### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary4, 200 5 S es sio n DANA COUNTS v. J ENNIFE R LYNN BRYAN, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Maury County No. 7873 Robert

L. Holl oway, Ju dge

No. M2003- 01671-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jul y 13, 2005

Def endants a ppeal the de nial of a Te nn. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for direc ted verdic t. This is P laintiff’s second a ction ag ainst Defe ndants to rec over damag es resulting from a persona l injury acc ident. The first ac tion was timely

filed and voluntarily dismiss ed. This action, which is a separ ate, subseque nt action, wa s commence d within one y ear of the voluntary dismiss al; howeve r, Plaintiff did not plea d sufficie nt fac ts in the complaint to establish the timeliness of the commenc ement of the new a ction. Def endants affirmatively pled the statute of limitations defense in their answe r; howeve r, Plaintiff did not amend the complaint nor introduce evidenc e at trial to addre ss the statute of limitations i ssue. Def endants put the aff

irmative defe nse at issue during closing arg uments. The trial c ourt took the motion under advisement, t h e t ri al proce eded and the jury returne d a ver dict in favor of Plaintiff. Th e re a ft e r, thetria l c ou rt e le c te d to take jud ic ia l no tic e of fa c ts a pp e ari ng in the re c or d inthefi rs t action, the date the first a ction was c ommenced and the date of the voluntary dismiss al, determined these c on d a c tio n w a s ti me ly fi le d andde nie d D e fe nd a nts ’ m oti on . We a ff irm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.
J ohn S. Col ley , I I I , Columbi a, Te nnessee , for the appellants, J ennife r L

. Bry an, J erry Bry an and G eri Bry an.
L a wr e nc e D. Sa nd s, Col umb ia , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e , D a na

Cou nts

. OP IN ION
Dana Renee Counts sust ained phy sical injuries in a ve hicular a ccide nt with J ennife r Ly nn B ry a n o n F e br

ua ry 26 , 19 96

. S he c omm e nc e d h e r f ir st a c tio n a g a ins t Ms . B ry a n andhe r p are nts ,T he cl ai m agai ns t t he pare nt s was bas ed upon t he Fami l y P ur po s e D oct r i ne. 1

T h i s i s a s epa r at e, s u bs equ en t ac t i on ; i t i s n ot a con t i n u at i on of t h e f i r s t ac t i on pu r s u an t t o T en n
. R. Ci v
. P. 3. 2 If p roce ss is no t served w i t hi n 3 0 d ays fr o m is suance, the p l ai nt i f f m ay rel y up o n the o ri gi nal c o m m encem ent t o t o l l t he
run ning o f

a stat ute o f

l i m i t ati o ns p ro vid ed t he p l ainti f f “co nti nu es the a cti o n” b y ob t a in ing i ssua nc e o f ne w p ro ce ss wi t hi n one y ear f

rom i ss uance of t he p revi o us unser ved p roce ss o r, i f no p roce ss i s i ss ued , wi t hi n one y ear of t he f i l i ng of t h e compl ai n t

. T en n
. R. Ci v
. P. 3. T h at r u l e does n ot a ppl y h er e bec au s e t h e f i r s t a ct i on w as di s mi s s ed.

D ef en dan t s f r ame d t h e i s s u e: “ I s t h e f ai l u r e t o pl ea d an d pr ov e t ol l i n g f ac t s f at al t o a n a ct i on br ou g h t ou t s i de 3
t he appl i cabl e s t at ut e of l i mi t at i ons ?” As we r evi ewed t he cas e a nd r el eva nt l aw, we f i nd t he r eal i s s ue i s j udi ci al not i ce. -2- J erry and Geri Bry an, on September 27, 1996. The complaint was served and Def endants filed an 1
answe r. Seven months later , on April 16, 1997, Plaintiff voluntarily dismiss ed her

action. She filed this action by

filing a complaint on October

28, 1997.
The c omplaint in thi s action – the sec ond action – provide d the date of the ac cident; howeve r, it m a de no re fe re nc e to the pr e vio us a c tio n. Th e c omp la int , how e ve r, didno t st a te thedate thefi rs t action was commence d, when that action was voluntarily dismiss ed or that the statute of limitations was tolled by

the Tennessee Saving S tatute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. Thus, on the fa ce of the se c on d c omp la int

it a pp e are d th a t th is a c tio n w a s f ile d mo rethan o ne y e ar a ft e r the a c c ide nt i n viola t ion of the one- y ear statute of limitations for persona l injury actions. De fendants filed an answe r and a sserted inte r a lia the af firmative de fe n s e o f the statute of limitations. P laintiff, howeve r, did not amend the co m p l ai n t t o curethe def iciencie s. Moreove r, she did not introduce evidenc e during the trial to establish t h e t i mely commence ment of the fir st action, the date of the vo lun tary dis mis sa l, o r the tim e ly

c omm e nc e me nt o f this a c tio n. Af te r the pa rtie s ha d c los e d th e ir 2 pr oo f, De fe nd a nts pu t th e a ff irmativ e de fe ns e of the statut e of lim itatio ns a t is su e by a tte mpt ing to arg ue the de fense to the j u ry
. Plaintiff objected and the trial court sustained the objection. De fe nd a nt the n ma de theTe nn . R. Civ . P. 50 motion , whi c h the tria l cou rt too k u nd e r a dv ise me nt. Subsequent to the jury

returning a ver dict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial court e lected to takejudicial notice of two f

acts fr om the previous ac tion: 1) the date the pr evious ac tion was commenc ed, and 2) the date that ac tion was voluntarily dismiss ed. With the benefit of theseadditional fac ts, the trial court de termined that the seco n d action did not violate the statute of limitations and denied Def endants’ motion. Def

endants a ppeale d. No g enuine mate rial fa ctual disputes are prese nted. The issue prese nted hinge s on the prope r interpre tation of law a nd i t s ap p l i cation to the fa cts of this case , thus they arequestions of law. Mem phis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Serv s., Inc ., 87 S.W .3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002) ; W aller v. Bryan , 16 S.W .3d 770, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). There fore , the trial court’s resolution of a qu e sti on of

la w i s n ot e nti tle d to Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13( d) ’s pr e su mption of c or re c tne ss o n a

pp e a l. Ac c or din g ly , w e wi ll r e vie w the iss ue s de novo a nd re a c h in de pe nd e nt c on c lus ion s r e g ard ing the m. King v. Pope , 91 S.W .3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2002)

. Th e dis po sit iveiss ue is w he the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d b y takin g jud ic ia l no tic e of

tw o f a c ts fr om the re c or d o f the tria l c ou rt in the pr e vio us a c tio n b e tw e e n th e pa rtie s. 3In M a n d e la , t he defendan t f i l ed a mot i on t o di s mi s s , wh i ch was bas ed upon a re s ju d ic a ta defens e. T he t r i al 4

co urt grant ed t he m o t i o n af t er t aki ng judi ci al noti ce o f pri o r act i o ns b et ween t he p art i es. T hi s co urt af f i rme d noti ng, “ T he p rio r p ro c e e d ing s a n d ju d g m e n ts in the sa m e c o u rt w e re s u b je c t to j u d ic ia l n o tice b e c a u se th e y w e re ‘ca p a b le o f ac c u ra te an d re ady det er mi n at i on by re s or t t o s ou r ce s wh os e ac cu r ac y c an n ot r ea s on abl y be qu es t i on ed. ’ " Id

. at 2, ci t i ng T enn. R . E v id 2 0 1 (b )( 2 ). T h is c o u rt fur the r n o te d the p la intiff w a s a ff o rd e d th e o p p o rtu n ity to b e h e a rd “a s to the p ro p rie ty of t a k i n g j u di c i a l n ot i c e a n d t h e t e n or of t h e ma t t e r n ot i c e d, i

. e
. , t h e n a t u r e of t h e pr i or pr oc e e di n g s a n d i de n t i t y of s a me wi t h t he p res ent pro ceed i ng. T enn. R

. E vi d 20 1 (e). T hi s o p p o rt uni t y to b e h e a rd i ncl ud ed t he o b l i gat i o n and
res p o nsi b i l i t y t o p res ent and p res erve i n t hi s reco rd suf f i ci ent evi d ence t o co nt rovert t he m at t ers of whi ch t he T ri al C o urt t o o k judi ci al know l ed ge. ” T hi s saf eguard i s p rovided i n t he rul e. T enn. R

. E vi d

. 20 1 (e).

-3- J udicial not ice is "a method of dispe nsing w ith the nece ssityfor taking proof." Sta te ex re l. Sch mi tto u v . Ci ty of N

as hv ill e , 3 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d8 7 4 , 8 8 3 ( T e n n
. 1 9 6 1 )

. " Ju d i c i a l n o t i c e i s g e n e ra lly define d as a judg e' s utili zation of knowledg e other than that derived from f

ormal evide ntiary

proof in the pe nd ing c a se." 1 J. W EI N S TEI N & M. B ER GER , W E IN ST E IN ' S E V I D EN CE , note 3, ¶ 200[01] at 200-02 (1991) . The re sult of taking judicia l notice of a fac t is the establishment o f t h e admission of that fa ct into evidence

. Robert Banks, J r. & Eliz abeth T. Collins, Judicial Notice in Tennessee , 21 Mem. St. U. L . Rev. 431, 433 (1991). Since 1990, Tenn. R. Evid. 201 has g overne d judicial notice of ad judicative fa cts. A judicially noticed fa ct m ust be one that is not subject t o rea sonable dispute. Te nn. R. Evid. 201(b). It mu st b e e ith e r ( 1) g e ne rally kn ow n w ith in the te rrito ri a l jurisd ic tio n of thetria l c ou rt or (2 ) c apa ble of ac curate and r eady

determination by

resor t t o source s whose ac cura cy cannot r easona

bly be questioned. Tenn. R. Evid. 201(b). Furthermore , a court may take judicial notice whether reque sted or not. Tenn. R. Evid. 201(c ).
P ri o r t o t h e ad o p t i o n o f T en n
. R

. E v i d 2 0 1 , i t wa s n o t p er m i s s i b l e t o t ak e j u d i ci al k n o wl ed ge of fo rm e r pr oc e e din g s and jud g me nts , ev e n thos e in the sa me c ou rt be tw e e n th e sa me pa

rtie s. See Am e ric an Nat ion al B an k v . B ra dfo rd , 188 S.W .2d 979 (Tenn. Ct

. App. 1945). Te nnessee historically

permitted the taking of judicial notice of fac ts from ea

rli er p roce eding s only

if they occur red in the same ac tion. See Sims v . Barnham, 743 S.W .2d 179, 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that a court may

properly take judicial notice of filing s within that procee ding, suc h as a m o u n t s p a i di n t o t h e c l e rk ’ s o f f i c e ); S t o n e v. Ne al , 90 S.W .2d 549, 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935) (s tatin g that c ou rt s may

take jud ic ia l no tic e of

a ll p ape rs fi le d inthat a c tio n) ; De lbr idg e v . S tate , 742 S.W .2d 266, 267 (Tenn. 1987) (finding judicial notice appr opriate w hen a c ourt took notice of e arlier proce eding s in the same case)

. The adoption of t he Tennessee Rules of Evidence, effec tive J anuary 1, 1990, eff

ecte d a substantial chang e, at lea st for taking judicial notice of f acts a s distinguished fr om taking judicial notice of la w. S ee Ma n d el a v. Reynolds , N o
. 0 1

- A

- 0 1

- 9 3 0 3

- CH 0 0 1 2 6 , 1 9 9 3 WL 236607 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 1993). Most Te nnessee opinions on the subject of taking judicial 4
no tic e of fa c ts we re auth or e d prior to the a do pti on of Te nn . R. Ev id. 20 1. As a c on se qu e nc e , th os e opinions are no long er c ontrolling.
The issue be fore us pertains to taking judicial notice of f acts, as d i s tinguished f

rom law. Tenn. R. Evid. 201(A) expressly states that it “ g overns
. . . judicial notice of adjudicative fac ts.” TheW hy t he o m i ssi o n? P erh ap s i t wa s o m i t t ed , as the a utho r o f an e xc ell en t a rti cle o n t he su b je ct o p i ne d , b ec au se 5 “it i s e a sie r to illus tra te a n a d ju d ic a tive o r le g islativ e fa c t o r a q u e stio n o f l a w tha n it is t o a rtic u la te a ge n e ra l p rin c ip le t ha t d i st i ng uishes t he m .” R o b ert B an ks, Jr & E l i za b eth T

. C o l l i ns, Judi ci al No t i ce i n Tenn es s ee , 2 1 M em St. U

. L. Re v. 4 3 1 , 44 1 (19 9 1 ).

L o n g na rr a tive s w ill lik e ly c o n ta in so m e thin g th a t is su b je c t to re a so n a b le d isp u te . O n e o f t h e c o n d iti o n s to 6
t aki ng j udi ci al not i ce of a fact pur s uan t t o T enn
. R. E vi d. 201 i s t hat t he f act i s not s ubj ect t o re as onabl e di s put e.
A dju di cat i ve f act s mus t not be s ubj ect t o re as onabl e di s put e. T enn
. R. E vid . 2 0 1

. H i s t ori cal f act s , s uch as 7 who, wh at or whe n, ar e more l i kel y t o s at i s f y t hi s cri t er i a, as di s t i ng ui s hed f r om na r r at i ve expl ana t i ons or op i ni ons , wh i ch
a re m o re li k e ly t o b e su b je c t t o d isp u te . S e e 2 1 M e m . S t. U

. L

. R e v . 4 3 1 , *4 3 3 -4 3 4 ; s ee al s o St at e v. M at heny , 884 S.W

. 2 d 48 0 , 48 3 (T enn. C ri m
. A p p
. 19 9 4 )( ho l d i ng t hat op i ni o ns are not ap p rop ri at e fo r j ud i ci al noti ce). -4- rule, however, does not define the term " adjudicative f act." 21 C. W R I GH T & K. G R AHAM , F ED ER AL P R AC TI C E AND P R OC E DU RE § 5 1 03, at 473 (1977) ( describing the a bsenceof a de finition as "ba ffling ")

. Nor is it explained or define d in the Advisory Commi ssion Comments to the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidence . Moreove r, F ed. R. Evid. 201, which is identical to t he Tennessee rule, provide s no such explanation. 5
Other sour ces inform us t h at j u d i cial noti ce of adjudicative f

acts g ener ally

ref ers to the rec og nition of facts that a re relevant to a specific lawsuit. 21 Mem. St. U. L . Rev. 431, 434 (citing E. C LEARY , M C C OR MI C K ON E V I D EN CE § 328, at 920 (3d e d. 1984)). T he re specte d treatise, T ENNES S EE LA W O F E VI DENCE endeavored to de fine or explain the term adjudicative fac ts and found no definitive answe r but a va riety of def initions . N EIL P. C OHEN , S AR AH Y. S HE PP EA R D & D O N A LD F. P AI NE , T ENNES S EE LA W O F E VI DENCE § 2 .0 1 [3] ( 4 e d. 20 00 ). On e su c h d e fi nitionis that: th [A] djudicative fa cts help to “e x plain who di d what, whe n, wher e, how, and with what motive and intent. Another de finition is a fact “ to wh i ch t h e law is applied in the proce ss of adjudication. They arethe fa cts that normally g o to the jury in a jury

case
. Th e y re late to p artie s, the ir

a c tiv iti e s, the ir

pr op e rtie s, the ir

bu sin e sse s. Trial courts may

also take notice of adjudicative fac ts in the form of books and re ports, and of rules of arbitration, suc h as Commercial Rules of the American Ar bitration Association (AAA ). Py bu rn v . B ill

He ar d Ch e v ro le t, 63 S.W .3d 351, 362 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that the court may take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f

a n ar b i tr a t i o n a g r e e m e n tt h e p art i e s a g r e e dt o u t i l i z e ); se e als o Fl an ar y v . Ca rl Gr ego ry D od

ge o f Johns on City

, LLC , N o
. E 2 0 0 4

- 0 0 6 2 0

- CO A-R3CV, 2005 WL 1277850, *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2005) . Howeve r, Tenn. R. Evid. 201(b) (2) g ener ally should not be applied to take judicial n o ti c e o f a w itn e s s ’ o p in io n o r o f lo n g n arr a ti v e s b y a w itn e s s o f h is o r h er g ener al observations or perc eptions of events. Adjudicative f acts c ontemplated in Tenn. R. Evid. 201 ar e 6 ty pic a lly tho se fa c ts D e te c tiv e Joe Fri day , a c ha ra c te r of thepo pu lar 1 95 0' s te le vis ionse ri e s Dragnet , de sir e d to e lic it f

ro m a wi tne ss. Hi s cla ssi c lin e – to enc ou ra g e a wi tne ss wh o w a s b e ing too ve rb os e – was, “ J ust the fac ts, ma’am.” 7 As Tenn. R. Evid. 201(b)( 2) provides, the adjudicative f act must be one that is "not subject to r e a so na

ble di sp ute " a ndit mus t be" c apa bleof a c c ur a te a ndre a dy

de te rm inatio n b y

re so rt to-5-

so ur c e s who se a c c ur a c y

c a nn ot r e a so na

bly be qu e sti on e d. " He re , D e fe nd a nts mov e d to dis mis s, arg uing the second action violated the one-y ear statute of limit ation for pe rsonal injury actions. The fac ts nece ssary

to answer that question are : (1) the date the c ause of action ac crue d – the date of the acc ident, (2) the date the first a ction was c ommenced, ( 3) the dat e of the voluntary dismiss al, and (4) the date the second action was c ommenced. T he complaint in the sec ond action provide d two of the four

dates, the date of the a ccide nt and the date the second action was commence d, which wa s stamped on the fa ce of

the sec ond complaint. The two missing fac ts – the date the first ac tion was commence d and the date of the voluntary dismiss al – wer e in the trial c ourt’s re cords. The two missing dates wer e capa ble of acc urate and rea dy

determination by

ref ere ncing the court’s f iles. Moreove r, the a ccur acy of the dates cannot reasona bly be questioned beca

use t he date s we reimp ri nte d b y

theCir c uit

Cou rt Cle rk of Maury Cou nty on thedo c ume nts a s th e y we refi le d in that a cti on . T e nn . R. Ev id. 20 1( b) auth orize s th e trial c ou rt to t ake jud ic ia l no tic e of a fa c t th a t is no t su bje c t to re a so na

bledis pu te if

it i s c apa bleof a c cura te and re a dy

de te rm inatio n b y

re so rt to so ur c e s w ho se a c c ur a c y

c a nn ot r e a so nably be qu e sti on e d. Th e re fo re , th e tria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to take judicial notice of t h e t wo m issing date s was an a ppropriate exercise of

its discretion, as authorized by

Tenn. R. Evid. 201. The judgment of the t rial court is aff irmed and this matter is re manded with costs of a ppeal assessed a g ainst Defe ndants, J ennife r Ly nn Bry an, Jerry Bry an and G eri B ry an.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE