### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17-1806 B.G., by his next friend, J.A.G., Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v.

B OARD OF E DUCATION OF THE C ITY OF C HICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:15-cv-06372 — Virginia M. Kendall

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED M AY 17, 2018

— D ECIDED A UGUST 27, 2018

____________________

Before B AUER , E ASTERBROOK, and M ANION, Circuit Judges

. M ANION, Circuit Judge . B.G. and his mother, J.A.G., appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion to reverse theruling of an Illinois State Board of Education Impartial Hearing O ffi cer. J.A.G. had sought public funding for several Individual Educational Evaluations because she believed the Chicago Public Schools’ (the Distri ct) evaluations of B.G. were inadequate. The hearing o ffi cer found that the District proved by a preponderance of the eviden ce that its evaluations were2 No. 17-1806

appropriate. The district court denied B.G.’s motion 1 to reverse the hearing o ffi cer’s decision, deferring appropriately to the hearing o ffi cer’s conclusions. For the reasons stated below, we a ffi rm. I. Background B.G. had an unfortunate childhood. He lived alternately with his mother (who speaks on ly Spanish) and three siblings in a small apartment, and with his father, who was apparently so much an absentee parent that B.G. was left entirely to his own devices while he was there. He repeated fi rst grade andwould have repeated seventh grade had the District not promoted him because of his age. B.G. was diagnosed with a speci fi c learning disability and also had signi fi cant behavior and

a tt endance issues—he was absent for one third of the school year during his seventh grade year in 2013-14. All in all, B.G.’s situation at the start of 2014 was already quite bleak. Things only got worse when B. G.’s father died in April 2014. B.G was hospitalized shortly thereafter with diagnoses of morbid obesity, hypertension, severe hypoxia syndrome, Type 2 diabetes, and obstructiv e sleep apnea. While B.G. was dealing with his medical issues and the grief from losing hisfather, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services received a report that his mother was not able to care forher children. As a result, B.G. was sent to live with his godmother for an unspeci fi ed period. He returned to his mother at some point, although the record is unclear about the timing. In July 2014, B.G.’s mother fi led a request for a Due Process Hearing with the Illinois State Board of Education. She

1 B.G. and J.A.G. are referred to collectively as B.G.No. 17-1806 3

alleged that the District had violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 and denied B.G. a Free Appropriate Public Education. The parties mediated this claim in August: the Districtgave B.G. an aide and moved him to a classroom with a teacher familiar with “multisensory approaches to teaching reading and writing for students with dyslexia.” B.G. by J.A.G. v. City of Chicago Sch. Dist. 299 , 243 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (decision below). Around the same time, the District began to perform the assessments of B.G.’s educatio nal needs that would wind up at the center of this case. The results of these assessments werepresented at an October 9, 2014, meeting of B.G.’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) team. Present at the meeting were B.G.’s case manager, all of his District evaluators, his mother, and counsel for both sides. Although she did not voice any objections to the IEP team’s report at the meeting, B.G.’s mother soon requested Independent Educational Evaluations (IEEs) at public expense in seven areas: psychology, speech and language, physical th erapy, occupational therapy, nursing, social work, and assi stive technology. Believing itsevaluations were appropriate, the District sought a Due Process Hearing with the State Board of Education to defend its decision not to fund IEEs. An administrative hearing began in February 2015 before Board-appointed Impartial Hearing O ffi cer Janet K. MaxwellWicke tt . The District presented as witnesses the professionals who evaluated B.G., while B.G. presented two experts who reviewed the record and o ffered their conclusions that the District’s various evaluations were inadequate. The hearing

o ffi cer found the District’s witnesses credible and persuasive, and she discounted the testimony of B.G.’s experts because4 No. 17-1806

they lacked Illinois certi fi cations and had never met B.G. She thus concluded that the District had carried its burden to show that its evaluations were appropriate.

B.G. fi led motions in the district court to supplement the administrative record and to reverse the hearing o ffi cer’s decision. The district court then de nied (in relevant part) B.G.’s motion to supplement the administrative record and denied his motion to reverse the hearing o ffi cer’s decision. B.G. by J.A.G, 243 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Ill. 2017). He timely appealed to this court.

II. Discussion A. Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record As a preliminary ma tt er, we must review the districtcourt’s partial denial of B.G.’s motion to supplement the administrative record. B.G. argues that the district court should have added to the record (1) blank testing protocols for the Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL); and (2) IEEs performed after the administrative hearing by Mari Lane and Ari Goldsmith (the la tt er of whom was one of B.G.’s experts at the hearing). The court declined largely because it concluded that the proposed additions would change the character of the proceedings from a review of the hearing

o ffi cer’s decision to a trial de novo . Additionally, it found that (1) the protocols were not necessary because B.G. had been given several other assessments; and (2) post-hearing IEEs were not relevant to review of the hearing o ffi cer’s decision. We review the denial of the motion to supplement for abuse of discretion. Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L. on Behalf of Brock L. , 102 F.3d 895, 901–02 (7 th Cir. 1996). And theNo. 17-1806 5

district court was right to consider whether additional evidence would change the nature of the proceeding; we have cautioned that trial courts should guard against admi tt ing “such evidence to change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo .” Id. at 901 (quoting Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. , 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir. 1984)). We cannot say the district co urt abused its discretion by concluding that considering the post-hearing IEEs would turn the proceedings into a trial de novo . We have explained that “the appropriateness of an IEP ‘can only be judged by examining what was objectively reasonable at the time’ the case conference commi tt ee created the IEP.” M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools , 668 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2011). The same logic applies to IEEs procured not only after the IEP team met, but after the hearing o ffi cer heard the case. The district court was in no position to judge how the new IEEs mighthave contributed to the IEP team’s conclusions. Further, admi tt ing the new IEEs into the re cord would have made the district judge the fi rst arbiter of those evaluations—precisely what we have cautioned district courts to avoid. We decline to disturb the district court’ s conclusion on this point. Nor can we say the district court abused its discretion byrefusing to add the blank testing protocols to the record. Unlike the IEEs, which B.G. obtained after the due process hearing, the protocol issue was raised at the hearing. The hearing

o ffi cer sustained the District’s objection to the admission ofthe blank protocols on the ground that they were not the actual protocols that had been used to examine B.G., but she permi tt ed B.G.’s counsel to question the District’s speech and language evaluator about whether she had fi lled out the CASL protocols. In the end, the hearing o ffi cer was convinced6 No. 17-1806

that the absence of the protocols used to evaluate B.G. was immaterial because the CASL was only one of several tests the speech and language evaluator administered. As we explain below, the hearing o ffi cer’s conclusion was reasonable. Thus, the district court’s decision to exclude the blank protocols did not amount to an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, we a ffi rm the district court’s denial of the motion to supplement the record with the additional IEEs and CASL protocols.

B. Motion to Reverse the Administrative Decision With the motion to supplemen t the record resolved, we move to the heart of the case: whether the district court erred in denying B.G.’s motion to reverse the hearing o ffi cer’s decision. When a parent disagrees with a public agency’s educational evaluation of her child, she has the right to an IEE at public expense in certain situ ations. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1). However, the agency may (as the District did here) seek a due process hearing in order to demonstrate that its evaluation was appropriate. Id. § 300.502(b)(2)(i). The appropriateness of the agency’s evaluation is ge nerally measured by its compliance with federal regulations, speci fi cally 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.304 and 300.305. If the agency proves by a preponderance of the evidence that its evaluation was appropriate, the parent is not entitled to an IEE at public expense. In reviewing the hearing o ffi cer’s decision, the district court was required to “give ‘due weight’ to the administrative process proceedings.” Monticello , 102 F.3d at 901. The level of deference due the hearing o ffi cer depends upon how much new evidence the district court allows into the record. WhenNo. 17-1806 7

the court hears no new evidence, it owes “considerable deference” to the hearing o ffi cer’s factual fi ndings. Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 221 , 375 F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2004). It may set the judgment aside “only if it is ‘strongly convinced that the order is erroneous.’” Id. (quoting School Dist. v. Z.S. , 295 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 2002)). This standard is “akin to the standards of clear error or substantial evidence” under which we review the decisions of the Social Security Commissioner. See id. ; cf. Cli ff

ord v. Apfel , 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining the standard of review in Social Security cases).On appeal, we review the district court’s legal conclusion’s de novo and factual fi ndings for clear error. Alex R, 375 F.3d at 612. We emphasize that neither the district court nor this court should treat IDEA ca ses “as ‘an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.’” Monticello , 102 F.3d at 901 (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). The vast majority of B.G.’s brief focuses on alleged errors by the district’s psychologists that, in B.G.’s view, render the district’s psychology assessmentinappropriate. We will start there and proceed through B.G.’s complaints about the other assessments. In the end, however, the signi fi cant deference we owe to both the hearing o ffi cer’s and the district court’s factual fi ndings dictates the outcome. This case is fact-intensive, and the hearing o ffi cer’s review of the evidence in her wri tt en decision was comprehensive. Because the hearing offi cer resolved the factual issues in the District’s favor, our power to disturb her judgment is signi fi cantly constrained.8 No. 17-1806

Substantial evidence in the record supports the hearing offi cer’s decision that the district’s evaluations were appropriate under the governing regulations. 1. Psychology Assessment Two psychologists, Nicole Cintron and Yazmin Coehlo, conducted the district’s psychological assessment of B.G. At the time of the administrative hearing, Cintron had been a lead psychologist for the distri ct for eight years. Before that, she was a fi rst grade teacher for seven years and a special education teacher for three years. She holds a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in bilingual special education. Coehlo hadbeen a school psychologist for three years and holds a master’s degree in special educatio n, an Illinois Type 73 license, 2 and bilingual certi fi cation in Spanish.

Coehlo administered two asse ssments before she went on maternity leave and left Cintron to interpret the data: the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition (WISC-IV), 3 and the Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition (BASC-II). 4Cintron then a tt empted to administer the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement,

2 The Type 73 license is the Illinois School Counselor Certification.

3 WISC-IV is a full-scale IQ test designed for children between 6 and 16 years old.

4 The BASC-II is an assessment intended to help “understand the behaviors and emotions of children an d adolescents.” See https://www.pearsonclinical.com/education/products/ 100000658/behavior-assessment-system-for-children-second-edition-basc-2.html#tab-details (last visited August 9, 2018).No. 17-1806 9

Third Edition (KTEA-3), 5 but found B.G. to be uncooperative and the test results unreliable.Cintron reviewed B.G.’s academic history, previous evaluations, and medical history. She also performed classroom observations in a general education class and in B.G.’s specialeducation classroom. Cintron noted that B.G. had been hospitalized in May 2014 and diagnosed with morbid obesity, hypertension, and diabetes among other things. She also observed that B.G. was exhibiting some signs of depression after his father died around that same time and he had to move in with an aunt (his godmother) while his mother sought stable housing. Unfortunately, due to B.G.’s uncooperativeness, Cintron was unable to conduct an interview with him on two separate occasions. After all this, Cintron composed a report for B.G.’s IEP team which the hearing o ffi cer deemed “comprehensive.” Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Findings of Fact ¶ 42. Based on Cintron’s report, the IEP team concluded B.G. was eligible for services under the emotional disability and special learning disability categories. The team also used Cintron’s report to write goals for B.G. At the IE P meeting, the team shared the report with B.G.’s mother, who raised no objections.

As far as we can tell from the brie fi ng, B.G. has eight mainobjections to the psychological assessment: (1) the psychologists were not su ffi ciently trained and knowledgeable; (2) errors in administering the asse ssments rendered them invalid,

5 The KTEA-3 is “an individually administered measure of academic achievement from ages 4.5 through 25 .” See http://txautism.net/evaluations/kaufman-test-of-educational-achievement-third-edition-ktea-3 (last visited August 9, 2018).10 No. 17-1806

and, relatedly, the District’s failure (in his view) to assesswhether B.G. has an intellectual disability; (3) the psychologists erred when they concluded that B.G. was an English speaker (and further erred by providing minimal Spanishtranslation on one of the tests administered); (4) the psychologists incorrectly thought B.G. was su ffering from an emotional disability; (5) the assessment did not consider that B.G. might have had A tt ention De fi cit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD); (6) Cintron entered the IEP meeting thinking that B.G. should no longer be classi fi ed as learning disabled; (7) the District failed to report certain academic data; and (8) Cintron’s recommendations to the IEP team were erroneous. We consider these objections in turn and ultimately fi nd that, in light of the record and factual fi ndings by the hearing offi cer and the district court, none has merit. a. Quali fi cations and trainingAs noted above, Cintron and Coehlo possess all the traditional credentials and mark ers of individuals quali fi ed to perform psychological evaluations. Nobody can question their their education, certi fi cations, and years of experience. Yet B.G. contends that despite Cintron’s training and experience, she lacked important knowledg e that rendered her unqualifi ed under 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(1)(iv). As the District points out, however, B.G.’s claims are based on a selective reading of the record. For example, nothing B.G. cites indicates that Cintron had any “glaring” gaps of expertise with respect to reading. And B.G.’s citations do not support his claim that Cintron did not know the di ff erence between phonemic awareness and phonics. In short, the record contains substantial evidence that Cintron (and Coehlo) had su ffi cientNo. 17-1806 11

knowledge, training, and experience to administer an assessment. Further, we cannot fault the hearing o ffi cer for discounting the testimony of B.G.’s expe rt, Dr. Goldstein, that Cintron should have tried harder and used di fferent methods to administer assessments to B.G. After all, Cintron knew B.G., while Dr. Goldstein had never met or evaluated him. Given that, it is understandable that the hearing o ffi cer thoughtCintron’s explanation was more persuasive than Dr. Goldstein’s objections. 6b. Intellectual disability and testing irregularities B.G. argues that Cintron did not adequately consider whether his score on the WISC-I V indicated an intellectual disability. He takes issue with Cintron’s conclusion that his drop in IQ evidenced by the two assessments was a result ofeither an emotional disability or depression caused by his father’s death. Admi tt edly, B.G.’s 2014 IQ, according to the WISC-IV, was 71, just one point above the cuto fffor an intellectual disability. But, as B.G.’s expert Dr. Goldstein acknowledged, B.G.’s 2009 WISC scores were much higher and not indicative of an intellectual disability. Administrative Record at 3118. Since B.G. had not experienced a head injury or other condition that would lead to such a drop in IQ, see id. at 3471, we cannot say the hearing o ffi cer was wrong to credit

6 To the extent that B.G. argues Cintron should have done something different to assess his academic skil ls (such as math) because he was uncooperative during her attempt to assess the KTEA-3, the hearing officer’s factual findings do not support his claim. See Hearing Officer’s Decision, Findings of Fact ¶ 33–34 & p. 61.12 No. 17-1806

Cintron’s belief that something else—whether it be grief, depression, an emotional disability, or extended absences from school—had caused the drop in B.G.’s IQ score. 7 B.G. relatedly argues that admi tt ed mistakes in the administration of the WISC-IV and BA SC-II rendered their resultsinvalid. But here, too, substantial evidence supports the hearing o ffi cer’s conclusion that these errors were harmless. The errors included Coehlo’s decisi on to provide minimal Spanishtranslation while administering the WISC-IV, Cintron’s failure to explain “f scores” on the BASC-II in her report, andCintron’s failure to consider B.G.’s results on the Vineland assessment administered by B.G.’s former special education teacher. The hearing o ffi cer credited the District’s psychologists’ testimony that these erro rs did not invalidate the results of the assessments (and the ultimate conclusion that B.G. did not have an intellectual disability). See Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision p. 62. Importantly, even Dr. Goldstein was not willing to state at the hearing that thes e errors invalidated the results. 8

7Here, too, B.G.’s factual assertions are best described as a selective reading of the record. For example, B.G. faults the District for failing to report discrepancies between the Verb al Confirmation and other indiceson the WISC-IV, but as the District points out, the cited portion of the transcript is Dr. Goldstein testifying abou t these very discrepancies. B.G. also charges that Coelho’s failure to admini ster subtests for visual closure rendered her assessments inadequate, but ignores that the District’s occupational therapist did administer such a test . In any event, all of this is at the margins; the bottom line is that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusion that B.G. did not have an intellectual disability. Hearing Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 38.

8 B.G. contends that the hearing offi cer shifted the burden by requiring his expert to “definitively state” that th e errors affected the results. That is not so. The hearing officer simply disc ounted Dr. Goldstein’s testimony in part because of his unwillingness to go on the record to that effect. FindersNo. 17-1806 13

Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 55, 57 & p. 62. In light of all this, we conclude that the hearing o ffi cer was within her discretion to credit the psychologists’ assertions and discount Dr. Goldstein’s testimony. c. Testing in English B.G. next contends that the hearing o ffi cer erred by accepting the psychologists’ conclusion that he was pro fi cient in English. The upshot here is that if B.G. were tested in English even though he was not pro fi cient in the language, the assessment might be racially or culturally biased. 34 C.F.R.300.304(c)(1)(i). But the evidence supports the hearing offi cer’s conclusion that English was the proper language inwhich to test B.G. Cintron knew from her review of B.G.’s records that he was no longer an English Language Learner and that he was instructed in and spoke English. Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 37. Se veral of the District’s other assessors testi fi ed that B.G. was pro fi cient in English and preferred it to Spanish. See id. ¶¶ 63, 65, 67, 127, 171. And Dr. Goldstein agreed that if a student is pro fi cient in English, the WISC-IV does not have a racial or cultural bias. Id. ¶ 55. Substantial evidence supports the hearing o ffi cer’s conclusion that B.G. was pro fi cient in, and indeed preferred, English. Thus, the hearing o ffi cer was correct that the testing was not racially or culturally biased. Relatedly, B.G. contends that nonverbal IQ testing would have been more accurate. Cintron testi fi ed that nonverbal

of fact are entitled to do that with out conducting unla wful burden shifting. Indeed, the hearing officer would have been entitled to discount Dr. Goldstein’s testimony even if he had been unequivocal, since a competing explanation exists in the record.14 No. 17-1806

testing is appropriate for stud ents who are English Language Learners, but that designation no longer applied to B.G. Id. ¶ 37. Furthermore, Cintron and Coehlo had observed that B.G. was comfortable communicating in English; he responded only in English when Cintron asked him test questions. Id. Thus, the hearing o ffi cer had no reason to doubt the psychologists’ assertion that B.G. was pro fi cient in English and could be tested in that language. d. Emotional disability

B.G. next contends that he should not have been classi fi edas a student with an emotional disability. He accuses the District’s psychologists of con fl ating an emotional disability with the short-term e ffects of coping with his father’s death. But it is unclear what the District could have done di fferently even if grief, and not a disability, were the primary cause of B.G.’s poor emotional indicators. As the District notes, B.G.’s motherdemanded a publicly-funded IEE in this case; it was not practicable for the District to post pone its evaluation until B.G.was no longer grieving. And B.G.’s evaluation pointed towards emotional issues, as B.G. himself reported that he has desire for self-harm and always feels like his life is ge tt ing worse. See id. ¶ 30. B.G. also had very few friends at school and had already been held back a year. Combine this with his signi fi cantly falling IQ scores and we cannot say that the hearing o ffi cer erred by concluding that B.G. su ffered from an emotional disability.

e. ADHD Next, B.G. claims that the psychologists ignored potential ADHD in their evaluations. ADHD is a medical diagnosis not within the area of expertise of the evaluators (or the hearingNo. 17-1806 15

o ffi cer), but the evidence suggests that the psychologists did consider the possibility of ADHD. As the district court noted, the hearing o ffi cer found that B.G.’s 2009 Psychological Evaluation Report, which indicated ADHD symptoms, was unreliable because it was out of date. B.G. by J.A.G. , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 982 (citing Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 210). B.G.’s mother then had fi ve years to follow up on thepotential of ADHD, but she failed to do so. Without a diagnosis, there was nothing the Distri ct’s psychologists could have done di fferently. They were not obliged to make a medical diagnosis during their evaluation of B.G.f. Cintron’s opinion on B.G.’s learning disabilityThere is no question that Cintron believed that B.G.’s primary problem was either an em otional disability or his economic disadvantage and lack of a tt endance. Cintron found that B.G.’s a tt endance problem made it hard to assess whether he actually had a learning disability. But, contrary to B.G.’s assertion, Cintron did not recommend that B.G. lose access to audiobooks even if he were not classi fi ed as learning disabled.See Defendants’ Appendix at 692. And the IEP team ultimately concluded that B.G. was eligible for services because he had a speci fi c learning disability, see Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision at p. 61, so Cintron’s beliefs did not factor into the fi nal decision of the IEP team. It is hard to see what Cintron didwrong here; on the contrary, her reservations were quite reasonable. We fi nd no error here.16 No. 17-1806

g. Failure to report academic data B.G. argues that the District almost totally failed to report academic data, but the citations in his brief are limited to subtests that were not completed because B.G. proved uncooperative. Even Dr. Goldstein admi tt ed that B.G. was not engaged in the process of testing and thatthe subtests of the KTEA thatCintron tried to administer were not necessary. Administrative Record at 3175–76, 3419. Moreover, even were we to credit B.G.’s position on the di ffi culty of testing him, IEP team member Uchenna Obialor performed a comprehensive “Learning Environment Screen ing” that included signi fi cant detail regarding B.G.’s academic weaknesses. See Defendants’Appendix at 699–704. We see no error with respect to the District’s reporting of academic data.

h. Cintron’s recommendations Finally, B.G. faults Cintron for failure to recommend to the IEP team that B.G. have a multisensory program and failure to specify how many instructor s he needed and how long heshould be instructed. But it was the IEP team, not Cintron herself, whose job it was to create educational goals for B.G. Andthe IEP team did write a goal to use “a systematic multi-sensory approach” with B.G to help him learn to decode unfamiliar words. Administrative Record at 759. Thus, the IEP team used Cintron’s report to develop an apparently appropriate goal. We fi nd no error. 2. Occupational Therapy Evaluation Rebecca Cassidy, an outside contractor with the District who is employed by private rehabilitation facility Health Pro Rehabilitation, performed the District’s occupational therapy evaluation of B.G. She has work ed with the District for nearlyNo. 17-1806 17

30 years, supervising the District ’s occupational therapists and providing professional development training. Cassidyholds a bachelor’s degree in occupational therapy and is licensed in Illinois.Cassidy evaluated B.G. on September 19, 2014. She observed B.G. in the classroom and followed him “through dailytransitions, observing his sensory processing, movement, interaction with other students, and strategies to get from place to place.” B.G. by J.A.G. , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 973 (citing Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Finding of Fa ct ¶ 116). She also saw that B.G. could access the school environment relatively easily anddo basic self-help activities independently. Cassidy also evaluated B.G.’s writing through the McMasters Writing Assessment, fi nding that B.G. could legibly copy 50 le tt ers per minute, an appropriate level for a sixth grader. But her a tt empt to administer the Visual Closure subtest of the DevelopmentalTest of Visual Perception (DVPT-A) failed due to B.G.’s unwillingness to engage. Nevertheless, Cassidy was able to conclude that B.G. could write and type a bit slower than average for his age, although he had trouble pu tt ing his thoughts onto paper. She recommended the use of word prediction software and increased keyboarding practi ce to improve B.G.’s speed in performing work. B.G. faults Cassidy for failing to assess his hygiene, but the record does not reveal that personal hygiene was a problem for B.G. at the time of the evaluation. Neither Cassidy nor any of the other District evaluators made any notes suggesting that B.G. appeared to be neglecting his personal hygiene. Onthe contrary, B.G. responded positively during a life-skills assessment he took around the time of the IEP meeting, noting that he brushed his teeth and bathed daily. Administrative18 No. 17-1806

Record at 804. B.G.’s hygiene problems appear to have been in the past by the time he was evaluated. What is more, B.G. is incorrect that Cassidy testi fi ed at the hearing that she was unware of hygiene concerns; as the district court explained, plainti ff’s counsel never elicited such testimony. B.G. by J.A.G. , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 985–86 (citing Administrative Recordat 2914). In short, the record does not support B.G.’s contention that Cassidy ignored hygien e issues. Nor does it supportB.G.’s contention that Cassidy conducted a cursory evaluation. Substantial evidence supports the hearing o ffi cer’s conclusions.

3. Social Work EvaluationJennifer Avilas conducted the District’s social work evaluation. She had eighteen years of experience as a social worker for the District and holds a Bach elor’s and Master’s degree in Social Work and an Illinois type 73 license. Avilas is also fl uent in Spanish. She interviewed B.G. in English (without concern) and B.G.’s mother in Spanish; B.G.’s mother indicated concerns that B.G. was unable to verbalize his frustrations. Avilas noted that B.G.’s family lived in a small apartment and received social welfare bene fi ts. Avilas also gave the Strengths and Di ffi culties Questionnaire to B.G.’s then-current and former special education teachers; the current teacher indi cated a normal rating, but the former teacher provided answers indicating concern with B.G.’s lack of considering the feelings of others, ability to share, disruptive behavior, obed ience, and work completion. She observed him in class onSeptember 19, 2014, and noted that he was disruptive and refused to take direction.No. 17-1806 19

Avilas’ report recommended social-emotional accommodations be implemented for B.G. throughout the day. She also

o ffered to provide B.G.’s mother with a list of professionals for B.G. to seek counseling for grief. Further, she agreed that B.G. had an emotional disability. B.G.’s mother, present at the IEP meeting, speci fi cally noted that she agreed with Avilas’ report.

B.G.’s fi rst concern is that Avilas never conducted a homevisit and so had no basis to conclude that he could do homework at home. But the hearing o ffi cer thought a home visit was not necessary given Avilas’ interview with B.G.’s mother, who was deemed credible. Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 178. This allowed Avilas to testify about B.G.’s living situation with su ffi cient speci fi city that a home visit was unnecessary. Avilas testi fi ed credibly that she had worked with families with ten children who manage to do their homework in a two room apartment. Administrative Record at 2849–50. The hearing o ffi cer was within her discretion to accept this testimony.Next, B.G. questions the appropriateness of Avilas’ Functional Behavior Assessment (or, as the district court put it, Functional Behavior Plan). See B.G. by J.A.G. , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 987. In the district court, B.G. cited only to the testimony of Dr. Goldstein, which the hearing o ffi cer had discounted because it did not consider him an expert in areas other than psychology. Id. The hearing o ffi cer instead credited Avilas’ testimony that the Assessment wa s adequate and that her recommendations were based on appropriate research. See Administrative Record at 2791. Like the district court, we fi nd no20 No. 17-1806

reason to disturb the hearing o ffi cer’s fi nding that Avilas conducted the Functional Behavior Assessment appropriately. The same is true for the entirety of the social work evaluation. 4. Physical Therapy Evaluation

Andrea Alter conducted the Di strict’s physical therapy evaluation of B.G. She holds a Doctorate in Physical Therapy from Boston University, is a lice nsed physical therapist in Illinois, and has worked for the District for three years. She evaluated B.G. on October 24, 2014, including observations during class, recess, lunch, an d transition periods. Alter observed that B.G. could sit uprigh t in class and was able to navigate the halls and stairs between classes. B.G. also demonstrated strong gross motor skills. He even participated inphysical education class and met weekly with the school social worker for twenty minutes of interval circuit training.

Alter found B.G. had decreased endurance due to his weight and other medical conditions, but that this was not an issue for the short periods of movement required during theschool day. Relatedly, Alter concluded that B.G. could independently access the education environment. While she recommended modi fi cations to his physic al education program, Alter ultimately concluded that B.G. did not need physical therapy services. B.G. argues that Alter’s assessment did not assess his pain or posture issues. With respect to pain: while the district court correctly pointed out the hearing o ffi cer’s mistaken conclusion that Alter had ruled out pain, the court also observed that “there is actually no signi fi cant evidence that B.G. was, in fact, experiencing pain such that physical therapy was necessary.” B.G. by J.A.G. , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 985. We agree with the districtNo. 17-1806 21

court that the hearing o ffi cer’s small error in this instance was harmless. As for posture, B.G. is simply incorrect that Alter ignored such concerns. He is also incorrect that Cassidy (the District’s occupational therapis t) noted posture issues; she actually concluded that B.G.’s penchant for leaning on his desk rather than si tt ing up was out of habit rather than a lack of strength. Administrative Record at 694. We agree with the district court that the hearing o ffi cer commi tt ed no error in fi nding the physical therapy evaluation appropriate. 5. Speech and Language EvaluationJoeyllyn Martin performed the District’s speech and language evaluation of B.G. She ha d 12 years of experience with the District, holds a graduate degree in Speech and Language Pathology, and is licensed in Illinois with a certi fi cation in clinical competence. Martin ob served B.G. in September 2014; this observation included watching B.G. communicate with others in small and large groups as well as a one-on-one interview with him. She reported that B.G. was comfortablespeaking English and able to maintain an appropriate conversation. Martin also administered several assessments. Throughthe Oral Motor Assessment and an informal Voice Assessment, she found that B.G. “w as functional for educationalpurposes.” An Articulation Assessment revealed B.G.’s tendency to substitute the ‘f’ sound in place of ‘th.’ The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test and the CASL showed that B.G. had “moderate de fi cits in receptive vocabulary.” Martin did not believe B.G. had an issue with expressive vocabulary. She also chose not to perform the Mean Length of U tt erance test, explaining at the hearing that research indicates it should not22 No. 17-1806

typically be used for children B.G.’s age. B.G.’s expert Dr. Bailey substantially agreed. Administrative Record at 3543 (Dr. Bailey’s testimony that “[a]s ch ildren age, traditional assessments of length of u tt erance with MLU become less talked about in the literature and less accurate as an indicator, because often times teenagers are able to give a whole lot of meaning with very short words.”). Finally, Martin reviewed the results of the Lindamood-Bell assessment administered by an outside individual procured by B.G.’s mother, but found it somewhat unhelpful because the assessor did not provide an explanation of his or her fi ndings.Martin concluded that B.G. was impaired in receptive language and was eligible for speech services. While she lost the testing protocols for the CASL after the IEP meeting and was unable to produce them atthe hearing, the hearing o ffi cer found that this did not invalidat e the results because Martin’sreport was comprehensive, assessing B.G.’s needs and formulating speech and language goals. Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision,Finding of Fact ¶ 81. Finally, Martin declined to give an opinion on B.G.’s reading skills; she testi fi ed at the hearing that reading skills are beyond her ar ea of expertise and that she would defer to the District’s reading specialist. B.G. argues that the hearing o ffi cer incorrectly found the lost CASL protocols to be harmless. But it is hard to see why Martin’s misplacement of the protocols should invalidate the CASL results, much less Martin’s entire evaluation. As thedistrict court noted, B.G.’s CASL results corroborated the results of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. B.G. by J.A.G.

, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 972. Moreover, Martin had the protocols when she a tt ended the IEP meeting, and still possessed the scores and other information in he r report at the time of theNo. 17-1806 23

hearing. See Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 81. It is unfortunate that she mi splaced the protocols and couldnot produce them at the hearing, but we agree with the hearing o ffi cer and the district court that Martin’s mistake did not doom the entire assessment. B.G. argues that Martin was incapable of administering the CASL, but points to no useful evidence to support this allegation. Instead, B.G.’s argument is based on (1) an IEE conducted by Mari Lane which B.G.’s mother procured after the hearing; and (2) the psychologists’ handling of the BASC-2 and WISC-IV assessments. The form er piece of evidence is not in the record, see supra at 5, and the la tt er is irrelevant to the question whether Martin could administer the CASL

. B.G. also takes issue with Mart in’s decision not to test expressive vocabulary, but Martin felt no need to do so because B.G. did not have a problem fi nding the proper word to use in English. Hearing O ffi cer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 84. Given that Martin had intervie wed and observed B.G., it was reasonable for the hearing o ffi cer to credit her testimony that an assessment was not necessary. Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the hearing o ffi cer’s decision in this

area. 9

III. Conclusion

This case involves a volumi nous administrative record dealing with subject ma tt er beyond the expertise of federal

9 B.G.’s brief fails to develop argu ments with respect to the Nursing and Assistive Technology assessments, so we find these arguments waived. Weinstein v. Schwartz, 422 F.3d 476, 477 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005). Absent wavier, we would agree with the district court that the hearing officer’s conclusions on these assessments were supported by substantial evidence.24 No. 17-1806

judges. That is why we defer to the hearing o ffi cer’s factual fi ndings and decline to substitute our own views on educational policy for the hearing o ffi cer’s. The hearing o ffi cer in this case conducted a fi ve-day hearing, heard the relevant evidence, and concluded that the District’s experts evaluated B.G. appropriately. While B.G. presents many complaintsabout the District’s evaluators, the record shows that the District’s evaluators were competent, well-trained, and performed comprehensive evaluations. Particularly under the deferential standard of review applicable here, we have no cause to set aside the hearing o ffi cer’s well-reasoned decision.

A FFIRMED