[Cite as State v. Harvey, 2024-Ohio-702.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

LC DESHAWN HARVEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 2023-T-0046

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00418

O P I N I O N

Decided: February 26, 2024

Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 

44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant)

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

{¶1} Appellant, LC Deshawn Harvey, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull 

County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to two concurrent twelve-month terms 

of imprisonment following his plea to possession of cocaine and attempted tampering of 

evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

{¶2} On June 28, 2022, the Trumbull County Grand Jury indicted appellant 

charging him with possession of cocaine, a fourth degree felony with a specification of 

forfeiture, pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(b), R.C. 2941.1417(A), R.C. 

2981.02(A)(1)(b) and/or (c)(i), and R.C. 2981.04 (“Count 1”), and tampering with 
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evidence, a third degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1)(B).

1 Appellant pled not 

guilty on June 28, 2022, and bond was set at $100,000 cash or surety. 

{¶3} On March 27, 2023, appellant appeared with counsel, waived his rights, and 

entered a guilty plea to an amended indictment of possession of cocaine, a fourth-degree

felony with specification of forfeiture and attempted tampering with evidence, a fourthdegree felony. A presentence investigation (“PSI”) was ordered. The trial court also 

ordered appellant to forfeit $606.00 of U.S. currency. 

{¶4} On June 5, 2023, the trial court sentenced appellant to twelve-month prison 

terms on each count and ordered the terms to be served concurrently. 

{¶5} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that appellant’s criminal 

history was “horrible,” that he had an extensive criminal record in multiple states, had 

served two prior prison terms, and had 14 active warrants out of at least seven different 

jurisdictions. The trial court also noted that appellant had another drug case pending 

before another judge of the court and since the inception of the case, had seven new 

charges. The trial court concluded that appellant was “not amenable to any available 

community control and a prison sentence is consistent with the purposes and principles 

of sentencing.” These findings are also reiterated in the sentencing entry. 

{¶6} Appellant appeals and raises the following assignment of error: “[t]he trial 

court erred by sentencing appellant to two terms of incarceration as the record does not 

support such a sentence.” Specifically, appellant asserts in his merit brief that “the record 

1.This matter was originally filed in the Niles Municipal Court in Case No. 2022CRA267 and bound over 

to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas on June 2, 2022.
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evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly indicates that the Trial Court should have 

imposed a Community Control sanction.” We disagree. 

{¶7} We review felony sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which 

provides:

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise 

modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may 

vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing 

court for resentencing. The appellate court's standard for 

review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized 

by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the 

following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's 

findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division 

(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 

2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that while “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) 

permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly 

finds that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under’ certain 

specified statutory provisions. But R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory 

provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Only R.C. 2929.13(B) and (D), 

2929.14(B)(2)(e) and (C)(4), and 2929.20(I) are specified.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 

242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 28. “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) therefore does not 

provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view 

that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Id. at

¶ 39. See also State v. Reed, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0082, 2023-Ohio-1324, ¶ 

13. 
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{¶9} Appellant asserts that the “standard for felony sentencing essentially 

amounts to no review at all, assuming a trial court stays within whatever sentencing range 

is established by statute.” This Court has previously viewed such claim “as a challenge 

to the constitutionality of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) or Ohio's high court ruling in Jones.” Reed

at ¶ 14. In response to that argument, this Court agreed with Justice Fischer's concurring 

opinion in Jones, which noted: 

There is also no reason to believe that a trial court's

consideration under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 is wholly

unreviewable. First, although, as the majority opinion

explains, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not require a trial

court to make any specific findings on the record, those

statutes are not optional. Both statutes use the term “shall”

multiple times in relation to other matters. For example, R.C.

2929.11(A) and 2929.12(A) through (F) set forth matters that

a sentencing court “shall consider,” and R.C.

2929.11(A) provides that the trial court “shall be guided by”

the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing. R.C.

2929.11(B) further states that the sentence imposed by the

trial court “shall” meet certain specific criteria. * *

* Second, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) expressly requires an

appellate court to “review the record, including the findings

underlying the sentence.” The breadth of this statutory 

provision necessarily means that if a trial court does make 

findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the appellate court 

may review those findings for certain limited purposes. 

Third, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) provides that an appellate court 

can modify or vacate a sentence on the ground that it is 

“otherwise contrary to law.” This court's holding today 

specifies what an appellate court may not do under this 

provision: it may not conduct an independent review of 

whether the record supports the sentence and substitute its 

own judgment regarding the appropriate sentence.

Jones, supra, at ¶ 46.

{¶10} The trial court, when imposing its sentence, considered “the record, oral 

statements, the pre-sentence investigation report, and any victim impact statements, as 

well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and has balanced 
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the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12.” The trial court noted appellant’s 

prior prison sentences, his extensive criminal history, his prior failed attempts on 

community control sanctions, his numerous aliases, his multiple active warrants in several 

jurisdictions, and his lack of remorse. 

{¶11} Like in Reed, there is nothing to support appellant’s contention that his 

sentence is contrary to law. Appellant’s argument essentially asks this Court to review 

whether the record supported the trial court's decision to impose a prison term rather than 

a community control sanction, which this Court is not permitted to do. Jones, 163 Ohio 

St.3d 242, at ¶ 39. Appellant’s sentence is consistent with the law, and the trial court 

complied with the statutory requirements when imposing its sentence. Thus, appellant’s 

sole assignment of error is without merit.

{¶12} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. 

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.