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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV 

No. CV-16-446 

SHANNON GODWIN

APPELLANT

V.

GARLAND COUNTY LANDFILL 

AND AAC RISK MANAGEMENT

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered October 26, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

COMMISSION 

[NO. G409544]

AFFIRMED

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge

Shannon Godwin appeals the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission’s (the 

Commission) decision that he failed to prove that he sustained a compensable left-knee 

injury. He argues that the Commission’s decision was based on speculation. We disagree 

and affirm. 

Godwin filed a workers’ compensation claim on 3 December 2014, alleging that he 

sustained a compensable injury to his left knee on 17 March 2014. Godwin’s employer, 

Garland County Landfill (Garland), controverted the claim in its entirety. At a hearing 

before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in April 2015, Godwin testified that in March 

2014, he had worked for Garland for approximately five months and that his job consisted 

of driving a semi truck to the Pulaski County landfill and back twice a day. He testified 

that on March 17, he was “getting [his] stuff out of the truck and slipped off the top step 
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and fell and jammed [his] knee.” Godwin said that he “just wanted to leave” and did not 

tell anyone that he had been hurt. He claimed that someone named Mike and another 

person that he did not know witnessed his injury. He went to the doctor on April 29, 

approximately five weeks later, and eventually had three arthroscopic surgeries on his knee 

in May, June, and December 2014. Godwin also confirmed that he suffered a 

compensable injury to his neck and shoulder in 2012, from which he received some 

temporary disability benefits and was still receiving medical treatment. He had recently 

been approved for neck surgery, which was scheduled for May 2015. 

 Godwin explained that he initially used his wife’s insurance to pay for the 

treatment of his knee because 

I didn’t want nothing to do with workmen’s comp, I mean, Garland 

County. I was humiliated and, you know, I just didn’t want nothing to do 

with them. You know, I just, that was it. 

 I just, my insurance was turned down, said it was a workmen’s comp 

case so I had to try to, you know, get workmen’s comp, Garland County to 

pay for it. 

Godwin said that he had been “written up” a couple of times by Garland and that on 

March 17, he had been fired. He was told to collect his personal items out of the truck, 

and that is when he had the accident that caused his knee injury. He also said that he had 

slipped on some ice at work and hurt the same knee about a month previously, but there 

was no written report of that incident. 

 On cross-examination, Godwin confirmed that he had received a 16% disability 

rating on his left shoulder from his 2012 injury and that he had received temporary 

disability payments through November 2014. He acknowledged that he originally 

reported that his 2014 injury happened on February 17, not March 17, and said, “I was 
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probably just confused about the dates.” He also confirmed that he waited five or six 

weeks to go to the doctor for his knee injury, and when asked “How do we know 

something didn’t happen to your knee in that five or six weeks?” Godwin responded, “I 

guess you’ll just have to trust my word[.]” He also confirmed that he filed the claim on 

his knee on December 3, right after the temporary disability payments from his 2012 

injury were stopped. 

Billy Sawyer, the fleet manager at Garland, testified that he terminated Godwin’s 

employment and told him to collect his personal belongings. Sawyer stated that he did 

not follow Godwin outside and that Godwin never reported an injury after he was 

terminated. Sawyer did not learn of any injury until December 2014. 

 Shana Settle, a supervisor at Garland, testified that she was present when Godwin 

was terminated and confirmed that he was told to collect his personal belongings and leave 

the property. She also confirmed that she did not watch him go to the truck and collect 

his things. She stated that she first heard about Godwin’s knee injury on December 3, 

2014, when she received a call from Garland’s insurance adjuster. 

 In a written opinion filed 9 July 2015, the ALJ reviewed all of this testimony and 

the medical evidence and concluded that (1) Godwin was performing employment 

services when his alleged injury occurred, but (2) Godwin had failed to prove by a 

preponderance of the credible evidence that he sustained a compensable left knee injury 

arising out of and in the course of his employment. The ALJ stated, “I am of this 

persuasion, particularly when considering all of the inconsistencies and contradictions 

made by the claimant[.] . . . Given these circumstances, it would require conjecture and 
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speculation to conclude that the claimant’s current left knee problems are causally related 

to his employment duties.” The ALJ also specifically found that Godwin was not a 

credible witness. 

 Godwin appealed to the Commission, and Garland cross-appealed the finding that 

Godwin was performing employment services at the time of his alleged injury. In an 

opinion dated 31 March 2016, the Commission, in a 2–1 majority opinion, affirmed and 

adopted the ALJ’s opinion as its own. Under Arkansas law, the Commission is permitted 

to adopt the ALJ’s opinion. SSI, Inc. v. Cates, 2009 Ark. App. 763, 350 S.W.3d 421. In 

so doing, the Commission makes the ALJ’s findings and conclusions the findings and 

conclusions of the Commission. Id. Therefore, for purposes of our review, we consider 

both the ALJ’s opinion and the Commission’s majority opinion. Id. 

The Commission determines credibility, weighs the evidence, and resolves conflicts 

in medical testimony and evidence. See Martin Charcoal, Inc. v. Britt, 102 Ark. App. 252, 

284 S.W.3d 91 (2008). We review the Commission’s decision in the light most favorable 

to its findings and affirm when the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Parker v. 

Atl. Research Corp., 87 Ark. App. 145, 189 S.W.3d 449 (2004). Substantial evidence is 

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from the 

Commission, but whether reasonable minds could reach the result found by the 

Commission: if so, the appellate court must affirm. Parker v. Comcast Cable Corp., 100 

Ark. App. 400, 269 S.W.3d 391 (2007). 
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 To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant 

must establish that the injury was one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” 

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012). Godwin argues that there is no 

question that he has a knee injury and that when he sought medical treatment for his 

injury in April 2014, “the history of injury is exactly that which appellant has described all 

along.” He further argues that there is no evidence that he was injured in any other way 

other than the way he described. He asserts, without citation to authority, that “the fact 

finder must determine that appellant was hurt in some way other than how he says.” And 

because no alternative explanation for his injury was proven or even offered, the 

Commission was required to speculate to find that his claim was not compensable. 

 In response, Garland argues that credibility is determined exclusively by the 

Commission and that, in this case, the Commission concluded that Godwin “was not 

credible and was not truthful when explaining where his knee injury actually originated 

from.” Garland explains that for an accident to be compensable, there must be a causal 

connection between the accident and a risk that is reasonably incident to the employment, 

and that connection cannot be supplied by speculation. See Ark. Dep’t of Correction v. 

Glover, 35 Ark. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (1991). In other words, speculation cannot 

establish the existence of an injury, and without credible testimony from Godwin, the 

Commission would have to speculate to find that a compensable injury occurred. 

Godwin insists that he has “provided a sensible and consistant [sic] history that is 

supplemented by the fact that (1) he is absolutely objectively injured and (2) there is no 
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other explanation offered as to what caused him to be objectively injured.” Thus, the 

Commission speculated in finding his injury not compensable and should be reversed. 

 We affirm the Commission. As we stated earlier, the Commission determines 

credibility, weighs the evidence, and resolves conflicts in medical testimony and evidence. 

See Martin Charcoal, Inc., supra. Viewing the Commission’s decision in the light most 

favorable to its findings, we hold that the Commission’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

 Affirmed. 

 VIRDEN and BROWN, JJ., agree. 

Gary Davis, for appellant. 

Michael E. Ryburn, for appellees.