________________ _______________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Chief Justice: Justices: Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly 

# Opinion

Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JULY 18, 2007 JODIE VEGA, Conservator of the Estate of JEFFREY HURLEY, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 129436
LAKELAND HOSPITALS AT NILES AND ST. JOSEPH, INC., ST . JOSEPH MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BETH VANDERAH and MICHAEL SPEERS, Personal Corepresentatives of the Estate of DAVID ALAN SPEERS, M.D., Deceased, Defendants-Appellees.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH MARKMAN, J. We granted leave to appeal to de termine whether the insanity saving provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to medical malpractice claims. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary dispositi on, concluding that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does not a pply to medical malpractice claims and, thus, that plaintiff’s cl aim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that th e insanity saving provision of § 5851(1)does apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiff’s claim.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The alleged medical malpractice occu rred on December 13, 1999, when the claimant was 11 years old. Pl aintiff, the claimant’s mother, alleges that, as a result of the defendant physicia n’s misdiagnosis, the claimant sustained severe, permanent mental impairment. Plaintiff se nt a notice of intent to bring an action to defendants on November 8, 2001. As a result, th e period of limitations was tolled for 182 days from November 8, 2001 , to May 9, 2002, and the period of limitations expired on June 12, 2002. Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 11, 2002. The trial court granted defenda nts’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that the insanity saving pr ovision of § 5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice claims and, thus, that plaintiff’s claim wa s time-barred. In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 267 Mich App 565; 705 NW2d 389 (2005). After in itially denying plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal, 475 Mich 854 (2006), this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, vacated its pr evious order deny ing leave to app eal, and granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. 477 Mich 957 (2006).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court’s ruling on a summary di sposition motion is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Haynes v Neshewat , 477 Mich 29, 34; 729 NW2d

2488 (2007). Questions of statutory int erpretation are also questions of law that that this Court reviews de novo. Id.
III. ANALYSIS Generally, a medical malpractice acti on must be commenced within two years after the action accrued. MCL 600.5805(6). Plaintiff concedes that she did not file a complaint within the two-year p eriod of limitations. However, plaintiff argues that the claimant is insane and, th us, that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies. 1 MCL 600.5851(1) provides , in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although th e period of limitations has run. [2] MCL 600.5851(7) provides , in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in subsection (8), if, at the time a claim alleging medical malprac tice accrues to a person under section 5838a the person has not reached his or her eighth birthday, a person shall not bring an action ba sed on the claim unless the action is commenced on or b efore the person’s tenth bi rthday or within the period of limitations set forth in section 5838a, whichever is later.

1 MCL 600.5851(2) defines “insane” as “a condition of me ntal derangement such as to prev ent the sufferer from comprehending rights he or she is otherwise bound to know and is not dependent on whether or not th e person has been judicially declared to be insane.” Whether the claimant is “insane” is not at issue in this appeal.

2 It is undisputed that § 5851(8), which applies to cl aimants who have suffered injuries to their reproductive systems, does not apply in this case.

3If, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a person under section 58 38a, the person has reached his or her eighth birthday, he or she is subject to th e period of limitations set forth in section 5838a. MCL 600.5838a(2) provides , in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period pres cribed in section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856 . . . . The lower courts held that the insanity saving prov ision of § 5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice claims. The Court of Appeals dissent, on the other hand, concluded that “although MCL 600.5851(7) may limit a claim for malpractice that accrued before the age of eight, its plai n language does not limit those plaintiffs whose claims accrued after the age of [eight]-- as in the present case.” 267 Mich App at 577 (Jansen, J., dissenting). The saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to cl aimants who are under 18 years of age or insane “[e]xcept as otherw ise provided in subs ection[] (7),” and it allows a claimant to file an action with in one year after the disability is removed. 3 The first sentence of § 5851(7) states that if the medical malp ractice claimant was

3 MCL 600.5838a(2) provides, in per tinent part, “excep t as otherwise provided in section 5851(7) or (8), the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 years after the date of the act or omi ssion that is the basis for the claim.” Therefore, even under the insanity saving provisio n of § 5851(1), a medical malpractice claimant only has six years to file a compla int. The only medical malpractice claimants who woul d have longer than six years to file a complaint would be those claimants wh ose claims accrued at a very young age. See § 5851(7) and (8) (the longest time claimant s would have under these provisions is 10 and 15 years, respectively, and they woul d only have that long if their claims accrued at birth).

4less than eight years old when the cl aim accrued, the claima nt must file a complaint before his tenth birthday or before the p eriod of limitations expires, whichever is later. The medical malprac tice claimant in the instant case was 11 years old when the claim accrued, and, thus , the first sentence of § 5851(7) is not applicable. The second sent ence of § 5851(7) states th at if a medical malpractice claimant was eight years of age or older when the claim accrued, as in this case, the period of limitations set forth in § 5 838a applies. MCL 600.5851(7) does not state anything about when an insane medical malpractice claimant must commence an action. Therefo re, § 5851(7) does not preclude application of the insanity saving prov ision of § 5851(1). 4 Section 5851(7) states that if the claimant was eight years old or older when the claim accrued, “the period of limitations set forth in § 5838a” applies; contrary to defendants’ suggestion, it does not state the corollary, i.e., that the saving

4 Defendants argue that if the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to medical malpractice claima nts, the entire second sent ence of § 5851(7) will be rendered meaningless. We respectfully disagree. The first sentence of § 5851(7) states that if the medical malpractice clai mant was less than eight years old when the claim accrued, the claimant must file suit before his tenth birthday. Therefore, it is logical to include a s econd sentence that explains when a medical malpractice claimant must file a suit if that claima nt’s claim accrued wh en the claimant was eight years old or older. The fact that the second sentence does not change the outcome of the instant case does not make it meaningless. In addition, the second sentence could be read to m ean that the minority savi ng provision of § 5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice clai mants whose claims accrued when they were eight years old or older. We do not address this issue because plaintiff does not argue for application of the minority saving provision of § 5851(1); plaintiff only argues for application of the insan ity saving provision of § 5851(1).

5provision of § 5851(1) does not apply. See Waltz v Wyse , 469 Mich 642, 650; 677 NW2d 813 (2004) (a saving prov ision is not a period of limitations). As the Court of Appeals dissent explained: Clearly, the first part of MCL 600.5851(7) sets out a specific time that a person under the age of ei ght must file his or her claim, i.e., before the tenth birthday if th e claim accrued before the age of eight. MCL 600.5851(7). But th e second sentence, which is applicable here because plaintiff was over the age of eight at the time of claim accrual, contains no language limiting the application of the saving provision for insanity . MCL 600.5851(7). The second sentence of MCL 600.5851(7) only st ates what the limitations period will be for those plaintiffs whose cl aim accrues past the age of eight. In other words, althou gh the standard two-year limitations period applies for those plaintiffs past age eight, it does not simultaneously limit the saving provision of subsec tion 1, which provides that the period of limitations fo r an insane plaintiff does not begin to run until, “1 year after the disability is removed . . . although the period of limitations has run .” MCL 600.5851(1) (emphasis added). [5]
* * * Therefore, I would find that, a lthough MCL 600.5851(7) may limit a claim for malpractice that accrued before the age of eight, its plain language does not limit thos e plaintiffs whose claims accrued after the age of [eight]--as in the present case. [6] The only direction the statute gives is to the “period of limitations set forth in section 5838a . . . .” MCL 60 0.5851(7). This pl ain language does not

5 This last sentence is not altogeth er correct, in our judg ment, because the period of limitations begins to run when the claim accrues, bu t § 5851(1) allows minors and insane persons to bring their cl aims within one year after the disability is removed “although the peri od of limitations has run.”

6 To the extent that the Court of Appeal s dissent can be read to mean that if a medical malpractice claimant was under th e age of eight when the claim accrued, he cannot rely on the insanity saving pr ovision of § 5851(1 ), we respectfully disagree because, as discu ssed throughout this opini on, we believe that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to all insane claimants.

6simultaneously limit the applicati on of MCL 600.5851(1). [267 Mich App at 576-578 (Jansen, J., dissenting).] The insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) app lies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection[] (7) . . . .” MCL 600.5851( 7) states that if a medical malpractice claimant is less than eight years old when the claim accrued, the claimant must file suit before he is ten years old or b efore the period of limitations expires, whichever is later; but, if the medical malprac tice claimant is eight years old or older when the claim accrued , the claimant must file suit before the period of limitations expires. MCL 600.5851(7) stat es nothing about an insane medical malpractice claimant. That is, nothing in § 5851(7) prohibits an insane medical malpractice claimant from taking advantage of the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). 7 Defendants argue that the first ph rase of § 5851(1) conditions the application of all remaining clauses in th at subsection on the inapplicability of § 5851(7). That is, they argue that if § 5851( 7) is applicable, i.e. , if the plaintiff is

7 This position is consistent with this Court’s order in Dantzler v Hughett, 456 Mich 922 (1998). In Dantzler, the Court of Appeals had held that the medical malpractice claimant was not insane for purposes of § 5851(1). This Court reversed the Court of App eals and remanded the case to the trial court because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whet her the medical malpractice claimant was insane for pur poses of § 5851(1). There would have been no need to rem and the case to the trial court for a determination whether the medical malpractice claimant was insane if the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does not apply to me dical malpractice claimants.

7bringing a medical malpractice claim, § 5851 (1) is not applicable . We respectfully disagree. MCL 600.5851(1) begins, “E xcept as otherwise prov ided in subsection[] (7) . . . .” Contrary to defendants’ conten tion, this language does not mean that if § 5851(7) is applicable, § 5851(1) is not applicable. Instead, it simply means that if § 5851(1) is inconsistent with § 5851(7 ), § 5851(7) is controlling. For example, if the claimant was four years old wh en his medical malpractice claim accrued, under § 5851(1), the claima nt would have until he wa s 19 years old to file a complaint. However, und er § 5851(7), the claimant wo uld only have until he was ten years old to file a complaint. Because § 5851(1) states “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection[ ] (7),” § 5851(7) would be controlling under those circumstances. On the other hand, if th e claimant was four years old when the medical malpractice claim accrued and was in sane, the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) would apply becau se nothing in § 58 51(7) prohibits ap plication of the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). That is, § 5851(7) does not “otherwise provide[]” anything with reg ard to the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). Therefore, § 5851(7) does not prohibit application of the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) to medical ma lpractice claims.
IV. CONCLUSION Because we conclude that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of

8Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiff’s claim. Stephen J. Markman Clifford W. Taylor Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr.

9________________ _______________ v S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT JODIE VEGA, Conservator of the Estate of JEFFREY HURLEY, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 129436
LAKELAND HOSPITALS AT NILES AND ST. JOSEPH, INC., ST . JOSEPH MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BETH VANDERAH and MICHAEL SPEERS, Personal Corepresentatives of the Estate of DAVID ALAN SPEERS, M.D., Deceased, Defendants-Appellees.

CAVANAGH, J. ( concurring ). Under the plain language of the stat utes involved, J effrey Hurley or a person suing on his behalf has until one year after Jeffrey ’s disability is removed through death or otherwise to bring his claim. Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the tr ial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s claim as untimely, and the Court of Appeals erred by affirming that result. Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly