Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 4, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00561-CV

NO. 14-18-00562-CV

NO. 14-18-00563-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.Z.C. AKA A.Z.H., L.D.C. AKA L.C., AND B.C. 

AKA B.B.H., CHILDREN 

On Appeal from the 257th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 2010-58803, 2016-60348, & 2016-78905 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant L.M.H. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s final decree terminating 

her parental rights and appointing the Department of Family and Protective Services 

as sole managing conservator of her children A.Z.H. (Andrea), L.D.C. (Leslie), and 

B.C. (Barry).

1 The trial court terminated Mother’s rights to Andrea on the predicate 

 

1 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.8, we use fictitious names to identify the minors

and other individuals involved in this case.
2

grounds of endangerment. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) & (E). 

(West. Supp. 2017). The trial court terminated Mother’s rights to Leslie and Barry 

on the predicate grounds of endangerment and being the cause of the children being 

born addicted to alcohol or a controlled substance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) & (R). The trial court further found that termination of 

Mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest, and named the Department 

managing conservator of the children.

In two issues Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s findings on section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and the 

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination 

is in the best interest of the children. Because we conclude the evidence is sufficient 

to support the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Pretrial Proceedings

A. Child Support Review Order 

These cases began in 2010 with a Child Support Review Order establishing 

that Mother and R.G.C. (Father) were Andrea’s parents. The order appointed both 

parents as joint managing conservators. Mother was designated the conservator who 

could determine the child’s primary residence. The order also directed when each 

parent would have possession of the child. 

B. 2014 Referral 

Four years later the Department filed a motion to modify for conservatorship 

and termination of both parents’ parental rights. By this time Leslie was ten months 

old. The removal affidavit noted that Andrea was exposed to drug use and domestic 

violence. Due to Mother’s admitted use of cocaine and PCP, the Department asked 
3

to be named temporary managing conservator of Andrea and Leslie. 

When questioned by the Department investigator, Mother denied any history 

of alcohol or drug abuse. Mother denied use of alcohol or drugs at the time and 

denied any experience with domestic violence. Mother was unemployed and 

received government assistance for her and her children. 

Mother submitted to a drug test during the investigation, which came back 

positive for PCP. After being confronted with the test results, Mother admitted prior 

PCP use but denied using drugs at home in front of her children. 

The children were placed with a maternal aunt and Mother found a location 

where she could undergo drug education. Mother asked that the children be moved 

to their godmother, which was approved. Family Based Safety Services (FBSS) was 

engaged to monitor Mother’s progress toward remaining drug and alcohol free. 

While being monitored by FBSS Mother continued to test positive for cocaine and 

PCP. 

A family service plan was created and the trial court ordered Mother to 

comply with the plan to obtain the return of her children. Mother entered inpatient 

treatment for substance abuse but did not appear to understand the tasks she was 

required to complete. Mother thought that the children would be returned to her as 

soon as she was discharged from inpatient treatment. Mother was discharged from 

the first inpatient treatment facility because she took drugs with her to the facility. 

Mother attended a second treatment facility for three months. Following discharge 

from the second facility Mother was asked to participate in outpatient treatment and 

random drug testing. Mother tested positive for drugs after discharge. 

The Department initiated protective custody of Andrea and Leslie, and was 

named temporary managing conservator. 
4

B. 2016 Referral

When Barry was born on November 9, 2016, the Department received a 

referral of neglectful supervision due to the active Department case involving 

Andrea and Leslie and Mother’s “ongoing use of illicit drugs.” When Mother gave 

birth, she tested positive for cocaine, PCP, benzodiazepines and amphetamine. 

Barry, who was born at 34 weeks’ gestation, tested positive for PCP and cocaine at 

birth. 

Mother told the Department investigator that she regretted using drugs while 

pregnant and wanted to seek inpatient treatment at a facility that would allow Barry 

to accompany her. Barry’s neonatal nurse informed the investigator that due to 

Barry’s premature birth he could not go with Mother because he needed stay in the 

hospital at least one week. The Department sought temporary managing 

conservatorship of Barry. 

D. Department History 

On December 28, 2010, when Andrea was eight months old, the Department 

received a referral noting that the baby was “at risk when with her father.” The case 

was ruled, “unable to determine.” 

On May 27, 2012, the Department received another referral for neglectful 

supervision in which it was alleged that Father sold drugs out of the home and abused 

drugs. The referral also noted that Mother and another non-relative had been seen 

using drugs around the child. The case was “ruled out.” 

E. Criminal History 

Mother pleaded guilty in 2010 to public intoxication and served an 

indeterminate sentence. Mother pleaded guilty in 2011 to prostitution and was 

sentenced to six days’ confinement in the Harris County Jail. 
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F. Temporary Orders and Family Service Plan

In all three cases the trial court entered temporary orders suspending visitation 

until the “parents have a clean drug test,” and ordering both parents to comply with 

each requirement set out in the Department’s family service plan. Mother’s plan first 

noted that the older children came into care because neighbors had seen Andrea and 

Leslie appearing dirty and hungry. The report further noted that Mother received 

food stamps for her children but would sell the food stamps rather than buy food for 

her children. All three children were considered to be vulnerable and unable to 

protect themselves from abuse or neglect. 

Mother’s family service plan required her to complete the following tasks: 

 participate in an intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment 

program for 45 days, which includes three groups per week at 

three hours per group with one individual session per week at one 

hour per individual session;

 participate in a supportive outpatient 90-day substance abuse 

treatment program, which includes two groups per week at three 

hours per group with two individual sessions per month at one 

hour per session;

 participate in person in Department-approved parenting classes 

of six to eight weeks in length;

 provide the Department caseworker with a release of information 

for all service providers, medical personnel, and officers of the 

court to obtain records and progress information;

 maintain contact with the current Department caseworker giving 

truthful information, attending all meetings, court hearings, 

visitations, and other planning sessions regarding her children;

 refrain from criminal activity;

 participate in twelve-step meetings and a twelve-step program 

throughout the case;

 remain free from all mind-altering substances including alcohol 

and drugs, sobriety to be monitored by participating in random 
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drug testing with the understanding that a failure to report will be 

treated as a positive test;

 participate in a substance abuse assessment and follow all 

recommendations;

 maintain stable, sanitary housing and legally verifiable 

employment;

 participate in a psychosocial evaluation and follow all 

recommendations; and

 participate in a psychiatric assessment and follow all 

recommendations.

III. Trial

A. Mother 

Stacy Ellison, a substance abuse counselor with Star of Hope, was Mother’s 

counselor in an intensive residential program for women who are trying to maintain 

their sobriety. At the time of trial Mother had been in the 90-day program for 

approximately six weeks. The Star of Hope was building apartments where Mother 

could live with her children if they were returned to her. Since being in the program 

Mother passed every drug test. Ellison testified that Mother had a plan after 

discharge for employment at a fast food restaurant and daycare for her children. 

Mother testified that she took full responsibility for her children’s removal. 

Mother completed a 90-day drug treatment program at Santa Maria before going to 

the Star of Hope. Mother had not seen her two oldest children for two years, and had 

not seen her youngest child since his birth. Mother completed all services. Mother 

testified that she had not used drugs since entering treatment in the Star of Hope 

program. Mother admitted missing some of the pretrial hearings in the case stating 

that she was still “in [her] addiction.” 

Mother testified about attending inpatient treatment at Volunteers of America 
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and Santa Maria Hostel. Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from Santa Maria 

and began using drugs again. Approximately three months after leaving Santa Maria, 

Mother entered the Volunteers of America inpatient program. Mother relapsed one 

month after leaving Volunteers of America. Mother also stopped taking prescribed 

medication after leaving Volunteers of America. Mother testified that at the Star of 

Hope program she became more dedicated to remaining sober and was receiving 

medication to address her mental health issues. Mother learned that her triggers are 

seeing other people with their children, and associating with people who use drugs 

and alcohol. Mother learned how to deal with her triggers through twelve-step 

meetings and working with recovery coaches. Mother has filled out an application 

for an apartment to move into after leaving treatment and has three job placements 

for when she leaves the program. Mother also plans to be trained as a nursing 

assistant. 

Both court-appointed Child Advocates met with Mother while the case was 

pending, and Mother was pregnant with another child. Mother admitted PCP use a 

week before the advocates met with her. 

Ashley Edwards, the caseworker for all three children, testified that both 

parents had been given family service plans, which were made orders of the court. 

With regard to Mother’s plan, she had completed a substance abuse assessment, 

attended parenting classes, refrained from criminal activity, and attended twelvestep meetings. These tasks were in addition to Mother’s inpatient substance abuse 

treatment, which she was receiving at the time of trial. 

While crediting Mother’s progress toward sobriety, Edwards testified that the 

Department was not able to return the children to Mother because she had not 

demonstrated the ability to provide a stable home. Edwards emphasized that the two 

youngest children were born dependent on drugs and needed six to seven months to 
8

withdraw. The youngest child was still experiencing physical withdrawal symptoms 

at the time of trial. 

Dr. Akalita Ross conducted a psychological examination of Mother, which 

included a parenting assessment. The assessment was based on the Adult-Adolescent 

Parenting Inventory, described as an inventory designed to assess the parenting and 

child-rearing attitudes of adult and adolescent parent populations. The assessment 

consisted of 40 questions relating to parenting techniques, thoughts about how a 

child should act toward the parent and how a parent should act toward a child. Ross’s 

assessment indicated: 

[Mother] is at High Risk for appropriate expectations of children. She

may lack an understanding of normal child growth and development, 

and her self-concept as a parent may be weak and easily threatened. 

This suggests that she may expect children to achieve at a higher level 

than they are capable often display a sense of self-inadequacy and 

perceived inadequacy as a caregiver. She is at High Risk for low 

empathic awareness of her children’s needs. [Mother] may fear spoiling 

her children along with having difficulties understanding children’s 

normal development and value. She may expect children to be [sic] act 

right and be good. [Mother] is at Medium Risk stern score for corporal 

punishment. This may indicate that hitting is the only way children 

learn to obey rules and stay out of trouble. Many people believe that 

fear, pain, or belittlement are necessary for children to fear their parents

which results in greater compliance. [Mother] [l]acks knowledge of 

alternatives to corporal punishment. [Mother] is at Medium Risk of 

parent-child family roles which may perceived [sic] children as objects 

for adult gratification, and may tend to treat children as confidant and 

peer. She may also expect children to make life better by providing 

love, assurance, and comfort. Furthermore, the results indicate she is at 

High Risk of oppressing children’s power and independence. This may 

indicate that children are expected to be obedient to demands, views

independent thinking as disrespectful and views children with power as 

threatening.

As a result of the assessment, Ross recommended Mother participate in parenting 
9

classes, obtain substance abuse treatment, and attend therapy for depressive 

symptomology in her relationship with her children. 

Ross testified that Mother was in the high-risk category with regard to 

empathy toward children’s needs. Ross explained that this determination meant that 

Mother does not understand the children’s emotional and physical needs. Mother 

was also at risk in the “power and independence” category, which describes a 

parent’s feeling that they have complete power over a child, and not understanding 

a child’s level of independence. This attitude can detrimentally affect children’s 

emotional growth. Mother scored as medium risk in the corporal punishment 

category, which means that Mother generally sees corporal punishment as the 

primary method of discipline. Corporal punishment can have a negative effect on 

children, especially if it is done when a parent is angry or upset and there has not 

been time to process emotion or explain to the child the reason for the discipline. 

Mother lacked knowledge of alternatives to corporal punishment. Ross testified that 

her findings with regard to Mother’s parenting were concerning because, at the time, 

Mother had attended parenting classes where she should have learned new skill sets, 

which should have improved her scores. Ross testified that if Mother were named 

primary caregiver of the children it would put the children at risk. 

Ross also conducted psychological testing, which led to diagnoses for major 

depression disorder as well as stimulant use disorder. Ross recommended individual 

therapy, parenting classes, ongoing substance abuse programs, and an outpatient 

program upon completion of an inpatient program. 

Mother testified that her parenting classes taught her how to be a nurturing 

parent, how to discipline her children in an appropriate manner, and how to show 

affection to her children building up their self-confidence. Mother also learned how 

to teach her children to handle stressful situations and cook nutritious food. 
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B. Children

Robin Noser, the Child Advocates’ volunteer, testified that the children were 

thriving. Andrea, seven, and Leslie, four, were still behind in school and had 

behavioral problems but were improving. Barry, who was 18 months old, was a 

“happy baby who loves to look at books and play peek-a-boo.” Although the older 

children were improving in school they had significant behavior and academic 

challenges that Mother did not have the skills to address. 

All four children live in the same foster home.2 The foster home was stable 

and, in Noser’s opinion, was Andrea’s and Leslie’s best chance to have “a normal 

childhood.” The girls were able to ride their bikes and play with other children in the 

neighborhood. The foster mother was at home when the girls arrived home from 

school; the foster mother took the girls to church, and the children call her “mom.” 

Barry was born with symptoms of drug withdrawal, including shakes, 

inability to track with his eyes, inability to produce tears, and hearing loss. Barry 

was removed at birth and taken directly to the foster home. By the time Barry was 

six or seven months old the shakes stopped, and his hearing was normal. Barry had 

successful surgery on his eyes. At 18 months Barry did not require additional care. 

Noser recommended that Barry remain in the foster home. Barry was well-adjusted 

and happy in the foster home, which is the only home he knows. Barry had no delays 

in development. Noser had not seen any evidence that Mother could provide a safe 

and stable home for Barry. 

Linda Hernandez was the court-appointed Child Advocate for Andrea and 

Leslie. Hernandez was appointed as guardian ad litem for the girls in 2016, and met 

 

2 A fourth child was born while this case was pending. That child is not a part of these 

proceedings.
11

with them once a month. The last time Hernandez saw the girls, they were the 

happiest she had seen them since the beginning of the case. Hernandez attributed 

this improvement to the consistency the girls enjoyed in their foster home. The foster 

mother made sure the girls received the weekly counseling and speech therapy they 

needed. 

The girls attended school in a “very nice school district” and the foster mother 

maintained contact with the school administrators and teachers. Andrea also 

received “reading intervention” during the school day and tutorials after school. 

Andrea repeated kindergarten and at the time of trial was in first grade. Hernandez 

spoke with Andrea’s teachers who said she was doing well. Andrea tended to get 

into arguments but the teachers reported that is not atypical of children Andrea’s 

age. Leslie was in pre-kindergarten and was performing appropriately. Leslie 

showed some aggression on the bus riding to and from school but no aggression in 

the classroom. Leslie struggled with maintaining attentiveness in the classroom and 

has since been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Leslie is 

not old enough to take medication for ADHD but the foster mother is using other 

tools to help her cope. 

Hernandez believed termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the girls’ 

best interest because they have had a “very inconsistent lifestyle in regards to 

caregivers.” When the girls were transferred from their last foster mother to the 

foster mother they were living with at the time of trial Andrea developed severe 

anxiety, which manifested in physical symptoms including vomiting. Hernandez 

believed that consistency was extremely important to the girls’ emotional and 

psychological development. 

Edwards, the caseworker, agreed with Noser and Hernandez about the 

progress of the children while in foster care. In Edwards’ permanency report she 
12

noted that when the girls came into foster care they experienced some difficulties 

and adverse behaviors. Specifically, Andrea told her therapist that she wanted to 

harm her sister. Andrea’s caregiver in late 2017 had seen Andrea placing objects, 

including her fingers, down her throat causing her to vomit, bleed in her throat, and 

experience infections. Also late in 2017, Leslie, who was four years old at the time, 

exhibited difficulty in performing certain tasks independently including dressing 

herself and going to the restroom without assistance. 

The foster home is a very supportive environment conducive to the children’s 

needs, including their emotional needs in addition to basic needs of the ability to 

attend school regularly, go to church, and go on outings and trips. Edwards also 

believed adoption was in the children’s best interest to permit them to be in a stable 

home. 

ANALYSIS

In two issues Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment under section 

161.001(b)(1)(D) and the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the bestinterest finding. 

Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious matter implicating 

fundamental constitutional rights. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); 

In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 

Although parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002) (“Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize 

the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential 

that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve 

that right.”). 
13

Due to the severity and permanency of the termination of parental rights, the 

burden of proof is heightened to the clear and convincing evidence standard. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002). 

“Clear and convincing evidence” means “the measure or degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of 

the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 

2014); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. This heightened burden of proof results in a 

heightened standard of review. In re C.M.C., 273 S.W.3d 862, 873 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh 

all of the evidence, including disputed or conflicting evidence. In re J.O.A., 283 

S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence 

that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so 

significant that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or 

conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. We give due deference to 

the fact finder’s findings and we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the 

fact finder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). 

I. Endangerment Finding 

In her first issue Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment under section 

161.001(b)(1)(D). Mother’s parental rights to Andrea were terminated on the 

predicate grounds of endangerment under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). 

Mother’s rights to Leslie and Barry were terminated on endangerment grounds and 

grounds that she was the cause of the children being born addicted to alcohol or a 

controlled substance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), & (R). On 

appeal Mother only challenges the trial court’s findings under section 
14

161.001(b)(1)(D). 

“Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to 

support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in 

the child’s best interest.” See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). Mother 

has not challenged all possible grounds supporting the trial court’s judgment. 

Because Mother has not challenged the trial court’s findings under subsections E 

and R, we must overrule Mother’s challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the trial court’s finding under subsection D. See Fletcher v. 

Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 277 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (when an appellant does not challenge an independent 

ground that may support the judgment that appellant seeks to reverse, this court must 

overrule the challenges that the appellant has chosen to assert). We overrule 

Mother’s first issue. 

II. Best Interest of the Children

In her second issue, Mother challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence 

to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the 

children. 

The factors the trier of fact may use to determine the best interest of the child 

include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future physical and emotional 

needs of the child; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the 

child; (4) the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs 

available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the 

child; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) 

the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent 

that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) 

any excuse for the parents’ acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 
15

371–72 (Tex. 1976); In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b) (West Supp. 

2017) (listing factors to consider in evaluating parents’ willingness and ability to 

provide the child with a safe environment).

Courts apply a strong presumption that the best interest of the children is

served by keeping the children with their natural parents, and the burden is on the 

Department to rebut that presumption. In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230. Prompt and 

permanent placement in a safe environment also is presumed to be in the children’s 

best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).

A. Desires of the children 

At the time of trial Andrea was seven years old, Leslie was four years old, and 

Barry was 18 months old. When children are too young to express their desires, the 

fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are

well cared for by the foster family, and have spent minimal time with a parent. In re

L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). 

Mother argues there is no evidence about the children’s desires. The record 

reflects, however, that the oldest child is seven, and that all three children live in the 

same foster home with Mother’s youngest child who was removed at birth. The 

foster home was stable and was described by the caseworker as Andrea’s and 

Leslie’s best chance to have “a normal childhood.” Barry was born with symptoms 

of drug withdrawal, which have abated since his time in the foster home. The foster 

home is the only home Barry has known and he seemed happy and well-adjusted. 

B. Present and future physical and emotional needs of the children

and present and future physical and emotional danger to the 

children

Mother acknowledges that Barry was described by Noser, the Child Advocate, 
16

as a “normal, happy baby” with no special needs. Noser further testified that Barry 

came into care with special needs and required extra medical attention due to drug 

withdrawal. Noser testified that the foster mother was capable of meeting all of 

Barry’s physical and emotional needs. Leslie needed speech therapy twice a week 

and Andrea was receiving reading intervention and tutorials after school. Both Child 

Advocates and the Department caseworker believed that the foster mother was 

capable of meeting all the children’s physical and emotional needs. 

Mother argues, however, that the only competent evidence suggesting that she 

could not meet the children’s needs was the caseworker’s testimony. Mother argues 

that the Advocates’ testimony was conclusory. On review of the factual sufficiency 

of the trial court’s best-interest finding, we must give due deference to the trial 

court’s fact-finding role by resolving disputed evidence in favor of the finding if a 

reasonable person could have found it to be clear and convincing. See In re J.F.C., 

96 S.W.3d at 266. The caseworker’s testimony along with that of the Child 

Advocates and the psychologist that Mother could not meet the children’s physical 

and emotional needs is sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See 

In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (A 

fact finder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and 

emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s needs in the 

future.). 

Mother further argues that she has taken significant steps toward addressing 

her drug abuse by participating in residential treatment and intensive outpatient 

programs. Mother has begun taking medication to address other mental health issues. 

Despite opportunities to relapse Mother has maintained sobriety for nine months. 

To be sure, Mother has made progress toward her own sobriety. “[E]vidence 

of a recent turnaround should be determinative only if it is reasonable to conclude 
17

that rehabilitation, once begun, will surely continue.” In re M.G.D., 108 S.W.3d 508, 

514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). A factfinder is “not 

required to ignore a long history of dependency and abusive behavior merely 

because it abates as trial approaches.” Id. at 513. 

In making its best-interest finding, the trial court reasonably could have 

credited the evidence of Mother’s rehabilitation and decide that it justified returning 

the children, but we cannot say the trial court acted unreasonably in finding the 

children’s best interest lay elsewhere. See id. at 514. It is not our role to reweigh the 

evidence on appeal, and we may not substitute our judgment of the children’s best 

interest for the considered judgment of the fact finder. Id. 

C. Parental abilities of those seeking custody, stability of the home or 

proposed placement, and plans for the children by the individual 

seeking custody 

These factors compare the Department’s plans and proposed placement of the 

children with the plans and home of the parent seeking to avoid termination of the 

parent-child relationship. See In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 535. 

Ross, the psychologist who conducted Mother’s assessment, testified that 

Mother did not understand the children’s emotional and physical needs. Mother did 

not understand the children’s level of independence and was unable to balance this 

feeling with the feeling that she should have complete power over the children. Ross 

testified that Mother lacked knowledge of alternatives to corporal punishment and 

that Ross’s findings were concerning because at the time Mother was assessed she 

had attended parenting classes. 

In contrast, the foster mother was providing a consistent lifestyle for the 

children. The girls were attending school and were performing appropriately. The 

foster mother was working with Leslie to manage Leslie’s ADHD until Leslie was 
18

old enough to take medication. The foster mother cared for Barry while he recovered 

from symptoms of drug withdrawal. By the time of trial Barry was happy and welladjusted in the only home he knew. 

D. Programs available to assist in promoting the children’s best 

interest 

Under this factor Mother argues that she has succeeded in availing herself of 

programs available to assist her with her substance abuse. Mother points out that the 

Star of Hope program will provide daycare assistance, work-study programs, and 

job training programs. The best interest analysis, however, focuses on the best 

interest of the child, not that of the parent. In re C.V., 531 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. denied). 

Although the record reflects that Mother completed most of the services in her 

service plan, it also demonstrates that even after taking the prescribed parenting 

classes, Mother did not demonstrate basic understanding of parenting skills to keep 

her children safe. Compliance with a family service plan does not render termination 

impossible or trump all other termination factors. See In re M.G.D., 108 S.W.3d at 

514. “The elements of a safe, stable, and happy childhood cannot all be reduced to 

a checklist in a service plan.” Id. The trial court could have held a firm conviction 

that, despite Mother’s compliance with the family service plan, her endangering 

conduct was likely to continue. 

E. Acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing 

parent-child relationship is not appropriate, and any excuse for the 

parent’s acts or omissions 

Mother admits she did not initiate services or substance abuse treatment until 

over one year after her children were removed. Mother blames the Department for 

her inability to visit her children for two years. The record reflects the trial court 

ordered that Mother was not permitted to visit her children until she tested negative 
19

for drugs. Mother had control over whether she would be allowed to visit her 

children. 

Mother’s pattern of conduct reflects that termination is in the best interest of 

the children. In view of the entire record, we conclude that the disputed evidence is 

not so significant as to prevent the trial court from forming a firm belief or conviction 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We 

overrule Mother’s second issue. 

CONCLUSION

Because Mother failed to challenge the predicate grounds for termination 

under section 161.001(b)(1)(E) & (R), the trial court’s findings under those sections 

suffice to sustain the predicate grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

And, based on the evidence presented, the trial court reasonably could have formed 

a firm belief or conviction that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interest so that they could promptly achieve permanency through 

adoption. See In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2013, no pet.). 

We affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

 

 /s/ William J. Boyce 

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Jewell.