COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SARAH ELIZABETH SCHOENFIELD, S/K/A 

 SARAH ELIZABETH SCHOENFELD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1861-99-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 MAY 23, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

Keith B. Marcus (Bremner, Janus, Cook & 

Marcus, on brief), for appellant. 

Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

Sarah Schoenfeld appeals from her conviction of driving 

under the influence of alcohol, second offense. She contends 

the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence 

because she was the subject of an illegal search and seizure. 

We disagree and affirm. 

FACTS

Upon review of "a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, '[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to 

. . . the prevailing party below, and we grant all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.'" McNair v. 
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Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 76, 81-82, 521 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1999) 

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 

1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991)). At approximately 1:04 a.m. on 

March 31, 1999, Virginia Commonwealth University Police Officer 

Mindy Dunn was on duty patrolling the university's campus in the 

City of Richmond. As she stood next to her parked police 

cruiser, she heard the sound of an engine racing and, looking in 

the direction of the sound, she saw Schoenfeld's car as it 

passed her position on Harrison Street. The car appeared to be 

traveling well in excess of the posted 25 miles per hour speed 

limit, possibly as fast as fifty miles per hour. Based on this 

observation, Dunn got into her police cruiser and followed 

Schoenfeld's car. Dunn caught up to Schoenfeld when Schoenfeld 

stopped for a traffic signal on Harrison Street. Dunn activated 

her emergency lights, signaling Schoenfeld to stop. 

Dunn approached Schoenfeld's vehicle. The driver's side 

window was down, and as soon as Dunn reached it she smelled an 

odor of alcohol. Dunn asked Schoenfeld for her license and 

registration, and in response Schoenfeld handed Dunn a credit 

card instead of her registration card. Based on her observation 

of Schoenfeld's speed, the odor of alcohol emanating from 

Schoenfeld, and Schoenfeld's mistake in handing over a credit 

card instead of her registration card, Dunn decided to 

administer field sobriety tests. Due to Schoenfeld's 
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performance in the field sobriety tests, Dunn administered a 

breath test, which indicated a blood alcohol level of .16%. As 

a result, Schoenfeld was charged with speeding and with driving 

while intoxicated. Following the denial of Schoenfeld's motion 

to suppress evidence, Schoenfeld entered a conditional plea of 

guilty, which the trial court accepted. She was sentenced to 

sixty days in jail, with fifty-five suspended, and a fine of 

$300. Her driving privilege was also suspended for a period of 

three years. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

When we review the denial of a defendant's motion to 

suppress, the appellant has the burden to prove that, when the 

evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the trial court's denial of the motion was error. 

See Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 618, 621, 519 S.E.2d 

378, 379 (1999) (citing Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 

1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980)). 

"In our analysis, we are bound by the trial court's findings of 

historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to 

support them." McNair, 31 Va. App. at 82, 521 S.E.2d at 306 

(internal quotation omitted). "However, we review de novo the 

trial court's application of defined legal standards such as 

. . . reasonable suspicion to the particular facts of the case." 

Logan v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 353, 358-59, 512 S.E.2d 160, 
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162-63 (1999). "[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only that an 

objectively reasonable basis exist for a search." Id. at 359, 

512 S.E.2d at 163. 

"[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in 

an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of 

investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no 

probable cause to make an arrest." Parker v. Commonwealth, 255 

Va. 96, 104, 496 S.E.2d 47, 51-52 (1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). "In order to justify a Terry seizure, 

the police officer must be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 

104, 496 S.E.2d at 52 (internal quotation omitted). We have 

previously equated a traffic stop with a Terry stop. See Stroud 

v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 633, 637, 370 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1988) 

(citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)). 

[I]f there are articulable facts supporting 

a reasonable suspicion that a person has 

committed a criminal offense, that person 

may be stopped in order to identify him, to 

question him briefly, or to detain him 

briefly while attempting to obtain 

additional information. . . . In determining 

whether a police officer had a 

particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting that a person stopped may be 

involved in criminal activity, a court may 

consider the totality of circumstances. 

This test is less stringent than probable 

cause. 
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Parker, 255 Va. at 104, 496 S.E.2d at 52 (internal citations 

omitted). 

Schoenfeld contends that her detention by Dunn was improper 

because Dunn admitted that, at the time she decided to stop 

Schoenfeld, she had not decided whether she would cite her for a 

speeding violation, and was primarily interested in determining 

whether Schoenfeld was "safe to drive." However, an officer's 

subjective intent in making a traffic stop is irrelevant in 

determining a Fourth Amendment violation; "[p]olice actions are 

to be tested under a standard of reasonableness without regard 

to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers 

involved." Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 537-38, 383 

S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989); see Logan, 29 Va. App. at 359, 512 

S.E.2d at 163 ("[T]hat the officer does not have the state of 

mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 

legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate 

the action taken as along as [all] the circumstances, viewed 

objectively, justify that action."). 

Officer Dunn identified reasonable, articulable grounds for 

her suspicion that Schoenfeld was violating the law. She 

observed Schoenfeld driving at a speed greatly in excess of the 

posted speed limit, giving her reasonable suspicion, and indeed 

probable cause, to issue a citation for speeding. Accordingly, 
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the trial court committed no error in denying Schoenfeld's 

motion to suppress evidence, and we affirm the court's decision. 

 Affirmed.