IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Amy McFalls, :

 Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 737 C.D. 2021

Municipality of Norristown : Submitted: January 21, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 17, 2022

Amy McFalls (McFalls) appeals pro se from the January 27, 2021 order 

(Order) of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) that 

granted the “Municipality of Norristown’s Motion for Summary Judgment”

(Summary Judgment Motion) and dismissed McFalls’ “Petition for Attorney[] Fees, 

Civil Sanctions and Release of Records As Appropriate” (Petition). Upon review, 

we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

On May 24, 2019, pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL),

1

McFalls requested documents from the Municipality of Norristown (Norristown) 

related to a March 22, 2018 incident (March 2018 incident) involving herself and 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
2

Norristown police officers (Request).

2, 3

 See Trial Court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Opinion dated April 21, 2021 (Trial Court Opinion) at 1. Norristown denied the 

2 Specifically, McFalls requested:

1. A copy of any internal notes or memoranda by jail staff 

documenting my conduct and/or the actions of the officers during 

my incarceration.

2. All policies related to the investigation of traffic accidents.

3. All policies requiring officers to follow guidelines regarding 

witness interviews.

4. A copy of training materials, [] policies[ and] requirements 

during a [driving under the influence (DUI)] arrest.

5. A complete record of all radio traffic before, during and 

immediately after my arrest.

6. A copy of relevant policies related to the use of force.

7. A list of use of force reporting requirements.

8. A copy of relevant policies related to custody and care of 

prisoners.

9. A copy of relevant policies related to restraint procedures for 

combative prisoners.

10. A copy of certifications and training records for all involved 

officers.

11. A complete roster of all employees on duty during the assault of 

myself.

12. A complete list of inmates in custody on the night of my arrest 

who may have witnessed the events described in my case.

13. A copy of emergency procedures related to inmate mental health 

issues or distress.

Trial Court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion dated April 21, 2021 (Trial Court Opinion) at 1-2.
3

Request and McFalls appealed the denial to Pennsylvania’s Office of Open Records 

(OOR). See Trial Court Opinion at 2. On August 9, 2019, the OOR issued a Final 

Determination granting McFalls’ appeal in part, denying the appeal in part, and 

transferring the appeal in part (Final Determination). See id. In the Final 

Determination, the OOR ordered Norristown to produce, within 30 days, responsive 

documents related to Norristown Police Department policies regarding the custody 

and care of prisoners and restraint procedures for combative prisoners,4 certain 

records relating to the certification and training of officers involved in the March 22, 

2018 incident,5 and documents related to policies and reporting requirements for

3 By way of relevant background, the incident underlying this matter occurred in the early 

morning hours of March 22, 2018, following McFalls’ arrest for driving under the influence of 

alcohol (DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). See Commonwealth v. McFalls, 251 A.3d 1286, 1288 (Pa. 

Super. 2021). The incident involved McFalls removing and placing her sweatshirt into a holding 

cell toilet, thereby causing the toilet to overflow, and then assaulting a responding police officer 

by spitting in the officer’s face. See id. at 1288-89. After being charged with aggravated 

harassment by a prisoner, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2703.1, and institutional vandalism, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3307(a)(3),

in addition to the DUI charge, McFalls engaged in discovery in the criminal matter by serving a 

subpoena on Norristown’s police chief, which subpoena was quashed by a criminal judge of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (criminal trial court) after a hearing. See id. at 

1289. McFalls also filed a pre-trial discovery motion in the criminal matter, which motion sought 

the documents, policies, training materials, and guidelines McFalls sought in the Request. See id. 

At a hearing, McFalls alleged the materials sought were relevant in her criminal trial to challenge 

the credibility of the police officer involved in the March 2018 incident. See id. at 1290. The 

criminal trial court denied McFalls’ discovery request as overly broad and immaterial. See id. 

Thereafter, in a bifurcated trial, McFalls was convicted of DUI following a bench trial on July 1, 

2019, and of institutional vandalism and aggravated harassment by a prisoner following a jury trial 

on September 17, 2019. See id.

4 Request Nos. 8 & 9.

5 Request No. 10.
4

incidents involving use of force.

6

 See id. at 2-3.7 Neither McFalls nor Norristown

appealed the Final Determination, and Norristown forwarded responsive documents

by letter dated September 13, 2019. See Trial Court Opinion at 5; Norristown Br. at 

6.

McFalls filed the Petition in the trial court on October 15, 2019, seeking 

an order to compel compliance with the Final Determination, as well as fines and 

attorney fees, based on McFalls’ allegations that, by producing records that were 

both heavily redacted and late, Norristown failed to comply with the Final 

Determination. See Trial Court Opinion at 3; see also Petition at 4-5.8 Norristown 

moved for summary judgment on the Petition, arguing that a “petition” was an 

improper procedural device to seek compliance with an OOR decision and that, if 

the Petition is construed as an appeal from the OOR decision, it is beyond the 30-

day appeal period for appealing such a decision. See Trial Court Opinion at 3-4. 

The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed the Petition. See id. at 3. 

McFalls now appeals to this Court.9

6 Request Nos. 6 & 7.

7 The OOR also determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Request Nos. 1 & 12, which 

respectively sought copies of jail staff internal notes/memoranda related to the conduct of McFalls 

and officers involved in the March 22, 2018 incident, and a complete list of inmates in custody on 

the night in question who could act as possible witnesses. See Trial Court Opinion at 3. By letter 

dated August 12, 2019, the OOR instructed the Norristown Police Department to turn over 

responsive documents not related to a criminal investigation, if located. See id. Norristown’s 

appeals officer issued a denial letter regarding these Requests on October 21, 2019. See id. at 3 

n.3.

8 McFalls did not number the Petition’s pages. The Petition page numbers referred to 

herein coincide with the page numbers supplied by the trial court, which pagination begins with 

the cover page that accompanied the Petition when filed with the trial court. 

9 McFalls originally appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which transferred the 

matter to this Court.
5

On appeal,10 McFalls argues that the trial court erred and denied her due 

process of law by granting the Summary Judgment Motion because Norristown 

acted in bad faith by providing only highly redacted documents after the date ordered 

by the OOR.

11

 See generally McFalls’ Br. McFalls alleges that Norristown’s failure 

10 Our standard of review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. See Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011). A motion for 

summary judgment is properly made if “there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a 

necessary element of the cause of action.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(1). “Summary judgment may be 

entered only when, after examining the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

and resolving of all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving 

party, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pyeritz, 32 A.3d at 692. 

This Court, in the exercise of our appellate review, may reverse a trial court’s order only for abuse 

of discretion or an error of law. See Pentlong Corp. v. GLS Cap., Inc., 72 A.3d 818, 823 n.6 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013).

11 Specifically, McFalls purports to raise the following questions on appeal:

I. Did the honorable trial court err and abuse its discretion in 

granting [Norristown’s] Motion for Summary Judgment because 

[Norristown] acted in bad faith and failed to provide all the records, 

provided only a portion of the records redacted and did not provide 

them on the date of OOR ordered [Norristown] to do so, and further 

provided untruthful statements to [McFalls]?

II. Did the honorable trial court err and abuse its discretion in 

granting [Norristown’s] Motion for Summary Judgment and 

denying [sic] release of the requested records to [McFalls], as the 

Commonwealth was required to by due process guarantees to abide 

by the Federal Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution, and 

thus, its Order violates [McFalls’] Federal and State due process 

guarantees?

III. Did the honorable trial court err and abuse its discretion in 

granting [Norristown’s] Motion for Summary Judgment and 

denying the award of attorney[] fees to [McFalls] and [imposing]

sanctions upon [Norristown]?

IV. Should judgment be reversed and [Norristown] be ordered to 

relinquish all requested documents in full to [McFalls] and ordered 

to pay appropriate sanctions and attorney[] fees?
6

to remit the responsive documents within 30 days of the Order resulted in a violation 

of her due process rights in her criminal trial. See McFalls’ Br. at 9-11. She seeks 

reversal of the Order with instructions from this Court requiring Norristown to 

provide all documents requested in the Request, as well as the imposition of a $1,500 

civil penalty and attorney fees in the amount of $8,000. See id. at 22. 

Initially, we observe, as did the trial court, that where a requester has 

not appealed a final determination of the OOR to a reviewing court for a merits 

review, “the appropriate way to compel the production of a local agency’s public 

records is by a complaint in mandamus[,]” as opposed to a petition to enforce. 

Capinski v. Upper Pottsgrove Twp., 164 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (holding 

that a complaint in mandamus, not a petition to enforce, is the proper procedural 

device to seek compliance with a final determination of the OOR). As this Court 

has observed, 

an action in mandamus is not available to usurp the 

jurisdiction of the [OOR] to resolve a dispute about 

whether a public record is subject to disclosure. It is 

available, however, once a party’s right to the record has 

been established through a final determination.

Id. at 609. A petition to enforce, therefore, is an improper procedural device to 

compel compliance with OOR final determinations that were not appealed to a 

reviewing court. Instead, “mandamus is the action to file where the requester has 

not appealed the final determination to a court for a merits review and seeks 

compliance with a final determination of the [OOR].” Id. This Court, however, may 

Statement of Questions Involved, McFalls’ Br. at 7 (emphasis in original).
7

treat a petition to enforce as a mandamus action where the petition pleads the 

essential factual prerequisites of mandamus. See id. at 610.

Here, the Petition seeks an order compelling Norristown’s compliance 

with the Final Determination. See generally Petition. As such, the Petition is 

effectively an enforcement petition. The trial court noted, however, that 

[McFalls] did not timely appeal the OOR’s Final 

Determination.[12] As such, an action in mandamus is the 

proper vehicle for her to have sought enforcement against 

Norristown. Because [McFalls] commenced the instant 

matter by way of petition, any request that [the trial] court 

order Norristown to produce requested documents to 

[McFalls] is invalid.

Trial Court Opinion at 5. We agree with the trial court that the Petition is the

improper procedural vehicle for McFalls to seek an order compelling Norristown to 

comply with OOR’s directives set forth in the Final Determination. See Trial Court 

Opinion at 4-5. Because McFalls did not appeal the Final Determination, she should 

have filed a complaint in mandamus, not an enforcement petition, to seek 

compliance with the Final Determination. See Capinski, 164 A.3d at 607. We will 

treat the Petition as a mandamus action for the purposes of this appeal, however, 

because it pleads the factual prerequisites of mandamus. See id. at 609. Nonetheless, 

we conclude that the Petition fails on the merits.

“Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which will only issue to compel 

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal 

right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and want of any other 

12 Section 1302(a) of the RTKL allows 30 days to appeal the final determination of an 

appeals officer relating to a decision of a local agency. See 65 P.S. § 67.1302(a).
8

adequate and appropriate remedy.” Dotterer v. Sch. Dist. of Allentown, 92 A.3d 875, 

880 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If any one of the 

foregoing elements is absent, mandamus does not lie.” Id. at 881. 

Here, Norristown forwarded responsive documents as ordered by the 

OOR by letter dated September 13, 2019. See Trial Court Opinion at 5; Norristown 

Br. at 6. The responsive documents forwarded included “over 200 pages of 

documents reflecting the policies related to custody and care of prisoners, restraint 

procedures for combative prisoners, certification records, and a redacted version of 

the Use of Force policy showing the ‘reporting methods for use of force’ sections.” 

Norristown Br. at 6. The trial court observed that “Norristown provided [McFalls] 

with documents in response to her request and the OOR decision[,]” and McFalls 

does not dispute that Norristown produced responsive documents. Trial Court 

Opinion at 6. Further, to the extent that she alleges Norristown’s failure to serve 

responsive documents within 30 days of the Order resulted in prejudice in her 

criminal trial, we note that McFalls has fundamentally conflated the concept of 

criminal discovery with her rights of access under the RTKL. See McFalls’ Br. at 

9-18. McFalls’ insistence that Norristown’s behavior in relation to the Request 

constitutes criminal discovery violations under the Sixth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution13

concern concepts of compulsory criminal discovery not at issue in RTKL matters. 

Alleged discovery violations in McFalls’ criminal matter are to be addressed to and 

by the criminal trial court and appeals court, and are not appropriate matters for 

13 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 

the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....” U.S. 

Const. amend. VI. Under article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the accused has a 

right “to be heard” and “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 9.
9

RTKL litigation. McFalls’ failure to grasp the limitations of her rights or 

Norristown’s obligations under the RTKL does not expand those rights or 

obligations to include an entitlement to discovery devices traditionally employed in 

other types of litigation. See Olick v. Easton Suburban Water Auth. (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 995 C.D. 2020, filed Dec. 3., 2021),

14 slip op. at 10. For these reasons, 

mandamus does not lie in this matter, and we affirm the Order to the extent the trial 

court determined Norristown was entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Additionally, we find no merit in McFalls’ claim that she is entitled to 

$8,000 in attorney fees. To support her claim to attorney fees, McFalls relies on 

Section 1304(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1304(a),15 which allows a trial court to 

award court costs and attorney fees upon review of an agency appeals officer’s final 

determination. Such a review did not occur in this case, as McFalls did not timely 

14 Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure Section 414(a), 210 Pa. 

Code § 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be 

cited for their persuasive value.

15 Specifically, Section 1304(a) of the RTKL provides as follows:

(a) Reversal of agency determination.--If a court reverses the final 

determination of the appeals officer or grants access to a record after 

a request for access was deemed denied, the court may award 

reasonable attorney fees and costs of litigation or an appropriate 

portion thereof to a requester if the court finds either of the 

following:

(1) the agency receiving the original request willfully or 

with wanton disregard deprived the requester of access to 

a public record subject to access or otherwise acted in bad 

faith under the provisions of this act; or

(2) the exemptions, exclusions or defenses asserted by the 

agency in its final determination were not based on a 

reasonable interpretation of law.

65 P.S. § 67.1304(a).
10

appeal the Final Determination to the trial court. Further, McFalls appeared pro se 

in the instant matter. “[I]t is well-settled that a pro se litigant cannot recover 

attorney[] fees for the work expended in litigating his or her own case.” Kanofsky 

v. Tax Rev. Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2740 C.D. 2015, filed Jan. 5, 2017), slip op. at 9 

(citing Westmoreland Cnty. v. Allegheny Cnty., 723 A.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1999)). Additionally, as the trial court noted, the record of this matter 

contains no evidentiary basis to support McFalls’ demanded $8,000 in attorney fees. 

See Trial Court Opinion at 6 n.6. In fact, McFalls’ brief makes clear that the $8,000 

in attorney fees that she seeks relates not to expenditures in the instant RTKL matter, 

but instead to monies expended for her defense in her criminal case. See McFalls’ 

Br. at 9 (“[McFalls] incurred a total of $8,000 for attorney[] fees in relation to the 

[criminal] trial and pending appeal based on the absence of these crucial 

documents.”). Section 1304(a) of the RTKL does not authorize a requester to recoup 

attorney fees from a separate, independent matter. For these reasons, we find no 

error in the trial court’s determination that McFalls is not entitled to attorney fees or 

costs based on Section 1304(a) of the RTKL.

However, McFalls may be entitled to relief regarding her request to

impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 1305(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 1305(a),

16

which allows the imposition of a civil penalty where an agency denies access to 

public records in bad faith. The record in this matter illustrates that Norristown 

16 Section 1305(a) of the RTKL provides:

(a) Denial of access.--A court may impose a civil penalty of not 

more than $1,500 if an agency denied access to a public record in 

bad faith.

65 P.S. § 67.1305(a).
11

complied with the Final Determination’s directives to produce documents 

responsive to McFalls’ Request Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 on September 13, 2019. See

Petition Exhibit F. In denying McFalls’ claim, the trial court determined that 

McFalls failed to carry her burden to demonstrate bad faith, noting that

it appears Norristown has provided [McFalls] with 

documents in response to her request and the [Final 

Determination]. To the extent [McFalls] alleges 

Norristown acted in bad faith by producing redacted 

documents after it was too late for use in her criminal case, 

she has not demonstrated whether the records would have 

been admissible at her trial or their relevance to a defense 

against the charges.

Trial Court Opinion at 6. 

The trial court’s reasoning misses the mark. The trial court bases its 

determination of whether a penalty should be imposed based on McFalls’ motivation 

for making her RTKL request, giving weight to the fact that McFalls did not 

demonstrate that she was harmed. However, the appropriate inquiry in a 

determination of bad faith for the purposes of imposing a penalty under Section 

1305(a) of the RTKL is not on the motivation of the requester in requesting 

documents, but on the actions and behavior of the agency to which the request is 

made. To that end, while we acknowledge that the imposition of sanctions under 

Section 1305(a) of the RTKL requires evidence of bad faith and that the burden of 

proving an agency’s bad faith is on the requester, we observe that “[e]vidence of an 

agency’s failure to perform its mandatory duties[] may suffice.” Uniontown 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 1161, 1170-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2018), aff’d, 243 A.3d 19 (Pa. 2020). This Court has found that failure to disclose 

responsive documents within the time allotted by an OOR order requiring disclosure 
12

represents a violation of such order that evinces a lack of good faith. See id. at 1174. 

While Norristown ultimately complied with the Final Determination’s directives to 

produce documents responsive to McFalls’ Request Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10, the record 

illustrates that Norristown – in the absence of an appeal of the Final Determination 

– did not mail the documents until September 13, 2019, which was several days after 

the expiration of the 30 days the OOR allowed for such production. See Final 

Determination at 15; Norristown Br. at 6. Norristown provided no excuse for this 

delay. See Norristown Br. at 6. Whether the documents McFalls requested would 

have been admissible at her criminal trial or relevant to her defense against the 

charges is of no moment. Regardless of the reasons underlying McFalls’ request for 

the documents, Norristown’s unexcused failure to produce records until after the 

expiration of the Final Determination’s ordered 30 days for production of responsive 

documents represents a disregard for the OOR’s order that may constitute bad faith

worthy of sanction under Section 1305(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a). See

Uniontown Newspapers, 185 A.3d at 1174. Further, we observe that an in camera

review may be appropriate to determine whether Norristown’s redactions to the 

produced documents were unauthorized and in bad faith for the purpose of imposing 

a civil penalty pursuant to Section 1305(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a). 

Therefore, we vacate the Order to the extent it granted Norristown’s requested 

summary judgment regarding McFalls’ request to impose a civil penalty pursuant to 

Section 1305(a) of the RTKL and remand the matter for determination of whether 

such a penalty is warranted in consideration of Norristown’s conduct, as opposed to 

McFalls’ purported motivation in making the request.

17

17 We note that Section 1305(a) of the RTKL permits, but does not require, the imposition 

of a fine up to $1,500. See 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a). We express no opinion on the appropriate fine 

amount, if any, under these circumstances, and instead leave such a determination to the sound 

discretion of the trial court.
13

For these reasons, we affirm the Order in part, vacate the Order in part, 

and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Amy McFalls, :

 Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 737 C.D. 2021

Municipality of Norristown :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2022, the January 27, 2021 order

(Order) of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) is 

AFFIRMED to the extent that it denied further forwarding of records and denied 

Amy McFalls’ (McFalls) request for attorney fees pursuant to Section 1304 of the 

Right-to-Know Law (RTKL), 65 P.S. § 67.1304(a). The Order is VACATED to the 

extent that it denied McFalls’ request to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 

1305(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a). The matter is REMANDED to the trial 

court for the determination of a whether a civil penalty pursuant to Section 1305(a)

of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a), is warranted and the amount thereof, if 

appropriate.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge