SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2284-17T4

IDALIS KIZIEE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Respondent-Appellant.

______________________________

Argued February 11, 2019 – Decided May 23, 2019

Before Judges Haas and Sumners.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Community Affairs, Agency Docket No. OCA 211-17.

Howard Goldberg, First Assistant County Counsel, 

argued the cause for appellant (Christopher A. Orlando, 

County Counsel, attorney; Howard Goldberg, on the 

brief).

Sonia L. Bell argued the cause for respondent Idalis 

Kiziee (South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; 

Sonia L. Bell, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent Department of Community Affairs 

(Dominic L. Giova, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

The Camden County Department of Health (the County) appeals the final 

agency decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs, 

which adopted the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that 

ordered the County to pay relocation assistance in accordance with the 

Relocation Assistance Act (Relocation Act), N.J.S.A. 20:4-1 to -22, and the 

Relocation Assistance Law of 1967 (Relocation Law) , N.J.S.A. 52:31B-1 to -

12, to Idalis Kiziee because she received oral and written notice from the County 

to vacate her rental home (the property) due to mold infestation. The County 

contends the Commissioner's ruling is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable 

because it did not direct Kiziee and her family to vacate the property as required 

by the Relocation Act and the Relocation Law (collectively the legislation). We 

agree with the ALJ's interpretation of the legislation, statutes and the 

implementing regulations, and applying our deferential standard of review to a 

state agency's fact-finding decisions, we affirm. 

It is well settled that the Legislature fashioned a statutory design in the 

legislation to establish a uniform policy for fair and equitable treatment of 
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persons displaced, not only by acquisition, condemnation, or voluntary 

rehabilitation programs, but also by building code enforcement activities. 

McNally v. Middletown Twp., 182 N.J. Super. 622, 625-626 (App. Div. 1982). 

The Relocation Law provides for relocation assistance payments "to persons or 

businesses displaced on account of acquisition of real property for a public use, 

or on account of a program of law enforcement, or on account of a program for 

voluntary rehabilitation of dwelling units[.]" N.J.S.A. 52:31B-4(a). The 

Relocation Act was enacted to provide "a uniform policy for fair and equitable 

treatment of persons displaced by the acquisition of real property by State and 

local land acquisition programs, by building code enforcement activities, or by 

a program of voluntary rehabilitation of buildings or other improvements 

conducted pursuant to governmental supervision." N.J.S.A. 20:4-2.

The dispute before us involves whether the County directed Kiziee to 

vacate the property due to mold infestation, which thereby entitles her to

relocation expenses under the legislation. Following a fact finding hearing at 

which Kiziee and Ann Biondi, the County's Director of Health and Human 

Services, testified, the ALJ found that Kiziee, her husband, and their three 

children were directed in writing, as well as given verbal direction, to leave the
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property because of mold infestation in the children's bedroom and a second 

floor closet caused by a leaking roof. 

The ALJ cited inspections by Winslow Township and the County. The 

township's Chief Inspector inspected the property after Kiziee retained a private 

inspection, and he issued a violation notice1requiring the property owner to hire 

a certified mold remediation company to remove mold in all areas of infestation. 

This was followed by an inspection by the County's Health Officer, who also 

reviewed the private inspection report. The Health Officer issued a verbal and 

written recommendation that the family should vacate the property. According 

to the ALJ, the verbal recommendation was to do so "as soon as possible." 

About two weeks later, the family moved out of the property, and Kiziee sought 

relocation assistance approximately three weeks later. The County denied the 

request for assistance. 

In deciding in Kiziee's favor, the ALJ cited the Relocation Act and the 

Relocation Law, stating that they both 

demonstrate the public policy to provide for the 

protection of the health and welfare of the residents of 

this State in order to assure the uniform, fair and 

equitable relocation of persons displaced by State and 

local land acquisition, activities, projects, and code 

enforcement. The Legislative policy expressly states 

 

1

 In total, the violation notice identified fourteen code violations. 
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that the act should be liberally construed to effectuate 

the purposes and intent thereof. N.J.S.A. 52:31B-2; 

N.J.S.A. 20:4-2. 

The ALJ also cited regulations promulgated by the Department of 

Community Affairs to carry out the legislation. She referenced N.J.A.C. 5:11-

2.1(a), which provides:

Whenever a State Agency or unit of local government 

undertakes a program of building code enforcement, 

housing code enforcement or health code enforcement 

that causes the displacement of any person, the said 

State Agency or unit of local government shall provide 

relocation payments and assistance to all lawful 

occupants who are displaced, as provided in N.J.A.C. 

5:11-3 and 4. The date of eligibility shall be the date 

occupants received formal written notice to vacate from 

the State Agency or unit of local government. Said 

written notice shall include the information required 

pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:11-4.2. 

The ALJ pointed out the notification requirements under N.J.A.C. 5:11-

4.2 required that

[w]henever a displacing agency determines that their 

activities shall cause a displacement of individuals or 

businesses that are eligible for relocation payments and 

assistance, the displacing agency shall notify those 

individuals and businesses, in writing, at the earliest 

possible date of the benefits and obligations of the Act 

and this chapter. Said notice shall be issued 

immediately upon the determination of the displacing 

agency that displacement shall occur. The notice shall 

contain the nature and types of payments and assistance 

available, the eligibility criteria, and a notice that the 
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displacee should not vacate the property prior to being 

authorized to do so in order to remain eligible for 

payment and assistance and that they should continue 

to pay rent to the landlord, as provided by the law.

To determine whether Kiziee and her family were displaced, the ALJ cited 

the Relocation Act, which defines a displaced person as:

A person who moves or discontinues his business or 

moves other personal property, or moves from his 

dwelling on or after the effective date of this act as the 

direct result of code enforcement activities, or a 

program of rehabilitation of buildings conducted 

pursuant to a governmental program, is deemed to be a 

displaced person for the purposes of this act.

[N.J.S.A. 20:4-14.]

She also relied upon the Relocation Law that states the term "displaced"

shall mean required to vacate any real property, or any 

tenancy therein, pursuant to any lawful order or notice 

of any State agency or unit of local government on 

account of the acquisition of any real property for a 

public use, or on account of a program of law 

enforcement, or on account of a program or project for 

the voluntary rehabilitation of dwelling units.

[N.J.S.A. 52:31B-3(e).] 

The ALJ then cited McNally, where we relied upon the statutory 

provisions and the same regulations to determine that the Commissioner

properly allowed relocation assistance where the inhabitant vacated her home 
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"by virtue of the direct, not indirect, action of [the township's] building 

inspector." 182 N.J. Super. at 626. 

Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Kiziee received "both oral and 

written notice to vacate [her] rental home because of a serious health condition, 

and the notification is within purview of the applicable statutes and regulations 

to qualify for relocation assistance." 

Before us, the County argues that Kiziee was not displaced due to a law 

enforcement process and that the Relocation Law does not apply to her situation 

because she was not provided a written notice to vacate the property. Thus, it 

asserts the ALJ, and in turn the Commissioner, misapplied the law. We are not 

persuaded. 

Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited.

In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). The "final determination of an 

administrative agency . . . is entitled to substantial deference." In re Eastwick 

Coll. LPN-to RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016). To that end, we 

will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless 

there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the 

decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not 
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supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees 

for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).

Additionally, we give "due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard 

the witnesses to judge . . . their credibility[,]" and, therefore, accept their 

findings of fact "when supported by adequate, substantial and credible 

evidence[.]" In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). "'Deference to an agency 

decision is particularly appropriate where the interpretation of the [a]gency's 

own regulation is in issue.'" R.S. v. Div. Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 434 

N.J. Super. 250, 261 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting I.L. v. N.J. Dep't of Human 

Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 389 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. 

Div. 2006)). "Nevertheless, 'we are not bound by the agency's legal opinions.'" 

A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. 

Div. 2009) (quoting Levine v. State Dep't of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 

(App. Div. 2001)). "Statutory and regulatory construction is a purely legal issue 

subject to de novo review." Ibid. (citing Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 

64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).

We have considered the County's contentions that the ALJ's initial 

decision, which was fully adopted by the Commissioner, is arbitrary, capricious 

or unreasonable. In light of the record and applicable legal principles, we 
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conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant a discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed 

in the ALJ's decision, which is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record, Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Affirmed.