Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 30, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00243-CV

KEN SCHAWE AND 304 CONSTRUCTION, LLC, Appellants 

V.

CALDWELL COUNTY AND DANIE BLAKE, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 421st District Court

Caldwell County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 21-0-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

When 304 Construction, LLC was not awarded a Caldwell County

infrastructure construction project, 304 and Ken Schawe (together, “Appellants”) 

sued Caldwell County and its purchasing agent Danie Blake (together, the “County 

Appellees”). The County Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial 

court granted. For the reasons below, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND

The County Purchasing Act sets forth the competitive bidding process that 

counties must follow to select a contractor for county projects costing in excess of

$50,000. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 262.021-262.037. As relevant here, 

the process culminates in a decision by the County Commissioners Court to either 

“award the contract to the responsible bidder who submits the lowest and best bid” 

or “reject all bids and publish a new notice.” Id. § 262.027(a). The “lowest and 

best bid” is defined as the bid that “provide[s] the best value considering associated 

direct and indirect costs, including transport, maintenance, reliability, life cycle, 

warranties, and customer service after a sale.” Id. § 262.022(5-a).

As Caldwell County’s purchasing agent, Blake was responsible for 

managing the competitive bidding process for county projects. See id. § 262.011 

(delineating the duties of a purchasing agent). In early 2020, Blake solicited bids 

to complete a four-part General Land Office road construction project; six bids 

were submitted in response to the solicitation. 

The two lowest bids were $680,855.50 submitted by 304 and $737,046.41 

submitted by WJC Constructor Services. As well as their bid price, the companies’ 

bid packets included information detailing their number of years in the 

construction business, current and completed contracts, total staff, available 

equipment, and available credit. The bid packets were reviewed by Blake, 

engineers with Doucet & Associates, and grant management consultants with 

Langford Management, all of whom recommended that WJC be selected for the 

road construction project even though it was not the project’s lowest bidder. 

In this situation, the Caldwell County Purchasing Policies and Procedures 

Manual requires that “clear justification for not selecting the lowest bidder [] be 

documented to the Commissioner’s Court” that delineates “the rationale for 
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awarding to a bidder other than the lowest bidder.” In accordance with this policy, 

Blake prepared the following statement in advance of the March 23, 2021 Caldwell 

County Commissioners Court meeting:

Discussion Items:

The County Purchasing Department is requesting approval for the 

award opportunity to be given to WJC Constructors Services for the 

GLO Harvey CDBG Infrastructure Project RFB 20-065-020-C066.

All provided bids were reviewed by the county purchasing 

department, the county’s contracted engineers, and contracted project 

management consultants taking into consideration the number of years 

in business, input from past and current project references, and cash 

flow consideration through credit limits reported on the bidder 

qualification forms. 

Based on that review and those considerations, WJC Constructor 

Service will be recommended for the contract award. The lowest 

bidder (304 Construction) is not recommended due to inadequate 

credit limit amount ($100,000), concerns about equipment availability 

with multiple project sites and other ongoing projects, as well as 

limited years in business (4 years). 

Caldwell County Purchasing Department notified 304 Construction of 

the proposed award on 03/16/21 and that they had the opportunity to 

appear before the Commissioners Court on March 23, 2021, at 9:00 

a.m. pursuant to Texas Local Government Code 262.027 to present 

previously unconsidered evidence concerning the lower bid, which 

may include evidence of the bidder’s responsibility. 

Notable Budget Items: $737,046.41

Recommendation to Commissioner’s Court:

County Purchasing Department respectfully recommends the 

following:

Approval of award opportunity be given to WJC 

Constructor Services for RFB 20-065-020-C066 GLO 

Harvey CDBG Infrastructure Project. 

Blake’s statement incorporates Local Government Code section 262.027, which 

provides that a county contract may not be awarded to a bidder who is not the 
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lowest dollar bidder unless, before the award, each lower bidder is given (1) notice 

of the proposed award, and (2) an opportunity to appear before the Commissioners

Court and present previously unconsidered evidence. See id. § 262.027(c). In 

accordance with this section, Adam Meuth from 304 attended the March 23, 2021 

Commissioners Court meeting to present additional evidence relevant to 304’s bid. 

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Commissioners Court awarded the 

construction project to WJC.

A second Commissioners Court meeting was held approximately three 

weeks later, at which an attorney representing 304 appeared and provided 

additional evidence regarding 304’s bid. The Commissioners Court declined to 

revisit its previous determination awarding the contract to WJC. 

One month later, Appellants sued the County Appellees and alleged that “the 

bidding process has resulted in the erroneous award to WJC Constructors which 

was not the lowest and best bid.” Appellants sought a declaratory judgment and an 

injunction to (1) cancel the contract awarded to WJC and restart the bidding 

process, and (2) enjoin Blake from any further involvement in the bidding process. 

The County Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction and, in a signed order, 

the trial court afforded Appellants “an opportunity to conduct discovery regarding 

the decision to deny 304 Construction, LLC’s bid.” Appellants subsequently filed 

a motion for summary judgment and attached evidence, which the trial court 

agreed to “treat as a Response to [the County Appellees’] Plea to the Jurisdiction.” 

After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, the trial court signed an order 

granting the County Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Appellants’ 

claims with prejudice. Appellants timely appealed and their case was transferred 
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to this court by Supreme Court of Texas Transfer Order.1 

ANALYSIS

Asserting the trial court erred in granting the County Appellees’ plea to the 

jurisdiction, Appellants contend the trial court properly may exercise jurisdiction 

under (1) the County Purchasing Act (see Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 262.033),

and (2) the ultra vires doctrine. We consider these jurisdictional bases below, 

beginning with the applicable standard of review.

I. Standard of Review

Sovereign immunity protects the State of Texas and its agencies from suit 

and liability, whereas governmental immunity provides similar protections to the 

State’s political subdivisions, including its counties, cities, and school districts. 

Chambers-Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 344 (Tex. 

2019). An assertion of governmental immunity implicates the trial court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction and, therefore, may be asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. 

Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); City of Austin v. Findley, 

No. 03-21-00015-CV, 2022 WL 1177605, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 21, 

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the 

jurisdiction de novo. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Johnson, 572 S.W.3d 658, 664 

(Tex. 2019). 

When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of 

jurisdictional facts, we may consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties 

and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Tex. Dep’t of 

Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 223, 227 (Tex. 2004). The 

1 Because of the transfer, we must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the 

Third Court of Appeals if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with that court’s 

precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
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applicable standard of review mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment: “all 

the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine 

whether a genuine issue of material facts exists.” Town of Shady Shores v. 

Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). 

But there is another layer to our review because we are, in essence, asked to 

revisit a decision made by the Caldwell County Commissioners Court. A 

Commissioners Court serves as the county’s principal governing body and may 

exercise legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial functions. See Tex. 

Const. art. V, § 18; Comm’rs Ct. of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 

1997). 

Appellate review of a Commissioners Court’s decision is narrow: “[a] party 

can invoke the district court’s supervisory control over a Commissioners Court 

judgment only when the Commissioners Court acts beyond its jurisdiction or 

clearly abuses the discretion conferred upon the Commissioners Court by law.” 

Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80. Accordingly, our review is limited to discerning whether 

the Commissioners Court acted “illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily,” and we 

may not substitute our judgment and discretion for that of the Commissioners 

Court. Id.; see also, e.g., Labrado v. City of El Paso, 132 S.W.3d 581, 597 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (to determine whether one party was a “responsible” 

bidder within the statute’s meaning, “the commissioners court’s decision should be 

reviewed only to determine whether it was fraudulent, arbitrary, or an abuse of 

discretion”).

II. The County Purchasing Act

Schawe contends that the County Purchasing Act provides a jurisdictional 

foundation for his claims and points to section 262.033, which states: “[a]ny 

property tax paying citizen of the county may enjoin performance under a contract 
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made by a county in violation of [the County Purchasing Act].” Tex. Loc. Gov’t 

Code Ann. § 262.033. Schawe asserts the following violations: 

1. WJC was not the lowest responsible bidder because it failed to submit 

a signed and sworn statement of bidder’s qualifications;

2. WJC was not the lowest responsible bidder because 304’s bid was 

rejected without clear justifications; and

3. the Caldwell County Commissioners Court erred in failing to consider 

the additional evidence presented by 304.

Whether these allegations constitute “violation[s]” of the County Purchasing Act 

are questions of statutory construction we review de novo. Hegar v. J.D. Fields & 

Co., 604 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied). Our goal when 

construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent, 

guided by the words’ plain meanings. Id. We interpret statutory waivers of 

immunity narrowly. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 

655 (Tex. 2008); City of Austin v. Util. Assocs., Inc., 517 S.W.3d 300, 313-14 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied). 

A. WJC’s Signed and Sworn Statement

When the bidding process was opened for the project at issue, interested 

bidders were instructed to submit a “Statement of Bidder’s Qualifications.” The 

Statement’s opening paragraph instructs that “[t]his statement must be notarized.” 

With its “Statement of Bidder’s Qualifications,” WJC included the notary 

statement shown below:
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Pointing out that the top portion of the notary statement was not completed by 

WJC’s representative, Schawe asserted the Commissioners Court violated the 

County Purchasing Act by awarding the project to WJC. 

We disagree for two reasons. First, the County Purchasing Act provides a 

jurisdictional basis for claims seeking to enjoin performance of a contract “made 

by a county in violation of [the County Purchasing Act].” See Tex. Loc. Gov’t 

Code Ann. § 262.033. The County Purchasing Act does not include any provisions 

mandating a notarized statement of bidder’s qualifications. See id. §§ 262.021-

262.037. At most, this requirement was one mandated by Caldwell County — but 

that alone is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the County Purchasing 

Act. See id. § 262.033. 

Second, although WJC’s representative did not complete the above-shown 

portion of the notary statement, he did print, sign, and date the preceding page. 

Courts examining similar situations have declined to find that a sworn document 

must be signed in a particular place. See Kohn v. Washer, 6 S.W. 551, 552 (Tex. 

1887) (concluding that an affiant’s signature placed below the jurat for purposes of 

subscribing to the instrument nonetheless complied with the law); see also, e.g., 

Dominguez v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 08-23-00083-CV, 2023 WL 8853742, 

at *2-3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“What matters is 
9

whether the document was signed for the purpose of subscribing to the 

instrument.”) (internal quotation omitted); Acme Brick, a Div. of Justin Indus., Inc. 

v. Temple Assocs., Inc., 816 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. App.—Waco 1991, writ 

denied) (“The law does not direct or guide where the necessary signature is to be 

located.”). 

Therefore, we decline to find that the incomplete notary statement shown 

above provides a basis for jurisdiction under section 262.033. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t 

Code Ann. § 262.033.

B. Clear Justifications for the Rejection of 304’s Bid

In his second argument, Schawe asserts that jurisdiction is established under 

section 262.033 because 304’s bid was rejected “without providing clear 

justifications for doing so.” 

Where, as here, a bidder other than the lowest-priced bidder is recommended 

for a project, the Caldwell County Purchasing Policies and Procedures Manual 

requires that “clear justification for not selecting the lowest bidder [] be 

documented to the Commissioner’s Court” that delineates “the rationale for 

awarding to a bidder other than the lowest bidder.” Following this requirement, 

Blake prepared a statement in advance of the March 23, 2021 Commissioners 

Court meeting that provided the following justifications for rejecting 304’s bid: 

(1) “inadequate credit limit amount”; (2) “concerns about equipment availability 

with multiple project sites and other ongoing projects”; and (3) “limited years in 

business (4 years).” Schawe puts forth the following challenges to these 

justifications:

• a company’s credit limit is not an adequate measure of cash flow;

• Doucet & Associates’ recommendation letter to Blake regarding the 

bid selection incorrectly characterized 304’s references as “generally 
10

neutral or non-positive” and WJC’s references as “generally positive”; 

• in its “Statement of Bidder’s Qualifications,” 304 only listed one other 

ongoing project which was scheduled to be completed before the 

commencement of the project at issue; and 

• 304’s owners had professional experience beyond the company itself. 

These arguments do not show that the contract with WJC was made in violation of 

the County Purchasing Act. See id. 

The County Purchasing Act does not require that “clear justifications” be 

provided when the lowest-priced bidder is rejected — rather, the Act mandates 

only that a contract be awarded to “the responsible bidder who submits the lowest 

and best bid.” Id. § 262.027(a). The “lowest and best bid” is defined as the bid 

that “provide[s] the best value considering associated direct and indirect costs, 

including transport, maintenance, reliability, life cycle, warranties, and customer 

service after a sale.” Id. § 262.022(5-a). The justifications provided by Blake fall 

within these “best value” considerations. See id.; see also Tex. Health Ins. Risk 

Pool v. Sw. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 272 S.W.3d 797, 804 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no 

pet.) (“The word ‘including’ must be construed as a term of enlargement, 

signifying a non-exhaustive list.”) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 31.005(13)). 

Moreover, as set out above, our review of a Commissioners Court decision 

is narrow and confined to examining whether the Court acted illegally, 

unreasonably, or arbitrarily. Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80; Labrado, 132 S.W.3d at 

597. But Schawe’s arguments address the justifications provided for 304’s 

rejection on a granular level and specifically challenge the appropriateness of the 

chosen metrics or the measurements made pursuant to them. These arguments fall 

outside the scope of our review. See Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80; Labrado, 132 

S.W.3d at 597.

Therefore, we decline to find that the justifications provided for the rejection 
11

of 304’s bid constitute a basis for jurisdiction under section 262.033. See Tex. 

Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 262.033.

C. 304’s Additional Evidence

Under Local Government Code section 262.027, a contract may not be 

awarded to a bidder who is not the lowest bidder unless, before the award, each 

lower bidder is given: (1) notice of the proposed award, and (2) an opportunity to 

appear before the Commissioners Court and present previously unconsidered 

evidence concerning the lower bid as best. See id. § 262.027(c). In accordance 

with this provision, 304 presented additional evidence regarding its bid at the 

March 23, 2021 and April 12, 2021 Commissioners Court meetings. 

In his final argument for section 262.033 jurisdiction, Schawe asserts the 

Commissioners Court erred in failing to consider this additional evidence. Schawe 

contends that the “evidence was material and if considered, would have likely 

changed the result of the vote.” 

But the record does not support Schawe’s contention that the Commissioners 

Court failed to consider 304’s additional evidence. With their summary judgment 

motion, Appellants attached transcripts from both the March 23 and April 12, 2021 

Commissioners Court meetings. At the meetings, 304 representatives discussed 

their bid for the project and presented additional evidence for the Court’s 

consideration. There is no indication that the Commissioners Court failed to 

consider this evidence. Without this showing, Schawe cannot support his 

argument for jurisdiction on this basis. See Town of Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 

550; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 223, 227.

We decline to find that this argument provides a basis for jurisdiction under 

section 262.033. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 262.033. Having overruled all 
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three arguments on this point, we overrule Appellants’ first issue in its entirety. 

III. Appellants’ Ultra Vires Claims

Appellants’ alternative theory for invoking the trial court’s jurisdiction relies 

on the ultra vires exception, whereby a claimant can seek prospective relief to 

compel a governmental body to comply with its statutory authority to perform a 

non-discretionary duty. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 

(Tex. 2009); Tex. Tel. Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 653 S.W.3d 227, 248 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.). To invoke this exception, a suit must allege 

and prove that a government officer, acting within her official capacity, acted 

without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. Heinrich, 284 

S.W.3d at 372; Tex. Tel. Ass’n, 653 S.W.3d at 249. 

“Ministerial acts are those where the law prescribes and defines the duties to 

be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise 

of discretion or judgment.” Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 587 

(Tex. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Conversely, if an action involves 

personal deliberation, decision, and judgment, it is discretionary and falls outside 

the purview of what may be considered a ministerial action. City of Lancaster v. 

Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1994); Crystal Int’l, Inc. v. Tex. Comm’n on 

Env’t Quality, No. 03-16-00008-CV, 2016 WL 4272117, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin 

Aug. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

When an official is granted discretion to interpret the law, an action is not 

ultra vires just because it is erroneous — “[o]nly when these improvident actions 

are unauthorized does an official shed the cloak of the sovereign and act ultra 

vires.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. 2017) (emphasis in original). 

“[M]erely asserting legal conclusions or labeling a defendant’s actions as ‘ultra

vires,’ ‘illegal,’ or ‘unconstitutional’ does not suffice to plead an ultra vires claim 
13

— what matters is whether the facts alleged constitute actions beyond the 

governmental actor’s statutory authority, properly construed.” Tex. Dep’t of 

Transp. v. Sunset Transp., Inc., 357 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no 

pet.).

Relying on these legal principles, Appellants assert Blake breached several 

ministerial duties she, as Caldwell County’s purchasing agent, was charged with 

carrying out. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 262.011(o) (“The county 

purchasing agent shall adopt the rules and procedures necessary to implement the 

agent’s duties under this section subject to approval by the Commissioners 

Court.”), 262.0115(d) (“the purchasing agent . . . shall administer the procedures 

prescribed by law for notice and public bidding for county purchases and 

contracts”). Specifically, Appellants assert Blake failed to perform the following 

ministerial acts:

1. reject WJC’s bid because it lacked a properly notarized statement of 

bidder’s qualifications;

2. provide clear justifications for not selecting 304 for the county 

contract; and

3. recuse herself from the bidding process due to conflicts of interest. 

We consider these alleged ultra vires acts individually below.

A. WJC’s Signed and Sworn Statement

Appellants argue that Blake had a ministerial duty to reject WJC’s bid 

because it did not contain a “properly notarized statement of bidder’s 

qualifications.” 

We disagree. As discussed above, WJC’s representative printed, signed, and 

dated the page preceding the notary statement, and courts have declined to require 

that a sworn document be signed in a particular location. See Kohn, 6 S.W. at 552; 
14

Dominguez, 2023 WL 8853742, at *2-3; Acme Brick, a Div. of Justin Indus., Inc., 

816 S.W.2d at 441. Because the law does not impose a specific requirement 

regarding signature placement on a sworn document, Blake was not under a 

ministerial duty to reject WJC’s bid for the alleged defect therein. See Sw. Bell 

Tel., L.P., 459 S.W.3d at 587. 

We overrule Appellants’ ultra vires argument on this point. 

B. Clear Justifications for Rejecting 304’s Bid

Asserting that Blake’s provided reasons for rejecting 304’s bid “were littered 

with half-truths and allegations that were not factually supported by the underlying 

investigation,” Appellants contend that Blake failed to provide “clear 

justifications” for 304’s rejection. Therefore, Appellants argue, Blake breached 

her ministerial duty to recommend to the Commissioners Court a “responsible 

bidder who submits the lowest and best bid.” See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. 

§ 262.027(a)(1).

Similar allegations were considered in City of Austin v. Utility Associates, 

Inc., in which an unsuccessful applicant challenged the City’s decision to award a 

contract to another vendor following a competitive bidding process. See 517 

S.W.3d at 304, 308-11. On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that their claims fell 

within the ultra vires exception to the City’s governmental immunity because the 

defendants were required to award the contract to the “responsible offeror” with 

the bid “most advantageous to the municipality considering the relative importance 

of price and other evaluation factors.” Id. at 310 (citing Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 

Ann. § 252.042(b)). Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the competing vendor’s 

proposal failed to comply with numerous mandatory technical requirements. Id.

Rejecting this argument, the Austin Court of Appeals reasoned that:
15

[t]he above allegations by Plaintiffs, without more, amount only to 

disagreements with the outcome of determinations by the City 

Defendants that were well within their discretion to reach. It is true, 

as Plaintiffs emphasize, that Chapter 252 requires that “the contract 

must be awarded to the responsible offeror . . .” and that “must” 

typically denotes a requirement rather than a choice. But Plaintiffs 

overlook that the identity of the “responsible offeror” to whom “the 

contract must be awarded” turns on multiple underlying 

determinations that the City Defendants were necessarily empowered 

to make — it is the offeror “whose proposal is determined to be the 

most advantageous to the municipality considering the relative 

importance of price and the other evaluation factors included in the 

request for proposals.” While Chapter 252 may require that the City 

Defendants weigh these specified considerations and factors, it does 

not limit their discretion in the outcome of these judgment calls. 

Id. at 310-11 (emphasis in original); see also Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, Inc. 

v. Bass, No. 03-16-00320-CV, 2017 WL 4348181, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin 

Sept. 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“complaints that an official reached a wrong 

result when exercising its delegated authority are insufficient to state an ultra vires 

claim of exceeding constitutional authority”) (internal quotation omitted).

Here too, Appellants’ ultra vires allegations ultimately challenge whether 

the correct determination was made as to the “responsible bidder who submits the 

lowest and best bid.” See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 262.027(a). But similar to

City of Austin, this determination required “considering associated direct and 

indirect costs, including transport, maintenance, reliability, life cycle, warranties, 

and customer service after a sale.” See id. § 262.022(5-a). Neither the County 

Purchasing Act nor the Caldwell County Purchasing Policies and Procedures 

Manual limit the analyses of these or other factors “with such precision and 

certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” See Sw. 

Bell Tel., L.P., 459 S.W.3d at 587. Therefore, Appellants’ challenges to these 

underlying decisions are insufficient to establish an ultra vires act. See City of 
16

Austin, 517 S.W.3d at 308-11; Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, Inc., 2017 WL 

4348181, at *3.

C. Conflicts of Interest

For its final ultra vires allegation, Appellants assert Blake had the 

ministerial duty to recuse herself from the bidding process. Appellants cite to the 

following section in the Caldwell County Purchasing Policies and Procedures 

Manual:

Purchasing employees will avoid any activity that would create a 

conflict between personal interests and the interests of Caldwell 

County. Conflicts exist in any relationship where an employee is not 

acting in the County’s best interest and may be acting in their own 

best interest or the interests of someone associated with them. Such 

conflicts of interest would include being involved in any procurement 

activity in which:

1. The employee or any member of the employee’s family has any 

financial interest pertaining to the Caldwell County 

procurement process; 

2. A business or organization in which the employee, or any 

member of the employee’s family, has a financial interest 

pertaining to the Caldwell County procurement process; 

3. Any person, business, or organization with whom the employee 

or a member of the employee’s family is negotiating or has any 

arrangement concerning prospective employment; or

4. Any private or professional activity would create a conflict 

between your personal interest and the interests of Caldwell 

County.

If any such conflicts of interest exist, the employee will immediately 

notify the Purchasing Manager in writing and will remove 

himself/herself from the Caldwell County procurement process.

Appellants contend that Blake’s “relationship with her former supervisor” ran 

afoul of these recusal requirements because (1) one of the supervisor’s daughters 

alleged that she previously had been abused by a 304 employee, and (2) the 
17

supervisor’s other daughter is married to the owner of WJC. Appellants contend 

that Blake “likely had knowledge of [these] allegations” because everyone in 

Bastrop knew about them. 

We disagree that Blake’s failure to recuse herself from the bidding process 

constitutes an ultra vires action. The Caldwell County Purchasing Policies and 

Procedures Manual does not mandate recusal in the above-described situations. At 

most, the relationship could constitute a “private . . . activity” that could “create a 

conflict between your personal interest and the interests of Caldwell County.” But 

whether the relationship fell within this category is the type of personal, 

discretionary judgment that falls outside the purview of what may be considered a 

ministerial action. See Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 459 S.W.3d at 587; City of Lancaster, 

883 S.W.2d at 654; Crystal Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 4272117, at *4.

We overrule Appellants’ ultra vires argument on this point. Having 

overruled all of Appellants’ ultra vires contentions, we overrule their second issue 

in its entirety. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s March 7, 2023 order granting the County

Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction. 

/s/ Meagan Hassan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan.