United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JAY ANTHONY DOBYNS,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-5020, 2015-5021, 2017-1214

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:08-cv-00700-FMA, Senior Judge Francis 

M. Allegra, Judge Patricia E. Campbell-Smith.

______________________ 

Decided: February 6, 2019

______________________ 

JAMES BERNARD REED, Baird Williams & Greer LLP, 

Phoenix, AZ, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented by ANNELISE MARI DOMINGUEZ. 

 MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., JOSEPH H.

HUNT. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
2 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

This is an action for breach of a 2007 settlement agreement (“2007 agreement”) between the government and Jay 

Anthony Dobyns. The Court of Federal Claims (“Claims 

Court”) held that (1) the government breached the implied 

duty of good faith and fair dealing in the 2007 agreement, 

(2) Dobyns was entitled to emotional distress damages 

from the breach, and (3) Dobyns was not entitled to relief 

under Rule 60 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims 

for alleged government misconduct. We reverse the Claims 

Court’s judgment as to the breach of the implied duty and 

affirm its Rule 60 decision.

BACKGROUND

The events leading up to the 2007 agreement began in 

2003, when Dobyns, then an agent at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), was engaged in undercover work for the investigation known as 

Operation Black Biscuit. During this investigation, Dobyns 

successfully infiltrated the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club 

and assisted in the indictment of 36 people for racketeering 

and murder charges. This led to numerous accolades for 

Dobyns’ work, but the disclosure of his identity during the 

criminal prosecutions also led to threats of death and violence against Dobyns and his family. 

ATF’s alleged failure to appropriately respond to these 

security threats from 2004 to 2007, and to provide adequate support for concealing Dobyns’ and his family’s identity during an emergency relocation, led Dobyns to seek 

compensation from the government. In 2007, Dobyns and 

ATF settled their dispute. ATF agreed to pay Dobyns a 

lump-sum and to “comply with all laws regarding or otherwise affecting the Employee’s employment by the Agency.” 

J.A. 332–33. The parties also agreed that the 2007 agreement was integrated, “constitut[ing] the entire agreement 

by and between the parties.” J.A. 333. 
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 3

Neither the Claims Court nor Dobyns identifies any explicit threats that were made after the 2007 agreement. 

However, ATF, allegedly in violation of the agreement, 

withdrew Dobyns’ and his family’s fictitious identities, 

completing that process in May 2008. ATF determined that 

these fictitious identities were not required despite a 2007 

threat assessment indicating that there were still concerns 

about threats against Dobyns and his family. In 2013,

ATF’s Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) released a report 

concluding that there had been no valid reason for the 

withdrawal of these fictitious identifies and that the safety 

risks to Dobyns and his family had been ignored. 

Subsequently, in August 2008, an act of arson substantially damaged Dobyns’ home, but his family was able to 

escape without injury. Following the arson, ATF, allegedly

in violation of the agreement, delayed its initial response, 

persisted in pursuing Dobyns as a primary suspect, even 

after evidence established his innocence, and mishandled 

the manner in which information was disseminated to ATF 

supervisors. In 2012 IAD released a report concluding that 

the response to the arson at Dobyns’ residence had been 

mismanaged, and ATF’s Professional Review Board proposed that two of the employees responsible be removed 

from federal service. 

The agency actions concerning the withdrawal of the 

identifications and the arson investigation were alleged to 

breach the 2007 agreement because they were in violation 

of internal agency “orders” and contrary to the 2007 agreement’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Dobyns filed a complaint in the Claims Court on October 2008, alleging breach of the 2007 agreement. While the 

suit was pending in 2009 Dobyns’ book, No Angel: My Harrowing Undercover Journey to the Inner Circle of the Hells 

Angels, was released to the public, and Dobyns thereafter 

made frequent media appearances to promote the book. 
4 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

After a two week trial in 2013, the Claims Court held 

that there was no breach of any express provision of the 

2007 agreement, but that there was a breach of the implied 

duty of good faith and fair dealing. This was based on the 

government’s conduct discussed above, which the Claims 

Court determined violated an implied duty in the 2007 

agreement to “ensure the safety of Agent Dobyns and his 

family” and, “secondarily, that ATF employees would not 

discriminate against Agent Dobyns.” Dobyns v. United 

States, 118 Fed. Cl. 289, 319 (2014). The Claims Court went 

on to hold that, although Dobyns did not show economic 

damages arising from this breach, Dobyns was entitled to 

emotional distress damages. The Claims Court awarded 

damages in the amount of $173,000. 

After the Claims Court had entered final judgment, 

and the government had filed its notice of appeal, the 

Claims Court sua sponte issued an order voiding its judgment based on concerns of potential government misconduct. The government moved to vacate the order because 

jurisdiction had already transferred to this court. The 

Claims Court vacated its order. Dobyns then “request[ed] 

that the [Claims] Court make an ‘indicative ruling’ pursuant to Rule 62.1 of its intention to alter, amend or void the 

judgment if vested with jurisdiction.” J.A. 754. In his motion, Dobyns sought to “set aside the judgment entered August 28, 2014, based on [his] ability to prove that 

Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys engaged in unethical conduct intended to prejudice plaintiff’s rights.” J.A. 

754. Dobyns contended that “further trial court proceedings c[ould] determine if DOJ attorney misconduct prejudiced the [Claims] Court’s factual findings or award, at 

which plaintiff can produce evidence of DOJ’s misconduct.” 

J.A. 758. Dobyns alleged incidents of misconduct known before judgment, including counsel’s alleged attempts to improperly influence the agency’s actions and witness 

testimony, and incidents that became known after judgment, involving alleged threats made against one of the 
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 5

witnesses by another witness and defense counsel. The 

Claims Court issued an indicative ruling noting that it 

would investigate whether relief under Rule 60 would be 

appropriate based on the alleged misconduct. Pursuant to 

Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, we 

remanded the case to the Claims Court to determine 

whether such relief was warranted but otherwise retained 

jurisdiction. 

The Claims Court appointed a special master to “make 

findings assisting the assigned judge in determining 

whether” Rule 60 relief was appropriate. J.A. 261. After 

discovery and briefing, but without depositions, the special 

master determined that none of the alleged acts of misconduct warranted relief under Rule 60 because, even if they 

occurred, there was no showing that these acts could have 

affected Dobyns’ case. The Claims Court adopted the special master’s report and recommendation, going through 

each incident of alleged misconduct and finding that there 

was no showing that they affected Dobyns’ ability to pursue 

his case and no showing that they affected the Claims 

Courts’ judgment.

The government appealed the Claims Court’s judgment 

as to the breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair 

dealing, and Dobyns cross-appealed the denial of Rule 60 

relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 60 Proceedings1

 

1 The same standard that applies to Rule 60 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to Rule 60 of the 

Rules of the Court of Federal Claims. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 794–97 & n.3 

(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
6 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

In his appeal from the denial of Rule 60 relief, Dobyns 

alleges incidents of misconduct that were known to the 

court before judgment was entered, including defense counsel’s alleged attempted improper interference with agency 

actions and witness testimony, and also alleges incidents 

that came to light after judgement was entered, involving 

alleged witness intimidation by another witness and defense counsel. 

A Rule 60 movant must provide a sufficient “reason to 

believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty 

exercise or a futile gesture.” Murray v. District of Columbia, 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). The 

fundamental problem with Dobyns’ Rule 60 claim is that 

he does not actually seek to reopen the merits of the case 

via Rule 60 proceedings. Although Dobyns seems to have 

originally requested re-opening the merits in his motion for 

an indicative ruling to secure a larger damages award, his 

present position is that he does not want the judgment on 

the merits re-opened. “What we don’t want the court to do, 

and what we ask that the court not do, is open up the entire 

proceeding and send it back down to the trial court . . . .” 

Oral Arg. at 42:17–42:26; see Cross-Appeal Open. Br. 99 

(requesting remand for the Rule 60 proceedings “for the exclusive and limited purpose of allowing the completion of 

discovery, including depositions and an evidentiary hearing, regarding sanctions against the Justice Department”). 

Dobyns seeks to reopen the judgment only to seek sanctions and attorney’s fees. But Rule 60(b) cannot be used to 

seek sanctions. “Rule 60(b) is available only to set aside a 

prior order or judgment; a court may not use Rule 60 to 

grant affirmative relief in addition to the relief contained 

in the prior order or judgment.” James Wm. Moore, Moore’s 

Federal Practice—Civil § 60.25 (3d ed. 2017); see Delay v. 

Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2007); Adduono 

v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1987); 

United States v. $119,980, 680 F.2d 106, 107 (11th Cir. 

1982); Rule 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court 
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 7

may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding . . . .”). 

At oral argument, counsel for Dobyns also admitted 

“[t]here was no request for sanctions made.” Oral Arg. at 

30:00–30:03; see id. at 29:39–29:46 (“Q. Did you make a motion for sanctions in the . . . Court of Federal Claims? A. 

Your Honor, we had not yet . . . .”).2 Nor does Dobyns argue 

it was error not to award sanctions. To the extent that 

Dobyns argues Rule 60 was a necessary predicate to receiving sanctions, that argument is incorrect.

Courts typically retain jurisdiction to rule on collateral 

issues, such as sanctions or attorney’s fees, even after they 

lose jurisdiction over the merits decision. See Willy v. 

Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136–37 (1992); Cooter & Gell 

v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) 

(“[W]hether the attorney has abused the judicial process, 

and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate” is a collateral issue); In re Hewlett-Packard Co., 50 F.3d 20 (table), 

1995 WL 101334, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 1995) (unpublished). 

Dobyns offers no reason why granting his Rule 60 motion would not be an empty exercise, and thus relief is not 

warranted here. 

II. Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The Claims Court’s interpretation of a contract is a 

question of law reviewed de novo, and factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Scott Timber Co. v. 

United States, 692 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

Every contract, including one with the federal government, imposes upon each party an implied duty of good 

 

2 Instead, Dobyns’ sole theory with respect to sanctions was that they could not be imposed unless the judgment was first set aside under Rule 60. J.A. 289–91.
8 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement. 

Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 990 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981)) (“Metcalf”). A party breaches the contract when it fails to abide by this implied duty, which 

includes “the duty not to interfere with the other party’s 

performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable 

expectations of the other party regarding the fruits of the 

contract.” Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 

1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005). But “[t]he implied duty of good faith 

and fair dealing cannot expand a party’s contractual duties 

beyond those in the express contract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s provisions.” Precision Pine & 

Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 831 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (“Precision Pine”). Instead, “any breach of that duty 

has to be connected, though it is not limited, to the bargain 

struck in the contract.” Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 994; see id. at 

991 (“The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is limited by the original bargain; it prevents a party’s acts or 

omissions that, though not proscribed by the contract expressly, are inconsistent with the contract’s purpose and 

deprive the other party of the contemplated value.”).

To be sure, “a breach of the implied duty of good faith 

and fair dealing does not require a violation of an express

provision in the contract.” Id. (emphasis in original). But a 

specific promise must be undermined for the implied duty 

to be violated. For example, comment 1 to § 1-304 of the 

Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) notes that the “section 

[on good faith] means that a failure to perform or enforce, 

in good faith, a specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a breach.” U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (emphasis added). “[T]he UCC ‘provides useful guidance in 

applying general contract principles.’” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 

v. United States, 838 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Hughes Commc’ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 

271 F.3d 1060, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 9

We have thus recognized that the duty must be “keyed 

to the obligations and opportunities established in the contract,” so as to not fundamentally alter the parties’ intended allocation of burdens and benefits associated with 

the contract. Lakeshore Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. United States, 

748 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also 2 E. Allan 

Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.17 at 358 (3d ed. 

2004) (“[T]he duty of good faith must be connected to a duty 

clearly imposed by the contract itself.”); Bradley v. Chiron 

Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the 

“implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing are limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the 

contract and can not be extended to create obligations not 

contemplated in the contract.” (citing Racine & Laramie, 

Ltd. v. Cal. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 11 Cal. App. 4th 

1026 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992))).

For example, in Centex, we held that the later imposition of tax liability on payments the government made pursuant to an agreement “interfere[d] with the plaintiffs’ 

enjoyment of the benefits contemplated by the contract” 

(i.e., it undermined the reasonably anticipated value of the 

contracted-for government payments) and therefore constituted a breach of the implied duty. 395 F.3d at 1287–88, 

1306. On the other hand, in Precision Pine, we held that 

interference with the plaintiff’s ability to harvest timber 

did not breach the implied duty in part because the government “did not reappropriate any ‘benefit’ guaranteed by the 

contracts, since the contracts contained no guarantee” of 

uninterrupted performance. 596 F.3d at 828–29.

Here, the Claims Court concluded that “the essence of 

the Settlement Agreement was to ensure the safety of 

Agent Dobyns and his family—and, secondarily, that ATF 

employees would not discriminate against Agent Dobyns.” 

Dobyns, 118 Fed. Cl. at 319. This was apparently based on 

parol evidence: testimony by Ronald Carter and Dobyns, 

which indicated that the “protection of Agent Dobyns is included with the expectation of Paragraph 10 of the 
10 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

settlement agreement.” See, e.g., J.A. 10617. The Claims 

Court further concluded that these duties were violated by 

the government when it (1) “put[ ] Agent Dobyns at risk” 

by withdrawing his, and his family’s, fictitious identities, 

(2) failed to adequately and appropriately investigate the 

arson at Dobyns’ residence, and (3) failed to provide a systematic overhaul of ATF’s procedures and processes to 

avoid recurrence of the ATF’s pre-2007 security lapses relating to Dobyns. Dobyns, 118 Fed. Cl. at 319–21. 

The flaw with the Claims Court’s analysis is that the 

supposed duties (ensuring Dobyns’ security and not discriminating against him) are not duties imposed by the language in the contract. Parol evidence by Carter and Dobyns 

cannot add additional provisions to the contract, particularly in light of the integration clause. Parol evidence cannot be used to “add to or otherwise modify the terms of a 

written agreement in instances where the written agreement has been adopted by the parties as an expression of 

their final understanding.” TEG-Paradigm Envtl., Inc. v. 

United States, 465 F.3d 1329, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 

1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see Barron Bancshares, 366 

F.3d at 1375 (“The rule thus renders inadmissible evidence 

introduced to modify, supplement, or interpret the terms of 

an integrated agreement.”).3 Without grounding the supposed duties in the specific provisions of the contract, the 

Claims Court imposed a vague duty of “ensur[ing] the 

safety of Agent Dobyns and his family” on the government 

 

3 Although parol evidence may be useful to determine party expectations relating to particular contract provisions, it cannot be the source of an additional duty. See, 

e.g., Centex Corp., 395 F.3d at 1288 (looking to the government’s representations to understand plaintiff’s reasonable 

expectations relating to the anticipated benefit of contracted government payments).
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 11

as well as non-discrimination. Dobyns, 118 Fed. Cl. at 319. 

These obligations went well beyond those contemplated in 

the express contract and altered the contractual allocation 

of the burdens and benefits. See Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 

831. 

It is true that the alleged grievances that led to the 

2007 agreement were based on ATF’s security failures relating to Dobyns’ safety. But here, as we discuss below,

there were no future promises regarding how the government would ensure the safety of Dobyns and his family, except the government agreed that “[s]hould any threat 

assessment indicate that the threat to the Employee and 

his family has increased from the assessment completed in 

June 2007, the Agency agrees to fully review the findings 

with the Employee and get input from the Employee if 

transfer is necessitated.” J.A. 330. There is no claim here 

that this provision was undermined by the government’s 

actions. 

Inferring an implied duty based on the supposed purpose of the 2007 agreement, without a tether to the contract terms, would fundamentally alter the balance of risks 

and benefits associated with the 2007 agreement and cannot be the basis of a claim for breach of the implied duty of 

good faith and fair dealing. Because the Claims Court’s 

judgment was not based on the government undermining 

any specific promise of the 2007 agreement, we conclude

that the judgment for breach of the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing cannot be sustained. 

III. Breach of Express Contract Terms

Dobyns also relies on an alternative theory that the 

government actions also constituted breach of express contract terms that obligated the government to comply with 

agency “orders.” The agency orders at issue are not money 

mandating. Instead, the remedy for violations of these orders is generally limited to internal remedies (e.g., complaint to the Office of Inspector General). Dobyns claims he 
12 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

is uniquely able to pursue a monetary remedy for violations 

of these orders because of the 2007 agreement. But judgment cannot be sustained on the alternative ground that 

there was an express breach of paragraph 10 of the 2007 

agreement. 

Paragraph 10 states: 

10. This Agreement does not constitute an admission by the Agency or Employee of any violation of 

law, rule or regulation or any wrongful acts or 

omissions. The Agency agrees that it will comply 

with all laws regarding or otherwise affecting the 

Employee’s employment by the Agency.

J.A. 332–33 (emphasis added). Dobyns argues that the 

term “all laws” includes particular internal ATF orders, 

covering a variety of topics including procedures for operational security as well as investigative protocols. See 

Dobyns, 118 Fed. Cl. at 314–15 & n.41. He argues that the 

purpose of the 2007 agreement and the ATF orders were 

violated by the same government conduct that was the basis of the Claims Court’s holding as to the breach of the 

implied duty.

The Claims Court concluded that there was no breach 

of paragraph 10. It found that the earlier sentence in paragraph 10 demonstrates that “all laws” do not include the 

agency’s rules, regulations, and orders. In paragraph 10, 

the 2007 agreement distinguishes between a “law, rule or 

regulation.” Additionally, in paragraph 6, the 2007 agreement refers to “Agency practice and procedure.” These distinct uses of the terms law, rule, regulation, agency 

practice and procedure in the 2007 agreement indicate that 

the parties assigned different meanings to these terms.

The Claims Court also determined that Dobyns’ claim that 

paragraph 10 included more than a dozen ATF orders was 

belied by the requirement that “language used in a contract 

to incorporate extrinsic material by reference must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the written material 
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 13

being incorporated and must clearly communicate that the 

purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced 

material into the contract.” Northrop Grumman Info. 

Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). We agree with the Claims Court’s conclusion that 

the express language of the 2007 agreement does not admit 

of Dobyns’ construction of “all laws.” Although it is possible 

that in certain circumstances “all laws” could include 

agency regulations and guidelines, here the contract is 

clear on its face that it does not include ATF regulations 

and orders.

Dobyns’ response is twofold. First, he relies on witness 

testimony that allegedly equated ATF orders with “all 

laws.” One of the ATF negotiators of the 2007 agreement 

(Carter) gave contradictory testimony in this respect. For 

example, Carter responded to the question “if there was an 

ATF order that governed how ATF investigated threats 

against its employees, would that be included within the 

Agreement,” with “Yeah, I would say so.” J.A. 10486. But 

Carter also testified that he did not “see laws and ATF orders being the same thing. . . . ATF orders aren’t laws.” J.A. 

10468. 

Dobyns also relies on the understanding of other 

agency employees who equated ATF orders with laws. See, 

e.g., J.A. 15083 (“Q. Okay. But are ATF orders essentially 

for operating purposes of ATF the laws of the Agency? A. 

Yes.”); J.A. 11362 (“Q. And in your experience at ATF, are 

ATF orders the laws of the agency? A. Yes, sir.”); J.A. 

12732–73 (“Q. What do ATF orders mean to you as you understand them in the carrying out of your daily duties? 

A. . . . [T]hey are the law of the land at ATF.”). 

In light of the contract’s language, and in light of the 

authority discussed above, Dobyns cannot rely on parol evidence to vary the terms of the agreement.

Second, Dobyns relies on the government’s response to 

Requests for Admission as admitting that the contract 
14 DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES

incorporated additional regulations. For example, Request 

for Admission No. 12 and the government’s response 

stated:

Request No. 12. Admit that, with respect to Paragraph Ten of the [2007] Settlement Agreement, 

ATF had an obligation to protect the physical 

safety of Plaintiff during his period of his employment with ATF.

Response. Admits to the extent that the obligation 

identified in the request, pursuant to the language 

of paragraph 10, is established by statute, regulation, or ATF Order. Paragraph 10 of the Settlement 

Agreement provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he 

Agency agrees that it will comply with all laws regarding or otherwise affecting the Employee’s employment with the Agency.” ATF Order 3040.1A 

and ATF Order 3040.2A, in turn, provide the 

agency’s guidelines and procedures for the reporting, investigating, evaluating, and handling of 

threats that could potentially impact the physical 

safety of Mr. Dobyns during his employment with 

ATF. Except as expressly admitted, the request is 

denied. 

J.A. 1992–93.4

 

4 Dobyns also relies on the government’s response to 

Request No. 5:

Request No. 5. Admit that ATF has an obligation 

to protect the physical safety of ATF agents during 

their period of employment with ATF from external 

threats of violence and intimidation.

Response. Admits to the extent that the obligation 

referred to in the request arises from statute, 
DOBYNS v. UNITED STATES 15

Although the government’s responses are badly 

drafted, at the end of the day they do not support Dobyns’ 

argument. The admissions do not say that the government 

agreed ATF orders were to be included under the “all laws” 

language. Instead, they merely note that “to the extent” 

paragraph 10 were interpreted to cover more than statutory laws, the specific orders cited in the response provided 

the “agency’s guidelines and procedures for reporting, investigating, evaluating, and handling of threats that could 

potentially impact the physical safety of Mr. Dobyns during 

his employment with ATF.” 

CONCLUSION

We reverse the Claims Court’s judgment on liability 

and affirm the Claims Court’s rejection of Dobyns’ motion 

for relief under Rule 60.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND REVERSED-IN-PART

COSTS

No costs.

 

regulation, or ATF Order. ATF Order 3040.1A and 

ATF Order 3040.2A provide the agency’s guidelines 

and procedures for reporting, investigating, evaluating, and handling external threats of violence 

and intimidation made against agents or the family 

members of agents. Except as expressly admitted, 

the request is denied. 

J.A. 1989–90. Although the government admitted the obligation to comply with ATF orders, this response does not 

refer to obligations arising from the 2007 agreement.