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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 18-3633

U NI T E D S TAT E S OF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

A L F RE D L. C R

O S S , Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the

S o uthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s
. No . 3 :1 7 -cr-3 0 0 47 -NJR -1 — Na ncy J. Rose nste nge l , Ch ief Judg e
.

A RGUE D S E PT E MB E R 25, 2019

— D E C I D E D M A Y 2 2, 2020

Befor e R I P PL E, R OVN E R

, and B RE N NAN

, Circuit Judges

. R OVN E R , Cir cuit Judge. Alfr ed L

. Cr oss pled gui l ty to fi v e counts of bank fr aud, in v i olati on of 18 U.S

. C. § 1344(1). S h or tly befor e sentencin g, he mov ed pro se to ter min ate hi s counsel, wi thdr a w hi s gui lty plea, and di smis s t he case. The di s tr i ct
cour t deni ed all thr ee moti ons. H e now appeals the cour t’s deni al of hi s moti on to wi thdr aw hi s plea, and we affi r m.2 No. 18-3633
I. Betw een Apr i l of 2011 and Mar ch of 2015, Cr oss unlawfully
ob t a in e d a p p r o x i m a t e ly $ 5 1 6,000 fr om sev er al souther n Illino i s banks thr ough a si mple scheme. Cr oss opened bank accounts at out-of-state banks in the n a mes of compani es that he clai med to own. He a l so opened checking accounts at sev en banks in souther n Illin oi s, agai n in the names of compani es he pur por tedly owned. Ov er the cour se of four y ear s, he wr ote l a r ge checks on the out-of-state accounts and deposi ted them in hi s accounts at the Illinoi s banks, knowin g that ther e w er e insuffi

ci ent funds in the out-of-state accounts to c ov er those checks. In each of the char ged instances, he then wi thdr ew fr om the Illinoi s banks all, or substanti ally all, of the money that he had pur por te d l y d eposi ted, taki ng the funds in the for m of cashi e r ’ s checks, cash wi thdr aw als, checks and deb i t c a r d p u r ch a s e s befor e any of the banks could d i s cov e r t h a t the lar ge checks that h e had d eposi ted w er e not backed by suffi ci ent funds in the out-of-state accounts. Based on thi s conduct, he was char ged wi th fi v e counts of bank fr aud in v i olati on of 18 U.S

. C. § 1344(1). Each count of the indi ctment alleged th a t C r o s s c a r r i ed out hi s scheme to defr aud th e b ank s b y d e p o si ti ng lar ge checks wr i tten on the out-of-state accounts in to banks in Illinoi s, knowi ng those checks wer e not
c o v e r ed by suffi ci ent funds, and then wi thdr awing the f u n d s befor e the banks c ould d i s cov er that the deposi ted checks w er e not suffi ci ently funded. For example, Count I char ged: O n o r about Apr i l 14, 2011, wi thin the S outher n Di str i ct of Illinoi s, ALF R E D L. CROS S , defendant her ein, knowi ngly executed and a ttempted toNo. 18-3633 3

execute h i s s cheme to defr a u d by making a deposi t into the “Al L. Cr oss - Consoli dated Bi lling Account” at W

ashington S a v ings Bank using a check in the amount of $18,875, dr awn on an account enti tled “Alfr ed L. Cr oss - Cr oss/Har t/P a ge - S p eci al Account” at County Bank in F r esno Cali for n i a, whi ch check defendant kne w t o be NS F; In v i olati on of Ti tle 18, Uni ted S tates Code, S ecti on 1344(1). R. 36, at 3. 1 The other four counts v ar i ed only in the d a tes of the deposi ts, the amounts of the checks, the ti tles on the a ccounts, and the names of the banks inv olv ed in the scheme. The cour t appoi nted counsel to r epr esent Cr oss in Mar ch of 2017, shor tly a fter he w as char ged. But Cr os s h a d di ffi culty wi th each of the t h r e e lawy er s that the cour t ulti mately appoi nted. After appr oxi mately ei ght month s , the cour t allow ed the fi r st attor ney to wi thdr aw , and appointed a s econd on Nov ember30, 2017. On Mar ch 1 6, 2 018, whi le r epr esented by the second attor ney , Cr oss enter ed hi s gui l t y p l e a. T w o months l ater

, h i s relati onshi p wi th the second l awy er d eter i or a ted and the cour t allow ed that attor ney to wi thdr aw as w ell, appoi nti ng a thi r d counsel on May 24, 2018. Less than a week later , Cr oss fi led a pro se m o t io n t o wi thdr aw hi s gui l ty plea, whi ch the c our t pr omptly str uck, adv i sing Cr oss that the cour t
w ould enter tai n only those m oti ons that had been fi led b y counsel. D espi te that w ar ning, on D ecember 6, 2018, a few d a ys befor e hi s scheduled sentenci ng hear in g, Cr oss fi led thr ee pro

1 “NS F ” i s a n a cro nym used i n the b a nki ng i ndustry. It s ta n d s f o r “ no nsuffi ci ent funds..”4 No. 18-3633

se moti ons styled, “ An [si c] Moti on T o Wi thdr aw Gui lty Plea,” “Moti on T

o T er minate Counsel,” and “Moti on T o Di smi ss Case PerA, Maur o, Vi olati on.” 2 Rather than str i ki ng t hese moti ons outr i ght, the cour t d e c ided to take them up at the sentencing hear ing that w a s scheduled for j ust a few days later

. The Cour t’s or d er adv i sed counsel for both si d es and the d e fe n d a nt hi mself to be pr epar ed to di scuss the moti ons. At the hear ing the cour t gav e the defendant, h i s c ounsel and the gov er nment oppor tuni ti es to addr ess the moti ons. 3 T h e cour t deni ed the Moti on to T er mi

nate Counsel on the mer i ts and deni ed the Moti on to Di smi ss b e cause Cr oss had fi l ed i t pro se dur ing a ti m e that h e w a s
r epr esented b y counsel. The c our t deni ed the Moti on to Wi thdr a w Gui lty Plea both on the mer i ts and because Cr oss had fi led i t pro se whi le repr esented by coun s e l

. T h e cour t
r e s o lv ed Cr oss’s numer ous obj ecti ons to the PS R, consi der ed the par ti es ’ r e specti v e ar guments as to sentencing, h ear d Cr oss’s allocuti on, and analyze d t h e statutor y sentencing factor s. The cour t then sent e nced Cr oss to sev enty-ei ght months’ i mpr i s onment and fi v e y ear s of s uper v i sed r elease. Cr oss appeals.

2 “ M a uro ” i s a ppa rentl y a reference t o United States v
. Mauro , 4 3 6 U .S

. 3 4 0 (1 9 7 8 ), whi ch i s ci t ed i nthe mo ti o na s the b a si s fo r di smi ssa l

.

3 In hi s b ri ef, Cro ss co mpl a i ns tha t the di stri ct co urt di d no t a l l o w hi m to
a rgue hi s mo ti o ns a nd cut hi m o ff when he a ttempted to spea k. Tha t i s n ot
a n a ccura t e cha ra cteri z a ti o n o f the hea ri n g. A ltho ugh t h e d i s t ri ct j udge l i mi ted Cro ss’s rema rk s , she di d a l l o w hi m t o a ddress hi s three mo ti o ns. Tha t he fa i l e d t o m a ke pro ducti v e use of the o ppo rtuni ty wa s hi s o wn mi sstep, a nd the co urt wa s no t o b l i ga ted to a l l o w hi m unl i mi ted ti me.No. 18-3633 5
II. On appeal, Cr oss asser ts that the di str i ct c our t er r ed when i t deni ed hi s Moti on to W it h d r aw Gui lty Plea. W e r ev i ew the di str i ct cour t’s deni al of a m oti on to wi thdr aw a gui lty plea for abuse of di scr eti on, and w e r ev i ew any r elated factual findings for clear er r or
. United States v
. Haslam , 833 F .3d 840, 844 (7th Ci r
. 2016). When a defendant mov e s t o wi thdr aw a plea after the cour t has accepted the plea but befor e sentencin g , the defendant may wi thdr aw the plea i f he or she “can show a fai r and j ust reason for r equestin g the wi thdr aw a l.” Fed. R. Cr i m. P

. 11(d)(2)(B). See a l s o Haslam , 840 F .3d at 844. “A gui lty plea oper ates as a w ai v er of i mpor ta nt r i ghts, and i s v ali d only i f done v oluntar i ly

, knowi ngly

, and intelli gently

, ‘wi th s uffi ci ent
aw ar ene s s of the r elev ant ci r cumstances and li kely consequences.’” Bradshaw v
. Stumpf , 545 U.S

. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting Brady v
. United States , 397 U.S . 742, 748 (1970)). A plea may be found inv ali d under thi s standar d wher e a d ef e n dant pleads gui l ty to a cr i me wi thout hav ing been in for med of the cr i me’s eleme n t s
. Bradshaw, 545 U.S

. at 183; Henderson v
. Mor gan , 426 U.S . 637, 645–47 (1976). Cr oss asser ts her e that he w as not p r oper ly infor med of all of the elements of bank fr aud. He ar gues that, in or der to hold hi m li able for b a n k f r aud under secti on 1344(1), the gov er nment w as requi red t o p r o v e that the scheme to defr aud inv olv ed a m a ter i al falsehood or omi ssi on, ci ti ng Neder v
. United States , 527 U.S . 1 (1999). But ther e w as no menti on of a mater i al f alsehood or omi ssi on at hi s plea hear ing, he a sser ts, and the g o v er nment instead p r ov ed nothi ng mor e than the passing of bad checks, whi ch he a r gues i s not a feder al offense.6 No. 18-3633
Because he w a s not infor med of all of the elements of the cr i me to whi ch he pled gui lty and because the gov er nment pr esented
no ev i dence of the element of a mater i al falsehood or omi ssi on, he contends that h i s plea w as not knowi n g and v oluntar y
. He
ur ges u s to conclude that the di str i ct cour t ther efor e abused i ts di scr eti on in denyi ng hi s moti on to wi thdr aw hi s plea. He asks that w e v acate the judgment and r emand for fur ther pr oceedings. A. As Cr oss hi mself concedes in hi s br i ef, “[t]her e i s a wr inkle in thi s case.” Br i ef at 21

. A w ar e that the cour t deni ed the Moti on to Wi thdr aw Gui lty Plea b oth on the m er i ts and, in the alter nati v e, because i t w as fi led pro se, Cr oss also adv ances an
ar gument that the di str i ct cour t abuse d i t s di scr eti on when i t deni ed hi s Moti on to T er minate Counsel. S peci fi cally , he contends that he expr essed in hi s Moti on to T er minate Counsel

an unequiv ocal r equest to pr oceed pro se
. But the cour t instead mi sconstr ued that moti on as one to substi tute counsel, he contends, a nd then fai led to conduct the colloquy necessary to deter m ine whether he could pr oceed pro se
. S ummar i ly denyi ng hi s r equest to pr oceed pro se w as an abuse of di scr eti on, h e asser ts. He suggests that the di str i ct c our t ther efor e also abused i ts di scr eti on when i t deni ed h is m o ti on to wi thdr aw hi s gui lty plea o n the alter nate gr ound that i t w as fi led pro se
. He then appear s to ask that thi s cour t addr ess hi s appeal of the deni al of hi s moti on to wi thdr a w his g uil t y plea solelyNo. 18-3633 7

o n the mer i ts, and di sr egar d the di str i c t cour t’s alter nate
r a ti onale. 4 Although i t i s unclear whether Cr oss seeks appellate r eli ef fr om the deni al of hi s Moti on to T er minate Counsel, i t i s clear that h e means to use the di s tr i ct cour t’s pur por ted er r or on that i ssue to nar r o w o ur r ev i ew of the deni al of the Moti on to Wi thdr aw Gui lty Plea, hi s pr i mar y is s ue on appeal. Befor e consi der ing the ar guments r elati ng to the Moti on to Wi thdr aw Gui lty Plea, w e thi nk i t best to clear aw ay the underbr us h of thi s secondar y ar gument r egar din g the Moti on to T er minate Counsel. W e begi n wi t h Cr oss’s clai m that the c our t er red when i t mi sconstr ued hi s Moti on to T er min ate Counsel as a moti on to substi tute counsel r a ther than as a r equest to pr oceed pro se
. “In
or der to p r oceed pro se, a defendant must ‘clear ly and unequi v ocally’ r ai se the ri ght to s e l f -r epr esentati on.” United States v
. Mancillas , 8 80 F .3d 297, 301 (7th Ci r
. 2018) ( qu oti ng Faretta v
. California , 4 22 U.S

. 806, 835 (1975)). W e requi r e an unequi v ocal inv ocati on of the r i ght to pr oceed p ro se in or d er “to pr ev ent a defendant fr om u sing an ambi guous w ai v er of the r i g h t t o counsel as a tool to ov er tur n hi s or her conv i c ti on.” Mancillas ,

4 We hedge o ur descri pti o n o f Cro ss’s a rgument b o th b eca use i t i s di ffi cul t to untangl e the l o gi c i n thi s pa rt o f h i s o p eni ng b ri ef a n d b eca use he empha si z es i n hi s repl y b ri ef tha t “ he do es no t a rgue tha t the pro secuto r’s mi scha ra cteri z a t i o n o f hi s mo ti o n t o termi na te c o u n s el enti t l es hi m t o rel i ef.” Repl y Bri ef a t 1

. Yet the a rgume n t i n th e o peni n g b ri ef seems t o suggest tha t he i s a t l ea st seeki n g r e l i e f f o r tha t a l l eged erro r b y the co urt b el o w b y urgi ng thi s co urt to d i srega rd the di stri ct co u rt’s a l terna te
ra ti o na l e fo r denyi ng hi s mo ti o n to wi th dra w hi s gui l ty pl ea
.8 No. 18-3633
880 F .3d at 301. See also United States v
. Campbell , 6 59 F

. 3d 607, 612 ( 7th Ci r
. 2011), v acated on other gr ounds, sub. nom. Campbell v
. Un i te d States , 568 U.S

. 802 (2012) (descr ibing the

r a ti onales for r equi r ing that the demand to pr oceed p ro se be unequi v ocal). Cr oss’s pur por ted r equest to pr oceed pro sedoes not meet thi s standar d. Cr oss r eli es heav i ly on the ti tle of his mo t i on, noti ng that i t seeks to “ter minate” counsel, a nd on a letter fr om hi s counsel that he a ttached to the moti on. 5 But nowher e in the Moti on to T

er min a te Counsel di d Cr oss expr es s a d e si r e to
r epr esent hi m self should the cour t gr a nt hi s r equest to ter mi

nate hi s thi r d appoi nted lawy er
. Instead, Cr oss asser ted in the Moti on that cou nsel w as ineffecti v e because he w a s insuffi

ci ently aw ar e of the facts and law related to the char ges agai nst Cr oss. Cr oss also complain ed t h a t counsel “ inher i ted” the
er r or s of the tw o lawy er s who came b efor e h i m, r efused to fi le

a moti on to wi thdr aw t he gui lty plea, and fai led to cor r ect clai m ed er r or s in the pr esentence r epor t. R. 153. On the day of the hear in g, when the c our t inqui r ed whether Cr oss wi shed to “per si st in the moti ons that [ he] fi led” the pr i or w eek, he

r esp o n d ed affi rmati v ely and then spoke for tw o pages of tr anscr i pt wi thout ev er indi cating that he w i shed to r epr esent hi mself. In fact, at no poi nt dur ing the hear ing di d Cr oss

5 The a tta ched l etter fro m Cro ss’s thi rd a tto rney ex pl a i ned the rea so ns tha t
co u nsel wo ul d no t co mpl y wi th Cro ss’s dema n d tha t he fi l e a mo ti o n t o wi thdra w the gui l ty pl ea
. Co unsel ends the l etter b y cl ea rl y sta ti ng tha t he wi l l no t fi le the mo ti o n, a nd a dv i s i ng Cro ss tha t , i f h e wa nts to fi l e the
mo ti o n, “yo u wi l l need to a sk the Co urt to l et y o u represent yo ursel f.” The quo ted po rti o n o f the l etter i s underl i ned b y h an d, presumab ly b y Cro s s hi msel f. R . 1 2 3 , a t 5

.No. 18-3633 9
menti on that he wi s hed to r epr esent hi mself. Rather , he si m p ly expr essed di ssati sfacti on w i th h is cur r ent and for mer attor

neys. A d efendant seeking to “ter m inate” counsel could be

r equesting to s ubsti tute new counsel, be seeki ng to pr oceed pro
se enti r ely

, or be r equesting to p r esent apar ti cularmoti on pro
se ev en though repr esented b y c ounsel. See United States v
. Patterson , 576 F

. 3d 431, 436 (7th Ci r
. 2009) (noti ng that whether

a defendant may a ct as co-counsel along wi th hi s own a ttor n ey i s a matter wi thi n the di scr eti on of the di s tr i ct cour t). Wi thout any st a t ement that Cr oss wi shed to r epr esent hi mself, much less a n unequiv o cal r equest to d o so, the cour t
r easonably inter p r eted Cr oss’s moti on as one to s ubsti tute counsel, whi ch i t appr opr i ately deni ed a fter r ej ecting Cr oss’s complaints about hi s thi r d lawy er
. In r esponse to Cr oss’s p r i or di ffi culti es wi th hi s lawy er s, t he c our t h ad twi ce appointed
new counsel, and i t w as r easonable to constr u e thi s ambi guous moti on as asking for s i mi lar reli ef. In deter mining whether a cour t abuses i ts di scr eti on in denying a moti on to s u b sti tute counsel, a cour t c onsi der s, among other things, the ti m eliness of the mo t io n, t he adequacy of the c our t’s inqui r y into the defendant’s moti on, and whether the confli c t w as so gr eat that i t r esulted in a t o t a l l ack of communi c ati on pr ev enti ng an adequate defense. United States v
. B est, 426 F .3d 937, 94 7 (7th Ci r
. 2005). Her e, the cour t found that c ounsel had competently

r epr esented Cr oss, and that c oun s e l h a d appr opr i ately fi led obj ecti ons to the PS R th a t t he cour t w ould take up at the appr opr i ate ti me. The cour t also n oted that Cr oss appear ed to be tr yi ng to si mply d e lay the pr oceedings. Impor tantly , the
cour t also found that ther e w as n o br eakdown of communi cati on betw een Cr oss and hi s l awy er that mi ght j usti fy substi tu-10 No. 18-3633
ti on of counsel. Fi nding no abuse of di s cr eti on in t h e cour t’s d e ni al of the Moti on to T er minate Counsel, we tur n to t he pr i mar y i s sue on appeal unencumber ed by thi s si d e i ssue. B

. The di str i ct cour t pr ov i ded tw o r easons for denying the Moti on to Wi thdr aw Gui lty Plea. Fi r st, i t deni ed the m oti on on the m er i ts, finding that Cr oss had knowingly and v oluntar i ly pled gui lty

. Second, the cour t r ej e c t e d the moti on because i t
w as fi led pro se ev en though the defendant w as r epr esented b y counsel. As we noted abov e, we r ev i ew the mer i ts of a deni al of the Moti on to Wi thdr aw the Gui lty Plea for abu se of di scr eti on. Haslam , 833 F

. 3d at 8 44. W e also r ev i ew for abuse of di scr eti on a di str i ct cour t’s deni al of amoti on fi l ed p ro se b y a defendant who i s r epr esented by counsel. Patterson , 576 F .3d a t 436. 1. A defendant d oes n ot hav e a r ig h t to r epr esent hi mself

w hen he i s also r epr esented by counsel. Patterson , 576 F

. 3d at 436. A cour t thus has “wi d e d i s cr eti on to rej ect pro se submi ssi ons by defendants r epr esented by counsel,” and ther e w as no
a b u s e of d i s cr eti on in the cour t’s deci si on to r ej ect Cr oss’ s moti on on that basi s her e. A car eful readin g of the tr anscr i pt
r ev eals that the cour t had concluded that Cr oss w as fi ling thi s moti on for the pur pose of delayi ng t h e p r oceedings, noti ng that h e had fi l ed hi s latest r ound of pro se motio n s j u s t t w o business days befor e hi s sentencing hear ing, a fter pr oceedings that had alr eady b een in pr ogr ess for tw enty-one m onths. The
cour t also r emar ked that Cr oss h ad been r epr esented by hi ghly competent l awy er s includin g tw o lawy er s whom the cour tNo. 18-3633 11
char acter i zed as a mong the best p anel attor n eys av ai lable in the di str i ct. That in c luded the attor ney who r epr esented hi m a t the ti m e of sentencin g, who had also r efused to fi le a moti on to wi thdr a w the gui lty plea, explai n ing in a letter t h a t Cr oss attach e d to hi s Moti on to T er minate Counsel the r easons for that refusal. Th e cour t w as well wi thin i ts di scr eti on in denying the moti on because i t had been fi led p ro s e w h en Cr oss w as
r epr esented by hi ghly competent counsel who had refused to fi le the v er y same moti on for cogent r easons. 2. Although w e r es t our affi r m a nce of the cour t’s j udgment on that second r ati onale for denying t h e Moti on to Wi thdr aw Gui lty P lea ( s p eci fi cally , that i t w a s fi led pro se when Cr oss w as
r ep r e s e nted by counsel), w e br i efly clar i fy the mer i ts i ssue because i t i s a r ecur r ing one. Cr oss contended that he w a s not adv i sed of one of the elements of bank f r a u d , namely , the

r equi r ement that the gov er nment pr ov e a mi sr e p r e s e ntati on or omi ssi on of a mater i al fact. He also contends that the gov er nment di d not p r esent ev i d ence of thi s element a nd that he di d

n ot admi t to conduct that w ould sati sfy that element of t he
cr i me. H e maintai ns tha t, because of these fai lur es, hi s gui lty plea w as not knowi ng and v olunt a r y , and the cour t should hav e allow ed hi m to wi thd r a w it on that b asi s
. The gov er nment r esponds that secti on 1344(1) does not r e qui r e that a s ch e me to defr aud inv olv e false statements or r epr esent a t i o n s
. 6

6 The go v ernment a l so a rgued tha t Cro ss’s scheme resemb l es check ki ti ng,
a nd tha t check ki t i ng i s unl a wful under secti o n 13 4 4(1 ) wi tho ut a ddi ti o na l pro o f o f a ma teri a l mi s representa ti o n. We decl ine to co nsi der th is a ddi

- (co nti nued...)12 No. 18-3633
W e r ecently addr essed the mater i a l i ty p r ong of s ecti on 1344 in United States v
. LeBeau , 949 F .3d 334 ( 7th C ir

. 2020). The defendant t h er e w as also char ged wi th bank fr a ud under secti on 1344(1), although for a v er y di ffer ent scheme than the
on e a t is sue her e. LeBeau obtai ned bank loans in par t b y submi tti ng false financi al statements that fai led to di sclose hi s si gni fi cant debts. He also m i sr epr esented to the bank the status of a bui ldin g pr oj ect in or der to per s u ade the bank to de l ay for eclosing on the loan. At tr i al, the j ur y i nstr u cti ons fai led to
s t a t e that the gov er nment w as r equi red to pr ov e that the “scheme inv olv ed a mater i ally false or fr audu lent pr etense,
r epr esentati on, or pr omis e
... , ” as r ecommended in the S ev enth Ci r cui t P a tter n Jur y Instr ucti ons. The p anel concluded that LeBeau w a iv ed the i ssue because he affi r mati v ely appr ov ed the w or ding of the j ur y i nstr ucti ons. But the panel also noted that the i ssue was a ser i ous one: In Neder v
. United States , 527 U

. S

. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the S u pr eme Cour t held that “mater i ali ty of falsehood i s an element of the feder al

... b a n k f r a u d statute[ ].” Id

. at 25, 119 S .Ct. 1827. It di d not l i mi t that holding to secti on 1344(2). Rather , i t d eter mined that “ fr a u d ” i t s e l f r e qui r es the element of mater i ali ty

. Id

. at 23, 119 S .Ct. 1827. W e hav e s ince sai d that Neder r equi r es “di str i ct cour ts [to] include mater i ali ty in the j ur y instr ucti ons for secti on 1344.”

6 (...co nti nued) ti ona l a rgument.No. 18-3633 13
United States v
. Reynolds , 189 F .3d 521, 525 n.2 (7th Ci r . 1999). LeBeau , 9 4 9 F .3d at 341. The commentar y for the P atter n Instr u cti on for secti on 1344 pr ov i ded addi ti onal gui dance: Although the S ev enth Ci rcui t h as not y et addr essed the appli cati on of Neder to § 1 344(1) speci fi cally , the Ninth Ci r cui t, in United States v
. Omer, 395 F .3d 1087 (9th Ci r
. 2005), held that mater i a li ty i s an element of

a § 1344(1) v io lati on u nder Neder

. In li ght of the gener al admoni ti ons in Neder and Reynolds , thi s instr ucti on has been modi fi ed to r eflect thi s r equi rement. LeBeau , 949 F .3d at 341 (quoting P atter n Cr i minal Jur y Instr ucti ons of the S ev ent h Ci r cui t (2012 E d.) (plus 2015–2017 and 2 0 1 8 c h a n g e s ) , h t t p : / / w w w
. c a 7

. u s c o u r t s
. g o v / patter n-j ur y-in str ucti ons/7th_cr i minal_j ur y_i nstr

. pdf, at 448). W e acknowledged that w e hav e not alw ays b een consi stent in following thi s g u idance but adv i sed that “[t]he better cour se, consi stent wi th Neder, i s to r equi r e the mater i ali ty instr ucti on
on a ll bank-fr aud char ges, whether br ought under s e cti on 1344(1) or ( 2),” unti l w e r ecei v e gr eater clar i ty f r o m the S upr eme Cour t on what i s r equi r ed

. L e Be a u , 949 F .3d at 341. Because we d eci de the appeal on other gr ounds, w e need not deci de in thi s case whether the fai l ur e to include the element of mater i al m is r epr esentati on in a secti on 1344(1) case could inv ali date Cr oss’s gui lty plea a s not knowing and v olu ntar y
. T h e gov er nment assur ed the panel in LeBeau that i ts cur r e n t pr acti ce i s to include the mater i a li ty element in all secti on 1344 cases, a pr udent poli cy
. S omethi ng must di stingui sh fr aud14 No. 18-3633
fr om theft, and the S upr eme Cour t made clear in Nederthat a mater i ally false pr ete n s e fi ts the b i ll. See also United States v
. Freed, 9 2 1 F .3d 716, 722 (7th Ci r
. 2019) (noti ng that a b ank fr aud
conv i cti on r equi r es the gov er n ment to pr ov e, among other thi ngs, that the scheme inv olv ed a m ater i ally false or fr audulent pr etense, r epr esentati on, or pr omi se). As for Cr oss, we conclude by noti ng that ther e is s o m e
ev i dence in the r ecor d that at least par t of hi s scheme inv olv ed mate r ia l mi s r epr esentati ons. United States v
. Arenal , 500 F .3d 634, 638 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (a di str i c t cour t may consi der not only the infor mati on pr offer ed at the plea hear ing, but also infor mati on contai ned in the PS R to establi sh a f a c t u a l basi s befor e entr y of j udgment a nd i mposi ti on of sentence). As the di s tr i ct
cour t noted, banks nor mally plac e h olds on lar ge checks,

r e f using to make the deposi ted funds av ai lable unti l t he
or i gi n a tin g banks confi r m that ther e a r e suff ici ent funds to
cov er the deposi ted checks. R. 174, S ent. T r
. at 59–60. S ome of the Illinoi s banks wher e Cr oss engaged in hi s scheme f ai led to follow thei r own r ules on check holds, r eleasing funds to Cr oss wi thout fi r st ensur ing that the deposi ts w er e v ali d

. The di s tr i ct
cour t noted that C r oss “schmoozed” one b ank employ ee and “scammed” other s in or der to conv ince them to bend the rules and r elease the f

unds. The cour t a lso r emar ked that Cr oss tar geted the y oungest and least exper i enced bank employ ees
a n d then alw ays h ad an excuse or stor y when the b a nk s cont a cted hi m after the deposi ted checks fai led to clear

. An Ill in oi s bank employ ee w as fi r ed as a r esult of f alling for Cr oss’s a ssur ances. R. 174, S ent. T r
. at 59–60. B u t agai n, w e need not r each any conclusi o ns on the questi on of mater i al mi sr epr esentati ons because w e affi r m the j udgmen t o n theNo. 18-3633 15
di str i ct cour t’s a lter nate r ati onale for r ej ecting Cr oss’s Moti on to W i thdr aw Gui l ty Plea. AFFIRMED.