meet all the unforeseeable challenges? The events that subsequently
occurred during the operation left no doubt as to the answer to this
question, Then there was the questionable wisdom in selecting a single
road axis for the major effort of tae offensive. Hemmed in by dense
jungle and rough mountainous terrain, this type of road did not lend
itself readily to heavy logistic activities. In South Vietnam, such
difficulties in road transportation could be removed by the alternate
use of waterways or U.S. airlift facilities. But in lower Laos, jungles,
rough mountains and steep valleys, added to the stubborness of the enemy,
created serious problems that should have received more attention.
While there were plans for infantry units to advance and withdraw using
different routes, mechanized and armor units were confined to Route No. 9.
The holding of this route required the relative superiority of friendly
forces, which was not the case,

Next was the tactic of establishing fire support bases. In view
of the single axis available to progress through mountains, the effec-
tive control of the area of operation and the conduct of search activi-
ties depended on the capability of our forces being deployed on both
sides of the road, north and south. In our case, the operational plan
called for the advance of infantry forces through a series of fire
support bases. Each new leap forward necessarily required an additional
number of these bases. The use of fire support bases had been successful
in South Vietnam but this success depended a great deal on the over-—
whelming firepower and initiative of United States forces in the face
of a less endowed enemy. To be effective in lower Laos, it was apparent
that fire support bases would have to enjoy the same donditions. The
question was: would it be feasible? If it was not — without the
benefit of firepower and initiative in the area of operation — fire
support bases were apt to become defensive positions tying down sizeable
forces which otherwise might be used for ‘offensive.

A comparison between friendly and enemy forces in lower Laos also
resulted in hard thinking even during the initial phase. As intelligence
estimates had made it clear, enemy forces in the area of operation

included three infantry regiments, not to mention the eight or so binh

55



Early the next morning, 23 March, while Khe Sanh Base was still
finishing off Communist sappers who had infiltrated earlier, the ARVN
armored column crossed the Xepon River and the lines of the U.S. Ist
Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 5th Division. The convoy returned with 98
vehicles left behind, among them 22 M-41 tanks and 54 armored personnel
carriers. Aerial and photo reconnaissance showed that the ARVN units
had left 21 tanks, 26 armored personnel carriers, 13 bulldozers, two
graders and 51 vehicles at a night bivouac area on Route No. 9. U.S.
air force helicopter gunships and artillery were used to destroy these
vehicles to keep the enemy from using them. Khe Sanh Base, in the
meantime had received four attacks by fire during the night, all by
122-mm artillery, but damage was insignificant.

In lower Laos, meanwhile, fighting was still fierce around Fire
Support Base Delta. The airdropping of supplies on the base was not
successfu] and ammunition stocks had dropped to an alarming level.
Enemy troops had penetrated and established a firm foothold inside the
Marines' perimeter. Late in the afternoon, the enemy launched a new
attack, this time supported by ten flame-throwing tanks. The Marines
blew up the first two tanks with light antitank weapons. The third
tank detonated mines- and the fourth was hit by tactical air. But the
remaining tanks continued to advance. The headquarters of the 147th
Brigade had to move out of its position. The 2d and 4th Battalions sup-
ported the 7th Battalion to break the enemy's encirclement and withdraw
toward the 258th Brigade (Fire Support Base Hotel). The enemy seemed
to have anticipated this move and he intercepted the troops of the
147th Brigade in an ambush. A pitched battle ensued with enemy tanks
and infantry. The following morning, 23 March, all battalion commanders
of the 147th Brigade, though wounded, managed to maneuver their battal-
ions to link up with the 258th Brigade. Eventually, isolated teams of
marines who had been cut off from their units also followed suit.
Almost immediately thereafter, 230 wounded were evacuated and, before
nightfall, the entire 147th Marine Brigade with its 2d, 4th and 7th
Battalions were transported by U.S. Army helicopters to an area near
Ham Nghi Base. There were initially 134 missing reported but they

119



Enemy Situation in the Laos Panhandle

The enemy had a sizable combat force in Laos. (Map 6) Within the
Royal Lao MR III area, this force was estimated at 42,000 men, consist-
ing of 13 NVA battalions (5,000 men), 20 Pathet Lao battalions (5,000),
and about 32,000 troops and cadres of Transportation Group 559, Further
south in Royal Lao MR IV, enemy strength was estimated at 22,000 troops
who made up 17 NVA battalions (7,000 men), 21 Pathet Lao battalions (4,000
men) and about 10,000 troops and cadres belonging to six binh trams
of the 559th. In northern Laos, enemy strength was estimated at 33,000,
consisting of 16,000 NVA and 17,000 Pathet Lao troops. However, intelli-
gence estimates precluded the participation of these elements in any
‘engagement west of Quang Tri.

Air reconnaissance and agent reports further confirmed the enemy's
stepped up logistical activities and augmentation of combat forces at
base areas 604 and 611 since the beginning of the lower Laos dry season.
In October, 1970, an agent report revealed that a division-size unit,
approximately 10,000 strong, was leaving the Mu Gia Pass and moving south.
It was believed at that time that this was the 320th NVA Division with
its three organic regiments, the 48th, 52d, and 64th. Subsequent intel-
ligence reports confirmed that the 52d Regiment was located west of the
DMZ and the 64th Regiment was building roads in Quang Binh Province,
north of the DMZ. It was, therefore, probable that the 48th Regiment
was the unit which was moving into base area 604.7

A rallier from the enemy B-7 Front reported that the 9th and 66th
Regiments of the 304th NVA Division had returned to North Vietnam,
leaving behind the 24B Regiment which used to operate west of Khe Sanh.
(Map 7) Air reconnaissance missions revealed traces of an enemy unit in
the area west of Quang Tri. This was believed to be an element of the

24B Regiment. At the same time, the enemy 81st Artillery Battalion was

2au1 enemy units referred to in this monograph are infantry unless
otherwise specified.

21



to detect strong enemy pressure. President Thieu made a few remarks
to the effect that ARVN forces should take their time and should conduct
search operations in the vicinities of their present positions while
waiting for developments. From that day on, the Airborne Division
would not make any further advance.

The second time involved the decision to push into Tchepone. On
28 February, President Thieu met again with the I Corps commander in
Saigon. By this time, progress on the ground had been stalled for
over two weeks and the foreign press was publicizing daily ARVN's
inability to advance further. During this meeting, it was President
Thieu who decided that ARVN forces should go into Tchepone. As a
result, General Lam produced his plan to occupy Tchepone and President
Thieu ordered the JGS to reinforce I Corps with the entire Marine Divi-
sion and additional armor elements. The attack against Tchepone was
conceived merely as a short-term raid to be conducted primarily for
its propaganda and morale value. Although President Thieu suggested
that the Marine Division be used to relieve the Airborne Division in
the main effort, General Lam convinced him that the lst Division would
be better in this role, while the marines could be employed to protect
the rear and the LOC. The division commanders present also agreed
that the advance, except for the raid to Tchepone, should be suspended
until the enemy's intentions and capabilities became more clear, The
field commanders and General Lam also persuaded President Thieu that
reinforcement with the 2d Division in Laos would not improve the
situation. Now that the initiative had been largely assumed by the
NVA, a much more potent force than the 2d Division would be required
to recapture it. Finally, President Thieu's desire to conduct a raid-
in-force into Muong Nong ceased to be a practicable course of action
by the time the withdrawal was beginning and General Lam exercised his
command prerogatives by not attempting it. It was clear that President
Thieu listened carefully to the recommendations of his field commanders,
that he did not arbitrarily impose rigid instructions upon them, but
that he allowed them the latitude in the execution of plans and orders

,
that combat commanders must have.

150



and new 90-mm recoilless rifles were quickly brought in as replacements.
Even U.S. gunships during the early stage of the operation were not
armed with HEAT rockets which were required to knock out tanks. Our
head-on collision with enemy tanks, therefore, was obviously a big
tactical surprise.

Enemy artillery also posed a challenge that could not be easily met.
In the first place, mortars of all calibers formed close rings of fire
around our positions. Their continuous firing indicated that the enemy
had an ample supply of ammunition which was probably pre-positioned.
Next came recoilless rifles, rockets and artillery of all types. For
the first time in the war, ARVN forces came to grips with the deadly
fire of enemy 152-mm howitzers and 130-mm guns which had a range far
greater than their own 105-mm and 155-nm howitzers. Enemy artillery
was emplaced in scattered, individual positions, some dug into mountain
slopes to elude our counterbattery fire. In action, several pieces
would open fire at the same time from several directions, making them
all the more difficult for our forces to locate. Without field radar,
ARVN forces had to rely on their technique of crater analysis which
did not produce a¢curate results.

The enemy effectively coordinated all his capabilities, to include
antiaircraft, artillery, mortars and massive infantry formations to
envelop and overrun our FSBs as well as our mobile units. As soon as
a FSB was established or a unit had debarked on a landing zone, the
enemy's encirclement process would begin, first by mortars which moved
in at close range around the position and opened fire every time heli-
copters landed or took off. Then, antiaircraft teams and infantry
units advanced to complete the ring, always keeping as close as they
could to our position, while from many directions further away, enemy
artillery guns zeroed in to create a continuing state of tension within
our base. The surrounding web of antiaircraft weapons, mortars and
artillery gradually became so thick that the base was effectively iso-
lated and no resupply or medical evacuation activities could be con-
ducted. A FSB was usually occupied and defended by an ARVN battalion

which normally deployed from two to three companies to man a security

145



Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Hinh, Nguyen Duy.
Lam Son 719.

(Indochina monographs )

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Campaigns--Laos.
I. Title. II. Series.
DS557-8.L3H56 959-704 '342 79-607101L

This book is not copyrighted and may be reproduced in
whole or in part without consulting the publisher.

First printing 1979



Late in- the afternoon of 19 March, Ambassador Bunker and General
Abrams were received by President Thieu. President Thieu disclosed he
had directed a cautious withdrawal which would be completed from 5-8
April. When the withdrawal was complete, he planned to have about three
battalions launch a raid against Muong Nong, the center of Communist
Base Area 611, and wanted strong U.S. air support for this raid.

On 20 March, the U.S. Air Force and Army helicopters exerted their
maximum effort, with 1,388 gunships sorties, 27@-tactical air strikes
and 11 B-52 missions dropping 909 tons of bombs. Around 1300 hours,
the 3d Battalion, 2d Regiment was extracted from the area west of Sophia
East by U.S. Army helicopters which flew through heavy antiaircraft fire
to evacuate it to Ham Nghi Base. In the process, 28 of the 40 helicop-
ters involved were hit. Plans for the extraction of the 4/2 Battalion
were subsequently aborted because the first helicopter attempting to
land was hit by fire and exploded in the air. Before nightfall, the
artillery pieces at Fire Support Base Alpha along with the 2d and 7th
Airborne Battalions were transported back to Vietnam. PLans provided
for the 2d and 4th Battalions, 2d Regiment, to be picked up the next
day, followed by the regimental headquarters, its artillery, and the
1st Battalion, 3d Infantry from Fire Support Base Delta.1. The two
2d Regiment battalions were ordered to find a more secure pick up zone.

In the meantime, the lst Armored Brigade, reinforced by the 7th
and 8th Airborne Battalions, had arrived at Phase Line Alpha the preceding
evening. The armored and airborne elements deployed to provide security
for Route No. 9 from Alpha to Base Bravo. At 2100 hours the NVA attacked
the 8th Airborne Battalion and 11th Armored Cavalry Squadron south of
Alpha but were repulsed with heavy losses.

Around Fire Support Base Delta of the 147th Marine Brigade, on
this same day, Communist suicide troops reached the defense perimeter
and dug in. Small arms fire from these pockets made helicopter landings
and takeoffs even more difficult. Supply deliveries could not be made
but the 7th Marine Battalion and the troops ef the 147th Brigade held
on because they had previously received a ten-day reserve of supplies

which would permit them to continue fighting.

115



The weather was favorable during the first few days of the opera-
tion and our air support was effective. On 4 and 5 February, however,
the weather turned unfavorable; low clouds, interspersed with rain,
delayed some ttoop landing plans and interfered with the activities of
engineer units, particularly road repairs and rehabilitation work being
conducted at the Khe Sanh airstrip. Although the weather during 6 and 7
February was better than the preceding two days, it was not adequate
for effective preemptive airstrikes by the United States Air Force.
Lieutenant General James W. Sutherland, Commander of XXIV Corps, com-
municated this information to Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, Com-
mander of I Corps who decided that the cross-border operation should
go ahead as planned despite the lack of adequate preemptive airstrikes.
Apparently General Lam would not modify his orders without consulting
President Thieu who had approved the original plan. To compensate for
this, General Lam requested that U.S. air cavalry fly ahead of the ARVN
thrust. But because the air cavalry could not cross the border ahead
of ARVN units, the RVNAF and U.S. corps commanders agreed that, at
precisely 0700 hours on D-day Phase II (8 February) the Airborne Divi-
sion would send a combat team across the border to be immediately fol-
lowed by air cavalry.” This compromise seemed. to satisfy both U.S.
political restrictions and the I Corps desire for additional support.

1a fter-action Report on LAM SON 719 dated 1 April 1971 by
Colonel Arthur W. Pence, pp. 7, 8.

2specific instructions from COMUSMACV prohibited any U.S. Army
elements from entering Laos in advance of the RVNAF border crossing.

64



This shortcoming was remedied however, when a U.S. Joint Coordi-
nating Group (JCG) was established on 1 March 1977 under the control of
the Commander, U.S. 108th Artillery Group who represented the Commanding
General, U.S. XXIV Corps. Members of the JCG included the deputy com-
mander U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) who acted as an aviation
officer, a representative of the G-3, U.S. XXIV Corps, and a represen-
tative of the U.S. 7th Air Force (not a permanent member). Co-located
with I Corps Tactical Control CP at Ham Nghi Base, this Joint Coordi-
nating Group proved to be extremely effective in the rapid coordination
of U.S. combat support assets. Working hand in hand with the I Corps
commander and his staff who provided timely data for the planning of
support operations, the JCG chief and his aviation officer were able to
assist them in the process of operational planning and decision-making
by providing expert advice.

Although a combined operation, LAM SON 719 had an unusual character
of its own. It was the first large-scale operation undertaken without
the direct participation of U.S. advisers. Long accustomed to the
presence of advisers which they found reassuring and invaluable,
especially in difficult combat situations, ARVN regimental and battalion
commanders went into Laos with apprehensive feelings. They realized
that this was going to be a difficult challenge and they were not too
sure they could handle the problem of communications with supporting
U.S. units. This had always been an exclusive service provided by their
advisers in addition to regular and routine advisory assistance. But
they had to accomplish all requirements by themselves this time, and
despite some apprehensions, they all felt proud and believed they could
excel without their advisers. After all, as unit commanders, they
were accustomed to assuming responsibility which they routinely discharged
without difficulty whether it was administrative work, troop training
or the conduct of combat operations with only ARVN support. Their self
assurance and determination was demonstrated throughout LAM SON 719.

Due to special arrangements to provide Vietnamese interpreters aboard
FAC and AFCC aircraft, ARVN unit commanders handled the problem of
calling for U.S. support quite professionally.

148



The Enemy Counteracted

Nearly a week had passed since Ban Dong was occupied. Except for
a few clearing activities conducted by units of the lst Infantry Divi-
sion, the forward movement of ARVN forces seemed to have stalled. The
heliborne insertion of troops through the fierce enemy air defense
screen in the afternoon of 10 February had enabled friendly forces to
quickly occupy this objective. The linkup with armored forces had also
been made immediately thereafter. Fire Support Base Ban Dong was now
well entrenched with six 105-mm and six 155-mm howitzers and adequate
ammunition and supplies. However, as of 16 February, six days after
the capture of Ban Dong, there had been no further progress by ARVN
troops toward the objective Tchepone. In the meantime, the enemy had
increased his air defense capabilities along the mountain slopes to the
south. Enemy attacks by fire, which were initially conducted with
assorted mortars and 122-mm rockets, were now occasionally augmented by
long-range artillery. ARVN armored units had tried to advance but could
not make much progress. The dense forests bordering the road required
careful, time-consuming reconnaissance to avoid ambush and this made the

armored colum's movement extremely slow.
On 17 February, it rained hard and the helicopters rested idly on

the airfields. However, since early morning, an armored infantry task
force consisting of the 17th Armored Squadron and the 8th Airborne Bat-
talion operating north of Ban Dong had been engaging the enemy. The
results were four friendly troops killed while the enemy suffered 36
killed. Sixteen AK-47 assault rifles and a quantity of military clothing
and equipment were seized. Toward noon, this task force made another
contact four kilometers north of Ban Dong and captured one PT-76 amphib-
ious tank, two Russian trucks, one 12.7-mm machinegun and two 7.62-mm
machineguns., The PT-76 tank was only slightly damaged and was towed
back to A Luoi. To the south, the lst Infantry Division continued to

make contacts and receive attacks by fire.

75



Mu Gia Pass and other lesser passes such as Ban Karai and Ban Raving,
penetrated into lower Laos and finally came out in northern Cambodia
and the Tri~Border area of South Vietnam. In several areas, the trail
system was so extensive that it could be compared to a cobweb of criss-
crossing roads making up a corridor of from 30 to 50 miles wide, com
plete with bridges (over or under water), culverts, river crossing
ramps, much of it concealed under dense jungle canopies. With the
assistance of Pathet Lao guerrillas, the estimated 50,000 troops of NVA
Group 559 and about 100,000 Vietnamese volunteers and forced laborers
maintained this vital artery.

To protect the corridor, the Communists established an elaborate
defense and security system. The duty of Pathet Lao units was to inten-
sify guerrilla activities and launch periodic attacks in order to keep
the Royal Lao Army confined to the cities and towns along the Mekong

River. The protection of the trail *s

system and storage areas was performed

by Group 559 itself. Augmented by in- HANOI

NORTH
VIETNAM

the group defense forces included anti-
aircraft units armed with all types of HAINAN
light and heavy weapons, from 12.7-mn,

. @ VINH

\ Gulf of

14.5-mm and 23-mm heavy machineguns to

fantry units and unattached militiamen,

37-mm, 57-mm and 100-mm anti-aircraft Tonkin

cannons.
Group 559 installed a forward
headquarters in the southern panhandle
of North Vietnam from where it con-
trolled many 'binh trams' (literally
troop stations). In 1970 there were
about 40 such stations, from Vinh to

the Cambodian border, under the con-

trol of a number of intermediary CAMBODIA 1

SOUTH
VIETNAM

headquarters. Each binh tram was a Map 1 — The Ho Chi Minh Trail

self-contained, logistical complex

11



the U.S. 10lst Airborne Division landed without problems. In the
meantime, a forward air controller aircraft and a communication relay
aircraft circled over the area. The Black Panther unit searched the
area and found the bodies of 85 enemy troops killed and 18 weapons
destroyed by B-52 action. Continuing their search, the troops only made
light contacts with the enemy. On the night of 31 March, enemy vehicles
were heard moving to the south and the information was immediately re-
ported to the forward air controller. The forward air controller
verified the information and called for an air attack in which five
enemy vehicles were destroyed. The following morning, friendly troops
continued the operation and found an enemy fuel dump hit by airstrikes
along with a destroyed tunnel complex housing tracked vehicles.

The next afternoon, the Black Panthers were picked up by U.S.

Army helicopters and transported to Hue while President Nguyen Van Thieu
was visiting the operational headquarters of I Corps at Dong Ha and

the units which had fought in lower Laos. To foreign and local press
reporters gathered there, he expressed his belief that the lower Laos
operation had been the greatest victory of all and announced a new phase
of attacks against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In the meantime, the evacuation of Khe Sanh continued. After
President Thieu's visit, the Airborne Division boarded aircraft bound
for Saigon. On 2 April, the 8/4 Artillery Battalion, the last U.S.
heavy artillery unit, left Khe Sanh, heading southeast. On the night
of 4 April, the entire Marine Division left the Laotian border ‘area and
redeployed near Quang Tri. Vietnamese and U.S. logistical installations
at Vandegrift and Khe Sanh had by now all relocated, On 5 April, the
ARVN 4th Armored Squadron and the 77th Ranger Battalion were the last
units to leave the border area, bound for Dong Ha.

On 6 April, another raid of the Black Panther forces of the lst
Infantry Division was initiated against another area of the Lao-Viet
border salient approximately 22 kilometers southeast of Lang Vei. At
1000 hours after preparatory airstrikes, the reinforced Black Panther
company landed unopposed. The search it conducted lasted until late
afternoon without making contact with the enemy. At one location, the

124



‘Table 3 — Major Items of Equipment Lost or Destroyed3

ITEMS us RVNAF TOTALS
Small Arms Individual Weapons 363 2,107 2,470
Smait Arms Crew Served Weapons 98 320 418
Trucks 67 211 278
Combat Vehicles 76 87 163
Tanks 17 54 71
Artillery 4 96 100
Radios ; 61 1,516" 1,577
Bulldozers 6 31 37

* Figures provided by RVNAF and used as the basis for requisitioning replacement items. Apparently
not all were combat losses.

Satter Action Report, LAM SON 719, Headquarters, US XXIV Corps, dated 14 May 1971, p. 90.

130



Abn Div (+) (OPCON)

Abn Div Arty (-)
44th Arty Bn (155)

1st Abn Med Bn
1st Abn Service Bn
1st Abn Signal Bn

1st Abn Bde -
1st Abn Bn
8th Abn Bn
9th Abn Ba
1st Arty Bn

2d Abn Bde
5th Abn Bn
7th Abn Bn
11th Abn Bn
2d Arty Bn

3d Abn Bde
2d Abn Bn
3d Abn Bn ~
6th Abn Bn
3d Arty Bn

Marine Division (OPCON)

Hq Bn

Service Bn

Medical Bn

A Btry, 48th Arty Bn (-) (155)

147th Bde (D+L)
2d Inf Bn
4th Inf Bn
7th Inf Bn
2d Arty Bn
C Btry, 20th Arty Bn (155)

258th Bde
1st Inf Bn
3d Inf Bn
8th Inf Bn
3d Arty Bn
D Btry, 48th Arty Bn (-) (155)

369th Bde (D+32)
5th Inf Bn
6th Inf Bn
9th Inf Bn
1st Arty Bn

5th Inf Regt, 2d Inf Div
lst Bn, 5th Inf Regt
2d Bn, 5th Inf Regt

174



Zone Ranger North, two kilometers west of Ban Na in coordination with
the 2lst Rangers which had been manning Ranger South since 8 February.

In order to obtain additional fire support for the planned movement
all major fire support bases were consolidated and reinforced. At Fire
Support Base 30, one 105-mm battery and one 155-mm battery were deployed.
Fire Support Base 31, the command post of the 3d Airborne Brigade, had
a six-piece 105-mm battery. Light bulldozers were helilifted into these
fire support bases to help fortify the defenses. Fire Support Base
A Luoi (Ban Dong) 2, Fire Support Base Hotel of the 3d Infantry Regiment,
and Fire Support Base Delta of the lst Infantry Regiment (lst Infantry
Division) also received an adequate number of artillery pieces.

From 11 to 16 February, while I Corps staff in the rear was planning
the next moves, ARVN units in the forward area in lower Laos expanded
their operations and continued the search for the enemy, increasing the
number of contacts and caches uncovered. In the ranger's area, on the
northern flank, the 37th Ranger Battalion operating near Fire Support
Base Phu Loc and protecting the northwestern approaches to Khe Sanh was
continuously subjected to enemy attacks by fire and probes. At 1100
hours on 12 February, the battalion, supported by U.S. gunships, engaged
an enemy force three kilometers north-northwest of the base. The results
were as follows: on the friendly side, four rangers killed, six wounded,
and one UH-1G helicopter shot down by 12.7-mm fire; enemy troops suffered
13 killed, one captured and ten AK~47 assault rifles seized.

The 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions, which operated around Landing
Zones Ranger North and Ranger South respectively, were probably the
units most frequently in contact with the enemy. At 1825 hours on 11
February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged the enemy four kilometers
northeast of its base killing 11 Communist troops, but later, at 2200
hours suffered six wounded from an enemy attack by fire consisting of
forty 82-mm mortar rounds. During the afternoon of 13 February, the
39th Battalion engaged a large enemy force at three kilometers west-—
southwest of Landing Zone Ranger North, killing 43 enemy personnel and
seizing two 37-mm antiaircraft artillery guns, two 12.7-mm machineguns,
a substantial amount of ammunition and assorted types of equipment.

70



characterized by three prominent features. The first of these was the
Xepon River which ran south and then parallel to Route No. 9 until it
reached Tchepone where it met the Xe Bang Hiang River, the primary north-
south waterway in the area. During the rainy season, when most ground
lines of communication were inundated, the enemy used the Xe Biang Hiang
River to float supplies downstream.

The second prominent terrain feature was the Co Roc Highland adjacent
to the Laotian border and just south of Route No. 9. This highland had
several peaks with elevatiors ranging from 500 to 850 meters which dominated
Route No. 9 to the east and west. It also provided excellent observation
into the Khe Sanh area. The vegetation in the Co Roc area consisted
primarily of bamboo and brushwood, offering adequate cover and concealment.

The third significant terrain feature was a high escarpment whose
ridgeline extended all the way to Tchepone, parallel to and south of
Route No. 9 and the Xepon River. Several peaks of this ridgeline were
600 to 700 meters high and offered excellent observation over Route No. 9
and the Tchepone area. Much of the area was covered by dense jungle and
thick brushwood except for a few places which had been cleared for farming.

The terrain north of Route No. 9 was hilly and heavily vegetated
against a backdrop of relatively high peaks which restricted operations
in this area almost entirely to infantry. Around Tchepone, the terrain
was much lower, sparsely vegetated and more appropriate for armor vehicles.

Route No. 9 from Khe Sanh to Tchepone was a one-lane, unevenly sur-
faced dirt road with destroyed bridges and culverts. Dominated by the
high escarpment to the south, this road was easily interdicted. It also
was difficult to prepare bypasses due to the river to the south and the
hilly terrain to the north.

In addition to Route No. 9, which was an old public road, the enemy
had completed in the area west of the Laotian border an extensive, criss-—
crossing system of lines of communication. - (Map 9) Most important of
these was Route 1032 which connected with Route 92 and offered direct
access from North Vietnam and the western DMZ area into base area 604,
then base area 611, and from there into South Vietnam either by Route 92

or Route 616 or Route 922 further to the south. Another route, designated

28



point that contained 150 rocket launchers (122-mm), 43 grenade launchers,
17 heavy machineguns, eight 82-mm mortars and 57 AK-47 rifles, all
damaged beyond use. Nearby, the battalion found two Communist tanks
destroyed by airstrikes and an ammunition storage area which it marked
for future disposal (B-52 strikes conducted later on this target resulted
in approximately 2,000 secondary explosions). While the 2d Battalion,

2d Infantry reconnoitered east of Tchepone, the 4th Battalion, lst
Infantry conducted a similar mission in the heights southeast of Tchepone
and found the bodies of 112 enemy troops and seized 32 medium mortars,
five 12.7-mm machineguns, six grenade launchers and 18 AK-47 rifles.

Meanwhile the 2d Regiment launched the first foray into Tchepone,
to find only a shambles of the former district seat, and no human beings
in sight. On their way out, the reconnaissance troops killed a squad
of NVA soldiers and found a cache containing eight 82-m mortars, two
tons of rice and other military equipment.

During the morning of 8 March, while marine and airborne units
made sporadic contacts with the enemy in all other areas with varying
degrees of success, Fire Support Base Lolo continued to receive attacks
by fire which caused all planned resupply and evacuation flights into
the base to be cancelled.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry continued to search the areas around
Tchepone and found 52 dead enemy soldiers along with three heavy machine-
guns, 44 rifles and about 50 heavy artillery rounds destroyed by air-
strikes.

Late afternoon found the units of the 2d Regiment assembled near
the banks of the Tchepone River. That night, two battalions of the
2d Regiment moved past Tchepone on the east and crossed the river to
the southern side. On 9 March at 0900 hours, the regiment began to
climb the ridge to FSB Sophia. The invasion of Tchepone had been com-
pleted.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Lam, Commander of I Corps, arrived
at the Presidential Palace in Saigon to report to President Thieu on
the situation. General Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, was

present at that meeting and heard General Lam present the rationale for

99



After this exclusive briefing, General Lam met in private with
Lieutenant General Sutherland, Commander U.S. XXIV Corps. General
Sutherland's staff had already begun planning after receiving the MACV
directive on 7 January, but now joint planning could begin in earnest.
A joint planning committee with strictly limited membership began work-
ing on the operational plan at the headquarters compound of U.S. XXIV
Corps. The only I Corps staff members involved were the G-3 and the
G-2. On the U.S. side, the same restriction on the planning staff was
initially observed. Both staffs worked closely together in a specially
arranged area with limited and controlled access.

On 17 January, planning guidance was provided by I Corps and U.S.
XXIV Corps to participating units under the guise of "Plans for the 1971
Spring-Summer Campaign" and on 21 January, General Lam and General Suther-
land flew to Saigon, where, during a meeting at MACV Headquarters, they
submitted the plan to the Chairman of the JGS and the MACV Commander.”
Intelligence estimates on which the detailed operational concept was
formulated were also carefully reviewed. Subsequently on the same day,

General Lam personally presented his operational plan to President Thieu.
The Basie Operational Plan

The combined operation was code-named LAM SON 719.4 It was to be
executed in four. phases during an indefinite period of time with the

objective of destroying enemy forces and stockpiles and cutting enemy

lines of communications in base areas 604 and 611.°

3this date was obtained from U.S. XXIV Corps After Action Report
which records: "21 January: XXIV Corps/I Corps received approval of
detailed concept." Ibid. p.3.

41am Son was the birthplace of Le Loi, a national hero second only
to Tran Hung Dao in popular reverence. Le Loi ejected the Chinese from
Vietnam in the early 15th Century.

Sthe directive given by U.S. XXIV Corps to the U.S. 101st Airborne
Division (Airmobile) and the Da Nang Support Command stated that these
units should be prepared to provide support for I Corps operations forces
for at least 90 days, in other words, until the onset of the Laotian
rainy season in early May 1971.

35



each FSB was also not adequate. The inevitahle result was that our
units were immobilized in these FSBs and gradually became fixed targets
for enemy encirclement and attacks. Most of the 96 artillery pieces
lost in Laos resulted from our system of lame-duck FSBs. This system
could have been replaced by other alternatives such as mobile FSBs,
selection of lower, more accessible sites and increased use of mortars
to augment artillery firepower. A system of mobile FSBs would have
fully utilized the U.S. helilift capabilities; it would also have af-
forded better defense and greater opportunities to keep the offensive
moving. Heliborne operations as a tactic were thoroughly put to test
during the Laotian campaign because they were conducted in an area of
operation where fighting was more intense than in any past experience
in South Vietnam and where the enemy's antiaircraft system was ef-
fective. But the U.S. Army's rules governing these operations seemed
to hold fast and were proved valid. However, their execution could
stand some improvement in terms of coordination and fire support; in
any case, it should be done with expertise and attention to details.
First, it appeared that the enemy would have been confused if
more landing zones (LZ) had been prepared than were really needed.
B-52 strikes should not be used too far in advance of the actual
landings. After that other types of firepower could be used to prepare
LZs. Experience showed that it would be better to divide the area
into several sectors, each sector assigned to a particular type of
firepower so that all the various types firepowers available could be
applied at the same time to achieve a maximum effect: tactical air,
aerial artillery, air cavalry, ground artillery, etc, The use of fire-
power should not be confined to the preparation of L2s; it should also
be directed against avenues of approach and areas where enemy artillery
or troops concentration were suspected. Shortly before the landings,
all firepower should be concentrated for the last time on the selected
sites. Next, air cavalry elements would carry out their classic re-
connaissance mission. Since they were familiar with LZ sites, local
terrain and flight approaches, the air cavalry commander ‘should be made

responsible for fire coordination. When landings began, support fire

160



used during the initial phase pending repairs on the main airstrip.
Concurrently, a company of the U.S. 7th Combat Engineer Battalion, with
three D7 bulldozers, immediately started building a road leading from
the Rockpile directly to Khe Sanh.

Initial artillery support was provided by the 1/82 (-) and 2/94
Artillery Battalions at Vandegrift along with the 8/4 Artillery Battalion
at Camp Carroll. e 5/4 Artillery Battalion was expected to displace
forward to provide support at Khe Sanh. ©

Beginning at 0830 hours, three infantry battalions (3/187 Infantry,
1/11 Infantry and 4/3 Infantry) of the U.S. lst Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) were heliborne into three landing zones in the
Khe Sanh area. The operation proceeded smoothly and was completed at
1530, each battalion moving into its assigned area of operation without
significant contact with the enemy. While the 1/11 Infantry Task Force
secured Khe Sanh, the 1/77 Armored Task Force remained in the Vandegrift
area and provided security along Route No. 9 from the Rockpile to the
south of Vandegrift. The 1/1 Cavalry Task Force meanwhile conducted a
reconnaissance in force along from Khe Sanh toward the Laotian border.

After U.S. armored and infantry forces had consolidated their
positions in the objective area on 1 February, heavy artillery elements
along with the 8/4 Artillery Battalion began to move into Khe Sanh. On
that day, U.S. engineer units also completed temporary repairs on the
road from Vandegrift to Khe Sanh and it was now able to accommodate
tracked vehicles as far west as Lang Vei. The 27th Engineer Battalion
meanwhile began to remove damaged PSP from the main airstrip at Khe
Sanh.

Two efforts were conducted in the next morning; the 1/1 Cavalry
Task Force advanced to approximately four kilometers west of Lang Vei
where it established a screen near the border. Meanwhile, the 2/17
Cavalry Squadron conducted a raid in an area where enemy presence was
suspected, approximately 18 kilometers south of Khe Sanh. No enemy
contact was made but they did find a hospital lqcated in a large tunnel

complex. Evidently the enemy had moved out 12 to 24 hours earlier.

60



Another enemy weapon that was least expected in view of the adverse
terrain in lower Laos was the tank. Since the very first days of the
operation, our troops had detected and reported traces of tracked vehi-
cles. Then enemy prisoners provided additional information which pointed
to the presence of an armor regiment in the area. It was only later
when some of these tanks made their appearance that they were observed
and attacked by U.S. aircraft. ‘Then, a combined infantry-armor attack
against FSB 31 made it all too clear that tanks were being used exten-
sively by the enemy although in a rather unorthodox manner. In his
attack against FSB 30, for example, the enemy used tanks only to provide
direct support fire, and at FSB Delta, his flame-throwing tanks repulsed
a counterattack by our Marine troops. The enemy's employment of armor
was even more unorthodox in that tanks were used individually to ambush
our troops along well concealed jungle paths, as if they were playing a
hide-and-seek game. This tactic worked because the enemy knew well the
system of paths that crisscrossed the area. Against our armor or truck
convoys, enemy tanks were usually positioned in ambush, then suddenly
opened fire and withdrew quickly into jungle paths. In addition to
PT-76's, the enemy also employed medium T-54 and T-34 tanks whose 100-mm
and 85-mm guns had a greater firepower than our 76-mm M-41 light tanks.
Confined to a one-way road with little room for cross-country maneuvers,
ARVN armor units found themselves in an extremely disadvantageous posi-
tion.

While enemy infantry troops seemed to have excellent anti-tank
capabilities with their B-40 and B-41 teams and their ambush tactics,
our infantrymen were not well prepared against enemy tanks. ARVN air-
borne troops, for example, complained about the ineffectiveness of the
M-72 light anti-tank weapon.’ As a result, old 3.5" rocket launchers

Ne is possible that one of the problems the troopers experienced
with the LAW was related to firing the weapon at very close range,
shorter than the minimum arming distance of the projectile.

144



flown first to the Khe Sanh airfield. Low ceilings and hazardous
mountains would force helicopters flying frontline support missions to
follow natural avenues of approach such as valleys and rivers which the
enemy could interdict with ease. This handicap was going to be an impor-

tant factor affecting the course of combat operations.

31



personnel were killed and 51 armor and airborne personnel wounded.
These were the first ARVN casualties of Operation LAM SON 719.

On the logistic side, immediately following in the steps of the
U.S. engineers who were repairing and opening roads, U.S. logistic units
were displacing forward to establish support facilities.and Forward
Support Area (FSA) 26-1 at Ca Lu south of Vandegrift was opened on 30
January. Advance elements of Forward Support Area 26-2 arrived at Khe
Sanh on 3 February and this facility was operational two days later.
Ground transportation soon became difficult because the road section
between Vandegrift and Khe Sanh was only trafficable one way. Despite
this, U.S. and ARVN convoys, combat and logistic alike, moved day and
night.

During the first days, and as originally planned, ARVN units were
supported by U.S. logistic facilities. As soon as ARVN units reached the
assembly area, they were issued supplies in preparation for action.

This activity proceeded smoothly except for some difficulties in the
issue of combat rations. Vietnamese combat rations were not similar to
American C-rations. Instead of a self-contained package of individual
meals, each Vietnamese ration consisted of three separate items: instant
rice, canned meat or fish, and condiments. These were packaged individ-
ually but issued collectively by the carton. American logistics person-
nel were unfamiliar with these rations and with ARVN issue and accounting
procedures so to solve the problem some Vietnamese specialists were
detached to FSA 26-2. During this same period, ARVN logistic units
dispatched advance teams to Khe Sanh to establish their own support
facilities including ammunition and fuel :supply points, which were
scheduled to tnitiate operations on D-Day + 17 (16 February).

Probably taken by surprise, enemy troops in Quang Tri reacted very
slowly and weakly during the first days. Although some mine explosions
occurred along the routes of advance, floating mines appeared on the
Cau Viet River, and a few rockets were fired into rear support bases,
other activities of Communist units in northern Quang Tri Province showed
no significant changes. The northwestern corner of Quang Tri, in partic-

ular, remained very quiet.

63



the withdrawal and the outline of how it would be executed. Why did

General Lam and General Vien recommend to President Thieu that the ap-
parently successful operation into Laos be terminated so far ahead of
schedule? The 2d Infantry had not nearly completed its mission in the
hills east of Tchepone where great quantities of NVA military supplies
were stored, and only a brief reconnaissance had been conducted into
the town itself. No ARVN reconnaissance in force had reached the Xe
Bang Hiang River, the principal waterway that flows from north to south
west of the town, although the ARVN commander in this zone had requested
that CBU-42 (time-delay bomblets) be sewn on the west bank to make it
difficult for the NVA to concentrate there. Coincidentally, of course,
this barrier also inhibited any ARVN crossing of the river in this area,
although it was the western side of the Tchepone complex that was
suspected of containing numerous supply depots and huge quantities of
war materiel, The river would have to be crossed to complete the task.

Why was the river not crossed? The answer is that a careful mili-
tary estimate was made, based upon all the pertinent information avail-
able at the time, and the conclusion was inescapable: it was time to
get out. First was the problem of terrain. In a tactical sense, ARVN
forces were facing an uphill task, progressing as they did from the
lowlands, with which they were familiar, to the highlands where the
well-entrenched enemy enjoyed the advantage. The only road available
for troop and supply movements ran through steep mountains and dense
forests. The enemy had operated in this region for many years, was
familiar with it and knew all the trails. He could cut the road or lay
ambushes almost anywhere. To the west past Ban Dong, this road ran
through a range of high mountains. All along the slopes the NVA had
positioned a dense array of antiaircraft guns, big and small. These
guns not only fired at aircraft but also at ARVN troop columns and
truck convoys moving to and from Tchepone.

The forests of the Truong Son Range are especially formidable
obstacles to cross-country movement. The bases of the tall trees are
girded by bamboo thickets, dense and thorny. Thesé forests do not

permit armored operations and thorny bamboo greatly hampers movements

100



all, withdrawing under enemy pressure was always a difficult operation
which should be carefully planned and executed. The time allowed for
its execution was too short. The extrication of troops by helicopters
naturally increased their vulnerability when compared to a withdrawal
on foot. However, some movements to the rear on foot were not executed
in a satisfactory manner. Our forces suffered serious losses on routes
selected for withdrawal because of combined armor-infantry ambushes
laid by the enemy. During the withdrawal, the Airborne Division and
the entire armor force were unable to ensure protection for their own
movements. The Marine units, however, fared much better; their with-
drawal was a successful operation.

In summary, LAM SON 719 was a bloody field exercise for ARVN
forces under the command of I Corps. Nearly 8,000 ARVN soldiers and
millions of dollars worth of valuable equipment and materiel were
sacrificed. The realities of battles fought in Laos certainly taught
us many invaluable lessons that the RVNAF would have to learn in order
to defend South Vietnam effectively. Many of these lessons—those that
were appropriate for such treatment—became subjects of instruction at

RVNAF service schools and training centers.

163



to view Operation LAM SON 719 as an incomplete campaign, being too
hastily terminated. Photographs of the battered ARVN forces in retreat
taken by war correspondents, coupled with moving news reports created
unfavorable feelings toward the RVN. The operation had received too
much publicity and its objective had been misinterpreted as being
decisive by some reporters. To terminate the operation at this time,
well before the lower Laos rainy season, would surely be branded a
defeat by public opinion. Moreover, the RVN military spokeman in his
vague style of public announcement reiterated during a press conference
after 25 March that the lower Laos operation was not really over and
RVN forces were still attacking Communist logistical routes. To get
itself off the hook, the GVN surely had to continue Operation LAM SON
719. The attacks against the Ho Chi Minh trail complex would continue,
but less for military gains, than for face-saving purposes, particularly
in light of the fact that Communist troops had just launched a series
of attacks in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and even in MR-2.

After repeated bombings by B-52s throughout the night of 28 March
extending into the early morning of 29 March, reconnaissance aircraft
were sent to check the Muong Nong area. There were two serious obstacles
there which prompted the raid to be called off: enemy antiaircraft guns
had laid out an intense barrage of fire and the dense fog in the area
would make air support almost impossible. Prolonged airstrikes would
compromise the target and the units which were to conduct the raid as
well as those supporting it would be subjected to further difficulties.
The raid was, therefore, rescheduled for 31 March, but against another
target.

In the early morning of 31 March, in the projected area of opera—
tion, a wave of B-52 strikes was followed by 22 tactical air sorties,
all designed to prepare a landing zone south of the Laotian salient
approximately 40 kilometers southeast of Lang Vei. Map 23) However,
at 1030 hours reconnaissance aircraft reported continued heavy enemy
antiaircraft fire. Preparations of the landing zone by airstrikes were
resumed and at 1130 hours a Black Panther unit of the lst Infantry Divi-
sion, about 200 men and supported by the 2/17 Air Cavalry Squadron of

122



Chart 1 — Task Organization, LAM SON 719, Early February 1971

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83



forces to capitalize on the enemy's diminishing strength. Major opera-
tions were launched successively which succeeded in forcing the enemy
from his bases and driving him over the national boundaries.

The enemy's weakness and the Allied successes of 1969 and 1970
were favorable to the implementation of the Vietnamization program.
ARVN units were redeployed to gradually replace United States troops
and assume more combat responsibilities. The northernmost DMZ area
was taken over by units of the lst Infantry Division. By the end of
1969, the northern part of II Corps area and the entirety of IV Corps
area were defended by the armed forces of Vietnam. In other corps
areas, whenever a United States infantry unit was leaving, adjacent
Vietnamese units immediately expanded their operational responsibili-
ties to cover the evacuated area as well.

The Vietnamese Air Force continued to develop and provided more
effective support for friendly ground units. The Navy also was given
more responsibilities at an accelerated pace. By September 1970, the
inner perimeter of Operation Market Time, which was designed to inter-
dict sea infiltration routes to the Communists, became the sole respon-
sibility of the Vietnamese Navy. By the end of 1970, twelve of the
fourteen joint United States-Vietnamese naval operations in progress
were conducted entirely by the Vietnamese Navy. The other two opera-
tions, Solid Anchor (south of Cape Ca Mau) and the outer perimeter of
Market Time, were subsequently completely turned over to the Navy of
the Republic of Vietnam.

The years 1969 and 1970 were a period when the Republic of Vietnam

took advantage of the enemy's declining strength and power. Pacifica-
tion and development campaigns were launched in rapid succession,
designed to reoccupy and rehabilitate the countryside. As early as
at the end of 1968, the Hamlet Evaluation System indicated that the
pacification program had more than restored the conditions that had
existed in the countryside prior to the Communist general offensive.
In late 1970, 95 percent of the hamlets of the Republic of Vietnam were
recorded as secure and fairly secure (HES categories A, B and C). When
compared to 1967, an additional five million people had come under the
authority of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

4



as an ARVN infantry division commander and from interviews with Viet-
mamese unit commanders and staff officers who participated in the
operation. My work would not have been complete without the valuable
contributions of several associates to whom I owe a special debt of
gratitude.

General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF,
has provided me with a unique insight into LAM SON 719 from the highest
level of our armed forces. Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, who was
Commander of the Central “Logistics Command, RVNAF at the time, has con-
tributed his account of combined logistic support for the operation.
Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Commander of IV Corps and later
I Corps, under whose command and leadership I had served for several
years, has enlightened me with his highly professional and analytical
comments on tactical problems concerning the ARVN and especially the
lst Infantry Division. Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, Assistant
Chief of Staff -J-3, JGS, has briefed me in detail concerning his per-
sonal involvement in the early planning stage of the operation. Colonel
Hoang Ngoc Lung, Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, JGS, has been of great
assistance with his intimate knowledge of NVA forces, their activities
on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the enemy logistic structure in the area
of operation.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan
Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache
serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a highly
professional job of translating and editing that helps impart unity and
cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ms. Bong, a former Captain in the
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of the Viet-
namese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in the

administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form.

McLean, Virginia Nguyen Duy Hinh
31 July 1977 Major General, ARVN

vi



belt around the base. This ARVN tactic worked fine in South Vietnam

in most situations. However, in the face of a more concentrated en-
circlement combined with artillery fire and ground attacks and frequently
with an armor thrust, this ARVN defensive tactic proved to be less ef-
fective.. Under these conditions, a single battalion was eventually
overpowered and lost the initiative. The final attack to overrun a base
was usually conducted with a massive concentration of infantry troops
usually outnumbering the defenders by three to five times without

regard to losses.

In the face of these difficulties which ARVN forces were not pre-
pared to meet, Operation LAM SON 719 bogged down as soon as it reached
Ban Dong. First the rangers, then the paratroopers, and finally the
armor troops, all had the chance to prove their gallantry in combat
and indeed inflicted severe losses to the enemy. But by this time, the
ARVN forces had lost their initiative and our vigorous offensive thrust
was blunted. The state of inconclusive, see-saw fighting continued
until the beginning of March when, with increased U.S, helilift and
firepower support, the 2d Regiment of the lst Infantry Division suc-
ceeded in landing in Tchepone, the major terrain objective of the entire
operation. For all its merits, this exploit was more a symbolic gesture
than a real achievement. It merely meant that "we were there."

The 2d Regiment did not stay long in Tchepone. The imbalance of
forces by that time precluded any attempt at holding and exploiting
this objective. Our success in reaching Tchepone was largely due to a
flexibility in plans and the awesome capability of U.S. helicopters.

The real prize, however, was not to be found there. It was located
further west where the enemy's more important supply caches still lay
unsheltered on the ground. But ARVN forces could not get there nor
could they afford to linger long in Tchepone. As swiftly as they came
in, they were extracted in haste before the enemy had time to regroup
and react. A previous prolonged search of the area of Route 914 by

the lst Division had shown that enemy reactions were swift. This was
another indication of our inability to achieve what had been originally
intended. It was true that U.S. helicopters helped with the maneuvering

146

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Planning and preparations for the offensive were another major
area that needed improvement. The operational plan for LAM SON 719
was adequate only so long as the operation progressed smoothly and ARVN
forces were able to hold the initiative. It should have taken contin-
gencies into full consideration and been able to respond to them with
resourcefulness, The extent and intensity of enemy reactions, for
example, were one contingency that planners apparently overlooked.

Then the enemy could well reinfdrce his resistance by diversionary
actions elsewhere in South Vietnam, too. The absence of contingency
planning was a glaring deficiency of LAM SON 719. ARVN units were also
not thoroughly prepared when they went into Laos. Elite troops like
the paratroopers, for example, had problems using the M-72 light anti-
tank weapon. Several other units did not have enough warm clothes and
blankets for their troops. FSB 31, which was supposed to serve as a
major supporting base during the entire course of the operation, had
only a most rudimentary defense system: a single concertina ring thrown
around it. The command and control center of the 3d Airborne Battalion,
which was responsible for the defense of FSB 31, was sheltered only by
12 PSP sheets protecting the battalion headquarters, its S-3 section,
and communications and medical elements. With this kind of defense and
protection, how could FSB 31 hold out against enemy 130-mm shells and
tanks? Obviously, planning and preparations should have been more
extensive, more careful.

The problem of preparations was closely related to the need to
preserve secrecy. How to proceed with preparations at the unit level
while keeping them from being detected by the enemy? That was a major
problem that needed to be solved. At the JGS level, even the J-2 was
not informed about the operational plan until the campaign had started.
He did not have the opportunity to contribute to the planning process
either his intelligence data or his own expert assessment of the enemy's
capabilities. I Corps staff agencies other than the G-2 and G-3 divi-
sions, and those of participating units were similarly left out. It
seemed as though the whole undertaking had been just a contingency
action to meet a difficult situation.

157



Luoi (Ban Dong), approximately 20 kilometers from the border. Enemy
antiaircraft fire was heavy, but thanks to the dedicated support of air
cavalry teams, the landing was completed at 1720 hours. ‘wo hours later,
advance elements of the armored column linked up with the 9th Airborne
Battalion at A Luoi. This was the greatest success of the day.

The same day was marked by several other events. Troops of the
3d Airborne Battalion, operating approximately one kilometer east of
Fire Support Base 31, were engaged by the enemy at 1230 hours. They
suffered light casualties but captured six Molotova trucks loaded with
ammunition. Extending their search north, this team found a cache of
fourteen 82-mm mortars, four 122-mm rocket launchers and nine AK~47
assault rifles.

Meanwhile, near the area of operations of the 2lst Ranger Battalion,
a flight of four VNAF helicopters bound for Landing Zone Ranger South
was hit by enemy 37-mm antiaircraft artillery fire at 1300 hours. ‘Two
helicopters were downed and all passengers were presumed killed. ‘The
first helicopter carried two ARVN colonels, the G3 and G4 of I Corps.
The second helicopter reportedly carried a number of foreign correspon-
dents. It was suspected that the I Corps G3 had carried with him an
operational map of LAM SON 719 along with signal operating instructions
and codes. The loss of these documents to the enemy would be extremely
significant. A thorough search of the area for the downed helicopters
produced no results.

The linkup on Route No. 9 between the armored and airborne troops
at Landing Zone A Luoi (Ban Dong) nearly 20 kilometers deep into eneny
territory was an encouraging achievement. I Corps Headquarters there-
fore decided to push the operation further westward. Reinforcements
were to be sent on 11 February to increase security on the northern and
southern flanks before further advance was made. At 1430 hours, the
3/1 Infantry Battalion was heliborne to be inserted into Landing Zone
Yellow but because of last-minute intelligence reports of important ene-
my concentration nearby, the battalion was diverted to Landing Zone Don,
four kilometers southwest of LZ Delta. During the same period, toward

the north, the 39th Ranger Battalion was deployed in the area of Landing

69



HNVS 3H»

LZ6L Arenaqa, 30 yaa seq ‘uonentis Awaug — g, dew

78



Indochina Monographs

Lam Son 719
by

Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh

U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DTIC QUALITY LNaPECTED }



Route 914. The Ist and 2d Regiments would.:conduct operations in the
area of Route 914 for seven to ten days. The withdrawal would then
proceed in the following order: first, the lst Division, then the
Airborne Division; Fire Support Base Lolo ‘would close thereafter to be
followed by Fire Support Base Brick; the 3d Infantry Regiment in the
area of Brown and Fire Support Base Delta I would pull out after closing
FSB A Luoi. After the withdrawal of the Airborne Division, the 147th
and 258th Marine Brigades would move out from the areas of Fire Support
Bases Delta and Hotel. The entire withdrawal, according to Lieutenant
General Lam's estimate, was scheduled for completion by 31 March. After
resting and reorganizing for about two weeks, the lst Infantry Division,
two Marine brigades and one Airborne brigade would conduct operations
into the eastern sector of enemy Base Area 611, the A Shau Valley and
the Laotian salient. ‘The Khe Sanh Base would probably close on 15 April.

The Valiant ARVN Ist Infantry Division

While the withdrawal plan was being explained to the President,
the lst Infantry Regiment began to move toward objective area Ta Luong.
(Map 21) Advance elements reported sighting enemy tanks near the area.
Further north, near Route No. 9, at 10 kilometers southeast of Tchepone,
observation teams of the lst Regiment also reported sighting a Communist
armored group. ARVN artillery opened fire and disabled five enemy tanks.
Meanwhile, the Marine sector was very active. The battalions received
heavy attacks by fire, and, searching out 10 km south-southeast from
their bases, found a NVA camp that had been bombed by B-52s with 5,000
heavy artillery rockets along with numerous other weapons and substantial
volumes of ammunition all destroyed. In the morning of 10 March, the
lst Marine Battalion engaged the enemy twice, the first time in a light
encounter and the second time fighting a battalion-size unit with the
following results: 72 enemy killed and 20 small arms, one recoilless
rifle, and four grenade launchers seized. The Marine losses were only
six killed and 19 wounded. ,

104





was definitely inflated because the highest level of ARVN strength
committed during the entire operation reached only 17,000. It is
obvious that if the casualties had been 10,000 as reported by these
correspondents, certainly not very many ARVN units would have been
able to make their way back to the border, which was not true. Reports
on enemy losses, similarly, were regarded as being inflated. Also the
general public believed that more U.S. helicopters had been destroyed
than official announcements indicated. (Table 1)

RVNAF and United States casualties including killed, wounded and
missing as reported through military channels for all of LAM SON 719
totaled 9,065. Most of the 7,683 RVNAF casualties were incurred by
the tactical units that participated in the operations in Laos; the
1st Infantry Division and the Airborne Division absorbed over one-half
of this total. (Table 2)

: I Corps casualties thus represented about 45% of the maximum
17,000 troops that were committed during the most active phase of the
operation. For LAM SON 719, I Corps had deployed a total of 42 bat-
talion-size combat units of which 34 actually fought in lower Laos.
Four ARVN battalions suffered losses so severe that they had to be re-
constituted; six others, while suffering losses considered "moderate,"
still managed to fight as units. As to U.S. casualties they were
incurred partly in combat activities conducted in South Vietnam, partly
in helilift and air support activities in Laos.

Equipment and materiel losses for both U.S. and ARVN forces are
outlined in Table 3. On the ARVN side, the most noteworthy losses were
the 87 combat vehicles (to include M-113 armored personnel carriers
and similar vehicles), 54 light tanks (M-41), 96 artillery pieces (of
both 105-mm and 155-mm), 31 bulldozers, and over 1,500 radio sets.

Most tanks and armored vehicles were damaged and destroyed during
combat but the losses also included those left behind which were not
able to maneuver around ambush sites. Among the 96 artillery pieces
lost, the majority had been damaged by enemy counter-battery fire
before being left behind in evacuated fire support bases; the remaining
were destroyed by ARVN artillery troops prior to their withdrawal. No

127



seriously underestimated the enemy's capabilities or the restrictions
dictated by the terrain in that area. As a result, the lst Armor Bri-
gade was at a great disadvantage when faced with enemy tanks deep in
the jungle. In those circumstances, ARVN armor officers were naturally
unable to make effective use of combat tactics they had learned in
Western service schools. The brigade commander was also not resource-
ful enough to meet this unusual combat challenge. The outcome was
evident: only one-third of the total number of armored vehicles com-
mitted managed to return home after accomplishing nothing substantial.
If someone was to be held responsible for this failure, the question
would arise as to whether it should be the commander of the brigade or
his superior, who committed this unit to such an undesirable and
impossible situation,

In contrast, I Corps artillery performed exceptionally well during
the entire operation. Fire coordination between ARVN and U.S. sup-
porting units was extremely flexible and effective. Divisional artillery
units providing direct support in Laos fared less well, however. Their
deployment was also limited. Each infantry regiment or brigade was
supported by only one 105-mm battery and one 155-mm battery. Given the
number of artillery pieces left behind in Laos after the hasty with-
drawal, one may wonder whether we should have committed more artillery
assets to the battle.

The lst Air Division, Vietnam Air Force, did not play a significant
role in providing close air support for I Corps forces. Its partici-
pation and contributions were rather modest even by RVNAF standards due
to the availability of the United States Air Force. The lst Area
Logistics Command, by contrast, proved to be resourceful and capable
enough to meet the challenge of providing support for a corps-size
operation on short notice. Its lack of initial preparations were more
than offset by the solid backing given by U.S. logistical agencies.

155



Preface

For several years, the eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was
used by North Vietnam as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel
and materiels réquired to sustain its war efforts in South Vietnam and
Cambodia. In addition to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the eastern panhandle
contained many logistic installations and base areas. After the 18
March 1970 change of government in Cambodia which closed the port of
Sihanoukville to the enemy, this trail-base area complex in lower Laos
became even more important to North Vietnam in its prosecution of the
war in the South. The real hub of this entire complex, where transpor-
tation and storage activities were coordinated, was Base Area 604
located west of the Demilitarized Zone and surrounding the district
town of Tchepone.

To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South
Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against
this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. Operation LAM SON 719
was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and
helilift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those
ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test of Vietnamization, this opera-
tion was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effec~
tiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, LAM SON
719 achieved the objective of forestalling a Communist offensive in
the spring of 1971.

This monograph will present a critical analysis of all aspects
of LAM SON 719 from the planning stage to the withdrawal from lower

Laos. In its preparation, I have drawn primarily from my own experience



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on station above the battle that U.S. airpower could have been employed
to hold the firebase. A number of airborne troops managed to break out
but the commanders of the 3d Airborne Brigade and 3d Artillery Battalion
were captured by the eneny .° The weather thereafter worsened and air-
craft could not provide support. ARVN losses at Fire Support Base 31
were 155 killed and missing with a corresponding number of individual
weapons and six 105-mm howitzers. The enemy lost an estimated 250
killed and eleven PT-76 and T-54 tanks.

Between 25 February and 1 March, on its way to relieve Fire Support
Base 31, the armored~infantry task force composed of the 17th Armored
Squadron, the 8th Airborne Battalion and remaining elements of the 3d
Airborne Battalion fought three major battles on 25 February, 27 Febru-
ary and on the night of 1 March 1971. They lost 27 KIA, 186 WIA, one
MIA, three M-41 tanks and 25 armored vehicles destroyed. The enemy
sustained 1,130 killed, two captured, over 300 assorted weapons seized,
17 PT-76 and six T-54 tanks and two Molotova trucks destroyed. The
prisoners disclosed that the 24B Regiment and the 36th Regiment of the
308th Division, reinforced by the 202d Tank Regiment, had taken part
in recent battles. The 24B Regiment was the unit which attacked Fire
Support Base 31 while the 36th Regiment was operating to the south.
Cumulative enemy losses during these battles equaled one-half of the
strength he initially committed.

Even before the attack on Fire Support Base 31, Fire Support Base
30 of the 2d Airborne Battalion had been the target of repeated enemy
attacks by fire involving all sizes of ammunition in the Communist in-
ventory. Because of the accurate enemy anti-aircraft fire, helicopter

takeoffs and landings were very risky. Each resupply mission was

Scolonel Nguyen Van Tho, commander of the 3d Airborne Brigade,
was forced by the Communists to make a radio statement denouncing
LAM SON 719 shortly after his capture.

85



With most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded
in the 2lst Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire,
including 130-mm artillery, on the night of 21 February. Plans were made
to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day. Toward noon on 22
February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy
barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and
ground artillery for nearly an hour while 13 medical evacuation helicopters
were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked
up122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since
his aircraft was shot down. The ranger force remaining in combat position
at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th
Battalion but two days later, on 24 February, the battalion was ordered

by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB 30. From there they were
helilifted to FSB Phu Loc.

While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities
took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and
destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south,
striking along Route 92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but
also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fire. The 8th
Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers
north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank :and a 23-mm gun position.
This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the
friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply,
medical evacuation or support missions.

The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the
21st Rangers and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum ef-
fort in air and artillery support was required for each resupply and
evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support.
The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military
advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold
it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west
and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the
main mission.

In the southern sector of the Ist Division, within objective area
A-Ro, the 2/3 Battalion came into heavy contact with the enemy on 23 Feb-
ruary. The 3/3 Battalion was brought in to reinforce but the enemy would

80



This was a difficult time for the enemy. His system of bases and
sanctuaries on both sides of the Cambodian border was apparently para-
lyzed and continued to be harassed. The port of Sihanoukville (redesig-
nated Kompong Som) no longer was a free port of entry for his supplies
and our Operation Market Time on the high seas off the Vietnam coastline
was effectively interdicting infiltration by sea. To continue support-
ing its war in the South, it appeared that North Vietnam would have to
rely solely on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the supply route along the rugged
Truong Son mountain range. Therefore, an invasion of the Laos Panhandle
became an attractive idea; such an operation would retain the initiative
for the RVNAF, disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies to South
Vietnam, and greatly reduce the enemy's capability to launch an offen-
sive in 1971.



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The above analysis serves to point out the main objectives that
both the RVN and the U.S. had expected to achieve through LAM SON 719:
more time for the Vietnamization process and the strengthening of the
RVN to justify the continued redeployment of U.S. forces. From all
indications, this objective was achieved. It permitted President Nixon
to announce, only one day after the last raid into Laos had ended, that
an additional 100,000 troops would be withdrawn between early May and
the end of November 1971. This would reduce total U.S. combat strength
in South Vietnam to 184,000. So, in the final analysis, although LAM
SON 719 was not a total tactical success, it certainly helped the RVN
and the U.S. to achieve some of their more important strategic objectives.
In return, the RVN had to pay a high price and in the process exposed
some of its weaknesses in the areas of defense and security.

In the first place, the general reserve forces, which consisted of
the Airborne and the Marine Divisions, proved to be insufficient. for the
defense posture of the RVN. During LAM SON 719, both divisions were
unable to achieve total success despite a rather limited objective and
the participation of the lst Infantry Division and the lst Armor Brigade.
On the enemy side, the NVA reserve forces which were thrown into the
battle effectively blunted our offensive thrust in spite of serious
losses, a clear indication of the enemy's ever-increasing military might.
In addition, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become a sophisticated, convenient
and flexible infiltration system and its thousand-odd miles of well-
concealed jungle roads had proved to be difficult to interdict and hold.

Next, was the continued RVNAF dependence on U.S. support demon-
strated by LAM SON 719. In retrospect, one may wonder how the Laotian
incursion would have proceeded without U.S. artillery, air and other
combat support assets. The RVNAF had been trained and conditioned for
several years in the use of U.S. firepower either through the U.S.
advisory effort or through combined operations with U.S. combat units.
The Vietnamization program which was designed to enable the RVNAF to
assume the combat burden, apparently had not provided enough firepower
and mobility for self-support. It was understood that in the long run,
the RVNAF would have to develop a combat doctrine of their own supported

167



reported sighting an estimated 8 enemy tanks moving near Route No. 9,
approximately eight kilometers west of A Luoi. The gunships attacked
and destroyed some of the tanks. Toward noon, tactical air sighted

two T-54 tanks south of the road between A Luoi and the border, attacked
and destroyed one.

Meanwhile, in the north, the 17th Armored Squadron was heavily
engaged and Fire Support Base 30 of the 2d Airborne Battalion remained
under siege. At Fire Support Base 30, fierce fighting took place on 3
March from 0100 to 0900 hours. After heavy attacks by fire, enemy
infantry, supported by armor, approached friendly positions. The base
was located on a high mountain with steep slopes and enemy tanks were
used only to provide direct fire support. C-130 gunships and two Arc
Light strikes diverted at the last minute helped the 2d Airborne Bat-
talion hold its ground. When the gunfire ended, a search around the
base produced 98 enemy bodies, 26 AK-47s, eight B-40s and two machine-
guns right on the perimeter of defense. Friendly casualties were one
killed and four wounded. However, as a result of repeated enemy attacks
by fire during the preceding days, all 12 artillery pieces (six 105-m
and six 155-mm) had been damaged. In the afternoon of 3 March, the 2d
Airborne Battalion was ordered to abandon its positions and move out
to evacuate its wounded and conduct mobile operations. The damaged
artillery pieces at the base were destroyed before the battalion left.

During the night of 3 March, the 17th Armored Squadron, reinforced
by the 8th Airborne Battalion, engaged a battalion-size enemy force five
kilometers north of Ban Dong. Results of the battle were 383 enemy
killed, two detained, 71 individual and 28 crew-served weapons seized.
Friendly forces suffered over 100 killed and wounded and 10 armored
vehicles damaged. In the early morning of 4 March, after two resupply
and medical evacuation attempts had proved unsuccessful because of heavy
enemy fire, an Arc Light strike was made and, following it, a third
attempt succeeded in evacuating 77 airborne wounded. Only one UH-1H
helicopter was shot down and an airborne company was brought in as re-
inforcement. The next day, a column of armor-supported airborne troops

linked up with the 17th Armored Squadron to resupply it and evacuate

92



several other Communist bases located in Cambodia. This conduct of

two simultaneous major offensive operations beyond the national border
would have been impossible for the RVN just two years earlier. More
significantly, while our troops were operating outside the border, the
military situation at home was quiet, security improved, and the re-
deployment of U.S. combat troops continued at a steady pace. All these
accomplishments would have been impossible without considerable progress
in the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF and in the Vietnamization and
Pacification programs.

In lower Laos, ARVN forces had proved their fighting ability. At
least three quarters of all infantry battalions fought with professional
effectiveness despite the absence of U.S. advisers and the overwhelming
numerical superiority of enemy forces which were also supported by
substantial firepower. This fact alone imparted self-confidence to
those units which engaged such great odds.

The swiftness and forcefulness with which enemy forces reacted to
our incursion gave credence to intelligence reports that the enemy had
been preparing to launch an offensive of his own some time during the
year. Had it not been for LAM SON 719, the enemy's planned offensive,
which occurred in the spring of 1972, may have come up to a year earlier,
As it was, the RVNAF were much further along in the process of Vietna-
mization by Easter 1972 than they were in early 1971 and better pre-
pared to cope with the great and widespread offensive the NVA eventually
launched. This delay forced upon the enemy was one of the most impor-
tant outcomes of LAM SON 719.

On the other hand, subsequent intelligence reports also indicated
that the enemy was concerned that after LAM SON 719, the RVN would
strike into the A Shau Valley and try to destroy Base Area 611. This
concern on the part of the enemy revealed two things. First, he would
be preoccupied with consolidating the defense of this base area and,
as a consequence, would have less time to devote to any offensive
activity. Second, despite his boastful claims of victory, the enemy
apparently respected the RVNAF capabilities.

166



The 39th Battalion had only one killed and 10 wounded. Meanwhile, the
21st Ranger Battalion made sporadic contacts with the enemy throughout
the day without significant results. Light contacts continued during
the following days.

In the area of operations of the Airborne Division, no additional
major units were inserted after the initial deployment but the ones
already in place were expanding their search activities. The lst
Armored Brigade launched two reconnaissance missions ‘of combined
armored/airborne forces north and south of Fire’ Support ‘Base A Luoi
(Ban Dong). In the afternoon of 11 February, the northern element
engaged an unknown-size force. Friendly losses were two M-113 armored
personnel carriers destroyed, one killed and one wounded. At approxi-
mately the same time, another M-113 detonated a mine, causing nine
wounded. In the afternoon of 15 February, an element of the 17th
Armored Squadron came upon two Russian trucks three kilometers north
of Ban Dong and destroyed an estimated six tons of rice.

Around Fire Support Bases 30 and 31, the 2d and 3d Airborne Bat-
talions pushed further out. Their companies made sporadic contacts
and proved superior to enemy forces in the area. In the morning of 12

. February in particular, an element of the 2d Airborne Battalion engaged
the enemy five kilometers southeast of Fire Support Base 30, killing

32 enemy troops, seizing 20 individual weapons and destroying three
crew-served weapons. Friendly forces had only three killed. Other
sporadic contacts were all in favor of friendly forces. At 1430 hours
on 14 February, Fire Support Base 31 received an attack by fire which
resulted in six airborne troops killed, three wounded and one bulldozer
damaged. The following day, toward noon, Fire Support Base 31 received
122-mm rockets which killed two and wounded four.

In the meantime, south of Route No. 9, the lst Infantry Division
introduced more troops into action. The 3/1 Battalion had been trans-
ported to Landing Zone Don in the afternoon of 11 February, and the
2/1 Battalion was helilifted to Landing Zone Delta 1,‘ six kilometers
southeast of Ban Dong, in the afternoon of the following day to push
further west. On 16 February, the 2/3 Infantry Battalion was inserted

71



CHAPTER III
The Planning Phase

How It All Started

To the South Vietnamese political and military leaders, the Ho Chi
Minh Trail had always been like a thorn in the back to be removed at
any cost whenever there was a chance. The possibility that something
could be done about it began to take shape as the war intensified and
U.S. combat forces helped regain the military initiative in 1966.

One of the leading Vietnamese strategists, General Cao Van Vien,
who was both Chairman of the Joint General Staff and Minister of Defense
at that time, was the first to advocate the severance of the Communist
lifeline. In a testimony given before members of the National Leader-
ship Committee, who ruled the country from June 1965 to September 1967,
General Vien propounded an offensive strategy, called the "strategy of
isolation and severance" for the effective defense of South Vietnam.
This was in essence a two-pronged strategy aimed at isolating the Commu-
nist infrastructure and guerrillas from the population within South
Vietnam by pacification on the one hand, and severing North Vietnam's
umbilical cord with its southern battlegrounds on the other. To imple-
ment this severance action, he proposed to invade North Vietnam's southern
panhandle with the objective of seizing the city of Vinh, the northern
terminal of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and at the same time establishing a
strong defense line across northern Quang Tri Province to run the entire
length of National Route No. 9 from the eastern coast to the Mekong River
bank. This operation assumed the participation of U.S. and other Free
World Military Assistance Forces. The attack against the two southern- ~

most North Vietnamese provinces — Thanh Hoa and Nghe An —and their

32



298th Sign Co
Co B,° 23d Med Bn, 23d Div (OPCON D+31 to D+48)
75th Support Bn

Trp F, 8th Cav (OPCON D+2 to D+67)

1lth Bde, 23d Inf Div (OPCON 101st Abn Div (Amb1) D+32 to D+66)

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2d Bn, Ist Inf (D+21)
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H Troop, 17th Cav
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6th Bn, llth Arty (-)
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Btry C, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
Btry A, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
llth Spt Bn (Prov)

Hq, USASUPCOM - DNG

26th GSG
8th Trans Gp
39th Trans Bn
57th Trans Bn
Co C, 1lth Motor Trans Bn (+)
2d Maint Bn
63d Maint Bn
FSA Maint Bn
FSA 26-1
FSA 26-2

177



lower Laos. U.S. advisers could still provide assistance to ARVN staffs
but only at command posts located on the RVN side of the border. Even
division senior advisers were not authorized to fly over lower Laos.®

To compensate for the absence of advisers who always helped in communi-
cating with U.S. units for support, it was decided to assign a Vietnamese
serviceman-interpreter to each of the FAC teams and to the 7th Air Force
airborne command and control center. It was also planned that one member
of each division advisory team would be airborne over the AO of their
respective units. This was intended to alleviate some of the problems
related to language and communications.

The U.S. 108th Artillery Group received the mission of augmenting
the firepower of I Corps Artillery. This group consisted of the 8th
Battalion, 4th Artillery (with four 8-inch howitzers and eight 175-mm
guns), the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (with the same number of artillery
pieces), and B-Battery, lst Battalion, 396th Artillery (with four 175-mm
guns). As required, the 108th Artillery Group could be augmented by the

5th Battalion, 4th Artillery (with eighteen 155-mm self-propelled howitzers),

which was the direct support unit of the U.S. lst Infantry Brigade
(Mechanized).

Procedures for coordination and liaison were clearly established.
Fire coordination was to be effected at I Corps FSCC between fire support
elements of I Corps and XXIV Corps, and communications with I Corps
artillery was to be maintained through U.S. advisers. Plans were also
made to provide for close coordination between supporting and supported
units. This was done by an exchange of liaison officers between the U.S.
108th Artillery Group and ARVN infantry divisions and brigades operating
separately. Fire support requests from ARVN units in Laos could be
routed through either one of two alternate channels. The first channel
was from requesting units to division or separate command posts where

the U.S. 108th Artillery Group's liaison officers would receive and

Satter Action Report on LAM SON 719; 1 April 1971, by Colonel
Arthur W. Pence, p. 3.

44



The 64th and 24th Regiments (respectively from the 320th and 304th
Division) continued to encircle the Ban Dong area east of Route No. 9.
The 2d Division was trying to annihilate the remaining forces of the
ARVN Ist Infantry Division. The 324th Division deployed its 29th and
803d Regiments to attack the 147th Marine Brigade while its 812th
Regiment pinned the 258th Marine Brigade down around Hotel and at Co
Roc. The enemy apparently wanted to catch the entire ARVN force in
his trap. In the manner of a hunter, he set about to kill his prey by
"locking its head and gripping its tail." This was his strategy of
annihilation for which he had coined this metaphorical phrase.

In the RVN territory, all Communist main and local force units
stepped up their operations. Mine attacks and ambushes occurred daily
on the LOC, Route No. 9, Enemy sappers continually probed logistical
installations and the enemy launched a psychological warfare campaign
aimed at publicizing the NVA victories along Route No. 9.

Beginning in early morning, north of Ban Dong, the 8th and 9th
Airborne Battalions were under attack. The 8th Battalion had 32
casualties while the 9th Battalion immediately to the east inflicted
heavy losses on the enemy. Only light engagements were reported along
Route 9 while Ban Dong Base began to be evacuated after most of the
artillery pieces had been lifted out by helicopters.

The armored logistic convoy set out, towing damaged vehicles and
guns under the protection of airborne units and other armored elements
while the enemy continued to exert pressure on the rear of the colum.
At 0730 hours, approximately two kilometers north of Ban Dong, forward
air controller aircraft reported sighting four enemy tanks moving down.
Approximately four kilometers east of Ban Dong Base, the logistic convoy
was ambushed and all 18 vehicles were immobilized. Some of the lead
vehicles were hit by direct fire and destroyed. The road had only one
lane; the vehicles behind were stalled in the ambush zone. While the
battle was in progress no reports were received from the convoy com-
mander; his superiors were therefore unaware of what was happening to
the convoy. Losses incurred during the ambush were neither reported

nor even analyzed afterwards. According to reports from an observation

113



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134



forward all requests to supporting units. Through the second channel,
operational units were able to send fire support requests directly to
their liaison officers posted at the U.S. 108th Artillery Group CP where
the requests would be immediately routed to the fire direction centers
(FDC) of supporting units. Fire coordination with the U.S. 4/77 Aerial
Artillery Battalion was to follow the same channels as those of the
108th Artillery Group to which the battalion would attach liaison of-
ficers to collect fire data or requests.

Of prime importance to the entire operation was the mobility sup-
port provided by United States helicopters of all types. The U.S. 101lst
Airborne Division (Airmobile) was assigned this support responsibility.
Having to continue its current missions inside South Vietnam which were
greatly expanded due to the redeployment of a number of ARVN units and
to provide operational support in lower Laos at the same time, the 101st
Airborne Division obviously could not meet all the requirements with
its organic assets, so the division was augmented with four Assault
Helicopter Companies (UH-1H), two Assault Support Helicopter Companies
(CH-47), two Air Cavalry Troops and two Assault Helicopter battalion
headquarters, all detached from other U.S. divisions. This reinforce-
ment was to be more substantial on days when special requirements arose.
Each U.S. assault helicopter battalion was made responsible for providing
direct support to an ARVN major unit. Thus the 158th Assault Helicopter
Battalion was assigned to support the ARVN Airborne Division and its
reinforcements and the 223d Combat Assault Battalion was to provide
support for the ARVN lst Infantry Division while the 14th Combat Assault
Battalion would support the Vietnamese Marine brigades. Each of these
support battalions was to attach a liaison team to the ARVN unit to be
supported and each U.S. battalion commander was required to visit the
ARVN unit he supported every day. In case additional support units were
provided, they would be placed under the operational control of these
commanders. The commander of the 101st Aviation Group, 10lst Airborne
Division was to exercise operational control over all assault, assault
support and aerial weapons helicopter units. (Chart 2) In addition,
an Assistant Commander of the 10lst Airborne Division was designated

as the aviation support coordinator.

45



By the-end of the first week of the invasion of Laos, the I Corps
armored-airborne advance along Route No. 9 had become much slower and
more cautious. Securing and repairing this road had become vital to
guarantee a logistical life line for ARVN forces in the event inclement
weather precluded the use of helicopters. A network of fire support
bases had been established along the road to ensure artillery support
and while the task force proceeded westward, its flanks were effectively
protected. An airborne brigade and a ranger group secured the northern
flank while two regiments of the 1st Infantry Division were deployed
along the southern flank.

According to the operational plan, the Airborne Division and the
lst Infantry Division were expected to advance westward, each step
forward to be solidly anchored on a fire support base. The planners of
LAM SON 719 apparently believed that this tactic, coordinated with the
massive support by the USAF and U.S. Army air cavalry, would help ac—
complish the mission with minimum losses. But because of this proce-
dure, the operation progressed slowly and did not exactly meet the
expectations of U.S. counterparts. In Saigon, General Abrams, COMUSMACV,
in a discussion with General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the JGS/RVNAF ,
expressed his wish to see the operational units reach Tchepone as
quickly as possible.” Then, in the afternoon of 16 February, in the
forward command post of I Corps at Dong Ha airfield, Generals Vien and
Abrams met with Generals Lam and Sutherland for two-and-a-half hours.
After a review of the general situation, a decision was made to step
up the operation by having the 1st Infantry Division quickly occupy
the higher mountain tops south of the Xepon River and establish fire
support bases there to support the Airborne Division's push toward
Tchepone. They estimated that this would take three to five days. But,
as later events were to prove, battlefield developments seldom occur
exactly as planned. Enemy reactions were becoming stronger with each

day and the test of strength more arduous.

———_——

‘Message 00843, 1414352 Feb 71, COMUSMACV to CJCS.

74



as reinforcement. Remaining at the hase were a 105-mm artillery battery,
the command section of the 3d Airborne Artillery Battalion and the 33d
and 34th Rifle Companies. The 34th Company had suffered heavy combat
casualties and was left with only 60 men. Outside the base there was
only the 3d Reconnaissance Company deployed on a mountain to the west.
On the night of 23 February, a team of Communist sappers was spotted as
it attempted to infiltrate the base from the west. Fifteen Communist
troops were killed on the spot. The enemy continued to launch attacks
by fire and kept our helicopters from providing support. Many of our
dead and wounded were left on the base for three or four days as evacua-
tion was not possible.

At 1100 hours on 25 February, Fire Support Base 31 received massive
attacks by fire, including fire from 130-mm field guns. At 1300 hours,
the 3lst Company to the south reported enemy armored movements. The
base responded with artillery fire and called for artillery support
from Fire Support Bases 30 and A Luoi. The forward air controller's
aircraft (FAC 229) was not in the air because of a confusion in grid
coordinates and did not arrive until 1400 hours. By that time, fire
from small weapons was being received from all directions and enemy
tanks had reached the southern perimeter of the base, The first flight
of fixed-wing tactical aircraft to reach the base destroyed a number
of enemy tanks on the spot and held back the armored thrust against
the southern perimeter. At 1520 hours, an estimated 20 tanks supported
by enemy infantry troops moved in from the northwest and the east. At
precisely the same time, an F-4 aircraft was hit and erupted in flames
but the pilot ejected. The Hammer FAC aircraft left its position to
direct effort to rescue the U.S. pilot, interrupting air support for
Fire Support Base 31. After a fierce artillery barrage, the enemy as~
saulted. At that time, a helicopter of the advisory team for the Air-
borne Division was the only aircraft flying overhead. It turned its
M-60 machinegun fire on the enemy but it was in vain! Artillery from
A Luoi and Fire Support Base 30 continued to fire in support but could
not stop the enemy tanks attacking on the hill slopes. Forty minutes
later, the base was overrun. It is possible that had the FAC remained



Luoi to link-up with the third ABN Brigade which was to be helilifted into
Tchepone. The Marine 147th and 258th Brigades would serve as I Corps
reserves at Khe Sanh.

Also during Phase II, the U.S. lst Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) was to continue operations west of Quang Tri Province and
the U.S. 101st ABN Division (Airmobile) was to continue security operations
as during Phase I and provide reinforcements and combat support as required.
The ARVN "Black Panther" (reconnaissance) company, lst Infantry Division,
in the meantime, was to be attached to the U.S. 10lst ABN Division and
employed in rescue missions, if required, to extract U.S. crew members
shot down in Laos.

Phase III was to be initiated after the successful occupation of
Tchepone. It was to be the exploitation phase during which search opera-
tions would be expanded to destroy enemy bases and stockpiles. The ABN
Division would search the area of Tchepone while the 1st Infantry Division
would conduct search operations to the south. The lst Ranger Group,
meanwhile, would continue holding blocking positions to the north. During
Phase III, the mission of U.S. forces was unchanged; they would continue
to provide fire support, helilift and tactical and strategic air for
ARVN units.

Phase IV was the withdrawal phase. On order, I Corps forces were
to withdraw toward the border by one of two alternate routes called
Options 1 and 2. In Option 1, the ABN Division and the lst Armor Brigade
were to withdraw to Objective A Luoi to support and cover the lst Infantry
Division which was to attack and search the western part of base area 611
then move on southeastward, followed by the ABN Division. In the mean-
time, the lst Armor Brigade, augmented by the lst Ranger Group from its
northern positions and having been separated from the ABN Division, was
to withdraw toward Khe Sanh along Route No. 9. The Marine 147th and 258th
Brigades were to conduct operations into the Laotian salient toward
Objective Ngok Tovak at the same time as the lst Infantry Division began
its attack to the southeast. Option 2 differed from Option 1 only during
the last stage of the withdrawal when, after sweeping through base area
611, the 1st Infantry Division, to be followed by the ABN Division, was to

39



Black Panthers found 15 enemy bodies and 17 weapons along with large
quantities of food and an intricate network of tunnels, trenches and
huts, all destroyed. In the course of the operation, U.S. tactical air
destroyed three antiaircraft gun positions. The Black Panthers were
extracted at 1700 hours the same day.

A few hours before the Black Panther unit ended its second raid
into enemy bases on the other side of the border, the last ARVN and
U.S. units were on their way out of Khe Sanh. The 5th and 54th Infantry
Regiments moved to Cam Lo where they boarded trucks to return to their
respective parent units, The U.S. lst Battalion, 11th Infantry Task
Force was the last unit to board helicopters leaving Khe Sanh, thereby
ending Operation LAM SON 719.

125 (



Battalion, operating outside the base, received a corresponding number
of artillery rounds and had five wounded. Other units of the brigade,
the 2d and 4th Battalions, continued to search objective area Alpha,
approximately five kilometers south of Fire Support Base Delta.

During the afternoon of 16 March the headquarters of the 3d In-
fantry Regiment (lst Division) and its 4th Battlaion were picked up
in the Delta 1 area and taken to Ham Nghi Base along with a number of
supporting units. The 3d Battalion had been taken out for rest and
reorganization two days before. The lst Battalion remained to secure
the base (Delta 1).

Meanwhile, the enemy was beginning to harass Khe Sanh. For the
second day running, this fire support base was hit by mortar fire which
wounded four. Americans and damaged two helicopters and a number of
vehicles.

On 17 March, Communist gunners stepped up their shellings of other
targets. In RVN territory, at the border, Fire Support Bases Phu
Loc and Lao Bao were attacked by 130-mm artillery but the losses were
small, :
Fire Support Base A Luoi received attacks by fire practically
every day and Fire Support Base Delta and the 7th Marine Battalion were
pinned down. In a small engagement, the 7th Battalion killed 16
enemy troops while suffering only five casualties. A NVA recruit just
assigned to the 812th Regiment, 24B Division rallied to the Marines
and disclosed that the entire 324B Division was in the "Route 9 campaign"
with its 29th, 803d and 812th regiments. The 29th Regiment had recently
suffered heavy losses and the 812th ‘Regiment was engaging the 147th
Marine Brigade.

In the meantime, in the area of the 2d Regiment, the 5th Battalion
received an intense early morning attack of an estimated 300 rounds of
mortar and artillery fire. The battalion continued its search oper-
ations and, thanks to intensive air support, scored a major victory in
the area near Landing Zone Brown, killing nearly 100 enemy and capturing
a large number of weapons and a ton of ammunition. In accordance with
the withdrawal plan, the headquarters of the 2d Infantry Regiment was

109



day when it came out near the banks of the river, about one kilometer

south of Route No. 9. The brigade was provided with a helicopter to
help it find a crossing point and the commander of the Airborne Division
had helicopters prepared to airlift light bulldozers as well as tree-
cutting equipment to help set up a crossing point for the armored
vehicles. During the dry season, the Xepon River is usually shallow
but the current is swift and the banks are steep, in many places ten
meters straight down. A crossing point for vehicles was therefore not
easy to find. Meanwhile, the 9th Airborne Battalion had crossed the
river and secured the eastern bank. In late afternoon, two D-2 bull-
dozers and other pieces of equipment were lifted in by U.S. Army CH-54
helicopters and the river-crossing site was prepared.

Meanwhile, forward air controller aircraft sighted an estimated
20 enemy armored vehicles closing in pursuit nine kilometers to the
west by way of Route No. 9 and called in tactical air. The lead tank
was hit and went up in flames. Enemy antiaircraft gunners returned
the fire and one F-100 aircraft was shot down. The pilot was not seen
ejecting. ‘Two more flights of aircraft were called in and two more
enemy vehicles were destroyed. Artillery support following the air-
strikes finally caused the enemy armored formation to break up and the
vehicles to seek concealment.

Why did the armored convoy leave Route No. 9 and make a cut through
the jungle to find a way to cross the river when there was only a final
stretch of five kilometers left to cover until the Lao-Viet border?

The reason was never officially explained but Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat,
Commander of the lst Armor Brigade, later told this writer that had his
unit not taken to the jungle to seek a way out, he did not believe a
single vehicle could have made it back to Vietnam. Route No. 9 was a
one-way road, not only littered with abandoned vehicles and rigged with
mines all along, but every section of it could conceal a Communist ambush
site. It was so treacherous that no one dared venture on it. The with-
drawal along Route No. 9 surely did not proceed as planned in an orderly

and controlled manner.

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of our forces but the overall tactical imbalance that prevailed at that
time made it impossible for ARVN forces to hold terrain and exploit the
gains. This was a truth that no one could deny.

Throughout the operation, the role played by U.S. combat support
was particularly illustrious. It was evident that without this support,
no incursion would have been possible, much less on such a large scale.
The fact that ARVN forces were able to progress into Laos as far as
Tchepone was a measure of the significance of United States support.
When enemy resistance developed into such proportions ‘that no further
progress was possible, it became all the more obvious that without
U.S. combat troops in the rear and without U.S. helicopters and tactical
air support for the frontline, it would have been impossible to withdraw
with any satisfactory degree of unit integrity.

U.S. support assets were plentiful, but it appeared that during

the early stage of the operation, their control and coordination were
not entirely satisfactory. Part of the problem seemed to derive from

the physical separation of major operational headquarters. The U.S.
XXIV Corps Forward CP was installed at Quang Tri Base while its counter-
part, I Corps Forward CP was at Dong Ha, about 10 miles to the northwest.
Still, another important element of I Corps Forward CP, the operational
control staff, was located further west at Ham Nghi Base (Khe Sanh)
which was 35 miles southwest of Dong Ha. Operating on the principle

of cooperation and coordination, both the U.S. and ARVN staffs found it
difficult to work effectively while physically separated. At Ham Nghi
Base, an important hub of support activities where all ARVN divisions’
rear echelon headquarters and U.S. forward support agencies were located,
there was no official representative of the Commanding General, U.S.
XXIV Corps with authority for control and coordination. All decisions
pertaining to support and the distribution of support assets had to be
made at the Quang Tri Base. As a result, at the forward echelon, the
direction of support effort suffered from delays and the coordination

of support activities was too loose for a fast changing tactical situa-

tion which required timely decisions on the spot.-

147



The conduct of the operation was also plagued by dissension verging
on insubordination among some ARVN field commanders. Lieutenant General
Lam was never able to exercise full control over the commanders of the
Airborne and Marine Divisions who were his equals in rank. Of the two,
Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong, the paratrooper, proved to be more
submissive, but he did not always carry out the I Corps commander's
orders in a strict manner. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, Com-
mander of the Marine Division, who was more senior in rank than the
I Corps commander, delegated his command authority to his deputy,
Colonel Bui The Lan, who directly exercised operational control over
the entire division. While occasionally present at the Marine Division's
rear echelon CP, General Khang never attended any official operational
briefings presided over by the I Corps Commander. Because of this,
the Marine Division acted independently on a few occasions when the
odds were against it. For example, it made its own decision to abandon
FSB Hotel and withdraw its troops from Laos.

President Thieu and General Vien, Chief of the JGS, were probably
aware of the discord among their subordinates, but they took no remedial
action. Perhaps General Lam did not ask for such an action. Or perhaps
the matter was so delicate among these generals, who were all considered
pillars of the regime, that it defied any easy solution.

This dissension among commanders adversely affected staff coordi-
nation between I Corps and the Airborne and Marine Divisions. Many
reports were delayed; at times, there were no reports at all. As a
result, I Corps was unable to control the situation effectively, espe-
cially when the enemy pressure began to increase significantly. Because
of this, General Lam chose an organic unit of I Corps, the lst Division,
for the Tchepone mission instead of the Airborne or Marine Division.

LAM SON 719 was further impeded by, advance news dispatches in the
press. During the preparatory period, reporters were not allowed into
the Quang Tri area but this aroused their curiosity and gave rise to
speculation. The press seemed to be able to pick up leads and develop
them into news dispatches that gave every detail of the operation as of

the end of January 1971. Thus, the advantages of surprise were lost very

i151



Indochina Monographs

This is the first of a series of studies to be published by the
U.S. Army Center of Military History that have been written by offi-
cers who held responsible positions in the South Vietnamese, Cambo-
dian, and Laotian forces during the war in Indochina. The General
Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessa—
ry support under an Army contract with the Center of Military His—
tory. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the
views of their authors~-not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or
the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write
definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in South-
east Asia.

Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a

forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam: From Cease-Fire

to Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao
Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General
Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent
of Documents.

Taken together these works should provide useful source
materials for serious historians pending publication of the more de-

finitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam.

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History



incursion of 1970, the RVNAF felt as if they had matured overnight and
desired another chance to prove it. With every passing day, the security
situation looked better and better despite our anticipation of additional
reductions in U.S. combat forces; at the beginning of 1971 a total of
over 250,000 U.S. troops had already departed since the Vietnamization
program was initiated and another redeployment increment was scheduled in
“the near future. Politically, two important events, the RVN and U.S.
presidential elections, in late 1971 and 1972 respectively, were drawing
near. These and the improved military situation in South Vietnam joined
hands to provide the rationale for LAM SON 719.

Once the decision had been made, the combined planning for the
operation between Vietnamese and American staffs became a shining example
of close and effective cooperation. By the time the J-3, JGS relayed the
official decision to the I Corps commander and briefed him on the general
concept of the operation, the initial planning process was already under-
way by the I Corps and the U.S. XXIV Corps staffs. This was made possible
by an instant exchange of data concerning the enemy situation, U.S. support,
characteristics of the area of operations, especially those pertaining to
North Vietnam and the target area which were almost exclusively provided
by the G-2, U.S. XXIV Corps. Everything that should be known by I Corps
about the enemy was made available including order of battle on NVA forces
in North Vietnam and Laos, the status of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and enemy
activities on it, the situation in Base Areas 604 and 611, and disposition
of enemy units and detailed information on the enemy's anti-aircraft
capabilities in the area of operation. Aerial photos were scrutinized with
‘particular care. Our intensive study and planning resulted in estimates
that bolstered confidence. The enemy's opposition would be initially
light. His antiaircraft system would be effectively neutralized by our
devastating firepower. Our helilift capabilities and mechanized assets
would make short work of the occupation of key objectives. Initially, it
was thought that Tchepone could be ours after three days of combat. ©

®Reference Message No. PT008443, datetimed 141435Z Feb. 71 from
COMUSMACV to CJCS and CINPAC.

141



and 152-mm heavy artillery. ARVN's stationary fire support bases on

hilltops, therefore, were easy targets for enemy artillery fire. The
second factor in the enemy's capability of déep concern to the leader-
ship in Saigon was the enemy armor strength that had become apparent.
The planners of LAM SON 719 had failed to give sufficient consideration
to the threat of NVA armor, and now this threat had become a reality.
Even though enemy armor was under daily attack from the air, Fire Sup-
port Base 31 had been lost because of the enemy's effective coordination
of armor and infantry forces. In other places the enemy used his tanks
as highly mobile field guns moving them individually over trails to
ambush ARVN armored vehicles on the roads. The maneuvering of tanks

on such a large scale over forest trails known only to the enemy posed
a great threat-to ARVN armored vehicles which were confined to congested
one-way roads strewn with disabled vehicles. Moreover, NVA tanks had
thicker armor and mounted guns of a larger caliber than the ARVN tanks,
100-mm versus 76-mm and had a significantly greater armor-defeating
capability.

Thirdly, even after a month of intensive attack the enemy's air
defense capabilities showed no signs of being subdued and he had posi-
tioned surface-to-air missiles west of the border or at the Ban Raving
Pass. These missiles had Route No. 9 from Khe Sanh to Ban Dong within
effective range, a challenge that the U.S. Air Force had to face. Around
the ARVN's besieged bases, even after waves of airstrikes, enemy anti-
aircraft guns would reappear close to their original positions. Also,
antiaircraft batteries were deployed along helicopter avenues of ap-
proach; those positioned on the mountain slopes between Ban Dong and
Tchepone seemed impossible to uproot. This enemy capability practically
neutralized the ARVN advantage of helicopter mobility and logistic
support.

In contrast to the enemy who had large uncommitted reserves in
North Vietnam, our reserves were limited indeed. The Airborne and
Marine Divisions constituted the entire general reserves of the RVN
and they were already committed. Committing the lst Infantry Division
and the lst Ranger Group required an extreme effort made possible only

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tions for support, it was too late. But this tardiness was in no way
an insurmountable obstacle. A big, helping hand was extended by the
U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang. U.S. support and the division of
tasks between U.S. and ARVN logistics units were planned as follows:
from D-day to D+8 I Corps units were to receive the same support from
U.S. logistic agencies as United States units. During the period from
D+9 to D+17 the ARVN lst Area Logistics Command was to gradually take
over responsibility for the support of operational forces. U.S. logis-
tic agencies would be deployed to the assembly area ahead of time and
would initiate support activities when the operation was launched.
Under the’ delegation of authority from and with reinforcements provided
by the Da Nang Support Command, the U.S. 26th General Support Group
(GSG) was to establish a base support area (BSA) at Quang Tri to be
operational on D-Day. Two forward logistic agencies were also to be
established: Forward Support Area (FSA) 26-1 in the Ca Lu - Vandegrift
area to begin operations on D-day, to be followed by FSA 26-2 at Khe
Sanh which would become operational during the period from D¥4 to D+6.
(Map 12)

During the initial period, no significant difficulties were en-
countered by U.S. logistic units in supplying ARVN forces because most
supply items were similar with the exception of some special types of
ammunition, for example 57-mm recoilless, and more particularly, combat
rations. The ammunition items were no longer available in the U.S.
supply system and ARVN combat rations were radically different from
U.S. C-rations. As a result adequate ARVN combat rations were immedia-
tely shipped to class I supply points operated by United States forward
support areas.

On its part, the ARVN lst Area Logistic Command planned to estab-
lish three main support areas at Phu Bai (near Hue), Quang Tri and Khe
Sanh. (Map 13) To facilitate coordination of activities and the main-
tenance of security, it was decided that U.S. and ARVN logistic agencies
would be co-located and there should be an exchange of liaison officers
as well as logistic data between the two staff elements at Da Nang and

in forward support areas.

48



We did not expect to meet head on with T-54 tanks and 130-mm guns in
the jungles of Laos. Neither did we suspect that Route No. 9 would be’
such a problem, heavily mined and riddled with fire ambushes. We had
no idea that the enemy had developed to such an extent his defense of
our area of operation.

The rapid and determined reaction of the enemy to our incursion
also presented additional complications. Even though we enjoyed modern
and effective air support, we were unable to neutralize his antiaircraft
system. His artillery did not suffer much from our counter-battery
fire. As to his mortars, they were beyond our capability to destroy or
drive away. In a concerted effort, his antiaircraft weapons, artillery
and mortars joined fires to neutralize our superiority in air mobility.
Our infantry was eventually forced on the defense by the numerical si-
periority of enemy units whose firepower was also no less overwhelming.
We did not anticipate that the enemy's armor would be a major threat,
especially in the Laotian jungle. We were wrong. As a matter of fact,
we were unable to counter it effectively regardIess of the manner in
which it was deployed. We had 300 armored vehicles but they could
barely control twelve miles of road. It is obvious that our commanders
and planners had underestimated the enemy's ability to react. We did
so because we viewed the enemy through our own lens and judged him
according to our experience. Most of our combat decisions were based
on subjective reasoning with the end result that neither our strategy
nor our tactics seemed responsive enough to the kind of warfare the
enemy was waging. The great military strategist, Sun Tzu, had said
centuries ago: "Know thy enemy, know thyself, a hundréd battles fought,
a hundred victories assured." This was perhaps just military common ~
sense but how many of our current military commanders really grasped
that simple truth and put it to work? Besides, it seemed that our side
was still complacent with its outdated vision of a guerrilla type enemy
which had existed only a decade ago.

The major tactical error of LAM SON 719 centered, then, on a rigid
application of familiar operational patterns that had so far succeeded
reasonably on the battlefields within South Vietnam. These ingrained

169



than planned, but preparations for this operation had heen so carefully
executed that when the first helicopters carrying the 2/2 Battalion
landed at Landing Zone Hope four kilometers northeast of Tchepone,

only sporadic gunfire was received. By 1343 hours both the 2d and 3d
Battalions along with an element of the 2d Reconnaissance Company and
the tactical command post of the 2d Infantry Regiment had landed safely
at Hope. Searching the adjoining areas and occupying key positions,

the 2d Regiment only made light contacts but found the bodies of 102
enemy troops killed by B-52s and seized five 12.7-mm machineguns and
one anti-aircraft artillery gun. Extending its search further south
toward Tchepone, the 3/2 Battalion found a cache of an estimated 1,900
tons of rice and 2,000 gas masks along with 31 enemy bodies and numerous
weapons destroyed by B-52s. Nearby, the 2/2 Battalion found an area
devastated by B-52s with nearly 100 enemy bodies and assorted weapons
shattered to pieces. After the two reinforced ARVN battalions had

made assault landing near the objective and rapidly exploited their
success, the district town of Tchepone was practically under ARVN :
control, dominated as it was by the array of artillery pieces to the
south. The most remote terrain objective of LAM SON 719 was attained.

97
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allowed him to move his trucks to the western edge of the DMZ. Here
his supplies were usually floated on the Houay Nam Xe River and then on
the Xe Bang Hiang River southwesterly toward Tchepone where they were
picked up before reaching the town.

To the south, the enemy had already completed Route 616 which cut
across the Xepon River and deep into South Vietnam. -The existence of
this east-west infiltration route was detected for the first time on
1 January 1970 but subsequent surveillance indicated that enemy activi-
ties on it were light. The heaviest traffic was always reported on the
north-south axis, moving from base area 604 on Routes 96, 926 and 914
toward base area 611.

By January 1971, Route 1032A had been connected with Route 1032B
which gave the enemy an additional roadway into lower Laos from North
Vietnam. Recordings made by electronic sensors indicated that of every
four trucks leaving North Vietnam, one always moved on this route regard-
less of the bombings by United States planes west of the DMZ. Aerial
photos also revealed that the enemy had built several alternate bypass
routes in this area in order to avoid concentrated bombings and ensure
the flow of traffic. Reconnaissance planes further reported that east-
west Route 925 had been widened but terminated approximately two-and-a
half miles from the GVN border. This appeared to indicate that the enemy
wanted to project another infiltration route into the Khe Sanh area,
west of Quang Tri but subsequent air reconnaissance showed that the
enemy was using Route 616 for truck traffic and his activities were
increasing substantially south of base area 611.

All of these indications clearly confirmed the enemy's efforts to
open additional infiltration roads, develop storage areas, transhipment
points and truck parks, and to make the entire area just west of Quang
Tri Province an intricate logistical and transportation complex complete
with pipelines and bypass roads. Furthermore, all these activities pro-
gressed with little interruption despite continuous bombings. The
efforts were most conspicuous in base areas 604 and 611. On the other
hand, to increase his protection capabilities, the enemy also moved

additional anti-aircraft and combat units into these areas.

18



of infantry soldiers. But enemy troops were familiar with the terrain,
had pre-dug fortifications and knew all the paths and trails. The NVA
soldiers enjoyed this important advantage.

The weather was a factor which also worked for the enemy and seldom
favored the ARVN side with its numerous helicopters and strong airforce.
As presented in the terrain description of Chapter II, lower Laos is
usually obscured in fog from dawn until mid-morning, sometimes until
noon. Aircraft could usually operate after the fog lifted until late:
afternoon, but only if there was no rain and even if it didn't rain low
clouds sometimes prevented the full use of ARVN's air support.

On the other hand, the endless mountains and forests provided good
concealment for enemy deployments within the area of operations as well
as for the movement of reinfércements from far away. Our failure to
detect all of these movements presented ARVN commanders with many un-
welcome surprises. Even those enemy units which had not previously
operated in the Laos panhandle had the support of veteran units to
provide guides, assistance and advice.

In short, the enemy was thoroughly familiar with the terrain in
lower Laos and ARVN troops were not. The terrain and weather favored
the defenders and handicapped the attackers. The area was especially
disadvantageous for our mechanized and armored forces which were re- |
stricted to narrow jungle roads on which two vehicles could not pass
and on which entire columns could often be jammed or stalled by one
disabled vehicle.

The NVA strength and reinforcement capability was the second factor
that influenced the decision to initiate the withdrawal. Estimated
enemy forces in the immediate area of operation consisted of three in-
fantry regiments, rear service elements capable of local defense, and
artillery elements-especially notable for their air defense capability.

It was estimated that the NVA could reinforce, within two weeks, with
up to eight infantry regiments and the equivalent of an artillery regi-
ment.

Heavy artillery and armor also strengthened the enemy's capabilities,

First among these was the enemy's dispersed and well concealed 130-mm

101 (



As far as command and control were concerned, the most important
problem to be solved was inaubordination on the part of general reserve
unit commanders who like many other generals considered themselves the
pillars of the regime. The I Corps commander apparently bowed to the
political powers of these generals and this adversely affected his con-
duct of the operation. -The tnmsubmissive attitude of the Marine and
Airborne Division commanders was actually inexcuseable in that they
placed themselves above the national interest and let their personal
pride interfere with the task of defeating the enemy. For the opera-
tion to succeed as planned, the problem of effective command had to be
satisfactorily solved above everything else because it affected the
relationship between subordinate staffs and the control of the opera-
tion itself. At least, the I Corps commander should have been given
the authority to require that his orders be strictly carried out.

The arrangements for effective operational control did not neces—
sarily require the traditional echelons of tactical command posts as
had been organized: main CP, forward CP and tactical control CP. In
view of effective signal communications and the availability of command
ships, the tactical control CP and the forward CP could be combined
into one. Its location was immaterial as long as the CP was able to
exercise effective control and coordination of subordinate units. At
this operational CP, there should have been adequate staff personnel,

a clear division of responsibilities among staff elements and full
authority should have been given them to solve every problem at hand
without having to refer to another echelon of command. The effective
functioning of this CP would inspire confidence among subordinate units
and their staffs. The breaking down of I Corps headquarters into three
echelons for the control of LAM SON 719 required a dilution of its
limited staff personnel with the end result that no echelon was able

to function properly.

ARVN units that participated in the operation definitely lacked
a system of accurate and timely reporting. This was not only a matter
of training or experience but also a matter of loyalty. A higher com-

mand's exercise of control was only as effective as its subordinate

158



should be continued but diverted to other pre-selected areas. Aircraft-
laid smoke screens could be useful to conceal landing activities; they
could also be used elsewhere to deceive the enemy. Air cavalry recon-
naissance, in the meantime, should extend its coverage to protect
landings. For command and control purposes during landings, at least
two command ships should be utilized, one above the pick up zone (PZ)
and the other above the LZ. Each should have command authorities
aboard with full power to solve contingency problems. Both the air
mission commander and the ground commander should be airborne together
at the LZ. Alternate troop commanders should be designated in advance
to take over in case of accidents. All protective fires and reconnais-
sance flights should continue until the landings are completed.

A basic weakness of ARVN forces participating in LAM SON 719 was
their lack of ground mobility. Since the concept of operation evolved
around the extensive use of helicopters, ARVN forces tended to be over-
dependent on them. They used helicopters indiscriminately for every
activity, even for short movements which could have been made more
effectively by marching. This was a serious mistake that not only
overtaxed U.S. helilift untts but also incurred their complaints. The
use of helicopters should have been conceived more judiciously and
then only for extensive movements such as a shift of effort direction,
the move toward Tchepone, or an exploitation of gains and creating
surprise for the enemy. More troops movements should have been made
by marching to ensure discretion and initiative. In this regard, the
1st Infantry Division was particularly commendable. Another short~
coming of ARVN units at battalion and lower levels was their failure
to maneuver when being engaged. After the first contact, they tended
to stop and wait for support rather than conduct probes and maneuver
to attack or close in on the enemy. This shortcoming indicated a need
for additional training for small-unit leaders.

With regard to combined-arms tactics, there was no doubt that
ARVN units had received extensive training but in actual combat they
seemed to falter easily, In the face of a formidable enemy, neither

the airborne nor the armor units displayed evidence of effective

161



early February 1971 with approximately 2,000 men. After 45 days of
combat, it was reduced to a total strength of 600 to 900. These losses
required replacements, and to keep his severely mauled main force units
in the north up to combat strength, the enemy was forced to reduce the
amount of replacements earmarked for his units further to the south in
both Vietnam and Cambodia.

Although the supply caches that our forces found in Laos were not
as large as those captured in Cambodia the “previous year, the amount
of enemy materiel and supplies destroyed was quite substantial accord-
ing to statistics which included bomb damage assessment of only 10% of
the B-52 targets. The true amount could have been much greater had all
strike targets been carefully searched. Of particular importance,
sections of the enemy's fuel pipeline system were destroyed in at least
seven areas. The quantity of enemy ammunition and other supplies
expended or destroyed during this campaign also reduced his supply
level to a considerable extent. In fact, in the aftermath of LAM SON
719, there were many indications that enemy units, throughout all of
South Vietnam and Cambodia, began to feel the pinch of supply and
personnel shortages.

These losses and expenditures naturally had to be replaced or
replenished, and to meet these heavy demands, the enemy required more
resources, more manpower, and more time. Despite its short duration, :
LAM SON 719 effectively disrupted the enemy's north-south supply system.
This effect was nearly total in the area of operation, somewhat less
west of it. Our intelligence revealed that enemy personnel manning the
supply base system sustained about 50% casualties along with sizable
materiel losses. In addition, the destroyed and mined roads that ARVN
forces left behind caused the enemy more difficulties long after the
incursion had ended. ARVN troops had also received the opportunity to
observe first hand the road net, terrain and disposition of enemy
logistic facilities which contributed to our target development.

On the part of the RVN, the offensive it had launched into Laos
obviously meant much mbre in another aspect. Simultaneously with this
effort, the RVN also initiated a large sweeping operation through

165



Route 1039, also originating in North Vietnam passed through the Ban
Raving Pass and offered access into Tchepone and base area 604 then
connected with either Route 29 to go further south or with Route 914
which led into base area 611 and from there into South Vietnam. All
these routes were well-maintained two-lane roads practicable for large
trucks at least during the dry season. Due to extensive bombings, the
enemy had built several alternate routes which were well concealed by
vegetation and often under double and triple canopies. In addition to
main routes, the enemy also built narrow pathways crisscrossing the
entire area. These were difficult to observe from the air and were
convenient for concealing troop movements.

February in the Tchepone area was the transitional period from the
northeast to the southwest monsoons. The northeast monsoon, which
brought rains and cloudiness to Central Vietnam above the Hai Van Pass
from October to March, was the dominant weather factor. The Truong Son
mountain range deflected much of this wet weather on the Laotian side
but in the area of operation, the skies were generally covered. The
amount of cumulus buildup in this area depended on the strength and
depth of the monsoon. Average temperature during February was 22°C in
the lowlands and about 18°C in mountainous regions.

As of mid-March, the southwest monsoon gradually picked up, result-
ing in a relative improvement of the weather and higher ceilings. The
average temperature was warmer than in February but this was a period
of showers during which the skies were temporarily covered. Beginning
in May, however, rainfall became heavier over the Truong Son Range while
in the eastern lowlands, the weather was dry and hot.

In general, during the period considered for the operation, the
weather was fairly good but quite unpredictable. From experience, it
was estimated that the area of operations would be cloudy and hazy in
the morning. The weather was favorable for air operations only from
1000-1200 hours until mid-afternoon. The 2,500-foot ceiling in the low-
lands would allow only a 1,000-foot altitude’ in the area of operation.
This was recognized as a major handicap since all aircraft used in

support missions would be located in the lowlands and would have to be

30



In lower Laos, our enemy had once more proved that his war machinery
was effective. He also proved he was determined and capable enough to
muster his force for the protection of his vital area. As individuals,
the enemy troops who were captured or rallied to our side all proved
to be weary of the war and utterly demoralized. But within their own
ranks and during combat, under the stimulation of command and Party
cadres, they were apt to become fearless. During the operation, their
repeated waves of assault were so fierce that some were reported oc-
casionally to have been drugged prior to engagement. Whatever the
‘truth, the fact must be admitted that enemy command and control was
effective. North Vietnam also demonstrated it could see far ahead,
plan for its goal realistically and implement its plans with resolution.
In addition to having effective command and control, NVA units were
well disciplined, well, trained and exceptionally well indoctrinated.
Their obvious advantage was positive and determined leadership, both
military and political.

The South Vietnamese soldier was definitely superior to his enemy
as an individual. He was more experienced, better trained and wiser.
In general, he had fought with determination and professionalism against
a numerically superior enemy who endeavored to protect his vital life-
line. Despite the protractedness of the war and overwhelming hardships
and privations, he still fought on and accepted sacrifices. This was
evident during LAM SON 719.

The immediate results of LAM SON 719 were impressive indeed.
However, the far-reaching impact of this operation only materialized
a long time afterwards as the situation in both South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia began to improve. But the repercussions of this imperfect exploit
seemed to indicate that the long-term struggle of South Vietnam needed
to be forged by sharper tactical skills and guided by an approrpiate
and more effective strategic leadership. This was perhaps the greatest
lesson that we could derive from LAM SON 719.

171



as possible; General Phu, commanding the lst Division, displayed anxiety
for the first time in the campaign.

When the conference was over, General Lam ordered that the with-
drawal proceed at a quicker pace and that preparations begin immediately
for the extraction of the 2d Regiment from the Brown area and Fire Base
Delta 1 where all its battalions were under heavy attack and in danger
of being cut off and destroyed.

On the morning of 19 March, abandoning Fire Support Base A Luoi
(Ban Dong), ARVN armored elements and attached airborne units moved
overland to take positions along a line near Fire Support Base Alpha.

The 2d Airborne Battalion operating to the north and having made a .
contact with the enemy during the day, would be helilifted from a landing
zone north of Base Alpha. After the elements from Ban Dong had arrived
at Alpha, the remaining forces of the lst Infantry Division were also
picked up, including the battalions of the 2d Regiment from the Brown
area and the 2d Regiment Headquarters along with the lst Battalion,

-3d Regiment from Base Delta 1. |

Information received during the night added some clarity to the
situation. Almost all the airborne battalions were in contact with the
enemy. The 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Airborne battalions had relatively
light engagements with minimal losses on both sides. The lst Airborne
Battalion, however, had 18 casualties and reported killing 80 enemy
troops, capturing five prisoners and seizing five AK-47 rifles. The
2d Airborne Battalion also suffered relatively high losses, with 18
killed and 57 wounded. Enemy losses were unknown. On the Marine side,
Base Delta was still experiencing heavy enemy pressure. The 7th Marine
Battalion constantly received attacks by fire and ground attacks. The
enemy even used a noxious gas but suffered heavy casualties with 42
killed. Marine losses were light. .

The 19th of March was a day of intensé activities. All ARVN units
in Laos reported enemy contacts. A synthesis of information received
from prisoners, ralliers and the combat units gave a rather clear picture {
of enemy dispositions on the battlefield. The 308th NVA Division with
its 36th, 102d and 88th regiments was attacking from the north. (Map 22) (

111



men. Out of this total, the enemy lost an estimated 20,000 men or
about one half. But while his losses caused by actual combat engagements
could be generally verified, his casualties inflicted by artillery and
aerial bombings could only be estimated. Bomb damage assessments could
only be obtained on approximately 10% of all B-52 missions. Even in
those areas where search and bomb damage assessments were conducted an
accurate body count was not always possible, partly due to the immensity
and ruggedness of the terrain and partly due to the unbearable stench
produced by masses of badly decomposed human bodies.

Enemy equipment losses throughout the campaign were also substan-

tial; major categories are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5 — Enemy Equipment Losses”

Items Quantity Observations
Individual Weapons 5,170
Crew Served Weapons 1,963
Vehicles 2,001 Reported by USAF (RVNAF

ground troops confirmed
422 trucks)

Combat Vehicles 11
Tanks 106 U.S. verified 88
Artillery/Mortars 13/93
Radios 98
Ammunition 170,346 tons U.S. verified 20,000 tons
Rice 1,250 tons

5tbid, p. 91.

132



1st Inf Div

ist Inf Div Arty
48th Arty Bn (-)

B/11 (105)

B/48 (155)

C/10 (155)

14th Arty Bn (-)
A/48 (155)

62d Arty Bn
A/62 (105)
B/14 (105)
C/48 (155)

1lth Arty Bn (-)
C/11 (105)
A/10 (155)

lst Engr Bn
ist Med Bn
ist Sig Bn
lst Log Bn

ist Regt
Ist Bn, lst Inf Regt
2d Bn, lst Inf Regt
3d Bn, lst Inf Regt
4th Bn, lst Inf Regt

2d Regt
ist Bn, 2d Inf Regt (OPCON 54th Regt D+53 to D+68)
2d Bn, 2d Inf Regt
3d Bn, 2d Inf Regt
4th Bn, 2d Inf Regt
5th Bn, 2d Inf Regt

3d Regt
ist Bn, 3d Inf Regt
2d Bn, 3d Inf Regt
3d Bn, 3d Inf Regt
4th Bn, 3d Inf Regt

54th Inf Regt
Ist Bn, 54th Regt
2d Bn, 54th Regt
4th Bn, 54th Regt

173 (

|


another consideration of prime importance which contributed to the
decision to conduct LAM SON 719 at this time.

Once the decision was made, the speed with which planning and
preparations progressed was amazing. Only two weeks after planning
guidance was received, operational orders had been developed by I Corps
and XXIV Corps. This was indicative of how close and effective coopera-
tion and coordination between U.S. and ARVN staffs had been,

The exchange of intelligence proved to be particularly beneficial
to ARVN forces. Lacking long-range reconnaissance facilities, the ARVN
intelligence system could not provide adequate data.on the Ho Chi Minh
trail and North Vietnam. It was obvious that almost all information
concerning enemy capabilities in the target area had to be supplied
by the United States.

Combat support provided by the U.S. XXIV Corps for I Corps was
another indication of the outstanding support provided by MACV. The
I Corps unit commanders who were to participate in the operation felt
encouraged and unusually enthusiastic because of this. To them, this
was an opportunity not only to prove I Corps combat effectiveness but
also to compete with their colleagues of III and IV Corps who had par-
ticipated in the Cambodia incursion the previous year. Finally, the
fact that no U.S. combat troops were to cross the border and that even
U.S. advisers were precluded from the operation made the role of ARVN
units even more prominent.

In spite of the sound decision, the effective cooperation and
coordination between the RVNAF and MACV and the support allocated by
the United States, several problem areas cropped up during the planning
phase which should receive special attention, First, the entire
process of planning and operational preparations appeared to have
taken place in a great rush. Considering the scale of the operation
and the importance of the objectives, the time involved for planning
might have been too short. To ensure utmost secrecy, participating
units were given only a short time to prepare. In the face of such a
difficult campaign which was to be conducted over unfamiliar terrain,

the question that naturally arose was: were I Corps units prepared to

54



in pursuit, all the while rejecting the NVA demands for it to surrender.
On 17 March, close to the banks of the Tchepone River, the battal-
ion was intercepted and the fighting lasted all day, with tactical air
and gunships providing dedicated support. The battalion commander and
his deputy were both killed. Most of the company commanders and of-
ficers of the battalion were also killed and the few survivors managed
to escape to an area near Route No. 9. There, in the late afternoon of
18 March, U.S. helicopters with tactical air support conducted a daring
rescue. Three helicopters were hit and one fighter-bomber exploded in
the air but the thirty two survivors of the 4th Battalion were rescued
and flown to the rear.” The battalion had accomplished well its rear
guard mission and in the process, had sacrificed nearly every man. The
fight put up by Fire Support Base Lolo and the units of the lst Infantry
Regiment had resulted in 1,100 enemy killed, causing severe losses to

two main force regiments of the Communist NI-2 Division.
"Lock Its Head, Grip Its Tail"

While the lst Regiment was subjected to heavy attacks which even-
tually caused it to pull out of the Lolo area, the battalions of the
2d Regiment continued to conduct reconnaissance in force and search the
Cua Tung and Cua Viet objective areas along Route 914. In three areas,
approximately one-and-a-half, six and seven kilometers southeast of
FSB Sophia East, the 2d and 3d Battalions found many logistical instal-
lations and camps destroyed along with decomposed bodies of enemy troops.
Supported by helicopter gunships, they destroyed five enemy trucks.

In the southeast, activity in the Marine sector began to pick up.
The 147th Marine Brigade Headquarters at Fire Support Base Delta re-
ceived 400 incoming rounds which killed eight marines. The 7th

2ohe next day, additional troops managed to reach safety. The
reported strength of the 4th Battalion on 19 March was 82 men.

108



at Landing Zone Grass, 12 kilometers northeast of Muong Nong, to push
further south toward the enemy's Base Area 611. LZ Grass was the
southernmost position held by friendly forces in the area of operation.

Throughout this period, various units of the division searched for
the enemy and made many contacts which produced substantial results to
include several enemy caches. At 1615 hours on 11 February, the 3/1
Battalion observed a target one kilometer southeast of Landing Zone Don
which had been hit by airstrikes. The battalion discovered 23 enemy
bodies and seized two 12.7-mm machineguns, four AK-47 assault rifles and
one Chicom radio. In the afternoon of 12 February, this battalion found
a cache three kilometers south-southwest of Landing Zone Don which con-
tained 600 individual weapons, 400 82-mm mortar rounds, numerous rounds
of assorted ammunition and the bodies of 50 enemy troops killed by air-
strikes. Late in the afternoon, at.three kilometers south of Landing
Zone Don, the 1/1 Battalion discovered an enemy camp containing substan-
tial amounts of food along with military clothing, equipment and ammuni-
tion, particularly 12.7-mm rounds. On 13 February, the 3/1 Battalion
found another cache with thirty 75-mm recoilless rifles, fifty 55 gallon
drums of gasoline and substantial quantities of other types of equipment.
At the same time, six kilometers north-northeast of Landing Zone Grass,
the 2/3 Battalion seized three new Russian trucks.

As of 13 February, contacts being made by elements of the Ist Divi-
sion forces were increasing. During the afternoon of that day, the
1/1 Battalion engaged an enemy element three kilometers south-southwest
of LZ Don, killing 28 enemy troops and seizing a storage area which
contained an East German machinegun, seven RPDs, one B40, one B41, two
SKS, gasoline, generators and huge quantities of food along with kitchen
utensils. On 14 February, the 2/3 and 1/3 Battalions each received an
attack by fire of an estimated one hundred 82-mm mortar rounds, The
lst Battalion had one killed and seven wounded and the 2d Battalion had
16 wounded. Even though enemy attacks by fire and actual contacts in-
creased during the next few days, all the units of the lst ARVN Division

continued to seize substantial amounts of enemy supplies and materiel.

72



reported north of National Route No. 9. The detection of tracks in this
area further indicated the presence of artillery pieces.?

In late December, 1970, aerial photography and air reconnaissance
revealed an enemy effort to open Route 616 to vehicle traffic. This
road appeared to head toward the Laotian salient, west of Quang Tri
where the 812th Regiment, NVA 324B Division was reported. In this same
area, the enemy was also increasing his logistical efforts and probably
his engineer, logistical and anti-aircraft capabilities. Other intelli-
gence data obtained from prisoners of war and an enemy cadre who had
rallied to the Royal Lao Army indicated that the 141st and 9th Regiments
(separate) were also operating in lower Laos under control of the Commu-
nist Southern Laotian Front. It was probable that the 14lst Regiment
would move back to Quang Nam after being refitted.

In the meantime, the enemy 2d Division seemed to be going through
a refitting process with its two regiments, the lst and 3d, in an area
north of base area 612. This division was probably preparing to return
to Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces in southern MR-1, but it was
possible for it to be deployed as reinforcement to the Tchepone area
in Laos if required.

In addition to Communist combat units reported in the proposed
operational area west of Quang Tri Province or in its vicinities, there
were eight binh trams that had been recently reinforced with approximately
20 anti-aircraft battalions.> Not all of these battalions were fully

equipped but since each battalion could have from 2 to 16 anti-aircraft

3u.s. XXIV Corps Operation Order, LAM SON 719, dated 23 January 1971,
Annex B (Intelligence), p. B-5.

4N0 distinction is made here between NVA and Viet Cong units: because
it does not make sense to dwell on this technicality when 3/4 of the so
called Viet Cong units were made up of NVA troops and the majority of
their commanders and staffs were North Vietnamese.

5u.s. XXIV Corps Operation Order, LAM SON 719 dated 23 January 1971,
Annex B (Intelligence): Appendix 2 (Anti-Aircraft Capability), p. B-2-1.

24



Tchepone. The Airborne Division would provide protection for the
northern flank and secure Route No. 9. The Marine Division was to
deploy two brigades behind the lst Division; its remaining brigade
would serve as the corps" reserve.

Tchepone, a tiny town whose civilian population had fled long ago,
now had only scars and ruins left. By this time, it had become more
of a political and psychological symbol than an objective of practical
military value. There was nothing of military importance in the ruined
town; enemy supplies and war materiel were all stored in caches in the
forests and mountains. Lines of communication were located east and
west of Tchepone, not in the town proper. Despite all this, the
Tchepone road junction was near the center of NVA logistics activity
in the Laos panhandle and it was understandable that it became a symbol
of great importance. The RVN information agencies, the press (both
foreign and domestic), all contributed their share in making Tchepone
the place to reach at all costs so the ARVN effort now seemed to be
more directed at setting foot in Tchepone than trying to destroy the
NVA logistical system which was the real objective of the offensive.

Meeting with Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams in the afternoon
of 1 March, President Thieu made known his plan to relieve the Airborne
Division and expressed his desire to helilift two infantry regiments
into the areas surrounding Tchepone. He also disclosed that the JGS/
RVNAF had been ordered to reinforce I Corps with a number of tanks and
that the Marine Division had been sent to the northern front. General
Abrams took this opportunity to defend the U.S. position in the face
of Senator Tran Van Huong's complaints that the U.S. was not providing
adequate support to RVNAF forces operating in lower Laos. These com-
plaints had given rise to all sorts of rumors speculating on the dif-
ficulties ARVN forces encountered in lower Laos. President Thieu stated
that the change of plan did not result from losses sustained by the
Airborne Division but came about because the lst Infantry Division was
more familiar with the lower Laos terrain and, being an organic unit
of I Corps, was more accustomed to working with the corps and would

respond better to the I Corps commander during this difficult operation.

90



Achievements in other areas also pointed to the success of the
pacification effort during the initial stages of the Vietnamization
program. The number of Communist personnel defecting to the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam reached its peak in 1969 (47,000) and remained
very high in 1970 (32,000). Many of the Communist senior cadre chose
to come over to the side of the government. At the same time, popular
sentiment against the Communists continued to rise in the aftermath of
their 1968 general offensive.

In early 1970, the People's Self-Defense Force numbered as many as
3-1/2 million members, supplied with approximately 400,000 weapons of
various types, a significant force politically and militarily. The
territorial forces, comprised of the Regional and Popular Forces, in
coordination with the para-military forces including Police, Rural
Development cadre, Armed Propaganda cadre, Provincial Reconnaissance
units and People's Self-Defense forces, succeeded —with support from
ARVN units —in driving the enemy from the populated areas and reducing
his infrastructure. His local guerrilla bases were eliminated by these
forces while his major bases in country were being destroyed by the
Armed Forces of Vietnam and those of the United States.

As the pacification program continued to improve, the people who
had taken refuge in the more secure urban areas were able to return to
their home villages and resume farming. Rural development programs
steadily changed the outlook of the countryside of South Vietnam.
Schools sprang up almost everywhere, attended by large numbers of eager
children. As a result of the agricultural development and technical
guidance programs, extensive use of fertilizers and improved rice hybrids,
and finally the implementation of the Land-To-The-Tiller program, agri-
cultural production in South Vietnam improved considerably. Rice pro-
duction in 1969 increased by 700,000 metric tons as compared to the
preceding year. In 1970, this figure rose by another 400,000 tons.
Total agricultural production in 1970 reached the 5.5 million tons
mark, exceeding even the 1964 figure which had been the highest in South
Vietnam since World War TI. Besides rice crops, other agricultural

products were plentiful. Fisheries became highly productive as a large



Meanwhile, in northwest Quang Tri Province, U.S. units continued
their security operations. Their efforts were mainly directed north-
ward ‘toward the DMZ, particularly north of the Rockpile. In the evening
of 11 February, Forward Support Area 26-1 at Vandegrift received six
122-mm rockets which resulted in four U.S. troops killed and two wounded.
On 14 February at 0215 hours, Dong Ha City and its airfield, where the
forward CP of I Corps was located, received 25 rounds of 122-mm rockets
which killed one civilian and wounded 14 others but the airfield suf-
fered only light damage.

In addition to the big guns of the 108th Artillery Group, U.S.
air support was an important factor during the first week of the
incursion. Each day, from 500 to 800 sorties of air cavalry gunships
were flown in addition to approximately 100 sorties of tactical bombers
and, depending upon available targets, a number of missions by B-52
strategic bombers. Losses inflicted on the enemy by these airstrikes
were very significant.? But despite the devastating U.S. air and
artillery support, enemy anti-aircraft gunners took a heavy toll of

helicopters; and the U.S. air cavalry, as well as the RVNAF, had to
increase their efforts to silence the Communist guns.

3gomb damage assessments were extremely difficult and hazardous
to conduct in this dense, heavily defended area. As a consequence,
only 10% of the B-52 targets struck during LAM SON 719 were recon-
noitered later on the ground and even those that were entered by ground
troops were so torn up by craters and splintered trees that accurate
assessments were impossible. Nevertheless, by putting together all
sources of information—prisoner and rallier interrogations, aerial”
observation and photography, ground reconnaissance, document exploita-
tion, agent reports and communications intelligence—analysts concluded
that enemy losses to U.S. air attacks were substantial.

73



While firefights were raging in the Ranger North area, on 19
February President Thieu visited I Corps Forward CP at Dong Ha. General
Lam reported the critical situation faced by the 39th Rangers and the
increasingly forceful enemy reactions which were making the planned
push toward Tchepone by the Airborne Division highly questionable. In
the presence of ARVN division commanders, President Thieu told him to
take his time and, under the present circumstances, perhaps it would
be better to expand search activities toward the southwest to cut off
Route 914 which led into Base Area 611.

During the night of 19 February, the enemy continued to attack the
39th Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold
the 2lst Battalion in check. Seven fixed-wing gunships and six flare-
ships were used in support of the 39th Battalion and, from 0730 to
1430 hours on 20 February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in sup-
port of the rangers. Efforts to resupply and evacuate their casualties
were made with strong support from tactical air, gunships and artillery.
Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered
and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were -
damaged by enemy fire. One had to land in the positions of the 21st
-Ranger Battalion (Ranger South) and the other managed to land at Fire
Support Base 30.

In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an
estimated 400 to 500 enemy troops encircling the 39th Battalion. At
1710 hours on 20 February, radio contact with the 39th Ranger Battalion
was lost. At 1856 hours, I Corps CP received information that the
able-bodied personnel of the battalion had fought their way out and
reached the 21st Ranger Battalion positions with most of the wounded
and all of their weapons but with very little ammunition left. Those
who reached the 21st Ranger Battalion numbered nearly 200; 107 were
still able to fight but 92 were wounded. Total losses were 178 dead
and missing and 148 wounded. Intelligence reports indicated enemy
casualties to be 639 killed with a corresponding number of weapons
destroyed (423 AK-47s, 15 B40/B41s and numerous automatic weapons).

79



CHAPTER I

Introduction

The overall situation throughout South Vietnam began to improve
soon after American troops were committed to the ground war; and as

the enemy gradually lost the initiative, his main force units were
driven away from populated regions and other areas vital to the defense
of the country. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF)
regained their poise and, with increased United States assistance and
support, were greatly strengthened.

The exertions made by the Communists during the 1968 general offen-
sive seriously depleted their strength. The huge losses they incurred
during this campaign — 200,000 troops killed, taken prisoners or rallied
to the GVN— caused entire units of the enemy's main force to be para-
lyzed and considerably weakened his infrastructure. Consequently, as
of late 1968, it became evident that the improved military situation
provided the opportunity for an energetic revitalization of the Republic
of Vietnam. To consolidate the gains, the United States found it neces-
sary “to further strengthen the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam
and increase American assistance in all forms. Firepower and troop
morale of ARVN combat units were quickly improved as a result of force
structure increases, the creation of new units and the delivery of modern
weapons such as the M-16 rifle, M-60 machine-gun and M-79 grenade-
launcher.

In 1969, the new Nixon administration reemphasized efforts begun
in the last part of the Johnson administration to obtain a lasting
peace in Indochina. New efforts were made in Paris and the United
States adopted a more flexible negotiating stance aimed at reaching
an early compromise. While at the Midway meeting of 8 June 1969, the
President of the United States and the President of the Republic of



the lst Infantry Regiment, whose headquarters was at Fire Support Base
Lolo, were the forces located deepest to the west.

On the fronts manned by the Airborne and Marine Division, enga-
gements and attacks by fire followed an increasing trend. Meanwhile,
two M-41 tank troops reassigned by JGS from MR 2, were moving into
lower Laos to reinforce the 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron. U.S. air
support was becoming more effective since Vietnamese interpreters flying
with forward air controllers had become more familiar with the situation.
Resupply operations were conducted throughout the battle area thanks
to the daring and the noble spirit of sacrifice of U.S. Army helicopter
crews.

Upon the 2d Infantry Regiment's withdrawal from the area west of
Lolo, NVA forces, probably elements of the lst and 31st Regiments of
the NTI-2 Division, began to encircle units of the 3d Infantry Regiment.
Beginning on 13 March, the battalions operating in the Ta Luong area
(Objectives Gia Lam and Bach Mai) were gradually forced to withdraw
north and Fire Support Base Lolo began to receive uninterrupted attacks
by fire. On 14 March, the intensity of these attacks increased. During
the day, the base received an estimated two hundred 122-mm rockets and
one hundred 152-mm artillery rounds. Thanks to their solid shelters
and trenches, the regiment had only three killed and two wounded but
one D-4 bulldozer and two 105-mm howitzers were seriously damaged. In
the meantime, the enemy had moved up to the base and small arms fire
was being directed at supply aircraft, causing medical evacuation and
resupply attempts to be called off. On 15 March, the base could not
be resupplied (nor :could Delta or A Luoi, both of which were under
attacks by fire). The various units on and around the base were running
out of ammunition and the number of wounded in need of evacuation was
increasing. A withdrawal plan was hastily prepared. The headquarters
of the Ist Regiment and the battalions outside the base would move
east. The 4th Battalion would serve as the rear guard protecting the
regiment in its effort to break through enemy encirclement. The plan
was carried out satisfactorily but the enemy tightened its hold on the
4th Battalion, Finally, this unit fought its way out with the enemy

107


used in South Vietnam, the enemy had also fired quite a few rounds of
122- and 105-mm field guns and howitzers and possibly 85- and 130-mm
field guns as well. In addition to three pipeline sections found and
destroyed, captured documents also suggested the existence of pipeline
throughout Base Areas 604 and 611. And the presence of enemy armor
became increasingly apparent.

Enemy main force units in the area of operation were confirmed
during the first days to be the Ist Regiment of the 2d (Yellow Star)
Division, 24B Regiment of the 304th Division and elements of the 675th
Artillery Regiment. A prisoner from the 14th Air Defense Battalion
of the 2d Division disclosed that the subordinate units of this divi-
sion (1st, 3d and 141st regiments) had been moving east from the Tchepone
area since early February to block the ARVN advance,

Enemy opposition grew stronger with each day around Ban Dong and
the area of Route 1032B for which the rangers were responsible. On
10 February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged an element of the enemy's
88th Regiment. The next day, the 37th Ranger Battalion engaged a bat—
talion-size unit near FSB Phu Loc. The discovery of the command post
of the 308th Division on 18 February further confirmed reports that
this division had joined in the fighting (the 308th Division had three
regiments: 36th, 88th and 102d).

On 11 February, two prisoners disclosed that the 64th Regiment/
320th Division had arrived in lower Laos on 4 February and was operating
in the Ban Dong area. On 14 February another prisoner of the 64th
Regiment gave the location of each battalion of this regiment. He
also reported an NVA armored unit with an estimated fifteen PT-76s in
the same area southeast of Fire Support Base 31 where signs of enemy
tracked vehicles had been detected. The vehicles were subsequently
attacked. Toward the south, in the area of operations of the Ist In-
fantry Division, captured documents confirmed the location of Binh Tram
41 two kilometers south of Landing Zone Blue with the 4th Air Defense
Battalion, the 75th Engineer Battalion, and an unidentified infantry
regiment providing additional security. This infantry regiment might ©
have been the 14lst Regiment of the 2d Division. (Map 18)

77



with the help of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division which replaced these

two units in the lowlands of Thua Thien Province. And now, in the

light of the enemy's reinforcement and strength on the battlefield, it
was becoming apparent that the ARVN force committed to LAM SON 719 was
too small for the task. General Abrams recommended that the ARVN 2d
Infantry Division be sent in to reinforce, and the division was preparing
plans to turn over its area of responsibility in MR 1 to the U.S. 23d
Infantry Division.+ Still, in the view of the RVN leadership, one ad-
ditional division would be insufficient to ensure total victory and
would result in a higher casualty figure for our forces in Laos. Also,
removing the 2d Division from MR 1 would leave more of the vital lowland
areas of MR 1 undefended. The only reasonable course of action was an
orderly withdrawal to conserve as much of the committed force as possible.
Further reinforcing this conclusion was the fact that the political and
psychological objective of the campaign had been achieved; the RVNAF

had entered Tchepone. It was apparent that President Thieu had decided,
at the outset, that once Tchepone had been entered by RVNAF, the with-
drawal should begin without delay.

The main features of the withdrawal plan were outlined to President
Thieu at the 9 March meeting. The 2d Infantry Regiment would close Fire
Support Base Sophia and establish a new fire base (called Brick) near
Route 92 about nine kilometers south of Ban Dong. The units of the 2d
Regiment would be picked up at various landing zones in the Sophia-Liz
area and inserted into landing zones south and west of Fire Support Base
Brick, Thereafter, the 2d Regiment would move southwest, searching for
and destroying installations of Communist Binh Tram 33 and interdicting

1 according to General Cao Van Vien, General Abrams mentioned
sending the ARVN 2d Infantry Division into lower Laos to President Thieu
who countered that a U.S. division should be sent alongside. The matter
was dropped because U.S. ground forces were not authorized to enter Laos.
The planning done by the ARVN 2d Division and the U.S. 23d Division was
accomplished without orders or direction from the JGS.

103



pending return to the United States, were hastily transported to the
front for distribution to combat units. XXIV Corps also gathered a
number of 90-mm recoilless rifles to help the ARVN airborne forces.
However, the M-72 light anti-tank weapon was later re-tested at the
Quang Trung Training Center and proved to be effective. As regards
ARVN armor units, this was their first significant confrontation with
enemy tanks. ARVN gunners proved to be confused and hasty, firing from
too far away and often too soon, thereby frequently causing deflections.
Enemy tanks, moreover, seldom moved in the open but mostly lay in ambush,
well concealed in the jungle.

A number of units also failed to carry adequate clothing when this
was a period of lingering cold in the mountains and forests of the
Truong Son Range. The Central Logistic Command was required to have

field jackets and blankets air delivered to units during combat.
Tehepone Was the Objective

After capturing and destroying Fire Support Base 31, Communist
forces continued to encircle and harass ARVN fire bases. North of
Route No. 9, Fire Support Base 30 continued to bear the pressure of
heavy artillery attacks each day and was cut off from the rear by an
almost impenetrable air defense net. The ARVN armored task force which
tried to pick up the survivors of the 3d Airborne Battalion from Fire
Support Base 31 was repeatedly engaged by NVA armor-supported infantry.

South of the road, the targets of enemy encirclement were Fire
Support Base Hotel 2, seven kilometers southwest of Landing Zone Don,
and the 2/3 and 3/3 Battalions of the lst Infantry Division on mobile
operations along Route 92 nearby. On 27 February, despite heavy air
strikes which attempted to silence enemy air defense guns, a big H-53
helicopter was hit and exploded in the air while trying to sling-carry
a 105-mm howitzer. It was then decided to close Fire Support Base
Hotel 2 and send the 3d Regiment northwestward on a mission to interdict
and disrupt Route 914. This plan could not be carried out immediately
because there still remained a battery of 105-mm howitzers whose extri-

88



101st Combat Aviation Group
101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) (D-1 to D+67)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) (D-1 to D+67)
159th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb1) (D-1 to D+67)
5th Trans Bn (D-1 to D+67)
14th Avn Bn (OPCON) D+2 to D+63)
71st AHC (D+25 to D+59)
116th AHC (D+34 to D+36 & D+50 to D+53)
174th AHC (D+25 to D+67)
132d ASHC (D+25 to D+63)

223d Avn Bn HHC (OPCON) (D+2 to D+67)
48th AHC (D+2 to D+67)
173d AHC (D+2 to D+67)
282d AHC (D+34 to D+36 & D+50 to D+51)
235th AWC (D+38 to D+56)
238th AWC (D+2 to D+56)
D/227th AWC (D+28 to D+66)
179th ASHC (D+23 to D+66)
756th Med

2d Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Air Cav
C/7/17 Cav Sqdn (OPCON)
B/7/1 Cav Sqdn (OPCON)

67th Med Gp
237th Med Det -
571st Med Det

34th Gen Spt Gp (-)
34th Avn Det (DS)
34th Co Spt Gp (AM&S)

58th Trans Bn
610th SG Trans Co
142d DS Trans Co
263d GS Avel Co

MHHS 463d, Ist MAW (OPCON D+1)

lst Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) (+) (OPCON 101st Abn Div (Amb1)
D+32 to D+67)
ist Bn, llth Inf (Mech)
3d Bn, 187th Abn Inf, 10lst Abn Div (OPCON D-1 to D+t67)
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech) (OPCON 101st Abn Div (Amb1) D+#26 to
D+31 and D+57 to D+67) (11th Bde, 23d Div D+32 to D+56)
3d Sqdn, 5th Cav
ist Bn, 77th Armor
5th Bn, 4th Arty (DS)
Ist Bn, 82d Arty (-) 23d Div (Atch) (DS) (D-1)
Co A, 4th Bn, 12th Armor
Co A, 7th Engr
Co P, 75th Ranger

176



Glossary

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery
AA/AW Antiaircraft Automatic Weapon
ABN Airborne
AFCCC Air Force Command and Control Center
AHB Assault Helicopter Battalion
ALC Area Logistics Command
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASHB Assault Support Helicopter Battalion
ASRT Air Support Radar Team
BSA Base Support Area
BDA Bomb Damage Assessment
CAB Combat Assault Battalion
CIDG Civil Irregular Defense Group
CINCSAC Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
COMUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam
DASC Direct Air Support Center
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
FAC Forward Air Controller
FDC Fire Direction Center
FSA Forward Support Area
FSB Fire Support Base
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center
GSG General Support Group
HES Hamlet Evaluation System
178

|



trams, each equivalent to a regimental size force in terms of ground
defense and antiaircraft capabilities. Within a period from one to two
weeks, the enemy was capable of reinforcing with up to a total of eight
additional infantry regiments, not to mention artillery and other units
from North Vietnam. To defeat these 11 infantry regiments and the
defense forces of the binh trams, I Corps committed, according to the
initial plan, only eight infantry regiments or brigades. Our forces
enjoyed the advantage of an armor brigade but our tanks might be of
little value off the main axis. Even if, at the limit of its capabilities,
I Corps would bring in two additional regiments (the remaining Marine
brigade and the third regiment of the lst Infantry Division), it would
only have 10 regimental size units and the balance would still be in
favor of the enemy. Additional reinforcements would be highly improbable
and any such effort to obtain them would certainly meet with difficulties.

In the effort to obtain the tactical advantage in the area of
operations and to compensate for the lack of force superiority, the
planners of LAM SON 719 expected too much from the support of United
States tactical air and air cavalry gunships. The question that should
have been asked then was: how effective would air power be in support
of ground combat troops deep in the Truong Son mountain range? If the
bombings of North Vietnam had been an indication of this effectiveness,
then were the results to be obtained exactly what we had desired? Over
the years, the U.S. Air Force had bombed the Ho Chi Minh trail heavily.
Was the effect of these bombings enough to paralyze the enemy's activities
on the battlefields of South Vietnam and Cambodia? Too much was expected
from airpower and this problem should have been weighed with caution by
the planners.

Then there was the role to be played by helicopters. With the ex-
ception of mechanized forces operating along Route No. 9 which would be
resupplied by road transportation according to plans, all other opera-
tional units would have to depend on helicopters for movement of troops
and artillery, supply and medical evacuation. This was the only means
practicable as long as these forces were required to operate considerable

distances from roads and fire support bases. There was no doubt that

56



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52



Map 3— The Border Area, Military Regions 1 & 2°

as

* KHESANH jeer o”

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DEMARCATION LINE

SOUTH CHINA SEA

QUANG NGAI

oem net,

14



The I Corps organic forces that participated in the operation were
the lst Infantry Division, lst Ranger Group and Ist Armor Brigade, all
immediately available. The lst Armor Brigade with its two squadrons was
attached to the Airborne Division. The lst Ranger Group was assigned the
security mission on the northern flank of the operational area. Its
three lightly equipped battalions would be deployed in screening positions
facing north.” The lst Infantry Division, meanwhile, would deploy its
two regiments, the lst and 3d, to its area of operation south of Route
No. 9 with the mission of blocking enemy forces from the south and simul-
taneously searching enemy base area 611. Its two other regiments, the
2d and 54th, which would not participate in the operation, but would

remain where they were, east of the DMZ area and west of Hue, respectively.

U. S. Support

It was apparent that due to the lack of helicopters, tactical air
and long-range artillery, I Corps could not conduct such a large scale
operation away from its support bases without assistance. United States
support was therefore required, not only to compensate for I Corps' lack
of assets but also to provide the kind of mobility and firepower needed
for combat against a heavily defended enemy stronghold in rugged terrain.
Therefore, the U.S. XXIV Corps was charged with planning for this sub-
stantial support.

An outstanding feature of LAM SON 719 was the conspicuous absence
of U.S. combat troops and U.S. advisers who were not authorized to go into

‘General Lam considered the Ranger Group adequate for this mission,
which was to provide the main body early warning of any enemy force
approaching on his flank and to delay and force him to concentrate until
heavier combat power could be placed against him. It would have been
advantageous to assign this mission to a mobile, armor-equipped force,
but not only did the rugged terrain preclude this, but General Lam
needed his armor and his lst Division for the main effort. Furthermore,
he wanted to keep the 1st Division available for a sweep south through
base area 611.

43



To solve problems related to tactical air support, certain flexible

arrangements were made. An airborne command and control center of the

United States 7th Air Force (AFCCC) was to operate around the clock

aboard a C-130 aircraft to receive support requests, provide guidance
for preplanned tactical air sorties, to make decisions on the employment

of assets, and to ensure that additional sorties would be available in
case of emergency. All forward air controller (FAC) teams, each as-
signed a Vietnamese interpreter, were to cover the areas of operation
assigned to ARVN divisions and separate brigades. Initially, 200 tacti-
cal air sorties were planned for each day. Emergency tactical air sup-
port requests would be initiated by ground units and sent to the air-
borne FAC team which would relay them to the 7th Air Force AFGCC, also
airborne, for immediate action. Preplanned sorties would have to be
requested through the normal channel which went from the Tactical Air
Control Parties (TACP), attached to ARVN divisions, to I Corps Fire Co-
ordination Control Center/Direct Air Support Center (FSCC/DASC) and
from there to the XXIV Corps Forward Direct Air Support Center at Quang
Tri. To facilitate air support missions in bad weather or at night,

an air support radar team (ASRT) of the U.S. Marines at Quang Tri would
be provided at Khe Sanh from where it could cover the entire area of
operation in lower Laos. A number of U.S. naval air sorties to be
launched from aircraft carriers USNS Hancock, Kitty Hawk and. Ranger was
also planned. Finally, LAM SON 719 was to receive the highest priority.
in strategic air sorties provided by the Unites States Strategic Air
Command.

Solving Logistie Problems

In addition to combat and combat support planning, an important
area that required extensive pre~arrangements was logistics. Unfortu-
nately, the ARVN Ist Area Logistics Command, which was responsible for
logistical support for I Corps and MR-1, was excluded from the opera-
tional planning staff because of security and restrictive measures.

Therefore, when this, logistic command received orders to make prepara~

47



In the early morning of 18 February, the lat Airborne Battalion,
while conducting an Arc Light bomb damage assessment two kilometers
north of LZ Bravo, made light contact with the enemy and found a command
post. Captured documents indicated that this was the command post of
the 308th NVA Division and traces found in the area were rather recent.
Toward noon, U.S. air cavalry spotted and attacked an enemy truck convoy
nine kilometers west-northwest of Ban Dong destroying one truck, and
damaging another and a tracked vehicle. Nearby, at two places two-and-
a-half kilometers to the east, the 2d Troop, 17th Armored Squadron found
and cut three pipeline sections four inches in diameter. Two sections
were destroyed while the third one was made unusable. During the day,
other airborne units and elements of the lst Infantry Division were
subjected to sporadic attacks by fire and ground contacts and a few
helicopters were shot down.

All these activities were quickly eclipsed by reports of heavy
enemy troop concentrations around the 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions.
Both battalions were being subjected to attacks by fire and ground at-
tacks and the fighting lasted all night while friendly artillery, tac~
tical air- and flareships responded quickly in support of the embattled
rangers.

The next morning, enemy pressure on the 21st Ranger Battalion
gradually diminished but heavy pressure persisted on the 39th Battalion
in the Ranger North area. The battle continued over 19 February. Enemy
troops here were confirmed to be elements of the 102d Regiment of the
308th Division, all with new weapons and clothing. Before launching
an assault, the rangers reported, the enemy made extensive use of re-
coilless rifles and mortars; his fire was very accurate. The strongest
enemy attacks were directed at the eastern flank of the rangers which
was their weakest spot. However, the 39th Battalion continued to hold
its positions with support from U.S. artillery and tactical air.

Meanwhile, information concerning the enemy's growing capabilities
became clearer with each day. His air defense network was becoming
dense and heavy artillery was committed. ARVN artillerymen confirmed

that, in addition to the various types of mortars and rockets commonly

76



The assessment of bomb damage inflicted by B-52 missions was nearly

impossible to carry out, however.

In general, only about 10% of all

B-52 targets were searched through by ground troops; their BDA reports

are summarized in Table 11.

In addition secondary explosions were

observed by B-52 air crews and other aerial observers over 480 targets.

Table 11 — BDA Results on 55 Arc Light Targets

Categories of Damage

Quantities

KIA

WIA

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS
CREW SERVED WEAPONS
MORTARS

ROCKET LAUNCHERS
AAA

AA/AW

TRUCKS

TRACKS

ARTILLERY PIECES
AMMUNITION

FOOD

STRUCTURES
BICYCLES

BUNKERS

FUEL

2644
12
1541
82
93
300
16

41

72

ll

13

933
1101
890

300

176
151,925

(INCLUDES 23MM, 37MM and 57MM
WEAPONS)

(INCLUDES 12.7MM WEAPONS)
(INCLUDES ONE TANK)

TONS
TONS

GALLONS

Last but not least, U.S. artillery units, despite their location

on the RVN side of the border, contributed significantly to the ef-

fective support of ARVN forces due to their long range and accurate

fire. Their support was particularly useful at night or in bad

weather. (Table 12)

138



engineer machinery was brought back. In fact, the 10lst Combat Engineer
Battalion and a platoon of the 118th Engineer Land Clearing Company lost
all of their heavy equipment.

As to the enemy, his human losses were considerably higher than
those suffered by the RVNAF. (able 4)

Table 4 —- Enemy Casualties, LAM SON 7ig*

Enemy Losses
Reported By U.S. RVNAF Total
*
Killed 4,795 14,565 19, 360
Captured 8 49 57

*
Includes enemy personnel killed by U.S. tactical air and B-52s
discovered by ARVN troops conducting operations in Laos.

To counteract the ARVN incursion into his most vital logistic base
area, the enemy deployed, and the figures were later confirmed, 12 in-
fantry regiments belonging to five different divisions, and at least
an armor regiment and an artillery regiment. Total enemy combat strength
thus committed in the LAM SON 719 area of operation was estimated at
30,000, not to include reserve elements. In addition, the enemy logistic
structure in the general area of operations also had from 10 to 20,000

4 after Action Report, LAM SON 719, Headquarters, U.S. XXIV Corps,
14 May 1971, p. 90.

131



CHAPTER IIL
The Operational Environment

The Ho Chi Minh Trail System

A by-product of the First Indochina War, 1946-1954, the footpath
system that ran North-South along the Truong Son Mountain Range of
Vietnam became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail; for a long time it had
served the strategic purposes of the Viet Minh. From its jungle redoubt
of North Vietnam's highlands, the Viet Minh High Command was faced with
the pressing need for a secure communication system that would enable
it to direct the war effort in South Vietnam and support its subversive
activities in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. National Route No. 1
which ran parallel to the coastline was not practicable because of
French control. Sea routes were available but the risks of running
into French naval patrols and foul weather were forbiddenly high.
Besides, the Viet Minh did not have a reliable, organized sea transpor-
tation fleet. Considering these circumstances, the heavily jungled
mountains of the Truong Son Range lent themselves to the establishment
of a secure line of communication generally free from observation and
attacks.

It was this footpath system that kept the Viet Minh resistance in
South Vietnam alive with fresh troops, weapons and ammunition. By the
end of the First Indochina War, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had been well
developed although it was only a system of jungle paths connected by
local secondary roads and suitable only to movement by foot, animals
and bicycles. Soldiers moved on foot but military supplies, although
usually carried by manpower, were sometimes transported on bicycles,

oxcarts, horses or elephants. The narrow, steep pathways meandered



Most enemy vehicles were destroyed by U.S. gunships and tactical
air. So were enemy tanks of all types which largely consisted of the
amphibious PT-76's and a number of T-34's and T-54's, all Russian-made.
The ammunition destroyed included an important quantity of artillery
shells and rockets, also Russian-made. In addition, the enemy fuel
pipeline originating in North Vietnam and running through the LAM SON

719 area of operations was cut in several places.
United States Combat Support

No account of LAM SON 719 would be complete without mentioning
the importance of U.S. support. In closing the balance sheet on
friendly and enemy losses, credit should be duly given to the role
performed by U.S. Army Aviation, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Naval Air
for without them, LAM SON 719 could hardly have been possible.

Topping the scale and from the point of view of the ARVN infantry-
man, U.S. Army Aviation units contributed by far the most important
kind of support. In total, U.S. Army gunships and other types of
helicopters flew over 90,000 sorties for the benefit of ARVN forces,
to include nearly 24,000 gunship sorties, over 34,000 trooplift sorties
and nearly 20,000 logisticsrelated sorties. (Table 6)

To carry out their vital support mission, U.S. Army Aviation units
suffered losses in Laos amounting to 82 aircraft of all types destroyed
and over 600 aircraft damaged but recoverable. (Table 7) U.S. Army
pilots and crew members who sacrificed their lives in combat numbered
55 while 178 others were wounded and 34 were listed as missing in action.

The performance of the U.S. Air Force in support of LAM SON 719 was
no less impressive. A total of 9,000 tactical air sorties were flown,
to include 7,000 over lower Laos. The highest daily number of sorties
reached 277 on 8 March 1971. (Table 8)

During the course of the operation, a total of 25 "Commando Vault"
bombs (15,900-1b) were dropped by C-130 aircraft to clear landing zones
and also to strike against specific targets such as warehouses, vehicle

parks and enemy troop ‘concentrations. Armed fixed-wing aircraft such

133



The most vital consideration in logistic support planning was sup~
ply routes and transportation. The major axes of road communication
available were Routes No. 1 and No. 9. While No. 1 was a two-way all-
weather road from Da Nang to Dong Ha, truck traffic from the Dong Ha
junction had to move westward on No. 9. This was possible only to
Vandegrift base. From Vandegrift to the Laotian border, No. 9 was
extensively damaged with many destroyed bridges. Therefore, U.S. en-
gineer units were charged with repairing and rehabilitating this stretch
of road. The control of traffic movements on Routes No. 1 and 9 would
require very close coordination between U.S. and ARVN traffic management
agencies.

In sea transportation, the port of Tan My and the Dong Ha ramp,
about 8 miles upstream from the Cua Viet rivermouth, were to serve as
major shipping points. Both facilities were operated by U.S. forces.
Most ARVN supplies would be shipped by LST to Tan My where they would
be unloaded with the assistance of U.S. terminal personnel. For the
shuttle of supplies between Tan My and Dong Ha, a number of American
intercoastal ships would be used to assist the ARVN lst ALC. (Map 14)

In air transportation, the two existing airfields at Quang Tri and
Dong Ha were ready for immediate use. The abandoned airstrip at Khe
Sanh, however, needed extensive repairs by U.S. engineer units and was
scheduled to become operational on D+6 to accommodate C-130 cargo planes.
Several U.S. C-130 planes were also earmarked for the ARVN to transport |
emergency supplies directly to Khe Sanh. Due to the sizable quantity
of helicopters required to support the operation, rhe supply of avi-
ation fuel was an important problem. ARVN quartermaster units were as-
signed additional assets for the transportation of fuels, and the
establishment of forward storage facilities and supply points.

To move supplies to forward combat units operating along Route
No. 9, ground transportation was planned. For those units operating
far from the road, helicopters would be used both for resupply and
medical evacuation. As to the movement of heavy items of supply to
forward areas, the only means available would be large U.S. cargo

helicopters.

51



Contents

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

Iv.

VI.

INTRODUCTION . 2. 2 ww ee ee ee ee ee ee

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The Ho Chi Minh Trail System

Enemy Situation in Northern Military Region

Enemy Situation in the Laos Panhandle

The Area of Operation. ......-

THE PLANNING PHASE... 2. + + ee ee

How It All Started
The Basie Operational Plan

Division Planning and Preparations

U.S. “Support

Solving Logistic Problems .....

Observations

THE OFFENSIVE PHASE

Preparing to Cross the Border .
Seeuring Ban Dong... s+ eee
The Enemy Counteracted ,...
The Loss of Fire Support Base 31
Tehepone Was the Objective . .

THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE... . ss ©

The Disengagement... 1. +e sees
The Valiant ARVN Ist Infantry Division

"Lock Its Head, Grip Its Tail"
_Black Panther Raids... ...

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Balance Sheet of LAM SON 719
United States Combat Support .
Observations and Evaluation .
Lessons Learned ..

vii

eee eee oe we

126

126
133
140
156,



habits did not go unnoticed by the enemy who always reviewed every
detail following an engagement. But these tactics simply did not work
in the rugged terrain of the Truong Son Range, a long-held enemy base
area. Despite the advantage of U.S. firepower and airmobility, I Corps
did not always know how to employ it effectively although the heliborne
thrust into Tchepone conducted by the lst Infantry Division was a suc-
cessful maneuver. By contrast, the enemy proved resourceful enough to
take maximum advantage of the terrain and to develop his strengths ac-
cordingly while minimizing his weaknesses. Because of his resourceful-
ness, the effectiveness of our FSB system, our armor and our airmobility
were greatly reduced. Even our firepower became less devastating than
it should have been. .

Finally, both the RVN and the U.S. really missed the chance for a
big victory during LAM SON 719 on a battleground which was decisive for
the outcome of the war. Because of the significance of the panhandle,
the enemy had thrown into combat almost all of his reserve forces — 12
regiments confirmed and three others probable — and he seemed determined
to go all-out, win or lose. On our part, we hesitated, we procrastinated
and we passed up a big chance of winning when the chips were all down.
For one thing, we failed to foresee the big stake, plan for it care-
fully and commit sufficient forces to ensure success. When we went in,
we knew that the objective was important. We believed our firepower
was superior enough to destroy the massive concentration of enemy forces .
which resisted us. But we did not use it fully to our advantage to
reach our objective as quickly as possible. As new enemy units arrived
in the area, tilting the balance of forces in his favor, we only con-
sidered withdrawing to avoid undue losses. Was it an error in planning
or a lack of planning? The 2d Infantry Division was available for
commitment. It could have been redeployed without risk because the
U.S. 23d Division (Americal) was in its area to provide security. But
we did not commit the 2d Division for the simple reason that we were
not sure we could win. As to committing more forces to ensure victory,
the RVNAF simply did not have them available.

170



units' reporting was reliable. In the case of LAM SON 719, this re-
porting was most deplorable. Because the intensity of the fighting
did not permit frequent visits by the I Corps and division commanders,
they depended entirely on reports for the control of the situation.
But reports by their subordinate units were slow, inaccurate, and some-
times non-existent. During the operation, there were several instances
in which division commanders lost control of their units. Even the
I Corps commander sometimes did not know the major events affecting
his divisions.

A significant development which turned out to be extremely
valuable for the effective support of the operation was the creation
of the Joint Coordinating Group (JCG) by the XXIV Corps as of the begin-
ning of March 1971, The group exercised operational control of all
U.S. support activities. Its centralized coordinating authority was
instrumental in providing timely and appropriate support for every ARVN
combat need during the operation. Co-located with the I Corps tactical
control CP, the Joint Coordinating Group assisted it with invaluable
data for effective planning. An organization of this type was clearly
indicated for every combined effort in which the U.S. only played a
supporting role. On its part, the ARVN could have benefited more if it
-had established a counterpart "support coordination center" or equivalent
to coordinate ARVN support activities with those of U.S. units through
the JCG. This would have enabled the operational commander to monitor
closely the flow of support activities and plan his tactical moves more
systematically.

In the area of combat tactics, a most remarkable feature of LAM SON
719 was the use of ‘semi-fixed fire support bases installed on high peaks.
This tactic was a duplication of the American usage in South Vietnam.
But the situation in lower Laos did not favor the installation of these
FSBs for the reason that the area of operation had been under enemy
control for a long time; the enemy was well entrenched and well organized
for defense. The several peaks in the area gave the enemy an advantage
in observation which resulted in accurate indirect fire on our fixed

fire control bases. The amount of troops deployed for the defense of

159



subjected to an enemy attack by fire consisting of 50 rounds of 82-mm
mortar and 105-mm howitzer; three soldiers were killed and 15 wounded.

By nightfall of the first day, the ARVN armored column had moved
nine kilometers into Laos. Though enemy resistance was weak, the column
could not move more rapidly because of the bad road conditions and the
dense jungle on both sides of the road.

During the day, on the Vietnamese side of the border, U.S. units
continued to expand their operations to consolidate security for ARVN
rear bases. The pioneer road from the Rockpile to Khe Sanh was opened
to track vehicles by 1635 hours providing another vehicular access to
Khe Sanh.

In support of the first day of the cross-border operation, U.S.
forces had flown 11 B-52 sorties expending 719 tons of bombs which
caused 40 secondary explosions, and performed 468 helicopter gunship and
52 tactical air missions, destroying 11 gun emplacements and 40 trucks,
damaging 18 trucks and causing 13 secondary explosions and 23 fires.
Four huge "commando vault" bombs had been used to clear landing zones.
During the night, C-130 gunships had also destroyed additional enemy
trucks moving near Ban Dong, the next objective.

On 9 February, the weather suddenly became very poor. Heavy rain
made the road a quagmire, preventing the engineers from working. Heli-
borne troop insertions were delayed and logistical buildup efforts were
halted. Those units already in Laos endeavored to consolidate their
positions or increase the range of their patrols. Throughout the day,
there were only two minor contacts made by the 21st Ranger Battalion
near the Ranger South area and by the 8th Airborne Battalion north of
Landing Zone Alpha approximately 10 kilometers west of the border with
insignificant results reported by each unit.

The next day, 10 February, the weather improved but did not permit
heliborne operations until late in the afternoon when the 4th Battalion,
lst Infantry Regiment, completed an assault into Landing Zone Delta, 10
kilometers due west of LZ Hotel at 1630 hours. The armored thrust .
meanwhile resumed at a stronger pace after a day of marking time. At
1700 hours the 9th Airborne Battalion was inserted into Landing Zone A

68



apze Bye

LZ6L Aenageg Aye ‘uolsodsiq Aweuy — 2 dew

23



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SSVUD @ :
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Buog ueg 0} soueapy ey — ZL dew

66



Naturally, after that, our search activities would expand and continue
until the enemy's logistical system in the area of operation was
effectively strangled. Although there was no official record of the
anticipated duration of the campaign, it could be inferred from public
statements and private comments made by authorities that the operation
was to last untit! the onset of the rainy season in lower Laos, or about
early May 1971. From then on, monsoon rains over the Truong Son Mountain
Range would inhibit the enemy's infiltration and logistic activities.

The close coordination between I Corps and U.S. XXIV Corps continued
during the entire course of the operation by a constant exchange of
combat information which resulted in appropriate modifications of the
original plan and even better cooperation. Intelligence continued to be
an important aspect of the combined effort. Initial data provided by
U.S. forces were corroborated and complemented by battle reports and intel-
ligence gathered from enemy prisoners and ralliers which in time became .
particularly important with regard to the confirmation of enemy units,
the movements of enemy troops and the day-to-day situation along the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. All these data were shared between the U.S. and ARVN
staffs.

During the initial phase of the campaign, the advance of ARVN units
was bold, swift and effective. The concept of maneuvering along ridge-
lines by helilift combined with a series of fire support bases allowed
an atdacious progress, well supported by artillery. Heliborne movements
were coordinated with an armor thrust; these forces linked up at predetermined
objectives along the axis of the main effort. Both the northern and
southern flanks of this effort were also protected and once the final
objective was attained, the actual search of the target area and
exploitation of combat gains could be expanded.

This was a sound concept whose success depended on the superiority
enjoyed by ARVN in terms of heliborne mobility, air power and mechanized
capabilities. Swift progress made step by step and from peak to peak,
and occupation of dominating terrain features by a series of mutually
supporting fire support bases where the essence of that concept. It was

in fact the faithful transplant of a combat tactic that had worked for so

142



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LdIUOSONVA,
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59


trail. In fact, in early 1971, the Air Force released the story that
this interdiction was 80 effective that only one ton out of every 32
tons shipped from North Vietnam ever reached its final destination in
South Vietnam. Subsequent NVA offensive operations in South Vietnam
demonstrated that the U.S. Air Force claim was greatly exaggerated.

Among the targets of intensive bombing were the mountain passes
and roads which were pounded day and night. The enemy's efforts to
repair the damage were complicated by his lack of heavy machinery, but
he was resilient and stubborn. No sooner was a mountain road destroyed
than a detour was completed. /

The Ho Chi Minh Trail could supply about 50 percent of the enemy's
combat needs; in other words, the trail was capable of sustaining Com
munist forces in RVN Military Regions 1 and 2. The port of Sihanouk-
ville in Cambodia was used to support forces operating in RVN Military
Regions 3 and 4. The couwp.in Phnom Penh during March 1970, however,
closed the port. The Ho Chi Minh Trail then became essential for the
enemy. to support the entire war in South Vietnam. As a result, the NVA
Transportation Group 559 received special reinforcements and during the
second half of 1970, the enemy made a determined effort to develop
logistical base area 604, adjacent to Quang Tri province. (Map 4)
Concurrently, he improved the existing base and road system in the
eastern part of lower Laos. After his seizure of the cities of Attopeu
and Saravane in Laos, he widened his trail system to the west in order
to increase the flow of supplies and to complicate the U.S. Air Force's
interdiction efforts.

At the beginning of 1970, the enemy's plan to rehabilitate Route
1036 was suspended for some time due to extensive United States bombing
along the Laotian border. Nevertheless, he succeeded in opening Route
1039 through the Ban Raving Pass which connected with Route 913. This .
gave the enemy an additional route into Tchepone, the communications

center for base area 604. In the meantime, Route 1032A in North Vietnam

Inuntoid Story of the Ho Chi Minh Trail", U.S. News and World
Report, February 15, 1971.

16



eventual occupation, would serve as leverage for bargaining in truce
negotiations while the defense line along Route No. 9 would give the RVN
a reasonable chance to defend itself after its forces would have been
withdrawn from North Vietnam's panhandle. Such was the general outline
of General Vien's strategy which subsequently became the widely-commented
subject of several lectures and magazine articles.

General Vien's concept remained only that because South Vietnam was
unable to perform this momentous task all by itself.

In early January 1971, General Crighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, called
on General Vien at the JGS and suggested an operation into lower Laos.
With the unrealized concept still nurtured in his mind, General Vien
gladly agreed. Meeting with General Vien again a few days later, General
Abrams explained his concept of the operation on a map. U.S. forces were
to clear the way to the border by conducting an operation inside South
Vietnam. The main effort was to be conducted by RVNAF airborne and armor
forces along Route No. 9 in coordination with a heliborne assault into
Tchepone. The purpose was to search and destroy base area 604. Other
RVNAF units would be employed to cover the northern and southern flanks
of the main effort. For the support of the operation, maximum U.S. assets
would be provided. After searching and destroying base area 604, ARVN
forces would shift their effort toward base area 611. At the end of the
meeting, both General Abrams and General Vien agreed to have staff
officers work out an operational plan.

General Vien then reported his discussions with General Abrams to

President Nguyen Van Thieu because he knew this cross-border operation
was going to have international repercussions. Being a military man
himself and well versed in military strategy, President Thieu immediately
approved the operation.

Recognizing the political realities, General Vien had long since
abandoned the idea of an invasion of North Vietnam as part of an opera-—
tion to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but still his concept differed some-

what from that presented by General Abrams. General Vien advocated
huvietnam: What Next? The Strategy of Isolation," Military Review,
April 1972.

33

a



as those of the Cambodian incursion. For one thing, ARVN forces had
stopped short of the real prize, the area west of Tchepone where most
of the enemy's supplies lay vulnerable on the ground. For another,

the search and destruction of Base Area 611 could not be carried out
as planned because the tactical balance no longer favored the continua-
tion of the operation in that direction.

Regardless of these shortcomings, a substantial number of the
objectives had been accomplished which required ARVN units to fight
hard and incur great sacrifices. Topping the honor roll, the lst ARVN
Infantry Division stood up to its reputation as the number one ARVN
combat unit. The division's organic wits maneuvered with skill and
were well led; its well disciplined troops fought with gallantry and
dedication. During its 42 days of operation in Laos, the division was
extremely active south of Route No. 9. Switching its effort during
the final days, it successfully pushed toward Tchepone and occupied it.
During the withdrawal, some of its units were heavily engaged and suf-
fered losses. Despite this, the lst Infantry Division accomplished
its mission with top honors.

Long considered as the elite unit of the RVNAF, the Airborne Divi-
sion did not perform as brilliantly as its reputation would indicate
during LAM SON 719. Despite the enemy's superiority in maneuvering
forces and his employment of new weapons, the fact that the division
was unable to hold FSB 31 seemed to be indicative of its lack of con-
tingency planning for such a situation. But our airborne units fought
extremely well as individual elements. One of the division's brigade
commanders was missing in action—probably captured by the enemy; and
five out of nine of its battalion commanders were either killed or
wounded, This testified to the intense fighting that the division had
to face but by and large, the division accomplished nothing spectacular
in its assigned mission. During the final stage, the division also
failed to provide effective flank protection for the major effort and
secure Route No. 9 even with the reinforcement of four armor squadrons.
This failure greatly complicated the ARVN withdrawal from Laos.

153



Observations

The entire planning process — and the resultant operations plan —
for LAM SON 719 indicated a carefully considered decision arrived at by
responsible U.S. and GVN political and military authorities. The au-
thorities of each country — the US and the GVN — considered in
their decisions the best intelligence available to them at the time and
each approached the problem with the best interests of his own country
in mind, Of course, each was influenced by the political and military
factors peculiar to his own country. Tchepone, the crossroads of enemy
supply.routes, appeared to be a well selected objective since all enemy
logistic and infiltration movements south had to go through this area.
According to intelligence reports, this was indeed an area where important
enemy storage facilities were located. The time had finally arrived to
sever by ground attacks the lifeline which had sustained enemy warring
capabilities for so many years. This was a sound and bold decision
following several years of reconnaissance and interdiction efforts from
the air.

The time frame selected for the operation was also appropriate in
that the dry season in the Laotian panhandle had begun three months
earlier. After his substantial losses in Cambodia during 1970, the
enemy was using the dry season to the maximum for the movement of re-
placements south and to replenish his supplies; the enemy was conducting
an aggressive "logistic offensive." The amount of supplies in transit
and in these storage facilities was substantial and if we succeeded in
destroying them, the blow on the enemy would be most devastating. He
would be in serious trouble, not only from our spoiling actions during
the remaining three months of the dry season, but also because time
was running out for the movement of supplies for that year.

Despite the continuation of redeployments, United States military
presence in South Vietnam was still substantial enough to support a
large-scale ‘offensive by the ARVN. If this offensive were deferred,
U.S. support would no longer be as adequate and as effective. This was

53



Enemy Situation in Northern Military Region 1

In South Vietnam proper, no significant enemy activities were

recorded in northern MR-1 during the entire first half of 1970. Enemy
initiatives in this area consisted only of attacks by fire and small-

scale, sapper attacks. Targets were usually remote, small-size fire
Support bases and outposts. The enemy main force units devoted this
entire period to building roads, refitting troops, and storing food and
supplies, but intelligence reports revealed that enemy forces were pre-
paring to launch an offensive campaign against the two northernmost
provinces of MR-1, probably in January 1971. Another agent's report
disclosed that North Vietnam might strike forcefully into Quang Tri and
Thua Thien during the spring and summer of 1971 with a goal to occupy
the plains area of these two provinces. At the boundary area between
Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, the enemy had further extended the
newly rehabilitated Route 616 into the Da Krong River valley, apparently
with a view to facilitate his supply movements into MR-1l.

In terms of force structure, in the DMZ area, the enemy's B5 Front
forces consisted most notably of three infantry regiments: the 207th,
27th, and 246th which were all deployed for the defense of this area; a
number of artillery battalions; the 33d Sapper Battalion and the 126th
Naval Sapper Regiment. Both of these sapper units usually conducted
attacks along the DMZ area, against National Route No. 9 and the Cua
Viet River. The 270th Regiment had the apparent mission of protecting
the Vinh Linh area, north of the DMZ while the 164th Artillery Regiment
was conducting training and defending the coastal area. (Map 5)

In the enemy Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, the enemy main force
consisted of three regiments under direct control of the MR headquarters
— Regiments 4, 5, and 6 — and a number of sapper battalions which
usually operated within the MR and sometimes penetrated into the plains
area of Thua Thien Province to interdict traffic on National Route No. 1.
In addition, west of Thua Thien and in base area 611, the 324B NVA
Division, supported by the 675th Artillery Regiment, was almost always
deployed with its three infantry regiments, the 812th, 803d, and 29th.

19



as a horrendous trauma for those unlucky families who, in their traditional
devotion to the cult of the dead and their attachment to the living, were
condemned to live in perpetual sorrow and doubt. It was a violation of
beliefs and familial piety that Vietnamese sentiment would never forget

and forgive.
Observations and Evaluation

Operation LAM SON 719 was terminated unexpectedly and in haste.
Despite official denials to the contrary by GVN authorities, the fact
could not be hidden from the inquisitive media reporters of the Free
World. The campaign had lasted only 45 days, much shorter than its
intended duration, but it was’ long enough to create a disquieting impact
on the troops and population alike. Much speculation had arisen about
the merits of the operation measured against the losses and casualties
that I Corps had suffered. Was it worth all the bloodshed and the
bodies and wounded left behind? Was it a victory or a defeat? Popular
sentiment seemed to be aroused by the dramatic accounts and personal
feelings of the I-Corps troops who returned from Laos. Almost without
exception, they did not believe they were victorious.

To political and military leaders of South Vietnam, the Laotian
incursion offered further proof of close cooperation berween the U.S.
and RVN in the face of the enemy's threat. They had.long coveted such
an action but knew that South Vietnam alone could not destroy the war-
sustaining lifeline from North Vietnam so they had welcomed the American
initiative with unconcealed enthusiasm.

The general situation at that time also lent itself to a focus of
attention on our objectives in lower Laos. The turnabout in Cambodia's
political attitude and the resulting cross-border operations of 1970
brought about encouraging prospects of denying safe havens and storage
areas to the enemy in that terminal section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The prospects would look still better if the Communist lifeline could be
cut at" its most sensitive point — in lower Laos. Domestically, the
Vietnamization program was making excellent progress. After the Cambodian

140



planned and prepared as if it had been a landing of combat troops. On
27 February, resupply efforts were made; smoke cover, artillery, gun-
ships and tactical air were used but the enemy still shot down an air-
craft which interrupted the supply attempts. Supplies were running
low while the number of dead and wounded increased but could not be
evacuated, The base fought desperately to defend itself.

Up to this point, the direction taken by enemy reactions seemed
rather clear, The main forces committed consisted of the 304th, 308th
and 2d (Yellow Star) Divisions along with elements of the 320th and
324B Divisions and armored and artillery units. ‘The NVA strategy ap-
peared to concentrate on massing the infantry, armor and artillery
force necessary to isolate and overwhelm—one by one—the RVNAF fire
bases. The enemy took advantage of the rugged terrain to disperse his
logistic, engineer and air defense units into small elements which
were well entrenched in fortified positions established throughout the
area and ARVN forces made contact wherever they moved; only by summoning
concentrated firepower were they able to overpower the enemy.

The enemy appeared to have coped effectively with friendly mobile
forces, heliborne insertions of troops and artillery positions. His

_ mortar fire, which was sustained by adequate reserves of ammunition,

was now supplemented by long-range artillery. This came as a new
experience for ARVN forces who were not fully prepared to cope with
massive and sustained attacks by fire and the conventional armor-sup-
ported infantry attack that overran FSB 31 was probably the first Com-
munist large-scale combined arms attack in the Indochina theater.

The difficulties that Fire Support Base 31 had experienced and
Fire Support Base 30 was now experiencing showed that enemy reactions
largely consisted of attacks by fire and air defense. Attacks by fire
were designed to create tension and cause attrition. Anti-aircraft
fire was aimed at disrupting communications, supply and medical evacu-
ation by helicopters, and isolating the bases.

On the friendly side, several shortcomings were evident from the
very beginning of the operation. First, high-level headquarters were

located too far from the combat zone and from each other. As a result,

86



by their limited capabilities. However, this goal was not in reach
within the foreseeable future. In the immediate present, LAM SON 719
made it all too clear that not only was North Vietnam's combat strength
increasing, its capabilities surpassed the RVN's by a large margin in
terms of anti-aircraft weapons, armor and artillery. The question posed
at that time appeared to be whether the RVN, without U.S. presence and
support, could meet the challenge presented by the enemy's continued
expansion and development.

LAM SON 719 did not come as a surprise for the enemy as intended.
This was a profound disappointment for our side. We had tried to keep
the planning and preparation process as leak-proof as possible, even
at the expense of carefully preparing our units for the challenge. But
the enemy had correctly anticipated our possible action five months in
advance.* To counter it, he had activated a Corps level control head-
quarters, Front 70B, as early as in October, 1970 to exercise control
over the 304th, 308th and 320th Divisions. The battleground had also
been carefully prepared. To the dismay of ARVN units, they found that
regardless of their direction of advance in the area of operation, they
encountered well-organized defense positions. Enemy artillery was also
pre-registéred to every hilltop susceptible of becoming a landing zone
for our helicopters. In addition, enemy prisoners testified that a
substantial part of supply caches had been removed to other areas.
What we had hoped to be a surprise turned out to be something the enemy
had planned for as a contingency ever since the Cambodian incursion was

terminated. On the contrary, the surprise, in some areas, was ours.

——

deposition made by a Communist sergeant from the 24B Regiment,
NVA 304th Division who defected to our side. Enemy units had received
orders to counteract a possible ARVN offensive along Route No. 9 five
months before it was launched.

168

12



change directon and move eastward through the Laotian salient toward an
area near Route No. 9. The mission of U.S. forces during this final
phase was to remain unchanged.

On 22 January, XXIV Corps and I Corps completed preparation of their
operational orders. On D-Day, 30 January the Forward CP of I Corps was
to be established at Dong Ha; it was to include a small command element
to be located at Ham Nghi ‘FSB, south of Khe Sanh. The Forward CP of the
U.S. XXIV Corps was to move to Quang Tri combat base the day before. The
I Corps forces were to cross the border on 8 February. During a combined
briefing session held at Dong Ha on 2 February, the I Corps operation
orders were disseminated to all participating units.° (Chart 1)

To assist in the execution of LAM SON 719, MACV planned a diversion
in the form of a maneuver involving U.S. naval and marine units off the
coast of Thanh Hoa Province (North Vietnam).

Division Planning and Preparations

The main effort of LAM SON 719 was assigned to the Airborne Division
and on 18 January 1971, during a meeting at I Corps Headquarters, the
division commander, Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong, learned this for
the first time. He immediately ordered his division, at the ABN Division
rear base in Saigon to begin preparations for deployment. Meanwhile, the
U.S. advisory team on 27 January visited headquarters, U.S. XXIV Corps,
to receive first hand briefings and report on ABN preparations. ABN
units deployed on an operation in War Zone C (north of Tay Ninh) were
withdrawn to receive additional training by U.S. advisers on ‘communications
and the employment of U.S. gunships and supply and medevac helicopters,
as well as air-ground communications with supporting U.S. tactical air-
craft.

General Dong flew to Dong Ha on 1 February 1971 and was followed
during the next few days by his staff, the U.S. ABN Division advisory

team, and combat and support units.

Spor details on participating units, see Appendix A.

40



not disengage. On 24 February, the commander of the lst Infantry Divi-
sion requested a B-52 mission and the two battalions pulled back an hour
prior to the airstrike; they counterattacked immediately thereafter.
Results were verified to be 159 enemy bodies left in place along with
numerous weapons. Still, the enemy remained deployed around Fire Support
Base Hotel 2, causing a delay in the plans to move the 105-mm artillery
battery out and close the base in order to send the 3d Infantry Regiment
westward with the, mission of cutting off Route 914 as directed by
President Thieu during his 19 February visit.

The Loss of Fire Support Base 31

The withdrawal of the 21st Ranger Battalion left the northern flank
of the Airborne Division exposed and Fire Support Bases 31 and 30 now bore
the brunt of enemy attacks. They had been under pressure since the 2d and
3d Battalions of the 3d Airborne Brigade were inserted. Established in
the immediate vicinity of the Communist north-south supply line, both bases
were able to monitor closely enemy troop movements as well as signs of ene-
my armored activities. Each battalion left but a small force to defend
the bases while a larger force fanned out in security and search activities,
but this mobile force was not sufficient to prevent the enemy from moving
close to the bases and setting up mortars and antiaircraft guns to interdict
supply and medical evacuation attempts.> Each helicopter landing or
departing usually resulted in heavy attacks by fire.

To strengthen the security of Fire Support Base 31, which was a more
important position and seemed to be more heavily threatened because it
housed the 3d Airborne Brigade headquarters, plans were made to helilift
the 6th Airborne Battalion to a mountain range northwest of the base on
13 February. This mountain range controlled a valley running a south-

easterly course to Fire Support Base 31 and the valley was the
source for attacks by fire against friendly positions. Although B-52

Airborne units routinely secured their fire support bases in this
manner. Other ARVN units also employed this technique when the terrain
and enemy situation made it appropriate.

81



APPENDIX A

TASK ORGANIZATION, ARVN I CORPS
FOR LAM SON 719

Hq, I Corps

I Corps Arty
64th Arty Bn

lst ALC I Corps
71st Med Gp
I Corps Sig Bn
lst MP Bn
111th Trans Co
116th Trans Co
118th Trans Co

ist Armored Bde
7th ACS
11th ACS
17th ACS
4th ACS (Prov) (OPCON) (D+40)
1st/3d Armored Cav
1st/8th Armored Cav

1st Ranger Gp (+)
21st Rngr Bn
37th Rngr Bn
39th Rngr Bn
77th Rngr Border Defense Bn
3d Co 79th Rngr Border Defense Bn

10th Engr Gp
101st Engr Bn (OPCON to Abn Div)
102d Engr Bn
118th Engr LC Co

172



CHAPTER IV
The Offensive Phase

Preparing to Cross the Border

To assist I Corps forces in making preparations for their cross-
border offensive, XXIV Corps implemented Phase I of LAM SON 719 exactly
as scheduled, at 0000 hours on 30 January 1971. Code-named DEWEY CANYON
II, this operation consisted of securing staging and assembly areas for
I Corps units in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri Province adjacent
to the Laotian border, including Khe Sanh Base and Route No. 9. As part
of a deception plan, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Air mobile)
launched heavy attacks by fire and reconnaissance patrols into the A
Shau valley farther to the south. This move was to divert the enemy's
attention from the area where the main action was about to unfold.

Almost simultaneously the Ist Brigade, U.S. 5th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) advanced west from Fire Support Base Vandegrift in two
elements. The main effort, Team A, 3/5 Cavalry reinforced by engineer
troops, advanced along Axis Gold, following Route No. 9 toward Khe Sanh.
The secondary effort, a task force of the 3/5 Cavalry (-), proceeded
southwesterly along Axis Brown from the Rockpile area to north of Khe
Sanh. (Map 15) Thanks to the element of surprise, ‘the lead element
managed to progress six kilometers before daylight along the highway
without enemy contact.

The U.S. 14th Combat Engineer Battalion immediately followed the
attacking cavalry forces, restoring nine of the eighteen required bridges
and nine of the 20 required culverts along the road. At Khe Sanh, U.S.
Army engineers were to survey a site. planned for an assault airstrip
which was to run parallel to the old, unserviceable PSP airstrip. This

assault airstrip, scheduled to be completed on 3 February, was to be

58



bombs had cleared the landing zone and its approaches, the fleet of
helicopters bringing in the first elements of the 6th Airborne Bat-
talion was subjected to heavy attacks by fire immediately upon landing.
The remaining elements of the 6th Battalion were diverted to alternate
landing zones nearby. Upon touching the ground, the battalion spread
out its troops over nearly a kilometer but continued to receive enemy
artillery fire. The battalion then broke up and withdrew south, to
near Fire Support Base 31. It had lost 28 KIA, 50 WIA and 23 MIA
during this short venture. Between that time and its eventual evacua-
tion on 19 February, the 6th Battalion was unable to carry out any
significant mission. The northwest mountain range remained under enemy
control and FSB 31 continued to hold under heavy enemy pressure.

(Map 19)

A company of the 3d Airborne Battalion operating southwest of
FSB 31 received a rallier who was a sergeant, platoon leader in the
24B Regiment of the 304th Division. He reported that the Communists
had been preparing to counter the RVNAF-US operation since October 1970.
Rear service units of Group 559 had in fact received orders to prepare
for combat and an army corps size headquarters called the 70th
Front was designated in October 1970, to command the 304th, 308th and
320th divisions, a number of artillery regiments, an armored regiment,
a number of air defense regiments and other support units. To counter
Operation LAM SON 719, the 70th Front Headquarters was sent to lower
Laos along with NVA combat units. The 24B Regiment along with advance
elements of the 9th and 66th Regiments had infiltrated the border area
west of Quang Tri since 9 February. From all these new revelations
it appeared that the enemy would make a determined effort to defend
his base areas.

The situation heated up following the evacuation of ranger posi-
tions in the north and as a result of heavy enemy attacks, The 31st
and 32d Companies, 3d ABN Battalion operating in the mountain ranges
northeast of Fire Support Base 31 received orders from the division
to move south and meet an armored task force composed of the 17th

Armored Squadron and two companies of the 8th Airborne Battalion coming

82



able to return to their base but all bore battle scars. An eighth
helicopter was shot down.

During this period the enemy greatly increased his interference
and jamming of our radio communications. Several frequencies were so
badly jammed that communications became impossible. In many instances,
enemy radio operators argued and exchanged insults with ours. These
heated verbal exchanges occurred most frequently when the enemy inten-
sified his attacks against the marines. To return the courtesy, our
operators also intercepted and jammed enemy radio frequencies. During
one of these interceptions, marine operators overheard a female voice
giving combat orders. In general, South Vietnamese units did not make
enough effort to safeguard radio communications security, often using |
the most rudimentary of self-devised code systems. This episode of
reciprocal interference and jamming was perhaps more damaging to our
side than to the enemy who was usually more disciplined. ‘The extent
of this damage, if any, could never be ascertained because of the
intense fighting.

In the morning of 21 March, Vandegrift logistical base was pene-
trated by Communist sappers and 10,000 gallons of aviation fuel exploded
into flames. Along Route No. 9, near Fire Support Base Bravo, the 11th
Armored Cavalry Squadron and 8th Airborne Battalion were heavily en-
gaged. There were nearly 100 casualties while four M-41 tanks and 13
armored personnel carriers were damaged. This battleground looked
forlorn after the attack, with damaged vehicles abandoned and scattered
across the road, making passage extremely difficult.

During the day, U.S. air support remained at a high level to help
relieve the enemy pressure and facilitate the withdrawal of ARVN forces.
There were 788 helicopter gunship sorties, eleven B-52 missions dropping
921 tons of bombs and 157 tactical air sorties which destroyed 37 enemy
vehicles and one field gun and damaged 18 other vehicles.

During the night of 21 March, the 1st Armored Brigade and the lst
and 8th Airborne Battalions left their positions along Route No. 9 and
moved east through the jungle in search of a point to cross the Xepon
River. , Successful in avoiding enemy contact, the convoy of nearly 100
vehicles meandered through the dense jungle until about noon the next

117



gradually came back, leaving the entire brigade with only 37 missing.
The battle at FSB Delta had cost the enemy an estimated 2,000 troops,
seriously hurting his 29th and 803d Regiments.

Around noon of 23 March the last vehicles of the armored convoy
crossed the border and the remaining airborne elements successively
reached the forward positions of the U.S. 1st Brigade, Sth Infantry
Division (mechanized). Because of enemy armored presence reported near
the border, the U.S. brigade had recently been reinforced with a tank
battalion (1/77 Armor). During the day, 23 March, U.S. air support
continued at a high level: 756 helicopter gunship sorties, 11 B-52
missions dropping 941 tons of bombs which caused 77 secondary explosions,
and 283 tactical air sorties.

In the morning of 24 March, as if propelled by the momentum of the
pursuit, many Communist armored vehicles appeared on the Laotian side
of the border. Near Route No. 9 and south of the road, between 1000
hours and noon, U.S. air cavalry reported up to five different locations
of enemy armored vehicles near the border. The U.S. air cavalry and
tactical air attacked and destroyed 10 Communist tanks, not counting
those suspected of being damaged.

In the area of Fire Support Base Hotel, the remaining elements of
the 258th Marine Brigade began to feel enemy probes. Not wishing to
fight another Delta battle, the Marine Division commander ordered its
evacuation. In the late afternoon, U.S. helicopters lifted out all six
105-mm and four 155-mm howitzers, and all of the Marines. Immediately
upon reaching Khe Sanh, the 258th Brigade was sent to Lang Vei to set
up a fire support base and take over an area of operations. On this
same day, the 2d Regiment, Ist Infantry Division also deployed its units
to provide security for Ham Nghi Base. The 54th Infantry Regiment from
Hue received orders to move to Khe Sanh and relieve the 2d Regiment
which needed some rest. ARVN units including the 5th Regiment, 2d Divi-
sion were also deployed to gradually replace U.S. units west of Quang
Tri. On 25 March, upon special orders from I Corps, the Marine Division
dispatched two reconnaissance teams to the Co Roc area-to control a

vantage point essential for the security of Khe Sanh Base. On this day,

120



North of the Thach Han River, the terrain of Quang Tri Province
could be divided into three general regions: (1) the lowlands bordering
on the sea, which was flat terrain not exceeding 10 meters in elevation;
(2) the piedmont region which ran west from National Route No. 1 toa
depth of between 15 and 20 kilometers with an average elevation of about
300 meters; (3) and the westernmost mountainous region of the Truong
Son Range with elevations up to 1,600 meters.

The vegetation of Quang Tri province reflected the characteristics
of these three geographical regions. The flat coastal plains were
usually inundated, which permitted rice planting and the agglomeration
of farming villages. The piedmont region was dry and sterile with vege-
tation not taller than a man's height, consisting mostly of scattered
bushes. The mountainous region was generally covered by rain forests
whose trees grew taller further to the west. These were double and
triple canopied forests with very dense undergrowth consisting mostly of
bamboo and thorny underbushes. River valleys in this region were fertile
and favored crop planting. The Lao Bao Valley, for example, was renowned
for its coffee and fruit trees.

The primary line of communication (LOC) in the province was National
Route No. 1 which ran north-south close to the coastal plains. A secon-
dary LOC was National Route No. 9 which ran from a junction with Route
No. 1 in the vicinity of Dong Ha west to the Laotian border. From Dong
Ha to Son Lam hamlet (close to FSB Vandegrift), Route No. 9 was a two-
lane, all weather, hard surfaced road, occasionally subjected to enemy
harassment. West of FSB Vandegrift it became a dirt road usable only in
good weather; this stretch was insecure and had several destroyed bridges.
The Khe Sanh airfield, which had been abandoned for a long time, would
require extensive repairs to be operational.

The Thach Han River, a major tributary of the Cua Viet River, was
a major waterway linking the cities of Quang Tri and Dong Ha with the
sea. Because of its proximity to the DMZ, this river was continually a
target for minings and sabotage by enemy frogmen.

To the west beyond’ the Laotian border, the terrain was predominantly

mountainous. The area of operation on this side of the border was

27



early and the enemy had ample time to prepare. As early as during

the first days of February, Tchepone had already been mentioned as

an objective. After that, U.S. Government officials publicly praised
the merits of the Laotian campaign which would ensure the continued
redeployment of U.S. forces. Then on 8 February, the day I Corps forces
crossed the border into Laos, President Thieu went on TV to personally
break the news to the Vietnamese public. As the operation continued,
press reports increasingly focused on the small district town of
Tchepone as the final objective... To the RVN, it had become an objec-
tive to be attained at all costs.

While the RVN announced that its troops had occupied Tchepone,
North Vietnam quickly and loudly disclaimed it. The GVN in the mean-
time received foreign press reporters with a total lack of enthusiasm
and did not allow them easy access to battleground visits as it had
during other operations. This increased suspicion and speculation.
Subsequent press articles and pictures depicting the withdrawal of
ARVN troops from Laos further confused attempts at assessing the of-
fensive campaign correctly, particularly by foreign observers. However,
with the exception of the minority elite in big cities, the South Viet-
namese general public was not influenced by the foreign press. Still,
the initial publicity about LAM SON 719 looked embarrassingly hollow
in their eyes in view of the hasty termination of the operation. This
impression lingered on despite official announcements of victory and
the ribbons and medals awarded to the "victorious" troops of I Corps.

If the premature conclusion of the Laotian campaign could not be
effectively screened from the outside world, it was all too clear to
insiders that the campaign was an unfinished job. The intended and
desired goal to sustain combat until the onset of the rainy season in
order to strangle the enemy's supply route could not be accomplished.
Only 45 days after ARVN forces had crossed the border, they were
already back in South Vietnam. The two lesser raids that were subse-
quently conducted sought to enhance the public image of the RVNAF more
than to achieve military gains. Finally, the returns produced by LAM

SON 719 in terms of enemy caches destroyed were not even as impressive

152



APPENDIX B

TASK ORGANIZATION, US XXIV CORPS
FOR LAM SON 719

Hq, XXIV Corps

108th Arty Gp
8th Bn, 4th Arty
2d Bn, 94th Arty
lst Bn, 39th Arty (-) (D+30)
1st Bn, 44th Arty AWSP (-)
45th Engr Gp (OPCON D-13 to D+23)
14th Engr Bn (CBT)
630th Engr Co (LW)
511th Engr Co (PB)
59th Engr Co (-) (LC)
27th Engr Bn (CBT) (-)
59lst Engr Co (LE)

504th MP Bn (-)
300th MP Co (OPCON)

212th CAB
13lst Surv Aerial Co
220th Recon Airplane Co

101st Abn Div (Amb1) (-)

101st Abn Div Arty (-)
2d Bn (Amb1) 11th Arty
2d Bn (Amb1) 319th Arty
4th Bn, 77th AFA (Amb1)
Co B, 326th Engr Bn (Amb1)

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Amb1) (Res)

3d Bde, 1Olst Abn Div (Amb1) (D+30 to D+67)
lst Bn, 501st Abn Inf (D+25 to D+67)
2d Bn, 502 Abn Inf (OPCON 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div) (D+26 to D+67)
ist Bn, 506th Abn Inf (D+47 to D+67)
2d Bn, 327th Abn Inf (D+29 to D+48)

TF 326th (-) (OPCON) (D-1 to D+67)
CoA, 326th Engr Bn (Amb1) (+)
59th EOD Det (-)

175



district levels, rose from 150,000 in early 1968 to 280,000 in late
1970. The number of their fighting units increased accordingly from
880 to 1,600 companies. The Popular Forces, responsible for security
in villages and hamlets, numbered 250,000 by late 1970 as compared to
150,000 in 1968, an increase from 4,100 to 7,200 combat platoons.
Noteworthy is the fact that these territorial forces were supplied
with new basic weaponry just like their regular counterparts and were
greatly improved in terms of training, command and control, and
logistics.

As the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces developed following the
Midway agreement, the United States and other free world forces grad-
ually stood down and redeployed. Of the ten U.S. divisions fighting
in Vietnam, only six remained as the year 1971 began.

During the period that United States combat forces were actively
fighting the ground war, major units of the Vietnamese regular forces
were assigned the primary role of pacification support. The 1968
Communist offensive, however, caused a significant change in the respon-
sibilities of the RVNAF. Since most of the targets of this offensive
were cities and urban centers, Communist forces were pitted directly
against the ARVN. This general offensive resulted in a military defeat
for the enemy and two facts became immediately apparent. One was that
the RVNAF had the capability to meet and cope with such challenges. The
second was that the people of South Vietnam were still strongly anti-
communist. They refused to respond to the call of the Communists for
a general uprising and their wide response to the general mobilization
law afforded the manpower needed to enlarge the national armed forces.

Even though the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam could not
replace the redeployed United States and other free-world forces on
a numerical basis, they made every effort to fill the vacuum. In the
beginning, this was not a very difficult task. The enemy's post-offen-
sive strength had considerably dwindled while the combat effectiveness
of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam was improving as each
day passed. New weapons and equipment stimulated ARVN morale. Con-

“ currently, United States troops cooperated with the Vietnamese armed



Table 7 — U.S. Army Aircraft Damaged and Destroyed

Destroyed
Type In South Grand
Aircraft Damaged* In_Laos Vietnam Total Total
OH6A 25 4 6 10 35
OHS8 15 4 2 6 21
UHIC 63 7 1 8 71
UH1H 316 43 10 53 369
AHIG 158 20 6 26 184
CH47 26 3 0 3 29
CHS3 13 1 1 2 15
CHS4 2 0 0 0 2
Total 618 82 26 . 108 728
(Non-hostile) (4) (0) (5) (5) (9)

*Aircraft receiving any degree of combat damage but is economically
repairable.

Table 8 — U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Support

In South

In_Laos Vietnam Total
Total Sorties Flown 7104 2010 9114
Average Sorties/Day 103 29 132
Highest Number of Sorties on
Any One Day (8 March 1971) 277
Total Ton Ordnance. Delivered 10931 “3100 14031
Number of Aircraft Lost 7

135



many years in South Vietnam and should work in lower Laos, given the
considerable concentration of resources. This also offered the ARVN
forces an opportunity to put into combat practice what they had learned
from combined operations with U.S. forces.

The rough, jungled terrain of lower Laos proved particularly dif-
ficult for ARVN forces. In every advance, they were apt to be engaged
by the enemy in heavy firefights. At almost all prominent terrain
features in the area, they met head on with solid defensive positions
deployed by enemy logistic units. This defense system, consisting of
mutually supporting, well dug-in, crescent~shape, covered trench
segments, which the enemy called “horseshoe blocks," was extremely
difficult and time-consuming to break through since their destruction
would require accurate, highly concentrated artillery fire.

One of the first major problems that our forces had to face, in ad-
dition to the enemy's blocking positions, was his elusive but devastating
anti-aircraft system. The most common weapon he used against our air-
craft was the 12.7-mm heavy machinegun which constantly switched firing
positions. In addition, throughout the area, there were about 200 AAA
pieces from 23-mm up to 100-mm, some of them radar~controlled. Even
these heavy weapons frequently changed their firing positions which were
usually well concealed. In general, the enemy's anti-aircraft system
seemed to be well coordinated and its fire controlled with skill and
discipline. His heavy machineguns such as 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm or even
23-mm, were arranged in a diamond or circle pattern, affording mutual
protection and providing a well-coordinated fire trap. For example,
one weapon could open fire to draw our aircraft to it-and when our
aircraft made the attack, it would enter another weapon's field of fire.
Enemy AAA positions not only changed frequently, they also moved in
uncomfortably close to our units in coordination with an envelopment
and attack by infantry troops. As a result, they were extremely
difficult to destroy and the price our helicopters had to pay when
lifting troops, delivering supplies or evacuating the wounded was
high.

143



U.S. advisers could have helped more had they been permitted to do
so. As it was, only one member from each division advisory team was
allowed in the air at any time over his division's tactical area of
responsibility. The division senior advisers were not allowed to overfly
Laos at any time. Although the advisers in the air over the divisions
monitored the situation closely and helped greatly in difficult problems
of support, they were often overwhelmed by requests for assistance from
several divisional units which were being engaged by the enemy simulta-
neously. Confined to the divisions' rear echelon CPs inside South Viet-
nam, the senior advisers were able only to expedite support through
reports or map studies.

The question has often surfaced concerning President Thieu's per-
sonal influence on the operation, From the beginning it was obvious
that his influence was decisive. It was he who approved the idea of
launching an offensive into lower Laos, concurred with the general con-
cept of operation and decided to augment the forces for I Corps. The
JGS only acted with his approval. The attachment of the Airborne and
Marine Divisions to I Corps for the offensive effort, for example, could
not have been done without President Thieu's personal approval. But the
selection of 8 February as D-day, as far as I can determine, was a re-
commendation of the combined planning staffs of I Corps and the U.S.
XXIV Corps. President Thieu had been briefed on this selected date by
the I Corps commander. Therefore, without strong reasons for a change,
the I Corps commander apparently felt committed to the decision that he
had recommended and obtained from the President.

But President Thieu's role was not confined just to the decision
to proceed with the operation. At least on two occasions, the direc-
tives he gave to the I Corps commander clearly affected the course of
the operation itself. During a visit to I Corps on 19 February, in the
company of a central government delegation, he received an operational
briefing presented by the participating ARVN field commanders. During
this briefing they outlined for him the serious difficulties being
met by ARVN units in lower Laos with the implied suggestion that a
deeper incursion would be inadvisable. At that time, the Ranger 21st
and 39th Battalions were being heavily engaged and FSBs 30 and 31 began

149



The ABN Division began its operational planning only after it received
detailed guidance from the I Corps commander on 2 February during the
combined staff meeting at Dong Ha, where the I Corps Forward CP was now
located.

The combat plan developed by the Airborne Division called for succes-
sive heliborne operations to occupy Objectives 30, 31 and A Luoi in
coordination with an armor-infantry thrust along Route No. 9. Intermed-
diate objectives, op which fire support bases would be established, would
be seized in the advance to Tchepone, after which battalion-sized block-
ing positions would be occupied around Tchepone. The heliborne operations
to occupy A Luoi and Tchepone would be conducted as soon as the armor-
infantry thrust progressed near the objectives. This was to be a coordi-
nated advance so timed as to provide immediate link-up at the objectives.
(Map 11)

Initially, the armor-infantry thrust consisted of two squadrons,
the 11th and 17th of the lst Armor Brigade, the lst Airborne Brigade
(with its three battalions: 1st, 8th and 9th), the 44th Artillery Battal-
ion (155-mm) and the 101st Engineer Battalion. This task force was to
advance along Route No. 9, repair raads as it moved and link-up with
heliborne units. The 3d Airborne Brigade (three battalions: 2d, 3d and
6th) would be the heliborne force assigned to occupy objectives and
establish FSBs north of the road. For the assault on Tchepone, the
mission was given to the 2nd Airborne Brigade which consisted of three
battalions, the 5th, 7th and llth. The troop pick-up point for airborne
operations would be Ham Nghi Base. The Airborne Division operation plan
was presented to Lt. General Hoang Xuan Lam on 3 February who immediately
approved it in principle.

Of the two Marine brigades to be provided by the JGS, the 258th
Brigade with one artillery and three infantry battalions was operating
in an area southwest of Quang Tri. The other brigade, the 147th after
regrouping its detached units, completed its movement by C-130 to Dong
Ha on 3 February. Both brigades were to be employed as I Corps reserves
and given the temporary mission of security for ARVN forces on the RVN
side of the border.

42



Vietnam proclaimed a new course of action, which the U.S. referred to
as "Vietnamization." Under the doctrine of Vietnamization, the United
States would begin removing its combat troops and turning over the
prosecution of the war to the soldiers of the Republic of Vietnam. To
facilitate the withdrawal of United States troops, the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Vietnam were to be rapidly expanded and modernized and
the United States would also assist and strengthen the development and
economy of the Republic of Vietnam by increasing non-military aid as
well.

The years 1969 and 1970 witnessed an unprecedented development of
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Their total strength was
rapidly increased from 700,000 in early 1968 to nearly one million
in late 1970. Major ARVN combat forces consisted of ten infantry
divisions fully equipped with modern weapons, including heavy artillery
and armored vehicles. The general reserve forces consisted of the
Airborne and Marine Divisions, both up to strength and thoroughly
combat-worthy. In addition, armor, artillery, engineer and logistic
capabilities were rapidly improved and training facilities were developed
in order to provide for the needs of a 1,000,000-man army.

The Air Force and Navy were also strengthened. The Air Force,
which had 16,000 men in 1967, was boosted to 45,000 men in 1970. Its
five air wings were upgraded into five full-fledged air divisions,
equipped with A-37 and A-1H fighters and modern UH-1 helicopters. The
Navy also experienced a rapid development from 16,000 men in 1967 to
40,000 in late 1970. New naval units were created as a number of U.S.
vessels operating at sea and in rivers were turned over to the Vietnamese
Navy. Amphibious Task Force 211 was created at Dong Tam and became
fully operational in late 1969. River Patrol Force 212, created in mid-
1970, was assigned patrol and interdiction duties on rivers and canals.
United States naval vessels operating on the high seas were also grad-
ually turned over to the Vietnamese Navy.

In addition to regular forces, the territorial forces similarly
underwent major changes. The numerical strength of the Regional Forces,

whose units were responsible for local security at the province and



In Phase I, which was to be called Operation Dewey Canyon II, the
1st Brigade, U.S. 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), reinforced, was to
advance on D-Day, occupy the Khe Sanh area, and clear Route No. 9 up to
the Laotian border, ARVN troop assembly areas, and forward artillery
positions required for support of the operation. (Map 10) In the mean-
time, the U.S. 10lst Airborne Division (Airmobile), while continuing its
operations in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, was to conduct artil-
lery attacks by fire in the A Shau Valley, west of Thua Thien Province
from D-Day to D+4 (a diversionary action) and in cooperation with the
2d Regiment, lst ARVN Infantry Division to be prepared to defend the areas
south of the DMZ. The U.S. 45th Engineer Group was assigned the mission
to repair Route No. 9 up to the Laotion border and rehabilitate the Khe
Sanh airstrip for C-130 use. Tactical air was to be provided by the
U.S. 7th Air Force, B-52 strikes by CINCSAC, and gunships and artillery
by units of U.S. XXIV Corps. During Phase I, ARVN forces were to com-
plete their movements toward assembly areas and be prepared to attack on
order across the border into lower Laos.

In Phase II, on D-Day, I Corps forces, following intensive preparation
fires, were to launch their attack into lower Laos. The major effort was .
to be conducted along Route No. 9 by the ABN Division reinforced by the
lst Armor Brigade, engineer and artillery elements. While the 1st Armor
Brigade (with its two squadrons 11 and 17) and engineer troops moved
along Route No. 9, repairing it as they progressed, an ABN battalion was
to be helilifted into Objective A Luoi (geographical name: Ban Dong) and
two other ABN battalions were to establish fire support bases — one eight
kilometers northwest and the other eight kilometers northeast of A Loui—
to the north. (Map 11) Battalions of the lst Infantry Division's lst
and 3d Regiments were to be inserted by helicopter and establish FSBs on
the Co R6é elevation south of Route No. 9 to protect the I Corps southern
flank. The lst Ranger Group with its three battalions, the 21st, 37th
and 39th, was to be helilifted north of Route No. 9 to occupy blocking
positions more than 16 kilometers to the northeast of A Loui and protect
the northern flank of the ABN Division. After the completion of this

troop movement, the armor brigade would attack westward from Objective A

36



On 21 March, at 0300 hours enemy action became intense in the
area to the west, where the 2d and 4th Battalions of the 2d Regiment
were stranded two kilometers east of Sophia East. The Regiments of
the NVA 2d Division were determined to attack and annihilate these two
battalions but they were not successful. In the process, the enemy
lost 245 killed, 52 B~40s and B-41s, seven machineguns, seven 60-mm
mortars, five 82-mm mortars, eight flame throwers, nine 12.7-mm machine-
guns and 65 AK-47s. Friendly losses were 37 killed, 58 wounded and
15 missing. This ARVN victory caused enemy pressure to relax and the
remaining forces of the lst Infantry Division were transported by U.S.
helicopters to Ham Nghi Base before nightfall. Meanwhile, the head-
quarters of the Ist Airbanne Brigade, the 5th Airborne Battalion and
the troops of the artillery unit left at Fire Support Base Alpha were
also safely evacuated south. Fire support bases Alpha and Delta 1 were
thus closed on that day and ARVN forces pulled back near Fire Support
Base Bravo, five kilometers west of the RVN border.

The situation in the areas manned by the lst Infantry and the
Airborne Division had been resolved but, over in the Marines' area,

there was an eruption of fire. The 29th and 803d Regiments of the

324B Division were determined to destroy Fire Support Base Delta.

These two enemy units began attacking fiercely at dawn of 21 March.
Mortar and direct artillery fire (the latter believed to come from tank
guns) was very accurate. All 175-mm guns from the RVN side of the border
were mobilized to provide close fire support to the Marines. -In the
morning, 13 tactical air sorties provided additional support. A B-52
mission was diverted to the area and crushed an enemy battalion (a PW
later reported this battalion had lost 400 men from this B-52 action).
The attack was checked and the base held firm. A casualty count showed
that the Marines had 85 killed, 238 wounded and 100 weapons damaged
while enemy forces suffered 600 killed, five detained and an estimated
200 individual and 60 crew-served weapons seized. After the battle,
the 147th Brigade and the 7th Marine Battalion ran short of supplies.
Thanks to air support, seven U.S. UH-1H helicopters were able to land,
bringing ammunition and evacuating wounded, These helicopters were

116

|



Laos, particularly in the provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Kontum.
The enemy base area of Do Xa, which lay astride the boundary of MR-1
and MR-2, was a target for frequent ARVN attacks. In 1958, repair work
began: on the abandoned stretch of GVN National Route No. 14 which paral-
leled the Laotian border and connected Kontum with Hoi An in Quang Nam
Province but the onset of the insurgency interrupted the work which
‘was never resumed.

During the period from 1960 to 1965, as the fighting escalated,
the GVN was unable to do anything against the Laos infiltration route
but the United States nade a significant contribution in 1961 when it
helped organize the highlands Montagnards into combat units (CIDG's)
and develop the Vietnamese Special Forces for the defense of the border
areas. Against Communist activities on the Ho Chi Minh trail, however,
neither the U.S. Army Special Forces nor their Vietnamese counterparts
ever interdicted the Communist logistics system to a significant degree,
even during the period of maximum effort. Also, the idea of building
the "McNamara Line" of sensors across the Truong Son mountain range at
the southern boundary of the DMZ was never fully implemented as planned.

The surveillance and intérdiction of the trail, therefore, lay
primarily in the hands of the U.S. Air Force whose reconnaissance planes
covered the trail system around the clock. Ground electronic sensors
planted along jungle pathways, river crossings, and mountain passes
picked up vehicle and other man-made noises, transmitted them to over~
flying planes which relayed the information to terminal stations to be
analyzed and interpreted. The electronic monitoring of enemy ‘activities
on the trail system helped record the number of vehicles and men moving
along the trail; consequently, intelligence on Communist infiltration
was remarkably reliable.

In addition to surveillance, a major task for the United States
Air Force was to interdict this infiltration. All types of aircraft
were used including B-52 strategic bombers, sophisticated fighter-
bombers and several types of gun ships. The U.S. Air Force claimed
that its bombs and improved weapons systems inflicted heavy losses to

the enemy in terms of personnel, vehicles and materiel moving down the

15



through dense jungles, across streams and mountains and a journey on
the trail was exhausting and slow.

For a time after the Geneva Accords in 1954, the trail was practi-
cally abandoned since the war had ended. Then, when South Vietnam,
under ‘the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, began restoring its
stability and proving that it could stand on its own after repudiating
reunification with North Vietnam, the Central Committee of North Vietnam's
Communist Party decided on a new course of action against South Vietnam.
In May 1959, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) High Command activated
Transportation Group 559 under the direct control of its Rear Service
(Logistics) Department. Group 559 was to be a special unit in charge
of moving men and supplies into the South for the support of the insur-
gency effort which had just been initiated under the form of a "war of
liberation." ‘The trail's old pathways were rehabilitated and widened,
and new ones were surveyed and projected. Group 559's task of enlarging
this strategic axis of infiltration was pushed ahead with vigor and |
determination. {

The increase of subversive activities against South Vietnam was
in almost direct proportion to the development of the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
since the Communist war effort in the South was largely sustained by a
constant flow of cadre and troops from the North. At this early stage,
the flow was sporadic because the journey was harsh and long for the
men and the means of transporting supplies still primitive. But as
Pathways were eventually enlarged into roads, the means of transporta-
tion were also improved.

Prior to 1965, the Ho Chi Minh system was close to the Vietnam
border, but after the United States became involved in the war and
bombings increased, the Communists gradually shifted toward the west
where they found the densely jungled areas of lower Laos and eastern
Cambodia perfect sanctuaries for the movement or concentration of
troops and the storage of weapons and war materiels.

By the end of the 1960's, the Ho Chi Minh trail had become an
elaborate system of nearly 2,000 miles of pathways and roads, including

some natural waterways. (Map 1) It started at Vinh, ran through the

10



Chapter

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .........
Appendix
A. TASK ORGANIZATION, ARVN I CORPS, FOR LAM SOM 719

B.

TASK ORGANIZATION, U.S. XXIV CORPS, FOR LAM SON 719

GLOSSARY «2 ee ee ee eee we ee wee we ewe ne

No.

Tables

GVN Released Results for LAM SON 719 ......
LAM SON 719 Cumulative Casualties .......
Major Items of Equipment Lost or Destroyed...
Enemy Casualties, LAM SON 719 .........
Enemy Equipment Losses ..... 2+ ese

LAM SON 719: U.S. Army Aviation Support Sorties
U.S. Army Aircraft Damaged and Destroyed ....
U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Support ......
Bomb Damage Assessment, U.S. Tactical Air ...
B-52 "Arc Light" Operation Summary, LAM SON 719
BDA Results on 55 Arc Light Targets ......
U.S. and ARVN Artillery Support ........

Charts

Task Organization, LAM SON 719, Early February 1971

U.S. Army Aviation Task Organization. .....
Maps.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail .......% .
The Trail System, Lower Laos, 1970....
The Border Area, Military Regions 1&2 .
The Logistical Area of Tchepone .....
Enemy Deployment, Northern MR1 .....
Laos and North Vietnam. ...... o-
Enemy Disposition, Early February 1971 oe
The Area of Operation .......4.4.6.
The Main Trail System and Base Areas .....

Operation Plan, Phase I (Dewey Canyon II) ..

Operation Plan, Phase IIT... . 2... eevee
U.S. Army Logistics Plan, LAMSON 719 .....
ARVN Logistics Plan, LAM SON 719..... .
Integrated Transportation System, LAM SON 79° .
The Attack Toward Khe Sanh... .. 2-2 eee
Consolidation of the Assembly Area. ......
The Advance to Ban Dong .. 2... +. ee eee
Enemy Situation, Last Week of February 1971 ..

vili

Page

164

172
175

178

128
129
130
131
132
134
135
135
136
137
138
139



Table 1— GVN Released Results for LAM SON 719!

ALLIED LOSSES

UNITED STATES
Dead: 102
Wounded: 215
Missing: 53

SOUTH VIETNAM

Official | Unofficial

Dead: 1,146 3,800
Wounded: 4,236 5,200
Missing: 246 775
HELICOPTERS
Destroyed: 92
Cost about $30 million
Damages to others about
$10 million
PLANES
Destroyed: 5

Cost about $8 million

ENEMY LOSSES
TROOPS
Dead: About 13,000
(Saigon government figure)
Captured: About 50
(Saigon government figure)

WEAPONS
Captured or Destroyed:
1,968 crew-served
4,545 individual

VEHICLES
Captured or Destroyed:
100 tanks 291 trucks

SUPPLIES
Captured or Destroyed:
128,000 tons of ammunition
1.3 million drums of gasoline
7,600 yards of pipeline
Food, medicine and clothing

1 this information was published in the American Newsweek magazine, April 5, 1971, p. 29.

128



The lst Infantry Regiment continued to search the areas of Ta
Luong and Route 914 and was able to asses the substantial damages in-
flicted by B-52 bombing runs. In two areas approximately 10 kilometers
south and southeast of FSB Sophia, the 4th Battalion found the bodies of
72 Communist troops, 12 Soviet trucks, eight tracked vehicles, three
122-mm towed cannons, two 37-mm anti-aircraft artillery guns, four
12.7-mm machineguns, two 122-mm rocket launchers, 400 AK-47 rifles,
thirty two 82-mm mortars, 18 B-40s, 60 Chicom radios and huge quantities
of food of all types. Most of these supplies were blown to bits by
B-52 bombs. The battalion also captured five prisoners of war.

During the morning of 10 March, the 2d Regiment on Fire Support
Base Sophia received a heavy attack by fire. The attack wounded 13
soldiers and damaged six of the eight 105-mm howitzers at the base. On
11 March, 2d Infantry Regiment elements operating around the fire sup-
port base had increasing contacts with the enemy. At 1100 hours, a
reconnaissance element operating approximately one kilometer southeast
of the base engaged a Communist patrol killing eight and seizing their
weapons. According to plans, the 2d Infantry Regiment was to move this
day, on foot, to Landing Zone Liz from where it would be helilifted
eastward. Between 1400 hours and nightfall, the 2d Battalion was removed
from Landing Zone Liz and deposited on Landing Zone Brown. The Sth
Battalion landed approximately one kilometer north of Landing Zone Sophia
East where the headquarters of the 2d Regiment had already relocated
while the 4th Battalion continued to secure Fire Support Base Sophia.
Late that afternoon, an element of the battalion engaged the enemy
approximately 1,000 meters south of the base but casualties were light
on both sides.

During the day, lst Infantry Regiment forces continued to search
the Ta Luong area and found more substantial damage caused by B-52
attacks. On 12 March, the evacuation of the 2d Regiment was completed.
The 3d Battalion from Liz landed approximately 1,000 meters south of
Sophia East and the 4th Battalion was the last unit to leave Sophia.

In order to facilitate the movement of troops, U.S. tactical air bombed
and destroyed the eight 105-mm howitzers left on the base and another
105-mm battery was brought to Sophia East from Khe Sanh. The units of

106



Securing Ban Dong

In the early hours of 8 February, 11 Arc Light sorties were flown
against targets in lower Laos as well as to support troop landing zones.
The Airborne Division had positioned artillery batteries at Lao Bao in
the immediate vicinity of the border to support the main thrust along
Route No. 9, Everything seemed to be ready and at 0700 the first air-
borne-armored team crossed the border. A moment later, it was followed
by a flight of U.S. air cavalry helicopters which eventually took the
lead to cover the main ARVN task force. The ARVN soldiers, after so
many days of waiting, were now cheerfully waving from their armored
vehicles at foreign and local press reporters. The press embargo, which
had been imposed during the initial stage for security reasons, had been
lifted a few days earlier and a number of reporters were already at the
border. This first task force consisted of the lst Armor Brigade (11th
and 17th Armor Squadrons) reinforced by the lst and 8th Airborne Bat-
talions, the 101st Combat Engineer Battalion and a platoon of bulldozers.
The road on the Laotian side of the border had been cratered and cut by
ditches at many places, and the armored elements provided support for
the engineer repair crews. Many parts of the roads were destroyed
beyond quick repair and the engineers had to build detours. Sporadic
enemy fire was received but it was insignificant in the face of our
mighty armored force and the brave airborne troops and they advanced
rapidly. Ahead of the column and on the mountain slopes north and south
of the axis of advance, air cavalry gunships struck at enemy air defense
positions. (Map 17)

All supporting firepower provided by U.S. forces was coordinated
by the U.S. 108th Artillery Group. The 155-mm and 8-inch howitzers and
long-range guns hit against deep targets in lower Laos beginning at 0800
hours. The 108th Group expertly and effectively performed its support
mission.

Meanwhile, U.S. air cavalry teams expanded their range in search
of the enemy. Toward the north, not far from the border, by a stream

65



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Table 12 — U.S. and ARVN Artillery Support

Number Number Pieces

Caliber of Tubes Missions Rounds Combat Loss
Us 105mm 6 111 3197 0
155mm 28 5738 132278 0
175mm 20 6946 36695 4
8 inch 8 2373 16392 0
TOTAL 62 15168 208962 4
ARVN 105mm 152 Unknown | 240709 70
155mm 48 Unknown 70228 26
TOTAL 200 Unknown | 310937 96
TOTAL 262 15168* 519899 100

(US ONLY)

*This figure does not include 4969 missions flown by two batteries of
U.S. Aerial Field Artillery (24 helicopters).

In summary, during their 45-day incursion into lower Laos, ARVN
forces of I Corps inflicted on the enemy heavy casualties amounting to
at least 50% of the combat forces he had committed to the area of operation.
A sizeable dent had thus been made into the participating elements of five
NVA divisions, the 2d, 304th, 308th, 320th, and 324B, and the logistical
units in Base Areas 604 and 611. : :

In exchange for these results, I Corps suffered casualties equivalent
to 45% of the combat strength it had committed in the operation not to
mention substantial losses in equipment. Although not a protracted cam-
paign, SAM SON 719 brought about profound repercussions among the South
Vietnamese people. Despite official claims of a "big victory" and mass
demonstrations to celebrate the "lower Laos victory," the people still
were shocked by the severe losses incurred. Perhaps the greatest emotional
shock of all was the unprecedented fact that ARVN forces had to leave

behind in Laos a substantial number of their dead and wounded. This came

139



number of the fishing fleet units made use of newly imported motors.
The results of these rural development programs were apparent through-
out South Vietnam in the gleaming prosperity of the countryside: great
expanses of green ricefields, the great number of motor bicycles on the
roads, the TV antennas on rooftops, and the fleet of motorized sampans
crisscrossing the waterways.

Against this favorable setting for increasing self-sufficiency,
1970 also provided a major event that diminished still more the Commu-
nist threat and boosted the morale of the people of South Vietnam.
Prince Sihanouk was overthrown as Chief of State of neighboring Cambodia.
For many years, Cambodia, under Sihanouk's tule, had been a sanctuary
for the Communists; they had built on Cambodian territory near the
border areas a network of bases from which they mounted attacks against
the Republic of Vietnam. It was on this "neutral" territory that Commu-
nist war supplies and materiel dispatched from North Vietnam were stored
before being brought to use in South Vietnam. The seaport of Sihanouk-
ville had also served as a major supply port for the enemy for many
years.

At the end of March 1970, after General Lon Nol had taken over,
ARVN III and IV Corps sent a few reconnaissance patrols into the border
area adjacent to the provinces of Hau Nghia and Kien Tuong and found a
number of Communist supply caches in the area. In late April, with the
concurrence of the new Cambodian government, and the cooperation and
support of United States units, III and IV Corps launched a large offen-
sive against Communist sanctuaries on the other side of the border.

This offensive was joined in early May 1970 by the U.S. 25th Infantry
Division, lst Air Cavalry Division and armor elements. While United
States units swept into enemy bases and command complexes adjacent to
the border, west and north of Tay Ninh province, ARVN forces progressed (
deeper into Cambodia flushing out Communist units and searching for

supply caches.

Unable to resist the advancing U.S. and ARVN units, Communist
forces fell back into Cambodia and, in cooperation with Khmer Rouge

units, threatened Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, and a number of



many emergency situations.

strikes in their plans for combat maneuvering with skill. Total
strikes in support of LAM SON 719 amounted to 622, to include 421 for

the benefit of ARVN forces and 201 in support of U.S. forces.

Table 10 — B-52 "Arc Light" Operation Summary, LAM SON 719

Several ARVN units learned how to use B-52

B-52

(Table 10)

PHASE II | PHASE III | PHASE IV
PHASE I (8 Feb - | (6 Mar - (16 Mar- | Total
(Planning) | 5 Mar 71)} 15 Mar 71)| 7 Apr 71)

I Corps 175 90 132 397

NOMINATED | U.S. 93 39 212 352

TOTAL 8 268 129 344 746

I Corps 0 158 86 129 373

ISCHEDULED | U.S. 7 87 39 175 308

TOTAL 7 245 125 304 681

I Corps 93 86 153 332

DIVERTS U.S. 16 16 32

MACV 10 15 27

TOTAL (0) 119 88 184 391

JABORTS 0 9 6 17 32

I Corps 0 189 97 135 421

STRIKES U.S. 7 37 20 137 201

TOTAL 7 226 117 272 622

INUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 18 670 359 807 1854
TONS OF BOMBS 456.75 14435.50) 9261.75 }22,705.25 |46,859.25

137



JGs Joint General Staff (VN)

JCG Joint Coordinating Group
Jcs Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.)
KIA Killed-in-Action
LAW Light Anti-Tank Weapon
Loc Line of Communication
LZ Landing Zone
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MIA Missing~In-Action
MR Military Region
NVA North Vietnamese Army
PHILCAG Philippine Civic Action Group
POW Prisoner of War
PSP Pierced Steel Planking
PZ Pick Up Zone
RVN Republic of Vietnam
'RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
TACP Tactical Air Control Party
USAF United States Air Force
USN United States Navy
USNS United States Navy Ship
WIA Wounded-In-Action
179



weapons, it was estimated that the enemy's medium caliber anti-aircraft
artillery deployed in the proposed operational area numbered from 170 to
200 pieces of 23-mm to 100-mm in caliber.

In summary, enemy forces in the area of operation were estimated
at three infantry regiments (Regiments 48/320, 24B/304, and 812/324B),
an artillery element and the binh tram units whose most important capa-
bility was anti-aircraft. Total enemy strength in the area was estimated
at 22,000 to include 7,000 NVA combat troops, 10,000 men belonging to
logistic units, and 5,000 Pathet Lao soldiers. (Map 7)

The enemy's capability to reinforce within a short time (2 weeks)
was estimated at eight regiments which were: the 52d and 64th Regiments
of the 320th Division, the 29th and 303d Regiments of the 324B Division,
the 3d and Ist Regiments of the 2d Division, and the 141st and 9th
Separate Regiments, all supported by artillery elements. Additionally,
enemy reinforcement capabilities from North Vietnam were also considered
by planning staffs and field commanders.

Finally, in January 1971, agent reports disclosed that Communist
units located north of the DMZ had received alert orders. The enemy
B-5 front was reported making preparations to face an attack by allied
forces against the provinces of southern North Vietnam. Remembering his
losses during the Cambodia incursion of the previous year, it appeared ©
that the enemy was consolidating his general defensive posture, and would
devote particular attention to the security of his infiltration and sup-
ply corridor in lower Laos during the remaining months of the 1971 dry

season.

The Area of Operation

To inflict maximum damage on the enemy logistic and infiltration
corridor system, all intelligence indicated that Tchepone would be the
decisive objective area. This area was unpopulated except for a few
Montagnards living in the vicinity of Khe Sanh - Lang Vei and a very
sparse population in Tchepone itself. Intelligence revealed that all
villages and towns whose names appeared on our maps had been evacuated

or largely destroyed by the protracted war. (Map 8)

25



cooperation and teamwork. Armored vehicles were mostly used for
transportation. When an engagement was made, infantry troops left
tanks unprotected in the jungle and tanks were compelled to fend for
themselves, alone, It was apparent that because of this lack of team-
work and mutual protection, the Airborne Division and the four armor
squadrons could not operate effectively along the road and in the
jungle of lower Laos.

Another serious shortcoming was the employment of reserves. During
LAM SON 719, all participating divisions had their own reserve force.
I Corps, on its part, had a reserve force consisting of a Marine bri-
gade and a Ranger group. But the strange thing was that in no instance
during the course of the operation was a reserve force thrown into
combat to help clear an area from heavy enemy pressure. All reserve
forces were used piecemeal at the rear echelon. No commander ever
thought of using them at the forward echelon to his advantage. When
a FSB was threatened with being overrun, the only course of action our
unit commanders took was to destroy the artillery, abandon the base
and extricate their troops by helilift. It was apparent that to be
more combat effective, ARVN units needed to learn how to organize
reserves and employ them decisively on the battlefield.

A lesser but no less dangerous shortcoming was the lack of com-
munications security. In general, ARVN units at lower levels were not
disciplined enough in the application of security procedures concerning
radio communications. At corps and division levels, however, these
procedures were more strictly observed through the systematic encoding
of messages sent by CW radio or radioteletype. But at lower level
units, which made extensive use of FM voice radio sets, communications
were usually sent in clear text in sheer disregard of basic encoding
procedures. ARVN commanders were accustomed to talking freely over
radio networks, using the most rudimentary system of codes. Something
was missing in the enforcement of communications discipline among
ARVN units.

Finally, the withdrawal operation conducted by I Corps was such
that this experience should be examined with utmost candor. First of

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as AC-119 "Stingers" and AC-130 “spectres" and AC-130 "Candlestick"
flareships were particularly effective in attacking and destroying
enemy trucks moving by night and in providing close support for ARVN
forces engaged in fire-fights. These aircraft accounted for about
50-60 enemy trucks destroyed. The results obtained by U.S. tactical
air support to include both U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval Air are out-
lined in Table 9.

Table 9 — Bomb Damage Assessment, U.S. Tactical Air

In Laos tn South Total

Enemy Killed by Air 3103 61 3164
Secondary Explosions 6694 234 6928
Secondary Fires 779 207 986
Destroyed: Structures/Bunkers 471 421 892
Trucks 197 1 198

Tanks 59 0 59
Antiaircraft Weapons 165 2 167

Radar Sites 1 0 1

i

Total losses and casualties incurred by USAF tactical air units

in support of the operation amounted to seven aircraft destroyed (3 F-4's,

1 F+100, 1 A-7, 1 A-1, and 1 0-2) and 4 pilots killed in action. Other
pilots who had been shot down over Laos were all rescued.

U.S. Naval aircraft also contributed significantly to the support
of LAM SON 719 with nearly 1,900 sorties launched from U.S. carriers
Hancock, Kitty Hawk and Ranger.

A particularly important role in air support was performed by the
B-52s in the annihilation of enemy installations, rear bases and troop
concentrations. In Operation LAM SON 719, B-52 sorties were also used

to clear landing zones and to provide close support for ARVN forces in

136

|


they had difficulties coordinating with each other. The U.S. XXIV Corps
Forward, for example, was located in Quang Tri while I Corps Forward
was in Dong Ha. Coordination was thus difficult and often slow. Second,
the tactical command post of I Corps at Ham Nghi Base was apparently
weak, Officers on duty there were all in the junior grades; key staff
officers meanwhile remained at Dong Ha. Though the I Corps commander
was frequently at Ham Nghi during the day, staff operations were still
hampered by the absence of senior staff personnel with enough authority
and competence to provide immediate solutions to battlefield emergencies
as they arose. This was a noteworthy shortcoming and it contributed to
the loss of Fire Base 31 and the inadequate coordination between RVNAF
commands in the withdrawal.

Third, the U.S. XXIV Corps had no representative in the forward
area with authority to coordinate the activities of those units sup-
porting the RVNAF forces such as the 10lst Aviation Group, the 1/5
Mechanized Brigade, and the 108th Artillery Group. All these units
communicated directly with the ARVN divisions they supported. As a
result, coordinating the allocation of support assets among the ARVN
divisions became extremely difficult. The divisional advisory staffs
meanwhile had no authority to handle the coordination of support and
had to refer every action to Quang Tri. Solutions, therefore, were
worked out on the basis of expediency, requirements and good will.

In addition, the Airborne Division complained that there was only
one forward air controller aircraft for the entire area covered by the
division. Since the airborne division was involved in several operations
simultaneously conducted in different directions this represented a
major handicap. This problem was quite evident during the battle at
Fire Support Base 31.

Counterattacks by the enemy revealed the weakness of ARVN anti-tank
weaponry. The Airborne Division reported ‘that the M-72 light anti-tank
weapon was ineffective against armored vehicles which continued to move
after being hit. Lieutenant General Lam immediately notified the Central
Logistical Command. As a result over 300 3.5" rocket launchers with

ammunition, all previously considered obsolescent and placed in storage

87 (



other cities. This prompted the new Cambodian government to appeal for
help. Responding to this request, III Corps forces assisted in the
relief of Cambodian provinces under pressure west of Tay Ninh, while
IV Corps helped clear the enemy threat from provinces south of Phnom
Penh. During these relief operations, ARVN engineers reestablished
road communications on National Route No. 1 between Phnom Penh and Saigon
and built a major logistic base at Neak Luong, 40 miles south of the
Cambodian capital. A Vietnamese Marine brigade was deployed to Neak
Luong with the mission of assisting with the security of Phnom Penh,

if required. In the meantime IV Corps units and the Vietnamese Navy
mounted operations to clear the Mekong River, a vital supply route for
the Cambodian capital.

This crossborder, offensive campaign was a resounding success. By
30 June 1970, which was the deadline for United States forces to with-
draw from Cambodia, Allied forces had eliminated 5,000 enemy troops,
and captured 9,300 tons of weapons, ammunition and assorted supplies,
and 7,000 tons of rice. Most enemy bases had been overrun and destroyed.
The amount of materiel and supplies seized was enough for the enemy to
sustain a military campaign in his COSVN area of South Vietnam for at
least six months.

After the Cambodian incursion the RVNAF continued to conduct small-
scale crossborder operations as required by the situation or to assist
the Cambodian government when requested.

The operations into Cambodia resulted in significant improvements
in security in South Vietnam and, just as important, the morale of the
population as well as of our troops was stimulated in the belief that,
despite the continued redeployment of United States and Free World
Military Assistance forces and the deadlocked Paris talks, the U.S. was
still striving for a satisfactory solution to the war and Vietnamization

was going’ to work.

looswy, the Central Office for South Vietnam, was the enemy head-
quarters responsible for the geographical area under GVN Military
Region 3, Military Region 4 and the five southern provinces of Military
Region 2. .



the remaining 43 armored wounded. Cumulative enemy losses for the
period from 25 February to 3 March throughout the lower Laos area of
operation were 1,536 killed. These losses amounted to about one
regiment per week.

While the enemy endeavored to annihilate Fire Support Base 30 and
the 17th Armored Task Force, the relief plan was being carried out,
marking the beginning of a new offensive phase. (Map 20) Between Fire
Support Base A Luoi (Ban Dong) and the border, the Airborne Division
set up two fire support bases, Alpha and Bravo, to consolidate the
security of Route No. 9. The lst Ranger Group with its remaining two
battalions (21st and 37th) was deployed northwest of Khe Sanh and
provided security for Fire Support Base Phu Loc. The 369th Brigade,
kept in reserve by the corps, conducted security operations south of
Khe Sanh.

On 2 March, the 7th Marine Battalion, 147th Brigade, began landing
troops in Fire Support Base Delta. The 2d Battalion of the 3d Regiment,
which had suffered from combat attrition at Hotel 2, was sent to the . '
rear to reorganize while other elements of the regiment moved out to
operate in the areas of Delta 1 and Brown. For three consecutive days,
the 147th Brigade Headquarters and the remaining 2d and 4th Battalions :
were inserted into Delta. Immediately thereafter, the 2d and 4th Marine |
Battalions moved out to operate in the area of objective Alpha. The
entire 258th Brigade, meanwhile, was inserted at FSB Hotel. The 8th
Battalion assumed security of the base and operated in the Co Roc area
while the lst and 3d Battalions searched for the enemy in the area of
objective Bravo. Marine activities during this time resulted in 361
enemy killed and 51 weapons seized. Also, 153 enemy personnel killed
by airstrikes were found by marine troops.

On 3 March, in execution of the plan to enter Tchepone, the Ist
Battalion of the lst Infantry Regiment was inserted at Landing Zone
Lolo 13 kilometers southeast of Tchepone. The landing had met with
strong enemy opposition and had been postponed twice because of ad-
ditional preparations required for the landing zone. The 1/1 Battalion
finally touched ground at the price of 11 helicopters shot down, 44

93 (



CHAPTER V

The Withdrawal Phase

The Disengagement

In the early morning of 7 March, the first enemy reactions to the
1st Division's presence at Tchepone occurred in the form of artillery
and mortar fire against Fire Support Base Lolo. The first attack,
which was brief and light, caused only five casualties, but the second
attack was heavier as indirect fire poured in from all calibers of guns
from 82-mm mortars to 152-mm artillery. More than 20 soldiers were hit
— three were killed — and all of the bulldozers used in the construction
of fortifications were damaged. While the troops on Lolo were digging
in under this heavy bombardment, Fire Support Base A Luoi was also
subjected to a heavy attack by fire. NVA artillery fell on the posi-
tions intermittently throughout the day, disrupting the scheduled
heliborne supply and evacuation runs.

On the same day, the Black Panther (Reconnaissance) Company of
the lst Infantry Division, which had been attached to the US 10lst
Airborne Division from the beginning of the campaign, landed troops
about five kilometers west-southwest of Ban Dong to rescue the crew
of a U.S. aircraft which had gone down two days before. The Black
Panthers scored a major combat exploit by rescuing all the Americans
and subsequently made contact with the enemy, sustaining light casual-
ties but killing more than 60 Communist troops. During this violent
action, they also seized 30 NVA automatic rifles, destroyed an anti-
aircraft gun position, and found another 40 NVA soldiers killed by
airstrikes.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, on a mission to assess B-52 bomb

damage in an area east of Tchepone, found a smashed weapons supply

98



plane, four M-41 tanks and three M-113 APCs, each towing a 105-mm
howitzer, were apparently damaged among the 18 stranded vehicles. Road
security for the movement of this convoy was the responsibility of armor
and airborne units but during the attack, the convoy never initiated any
request for air support or gunships. Apparently the ambush caught the
convoy by surprise and it ended as quickly as it began. Later the com-
mander of the lst Armored Brigade requested tactical air to destroy the
ambushed vehicles and his request was immediately granted in order to
prevent the enemy from capturing usable equipment.

On the front manned by the Marine Division, the situation was even
more serious. The units of the 258th Brigade were increasingly engaged
by the enemy and the encirclement of Fire Support Base Delta did not
relax in any way. Supplies could not be delivered and the 2d and 4th
Battalions were intercepted on their way to the relief of the base.
Inside the base, five of the ten 105-mm howitzers were out of action
due to enemy fire and the number of marines killed and wounded kept
increasing.

In the area of the lst Division, Fire Support Base Delta 1 was hit
by numerous 122-mm rockets and 75-mm recoilless rifle rounds which put
four 105-mm howitzers out of action and caused 1,400 rounds of 105-mm
ammunition to explode. The 2, 3d and 4th Battalions of the 2d Infantry
Regiment west of Sophia East were involved in skirmishes throughout the
day.

Late afternoon saw the enemy attack more fiercely and tactical air
as well as C-130 gunships were called in to provide support. By mid-
night all three battalions reported having consolidated their positions.
The 3d Battalion had 47 casualties after killing 87 Communist troops and
seizing 49 AK-47s and 17 grenade launchers. Among the enemy bodies were
those of two company commanders of the NVA 2d Division. The 2d Battal-
ion had light casualties but reported killing 85 enemy, seizing 47 AK-47s
and several other crew-served weapons. The 4th Battalion reported
killing 195 enemy troops and seizing 59 AK-47s and numerous other weapons.

During the day, U.S. air support substantially increased, with 686
sorties of helicopter gunships, 246 tactical air sorties and 14 B-52

missions which dropped 1,158 tons of bombs.

114



While U.S. units continued to expand their control in the north-
western corner of Quang Tri, ARVN units began to move into the staging
area. The Airborne Division Headquarters and the 3d Airborne Brigade,
along with support units were successively airlifted from Saigon to
northern Quang Tri, beginning on 1 February. By 4 February the entire
3d Airborne Brigade with supporting artillery had closed into its as-
sembly area south of Khe Sanh. The Forward Command Post of I Corps had
opened at the Dong Ha airfield on 30 January. The tactical command
post of the lst ARVN Infantry Division was also established and initiated
operations in its vicinity.

On 2 February, the first combined operational meeting was held at
the headquarters of I Corps Forward, attended by all RVNAF and U.S.
commanders and detailed operational orders were issued. Immediately
after this meeting, ARVN units feverishly completed their preparations
for the big operation that promised numerous challenges.

The next day, the lst Ranger Group (21st, 37th and 39th Ranger
Battalions) was helilifted into the Phu Loc area northwest of Khe Sanh
to defend a fire support base to be established there.

The Khe Sanh assault airstrip was completed on 4 February but test
landings by C-130 aircraft revealed that additional compacting would be
required. On 5 February, the 1/1 Cavalry Task Force reached the border
on Route No. 9. This unit immediately deployed along the border and
assisted ARVN units entering the assembly area. All U.S. units were
assigned specific areas of responsibility to secure the assembly area
and support ARVN forces. (Map 16)

The 2d ARVN Airborne Brigade arrived at the Dong Ha airfield on
6 February while other ARVN units — the lst Armor Brigade, lst Airborne
Brigade and 3/1 Infantry Regiment — moved overland to the Ham Nghi (Khe
Sanh) area. Upon arrival, the lst Armor Brigade and the lst Airborne
Brigade, which were both scheduled to move out by way of Route No. 9
on D-Day Phase II, immediately entered the assembly area adjacent to
the border. That evening, a regrettable incident occurred. A United
States Navy aircraft mistakingly attacked the ARVN forward elements
destroying one M-113 armored personnel carrier; additionally, six ARVN

61


nearly two kilometers south of Ban Na, U.S. gunships attacked four enemy
tracked vehicles at 0820 hours. One vehicle was towing a 37-mm anti-
aircraft gun; ‘the gun was immediately destroyed. At 1100 hours, air
cavalry reconnaissance spotted enemy armored vehicles northwest of
Landing Zone 31, about eight kilometers north of Ban Dong. Results of
the gunship attack on these vehicles could not be verified immediately
but this was the first evidence of enemy armored units in the area of
operations.

While armored and infantry forces were progressing into Laos along
the road, the northern and southern flank security elements were heli-
borne. The 4/3 Infantry Battalion was transported to Landing Zone Hotel
in the Co Roc area by helicopters at 1100 hours without enemy contact.
The 2d Airborne Battalion reached Landing Zone 30 ten kilometers north
of Route No. 9 unhampered. At 1300 hours, however, near Landing Zone
Ranger South, five kilometers northwest of LZ 30, the 21st Ranger Bat-
talion's insertion was met with fire from 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine-
guns; 11 rangers wounded and the troop insertion continued while U.S.
air cavalry attacked the gun positions. This U.S. gunship activity
resulted in a number of enemy troops killed and several trucks destroyed,
but more significantly, these attacks caused numerous secondary explosions
from a network of fortifications which lasted over a period of an hour.

At 1620 hours, the lst and 2d Battalions of the 3d Infantry Regi-
ment were helilifted into two areas in the vicinity of Landing Zone
Blue, four kilometers southwest of LZ Motel. Immediately thereafter,
the 2/3 Battalion was engaged by the enemy. Friendly forces sustained
five wounded while the enemy lost nine killed and one 12.7-mm machinegun,
one AK-47 assault rifle and one Chicom radio captured.

At 1655 hours, U.S. air cavalry gunships attacked a suspected
target two kilometers east of Landing Zone 31, causing numerous secondary
explosions with flames reaching 1,500 feet in the air. Reconnaissance
aircraft reported the fire lasted until just before daylight the follow-
ing morning. After the attack on this target, the 3d Airborne Brigade
Headquarters and 3d Airborne Battalion occupied Landing Zone 31 unopposed.

Toward nightfall, near Fire Support Base Phu Loc at the border, the
command post of the lst Ranger Group and the 37th Ranger Battalion were

67



responsible for a well-defined area. Its subordinate units usually con-
sisted of engineer troops, surface and waterway transportation elements,
maintenance units, quartermaster and medical units, warehouses, and a
certain number of way stations to support troop movements.

During the cessation of bombings in North Vietnam, trucks moved
by convoy from Vinh down the trail. Upon reaching the Laotian border,
they formed units of five to eight vehicles and usually moved only at
night or in foul weather in order to avoid the round-the-clock bombing
by United States Air Force planes. As a result, binh trams were usually
separated from one another by a day's journey and their parking areas
were scattered and well concealed. The vehicles moving on the trail
only transported supplies and heavy materials. Light equipment was
either carried on men's backs or by animals. Since troops had to march,
they moved by day or night, using pathways different from those used by
trucks. New recruits or replacements usually entered the system at Vinh
in North Vietnam and often marched over 100 days to reach their final
destination in South Vietnam. In view of this long journey, they had
to rest and recuperate at way stations where they received food, medicine
and indoctrinations. Combat units usually moved by battalions of 500-600
men each and they often suffered substantial losses from disease and
constant bombings by the U.S. Air Force.

The extensive use of vehicles posed a fuel supply problem for the
Communists. Until they built a pipeline system from Vinh to the Mu Gia
Pass in 1968, all fuels were transported by trucks but by February 1969
the main pipeline had been extended to the Muong Nong area in Laos, west
of the A Shau valley. (Map 2) Fuel storage areas along this line
became one of the major targets for bombings by American planes.

As the insurgency intensified in South Vietnam, efforts to inter-
dict the Ho Chi Minh supply line increased. As early as the first few
years of the First Republic, President Ngo Dinh Diem implemented several
plans aimed at controlling the territory adjacent to the Laos border.

In Military Region 1, agrovilles were established in such areas as Lao
Bao, A Shau, A Luoi and Nam Dong. (Map 3) ARVN units regularly con-

ducted reconnaissance patrols deep into the border areas adjacent to

12



Lessons Learned

LAM SON 719 reflected quite accurately the strengths and weaknesses
of the RVNAF combat effectiveness in almost every area: organization,
command, leadership, motivation, operating techniques, planning, and
execution. It was impeded by certain significant errors and short-
comings that made the entire effort fall short of its intended goal.

Foremost among the most significant problems of LAM SON 719 was
perhaps timely tactical intelligence. To give due credit to the intel-
ligence effort, one must admit that intelligence estimates concerning
the operation were definitely accurate or nearly accurate as far as
enemy capabilities in antiaircraft weapons and troop reinforcements
were concerned. However, they were less accurate in other areas. Enemy
artillery and armor capabilities were not listed as significant factors.
In addition, reports on the area of concentrated supplies were not en-
tirely accurate. Several enemy prisoners in fact disclosed that most
supplies caches had been evacuated to areas outside the AO. The enemy
appeared not to be surprised at all; by contrast, he had been prepared
and expecting our forces to come in, This led to the conclusion that
several things concerning the enemy had eluded our collection capabi-
lities. Once more, the Vietnam war seemed to have taught us some useful
things about intelligence and security. To be more effective, a more
extensive collection network would seem to be indicated with emphasis
on human intelligence in the areas under enemy control, Then, analysis,
evaluation and interpretation of enemy capabilities should be made with
the full cognizance that they were apt to change very rapidly and as a
result, estimates would have to concentrate not only on the current
situation but also on-how it was going to change. At the same time,
for an operation of that scale and importance, a more conscious effort
at deceiving the enemy by a comprehensive deception scheme perhaps would
have helped offset the adverse effect of publicity and effectively
confused the enemy. What we did for LAM SON 719 was certainly not enough

for the purpose contemplated.

156



others hit by gunfire and two D4 bulldozers destroyed after being
dropped from the air. The following day, the lst Regiment Headquarters,
the 2/1 Battalion and a battery of 105-mm howitzers were brought into
Landing Zone Lolo. Fire Support Base Lolo was thus established. The
4/1 Battalion meanwhile landed at Landing Zone Liz, six kilometers
west-northwest of Lolo.” The various units then moved out to search
the area but only a few light contacts were made with minor results.

In the morning of 5 March, in order to continue its westward push,
the 2d Infantry Regiment of the lst Division was scheduled to occupy
Landing Zone Sophia, four-and-a-half kilometéts southwest of Tchepone
at 1100 hours but unexpected bad weather delayed the operation. After
preemptive airstrikes, at exactly 1320 hours five UH-lHs landed safely.
Sporadic gunfire was received but posed no major threat. By nightfall,
Landing Zone Sophia had eight 105-mm howitzers in position with adequate
ammunition. Searching further out the 4th and 5th Battalions found
the bodies of 124 enemy troops and seized 43 AK-47s, nine 12.7-mm -
machineguns, four RPD automatic rifles, nine B-40 rocket launchers,
three radios, military clothing, equipment and food supplies. After
securing Fire Support Base Sophia, the 2d Regiment was now in a position
to control Tchepone from its mountain base and keep the areas surrounding

the town within range of its artillery.

‘English names were chosen for objectives, firebases and the like
primarily to facilitate communications with U.S. support units. During
the First Indochina War. The French had followed a parallel practice
(at Dien Bien Phu, for example). Perhaps feminine names were selected
to bring some softness into the virile world of combatants at war.
"Lolo", "Liz", and "Sophia" were chosen by Colonel Vu Van Giai, the
very effective deputy commander of the lst Division who assisted in
maneuvering the division during this period. He had served for several
years in the DMZ area, in coordination with U.S. combat units, and he
naturally followed their practice in naming firebases. The small
return that the NVA might have enjoyed by exploiting these names for
propaganda value—as proof that the Americans were still in charge
despite Vietnamization—was certainly overridden by the practicality
of having words the Americans could understand and pronounce.

95



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Chart 2 — U.S. Army Aviation Task Organization

US ARMY ARVN
AVIATION UNITS UNITS

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CAB

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46



While high-level officials were reviewing the plans to arrive at
appropriate decisions, at the subordinate levels preparations and as-
signments were already underway. The I Corps commander needed rein-
forcements in lower Laos and in the northern area of MR 1 so on 25
February, the U.S. XXIV Corps ordered the U.S. 101lst Airborne Division
to be prepared to send its 3d Airborne Brigade to the Demilitarized
Zone to replace the ARVN 2d Infantry Regiment. This regiment had five
battalions; one remained in place while the other four were redeployed
on 28 February. On 29 February, the llth Brigade/U.S. 23d Infantry
Division was pulled out of the area south of Hai Van Pass (southern MR
1) and also sent to reinforce the northern sector and all U.S. forces
in northern Quang Tri or operating in support of ARVN forces were placed
under operational control of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division. The
forward command post of this division relocated in Quang Tri from its
former position further south. In order to coordinate operational
support, a joint coordinating group was set up and placed under the
Commander of the 108th Artillery Group. This group operated from the
tactical CP of I Corps at Fire Support Base Ham Nghi (Khe Sanh) as of
1 March. Coordination and control of U.S. support was thus made pos—
sible in the forward combat area instead of being referred to Quang
Tri as in the past.

More RVNAF forces were also committed to the new effort. The
command section of the 369th Marine Brigade and support elements were
airlifted directly to Khe Sanh beginning on 1 March and this movement
was completed two days later. The 2d Infantry Regiment was ready.

The 4th and 7th Armored Squadron of the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions
were brought in to reinforce armored elements in lower Laos. I Corps
Headquarters also relocated the 77th Border Ranger Battalion (+) from
Quang Tin and reassigned it to provide security for Fire Support Base
Ham Nghi, freeing other forces for combat and the corps’ tactical
control CP there was strengthened.

While these preparations were made for the push into Tchepone
there were increasing reports of enemy armor presence throughout the

area of operation. In the early morning of 1 March, C-130 gunships

91



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CHAPTER VII

Observations and Conclusions

LAM SON 719 was a combined RVNAF-US operation conducted under
several constraints. No U.S. ground combat troops were allowed to cross
the border into Laos. There was tio joint command for the control of
operations. Both the ARVN I Corps commander, who directed the opera-
tional effort in Laos, and the Commanding General, U.S. XXIV Corps,
his senior adviser, worked together on an equal footing in keeping with
the principle of cooperation and coordination. In contrast to the
usual practice, ARVN.forces went into combat without their advisers;
neither could they expect a helping hand from U.S. or other Allied
infantry troops while on Laotian soil. On the other hand, U.S. combat
support for the offensive effort was greatly increased in terms of
firepower and helilift. This support was vital since the objectives
of the operation lay outside the RVN national border in a terrain which
was not only unfamiliar and difficult but also held for a long time
by the enemy and organized into an important logistical base area.

To break the RVN attempt to strangle their lifeline, which was
the only oné remaining in the entire southern Indochina area, the
North Vietnamese Communists reacted swiftly. Elements of five infantry
divisions with their armor and artillery support and all logistic units
operating in the area were eventually thrown into the battle. This
combat force was estimated at over 40,000 men. In an effort to com-
pensate for his inferiority in firepower, the enemy employed the tactic
of massive infantry attacks. In response, our devastating firepower
inflicted severe losses on the enemy; about one half of his committed

combat strength was sacrificed. An enemy regiment went into Laos in

164



Table 2 — LAM SON 719 Cumulative Casualties

2

FRIENDLY
UNIT
KILLED WOUNDED MISSING TOTAL
XXIV Corps -

101st Airborne Division 68 261 7 346
1st Bde, Sth inf Division $5 431 3 489
11th Bde, 23rd Inf Division 47 256 7 310
XXIV Corps Artillery 9 76 0 85
Other Support Forces 36 125 11 172

Total 215 1149 3 1402

1 Corps -

1st Infantry Division 537 1607 537 2681
Airborne Division 455 1993 0” 2448
Marine Division 355 770 63 1188
‘1st Armored Brigade 54 364 0 418
1st Ranger Group 93 435 27 -555

1 Corps Troops 55 314 24 393
Total 1549 5483 1 7683

Sum-Total 1764 6632 689 9065

(Adjusted) :

“It was not true that there was absolutely no MIA for the Airborne Division. Based on first hand information,
the author knew that a number of Airborne officers and troops were captured by the enemy.

Excerpt from “An Assessment of the Performance of South Vietnamese Forces During Operation LAM SON 719:

30 January - 6 April 1971” by Headquarters, US XXIV Corps, dated 3 May 1971.

129



Map 2 — The Trail System, Lower Laos — 1970

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the U.S. would provide enough helicopters to satisfy requirements. But
there was cause to doubt the effectiveness of helicopters in the expected
combat situation, considering the terrain and weather in lower Laos and
the enemy's antiaircraft capabilities. This was a serious question which
required careful consideration.

As the time approached for D-day, however, ARVN and U.S. commanders
and staffs alike appeared to be confident of success. As a testimony to
this confidence, I think it appropriate to excerpt here a passage of the
report filed by Colonel Arthur W. Pence, senior adviser of the Airborne
Division. In this after-action report, Colonel Pence described the mood
that prevailed during a meeting at Headquarters, U.S. XXIV Corps prior
to Phase I of LAM SON 719. He wrote:

"It was apparent at this time that United States intelligence
felt that the operation would be lightly opposed and that a
two-day preparation of the area prior to D-Day by tactical
air would effectively neutralize the enemy antiaircraft cap-
ability although the enemy was credited with having 170 to
200 antiaircraft weapons of mixed caliber in the operational
area. The tank threat was considered minimal and the rein-
forcement capability was listed ag fourteen days for two
divisions from north of the DMZ."

The RVN military leaders thought that ARVN forces had a tough
mission ahead but would be able to carry it out with the support of the
United States. The decision had been made. I Corps forces were like
the soldier on the firing line who had armed his rifle and taken aim.

All he had to do now was to squeeze the trigger.

Satter Action Report on LAM SON 719 dated 1 April 1971 by Colonel

Arthur W. Pence, p. 2.

57



CHAPTER VI

A Critical Analysis

The Balance Sheet of LAf SON 719

The picture of ARVN soldiers hanging on the skids of a helicopter
which evacuated them from lower Laos and other equally dramatic photo-
graphs showing battered I Corps troops returning back across the Laotian
border caused grave concern among South Vietnamese, military and civil-
ian alike. Their concern deepened when they read the tantalizing news
articles first carried by American newspapers and magazines then picked
up by the foreign and Vietnamese press which all reported that the
ARVN incursion into lower Laos was being terminated. The GVN military
spokesman had a hard time denying these reports. He announced that
this was simply an exchange of operational forces and for all practical
purposes, LAM SON 719 was still underway and that ARVN forces were
continuing their destructive forays against Communist logistical bases
and infiltration routes’ on the other side of the border. President
Nguyen Van Thieu echoed this line during his press conference at Dong
Ha on 1 April 1971, but news. about raids in lower Laos no longer in-
terested Vietnamese public opinion ‘which was more concerned about the
real outcome of the well-publicized campaign. In the absence of of-
ficial announcements, rumors and speculations proliferated. Everyone
wanted to know the truth about friendly losses. But when official
results were later made public, no one seemed to believe that they
reflected the truth.

Despite the high figure of ARVN casualties which the GVN confirmed
at nearly 6,000, there was still suspicion that the true figure was
being concealed from public view. Newsweek magazine correspondents

estimated this figure unofficially at nearly 10,000. But their figure

126



evacuated to Delta 1 while its battalion proceeded east on foot.

From 18 March on it seemed that the enemy was well aware of the
ARVN withdrawal and there were signs of the enemy concentrating a regi-
mental size unit northwest of Fire Support Base A Luoi while pressure
increased around Fire Support Base Delta of the 147th Brigade. The
base began to receive fire from 130-mm field guns and NVA infantry had
infiltrated close enough to fire at aircraft. There were about 10
antiaircraft guns positioned on the mountain slopes around the base that
could not be silenced. The 2d and 4th Battalions operating to the
south were recalled to sweep the area around Delta and to prepare for
the withdrawal.

By mid-day of 18 March the lst Infantry Regiment, with its 1st,
2d and 3d battalions, after falling back from the Lolo area, arrived in
an area approximately 2,000 meters southwest of Fire Support Base A Luoi.
There they were picked up by helicopters and flown to Khe Sanh. The
survivors of the 4th Battalion were also flown back in the late after-
noon. Next came the turn of the 5th Battalion, 2d Regiment, which
boarded helicopters from an area adjacent to Landing Zone Brown.

Immediately thereafter, from about 1600 hours and continuing
through the night of 18 March, the remaining three battalions of the
2d Infantry Regiment, the 2d, 3d and 4th, received heavy attacks west
of the Brown area. The NVA followed up its artillery with ground as-
saults, The next morning the 4th Battalion made a preliminary report
that it had 33 wounded and five missing. The -2d Battalion had similar
casualty figures while enemy losses were unknown.

For four days now, reports flowed into I Corps headquarters of
strong attacks that included very heavy bombardments by heavy artillery
and tank attacks. Reports of ARVN losses, including the decimation of
the 4th Battalion, lst Infantry, were very disturbing to General Lam,
as were the many indications that the enemy was reinforcing and maneu-
vering to prevent the orderly ARVN withdrawal from Laos. So, on the
night of 18 March, General Lam called his division commanders to a con-
ference at Ham Nghi Base (Khe Sanh) to hear their assessments and recom-

mendations. They each “recommended that disengagement proceed as quickly

110



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112



No.

Attack of FSB 31. ...-424-+-e08
The Attack Toward Tchepone ......
Friendly Operations, Early March 1971
Enemy Situation, Late March 1971...
Raids Across The Border ......-.

ix

Page
83
105

112
123



cation proved difficult. During the night, I Corps Headquarters ordered
the destruction of the artillery pieces in the base; the defending unit
was then to proceed on foot to join the 3d Regiment. The 2d and 3d
Battalions of the regiment were also ordered to move their wounded
north to find a suitable pickup point for medical evacuation helicopters.
In the morning of 28 February while on their way, these units came upon
a target hit by B-52s and found the bodies of 157 enemy troops along
with numerous weapons destroyed. During that day, medical evacuation
efforts were not successful because of intense enemy fire from 82-mm
mortars and small arms directed at the pickup zone and one UH-1H was
hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire and burst into flames.

The situation by this time was becoming increasingly tense through-
out the area of operations. Truck convoys were frequently attacked on
Route No. 9 in Laos and on the RVN territory, the enemy increased ef-
forts to ambush convoys and attack rear bases. The ARVN westward drive
was stalled. In the midst of this situation, I Corps Headquarters
received a directive from President Nguyen Van Thieu to have the Marine
Division relieve the Airborne Division. He must have realized that
such a relief under the combat conditions on that battlefield would
be very hazardous. Besides, the Airborne Division was still a strong
unit; it had suffered some losses but these losses were not yet too
serious. What then caused him to order its replacement? The most
probable answer could be that he was really worried over the additional
losses that the Airborne Division would sustain in protracted combat.
He certainly would like to keep this elite unit intact at all costs.

In any event, the Marine Division was a poor choice for the relief.
Despite the combat worthiness of its individual brigades, it had never
fought as a division.

It was probably with this bothering thought that in the afternoon
of 28 February, Lieutenant General Lam flew to Saigon with an alterna-
tive to present to the President. During his meeting with President
Thieu, Lam's plan was adopted. Instead of the Marine Division, the
1st Infantry Division with three regiments under its command was

selected to proceed northwest from its present positions to occupy

89



an airborne operation into Tchepone as the first step. Then after search~
ing, the paratroopers would attack east to link up with an armor-infantry
task force moving along Route No. 9. After link-up, the forces could
shift their effort southward toward base area 611. General Vien con-
ceived the foray into Laos to be a raid, an operation of short duration
and ordered his J-3 to look for drop-zones around Tchepone. Later,
because he felt he should go along with the MACV concept in order to
obtain the necessary U.S. support assets, he abandoned this concept and
did not even discuss it with General Abrams.

In mid-January the J-3, JGS, Colonel Tran Dinh Tho, and his MACV
counterpart flew to Da Nang. Colonel Tho's mission was to brief Lieuten-
ant General Hoang Xuan Lam, Commander of I Corps and MR-1 on the concept
of the operation. The meeting took place discreetly at Headquarters,

US XXIV Corps. General Lam was taken to a private briefing room where,
in front of a general situation map, Colonel Tho explained how the opera-
tion was to be conducted as conceived by the Joint General stafe.2 The
main effort of the operation, he said, was to be launched along National
Route No. 9 into Laos with the objective of cutting the Ho Chi Minh
Trail in the region of base area 604 and destroying all enemy installations
and supplies stored there. After this mission had been accomplished,

the operational forces were to move south and sweep through base area 611
to further create havoc to the enemy's logistic system before returning
to South Vietnam. This operation was to be conducted and controlled by
the I Corps Command which, in addition to its organic units, would be
augmented by the entire Airborne Division and two Marine brigades. The
third Marine brigade and the Marine Division Headquarters would be
available if required. As to U.S. forces, they were going to conduct
operations on the RVN side of the border and provide the ARVN operating
forces with artillery, helilift and tactical air support. This concept
of operations thus coincided in near totality with the one initially
proposed by CoMUSMACV.

2 after the exclusive briefing for General Lam, Colonel Cao Khac Nhat,
G-3 I Corps, took Colonel Tho aside and told him, "Why exclude me from
the briefing? I have already completed the operational plan."

34



As for the Marine Division, it was the first time it had partici-

pated in an operation as a division. Accustomed to operating separately
at brigade level, and in view of the traditional autonomy of its bri-
gades, the division seemed to have problems of command and control.

The 147th Marine Brigade did not succeed in clearing the enemy pressure
around FSB Delta despite continuous efforts for several days. Then

the division made its own decision to withdraw from FSB Hotel and its
positions on the Co Roc promontory, apparently to avoid facing a dif-
ficult battle. This action clearly reflected the autonomy enjoyed by
the division commander, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, who did not
consider himself under the control of the I Corps commander but still
made tactical decisions that affected the latter's conduct of the oper-
ation. Despite this, Marine units fought extremely well during sustained
combat under heavy enemy pressure. Regardless of losses, they always
retained unit integrity and cohesiveness.

The 1st Ranger Group was heavily engaged as soon as it was de-
ployed. Its 39th and 21st Battalions responded well to the eneny's
massive attacks and also inflicted severe losses on enemy units. The
early withdrawal of this Group did not allow a correct evaluation of
its performance.

As to ARVN armor units, their employment in LAM SON 719 was per-
haps one of the very few occasions of any large concentration during
the war. The lst Armor Brigade was committed initially with only two
squadrons; this total was later increased to four in addition to two
troops of M-41 light tanks redeployed from MR-2. These reinforcements
were introduced to offset some losses but still the deployment of all
these armored forces on a short stretch of narrow jungle road not even
20 kilometers in length and affording no room for maneuver represented
perhaps one of the unwisest moves on the part of the tactical commanders
involved.® If this decision was deliberate, then perhaps they had

Bre commanders of ARVN I Corps and U.S. XXIV Corps were both
armor officers.

154 1



25 March, there were only two small ARVN reconnaissance teams left on

Laotian territory,
Black Panther Raids

As I have previously mentioned, about a week earlier, on the
afternoon of 19 March, President Thieu informed Ambassador Bunker and
General Abrams that he had ordered a cautious pullback of RVNAF forces
to South Vietnam. He conceived the possibility of the withdrawal
lasting until 5 - 8 April 1971, to be followed by a surprise raid con-
ducted by a regimental size force and directed at Muong Nong, the
heart of Communist Base Area 611. Operation LAM SON 719 had the
objective of disrupting two Communist base areas, one was Base Area
604 whose heart was Tchepone, the other, Area 611, centered on Muong
Nong. All ARVN operations had been confined to Base Area 604. As far
as Base Area 611 was concerned, the incursion went only as far as its
northern boundary, The idea of further attacks into Muong Nong was,
therefore, simply a follow-up action to finish the incomplete operation.
But, by 25 March 1971, most ARVN forces had already left lower Laos.
Only two small Marine reconnaissance teams remained there, operating
stealthily in the hilly area of Co Roc.

For several days, while the withdrawal was feverishly taking
place in lower Laos, the logistical and command installations at Khe
Sanh (Ham Nghi) had been gradually deploying to the rear, too. U.S.
forces such as the Sth Mechanized Brigade and units of the 10lst Air-
borne Division continued to provide security on the RVN territory and
the area along Route No. 9 up to the border. But upon crossing the
border, the Marine units were assigned responsibility for the Lao-Viet
border in cooperation with the lst Ranger Group still stationed north-
west of Khe Sanh. ~

Although it no longer had any battalions in Laos, I Corps, whose
forward command post was still located at Dong Ha, had an outstanding
mission: the raid into Muong Nong. At this point, the world press
as well as public opinion in South Vietnam and the United States tended

121 4



For the next two days, throughout the areas of operation of the
lst Infantry and the Marine Divisions, friendly units caught the spirit
of the new offensive. They fought aggressively, repeatedly engaged
the enemy, and defeated him everywhere. In the morning of 5 March, in
the area of Objective Alpha, the 4th Marine Battalion killed 130 enemy
troops and seized 25 assorted weapons including two 82-mm mortars.
Friendly forces sustained six killed and 42 wounded. The 4/1 Battalion
made contact near Landing Zone Liz, killing 41 Communist troops and
seizing 15 weapons along with two mortars. By 6 March, engagements were
increasing and occurring everywhere, but friendly forces suffered only
light casualties while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. More
importantly, they were now within easy reach of Tchepone, the final
objective that President Thieu had ordered them to take just three
days earlier.

In the afternoon of 6 March, Khe Sanh received an attack by fire
of an estimated 22 rounds of 122-mm rockets and two U.S. troops were
killed and 10 wounded. Elsewhere, the enemy appeared to take no signif-
icant initiative but he was increasing his use of surface-to-air missiles
in lower Laos. Earlier, on 2 February, a Mohawk aircraft flying west of
the demilitarized zone reported an unidentified missile fired from the
ground which exploded approximately 100 meters away, causing no damage
to the aircraft. Subsequently, 14 instances of surface-to-air missile
firing were photographed or reported by forward air controllers, army
pilots, tactical air and reconnaissance aircraft. Missile transportation
equipment and antenna vans along with other equipment related to
surface-to-air missile systems were also sighted in the tri-border
area.

The day selected to enter the ultimate objective, Tchepone, was
6 March. A total of 120 U.S. helicopters were assembled to carry out
the assault. In addition to B-52, U.S. tactical air strikes or air
cover sorties were scheduled every 10 minutes. Elements of the 2/17
U.S. Air Cavalry reconnoitered targets, prepared landing zones and
covered the assault. An enemy attack by fire on Khe Sanh Base forced

the huge assemblage of U.S. helicopters to depart 90 minutes earlier

96



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