Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS

OF UNDERGROUNDS

IN INSURGENCIES

SECOND EDITION

25 JANUARY 2013

United States Army Special Operations Command

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., USASOC Project Lead

Nathan Bos, Editor

United States Army Special Operations Command

and

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

National Security Analysis Department

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS

OF UNDERGROUNDS

IN INSURGENCIES

SECOND EDITION
This publication is a work of the United States Government in 

accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105. 

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

25 January 2013

Second Edition 

First Edition published by Special Operations Research Office, 

American University, December 1965 

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the 

United States government. Nonmateriel research on special warfare is 

performed in support of the requirements stated by the United States 

Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army. This 

research is accomplished at The Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory by the National Security Analysis Department, 

a nongovernmental agency operating under the supervision of the 

USASOC Special Programs Division, Department of the Army.

The analysis and the opinions expressed within this document are 

solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions 

of the U.S. Army or The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may be 

appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Special Programs Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil

under the ARIS link. 
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series 

consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army 

Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to 

develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and 

revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast 

amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, 

professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique 

adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various 

environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by the 

Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in 

the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work and 

in several instances releasing updated editions of original SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1933–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

FUTURE STUDIES

The Legal Status of Participants in Irregular Warfare

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

SORO STUDIES

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954–1962 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Study in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)

v

LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION

The foreword to Special Warfare’s 1966 Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies notes, “in the desire to understand 

the broad characteristics and societal impact of revolutionary movements we often neglect the study of the human element involved.” “To 

understand the individual, his reasons, his behavior, and the pressures 

that society places upon him is at the heart of the problem of social 

change.” The earlier study and this updated edition represent part 

of our intellectual investment in understanding the human domain. 

Understanding the human domain remains critical for future Special 

Warfare operations. 

Since the inception of the United States Army Special Forces, understanding indigenous individuals and the human domain in which they 

exist has been a persistent Army Special Operations Forces cornerstone. Relationships with indigenous individuals enable Special Warfare. Understanding why individuals choose to join an underground 

movement, why law-abiding citizens are tempted to lead a dangerous 

underground life, why individuals stay in underground organizations, 

and what behaviors individuals use to survive are key questions that 

will reveal insights into the individuals that may be our partners. Special Warfare’s leverage of and reliance on indigenous forces offers a 

unique capability. This Special Warfare capability offers our nation’s 

leaders necessary and different strategic options. Our Special Warfare 

mission necessitates our continued educational and intellectual commitment to studying human factors. Our endeavor must include institutional and individual commitments. This updated volume offers a 

beginning, and the text will be integrated into our schoolhouse curriculums. The schoolhouse introduction represents only the starting 

point for each Army Special Operations Forces member’s continued 

learning. Our nation requires a Special Warfare capability. The Special 

Warfare capability requires intellectual investment and continuous evolution to understand the people that the human domain represents. I 

encourage each member to read, analyze, debate, and challenge this 

work as we endeavor to remain the premier Special Warfare capability 

in the world.

LTG Charles T. Cleveland

Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
vi

The first time I saw the original version of this book was when it was 

presented to me in 1979 at the Special Forces Qualification Course, 

and I have reread it multiple times in the years since. The original edition of this book, and the remainder of the series produced by Special 

Operations Research Office (SORO),a

 constitute some of the foundational references necessary to a full understanding of Special Forces 

operations and doctrine. Thirty-three years later, I still use it routinely 

to teach and mentor new and experienced Special Forces personnel. 

This book is intended as an update to the original text. Basic human 

nature does not change, and much has remained the same throughout the history of human political conflict. The new edition therefore 

includes the enduring principles and methods from the original. The 

sections of the book discussing techniques, causes, and methods, however, required updating to reflect the many changes in the world and 

experiences of Special Forces in the last fifty years. 

While the need to resist perceived oppression has not changed, the 

ways in which oppressed societies express this need through culture 

have changed significantly. Whereas insurgencies prior to the publication of the first edition of this book in 1963 were predominantly Communist-inspired, modern rebellions have been inspired by a greater 

number of factors. This increase in the causes of insurgency began 

with the fall of the Soviet Union, and accelerated with the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, on the United States. 

In addition, technology has changed the world significantly over 

the last fifty years. Modern communications, the Internet, global positioning and navigation systems, and transportation have all introduced 

different dynamic pressures on how insurgencies develop and operate. As a result of the cultural and technological shifts of the past fifty 

years,  we decided that the original series by SORO needed revision 

and updating. Like the original series, this update is written by sociologists, this time from The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory. 

Plenty of histories and military analyses have been written on the 

different revolutions that have taken place over the past fifty years, but 

this series—including the new, second volume of the Casebook—hopefully provides a useful perspective. Since rebellion is a sociopolitical 

issue that takes place in the human domain, a view through the nonmilitary lens broadens the aperture of learning for Special Forces soldiers.

a They include: Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare and the 

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, which includes case studies on Cuba, Algeria, Guatemala, and Vietnam, and a study of guerrilla warfare in Greece during World 

War II.
vii

This project would not have been possible without the support of 

COL Dave Maxwell, who was the USASOC G3 (my boss) and fought to 

get the project approved. Also I must thank Michael McCran, a longtime friend who encouraged me to continue to seek the approval of 

this project.

Paul J. Tompkins Jr. 

USASOC Project Lead
viii

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1966

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies is the second product of Special Operations Research Office (SORO) research 

on undergrounds. The first, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, 

and Resistance Warfare, was a generalized description of the organization and operations of underground movements, with seven illustrative 

cases. The present study provides more detailed information, with special attention to human motivation and behavior, the relation between 

the organizational structure of the underground and the total insurgent movement, and Communist-dominated insurgencies.

Because an understanding of the general nature of undergrounds 

is necessary to more detailed considerations, some of the information from the earlier study of undergrounds has been included in this 

report. Wherever possible, material from insurgency situations since 

World War II has been used. Occasionally, however, it was necessary to 

use information from studies of World War II underground movements 

in order to fill gaps about certain operations.

In the methodological approach it was assumed that confidence 

could be placed in the conclusions if data on underground operations 

and missions and similar data could be found in other insurgencies. 

An attempt was made to base conclusions on empirical information 

and actual accounts rather than theoretical discussions, and upon data 

from two or more insurgencies. An effort was made to find internal 

consistencies within the information sources. For example, if units 

were organized and trained to use coercive techniques for recruiting, 

and defectors described having been recruited in this manner, the 

conclusion that people were coerced into the movement can be made. 

Because of this approach there is a good deal of redundancy within 

and among the various chapters.

While the main emphasis in this report has been on underground 

organization, many characteristics can be understood only in relation 

to overt portions of the subversive organization. Therefore, discussions 

of guerrilla forces, the visible outgrowth of undergrounds, and of Communist structures, which often inspire, instigate, and support subversive 

undergrounds, have been included. The report is designed to provide 

the military user with a text to complement existing training materials 

and manuals in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, and to 

provide helpful background information for the formulation of counterinsurgency policy and doctrine. As such, it should be particularly 

useful for training courses related to the counterinsurgency mission.

The authors wish to express thanks to a number of persons whose 

expertise and advice assisted substantially in the preparation of this 
ix

report. Mr. Slavko N. Bjelajac, Director of Special Operations for the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the 

Army, on the basis of his personal experiences and special interest in 

the study of underground movements, contributed guidelines and concepts to the study.

Four men reviewed the entire report: Dr. George K. Tanham, Special Assistant to the President of the Rand Corporation of Santa Monica, 

California, made many helpful suggestions based upon his firsthand 

experiences and study of Communist insurgency; Dr. Jan Karski, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., whose 

personal experience as a former underground worker is combined with 

a talent for thorough, constructive criticism, also helped the final manuscript; Dr. Ralph Sanders of the staff of the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., offered a careful and useful critique 

of the manuscript and helpful suggestions; Lt. Col. Arthur J. Halligan 

of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, provided valuable suggestions based upon his experience in Vietnam.

Within SORO, Dr. Alexander Askenasy, Brig. Gen. Frederick Munson (Ret.), Mr. Phillip Thienel, Mr. Adrian Jones, Dr. Michael Conley, Mrs. Virginia Hunter, and Mrs. Edith Spain contributed to the 

end product.

Andrew Molnar
x

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This book, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, is the second edition to the 1966 book of the same name. The first 

edition of this book was produced by the Special Operations Research 

Office (SORO) at American University in Washington, DC. SORO was 

established by the U.S. Army in 1956. During the 1950s through the 

mid-1960s, SORO social scientists and military personnel researched 

relevant political, cultural, social, and behavioral issues occurring 

within the emerging nations within Asia, Africa, and Latin America.1

The researchers conducted analyses, sometimes for the first time, on 

the effects of propaganda and psychological operations and the roles of 

the military in developing countries, and provided large bibliographies 

of unclassified materials related to counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. The Army had a particular interest in understanding the 

processes of violent social change in order to be able to cope directly or 

indirectly through assistance and advice with revolutionary actions. In 

1962, SORO published the Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare; in 1963, it published Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and 

Resistance Warfare; and in 1966, it published Human Factors Considerations 

of Undergrounds in Insurgencies—each of these publications remained in 

the Special Operations training curricula for subsequent generations. 

The work of SORO, whose scholarship grew more ambitious and controversial, and later the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), 

has endured. Some of the reports under Project PROSYMS (Propaganda Symbols) have served as examples of incorporating rigorous 

social science research methods into psychological operations, and the 

CRESS report on the subversive manipulation of crowds is still widely 

used as a training resource. Relevant components of many of SORO 

and CRESS papers are referenced in this edition.

The American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, 

the Horn of Africa, and other locales in the twenty-first century reaffirmed the need for cooperation between the academic and operational 

communities. In 2009, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 

(USASOC) G-3X sought to recreate some of the capability SORO had 

provided. They turned to, among other institutions, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). Under a project entitled Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS), 

researchers at JHU/APL have been engaged in understanding how 

social movements such as insurgencies and revolutionary groups are 

created; how they grow, spread, and sustain themselves; and how they 

succeed or fail.2

 The first product of that effort is the forthcoming 

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009. 

Similar to the first volume, the second volume is intended to provide a 
xi

foundational understanding of insurgent warfare by presenting cases 

using a common analytical framework and format. The second and 

third major products under ARIS are the second editions of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare and Human 

Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies.

Most of the text in this edition is new. Some large sections of the 

first edition are retained verbatim, mostly in Chapter 3’s study of Communist organizations and sections of Chapter 5 on recruitment and 

retention, but also in smaller sections of the other chapters as well. 

We preserved much of the overall structure, although not the specific 

chapters, and strove to answer many of the same underlying questions. 

Material from the first edition is used without citation. Material from 

other SORO studies is referenced like any other source.

Intended as a complement to the second edition of Undergrounds in 

Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, this book delves deeper 

into theory and further into background materials and focuses less on 

operational details. We provide numerous chapter cross-references to 

the second edition of Undergrounds. We also drew heavily on the new, 

second volume of the Casebook; these cases are cited in the normal way. 

We also provide a table of contents at the beginning of every chapter to 

make the book more useful as a reference.

The first edition of Human Factors was an important synthesis of a 

poorly understood topic and has proved to have some remarkable staying power, with much still relevant even in the edition’s fifth decade. 

An update to the first edition is needed, however, simply because the 

world has changed since the 1960s.

CHANGES SINCE THE ORIGINAL EDITION

The 1966 Human Factors edition focused on the contemporary threat 

of Maoist insurgencies, particularly in Southeast Asia, and also drew 

extensively on World War II resistance movements in Europe. Much of 

this information is still relevant and has been retained and integrated. 

In the post-Cold War world, the most important insurgencies tend to be 

ethnic and religious. Long-simmering conflicts, sometimes with roots 

in colonial policies, have become prominent; examples include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom or ETA) in Spain, the Hutu-Tutsi 

genocides, the Ushtia Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army, or 

KLA), and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Battle lines 

in these conflicts are often drawn along ethnic lines, even when land 

or politics are the immediate issues in contention. The other important new category is extremist religious movements, most prominently 
xii

Islamic groups, including regional insurgent movements like Hizbollah 

and Harakat al-Muqawamah al-’Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement, or HAMAS) and global movements like Al Qaeda. These present a 

different profile of ideology, organizational forms, and psychology than 

either Cold War Maoists or post-colonial ethnic insurgencies (although 

the Palestinian cause could be considered a post-colonial issue).

Globalization has also changed underground operations in numerous ways. Insurgencies, enabled by low-cost transportation, Internetbased communications, and other information technologies, can more 

easily recruit, communicate, and operate across borders. It is correspondingly much more difficult to contain an insurgency in a region. 

Global media has led to development of new tactics, in particular new 

types of terrorism, designed to capture worldwide attention.

Compared with what was available in the 1960s, there are orders 

of magnitude more academic research available relevant to this study’s 

topics. We were able to draw on more recent work in psychology, political science, economics, sociology, organizational studies, and communications studies. Readers of this edition will, over the course of eleven 

chapters, get a wide exposure to basic concepts from a number of disciplines. This breadth also presented a challenge in trying to evaluate and synthesize many competing explanatory frameworks while 

keeping focus on what is relevant (sometimes directly, sometimes as 

background) to the study. The authors strove to accurately synthesize 

relevant background material but avoided wading into inconsequential 

details or academic debates; readers can make their own judgment as 

to how effectively the latter part was accomplished.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS OF ORIGINAL AUTHORS AND 

ARIS CONTRIBUTORS

Each chapter in this edition does have author credits at the beginning; chapters that borrow significant sections of the original edition 

list “SORO authors” as authors. (At the beginning of this effort, the 

co-authors for this edition, along with project lead Chuck Crossett, had 

a brief social meeting with Andrew Molnar, first author of the original 

study, who is now retired and living a short drive from our campus in 

Maryland. Dr. Molnar, for his part, was quite amenable to his work 

being used in an updated edition.)

The ARIS project is the result of the joint vision and initiative of 

Paul Tompkins Jr., chief USASOC, G-3X Special Programs Division, 

and our colleague Chuck Crossett of JHU/APL.
xiii

John Shissler, Senior Researcher, JHU/APL, served as quality 

reviewer for this edition and made many substantive contributions. 

This effort also benefitted from the knowledge and efforts of our JHU/

APL colleagues Jerome Conley, Angela Hughes, Robert Leonhard, 

Kelly Livieratos, and Summer Newton.

Nathan Bos, Ph.D., and Jason Spitaletta

Laurel, Maryland, March 2012

ENDNOTES

1 Joy E. Rohde, “The Social Scientists War: Expertise in a Cold War Nation” (Ph.D. diss., 

University of Pennsylvania, 2007).

2 Chuck Crossett and Ronald J. Buikema, “Analysis of Social Movements in Warfare,” Johns 

Hopkins APL Technical Digest 30, no. 1 (2011): 5–12.
xiv
xv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION ......................................................... v

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1966......................................viii

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION .............................................x

Changes Since the Original Edition.................................................xi

Acknowledgments of Original Authors and ARIS Contributors......xii

Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................1

Underlying Causes..............................................................................4

Part I: Undergrounds as Organizations ............................................5

Part II: Motivation...............................................................................7

Part III: Underground Psychological Operations.............................8

Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence .............................. 11

Economic Deprivation......................................................................15

Poor Governance .............................................................................. 17

Lack of Government Legitimacy......................................................19

Marginalization or Persecution of Identity Groups........................20

History of Conflict in the Country or 

Conflict in Nearby Countries..................................................23

Demographic Youth Bulge ...............................................................25

Exploitable Primary Commodity Resources ...................................26

Type of Terrain .................................................................................27

Summary .......................................................................................28

PART I. UNDERGROUNDS AS ORGANIZATIONS ...................... 31

Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function............33

Components of an Insurgency .........................................................35

Command and Control ....................................................................36

Aligning Structure with Strategy .....................................................39

Secrecy and Compartmentalization ................................................40

Evolution and Growth of Organizations .........................................43

Underground and Aboveground Connections...............................44

Criminal Connections......................................................................46

The PIRA as a Regional Insurgency ................................................47

Evolution and Growth of the Organization ................................49

Command and Control ................................................................50

Underground and Aboveground Connections...........................52

Criminal Connections..................................................................54

Communist Insurgencies as Organizations ....................................56

Command and Control ................................................................56
xvi

Table of Contents

International Command and Control.........................................58

Chain of Command Between Committee Levels........................58

The Role of Self-Criticism Sessions.............................................. 59

Underground and Aboveground Connections...........................61

Parallel Structures......................................................................... 61

Infiltration of Mass Organizations and Use of “Front” 

Organizations ...................................................................62

Methods of Controlling Mass Organizations..............................63

United Front Activities..................................................................66

Aligning of Structure to Strategy ................................................68

Al Qaeda as a Decentralized Network.............................................70

Secrecy and Compartmentalization ............................................70

Evolution and Growth of the Organization ................................71

Command and Control ................................................................78

Aligning Structure to Strategy.....................................................79

Underground and Aboveground Connectivity ...........................81

Criminal Connections..................................................................82

Chapter 4. Leadership...................................................................89

Transactional and Transformational Leadership...........................91

Charismatic Leadership in Undergrounds .....................................92

Profiling Leaders ..............................................................................96

Trait/Motivational Approaches ...................................................96

Cognitive Approaches...................................................................98

Psychodynamic Approaches.........................................................98

Personological Approaches ........................................................100

A Case Study: Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri ........................................... 101

Targeting Leaders...........................................................................107

Summary .....................................................................................108

PART II. MOTIVATION................................................................... 113

Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving 

the Underground .................................................... 115

Reasons for Joining......................................................................... 117

Recruitment ................................................................................ 117

Recruitment in Rural Insurgencies: the Huks and the Viet Minh.118

PIRA Recruitment of Republican Sympathizers.......................120

Campus Recruitment by EIG: Filling a Void ............................. 121

Ideology .......................................................................................123

Qutbism: Ideology of the Modern Global Salafist Jihad ..........125

Affiliative Factors ........................................................................131

Reasons for Staying.........................................................................132
Table of Contents

xvii

Reasons for Leaving........................................................................135

Defection .....................................................................................136

Disengagement............................................................................ 141

Deradicalization.......................................................................... 141

Reintegration ..............................................................................143

Insurgent Transitions......................................................................146

Summary .....................................................................................148

Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization .................. 155

Social Psychology of Group Conflict .............................................158

Social Identity Groups: Categorization and Salience ...............158

Stability ........................................................................................159

Salience........................................................................................160

Conflict........................................................................................160

In-Group Formation ...................................................................161

In-Group Biases........................................................................... 162

Out-Group Stereotypes and Discrimination............................. 162

Competition Between Groups.................................................... 163

Mechanisms of Group Radicalization ...........................................164

Escalation of In-Group/Out-Group Conflicts...........................164

Radicalization Through Isolation..............................................165

Radicalization Under Threat .....................................................168

Radicalization Through Condensation or Splitting ................. 170

Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support ... 170

Radicalization Through Hate .................................................... 171

Rhetoric of Hate: Dehumanization and “Selective Moral 

Disengagement”.............................................................. 172

Escalation of Violent Actions...................................................... 174

Radicalization Through Martyrdom ......................................... 176

Summary ..................................................................................... 177

Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors .................................. 181

Introduction: Is the Disease Model Applicable? ...........................183

Axis I Disorders and “Lone Wolf” Terrorists ................................185

Axis II: Developmental and Personality Disorders .......................186

Suicidality and Suicide Bombers....................................................189

Emotional Vulnerability ................................................................. 191

Youth ............................................................................................193

Personal Connection to a Grievance (Political or Otherwise).....194

Vicarious Experience of Grievance ...............................................194

Humiliation.....................................................................................195

Mechanisms.....................................................................................197

Summary .....................................................................................199
xviii

Table of Contents

PART III. UNDERGROUND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS..203

Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, 

and Internet.............................................................205

Importance of Media to Insurgencies ...........................................208

Traditional Media ...........................................................................209

Global Broadcast Media ................................................................. 211

Media Dilemmas and Responses................................................ 216

Insurgent-Owned Broadcast Media...........................................218

Insurgent Use of the Internet ........................................................219

Properties of the Internet...........................................................220

Inexpensive..................................................................................220

Decentralized ..............................................................................220

Anonymous..................................................................................220

Uses of the Internet ....................................................................220

Publicity and Communications..................................................220

Targeting the Enemy ..................................................................223

Recruitment and Radicalization................................................223

Training.......................................................................................225

Fundraising .................................................................................225

Command and Control ..............................................................226

Summary .....................................................................................228

Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence........................................233

Psychological Operations ...............................................................235

Aspects of Influence .......................................................................236

Influence as a Social Process..........................................................237

Interpersonal Influence..............................................................238

Social Pressures and Social Networks........................................240

Social Identity and Influence .....................................................242

Diffusion of Innovation..................................................................245

Influence as an Individual Process................................................247

Rumors as an Example of Message Transmittal .......................247

Promoting the Understanding and Retention of Messages .....249

Personal Relevance .....................................................................249

Evaluating Message Content ...................................................... 251

Message Repetition .....................................................................253

Presenting One Versus Both Sides of an Argument: 

Message Inoculation.......................................................253

Combining Words and Actions......................................................254

Cognitive Dissonance .................................................................255

Persuasion Techniques ...............................................................257

Armed Propaganda ....................................................................258

Reciprocity and Obligation ........................................................259
Table of Contents

xix

Coercion and Private Beliefs..........................................................260

Role of Narratives in Justifying Insurgent Movements.................261

Summary .....................................................................................268

Chapter 10.Nonviolent Resistance...........................................273

Objectives ........................................................................................275

Techniques ......................................................................................279

Attention-Getting Devices..........................................................283

Noncooperation..........................................................................287

Civil Disobedience ......................................................................288

Organization...................................................................................290

Legitimacy .......................................................................................293

Normative Factors.......................................................................293

Mystical Factors...........................................................................295

Consensual Validation................................................................296

Communication and Propaganda .................................................297

Training .......................................................................................299

Riots and Demonstrations..............................................................300

Colombia (1948) .........................................................................302

Seattle, Washington (1999) ........................................................305

Shadow Government Structure......................................................309

Summary ......................................................................................... 310

Chapter 11.Terrorism................................................................... 315

Objectives of Terrorism .................................................................. 317

Disruption of Socioeconomic and Political Status Quo ........... 319

Demonstration of Strength ........................................................320

Strategic Risks ............................................................................. 321

Punishment and Retaliation ......................................................323

Maintenance of Security.............................................................324

Terrorist Oaths............................................................................325

Enforcing Squads........................................................................325

Provocation .................................................................................326

Considerations of Terrorism ..........................................................328

Unity of Effort.............................................................................329

Franchising Terror ...................................................................... 331

Suicide Terrorism........................................................................331

Terrorism Planning ....................................................................333

Target Selection ..........................................................................334

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance .......................335

Rehearsals....................................................................................337

Execution.....................................................................................338

Escape and Evasion.....................................................................338

Rationalizing Terrorism .............................................................339
xx

Table of Contents

Terrorist Threats.........................................................................340

Specific Threats...........................................................................341

General Threats..........................................................................343

Psychological Effects of Terror.......................................................344

Terror Management Theory.......................................................346

Individual Responses..................................................................347

Group Responses ........................................................................350

Summary .........................................................................................352

Glossary........................................................................................359

Part I: Abbreviations and Acronyms.............................................361

Part II: Terms and Definitions ......................................................365
Table of Contents

xxi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1-1. Covert and overt functions of an underground.............6

FIGURE 3-1. Components, phases, and functions of an insurgency.36

FIGURE 3-2. Cells in series. ................................................................41

FIGURE 3-3. Parallel cells. ..................................................................42

FIGURE 3-4. Covert and overt functions of an underground. .........45

FIGURE 3-5. Cyclical evolution of the PIRA......................................48

FIGURE 3-6. Organizational divisions and hierarchy of a mature 

Maoist insurgency. ...............................................................69

FIGURE 3-7. Evolution of Al Qaeda as a decentralized network, 

1989–2012. ...........................................................................72

FIGURE 3-8. Excerpt from page 13 of the “Manchester Manual.” ...73

FIGURE 3-9. Excerpt from page 14 of the “Manchester Manual.” ... 74

FIGURE 8-1. Instructions for crowd assembly from Egyptian 

protestors’ pamphlet. ........................................................228

FIGURE 9-1. Which line segment matches the one on the left? ....240

FIGURE 9-2. Everett Rogers’s diffusion of innovation model, role 

distribution and market saturation. .................................246

FIGURE 9-3. X-ray image of a chest showing a growth on the left side 

of the lung. ........................................................................ 251

FIGURE 10-1. Time series component model for the Orange 

Revolution. ........................................................................ 291
xxii

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 2-1. Code guidance for three discrimination categories from 

the MAR dataset. .................................................................22

TABLE 3-1. Organizational features illustrated by three cases......... 47

TABLE 7-1. Radicalization mechanisms and their relevance to the 

Zawahiri case study............................................................ 198

TABLE 9-1. Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies 

(ARIS) dataset. ..................................................................263

TABLE 9-2. Distribution of narrative themes across ARIS categories..

............................................................................................264

TABLE 10-1. 198 Methods of nonviolent action...............................280
CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Underlying Causes......................................................................................4

Part I: Undergrounds as Organizations ....................................................5

Part II: Motivation.......................................................................................7

Part III: Underground Psychological Operations.....................................8
Chapter 1. Introduction

3

Nathan Bos and Jason Spitaletta

Warfare is an inherently human activity, fraught with the idiosyncrasies of human behavior experiencing existential stress. The complexity 

of human factors in warfare is perhaps best articulated by Clausewitz’s 

wondrous trinity, which describes war as “more than a true chameleon 

that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are 

to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element 

of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to 

pure reason.”1

An understanding of human factors is arguably more critical in 

irregular warfare than in conventional warfare and especially critical 

in complex civil conflicts that extend over time into a protracted war 

for “hearts and minds.” The Director of Central Intelligence Directive 

(DCID) 7/3 defines human factors as, “The psychological, cultural, 

behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision-making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by 

individuals and groups at any level in any state or organization.” This 

definition is appropriate but somewhat cold. It fails to communicate 

the simultaneously fascinating and frustrating part of human factors in 

insurgencies, which is that such conflicts push common behavioral and 

social dynamics to their extremes. Organizational design, leadership, 

social influence, mental health, and the other topics discussed in this 

book are standard topics in the behavioral sciences. But these choices 

take on existential significance when they involve an insurgent organization weighing trade-offs between reliability and flexibility, a strategic 

choice whether to embrace violence or nonviolence, or an individual’s 

judgments about whether to trust an ideology, a social contact, or a 

charismatic leader. Understanding individual choices regarding underground movements requires knowledge of mental health, the dynamics 

of hate, and the power of social influence in extremis. Understanding 

a population’s support or rejection of such movements requires understanding of a broad set of political, economic, and social factors, and 

often requires an understanding of how individuals respond to oppression, violence, or terrorism.

This book is divided into two background chapters and three main 

sections. This structure follows the basic organization and flow of the 

first edition. Previews of the sections and chapters are provided below.
4

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Underlying Causes of Violence

Part I: Undergrounds as Organizations

Chapter 3: Organizational Structure and Function

Chapter 4: Leadership

Part II: Motivation

Chapter 5: Joining, Staying In, and Leaving the Underground

Chapter 6: Group Dynamics and Radicalization

Chapter 7: Psychological Risk Factors

Part III: Underground Psychological Operations

Chapter 8: Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and 

Internet

Chapter 9: Psychology of Influence

Chapter 10: Nonviolent Resistance

Chapter 11: Terrorism

UNDERLYING CAUSES

Why do violent insurgencies appear in some countries and persist 

for decades, while countries that appear culturally, politically, or economically similar experience no such events? Understanding where 

and why civil violence is likely to occur is of great interest to policy 

makers, of course, and is also relevant to soldiers on the ground inasmuch as it helps explain the causes and internal dynamics of a conflict. 

Chapter 2 delves into the political and social factors that seem to predict civil violence.

Poverty contributes to instability, but not in as direct a way as might 

be supposed. People’s perception of relative deprivation, which is failure 

to meet economic expectations or keep up with visible peer groups, 

tends to be more important than the absolute level of deprivation. Poor 

governance combined with poverty is an even more dangerous combination. The legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the populace 

can insulate governments in poor countries or endanger them even in 

wealthier ones; legitimate governments provide security, justice (especially related to corruption), and economic development and have ideological legitimacy conveyed to them by other powerful institutions.

Marginalization or persecution of ethnic or religious groups 

within the country is one of the strongest factors predicting violent 

resistance. The importance of social identity-based conflicts in understanding insurgencies is a common theme in this book. Countries in 
Chapter 1. Introduction

5

conflict-filled “neighborhoods,” or with a history of domestic conflict, 

are much more likely to see future conflict because of the ready availability of weapons and trained personnel, and because the population 

may be desensitized to violence. Countries experiencing a demographic 

“youth bulge” seem to be particularly vulnerable to instability; such 

population bulges often lead to feelings of relative deprivation if young 

people are unemployed at high levels.

 Insurgencies need funding, and those that do not have external 

sponsors must find funding domestically; the presence of an exploitable commodity resource that can be smuggled, stolen, or extorted, 

such as diamonds, drugs, or oil, seems to increase the likelihood of an 

ongoing insurgency. The terrain itself may be a contributor, as dense 

forests or mountainous terrain provide cover for insurgents. Chapter 2 

of this work reviews the evidence surrounding these factors and details 

the mechanisms by which these factors may lead to violent resistance.

PART I: UNDERGROUNDS AS ORGANIZATIONS

Chapter 3: Organizational Structure and Function and Chapter 4: Leadership complement the similar chapters in the companion to this work, 

the second edition of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. In Chapter 3, we examine six organizational challenges 

faced by all insurgent groups: command and control, aligning of structure with strategy, secrecy and compartmentalization, evolution and 

growth of organizations, underground and aboveground connections, 

and criminal connections. To understand how these factors play out in 

a contrasting set of cases, we examine these aspects of the Provisional 

Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Ireland, of prototypical Communist 

organizations, and of Al Qaeda. In terms of command structure, the 

PIRA’s military-type of command structure is an interesting contrast to 

Al Qaeda’s “franchise” model, which is different again from the Communist practice in which nonmilitary decision-making bodies, at least 

in theory, maintain control over armed components. Navigating the 

aboveground and underground connections presents challenges for 

every insurgent group, and the PIRA’s rejection, then gradual embrace 

of, political engagement (via Sinn Féin) highlights these issues. The 

international Communist movement, although well past its peak of 

influence, is still a fascinating organizational study in its complex, ingenious (in concept) interlocking coordination of infiltrated civil organizations, Communist front organizations, national and international 

party leadership, and military components.
6

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

Overt

Clandestine

Public component activities

Armed component activities

Underground activities

Dissatisfaction with political, economic, social administrative, and/or other conditions; national 

aspiration (independence) or desire for ideological and other changes

Creation of atmosphere of wider discontent through propaganda, lies, and political and 

psychological effort: discrediting government, police, and military authorities 

Assassination, forming favorable public opinion (advocating national cause), creation 

of distrust of established institutions

Increased agitation, unrest, and disaffection, inltration of administration, police, 

and military and national organizations, and slowdowns and strikes

Inltration of foreign agents and agitators, and foreign propaganda material, 

money, weapons, and equipment

Recruitment of like-minded individuals and others; indoctrination and use 

of these for organizational purposes

Penetration into professional, social, and political organizations and into 

all parts of society

Spreading subversive organizations into all sectors of life in 

a country/region

Establishment of formalized resistance elements; appeal to 

extraterritorial support infrastructure

Expansion of and coordination among resistance networks

Intensication of propaganda, increase in disaffection, 

psychological preparation for revolt

Overt and covert pressures against government; strikes, 

riots, and disorders

Sabotage and terror to demonstrate weakness of government

Increased underground activities to demonstrate 

strength of revolutionary organization

Intense sapping of morale of government, 

administration, police, and military

Negotiations with government representatives

Increased political violence, terror, and sabotage

Minor military and paramilitary actions

Large-scale military and 

paramilitary actions

International strategic communications

Negotiated settlement

Preparation of revolutionary cadres and of masses for revolution

Preparation of revolutionary cadres and of masses for revolution

Shadow governance activities

Shadow governance activities

Figure 1-1. Covert and overt functions of an underground.

Figure 1-1, also shown in Chapter 3, shows the range of organizational functions performed by an underground. A figure very similar 

to this was included in the first edition and has been reproduced somewhat widely since; this update to the figure includes more aboveground 

functions of insurgent public components.
Chapter 1. Introduction

7

In addition to organizational structure, the personalities of key 

leaders can also have a strong influence on the operations of insurgent 

organizations, particularly during their early stages. What kind of personality is required to recruit and lead friends, relatives, and strangers in such a dangerous undertaking? Upstart insurgencies are often 

headed by leaders who are charismatic, a style with critical strengths 

and marked limitations, particularly when groups become larger. 

Several other strong personality traits, some bordering on psychopathologies, may be associated with insurgent leadership and may affect, 

hinder, or sometimes help a would-be underground leader. Chapter 

4’s study of leadership includes an example profile of former Egyptian 

Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and current Al Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri; the profile was drawn from an unclassified integrated personality 

profile2

 using the Integrated Political Personality Profile method that 

was created, published, and taught by Dr. Jerrold M. Post.

PART II: MOTIVATION

The middle section of this book addresses the psychological and 

social variables important to understanding insurgent membership. 

Chapter 5 reviews what is known about joining, staying in, and leaving 

underground organizations, particularly foot soldiers in armed struggles. Social connections are always a key factor in recruitment. Ideology 

seems to play a more important role in early recruitment of true believers and a lesser role in mass recruitments during later-phase armed 

struggles. In these later phases, some groups turn to coercion, although 

this is usually paired with some subtlety with other incentives or manipulations. In Chapter 5, the recruitment strategies of rural insurgents 

(mostly Viet Minh and Phillipino Hukbalahap) are compared with the 

very different recruitment strategies used by the PIRA during “The 

Troubles” in Ireland and the recruitment of lonely and vulnerable college students by Egypt’s EIJ/Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG).

Ideology is a necessary although not sufficient element that affects 

both recruitment and retention. Ideology provides intellectual common ground for a movement, reduces uncertainty, justifies violent 

actions, and motivates members to persist through difficulty. One 

modern example of a well-developed ideology that has grounded and 

inspired radical and insurgent groups is Qutbism. Based on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, this ideology condemned current Arab leadership 

and called Muslims to a different kind of engagement with the outside 

world. Its influential role in shaping first modern Egyptian and ultimately global Salafist jihad movements is discussed in some detail.
8

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

Research on retention in underground movements is sparse, but 

there seem to be good parallels to soldiers in conventional military 

units in losing efforts, who often remain loyal to military units because 

of their social commitments and quality of leadership. There is also 

emerging research on why people leave insurgent groups, including a 

number of interesting (but largely unproven) tactics for “deradicalization” that are reviewed in Chapter 5.

Individual behavior can rarely be understood without understanding the social influences that surround that person, and the focus of 

Chapter 6 is on group dynamics. Academic research on in-group/outgroup conflicts started with bewildered researchers trying to explain 

the horrors of the Holocaust and other atrocities of World War II. These 

classic works remain relevant to today’s ethnic and religious conflicts, 

such as the escalation of tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri 

Lanka that fed the Tamil Tiger insurgency.

A recent paper on mechanisms of radicalization3

 provides a framework for discussing how group dynamics and outside pressures can 

lead groups to “radicalize,” or cross the line from nonviolent to violent 

actions. Some of these mechanisms are fairly easy to understand, such 

as radicalization under threat, but others are less intuitive, such as radicalization of groups in competition for the same base of support. The 

steps by which hate groups form and desensitize members to increasingly violent actions are also described.

Chapter 7 delves deeper into the individual psychological factors 

that may affect underground involvement. The mental stability of 

insurgents, terrorists, and suicide attackers is examined, and although 

the profile of the “psychopathic terrorist” is mostly a myth, there are 

some disorders that are helpful in understanding violence, suicidality, and related phenomena. A number of other more circumstantial 

influences on a person’s psychological state can affect the decision 

to become involved in a violent movement, including emotional vulnerability, experience of grievances such as abuse by government or 

military forces, vicarious experiences of grievances such as through 

Internet-based recruiting materials, and the perception that one’s religious or ethnic group has experienced humiliation at the hands of an 

opponent.

PART III: UNDERGROUND 

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Insurgent groups never succeed as purely military operations; they 

must also effectively engage in battles of persuasion and influence. 

While the term “psychological operations” is no longer used by the 
Chapter 1. Introduction

9

U.S. military (in favor of Military Information Support Operations or 

MISO), the phrase is an appropriate label for the functions that underground groups can and do perform. The information domain’s impact 

on the radicalization process in modern insurgency cannot be overstated. The seemingly ubiquitous availability of information, including 

ideological narratives and success stories and even the presence of tactics, techniques, and procedures, can have a profound influence on 

cognitive processes.

Chapter 8 describes the use of media to reach a variety of audiences, to seek support from internal and external sympathizers, and to 

intimidate or demoralize internal opposition and the enemy. The basic 

functions of communication remain the same whether the medium is 

handbills or websites. But two recent historical technological developments did seem to be game changers for insurgent groups and those 

that oppose them. The first was the rise of global broadcast media, 

particularly satellite-linked television, which encouraged spectacular 

terrorist attacks such as the Munich Olympic kidnappings. The second 

technological breakthrough is still developing—use of the Internet. 

The Internet has lowered the cost and extended the reach for every 

important insurgent communications activity, including publicity, 

recruitment, training, fundraising, and command and control.

Insurgent groups, and those who oppose them, must also understand the basic principles of influence and its use in recruitment, 

persuasion, negotiation, and coercion. Chapter 9 is a more academic 

review of research in the area of influence, with relevant examples in 

the military domain. When influence is exercised one-on-one or oneto-many, charisma and nonverbal communication are critical factors. 

As influence extends throughout a population, understanding social 

networks and the roles of key individuals in a network becomes paramount; Everett Rogers’s model of how innovations diffuse in a population via “change agents,” “innovators,” and “opinion leaders” is relevant 

for political movements as well. The content of messages themselves 

also matters; careful use of evidence, “inoculation” messages, personal 

relevance, and other factors are what make certain messages resonate 

while others are ignored. It has also long been understood that the 

combination of words and actions can be more powerful than either by 

itself. The psychological mechanism of “cognitive dissonance” underlies some models for how this can be accomplished. Chapter 9 also 

includes a study of narratives as influence mechanisms, matching types 

of narrative arguments with different types of resistance movements.

Mastery of nonviolent tactics, as detailed in Chapter 10, is also critical for undergrounds facing stronger opponents. Some movements rely 

on nonviolent tactics exclusively; some integrate them with military 
10

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

actions (although this does tend to detract from the legitimacy of the 

nonviolent aspects). Many have developed ways to subversively manipulate nonviolent actions such as street protests to provoke violent confrontations, justify retaliatory attacks, or divert attention from other 

actions. Nonviolent actions can be classified into three broad categories: attention-getting devices such as street protests and street performance art; noncooperation techniques such as boycotts and work 

slowdowns; and civil disobedience campaigns such as civil rights sit-ins 

and Gandhi’s salt protests. Cyber activism and so-called Hacktivism are 

two newer developments in this area and are described in Chapter 10.

Terrorism, described in Chapter 11, has proven to be one of the 

more effective forms of psychological warfare. Chapter 11 discusses not 

only the individual and social psychological effects of terrorism but 

also the planning and justification processes behind the decision to 

use this tactic. The resultant anxiety and dysphoria associated with acts 

of terror create not only an increased fear but also awareness of death. 

This leads individuals to affiliate with those of similar worldviews and 

to be more willing to sacrifice their civil liberties to charismatic (and 

authoritarian) leaders. The chapter goes on to discuss some of the considerations and risks of terrorism as an insurgent tactic as well as some 

generalized patterns of behavior under the threat of terrorism.

ENDNOTES

1 Andreas Herberg-Rothe, “Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous Trinity’ as a Coordinate System of War 

and Violent Conflict,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 3, no. 2 (2009): 204–219.

2 Jason Spitaletta, “Integrated Personality Profile: Dr. Ayman Mohammed Rabie Al-Zawahiri” (unpublished paper submitted to The George Washington University, 2009).

3 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.
CHAPTER 2.

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF VIOLENCE
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Economic Deprivation..............................................................................15

Poor Governance ...................................................................................... 17

Lack of Government Legitimacy..............................................................19

Marginalization or Persecution of Identity Groups................................20

History of Conflict in the Country or Conflict in Nearby Countries...23

Demographic Youth Bulge .......................................................................25

Exploitable Primary Commodity Resources ...........................................26

Type of Terrain .........................................................................................27

Summary ...............................................................................................28
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

13

Nathan Bos

Why do violent insurgencies appear in some countries and persist 

for decades, while countries that appear culturally, politically, or economically similar experience no such events? Many people would, of 

course, like to be able to predict where violence is likely to occur before 

it happens, as well as understand what regimes are vulnerable and 

when. Political scientists have for decades been trying to understand 

what factors increase the probability of terrorism, insurgency, or other 

forms of political violence appearing in a country or region. This chapter will review the set of economic, political, geographic, and social 

variables that have the best evidence of being linked to the likelihood 

of violence.

In recent years, this question has been addressed with statistical 

analysis of large historical datasets. Without delving too far into the 

mathematics of these techniques, it is worth describing qualitatively 

how these techniques use past data to try to identify the most important factors influencing violence.

A good example of such a study was recently sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and conducted by a very accomplished 

group of political scientists.1

 This study sought to build a statistical 

model that could forecast instability events with as small a number 

of variables as possible. They produced a model that could “predict” 

80 percent of instability events based on just four variables, which will 

be described later in this chapter.

Models to predict the future are necessarily based on past data, 

so this group, drawing on several well-known datasets, assembled data 

to construct a cross-national time-series dataset covering the period 

from 1955 through 2003 for all countries with a population of more 

than 500,000. Each record (row) in this dataset represented one country year (e.g., United States, 1965). The dataset included 7,500 total 

country years.

Their definition of an instability event included three types of 

events: civil wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides/politicides. 

(Precise definitions of each of these are included in the paper.) They 

identified 141 instability events and then began analysis of what factors 

might have predicted these.

Modern studies almost always use some form of multivariate regression, which is a statistical technique that allows one to propose a set of 

predictor variables (e.g., infant mortality, unemployment, civil wars in 

neighboring countries, climate) and an outcome variable (instability 

event) and determine which of the variables are most strongly associated with violent events while controlling for the other variables. The 
14

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

ability to control for the influence of some variables and isolate the 

influence of others is the most important power of regression compared with other techniques.

Different combinations of variables are tried to see which ones 

produce the strongest model. Multivariate regression forces predictor 

variables to “compete” with each other as explanatory variables within 

a given model. So one could enter both “infant mortality” and “unemployment” into the same model and might find that when infant mortality was available as an explanatory variable, unemployment became 

unimportant. The model could also show the reverse or show that 

they were both important independent of each other. These models 

can also reveal more complex relationships between three or more 

predictor variables.

Researchers will often try out dozens of combinations of variables 

over the course of a study, adding and removing variables to understand how they interact. (Because of the mathematical assumptions of 

noncollinearity in regression, it is impermissible to include predictor 

variables that are strongly correlated with each other, so researchers 

cannot simply include every variable in every model.) In published 

papers they may present just one best model or may present a series of 

perhaps four or five best alternative models, allowing the reader to also 

use their own judgment.

One of the most difficult aspects of interpreting statistical studies 

of past events is separating correlations from causality. There may be 

a strong statistical relationship between infant mortality and civil war, 

but does this mean that people are more likely to revolt because of 

high infant mortality (and associated poverty and poor health care), 

does it simply mean that health care services tend to be disrupted during wartime, or is there another explanation? An important additional 

tool is the use of time-lagged analysis. If infant mortality is also lower in 

the two years before the onset of a civil war, this shows that disruption 

in health care due to war is not the only reason for the relationship. 

This does not completely answer the question of how infant mortality 

is involved in causing instability, of course, but it does eliminate some 

possible explanations.

In the CIA study mentioned earlier, the authors presented a fourfactor model which “predicted” 80  percent of instability events. The 

four factors were (1) infant mortality (perhaps acting as a proxy for 

development), (2) presence of armed conflict in four or more bordering states, (3) regime type, and (4) presence of state-led discrimination. 

These will each be discussed below as risk factors for civil violence. 

The risk factors identified in this chapter are supported by similar 
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

15

regression-based studies performed over several decades of research 

with a variety of datasets and theoretical assumptions.

This chapter will discuss eight risk factors for political violence. Six 

of these are human factors: economic deprivation, poor governance, 

lack of legitimacy, marginalization and persecution of identity groups, 

history of conflict in the country or conflict in nearby countries, and 

unfavorable demographics such as a “youth bulge.” We will also discuss 

two risk factors that are not human factors: presence of a primary commodity resource and terrain type.

 Each of these factors has been identified in at least one large-scale 

study relating it to political instability, political violence, or civil war. 

It is important to note that there is not universal agreement on any of 

these factors. For each of these factors, one can find at least one study 

or model that does not find a statistical relationship between that factor 

and political violence. However, absence of evidence is not necessarily 

evidence of absence, and we have chosen to err on the side of inclusiveness to present a broader set of possible factors.

ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

Political violence is more likely to occur in countries with lower 

levels of economic development and less likely to occur in prosperous 

countries, making economic deprivation a risk factor. Overall level of 

economic development has been shown to be a significant predictor of 

civil war. Different authors have used different variables as indicators 

or proxies for development. Each of these has been shown to have a 

relationship with political violence: energy usage per capita,2

 per-capita 

income,3

 infant mortality,4 and level of male secondary schooling.5

The simplest explanation for these relationships is probably wrong: 

insurgencies do not spring up solely because of a population’s anger 

about poverty or associated deprivations such as lack of education, 

health care, or employment. Deprivation may lead individual poor people to participate in “bread riots” or to commit property crimes, but it 

does not directly lead to organized, sustained insurgencies.

It is also true that political opposition occurs in all settings, including more developed countries; and revolutions are usually led by 

wealthier and more educated members of society. Deprivation alone is 

rarely used by non-Communist groups as a narrative to explain their 

actions, although it is may be given as a justification after the fact of a 

successful revolution.6

Poverty is generally considered to be an indirect contributing factor 

and not a primary cause of political violence. Poverty may lead young 
16

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

military-age men to feel that they have fewer options in life and less to 

lose, making joining an insurgency a more attractive option. Poverty 

does tend to increase property crimes, which may desensitize populations to lawlessness and violence, create a criminal class and illegal 

markets to support insurgencies, and undermine the government’s 

legitimacy.

Successful Communist revolutionaries understood these dynamics 

very well. Their goal was to convince peasants over time that their poverty and deprivation were the fault of the elite and the government, but 

they saw little value in entering a village and immediately exhorting 

the poorest villagers to rise up against their oppressors. Before seeking recruits for a class struggle, Maoists did a great deal of groundwork 

learning about very specific local grievances and teaching villagers to 

blame these things on wealthy landowners and the government. Equally 

important, they worked to build the complex social, organizational, 

and ideological infrastructure needed for an effective insurgency, as 

will be described in the following chapters of this book.

Theda Skocpol’s well-regarded comparative study of three revolutions illustrates these points.7

 The three revolutions were France 1789 

(the French Revolution), Russia 1917 (resulting in the takeover of 

Leninists), and China 1911–1949 (resulting in the takeover of Maoists). 

Each of these featured peasant revolts was motivated in the long term 

by economic exploitation and in the short term by food shortages or 

other economic failures. But it is the author’s view that

In all agrarian bureaucracies at all times, peasants 

have had grievance enough to warrant, and periodically spur, rebellions. . . . Economic crises (which are 

endemic in semi-commercial agrarian economies anyway) . . . might substantially enhance the likelihood of 

rebellions at particular times. But such events ought to 

be treated as short-term precipitants of peasant unrest, 

not fundamental underlying causes.8

 In order to foment revolution, each of the three cases required 

other elements to be in place, specifically (1) outside military and economic pressure from other countries that were modernizing faster and 

undermined the ruling bureaucracies and (2) parallel movements led 

by “marginal elites” for their own reasons. These political elites, such as 

the Maoist Communists in China, might assist the peasantry in forming 

a cohesive identity, organizing across distance, and mobilizing in a coordinated fashion. In the French and Russian cases, there was less direct 

coordination between elites and peasants, but there was coincident timing and mutual inspiration between peasant anti-landlord movements 

and urban anti-government movements. Other details relating to the 
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

17

structure of the central bureaucracy, loyalties of the army, and external 

pressures also play important roles in determining the course of events. 

Poverty and deprivation laid the groundwork for revolution, but other 

instigating factors were needed.

Ted Gurr’s influential 1970 book Why Men Rebel 9 proposed relative deprivation as another related factor. Relative deprivation is a 

mismatch between peoples’ level of expectation and their economic 

reality. Impoverished peasants with no expectations for improvement 

have no reason to risk what little they have on an insurgency. But 

groups that have experienced sudden changes of fortune, are jealous of 

peer groups who are prospering more, or have had expectations raised 

for other reasons may experience more discontent. This discontent, in 

the right circumstances, can lead to organized rebellion. The revolutions of France, Russia, and China studied by Skocpal10 fit this pattern, 

because in each case the nation was failing to modernize as fast as their 

neighbors, leading to widespread dissatisfaction among elites who were 

in a position to observe their comparative failures. Also, fitting with the 

theory of relative deprivation, the thwarted ambitions of educated and 

underemployed youths in Middle Eastern countries such as Tunisia and 

Egypt have been blamed for high levels of political discontent (see the 

Demographic Youth Bulge section).

Subsequent research questioned whether relative deprivation is a 

reliable predictor of revolution,11,12 although it may be an important 

component of the political grievances of marginalized subgroups. Like 

economic deprivation, relative deprivation is considered to be a general risk factor but only an indirect cause of political violence.

POOR GOVERNANCE

A country’s system of governance can, not surprisingly, be an important risk factor. But what kinds of governments are the most at risk for 

violent insurgencies? One might expect the most violent and repressive 

governments to be the most at risk, but the answer is more complex 

than this.

There is general agreement that the most democratic governments 

are the least vulnerable to violent insurgency. This does not mean they 

are free from opposition or dissent—far from it. But open democracies 

offer nonviolent channels for opposition, including elections, public 

protests, and many other forms of free speech. Most opposition groups 

realize that they have better options than trying to take on the central 

government with military force, and radicalized groups have difficulty 

rallying citizens to their cause when other, safer options are available.
18

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

Highly repressive regimes offer no such avenues. The most repressive regimes prevent opposition groups from forming, even informally, 

and prevent alternative messages from being heard. Established regimes 

have effective secret police embedded throughout the population who 

are not held in check by any legal restrictions on intelligence gathering, 

interrogation, or arbitrary arrest. Most dissent is quashed before it can 

gain any momentum. Modern North Korea is an example of a highly 

repressive but stable regime.

Most modern states fall somewhere in between full democracy and 

the most repressive dictatorships. These blended regimes are sometimes called hybrid regimes or anocracies. These regimes may allow 

opposition political parties but rig elections so that the ruling party 

is never seriously challenged; they may restrict political freedom but 

allow a great deal of economic freedom; or, as in recent times, they may 

restrict the media but allow relatively free Internet access.

Researchers in this area often make use of the Polity project dataset,13 which assigns democracy ratings to every country with more than 

500,000 people for every year since 1800. Every country-year has been 

assigned a “Polity” score between –10 and 10, with –10 being the most 

repressive regime and 10 being the most democratic. Polity scores take 

into account these subcomponents: competitiveness of political participation (are elections really contested?), regulation of political participation (who can vote?), competitiveness of executive recruitment (are 

high-level positions really contested?), openness of executive recruitment (who can be appointed?), and constraints on chief executive 

(checks and balances).

One interesting but controversial finding is an inverted U-shaped 

relationship between a nation’s Polity score and the likelihood of political violence in that country.14,15, a

 The theory is that countries at the far 

ends of the continuum—the most autocratic and the most democratic—

are the most stable, because democracies allow nonviolent opposition 

and complete autocracies effectively quash dissent. Anocracies, which 

have a mix of democratic and autocratic policies, may be the most 

unstable. The reason for this would be that the hybrid governments 

allow enough freedom of speech and assembly to allow opposition 

groups to form but are autocratic enough that challengers are often put 

down forcefully, causing opposition groups to believe they must resort 

to violence to achieve their aims. These hybrid governments “possess 

a It should be noted that this inverted “U” finding has been challenged recently. 

These sources argue that the presence of violence influenced the assignment of Polity 

scores, particularly the influential “regulation of political participation” subscore, and 

therefore Polity should not be used in models as a predictor of violence. Similar criticism 

has been made of the separate dataset used by Muller, who made a similar finding.
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

19

inherent contradictions . . . (they) are partly open yet somewhat repressive, a combination that invites protest, rebellion, and other forms of 

civil violence. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take 

action, and openness allows for them to organize and engage in activities against the regime.”16

LACK OF GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

Beyond style of governance, the perceived legitimacy of the government is an important predictor of its ability to govern especially in the 

face of challenges; legitimacy has become a core concept in counterinsurgency theory. A government has legitimacy when it is perceived 

as having both the right to rule and the competency to fill expected 

functions of government. These are the most important factors affecting legitimacy:

• Security. People who experience threats to their physical safety 

tend to lose faith in their government. This is particularly true 

when threats are internal, from crime, insurgency, or terrorism, 

rather than external threats, which tend to evoke a unifying 

reaction. (Not surprisingly, governments tend to blame internal 

security problems on “outside agitators” or external manipulation 

whenever they can.) Terrorism is often an attempt to undermine 

a government’s legitimacy by undermining people’s sense 

of security.

• Justice. Governments are expected to settle disputes fairly and 

quickly. Widespread corruption in the judicial system undermines 

legitimacy. Many countries with widespread corruption rely on 

alternate judicial systems, such as the Shura system in Afghanistan 

and adoption of Shari’a law in a number of states in northern 

Nigeria; these work-arounds undermine the legitimacy of federal 

governments.b

• Economic needs. Governments are expected to make sure people 

of the nation are fed and to meet their other basic needs, which 

could include fuel, roads and utilities, health care, education, 

and employment. Expectations for what services a government 

should provide vary widely between cultures and nations and 

are closely tied to both prior conditions and conditions of 

immediate neighboring countries. Widespread corruption, by 

which employment, health care, and other services can only 

b Establishing “shadow government” services can be an effective delegitimizing tactic for an insurgent group. See the Shadow Governments chapter in the companion to this 

work, the second edition of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare.
20

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

be obtained through bribes or connections, can undermine 

legitimacy (although judicious use of patronage can in some 

circumstances increase it).

• Ideological legitimacy. Cultures also have idiosyncratic 

expectations for what constitutes a legitimate government. 

Religious leaders may undermine a government by withholding 

sanction or declaring the government illegitimate. The Catholic 

Church in the past held such power over many European states 

(Henry VIII founded the Church of England because he could not 

obtain legitimization by the Roman Catholic Church). Modernday Islamists often direct their most vehement criticism at secular 

leaders of Muslim nations who do not meet their standards for 

Islamic rulers. Nonreligious ideologies also matter; governments 

may forfeit legitimacy for violating strongly held ideals of freedom 

and democracy or other values that a population feels to be 

ideologically nonnegotiable.

Legitimacy is ultimately a subjective judgment in the eyes of the 

governed. Regimes that provide poorly for their people by the standards of developed democracies may nevertheless enjoy a high standing 

with their own people. However, exposure to information from outside, 

particularly related to peer nations, may be enough to engender dissatisfaction. Information and communication with the outside world 

are therefore important determiners of legitimacy and something that 

underperforming governments will have good reason to try to control. 

Attacking the government’s legitimacy is almost always a central theme 

of the war of words between insurgents and the government.

MARGINALIZATION OR PERSECUTION OF 

IDENTITY GROUPS

Perhaps the strongest and most immediate risk factor for radicalization is the systematic marginalization or persecution of identity groups 

in a country.17 Politically, the most important identity groups tend to be 

based on ethnicity but can also be tribal, religious, political, ideological, regional, or economic.

A number of researchers have asked whether ethnically diverse 

countries are, in general, more prone to civil violence. Earlier models 

included measures such as Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, which 

is a simple measure of how diverse a country is.18 But ethnic diversity 

taken by itself does not appear to be a risk factor;19,20 many countries 

have peacefully coexisting religions and ethnic groups.
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

21

Risk of political violence is great, however, when diversity is combined with some form of economic or political exclusion. Violence is 

particularly likely when a minority group controls the central state government and excludes other groups,21 even if those groups have some 

level of local autonomy. State-led discrimination of other forms is also 

a strong predictor of political violence.22

Systematic discrimination against minority groups can endanger 

otherwise democratic societies. Groups usually turn to organized, violent resistance only when they believe they have no nonviolent alternatives. When a minority group believes it is systematically excluded 

from the democratic process, violent resistance becomes a more likely 

option. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) persisted within the democratic nation of Great Britain because of their Irish Republican feelings of exclusion. The civil rights movement in the United States may 

be seen as another example. The United States has always taken great 

pride in its democratic institutions, but the systematic exclusion of African Americans from these institutions led to violence during the civil 

rights movement and to the brink of what might have become organized insurgent-type activity.

To understand the typical types and ranges of discrimination, it is 

interesting to look at the criteria for discrimination used by the ongoing Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.23 Data from this project are often 

used in high-level studies of political violence and discrimination. This 

effort monitors the treatment of minority groups identified as being at 

risk for discrimination. As of 2011, the project is monitoring 283 at-risk 

ethnic groups across the world; archived data go back to 1945. MAR 

examines a wide range of types of discrimination and rates each type 

on scales that increase from 0 to 4 or 5. Paid raters working for this 

project scour news archives and other sources to find evidence of different kinds of discrimination to inform these ratings. Criteria for ratings of government repression, political discrimination, and economic 

discrimination categories is listed in Table 2-1.
22

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

Table 2-1. Code guidance for three discrimination categories from 

the MAR dataset.

Rating Government 

repression

Political discrimination Economic 

discrimination

1 Surveillance,

e.g., domestic 

spying, wiretapping, etc.

Neglect/remedial polices

Substantial underrepresentation in political 

office and/or participation due to historical 

neglect or restrictions. 

Explicit public policies 

are designed to protect 

or improve the group’s 

political status.

Neglect/remedial 

polices

Significant poverty and 

underrepresentation 

in desirable occupations due to historical 

marginality, neglect, 

or restrictions. Public 

policies are designed 

to improve the group’s 

material well-being.

2 Harassment/ 

containment, 

e.g., saturation 

of police/military presence, 

militarized 

checkpoints 

targeting members of group, 

curfews, states 

of emergency

Neglect/no remedial 

policies

Substantial underrepresentation due to historical 

neglect or restrictions. No 

social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal 

exclusion. No evidence 

of protective or remedial 

public policies.

Neglect/no remedial 

policies

Significant poverty 

and underrepresentation due to historical 

marginality, neglect, or 

restrictions. No social 

practice of deliberate 

exclusion. Few or no 

public policies aim at 

improving the group’s 

material well-being.

3 Nonviolent 

coercion, 

e.g., arrests, 

show-trials, 

property confiscation, exile/

deportation

Social exclusion/neutral 

policy

Substantial underrepresentation due to prevailing social practice by 

dominant groups. Formal 

public policies toward 

the group are neutral or, 

if positive, inadequate 

to offset discriminatory 

social practices.

Social exclusion/neutral policy

Significant poverty and 

underrepresentation 

due to prevailing social 

practice by dominant 

groups. Formal public 

policies toward the 

group are neutral or, if 

positive, inadequate to 

offset active and widespread discrimination.
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

23

Rating Government 

repression

Political discrimination Economic 

discrimination

4 Violent coercion, short of 

killing, e.g., 

forced resettlement, torture

Exclusion/repressive 

policy

Public policies (formal 

exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s 

political participation by 

comparison with other 

groups. (Note: This does 

not include repression 

during group rebellions. 

It does include patterned 

repression when the 

group is not openly resisting state authority.)

Exclusion/repressive 

policy

Public policies (formal exclusion and/or 

recurring repression) 

substantially restrict 

the group’s economic 

opportunities in contrast with other groups.

5 Violent coercion, killing, 

e.g., systematic 

killings, ethnic cleansing, 

reprisal killings

Besides the three variables listed in columns here, MAR also records 

the history of violent conflicts between groups (not necessarily involving the government), grievances expressed by group leaders, and protests and rebellion by group members.

The social psychology of relationships between social identity groups 

(“in-groups” versus “out-groups”) will be discussed extensively in Chapter 6: Group Dynamics and Radicalization, and elsewhere in this work.

HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN THE COUNTRY OR 

CONFLICT IN NEARBY COUNTRIES

Countries with a history of violence are more likely to experience 

violence in the future.24 The same is true for countries whose geographic neighbors have experienced violence. There are both psychological and non-psychological reasons for this. The simplest cause may 

be the available supply of weapons and people trained to use them, 

either in-country or nearby. When one conflict ends or dies down, both 

weapons suppliers and soldiers may be unemployed and have few other 

skills; they may return to their home countries or cross borders as mercenaries. A second reason for the bleed-over of violence across borders 

may be large numbers of refugees or other displaced persons. These 
24

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

refugees may strain the resources of new areas, leading to violence. Or 

the refugees may hold claims on their prior land (such as displaced 

Palestinians) or have other grievances (e.g., lost relatives and friends) 

to be redressed with violence in a new location.

There are also psychological processes at work that create secondorder effects of regional violence. Populations can become desensitized 

to violence, which leads to more violence.

Wartime crime rates give some evidence for this. American sociologists Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner25 were among the first 

to show that homicide rates increased during wars and continued to 

be higher after the wars ended. They found that homicide rates were 

higher in countries that were involved in World War II than in nations 

that were not; in Italy, the homicide rate more than doubled. Similarly, 

the homicide rate increased in all six nations involved in the Vietnam 

War. In the United States, despite the fact that none of the fighting 

took place on U.S. soil and that large numbers of the demographic 

group responsible for homicides (young men) were fighting overseas, 

the homicide rate increased every year of the war, peaking in 1973 at a 

rate 107 percent higher (more than double) than the prewar rate. Of 

course, other dramatic changes were taking place in the United States 

at that time, including anti-war protests and the civil rights movement, 

but the effect holds statistically across many other nations in different 

situations. The increase in homicide rates holds across both victorious 

and defeated nations, and is, in fact, higher in victorious nations. Countries with more battle deaths experience subsequently higher homicide 

rates. These increases in violence cannot be attributed solely to violent 

or battle-scarred veterans; more violent crimes are also committed by 

women and older age groups during and after wars.

Most humans have natural inhibitions toward violence, and all cultures have norms and practices designed to prevent and manage violence. Wars and political conflicts can desensitize people to violence on 

a large scale, making many kinds of violence more likely.

Desensitization has been demonstrated in many different settings. 

Most of the relevant research has been done with children. Children 

who witness adults behaving aggressively, for example, by pummeling 

a stuffed animal, tend to imitate that aggression. Children who watch 

violent television or play violent video games have more aggressive 

thoughts and behaviors, less empathy toward victims, and lower physiological reactions when witnessing violence.26 And children exposed 

to actual violence show a range of negative stress reactions that persist 

long after the events.27 Similar results have been found with adults.

Being witness to violence does not universally cause violence. No 

amount of watching violent television or playing violent video games 
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

25

will make a child violent if they are not predisposed. Exposure to violence will lead some to commit more acts of violence, through desensitization or simple imitation, and desensitization on a large scale can 

affect how quickly people intervene or punish incidents, and generally 

weaken cultural mores that prevent violence.

There is also speculation that some national and regional cultures 

may be predisposed to violence, beyond the effects of recent conflicts. 

Generalizations about entire cultural groups tend to be controversial 

and might even be considered a form of racism, so there are not many 

empirical studies or findings on this topic. One of the few examples 

is Nisbett’s study of differences in the reactions of males in the north 

and south of the United States to minor insults. Nisbett found what he 

describes as an “honor culture” in the south, with a cultural imperative 

to preserve honor by retaliating against even minor acts of aggression. 

The presence of honor cultures has been tied to levels of interpersonal 

conflicts and low-level feuds. There may be geographic and economic 

reasons for these norms, e.g., the need for herdsmen to establish a tough 

reputation to prevent theft, but the culture seems to persist even when 

the underlying circumstances change.28 Similar dynamics of honor and 

retribution are common (but not ubiquitous) in the Middle East.29

DEMOGRAPHIC YOUTH BULGE

There has been recent attention to violence and youth bulges in 

a nation’s demographics. Larger than normal proportions of young 

people may have contributed to historical conflicts including the European Revolutions of 1848, the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, 

and the American anti-war and civil rights protests (led by “baby boomers”) in the 1960s. Henrik Urdal30 examined a large historical dataset31

and found a relationship between nations with a comparatively large 

percentage of young people (15–24 years old) and levels of smallerscale political violence. Using a separate dataset32 Urdal also found a 

relationship with levels of terrorism and rioting. This effect seemed to 

hold across different types of governance but seemed to be a greater 

risk factor in autocratic regimes.

There are several proposed reasons for this. Unemployment and 

lack of economic opportunity are usually considered the most important elements. Societies often cannot provide enough jobs for a sudden 

swell in young adults, so frustration and unemployment can contribute to a sense of grievance. Second, the presence of large numbers of 

military-age males (16–30 years old) provides a pool for existing protest 

or insurgent movements, and combined with high unemployment or 

underemployment, the risk is greater yet. A third factor may be that 
26

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

young people are more mobile and more likely to move to urban areas 

seeking employment,33 where urban overcrowding and the concentration of young, restive people may create conditions for street protests 

and other more violent protests. A fourth factor may be more psychological; young people, especially those who are unattached, may be 

more likely than their elders to protest against grievances that are felt 

by all and may be more accepting of the risks associated with protest 

against the government, particularly autocratic regimes. The youth 

bulge hypothesis is relevant to current concern about Middle Eastern 

terrorism; areas of the Middle East including Saudi Arabia and large 

parts of Africa had large youth bulges approaching young adulthood 

coincident with these movements.

EXPLOITABLE PRIMARY COMMODITY RESOURCES

A provocative recent theory by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler34

argues that violent rebellions are more likely when there is a “primary 

commodity resource” that can be used to finance a rebellion. Examples 

of insurgencies financed in this way would be the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 

or FARC), which is financed by cocaine trafficking, Nigeria’s Movement 

for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which is financed 

with “bunkered” oil, and Angolan rebels, who are financed with “conflict diamonds.”

This argument starts with the assumption that all countries have 

some groups with grievances and motivation to rebel but that most 

are incapable of sustaining themselves economically for long enough 

to pose a serious challenge. It is difficult for insurgencies to sustain 

themselves through legitimate businesses and voluntary contributions; 

therefore, many turn to more lucrative criminal enterprises. A highly 

valuable commodity that can be stolen and smuggled to finance a 

rebellion seems to make radical rebellion more likely. A second means 

of making money from valuable commodity exports is through extortion or “protection,” which is a natural fit for insurgencies that already 

operate as mobile armed forces. However, it may be important that 

these resources be based in rural areas, where insurgents can operate 

more freely and the need for safe long-distance transportation facilitates extortion.

In this analysis, it seemed to be important that these valuable commodities were “primary” commodities, which means that they represented a large percentage of the country’s gross domestic product. This 

could be simply because countries that have more diversified or welldeveloped economies are resistant to violence for other reasons, such 
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

27

as better governance or more stable government financing. There has 

also been considerable research specifically on oil-producing nations, 

which may be vulnerable to corruption, repressive governance, and 

political violence, sometimes referred to as the “oil curse.” The theory 

here is that when governments can make a great deal of money by selling a resource that does not require either a highly educated populace 

or modern infrastructure to produce, they will tend to fall into patterns 

of corruption, patronage, and repression that are simpler to maintain 

than a modern economy.

A second economic risk factor identified by Collier and Hoeffler 

was the presence of a large diaspora living in more developed countries. Expatriates living in wealthier countries are a potential funding 

source for insurgents, as demonstrated by the substantial support provided by Tamils in North America for the insurgency in Sri Lanka; 

another prominent example is the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.c

TYPE OF TERRAIN

The terrain of a country may also be a risk factor in that some 

terrains provide more shelter and secrecy to insurgents than others. 

The Afghani Taliban (and many prior insurgent groups) benefit from 

mountainous terrain that makes surveillance and pursuit difficult. 

Mountainous terrain also tends to isolate villages, making them harder 

for the government to protect and easier for insurgents to influence or 

intimidate. At least two studies have found a correspondence between 

mountainous terrain and civil war.35,36

Dense forest might have a similar effect. Most experts would agree 

that the FARC in Colombia has benefitted from being able to hide and 

organize in the thick jungles of that country; the Viet Cong may have 

benefited similarly, despite American attempts to defoliate sections of 

the country. However, a general statistical relationship between forest 

cover and adverse political events has not been shown. It may also be 

that while difficult terrain does not necessarily encourage insurgencies 

to develop, it does tend to prolong them once they have developed by 

hindering government response.37

Of course, there are plenty of examples of insurgencies that survived without any particular geographic cover. The IRA relied on the 

“human terrain” of Catholic enclaves in larger cities for safe havens and 

bases of operations.

c Civil strife tends to encourage those with means to leave; so one could argue that it 

is the insurgencies causing the diasporas to form rather than the other way around. Likely, 

the causation goes both ways.
28

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

SUMMARY

Predicting where violence will break out remains an inexact science, 

but there is a great deal of useful research on underlying causes that 

may increase the probability of violence in a particular area. Economic 

deprivation contributes to instability, but the mechanisms are more 

complex than simply stating that poor people are more likely to rebel; 

the experience of “relative deprivation” related to either peer comparisons or internal expectations is an important contributor. Insurgencies tend to be led by the more affluent and educated members of 

poor countries but benefit from the ability to recruit unemployed or 

economically distressed members. The way a country is governed is 

another key predictor, and the failure to provide basic levels of justice, basic needs, and security undermine legitimacy and encourage 

rebellion. Marginalization of ethnic groups within a country is also a 

common catalyst to violence, especially if the state participates in discriminatory practices.

Countries that have a history of conflict internally or in nearby states 

are also at greater risk; violence begets violence via a number of pathways, including the availability of military-trained personnel and weapons and psychological damage from and desensitization to violence.

Countries experiencing youth bulge demographic shifts can 

become very vulnerable as these people reach young adulthood; failure to provide economic opportunity for large numbers of military-age 

adults can be a particularly dangerous precursor to violence.

Insurgencies need finances to survive; countries with an exploitable 

resource such as diamonds, oil, or cocaine can allow insurgencies to 

sustain themselves more easily than if they were dependent on external 

supporters or internal contributors. Insurgencies also need safe places 

to hide from superior government forces; national terrain that includes 

dense forest, rugged mountains, or other such features may increase an 

insurgency’s chances of survival.

ENDNOTES

1 Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 

190–208.

2 Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American 

Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 33.
Chapter 2. Underlying Causes of Violence

29

3 Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity Onto Nationalist Insurgencies,” American Political Science Review 101, no.  1 (February 2007): 173.

4 Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 190–208.

5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic 

Papers 56, no. 4 (June 2004).

6 Ibid.

7 Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1994).

8 Ibid., 36.

9 Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

10 Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World.

11 Stephen G. Brush, “Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 

523–545.

12 Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J. Tierney, “Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: 

A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research,” The Sociological Quarterly 23, 

no. 1 (December 1981): 33–47.

13 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 

Transitions, 1800–2007 (2007), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

14 Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?” 33.

15 Edward N. Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” 

American Sociological Review 50 (1985): 47–61.

16 Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?” 33.

17 Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 190–208.

18 Philip G. Roeder, “Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985,” 

accessed April 16, 2011, http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm.

19 Cederman and Girardin, Beyond Fractionalization.

20 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance.”

21 Lindsay Heger and Idean Salehyan, “Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the Severity of 

Civil Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (June 2007): 385–403.

22 Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 190–208.

23 Ted R. Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and 

Conflict since 1945,” International Political Science Review 14, no. 2 (January 1993): 161–201.

24 Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 190–208.

25 Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner, “Violent Acts and Violent Times: A Comparative 

Approach to Postwar Homicide Rates,” American Sociological Review 41, no.  6 (1976): 

937–963.

26 Craig A. Anderson, Akiko Shibuya, Nobuko Ihori, Edward L. Swing, Brad J. Bushman, 

Akira Sakamoto, Hannah R. Rothstein, and Muniba Saleem, “Violent Video Game 

Effects on Aggression, Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western Countries: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Psychological Bulletin 136, no. 2 (March 2010): 151–173.

27 Paramjit T. Joshi and Deborah A. O. Donnell, “Consequences of Child Exposure to War 

and Terrorism,” Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review 6, no. 4 (2003).

28 Dov Cohen, Richard E. Nisbett, Brian F. Bowdle, and Norbert Schwarz, “Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An Experimental Ethnography,” Journal of 

Personality and Social Psychology 70, no. 5 (1996): 945.

29 David Pryce-Jones, The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs (London: Weidenfeld & 

Nicolson, 1989).
30 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (September 2006): 607–629.

31 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Petter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and 

Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39, 

no. 5 (2002): 615–637.

32 Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey 

D. Dabelko, Pamela Surko, and Alan N. Unger, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings (McLean, VA: Science Applications International, 1998).

33 Jack A. Goldstone, “Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to 

Violent Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (2002).

34 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance.”

35 Ibid.

36 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American 

Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

37 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale 

Ethnic Violence Since 1945” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 

Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2–5, 1999).
PART I.

UNDERGROUNDS AS 

ORGANIZATIONS

CHAPTER 3.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 

AND FUNCTION
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Components of an Insurgency .................................................................35

Command and Control ............................................................................36

Aligning Structure with Strategy .............................................................39

Secrecy and Compartmentalization ........................................................40

Evolution and Growth of Organizations .................................................43

Underground and Aboveground Connections.......................................44

Criminal Connections..............................................................................46

The PIRA as a Regional Insurgency ........................................................47

Evolution and Growth of the Organization ........................................49

Command and Control ........................................................................50

Underground and Aboveground Connections...................................52

Criminal Connections..........................................................................54

Communist Insurgencies as Organizations ............................................56

Command and Control ........................................................................56

International Command and Control.................................................58

Underground and Aboveground Connections...................................61

Aligning of Structure to Strategy ........................................................68

Al Qaeda as a Decentralized Network.....................................................70

Secrecy and Compartmentalization ....................................................70

Evolution and Growth of the Organization ........................................71

Command and Control ........................................................................78

Aligning Structure to Strategy.............................................................79

Underground and Aboveground Connectivity ...................................81

Criminal Connections..........................................................................82
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

35

Nathan Bos, Jason Spitaletta, and SORO authors

Despite their unique nature, resistance groups are human organizations that can be understood from the perspective of modern organizational studies. Academic research on industrial/organizational 

psychology, operations research, and social network analysis can each 

provide some insight into the functioning of insurgent organizations. 

Some core issues from these areas are already discussed in this book 

(Chapter 4: Leadership) and in the companion to this work, the second 

edition of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Chapter 1: Leadership and Organization).

COMPONENTS OF AN INSURGENCY

Insurgencies can be understood as having four components: the 

underground, auxiliary, armed component, and public component, as 

shown in Figure 3-1.

• Underground—A clandestine organization established to operate 

in areas denied to the armed or public components or conduct 

operations not suitable for the armed or public components.

• Armed component—The visible element of a revolutionary 

movement organized to perform overt armed military and 

paramilitary operations using guerrilla, asymmetric, or 

conventional tactics.

• Auxiliary—The support element of the irregular organization 

whose organization and operations are clandestine in nature 

and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or 

involvement with the irregular movement. Members of the 

auxiliary are more likely to be occasional participants of the 

insurgency with other full-time occupations.

• Public component—The overt political component of an 

insurgent or revolutionary movement. Some insurgencies pursue 

military and political strategies. At the termination of conflict, 

or occasionally during the conflict, the movement can transition 

to the sole legitimate government or form part of an existing 

government. Thus, the four spheres—armed component, 

underground, auxiliary, and public component—engage in a 

dynamic and evolving relationship that changes in response 

to internal and external drivers. The public component’s overt 

position distinguishes it from the clandestine underground. 

However, it frequently overlaps with the underground in that the 

latter’s functionality includes the management of propaganda 

and communications in general.
36

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

Armed 

Component

Public

Component

Auxiliary Underground

Figure 3-1. Components, phases, and functions of an insurgency.

Within this broad categorization of components, there are many 

different ways of organizing an insurgency. This chapter will examine 

three insurgencies in some detail—the Provisional Irish Republican 

Army (PIRA), the classical Communist model, and Al  Qaeda. Each 

of these can be analyzed using the four-component model, but each 

instantiates the components within very different organizational structures and practices.

This chapter will not focus on the general model of insurgencies, 

which is treated elsewhere. Instead, we will focus on six cross-cutting 

issues, three of which are common to all organizations—command 

and control, aligning structure with strategy, and evolution and 

growth—and three of which tend to be unique concerns of resistance 

movements—secrecy and compartmentalization, underground and 

aboveground connections, and criminal connections.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

One way to characterize organizational structures is according to 

their hierarchical structure. A classic military unit has a very strict hierarchy, with clear lines of authority, often drawn as a pyramid. Authority 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

37

is established by one’s level and position in the hierarchy. Large corporations also usually have elements of hierarchical structures, often 

depicted in tree-like “organization charts.” Over time, organizations 

have tendency to evolve more layers of hierarchy to deal with increasing size of the organization without any level of management being 

overwhelmed, and for other reasons, such as the need to prevent errors 

and create higher-status management positions. Hierarchies are often 

contrasted with network structures, which are organically evolved 

sets of relationships between individuals. Authority in a pure network 

comes from personal relationships, reputation, and to some extent 

network position, in that more-well-connected individuals may exert 

more influence. David Alberts and Richard Hayes popularized a third 

option, which they call an “edge” structure.1

 An edge has clearer vertical lines of authority than a network, and authority is at least partially 

established by position, but it is designed to be much flatter than hierarchies, intentionally allows many cross-cutting connections for information flow, distributes more decision-making authority to individuals, 

and is more flexible in allowing ad hoc teams to form and focus around 

specific problems.

The choice between hierarchy, network, and edge organizations 

involves trade-offs, with each type of system having different strengths. 

Modern organizational research has emphasized the importance of 

matching organizational forms to specific tasks and situations rather 

than identification of always-optimal strategies. Relevant questions 

related to choice of command structures are:

• How important is speed of response? Hierarchical command 

structures almost invariably involve delay as requests move up 

and down a chain of command, and bottlenecks when managers 

have to prioritize some decisions at the expense of others. Flatter 

systems typically gain speed but sacrifice reliability and quality 

control. The relative importance of speed is largely driven by the 

environment, e.g., the speed of competitors or enemy forces or 

time window of opportunities.

• How important is specialization? An insurgent organization at 

some point must begin to set up basic specialized functions such 

as media production or weapons training; if they do not, they risk 

wasting resources on redundant efforts.

• How costly are mistakes? In the corporate domain, a toymaker 

or radio station might be able to tolerate a great deal of variance 

in quality for the sake of novelty and freshness; likewise, a newly 

formed insurgency might highly value surprise at the cost of 

the occasional operational disaster. An established automobile 

manufacturer may have much less tolerance for manufacturing 
38

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

defects; likewise, a late-stage insurgency trying to establish 

legitimacy may have much less tolerance for accidental civilian 

deaths or public relations disasters.

• How important is unity of command? Effective hierarchical 

command structures maximize consistency. The archetype of this 

is a Napoleon-era army flawlessly executing a complex battle plan 

with preplanned, synchronized movements. In an insurgency, 

coordination of units, and coordination of military, political, and 

communications actions, can be crucial.

• How important is efficiency? Hierarchical structures can 

maximize efficiency by optimizing systems (manufacturing, 

training) and enforcing consistency across the organization. This 

optimization works best in low-margin business environments 

where small efficiencies can be large competitive advantages. 

This efficiency also presumes that the environment is sufficiently 

slow-moving to allow opportunity costs to be optimized. It also 

presumes that the cost of maintaining the hierarchy itself is not 

greater than intended gains.

• Are there cultural reasons to favor centralization? Hierarchies 

may also be preferable when an organization’s membership 

strongly favors it. This could be the case in a resistance movement 

that recruits heavily from ex-military personnel, making militarystyle organization easy to implement. This might also be the case 

in national cultures that Hofstede2

 refers to as being high in 

“power distance”—where there are strong role expectations for 

leaders and followers.

None of these trade-offs are inviolable; examples can be found of 

fast-adapting hierarchies, efficient networks, etc., based on well-developed practices, competent leadership, or other factors. In general, 

effective decentralization requires these two factors:

• Communications technology. Information technology can 

allow faster communication and more widespread and efficient 

information dissemination, and successful organizations evolve 

to use this technology to flatten hierarchies and empower 

personnel.

• Highly trained and educated “edge” workers. When intelligent 

and capable personnel are available, it is more feasible to train 

members to adapt, coordinate, optimize processes, etc., without 

management directives. Research on self-organizing and selfoptimizing systems is of great interest across many fields.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

39

ALIGNING STRUCTURE WITH STRATEGY

A first principle of organizational design is that an organization’s 

strategy should match its structure. If an insurgent group values media 

exposure, it should have an active and well-supported media arm. If 

it intends to affect the political process, it should have a strong public 

component with a political wing. Maoist organizations, as will be discussed, had the goal of undermining and then replacing existing political institutions. Consistent with this goal, they invested a great deal of 

effort into either infiltrating or creating nonmilitary civilian organizations of all types. Branches of Al Qaeda, in contrast, do not try to take 

or hold territory and generally have no ambitions of participating in 

political processes or directly governing nations, and this is reflected in 

their organizational structures as well.

Other types of organizations often must choose between regionally focused, product-focused, and functional divisions.3

 For an auto 

manufacturer, a regional division would focus on a manageable area 

(e.g., South America); a product division would focus on a product line 

(e.g., SUVs); and a functional division would focus on a technical area 

(e.g., transmissions or sales). Larger organizations will have all three 

types, with complex reporting relationships between them. Smaller 

organizations with less management and staff must choose which type 

of division will be primary and may need to manage difficult transitions between structures as strategy changes.

For insurgent groups, a key decision is often between regional and 

functional structures. Regional groups would have all functions located 

in an area and would be responsive to local conditions; functional 

groups would have specialized support groups located in a centralized 

command and would dispatch those specialists to regional groups as 

needs arise. Structure also strongly affects an organization’s ability to 

learn and adapt. Regionally based structures are generally better at perceiving and adapting to local conditions. Functional structures, where 

specialists in an area (e.g., military strategy) mostly interact with other 

specialists, may attain a higher level of professionalism in that specialty 

and be able to take on more complex tasks.

It is also common for insurgents to have to decide between being 

primarily military or political organizations and between short-term 

and long-term structures; see Chapter 1 in Undergrounds in Insurgent, 

Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare for discussion of these two issues.

A recent study of terrorist violence suggests these choices do make 

a difference in insurgent group functioning. This study4

 claims to show 

that violent groups that adopt a vertically integrated functional structure, and thus have specialized units dedicated to violence, commit 
40

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

more lethal attacks and sustain violence over longer periods of time. 

This is supported by a statistical analysis of attacks by groups listed in 

the MIPT Rand Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) dataset and illustrated by a case study of the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA) in Spain. The ETA has 

reorganized itself between vertical and flat structures several times and 

has been more violent during periods of vertical organization. Specialization led to more competent and coordinated violence in this case; 

the trade-offs in slower responsiveness to local conditions and less compartmentalization were apparently not critical inhibitors.

Modern organizations also spend considerable resources on internal knowledge management. These initiatives may involve creating 

information systems to ease sharing of information across divisions and 

creating communities of practice that bring together organizationally 

separated specialists to share technical information and keep up with 

new developments. There is also a great deal of organizational research 

on use of social media, information markets, and other innovations to 

improve internal information flow with the goal of increasing learning 

and adaptability.

Insurgent groups operate under a different set of constraints, however, because of the need for secrecy and compartmentalization. Open, 

free flow of social contact and information is not a reasonable goal; 

cross-divisional communication must be more carefully managed or 

involve more anonymity. Nevertheless, new information technology 

and new media (see Chapter 8) are opening up new possibilities for 

facilitating internal information flow while managing risk.

SECRECY AND COMPARTMENTALIZATION

In resistance movements, the need for secrecy and security can 

trump all other concerns, particularly in the early stages or when operating in urban environments where governments maintain effective 

control. Compartmentalization thus becomes a critical design priority; as much as possible, forces are divided into cells where members 

have little knowledge or contact outside of the cell so that one compromised cell does not have cascading effects, endangering the larger 

organization. In a cell structure, usually only the leader has contact 

with the outside and relays instructions or requests through a single 

contact outside of the group. In some cases, even the leader may not 

have regular personal contact, and communication happens through 

coded messages or dead drops. Cell size is dictated by the demands 

of the type of work to be done (with the smallest capable group being 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

41

best) traded off against the danger of penetration. Intelligence cells 

are most likely to use this level of secrecy. Cell size may be adjusted 

as conditions change; before World War II, the Communist Party in 

France had cells of fifteen to twenty or even thirty members. After the 

party was declared illegal in September 1939 and until the armistice 

in June 1940, cell size was reduced to three men to ensure maximum 

security. Later, cells were increased to five to eight and then reduced 

again under Nazi occupation.5

Communication and coordination must occur between cells, however, and the more complex the organization’s goals, the more necessary this communication becomes.

Cells can be organized to accomplish different workflows. When possible, cells may be arranged in series, like an assembly line (Figure 3-2). 

In the Belgian Underground, six cells or sections were connected in a 

series to produce large-scale newspapers. One cell of reporters sent raw 

information to a cell of editors who composed stories that were handed 

off to other cells for printing and distribution.6

Cells in series

Branch leader

Cell

leaders

Intermediary

or mail drop

(1) (2) (3)

Members

Figure 3-2. Cells in series.

Cells can also be set up in parallel (Figure 3-3). These can conduct 

work independently and report up a chain of command. Parallel cells 

are also sometimes set up to confirm or disconfirm information independently or set up as backups in case one cell is compromised.
42

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

Parallel cells

Branch leader

Cell

leaders

Intermediary

or mail drop

Intermediary

or mail drop

Members

Primary

cell

Secondary

cell

Figure 3-3. Parallel cells.

Task demands usually force some violations of strict compartmentalization. Erickson’s7

 study of six secret societies documents some of 

the common reasons. For the White Lotus group, which was part of 

the 1813 Eight Trigrams rebellion in China,8 the desire to spread new 

boxing skills led the group to employ traveling teachers who were not 

members of the upper hierarchy yet who gained knowledge of cell 

membership and function. The resistance cells within Auschwitz9 were 

organized into a rigid hierarchical structure. Members of one five-man 

cell did not, in theory, know the identity of any of the members of 

any other cell, and cells only communicated through higher command. 

The Auschwitz group had difficulty maintaining compartmentalization because it was a relatively small community in very close quarters; 

members knew each other socially outside of the cell structures. Accidental discoveries also happened because cells had similar needs. Cells 

would find out about each other as each attempted to use the same 

couriers traveling outside of the camp or would recognize others’ clandestine behaviors or convenient meeting locations simply because they 

were discovered in parallel. The main impediment to compartmentalization, according to Erickson, is the fact that groups such as organized 

crime families recruit from the same clusters of families, friends, and 

neighborhoods; the pre-existing social ties are too dense to allow strict 

separation. Strict cellular structures also have the same weaknesses as 

other types of hierarchies—slow response times and bottlenecks in the 

information flow between units.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

43

EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONS

A key factor in an insurgency’s success is the individual adaptability of its principal leaders and the strategic and ideological flexibility of the organization at large.10 For example, recruiting tactics must 

change over the course of an insurgency. During the early stages, leaders seek to carefully select, investigate, and approach potential fellow 

insurgents. During the middle stages of an insurgency, leaders usually 

have to expand the recruiting effort in order to fill out the rank and 

file of forces—conventional, guerilla, terrorist, or other types of units 

and cells. It is during this transition period that some revolutionary 

movements fail while others succeed, and the question often comes 

down to the organization’s ability to find new sources for recruitment 

and support. During the latter stages of an insurgency, recruiting is 

characterized by the momentum of the movement. A successful insurgency that is able to either take power (supplanting the former government) or achieve political, legal, or quasi-legal status will normally 

expand recruitment operations to include parallel efforts at political 

mobilization.

Ideology serves a dual function in an insurgency: it serves as the 

basis for recruitment, and it illuminates strategic direction. Ideology 

is a point of unification for insurgencies that have grown beyond the 

point where personal relationships are the major unifying force, and 

it provides an analytical framework from which new and peripheral 

members can interpret their environment. The subsequent worldview 

often serves as a cohesive meme that can further incentivize new members to join. An insurgency’s ideology moves along a spectrum of exclusivity and inclusivity as leaders establish the movement’s position on any 

number of social, political, and/or operational issues.a

 Exclusive ideologies aim at energizing the targeted sector of the population, helping 

them to define themselves in relation to the foes they oppose. Inclusive ideologies, conversely, seek to unify various groups and encourage 

them to coalesce around the insurgency’s main goal.

The particular progression of an organization’s ideology often coincides with changes in organizational structure and recruiting practices. 

As insurgencies evolve they tend to assume a greater degree of risk of 

exposure as their recruiting and communications operations become 

more overt. Moving beyond clandestine operations is necessary in order 

to build operational capacity; the span of control in a compartmentalized organization is such that information cannot be disseminated in 

a timely enough manner to make for effective command and control. 

a See Chapter 1 of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare for 

further discussion of the dilemma of inclusiveness.
44

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

While secrecy is often prioritized in deliberate planning phases of 

operations, it becomes impractical as the requirement to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance and/or tactical rehearsals becomes more 

tangible.

Organizational structures may also evolve in response to a changing security environment (as the PIRA did) or to reflect the increasing 

legitimacy of a movement (such as Hizbollah). The degree to which an 

insurgency recognizes these internal or external changes and adapts 

appropriately correlates with longevity. Although restructuring does 

not come without its costs (for example, the highly ideologically oriented may disapprove of a more inclusive recruiting strategy and thus 

may discontinue their association with the movement), overly rigid 

organizations are unlikely to enjoy success.

UNDERGROUND AND ABOVEGROUND 

CONNECTIONS

Nye suggests international relations exist on three separate but 

related levels: the world of traditional sovereign state power (e.g., 

military and diplomatic), economic power and influence, and the 

nongovernmental activities that affect the global system (e.g., human 

migration, criminal activity, black/gray markets, etc.).11 This final level 

consists of both licit and illicit, light and dark, and overt and covert 

organizations and networks. Underground organizations must either 

interact with the legitimate networks or establish their own clandestine networks that parallel the legitimate ones.12 The fuzzy boundary 

that is the light/dark nexus is the critical vulnerability of many underground organizations and thus is a priority for intelligence gathering. 

Modern insurgencies are microcosms of Nye’s contention and are often 

required to operate effectively in both overt and covert domains.

Insurgencies exist in both overt and clandestine domains. Figure 3-4 

shows some of the overt and covert functions of an underground. In the 

nascent period, the underground predominates. Often organized by 

charismatic individuals, the underground recognizes the underlying 

socioeconomic and/or political grievances and seeks to organize that 

dissatisfaction into a coherent narrative and to start forming a broader 

base of support. Much of the early activity involves disseminating information in order to generate internal and external support, shape perceptions, and set conditions for a broader mobilizations.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

45

Overt

Clandestine

Public component activities

Armed component activities

Underground activities

Dissatisfaction with political, economic, social administrative, and/or other conditions; national 

aspiration (independence) or desire for ideological and other changes

Creation of atmosphere of wider discontent through propaganda, lies, and political and 

psychological effort: discrediting government, police, and military authorities 

Assassination, forming favorable public opinion (advocating national cause), creation 

of distrust of established institutions

Increased agitation, unrest, and disaffection, inltration of administration, police, 

and military and national organizations, and slowdowns and strikes

Inltration of foreign agents and agitators, and foreign propaganda material, 

money, weapons, and equipment

Recruitment of like-minded individuals and others; indoctrination and use 

of these for organizational purposes

Penetration into professional, social, and political organizations and into 

all parts of society

Spreading subversive organizations into all sectors of life in 

a country/region

Establishment of formalized resistance elements; appeal to 

extraterritorial support infrastructure

Expansion of and coordination among resistance networks

Intensication of propaganda, increase in disaffection, 

psychological preparation for revolt

Overt and covert pressures against government; strikes, 

riots, and disorders

Sabotage and terror to demonstrate weakness of government

Increased underground activities to demonstrate 

strength of revolutionary organization

Intense sapping of morale of government, 

administration, police, and military

Negotiations with government representatives

Increased political violence, terror, and sabotage

Minor military and paramilitary actions

Large-scale military and 

paramilitary actions

International strategic communications

Negotiated settlement

Preparation of revolutionary cadres and of masses for revolution

Preparation of revolutionary cadres and of masses for revolution

Shadow governance activities

Shadow governance activities

Figure 3-4. Covert and overt functions of an underground.

Undergrounds initiate recruiting, training, and infiltration, establish escape-and-evasion networks, raise funds, establish safe havens, 

and develop external support. The establishment of formal organizations and training programs and the coordinated penetration of 

government entities are historic functions of the underground, as is 
46

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

intelligence and logistics support to these operations. Undergrounds 

may evolve to conduct subversive and psychological operations to 

undermine and delegitimize the government and cultivate popular 

support. They may ultimately perform command and control functions 

of the guerrilla force, establish shadow governments, and institute population control measures. An underground organization also requires 

financial resources to function: agents must be compensated and guerrilla forces armed; escape-and-evasion networks require money for 

extra food, for safe houses, and to provide to escapees; psychological 

operations require funds for products and activities; and headquarters 

and administrative sections require office supplies. Undergrounds also 

often coordinate the engagement of diaspora communities for financial, logistic, and/or informational support. Many of these functions 

require overt movements and/or establishment of relationships outside 

the insurgent institution. These functions often exist in both the clandestine and overt domains and may be functions of either the underground or the public component. Shadow governance activities such as 

the provision (and withholding) of unofficial social welfare programs 

are types of activities that may be conducted by either overt and/or 

clandestine elements.

Perhaps the most vital of these functions is the establishment of 

political legitimacy not only in the eyes of the populace but also in 

the eyes of extraterritorial entities that inevitably influence a conflict. 

Today it is more likely that the successful insurgency will gain some 

level of legitimate, open political acknowledgment while simultaneously 

continuing quasi-legal and illegal activity (e.g., Irish Republican Army 

[IRA]/Sinn Féin, Umkhonto we Sizwe/African National Congress, 

Weather Underground Organization/Prairie Fire Organizing Committee). The integration of the underground and the armed components and (as a protective function) the obfuscation of the relationship 

between the two ensures both unity of effort and security. Although 

groups vary in their level of integration, from those that are tightly integrated (Hizbollah closely integrating the numerous components of the 

insurgency) to those that are loosely integrated (Al Qaeda continues 

to use numerous layers of individuals, organizations, and active denial 

measures to obscure their ties to any public components), success in 

modern insurgency requires coordination between each of the components of an organization (or organizations).

CRIMINAL CONNECTIONS

Most armed insurgencies at some point use criminal activities 

such as theft, smuggling, or extortion (“protection”) as a means of 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

47

fundraising. This often also brings the groups into contact with career 

criminals and organized crime elements, for better or worse. Criminal 

connections are a threat to the groups in more ways than one, threatening their ideological legitimacy and their support from the populace, 

and tempting members to become swept up in a different lifestyle and 

social network. Criminality may be viewed as distasteful by many of 

the more ideologically or politically motivated insurgents, particularly 

those drawn in for political or ideological reasons.b

 Mao cautioned 

against illegal activity lest the movement devolve into armed banditry 

for these reasons, but few groups manage to avoid criminal associations entirely. In some movements, the line between the strictly ideological insurgent and the strictly criminal drug lord becomes blurred. 

Pablo Escobar—the notorious Colombian drug lord killed in 1993—

evolved from a criminal gang leader into a quasi-political figure who 

dabbled in social activism. Three cases of insurgency organizations 

will illustrate these points. The cases are as follows: the PIRA as an 

example of a regional insurgency; Communist insurgencies, using the 

blueprint described by Mao and elaborated with specific examples; and 

Al  Qaeda, an example of a modern, decentralized insurgency. Each 

case will be used to illustrate the specific strengths of those organizations and treated in the order that makes for the clearest presentation.

Table 3-1. Organizational features illustrated by three cases.

PIRA Communist Al Qaeda

Command and control √ √ √

Aligning structure with strategy √ √ √

Secrecy and 

compartmentalization

√

Evolution and growth of the 

organization

√ √

Underground and aboveground 

connections

√ √ √

Criminal connections √ √

THE PIRA AS A REGIONAL INSURGENCY

Figure 3-5 represents the circular evolution of the Provisional IRA 

and its complementary public component, Sinn Féin. After splintering 

b This was particularly so for the PIRA, namely Eamon Collins, whose disillusionment with the petty criminality of his Active Service Unit (ASU) caused him to rethink 

his involvement and ultimately led to his disengagement and subsequent cooperation with 

the British.
48

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

from the IRA, the PIRA emphasized its small but prominent armed 

component with substantial militant auxiliary and international underground support. The relationship between the armed component and 

the public component began to equalize in the 1980s after the death 

of hunger striker Bobby Sands and the 1986 Sinn Féin convention ending abstentionism. Into the 1990s, Sinn Féin entered negotiations with 

the British government (without disestablishing the armed component 

or renouncing violence), eventually leading to the signing of the 1998 

Good Friday Agreement calling for the decommissioning of the armed 

component and the entry of the public component into a devolved 

Northern Irish government.

Aux. UG

PC PC

UG

UG

UG Aux.

Aux.

Aux.

AC

AC

AC

Late 1990s PIRA and 

Sinn Féin

Mid-1980s PIRA and 

Sinn Féin

1960s Ofcial IRA Early 1970s PIRA 1975 PIRA and Sinn Féin

PC

AC

PC

Time

Figure 3-5. Cyclical evolution of the PIRA. AC, armed component; Aux., auxiliary; UG, underground; PC, public component. The above represents the evolution 

of the Provisional IRA and its complementary public component, Sinn Féin. The 

insurgency began with the moribund armed component of the Official IRA along 

with a robust public component that emphasized direct action. After the 1969 split, 

the Provisional IRA revived its military wing. Sinn Féin, the political party associated with the PIRA, gained importance and influence after establishing Advice 

Centers in 1975 to monitor the cease-fire terms of the same year. The relationship 

between the armed component and the public component began to equalize in 

the 1980s after the death of hunger striker Bobby Sands and the 1986 Sinn Féin 

convention ending abstentionism. Into the 1990s, Sinn Féin entered negotiations 

with the British government, eventually leading to the signing of the 1998 Good 

Friday Agreement, which called for the decommissioning of the armed component 

and the entry of the public component into a devolved Northern Irish government.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

49

Evolution and Growth of the Organization

The IRA is an insurgent organization that dates back to the failed 

Easter Rising of 1916 against the British in Ireland. The early IRA, 

and its political wing, Sinn Féin, waged a successful guerilla campaign 

against a weakened Britain shortly after World War I in 1919–1921. 

Nearly all of Ireland gained independence from Britain, except the 

six counties of the traditional region of Ulster, now known as Northern Ireland. Catholic mobilization revived again during the worldwide 

political turbulence of the 1960s. During this decade, the IRA focused 

on direct action, influenced by socialist ideologies, at the expense of its 

armed wing. Waves of violence broke out in 1969 as the minority Catholic population marched in civil rights parades, calling for more equitable rights from the Protestant-dominated government. Mobs attacked 

each other across Belfast and Derry neighborhoods, and the British 

army was finally called in to regain control. As the violence continued 

to grow, a new offshoot of the IRA emerged to protect the Catholics 

from Protestant mobs and sectarian security forces and to drive British security forces back to England. This group called for a return to a 

focus on the armed component and a limited public component. The 

new Provisional IRA (PIRA), as it was called, just like the IRA from 

which it separated, intended to gain independence from Britain and 

unite with the Republic of Ireland through armed rebellion.

The Provisionals engaged in a three-decades-long campaign of 

urban guerilla warfare across Northern Ireland and England. The 

Provisionals underwent near collapses, rebuilding, and shifting tactics 

throughout the conflict until the 1998 cease-fire and the 2005 official end to its thirty-six-year armed campaign. In September 2005, the 

head of the PIRA’s decommissioning, General John de Chastelain, confirmed that the weapons of the group had been destroyed and that the 

final event had been observed by the General, a Catholic priest, and a 

Methodist minister. No others were allowed at the event nor were any 

photographs taken. The original organization, the Official IRA, continued its socialist activities and officially ended its armed struggle in 

2010, decommissioning its weapons in February 2010 under the same 

auspices as the PIRA.13

During the initial years of the fighting in the early 1970s, before the 

security forces refined their intelligence and counterinsurgent tactics, 

the Provisionals adopted the conventional military structure developed 

during the IRA’s long history of struggle against the British. As the British’s counterinsurgent tactics put more pressure on the Provisionals, the 

group re-aligned its strategy and structure. In the mid-1970s, the PIRA 

adopted a “long-war strategy,” or a war of attrition. To complement this 

strategy, and to counteract British intelligence efforts, the PIRA also 
50

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

adopted a cell structure. Initially, the Provisionals relied on, and could 

expect, active community support. After the failed 1975 cease-fire and 

Provisional bombings that killed several innocent civilians, a more warweary Catholic population was not as enthusiastic in their support of 

Provisional insurgents. However, because of the changing strategies of 

the PIRA—to a long-war strategy and a cell structure—the Provisionals 

did not require active community support but only passive support.14

The secrecy required by insurgent groups often ensures their inefficiency and incompetence.15

Command and Control

The best estimate of the PIRA as an organization indicates that 

it had only a few hundred official Army members after it reached a 

steady-state campaign in the mid-1970s. After The Troubles and the 

formation of the Provisional movement, volunteers were very easy to 

come by, and membership peaked during 1972. As the British stepped 

up their countermeasures and narrowed the opportunities for action 

and movement, the PIRA implemented a smaller cellular structure for 

its active units and diminished the number of volunteers needed. The 

support network for the Army, however, stretched into the thousands in 

both Northern Ireland and the Republic.16

Active Service Units (ASU) contained the bulk of the membership of 

the PIRA and carried out its military operations. These units included 

both part-time volunteers and full-time members of the Army. Some 

men and women held normal jobs in the communities and participated 

in Army operations on the weekends or after work hours (the auxiliary). 

Far fewer members were paid by the PIRA with a weekly allowance to 

enable their full-time support to the Army. Members who had such a 

stipend often received additional support from the local community 

in the form of purchased clothes, donations, and food.17 ASUs usually 

had four volunteers and one operations commander. If needed, an 

intelligence officer or an education officer could be made available for 

operational support or training, respectively. Each ASU was believed 

to be responsible for the bulk of their operational expenses, their local 

safe houses, and any required transportation. For security purposes, 

each operations commander most likely knew the identity of only one 

higher commander, the brigade adjutant. In turn, the brigade adjutant 

took orders from the higher geographical and/or central command.18

The PIRA was divided into two commands, the Northern and 

Southern commands19; the Northern Command covered the entirety 

of Northern Ireland plus the five Republic border counties of Louth, 

Cavan, Monaghan, Donegal, and Leitrim. This command was created 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

51

in 1976 and was the predominate area of operations for the PIRA. Its 

leadership was tightly coupled with the commanders above it. The 

creation of the Northern Command coincided with a marked shift 

in the PIRA leadership from being dominated by members from the 

Republic to those from Belfast and Northern Ireland. Southern Command, created slightly later, encompassed the rest of the Republic and 

was far smaller in membership and importance. Southern Command 

functioned mainly to provide logistical support for the operations in 

Northern Command, including training, funding, safe houses, and the 

storage and movement of arms.

The upper authority echelons of the PIRA consisted of the General 

Army Convention, the Army Executive, the Army Council, and General 

Headquarters (GHQ). GHQ regulated and executed the daily tasks of 

the Army, ensuring the maintenance of the commands, and centralized 

the functions of the Army, including Finance, Security, Quartermaster, 

Operations, Foreign Operations, Training, Engineering, Intelligence, 

Education, and Publicity. GHQ consisted of approximately fifty to sixty 

people who were responsible for the overall conduct of the PIRA. It 

was officially located in Dublin, Ireland, although many staff members 

were based elsewhere. GHQ was headed by the Army Chief of Staff, 

who was selected by vote of the Army Council and was the key decision 

maker within the Army. The first Chief of Staff was Seán MacStiofáin, 

one of the original troika that formed the Provisionals. Traditionally, 

the Chief of Staff and other major positions were held by the trusted 

core members, with little turnover unless one was arrested. Members 

were required to give up their positions upon capture, and they were 

banned from partaking in decisions for a period of time after their 

release. There were nine Chiefs of Staff from the PIRA’s inception to 

the peace accord in 2002.20

The Army Council was a seven-member panel, usually including 

the GHQ Chief of Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster, the 

Head of Intelligence, the Head of Publicity, and the Head of Finance. 

These men approved all major actions and established the majority of 

the strategy and policies of the PIRA, therefore serving as the main 

authority of the PIRA. The Council met at least once a month to review 

operations and to vote on major items, such as cease-fires or the expansion of operations to Britain.21 The Army Executive was a board of 

twelve very senior and experienced PIRA veterans who met every six 

months or so to review the activities of the Army Council and to serve 

as the voting body that elected the seven members of the Army Council. 

Members were barred from sitting on both the Executive and the Council.22 The Constitution of the PIRA placed the supreme authority of the 

movement within the General Army Convention. The Convention was 
52

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

a large body of delegates from the structures of the entire PIRA, and it 

was designed to meet to approve and vote on only the most important 

of issues, such as declarations of peace and the election of the Army 

Executive. The size of the Convention ranged from 100 to 200 members and included active volunteers, representatives for the imprisoned, 

staff from local brigades, the Commands, and GHQ, and usually all 

members of the Army Council. The constitution allowed for meetings 

to be held every two years, unless security deemed it prudent to delay 

the gathering of such a large group of members. The first convention 

instituted the new PIRA as an entity separate from the Official IRA, 

and others may have been held to debate major cease-fires, the end of 

abstentionism, and the final accords.23

Underground and Aboveground Connections

The relationship between the PIRA and its political arm, Sinn Féin, 

was often viewed as complementary and equal, but for the majority 

of the period of violence, the Army was the central organization and 

decision-making apparatus, while Sinn Féin was peripheral. The break 

of the Provisionals from the Official IRA in 1969 was due to perceptions that the Official IRA had emphasized a political strategy to the 

detriment of the armed rebelllion. Thus, the PIRA existed primarily 

as a fighting Army, seeing political solutions as undesirable and not 

worth pursuing until the British had been beaten into submission. Sinn 

Féin, therefore, operated mostly to explain the military operations to 

the public in the early days. It would take a generational change from 

within the Provisionals to make it possible for a political solution to 

take place in the 1990s. With the ascendancy of Gerry Adams to the 

top post of the political party in 1983, Sinn Féin became a powerhouse 

to the Republican cause, putting candidates up for office and acting 

as the proxy for the PIRA in the peace process. The PIRA also experienced a resurgence of support after the death of hunger striker Bobby 

Sands in 1981. His popularity, in part, derived from his election to the 

British Parliament while imprisoned. The success of this political strategy galvanized interest in the approach within the PIRA leadership. 

However, when the PIRA engaged in military actions, the British government would refuse Sinn Féin a place at the negotiating table until a 

cease-fire was called.

The PIRA’s refusal to officially participate in any government 

changed in 1981 after a Sinn Féin ard fheis, or convention. They would 

still abstain from the London and Dublin governments, and any Belfast 

assembly, but they would pursue and occupy seats in the country’s local 

elections. Sinn Féin first contested elections in 1985, winning 12 percent 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

53

of the first preference votes.24 Sinn Féin, however, was also up against 

its moderate counterpart, the Social Democratic and Labour Party 

(SDLP), which consistently did better at the polls than Sinn Féin. The 

SDLP offered a much milder brand of nationalism. In the 1982 election 

for the Northern Ireland Assembly, Sinn Féin received 64,191 votes to 

the SDLP’s 118,891. Relations between the two parties were noticeably 

sour during most of the 1980s.25

Although Sinn Féin’s candidates were often beaten, the threat of 

the political party, which openly supported armed struggle, worried 

both London and the unionists. In 1985, Britain and the Republic of 

Ireland struck an accord, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which stated the 

status of Northern Ireland would not be changed except by vote of the 

Northern Ireland population and that the Republic would work with 

the United Kingdom on issues of security, human rights, and reconciliation. The agreement gave the Republic an “ongoing, consultative 

role” in matters relating to Northern Ireland. Prime Minister Margaret 

Thatcher engineered the agreement partly to boost the strength of the 

SDLP against Sinn Féin but primarily for Irish support in security matters, especially along their porous border with the North.26 The agreement angered the unionists in Northern Ireland more than the PIRA, 

in part because the Republic and Britain had not requested any unionist presence or input during the negotiations. Gerry Adams argued that 

while, on one hand, the agreement legitimized the continued partition 

of Ireland, it also indicated that Republican activities were successful in 

gaining concessions from Britain.27

The PIRA continued its dual operations in both violence and politics, with the Sinn Féin now becoming as important as its military wing. 

Although Sinn Féin appeared to be gaining ascendancy over the latter, 

by no means did its members advocate a cessation of violence. The PIRA 

strategy gave equal measure to the ballot box and the ArmaLite. Both 

wings shared the same Republican aspirations and often even personnel. Released prisoners and other volunteers whose roles with the PIRA 

became public knowledge were often shuffled from the military wing 

to Sinn Féin.28 Moreover, those who opposed the dual strategy were 

expelled from the movement.c

 Ironically, the shipment of Libyan arms 

received in 1985 also bolstered the Provisionals’ emphasis on politics. 

Who could say that the volunteers advocating a political strategy were 

going soft on the armed struggle with an arms dump full of weapons?30

c A number of key Republicans disagreed with the Provisional Sinn Féin’s position on 

abstentionism. Ruairi O’Bradaigh, president of Sinn Féin before Gerry Adams took the 

reins in 1983, formed a splinter Republican movement, Republican Sinn Féin, and its military wing, the Continuity IRA.29
54

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

Gerry Adams took charge of the political party in 1983.d By 1986, the 

Provisionals removed the ban on taking government seats in the Dublin parliament and also removed the official taboo on any volunteer 

openly discussing ending abstentionism.31

Criminal Connections

The desperation of the seemingly perpetual shortage of operational 

funds led the PIRA to use some creative fundraising tactics. These 

schemes included providing armed escorts for payments on international shipments (or riding shotgun); money-laundering schemes in 

the United States, Northern Ireland, and the Republic; gypsy taxi services; and counterfeit merchandise (including film piracy, unregulated 

alcohol production and distribution, designer clothing, etc.) as well 

as legitimate “front” businesses.32 Social welfare fraud was a common 

exploitative tactic used by the PIRA; Irish-American fundraising bodies, such as NORAID (Northern Aid Committee) and FOSF (Friends 

of Sinn Féin), used local collections in pubs and clubs in Ireland and 

voluntary private donations as additional funding sources.33 This further heightened the suspicion of more sophisticated forms of money 

laundering.34 The PIRA turned to the United States for money and 

weapons as soon as they were organized enough to send agents abroad, 

and the Irish communities of Boston and New York proved very supportive. NORAID was founded by Irish expatriate Michael Flannery in 

New York City in 1970 to provide a steady stream of money to the IRA, 

mostly for the purchase of weapons. Republican sympathizers there 

cooperated at many stages of the weapons shipping routes to Dublin. 

For example, furniture might be filled with weapons at a warehouse, 

and customs in both New York and Dublin could be taken care of with 

a phone call. The arrival date would be given to someone in Dublin for 

pickup. Supply lines were established with Irish émigrés in the United 

States. One network alone shipped hundreds of light, powered, collapsible, concealable assault rifles during the 1970s. The security forces 

confiscated more than 700 weapons, 2 tons of explosives, and more 

than 150,000 rounds of ammunition in 1971 alone, most of which came 

from the United States.

The good fortunes of the PIRA hinged on the relationship they 

established with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 1972. Shipments 

began to flow to Dublin in 1973, often without success. The Claudia

was boarded by Irish authorities, revealing that the PIRA was willing 

d Adams, a northerner, replaced Ruairi O’Bradaigh, a southerner, in another 

instance in which control of the Republican movement was moving more firmly into 

northerner hands.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

55

to accept large amounts of money and weapons from the state-sponsor. The relationship was a long one that was only reinforced with the 

later leadership of the PIRA under Adams. The Eksund was captured 

by French authorities on November 1, 1987, with more than 150 tons 

of armaments from Libya: 1,000 AK-47s, 1 million rounds of ammunition, 430 grenades, 12 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 12 DHSK 

machine guns, more than 50 SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles, 2,000 electric detonators, 4,700 fuses, 106-mm cannons, anti-tank missiles, and 2 

tons of Semtex.

The PIRA was allegedly involved in narcotics trafficking in the late 

1970s and 1980s; however, condemnation from the Catholic Church 

and the subsequent decrease in popular support led to the abandonment of the tactic in favor of armed robbery.35 This involvement 

was probably an individual ASU-level decision vice an institutionally 

approved methode,36—cellular structures often risk having decisions 

made at the cell level rather than at higher levels of authority.f

 The Real 

IRA, another offshoot of the movement, did not rely as extensively on 

popular support or the approval of the Catholic Church as the PIRA. 

The Real IRA continued its practice of fundraising through narcotics 

trafficking; however, they expended considerable effort in concealing 

the activity from the populace. In an effort to diminish the Real IRA 

and reassert its relevance, the PIRA began targeting drug dealers in 

Northern Ireland with a series of violent acts to not only intimate/dissuade the industry, but also to reassert the PIRA’s role as the protectorate of the Irish Catholic community.37

e The social conservatism of many PIRA members often influenced their operations 

and policies. Seán MacStiofáin, first leader of the Provisional IRA, refused to allow contraceptives into Northern Ireland even though they had potential use in making acid fuses 

for bombs. His conservatism led one of his comrades to remark that MacStiofáin “would 

rather, it seemed, be caught with a Thompson [sub-machine gun] in his car boot than a 

packet of contraceptives in his pocket.”

f Cellular structures, particularly blind cells, are not as susceptible to communications interdiction as hierarchal structures because there are fewer requirements to 

communicate in the interest of operational security. Decentralization, however, has its 

concomitant risk because the core leadership of an organization has less tactical control 

of a cell and thus the cell leader’s freedom of movement may result in deviations from 

the group’s strategy. The South Armagh Brigade of the PIRA had a notoriously aggressive ASU commander dubbed “The Butcher” for both his occupation and his propensity 

toward violence. Though his attacks on British soldiers were alienating the local populace, 

the PIRA leadership decided not to contact him lest the clandestine relationship be discovered. In this case, accepting local deviations from strategy was more palatable than the 

risk of comprising the political effort by exposing the network.
56

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES AS ORGANIZATIONS

Mao, Lenin, and other leaders of global Communism paid a great 

deal of attention to organizational design and produced doctrinal 

statements of how Communist insurgencies should be organized. In 

his 1902 pamphlet “What Is To Be Done?” V. I. Lenin laid the organizational foundations of modern Communist insurgency. He formulated 

the notion that if revolutions are to be successful, they must be led 

by small, professional (i.e., Communist) elites. Later in his “Left-Wing 

Communism: An Infantile Disorder,” written in 1920, he stressed the 

importance of political infiltration and the use of united fronts to disguise the Communist revolutionaries’ purpose. He described the strategy of creating a covert parallel apparatus with interlocking leadership 

so that a small, highly disciplined elite could secretly direct and control 

a much larger revolutionary movement. Mao Tse-Tung formalized the 

strategy and tactics of a protracted guerrilla war among the rural peasantry as a means of extending international Communism into underdeveloped areas of Asia.

These models evolved over decades and through experience in multiple theaters. The outstanding features of Communist insurgencies 

as organizations were (1) the combining of aboveground and underground elements, especially through the infiltration and co-option of 

existing organizations, and (2) the matching of different divisions and 

committees to diverse functions.

Communist parties in Communist countries operated differently 

and are not a subject of this study. Legal Communist parties in nonCommunist countries usually took part in legitimate political competition but very often also had underground and/or armed components; 

their goal was still to overthrow the system and replace it with a Communist-controlled one.

While the worldwide Communist movement appears to be well past 

its peak, and there may be no active insurgency that instantiates the 

classical model described here, there is much to be learned from these 

ingenious organizational designs. We will refer to the model in the 

present tense, as it was described in the first edition of this book.

Command and Control

Communist organizations are essentially hierarchical, although 

they are designed to appear democratic. Rank-and-file members participate in meetings and self-criticism sessions, and the organization’s 

rhetoric is anti-elitist. But the power and decision making, by design, 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

57

rest with a small number of committees reporting upward in a pyramid 

structure.

National central committees wield most of the power, although 

officially the supreme authority is the national congress. The national 

congress is composed of delegates elected by the various conferences 

and by the next lower level of the party. The congress meets every two 

or three years, when it is convened by the central committee, and is 

charged with four major responsibilities: (1) to determine the tactical line for the party on political issues; (2) to revise the official program and make new statutes; (3) to hear and approve the reports of 

the central committee; and (4) to elect the central committee. From 

time to time it is called upon to discipline top members of the leadership. In practice, most matters that are considered before the national 

congress have already been discussed. The central committee prepares 

and documents questions and problems, which are sent to the various 

party levels where they are discussed and agreed upon. The national 

congress usually approves what has already been decided. It also sanctions the decisions of the central committee. The national conference 

is called into special session by the central committee if urgent political 

matters arise in the period between party congresses. It is restricted in 

size to a small number of delegates. It is often used as a substitute for 

the national congress when the party, to minimize the chance of police 

detection, wishes to conduct clandestine meetings that can be quickly 

called and dispersed.

Between meetings of the national congress, the maximum authority of the party rests with the central committee, which is composed of 

top party leaders and varies in size from party to party. The members 

must have demonstrated competence in organizational ability. Their 

functions include carrying out the decisions of the national congress, 

supervising finances, enforcing programs and statutes, and controlling the party press and propaganda. The central committee sets up a 

finance commission for fundraising and a central control commission 

for carrying out party discipline and security. Its executive bureau, the 

political bureau (politbureau), is made up of ten to twelve members 

who are elected by the central committee and directs party activities 

between meetings.38

A secretary general and two aides are elected by the central committee to carry on the daily operations of the party. This secretariat 

transmits the decisions of the central committee and the party to the 

subordinate commands. The secretary general is the highest-ranking 

elected official and is responsible to the party congress. He makes decisions with the politburo and is responsible to the central committee. The 

party presidency, an honorary post, exists in some Communist parties.39
58

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

There are executive committees set up to discuss and resolve problems at the various echelons and pass issues to higher authorities for 

consideration. These committees supervise ideological instruction, the 

training of executive committees for finance and control committees, 

and the elections of delegates to the next higher level of the party. 

In addition, they are responsible for routing party business and directives through their area jurisdiction and executing the decisions of the 

party. All members of the party belong to a cell and have weekly or 

biweekly meetings.40

International Command and Control

National committees were intended to be part of a global hierarchy, with all national Communist organizations reporting to the Communist International (Comintern). In the 1930s, the Comintern was 

extended to every part of the world. In Western Europe and America, 

permanent bases were established. In many parts of the Western Hemisphere, seamen’s and port workers’ international organizations served 

as reception and reporting centers for agents. Agents could report to 

one of these groups and receive shelter, money, and further instructions. Agents within the maritime organizations made contacts for international functionaries, agents, and instructors passing through their 

districts and also provided cover addresses for covert communications. 

They received and handled international funds for local organizations. 

During the period from 1930 to World War II, through its Executive 

Committee (ECCI), the Comintern became a second arm of Soviet foreign policy. The role and power of the Comintern changed after the 

rise of China as a second-leading Communist power. Because of disharmony between the Soviet Union and China after World War II, the 

Comintern became less powerful than the Soviet and Chinese national 

committees, which exerted separate control over client state committees. International coordination still occurred, such as joint support for 

regional insurgencies, but these were negotiated rather than mandated 

by the Comintern.

Chain of Command Between Committee Levels

The Communist Party operates on principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism. Collective leadership means that 

executive and administrative decisions must be agreed upon by the 

majority of the officers at a given level of the party. Collective leadership, however, is an exception and practiced only during interparty 

conferences. In practice, the party functions in a highly centralized 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

59

manner, with authority and command decisions flowing from the top 

to the lower echelons.41

Democratic centralism means that within the hierarchy of party 

organizations and committees, each lower body selects a representative 

to serve on a party committee; this committee in turn selects another 

representative to serve on a higher committee in the hierarchy. The 

principle of democratic centralism is followed throughout Communist 

organizations. Unit committees are elected by the membership or the 

delegates of the party organization. Each committee must report regularly on the activity of the party organization and must give an account 

of its work. These committees are responsible for carrying out the decisions of the higher party committees. All decisions of the higher committees are binding upon the lower body members.

In theory, each proposal is discussed at the lower levels of the party, 

and each committee member presents the opinion of the lower body 

to the next higher body until a decision is made at the central committee level. Once a decision is made, the entire party must carry it out. 

In general practice, a decision is determined at the central committee 

level and, although the lower echelons discuss it, the members are well 

aware that they must ultimately concur with it.42

Elections of committee members and their secretaries must be 

approved by the committee at the next higher level. This enables the 

leadership to exercise strict control over subordinates and to suppress 

any opposition from the outset.43 Changes in leadership within the 

Communist Party are not frequent; elections become the equivalent of 

promotions. The leadership submits candidates and issues to the membership. In order to legitimize this authority, members are compelled 

to discuss these matters and overtly agree and vote on them.

This disposition of authority follows the party principle of reverse 

representation at all levels. The elected or designated leader of any 

organizational element of the party, regardless of the level at which 

he operates, represents among his associates the authority of the next 

highest party body. He is not the spokesman for his subordinates in 

higher party councils, but rather the latter’s liaison with lower levels.

The Role of Self-Criticism Sessions

Institutionalized criticism or self-criticism serves two essential purposes in the Communist organization: (1) it increases the efficiency of 

the party by subjecting its operations to constant review and revision; 

and (2) it creates a norm of behavior in members and helps secure 

commitment and dedication to the party. The actual activities of criticism and self-criticism sessions consist of conferences, discussions, and 

meetings within the party in which attempts are made to determine 
60

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

and correct any weaknesses in the work of the party or party members. 

Criticism is practiced on all occasions and is an integral part of Communist life.

Theoretically, all decisions and basic policies of the party are open 

to institutional criticism and discussion in these sessions. But in actual 

practice, criticisms must never contradict the essential party line and 

are directed only toward improving the practice and implementation 

of existing revolutionary theory. A member is expected to analyze mistakes and shortcomings of the party operations only. Unless his criticism 

is constructive—that is, offers a concrete proposal for improvement in 

work or a method for correcting mistakes—it is not accepted and the 

individual making the criticism may find him or herself under attack. 

No criticism may be made of the central leadership, and no organized 

expressions of criticism or dissent are tolerated.44

Self-criticism sessions are a unique and effective feature of Communist organizations and are designed to develop absolute commitment 

and ideological dedication among members so that party orders are 

implemented, not mechanically but creatively. They attempt to make 

the individual member think in terms of a vanguard and how better to 

advance the current line and more effectively carry out revolutionary 

work. Members are compelled to report errors, mistakes, or weaknesses 

displayed by all party members no matter how small or trivial; they may 

also state and restate any change in policy.45

Every party member knows that if he does not make every effort 

to contribute seriously to criticism of his fellows, he will be obliged to 

confess this guilt in the subsequent comprehensive dissection of his 

own conduct. He also knows that participating fully in the identification of others’ failings will not help him to escape his own eventual 

subjection to the same process. The thorough analysis of his conduct 

can proceed into the smallest details of his life, both private and public, 

both intimate and generally known. He must clearly acknowledge his 

faults before the group and promise to improve. He understands that 

an inadequate response in his own session can lead to a reduction of 

rank or even to expulsion from the party. Thus, the sessions instill in 

each member a need to demonstrate to his associates his unqualified 

responsiveness to the wishes of authority so that he can avoid undue 

attention by his cohorts and escape excessive criticism when his turn 

comes. In this fashion the Communist Party maintains a built-in, permanent uncertainty and apprehensiveness among the rank and file 

and can be assured of obedience from below.46
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

61

Underground and Aboveground Connections

Communist insurgencies, although past their peak of activity, may 

be unmatched in the sophistication with which they coordinate multiple organizations to achieve their ends. The Communist model laid 

a blueprint for parallel governance structures, infiltration of existing 

organizations, and coordination of multiple organizations in united 

insurgent fronts.

Parallel Structures

Article 12 of the Comintern Statutes called for Communists 

throughout the world to create secret illegal Communist organizations 

alongside legal organizations. Even in countries where the Communist Party is a legal political party, Communists typically maintained 

two major organizations, one open and one covert. The overt organization functions as an ordinary political party. However, the Communists 

everywhere organize their party into a system of cells and committees, 

regardless of the size or strength of the party or the degree of government opposition. Even in the legal party, the cellular structure serves to 

train members in conspiratorial behavior. Cell meetings are often held 

secretly so that members attending them can learn how to travel to and 

from them without arousing suspicion. Members are assigned minor 

intelligence gathering or sabotage missions, which in themselves have 

little or no practical use but which test and train members in clandestine behavior. A press (either open or clandestine) is usually set up in 

order to give members experience in writing, printing, and distributing 

material for the party.

In addition to the open legal party, a highly compartmentalized, 

clandestine organization is also created. Members of its cells are people who have potential value to the Communist Party in the event of 

an insurgency or coup d’état. Individuals recruited from government, 

vital communications centers, industry, or other organizations that the 

Communists seek to infiltrate may not be admitted directly to the party 

itself but may become members of clandestine cells. Thus a network 

of infiltrators and agents in important positions is in readiness. These 

cells may remain dormant for many years, being used only to collect 

selective intelligence, and are activated only in case of an insurgency.47

Communist doctrine also distinguishes between legal and illegal 

organizations for gathering intelligence and espionage internationally. 

While the party operates openly or through front groups, it also operates through embassies, foreign trade commissions, and news agency 

personnel. Those agencies that enjoy diplomatic immunity are termed 

the legal apparatus within a country. The term legal is used because the 
62

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

members of such agencies have diplomatic immunity and, if arrested 

for espionage activities, are not jailed but declared persona non grata 

and forced to leave the country.

The illegal apparatus is composed of espionage or intelligence 

agencies such as the Soviet GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) and 

the KGB (Committee for State Security) and their agents and informers. If caught and arrested, members of these units can be legally tried 

for espionage. The GRU is in charge of military intelligence in foreign 

countries and the KGB units are responsible for nonmilitary espionage in foreign countries, operating parallel and often rival units to 

the GRU.48

Infiltration of Mass Organizations and Use of “Front” Organizations

A hallmark of Communist insurgencies is the infiltration, manipulation, and coordination of non-Communist groups, including trade 

unions, farmer’s cooperatives, advocacy groups, and even government 

agencies.

Large groups that the Communists strive to infiltrate are called 

“mass organizations.” Communist Party theory holds that a small 

group of highly disciplined individuals, operating through mass organizations, can rally the support required to win a revolution. V. I. Lenin 

recognized the vulnerability of mass organization to infiltration and 

manipulation. In turn, Joseph Stalin argued that Communist Party 

members must avoid the concept that efforts to build up the party 

should be directed solely toward recruiting new members. Instead, he 

suggested that the Communists systematically use mass organizations 

as “transmission belts” to the broad masses of nonparty workers. By 

working through mass organizations, Communist Party workers can 

reach and influence many thousands of workers “not yet prepared 

for Party membership.” “[Through] these organizations, led by wellfunctioning fractions the Party must necessarily find its best training 

and recruiting ground. [Mass organizations] are the medium through 

which the Party . . . guides and directs the workers in their struggles 

and . . . keeps itself informed on the mood of the masses, the correctness of the Party slogans, etc.”49

In addition to infiltrating existing organizations, Communists also 

organize “front” groups to use people who are sympathetic with causes 

that the Communist Party promotes but who are either unreliable or 

would not for personal reasons join the Communist Party. Front groups 

are organized around currently popular issues. While the party usually 

controls these organizations, they are kept separate. The Communists 

also attempt to gain control of governmental agencies through coalitions with other, non-Communist parties.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

63

The use of front organizations in an insurgency can be illustrated 

by several cases. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), early in its history, set about organizing a number of front groups, including the Proletarian Art League, Youth Corps, Racial Emancipation League, and 

General Labor Unions (GLU). The labor front was perhaps the most 

important. Using the demand for higher wages to match the rise in 

rubber and tea prices as a basis, the union movement organized a number of strikes and collective actions. The principle of organizing labor 

for collective action was new to Malaya in the thirties, and the Communists’ efforts to develop labor unions were to pay off in the insurgency 

after World War II.

After the war, the MCP set up additional organizations. It organized a General Trade Union and a Youth League to attract Chinese 

students. Once the insurrection was underway, a Cultivation Corps, 

an Anti-British Alliance Society, a Students’ Union, Women’s Union, 

etc., as well as less overtly political organizations, such as youth and 

sporting groups, were organized. With employment hard to find, it 

was often necessary for a man to join a Communist union in order 

to get a job. The MCP  also established its own schools and clubs so 

that it could approach the Chinese community to conduct political discussions and disseminate party literature.50 During the insurgency in 

Greece, the Communists organized and controlled many front groups, 

such as the Seamen’s Partisan Committee, the Communist Organization for Greek Macedonia, and the Democratic Women’s Organization 

of Greece. In the rural areas, the Communist Party operated through 

the Greek Agrarian Party (AKE) and the United All Greece Youth 

Organization (EPON).51

In the Philippines, Communist Party officials spent much time 

before the war engaging in labor activities in Manila and other parts 

of Luzon. The printer’s union was influenced by Mariana Balgos, and 

the League of the Sons of Labor was headed by Crisanto Evangelista, 

both noted Communist leaders. The League of Poor Laborers, the predecessor of the Confederation of Peasants, was among the mass support organizations that provided the base of support for the insurgency 

between 1946 and 1954. Most of the members of the Communist politbureau in Manila were officers in the unions affiliated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO).52

Methods of Controlling Mass Organizations

Most voluntary, large-scale organizations are composed of a leadership (a small corps of individuals who represent the administration), a 

few faithful, full-time followers, and a large group of dues-paying members. The followers usually leave the operations and decisions to the 
64

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

leadership. Members may or may not agree with the leaders on all decisions and actions.53 Members who are willing to work and accept responsibility are usually given the opportunity to do so and indeed, such 

willingness leads to a gradual promotion to leadership responsibilities.

When planning a takeover, the Communists first try to gain influence in the organization’s membership office in order to control 

recruitment and to infiltrate Communist members. Once in, Communists are instructed to volunteer for all positions and for all work in 

the organization. They are instructed to be the first to arrive at and 

the last to leave meetings. They are taught how to harass non-Communist speakers and, through the tactics of attrition-through-tedium, win 

votes and offices within the organization. They seek the leadership of 

political and education committees and use these offices to identify 

people in the organization who might be sympathetic and those who 

are avowedly anti-Communist. Editorship of the organization’s newspapers provides opportunities for expressing subversive ideas and gives 

access to printing materials that may be used to establish Communist 

distribution routes. Once the Communists have organized cells or fractions within the organization, they caucus and plan their organizational moves in advance.54

The Communist seeks leadership positions and represents himself as dedicated and loyal to the organization, taking the initiative in 

planning activities and volunteering for any job, no matter how time 

consuming or unpleasant. He is instructed to avoid the appearance 

of any subversive activity. Although his candidacy is supported by cell 

members in the rank and file, close ties between the candidate and 

the cell collaborators are hidden from the general membership so that 

the candidate’s support appears spontaneous and unsolicited. Usually 

the most vocal members at a meeting pass resolutions and manipulate 

the apathetic majority. Therefore, a small, articulate group can readily 

influence the direction of the organization and eventually gain control.

In such organizations as labor unions, systems of rewards and punishments can be utilized to maintain the obedience of members. If a 

member is dropped from a union he may not be able to get employment. On the other hand, if the union leader improves the lot of the 

union members, they will more willingly go along with more purely 

political actions and obey strike calls. In addition, goon squads may 

be used to “persuade” uncooperative members. Having instruments of 

persuasion and coercion, the leadership can gain the compliance of a 

majority of members. Most members will comply with a strike decision, 

since higher wages may benefit them and failure to comply will only 

lead to punishment, loss of membership, or worse. When using front 

organizations, the Communists attempt to develop and maintain the 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

65

loyalties of people who otherwise could not be persuaded to enter the 

Communist Party or who, even if willing, would not be sufficiently reliable. They also are able to mobilize many who are indifferent or even 

opposed to Communist ideology—uniting them instead behind causes 

such as “nationalism,” “liberation,” “pacifism,” or other popular social 

issues within a particular society. The organization also attempts to 

gain support of those elements within the community, such as religious 

and fraternal organizations, that command the respect and loyalty of 

the workers.55

The cell attempts to evaluate the power structure of the group that 

it is trying to infiltrate. In professional groups such as industrialists, 

lawyers, or university presidents, the Communists seek to control executive staff functions because this is where the power resides in such 

organizations. They look upon the facade of distinguished citizens on 

the board of directors as an asset to the organizational infiltration. 

Hence, they do not seek positions of prestige but instead positions of 

control that affect the day-to-day operations of the organization.

In the Malayan Communist insurgency, for example, the MCP 

maintained its influence within the GLU through three separate control systems. The first system was made up of a president or secretary 

and two or three full-time organizers, who were part of the open membership of the labor union. Although they were party members, they 

avoided any connection with meetings or activities that might identify 

them with the party. They reported to and took orders from the GLU. 

They were told to operate within the law and to give the impression 

that their primary interest was the advancement and concern of trade 

unionism.

The second system of control was exercised through underground 

party members, who held no official office and were members of the 

open rank and file. They were activists who recruited new members for 

the union and for the MCP. They served to engender grassroots sentiment for policies favored by the party, enabling the leader to avoid the 

appearance of dictating to the union. This group also reported on the 

financial status of each member and provided information to the party 

on membership attitudes; the party then based organization policy on 

these reports. The underground members reported to the section of 

the party responsible for trade unionism, which was separate from the 

regular party. These members were more trusted than the leaders, who 

were considered expendable if discovered.

The third control system consisted of the regular party members 

who formed a fraction within the union membership. They held no 

official posts. They reported their activities to and received orders from 

the regular party.56
66

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

United Front Activities

After gaining control of existing mass organizations and creating 

front organizations, Communist strategy is to combine forces of these 

groups into united fronts while still maintaining the appearance of 

each group’s independence. The groups in the united front need not 

agree with the objectives or goals of the Communist Party. However, 

if there is an aboveground party, they may offer support. In this manner the Communists maintain organizational integrity while becoming 

associated with other, legitimate organizations.57 By drawing a number 

of legitimate groups into a united front, the Communists can gain the 

prestige of speaking for a large and diverse group of people. Once in 

the front, they may seek to discredit the leaders of the other organizations so as to gain control of their followings.58

In Venezuela, the creation of a united front was the first major step 

in initiating an insurgency and is characteristic of most Communistdominated insurgencies. For example, the Venezuelan Communist 

Party (Partido Comunista Venezolano, or PCV) initially used its legal 

status to cover its illegal activities. Communists infiltrated the Acción 

Democrática (Democratic Action Party, or AD), and in 1960, under 

Domingo Alberto Rangel, the left wing of the party was expelled. The 

party formed a new group called the Movement of the Revolutionary 

Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario, or MIR). In the midfifties, both the MIR and PCV were in militant opposition to President 

Rómulo Betancourt. In 1961, the MIR used its congressional immunity 

to carry out terrorism against the Betancourt regime. Finally, in 1962, 

both the PCV and MIR were ruled illegal by the Supreme Court of Venezuela. After this decision, a National Liberation Front (Frente de Liberación Nacional, or FLN) was formed to unite all left-wing elements 

against President Betancourt and initiate an insurgency. The FLN 

organized the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas 

de Liberación Nacional, or FALN) to conduct urban terror and guerrilla warfare against the government.

In 1962, the Minister of Defense of Venezuela described the Communist plan as it appeared in captured FALN documents. The FALN 

proposed (1) agitation against the government; (2) demonstrations, 

disturbances, strikes, and terrorism; (3) sabotage and guerrilla actions 

throughout the country; and (4) insurrection culminating in violent 

takeover of power. The purpose was to create such chaos that the 

armed forces would take power through strong-arm methods; then the 

Communists would overthrow the army and gain control of the government. The Communists have gained support in the left wing of the 

Republican and Democratic Union (Unión República Democrática, or 

URD), which withdrew from the Betancourt coalition in protest against 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

67

the government’s anti-Castro action in 1960, as well as the AD opposition, which split from the AD in 1962. Both of these elements supported the terroristic campaign.59

Another example of a united front was the North Vietnamese opposition that united behind opposition to French rule. Communists were 

flexible enough to even temporarily disavow Communist affiliation to 

achieve longer-term gains. In May 1941, members of the Indochinese 

Communist Party (ICP) formed the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi 

(League for the Independence of Vietnam) or, as they were popularly 

known, the Viet Minh. The organization was a broad coalition of political parties, all of which wished to free Vietnam from French rule. But 

many nationalists did not join the coalition because it was Communist 

controlled, and Ho Chi Minh officially dissolved the ICP on November 11, 1945. In May 1946, in still another move to win nationalist support, he announced the establishment of the Mat Tran Lien Hiep Quoc 

Dan Viet Nam (Vietnamese Popular National Front), a broader front 

than the Viet Minh, whose goal was “independence and democracy.”

In 1951, because the front received most of its aid from Communist 

China and the Communist bloc, the Communists felt that they had sufficient control over the movement and could reestablish a Communist 

Party. In addition, if some unforeseen event should occur in which they 

lost control of the front, they wanted to leave some official representation in the organization. The name, Dang Lao Dong (Workers’ Party), 

was carefully selected. One party document describes how questions 

about the party’s connection to Communism would be handled: “It 

should never be admitted outside Party circles that the Workers’ Party 

is the Communist Party in its overt form for fear of frightening and 

alienating property owners and weakening national unity. To party 

members and sympathizers it can be admitted that the Workers’ Party 

is the Communist Party, but to others it should neither be admitted 

nor denied.”60 In this way they avoided alienating people who for one 

reason or another could not accept Communism but at the same time 

won recognition from other Communist parties throughout the world.

Re-using the same tactics, in 1962, the Communists organized the 

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). In order 

to control the movement, key members of the central committee of the 

Lao Dong Party went to the South to participate in the operations. Once 

they had firm control, a thinly disguised Communist Party (People’s 

Revolutionary Party, or PRP) was formed that is ostensibly independent 

of the North but in fact is an extension of the Lao Dong Workers’ Party. 

Except in the rare cases involving attempted coup d’état, the creation 

of a united front has preceded the initiation of Communist insurgency 

and guerrilla warfare.
68

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

When Radio Hanoi announced the formation of the PRP, it avoided 

the word “Communist” and described the party as “representatives of 

Marxist-Leninists in the South.” A captured Viet Cong document that 

originated in North Vietnam and was sent to a provisional party committee in South Vietnam states that the formation of the PRP should 

be explained to party members as a tactical move to rebut accusations 

about the invasion of the South by the North and to permit the NFLSV 

to recruit new members and win sympathy and support from nonaligned 

nations. In July 1962, when the North Vietnamese signed the international agreements on Laos, a member of the delegation reported to 

foreign journalists that the list of members of the central committee of 

the Workers’ Party was necessarily incomplete. Some names had been 

left off in order to protect the identity of men who were directing military operations in South Vietnam.61,62

Aligning of Structure to Strategy

Communist insurgencies, especially in the later stages of operations, employ a wide variety of specialized divisions, including military 

components, legal and illegal activists, and infiltrated external organizations brought into a united Communist front. Figure 3-6 shows the 

organizational structure of a mature insurgency.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

69

Central

Committee

National

Committees

Supreme

Headquarters

Military forces

National

Liberation

Front

Provincial

Committees

Provincial

Liberation

Committee

District

Liberation

Committee

District

Liberation

Committee

Local

(village or hamlet)

Liberation

Committee

Secretary

General

Politbureau

Front groups

Professional

groups

Youth

groups

Women’s

groups

Workers’

groups

Farmers’

groups

Main forces

• Battalion

• Company

• Platoon

• Squad

Regional forces

• Company

• Platoon

• Squad

District

Local

Local forces

(village militia)

Cells

Communist Party (CP)

Military force Civil organization

CP

cells

CP

cells

CP

cells

CP

cells

CP

cells

CP

cells

Figure 3-6. Organizational divisions and hierarchy of a mature 

Maoist insurgency.

Figure 3-6 shows that Communist organizations have some aspects 

of modern matrix designs, implementing both regional authority and 

also functional command.63 Regionally, commands are hierarchically 

arranged from cells to local district, provincial, and national commands. But this does not imply that local leaders are independently 

directing local military actions; their involvement instead relates to 

recruiting, intelligence gathering, and interfacing with the population. 

There are parallel lines of authority enacting military strategies and 
70

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

political strategies. The movement still retains paramilitary elements 

for special purposes even in the latter stages of an insurgency, when 

the overall emphasis has shifted from discrediting the government to 

capturing and holding territory. Paramilitary units have a parallel command structure and higher levels of secrecy and compartmentalization. 

There is also a parallel divisional line for control of associated front 

organizations, shown on the far right of Figure 3-6 and described earlier in this chapter.

The central committee maintains highest authority over all aspects 

of the movement, but the most important methods of exerting crosscontrol between specialized divisions are not necessarily through the 

formal lines of reporting. Another trademark of Communist organization design is the strategy of placing high-level functionaries on governing committees across different functional divisions. These elite 

members are not necessarily in the majority and do not necessarily 

have formal power (although they do have the backing of the official 

party); so in large measure, these party members have to rely on their 

well-practiced skills of both overt leadership and subversive influence 

to bring about coordinated action.

AL QAEDA AS A DECENTRALIZED NETWORK

The Al  Qaeda “franchise”’ represents a model of an insurgent 

organization that is very different from either the regional model of 

the PIRA or the global infiltration model of Maoist insurgencies, with 

different goals and a looser, more decentralized command structure. 

(This section on Al Qaeda is written for the most part in the past tense, 

because it is based on information that mostly predates Operation 

Enduring Freedom [OEF].)

Secrecy and Compartmentalization

Al Qaeda was conceptualized as a conspiratorial network that draws 

on leaders of all its regional nodes, and, when necessary, those leaders 

serve as an integral part of Al Qaeda’s high command. Its structure is 

similar to that of a holding company, whose structure includes a core 

management group that controls partial or complete interests in other 

companies.64 By some estimates, Al  Qaeda had autonomous underground cells in some one hundred countries.65 This apparent decentralization not only makes tracking affiliated militants and uncovering 

their operations more difficult, because there are no longer central 

“nodes” of individuals or institutions where significant activity is taking 
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

71

place, but it also increases the probability that cells will recruit on 

their own.66

Evolution and Growth of the Organization

Figure 3-7 depicts the evolution of Al Qaeda as will be described in 

this section. The organization started as an underground organization 

in Peshawar, Pakistan, providing support (in the form of Arab volunteers) to the Afghan mujahidin. When “Al Qaeda” was officially formed 

in the late 1980s, the organization was entirely underground and operated from Afghanistan, then from Sudan, then again from Afghanistan. 

Its armed component consisted of the 055 Brigade in Afghanistan as 

well as the training camp operations; beyond that, the elements were a 

loosely affiliated set of cells. In the wake of OEF, Al Qaeda has splintered 

and established regional underground franchise in Yemen (Al Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP), North Africa (Al Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM), and most recently Somalia (Al Shabaab).

Ideologically, Al Qaeda represents the extremist fringe of the global 

political Islamist movement67 and the culmination of a religious struggle viewed in evolutionary terms. Al Qaeda’s evolution corresponded 

roughly to the schools of thought prevalent among Islamic militants 

during different times. The first phase was associated with the charter of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, titled “The Neglected Duty” and written by Mohammad Abdel Salam Farraj. Early phases of this struggle 

were characterized by groups of dissident Muslims actively seeking to 

overthrow their own regimes, which they viewed as “apostate” governments. This “defensive jihad” was then expanded beyond the domestic 

arena to the entire globe. The second phase, epitomized by the writings of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, was strongly influenced by the Soviet 

invasion of Afghanistan and the continued occupation of the Palestinian territories. Proponents of the radical doctrine argued that it was 

necessary for Muslims to fight alongside their co-religionists wherever 

apostate governments existed. This was exemplified by the participation of many Arab fighters in the Afghan struggle against the Soviets. Ultimately came the transition to an offensive jihad against the 

far enemy—Europe and the United States.68 This third phase has long 

been present in the writings of political Islamists but became Al Qaeda’s guiding principle when Azzam was killed and bin Laden secured 

singular control over the group’s future direction.
72

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

Mid-1980s Early 1990s

2012

Al Qaeda Core

UG

UG

UG

UG

UG

UG

UG

UG

Aux.

Aux.

AC

AC

Aux.

Aux.

AQIM

Al 

Shabaab

AQAP

AC

PC

AC

UG

Time

Figure 3-7. Evolution of Al Qaeda as a decentralized network, 1989–2012. AC, 

armed component; Aux., auxiliary; UG, underground; PC, public component. 

Al Qaeda, the loosely affiliated network at the center of the global Salafist jihad, 

started as primarily an underground organization in Peshawar, Pakistan, providing support (in the form of Arab volunteers) to the Afghan mujahidin. The MAK 

(Services Bureau) served as the overt element, although their role was more logical 

and financial than political. When Al Qaeda officially formed in the late 1980s, 

the organization was entirely underground and operated from Afghanistan, then 

from Sudan, then again from Afghanistan. Its armed component consisted of the 

055 Brigade in Afghanistan as well as the training camp operations; beyond that 

the elements were a loosely affiliated set of cells. In the wake of OEF, Al Qaeda 

has splintered and established regional underground franchises in Yemen (AQAP), 

North Africa (AQIM), and most recently Somalia (Al Shabaab). After Bin Laden’s 

death in May 2011, the leadership passed to Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, whose core 

likely still operates from Pakistan.

Throughout this evolution, the structure of Al Qaeda was purposefully designed to be covert, secure, and ideologically (but not necessarily tactically) authoritative. The following excerpts from an Al Qaeda 

publicationg (Figures 3-8 and 3-9) delineate the organization’s principles, requirements, and operational priorities. Although just a snapshot, this translated component establishes a hierarchy between the 

military commander (a position also referred to as “emir”) and his 

g The “Manchester Manual” was discovered by the Manchester (U.K.) Metropolitan Police during a search of an Al Qaeda member’s home. The manual was found in a 

computer file described as “the military series” related to the “Declaration of Jihad.” The 

manual was translated into English and is available at the following website: http://www.

justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

73

advisory council and the individual members (or soldiers). This is a 

relatively simply replicated model that could be instituted by nascent 

(or franchised) cells. As those cells mature, specialization within the 

advisory council could emerge; however, the overarching strategy was 

retained by a new franchise and imbued in each new member.

Figure 3-8. Excerpt from page 13 of the “Manchester Manual.”
74

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

Figure 3-9. Excerpt from page 14 of the “Manchester Manual.”

Organizationally, the roots of Al Qaeda lie in a number of different organizations, including the Maktab Al Khidamat (MAK) or Services Office, a clearinghouse established to facilitate the recruitment, 

transportation, organization, training, and equipping of Arabs to support the Afghan resistance. Established by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a 

Palestinian scholar of Islamic law, and Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, 

Pakistan, in 1984, the MAK consisted of a network of international 

recruiting offices, bank accounts, and safe houses and was also responsible for the construction of paramilitary camps for the training of 

militants and the fortifications used by Arab fighters.h The network of 

international recruiting offices (including the Al Kifah Refugee Center at the Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn, New York) and bank accounts 

collected and distributed nearly $600 million annually from a variety 

of Islamic charities and state sponsors. The MAK was responsible for 

training approximately 12,000–15,000 of those fighters,i

 with approximately 4,000 remaining connected through either chain of command 

or ideological affinity after the conflict. The MAK also played a role, 

albeit minor, in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Operation 

Cyclone, which helped provide funding and weapons to the Afghan 

mujahidin through Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Directorate 

(ISI). Al Qaeda as an organization can be traced to a meeting held 

on August 11, 1988, between Azzam, bin Laden, and Zawahiri among 

others that addressed what to do with financial resources and a cadre 

of trained operatives once the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was 

h Azzam originally established the MAK and later persuaded bin Laden to join. Bin 

Laden used his family’s relationship with the Saudi Royal Family to support the effort 

overtly—through a strategic communications plan—and covertly, eventually matching 

U.S. financial contributions to the resistance.

i Between 1982 and 1992, estimates report approximately 35,000 foreign fighters 

contributed to the Afghan effort, although there were probably never more than 2,000 in 

Afghanistan at any one time.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

75

complete. The 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan emboldened 

the Al  Qaeda leadership, who believed their success in Afghanistan 

could be replicated in other Muslim territories. Some fighters remained 

in Afghanistan, but many traveled to other conflict sites, not only to 

support the global religious struggle but also because they were unwelcome in their home countries.j

To grow their nascent organization, Al Qaeda targeted mosques, 

schools, and boardinghouses throughout the world to serve as recruiting 

stations.69 Although many fighters came from middle- and upper-class 

backgrounds, many also drew monthly paychecks from the organization.70 During the 1980s, many Muslim nations supported the efforts 

of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more militant Islamic groups to 

recruit, encourage, and, to a lesser degree, facilitate the movement 

of young Muslim males from their native nations to Pakistan. Upon 

arrival, they were received, housed, and trained by Azzam and bin Laden’s MAK and inserted into Afghanistan to support the Afghan mujahidin resistance of the Soviet occupation.71 Al Qaeda does not necessarily 

use a centralized recruiting approach, often allowing subordinate 

leaders to determine the most appropriate course of recruitment for a 

given operational need,72 but Al Qaeda does use a variety of models and 

approaches to recruiting. Some (referred to as The Net,k

 The Funnel,l

j The existence of so many conflicts, spread across a wide geographic space, facilitated the entry of many individuals into the militant apparatus. When enhanced security 

in one region made movement difficult (as was the case on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border after the 1998 bombings in East Africa), Al Qaeda’s leadership reached out to movements located elsewhere that could house and train militants (in this case the Philippines 

offered an alternate location).

k In The Net, target populations may be engaged equitably. Some members will 

respond positively and others negatively, but in general the whole population is viewed 

as primed for recruitment. The target audience is viewed as homogeneous and receptive 

(and therefore does not require a differentiated message). This approach is used when 

serious opposition to the group (or cause) is absent in the audience’s environment. It was 

initially used during by MAK during the anti-Soviet recruiting campaign throughout the 

Middle East and is often endorsed by various regimes.

l In The Funnel, the recruiter uses a phased approach when the target population is 

ripe for recruitment yet may require significant transformation in identity and/or motivation. With Al Qaeda, progress is measured “by validation of commitment to Salafist principles through the recruits’ demonstrated knowledge of al-Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam 

and both the willingness and ability to employ violence to achieve its goals.” This approach 

can backfire (as it has in certain cases of Al Qaeda recruits) because individuals may not 

fully accept the ideology or may become turned off by the justifications for and types of 

violence perpetrated on behalf of Islam.
76

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

The Infection,m and The Seed Crystaln), but not all, are detailed in 

the footnote below.73 Within the aforementioned models, Gerwehr and 

Daly also describe four recruiting approaches that are interchangeably 

used depending on the environment: public and proximate, public and 

mediated, private and proximate, and private and mediated.74 In the first 

approach, public and proximate, recruiters commingle with the target 

population and make appeals individually or in small groups irrespective of any opposition or observation by authorities.75 Islamic groups 

have used this approach for generations in prisons and concentration 

camps throughout the Muslim world with great success. The public and 

private mediated approaches are often broader and exploit mass media 

and marketing tactics, techniques, and procedures and modern information technology to convey their message.76 The Muslim Brotherhood 

has historically used print media in various forms to further their social 

outreach message, while others have used the tactic to a lesser degree, 

often preferring Friday sermons at the mosques or public gatherings 

as better venues. Al Qaeda’s use of the print media is best described as 

propaganda or psychological warfare.77 During the 1990s, Zawahiri’s 

writings served to elevate his personal status in the eyes of Egyptian 

Islamic Jihad (EIJ) members and legitimize the message to potential 

recruits.78 By the end of the decade, the message became less of an 

espousal of his individual ideology and more of that of Al Qaeda itself 

and its recognized emir. Use of the Internet as a recruiting medium by, 

with, and through which Al Qaeda conveyed its message and targeted 

recruits did not reach maturity or operational effectiveness until after 

the 2001 merger with EIJ. Through its emergence as a distinct federation of interested parties after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, 

Al Qaeda’s preferred recruiting approach was private and proximate. 

m The Infection model is typically used when a target population is insular or a subcomponent of a larger group that would actively deny terrorist group recruitment. Often, 

a trusted agent is inserted into the target population to rally potential recruits through 

direct, personal appeals. This method leverages individual charisma and persuasive 

strength of source credibility, social comparison and validation, and appeal specificity 

and was a favored strategy of Zawahiri as a clandestine cell leader. Egyptian Islamic Jihad 

(EIJ) under Zawahiri’s guidance used this method extensively; EIJ veterans of the Afghan 

resistance would be dispatched to specific locales in Egypt to recruit quality fighters with 

military and/or engineering backgrounds to contribute both technically and operationally to the mujahidin resistance. This approach is often used when targeted recruits are in 

the existing security apparatus, such as police and military forces.

n The Seed Crystal is used when a target audience is too remote or inaccessible to 

penetrate and/or insert an agent. Recruiters here would provide the context and often the 

tools for individuals to seek out the groups, a pattern that tends to evolve into that of the 

Infection model. This approach was used by a variety of groups who were affiliated with 

the MAK during the 1990s when much of their leadership, now veterans of the Afghan 

resistance, were operating outside their native countries but still required access, which 

was actively denied by the authorities, to the younger generation of young men to execute 

terrorist operations domestically.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

77

In this context, pitches were made in intimate settings with the explicit 

intent of avoiding observation. The technique leverages the influential 

power of conformity and relies heavily on personal appeals tailored 

specifically for a targeted individual, often using peers and/or relatives 

in making the pitch.79

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August  1990, bin Laden 

offered the services of his mujahidin to King Fahd to protect Saudi 

Arabia;o

 however, the king demurred, opting to allow U.S. and allied 

forces to deploy troops into Saudi territory. The deployment angered 

and offended bin Laden, because he believed the presence of foreign 

troops in the “land of the two mosques” (Mecca and Medina) profaned 

sacred soil. In 1992, bin Laden travelled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to 

Kabul, Afghanistan, to help stop the intertribal militia conflict; his trip 

ultimately terminated in Khartoum, Sudan, where the Al Qaeda inner 

circle established a base of operations. From 1992 to 1996, Al Qaeda 

and bin Laden based themselves in Sudan at the invitation of Islamist 

theoretician Hassan al Turabi. During this time, bin Laden assisted the 

Sudanese government, bought or established various business enterprises, and established camps where insurgents trained.80

A key turning point for Al  Qaeda occurred in 1993 when Saudi 

Arabia gave support for the Oslo Accords, which set a path for peace 

between Israel and Palestinians. On April  9,  1994, bin Laden’s 

Saudi citizenship was revoked and his family publicly disowned him 

(although controversy persists over whether and to what extent he continued to garner support from members of his family and/or the Saudi 

government).81

The debate over targeting the near (Middle Eastern) versus the far 

(e.g., the United States) enemy seems to have shifted Al Qaeda’s operational focus. The rebuke by the Saudi monarchy denied bin Laden the 

opportunity to surpass his own father’s contributions to the land of 

the two holy places. Zawahiri, who had recently had a falling out with 

Sayyed Imam al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl) over the rationalization of terrorist acts against Muslim civilians, joined bin Laden in Sudan (though he 

is said to have preferred Yemen as a training ground for EIJ). At this 

point, Zawahiri had essentially integrated the senior leadership of EIJ 

into Al Qaeda, be it for pragmatic or strategic purposes.

During the early 1990s, alumni of MAK camps were participating 

in jihad (in support of Islamic causes) worldwide; however, by 1994, the 

o In August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait (over a petroleum resource dispute that was left unresolved by the United Nations [UN]). The Iraqi 

invasion placed the Saudi kingdom, its oil fields, and its ruling House of Saud at risk. In 

the face of a massive Iraqi military presence (at the time, Iraq possessed the fourth-largest 

standing army in the world), Saudi Arabia’s own forces were well armed but outnumbered.
78

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

groups in Bosnia saw a decline in their aggressiveness and effectiveness.82 Al Qaeda recognized this and decided to intervene by assuming operational control of many of the terrorist cells in Bosnia. The 

Al Qaeda leadership instructed its recruiters to search for like-minded 

Muslims (those who believed in a globalized Islamic insurgent movement) with academic (mostly science, mathematics, and engineering) 

and religious (Sunni Muslims with Salafist beliefs) backgrounds to 

increase the capability and reach of the still (publicly) unnamed organization. From 1991 to 1996,p Al Qaeda operated from the Northwest 

Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan along the Afghan border or 

inside Pakistani cities, though it has autonomous underground cells in 

some one hundred countries, including the United States.83

As of this writing, it is unclear what effect bin Laden’s deathq will 

have on Al Qaeda. Since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, Al  Qaeda has grown increasingly decentralized, with the most 

active franchises in Yemen (AQAP), Northern Africa (AQIM), and 

Somalia (Al Shabaab).

Command and Control

The Al  Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri has said: “Al  Qaeda 

is not an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be. It 

is a call, a reference, a methodology.” Though the exact structure of 

Al Qaeda is still unknown, information acquired from former members provided U.S. authorities with a rough picture of how the group 

was organized.84 Al Qaeda was administered by a Shura (consultative) 

council that discussed and approved major actions, including terrorist 

operations. Its structure is similar to that of a holding company, with 

a core management group controlling partial or complete interests in 

other companies (Al Qaeda affiliates). The core of the organization 

comprised a dozen or so militants, primarily Egyptians who had previously been held as political prisoners and traveled to Afghanistan to 

fight against the Soviets. This inner cadre was surrounded by an outer 

layer of one hundred or so highly motivated and well-trained loyalists 

from throughout the Muslim world. U.S. and coalition counterterrorism operations have been reasonably effective at capturing or killing 

many in this layer, and thus, as of early 2012, while inexact, this number 

is estimated to be somewhat less.

p During this period, the Taliban began to emerge in Afghanistan as the most powerful of the groups competing for power.

q Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special Operations Forces in a raid on his 

Abbotabad, Pakistan, compound on May 1, 2011.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

79

Osama bin Laden was, until his death, the group’s undisputed 

leader—to whom the newly admitted swore an oath of allegiance 

(bayat).85 Bin Laden’s personal credibility was among the highest of 

any modern Muslim leader. His ascetic lifestyle contrasted sharply 

with those of the state-sponsored clergy, as well as those of many previous movement leaders, who amassed significant personal fortunes. 

Although the textual and visual narrative of bin Laden as the warriorscholar has been carefully crafted, it does rest on a body of proven 

exploits. Although he lacked many of the serious religious, academic, 

and military credentials of other movement leaders, his image as a billionaire’s son who forsook wealth and comfort for the austerity and 

deprivation of the life of a militant was admirable to many.

 Throughout the 1990s, Al Qaeda used satellite phones and computers to organize and maintain plans and faxed copies of religious 

rulings issued by bin Laden throughout the Muslim world and Europe 

where they were picked up by Arabic-language media outlets.86 The 

group also exploited informal, traditional forms of communications, 

such as pre-existing social ties, to transfer information.87 Ultimately, 

their communications infrastructure and operations made extensive 

use of electronic media for mobilization, communication, fundraising, 

and planning attacks.

Subsequent to the 9/11 operation and the initiation of Operation 

Enduring Freedom, Al Qaeda’s command and control apparatus was 

degraded to the point that there was very limited communication 

between the core leadership and its followers.88 This degradation, however, did not necessarily limit the operational effectiveness of Al Qaeda 

as a social movement, as attacks such as the July 7, 2005, bombing of 

the London Underground indicate. The ideology that serves to unify 

Al Qaeda’s narrative with its tactics does not require technologically 

sophisticated information systems to endure.

Aligning Structure to Strategy

The Al Qaeda command core is augmented by a set of specialized 

committees, each with a tailored set of goals, missions, and budgets. 

The Military Committee is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.89 The most operationally viable 

component of the military committee (and Al Qaeda writ large) was, at 

one time, the 055 Brigade. At its peak in 2001, the 055 Brigade had an 

estimated 2,000 soldiers and officers comprising Arabs, Central Asians, 

and South Asians, as well as Chechens, Bosnians, and Uighurs from 

Western China.90 The 055 Brigade, a guerrilla organization, was made 

up of veterans of the war against the Soviets, many of whom remained 
80

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

in Afghanistan after that conflict, and a second generation of younger, 

better-educated recruits shunned by their native countries and very 

loyal to bin Laden. The 055 Brigade fought with the Taliban (as their 

shock troops) against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in 2002 and 

suffered significant losses.91 Bin Laden ordered what remained of this 

force to retreat to the mountainous region along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border to wage a “protracted campaign” and to fight another day. 

The 055 Brigade, as an organization, did not possess a capability to 

operate outside of the region. Individual members of the brigade may 

join terrorist cells if selected to do so.92

The Finance and Business Committee, comprising professional 

bankers, accountants, and financiers, funded the recruitment and 

training of operatives, often through the hawalar

 banking system, providing airline tickets and false passports, issuing paychecks, and overseeing the group’s vast network of businesses, as well as dealing with 

large organizational issues, such as developing financial resources to 

meet Al Qaeda’s payroll and fund its operations and those of its various 

affiliates.93 The Al Qaeda Finance and Business Committee managed 

the group’s resources across four continents. The Foreign Purchases 

Committee was responsible for acquiring weapons and other technical 

equipment.94 Regional money managers also appear to have exercised 

considerable influence and control over the network’s financial decisions. The Sharia Committee determined whether particular courses 

of action conformed to established Islamic law. The Fatwa (formal legal 

opinion) Committee issued religious edicts, while the Media Committee supplied video and audio materials. The Media Committee was an 

essential component to the organization because it served as the mechanism though which bin Laden and/or Zawahiri could articulate their 

message to the faithful. In 2005, Al Qaeda formed Al-Sahab, a media 

production house, to supply its video and audio materials; this greatly 

professionalized the products and increased the receiving audience as 

the dissemination mechanisms evolved with technological advances in 

information technology.95 Al Qaeda’s strength and appeal did not lay 

solely in its sophisticated theological discourse, but also lay in its ability to comprehend, co-opt, and exploit modern grievances. Al Qaeda’s 

leadership was not composed of highly trained religious scholars, and 

r Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system outside of, or parallel to, traditional banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction 

of Western banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system used around the 

world. The components of hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are 

trust and the extensive use of connections, such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike traditional banking, hawala makes minimal use of any sort of negotiable 

instrument. Transfers of money take place based on communications between members of 

a network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

81

their religious rhetoric was far from complex or nuanced. Al-Sahab, in 

turn, transformed these edicts into accessible memes that resonated 

across geographic boundaries and at almost any position along the 

socioeconomic spectrum. Over the past decade, Al Qaeda has increasingly relied on groups external to this structure through its affiliates or 

franchises in Yemen, North Africa, and East Africa.96

Unlike the Communist model, nowhere in Al Qaeda “doctrine” is 

there explicit instruction as to how a cell must be formed; rather, a 

loose set of requirements for vertical (strategic-operational-tactical) 

integration is established. The proliferation of consistently themed 

Internet chat rooms and secure blogs have further socialized different “best practices” or “lessons learned” from aspiring cell members 

and leaders; however, those ideas (while often valid) are not necessarily 

sanctioned by Al Qaeda’s core leadership.

The post-9/11 Al  Qaeda has been categorized as somewhere 

between a centralized hierarchy and a flat network comprising a 

core (its central leadership based in Pakistan), the movement, and 

the periphery. This classification is not necessarily categorical but 

rather reflects the relative strength of the ties between an individual (or group) and the original membership of Al Qaeda. The core 

represents the strongest ties to bin Laden and his ideology; the franchises such as Al Shabaab in Somalia, AQAP in Yemen, and AQAM 

in Northern Africa would be considered part of the movement; and 

the self-radicalized or part-time supporters would be enmeshed in the 

periphery, or auxiliary.97

Underground and Aboveground Connectivity

Al  Qaeda deviates from the four-component model of an insurgency because there is no explicit “public component” of the group 

that engages in legal or quasi-legal activity in support of political objectives. The combination of a transnational area of operation and Islamic 

fundamentalist worldview distinguished Al  Qaeda from other insurgencies. Al Qaeda did, however, attempt to enhance its capabilities by 

acquiring and integrating existing militant organizations. Al  Qaeda 

was a supporter of EIJ for years prior to June 2001, when the two organizations merged. Thereafter, all activities and operations of former 

EIJ members were carried out under bin Laden’s banner. Al  Qaeda 

may also have formed a strategic partnership with other militant 

groups, including possibly Hizbollah, from whom it may have received 

technical assistance, training, and intelligence. Israeli intelligence also 

believes that Al Qaeda infiltrated the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
82

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

with the support of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-’Islamiyyah (Islamic 

Resistance Movement, or HAMAS).

Al Qaeda was, for a time, aligned with the de facto government of 

Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban. The Taliban were a group 

of mujahidin veterans and orphans of the conflict, many of whom had 

been educated in the expanding network of Islamic schools (madrassas) either in Kandahar or in the refugee camps on the Afghanistan–

Pakistan border. Bin Laden’s organization and/or affiliates thereof 

laundered much of the financial support to these institutions in the 

form of donations from an array of Islamic charities (some were simply 

front organizations while others were more legitimate). The continuing 

internecine strife between various mujahidin factions in Afghanistan 

and the concomitant lawlessness subsequent to Soviet withdrawal set 

the conditions for the principled and well-disciplined Taliban, under 

the leadership of Mullah Mohamed Omar, to expand their control over 

the territory they called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban captured the regional center of Kandahar in 1994 and the national 

capital of Kabul in September  1996. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan 

provided a suitable location for Al Qaeda to establish its headquarters. 

Al Qaeda enjoyed the Taliban’s protection and a measure of legitimacy 

as a component of their Ministry of Defense, although only Pakistan, 

Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban 

as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Bin Laden quickly established a close relationship with the Taliban (now the de facto government of Afghanistan) leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, whom he 

acknowledged as the “Amir Ul-Momineen” (Commander of the Faithful), a title once reserved for the head of the Islamic caliphate.

Criminal Connections

Among the reasons for Al  Qaeda’s success has been their ability 

to move operational funds through overt donations, quasi-legal gray 

markets, and patently illegal black markets. While some of these activities are considered illegal, Al Qaeda’s public religiosity has somewhat 

insulated them against the “criminal network” label within much of the 

Middle East as well as in central and southeast Asia. From the MAK’s 

operations in Peshawar to the modern affiliates throughout the world, 

Al Qaeda has relied upon and integrated criminal entities out of necessity. However, they have done so with sufficient discipline (for the most 

part) to accomplish their required missions without the concomitant 

excesses that tend to draw attention from law enforcement and/or 

other security forces.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

83

The origins of many Islamic economic and financial regulatory organizations date back to the Muslim Brotherhood’s development of political, economic, and financial infrastructures that enabled fulfillment 

of their religious obligations. The founder, Hassan Al-Banna, viewed 

finance as a critical weapon in undermining the infidels and reestablishing the Islamic caliphate. To do so, he believed Muslims would need 

to create an independent Islamic financial system that would parallel and later supersede the Western economy.98 Al-Banna’s successors 

set his theories and practices into motion, developing uniquely Islamic 

terminology and mechanisms to advance the Brotherhood’s system of 

faith, as well as their unique financial apparatuses. In 1962, the Brotherhood convinced the king to launch a global financial joint venture 

that established numerous charitable foundations across the globe, 

and these foundations became the cornerstone and spread Islam (and 

later funded terrorist operations) worldwide. The first of these charitable foundations were the Muslim World League and Rabitta al-Alam 

al-Islami, which united Islamic radicals from more than twenty nations. 

In 1978, the kingdom backed another Brotherhood initiative, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an entity that has been 

implicated in funding organizations such as Al Qaeda and HAMAS.

Al Qaeda used an extremely sophisticated, complex, and resilient 

money-generating and -transferring network.99 The organization’s 

highly resilient financial infrastructure spanned the globe with fundraising operations, various types of accounts, and financiers on every 

continent in approximately one hundred countries.100 The versatility of 

Al Qaeda’s financial infrastructure was primarily due to its compartmentalized structure. Sources of funding were kept separate from the 

cells receiving the money, and high priority was assigned to financial 

training and management, as well as to the sustained generation and 

investment of funds.

To move funds clandestinely from source to recipient, Al Qaeda’s 

financial network disguised the identities of both parties and established several legitimate institutions, including state and privately owned 

charities, banks, and companies, through which to funnel funds.101 Revenues went directly to central headquarters. With the exception of some 

operational expenses, cells were typically expected to be self-sufficient. 

Operational cells could deploy without much information regarding 

the larger organization’s underlying financial network.102
84

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

Al Qaeda favored charities as a primary source of income.s Charitable contributions are a sizeable source of financing for humanitarian, 

educational, and foreign aid activities in Muslim countries. Donations 

were largely cyclical; they peaked during the months of Ramadan, suggesting funds came from zakat and other obligatory charitable activities, often from unsuspecting religious institutions.103 Al Qaeda utilized 

two different approaches in redirecting funds from charities to its own 

organization. The first involved creating, subsuming, or collaborating 

with a cooperative charitable organization. Donors to these charities 

may or may not have known the true nature of the organization to 

which they were contributing. Once donations were made to the charity, money was then sent to the network’s headquarters. The charities 

would print false documentation for the benefit of donors, typically 

showing the money had been spent on humanitarian causes. The second, less common and riskier approach involved Al Qaeda operatives 

infiltrating unwitting charities with the intent of having those charities send funds to support the group’s efforts in various parts of the 

globe.104 Most donors to these types of benevolent organizations probably did not know that the organization had been infiltrated. However, 

some donors may intentionally have provided funds to such charities, 

providing an additional layer of plausible deniability to hide the true 

intentions of their funding activities.

Al Qaeda was adept at exploiting the environment of limited financial regulation prevalent in the Middle East and many Asian states but 

was also able to make use of formal financial institutions (including 

wire transfers and bank accounts). Like other components of their 

logistical and operational networks, redundancies were incorporated to 

avoid interruption, and nodes were replaced frequently to avoid detection and surveillance.105 A presence was established in most countries 

using indigenous or migrant Muslim communities. Although Al Qaeda 

had no single, central financial repository, it could never operate in 

isolation because mounting a terrorist operation required financial 

and technical logistical support that often had to be in place years in 

advance. In the Middle East, especially the Gulf states, Al Qaeda had 

a great deal of covert support among the public and received practical 

s Most Muslim nations collect mandatory Islamic charity (zakat is the third pillar of 

Islam, an annual wealth tax for charitable purposes) of about 2.5 percent from Muslim 

institutions and companies. Zakat is proscribed to go to those less fortunate. However, the 

Brotherhood has determined that those engaged in jihad against the enemies of Islam are 

entitled to benefit from the charitable offering. The interpretation that modern jihad is 

a serious, purposefully organized work intended to rebuild Islamic society and state and 

to implement the Islamic way of life in the political, cultural, and economic domains is 

widely accepted among Muslims and thus those engaged in jihad are viewed as legitimate 

recipients of zakat.
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

85

help from Islamic philanthropists and foundations, particularly from 

the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.106

The exploitation of existing commercial, financial, and transportation systems and institutions is common practice in organized crime 

and was implemented adeptly by Al  Qaeda. The hawala system, an 

informal network of money brokers originally established to facilitate 

long-distance trade beginning around eighth century, was one such system.107 Partly because of the weakness and undependability of the existing financial and banking system, MAK relied heavily on the hawala

system to move money from its satellite entities (recruiters, arms dealers, logisticians) to the training camps during the Afghan resistance.108

Hawaladers used formal financial institutions and couriers to transfer funds, but the process was not subject to substantial government 

oversight or record keeping, which was written in shorthand and kept 

only for brief periods. This enabled operatives to access funds without 

opening an account. Couriers came from inside the network and were 

chosen for certain characteristics that facilitated their movement (ethnicity, documentation, language skills), but they were rarely privy to 

operational details.109

ENDNOTES

1 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge (CCRP Publication Series, 2003).

2 Geert Hofstede, “National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-based Theory of 

Cultural Differences Among Nations,” International Studies of Management & Organization

13, no. 2 (1983): 46–74.

3 Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Organizations: An Executive Briefing on Strategy, Structure, and 

Process (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1995).

4 Lindsay Heger, Danielle Jung, and Wendy Wong, “Organizing for Resistance: How Group 

Structure Impacts the Character of Violence” (49th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, 2008).

5 Angelo Rossi, A Communist Party in Action (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949).

6 George K. Tanham, “The Belgian Underground Movement 1940–1944” (unpublished 

Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1951).

7 Bonnie H. Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” Social Forces 60, no. 1 (1981): 

188.

8 Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

1976).

9 Jozef Garlinski, Fighting Auschwitz: The Resistance Movement in the Concentration Camp (London: Friedman, 1976).

10 Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York: 

Routledge, 2006).

11 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It 

Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
86

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

12 John R. Dodson, “Man-hunting, Nexus Topography, Dark Networks and Small Worlds,” 

IO Sphere (Winter 2006): 7–10.

13 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–

2001,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck 

Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

14 Ibid.

15 Summer Newton, The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–1998 (Alexandria, VA: U.S. 

Army Publications Directorate, in press).

16 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and 

Function Structure,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 1 (1997): 1–32.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Newton, The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–1998.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ - Financing the Provisional IRA: 

Part 1,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 2 (1999): 1–38.

33 Newton, The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–1998.

34 Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card.’”

35 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 165.

36 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

37 Felab-Brown, Shooting Up.

38 Rollie E. Poppino, International Communism in Latin America (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 

1964).

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 J. Peters, The Communist Party: A Manual on Organization (New York: Workers Library 

Publishers, 1935).

43 Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

44 Peters, The Communist Party: A Manual on Organization.

45 Louis Francis Budenz, The Techniques of Communism (Chicago, IL: Henry R Finery Co., 

1954).

46 Ibid.

47 Arthur Koestler, “The Initiates,” in The God That Failed, ed. Richard Crossman (New 

York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).
Chapter 3. Organizational Structure and Function

87

48 Andrew R. Molnar, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, 1963).

49 Philip Selznik, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), 118.

50 Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1956).

51 Edward R. Wainhouse, “Guerrilla War in Greece 1946–1949: A Case Study,” Military 

Review 37, no. 3 (1957): 17–25.

52 Molnar, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare.

53 Selznik, The Organizational Weapon.

54 Budenz, The Techniques of Communism.

55 Selznik, The Organizational Weapon.

56 Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya.

57 Selznik, The Organizational Weapon.

58 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?” in Collected Works (New York: International 

Publishers, 1943).

59 Special Operations Research Office, Area Handbook for Venezuela (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1964).

60 P. J. Honey, “North Vietnam’s Workers’ Party and South Vietnam’s People’s Revolutionary Party,” Pacific Affairs 35, no. 4 (1962): 375–383.

61 Ibid.

62 Van Chi Hoang, From Colonialism to Communism (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

63 Peters, The Communist Party: A Manual on Organization.

64 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The 

Free Press, 2001), 32.

65 Bruce O. Reidel, The Search for al-Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future (New York: 

Reed Elsevier Inc., 2009).

66 Ibid.

67 Jason Spitaletta and Shana Marshall, “Al Qaeda,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 30.

71 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2005), 60.

72 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

73 Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” in The 

McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook: The Definitive Guide for Law Enforcement, EMT, 

and All Other Security Professionals, ed. David G. Kamien and Michael Kraft (New York: 

McGraw Hill, 2005), 80.

74 Ibid., 80.

75 Ibid., 82.

76 Ibid.

77 Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy, 

Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, no. 21 (Maxwell Air Force Base, 

AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2004), 8.

78 Ibid.

79 Gerwehr and Daly, “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 82.
88

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

80 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Reidel, The Search for al-Qaeda.

84 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

89 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Steve Kiser, Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al-Qaeda’s Financial 

Infrastructure (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 67.

94 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

95 Ibid.

96 Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright, “Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the 

Dimensions of Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 5 (2011): 367–382.

97 Ibid.

98 Rachel Ehrenfeld, “The Muslim Brotherhood New International Economic Order,” The 

Terror Finance Blog (blog), October 13, 2007, http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_

finance_blog/2007/10/the-muslim-brot-1.html.

99 Kiser, Financing Terror, 67.

100 Jason Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications 

Directorate, in press).

101 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

102Kiser, Financing Terror, 67.

103 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.
CHAPTER 4.

LEADERSHIP
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Transactional and Transformational Leadership...................................91

Charismatic Leadership in Undergrounds .............................................92

Profiling Leaders ......................................................................................96

Trait/Motivational Approaches ...........................................................96

Cognitive Approaches...........................................................................98

Psychodynamic Approaches.................................................................98

Personological Approaches ................................................................100

A Case Study: Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri ................................................... 101

Targeting Leaders...................................................................................107

Summary ................................................................................................108
Chapter 4. Leadership

91

Jason Spitaletta and Nathan Bos

Leadership over human beings is exercised when a person mobilizes 

institutional, political, financial, psychological, and other resources to 

arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.1

 The core leadership of underground organizations develops ideology, finds a common 

grievance to garner popular support, and develops a strategy and organizational pattern based on the physical, human, and security environments. Leadership is one of the most observed, but least understood, 

phenomena in the social sciences, yet the study of leaders is integral 

to a thorough comprehension of revolutionary and insurgent warfare. 

There has been a great deal of research within the U.S. government on 

leadership analysis and related methodologies. A comprehensive discussion of theoretical and analytical methods used to assess leaders is 

beyond the scope of this chapter; what follows is an attempt to introduce some of the central concepts and their applications.

TRANSACTIONAL AND 

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Modern studies of leadership in the corporate domain distinguish 

between transactional and transformational leadership styles.2 Transactional leadership, which focuses on the monitoring of employees and 

explicit reward and punishment contracts, has been shown to be effective but counterproductive when overemphasized. Transformational 

leadership, which focuses on inspirational leadership that communicates common purpose, has been shown to have a more direct impact on 

productivity than transactional strategies and a much greater impact on 

trust and group identity.3

 Charismatic political leaders (described in the 

next section) generally fit the description of transformational leadership.

Leadership also includes a broad range of activities, usually more 

than can be performed by a single person. Yukl’s synthesis of leadership 

literature4

 (mostly from studies in the corporate domain) summarizes 

the tasks of leaders into the list below. Necessary behaviors fall into three 

categories: task focused, relationship focused, and change focused.

Task Behaviors

• Plan short-term activities

• Clarify task objectives

• Monitor operations and performance

Relationship Behaviors

• Provide support and encouragement

• Provide recognition for achievement and contributions
92

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

• Develop member skill and confidence

• Consult with members when making decisions

• Empower members to take initiative in problem solving

Change Behavior

• Monitor the external environment

• Propose an innovative strategy or vision

• Encourage innovative thinking

• Take risks to promote necessary changes

As organizations expand, this range of leadership functions must 

be accomplished by teams, not individuals, not only because of the 

amount and complexity of the work to be done, but also because different leadership styles have different advantages and disadvantages. 

Effective leaders surround themselves with a team that both accentuates their strengths and complements them where they are weakest.

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN UNDERGROUNDS

Rare or extraordinary personal factors such as charisma are often 

necessary to begin underground movements. Nascent movements are 

extremely vulnerable, and many if not most are crushed before they 

have a chance to grow beyond small cells; it often takes an extraordinary leader (or leaders) to motivate the initial cadre and keep it 

together through inevitable setbacks. The leadership cadre of an insurgency later becomes the core of the larger organization and consists of 

persons who devote their full time to the cause.

Charismatic leadership is the “quality of an individual personality 

by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 

endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”5

 These leaders are seen as visionaries who 

demonstrate some combination of emotionality; activity; sensitivity to 

the sociopolitical landscape; intense interest in and empathy toward 

their followers; superior rhetorical and persuasive skills; and exemplary 

behavior in the form of sacrificing their personal ambitions to those 

of the movement.6

 Abimael Guzmana,8 (Sendero Luminoso), Velupillai 

a Abimael Guzman was the undisputed leader of Sendero Luminoso. This physically 

unremarkable man, rarely seen by Sendero members apart from the highest leadership, 

employed an extraordinary capacity for persuasion and organization to create a cult-like 

organization whose members literally revered him as a god in many cases. For the Sendero members, Guzman was shrouded in mystery—a charismatic, almost hypnotic leader 

who held the one true vision of the future and the means to achieve it. In their minds, 

he was almost superhuman, and his commands were obeyed without question or hesitation. He demanded and received absolute devotion. Indeed, Guzman saw himself as a 
Chapter 4. Leadership

93

Prabhakaranb

 (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]), Osama bin 

Ladenc (Al Qaeda), and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi have all been 

considered charismatic leaders of their respective groups. Gandhi, of 

course, espoused nonviolent tactics and would not be considered an 

insurgent leader; but he did lead people to endure hardship and violence, and his charismatic leadership style is relevant.

Gandhi’s leadership of India’s independence struggle verged on the 

mystical. Thousands of villagers from rural India, who perhaps could 

not be touched or aroused by any modern means of communication or 

organized population pressure, were stimulated into action by Gandhi’s 

fasts and his religious mystique. Hundreds of thousands of peasants 

gathered to meet Gandhi, although they often did not understand his 

language and could barely see him. It is difficult to estimate the role of 

Gandhi’s mystique in coalescing public opinion against the British, but 

it is clear that resistance to colonial rule had never appeared on such a 

large scale before Gandhi. Movements headed by charismatic leaders 

are prone to a high degree of volatility. Whether it is because of the lack 

of institutional parameters (such as legislated checks and balances) or 

the unwillingness of the true believers to challenge the leader, groups 

with unconstituted leaders tend to be comparatively less stable.

Charismatic leadership is difficult to maintain, especially as movements grow larger. Charismatic leaders must accomplish these four 

functions: (1) maintain the public persona of the leader; (2) moderate the effects of the psychological identification of followers with the 

leader; (3) negotiate the routinization of charisma; and (4) achieve 

frequent new successes.9

 To address the first and second, charismatic 

“revolutionary Moses who will lead his followers across a river of blood into the Maoist 

promise land of communism.” Sendero believed that Peru was the epicenter of a world 

revolution and that ultimate victory depended on absolute obedience to Guzman, the 

leader of the world revolution. In one sense, the near deification of Guzman ensured 

unparalleled organizational unity and clarity of vision.7

b Velupillai Prabhakaran’s veneration by Tiger members led some observers to liken 

the LTTE to a religious cult rather than an ethno-nationalist movement, although Prabhakaran himself was believed to be an atheist. There is disagreement as to his background—

some analysts claim he was the son of a smuggler, while others report that his father 

was a tax commissioner and his grandfather a postal worker. This latter account would 

indicate that his family had access to more educational resources than the average rural 

Tamil family.

c Osama bin Laden was the group’s undisputed leader to whom the newly admitted 

swore an oath of allegiance. Although few of the Afghan Arabs or later Al Qaeda recruits 

had direct contact with bin Laden, he was able to build a popular following throughout 

the Islamic world and continues to be regarded as the supreme symbol of resistance to 

U.S. imperialism. Although bin Laden was principally a financier, logistician, and facilitator, he also retains some distinction as a military commander. In 1987, Soviet Special 

Forces attacked a training camp in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and a small group of fighters 

repelled the attack, earning bin Laden a reputation for tactical prowess.
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leaders must be seen and heard from on a regular basis through both 

staged public displays and small appearances before regular members 

of the group. However, the leader must balance this exposure with an 

aura of mystery and in some cases a sense of supernatural power (to 

address the third issue, above), and this requires occasional segregation or isolation from his or her followers. Such isolation has the potential to stem negative feedback from group members; it can also lead to 

future decisions being made without the consideration of all necessary 

information and a subsequent failure and internal fracture over direction.10 The smaller the group, the greater the impact a leader’s personalityd can have on the group. Of course, public exposure entails great 

risk when groups are still in clandestine stages.

Another limitation of charismatic leadership can be demonstrated 

by the LTTE’s Prabhakaran, whose force of personality also meant he 

had little capability for political compromise. This probably perpetuated 

the kinetic component of the conflict while decreasing the bargaining 

room for the Sri Lankan government, thus limiting the Tamil minority’s options for achieving political objectives without further bloodshed 

and ultimately resulting in the destruction of Prabhakaran’s movement.

George Jackson, founder of the Black Guerrilla Family (BGF), is 

an example of a charismatic source of inspiration11 whose ideology did 

not seem to survive him (though his organization has). Jackson’s writings highlight a unique manifestation of Black Power e

 inside prison 

walls—political mobilization of a disenfranchised demographic was 

transformed into riot and ultimately revolution.12 In 1966, Jackson 

formed the BGF in San Quentin State Prison with the goal of restoring 

the inherent dignity to the black prisoner and eventually overthrowing 

d Personality is the outward manifestation of how individuals tend to experience, use 

ideation, modulate affect, manage stress, view him or herself, and interact with others.

e Black Power is a political slogan and an umbrella concept for various associated 

ideologies from black separatism to emancipation from economic neo-slavery. The movement came to prominence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, coincident with the U.S. civil 

rights movement. Black Power expresses a range of political goals, from defense against 

racial oppression to the establishment of separate social institutions and a self-sufficient 

economy. Not only did the Black Power movement encourage separatism, but it also 

helped usher in black radical thoughts and action against what was considered to be an 

elusive, yet visible, oppressive power. Black Power stood in dramatic contrast to the civil 

rights movement led by the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who advocated inclusion 

and stressed the similarities among all peoples. The more radical elements disagreed with 

the use of a nonviolent approach, with criticism ranging from claims of its ineffectiveness to claims that it represented appeasement. Black Power gained notoriety and prominence through its advocacy by the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense founded by Huey 

Newton and Bobby Seale in Oakland, California, in 1966. The Black Panthers achieved 

international renown through their deep involvement in the Black Power movement and 

in the U.S. politics of the 1960s and 1970s, and the intense antiracism of the time is today 

considered one of the most significant social, political, and cultural currents in twentiethcentury U.S. history.
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the white-run government in America and the prison system. Often 

sequestered in solitary confinement, Jackson studied political economy 

and radical theory and wrote two books, Soledad Brother and Blood in 

My Eye, which brought him worldwide attention during the zenith of 

American prison literature’s popularity.13 Jackson’s thesis can be considered a fusion of Marxist class struggle and Guevarist revolutionary 

fervor.14 Jackson’s prison experience and its influence on his psychological state cannot be overstated. While many insurgent leaders consider periods of political imprisonment transformative, Jackson’s was 

particularly so. It was while imprisoned that he saw extremes of racial 

hostility. Prison was certainly not the first time Jackson experienced 

racism; however, for him, like many African American males of his 

generation,15 it reinforced his preexisting negative identity as nothing 

more than an emasculated black man whose incarceration was inevitable.16 Prison is also where Jackson’s propensity toward violence was 

exacerbated; his subjective experience in the low socioeconomic status 

neighborhoods of Chicago and Los Angeles and later in the California 

penal system reinforced the pro-social components of violence.17 He 

saw the social value of violence as protective, deterrent, and admirable 

and prioritized those positive ramifications over the acknowledged 

negative consequences. His letters indicate a passing hint of remorse 

for resorting to violence, but he is able to rationalize violence as necessary to keeping his word and protecting those of his in-group, actions 

he seemingly prioritizes over his personal freedom.18 George Jackson’s 

ideological heritage includes the BGF,f The George Jackson Brigade,g,19

and his insightful writings on the Marxist–Leninist–Maoist–Fanonist 

Revolutionary movement in late-1960s America. While his ideal was 

never quite realized by his organization and his political objectives 

were not met, his legacy survives as motivation for both the modern 

f BGF at its founding was the most politically oriented of the major prison gangs; 

Jackson’s goals were to form a revolutionary organization with specific objectives to eradicate racism, struggle to maintain dignity in prison, and overthrow the U.S. government. 

Some original BGF members were formerly associated with the Black Liberation Army, the 

Symbionese Liberation Army, and the Weatherman Underground organization. Today, 

the BGF is said to have upward of 50,000 members in both state and federal prisons, with 

the majority of them concentrated on the East and West coasts. Prospective members must 

be black and nominated by an existing member; if selected, they must pledge a life of loyalty to the group. BGF is aligned with some African American and Hispanic prison gangs 

and against many of the white prison gangs. A feature unique to the BGF is that members 

must be incarcerated in order to advance in rank within the organization.

g A Seattle-based revolutionary group, The George Jackson Brigade was involved in 

violent acts and claimed to use force to overthrow the U.S. government or the government 

of the State of Washington. The group justified their actions by claiming to further the 

ends of a revolution of the masses to overthrow the present governmental and international business structures and to establish a system of Communism. In various communiqués, the group claimed credit for bank robberies, bombings, and attacks against custom 

houses, court houses, grocery stores, public utilities, and correction facilities.
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revolutionary as well as those activists who continue to fight for social 

justice for the disenfranchised.

Charismatic leaders needn’t be violent or in positions of authority to be effective. Throughout his twenty-seven-year incarceration in 

South Africa’s prison system, Nelson Mandela was not only able to lead 

African National Congress’s guerilla component, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 

but also become the international symbol for the antiapartheid movement. Mandela’s experience as an enlightened political prisoner and 

later the first black president of South Africa continues to serve as an 

archetype for both dignified nonviolent resistance and racial equality.

PROFILING LEADERS

The first remote psychological profile of a foreign leader was led 

by the Office of Strategic Services’ Walter C. Langer in collaboration 

with Henry A. Murray (Harvard Psychological Clinic), Ernst Kris (New 

School for Social Research), and Bertram D. Lawin (New York Psychoanalytic Institute). Their target was Adolph Hitler, and their report, A 

Psychological Profile of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend, was a vital piece 

of intelligence that supported Allied psychological warfare efforts and 

military deception operations.20 Since World War  II, numerous academic and operational methods of assessing leaders have been devised 

and implemented. Among the more prevalent methods are a psycholinguistic approach developed by Margaret Hermann and a psychodynamic approach postulated by Jerrold Post. The following section 

provides a brief overview of some of those methods and an abbreviated 

case study that includes elements of each of them.

Trait/Motivational Approaches

Early psycholinguistic approaches to personality analysis date back 

to Walter Wientraub’s work with clinical populations in the 1960s. Wientraub employed content analytic methods to identify syntactic structure in patient responses to ambiguous stimuli (given during projective 

assessments such as the Thematic Apperception Test or TAT) and clinical interviews. David Winter’s motivational analysis of political behavior applied similar content analysis to code for need for achievement, 

power, and affiliation to determine a leader’s interpersonal behavioral 

preferences.21 In Margaret Hermann’s profiling method (trait analysis of leadership style), each trait is assessed through content analysis 

of the leader’s public statements as well as other secondary sources of 

information. Although both prepared speeches and statements from 

interviews are considered, the latter is given preference because of its 
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spontaneity. The data are collected from interviews and analyzed or 

content coded, and then a profile is developed. The profile is then compared with the baseline scores developed for the database of leader 

scores. One is considered to have high score on a trait if he or she is one 

standard deviation above the average score for all leaders.

Hermann’s work exploits the stable patterns or personality traits 

vice the psychopathology model.22 Hermann’s method assesses these 

aspects of leadership style:

• Belief that one can influence or control what happens (selfefficacy)

• Need for power and influence

• Conceptual complexity, or the ability to differentiate among 

things and people in one’s environment (related but not identical 

to intelligence)

• Self-confidence or self-esteem

• The intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias

• General distrust of others

• Task versus relationship focush

No single aspect dominates behavior; Hermann analyzes how combinations of these aspects lead to certain observable patterns of behavior. The combination of beliefs and need for power and influence often 

determines whether the leader will challenge or respect constraints. 

The combination of conceptual complexity and self-confidence determines how open a leader will be to new information and new ideas. 

The extent of their in-group bias and general distrust of others provides evidence concerning a leader’s motivation, particularly whether 

the leader may coordinate or form coalitions with other groups. The 

leader’s outlook about the world and its problems largely determines 

the confrontational attitude of the organization and may help predict 

whether groups will espouse violence.

Jerrold Post has a method of profiling leaders that has a great deal 

of overlap with Hermann’s, as well as some points of differentiation. 

His method is based less on public statements and more on biographical information. It also takes the political and cultural context into 

account in understanding a leader’s development; the extended analysis of Al Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is adapted from a longer 

case study using this approach.

h Hermann expresses the two distinct leadership functions as a continuum between 

moving the group toward completion of a task (solving problems) and maintaining group 

spirit and morale (building relationships).
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Cognitive Approaches

Operational code analysis has transformed from a manual process to near-automated (with human in the loop) processes. Regardless of the means, cognitive approaches assume perception and beliefs 

are more easily inferred than personality given the availability of data 

sources (often transcripts of speeches, letters, or the personal communications of a particular leader). The integrative complexity approach 

to political personality assessment is an extension of operational code 

analysis in that it is more rooted in cognitive psychology and social cognition than in personality psychology.23 Content analytical measures of 

integrative complexity can be applied to verbal (or written) materials to 

assess the extent to which the individual can differentiate and integrate 

multiple perspectives on a particular issue. Low integrative complexity 

correlates with cognitive rigidity, where the individual is either unable 

or unwilling to consider varying frames of reference.24

Psychodynamic Approaches

From Langer’s team’s initial work through today, remote psychodynamic assessments have been employed to determine “what makes a 

leader tick.”25 Psychoanalysisi

 is based on the proposition that much of 

mental life is unconscious, that a person’s psychological development is 

important for understanding their current state, and that psychological 

distress derives from unresolved intrapsychic conflict. Psychoanalytic 

studies of narcissism and paranoia may shed light on the personalities 

of some insurgent leaders.26

Egocentricity is a normal component in infantile development; 

however, as a child develops into adolescence, he or she is supposed to 

become less self-absorbed and more cognizant of others. Narcissism is 

a psychoanalytic theory that holds that primary narcissism (or self-love) 

in the form of the grandiose self does not diminish as the individual 

i The dynamics of this theory were derived from nineteenth-century concepts of physics (as interpreted by Sigmund Freud), in which the flow of mental and libidinal energy is 

deterministically expressed, repressed, or discharged. The theory has variants, but they 

share the notions that (1) parenting (as opposed to intrinsic temperament) determines 

psychological temperament and health; (2) active, unconscious forces exclude unpleasant thoughts from the consciousness; and (3) relationships with others, object relations, 

are controlled by unconscious forces such as projection—the theory that one irrationally 

attributes one’s own attitude to others. Strengths of psychoanalytic interpretations of 

terrorism are their acknowledgment that individual developmental factors beginning in 

early childhood probably influence adult behavioral proclivities, their recognition of the 

enormous power of the unconscious to influence conscious thought, and their observation 

that covert psychodynamic forces of groups may subsume individuality. The weakness of 

psychoanalytic interpretations is their lack of falsifiability.
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develops and expands his or her social network. If this fails to occur, 

regardless of reason, the resultant grandiose self-image can result in 

individuals who are sociopathic, arrogant, and devoid of compassion 

for others. Some leaders demonstrate a marked desire for admiration 

and attention, a hallmark of narcissism.27 Their chosen methods of violence are often spectacular and attention grabbing, suggesting a more 

narcissistic clinical presentation. There are also those who exhibit a 

narcissistic leadership style although they probably do not meet the 

clinical criteria for an Axis II disorder.28 In fact, this leadership style 

is heavily represented in the military, industry, and academia. Characteristics of the narcissistic leadership style include a vulnerability to 

biased information processing that results in an overestimation of their 

own strength and an underestimation of their adversary’s, a grandiose 

and self-serving disposition, a lack of tolerance for competition, difficulty relying on experts, and a desire for sycophantic subordinates.j

Often displaying superficial arrogance over profound personal insecurity, they actively seek admiration, are vulnerable to insults, slights, 

and attacks, and are prone to rage.29 Key observables that indicate this 

style are the leader’s sensitivity to criticism, surrounding themselves 

with sycophants, and an overvaluation of his chances of success and an 

underestimation of the strength of an opponent.30

Paranoia theory states that violent radicalism is the result of a particular personality trait that predisposes one to mistrust others and display aggressive behavior. Paranoia theory states that the salient feature 

of terrorist psychology is projection, an infantile defense that assigns 

intolerable internal feelings to an external object. This occurs when an 

individual who has grown up with a damaged self-concept idealizes the 

good self and splits out the bad self. This projection is proposed to be 

the root of an adult persistence of the infantile phase called the “paranoid schizoid position.”31 Two personality traits evident in some individuals drawn to radical groups are the psychological mechanisms of 

externalization and splitting.32 Splitting is an extreme tendency to see 

the world in black and white, at the extremes of attraction and rejection.33 Problematic feelings are not accepted as part of the self but are 

instead ascribed to something external. Socially acceptable feelings are 

located within an idealized “good self,” whereas bad feelings are split 

j Another manifestation of the theory is the malignant narcissist style of leadership: a 

combination of narcissism, paranoia, and sociopathy. These individuals exhibit grandiosity and suffer from poor underlying self-esteem with attendant sensitivity to slights, insults, 

or threats. They suspect and blame others, have no compunction regarding the use of 

violence, and lack empathy or concern for the impact of their actions on others. Observable characteristics of the malignant narcissist leader are displays of extreme grandiosity, 

paranoia, and other antisocial traits, the lack of inhibition in the use of violence, dreams 

of glory, lack of empathy regarding the impact of his or her acts on others, and the target 

of anger (subsequent to personal or group setbacks) being an external entity.
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out and projected onto something external. Individuals with such traits 

are hypothesized to be likely to strongly idealize the group to which 

they belong (the in-group) while demonizing outsiders.34 The paranoid 

position inflames the terrorist with suspicions that justify bloody acts of 

“self-defense” against his victims.35 For leaders with rigid and extreme 

ideological belief systems centered on themes of oppression and persecution, paranoid personality disorder would seem a logical fit.36 Paranoia regarding the survival of the in-group creates the psychological 

foundation that permits terrorists to kill random civilians who, seen 

from the outside, do not directly threaten the terrorist group.37

There are also those who exhibit a paranoid leadership style and 

again probably do not meet the clinical criteria for the Axis II disorder.38 Characteristics of the paranoid leadership style include the view 

that one is surrounded by enemies, suspicion and distance, preoccupation with unjustified doubts about the loyalty and/or trustworthiness 

of those around them, hypervigilance and invulnerability to influence, and the deeply rooted need to externalize blame for their own.39

Observable characteristics of the paranoid leadership style are the 

blaming and demonization of adversaries, the stockpiling of weapons 

to defend against imminent attack, and the frequent purging of the 

inner advisory group.40 Experts tend to agree that paranoid personality 

disorder may be more common among leaders than among nonleaders 

of terrorist organizations.41 Some degree of paranoia can be a useful 

trait in the highly vulnerable position of an insurgent leader, especially 

in early stages where infiltration and security lapses can lead to rapid 

annihilation. A combination of the narcissistic and paranoid styles may 

be somewhat common among underground leaders.

Personological Approaches

Another approach to remote leadership analysis is Theodore Millon’s personological model. A clinical criticism of the aforementioned 

approaches is that they do not adequately incorporate disciplines of 

personality theory and psychodiagnostics.42 Millon’s theory of personality was the intellectual driver behind the DSM-IV Axis II personality 

disorder diagnostic criteria as well as the Millon Clinical Multiaxial 

Inventory (MCMI), a widely used personality assessment.

Millon divides the personality into functional and structural attributes. Functional attributes are the processing and modulating features of the personality such as behavior, cognitions and perceptions, 

and intrapsychic regulatory mechanisms. There are four functional 

attributes: expressive acts (observable behavior), interpersonal conduct 

(how individuals interact with others), cognitive style (perceptions, 
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attention, information processing, organization of thoughts), and regulatory mechanism (unconscious processes to resolve needs, protect the 

ego, and mediate conflicts).43

Structural attributes are the enduring components of the personality that help define one’s worldview. There are four structural attributes: 

self-image (perception of oneself/identity), object representations 

(interaction with memory and its influence on information processing), morphologic organization (structural strength and internal cohesion of the mental system), and mood temperament (how one interacts 

with and processes emotion).44

A CASE STUDY: DR. AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI

An illustrative example of the evolution of underground leadership is the case of Zawahiri, the Egyptian Islamic scholar, surgeon, 

and radicalized Islamist whose contributions to the global Salafist jihad are the extension of those of his hero and ideological forefather, Sayyid Qutb, and his Egyptian contemporary, Salam Faraj. 

His synergistic codependent relationship with Osama bin Laden has 

changed the international security landscape as well as political and 

military strategies of the twenty-first-century world. Both Zawahiri’s 

original organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),k

 and his current 

organization, Al  Qaeda, can credit undergrounds with a large component of their operational successes. During the mid-1980s (after 

most had been released from prison for their actual or suspected role 

in the Sadat assassination), many EIJ and Egyptian Islamic Group 

(EIG) members relocated to Peshawar, Pakistan, to escape the Egyptian government and to participate in the Afghan resistance to the 

Soviet Union’s occupation. Although some EIJ members recognized 

the still-imprisoned Abud al-Zumur as emir, others began to consider

k EIJ was formed in 1979 when Faraj united four to six clandestine jihadi cells under 

his leadership, including one that was still underground and not yet operational led by 

Zawahiri and two army officers. During a Shura in late spring of 1981, leaders of the two 

branches (Karam Zuhdi of EIG and Faraj of EIJ) agreed to merge their groups under 

the leadership of Sheik Umar Abd-al Rahman, who agreed to be the mufti. Rahman, an 

alumnus and former professor at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, became one of the most 

outspoken clerics to denounce Egypt’s secularism. Although respected by both groups, he 

did not have a unanimous mandate to serve as the group’s emir. Zawahiri’s cell, and later 

EIJ as a whole, employed a blind-cell structure like that of the Leninist Communist Party 

where members in one cell did not know the identities or activities of those in another, so 

that if one member was captured or compromised, he would not be able to endanger more 

than a few people.45
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Sayyed Imam al-Sharif,l also known as “Dr. Fadl,” EIJ’s leader. At some 

point during the mid-1980s, Sharif’s academic, professional, and ideologically like-minded colleague, Zawahiri,m became the recognized 

leader of EIJ.n,47 The opportunity to select, train, and indoctrinate 

operatives from the pool of Egyptians seeking to martyr themselves 

in Afghanistan enabled Zawahiri to slowly unite the still-disparate 

cells of EIJ and build capability.48 It also brought Zawahiri into contact with Osama bin Laden, who, along with Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, 

a Palestinian scholar of Islamic law, established the MAK or Services 

Office, a clearinghouse to facilitate the recruitment, transportation, 

organization, training, and equipping of Arabs to support the Afghan 

resistance.o

 Osama bin Laden was the group’s undisputed leader, to 

whom the newly admitted swore an oath of allegiance.49 Although few 

of the Afghan Arabs or later Al Qaeda recruits had direct contact with 

bin Laden,50 he was able to build a popular following throughout the 

Islamic world and continues to be regarded as the supreme symbol of 

resistance to U.S. imperialism.51 Although bin Laden was principally a 

financier, logistician, and facilitator, he also retains some distinction as 

a military commander. Bin Laden’s principal ideological advisor, and 

l Sharif, a physician who was administering to the refugees from Afghanistan under 

the Red Crescent, emphasized the importance of the Qutbist ideology and the condemnation of those who deviated from it. Sharif had established a series of guesthouses and 

training camps in Peshawar to receive young Muslims from the Middle East and to stage 

and prepare them to move and integrate into the Afghan resistance. His was a parallel 

effort to that of Osama bin Laden and his spiritual advisor (a role Zawahiri would eventually assume), Abdullah Azzam, who had established Maktab Al Khidamat (MAK), or Services Office, to address administrative problems for foreign Muslim fighters.

m Both Zawahiri and Imam al-Sharif were pious, high minded, prideful, and rigid in 

their views. They evaluated matters of religion as a series of immutable rules established 

by God, a mindset representative of the well-educated engineers and technocrats who 

occupied the higher ranks of Salafists.

n In 1992, as the conflict between EIG and EIJ reached the stage of mutual accusations of apostasy and individual acts of assassination attempts, Zawahiri emerged as the 

winner, largely because of bin Laden’s support and because of the murder of Abdullah 

Azzam, the spiritual leader of bin Laden, which some attribute to EIJ.46

o There is a long history of Arab migration into Afghanistan, much of it following 

the Russian Revolution of 1917 when Arabs living throughout central Asia fled encroaching Soviet control for the religious freedom afforded them in Afghanistan. Later, under 

Stalin, many Muslims of Arab and non-Arab descent living in the Caucasus were deported 

en masse to Siberia and Central Asia. The current Islamist resistance in Chechnya owes 

much to these earlier Soviet policies. Although this resistance was originally led by indigenous fighters, it has received substantial financial and human support from Muslims 

throughout the Middle East, where many deportees settled and integrated into the local 

communities. Therefore, to suggest that the Arabs who supported the anti-Soviet resistance are religious mercenaries focused only on global jihad and without personal ties to 

Muslims living outside the Middle East is misleading. More likely, the intense migration 

and intermarriage between Muslims of Arab and non-Arab descent throughout Central 

Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East created strong personal ties that supported the 

narrative of religious jihad and resistance to foreign occupation.
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103

the organization’s deputy chief of operations, was Zawahiri,p who provided the scriptural and juridical substance for bin Laden’s more general political ideals.53 Al Qaeda’s senior leadership (top aides, media 

representatives, military advisors, etc.) were more likely to have technical and professional backgrounds—in business, public administration, 

law, engineering, or medicine—than religious ones.q

Bin Laden (particularly after September 11, 2001) was the charismatic leader of the movement until his death in 2011; his name recognition and affiliation connote credibility and legitimacy.54 To many 

Islamists, bin Laden represents the personification of strong oppositional leadership: resolutely defying those who attempt to exploit Muslims (regardless of nationality) and/or fail to live and govern by the 

principles set forth in the Koran and Hadith. Bin Laden’s legacy will 

probably extend beyond his death regardless of whether Al Qaeda in its 

current structure and function continues to be a viable organization/

movement.

Bin Laden’s proclivity toward conformity (the opposite pole for 

the personality trait of openness), conscientiousness, and introversion 

(the combination that results in deference to religious authority)55 rendered his personality an ideal fit with that of the abrasively negativist 

Zawahiri. Both individual personality types, despite their differences, 

resulted in a shared religious extremism and strict reliance on a literal 

interpretation of the Koran. Their ability to rationalize actions (such 

as intentionally targeting civilians or killing innocent women and children of all faiths) as justifiable in the eyes of God (although debatable) 

is considerate, careful, and rational (hallmarks of conscientiousness) 

p Zawahiri, a trained surgeon, was born into a pious, middle-class Egyptian family. 

A key figure in EIJ, he spent time in prison in Egypt on suspicion of being involved in the 

assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Zawahiri is now an older man 

whose long beard has turned to gray and white and whose large glasses cover eyes set 

among the wrinkles of a man who has lived a life of secrecy that has been under siege for 

more than two decades. His most prominent physical feature is probably a large callous 

in the middle of his forehead that indicates hours spent bowing prostrate while reciting 

the Koran or praying. His obsessive-compulsive tendencies were probably a benefit in his 

academic pursuit of medicine, which requires not only an expansive memory but also high 

general fluid intelligence in the application of the learned material in a clinical setting 

(particularly as a surgeon). It is said that he does not have many hobbies (or vices) and 

that his chosen activities are often solitary and intellectual (praying, studying, or reading); 

both his academic accomplishment and his theological knowledge attest to his attempts at 

mastery. Most individuals that have come in to contact with Zawahiri recall his vast intellect; a gift evident at an early age not only by objective measures but also though subjective 

interactions. Given the competitiveness and rigidity with which the socialist-leaning Nassertist regime’s education system functioned, Zawahiri was subjected to (and performed 

well on) numerous standardized tests throughout his formative years, qualifying for admittance into Cairo University (from which he later graduated with distinction).52

q This is as much a product of changes in the region’s educational system as it is indicative of psychological links between certain occupations and support for terrorist tactics.
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Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

and not necessary antisocial. The actions ascribed to bin Laden’s direction seem indicative of a charismatic destructive narcissist56; however, 

accounts of his personal behavior present the image of someone introverted by nature who seems to prefer isolation, drawing energy from 

being quiet, contemplative, and focused on his religion. Among the 

personality traits that remain uncertain are his agreeableness and/or 

neuroticism (particularly his proneness toward worrying). Zawahiri, 

who has exhibited both highly disagreeable and paranoid tendencies, 

would probably be able to, through the strength of his personality, compel even a stable bin Laden to worry. Again, this confluence of personality styles may be a contributor to their collective (and repeated) 

warnings about the influence of the United States in the Middle East.

Zawahiri, in some respects, can be considered a representative 

example of an underground strategist57 in that he lacks the interpersonal charisma or inspirational aptitude of bin Laden and prefers to 

work behind the scenes. Despite his tendency toward and preference 

for secrecy, Zawahiri was often selected to represent various groups to 

which he belonged, whether as an EIJ member in Tula prison or as 

bin Laden’s deputy in Al Qaeda, because of his intellectr

 and articulate yet demonstrative manner of speaking.59 Zawahiri is not described 

as a man whose affective reactions compromise his ability for rational 

thought; however, he does speak with an impassioned tone and often 

waves an extended right index finger with his palm toward the camera or interviewer in a demonstrative, often condescending manner.s

r Zawahiri’s judgment (particularly in operation matters), however, has been questioned. In the late 1980s, while preoccupied with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, his financial mismanagement of EIJ necessitated a closer alliance with Al Qaeda that ultimately 

detracted from their initially stated objective (driving some members away).The string of 

failed operations in the 1990s at the hands of the Egyptian authorities were also attributed 

to Zawahiri, who was still considered a valuable strategic thinker but who lacked the operational experience to effectively plan and execute terrorist operations.58

s Zawahiri’s public statements reveal not only some of the aforementioned personality traits but also a degree of Machiavellian leadership evidenced by his willingness to 

subordinate certain components of his nuanced Islamic beliefs to the strategic objective. 

Zawahiri’s words (both written and spoken) are the extension of Qutb’s, calling for militant opposition not only to Christian and Jew infidel crusaders but also to Muslim apostates who deviate from Salafist practice. Zawahiri’s writings blend his militant ideology 

with pragmatic recommendation for vanguard Islamist movements, tactical employment 

of diverse weapon systems, and underground tradecraft recommendations that render 

his writings must-reads for the budding jihadist. His acknowledgment of the populace as 

the center of gravity of the global Salafist jihad (for both the insurgents and counterinsurgents) indicates an appreciation for both those people and an understanding of the 

U.S. and coalition strategic communication and/or psychological operations themes, messages, and targeting priorities. In advising Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (the Jordanian leader of 

Al Qaeda in Iraq) not to highlight his Wahhabist ideals (as neither the majority Shia nor 

the minority Sunni population in Iraq subscribes to Wahhabism), he acknowledges the 

limitation of proselytizing by force as well as the risk of imposing one’s religion. In a further divergence from his Qutbist revolutionary core, he urges Al-Zarqawi against branding 
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105

It is unclear whether this gesture is Zawahiri’s way of paying homage to 

Qutb (who exhibited a similar demonstrative gesticulation) or whether 

it is indicative of his inability to regulate the anger he seems to experience when speaking about the plight of the umma at the hands of the 

apostate regimes or in response to rumors of his death or his organization’s reduced operational capabilities. The value of the underground 

strategist is thought leadership and planning acumen; his role is akin 

to operational art in that he translates the intent of the inspirational 

leader into a proscribed set of tasks for subordinates to execute. Their 

role is vital yet often unrecognized and a potential source of personal 

and organizational tension.

Zawahiri has exhibited narcissistic and paranoid personality traits, 

but none have been exhibited to the degree that would meet the clinical criteria for a disorder. He exhibits contentious/oppositional and 

dominant/controlling features, with secondary features of the dauntless/dissenting and ambitious/self-serving pattern.60 The amalgam of 

contentious (negativistic or passive aggressive) and dominant (aggressive or sadistic) patterns in Zawahiri’s profile suggests the presence of 

abrasive negativist syndrome, a set of characteristics whereby seemingly 

minor frictions are perceived as significant confrontations.61 Zawahiri’s self-concept is that of the Islamic scholar carrying the banner 

of his heroes (Qutbt

 most prominent among them) who lives life in 

anticipation of martyrdom because that is perceived to be the noblest 

path to paradise. Both his reluctance to participate in contact sports 

as youth and what some saw as his hesitance to act in his early years 

as a cell leader indicate a lack of physical courage that he attempts to 

conceal behind his academic demeanor. Zawahiri also may be haunted 

by the memory of betraying some of his friends to Egyptian authorities under torture. Both the shame of this confession and the lack of 

physical courage manifested though his thoughtful, contemplative, 

himself a cruel terrorist by conducting and broadcasting hostage executions because it is 

inconsistent with the strategy of Al Qaeda and the loosely federated (and successful) resistance movement in Iraq.

t The most defining relationship of Zawahiri’s personality is that with the ideal of 

Sayyid Qutb. In adolescence, accounts of Qutb’s character, binary worldview, and steadfast 

devotion to Islamic principles caused the ambitious Zawahiri to identify Qutb as a surrogate father figure to emulate and to which he continually aspires. Zawahiri has exhibited 

at times narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, and paranoid leadership styles but seems to 

favor a mixture of obsessive-compulsive and paranoid. His contentious/oppositional and 

dominant/controlling personality traits, along with his hypersensitivity and introversion, 

cause him to prefer serving in a Rasputin-like advisory capacity to being the individual 

who makes the decisions (and thus experiences the ramifications and criticisms of those 

decisions). He is often dismissive, hypercritical, and condescending when threatened or 

challenged, causing some Western analysts to dismiss his comments holistically as propaganda. However, his choice of tone is deliberately calculated to appeal to his target audience and should not be overlooked.62
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Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

and sensitive private self conspire to create a sense of vulnerability, 

weakness, and shame that he aggressively protects with his most prolific gift: his intellect. The operationalizing of his intellect as an ego 

defense mechanism is emboldened by the respect his academic accomplishments have afforded him as a young man and his willingness to 

live an austere life of sacrifice under constant threat in pursuit of his 

beliefs as an older man.u Abrasively negativistic individuals are often 

eager to identify inconsistencies in others’ actions or ethical standards 

and are adept at constructing arguments that amplify observed contradictions.63 Zawahiri has been known to act in such a manner, but it 

is unclear whether it was to achieve a particular goal in Machiavellian 

fashion or because he felt threatened and needed to defend himself or 

his position. Zawahiri has and will probably continue to take the moral 

high ground, dogmatically and contemptuously exposing his antagonists’ perceived hypocrisy and contemptuously, derisively, and scornfully betraying those who cross his path.64

The decision to strike the United States, although not exclusively 

attributed to Zawahiri, has come under criticism by many Islamist 

groups throughout the Middle East who saw their freedom of movement (and subsequent opportunity to strike) diminished by the post9/11 United States-led global war on terrorism; these groups felt that 

the Al Qaeda leadership traded a tactical victory for strategic defeat.65

These criticisms, although significant, are insufficient to make the 

assertion that he lacks judgment, for clearly someone who has been at 

or near the top of multiple organizations with rigid vetting processes 

could not have attained or retained positions of leadership lacking 

some capacity for judgment. This particular debate (if one did occur) 

is an important component of the underground decision-making process. Understanding not only the personality of the leader but also how 

he receives and processes information are vital in the dynamics of the 

underground. This is particularly so during crises where one’s leadership is stressed, challenged, or removed. These crises can be assassination attempts on a leader, successful counternetwork operations by an 

adversary, or even planned political events such as the guerilla conferences held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC).v

u Intellectualization is also a defense mechanism that satiates both a practical and 

aesthetic need, as one of the quotes attributed to the Prophet Mohamed in the Hadiths is 

(to paraphrase): “the ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr.”

v The FARC hold periodic conferences to assess progress and plan for the future. The 

1st Guerrilla Conference was in late 1965 in Río Chiquito. Several disparate groups joined 

together, forming what was called the “South Bloc” and what would eventually become 

the FARC.
Chapter 4. Leadership

107

Zawahiri’s leadership stands in stark contrast to that of the stabilizing and politically flexible Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbollah since 1992. Nasrallah’s subtle charisma has endeared him to strict 

Islamists and secular Lebanese alike: his face appears on billboards, 

key chains, and screensavers and excerpts of his speeches are even 

used as cell phone ringtones.66 Although highly intelligent and deeply 

devout, Nasrallah (unlike Zawahiri) is not as ideologically rigid nor is 

he passive aggressive. In fact, his willingness to deviate from Hizbollah’s 

initial manifesto has led to the increased political prominence of Hizbollah. His recognition of the social landscape and political acumen, 

coupled with his religious credentials, have continued to provide him a 

degree of legitimacy unrivaled in insurgent groups. While bin Laden’s 

visage is as popular in the Middle East as it is condemned in the West, 

he lacked both the political authority and the legitimacy of Nasrallah. 

Nasrallah earned broad support by cultivating a social welfare network 

that provided schools, clinics, and housing in the predominantly Shiite parts of Lebanon and received considerable credit for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Although he cannot claim full credit for the 

military operations that Hizbollah waged, he was largely responsible 

for the information campaign that secured Hizbollah broad Shiite support and decreased Israeli public opinion (and ultimately political will) 

toward the occupation of Lebanon.

TARGETING LEADERS

Leadership analysis can facilitate the targeting process, particularly 

when the goal is not necessarily removal but manipulation or marginalization. Influencing a group’s membership and/or civilian populace 

to discredit an effective leader or sow dissension can be far more effective when based on psychological characteristics in additional to other 

sources of intelligence. Conversely, a counterinsurgent force or rival 

group may want to strengthen a relatively ineffective leader to lessen 

the organization’s effectiveness.

Kinetically targeting leaders is a common counterterror and counterinsurgency tactic; however, decapitation strikes have not been 

proven to be a cost-effective strategy.67 The underlying logic behind 

targeting leaders lies in eliminating the impact of charismatic leadership, which was discussed earlier. Viewing leaders as moral centers of 

gravity presupposes that the movement centered on them will cease to 

exist if they are removed. In cases such as Guzman and Sendero Luminoso, this was the case; however, Guzman’s public recanting was likely 

more catastrophic than his death. An organization that decides to execute a leader runs the risk of martyring that leader and thus further 
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Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

incentivizing resistance; however, execution is still a viable option in 

many campaigns. Qutb’s refusal to renounce his beliefs, temper his 

rhetoric, or plead for his life has made him an admirable martyr in the 

minds of many devout Islamic insurgents.

In a rigorous analysis of the 298 cases of leadership decapitation 

from 1945 to 2004, Jordan concluded that younger and smaller organizations are more vulnerable to such strikes than larger and/or moredeveloped institutions. Furthermore, whereas religious organizations 

are resilient to decapitation, nonreligious ideological organizations 

are more susceptible to collapse after decapitation.68 Other approaches 

may include discrediting a key leader or using his relative isolation as 

an opportunity to manipulate/modify/disrupt his communication with 

his extended network of subordinates and associates as a means of sowing friction within the group.

SUMMARY

Leadership is a critical factor for understanding underground 

movements. Charismatic leaders are often at the center of such movements, perhaps by necessity. These leaders exhibit the characteristics of 

transformational leadership and can help nascent organizations form 

against opposition and survive their most vulnerable stages. Charismatic leaders such as George Jackson also form ideologies that can unite 

movements and propel them forward. Charismatic leadership has limitations as well, however. Maintenance of such personas can be costly, 

these leaders may be resistant to compromise, and they may lack other 

organizational skills necessary as underground organizations grow.

Leadership profiling methods, such as those of Margaret Hermann 

and Jerrold Post, can shed some light on both the personalities and 

likely behaviors of leaders. Psychoanalytic theory, particularly studies 

of narcissism and paranoia, may also lend some insights. There is, however, no single approach that is either universally applicable or resistant 

to criticism. The most appropriate approach is understanding the tools 

and methods available and selecting the appropriate technique given 

the existing data. The Millon-based approach is the most consistent 

with current (as of 2012) diagnostic criteria; however, it (much like the 

others) requires the expertise of a clinician and/or behavioral scientist 

to ensure the necessary analytical rigor and context. Leadership analysis entails concomitant risks such as the fundamental attribution error 

and/or deception. To mitigate some of those risks, it is vital to ensure 

individual actors (and their actions) are placed in the appropriate 

sociocultural context.69 This is compounded by the fact that insurgent 

group leaders do not make themselves readily available for analysis. 
Chapter 4. Leadership

109

Access to credible primary source materials (family members, former 

associates, written documentation, audio/video recordings, interviews, 

intelligence materials, etc.) that can be used to conduct a leadership 

analysis may be the single most important limiting factor in determining which methodology can be used.

ENDNOTES

1 Jerrold M. Post, The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

2 Bernard M. Bass, “Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational 

Leadership,” European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 8, no. 1 (1999): 9–32.

3 Philip M. Podsakoff, Scott B. Mackenzie, Robert H. Moorman, and Richard Fetter, 

“Transformational Leader Behaviors and Their Effects on Followers’ Trust in Leader, 

Satisfaction, and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors,” Leadership Quarterly 1, no.  2 

(1990): 107–142.

4 Gary Yukl, Angela Gordon, and Tom Taber, “A Hierarchical Taxonomy of Leadership 

Behavior: Integrating a Half Century of Behavior Research,” Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 9, no. 1 (2002): 15–32.

5 Jay A. Conger and Raabindra N. Kanungo, “Toward a Behavioral Theory of Charismatic 

Leadership in Organizational Settings,” The Academy of Management Review 12, no.  4 

(1987): 637–647.

6 Ibid.

7 Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Charles Crossett (Laurel, MD: The Johns 

Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2009), 58–59.

8 Ibid.

9 Post, Psychological Assessment.

10 Conger and Kanungo, “Charismatic Leadership.”

11 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorist’s Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 

Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 102.

12 John Pallas and Robert Barber, “From Riot to Revolution,” in The Politics of Punishment, 

ed. Erik Olin Wright (New York: HarperCollins, 1973), 237.

13 H. Bruce Franklin, “The Inside Stories of the Global American Prison,” Texas Studies in 

Literature and Language 50, no. 3 (2008): 235–242.

14 George L. Jackson, Soledad Brother – The Prison Letters of George Jackson (New York: Bantam 

Books, 1970).

15 James B. Jacobs, “Race Relations and the Prisoner Subculture,” Crime and Justice 1 (1979): 

1–27.

16 Dennis D. Dorin and Robert Johnson, “The Premature Dragon: George Jackson as a 

Model for the New Militant Inmate,” Contemporary Crises 3, no. 3 (1979): 295–315.

17 Ibid.

18 George L. Jackson, Blood in My Eye (New York: Bantam Books, 1972).

19 Daniel Burton-Rose, Guerrilla USA: The George Jackson Brigade and the Anticapitalist Underground of the 1970s (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).

20 Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report (New York: Basic 

Books, 1972).
110

Part I. Undergrounds as Organizations

21 Audrey Immelman, “Political Psychology and Personality,” in Handbook of Personology and 

Psychopathology, ed. Stephen Strack (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005).

22 Margaret G. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 7–46.

23 Immelman, “Political Psychology and Personality.”

24 Dean K. Simonton, “Presidential IQ, Openness, Intellectual Brilliance, and Leadership: 

Estimates and Correlations for 42 U.S. Chief Executives,” Political Psychology 27, no.  4 

(2006): 511–526.

25 Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler.

26 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological 

Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42.

27 Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New 

York: Guilford Publications Inc., 1993).

28 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 1: An 

Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 73–100.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist.”

32 Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda

(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007).

33 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why

(Washington, DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1999).

34 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory” (DIIS Working Paper no. 2008/2, Denmark, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008).

35 Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist.”

36 Ronald N. Turco, “Psychological Profiling,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and 

Comparative Criminology 34, no. 2 (1990), 147–154.

37 Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe.”

38 Post et al., “The Radical Group in Context 1.”

39 Ibid.

40 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 2: 

Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group 

Type,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 101–126.

41 Jordan Maile, Tali K. Walters, J. Martin Ramirez, and Daniel Antonius, “Aggression in 

Terrorism,” in Interdisciplinary Analyses of Terrorism and Political Aggression, eds. Daniel 

Antonius, A. D. Brown, Tali K. Walters, J. Martin Ramirez, and S. J. Sinclair (Cambridge: 

Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010).

42 Audrey Immelman, “The Assessment of Political Personality: A Psychodiagnostically Relevant Conceptualization and Methodology,” Political Psychology 14, no. 4 (1993): 725–741.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Jason Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications 

Directorate, in press).

46 Jason Spitaletta and Shana Marshall, “Al Qaeda,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).
Chapter 4. Leadership

111

47 Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004).

48 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2005).

49 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 

2002).

50 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: The 

Free Press, 2002).

51 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda.

52 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

53 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage 

Books, 2007).

54 Moghaddam, From the Terrorist’s Point of View, 103.

55 Post, The Mind of the Terrorist.

56 Ibid.

57 Moghaddam, From the Terrorist’s Point of View.

58 Chuck Crossett and Jason Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological 

Concepts (Ft. Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2010).

59 al-Zayyat, The Road to Al-Qaeda.

60 Audrey Immelman and Kathryn Kuhlmann, “Bin Laden’s Brain: The Abrasively Negativistic Personality of Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri” (paper presented at the Twenty-Sixth Annual 

Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, 2003).

61 Ibid.

62 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

63 Immelman and Kuhlmann, “Bin Laden’s Brain.”

64 Ibid.

65 Gerges, The Far Enemy.

66 “Profile: Hassan Nasrallah,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed May 9, 2011, http://

www.cfr.org/publication/11132/profile.html.

67 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18 (2009): 719–755.

68 Ibid.

69 Jennie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berrett, “Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool 

for Intelligence Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 2 (2011): 1–22.

PART II.

MOTIVATION

CHAPTER 5.

JOINING, STAYING IN, AND LEAVING 

THE UNDERGROUND
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Reasons for Joining................................................................................. 117

Recruitment ........................................................................................ 117

Ideology ...............................................................................................123

Affiliative Factors ................................................................................131

Reasons for Staying.................................................................................132

Reasons for Leaving................................................................................135

Defection .............................................................................................136

Disengagement.................................................................................... 141

Deradicalization.................................................................................. 141

Reintegration ......................................................................................143

Insurgent Transitions..............................................................................146

Summary ................................................................................................148
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

117

Jason Spitaletta, Nathan Bos, and SORO authors

This chapter is about the process by which individuals come to join 

underground and insurgent groups, why they stay, and why some leave, 

including notes on demobilization (or so-called “deradicalization”) 

programs. This chapter includes a substantial amount of material 

related to southeast Asian insurgencies—in particular the Viet Minh 

and Philippine Huk insurgency—that appeared in the original version of this book. This chapter will not delve as deeply as subsequent 

chapters into the psychological forces, group dynamics, and influence 

methods behind these decisions. Rather, we will give an overview of 

these behaviors and the most apparent causes. Because these processes 

differ greatly between settings and groups, where possible we will give 

multiple diverse examples of each process.

REASONS FOR JOINING

Recruitment

As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of the companion to 

this work, the second edition of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, 

and Resistance Warfare, recruiting and retention of personnel is a sine 

qua non of any sustained movement. Insurgent recruitment is typically 

very different at different insurgency stages, as insurgencies move from 

small conspiracies to larger organizations with specialized roles. An 

insurgency that is in its nascent stages might take an extended period 

of time to investigate and cultivate a relationship with a potential front 

leader in an area of a country targeted for expansion of the movement. 

As an insurgency expands, the underground organization must recruit 

and develop middle-level leaders, such as front or provincial leaders, 

influential agents within a university or government agency, and military leaders. Recruiting key figures that already wield great influence in 

a society is a boon for the insurgent underground because it subtracts 

this individual’s influence and reach from the government and adds 

significant new capability to the movement. During the middle stages 

of an insurgency, leaders usually have to expand the recruiting effort in 

order to meet growing operational and functional requirements as well 

as to replace members lost to attrition. During the latter stages of an 

insurgency, the momentum of the movement characterizes recruiting. 

A successful insurgency that is able to either take power (supplanting 

the former government) or achieve political, legal, or quasi-legal status 
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Part II. Motivation

will normally expand recruitment operations to include parallel efforts 

at political mobilization.

The type of individual an insurgency attracts and the nature of their 

motivations for joining also changes as an insurgency develops. In the 

early stages of an underground movement, recruitment is selective and 

restricted as much as possible to known, trusted associates of current 

members. Strong ideological sympathies are most important at this 

point, when joining entails greater risk and thus requires stronger convictions. If they are successful and survive to later stages of expansion 

and militarization, undergrounds move into mass recruitment. The 

motivations for joining an underground movement during later phases 

are more complex, with no single motivating reason being dominant.

Three contrasting examples will illustrate the range of experiences 

and recruitment tactics that have been observed. The examples are as 

follows: (1) “classic” rural insurgencies, illustrated with the Philippine 

Huks and the Viet Minh; (2) Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 

recruitment, a largely urban insurgency that drew from the large pool 

of sympathizers born into multigenerational Republican families, and 

(3) campus recruitment efforts of the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) 

in Egypt.

Recruitment in Rural Insurgencies: the Huks and the Viet Minh

Rural insurgencies are typical of Communist movements in the 

developing world, where the class struggle of poor farmers versus 

wealthy landowners is a central theme, and the tactics and motivations that characterize rural Communist insurgencies are typical of 

non-Communist rural insurgencies as well. A study of the Philippine 

insurgency suggests that individuals usually join as the result of a combination of factors—most often reflecting immediate needs and situational constraints.1

 A chance to obtain personal advantage—ownership 

of land, leadership, or position of authority—was frequently cited. For 

some individuals, situational problems, such as family discord, violations of minor laws, and so on, also influenced decisions to join because 

the insurgency offered a convenient way to disappear. First contact with 

the movement usually came through chance. An individual joined if 

the movement fulfilled a personal need or served as an escape, or if 

social pressure or actual force was applied. Once he was in the movement, indoctrination and other organizational processes helped him 

to rationalize his commitments.

A chain of interlocking acts eventually led to full-fledged membership. While not invariable, this process was typical of most of the ex-Huks 

interviewed. The story of one former Huk exemplifies the interplay of 

motives. This man was recognized as a leader in his barrio and became 
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

119

the local contact for the Huks. He got involved in the arrangement 

of a rally. When the local people then decided to form a Huk unit, 

they chose him as its leader. He could not refuse without antagonizing 

the Huks nor could he leave the town and move elsewhere. The Huks 

sent him to a “Stalin University,” where he was exposed to Communist 

thinking and propaganda, and the propaganda points that particularly 

impressed him were the promises to eliminate usury and government 

corruption and to distribute land to the poor.2

The role of ideology varied between the Vietnamese and Huk example. A survey of a group of captured Viet Minh showed that 38 percent 

of the prisoners expressed a belief in the Viet Minh cause; only 17 percent of a Huk sample of 400 prisoners expressed sympathy with the 

political objectives of the Communist Party.3

Promises and propaganda appear to have been involved in a number of cases, although their actual effects are difficult to determine. 

One source has noted than among ex-Huks, a majority had joined the 

movement without any noticeable propaganda influence; most had 

been primarily concerned with issues like land distribution and lower 

interest rates. Less than 15 percent gave their only reason for joining 

the Huks as propaganda or verbal persuasion, although 27  percent 

reported persuasion or propaganda as a contributory factor. Thirtyeight percent of the Huks became involved through personal friends. It 

was probably later, after being exposed to propaganda and indoctrination, that motives for joining were related to specific grievances.4

A number of prisoners claimed that they were coerced into joining 

the movement, but because they were prisoners, their claims may have 

been exaggerated. Huk leaders realized that recruiting could not wait 

for the slow process of persuasion and free decision. A simple example 

of a coercion technique was related by a farmer’s young son who, while 

working in the fields, was asked by the Huks to help carry supplies to 

their mountain hideout. Since they were armed, he complied. After 

they got to the mountains, the Huks told him he had better stay or else 

they would report him to the constabulary, who would punish him for 

helping them. In one study it was found that 20  percent of ex-Huks 

had been forced to join at the point of a gun or because of threats of 

violence against their families; for another 13 percent, violence was one 

important factor among several others.5

During the Indochinese War, some cases were reported of young 

men who had been forced to join the Viet Minh by direct physical coercion. Other men entered the movement because of indirect pressure on 

their families or on village leaders to provide recruits. The Communists 

in general combined strong-arm and other pressure techniques with 

propaganda appeals stressing independence. They generally avoided 
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Part II. Motivation

open appeals for Communism. At any rate, in one study 25 percent of 

the Viet Minh prisoners stated that they had been forced to join against 

their wishes and had resented being coerced. Another 23 percent also 

claimed to have been forced to join but did not appear to resent the 

fact.

Coercion alone did not seem to be a large factor (20–23 percent) 

in either the Huks or Viet Minh. Coercion combined with other positive incentives related to personal and situational factors, however, 

accounted for a larger proportion of joiners (33–48 percent). Another 

important factor was the action of government troops. Of the 95 exHuks interviewed, 19 percent said they joined the Huks because of persecution or terrorization by government forces. The effort of the army 

to suppress the revolt apparently was a factor that led many to join 

the movement.6

PIRA Recruitment of Republican Sympathizers

The IRA’s recruitment methods were quite different from those of 

the rural, ideology-based, and relatively new insurgencies in Southeast 

Asia. In many ways, the Provisional IRA’s recruitment strategies were 

easier than those of most other insurgencies because the resistance had 

been continuing for so long at the point when this group became most 

active. Many potential recruits were from “Republican” families, and 

these sympathies sometimes went back generations. When “The Troubles” started in August 1969, approximately one hundred active PIRA 

members were in Belfast, with another 300–500 supporters providing 

cover, hiding, or communications. Through 1971 and 1972, the Provisionals had smaller membership numbers than the Official IRA, but 

the perception that the Provisionals were protecting the Catholic population against the brutality of the British Army and Protestant mobs 

gained them a following and support that began to drain the popularity and support from the older, politically oriented Official IRA.7

The sectarian violence and actions of the British Army during The 

Troubles were sufficient catalysts to drive young men to the Provisionals. Many volunteers came from Republican (not necessarily IRA) backgrounds and had already experienced a violent confrontation with 

mobs or the British Army, and retribution more than politics was the 

proximal factor that motivated volunteers to seek out PIRA affiliation. 

Nevertheless, the PIRA leadership carefully weeded out those who were 

motivated purely by revenge and violence. Prospective members were 

required to endure tedious lectures and reading assignments about 

Republicanism in order to (1) fully indoctrinate the individual into 

the cause of a united Ireland and (2) discourage those seeking solely 

prestige or violence.8

 The volunteers who were selected were typically 
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

121

in their late teens or earlier twenties, mostly middle class, and usually 

adequately educated.9

As the PIRA grew, it focused on recruiting a professional army and 

were thus interested in sound, stable members, not academics, thrill 

seekers, the well connected, or the rich, as illustrated by this section 

from the IRA’s Green Book:

The Army as an organisation claims and expects your 

total allegiance without reservation. It enters into every 

aspect of your life. It invades the privacy of your home 

life, it fragments your family and friends, in other 

words claims your total allegiance. All potential volunteers must realise that the threat of capture and of 

long jail sentences are a very real danger and a shadow 

which hangs over every volunteer . . . potential volunteers should think about their ability to obey orders 

from a superior officer . . . whether they like the particular officer or not . . . He should not join the Army 

because of emotionalism, sensationalism, or adventurism. He should examine fully his own motives, knowing the dangers involved and knowing that he will find 

no romance within the Movement.

Most PIRA members had day jobs and took part in operations during the weekends or evenings. Their regular jobs often facilitated their 

support of the PIRA. If they worked in a government office, then collecting official paperwork, forms, or intelligence was part of their PIRA 

duty. Those volunteers who had training or experience in politics or 

in organizational planning were put to work in Sinn Féin, while those 

who wished to serve without exposure to violence were asked to be part 

of the auxiliary, providing safe-houses, transportation, donations, and 

communications. The support and cover that the PIRA received from 

the auxiliary and from the broader Catholic community allowed them 

to operate somewhat overtly, establish weapons caches, and quickly 

disappear into sympathizer’s houses after an ambush. While this deep 

connection to the community afforded freedom of movement, it also 

made the PIRA reliant upon popular opinion.10

Campus Recruitment by EIG: Filling a Void

Communist groups were notorious for their campus recruitment: 

in Europe, Latin America, and the United States, it was not uncommon for groups to have an overt presence in many universities. Islamic 

groups adopted similar tactics where the environment was suitably 

permissive (predominantly in the Middle East and North Africa). As 

groups like Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
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Part II. Motivation

(EIJ) began to distinguish themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood in 

the 1960s and 1970s, they were often led by individuals with academic 

backgrounds in science and engineering (a demographic overrepresented among Islamist movements in the Muslim world). Therefore, 

a crowded (in some cases, overcrowded) university setting made for a 

logical recruiting ground. Many of these young men were intelligent 

but not yet worldly and knew little outside of their upbringing. While 

educational opportunities were available (if one were to do well enough 

on his exams), the supporting institutions such as housing and transportation were unable to meet the demands of the influx of students 

each year. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and EIG stepped in, 

not necessarily to recruit but rather to provide necessary services to 

their perceived in-group.

Early in its campus recruiting and social outreach programs during 

the 1970s, EIG subjected their recruiting pool to a single, undifferentiated message to which some, but not all, were expected to respond 

positively.11 The Muslim Brotherhood historically used print media in 

various forms to further their message, while EIG employed the tactic 

to a lesser degree, often preferring Friday sermons at the mosques or 

public gatherings as better venues. This served to provide a social component to the ideological indoctrination process.12 In its role as a provider of social services (housing, transportation, tutoring, mentoring, 

etc.) on college campuses, EIG served as a conduit for young Muslim 

men seeking both intellectual and spiritual guidance to local mosques 

and Muslim organizations, including both the Muslim Brotherhood 

and EIG. EIG favored a public and proximate approach whereby prominent members, such as civic leaders or clerics, would serve as recruiters, openly espousing the benefits of affiliation.13 This occurred in 

full view and often with the tacit support, if not overt consent, of the 

Sadat regime. EIG activists were often prominent university students or 

recent graduates, including rural-to-urban migrants and urban middle-class youth whose fathers were middle-level government employees 

or professionals. Their fields of study—medicine, engineering, military 

science, and pharmacy—were among the most highly competitive and 

prestigious disciplines in the university system. The rank-and-file members of EIG came from the middle class, the lower-middle class, and the 

urban working class.

EIG’s domestic recruiting efforts fared better than those of EIJ during the 1980s (particularly since the Egyptian regime, with Saudi Arabian financial backing, provided tacit support to the Islamic groups 

contributing personnel to aid the anti-Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan) 

and early 1990s, and their membership, though always significantly 

larger than that of EIJ—an estimated tens of thousands compared with 
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123

hundreds—remained strong until the Egyptian law enforcement and 

counterintelligence apparatus began to systematically dismantle the 

networks in the mid-1990s.14

Ideology

While an organization rarely survives on ideology alone, “men who 

are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph.”15 Successful movements often rely on a narrative for recruitment, legitimacy, 

and support that resonates with a deep cultural, ethnic, or historical 

myth/memory within the population.

Common to most underground movements is an ideology, a set of 

inter-related beliefs, values, and norms. Ideologies are usually highly 

abstract and complex and are more than a group of rationalizations and 

myths that justify the existence of a group; they can be used to manipulate and influence the behavior of the individuals within the group. In 

every society, ideas, knowledge, lore, superstitions, myths, and legends 

are shared by its members. These are cultural beliefs. Associated with 

each belief are values—the “right” or “wrong” judgments that guide 

individual actions. This value code is reinforced through a system of 

rewards and punishments dispensed to members within the group. In 

this way, approved patterns of behavior, or “norms,” are established.

Because beliefs and values are only distantly related to concrete 

action in daily life, an interpretive process is essential to derive specific 

rules of behavior. Commonly agreed-upon historical truths are used to 

justify the norms, values, and beliefs of the group. Significant events 

that occurred in distant times are given symbolic meanings, and a reinterpretation or “reification” of these events in the form of myths or 

legends supporting the group’s purpose is developed. In doing this, the 

group may select certain concepts and adapt or distort them to justify 

specific forms of behavior; where existing concepts conflict with current activities, the group may deny that a particular concept is relevant 

in a particular case.

Within organizations, certain rules specify desirable behavior and 

the consequences of not conforming. The rules are enforced by organized rewards and punishments that are relevant to the objectives of 

the group. Normative standards are also enforced by surveillance of 

members. In established groups, many beliefs are based on authority; that is, since the leaders of the group voice the beliefs, they are 

accepted as true. When a leader controls the dissemination of information to the members of an organization, he censors and approves 

various types of information. As a result, the group receives a restricted 
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range of information, and group members tend to develop a set of common beliefs. Thus, in some cases, members need not be persuaded by 

argument, induced by reward, compelled by pressure, guided by past 

beliefs, or influenced by the opinions of other people; the restricted 

range of information to which they have access is sufficient to determine their beliefs.

Human beings dislike ambiguity and uncertainty in their social and 

physical environment. Through generalized beliefs, individuals seek to 

give meaning and organization to unexplained events. Common agreement on certain beliefs also enables individuals to operate collectively 

toward a desired goal. Leaders can interpret situations in terms of the 

group’s beliefs or ideology, translating abstract, ideological beliefs into 

specific, concrete situations in which actions are to be taken.

Uncertainty reduction theory holds that most people do not tend to 

categorize themselves into groups unless there is a motive to alleviate 

uncertainty. This uncertainty arises from instability and the inability 

to obtain confirmation of one’s beliefs and attitudes from objective criteria16 and is a source of stress that has cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences17 that can inhibit decision making. Intolerance of 

uncertainty (IU) is the tendency to adversely react to (or in anticipation of) uncertain situations.18 IU is a cognitive bias that affects individual observation, orientation, decision, and action during uncertain 

situations19 and is an indicator of susceptibility to anxiety.20 IU can be 

categorized as the desire for predictability and/or the predilection 

towards paralysis21 when confronting a task where the effect of one’s 

input on a system is indeterminate.22 High IU individuals prefer either 

very easy or very difficult tasks because of the low risk of an unexpected 

outcome resulting in cognitive disorientation, unsettling experience, 

or (at worst) lowered self-esteem.23 Intermediate challenges moderately push the limits of one’s knowledge, skills, and/or abilities and 

thus do not provide predictable estimates; such challenges are therefore avoided by people with high IU.24 Similarly, people with high IU 

may not effectively interact with strangers or tolerate being exposed to 

situations in close interpersonal relationships whose consequences are 

unpredictable.25 Intolerance of uncertainty as a characterological trait 

does present a cognitive risk factor for anxiety;26 however, there are no 

empirical data to support it as a risk factor for either joining or remaining in an insurgent organization. Nevertheless, employing an ideology 

(often in the form of a narrative) provides an individual a conceptual 

framework through which to interpret the existing world and process 

novel stimuli.
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Qutbism: Ideology of the Modern Global Salafist Jihad

The modern global Salafist jihad, as proposed by Marc Sageman, 

consists of three phases. The first was the largely clandestine Islamist 

movement in Egypt, with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Egyptian 

Islamic Group (EIG) being the most prominent of the groups that 

emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood. The second phase was the 

mass mobilization of Muslim youth to participate in the defensive jihad 

in support of the Afghan mujahidin’s resistance to Soviet occupation. 

The final (and ongoing) phase is the Al  Qaeda social movement, a 

loosely affiliated group of networks linked by a common ideology.27

No modern theorist influenced Al Qaeda ideology more than Sayyid 

Qutb, whose unique Salafist interpretation of Islamic theory provides 

the ideological foundation of the late-twentieth-century global Salafist insurgency. The concept of Salafism has been employed by Sunni 

theologians since at least the fifth Muslim generation to differentiate 

the creed of the first three generations (the Sahabah, or Companions 

of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and the two succeeding generations, the Tabi’un and the Tabi’ al-Tabi’in) from subsequent variations in 

the Muslim belief system and method of interpretation. Salafists view 

those generations as an eternal model for all succeeding Muslim generations, especially in their beliefs and methodology of understanding 

the texts, and also in their method of worship, mannerisms, morality, 

piety, and conduct. Salafists place a particular emphasis on monotheism (tawhid); they condemn religious and political practices that are 

insufficiently deferential to God. Salafist ideology strictly prohibits 

Muslim practices such as venerating the graves of Islamic prophets and 

saints and in general opposes both Sufi and Shia doctrines. Salafists 

also reject Islamic speculative theology (kalam), which involves the use 

of discourse and debate in the development of the Islamic creed. Salafists maintain that innovation in the Islamic creed (bid’ah) or actions of 

worship are totally without sanction, and, based on scriptural evidence, 

that they are unacceptable to God. Salafists idealize an uncorrupted, 

pure Islamic religious community. They believe that Islam’s decline 

after the early generations results from religious innovations (bid’ah) 

and from an abandoning of pure Islamic teachings; they believe that an 

Islamic revival will only result through the emulation of the three early 

generations of Muslims and the purging of foreign influences from the 

religion. Salafists, as do strict adherents of other Islamic denominations, place great emphasis on ritual, from their five-times-daily prayers 

to activities such as eating, sitting, and manner of dress so as to follow 

the example of Muhammad and his companions as they endeavor to 

make religion part of every activity in life.28
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A well-educated literary critic from Cairo, Qutb returned to Egypt 

in 1950 after spending two years at the Colorado State College of Education under the sponsorship of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Education. Qutb left Egypt a secular nationalist opposed to British colonial 

occupation of Egypt and returned to his homeland a radical Islamist. 

His writings stoked the revolutionary fire within disillusioned young 

Muslims who sought a more active role in returning Egypt to the center of the Islamic world. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, political 

Islam served as an intellectual and ideological counterweight to the 

uniquely Egyptian blend of Arab nationalism and socialism espoused 

by the Nasser government. The ideological war over Egypt’s future 

reached a climax on the night of October  26,  1954, when a Muslim 

Brother, Abdul Munim Abdul Rauf, attempted to assassinate Nasser as 

he spoke before a crowd in Alexandria; six conspirators were quickly 

executed and more than 1,000 Muslim Brothers, including Qutb, were 

imprisoned. Qutb’s imprisonment, and the accompanying physical and 

psychological torture he endured, influenced the articulation of his 

revolutionary Salafist doctrine. His most famous work, translated as 

Milestones or Signposts Along the Road, published in Cairo in 1964, was 

quickly banned, and anyone caught with a copy was charged with sedition. Qutb was released from prison the same year.

While a detailed analysis of Qutb’s worldview and its development, 

much less a historiography, is beyond the scope of this section, it is 

important to acknowledge the effects of historical influences and his 

subjective experience on his worldview. Humans process information 

through their subjective experience and acquired biases, and Qutb 

was no different. Qutb believed that the world was meant to serve man 

if it was understood properly; that understanding was to be realized 

through Islam. One’s faith in Islam should be approached as a means 

to change society, to remove man from the enslavement of other men 

to the servitude of God. He viewed Islam as a system of morality, justice, and governance, whose laws and principles (Shari’a) should be the 

sole basis of political, public, and personal life. After the 1952 coup by 

the Free Officer’s Movement (in which he was tangentially involved), 

he espoused a just dictatorship that would grant political liberties to 

the virtuous alone. Later he wrote that rule by Shari’a would require 

essentially no government at all. On the issue of Islamic governance, 

Qutb differed with modernist and reformist Muslims who espoused 

the democratic ideals of Islam by referencing the Quranic institution 

of Shura that supported elections and democracy. Qutb disputed this 

because the particular Quranic reference was revealed during the Mekkan period and therefore did not address the issue of governance. Qutb 

opposed the idea of Arab nationalism in the wake of the 1952 coup; 

shortly after Nasser took power, he and Qutb had a falling out and 
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127

Qutb was subsequently imprisoned and subjected to the regime’s practices of arbitrary arrest, torture, and oppressive violence. He believed 

the corruption of good men in positions of power could only be avoided 

through the institution of Shari’a. Qutb is referenced less in support of 

the argument to implement Shari’a than in the justification of armed 

conflict as a means of doing so. His most recent writings claimed that 

Muslims should resist any system where men are in servitude to other 

men, be they religious or political figures, because it violates God’s sovereignty; a truly Islamic polity has no rulers because Muslims require 

neither judges nor police to obey divine law. Qutb believed much of the 

world to exists in a state of ignorance (jahiliyyah) and that submitting 

to Islam was a political, social, psychological, and spiritual liberation. 

The way to bring about this freedom was for a revolutionary vanguard 

to combat ignorance through preaching and through abolishing the 

organizations and authorities of all un-Islamic systems by jihad. This 

movement would spread across the Islamic homeland and ultimately 

throughout world, with all attaining freedom through submission 

to Islam.29

In 1965, Qutb was arrested again, charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government, and hanged in August 1966. Authorities hoped 

the execution would extinguish the Islamist threat to the Nasser regime. 

However, the tactic did not have the desired effect.30 The execution 

drove many Islamists underground and clandestine cells began to form 

among the restless, disillusioned, and disaffected youth, especially students. The Qutbist legacy was not only a binary worldview (or one that 

perceived the world as starkly divided between good and evil, the former being true Islam and the latter being the state of ignorance, jahiliyya, in which the rest of the world existed), but also the resurgence of 

takfira

 (or declaration of apostasy) authority pronounced by the umma

(Muslim community), no longer solely the prerogative of the ulema

(religious scholars), imam (prayer leader), or Shari’a.

31 These teachings 

were embodied by a number of young Muslims who opposed both the 

government and the Muslim Brotherhood’s perceived appeasement of 

the regime; both EIJ and EIG emerged from this Salafist community.

The Neglected Duty or The Absent Obligation, which has been retrospectively classified as the founding manifesto and the de facto operational 

manual of EIJ, was written by its founder, an electrical engineer named 

Mohammed Abd al-Salam Farraj. In this text, Farraj began by stating, 

a The traditional sentence for apostasy under Shari’a was execution, amputation, 

or expulsion, thus requiring stringent evidence for such accusations and often requiring an Islamic court or a religious leader to pronounce a fatwa (religious edict) of takfir. 

This subordination or decentralization of authority to declare takfir now empowered 

devout Muslims to rationalize not only judgment of their fellow Muslims but also violent 

punishment.
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“Jihad for God’s cause . . . has been neglected by the Ulema of this 

age.”32 He expanded the interpretation of jihad to include the violent 

struggle that is a duty (fard al-ayn) incumbent on all Muslims. Farraj’s 

argument was an extension of Qutb’s with a more explicit advocacy 

for the consideration of jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam. He rejected 

the interpretation that inner spiritual struggle was the greater jihad 

and emphasized the role of armed combat. He believed that peaceful 

means could never bring about a truly Islamic society and so jihad was 

the only option. He built on Qutb’s idea that modern Islamic societies 

represented jahiliyyah and used the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyahb

 to blame 

this on modern “apostate” Islamic rulers. Farraj’s advocacy entailed the 

establishment of an Islamic vanguard, an elite cadre of pious Muslims 

with either academic or military credentials that made them pillars of 

society. The responsibility of this vanguard was to serve as a model for 

elites in other Muslim nations to emulate. He made the initial classification of the “near enemy” (the impious Egyptian government) and 

the “far enemy” (Israel), subordinating all Islamic goals to the fight 

against local apostates.33 Farraj believed that a new Islamic state should 

be established in Egypt prior to initiating the campaign to reclaim lost 

Muslim lands because jihad under the banner of the then-current Arab 

regime would embolden the impious rulers (whom he blamed for colonial presence in the Middle East).34

EIJ saw its organization not only as the vanguard of Qutb’s vision for 

an Islamic revolution but also as an entity with requisite political and 

religious authority to declare all those who did not meet their requirements for piety essentially non-Muslim, regardless of what the individuals professed to believe. EIJ operationalized Qutbism by exemplifying 

piety in its members, as well as the organization’s oppositional stance 

against the Egyptian government. Nowhere was this more apparent 

than in EIJ’s commitment to conducting attacks against Egyptian and 

Western interests, despite the increasing difficulty of such attacks and 

the EIJ’s relative lack of success in the early to mid-1990s.35

During the mid-1980s, much of the EIJ underground relocated to 

Peshawar, Pakistan, to escape the Egyptian government and to participate in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union’s occupation. Although 

some EIJ members recognized the still-imprisoned Abud al-Zumur (a 

former lieutenant colonel in the Egyptian Army implicated in the Sadat 

assassination) as emir, others began to consider Sayyed Imam al-Sharif 

b Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah was an Islamic scholar, theologian, and philosopher and was born in Harran (the region that is now southwest Turkey). He lived during 

the period of the Mongol invasion and subsequent rule of the Middle East. He was a member of the school founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a Salafi scholar. His writings did not 

have considerable impact during his lifetime; however, they have been influential in Salafist ideologies from the nineteenth century through today.
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

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(Dr. Fadl) as EIJ’s leader. Sharif, a physician who was administering to 

the refugees from Afghanistan under the Red Crescent, emphasized 

the importance of the Qutbist ideology and the condemnation of those 

who deviated from it. Sharif had established a series of guesthouses 

and training camps in Peshawar to receive, stage, and prepare to move 

and integrate young Muslims from the Middle East into the Afghan 

resistance. His was a parallel effort to that of Osama bin Laden and 

his spiritual advisor (a role Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri was eventually to 

assume), Abdullah Azzam, who had established Maktab Al Khidamat 

(MAK) or Services Office to facilitate the resolution of administrative 

problems for foreign Muslim fighters. At some point during the mid1980s, Sharif’s academic, professional, and ideologically like-minded 

colleague, Zawahiri, became the recognized leader of EIJ. The operational and ideological relationship between bin Laden and Zawahiri 

grew closer during their years in Pakistan and Afghanistan. EIJ under 

Zawahiri was never financially stable and became increasingly reliant 

on stipends from bin Laden to retain a capability. 36

The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent deployment of U.S. and coalition forces to the region resulted in an update 

to the Salafist insurgent ideology. Bin Laden saw the stationing of U.S. 

troops in Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s holiest sites, as an unforgiveable offense. The Royal Family’s dismissal of bin Laden’s offer to provide security using his hardened Arab Afghan fighting force rather 

than receiving the American military delegation compounded his 

indignation. The Americans’ increasing role in the region, signified 

by repeated bombing campaigns in Iraq, the United States’ central 

role in the sanctions regime, the increasing visibility of U.S. military 

forces, and its bank-rolling of many despotic Arab regimes had now 

largely outstripped the residual goodwill it had earned by abstaining 

from colonization and supporting the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. 

In 1996, Al Qaeda announced its intention to expel foreign troops and 

interests from what they considered Muslim territory. Bin Laden issued 

a fatwa, entitled “Declaration of War Against Americans Occupying the 

Land of the Two Holy Places,” a public declaration of war against the 

United States and any of its allies, and began to refocus the organization’s resources toward large-scale psychological operations. The fatwa

represented an overall shift in focus on behalf of the EIJ and the other 

cells comprising Al Qaeda from the near enemy, or Muslim “apostate” 

governments, to the far enemy, or the United States.37 In 1998, Zawahiri issued a joint fatwa with bin Laden and Rifi Taha (EIG) under the 

title “World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders” which read:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—

civilians and military—is an individual duty for every 
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Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosquec

and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order 

for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, 

defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This 

is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, 

“and fight the pagans all together as they fight you 

all together,” and “fight them until there is no more 

tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and 

faith in Allah.”38

In June 2001, although difficult to distinguish for years, Al Qaeda 

and EIJ merged, forming “Qaeda al-Jihad,”39 and hereafter all activities and operations of former EIJ members were done under bin Laden’s banner. At this point, Zawahiri was presumed to be the deputy to 

bin Laden and the leader of EIJ. While the charismatic leadership of 

bin Laden was by now well known among the mujahidin, Al Qaeda’s 

strength and appeal did not lay solely in its sophisticated theological 

discourse but also in its ability to comprehend, co-opt, and exploit modern grievances. This narrative combination resonated with extremists 

and moderates alike, regardless of whether an individual approved of 

the means by which Al Qaeda sought to accomplish its goals. Al Qaeda’s leadership was not composed of highly trained religious scholars, 

and its religious rhetoric was far from complex or nuanced, making 

it broadly accessible across the socioeconomic spectrum. The specific 

messages within the larger narrative rarely focused on citing authoritative texts (beyond selective interpretations of previous theorists reinforced by Quranic quotes without context) but rather relied on the 

application of general religious or ethical principles to modern political and social problems.40

Despite the death of bin Laden in May 2011, Al Qaeda affiliates are 

still active throughout the globe, with the most prominent “franchises” 

being Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Northern Africa, 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and Al Shabaab 

in Somalia. Although the members probably agree with the teaching 

of Qutb, that literature is unlikely to be the proximal cause of their 

rationale for joining.

c The Al Aqsa Mosque, considered Islam’s third holiest site, is located in East Jerusalem, the proposed capital of an eventual Palestinian state.
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Affiliative Factors

Affiliative rationales for joining a radical group are far more 

common than ideological rationales. Maslow identified that humans 

require belonging and acceptance (whether from large or small social 

groups); they need to love and be loved (sexually and nonsexually) by 

others. The absence of these elements may increase one’s susceptibility 

to radicalization.41 These needs often exacerbate issues of social identity, particularly in immigrant enclaves, leading individuals to question 

their role in a new culture and/or seek out others with similar ethnic, 

social, and/or professional backgrounds.42 It is more likely that only 

after an individual joins and is indoctrinated that he or she comprehends and accepts the ideology upon which the group was constructed. 

In contemporary work on the Black Guerrilla Family (BGF) very few 

acknowledge the Marxist–Leninist–Fanonist influence of George Jackson or his advocacy of Black Separatism. Instead, most members choose 

to affiliate upon their first incarceration as a means of protection.

Sageman’s work on the Al Qaeda social movement identifies similar motives for joining. In the study, he compiled biographies of 400 

Al Qaeda-affiliated radicals from trial transcripts, press accounts, academic publications, and corroborated Internet sources. Of that sample, 162 were from the Maghreb (the predominantly Muslim countries 

of North Africa), 132 were from Arabian countries, and 55 were from 

southeast Asia. He further distinguished those 38 high-value individuals who were components of the Al Qaeda central staff. The vast 

majority had secular, not religious, educational backgrounds. Seventythree percent were married, and most had children (all of the central 

staff and southeast-Asian members were married). The central staff was 

composed mostly of Egyptian Islamic militants who had been released 

from prison and who traveled to Afghanistan for the jihad against the 

Soviets. The central staff and Maghreb Arabs were upwardly mobile 

young men from religious, caring, and middle-class families. Many 

spoke three to four languages and possessed computer skills. Most 

found themselves abroad, separated from traditional and cultural 

bonds, and sought social interaction with those of similar backgrounds 

and psychological states. They adopted the set of radicalized beliefs 

after they established social networks with radicalized individuals. The 

organization (or social movement) was a bottom-up, self-organizing 

activity with no centralized recruiting mechanism. Of those interested 

in joining, only very few were actually accepted. Sixty-eight  percent 

joined because of pre-existing friendships with members, and 20 percent joined because of familial ties with members; in 98 percent of the 

cases, social bonds preceded ideological commitment. There was no 

evidence of coercion or brainwashing; individuals acquired the beliefs 
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of those around them. In each case, the individual joined the jihad 

through human bridges (acquaintances, relatives, and imams) and not 

electronic or bureaucratic ones.43

Reviewing the reasons stated by captured members for joining a 

movement, one finds a paucity and ambiguity of data and further difficulties in the interpretation of the data available. Nonetheless, certain 

conclusions may be stated.

• Multiplicity of motives. Usually, more than one motive is present 

when a member joins. A combination of factors is usually cited; 

no one factor is preeminent.

• Personal and situational factors. Most of the motives cited for 

joining tend to be related to situational or personal problems and 

to reflect the individual’s immediate needs.

• Belief in the cause or political reasons. Only a minority admits that 

political reasons or sympathy with the ideology or organization 

are related to joining.

• Propaganda and promises. Few join because of propaganda 

or promises alone. These are apparently more effective when 

combined with situational factors.

• Coercion. Coercion alone is a small but important factor in 

joining.

• Coercion with other positive incentives. When combined with 

other positive incentives related to personal or situational factors, 

coercion accounts for a significantly large number of recruits.

• Government persecution. This factor appears to be a small but 

significant factor leading individuals to join the movement.

REASONS FOR STAYING

Once involved in an underground organization, individuals develop 

reasons for staying that are often very different from their original 

reasons for joining. Individual differences often disappear in the face 

of the powerful unifying forces of group and organizational psychology. Although there are few empirical studies of insurgent motives for 

remaining with the movement, a review of two studies of conventional 

military personnel provide insights into the motives of men in combat 

situations and into the sustaining role of ideology.

In a study of American soldiers during World War II, it was found 

that the soldier’s willingness to fight was not significantly affected by 

indoctrination or ideological justifications or by receiving awards for 

exceptional valor. The concern for what his fellow men within the unit 
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133

thought of him was an important influence on his performance and 

group effectiveness. It was concluded that most nonprofessional soldiers fight reluctantly and are probably motivated by status-group considerations. Another study, based on the collapse of the German army 

in World War II, found that in those units that did not surrender, values 

such as honor and loyalty had created a sense of obligation among the 

soldiers. Loyalty to their comrades was more important than ideology 

in their willingness to continue fighting to the end. Ideology, however, 

did play an indirect role. The type of leadership had a positive effect 

on the combat effectiveness and commitment of the individuals within 

a unit. When the men in the units accepted the leadership of officers 

and noncommissioned officers who were devoted Nazis, the units’ 

performance was much more effective than that of units without ideologically oriented leaders.44 If the leadership is ideologically oriented, 

the units seem to be more cohesive and effective, even if the members 

are apolitical.

In most military units, individuals fight less because they agree with 

the political system than because they feel a loyalty to their fellow soldiers. They develop an esprit de corps and, in spite of adversity, try not 

to let their comrades down. Many insurgents who have defected still 

have favorable memories of the comradeship and togetherness of the 

guerrilla camps or the underground cells.

In his study of the Philippine insurgency, Scaff concluded that 

although people joined the Huks for various reasons, there was a tendency for a person, once a member of the movement, to gradually 

develop new motives for staying.45 Members stayed on because they 

were made to believe that the movement would bring about a better 

life for them and for the masses. Insurgents often are influenced by 

their own propaganda and agitation themes. The impact of agitational 

slogans was shown in one study of 400 captured Huk guerrillas: 95 percent asserted that their main reason for fighting was to gain land for 

the peasants.46

Psychological methods and morale-sustaining techniques are also 

important for maintaining loyalty. Because defections often occurred 

after serious losses, the Viet Cong went to elaborate lengths to keep 

up morale. Those killed in battle were carried away, often by special 

volunteers for that purpose, and buried with great ceremony. If it was 

not possible to carry the dead away immediately after the battle, the 

insurgents returned for them at night. This experience built up support for the movement through a desire to avenge the deaths of comrades and was apparently a significant psychological factor in keeping 

up morale.47
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Insurgents, particularly new members, also know that they are under 

surveillance and will be punished for disloyalty. Most underground 

movements require recruits to take an oath promising to remain with 

the movement on the penalty of death. Terror or enforcing squads are 

often used to retaliate against defectors. Threats of revenge are especially effective when it is difficult to defect to safe areas. Atrocity stories 

about how the government mistreats defectors are also used.

The Communists’ frequent criticism and self-criticism sessions act 

as a form of catharsis and permit members to voice fears and problems. These sessions give members a chance to speak out and be heard. 

No matter how limited and directed it may be, this process apparently 

serves as an outlet for emotions that might otherwise lead to defection. In addition, an individual who is disillusioned with the movement 

will find it difficult to conceal this in the frequent self-criticism sessions. Another significant factor that prevents people from leaving a 

subversive movement is the human tendency to inertia: to do what is 

customary and expected of them in spite of any displeasure with the 

organization.

Several conclusions can be drawn as to why insurgents tend to stay 

with the movement.

• Changing motives. Motives for remaining within the movement 

are usually quite different from those for joining. Indoctrination 

and propaganda expose the individual to new ideas, of which 

he may have been unaware before joining. New friends and 

organizational responsibilities are also motives for staying.

• Group norms. Insurgents are influenced by other members of 

the movement. They are probably more motivated by what their 

friends and comrades think of them than by any ideological 

considerations and tend to stay out of loyalty to them.

• Ideology. Ideology plays an indirect role. Units whose leaders are 

ideologically oriented are more cohesive and effective than those 

whose leaders are not, even when the members of the group are 

apolitical.

• Morale-sustaining techniques. Various psychological techniques 

are used to maintain morale such as special ceremonies and 

group discussions that give members an opportunity to air 

their emotional problems and receive group support and 

reinforcement.

• Surveillance and threat of retaliation. Continual surveillance and 

threats of retaliation from terror enforcement units keep many 

members within the movement.

• Inertia. Simple inertia and habit may be stronger than any 
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inclination to leave. It is easier to continue a habit than to 

change it.

REASONS FOR LEAVING

Of vital interest is why an individual decides to leave a radical 

group. Psychological motivations to leave an organization are ideological, social, and behavioral but as diverse and idiosyncratic as the motivations to join.48

Factors influencing the decision to leave can be categorized into 

two factors: push and pull. Push factors are negative circumstances 

or social forces that render the status quo unappealing such as criminal prosecution, social disapproval, or effective violence from oppositional groups. 49 Leaving often entails a shift in the normative factors 

that comprise the moral and ideological foundation of the respective 

groups from the insurgent to another.50 Some of those factors include 

losing faith in the group’s ideology, frustration with the lack of success, 

and renunciation of violence.51 If an individual joined and remained in 

a group for specific values the group espoused and upheld, a shift in or 

compromise of those values may push him or her away. Eamon Collins’s 

account of his disillusionment with the petty criminality of some members of the PIRA is one such example. Collins, who believed strongly in 

the virtues of Republicanism and his identity as a “volunteer,” describes 

a sense of moral betrayal when he witnessed individuals stealing money 

from a cash register after bombing a hotel. Collins’s unit had taken 

steps to avoid civilian casualties, and he viewed thievery as a compromise of the PIRA’s integrity.52

Pull factors are opportunities or social forces that attract an individual to an alternative course of action such as employment or educational opportunities, newfound social responsibilities, or an alternative 

political path.53 Affective factors—the social and organization attachments within the group—are vital to both organizational cohesion 

and individual identity. Affective factors contributing to disaffection 

include failing group interaction and failing leadership.54 Related to 

(and often an extension of) affective factors are individual maturation 

and competing social relationships that shift the pragmatic calculus 

away from remaining involved to the less violent “other.”

Understanding the rationale behind disengagement requires primary interaction with those individuals; unfortunately, the empirical 

evidence is scant.
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Defection

Disaffection may result in a person’s leaving or defecting from an 

insurgent movement to the government side. A potential defector seeks 

the easiest and safest avenue of escape. If circumstances are such that 

he can simply leave, he will likely do so; if, on the other hand, the possibility of going to government forces arises first, and is relatively easy 

and safe, he may defect. The process of deciding to leave is an unseen 

cognitive phenomenon that systematically increases one’s openness to 

possible disengagement through the consideration of alternative worldviews.55 For some, this process is gradual while for others it is an abrupt 

separation stemming from a specific catalytic event.56

In Vietnam, in January  1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem began 

the chieu-hoi (open arms) program. Viet Cong defectors were offered 

amnesty and assistance after a short indoctrination and retraining 

course. Between February  18 and June  25,  1963, 6,829 Vietnamese 

defectors took advantage of the chieu-hoi program. The defections 

from the Central Lowlands were primarily from Quang Ngai and Binh 

Thuan provinces, both sparsely populated; there were none from the 

city of Da Nang. The majority of the defections from the Central Highlands were in the rural provinces of Darlac, Lam Dong, and Phu Bon. 

There were no defectors reported from the city of Da Lat and only thirteen from Saigon. The largest number of defectors, more than twice as 

many as from the other areas combined, came from the western region. 

The majority of these defections were in the An Giang Province. The 

wide range in the number of defectors from the various areas probably 

reflects local political, social, and psychological conditions, as well as 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s military strength in particular areas.

One explanation for the low defection rate in the more populated 

urban areas, where it would appear to be easier to defect, could be that 

underground members in the cities do not have to endure the hardships that units in the field do. Another explanation is that defection 

to the government is unnecessary to leave a movement; individuals can 

simply disappear into the urban setting.

An analysis was made of the relationship between Republic of Vietnam government appeals and the number of Viet Cong defectors. On 

the basis of this sample, there appears to be a low relationship between 

appeals for defection and the number of people who defect. Of those 

who defected as a result of government appeals, most heard of defection appeals indirectly from civilians and other insurgents. It is likely 

that many individuals decided to defect first and then became sensitive to propaganda appeals. A large number found their reasons for 
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137

defection so compelling that they defected without ever having heard 

any appeals.

In an analysis of 382 Viet Cong defectors, figures for defectors from 

guerrilla units were higher than those for political defectors. This is 

significant in that there are usually far more underground members 

and liaison agents than guerrillas. There are several explanations for 

this disproportion: political units have a less rigorous physical existence than military ones; political units’ day-to-day activities require 

them to reiterate propaganda themes and carry on persuasive arguments in favor of the movement, so they tend to be insulated from 

thoughts of defection. Nineteen defectors were liaisons. This relatively 

high number suggests that, in spite of insurgent efforts to place only 

the most reliable people in such positions, it is a highly vulnerable job. 

The liaison agent has unusual opportunities for defection because he 

usually travels by himself and goes into government-controlled areas. 

Amnesty offers probably influence liaison agents to take advantage of 

their chance to escape.

In October 1964, the cheu-hoi program reached its low point, with 

only 253 Viet Cong defecting during that month. Defection continued 

at this low level until April 1965, when 532 defected. Then the figures 

began to climb: 1,015 defectors were reported for May and 1,089 for 

June. The increase in the defection rate coincided with and was largely 

attributed to the stepped-up Viet Cong conscription program. The 

young men pressed into service did not have the ideological conviction of earlier recruits and, in many cases, resisted recruitment. Among 

the new conscripts who defected, personal hardships and the contempt 

shown them by the veteran Viet Cong were among the reasons cited 

for defecting.

A 1965 study of 1,369 men and women who defected from the Viet 

Cong attributed their defection to the harshness of material life in 

the Viet Cong. Food shortages and limited medical supplies were most 

often mentioned. Almost none of the defectors mentioned ideological 

factors. In addition to material and personal factors, the military situation also affected the decision to defect. Members of guerrilla units, for 

example, were found to be most susceptible to defection appeals immediately after a battle—especially if their unit had suffered heavy losses.

An analysis of defection from the Huk movement in the Philippines has also been made. Several motives for leaving were given by the 

ninety-five former Huks interviewed, just as they gave several reasons 

for their earlier entrance into the movement. Sixty-one percent gave 

physical hardship as their chief reason. In particular, they complained 

about the cold, hunger, and lack of sleep. Government forces contributed to these hardships by frequent attacks. Many of the interviewees 
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said that they were tired of years of being fugitives and just wanted 

to live in peace. Forty-five percent said they defected because of the 

failures and disappointments of the Huk organization. Specifically, 

they resented the strict discipline in the movement and found orders 

distasteful, or had lost the feeling of progress and foresaw failure of 

the insurgency. Twenty-three  percent surrendered because of promises and opportunities offered by the government. The most effective 

promise was that of free land. Mentioned almost as often was the promise that the surrendering men would not be tortured. Other promises 

cited were those of a job, of payment for surrendered firearms, and of 

freedom for those against whom no criminal charges were being held. 

Almost half (45 percent) of the defectors had heard of the governmentsponsored Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), and most of these 

indicated that the program was influential in their decision to give up.

Some said the EDCOR program gave them hope for a new life. Not 

more than 5 percent said they surrendered because of pressure by their 

families. Of course, most of the Huks were unmarried young men who 

did not have many family responsibilities. In sum, there was no single 

overall motive for the defections. The hardships of existence and the 

constant pressure of pursuit, disillusionment with the Huk organization, and government promises appeared, in that order, to be the main 

reasons for surrender. Thus, the government effectively pressed the 

Huks toward surrender by maintaining steady pressure against them 

and by providing various promises and opportunities—in particular, 

EDCOR. Interviews with sixty former Communist insurgents in Malaya 

indicated that some of the reasons that led them to join the Communist movement were related to their later defections. Many joined as a 

means of personal advancement and security. They saw the party as a 

strong organization that would give them a voice in the future. But as 

they perceived the party to be growing weaker, they felt that they had 

made a mistake and wanted to extricate themselves as expeditiously 

as possible.

Most defectors gave no serious thought to leaving the movement 

during their first year, being too strongly involved in party work or still 

having high expectations. The critical phase for most came about a year 

and a half after joining the party. At this point they reappraised and 

gave critical thought to their current position and possible future. Most 

had made great sacrifices for the party, and it was increasingly clear 

that greater sacrifices were to be demanded even while the chances of 

victory grew slimmer. Many began to feel that the future was hopeless 

and passed through a period of doubt in which various “crises” arose 

that often triggered defections. One category of crisis centered on the 

member’s inability to meet the requirements of party membership. 
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Generally, an individual who developed personal difficulties within the 

party simultaneously developed critical arguments against the party’s 

goals and methods and the Communist cause in general. Most defectors specified Communism as “bad” in terms that were most meaningful in a setting of personality politics. If the party and its leaders were 

seen to be “corrupt,” the defector could justify his own personal position and his subsequent defection.

Another category of crises resulted from the party’s attitude toward 

sex. Party members were supposed to lead chaste lives even though 

10  percent of those in the jungle were women. Even thinking about 

sexual matters was classified as symptomatic of “counterrevolutionary” attitudes. Permission to marry was generally refused. The party 

made death the penalty for rape, which was loosely defined and judged 

by party leaders rather than by the woman. Accordingly, the women 

tended to attach themselves to the party leaders, and members resented 

this departure from the party policy of “equality.”

Another type of crisis appeared when the party failed to satisfy the 

defector’s personal hopes, either not meeting his needs at all or doing 

so at too high a price. After World War II, the living standard of the 

general population increased and social stability improved in Malaya. 

In contrast, the party member often saw his life as rugged and unrewarding. Among the immediate problems cited by many ex-Communists were that they had to work too much, that life in the jungle was 

too boring, or that they underwent too much physical suffering. Almost 

one-third felt that their existence had become too dangerous. Some 

were pushed into a decision to defect by the death of a friend. In nearly 

all cases, the decision to defect took place after several minor crises. 

The likelihood of a crisis leading to defection was especially strong 

if earlier crises were not resolved. The psychological preparation for 

defection was complete when a member began to formulate general 

criticisms of Communism. Once members became disaffected, they 

sought to disengage themselves from the party as rapidly as possible. 

Although these interviewees, because they were defectors, are not necessarily representative of the whole party membership (many of whom 

might conceivably fight to the bitter end rather than surrender), the 

Malayan data strongly indicate that there is continuity in the defectors’ 

motivations. At one point in time they joined the movement, at another 

they deserted it; the roots for both actions lay in the same purposes 

and hopes. As conditions changed, the attractiveness of the alternative 

paths for achieving these hopes also changed. As the overall prospects 

of the rebellion changed, the strategic calculus changed and many perceived their desires for personal safety and social advancement were 

better served by defecting.
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Thus, apparently contradictory actions (joining and defecting) had 

a motivational consistency. Certain generalizations can be made about 

acts of defection among insurgents in general and among members of 

the underground and of guerrilla forces.

• Types and rate of defection. Once the individual becomes 

disaffected, he may stay in the movement but not participate 

actively, he may leave the movement simply by withdrawing, or he 

may defect to the government side. The rate of defection varies 

widely, with a high rate in some areas and a low one in others. 

Local factors chiefly determine the rate of defection.

• Multiplicity of reasons. Defectors usually give many interrelated 

reasons for their defection, usually involving some personal and 

situational factors.

• Conflict and crisis. Internal conflicts and personal crises within 

the organization usually precede defection. Conflicts usually 

arise over frustration of individual goals, harsh discipline, or lack 

of advancement.

• Time of defection. Young recruits who are forcibly conscripted 

tend to defect early; those who join for ideological reasons 

tend to reconsider and have second thoughts some months 

(approximately a year) after joining the movement. It is at this 

time that they are most susceptible to defection.

• Appeals. Although many defectors are unaware of government 

appeals and rehabilitation programs, these programs appear to 

be an influencing factor among those who do hear of them.

• Underground defection. There are some unique characteristics 

related to underground defection. There is less defection to 

the government side among members of the underground 

engaged in political work than among members of guerrilla 

units; similarly, there is less defection in the populated urban 

areas than in the rural areas. There are several reasons for this: 

political activities probably insulate underground members from 

thoughts of defection; the underground is not exposed to the 

rugged, harsh existence of guerrilla life; and while defection may 

be the only option of guerrillas, underground members may be 

able to simply withdraw or be passive.

• Guerrilla defection. Among the guerrilla units, the rigors and 

hardship of life in a guerrilla unit, such as bad weather and 

lack of food and sleep, are often cited as reasons for defection. 

Usually, however, a personal crisis involving individuals in the 

guerrilla force is the ultimate triggering force. Defection is also 
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141

frequent immediately after battles, especially if there have been 

heavy losses among the guerrillas.

Disengagement

Disengagement is the cessation of terrorist activities.57 Programs 

that focus more on disengagement tend to focus on affiliative factors 

and more generalized social regulation, rather than try to change 

the ideological mindset of the participants. In essence, the programs 

attempt to get participants involved in activities and networks that are 

not violent, rather than seek a conversion. The role of social networks 

in recruitment and in the process of radicalization is widely acknowledged. The relevant literature in a variety of disciplines indicates the 

central importance of affiliative factors in individual motivations for 

entry into and exit from the radical organizations.58 One Saudi program seeks the involvement of participants’ family members in the process and, reportedly, in some cases provides assistance in finding a wife. 

Others seek to reduce potential economic barriers to disengagement 

through the provision of social services such as job training or placement, educational opportunities, or modest cash stipends.59 In each 

instance, the program adopts an approach that may be readily accommodated and implemented in the setting in which it is to be carried 

out (government-run detention facilities in the case of deradicalization, short-term abduction conditions in the case of deprogramming, 

and longer-term municipal and federal project structures in the case of 

de-ganging).60

Deradicalization

Both radicalization and deradicalization (the acceptance and subsequent abandonment of a violent political ideology) have been equated 

with spiritual experiences, analogous to religious conversion with the 

differences being that the deradicalization process is often an individual decision that isolates one from an in-group and typically does not 

require an individual to accept or incorporate a new ideology.61 However, some deradicalization programs aimed at Islamic fundamentalists 

attempt to convert the radical’s belief in the central ideology of the 

group or movement to which they belong. State-sponsored deradicalization programs have been implemented in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, 

Jordan, Algeria, Libya, Tajikistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and 

the United Kingdom.62 The programs in many predominantly Muslim 

countries consist primarily of discourse between program participants 

and moderate imams, who attempt to persuade participants, through 
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religious discussion and debate, to abandon terrorist ideologies in 

favor of a more moderate, nonviolent understanding of Islam. Many 

programs also often include a counseling or psychological component, 

as well as a social outreach component that seeks to engage their preradical network. However, despite these efforts, there has yet to be a 

valid and reliable set of political, cultural, or psychological indicators 

of successful deradicalization.63

A study that evaluated programs in fifteen countries lends some 

insight on approaches to deradicalization. The existence of hierarchical command and control structures in the deradicalization program 

may enable radicals to surrender their arms and even renounce violence while retaining the inherent dignity of their identity as a solider/

fighter/warrior. When political concessions form part of a negotiated 

agreement between the state and the radical group, deradicalization 

should be a component of the said agreement. However, the process 

requires tangible goals, effective management, and patience.64 This 

multinational study also recommends using a combination of counterideological education (or religious re-education) with vocational training. It recommends employing credible and empathetic interlocutors 

who can relate to prisoners’ personal and psychological needs and not 

simply confront their beliefs with an unsympathetic set of alternative 

beliefs. It also recommends re-establishing a social network in mainstream society through pre-existing (but nonviolent) connections. This 

process is obviously confounded when the radical is collocated with 

other violent radicals. Material inducements are often helpful, but as a 

supporting effort only. The main effort requires a sophisticated holistic 

approach to simultaneously satiate one’s hierarchy of needs by credibly 

incentivizing positive behaviors.65

Measuring the effectiveness of deradicalization programs is rather 

difficult, and differences in cultural contexts as well as program eligibility requirements have produced data that are difficult to assess and 

nearly impossible to compare. Although several studies are ongoing, 

reliable data on recidivism rates of terrorist behavior and/or longitudinal studies on the long-term effectiveness of deradicalization programs 

are scarce. This problem is compounded by the inconsistent inclusion 

criteria and/or inaccurate claims of success by many nations who have 

implemented Islamic deradicalization programs. An example is the 

Saudi program that released 700 of the 2,000 prisoners who participated in their deradicalization program and the subsequent claim that 

only nine have been rearrested. The Saudi criteria for what constituted 

a “radicalized” militant have never been made public and thus their 

recidivism rates are difficult to decipher.66 A Jordanian program boasts 

similar recidivism rates, however, some graduates of the program were 
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143

arrested or killed in Iraq supporting the various Islamic militant groups 

contributing to the anti-coalition insurgency.

Despite the challenges of and approaches toward deradicalization, 

some themes have emerged from the literature. The focus on social 

networks and recreating (or repairing) familiar ties broken through 

joining a violent group is consistent with recommendations from social 

scientists. Incentivizing “pull” factors are more successful than disincentivizing “push” factors. This trend appears to extend to criminal 

youth organizations (gangs) as well. A Canadian report identified similar “pull” factors as prevalent in the decision to leave a violent organization but indicated that barriers associated with the negative identity 

of being a former gang member inhibit the transition process.67 While 

positive incentives require more nuanced targeting, social and economic development policies aimed at weakening support for violent 

extremist organization have shown some, albeit limited, success.68

Reintegration

A trend in insurgent warfare since 196269 has been the intervention 

of supranational organizations and international nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) to broker peace agreements and facilitate the 

transition to civil authority.70 The international community’s involvement in demilitarization (or disarmament), demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) has occurred in dozens of conflicts and is often a 

planning consideration for military staffs tasked with the variety of mission-sets under peace operations.d Central to DDR is demobilization/

reintegration (transitioning combatants to productive civilian life) for 

four reasons: humanitarianism, compensatory justice, potential contribution, and jeopardizing peace.71

Humanitarian perspectives consider some insurgents, despite 

being perpetuators of violence, as victims. This is particularly appropriate when those individuals are children because the reintegration 

of child soldiers has profound psychological challenges. There are estimates that approximately 300,000 children in thirty-three countries (in 

Africa alone) have been forcibly conscripted into regular or irregular 

armies.72 The United Nations (UN) considers those less than 16 years 

of age to be “children” and thus requires a different process of treating 

d Joint Publication 3-07.3 Peace Operations defines peace operations (PO) as crisis 

response and limited contingency operations that normally include international efforts 

and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment 

to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO include peacekeeping operations, military peace enforcement operations, 

peace building post-conflict actions, peacemaking processes, and conflict prevention.
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(psychologically and/or medically), training, and reintegrating these 

juvenile combatants.

Reintegrating former combatants presents psychological challenges 

because most insurgents consider their service a duty to their in-group 

(be it a clan, ethnicity, or nation) and may expect compensatory justice.e

 The subjective humiliation of grievances being ignored can lead 

not only to psychological disturbance, suicide, or addiction, but also to 

socially maladaptive behaviors and/or continued or political disaffection.73 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are often established to ensure past wrongdoings (from oppression to war crimes) are 

made public and redress is afforded the aggrieved. The TRC organization and process is designed so that the resultant society can move forward without the underlying resentment of one group toward another. 

While some commissions are internal and independent, others operate in conjunction with the International Criminal Court (ICC), which 

prosecutes perpetrators of war crimes. Over twenty nations currently 

have active TRCs to address a variety of political grievances. One of 

the more prominent TRCs was that established in South Africa74 after 

the abolition of apartheid in 1994 with a mandate to “bear witness to, 

record and in some cases grant amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes 

relating to human rights violations, as well as reparation and rehabilitation.”75 While the South African TRC was not initially viewed well by 

South African blacks76 or whites,77 it has since served as a model reintegration program (although of an oppressive majority, not necessarily 

a violent insurgency). The international perception of the South African TRC was largely favorable; however, that might be more a function 

of the charismatic leadership (and concomitant popularity) of Nelson 

Mandela more so than a triumph of compensatory justice.

The threat posed by ex-combatants is tangible given the nascent 

state of security forces (in the event of a regime change), particularly 

amid fractionalization of the movement itself.78 It behooves the governing body, be it that of the status quo antebellum, the public component 

of the insurgency, or an international caretaker regime, to provide an 

opportunity for ex-insurgents to address their grievances in a nonviolent forum. Reintegration of former combatants can also provide a 

positive force in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of regions damaged by war.79

e Compensatory justice is strictly conceptualized (in a legal context) as requiring 

unitary and discrete event that produces a clearly defined injury, a clear causal connection between an indefinable defendant’s conduct and identifiable plaintiff’s injury. The 

concept requires the legal system to restore the plaintiff to the position that he would have 

occupied if the unlawful conduct had not occurred.
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The challenges of reintegration are evident in the policies implemented as part of the Irish Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998. 

The Early Release Scheme offered political prisoners the conditional 

opportunity to participate in a peaceful resolution to The Troubles so 

long as their respective group did not violate the cease-fire. Prisoners 

on both sides experience challenges finding employment in Northern 

Ireland and securing travel visas to find work elsewhere. The Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders 

(NIACRO) was eventually established to provide education and vocational training to reintegrate all prisoners into Northern Irish society.80

Prior to the GFA, a charitable trust (the Educational Trust) was specifically dedicated to education and resettlement support of political 

prisoners. The program was later expanded to their families; of the 

308 persons to take advantage of that program, over one hundred were 

children of prisoners. 81 While still criticized, the Early Release Scheme 

was viewed as both successful and vital to the peace process in Northern Ireland.

Colombia’s Reincorporation Program focused on the group (vice 

the individual) to demobilize the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC). The 

first step in the process required paramilitary commanders to provide 

a list of names to the Office of the High Commissioner. That office 

verified the names with the Ministry of Defense. The individuals specified went to a location selected by the government to be debriefed and 

registered with Colombia’s Technical Investigative Body. The government registrar supplied them with identification classifying them as 

demobilized individuals to avail them of government benefits. Each 

demobilized guerrilla ceremonially surrendered his or her weapon to 

government representatives; representatives of the Organization of 

American States witnessed and verified the process.82

A focus of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

has been reintegrating former Taliban insurgents into Afghan society. Funded by both coalition partners and the Government of the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), reintegration programs have 

increased in urgency since 2009, however, with mixed results. An analysis of thirty-six reintegration cases in Afghanistan between 2001 and 

2011 showed that 36 percent reintegrated because of a perception that 

their group was losing the war; in 33 percent of the cases, coercion was 

a critical factor; and in 71 percent of the cases, insurgents reintegrated 

because of intra-group grievances.83 This research suggests that “push” 

factors more so than “pull” factors influenced the decision to reintegrate into Afghan society.
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Part II. Motivation

INSURGENT TRANSITIONS

Sometimes insurgencies succeed, resulting in a different kind of 

transition, from that of a mobile and flexible opposition either to the 

role of a legitimate political party or directly to the role of a governing 

coalition, with all its implied expectations and responsibilities. From 

the demobilization of the guerrillas to the establishment of the necessary machinations of civil bureaucracy, the transition from armed 

movement to governing institution is one not easily made. The trend 

in modern revolutions has seen more conflicts conclude at the negotiation table than in the battlefield. The decision by insurgent movements 

to opt for negotiations is viewed as a positive, politically oriented decision and not necessarily an admonition of military inferiority or the 

renunciation of violence.84 As identified in the previous section, the 

process must make accommodations for the reintegration of the guerrillas into the emerging political environment. From the revolutionary 

perspective, plans must be made to ensure political and/or military 

gains (regardless of the means by which they were made) are not lost 

in the emerging government. To this end, the underground must shift 

their attention (and possibly their resources) from the guerillas to the 

public component and/or ensure the integration of the shadow government into whatever institutions will be preserved or created.f

 In some 

cases, reintegration is not desired and the programs put into place are 

aimed at punishment and not reconciliation. The 1975 North Vietnamese victory saw little interest in reintegrating former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers and South Vietnamese civil servants. 

South Vietnamese were put in re-education camps by the hundreds 

of thousands—often for months to years (some for decades).85 The 

North Vietnamese perspective held that the South Vietnamese regime 

was corrupt beyond rehabilitation and that all those associated with it 

should be purged from society. Furthermore, the revolutionary leadership needn’t retain a tangible enemy.86 The persistence of the negative 

identity of the corrupt yet defeated adversary of Communism not only 

validated the years of war but also served to intimate those who might 

consider resisting the new regime.

The ongoing Quetta Shura Taliban insurgency took place during two periods that were interspersed with a phase during which the 

Taliban was the de facto (though not universally recognized) government of Afghanistan. The first phase of the insurgency took place from 

1994 to 1996 against the ruling mujahidin. The phase second was from 

2001 to 2009 after U.S. and coalition forces toppled the regime and 

f For more information on insurgent shadow governments and the public component, 

refer to Chapter 9 of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare.
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

147

helped establish the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The Taliban began their rise to power in October 1994 

when close to 200 guerrillas attempted to secure the commercial road 

from Kandahar to Pakistan. The group conducted a series of operations 

against other Afghan factions competing for power in the wake of the 

Soviet withdrawal. Eventually they captured Spin Boldak and moved to 

Kandahar where they unseated Mullah Najibullah. As a result of securing these strategic positions and weapons acquisitions (including some 

remnants of the Afghan army’s armor and aviation assets), they were 

able to disarm local armed groups and secure the military garrison and 

administration in Kandahar. They gained control of the commercial 

road between Kandahar and Pakistan while maintaining security on that 

road for goods and travelers. This was their first demonstration to the 

Afghan people that they were committed to combating corruption and 

establishing order in Afghanistan, a foothold to legitimacy. The Taliban 

established their administration in Kandahar and began to organize 

their military campaign for the surrounding towns and provinces. They 

would send a delegation of ulema, a group of educated Islamic legal 

scholars, to engage local militia commanders, asking them to implement Shari’a law and promote peace by surrendering their weapons 

and ammunition. Acquiescence resulted in access to social welfare programs as well as to government funding. Rejection resulted in further 

engagement with tribal leaders and a Taliban representative. Only if the 

second delegation failed was violence employed. The Taliban effectively 

“conquered” and governed southern Afghanistan (Kandahar and Helmand provinces), but their inroads to Herat in the west and in Nuristan 

in the east were not as effective. They were not able to gain access to and 

influence in the Northern provinces whose militia (the Northern Alliance) became their principal rival. In 1997, the Taliban was officially 

recognized as legitimate rulers by only Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The 

Taliban ruled brutally yet consistently, imposing a harsh interpretation 

of Islamic law that has drawn criticism from many international human 

rights organizations as well as other nations. They became a target of 

U.S. and coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces in the 

wake of the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda attacks. OEF resulted in the 

rather rapid unseating of the regime by the end of 2001 and their displacement to the Northwest Frontier Provinces in Pakistan. From this 

sanctuary, the Taliban reconstituted its capability and eventually began 

increasing its influence in the Southern region of Afghanistan in much 

the same manner as it had a decade earlier. The Taliban leadership 

under Mullah Omar as well as that of Al Qaeda has been the focus of a 

controversial program run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that 

has employed unmanned aerial systems (UAS) strikes in Pakistan to 

eliminate their interference in the nascent GIRoA.87
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Part II. Motivation

The Taliban has proven resilient and rather effective at transitioning 

between armed insurgent group, governing entity, and back. Throughout they have employed multipronged diplomatic, subversive, ideological, and terroristic methods in currying popular support, intimidating 

potential opponents, and forging alliances with state and substate 

actors. It is unclear whether these transitions were a planning consideration; however, the diversity of their tactics and use of Islamic emissary 

practices (the elevation of political and religious engagement seeking 

conversion over military conquest) may have prepared the organization 

better for its assumption of power. While Omar’s brief tenure as the 

leader of Afghanistan was fraught with civil, social, and international 

failures, he has been able to remain in a position of authority and influence for nearly two decades, despite being one of the most hunted men 

in the world.

SUMMARY

Information from a wide range of insurgencies, across different settings and time periods, presents a picture of why insurgents and members of the underground join movements, why they stay, and under 

what circumstances they may leave via defection or other means.

People join insurgencies for a variety of reasons. Ideology is most 

important in the earliest stages of insurgencies, when danger is most 

imminent and trust most critical; ideology and propaganda remain 

important but other factors also enter when insurgencies are more successful and move to mass recruitment. Studies of former insurgents 

with the Huk rebellion in the Philippines and Communist insurgents 

in Vietnam illustrate how personal, situational, and intellectual reasons 

combine to lead to insurgent involvement. Personal circumstances such 

as trouble with the law, trouble with relatives, or friendship with someone else who joins are often the most salient factor. Belief in the cause 

seems helpful but not sufficient or even strictly necessary. This belief 

comes in two types: a more complex cognitive commitment to the Communist cause, and a simpler response to propaganda promises on tangible issues like land reform. Coercion also played an important role, 

often combining with other factors to be an effective short-term means 

of building a capability.

Very different motivations for recruitment are seen in the urban 

insurgencies of the Provisional IRA and EIG and EIJ. Coercion was 

quite atypical in each of these. The PIRA drew from a well-established 

identity group of Republican sympathizers. While run-ins with the 

police or firsthand exposure to violence was often the immediate cause 

for wanting to join, the PIRA attempted to select those who would be 
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

149

sound, long-term members, not academics, revenge or thrill seekers, 

the well-connected, or the rich. EIG/EIJ’s effective campus recruitment 

presents another noncoercive model. These organizations entered the 

lives of young students—often from rural backgrounds—entering universities and filled their needs for support, community, and connection 

to their religious roots.

Once recruits have joined an insurgency, motivations for staying 

often develop that are different from their original motivations to join. 

Some recruits develop the more complex ideological commitments 

that they initially lacked. But the most important factor for continued 

engagement of both insurgents and soldiers seems to be the loyalty, 

obligation, and connection to fellow soldiers and to leaders.

Leaving such movements can also involve a complex interplay of factors. Hardship, military losses, and loss of confidence in the cause can 

lay the groundwork for defection, after which individuals may opportunistically take advantage of the proximity of enemy lines, promises of 

amnesty, or promises of reintegration programs.

There is currently a great deal of interest in reintegration and 

“deradicalization” programs in Middle Eastern countries, particularly 

programs targeted at domestic religious extremists. Reintegration is a 

core concept—reintegration is the process by which individuals who 

had isolated themselves or were isolated in an insurgent group renew 

family and moderate friendship ties, or are introduced to new contacts, 

including moderate religious leaders. The incentivizing “pull” factors 

seem to be generally more successful than coercive “push” strategies 

(although participation in the programs themselves is generally not 

voluntary).

Reintegration of child soldiers, particularly in Africa, presents a 

different set of challenges. Reunification with family and moderating 

influences is again central to the efforts, but addressing the psychological and developmental damage is also required. Unfortunately, many 

reintegration programs are insufficiently resourced and therefore 

inadequate in addressing some of the underlying psychological, social, 

and/or economic underpinnings that prompted individuals to join a 

violent group.

Large-scale reintegration of insurgents also requires addressing the 

underlying grievances that motivate the movement, as well as addressing specific atrocities. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, most 

famously implemented in post-apartheid South Africa, are an approach 

that brings past injustices to light without necessarily seeking criminal charges or retributions against individual perpetrators. Other programs that have seen some success are Ireland’s Early Release programs 
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Part II. Motivation

for political prisoners, Colombia’s Reincorporation program aimed at 

FARC insurgents, and ISAF’s Taliban reintegration programs.

ENDNOTES

1 Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 1955).

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–

2001,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck 

Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Jason Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications 

Directorate, in press).

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14.

16 Sara Savage and Jose Liht, “Mapping Fundamentalisms: The Psychology of Religion as 

a Sub-discipline in the Understanding of Religiously Motivated Violence,” Archive for the 

Psychology of Religion 30, no. 1 (2008): 75–91.

17 Angela J. Yu and Peter Dayan, “Uncertainty, Neuromodulation, and Attention,” Neuranatomy 46, no. 4 (2005): 681–692.

18 Michel J. Dugas, Mark H. Freeston, and Robert Ladouceur, “Intolerance of Uncertainty 

and Problem Orientation in Worry,” Cognitive Therapy and Research 21, no.  6 (1997): 

593–606.

19 Michel Dugas, Mary Hedayati, Angie Karavidas, Kristin Buhr, Kylie Francis, and Natalie 

A. Phillips, “Intolerance of Uncertainty and Information Processing: Evidence of Biased 

Recall and Interpretations,” Cognitive Therapy and Research 29, no. 1 (2005): 57–70.

20 Michel J. Dugas, Mark H. Freeston, Robert Ladouceur, Josee Rhéaume, Martin 

Provencher, and Jean-Marie Boisvert, “Worry Themes in Primary GAD, Secondary GAD 

and Other Anxiety Disorders,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 12, no. 3 (1998): 253–261.

21 Keith Bredemeier and Howard Berenbaum, “Intolerance of Uncertainty and Perceived 

Threat,” Behavior Research and Therapy 46, no. 1 (2008): 28.

22 Magda Osman, “Controlling Uncertainty: A Review of Human Behavior in Complex 

Dynamic Environments,” Psychological Bulletin 136, no. 1 (2010): 65–86.

23 Todd B. Kashdan and Jonathon Rottenberg, “Psychological Flexibility as a Fundamental 

Aspect of Health,” Clinical Psychology Review 30, no. 7 (2010): 865–878.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

151

26 Dugas et al., “Intolerance of Uncertainty.”

27 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

28 Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986).

29 Ibid.

30 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

31 Devin R. Springer, L. Regens, and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009).

32 Jansen, Neglected Duty.

33 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2005).

34 Jansen, Neglected Duty.

35 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

36 Ibid.

37 Jason Spitaletta and Shana Marshall, “Al Qaeda,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

38 Ibid.

39 Muntasir Zayyat, The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man (London: 

Pluto Press, 2004).

40 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

41 Chuck Crossett and Jason Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological 

Concepts (Ft. Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2010).

42 Aidan Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

30, no. 5 (2007): 415–428.

43 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 

Press, 2004).

44 Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmachts in 

World War II,” in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. D. Katz, D. Cartwright, S. Elderwold, 

and A. McLee (New York: Dryden, 1954).

45 Scaff, Philippine Answer, 116, 119.

46 Ibid., 121–122.

47 Seymour Topping, “Portrait of Life with the Viet Cong: A Defector’s Own Story,” The New 

York Times, May 23, 1965, E-3.

48 Darcy M. E. Noricks, “Disengagement and Deradicalization: Process and Programs,” in 

Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

49 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from Political Violence (New York: Routledge, 2009).

50 Natalie J. Allen and John P. Meyer, “The Measurement and Antecedents of Affective, 

Continuance and Normative Commitment to the Organization,” Journal of Occupational 

Psychology 63, no. 1 (1990): 1–18.

51 Kira J. Harris, Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups (proceedings of the 1st 

Australian Counter Terrorism Conference), accessed December 2, 2011, http://ro.ecu.

edu.au/act/4.

52 Eamon Collins and Mick McGovern, Killing Rage (London: Granta, 1998).

53 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind.

54 Harris, Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups.

55 Ibid.
152

Part II. Motivation

56 Ibid.

57 John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis,” in Leaving Terrorism 

Behind: Disengagement from Political Violence, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New York: 

Routledge, 2009).

58 Madeline Morris, Frances Eberhard, Jessica Rivera, and Michael Watsula, Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Deganging and 

Deprogramming (Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010).

59 Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari, “Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programmes 

Targeting Religious Terrorists and Extremists in the Muslim World: An Overview,” in 

Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from Political Violence, ed. Tore Bjrgo and John 

Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009).

60 Morris et al., Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature.

61 Renee Garfinkel, “Personal Transformations: Moving from Violence to Peace,” Special 

Report 186 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

62 Noricks, “Disengagement and Deradicalization.”

63 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, 

no. 2 (2010): 267–291.

64 Peter R. Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries (London: The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 

Violence, 2010).

65 Ibid.

66 Noricks, “Disengagement and Deradicalization.”

67 Ross Hastings, Laura Dunbar, and Melanie Bania, Leaving Criminal Youth Gangs: Exit 

Strategies and Programs (Ottowa: Institute for the Prevention of Crime, 2011).

68 Noricks, “Disengagement and Deradicalization.”

69 Chuck Crossett, ed., Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

(Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

70 Bill Rolston, “Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: The Irish Case in 

International Perspective,” Social & Legal Studies 16, no. 2 (2007): 259–280.

71 Ibid.

72 Aaron Young, “Preventing, Demobilizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in African Conflicts,” The Journal of International Policy Solutions 7 (2007): 19–24.

73 Rolston, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” 259–280.

74 “The TRC Report,” accessed December  3,  2011, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/

index.htm.

75 Ibid.

76 The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & the Khulumani Support 

Group, “Survivors’ Perceptions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Suggestions for the Final Report,” accessed December 5, 2011, http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/

papers/papkhul.htm.

77 Jay A. Vora and Erika Vora, “The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner, and English South Africans,” Journal 

of Black Studies 34, no. 3 (2004): 301–322.

78 Rolston, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” 259–280.

79 Ibid.

80 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?”

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.
Chapter 5. Joining, Staying in, and Leaving the Underground

153

83 Seth G. Jones, Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2011).

84 Veronique Dudouet, “Negotiating Conflict Settlements: Lessons Learnt and Challenges,” 

Berghof Project: Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transitions to Politics: Building 

a Network of Experience (Roundtable Meeting Report, March 7–9, 2008, Schwanenwerder, Berlin, Germany).

85 Andrew Wiest and Jim Webb, Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN

(New York: NYU Press, 2007).

86 Ibid.

87 Sanaz Mirazei, “Taliban 1994–2009,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare,

Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

CHAPTER 6.

GROUP DYNAMICS AND RADICALIZATION
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Social Psychology of Group Conflict .....................................................158

Social Identity Groups: Categorization and Salience .......................158

In-Group Formation ...........................................................................161

Mechanisms of Group Radicalization ...................................................164

Escalation of In-Group/Out-Group Conflicts...................................164

Radicalization Through Isolation......................................................165

Radicalization Under Threat .............................................................168

Radicalization Through Condensation or Splitting ......................... 170

Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support............ 170

Radicalization Through Hate ............................................................ 171

Radicalization Through Martyrdom ................................................. 176

Summary ................................................................................................ 177
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

157

Nathan Bos

This chapter is about the group dynamics that affect the course of 

underground and resistance movements, with particular a focus on the 

process of radicalization. Previous chapters have discussed related individual psychological factors, but current research suggests that group 

dynamics are at least as important, and perhaps more important, than 

individual psychology in understanding and predicting radicalization.

Radicalization is the process by which an individual, group, or mass 

of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to using or supporting violence for political purposes. Radicalization includes specific forms, such as terrorism, 

which is violence against the innocent bystander, or insurgency, which 

is violence against the state. It does not include legal and/or nonviolent political protest; such protest is more properly called activism. 

The chapter is organized around a set of mechanisms of group radicalization adapted from a framework by Clark McCauley and Sophia 

Moskalenko.1

For our purposes, we consider violence to be a necessary component of the definition of radical activity. The Polish Solidarity movement would be an example of an organization that was illegal but not 

radical. The organization became illegal when the Polish government 

decided to outlaw the movement in the 1980s, driving the labor union 

to become an underground protest organization. Although they conducted illegal activities, the Solidarity union would not fit our definition 

of a radical movement because they did not routinely or purposefully 

engage in violent opposition to the government.

Many people associated with radical groups do not themselves commit violence, however. Only a subset of people belongs to the armed 

components of these movements; others are involved in the underground or public component. We consider the group to be radicalized 

if any part of it commits violence. Members who do not directly participate in violence must still be supportive of the actions at some level, 

and the group as a whole must go through a process of radicalization 

before it can regularly take on violent action.

Organizations often start out emphasizing activism and only later 

turn to violence. Often, the decision is made incrementally, as part of a 

process whereby actions, decisions, and behaviors move toward becoming more illegal or violent. At other times, the decision to cross the line 

between activism and radicalism is abrupt, decisive, and emotionally 

jarring. Understanding the circumstances under which groups turn 

toward more violent tactics is of great importance. By radicalization, 

we also mean the process by which already-violent groups become more 
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Part II. Motivation

violent, for example, by endorsing new tactics—such as violence against 

civilians or suicide attacks—that they had previously rejected.

We will give a number of historical examples of these group radicalization mechanisms and will use one particular example repeatedly. 

The pathway to violence between ethnic Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri 

Lanka is a well-documented escalation of group conflict that illustrates 

several of the common mechanisms of group radicalization. The Tamil 

people did not have a pre-existing culture or history of violence. Yet 

beginning in 1956, when the Sinhalese exclusionist Sri Lanka Freedom 

Party (SLFP) took control of the national government, and over the 

course of less than two decades, a large part of this population became 

radicalized. The group at the spearhead of this was a particularly 

violent and extreme insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam (LTTE), commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. This single case 

of large-scale radicalization illustrates in-group/out-group conflicts as 

well as radicalization through isolation, radicalization under threat, 

and the role of martyrs.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP CONFLICT

Most of the mechanisms described in this section are based on 

group dynamics. Some background in the social psychology of intergroup conflict will be useful, including an understanding of what social 

identity is, how and why in-groups form, and what is known about outgroups and intergroup polarization.

Social Identity Groups: Categorization and Salience

Humans have natural inclinations to form into cohesive groups that 

serve the purposes of information exchange, provide social support 

(caring for ill, community raising of children), allow collective action 

(hunting, building projects), and enable mutual protection. People 

seek affiliation with groups more strongly when faced with anxiety 

or conflict. Modern research is uncovering how social behavior has 

deep roots in our cognitive and biochemical makeup and affects a 

wide variety of human behaviors. Persistent groupings are called social 

identity groups.

All individuals have a sense of belonging to multiple identity 

groups. Since the 1950s, psychologists have used the simple “Twenty 

Statements Test” to gauge self-concept.2

 Participants make twenty statements in the form of “I am ____.” Responses tend to fall into different 

types, one of which is social categorization, or social identities. Social 

identity responses might be “I am Christian,” “I am American,” or “I 
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

159

am a Teamster.”a

,

3

 Individuals may have many social identities along 

dimensions of ethnicity, religion, politics, economics, and ideology, 

among others.

Patterns of identities are often studied by presenting people with lists 

of possible identity groups and asking them to choose and rank identities according to their importance. (Sometimes the question is also 

left open-ended and responses are categorized later by the researchers.) This method showed, for example, that in Northern Ireland, the 

number of Protestants who identified as “Irish” declined precipitously 

in the decades preceding “The Troubles.” In these surveys, Catholics 

often self-identified as “Irish” while Protestants more typically identified themselves as “British.”4

 A shift such as this shows a larger group 

(residents of Northern Ireland) recategorizing themselves into two 

mutually exclusive, and in this case hostile, in-groups.

Knowing an individual’s identity affiliations can be the key to 

understanding attitudes and opinions, as individuals tend to adopt 

opinions compatible with their salient identity groups.5,6

 Identity can 

help explain the day-to-day behavior of individuals when rituals, mores, 

practices, or more subtle behavior patterns are associated with identity 

groups.7

 Understanding the pattern of identities in a population is a key 

to understanding conflicts, predicting both where conflicts are most 

likely to occur and how groups are likely to align in a conflict situation.

Stability

Identities vary in their stability, or how much they shift over time. 

Some groups, such as military units or sports teams, may command a 

great deal of attention and commitment for a relatively short time. Others, such as religious, ethnic, and social class, may represent lifelong 

identity components. But even the most seemingly unchanging identity 

groupings, such as ethnicity, do shift and redefine themselves over time. 

Ethnic groups often propagate narratives to create the impression of 

having existed unchanged for thousands of years, but these rarely hold 

up to historical scrutiny. Ethnic groups can merge with each other when 

incentives are aligned. For example, the Gungawi group in northern 

Nigeria, finding itself surrounded by the higher-status Hausa group, 

began to intermarry (paying a premium bride price to marry a Hausa 

woman), began to convert to Islam at high rates, and generally experienced an intentional blurring of boundaries; over time, many members 

a Interestingly, people in “collectivist” cultures tend to give more group-oriented 

answers to this test (I am a sister, I am a member of this mosque), whereas people in individualistic cultures tend to cite personal qualities in their responses (I am a doctor, I am 

a good basketball player). This is only one of a wide range of differences between cultures 

being identified in the ongoing study of culture and cognition.
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Part II. Motivation

simply became Hausa.8 Arab tribes have been observed undergoing 

similar processes, often inventing a shared lineage to reinforce a newly 

shared identity. And the opposite process, fissioning—driven by drifts 

in geography, language, or culture —is equally common. Fissioning 

can also be intentionally brought about by leaders to maximize their 

own influence over a subgroup. In the 1990s, as The Troubles waned, 

young, educated, and middle-class people in Northern Ireland, particularly Protestants, increasingly self-identified as “Northern Irish,” an 

identity chosen to avoid the divisiveness of previous labels.9 Religious, 

economic, and all other social identity types have similar dynamics.

Salience

Identities also fluctuate widely in their salience. All individuals have 

multiple possible identities that can become more or less important 

(salient) depending on the situation. Ethnic and religious identities 

that are central to life in rural villages often take a back seat to ideological, political, or professional identities when young people leave their 

hometowns for better jobs in urban areas. Divisions within groups, such 

as rifts between religious factions, often become more or less salient in 

different settings; for example, emigrants who are practitioners of distinct religious factions (Sunnis and Shiites, Baptists and Episcopalians) 

often worship together and downplay differences in countries with a 

different majority religion.

Conflict

Conflict is often the factor that piques identity salience, as will 

be discussed below in reference to out-group conflict. Studies of voting and ethnicity in ten African countries show that the strength of 

peoples’ ethnic identification seems to increase in importance during 

election years, because post-colonial national elections have often been 

seen as competitions between ethnic groups.10 Some identities, such as 

professional identity, may have almost no salience until a conflict arises; 

but when a land use conflict arises between “farmers” and “herders” or 

a workplace dispute arises between “workers” and “management,” these 

professional identity groups may coalesce quite quickly.

Conflict can also make identity differences less salient—rival groups 

may join together against a perceived common enemy. It is not uncommon for a leader facing domestic opposition to exaggerate an external 

threat or even engage in a foreign war in order to unite the country 

against such an enemy. Saddam Hussein, who throughout his rule 

feared opposition from his country’s Shiite majority, may have sought 

out conflict with Iran—which is Shia, but ethnically Persian—to unite 

his country against the “Persian” enemy.
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

161

Finally, social identity can be used flexibly within conflicts to activate 

different narratives or bring differences into relief. An interesting finding from the conflicts in Northern Ireland is that each identity group 

described the conflict with reference to a different identity category. 

Protestants in the Northern Ireland conflict often identified themselves 

with that religious label, which evoked a narrative of victimization at 

the hands of the Catholic majority in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 

The Irish Republican Army (IRA), while predominantly Catholic and 

having many informal ties with the Catholic Church, nevertheless did 

not usually refer to their in-group as Catholics. The salient identities for 

this group were the Irish ethnic identity and the Republican political 

identity. Their opponents were always referred to as British Royalists; 

the relevant narrative evoked was that of the Irish Republic struggling 

against the politically dominant British. In this way, both groups’ dominant narrative was of a minority group struggling against a numerically 

superior foe: the Protestants felt persecuted by the Catholic minority 

in Ireland, while the Irish Republicans claimed to be long-suffering 

victims of the British, who were militarily and numerically superior in 

the British Isles. This is sometimes referred to as a “double minority,” 

and parallels can be found in many other settings.

In-Group Formation

How do identity groups form, and what are their typical modes of 

interaction? Much of the classic research on negative intergroup relations was begun after World War II in an attempt to understand the 

virulent intergroup hatreds that fed the conflict. Henri Tajfel remains 

one of the most influential researchers in this area. A Polish Jew, Tajfel 

left Poland for France because of discrimination in his home country. 

He fought for the French in World War II and was captured by the Germans, but he survived life as a prisoner of war. After the war he found 

that most of his family and friends had been killed in the Holocaust 

and spent a number of years working with Jewish orphans and refugees.

Tajfel later began a program of research to understand how intergroup conflicts arise and was surprised to find how easy it was to 

induce groups of strangers to form into semiexclusive groups. Tajfel 

had planned a series of laboratory interventions intended to see what 

factors would cause such groups to form. What he found was that essentially anything he did to encourage subgroup formation worked, even 

assigning meaningless and arbitrary labels. This type of experimental manipulation became known as the “Minimal Groups Paradigm,”11

and the technique became the basis for hundreds of follow-up studies 
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Part II. Motivation

on the effects of group divisions. These cohesive groups became known 

experimentally as “in-groups.”

In-Group Biases

Once they form, for whatever reasons, groups begin to show a 

typical set of in-group biases. When given the chance to distribute 

resources, in-group members very quickly begin to favor members over 

nonmembers.12 Individuals also begin to trust in-group members more, 

attribute more positive attributes to in-group members than others, pay 

more attention to in-group members, and show more empathy to ingroup members.13 These findings about newly formed in-groups are 

robust but also somewhat benign. When it is pointed out to individuals 

that they are favoring in-group members unfairly, they usually adjust 

their allocations to fit their values about fairness. In-group members 

usually police themselves more closely when, instead of favors, they are 

asked to allocate obligations or penalties.

In-group biases serve to help bring groups together and can be 

good for both group functioning and individual self-esteem. Military 

units, businesses, families, and almost all other organizational types 

strive to use positive emotions, trust, and biased attention to create 

cohesive groups. At the level of societies, pride in one’s ethnic group, 

religion, profession, etc., are all generally positive forces.

Out-Group Stereotypes and Discrimination

Over time and in the wrong circumstances, however, positive ingroup dynamics can turn into more destructive in-group/out-group 

hostility. In large, diffuse identity groups, it is sometimes unclear where 

the boundaries of the group are, so in-groups often begin to define 

themselves in contrast to one or more out-groups. A political party 

that brings together a number of interest groups may try to increase 

internal unity by emphasizing sharp disagreements with selected other 

groups, e.g., not “liberal” or not “capitalist.” Members on the boundaries feel pressure to clarify their identities by choosing one side or the 

other. (In Northern Ireland, these identity borders correspond closely 

to geographic borders. Donnan’s study of Protestants living near the 

border with the Republic of Ireland documents how collective memory 

of conflicts and “atrocities” associated with specific border locations is 

particularly important for Protestants for maintaining both their geographic and social identity boundaries.14)

Once out-groups are identified, a number of negative social dynamics can be set in motion. In-group members create and reinforce stereotypes of out-group members. Out-group members tend to be seen as 

more similar to each other than in-group members, whose individual 
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

163

characteristics are more distinctive.b

 Out-group members are associated with more negative traits than in-group members. The so-called 

“fundamental attribution error” also affects group perceptions. It is well 

established that individuals tend to explain the actions of themselves 

and people close to them as a result of situations and explain actions 

of others as being the result of permanent personal dispositions. Attributions toward out-group members can show a sinister twist on this 

bias15: when out-group members exhibit negative behaviors, people see 

them as inherent qualities of the out-group, but the same behaviors are 

blamed on circumstance for in-group members. The reverse is true for 

positive behaviors.

Negative stereotypes of out-groups may be spread by opportunistic 

in-group members for their own purposes. Leaders or would-be leaders of in-groups also have reasons to want to demonize out-groups. By 

forcing members to choose between being “in” and “out” of a group, 

leaders increase the cohesion of the group. Identification of a common 

enemy can cause groups to “pull together” and minimize internal conflicts, increasing the leader’s power and at the same time increasing 

salience of the group for members (salience is discussed below). Peripheral or low-status members of an in-group, who do not feel secure in 

their membership, are often more negative about out-group members 

in an attempt to show loyalty and solidify their identity as one of “us” 

versus “them.”

Fault lines can exacerbate in-group/out-group polarization. Fault 

lines occur when the dividing line between two or more identities overlay each other; the most common example is ethnicity and religion. 

In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese language majority was mostly Buddhist 

while the Tamil language minority was Hindu with some Muslim and 

Christian elements. This double divide made reconciliation more difficult. In contrast, during the height of the U.S. civil rights conflict, the 

shared religious background of white and African-American groups 

was a source of common ground; the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, 

Jr. was a Baptist preacher whose values and rhetoric were easy for white 

Americans to understand and identify with.

Competition Between Groups

Competition between groups is one of the most important factors 

that tend to highlight differences between groups and lead to negative 

in-group/out-group dynamics. Competition also tends to mobilize and 

energize groups and force on-the-fence individuals to choose sides. In 

b This may be less strong or even reversed in collectivist cultures, where different attitudes toward uniformity and individuality come into play.
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a famous field experiment with ten- to twelve-year-old boys at a series of 

summer camps,16 in-groups were created by randomly assigning groups 

and isolating them, but out-group hostility did not occur until a series 

of athletic competitions. After this point the boys began to call each 

other names, lead “raids” on each others’ barracks, and avoid each 

other socially.

In real-world political contexts, competition is more likely to be 

over resources or governance. Control of a nation’s central government 

is the most common source of escalating competition. Other common 

points of conflict include control of key export resources (such as oil), 

farmland, and government-appointed jobs. Corrupt governance and 

lack of free market opportunities can exacerbate this struggle because 

they increase the importance of government control and reduce the 

available means of acquiring wealth through the private sector.

MECHANISMS OF GROUP RADICALIZATION

Escalation of In-Group/Out-Group Conflicts

Marginalization and persecution of one or more identity groups 

is one of the strongest risk factors for violent resistance, especially if 

this prejudicial behavior is conducted and condoned by the central 

government.17

The escalation of hostility between the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri 

Lanka18 is a prototypical example of escalating in-group/out-group 

conflicts. The island has a Sinhalese majority across most of the island 

(approximately 75 percent of population) and Tamil minorities in the 

north and east (approximately 20 percent). These two identity groups 

are defined primarily by language, although they also differ by religion. Sinhalese speakers today are mostly Buddhist, while the Tamils, 

more connected to the Indian mainland, include Hindu, Christian, 

and Muslim subgroups. Under British colonial rule, the groups were 

more politically separate than before. The Tamil minority grew disproportionately in political power and were over-represented in the British civil service, creating a pent-up reservoir of resentment within the 

Sinhalese population.

The groups worked together to achieve independence from Britain 

in 1948, but soon afterward, the Sinhalese majority began systematically discriminating against non-Sinhalese. Extreme nationalist Sinhalese political parties gained power against both moderate Sinhalese 

and minority parties in the parliamentary government. In 1956, a coalition of these groups took control of parliament and began demanding that the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority have its “rightful” share of 
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

165

economic and employment benefits.19 Sinhalese replaced English as the 

official language, removing one of the Tamil’s key cultural advantages. 

Tamils responded with protests and riots. The nationalist Sinhalese 

Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959 and 

was replaced by his even more polarizing wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, 

who instituted more blatantly pro-Sinhalese educational and employment policies. Mostly nonviolent protests and international pressure 

led to another attempt at reconciliation, which broke down by the early 

1970s. By this time, the once-privileged Tamils had been almost entirely 

removed from the civil service and the army, anti-Tamil university quotas were established, and in 1972, anti-Tamil policies were solidified in 

a new constitution.

Tamils reacted by forming a united political opposition, the Tamil 

United Front, and a number of militant resistance groups also formed. 

The 1974 attack by police on the Fourth International Tamil Conference in Jaffna killed eleven Tamils and accelerated the move toward 

militant resistance. By the late 1970s, violence was escalating; an LTTE 

attack killed thirteen government soldiers in 1983, prompting antiTamil riots that killed an estimated 2,500 Tamils.

One of the most radicalizing events for Tamils was the 1981 burning 

of the Jaffna Library, which held 90,000 Tamil books and manuscripts 

and was the most important repository of Tamil culture. This event 

radicalized many Tamils, even though it did not involve mass fatalities, new government policies, or have much direct economic impact. 

But the burning of the library had great symbolic value, which is best 

understood from the perspective of social identity theory. This event 

convinced many Tamils that their identity itself was under attack and 

that nothing less than unified, militant resistance could preserve it. 

The ensuing intergroup conflict was destructive for both sides, leading 

to decades of loss of life, international sanctions, loss of prestige, and 

economic and political stagnation.

Radicalization Through Isolation

Group isolation can be a force that leads to radicalization. The 

groups in this case can range from small peer groups to entire subpopulations of a country. Another well-known social psychological phenomenon can help explain how isolation can lead to radicalization. The 

phenomenon called “risky shift”20,21 describes a tendency for groups of 

like-minded people to, as a group, make riskier decisions than they 

would individually. Closely related is the phenomenon of ideological 

polarization in isolated groups. For example, groups of moderately 
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profeminist women tend to be more strongly profeminist after group 

discussion with like-minded individuals.22

Polarization and risky shift have two similar causes. The first is 

called persuasive argumentation23 and has to do with hearing a biased 

set of opinions within a group without any dissenting opinions. Before 

joining a group, individuals presumably were aware of how their opinions compared with those of society and were exposed to contrary ideas 

from a variety of perspectives. But when a group of people who are on 

the same side of an issue communicate more with each other than with 

the more diverse outside world, each individual’s more extreme views 

are confirmed and reinforced, and the group mean may move toward a 

point that is more extreme than the original mean. (In American politics, this tendency to listen only to agreeable viewpoints is sometimes 

referred to as a political “echo chamber.”) A second cause of risky shift 

is the social comparison process,24 which is similar to the mechanisms 

of polarization through identity differentiation. Particularly in groups 

that define themselves ideologically, e.g., Marxists or environmentalists, people do not want to be seen as being on the periphery of the 

group and do not want to be seen as weak members. For both identity and power-seeking reasons, most would rather be positioned in the 

center on the vanguard (extreme edge) of such a group. The result over 

time of all members trying to move toward the vanguard-center is, of 

course, that the entire group tends to move away from the center, even 

to extreme positions. The combination of a move toward more extreme 

views and a tendency to take riskier actions as a group can be a powerful mechanism of radicalization.

Why and how do groups become isolated? There are four types of 

reasons: circumstantial, self imposed, leader imposed, and externally 

imposed.

Expatriate communities are an example of circumstantial isolation. 

Recent immigrants or foreign nationals often have strong associations 

with other immigrants, living in the same neighborhoods and interacting around religious or social institutions. For first-generation immigrants, language is often part of the barrier between them and the 

larger society. These enclaves can form isolated groups that may be 

more vulnerable to radicalization than less isolated groups in the home 

country. There has been a great deal of attention paid to possible radicalization of immigrant groups from Arab nations living in Europe. 

Marc Sageman makes the argument that these groups became more 

isolated after suspicion was cast on them following the 9/11 attacks in 

the United States and the Madrid subway attacks in Spain;25 isolation 

then increased tendencies toward radicalization.
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Groups can also self-impose isolation. Religious devotion is a common reason. Seeking greater devotion and piety, groups cut themselves 

off from corrupting influences of society by severing secular contacts 

and setting up their own social structures, schools, and economic networks. For groups moving toward a religious or ideological extreme, 

often the groups nearest them are seen as the greatest threat; they may 

go to great lengths to separate themselves from “lukewarm” or “secularized” groups. Self-imposed isolation is also a danger sign for individual radicalization.

Isolation may be encouraged or demanded by group leaders. The 

reasons given for this would be to purify the group ideologically or 

to avoid exposure to and infiltration by perceived enemies. Isolation 

also reinforces leadership’s power by increasing cohesiveness, increasing social and economic dependence on the group, removing competing influences, and isolating the leader from many potential rivals. 

The American cult leader Jim Jones used isolation techniques in the 

extreme when he transported his group to a camp in Guyana that was 

surrounded by jungle; the isolation was part of a regime of manipulation that turned a group of middle-class Americans into a radicalized 

group that committed multiple murders and later committed mass suicide.26 For larger groups, isolation is more likely to be enforced ideologically, through demonization of out-groups, attacks on in-group 

members accused of collaboration or fraternization, and constant 

warnings about infiltration by out-group members.

Isolation can also be imposed from the outside. Apartheid in South 

Africa was a very large-scale example of the isolation imposed by others; in this case, the isolation extended to neighborhoods, professions, 

and public and educational facilities. Refugee camps are a second isolated environment that is believed to breed resentment and radicalization. Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and elsewhere are a key 

recruiting ground for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 

and Harakat al-Muqawamah al-’Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement, or HAMAS). Prison is another isolating environment that has 

often been shown to breed radicalization. In an interview with a Marine 

Corps researcher, Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi, who took 

over leadership of the Iraqi (Anbar) Awakening Party after the assassination of his brother, said that the United States’ sending of low-level 

insurgents to Bucca prison was a mistake: “It was better to have referred 

those criminals to the Iraqi justice system than to Bucca, because they 

started having a school, and they indoctrinated other detainees.”27

(Chapter 5 discussed the importance of social reintegration as part of 

successful demobilization programs.)
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Radicalization Under Threat

Uniting against a common enemy is one of the most powerful activators and unifying factors for identity groups, increasing the group’s 

salience to members, decreasing internal dissent, and increasing a 

sense of unified purpose. External threats are often the catalyst for 

identity groups to radicalize toward violent action.

Government crackdowns against opposition are often the catalyst 

for radicalization. Most internal opposition groups attempt to work 

within the political system first, use nonviolent protest second, and 

turn to violence as a last resort. Even when group leaders, for their own 

reasons, might prefer violent struggle from the beginning, it is difficult to recruit enough support among the population if other options 

seem to be available. But governments often aid the radicalization process by engaging in disproportionately harsh or violent responses to 

opposition.

As already described, the escalation of aggressive tactics between 

the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority in Sri Lanka after independence is a prototypical case of group conflict. However, until the mid1970s, large-scale armed struggle was not inevitable. Tamils continued 

to pursue both violent and nonviolent opposition tactics. Political compromises were forged in 1957 (the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact 

related to language rights) and 1965 (the Senanayake–Chelvanayakam 

agreement), and a coalition government ruled briefly from 1965 to 

1968. But increasingly effective attacks by violent groups, including the 

Tamil Tigers, drew increasingly harsh responses from the government. 

The “Jaffa massacre” in Sri Lanka seems a clear example of disproportionate government response forcing opposition groups to either radicalize or capitulate. In January 1974, when police attacked the peaceful 

Fourth International Tamil Conference in Jaffna, killing eleven Tamils, 

the mood among the Tamils, especially the youth, turned from alienation and protest to overt defiance and militant action. Armed resistance became seen as the only effective avenue by military-age Tamils, 

leading the way to an increasingly active insurgency.

McCauley and Moskalenko28 refer to government-fueled resistance 

as “jujitsu politics,” because it is the government’s own response that 

causes the violent opposition that may bring it down. It is not clear 

that violent repression is always an irrational response, however. The 

Sinhalese government in Sri Lanka seemed to have made a tactical 

decision that violent suppression of Tamils was preferable to political 

accommodation, perhaps gambling that they could win any subsequent 

armed struggle (which they did, but decades later). Autocratic governments that serve the privileged elite or pursue exclusionary, prejudicial 
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

169

policies may have little hope of attaining support in a fair and open 

contest for power. The most stable autocracies effectively use secret 

police, political arrests, and every other available means to crush opposition before it can pose a serious challenge.

Governments that seek the consent of the governed, even partially, 

must be more cautious about proportionate use of force. The Bloody 

Sunday attacks in Northern Ireland that catalyzed decades of subsequent conflict would be a clearer example of a jujitsu effect. British paratroopers killed thirteen unarmed protestors during a largely peaceful 

Catholic demonstration. This was an unintentional provocation on the 

part of the British. In retrospect, military leaders regretted assigning a 

unit of paratroopers known for thuggish qualities to crowd control, a 

mission for which they were completely unsuited. Prior to this, Catholic 

protest groups had welcomed the presence of British troops as protection against sectarian violence. However, this event turned the Irish 

Catholics against the British soldiers and energized the violent factions 

within the IRA, accelerating a decline into The Troubles.29

Insurgent groups usually understand the dynamics of jujitsu politics and may manipulate them to their own ends. Opposition leaders 

wishing to unite and radicalize their followers may undertake attacks 

for the sole purpose of drawing a disproportionately violent response. 

Placing a few violent actors within a peaceful crowd is a time-honored 

tactic: one protestor throws a rock at police from within or near a 

crowd, fires a shot, or simply creates an explosive noise; police or troops 

perceive an attack from within the crowd and respond with force; the 

crowd perceives that a peaceful demonstration has been attacked; and 

a catalyzing event is created.

Provoking a disproportionate response as a means of radicalizing a 

movement is not a new tactic. The Brazilian Marxist Carlos Marighella, 

in his 1969 Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, advocated this tactic as a 

means of cultivating popular support. Instead of compelling the populace to join an insurgent cause, the insurgents would provoke the state 

to react violently and indiscriminately, thus driving the populace into 

the arms of the insurgents.30

A study by RAND sought to identify effective counterinsurgency tactics across a number of historical case studies and reduced the findings 

to a small list of “Good” and “Bad” factors. Among these are a number 

of recommendations to prevent jujitsu effects by well-intentioned governments. Governments that avoid collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, use of collective punishment, and forced resettlement 

tactics fare better in the long run than those that do.31
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Radicalization Through Condensation or Splitting

Another somewhat ironic mechanism of radicalization (from the 

government’s perspective) is radicalization through condensation. 

The basic mechanism is that a large percentage of a group is suddenly 

removed. From the outside, the movement appears to be ending, but 

sometimes what is left is a more committed and isolated core, which 

subsequently undertakes more radical actions.

Removal of part of the group could happen when there is a government crackdown on a largely peaceful group—a demonstration is 

attacked, or dissidents are arrested—leading to widespread defection 

and distancing by less committed members of the group. In this case 

the ones that remain may be more extreme, more committed, somewhat desperate to regain momentum, and motivated to seek revenge.

Another situation where groups may find themselves isolated and 

condensed is when a large proportion of a larger organization accepts 

a political compromise or decides to go mainstream. In 1969, the IRA 

appeared to be transitioning to a legitimate, and largely peaceful, political organization. They reorganized away from a military structure, 

and military training was de-emphasized as the group’s leadership 

transformed the Republican institution into a “revolutionary citizen 

army” capable of economic resistance and direct political action, as 

well as military operations. More significantly, at the IRA Convention 

of December 1969, the group leadership voted overwhelmingly 39–12 

to begin participating in rather than abstaining from the government 

in Northern Ireland and also to form a united national liberation front 

with radical leftist elements, including Marxists. To most observers, this 

appeared to be a standing down from armed confrontation. However, a 

splinter group formed, calling itself the Provisional IRA, as differentiated from the “official” IRA. This group was smaller but more committed to resistance. The Provisionals re-established the military brigade 

and battalion structures. And it was this condensed and radicalized 

group that grew into the violent wing behind The Troubles of the following decades.32

Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support

Insurgent movements often face competition from parallel or 

splinter groups. One way to gain public support in the face of such 

competition is to be seen as the most dedicated and the most radical. 

The Tamil Tigers again provide a good example. As persecution and 

marginalization of Tamils in Sri Lanka accelerated in the late 1970s 

and 1980s, a large number of opposition and resistance groups began 
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to form among the Tamils. There were as many as thirty-six militant 

groups along with other nonviolent resistance groups. Within a few 

years of their formation in 1976, however, the Tamil Tigers were the 

dominant militant force. They attracted support from other groups, 

including less militant groups, because of their effectiveness, dedication, and ruthlessness.

 From very early on, the LTTE leadership has demanded that all 

their personnel should take an oath of loyalty expressing a readiness 

to die for their cause, even by their own hand. This commitment was 

embodied in the cyanide vials (kuppi) carried around their necks—a 

ready instrument for use if captured. This practice, adopted around 

1983–1984, immediately garnered admiration among all classes of 

the Tamil population, giving an edge to the LTTE in the competition 

with other militant groups for recruits and supporters. Michael Roberts interviewed a Christian Tamil octogenarian in Adelaide about the 

Tigers, at a time when other groups with stronger Christian elements 

were still active, but this interviewee stated that the “devotion that the 

Tigers showed was unmatched.”33

The Tamil Tigers did not restrict themselves to competing for supporters; they also engaged in direct attacks on competitors, wiping out 

competition. It is believed that during their rise to power, the Tigers 

killed more Tamils than Sinhalese.34 Radicalization for the Tigers also 

included attacks on influential Tamils holding centrist positions; moderate politicians and policemen were frequent early targets.

The dynamics of radicalization through competition may also apply 

to the competition between the PLO and HAMAS to be the spokespersons for the Palestinian cause. While the PLO gained political advantage and a number of concessions in the Oslo Accords with Israel, 

they also lost credibility with radical supports and opened the door 

for HAMAS. In this case, it is important to note that the groups were 

not just competing for local support; at least as important was external 

support of wealthy Muslims using Palestinians as proxies in an ongoing 

war against Israel. These supporters might see little value in political 

accommodations of the type negotiated by the PLO in Oslo.

Radicalization Through Hate

Hostility and suspicion between an in-group and one or more outgroups can take a malevolent turn toward out-group hatred. In this 

dynamic, hatred, suspicion, conspiracy theories, and planned attacks 

on the out-groups become the focal point of group energy.

Hate fills similar functions as other in-group/out-group dynamics. It provides a common enemy that draws together the in-group, 
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de-emphasizing any within-group rifts, and gives members a sense of 

belonging. Emphasizing the negative qualities of the out-group and 

the positive qualities of the in-group creates a sense of pride. And the 

imminent threat posed by the out-group creates a sense of urgency 

and purpose.

Scapegoating refers to out-group hatred targeted at a group that 

is a less politically and socially powerful group than the haters. Scapegoating of Jews in Nazi Germany and hatred of African Americans and 

foreigners by American white supremacist groups are two examples. To 

sustain a high level of fear and hostility against less-powerful groups 

often requires some ideological contortions to magnify their perceived 

power. These could involve conspiracy theories that claim the scapegoated group secretly has more power than is evident. Or, the scapegoated group could be accused of conspiring with and opening the 

door for powerful international enemies. A third form accuses the outgroup of degrading the purity and culture of the in-group with negative effects disproportionate to the actual social or political power of 

the out-group.

Is there really a difference between the dynamics of hatred and 

more common out-group stereotyping and hostility? The differences 

are partly a matter of emphasis and degree. But there are also some 

characteristic patterns of groups moving toward hatred. The first 

pattern has to do with group rhetoric and dehumanization of hated 

groups as a way of psychologically preparing for more extreme action. 

The second is a pattern of observable activities that indicate a group is 

preparing behaviorally and tactically for violence.

Rhetoric of Hate: Dehumanization and “Selective Moral Disengagement”

Primo Levi asked a Nazi camp commandant why they went to 

extreme lengths to degrade their victims, whom they were going to kill 

anyway. The commandant chillingly explained that it was not a matter 

of purposeless cruelty. The victims had to be degraded to subhuman 

objects so that those who operated the gas chambers would be less burdened by distress.35

Dehumanization refers to attempts, through rhetoric or action, to 

portray a person or group in a way that strips them of their essential 

human qualities, thus justifying some kind of subhuman treatment. 

One of the classic experiments in this area was published by Albert 

Bandura and colleagues in 197536 and showed that small changes could 

lead to large differences in aggressive behavior. College-age males were 

assigned to be “supervisors” or “workers.” Three-member teams of 

supervisors were supposed to deliver electric shocks to unseen threemember work teams when their work was judged inadequate. The 
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

173

“supervisors” were told when they had to deliver shocks but could freely 

choose the level of shock, from one to ten. Bandura varied two conditions related to actions of the supervisors and three related to descriptions of the workers (what experimentalists would call a “two-by-three” 

design). Supervisors were sometimes told they were delivering shocks 

directly to an (unseen) individual worker, and they were sometimes told 

that the shock levels assigned by the three supervisors were averaged. 

When shocks were averaged and therefore less personal (a means of 

dehumanization) in the second condition, supervisors tended to assign 

higher levels of shock. And supervisors’ level of punitive shocks was also 

significantly affected by three levels of labeling. Subjects “accidentally” 

overheard comments from the administrators describing the worker 

group in neutral terms, dehumanizing terms (“animalistic”), or humanizing terms (“perceptive,” “understanding”). Dehumanizing descriptions led to significantly higher punitive shock levels and humanizing 

to lower shock levels, as compared with the neutral condition. When 

the two “dehumanizing” conditions both occurred together, i.e., depersonalized administration and dehumanizing descriptions, the shocks 

delivered were particularly large, showing a statistical interaction.

Hate groups also employ these same tactics toward the targets of 

their enmity. Haslam’s studies of dehumanization37,38 showed that the 

characteristics we consider most uniquely human are the ones that 

recur in dehumanizing speech. He identified two distinct types: comparison to animals and comparison to machines.

Targets of hate are frequently compared to animals (dogs, rats) 

or assigned animal-like qualities. Targets are accused of lack of culture, coarseness, amorality, irrationality, and immaturity and denied 

uniquely human characteristics of civility and moral sensibilities. When 

the opportunity exists, targets are sometimes made to perform animallike acts. Among the mistreatments perpetrated by American soldiers 

at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq was forcing prisoners to wear dog collars 

and crawl on the ground.

Targets of hatred may also be compared to machines. Hate groups 

create enemy stereotypes of coldness, lack of emotion, and rigidity. This 

is a quite different set of characteristics than the animal comparisons: 

cold, rational, computer-like beings on the one hand and irrational 

beings controlled by passions on the other. But both serve the same 

purpose: to deny intended victims some qualities we consider most 

characteristically human.

Depersonalization is also an important component of dehumanization. Hate rhetoric avoids assigning individual qualities to most enemies and makes use of broad stereotypes.
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Later in his career, Bandura referred to the process of preparing to commit violence against hate victims as “selective moral disengagement” and describes a number of other typical communication 

patterns, including sanitizing language, distancing of personal responsibility for actions, minimizing or disregarding harm to be committed, 

and blaming victims for bringing punishment on themselves.39

Why do hate groups need to engage in dehumanization? This process has both individual and group functions. Most individuals do not 

easily take to violent actions, as discussed previously. The crueler the 

acts, the more preparation and justification is required. People have 

individual standards of morality and a need to maintain a positive selfimage by upholding those standards. Some individuals will find violence easier to acclimate to than others, and this affects what positions 

individuals will be assigned to within a group, such as whether they 

will be judged most fit for violent operations or underground support. 

But to convince mass movements, including many different kinds of 

people, to commit cruel acts, or to look the other way when they are 

committed, is a more difficult feat. Constant repetition of dehumanizing speech acclimates new members and reinforces messages.

Hate rhetoric can be a product of group radicalization, but it can 

also be produced by one or a few strong leaders driving the process 

for their own ends. Edward Glaeser, a Harvard economist, attempted 

to create an economic model of supply and demand for hatred as a 

political tool. He argues that ambitious and unscrupulous leaders will 

use hatred as much as they are allowed to, because when such leaders 

are out of power it helps unify opposition, and when they are in power 

it justifies economic exploitation of other groups to the benefit of constituents. The limits on hateful rhetoric may be mainly a function of 

the strength of various groups, how much a population will tolerate, 

and how much humanizing contact there is between groups, but have 

little to do with grievances: “the fact that demagogues form hatred by 

telling tales of past crimes shouldn’t fool us into thinking that the level 

of hatred is actually a function of past injustice.”40

Escalation of Violent Actions

Besides moral justification, groups also escalate their violent actions 

over time as they individually and collectively desensitize themselves to 

violence. Many law enforcement organizations have employed a staged 

approach to assess this mechanism. The Seven-Stage Hate Model41

comprises the following:

• Stage 1: The Haters Gather. Like-minded individuals find each 

other and recruit others who may or may not initially share their 

ideology.
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175

• Stage 2: The Hate Group Defines Itself. Individuals see themselves 

as members of a defined group; symbols and rituals are often 

chosen at this point.

• Stage 3: The Hate Group Disparages the Target. Groups define 

themselves with a narrative of grievances and conspiracies and 

develop an ideology of hatred.

• Stage 4: The Hate Group Taunts the Target. The group’s ideology 

is revealed to outsiders. Graffiti, use of symbols, and insults 

shouted from cars are typical.

• Stage 5: The Hate Group Attacks the Target Without Weapons. 

Schafer and Navarro tie these types of attacks to “thrill-seeking” 

behavior; attacks tend to be more violent than comparable crimes. 

Defending turf is a typical rationale for gang-type groups.

• Stage 6: The Hate Group Attacks the Target with Weapons. 

Weapons can range from tools and belts to more lethal weapons. 

Some members may prefer up-close violence (knives as opposed 

to guns or explosives) for the personal and thrill-seeking aspects.

• Stage 7: The Hate Group Destroys the Target. Groups move to 

more lethal weapons with larger effect.

The personal story of Lars, a former member of Norway’s rightwing extremist National People’s Party, illustrates the process of one 

person working through these stages. His story is recounted in John 

Horgan’s book, Walking Away from Terrorism.

42 Lars, who would later be 

imprisoned for bombing a mosque, began his involvement with no particular malevolence toward Muslims or other groups targeted by the 

National People’s Party. Instead, he began as a lonely and disconnected 

teenager in Oslo. He contacted the party after seeing a bumper sticker 

and was unaware of their political views; he was invited to gather with 

other young people at a social event (Stage 1). “It was very informal, not 

even really a meeting . . . we just met, barbecued, and drank beer. And 

we had a very good time.” After becoming involved socially, he became 

exposed to the group ideology of hatred. The ideology at this point 

seemed to serve as a marker of identity (Stage 2) more than a matter 

of political urgency. Gradually, he began to take part in small acts of 

aggression against opportunistic targets, such as small shops owned by 

Pakistani and Indian immigrants. Taunting (Stage 4) took the form 

of surveillance and putting glue in the door locks at night. Smashing 

shop windows was another small escalation (Stage 5). Only after these 

lines were crossed was Lars encouraged, indirectly, to make an attack 

with some dynamite stolen from a construction site (Stage 6). In a tragicomic turn, Lars was supposed to attack a synagogue, but he got on 

the wrong bus and decided to bomb a conveniently located mosque 

instead. He intended to commit only property damage in this attack, 
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but several people were injured. Presumably Lars might have escalated 

to more lethal attacks had he not been arrested and undergone an 

ideological transformation in prison.

Radicalization Through Martyrdom

Martyrdom seems to have a power to inspire radicalism in a way 

that other grievances do not. The first death, or a widely publicized 

death related to a cause, can be a psychologically jarring experience 

with several effects on sympathizers. First, it elevates the seriousness 

and urgency of the cause. Sympathizers to a cause who had previously 

held back may be both shamed and emboldened; the threats of arrest, 

persecution, economic loss, etc., seem comparatively less important. 

A psychological mechanism of “survivor guilt” may help create strong 

feelings of obligation. Supporters also often say they are inspired to 

ensure that martyrs’ deaths be made meaningful.

Even when a number of victims have died for a cause, a single martyr is often symbolically elevated to personalize the phenomena. Many 

protestors were killed in the 2009 Iranian election protests, but Neda 

Agha-Soltan’s became the face of the protests, largely because goodquality video of the entire sequence of events was serendipitously taken 

and then made available on the Internet. Neda was an attractive young 

woman and a peripheral participant in the protest. Video showed 

her being shot in the back without provocation,43 making it difficult 

for government supporters to claim that her killing was justified for 

security reasons.

Martyrs do not have to be killed by the government or opposition 

forces to serve the purpose. Bobby Sands’s death galvanized IRA support even though his death was caused by a hunger strike. The 2010–

2011 protests in Tunisia were touched off by the suicide of Mohamed 

Bouazizi, a street vendor who lit himself on fire in protest after police 

confiscated his fruit and vegetable cart. In cases of martyr suicide, the 

means of death is likely important; death by self-starvation or public 

self-immolation conveys a message of protest and emboldens others to 

take actions that might lead to less painful ends.

Leaders’ responses to martyrdom may also be viewed as a critical 

test of character by their followers. Respect for Hassan Nasrallah and 

the strength of his leadership in Hizbollah increased greatly because of 

his continued resolve after the death of his son.

For the LTTE and other groups such as Hizbollah and HAMAS, 

suicide martyrdom became an integral part of the group’s ideological 

and motivational structures. The transition from offensive military or 
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177

terrorist operations to suicide attacks represents an important psychological escalation both for insurgent groups and their opponents.

The LTTE’s first suicide operation was in 1987, when an explosiveladen vehicle was used to spearhead an assault on an army camp. This 

tactic was similar to the attack by Hizbollah against the U.S. Marine 

barracks in Lebanon four years earlier. LTTE began utilizing both land 

and naval missions very effectively. Soon thereafter, suicide attackers 

made up their own branch of the LTTE, the “Black Tigers.” This group 

was believed to be the only one directly overseen by the Tigers’ charismatic leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.44 There were noteworthy rituals 

surrounding LTTE suicide attacks. Before their mission, Black Tigers 

were given the rare honor of sharing a last meal and having a photograph taken with the seldom-seen Prabhakaran.

It was a female Black Tiger that assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, India’s 

former prime minister, in 1991. That same year, the LTTE began commemorating martyrs on November  27, a holiday called Maaveerar 

Naal, “Heros’ Day.” The most significant ritual of this day was a candlelighting ceremony at a site called tuyilam illam, where martyrs were 

commemorated. The site featured stone gravestones and caskets. The 

gravestones themselves were unusual because Hindus burn rather 

than bury their dead; tuyilam illam was considered a temple rather 

than a cemetery. (The site has since been destroyed by the Sri Lankan 

government.)

SUMMARY

An understanding of the social psychology of groups is useful for 

understanding the actions of resistance movements. Of particular 

interest is the process of radicalization, whereby some groups make the 

transition from nonviolent to violent tactics.

Humans have a strong tendency to associate with identity groups, 

be they teams, organizations, political parties, or religions. Most people 

have a set of social identities that are important to their understanding 

of self; these identities can wax and wane in importance over time and 

depending on circumstances. While mostly a positive phenomenon, 

identity groups are also at the root of in-group/out-group conflicts. 

This chapter uses the extended example of the conflict between the 

ethnic Sinhalese and ethnic Tamil groups in Sri Lanka as an example 

of how in-group/out-group distinctions can breed animosity and lead 

to violence. The long, violent insurgency of the Tamil Tigers was perhaps a predictable outcome of ethnic tensions played out through government persecution after the end of British colonial rule.
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Drawing on work by McCauley and Moskalenko, we identify a number of mechanisms by which groups may be drawn or forced to cross 

the line between nonviolent and violent resistance. Some of these 

involve reactions to government crackdowns, such as radicalization 

under threat. Condensation and splitting are particularly interesting 

phenomena, because they occur when movements may appear to at 

their weakest—splitting involves a schism within a group, and condensation happens when groups lose large numbers of members. In both 

cases, the cleavages leave the most radical members isolated together, 

and group dynamics or desperation can lead the remnants to turn to 

violence, in some cases very effectively. Martyrdom, from either external attack or self-imposed as in a hunger strike, can also be a catalyst 

to radicalization.

Other mechanisms of radicalization are less a response to external 

pressures and more a result of internal dynamics, such as competition 

between groups for members or competition between leaders for influence within the group. Understanding the stages that hate groups go 

through to dehumanize their targets and desensitize their members to 

violence is particularly important because these often occur without 

outside pressure or apparent cause.

ENDNOTES

1 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.

2 Manford H. Kuhn and Thomas S. McPartland, “An Empirical Investigation on Self-Attitudes,” American Sociological Review 19 (1954): 68–77.

3 Hazel R. Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation,” Psychological Review 98, no. 2 (1991): 224–253.

4 Peter Bull, “Shifting Patterns of Social Identity in Northern Ireland,” The Psychologist 19, 

no. 1 (2006): 40. Reporting on a series of British Social Attitude surveys from 1989 to 

1995.

5 S. Alexander Haslam and John C. Turner, “Context-Dependent Variation in Social Stereotyping 2: The Relationship between Frame of Reference, Self-Categorization and 

Accentuation,” European Journal of Social Psychology 22, no. 3 (1992): 251–277.

6 John C. Turner, Michael Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. 

Wetherell, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

7 Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 4 (2006): 695–711.

8 Frank A. Salamone, “Becoming Hausa: Ethnic Identity Change and Its Implications for 

the Study of Ethnic Pluralism and Stratification,” Africa 45, no. 4 (1975): 410.

9 Peter Bull, “Shifting Patterns of Social Identity,” The Psychologist 19, no. 4 (2006): 40–43.

10 Benn Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 

494–510.
Chapter 6. Group Dynamics and Radicalization

179

11 Henri Tajfel, M. G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and Claude Flament, “Social Categorization and 

Intergroup Behaviour,” European Journal of Social Psychology 1, no. 2 (1971): 149–178.

12 Marilynn B. Brewer and Roderick M. Kramer, “The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes 

and Behavior,” Annual Review of Psychology 36, no. 1 (1985): 219–243.

13 Miles Hewstone, Mark Rubin, and Hazel Willis, “Intergroup Bias,” Annual Review of Psychology 53, no. 1 (2002): 575–604.

14 Hastings Donnan, “Material Identities: Fixing Ethnicity in the Irish Borderlands,” Identities 12, no. 1 (2005): 69–105.

15 Thomas F. Pettigrew, “The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive 

Analysis of Prejudice,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 5, no. 4 (1979): 461–476.

16 Muzafer Sherif, O. J Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif, 

Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robber’s Cave Experiment (Norman, OK: University 

of Oklahoma Book Exchange, 1961).

17 Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 

190–208.

18 Michael J. Deane and Maegen Nix, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” in Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (Laurel, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 

Applied Physics Laboratory, 2009), 52–53.

19 Howard Wriggins, “Ceylon’s Time of Troubles, 1956–1958,” Far Eastern Survey 28, no. 3 

(1959): 33.

20 James A. F. Stoner, “Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions: The Influence of 

Widely Held Values,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 4, no. 4 (1968): 442–459.

21 Daniel J. Isenberg, “Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis,” Journal of 

Personality and Social Psychology 50, no. 6 (1986): 1141–1151.

22 David G. Myers and Helmut Lamm, “The Polarizing Effect of Group Discussion,” American Scientist 63, no. 3 (1975): 297–303.

23 Eugene Burnstein and Amiram Vinokur, “Persuasive Argumentation and Social Comparison as Determinants of Attitude Polarization,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

13, no. 4 (1977): 315–322.

24 Glenn S. Sanders and Robert S. Baron, “Is Social Comparison Irrelevant for Producing 

Choice Shifts?” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13, no. 4 (1977): 303–331.

25 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 

Press, 2004).

26 Neal Osherow, “Making Sense of the Nonsensical: An Analysis of Jonestown,” in Readings about the Social Animal, 9th ed., ed. Elliot Aaronson and Joshua Aaronson (New York: 

Worth Publishers, 2004).

27 Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume II, Iraq 

Perspectives. U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009 (U.S. Marine Corps: 

2009).

28 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.

29 Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–1998,” in Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (Laurel, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory, 2009), 64–66.

30 Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, trans. John Butt and Rosemary 

Sheed (Havana, Cuba: Tricontinental, 1970).

31 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of 

Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

32 Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–1998.”
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33 Michael Roberts, “Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration,” Social Analysis 50, no. 1 (2006): 73–102.

34 Rajan Hoole, Daya Bomasundaram, and K. Thiranagama Sritharan Rajani, The Broken 

Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka, an Inside Account (Claremont, CA: The Sri Lankan 

Studies Institute, 1990).

35 Albert Bandura, “Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,” Journal of Moral Education 31, no. 2 (2002): 101–119.

36 Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael E. Fromson, “Disinhibition of Aggression 

through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims,” Journal of Research 

in Personality 9, no. 4 (1975): 253–269.

37 Nick Haslam et al., “Subhuman, Inhuman, and Superhuman: Contrasting Humans with 

Nonhumans in Three Cultures,” Social Cognition 26, no. 2 (2008): 248–259.

38 Nick Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology 

Review 10, no. 3 (2006): 252–264.

39 Albert Bandura, “Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,” Journal of Moral Education 31, no. 2 (2002): 101–119.

40 Edward L. Glaeser, “The Political Economy of Hatred,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 

no. 1 (2005): 45–86.

41 John R. Schafer and Joe Navarro, “The Seven-Stage Hate Model: The Psychopathology of 

Hate Groups,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 72, no. 3 (March 2003): 1–9.

42 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and 

Extremist Movements (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

43 Nazila Fathi, “In a Death Seen Around the World, a Symbol of Iranian Protests,” The New 

York Times, June 22, 2009.

44 Chris Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” in Transforming 

Rebel Movements After Civil War, ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).
CHAPTER 7.

PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK FACTORS
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Introduction: Is the Disease Model Applicable? ...................................183

Axis I Disorders and “Lone Wolf” Terrorists ........................................185

Axis II: Developmental and Personality Disorders ...............................186

Suicidality and Suicide Bombers............................................................189

Emotional Vulnerability ......................................................................... 191

Youth ................................................................................................193

Personal Connection to a Grievance (Political or Otherwise).............194

Vicarious Experience of Grievance........................................................194

Humiliation.............................................................................................195

Mechanisms.............................................................................................197

Summary ................................................................................................199
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

183

Jason Spitaletta

INTRODUCTION: 

IS THE DISEASE MODEL APPLICABLE?

Critics of the field of psychology identify the disproportionate 

focus on the abnormal (or behavioral extremes) at the expense of the 

average. Accounts of terrorist acts in the media tend to do the same 

because commentators often describe abhorrent acts in clinical terms. 

One needn’t be mentally ill to commit atrocities; in fact, the vast majority of terrorists and/or insurgents are psychologically normal (e.g., not 

clinically psychotic). Although there are certainly exceptions, it is reasonable to assume that terrorists and/or insurgents do not necessarily 

possess any cognitive, affective, or neurological deficits, or at least that 

those deficits are not precipitating causes of their behavior. There is 

no experimentally derived or empirically based psychological or demographic profile that would indicate a predisposition toward joining violent extremist organizations. What follows are a proposed set of risk 

factors that seem to apply to individual and group radicalization. A risk 

factor is a variable associated with an increased risk of radicalization 

whose presence is neither deterministic nor implicitly characterological. The behaviors or attributes described below merely point to a possible increased likelihood of a willingness to participate in or eventual 

participation in political violence.

Social-science research on the underlying causes of terrorism have 

focused on three main areas: (1) the political, economic, and social 

conditions that correlate with increased incidences of politically motivated violence, (2) group dynamic processes that facilitate radicalization and an increased risk of violence, and (3) psychological traits and 

characteristics of group members that predispose individuals to seeking membership in violent organizations.1

 Although explanations at 

the level of individual psychology are insufficient, the incorporation of 

multiple subdisciplines within psychology does help one comprehend 

the phenomena associated with radicalization. Many consider radicalized individuals rational in that their actions (although violent) are 

derived from a conscious, calculated decision to take this particular 

type of action because they believe it is the optimum strategy to accomplish a sociopolitical goal.2

The violent acts perpetrated by terrorists, against civilian targets 

including women, children, and countrymen, or against themselves in 

the case of suicide bombers, beg the question of whether terrorists are 

mentally ill. The balance of research indicates that this is not the case, 
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in the sense of being legally insane or socially dysfunctional in normal settings. One of the best datasets on mental illness and terrorism 

comes from Marc Sageman’s study of Al Qaeda members. In a dataset 

of 398 profiles, he identified only four cases of possible thought disorder, one case of mild cognitive impairment (what used to be considered 

mental retardation), and no indications of pathological narcissism or 

excessive egocentricity. There were very few indications of traumatic 

histories. Sageman considered many to be overprotected youth who 

became well-adjusted, psychologically healthy adults.3 To date, no terrorist profile has been discovered,4

 and there is no scientific evidence 

of any genetic role in determining why certain people become involved 

in terrorism. In general, radical organizations probably have a sufficient range of personality and cognitive profiles within their ranks to 

be indistinguishable from the surrounding population.

Severely mentally ill people usually have difficulty fitting in within 

teams and larger organizations, and this is true whether the organization is a corporation or a component of an insurgency. Effective 

underground groups weed out unfit volunteers (see Chapter 2: Recruiting in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare), 

because they pose a risk to both the effectiveness and security of the 

organizations.

Having said this, an understanding of mental health issues can shed 

some light on insurgent psychology. It will be useful to understand the 
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

185

distinction between “Axis I” and “Axis II” disorders.a

 This distinction 

comes from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 

Edition (DSM-IV),5

 which is the “bible” of clinical psychiatric diagnosis. 

Axis I refers to the major clinical illnesses, such as schizophrenia or 

major depression, that are most familiar to laypersons. Axis II refers 

to developmental or personality disorders that can be subtler and less 

likely to be debilitating but still have profound effects on behavior.6

AXIS I DISORDERS AND “LONE WOLF” 

TERRORISTS

There are some isolated examples of insurgents or terrorists who 

do exhibit symptoms of Axis I disorder that indicate profound thought 

disorders and distortions of reality. These tend to be lone wolf terrorists, partly because of the difficulty they have integrating into larger 

groups, and partly because of the unique features of their pathology. 

Anders Behring Breivik used a diversionary bombing to kill seventyseven people in a combined attack in Norway in 2011. He then proceeded to personally massacre sixty-nine students attending a youth 

leadership conference on an isolated island. His reasons for his actions 

appear to be senseless to most, but in his mind, they were a necessary 

step to combat foreign influences in Norway, according to his detailed 

a The DSM-IV-TR uses a multiaxial or multidimensional approach to diagnoses 

because rarely do other factors in a person’s life not affect their mental health. Axis I 

(Clinical Syndromes) are those psychological disorders that are the focus of a diagnosis. 

Axis I disorders are divided into fourteen categories, including Anxiety Disorders, Childhood Disorders, Cognitive Disorders, Dissociative Disorders, Eating Disorders, Factitious 

Disorders, Impulse-Control Disorders, Mood Disorders, Psychotic Disorders, Sexual 

and Gender-Identity Disorders, Sleep Disorders, Somatoform Disorders, and SubstanceRelated Disorders. Axis II (Developmental Disorders and Personality Disorders) are 

long-standing chronic conditions that may affect the clinical syndromes listed in Axis I. 

Developmental disorders include autism and mental retardation, disorders that are typically first evident in childhood. Personality disorders are clinical syndromes that have 

enduring symptoms and encompass the individual’s way of interacting with the world. 

They are divided into three clusters: Cluster A (odd or eccentric) includes Paranoid, Schizoid, and Schizotypal. Cluster B (overly emotional, unstable, or self-dramatizing) includes 

Antisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, and Narcissistic. Cluster C (tense and anxiety ridden) 

includes Avoidant, Dependent, and Obsessive-Compulsive. Axis III disorders are medical/

physical conditions that play a role in the development, continuance, or exacerbation of 

Axis I and II disorders or other physical conditions such as brain injury or HIV/AIDS that 

can result in symptoms of mental illness. Axis IV are social and environmental stressors 

that may affect the clinical syndromes listed in Axis I. Events in a person’s life, such as 

death of a loved one, starting a new job, college, unemployment, and even marriage can 

affect the disorders listed in Axis I and II. These events are both listed and rated for this 

axis. Axis V represents the highest level of functioning where a clinical rates the person’s 

level of functioning at both the present time and the highest level within the previous year. 

This helps the clinician understand how the above four axes are affecting the person and 

what type of changes could be expected.
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Part II. Motivation

manifestos and journals. An evaluation panel later declared that 

Breivik was insane at the time of his crime. The concept of “insanity” is 

a legal term, not a clinical diagnosis from the DSM-IV, but in Norway, 

as elsewhere, it usually implies psychosis or some psychological break 

from reality.

Typical characteristics of these lone wolf attackers are delusions of 

grandeur and some associated narcissistic tendencies. In this presentation of paranoid schizophrenia with the presence of thought disorder, 

individuals may believe the government or other powerful groups are 

“out to get them.” The personal identification with the adversary (e.g., 

the government is out to get “me”) is a delusion of grandeur that can be 

considered an unconscious attempt to elevate self-esteem. Presumably, 

if a powerful group has a specific grievance with a single individual, 

that individual must be important. The subsequent elevation in selfesteem and self-importance may perpetuate the disordered thinking.

Self-efficacy (the belief that one is capable of goal-directed behavior 

to affect the operational environment) and self-agency (the sense that 

one is the primary creator and principal driver of a particular thought 

or movement) are typically high in individuals who act alone to remediate political grievances. Self-efficacy and self-agency are often correlated with narcissistic tendencies. However, their presence does not 

necessarily indicate the presence of the personality disorder or the associated leadership style.b

 There is a greater probability of some degree of 

psychopathology in this category than in any other,7 although the psychopathology is rarely the proximal factor in the transformation from 

law-abiding citizen to violent actor. Rather, it is a combination of some 

underlying psychopathology (major or minor) along with specific environmental conditions that propel the individual toward radical behavior. In certain cases, such as paranoid schizophrenia with underlying 

thought disorder, the violence is a result of disordered cognition and a 

break from reality and not necessarily truly politically motivated.

AXIS II: DEVELOPMENTAL AND 

PERSONALITY DISORDERS

While the most serious psychiatric disorders may be rare, there 

are associated personality and other disorders that may correspond 

to violent radicalism. Most of the literature attributing clinical mental 

disorder to radicalism speaks of the remorseless personality type, psychopathy, or sociopathy.8

 The concept of “insanity” is often associated 

with terroristic behavior. However, “insanity” is not a behavioral science 

b Refer to Chapter 4 of this book for a discussion of leadership styles.
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

187

term but a legal one, usually implying psychosis, although no official 

legal definition or objective criteria exist.9

 Common theories hold that 

certain individuals possess or lack certain personality traits that make 

them more susceptible to radicalization and performance of terrorist 

acts than those individuals who do not. One theory is that this type of 

personality is largely the result of a dysfunctional childhood that fosters an impoverished sense of self and hostility toward authority. This 

resentment to authority may be an outgrowth of unconscious hostility 

toward abusive or controlling parents and is later reflected in the adult 

terrorist’s rigid mindset.10

Antisocial personality disorder (APD) is considered an Axis II disorder and is the current term used to describe a pattern of remorseless 

disregard for the rights of others.11 First referred to as “moral insanity” 

in 1835,12 then psychopathy up until the mid-1950s, and then sociopathy 

until 1980,13 APD is hypothesized to occur in approximately 3 percent 

of the male population, is characterized by chronic disregard of social 

norms and laws, lack of remorse, impulsivity, and other traits and seems 

a plausible explanation for some terroristic behavior.14 A subset of violent extremists would meet criteria for a diagnosis of APD,c

 although 

many others would probably exhibit traits associated with APD without meeting full diagnostic criteria. Many individuals with APD share 

certain characteristics with violent radicals, such as a sense of social 

alienation, early maladjustment, impulsivity, and hostility.15 There are 

also those who exhibit an antisocial or sociopathic leadership style and 

probably do not meet the clinical criteria for the Axis II disorder.16 The 

characteristics of a sociopathic leadership style include lack of empathy, absence of moral constraints, and the consideration of violence as 

a tool to accomplish a goal.17 Observables of a sociopathic leadership 

style include a history of criminal activity not motivated by politics and 

the projection of personal desire for violent action.18 (Psychological 

profiling of leaders is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4: Leadership.)

Another assessment used in conjunction with a clinical interview 

and case history evaluation is Hare’s PCL-R.d The PCL-R consists of 

two factors: Factor 1, a personality marked by “aggressive narcissism”; 

and Factor 2, a case history of a “socially deviant lifestyle.” Factor 1 

includes a history or current evidence of glibness/superficial charm, 

c Based on a comparison between Napoleoni’s 2005 open-source reporting of biographical data on Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and Hare’s psychopathy checklist-revised (PCLR), it can be determined that Al-Zarqawi would most likely score between thirty and forty, 

thus reaching Hare’s criteria for APD.

d The PCL-R is composed of the twenty aforementioned elements scored along a 

three-point Likert scale (0, 1, or 2). A score of thirty to forty indicates psychopathy; however, the PCL-R must be administered by a fully trained and credentialed clinician in an 

appropriate environment for the assessment to be considered valid.
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Part II. Motivation

grandiose sense of self-worth, pathological lying, cunning/manipulativeness, lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, callousness/lack of 

empathy, and failure to accept responsibility for one’s own actions. Factor 2 includes a history or current evidence of need for stimulation/

proneness to boredom, parasitic lifestyle, poor behavioral control, promiscuous sexual behavior, lack of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity, irresponsibility, juvenile delinquency, early behavior problems, and 

revocation of conditional release. Two additional traits not included 

in either of the factors are many short-term marital relationships and 

criminal versatility.19 The behavioral profile of the psychopath suggests 

a disposition wholly unsuitable for the stressors of the underground. 

Psychopaths are often unstable, unreliable, unconcerned with group 

objectives, and have difficulty maintaining goal-directed behavior. For 

these reasons, they often fail to meet the selection criteria (if existent) 

for the group or are employed as a component of the auxiliary when 

and where required.

These personality and behavioral disorders are also associated with 

ordinary criminality. There is reason to believe that typical insurgents 

are healthier than typical criminals. A 1986 study20 examined 106 persons charged with murder in Northern Ireland between 1974 and 1984 

who were referred for psychiatric assessment. Of the political murders 

(those affiliated with a political organization), only 16 percent met the 

clinical criteria for mental illness (compared with 58  percent of the 

nonpolitical murderers), 6  percent (compared with 34  percent) met 

the criteria for diminished capacity, and 13 percent (compared with 

64 percent) met the criteria for mitigation of sentence resulting from 

their mental state.e,21 The study illustrates the prevailing characteristics of murderers in general: they are predominantly male, they are 

usually in their 20s to 30s, and approximately one-third to one-half 

have prior criminal records.22 The finding most pertinent in studying 

insurgencies, however, was the relative stability of the political murderers as compared with nonpolitical murderers. The political murderers 

were also far less likely to be intoxicated (or under the influence of 

narcotics) at the time of the offense or to have prior criminal records. 

e Criteria for a ruling of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) vary between and 

within nations. However, some of those criteria include both loss of control and impaired 

reasoning and thus meet the criteria for both insanity (his or her free will is undermined 

by a mental illness and is thus exonerated) and diminished capacity (his or her free will 

is affected, but not completely undermined, but he or she nevertheless acts with less than 

usual moral blameworthiness). The M’Naghten test requires an actor to be ignorant of the 

nature and quality of an act and/or must not know that the act is legally or morally wrong. 

The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute (ALI) test incorporates both the 

cognitive element of M’Naghten and the volitional element of the irresistible impulse test 

and requires the lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness 

of one’s conduct or to control one’s impulses.
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

189

The Lyons and Harbinson study is one of the few examples in the literature of a direct comparison between those who commit violence with a 

political goal (e.g., consistent with the objectives of an insurgent group) 

and those who simply commit a violent act.

SUICIDALITY AND SUICIDE BOMBERS

The phenomenon of suicide attacks also naturally leads to questions about mental health. Are suicide attackers similar to people who 

commit suicide for other reasons? Are there other personality characteristics or pathologies associated with this phenomenon?

Suicide attacks are among the more historically, socially, and psychologically compelling tactics used in support of a political objective. 

The willingness to consciously act in a manner that will logically lead to 

one’s death is considered individually illogical and operationally unexpected. Accounts of such heroism from Thermopylae to Bastogne to 

Khe Sahn have provided validity to cohesion narratives within many 

cultures. That same romanticism has been employed by modern nonstate actors to vindicate the few who stood against the many or liberate 

the oppressed. While the admiration for such individuals (regardless 

of one’s agreement with their political or moral ideals) is well deserved, 

the underlying motivation of the behavior remains somewhat of a mystery. Analogous to clinical research on suicidality, access to the actor 

is prohibited by the act itself and thus theories require extrapolation 

from the antecedent data. The resultant behavior has proven difficult 

to deter tactically and contend with politically. Suicide attacks have 

been a hallmark of a number of modern groups including Hizbollah in 

Lebanon, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, 

the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and Al  Qaeda. The Irish Republican Army’s use of hunger strikes also resulted in a form of suicide,f

although the underlying psychology and selection process may have 

been different.

No fewer than four motives for martyrdom (the suffering of death 

on account of adherence to a cause and especially to one’s religious 

faith) have been postulated: the self-punitive or suicidal motive, the 

aggressive or homicidal motive, the altruistic or political motive, and 

f The question as to the morality of a hunger strike is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, this was a divisive issue among Christian theologians during The Troubles. 

Catholic priests in Northern Ireland considered the hunger strike an act of resistance and 

thus if an individual carried the hunger strike to its logical conclusion, then that individual would be afforded all rights and privileges of a Catholic burial. However, Protestant 

leaders in Northern Ireland and Catholic leaders in England postulated that a hunger 

strike was a suicidal act and thus a sin, therefore denying Catholic hunger strikers those 

rights.
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Part II. Motivation

the erotic or sexual motive.23 In Durkheim’s typology,g the altruistic 

suicide is characterized by consumption with, and subsequently being 

overwhelmed by, a group’s goals and ideology.24 This phenomenon 

occurs in organizations (and societies) with high integration, where 

individual needs are subordinated to that of the whole.25 Many religious cultures, political extremist groups, and military organizations 

hold those who sacrifice themselves for the common good in great reverence and thus this mechanism can be considered a perverse exploitation of the dead as an unimpeachable source of credibility.26 Culture 

cannot be divorced from the analysis of individual and group patterns 

of behavior; the cultural significance of self-immolative behavior as a 

means of addressing grievances was evident in the 1917 and 1920 (IRA) 

and 1981 (Provisional IRA [PIRA] and Irish National Liberation Army 

[INLA]) hunger strikes.27

Studying suicide terrorism is difficult for a number of reasons, 

including the danger surrounding contact with relevant groups and 

also the simple fact that successful suicide attackers are no longer available to question. One of the best available studies by Ariel Merari28

and his colleagues compared three groups of Palestinians imprisoned 

for involvement in terrorist activities. One group consisted of higherlevel organizers within their respective organizations. A second group 

consisted of individuals who had been involved in non-suicide attacks, 

and the third group consisted of “martyrs,” or suicide attackers, who 

were sent on missions but either experienced equipment failure or were 

caught before they could detonate their explosives. This analysis did 

find some differences between the groups. The would-be martyrs had 

lower levels of ego strength as well as a dependent and avoidant personality style, a profile that made them more amenable to group, leader, 

and public influence. Significantly more martyrs than the other control group members displayed symptoms of depression, and some of 

the would-be martyrs but none of the control group and organizers 

group members displayed subclinical (e.g., not meeting DSM criteria) 

suicidal tendencies. These findings may have more to do with how the 

Palestinian groups selected people for different assignments than the 

psychological makeup of people willing to die for a cause.

To be effective, the social construction of martyrdom must rule out 

the possibility of the martyr being afflicted by some kind of psychological disorder, as it would risk categorization as another of the four 

motivations. Rather, higher-status martyrs (those amongst the in-group 

g Durkheim proposed four subtypes of suicide: egoistic (reflecting a sense of social 

isolation resulting in apathy and depression, altruistic (being overwhelmed by an integrated in-group’s objectives), anomic (a moral confusion resulting from socioeconomic 

turmoil), and fatalistic (an over-controlled hyper-regulation).
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

191

with higher social, academic, or hierarchal standing) have more credibility with the masses and thus their sacrifice carries more weight. This 

seems to be the trend identified in studies of the selection process that 

the PIRA used to select those who would participate in the 1981 hunger strikes in the H-Block of Long Kesh (later called the Maze) prison. 

Hunger strikers had to volunteer and be approved by the PIRA military 

council, and most of those selected were highly regarded within the 

organization. Hunger strikers appear to have possessed a rather high 

level of dispositional resilience, thus enabling them to persevere through 

extraordinary physiological and psychological anguish while serving as 

a suitable example to engender ideological or financial support.

There is controversy over including hunger strikers in the same category as suicide bombers; however, both approaches require an individual to value a particular cause (or perhaps an otherworldly goal) over 

their own existence. While the literature suggests this commitment is 

unlikely to be the result of major psychopathology, there is still debate 

over whether those willing to engage in self-immolative behavior in the 

process of killing others and/or destroying property can be considered 

psychologically healthy.29

EMOTIONAL VULNERABILITY

The existence of some temporary emotional state that predisposes 

the individual to greater openness to the use of, or support for the 

use of, violence30 creates a window of opportunity or vulnerability. 

This could be brought on by any number of internal (cognitive and/

or personality predisposition) or external (death or injury of a loved 

one) stimuli.

The case of Timothy McVeigh illustrates the role of both vicarious 

victimization, in his identification with members of the Branch Davidians killed in Waco, Texas, in 1993, and emotional vulnerability, related 

to previous life experiences and failures. McVeigh was the perpetrator of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 

Oklahoma City, which was, at that time, the deadliest terrorist act on 

American soil. McVeigh was the middle child between two sisters and 

born into a middle-class Irish, Roman Catholic family in rural western 

New York. He possessed above-average intelligence, was by temperament an introvert, although not antisocial, and was considered personable. Despite his social skills, he was reluctant to trust others and did 

not form close relationships easily. His parents separated when he was 

eleven years old, causing him to repeatedly withdraw into fantasies 

about himself as a hero as a means of coping with the familial tension 

during his latency years. The dissolution of his parents’ relationship 
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Part II. Motivation

increased his interest in survivalism and firearms while also appearing to lower his motivation for academic achievement and severely 

dampening his interest in women. The crystallization of McVeigh’s personality in late adolescence focused on his conscious identification as 

the self-described “ultimate warrior.” This fantasy was inferred from 

numerous behaviors and personal predilections including his interest 

in (and proficiency with) weapons and survivalism, his enlistment and 

success in the U.S. Army (to include combat actions during Operation 

Desert Storm), and his political interest in defending Second Amendment rights. This narcissistic fantasy, although grandiose, was for a 

time supported by reality and compensated for other disappointments. 

The fantasy progressed undeterred until he returned from Kuwait and 

attended the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) Program 

in April 1991. McVeigh’s personal failure, however, and voluntary withdrawal from training was probably a humiliating and dysphoric (distressed/uneasy) experience. His subsequent behavior suggested this 

event was significant enough to contribute to his alienation from the 

U.S. government. He remained in his own mind the “ultimate warrior” 

in search of another war, socially adrift and exhibiting symptoms associated with mild depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 

although he was never diagnosed with or treated for either disorder. 

McVeigh found another war through the politics of the Patriot (or militia) movement, although he never officially joined any of the affiliated 

organizations. Instead, he formed a leaderless cell composed of himself, Terry Nichols, and Michael Fortier.

Consequent events in the United States, particularly the burning 

of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, on April 19, 1993, 

provided a rationale for his anger directed toward the government. He 

began operationalizing that anger approximately a year after Waco, 

when he began actively planning the Oklahoma City bombing. McVeigh 

used a variety of methods to maintain his pathologically narcissistic 

belief that his act of bombing was his destiny. First, he held an intense 

interest in The Turner Diaries,

h a fictional account of a race war in which 

a federal building is bombed, and an affinity with the novel’s protagonist. Second, he personally identified with American patriots such as 

Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Patrick Henry, as evidenced by 

his collection and dissemination of their writings. Finally, he selected 

h Considered the bible of the racist right by the Southern Poverty Law Center, The 

Turner Diaries is a 1978 novel written by William Luther Pierce (the former leader of the 

white nationalist organization National Alliance). The novel depicts a violent revolution in 

the United States that leads to the overthrow of the federal government, nuclear war, and, 

ultimately, to a race war leading to the genocide of all Jews and non-whites. In the novel, 

the protagonist, operating independently from any organization, destroys a federal building; the event serves as a catalyst for the race war.
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

193

April 19, 1995, as the date of the bombing to not only avenge the deaths 

at Waco in 1993, but also to commit what he saw as a revolutionary act 

on the birthday of the American Revolution, April 19, 1775, in Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. The meticulously crafted and tested 

ammonium-nitrate-and-diesel-fuel mixture bomb placed in the rear of 

a rental truck killed 168, injured nearly 700, and damaged more than 

300 buildings within a 16-block radius.

Understanding the emotional state of an individual at various 

points in the radicalization process is mostly useful after the fact; 

unfortunately, individual emotional states change too frequently and 

in response to too many different stimuli for them to be easily definable or have sufficient predictive validity.31 Absent direct access as well 

as psychometric and demographic data, it is not only difficult to determine the psychological state of an individual but it is also nearly impossible to develop appropriately idiosyncratic countermeasures.

YOUTH

Young males in their mid-teens to late 20s are the most likely to be 

recruited by or interested in joining a radical organization.32 Empirical data suggest the greater the concentration of activists between the 

ages of eighteen and twenty-five, the greater the risk for radicalization.33 This is a nonlinear statistical predictor and not a psychological 

predictor; although the adolescent personality is still developing and 

thus more susceptible to persuasion, one cannot necessarily say (for 

example) that, controlling for other variables, a 19-year-old male is 

more vulnerable to recruitment than a 24-year-old male. Census operations are among the most important information-gathering tasks in 

counter-radicalization operations. From Galula to Killcullen, practitioner-theorists have advocated that accurate census taking will facilitate 

better administration, security operations, and ultimately pacification. 

Propensity for risk taking is influenced by both life experiences and 

neurocognitive functions. Some factors contributing to increased risktaking propensity include younger age, lack of parental status, lower 

reproductive goals (e.g., lack of interest in sexual relationships with 

women), being the last-born, and lower subjective life expectancy. The 

tendency for risk taking is not necessarily a stable personality trait but 

rather varies by life-history traits and specific operational or occupational domains.34

In 2010, the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) published 

a report documenting thirty-two major terrorism cases in the United 

States from September 11, 2001 through 2010. The research sample in 

the report comprised predominately males between the ages of eighteen 
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Part II. Motivation

and thirty-three who explicitly support or follow radical Islamic ideology. Over half of the individuals were legal U.S. citizens at the time of 

their arrest, with 70 percent natural-born citizens. These individuals 

operated in small groups that often formed within a community where 

common attributes and beliefs were shared publicly.35

PERSONAL CONNECTION TO A GRIEVANCE 

(POLITICAL OR OTHERWISE)

Identification with victims (actual or vicarious)36 will predispose an 

individual to radicalization. The proximity and/or strength of connection of one individual to another who was victimized or perceived to be 

victimized by a political out-group will increase the likelihood for radicalization. Any political or military action will have unintended consequences, including individuals who suffer physically, psychologically, 

financially, or otherwise by a change in policy, a military operation, 

legislation, etc.

Shamil Baseyev’s Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage 

Battalion of Chechen Martyrs is often associated with employing 

female suicide operatives recruited from pools of women whose husbands were killed by Russian forces.37 These “Black Widows” are often 

described as being particularly vulnerable as a result of this personal 

tragedy. Superficially this appears to be an ideal exemplar of the personal grievance mechanism. Reality, however, is more complex. The 

degree to which these individuals willingly participated is debatable; 

Baseyev’s recruiters coerced some, others felt the social pressure of 

marginalization from an insulated culture of strict Islamic mores, and 

others may have been acting out of a sense of grief-induced hopelessness (along a depressive continuum).

VICARIOUS EXPERIENCE OF GRIEVANCE

The personal grievance need not be direct but can be experienced 

by proxy. This dynamic is particularly prevalent in modern recruitment 

strategies of radical Islamic groups, which emphasize victimization of 

Muslims at the hand of Westerners. Vicarious victimization can be 

experienced through self-study, media exposure, or accounts learned 

from members of the same social network. Al Qaeda’s narrative, from 

Osama bin Laden’s fatwas to Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s speeches and 

their propagation throughout the information environment, continues 

to call for devout Muslims to rise up and serve the greater umma through 

jihad. This struggle (says Al Qaeda’s distinctly Qutbist interpretation) 
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

195

should be aimed toward the apostate regimes throughout the Muslim 

world because they have been corrupted by the “seductive” West. The 

narrative implies that Western culture has victimized Muslim rulers 

who have in turn victimized Muslims. The appropriate response to this 

dual victimization is to support Al Qaeda’s efforts to rectify this situation. The individuals with no direct contact to Al Qaeda leadership 

or even operatives (sometimes referred to as self-radicalized or superempowered) become adherents to the narratives of violent extremists 

and radicalized to the point of contemplating terrorist acts. There are 

several variants of these grievances, including grievances against governments, a hatred for the perceived erosion of fundamental values, 

disaffection from society, anger over unequal economic opportunities, 

the desire to belong to something larger than self, and a desire to make 

a name and prove oneself.

The phenomenon of vicarious victimization is becoming increasingly prevalent in Muslims residing in the United Kingdom. The Report 

of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on July 7, 2005, cited 

that international conflict involving Muslims was widely interpreted as 

widespread war against Islam, that leaders of the Muslim world were 

perceived as corrupt and non-Islamic, and that some U.K. policies were 

viewed as evidence of a persecuted Islam. Despite the variation in socioeconomic status among the relatively small sample, the report identified 

that the U.K. Muslim population had internalized the issues affecting 

Muslims globally and often used the first person plural to refer to Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, and/or Afghanistan. This justification included 

the idea that violence was a demonstration of commitment to Islam 

and that suicide terrorism (including the praise and admiration for 

martyrs) was a noble undertaking. Jihad is interpreted as a way of life 

or a permanent and individual obligation on all Muslims.38

Vicarious grievances are most effective when supported by ideological frameworks articulating perceived problems, a vision of the future, 

and a prescription for action. Cases of individual radicalization to 

political violence (when the individual acts alone rather than as part 

of a group) are relatively rare.39 In such cases, the individual is likely 

to have some association with a larger intellectual community or social 

movement.40

HUMILIATION

Humiliation and the consequent internal pressure for revenge is 

a psychological factor that has been suggested to predispose one to 

violent behavior.41 The experiences of grief, either personally or vicariously, are often accompanied by strong feelings of humiliation, which 
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Part II. Motivation

present a dangerous risk factor for radicalization. The greater the 

degree to which the radical group is subjected to physical repression or 

torture, or perceives itself to be humiliated by its enemies, the greater 

the risk that they will take revenge through political violence.42 Intentionally or unintentionally robbing an individual of his or her inherent dignity provides not only a logical rationalization for radicalization 

but also a sociocultural motivation to defend the inherent dignity of 

all those within the in-group. Revenge is an emotion that is probably 

deeply rooted in the adaptive instinct to punish transgressors who violate the contracts of social species; hence, it is a motivator that often 

serves not only the goals of a vengeful individual but also the goals 

of the group.43 Revenge is not always considered an antisocial behavior and can be considered normal and potentially useful in certain 

contexts. The humiliation and traumatization of political opponents 

can create an environment that stimulates regression to more violent 

behavior, thereby aggravating a conflict or escalating the level of violence. Political, ideological, and/or religious narratives may mediate 

between the collective identity and personal misery from humiliation, 

but they may also reinforce a victimization identity that contributes to 

increased potential for violent behavior.44 The concept that feelings of 

humiliation or exploitation give rise to a passion for revenge is prevalent in forensic psychiatry and criminology, and it has been suggested 

that it may contribute to nonpolitical murders.45

Richard Nisbett has described what he calls “cultures of honor,”46

which are cultures where there is a perceived imperative to preserve 

honor by avenging even minor slights. Particularly for males, failing to 

retaliate for an insult, attack, or property encroachment can be seen as 

a serious threat to the individual’s honor and reputation. Examples of 

these cultures exist all across the world, including parts of the American South and the Middle East. (Nisbett speculates that these cultures 

developed from the unique vulnerabilities of herdsmen, who possess 

property that is difficult to defend because of its topography and who 

need to maintain a reputation of toughness and retaliation.) Not surprisingly, such cultures are vulnerable to high homicide rates, cycles of 

retaliation, and longstanding feuds. In such cultures, humiliation can 

be a cumulative pervasive internalization (often spanning generations) 

that becomes so ingrained that it becomes the definitive trait of an individual.47 This theory, in the context of political violence, may manifest 

as the logical reaction to a personal or political grievance or a misapplication of the law of social substitutability. This anthropological concept holds that the killing of any member of the in-group is considered 

a group offense and can be avenged by the killing of any member of 

the offender’s out-group.48 This law may be perverted or manipulated 

by individuals to rationalize terrorist behavior. For example, members 
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

197

of the Abu Nidal Organization justified the skyjacking and execution 

of hostages on an El Al  airline on the grounds that Israel required 

compulsory military service. The individuals were therefore members 

of the military and thus justifiable targets.49 This rationalization has 

been further extrapolated by Al Qaeda and its affiliated networks to 

include American citizens who, as taxpayers, support the U.S. government’s oppressive and exploitative policies.

MECHANISMS

It is radical behavior, not simply beliefs and/or feelings that is of 

greatest practical concern when analyzing psychological risk factors 

of a prospective insurgent. However, the underlying susceptibility, vulnerability, and concomitant feelings of an individual throughout the 

process do help develop a potential set of observable behaviors and/or 

conditions. It is important to note that the adoption of radical beliefs 

alone does not necessarily mean an individual will become violent; the 

transition from activist to violent radical is not inevitable. In addition, 

an individual need not personally suffer a transgression to seek out 

radicalization opportunities. Any individual with a degree of empathy, 

sufficient emotional vulnerability, and the opportunity to access informative materials (of which there is no short supply on the Internet) 

could potentially succumb to this mechanism. However, there may be 

underlying factors that predispose one to vulnerability, but those factors have not been studied with sufficient rigor to have generated a set 

of empirically determined criteria for susceptibility to radicalization. 

The risk factors and mechanism presented in this and the subsequent 

chapter discuss how and the reasons why an individual chooses to participate in violent radical behavior. Some become radicalized because 

of a personal or political grievance whereas others do so because of 

social or environmental pressure. These mechanisms, while not deterministically predictive, do have value in interpreting the behavior of 

individuals when direct assessments are impractical. An example of the 

application is included in Table 7-1, where the mechanisms discussed 

in this and the next chapter are applied to the Zawahiri case study 

included in Chapter 4.
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Part II. Motivation

Table 7-1. Radicalization mechanisms and their relevance to the 

Zawahiri case study.

Mechanism50 Relevance to Zawahiri

Radicalization due to personal 

grievance: Harm to self or 

loved ones can move individuals to hostility and violence 

toward perpetrators.

High: Zawahiri’s close relationship with his 

maternal uncle (Sayyid Qutb’s attorney)

Radicalization under threat: 

Threat or harm to a group 

or cause the individual cares 

about can move the individual to hostility and violence 

toward perpetrators.

Medium: Generalized predisposition to 

perceived threat indicative of intolerance 

of uncertainty (manifested both individually as well as generally on behalf of Egyptian Islamists toward the secular regimes 

of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and 

Hosni Mubarak)

Small involvements in political 

conflict can create new forces 

that can move an individual 

toward radicalization.

High: Early days (1966) as a clandestine cell 

leader within Muslim Brotherhood faction 

provided sense of political identity

Radicalization through social 

networks: Love for someone already radicalized can 

move an individual toward 

radicalization.

Low: Zawahiri’s radicalization resulted 

more from his admiration for the idealized, martyred Qutb than the social network argument put forth by Sageman and 

McCauley and Moskalenko

Radicalization by disposition: 

The attractions of risk taking 

and status can move individuals, especially young males, to 

radical political action.

Low: Zawahiri did not exhibit novelty- or 

sensation-seeking behaviors in childhood, 

adolescence, or adulthood; in fact, he 

tended to be more “bookish” than athletic 

or adventurous

Radicalization through isolation: Loss of social connection can open an individual 

to new ideas and new identity 

that may include political 

radicalization.

Medium: This is more of a perception 

emanating from an introversive tendency 

as both maternal and paternal sides of his 

family were well connected socially, academically, and politically

Discussion among likeminded individuals tends to 

move the whole group further in the direction initially 

favored.

High: Particularly so during the internment period subsequent to the Sadat 

assassination

Radicalization in competition for the same base of support: Groups are radicalized 

in competition with other 

groups.

High: Particularly so when comparing the 

Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic 

Group (EIG), and EIJ (although more so 

EIG-EIJ) from the late 1970s through the 

1990s
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

199

Mechanism50 Relevance to Zawahiri

Radicalization through condensation or splitting: The 

power of group dynamics is 

multiplied to the extent that 

group members are cut off 

from other groups.

High: Particularly during the period immediately after internment when Zawahiri and 

many EIJ leaders “escaped” to Peshawar and 

linked up with Abdullah Azzam and Osama 

bin Laden

Radicalization through jujitsu 

politics: Terrorists often count 

on government reactions to 

advance their causes.

Medium: This seems to have been a consideration in the Embassy operations; however, 

Al Qaeda’s organizational reasoning was 

biased by the 1993 incident in Mogadishu 

and thus it miscalculated the U.S. response 

to 9/11

Radicalization through hate: 

In protracted conflicts, the 

enemy is increasingly seen as 

less than human.

High: Particularly so when analyzing 

the content of Zawahiri’s speeches/press 

releases; his abrasive negativism has become 

more pronounced

Radicalization through martyrdom: A successfully constructed martyr can radicalize 

sympathizers for the martyr’s 

causes.

Medium: The salience of Qutb’s martyrdom 

remains with Zawahiri; however, he has 

demonstrated lack of empathy in considering the human effect (e.g., surviving family 

members, innocents, etc.) of martyrdom 

operations instead focusing on the enemy—

bin Laden on the other hand, seems to have 

displayed more empathetic reactions toward 

the families of both suicide operatives and 

those killed in combat against the Soviets

SUMMARY

Acts of terrorism, while they are often bloody and irrational to outside observers, are nevertheless not usually perpetrated by individuals with severe, diagnosable psychological disorders. As elaborated in 

other chapters, most insurgents are indistinguishable from other members of their societies but have gone through a social and ideological 

process of radicalization and desensitization to violence. A study comparing individuals guilty of politically motivated murder (IRA members or opponents) to other murderers found the politically motivated 

set to have much lower rates of psychological problems.51

Radical organizations likely have a sufficient range of personality 

and cognitive profiles within their ranks to be indistinguishable from 

the surrounding population on either of these axes. Having said this, 

there are a number of negative psychological risk factors that are contributors to violent radicalization and should be understood as such.
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Part II. Motivation

Most functioning insurgencies effectively screen out potential 

members who are dangerously mentally ill, having diagnosable Axis I 

disorders such as major depression or schizophrenia. These people, 

untreated, have great difficulty working with others and present both 

social and operational risks. There is a phenomenon of lone wolf terrorists, however, who may be quite sick but nevertheless be capable of 

feats of individual mayhem, with Anders Behring Breivik being a notable recent example.

Axis II developmental or personality disorders are subtler and may 

be more common among violent insurgents. Antisocial personality disorder, or APD, is characterized by a lack of empathy, absence of moral 

constraints, and the consideration of violence as a legitimate tool to 

accomplish a goal; individuals with this pathology may find a place in 

insurgent movements and may even be effective leaders in the right 

circumstances.

Suicide bombers in general have a different motivational profile 

than other suicide victims and may be manipulated to act even though 

they have no wish to die. However, a study of failed suicide bombers 

shows that they do in fact have more characteristics of depression 

and suicidality than other members of the same organizations.52 It is 

unclear whether they were self-selected for suicide assignments because 

of this, whether they were selected by others, or whether there are other 

common causes.

Emotional vulnerability, brought about by internal or external circumstances, is a risk factor for both recruitment and radicalization into 

violent groups. Youth is a risk factor that interacts with others and is 

often exploited.

Personal connections to grievances such as government-sponsored 

atrocities is an important circumstantial risk factor. Counterinsurgent 

actions can sometimes be turned into effective recruitment tools for 

the opposition. The vicarious experience of grievances through social 

connections or media can also be quite powerful. Ethnic and religious 

extremists groups use video and other accounts of atrocities committed against their members very effectively, with Al Qaeda being a 

prime example. The experience of humiliation in various forms is also 

a potent risk factor; humiliation can be experienced either as an individual or as a member of an aggrieved in-group. These vulnerabilities 

are hard to detect a priori in individuals, but an understanding of them 

as risk factors is important for understanding insurgent recruitment, 

indoctrination, and other social dynamics of these movements.
Chapter 7. Psychological Risk Factors

201

ENDNOTES

1 Chuck Crossett and Jason Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological 

Concepts (Ft. Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2010).

2 Ibid.

3 Marc Sageman, Understanding Al Qaeda and the New Terror Networks (speech given at the 

Foreign Policy Research Center, October 4, 2010), accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.fpri.

org/multimedia/20101004.sageman.terrorism.html.

4 Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda

(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007).

5 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th 

Ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000).

6 Ibid.

7 Clark R. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: 

Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.

8 Jeffrey Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological 

Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42.

9 H. H. A. Cooper, “Psychopath as Terrorist,” Legal Medical Quarterly 2 (1978): 253–262.

10 Jordan Maile, Tali. K. Walters, J. Martin Ramirez, and Daniel Antonius, “Aggression 

in Terrorism,” in Interdisciplinary Analyses of Terrorism and Political Aggression, ed. Daniel 

Antonius et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010).

11 Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist,” 3–42.

12 Nancy McWilliams, Psychoanalytic Diagnosis, 2nd Ed. (New York: The Guilford Press, 

2011).

13 Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New 

York: Guilford Publications Inc., 1993).

14 Willem H. J. Martens, “The Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder,” Journal of 

Forensic Psychology Practice 4, no. 1 (2004): 45–56.

15 Ibid.

16 Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 1: An 

Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 73–100.

17 Ibid.

18 Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 2: 

Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group 

Type,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 101–126.

19 Hare, Without Conscience.

20 H. A. Lyons and H. J. Harbinson, “A Comparison of Political and Non-Political Murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974–84,” Medicine, Science, and Law 26, no. 3 (1986): 193–197.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 J. Reid Meloy, “Indirect Personality Assessment of the Violent True Believer,” Journal of 

Personality Assessment 82, no. 2 (2004): 138–146.

24 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: Study in Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1997).

25 Ibid.

26 Rona M. Fields, Martyrdom: The Psychology, Theology, and Politics of Self-Sacrifice (New York: 

Praeger, 2004).

27 James Dingley and Marcello Mollica, “The Human Body as a Terrorist Weapon: Hunger 

Strikes and Suicide Bombers,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 6 (2007): 459–492.
202

Part II. Motivation

28 Ariel Merari, Ilan Diamant, Arie Bibi, Yoav Broshi, and Giora Zakin, “Personality Characteristics of ‘Self Martyrs’/‘Suicide Bombers’ and Organizers of Suicide Attacks,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 1 (2009): 87–101.

29 Ariel Merari, “Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism,” in Psychology of Terrorism, eds. 

Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. 

Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

30 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and 

Extremist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2009).

31 Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization.

32 Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,” European Journal of Criminology 5, no. 1 (2008): 99–125.

33 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “Radical Group in Context 1,” 73–100.

34 X. T. Wang, Daniel J. Kruger, and Andreas Wilke, “Life History Variables and Risk-Taking Propensity,” Evolutionary Human Behavior 30, no. 2 (2009): 77–84.

35 New York State Intelligence Center, The Vigilance Project: An Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases 

Against the Homeland (2010).

36 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism.

37 Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting 

Violent Non-state Actors (New York: Lexington Books, 2005), 157.

38 Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization.

39 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).

40 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization.”

41 Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization.

42 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “Radical Group in Context 1,” 73–100.

43 Jeff Victoroff and Arie Kruglanski, Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights

(Washington, DC: Psychology Press, 2009).

44 Sverre Varvin, “Humiliation and the Victim Identity in Conditions of Political and Violent Conflict,” Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review 28, no. 1 (2005): 40–49.

45 Victoroff and Kruglanski, Psychology of Terrorism.

46 Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

47 Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism (Boston: 

Oxford University Press, 2010).

48 Joyce Marcus, “The Archaeological Evidence for Social Evolution,” Annual Review of 

Anthropology 37 (2008): 252–266.

49 Post, Mind of the Terrorist.

50 Clark R. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them 

and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

51 Lyons and Harbinson, “Comparison of Political and Non-Political Murderers,” 193–197.

52 Merari, Driven to Death.
PART III.

UNDERGROUND PSYCHOLOGICAL 

OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 8.

INSURGENT USE OF MEDIA: TRADITIONAL, 

BROADCAST, AND INTERNET
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Importance of Media to Insurgencies ...................................................208

Traditional Media ...................................................................................209

Global Broadcast Media ......................................................................... 211

Media Dilemmas and Responses........................................................ 216

Insurgent-Owned Broadcast Media ...................................................218

Insurgent Use of the Internet.................................................................219

Properties of the Internet...................................................................220

Uses of the Internet ............................................................................220

Summary ................................................................................................228
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

207

Nathan Bos

The Zapatista rebellion of 1994 was, from the perspective of the 

Mexican government, no different from many small-scale uprisings of 

indigenous groups, and there was no reason to expect the same counter-tactics would not work as they had in the past. Frustrated by lack 

of response to their demands for land reform, and threatened by new 

privatization of communal lands, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 

Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN) planned a 

coordinated action to commence on January  1,  1994. That date was 

chosen because it was also the date that the North American Free 

Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would take effect, which the EZLN considered a threat to local farmers. On January 1, as planned, 1,000–2,000 

militants swept down from the hills and took over five villages and 

one city, San Cristóbal de las Casas, a city of approximately 100,000 

in the remote southernmost province of Chiapas, Mexico. The Mexican government responded with a two-pronged approach that, at first, 

appeared to be going exactly as planned. The military arrived and 

within two weeks drove the EZLN out of the occupied towns and villages and back into the hills. The federal government, meanwhile, used 

the state-controlled media to contain the rebellion and quell possible 

support from other regions by limiting news coverage. Media control 

allowed the government to downplay the size of the rebellion and give 

their own narrative of events, which framed the rebellion as an externally connected threat to Mexican sovereignty, “conjuring the threat of 

a pan-Mayan movement embracing both Southern Mexico and much 

of Central America.”1

However, events around the Zapatista rebellion quickly deviated 

from the expected script. Far from being contained in Chiapas, the 

previously unknown Zapatistas soon became the subject of discussion 

on five continents and benefitted from an unprecedented nongovernmental organization (NGO) mobilization and advocacy campaign. 

Both sides accepted a cease-fire, and the combat continued in another 

venue. As the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations Jose Angel Gurria later said: “Chiapas, please take note, is a place where there has not 

been a shot fired in the last 15 months. . . . The shots lasted 10 days, 

and ever since the war has been a war of ink, of written word, a war on 

the Internet.”2

 For the EZLN, neither the military tactics nor the basic 

land disputes had changed from prior conflicts. What had changed was 

their ability to bypass the state-controlled media using the Internet, 

along with the ability of NGOs and individuals to help groups organize 

quickly across distance, also using the Internet. As will be described 

later in this chapter, the social networking capabilities of the Internet 

had made possible what Cleaver dubbed “the Zapatista effect.”3
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IMPORTANCE OF MEDIA TO INSURGENCIES

Media exposure is critical to insurgencies of all types. Insurgencies know that they cannot win isolated force-on-force contests against 

larger, more established forces. Contact with and support from noncombatants is a part of every insurgency, and this has been true since 

long before the advent of mass media and the Internet. What also has 

not changed are the set of audiences important to insurgents (below). 

There has, however, been a sea change brought about by technology as 

to the means, effectiveness, and reach of communication.

Every insurgency group needs to communicate with the following 

groups to a greater or lesser extent:

• Internal supporters. Insurgencies need to communicate internally; 

when the insurgency is large or spread out, or when direct 

communication is denied, media channels become a means for 

coordinating action, spreading news that may be suppressed by 

official channels, clarifying and reinforcing ideology, providing 

encouragement, and sending antidefection messages. This is 

sometimes referred to as “auto propaganda.”4

 Internal supporters 

are sometimes referred to as the auxiliary.

• External supporters. Insurgencies rely on networks of sympathizers, 

ranging from local residents, whose main contribution may 

be forgetting what they have seen when questioned by police, 

to international sympathizers, who may provide money, relay 

messages, or advocate to foreign governments. This group is on a 

continuum from support to apathy and may also become hostile. 

Timely and frequent communication from insurgents is often 

critical to maintaining the disposition of supporters. Different 

messages and different media are required to reach external 

supporters than are required to reach internal supporters.

• Nonsympathetic supporters. Terrorist groups, in particular, also 

design communications for external audiences that may never 

support their cause yet play a role in its success. These audiences 

are the target of influence to include intimidation and terror; but 

affecting them in any way may show strength, increase publicity 

(good or bad), and keep the neutral media interested.

• The enemy. External communications may also be designed 

to demoralize, intimidate, or mislead enemy combatants. 

Communicating directly with the families of enemy combatants, 

where possible, may be a particularly effective means of sapping 

an enemy’s will to fight.
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

209

TRADITIONAL MEDIA

Handbillsa and newspapers have been important tools for undergrounds for centuries, and they remain so, even as new media augment 

them. The two have different purposes: handbills are used for short, 

often time-dependent and highly localized events; newspaper are aimed 

at somewhat broader constituencies and deal with broader issues.

The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front or FMLN) of El Salvador were 

known for having a very-well-organized media arm. They used both 

handbills and newspapers and a well-articulated communication strategy 

laid out in a document called Concerning Propaganda, which was analyzed 

in a RAND study called Underground Voices.

5

 For leaflets, they produced 

posters and pamphlets on a geographically dispersed network of mimeograph machines (pre-photocopying duplication machines). This 

allowed faster dissemination and a more resilient production capacity. 

Local producers were also expected tailor information to local needs.

The ability to distribute handbills can itself be a signal of strength 

for an insurgency group. Harakat al-Muqawamah al-’Islamiyyah’s 

(Islamic Resistance Movement, or HAMAS) distribution of handbills 

starting in 1988 was one of the first public signs of its challenge to the 

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)’s leadership in the area. 

Handbills are an important means of communication in the occupied 

territories and are often used to organize strikes and demonstrations.6

Hand delivery of handbills and newsletters seems to be a key to 

their effectiveness. In the Philippines, Malaya, and Korea, handbills 

were passed surreptitiously from person to person by hand or by chain 

letter. Giving a handbill thus implied a proof of confidence, an honor, 

and a privilege. It was reported that people saw, read, and remembered 

more of the handbills handed to them personally than those received 

by mass distribution. In an experiment conducted in six Korean villages, pro-government leaflets were dropped by air and Communist 

propaganda was circulated personally. It was found that the villagers 

had a more accurate memory of the wording of the Communist leaflets 

than of the government messages.7

 The FMLN also organized an unusual letter-writing campaign 

aimed at the military. Supporters were asked to write letters to soldiers 

they knew encouraging them to desert. Supporters were even asked 

to write to commanders they did not know “with names and grades 

in respectful tones calling on them to reflect about the situation.”8

a In the lexicon of Military Information Support Operations (PSYOP), small printed 

bills delivered by air are called leaflets, and those distributed on the ground are called 

handbills.
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This tactic assumed a semipermissive environment where such contact 

would not lead to retribution.

Most undergrounds produce newsletters, and most also produce 

multiple newsletters for different audiences or representing different 

factions. FMLN published a newspaper called Venceremos. The content 

indicates that it was not intended for their broader audience of sympathizers but rather intended to guide the political actions of the FMLN 

underground auxiliary and armed component, which their communications plan referred to as their “middle sectors” and “special sectors.” Reaching beyond their borders, FMLN distributed different print 

materials worldwide, with titles including “Why is FMLN fighting?” and 

“Women and war in El Salvador.” They also employed an American public relations firm to arrange press conferences and issue press releases.9

For the Bolsheviks, newsletters also served a training purpose. 

Members of the organization were able to practice gathering and distributing information; they also learned to estimate the effects of political events on various sections of the population and to devise suitable 

methods to influence these events through the revolutionary party. In 

Lenin’s words: “Arranging for and organizing the speedy and proper 

delivery of literature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., training a network of 

agents for this purpose, means performing the greater part of the work 

of preparing for future demonstrations or an uprising.”10

If control measures are strict, various disguises for handbills and 

newsletters can be used. The Viet Cong sometimes used the government’s own materials to disguise their propaganda. In a number of 

villages, security forces found Viet Cong propaganda booklets with the 

same covers as government booklets.11 During World War II, the Belgian 

underground also used a variety of disguises for their propaganda.12

One method of disguising the transmission of propaganda materials into a target country is through the diplomatic channels of embassies 

friendly to the underground cause. In October 1962, the Chilean government intercepted a crate that had been shipped by the Cuban government to its embassy in Santiago. The 1,800-pound crate was labeled 

“samples of Cuban products and cultural and commercial material” 

but actually contained subversive propaganda addressed to various 

Chileans who had visited Cuba within the previous few months.13 The 

Internet, electronic storage media, faxes, and cell phones have made 

the basic task of distributing content—even content intended for printing and distribution—much simpler.

Even when using traditional media, production quality matters. 

Insurgents must not only produce and distribute their propaganda, but 

they must compete for attention and interest with private newspapers 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

211

as well as government counter-messages. As stated in the FMLN’s “Concerning Propaganda” document:

We must keep in mind that the highest quality propaganda is necessary to carry forward the expansion of 

political work into new and more densely populated 

zones, to establish contact with the urban and suburban masses having a more sophisticated political and 

cultural level. It is a mistake to content oneself with 

mediocre propaganda simply because resources are 

limited. We must make its quality superior as well as 

appropriate to its place. We must make it attractive, 

accompanying it when possible with well made and 

expressive graphics, with clear and precise texts, with 

sharp and visible titles, with clean and attractive print.14

GLOBAL BROADCAST MEDIA

Technological changes in broadcast media have been changing 

the game for insurgency groups for at least a century, with particularly dramatic changes around the development of satellite television 

in the 1980s. By broadcast media, we mean radio and television in the 

pre-Internet era. (In the Internet era, “streaming” media has brought 

about another revolution, which will be discussed later.) The defining 

characteristics of broadcast media for insurgents are as follows:

• Broadcast media provide more immediate access to larger 

audiences than traditional media. Audiences can be illiterate or 

unwilling to invest time in reading written material.

• Broadcast media are more entertaining to many and thus 

provide new ways of capturing the attention of audiences. 

However, providing broadcast media comes at a cost of requiring 

insurgencies to provide information at different rates and in 

different formats and also requiring insurgencies to increase 

their production values in order to compete with other media 

outlets.

• Broadcast media require expensive and vulnerable infrastructure 

in the form of production studios and broadcast towers; 

maintaining and protecting these may require a significant 

allocation of resources.

• Broadcast media are more difficult to tailor to individual tastes 

or localized concerns than other forms of communication.

The rise of international broadcast media did not just change the 

way insurgent groups publicized themselves; it changed their targets, 
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their methods, and their goals as well. The Irgun, a small terrorist offshoot of the Haganah paramilitary organization that was part of the 

Zionist movement to create a Jewish homeland, was one of the first to 

recognize and exploit the opportunities international broadcast media 

provided.15 Irgun had a cause that could only succeed through international exposure. The key audiences were the British government, 

which occupied Palestine and could designate a Jewish homeland, and 

the United States, with a strong pro-Jewish lobby and the international 

clout to pressure Great Britain and the United Nations to support such 

an action. Led by Menachem Begin (later the prime minister of Israel 

who signed the Camp David Accords), Irgun undertook a series of 

bombings against high-profile symbolic targets in Palestine. Immigration offices were targeted because they limited the number of Jews who 

could emigrate. One of the largest attacks was a bombing that killed 

ninety-one people at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which housed 

the British secretariat. These targets were chosen partly to undermine 

the confidence local Palestinians had that Britain could control the 

country. But the more important audiences were overseas. The most 

successful attack they undertook was one of the smallest but most effective because of the gruesome, symbolic images that accompanied it. 

The event was the public hanging of two British sergeants in retaliation 

for the execution of three Irgun terrorists.

“Photographs of the grim death scene—depicting the two corpses 

just inches above the ground, the sergeants’ hooded faces and bloodied shirts—were emblazoned across the front pages of British newspapers. . . . For both the British and the press, the murders seemed to 

demonstrate the futility of the situations in Palestine and the pointlessness of remaining there any longer than was absolutely necessary.”16

The new state of Israel quickly became the target of a “terrorist 

spectacular” attack when eleven members of Israel’s Olympic team 

were kidnapped, held for two days, and killed by the Palestinian Organization “Black September” at the Munich Olympics in 1972. The international attention garnered by the operation far exceeded the scope or 

lethality of the action itself. As a media event, it was well chosen first 

because of the proximity of broadcast media set up to cover the Olympics and second because of the attention already focused on the event. 

According to one of the organizers, the target was also chosen for its 

symbolic value:

We recognized that sport is the modern religion of the 

Western world. We knew that the people in England 

and America would switch their television sets from 

any program about the plight of the Palestinians if 

there was a sporting event on another channel. So we 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

213

decided to use their Olympics, the most sacred ceremony of this religion, to make the world pay attention 

to us. We offered up human sacrifices to your gods of 

sport and television. And they answered our prayers. 

From Munich onwards, nobody could ignore the Palestinians or their cause.17

The Black September attack did not, in fact, realize its tactical goal, 

which was to arrange for a prisoner swap with Israel. It was also widely 

criticized, and it discredited the Palestinian cause in the eyes of some 

potential sympathizers. But it nevertheless set an example for capturing and holding international attention. In the words of Abu Iyad, the 

organization’s intelligence chief at the time, the operation “didn’t bring 

about the liberation of any of their comrades imprisoned in Israel as 

they had hoped, but they did attain the operation’s other two objectives: world opinion was forced to take note of the Palestinian drama, 

and the Palestinian people imposed their presence on an international 

gathering that had sought to exclude them.”18

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) did not embrace new media as 

readily as other groups. But the Long Kesh hunger strikes of 1981, which 

resulted in the deaths of Bobby Sands and nine other IRA protestors, 

does point out some features of media-savvy protests. Bobby Sands and 

nine other imprisoned IRA members went on a hunger strike to protest 

their loss of prisoner-of-war-type status within Long Kesh prison. Hunger strikes are by design drawn-out affairs compared with other forms 

of suicide, allowing time for media coverage to disseminate and public 

support to spread. Bobby Sands’s hunger strike lasted long enough for 

him to be elected to the British parliament during the strike. Hunger 

strikes also create a sense of building drama as strikers near death. 

IRA hunger strikers took water and salt, which drew out their deaths. 

These strikers also intentionally staggered the starts of their strikes, 

rather than beginning at once, to create a constant stream of news 

both when each began their strike and again as each died. Although it 

did receive international coverage, Bobby Sands’s hunger strike did not 

reach the same level of media coverage achieved by some contemporaneous events partly because the British could and did control media 

access to the prison. It was impossible for international television to 

show daily updates on his emaciated condition on television or for print 

media to obtain daily photos. (Today it is much easier to find emaciated images from Mahatma Gandhi’s hunger strikes in India decades 

earlier than images of Bobby Sands or the other nine who died in Great 

Britain in 1981.) The results of the hunger strikes were a partial success for each side. The IRA received some concessions on prison conditions and, more importantly, galvanized support around the martyred 
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Bobby Sands. Margaret Thatcher’s government demonstrated resolve 

by allowing ten strikers to die first and in the end made only partial 

concessions.

According to Hoffman,19 the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 

June 1985 and subsequent hostage taking represented a low point in 

the media’s unwitting complicity with attention-seeking terror groups. 

Hizbollah gunmen hijacked the flight on June 14 with the purpose of 

exchanging hostages for a group of associates imprisoned in Israel. The 

hijacked flight originated in Egypt and was carrying 153 passengers en 

route from Athens to Rome. The plane was hijacked by two Germanspeaking Lebanese men and diverted to Beirut. Over the next several 

days, the hijackers took the plane back and forth between Algiers and 

Beirut, releasing non-American passengers along the way and killing 

one American Navy diver. On Monday, June 17, forty American hostages were taken from the plane and held hostage in the divided, militia-controlled city of Beirut until they were released on June 30. Israel 

subsequently released 766 Shia prisoners, most likely as part of a multinational deal to secure release of the hostages.

The crisis was the subject of constant attention by the three major 

U.S. television networks. “During the 17 day crisis, while Americans 

were held hostage in Beirut, nearly 500 news segments—an average 

of 28.8 per day—were broadcast by the 3 major U.S. television networks . . . on average, two thirds of their daily early evening ‘flagship’ 

news shows (fourteen out of twenty-one minutes) focused on the hostage story, and their regularly scheduled programs were interrupted 

at least eighty times over those 17 days with special reports or news 

bulletins.”20 Networks filled in for the lack of new developments and 

access to the hostages themselves with human interest stories on the 

hostage’s families, creating stronger emotional involvement on the part 

of viewers. The presence of multiple networks highly invested in the 

story created competition between them to be the first to find small 

updates or unpublicized tidbits of information. Even if one network 

wanted to downplay the crisis, competition for viewership would make 

it difficult to do so. The drawn-out nature of the crisis again lent itself 

to more media exposure than a single attack or simpler hostage-taking 

event might have.

Many critics have since questioned whether the media went too 

far in this crisis. Bias toward compelling visuals and human interest 

stories, or to use Garrick Utley’s phrase, “immediacy, exclusivity, and 

drama,” may have obscured the larger picture, and constant coverage 

may have inflated the importance of the events.21 Both would-be terrorists and news organizations have taken lessons from these events, as 

will be discussed.
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

215

An effect of the constant attention was to create great pressure on 

Ronald Reagan’s administration to go back on its policy against negotiating with terrorists. The immediacy and personal aspects of television 

tend to outcompete long-range goals and policies for public support 

and sympathy. The media’s effect may have been somewhat intentional: CBS White House correspondent Leslie Stahl said that “We are 

an instrument for the hostages . . . we force the Administration to put 

their lives above policy.”22

Insurgent groups aspiring to broadcast media coverage could distill 

from recent events these lessons for managing the media:

• Go where the coverage is. Broadcast media coverage is much easier 

to gain in urban areas, and the largest cities are the most media 

saturated. Insurgent groups realized that, despite the dangers, 

media coverage sometimes demanded leaving the countryside for 

the city. This has changed somewhat in the current era of selfcoverage.

• Guarantee access to the media. Savvy insurgent groups may go out 

of their way to develop relationships and guarantee access. The 

Chechen insurgents’ savvy in this regard has been documented by 

British journalist Anatol Lieven. Former insurgent leader Shamil 

Basayev was particularly proactive; he openly courted the media, 

frequently gave interviews from his command post or living 

quarters, and had correspondents as guests in his home; Lieven 

at one time was a guest in the home of Basayev’s aunt. Journalists 

need these relationship as well to gain access and guarantee their 

own safety; Basayev personally signed safe-passage documents 

for some correspondents, which were effective: “any suspicion 

(Chechen fighters) showed was instantly dispelled by a pass 

bearing Mr Basayev’s personal red stamp with its emblem of the 

lone wolf.”23 Media who are under the protection of an insurgent 

group may of course be guided to a particular view of events; they 

may also be vulnerable to some forms of intimidation.

• Images matter. A lesser event with compelling video or imagery 

may have a greater effect than a larger operation conducted 

away from cameras. Airplanes and skyscrapers are frequent 

targets partly because of their visual appeal and ability to stir 

emotions. Gabriel Weimann, who has written a series of books on 

the subject, writes that “Modern terrorism can be understood in 

terms of the production requirements of theatrical engagements. 

Terrorists pay attention to script preparation, cast selection, sets, 

props, role-playing, and minute-by-minute stage management. 

Just like compelling stage plays or ballet performances, the media 

orientation in terrorism requires full attention to detail to be 
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effective.”24 During the 2006 clash between Israel and Lebanon, a 

Lebanese man named Salem Daher was discovered to be carrying 

the body of a dead boy from one location to another, allegedly 

so that different camera crews would photograph it in different 

settings.25

• Sustain events over time. Broadcast media thrive on events that 

are drawn out over time. A hunger strike is better theater than a 

suicide; hostage taking can generate more publicity than an attack. 

The obvious drawback of these types of events is the vulnerability 

they create for the perpetrators. A prolonged, media-accessible 

event goes against insurgent doctrine of quick, unpredictable 

strikes. Nevertheless, in situations where insurgents can control 

territory or are willing to undertake high-risk operations, the 

benefits are clear.

• Follow news cycles and provide a constant trickle of news. Mediasavvy insurgent groups can also sustain attention by providing a 

steady stream of developments or new information rather than 

a single rush of information. This may be done by releasing 

hostages slowly or by providing frequent contact with insurgents 

or spokespersons. Insurgent groups may also be savvy enough to 

take into account differences in time zones for different audiences.

Media Dilemmas and Responses

Covering insurgency activities, particularly terrorism, presents a 

number of dilemmas for the broadcast media.26

• When should new developments prompt interruption of normal 

programming, e.g., “special bulletins”? This is less of an issue for 

all-news media such as CNN, but the issue of prioritizing coverage 

remains.

• What are risks and benefits of live coverage? How should reporters 

deal with the possibility of showing graphic violence? When 

should the rumors and inaccuracies that accompany breaking 

stories be corrected?

• When and how is the media responsible for preventing the spread 

of panic?

• What images and information should not be broadcast? How 

should the personal privacy of victims and bystanders be 

protected?

• How can correspondents avoid being publicists for terrorists or 

other parties? How much consideration (protection, special access) 

can correspondents accept from insurgents, the government, or 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

217

the police without becoming beholden to them?

• How accommodating should media be to government sources? 

Media often gives relatively unfiltered access to government and 

police to broadcast warnings and sometimes publicize “most 

wanted” information. What is the media’s responsibility to 

confirm these sources during time-critical events?

Some broadcast media leaders have responded to the criticism leveled at them. Some provide training and guidelines for their correspondents. BBC published an instruction document titled Terrorism and 

National Safety, which in its preamble states that the “basic role of BBC 

in reporting about a terrorist situation is – to tell the truth, fast, carefully, responsibly and avoiding speculation.”27

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a 

declaration called “Declaration on Freedom of expression and Information in the Media in the Context of the Fight Against Terrorism”28

that includes the following suggestions for the media regarding coverage of terrorism:

Bear in mind their particular responsibilities in the 

context of terrorism in order not to contribute to the 

aims of terrorists; they should, in particular, take care 

not to add to the feeling of fear that terrorist acts can 

create, and not to offer a platform to terrorists by giving them disproportionate attention.

Be aware of the risk that the media and journalists can 

unintentionally serve as a vehicle for the expression of 

racist or xenophobic feelings or hatred.

Respect the dignity, the safety and the anonymity of 

victims of terrorist acts and of their families, as well 

as their right to respect for private life, as guaranteed 

by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 

Rights.

Set up training courses, in collaboration with their 

professional organisations, for journalists and other 

media professionals who report on terrorism, on their 

safety and the historical, cultural, religious and geopolitical context of the scenes they cover, and to invite 

journalists to follow these courses.

Despite some good intentions, the growth of global media and 

twenty-four-hours-per-day coverage have only increased the pressures 

on media sources to compete for timely information, compelling visual 

images, and inside access.
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Insurgent-Owned Broadcast Media

To avoid the difficulties of managing externally controlled broadcast media, underground groups have on occasion set up and run 

their own broadcast media sources. The FMLN in El Salvador, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and the Contras in Nicaragua all used radio 

to broadcast propaganda aimed both at sympathizers and the neutral 

population. The FMLN actually operated two stations that were run 

by rival factions: Venceremos, founded by the People’s Revolutionary 

Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, or ERP), and Radio Farabundo Marti, operated by the Popular Liberation Forces. Venceremos 

was considered one of FMLN’s most important communications tools. 

For a time the station switched from shortwave broadcast to FM and 

operated from atop the Guazapa volcano outside of the capital, San 

Salvador. This location presented an excellent broadcast location but 

was also very vulnerable to attack, requiring a large commitment of 

manpower to protect the facility. FMLN’s information campaigns were 

well integrated with other operations; they magnified the effect of their 

broadcasts and made them more locally relevant by having supporters 

organize local “listening groups.”29

One of the more successful underground-run broadcasts is Hizbollah’s Al-Mansar television station. Al-Mansar is primarily dedicated to 

promoting Hizbollah’s point of view but is also notable for its variety of 

programming. Besides news, it broadcasts documentaries such as “My 

Blood and the Rifle,” about Hizbollah’s guerilla fighters, and “In Spite 

of the Wounds,” dedicated to individuals who have been injured while 

fighting against Israel. There have been features such as “Reversal of Picture,” which presents and debunks Israeli TV and sometimes newspaper 

stories, and a talk show called “The Spider’s House,” dedicated in part 

to uncovering the weaknesses of the “Zionist entity.” Al-Mansar even has 

insurgent-themed music videos, which represent about 25 percent of its 

programming and “feature violent images and incendiary language.”30

Setting up actual broadcast facilities presents considerable logistical challenges. If in-country broadcast towers are to be used, insurgents 

need to control territory, and towers are usually placed on high ground 

in highly exposed places. A broadcast tower also presents a fixed, highvalue asset of their own that can be attacked. When the FMLN operated a transmitter atop the Guazapa volcano, near San Salvador, they 

needed a staff of approximately one hundred to operate and guard the 

facility.31

In some cases, broadcasts can be made from outside of the target country, as in the case of Algerian Frente de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front, or FLN) broadcasts over Radio Cairo 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

219

and Radio Damascus. The Communist Greek underground operated Radio Station Free Greece, which pretended to broadcast from 

within Greece, although it was probably located in Albania or Rumania. Latin-American subversive groups such as the Dominican Liberation Movement, the Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement, and 

the Guatemala Information Committee transmit hostile propaganda 

against their respective governments through the facilities of Radio 

Havana.32 Another famous example was the use of the BBC to support 

communications from foreign governments in exile to their populations and associated underground movements throughout Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II. In its early period, the Viet Cong 

operated a weak transmitter in the south, apparently from a junk floating offshore. Subsequently, they used a much stronger transmitter for 

Liberation Radio to broadcast news features and commentaries in five 

languages: Vietnamese, English, Cambodian, French, and Chinese.33

Radio Hanoi lent official support to the insurgents.

Insurgent-controlled broadcast media still have to compete for 

attention with other media. As in other media, production quality 

matters; even sympathetic audiences will be dissuaded by poor video 

or sound quality and may not be interested in talk formats that present only repetitive, ideological rants. Insurgent media is subject to the 

same demand for “immediacy, exclusivity, and drama” as other media; 

privileged access to their own operations is a competitive advantage but 

may not be sufficient. Broadcast media of all kinds also have to make 

choices between being locally relevant or appealing to a mass audience. It is logistically much easier to produce neighborhood-relevant 

pamphlets than locally tailored broadcast programming. Because of 

these limitations, insurgent-owned broadcast facilities are still a relatively rare phenomenon. The emergence of the Internet, however, has 

drastically lowered the barriers to providing the same kind of content 

without the need for expensive broadcast infrastructure.

INSURGENT USE OF THE INTERNET

The emergence of the Internet as a globally accessible communications network has changed, and will continue to change, the equations 

for insurgent communications. By Internet, we include a range of applications that use the same infrastructure, including World Wide Web 

sites, established communications methods of e-mail and chat, and 

emerging social media applications.
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Properties of the Internet

These properties, in particular, make the Internet a propitious 

place for insurgents to operate:

Inexpensive

Newsletters, historical information, and press releases can be made 

accessible worldwide for a few dollars a month. For not much more 

groups can avoid the cost of transmission towers or distribution networks and stream audio or video clips on broadcast Internet channels 

with content similar to that presented on broadcast radio or television.

Decentralized

The Internet was developed by the U.S. military to be a communications network that was resistant, through redundancy and flexibility, 

to disruption at any one node. There is no single central directory of 

Internet sites, for example; the directory that tells a web browser how to 

reach a particular URL is replicated across thousands of domain name 

servers worldwide, and disrupted communications are easily rerouted 

across servers or across borders if need be. This decentralized property 

is a perfect match for modern, stateless insurgencies such as Al Qaeda.

Anonymous

The Internet was developed without strong identity management 

protocols. E-mail addresses are easily “spoofed”—there is no foolproof 

way of confirming a sender’s identity without cooperation from the 

Internet service provider (ISP). Content can generally be accessed without identity confirmation, except that demanded by the website itself 

through password protection or encryption. Methods exist to trace 

these requests, but there are also counter-measures such as anonymization servers.

Uses of the Internet

The most important current uses of the Internet for undergrounds 

and insurgencies fall into these categories:

Publicity and Communications

Websites have augmented or supplanted handbills and newspapers 

for many undergrounds. Public components can maintain websites 

in the open if they separate themselves from underground components. Those that advocate terrorism more directly must engage in an 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

221

ongoing shell game of shifting servers, changing web URLs, and redirecting e-mails as they are shut down directly or hosts are pressured to 

remove them.

The Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka made particularly effective 

open use of the Internet for publicity through sites including Tamilnet.

com34 and eelam.com.35 Support from the diaspora was critical for the 

Tamil cause, and the Tamilnet website provides a much faster and easier means of keeping information flowing to distant supporters than 

printed newsletters did previously. In Sri Lanka, the government suppressed stories about police abuse (newspapers often printed “blacked 

out” stories in protest) and denied foreigners, including journalists, 

access to Tamil areas in the north and east of the country. The militant 

insurgents (the Tamil Tigers) also prevented unfettered coverage and 

did not permit journalists to enter territories they controlled unless 

they were sympathetic to the cause. Underground websites including 

Tamilnet (which does not appear to have been closely tied to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) were often the most reliable source of 

information on government/Tamil clashes during the latter years of 

that insurgency. More than one observer has noted that despite the 

violent content, Tamilnet maintained the detached tone of a Western news source. Stories followed journalistic conventions and generally did not mix facts with commentary or political rhetoric. Even in 

accounts of graphic torture, stories were carefully sourced and referred 

to “alleged” police misdeeds. This suggests that Tamilnet’s target audience went beyond its supporters and that the site sought to reach a 

skeptical foreign audience including the press. By providing information in a credible format, the site maximized its chances of being used 

as a source by foreign media.

The ability to recruit talent and work from distant locations is also 

key advantage of Internet-based journalism. The Tamilnet.com site was 

begun in Sri Lanka but benefitted from the assistance of Tamils living overseas, including a computer programmer from Norway, a systems analyst in London, and “dotcom entrepreneurs” from the United 

States. Distributing the technology does not obviate the danger for 

local reporters; a Tamilnet.com reporter was killed by a grenade tossed 

through his study window in 2000. But the decentralized nature of the 

Internet does provide more mobility to content providers. Endangered 

local writers and editors can also more easily move from place to place 

while continuing to produce content. Translating, editing, and some 

writing can also be done from overseas. As an example of this, Mark 

Whitaker describes a time when the editor of Tamilnet.com filed a 

story from Canada.36 The story was about an instance of police brutality against Tamil detainees. The story was leaked by a member the Sri 
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Lankan government’s own Human Rights Commission and included 

accounts of prisoners being tortured with boiling water, being forced 

to eat cow dung, and a string of similar abuses. The editor crafting 

the story was sitting in his nephew’s bedroom in a suburb of Toronto, 

surrounded by Star Wars paraphernalia, trying to tune out six noisy 

nieces and nephews. (The same editor would be brutally beaten after 

his return to Sri Lanka during the fall 2001 election campaign.)

The Zapatista uprising is another example of a group using the 

Internet for publicity and effectively creating a counter-narrative to 

bypass government control of communications. The Mexican government sought to compare the Zapatista movement to the ongoing 

destructive insurgencies in Central America that Mexican citizens 

wanted badly to avoid. The Zapatistas were able, with the help of foreign NGOs, to communicate an effective counter-narrative. At a press 

conference soon after their January 1 uprising, Subcomandante Marcos declared that the EZLN (1) renounced Marxism and (2) did not 

aspire to overthrow the central government. These were understood 

to be important differentiators between Zapatistas and groups such as 

Nicaragua’s Sandanistas and El Salvador’s FMLN.

Clifford Bob37 cites a number of factors as important for the EZLN’s 

success in broadcasting their message internationally. First, the symbolic 

choice of the date of NAFTA’s enactment was well chosen; many groups 

were already ready to mobilize around this issue. Second, the EZLN were 

proactive in seeking domestic and international attention. They benefitted from a charismatic and verbose spokesperson who went by the name 

Subcomandante Marcos. The group did not have a great deal of technical capability or savvy but received help in these areas from NGOs and 

academics who were. They gained important exposure by having their 

communiqués translated and distributed on an e-mail listserv, ANTHAP, hosted by Oakland University (Detroit) Applied Anthropology 

Research Computer Network. Information was also disseminated via a 

number of websites, including Chiapas95, which was established by an 

economics professor at the University of Texas at Austin.

The Zapatistas were also willing to adapt their message quickly 

to new audiences. Besides disavowing revolutionary intentions, they 

made a critical decision to refocus their message away from economic 

class struggle and onto the rights of indigenous peoples in Mexico, 

which proved to be much more in sync with international priorities. 

The EZLN’s progressive feminist stance and strong female leadership, 

against the backdrop of a highly patriarchal indigenous culture, also 

proved to be an almost accidental boon; they drew support and attention from feminist groups that they might not have thought to appeal 

to directly.
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

223

The Zapatista case may also illustrate the limits of Internet-only 

communications. Bob argues that, despite the amplifying effects of 

the Internet, face-to-face connections were also critical to EZLN’s 

success. EZLN leaders held in-person press conferences and traveled 

both within Mexico and internationally to promote their cause. They 

also encouraged supporters to come to them. More than 140 NGOs 

sent representatives to the area during the period immediately after 

the 1994 uprising.38 EZLN actively supported and encouraged foreign 

sympathizers to visit Chiapas and made it possible for them to meet 

insurgents in person, an innovation dubbed “Revolutionary Tourism,” 

similar to the very successful “ecological tourism” industries established 

elsewhere in Central America.

Targeting the Enemy

A less common goal of Internet communications seems to be in terrorizing or manipulating the opponent. The Internet offers too much 

choice and control to be manipulated in the same way that commercial 

broadcast media can sometimes be. There are some examples of this 

usage, however. In 1999, Hizbollah revealed on its website that a coffin 

returned to Israel contained body parts of a number of soldiers, not 

just one.39 Following this gruesome revelation, some parents of Israeli 

soldiers reluctantly began to monitor Hizbollah.org because of the possibility it would have information on attacks not available elsewhere.

Recruitment and Radicalization

According to Rita Katz, director of the Search for International Terrorist Entities Institute Intelligence Group, “We know from past cases—

from captured al Qaeda fighters who say they joined up through the 

Internet—that this is one of the principal ways they recruit fighters and 

suicide bombers.” 40

Videos of successful terrorist attacks or guerilla missions are popular features of sites focused on recruitment. Videos often show extreme 

graphic violence, sometimes accompanied by audio or text commentary. 

Producing these videos is important enough that a number of violent 

groups, including Hizbollah, the Chechen resistance, and Al Qaeda, 

routinely include a videographer as an essential part of an operational 

team. These videos serve several functions. First, they attract attention 

and excite passions of sympathizers, particularly young males who may 

be recruited to perform these types of actions. Second, they create 

mental imagery, allowing recruits to imagine themselves as successful 

operatives, and repetitive video reinforces the message that attacks are 

likely to be successful. Reading about a successful attack is not as compelling as watching one unfold in real time from the vantage point 
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of someone who was involved and lived to deliver the video footage. 

Third, they begin the process of desensitizing recruits to violence and 

the parallel process of dehumanizing opponents. (See Chapter 6 on 

Group Dynamics and Radicalization.)

Hizbollah used the Internet and another emerging media for similar effects by creating and distributing a video game called “Special 

Forces.”41 The game is in the “first person shooter” genre. Players can 

take “target practice” by shooting at an avatar of then-Israeli prime 

minister and Israeli Defense Force chief of staff. Players can then play 

in recreated missions against Israeli tanks, helicopters, and fortified 

positions. Instructions for play are available in Arabic, English, French, 

and Farsi; the game claims to have sold more than 10,000 copies.

Many recruitment sites focus on adolescent, mostly male, recruits. 

One HAMAS website called Al-Fateh (“The Conqueror”) goes even 

further, explicitly targeting children. The site features cartoon-like 

graphics and (as the website describes) “pages discussing Jihad, scientific pages, the best stories, not to be found elsewhere, and unequalled 

tales of heroism.” Despite its audience, Al-Fateh does not shy away from 

violent imagery; the site at one time featured a photo of the decapitated 

head of a young female suicide bomber, with praise for her act.42

At some point in the recruitment and radicalization process, 

recruits usually make personal contact with mentors or organizational 

liaisons to further training or coordinated activity. Technology facilitates this process by allowing users to move from viewing a website to 

sending an e-mail, posting on a discussion board, or joining a realtime chat room. A 2010 analysis of the Irish Republican Board (http://

admin2.7.forumer.com/) found invitations to take part in marches, 

invitations to support prisoners by writing letters, and links to online 

petitions, as well as more direct invitations to join Republican organizations. 43 The board also includes a chat feature, offering communication with like-minded members that is both more immediate and 

less public.

The transition from passively viewing to interacting involves 

increased risk for both parties. Revelation of personal details or concrete biographical facts increases the chances of being identified and 

geolocated. The Internet’s anonymity provides partial protection but 

also means that both recruiters and recruits can be “spoofed” by opponents or law enforcement playing a role.

Providing contact information on illicit sites requires frequently 

changing that contact information and redirecting e-mail. In 2004, a 

U.S. researcher with the PRISM center44 attempted to trace an e-mail 

contact for Ansarnet.ws, a group supporting global jihad. The address, 

sout@mail4all.us, was posted by an Algerian using the nickname of 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

225

“Sulayman ibn Al-Qa`qaa.” The e-mail address redirected through 

www.mail.com, and the mail4all.us domain was registered to a New 

Jersey address through GoDaddy.com. The poster stated in his instructions that the e-mail would be changed from time to time, and he cautioned Saudis not to use a phone line or e-mail account that could be 

traced when contacting the group.

Training

A variety of insurgent groups are experimenting with use of the 

Internet as a channel for training in operational techniques. Self-training manuals such as The Terrorist’s Handbook, The Anarchist’s Cookbook, 

and The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook are available online. The New 

York Times interviewed a Palestinian called Abu Omar who had been 

employed as a trainer in Iraq, teaching foreign fighters how to make 

bombs and stage roadside attacks; at the time, he was working with 

two cameramen, who were videotaping his bomb-making classes, to 

produce Internet instructional videos.45 Marc Sageman’s book Leaderless Jihad46 reviews a number of attempts at completely independent 

self-training. One example of a simple technique that has been taken 

up by disconnected amateurs is “tree spiking.” This technique of driving spikes into trees to destroy loggers’ chainsaws was propagated by 

the Earth Liberation Front as one of a number of independent “monkeywrenching” techniques that have been used by individuals with no 

explicit connection to the front organization.

It is unclear to what extent it is realistic to expect that insurgents 

can self-train to a level of competency to make a serious contribution 

to an insurgent effort. Bomb-making techniques, for example, require 

considerable practice and expertise. In other complex domains, successful e-learning usually requires some personal interaction, contact, 

and feedback from experts. Self-training is probably more effective for 

disseminating new techniques or counter-measures to already-trained 

operatives than for training absolute novices.

Fundraising

E-commerce is an important aspect of private Internet usage, 

although it is not as often a part of insurgent fundraising. The first 

generation of insurgent websites included explicit appeals for online 

donations; however, subsequent legislation preventing fundraising for 

terrorist organizations forced this activity underground. Aboveground 

websites sometimes make money by selling souvenirs and may imply 

that the money will support the insurgent cause. The 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a group associated with the Real IRA (RIRA) at 

one time joined Amazon.com’s “Associates” program and received a 
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cut from book sales when they redirected visitors to buy those books 

at Amazon, but the company removed the PIRA from the Associates 

program when it was informed of the group’s insurgent ties.47

Financial transactions are easier to track than other kinds of information that flow over the Internet, making fundraising more difficult 

for insurgents than recruitment or publicity. Finding new ways of soliciting funds over the Internet is another fast-changing cat-and-mouse 

game between insurgents and their opponents.

Command and Control

The Internet can also facilitate command and control. In the leaderless jihad model previously mentioned, groups may attempt completely 

decentralized command and control, for example, by openly suggesting targets and tactics and hoping that self-managed groups will enact 

them. The website irelandsown.net once published specific information related to Prince William’s boarding school, including a suggested 

location for an attack.48 This brazen type of suggestion, of course, also 

tends to alert law enforcement and potential targets.

One of the boldest uses of Internet for command and control is 

Hizbollah’s dedicated fiber optic network. This network was emplaced 

parallel to Lebanon’s legitimate cable television and Internet lines. It 

was a sign of Hizbollah’s political influence that when the government 

threatened to dismantle the network, Hizbollah was able to pressure 

them to back down and leave the network in place.49

Cell phone-based text messaging has been successfully used to 

coordinate anti-government protests. The World Trade Organization 

(WTO) protests in Seattle pioneered the use of social media for this 

purpose. Strategic movement of crowds as a protest tactic has been used 

for many years but previously tended to rely on pre-planned sequences 

and formations similar to how military movements were once limited; cell phones, text messaging, and Internet-based communications 

allowed much greater flexibility in the movement of demonstrators and 

diversionary forces in response to police movements. (See Chapter 10: 

Nonviolent Resistance for a more detailed discussion of the so-called 

“Battle in Seattle.”)

Internet and cell phone technology are thought by some to have 

played an important mobilizing role in the Iranian protests after the 

disputed 2009 elections, although this claim is controversial. The use of 

Twitter during these protests received a great deal of attention.50 Twitter is a very flexible text messaging service that can be used either to 

broadcast to a large audience or to send personalized messages among 

friends, and the messages can be broadcast using either the Internet or 

SMS (cell phone based). It is clear that Twitter, along with other services 
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

227

such as the YouTube video-sharing service, were closely monitored by 

people outside the country who wanted to follow events. Some authors 

have questioned whether Twitter played an important role in mobilizing and organizing the protests themselves.51

On June 16, during these protests, the U.S. Department of State 

contacted Twitter to ask them to delay a scheduled server upgrade that 

might have disrupted Twitter traffic. Later, the Iranian government 

intentionally disrupted Twitter traffic by shutting down or throttling 

(slowing) both Internet and cell phone services in sections of Tehran.

There is a clearer case to be made that the Internet played a role 

in mobilization of popular protests in Egypt, which forced the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. One group at the center of the 

movement was the 6th of April Youth Movement, whose main outreach 

mechanism was a publicly accessible page on Facebook. The group 

had organized earlier demonstrations on April 6, 2008, with minimal 

impact, but had continued to gather followers, mostly among younger 

and better-educated Egyptians. This group was also able to communicate with and learn nonviolent protest tactics from the Serbian student 

group Otpor.52 The January 25 protests, however, were not preplanned; 

they were an opportunistic response to events unfolding in Tunisia. A 

protest was hastily scheduled for the nearest available holiday, which 

ironically was “Police Day.” Such rapid, coordinated response requires 

open and accessible communication channels, which the Internet provided. Mubarak’s government shut down almost all Internet access to 

the country on January 26 in an attempt to control the movement. This 

was done relatively easily by pressuring four major telecommunications 

providers in Egypt. The move was ineffective at dispersing the alreadyassembled crowds, however.

It is important to note that the movement was not entirely organized and conducted online. Only a fraction of Egyptians have Internet 

access, and the movement did not engage in the more complex crowd 

maneuvers of the WTO protestors. But in a country where media is controlled and public gatherings attract police attention, the initial group 

assembly, instruction in tactics, and opportunistic mobilization would 

have been very difficult via any other available media.

More traditional media benefit from Internet distribution. A twentysix-page pamphlet with instructions for protestors played an important 

role in the Egyptian movement and was distributed in either print or 

pdf format from person to person (Figure  8-1). Instructions on the 

front of the pamphlet urged that it not be posted on publicly accessible Internet sites, however, saying: “Please distribute through e-mail, 

printing and photocopies ONLY! Twitter and Facebook are being monitored. Be careful not to let this fall into the hands of the police or 
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state security.” The page reproduced from this handbook shows one 

of the more important tactics used by Egyptian protestors, which was 

to assemble groups outside of Tahrir Square. This allowed them to 

swell numbers by recruiting local residents, and, more importantly, it 

allowed them to aggregate people in the square more quickly and in 

a manner that was harder to prevent or disperse. (See also Chapter 10: 

Nonviolent Resistance.)

Figure 8-1. Instructions for crowd assembly from Egyptian protestors’ pamphlet.

The page reproduced shows how the Egyptian protestors assembled groups outside 

of Tahrir Square, which allowed protestors to recruit local residents and aggregate 

people in the square more quickly and in a manner that was harder to prevent 

or disperse.

SUMMARY

Insurgencies do not survive on military strength alone; the ability to effectively convey a message using available media is critical to 

their success. Communication is typically an underground function. 

Undergrounds must have means of communicating with a number of 

audiences, including both internal and external supporters who provide recruits, funding, and support; they must also at times be able to 

reach nonsympathetic supporters and the enemy, who are the objects 

of intimidation or demoralizing messages.
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

229

Successful undergrounds have been opportunistic in their use of 

whatever media is at hand, up to and including the modern era. Handbills and newsletters have been used to good effect; effective delivery 

channels and production qualities are keys to success.

 Manipulation and management of broadcast media became critical functions in the post-World War  II era. Global broadcasts using 

near-real-time satellite transmissions changed the game for insurgent 

groups starting in the 1970s. Middle Eastern groups became particularly adept at staging “terrorist spectaculars” such as the PLO’s Munich 

Olympic kidnappings in 1972 and the prolonged hijacking/hostage crisis perpetrated by Hizbollah in 1985. Groups discovered still-relevant 

principles for attracting and holding media attention, such as providing media access and drawing out the event over time. Even when these 

were tactical failures they were judged public relations successes and 

encouraged use of terrorist tactics against high-profile targets. Many 

accused broadcast networks of being too easily manipulated by such 

tactics, and over time the media have responded with guidelines and 

practices to avoid becoming inadvertent spokespersons for terrorists. 

Competition between news sources for immediacy and airtime works 

against these self-imposed limits, however.

The Internet era has ushered in a great deal of new capabilities that 

undergrounds are still learning to exploit. Groups such as Mexico’s 

Zapatistas and the erstwhile Tamil resistance in Sri Lanka found that 

the Internet greatly increases the ability to both communicate with and 

garner support from foreign sympathizers. Extremist groups use both 

public and illicit websites to spread messages of hate, promote violent 

tactics, and attempt to provide training for would-be terrorists. The 

Internet is also becoming useful for mobilization and coordination of 

protest movements, such as the 6th of April Youth Movement that ultimately ousted Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Governments have not been 

idle in the face of these changes in tactics; regimes in Iran and China 

have been particularly proactive in Internet counter-strategies, in an 

ongoing technological arms race between undergrounds and those 

that they seek to overthrow.

ENDNOTES

1 Harry M. Cleaver, “The Zapatista Effect: The Internet and the Rise of an Alternative 

Political Fabric,” Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1998): 621.

2 Rodolfo Montes, “Chiapas Is a War of Ink and Internet,” Reforma, April 26, 1995, translator unknown.

3 Cleaver, “Zapatista Effect,” 621.

4 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
230

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

5 Christina Meyer, Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and 

Peru (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991).

6 Jonathan Schanzer, “The Iranian Gambit in Gaza,” Commentary 127, no. 2 (2009): 29–32.

7 Fred Barton, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas (OROT-228) (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 

1963).

8 Meyer, Underground Voices.

9 Ibid.

10 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, What Is to Be Done? Collected Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 20.

11 Seth S. King, The New York Times, March 17, 1965.

12 George K. Tanham, “The Belgian Underground Movement 1940–1944” (Ph.D. diss., 

Stanford University, 1951): 221–226.

13 Edward Martin, Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of State, 1963).

14 Meyer, Underground Voices.

15 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.

16 Ibid.

17 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex: A Study in Terror (New York: 

Putnam, 1977), 15.

18 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 69. Original quote from Abu Iyad’s My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle.

19 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.

20 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 69.

21 Garrick Utley, “The Shrinking of Foreign News: From Broadcast to Narrowcast,” Foreign 

Affairs 76, no. 2 (1997): 2–10.

22 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 175.

23 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 1998).

24 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006).

25 Marvin Kalb, “The Israeli—Hizbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 12, no. 3 (2007): 43.

26 List adapted from Gabriel Weimann and C. Winn, Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishing Group, 1994).

27 Anita Perešin, “Mass Media and Terrorism,” Medij. Istraž 13, no. 1 (2007): 323, http://

hrcak.srce.hr/file/28073.

28 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Information in the Media in the Context of the Fight Against Terrorism,” 

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm_EN.asp.

29 Meyer, Underground Voices.

30 Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballahs Al-Manar Television (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004).

31 Meyer, Underground Voices.

32 Martin, Communist Subversion, 350.

33 Douglas Pike, The Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus in South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 

1964).

34 Mark P. Whitaker, “Tamilnet.Com: Some Reflections on Popular Anthropology, Nationalism, and the Internet,” Anthropological Quarterly 77, no. 3 (Summer, 2004): 469–498.
Chapter 8. Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet

231

35 Pradeep Jeganathan, “Eelam.Com: Place, Nationa, and Imagi-Nation in Cyberspace,” 

Public Culture 10, no. 3 (1998): 515.

36 Whitaker, “Tamilnet.Com”

37 Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

38 Ibid.

39 Maura Conway, “Reality Bytes: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet,” First 

Monday 7, no. 11 (2002).

40 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 120

41 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 209.

42 Gabriel Weimann, “WWW.AL-QAEDA: The Reliance of Al-Qaeda on the Internet,” in 

Responses to Cyber Terrorism, ed. Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press, 2008), 61.

43 Lorrain Bowman-Grieve, “Irish Republicanism and the Internet: Support for New Wave 

Dissidents,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 2 (2010).

44 Reuven Paz, “Who Wants to Email Al-Qaeda?” PRISM Series of Global Jihad 2, no.  2 

(July  2004), http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_2_vol_2_-_Who_Wants_to_

Email_Al-Qaeda.pdf.

45 Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers,” The New 

York Times, October 15, 2007.

46 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, 

PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

47 Weimann, Terror on the Internet.

48 Myra Philip and Dennis Rice, “Omagh Killers Target William,” Daily Express, October 14, 2000, http://www.mail-archive.com/kominform@lists.eunet.fi/msg03972.html.

49 Weimann, Terror on the Internet.

50 Lev Grossman, “Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement,” Time Magazine, 

June 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html.

51 Maximillian Forte, “America’s Iranian Twitter Revolution,” Open Anthropology (blog), June  17,  2009, http://openanthropology.wordpress.com/2009/06/17/

americas-iranian-twitter-revolution/.

52 Dusan Stojanovic and Jovana Gec, “Serbian Ousters of Milosevic make Mark in Egypt,” 

Associated Press, February 22, 2011.

CHAPTER 9.

PSYCHOLOGY OF INFLUENCE
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Psychological Operations .......................................................................235

Aspects of Influence ...............................................................................236

Influence as a Social Process..................................................................237

Interpersonal Influence......................................................................238

Social Pressures and Social Networks................................................240

Social Identity and Influence .............................................................242

Diffusion of Innovation..........................................................................245

Influence as an Individual Process........................................................247

Rumors as an Example of Message Transmittal ...............................247

Promoting the Understanding and Retention of Messages .............249

Combining Words and Actions..............................................................254

Cognitive Dissonance .........................................................................255

Persuasion Techniques .......................................................................257

Armed Propaganda ............................................................................258

Reciprocity and Obligation ................................................................259

Coercion and Private Beliefs..................................................................260

Role of Narratives in Justifying Insurgent Movements.........................261

Summary .............................................................................................268
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

235

Nathan Bos and Jason Spitaletta

This chapter is about influence and persuasion. Understanding 

how human opinions and subsequent behaviors are shaped is a topic 

of fundamental importance to anyone concerned with “winning hearts 

and minds,” including underground organizations struggling against 

superior forces, governments seeking to gain or bolster legitimacy, and 

military forces engaged in counterinsurgency or asymmetric warfare.

This chapter adds to and complements other chapters in this book 

that discuss specific aspects of influence, including Chapter 8 on insurgent use of media, Chapter 7 on psychological risk factors, and Chapter 

6 on group dynamics and radicalization. This chapter will focus more 

narrowly on trying to connect the academic literature on influence to 

the problems relevant to undergrounds.

This chapter will review research by cognitive psychologists and 

communication theorists who have studied how individuals process 

persuasive messages; by social psychologists and sociologists who have 

studied various forms of social influence; by political scientists who 

have studied the effectiveness of influence campaigns, the effects of 

coercion, and the effects of economic variables; and by marketing and 

negotiation researchers who have studied the effects of different influence strategies. The chapter concludes with a study of narratives as justifications for insurgent activity, and an analysis of how different types 

of insurgent groups employ different narratives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Few insurgencies have been won or lost by large, decisive military 

battles. More commonly, insurgencies are won by a combination of 

military and political means. Much of the political leverage involved 

in such settlements is derived from effective psychological operations 

that have structured the environment necessary for a political solution. 

To insurgents, influencing opinion and attitudes is not an end in itself, 

but only a means to enhance their ideology and/or organizational work 

among broad elements of society. Sometimes the goal is recruitment, 

sometimes support or complicity, and sometimes the objective of psychological operations is to create social disorganization and conditions 

of uncertainty. The resultant unrest and confusion are used as a cover 

to carry out underground operations.

Underground psychological operations are conducted in a variety 

of forms: mass media and face-to-face persuasion; leaflets and theatrical performances; programs for local civic improvement; and threats, 

coercion, and terror. Although the substantive content of psychological 
236

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

operations during any phase of a campaign is likely to be determined 

at the highest echelon of the organization, successful implementation 

depends in large part on the ingenuity of the operators at the local 

level. In attempting to influence mass action, and to develop mass support, psychological operations are directed primarily at specific audiences or groups within a population. Occupational, religious, ethnic, 

and other social groups are often singled out as “target audiences,” and 

tactics are tailored to be effective within a particular group. The purpose of underground propaganda may be to win support among the 

neutral and uncommitted; to raise morale and reinforce existing attitudes and beliefs among underground members and their supporters; 

to undermine confidence in the existing government; and to lower the 

morale of government forces and personnel.

There is an enormous amount of academic research on the process 

of influence, but applying this research is sometimes difficult because 

most of the research is done in Western countries, often on college campuses, and far from the contentious politics and threats of violence that 

characterize underground and insurgent struggles.1

 Nevertheless, from 

the aggregation of prior work, we will attempt to identify fundamental 

principles relevant to both undergrounds and those who oppose them.

ASPECTS OF INFLUENCE

The ability to exert influence over the populace is among the most 

critical of all the requirements of an underground. Rogers’s seminal 

book, Diffusion of Innovation,

2

 begins with the story of what seems to be 

a simple persuasion challenge: A social worker named Nelida, aided by 

the government and medical authorities, spends several years attempting to convince rural villagers in Peru to begin boiling their water before 

drinking it. Given the toll that typhoid and other water-borne diseases 

takes on the population, and the relatively low cost of this innovation, 

this would seem like an easy sell. However, after spending two years and 

making hundreds of visits to family homes, she achieved only modest 

success—eleven families have begun regularly boiling their drinking 

water. Furthermore, very little of her success was due to her scientific 

and medical explanations of germ theory and water-borne contaminants. Instead, families were persuaded to change their behaviors for a 

variety of other reasons. For most families, boiling water violated local 

norms: “local tradition links hot foods with illness. Boiling water makes 

water less ‘cold’, and hence, appropriate only for the sick. But if a person is not ill, the individual is prohibited by village norms from drinking boiled water.”
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A woman referred to as “Mrs. B” adopted water boiling because 

she was an outsider to the village and thus less beholden to the “hot” 

and “cold” food norms. Mrs. B also felt somewhat shunned, and the 

social worker, Nelida, had become an important social contact for her. 

“Anxious to secure social prestige from the higher-status Nelida, Mrs. B 

adopted water boiling, not because she understood the correct health 

reasons, but because she wanted to obtain Nelida’s approval.” For most 

villagers, however, Nelida’s status as an “outsider” meant that her message would probably be ignored and advice unheeded.

Another resident who did adopt water boiling, known as Mrs. A, suffered from a sinus infection and was regarded by her peers and herself 

as “sickly.” Mrs. A accepted the practice because the idea was compatible with her belief system (“hot” foods are for sick people) and the 

associated behavior was compatible with her self-concept. Neither Mrs. 

A nor Mrs. B was an influential person in the village, however, so their 

adoption did not much affect their neighbors. For the small number 

of healthy, local people who did adopt water boiling, they did so only 

after somehow translating or rationalizing the message received so that 

it would be in line with their own belief system.

This example illustrates several central principles of influence:

• New ideas are most readily accepted when they are connected to, 

and compatible with, existing beliefs.

• Self-concept is critical: new ideas, and especially new behaviors, are 

evaluated as to whether they are compatible with an individual’s 

self-concept and will likely be rejected if they are not.

• Social networks influence both beliefs and actions. Messages are 

evaluated on the basis of the status and identity of the source as 

much as for their information content.

• Social identity associations (in-group versus out-group 

distinctions) also influence both beliefs and actions.

• Changes in beliefs occur slowly, in stages, especially when changes 

in behavior are required.

INFLUENCE AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

Influence is fundamentally a social process that occurs on a number of levels. Influence can happen face-to-face, within small groups 

of people, through larger social networks, or through one-to-many 

broadcasts. In all of these social settings, charisma, nonverbal communications, and similarity of opinions have a strong effect on whether 

minds are changed. When influence happens through social networks 

of dozens or hundreds of individuals, the structure of the networks 
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and opinions of key people in the network are critical. Influence also 

happens on larger, less personal scales. All humans see themselves as 

members of larger groups, including social identity categories such as 

ethnicity, religion, and ideology. These identity groups can come to be 

associated with each other, and with certain opinions or attitudes, and 

these associations affect individuals in subtle yet powerful ways. A predominant function of undergrounds is to determine the best methods 

to exert influence over their selected target audiences. In the nascent 

stages of a revolution, this is done almost exclusively through clandestine means, using pre-existing social networks.

Interpersonal Influence

What makes a certain individual more influential than others in a 

face-to-face setting? The ability to influence others is sometimes called 

charisma, which has many components. Charismatic leadership, discussed in Chapter 4, is often a boon to a nascent group; it can also serve 

as a vulnerability if the leader is effectively targeted. In certain cases, 

most notably Che Guevara, charisma can extend beyond the lifespan 

of the individual. Nevertheless, charisma in any of its manifestations is 

a valuable asset to any revolutionary.

Physical attractiveness gives a measurable advantage to people 

attempting to influence others, at least when they are physically present 

or visible on a broadcast medium. There are several underlying cognitive mechanisms that give attractive people their advantage. Attractive 

people can simply command more attention, increasing the likelihood 

that a message will be heard and understood. Attractive people may 

evoke positive moods, indirectly increasing idea acceptance through 

association. Attractive people may also be more well liked and evoke a 

desire in the listener to be liked in return.

The ability to communicate energy and positive emotions is a strong 

component of influence; much of this communication is nonverbal. 

Humans naturally synchronize both verbal and nonverbal behaviors. 

The degree to which they synchronize behavior is a strong indicator of 

whether they are establishing rapport or not. Humans quickly and nonconsciously imitate facial expressions of those with whom they interact.3

 Studies of brain activation measured with functional magnetic 

resonance imaging (fMRI) suggest that perceiving facial expressions 

activates the neural patterns for those facial expressions in the perceiver. That is to say, when a person perceives an expression of a recognizable emotion (happiness, sadness, fear, disgust), their own neural 

areas for those emotions are activated, and they tend to feel the corresponding changes in emotions. This often happens below conscious 
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awareness, such that one may not even realize why one’s emotions are 

being changed. The tendency to mirror the emotional states of people 

nearby is called emotional contagion.4

Besides facial expression, a number of other nonverbal signals show 

similar mimicry effects, including gestures, head movements, and indirect indicators of arousal. Emotions are also conveyed through use of 

language. People who are working well together tend to adopt each 

others’ vocabulary and phrases and develop shared ways of referring to 

objects of mutual interest. Emotional contagion affects groups as well 

as pairs of people,5

 can show effects over long periods of time, and has 

even been shown to occur through text-only communication, in the 

absence of facial cues.6

Some people are naturally more expressive than others, and these 

individuals have been shown to have more influence over others’ 

emotional states. Experiments show that expressive people exert this 

unequal influence even when subjects are sitting silently together and 

not interacting.7

 This quality is a component of charismatic leaders8

and is one of the qualities that distinguish skilled actors. In general, 

synchronization of verbal and nonverbal patterns between conversational partners leads them to like each other more. Synchronization at 

these different levels is also strongly related to perceptions of competence, confidence, social skills, and negotiation success, and it has also 

been related to persuasiveness. Negotiators have a critical advantage if 

they learn to use mimicry and synchronization effectively.

Nonverbal communications can also be used to assert control or 

dominance. In conversation the listener normally tends to maintain 

eye contact while the person speaking does not. Violating this norm by 

continuing to hold eye contact while speaking is a signal of dominance 

that is referred to as “gaze control.” Higher levels of eye contact in general are also associated with credibility, competence, and social skill.9

Voice volume, voice pitch (low), and control of conversational turn-taking are other common nonverbal expressions of dominance.

Many other components of charisma, beyond physical and nonverbal characteristics, have been identified. A few of these are:

• Vision and intelligence: studies of leadership have shown 

that command of a situation and a vision for action are key 

differentiators of effective leadership.

• Similarity: individuals pay more attention to and are much more 

influenced by people who hold similar opinions and have similar 

social characteristics such as the same ethnicity.

• Liking: personality and communication style affect how much a 

person is liked, thereby strongly affecting that person’s influence.10
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• In some cultures, being male, being older, and being wealthier 

have a strong affect on influence, although others can often 

achieve indirect influence.

Social Pressures and Social Networks

In the study of water boiling in rural Peru, cited by Rogers and discussed at the beginning of this chapter, one variable was more important than all others in predicting whether a certain person had adopted 

the practice: their specific village of residence. The social worker Nelida worked in a village that had, for the most part, rejected the practice; in other villages adoption was nearly universal. For individuals, 

the predominant view of their social network tended to supersede their 

individual characteristics. This can be understood as an effect of conformity and a result of the structure of their social networks.

Figure 9-1. Which line segment matches the one on the left? In Asch’s famous 

experiment on conformity, subjects were asked to state which of three line segments (A, B, or C) is the same length as the line on the left. When subjects performed this task alone, they almost always answered correctly. But when Asch placed 

people on a panel of supposed peers, who were actually accomplices of the experimenter, and peers unanimously gave an incorrect answer, respondents would go 

along with the crowd and give answers that were obviously incorrect about 37 percent of the time. Image from Wikimedia Commons: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

File:Asch_experiment.png.

Asch’s famous experiment on conformity,11 described in most introductory psychology textbooks, is nevertheless still compelling. Asch 

recruited subjects to sit on a panel and make a very simple judgment: 

to determine which of three line segments was the same length as a 

fourth. The task was made easy enough that when the subjects performed the task alone, subjects were correct more than 99 percent of 

the time (see Figure 9-1). But when Asch placed people on a panel of 
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241

supposed peers, who were actually accomplices of the experimenter, 

and peers unanimously gave an incorrect answer, respondents would 

go along with the crowd and give answers that were obviously incorrect 

approximately 37 percent of the time. It is important to note that there 

was no overt social pressure to conform in these studies, or penalty 

for disagreement; the pressure to conform was unstated yet strongly 

felt. The power of conformity is an important part of the indoctrination used by all military and paramilitary forces. Conformity is much 

stronger when opposing opinions are unanimous; when Asch’s subjects 

had just one other person who agreed with them, they were much less 

likely to conform (about 75 percent less). This is why social or physical 

isolation is also a hallmark of indoctrination. Underground movements 

have been described as “normative-coercive” organizations, because 

they employ both persuasive group pressures and overt coercion. They 

are normative in that institutional norms and mores secure behavioral 

conformity to certain rules and in that group membership satisfies 

certain individual needs and desires. Coercive power is applied at the 

same time through the threat or application of physical sanctions or 

through the deprivation of certain satisfactions.

Younger people are typically more vulnerable to conformity pressure than older people. There are at least two reasons for this. First, 

they are simply less experienced in processing messages and resisting 

unwanted influence. Second, they are developmentally at a stage where 

peer opinions and questions of self-identity are of paramount importance. The Viet Cong had a standard technique of separating young 

people from their elders to utilize this effect. According to a Viet Cong 

recruiting document, the first step was to organize large gatherings 

of young people for a celebration, a political rally, or a cultural event, 

segregating them from the older people of the village. During the gathering, recruiters made heated speeches denouncing the government. 

Earlier recruits were planted in the audience to applaud the speeches 

and volunteer to follow the Viet Cong to the mountain bases. Other 

young people, emotionally aroused by the speeches and seeing fellow 

teenagers “volunteering,” also volunteered to go, sometimes en mass. 

Other young peoples’ movements, such as “Hitler youth” programs and 

modern suicide bombing recruitment programs, use the same basic 

techniques of isolation and peer pressure.

Studies of social networks and influence continue to reveal how 

powerful networks are in shaping all kinds of opinions and behavior. 

A long-term study of health behaviors conducted in Framingham, Massachusetts, has found, for example, that close associates have a strong 

effect on peoples’ individual decisions to quit smoking. Individual 

smokers were 67 percent more likely to quit smoking in a given year if 
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their spouse quit smoking; 25 percent more if a sibling quit; 36 percent 

more if a friend quit; and 34 percent more if a coworker in a small company quit. These effects also propagated through the social networks; 

statistical effects of one person’s behavior could be observed in presumed strangers several degrees of separation distant from them. The 

same authors found similarly strong effects on obesity and happiness, 

neither of which were previously assumed to be strongly determined by 

social influence.12,13,14

There is often a large discrepancy between rural and urban settings in the amount of pressure to conform. In rural villages, the social 

networks tend to be densely interconnected and the pressure of conformity very high. In small, rural villages, Communist recruiters often 

abandoned their strategy of trying to win over sympathizers a few at a 

time, assuming that they could not do this secretly or effectively, and 

instead adopted a strategy of converting the entire village using more 

coercive techniques.15

In larger, more urban and more diverse settings, social networks 

and conformity still matter, but there is more diversity along most 

dimensions, more competing influences, more complex patterns of 

affiliations, and less monolithic conformity to any idea. In these settings, social identity becomes an increasingly important factor in individual opinions.

Social Identity and Influence

Social identity refers to categorizations of people that affect, often 

on a deep level, an individual’s self-concept, beliefs, and behavior. 

The dynamics of social identity group formation and activation and 

their role in conflict are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, which 

addresses group dynamics and radicalization. The social identity categories that are typically most relevant for political conflicts are race, 

ethnicity, tribe, religion, social class, gender, ideology, political loyalty, 

and regional affiliation. Social identity has a number of implications 

for the study of influence, some obvious and some less so.

Not surprisingly, social identity usually has a direct effect on influence. In general, a speaker who is perceived as belonging to the same 

category as the listener will be more persuasive than one who is perceived as being different. It is commonly understood that, for instance, 

an expatriate will be more persuasive than a foreigner in psychological warfare; female spokespersons are generally better for reaching a 

female audience; co-religionists are helpful as advisors on crafting messages on ethical or religious topics, etc.
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Understanding social identity’s effects is complicated, however, by 

a few factors. First, most individuals have numerous identity categories 

that are relevant to them. A typical resident of the United States might 

have a gender identity, a trade union or professional identity, a sense 

of pride in being an American, a political party preference, a religious 

affiliation, and an ethnic heritage inherited from immigrant ancestors. 

Second, these identities are not equally important to every member of a 

group on every issue. An ethnic group may have strong norms for dress 

but none for diet, while another group may have the opposite profile. 

For many Westerners, their religious identity has an effect on a variety 

of ethical issues but little effect on political positions. In many other 

settings, religion and politics are intertwined; examples can be found 

in (some) evangelical Christian groups in the United States, Catholic 

and Protestant groups in Ireland; Hindu and Buddhist organizations 

involved in the Sri Lankan conflict; and conservative Islamic groups 

across the Middle East. In many parts of the world there are strong 

alignments between ethnic groups and particular occupations, which 

often comes as a surprise to Westerners.16 The connections between 

identity groups of all types are highly variable, culture-specific features. 

An important part of the process of understanding any cultural landscape is identifying that identity groups have unified or officially sanctioned positions in which spheres of influence. These positions may be 

highly localized or idiosyncratic, and making assumptions based on 

one’s own culture is a frequent source of error. For example, religious 

leaders are key political actors in some towns, whereas other towns that 

are not far away keep religion and politics separate.

On the basis of their relevant social identity and associations with 

that identity, individuals may have a strong attraction or aversion to 

ideas or attitudes that is invisible to outsiders. One anecdote involved 

an American in England who bought tickets to a soccer (football) 

match and invited some British friends. He knew them to be fans of 

the team but met with strange, awkward reluctance to attend in person. Further conversation revealed a strong association between game 

attendance and a hooligan culture (an identity group) that the friends 

did not want to be associated with. An experimental example of this 

effect, which is called normative pressure, comes from a study at the University of Texas A&M, whose sports teams and students are referred 

to as “Aggies.”17 Students were asked for their opinions on two issues, 

one about illegal drug use and one about sexual equality in the workplace. When students were told that “Aggies” on average had a fairly 

extreme opinion on one of these issues, they had a strong tendency 

to agree with this self-relevant group, even when this extreme opinion was opposite of their original opinion. Students also came up with 

rationalizations for why members of their reference group had (they 
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were told) strongly endorsed positions such as consideration of sex in 

job promotions, reinterpreting the question in creative but implausible 

ways to keep their own attitudes in synch with that of their identity 

group. Opposite effects were obtained when students were told the attitudes of an out-group they wanted to be disassociated with; given the 

(fictional) opinion of Ku Klux Klan members, students adjusted their 

opinions in the opposite direction.

The third, and perhaps most interesting, aspect of social identity 

and influence is that the salience of particular identity groupings is not 

equally relevant in every situation and that identities can be “activated,” 

either by circumstance or by design, to achieve different effects. In one 

typical study, simply reminding Catholic high school students of their 

religious identity caused them to be more resistant to ideas perceived as 

anti-Catholic than other students who had not been reminded.18

Because most individuals have multiple identity affiliations, and 

because these identity groups carry different associations, activating different associations can have powerful effects on influence campaigns.

Anti-insurgent messages propagated by American forces in Iraq 

often stressed that violence was terrorism and was “against Iraq.” This 

simple message attempted to evoke two identity-based associations. 

First, it created an association between resistance violence and terrorism, an association attractive to few people. More importantly, it evoked 

“Iraq” as the relevant identity group. This was at a time when much of 

the violence pitted Sunnis against Shiites. The message evoked a superordinate, unifying identity group, Iraqis. The message could plausibly 

have argued that violence was against “Islam,” also superordinate to 

Sunni and Shiite. However, “Iraq” was the preferred identity reference 

because of the United States’ goal of creating a unified, modern, secular state. Also, any message about Islam from the United States might 

have been rejected out of hand.

Psychological operations practitioners are often in the position of 

trying to influence people who are very aware that their messages are 

coming from an out-group, if not an outright enemy. An experienced 

World War II and Cold War propagandist gave this advice:

I think our propaganda to Russia should be done on the 

supposition that we are talking to Communists (leadership). If you talk to the Russian peasant as though he 

is your friend and is opposed to the [Soviet] regime, 

he may patriotically turn off his wireless because he 

is a patriot as well as a peasant. . . . There were many 

Germans who did not like the [Nazi] regime, but if 

you appealed to them as traitors, they did not take 

the propaganda. They were much more content to 
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overhear you talking to a Nazi. . . . nor is it any good 

pouring out the most moving exhortations to become 

a democrat because the enemy knows that this comes 

from the enemy, and writes it off as propaganda.19

Note how certain identity groups are carefully evoked and implied. 

Associations with the label “traitor” are assiduously avoided. By addressing the country’s leadership as an identity group separate from the country’s people, the propagandist attempts to drive a wedge between these 

groups. This propagandist also did not attempt to make an argument 

based on a superordinate “democrat” identity, which might have been 

effective in another context but not coming from an enemy in wartime.

DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION

The study of insurgencies as social movements and the applicability 

of diffusion of innovation dates back at least to the Special Operations 

Research Office’s work in the 1960s.20 Interpersonal communication, 

more so than mass media, typically determines whether an innovation 

is adopted. The process of diffusion can be considered “the acceptance, over time, of some specific item—an idea or practice, by individuals, groups or other adopting units, linked to specific channels of 

communication, to a social structure, and to a given system of values 

or culture.”21

Researchers have also tried to understand how ideas move from 

individuals and small groups to large-scale social changes. Everett Rogers’s 1962 book Diffusion of Innovation, referred to at the beginning of 

this chapter, was a landmark in this area of study and was ahead of its 

time in understanding the importance of social factors and social network structures.

Rogers proposed the now-famous curve shown in Figure 9-2. The 

curve divides the population into segments based on when they are 

likely to adopt a new innovation. The first people to try something new 

are usually innovators, who are likely to be younger, wealthier, and less 

risk averse than others. Innovators are not, however, the most influential members of society; they are in fact often regarded with bemusement or suspicion. Most people will not adopt a new idea or innovation 

because of the actions of a few innovators. More change happens if 

innovators are followed by a somewhat larger group of early adopters. 

This segment is more cautious than innovators and more concerned 

with losing face through making a foolish choice, but they also see an 

advantage in being on the forefront of something important. Early 

adopters also tend to be younger and more affluent than the general 

population. Diffusion does not really take hold, however, until a group 
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of people known as opinion leaders embraces change. Opinion leaders 

are the most influential members of the society with regard to innovations in their domains of expertise. Unlike innovators, opinion leaders 

have a reputation for prudence, which they are careful to maintain, 

and are closely observed by many segments of society. When opinion 

leaders are observed embracing a new idea, innovations become widely 

known throughout the opinion leaders’ large social networks, and the 

status of opinion leaders makes the innovations palatable to a much 

larger percentage of the population. Opinion leaders are not necessarily the highest-status individuals in a society, or the formal leaders, so 

identifying them often takes some investigation. Some opinion leaders 

will remain hidden until a social structure is very well understood. In 

rural regions, a person may be more likely to become an opinion leader 

by virtue of their character and personal relationships. In more urban, 

information-dense environments, the crucial characteristic of opinion 

leaders may be intelligence and more specifically their ability to monitor and process large amounts of information from different sources.22

In more complex societies where information specialization is necessary, there is also more differentiation as to the type of influence an 

opinion leader wields; one person may be very influential in arts and 

culture, for example, but have very little influence on politics.

Figure 9-2. Everett Rogers’s diffusion of innovation model, role distribution and 

market saturation. Image from Wikimedia Commons: http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/File:Diffusionofideas.PNG.

Rogers defines one more important role beyond the opinion 

leader: the change agent. This is a person who is intentionally trying to 

bring about a large-scale change, possibly as a representative of some 

larger organization (political, corporate, or ideological). This person is 

often an outsider, such as the social worker Nelida in the water-boiling 
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anecdote from the beginning of this chapter. They may also be political activists or members of an underground. Successful change agents 

must be able to identify and work with opinion leaders if their goal is to 

bring about large-scale change.

INFLUENCE AS AN INDIVIDUAL PROCESS

Most people are exposed to much more information than they 

remember and many more opinions than they decide to believe in or 

act upon. Effective influencers must understand how their audience 

will evaluate and accept or reject the content of their messages. Messages are evaluated on a number of levels: their personal relevance, 

the nature of the source, the factual content of the message, and the 

emotional content of the message. The study of rumors is a good introduction to the basic processes of message transmission and acceptance.

Rumors as an Example of Message Transmittal

The study of rumors has provided an interesting method to understand how people receive, reject, and pass on messages. Rumors are 

unconfirmed information that is widely spread from person to person. Sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani described rumors as “improvised 

news,”23 which is especially relied upon when either information is not 

available through formal channels or formal channels are not trusted 

and becomes particularly important in times of conflict and war.

Rumors usually have strong emotional components. Knapp’s study 

of wartime rumors in the United States during World War II24 identified three prevalent types, each with a different emotional theme:

• The Pipe-dream or Wish rumor, which addresses a popular hope: 

“The Japanese do not have enough oil to last 6 months”

• The Bogie rumor, expressing fear: “The entire Pacific Fleet was 

destroyed at Pearl Harbor”

• The Wedge-driving or Aggression rumor: “Churchill blackmailed 

Roosevelt into provoking war with Japan”

Rumors should also have personal relevance; misinformation without personal implications for the listener will probably be forgotten 

rather than widely distributed. Wartime rumors centered on things 

such as rations, war bonds, combat stories that contradicted official 

reports, secret enemy actions, etc. Even seemingly irrelevant rumors, 

such as urban legends about bizarre household accidents, usually survive only if they hold some moral or practical lesson for the listener. 
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There are some exceptions to the personal relevance rule, however, 

such as salacious folklore about celebrities.

Rumors also tend to be distorted over time as they are passed 

between people. Rumors tend to be shortened and simplified over 

time; detailed information in original rumors (specific numbers or 

dates) tends to be forgotten; precise circumstances tend to be lost.25 At 

the same time, rumors can pick up new (false) details, often serving the 

purpose of confirming the listener’s preconceived ideas or stereotypes.

More recently Stephanie Kelly of the Naval Postgraduate School 

conducted a study of rumors prevalent among Iraqi citizens in Baghdad 

in the years after the United States’ invasion in 2003.26 Rumors were 

prevalent in this area even before the invasion and were also known 

as “whispering campaigns” or “souk-telegraph,” emphasizing their role 

as an alternate news source.27 Rumors about the multinational forces 

and their intentions were prevalent and were believed to hinder U.S. 

efforts, so a central database for rumor tracking called the “Baghdad 

Mosquito” was set up to allow both tracking and rapid response. Kelly 

found that Knapp’s typology of rumors categorized these rumors fairly 

well; Kelly also added a category of “curiosity” rumors that have lessimmediate implications but survive because they involve topics or individuals of interest.

The military value of rumors has long been recognized. As noted 

by Knapp, “In France, German agents disrupted morale by alternately 

spreading optimistic and pessimistic rumors in such rapid succession 

that the French people were almost too confused to act effectively in 

their own defense. The uses of rumor for propaganda are as varied 

as ingenuity can devise. Rumors have been used to force the enemy 

to issue information. They have been used to discredit enemy news 

sources that take the bait and leave themselves open to ‘disclosure.’”

The recipe for creating a successful rumor is much simpler than the 

recipe for dispelling one. Common advice from experts on responding 

to rumors includes the following:

• Rapid response to potentially damaging rumors can limit 

impact and spread. Rumors should be countered with facts from 

authoritative sources quickly before the rumors change form. 

These official disclaimers are necessary but not sufficient.

• Combining public statements with visible public actions is more 

powerful than either words or actions in isolation.

• It pays to spend time developing relationships with opinion 

leaders and media sources before rumors arise; it may be too late 

to develop these relationships afterward. Reputation matters a 

great deal, for both individuals and organizations.
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• Rumors are best gathered and countered in person-to-person 

communication, where feasible.

• An awareness of the length of the local “news cycle,” which may 

be determined by media broadcasts, market schedules, holidays, 

etc., is useful.

Promoting the Understanding and Retention of Messages

Going beyond rumors, much communications research is directed 

toward the question of how to get persuasive messages about political 

issues, innovations, or products to be accepted by an audience.

Personal Relevance

As with rumors, personal relevance is critical to message acceptance. Psychological warfare practitioners have long understood the 

importance of target audience analysis, as did Maoist Agitprop teams, 

who interviewed informants and researched local grievances before 

entering an area.

Under stress, individuals’ ability to receive and process messages 

can be reduced or distorted. People stressed by danger, or simply by 

high cognitive demands, experience a “narrowing of attention” onto 

matters most immediately salient or apparent. After a stressful event, 

the types of messages that can be received roughly follow Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.28 In 1994, a large contingent of Haitian refugees were 

interdicted at sea while trying to reach the United States and placed 

in temporary camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Immediately after the 

initial trauma of flight, interdiction, and unexpected resettlement, the 

refugees were preoccupied with basic physical survival needs of food, 

water, and shelter. Concern with physical safety followed. Later, as they 

became confident about their immediate survival and how they would 

be treated, they could pay attention issues related to broader considerations of migrant versus refugee status and political groupings tied 

to Haitian politics (John Shissler [former J-2A, Joint Task Force 160, 

Operation Sea Signal], personal communication, January 2012).

Under less stressful conditions, individuals’ judgment about what is 

personally relevant can extend to wider social identity groups. Political 

scientists have studied what is called “economic voting” and have found 

that individuals do “vote their pocketbook” but also pay attention to 

the pocketbooks of their friends, neighbors, and countrymen. When 

researchers attempt to determine which is more influential, individual circumstances or identity group circumstances, conditions of the 

larger identity groups tend to be more important in predicting voting 
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behavior. A few other interesting findings from the study of economic 

voting29 are as follows:

• Economic change explains approximately one-third of the 

change in the vote (between elections) as opposed to other 

factors (policy, personal opinions about candidates, etc.).

• Voters pay most attention to “the big two” economic variables: 

unemployment/growth and inflation.

• Voters are myopic and so have a short time horizon. Voters react 

more to past events than to expected future ones.

• Voters may react more to negative changes than to corresponding 

positive ones.

While most of the research in this area has been done in the industrialized Western countries, there is evidence that economics matter 

in other settings. One study in Ethiopia showed that economic considerations did affect voting, although the effects were highly variable 

by district and economic considerations did seem to be of secondary importance behind ethnicity and patronage.30 Another study in 

Ghana31 found similar results: individuals’ positive perceptions about 

the economy in the past five years corresponded with support for the 

current government, and optimistic beliefs about the next year had 

an even larger statistical relationship with support for the government. These opinions seemed to go beyond self-centered concerns and 

reflected an awareness of and interest in the economic situation of the 

region or nation.

Another study of eighteen Latin American countries32 focused 

specifically on whether economic voting was more “egotropic,” or concerned only with one’s own pocketbook, or “sociotropic,” indicating 

interest and concern with the larger economy. This distinction between 

self-centered and nation-centered concern is particularly important in 

countries struggling with patronage and corruption; self-centered voters (or their key leaders) might be more easily “bought,” while nationcentered voters will be more likely to demand sound policies and real 

development. Research indicates that Latin American voters are more 

sociotropic, i.e., more influenced by the state of the national economy 

than their own pocketbook. Egotropic considerations are somewhat 

stronger in the poorest countries in this sample (e.g., Honduras, Nicaragua) but still less influential. Other factors that made a difference 

were the political fragmentation of the government (in divided governments voters do not know where to give credit or blame) and a leader’s 

length of time in office.

Besides economic conditions, judgments of personal relevance are 

made on this basis of religious and ideological values, effects on relevant 
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identity groups, and fears related to personal safety. An example of 

how personal connections to safety concerns affect behavior comes 

from a study examining rates of smoking cessation among doctors.33

While almost all doctors were exposed to the increasingly compelling 

evidence linking smoking to cancer, many doctors continued smoking. 

One group, however, had a particularly high cessation rate—radiologists, who were frequently exposed to vivid images of cancerous growths 

in patients’ lungs (see Figure 9-3). While all doctors were presumably 

exposed to the same evidence, and most believed it, the subset personally exposed to vivid visual evidence were more likely to be persuaded.

Figure 9-3. X-ray image of a chest showing a growth on the left side of the lung.

From Wikimedia Commons: http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/File:X-ray(Chest)

Cancer.jpg.

Evaluating Message Content

Despite a great deal of research on the topic, there are very few universal findings about the content of persuasive messages, and there are 

many variables that seem to diverge across settings and cultures. Obvious findings are as follows: clear communication is better than unclear 

communication, authoritative sources increase message acceptance, 

and support with related evidence improves persuasiveness.

Evaluating evidence is more cognitively demanding than evaluating a source. Because of this, when a message is less relevant to a person, the credentials of the source often become more important. What 

seems to occur is that people make an implicit decision of how much 

attention to devote to the matter; when it is less relevant people will use 

a more “lazy” strategy of evaluating an argument based on the source 

rather than the evidence.34
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 The same seems to be true for “celebrity” endorsements, at least 

in one study; people were more influenced by the celebrity endorsement when the issues were less personally relevant to them but paid 

more attention to the arguments themselves when the issues were 

self-relevant.

Culture can, not surprisingly, have a strong effect on how persuasive a message is. R. S. Zahama35 describes a set of differences between 

American and Arab communication styles that often lead to miscommunication. Among other distinctions, Arabs are more indirect especially with criticism, value linear argumentation less, and value the 

poetic use of language more.

Another study36 found that culture, particularly the distinction 

between “collectivist” and “individualist”a cultures, predicted different responses to advertising messages. They conducted an experiment 

with American and Korean students and found that individualistic 

Americans are more persuaded by ads that promise individual benefits, personal success, and independence, whereas collectivist Koreans 

are more persuaded by ads that emphasize in-group benefits, harmony, 

and family integrity.

Epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and is often 

concerned with what “counts” as evidence. Cultures, academic specialties, and identity groups of all types develop their own epistemologies 

of what is and is not convincing. For example, fundamentalist religious 

groups usually have well-developed standards for argumentation. Religions that rely on holy writings often have a hierarchy, where there are 

pre-eminent sources (e.g., the Bible in Christianity, the Koran in Islam) 

and then other holy writings or commentaries of lesser authority. Arguments based on the Bible or the Koran generally trump arguments 

based on commentaries or any contemporary writings. A second type 

of evidence is the ruling of contemporary religious leaders; if they are 

respected as scholars, their words may be given the same credence as 

direct evidence from the holy writings because it is presumed that the 

leader is more learned than the reader. In Islamic scholarship, the academic lineage of the scholar is also very important; clerics inherit credibility from their teachers. Each religious group also develops particular 

ways of reading and using these writings as evidence. For an outsider, 

attempting to enter these discussions is a risky proposition because if it 

a The contrast between collectivist and individualist countries has proved to be robust 

and has a surprisingly broad range of effects. Han and Shavitt37 explain the distinction 

this way: “Individualistic cultures are associated with emphasis on independence, achievement, freedom, high levels of competition, and pleasure. Collectivist cultures are associated with emphasis on interdependence, harmony, family security, social hierarchies, 

cooperation, and low levels of competition.”
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

253

is done clumsily or with obvious manipulative intent, it may provoke the 

opposite reaction intended. However, sincere curiosity and concerted 

attempts to study and understand a religion are often rewarded and 

can lend an outsider some credibility.

Message Repetition

Repetition of a consistent message is also a key to effective marketing of ideas. An interesting take on repetitive messaging comes from 

this World War II propagandist:

We had to order our journalists (it was agony to 

them!) to repeat the same news day after day in forms 

in which it did not look the same. . . . ‘News creation’ 

does not mean invention . . . assume that you have 

been instructed to create the impression that typhus is 

prevalent in the enemy army. If you see that the fourth 

item in each news bulletin (not too high up, because if 

you put it as the No. 1 item it is obvious propaganda) 

is about a case of typhus,.. if you see that over three 

weeks the bulletin never lacks one true item about 

typhus, if . . . your leaflet newspaper reports a new 

case of typhus every day—and if they are all true—

then you are doing good psychological warfare.38

Being exposed to simple messages repeatedly can sometimes have 

effects even when the message being heard is not the focus of attention. 

In one experiment, students were asked to evaluate the sound quality 

of audio tapes that contained arguments in favor of raising the price 

of their local newspaper. The more times a student was required to 

listen to the taped message, the more agreeable they were toward the 

price increase when asked about it by a different experimenter eight 

to fourteen days after the experiment.39 For more complex arguments, 

however, more deliberate processing is usually required.

Presenting One Versus Both Sides of an Argument: Message Inoculation

There is some debate as to whether it is wise to try to present both 

sides of an argument or whether it is better to present only your own 

side. There is some good evidence that “inoculation” strategies, which 

present your own side along with a synopsis and warning about the 

other side’s argument, can be quite effective under the right circumstances.40 In one study, students were exposed to an anti-legalization 

argument about marijuana and then a pro-legalization message. They 

were less influenced by the second message when the first contained 

this inoculation statement: “Advocates for the legalization of marijuana 
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claim the substance provides important medical benefits for people, 

especially for cancer patients who suffer from nausea following chemotherapy treatments. However, many studies show that marijuana 

provides only short-term antiemetic relief, and only for a minority of 

users . . .” Inoculation messages have been applied to such varied contexts as preemptive political attack ads, teenager anti-smoking campaigns, and competitive advertising campaigns. These experiments 

have shown that inoculating people to ideas beforehand is more effective than trying to counter ideas afterward. Inoculation even provides 

resistance to opinions on the same topic supported by different arguments than the ones “inoculated” against.41,b

COMBINING WORDS AND ACTIONS

During periods of uncertainty, people tend to be suspicious of what 

they hear and rely on their personal experiences, believing only those 

things which they have seen with their own eyes. When action immediately follows promises, this is called action propaganda. There are 

two common forms of action propaganda by insurgent groups: one 

focuses on specific actions that alleviate hunger and suffering among 

the people and demonstrate the insurgents’ ability to accomplish set 

goals, while the other focuses on military acts, violence, sabotage, and 

punishment of traitors among the local population. Both show that the 

insurgents are powerful in spite of being outnumbered. It is a truism 

of psychological warfare but bears repeating: the combination of words 

and actions, when applied with planning and consistency, is more 

powerful than either used in isolation. This tactic, though universally 

acknowledged, can become harder to achieve as organizations grow 

bigger, and especially as military and communications functions are 

divided between specialized units.

Examples of effective coordination of messages and actions include:

• Statements of concern for local grievances coordinated with public 

works, charity, or new supplies. A directive from the North Korean 

guerrilla bureau argued that words alone cannot persuade the 

masses that their lot will improve under Communism; therefore, 

deeds, however small, are needed to convince the people of 

the superiority of the Communist system.42 In Malaya and the 

Philippines, insurgents were reported to have used a wider variety 

b One U.S. document produced for information operations discusses this concept 

using different terminology and makes an additional distinction between forestalling 

(countering possible lines of persuasion prior to the release of propaganda) and conditioning (preemptively shaping target audience vulnerabilities prior to exposure to 

propaganda).
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

255

of topics in their propaganda than did the government forces. 

Rather than giving ideological reasons for the support they 

requested, they offered tangible advantages, such as more land, 

more food, and other material acquisitions, to their supporters.43

• Threats preceding military action by insurgent groups. 

Outnumbered forces can nevertheless make an impression by 

promising specific actions before then taking action, creating 

an greater impression of strength than that which would be 

created if the action were taken in isolation. Many insurgencies 

have used the practice of posting warnings or “death sentences” 

against named collaborators before attacking them; the Afghani 

Taliban’s use of “night letters” fits this pattern.

• Defection messages and “free passes” for defectors timed for 

release at the high water mark of counter-offensives, to coincide 

with points of maximum demoralization and greatest freedom of 

movement across contested lines.44

Cognitive Dissonance

Some techniques make use of the message recipient’s own actions, 

often to powerful persuasive effect, driven by a phenomenon known as 

cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is a process in which people are made uncomfortable by an apparent conflict either between 

two beliefs that they hold or between their beliefs and their actions. 

People often resolve this conflict by changing their beliefs, sometimes 

in surprising ways. A failed experiment in 1953 illustrates the effect. 

(Hundreds of follow-up variants have confirmed the basic effect.)45

Experimental subjects were pressured into making speeches supporting positions they did not believe in. Some were paid a small amount of 

money and some a larger amount of money for the same action. After 

giving the speech, the subjects were found to have also changed their 

private opinion somewhat to be in line with the speech they had given. 

The most unexpected part of the experiment was this: subjects who 

were paid a small amount of money changed their beliefs to a greater 

extent than those paid more. The experimenter had anticipated the 

attitude change but thought that more money would lead to greater 

change in attitude rather than the opposite. The explanation for this 

accepted by most psychologists is cognitive dissonance. Subjects found 

themselves in the uncomfortable position of having made a public 

speech they did not believe in. To ease their discomfort, they adjusted 

their beliefs. Those who were paid a larger amount of money experienced less dissonance; they could rationalize their actions more easily 

because they had been paid well. Those who were paid less experienced 
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more uncomfortable dissonance, because the money seemed paltry in 

comparison with the act. The low-paid subjects therefore made the largest adjustment to their beliefs to bring them in line with their actions.

Leon Festinger documented what he believed to be a real-world 

example of cognitive dissonance as part of a study of followers of a UFO 

cult that believed the world was going to end on December 21, 1954.46

Festinger followed cult members up to and beyond that date and was 

surprised to find that, after the expected event failed to occur, the 

group did not disband. Instead, the opposite seemed to happen: the 

group rallied around a rationalization of the event (God had spared 

the planet at the last moment) and became more committed to the 

cause, not less. The group also became more active in seeking converts 

and more receptive to press attention. Festiner’s explanation was that 

group members were too committed to the cult’s ideas, had committed 

too many public acts, and were too enmeshed in the social network of 

the cult to change their beliefs. Instead, group members decided to 

adjust their beliefs (accepting a suspicious rationalization immediately 

and without evidence) and renew their commitments to the cause, both 

socially and ideologically. Recruiting new members to the cause also 

served the purpose of seeking confirmation; the more people believed 

the more true their beliefs would seem.

The two examples given here represent two of the standard ways of 

evoking cognitive dissonance. The speech-writing study is an example 

of what is called “induced compliance,” while the UFO cult’s experience is an example of “belief disconfirmation.” The third common 

method is called “hypocrisy paradigm,” which involves having individuals recall prior actions and then pointing out where those actions 

failed to match with stated values. (A fourth method, “free choice,” is 

not discussed here.) Communist self-criticism sessions can be understood as examples of the hypocrisy paradigm. Communists of all rank 

are supposed to engage in self-criticism sessions, where they scrutinize 

their behavior, public and private, for instances where their behavior 

failed to match their ideology. Even when the act of self-scrutiny has 

been coerced (as in mandatory self-criticism sessions), self-identified 

inconsistencies can be very unsettling, and the motivation to change 

quite powerful.

There is reason to believe that cognitive dissonance may take different forms in different cultures. In particular, cultures differ on how 

important it is for individuals to maintain independent and consistent 

sets of beliefs (most true in Western individualist cultures) versus making sure ideas are in harmony with others (more true in collectivist 

cultures) or with authorities (characteristic of “vertical collectivist” 

cultures).47
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

257

A coercion experiment done in the United States and Poland illustrates possible differences.48 The researchers asked students from the 

United States and from Poland whether they would be willing to participate in a forty-minute marketing survey without pay. For each participant they used one of two different means of indirect persuasion. 

Half were prompted to think of other times they complied with similar 

requests; this was an appeal to self-consistency (“if you agreed to this 

kind of thing before, why wouldn’t you do it now?”). The other half 

were asked to look at information about how many other students had 

complied with the request. Both techniques increased compliance, but 

their levels of effectiveness differed. In the individualistic West, people 

were more affected by appeals to maintain self-consistency; in more 

collectivist Poland, people were more persuaded by the social evidence.

Persuasion Techniques

Some persuasion techniques, most notably the so-called “foot in 

the door” technique, make use of peoples’ desire for consistency. “Foot 

in the door” describes a process of asking for small concessions as a 

precursor to larger ones. This technique can be used for underground 

recruitment. One source49 describes how Viet Cong troops would start 

by soliciting very small amounts of money from rural residents. Asking 

for donations opened up a relationship, and the fact that the amounts 

were small and semivoluntary set up a cognitive dissonance dynamic 

whereby villagers might convince themselves that they were sympathetic 

to the cause. Later, when requests became larger and more insistent, 

residents would often continue to comply.

In another approach, a person may also be asked to donate funds 

to the movement. However, if he seems reluctant, the third member 

of the team may suggest to him that if he collects money from others, he himself need not donate to the movement. The individual may 

halfheartedly attempt to collect some money. Even if he collects only a 

token amount, once he has committed himself to this extent, he can be 

coerced in to performing other assignments.50

An example of a foot-in-the-door technique combined with deception and more overt coercion was reported during the Maoist insurgency in Malaya. A rubber tapper’s duties took him daily into the jungle 

to tend the rubber trees. On one occasion, he was approached by three 

armed men. They were friendly and talked him into bringing them 

cigarettes the next day. Soon he began smuggling such items as aspirins and flashlights: getting these things past the guards at the village 

added a little interest to his life. One day, only two of the three men 

showed up, explaining that the third had been captured and would 
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almost certainly reveal the rubber tapper’s smuggling activities. Faced 

with the choice between returning to his village and facing arrest and 

prison or joining the Communists who would protect him, he joined.51

In Korea, the Communist Party gave conspicuous assistance to 

impoverished families when no government aid was forthcoming. Cooperative food stores were started in the Philippines and in Korea; community pools of money and goods were set up in both these countries 

and in Malaya. Villagers in Korea frequently were abducted, exposed 

to propaganda, and returned the next day well-fed and unharmed.52

Armed Propaganda

The concept of armed propaganda illustrates the integrated nature 

of military and political operations in an insurgency and stresses the 

relative importance of psychological and political operations. According to General Vo Nguyen Giap’s view, the first of three phases of insurgent conflict is the psychological warfare phase. In the second phase, 

propaganda and agitation continue but armed struggle comes to the 

forefront. In the final phase, when victory is near, the emphasis returns 

to political propaganda. Before, during, and after the armed conflict, 

military units are charged with carrying out propaganda missions. 

Likewise, the political arm of the movement has armed enforcing units 

to support its psychological and military missions.53

In Vietnam, Viet Cong agitation was carried out by armed propaganda teams and cadre agitprop agents, supplemented by relatively 

simple village propaganda subcommittees.54 A Viet Cong indoctrination booklet succinctly described the nonmilitary responsibilities of its 

soldiers in a political struggle:

Because of their prestige, the members of the armed 

forces have great propaganda potentiality. If the 

fighter with a rifle in his hand knows how to make 

propaganda, to praise the political struggle and to 

educate the masses about their duty of making the 

political attack, his influence may be very great. But 

if he simply calls on the population to join him in the 

armed struggle he will cause great damage. He must 

say, “Those who do political struggling are as important as we who fight with rifles. If you do not take up 

the political struggle we will be unable to defeat the 

enemy with our rifles.” This will make our fellow countrymen more enthusiastic and will also help to promote the political struggle.55
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

259

Armed propaganda companies serving each province, although 

primarily military units, were also responsible for psychological warfare. These units infiltrated by night those villages that by day were 

controlled by government troops. They sometimes even entered during 

the day, assembled the villagers, made their appeals, and left before 

government troops could respond. The armed propaganda units range 

in size from a squad to a company. Their duties included agitation, 

recruitment, and selective terrorism through enforcement of death 

sentences. They made periodic visits to villages to conduct propaganda 

sessions. When visiting a village, the armed unit might suggest that all 

villagers attend the meeting and would usually ostensibly excuse one 

or two reluctant persons. However, if many of the villagers failed to 

attend, the team might find it necessary—in the name of patriotism 

of course—to enforce attendance. The tactics of armed propaganda 

teams varied, according to the local situation, from a simple display of 

armed strength to disemboweling an uncooperative village chief. In 

one operation in Vietnam in January 1962, one hundred youth group 

leaders were captured by a Viet Cong armed propaganda unit. Most 

were released several weeks later after a period of intensive political 

indoctrination. Seven incorrigibles, however, were held back and probably murdered.56

The possession of weapons gave such teams an air of prestige before 

a village audience. As a leading figure in the Philippine Hu movement 

stated: “The people are always impressed by the arms, not out of fear 

but out of a feeling of strength. We get up before the people then, 

backed by our arms, and give them the message of the struggle. It is 

never difficult after that.”57

Reciprocity and Obligation

Creating a feeling of obligation by doing favors or making small concessions is a parallel technique. Reciprocating gifts and favors seems to 

be a fundamental aspect of human relationships, and the motivation 

to comply is strong and can leave one vulnerable to manipulation.58 A 

small gift from a salesperson can make one feel obligated to listen to a 

sales pitch; a small concession on price may create obligation to make a 

large purchase that one was not intending. Reciprocity can be a powerful technique in extended interrogations, as very small comforts and 

freedoms are exchanged for information.

Members of underground groups in Indochina were instructed 

to recruit new members by creating social indebtedness. They sought 

out families in difficult life circumstances—the propertyless, the 

unemployed, and the sick—and offered them aid. This enabled the 
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underground worker to enter the family or the neighborhood and gain 

the attention and loyalty of a large number of people. Pressure was then 

applied to have the people repay their indebtedness by assisting the 

movement and eventually joining it. A favorable word from a mother, 

father, relative, or close friend was judged a more powerful persuader 

than any impersonal propaganda message.59

COERCION AND PRIVATE BELIEFS

Undergrounds and insurgencies make use of more overt coercive 

techniques, as do authoritarian governments. Constant pressure to 

conform can produce cognitive dissonance-like effects. Every tyrant 

has followers who are true believers; and even longstanding methods of 

social repression such as India’s caste system are often supported and 

reinforced by the people they victimize. However, systematic coercion 

can also breed a system in which individuals become used to keeping 

two sets of opinions, one public and one private. Protests and passive 

resistance (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10) also provide 

strong social coercion to influence the undecided or uncommitted.

Timur Kuran has studied the effects of preference falsification and 

has a book on the topic called Public Truths, Private Lies.

60 Kuran argues, 

first, that authoritarian regimes are different from other societies only 

in degree, not kind—every socialized adult routinely has opinions that 

they keep to themselves and makes public statements that do not fully 

match private feelings. An economist, Kuran describes the decision 

whether to express an opinion in terms of economic costs. Individuals often judge the benefit of expressing a true preference to be lower 

than the potential costs in terms of personal influence, opportunity 

for advancement, and freedom from persecution, leading to systematic falsification even in the absence of direct coercion. An individual 

may calculate that it is wisest to verbally support a despised government even in situations where there is little to no chance of being overheard. Widespread preference falsification can keep undesirable social 

structures in place indefinitely, even though they benefit few and harm 

many. However, when circumstances change, the cost of expressing 

contrary opinions even slightly, usually when a critical mass of protestors makes dissent suddenly seem less risky, the result can be very sudden, unplanned revolutionary uprisings such as the French Revolution 

and the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. The rapidity of 

these changes often comes as a surprise even to their leaders and participants. Kuran refers to coerced support for Middle Eastern dictators 

frequently, and his book, written in 1995, seems prescient of the “Arab 

Spring” uprisings less than a decade later.
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

261

ROLE OF NARRATIVES IN JUSTIFYING INSURGENT 

MOVEMENTS

Insurgent groups often employ narratives as a means of communicating grievances, goals, and justifications for their actions within a 

story-like framework. A narrative has three distinct elements: (1) actors 

and the physical, social, and informational environment within which 

they operate; (2) events along a temporal continuum; and (3) causality, 

which is the attribution of cause and effect relative to the first two elements.61 A narrative serves as an organizing framework through which 

individuals can make sense of their world62 and provides insight into 

the beliefs, norms, and values of a group.63 Narratives facilitate sensemaking, the process of interpretation, and production of meaning, 

whereby individuals and groups decipher and reflect on phenomena.64

Sense-making enables individuals to conceive and formulate their 

social environment, creating a shared worldview among members of a 

particular in-group.

Al Qaeda’s strength and appeal did not lay solely in its sophisticated 

theological discourse, but also in its ability to comprehend, co-opt, 

and exploit modern grievances. This narrative combination resonated 

with extremists and moderates alike, regardless of whether the individual approved of the means by which Al Qaeda sought to accomplish 

its goals.65 Al Qaeda’s narrative, for example, was best exemplified in 

Osama bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa entitled “Declaration of War against the 

Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” The 12,000-

word statement appealed to the social identity of Muslims and established a clear out-group by saying “the people of Islam had suffered 

from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the ZionistCrusaders alliance and their collaborators . . . .”66

An effective narrative is a simple, unifying, easily expressed concept 

that organizes subjective experience and provides a framework through 

which one can perceive his or her environment.67 To understand why 

a narrative resonates with a specific target audience, one must understand how members of that audience view themselves, their in-group, 

and relations among the collective groups comprising society. At the 

group to societal level, a well-crafted message that appeals to a variety 

of vulnerabilities (sociocultural symbols, individual affective vulnerability, etc.) within a selected target audience will help create an environment that incentivizes participation.c

 Bin Laden not only appealed 

c This is increasingly so in relatively closed environments in which it is more difficult 

to gain access to alternative explanations through additional information resources or in 

environments in which there is a social or historical predisposition (or bias) toward a particular interpretation.
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to Muslims’ sense of victimization, but also attempted to embolden and 

empower them to support his movement. He claimed, “The people 

of Islam awakened and realized that they are the main target for the 

aggression of the Zionist-Crusaders alliance” then “from here, today 

we begin the work, talking and discussing the ways of correcting what 

had happened to the Islamic world in general, and the Land of the 

two Holy Places in particular.”68 His criticism of Arab leaders, however, 

was not simply unsupported rhetoric; he provided specific examples 

of decisions made by (in particular) the Saudi Arabian government 

that are contradictory to Quranic values such as the subordination of 

Shari’a to the rule of law and the permission to billet foreign forces 

(namely the United States) on the Saudi peninsula starting in 1990.

Framing describes the narratives social movements employ to 

engender support. Frame alignment is the “linkage of individual and 

[social movement organization] interpretative orientations, such that 

some set of individual interests, values, beliefs and [social movement 

organization] activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”69 Frames link grievances to specific goals, actions, and justifications for those actions. The 1996 declaration articulated Al Qaeda’s 

grievances, but the 1998 joint fatwa with bin Laden, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Egyptian Islamic Jihad [EIJ]), and Rifi Taha (Egyptian Islamic 

Group [EIG]) provided the religious justification as well as a challenge 

to Muslims. Under the title “World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders,” the fatwa read:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible 

to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosqued and 

the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their 

armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated 

and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, “and fight the 

pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and 

“fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”70

Different types of movements will employ different types of narratives. A recent study71 done in parallel with this book examined the 

correspondence of common narrative themes with types of movements. Insurgent movements were classified into five types: Revolution 

to Modify the Type of Government, Revolution Based on Identity or 

d The Al Aqsa Mosque, considered Islam’s third holiest site, is located in East Jerusalem, the proposed capital of an eventual Palestinian state.
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

263

Ethnic Issues, Revolution to Drive Out a Foreign Power, Revolution 

Based on Religious Fundamentalism, and Revolution for Modernization or Reform.

Table 9-1. Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies 

(ARIS) dataset.

Type of 

Movement Group

Revolution to 

Modify the Type 

of Government

New People’s Army (NPA)

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) and 

the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Sendero Luminoso

Iranian Revolution of 1979

Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or 

FMLN) of El Salvador

Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)

Revolution Based 

on Identity or 

Ethnic Issues

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Hutu-Tutsi genocides

Ushtia Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation 

Army, or KLA)

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

Revolution to 

Drive Out a 

Foreign Power

Afghan mujahidin

Viet Cong (VC)

Chechen Revolution

Hizbollah

Hizbul mujahidin (HM)

Revolution Based 

on Religious 

Fundamentalism

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)

Taliban

Al Qaeda (AQ)

Revolution for 

Modernization or 

Reform

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 

(MEND)

Orange Revolution of Ukraine

Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Polish Solidarity

Experts knowledgeable in both the history and communications of 

twenty-three insurgent groups (shown by type in Table 9-1) rated each 

as to the most common narrative elements used by these movements. 
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There is some subjectivity and overlap in both the matching of movements to types and the identification of common themes, but the overall pattern is nevertheless interesting.

Table 9-2. Distribution of narrative themes across ARIS categories. Operational Code Category Revolution to Modify the Type of Government Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues Revolution to Drive Out a Foreign Power Revolution Based on Reli- gious Funda- mentalism Revolution for Modernization or Reform

Expel 

foreign 

power and 

reestablish 

status quo

PLO

Reform 

(antisecularism)

EIJ, AQ

Moral center 

of gravity

Sendero 

Luminoso, 

Iranian 

Revolution

Reform 

(economic)

FARC/ELN MEND, 

RUF, 

Solidarity

Self-interest 

(material)

FARC/

ELN, 

FMLN

MEND, 

RUF

Religious 

exclusionism

Chechen 

Revolution, 

EIJ, 

Taliban, 

AQ

Illegitimate 

state 

(political 

difference)

FMLN VC, 

Chechen 

Revolution

EIJ, AQ

Reform 

(institutional)

FMLN, 

Sendero 

Luminoso

Orange 

Revolution, 

Solidarity
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

265

Operational 

Code Category

Revolution 

to Modify 

the Type of 

Government

Revolution 

Based on 

Identity or 

Ethnic Issues

Revolution to 

Drive Out a 

Foreign Power

Revolution 

Based on Religious Fundamentalism

Revolution for 

Modernization 

or Reform

Illegitimate 

state 

(ideological 

difference)

NPA, 

Sendero 

Luminoso, 

Iranian 

Revolution, 

FMLN

PLO EIJ

Illegitimate 

state 

(foreign 

influence on 

leader)

NPA, 

Sendero 

Luminoso, 

Iranian 

Revolution

EIJ, Taliban MEND

Separatism 

(separate 

state)

KNLA LTTE, 

PLO, 

Euskadi Ta 

Askatasuna 

(ETA), 

KLA, PIRA

Heroic 

dynamics

KNLA LTTE, ETA, 

PIRA

VC

Illegitimate 

state (lack of 

security)

LTTE, 

PLO, ETA, 

KLA, PIRA, 

Hutu-Tutsi

Taliban

In-group 

self-determination

KNLA LTTE, 

PLO, ETA, 

KLA, PIRA, 

Hutu-Tutsi

MEND

Martyrdom Iranian 

Revolution

LTTE, 

PLO, PIRA

Hizbollah EIJ, AQ

Illegitimate 

state (lack of 

services)

NPA, 

FMLN

PIRA Afghan 

mujahidin, 

VC

Taliban MEND, 

RUF, 

Solidarity

Oppressive 

state

Iranian 

Revolution, 

FMLN, 

KNLA

LTTE, 

PLO, KLA, 

PIRA

EIJ
266

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations Operational Code Category Revolution to Modify the Type of Government Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues Revolution to 

Drive Out a 

Foreign Power

Revolution 

Based on Religious Fundamentalism

Revolution for 

Modernization 

or Reform

Expel 

foreign 

power and 

reform

PIRA Afghan 

mujahidin, VC, 

Chechen 

Revolution, 

Hizbollah, 

HM

Taliban MEND

Inherent 

nobility 

of cause 

and/or 

participants

KNLA ETA, PIRA Hizbollah, 

HM

EIJ, AQ Solidarity
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

267

In Revolutions to Modify the Type of Government, such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the FMLN of El Salvador, class arguments, 

emphasizing the illegitimacy of the state, is a frequent narrative theme. 

These groups are highly dependent on a large or powerful segment of 

the population not having its socioeconomics needs being met by the 

current governmental system as well as a mature ideological alternative 

system to propose. Class arguments are quite prevalent.

The next type of group, “Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic 

Issues,” includes groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Euskadi Ta 

Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA). These types of 

movements often occur where colonialism or war has artificially combined various ethnic or identity groups into the same government, with 

one side having preferential treatment, over-representation, or dominant political voice. A contributing factor is also the current governmental system’s fragility or constraints for accommodating concessions 

or evolution to a more egalitarian system. The important factors within 

this type are the creation/use of a narrative that distinguishes the disaffected group from the ruling group as a unique cultural/social unit. 

As the data suggest, these groups advocate strongly for self-determination and/or preservation of their heritage. The recurrence of the “Ingroup self-determination” content code in each of the cases and the 

“Illegitimate state (lack of security)” code appearing in five of the six 

help account for the degree of similarity.

“Revolutions to Drive Out a Foreign Power,” represented by the 

Afghan mujahidin, Viet Cong (VC), the Chechen Revolution, Hizbollah, and Hizbul mujahidin, result from a segment of the population 

trying to oust a foreign occupier, colonial ruler, or a foreign military 

presence. Common narrative themes are the desire for independence, 

the need for reform, and the illegitimacy of the occupying power.

“Revolutions Based on Religious Fundamentalism,” which include 

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the Taliban, and Al Qaeda, are heavily 

dependent on religious scholarship, both in terms of motivation as well 

as legitimacy, and incorporate appropriate themes and symbology into 

their narratives. They tend to derive legitimacy from their adherence 

to a particular interpretation (not necessarily a widely or academically 

accepted interpretation) of their faith. Common themes are the evils 

of secularism, represented by the secular government, and the need 

for religious separation and purification. The intensity with which they 

delegitimize the state is often greater than with other groups, a trend 

evident in the psychological warfare tactics of both EIJ and Al Qaeda. 

The willingness to negotiate (at the strategic level) with the state is considerably less and is often on terms deemed unreasonable by the state.
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Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

The final category, “Revolutions for Modernization or Reform,” 

such as the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, the Revolutionary United 

Front (RUF), and Polish Solidarity, is categorically the least similar, but 

all movements share aspects relating to weakening states and their disintegration of powers and services. These groups tend to employ narratives that address a particular political issue (e.g., “Illegitimate state 

[lack of services]”) to engender support but not necessarily to incite 

violence. They rarely wish to acquire the responsibility of governance 

but rather want a degree of policy reform or political inclusion.

The clustering of narratives around a set of themes identifies referent trends; however, this is done so at a level of abstraction for ease of 

analysis and not operational relevance. The idiosyncratic application of 

each of these narratives is where comprehension of the local culture, 

symbology, and customs differentiates the individual movement from 

their group. To consider the FARC a Marxist group would be accurate 

but incomplete. The FARC did not rigidly adhere to Marxist-Leninist 

ideology; their pragmatism in dealing with farmers and narcotraffickers alike was more capitalistic. Their ideological evolution to Bolivarianism indicates an intellectual and cultural adaptability for which a 

broader classification cannot account. Furthermore, the PIRA was not 

a religious fundamentalist organization, but their recognition of Catholic symbolic reverence for those willing to sacrifice themselves for the 

larger good was clearly indicated during the hunger strikes. Organizations/movements such as Hizbollah and Al Qaeda that have a presence 

(however small) in many locations throughout the world retain a unifying strategic narrative but employ a far subtler and nuanced approach 

depending on their geographic location and functional responsibility. 

A Hizbollah operative recruiting in Lebanon will likely make the imminent threat of Israel more salient than a financier soliciting donations 

from the Lebanese diaspora in the Tri-Border Region of South America. Likewise, the franchised component of the Al Qaeda social movement that emerged from the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Bureau) 

during the Afghan resistance explicitly tailored their recruiting and 

fundraising themes to the local target audience.

SUMMARY

The study of influence encompasses research from a number of 

domains and includes both social and individual factors. Understanding person-to-person influence requires understanding of charisma, 

nonverbal communication, and leadership factors. Individuals are 

also strongly influenced by their social networks—so much so that facing uniform disagreement often induces conformity. Social identity 
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

269

categorizations are also important to understand how individuals synchronize their opinions with groups that they want to identify with, 

and avoid those that they do not. On the individual level, people are 

influenced by messages that have emotional appeal and appear to be 

relevant to their interests. Stress may narrow the attention of message 

recipients in traumatic situations to focus on basic needs; successful 

communicators must assess what level of messaging or persuasion a target audience is ready to receive. Research on rumors, particularly wartime rumors, illustrates how self-interest and emotional appeals attract 

and hold peoples’ attention. For those wishing to craft influential messages, the combination of words and actions is particularly powerful.

An understanding of cognitive dissonance, which is created when 

an individual’s desire to have a consistent and positive self-concept is 

disrupted, also sheds light on proven influence techniques such as the 

“foot in the door” process and reciprocity. Influence and associated 

cognitive effects vary by culture; research has shown some intriguing 

contrasts, particularly between collectivist and individualistic cultures.

Narratives provide a way to contextualize and justify grievances 

against the government. Narratives also frame a struggle and tie grievances to specific goals and actions. While there are many common 

themes between groups, different types of insurgent groups rely on different clusters of narrative types that are congruent with their goals.

ENDNOTES

1 Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People in the 

World,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 2–3 (2010): 61–83.

2 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 4th ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

3 Tanya L. Chartrand and Amy N. Dalton, “Mimicry: Its Ubiquity, Importance, and Functionality,” in Oxford Handbook of Human Actions, ed. Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh, and 

Peter M. Gollwitzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

4 Sigal G. Barsade, “The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group 

Behavior,” Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2002): 644.

5 Caroline A. Bartel and Richard Saaverda, “The Collective Construction of Work Group 

Moods,” Administrative Science Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2000): 197–231.

6 Arik Cheshin, Anat Rafaeli, and Nathan D. Bos, “Anger and Happiness in Virtual Teams: 

Emotional Influences of Text and Behavior on Others’ Affect in the Absence of NonVerbal Cues,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116, no. 1 (2011): 2–16.

7 Ellen S. Sullins, “Emotional Contagion Revisited: Effects of Social Comparison and 

Expressive Style on Mood Convergence,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17, no. 2 

(1991): 166–174.

8 Joyce Bono and Remus Ilies, “Charisma, Positive Emotions and Mood Contagion,” The 

Leadership Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2006): 317–334.

9 Chris L. Kleinke, “Gaze and Eye Contact: A Research Review,” Psychological Bulletin 100, 

no. 1 (1986): 78–100.
270

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10 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice, 4th ed. (Allyn and Bacon, 2001).

11 Solomon E. Asch, “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One 

Against a Unanimous Majority,” Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 70, no. 9 

(1956): 1–70.

12 Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, “The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in a 

Large Social Network,” The New England Journal of Medicine 358, no. 21 (2008): 2249–2258.

13 Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, “The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social 

Network Over 32 Years,” The New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 4 (2007): 370–379.

14 James H. Fowler and Nicholas A. Christakis, “Dynamic Spread of Happiness in a Large 

Social Network: Longitudinal Analysis Over 20 years in the Framingham Heart Study,” 

British Medical Journal 337 (2008): a2338.

15 Peter Grose, “Vietcong’s ‘Shadow Government’ in the South,” The New York Times Magazine, 1965.

16 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkley: University of California Press, 

2000).

17 Wendy Wood, Gregory J. Pool, Kira Leck, and Daniel Purvis, “Self-definition, Defensive 

Processing, and Influence: The Normative Impact of Majority and Minority Groups,” 

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 6 (1996): 1181–1193.

18 Harold H. Kelley, “Salience of Membership and Resistance to Change of GroupAnchored Attitudes,” American Sociological Review 17, no. 4 (1955): 453–465.

19 William E. Daugherty, “The Creed of a Modern Propagandist,” in A Psychological Warfare 

Casebook, ed. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, MD: Johns Hopkins 

Press, Operations Research Office, 1958): 35–46.

20 Charles Windle and T. R. Vallance, “The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary 

Psychology,” American Psychologist 19, no. 2 (1964): 119–129.

21 Ibid.

22 John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1992).

23 Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Inc., 1966).

24 Robert H. Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor,” Public Opinion Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1944): 22.

25 Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, “An Analysis of Rumor,” Public Opinion Quarterly 

10, no. 4 (1946): 501–517.

26 Stephanie R. Kelly, “Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds” (master’s 

thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).

27 Ibid., 20.

28 Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50 (1948): 

370–396.

29 Michael Lewis-Beck, “Economic Voting: An Introduction,” Electoral Studies 19, no. 2–3 

(2000): 113–121.

30 Leonardo R. Arriola, “Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and Opposition Support: Evidence from Ethiopia’s 2005 Elections,” Northeast African Studies 10, no. 1 (2008): 115–144.

31 Jeremy Youde, “Economics and Government Popularity in Ghana,” Electoral Studies 24, 

no. 1 (2005): 1–16.

32 Matthew Singer and Ryan E. Carlin, “Are Latin American Voters Campesinos o Empresarios? Economic Perceptions and Government Support 1995–2008” (paper presented at 

the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2011).

33 Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

34 Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 19, no. 1 (1986): 123–205.
Chapter 9. Psychology of Influence

271

35 Rhonda S. Zaharna, “Understanding Cultural Preferences of Arab Communication Patterns,” Public Relations Review 21, no. 3 (1995): 241–255.

36 Sang-pil Han and Sharon Shavitt, “Persuasion and Culture: Advertising Appeals in Individualistic and Collectivistic Societies,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 30, no. 4 

(1994): 326–350.

37 Ibid.

38 Daugherty, “Creed of a Modern Propogandist,” 39.

39 Petty and Cacioppo, “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion,” 123–205.

40 Michael Pfau, Kyle James Tusing, Waipeng Lee, Linda Goldbold, Ascan Koerner, Linda 

J. Penaloza, Yah-huei Hong, and Violet Shu-huei Yang, “Nuances in Inoculation: The 

Role of Inoculation Approach, Ego-Involvement, and Message Processing Disposition in 

Resistance,” Communication Quarterly 45, no. 4 (1997): 461–481.

41 W. J. McGuire and D. Papageorgis, “The Relative Efficacy of Various Types of Prior 

Belief-Defense in Producing Immunity Against Persuasion,” Journal of Abnormal and 

Social Psychology 62 (1961): 327–337.

42 Fred H. Barton, Salient Operation Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas, OROT-228 (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, 1953), 25.

43 Ibid., 90.

44 William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, Social Forces 

37 (Bethesda, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, Operations Research Office, 1958).

45 Eddie Harmon-Jones, “A Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion,” in 

The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2002), 99–116.

46 Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

47 Harry C. Triandis and Michele J. Gelfand, “Converging Measurement of Horizontal and 

Vertical Individualism and Collectivism,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, 

no. 1 (1998): 118–128.

48 Robert B. Cialdini, Wilhelmina Wosinska, Daniel Barrett, Jonathan Butner, and Malgorzata Gornik-Durose, “Compliance with a Request in Two Cultures: The Differential 

Influence of Social Proof and Commitment/Consistency on Collectivists and Individualists,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25, no. 10 (1999): 1242–1253.

49 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of 

South Vietnam (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966).

50 Ibid.

51 Juan DeDios Marin, “Inside a Castro ‘Terror School,’” The Readers Digest, 1964, 119–120.

52 Barton, Salient Operation Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare, 86.

53 General Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 76–81.

54 Douglas Pike, “The Communication Process of the Communist Apparatus in South Vietnam,” (unpublished manuscript, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, circa 1964), 39.

55 Ibid.

56 Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 

1963), 137.

57 William J. Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 43.

58 Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice.

59 Barton, Salient Operation Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare, 43.

60 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
61 Shaul R. Shenhav, “Political Narratives and Political Reality,” International Political Science 

Review 27, no. 3 (2006): 245–262.

62 Andrew D. Brown, Patrick Stacey, and Joe Nandhakumar, “Making Sense of Sensemaking Narratives,” Human Relations 61, no. 8 (2008): 1035–1064.

63 Montgomery McFate, Britt Damon, and Robert Holiday, “What Do Commanders Really 

Want to Know?,” in The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 92–113.

64 Brown, Stacey, and Nandhakumar, “Making Sense of Sensemaking Narratives.”

65 Jason Spitaletta and Shana Marshall, “Al Qaeda,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

66 “Bin Laden’s Fatwa,” August  1996, reprinted at PBS Newshour, http://www.pbs.org/

newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html?print, accessed February 24, 2012.

67 David J. Killcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

68 “Bin Laden’s Fatwa.”

69 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 

Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–481.

70 As quoted in Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

71 Chuck Crossett, Summer Newton, and Jason Spitaletta, “The Role of Narrative in Insurgent and Revolutionary Warfare: Examples from 24 Case Studies Spanning 1962–2009,” 

Journal of Cultural Intelligence (in press).
CHAPTER 10.

NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Objectives ................................................................................................275

Techniques ..............................................................................................279

Attention-Getting Devices..................................................................283

Noncooperation..................................................................................287

Civil Disobedience ..............................................................................288

Organization...........................................................................................290

Legitimacy ...............................................................................................293

Normative Factors...............................................................................293

Mystical Factors...................................................................................295

Consensual Validation........................................................................296

Communication and Propaganda .........................................................297

Training ...............................................................................................299

Riots and Demonstrations......................................................................300

Colombia (1948) .................................................................................302

Seattle, Washington (1999) ................................................................305

Shadow Government Structure..............................................................309

Summary ................................................................................................ 310
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

275

Jason Spitaletta and SORO authors

Nonviolent resistance has long been a method and corollary of 

human conflict, playing a role in many underground and revolutionary activities. Although both the role and, particularly, the process of 

passive resistance have sometimes been obscured by philosophic and 

religious considerations, its tactics remain much the same, whether 

practiced by a figure as prominent as Gandhi from moral and religious 

convictions or by a pragmatic underground as an expedient. Typically, 

the underground organizes and directs passive resistance techniques 

and persuades the ordinary citizen to carry them out. These types of 

action can be described as activism in opposition to radicalism.

Nonviolent resistance and mass mobilization have contributed to 

significant revolution in the past thirty years: the Solidarity movement 

in Poland during the 1980s saw disparate labor strikers organize and 

ultimately unseat the Communist regime, the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution in the Ukraine saw mass mobilization and broad civil disobedience usher in a democratic electoral process, and the January 2011 

Lotus Revolution saw a disparate group of Egyptians occupy Tahrir 

Square in Cairo until President Hosni Mubarak relinquished his presidency after thirty years.

The twenty-first century has witnessed a synthesis of the global technological networks that link computers on the Internet and the social 

networks that have connected humans since the dawn of the species.1

Many innovative forms of protest have emerged in the post-Cold War 

era. Although few have managed to mobilize a sufficient number to displace a regime, they have provided a forum for a youthful demographic 

to engage in creative, often social-media-directed alternatives to the 

picketing and chants their elders employed.2

OBJECTIVES

Passive resistance implies a large, unarmed group whose activities 

capitalize on social norms, customs, and taboos in order to provoke 

action by security forces that will serve to alienate large segments of 

public opinion from the government or its agents. If the government 

does not respond to the passive resisters’ actions, the resisters will 

immobilize the processes of public order and safety and seriously challenge the writ of government. Passive resistance rests on the basic thesis that governments and social organizations, even when they possess 

instruments of physical force, depend on the voluntary assistance and 

cooperation of great numbers of individuals.3

 One method, therefore, 
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Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

of opposing an established power structure is to persuade many persons to refuse to cooperate with it.

The principal tactic used to induce noncooperation—tacit withdrawal of the populace support of the government—is frequently 

described as persuasion through suffering. One of the persistent myths 

of passive resistance is that persuasion through suffering aims only to 

persuade the opponent and his supporting populace by forcing him to 

experience a guilty change of heart and a sense of remorse. “The sight 

of suffering on the part of multitudes of people will melt the heart of 

the aggressor and induce him to desist from his course of violence.”4

This conception of the role of suffering makes the fundamental error 

of presuming that only two actors are involved in the process of passive resistance: the suffering resister and the opponent. Actually, passive resistance operates within a framework involving three actors: the 

suffering passive resister, the opponent (the government and security 

forces), and the larger “audience” (the population). Every conflict 

situation is dramatically affected by the extent to which the audience 

becomes involved.

This “contagiousness of conflict”5

 inevitably occurs in the nature 

of the conflict when the audience is included as a third actor. The 

original participants are apt to lose control or, at the least, the outcome is greatly influenced. It is most important in politics to determine the manner and extent to which the scope of conflict influences 

the outcome, and how to manipulate that outcome. Passive resistance 

techniques, particularly the function of suffering, provide one insight 

into the manipulation of “the contagiousness of conflict.” More than 

anything else, the objective of passive resistance is to create situations 

that will involve public opinion and direct it against the established 

power structure. When this happens, the position of the passive resisters is legitimized. While not explicitly linked with the ongoing nonviolent civil rights movement, the conflict in Northern Ireland became 

increasingly violent on January 30, 1972, in Derry when British paratroopers of the First Battalion of the Parachute Regiment fired on a 

crowd of anti-internment demonstrators, killing thirteen and wounding another thirteen. All the injured were Catholic, seven of whom were 

under nineteen years of age. The events of “Bloody Sunday” brought 

strong about reactions from both the Republic of Ireland and the 

Catholic community in Northern Ireland as well as the international 

community. The event was followed by a decision by the British prime 

minister to suspend the Northern Irish parliament and assume direct 

governance. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) responded 

with an escalation of violence.6
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

277

When the passive resister suffers at the hand of the government, 

it demonstrates his integrity, commitment, and courage, while showing the injustice, cruelty, and tyranny of the government. The essential 

function of suffering is comparable to the interaction that takes place 

between a martyr and a crowd. The passive resister’s token to power in 

the face of the security force is his capacity to suffer in the eyes of the 

onlooker. The courage and dedication of an unresisting martyr can 

have a tremendous impact on the imagination of a crowd.7

If the passive resister provokes a response from the security forces 

or government that can be made to seem unjust or unfair, his charges 

of tyranny and persecution are confirmed. Should the government 

fail to act, it abdicates its control over the population, over the enforcement of law, and over the maintenance of order. Passive resistance 

techniques suddenly thrust upon a government the initiative, and also 

the responsibility, for uninvited conflict with unarmed citizens. Jujitsu 

politics (see Chapter 6: Group Dynamics and Radicalization) is when a 

population is mobilized by conflict between two groups in which one 

(usually the government) has aggressively/excessively responded to 

the other, promoting sympathy and outrage.8

 In this context, jujitsu 

politics refers to the use of a state’s (or political adversary’s) momentum against itself by a less resourced entity. This mechanism is a generalization of group dynamic theory and states that a group seeks to 

influence potential sympathizers by reframing the out-group threat. 

By identifying the out-group as a threat to that in-group reference, 

and capitalizing on the outrage to the recent over-reaction, those 

potential sympathizers can be swayed and/or mobilized without much 

expended effort on the part of the radical group.9 Carlos Marighella, 

in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, advocated this tactic as a highly 

effective means of cultivating popular support. Instead of compelling 

the populace to join an insurgent cause, the insurgents would provoke the state to react violently and indiscriminately, thus driving the 

populace into the arms of the insurgents.10 Al Qaeda in Iraq and the 

Taliban in Afghanistan have employed variations of his tactic against 

U.S. forces.11

Demonstrations and festivals, even if not politically motivated, can 

be co-opted and exploited by nefarious actors. The Tamil New Tigers 

(TNT) group was the forerunner and vanguard of the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group that at its height was among 

the most innovative, ruthless, and well-organized insurgent movements in recent history. In January 1974, Sri Lankan police attempted 

to dismantle and disperse the Fourth International Tamil Conference 

in Jaffna, resulting in the deaths of eleven Tamils—seven were electrocuted and four were trampled to death—and approximately fifty 
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Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

civilians sustaining severe injuries. The incident took place while Naina 

Mohamed, a distinguished Tamil scholar from India, was speaking to a 

crowd of thousands. Although the TNT did not instigate the police or 

incite the riot, they used the incident to rationalize the assassination of 

the Jaffna mayor in July 1975.12 The TNT framed the event as an intentional attack on their cultural heritage and commemorated it annually.

The primary function of passive resistance suffering is to redraw 

the political battle lines in favor of the resister. There are, of course, 

a number of variables that affect the effectiveness of suffering. One 

is the attitude and orientation of the opponent; success seems dependent on whether the opponent really cares how a population views 

him, whether he is attempting to win favor. However, if the opponent 

is unconcerned with popular opinion, passive resistance tactics are 

less likely to be effective. Leaders rarely operate with unlimited agency 

and are thus somewhat constrained (or certainly influenced by) the 

political environment. Also, the coercive effect depends on whether 

the opponents are the passive resisters’ own countrymen; if they are, 

common identity and nationalism tend to induce empathy. In some 

societies, passive suffering is viewed with contempt and is seen as masochism or “an exploitation of the rulers’ good-natured reluctance to 

allow unnecessary suffering, denying attributes of personal courage orvirtue to the sufferer.”13

In addition to alienating public opinion from a government, underground-sponsored passive resistance has two other equally important 

objectives. The first is to lower the morale of government officials and 

security forces. This goal is most relevant to occupying forces. Imposing 

casualties on a military force is but one way to lower morale; forcing soldiers to question not only the legitimacy of their cause but also the viability of success can erode capability from the inside out. Confronting

unarmed and nonviolent activists (particularly women and children) 

often undermines the ethos that serves as a cohesive force among militaries. The resultant stress may lower productivity (and thus increase 

manpower demands) and eventually cause psychological injuries 

among the forces. A second objective is to tie down security forces. 

By organizing and encouraging a citizenry to use techniques of passive resistance, the underground can successfully divert security forces 

from other tasks.14 The coordinated operations of a nonviolent wing 

and guerrillas can be extremely effective in disorienting security forces 

by preventing them from focusing on any one particular aspect of 

the insurgency.
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

279

TECHNIQUES

Among the most prominent theorists in nonviolent revolution is 

Dr. Gene Sharp,a

 whose compilation of nonviolent resistance tactics 

is included in Table  10-1. Operationalizing those who condemned 

violence from Gandhi to Thoreau, Sharp’s key theme is that political 

power is not derived from the intrinsic qualities of those in positions of 

authority. Rather, the power of any state is derived from the consent of 

the governed, and thus they possess the moral and political authority to 

take it back. Essentially, leaders lack power without the consent of the 

governed, and because the state may hold the monopoly on the use of 

force, nonviolent methods are the ideal means for the people to impose 

their will on the state.15 The arsenal of the passive resister contains a 

number of weapons of nonviolence. One reason these weapons may be 

effective is that the government forces may not know how to cope with 

nonviolence. Police and soldiers are trained to fight force with force 

but are usually “neither trained nor psychologically prepared to fight 

passive resistance.”16

Actions of passive resistance may range from small isolated challenges to specific laws to complete disregard of governmental authority, but the techniques of nonviolent resistance have be classified into 

three general types: attention-getting devices, noncooperation, and 

civil disobedience.

a As of December 2011, Dr. Sharp is a professor emeritus of political science at the 

University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth. Sharp has served as a professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, since 1972 and has held a research 

appointment at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs since 1965. He 

founded the Albert Einstein Institution, a nonprofit organization that studies and promotes the use of nonviolent tactics, in 1983.
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Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

Table 10-1. 198 Methods of nonviolent action.17

THE METHODS OF 

NONVIOLENT PROTEST 

AND PERSUASION

Formal Statements

1. Public speeches

2. Letters of opposition or support

3. Declarations by organizations 

and institutions

4. Signed public statements

5. Declarations of indictment and 

intention

6. Group or mass petitions

Communications with a Wider 

Audience

7. Slogans, caricatures, and 

symbols

8. Banners, posters, and displayed 

communications

9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books

10. Newspapers and journals

11. Records, radio, and television

12. Skywriting and earthwriting

Group Representations

13. Deputations

14. Mock awards

15. Group lobbying

16. Picketing

17. Mock elections

Symbolic Public Acts

18. Displays of flags and symbolic 

colors

19. Wearing of symbols

20. Prayer and worship

21. Delivering symbolic objects

22. Protest disrobings

23. Destruction of own property

24. Symbolic lights

25. Displays of portraits

26. Paint as protest

27. New signs and names

28. Symbolic sounds

29. Symbolic reclamations

30. Rude gestures

Pressures on Individuals

31. “Haunting” officials

32. Taunting officials

33. Fraternization

34. Vigils

Drama and Music

35. Humorous skits and pranks

36. Performances of plays and 

music

37. Singing

Processions

38. Marches

39. Parades

40. Religious processions

41. Pilgrimages

42. Motorcades

Honoring the Dead

43. Political mourning

44. Mock funerals

45. Demonstrative funerals

46. Homage at burial places

Public Assemblies

47. Assemblies of protest or 

support

48. Protest meetings

49. Camouflaged meetings of 

protest

50. Teach-ins

Withdrawal and Renunciation

51. Walk-outs

52. Silence

53. Renouncing honors

54. Turning one’s back

THE METHODS OF SOCIAL 

NONCOOPERATION

Ostracism of Persons

55. Social boycott

56. Selective social boycott

57. Lysistratic nonaction

58. Excommunication

59. Interdict
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Noncooperation with Social Events, 

Customs, and Institutions

60. Suspension of social and sports 

activities

61. Boycott of social affairs

62. Student strike

63. Social disobedience

64. Withdrawal from social 

institutions

Withdrawal from the Social System

65. Stay-at-home

66. Total personal noncooperation

67. “Flight” of workers

68. Sanctuary

69. Collective disappearance

70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC 

NONCOOPERATION: 

(1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS

Actions by Consumers

71. Consumers’ boycott

72. Nonconsumption of boycotted 

goods

73. Policy of austerity

74. Rent withholding

75. Refusal to rent

76. National consumers’ boycott

77. International consumers’ 

boycott

Action by Workers and Producers

78. Workmen’s boycott

79. Producers’ boycott

Action by Middlemen

80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ 

boycott

Action by Owners and Management

81. Traders’ boycott

82. Refusal to let or sell property

83. Lockout

84. Refusal of industrial assistance

85. Merchants’ “general strike”

Action by Holders of Financial 

Resources

86. Withdrawal of bank deposits

87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and 

assessments

88. Refusal to pay debts or interest

89. Severance of funds and credit

90. Revenue refusal

91. Refusal of a government’s 

money

Action by Governments

92. Domestic embargo

93. Blacklisting of traders

94. International sellers’ embargo

95. International buyers’ embargo

96. International trade embargo

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC 

NONCOOPERATION: 

(2) THE STRIKE

Symbolic Strikes

97. Protest strike

98. Quickie walkout (lightning 

strike)

Agricultural Strikes

99. Peasant strike

100. Farm workers’ strike

Strikes by Special Groups

101. Refusal of impressed labor

102. Prisoners’ strike

103. Craft strike

104. Professional strike

Ordinary Industrial Strikes

105. Establishment strike

106. Industry strike

107. Sympathetic strike

Restricted Strikes

108. Detailed strike

109. Bumper strike

110. Slowdown strike

111. Working-to-rule strike

112. Reporting “sick” (sick-in)

113. Strike by resignation

114. Limited strike

115. Selective strike

Multi-Industry Strikes

116. Generalized strike

117. General strike
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Combination of Strikes and 

Economic Closures

118. Hartal

119. Economic shutdown

THE METHODS OF POLITICAL 

NONCOOPERATION

Rejection of Authority

120. Withholding or withdrawal of 

allegiance

121. Refusal of public support

122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

Citizens’ Noncooperation with 

Government

123. Boycott of legislative bodies

124. Boycott of elections

125. Boycott of government employment and positions

126. Boycott of government depts., 

agencies, and other bodies

127. Withdrawal from government 

educational institutions

128. Boycott of government-supported organizations

129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents

130. Removal of own signs and 

placemarks

131. Refusal to accept appointed 

officials

132. Refusal to dissolve existing 

institutions

Citizens’ Alternatives to Obedience

133. Reluctant and slow compliance

134. Nonobedience in absence of 

direct supervision

135. Popular nonobedience

136. Disguised disobedience

137. Refusal of an assemblage or 

meeting to disperse

138. Sitdown

139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation

140. Hiding, escape, and false 

identities

141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws

Action by Government Personnel

142. Selective refusal of assistance 

by government aides

143. Blocking of lines of command 

and information

144. Stalling and obstruction

145. General administrative 

noncooperation

146. Judicial noncooperation

147. Deliberate inefficiency and 

selective noncooperation by 

enforcement agents

148. Mutiny

Domestic Governmental Action

149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays

150. Noncooperation by constituent 

governmental units

International Governmental Action

151. Changes in diplomatic and 

other representations

152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events

153. Withholding of diplomatic 

recognition

154. Severance of diplomatic 

relations

155. Withdrawal from international 

organizations

156. Refusal of membership in international bodies

157. Expulsion from international 

organizations

THE METHODS OF 

NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION

Psychological Intervention

158. Self-exposure to the elements

159. The fast

a) Fast of moral pressure

b) Hunger strike

c) Satyagrahic fast

160. Reverse trial

161. Nonviolent harassment
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Physical Intervention

162. Sit-in

163. Stand-in

164. Ride-in

165. Wade-in

166. Mill-in

167. Pray-in

168. Nonviolent raids

169. Nonviolent air raids

170. Nonviolent invasion

171. Nonviolent interjection

172. Nonviolent obstruction

173. Nonviolent occupation

Social Intervention

174. Establishing new social patterns

175. Overloading of facilities

176. Stall-in

177. Speak-in

178. Guerrilla theater

179. Alternative social institutions

180. Alternative communication 

system

Economic Intervention

181. Reverse strike

182. Stay-in strike

183. Nonviolent land seizure

184. Defiance of blockades

185. Politically motivated 

counterfeiting

186. Preclusive purchasing

187. Seizure of assets

188. Dumping

189. Selective patronage

190. Alternative markets

191. Alternative transportation 

systems

192. Alternative economic 

institutions

Political Intervention

193. Overloading of administrative 

systems

194. Disclosing identities of secret 

agents

195. Seeking imprisonment

196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” 

laws

197. Work-on without collaboration

198. Dual sovereignty and parallel 

government

Attention-Getting Devices

Passive resistance in the early stages usually takes the form of 

actions calculated to gain attention, provide propaganda for the cause, 

or be a nuisance to government forces. These dilemma actions force 

the authorities to choose between allowing such activities to continue 

and taking the risk that they will build into something significant and 

imposing harsh punishment on people who are engaged in a seemingly 

benign activity.18 Attention-getting devices include demonstrations, 

mass meetings, picketing, and the creation of symbols: Demonstrations and picketing help advertise the resistance campaign and educate the larger public about the issues at stake. Such activities provide 

propaganda and agitation for both internal and external consumption. 

An example of this was the 1963 Buddhist protest in South Vietnam. 

The self-immolation of a Buddhist monk was strategically timed to 

ensure that newsmen and photographers—particularly U.S. reporters—would be present to record the event. The leader of the Buddhists, 

Thich Tri Quang, wanted publicity in the U.S. press and took pains to 

make U.S. reporters welcome.19 The upheaval in Tunisia that began 
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December  17,  2010, had similar, though less intentional, origins. In 

the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, a 26-year-old fruit vendor 

named Mohammed Bouazizi performed an act of self-immolation to 

protest the humiliating tactics of local officials. The act jolted Tunisians, and dozens (later hundreds then thousands) began protesting 

in the streets. The protestors ultimately clashed with Tunisian security 

forces, resulting in the deaths of approximately one hundred individuals throughout the country. The protest resulted in the renunciation of 

power and exodus of President Ben Ali (who had been in power since 

November 1987) on January 14, 2011.20

Symbolic interactionismb holds that individuals act toward things 

based on the meanings ascribed to those things21 and thus the creation 

of symbols is also a common passive resistance device. Gandhi’s exhortation for Indians to use the rudimentary spinning wheel to spin their 

own cloth and not depend on British factories was so resonant a symbol 

of Indian resistance to the Raj that today it is on the Indian national 

flag. Besides gaining attention, the Buddhist monks who immolated 

themselves—particularly the first, whose heart was preserved and displayed in Saigon’s Xa Loi Pagoda—also became symbols for the resistance campaign. An example of another kind of symbol is seen in the 

Danish resistance movement against the Nazis. King Christian became 

a symbol embodying the spirit of the passive resistance struggle. The 

King’s traditional morning ride through Copenhagen on his statuesque 

horse, unaccompanied by police or aides-de-camp, even months after 

the Nazi occupation began, gained national attention. As the Danish 

poet Kaj Munk wrote then: “It does us good, as if it says to us, Denmark 

is still in the saddle.”22 The King also kept his royal standard flying both 

day and night over his palace, indicating he was always ready—either to 

negotiate with the Germans or lead his people. Protest puppetry (the 

use of large puppets to represent an issue to bystanders, the media, 

and others) has been used in demonstrations in Seattle, Washington; 

New York City; and Windsor, Ontario.23 Protest (or radical) puppetry 

is a confluence of performance art and social messaging that seeks 

to represent social concerns through readily identifiable caricatures24

Activists seeking to bring attention to environmental issues, nuclear 

disarmament, racism, substance abuse, peer pressure, sexism, and 

homelessness have employed this device.25

b There are three underlying premises of the theory: individuals act toward things 

based on the ascribed meaning of said things, the meaning of such things is derived from 

the social interaction an individual has with others and the society, and these meanings 

are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the individual in 

dealing with the things he or she encounters.
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285

Few symbols are more resonant than the martyr, particularly in 

groups and/or cultures where there is a heightened sense of heroism 

associated with fallen members and where the community supports 

and rallies around families of the fallen or incarcerated. Families of 

fallen or incarcerated members are given enhanced social status (as 

well as financial and/or material support). Voluntary participation—be 

it religious or politically motivated—in the cause is considered a victory. As with other phenomena, as individuals adopt this view of success, their own self-image becomes more intimately intertwined with 

the success of the organization.26 In January  1978, Iranian internal 

security forces (SAVAK) responded brutally to protests by Ruhollah 

Khomeini’s students in Qom. At least seventy were killed over two days; 

the incident was tipping point for the movement, which shifted from an 

anti-Shah movement dominated by the secular opposition to one led by 

religious leaders (or ulema), particularly Khomeini. The cycle of fortyday commemorations consistent with the tenets of Shia Islamc

 started 

that February to honor those killed in Qom, and thereafter, every time 

a demonstrator was killed, individuals knew exactly when and where 

the next event would occur. Riots and protests soon spread to other 

cities around Iran, and each cycle of the forty-day commemorations 

saw an increase in participation and potency, with new martyrs being 

generated at each commemoration.27

Humor can facilitate outreach and mobilization, a culture of 

resistance, and an inversion of oppression.28 Humor attracts members though its engendered energy, creativity, and enjoyment. This 

in turn increases in-group cohesion by boosting morale by comically 

exacerbating in-group/out-group differences. Finally, humor enables 

the change agent to seize the sociopolitical momentum by provoking, 

mocking, and/or ridiculing; reduce the fear associated with confronting a regime; and constrain the regime’s response options.29 Humor 

can also be used to provoke an enemy and demonstrate contempt. This 

technique was used by most passive resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe. Sometimes it took the form of shouting anti-Nazi jokes in 

a cinema hall showing German films, or of little jokes made in public 

about Nazi repression policies, like the Danish streetcar conductor calling out, “All saboteurs change here.”30 The Serbian youth movement 

c Arbaeen, which means “forty” in Arabic, is a Shia religious observation that occurs 

forty days after the Day of Ashura, the commemoration of the martyrdom and beheading of Imam Husayn Ibn Ali (who along with seventy-two supporters died in the Battle of 

Karbala in 680 CE), the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Forty days is the typical 

mourning period in many Islamic cultures.
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Otpor!d used public theater and satire through various forms of media 

in concert with more “traditional” approaches to nonviolent resistance 

such as demonstrations, concerts, electoral politics, general strikes, and 

even the occupation of government buildings and disruption of traffic. 

Otpor! created publicity by spreading handbills, posters, and graffiti 

showing their symbol (a clenched fist) throughout the country and by 

having political cartoonists incorporate incongruity and absurdity into 

their products.31

Ostracism campaigns, accusations, whispering campaigns, and 

refusal to speak or be friendly are also frequent techniques. In the antiNazi resistance, these occasionally developed spontaneously; later, they 

were often organized by the undergrounds. In Denmark, these techniques were labeled Den kolde Skulder (the cold shoulder) policy, and 

many people wore buttons initialed DKS or SDU (Smid dem ud, or throw 

them out). Open contempt was displayed: “If a German military band 

gave a concert in a public place, they did so without a single listener. 

If Germans entered a cafe, at a given signal all Danes then rose and 

left.”32 In Belgium, similar activities were organized. One illustration of 

the type of witticism that helped the Belgian morale and enraged the 

Germans centered on the proposed German invasion of England: “An 

attractive housewife entered a store just before a German officer, who 

of course told the storekeeper to help the lady first. The lady declined 

and stated she did not wish to delay the officer who was probably in a 

hurry to catch his ship for England.”33 Also, anti-German inscriptions 

began to appear on the sides of buildings, on sidewalks, and on streets. 

In fact, one ingenious Belgian reportedly cut letters spelling “Down 

with the Boche” into the rims of his automobile tires and then filled 

the letters with paint, so that the slogan was painted continuously down 

the middle of the street.34 Such programs served dual purposes: they 

lowered the morale of the Germans while at the same time raising the 

morale of the populace, creating a feeling of defiance and unity that 

could be later channeled into more significant resistance activity.

d Otpor! (“resistance” in Serbian) was an influential youth movement in Serbia 

from 1998 to 2003 that engaged in a two-year-long, successful nonviolent struggle against 

Slobodon Milosevic. Otpor! was formed in Belgrade in response to repressive university 

and media laws introduced earlier that year. The group primarily consisted of members 

of the Democratic Party Serbia (DS) youth wing, members of various nongovernmental 

organizations that operated in Serbia, and university students (many of whom were veterans of anti-Milosevic demonstrations). The organization quickly gained prominence 

as anti-regime media outlets started featuring the clenched fist symbol in open defiance 

of Serbia’s information law. In the aftermath of the 1999 NATO bombing, Otpor! demonstrations resulted in nationwide police repression, resulting the arrests of over 2,000 

activists, some of whom claimed to have been beaten in custody. After Milosevic’s 2000 

resignation, the organization became an international resistance cause célèbre and eventually (2003) transformed into a political party. It eventually merged back into the DS 

in 2004.
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287

Nuisance activities vary greatly. They may be offensive personal acts 

against the opponent, such as the Algerian children publicly spitting 

on French soldiers. If a soldier struck a child, public opinion against 

the French would solidify all the more. The soldier felt humiliated 

and was clearly shown how the populace felt about his presence. Similar accounts exist with pro-PIRA children on the streets of Belfast. 

Another nuisance device is to overload the government security system 

with reports of suspicious incidents and persons. By following government instructions, large numbers of people can turn in false alarms 

or make unfounded denunciations of people who are suspected of 

aiding the enemy and in this way so overload governmental authority 

that valid reports cannot be handled. This technique has frequently 

been used against the block-warden surveillance system of countering 

underground activities.

The confluence of performance art, political theater, and social 

activism in the early twenty-first century has seen many of these tactics 

employed in pursuit of rather specific objectives. FEMEN is a Ukrainian activist group that seeks to publicize and eradicate the sex tourism trade among other social issues. Their provocative (and public) use 

of eroticism has brought them vindication and condemnation.35 Their 

tactics typically employ disruption using topless activists (engaging in 

what Sharp refers to as “protest disrobing”) who engage in a form of 

public theater documented by their internal media team and reporters, 

photographers, and videographers. The themes of these events have 

ranged from the corrupt Ukrainian political system, to sex tourism, to 

students’ rights, to a variety of governmental policies/actions deemed 

unfair to the masses. While FEMEN’s approach has been criticized 

as more of a novelty sideshow, their efforts have helped to catalyze a 

nascent feminist movement that emerged from the post-Soviet era society.36 While their efforts have brought some attention to their issues, 

the group has indicated their intention to evolve into a political party 

(much like Otpor!) and formerly participate in the political process.

Noncooperation

Techniques of noncooperation call for a passive resister to perform 

normal activities in a slightly contrived way, but not so that police or 

government can accuse him of breaking ordinary laws. Activities such 

as “slowdowns,” boycotts of all kinds, and various forms of disassociation from government are all examples of noncooperation. There are 

numerous examples of noncooperation in the anti-Nazi resistance 

movements, including falsification of blueprints and deliberate errors 

in adjustment of machine tools and precision instruments.37 Workers 
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Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

in shipping departments of Nazi factories addressed shipments to the 

wrong address or conveniently forgot to include items in the shipments. 

Feigned sickness was widespread.38

These acts of noncooperation impeded the war effort while appearing simply to be honest mistakes. In Yugoslavia railroad workers used 

a particularly effective noncooperation technique: during an Allied 

air raid, they deserted their jobs and, after the raid, they stayed away 

for twenty-four hours or more because of “feigned fear.” This seriously 

delayed railway traffic.39

Noncooperation is a principal tool of passive resistance and has 

been shown to be most effective in disrupting the normal processes of 

society and severely hampering and challenging the writ of a government—all in a way that is difficult for the government and its security 

forces to challenge. Many individuals altering their normal behavior 

only slightly can add up to a society behaving most abnormally.

Civil Disobedience

Mass participation in deliberately unlawful acts, though generally misdemeanors, constitutes civil disobedience. This is perhaps the 

most extreme weapon of passive resistance; the boundary between 

misdemeanors and serious crimes can be considered the dividing line 

between nonviolent and violent resistance. Forms of civil disobedience 

include the breaking of specific laws, such as tax laws (nonpayment 

of taxes), traffic laws (disrupting traffic), and laws prohibiting meetings, publications, free speech, and so on. Civil disobedience can also 

take the form of certain kinds of strikes and walkouts, resignations en 

masse, and minor destruction of public or private property.

In Palestine, after the Haganah raided the British and hid in a 

nearby village, passive resistance by the Jewish population was effective 

in preventing their capture. When the police began a search, people 

vigorously refused them entrance to their homes, stopping only short of 

using arms; hand-to-hand fighting with bricks and stones often broke 

out, and first-aid stations were set up to treat the injured. At the first 

sign of a British cordon, a gong or siren would sound, and at this signal 

villagers from nearby settlements would rush into the area, flooding it 

with “outsiders” and effectively preventing the British from recognizing 

which “outsiders” had taken refuge in the village following the raid and 

which had come simply to create confusion.40

Civil disobedience is a powerful technique, but to be effective, it 

must be exercised in large numbers. There is a calculated risk involved: 

the breach of law automatically justifies and involves punishment by the 

government and security forces. However, the more massive the scale 
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

289

on which civil disobedience is organized, the less profitable it is for 

the government to carry out sanctions. For example, during a Huk-led 

strike in the Philippines, as police were attempting to arrest the leaders, Luis Taruc used the tactic of demanding and forcing the government to arrest everyone participating in the strike. “We must crowd the 

prison with our numbers,” he said. “If there is no room for us [in the 

police vans], we will walk to jail.” It quickly became unfeasible for the 

security forces to use the threat of jail.41

During the Indian independence movement, Gandhi effectively 

used the same tactic. He led so many millions in the breach of law 

that it proved impractical, if not impossible, for the British to jail all 

offenders. As British officials saw, such widespread disrespect for a law 

makes its enforcement ridiculous and counterproductive.42 Yet, if a government cannot enforce its writ, it must abdicate authority. As the jails 

became impossibly full, Gandhi’s position in pressing his demands on 

a government searching for ways to pacify the population was increasingly enhanced.43

Organizers of passive resistance are selective about the laws that are 

to be broken. The laws should be related in some manner to the issues 

being protested or the demands being made. Examples are Gandhi’s 

selection of the salt tax in India, which was considered a hardship tax 

on the peasants and representative of unjust British rule; the civil rights 

sit-ins in the United States, which were directly related to discrimination in public places; and the Norwegian teachers’ strike against the 

Nazi puppet-government’s demands that teachers join a Nazi association and that Nazi socialism be taught in the schools. If the laws that 

are broken have little or nothing to do with the issues involved, it is 

difficult to persuade a citizenry to risk government sanctions by taking 

provocative actions.

Cyber (or virtual) activism refers to normal, nondisruptive use of 

the Internet in support of an agenda or cause. Also called online organizing, electronic advocacy, e-campaigning, and e-activism, operations 

in this area include web-based research, website design and publication, transmitting electronic publications and other materials through 

e-mail, and using the web to discuss issues, form communities of interest, and plan and coordinate activities.44 Hacktivism, the exploitation 

of computer systems (hacking) for a political purpose, brings methods 

of civil disobedience to cyberspace.45 Hactivist tactics include a litany 

of constantly evolving techniques often at the leading edge of information security. Included among them are virtual sit-ins, automated e-mail 

bombs, web hacks and computer break-ins, and computer viruses and 

worms. A virtual sit-in is the cyberspace equivalent of a blockade where 

the objective is to disrupt normal operations, thus calling attention to 
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the perpetrator. In 1998, the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) 

organized a series of web sit-ins against a series of Mexican and U.S. 

government websites as well as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange to demonstrate solidarity with the Mexican Zapatistas.46 This variation of a 

denial-of-service (DOS) attack has supporters visit the specified sites 

in order to overwhelm the servers and limit accessibility. An e-mail 

bomb is another form of virtual blockade in which a particular e-mail 

address (or group of addresses) is inundated with messages, preventing the effective use of a particular account or server. In 1998, a Tamil 

group sympathetic to the LTTE swamped Sri Lankan embassies with 

thousands of e-mail messages from the Internet Black Tigers.47 Website defacement is a form of hacking that does not necessarily seek to 

exfiltrate information or corrupt a network but rather seeks to replace 

existing public content with a political message. Also in 1998, a group 

of Portuguese hackers modified the sites of forty Indonesian servers 

to add a “Free East Timor” banner.48 Hacktivists have used computer 

viruses, worms, and other malicious code to disseminate propaganda 

and damage target computer systems. On October  16,  1989, computer systems at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 

Maryland, were infected by the WANK (Worms Against Nuclear Killers) worm. The attack was executed by a loosely affiliated group of 

anti-nuclear weapons activists.49 The WANK worm and other Hactivist 

tactics are migrations (with some mutation) of techniques used in the 

physical domain to the infosphere.

In summary, the underlying consideration in most passive resistance techniques is whether they serve to legitimize the position of the 

passive resister while alienating or challenging the government.

ORGANIZATION

The success of passive resistance rests largely on its ability to secure 

widespread compliance within the society. A government cannot be 

robbed of the popular support upon which it depends if only a few 

individuals act. A boycott, for example, requires participation by great 

numbers. The relative distribution of the components within a social 

movement differs on the basis of operational requirements. Experienced and highly effective organizers during the Orange Revolution 

in the Ukraine were able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people 

(often despite frigid temperatures) against the sitting government while 

simultaneously avoiding the use or provocation of violence. On November 22, 2004, the day after a fraudulent vote, approximately 500,000 

people (many dressed in orange) gathered in Independence Square 

in Kiev and marched to the headquarters of the Ukrainian parliament 
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

291

while carrying orange. This scene was broadcast globally, sending an 

unambiguous message to the members of parliament who would vote a 

few days later to void the election results.50 Figure 10-1, showing a time 

series component model of the Orange Revolution, depicts how the 

Orange Revolution represents a departure from both the traditional 

and contemporary insurgent models in that the armed component was 

subsumed by the auxiliary and served essentially as a personal security element to protect prominent members of the political component 

from government attacks. The Yushchenko camp anticipated and prepared for violence. Viktor Yushchenko’s personal security detail was led 

by Yevhen Chervonenko and included fifty-five former military special 

operations and Interior Ministry security experts. Chervonenko claims 

that they had an “elaborate system of reconnaissance, intelligence, 

and physical protection.”51 Chervonenko also built up a team of hundreds of “battle-ready” individuals, including many athletes. “All were 

armed. Many of them legally held various weapons, including hunting 

weapons.”52 These paramilitaries were backed by 4,000 volunteers who, 

according to Orange Revolution organizer Taras Stetskiv, were “ready 

for everything and only waited for a signal”53 to storm the presidential 

administration. While the underground was initially prominent, the 

relatively rapid expansion of the Orange Revolution was almost entirely 

in the public component.54

UG

Aux.

PC PC PC

UG

UG

Aux. Aux

AC

AC AC

Time

Initial voting/no majority

Oct. 31, 2004

2nd round/run-off vote

Nov. 31, 2004

3rd round/nal voting

Dec. 2, 2004

Figure 10-1. Time series component model for the Orange Revolution. AC, armed 

component; Aux., auxiliary; UG, underground; PC, public component. The Orange 

Revolution represents a departure from both the traditional and contemporary 

insurgent models in that the armed component was subsumed by the auxiliary and 

served essentially as a personal security element to protect prominent members 

of the political component from government attacks. While the underground was 

initially prominent, the relatively rapid expansion of the Orange Revolution was 

almost entirely in the public component.
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The mobilization of civic youth organizations under the well-trained 

Otpor! youth movement leaders from Serbia and Georgia provided a 

level of maturity and nonviolence that was critical for the effective presentation of a united front against the sitting administration.55 Solidarity’s loose national coordination enabled a decentralized control 

mechanism, allowing local organizers to gain recognition among their 

immediate constituency. The movement relied heavily on the organizational resources of seasoned activists and at one point initiated a strike 

with a single phone call. Once the movement was forced underground 

during the period of martial law, it had to re-establish its structures and 

leadership in accordance with the new conditions. Eighty percent of 

the Solidarity leadership was incarcerated during the initial sweeps, yet 

those in prison still heavily influenced the underground, with the leaders who avoided capture acting as intermediaries. The underground 

movement became even more nonhierarchical, local, and autonomous. 

Strategy and communications were the most centralized functions 

for this stage, with the agreement that a passive resistance campaign 

should be followed, and many publishing outlets were established to 

spread messages across the nation. A Provisional Coordinating Committee was established at the national level to develop and promulgate 

their strategy as well as issue demands to the government. Regional 

structures emerged in places where the crackdown had not completely 

decimated the organizational structure or caused the leadership to 

flee. Some of these regional structures also set up organizations within 

the largest factories and workplaces. The underground resisted efforts 

mostly at the local level through loosely connected organizations and 

networks that re-formed often.56

Advances in information and communications technology (particularly the Internet) and the ubiquity of access to social media have 

rendered the requirement for physical infrastructure and face-to-face 

interaction moot. Unlike traditional organizational constructs, these 

networks do not require physical instruction, geographic collocation, 

or even individual notoriety.57 Political pressure no longer requires the 

aggregation and assimilation of committed individuals into an organizational structure. Activist groups can advance their concerns far 

more rapidly through the spontaneous formation of distributed networks of concerned individuals. These ad hoc, location-independent, 

and medium-agency networks self-organize around functional, not 

geographic, concerns. While the rapidity with which these groups can 

coalesce and act far surpasses that of an underground movement, an 

organizer sacrifices control and message discipline for speed. With virtual communities, there is not always a vetting and/or acculturation 

process and thus there is not the same discipline or unity of effort seen 

in small, clandestine organizations.58
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293

Politically divisive issues often catalyze the formation of virtual networks who organize to discuss, plan, and sometimes take action. An 

example is the Tibet Autonomous Region, which presents challenges 

with official relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

Because of the geographic isolation of Tibet and the relative inability 

of Tibetan activists to voice dissent from within the PRC, an online 

“Free Tibet” network has emerged to support the independence movement. The conglomeration of websites in English, Chinese, and Tibetan 

are hosted on servers outside China (often in Europe and the United 

States), are linked to one another, and have similar pro-independence 

sentiments; however, they do not have a common style or format or 

common themes, messages, or strategies.59 While there is conceptual 

commonality among these activities, there is no explicit command and 

control apparatus. This affords freedom of action; however, it comes at 

a cost because loosely affiliated networks can be more easily co-opted, 

distracted, and/or delegitimized.

Organization is of critical importance to passive resistance. Although 

a few individuals can launch a passive resistance movement, in order to 

succeed, thousands—whose participation must be strategically channeled—must join them. How is widespread social compliance secured? 

What forces and factors induce people to practice passive resistance?

LEGITIMACY

Obtaining legitimacy is integral to the success of any revolutionary 

movement, regardless of the means by which the organization presents 

itself to the general population, their opposition, and external actors; a 

movement must be taken seriously as a legitimate actor within the political realm.60 The following sections detail the factors that nonviolent 

movements employ to not only assert but also advertise their legitimacy 

in the eyes of the government, their constituency, and the international 

community. Those methods include conditions of normative and mystical factors, and consensual validation.

Normative Factors

One method by which leaders of passive resistance movements 

secure widespread compliance is by cloaking their movement and techniques in the beliefs, values, and norms of society—those things people accept without question. For example, the clergy led the earliest 

stages of the Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation and 

Quisling puppet government. From the pulpit and parsonage, the religious leadership of Norway coalesced public opinion against the Nazis 
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by invoking the voice of the church. “When the Nazis established a 

new ecclesiastical leadership, the bulk of the old established Church 

ignored the orders of the new hierarchy. Through nonviolent action it 

preserved its integrity,” simply refusing to cooperate in religious affairs 

with the Nazi occupation.61

Because the institutions of religion were held in high esteem, and 

because the clergy appealed within the framework of religious values, 

the Nazis never were able, even in the later stages of the occupation, to 

break the church’s resistance. In India, women were used on the front 

lines of demonstrations, making it awkward for British forces to break 

up the crowd without inflicting injuries on the women and further stirring up public opinion.62

Poland was the only Eastern Bloc state in which the Church 

remained an independent actor and continued to exert a tremendous 

influence over the people. The symbols and rituals of the Roman Catholic Church pervaded the scene of strikes during the Solidarity movement. Primarily because of the astute leadership of Cardinal Wyszynski 

(later Pope John Paul  II) and Catholic intellectuals, the Church in 

Poland began to champion basic human rights and political and civil 

liberties, providing the non-Catholic intelligentsia and the workers in 

Poland with a common vocabulary with which to oppose the state. The 

presence of priests saying Mass and giving Communion during demonstrations further validated the righteousness of the cause among 

Catholic laborers.63

The events in Egypt during January 2011 are an example of longstanding resentment manifested over generations reacting to a catalyst (Tunisia) and mobilizing (with the intent of removing President 

Mubarak). The turmoil in Egypt is an ideological extension of what 

transpired in Tunisia and is reminiscent of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; however, the unique geopolitical circumstances within 

Egypt differentiate it from both.e

 This distinction is evident in the 

e The dissatisfaction with Mubarak can be traced back to the Free Officer’s Movement in 1952 that deposed King Farouk. Nasser, followed by Sadat (assassinated in 1981), 

and Mubarak represent a series of technocratic military dictators whose relationships with 

the West alienated the religious elite and the bulk of their populace. Seminal events that 

contributed to this dissatisfaction were the surprisingly swift defeat by Israel in the 1967 

Six-Day War (although a semblance of pride was recovered by Egypt’s performance in the 

1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel), the 1979 Camp David Accords (which has been arguably the most geopolitically significant policy change in the Middle East since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire), and the 1981 Sadat assassination, which brought Mubarak 

to power. This series of leaders increased the prominence (and governmental condemnation) of the Muslim Brotherhood (an Islamic sociopolitical organization established in 

1928 that has served as a counterweight to the colonial then the secular government). The 

continual friction between the various regimes and the Brotherhood gave rise to more 

militant groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad 

(EIJ). The former emerged as an umbrella organization for the proliferation of Islamic 
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juxtaposition of typical protest violence and the erudite articulation by 

the blocked elite who accompanied the younger university students in 

Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

Mystical Factors

Rare or extraordinary factors such as charisma play an important 

part in mobilizing public opinion in a passive resistance movement. 

Gandhi’s leadership of India’s independence struggle verged on the 

mystical. Thousands of villagers from rural India, who perhaps could 

not be touched or aroused by any modern means of communication or 

organized population pressure, were mobilized into action by Gandhi’s 

fasts and his religious mystique. Hundreds of thousands of peasants 

gathered to meet Gandhi, although they often did not understand his 

language and could barely see him. It is difficult to estimate the role 

of Gandhi’s mystique in coalescing public opinion against the British, 

but it is clear that resistance to colonial rule had never appeared on 

such a large scale before Gandhi. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the former 

Catholic priest and Haiti’s first democratically elected president, was 

another charismatic leader who exerted near-mystical influence over 

the Haitian people. In the wake of the 1991 coup d’état that left Aristide in exile, many Haitians fled the country by sea. In the summer of 

1994, the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy retrieved over 20,000 migrants 

in a three-week period. Debriefings of migrants by U.S. intelligence 

personnel confirmed that the opposition underground had disseminated rumors that “Ti dede” wanted his people to go out to the sea as 

migrants to influence the Americans. The United States made a deal 

with Aristide to restore him to power if he would tell the migrants to 

cease, and within forty-eight hours of Aristide making a broadcast to 

Haiti (transmitted over via traditional media and U.S. psychological 

operations platforms), the mass exodus halted.64

Although not a nonviolent movement, the PIRA relied heavily on 

support from Catholics in Northern Ireland who disapproved of the 

violent tactics (particularly terrorism) but supported the Republican 

cause. Counterintuitively, Catholic support for the PIRA would wane 

when the Provos were relatively strong militarily yet would increase 

student groups that emerged in the 1970s, while the latter was a more secretive and elitist 

organization that considered itself the ideological vanguard of the global Salafist jihad 

movement of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (ultimately merging with 

Al Qaeda in 2001). The increasingly close political–military relationship between Egypt 

and the United States, the heavy-handed reactions of the government to perceived internal threats from the militant Islamists against those advocating freedom of speech, and 

the epidemic underemployment of the educated class are but some of the grievances that 

have contributed to the widespread dissatisfaction with President Mubarak.
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when oppression and the concomitant suffering was at its most fierce. 

Perhaps nowhere was the confluence of cultural, religious, and political 

factors more manifest than the engagement in self-immolative behavior as a means of addressing grievances in the 1917, 1920, and 1981 

hunger strikes.65 By March 1981, the conditions at Long Kesh prison 

had reached another standoff, and another hunger strike was initiated 

that ultimately led to the death of ten volunteers. Bobby Sands, the 

Officer-Commanding within Long Kesh, led the effort. The strike generated very high levels of public attention because four days into the 

protest, Sands’s name was nominated to be a member of Parliament 

from Northern Ireland, and on April  9, he was elected by a narrow 

margin. The election brought heightened attention to the struggle as 

the international community debated whether the British government 

would allow a member of Parliament to succumb to hunger in defiance 

of their internment policy. On May 5, 1981, his sixty-sixth day on hunger strike, Sands died. The ensuing international publicity generated 

a substantial increase in support. Sands’s death revitalized the PIRA’s 

motivation and prompted the more overtly political role of Sinn Féin.66

Furthermore, his leadership of the Provisionals during his internment 

and steadfast adherence to the Republican cause continue to resonate 

among Republican and revolutionary circles. Although the PIRA was 

suspicious of politics and equated political participation with compromise, some of the leadership began to see its value.

Consensual Validation

The technique of “consensual validation”—in which the simultaneous occurrence of events creates a sense of their validity—is often used 

to coalesce public opinion. For example, if demonstrations take place 

at the same time in diverse parts of a country, the cause which those 

protests uphold appears to be valid simply because a variety of persons 

are involved. A minority group can organize a multitude of front organizations so that seemingly widely separated and diverse organizations 

simultaneously advocate the same themes and give the impression 

that a large body of opinion is represented. Passive resistance organizers effectively use the psychology of “consensual validation” to rally 

public opinion.

The same techniques used by passive resisters against the government can be used to ensure widespread social compliance within the 

resistance movement. Ostracism is frequently used to apply pressure 

on individuals not participating in the passive resistance campaign. 

Instances of organized ostracism of collaborators can be found in all the 

underground resistance movements in Nazi-occupied countries during 
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World War II. In Denmark, the underground published blacklists that 

were “feared by all those who acted in the interest of the enemy.”67

Informal, everyday pressures of conformity also help secure widespread 

compliance. The fact that passive resistance generally appears during 

times of crisis or of popular unrest indicates that at such times there 

is often a greater sense of nationalism, of a particular “we” arraigned 

against “they.” There are then strong pressures demanding conformity.

Like the previous Polish Solidarity strikes in 1970 and 1976, the 

strikes of 1980–81 were precipitated by an economic crisis but were different in that they were more political, and larger. The 1980–81 strikes 

evidenced a more notable concern for political rather than economic 

well-being. The scope of these strikes dwarfed those in the past, with 

nearly 10 million members at the onset of martial law in 1981. An estimated 8,000,000–9,000,000 workers participated in the strikes, effectively halting economic and political life in Poland.68 The enormity of 

these efforts not only drew domestic and international attention but 

also lent legitimacy to the movement.

COMMUNICATION AND PROPAGANDA

As noted earlier in this chapter, the first phase of passive resistance 

is characterized by a period of attention-getting propaganda activities: 

parades, demonstrations, posters, newspapers, and other forms of communication, either clandestine or open. Once the resistance movement 

is launched, there must be continuing means of “spreading the word.” 

No movement can operate without some form of communication 

between the leaders and the led. The underground press in Denmark 

played an important role; the first illegal newssheet appeared on the 

very first day of the German occupation. Within a year, nearly 300 illegal newspapers were being published once or twice a month. They had 

an estimated circulation of 70,000, and each copy was read and passed 

on by large numbers of people. Ironically, “as the German domination 

became sharper, so did the free press become more and more powerful.”69 Similar examples can be found in Norway, Poland, France, and 

The Netherlands during the Nazi resistance: Besides providing “objective” information on the course of the war, using Allied news-broadcast 

reports, the clandestine papers instructed the populace in passive resistance techniques and procedures.70

Unlike most revolutionary organizations, the Solidarity movement 

in Poland initially conducted its meetings openly and disseminated its 

messages through overt networks; it was then forced underground as 

martial law was imposed. Within Poland, during the last half of 1982, 

the underground circulated more than 1500 regular publications that 
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bypassed the government censor. Underground publishers also produced vast reprints such as George Orwell’s 1984 and similar works. 

Radio Free Europe was also crucially important to the spread of the 

opposition’s version of events and messages to the Polish population.71

Informal communication networks were invaluable in countering previously effective strikebreaking tactics. Workers throughout Poland 

were kept abreast of strike activity and government concessions to the 

strikes, and as news spread of government concessions, the strikes escalated rather than diminished.72

The use of media, particularly nontraditional forms, has been effective in disseminating the organizer’s message and in many cases inadvertently serving as a source for mainstream media. Instead of more 

using elaborate attention-getting tactics to attract mainstream media, 

some activist groups have created and organize media capability. This 

“coverage” is often disseminated through sympathetic physical or virtual networks and at times picked up by mainstream media. In one 

study, activist-based Internet sources reported a higher proportion of 

protest events at the local, national, and international levels.73 The use 

of media and communication technology is essential for the collaborative planning and simultaneous exaction of distributed transnational 

protest events. A distinct advantage of the Internet over traditional 

communications is the ability to circumvent government attempts at 

censorship. Increasingly technologically sophisticated activist groups 

have employed organic capabilities and contracted information-technology support from third parties to penetrate denied areas and expose 

sequestered populations to their message.74 FEMEN rarely conducts an 

operation without numerous media outlets accompanying their internal photographers and videographers to document the event. The 

images and/or videos and accompanying commentary are posted to 

their organizational website and blog within hours. Followers post comments, include links to other media coverage, and share their experiences with members of the network.

Communications technologies have been used to facilitate clandestine organization and planning; however, the government capabilities 

(although not necessarily their agility) may exceed those of the organizers, and thus redundant systems and plans are necessary. The Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) allegedly hacked passwords of Facebook 

sites advocating the removal of Ben Ali and ultimately (under orders of 

the government) restricted access to the Internet from all IP addresses 

outside governmental facilities.75 Tunisia’s National Computer Security 

Agency was engaged in a limited cyber conflict with some activists—

many of whom were members of sympathetic groups outside Tunisia—who attempted to overload government websites with distributed 
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

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denial-of-service (DNS) attacks.76 The Egyptian government restricted 

access to the Internet and mobile networksf at the height of the tensions 

(January 28, 2011). The protests attracted worldwide attention thanks 

to the increasing integration of social media that has enabled activists 

and spectators to communicate, coordinate, and document the events 

as they occur. As the level of publicity increased, the Egyptian government accelerated efforts to limit Internet access, especially access to 

social media, securing essentially all Internet access and mobile phone 

service on the eve of major planned protests on Friday, January  28. 

Limited mobile service resumed on January 30.77

Clandestine methods of communication resembling those used by 

espionage organizations were also developed. One of the earliest and 

most successful acts of resistance in Norway was the dramatic resignation in 1941–42 of 90 percent of Norway’s teachers in response to Nazi 

pressure to teach National Socialism and join a Nazi teachers’ association. This dramatic rebuke to the Nazi regime was accomplished by 

communicating the plan to all of Norway’s teachers by disseminating 

the message through boxes of matches that contained a statement the 

teachers were required to make to the Nazis. The communication was 

obeyed, even though the leaders were never known, because each communicator was trusted and people were assured others were going to 

take similar action.

TRAINING

Once organizational steps are taken to secure widespread social 

compliance, an effort must be made to instruct and train passive resisters. The idea is to erect a mental barbed-wire fence between resisters 

and authority. This instruction often takes the form of codes of “do’s 

and don’ts.” Many undergrounds have found that it is easier to tell people what not to do than what to do.78

Training is particularly critical when positive, not just negative, 

actions are desired. Noncooperation and civil disobedience are positive acts that necessarily involve training, organization, and solidarity on the part of the resisters, whether they operate in the open or 

clandestinely.

f U.K.-headquartered Vodafone Group PLC, which is contracted by the Egyptian 

government to provide mobile services to the country, released a statement on January 28 

that claimed, “All mobile operators in Egypt have been instructed to suspend services in 

selected areas. Under Egyptian legislation the authorities have the right to issue such an 

order and we are obliged to comply with it. The Egyptian authorities will be clarifying the 

situation in due course.”
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Gandhi placed great emphasis on nonviolent training, not only 

because he looked upon nonviolence as a moral creed, but also because 

he understood that it was essential for effective passive resistance. He 

required his followers to swear an oath, and he developed a code for 

volunteers. When individual suffering is involved, and when individuals must invite suffering through civil disobedience, considerable discipline is required. The American civil rights movement followed the 

Gandhi example and applied it in planning the 1958 “sit-in” movement. 

Special schools were established to train young people to withstand 

physical violence and tolerate torment without responding with violence that might negate the entire stratagem. Any violent response on 

the part of the passive resisters might provide a justification for the use 

of violent procedures in quelling demonstrations.

Organizations like Otpor! have compiled literature and lessons 

learned from their protest experience and packaged them in print, 

video, and electronic media. These free materials are readily available 

on the Internet and often come with points of contacts for additional 

information, thus building the virtual network of nonviolent activists. 

Institutions like the Albert Einstein Institution (AEI)g

 and the U.S. 

Institute for Peace (USIP)h have not only served as a repository for 

this information but also funded research (as well as the translation 

and publication of nonviolent resistance materials) and hosted events 

promoting nonviolent resolution to political problems. The works of 

Gene Sharp (mentioned earlier) have been translated into over thirty 

languages and employed from the Ukraine to Egypt.79 There are even 

organizations such as the International Center on Nonviolent Conflicti

that have developed video games to serve as interactive training tools.

RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

The manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances is just one of 

the means used to accomplish the objective of seizing power. This section introduces some of the strategies and tactics employed in riots and 

demonstrations and includes two brief case studies.

The internal security forces, which bear a major share of the burden 

of maintaining order, should understand that the control of subversively manipulated crowds requires special considerations. The security forces of a nation may be composed of paramilitary and military 

units and civil police. The function of maintaining internal security 

g Online at http://www.aeinstein.org/.

h Online at http://www.usip.org/.

i Online at http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/.
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may be performed by one or any combination of these forces. Standard 

priorities of force may be adequate for dispersal of ordinary civil disturbances, but in dealing with a subversively controlled riot, internal 

security forces must be alert to situations or acts that compel them to 

respond in ways that the subversives can politically exploit. The underground use of subversively manipulated crowds and civil disturbances 

adds a new dimension to the problem of maintaining internal security. 

The difference between civil disturbances that are subversively manipulated and those that are not can be expressed in terms of objectives. 

Strikes, riots, and demonstrations usually have limited goals, such as 

better working conditions or social changes.

The subversive manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances 

involves a relatively small number of underground members who try to 

guide and direct “legitimate” protests. They attempt to direct the crowd 

toward emotional issues and arouse them against authority. The U.S. 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has employed subversive manipulation of crowds to facilitate political objectives. Shortly after President 

Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated in 1953, CIA officers in Iran 

involved in anti-Soviet operations shifted their focus to undermining 

Iranian President Mohammed Mossadeq’s rule. Agents orchestrated a 

pro-Tudeh Party demonstration to push the military and civilian populations toward General Fazlollah Zahedi. The following day, agents 

again helped incite an anti-Mossadeq crowd that was later joined by 

police and army units who, after wreaking havoc on government buildings and pro-Mossadeq institutions, marched on toward the president’s 

house, where he surrendered to General Zahedi.80

There are several theories for explaining crowd psychology and the 

ways in which the behavior of the crowd differs significantly from the 

psychological dispositions of those individuals within it. Freud’s crowdbehavior theory, dated but nonetheless valid, holds that people in a 

crowd tend to act as though their psyches have merged into a single 

entity whose collective thought process is dramatically different from 

those comprising the crowd. As the collective enthusiasm increases, 

individuals tend to lose their inhibition and become less risk averse.81

This behavior theory, derived from the behavior of animals in herds, 

flocks, and schools, has been applied to the study of human conduct 

during activities such as stock market bubbles and crashes, street demonstrations, sporting events, religious gatherings, and episodes of mob 

violence, as well as decision making, judgment, and opinion forming.82 A riot is typically the result of an unorganized violent mob that 

is neither controlled by a leader nor organized into units or another 

hierarchical structure. Riots have, however, been intentionally incited 

and/or directed by organized political activists and have been at least 
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partly directed. Although major insurrections have been initiated by 

riots, such as the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution 

of February 1917, the spontaneous street violence was not part of an 

orchestrated plan to overthrow the respective governments.83

The emotional perceptions and beliefs of the crowds that participate in civil disturbances often do not coincide with objective reality, 

and the individuals involved do not realize that their grievances are 

being manipulated in politically subversive ways. The following case 

studies exemplify the use of protests (both violent and nonviolent) to 

achieve a political objective. The first is an example of a demonstration subversively manipulated by Communist organizers in Colombia; 

the El Bogotazo incident had a profound effect on Fidel Castro, who 

is among the most prominent revolutionaries in the latter twentieth 

century. The second is a more contemporary example of networked 

nonviolent warfare with ideologically diverse groups uniting against a 

common adversary. The 1999 Battle in Seattle is arguably one of the 

most influential single demonstrations in recent history.

Colombia (1948)

El Bogotazo (Blow at Bogota) demonstrated the effectiveness of the 

riot technique. It is particularly significant in that the techniques for 

provoking street crowds into rioting learned in the demonstration are 

used as training material for revolutionaries. A Venezuelan Communist 

defector from Castro’s training school—the Tarara Training Center in 

Cuba—reported that the classroom materials included diagrams of the 

tactics and descriptions of how the crowds were manipulated in the 

three-day riot that wrecked the Ninth Inter-American Conference and 

left the Colombian capital in ruins.

The Ninth Inter-American Conference had been called for 

March 30, 1948, to discuss the pledge among member nations to the 

mutual defense and resistance to the threat of international Communism. According to testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the 

86th U.S. Congress, intercepted Communist communiqués reveal that 

the party immediately went into action to disrupt the conference and 

the combined forces of the Latin American Communist Party apparatus set about making plans. A high-ranking official of the Colombian 

Communist Party (which claimed at that time a membership of 10,000 

out of a total population of 11 million) said that the Inter-American 

Conference must be blocked but that this action was not to be known 

as a Communist activity; he admonished the party to refrain from open 

activity so as not to jeopardize or curtail party functions.
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The Communists devoted considerable effort to preparing for any 

proposed riot; they seldom relied exclusively on spontaneity or accidental occurrences, even though they attempted to capitalize on such 

events. By January  29,  1948, arms and explosives had already been 

stored in seventeen houses. A Communist dispatch dated February 2 

included the information that plans called for organization of mass 

public meetings, organization of sixteen meetings of cells in outlying 

districts, recruitment of new members to the party, organization of fifteen syndicates and unions, further organization of cells within the 

syndicates, and distribution during the conference of 50,000 handbills 

and 3,000 posters. A committee of the Communist Party was assigned 

to supervise these arrangements. A dispatch dated March 30 laid out 

the program of agitation and attacks upon the U.S., Chilean, Brazilian, 

and Argentine delegations, all of which were especially anti-Communist. During the middle of the first week in April, the Communistcontrolled Latin American Conference (CTAL) adopted resolutions in 

Mexico City condemning the conference.

On April  9, a well-known figure, Dr. Jorge Gaitan, was killed by 

four bullets from a revolver fired by an unidentified person. Dr. Gaitan, a 47-year-old lawyer, was the leader and former presidential candidate of Colombia’s liberal movement. Although it was reported that 

the Communist Party had supplied money through an intermediary 

for the support of Dr. Gaitan and his movement, he had maintained an 

independent attitude toward the Communists. Rumors of Communist 

plans to disrupt the conference caused Dr. Gaitan to publicly repudiate all acts against the conference, saying that these were acts against 

democracy and the unity of the Americas. Although his assassin was 

never identified, both the personality of Dr. Gaitan and the circumstances surrounding his death inspired at least one observer to say that 

the Communists, needing an appropriate victim whose death could 

prevent the holding of the conference, targeted a prominent person. 

Colombian President Ospina Perez also suggested that the man who 

killed Dr. Gaitan apparently had Communist affiliations and that the 

entire affair was a Communist maneuver.

A wave of mass violence was triggered by the assassination, which 

took place within the sight of thousands. The Communists channeled 

the high emotions into anti-U.S. feelings and acts of violence against 

U.S. property and individuals. Within fifteen minutes of the attack on 

Dr. Gaitan, radio-broadcasting stations in Bogota had been taken over 

and the Communists were issuing instructions and inciting the people 

to revolt against the government, the conference, and Yankee imperialism. Orders were given to plunder arms depots, hardware stores, 

gunsmith shops, department stores, government buildings, police 
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precincts, and army barracks, and to organize a “popular militia.” The 

radio also transmitted orders to specific individuals to assault specific 

places and gave locations where additional weapons could be obtained. 

Instructions were given on how to manufacture Molotov cocktails. During the broadcasts, fighting—reportedly between the Communists and 

a group of students—for control of the radio facilities could be heard 

in the background; the armed Communists forced the students out 

of the station. By controlling communications, the Communists could 

incite attacks against the symbols and instruments of power within the 

government. Within each group of demonstrators in the crowds were 

organized agitators chanting similar slogans. Prompted by the Communist agitators, a crowd entered the parliament building where the 

Inter-American Conference was being held and destroyed most of the 

interior. The rioters concentrated on destroying offices of the Chilean 

and U.S. delegations. Mob action almost completely suspended transportation, created obstacles for the police, and made the crowd that 

much more difficult to control.

Led by the Communists, less than 5 percent of the population carried on the riot for three days. Shops, churches, public utilities, and 

institutions of public service were attacked. Red flags were evident 

throughout the crowd, and in every group orders could be heard 

directing the mobs. The word “abajo” (down with) was heard frequently. 

There was heavy sniper fire.

The first burnings of buildings may have been simple, random gestures of protest, but a consideration of which buildings were burned 

showed a subversive pattern. On the afternoon of April 9, the Ministry 

of National Education, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, the Palace of Justice, the Ministry of Government, the Episcopal Palace, the detective headquarters, and the Identification Section 

for natives and foreigners were all attacked and burned. The Confederation of Colombian Workers, which represented 109,000 organized 

workers, called for a general strike throughout Colombia.

After declaring a state of siege and imposing martial law, President 

Perez eventually restored order. But the Communists had achieved 

their tactical objective of disrupting the conference and, in the process, 

had effectively demonstrated the practicability of their methods.
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Seattle, Washington (1999)j

The incident colloquially known as the “Battle in Seattle” is an 

example of the effective use of nonviolent resistance techniques to 

disrupt a high-profile political event. On November 30, 1999, approximately 50,000 activists representing more than 200 organizations84

from across the globe collaborated in Seattle to demonstrate during 

the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference held at 

the Washington State Convention and Trade Center in Seattle, Washington. The purpose of the conference was to initiate “The Millennium 

Round” of trade negotiations. However, delegates failed to agree on the 

agenda amidst the disagreements between industrialized and developing nations.85

People for Fair Trade/Network Opposed to WTO (PFT), Direct 

Action Network (DAN), and the American Federation of Labor and 

Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were among the 

coalitions that helped set the conditions for the coming events. All 

three established bases in Seattle in the months leading up to the WTO 

Ministerial Conference, and each attempted to build a coalition from 

diverse organizational members. DAN represents an emerging species 

of political organization—one based on loosely affiliated networks 

rather than institutions. The primary networked organizations in DAN 

were a coalition of such groups as the Rainforest Action Network, Art 

& Revolution, and the Ruckus Society. Through DAN, these groups 

coordinated nonviolent protest training, communications, and collective strategy and tactics through a decentralized process of consultation/consensus decision making. DAN organized training sessions for 

approximately 250 people that were conducted by the Ruckus Society 

in the weeks prior to the protests.86 These groups were fairly heterogeneous, with representation across ethic and socioeconomic lines. Many 

were active in (or supportive of) the environmental movements gaining increasing attention at the time, while others came to be involved 

through human bridges. Organizers and participants alike derived a 

j Methodological note: The majority of the information presented in this section was 

derived from sources in the scholarly literature. That information was augmented by the 

subjective experience of an individual who was on the periphery of planning and coordinating events leading up to the demonstration and who witnessed (but did not participate) in the events. The interviewee (heretofore referred to as “HC”) was a recent college 

graduate at the time and was employed and resided in downtown Seattle. HC was (and is) 

politically informed and involved in environmental activism but has no criminal record 

or a history of involvement with violent extremist groups. Although not formally affiliated 

with any particular group, HC’s social network included a number of individuals who were 

active members of environmentalist and/or anti-capitalist movements (all of which were 

nonviolent). The interview took place over the phone on December 13, 2011, and lasted for 

approximately ninety minutes. HC was not compensated for the time.
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great deal of pride and satisfaction from the group’s diversity of membership and interest yet singularity of focus.87

The second principal WTO opponent was the AFL-CIO, a hierarchical institution that employed the traditional labor organization model 

of unitary top-down command with relatively little decision-making 

input from rank and file members. The AFL-CIO’s policy goals were 

directed more at American politics and less at international issues. 

Their target was supporting and legitimizing President Bill Clinton’s 

actions at the conference through symbolic displays. The AFL-CIO 

helped attract thousands of people to Seattle with the intent of holding 

a rally at the Seattle Center and then marching downtown to the Paramount Theater. Its main adherents had little interest in joining with 

DAN’s, but during the second and third days of the protests, a spillover 

from the AFL-CIO crowds into DAN’s street actions added to a third 

wave of protest that ultimately overwhelmed the police.88

Although neither numerous nor operationally integral to the WTO 

protests, a third group (anarchists mostly from Eugene, Oregon)89

received a disproportionate amount of media attention.90 The groups 

of anarchists, or Black Blocs, varied in size from a few dozen to a few 

thousand and typically appeared on the occasion of a rally and dissolved at its conclusion.91 A Black Bloc consisted of protesters who wore 

black, carried anarchist flags and banners, and took a more confrontational approach to protest.92 The Black Bloc tactic was disseminated 

mainly via the ultra-left counterculture network through periodicals, 

touring music groups, and social networks of travelling activists. The 

first observed Black Bloc tactic in North America was a January 1991 

anti-war rally in Washington, DC.93 The total number of Black Bloc 

participants in Seattle was estimated between one and two hundred 

people; however, their tactics continue to be disputed. The vandalism 

and anarchist graffiti targeting the corporate symbols of Nike, Starbucks, and the like were Black Bloc hallmarks; however, their message 

was confounded by the presence of nonaffiliated groups looting and 

vandalizing the shops. While police shadowed Black Bloc operations, 

some DAN members attempted to stop the vandalism and/or incitement.94 This direct intervention suggested the degree to which DAN 

was attempting to preserve the integrity of their protest.

DAN’s goal was to halt the WTO meeting by preventing the attendees from gaining access to the venue. The main instrument of doing so 

was the infiltration of a few dozen affinity groups (small, self-organizing units). DAN’s first wave of 200–300 protestors comprised supporters who sought nonviolent civil disobedience and were willing to be 

arrested. Their job was to penetrate the area immediately surrounding 

the conference site, seize and hold the dozen strategic intersections 
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

307

that controlled access to the site, and wait for the second wave. They 

began staging by 5:00 a.m. local time, before the police arrived to 

establish the initial security cordon. The second wave of several thousand included other affinity groups and supporters who also opted for 

nonviolent civil disobedience but were unwilling to risk arrest. Their 

task was to establish street blockades in the vicinity of the WTO conference to inhibit the movement of responding police forces.95 The first 

and second waves were organized around a dozen simultaneously converging affinity groups, overwhelming the protest target from multiple 

directions. Each affinity group blockaded a specific intersection. The 

first and second waves had control of the decisive ground around the 

Convention Center by 8:00 a.m. DAN anticipated that the blockade 

would last only until police had arrested sufficient demonstrators to 

regain control of the streets. By 9:00 a.m., the police began reporting difficulty with their crowd control efforts, resulting in an alert to 

potential law enforcement entities in western Washington. Shortly after 

10:00 a.m., the first round of tear gas was deployed against DAN in an 

attempt to expand the police’s security perimeter around the Olympic hotel.96 DAN utilized communications channels—from cellular 

phones, to portable computers with an Internet connection, to pagers, 

police scanners, and two-way radios—to command and control certain 

nodes and maintain a degree of tactical cohesion. In addition to the 

organizers’ all-points network, protest communications were leveraged 

with individual protesters using cell phones, direct transmissions from 

roving independent media feeding directly onto the Internet, personal 

computers with wireless modems broadcasting live video, and a variety 

of other networked communications.97

Simultaneously, another crowd (which would reach approximately 

20,000 people by 11:00 a.m.) began staging for the AFL-CIO rally at the 

Memorial Stadium at the Seattle Center. The assistant police chief was 

still resisting calls from tactical units to declare a state of emergency; 

the decision was not made until 3:24 p.m. This third wave arrived in 

such high numbers that the mass arrests did not start occurring until 

later Tuesday evening. The third wave was a march by several thousand 

additional people composed mostly of environmental and human rights 

groups who elected to participate in the street protests instead of the 

labor parade. This group entered downtown from the south at about 

1:00 p.m. local time and marched to the Paramount Theatre inside 

the protest zone. By 5:30 p.m., the police reinforcements began arriving, and their tactics became more aggressive with the deployment of 

mounted police, dismounted police in full riot gear, and the use of tear 

gas, stun grenades, and nonlethal projectiles. Many protestors began to 

withdraw from the Convention Center after the establishment of a 7:00 

p.m. curfew.98 By this time, residents were frustrated by their inability 
308

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

to travel effectively amidst the large crowd and emerging police barricades. There were violent incidents and looting during this period. 

Some commercial establishments had been ransacked, and there were 

burning cars, tires, and garbage on certain streets. However, the disturbances and confrontations with police were not explicitly linked to 

DAN or their affiliates but attributed to unaffiliated individuals heretofore not involved in the demonstrations. Some racial tension erupted 

in some predominantly African-American sections of Capitol Hill, with 

much of the anger directed toward the police. The aftermath of the 

day’s events provided an odd juxtaposition for many activists: satisfaction with a well-executed preventative action yet disappointment (even 

victimization and regret) with the destruction and violence. While 

many of the local environmental activists disagreed with the WTO and 

its policies, they possessed civic pride in and identified closely with 

the Seattle community and intended to disrupt the event, not destroy 

the city.99

President Clinton was scheduled to address the WTO Ministerial 

on December 1 and, by then, order had largely been restored. As the 

presidential motorcade departed, the police again deployed nonlethal 

force. They planned a 4:00 p.m. offensive to clear the area (an order 

about which the Washington governor had not been informed) and 

began a demonstration of force by sending patrol cars on high-speed 

patrols through cleared areas. At approximately 7:00 p.m., several hundred demonstrators began withdrawing from downtown area to Capitol Hill to continue their nonviolent protest. At approximately 9:00 

p.m., police and National Guard elements arrived and quickly came 

under attack by members of the crowd. Most accounts indicate that the 

agitators were Capitol Hill residents and not DAN members. The crowd 

finally dispersed around 2:00 a.m. on December 2. By this point, DAN’s 

success in disrupting the WTO Ministerial was well acknowledged. 

Their tactical actions, which limited delegate attendance, coupled with 

President Clinton’s announcement of U.S. policy initiatives essentially 

rendered consensus impossible. DAN’s focus shifted to providing support for detained protestors and it commenced a two-day vigil outside 

the Public Safety Building.100

The anti-WTO demonstration was the largest left-wing protest 

action in the United States since the Gulf War. Despite causing an estimated $3 million in damage, DAN achieved its objectives through a 

disciplined adherence to nonviolent principles and a tactical flexibility 

that readily accepted diverse tactics. Their success was also unintentionally facilitated by the large AFL-CIO presence as well as intelligence failures and tactical mistakes on the part of the Seattle police. 
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

309

Nevertheless, the 1999 WTO demonstration served as an exemplar of a 

networked approach to swarm tactics using nonviolent means.

Strategically, the “Battle in Seattle” is viewed a tactical success in the 

anti-globalization movementk because it validated the capability to disrupt powerful economic and governmental process through nonviolent 

means. The event emboldened nonviolent activists, encouraged many 

others to mobilize, and infused the aforementioned cottage industry of 

protest training. Tactically, the 1999 WTO protestors’ incorporation of 

the information domain into their strategy —from tactical command 

and control networks to real-time global messaging using cellular 

and mobile computing technology—has been emulated with varying 

degrees of success in numerous demonstrations throughout the world. 

What might future actions hold? The logical extrapolation of tactical 

communication networks will include the use of all conceivable means 

of technological communication variable. This will likely include 

sophisticated military-grade hardware, with demonstrators employing 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to provide indications and warnings 

of police activity, to serve as a command and control node, and/or to 

serve as a communications relay to disseminate images and accounts of 

ongoing operations.102

SHADOW GOVERNMENT STRUCTUREl

One method that is frequently used to both undermine public 

confidence in a government and secure population compliance with 

passive resistance is the establishment of parallel structures of government. If a population must depend on an underground-sponsored 

“government,” it will be forced to comply with the underground’s passive resistance program and therefore withdraw its support from the 

regular government.

In India, for example, Gandhi felt that the highest form of passive 

resistance would be the establishment of parallel institutions of government—not only because they would be a potential weapon against 

the British colonial government, but also because they would provide 

k The paradox of globalization (the economically driven phenomenon that increases 

financial interdependency and obscures traditional national boundaries) is that while the 

underlying theoretical logic is intends to secure peace and prosperity for the world, the 

result is often political and social instability resulting from the shift in patterns of political 

authority from the centralized, hierarchical state-based model to more decentralized conglomerates. The result is the proliferation of stretches of territory indefinitely existing in a 

sort of limbo between sovereignty and subordination to existing juridical states.101

l For a more comprehensive discussion of insurgent use of shadow governments, refer 

to the appropriate chapter in the companion to this work, the second edition of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare.
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Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

positive value in creating a sense of unity and community within the 

diverse Indian population. Indeed, many observers assert that the passive resistance movement in India was important not so much because 

of what it did against the English but because of what it did for the Indians: It shaped a new Indian nationalism and provided an opportunity 

for Indians to repair the wounds to their national self-esteem that had 

been inflicted during more than one hundred years of outside rule.103, 104

Similarly, in Poland, the underground passive resistance movement helped the Polish people maintain a sense of national identity 

and unity in the face of Nazi harshness. The establishment of a “secret 

state”—of underground courts, schools, and civil government—maintained a continuity and identification with nationalism, thus denying 

loyalty to the occupier. During the Algerian War for Independence in 

the 1950s, passive resistance served to solidify the Arab community. 

Although unfavorable environmental, social, and political conditions 

had existed for generations, there was no insurgency until Arab grievances crystallized into national consensus. In mid-1940s Palestine, 

the Zionist insurgent-led passive resistance campaigns did as much to 

develop a strong feeling of unity and nationalism as they did to oppose 

the British forces. The main effect was to lead people away from any 

form of support for the official government. Thus, a consensual validation of the values and objectives of the insurgents was provided.

The techniques and societal values capitalized upon to undermine 

popular support of the government also serve the positive function of 

solidifying public opinion around a larger sense of community and 

national identification.

SUMMARY

Nonviolent resistance continues to play a prominent role in many 

underground and revolutionary activities. The twenty-first century has 

witnessed a synthesis of the global technological networks that link 

computers on the Internet and social networks to result in innovative 

forms of protest. Though few have managed to mobilize a sufficient 

number to displace a regime, they have provided a forum for a youthful 

demographic to engage in creative, often social-media-directed alternatives to the picketing and chants their elders employed.105 This trend 

is likely to continue, as the opportunities for the voiceless to find their 

voice are numerous and growing as is discontent with the political status quo and the concomitant passivity.
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

311

ENDNOTES

1 Jon Kleinberg, “The Convergence of Social and Technological Networks,” Communications of the ACM 53, no. 11 (2008): 66–72.

2 Ellen Barry, “Sound of Post-Soviet Protest: Claps and Beeps,” New York Times, 

July 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/world/europe/15belarus.html?_r=

1&pagewanted=all.

3 Mulford Q. Sibley, ed., The Quiet Battle (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 9.

4 Leo Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 

84.

5 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 

1960), chapter I.

6 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–

2001,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck 

Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

7 C. M. Case, “The Social Significance of Non-violent Conduct,” The Quiet Battle, ed. Mulford Q. Sibley (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 57.

8 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.

9 Chuck Crossett and Jason Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological 

Concepts (Ft. Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2010).

10 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence 5, 

no. 3 (1993): 213–251.

11 Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts.

12 Ibid.

13 Kuper, Passive Resistance, 85.

14 Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, The Secret Army (London: Victor Gollanez, 1950), 79.

15 Gene Sharp, Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

16 Feliks Gross, The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), 51.

17 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Portor Sargent, 1973), reproduced 

by The Albert Einstein Institution, accessed December 11, 2011, http://www.aeinstein.

org/organizations103a.html.

18 Barry, “Sound of Post-Soviet Protest: Claps and Beeps.”

19 Denis Warner, “Vietnam’s Militant Buddhists,” The Reporter, December 3, 1964, 29.

20 Mike Elkin, “Tunisia Internet Chief Gives Inside Look at Cyber Uprising,” Wired, January 28, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/as-egypt-tightens-its-internetgrip-tunisia-seeks-to-open-up/.

21 Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat

(New York: New York University Press, 1996).

22 Lt. Col. Th. Thaulow, “King Christian X,” Denmark During the German Occupation, ed. 

Borge Outze (Copenhagen: The Scandinavian Publishing Co., 1946), 135–136.

23 Leslie J. Wood, “Breaking the Wave: Repression, Identity, and Seattle Tactics,”Mobilization: 

The Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2007): 377–388.

24 Rikki Asher, “Radical Puppets and the Language of Art,” Art Education 62, no. 3 (2009): 

6–12.

25 Ibid.

26 Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts.
312

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

27 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “1979 Iranian Revolution,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, edited by Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

28 Majken Jul Sorenson, “Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression,” Peace & Change 33, no. 2 (2008): 167–189.

29 Ibid.

30 Ronald Seth, The Undaunted: The Story of the Resistance in Western Europe (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1956), 99–100.

31 Sorenson, “Humor as a Serious Strategy,” 167–189.

32 Seth, The Undaunted.

33 George K. Tanham, “The Belgian Underground Movement 1940–1944” (unpublished 

Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1951), 64.

34 Ibid.

35 Marian J. Rubchak, ed., Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of the New Ukraine (New York: 

Berghan Books, 2011).

36 Sarah D. Phillips, Women’s Social Activism in the New Ukraine (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 2008).

37 Guillain de Benouville, The Unknown Warriors (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 

197.

38 John G. Williams, “Underground Military Organization and Warfare” (unpublished master’s thesis [thesis 452], Georgetown University, Washington, DC, February 1950), 89–90.

39 David Martin, Ally Betrayed (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), 177–179.

40 R. D. Wilson, Cordon and Search (Aldershot, England: Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1949), 33.

41 Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 1953), 41–42.

42 India in 1930–31: A Statement Prepared for Presentation to Parliament (Calcutta: Government 

of India Central Publications Branch, 1932), 73.

43 See Joan V. Bondurant, Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 91ff.

44 Martha A. McCaughery and Michael D. Ayers, Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and 

Practice (Bristol, PA: Taylor & Francis, Inc, 2003).

45 Dorothy E. Denning, “Activism, Hactivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool 

for Influencing Foreign Policy,” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 

Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Rondfelt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2001).

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Jerome M. Conley, “Orange Revolution (Ukraine): 2004–2005,” in Casebook on Insurgency 

and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. 

Army Publications Directorate, in press).

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “Solidarity,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army 

Publications Directorate, in press).
Chapter 10. Nonviolent Resistance

313

57 McCaughery and Ayers, Cyberactivism.

58 Laura Illia, “Passage to Cyberactivism: How Dynamics of Activism Change,” Journal of 

Public Affairs 3, no. 4 (2003): 326–337.

59 Tianjun Fu and Hsinchun Chen, “Analysis of Cyberactivism: A Case Study of Online Free 

Tibet Activities,” Intelligence and Security Informatics (2008): 1–6.

60 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

61 Sibley, The Quiet Battle, 156–157.

62 India in 1930–31, 660.

63 Crossett and Newton, “Solidarity.”

64 John Shissler (former J-2A, Joint Task Force 160, Operation Sea Signal), personal communication, January 2012.

65 James Dingley and Marcello Mollica, “The Human Body as a Terrorist Weapon: Hunger 

Strikes and Suicide Bombers,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 6 (2007): 459–492.

66 Crossett and Newton, “Solidarity.”

67 Halfdan Lefevre, “The Illegal Press,” Denmark During the German Occupation. ed. Borge 

Outze (Copenhagen: The Scandinavian Publishing Co., 1946), 64.

68 Crossett and Newton, “Solidarity.”

69 Lefevre, “The Illegal Press,” 63–64.

70 Ernest K. Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1945), 210.

71 Crossett and Newton, “Solidarity.”

72 Ibid.

73 Paul D. Almeida and Mark Irving Lichbach, “To the Internet, From the Internet: Comparative Media Coverage of Transnational Protests,” Mobilization: An International Journal 

8, no. 3 (2003): 249–272.

74 Denning, “Activism, Hactivism, and Cyberterrorism.”

75 Elkin, “Tunisia Internet Chief.”

76 Ibid.

77 Charles Levinson and Matt Bradley, “Egypt’s Regime on the Brink,” Wall Street Journal 

Online, January 29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870395660457

6109323492986438.html?mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory.

78 Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police, 210.

79 Ruaridh Arrow, “Gene Sharp: Author of the Nonviolent Revolution Rulebook,” BBC 

News, February 21, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12522848.

80 Crossett and Newton, “1979 Iranian Revolution.”

81 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (New York: Liveright Publishing, 1922).

82 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How 

Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations (New York: Doubleday, 

2004).

83 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.”

84 Paul de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO Protest Strategy and Tactics,” in 

Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and 

David Rondfelt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).

85 Larry Elliot and John Vidal, “Week of Division On and Off Streets,” The Guardian, December 3, 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/dec/04/wto.johnvidal1.

86 de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City.”

87 Interview with HC.

88 de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City.”
314

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89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Francis Dupuis-Deri, “The Black Blocs Ten Years after Seattle,” Journal for the Study of 

Radicalism 4, no. 2 (2010): 45–82.

92 de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City.”

93 Margaret Levi and Gillian H. Murphy, “Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO 

Protests in Seattle,” Political Studies 54 (2006): 651–670.

94 de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City.”

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Interview with HC.

100de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City.”

101 Mark Duffield, “Globalization and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of 

History?” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 23, no. 2 (1999): 21–38.

102 Stuart Ackerman, “Occupy the Skies! Protesters Could Use Spy Drones,” Wired, November 17, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/11/ows-drones/#more-63792.

103Bor-Komorowski, The Secret Army.

104 Jan Karski, The Story of a Secret State (New York: Simon Publications, 2001).

105Barry, “Sound of Post-Soviet Protest: Claps and Beeps.”
CHAPTER 11.

TERRORISM
CHAPTER CONTENTS

Objectives of Terrorism .......................................................................... 317

Disruption of Socioeconomic and Political Status Quo ................... 319

Demonstration of Strength ................................................................320

Punishment and Retaliation ..............................................................323

Maintenance of Security.....................................................................324

Provocation..........................................................................................326

Considerations of Terrorism ..................................................................328

Unity of Effort.....................................................................................329

Suicide Terrorism................................................................................331

Terrorism Planning.............................................................................333

Rationalizing Terrorism .....................................................................339

Terrorist Threats.................................................................................340

Psychological Effects of Terror...............................................................344

Terror Management Theory...............................................................346

Individual Responses..........................................................................347

Group Responses ................................................................................350

Summary ................................................................................................352
Chapter 11. Terrorism

317

Jason Spitaletta and SORO authors

Terrorism has proven to be one of the more effective forms of 

psychological warfare. Terrorism is a tactic by which a group seeks to 

impose its will on a selected target audience.1

 Most liberation or underground movements have at least dabbled in “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or 

societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other 

ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.”2

 Despite often relying on illegal acts and/or criminal networks, terrorism is not traditionally used for financial gain but rather 

for psychological gain.3

 Insurgents have seldom relied solely on the 

attractiveness of their appeals or on the persuasiveness of their goals to 

secure popular support; they have generally assumed that people never 

entirely pursue idealistic goals or do what logic might tell them is most 

beneficial. Coercive means are therefore used to focus public attention on the goals and issues identified as important by the insurgents. 

The Chinese saying “Kill one, frighten ten thousand” summarizes the 

objective of terrorism: maximize the psychological effect of politically 

motivated violence.4

 Creating uncertain conditions is often an operational objective of insurgent groups because it supports their narrative 

that the existing government is powerless and/or lacks legitimacy.5

Terror is also used to support other insurgent techniques and 

operations, such as propaganda and agitation. Because it has limited 

resources, an underground needs to consider economy of force and 

thus terrorism can be seen as a prudent course of action and not an 

irrational or ill-considered act of madmen. Terrorism is the confluence 

of violence and propaganda, where the former seeks to modify behavior through coercion and the latter through persuasion.6

 This chapter 

is about the use of terrorism by insurgent and revolutionary movements. The focus will be the psychological rationale of the decision to 

use terror as well as the effect of the use of terror on the state, other 

groups, and the civilian populace writ large. The chapter begins with 

a discussion of the considerations of employing terrorism as a strategy 

and concludes with a discussion of the psychological effects of terrorism including individual and group responses.

OBJECTIVES OF TERRORISM

The modern use terrorism as a political tool can be considered in a 

set of four forty-year periods dating back to the late nineteenth century. 

The first period started coincidently with the discovery of dynamite 

in the 1880s. Anarchists who believed traditional forms of intellectual 
318

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

rebellion were insufficient to change the political status quo employed 

terrorism in this wave. The 1920s saw the start of an anticolonial wave of 

terror that was used in the wars of national liberation. These conflicts 

saw the transition to a wave of New Lefta terrorism from which emerged 

the concept of fourth generation warfare.b The New Left wave of terrorism emerged in both Europe and the United States as a rebellion 

against the political and social intuitions of their parents’ generation. 

Groups such as the Brigate Rossi (Red Brigade) in Italy, the Red Army 

Faction in Germany, and the Weather Underground in the United 

States were indicative of these politically informed but discontented 

groups. The current wave of religious extremism began in 1979, before 

the wave of New Left terrorism came to its conclusion. Nevertheless, the 

advent of, particularly Islamist, extremist groups has come to dominate 

the political landscape.8

 Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) emerged from 

the larger Islamic movement in Egypt in the latter half of the twentieth century and was considered the first element of the modern global 

Salafist jihad.9

 The prominence of this movement grew with the 1979 

Islamic Revolution in Iran and its export to the Lebanese resistance, 

giving birth to Hizbollah. The second element was the mobilization 

of many across the Muslim world to help the Afghan mujahidin expel 

Soviet forces from Afghanistan during a decade-long war. From that 

emerged the third element, Al Qaeda, a group of committed veterans 

of the Afghan conflict who sought to exploit the global Islamic mobilization to reestablish the caliphate that was dissolved in 1922 with the 

fall of the Ottoman Empire.10

a “New Left” was a term popularized in the United Kingdom and United States in 

reference to activists in the 1960s and 1970s who sought to implement a broad range of 

political and social reforms in contrast to doctrinaire Marxist movements, which focused 

principally on labor unionization and questions of social class.

b The phrase “fourth generation warfare” was coined in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette

article7

 that proposed a generational model of modern warfare the coincided with 

advances in technology dating back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. First generation 

warfare (1GW) was characterized by tactics of line and column that developed in the 

age of the smoothbore musket. 1GW consisted of tightly ordered soldiers with top-down 

discipline and rigid, centralized command and control. The advent of the machine gun 

and rifled barrel saw the transition into second generation warfare (2GW) and its tactics 

of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire. 2GW saw the emphasis shift 

from the offense to the defense and from direct to indirect weapons systems. The carnage 

of World War I saw a rethinking in the latter stages of that conflict and the beginnings of 

third generation warfare (3GW). Also called maneuver warfare, 3GW (aided by advances 

in aviation, armor, and tactical communications as well as a more decentralized command 

and control philosophy) employs defense in depth and offensive tactics of infiltration to 

bypass enemy surfaces and exploit gaps. The goal of 3GW is to shatter an adversary’s will 

to fight instead of attritting the forces through firepower alone. Fourth generation warfare 

(4GW), or asymmetric war, is form of conflict that blurs the distinction between war and 

politics as well as between combatant and noncombatant and is characterized by terroristic tactics.
Chapter 11. Terrorism

319

Disruption of Socioeconomic and Political Status Quo

A common aim of terrorism is to destroy existing organization of 

governments, social structures, and/or the socioeconomic status quo. 

Terrorist acts are often directed toward governmental officials and key 

supporters, making it unsafe to be a government official and, through 

systematic assassination, crippling the actual functioning of government. The utility of terror for a subversive movement is multifarious: 

it disrupts government control of the population, demonstrates insurgent strength, attracts popular support, suppresses cooperation with 

the government by “collaborators” and “traitors,” protects the security 

of the clandestine organization, and, finally, provokes counteraction by 

government forces.

The application of this theory can be seen in South Vietnam, where 

the Viet Cong weakened government control in certain regions by killing and kidnapping province chiefs, police officials, village guards, and 

landlords. It has been estimated that in the five-year period between 

1959 and 1964, the Viet Cong murdered more than 6,000 minor Vietnamese officials. Schoolteachers, social workers, and medical personnel were also favorite targets. The allegiance of the people is the chief 

prize in an insurgency, and because schoolteachers, as one observer 

noted, “form young minds and educate them to love their country and 

its system of government, to close such schools or to cow the teachers 

into spreading antigovernment propaganda can be a more important 

victory than to defeat an army division.”11 Almost 80,000 South Vietnamese schoolchildren had been deprived of schools by 1960 because 

of terrorist action: 636 schools were closed, approximately 250 teachers were kidnapped, and another 30 were killed. The Viet Cong also 

disrupted the South Vietnamese social welfare and medical program; 

a highly successful malaria-eradication program, for example, was 

stopped in 1961 because of high casualties among its personnel caused 

by terrorists.

To underscore the unprofitability of being, or becoming, a government servant, the Viet Cong carried out assassinations by unusual, 

brutal, or mysterious methods. Vietnamese village headmen suspected 

by the Viet Cong “of cooperating with the government or guilty of 

‘crimes against the people’ were disemboweled and decapitated, and 

their families with them.”12 The attention value of such acts in the press 

and through word of mouth was great and the implied threat to others 

obvious. When, through the simple process of attrition, the machinery 

of government in one area came to a virtual standstill, the Viet Cong 

reestablished social order by setting up a shadow government with its 

own official apparatus to collect taxes, operate schools, and implement 

population control measures.
320

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

Demonstration of Strength

In a terrorist campaign, the individual citizen lives under the continual threat of physical harm. If government police are unable to curb 

the terrorists’ threats, the citizen tends to lose confidence in the state 

whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety.13,14 The use of terror, when effective, convinces the people of the movement’s strength. 

Captured Viet Cong documents indicate that this was one of its primary 

objectives in South Vietnam. Through a demonstration of strength by 

effective assassination of government and village leaders, it attempted 

to convince the rural population that the regime in Saigon could not 

protect them.15

In order to publicize the movement’s strength, some terrorist activities are conducted publicly. The National Liberation Front (Frente de 

Liberación Nacional, or FLN) in Algeria used this tactic. Witnesses 

of terrorist acts were not eliminated but were spared in order to confirm the FLN success. Muslims who supported the French were warned 

by letters bearing the FLN crest to desist from cooperating with the 

French; if a Muslim refused, the FLN execution order was attached to 

the victim’s dead body. The FLN murdered approximately 16,000 Muslims and kidnapped 50,000 others16 and thus silenced “its opposition, 

weakened the . . . French by depriving them of the support of . . . Muslim leaders, and at the same time, assassination enhanced the prestige 

of the FLN . . . by affording tangible proof of the organization’s effectiveness and intrepidity.”17

However, in pursuing a similar tactic, the Communist insurgency in 

Malaya got itself into a difficult position. Unable to carry out and win a 

guerrilla war, the Communists attempted by mass terror to demonstrate 

their strength and neutralize the members of the population who were 

supporting the government. They soon received complaints from their 

political arm, the Min Yuen, that indiscriminate terror was alienating 

the voluntary support upon which their long-range success depended.18

In response to Republic of Ireland pressure, the Provisional Irish 

Republican Army (PIRA) considered extending its operations to mainland Britain. In early 1973, the Army Council formally approved action 

in Britain, to include strikes on economic, military, political, and judicial targets. The operations were designed to capture the attention of 

the British public, generate a weariness of the problem in Northern 

Ireland, and increase pressure on their respective Members of Parliament (MP) to withdraw. Attacks within Great Britain would also allow 

the PIRA to avoid Irish civilian casualties and provide needed relief 

to Belfast and Derry units. The first mainland operation involved 

four car bombs in London detonating and injuring 180 people. The 
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next team planted nine bombs in mid-England and a series of small 

incendiary devices in popular shops around London. Innocent civilians were supposed to be avoided in these mainland-bombing attacks, 

but the bombings were conducted indiscriminately and without consideration of civilian casualties. Pubs frequented by British soldiers were 

occasionally targeted; however, the typical targets were those associated with influential members of the British government and business. 

Residences of the members of parliament, high-end hotels, clubs for 

the wealthy, and similar locations were favorite targets. The highestprofile bombing was perhaps the attempt on Prime Minister Margaret 

Thatcher’s life in 1984 at the Brighton Grand Hotel. The PIRA planted 

a large Semtex bomb 24 days before it detonated using a sophisticated 

long-delay timer. The cabinet and Thatcher were attending a conference at the hotel, and the blast came very close to Thatcher’s suite. She 

was unharmed, though the Trade Secretary was badly hurt and several 

senior politicians were killed. Five people died in the blast and significant visible damage inside and outside the hotel showed the reach and 

power of the PIRA.19

Strategic Risks

Terror can politically boomerang if the target is unwisely chosen or 

the assassination unwisely timed. An example of this occurred in the 

Philippines when a contingent of Huk insurgents ambushed and killed 

Aurora Quezon, wife of the Philippine president, along with her daughter and other distinguished citizens. Because she was widely known and 

respected by the people, Mrs. Quezon’s death was a serious setback to 

the Communists. Reacting to the nation’s feeling of condemnation, the 

Huk leaders declared that the terrorists acted without orders.

In Algeria, terrorism in the name of nationalism largely won support from or cowed the Muslim population, but it had an opposite 

effect on the French community. Although thoroughly unnerved by 

the FLN terrorist offensive of 1956, the French never reached the point 

of surrendering. In itself, the dramatic nature of the terrorist challenge 

ensures a dramatic response to the call for counteraction. The effect of 

FLN terrorism on French policy was to strengthen the resolve to stamp 

out the rebellion, indeed to make it politically impossible to follow any 

other course.20

In the early 1990s, the PIRA adopted the proxy bomb, a tactic similar to suicide bombing whereby individuals were forced to drive bombs 

into military checkpoints or other targets. The individual was typically 

a suspected enemy collaborator whose family was held hostage until the 

mission was completed. In 1990, the PIRA Derry Brigade forced Patsy 

Gillespie, a Catholic cook for the British army, to drive a car bomb into 
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an army checkpoint, killing him and five soldiers. His family in Derry 

was held hostage as insurance. The proxy bomb experiment was an 

utter public relations disaster for the PIRA and Sinn Féin. Anger in 

Derry, a nationalist stronghold, reached unprecedented levels. Disgust 

and revulsion over the use of human bombs also led to more internal 

dissension within the Republican movement.21

In November 1997, operatives from Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) 

and an element of EIJ called Jihad Talaat al-Fath or “Holy War of the 

Vanguard of the Conquest” killed sixty-three tourists at the Temple 

of Hatshepsut, Egypt. During the operation, later dubbed the “Luxor 

Massacre,” six assailants dressed in police uniforms systematically shot 

and stabbed to death fifty-eight foreign and four Egyptian tourists. The 

day after the attack, despite evidence of the systematic executions, EIG 

claimed that the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage. 

Others denied Islamist involvement completely: Omar Abdel-Rahman 

(the spiritual leader of EIG) blamed the Israeli Mossad, while Dr. 

Ayman Al-Zawahiri (then the emir of EIJ) maintained that the Egyptian police were responsible. This operation was to be the last kinetic 

action attributed to either EIG or its members. The audacity and 

depravity of the attack stunned Egyptian society, ruined tourism for 

years, and destroyed much of the remaining popular support for EIG 

and EIJ in Egypt.22

The Weather Undergroundc was an American radical leftist organization that emerged out of the 1960s antiwar group Students for a 

Democratic Society (SDS). The organization was formed in the wake 

of the killing of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in a 

December 1969 Chicago police/FBI raid. A small cadre of SDS members perceived this event to be a signal that nonviolent resistance to 

the U.S. government was a futile endeavor and that terrorism was necessary in order to achieve their objectives. The “Days of Rage,” which 

commenced on October 9, 1969, was their first public demonstration; 

a riot in Chicago was timed to coincide with the trial of the seven individuals who were charged with conspiracy, inciting to riot, and other 

charges related to protests at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. The Weathermen believed that the American public had become 

desensitized to the status quo of political activism and that it was only 

through violence that the group could draw sufficient attention of the 

c The Weather Underground (or Weathermen) described themselves as a revolutionary organization of Communist men and women. Their goal was to create a clandestine 

revolutionary party for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Weather Underground and the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense were priority intelligence targets of the U.S. Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI)’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO); however, many tactics 

used under that program were eventually ruled illegal.
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U.S. government to the group’s political goals. The group’s intent was 

to foment public chaos and mobilize the American public in opposition 

to the U.S. government’s policies toward Southeast Asia. In 1970, the 

group issued a Declaration of a State of War against the U.S. government and began a campaign of bombings through the mid-1970s. The 

bombings targeted government buildings along with several banks. 

Each target was carefully selected for its symbolism and tied to a specific political objective. For the bombing of the United States Capitol 

on March 1, 1971, they issued a communiqué saying it was in protest 

of the U.S. invasion of Laos, whereas the bombing of the Pentagon on 

May 19, 1972, was in retaliation for the U.S. bombing raid in Hanoi. 

The Weathermen largely disintegrated after the United States withdrew from Vietnam, which also marked the beginning of the general 

decline of the American New Left.23

Punishment and Retaliation

The threat of punishment against collaborators and informers 

within the general populace is a common feature of insurgent terrorism. In fact, many insurgencies against occupying powers have taken a 

higher toll on indigenous citizenry than on the occupying forces. If the 

group adopts an increasingly paranoid defensive posture, including the 

intimidation, expulsion, even killing, of suspected traitors, there is an 

increased risk of further violence.24 For example, the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, or 

National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), killed more Cypriots—as 

“traitors” or “collaborators”—than it did British security forces or government officials. During the early days of the Cypriot insurgency, the 

population, easy-going by nature and tradition, seemed not to be taking the rebellion seriously. EOKA immediately began an offensive to 

punish “collaborators”; the slogan “Death to Traitors” was scrawled on 

walls to make the threat visible, and selected murders of Greek Cypriots 

drove the point home. A concrete example of this occurred on October 28, 1955, when Archbishop Makarios publicly called for the resignation of all Greek village headmen. The date was symbolically chosen, 

for October 28, known as Okhi (“No”) Day, is the anniversary of the 

Greek refusal to submit to the Italian ultimatum in 1940. Only about 

a fifth of the headmen had responded by the end of the year, however. 

EOKA then went into action by murdering three headmen and within 

three weeks, resignations reached 80 percent.

Luis Taruc, the leader of the Huks in the Philippines, bragged that 

by using old women in the town markets, young boys tending carabaos in the fields, and small merchants traveling between towns, every 
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traitorous act, every puppet crime, every betrayal through collaboration was known to the Huks. After a warning of impending punishment, the Huks would blacklist offenders, and agents were authorized 

to arrest or liquidate them.25

The Polish underground also used techniques of terror propaganda against collaborators. Initially, specific collaborators were morally condemned in the underground press; next, they were blacklisted 

and death sentences were published. Further, the underground press 

frequently lumped the crimes of collaborators with the names of Nazi 

officials, listing the names of German officers who would be brought 

before war crimes tribunals after the war. In most cases, the underground later executed the condemned individuals.

Terror can be used in retaliation against or as a counterbalance 

to terror. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) relied heavily on assassinations of rival Tamil separatists, politicians, police informants, and high-ranking politicians. The first assassination for which 

the LTTE claimed responsibility was that of the Tamil mayor of Jaffna 

and SLFP (Sri Lankan Freedom Party) member Alfred Thambirajah 

Duraiappah, who was killed in 1975. Many assassinations attributed to 

the LTTE were impossible to verify since its practice was to neither 

claim nor deny involvement in specific activities, instead pointing to 

continued paramilitary and police violence against Tamil civilians as 

contributing to specific assassinations. Some of the suspected LTTE 

assassinations included the death of TULF (Tamil United Liberation 

Front) Vice President Neelan Thiruchelvam; the attempt on then-President Kumaratunga in 1999; and the deaths of Rajiv Gandhi, President Ranasinghe Premadasa, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, and Lakshman 

Kadirgamar.26

Maintenance of Security

To bring about the failure of government countermeasures, the 

security of the clandestine organization must be maintained. There are 

two ways in which an underground movement can protect its own security: “It can police the loyalty of its members and take steps to see to it 

that a complete picture of the movement is held only by a limited few, 

or it can employ the threat of terror against informers.”27 Terror is used 

by insurgent organizations against their own membership in order to 

protect the security of their operations. It is always implicit, and often 

made explicit, that they who defect or betray the cause will be severely 

punished. To demonstrate the reality of the threat, undergrounds 

characteristically have organized terror squads that enforce threats 

and punish traitors.28 Most frequently, punishment means death.
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Terrorist Oaths

In Kenya in 1952, a Kikuyu tribesman who was being admitted to 

the select terrorist cadre of the Mau Mau had to swear himself to a 

brotherhood of murder:

• If I am called upon to do so, with four others, I will 

kill a European.

• If I am called upon to do so, I will kill a Kikuyu who 

is against the Mau Mau, even if it be my mother or 

my father or brother or sister or wife or child.

• If I am called upon to do so, I will help to dispose 

of the body of the murdered person so that it may 

not be found.

• I will never disobey the orders of the leaders of this 

society.29

Rituals involving bestial and degrading practices, the object of 

which was to make the initiates become outcasts who shrank at nothing, often accompanied this murder oath. The acts performed were 

intended to be so depraved that, by comparison, the mere disemboweling of pregnant women, for instance, would seem mild. Furthermore, 

this degradation would alienate the initiate from the Kikuyu community, insuring that he could never fully return to normal life and betray 

Mau Mau secrecy. But where such tribal superstitions proved inadequate, the gap was filled by fear of personal violence or death.30

Members of the LTTE’s elite Black Tigers, whose acceptance into 

the unit was ritualized and presided over by Vellupillai Prabhakaran, 

carried laminated cards with a warning (in English and Sinhala) that, 

“I am filled with explosives. If my journey is blocked I will explode it. 

Let me go.”31

Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al  Qaeda from its inception in 

the late 1980s until his death at the hands of U.S. Special Operations 

Forces in May 2011, recruited perspective members to swear an oath of 

allegiance (or bayat) to him before they were admitted.32

Enforcing Squads

An example of underground enforcing squads was the “Traitor 

Elimination Corps,” which was one of the first units organized by the 

Communist underground in Malaya. The very existence of this unit 

caused recruits to the underground to be quickly impressed with the 

importance of “discipline” and with “the severity of the Party’s means 

of enforcing discipline.”33 However, one source cites evidence that the 
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Malayan Communist Party also used lesser threats, hoping to avoid liquidating agents who broke discipline yet always reserving the implied 

“escalation” of the threat of death.

Interviews with numbers of surrendered Malayan insurgents 

revealed that although 80 percent said they feared bodily harm, the 

real reasons for their fear were more subtle threats. Nearly all said they 

feared most “the Party’s practice of disciplining its members by depriving them of their firearms; . . . they claimed this was something to be 

dreaded because, without their weapons, they would be defenseless.”34

Coupled with social ostracism, physical defenselessness threatened the 

very basis of the man’s sense of personal security.

The Huk underground in the Philippines also used terror to maintain the security of its operations, executing its threats through a special 

terror squad. 35 Similarly, the FLN in Algeria enforced discipline in its 

urban underground networks by summarily executing “traitors” when 

discovered. The security of the Yugoslav Communist underground 

was maintained by a secret police unit called the Department for the 

Defense of the People (0.Z.Na.). This group provided intelligence on 

the behavior of underground comrades and was authorized to liquidate those who were disloyal to the partisans.36 During the Moroccan 

independence insurgency, the counterterrorist “Red Hand” guarded 

its secrecy by eliminating defectors through mysterious accidents.37

The PIRA employed counterintelligence units (called “nutting 

squads”) to be responsible for internal security. These units killed at 

least twenty-four suspected informers. The Provisionals were sensitive 

to the effect the execution of informers had on their popular support. 

The bodies were generally found with no shoes, a folded bank note in 

the pocket, masking tape over the eyes, and a bullet in the back of the 

head. Several times, the PIRA attempted to demonstrate their capacity 

for forgiveness, as in 1982 when they offered amnesty to all those who 

came forward and admitted their crime. Provisional punishment was 

harsh and swift for informers, but so was the community’s castigation 

directed at known informers and their relatives. Informing, becoming 

a “tout” as informers are called, was viewed as a severe betrayal in the 

Republican-sympathetic community.38

Provocation

Insurgent movements frequently utilize terrorism to provoke a counteraction that may be strategically useful. The Organisation de l’Armée 

Secrète (Organization of the Secret Army/Secret Armed Organization, 

or OAS), the illegal secret French army organization in Algeria, used 

this tactic to provoke the nationalist FLN into upsetting the cease-fire 
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upon which negotiations between the French government and the FLN 

were based.d By carrying out indiscriminate terrorist attacks on Arab 

civilians, “the OAS leadership evidently believed it would so exacerbate 

French–Algerian relations that the Algerians would be provoked into 

massive countermeasures, that full-scale war would be resumed, and 

that no settlement would be possible.”39

Provocation often attempts to exploit the “accidental guerrilla” phenomenon, where violent movements gain popular support by default 

after a heavy-handed response by the state.40 The Iraqi resistance after 

the initial surge of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 was particularly fierce in Al Anbar province and was initially the most hostile 

toward the American presence. The predominantly Sunni population 

of Al Anbar was historically resistant to outside influence, regardless of 

ethnicity, nationality, or religion. The Anbar resistance was fueled by 

the “accidental guerrilla” syndrome, the processe

 by which heretoforenoninvolved individuals determine it is in their best interest to aid an 

insurgency because it provides the best opportunity for them to achieve 

their desired goals. The process began with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)f

infecting the area by establishing a base of operations outside the control of U.S. or Iraqi authorities. From this safe haven, AQI operatives 

began contaminate the zone by expanding into neighboring areas, 

often marrying into local tribes. In response to this, the state or occupying authority (in this case the U.S. military) intervened by launching 

d The OAS was a French far-right nationalist organization during the Algerian War 

(1954–62). The OAS used asymmetric tactics (including terrorism) to prevent Algeria’s 

independence from France. It was officially formed in Madrid in January 1961 by French 

politicians and military officers in response to the January 8, 1961, referendum on Algerian self-determination organized by General Charles de Gaulle. The OAS was an amalgamation of existing, albeit unofficial, resistance networks to the FLN. The OAS carried out 

attacks on the FLN and their perceived supporters throughout the war.

e Killcullen’s model entails four phases: “infection,” “contagion,” “intervention,” and 

“rejection.”

f In this case, AQI is used as a composite of multiple foreign-fighter organizations 

operating in Iraq who were ideologically affiliated with, but not explicitly commanded 

and controlled by, Al Qaeda. Among those groups was Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, the 

group led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (who became the de facto “face” of AQI). The stated 

goals of AQI were to force a withdrawal of United States-led forces from Iraq, topple the 

Iraqi interim government, assassinate collaborators with the occupation, marginalize the 

Shia population and defeat its militias, and establish an Islamic state. Initially, the various 

insurgent groups primarily targeted coalition forces (with a minimal amount of targeting directed at Iraqi civilians). AQI developed an expansive militant network, including 

some of the remnants of Ansar al-Islam (a Kurdish militant group) and a growing number 

of foreign fighters, to resist the coalition occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. Unlike 

the former Baath regime elements or the Shia groups, AQI employed asymmetric tactics 

(suicide bombings, car bombings, and the use of improvised explosive devices [IEDs] as 

counter-mobility weapons), along with more traditional guerrilla tactics such as ambushes 

and small-scale raids.
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military operations against AQI. The consequence of such action, rejection of the coalition by the Anbari people, served to reinforce AQI’s 

narrative, and the combination of psychological preparation by AQI 

and the reality of circumstances on the ground strengthened the bond 

between AQI and the Al Anbar Sunnis, thus growing the capability of 

the in-group and further perpetuating this cycle.41 AQI exploited U.S. 

tactics to mobilize the mass of Iraqis who were opposed to both the U.S. 

and AQI presence in Al Anbar. AQI successfully used coalition force to 

turn small tactical defeats into operational successes by exploiting the 

information domain and framing the coalition as oppressive occupiers 

and themselves as defenders of the Iraqi people.42

Governments that seek the consent of the governed, even partially, 

must be more cautious about proportionate use of force. One use of 

terror to create a provocative situation is the deliberate assassination 

in a riot of innocent bystanders in order to create a martyr and provoke the populace into further actions against the government. Carlos 

Marighella, in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, advocated this tactic as a highly effective means of cultivating popular support. Instead 

of compelling the populace to join an insurgent cause, the insurgents 

would provoke the state to react violently and indiscriminately, thus 

driving the populace into the arms of the insurgents.43 A similar outcome may result whether the casualty was intentional or not. The 

“Bloody Sunday” attacks in Northern Ireland—in which British paratroopers killed thirteen unarmed protestors during a largely peaceful 

Catholic demonstration—catalyzed decades of subsequent conflict. 

This was an unintentional provocation on the part of the British. In 

retrospect, military leaders regretted assigning a unit of paratroopers 

known for aggressiveness to crowd control, a mission for which they 

were unsuited. Prior to this, Catholic protest groups had welcomed 

the presence of British troops as protection against sectarian violence. 

However, this event turned the Irish Catholics against the British soldiers and energized the violent factions within the IRA, accelerating a 

decline into “The Troubles.”44

CONSIDERATIONS OF TERRORISM

A key feature of terrorism is detailed preparation. To demonstrate 

insurgent strength and sustain momentum, early success is essential. 

Targets are selected so that the terrorists are free to choose the time 

and place that will best insure the success of the mission.45 Effective use 

of terror requires a thorough knowledge of localities, people, customs, 

and habits; it requires extensive and secret reconnaissance activities. 

Undergrounds have both a technical and social infrastructure that is 
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actively concealed yet requires financial resources to function. Agents 

must be compensated and guerrilla forces armed; escape-and-evasion 

networks require money for extra food, for safe houses, and to provide to escapees; psychological operations require funds for products 

and activities; and headquarters and administrative sections require 

office supplies. Al Qaeda is often considered the exemplar of underground networks. Dating back to the mid-1980s, the Maktab Al Khidamat (Services Office) or MAK served as a clearinghouse to recruit, 

finance, train, and employ foreign fighters from across the globe in 

support of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union. Using methods 

acquired from the Muslim Brotherhood, both MAK and Al Qaeda used 

a sophisticated, complex, and resilient money-generating and -transfer 

network.46

Unity of Effort

Operational discipline is a necessity if terrorism is to be an effective component of a psychological warfare campaign. Normally unorganized terrorism involves unplanned acts against unselected targets. 

Such acts are the incidental result of more generalized attacks. The 

distinguishing feature of unorganized terrorism is that individuals in 

large units that do not have terror as their sole function commit it. 

These acts are often against targets of opportunity and prosecuted 

by independent cells with either vague mission-type orders or the 

autonomy to attack at their discretion. Examples may include AQI cells 

deploying a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) against 

a U.S. patrol that had fallen into habitual patterns. Instead of risking 

exposure of the network by requesting permission, a cell leader would 

exploit the vulnerability in the patrol’s tactics and attempt to cause as 

much damage to the U.S. personnel as possible. The risk with this lack 

of organizational direction, however, is the perceived indiscriminate 

nature of the attacks due to civilian casualties.

Undergrounds usually are careful to avoid wanton acts of terrorism 

against the populace. Such notable experts as China’s Mao Tse-Tung 

and North Vietnam’s General Vo Nguyen Giap counseled extreme 

restraint, advising that great care be taken to avoid bringing undue 

suffering to the populace and unduly alienating public opinion.47 As 

noted earlier, terror squads are frequently used as an enforcing arm 

for underground political units. For this purpose, terroristic acts are 

specifically designed to support the underground’s political goals and 

are usually carried out by specially trained and organized squads. An 

example of this is the organization of the Communist Party underground in Malaya. Just as propaganda and political units were attached 
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to the party’s Liberation Army to assist in its “military” activities, terrorist squads were attached to the party’s political arm, the Min Yuen, 

to enforce support of its political activities. Somewhat similar to the 

“Blood and Steel Corps,” these terrorist units consisted mostly of 

“trusted party thugs who, in addition to perpetrating acts of extortion 

and intimidation against those designated by the Party, were ordered 

to strengthen the treasury by engaging in payroll robberies and raids 

on business establishments.”48

Another dimension of terroristic activity used in support of insurgent political goals is seen in the plan for urban insurgency adopted in 

1961 by the Castro-Communist-supported insurgents (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional [Armed Forces of National Liberation, or 

FALN]) in Venezuela. Here, the insurgents attempted to organize terrorist units or shock brigades to serve as the catalytic agent for urban 

revolution. The tactic was to induce a state of paralysis and alarm within 

the urban public through an extended period of urban violence, eventually undermining the support and power of the government and 

leading to a rapid victory. Terror squads, called Tactical Combat Units 

(TCUs), were used for robberies, sabotage, arson, murders, and the 

creation of street violence and riots. The units were usually organized 

in detachments of about thirty: five to eight men engaged in the bolder 

terrorist actions while the rest filled lesser supporting roles.49

The success of many of the units’ terrorist actions was largely attributable to careful advance preparation, including written operations 

plans. Although much of the street violence appeared to be spontaneous, careful examination reveals a pattern: attacks on Venezuelanowned properties were usually limited to robbery, whereas those on 

U.S. properties involved some use of incendiaries or explosives. The 

terrorist units operated in the mobile hit-and-run style, usually proceeding to and from their targets in stolen automobiles. Although the 

TCU attempted on numerous occasions in 1963 to induce an atmosphere of mass terrorism in Caracas through stepped-up sniper fire 

and associated acts of violence, these operations failed. Although they 

interrupted normal patterns of urban life, they did not succeed in producing mass terrorism of the sort that would immobilize or cripple the 

functioning of government.50

There are times when tactical objectives of subordinate leaders may 

be inconsistent with the overall organizational strategy. By 2005, the 

tactics used by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (the leader of AQI) to foment secular conflict between Iraq’s Shia and Sunni populations drew criticism 

from Al Qaeda’s leadership. Zawahiri advised Zarqawi to eschew internecine conflict in Iraq because he (Zawahiri) believed the American 

exit was imminent. He also admonished Zarqawi to cease beheading 
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hostages and posting the executions on the Internet because “We are 

in a battle and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”51 Zarqawi did not heed Zawahiri’s advice, and as 

AQI operations devolved into “armed banditry,” Al Qaeda leadership 

shifted their resources to support alternative fronts where the chances 

of victory seemed more promising.52

Franchising Terror

Rifts within insurgent groups are inevitable, particularly when security requirements demand a decentralized network. A recent trend in 

organizational structure is the extension of the networked systems of 

cells to ad hoc or post hoc affiliations. Since late 2001, weakened by 

U.S. operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, Al Qaeda has 

encouraged affiliates to conduct operations without necessarily possessing significant financial or operational links to the original group. 

It may be this contagion effect that is Al Qaeda’s most lasting legacy. 

Al Qaeda has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes having various degrees 

of independence. Operations include the London subway bombings 

(2005), the Madrid train bombings (2004), the nightclub bombing 

in Bali, Indonesia (2002), and the hostage crisis in a Moscow theater 

(2002). Al  Qaeda-affiliated groups are also blamed for attacks in 

Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia, Pakistan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Madrid, London, Indonesia, and Algeria (as well as failed attempts in the United 

States). This proliferation of loosely affiliated groups and their highprofile attacks have also provided many authoritarian regimes with 

free hand to repress legitimate and nonviolent dissent, citing dubious 

linkages between Al Qaeda and domestic opposition forces.53 Again, 

the effect of successful attacks may unintentionally result in an innocent populace voluntarily surrendering their civil liberties to a regime 

that not only simplifies the problem but also articulates a solution perceived as suitably reciprocal.54 The linkage between mortality salience 

and individual political preference is by no means deterministic; however, the pervasive threat caused by the omnipresent threat of smallscale attacks has a profound effect on political will (particularly in the 

immediate wake of a terrorist event).55

Suicide Terrorism

Among the more historically, socially, and psychologically compelling tactics used by undergrounds are suicide attacks. From their 

modern inception by Hizbollah in Lebanon, to their strategic incorporation by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, to their employment as a strategic 
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special operation by EIJ and Al  Qaeda, suicide terrorism has been 

defined in various manners: (1) as a conscious, logical decision,56 (2) 

as a tactic of desperation by a numerically and/or technologically inferior force,57 and (3) as the exploitation of a vulnerable demographic by 

more mature, albeit inconsiderate, organizers.58

Particularly talented LTTE soldiers were selected for membership 

in the Black Tigers, a special unit tasked with the most difficult missions 

including suicide bombings and assassinations. Unlike many insurgent 

groups, the LTTE integrated suicide bombings and assassinations not 

out of desperation but as an integral aspect of their campaign against 

the Sri Lankan government. Their first suicide attack was used to 

breach a Sri Lankan Army camp. The attack was followed by a much 

larger operation with a truck bomb, allowing LTTE regular forces to 

storm the camp in order to halt an impending army offensive.59

Although Hizbollah’s successful exploitation of suicide attacks 

contributed to the popular association of militant Islam with suicide 

missions, 81  percent of suicide attacks during the Israeli occupation 

(1982–86) were carried out by Christians or affiliates of secular or leftist parties, and only twelve of Hizbollah’s attacks involved the intentional death of a party operative.60 Hizbollah inspired the use of suicide 

tactics in high-profile terrorist operations. Their 1983 attacks precipitated the withdrawal of both the French and American forces after the 

deaths of 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers.61 This model 

proved desirable but difficult to replicate.

In August 1993, EIJ operatives attempted to assassinate the Egyptian interior minister, who was leading a crackdown on Islamic militants 

and their terror campaign. A bomb-laden motorcycle exploded next to 

the minister’s car, killing the bomber and his accomplice but not the 

minister. The failed attack marked the first time Sunni Islamists had 

made use of suicide in terrorism. Several months later, in November, 

EIJ and EIG used a suicide truck bomb to destroy the Egyptian embassy 

in Islamabad, Pakistan. Two dismounted operatives approached the 

embassy and executed the security detail with a combination of smallarms fire and hand grenades. Then, a taxi loaded with 250 pounds of 

explosives breached the gate where the driver detonated the bomb, 

destroying both the vehicle and the gate. Minutes later, a second 

vehicle carrying a larger bomb was detonated alongside the Embassy, 

destroying the building and damaging the adjacent Japanese and Indonesian embassies and a nearby bank. The attack killed sixteen, injured 

sixty, and served as a prototype for the 1998 Al Qaeda attacks on the 

two American embassies in Africa.62 The near-simultaneous explosions 

at the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998, were 
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carried out using similar tactics and resulted in the deaths of 223 and 

injuries to more than 4,000.63

Suicide terrorism results in both shock to and victimization of the 

groups that identify with the target (discussed later in this chapter) as 

well the groups who identify with the attacker. To be effective, the social 

construction of martyrdom must rule out the possibility of the martyr being afflicted with some kind of psychological disorder because 

it would cause the populace to see the suicide as being motivated by 

something other than selflessness.g Rather, higher-status martyrs 

(those among the in-group with higher social, academic, or hierarchal 

standing) have more credibility with the masses and thus their sacrifice 

carries more weight. The study of suicide terrorism has been criticized 

for methodological problems (selection bias and selection effects), use 

of unverified and often-contradictory anecdotal evidence, inadequate 

sample size, and poor internal validity; 64 however, its inclusion of 

analyses of modern underground movements is nonetheless pertinent 

because there are unique considerations that differentiate this type of 

operation from “traditional” terrorism.

Terrorism Planning

Many underground movements organize specialized terror units 

to conduct special operations. Such units are characterized by wellplanned operations carried out by a small, highly trained professional 

elite, usually organized on a cellular basis. The targets are usually 

selected individuals of special importance or iconic structures/organizations having symbolic importance (e.g., the U.S. embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania, the Marine Barracks in Beirut, the USS Cole, and the 

World Trade Center). Historically, the skill necessary to execute such 

an attack necessitated highly trained personnel and thus operations 

were tailored to secure the safe escape of the terrorists. However, with 

the advent of the religious extremist wave of terrorism, suicide attacks 

(discussed in the previous section of this chapter) have become more 

prevalent.

g Durkheim proposed four subtypes of suicide: egoistic (reflecting a sense of social 

isolation resulting in apathy and depression), altruistic (being overwhelmed by an integrated in-group’s objectives), anomic (a moral confusion resulting from socioeconomic 

turmoil), and fatalistic (an over-controlled hyper-regulation). In Durkheim’s typology, 

consumption with, and subsequently being overwhelmed by, a group’s goals and ideology 

characterize the altruistic suicide. This phenomenon occurs in organizations (and societies) with high integration, where individual needs are subordinated to that of the whole. 

Many religious cultures, political extremist groups, and military organizations hold those 

who sacrifice themselves for the common good in great reverence and thus this mechanism can be considered a perverse exploitation of the dead as an unimpeachable source of 

credibility.
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In Cyprus, one of the first steps taken by George Grivas, the leader 

of the Greek Cypriot insurgents, was to organize a cadre of specialized 

terrorists. Never numbering more than fifty, this small group “terrorized half a million people.”65 Significantly, Grivas developed his cadre 

of terrorists only from the very young. His study of Communist tactics 

used during the Greek insurgency convinced him that only youths in 

their late teens or early twenties can be molded into assassins “who 

will kill on order, and without question.”66 Young men combine youthful daring and, after indoctrination, fanatical conviction and can be 

made to believe they are behaving in a heroic way. Grivas groomed the 

youths for their role as specialized terrorists through a process of escalating acts of lawlessness: first they smeared slogans on walls, then they 

advanced to throwing bombs into open windows or bars. Only after 

an extended period of testing and training were the youths given their 

first “professional” assignment of killing a selected target.67

Terrorism, like many planning processes, can be considered in 

a cyclic series of phases: (1) target selection; (2) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (3) rehearsal; (4) execution; and (5) escape 

and evasion. Not all organizations employ rigid processes, and most 

differ in some details; however, successful operations do tend to be 

the result of rigor more so than providence alone. Some organizations 

are more hierarchal; the PIRA’s executive council issued the approval 

order for the 1981 hunger strikes as an operation as well as for each 

individual participant,68 while Al Qaeda’s leadership did not necessarily exert command and control over tactical planning and operations, 

instead emphasizing local initiative.69

Target Selection

The proper selection of targets is important in any terrorist campaign. Potential targets are compared against intent and assessed 

based on accessibility, symbolic value, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, expected casualties, and potential media exposure. A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the 

chosen target.

Viet Cong terrorists were particularly directed to seek as first targets government authorities who were corrupt or unpopular; after murdering them they could then boast: “We have rid you of an oppressor.” 

A captured copy of the Viet Cong “Military Plan of the Provincial Party 

Committee of Baria” specifically orders squads in charge of villages to 

conduct assassination missions with the principal targets being security 

forces and “civil action district officials, hooligans and thugs.” Relieving the community of undesirables through selective assassination, 

Viet Cong terrorists sought to win popular support while crippling the 
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operation of government. A 1965 Viet Cong directive was explicit in 

identifying those who should be punished:

The targets for repression are counterrevolutionary elements who seek to impede the revolution and 

work actively for the enemy and for the destruction 

of the revolution. Elements who actively fight against 

the revolution in reactionary parties such as the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Quoc Dan Dang), Party for 

a Greater Viet Nam (Dai-Viet), and Personality and 

Labor Party (Can-Lao Nhan-Vi), and key reactionaries 

in organizations and associations founded by the reactionary parties and the US imperialists and the puppet 

government.70

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Undergrounds typically operate from a position of numerical and 

technological inferiority relative to government forces. Offensive operations therefore require accurate intelligence in order to maximize 

effectiveness and maintain security of often small, vulnerable guerilla 

forces. The 1956 version of the IRA Green Book considered information gathering a continuous evolution. Undergrounds provide this 

critically important military intelligence not through normal military 

methods but rather through their infiltration of society and networks 

of clandestine operatives. Careful intelligence work is a prerequisite for 

all terrorism, particularly professional terrorism. The target is special, 

and therefore the underground must find concrete answers to “who,” 

“where,” and “when.” Intelligence must both identify the target and 

document his modus operandi. A local person may identify the target 

for outside agents who then execute the plan; although a local person can facilitate identification, it is difficult for him to commit the 

assassination because of local loyalties and the difficulty of escaping. 

Another approach is to have outside agents undertake both the intelligence work and the execution.

The difficulties of requiring local agents to assassinate local people 

are illustrated in an experience of the Red Hand counterterrorists in 

Morocco. In 1954, the underground’s entire security was severely jeopardized after it assigned a local terror squad to murder the editor of the 

local Moroccan nationalist newspaper, Maroc-Presse. One of the members of the Red Hand squad was a close friend of the editor and, learning of the plot, he became remorseful and defected. The result was 

that the Maroc-Presse, “the only important French-language paper in 

Morocco not in sympathy with the counterterrorist Red Hand, became 
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the best informed about their activities.”71 However, the repentant Red 

Hand agent soon met with sudden accidental death.”

The local populace, or popular antennae (as these sources are 

described in one Viet Minh manual), may collect information on security force disposition and activities. The Viet Minh used children playing 

near Japanese (and later French) fortifications as a source of information on troop arrivals and departures, the guard system, and other 

pertinent details—all of which were easily observable by untrained 

children—that aided the guerrillas in planning attacks.72

PIRA insurgents were successful in preventing British security forces 

from infiltrating base areas and in gaining intelligence by cultivating 

close relations with their communities and using both coercion and 

incentives to encourage loyalty.h Eventually, government forces intensified efforts to gather intelligence through informers, surveillance, 

and interrogation.73 The struggle for control of intelligence continued 

throughout the 1970s, and the increasing success of British efforts led 

to the PIRA changing its organization and practice in favor of greater 

security. They began to organize in small cells rather than in the larger 

battalions of the earlier years. They also took greater care in instructing recruits to refrain from discussing operations with anyone. For 

example, their sophisticated response to British intelligence efforts 

included training members to avoid leaving forensic evidence after an 

operation and how to resist interrogation after capture.74 PIRA counterintelligence served two primary purposes. First, adequate counterintelligence allowed the PIRA to engage the British army with a measure 

of confidence and mitigate operational uncertainty. Second, successful counterintelligence served important symbolic measures, enhancing the PIRA’s ability to maintain internal control, increase volunteer 

morale, and demonstrate to volunteers that the British could be overpowered. While British intelligence efforts in Northern Ireland would 

eventually reach mammoth levels, their initial efforts in the early 1970s 

were inadequate at best. Prior to the large civil rights marches and the 

ensuring riots in 1969, because of poor resources and British indifference, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) intelligence on the IRA was 

scanty and outdated because most of the available intelligence related 

to the Border Campaign. After the break with the Official IRA and an 

influx of young Republicans, such information was largely unhelpful in 

thwarting PIRA operations, preventing even the identification of active 

h However, initial British intelligence efforts were also hampered by lack of knowledge regarding the nascent PIRA insurgent movement. Most intelligence they did have 

of IRA members was outdated, identifying primarily members of the older, Marxist-influenced Official IRA. The 1975–76 cease-fire provided the British an opportunity to accelerate their intelligence efforts.
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PIRA members.75 The implicit and explicit support of the Catholic population ebbed and flowed throughout the PIRA campaign. There was 

always support for the cause, but the violence against civilians or the 

periodic hope for a political solution would often erode that support. 

Catholics regarded the PIRA members as members of their community 

and had strong familial and community ties to the men that they knew 

(or suspected) were members. Some Catholics could turn a blind eye 

or deaf ear when they saw or heard of an operation. Vehicles might 

be loaned, or intelligence passed on. Catholics in government administrative jobs provided rich information, such as the home addresses 

of policemen or loyalist paramilitary members, to the Provisionals. 

Those who provided information about the PIRA to the security forces 

were intimidated or executed. The killing of civilians, however, often 

placed the PIRA on the defensive, and marches and organizations were 

formed by some Catholics to voice their dissatisfaction with the PIRA’s 

policy of violence.76

Underground intelligence networks most often extend beyond 

the borders of the movement’s native country. It is not uncommon for 

undergrounds to have cells distributed throughout the world among 

populations sympathetic to the cause. The LTTE, for example, maintained more than fifty offices and cells in foreign countries, especially 

in countries with large numbers of Tamil expatriates, such as England, 

France, Australia, Canada, and the United States. The LTTE had communication hubs in Singapore and Hong Kong to facilitate its weapons procurement activities; secondary cells in Thailand, Pakistan, and 

Myanmar; and front companies in Europe and Africa. From these 

locales, LTTE operatives coordinated purchases and shipments from 

Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.77

As a plan matures, a terrorist cell shifts to preattack surveillance 

and detailed planning. Members of the operational cells may appear in 

the vicinity of the objective during this phase. Trained intelligence and 

surveillance personnel or members supportive of the terrorist cell may 

be organized to gather information on the target’s current patterns, 

usually days to weeks prior to an operation. The attack team confirms 

information gathered from previous surveillance and reconnaissance 

activities.

Rehearsals

As with conventional military operations, rehearsals are conducted 

to improve the odds of success, confirm planning assumptions, and 

develop contingencies. Terrorists also rehearse to test security reactions to particular attack profiles. Terrorists use both their own operatives and unsuspecting people to test target reactions.
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Rehearsals, like many terrorist or guerilla training evolutions, 

require physical safe havens that afford sufficient privacy and security. 

Physical safe havens are important in the early, vulnerable periods of 

an insurgency, when political objectives are still being formulated and a 

support base is being established. Operationally, the segregated spaces 

provide a secure location for launching operations and for training 

and offer a defensible enclave, while making the group more cohesive.78

It should be noted the aforementioned Maoist view of safe havens is a 

physical requirement; there is also the psychological safe haven.79

Execution

As indicated through this chapter, terrorist attacks come in many 

different forms for many different purposes. They can range from 

targeted assassination of political leaders, such as the PIRA’s attempt 

on Margaret Thatcher, to indiscriminate suicide bombings in marketplaces such as those that seemed proliferate in Baghdad, Iraq, during 

the height of the insurgency. The first attack attributed to Al Qaeda 

took place in 1992, when bombs were detonated at the Mövenpick and 

Goldmohur Hotels in Yemen. Although American soldiers transiting 

Yemen on a United Nations mission to Somalia were the presumed targets, the attacks killed only two civilians. In 1993, a team of Al Qaeda, 

EIG, and EIJ operatives parked a rental truck loaded with a 1,500-

pound explosive in the parking garage of the World Trade Center hoping to damage the first tower sufficiently to send it crashing into the 

second tower, with a casualty estimate of about 250,000. Although the 

blast did not destroy either tower, it shook both, killing six and injuring 

1,042. In August 1998, the near simultaneous explosions at the U.S. 

embassies in Tanzania and Kenya killed 223 and injured over 4,000.80

In 2000, Al Qaeda operatives attacked the destroyer USS Cole while it 

was refueling at a port in Yemen. The attack, a suicide mission using a 

skiff packed with approximately 1,000 pounds of explosives, killed seventeen U.S. servicemen and damaged the vessel. Then, in 2001, nineteen Al  Qaeda operatives simultaneously hijacked four commercial 

airliners, flying two into the World Trade Center towers in New York 

City while another crashed into the Department of Defense in Washington, DC (the fourth, targeting the U.S. Capitol building, crashed in 

Shanksville, Pennsylvania). The attacks killed nearly 3,000 altogether.81

Escape and Evasion

Escape plans, as much as attack sequences, require detailed 

rehearsal and disciplined execution. Because professional terrorists are 

usually highly trained and skilled in their craft, they are obviously valuable to any underground. The problem of safe escape after executing a 
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mission receives considerable attention. This is an inherent advantage 

to a suicide attack, as the escape and evasions plans and network are 

not required.

The Communist-led underground in Greece in 1945 developed cells 

of three agents whose identities were secret and who were unknown 

to each other. These units, called synergeia, were formed any time a 

professional terrorist job was required. When the mission was accomplished, the members of the group dispersed, changed their addresses, 

habits, and clothes, and concocted alibis.

In Cyprus, the EOKA adopted a number of techniques to secure the 

escape of its terrorists. One method used was for a terrorist, posing as 

a journalist-photographer, to be followed down a street by two or three 

young girls. When he sighted the man he was to kill, he shot him in 

the back and immediately threw the revolver to one of the girls trailing 

him, who slipped it into her purse and vanished. The terrorist remained 

briefly on the scene under the pretext that he was a journalist.82

Terrorists may manipulate social conditions and grievances and 

execute specific criminal acts (that may be inconsistent with their public ideology) to set the appropriate conditions for the establishment of 

escape and evasion networks.83 Often Iraqi tribal customs and courtesies enabled insurgents to flee from coalition forces in the wake of an 

attack. The tribes provided financial, material, and personnel resources 

to facilitate escape and evasion.84

Rationalizing Terrorism

The indiscriminate nature of terror operations requires organizations to justify and/or explain the purpose of such operations. This 

rationalization is required for purposes of internal cohesion; the individual required to support and execute such attacks needs appropriate validation from their superiors as well as their accepted sources of 

authority.85 EIJ and later Al Qaeda drew its legitimacy from a Salafist 

interpretation of Islam viewed through a Qutbist lens.i

 EIJ saw its organization not only as the vanguard of Qutb’s vision for an Islamic revolution but also as an entity with requisite political and religious authority 

to declare all those who did not meet their requirements for piety takfir (or essentially non-Muslim), regardless of what the individuals professed to believe. EIJ also declared that all able-bodied Muslims were 

obligated to dedicate their lives to jihad. Farraj (EIJ’s founder) took 

this to its logical extension and proposed violent jihad as an obligation 

of all pious Muslims.86 Al Qaeda synthesized Qutbism’s sophisticated 

i This particular ideology is described in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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theological discourse with a nuanced ability to comprehend, co-opt, 

and exploit modern grievances. This narrative combination resonated 

with extremists and moderates alike, regardless of whether an individual approved of the means by which Al Qaeda sought to accomplish its 

goals. The specific messages within the larger narrative rarely focused 

on citing authoritative texts (beyond selective interpretations of previous theorists reinforced by Quranic quotes without context), but rather 

relied on the application of general religious or ethical principles to 

modern political and social problems.87 Attacks that resulted in the 

deaths of innocents (even Muslims) were justified on the basis that the 

act was sanctified as religious obligation. Sympathetic Imams often 

issued fatwas as religious justification to insulate the operatives from 

moral culpability.

While the PIRA was not a Catholic fundamentalist group, they did 

employ some theological rationale for acts of terror. The PIRA’s arguments exploited cultural and not necessarily doctrinally adherent or 

historically accurate perceptions of the sociopolitical issues at hand.88

Nevertheless, the deeply entrenched social networks within the Catholic 

community combined with the long-standing narrative of the Republican movement allowed the PIRA to immediately have an implied legitimacy across the entire Irish Catholic population. By invoking the name 

and mission of the IRA and harkening the struggle for independence, 

the Provisionals framed their campaign as historically legitimate and 

morally just.89 This support, however, waned as civilian casualties in 

Northern Ireland and Great Britain increased: the Catholic population may not have actively supported the targeting of British soldiers 

garrisoned in Northern Ireland, but it was largely viewed a necessity 

to resist an occupying force. The targeted killings of Protestant prison 

guards were even tolerated because those individuals were portrayed 

as being complicit in the systematic abuse of detainees and violators 

of civil rights. The mainland bombing campaign and targeted assassinations, however, were not well received and alienated the PIRA from 

their support networks.90

Terrorist Threats

Two essential principles of phrasing a threat can be postulated on 

the basis of general patterns of human behavior under stress. First, 

there are specific threats in which the demands and consequences are 

communicated so that they cannot be misunderstood. Use of a specific threat rests on the basic assumption that an individual confronted 

with persuasively stated, clear-cut demands and imminent harmful 

consequences will take the path of least resistance, which is compliance. Rather than endanger himself, his family, or his property, the 
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individual will accept, albeit reluctantly and as evasively as possible, the 

threatener’s alternative. The effect of a terrorist threat is maximized 

when the target audience believes the likelihood of future attacks on 

themselves and their in-group is increasingly likely.91

Specific Threats

In specific threats, the threatener seeks to secure compliance without actually being required to execute the threat. Persuasive communication, leaving little room for misunderstandings, is essential for 

effectiveness. For example, Viet Cong guerrillas attacking a South Vietnamese fortification during the night call over loudspeakers saying: 

“We only want to kill the Americans. All the rest can go free if they leave 

their weapons.”92 Surrounded by superior Viet Cong forces and offered 

a clear alternative to further resistance, South Vietnamese militia have 

been known to throw down their weapons and leave the Americans to 

fend for themselves.93 Occasionally the Viet Cong varied this kind of 

threat by distributing leaflets saying they will fire on government troops 

only if they are accompanied by U.S. military advisers. The intensity of 

delegitimization is the degree to which the radical group challenges 

the legitimacy of its opponents—the more intense the delegitimization, the greater the risk for radicalization.94 If the group increasingly 

believes that change is not possible in existing society and that a radical 

change is necessary, they are more likely to radicalize. Additional signs 

of delegitimizing an adversary include the following: the group calling 

for violent action against enemies, specifying targets with explicit detail 

or expanding the spread of targets from specific to general,j emphasizing the historical sins of a designated group, and/or characterizing 

group members as righteous and uniquely empowered to rectify the 

perceived ills of society. A radical can delegitimize the out-group by 

idealizing the goals and means of the in-group’s revolutionary nation 

or leaders associated with violence, terrorism, or revolution.95

Terrorists have often used the tactic of escalating warnings. A mild 

first warning is followed by more harshly stated threats and then by 

an imminent show of action. World War  II resistance movements in 

occupied Europe provide numerous illustrations of specific threats 

issued to collaborators to make them desist from supporting the Nazis. 

The threat often began with a blacklisting of the individual’s name 

in an underground newspaper, escalated to a warning note delivered 

directly to him, and ended when the threat was enforced. Meanwhile, 

the demand behind the threat was specifically stated. As the Fuerzas 

j The perversion or misapplication of the law of social substitutability (which holds 

that the killing of any member of a segment is considered a group offense and can be 

avenged by the killing of any member of the offender’s segment) greatly expands the 

threat assessment associated with the particular group.
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Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia, or FARC) expanded the scope of its operation to include 

narcotics trafficking and kidnapping for ransom during the 1990s, 

their first diplomatic foray into an area was typically an unambiguous 

threat against the local political apparatus to ensure necessary freedom of movement.96

If a threat is to affect a large number of people, it must be related 

to a clearly discernible act, so that all learn the lesson demonstrated by 

the enforcement of the threat. Viet Cong terrorists in Vietnam, after 

several implicit or explicit warnings to a prominent villager or government official, sent a signed “death sentence” to that individual. When 

the threats (usually assassinations) were carried out, the tale of Communist omnipotence was spread by the terror-stricken widows and children who still had the written death sentence hanging over them. The 

bandwagon effect sought in these cases was to convince the inhabitants 

of the village that they had better obey the Viet Cong or the same fate 

may be theirs.97

Another requirement for the effectiveness of a specific threat is that 

the threatener must have visible means of administering punishment if 

he is to be persuasive. The threatener must be able to determine that 

the threatened person did not in fact comply with the demands before 

inflicting punishment; otherwise, the environment created by a specific threat changes to one of general terror.

The phrasing and structuring of specific threats vary according to 

the kind of compliance that is sought. Essentially, there are three kinds 

of threat demands. First, a threatener may choose to demand actions 

toward which the populace is already predisposed. This is the easiest 

kind—the one for which compliance is most easily secured. It may be of 

considerable advantage for an underground to use this tactic because 

its easy success gives the threatener a disproportionate amount of credit 

for power and influence. For example, in Algeria, the OAS, in order to 

demonstrate its displeasure with the French government, demanded 

that all Algerians stay off the streets during the evening hours and turn 

off their lights and threatened to punish anyone found on the streets 

during the evening hours. These demands on the populace were consonant with what an individual might do on his own during any kind 

of disorder. Thus compliance was easy. The LTTE’s reliance on Tamil 

expatriates for financial support (a necessity after loss of control of the 

Jaffna peninsula in the mid-1990s) often relied on coercive acts. While 

the vast majority of contributions to the Tamil cause were voluntary, 

competition among rival groups prompted the LTTE to not only systematize their collection process but also implement punishments for 

noncompliance.98
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General Threats

A second kind of demand seeks to induce an individual or group 

to change specific behavior by demanding alternative actions. This 

is more difficult than the first kind of demand and requires clearly 

stated alternatives and persuasively stated (and perhaps demonstrated) 

consequences for refusing. To make these demands effective, that target audience must “personalize” the event through either a social or 

geographic connection; this decreases the psychological distance from 

the event and thus makes the threat more imminent.99 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”) portrayed themselves as a modernday Peruvian Maoist version of Robin Hood. They secured geographic 

areas through assassinating local government officials and taking control of their belongings/property and redistributing it to the local villagers. Sendero Luminoso attempted to frame their efforts as a positive 

force with the charismatic Abimael Guzmán as a benevolent revolutionary; however, they often resorted to threats and coercion. Students and 

teachers at the venues where Guzmán (a former university professor) 

spoke attended because many felt obliged. Those that did not attend 

(whether out of disinterest or a competing obligation) were threatened, 

at a minimum, and often verbally and physically harassed. Faculty 

members who did not support Sendero Luminoso were encouraged to 

resign their posts and leave the region, even under the threat of death 

if they chose to stay. Throughout this near-cultish movement, fear was 

used as the great neutralizer of the political opposition.100

The third and most difficult kind of demand is one that orders an 

individual to refrain from a course of action he is already pursuing. 

The Taliban have successfully used shabnamah (or “night letters”) to 

communicate threats to Afghan villagers. The documents are typically 

handwritten (but have been printed pamphlets and/or communiqués) 

and often address specific individuals, circumstances, and events to 

demonstrate proximity, credibility, and legitimacy.101 The purpose is 

generally to dissuade villagers from supporting or even working with 

coalition and/or Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA) forces. Night letters have been a traditional and common 

instrument of Afghan religious figures, jihadists, and rebels to encourage rural populations to oppose both state authority and regulations. 

Night letters often invoke traditional narratives to exert greater social 

control by reinforcing in-group/out-group distinctions while reminding the target of the credible threat the Taliban presents.102

Generalized or uncertain threat is the second pattern of phrasing. The generalized threat does not delineate behavior or specify 

demands and consequences; these are left to the imagination of the 

threatened individual. Uncertain threats are used to create terror 
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among the populace, making them vigilant and sensitive to terrorist 

suggestions. The threatener captures attention at a point when persons 

under stress are desperately searching to eliminate uncertainty and 

ambiguity. He may suggest escape routes and alternatives and make 

compliance demands that are readily accepted in order to eliminate 

the uncertainty of the threat and reduce terror. Occasionally, terrorists 

do not even seek compliance with specific demands but rather hope to 

cause evacuation or psychological breakdown of popular morale. The 

South Vietnamese army used uncertain threat in a counterterror campaign dubbed “Operation Black Eye” against the Viet Cong. Selected 

Vietnamese troops were organized into terror squads and assigned the 

task of working with rural agents in penetrating Viet Cong-held areas. 

Within a short time, Viet Cong leaders—key members of the clandestine infrastructure—began to die mysteriously and violently in their 

beds. On each of the bodies was a piece of paper printed with a grotesque human eye. The appearance of “the eye” soon represented a 

serious threat. The paper eyes, 50,000 copies of which were printed by 

the U.S. Information Service in Saigon, turned up not only on corpses 

but also as warnings on the doors of houses suspected of occasionally 

harboring Viet Cong agents. The eyes came to mean, “big brother is 

watching you.” The mere presence of “the eye” induced members of 

the Viet Cong to sleep anywhere but in their own beds. It was an eerie, 

uncertain threat.103

Generalized terror seems to have limited effectiveness over a period 

of time. Uncertain threat reaches a point of diminishing returns when 

the populace finally either becomes habituated to the stress of ambiguity or focuses hostility on some objective it perceives, correctly or 

not, as the source of threat.104 Once such a “hostile belief” develops, 

the populace’s openness to suggestion ends. The essential distinction, 

then, between specific and uncertain threat is the difference between 

threat used to secure specifically stated demands (known and planned 

in advance) and threat designed to debilitate and/or sensitize a populace to later suggestions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF TERROR

Unlike the guerrilla, the terrorist does not occupy territory in 

the physical domain but seeks to dominate the psychological, social, 

and information domains by manipulating target audiences, sending 

implied messages about the cause and meaning of terrorist tactics.105
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There are two principal audiences: the organization’s constituencyk

(in-group) and the enemy (out-group). In-group messages stress violent 

resistance is necessary to accomplish the desired end state, that negation is acquiescent to tyrannical authority, and that the adversary is 

vulnerable. Out-group messages stress the likelihood of future attacks, 

the identification of all those affiliated with the government (including 

civilians) with the enemy, and the lack of government control over—as 

well as the inability of the government to protect—civilians.106

As Lenin indicated, the purpose of terrorism is to cause terror—an 

unremitting, paralyzing sense of fear that permeates one’s psyche.107

Fear precipitates the acute secretion of catecholamines and glucocorticoids typical of the human stress response. This response is elicited by 

four situational characteristics: novelty, unpredictability, threat to survival, and perceived lack of control,108 all of which have been identified 

in survivors of terrorist events.109 Emotional responses to manmade 

disasters are considerably more stressful than responses to naturally 

occurring phenomena.110 Stress is not entirely negative, although it can 

have harmful consequences if one is not appropriately prepared for 

it. Moderate stress can have positive effects on behavioral and neuroendocrine measures; however, prolonged exposure to stress without 

sufficient protective measures or rest can result in cognitive depletion 

and emotional disturbances.111 With terrorism, it is not only the effect 

of previous attacks but also the anticipation of future attacks that can 

induce this stress.112

The psychological manifestation of terror is neither simple nor 

straightforward because different audiences will respond with various 

interpretations of terrorist acts. Observers may identify with either the 

victims or the aggressor based on in-group bias and not necessarily 

the subjective morality of the act.113 People who have experienced or 

witnessed a terrorist attack may go into a state of acute stress (termed 

acute stress disorder, or ASD). Symptoms of an acute stress response 

include recurring thoughts of the incident, irrational fears of previously normal activities, significant deviation from one’s daily routine, 

survivor guilt, a pronounced sense of loss, a reluctance to communicate feelings, and a subjective uncertainty or loss of control. If these 

symptoms persist for more than thirty days after a traumatic event, an 

individual may have posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Symptoms 

of PTSD fall into three main categories: intrusive memories, avoidant 

behaviors, and arousal. Intrusive memories, or episodes of re-experiencing the event that disrupt daily life, include flashbacks, nightmares, 

and/or uncomfortable or disturbing reactions to those memories. 

k Neutral (or uncommitted groups) can be considered a third audience, however, 

with the higher-order goal being to assimilate the neutrals into the in-group.
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Avoidance includes emotional numbing, feelings of detachment, the 

inability to recall the traumatic event, a general malaise (particularly 

toward activities previously considered pleasurable), avoiding people 

and/or places that are reminiscent of the event, and an uncertainty 

regarding the future. Arousal symptoms include difficulty concentrating, startling easily (and with a more exaggerated reaction), hypervigilance, irritability, and difficulty sleeping. Diagnostic criteria for PTSD 

include a history of exposure to a traumatic event meeting two criteria 

and symptoms from each of three symptom clusters.114 The psychological consequences of a successful act of terrorism are both acute and 

chronic and tend to increase with proximity to the event. Populations 

exposed to the attack show higher rates of PTSD and those suffering 

losses as a result of the attack show higher rates of depression.115

Terror Management Theory

The psychological effects of terrorism are not simply manifested in 

individual physiology and psychology but also in a social context. Terror Management Theory (TMT) states that human behavior is mostly 

motivated by the fear of death and if mortality is made salient, individuals will intensify strivings for self-esteem and will respond positively 

toward people and ideas that support their worldview and respond negatively toward those people and ideas that undermine that worldview. If 

self-esteem is lowered or the validity of a cultural worldview is damaged, 

death anxiety will increase, necessitating an active solution. Mortality 

salience exacerbates group defenses and reinforces in-group biases, 

thus achieving simultaneous higher-order effects on both the target 

audiences. Individuals evaluate in-group members positively because 

similarly minded individuals are assumed to support, and therefore 

validate, their own cultural worldview. In contrast, individuals evaluate 

out-group members negatively because alternatively minded individuals (relative to the in-group) are assumed to threaten their worldview.

Under uncertain conditions, individual cognitive processes are 

biased toward emotionally evocative events, resulting in an increased 

estimate of a perceived threat and a tendency toward indecision. This 

results in a desire for predictability and therefore the tendency to 

gravitate toward charismatic leaders who simplify (or split) complex 

problems into binary issues. When individuals perceive they lack the 

necessary information to come to a judgment, they tend toward negatively valanced information; this is particularly so in the aftermath 

of a terrorist incident. Social amplification (which is also increased 

under ambiguous and/or uncertain conditions) further magnifies the 

negative bias and thus social interaction further compounds the terror 
Chapter 11. Terrorism

347

effect. Although unintentionally, media coverage of acts of terror exacerbates the aforementioned phenomena and thus increases the effect 

of an attack, therefore incentivizing such tactics. Given the ubiquity 

and global reach of modern media outlets as well as social media, this 

trend is unlikely to cease.

Terror is not a static phenomenon: As threatening acts accumulate 

or escalate, the degree of terror heightens. A stimulus can be anything 

from an act of social sanction to threats of physical violence or actual 

physical attack. The corresponding interpretation of these threatening 

stimuli is a heightening state of psychological distress. The response 

may vary from coerced compliance to acquiescence, from physical 

flight to psychological immobilization and breakdown. The effect of 

terror upon individuals cannot always be determined from an objective 

description of the terrorist act. That which threatens or terrorizes one 

individual may not affect another in the same way. Essentially, however, 

the process of terrorism can be viewed in the following manner: the 

stimulus is the threatening or terroristic act, and the response is the 

course of action, or inaction. If the perception of the threats leads to 

disorganized behavior or the inability to take appropriate action, the 

individual is said to be in a state of terror.

Individual Responses

The effect of terrorism upon individuals differs widely. Similar 

threats or actions affect individuals differently. Behavior patterns are 

affected to a large extent by personality and previously established 

behavior habits. Because personality variables affect an individual’s 

perception of threat, the vagaries of perception are the keys to understanding human behavior under stress. It is not the objective character 

of the threat that determines an individual’s behavior so much as his 

subjective evaluation of the situation.

Human response to threat also varies according to the nature of the 

threatening situation—whether it is specific or uncertain. The terrorist may wish to have the threatened party perform a particular act and 

may issue a highly specific threat. Where the threat is clearly defined 

and specifically communicated to an individual, with demands, alternatives, and consequences apparent and persuasively stated, an individual’s reaction is probably based on a relatively clear assessment of 

known variables and he may comply out of fear of having the threat carried out. However, the terrorist may seek to cause disruptive behavior or 

panic by issuing an uncertain, generalized threat. The very ambiguity 

of the situation makes rational decision-making and assessment functions break down and leads to hysteria and panic.116 The more specific 
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the threat, the more fear inducing it is; the more vague the threat, 

the more anxiety inducing it is, making an individual hypersensitive to 

ordinarily neutral situations and causing disruptive behavior.

The relative intensity of threat, regardless of whether it is vague 

or specific, determines whether a person will be able to take effective 

action.117 Thus, unlike the previous “specific versus uncertain” threat 

theory, where individuals respond rationally and positively to a specific 

threat and rather hysterically to an uncertain threat, this theory suggests that whenever the magnitude of threat is great, it tends to produce an ineffective or irrational response regardless of the vagueness 

or specificity of content. Others argue that threats or threatening acts 

need not necessarily grow in magnitude for terror to intensify; the 

mere continuance of threats over a period of time is sufficient to intensify the reaction.118

Different behavior patterns emerge from situations in which there 

are conflicting threats. The individual usually succumbs to the threat 

that appears most imminent or is greatest in magnitude. Regardless 

of whether a threat is specific or uncertain, or different in magnitude 

and danger, an individual’s vigilance response generally evolves in 

five phases:

• Recognition: The threat, or threatening situation, is perceived by 

some cue or message.

• Probability: An estimation of the probability of the threatening 

event occurring is made; the validity of the threat is checked.

• Assessment: The qualitative nature of the threat is assessed 

(whether physical pain, loss of loved ones, loss of property, etc.). 

There is some attempt to define the situation: the nature, timing, 

and magnitude of the threat are assessed and an estimation is 

made of the means of coping with it, the probability of success, 

and the cost to the individual.

• Defense: Commitment to an avenue of escape and adaptation; 

progressive use of a “lattice of defense,” in which the failure of 

one defense leads to another more extensive defense.

• Reassessment: When first-defense routes fail, other avenues are 

attempted, but under the stressful or threatening situation, the 

individual tends to become overcompensatory or excessively 

sensitive or may exhibit other nonadaptive responses; psychological 

immobilization or breakdown may occur at this stage.

This sequence can be terminated at almost any point, and the 

phases may telescope so that they are virtually simultaneous.119 Where 

threat demands and consequences are apparent, rational assessment is 

relatively easy. Where they are ambiguous or uncertain, the likelihood 
Chapter 11. Terrorism

349

of irrationality and hysteria is increased. The most debilitating factors 

in human response to threat are uncertainty and ambiguity because 

the individual tries to resolve the uncertainty before he takes action to 

escape the threat. The more difficult the perceived difficulty of resolving the uncertainty, the more unnerved the individual becomes.

When uncertain threat leads to a state of hysteria, the individual 

attempts to remove the ambiguity of the threatening situation by identifying some certain source—even if the “source” has little or nothing to do with the real origin of the threat. In certain cases, this can 

lead to the individual identifying with the aggressor instead of the victims, particularly if there is an uncertain (or divided) group loyalty, 

for example, between an ethnic group and a state apparatus. This is 

particularly so when those individuals have expressed the desire for 

revenge, have a history of disagreements with the authorities, have a 

history of violent behavior or experience with weapons (including participation in military training, paramilitary, or other violent organizations or campaigns), or possess specialized skills that can contribute to 

or facilitate violent action.120 A corollary human response to hysteria 

is the predilection to suggestion (what Freud called wish-fulfillment 

beliefs).121 In trying to identify the source of the threat and redefine the 

uncertain situation, an individual is more susceptible to rumors and 

targeted influence operations that exploit these biases.

Individuals narrow or restrict their span of attention under threat. 

Becoming hypervigilant, they focus their attention on the threat and 

the threatener, to the virtual exclusion of other stimuli. Thus, hypervigilance leads an individual to concentrate on the demands and suggestions of the underground threatener and reduces his attention to 

communications from the government or security forces. In a group 

context, the prolonged isolation or segregation can foster a sense of 

humiliation or collective loss of self-esteem. If the group experiences a 

growing sense of stigmatization or isolation directed against the group, 

individual members, or their constituents, their propensity for a violent 

response may increase. Organizations can experience a sense of helplessness and rage in response to collective attacks against the group or 

other actions designed to demonstrate the group’s inferiority.122

If an individual can perceive no avenue of escape from a threat, 

he or she develops a sense of helplessness and this sense increases the 

stress reaction. If the purpose of a threat is to achieve compliance with 

certain demands, a threat that leaves the individual with no influence 

over the outcome may backfire. The individual either breaks down 

and is unable to comply or pursues an opposite, hostile course. For 

example, the Nazi policy of threatening reprisals in occupied Greece 

during World War II tended to operate against the German objectives 
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of population control. Indiscriminate reprisals against the Greek populace left the individual citizen helpless to influence the outcome: guerrilla band activity near a village, over which the villager had no control, 

brought the threat of death. “The wanton nature of the retaliation— 

the picking of victims at random—meant that pro-German Greeks or 

their relatives suffered as much as anti-German Greeks. Under these 

circumstances there was little advantage in being a collaborator. As 

the reprisals continued they tended to give credence and prestige to 

the guerrillas . . . .”123 Further, indiscriminate “burning of villages left 

many male inhabitants with little place to turn except to the guerrilla 

bands.”124

Group Responses

Uniting against a common enemy is one of the most powerful activators and unifying factors for identity groups, increasing the group’s 

cohesion, decreasing internal dissent, and increasing a sense of unified purpose. External threats are often the catalyst for identity groups 

to radicalize toward violent action. The external requirements for this 

mechanism do not require deprivation or an oppressive out-group 

but merely the perception of an external threat. In small, face-toface groups, an out-group threat leads to increased group cohesion, 

increased respect for in-group leaders, increased sanctions for ingroup deviates, and idealization of in-group norms.125 This results in 

increased cohesion and a solidification of tighter social networks. The 

presence of a threat reinforces the need for cooperation and agreement, exacerbating the “us against them” mentality and the “we’re all 

in this together” motivation to cooperate and deindividuate. The group 

can also perceive a serious threat to individual members or their leaders after physical attacks (including arrests, torture, and assassination) 

or catastrophe. The combination of isolation and outside threat makes 

group dynamics more powerful in the underground.126 The group 

experiences fear that the regime or other opponent is attempting to 

destroy the group as a whole.127 The underground group, isolated from 

society, develops tighter cohesion in response to shared danger, providing an exaggerated variant of the fight-flight group.128

There are a number of indications and warnings of this mechanism that have been derived empirically. Among the observables is the 

active recruitment from a pool of disenfranchised, victimized, radicalized, or violent individuals. Another observable signifying a movement 

toward radicalization is a change in recruitment strategy such as adapting methods to attract personnel with skills and motivations necessary 

for violence, using more elitist entry requirements, and perpetrating 
Chapter 11. Terrorism

351

media-coverage-generating events such as demonstrations and open 

confrontations with police to draw recruits. This is illustrated by some 

experiences of the Philippine army during the Huk insurgency. To 

counteract Huk terrorism or to dissuade a village from giving strong 

support to the Huk movement, the Philippine army gathered the villagers, including the mayor and village policemen, in an open area. 

Approximately 200 yards away, Philippine troops, in full uniform, 

would line up a number of “captured Huks.” Then they ushered out 

each Huk blindfolded and executed him by bayonet. As one Philippine 

officer reported, “While we were killing them, some were shouting out 

the name of the mayor, the names of the policemen, and . . . the names 

of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, 

hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.”129

In reality, the villagers had witnessed a mock execution of regular Philippine troops equipped with chicken blood and stage presence. But the 

executions had the desired effect of making the government counterthreat apparent. Afterward, officers talked individually with the villagers, explaining that they now knew everything about the village and 

that those who confessed or cooperated would not be treated like the 

captured Huks. To protect the villagers from further Huk threats, the 

officers established several meeting places that evening where individuals could report to receive protection in exchange for information. The 

threat of the government was thus made more pressing and real than 

the Huk terror; effective responses were obtained.130

Cultural factors are also a significant variable in human behavior 

under threat. Unique cultural mores and beliefs frequently affect an 

individual’s sense of threat or subjective experience of terror. One 

needs only to think of the role voodoo terror plays in certain areas, 

such as Haiti, where agents of Haitian dictator Dr. Francois “Papa Doc” 

Duvalier reputedly use the threat of the pin-in-the-doll with some effectiveness. In Angola, it is believed that a mutilated body cannot enjoy 

an afterlife, a fear exploited by the Angolan administration during the 

1961 rebellion. While the tribesmen will occasionally charge fearlessly 

into a barrage of machine-gun fire, reported one writer, they will think 

twice about attacking anyone armed with a machete.131

Segregation and isolation exacerbate a perceived threat, particularly during times of conflict. Palestinian refugee camps were established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to accommodate the Palestine 

refugees who were forced to leave or chose to do so after the creation 

of Israel. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 grants Palestinians the right to return to their homeland, but Israel has refused 

to allow the vast majority of refugees to return.132 The collective 
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humiliation at the hands of and subsequent anger toward the Israelis has served as a unifying theme among the Palestinian people. The 

clear distinction between the in-group and the out-group is reinforced 

through the physical security measures of the refugee camps and the 

strictly controlled lifestyle required of the inhabitants. Isolation creates a unique combination of relative deprivation and frustrationaggression called cramping. Groups feel cramped when their desire for 

security and social needs is unavoidably interfered with. This negative 

sensation grows increasingly intolerable and results in violence against 

those who are perceived to interfere with the aforementioned needs. 

Interviews with both secular and nonsecular Palestinian terrorists have 

identified the common trend of being under constant threat by Israel. 

This shared fear and contempt appears to be a defining characteristic of those engaged in political violence against Israelis. In a series 

of interviews with thirty-five incarcerated Palestinian operatives, most 

reported their families had good social standing, but their status and 

experience as refugees was paramount in their development of selfidentity. For the secular terrorists, enlistment was a natural step and 

it led to enhanced social status. Armed attacks are viewed as essential 

to the operation of the organization. There was no question that these 

types of attacks were necessary for the success of the cause; the attacks 

provided a sense of control or power for Palestinians in a society that 

had stripped them of it. The hatred socialized toward the Israelis was 

remarkable, especially given that few reported any contact with Israelis. 

There was a common theme of having been unjustly evicted from their 

land, of being relegated to refugee status or living in refugee camps 

in a land that was once considered theirs.133 They expressed a fatalistic 

view of the Palestinian/Israeli relationship and a sense of despair or 

bleakness about the future under Israeli rule. Few of the interviewees 

were able to identify personal goals that were separate from those of 

the organization to which they belonged.134

SUMMARY

John Boyd extrapolated Clausewitz’s Wondrous Trinity (referenced 

in the Preface) and proposed that uncertainty pervades everything in 

life, including warfare. In fact, uncertainty is a fundamental and irresolvable characteristic of war, no matter how good our observations, 

theories, and/or rationalizations are.135 Terrorism seeks to exploit the 

endemic uncertainty in the human condition and use the natural 

result of violence (fear) to exert control over members, reinforce the 

biases of supporters, and intimidate adversaries. This uncertainty not 
Chapter 11. Terrorism

353

only creates a receptiveness to insurgent ideology but also exacerbates 

preexisting prejudices in the wake of traumatic experiences.

Despite often relying on illegal acts and/or criminal networks, terrorism is not traditionally used for financial gain but rather for psychological gain.136 Insurgents have seldom relied solely on the attractiveness 

of their appeals or on the persuasiveness of their goals to secure popular support; they have generally assumed that people never entirely 

pursue idealistic goals or do what logic might tell them is most beneficial. Coercive means have been used to focus public attention on 

the goals and issues identified as important by the insurgents. Negative sanctions are used to ensure that recalcitrant individuals comply 

and do act in their own self-interest. Terror has been used to support 

other insurgent techniques and operations, such as propaganda and 

agitation. Terrorism, however, has its inherent risks. If brutality is used 

to maintain internal cohesion, both recruiting and retention become 

difficult. Furthermore, the wanton murder of innocent civilians can 

have a negative effect on the organization’s ability to raise money and 

engender popular support. Nevertheless, the psychological benefit of 

terrorist action often outweighs the cost and thus has been an effective 

psychological warfare tactic from antiquity to modernity and will continue to be employed.

ENDNOTES

1 L. Morgan Banks and Larry C. James, “Warfare, Terrorism, and Psychology,” ed. Bruce 

Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo, Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

2 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 

1-02 (JP1-02) (Department of Defense, 2012), 342.

3 Boaz Ganor, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare,” Journal of Aggression, 

Maltreatment, and Trauma 9, no. 1/2 (2004): 33–43.

4 Alex Schmid, “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare,” Democracy and Security 1 (2005): 

137–146.

5 Gerard Chalian and Arnaud Blin, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al  Qaeda 

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

6 Schmid, “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare.”

7 William S. Lind, Keith Nightingale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, 

no. 10 (1989): 22–26.

8 Davic C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthopoetics 8, 

no. 1 (2002), http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm.

9 Jason Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications 

Directorate, in press).
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10 Jason Spitaletta and Shana Marshall, “Al Qaeda,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

11 Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1963), 

360.

12 Ibid., 360–361.

13 Robert B. Rigg, “Catalog of Viet Cong Violence,” Military Review 42, no. 12 (1962): 25.

14 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1964), 16–177.

15 Wesley R. Fishel, “Communist Terror in South Vietnam,” The New Leader III, nos. 27–28 

(July 4–11, 1960): 14.

16 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence 5, 

no. 3 (1993): 213–251.

17 Paul Jureidini, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954–62 (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), 98–99.

18 Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1956), 104.

19 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–

2001,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck 

Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

20 Brian Crozier, The Rebels (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), 176.

21 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

22 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

23 Chuck Crossett and Jason Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological 

Concepts (Ft. Meade, MD: Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2010).

24 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 2: 

Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group 

Type,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 101–126

25 Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 1953), 134, 137.

26 Maegen Nix and Shana Marshall, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume  II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett 

(Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

27 Interview with former member of the Polish underground, Washington, DC, April 27, 

1965.

28 Joestan Joachim, The Red Hand (London: Abelard Schuman, 1962), 47–49.

29 Crozier, The Rebels, 169–170.

30 Ibid.

31 Nix and Marshall, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”

32 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

33 Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya, 104.

34 Ibid., 252.

35 Taruc, Born of the People, 134.

36 See U.S. Senate, Committee of the Judiciary, Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), 124.

37 Joachim, The Red Hand, 47–49.

38 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

39 James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War (Garden 

City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 54.
Chapter 11. Terrorism

355

40 David Killcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

41 Ibid.

42 Linda Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda’s New Generation (Washington, 

DC: Seven Stories Press, 2005).

43 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.”

44 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

45 Col. de Rocquigny, “Urban Terrorism,” trans., Military Review 38, no. 2 (February 1959): 

93–99.

46 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

47 See Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1962), 65.

48 Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, 88.

49 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

50 Ibid.

51 Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of Jihad, Al Qaeda Is Just 

the Beginning,” The New Yorker, September  11,  2006, http://www.newyorker.com/

archive/2006/09/11/060911fa_fact3#ixzz1hYvNJLzp.

52 Ibid.

53 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

54 James N. Breckenridge and Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the 

Psychology of Mass-Mediated Fear,” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. 

Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2007).

55 Tom Pyszczynski, Abdolhossein Abdollahi, Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Florette 

Cohen, and David Weise, “Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great 

Satan Versus the Axis of Evil,” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Jeff Victoroff and Ariel W. 

Kruglanski (New York: Psychology Press, 2009).

56 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 2005).

57 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006).

58 Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism (Boston: 

Oxford University Press, 2010).

59 Nix and Marshall, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”

60 Shana Marshall, “Hizbullah: 1982–2009,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications 

Directorate, in press).

61 Ibid.

62 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

63 Ibid.

64 Alex Mintz and David Brule, “Methodological Issues in Studying Suicide Terrorism,” 

Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 365–371.

65 Dudley Barker, Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), 

142.

66 Ibid., 140–141.

67 Ibid., 142.

68 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”
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69 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

70 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.”

71 Joachim, The Red Hand, 47–49.

72 Bryan Gervais and Jerome M. Conley, “Viet Cong: National Liberation Front for South 

Vietnam,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. 

Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

73 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Nix and Marshall, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”

78 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

79 Inge Bretherton, “The Origins of Attachment Theory: John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth,” Developmental Psychology 28 (1992): 759–775.

80 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

81 Ibid.

82 Barker, Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist, 145.

83 John B. Wolf, “Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups,” 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 1, no. 2 (1978): 169–186.

84 Montgomery McFate, “Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs,” Military Review 85, no. 3 (May/

June 2005): 37–40.

85 David Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society

(Boston: Back Bay Books, 2007).

86 Spitaletta, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”

87 Spitaletta and Marshall, “Al Qaeda.”

88 Timothy Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism

(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

89 Crossett and Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–2001.”

90 Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism.

91 Ganor, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare.”

92 “What’s News: South Vietnamese Communists,” The Wall Street Journal, CLXIV, 

August 12, 1964, 1.

93 The Evening Star (Washington, DC), February 14, 1965, A-1.

94 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 1: An 

Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 101–126.

95 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 2.”

96 Ronald J. Buikema and Matt Burger, “Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Columbia 

(FARC),” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. 

Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

97 Fishel, “Communist Terror in South Vietnam,” 14.

98 Nix and Marshall, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”

99 Ganor, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare.”

100Ronald J. Buikema and Matt Burger, “Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path),” in Casebook on 

Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).
Chapter 11. Terrorism

357

101 Sanaz Mirazei, “Taliban 1994–2009,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, 

Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Publications Directorate, in press).

102Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night 

Letters),” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (2007): 317–344.

103Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face of War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 119–120.

104Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 83, 101.

105 Schmid, “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare.”

106 Scott Gerwehr and Kirk Hubbard, “What is Terrorism? Key Elements and History,” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

107Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of MassMediated Fear.”

108 Sonia J. Lupien, “Brains Under Stress,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 54, no. 1 (2009): 

4–5.

109 Sandro Galea, Jennifer Ahern, Heidi Resnick, Dean Kilpatrick, Michael Bucuvalas, Joel 

Gold, and David Vlahov, “Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 

in New York City,” The New England Journal of Medicine 346, no. 13 (2002): 982–987.

110 Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of MassMediated Fear.”

111 Charles A. Morgan III, Sheila Wang, Steven M. Southwick, Ann Rasmusson, Gary Hazett, 

Richard L. Hauger, and Dennis S. Charney, “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 

Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training,” Biological Psychiatry 47, no. 10 (2009): 

902–909.

112Banks and James, “Warfare, Terrorism, and Psychology.”

113 Schmid, “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare.”

114 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th 

ed. (DSM-IV-TR) (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000).

115 Galea et al., “Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York 

City.”

116 Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, 83ff.

117 James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), 67–68.

118 Withey, “Reaction to Uncertain Threat,” 121.

119 Ibid.

120Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts.

121 Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, 84.

122Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 2.”

123Barker, Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist, 145.

124Doris M. Condit, Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (Washington, DC: 

Special Operations Research Office, 1961), 268.

125Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.

126 Ibid.

127Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context 2.”

128 Jerrold M. Post, “Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group 

Dynamics,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 10, no. 1 (1987): 23–35.

129Medardo T. Justiniano, “Combat Intelligence,” Counter-Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946–1953 (seminar, Fort Bragg, NC: June 15, 1961), 47–48.
358

Part III. Underground Psychological Operations

130 Ibid.

131Ronald Waring, The War in Angola: 1961 (Lisbon: Silvas, 1961), 27.

132Crossett and Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts.

133 Jerrol M. Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism,” Political Psychology 26, no. 4 (2005): 615–636.

134 Ibid.

135Franz P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York: 

Routledge, 2006).

136Ganor, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare.”
GLOSSARY

Glossary

361

PART I: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AD Acción Democrática (English: Democratic Action Party)

AEI Albert Einstein Institution

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of 

Industrial Organizations

AKE Greek Agrarian Party

APD Antisocial Personality Disorder

AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq

AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ASU Active Service Unit

ATI Tunisian Internet Agency

BBC British Broadcasting Company

BGF Black Guerrilla Family

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CLO Congress of Labor Organizations

CNN Cable News Network

CTAL Latin American Conference

DAN Direct Action Network

DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive 

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DKS Den Kolde Skulder (English: The Cold Shoulder)

DNS Denial of Service

DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

EDCOR Economic Development Corps

EIG Egyptian Islamic Group

EIJ Egyptian Islamic Jihad

EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (English: National 

Organization of Cypriot Fighters)

EPON United All Greece Youth Organization

ERP Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (English: People’s 

Revolutionary Army)

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (English: Basque Homeland and 

Freedom)

EZLN Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (English: 

Zapatista National Liberation Army)

FALN Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (English: 

Armed Forces of National Liberation)
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Glossary

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (English: 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FLN Frente de Liberación Nacional (English: National 

Liberation Front)

FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional 

(English: Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)

FOSF Friends of Sinn Féin

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GFA Good Friday Agreement

GHQ General Headquarters 

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GLU General Labor Unions

HAMAS H



arakat al-Muqawamah al-'Islamiyyah (English: Islamic 

Resistance Movement)

ICC International Criminal Court

ICP Indochinese Communist Party

IED Improvised Explosive Device

INLA Irish National Liberation Army

IP Internet Protocol

IRA Irish Republican Army

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISP Internet Service Provider

KKK Ku Klux Klan

KLA Ushtia Çlirimtare e Kosovës (English: Kosovo Liberation 

Army)

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MAK Maktab Al Khidamat (English: Services Office)

MAR Minorities at Risk

MCMI Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory

MCP Malayan Communist Party

MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (English: 

Movement of the Revolutionary Left)

MP Member of Parliament

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFLSV National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
Glossary

363

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NIACRO Northern Ireland Association for the Care and 

Resettlement of Offenders

NORAID Northern Aid Committee

OAS Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (English: Organization 

of the Secret Army/Secret Armed Organization)

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

PCL-R Psychopathy Checklist-Revised

PCV Partido Comunista Venezolano (English: Venezuelan 

Communist Party)

PFT People for Fair Trade

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

PRC People’s Republic of China

PRP People’s Revolutionary Party

PTSD Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

RAND Research And Development Corporation

RIRA Real IRA (Irish Republican Army)

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary

RVN Republic of Vietnam

SAVAK Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (English: 

National Intelligence and Security Organization)

SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party

SDS Students for a Democratic Society

SDU Smid Dem Ud (English: Throw Them Out)

SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party

SMS Short Message Service

SORO Special Operations Research Office

SUV Sport Utility Vehicle

TCU Tactical Combat Unit

TKB Terrorism Knowledge Base

TMT Terror Management Theory 

TNT Tamil New Tigers

TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission

TWA Trans-World Airlines

U.K. United Kingdom
364

Glossary

UN United Nations

URD Unión República Democrática (English: Republican and 

Democratic Union)

U.S. United States

USIP United States Institute for Peace

VC Viet Cong

WANK Worms Against Nuclear Killers

WTO World Trade Organization

WWII World War II
Glossary

365

PART II: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Agitation: Immediate, observable action that follows propaganda promises: one form is specific action to alleviate hunger and suffering, 

thereby demonstrating insurgents’ ability to accomplish set goals, and 

another form focuses on retaliatory acts of violence, sabotage, and punishment of so-called traitors among the local population.

Armed component: The visible element of a revolutionary movement 

organized to perform overt armed military and paramilitary operations using guerrilla, asymmetric, or conventional tactics.

Auxiliary: The support element of the irregular organization whose 

organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose 

members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with 

the irregular movement. Members of the auxiliary are more likely 

to be occasional participants of the insurgency with other full-time 

occupations.

Beliefs, values, and norms: Beliefs are ideas, knowledge, lore, superstition, myths, and legends shared by members of a society. Associated 

with each cultural belief are values—the “right” or “wrong” judgments 

that guide individual actions. Norms are acceptable patterns of behavior that are reinforced through a system of rewards and punishments 

dispensed within the group.

Cell: The smallest organizational element of an underground formed 

around a specific process, capability, or activity. Cells are kept small 

for secrecy, and communication between cells is often limited to limit 

damage if any one cell is compromised.

Clandestine operations: Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities in such a way as to ensure secrecy 

or concealment.

Coercion: Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent 

to ensure that an agent or group will respond as directed. Coercion is 

often contrasted with voluntary persuasion, although the two are also 

often used in combination.

Cognition: The mental processes of attention, memory, learning, language comprehension, problem solving, and decision making.

Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
366

Glossary

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are 

performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission.

Compartmentalization: Establishment and management of an organization so that information about the personnel, internal organization, or 

activities of one component is made available to any other component 

only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties.

Covert operation: Operations planned and executed so as to conceal 

the identity of those involved in, or permit plausible denial of, subversive operations. Covert operations differ from clandestine operations 

in that emphasis in clandestine operations is placed on concealment of 

the operation rather than the concealment of personal identity.

Deprivation: A state of lacking in psychological, economic, political, or 

social resources. Relative deprivation theory states that the subjective 

sense of being deprived of certain needs or freedoms by a domestic or 

international governing body can result in feelings of frustration, and 

when individuals can no longer bear this misery or indignity, a rebellion ensues. When these feelings of frustration go unresolved through 

productive or legal means and are left to fester, they can manifest in 

acts of violence motivated by, but not always directed toward, the governing body.

DSM-IV and Axis I and II Disorders: Currently in its fourth edition, the 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is published 

by the American Psychiatric Association and provides a common language and standard criteria for the classification of mental disorders. 

It is used in the United States and to varying degrees around the world 

by clinicians, researchers, psychiatric drug regulation agencies, health 

insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, and policy makers. 

The DSM-IV-TR uses a multiaxial or multidimensional approach to 

diagnoses because rarely do other factors in a person’s life not affect 

their mental health. Axis I (Clinical Syndromes) disorders are those 

psychological disorders that are the focus of a diagnosis. Axis I disorders are divided identified into fourteen categories, including Anxiety 

Disorders, Childhood Disorders, Cognitive Disorders, Dissociative Disorders, Eating Disorders, Factitious Disorders, Impulse-Control Disorders, Mood Disorders, Psychotic Disorders, Sexual and Gender-Identity 

Disorders, Sleep Disorders, Somatoform Disorders, and SubstanceRelated Disorders. Axis II (Developmental Disorders and Personality 

Disorders) are long-standing chronic conditions that may affect the 
Glossary

367

clinical syndromes listed in Axis  I. Developmental disorders include 

autism and mental retardation, disorders that are typically first evident 

in childhood. Personality disorders are clinical syndromes that have 

enduring symptoms and encompass the individual’s way of interacting 

with the world. They are divided into three clusters: Cluster A (odd 

or eccentric) includes Paranoid, Schizoid, and, Schizotypal. Cluster B 

(overly emotional, unstable, or self-dramatizing) includes Antisocial, 

Borderline, Histrionic, and Narcissistic. Cluster C (tense and anxiety 

ridden) includes Avoidant, Dependent, and Obsessive-Compulsive. 

Axis III disorders are medical/physical conditions that play a role in 

the development, continuance, or exacerbation of Axis I and II disorders or other physical conditions such as brain injury or HIV/AIDS that 

can result in symptoms of mental illness. Axis IV includes social and 

environmental stressors that may affect the clinical syndromes listed in 

Axis I. Events in a person’s life, such as death of a loved one, starting 

a new job, college, unemployment, and even marriage can affect the 

disorders listed in Axis I and II. These events are both listed and rated 

for this axis. Axis V represents the highest level of functioning where a 

clinician rates the individual’s level of functioning at both the present 

time and the highest level within the previous year. This helps the clinician understand how the above four axes are affecting the person and 

what type of changes could be expected.

Group dynamics: The study of two or more individuals connected by 

social relationships and how they interact and influence each other. 

Groups, relevant to the fields of psychology, sociology, and communication studies, comprise two or more individuals who are connected to 

each other by social relationships. Because they interact and influence 

each other, groups develop a number of dynamic processes that separate them from a random collection of individuals. These processes 

include norms, roles, relations, development, need to belong, social 

influence, and effects on behavior.

Human factors analysis: The psychological, cultural, behavioral, and 

other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of 

information, and the interpretation of information by individuals and 

groups at any level in any state or organization.

Identity: Identity theory addresses the individual’s sense of self and/or 

their place in the world. The theory posits a distinction among the psychological sense of continuity from the self (ego-identity) to one’s distinguishing idiosyncrasies (as the personal identity) to the set of social 

roles an individual may fulfill (social identity). Identity is a broad term 
368

Glossary

used throughout the social sciences to describe a person’s self-concept 

and expression of their individual and group affiliations.

Ideology: A set of beliefs that constitute one’s goals, expectations, values, 

and actions and form a comprehensive worldview. In insurgencies, a 

well-developed ideology serves the purpose of unifying disparate members of the movement, organizing actions around goals and shared values, and justifying actions that may include violence against countrymen.

In-group: A social group toward which an individual feels loyalty and 

respect, usually because of membership in the group based on social or 

familial ties. Commonly, in-groups include one’s family, team, professional organization, and those of the same race, culture, gender, or religion. This affinity often manifests itself as an in-group bias, whereby 

individuals tend to define their group over against a reference group 

and look more favorably upon their in-group than members of an 

out-group.

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Jihad: An Islamic term translated as a noun meaning “struggle” and 

a religious duty of Muslims. An individual engaged in jihad is called 

a mujahid (plural: mujahidin). Jihad is often dichotomized into greater 

and lesser jihad, although Islamic scholars differ in their belief as to 

which is indeed is more important. The greater jihad is the striving 

each Muslim experiences to live a life of piety amid temptation, while 

the lesser jihad is the armed struggle in defense of the faith. Sunni 

scholars refer to this duty as the sixth pillar of Islam, although it occupies no such official status. In Shia Islam, however, Jihad is one of the 

10 Practices of the Religion.

Mortality salience: Mortality salience is an increased awareness of and 

fixation upon one’s death. It has the potential to cause worldview 

defense, a psychological mechanism that strengthens people’s connection with their in-group as a defense mechanism.

Nonviolent resistance: Methods employed by resistance movements that 

capitalize upon social norms, customs, and taboos in order to provoke 

action by security forces that will serve to alienate large segments of 

public opinion from the government or its agents.

Out-group: A social group toward which an individual feels contempt, 

opposition, or a desire to compete.
Glossary

369

Propaganda: Any form of communication, especially of a biased or 

misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either 

directly or indirectly.

Psychodynamics: The theory and systematic study of the psychological 

forces that underlie human behavior, especially the dynamic relations 

between conscious motivation and unconscious motivation.

Psychological operations (PSYOP): A set of techniques used by the underground aimed to influence a target audience’s value systems, belief systems, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior.

Public component: The overt political component of an insurgent or revolutionary movement. Some insurgencies pursue military and political 

strategies. At the termination of conflict, or occasionally during the 

conflict, the movement can transition to the sole legitimate government or forms part of an existing government. Thus, the four spheres—

armed component, underground, auxiliary, and public component 

—form a dynamic and evolving relationship changing in response to 

internal and external drivers. The public component’s overt position 

distinguishes it from the clandestine underground. However, it frequently overlaps with the underground in that the latter’s functionality includes the management of propaganda and communications in 

general.

Radicalization: The process by which an individual, group, or mass of 

people undergo a transformation from participating in the political 

process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political 

purposes (radicalism).

Risk factors: A set of attributes (traits) or observable behaviors that may 

predispose an individual to or increase the likelihood that they adopt a 

set of beliefs or engage in politically motivated violence.

Resistance movement: An organized effort by some portion of the civil 

population of a country to resist the legally established government or 

an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.

Sabotage: Actions to withhold resources from the government’s counterinsurgency effort by acts of destruction. An act or acts with intent 

to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country 

by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, 

any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include 

human and natural resources.
370

Glossary

Safe haven: Any space, whether physical, legal, financial, or virtual (e.g., 

cyber), that enables insurgent organizations to plan, organize, train, 

conduct operations, or rest with limited interference from enemy or 

counterinsurgent forces.

Salafism: An Islamic school of thought employed by Sunni theologians 

since at least the fifth Muslim generation to differentiate the creed of 

the first three generations (the Sahabah, or Companions of the Islamic 

prophet Muhammad and the two succeeding generations, the Tabi’un

and the Tabi’ al-Tabi’in) from subsequent variations in belief system and 

method. Salafists view those generations as an eternal model for all 

succeeding Muslim generations, especially in their beliefs and methodology of understanding the texts, but also in their method of worship, 

mannerisms, morality, piety, and conduct.

Shadow government: A parallel governance structure established by an 

insurgent group that mimics the functions and attributes of the nationstate. Its functions include one or more of the following: extension of 

force, provision of social services, national identity and legitimacy, and 

revenue generation.

Social identity: Social identity is membership in a group that helps to 

define a person’s self-concept and provide self-esteem. An individual 

has multiple social identities including those of his or her family, sports 

team, ethnic group, military unit, etc., all of which help define who he 

or she is relative to the society and provide a particular sense of selfworth through identification with said group.

Social media: A set of Internet-based applications resulting from technological advances in communications technology that allows the creation and exchange of user-generated content. Social media supports 

informal, usually text-based communication in one-to-one, one-tomany, and many-to-many formats. Examples of three popular services 

that are considered social media are Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

Social network: A social network is a structure composed of individuals 

or organizations that are connected by one or more specific types of 

interdependency. Those interdependencies may be friendship; kinship; 

common interest; financial exchange; group affiliation; dislike; social 

relationships; or relationships of beliefs, knowledge, or prestige. Understanding these connections can give insight into a group’s patterns of 

influence and decision making; they can also be used to understand 

organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. Social network analysis is an 

active area of academic research.
Glossary

371

Subversion: Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.

Terrorism: Coercive acts of violence utilized by a subversive movement 

and usually directed toward disrupting government control over the 

citizenry and creating a state of mind that makes the citizenry acquiesce to subversive demands.

Terror management theory: Terror management theory states that existential anxiety (or the fear of death) is assuaged by adopting a worldview 

that makes death comprehensible and manageable. Terror management theory focuses on the implicit emotional reactions when individuals are confronted with their imminent mortality. It attempts to provide 

a rationale for the motivational catalysts of human behavior when life is 

threatened and advances the idea that a shared worldview provides an 

individual with a defense against inevitable existential anxiety (the fear 

of death). This cultural worldview minimizes death anxiety, providing 

an understanding of the universe that has order, meaning, and standards of acceptable behavior, resulting in increased self-esteem.

Uncertainty reduction theory: An application of communications 

research, uncertainty reduction theory puts forth the idea that group 

affiliation is motivated by the desire to alleviate uncertainty. An underlying assumption is most people do not tend to adopt a specific worldview and/or affiliate with a specific identity group unless there is a 

motive to alleviate uncertainty.

Underground: A clandestine organization established to operate in areas 

denied to the armed or public components or conduct operations not 

suitable for the armed or public components.

Unity of command: The operation of all forces under a single responsible 

commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those 

forces in pursuit of a common purpose.

Unity of effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.

Vanguard: Organizational theory common to Communist doctrines 

that calls for establishing a “front” or “vanguard” to infiltrate existing liberation or independence movements and orchestrate the overthrow of the incumbent authority. The vanguard is theoretically the 

most ideologically advanced sector of society not prone to the “false 

consciousness” infecting mass society. The organizational theory was 
372

Glossary

most clearly articulated by Lenin and adopted by the Bolshevik Party 

in Russia and has since been used by various theorists, including nonCommunists, such as Sayyid Qutb in his influential book, Milestones.