Filed 9/27/21 In re T.K. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re T.K.,

a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B309054

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NJ30152)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, John C. Lawson II, Judge. Affirmed.

Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and John Yang,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Juvenile T.K.1 appeals from the juvenile court’s order

sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 6022 petition 

finding he committed assault by means of force likely to produce 

great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, 

subdivision (a)(4).

T.K. argues the juvenile court’s questioning of witnesses 

during the bench trial was prejudicial misconduct. We disagree. 

The juvenile court’s questioning was measured and designed to 

clarify events portrayed on a grainy cellular phone video, which 

shows multiple minors punching or kicking the victim while 

hurling derogatory insults.

T.K. also contends there was insufficient evidence to 

support the judgment and that his self-defense or defense-ofothers claim was improperly rejected. T.K.’s assertion that he 

needed to defend himself or his friends is contradicted by the 

victim, his own testimony, and the video. The juvenile court is 

exclusively entrusted with assessing witness credibility and was 

well within its province to reject T.K.’s assertions.

Accordingly, we affirm.

1 We refer to the minor by his initials to protect personal 

privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.90(b)(4), 8.401(a)(2).)

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Assault

On February 10, 2020, Jared L.,

3 a student at California 

State University, Long Beach, was riding his bicycle home from 

school when he encountered T.K. and a large group of other 

minors who were also riding on a narrow bike path. As Jared L.

struggled to get past the group, he was harassed and eventually 

slapped by one of them.

Jared L. turned around, rode up to the minor who slapped 

him, and bumped his own bicycle into that person’s bicycle, 

saying, “You don’t hit people.” When Jared L. thereafter tried to 

continue his journey home, a member of the group rammed into 

his bicycle from behind, knocking him to the ground.

Once on the ground, a group of approximately eight minors 

surrounded Jared L. One of them said, “Why are you messing 

around with my homie?” Jared L. replied, “Your homie just hit 

me.” Another member of the group then punched Jared L.

As more of the group began attacking him, Jared L. began 

flailing his arms in defense. T.K. then grabbed Jared L. by the 

backpack and threw him to the ground.

The minors then beat and kicked Jared L. At some point, 

they asked where his wallet was. The minors then threw Jared 

L.’s bicycle into the adjacent riverbed. During the attack, 

someone struck Jared L.’s head with a glass bottle, leaving glass 

in his hair and cut wounds.

3 We refer to the victim by his first name and last initial to 

protect personal privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.90(b)(4).)
4

City of Seal Beach Police Department Officer Benjamin 

Jaispream responded that day. He spoke with Jared L. and took

photographs of injuries to his face, left arm, and left leg. Nearby, 

Officer Jaispream found a broken beer bottle on the rocks next to 

the riverbed.

T.K. testified on his own behalf. After the assault began, 

T.K. said he took out his phone to record since he wanted to post 

the fight to social media. “[T]his is going to be a cool clip for my 

edit or whatever,” he testified.

Once he saw Jared L. pushed to the ground, T.K. testified 

he began to back away, but Jared L. pulled on T.K.’s arm with 

one hand, and on T.K.’s shirt collar with the other. Jared L. then 

punched T.K. on the left side of his body. The punch caused T.K. 

to fall down the embankment.

T.K. then ascended the embankment and observed Jared L.

being attacked by the other minors, “[his] friends.” T.K. walked 

up to Jared L. and “push[ed]” him one more time because he was 

punching his friends. T.K. then walked away from the fight and 

rode away.

In stark contrast with T.K., Jared L. denied punching T.K. 

at any time during the assault or throwing him down the 

embankment.

B. The Section 602 Petition and Trial

The People filed a two-count section 602 petition, alleging 

T.K. committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code 

section 211, and assault by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision 

(a)(4).

Following a bench trial, the juvenile court declined to make 

a true finding on count 1, but sustained the petition as to count 2 
5

(declaring that count to be a felony), and placed T.K. on home 

probation.

T.K. timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court’s Questioning Was Proper

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a judicial misconduct challenge on a case-bycase basis. (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 531-532.) 

We first “ ‘ “determine whether the judge’s behavior was so 

prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a 

perfect, trial” ’ ” and then “make that determination on a case-bycase basis, examining the context of the court’s comments and the 

circumstances under which they occurred.” (People v. Abel (2012) 

53 Cal.4th 891, 914.)

On the other hand, it must be said that a trial court can

control the examination of witnesses to ensure the efficient

“ascertainment of the truth,” and may examine witnesses on its

own motion. (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1044.) 

“ ‘[I]t is not merely the right but the duty of a trial judge to see 

that the evidence is fully developed before the trier of fact and to 

assure that ambiguities and conflicts in the evidence are resolved 

insofar as possible.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14

Cal.4th 668, 739.) The “court has both the discretion and the 

duty to ask questions of witnesses, provided this is done in an 

effort to elicit material facts or to clarify confusing or unclear 

testimony.” (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 597.)

In undertaking an examination, the trial court should be 

careful not to take on the role of either the prosecutor or the 

defense. “The court’s questioning must be ‘ “temperate, 
6

nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair.” ’ ” (People v. Cook, 

supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 597; see also People v. Brown (1993) 6 

Cal.4th 322, 333 [a defendant has a due process right to an 

impartial judge]; accord, Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 

279, 309 [111 S.Ct. 1242, 113 L.Ed.2d 302].)

2. The Juvenile Court’s Questioning

T.K. argues the court committed misconduct by asking

numerous and detailed questions of the witnesses. In doing so, 

the argument goes, the court improperly aligned itself with the 

prosecution in a way that made the court no longer impartial but 

rather taking on the role and function of the prosecutor. T.K. 

insists the court’s questioning were “not simply clarifying.” 

Instead, the court was evidently unsatisfied with the prosecutor’s 

own examination, and so “stepped into the role of a second 

prosecutor.”

The first challenged testimony occurred after Jared L. had 

completed his direct and cross-examination. The juvenile court 

asked the prosecutor to play the video from the beginning. T.K. 

specifically complains that the court asked the prosecutor to play 

the video in “few-second increments at a time,” while asking 

Jared L. a series of questions, including who was hitting him, 

why he stood up, and what was happening with Jared L.’s 

backpack. T.K. highlights the following exchanges:

“The Court: And at this point – what are you trying to do 

at this point?

“[Jared L.]: Defend myself.

“The Court: And at this time approximately how many 

strikes or blows are you feeling?

“[Jared L.]: Right around, like, five or so. Five or six.
7

“The Court: And can you tell from what direction they’re 

coming from?

“[Jared L.]: At the time it felt like every direction.”

“The Court: What did you say to this person when you 

bumped their wheel?

“[Jared L.]: I said, ‘You don’t fucking hit people.’

“The Court: Did you – did the person respond to you?

“[Jared L.]: No.

“The Court: When you rode back to that group, did you 

ever punch anybody?

“[Jared L.]: No.

“The Court: You ever slap somebody back?

“[Jared L.]: No.”

The second examination highlighted by T.K. is his own 

testimony that followed the completion of direct and crossexamination. T.K. complains that the juvenile court examined 

T.K. for “six pages” worth of the reporter’s transcript.

“The Court: . . . So I do see the witness grabs you by the 

arm at that time. You’re indicating that’s you?

“[T.K.]: Yes.

“The Court: Why are you so close to him when all this 

started?

“[T.K.]: I was trying to get a clear video for my social 

media.

“The Court: And which hand is your camera – your phone 

in?

“[T.K.]: I’m right-handed, so I was using my right hand.

“The Court: All right. Counsel, could you play it again 

another 10 seconds[?] [Video plays.] . . . So you see where the 

witness turns around and you’re now out of the screen?
8

“[T.K.]: Yes.

“The Court: Where are you at this point?

“[T.K.]: I’m falling down the embankment.

“The Court: You’re falling down the embankment?

“[T.K.]: Yes.

“The Court: And did you actually – did you ultimately end 

up on the ground or just stumble?

“[T.K.]: I – I was rolling on my head and my hip to the 

bottom.”

“The Court: So that’s you coming back into the screen at 

approximately 13 seconds?

“[T.K.]: Yes.

“The Court: 14 seconds? And that’s you pushing him?

“[T.K.]: Yes.

“The Court: And so you came from up the embankment. 

You got up, came up the embankment, and then went over and 

pushed him; is that correct?

“[T.K.]: Yes.”

3. Analysis

We have reviewed the video of the assault, as well as the 

reporter’s transcript on appeal. The jerky, low-resolution video is

41 seconds long, and portrays multiple minors punching or 

kicking Jared L., while being cheered on with shouts of “Get his 

ass!” clearly audible.

The juvenile court’s questioning did not result in an 

improper alignment with the prosecution or deny T.K. a fair trial. 

To the contrary, the juvenile court’s questioning was measured, 

clarifying the order of events portrayed by the video, and 

improving the record on appeal. (See People v. Hawkins (1995) 
9

10 Cal.4th 920, 947-948 [trial judge may question witnesses to 

clarify the evidence or fill in evidentiary gaps].)

It also must be plainly stated that no jury was involved; 

this was a court trial where the juvenile judge was the finder of 

fact. Prejudice in the sense of improperly influencing the jury 

has no bearing, and T.K.’s counsel identifies not a single case 

involving prejudicial witness examinations in a bench trial 

setting.4

B. The Evidence Was Sufficient and Does Not Support a

Claim of Self-defense or Defense of Others

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable 

4 The three jury trial cases cited in T.K.’s briefing are 

therefore inapposite. In People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 

1194, the trial court used the prosecutor’s terminology in 

questioning police officers, dwelled on evidence from defense 

witnesses that was adverse to the defendant, and limited defense 

counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses. (Id. at pp. 1207-1209.) 

In People v. Robinson (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 624, the trial court 

was described as having engaged in “constant and extensive 

interruptions and activity” such as to create “in the minds of the 

jurors the impression that the court favored the case of the 

People.” (Id. at p. 631.) In People v. Williams (2021) 60 

Cal.App.5th 191, the trial court “interrupted the defense’s crossexamination at least a dozen times with its own questions and 

sua sponte objections,” “[asked] follow up questions that appeared 

to minimize potential reliability problems with” the prosecution 

expert’s position, and “did not allow relevant and appropriate 

cross-examination on the scientific reports and studies.” (Id. at 

p. 205.)
10

to supporting the judgment to determine whether substantial 

evidence supports the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562, 578.) Reversal is 

appropriate only where it appears “that upon no hypothesis 

whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the 

judgment].” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)

As discussed, T.K. testified Jared L. was the initial 

aggressor in the assault because Jared L.’s left hand made 

contact with his arm. T.K. claimed he was defending himself 

because Jared L. pulled on his arm with one hand and pulled on 

his shirt collar with the other. He then punched T.K. on the left 

side of his body causing him to fall down the embankment. 

Afterwards, T.K. allegedly scrambled up the embankment, 

“walked up to Jared L. and pushed him one time in order to 

defend himself and his friends.” T.K. says he then “pedal[led] 

away to get away from the whole situation.”

The juvenile court evidently rejected this testimony, and 

T.K.’s version of events is not supported by the video. (See People 

v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 [it is the exclusive province 

of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and the 

court will not substitute its own evaluation of witness credibility 

for that of the fact finder].)

2. Self-defense/Defense of Others

Someone who reasonably fears infliction of imminent bodily

injury is allowed to use all force reasonably necessary to prevent

the harm. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064-1065;

see Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.) The reasonableness of the apparent 

danger is evaluated from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in 

the defendant’s position and “[t]he [factfinder] must consider all 
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the facts and circumstances it might ‘ “expect[ ] to operate on [the 

defendant’s] mind.” ’ ” (Minifie, supra, at p. 1065.)

“ ‘[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes 

all of the elements for a finding of self-defense it may be held as a

matter of law that the [use of force] was justified; however, where

some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which a [use of

force] may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for

the [factfinder] to determine. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Levitt

(1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 500, 509, disapproved on another ground 

in People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 649, fn. 6.)

On the other hand, “[w]here the evidence is uncontroverted, 

but reasonable persons could differ on whether the resort to force 

was justified or whether the force resorted to was excessive, then 

the issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact.” (People v. 

Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 378-379.) In such cases, “ ‘[t]he 

[factfinder is] not required to accept [the] defendant’s version of 

the [incident].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bates (1967) 256

Cal.App.2d 935, 939.)

T.K.’s claim of self-defense or defense of others is 

specifically contradicted by his own testimony that he pushed 

Jared L., not to defend himself or others, but to stop the group of 

bicyclists from hitting Jared L. further. At that point, however, 

Jared L. was fighting at least four other individuals. A 

reasonable person under such circumstances would not have 

subjectively entertained a belief that there was a need to defend 

the group of bicyclists from Jared L. (See People v. Minifie, 

supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)

T.K. also cannot claim self-defense as a matter of law

because a member of the group struck the first blow. It is wellsettled law that someone who initiates a fight cannot thereafter
12

claim self-defense unless he made efforts to stop the fighting and

communicated such efforts. (See, e.g., People v. Hecker (1895) 

109 Cal. 451, 463-464; CALCRIM No. 3471 [“A person who 

(engages in mutual combat/[or who] starts a fight) has a right to 

self-defense only if: [¶] 1. (He/She) actually and in good faith tried 

to stop fighting; [¶] [AND] [¶] 2. (He/She) indicated . . . that 

(he/she) wanted to stop fighting and that (he/she) had stopped 

fighting. . .”].)

At the time T.K. pushed Jared L., T.K. had no need to 

defend himself, as he had allegedly just climbed out of the 

embankment and could have walked away. This he did not do. 

Instead, T.K. even mocked Jared L. after pushing him onto the 

rocks.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CRANDALL, J.*

We concur:

CHANEY, J. BENDIX, Acting P. J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.