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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL CHAIN 

OF COMMAND: AN EXAMINATION OF INFORMATION SHARING PRACTICES DURING A SPILL 

OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 12, 2010 

Serial No. 111–74 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

VACANCY

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

TOM GRAVES, Georgia 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

AL GREEN, Texas 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

TAMLA T. SCOTT, Director & Counsel 

NIKKI HADDER, Clerk 

MICHAEL RUSSELL, Senior Counsel 

KERRY KINIRONS, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Col. Michael D. Edmondson, Deputy Secretary, Superintendent of State Police, Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Frank V. Hibbard, Mayor, Clearwater, Florida: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

PANEL II 

Adm. Peter Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander, United States 

Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 35 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 38 

Ms. Juliette Kayyem, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 40 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 38 

PANEL III 

Mr. Ray Dempsey, Vice President of Strategy, BP America: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 61 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 63 

(1) 

THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL CHAIN 

OF COMMAND: AN EXAMINATION OF INFORMATION SHARING PRACTICES DURING A 

SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 

Monday, July 12, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

OVERSIGHT, 

New Orleans, LA. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in the Louisiana Supreme Court, 400 Royal Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, 

Hon. Christopher P. Carney [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Carney, Green, Jackson Lee, Richardson, Bilirakis, and Cao. 

Mr. CARNEY. The Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, 

and Oversight will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on ‘‘The 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Chain of Command: An Examination 

of Information Sharing Practices During A Spill of National Significance.’’ I would like to thank all of you for joining us today. 

We are here today to examine the command structure, including 

roles and responsibilities for the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We will examine whether the chain of command is 

being properly followed by the more than 38,000 personnel responding to the spill and ascertain how information flows from the 

Unified Area Command in New Orleans through the Incident Command Centers in Houma, Louisiana, Mobile, Alabama and St. Petersburg, Florida to State and local entities. 

The most recent Government estimate projects approximately 

60,000 to 100,000 barrels of oil are leaking from the damaged well 

each day. Based on estimates of the Flow Rate Technical Group, 

the spill has become the largest in U.S. waters, eclipsing the 1989 

Exxon Valdez several times over. 

Prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill, the largest release of oil 

from a platform accident was the Alpha Well 21 Platform A disaster in 1969, also known as the Santa Barbara oil spill which released about 100,000 barrels of oil. The Deepwater Horizon passed 

that mark in the first couple of days. 

Although there have been seven spills of National significance 

exercises, or SONS, the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon oil 

spill is so much greater spill that the preconceived command struc-
2 

ture may need to be revised. It is hard to believe that anyone could 

have imagined the devastation on the level that we are seeing 

today. 

Secretary Napolitano’s Spill of National Significance declaration 

triggered the incident command system set forth in the National 

response framework and dictated from that point forward a unified 

command structure established by the Federal Government would 

be in place to coordinate the response to the spill. There are more 

than a dozen Federal agencies involved in the Deepwater Horizon 

oil spill chain of command. Confusion surrounding the chain of 

command for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is exacerbated by the 

number of Government entities, including Federal, State, local, and 

Tribal that compromise the unified response. Moreover, the magnitude of the present spill has caused many of the Federal Government’s best-laid plans to become inoperable under the present circumstances. Past exercises yielded a blueprint for the Deepwater 

Horizon response. Unfortunately, the fact that the source has yet 

to be contained and oil is continuing to flow into the Gulf has prevented those in the chain of command from shifting solely to a 

clean-up operation and caused a much more complicated situation 

than had been previously imagined. 

Today, more than anything else, I want to hear how smoothly information is running up and down the chain of command. I would 

like to hear constructive ways that that information flow can improve. We need to know where the bottlenecks are so that they can 

be eliminated. I want to know if local and State entities are getting 

all the resources and the information they are requesting as well 

as the Federal Government and the decision-makers getting all the 

information they request. 

As much as I hope nothing like this ever happens again, none of 

us in this room are that naive. Sooner or later our country will face 

another environmental disaster. We would be remiss as a Nation 

if we did not thoroughly reflect on our response to this incident so 

that we could be better prepared for the next one. 

I would like to thank all the witnesses for their participation and 

I look forward to your testimony. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for an opening statement. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know on May 1, I, along with a couple of other Members 

of this subcommittee requested hearings to consider the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard’s informationsharing and dissemination efforts, Coast Guard staffing and resources, and the oil spill’s impact on the Gulf region. I am very 

pleased that the subcommittee—thank you, Mr. Chairman—is 

meeting to consider these issues today. 

It has been more than 80 days since this unprecedented disaster 

began, and unfortunately there is no end in sight. Oil has now 

reached the shores in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and 

in my home State of Florida, damaging the environment and wildlife and adversely impacting the fishing and tourism industries, the 

lifeblood of many Gulf cities and towns. 
3 

Like many Members of Congress, I am very concerned about the 

Unified Command’s efforts to share information with State, local, 

and private sector officials. I have heard from numerous constituents representing both the public and private sectors, who are experiencing difficulty in receiving vital information about the impact 

of the oil spill and recovery efforts. It is for this reason I am interested in learning from our Federal witnesses about how they provide information to their State, local, and private sector partners 

and also how they respond to the concerns of these partners. 

I hope that this hearing will serve to further inform BP and Federal responders of the needs and concerns of the residents of the 

Gulf region that have been so terribly impacted. I am also interested in hearing about BP and Federal efforts to rapidly deploy resources and consider new alternative technologies to combat this 

spill. We need to consider all available options, including offers of 

international assistance. The Unified Command must rapidly consider and respond to local requests for resource deployment. We 

cannot let bureaucracy get in the way of response efforts. 

It was reported last week in the Washington Post that BP has 

received approximately 120,000 proposals for technology that could 

address the spill. I am concerned about reports of delays in approving and deploying promising technology that could help stop the 

further spread of oil. How are the Government and BP processing 

these proposals to ensure that credible solutions are deployed in a 

timely manner? 

As we progress further into what NOAA has projected to be an 

active—extremely active, excuse me—Atlantic hurricane season, I 

would like to learn more about the potential impact of a hurricane 

on oil spill response and clean-up efforts, along with hurricane preparedness efforts. 

With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses here today. You 

all have a very important job ahead of you and the Members of this 

subcommittee stand ready to assist you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

We have unanimous consent that Representatives Jackson Lee 

and Richardson be able to sit and question the witnesses. 

Without objection, the gentlewoman from Texas, Congresswoman 

Sheila Jackson Lee, who chairs the committee’s Subcommittee on 

Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection; and the 

gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman Laura Richardson, 

who chairs the committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response are authorized to sit on the 

dais for the purpose of questioning the witnesses during the hearing today. 

Hearing no objection, it is so ordered. 

Today’s hearing will be divided into three panels. The first panel 

is comprised of State and local witnesses. The second panel will be 

comprised of Federal Government representatives and the third 

panel we will hear from will be from industry. I welcome each of 

the witnesses. 
4 

Our first witness is Colonel Michael D. Edmondson. Colonel 

Edmondson was appointed as the 25th superintendent of the Louisiana State Police in January 2008 by Governor Bobby Jindal, who 

of course is an alumni of this committee. He also serves as the Deputy Secretary of Public Safety Services and is responsible for an 

agency of more than 2,800 employees and a budget of nearly $0.5 

billion. In his role as Deputy Secretary, Colonel Edmondson oversees the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission, the Office of Management and Finance, the Office of Motor Vehicles, the Office of 

State Fire Marshal, the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office 

and the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Commission. 

Colonel Edmondson is a career State police officer, having joined 

the organization in 1981. He earned his bachelor’s of criminal justice in 1980 from Louisiana State University. He also attended 

graduate school there and is a graduate of the prestigious FBI National Academy in Quantico and the FBI National Executive Institute. 

Our second witness is the Honorable Frank V. Hibbard, Mayor 

of Clearwater, Florida. Mayor Hibbard was elected in March 2002. 

He is a graduate of Florida State University with bachelor of 

science degrees in business and economics as well as an MBA. 

He served as the volunteer executive to the United Way of 

Pinellas County and the Board of Corporate Partners at H. Lee 

Moffitt Cancer Center as well as a Board Member of the Jim 

Moran Institute for Entrepreneurial Study at Florida State College 

of Business. Mayor Hibbard is a graduate of the Class of 2000 

Leadership Pinellas and the Class of 2007 Leadership Florida. 

He currently serves as Vice Chairman of the Tampa Bay Area 

Regional Transportation Authority, or TBARTA, and on the Board 

of the Pinellas County Metropolitan Planning Organization, the 

Ruth Eckerd Hall, Salvation Army, and Clothes for Kids. Mayor 

Hibbard is a member of the Florida League of Mayors and the 

Mayors Council of Pinellas County. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes, beginning with Colonel Edmondson. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. EDMONDSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY, SUPERINTENDENT OF STATE POLICE, LOUISIANA 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS 

Col. EDMONDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

committee; thank you for inviting me to discuss the information 

sharing atmosphere that exists between the Command Group in 

the State of Louisiana during this oil spill of National significance. 

Although I am here to discuss issues related to the oil spill 

caused by the explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater 

Horizon, I would like to first take a moment to remember the 11 

individuals who lost their lives on the night of April 20, 2010. The 

loss of life is tragic and should remain at the heart of everything 

we do. I ask the committee to remember these individuals and 

their families in your thoughts and prayers. We do every day in 

Louisiana. 

The Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office (LOSCO) was moved 

to the Department of Public Safety in July 2009 by an act of the 
5 

Louisiana legislature. As you know and stated previously, located 

within the Public Safety Services is the Office of State Police, State 

Fire Marshal, Emergency Response, and Hazardous Materials. 

These offices contain specialized units such as crisis response and 

hazardous materials management that were thought by the legislature to be compatible with the core mission of LOSCO. From its inception in 1991 until July 2009, LOSCO was organizationally 

under the Office of the Governor. The move to place it under the 

umbrella of a large State agency provided a backbone of support 

and resources to assist LOSCO in carrying out its mission. The Department of Public Safety is able to provide administrative, technical, and logistical support to LOSCO at levels not seen previously. The original numbers were seven; with the advent of bringing them into the umbrella of State Police and Public Safety, they 

have the ability to have 50-plus individuals at their command 

when needed. 

In 1995, LOSCO and its partners in State government created a 

plan that describes how Louisiana agencies will respond during oil 

spills. Called the State Contingency Plan, this document helps clarify and streamline response procedures. LOSCO and its partners 

are continually working to further refine the State Contingency 

Plan. The results of this effort provide a more detailed chain of 

command for oil spill cleanups, including a description of each 

agency’s responsibilities in accordance with the Incident Command 

System. 

The State Contingency Plan is augmented by the Area Contingency Plan. There are three of those in Louisiana; one for each 

United States Coast Guard Marine Safety Office jurisdiction: MSO 

New Orleans, Morgan City, and Port Arthur. 

The plans describe response strategies for targeted areas, thereby providing an essential layer of preparation for oil spills. A committee guides each plan’s development and revisions. The committees are composed of representatives from industry, environmental 

groups, and planners from Federal, State, and local government. 

The committees meet regularly to update oil spill response plans, 

identify sensitive resources and develop site-specific response strategies. The meetings are co-chaired by LOSCO and the United 

States Coast Guard. 

Louisiana responds to any emergency through the Unified Command process. Through this process, Governor Bobby Jindal receives input from the involved State agencies and directs their responses. The Unified Command Group is established by statute 

and is defined as the strategic decision-making body for emergencies in this State with the Governor serving as the unified commander. The complex array of traditional and emerging threats 

and hazards demands the application of a unified and coordinated 

approach to emergency incident management not only during emergencies, but during day-to-day operation of State government. Governor Jindal established the UCG membership by Executive Order. 

It is composed of 16 members and I am a member of the Unified 

Command Group as well as the Oil Spill Coordinator. We have met 

every day and this being day 84 since the oil spill, we have met 

every day with the Governor to go over what is going on in the 

State of Louisiana. We have been flown to places around the State 
6 

that have been impacted by the oil spill. The current Executive Director of the Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office is with me today, Mr. 

Roland Guidry. He will be here for any questions you might have. 

He and his Deputy Director, Dr. Karolien Debussche, are here with 

me also and will communicate with me as they do on a daily basis 

as to the status of the response and issues that may be communicated to them through local, State, and our Federal partners. 

LOSCO staff prepares and disseminates reports to me and my command staff as to the status of the responses and the numbers and 

assignments of staff assigned to the Deepwater Horizon event responses. 

Unified Command Group meetings are held daily in response to 

this disaster. Also in Louisiana, our trustee meetings that are comprised of the Department of Environmental Quality, the Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife, and Fisheries, LOSCO, and 

Coastal Protection and Restoration, they meet every day as they 

look at the National disaster plan and damage assessment to the 

State of Louisiana. The Governor and cabinet members often 

present action items or requests for information to these representatives, who take such items back to the Incident Unified Command 

for review, response, and action. 

A Spill of National Significance was declared by the Secretary of 

the United States Department of Homeland Security on April 29. 

Governor Jindal then issued a State-wide declaration of emergency 

also on that same date. As the immediate emergency rescue missions ended, LOSCO engaged the Coast Guard and BP to begin 

normal oil spill response actions in accordance with the Federal Oil 

Pollution Act of 1990 and the Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention Act of 

1991. It is crucial to note that under the Federal law, that being 

OPA 90, BP, as the responsibility party, is legally responsible for 

response and removal activities. 

As the magnitude of the oil spill grew—and as you know, on Day 

1, there was a first report that came in there was no oil. Of course, 

there was maybe 1,000 barrels and then maybe 4,000 barrels, then 

maybe 9,000, 15,000 and then 19,000 and now anywhere from 30- 

to 60,000 barrels a day—it became apparent that more defensive 

measures to protect the coastline were necessary and that there 

was time to implement those measures as the oil approached from 

48 miles offshore. Local governments, concerned with the lack of 

protective measures in their parishes, developed more robust plans 

to counteract the approaching oil, but were frustrated with their inability to interact and participate in the response efforts. OPA 90 

imposes responsibility upon the responsible party to conduct response and removal activities with oversight from the United 

States Coast Guard for offshore spills. BP and the Coast Guard 

were rigidly, with little or no impact, executing an Area Contingency Plan and the State and local governments found it hard to 

influence those actions and to incorporate more recent analysis of 

what critical areas needed protection. Representatives from the 

State continued to engage the locals in preparing alternative response plans. These alternative response plans were then presented to BP/Coast Guard Incident Command, and vetted through 

the Planning and Operations subgroups. These plans were not 
7 

adopted in full, but served as a framework for use by the Unified 

Command in protecting the coast from impact. 

A State whose territory is impacted by an oil spill does not have 

the authority to direct response activities. This stands in marked 

contrast to the emergency response framework for non-oil spill 

emergencies and disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, ice 

storms, and earthquakes, where State and local officials have the 

authority and are expected to take direct actions to protect life and 

property. Under OPA 90, it is the responsible party—in this case, 

BP—that has the authority to conduct response and cleanup activities while the Federal Government maintains ultimate authority. 

As the event continued into the first weeks, the Coast Guard incorporated the local governments into the response efforts, both to 

take advantage of their in-depth knowledge of the local area, and 

to adopt the detailed local response plans into the overall response 

effort. 

LOSCO representatives have maintained their interaction with 

local officials since the early days of this event. A designated State 

On-Scene Coordinator has been present in the Houma command 

center since its inception. Representatives of State agencies have 

been integrated into various levels of the Federal response to include the Houma Incident Command Post and the Unified Area 

Command which was in Robert, Louisiana and is now located here 

in New Orleans. Additionally, State employees have worked tirelessly with local officials to better coordinate resource requests and 

serve as an ombudsman for local government. Additionally, LOSCO 

engaged a full-time representative to enhance coordination with the 

parishes. 

The United States Coast Guard has stationed a liaison officer at 

the State Emergency Operations Center. The Army Corps of Engineers, United States Department of Interior, NOAA, and the Department of Interior and others have been actively engaged in the 

response to protect Louisiana’s coastline. 

In conclusion, at this time, over 1,100 State personnel, including 

our National Guard, are involved in the response, both in the field 

and the Houma Command Center. The oil is the enemy and our response will remain firm and lines of communication will remain 

open. 

As of today, we need more skimmers to remove oil from the 

water, more boom to protect our shores, improved surveillance of 

oil so it can be removed from the water before it destroys more of 

our interior wetland. Most importantly, we need the Federal Government to pay attention to strategies for combatting this oil spill 

from those of us on the front line and to take action on them with 

the urgency this fight demands. If the Federal Government agrees 

this is a war, we need to see that they are in it to win it, as our 

Governor stated. He further states that our prayers continue to be 

with those on the coast and every Louisianan who is impacted by 

this spill. We are constantly amazed by the perseverance of our 

people in responding to this disaster. They are on the front lines 

every day turning fishing boats into defense ships, dragging boom 

to the oil to stop the oil and always coming up with more ideas to 

protect our land and waters. 
8 

It is the same spirit of perseverance that strengthened us 

through hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustaf, and Ike. This same perseverance leaves no doubt in our mind that we will win this war 

against the oil spill and come back better than ever before. 

To the people of coastal Louisiana, we will stand with you and 

work along side you until every drop of oil is off our coast and out 

of our waters and all of our fisheries, our industry are 100 percent 

restored. 

I stand available for any questions at the conclusion. Thank you 

very much. 

[The statement of Colonel Edmondson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. EDMONSON

JULY 12, 2010 

Good morning. I am Colonel Mike Edmonson, deputy secretary of the Louisiana 

Department of Public Safety, Public Safety Services. Although I am here to discuss 

issues related to the oil spill caused by the explosion and subsequent sinking of the 

Deepwater Horizon, I would like us to first take a moment to remember the 11 individuals who lost their lives on the night of April 20, 2010. The loss of life is tragic. 

I ask the committee to remember these individuals and their families in your 

thoughts and prayers. 

Chairman Thompson and Members of this committee: Thank you for inviting me 

to discuss the information-sharing atmosphere that exists between the Command 

Group and the State of Louisiana during this Spill of National Significance. 

The Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office (LOSCO) was moved to the Department of Public Safety in July of 2009 by an act of the Louisiana legislature. Also 

located within the Public Safety Services are the Office of State Police and the State 

Fire Marshal. These offices contain specialized units such as Crisis Response and 

Hazardous Materials Management that were thought by the legislature to be compatible with the core mission of LOSCO. From its inception in 1991 until July 2009, 

LOSCO was organizationally under the Office of the Governor. The move to place 

it under the umbrella of a large State-wide agency provided a backbone of support 

and resources to assist LOSCO in carrying out its mission. The Department of Public Safety is able to provide administrative, technical, and logistical support to 

LOSCO at levels not seen previously. 

In 1995, LOSCO and its partners in State government created a plan that describes how Louisiana agencies will respond during oil spills. Called the State Contingency Plan, this document helps clarify and streamline response procedures. 

LOSCO and its partners are continually working to further refine the State Contingency Plan. The results of this effort will provide a more detailed chain of command 

for oil spill cleanups, including a description of each agency’s responsibilities in accordance with the Incident Command System. The State Contingency Plan is augmented by the Area Contingency Plan (ACP). 

There are three ACP’s in Louisiana’s coastal zone, one for each of the United 

States Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Office (MSO) jurisdictions. 

• MSO New Orleans ACP 

• MSO Morgan City ACP 

• MSO Port Arthur ACP 

The plans describe response strategies for targeted areas, thereby providing an essential layer of preparation for oil spills. A committee guides each plan’s development and revisions. The committees are composed of representatives from industry, 

environmental groups, and planners from Federal, State, and local government. The 

committees meet regularly to update oil spill response plans, identify sensitive resources, and develop site-specific response strategies. The meetings are co-chaired 

by LOSCO and the USCG. 

Louisiana responds to any emergency through the Unified Command process. 

Through this process, Governor Bobby Jindal receives input from the involved State 

agencies and directs their responses. The Unified Command Group (UCG) is established by statute and is defined as the strategic decision making body for emergencies in the State with the Governor serving as the unified commander. The complex array of traditional and emerging threats and hazards demands the application 

of a unified and coordinated approach to emergency incident management not only 

during emergencies but during day-to-day operations of State government. Governor 
9 

Jindal established the UCG membership by an Executive Order. The UCG is composed of sixteen members. I am a member of the UCG as well as the Oil Spill Coordinator. The current Executive Director of the Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office is Mr. 

Roland Guidry. He and his Deputy Director, Dr. Karolien Debusschere, are here 

with me today and communicate with me daily as to status of the response and 

issues that may be communicated to them through local, State, and Federal partners. LOSCO staff prepares and disseminates reports to me, and my command staff, 

as to the status of the response, and the numbers and assignments of staff assigned 

to the Deepwater Horizon event response. 

UCG meetings are held daily in response to this disaster. Present at these daily 

meetings are representatives from BP and the Coast Guard who brief the Group 

with what they represent to be the most up to date data available from the Command Groups in Houma and New Orleans. The Governor and cabinet members 

often present action items or requests for information to these representatives, who 

take such items back to the Incident Unified Command for review, response, and 

action. 

A Spill of National Significance was declared by Secretary of U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security on April 29, 2010. Governor Jindal issued a State-wide declaration of emergency also on that same date. As the immediate emergency rescue missions ended, LOSCO engaged the U.S. Coast Guard and BP to begin normal oil spill 

response actions in accordance with the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (‘‘OPA 

90’’) and the Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention Act of 1991. It is crucial to note that, 

under the Federal law—OPA 90—BP, as the responsible party, is legally responsible 

for response and removal activities. 

As the magnitude of the spill grew over the first several days, it became apparent 

that more defensive measures to protect the coastline were necessary and that there 

was time to implement those measures as the oil approached from 48 miles offshore. 

Local governments, concerned with the lack of protective measures in their parishes, 

developed more robust plans to counteract the approaching oil but were frustrated 

with their inability to interact and participate in the response efforts. OPA 90 imposes responsibility upon the ‘‘responsible party’’ to conduct response and removal 

activities, with oversight from the U.S. Coast Guard for offshore spills. BP and the 

Coast Guard were rigidly executing the Area Contingency Plan and the State and 

local governments found it hard to influence those actions and to incorporate more 

recent analysis of what critical areas needed protection. Representatives from the 

State continue to engage the locals in preparing alternative response plans. These 

alternative response plans were then presented to the BP/Coast Guard Incident 

Command, and vetted through the Planning and Operations subgroups. These plans 

were not adopted in full, but served as a framework for use by the Unified Command in protecting the coast from impact. 

A State, whose territory is impacted by an oil spill, does not have the authority 

to direct response activities. This stands in marked contrast to the emergency response framework for non-oil spill emergencies and disasters (such as hurricanes, 

tornadoes, ice storms, and earthquakes) where State and local officials have the authority, and are expected, to take direct actions to protect life and property. Under 

OPA 90, it is the responsible party—in this case, BP—that has the authority to conduct response and clean-up activities while the Federal Government maintains ultimate authority. As the event continued into the first weeks, the Coast Guard incorporated the local governments into the response efforts both to take advantage of 

their in-depth knowledge of the local area, and to adopt the detailed local response 

plans into the overall response effort. 

LOSCO representatives have maintained their interaction with local officials since 

the early days of this event. A designated State On-Scene Coordinator (SOSC) has 

been present in the Houma command center since its inception. Representatives of 

State agencies have been integrated into various levels of the Federal response to 

include the Houma-Incident Command Post and Unified Area Command which was 

in Robert, LA, and is now located in New Orleans. Additionally State employees 

have worked tirelessly with local officials to better coordinate resource requests and 

serve as an ombudsman for local government. Additionally, LOSCO engaged a fulltime representative to enhance coordination with the parishes. 

The United States Coast Guard has stationed a liaison officer at the State Emergency Operations Center. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, United 

States Department of the Interior, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of the Interior, and others have been actively engaged in the response to protect Louisiana’s coastline. 

In conclusion, at this time, over thousand State personnel are involved in the response; both in the field, and in the Houma Command Center. The oil is the enemy 

and our response will remain firm and lines of communication open. 
10 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Colonel. 

We will hear from Mayor Hibbard. But Mayor Hibbard, please, 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK V. HIBBARD, MAYOR, CLEARWATER, 

FLORIDA 

Mr. HIBBARD. Thank you. I am very familiar with time limits; 

thank you, Mr. Chair, committee. I am glad to have the opportunity to talk to you and give you a local government’s perspective. 

I would like to talk about communication between the Federal, 

State, county, and local governments along with some of the effects 

from an economic standpoint that this spill is having in our area. 

I understand that we are functioning under unified command 

and have gone through all the required NIMS training. At the 

same time, there has been a disconnect between the data that we 

are getting at the local level. It is incumbent upon county emergency managers to be at the top of the heap as far as local response. Initially the conference calls that those emergency managers were having on a daily basis with BP, the Federal Government, and State DEP, we were not privy to those. So a lot of that 

data is not filtering down to the local cities that are dealing with 

this on a daily basis and trying to prepare and understand the resources. 

I did have the opportunity to visit New Orleans just a couple of 

weeks ago and go out to the marshlands right here in Louisiana 

and see the response and see the fact that you have limited resources. We want to make certain that those resources are going 

where they are most needed. We do not want to steal those away 

from the areas that are currently being affected. 

That being said, we also want to know that when the time 

comes, we will have resources should oil start to threaten our 

shores. That is one of the great challenges for us. 

I would also say that many of the conference calls which I have 

sat in on personally are very good from a technical standpoint, to 

keep someone like myself or our emergency managers up on the 

latest events. But as all of you know, all of the issues that we face 

have many facets, they are very complicated. 

I would request that somehow, we get somebody who specializes 

in public relations that can synthesize a lot of that data down so 

that we can convey it to our citizens and our businesses. One of the 

greatest challenges we have right now is educating people on what 

truly is going on, what they can expect, what form the oil may 

manifest itself on my beaches. We are also a victim of geography 

and the very poor geography that most Americans understand. 

They do not understand what a large State Florida is and the fact 

that there may be oil in Pensacola but we are 8 hours away and 

have not yet been affected directly by the oil. But certainly have 

been affected by the stigma that it brings. That is most affecting 

us right now with our European tourists that are normally coming 

from Germany and Great Britain. Those people are guaranteed 

that they will have a positive experience by their tour operators. 

If they do not, they are refunded their money. Now our hotels are 

giving money-back guarantees that there will not be oil on our 
11 

beaches and if there are, that the customers will not have to pay 

for that. But the airlines are not giving the same type of treatment. 

Therefore, none of the tour agencies in Europe—they have taken 

Florida basically off the map. 

We continue to try to communicate where the oil is and where 

it is not. A perfect example of poor communication was Visit Florida using a NOAA map and talking about how tourists should deal 

with oil should it be on the beach, for the entire State of Florida. 

That was disseminated to Europe, it was devastating. That is the 

bad type of information that we are seeing out there and I think 

that is something that certainly needs to be worked on. 

Our area is just coming off of obviously the recession, we were 

just starting to turn the corner, a very difficult cold spring and also 

the demonization of business travel. We have lost tremendous 

numbers of conventioners and we were just coming off that and 

now we are dealing with it again. We do not have the benefit of 

all the workers that Louisiana has. Our hotels just simply are losing business because people do not know that oil will not be there 

in a month or 2, even though we know that the loop current probably will keep it away from us. 

Let me give you just a couple of anecdotal stories. Our fishing 

fleets are backing off, they are not getting tours any more, they are 

concerned that some of our waters will be reduced. Our hotels, and 

the hotels have a tremendous multiplier effect. There are people in 

advertising, marketing, logistics that work with them and when 

they lose business, that trickle down effect is affecting all of these 

folks. We are even having real estate deals that folks are backing 

away from. That means we do not have documentary stamps, that 

means we do not have other transactions and that money is then 

not in our economy. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I will end there. If there are any questions 

I might answer, you also have my written statement, which is far 

more detailed. 

[The statement of Mr. Hibbard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK V. HIBBARD

JULY 12, 2010 

I would like to thank the Committee on Homeland Security for the opportunity 

to address the tragic events in the Gulf that we have been dealing with since April. 

I will be focusing my comments on communication between different levels of government, BP, and the public. I would also like to provide anecdotal examples of how 

this catastrophe is affecting our local and State economy. 

I did have the opportunity to travel to New Orleans in June with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and tour some of the Louisiana coast line. I have seen the resources being utilized and the devastation to the environment and economy. I am 

sensitive to efficient use of resources and making sure that resources are available 

to those most in need. I do know that the issues in Louisiana are different from 

those in Florida and believe the Federal Government has a responsibility along with 

BP in recognizing this as a factor in allocation of resources. 

It is understood that we are functioning under unified command throughout this 

event but at times it is unclear whether BP or the Coast Guard has ultimate authority. The difficulty for local government is that we are in daily contact with our 

citizens and businesses and they look to us to be a filter and advocate for them. 

Currently the Coast Guard and White House have daily conference calls, originally 

local governments were not privy to these calls, that has since changed. 

We look to our County emergency managers on a local basis for mitigation strategies and to determine whether we have all the resources to combat oil should it arrive on our beaches and estuaries, and the different forms it may manifest itself. 
12 

We are concerned about usurping the resources that are currently needed elsewhere 

but also want to insure that we are prepared and will have access to the resources 

should they become necessary. The time frames in which we would be notified by 

Coast Guard have been a moving target between 4 and 6 days. As a Mayor I have 

to be able to assure our coastal residents and businesses that we will be prepared 

to minimize damage and coordinate a rapid clean-up! 

I have personally listened to several of the conference calls and they are helpful 

in staying abreast of recent developments especially on a technical side. I would 

hope that an additional format can be developed that is more appropriate for a layman. We need information that is technically accurate but can be used to educate 

the media, citizens, and the tourist industry. Our greatest challenge in Clearwater 

and along the entire Florida coast is getting accurate information about where oil 

is and areas that most probably will not be directly affected. 

While there has been a shift of economic activity in Louisiana from fishing to oil 

clean-up, Florida is not reaping an offset of activity we are simply seeing a decline 

in tourism activity. While those in Louisiana fight a legitimate physical battle with 

oil we are in a fight with perception and the stigma of potential oil. We do not have 

a flood of workers staying in our hotels on the contrary we are losing reservations 

on a daily basis. 

Currently we are in our high season for tourists from Great Britain and Germany 

this is very challenging because these countries require tour operators to guarantee 

the quality of their customer’s experience. This guarantee has resulted in many tour 

operators taking Florida off their menu of destinations. They have done this because 

even with the knowledge that oil is not on Clearwater’s beach today there is no assurance that in a month when their client arrives that we will still be unaffected. 

Many of our larger hotels have introduced programs that offer a money-back guarantee should oil be on our beaches, this is beneficial but does not eliminate the second issue which is airlines. The second roadblock is that airlines are not allowing 

people to get out of their reservations and so they are choosing other destinations. 

What has all this done to our economy? It has hampered what was starting to 

be a slow recovery from the recession and a very cold spring. The multiplier effect 

of this is tremendous impacting; restaurants, fishing charters, logistical companies, 

retail, marketing firms, advertising, real estate, sales tax, car rentals, etc. We recently had a group meeting from the Labor Department that canceled because of 

the threat of oil and is now going to Boulder. 

A few examples of the multiplier effect; we recently had a convention coming that 

had contracted with a limousine and bus company for all transportation it was a 

contract worth $35,000 and with the conference moving to outside Florida that operator has lost that revenue which creates jobs for drivers and a means to cash flow 

vehicles. A prominent realtor I spoke with recently lost two beach front condo closings due to the threat of oil on our sugar white sand beaches. This resulted in a 

loss of commission that the realtor will not be spending locally. The State has lost 

documentary stamp revenue. There is no need for movers or the buying of appliances or any of the other activities associated with a real estate transaction. Eventually those units will sell but possibly at a lower price which then diminishes property tax revenues that leads to fewer dollars for Police, Fire, and Libraries. These 

are claims that are virtually impossible to quantify and will most likely never find 

their way to BP. 

We in Florida also face the challenge of geography, Clearwater is over 8 hours 

from Pensacola but the media reports that oil is on Florida’s beaches without distinguishing that the majority of the State is completely unaffected. I am not hopeful 

at getting our Nation to become better at geography nor those from other countries, 

that is why the quality of the information and the format in which it is presented 

is so crucial. This falls to BP and the Coast Guard as the originator of data. I would 

appreciate BP spending more money on public relations for the areas that have been 

affected tangibly and simply through perception. 

I hope that this synopsis is helpful and I look forward to answering questions not 

addressed as we work together to repair this devastating tragedy. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Hibbard. I want to thank both of 

you for your testimony. 

I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes 

to question the panel and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. If 

need be, we will go to a couple rounds of questions. 

This is for both of you. Have you ever received conflicting information from the Federal Government and/or BP? 
13 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think you can go back to Day 1. I think as 

part of our Hazardous Material Hotline Louisiana, the first calls 

made into that line by BP was the fact that there was an explosion 

on that oil rig, but there was no oil at that time leaking, there was 

no impact to the State of Louisiana. That continued for several 

days when they really did not know how much was coming out of 

it. It could be as little as 1,000 barrels and it could be as much as 

an unlimited amount. That changed every single day. 

I think what was most disturbing for a member of the Governor’s 

cabinet is the fact that getting resources into the State of Louisiana, we needed more boom, we needed more skimmers. You 

know, you go back to Katrina, I was here during Katrina, I saw 

the lives of families, I saw the looks on faces and the response 

somewhat from the Federal Government—and this is just honest— 

was maybe it is just not that bad. It is just not that bad, this is 

New Orleans, there is a little water down there, they are used to 

it, they are below sea level anyway. Well, maybe this incident in 

the Gulf, maybe it is just not that bad, is what they are saying. 

With that much oil even from Day 1 escaping from that line and 

the ability of how close it was to Louisiana of coming here. Keep 

in mind, it still has not stopped. I mean we are cleaning it up. It 

is easier to clean off the beach but it still has an impact. Getting 

inside those marshes, remember, that is what protects the city of 

New Orleans and cities along interstate 10 as storms come into the 

State of Louisiana. When that oil gets into the marsh, it just simply dies. 

Mr. CARNEY. Colonel, was the fact that the first couple of days 

or 2 or 3 days, that they said there is no or little oil coming up 

as a result of the explosion, that delayed, in your mind, the response from the Federal Government and State governments in 

terms of getting skimmers and boom in place and that sort of 

thing? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think it certainly did and I think when you 

look at BP, did they have plans in place. Most definitely they had 

plans in place. Were they plans that looked at significance occurrence, was it worst-case scenarios? Because this was a worst-case 

scenario in the beginning. It just did not seem like they were prepared at that point to actually fight that. To think that, again, 

maybe it is just not going to be that bad and we will be able to 

clear this up, because most oil spills in a regulated area, it is usually by space and even by time and this was one in the middle of 

the ocean and 5,000 feet. Certainly when plumes of oil come up, 

they do not go straight up, they move within the water. That is 

what we saw within Louisiana and then every day, depending on 

the weather, depending on the wind, it just kept coming right back 

into it. 

The other thing with NOAA, they rely on mechanisms within 

models to be able to look at where the possibility of the oil might 

go but if it is not a live eye looking at it that day because of weather or something like that, they really can only guesstimate based 

on models out of another State, to see what is happening in the 

Gulf of Mexico. So I think that was some of the earlier unknowns 

and inability. Keep in mind, you are dealing with the State of Louisiana, a very diverse group of individuals that are going to go out 
14 

there and do the best they can to protect their areas and they 

started doing that from Day 1. 

Mr. CARNEY. Are the lines of authority clear? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think they are in some parts. I think you 

have to go to—you can certainly do whatever you want, but it is 

that reimbursement. The ability of whether you do those things 

even though you are trying to fight the oil doing those things, there 

may not be a reimbursement in that portion of it from either the 

Federal Government or from the Oil Spill Act or whatever form or 

mechanism or funding that is available to get those in. 

Mr. CARNEY. I certainly hope that is not the initial decision point 

before somebody acts. 

Col. EDMONDSON. We certainly hope that also. 

Mr. CARNEY. I am sorry—Mayor. 

Mr. HIBBARD. I would say there were several things. I think the 

lines are becoming clearer, fortunately. 

One of the things that has vacillated is how the oil would manifest itself on our beaches. Would it be pure oil, would it be sheen, 

would it be tar balls. We were told that Pensacola would not get 

what I would call pure oil, that it would come in the form of tar 

balls. That obviously has not been the case. That is something that 

has been on-going. 

We have been told anywhere—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Excuse me. Who told you this? Was it—— 

Mr. HIBBARD. We had information from the Coast Guard. 

Mr. CARNEY. From the Coast Guard. 

Mr. HIBBARD. Yes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Is the Coast Guard your primary source of 

information? 

Mr. HIBBARD. It is one of our primaries, having Air Station 

Clearwater, who did the most Katrina sorties, they are one of our 

primaries. Also St. Petersburg has been one of the incident command points. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. 

Mr. HIBBARD. So they have been a point of contact. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. 

Mr. HIBBARD. The other issue has been how much notice we 

would get. Obviously we are dealing with weather, so that is variable. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. 

Mr. HIBBARD. But it has gone between 3 and 6 days that we 

would have a firm number, that if they thought it was coming to 

our beaches in the central west coast. At first, we were told 6 days, 

it has gone as low as 3 and now the party line is 4 days. The question is: Do we have the resources to deal with it? We have gone 

to each of our fire departments to find boom rather than going to 

the Coast Guard or BP. 

Also the success of boom. I guess you have all taken the tour 

today. Certainly when I was here a couple of weeks ago, you could 

see that the boom is a very imperfect defense against the oil. We 

too have estuaries very similar to the marshes. 

Then just the effects of a hurricane. What kind of wild card is 

a hurricane, and I do not think that anyone knows that. But getting a similar answer from different agencies is difficult. 
15 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. My time is up. Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mayor, are you hearing from constituents that the claims process 

currently established by BP is sufficient? Are you worried that 

claims that are difficult to quantify, such as the impact on the real 

estate market or tax revenue will not ultimately be paid by BP, 

and what input has BP solicited from your office to ensure that 

they have complete information on the impact of this spill on the 

Clearwater economy as they work to resolve the claim issues? 

Mr. HIBBARD. Well, I would credit Mr. Dempsey, who you are 

going to hear from shortly, to having very open lines of communication. He has done an excellent job. 

We recently had a claims office open in the city of Clearwater, 

which is a good and bad thing. Once people hear that you have a 

claims office, they assume again that you have oil on your beach 

rather than you are just being impacted by the threat. 

I think the information on how people will go through the claims 

process still needs work. That is one of the things that I continue 

to hope to work on. Most of the people should be putting their 

claims in on-line initially and then if they are having difficulties 

with that, then they can go to an actual field office to talk to them. 

I think the second part of your question, Congressman, is what 

I am most concerned about and that is quantifying the effect of this 

spill and the stigma attached to it. When you start getting further 

and further from the source of revenue, I think that is very difficult. I do not know that we will be able to quantify lost sales of 

real estate and what that means to our tax base and how that affects police and fire and libraries which we pay for through those 

tax revenues. All of the other multipliers within that. I think the 

further you get from the source, if you are not a fishing charter 

boat, if you are not a hotelier that has not had a canceled reservation, how can you quantify the business that simply is not even 

making inquiries in coming to your area? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. As in many Gulf cities, the tourism 

industry in Clearwater has suffered greatly from the cancellation 

of events as a result of this spill. You mentioned in your testimony 

a group from the Department of Labor canceling their meetings 

and relocating them to Boulder, Colorado because of the threat of 

the oil. This seems to illustrate the point that the Government is 

not doing a sufficient job internally to share information, let alone 

spread the message that the oil has only reached certain parts of 

Florida. What efforts would you like to see taken in terms of public 

relations and media messaging to alter the current perception that 

oil has reached all of Florida? You mentioned Europe and other 

parts of the country as well. 

Mr. HIBBARD. BP has given money to the State of Florida. A portion of that recently did come down to our Tourist Development 

Council within our county, which was our initial request to the 

Governor, because we believe that we understand our market and 

the markets that we serve better than Visit Florida does. We have 

been trying to get the information out. 

I think it is very difficult to get that information. The media has 

not been as helpful as we would like in reporting on the stories of 

where oil is versus where it is not. 
16 

My other concern I think is that we need to have another form 

of information that is less technical, that is accurate. Accuracy is 

critical but the information that we get from the Coast Guard and 

FDEP is not the kind of information that we can pass on to tour 

operators and hotels and our citizens. So there needs to be a more 

user-friendly medium. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Question for the entire panel and my last question, Mr. Chairman. 

What impact has the oil spill had on your hurricane preparedness efforts? Maybe Colonel, you could start on that. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Of course, we started some time ago with our 

hurricane preparedness. One of the main things we needed from 

BP, which took awhile to get from them was exactly their evacuation plan. That is going to be important to us as we look at removing those people that are closest to the coastline of Louisiana. So 

we need a plan from BP of actually how they are going to remove 

those people from the oil rigs, from the working ships in that area, 

to move them into Louisiana so we can get them out of harm’s way. 

What is critical to Louisiana is the H-hour and that is the hour 

when tropical force winds reach the coast of Louisiana. Once that 

starts 40 hours out, we have to start looking at contraflow, which 

is our last means of removing people from south Louisiana. Once 

we do that, of course, we close interstates and move them in one 

direction so we can move people. It is kind of like an hourglass. 

Prior to contraflow, you can go anywhere you want. To move people 

out, we encourage it, we assist people in doing that, but once those 

tropical force winds get close to the coast, we have got to quickly 

move those people out. So what has been critical, and we have gotten those plans from BP but it was a lot later than we would have 

liked to have gotten them. But we have been working, that is a 

constant effort that is on-going within Louisiana as far as hurricanes. We are certainly not, along with our brothers in Alabama, 

Mississippi, Florida, and of course in Texas, we do know how to 

deal with those things. Our concern is the life and property in the 

waters, to actually move those prior to hurricanes coming in. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Mayor. 

Mr. HIBBARD. Congressman, it has not changed any of our plans. 

Obviously those are in place. I think what it is, more than anything, is a distraction. As soon as we hit June 1, obviously we need 

to keep our eye on the ball in preparation for hurricanes. I think 

the spill has certainly distracted us from that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Green for 5 minutes, 

please. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you 

for your visionary leadership. This is clearly a hearing that is timely. I also would like to thank the members of the Court and the 

Court Administrators. It is not that often that we have an opportunity to have a hearing in such a stately and courtly environment. 

Most appreciative that we have been afforded this opportunity. 

Colonel, in my opinion, some things bear repeating. What you 

said about the lives lost, it bears repeating. Eleven people lost their 

lives, families are still suffering. Many were injured, still recovering. We should not forget that while we have other concerns that 
17 

have to be addressed, those lives that were lost must be considered 

such that we never allow this to happen again. I do not want us 

to lose focus and I am most appreciative that you called it to our 

attention. 

Mayor, I want to thank you for your testimony. You have a perch 

from which you have viewed this that is exceedingly important to 

us. So I will have a first question for you, Mayor. 

Heard a lot about the moratorium and we hear quite a bit about 

the jobs that are impacted. You are from another side of the Gulf. 

I am interested in knowing what your people are saying about this 

in terms of getting it right so that it never happens again. 

Mr. HIBBARD. There has been great discussion on that, Congressman. Our Governor has called a special session to talk about offshore drilling on Florida, which was on the docket for the next legislative session. I think the majority of Floridians right now see the 

threat that offshore drilling presents. At the same time, visiting 

here several weeks ago, I had the opportunity to be meet several 

families, half of which were fishermen and half of which worked for 

the oil industry. Those seemed to be inseparable. They believe that 

they can continue to live in harmony. I think the key is making 

certain that there are steps to increase safety on the rigs. We understand that we want to move towards energy independence. 

I would make one comment. Certainly we should remember the 

11 men that died on that rig, but there are lives being ruined right 

now because of the economic impact—people who will lose their 

livelihoods, lose boats, lose family businesses, that they may never 

get back. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I concur with you. There is a balance 

that we have to achieve. We have to make safety of primary importance and I understand this and I have a special relationship, by 

the way, with your State and with this State. I was born right here 

in this city and was reared in Florida. You and I went to institutions that border each other, I was at Florida A&M. So I do understand both States and I concur with you with reference to what we 

must do to do what we can to minimize the impact on the economy 

throughout the area along the Gulf coast. That balance has to include all that we can do to stem the flow of the oil, to move on with 

getting people back to work and keeping those jobs available, as 

well as making sure that we do not have the tragedy occur again. 

I just do not want us to lose sight of that as we talk about the 

economy. The economy is exceedingly important but so are lives, 

and it is that balance that we have to achieve. 

I would like to ask you, if I may, Colonel, as you have been working with the various departments trying to maintain as much intelligence as possible, what has been the chief obstacle that you have 

encountered in terms of having information flow to you such that 

you would have the empirical evidence that you need to make the 

decisions that you have made along the way? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think several issues that you have got to look 

at in that. One, the ability to know where the oil is moving to. Evidence outside of models from other States that guess possibly 

where the oil is moving to and then for us to see an impact to an 

area that the models did not really show that. Nothing beats a live 

eye, the ability for weather to be clear to allow a plane to fly over 
18 

to actually see from it. I think that was what was so important for 

every single day as we finished our Unified Command Group meeting, we got on a Blackhawk helicopter with Governor Jindal and 

we went to where we thought the oil was, so we could see firsthand, so we could talk to the individuals that were there and ask 

them: How is it affecting you, how can we do this better? There 

was an inability of that. 

I think the flow of communication early on was significant, because as we needed more boom, you really were not sure where the 

boom was. It was being deployed to other States, we certainly got 

our fair share in Louisiana, but some got moved to other States 

where there was no oil at the time. Then they would try to move 

it back to Louisiana. We also know that there was not a large supply of boom in the world at that time and we were trying to get 

as much as we could into Louisiana. But listen to that every single 

day, knowing that we needed those skimmers, knowing how much 

oil was coming out of that area, that it was just going to continue 

to flow, you needed that information, needed to get it quickly. So 

I think that flow of information early on to know the significance 

of this event. Certainly, BP had to know the significance of what 

the worst-case scenario would be from that oil and it just was not 

given to us in the timely manner that we felt we could have been 

a little bit more prepared. 

Plans were there, but also the ability to be flexible sometimes 

with those plans, to know your plan is this, this is what we are 

geared up for. Well, but you know what, we know that area a little 

bit better, we know that we should be flexible, let us do some other 

things here. Just the inability to do that in a timely manner. We 

will get back with you tomorrow, we will get back with you next 

week. Then next week, well, you know, give us another week. 

Every day that oil is flowing, every day lives are impacted, every 

day the economy is impacted. The Gulf is 35 percent of our seafood 

industry in the country, a third of our oil. So we know every day 

what that impact was. I think it was an inability for that to be focused so that we could get the right resources in place. I think that 

was probably the biggest obstacle as we looked at that, getting that 

flow of information. 

We have a working relationship with our Coast Guard, members 

of the Coast Guard was in our command staff briefings every day. 

So we had the ability to get that, but even from that point, sometimes his answer was, you know, I can only pass that forward. I 

will get back to you tomorrow. Tomorrow is 24 hours later and 

sometimes that is what the difficulty is. Both agencies were frustrated in ability to move forward on that. I think we saw that. 

I was in the very first meeting when President Obama came to 

Louisiana, I was able to be in that room that day. To hear from 

the EPA of the impact in New Orleans, to hear on our coastline, 

to hear from the Coast Guard, to hear from the officials first-hand 

what was going on and even the inability of well, we really are not 

sure exactly what to do, exactly what needs to be done. I think that 

inability that we saw in those first few days and first few weeks, 

I think we have paid the price for that as we move forward. Because it is hard to recoup that when the oil has not stopped. It is 

still flowing every single day. 
19 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Col. EDMONDSON. I just want to add this, if I could. What is most 

important, and I know y’all know this. This is not a 100-yard dash. 

When that oil—we hope that when they place it on there, we can 

stop that oil. We pray for that every day. But that is not the end. 

We cannot declare victory after that. We still have to clean it up, 

we still have to fix our fisheries, our coastline, our shoreline. That 

is what we have to remember. This is a marathon. We need to be 

in it for the long haul and that is why it is so important for y’all 

to have these hearings, that is why I am so pleased you could be 

here to be able to talk about these things, because you need to hear 

from us. We are in it for the long haul and we need to hear that 

from y’all. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Green. Mr. Cao for 5 minutes or so, 

please. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this important hearing in my district, which is at the front 

line of this oil spill. 

I have seen first-hand the confusion and the frustration caused 

by what I see as a lack of a coherent command structure. So most 

of my questions will be focused—will be asked toward Colonel 

Edmondson. 

My first question to you, sir, is you stated in your testimony that 

Federal officials should listen more to State and local governments 

with respect to this oil spill. In what ways has the Unified Command lacked in that regard and how has this deficiency affected 

the State’s ability to prevent oil from entering our most sensitive 

areas? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Well, I think we have certainly seen improvement. As we have all grown in this matter, we have certainly seen 

improvement in that area. But I think understanding the fact that 

people live in an area, work in an area, work within that industry, 

they know first-hand the best ways to approach the problems of 

significance in that area. I think we saw that and tried to get that 

information out, to be able to be flexible in those plans and to get 

the communication out. Maybe the original plan showed that boom 

needed to be in a specific area, but to be flexible to know that, you 

know what, it did say that, but it also needs to be here. As the currents flow within the Gulf, as weather has affected it, as winds affect it, the ability to be flexible and move those things in. I think 

that was the frustration, as I saw it, from the beginning. Again, I 

am here from the emergency response effort, to be able to talk 

about that, and the inability for us to do that. 

But certainly it was in place to address those matters, but just 

the flexibility to change as those matters came in place. 

Mr. CAO. Now did you see I guess mixed messages from the different agencies who were deciding on a number of projects or on 

a number of procedures? Did you encounter, for example, one agency saying one thing and another Federal agency saying another 

thing? What kind of confusion has that caused, for example, State 

agencies to better mobilize? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Well, I think just in line when you say I will 

get back to you, the oil is still flowing. To say I will get back to 
20 

you when you meet again, it might be 24 hours later. I think it 

takes sub-sea dispersements. We were against that, we wanted 

more information on that. Certainly when you disperse oil, it has 

got to go somewhere. When it breaks up into much smaller pieces, 

there is some understanding from Wildlife and Fisheries and the 

Department of Environmental Quality in Louisiana who were listening to our own scientists who work daily within that region and 

knows the marshes, knows the sub-sea life and the fisheries there. 

I think the lack of trying to get that information available, because 

we do not know what the long-term impact is going to be on that, 

we still do not know to this day. 

So I think some of those things as you compile them together certainly were frustrating as we moved forward in that because there 

were so many unknowns and even we might have had impact in 

that and it did not necessarily go the way we would suggest it. It 

had impact directly to the State of Louisiana. 

Mr. CAO. Now if you were in the shoes of Admiral Thad Allen, 

what would you want to implement? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I am not in his shoes thankfully. 

Mr. CAO. But if you were in his shoes, what would you want to 

implement? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Well, I certainly hate putting words in people’s 

mouths, but I think the ability to just get everyone together and 

really listen more than speaking, let us listen to exactly what is 

going on out there, let us talk to the people. Let me tell you something, these Coast Guards that live and work in Louisiana, they 

are Louisianans, they live and breathe and work here, they have 

families here. There was even some frustration internally what to 

do from the beginning because this was such a large magnitude. 

You know, it is just like the worst-case scenario was not there. We 

saw him do that, bring people in and try to get all the information 

available and find out where are the resources. Take the game of 

football, it takes a game plan, a game plan to get things done, to 

move that football down the field, to score a run in baseball, to 

score the winning goal in soccer—it takes a game plan. You have 

got to be able to stick to that game plan but be flexible in it also. 

Mr. CAO. What can we do to improve information sharing between Federal, State, and parish officials? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think we are doing it right here, Congressman. I think by bringing people together, having oversight from a 

committee such as this and make people talk about this so it is reported in the news, people see that. I think that is important. 

But keep in mind, once this is cleaned up and we move forward, 

we are still involved with the Coast Guard, we are still involved 

with industry in Louisiana. We have got to be able to move forward 

and I think that is why the open line of communication, listening, 

learning from mistakes, learning from incidents that happen and 

moving forward. I think that is going to be the key to this. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Cao. Ms. Jackson Lee for 5 minutes, please. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking 

Member for what is a very important hearing as it lays claim to 
21 

jurisdictional concerns by the Department of Homeland Security 

and this committee. 

Colonel, you are right, we are communicating and I am listening. 

It is not just communication, because this is, as my colleague has 

indicated, a major tragedy. There are families, as we sit here 

today—and some might think that we are speaking calmly—who 

are still mourning the loss of their loved ones. There are families 

who are still nurturing the wounds, both mental and physical, of 

their loved ones. 

Mayor, if there is a resiliency, it is in local government because 

you have got to be the captain and the champion, you have got to 

inspire your businesses and your local population to say hold on. 

But I want to show a little bit of emotion and suggest that this 

is gut-wrenching, this is fist-pounding, this is hair-pulling. We 

should not be ashamed of it. Because the people of the Gulf are resilient. Hurricane Rita, Hurricane Katrina and others, what more 

can they expect? Why have they been rendered this? Natural disasters we know may have no explanation, but a man-made disaster, 

for people who are educated and versed with the technology of their 

industry, you wonder why. So frankly, I am fist-banging today and 

outraged. 

My sympathy to the families and as well to the hard-working 

workers, innocent families in the industry, energy industry, and 

shrimpers and oyster persons and fishermen and others who depend upon the Gulf. 

I want, Colonel, to say to you that I note the conflictiveness of 

this process. BP is in charge, the Federal Government is ultimately 

accountable. That is unique. I would like to raise a question that 

if we can correct the structure of the utilization of what we call National disaster—a National disaster means that you pull upon Federal resources. The tension between not calling this a National disaster is to throw the burden on the Government as it relates to 

money. 

Would it not be helpful if we looked at that proclamation of a National disaster and had a modification of it that would allow the 

private entity to pay, but draw in all the resources of a National 

disaster? That is distinctive from a disaster of significance. Colonel. 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think you are right on with that, Ms. Jackson 

Lee. I think that is exactly something you have to look at and I 

certainly applaud you for making that statement because that is 

what we have to head into. 

I have got to add, if I might, our thoughts to Texas. Y’all were 

so good to us in Gustaf. I was on the tarmac with Governor Jindal 

as we watched ambulances there with people whose oxygen was 

being depleted and once that was out, it was over. To see those 

planes come from Texas, that was incredible, to bring the resources 

that you have. I am going to be meeting with my counterpart in 

Texas in Houston on July 20 and we are going to talk about preparedness, we are going to talk about this incident, and try to work 

with the police chiefs in Houston, Beaumont, and Orange to try to 

look at helping Houston, helping Texas the same way that y’all 

have been so good to us. 

I apologize for adding that, I know that is not what we are here 

to talk about, but I think it needs to be said. 
22 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We appreciate it. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Y’all have been incredible neighbors and we 

are going to certainly be just as good to y’all. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We appreciate it. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Thank you for those comments. I think that is 

something we have to—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me pose another question if I might. 

The Federal Government, with its structure, if there was the provision that if a company had a series of violations of safety, that 

the Federal Government could shut that company down in offshore 

drilling. Would that have made a better situation, now that we 

know how many safety violations BP had? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think certainly as we move forward we see 

the significance, as the Federal Government, State government 

gets involved in the investigation. I think you are going to see how 

significant that would have been. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mayor Hibbard, let me ask you with respect 

to the tourists and the effort that BP has had. Would you want 

funds to come directly to local government and what greater efforts 

can BP implement? Maybe they can use some of the advertising 

dollars that they have utilized now. I certainly appreciated that 

they tried to give the public more information. But I would think 

that they have given them enough information about how many 

good people are there trying to pay claims. Could they use some of 

that or could you use some of that—you do not have the ethical violations that might come up—to pay to advertise the goodness of the 

Florida coastline? Would that be helpful to you? 

Mr. HIBBARD. That has been something, Congresswoman, we 

have been asking for and have not gotten directly. But we do believe that we have the knowledge to really utilize those dollars and 

in a way to ultimately save BP money because we would not have 

the losses. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Less people for claims. 

Finally, Colonel, let me just say that in Katrina, as you well 

know, there was a degree of frustration, devastation, emotional distress. Legislation that I am writing called The Remedies Act includes some of the questions that I asked you. One that it adds is 

resources for post traumatic stress, which I imagine is happening 

to shrimpers and others, restaurant owners. Would that be a component in a disaster funding or structure that should be put in 

place? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Absolutely, and we are seeing evidence of that 

even today. So that is absolutely something we need. We certainly 

saw it in Katrina. I was there. Now we are seeing it after this incident. I think you are well within the right direction on that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. Ms. Richardson for 5 minutes. But before you do that, I think we will have enough interest in another 

round for this panel. So go ahead. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe it is Colonel, right? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I think you asked the question: Are we in this 

for the long haul? The answer is yes, and that is why we are here. 
23 

Many of us could be in our district and doing other things but we 

are here because we are concerned about what has happened. We 

view that there is accountability that can go across the board and 

that is why we are here. 

Let me talk a little bit about communications and outreach. You 

talked about layman’s terms. I have got to tell you—and let me say 

I am so glad—first of all, I want to thank our Chairman, Mr. 

Thompson; I want to thank Secretary Napolitano for affording 

Members an opportunity to not only be here for the hearing but to 

actually come and to see some of the real world of what is happening out there that you are facing. 

I have got to tell you this—and you know, many of us have our 

frustrations and we are going to have an opportunity to talk to a 

BP representative shortly, but one of my biggest frustrations, and 

I am going to be very frank with you, is the media and how this 

has been portrayed. 

When I listened to you, Mr. Hibbard, it is almost criminal what 

is being done on the television. I expected—and I am going to be 

very frank with you—I expected to go out there and see waves and 

waves of oil. I had no idea to be able to put into perspective—I am 

from California—I had no idea, and I have been to New Orleans 

many times, but I had no idea how to put in perspective the miles 

of distance between New Orleans and where we are seeing the unfortunate impacts. So to me, shame on the media, which I think 

equally has a role to play in this of hyping some of this up to the 

point that people are afraid to come out of their homes, they think 

birds will never fly again. I mean it is wrong what has happened. 

So what I intend upon doing and what I intend to challenge some 

of the Government agencies is shame on us for allowing the media 

to paint the story of what is happening out there. If we have to do 

our own television shows on C–SPAN or YouTube or whatever it 

is, then let us do it. But we should not be allowing the one or two 

scenes—you know, I have some information I am going to show you 

of, yes, oil that I saw, and, yes, it is there. But it is not what I have 

seen on the television and it is wrong. So part of what is hurting 

the economy is the failure to properly communicate what in fact is 

happening. 

So I wanted to say that publicly first and then I will get into my 

two questions. One for each of you. 

Colonel, in your testimony on page No. 5, you talked about participating in the response and you said, ‘‘Local governments, concerned with the lack of protective measures in their parishes, developed more robust plans to counteract the approaching oil, but 

were frustrated with their inability to interact and participate in 

the response efforts due to the response framework dictated by the 

OPA 90.’’ 

What specifically do you have as an example of what you mean 

by that? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think most important is flexibility. I know 

when you have an incident of this magnitude, you have got to be 

able to be flexible to know that just because in your plan it may 

have called for boom in one specific area, you ought to be able to 

move it on an as-needed basis, that was hard to do. Also, when you 

need more of it, you need to know when it is coming. Not just say, 
24 

well, you know, it is coming, it will be here tomorrow and the next 

day well, it is going to be here the next day. I think every day I 

think that hampered us and I think that was some of the things 

we saw involved in that, in getting that information to them and 

understanding they know it better than anyone does, especially in 

those areas. 

So I think more than anything else the flexibility of getting that 

information and also giving them impact to know what is needed 

in that area and try to get the resources there. I know that Chairman Carney actually said we hope that certainly did not impact 

that, it certainly did and they moved forward and did some of those 

things and whether we are able to fund that or not, certainly that 

was the right thing to do. But there ought to be some flexibility in 

there to actually allow them to do that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Have you seen that improve? 

Col. EDMONDSON. We have seen improvement in that. I think you 

have seen that, and certainly as we move forward. But I think the 

damage done in that critical early aftermath of it, I think that is 

going to be the problems we see from this point out. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay, and then my last question of this series 

is to Mr. Hibbard and I apologize if I am butchering your name 

here. You said it was difficult to know who was in charge, whether 

BP or the Coast Guard ultimate had authority. That was on page 

1 of your testimony. 

Do you not know that today, honestly? 

Mr. HIBBARD. I feel much more comfortable now understanding 

the chain of command. Those lines have been brightened. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Who, in your opinion, is in charge? 

Mr. HIBBARD. I feel the Coast Guard is in charge now. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Mr. HIBBARD. But at first, I really felt as though BP was calling 

the shots and even had written the President a letter to that effect, 

being very concerned. The Colonel had mentioned that it is like a 

game plan for a football team. We really do need a single coach 

calling the shots. I appreciate home rule, but you even have competing States for resources. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. HIBBARD. So we do need unified command. I think that has 

improved, but it is something to be looked at for future events. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So as I close my first round, I just want to say 

not to in any way portray that what I saw is not damaging and 

it is not going to take tremendous work to repair, but what I also 

saw is that it is not everywhere. All of the implications that I 

thought were not certainly the case. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. I think we will do another round with this panel and I appreciate your forbearance. We 

do not do this always. 

I’m sorry? 

Col. EDMONDSON. If you need any part of the technical information also, it is available. 

Mr. CARNEY. We will get to him if we need it. But the fact we 

are doing this is testament to the compelling nature of your testimony. So thank you very much. 
25 

Colonel, does your office provide input on the spill response efforts? If so, how was that received and how was that information 

treated? 

Col. EDMONDSON. We have input at the meetings and as information goes forward, we have an actual on-scene coordinator through 

Mr. Guidry’s office. He actually was there from Day 1 probably for 

the first 40-some-odd days, was actually there every day in the 

command post there in Robert, Louisiana and then we moved him 

to Houma because that is where the main emphasis was taking 

place. So we have people in meetings, we have people that are listening. 

I think what is critical here, if I may just go in this direction, 

is the real-time information. I think that is what is so critical. You 

get that in hurricanes, because everything is in the emergency operations center. With us having that emergency operations center 

say in Baton Rouge, say in the capitals around Tallahassee or Austin, wherever, Birmingham, Jackson; we had an office in Houma, 

we had an office in Robert and now in New Orleans. So getting 

that real-time information and getting it to the Unified Command 

Group, I think that is where some problems flow in there that you 

had this, that you have those offices going on. So just getting that 

real-time information has been difficult. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Guidry, how were you received? When you gave 

your input to the group, did they embrace it and say thank you 

or—— 

Mr. GUIDRY. I was accepted by the unified command. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, very good. 

Colonel, did your office participate in the SONS 2002 exercise 

they had in New Orleans when they had—please step up to the 

chair and join us. 

Mr. GUIDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I played the State on-scene coordinator for that along with Admiral Thad Allen. We worked the SONS. The first day after the spill, 

he told me this is worse than what we had practiced. Yes, sir, it 

is. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. 

For the record, could you identify yourself and your position and 

spell your name. 

Mr. GUIDRY. My name is Roland Guidry, R-o-l-a-n-d G-u-i-d-r-y 

and for the last 181⁄2 years, I have been the oil spill coordinator. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Now, the spill that we are seeing now is 

worse than you practiced in 2002. What could we have done to 

close that gap between the reality that we saw and what you practiced? What do you see that we need to do differently? 

Mr. GUIDRY. You know, I was the oil spill coordinator for 

Katrina, Rita where we had over 700 spills. We had 101⁄2 million 

gallons of oil at one time that got into the environment. We put our 

hands around it, but not by ourselves. We had the Gulf Strike 

Team and the Coast Guard Strike Team from the Atlantic and the 

Pacific coasts that came and helped us. We got into the branches 

and we really spread this thing out pretty good. I think that is one 

thing that we did not do fast enough, is get the strike teams activated and have the branches where it goes into the weed, where 
26 

the locals get into the branches and make things easier to work all 

the way up. 

Mr. CARNEY. That did not happen in this incident? 

Mr. GUIDRY. That did not happen until probably 40 days into the 

spill, 35–40 days. 

Mr. CARNEY. From your opinion and your observation, can you 

say why that was the case, why it did not happen? 

Mr. GUIDRY. No, I have no earthly idea. I asked for those guys 

early on because I knew how they operated. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. So from Rita and Katrina, you had 101⁄2 million gallons of oil spilled and you were able, using the strike teams, 

to get a handle on that and clean that up. 

Mr. GUIDRY. Pretty fast. When they came into the organization, 

things started really moving. They are experts in what they do; so, 

yeah. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Well, we will talk about that further I think 

in the next panel. 

Now, I have heard the word boom mentioned a lot and the shortage of it and not knowing exactly how much you had. Is there an 

inventory done of this and if so, how often? Do you know exactly 

how many feet of boom you have available? Do you know the type 

of boom, the in-shore boom, the further-out kind of—do you know 

that going in or how often is this inventoried? 

Col. EDMONDSON. We actually, Mr. Chairman, every single day, 

we know exactly how much boom is coming into Louisiana, what 

we have pre-staged, deployed in different areas that we can move 

forward. 

Mr. CARNEY. Prior to the spill? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Prior to that. Keep in mind, this does not last 

forever, so some of the stockpile in those areas, once not used, the 

expiration dates on there, you cannot use it forward. So it was the 

unknown of that, of exactly how much was available, and that was 

some frustration early on to try to get that because there just was 

not clearly enough to move forward on that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Understood. I see my time is up. Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mayor, what kind of effect or impact has the oil spill had on the 

seafood industry in Florida? Of course, knowing that most of Florida has not seen oil. Then Colonel, if you could answer that question as well with regard to Louisiana. 

Mr. HIBBARD. It is a very similar effect, Congressman to what 

the oil is having on the tourism industry. It is stigma. So whether 

you go to a restaurant that focuses primarily on seafood or a seafood market or the grocery stores, people first of all want to know 

where that seafood is coming from; and second, they are just avoiding it altogether. So it is affecting the seafood industry in that respect. It is also affecting a lot of the sportsmen that we have that 

come from all over the country to fish in our waters for grouper 

and other fish that we are really known for. So it is having an impact. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Colonel. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Clearly devastation in Louisiana because it is 

the source of what people believe, whether it is accurate or not. So 

perception, as we know, based on reality, you are exactly right, 
27 

Mayor. My friends call me from around the country, I just saw 

something from Louisiana, I am not going to eat it. Well, it would 

not be there if it was not safe. 

I think what the public needs to know around the country is that 

every single day we have scientists out there, we have Wildlife and 

Fisheries agents and DEQ specialists that are out there testing the 

waters, testing the fish, testing the life within our fisheries and the 

Gulf coast region and making sure that what comes in is edible and 

we can move it forward. Every day we open and close areas based 

on where we see the oil, based on tests that we have done and that. 

If there is any chance for that to be tainted, we are not going to 

allow fishing in that area, we are not going to allow it to be removed and we are going to continue to test it as we move forward 

on it. But again, it is perception. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. We have got to get the word out, is what we need 

to do. 

Colonel, how many—I understand you are authorized to deploy 

15,000 National Guardsmen in the State of Louisiana. How many 

are deployed at this time? 

Col. EDMONDSON. The average contingency is 1,100 that they 

have working throughout Louisiana actively involved in the berms 

and actually placing the rocks as we protect our coastline. You 

know, you have got to say hats off to the Louisiana National 

Guard. What they did in Katrina where they actually patrolled the 

streets of New Orleans, and what they are doing in this area with 

this oil spill is certainly outside the scope of what they have done 

throughout the Nation. They have been a tremendous asset to the 

State of Louisiana, but again, 1,100 of those are deployed. We have 

another couple hundred that are every day actively involved in the 

effort and response to this oil spill in Louisiana. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Do you plan do deploy more? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Well, that certainly would not be my decision. 

They are certainly available if more are needed, they could certainly do that; yes, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. As noted in your opening statement, I am concerned about the delays in the approval of response requests. I 

mentioned it, you did as well. 

What response capabilities have you requested, aside from the 

approval to dig berms, that have been delayed or denied and what 

impact has the denials had on the State of Louisiana? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Well, certainly when you look at what you exactly talked about has been the frustration portion of it, needing 

more boom, needing more skimmers. Knowing that as this oil 

moves in and out of our shoreline, we have got over 6,000 miles of 

shoreline in Louisiana. Most people do not realize that. But when 

you look at the topography of Louisiana, the inlets and outlets, it 

is so many miles there and knowing as it washes in and washes 

out, that that effect continues. I think that is why it is so critical 

that we know how much boom is available, what types of boom are 

available and getting those deployed in those areas. I think that 

has been the primary frustration in that aspect along with what 

you talked about. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 
28 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. Mr. Green, please, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Colonel, you spoke quite well about the flow of information as it 

relates to top-down and of course you put emphasis on the necessity to have not only information, but accurate information, and 

have timely information as it comes from the top down. 

I would like for you to put a bit of emphasis, if you will—and you 

as well, Mayor—on bottom-up. Were you able to have your ideas 

given immediate consideration? Did you get a response with reference to things that you thought were important that had some 

merit, that should be evaluated? Were you ideas vetted and did you 

get the feedback that you needed so that you could make some determination as to how efficacious you were in terms of helping with 

this endeavor? If you would, please. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Certainly you had the initial input, but it did 

not mean it was going to happen. I think you only had to turn on 

the news to daily see Parish President Mr. Nungesser and Craig 

Taffaro of Placquemines and St. Bernard Parish, every day talking 

about I am asking for this, I am asking for this, where is it? Certainly understand the fact that this oil just kept coming and it is 

still flowing in today. 

Mr. GREEN. Let me interrupt you, please. What was the process, 

as you understood it, for you to get your ideas to the top? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Mr. Guidry can certainly comment on that also 

because he was in those meetings every single day, but understanding every day listening to our parishes along the coast report 

information up and getting that to the unified group in Robert or 

in Houma, Louisiana and then getting that information to the Unified Command Group, of which the Governor is there and the cabinet secretaries. I think that real time, but also understanding that 

if they need something, they need it. To know that it may be the 

next day or the next week before it gets there, I think that was 

some of the frustration that we saw early on. 

Mr. GUIDRY. If I may. Stuff was slow coming. You know, boom, 

we made a request daily for boom and it got to be almost like a 

joke. I would say ‘‘need more boom’’ and everybody would quote, 

you know, say ‘‘need more boom,’’ everybody there would say the 

same thing, need more skimmers. Those were slow in coming. 

As the Colonel said, we had probably 16 or 18 reports a day that 

come in from all the State entities. We have a call in the morning 

and in the afternoon, all the local branches call in and in the afternoon all the parish EOCs are all together at one time and they 

comment on what they need, what they are doing, what is not happening. So the lines of communication are open to us and we pass 

that on. Sometimes it is a little slow getting back, but that is what 

we do. 

Mr. GREEN. Mayor, let me follow up with you if I may. Your access to persons who were able to filter your information, did you 

conclude that you had a fair vetting process in terms of getting information to the top? 

Mr. HIBBARD. We ran most of our information through our internal emergency manager who would run it up the flag pole through 

the county and then on to the Coast Guard and FDEP. It is a 

somewhat arduous process. I can tell you that on a daily basis, 
29 

Congressman, I was having constituents give me new ideas on how 

to either stop the well or to absorb oil. It is very hard to run all 

those down and I certainly would not want to distract the powers 

that be from the task at hand. 

I think one of the other issues we ran into was a lot of volunteers 

that wanted to be a part of any cleanup effort that might occur and 

after having a list of literally thousands of volunteers that e-mailed 

into the city and to the county, we were told that it would be the 

responsibility of BP and the people that they hired to do any cleanups. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, Colonel. I want you to address another question, 

so I want your response, but some of this waste cleanup, I am understanding that there is some desire not to have it located in certain places and persons have given their protest but the waste is 

still being placed in areas pursuant to contracts that were negotiated between BP and certain State agencies. 

I would like for you to comment on this if you would, please. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Certainly that is true. Once it reaches the 

coastline, we have a responsibility. Hazardous material is under 

me as far as response. We have got to make sure it is properly collected and manifested and properly transported to an area. That is 

a concern when that area transports to may not be an area it needs 

to be in. So we are working very, very closely with EPA and of 

course the Department of Environmental Quality, to make sure we 

work through that. But once it is moved in that area and then it 

becomes infected in that area, it causes problems. So I think you 

are right in your comments, Mr. Green, in that area, that we need 

to make sure that those places are done. 

You did ask for examples and I think that we certainly need to 

be able to give you those. I think when you look at booms, once you 

are asking for the booms, and that will come in time, then that all 

moves forward, then it is too late, it is in the marshlands. 

One thing that we saw early on and we certainly had many conversations with the Coast Guard, who has tried to respond to these 

types of things, but one thing they said early on was that we didn’t 

have skimmers small enough to get inside the marshes, which is 

why we have started doing the vacuum barges. We have actually 

got trucks on barges that are inside those marsh areas vacuuming 

that oil from around the marsh area, because there is so much of 

it and it gets thick in those areas. 

I think those are instances right there that just shows the realtime that you talked about, the ability to real-time get resources 

there, because once you lose that real-time, it has moved on and 

then you have to start fighting it from a different angle. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Green. Ms. Jackson Lee, please, 5 

minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Guidry, thank you for your work. I am 

going to ask a series of rapid questions to sort of build the record. 

Mr. Guidry, in your experience, have you ever seen an oil spill 

like this? 

Mr. GUIDRY. No, ma’am. The difference with this one and all the 

other ones, the other ones, eventually the source stops. This one 

here is like a thief in the night, it is not there today, tomorrow 
30 

morning it is here, next day it is here or it hits you back again in 

the same spot. You know, things do not move very fast, boats move 

very slow, so you have got to fly over the site and find out where 

the oil is in the morning and then send the boats out to clean it 

up. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You have worked 18 years—I am going to do 

some rapid fire questions. You have worked for 18 years and you 

have had oil spills and you have cleaned up oil spills, is that correct? 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The Gulf has gone on about its business. 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The oyster men and the shrimpers and the 

fishermen have gone on about their business. 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, ma’am. I am a former fisherman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that is important to note, and the reason is because the magnitude of this disaster I think is something 

that we clearly want to frame. But in terms of trying to fix the 

problems, let me again go back to a question I think I asked and 

would like to ask it more specifically. 

My understanding is that BP had a series of violations that may 

have been relevant to this well and that they were just in place, 

on record in one of our Federal agencies. In a legislative fix that 

might work, should we not have a certain number—for example, 

this was a high-risk drilling rig—certain number of violations could 

bring about an automatic shutdown for a period of time of that 

well. Mr. Guidry? 

Mr. GUIDRY. I really could not comment too much on the size of 

this, but I would tell you—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If there were a number of safety violations 

that had been shown. 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would it be appropriate for the Federal Government to shut down that well to ask for there to be remedy by 

the particular parties involved? 

Mr. GUIDRY. It could be, but I would have put some MMS people 

on those wells 24/7 to make sure that these problems did not happen. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If they saw that it did happen, you would give 

them the authority to shut the well down? 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Colonel. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Absolutely. I mean we do not need to be a 

country of reacting. It ought to be about proactive and the ability 

to do what you are talking about certainly would allow that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think—and you have mentioned the 

fact that the Coast Guard strike teams have been very effective. Do 

you think enhanced resources and making those strike teams—I 

use a different terminology, like a SWAT team, but giving them the 

additional enhanced resources and training would be helpful as we 

move into these difficult drilling procedures. Colonel. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Absolutely, you are going to have to have that 

in place so they have the ability to move forward and move rapidly 

to move those resources in; yes, ma’am. 
31 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The chain of command for me is enormously 

important. Do you think—and Mr. Guidry said something and I 

have heard this before of MMS individuals being on the rig and 

that would be certainly something to look at. Would you also think 

it is important to have a red phone on the rig that has the ability 

to go to the right people when you can perceive something is going 

to go wrong? I asked some of the officials of BP did they get a 

phone call that night and the answer was no. Do you think there 

should be a red phone call that reaches the appropriate persons 

even though this was in the midst of an emergency, so that reaction could start right then and there? Colonel. 

Col. EDMONDSON. You are certainly going to have to have that. 

You are going to have to have some form of communication and listen to everybody on that rig. The ability for anybody, even at the 

lowest level, when they see problems are occurring, they have got 

to be able to bring that to someone’s attention. Most importantly, 

when that phone rings, someone has to pick it up and listen. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If we were to—and this is a question where 

I do not want you to think that I am trying to get you to write legislation, but the Department of Homeland Security has been labeled as—and I think they have been very effective with the merger of so many different areas, the disaster homeland front line. We 

see man-made disasters and we see natural disasters, hurricanes. 

Expanding the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security such that all the resources or the crisis bearing could fall 

under one department as relates to this kind of disaster, would 

that help your question of where is the boom, where are the skimmers, who is in charge; so that once something like this occurred, 

one call, one group of people tells whoever it is get this done. 

Col. EDMONDSON. We certainly should have learned that in 

Katrina, certainly from a Federal level to understand that that inventory is in place. But also the ability to understand from a Federal level, you have got to listen to the local people, you have got 

to, because what worked in one State is not going to work in other 

States. I think that flexibility—communication, flexibility, and having plans in place of where your inventory is. I think that is vitally 

important. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Or having one Federal Government entity and 

then working with the local officials, that might be helpful to you. 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think so. I do not want them to get so big 

that they become ineffective. I think when you get too big and you 

put too much on your plate, you become ineffective. We do that as 

individuals sometimes. I know I do, and I think you have got to be 

careful not to put too much on that plate, but give them ability. 

But I think you are moving in the right direction; yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Richardson, do 

you have questions? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Just a couple of very quick ones and then I am 

looking forward to us continuing. 

Colonel, it is my understanding that the State of Louisiana has 

received $50 million. How much have you guys spent and what 

have you spent it on? 
32 

Col. EDMONDSON. Well, we spent it on emergency response efforts going on with the oil, the direct response to the oil that is approaching Louisiana, both on the State level and on a local level. 

I think that is what has been most important. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Specifically doing what though? When you say 

emergency response, what does that mean? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Personnel, resources, equipment. Again, all 

aimed at combatting the on-going effect of the oil as it approaches 

Louisiana. I can get the committee information on exactly what we 

spent it on. I think that would be better than just trying to remember the different things. But I know from my perspective, what I 

have used it on has been the people directly involved because I 

think that is where it should be exactly involved every day in combatting both very proactively and reactively the oil as it approaches 

Louisiana and making sure that it gets into those local areas. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So you will provide that to the committee how 

much has been spent and on what? 

Col. EDMONDSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Has it all been spent? 

Col. EDMONDSON. I am not sure exact numbers, I know that the 

first $25 million has been. Again, that second $25 million has not 

come into Louisiana. I know there was some monies that was 

placed forward for some work within the coastline itself, but I am 

familiar with the first $25 million that we have looked at. In fact, 

that funding actually comes through the Department of Public 

Safety as far as the area to oversee and disburse that. Again, we 

do not disburse until we get actual evidence from a State agency 

that they spent it on that. It is all through the PIRFA process that 

the Federal Government uses to make sure we document expenditures of those monies. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay, thank you, Colonel. 

Mr. Guidry, you mentioned that strike teams in the past have 

physically gone into the marsh themselves and have cleaned the oil 

out. Did they cut, did they flush it out with water, what was the 

process used? 

Mr. GUIDRY. They direct the clean-up, but in the past, like in the 

roseau canes, we will cut a path and flush it out with pumps. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So you would cut a path to flush it? 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, we cut a path in the roseau canes and from 

there wash the oil out. We put boom on the outside so that when 

the oil comes out the skimmers can pick it up inside the boom. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. You work for the State, sir? 

Mr. GUIDRY. Ma’am? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. You work for the State of Louisiana? 

Mr. GUIDRY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. That is a very important point that you 

just made because we saw that just today and there was an issue 

with that. 

Then finally for the record, I just want to say I equally was very 

frustrated. I did not understand why we could not just put a whole 

rim of boom around the site of the Horizon to be able to catch the 

oil before it even got further out. But I have got to tell you, once 

I physically saw it, with the waves, it only can provide limited protection. I think one thing we have learned out of this incident is 
33 

that BP and any other provider that does oil drilling must also use 

some of that money to look at technology and research and make 

sure that what we really have can do some work. Because even the 

booms themselves cannot solve the problems. 

Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentlelady yield for a moment? 

Could I just ask a quick question? 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yield for a moment? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Following up on her question, the 

headline here says ‘‘BP Works on More Secure Well Cap.’’ You 

made a very important statement, Colonel, it keeps flowing and we 

cannot clean up. Can you expand on that and the gentlelady’s point 

about having the technology, the redundancy on clean-up if something happens? Clean-up but stopping what happened. 

Col. EDMONDSON. Just looking at the diverse shorelines that we 

have throughout the Gulf, I mean looking at our beautiful beaches, 

looking at our marshland, our estuaries and all that, all that area 

requires a different type of response. I think what is most important is that we had so much flow at the beginning that we were 

not even responding to because we did not know it was there. Then 

all of a sudden, it was there and we did not have the resources 

available, the real-time efforts to do those things. As we speak, it 

is still flowing. Even once we get that cap on it and they capture 

what they tell us is most of it, and hopefully it is, and hopefully 

those relief wells that are being drilled are going to be effective and 

they are going to work and do the things they need to. Then at that 

point, this marathon, maybe we can get towards the end of it. But 

I think that natural resource damage assessment has to be ongoing, we have to look at the efforts and we have to make sure that 

this fight—we are in it for the long haul. I appreciate the fact and 

certainly you evidence here today in the comments you are making, 

I believe that y’all are also here to make sure those things happen, 

and I do appreciate that; and thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Quickly for all three of you. Where have the bottlenecks of the 

information flow been that you can identify? Bottlenecks of information. Mr. Guidry, do you have a sense of that? 

Mr. GUIDRY. Not really. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, Colonel. 

Col. EDMONDSON. I think what I talked about earlier, I think 

having three different places of information that has to flow, 

whether it is the State command post and whatever stage you are 

in, and you have your National post which is now New Orleans, 

your Gulf post which is in Houma, Louisiana. I think getting that 

real time information is difficult when you deal with bureaucracy 

in each one as you move that information around. I think that is 

a bottleneck. I think that is when it is hard to understand that you 

can make a decision here, but it has still got to be approved over 

here and maybe over here. I think telling you I will get that answer tomorrow. Well, if you do not have it tomorrow, then we are 

now 36 hours, 48 hours into getting that stuff and then it is past 
34 

the coastline, it is into the marshes, on the beaches, it affects the 

economy, it affects the seafood industry and that. I think the effect 

just moves on and multiplies when you do not have that real-time 

information and getting that where it needs to be. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mayor. 

Mr. HIBBARD. I think certainly we saw bottlenecks at the State 

level getting down to the county level and the county level to the 

municipal level. The municipalities were not even included in the 

process until just recently. 

Last, I would say there was a bottleneck between professionals 

and laymen and we need to get that out. 

Mr. CARNEY. For the record, I had a shrimp po’ boy for lunch. 

Okay? It was delicious, so thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony. We could 

probably do this another couple of hours anyway, but we have to 

be respectful of the other panels. Our hearts are out to you and certainly all those who lost family in the explosion. But we are in this 

for the long haul. My kids are long-distance runners and I know 

what it means to be in it for the long haul, and as long as I am 

in this Chair, we will stay here and work with you to make sure 

this kind of thing does not happen again. 

We will probably have further questions and we may come to you 

in writing. Please respond as soon as you possibly can to our questions if we have them. Please free to contact our subcommittee and 

our committee any time you think there is information we ought 

to have. 

We will adjourn this panel. We will reconvene in 5 minutes, so 

people can refresh themselves. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CARNEY. We will call the second panel now. I want to welcome our second panel of witnesses and thank them for their patience. I think the first panel was very interesting and we needed 

to hear from them. 

Our first witness will be Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger. Rear Admiral Neffenger serves as the Deputy National Incident Commander for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill response. Previous to 

this assignment, he served as Commander of the Ninth Coast 

Guard District from May 2008 to April 2010. In this capacity, he 

was responsible for Coast Guard operations throughout the five 

Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway and parts of the surrounding States, including 6,700 miles of shoreline and 1,500 miles 

of international border with Canada. 

A native of Elyria, Ohio, Rear Admiral Neffenger was commissioned in 1982 at Coast Guard Officer Candidate School in Yorktown, Virginia. He has a diverse career of operational and staff assignments across the spectrum of Coast Guard missions. Notable 

among these, he was Captain of the Port, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator and Commander of Coast Guard Sector at Los Angeles/Long Beach, California where he was the senior Coast Guard 

operational commander for an area of responsibility encompassing 

over 300 miles of southern California coast, including the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex, the Nation’s largest. 

He has served in five Marine safety field assignments as an engineer on the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Gallatin; as Coast Guard liai-
35 

son officer in the Territory of American Samoa; as Coast Guard fellow on the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee and as a Chief 

of the Office of Budget and Programs at Coast Guard Headquarters 

in Washington, DC where he was the principal budget advisor to 

the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 

Rear Admiral Neffenger has earned three master’s degrees in 

National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island; and Public Administration from 

Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government; and in Business Management from Central Michigan University—by the way, 

my wife’s alma mater. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Baldwin 

Wallace College in Berea, Ohio. 

Our second witness is Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs Juliette Kayyem. 

As Assistant Secretary, Ms. Kayyem has strengthened coordination of intergovernmental interaction across the Department, improving efficiency and consistency of communication with State, 

local, Tribal, and territorial partners, and ensuring the integration 

of their homeland security priorities into the policy development 

process. 

Under her leadership, Intergovernmental Affairs, or IGA, has assumed the primary communication and coordination role in a broad 

array of homeland security initiatives including grant processes 

and funding, drivers’ license security, energy efficiency, and intelligence and information sharing with the State, local, and Tribal 

partners. In addition, IGA serves as the primary Tribal liaison for 

the Department coordinating over 500 Tribes throughout the Nation on homeland security issues. 

From 2007 until her appointment by Secretary Napolitano, she 

served as the Massachusetts first Under Secretary for Homeland 

Security and the Governor’s Federally designated homeland security advisor. In that capacity, she was responsible for developing 

State-wide policies on homeland security, with a focus on all-hazards strategic planning, prevention, and response, information 

sharing, interoperability, and energy security. Ms. Kayyem also 

had oversight of the Massachusetts National Guard. 

She is a 1995 graduate of Harvard Law School and a 1991 graduate of Harvard College. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. 

I now ask each to summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes—for 5 minutes—beginning with Rear Admiral Neffenger. 

STATEMENT OF PETER NEFFENGER, DEPUTY NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I will do my best, sir. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Carney and distinguished Members of 

the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about 

the on-going response into the explosion and oil spill from the 

Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit. 

What began as a massive rescue and subsequent search for 11 

who unfortunately were lost, has become the most complex spill 
36 

our Nation has ever encountered and certainly the most complex 

event of my career. 

This spill is further complicated by the lack of human access to 

the source, the challenge of measuring the total volume of oil discharge, the fact that the oil is spreading out in all directions, and 

that we have a major new oil spill every day. This is not a single 

monolithic spill, but rather has become thousands of small spills 

that in total threaten all five of the Gulf States and the livelihoods 

of the citizens of the Gulf coast. 

As you have already heard in previous testimony, there are thousands of people and hundreds of organizations across the Gulf coast 

that are responding to this spill. So I can understand why it sometimes is not clear how we are organized and command and control 

functions. Let me try to explain some of how that works. 

One of the lessons that we learned coming out of Exxon Valdez 

and what led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was that during 

major incidents, you need National level leadership to set strategic 

direction, coordinate National policy, facilitate collaboration among 

Federal, State, and local governments and coordinate strategic 

communications across Government and the affected communities. 

In this case, you have a National Incident Commander named, 

and that is Admiral Thad Allen, and as noted, I am his Deputy and 

was named as such on the second of May of this year. 

At the next level, we have the Federal on-scene coordinator with 

the statutory authority for oversight of oil spill cleanup on the 

water in the case of the Coast Guard. That individual directs the 

operation, overseeing the incident commands and we have one in 

Houma, Louisiana, one in Mobile, Alabama. Those are the two 

most active incident commands. We have also established incident 

commands in Galveston, Texas as well as Miami, Florida, for potential impacts in those areas. 

The Federal on-scene coordinator sits at the Unified Area Command, and so the purpose of the area command is to coordinate resources amongst those various incident commands, but the actual 

decision-making on a daily basis takes place in the incident commands. So those individuals in Houma, in Mobile, in Miami, in 

Galveston, Texas make determinations for the geographic area for 

which they are responsible. 

So in an incident of this complexity, you have to have different 

levels of organization to manage what are the countless numbers 

of activities across the thousands of miles of water and coastline. 

They do not do it alone, the area command, as you have heard, has 

had State representation from the very outset of the event, and in 

fact it is critical that the State be involved with us from the outset 

because they know best how to protect their coastlines and we can 

speak more to that during the question session. 

Given the scope and magnitude of this event, we brought together all levels of government, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and volunteers to respond in unprecedented numbers. 

As I said, my primary purpose is to ensure a tight linkage among 

all those levels, to look for problems and try to correct those problems so that we have effective command and control, the guiding 

principle of which is to push authority to the lowest possible level 

so that on-scene leaders can act and can act immediately with flexi-
37 

bility and autonomy to employ effective response strategies. We 

continue to work to make that tenet a reality across the Gulf region. We learned a lot of lessons along the way and it is improving 

and getting better with each day of this response. 

I have personally briefed every day the five States’ Governors. I 

do this 7 days a week each day, and we typically have at least 

three of the five Governors on those calls. I have received valuable 

and very frank feedback that has alerted me to areas where we 

needed to adjust operations, expand efforts, and incorporate greater 

State and local participation. 

Harnessing local knowledge and leadership is a continuing priority and I would agree with Colonel Edmondson’s assessment of 

the need to involve State and local—I mean local individuals. There 

are a number of examples of how we have done that, pushing liaisons out to each of the parish presidents’ offices in the State of 

Louisiana, to the county supervisors’ offices in the other States. We 

have liaisons assigned to each Governor and we have liaisons at 

the local branch levels, which are down in the local communities. 

So we have attempted to continue to engage at greater and increasing numbers. 

We have established vessel of opportunity programs where we 

are giving local control of those vessels to local communities under 

the over-arching guidelines established by the incident commanders. 

I have spent a significant amount of my time in the Gulf region 

over the last 21⁄2 months. I have visited spill sites numerous times 

and have worked a lot with the incident commands to determine 

what it is they need and how we can do it. We have identified 

every—with respect to resources there are a number of critical resources and we have heard of some of those. We have identified 

every foot of fire boom in the world, we have established a supply 

chain for everything from dispersants to skimmers to boom. We 

have procured boom from all domestic manufacturers and we mobilized all east and Gulf coast offshore skimming vessels. To that 

end, we are now procuring nearly all Nationally produced snare, 

containment fire boom, and we have engaged every domestic boom 

supplier. Of note, the daily or the weekly production was a few 

thousand feet prior to this spill event. We are now producing domestically a quarter million feet of boom per week as a result of 

the demand placed by this. 

So in closing, I think the success of this response hinges on a 

unified coordinated effort at all levels in reaching down as deep 

into the local organizations as you—or local communities as possible. We will be here as long as it takes to get this region cleaned 

up and made whole again. The Coast Guard will not be going 

away. As was noted, we live here too. This is a community. I spent 

8 years of my life in New Orleans in the Coast Guard and so I have 

a lot of affection and concern for this area. 

So I thank you for this opportunity and I welcome any questions 

you may have. 

[The statement of Admiral Neffenger and Ms. Kayyem follows:] 
38 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER NEFFENGER AND JULIETTE KAYYEM

JULY 12, 2010 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee. We 

appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Federal Government’s 

response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill specifically the chain of command for 

responders. 

On the evening of April 20, 2010, the Transocean-owned, BP-chartered, Marshall 

Islands-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON, located approximately 72 miles Southeast of Venice, Louisiana, reported an explosion 

and fire on-board. This began as a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission—within the 

first few hours, 115 of the 126 crewmembers were safely recovered; SAR activities 

continued through April 23rd, though the other 11 crewmembers remain missing. 

Concurrent with the SAR effort, the response to extinguishing the fire and mitigating the impacts of the approximate 700,000 gallons of diesel fuel onboard began 

almost immediately. In accordance with the operator’s Minerals Management Service (MMS)-approved Response Plan, oil spill response resources, including Oil Spill 

Response Vessels (OSRVs), were dispatched to the scene. After 2 days of fighting 

the fire, the MODU sank into approximately 5,000 feet of water on April 22nd. On 

April 23rd, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) located the MODU on the seafloor, 

and, on April 24th, BP found the first two leaks in the riser pipe and alerted the 

Federal Government. ROVs continue to monitor the flow of oil. 

As the event unfolded, a robust Incident Command System (ICS) response organization was stood up in accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF) 

and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). 

ICS is utilized to provide a common method for developing and implementing tactical plans to efficiently and effectively manage the response to oil spills. The ICS 

organization for this response includes Incident Command Posts and Unified Commands at the local level, and a Unified Area Command at the regional level. It is 

comprised of representatives from the Coast Guard (Federal On-Scene Coordinator 

(FOSC)), other Federal, State, and local agencies, as well as BP as a Responsible 

Party. 
39 

The Federal Government has addressed the Gulf Oil Spill with an all-hands-on 

deck approach from the moment the explosion occurred. During the night of April 

20th—the date of the explosion—a command center was set up on the Gulf Coast 

to address the potential environmental impact of the event and to coordinate with 

State and local governments. After the MODU sank on the 22nd, the National Response Team (NRT), led by the Secretary of Homeland Security and comprised of 

16 Federal agencies including the Coast Guard, other DHS offices, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), Department of Interior (DOI), as well as Regional Response Teams (RRT), 

was activated. 

On April 29, Secretary Napolitano declared the event a Spill of National Significance (SONS), which enhanced operational and policy coordination at the National 

level and concurrently allowed Admiral Allen’s appointment as the National Incident Commander (NIC) for the administration’s continued, coordinated response. 

The NIC’s role is to coordinate strategic communications, National policy, and resource support, and to facilitate collaboration with key parts of the Federal, State, 

and local governments. 

The NIC staff is comprised of subject matter experts from across the Federal Government, allowing for immediate interagency collaboration, approval, and coordination. While the FOSC maintains authorities for response operations as directed in 

the National Contingency Plan, the NIC’s primary focus is providing National-level 

support to the operational response. This means providing the Unified Command 

with everything that it needs—from resources to policy decisions—to secure the 

source and mitigate the impact. This will be a sustained effort that will continue 

until the discharges are permanently stopped and the effects of the spill are mitigated to the greatest extent possible. Beyond securing the source of the spill, the 

Unified Command is committed to minimizing the economic and social impacts to 

the affected communities and the Nation. 

VOLUNTEERISM AND COMMUNICATION WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES

A critical aspect of response operations is active engagement and communication 

with the local communities. Several initiatives are underway to ensure that happens. 

1. Active participation and engagement in town hall meetings across the region 

with industry and Government involvement. 

2. Coordination of public involvement through a volunteer registration hotline 

(1–866–448–5816), alternative technology, products, and services e-mail 
40 

(horizonsupport@aol.com), and response and safety training scheduled and conducted in numerous locations. 

3. More than 35,889 inquiries received on-line via the response website 

(www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com) with more than 34,478 inquiries completed, with 4-hour average time of response. 

4. Over 12 million page hits on response website. 

5. Over 754 documents created/posted to response website for public consumption. 

6. News, photo/video releases, advisories to more than 5,000 media/Governmental/private contacts. 

7. Full utilization of social media including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and 

Flickr. 

8. Establishment of Local Government hotlines in Houma, LA (985–493–7835), 

Mobile, AL (251–445–8968), New Orleans, LA (985–902–5253). 

CONCLUSION

From the very beginning of this crisis, the Federal Government has been in 

charge of the largest environmental clean-up effort in our Nation’s history. Thousands of ships and other vessels have been deployed to the Gulf. There are now 

nearly 46,000 personnel working across four States to contain and clean up the oil. 

These personnel are assisting in efforts to prevent more oil from coming ashore, 

clean beaches, train response workers, and help process claims. 

On July 7, Admiral Allen announced the launch of a new Federal web portal— 

RestoreTheGulf.gov—dedicated to providing the American people with clear and accessible information and resources related to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response and recovery. The site is designed to serve as a one-stop repository for news, 

data, and operational updates related to administration-wide efforts to stop the BP 

oil leak and mitigate its impact on the environment, the economy and public 

health—unifying web resources across the administration and increasing public access to the latest information. 

The Unified Command continues to attack the spill. As of July 6, 2010, over 28 

million gallons of oily water have been successfully recovered using mechanical surface cleaning methods. Further, over a million gallons of surface dispersants have 

been applied to break up the slick, and controlled burns have been used as weather 

conditions have allowed. In addition to the on-going offshore oil recovery operations, 

significant containment and exclusion booms have been deployed and staged strategically throughout the Gulf region. These booms are used to protect environmental 

and cultural resources, as well as critical infrastructure, as identified in the applicable Area Contingency Plans (ACPs). To date, nearly 3 million feet of boom have been 

positioned to protect environmentally sensitive areas. Fourteen staging areas and 

three regional command centers have been established across the Gulf Coast States. 

The Secretary of Defense approved the requests of the Governors of Alabama (up 

to 3,000), Florida (up to 2,500), Louisiana (up to 6,000), and Mississippi (up to 

6,000) to use their National Guard forces in Title 32, U.S. Code, status to help in 

the response to the oil spill. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We are ready to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Admiral. Secretary Kayyem. 

STATEMENT OF JULIETTE KAYYEM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. KAYYEM. Thank you, Chairman Carney and Members of the 

committee. I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on 

the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the efforts that the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and our Federal family have undertaken to respond to this incident in coordination 

with our State and local partners. So my testimony will focus on 

that fact. 

My history, as you said, Chairman, I was a State homeland security advisor, I worked for a Governor, I now work for a former Governor. So I understand quite well the priority of focusing State and 

local—of understanding what State and local officials know, under-
41 

standing their unique needs of their community and environments, 

unlike any other entity. 

As the Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at DHS, 

one of my roles, ironically actually, was to serve as the intergovernmental lead in the SONS, the Spill of National Significance, exercise just a few months before this spill. During that exercise, we 

were able to identify information gaps with our State and local 

partners and update our plans to address these. Obviously, as Admiral Neffenger said, the exercises in no way were reflective of 

what we are experiencing today, we admit that wholeheartedly. 

From the outset, we knew that working collaboratively with the 

State and local officials and responders closest to the incident 

would be essential in order to effectively coordinate this response 

and their input would be an invaluable resource for ideas and suggestions for improvement. This has been an unparalleled event 

with many challenges along the way, and we sought to learn lessons from the past and use this local knowledge and experience to 

inform our decision-making in every step of the response. We have 

learned as we have gone along, there is no question about it. I will 

describe some of the changes we made. We continue to try to improve every day, especially as the mayor noted in the previous testimony, very helpful for him to tell us and to tell you sometimes 

we are speaking in Coast Guardese or we are speaking in a language that is not understandable for his constituents. We have that 

as a take-away and we will continue to improve every day as we 

shift from the immediate response to the long-term recovery and 

some of the priorities the Secretary made as she takes on that essential and important agenda. 

So as I said, since Day 1, the administration has engaged in allhands-on-deck response to this spill. As we transition from the 

search and rescue operation into a larger incident response, we 

begin then to more thoroughly engage with our State and local 

counterparts in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, with Texas sort of not being—being more engaged as of late 

because some of the tar balls have appeared there and we continue 

to engage indeed along the eastern seaboard. We have had a number of outreach efforts with the Governors in those States. 

These efforts were built upon the extensive coordination that 

took place prior to this event, including of course the Area Contingency Plans and the work that people like Roland from Louisiana, 

we have known him for a long time, the kind of work that we have 

been doing from the get-go on oil spills. 

We heard about the pipe leaking on a Saturday, I was down here 

by Monday and we had our first Governors’ call on that Monday. 

We were in close contact with the Governors and their staffs and 

on that day the Governors’ staffs were invited into the Unified 

Area Command. We made it a priority to set up different structures to allow State and local officials to have input into the response efforts and these structures took several forms. As I said, 

we had the calls with the Governors, they became daily by the beginning of May and we have held these daily morning conference 

calls with senior administration officials and the Governors of the 

affected States and followed up in the afternoon with daily calls 

with local officials in the afternoon. I think those were the calls 
42 

that the Mayor was speaking about. These calls offer an opportunity for Governors and local officials to obtain the most current 

operational information and engage in a dialogue with the senior 

administration officials who are overseeing the response, like the 

Admiral, and to make suggestions or convey concerns. These include the briefings on leak stabilization, resource deployments, obviously a very large issue, and answers to questions officials have 

received from local constituents, primarily on claims, of course. 

For example, I will just give you examples, so that this does not 

sound so theoretical. On one of the daily calls, Governor Barber of 

Mississippi raised concerns about the communication capabilities of 

boats participating in the vessels of opportunity program. You will 

remember, a lot of boats, a lot of boat owners came forward, a couple thousand. It was a massive undertaking and the Coast Guard 

actually working with the State of Mississippi and all the States 

subsequently worked to put in place a task force system led by the 

Coast Guard boats to improve communication between the vessels 

and to get the resources available to those vessels, so maybe not 

every vessel had all the high-tech needs that the lead vessel would 

have but we had a way to be able to say there is oil here, we need 

to move here. 

As a result of these daily calls, it also became clear—so this is 

our lessons learned as we went along—that the response would 

benefit through increased and direct communication between the 

Governors and the officials running the multi-State incident command posts. In response, the Coast Guard and the Department set 

up deputy incident commanders. So instead of having it too topheavy, this was the beginning of the flat-lining of the response in 

each State. So these deputy incident commanders are in each State 

to give Governors direct access to the individuals running Coast 

Guard operations in their States. This meant that not all the Governors had to come to Houma or Robert—excuse me, Robert, Louisiana, that facility is now in New Orleans. It meant that we were 

able to get deputy incident commanders in each State. This also ensured that any questions, concerns, or requests from these Governors could be met promptly. 

I also want to make it clear that we are DHS-focused, Coast 

Guard-focused. This is being repeated in almost every level with 

the Federal family. So there are weekly calls between the Labor 

Department and the State workforce commissions, between OSHA 

and the State employment workforce commissions. I could go 

down—SBA, I mean, we are polling and working with the entire 

Federal family to make sure that their natural access points within 

the States and localities; for example, Health and Human Services 

working with the State health officials, are all getting the right information at the right time. 

In addition to the daily calls, I am just going to highlight one last 

thing, which the admiral focused on, which is the liaison officers 

and the changes we made. As the mayor said, sometimes the States 

have a governance structure that is not getting to the local level. 

We understand that now. We are used to working with Governors’ 

offices because of the State EOC structure, that is how it works. 

So beginning in May, we began to deploy what we are calling the 

Coast Guard Liaison Program, it was originally called the Parish 
43 

President Liaison Program but we realized we had other States 

that did not have parishes—and have deployed up to 80 Coast 

Guard officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to 

provide direct access to response for local officials. We have people 

sitting in these local government entities, whether they are mayors, county officials, whatever, trying to get to yes as quickly as 

possible. We hear in the media about a lot of the no’s, but when 

you actually think of the number of decisions that are being made 

on the local level about boom deployment, boat deployment, whatever else, that is all being done because of the close and localized 

cooperation between the Coast Guard, the Federal family, and the 

State and localities. 

I have gone over my time, but I would be happy to answer any 

questions about the governance structure and our responsiveness. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Kayyem. We will begin the round 

of questions, each Member getting 5 minutes, of course, and we will 

go until we are done. I will start and recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Admiral, when was the Coast Guard first made aware of the explosion? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. On the day that it happened. I think—I do not 

know the exact time, I do not have a time line, but I think it was 

within about an hour and a half or 2 hours after the initial explosion that we were notified of it and notified that we had the potential for both a massive search and rescue operation as well as a potential for a major oil spill. There were 700,000 gallons of fuel oil 

on board that vessel, so from the very outset, we were concerned 

about a major oil spill as a result of the explosion. 

Mr. CARNEY. I saw pictures in the news and that was one hell 

of an explosion. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. It really was; yes, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Why did it take 2 hours to notify you? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, again, let me double-check on that to be 

sure. We got initial notification, I think it probably took us awhile 

to get out there because it is quite a ways offshore and so by the 

time you out on sea and it is going to be at least a couple of hours 

by the time you get the helicopters launched. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, so the on-scene is different than the time you 

were notified. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Then what role did you play once you were 

there? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, initially, it was a rescue operation. 

There were over 100 people on board the vessel and 11 of whom 

were very early on identified as missing. So the first was a rescue 

operation and then a coordination of those vessels that were on 

scene to fight the fire on board the vessel. The Coast Guard does 

not do firefighting but we coordinate the efforts of those who do 

come out and do firefighting. So the fire-fighting efforts were going 

on, we were coordinating those efforts as well as conducting the 

search. That search went on for, as you know, a period of about 36 

hours or so. 
44 

Mr. CARNEY. Right, right. Now within your experience, did the 

initial, the first responders and the initial response, did that all 

work as pre-arranged within the various chains of command that 

had been pre-established? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, in my experience, it went according 

to our normal protocols and there were no delays in terms of that 

response. This is something that we do every day. 

Mr. CARNEY. Sure. You know, it is interesting because the initial 

reports were that there is no oil flowing out of this explosion. So 

we go from zero barrels a day to somewhere between 60 and 

100,000. In fact, we have heard the range from zero to 100,000 and 

we are still hearing that. That, I imagine, has to cause some confusion obviously in terms of response, et cetera. When did you actually notice the oil starting to flow? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, as I said, we thought from the outset 

that we had the potential for a major oil spill, so we actually activated our strike teams on the very next day, on the 21st of April. 

The first of the strike team members actually began to deploy the 

21st, so the very next day, because again, there were 700,000 gallons of fuel oil on board. So at a minimum, we were concerned 

about that. 

We did not know what might happen with respect to the wellhead. We, like everyone else, assumed that the blowout preventer 

would have operated, although we do not typically monitor blowout 

preventers. But when the vessel sank on the 22nd—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Let me stop you there. Are you now monitoring the 

blowout preventers? Or are you relying on BP to do that or the industry to do that? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, again, the Coast Guard does not have 

any statutory authority to do so. This is what was the Minerals 

Management Service responsibility to do that. I think that that is 

a question that needs to be asked with respect to Government oversight. Our responsibility is for the vessel itself, so the mobile offshore drilling unit. But all the drilling equipment and the connection to the drill floor was the responsibility of the Minerals Management Service. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. I apologize, you were talking about the time 

line. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. So anyway, when the rig sank on the 

22nd and took down with it that 5,000 feet of riser pipe, when it 

hit the bottom, it stirred up a tremendous amount of mud and silt. 

So the initial attempts to see what happened were clouded by that 

mud and silt. We did not know whether or not it was leaking, but 

again, we were already responding as if we were going to have a 

massive spill because it took 700,000 gallons of fuel oil down with 

it. So at a minimum, we were concerned about that from the Coast 

Guard. So we had actually begun to mobilize and we pulled out the 

Area Contingency Plan, talked to the State and said we need to 

start mobilizing. In fact, we had State representatives in that. The 

incident command post in Houma was established on the 21st, the 

very next day. The State provided a State on-scene coordinator on 

that very day, and in fact, the very first incident action plan that 

was signed, talked about mobilizing resources for a major oil spill. 

So our approach was potential major oil spill from the outset and 
45 

our typical response is to then start rolling the resources in, which 

we did with the strike team. 

As it became clear that there were significant leaks coming off 

the top of that—and it took about 24 to 36 hours for the turbidity 

to settle and really to get a good look at that riser. Then we realized that we had a potentially much, much larger problem on our 

hand. But as I said, we were already rolling a lot of resources in 

or had already begun the process, I should say to roll resources in. 

Mr. CARNEY. So it is beyond major at this point, by the time the 

resources are rolling and the turbidity has cleared, it is clear it is 

beyond a major spill. I am not sure what the next step is beyond 

a major spill, but we are in the midst of it right now. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, it is a worst-case discharge at that point. 

Mr. CARNEY. Obviously. The question I had is would you have 

done anything differently had you known sort of what the magnitude of the spill was at that time? I mean what else could you 

have done had you known? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Had we had perfect information, in other 

words. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yeah. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I do not think that initially we would have 

done anything different. Remember, we were involved in a very 

massive search and rescue operation first. That always takes precedence, safety and preservation of life. So that consumed the better 

part of the first 12 to 18 hours, the initial 12 to 18 hours and actually stretched out over a longer period as we looked at it. The rig, 

as I said, the rig did not sink until the 22nd but when it went 

down, we were still looking for—we still had some hope that the 

individuals might have survived on the rig, but just were not able 

to get free, that they might have been able to free themselves as 

the rig sank. But I do not know that there would have been any 

different response initially because of the need to mobilize rescue 

resources while at the same time beginning to move resources for 

a spill response. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, thank you. Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, admiral, 

for being here and testifying. 

Can you give us an update on the latest containment methods? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. Well, today, this is actually a critical 

week with respect to containment and I do not know how familiar 

you are with the various options that have been in play, but essentially you have—if I can just describe for a moment what was occurring up until yesterday and then what the plan is moving forward. 

Up until yesterday, we had a vessel called the Discover Enterprise, which was the so-called top hat that you have heard about. 

This is the one where you can see the oil leaking around the skirt 

of it. That has been collecting somewhere in the neighborhood of 

15,000 barrels daily off the top of that blowout preventer and lower 

marine riser package. Attached to one of the lines coming off of the 

side, it is called a choke line, is a vessel called the Q–4000. It has 

been collecting about 8,200 barrels on average a day. It has been 

burning all those off because it has no storage capacity, so it has 

just been flaring that off. So the combined total has been some-
46 

where in the neighborhood of 24- to 25,000 barrels daily coming off 

the top of that leak. 

The plan moving forward, and this is actually taking place today, 

was to remove that top hat and to place instead a sealing cap on 

board. Basically another small blowout preventer that will sit on 

top of the current blowout preventer, seal tightly and allow for a 

100 percent capture of the oil coming off the top of that wellhead, 

assuming you do not have any hurricanes or storms that would interrupt the vessel. So there are some additional vessels that have 

come on scene in order to collect that oil. However, it also gives the 

opportunity to attempt to shut the well in, which is the first thing 

that they will do. 

So there are Government scientists from the National Laboratories who have been in Houston for the past 80 days or so, and 

they have been reviewing, along with the BP engineers and others, 

the various steps associated with this. It really comes down to 

whether or not the well bore has integrity. So when they close it, 

there are three valves or three rams on this device that they are 

putting on this weekend. They will attempt to make the initial closure of those rams sometime in the next 48 to 72 hours, depending 

upon the testing and what it shows. They will see whether the well 

bore holds pressure, and they are expecting it to hold a certain 

amount of pressure. If it does, then it should be an indication that 

you have a well bore that is intact, and they may actually be able 

to shut the well in with no further outflow at all, with the final 

closure of the well being the completion of the relief well. 

I hope that is responsive to your question. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. When will we know whether this method, this latest method, is successful? Why did we not try it say weeks ago? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. As I understand it, and again, I am not an engineer, a sub-sea engineer. But as it has been explained to me and 

I have spent a fair amount of time talking with our scientists and 

the scientists, engineers, that are working on this; part of the problem initially was that this arrangement of blowout preventer and 

this device called the lower marine riser package—these are actually two separate devices—when you have an emergency on board 

a mobile offshore drilling unit, the first line of defense of course is 

the closure of the blowout preventer. That is supposed to have 

sealed it off. The second is what is called an emergency breakaway, 

which should have allowed that second piece of equipment called 

the lower marine riser package to break free and pull off the top. 

Both of those failed, and that of course, is—the ultimate question 

is how did that, how did you have a fail of all the fail-safe systems? 

Well, because that package did not pull off as designed, there 

was no way to—had that top package pulled off, you would have 

had an ability to immediately attach another blowout preventer because all the fittings would have been exactly right. So the intervening time it has taken them to both—and you had the blowout 

preventer that got kinked over at about a 5-degree angle. So over 

the intervening weeks, they have slowly been straightening the 

blowout preventer, straightening the fittings, fabricating new fittings to go on top of something that was never designed to take a 

blowout preventer, and actually fabricating a new blowout preventer. It just took—as I understand it, it just took those inter-
47 

vening days to do that. But they started working on this procedure 

immediately when they determined that that piece of equipment 

did not come off the top. 

But all that tells me is that this is an exceptionally complex undertaking underwater, if not frustrating, that it takes as long as 

it does to see results. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, thank you. I would like to talk about the 

use of dispersants. Representatives from the Southern Shrimping 

Alliance, the director of which lives in my district, they have expressed deep concern that the use of dispersants poses a threat to 

certain species in the Gulf of Mexico, including the shrimp. John 

Williams, who is executive director of the alliance, wrote NOAA 

and EPA weeks ago but has not received a response. My question 

is why are dispersants still being used when the EPA called for BP 

weeks ago to find a less toxic means of breaking up the oil slicks 

at the surface and we have no clue what type of long-term ecological impact dispersants have on the seafood industry, but in general. Are there alternative technologies and then also if so, why are 

we not using these technologies? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I think you rightfully note that the EPA is the 

governing agency for use of dispersants and they have been—we 

have worked very closely with them with respect to how to use 

those and how to use them effectively. They have used very carefully at the toxicity of the current dispersants, they are continuing 

to conduct tests. I will tell you that the goal is to minimize their 

use as much as possible. 

If you have good weather windows, you can skim, burn, and otherwise attack the oil mechanically and significantly reduce the 

number of dispersants that you use. But the real tradeoff is between shoreline impact, ultimately shoreline impact and the potential environmental damage that that can do, particularly in sensitive marsh areas and rookeries and the like, and using 

dispersants to knock down that a bit. The other reason that they 

use dispersants is to knock down the volatile compounds coming up 

around the vessels because those pose, not just hazards to human 

beings, but explosion hazards out on the sea. 

So to that end, EPA has worked very carefully to set levels of dispersant use that they would like to see not exceeded. Those for the 

most part have been adhered to, although there have been times 

when operations have dictated use of higher levels. The hope is 

that this week if they are able to shut the well in, then we can stop 

using dispersants entirely because I think that no one ever expected to be using dispersants over this extended period of time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much, I appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Green for 5 minutes. We are going to adhere 

closely to 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, admiral, 

for your testimony today. I thank the other witness as well. But I 

also thank you, admiral, for your service to our country. We appreciate you greatly. 

Admiral, there is not a one-size-fits-all response. You indicated 

that you initially assumed that you had a major oil spill. Do you 

make a distinction in your mind between a major oil spill and what 
48 

we have with reference to the wellhead and oil continuing to flow 

from that wellhead at an enormous rate? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, I think that it is a new major oil spill 

every day for us. That is the unprecedented piece. I mean we have 

an event that has a beginning right now, but most oil spills have 

a beginning, middle, and end, the Exxon Valdez, even the very 

large ones are generally bound by an event. You have a full release 

and then you are done. 

So I think what makes this the most challenging oil spill certainly that I have been involved in and probably that this country 

has faced is the fact that it is on-going and it is continuous. So 

even on a good day when you can collect a lot of oil by skimming, 

you can burn a lot of it off and you can collect a lot through the 

containment systems, you are still facing another day the next day 

of the same thing. 

Mr. GREEN. If I may, Admiral, because time is of the essence, 

when did you first determine that you needed to throw everything 

that you have at it? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I think when we saw those leaks, when we realized that we did not have—the blowout preventer did not work 

and when the first images of those individual leaks coming off the 

riser pipe were seen, then we knew we had a real problem. 

Mr. GREEN. When did you conclude that you did not have enough 

resources immediately available to contain this spill? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, I just think back in my own experience, 

I’ve always assumed I do not have enough resources available because you cannot get everything you need fast enough. As an operational commander, I have always said send me everything you can 

find and if I do not need it, I will send it back home. 

Mr. GREEN. In this case, when did you say send me everything 

that you can find? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I think it was within the first few days of discovering that we had that leak coming out. 

Now again, I remind you that I became involved on the second 

of May, but I can tell you that when I arrived down here on the 

third of May, I saw people asking for everything they could get 

their hands on. Now the interesting thing is that as I mentioned 

before in my opening statement, there were only a few thousand 

feet of boom being manufactured weekly in this country prior to 

this spill, for obvious reasons. There was not a great demand for 

it. So it takes some time to ramp up production and it certainly 

takes some time to ramp up production of bigger ticket items like 

skimmers, particularly the types of skimmers that you need for inshore and near-shore. 

Mr. GREEN. I have two additional questions, Admiral, so I will 

have to intercede. One is this, have you received an estimate or a 

guesstimate as to the size of the pool of oil that the spill is emanating from? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. The reservoir itself? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I just know that it is considered a productive 

reservoir. I think I would refer that question to—in fact, I can take 

that question back to the BP engineers to get you an answer as to 
49 

how much they might expect to produce from that. But I do not 

have that answer at my fingertips. 

Mr. GREEN. I would like for you to, if you would, give us a written response. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I can do that. 

Mr. GREEN. My next question is, given what has happened this 

time and while your worst-case scenario, well, your major oil spill 

did not coincide with what this has become, a worst-case scenario, 

what would you need and what resources would you need, and 

what would you do differently if you had the opportunity to have 

the resources necessary? How would you go about this, coping with 

this and making sure that you had minimal impact by virtue of resources that you could utilize to impact the spill itself? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I think we would always have been challenged 

by moving resources in, because again, you have—there are a lot 

of resources on the Gulf coast and most of those moved right away, 

the large skimming vessels. So getting out to the source was not 

the initial concern, it was really preparing, getting enough boom 

and other protective devices and materials and technologies along 

the beaches as you look at the potential for an impact across a 5- 

State region. That is the unprecedented piece and you have hundreds and hundreds of small communities and sensitive areas and 

the like. Most oil spills are limited in geography as well as limited 

in time. So you can work to move those massive resources that you 

have to those areas. So I think that the challenge is thinking about 

what type of capacity do you need to have in reserve for something 

that threatens this large of a geographic area. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Ms. Jackson Lee, 5 minutes, please. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, our colleague has to leave and 

I will yield to my colleague from California. 

Mr. CARNEY. All right. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, the gentlelady from Texas and Mr. 

Chairman. 

I am going to be very brief in my questions and if you could answer as much as possible yes and no, that would be greatly appreciated. 

No. 1, Admiral, could you please provide to this committee the 

time line for both the skimmers and the boom, how many we have 

received, where we got them from and what is our plan forward? 

You do not have to give it to us right this moment, but within the 

next, preferably 48 hours, if you could give us the time line. I know 

it has gone anywhere from 300 to 447 3 weeks ago to now I think 

somewhere around 500-something. I think it is supposed to get to 

750. So if you could let us know, because I think that is a key point 

in how the recovery or the response occurred. 

My second question, Ms. Kayyem, clearly from the comments 

that have been made from the first panel, there is a concern about 

the terms of what is being communicated. I have watched the admiral make his presentation, Admiral Allen, and although it was 

excellent and all of that, to the general layman, it is quite complicated. So would you please take back to the Secretary for her 

very serious consideration of immediately, not lessons learned next 

time, but now, how quickly can we get a crew out here to begin to 
50 

televise on a daily basis pictures of what is happening, go out in 

the boats, so people will accurately know what is going on. Because 

as I said in my beginning comments, I have not found the coverage 

to be accurate thus far, of what I viewed of the media in terms of 

the entire coverage. 

The next is—— 

Ms. KAYYEM. Yes, I will. Thank you. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Admiral, if you would please—I do not 

know if you had an opportunity to hear Mr. Guidry, but he works 

for the State and when we were out there today in the impacted 

marsh, he admitted from the State level that one of the processes 

that they have used in the past has been to cut and to allow the 

flow to go through. Apparently there is disagreement out there in 

the sensitive area where we were, which was Pass a Loutre, of allowing that. So would you please double back and make a commitment to finding out if the State has already allowed it, why is there 

a concern now in the sensitive area? If I am not mistaken, you are 

in charge. So if you are in charge, the Coast Guard is in charge, 

what my request would be is if there is any disagreement, test one 

or two, and if it works, then we know. But to hold back and to 

allow it to sit there when that has not always been the practice 

that has been used I think certainly merits your review. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I will take a look at that and we will get a 

report back to you. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir. 

Then my last comments that I just wanted to make was a little 

bit of the facts of what I have learned, and I am on my way to 

learn some more. One, I want to say that to my knowledge, over 

600 media individuals have been allowed the opportunity to view 

what is going on. I do not think that has been clearly communicated, that there has been a very free moving back and forth. 

No. 2, 75 Members of Congress have been out here. There are 

46,000 workers out there working right now every day, many of 

them from 6:00 a.m. in the morning until 10:00 at night, and that 

is not being said. 

No. 3, finally, what I think is most important, my closing point, 

is to your liaisons. Commander Dan Precourt, who is in the Tammany area in Slidell, and Commander Claudia Guiser, I just want 

to say what incredible people and what they are doing and the 

folks all who are working with them, not just with the Coast 

Guard, but other teams as well, local, State, and so on. The people, 

what they are doing, the passion that they have, they are doing everything that they can. If they could lay their bodies out there and 

stop one more seep, they would do so. I do not think enough people 

know it. It is our job to make sure that they are aware of it and 

to give them the resources that they need. 

But I am very grateful for what has happened and hopefully we 

will make sure that this never occurs again. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee, you may reclaim your 

time now. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

thank the witnesses very much and to admiral, we meet again in 

New Orleans, as you well know, it should be noted well that you 
51 

were ever present during Hurricane Katrina in being first on the 

search and rescue of 22,000 individuals. That number may have 

gone up out of the waters of Hurricane Katrina right out of this 

city, and again, we want to offer our appreciation. 

To Madam Secretary, let me just suggest beyond those who are 

working here, to make it very clear that in the instance of this administration, a quick response has been evident. The President’s 

establishment of a task force that included the Secretary of Homeland Security, the many hours that the EPA Administrator has 

been on the ground, the Secretary of the Interior, collaborative 

work of the Secretary of Homeland Security and, of course, the U.S. 

Coast Guard that has dual jurisdiction in transportation and homeland security have been ever-present. I think that is important because it is difficult to explain the work that the Government is 

doing. 

I was with the EPA Administrator this weekend and I know that 

she has spent a number of hours, along with the Secretaries, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Homeland Security. This is important because as you heard the Colonel say, are you going to 

leave us, are you going to stay and to finish the mission? 

My question to you, Madam Secretary, are we going to finish the 

mission? Two, what are you doing to answer the question of the 

mayor as it relates to more resources from BP to help them with 

their tourism quandary that they are in? Also, his question as to 

how we can translate technicalese language, reporting language on 

conference calls to comforting language to businesses and citizens. 

Ms. KAYYEM. Well, let me begin with the first one, which is no 

one is going anywhere. I do not just speak for the Coast Guard or 

the Department. To describe the number of Federal agencies who 

are working with the States and localities on everything ranging 

from the health issues and the EPA issues, which you described, 

to worker exploitation, to the environment, marshland, and cleanup is an amazing relationship between the Federal Government, 

the States, and localities. Part of what their job is, is to not only 

help right now, but to lay a foundation for the important long-term 

reconstruction and recovery of this area that is not just about the 

environment and the waters, but of course about the people who 

have lost jobs or who may have to change jobs. So all of those are 

part of the mandate that Secretary Mabus, as the President had 

described and one that we are in partnership with Secretary 

Mabus’ team. You know they have been down here a couple of 

times already, because we view both the response and the longterm recovery as hand-in-hand. 

To the last point about the speaking in—being able to speak to 

communities, we heard that, we hear that, and we will continue to 

do that. Part of that is being able to explain to people sort of outside the noise of a lot of the complaints that we have received. We 

are not immune to what we see on TV either and so I asked this 

morning, just to give you an example, because I hear it. It sounds 

like we are not permitting emergency permits given the speed by 

which we need to get things done and I actually learned this morning that of the emergency permits on the environmental side by the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, they have gotten 101 permit requests, 79 have been issued, only 8 are pending. 
52 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I only have a few more seconds. 

Ms. KAYYEM. Yes. So in terms of putting this in perspective for 

people to know the speed by which we are working. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Admiral, if you would, strike teams have been very effective and 

I think people were confused about the line of command and who 

was leading, if you will. I have always or I have cited what is going 

on with BP as a cardiac surgeon having the talent to operate on 

a patient but having no talent to close the patient and the patient 

bleeds to death. What would be helpful in terms of more resources, 

more knowledge on technology on our strike teams? Secondarily, 

has BP, after the June 9 letter of Admiral Watson, provided you 

with their redundancy if Plan B and C do not work? What then are 

we expecting and what kind of enforcement will the unified command have, the strike teams have, the Federal Government have 

on the fact that they have no further answers or making them get 

an answer? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I will start with the first question on the 

strike teams. I think that is a relevant question. You know, we 

have three strike teams in the Coast Guard, they are managed out 

of the National Strike Force Coordination Center in Elizabeth City, 

North Carolina. I think it is important to take a look at what type 

of resourcing we need there going forward and what we learn out 

of this spill. They are sized for a certain type of expectation and 

I think that this spill response has taught us that maybe we need 

to take a look at what those expectations are. So I think that is 

a good question to ask. 

Second, with respect to the letter to BP, they have indeed provided a plan for redundancy. I described part of that plan just a 

moment ago with this cap, but there is a significant additional collection capacity that is on scene in the event this cap does not 

work, that we believe will be adequate to contain everything coming off of the top of that. If it is not, then they will have to continue—well, I will put it this way, if what they currently attach to 

it is not enough to collect it, then they have got additional vessels 

on hand that we expect them to bring into the fight to continue to 

collect. 

So I think that moving forward, they have provided us with assurances that they understand the need for redundancy, they have 

not yet failed to provide anything that we have asked for and we 

are hopeful that the combination of what they are attempting this 

weekend and the additional vessels that have come on scene should 

be enough to contain 100 percent of what is coming out and/or close 

it in completely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You will not be giving up? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. No, ma’am; no, as I said before, we are in this 

until it is over, however long that is. So this is my job for a long 

time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, ma’am. I hope not too long. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CARNEY. But we are glad you are here. 

Now the last SONS exercises in March of this year, were any of 

the lessons learned there brought to bear in this particular case? 
53 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, what I would say is you learn a lot of 

immediate lessons out of exercises and communications is always 

one of the first lessons. You have to talk to people up and down 

and sideways. It is always the greatest challenge. 

I think the real challenge in this one goes back to what I mentioned earlier and that is that it affected so many different communities so quickly and it is on-going. This is really the first response 

where you are already dealing with recovery and restoration issues 

in the middle of an on-going response. 

So some of those lessons are always carried forward. The final 

after-action report I do not believe has been done yet for that, but 

as I said, the initial lessons are that you need to establish a National incident command, that was one that we learned and we did 

that immediately as this was declared a Spill of National Significance. You need to work very quickly on establishing effective communications and getting a good handle on the information flow. As 

you know, those have been challenges, but we are getting better 

with that as we go along. 

Ms. KAYYEM. That was exactly the lesson that we learned working with the Coast Guard, in the Office of the Secretary, was the 

inner-governmental communications could not be fast enough or 

constant enough given, in that case, an exercise that just hit I 

think two States and the east coast. Given the breadth and depth 

and just how long this has been, that is why we have so many people deployed, that is why we established a liaison program and, as 

I said, we are learning as we go along. The States are one thing, 

and as you heard from the mayor, they have communications 

issues within their own chain of command and within their own 

State. Where did the $50 million go that BP gave to the State, that 

is something that the States will have to answer to and so there 

is a lot of—just because we are talking to a Governor’s office does 

not mean that that is going to be acceptable or necessary for the 

locality. So that is why we deployed these 80 folks into only local 

parishes or jurisdictions. 

Mr. CARNEY. One thing we learned from the previous panel is 

the issue of flexibility. I think that word was said about half a 

dozen times. In terms of communication, Madam Secretary, where 

are you going to go with the flexibility of communication, you 

know, to take input from locals who seem to know how to respond, 

who have done it in the past and work that all the way up to the 

President if need be? 

Ms. KAYYEM. I think some of them have. So I think part of our 

lessons learned is, No. 1, do people know where to go to actually— 

with their ideas or their response plans? I think, as you heard, we 

have worked that through much better now. I think part of that 

is because people see Coast Guard officials in their local EOCs, 

they know how to access the Coast Guard at the State EOCs. We 

have got a lot more people deployed, so they know how to access 

it. That is the first thing. 

The second is a much more difficult issue, which I will just be 

blunt with you about. Sometimes we cannot get agreement. I mean 

you have seen it on some of the more large, grand proposals that 

have come out of some localities. Sometimes there is just going to 

be reasonable disagreement. What we are trying to do is explain 
54 

to people why we are going to go one path and not the other. So 

we are taking seriously both the access to information issue and 

speaking maybe to more people more effectively, and then also explaining why certain decisions were made. Just quickly, the marsh 

issue, right? There is reasonable disagreement—these are things I 

never knew before—about why you would let oil sit in marshes and 

just evaporate, because if you put a lot of people in there to clean 

it up, you are going to kill the marshes. I did not know that, we 

need to explain it better. I did not know that before and we need 

to explain it better. That is a choice that we have made through 

the unified command. 

Mr. CARNEY. Oil does not kill the marshes? 

Ms. KAYYEM. Pardon? It does. These are the choices. None of 

these are ideal choices. I mean we start every day knowing that we 

are dealing with the worst environmental and oil spill. So any time 

there is slightly good news, that is a better day, and hopefully we 

are getting closer to some better days. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, as I noted in my opening statement, NOAA has predicted this will be an active to extremely active as far as the hurricane season is concerned. High winds and rough seas from Hurricane Alex delayed response efforts. In addition to the delay in the 

response efforts, what other impacts on the response and clean-up 

do you anticipate if another hurricane enters the Gulf and what 

impact might hurricanes have on the trajectory of the oil and to 

what extent does the Unified Command work with FEMA to define 

roles and responsibilities for dealing with the potential of more oil 

coming ashore as a result of a hurricane? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. With respect to the planning that we are concerned about. As you know, there are mature structures in place, 

mature plans in place for hurricanes along the Gulf coast. So we 

have a lot of experience, just like the State. Working together with 

them to plan for the normal types of evacuations that you might 

expect to see. In our case, it is evacuating people from offshore and/ 

or conducting the various rescue operations that generally come 

with weather systems that move offshore. 

The spill, of course, added some significant complexity to that. 

We have a lot of critical resources now that we have put to bear 

on this spill, whether it be skimming equipment, specialized vessels, boom and the like. So without speaking about the interruption 

of the actual attempt to clean, you have got to think about how you 

protect that equipment by retrieving it, putting it into safe harbors 

and/or safekeeping and then immediately putting it back on scene 

after the hurricane passes. 

So in real terms, you are probably looking at about a 2-week 

interruption by the time you get that equipment out, and we have 

been working with logisticians and the DOD and others to think 

about how you would actually take 6,000-plus vessels out of the region, protect them, over 3.5 million feet of boom out of the region, 

protect it, and get it re-established, re-deployed. So that is a significant challenge. I do not say that lightly because I think that it is 

likely that it would be difficult to save all the boom, for example. 
55 

In fact, most of it you would have to consider lost, but it will do 

its own damage. 

Storm systems typically push in from the south, as you know, so 

you are going to get strong southerly winds. Alex is a good example 

of some of the challenges that we would face. It raised the storm 

tides by about a foot and a half and we suddenly saw tar balls coming into Lake Pontchatrain. That is because of the surge action 

from a storm that was in the southwest of the Gulf. That flushed 

back out fortunately and we saw many of those tar balls come back 

out of Lake Pontchatrain. But you would see some type of impact 

like that. 

With respect to FEMA, we have been working very closely with 

FEMA over the past month and a half to define responsibilities, respective responsibilities, under this spill response. The definitions 

are already there for a normal hurricane but we had to determine 

what happens with this spill response. The basics of what happens 

is that the Federal on-scene coordinator remains the Federal onscene coordinator for clean-up of any oil impact from this spill. 

FEMA has responsibility for the Stafford Act declaration that 

might follow and the normal assistance and support to the State 

and localities that would result from that. So we have drawn a very 

clear line and if you are interested, there is actually a very detailed 

hurricane plan for this response, which we can provide. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. We would like that. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Okay. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Madam Secretary, would you like to respond as 

well? 

Ms. KAYYEM. Just to make absolutely clear to you that for purposes of the individuals who would be impacted by a hurricane, 

what they know, which is the Stafford Act regime, will apply. So 

there is no—there is this bright line because what we heard from 

the Secretary and the President was we do not want to mix anything up. So just to be clear that that regime of remedy would still 

absolutely apply regardless if the spill had stopped, was on-going 

or whatever else. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Admiral, do you have sufficient resources to carry out your additional missions? Can you answer that question? Because I know 

this is a big responsibility, and how can we help as Members of 

Congress? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, I think as I said to somebody once, you 

know, there is no operational commander who will ever say no to 

additional resources. But as I look at it, the real challenge for any 

agency going forward would be surging to this extent for an extended period of time. We have a significant number of our personnel assigned to this response, a significant number of our vessels, quite a few aircraft, and we have to do that while balancing 

the needs around the rest of the country. We are fortunate in that 

we have no other major incidents occurring in this country right 

now. But if we were to have one, it would—we would be stretched 

thin I believe. 

So I think the question going forward is what is the—how much 

surge capacity do you need a single agency to have and if you cannot afford the surge capacity you think it should have, how best to 
56 

integrate all the other arms of Government to be part of this, because honestly this event, there is no single agency that could manage an event like this by itself, you really do need all those other 

departmental agencies to be part of it as well. So I think that moving forward, the planning has to take into account how you integrate, effectively integrate, all those different arms of Government 

to take their various roles. But I think that it will remain a challenge for us moving forward if this were to extend for another extended period of time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate 

it. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One question, admiral. The BP worst-case scenario plan, that 

plan is something that you were privy to: True? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. For this particular well? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Adm. NEFFENGER. No, sir, there is no requirement for the Coast 

Guard to have reviewed the plan that was submitted to the Minerals Management Service. We required a plan for the vessel, for 

the mobile offshore drilling unit, because it is classified as a vessel. 

We required a response plan for that—— 

Mr. GREEN. Have you had occasion to review the plan at all? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I have reviewed the plan since this event; yes, 

sir. 

Mr. GREEN. All right, given that you have reviewed the plan, 

whether you were required to or not, what is your assessment of 

that worst-case scenario plan? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, I would say that it did not envision this 

type of scenario. Their plan, as most plans do, envisioned a bounded event, an event that had a beginning, middle, and end. So it did 

not take into account the potential for a well that was uncontrolled 

for this period of time. 

Mr. GREEN. The plan has been criticized, as you know, in the 

various media outlets. Some of the criticisms have gone to animals 

that were to be preserved that no longer exist; persons that were 

to be contacted that are no longer with us. What other deficiencies 

did you find in the plan? I want you to be a little bit specific if you 

can, please? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. Well, I can give you a more complete answer 

for the record, but I would say in general terms, if—and going forward, I think that we need to look at closing that gap, so that— 

it is clear to me that we need to have—if the Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing and ensuring the effective response to oil 

spills in the maritime environment, then I would like to know what 

the plans are associated with those, all the plans associated with 

the potential for oil to spill in the maritime environment. I think 

a detailed review of that plan is in order, as are all other plans associated with the potential for oils to spill, not just from vessels but 

from any entity on the outer continental shelf, because I think that 

that would be helpful in terms of our response. 

I will say though that regardless, we prepare—I always assume 

it’s going to be the worst possible thing that is going to happen. Because as I said before, you can always turn things around and send 
57 

them home. But with respect to specific deficiencies, I think that 

what I would like to do is let some of the investigations really play 

out and see what they recommend coming out of this. I know that 

there are a number of investigative arms that are taking a good 

hard look at that, and I am interested in seeing what their recommendations are for how to improve those plans in the future. 

Mr. GREEN. I will yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, Mr. Cao is here, so he gets to ask a question. 

Mr. CAO. I just have one question to the Secretary. Post-Katrina, 

we saw a lack of communications between Federal agencies. Now 

in regards to the oil spill, we again see a lack of communications 

between the different Federal agencies with, for example, just looking at the construction of the berms, the Army Corps of Engineers 

would say build and then someone else would come and say well, 

let us stop, move the pipe someplace else. It generated all kinds of 

confusion for the State as well as for the local governments. 

What do you have planned to promote better inter-agency communications in the event of a future natural disaster or a future 

oil spill? 

Ms. KAYYEM. Well, let me talk generally and then to that specific 

issue. So twice a day, both the cabinet Secretaries and then the 

White House hosts an inter-agency call as well, just to get the Federal family in place because of that concern that we wanted to have 

everyone on the same page. There are a number of important equities involved with this response. We take the environmental concern seriously, we take the response concern seriously, everyone 

has a seat at the table. Even within the Federal family, we may 

not always agree, but everyone has a place at the table for the ultimate decision-maker, which is of course the President, but the National incident command structure, which oversees this. 

So in terms of communication, that is how we are trying to get 

a unified—that is how we sort-of demand a unified voice by the 

Federal Government. Then as I described earlier, the sort of outreach to the States and localities about what it is that we are doing 

and why we are doing it, and we have lessons learned in terms of 

how we are communicating. So, for example, you know, on almost 

every sort of major initiative announcement, say the Ken Feinberg 

claims announcement, we were very, very clear about what that 

would mean and what it did not mean and then we are sort of a 

unified Federal family. 

On the issue about the berm, and obviously a very controversial, 

very, very public—you know, we have an Army Corps of Engineers 

that is running quickly on its emergency permits, it has issued all 

but one in less than 17 days. So we are focusing on the big one, 

but we are focusing on the minority in terms of what the Army 

Corps of Engineers is doing every day. If someone heard the Army 

Corps of Engineers say this is advancing, apologies for that, but actually the Army Corps of Engineers always knew it was not the ultimate decider. So even if it had approved something, which it had 

only approved a piece of it, ultimately the decision is made by the 

National incident commander. The Army Corps of Engineers is just 

looking at the feasibility of doing this; the National incident commander is looking at is this actually something that is going to 
58 

be—a larger question which is, is this part of the response or feasible response plan. 

Reasonable people disagree about that, but that is why it may 

appear the focus of where we are, but we have heard you and others concerned about was that red tape. For us, that was actually 

the necessary sort of different equities that had sort of a strong— 

different agencies having a strong equity in the ultimate decision. 

Mr. CAO. What I have seen at the ground level obviously is the 

inability of the Federal Government to make quick decisions. In situations such as an oil spill, we do not have a period of weeks or 

months to do one study and another study and another study. 

Quick decisions have to be made and again, there seems to be the 

inability of the Federal Government to do that. What ways can we 

streamline—— 

Ms. KAYYEM. We had the similar concern and so over the course 

of two and a half or however long we have been doing this, the 

summer of 2010, part of what we have been doing is to ensure that 

the Coast Guard and all the agencies are flat-lining their decisionmaking authority. It does not mean—the deputy incident command 

structure that is established, it is the liaison structure that we 

have in place with these 80 folks who are making sort of basic decisions. So flat-lining it so the decisions are made quickly about the 

deployment of assets, when things are coming in, making sure that 

every Federal partner knows the seriousness of this so, once again, 

people believe the Corps of Engineers is studying, studying, studying, when you actually look at the numbers, 79 have been issued 

out of 101 permits with 12 of those withdrawn because they were 

never going to satisfy the Corps. So we have only done two denials 

and we issued all but one of them with in 17 days. That is not 

ideal, you want decisions made in a day, but that is pretty fast 

from the perspective of the kinds of projects that we want forward. 

The movement of boom is always related to the weather, we are 

making those decisions every single morning. 

So we are concerned about that, we have heard it, we are trying 

to flat-line the Federal family and work with the States about what 

are they doing and what assets are they utilizing that can support 

us. So as you know, 17,000 National Guard had been authorized 

by Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Gates in that first week to 

be used. Only a small fraction are being utilized by the States. 

What can the States bring to the table as well on the Federal bill, 

and ultimately the BP bill actually, to assist in getting to yes, very, 

very quickly. So we look forward to working with the States in sort 

of the expansive use of their National Guard as well. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you, I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Questions always start mounting when you 

hear other Members raise concerns. 

Let me pose to you, admiral, I represent a large segment of the 

Gulf region that has individuals who live off the Gulf, whether it 

is fishermen and shrimpers, and when I say represent, they are in 

the region in Texas and we have worked with them through different hurricanes as a Member of the Homeland Security Committee. But also thousands of innocent workers who are in the oil 

and gas industry, who live off those types of opportunities, if you 
59 

will, and many around the Nation do not understand that. I think 

one of the witnesses said they were sitting next to shrimpers and 

people in the industry and both saying the same thing about the 

need to preserve their way of life, their opportunity for an income. 

With that in mind, you have been very careful not to step on jurisdictional toes and I respect that, but I want from your experience just as you have seen the building blocks come together, 

would you think it would be important that we ramp up and make 

more stringent, for example, the kind of recovery redundancy 

plans, the kinds of plans that the industry has previously had to 

file on something as catastrophic as this oil spill is? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I think that is a major lesson learned already, 

that we need to revisit the types of plans that we require and what 

those plans contain. I think that is something that we are already 

looking at inside the Coast Guard. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. One of the ideas that I have and let me say 

it and not necessarily ask you to comment unless you feel positively 

inspired. But I like you being gracious about the many agencies 

and I think the collaboration has been wonderful, but after 9/11, 

America woke up and said we need a general, we need a chief, we 

need someone to protect the homeland. It is the Department of 

Homeland Security, we cannot get away from it. Frankly, as I 

looked at a legislative fix, I think it is enormously important to 

vest that authority, even more so, in the Department of Homeland 

Security, which then raises the ante for the component that you 

may have, for example, because I think the Coast Guard, who has 

been very effective on the high seas of going and boarding ships 

and arresting people if necessary for the ills of the sea, has the 

kind of authority that can make it clear that your recovery plan 

must be of a great level of excellence and that there be no tomfoolery at relates to this kind of business which can be very dangerous. It can be very positive, but it can be very dangerous. 

Do you have thoughts about the need to ensure a better enforcement so that we can be attuned to who is not following the law and 

who is? 

Adm. NEFFENGER. I think your points are spot on. With respect 

to the particular planning enforcement, it goes back to my earlier 

comment about what I have already seen to be a gap between the 

requirements of what was the Minerals Management Service for 

producing plans, and the requirement of the Coast Guard for producing vessel plans. Those two did not come together. In retrospect, 

those are two things that should come together. So I absolutely 

agree that at a minimum, we need to look at closing that gap, so 

that those agencies, such as the Coast Guard, that are responsible 

for responding to and overseeing cleanup of oil spills on the water, 

understand all the potential oil spills that might occur. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, very quickly, I am going to 

suggest that we try to overcome those sticky jurisdictional issues 

and look at coming together, the vessel plans and the rig plans; but 

I know you have an answer. But let me just quickly throw this to 

you as my time goes. 

First of all, you can go back to the Secretary and indicate that 

Congresswoman Jackson Lee wants the Coast Guard to have arrest 

powers as they go on the drilling rigs if they are not going to ad-
60 

here to the commands that are being made, if there is a dangerous 

situation. 

But I do want to ask you quickly about this claims system which, 

again, is ad hoc. We think the person who has had great history 

with 9/11, but I think there should be a better claims process, independent claims process, that comes under an umbrella of some 

agency when it is required, beyond FEMA because this is not a 

natural disaster, has not been declared. What about a claims system that would be based or have some connection to the Department of Homeland Security and are you all ensuring that this 

claims system is working? I do not think it will because there is 

a push-back by BP for shrimpers and oyster men, where are their 

receipts, where are the restaurants’ receipts? It does not work that 

way. 

Ms. KAYYEM. So, just very quickly, we do have confidence in the 

independent assessments and claims process that Ken Feinberg is 

sort of reviewing right now. He is going to be completely up and 

running within 2 weeks, he has spent a lot of time in the field. In 

the interim, the Secretary recognizing the same thing that—most 

people know Stafford, we have got to deliver on their needs. She 

set up with Tracy Waring, who is behind me, is the lead in integrated services team that is taking all the claims available to folks 

and all the money that might be accessible, explaining it to them, 

providing them information. So in terms of claims, just even today, 

53,000 total checks have been written, 160,000 claims filed. So that 

is about 50 percent right now. 

The biggest issue right now is ensuring that what is in place now 

and the Ken Feinberg regime which is going to be up and running 

within 2 weeks, that it is perfect for the individuals and the businesses. That is what we are committed to, so that is why we are 

going to continue with the integrated services teams. 

On the moratorium issue and the 100 million that was reserved, 

we have been pushing BP to determine what in fact is going to be 

covered by that 100 million. I believe today or tomorrow, the Department of Justice will be issuing a letter to BP regarding what 

are the plans in terms of those who may be further down, sort of 

involved with issues related to the economic impact of the spill and 

so—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Madam Secretary, I am going to cut you off there. 

We are going long, we have a number of folks that need to get on 

a plane and we still have another panel to go. 

I would like to thank both you and the admiral for your testimony. As all good panels do, you stimulate more questions and boy, 

we are going to let you have it. Please respond promptly once we 

send them, but we need to start the third panel. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Dempsey, are you awake? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. I am, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Good for you, that is great. 

I think we are just going to jump right into it. 

Okay, our only witness on this panel is Mr. Ray Dempsey, Vice 

President of Strategy for BP America. Mr. Dempsey is currently deployed as part of the Deepwater Horizon response team, leading external affair activities across the State of Florida. For the response, 
61 

Mr. Dempsey is based in the Florida peninsula command post in 

Miami. 

Prior to being deployed on the response, Mr. Dempsey has been 

Vice President of Strategy and Portfolio for BP’s Chicago-based 

Fuels Value Change Strategic Performance Unit, a Fortune 100- 

size division of BP. Mr. Dempsey’s responsibilities include crude oil 

and fuel products market analysis, development of long-term strategy and business plans, business development, portfolio management, and project implementation. 

Previous to this current role, Mr. Dempsey was the Vice President and Regional Director for BP’s Latin America and Caribbean 

Region with responsibility for external affairs, crisis management, 

planning, and strategy. 

Over his 20-year career, he has held various engineering, environmental, strategy, and financial roles in BP’s refining, retail, and 

corporate staff organizations. Mr. Dempsey holds a bachelor’s degree in industrial engineering from Kansas State University in 

Manhattan, Kansas and a master’s degree in business administration from Northwestern University’s Kellogg Graduate School of 

Management in Evanston, Illinois. 

Mr. Dempsey is a member of the Board of Directors for the BP 

Foundation and is a member of the Deans’ Advisory Council for the 

College of Engineering at his alma mater, Kansas State. Mr. 

Dempsey also is a member of the BP Advisory Board for the National Society of Black Engineers and is a Board liaison for the National Action Council for Minorities in Engineering, NACME. 

Without objection, the witness’ full statement will be inserted 

into the record. I will now ask Mr. Dempsey to summarize his 

statement for 5 minutes, please. 

STATEMENT OF RAY DEMPSEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF 

STRATEGY, BP AMERICA 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member 

Bilirakis, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to appear today before this subcommittee to discuss information-sharing practices related to the oil spill response efforts. 

I have worked for BP for 20 years, as you noted. On May 6, 2010, 

I became a senior BP official in the St. Petersburg Unified Command, which directs the spill response efforts for the west coast of 

Florida and works together with incident command centers 

throughout the Gulf region. As part of my responsibilities, I also 

oversaw the St. Petersburg Joint Information Center where BP 

worked with the Coast Guard and other Federal and State government representatives to share information on spill-related efforts. 

The St. Petersburg Incident Command Post is now a branch of 

the Miami-based Florida Peninsula Command Post which I joined 

in early June. While I am directly responsible for supporting BP’s 

response efforts in Florida, I also work closely with my colleagues 

across the Gulf region and have spent time along the Gulf coast as 

we stand united in this unprecedented response effort. 

We are devastated by this horrendous accident. It has profoundly 

touched all of us and we are committed to doing the right thing for 

the people affected by this spill. The friends, family, and loved ones 

of those who lost their lives in this tragic accident remain in my 
62 

thoughts and prayers. Even as we absorb the human dimensions 

of this tragedy, we are also committed to doing everything possible 

to minimize and mitigate the environmental and economic impacts 

of the spill on the Gulf coast. 

As you have heard in earlier testimony, the overall region-wide 

spill response efforts are led by the Unified Area Command and retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen is the National Incident 

Commander with ultimate responsibility for the overall response 

effort. Coast Guard Admiral James Watson is the Federal OnScene Coordinator and the Unified Area Command currently based 

here in New Orleans includes personnel from BP, Transocean, the 

Coast Guard, multiple Federal agencies, and the affected States. 

To support the Unified Area Command, Incident Command Posts 

have been established in Mobile, Alabama; Houma, Louisiana; and 

Miami, Florida. The Incident Command Posts facilitate direct communication with State, city, parish, Tribal, and county officials and 

direct a significant portion of the near-shore and on-shore response 

efforts. BP personnel play key roles in supporting the incident command posts along with personnel from the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security and other Federal and State personnel. 

In addition, the BP Command Center based in Houston, which focuses on the source control, is supportive of the Unified Area Command. 

Importantly, all sub-sea, surface, and shoreline response efforts 

are coordinated through and must ultimately be approved by the 

Unified Area Command. The response currently involves approximately 46,000 personnel, over 6,000 vessels and 118 aircraft. As a 

result of the efforts, approximately 740,000 barrels of oil have been 

collected or flared by available containment systems and approximately 3 million feet of boom have been deployed. 

BP has committed tremendous global resources to the response 

effort. Our efforts are focused on two goals—stopping the flow of 

oil and minimizing the environmental and economic impacts from 

the spill. Towards this end, BP is deploying resources to fight the 

spill at the sub-sea, the surface, and the shoreline. These activities 

are carried out under the direction of the Unified Area Command. 

A key responsibility of the Unified Area Command is the timely, 

accurate information sharing. This is critical to the success of our 

operations and our obligations to governments, businesses, and individuals in the Gulf who have been affected by the spill. Our information-sharing expectations and objectives can be summed up 

rather simply—to ensure the timely, accurate updates to the public, to ensure close alignment and communications within the Unified Area Command to facilitate effective operations, and to effectively liaison with local officials, the private sector, and nongovernmental groups to address concerns and assure that recommendations are fully considered and implemented as appropriate. 

To successfully meet our goals, we have developed a number of 

formal and informal channels of communication. 

First, the Unified Area Command holds regularly scheduled 

meetings to facilitate timely information sharing among the Unified Area Command members. 

Second, in addition to the formal briefings, the Incident Command Posts communicate with the Unified Area Command mul-
63 

1The data described throughout this testimony is accurate to the best of my knowledge as 

of Friday, July 9, 2010, when this testimony was prepared. The information that we have continues to develop as our response to the incident continues. 

tiple times throughout the day. Decisions and recommendations 

made in the Incident Command Post are communicated up through 

ordinary command and through the Government and BP channels. 

Third, BP, within the context of the Unified Command and as 

the responsible party, regularly responds to information requests 

from key Federal and State entities such as OSHA, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Energy. Moreover, Federal 

Government personnel, including the Coast Guard, have been a 

continuous presence at the BP Houston command center. 

Finally, the Unified Area Command’s external communications 

are largely handled by the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Emergency Support Function Number 15, which includes the Joint 

Information Center, a Government affairs team and a community 

affairs team. 

We believe the Unified Area Command structure in place has 

been largely effective. With any undertaking of this size and complexity, there is always room for improvement. We are committed 

to making these improvements every day. 

BP is under no illusions about the seriousness of the situation 

that we face. The world is watching us. President Obama and 

members of his cabinet have visited the Gulf region and made clear 

their expectations of BP and our industry. So have Governors and 

local officials, Members of Congress, and the American people. We 

know that we will be judged by our response to this crisis and I 

can assure you that my colleagues and I at BP are fully committed 

to ensuring that we do the right thing. We are mounting the largest spill response effort in history. The complexities, as you have 

heard described, are unprecedented. We and the entire industry 

will learn from this terrible event, and will emerge from it stronger, smarter, and safer. 

I am very happy to answer your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Dempsey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAY DEMPSEY

JULY 12, 2010 1

Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis, Members of the subcommittee, I 

am Ray Dempsey, Vice President for Strategy & Portfolio for BP America. I am 

pleased to appear today before this subcommittee to discuss information sharing 

practices related to the oil spill response efforts. 

I have worked for BP for 20 years. On May 6, 2010, I joined the St. Petersburg 

Unified Command, which directs spill response efforts for the west coast of Florida 

and works together with incident command centers throughout the Gulf region, as 

a senior BP official. As part of my responsibilities, I also oversaw the St. Petersburg 

Joint Information Center, where BP worked with the Coast Guard and other Federal and State government representatives to share information on spill-related efforts. The St. Petersburg Incident Command Post is now a branch of the Miamibased Florida Peninsula Command Post, which I joined in early June. While I am 

directly responsible for supporting BP’s response efforts in Florida, I also work 

closely with my colleagues across the Gulf region and have spent time along the 

Gulf Coast as we stand united in this unprecedented response effort. 

There is an enormous team working on the response efforts, with over 47,000 personnel deployed throughout the Gulf region. In my role, I focus on information sharing within the Unified Area Command generally, and the Florida Peninsula Command Post more specifically. 
64 

We are devastated by this horrendous accident. This incident has profoundly 

touched all of us, and we are all committed to doing the right thing for the people 

affected by this spill. Even as we absorb the human dimensions of this tragedy, we 

are committed to doing everything possible to minimize the environmental and economic impacts of the oil spill on the Gulf Coast. I volunteered for my current assignment because I want to help the company respond to this spill and to address the 

needs of the people in the Gulf Coast region. 

THE UNIFIED AREA COMMAND STRUCTURE

Overall region-wide spill response efforts are led by the Unified Area Command 

(‘‘UAC’’). Retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen is the National Incident Commander with ultimate responsibility for the overall response effort, and Coast Guard 

Admiral James Watson is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The UAC, currently 

based in New Orleans, Louisiana, includes personnel from BP and Transocean, the 

Coast Guard, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (‘‘BOE’’), and other Federal entities such as the Departments of Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’), Energy, and Defense, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (‘‘NOAA’’), the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (‘‘USFWS’’), the National Marine Fisheries Service (‘‘NMFS’’), the Environmental Protection Agency (‘‘EPA’’), the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (‘‘OSHA’’), and the affected States. 

To support the UAC, Incident Command Posts (‘‘ICPs’’) have been established in 

Mobile, Alabama; Houma, Louisiana; and Miami, Florida. The ICPs facilitate direct 

communication with State, city, parish, Tribal, and county officials and direct a significant portion of the near-shore and on-shore response efforts. BP personnel play 

key roles in supporting the ICPs, along with personnel from the Coast Guard and 

DHS and other Federal and State personnel. Twenty branch locations (nine serve 

under the Houma ICP, nine under the Mobile ICP, and two under the Miami ICP) 

serve as Forward Operating Bases to help protect the shoreline and provide locations for efficient storage and deployment of the equipment, materials, and personnel needed for this response. Local government personnel engage with the BP 

and U.S. Coast Guard personnel at these branches. In addition, the BP Command 

Center based in Houston, which focuses on source control, also supports the UAC. 

Importantly, all subsea, surface, and shoreline response efforts are coordinated 

through, and must ultimately be approved by, the UAC. The response currently involves approximately 47,000 personnel, 6,670 vessels and 118 aircraft. As a result 

of these efforts, approximately 740,000 barrels of oil have been collected or flared 

by available containment systems and approximately 3 million feet of boom has 

been deployed. These actions have all been carried out under the direction of the 

UAC. 

BP’S ROLE IN THE UAC

BP has committed tremendous global resources to the response effort. Our efforts 

are focused on two goals: Stopping the flow of oil and minimizing the environmental 

and economic impacts from the spill. Towards this end, BP is deploying resources 

to fight the spill at the subsea, surface, and shoreline. 

For example, immediately following the explosion, in coordination with the Unified Command, BP activated its pre-approved spill response plan and began mobilizing oil spill response resources including skimmers, storage barges, tugs, aircraft, 

dispersant, and open-water and near shore boom. Today, BP carries out these activities through the ICPs. Currently, the Houma ICP directs offshore and near-shore 

skimming, dispersants, and controlled burn efforts. The nine branches serving 

under the Houma ICP direct the tactical response for near-shore skimming, marsh, 

and beach clean-up activities. Similarly, the Mobile ICP and its branch locations direct near shore, marsh, and beach activities for their area of responsibility. The 

UAC provides high-level strategic oversight of all ICP activities. 

In addition, all source control procedures and activities undertaken by BP’s Houston command center are approved through the UAC prior to execution. 

INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE UNIFIED AREA COMMAND

As a senior BP official in the Florida Unified Command, I have spent substantial 

time working with government officials at all levels to address concerns, to discuss 

requests and recommendations, and ultimately to take the appropriate actions to 

meet our responsibilities in the Gulf region. This is a key responsibility of the 

UAC—timely, accurate information sharing is both critical to the success of our operations and our obligations to the governments, businesses, and individuals in the 

Gulf who have been affected by this spill. Our information sharing expectations and 

objectives can be summarized simply: Ensure timely, accurate updates to the public; 
65 

ensure close alignment of communications within the UAC to facilitate effective operations; and effectively liaison with local officials, the private sector and non-governmental groups to address concerns and ensure that recommendations are fully 

considered and implemented as appropriate. To successfully meet our goals, we have 

developed a number of formal and informal channels of communication. 

First, the UAC holds regularly scheduled meetings to facilitate timely information 

sharing among UAC members. Under the Incident Command System (‘‘ICS’’), the 

UAC must hold regular situation updates, briefings, and meetings. For example, 

daily situation briefings are held twice each day. They are attended by section 

heads, including BP and the Coast Guard (although any member of the UAC is able 

to attend), and led by the planning section chief, as prescribed by ICS. 

The UAC also holds daily area command briefings, which include personnel from 

BP, the Coast Guard, and Government agencies, including Federal and State officials. Participants receive briefings from the ICPs, discuss requests, and receive updates on weather, oil movement, and status of operations. 

Second, in addition to the formal briefings, the ICPs communicate with the UAC 

multiple times throughout the day. The ICPs were established to ensure more direct 

access to and communication with local officials, businesses, and residents. Decisions and recommendations made in the ICPs are communicated up through ordinary command and through Government and BP channels. Moreover, IPCs continually seek input from localities, consider seriously any concerns and issues raised, 

and do our best to address them accordingly. As a result, our operations and information-sharing practices are constantly evolving. As a result, our operations and information-sharing practices are constantly evolving. For example, we just recently 

enhanced our Florida unified command structure to include additional branch locations in the Panhandle region. This is intended to bring an enhanced level of command and control that includes representatives of local government. Local government best understands the needs of their communities, and we are striving better 

to integrate them into response efforts. 

Third, BP, both within the context of the UAC and as a responsible party, communicates directly with Federal and State government officials. BP regularly responds 

to information requests from key Federal and State entities, such as OSHA, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Energy. Moreover, Federal Government personnel, including the Coast Guard, have been a continuous presence at the 

BP Houston command center. Through these activities, BP seeks to ensure up-tothe-minute information-sharing with key Federal and State personnel. 

Finally, the UAC’s external communications are largely handled by DHS’s Emergency Support Function (‘‘ESF’’) No. 15. ESF No. 15 has external affairs staff (led 

by the Coast Guard), including the Joint Information Center, which is staffed by 

representatives from BP, the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and Federal 

agencies (e.g., EPA, NOAA, USFWS), and which is responsible for responding to 

media inquiries. There is also a Governmental affairs team composed of liaison officers who provide information to and coordinate visits from elected officials and other 

interested parties. The community affairs team, composed of community liaisons, coordinates with BP and DHS community representatives working at the ICPs and 

branches. Community liaisons are responsible for working with affected members of 

the public and local officials in the affected areas and elevating issues to the UAC 

when necessary. 

CONCLUSION

We believe the UAC structure in place has been largely effective. With any undertaking of this size and complexity, there is always room for improvement. We are 

committed to making these improvements every day. 

BP is under no illusions about the seriousness of the situation we face. The world 

is watching us. President Obama and members of his Cabinet have visited the Gulf 

region and made clear their expectations of BP and our industry. So have Governors 

and local officials, Members of Congress, and the American people. 

We know that we will be judged by our response to this crisis. I can assure you 

that my colleagues at BP and I are fully committed to ensuring that we do the right 

thing. We are mounting the largest spill response effort in history. The complexities 

are unprecedented. We and the entire industry will learn from this terrible event, 

and emerge from it stronger, smarter, and safer. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you for your testimony. We are going to go 

out of order in this case to respect Mr. Green’s need for a flight. 

So I recognize Mr. Green for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
66 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a distinction between BP 

high-level management and BP rank-and-file with reference to my 

statements. The high-level management is where the policy emanates and I am going to address my questions to high-level management. 

People are unhappy with BP. I am one of those persons. BP has 

become synonymous with broken promises. BP has a record that in 

my opinion indicates someone in high management is not doing his 

or her job, and possibly many people. 

Texas City, 15 people killed, a report indicating that there was 

willful neglect. Willful neglect in the sense that there was knowledge that a problem existed and the problem was not corrected at 

Texas City. The North Slope of Alaska where penalties were paid. 

Now we have 11 additional person dying right here with the Deepwater Horizon. 

BP is not only going to be judged by how well BP responded to 

this incident, BP ought to be judged also by how well BP performed, allowing this incident to occur. An investigation ought to 

take place, people ought to be investigated. Oil companies themselves do not commit crimes, people do when they fail to take the 

proper measures to protect human life. We cannot allow another 

BP tragedy to occur. The public is not going to forgive us. 

It has been said that this was a wake-up call. This indeed was 

more than a wake-up call. The wake-up call was in Texas City 

when we lost 15 lives. This is a second alarm and I am not sure 

that we will have an opportunity to convince the public that we 

have done our jobs if a third alarm should occur, if something else 

should occur. I think that we have got to do what we must do, and 

that is have an external investigation of BP. I separate the rankand-file workers from the upper-level management where these 

policies and decisions are being made. 

Someone has to understand that the American people are not 

going to allow this kind of negligence to continue. I believe it to be 

negligence based upon the reports that I have seen thus far. If 

other reports to the contrary are presented, I will review them. But 

I am not happy with BP. I think that it is time for BP to understand that you cannot come in after the fact and throw your money 

around and then in some way think that you have now compensated for the lives that have been lost. 

I think that what is happening to this economy as a result of BP 

is also something that must be investigated such that not only will 

those persons who are closely related to these damages that they 

are suffering, but also those that are remotely related will receive 

some degree of compensation as well. 

This incident has to be the last straw for BP. We cannot continue 

to allow this company to continue to behave the way it has through 

the years—15 lives, 11 lives, and God knows what is ahead of us. 

So I am just letting you know that I am going to push for a thorough investigation of this process. I am interested in the response, 

but I also want to know what happened to allow this to occur 

again. 

No more deaths. BP has got to keep some of these promises that 

it continues to make. 
67 

Finally this, I appreciate you being here today. Your credentials 

seem to be impeccable. You are at one level and I am confident that 

you are capable, competent, qualified. But at some point, I am 

hopeful that we will get the President of BP or someone in that policy-making room with the President to come before a committee 

and give us some responses. I understand how you arrived here 

today, no disrespect to you, sir, but I just want you to know that 

I am speaking for a lot of people who cannot speak for themselves 

who are fed up with BP and the way it has responded to other crises that have already occurred, such that this one has now risen 

its ugly head. BP has got to do better if it is going to continue to 

do business in this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no time to yield back and I appreciate your courtesy. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes now. 

Mr. Dempsey, did BP participate in the SONS 2002 exercise in 

New Orleans? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I understand that BP has been a 

participant in a number of exercises around the Gulf for a number 

of years. In an earlier role of my own, I was accountable for the 

crisis management team through the United States. My understanding is that yes, indeed, we were part of the SONS exercise in 

2002. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. The lessons learned from your participation 

or BP’s participation, were they applied in this incident? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I believe that in every case of an 

exercise of the type that was conducted, there is a very thorough 

debrief, there is a very thorough reflection on what were the lessons learned and what changes can be implemented within our industry and within the Governmental agencies with whom we work. 

I believe that those lessons learned from that exercise have indeed 

been applied in BP and throughout our industry. 

Mr. CARNEY. What were those lessons learned in 2002? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most important 

observations that relates to this response and relates to our previous exercises is very much about a subject you have heard described throughout this hearing by previous panelists. A critical 

priority is to ensure the early and continuous involvement of local 

officials, officials who have deep knowledge and understanding of 

their geography, of the waters in their areas and of the concerns 

and priorities within their area of responsibility. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, I want to ask you a question. The number 

of gallons or barrels per day leaking started at zero and now it is 

somewhere between 60- and 100,000. How was that determined, 

how do you arrive at that number? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, in the early weeks of this response, 

the flow rates were developed and supported by the Unified Area 

Command and that was based on data provided by BP. In more recent weeks—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Stop right there. So BP provides Unified Area Command with a number of the flow, right? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. The data provided by BP 

relates to the imagery which many of us have seen, it relates to 
68 

the amount of oil that has been contained or burned through the 

series of exercises going on on the surface. Based on that data, estimates were made in a cooperative way by Unified Area Command 

and now, sir, by the Flow Rate Technical Group, which is an independent body appointed by the National Incident Commander. We 

continue to provide data to the Flow Rate Technical Group who 

have developed the most recent estimates for the amount of flow 

coming from the well. 

Mr. CARNEY. So it is true that BP was part of a team and not 

providing the initial assessments of the flow—of the output? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that has indeed been the 

case. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Now does BP have an interest in reporting 

or urging for lower flow rates as opposed to higher ones? Is there 

some liability that BP may face if the flow rates are actually higher 

than lower? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not know of any specific distinction that would be made in terms of liability as a function of 

the flow rate. I can assure you that the response that has been 

mounted here has not been a function of an estimate of the flow 

rate, it has been based on the reality of the oil that has been identified on the surface and the threat that we have perceived as it 

relates to shoreline response and response efforts. The resources 

that have been deployed are a function of BP bringing to bear the 

entire resources of our company from around the world, and they 

have been put into place to address whatever oil and whatever 

threat is identified through the decision-making of the Unified 

Area Command. 

Mr. CARNEY. So what you are saying is BP does not face a larger 

or smaller fiduciary responsibility based on how much oil has 

flowed out of the well? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any distinction 

in the liability that would be a function of this response that relates to the flow rate. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. If you learn differently, or please investigate 

that and send your answer back to the subcommittee. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. I will. 

Mr. CARNEY. I now recognize Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What is your response plan for the west coast of Florida, God forbid the oil comes near us? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman Bilirakis, I have personally been involved in the planning and the preparation for response on the 

west coast of Florida. As I noted in my testimony, I was assigned— 

I volunteered, frankly—to go to St. Petersburg and arrived there on 

the 6th of May, where I became a senior BP official. One of the earliest priorities that we identified was to invite in representatives 

from each of the counties in the 13-county area in the St. Petersburg sector, which starts in Taylor County in the north down to 

Collier County in the south. Our aim was to work with each of 

those counties on the Area Contingency Plans to make sure that 

there was a real sense of clarity about the sensitive areas within 

their counties, about the protective strategies that were in place according to those Area Contingency Plans, and that any adjustments 
69 

that were needed in respect of this particular response were made 

and made in full cooperation with the counties and local officials. 

At this time, the planning and the preparation which includes 

the development of those Area Contingency Plans has been put into 

place and, as has been noted in earlier testimony, we are in the 

process now of engaging through the liaison team to go deeper into 

communities and make sure we are aware of the priorities, the concerns that are raised by communities and by local officials, and 

that our response plans continue to be responsive to those priorities. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Will you include the cities as well? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman Bilirakis, I have met personally with 

Mayor Hibbard on at least two occasions that come immediately to 

mind. Indeed, part of my priority over the last month has been to 

meet with local elected officials, community leaders, business leaders and citizens around the State, and particularly around the west 

coast. Just last week, I was in a couple of counties up in the eastern edge of the panhandle with Congressman Allen Boyd, where we 

held a series of community meetings with his constituents to make 

sure that we listened to their priorities, their concerns and that we 

helped to share information with them about the preparation that 

has already taken place and is continuing and the potential threat 

to their coastlines. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

So, you do not think that this miscalculation with the flow rate 

had any effect on the response; is that what you are saying? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman, my understanding of the way we 

have mounted this response from the very beginning, which began 

frankly on the day of the incident; and on the day after the incident, BP personnel were here in New Orleans, with Admiral Mary 

Landry, who at that time was identified as the Federal On-Scene 

Coordinator. Admiral Landry put into place the Unified Area Command structure and from that point we have mounted a response 

that is focused on addressing the threat that comes from the well. 

Without specific regard to the estimate of the amount coming from 

the well, the resources that have been deployed including the activity at the spill site, the near-shore response and the clean-up efforts have been a function of what is there. Therefore, my assertion 

to you, Congressman, would be that the estimates of the flow rate 

did not limit our ability to mount this response. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, next question. I understand there has been 

a problem with the claims process in the State of Florida and that 

BP is working on that issue. Can you please give me maybe an update on that? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman, I would say to you that the claims 

process has been quite a learning experience in many ways. In 84 

days now of this response, you may know that we received over 

100,000 claims, we have paid out more than half of those or roughly half of those in an amount totaling roughly $165 million. We 

have made a commitment of a $20 billion fund to be administered 

over time, and as you may also be aware, we have appointed or we 

have had appointed an independent administrator, Mr. Kenneth 

Feinberg, who brings deep experience in this process from the work 

that he did post-9/11. 
70 

In Florida, we have managed to pay out individual claims now 

in a time of about 4 to 5 days. We now are paying out business 

claims in a time which is roughly 6 to 8 days. Our priority in recent days has been to streamline and improve the process for the 

local government entity claims process and just in the last week we 

have completed payments to a number of counties in the panhandle 

that had expended resources in this response and monies have 

been transmitted to them in reimbursement for their costs that 

have been put into place for this response. 

I know that Administrator Feinberg and his team will build into 

their plans ways to further increase the efficiency, the pace and the 

assurance that the objective here is to get money into the hands 

of those who ought to have it just as quickly and efficiently as we 

can. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. I have heard reports that BP—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Bilirakis, we will do another round. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, thank you very much. 

Mr. CARNEY. Ms. Jackson Lee, please. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Dempsey, for appearing here 

today. 

I know that BP has a command site in Houston, Texas in its corporate headquarters. My question to you is the willingness of BP 

to meet with me and my constituents as Texas prepares for the 

possibility of a hurricane and the intrusion of some of the oil spill 

in our region. Could you arrange that and ensure that we would 

have the opportunity to meet with locally elected officials, emergency preparedness individuals, to talk about being prepared in the 

State of Texas? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congresswoman, I would be very happy to go back 

with my colleagues in Houston and ensure that we can facilitate 

just such a meeting. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Does BP intend to file bankruptcy? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congresswoman, I have been asked this question 

before. A month ago in Washington, DC in a Senate hearing, I was 

asked a similar question by one of your colleagues. 

What I can tell you is that we are certainly committed to this 

response and we have brought to bear the full resources of our 

company to ensure that we stop the flow of the oil and we mitigate 

and minimize the environmental and economic impacts. We provide 

information to our shareholders and we provide information to 

Wall Street security analysts community and the City of London. 

They have made their own analyses of the potential liabilities, the 

potential costs, and they have drawn their own conclusions about 

whether or not BP will go out of business. 

I can tell you that within the organization, I have not been privy 

to any discussions that suggests that that is an intent that we 

would pursue. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me just say this, and I thank you for 

that answer. I think BP owes the American people a forthright pronouncement that they will not file bankruptcy and they will not file 

to the detriment of those who are still suffering. 

The second part of my question is I have repeatedly asked BP 

to understand the uniqueness of small restaurants, the tourism 
71 

business, oyster, fishermen, et cetera. My visit here, my first visit, 

was to oystermen, fishermen, and others and asked BP to provide 

them with a lump sum payment. To date, the restaurant is still on 

the brink of closing or already closed, the owner cannot pay her 

mortgage, and fishermen and oystermen have not gotten compensation based upon BP’s, if you will, entangled process of calling for 

receipts. 

I do not think these people are trying to defraud BP and the 

question is can BP move this process along now that the independent claims person has it? I frankly do not believe it is going 

to move any quicker if we have the same standards that BP is 

using. What are you doing to help these people who do not have 

traditional financial records? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congresswoman, I can tell you that from the early 

days of the claims process, we—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Dempsey, I do not want to interrupt you, 

but my time is very short too and I am leaving for the airport. Are 

you going to work with these individuals to provide them with 

funding? Can I get this back in writing? Why do I not just ask for 

an answer back in writing about the payment to these individuals. 

I will just move on. 

The other question is, quickly: What you are doing regarding 

health concerns and mental health concerns, which I think is also 

challenging? In addition, there have been many who have technology and I know that you cannot answer everyone’s call but there 

are individuals such as an African-American who has discovered a 

technology that is now presently on hold and I am trying to find 

the individual’s name—Rodney Whitney—been on hold for 6 weeks 

and has not been able to get a response from BP on utilization of 

this technology. 

Do you have any insight on small contractors who are waiting to 

be helpful and seemingly cannot get a response, along with the 

mental health issue? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congresswoman, just as it relates to your earlier 

question, I am not familiar with the specifics of the case that you 

were describing there, but I am happy to follow up with you and 

I will follow up to pursue that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that, thank you. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. We share your concerns around mental health impacts and I know that there is a conversation underway with 

States around the region to get clarity as to the best and the most 

effective way to support those concerns. 

As it relates to the third part of your question there, I am sorry, 

will you please—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mental and physical health concerns. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Right and there was—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Compensating for that. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. There was a third part to your question, Congresswoman and I—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It was the small business. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Small businesses. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Yes, that is right; thank you for the reminder. 
72 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The independent claims, whether or not you 

are able to move forward on paying people that do not have the 

traditional financial records that BP seems to be insisting on. Everybody is committing fraud, as we seemingly—they are interpreting that everyone is trying to, you know, take advantage of BP 

and these people are dying. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Thank you, I will go back to that and then return 

to the question around the ideas. 

So from early in the process, we created an advance payment facility for fishermen and a boat captain could go into any of the 35 

claims offices around the region and in many cases with very little 

documentation, presumably a payroll stub or some sort of a bank 

deposit receipt, could walk out of the claims office with a check for 

$5,000. A deck hand similarly could walk into a claims office with 

very little in the way of documentation, again, a check stub, a payroll receipt; and in many cases, frankly, Congresswoman, we would 

make a call to a boat captain to confirm their employment, and 

those deck hands could leave the claims office with a check for 

$2,500. The substantiation that would follow would give the opportunity for us to true-up their true compensation. So in the event 

that a boat captain earned more than that, they would be trued up 

in the following month. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I could just have you answer the other 

questions in writing. What you are repeating to me, there are those 

that are saying that they have not gotten checks in months and literally they are dying on the vine. 

Let me just conclude and thank the Chairman for this excellent 

hearing and say to you, Mr. Dempsey, that I too represent thousands who are innocent that are in the industry and I would only 

say that I believe your company and the entire industry owes, in 

a stand-up way, the American people an apology and an explanation of who the oil industry is. Not putting their head in the 

sand, and begin to talk about how they can do better and how they 

can work together with the American people to preserve what we 

have and to improve upon what needs to be improved. They owe 

us an apology and they are my constituents, because you are hurting not only the American people, but you are hurting all these innocent workers who are frightened for their jobs. That means those 

in the oil industry that I represent. Leadership owes a pronouncement to the American people that we will not go bankrupt. Your 

partners need to come out of hiding and they need to stand with 

you and own up to paying the American people, because everyone 

knows there are more than just BP on that rig. These individuals 

are hiding and you should not allow them to hide. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I hope as we try to construct a better management or command structure, that we also look at all the parties 

that were involved in this catastrophe, we call them out, let them 

stand before the American public and tell us how they will fix it. 

Mr. Dempsey, I appreciate your leadership and what you are trying to do. But you are trying to climb up the rough side of the 

mountain and you need your leadership to recognize that. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee; thank you for your 

questions. 
73 

Mr. Dempsey, media reports after the explosion occurred indicated, ‘‘There was no one in charge aboard the rig.’’ Who was actually in charge or who should have been in charge? Was it BP, was 

it Transocean, who? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman—Mr. Chairman, I should say that I 

think this answer is also a bit responsive to the comments made 

by Congressman Green and the comments made just now by Congresswoman Jackson Lee. I think it is really important to note 

that, first of all, this is indeed an unprecedented event and it is 

something that is beyond the scope of our previous experiences. 

There is an investigation underway and as Mr. Green called for 

and as Ms. Jackson Lee also called for, I want to make sure that 

it is clear that there is an investigation underway, both by BP and 

by the Federal Government. 

I am certain that given the conclusion of those investigations, we 

will learn what went wrong here and I believe that we will put into 

place changes in the policies, the practices, and the procedures to 

ensure that this kind of incident cannot happen again. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. From your experience watching the flow 

of information up and down the chain of command, where do you 

see the bottlenecks? Where do you see constrictions in flow and response? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I think that the unified command 

structure is actually quite purposeful in that it brings together expertise from different parties. The role that BP plays in the unified 

command structure is probably quite different from that that could 

be brought by the Coast Guard and by the other associated State 

and Federal agencies. 

I think that because there is a need for us to work cooperatively 

and collaboratively, there have been occasions where the time it 

takes to understand each others’ points of view, to understand the 

most effective ways to protect the shoreline have taken more time 

than many of us might like. I am not sure that I could point, Mr. 

Chairman, at any particular constriction, but it is important to 

note that working in the unified command structure, there is indeed a decision-making process and we are working very carefully 

within that to ensure that we make the right choices to maximize 

our protection of the shoreline. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Getting back to the claims process, I know there is a claims process now going on with BP and the $20 billion trust fund, which Mr. 

Feinberg is in charge of, the independent trust fund. How is that 

going to jibe in, how is that going to work? Is he going to be responsible for all the claims once the guidelines are established? 

You know, my constituents need to know where to go to, where to 

turn to. 

Mr. DEMPSEY. I understand. So, Congressman Bilirakis, I believe 

that the independent claims administrator, Mr. Feinberg, will 

make very clear over the next couple of weeks the scope and the 

range of the work that he and his team will do. My expectation is 

that they will indeed take accountability for executing the claims 

process for individuals, for businesses, and for local Government 

entities. 
74 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. With regard to the relief wells, there was 

a report I guess 3 or 4 days ago that the one well at least will be 

on-line by possibly July 20. I know that the target date is mid-August. Tell me something about that. Can you give me an estimation 

when it will be completed? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. Congressman, I am as anxious as the rest 

of the world to know that we have successfully completed the relief 

wells and will have killed the well. I listen every morning to the 

briefing provided by Admiral Allen, the National Incident Commander, as to the progress and the status and the expectations as 

to the timing of the completion. I believe that his briefings are 

thorough and comprehensive and the estimates that he provides 

are the best authoritative view as to when that work will be completed. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How about the latest containment method that is 

going on right now, anything on that? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Earlier today, Congressman, Admiral Allen provided a briefing on the placement of the containment cap. From my 

perspective, he was quite hopeful that within a matter of days now, 

we will have some clarity as to our ability to contain the flow from 

the well and will make some judgments about how best to ensure 

that that work is continued, but that the ultimate ending for this 

remains with the completion of the relief wells. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, last question. In your testimony, you noted 

that local government best understands the needs of their communities. This is something of course that I strongly agree with. I am 

pleased that you indicate BP is striving better to integrate them 

into response efforts, especially considering the comments we heard 

from Mayor Hibbard about the need for better communication efforts with local communities. What changes are you making to better integrate the expertise of State and local officials and businesses into the response efforts? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman, I think the most powerful example 

of the adjustments that we have made as we have been learning 

throughout this process is the implementation of these deputy incident commanders and the branches in the States throughout the 

region. In the State of Florida in particular, we have established 

a Florida Command Post based now in Tallahassee, led by a unified command structure that includes the Department of Environmental Protection Secretary Mike Sole, a BP Incident Commander 

Mary Schaefer-Maliki and Coast Guard Commander Joe Boudreau. 

Their accountability now will be to bring much more closely to the 

local jurisdictions, the counties, and the municipalities, to understand the planning, the preparation, and the response efforts that 

are underway in their communities and ensure that we understand 

their concerns and that we make adjustments in real time for maximum protection of their coastlines. This development of this deputy incident command came directly out of the understanding and 

the learning that the operations being directed from Mobile, while 

very comprehensive, left a distance from the voices of those on the 

ground within the counties and the municipalities. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. If my constituents have questions or issues, can 

we contact you directly? 
75 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Congressman; yes, sir, you may. I would be very 

happy to try to address any concerns by those constituents based 

in the State of Florida, as that is my primary accountability. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate 

it and I appreciate you holding this hearing. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. Dempsey, one more question and we can end for the day. 

Will BP make this situation whole, fix this situation regardless of 

the cost? 

Mr. DEMPSEY. Mr. Chairman, I remember early in this exercise, early in the response, there were questions about the $75 million 

liability cap to which we suggested—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes or no. 

Mr. DEMPSEY [continuing]. That we were not going to be focused 

on that. My answer, Mr. Chairman, is yes, BP is committed to 

bring the full resources of our company to meet the requirements 

of this response for as long as it takes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you very much. 

I really want to thank everybody who came today, everybody who 

stuck around today. I especially want to thank the staff of the 

courthouse for going way above and way beyond. This is I think a 

very important hearing to hold, it affects New Orleans, it affects 

the region and it affects the Gulf, it affects the entire Nation. So 

your efforts on our behalf are truly appreciated; thank you all on 

the staff. 

Once again, the staff that we have on our subcommittee is amazing, they do a great deal of work to prepare us for this, for these 

hearings. We are not done with this, we will be asking questions 

long into the future. 

Mr. Dempsey, I imagine you will receive some questions in writing, I appreciate your candor and we will get back to it at some 

point. 

But right now, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon at 6:01, the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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