UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ-MENDOZA, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 15-9558 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Samuel Rodriquez-Mendoza, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the 

immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. 

We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States in 1999 and was served with 

a notice to appear in 2009. He sought relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), which 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 11, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

permits the Attorney General to cancel removal of an inadmissible or deportable 

alien who 

(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period 

of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of [his] 

application; 

(B) has been . . . of good moral character during such period; 

(C) has not been convicted of [a specified] offense . . . ; and 

(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship to [his qualifying relatives]. 

The IJ determined petitioner met the requirements of subparagraph (C), but 

failed to meet subsections (A), (B), and (D). And even if petitioner had 

established the physical presence and good moral character required by 

subsections (A) and (B), the IJ found he failed to prove his removal would result 

in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives under 

subsection (D). 

 At the time of the merits hearing in May 2014, petitioner’s qualifying relatives for 

purposes of considering the hardship factor were his United States born children, ages 13, 

11, and 5. He testified they had no health problems and were doing fine in school. 

Petitioner worked in Montana, and he came home once a month to visit his family in 

Utah. His wife worked full time, and had recently become involved with another man by 

whom she was pregnant. Petitioner said if he were removed to Mexico, he would take his 

children with him. He testified he still had family living in Mexico. 

Petitioner testified there were fewer educational opportunities in Mexico, he 

would not be able to find work, and there is “a lot crime where I am from.” Admin. 
3 

R. at 117. The IJ, while “not unsympathetic to the hardship [petitioner’s] children 

would face in Mexico,” concluded that “the hardship . . . is not significantly different 

in type of severity which would ordinarily be expected upon the removal of a close 

family member.” Id. at 78 (citing In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 

(BIA 2001)). 

Petitioner appealed to the BIA, which held the IJ had correctly concluded he 

had not established exceptional or extremely unusual hardship. The BIA determined 

it did not need to address the residency or good moral character requirements, 

because petitioner would not be eligible for cancellation of removal in light of his 

failure to prove the required hardship. 

This court lacks jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of 

relief under section . . . 1229b.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). To avoid this 

proscription on our jurisdiction, petitioner argues the IJ failed to apply the proper 

legal standards and consider all the relevant evidence in deciding he did not meet the 

residency requirement and was not of good moral character. But the BIA’s decision 

turned on petitioner’s failure to prove the required hardship—not residency or good 

moral character, and that is the ground we review. See Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 

783, 790 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or 

judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the 

propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”) (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). And as to the BIA’s decision regarding undue 
4 

hardship, petitioner does not argue it was anything other than an exercise of 

discretion by the Attorney General, which we lack jurisdiction to review. 

 We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

Circuit Judge