United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-3591

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Tim Axelson

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Randall Watson, Warden, Varner Unit; Moses Jackson, Assistant Warden, Varner 

Unit; Floria Washington, Classification Officer, Varner Unit (originally named as 

F. Washington); Kennie Bolden, Major/Chief of Security, Varner Unit

 Defendants - Appellees

Ashlee Shabazz, Sergeant, 8 Bks Varner Unit (originally named as Shabazz); Mark 

Stephens, Captain, Varner Unit (originally named as Stephens)

 Defendants 

William Conner, Captain, Varner Unit (originally named as Conner); Telicia 

Mothershed, Officer, Varner Unit (originally named as Mothershed)

 Defendants - Appellees

Jane Doe, Grievance Officer, Varner Unit; John Does, Officers 1-6, Varner Unit; 

Myheisia Jones, Corporal; Travis Goins, Officer; Larry Louis, Officer; Gary 

Williams, Officer

 Defendants 

John Rogers, Officer

 Defendant - Appellee
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Deborah Andrews, Corporal; Chester Rayford, Officer; Shondreka Cooper, 

Corporal; James Plummer; Freddie L. Gibson, Sergeant (originally named as 

Gibson)

 Defendants 

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

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Submitted: April 13, 2021

Filed: May 28, 2021

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Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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KOBES, Circuit Judge.

Tim Axelson brought this action against prison officials alleging that they 

failed to protect him from his fellow inmates after he was labeled a snitch. The

district court1 sua sponte granted judgment as a matter of law to five defendants. 

Axelson appeals and also says that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his motions for continuance. We affirm.

I. 

In the span of a month, Tim Axelson was attacked three different times while 

in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Corrections. He was first attacked by 

Patrick Walker, who lived in the same barracks. Despite filing a grievance about the 

incident, Axelson said that he did not need to be placed in administrative segregation 

for his safety. 

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Arkansas.
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A few days later, Axelson was attacked by Dominic Sessions, who lived in a 

different barracks. Captain William Conner investigated and found that Sessions 

had called Axelson a “snitch” before hitting him in the face, and he recommended 

that Axelson be placed in administrative segregation. Axelson stayed in 

administrative segregation for two weeks while the Inmate Classification Committee 

evaluated his request to remain there. Despite Captain Conner’s recommendation 

otherwise, the committee unanimously decided to return Axelson to general 

population. Four days later, he was attacked again without provocation by a third 

inmate, Frankie Hunter. Axelson was then permanently moved to administrative 

segregation. 

Axelson sued seven prison employees, claiming they violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by failing to protect him from a known harm. The defendants 

included then-Warden Randall Watson, Chief of Security Major Kennie Bolden, 

Captain Conner, Officer Telicia Mothershed, Officer John Rogers, and two members 

of the Classification Committee, Floria Washington and Assistant Warden Moses

Jackson. 

In early 2019, Axelson requested and received appointment of counsel, and a

month later, the court set a trial date for June. Although Axelson’s requests for 

counsel pre-dated the initial discovery deadline, and continued throughout the case, 

the magistrate judge first granted his request in early 2019. In April, the court 

entered an amended order rescheduling the case for trial in September. 

Less than a month before trial, Axelson’s appointed counsel requested 

continuances of the trial date on two separate occasions. The first request cited the 

death of two family members and an increased case load, which “frustrate[d] his 

ability to properly prepare for the trial in this matter.” D. Ct. Dkt. 202 at 1. The 

court denied the motion, citing the case’s four-year procedural history. The second 

request for a continuance sought further discovery. The district court again denied 

the request, stating that counsel was given more than enough time to prepare when 

the court moved the trial from June to September. 
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The case proceeded to trial. After the close of Axelson’s evidence, the district

court sua sponte granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the five defendants 

who were not members of the Classification Committee. The case went to the jury 

on the claims against Jackson and Washington, and the jury found in favor of the 

two defendants. 

Axelson appeals, challenging the district court’s authority to sua sponte grant 

judgment as a matter of law, the merits of the judgment as a matter of law, and the 

denial of Axelson’s motions for continuance. 

II. 

A.

Axelson first challenges the district court’s authority to sua sponte grant 

judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Axelson did 

not object below, so we review for plain error, and Axelson cannot meet that

standard. See Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 950 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Absent a 

specific objection, we will review only for plain error.”). Rule 50(a) does not 

explicitly require a party to file a motion. Compare Cargill, Inc. v. Weston, 520 F.2d 

669, 671 (8th Cir. 1975) (to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 

50(b), party must file a motion for directed verdict after close of evidence and a 

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury returns), with 

Peterson v. Peterson, 400 F.2d 336, 343 (8th Cir. 1968) (“[W]e know of no rule 

which requires a formal motion by one side before a trial court may draw a legal 

conclusion and direct a verdict.”). To show plain error, the “error must be ‘plain,’ 

which ‘is synonymous with clear or, equivalently, obvious.’” Wilson v. Brinker 

Int’l, Inc., 382 F.3d 765, 771 (8th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). Even assuming we agreed 

with Axelson that Rule 50(a) requires a motion, we do not think that requirement is 

clear or obvious under our case law. 
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B. 

Next, Axelson says the district court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the 

five defendants who were not on the Classification Committee. Judgment as a matter 

of law is appropriate “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial 

and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 

evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). “In 

both Rule 56 motions for summary judgment and Rule 50 motions for judgment as 

a matter of law, the inquiry is the same: Whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Kinserlow v. CMI Corp., 217 F.3d 1021, 

1025 (8th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). “Our review of the district court’s decision is de 

novo, using the same standards as the district court.” Id.

To prevail on a failure-to-protect claim, an inmate must make two showings: 

(1) an objective component, that there was a substantial risk of harm to the inmate, 

and (2) a subjective component, that the prison official was deliberately indifferent 

to that risk. Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2018). Deliberate 

indifference in this context means that prison officials “subjectively knew of and 

disregarded [the inmate’s] safety risk.” Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 

644 (8th Cir. 1996).

Axelson argues that whether the prison officials deliberately ignored the 

possibility that he was in danger is a fact question for the jury. He says that the 

officials knew or should have known about Captain Conner’s report which said he 

had been labeled a snitch, and that the officials disregarded the ramifications of that 

label. But Axelson ignores that the report was given to the Classification Committee 

to make the decision about whether he should rejoin general population. Axelson 

cannot show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference by entrusting the

decision to the Classification Committee—the prison’s selected arbitrator. Indeed, 

even if they disagreed with the choice, there is nothing to suggest that four of the 

defendants—Chief of Security Bolden, Captain Conner, Officer Mothershed, and 
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Officer Rogers—had any power to circumvent the ruling of the Classification 

Committee. 

We acknowledge that this may be a closer call for Warden Watson. But still,

Axelson has not shown the necessary facts to allow a jury to draw the conclusion 

that Warden Watson was deliberately indifferent. Axelson has not provided any 

evidence that Warden Watson received Captain Conner’s report. Even if Warden 

Watson did receive the report, Axelson has not explained why he should have 

second-guessed the finding of the Classification Committee and taken the 

extraordinary step to intervene or overrule the decision, much less that the failure to 

do so amounts to deliberate indifference. See Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 

1079 (8th Cir. 2007) (supervisor not liable for deliberate indifference where they did

not make the decision that placed the inmate in harm’s way, even though they knew 

of the danger).

C. 

Axelson finally argues that the district court improperly denied his motions 

for continuance. “[A] district court possesses inherent powers . . . to manage their 

own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Dietz 

v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (citation omitted). “We will reverse a 

district court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance only if the court abused its 

discretion and the moving party was prejudiced by the denial.” United States v. 

Hyles, 479 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2007). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion. This case involves a relatively 

simple factual backdrop and was more than four years old. Given the trial was 

rescheduled from June to September, Axelson’s counsel had eight months total to 

prepare. We think the district court was well within its discretion to deny the 

continuance here, ensuring an expeditious disposition of the case, while affording 

significant time to allow Axelson to prepare.
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Axelson also has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of his 

motions. At best, he claims he needed more time for discovery. But he does not 

specify what discovery he needed or how that discovery might have made a 

difference to the underlying merits of his case. Nor does he show any examples

from trial in which his appointed lawyer appeared ill-prepared and unable to 

adequately present his case. 

III. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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