[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 16

- 16411 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:14

- cv - 00350

- SPC

- MRM MICHAEL ANAGNOS, an individual, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus THE NELSEN RESIDENCE, INC., a.k.a. Haven of D ivine Love, The Nelsen Residence, Inc., JEROME VALENTA, Defendants

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ (January 10, 2018) Before TJOFLAT , WILLIAM PRYOR and NEWSOM , Circuit Judges. PER C URIAM: This appeal presents the issue whether an employee seeking to recover minimum wages under the Florida Constitution , Fla. Const. art

. X , § 24, must

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 1 of 92 prove that his employer i s covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). M ich ael Anagnos sought to recover unpaid state minimum wages from his former housing community, The Nels e n Residence, Inc., and its president,
Jerome Valenta, premised on the theory that they were a n employer covered as “an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mental ly ill or defecti ve who reside on the premises, ” 29 U.S.C. § § 206, 203(r)(2)(A),
203 (s)(1)(B). At trial, the district court instructed the jury that Anagnos was eligible to recover state minimum wages only if his employer w as covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The jury found that The Residence and Valenta were
not operating a residential care facili ty and returned a verdic t in their favor

. Anagnos argues that the state constitutional W age A mendment i s self

- executing and creates a right to a minimum wage in Florida without regard to the Fair Labor Standards Act or the Florida Minimum Wage Act

. But the W age A mendment provides, by its terms, “ the terms ‘Employer,’ ‘Employee’ and ‘Wage’ shall have the meanings established under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, ” Fla. Const. art. 10 § 24(b), and states that t he “ case law, administrative interpretations, and other guiding standards developed under the federal FLSA shall guide the construction of this amendment and any implementing statutes or regulations, ” id. § 24(f). W e affirm.

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 2 of 93 I. BACKGROUND In May 2011, Anagnos, who was temporarily wh eelchair

- bound, applied for an apartment at the Haven for Divine Love, which is operated by and located on property that The Residence owns in Cape Coral, Florida. Anagnos moved onto the property on June 1, 2011, and after h is health improved , he began cleaning, performing landscaping services, and aiding with repairs on the property. Valenta lived in Bakersfield, California, and was unfamiliar with the extent of Anagnos’s work. Even so, Valenta suspended Anagnos’s rent payment s . In the second quarter of 2014, Anagnos demanded to be paid, but Valenta refused on the basis that The Residence accepted only volunteer services. After Anagnos discontinu ed all work for The Residence and stopped paying his rent , Valenta evicted him

. Anagnos filed a n amended compl aint against Valenta and T he Residence for unpaid minimum wages and for retaliating after receiving a demand for wages in violation of t he Florida C onstitution, Fla. Const. art. 10, § 24(a), (d) , a nd the Wage Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.110 . Anagnos alleged that Valenta and T he Residence “violat[ed] . . . the FMWA because he performed work for [their] benefit . . . for which he has never been compensated” and that “[t]he FW M A, via Article X, Sect. 24(c) of the Florida Constitution, mandates ” that employers pay employees the state minimum wage. Anagnos sought “to recover .

. . unpaid minimum wages, as

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 3 of 94 well as . . . liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees under the provisions of Title XXXI, Chapter 448.110 (Florida Minimum Wag e Act) and Fla. Const. art X section 24.” Anagnos alleged that Valenta and The Residence were his “employer .

. . within the meaning of the Florida Minimum Wage [sic] act pursuant to Section 3(d) of the ‘Fair Labor Standards Act’ [29 U.S.C. § 203(d)].” Val enta and The Residence answered that Anagnos was not an employee and raised the affirmative defense s that they w ere exempt from coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act , 29 U.S.C. § 213 , and lacked sufficient employees to constitute an employer under st ate law , Fla. Stat. § 448.101 (3)

. Before trial, Anagnos raised a new theory. He argued , in contrast with his complaint, that “Article X, Sect. 24 makes no mention of the FLSA ” and “ the FMWA’s purported r equirement that an employee . . . establish FLSA coverage in order to establish entitlement to a remedy for unpaid minimum wages under state law is an unconstitutional restriction on Art. X, Sect. 24 of the Florida Constitution .” A nagnos also argued that the jury should answer an interrogatory about whet her “Article X, Section 24,

. . . require [s] FLSA coverage.” During trial, The Residence elicited testimony that it was not a caregiver to the residents of the Haven. Haven r esidents Bonnie Ribich, Salvatore Carsi, and Wilfred Rodriguez testified that the y d id not receive medical care , counseling, meals, or transportation services fr om The R esiden ce . Rodriguez, who serv ed as

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 4 of 95 the chaplain for The Residence and conduct ed worship services and B ible studies occasiona lly in the chapel on the property , and his wife, Angelica, denied that they provid ed counseling to the residents of the Haven

. Angelica also testified that they did not receive a reduction in rent for serving on the board for The Residence

. Angelica classified the Haven as “just a living facility or . . . an elderly, low income place to live” and stat e d that the facility did not p rovide care for or services to its residents. Valenta described the Haven as a “hotel motel with efficiency units” that were available for monthly rent al

. When asked about the statement on the Haven website, Valenta responded he was unaware that the phrase “residential care facility” had a particular meaning “based on some kind of labor law

. ” He insisted tha t the property served strictly as “an apartment hou se , ” and he denied that The Residence provide d regular meals o r transportation for Haven residents.
T he district court instruct ed the jury “ to decide whether the Nels e n Residence and Jerome Valenta were employers covered under the FLSA and [the] Florida Mi nimum Wage Act” b y virtue of “operating a residential care facility.” The district court sta ted that , if the jury found “that the Nels e n Residence and Jerome Valenta were not operating a residential care facility, [it] will not decide the issue of Michael Anagnos’s damages.” The district court explained that the jury had to answer “special interrogatory number 1A ,” which asked, “Do you find from

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 5 of 96 a preponderance of the evidence . . . That the Nels e n Residence and Jerome
V alenta operate a residential care facility ? ” The jury marked “no” on the special interrogatory , which stated that a negative answer was dispositive of Anagnos’s claim for minimum wages. Later, t he district court entered judgment in favor of The Residence a nd Valenta and against Anagnos’s claim for unpaid state minimum
wages . II. STANDARD S OF REVIEW
We generally review for abuse of discretion the denial of a requested jury instruction, Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 636 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) , and of a special interrogatory verdict form , McNely v. Ocala Star

- Banner Corp. , 99 F.3d 1068, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996) , but we review de novo whether an instruction and verdict form accurately reflect the law , id. III. DISCUSSION The resolution of this appe al turns on the meaning of the minimum wage amendment to the Florida Constitution

. Fla. Const. art. X, § 24. “[ T ]he preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to ‘presume that [ an enactment ]

. . . says . . . what it means and means

. . . what it says there.’” Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States , 408 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States , 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) ). Because the Wage Amendment is written in clear, unambiguous language , we can “begin with the

. . . text, and end

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 6 of 97 there as well

. ” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting BedRoc , 541 U.S. at 183 ). In so doing, we give the words in the W age A mendment their plain and ordinary meaning. See id. The Wage Amendment makes plain that employees rece ive the same protection under state law that they enjoy under the Fair Labor Standards Act

. Its

s ubsection ( b ) giv e s its “terms ‘Employer,’ ‘Employee’ and ‘Wage’

. . . the meaning s established under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and its implementing regulations.” Id. § 24(b). U se of the word “meanings” connotes that the W age A mendment incorporates not only the definitions of, but also the criteria for coverage as , an e mployer and an employee under federal law. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Minimum Wage , 880 So. 2d 636, 641

– 62 (Fla. 2004)

. A n d subsection ( f ) declares an “inten [tion] that case law, administrative interpretations, and other guiding standards developed under the federal FLSA shall guide the construction of this amendment and any implementing statutes or regulations.” Id. § 24(f). That s ubsection reflects that the W age A mendment should operate like the federal minimum wage law. Id. § 24(f); see Minimum Wage , 880 So. 2d at 64 1 (“point[ing] out that the . . . amendment

. . . incorporates a reference to the entire body of law under the F LSA” ). The Wage Amendment also contem plates the use of implementin g legislation

. It provide s that “[t]he state legislature may by statute . . . adopt any

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 7 of 98 measures appropriate for the implementation of this amendment.” Fla. Const. art. X, §24(f). Based on that authority, the L egislature passed the Wage Act “ to provide measures appropriate for the implementation of [section] 24, Art. X of the State Constitution. ” Fla. Stat. § 448.110(2). The Wage Act p rovides a specific minimum wage for all hours worked in Florida and limits it to “[o]nly those individuals entitled to receive the federal minimum wage under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and its implementing regulations.” Id. § 448.110(3). The Wage Act also incorporates the exemptions and restrictions in sections 213 and 214 of the F air L abo r S tandards A ct “as interpreted by applicable federal regulations and implemented by the Secretary of Labor.” Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act r equire s an employee seeking to collect unpaid minimum wages to prove that he was employed by a covered employe r. T he Act states that employers must pay the applicable minimum wage to an employee “ who is . . . employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). An “ ‘ enterprise ’

means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose

. . . . ” Id. § 203(r)(1). As pertains to Anagnos, the activities of an employee are “ deemed

. . . activities performed for a bu siness purpose ,” if completed “in connection with

Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 8 of 99 . . . an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises . . . .” Id. § 203(r)(2)(A). The district court correctly instructed the jury

. See M cNely , 99 F.3d at 1072

. Anagnos’s entitlement to minimum wages was dependent on his coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Fla. Const. art. X, § 24(b), (f) ; Fla. Stat. § 448.110(2), (3)

. Under the federal law and concomitantly the state W age A mendment, Anagnos had to prove that The Residence and Valenta were covered employers by virtue of operating a residential care facility. See 29 U.S.C. § § 203(r) (1), 203(r) (2)(A) , 206(a). The jury found that The Residence and Valenta did not operate a residential care facility , and Anagnos does not dispute th at finding on appeal

. We affirm the judgment in favor of The Residence and Valenta. AFFIRMED. Case: 16-16411 Date Filed: 01/10/2018 Page: 9 of 9