J-S19018-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3086 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered, September 19, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-51-DP-1000097-2016.

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.M.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.M.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3093 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered, September 19, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000470-2017.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JUNE 04, 2019

In this matter, B.M.P. (Mother) appeals the decree terminating her 

parental rights to her nearly 3-year-old daughter N.M.J., pursuant to the 
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Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) and (b).1, 2 After 

review, we affirm.

Child came to the attention of the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS) when Mother and Child tested positive for marijuana and 

cocaine during Child’s birth in October 2015. Mother was unable to care for 

Child, who was removed from her parents’ care and placed in the home of 

Child’s maternal cousin. Child never lived with her parents for any extended 

period of time. Mother continued to test positive for illicit drugs, which led to 

the Child’s dependency adjudication in July 2016.

The juvenile court ordered Mother to seek drug treatment, participate 

in random drug screens, and visit Child. The court further ordered her to 

obtain appropriate housing and complete a parenting program. Mother never 

complied with the court-sanctioned reunification plan during the course of the 

dependency proceedings.

In April 2017, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s rights. The 

orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing on September 19, 2018 and 

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1 The court also terminated parental rights of L.J. (Father). Although his 

appeal is before this panel, it is not consolidated with this matter. See 3044 

EDA 2018; 3045 EDA 2018.

2 D.P. (Maternal Grandmother) also sought to join this matter. For reasons 

we set forth below, we grant the joint application filed by DHS and Child and 

strike Maternal Grandmother from this appeal.
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granted the petition.

3

 Mother filed this timely appeal. She presents two 

questions for our review:

1. Whether the orphans’ court erred by terminating the 

parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)?

2. Whether the orphans’ court erred by finding, under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights best serves Child’s developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare?

See Mother’s Brief at 5.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of 

the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the 

trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; 

R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion). As 

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3 We note that the Child was properly represented under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2313(a). In her concise statement to the orphans’ court, Mother alleged that 

the court erred by vacating Child’s legal counsel appointment, which was 

originally made to ensure Child’s legal interests were properly represented. 

See, e.g., In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017). At the 

beginning of the hearing, Child’s guardian ad litem advised the court that 

Child, who was nearly three years old, was pre-verbal and too young to 

articulate a preferred outcome. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018). 

Child’s legal counsel concurred with the guardian’s assessment. In its Rule 

1925 opinion, the court explained that no separate legal counsel appointment 

was necessary pursuant to § 2313(a) and In re T.S. Notably, Mother does 

not raise the issue in her brief; although this issue cannot be waived, we 

nevertheless agree with the lower court’s conclusion.
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has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia 

Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As [the Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear 

reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of 

review in these cases. [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts 

are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations 

on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the 

parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over 

numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts 

could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose 

its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we 

must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings 

are supported by the record and the court's legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 

1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
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This Court may affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights 

based on any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b) provide, 

in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

[her] physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

Instantly, Mother’s first issue concerns the first prong of the termination 

analysis. We address the court’s determination that DHS met its burden under 
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§ 2511(a)(2), namely that Mother’s drug addiction rendered her incapable of 

parenting.

The Supreme Court has addressed parental incapacity under § 

2511(a)(2) as follows:

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based 

upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in 

enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent 

who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as 

parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.

In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986) (quoting

In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s 

vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the 

necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous. Id. at 340.

Here, Mother cites her own testimony to conclude that she made 

sufficient progress on her reunification goals, that DHS failed to meet its 

burden, and that the court’s findings to the contrary equated an abuse of 

discretion. See Mother’s Brief at 11-13. We conclude that the record supports 

the orphans’ court decision to terminate Mother’s rights.
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Mother had a long history of substance abuse. Two other children were 

previously removed from her care because of her addiction. During Child’s 

dependency case, Mother participated in five drug treatment programs, but 

she never successfully completed any of them. See N.T., 9/19/18, at 212-

214. Other than two screens in May 2016, which were positive for cocaine, 

marijuana, and alcohol, Mother did not attend court-ordered drug screens. 

See DHS Exhibit 5; N.T. at 28-30.

Mother claims to have satisfied her parenting goal, because she received 

a certificate for attending a requisite parenting class. See Mother’s Exhibit at 

1. Yet, she ignores the fact that she could not be trusted to care for Child 

outside of supervised visitation due to her substance abuse. Moreover, Mother 

attended only about half of the visits offered to her. See N.T. at 14; 34; 130; 

187; see also Footnote 4, infra. Of those she attended, Mother arrived late 

and often left early. Id., at 36.

Mother disputes the court’s determination that she failed to meet her 

housing goal, because she lived with her sister. Here, the record also supports

the court’s conclusion. But even if Mother achieved stable housing, Mother’s 

inability to achieve sobriety or to visit Child for any significant length of time 

prevented the court from ordering further reunification. The court did not 

abuse its discretion when it concluded Mother was incapable of parenting 

Child. Mother’s first issue is without merit.

Having concluded that the court properly applied the first prong of the 

termination analysis, we turn now to the second prong under section 2511(b), 
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which is the subject of Mother’s second appellate issue. Mother argues that 

because Child is bonded to her, the termination of the relationship does not 

best serve the Child’s needs and welfare. See Mother’s Brief at 16-18.

This Court has stated that the initial focus of a termination analysis is 

on the parent, but the second prong focuses on the child. See In re Adoption 

of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the 

evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court 

has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child's “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and 

make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances...where direct 

observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not 
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necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are also a relevant part of this analysis. 

See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, the court 

may emphasize the safety needs of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 

763 (affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of 

some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best 

interests). “[A] parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing 

of ... her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to 

the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child's] 

potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d

847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

Instantly, two DHS caseworkers and two visitation coaches testified at 

the hearing. Mother relies exclusively on the favorable testimony from the 

visitation coaches, while ignoring the DHS caseworkers’ testimony entirely.

The first visitation coach on Mother’s case was Richard Collins. Mr. 

Collins concluded that, although Mother only attended less than a third of her 

offered visits, the parental bond was surprisingly strong. Id. at 179. He 

testified that the two act “like there’s no missed time, no time lost between 

them.” Id. 

The other visitation coach was Raymond Nichols. He testified that he

supervised about 14, two-hour visits between Mother and Child over the 

course of the final three months of the dependency case. Visitation Coach 
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Nichols testified that the parental bond between Mother and Child was “one 

hundred percent great.” See N.T. at 187. In fact, the witness testified that 

he has never seen such preparation on the part of the parent:

[The parents] set up the room before the child comes in. 

They know specifically what toys [Child] uses. They know 

what she eats. They know everything. Like their whole visit 

is set up like they have a time where their [sic] eating. They 

have a time where they’re learning. They have a time when 

they’re playing. They have a time when they’re getting 

ready, when they’re getting cleaned up, when they’re ready 

to go. I’ve never done a visit where the parents already had 

everything that they were going to do planned out prior to 

even getting in the room.

Id. at 200.

Mr. Nichols also stated that the parents were asked to walk out with 

Child to the car after the visit, because Child was upset when the visits ended. 

Id. at 194. The witness concluded that Child would absolutely suffer 

irreparable harm if the relationship was severed. Id. at 188.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court did not address the

visitation coaches’ testimonies. However, the court explicitly noted that it 

afforded greater weight to the testimony of the DHS’ caseworkers. There are 

ample reasons why the court afforded the visitation coaches’ testimonies

limited credence. 

Mr. Collins’ recommendation was not well-reasoned. He testified that 

he did not consider Mother’s illicit drug use and her inpatient addiction 

treatment to be worthwhile reasons to forbid unsupervised visitations. Id. at 

183-184. On the other hand, Mr. Nichols did not seem to grasp the concept 
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of irreparable harm. He testified: “Irreparable harm meaning not physical, 

but would it (sic) emotionally damage the child or would it – you know – sway 

her to do anything bad or anything like that.” See id. at 189. Although Mr. 

Nichols had first-hand experience, having been a child whose own parents had 

their rights terminated, he had no formal education regarding social work, 

child development, or the like. His degree was in funeral directing. Id. at 

190. Moreover, Mr. Nichols did not know who actually cared for Child, nor did 

he observe an interaction between the Child and the foster parent. Indeed, 

neither visitation coach could give an opinion about their bond. 

Meanwhile, the DHS caseworkers gave a largely contradictory account.

Caseworker Nakeya Plunkett, who had the case first, testified that Mother was 

offered approximately one hundred total visits during the pendency of the 

case. Of those, it appears Mother attended fewer than half.4 

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4 To this Court’s frustration, neither the witnesses nor the orphans’ court could 

state precisely how many visits Mother was offered, nor how many she 

attended. Nevertheless, we can glean from the record the following 

arithmetic:

Caseworker Plunkett testified that Mother was offered approximately 100 

visits during the entire pendency of the case. The supervised visits were 

weekly and were scheduled for two hours. Caseworker Plunkett testified that 

Mother attended about 12-15 visits during her time on the case, which was 

from September 2016 until October or November 2017. See N.T. at 34; 14. 

Caseworker Kenisha White took over immediately after Caseworker Plunkett 

left. Caseworker White did not give an actual figure, but she did testify that 

she attended three visits and that there was a four month gap between visits 

from March 2018 to July 2018. See id. at 130. 
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When Mother did come to a visit, Caseworker Plunkett testified that 

Mother often came late and left early. Id. at 36. Sometimes Mother confirmed

her attendance, only to not show up at all. Id. at 37-38. Caseworker Plunkett 

testified that Mother played with Child for a while, but then became more 

interested in her phone. Id. at 36. Caseworker Plunkett testified that when 

Child became fussy, Mother did not know how to calm her down or engage 

her in play. Id. Caseworker Kenisha White, who took over for Caseworker 

Plunkett, testified that she only observed Mother attend three visits. Because 

Mother arrived late and left early, Caseworker White testified that she 

probably saw only about 25 minutes of interaction between Mother and Child. 

See id. at 146.

Notwithstanding the competing accounts, the court was within its 

discretion when it ruled that DHS met the heightened burden when

demonstrating that termination was in Child’s best interests. We observe that 

the orphans’ court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted).

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Visitation Coach Collins worked on Mother’s case from April 2017 to April 2018. 

He surmised that Mother attended “30%” of her visits. Id., at 179. Visitation 

Coach Nichols testified that he was assigned to Mother’s case in April 2018, 

and that Mother attended 14 visits between July 2018 and the termination in 

September 2018. Id. at 187.
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For one, the visitation coaches’ assumptions about the parent-child bond 

were entirely superficial, and the court acted within its discretion to discount 

them. The coaches witnessed a happy toddler eat snacks and play with toys 

with an attentive adult. Mr. Collins testified that when Mother disappeared 

and reappeared, the Child resumed interacting with her like no time had been 

lost.

Significantly, the question is not whether Child and Mother have a bond, 

but whether that bond is worth preserving. While a parent's emotional bond 

with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

trial court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re 

A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing In re K.K.R.–S., 958 A.2d 

529, 535–536 (Pa.Super.2008). The mere existence of an emotional bond 

does not preclude the termination of parental rights. Id., 93 A.3d at 897-898; 

see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 2008) (trial court's decision to 

terminate parents' parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents' inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the 

trial court must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its 

termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 

Id. at 898 (citation omitted). 

Child resided with the same foster parent, the only caregiver she ever 

knew. Caseworker White testified that Child is “well-bonded” to the foster 

parent, that it is evident that they care for each other, that it is the foster 
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parent who attends to her daily needs. Id. at 121-122. For instance, Mother 

had attended only one of Child’s medical appointments. Id. at 123. 

Since being removed from Mother’s care in 2015, Child has not lived 

with Mother, because Mother’s drug addiction necessarily rendered any 

potential care to be unsafe. Mother’s inability to achieve sobriety prevented

her from affording Child necessary security and stability, which in turn 

prevented the creation of a worthwhile parental bond. And while Mother 

appeared to have been attentive during the final visits, there is no question 

that only the foster parent provided Child those intangibles essential for her 

proper development. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

by ruling that DHS met its burden under the second prong of the termination 

analysis. Mother’s final issue is without merit.

Finally, we observe that Maternal Grandmother, D.P., evidently joined 

this appeal and submitted a brief. DHS filed with this Court an application to 

strike Maternal Grandmother from the matter.

Maternal Grandmother’s brief does not include a question involved, but 

we gather from her argument that she believes she was entitled to a custody 

hearing under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3)(iii)(B) (“Standing for any form of 

physical custody or legal custody”), because she was a grandparent of a 

dependent child who was substantially at risk due to parental neglect. 

Although such a question causes some pause, we must nevertheless grant the 

application to strike and dismiss Maternal Grandmother’s appeal.
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Although Child was born in 2015, Maternal Grandmother did not petition 

the family court to intervene in the dependency matter until 2018. Maternal 

Grandmother’s petition was denied in March 2018, as was her petition for 

reconsideration in June 2018. On August 16, 2018, the court granted Maternal 

Grandmother leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. That appeal was docketed at 

2724 EDA 2018. In November 2018, the Superior Court issued a per curium 

order dismissing Maternal Grandmother’s appeal for failure to comply with the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

While it does not appear to be the case, we cannot resolve whether 

Maternal Grandmother satisfied § 5324(3)(i) of the Custody Act to warrant a 

hearing on standing.

5

 Having been the subject of her previously dismissed 

appeal, the issue is now settled. Maternal Grandmother cannot simply revive 

the matter by joining the instant appeal.

Decree affirmed. Application to strike granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/4/19

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5 Section 5324(3)(i) provides that a grandparent may file a custody action if, 

inter alia, the grandparent-child relationship began either with the consent 

of a parent or under a court order. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3)(i).