Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Special Operations 

Research Topics

2018

The JSOU Special Operations Research Topics 2018 publication 

highlights a wide range of topics collaboratively developed 

and prioritized by experts from across the SOF community. As 

with the previous versions of this publication, this list is tailored 

to address command priorities. The topics in these pages are 

intended to guide research projects for professional military education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, fellows and students, and 

others writing about special operations during this academic 

year. This research will provide a better understanding of the 

complex issues and opportunities affecting the strategic and 

operational planning needs of SOF.

ISBN 978-1-941715-24-6

Airmen from the 919th Special Operations Maintenance Group perform maintenance on a 919th Special Operations Wing aircraft engine at Duke Field, Florida. 

Photo by U.S. Air Force/Technical Sergeant Sam King.

JSOU Press Special Operations Research Topics 2018
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Education and 

Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board
The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

Special Operations

Research Topics

2018
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the Director 

of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

Recent Publications from the JSOU Press can be found online at: https://jsou.socom.mil

and at the JSOU Library website: https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United States 

Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

On the cover. Philippine, U.S., and Australian Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

conduct a hook and climb from a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) onto a ship while 

conducting a boat assault training event during exercise Balikatan 2016 at Oyster Bay, 

Philippines on 12 April 2016. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sergeant Ethan T. Johnson.

Back cover. Airmen from the 919th Special Operations Maintenance Group perform maintenance on a 919th Special Operations Wing aircraft engine at Duke Field, 

Florida. U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sergeant Sam King.

Printed in June 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-24-6
iii

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................v

Introduction .................................................................................vii

The USSOCOM Priorities ..............................................................ix

A. Priority Topics .......................................................................... 1

B. Win ........................................................................................ 11

C. Transform ............................................................................... 19

D. People ................................................................................... 29

E. Networking and Relationships ................................................ 33

F. Technology and Resources ...................................................... 37

Appendix: Acronym List .............................................................. 41

Endnotes ..................................................................................... 43
Research Topics Workshop 2018 participants at JSOU Pinewood 

Campus 10 January 2017. This was the last group event photo 

taken at the Pinewood facility. SOURCE: JSOU PHOTO
v

Foreword 

Our mission is to develop the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) most precious asset, the Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) operators and support personnel who provide the United States 

with decisive military options that ensure the security of our nation and its 

allies. Through high-quality education, our personnel develop the cognitive 

agility to successfully execute the challenges of current and future special 

operations missions. An important part in the development of that intellect 

and agility is accomplished through research where the SOF enterprise is 

both producer and consumer.

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Special Operations 

Research Topics 2018 publication highlights a wide range of topics collaboratively developed and prioritized by experts from across the SOF community. The topics in these pages are intended to guide research projects 

for professional military education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, fellows 

and students, and others writing about special operations. This research 

will provide a better understanding of the complex issues and opportunities 

affecting the strategic and operational planning needs of SOF.

Our research topics are organized to support the USSOCOM Commander’s three SOF priorities: win, transform, and people. To develop this list of 

topics, recommendations were solicited from the USSOCOM headquarters 

staff, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs), component commands, SOF chairs from the war colleges, and select research centers and 

think tanks. The topic submissions were then reviewed, revised, rated, and 

ranked at the annual Special Operations Research Topics Workshop. That 

workshop produced the first draft of this comprehensive list of issues and 

challenges of concern to the greater SOF community. The list was reviewed 

and vetted by the headquarters, TSOCs, and component commands prior 

to publication.

I encourage SOF personnel to contribute their experiences and ideas to 

the SOF community by submitting your completed research on these topics 
vi

to JSOU Press. If you have any questions about this document or ideas for 

future topics, contact the Director, Center for Special Operations Studies 

and Research via e-mail at jsou_research@socom.mil.

Brian A. Maher, SES

President
vii

Introduction 

The JSOU Special Operations Research Topics 2018 represents a list of 

SOF-related topics that are recommended for research by those who 

desire to provide insight and recommendations on issues and challenges 

facing the SOF enterprise. As with the previous topics publications, this list 

is tailored to address command priorities. The five areas include the three 

USSOCOM priorities of win, transform, and people, as well as two additional 

topic areas: networking and relationships (e.g., interagency and international 

partners), and technology and resources (e.g., enabling mechanisms). 

SOF PME students research and write on timely, relevant, SOF-related 

topics. Such activity develops the individual’s intellect and provides a professional and practical perspective that broadens and frames the insights 

of other analysts and researchers in regard to these topics. This list and 

the accompanying topic descriptions are a guide to stimulate interest and 

thinking. Topics may be narrowed or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school writing requirements or maximize individual interests and experiences). The researcher should explore and identify doctrine, 

capabilities, techniques, and procedures that will increase SOF efficacy in 

addressing them. At the same time, the research on these topics should be 

used to inform policymakers, the larger military profession, and the public 

of the issues and challenges facing the SOF enterprise.

Section A (priority topics) identifies topics of particular importance. 

Sections B, C, D, E, and F each reflect a consensus of the SOF experts who 

participated in the JSOU Research Topics Workshop as being particularly 

worthwhile in addressing immediate SOF needs and in building future 

capacity for emerging challenges. The 40 participants included representatives from each of the components, HQ directorates, international officer 

representation from USSOCOM J3-International Division, and select academic organizations to include National Defense University, the School for 

Advanced Military Studies, Joint Forces Staff College, and the civilian think 

tank Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The topics have been 

vetted through the USSOCOM headquarters, TSOCs, and components prior 

to publication.
viii

Please share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis advisors, and 

other colleagues, and feel free to submit additional topics for consideration 

in future research topics publications. You may also visit our library website to see if JSOU has a publication that relates to your area of interest. We 

encourage you to send us your completed research on these topics.

A Note on the Relevance of Previous Years’ Topics Lists 

Previous years’ research topics lists provide a repository of issues that 

may continue to have research relevance—especially the prior year’s list. 

Previous editions of these publications (2009 through 2016) are available 

on the JSOU library public website on the JSOU Press publications page 

located at: https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications. 
ix

The USSOCOM Priorities

Win

USSOCOM must win the current fight against the expanding influence 

of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and support Department of 

Defense (DOD) and United States Government (USG) efforts in confronting 

a subversive Iran; the resurgence of Russia; the unpredictable state of North 

Korea; and expansionist China while ensuring the security of our Homeland. 

To do this, we focus on sustaining and expanding the SOF enterprise and 

continue to foster international partnerships with allies to counter weapons 

of mass destruction and transregional threats.

• Win the current fight

• Be relevant across all five DOD challenges

• Operationalize SOCOM Headquarters

• Sustain the SOF enterprise

Transform

In an effort to meet the requirements necessary to win future conflicts, 

USSOCOM’s unique capability to acquire, develop technology, and provide 

logistics through bottom up, operator driven innovation, allows empowered 

SOF units and individuals to solve problems and implement solutions at 

the point of need. The real value to the SOF enterprise is pivot speed, which 

drives experimentation to transform our structure to be better postured for 

tomorrow’s conflicts.

• Transform current capabilities and equipment for future wars

• Bottom up, operator driven innovation which drives experimentation 

during exercises

• Transform our structure to be better postured for tomorrow’s conflicts

People

People are the most important assets of the SOF enterprise. Succeeding through the ‘Talent of People’ is one of the fundamental concepts of 

USSOCOM. It is important to recruit, assess, and train the right people while 
x

providing support and opportunities for our families. Focused Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program efforts result in a return on 

investment for our operators and families. We sustain our force by empowering SOF, managing our talent, and providing active mentorship to build 

the force of the future. SOCOM’s most precious asset: our comparative, 

competitive, and decisive advantage.

• Manage talent early

• Active mentorship to build the force of the future

• Focus POTFF efforts on a return on investment for our operators 

and families 

Supporting Topic Areas

Networking and Relationships

This topic area fully supports all three of the USSOCOM priorities. Because 

of the complexity and the effort required to maintain and further develop 

the SOF network, along with the relationships that make that possible, the 

workshop group devoted a separate session to focus on this area. This SOF 

network includes support from the Services and collaboration with joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The goal of the 

topics in this section is to challenge researchers to propose ways to integrate 

SOF partners at every level while increasing transparency, collaboration, 

and synchronization. 

Technology and Resources

This topic area also fully supports all three of the USSOCOM priorities, 

but the group addressed these specific issues in a separate session. This area 

concentrated on the challenges of fiscal realities and the requirement to 

support SOF operators with timely development, acquisition, and sustainment of service-provided and special operations–peculiar equipment and 

capabilities.
1

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

A. Priority Topics 

Topic Titles

Win

A1. Measuring the effectiveness of SOF campaigning: Converting 

tactical effects into strategic impacts 

A2. Operationalizing the SOF role in cyberspace 

A3. Countering enemy lessons learned to exploit vulnerabilities, block 

remediation efforts, and advise strategy

Transform

A4. Challenges to the third offset strategy 

People

A5. Capabilities management of SOF

A6. Educating SOF for 21st century unconventional warfare (UW) and 

countering UW

Networking and Relationships

A7. Identity narratives shaping interstate relations in the Gray Zone 

A8. State-Society relationships: How domestic politics shape or are 

shaped by international relations in the Gray Zone

Technology and Resources

A9. Precision targeting operations: Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) and CounterUnmanned Aircraft Systems 

A10. Contemporary UW

A11. Operational utilization of cyber technologies

A12. Big data and the operational force
2

Special Operations Research Topics 2018

Topic Descriptions

WIN

A1. Measuring the effectiveness of SOF campaigning: Converting 

tactical effects into strategic impacts

The purpose of this research is two-fold: (1) determine how the United 

States can achieve strategic success against violent Islamic terrorists 

and other VEOs that threaten important national interests, and (2) 

determine how the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and 

other organizations can better connect their tactical successes to the 

nation’s strategic goals.

Fifteen years into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the 

United States’ counterterrorism efforts have achieved many tactical successes. A case could even be made that America has realized 

positive gains at the operational level by degrading al-Qaeda and the 

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. However, success at the strategic level 

has proven elusive. Military leaders often claim that: “The nation will 

not kill its way out of this fight.” Yet, efforts by the armed forces—

and Special Operations Forces in particular—remain the primary 

mechanism policymakers employ against counterterrorism threats. 

When other elements of national power are utilized, the objective is 

often couched in democracy promotion terms. That approach has 

led to robust nation building endeavors such as those undertaken in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Those efforts, like the other components of 

the GWOT, have yet to accomplish their policy objectives. Iraq and 

Afghanistan are unable to defend themselves, secure their borders, 

govern their people well, serve as an example of democracy regionally, 

or be significant partners in the GWOT. The question, then, is how to 

achieve strategic success. Although sponsored by JSOC, discussion on 

this topic involved the breadth of SOF missions, from surgical strike 

to special warfare, and included such topics as: 

1. Measures of effectiveness and lasting behavioral change. How 

soon can behavioral change be implemented and how long 

will it last?

2. The “indigenous approach” and measuring the effect of SOF 

operations. What metrics are relevant for operations in the 
3

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

human domain? How do we measure the effectiveness of security cooperation activities such as building partnership capacity (BPC)? 

3. Determining the progress and sustainability of lessons learned 

versus lessons forgotten. What progress has the SOF community made in learning lessons during the last 15 years?

A2. Operationalizing the SOF role in cyberspace 

Today, stakeholders are engaged in cyber activities; however, there 

is little guidance and much confusion. As an example, there is no 

consensus on universal/international laws applicable to cyber warfare. Additionally, regulations and guidelines governing nation-state 

actions within the domain of cyber warfare have not yet matured 

and are still evolving. Cyber analysts, operators, and planners question how SOF can better leverage cyberspace for its operations, but 

confusion exists over the authorities and responsibilities. What cyber 

doctrine, policy, strategy, planning, etc., do we need to make SOF 

successful in cyber? What are the implications of ungoverned actions 

in the cyber domain? What actions should be taken to regulate cyberspace and to define acts of war? How do other countries interpret 

or exploit the laws of war to further their cyber operations? What 

and where are the boundaries that delineate peace and war within 

the realm of cyber warfare similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic 

Treaty that primarily refers to conventional warfare? Generally, how 

can SOF be better prepared for cyber-enabled operations? 

A3. Countering enemy lessons learned to exploit vulnerabilities, 

block remediation efforts, and advise strategy

In 2006, the United States Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center published a study, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting 

al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities1, which examined senior 

Salafi jihadi ideologues’ internal assessments of lessons learned from 

their efforts during the 1970s. The enemies’ “after action reports” 

(AARs) provided insights into Salafi jihadi macro-strategy. The study 

noted striking parallels of jihadi experiences in Syria in the 1970s to 

al-Qaeda sponsored operations in Iraq in 2006. The current transregional violent extremist effort demonstrates both the Salafi jihadists’ 
4

Special Operations Research Topics 2018

successful adaptations and their continued struggles to address specific lessons learned. For example, Abu Mus’ab Al Suri’s account of 

Muslim Brotherhood operations in Syria over 35 years ago provides 

considerable insight into their operations. Contemporary Salafi jihadists appear to have learned from Al Suri’s “AAR,” including lessons 

on the importance of an advanced comprehensive strategy, self-sufficiency, strong internal and external public relations, a well-crafted 

media campaign, and benefiting from previous experiences. What 

lessons are today’s transregional violent extremists learning that will 

apply to the strategies of the fifth, sixth, seventh, and subsequent 

generations of Salafi jihadists? How can U.S. and partner nation SOF 

identify and exploit the enemies’ lessons learned and preempt their 

strategic adjustments and adaptation? 

TRANSFORM

A4. Challenges to the third offset strategy 

The third offset is meant to give U.S. forces technological overmatch 

of its adversaries. Possible examples of this new offset include robotics, autonomy, miniaturization, 3-D printing, and/or big data. While 

the costs of developing new technologies continue to limit the number 

of immediate peer competitors, the costs of imitation appear to be 

declining over time. Nor is it clear that the technologies being developed are contributing to a larger unified operating concept or that 

the technological edge will extend the era of U.S. offensive power 

dominance.

What capabilities and/or advances in technologies need to occur 

to ensure SOF maintain a technological advantage over adversaries? 

How can SOF capitalize on the third offset? How can SOF benefit 

from these same technologies for operators’ safety and effectiveness? 

How can SOF use recent technological advances to sustain a force in 

austere environments, or decrease the footprint of a force in a situation that demands low visibility? 

Are the basic assumptions of the third offset valid? Can the third 

offset strategy be successful without a unifying concept on how to 

employ military forces? What is the low-end of the third offset? What 
5

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

is the poor man’s version (e.g., 3-D printer-enabled weapon manufacture)? Does DOD’s pursuit of technological third offsets undermine 

efforts to build mil-to-mil relationships with less advanced partners? 

Are SOF pursuing advances that so outpace allies and partners 

that it could isolate itself militarily? What are the future technologybased threats to SOF operators across the range of military and special operations? Can SOF overcome these threats? Are performance 

enhancing drugs a third offset capability? Advanced technologies 

may make the human-machine interface even more complex as the 

human side must recognize when the machine side is out of tolerance. Will that complexity outpace the education and training of the 

force? What are the legal, moral, and ethical issues associated with 

advanced technology concepts such as autonomous machines and 

machine-assisted decision making? 

PEOPLE

A5. Capabilities management of SOF

USSOCOM selects extremely capable individuals from different 

backgrounds and experiences, with a wide array of skills and talents. 

Once selected, it is difficult to identify and track specific skills and 

talents within the command so that each member can achieve his 

or her full potential. How can USSOCOM improve its capability to 

identify, track, and capture personnel capabilities? Does utilization 

of specific skills and talents lead to improvements in turnover, productivity, and morale? What can USSOCOM do to better manage the 

career progression and lifecycle of SOF operators and enablers in the 

future to better sustainably meet operational and enterprise requirements? What existing research or models should underpin SOF talent 

development and talent management? What methods can be used to 

vet, prioritize, and assign projects without overly taxing individuals? How can this be managed properly? Does today’s selection and 

assessment process give us the operator of the future as detailed in 

the USSOCOM SOF Future Operator Concept and the Global Scout 

as outlined in the Congressional Posture Statement of 2016? Are there 

ways to enhance aptitude assessment and optimize personnel selection and matching processes across the SOF enterprise? How can 
6

Special Operations Research Topics 2018

USSOCOM and its components ensure that needed capabilities are 

acquired rapidly and efficiently? Can the use of predictive genetic 

and biological markers be used to vet SOF candidates, operators, 

and leadership? 

A6. Educating SOF for 21st century unconventional warfare (UW) 

and countering UW

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council issued memorandum 

098-11 concerning UW. Task 9 from that memorandum tasked 

USSOCOM to assess UW education. The USSOCOM assessment 

found there was a need for providing UW education to senior leaders 

and all personnel within the DOD. What have numerous conflicts 

and wars taught the United States about UW? Is the doctrinal definition of UW still viable in the contemporary strategic environment? 

Is UW a viable strategic option for the United States in addressing 

future national security situations? Does UW expertise provide the 

intellectual foundation to develop strategies and campaign plans for 

countering enemy UW strategies and operations? What does UW 

education look like? How do we measure it? Who needs it? To what 

degree? Are SOF trained and equipped to capitalize on opportunities and enable resistance operations in times and locations of choice 

as approved by U.S. authorities? Should UW and counter UW be 

exclusive to SOF?

NETWORKING AND RELATIONSHIPS

A7. Identity narratives shaping interstate relations in the Gray Zone 

Modifying USSOCOM 2017 Research Topics D5: “Unraveling Identity: Assessing Multiple Levels of Personal and Communal Identity 

and the Overlaps Within Them.” Evaluate the meaning and definition 

of identity as it relates to challenges within the operating environment. How can the U.S. operationalize identity? Within the human 

domain, what are the boundaries of influence operations, social 

norms, cognition, and narratives? Consider the strengths/weaknesses 

for beliefs and what makes them that way. What kinds of internal/

external actors have the potential to shape beliefs and motivate 

actions? What are the costs/benefits for USSOCOM in challenges that 
7

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

involve identity? Evaluate strategies and tactical/operational mechanisms available currently and those that would need to be developed.

How does the geopolitical identity of a state affect the USG’s 

understanding of the human terrain? Discuss potential concerns 

associated with assigning identity to groups or individuals. Consider 

problems that could arise from those labels. How does Russia’s geopolitical identity affect the USG’s understanding of Russian human 

terrain and of U.S.–Russia relations? How does Russian subversion in 

the 21st century differ from Soviet Cold War subversion campaigns? 

How did the Soviet subversion from the 1940s to the 1950s affect 

American identity? What are parallels to those actions today? 

How should the USG manage and prioritize research and studies 

on issues of identity to enhance understanding of military/security 

matters? What sources or methods (e.g., historical records [U.S. or 

Russian], political polls, open-source materials, memberships in ideological organizations) are required to study these questions? What 

are the ethical considerations for these studies? 

A8. State-Society Relationships: How domestic politics shape or are 

shaped by international relations in the Gray Zone

There are strategic implications in the interplay between domestic 

politics and international relations in the state-society relationship. 

Economic, political, social, and other factors impact how states and 

their respective bureaucracies operate. As the USG seeks to influence 

these dynamics, what authorities or boundaries should be amended 

or created to support these activities more effectively? How can the 

USG encourage domestic and international support, and possibly 

funding, for a unified regional strategy? Which domestic policies or 

limitations prevent the USG from countering Russian influence in 

Eastern Europe? How does the USG gain international consensus 

on what the threat is? How does the USG become proactive rather 

than reactive in the Gray Zone? How does the USG develop a framework from which to identify Gray Zone challenges? Can the USG 

determine an algorithm to identify Gray Zone threats? Where are 

future Gray Zone threats likely to emerge? How does the USG identify 

potential Gray Zone threats? Is an actor’s former superpower status 

relevant? Which geographical region is most vulnerable to Gray Zone 
8

Special Operations Research Topics 2018

threats or susceptible to Gray Zone activities? How can nationalism 

be leveraged throughout Eastern Europe to promote U.S. interests 

and counter Russian influence in the Gray Zone?

TECHNOLOGY AND RESOURCES

A9. Precision targeting operations: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and CounterUnmanned Aircraft Systems 

Precision targeting operations involve direct action and counter-network activities enabled by SOF unique intelligence, technology, and 

targeting capabilities and processes. While every support and staff 

section has critical operating costs, funding for C4I is commonly the 

most expensive and pervasive of any budget. How can DOD anticipate 

and decrease information technology costs in an increasingly digital 

operating environment? What technological solutions are needed to 

deter/deny/destroy adversary unmanned aircraft systems (to include 

commercial, off-the-shelf solutions) in permissive and non-permissive 

environments? How can USSOCOM leverage partnerships with both 

government and civilian agencies/companies to improve precision 

targeting operations capability development and fielding? 

A10. Contemporary UW

Rapidly improving anti-access area denial (A2/AD) adversary capabilities pose a high risk to SOF personnel conducting UW missions. Notably, these missions specifically require SOF to operate for 

extended periods of time in denied or contested environments. How 

are VEOs maximizing A2/AD against SOF UW efforts? How could 

SOF potentially leverage existing technology to remotely train, advise, 

and assist resistance forces as part of a joint UW campaign? What 

risks would alternate UW approaches present from a force protection 

and/or operations security perspective? 

A11. Operational utilization of cyber technologies 

Numerous advances in artificial intelligence (AI) over the past several 

years could dramatically affect the operational and strategic effectiveness of USSOF (and the Joint Force). Still, very few—if any—AI 
9

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

capabilities are fielded for operational use. What various artificial 

intelligence capabilities exist with potential military utility? Which 

AI capabilities should be adapted for immediate use and/or warrant further investment? What are the risks versus rewards of fully 

autonomous systems? Similarly, how can and should AI and machine 

learning be used to better detect, configure, and catalog computer 

network hardware and software? Finally, what are ways new visualization and analytics tools could improve SOF threat awareness and 

intelligence processes?

A12. Big data and the operational force

Big data methods and systems create unprecedented ability to consolidate and analyze information from an array of sources. How 

can TSOCs and other operational headquarters enhance analytical 

capabilities through real-time application of big data technologies 

and techniques? What best practices in big data application could be 

applied to the USSOCOM enterprise, notably when conducting SOF 

command and control (C2)? What are the acquisition, sustainment, 

and personnel requirements for operational big data processing and 

analyses? What big data driven methods are adversaries using and/

or likely to use in the future against USSOF and partner forces?

11

B. Win

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

B. Win 

Topic Titles

B1. Case study: The integration of SOF and conventional forces (CF) in 

building the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program—is that approach 

applicable to building the capacity of local police forces in other 

theaters/Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)?

B2. How can the DOD (primarily SOF) tie BPC efforts into combating 

human smuggling networks? 

B3. The future of SOF infiltration in 2035 

B4. SOF in an A2/AD environment

B5. Techniques used by SOF to exploit publicly available information 

(PAI) as a method for follow-on operations 

B6. SOF Fusion Centers: The success of ad hoc SOF Fusion Centers 

for coalition/partner operations demands the development of 

a doctrinal (or standardized) Fusion Center concept for future 

operations

B7. Coalition operations in the Gray Zone 

B8. How can/should SOF capabilities be used to address or counter 

messaging from the virtual caliphate specifically and adversary 

virtual networks generally? 

B9. Conflict deterrence and prevention

B10. Tracing the evolution of SOF and defining its future utility

Topic Descriptions

B1. Case study: The integration of SOF and conventional forces (CF) 

in building the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program—is that 

approach applicable to building the capacity of local police forces 

in other theaters/Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)?

The ALP program was started in 2010 by SOF to develop local, 

community-based security forces to defend against the Taliban. The 

ALP program was part of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) 

program, another initiative by the special operations community 

to develop a comprehensive structure for security, governance, and 

economic development in select and willing communities. In most 
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cases, people refer to ALP within the context of VSO, that is, VSO/

ALP with ALP providing the security aspect of VSO. The program 

has been compared to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program 

in Vietnam—a counterinsurgency program initially developed by 

the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces to 

secure villages in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam and cut 

off the enemy’s link to the people of the region, hence their access to 

intelligence, manpower, and logistics. Participants also referenced 

SHADOW WARRIOR 16-3 wargames that looked at failed states and 

how a VSO/ALP program might be applied. 

The purpose of this research is to document the program, including the integration of SOF and CF in developing the program and 

building the capacity of those local forces. Generally, is that approach 

applicable in other regions? Specifically, what were the successes and 

failures of the program? Provide examples of SOF/CF integration 

and lessons from that integration. What other regions might this 

initiative support?

B2. How can the DOD (primarily SOF) tie BPC efforts into combating human smuggling networks? 

Special Interest Aliens (SIA) pose a significant threat to our homeland. Since 9/11, homeland security has paid increased attention to 

SIA, those individuals from “Special Interest Countries” that have ties 

to terrorism, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and others.2

As part of the process, human smuggling networks offer these SIA 

and their sponsoring Special Interest Countries a more efficient and 

organized approach to evading homeland defense systems.

BPC efforts are routinely conducted alongside other interagency organizations (such as Department of State, Department of Homeland 

Security, and Department of Justice agencies) in partner nations. 

In order to bolster regional security and combat human smuggling 

networks, DOD will identify threats and provide early warning of 

mechanisms to capitalize on illicit pathways. What are the illicit 

mechanisms and pathways used by SIA to gain entrance to the United 

States? What agencies and in what countries should USSOCOM 

engage as potential partners in combating the SIA networks and 
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initiatives? How can USSOCOM best integrate BPC efforts into integrated campaign plans? 

B3. The future of SOF infiltration in 2035 

As both civilian and military communication and detection systems continue to improve, what is the future of traditional infiltration methods for SOF operations? Personal electronics are especially 

important given the ubiquity of Twitter and so-called “citizen journalists” and, more importantly, non-traditional agents of influence 

such as Instagram “influencers.” How do traditional infiltration 

techniques and methods evolve to remain relevant and effective? In 

addition, the world population continues to grow, leaving less and 

less undeveloped space to conduct operations. Is the aerial platform 

model of SOF infiltration still relevant in light of the explosion in 

personal communication devices enabling instantaneous notification 

of any foreign military presence? Are modern military air defense 

systems so advanced that infiltrating a marginally contested environment becomes virtually impossible? Do both of these factors together 

enable adversaries and peer competitors to negate traditional infiltration methods? What are some of the other methods of infiltration, 

such as maritime, and how are they affected? How feasible are future 

platforms capitalizing on next generation technology such as hypersonic and space-based?

B4. SOF in an A2/AD environment

China and Russia pursue low cost A2/AD solutions to counter U.S. 

high cost infiltration capabilities and methodologies in times of 

crisis and conflict. Unfortunately, SOF is lagging behind in terms of 

understanding and articulating its purpose with regards to A2/AD. 

The United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) commissioned a study by the Center of Naval Analysis 

on how SOF naval forces can contribute and/or enable infiltration. 

NAVSPECWARCOM is also exploring this problem along two avenues: (1) How can SOF exploit its tactical mobility to provide access 

for special operations, actions, and activities, and (2) How can SOF 

build relationships with actors who already have access to those areas? 

Additionally, the SOCOM J9 was working on a concept to parallel 
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Air-Sea Battle/Forcible Entry, but there has not been much else in the 

public domain. The expectation is that SOF should focus on counterterrorism and the services should focus on A2/AD. This only sets 

SOF up for failure when, at the last minute before or during the onset 

of hostilities, the leadership turns to SOF and asks: “What can you 

do for us with regards to countering A2/AD challenges (which may 

not be ‘conventional’)?” SOF need to be prepared to respond to that 

question now. Additionally, how might SOF be utilized in peacetime 

and during times of crisis/conflict to better enable U.S.-led counterA2/AD efforts? 

B5. Techniques used by SOF to exploit publicly available information (PAI) as a method for follow-on operations

As part of sensitive site exploitation, innocuous information is often 

gathered and disregarded as “benign” by a strike force. However, 

some of this information can be exploited to highlight relationships 

between malign actors, to uncover hidden identities, and to illuminate the mechanisms and procedures used by adversaries. SOF analysts are seeking ways to define and express these areas of PAI that 

can be used to illuminate the threat networks for follow-on operations 

and for reinforcing actions. One challenge is creating a procedural 

mechanism whereby PAI acquired by a strike force is not automatically classified, simply by virtue of having been acquired by a strike 

force (e.g., collection means). How can information be disseminated 

while the source or collection methods/activities are not disclosed? 

Is there an effective way to index this PAI so it is available to analysts 

to consider in all-source analyses? 

B6. SOF Fusion Centers: The success of ad hoc SOF Fusion Centers 

for coalition/partner operations demands the development of 

a doctrinal (or standardized) Fusion Center concept for future 

operations

Recent history of the employment of SOF shows that even when unilateral action is taken in foreign internal defense (FID)/UW settings, 

the follow-on activities often fall to coalitions or alliances. One recent 

example is the establishment of the Special Operations Forces Fusion 

Centre (SOFFC) in Kabul in 2008, which paved the way for better 
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understanding of what intelligence requirements were necessary in a 

coalition environment for SOF to be able to operate inside the adversary’s decision cycle. At peak operational tempo in Afghanistan (2011–

2013), the SOFFC was capable of simultaneously supporting roughly 

20 task forces with fused multinational and interagency intelligence. 

There is broad concurrence on the utility of multinational fusion 

centers as evidenced by similar such fusion cells that exist within 

the NATO Alliance on a permanent basis, such as the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, the Tactical Terrorism Intelligence Unit, and 

the Intelligence Liaison Unit. Within this context, research should 

address the doctrinal and conceptual steps needed to “automate” 

the creation of fusion cells as organic parts in the stand-up of a Special Operations Joint Task Force. The research should delve into the 

multinational specific requirements of such centers and the implicit 

systems, competencies, procedures, or mechanisms that need to be 

put in place for such centers to be “short-notice operations” that are 

capable, as well as effective, if activated.

B7. Coalition operations in the Gray Zone 

As the threat of violent extremism continues to grow and a resurgent Russia continues to employ hybrid means below the threshold of 

conflict, senior military and civilian leaders increasingly state: “We 

need to do more to prevent conflict—to act in the Gray Zone between 

peace and war.” The Gray Zone, according to the Commander of 

U.S. Central Command, General Joseph Votel, “is characterized by 

intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet 

short of conventional war.”3 Preventing crisis is a SOF trademark. By 

conducting missions such as FID or military assistance, SOF helps 

build security sector capabilities in fragile nations, hence minimizing 

the opportunity for the next crisis to grow and spin out of control. It 

may seem difficult to build effective coalitions and conduct military 

operations outside the realm of conflict. Operations and activities 

are mostly bilateral in nature. Sometimes, nations allocate resources 

against the same problem set without basic coordination, resulting in 

wasted resources. At the same time, the 21st century is increasingly 

becoming the century of SOF as nations are reluctant to commit a 
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large ground force. In the words of USSOCOM Commander General 

Tony Thomas, “Business is good for SOF.” So good actually, that SOF 

is becoming a scarce commodity, resulting in painful prioritizations. 

Building effective coalitions in the Gray Zone to increase burden 

sharing and effect efficient use of resources seems ever more important. The question is, what are the preconditions for effective planning, preparation, and execution of steady-state/Gray Zone combined 

special operations to prevent crises around the world? 

B8. How can/should SOF capabilities be used to address or counter 

messaging from the virtual caliphate specifically and adversary 

virtual networks generally? 

The FBI has approximately 900 active investigations into homegrown 

VEOs across the 50 states; an estimated 90 people have been charged 

with homegrown terrorism. However, the sources for much of the 

online activities are overseas where SOF and interagency operate. 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria (ISIS) supporters are very active 

online despite repeated removal of social media. SOF has a network 

that has access, and sometimes placement, where it can affect or 

counter these activities.4 The concept of a virtual caliphate deserves 

study or perhaps research as another framing tool in the current 

fight. The United States is not fighting traditional mafias or other 

criminal organizations the way we are fighting ISIS or al-Qaeda. The 

United States is at war with the entities that seek to create a physical 

caliphate. This is also a different angle and approach to assessing 

and countering this threat. Additionally, how does this concept of a 

virtual caliphate play out into SOF doctrine?

B9. Conflict deterrence and prevention

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

which approaches are appropriate for achieving U.S. national security 

objectives in the current and future strategic environments. It is possible that a heavy emphasis on a deterrence-based security approach 

is not adequate or appropriate, given the current and emerging strategic environment. Further, any potential successes in deterring 

conflict are difficult to measure or even understand, particularly 

given information that has come to light from the Soviet archives 
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that indicate U.S. assumptions on Soviet rationality were unfounded. 

Simply deterring an undesirable event does not necessarily address 

underlying causes or grievances that may fester under conditions of 

artificially-imposed stability. The absence of conflict does not indicate 

the absence of threats to U.S. interests, and the costs associated with 

maintaining a status quo that is threatened in multiple dimensions 

grow quickly. A more comprehensive conflict prevention approach 

may provide a way to complement or replace the heavy emphasis on 

deterrence. A thorough examination of both approaches is required to 

improve strategy for the current and emerging strategic environment.

Are the deterrence-based theories behind the U.S. National Security Strategy adequate to address the current and future strategic 

environment? Are they appropriate for state and non-state actors? Are 

the competition and conflict that we currently experience necessarily detrimental to the U.S. National Security Strategy? Is deterrence 

of conflict adequate; is prevention of conflict practical? If so, what 

would a conflict prevention approach entail? How could USSOCOM 

facilitate a new conflict prevention approach? 

B10. Tracing the evolution of SOF and defining its future utility 

The objective of this topic is to develop new insights to evolve a complex and mature USSOCOM enterprise in terms of cost, mission, and 

footprint while retaining its special agility and adaptability. Special 

operations characteristics have not changed: missions of physical and 

political risk; unique operational techniques and employment; and a 

balance of intelligence and indigenous assets often require a clandestine/low visibility posture. Since 2001, SOF has been central in defense 

planning, persistently employed in conflict zones, and deployed 

across all combatant commands. A 2015 Government Accountability 

Office report indicated that SOF deployments increased 150 percent 

since 2003, with a complementary growth of budget and personnel. 

USSOCOM, while still dependent on the Services, shoulders servicelike and combatant command responsibilities. These responsibilities, along with force development/deployment are making the SOF 

institution less flexible. The question is where should SOF go, in what 

direction? The question is not how to go further down the current 

path, but where and in what direction should SOF go? 
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If USSOCOM has grown proportional to its demands and the SOF 

enterprise remains the force of choice for combatant commanders and 

the USG, then what becomes the catalyst to reframe and capitalize 

on SOF’s special nature? Is deploying SOF the new normal? That is, 

has using SOF become “conventional,” while the use of CF, predominantly in Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflict rather than 

Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflict (ODTAAC), 

has become “special?” While still winning the current fight, how 

can SOF evolve and retain its special character instead of becoming the conventional ODTAAC force? Themes of interest include: 

changing mission assignments (e.g., redefining the SOF narrative and 

SOF and CF roles); exploring consolidation of SOF core activities (is 

12 too many?); managing TSOCs/GCCs/USG expectations in using 

SOF; understanding the budget/resource impacts on introducing 

evolutionary/revolutionary technologies as well as the capabilities 

integration processes and authorities.
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C. Transform 

Topic Titles

C1. The role of USSOCOM as a “Global Synchronizer” 

C2. The implications of swarming tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTPs) for SOF 

C3. Security cooperation framework and global SOF 

C4. Developing understanding and wielding influence through 

expanded maneuver 

C5. Optimizing SOF C2 

C6. Posturing forces for steady state vs. contingency 

C7. Alternative campaign planning construct 

C8. Evolutionary and revolutionary change and the implications for 

SOF 

C9. How can SOF best leverage the cyberspace domain to conduct its 

own Mission Essential Task List (METL)? 

Topic Descriptions

C1. The role of USSOCOM as a “Global Synchronizer” 

A global synchronizer is the Combatant Commander responsible for 

the alignment of specified planning and related activities of other 

Combatant Commands, Services, DOD agencies and activities, 

and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies within 

an established, common framework to facilitate coordinated and 

decentralized execution across geographic and other boundaries. 

USSOCOM has global synchronizer responsibilities in counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, and countering Transregional Threat Organizations. While the definition is instructive, 

in practice the “global synchronizer” role requires further conceptual 

and functional development across DOD and other USG agencies. 

More broadly, the global synchronizer role could also extend to partner nations looking to USSOCOM for security cooperation activities. 

Generally, how do SOF address transregional threats using all 

the elements of national power when most, if not all, USG departments and agencies are configured along national or regional lines? 
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With increasing emphasis being placed on whole of government and 

interagency collaboration, how can USSOCOM encourage potential 

interagency and international partners to collaborate more effectively? How do SOF optimize partnerships and reinforce supported 

and supporting relationships within SOF, coalition forces, and joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) structural 

constructs to achieve operational and strategic effects and minimize 

risk in irregular and traditional operations across the range of military operations? How do SOF bridge critical seams between JIIM 

partners to conduct operations under Title 10 Authorities, Title 50 

Authorities, and/or the Ambassador’s Title 22 Authorities to achieve 

success in complex future operating environments? 

What are the objective barriers to success? What defines mission 

success versus the success of cooperation? What are the best practices toward attaining interagency cooperation and interdependence? 

With regard to the special operations support team/special operations 

liaison officer network, how can USSOCOM ensure the right people 

are being placed in the right agencies and countries? What is the role 

of the U.S. country team, who by definition is narrowly focused on 

a single country, in addressing transregional threats? What current 

agency/departmental cultures exist that hinder this collaboration, 

and how do SOF overcome them? 

How can partner nations be best incorporated in transregional 

efforts? Are there best practices and other mechanisms for understanding, identifying, assessing, developing, and motivating potential partners’ behavior, objectives, organization, and composition 

to successfully partner with SOF? What requirements exist for SOF 

in establishing a unity of effort with respect to level of education 

received by our global partners, which include the USG departments 

and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental 

organizations, multinational forces, and elements of the private 

sector? How do SOF develop similar situational understanding of 

CF, USG interagency, and international partner forces’ objectives, 

missions, and purpose to achieve complementary effects for other 

SOF operations?
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C2. The implications of swarming tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for SOF

Swarming technology is becoming increasingly viable, and swarming concepts are disseminating at a rapid pace. These facts present 

both opportunities and threats to SOF who must now adapt to a new 

operating environment. The implications of swarming TTP are not 

yet well understood and require immediate investigation. 

What swarming technologies can be leveraged to achieve a SOFcentric Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability? What types of commercial off-the-shelf technologies empower 

enemy forces to detect SOF presence or activities? What lessons can 

be learned by studying swarming behavior and techniques of adversaries to provide insight on how to defeat them or emulate that behavior? Is there a way to apply swarming tactics to magnify or obfuscate 

SOF on the battlefield? 

Are SOF-enablers (e.g., Little Green Men and motorcycle gangs 

in Crimea) the same as SOF? Can or should SOF leverage Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) or other unsavory groups as part 

of a swarming attack? What role does SOF have in identifying or 

counteracting swarming TTP by TOC or other unsavory groups? 

How can SOF leverage swarming techniques with auxiliary forces 

to achieve tactical, operational, or strategic effects? Where can SOF 

leverage swarming TTP in performance of their core missions? For 

instance, what modifications or updates to UW, FID, and security 

force assistance need to be undertaken to address the ability of human 

swarming that impact SOF activities?

C3. Security cooperation framework and global SOF 

SOF have become great tools for both the United States and partner 

nations in today’s complex and fluid current threat environment. As 

a result, many partner nations are emphasizing SOF capacity and 

institution building. However, under the U.S. security cooperation 

construct, SOF expertise gets lost in the system. Current U.S. security 

cooperation programs are underpinned by political and diplomatic 

interests. In practical terms, key players in the developmental phase 

of these programs are the U.S. country teams, GCCs, the Department 

of State, and the U.S. Congress, while in the implementation phase, 
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the key mechanisms are controlled by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the GCCs, and the country teams. Given the growing 

importance of SOF to the U.S. and partner nations, greater emphasis 

on SOF-centric programs might be warranted.

How might the GCC-centric system be adapted to better incorporate partner nation SOF whose interests and capabilities cross 

GCC boundaries? How can SOF integrate partner capabilities and 

improve information sharing among partners to more effectively 

counter transregional VEOs using a transregional approach? How 

might USSOCOM need to alter its frames of partnership to accommodate the variety of partner SOF organizational structures, such as 

with those lacking service-like responsibilities? Could theme-focused 

hubs (as opposed to regional hubs) provide a better solution when 

addressing transregional threats? 

How might the U.S. FID mission support an approach that 

addresses ways for tackling future crises in which multiple nations 

have a vested interest and for which the nations are willing to commit 

forces and resources based on agreed end-states and strategic diplomatic, information, military, and economic objectives? What systems, authorities, or procedures have to be changed or implemented 

within the Security Cooperation Programs, and what legislative or 

authoritative directives need to be adjusted or published to ensure 

that the application of U.S. funds and knowledge produce capable and 

interoperable SOF capabilities in partner nations? What mechanisms 

are available for partner nations to make known objectives, goals, 

and caveats as input to the strategic and campaign planning process 

before the plan is finalized? 

How can SOF share open-source information with partners and 

encourage partners to share their information and insights to more 

effectively counter terrorism? What authorities and issues impact 

open-source and other information sharing? What information can 

and should be shared with partners, what are the barriers to doing 

so, and how can these barriers be addressed? What can USSOCOM 

do to establish an effective collaborative information environment to 

enable information sharing, enhance situational awareness, and support decision-making? How would historical enmities within a region 

impact such an approach? What doctrine, organization, training, 
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materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities changes need 

to be made to institutionalize lessons learned in order to better enable 

future coalition SOF operations and improve interoperability? 

C4. Developing understanding and wielding influence through 

expanded maneuver 

Developing understanding of and wielding influence over populations are essential components of SOF core activities. In an era of 

population-centric competition and conflict, the joint force requires 

an expanded concept of maneuver that considers both physical and 

cognitive maneuver in and across multiple domains to move both 

force and ideas in time and space, especially in security environments 

below the threshold of Major Combat Operations where state and 

non-state actors seek to gain an asymmetric advantage by operating in the seam between peace and war. There is a need to examine 

how maneuvering in the cognitive space is an important aspect of 

‘systematic influence’ on the left side of the operational continuum.

What changes will need to be made for the United States to conduct agile political warfare, and what will be the SOF role? How can 

SOF expand the Army’s current frame for Unified Land Operations 

beyond the physical to consider “outmaneuvering adversaries both 

physically and cognitively” to ensure the joint force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our nation’s adversaries? 

How can SOF, as part of the joint force, better prepare and shape the 

contemporary and future operating environment for success through 

the conduct of “Cognitive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield”?

How do SOF design Preparation of the Environment (PE) operations to achieve both tactical and strategic effects? Do PE activities 

vary when conducting the various SOF core operations? If so, how 

and why? How are SOF PE operations synchronized with USG or 

partner nations? Are joint SOF standardized in how they approach 

PE so there is common vocabulary amongst the various Service 

components? 

How might deeper insight on social, environmental, and psychological factors improve influence operations to deter or weaken foreign 

fighters’ motivations to join or support extremist causes? Which factors are most salient to BPC, and how should SOF capacity-building 
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efforts address those factors? How does understanding culture make a 

positive difference and enhance SOF military effectiveness? As a way 

of developing greater understanding of context and others’ intentions 

when building relationships, especially in the fluid arena of the Gray 

Zone, what mechanisms exist to locate and assess the importance 

of competing identities? Why do some identities endure challenges? 

Why do some identities get folded into or subsumed by others and 

under what conditions is that likely to occur? 

How can the future joint force and SOF develop human domain 

indicators and warnings that inform comprehensive deterrence decisions and enable decision makers to prioritize force readiness to meet 

security challenges early, particularly in Gray Zone environments? 

How might qualitative, iterative, multidisciplinary, multimodal 

approaches to understanding population-centric challenges improve 

indicators and warnings for how SOF can maneuver in the cognitive 

space and better compete in the human domain? In order to answer 

these questions, research into the cultural norms found within political, social, and economic institutions will build rubrics for assessing 

identity clarity (specificity of values and actions promoted by the 

identity), predictability (amount and types of anticipated actions 

by others within the identity group), intensity (importance vis-àvis other identities), prevalence (breadth of acceptance within the 

community), durability (ability to withstand counter identities), and 

flexibility (adaptability with changing contexts).

C5. Optimizing SOF C2 

Building on General Votel’s Mission Command 2015 White Paper, 

how can or should USSOCOM standardize and simplify SOF C2. 

Strategic problems are no longer confined to sovereign borders or specific regions. Rather, these problems are transregional, spanning the 

entire globe. Global SOF operations will increasingly involve adversaries who conduct activities and operations across traditional GCC 

seams within the air, ground, sea, and cyber domains. However, the 

transregional threat presents unique C2 issues as threats cross GCC 

boundaries and responsibilities. SOF must determine if existing C2 

architectures are sufficient to address these challenges. This research 

should address current SOF C2 structures to either validate them 
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or determine if they need modification to more efficiently address 

current threats. 

Is there an optimal, standardized structure applicable at all 

(most) levels of SOF C2, and if so, what does it look like? How does 

USSOCOM synchronize and prioritize special operations, actions, 

and activities globally? How can USSOCOM better provide coherent 

and unified SOF capabilities to the GCCs? Does the command present coherent SOF employment options and recommendations? Are 

the authorities, leadership traits, and technical capabilities required 

for success currently available? 

Does current joint doctrine SOF C2 structure sufficiently address 

these challenges and the evolving dynamic of cross-GCC, or seam 

operations? What are some specific recommendations to enhance 

existing doctrine and/or implement new C2 concepts? How could the 

command expand the range of available options through requisite 

authorities, capabilities, and relationships? What can be learned from 

historical examples of how C2 of SOF has been established in different campaigns—SOF supporting a conventional force commander, 

supporting a SOF commander, or supporting the interagency?

What are the future agile information systems that USSOCOM 

should be focused on incorporating into the SOF network in the next 

15 years? Of these, what processes, systems, and mechanisms can be 

leveraged to share information with international partners to include 

differing levels of security classification?

C6. Posturing forces for steady state vs. contingency 

Since 9/11, SOF have been deployed at previously unanticipated levels, 

and many expect that Gray Zone or hybrid warfare challenges will 

require continued high levels of SOF engagement. Since SOF were 

envisaged as primarily a contingency force and resourced accordingly, some SOF enabler activities have been stretched to the limit 

and often require ad hoc adaptations to meet mission requirements. 

Is it now time to develop a concept of SOF posturing for steady-state 

operations instead of a contingency concept?

Is there a difference in posturing forces between contingencies 

and steady-state operations? What logistics issues are encountered as 

a result of supporting operations with contingency and crisis action 
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planning processes? Would a steady-state concept of operation promote cost savings or improve implementation? What are the political 

and military obstacles that impact or prevent a more efficient support 

structure? Is there value to having logistics personnel trained specifically to support SOF operators and operations? Do SOF operations 

require a level of support different than that of the CF? 

Current exercises and training opportunities centered on operational contract support which provided a means to better support the 

mission. How can USSOCOM optimize SOF sustainment operations, 

ensuring support to the TSOCs is fully integrated within the GCC 

and component logistics concept of operations? Given the complexity 

of the SOF environment, what authorities and resourcing changes are 

required to ensure USSOCOM can sustain SOF into the future? What 

equipment authorization changes are required to sustain the future 

SOF operator, and is there a better way to manage those authorities? What USSOCOM headquarters staff and organization changes 

(logistics leadership rank/grade, logistics operations, engineering, 

and medical) would enable the headquarters to best support TSOCs 

in their worldwide mission?

How can USSOCOM optimize the integration and interoperability of SOF sustainment with conventional force logistics operations, 

systems, and infrastructure? How can USSOCOM better ensure 

SOF logistics requirements are being met by GCCs and the coalition 

forces? With theater and national redundancies for crisis response, 

can the theater forces afford or accommodate longer response times 

in order to free up forces for steady-state OAAs? 

How does A2/AD impact our ability to resupply our forces? Are 

SOF mission requirements driving/equipping force capabilities? 

Where are these requirements coming from? Is USSOCOM building 

the force of the future or continuing legacy programs/systems? Are 

SOF efforts and capacities outpacing their authorities and appetite 

to use these resources?

C7. Alternative campaign planning construct 

In an era of persistent competition and conflict characterized by security challenges below the threshold of major armed intervention or 

war, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System has proved 
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to be an inadequate phasing construct for campaign and operations 

planning. Currently, the JS J-7 with input from the services is developing a Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC). 

How will the Joint Force design, plan, and execute joint campaigns 

in conjunction with interorganizational and multinational partners 

to overcome the emerging complexities of the future operating environment? How does SOF, as part of the joint force, operationalize the 

JCIC to design campaigns which do not fit within the traditional campaign planning paradigm, particularly when partner nations should 

be in the lead and U.S. planning is subordinate to our partner’s plan? 

In an era of persistent competition and conflict, how can USSOCOM 

become an adaptive organization comfortable with constant change, 

and how does an organization build in and encourage the practice of 

constant adaptation? How does a planning model inspire creativity 

without being reduced to a process that merely replicates the example 

offered in the guidance?

C8. Evolutionary and revolutionary change and the implications for 

SOF

While SOF remain dedicated to constant technological innovation, 

there is a growing tension between evolutionary change based on 

improvements to existing paradigms of warfare and revolutionary 

change based on the introduction of radically new concepts, technologies, and/or environmental conditions. To avoid strategic surprise, USSOCOM must maintain a foothold in both evolutionary and 

revolutionary advances.

How do emergent technologies affect the nature of the SOF enterprise? How does a growing bureaucracy adapt to the challenges of a 

complex strategic environment characterized by persistent disruption? Do existing paradigms require evolutionary or revolutionary 

change to achieve successful outcomes in environments characterized 

by entangled complexities and overlapping simultaneous conflicts?

C9. How can SOF best leverage the cyberspace domain to conduct its 

own Mission Essential Task List (METL)? 

As the cyber domain grows in importance, SOF will be increasingly 

compelled to envision its roles and responsibilities in this domain. 
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While USSOCOM will leverage and complement other DOD and 

interagency partners in the cyber domain, SOF will likely operate 

in ways unique to the community. While SOF cyber capabilities are 

still in their infancy, it is useful to begin conceptualizing a SOF cyber 

METL, or at least ask informed questions about how SOF might contribute to the overall effort in the cyber domain.

How might USSOCOM leverage different trades, branches, or 

authorities within the different formations across the enterprise, but 

also at the different components? How might USSOCOM delineate 

what SOF does in this domain in order to be able to understand, 

operate, influence, and coerce in this environment at the tactical level 

while differentiating itself from other strategic and operational level 

cyber mission forces? To what extent is physical location a consideration for SOF in the cyber domain, and what implications flow from 

the answer?
29

D. People

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

D. People 

Topic Titles

D1. Recruiting, assessing, selecting, training, and retaining Special 

Operations Cyber enablers and specialists 

D2. Authorities for educating SOF 

D3. Development of SOF logisticians

D4. Leadership and innovation in a large SOF enterprise 

D5. Preparing the millennial generation for military leadership

D6. Examine the implications and effects of adopting programs to 

enhanced SOF human performance: Are there limits to enhanced 

physical and mental capabilities? 

D7. The Warrior Care Program: “We will keep the faith with you”

Topic Descriptions

D1. Recruiting, assessing, selecting, training, and retaining Special 

Operations Cyber enablers and specialists

What is the return on investment associated with developing a SOFdedicated cyber workforce? With the exponential increase over the 

last 5–7 years for human capital well-versed in the multiple disciplines 

in cyber security, the DOD and USSOCOM need to look at how to 

better recruit and incentivize the current workforce to remain, as well 

as develop innovative ways to continually bolster its ranks. The private sector is utilizing the tried and tested method of increasing compensation for these work roles. What other methods can USSOCOM 

use to retain its cyber talent? How can USSOCOM compete with the 

private sector for its technical and cyber workforce? Can developing 

and fostering a culture like the one found in SOF combat organizations be the key to retaining and subsequently recruiting the best 

and brightest in the cyber security workforce? How can USSOCOM 

better collaborate with colleges and universities to boost recruitment 

efforts and increase the number of students studying cybersecurity 

as a profession? How does an organization effectively raise and sustain a cybersecurity aware culture? What are the most profound and 

impacting ways to shift the human to taking cybersecurity more 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2018

seriously and adopt an enduring and effective cybersecurity posture 

for the SOF enterprise? 

D2. Authorities for educating SOF

USSOCOM derives the authority for training, equipping, and organizing special operations personnel from Title 10 of United States 

Code. At present, the education of special operations personnel is 

the responsibility of the Services. Do special operations personnel 

(commissioned and non-commissioned) require additional education as compared to their conventional Service counterparts? Does 

the education currently provided by the Services meet SOF needs? If 

SOF has unique educational needs, what are they? Should USSOCOM 

petition Congress to amend Goldwater-Nichols to allow for the use of 

MFP-11 funds to educate the force? How can USSOCOM expand SOF 

learning and education opportunities for special operations personnel? What legal and policy authorities can USSOCOM compel the 

Services to address these challenges? What changes in law and policy 

are needed to address these challenges? 

D3. Development of SOF logisticians

The goal of the research would be to identify the value of having logistics personnel trained in specific disciplines to support SOF operators 

and UW operations where traditional logistics support could hamper 

or even compromise sensitive missions. U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command has used the term Non-Standard Logistics (NSL). Do SOF 

operations require a level of support different than that of the CF? 

What doctrinal and legislative support is required? Is a distinct Joint 

SOF Logistician designator required? Do all SOF components have 

an equivalent requirement for a SOF logistics specialist? Should a 

specialty career track managing system be established? What special 

authorities should these SOF logisticians be given? What exercises 

and training opportunities exist or need to be developed to incorporate NSL operational contract support as a means to better support 

the mission? 
31

D. People

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

D4. Leadership and innovation in a large SOF enterprise

As the SOF enterprise grows, how can it resist becoming bureaucratically rigid? What methods and approaches for innovation and idea 

generation can be adapted from the private sector or other unique 

government organizations? How can the SOF components improve 

retention of its most talented and innovative people? How should 

innovation be rewarded and organizational agility fostered? How 

can USSOCOM and its components purposefully integrate modern 

organizational design, leadership theory, and smart risk-taking to 

these ends? 

D5. Preparing the millennial generation for military leadership

Management and leadership challenges are fueled by generational 

change and shifts in its workforce. There is a great deal of research on 

leadership styles in the military: effectiveness, evolution, and adaptation to different environments and events. There is also research 

on the changing demographics of the military and the needs and 

motivations of the newest members of the armed forces. There is little 

research covering the convergence of these topics: How do millennials lead? The military has more individuals from Generation Y in 

leadership positions than the civilian population does, but available 

research stops at Generation X leadership. What is the basis for the 

notion that millennials lead “differently,” in particular, after they 

have been indoctrinated and join SOF units? How should the leadership of millennials be categorized? If they are different from previous 

generations, how is the military and SOF in particular adapting and 

preparing for this shift? How can SOF units prepare the next generation of SOF leaders?

D6. Examine the implications and effects of adopting programs to 

enhance SOF human performance: Are there limits to enhanced 

physical and mental capabilities? 

An extensive study directed by a former USSOCOM commander 

revealed that the current operational environment has been more 

difficult than operators and their families expected, leaving little time 

for them to adjust to the daily strains of perpetual absences. There has 

been legislative resistance to fund USSOCOM human performance 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2018

programs and infrastructure as opposed to military service-funded 

programs. USSOCOM human performance efforts are currently integrated under the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative. According to POTFF, there is a gap in empirical data in this area. 

What are the values of SOF-specific human performance programs? 

Should it be a stand-alone program more aligned with operational 

needs? Should or will the human performance initiative be considered an operational USSOCOM requirement? Why should USSOCOM 

spend money on such additional programs? What are the limits for 

the program to research enhanced or augmented physical and mental 

capabilities? What are the characteristics of human resiliency in SOF 

operators? Can “stress resistance capability” be measured biochemically? Explore the utility and effectiveness of differing treatment methods, therapeutic approaches, and linkages to human performance as 

part of said treatment. Examine existing data to determine preferred 

approaches, documented results, and willingness to sustain enhancement treatment.

D7. The Warrior Care Program: “We will keep the faith with you”

In 2005, USSOCOM established an aggressive program to internally 

care for SOF wounded, ill, or injured service members and their 

families. That intiative, the Care Coalition, had the stated goal “to 

accomplish the mission by, through, and with government and nongovernment organizations.” Recently renamed the Warrior Care Program to better align with other Services programs, the USSOCOM 

program has evolved from immediate care and recovery assistance to 

include a comprehensive recovery plan and a comprehensive transition. The program intends to provide direct, lifelong assistance to SOF 

personnel who are wounded, ill, or injured. In addition to transition 

assistance and mentoring, an adaptive sports program and fellowships were added. Documenting its history, evolution, and measures 

of effectiveness are of interest to USSOCOM leadership. How effective 

is the program? Can it be considered a model advocacy program for 

other services? Has it had a direct effect in increasing special operations 

readiness? What metrics can be considered to measure its effectiveness? 

With expected future budget constraints, is it a long-term sustainable 

program?
33

E. Networking and Relationships

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

E. Networking and Relationships 

Topic Titles

E1. Intellectual motivators of insurgencies and resistance movements 

E2. Thickening the SOF Network

E3. Forging partnerships with SOF

E4. New concepts in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

Multinational Coordination (JIIM-C)

E5. BPC for developing countries’ coastal navies 

E6. Multilateral regional maritime security

Topic Descriptions

E1. Intellectual motivators of insurgencies and resistance 

movements

In a hyper-connected, social media enabled cognitive world, the positive perceptions, beliefs, trust, and credibility that others hold of the 

United States will be the center of gravity in relation to the United 

States’ abilities to conduct successful campaigns, operations, and 

activities to advance U.S. interests. Super-empowered/hyper-connected individuals have an increased ability to provide an operational 

and organizational framework to achieve political change. Individuals or groups historically, and in the contemporary environment, have 

provided the big idea to achieve political change. These intellectual 

motivators develop ideas and then propel them forward, which in 

turn causes a state leader to resist those values or meta-narrative. Are 

there emerging intellectual motivators of insurgencies and resistance 

movements that represent a challenge to U.S. interests? Are there nontraditional means to query the social media network to find those 

emerging intellectual motivators before they are highly visible to 

external audiences? 

E2. Thickening the SOF network

USSOCOM has built an international network with global SOF 

partners. Initiated by commanders, the network is established via 

memoranda of agreement and reinforced with liaisons to and from 
34

Special Operations Research Topics 2018

USSOCOM. It manifests itself in a multinational coordination center 

that encourages collaboration and provides the connectivity infrastructure to encourage sharing through a Mission Partner Network Environment Working Group. Nineteen nations are currently represented 

at USSOCOM and the United States maintains liaisons in 18 partner 

nations. Where should the network go from here? What are the current 

limitations to further development of the network? How can interagency 

partners be included in the network? What ends could or should this 

network serve? What changes need to be implemented, and what policies 

and authorities need to be put in place to allow the network to thicken?

E3. Forging partnerships with SOF

The success of SOF is dependent upon building and sustaining relationships with partners, which typically include foreign militaries, 

the intelligence community, and other governmental agencies. Due to 

the unconventional nature and terrain in which SOF operates, nonstandard relationships are also forged. These include outreach with 

academic institutions and private industry. USSOCOM’s function 

as coordinating authority and lead component to synchronize DOD 

activities in the realms of Counter Transregional Terrorist Organizations, countering weapons of mass destruction, and Counter Threat 

Finance necessitates SOF working with non-traditional partners and 

industry experts. How can non-standard relationships be forged 

between like-minded organizations and individuals? How can SOF 

make better use of outreach programs into academia, professional 

associations, and public service? Which corporations should SOF be 

working with, and which industry partners should SOF maintain 

habitual relationships with? How does SOF broaden its reach and 

influence with these partners, and what C2 mechanisms are needed 

to facilitate these partnerships? 

E4. New concepts in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

Multinational Coordination (JIIM-C)

What is USSOCOM’s role as a “synchronizer” on certain interagency 

missions in what is essentially a “coalition of the willing” among organizations with different priorities, authorities, permissions, and concepts of operation? What can we learn from organization theory about 
35

E. Networking and Relationships

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

generating common operating pictures in a JIIM-C framework? What 

are the means for fomenting a sense of “team” above tactical-level 

Joint Interagency Task Force South groups? What structures are best 

suited for JIIM-C missions? Is there a difference between JIIM-C and 

combined, joint, interagency problems? What is the optimal organizational design for a globally deployed SOF with unknowable contingency operations that we are likely to face in the future?

E5. BPC for developing countries’ coastal navies 

BPC for maritime capabilities presents a serious challenge for developing countries that lack the infrastructure and economic resources 

to sustain conventional naval shipping and aircraft. For developing 

countries, what maritime BPC approaches work best? What approaches 

most effectively support these countries’ maritime security goals? What 

low-cost, off-the-shelf, sustainable systems work best for maritime 

domain awareness, for coastal communications, for maritime interdiction, for maritime strike, or for coastal patrol? What examples or case 

studies best inform the topic of maritime BPC? OEF-Philippines? Sri 

Lanka? Oman? Kenya? Gulf of Guinea? Africa Partnership Station? Are 

there other historical case studies from outside the American context?

E6. Multilateral regional maritime security

This topic involves identifying and strengthening the SOF role in 

building regional maritime security in areas such as the South China 

Sea or the Gulf of Guinea. What is the role of SOF in supporting the 

broader GCC problem set of competition with a rising China and the 

threat of an assertive regional hegemon? What is the state of affairs 

amongst the states and their coastal navies surrounding the South 

China Sea or the Gulf of Guinea? What states play leading roles? What 

states need more support? What agreements, relationships, policies, 

or engagements could be implemented to improve maritime security 

in the South China Sea or the Gulf of Guinea? What is the status 

of regional maritime security today? What is a realistic vision for 

improved regional maritime security in the future? What are some 

appropriate, feasible, and suitable options to get us from today to an 

improved future? What are the pros and cons, or advantages and disadvantages, for each of these options?

37

F. Technology and Resources

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

F. Technology and Resources 

Topic Titles

F1. Service support to SOF

F2. Collaborative tools

F3. Future of SOF Airborne ISR

F4. Disruptive innovation 

F5. Encryption and the way ahead

Topic Descriptions

F1. Service support to SOF

In the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress 

mandated the Services provide a report on the associated costs to 

support Special Operations within 180 days of the signed NDAA. 

Services provide a significant level of additional support, estimated 

at $8B annually in the following areas: Military Personnel, Major 

Weapons Programs, Base Operations Support, Military Training 

Support, and Military Construction. This analysis was conducted 

by USSOCOM Special Operations Financial Management and all 

are estimated support costs. How can we accurately capture the support costs across the Services? What are the direct/indirect costs to 

the Services in support of SOF operations? As an example, if SOF 

operators occupy a Service-owned building for a month while on a 

mission, should the utility costs be accounted? What are the Baseline versus Overseas Contingency Operations costs? What are the 

man-hour costs to support a SOF mission from a Services perspective? As an example, when a SOF-owned C-130J lands at a Service’s 

installation, what are the costs (man-hours) to recover and launch 

that aircraft? Should the Services create a “job order” type system 

to track the man-hour costs? SOF readiness is directly linked to and 

dependent upon Service funding levels. The Services have not provided details on where they would absorb future budget reductions; 

therefore, impacts on support to SOF cannot be itemized or assessed. 

Given historic impacts and the lack of Services’ abilities to absorb 

reductions, it is highly likely that their abilities to optimally support 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2018

SOF will diminish, further straining an already challenged support 

structure and eventually affecting SOF operations and training in 

an adverse manner. 

F2. Collaborative tools

Existing collaboration tools within DOD and the wider USG are 

both useful but also outdated. While several alternative and modern 

collaborative tools exist, it is difficult to introduce and implement 

such systems within complex, worldwide, classified environments. 

How should USSOCOM identify, introduce, implement and advocate for alternative collaboration tools? What education and training 

programs are needed to introduce a new USSOCOM collaborative 

tool? What does ‘success’ look like if/when adopting such a solution? 

Should the SOF enterprise feature a Google-like (data organization, 

search capabilities, integration, etc.) offering? 

F3. Future of SOF Airborne ISR

As both civilian and military communication and detection systems 

continue to evolve, what are the ideal future airborne ISR platforms 

for SOF operations? Is an aerial manned platform still viable or necessary? What platform characteristics allow for employment across 

a wide range of special operations? What SOF peculiar aspects of 

airborne ISR exist? How much should SOF depend on the Services 

for this support? Should USSOCOM pursue an autonomous ISR, lowobservable capability independent of the parent Services? 

F4. Disruptive innovation 

Disruptive innovation, a term popularized over the last twenty 

years, is widely used to describe situations that dramatically change 

an industry’s competitive pattern. The term is of specific salience to 

military advancements in technology and tactics, where predicting 

disruption can yield tremendous benefits against an adversary. What 

are current/past examples of disruptive innovation in the military 

environment, and how did they come about? What are the risks and 

benefits to creating and cultivating a culture of disruption within 

the SOF enterprise? 
39

F. Technology and Resources

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

F5. Encryption and the way ahead

With ever-increasing reliance on computing to achieve military outcomes, encryption becomes a progressively important factor. Our 

adversaries, aware of this, recently stepped up their efforts to infiltrate 

key U.S. networks for strategic and tactical gain. What should be the 

way ahead for USSOCOM and the use of advanced encryption? Will 

encryption requirements outpace bandwidth? What is the future of 

encryption technology at-large, and are these solutions—i.e., quantum technology—suitable for military use? To what extent can and 

should the military trust encryption vendors? What challenges are 

there in adopting new military encryption solutions? 

41

Acronym List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

Appendix: Acronym List

A2/AD anti-access area denial 

AAR after action report 

AI artificial intelligence 

ALP Afghan Local Police 

BPC building partnership capacity

C2 command and control

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 

 and Intelligence 

CF conventional forces 

CSOSR Center for Special Operations Studies and Research 

DOD Department of Defense 

FID foreign internal defense 

GWOT Global War on Terrorism 

GCC geographic combatant command 

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JCIC Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning 

JIIM joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

JIIM-C Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

 Multinational Coordination 

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command 

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

METL Mission Essential Task List
42

Special Operations Research Topics 2018

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NAVSPECWARCOM United States Navy Special Warfare Command 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NSL Non-Standard Logistics 

ODTAAC Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflict 

PAI publicly available information 

PE Preparation of the Environment 

PME professional military education

POTFF Preservation of the Force and Family 

SIA Special Interest Aliens 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SOFFC Special Operations Forces Fusion Centre

TOC Transnational Organized Crime

TSOC theater special operations command 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

USG United States Government 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

UW unconventional warfare 

VEO violent extremist organization 

VSO Village Stability Operations 
43

Acronym List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

Endnotes 

1. Harmony and Disharmony. Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, 

West Point, 14 February 2006, accessed at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/

harmony-and-disharmony-exploiting-al-qaidas-organizational-vulnerabilities.

2. Sylvia Longmire, “What Can We Learn From Trends in ‘Special Interest Alien’ 

Migration Into the US?” Homeland Security Today, US, 11 May 2011, accessed 

on 5 February 2017 at http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/

single-article/what-can-we-learn-from-trends-in-special-interest-alien-migration-into-the-us/dde14d2e6e96cdb40a5ae5003d4002f2.html.

3. Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, 

“Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter 2016).

4. Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Subject: Naming Convention 

for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” 13 February 2017. Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS) is the accepted naming convention.