo r

Hugh e s ’ s T i t l e V I I an d AD EA cl a i ms i s ac tua l l y less 9 than the th ree y ears affo rded by Michig an’s s tatute o f lim itations for the state law claim s. Therefore, the state co urts’ reso lution of claim s ba sed on acts sin ce S eptem ber 2 4, 1999 , n ecessarily cov ers all of Hughes’s possib le Title VI I and A DE A claim s, as w ell as § 1 981 claim s ba sed on acts fro m Se ptem ber 24, 19 99 to the date of H ug hes’s term ination. 5 Hug hes’s a

ppeal r aises two issues: (1) whether the district co u rt proper ly g rante d GM summary judgme nt on Hug hes’s Title VI I , ADEA, and § 1981 claims arisingout of ac ts occurr ing sin c e Se pte mbe r 2 4, 19 99 on iss ue pr e c lus ion g ro un ds ; and (2 ) whe the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y g rante d summary

judgme nt to GM on Hug hes’s § 1981 claims arising out of acts occur ring betwee n September 24, 1998 a

nd September 24, 1999. On su mm ary jud g me nt, our r e vie w i s de novo
. Thomas v. City of Chat tanooga , 398 F.3d 426, 428 -2 9 (6 th Cir. 2005) (“We apply a de novo standard in r eviewingthe district court' s g rant
o f s u m m ary

j u d gm en t
. ”) (c i t i n g McLean v . 988011 Ontario, Lt d. , 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000)). I f there is no ge nuine dis p ute over a mater ial fac t preve nting judg ment as a matter of law , then summary judgme nt is proper. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). O n
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , a l l i n f

e r e n c e s f r o mt h e f a c t s m u s t b e dr aw ni nf

av o r o f t h e n o n m o v i n g p arty. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A. Issue Pr eclusion The district cour

t gr anted summ ary judgme nt to GM on Hug hes’s Titl e VI I , ADEA, a nd § 1981 claims resulting from ac tions oc curr ing a fter Septe mber 24, 1999, on the g round of issue 9 prec lusion based on the re solution of Hughe s’s state law c laims f or employ ment discrimination on the basis of a g e, sex and rac e in Michig an state c ourt.No. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

6 Be cause the state courts’ resolution of Hug hes’s state law claims require d examinin g t he exact same operative facts as her feder al claims, issue pre clusion or collater al estoppel a pplies. On the question of issue pre clusion, “[i] t is now settled that a fe d eral court must g ive to a state- court jud g me nt t

he same pr e c lus ive e ff

e c t a s w ou ld b e g ive n that ju dg me nt u nd e r t he law o f t

he State in which the judg ment was re ndere d.” Migra v. W arren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). As the state cour ts in question are Michig an cour ts, we look to Michiga

n law. “Under Michig an law, the party asser ting pr eclusion bea

rs the burde n of proof

.” Uni t ed

S t a t es v. Dominguez , 3 5 9 F. 3 d

8 3 9 , 8 4 2 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Ci ty of De tro it v . Q ua lls , 454 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Mich. 1990))
. Mo re sp e c if

ic a lly , “ [a] c ourt

mus t a pp ly iss ue pr e c lus ion

when 1) th e pa

rt ie s in bo th p ro ce ed i n gs ar e t h e s am e o r i n p ri v i t y , 2 ) t h er e w as a v al i d , fi n al j u d gm en t i nth e f i rs tp ro ce ed i n g, 3) the same issue was a ctual ly litigated in the f

irst proce eding , 4) that issue wa s nece ssary to the ju dgment, a

nd 5) the pa rt y a g a ins t w ho m pr e c lus ion is a sse rt e d ( or

its pr ivy ) h a d a fu ll a nd fa ir
o p p o rt u n i t y to liti g ate the issue.” Dominguez , 3 5 9 F. 3 d at8 4 2 (c i t i n g Michigan v. G ates , 4 52 N.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Mich. 1990)) . The same part i es we re p resent in both the state and fe dera l proce eding s, and a va lid, final judgme nt in the first proce eding , based on the Mich iga n Court of Ap pe a ls’ a ff

ir matio n o f t

he Mic hig an tri a l court ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt t o G M, is a lso pr e se nt. Hughes v . Gen. M

otors Corp. , No. 263688, 2006 WL5513 4 8 (M i ch
. C t
. App. Mar. 7, 2006)
. Hug hes does not dispute that she ha d a “f ull and fair opport u n i t y ” t o l i t i g ate he r cla ims and the fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns un de rl yingtho se c la ims in s tate c ourt
. I n evaluating Hug hes’s Michig an state law claims of discrimination on the basis of ag e, sexNo. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

7 and ra ce, the Michig an cour ts use the same McD onnell Douglas burden- shifting pa radig m used by the fe dera l courts in evaluating Title VI Iclaims. Sniecinski v . Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. , 666 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Mich. 2003). F urthermor e, the standa rds g overningthe g rant of summar y judgme nt in Michiga

n state cour

ts are ide ntical to those g overningsummary judgme nt in fede ral court. F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Mich. Ct. R. 2.116(C)(10). Thus, in aff irming summar

y judgme nt for GM on Hug hes’s state la

w claims, the Michig an courts revie wed and resolved the same issues that
wo uld have be e n re so lve d in fe de ra l c ourt c on c e rn ing Hu g he s’ s Ti tle VI I , AD EA , and § 1 98 1 c la ims , and the state courts’ r esolution of those issues was ne cessa ry to the judgme nt. The district cour

t corre ctly

held t h at beca

use the Michig an state c ourts g rante d summary jud g me nt t o G M o n H ug he s’ s st a te law c la ims , H ug he s’ s T itl e VI I , A DE A, and § 1 98 1 c la ims arisingout of ac ts occurr ing sinc e September 24, 1999, are barr ed by

issue prec lusion. B . S ec ti o n 1 9 8 1 Cl a i ms Hug hes admits that she possesses no dire ct evidenc e of discr imination on the basis of rac e with res p e c t t o h e r

f a il u r e - to
- p r o mo te an d

d is p ar a te p ay

c la im s u n d e r

§ 1 9 8 1 f o r a c ts o c c u r

r ing betwee n September 24, 1 9 9 8 and September 24, 1999. There fore , her “ Section 1981 claims are
an a l y z e d u n d e r t h e T i t l e V II McD onnell Dou g l a s/Burdine framework.” Ne wm an v . F e d. Ex pr ess Corp. , 2 6 6 F. 3 d 4 0 1 , 4 0 6 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Patterson v. Mc Lean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989))
. Under that familiar approa ch, Hug hes must fir st es t ab l i s h a prima facie case of dis c ri min a tio n b y

satis fy ingfo ur e le me nts : To e sta bli sha pr ima

fa c ie c a se of

dis c ri min a tio n, a

pla int if f m us t show that 1) he is a

member of

a prote cted c lass; 2) he wa s qualified for his job and perf

ormed it satisfac torily ; 3) despite his qualificationsNo. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

8 and performa

nce, he s uffe red an adver se employ ment action; and 4) that h e wa s replac ed by

a per son outside the protec ted class or was tr e a te d le ss fa

vo ra bly tha n a sim ila rl y sit uate d ind ivi du a l outsi de his protec ted class. J oh ns on v . U

niv . o f Cin c inn ati , 2 1 5 F. 3 d

5 6 1 , 5 7 2 -7 3 (6 thC i r . 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

“ I f th e p la inti f

f is a b le to [e s ta

blish a pr im a fa c ie case ], a mandatory presumption of discrimination is created and the bur den shifts t o t he def endant to ‘a

rticulate some le g itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for the [ challeng ed ac tions] .’” Id. at 5 7 3 (q u o t i n g McD onnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802). I f the de fenda nt can articulate such a rea son, “then the plaintiff must prove that the proff ere d rea son was actually a pretext to hide unl awf ul discrimination.” Id. (c i t i n g Mc Do nn e ll Douglas , 4 11 U. S. a t 80 2) . Pr e te xt is e sta bli sh e d “ by

sh ow ingtha

t 1) the state d r e a so ns ha d n o b a sis in fac t; 2) the stated re as o n s we re not the actua l rea sons; and 3) that the stated r easons we re insufficient to explain the defe ndant' s action.” Id. (c i t i n g W he e le r v . M

c Kin le yEn te rs. , 937 F.2d 11 58 , 1 16 2 ( 6th

Cir .1 99 1) ). Ho we ve r, “ [a] r e a so n c ann ot be pro ve d to be ‘a pr e te xt for discrimination ’ unless it is shown bo th that the re ason wa s false, and that discrimination was the re al
rea son.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hic ks , 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (e mphasis in origina l). Wit h respe ct to Hug hes’s failure-to- promote claim, that she was not hired in si x teen diff ere nt ins tanc e s b e c a

us e of he r r a c e , th e g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f G M is a ff

ir me d. Ev e n if the first three elements for a pr im a fa c ie case are taken a s established, Hug hes ca nnot produce any evidenc e esta

blishing that the individuals hired into thirteen of those position s we re white. No evidenc e re g ardingthe thirteen positions still in question appea rs to exis t. And despite Hug h es ’sNo. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

9 re qu e st fo r an a dv e rs e ins tr uc tio n as a re su lt of the la c k o f e vid e nc e , s uc h a n in str uc tio n d oe s not

he lp he r av oid summa

ry jud g me nt, be c a

us e the re is no e vid e nc e te nd ing to su pp or t an in fe re nc e a dv e rs e
e no ug h to me e t H ughe s’ s b ur de n o r p ro of . O f th e oth e r t

hr e e po sit ion s, tw o w e re no t f ill e d unti l afte r Hug hes ’s t ra n s fer into VSAS, and one was ne ver f illed at all, establishing le g itimate, nonprete x tual rea sons for not hiring Hug hes for those positions as a matter of la w. As a pra ctical matter , g iven the desig n of t he job listi ng sy stem in question and the time that ha s p a sse d s inc e the e ve nts in q ue sti on , it is ne ith e r surp ri sin g no r bla me wo rt hy that G M is un a

ble to f ill in the se pa

rt ic ula r b lank s. An d if

the c ourt we re to r e mand

the § 1 98 1 f

a ilure to p ro mot e c la im for f urther pr ocee dings, it is unclea r pre cisely

what fur ther proce eding s would be possible without
e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g e ith e r H ug he s o r G M’ s a sse rt ions c on c e rn ingtho se thi rt e e n p os iti on s. As a
re su lt, the c ourt

a ff ir ms the distr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat H ug he s c ann ot p re va il o n h e r f a ilure to promote cla ims as a matter of law. Wit h respe ct to her c laims of disparate pay , Hug hes has not esta blished a pr im a fa c iecase . GM do e s n ot d isp ute that H ug he s wa s a qu a lif ie d A fr ic an- Am e ri c an e mpl oy e e , s a tis fy ingthe fi rs t two e le me n ts
. Wi th r e s p e c t to th e th ir d an d f o urth e le me n ts , H u g h e s f ir s t a tt e mp ts to arg ue that beingpaid below “ marke t rate” i s enough to establish disparate pay . The Six th Circuit, however , has dete rmined that “to be deeme d ‘similarly -situated,’” the individuals with whom Hug hes see ks compar ison “must have dealt with the same super visor, have be en subjec t to the same standar ds and have e ng ag ed in the same conduct without such diff er en t i at i n g or mitigating c ircumstance s that would distinguish their conduc t or the employ er’ s treatment of them for it.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. , 964 F.2d 577, 583 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). In other words, the people to whom Hug hes w i s h es t o drawa compa rison must be simil ar to he r in all rele vant aspe cts. Clayton v.No. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

10 Meijer, I nc. , 281 F.3d 605, 611 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Under that standard, H ug hes’s “mar ket rate” c omparison fa i l s . I t does not matter if H ug hes wa s paid below “ marke t rate” if she
c ann ot s ome ho w s ho w that th os e wi th who m sh e is “ sim ila rl y sit uate d” are pa id a t or a

bo ve mark e t,
or a t le a st le

ss be low mark e t th an H ug he s w a s. Hug hes’s more direc t compar isons to co-w orker s in the Tec hnical Assistance Group a nd the VSAS divis ion also fail to satisfy the t hird and fourth elements – that she was paid l ess, and less than simil arly situated white co-worker s. Duringthe spec ified time period, Hughes wa s actua lly treated better than all of he r co- worke rs in terms of the s al ar y i n cr ea se aw arde d. But that sing le salar y inc r e a s e d

u r in g th e ti me p e r io d d o e s n o t e n d th e d is c u s s io n . In th is c a s e , H u g h e s c la im s that she
wa s, fo r t he re le va nt t ime pe ri od

be tw e e n Se pte mbe r 2 4, 19 98 , a nd Se pte mbe r 2 4, 19 99 , p a id l e ss than all of he r co- worke rs in both the Tec hnical Assistance Group a nd in VSAS, establishing a prima fac ie claim. Howe ver, H ug hes has not pointed to any evid en ce i n t h e re cord e stablishing that the ind ivi du a ls l ist e d a

re ind e e d “ sim ila

rl y sit uate d” in or de r f

or he r t o d ra w a c omp ari so n. De sp ite be ingin t he same de pa

rtme nt, Hu g he s do e s no t po int to any e vid e nc e sh ow ingtha t th e ind ivi du a ls sh e lis ts “ de a lt w iththe same su pe rv iso r, [we re ] sub

je c t to the same sta

nd ard s a nd
. . . e ng a g e d in the same c on du c t wi tho ut su c h dif fe re nti a tin g or mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s that wo uld d ist inguis h t h ei r conduct or

the employ er’ s treatment of them for it.” Mi tc he ll , 9 6 4 F
. 2 d a t 5 8 3 (citation omitted). Hug hes has ther efor e fa iled to satisfy the fourth e lement for he r pr im a fa c ie case , and the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt must be affirme d.

III . For the fore g oing rea sons, the di strict court’s grant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

GM on Hug hes’s Title VI Iand ADE A claims, as we ll as on Hug hes ’s § 1981 claims based on a cts takingNo. 05-2649

Hughes v GMC

11 pla c e sin c e Se pte mbe r 2 4, 19 98 , is AF F IRM ED
.