SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0782-19T3

TAKIMA D'ANJOU,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FRANCOIS D'ANJOU,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted May 27, 2020 – Decided July 10, 2020

Before Judges Gilson and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FM-02-0818-16.

Francois D'Anjou, appellant pro se.

Takima D'Anjou, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

In this post-divorce-judgment matter, defendant Francois D'Anjou, 

representing himself, appeals from provisions of a July 26, 2019 order denying 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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his request to change certain arrangements for the parties' child. He also appeals 

from a September 13, 2019 order denying reconsideration. We affirm.

The record provided to us by defendant is limited, but the relevant material 

facts are indisputable. The parties were married in August 2008. They have one 

child, a daughter born in November 2010. In October 2016, the parties were 

divorced and the judgment of divorce incorporated a marital settlement 

agreement (MSA). 

The MSA states that the parties will share joint legal and physical custody 

of their daughter. Plaintiff, the mother, "is designated the parent of primary 

residence for the sole purpose of school enrollment for Willard Elementary in 

Ridgewood, New Jersey." When they entered into the MSA, both parties were 

represented by counsel.

The record reflects that following their divorce, the parties have had 

numerous disputes concerning their daughter. This appeal arises out of a motion 

defendant filed in 2019 to change where the daughter would go to school and to 

compel where the daughter would attend summer camp. Defendant sought to 

have his daughter go to school and summer camp in Cliffside Park, where he 

lives. Defendant also argued that plaintiff should be compelled to abide by the 

MSA. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for other relief. 
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The family court considered the papers submitted and on July 26, 2019,

issued an order denying certain relief and granting other relief. On defendant's 

motion, the court (1) denied the request to change where the daughter would go 

to school; (2) denied the request to compel the daughter to attend summer camp 

in Cliffside Park; and (3) granted the request that plaintiff provide defendant 

with her current employment information and copies of available health 

insurance for the daughter. On plaintiff's cross-motion, the court granted some 

relief, but denied other relief, including requiring defendant to provide proof 

that he paid $150 towards a qualified domestic relations order and, if proof could 

not be provided, that he pay the $150. The court also added a paragraph in the 

order directing both parties to act in the best interests of their daughter.

Defendant moved for reconsideration by refiling the papers that had been 

filed on the original motion and cross-motion. On September 13, 2019, the 

family court issued a written statement of reasons and order denying that motion.

On appeal, defendant makes three main arguments, which he breaks down 

into seven points. He contends that the family court erred by (1) not conducting 

a plenary hearing on his request to change where the daughter attended school; 

(2) not requiring the daughter to attend summer camp in Cliffside Park; and (3) 

not compelling plaintiff to abide by the MSA. Related to those arguments, 
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defendant asserts (1) we are not bound by the family court's factual findings; (2) 

it would be manifestly unjust to deny him relief; (3) we have the power to reverse 

and remand this matter for a hearing; and (4) on remand, a different judge should 

decide the issues.

Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive 

discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Accordingly, we will 

briefly analyze why defendant's three main requests for relief lack merit.

Defendant's primary argument is that the parties' daughter should attend 

school in Cliffside Park rather than Ridgewood. Defendant, however, agreed in 

the MSA that the child would go to elementary school at "Willard Elementary 

in Ridgewood, New Jersey." Before us, defendant asserts that the judge who 

entered the Judgement of Divorce made that decision. The record rebuts that 

assertion because defendant signed the MSA. Indeed, in signing the MSA, 

defendant certified that he was signing and agreeing to the MSA "as his 

voluntary act and deed." 

Defendant further argues that because the parties share joint legal and 

physical custody of their daughter, the decision concerning where the child 

should go to school should be made using the best interests of the child standard. 

Here, however, defendant voluntarily, and presumably in the best interests of 
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the child, agreed that the daughter would go to school in Ridgewood. "New 

Jersey has long espoused a policy favoring the use of consensual agreements to 

resolve marital controversies." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013) (quoting 

Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)). Consensual settlement 

agreements are subject to the "changed circumstances" doctrine. Lepis v. Lepis, 

83 N.J. 139, 148 (1980). A party seeking modification of a judgment 

incorporating a MSA "must meet the burden of showing changed circumstances 

and that the agreement is now not in the best interests of the child." Abouzahr 

v. Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 152 (App. Div. 2003); see also

Bisbing v. Bisbing, 445 N.J. Super. 207, 218 (App. Div. 2016).

Defendant has made no showing of a change of circumstances warranting 

either a plenary hearing or a change in where the child would attend school. 

Instead, defendant contends that after he agreed to the child attending school in 

Ridgewood, he now feels that it is too far for him to drive. That is not a change 

in circumstances. Instead, at best, it is a realization by defendant that he does 

not like the voluntary agreement that he made.

Defendant's second argument is that the child should go to camp in 

Cliffside Park where he resides. He relies on prior orders entered by the family 

court in 2017. He failed, however, to provide us with the transcripts and other 
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materials that would allow us to review why those orders were entered. An 

appellant's appendix must contain the parts of the record "essential to the proper 

consideration of the issues." R. 2:6-1(a)(1). When a failure to provide such 

records precludes meaningful review, we may dismiss that part of the appeal. 

See In re Zakhari, 330 N.J. Super. 493, 495 (App. Div. 2000); see also R. 2:8-2 

(providing that an appellate court may, at any time and on its own motion, 

dismiss an appeal). Moreover, the family court's June 2017 order addressed only 

the daughter's camp enrollment for that summer and did not address her future 

enrollment and the family court duly considered the daughter's interests in its 

July 26, 2019 order.

Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff should be compelled to abide by 

the MSA. In the order under review, however, the family court did just that. In 

paragraph three of the July 26, 2019 order, the court ordered plaintiff to provide 

defendant with her current employment information and copies of available 

health insurance for the daughter. To the extent that defendant is seeking other 

relief, he has failed to identify such relief or a legal and factual basis for such 

relief. He has also failed to identify that he requested such relief before the 

family court.

Affirmed.