*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT LEE

HUDSON III

(AC 39825)

Lavine, Prescott and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a plea of guilty, of the crimes of criminal possession

of a firearm and altering a firearm identification mark, the defendant

appealed to this court. The defendant had entered into a plea agreement

with the state pursuant to State v. Garvin (242 Conn. 296), under which

he would receive a certain sentence so long as he appeared before the

court for a scheduled sentencing hearing and was not arrested before

that time while out on bond, and would be subject to enhanced penalties

if he violated that agreement. The sentencing hearing had been continued

several times, and between the time the defendant entered into the

Garvin agreement and the sentencing hearing, he was arrested on new

criminal charges. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to continue the sentencing until the second case was resolved and sentenced

him to a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration instead of

the previously agreed six years of incarceration. Held that the defendant

could not prevail on his claim that the trial court deprived him of his

right to due process by finding that he violated the no new arrests

condition of the Garvin agreement and increasing his sentence without

first holding a hearing, in accordance with State v. Stevens (278 Conn.

1), to determine whether his arrest in the second case was supported

by probable cause; although the defendant did request the trial court

to postpone his sentencing in the present case until the ultimate question

of his guilt in the second case was decided, he failed to put the court

on notice that he was challenging the validity of the arrest in the second

case and, therefore, his claim was unpreserved, and even though the

record was adequate to review the claim pursuant to State v. Golding

(213 Conn. 233) and the claim implicated the defendant’s constitutional

right to due process, the defendant failed to demonstrate the existence

of a constitutional violation of his right to due process pursuant to the

third prong of the test set forth in Golding, as any evidence pertaining

to the defendant’s ultimate criminal liability with respect to the second

case was irrelevant to the trial court’s determination that he breached

the Garvin agreement, and there was nothing in the record to suggest

that the arrest in the second case lacked the requisite minimal indicium

of reliability necessary to be considered at sentencing given that a

judicial determination of probable cause was made within forty-eight

hours of the warrantless arrest and that the defendant had conceded,

at oral argument and in response to questions from this court, that he

was not challenging whether there was a legitimate basis for that arrest.

Argued February 5—officially released June 26, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of criminal possession of a firearm and altering the identification mark of a firearm, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of StamfordNorwalk, where the defendant was presented to the

court, Hon. Richard F. Comerford, Jr., judge trial referee, on a plea of guilty; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea, from which the defendant appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

W. Theodore Koch III, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr.,

state’s attorney, Paul Ferencek, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, and James Bernardi, former supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The defendant, Robert Lee Hudson

III, appeals following the judgment of conviction, challenging only the sentence imposed on him by the trial

court following his plea of guilty under the Alford1 doctrine to criminal possession of a firearm in violation of

General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-2172 and altering

the identification mark of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 29-36.3 The defendant’s

plea was entered subject to a Garvin agreement.4 The

sole issue on appeal is whether the court violated the

defendant’s right to due process when it found that

he had violated the Garvin agreement without first

conducting a hearing in accordance with State v. Stevens, 278 Conn. 1, 11–13, 895 A.2d 771 (2006), to determine whether probable cause existed to support the

defendant’s subsequent arrest, which was the basis of

the violation. We conclude that the defendant’s right

to due process was not infringed and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment of the court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. On September 9, 2013, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant for criminal

possession of a firearm in violation of § 53a-217, altering

the identification mark of a firearm in violation of § 29-

36, and having a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation

of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 29-38. The charges

stemmed from the defendant’s alleged involvement with

an attempted burglary in Stamford (Stamford arrest).

On September 4, 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty,

under the Alford doctrine, to criminal possession of a

firearm and altering the identification mark of a firearm.

The defendant subsequently entered into a Garvin

agreement whereby the court agreed to release the

defendant on bond while he awaited sentencing and to

impose the agreed upon sentence, which was six years

incarceration, followed by four years of special parole,

so long as he (1) appeared in court for sentencing on

December 5, 2014, and (2) was not arrested while out

on bond (no new arrests condition). The court advised

the defendant that, if he violated a condition of the

Garvin agreement, he was no longer entitled to the

agreed upon sentence and the court instead could sentence him up to the statutory maximum period of incarceration for the charges to which he pleaded guilty.

The court canvassed the defendant as follows:

‘‘Q. Now you’re out on bond on these files, sir. You

understand you have to be back here on December 5th.

Do you understand that, sir?

‘‘A. Yes, sir.

‘‘Q. If you don’t come back on that date, I will feel

free to sentence you to the maximum term for the

charges to which you’ve plead[ed] [guilty], which is ten

years to serve; two [years] mandatory minimum time.
Do you understand that, sir?

‘‘A. Yes, sir.

‘‘Q. In addition to that, you would be charged with

failure to appear in the first degree, which brings with

it an additional five years in the state’s prison system.

Do you understand that, sir?

‘‘A. Yes, sir.

‘‘Q. Secondarily, if you were to pick up any files

between now and the time you are sentenced, be they

serious motor vehicle offenses or criminal offenses, I

would feel free to sentence you to the maximum term,

which is ten years to serve. Do you understand that, sir?

‘‘A. Yes, sir.

‘‘Q. Do you agree to all of that, sir?

‘‘A. Yes, sir.’’5

On December 3, 2014, the sentencing hearing was

continued to January 20, 2015. On December 19, 2014,

the defendant was arrested in connection with a shooting in the Norwalk-Stamford area and charged with

attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a), reckless endangerment

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a63, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 53a-217c, unlawful discharge of a firearm in violation of General

Statutes § 53-203, altering the identification mark of a

firearm in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2014)

§ 29-36, and stealing a firearm in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-212 (Norwalk arrest).

On October 14, 2015, following numerous continuances, the court held a sentencing hearing on the

charges to which the defendant had pleaded guilty

under the Alford doctrine as a result of his Stamford

arrest. The court noted the Garvin agreement that the

defendant had entered into with respect to those

charges. The defendant’s attorney, Richard Meehan, Jr.,

then asked the court whether it would (1) consider

sentencing the defendant to the original agreed upon

disposition, which was six years to serve, followed by

four years of special parole, or (2) refrain from sentencing him until the Norwalk case was resolved because

he claimed that a third-party witness would exonerate

him of those charges.6

In response to Meehan’s request, the court stated

that ‘‘[w]hen the Garvin warnings are given—and the

Garvin warnings are not predicated upon guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt—the Garvin warnings are given

with the understanding that if [the defendant is]

involved in any kind of subsequent behavior that results

in a judge finding probable cause for his arrest, be it

a serious motor vehicle matter or a criminal matter,

then he has violated the Garvin warnings given by the
[c]ourt. That was the agreement he agreed to at the

time the Garvin warnings were given, not proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Despite the court’s explanation, the defendant failed

to argue that his Norwalk arrest was not supported by

probable cause or otherwise contest its validity. Nor did

the defendant explicitly request a hearing of any kind.

The court then heard from the state, which requested

that the court increase the defendant’s total sentence to

ten years of incarceration. The defendant subsequently

made a formal motion to continue the sentencing until

the Norwalk case was resolved. The court denied the

defendant’s motion for continuance and sentenced him

to two consecutive five year terms of incarceration for

criminal possession of a firearm in violation of § 53a217 and altering the identification mark of a firearm in

violation of § 29-36, for a total effective sentence of

ten years of incarceration, two years of which were a

mandatory minimum period of incarceration.

On November 21, 2016, the defendant filed the present appeal. On June 26, 2017, during the pendency of

this appeal, the Norwalk case was resolved when the

defendant pleaded guilty7 under the Alford doctrine to

criminal possession of a firearm in violation of § 53a217 and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation

of General Statutes § 29-35 (a).8

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

deprived him of his right to due process by finding that

he violated the no new arrests condition of the Garvin

agreement and increasing his sentence without first

holding a Stevens hearing to determine whether his

Norwalk arrest was supported by probable cause. We

disagree.

The state contends that this claim is not preserved.

The defendant, however, argues that his assertion that

he would be exonerated of the charges stemming from

his Norwalk arrest was enough to put the court on

notice that he was requesting a Stevens hearing. We

agree with the state that the claim the defendant

advances on appeal was not distinctly raised to the trial

court and is therefore unpreserved.

The defendant’s request that his sentencing in the

Stamford case be postponed until the ultimate question

of his guilt in the Norwalk case was decided is fundamentally different than a request for adjudication by

the court regarding the validity of his Norwalk arrest.

At no point during the defendant’s October 14, 2015

sentencing hearing did the defendant contest whether

his Norwalk arrest was supported by probable cause

or otherwise challenge the validity of the arrest, despite

the court’s statement that ‘‘the Garvin warnings are

not predicated upon guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—

the Garvin warnings are given with the understanding

that if [the defendant is] involved in any kind of subse-
quent behavior that results in a judge finding probable

cause for his arrest . . . then he has violated the Garvin warnings . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) We do not

mean to suggest that the defendant was required to use

the precise phrase, ‘‘I am requesting a Stevens hearing,’’

in order to preserve his claim. At the very least, however, he needed to put the court on notice that he was

challenging the validity of the arrest itself. Because he

failed to do so, we conclude that his claim is not preserved.

The defendant requests that, in the event we conclude

that his claim is not preserved, we review it pursuant

to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d

823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.

773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not

preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions

are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged

claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3)

the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if

subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in

original; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra,

239–40.

As a threshold matter, we note that the defendant’s

claim is reviewable under Golding because the record

is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional

magnitude. Specifically, the issue of whether the court

was required to hold a Stevens hearing before finding

that the defendant violated the no new arrests condition

of the Garvin agreement implicates his constitutional

right to due process. See State v. Stevens, supra, 278

Conn. 7 n.8, 11–13. The defendant cannot satisfy the

third prong of Golding, however, because no constitutional violation occurred in the present case.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles relevant

to the defendant’s claim. A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement. See State v. Brown, 145 Conn.

App. 174, 176 n.1, 75 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 310 Conn.

936, 79 A.3d 890 (2013). If a defendant enters into a

Garvin agreement and, thereafter, violates a condition

of that agreement, the court may decline to impose the

agreed upon sentence and instead increase the defendant’s sentence up to his or her maximum statutory

exposure. See State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 300–302,

314, 699 A.2d 921 (1997). Moreover, a no new arrests

condition may properly be imposed by the court pursuant to a Garvin agreement. See State v. Stevens, supra,

278 Conn. 8–9 (condition of Garvin agreement that

defendant not get arrested while awaiting sentencing

was valid).

In State v. Stevens, our Supreme Court determined
that, regarding a violation of a no new arrests condition

of a Garvin agreement, due process requires that the

defendant be given the opportunity to contest the validity of the arrest. Id., 12. If the defendant does contest

the validity of the arrest, the court must conduct an

inquiry regarding the defendant’s challenge.9

Id., 13. The

defendant in Stevens, however, did not dispute the facts

leading to the arrest or whether it was supported by

probable cause. Id., 12. Our Supreme Court concluded,

therefore, that ‘‘in the absence of a dispute as to the

validity of the arrest, giving effect to the breach of the no

[new] arrest condition does not violate due process.’’ Id.

The defendant argues that the court should have conducted a Stevens hearing before finding that he violated

the no new arrests condition of the Garvin agreement.

The defendant further appears to argue that the hearing

to which he was entitled would include, in addition to

any inquiry regarding whether his Norwalk arrest was

supported by probable cause, an opportunity to contest

his ultimate criminal liability. In Stevens, however, our

Supreme Court determined that due process did not

require the court to find that the defendant actually

committed the postplea offense that led to her arrest

before concluding that she violated the Garvin

agreement. See id., 12–13. Thus, even if the court did

conduct a Stevens hearing in the present case, any evidence relating to the defendant’s ultimate criminal liability would not have altered the court’s conclusion that

he violated the Garvin agreement.

Moreover, absent any indication that the defendant’s

Norwalk arrest was not valid, the court was free to

consider the arrest at sentencing without first holding

a Stevens hearing.10 ‘‘A sentencing judge has very broad

discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory

limits . . . . To arrive at a just sentence, a sentencing

judge may consider information that would be inadmissible for the purpose of determining guilt . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 126, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986). ‘‘The

trial court’s discretion, however, is not completely

unfettered. As a matter of due process, information may

be considered as a basis for a sentence only if it has

some minimal indicium of reliability.’’ Id., 127.

In the present case, there is nothing in the record to

suggest that the defendant’s Norwalk arrest lacked the

requisite minimal indicium of reliability necessary to

be considered at sentencing. Although the defendant

was arrested without a warrant, the court, Dennis, J.,

later determined, within the applicable forty-eight hour

period required by Practice Book § 37-12, that the arrest

was supported by probable cause. Moreover, at oral

argument and in response to questions from this court,

the defendant conceded that he was not challenging

whether there was a ‘‘legitimate basis’’ for the arrest—

in other words, he does not argue that the arrest lacked
probable cause.

Thus, because (1) any evidence pertaining to the

defendant’s ultimate criminal liability with respect to

the Norwalk arrest was irrelevant to the court’s determination that he breached the Garvin agreement, and (2)

there is nothing in the record to suggest that the arrest

lacked the requisite minimal indicium of reliability necessary to be considered at sentencing, we conclude that

the defendant’s right to due process was not violated.

See State v. Yates, 169 Conn. App. 383, 401–403, 150

A.3d 1154 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 920, 157 A.3d

85 (2017) (sentencing court properly considered defendant’s pending arrest warrants in deciding what sentence to impose in light of defendant’s failure to comply

with ‘‘no new arrests’’ condition of Garvin agreement

where, inter alia, defendant never challenged whether

arrest warrants were supported by probable cause

[internal quotation marks omitted]). The defendant’s

claim, therefore, fails under the third prong of Golding.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970); see also State v. Fairchild, 155 Conn. App. 196, 199 n.2, 108

A.3d 1162 (‘‘[a] criminal defendant who enters a guilty plea under the Alford

doctrine does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state has sufficient

evidence to convict’’), cert. denied, 316 Conn. 902, 111 A.3d 470 (2015).

2 Hereinafter, all references to § 53a-217 in this opinion are to the 2013

revision of the statute.

3 Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 29-36 in this

opinion are to the 2013 revision of the statute.

4 A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement. See State v. Garvin,

242 Conn. 296, 300–302, 699 A.2d 921 (1997). Typically, a defendant who

enters into a Garvin agreement agrees to a particular sentence of incarceration, but wishes to be at liberty pending sentencing. Thus, the court will

release the defendant on bond prior to sentencing and, in exchange, the

defendant agrees to abide by certain conditions. Oftentimes, those conditions include a requirement that the defendant appear at the sentencing

hearing and refrain from being arrested. If the defendant violates a condition

of the Garvin agreement, the court may impose a longer sentence than that

to which the defendant originally agreed. See id., 300–302, 309–14; see also

State v. Brown, 145 Conn. App. 174, 176 n.1, 75 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 310

Conn. 936, 79 A.3d 890 (2013).

5 We note that, at the time the defendant accepted the plea agreement,

the court did not explain to him in explicit terms that if he was subsequently

arrested, and that arrest was supported by probable cause, it would constitute a violation of the Garvin agreement. The defendant, however, does

not challenge on appeal whether the Garvin canvass itself was proper.

6 Specifically, Meehan stated to the court: ‘‘If Your Honor please, I discussed with [the defendant] the fact that the court intends to move forward

and sentence him in accordance with . . . Garvin, based upon the circumstances of the new arrest. He has asked me to make application to the court

as follows. Either, one, that the court consider sentencing him to the original

plea bargain here in the case, which was six years to serve, two of which

were to be mandatory, on the criminal possession of a firearm, followed

by four years of special parole. Or, [in the] alternative, to continue this case

until the resolution of the latest case, his Norwalk arrest, which forms the

basis for the Garvin claim.

‘‘It’s [the defendant’s] contention—and he’s indicated this to his prior

counsel, [Attorney John] Imhoff, and also to Attorney O’Reilly who’s now

been appointed—that there is a witness in that case, a codefendant who

has in fact given a statement that exonerates him. So, if in fact that’s true,

and if in fact he prevails before a jury on the new charge, it really would be

somewhat unfair for him, to sentence him under Garvin on the technicality

of the arrest. So he’s asked me to make that application to the court. If
Your Honor chooses not to impose the original plea bargain sentence that

had been discussed, then I would ask Your Honor to continue this matter

indefinitely until the resolution of the pending Norwalk case.’’

7 The fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to those charges does not

render this appeal moot. In Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286

Conn. 477, 486–88, 944 A.2d 340 (2008), our Supreme Court considered this

exact issue, namely, whether the fact that the petitioner pleaded guilty to

a charge stemming from a subsequent arrest rendered moot his claim that

the court should have allowed him to contest the validity of that arrest

before finding that he violated the Garvin agreement. In that case the

petitioner argued, and our Supreme Court agreed, that his claim on appeal

was not moot because the sentencing court had considered all of the charges

brought against him as a result of his subsequent arrest rather than the

single charge to which he ultimately pleaded guilty. Id., 488. The rest of the

charges were nolled by the state. Thus, our Supreme Court reasoned that

it was possible that, ‘‘if [the petitioner] were to prevail in this appeal, he

would not be precluded from attempting to establish on remand that there

was no basis for those charges. If the trial court were to agree . . . it might

impose a different sentence.’’ Id.

8 Although § 29-35 (a) was the subject of a technical amendment in 2016;

see Public Acts 2016, No. 16-193, § 9; that amendment has no bearing on

the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current

revision of the statute.

9 Although Stevens does not entirely delineate the scope of the requisite

inquiry, our reading of that case indicates that, typically, the issue would

be limited to whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant.

10 The defendant argues that a defendant must affirmatively waive his

right to a Stevens hearing, citing State v. Stevens, supra, 278 Conn. 11–13,

and State v. Yates, 169 Conn. App. 383, 388, 401–403, 150 A.3d 1154 (2016),

cert. denied, 324 Conn. 920, 157 A.3d 85 (2017). Our appellate courts, however, have never imposed such a rule, nor do we think it is appropriate to

require a court to canvass a defendant regarding his or her right to a Stevens

hearing in every case with an alleged Garvin violation. Presumably, a defendant is the person most likely in possession of any information undermining

the validity of the arrest that formed the basis of the Garvin violation and,

thus, would know whether a hearing might be appropriate.