Filed 3/18/22 P. v. Meza CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LUIS FRANCISCO MEZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

B312329

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. PA038036)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert Edward Myers for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. 

Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

_________________________________
2

Luis Francisco Meza appeals the denial of his motion to 

vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1473.7.

In 2001, appellant entered into a plea bargain in which he 

pleaded guilty to one count of second degree robbery. On 

February 4, 2021, appellant filed a motion to vacate his 

conviction pursuant to section 1473.7.2 The trial court denied the 

motion based on its own credibility and factual findings following 

its review of the court file and a hearing at which appellant 

testified and the court heard argument. Appellant contends that 

because he established by a preponderance of the evidence that 

he lacked a meaningful understanding of the adverse 

immigration consequences of his plea, the trial court erred in 

denying his section 1473.7 motion to vacate his conviction. We 

disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL3 BACKGROUND

On November 26, 2000, appellant and codefendant Donald 

Lee McClellan approached two boys (10 and 11 years old) riding

bicycles. McClellan pointed a knife at one of the boys and 

demanded both bicycles. As the victims fled on foot, appellant 

and McClellan picked up the bicycles and left. The next day, 

police learned that appellant had pawned one of the bicycles at a 

pawnshop. Police contacted appellant, who admitted taking and 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Appellant also sought relief under section 1016.5 but 

subsequently withdrew those grounds for the motion.

3 Appellant pleaded guilty before a preliminary hearing

was conducted. These facts are drawn from the probation report 

and the factual basis for the plea established in the plea 

proceedings.
3

pawning the bicycle. Thereafter, appellant turned himself in. 

The pawned bicycle was recovered undamaged, but the other bike 

was not recovered.

Appellant stated that he had given a ride to McClellan and 

they stopped at a liquor store. When appellant came out of the 

store, McClellan was talking to the two victims. McClellan told 

appellant to pick up one of the bicycles, and they put both bikes 

into appellant’s car. Appellant pawned one of the bicycles for 

$35, which he used to buy food. When the detective called him, 

he turned himself in. He told the detective he had purchased two 

new bicycles for the victims. But the detective told him it was too 

late, so he gave the new bicycles to his nephews.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT 

BACKGROUND

Appellant and his codefendant were each charged with two 

counts of second degree robbery in violation of section 211. In 

connection with both robbery counts, it was further alleged that 

McClellan personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a 

knife. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant was also charged with 

petty theft from a pawnbroker or secondhand handler, a 

misdemeanor, in violation of section 484.1, subdivision (a). The 

charges exposed appellant to a possible sentence of over six years 

in state prison.

On January 4, 2001, appellant accepted a plea bargain in 

which he pleaded guilty to one count of second degree robbery in 

exchange for a low term sentence of two years in state prison 

suspended, and formal probation for three years with a year in 

county jail. On February 15, 2001, appellant was sentenced 

pursuant to his plea bargain, and the remaining counts were 

dismissed.
4

The probation officer’s report filed February 15, 2001,

states that appellant was born in San Salvador, El Salvador, and 

came to the United States when he was four years old. He 

became a permanent resident alien of the United States along 

with his parents when he was eight years old. The report also 

states that appellant graduated from Manual Arts High School in 

Los Angeles in 1997. He then attended Bryman College in 

Reseda where he completed a nine-month course in medical 

assisting. As of February 2001, appellant had been married for 

three years, and had four children, three of whom were living 

(ages four, one and one-half, and eight months; his first child died 

a day after birth). He separated from his wife in November 2000 

and was living with his girlfriend and their three-month-old son 

for one month before his arrest. Appellant intended to return to 

his wife upon release.

During the plea proceedings on January 4, 2001, appellant 

was advised: “If you are not a citizen of the United States, then 

your plea in this case will result in your deportation, denial of 

naturalization, denial of reentry in this country.” Several times 

during the explanation of the conditions of the plea and 

appellant’s rights and waivers, appellant indicated he did not 

understand something. On each occasion, after consulting with 

his attorney and receiving a clarification from the district 

attorney, his attorney, or the court, appellant stated he 

understood. Finally, before joining in the waivers, concurring in 

the plea, and stipulating to the factual basis, defense counsel said 

to appellant, “You have asked a lot of questions during this plea. 

Are you comfortable and ready to go with the plea as it stands?” 

Appellant replied, “Yes, I am.” Counsel asked, “Any other 

questions you have with me?” Appellant answered, “No, I don’t.”
5

In November 2000, when he committed the robbery in this 

case, appellant was already on 36 months summary probation 

after having pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of misdemeanor 

forgery in violation of section 470. In that case, appellant had 

stolen a blank check from an elderly couple and cashed it for 

$800.

On October 18, 2003, while on probation in this case, 

appellant was charged with driving under the influence in 

violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a). He was 

convicted and sentenced to 36 months summary probation. 

Thereafter, in 2012, appellant was arrested and charged with 

possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Before he 

accepted a plea bargain on that charge, appellant was advised of 

the immigration consequences of the conviction.

After the 2012 plea, appellant was taken into immigration 

custody for 10 months. At that time he was ordered deported but 

was not removed. Appellant filed a written motion to vacate his 

plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel.4 The motion was 

denied on April 12, 2013.

DISCUSSION

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to 

Vacate Pursuant to Section 1473.7

Appellant contends the trial court erroneously denied his 

motion to vacate his conviction because he demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he lacked a meaningful 

understanding of the adverse immigration consequences of his 

plea. To the contrary, the record reveals the trial court properly 

evaluated and considered all the evidence and arguments, and 

4 This motion is not part of the record on appeal.
6

made reasonable and factually supported findings and credibility 

determinations based on the court file, plea proceedings, and 

appellant’s live testimony.

A. Relevant proceedings

Appellant testified at the hearing on the motion to vacate. 

When he committed the robbery in 2000, he was 22 years old and 

had been a permanent resident alien since he was eight years old. 

In 2001, when appellant was considering the People’s offer, his 

lawyer did not explain to him why it was better to accept a plea 

bargain rather than going to trial and only read aloud from some 

paperwork about the immigration consequences of a plea without 

explaining them to appellant. Although appellant told his lawyer 

he was a permanent resident, his wife was a legal resident, and 

he had four children who were U.S. citizens, counsel never 

explained how the plea would affect his residency status.

In 2012 appellant was in federal immigration custody for 

10 months after the “paraphernalia case.” It was then that he 

learned he was subject to deportation because of the robbery 

conviction. Thereafter, appellant has checked in with 

immigration officials from time to time, but he has never been 

removed from the country.

Appellant testified that he never would have pleaded guilty 

to the robbery in this case had he known that his plea would 

result in deportation or the loss of his permanent resident status. 

When he entered the plea, he did not understand he could lose 

his residency. He took the deal because of his family; he was not 

the one who actually committed the robbery, but he was scared

and wanted to “get out of jail as soon as possible” for his children. 

Appellant explained that he came to this country when he was 

four years old, and “[e]verything I have is here.”
7

On cross-examination, appellant admitted that as a 

juvenile he had a petition filed against him for burglary and he 

was on probation for a forgery conviction when he committed the 

robbery in this case. He did not recall being advised of any 

immigration consequences when he entered a plea in the forgery 

case.

Appellant asserted he had nothing to do with the robbery in 

this case until he came out of the store and his friend handed him 

the bike. He did not know that McClellan had threatened the 

boys with a knife and felt forced to take the bike, but did not 

know what was actually going on.

Appellant did not remember his lawyer discussing “all the 

various options” with respect to the plea, but only, “[E]ither you 

take this, or this is going to happen. But if you take this, . . . this 

will happen.” As a result of the plea deal appellant got probation 

and served 7 months and 20 days in county jail. While he was on 

probation, he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence; he 

did not recall being advised of any immigration consequences of 

his guilty plea at that time. Appellant did recall being advised of 

the immigration consequences of entering a plea to possession of 

drug paraphernalia in 2012. Appellant then admitted that in 

2001 his lawyer read something and “they mentioned something 

to [him]” about the immigration consequences, but he was not 

told he would be deported. However, later in cross-examination 

appellant reiterated that he had no recollection of being advised 

by the district attorney at any time during the 2001 proceedings 

that if he was not a citizen, his plea would result in his 

“ ‘deportation, denial of naturalization, denial of reentry into this 

country.’ ”
8

In 2016, appellant was arrested for using another person’s

identification and charged with multiple felony counts of identity 

theft. He entered a plea of no contest or guilty to four felonies 

and one misdemeanor and was placed on three years of 

probation.

Following argument, the trial court noted that appellant

recalled his attorney “reading paperwork that discussed 

immigration consequences in some manner.” Then, during the 

plea proceedings, he was clearly and unambiguously advised, “ ‘If 

you’re not a citizen of the United States, then your plea in this 

case will result in your deportation, denial of naturalization, or 

denial of reentry into this country.’ ” The court went on, “That is 

what he was told. And as the People noted, he was not shy about 

asking questions when he wished to ask a question. There was a 

lot of give and take, a lot of back and forth. He conferred with his 

lawyer, but he was clearly and unambiguously advised of the 

immigration consequences.”

The court observed that appellant admitted “he wanted to 

get out of custody as soon as possible, and he accepted the plea 

agreement which was probation” instead of a possible six years or 

more in prison. “So I think what the evidence shows is he was 

willing to take the risk, . . . rather than go to trial . . . [¶] I think 

he weighed all the risks, and knowing that he could be deported, 

he chose to get out sooner and run that risk rather than go to 

trial and get convicted.”

The court added that none of the objective, 

contemporaneous evidence presented corroborated appellant’s 

self-serving statements that he would not have entered the plea 

had he known he could be deported. Moreover, appellant had

“multiple crimes of moral turpitude. It does affect his credibility 
9

to this court. I also find that he has selective memory. He can 

remember things when he was eight years old, but on more 

relevant issues as it pertains to being advised of the immigration 

consequences, he simply cannot recall.”

The court expressed sympathy for appellant’s predicament, 

noting that he came to this country as a child and established his 

entire life here. “But sympathy aside, I need to follow the law, 

and under the law, the defense has not met their burden. So the 

motion to withdraw the plea pursuant to 1473.7 is denied.”

B. Applicable legal principles

Under section 1473.7, a person who is no longer in criminal 

custody may file a motion in the trial court to vacate a conviction 

or sentence where “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid 

due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to 

meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept 

the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a 

conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Our Supreme 

Court has explained that “[a] successful section 1473.7 motion 

requires a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of a

prejudicial error that affected the defendant’s ability to 

meaningfully understand the actual or potential immigration 

consequences of a plea. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (e)(1).)” (People v. 

Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 517 (Vivar).)

After its enactment in 2016, the Legislature amended 

section 1473.7 to clarify “that a finding based on prejudicial error 

may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” (Assem. Bill No. 2867 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) ch. 825, 

Legis. Counsel’s Dig.) “Thus, a person seeking relief pursuant to 

section 1473.7 need only demonstrate prejudice that he would not 

have entered the plea had he known about the immigration 
10

consequences.” (People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 

661 (Abdelsalam); People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 

1010–1011.)

According to our Supreme Court, “showing prejudicial error 

under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a 

reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected 

the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or 

potential immigration consequences. When courts assess 

whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they 

consider the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] Factors

particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties 

to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on 

avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea 

bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an 

immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible. (Vivar, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–530.)

In Vivar, the court endorsed independent review by an 

appellate court following a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

vacate under section 1473.7. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 524–527.) Under the independent standard of review, “ ‘an 

appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine 

whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 527, quoting

In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634.) But the court 

cautioned that independent review is not synonymous with de 

novo review, explaining that under independent review “[a]n 

appellate court may not simply second-guess factual findings that 

are based on the trial court’s own observations.” (Vivar, at 

p. 527.) Instead, in reviewing a trial court’s section 1473.7 ruling, 

the appellate court should “give particular deference to factual 

findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of 
11

witnesses,” but need not defer to the trial court’s findings that 

derive entirely from written declarations and other documents 

which lend themselves equally to interpretation by the appellate 

court and the trial court. (Vivar, at pp. 527–528 [“there is no 

reason to conclude the trial court has the same special purchase 

on the question at issue” when making its findings on 

documentary evidence; indeed, appellate and trial courts “ ‘are in 

the same position in interpreting written declarations’ ”].) 

“Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its 

independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice 

under section 1473.7.” (Vivar, at p. 528.)

C. Analysis

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

section 1473.7 motion despite appellant’s credible testimony that 

he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea 

and the contemporaneous evidence showing that he would have 

fought the case if he had understood those consequences. The 

record does not support appellant’s contention.

During his testimony, appellant acknowledged that, prior 

to his acceptance of the plea, his attorney read something to him 

about the immigration consequences of entering a plea. In 

addition, although he did not recall being specifically advised by 

the court or district attorney about any immigration 

consequences, he conceded that “they mentioned something to

[him]” about immigration. He insisted, however, that he was 

never told he would be deported.

Appellant was an active participant in the plea proceeding: 

When he did not understand something, he spoke up. He 

conferred frequently with his attorney, and after he received an 

explanation of a point he gave a clear indication that he 
12

understood. As the trial court noted, appellant was

unambiguously advised that his plea would result in deportation, 

but appellant expressed no confusion and gave no indication he 

did not understand. The transcript of the plea also shows that 

before joining in the waivers and concurring in the plea, 

appellant’s lawyer confirmed with appellant that he had no 

further questions. Finally, the court accepted appellant’s guilty 

plea and the waivers, finding they were “knowingly, intelligently, 

understandingly, expressly and explicitly made.”

The trial court could find no objective evidence on the 

record to corroborate appellant’s self-serving testimony. It also 

found appellant lacked credibility and seemed to have a selective 

memory for facts that suited him and little recollection of 

important information about the consequences of his plea. As 

Vivar instructs, these “factual determinations that are based on 

‘ “the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and 

observed” ’ are entitled to particular deference,” even if the 

reviewing court may reach a different conclusion based on its 

independent examination of the evidence. (Vivar, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 527.)

“A defendant seeking to set aside a plea must do more than 

simply claim he did not understand the immigration 

consequences of the plea. The claim must be corroborated by 

evidence beyond the defendant’s self-serving statements.” 

(Abdelsalam, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 664; Vivar, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 530 [“when a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea 

based on inadequate advisement of immigration consequences, 

we have long required the defendant corroborate such assertions 

with ‘ “objective evidence” ’ ”].) “It is up to the trial court to 

determine whether the defendant’s assertion is credible, and the 
13

court may reject an assertion that is not supported by an 

explanation or other corroborating circumstances.” (People v. 

Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 565.)

Here, unlike the defendant in Vivar, appellant did not 

present any objective evidence, such as defense counsel’s 

recollection or notes, or appellant’s own letters or documents 

showing some effort to avoid deportation at or around the time of 

the plea. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531.) Even 

appellant’s own testimony failed to convey that at the time of his 

plea, appellant “considered his immigration status ‘the most 

important part’ of his decision to plead.” (Id. at p. 530.) To the 

contrary, as the trial court found, appellant seemed to have

“weighed all the risks, and knowing that he could be deported,” 

he took his chances with a plea to get out of custody sooner rather 

than go to trial and still risk deportation. Indeed, “it was 

probably a very smart decision because here we are 20 years later 

and he still hasn’t been deported. So there’s some who would say 

his gamble paid off because two decades later, although he was 

convicted and the conviction stands, he has never been deported 

even to today’s date.”

Another important point of distinction between this case 

and Vivar is that in the latter case, the prosecution had offered a 

plea that would not have subjected Vivar to mandatory 

deportation, but because he was unaware of any immigration 

consequences, Vivar accepted the plea that resulted in mandatory 

deportation. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 517–519, 531.) By 

contrast, in this case there was no evidence to suggest the People 

would have offered and the court would have accepted a plea to 

an unidentified immigration-neutral offense or sentence.
14

In sum, appellant failed to carry his burden of establishing 

by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered a plea that 

was legally invalid due to prejudicial error. The trial court did 

not err in denying appellant’s motion to vacate his conviction 

under section 1473.7.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion under Penal Code section 

1473.7 is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.