J-S32035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDWARD REYNOLDS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 408 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0000444-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 3, 2024

Appellant Edward Reynolds appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction for possession of a firearm prohibited.

1

 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts in this matter as follows:

Officer Farida Kingsboro testified that she was working on July 30,

2020, when she came into contact with Appellant. She was 

patrolling her jurisdiction when she observed a male that 

appeared to be possibly unconscious on the stoop of a building 

located on the 100[] block of South 17th Street, at around 2:00 

a.m. Officer Kingsboro waited for backup and when the second 

officer[, Officer Garrett Miller,] arrived, the two approached the 

individual. The individual awoke, and Officer Kinsgboro asked for 

his identification. As the individual, identified as Appellant, 

searched for his identification in a plastic bag, Officer Kingsboro 

saw what appeared to be the butt of a pistol in the bag. Officer 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
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Kingsboro shined her light on the bag and when she confirmed it

was a gun, she quickly grabbed it as it was within close proximity 

to Appellant. 

Trial Ct. Op., 4/27/23, at 2 (unpaginated) (citations to the record omitted). 

Officer Kingsboro took Appellant’s identification card to her patrol car, and she 

began “running [Appellant’s] information to see if he had a conceal permit.” 

N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 23. The trial court continued:

[Officer] Miller testified that he has been a police officer with 

Harrisburg City for 22 years. On July 30, 2020, he was Officer 

Kingsboro’s backup, and he responded when she called out a 

subject stop. Officer Miller arrived at the scene in a marked police 

car and was in full uniform. The red and blue lights on Officer

Miller’s vehicle were activated when he arrived; however, he did 

not have his gun drawn. Officer Miller made conversation with 

Appellant while Officer Kingsboro returned to her police vehicle 

with Appellant’s identification. Officer Miller testified that he 

asked where Appellant lived. At some point, Appellant “[w]as just

rambling on about, you know, he found [the gun] and hope[d]

there was no bodies on it and said maybe there was [sic] some 

cowboys on it[,] it was so old.” [N.T., Suppression Hearing, 

9/19/22, at 33.] Officer Miller did ask [Appellant] if the gun was 

a .22 [caliber] but did not ask any other questions about the gun. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (unnumbered)(formatting altered and some citations 

omitted). 

After running Appellant’s information, Officer Kingsboro learned that 

Appellant did not have a permit to carry a concealed firearm. See N.T., 

Suppression Hearing, 9/19/22, at 23-25, 28-29. Officer Kingsboro then 

walked back over to Appellant and Officer Miller, she asked Appellant what he 

was doing on the sidewalk and if he had ever been arrested, Appellant 

responded that he had been arrested before, and Officer Kingsboro read 
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Appellant his Miranda2 warnings and placed him under arrest. Trial Ct. Op., 

4/27/23, at 3-4 (unnumbered); see also N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 

23-25, 28-29.

Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress “any and all statements”

3

he made because Appellant was questioned during a custodial detention and 

the officers did not provide Miranda warnings. See Mot. to Suppress, 

9/16/22, at 2-3. Immediately prior to trial, the trial court conducted a 

suppression hearing and denied Appellant’s motion. See N.T. Suppression 

Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 45. Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of possession 

of a firearm prohibited. See N.T. Trial, 9/19/22, at 160-61. The trial court 

subsequently sentenced Appellant to a term of seven and one-half to fifteen 

years of incarceration. Sentencing Order, 12/1/22.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court 

denied. Appellant did not file a direct appeal, and on February 24, 2023, 

Appellant filed a timely petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act4

(PCRA) requesting the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The trial court 

granted Appellant’s PCRA petition and reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal 

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2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3 Appellant filed a motion to suppress only the statements he made to police, 

and he did not challenge the seizure of the firearm. See Mot. to Suppress, 

9/16/22, at 2-3.

4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a timely appeal, and both the trial court 

and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

Whether the trial court erred in holding that [Appellant] was only 

detained pursuant to an investigative detention, depriving him of 

the protection of Miranda, when [Appellant] was not free to

leave, and officers had seized a handgun prior to questioning him?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed Appellant’s 

statements to the police officers. Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant 

contends that “[o]nce Officer Kingsboro seized [Appellant’s] identification, as 

well as the firearm involved in this case, he was subject to custodial 

interrogation.” Id. at 11. Appellant asserts that during this custodial 

interrogation, the police failed to provide Miranda warnings or inform 

Appellant of his constitutional rights, and he argues that he was “allowed to 

ramble by police and asked questions specifically about the firearm.” Id. at 

16-18. Appellant also contends that the order denying the motion to suppress 

was not harmless error. Id. at 19-21.

The Commonwealth responds that the police officers were not obligated 

to provide Miranda warnings until Officer Kingsboro placed Appellant under 

arrest because, until that point, Appellant was not subjected to a custodial 

detention. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Specifically, the Commonwealth 

asserts that under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s initial 

detention was not so coercive that it became the functional equivalent of an 
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arrest. Id. at 10-11. The Commonwealth notes that the police officers 

engaged Appellant in a mere encounter when they approached and asked for 

identification, Officer Kingsboro then saw the firearm in plain view while 

Appellant looked in his bag for identification, and Officer Kingsboro secured 

the weapon because of its proximity to Appellant. Id. It was not until Officer 

Kingsboro learned that Appellant did not possess a concealed-carry permit for 

the firearm that she placed him under arrest. See id. at 10. Moreover, the 

Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s spontaneous statements regarding 

the firearm were not made in response to police questioning. See id. Finally, 

the Commonwealth contends that any hypothetical error was harmless

because the Commonwealth established Appellant’s possession of the firearm 

beyond a reasonable doubt even without Appellant’s statement. See id. at 

11. The Commonwealth notes that Officer Kingsboro found the firearm in the 

bag where Appellant carried his identification, and therefore, the 

Commonwealth proved at least constructive possession of the gun. See id.

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a 

suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 

649, 654 (Pa. 2010). Our scope of review “is limited to the evidentiary record 

that was created at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 

296 A.3d 52, 55 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 

2013)).
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Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only 

if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression 

court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, 

whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the 

courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). 

Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution both protect the 

people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence 

arising under both charters has led to the development of three 

categories of interactions between citizens and police. The first, 

a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or 

carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an 

“investigative detention,” permits the temporary detention of an

individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. The third is an 

arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by 

probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal 

activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion 

existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be 

answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual 

stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court 

must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to 

the officer at the moment of the [stop] warrant a [person] of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate.
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Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). To conclude that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion, the 

officer “must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 

765, 768-69 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Further, a mere encounter escalates into an investigative detention 

where there is an investigation that causes the subject to believe that he is 

not free to leave. See Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1005 (Pa. 

2012). 

To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has 

been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an 

objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all 

surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have 

believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the 

circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means of 

physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s 

movement in some way has been restrained. In making this 

determination, courts must apply the totality-of-the 

circumstances approach, with no single factor dictating the 

ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, “[a]n investigative detention may develop into a 

custodial detention.” Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59. “The key difference between 

an investigative and a custodial detention is that the latter involves such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. This 

Court considers the totality of circumstances to determine if an encounter is 

investigatory or custodial.” Id. (citations omitted).
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The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the 

circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis for 

the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was 

transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether 

restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer 

showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative methods 

employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Id. (citations omitted).

Statements made during custodial interrogation are 

presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of 

Miranda rights. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated 

by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way. The Miranda safeguards come into play 

whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express 

questioning or its functional equivalent. Thus, interrogation 

occurs where the police should know that their words or actions 

are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 

suspect. In evaluating whether Miranda warnings were 

necessary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.

Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on 

whether the person is physically denied of his freedom of action 

in any significant way[,] or is placed in a situation in which he 

reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is 

restricted by the interrogation. Moreover, the test for custodial 

interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent of the 

law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on 

whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his 

freedom of action is being restricted.

Said another way, police detentions become custodial when, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or 

duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the 

functional equivalent of arrest. Thus, the ultimate inquiry for 

determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda 

purposes is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on 

freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 

arrest.
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Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 167 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887-88 (Pa. Super. 2009))

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

Here, at the close of the testimony, the [trial] court found that on 

the date in question, Officer Kingsboro stopped to check on an 

individual she observed sleeping on the stoop at 2 a.m. When 

backup arrived, the officers approached the individual (who was 

ultimately identified as Appellant). While initially sluggish and 

confused, Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated to any point

where he did not understand what was going on. Appellant 

interacted with Officers Kingsboro and Miller and was compliant 

and cooperative during the brief encounter. Appellant provided 

his identification to Officer Kingsboro, and she then observed a 

gun and took it into custody.

During this time, Appellant and Officer Miller had a casual 

conversation about where Appellant lives. Appellant then segued 

into a conversation about the gun and the only question asked by 

Officer Miller was what caliber the gun was. When Officer

Kingsboro returns, she asked Appellant whether he has ever been 

arrested. The court found at this point Appellant was being 

detained, was not free to leave, and no reasonable person under

the circumstances would believe they were free to leave, nor did 

Appellant attempt to leave. However, the court further found that

a custodial interrogation did not take place. The conversation that 

took place between the officers and Appellant was routine in 

nature, asking him where he lived, whether he had been arrested, 

and what caliber the gun was. The court opined that this line of

questioning did not rise to any level of custodial interrogation and 

denied the motion to suppress. 

* * *

In the instant matter, the contact between the officers and 

Appellant was initiated by Officer Kingsboro’s observation of an 

individual, who she believed might be unconscious, on the stoop 

of a building at 2:00 a.m. Officer Kingsboro did not activate her 

police lights or siren, nor did she or Officer Miller draw their 

weapons. As she and Officer Miller approached the individual, he 
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awoke, and Officer Kingsboro asked to see identification. None of 

the evidence presented indicated that the officers were acting in

an aggressive or intimidating manner. There was nothing to 

suggest that failure to produce the identification would result in a 

consequence to Appellant. Neither officer told Appellant that he 

was not free to leave, and he was not physically restrained, 

preventing him from leaving. To the contrary, the encounter was 

described as relaxed and casual.

* * *

While Officer Miller acknowledged that he asked Appellant where 

he lived, this inquiry does not rise to the level of a custodial 

interrogation. Further, Appellant, of his own volition, brought up 

the gun and that he had found it. In effect, he volunteered that

statement. As such, Miranda was not required. Given the time 

of night and the fact that Appellant was possibly unconscious on 

the stoop of a building in a high crime area, it was not 

unreasonable for the officers to approach Appellant and ask for 

identification. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5; 6-7 (unnumbered)(formatting altered and citations 

omitted). 

After review, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances,

the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and without legal error,

therefore the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.

See Jones, 988 A.2d at 654; see also Green, 168 A.3d at 184. 

As stated, Officer Kingsboro testified that it was 2:00 a.m. in a high 

crime area when police saw Appellant, who appeared to be unconscious on a 

building stoop. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 17. When Officer 

Kingsboro initially approached Appellant and asked for identification, the 

interaction was a mere encounter, which required no level of suspicion and 
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carried no official compulsion to stop or respond. See McAdoo, 46 A.3d at 

784. 

During the initial mere encounter and request for identification, Officer 

Kingsboro saw that Appellant had a firearm in his bag. See N.T., Suppression 

Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 19-23. After Officer Kingsboro secured the firearm and 

obtained Appellant’s identification, she walked back to her car to determine if 

Appellant had a permit to carry the firearm. Id. at 20, 23, 28. At that point, 

we agree with the trial court that the mere encounter escalated into an 

investigative detention because, under these facts, a reasonable person would 

not have felt free to leave. See McAdoo, 46 A.3d at 784; see also 

Commonwealth v. Cost, 224 A.3d 641, 651 (Pa. 2020) (stating that in 

determining whether there was an investigative detention, “retention by police 

of an identification card to conduct a warrant check will generally be a material 

and substantial escalating factor within the totality assessment”).

Further, on this record, we agree with the trial court that there was 

reasonable suspicion to support the investigative detention. See McAdoo, 46 

A.3d at 784. Officer Kingsboro testified that she encountered Appellant in a 

high crime area at 2:00 a.m., at which time she observed a concealed firearm 

in Appellant’s open bag. Accordingly, based on the totality of these 

circumstances,5 we conclude that Officer Kingsboro, articulated specific 

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5 We are cognizant that possession of a firearm alone is not sufficient to create 

reasonable suspicion; however, it is a factor to be considered when 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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observations from which she drew reasonable inferences based on her law 

enforcement training and experience, that criminal activity was afoot. See 

Green, 168 A.3d at 184. 

Finally, we agree with the trial court that Appellant was not subject to a 

custodial interrogation. As noted previously, Officer Kingsboro checked on 

Appellant’s welfare because he appeared to be unconscious on a city street at 

2:00 A.M. and ultimately discovered that Appellant had a gun. See N.T., 

Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 19-20. Additionally, the conversation that took 

place between the officers and Appellant was routine and included questions 

concerning where Appellant lived, whether he had been arrested, and what 

caliber the gun was. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Further, the detention was for 

investigative purposes, was not coercive or lengthy, did not involve any 

physical restraint or use of force, and did not involve transporting Appellant 

to a separate location for questioning. See Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59. Based 

on the totality of these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that 

because Appellant made statements to police during an investigative 

detention, no Miranda warnings were required. See Sloan, 303 A.3d at 167. 

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determining whether there is reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the 

circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 331 n.4 (Pa. 

Super. 2022); see also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 938-39 

(Pa. 2019) (providing that law enforcement officers may consider contextual 

factors, such as one’s presence in a high crime area, to reasonably suspect 

that a person’s possession of a firearm is unlawful).
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On this record, we discern no error by the trial court in denying 

Appellant’s suppression motion.6 For these reasons, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/03/2024

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6

In light of our conclusion, we need not address Appellant’s claim that the 

trial court’s error was not harmless error.