NUREG/CR-4829

UCID-20733

Vol. 2

Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway

Accident Conditions

Appendices

Prepared by L. E. Fischer, C. K. Chou, M. A. Gerhard, C. Y. Kimura,

R. W. Martin, R. W. Mensing, M. E. Mount, M. C. Witte

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Prepared for

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Rnneint.,d flrtnhar 11RR
NOTICE

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States

Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their

.mnrtlnu.ec makLt arni warranty svnrRwmt nr irnnlipj' nr ,ee,m. • lany In| i~hilitu uf is.

sponsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus,

product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would

not infringe privately owned rights.

NOTICE

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Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications.

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NUREG/CRA4829

UCID-20733

Vol. 2

RT

Shipping Container Response to

Severe Highway and Railway

Accident Conditions

Appendices

Manuscript Completed: April 1986

Date Published: February 1987

Prepared by

L. E. Fischer, C. K. Chou, M. A. Gerhard, C. Y. Kimura,

R. W. Martin, R. W. Mensing, M. E. Mount, M. C. Witte

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

7000 East Avenue

Livermore, CA 94550

Prepared for

Division of Reactor System Safety

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

NRC FIN A0397
0

1

v
ABSTRACT

This report describes a study performed by the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory to evaluate the level of safety provided under severe

accident conditions during the shipment of spent fuel from nuclear power

reactors. The evaluation is performed using data from real accident histories

and using representative truck and rail cask models that likely meet 10 CFR 71

regulations. The responses of the representative casks are calculated for

structural and thermal loads generated by severe highway and railway accident

conditions. The cask responses are compared with those responses calculated

for the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. By comparing the

responses it is determined that most highway and railway accident conditions

fall within the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. For those

accidents that have higher responses, the probabilities and potential

radiation exposures of the accidents are compared with those identified by the

assessments made in the "Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation

of Radioactive Material by Air and other Modes," NUREG-0170. Based on this

comparison, it is concluded that the radiological risks from spent fuel under

severe highway and railway accident conditions as derived in this study are

less than risks previously estimated in the NUREG-0170 document.

iii
S
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1. INTRODUCTION .. . . . . . . . .. ... .. . . .. . . . . . ... ... -1

1.1 Background .......................................................... 1-1

1.2 Regulations and Past Assessments .................................... 1-4

1.2.1 Title 10, Code of Federil Regulations, Part 71 ................ 1-4

1.2.2 Transportation of Radioactive Material -

Environmental Statement (NUREG-O170) ... ................... 1-7

1.3 Objective and Approach ...... o........ ...... .......... 1-9

2. ACCIDENT RATES, ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, AND LOADING PARAMETER

DISTRIBUTIONS ........... ....... *.. .. *~**. . ..... 2-1

2.1 Introduction ...... ... ***** ..................................... 2-1

2.2 Highway Accident Rates . ........................ o ....... o ..... .... 2-3

2.3 Railway Accident Rates ............. o..................o............ 2-3

2.4 Accident Loading Data Requirements .................................. 2-4

2.5 Highway Accident Loading Parameters ................................ 2-10

2'5.1 Mechanical Loading Parameters .. ................ ............. 2-10

2.5.1.1 Accident Scenarios and Object Hardness .............. 2-10

2.5.1.1.1 Collision Accident Hardness Data ......... 2-11

2.5.1.1.2 Non-Collision Accident Hardness Data ..... 2-14

2o5.1.2 Impact Velocity ................. o........ 2-17

2.5.1.2.1 Cask Velocity ... ............ ......... 2-17

2.5.1.2.2 Impact Angle .................... ..... 2-21

2.5.1.3 Cask Orientation ........ . ................ 0.. 2-23

2.5.2 Thermal Loading Parameters ................... o............... 2-24

2.5.2.1 Accident Scenarios and Fire Frequency .............. 2-24

2.5.2.2 Fire Duration ....... . ...... o ........... ........ 2-26

2.5.2.3 Flame Temperature ......... . ............ . .... ........ 2-26

2.5.2.4 Fire Location ....................................... 2-27

2.6 Railway Accident Loading Parameters ................................. 2-27

2.6.1 Mechanical Loading Parameters ................................ 2-27

Y
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

2.6.1.1

2.6.1.2

2.6.1.3

2.6.2 Thermal

2.6.2.1

2.6.2.2

2.6.2.3

2.6.2.4

Accident Scenarios and Object Hardness .......

Impact Velocity............ .......

2.6.1.2.1 Cask Velocity .. . ... . .. .... .... .. .. .. ...

2.6.1.2.2 Impact Angle..... ..........

Cask Orientation ....... ... . ... ... ... .. . .... .. .. ..

Loading Parameters ......... ............

Accident Scenarios and Fire Frequency ..............

Fire Duration ..........

Flame Temperature .. .. ..... . . ... . ... . ... .. .......

Fire Location .................................

3. SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE SPENT FUEL CASKS FOR EVALUATION .......

3.1 Introduction .....................................................

3.2 Cask Functions and Design Features .................

3.3 Cask Design Features Important to Safety . .. . .. .. ... ... .... ......

3.3.2 Radiation Shielding ... ........ ...................

3.3.3 Subcrlticality Assurance . ... .... ... .. . ... ... ... . ... ... ......

3.4 Selection of Cask Shielding Material ................

3.5 Definition of Representative Cask Designs . ............................

3.5.1 Shielding Features .............. ...............

3.5.2 Containment Features ................. ............

3.5.3 Subcriticallty Assurance Features ............ ..........

3.5.4 Damage-Mitigating Features .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

3.5.5 Representative Cask Design Description ...................

4. REPRESENTATIVE CASK RESPONSE STATES, LEVELS, AND REGIONS.........

4.2 Response States and Levels for Mechanical Loads...oo...

Page

2-28

2-30

2-31

2-34

2-34

2-34

2-35

2-35

2-35

2-37

3-1

3-1

3-2

3-5

3-5

3-8

3-8

3-11

3-14

3-14

3-15

3-17

3-17

3-18

3-19

4-i

4-1

4-2

Oi

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

4.2.1 Structural Response Level, SI ................................ 4-4

- 4.2.2 Structural Response Level, S2 ................................ 4-4

4.2.3 Structural Response Level, S3 ................................ 4-6

4.2.4 Application of Response States and Levels .................... 4-6

4.3 Response States and Levels for Thermal Loads ........................ 4-7

4.3.1 Thermal Response Level, T1 ................................... 4-9

4.3.2 Thermal Response Level, T2 ...................... ............ 4-11

4.3.3 Thermal Response Level, T3 ................................... 4-11

4.3.4 Thermal Response Level, T4 ................................... 4-12

4.3.5 Application of Response States and Levels .................... 4-12

4.4 Cask Response Regions ............................................... 4-14

5. PROBABILITY ANALYSIS ....................................... 5-1

5.1 Introduction .......................... ,. . . . . . . . . . . . .... 5-1

5.2 Probabilistic Inputs ................................................ 5-4

5.2.1 Mechanical Loading Parameter Distributions ................... 5-5

5.2.1.1 Object Hardness Distributions ....................... 5-5

5.2.1.2 Impact Velocity Distributions ....................... 5-5

5.2.1.2,1 Cask Velocity ............................ 5-5

5.2.1.2.2 Impact Angle ............................ 5-9

5.2.1.3 Cask Orientation Distributions ...................... 5-11

5.2.2 Thermal Loading Parameter Distributions ...................... 5-13

5.2.2.1 Fire Duration Distributions ......................... 5-13

5.2.2.2 Flame Temperature Distributions ..................... 5-15

5.2.2.3 Fire Location Distributions ......................... 5-18

5.3 Probability Calculation ............................... . .............. 5-20

6. FIRST-STAGE SCREENING ANALYSIS ........................ ..... . ........ 6-1

6.1 Introduction ........................................................ 6-1

6.2 Structural Response Analysis ........................................ 6-7

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

6.2.1 Cask Response Analysis for Highway Accidents ................. 6-15

6.2.1.1 Response to Minor Accidents .......................... 6-15

6.2.1.2 Response to Other Accidents .................... 0..... 6-16

6.2.1.2.1 Response for Impacts with Unyielding

6.2.1.2.2 Response for Real Objects ................ 6-18

6.2.2 Cask Response Analysis for Railway Accidents ................. 6-21

6.2.2.1 Response to Minor Accidents .......................... 6-23

6.2.2.2 Response to Other Accidents ......................... 6-25

6.2.2.2.1 Response for Impacts with Unyielding

Surfaces . .. . .. . .. .. ............... .. .. . .. .. .. 6-25

6.2.2.2.2 Response for Real Objects ................ 6-27

6.2.3 Discussion of Structural Analysis Results ..................... 6-31

6.3 Thermal Response Analysis .......................................... 6-32

6.3.1 Cask Response Analysis for Highway Fire Accidents ........... 6-36

6.3.2 Cask Response Analysis for Railway Fire Accidents ........... *.. 6-39

6.3.3 Discussion of Thermal Analysis Results ........................ 6-43

6.4 Accident Screening Analysis ...... .. ... ... .. ...... ... ... ... .... ... .... 6-45

7. SECOND-STAGE SCREENING ANALYSIS .. . ... .. . ... .. . .. .. . ..... . .... . .. . .. ... . .. 7-1

7.2 Structural Response Analysis . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 7-3

7.2.1 Cask Response Analysis for Highway Accidents ................. 7-4

7.2.1.2 Eidewise Impacts ..................................... 7-5

7.2.1.3 Impact Response Summary ............................. 7-8

7.2.2 Cask Response Analysis for Railway Accidents ................. 7-12

7.2.2.1 Endwise Impacts ................... 7-12,

7.2.2.2 Sidewise Impacts .................................. .. 7-14

7.2.2.3 Impact Response Summary ............................. 7-14

viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

7.2.3 Discussion of Structural Analysis Results .................... 7-14

7.3 Thermal Response Analysis .......................................... 7-18

7.3.1 Cask Response Analysis for Highway Fire Accidents ............ 7-19

7.3.2 Cask Response Analysis for Railway Fire Accidents ............ 7-21

7.3.3 Discussion of Thermal.Analysis Results ........................ 7-22

7.4 Accident Screening Analysis ......................................... 7-24

8. POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS .......... 8-1

8.1 Introduction .. . . . . . ....................................... 8-1

8.2 Description of Spent Fuel . ......... ........ .................... 8-1

8.3 Measures of Radiological Significance ............................... 8-3

8.4 Estimates of Radiological Hazards ................................... 8-7

8.4.1 Potential Radioactive Material Releases to the Environment ... 8-7

8.4.2 Potential Radiation Increases from Shielding Reduction ........ 8-12

8.5 Radiological Effect Estimates for Response Regions .................. 8-18

9. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................ .9-1

9.1 Introduction ........ ... ... .......................................... 9-1

9.2 Results ............................................................. 9-2

9.2.1 First-Stage Screening ......................................... 9-2

9.2.2 Second-Stage Screening ....................................... 9-4

9.2.3 Comparison with Previous Risk Assessments: NUREG-0170 ....... 9-6

9.2.4 Estimated Responses for Sample Severe Accidents .............. 9-15

9.2.4.1 Caldecott Tunnel Fire ........................ ...... 9-15

9.2.4.2 1-80 Bridge Accident ................................ 9-16

9.2.4.3 Livingston Train Fire ............................... 9-17

9.2.4.4 Derailment into the Alabama River ................... 9-18

9.3 Uncertainties ....................... *.* * . ... .. .. ... ..... 9-19

9.3.1 Uncertainty in Cask Response ................................. 9-20

9.3.1.1 Selection of Representative Cask Designs ............ 9-20

9.3.1.2 Definition of Accident Loads ........................ 9-21

ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

9.3.1.3 Computer Code Applications and Modeling ............. 9-21

9.3.2 Uncertainty in Estimating an Accident's Potential

Radiological Hazard ...................... 9-23

9.3.2.1 Radioactive Releases from Fuel Rods ................. 9-23

9.3.2.2 Radioactive Releases from Casks ..................... 9-24

9.3.2.3 Reduction in Radiation Shielding .................... 9-24

9.3.2.4 Reduction in Subcriticality Control ................. 9-24

9.3.3 Uncertainty in Probability Models ............................ 9-25

9.3.3.1 Accident Statistics .. . .. ... . ... ... .. .. . .. .. ... . ... .. 9-25

9.3.3.2 Surveys of Structures and Features .................. 9-26

9.3.3.3 Past Analysis and Models ............................ 9-26

9.3.3.4 Engineering Judgment . .. .. .. . .... .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. 9-27

9.3.4 Overall Statement of Uncertainty ................................. 9-27

APPENDIX A: Severe Accident Data .... ...... .... .... ... ...... .... .............. A-1

APPENDIX B: Truck Accident Data .............................................. B-i

APPENDIX E: Structural Analysis ........... ..... .. ......... ..... .............. E-1

APPENDIX F: Thermal Analysis ............................... ............... ... F-1

APPENDIX G: Probability Estimation Techniques ................................ G-1

APPENDIX H: Benchmarking for Computer Codes used in Impact Analysis .......... H-i

x
LIST OF FIGURES

1-1

1-2

1-3

Schematic of a typical spent fuel cask ................................. 1-6

Two-stage screening process used in evaluating the regulations ......... 1-11

Schematic representation of the report ................................. 1-13

2-1 Three impact loading parameters considered in the response

analysis for impacts on surfaces .......................................

2-2 Three impact loading parameters considered in the response

analysis for impacts with objects such as train sills ..................

2-3 Truck collision accident scenarios and their percent

probabilities ................................................ ......

2-4 Truck non-collision accident scenarios and their percent

probabilities .... . ..... .................... .. ... . ......... .. ........

2-5 Train accident scenarios ............... .... ................ .. ........

2-7

2-8

2-12

2-13

2-29

3-1 Spent fuel cask features important to safety ........................... 3-4

3-2 Typical closure designs for spent fuel casks ........................... 3-7

3-3 Typical cask penetration subsystems .................................... 3-9

3-4 Preliminary truck cask designs with three types of gamma

shielding, used for quasi-static loading response studies

only ....................................................................... 3-12

3-5 Preliminary rail cask designs with three types of gamma

shielding, used for quasi-static loading response studies

only .................................................................... 3-13

3-6 Representative truck cask design used for dynamic structural

and thermal response studies ...................... .................. 3-20

3-7 Representative rail cask design used for dynamic structural

and thermal response studies ..... ..................... .... ... ....... 3-21

3-8 Force-deflection characteristics of the limiter design as a

function of cask orientation at impact ................................. 3-22

xi
LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Page

4-1 Schematic representation of cask response state for

mechanical load ................. ....................................... 4-5

4-2 Schematic representation of cask structural response for

various surface hardness and impact velocities ......................... 4-8

4-3 Schematic representation of cask response state for thermal

loads .................................................................. 4-10

4-4 Schematic representation of cask response for various fire

locations and fire durations ........................................... 4-13

4-5 Matrix of cask response regions for combined mechanical and

thermal loads .......................................................... 4-15

5-1 Effect of cask orientation on the strain-impact velocity

relationship for a truck cask impacting an unyielding

object ................................................................. 5-2

5-2 Effect of flame temperature and fire location on

lead-temperature-time relationship for a truck cask .................... 5-3

5-3 Distribution of vehicle velocities adjusted for braking ................ 5-7

5-4 Flow Chart of TASP computer code ....................................... 5-32

6-1 Identification of first-stage screening ................................ 6-2

6-2 Methods of analysis used in cask response determinations ............... 6-5

6-3 Three impact loading parameters considered in the response

analysis for impacts on surfaces ....................................... 6-8

6-4 Three impact loading parameters considered in the response

analysis for impacts with objects such as train sills .................. 6-10

6-5 Equivalent damage technique ................... ................... 6-13

6-6 Strain versus impact velocity and cask orientation for the

representative truck cask impacting an unyielding surface .............. 6-19

6-7 Impact force for a rigid truck cask dropped endwise onto

real surfaces .......................................................... 6-20

Xii
LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Page

6-8 Rail car coupler override of spent fuel cask car ... .................. 6-24

6-9 Strain versus impact velocity and cask orientation for the

representative rail cask impacting an unyielding surface ................... 6-28

6-10 Impact force versus impact velocity for a rigid rail cask

dropped endwise onto real surfaces ..................................... 6-29

6-11 Comparison of an engulfing hypothetical fire and a real fire ........... 6-34

6-12 Representative truck cask temperature response to a

hypothetical 1475 0F (equivalent to a real 17000F) fire

versus fire duration *...................................** .. *.. .**. 6-37

6-13 Heat flux versus fire duration for the representative truck

cask exposed to the regulatory 14750 fire .............................. 6-38

6-14 Average heat flux factor versus temperature for the

representative truck cask ............. * .*.s*...*.......... 6-40

6-15 Heat load factor for real fire versus location of

representative truck cask .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. bo . .. . ... o . o . .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . . 6-41

6-16 Representative rail cask temperature response to a

hypothetical 14750F (equivalent to a real 17000F) fire

6-17 Heat load factor for real fire versus location of

representative rail cask ....... o .......... o ....... *....*.e............. 6-44

7-1 Second-stage screening analysis relationship with response

7-2 Example showing strain response of the representative truck

cask for 45 mph endwise impact on an unyielding surface (2-

D model with impact limiters) without any truck cab

crushing included ............................ *......... *o...S.**......... 7-6

7-3 Response of the representative truck cask to endwise

impacts on an unyielding surface (2-0 model with impact

limiters and cab crush) *................ ** ....... .... .**.* ...... .......... * 7-7

xiii
LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Page

7-4 Example showing strain response of the representative truck

cask for 60 mph sidewise impact on soil (2-D model without

limiters) with strain exceeding the 2% (S2) limit ...................... 7-9

7-5 Response of the representative truck cask to sidewise

impacts on various surfaces.................................... 7-10 .'

7-6 Response of the representative rail cask to endwise impacts

on an unyielding surface (2-D model with impact limiters

and railcar crush) ..................................................... 7-13

7-7 Response of the representative rail cask to sidewise

impacts on various surfaces .............. .............................. 7-15

7-8 Representative truck cask temperature response to a

hypothetical 14750F (equivalent to a real 1700°F) fire

versus fire duration ................................ 7-20

7-9 Representative rail cask temperature response to a

hypothetical 1475 9F (equivalent to a real 17000 F) fire

versus fire duration .................. ..... ...................... ..... 7-23

7-10 Fraction of truck accidents that could result in responses

within each response-region, assuming an accident occurs ............... 7-25

7-11 Fraction of rail accidents that could result in responses

within each response region, assuming an accident occurs ............... 7-26

8-1 PWR fuel bundle ........................................................ 8-4

8-2 Three mechanisms required to establish a radioactive

material release path .................................................. 8-8

8-3 Percentage of fuel rods breached as a function of force for

endwise impacts ........................................................ 8-9

8-4 Percentage of fuel rods breached per fuel assembly in each

cask response region ............................................. ...... 8-11

8-5 Lead voiding due to lead slump resulting from endwise

impact of cask ......................................................... 8-15

xiv
LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Page

8-6 Lead voiding due to high thermal loads and lead melting ................ 8-17

8-7 Radiological hazards estimated for response regions for a

representative truck cask ....................................... ....... 8-19

8-8 Radiological hazards estimated for response regions for a

representative rail cask ............................. ......... . 8-20

9-1 Two-stage screening process in the 20 response regions ................. 9-5

9-2 Probability-hazard estimates in curies for the 20 truck

cask response regions .................................................. 9-8

9-3 Probability-hazard estimates in curies for the 20 rail cask

response regions ........................ ........................... .... 9-9

xv
-i
LIST OF TABLES

Page

1.1 Correlation of NUREG-0170 Accident Fractional Occurrence

and Radiological Hazards as a Function of Accident Severity ............ 1-8

2.1 Accident Loads and Loading Parameters .................................. 2-5

2.2 Fractional Occurrence of Surface Types below Bridges on

Interstate 80 from Davis, California to Nevada Border .................. 2-15

2.3 Distribution of Velocities for Trucks/Semitrailers Involved in Fatal and

Injury Accidents in California, 1958-1967 .............................. 2-19

2.4 Distribution of Bridge Heights along Interstate 5 through

Orange and Los Angeles Counties, California ............................ 2-20

2.5 Train Velocity Distribution for Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing

Accident/Incidents Involving Motor Vehicles, 1975-1982 ................. 2-22

2.6 Frequency of Fire for Truck Accident Types ............................. 2-25

2.7 Railroad Accident Velocity Distribution, Collisions, Main

Line, 1979-1982 ........................ * . .. . 2-32

2.8 Railroad Accident Velocity Distribution, Derailments, Main

Line, 1979-1982 ..... *.0 .......... ............. . ....... 2-33

2.9 Train-Fire Accident Types ........... .......... .... ............... . 2-36

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

5.8

5.9

5.10

5.11

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cumulative

Cask Velocity Distributions for Highway Analysis ............

Cask Velocity Distributions for Railway Analysis ............

Impact Angle Distributions ..................................

Cask Orientation Angle Distributions ........................

Fire Duration Distributions for Truck Cask Analysis .........

Fire Duration Distributions for Rail Cask Analysis ..........

Flame Temperature Distribution ..............................

Fire Location Distributions ................. ................

5-8

5-10

5-12

5-14

5-16

5-17

5-19

5-21

5-25

5-28

5-31

Probability Inputs for Highway Analysis ................................

Heat Flux Factors for Flame Temperatures (Engulfing Fire) ..............

Probability Inputs for Railway Analysis ................................

xvii
LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Page

6.1 Material Parameters Selected for Real Surfaces ............. 6-14

6.2 Evaluation of Quasi-Static Force for Minor Highway Accidents ........ 6-17

6.3 Impact Velocities Required to Reach the 0.2% Strain (SI)

Level for Objects Impacted in Highway Accidents .................... .. 6-22 -

6.4 Evaluation Summuary of Minor Railway Accidents ................. 6-26

6.5 Impact Velocities Required to Reach the 0.2% Strain (Sl)

Level for Objects Impacted in Railway Accidents................. 6-30

7.1 Impact Velocities Required to Attain 2% (S)and 30% (S3)

Strain Levels for Objects Impacted in Highway Accidents .......... #...... 7'-11

7.2 Impact Velocities Required to Attain 2% (S2) and 30% (S3)

Strain Levels for Objects Impacted in Railway Accidents ............... 7-16

8.1 PWR Fuel Assembly Decay Heat and Radioactivity.. .................... 8-2

8.2 10 CFR 71 Release Limits for Radioisotopes ................. ...... 8-6

8.3 Material Release Fractions from Breached Fuel Rods

Occurring over I Week Following Rod Burst .................. ..... .. .. 8-13

8.4 Gamma Dose Summary for Lead Slump in a Rail Cask for

Impacts on Closure Region ........... ... *............................ 8-16

9.1 Comparative Measure of Risk/Accident for Spent Fuel

Shipment by Truck .......... *..... ........................ 9-12

9.2 Comparison of Release Risk/Accident for Spent Fuel Shipment

by Rail ............ ............................................ 9-13

xvii i
PREFACE

This report describes a study conducted to estimate the responses of

spent fuel casks to severe highway and railway accident conditions and to

assess the level of safety provided to the public during the shipment of spent

fuel. The study was performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research.

This report is. divided into two volumes: Volume I, the main report,

describes the study, the technical approach, the study results, and

conclusions; and Volume II, the Appendixes, provide supporting accident data

and engineering calculations. This report has been reviewed by the Denver

Research Institute at the University of Denver under a separate contract to

the NRC as the peer review. A companion summary report entitled "Transporting

Spent Fuel-Protection Provided Against Severe Highway and Railway Accidents"

(NUREG/BR-0111) has been prepared by the NRC for wide distribution to federal

agencies, local governments, and interested citizens.

Commercial spent fuel shipments are regulated by both the Department of

Transportation (DOT) and the NRC. The NRC evaluates and certifies the design,

manufacture, operation, and maintenance of spent fuel casks, whereas the DOT

regulates the vehicles and drivers which transport the spent fuel.

Current NRC regulations require spent fuel casks to meet certain

performance standards. The performance standards include normal and

hypothetical accident conditions which a cask must be capable of withstanding

without exceeding established acceptance criteria that

(1) limit the release of radioactive material from the cask,

(2) limit the radiation levels external to the cask, and

(3) assure that the spent fuel remains subcritical.

This study evaluates the possible mechanical and thermal loads generated

by actual and potential truck and railroad transportation accidents. The

magnitudes of the loads from accidents are compared with the loads implied

from the hypothetical accident conditions. The frequency of the accidents

that can produce defined levels of mechanical and thermal loads are developed

from the accident data base. Using this information, it is determined that

xix
for certain broad classes of accidents, spent fuel casks provide essentially

complete protection against radiological hazards. For extremely severe

accidents--those which could impose loads on the cask greater than those

implied by the hypothetical accident conditions--the likelihood and magnitude

of any radiological hazards are conservatively estimated. The radio 'logical

risk is then estimated and compared with risk estimates previously used by the

NRC in judging the adequacy of its regulations.

The results of this study depend primarily on the quality of the cask

response models, the radiation release models, and the probability models and

distributions used in the analysis. Models for cask responses, radioactive

releases, and distributions for the accident parameters are new developments

based on current computer codes, limited test data on radioactive releases,

and limited historical accident data. The results are derived using

representative spent fuel casks which use design principles and materials that

have been used in casks currently licensed by the NRC. The *representative

casks are assumed to have been designed, manufactured, operated, and

maintained in accordance with national codes and standards (or equivalent)

which have adequate margins of safety embedded in them. The results of this

study are limited to spent fuel casks designed and fabricated under current

technologies and operated under current regulations. New designs using

alternative design principles and materials, or changes to regulations such as

the imposition of a 75 mph national speed limit, could affect the results and

conclusions of this study.

This study does not consider the effects which human factors can have on

the cask design, manufacture, operation, and maintenance. If further study is

conducted, human factors should be considered because they can contribute to

*the overall risk in each phase of transporting spent fuel.

L. E. Fischer

xx
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to acknowledge the technical contributions made to this

report by R. C. Chun, L. L. George, T. E. McKone, and M. W. Schwartz of

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The authors wish to thank G. E.

Cummings of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for his report review and

comments. The authors also wish to thank J. R. Cook, W. R. Lahs, and

W. H. Lake of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their support and

comments during the research and preparation of this report. Many thanks to

N. J. Barnes and E. A. Stunner for report preparation and D. Bowden for report

editing.

In addition, the authors would particularly like to thank the following

organizations for providing information and counsel which were used in

preparing this report:

Anatech International Corporation

Association of American Railroads

Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety

California Department of Transportation

Central Electricity Generating Board, England

Denver Research Institute

Department of California Highway Patrol

Electric Power Research Institute

Engineering Computer Corporation

Federal Highway Administration

Federal Railroad Administration

Health and Safety Executive, England

Los Alamos National Laboratory

National Fire Protection Association

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Ridihalgh, Eggers and Associates, Inc.

Sandia National Laboratories

Southern Pacific Transportation Company

xxi
4

w

;
APPENDIX A

List of Tables

Page

A.1 Caldecott Tunnel Fire Data Summary Sheet .............................. A-4

A.2 1-80 Bridge Accident Data Summary Sheet .... 0........................... A-7

A.3 Livingston Train Fire Data Summary Sheet .............................. A-10

A.4 Alabama River Derailment Data Summary Sheet ........................... A-14

A.5 Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents ................................. A-17

A.6 Truck Accidents ......... .............................................. A-22

A.7 Train Accidents ........................................................ A-35

A-i

APPENDIX A

Severe Accident Data

A.1 Introduction

Under the first phase of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Transportation

Model Study Program, Ridihaigh, Eggers and Associates (REA) reviewed hundreds

of severe highway and railway accident reports for the period from 1961 to

1981.A Information on selected accidents was recorded onto a set of

specially formatted data summary sheets. In this study, the severe accident

data base was expanded to cover additional accidents in the 1980 - 1983

period. The accident data compiled by REA was reviewed to sort out the

information related to structural and thermal loading conditions. This

appendix describes the process used to select severe accidents and presents

sample data summary sheets for four severe accidents. Also summarized are all

of the selected severe accidents with some of their more important loading

parameters.

A.2 Data Summary Sheets

A literature search reported over 100,000 truck and train accidents in

the period from 1961 to 1983. Approximately 335 accidents were selected for

the period 1961 to 1981,and 60 accidents were selected for the period 1981 to

1983. These accidents were judged to contain accident information that could

be useful in assessing high physical loading conditions. All accidents had to

involve either a truck or a train to be included in the selection process.

In general, the information contained in the accident reports was more

related to public safety issues and the loss of life and property rather than

to the physical loading conditions that occurred during an accident. For

example' a severe accident typically reported could involve a truck and

several cars resulting in a high loss of property and life, but could have

occurred at moderate velocities (less than 45 mph) and loading conditions thatcould have been relatively high to the cars (40,000-150,000 pounds), but

relatively low to the truck. On the other hand, a runaway truck could hit a

bridge abutment at high speed (greater than 80 mph) which could result in high

A-1
loads (greater than 400,000 pounds), but never be included in a detailed

national report because the loss of life and property would not be high, and

the event would be so rare that it was not a public safety issue. All the

compiled accident data were reviewed and the more important loading parameters

that an accident can generate on a shipping container involved in such an

accident are identified. Tables A.1 to A.4 present the data summary sheets

for four typical severe accidents with high physical loading conditions.

The first data summary sheet, Table A.1, provides information on a truckfire accident in the Caldecott Tunnel near Oakland, California, in April 1982.

The accident involved a gasoline truck-trailer, an automobile, and a bus. A

fire resulting from approximately 8,800 gallons of gasoline had a peak flame

temperature of 1900°F. Although the fire lasted 2 hours and 42 minutes

according to the records, the peak flame temperature was estimated to have

occurred for at least 20 minutes but not for the entire fire duration.

Table A.2 summarizes a truck-bridge accident, where in March 1981, a

truck-tractor-trailer was struck by a pickup while on an overpass bridge on

Interstate 1-80 near San Francisco, California. The truck-tractor-trailer

veered into the bridge railing, broke through the railing and fell 64 feet to

the soil surface below.

Table A.3 provides information on a train fire accident, where on

September 28, 1982, 43 railroad cars derailed near Livingston, Louisiana.

Following the derailment, a fire started to burn various materials which

included plastic pellets, vinyl chloride, and petroleum products. The fire

which covered a wide area was allowed to burn for several days because of the

toxic chemicals and explosions involved. A railroad car carrying motor fuel

anti-knock compound (tetra-ethyl lead) exploded about 19 hours after the

derailment. A second thermally induced explosion occurred on October 1, 82

hours after the derailment, involving a car carring vinyl chloride. The fire

cooled down sufficiently on the fifth day to permit fire-fighting

operations. Six cars carring chloride materials were purposely detonated on

October 11 to dispose of the remaining unvented materials within them.

A-2
Finally, Table A.4 summarizes a train-bridge accident, where on

January 19, 1979, a train derailed off a bridge into the Alabama River near

Hunter, Alabama. One of the rail cars was carrying a pipe which struck the

bridge and caused the derailment. Five rail cars fell into the river 75 feet

below.

A.3 Severe Accident Summary Tables

Using the severe accident data summary sheets as input, tables were

prepared summarizing each of the selected severe accidents to highlight the

information related to loading magnitudes. Three different tables were

prepared: Truck-Train Grade Crossing Accidents, Table A.5; Truck Accidents,

Table A.6; and Rail Accidents, Table A.7.

Each accident is identified by its location (name of state and city) and

is listed by its location in alphabetical order. For each accident the

following information is provided: report source, date of accident, type of

accident, number of vehicles involved, the velocity prior to the accident, the

height of any fall involved, any object struck, and the duration of any fire

involved. In some cases, the information was not stated on the data summary

sheets and an NS is entered in the corresponding column.

A.4 Reference

A.1 P. Eggers, Severe Rail and Truck Accidents: Toward a Definition of

Bounding Environment for Transportation Packages, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC, NUREG/CR-3499, October 1983.

A-3
Table A.1

Caldecott Tunnel Fire Data Summary Sheet

1.0 ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION -'

1.01 Date of Accident: April 7, 1982

1.02 Time of Accident: 0012

1.03 Rail, Highway or Both: Highway

1.04 Location: Caldecott Tunnel near Oakland, California

1.05 Railroad and/or Trucking Co. Involved: Armour Oil Company

1.06 Accident Report No.: NTSB/HAR-83/01, PB83-916201

1.07 Source: NTSB

1.08 Title: HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT - Multiple Vehicle Collisions and

Fire Caldecott Tunnel near Oakland, California April 7, 1982

1.09 Location of Document: REA

1.10 Location of Additional Information: NTSB

1.11 No. of Drawings/Photos: 16

2.0 ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

2.01 Initiating Event (derail, skid, overturn, explosion, collision,

head to tail, head to head, tail to tail, head to side, fall):

Head to tail collision

2.02 Cause: Intoxicated driver operating car, inattention of truck

driver, excessive speed of bus

2.03 Number of Vehicles Involved: 1 truck and trailer, 1 car, 1 bus

2.04 Speed of Impact: Car stopped, truck 45 mph, bus 55 mph

2.05 Distance of Fall: Not applicable (N/A)

2.06 Weather Conditions: Clear

2.07 Ambient Temperature: 50°F

2.08 Distance Traveled from Impact Point: Truck about 536 ft., bus

about 2,175 ft

2.09 Description of Vehicles Involved: Cargo tank truck with full

trailer and 5,400 gallon aluminum cargo tank, Grumman Flexible 53-

passenger bus, Honda Accord

2.10 Adjacent Structures or Natural Formations: Caldecott Tunnel

2.11 Description of Cargo Involved in Accident: 8,800 gallons of

gasoline, bus had no passengers

2.12 Elevation of Vehicles at Time of Accident: Highway through

tunnel

2.13 Description of Surface Impacted: Truck to car, bus to car, bus to

truck trailer, bus to highway support pier, car to tunnel wall

3.0 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

3.01 Description of First Event: Honda car struck curb and stopped at

left edge of roadway one-third of way through tunnel

3.02 Description of Second Event: Left front tire of tank trailer

struck right rear corner of Honda

A-4
3.03 Description of Third Event: Bus changed lanes and struck Honda

and right front of the bus struck left side of the tank trailer

3.04 Description of Fourth Event: Trailer rolled over on right side

and tank truck stops upright, gasoline spills

3.05 Description of Additional Events: Bus climbed left curb, traveled

out of tunnel and impacted highway support pier. Gasoline spilled

from trailer ignites.

3.06 Summnary of Sequence of Events: N/A

4.0 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1.01 Truck or Rail Car No. 1: Truck completely destroyed by fire, only

remaining parts of cargo tank shell material included a 70 in by

96 in bottom sheet section from the rear compartment of the tank

truck and a 40 in by 21 ft section from the right side of the

trailer tank. Left safety cable broken, main leaf springs

deformed and separated from spring shackle.

4.1.02 Truck or Rail Car No. 2: Bus center front components displaced 17

ft rearward, front axle beam bent 6 inches rearward with axle and

suspension attachment devices displaced and destroyed. Forward

entrance door separated, forward front door post and hinge bar

displaced 17 feet rearward.

4.1.03 Truck or Rail Car No. 3: Honda destroyed by fire.

4.1.04 Truck or Rail Car No. 4: N/A

4.1.05 Additional Trucks or Rail Cars Damaged: Tractor and utility

semitrailer (beer truck), Ford pickup, Toyota pickup and Pontiac

Phoenix sedan in tunnel incurred extensive fire damage but were

not involved in collision.

4.1.06 Evidence of Crushing: N/A

4.1.07 Evidence of Impact: Left front tire of tank trailer struck right

rear corner of Honda, Honda impacted tunnel wall, left front

bumper of bus struck rear bumper of Honda, right front of bus

struck left side of tank trailer, bus impacted highway support

pier

4.1.08 Evidence of Falling: NIA

4.1.09 Evidence of Puncture: N/A

4.1.10 Evidence of Bending/Defarmation of Support Members: Front axle

beam of bus bent 6 inches

4.1.11 Evidence of Tearing Structural Members: N/A

4.1.12 Evidence of Projectiles Distance Traveled, Size/Weight of

Projectile: N/A

4.1.13 Other Evidence of Severe Structural Damage: Tank truck and

trailer tank destroyed, Honda destroyed, bus heavily damaged

4.2 THERMAL/EXPLOSION DAMAGE DATA

4.2.01 Type of Fire(s) and Fuel(s) Involved and Amounts: 8,800 gallons

of gasoline

A-5
4.2.02 Duration of Fire(s): 2 hours and 42 minutes

4.2.03 Evidence of Thermal Damage (e.g., melting, sagging or

weakening): All low melting point and combustible material

consumed by fire, only 2 sections of cargo tank shell material

remained, examination of copper wires, aluminum casting, plastic

parts, glass, glazed tile and concrete spalling provided a

temperature determination in tunnel

4.2.04 Materials which Showed Evidence of Thermal Damage: Aluminum cargo

tank

4.2.05 Evidence of Torch or Plume Fire: N/A

4.2.06 Evidence of Rocketing: N/A

4.2.07 Evidence of Explosions: Loud explosions were heard, lights went

out, tiles fell from wall, final explosion shook building

4.2.08 No. of Vehicles Affected by Fires, Explosions: 1 cargo tank truck

and tank trailer, 1 bus, 2 automobiles, I beer truck, 2 pickup

trucks

4.2.09 Approximate Area Covered by Flames: 1,900 ft of tunnel

4.2.10 Evidence of Burial/Duration: N/A

4.3 LEAK OR SPILL DATA

4.3.01 Substance(s) Leaked or Spilled: Gasoline

4.3.02 Hazards/Damage Generated by Leakage/Spill: Fire

4.3.03 Amount Leaked or Spilled: 8,800 gallons

4.3.04 Area Contaminated by Spill: N/A

5.0 MISCELLANEOUS OTHER DATA

Fire produced temperature reaching 1900OF and remained that high

for at least 20 minutes. Photos of damaged vehicles included in

report.

6.0 KEYWORD SUMMARY OF REPORT

A-6
Table A.2

1-80 Bridge Accident Data Summary Sheet

1.0 ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION

1.01

1.03

1.04

1.05

1.07

1.08

1.09

1.10

1.11

Date of Accident: March 1981

Rail, Highway or Both: Highway

Location: 1-80, San Francisco Bay

Railroad and/or Trucking Co. Involved: Thomas M. Bonnell

Tractor/trailer'

George A. Burris Pickup

Source: San Jose, California

Title: N/P Clipping

Location of Document: REA

Location of Additional Information: NTSB, BMCS, CHP

No. of Drawings/Photos: 1

2.0 ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

2.01 Initiating Event (derail, skid, overturn, explosion, collision,

head to tail, head to head, tail to tail, head to side, fall):

Collision and loss of control

2.02 Cause: Not applicable (N/A)

2.04 Speed of Impact: 55 mph

2.05 Distance of Fall: 64 feet

2.09 Description of Vehicles Involved: Commercial

Tractor/trailer, pickup truck

2.10 Adjacent Structures of Natural Formations: East Bay overpass

2.11 Description of Cargo Involved in Accident: N/A

2.12 Elevation of Vehicles at Time of Accident: On bridge roadway

2.13 Description of Surface Impacted: Tractor/trailer to pickup,

tractor/trailer to concrete barrier, tractor/trailer to gravel and

earth

3.0 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

3.01 Description of First Event: Pickup truck veered in front of the

tractor/trailer

3.02 Description of Second Event: Tractor/trailer then struck the

pickup and then itself. Tractor/trailer veered off the overpass,

vaulted a concrete barrier and railing, and fell 64 feet.

4.0 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1.01

4.1.02

4.1.05

Truck or Rail Car No. 1: Tractor/trailer was demolished

Truck or Rail Car No. 2: Pickup truck was damaged

Additional Trucks or Rail Cars Damaged: 73 feet of rail and 12

feet of concrete barrier was torn out of bridge

A-7
4.1.06 Evidence of Crushing: N/A

4.1.07 Evidence of Impact: Tractor/trailer collided first with pickup

truck then with bridge barrier and finally with earth

4.1.08 Evidence of Falling: 64 feet from bridge to earth

4.1.09 Evidence of Puncture: N/A

4.1.10 Evidence of Bending/Deformation of Support Members: N/A

4.1.11 Evidence of Tearing Structural Members: N/A

4.1.12 Evidence of Projectiles Distance Traveled, Size/Weight of

Projectile: None

4.1.13 Other Evidence of Severe Structural Damage: N/A

4.2 THERMAL/EXPLOSION DAMAGE DATA

4.2.01 Type of Fire(s) and Fuel(s) Involved and Amounts: None

4.2.05 Evidence of Torch or Plume Fire: None

4.2.06 Evidence of Rocketing: None

4.2.07 Evidence of Explosions: None

4.3 LEAK OR SPILL DATA

4.3.01 Substance(s) leaked or spilled: N/A

5.0 MISCELLANEOUS OTHER DATA

6.0 KEYWORD SUMMARY OF REPORT

6.01 Vehicle Class (R - rail, T - truck, C - rail & truck): T

6.02 Speed of Impact: 55 mph

6.03 Falling Distance: 64 feet

6.05 Impacting Object (11 - locomotive, 12 - coupler, 13 - sill, 14 -

axle, I5 - bar stock, 16 - plate stock, 17 - I-beam, 19 - rail,

110 - forging/casting, I11 = tractor, 112 - trailer, 113 - no

evidence of impacted object, 114 = caboose, 115 - other): Ill 112

6.06 Object Impacted (01 - locomotive, 02 - nox car, 03 - tank car, 04

- coal car, 05 = tractor, 06 - trailer, 07 - cargo, 08 - cask, 09 - structural concrete, 010 - building, 011 - bridge, 012 -

automobile, 013 - no evidence of impacted object, 014 - caboose,

015 - other): 011 015

6.08 Fire Duration: 0 minutes

6.09 Torch Duration: 0 minutes

6.10 Rocketing Distance: 0 feet

6.11 Weight of Rocketed Object: 0 pounds

6.12 Burial Event (B1 - evidence of burial larger than 24 hours, B2 -

evidence of burial shorter than 24 hours, B3 - no evidence of

burial): B3

6.13 Ambient Temperature: O°F

6.16 Number of Fatalities: 0

6.17 Vehicle Type Involved in Accident (V1 - unit train, V2 - passenger

train, V3 - mixed train cargo, V4 - tractor trailer, V5 - tandem

trailer, V6 - unit truck, V7 - other): V4

A-8
6.18 Cargo Type Involved in Accident (Zl - flammable, Z2 - explosive,

Z3 - toxic, Z4 - ordnance, Z5 - radioactive, Z6 - other): Z6

A-9
Table A.3

Livingston Train Fire Data Summary Sheet

1.0 ACCIDENT INFORMATION

1.01 Date of Accident: September 28, 1982

1.02 Time of Accident: 0512

1.03 Rail, Highway or Both: Rail

1.04 Location: Livingston, Lousiana

1.05 Railroad and/or Trucking Co. Involved: Illinois Central Gulf

Railroad

1.06 Accident Report No.: NTSB/RAR-83/05, PB83-916305

1.07 Source: NTSB

1.08 Title: RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT - Derailment of Illinois Central

Gulf Railroad Freight Train Extra 9629 East (GS-2-28) and Release

of Hazardous Materials at Livingston, Louisiana, September 28,

1982

1.09 Location of Document: REA

1.10 Location of Additional Information: NTSB

1.11 No. of Drawings/Photos: 11

2.0 ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

2.01 Initiating Event (derail, skid, overturn, explosion, collision,

head to tail, head to head, tail to tail, head to side, fall):

Derail

2.02 Cause: Disengagement of air hose coupling, excessive buff force,

placement of empty cars in train profile

2.03 Number of Vehicles Involved: 1 train

2.04 Speed of Impact: 40 mph

2.05 Distance of Fall: Not applicable (N/A)

2.06 Weather Conditions: Clear

2.07 Ambient Temperature: 570F

2.08 Distance Traveled from Impact Point: N/A

2.09 Description of Vehicles Involved: Extra 9629 East consisting of 3

locomotive units, 84 loaded cars, 16 empty cars and a caboose, 29

cars were tank cars loaded with hazardous materials and 5 tank

cars with flammable petroleum products

2.10 Adjacent Structures or Natural Formations: Small community with

buildings and pine groves surrounding tracks

2.11 Description of Cargo Involved in Accident: Plastic pellets,

petroleum products, vinyl chloride, chemical products, styrene

monomer, motor fuel anti-knock compound, toluene diisocyanate, phosphoric acid, hydrofluosilicic acid, sodium hydroxide,

perchloroethylene, ethylene glycol 2.12 Elevation of Vehicles at Time of Accident: Railroad bed 47 foot

above sea level

2.13 Description of Surface Impacted: Gondola car to gondola car, tank

car to railroad bed

A-10
3.0 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

3.01 Description of First Event: Train arrives Livingston and bottoms

out at 2 crossings. Train went into emergency braking, automatic

brake put into emergency position and throttle placed in ?

position

3.02 Description of Second Event: 43 cars derail breaching 2 cars

loaded with vinyl chloride

3.03 Description of Third Event: Leaking vinyl chloride gas ignites

creating fireball exceeding 100 ft south and 150 ft north.

3.04 Description of Fourth Event: Explosion occurs and numerous fires

break out

3.05 Description of Additional Events: Evacuation of area begun,

hazardous materials unit notified and begin work. Next day tank

car containing anti-knock compound explodes and rockets.

September 30 fires intensify and vinyl chloride begins venting.

October 1 vinyl chloride car explodes and rockets. October 4

styrene monomer re-ignites. October 5 styrene burns off and

burning oil cars extinguished. October 10 and 11 vinyl chloride

cars detonated. October 12 residents allowed to return. October

16 last derailed cars removed from accident site.

3.06 Summary of Sequence of Events: N/A

4.0 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1.01 Truck or Rail Car No. 1: 19th and 20th cars detached from their

trucks. 20th car had a vertical crease the full height

4.1.02 Truck or Rail Car No. 2: 3 tank cars loaded with petroleum

products separated from their trucks and heavily damaged. 1 of

these was breached.

4.1.03 Truck or Rail Car No. 3: Next 15 cars separated from their trucks

and were damaged beyond economical repair

4.1.04 Truck or Rail Car No. 4: Next 18 cars were tank cars loaded with

chemical products and were heavily damaged. 16 were punctured or

breached.

4.1.05 Additional Trucks or Rail Cars Damaged: 5 cars had minor damage,

13 more cars separated from trucks, 15 tank cars had bottom outlet

extensions'sheared off

4.1.06 Evidence of Crushing: N/A

4.1.07 Evidence of Impact: Vertical crease full height of gondola car,

tank cars overturned, several cars destroyed by impact

4.1.08 Evidence of Falling: N/A

4.1.09 Evidence of Puncture: 20 tank cars punctured or breached, shell

punctures in car containing perchloroethylene

4.1.10 Evidence of Bending/Deformations of Support Members: 36 cars

destroyed by crushing impacts during derailment or by postaccident fires

A-11
4.1.11 Evidence of Tearing Structural Members: 33 tank cars separated

from trucks and many breached

4.1.12 Evidence of Projectiles Distance Traveled, Size/Weight of

Projectile: Shell of tank car carrying anti-knock compound

propelled about 80 ft north and its tank head about 25 ft south

and most of its tub portion rocketed 425 ft north. Large section

of steel outer insulating jacket found about 80 ft away. Other

parts found 1,500 ft south

4.1.13 Other Evidence of Severe Structural Damage: 36 cars destroyed

either by crushing impacts during the derailment or by post- accident fires, explosions, and demolition. Empty gondola car had

vertical separation of bolster center plates.

4.2 THERMAL/EXPLOSION DAMAGE DATA

4.2.01 Type of Fire(s) and Fuel(s) Involved and Amounts: Vinyl chloride

163,043 gallons, styrene monomer 28,145 gallons, motor fuel antiknock compound (tetra-Ethyl lead) 5,666 gallons, toluene

diisocyanate 2,259 gallons. Fires also fed by plastic pellets

4.2.02 Duration of Fire(s): 8 days

4.2.03 Evidence of Thermal Damage (e.g., melting, sagging or

weakening): 2 thermally induced explosions

4.2.04 Materials which Showed Evidence of Thermal Damage: N/A

4.2.05 Evidence of Torch or Plume Fire: Vinyl chloride gas vented and

burned from domes

4.2.06 Evidence of Rocketing: Thermally-induced explosions of 2 tank

cars that had not been punctured caused them to rocket violently.

4.2.07 Evidence of Explosions: First explosion blew in brick front of

dwelling 250 ft north. 2 other thermally induced explosions.

4.2.08 No. of Vehicles Affected by Fires, Explosions: 13 train cars

4.2.09 Approximate Area Covered by Flames: 1,000 ft radius of derailment

4.2.10 Evidence of Burial/Duration: N/A

4.3 LEAK OR SPILL DATA

4.3.01 Substance(s) Leaked or Spilled: Phosphoric acid 148,552 gallons, hydrofluosilicic acid 19,780 gallons, sodium hydroxide 15,363

gallons, perchloroethylene 14,028 gallons, ethylene glycol 20,840

gallons, plastic pellets

4.3.02 Hazards/Damage Generated by Leakage/Spill: Acrid smoke and toxic

gases as well as danger of fire and explosions

4.3.03 Amount Leaked or Spilled: More than 200,000 gallons of toxic

chemical products

4.3.04 Area Contaminated by Spill: Several acres containing more than

60,000 cubic yards of soil to be expected

5.0 MISCELLANEOUS OTHER DATA

Photos of accident and information on chemical compounds included

in report. 9999 in fields 6.8 and 6.9 indicates time frame longer

A-12
than 6 days. See 4.2.02. 3,000 people within 5-mile radius

evacuated as long as 2 weeks

6.0 KEYWORD SUMMARY OF REPORT

6.01 Vehicle Class (R - rail, T - truck, C - rail & truck): R

6.02 Speed of Impact: 40 mph

6.03 Falling Distance: 0 feet

6.04 Crushing Events (Cl - locomotive, C2 - box car, C3 - coal car, C4 - flat car, C5 - tank car, C6 - tractor, C7 - trailer, C8 - unit

truck, C9 - heavy cargo, CIO - tank truck, C1H - bridge, C12 - heavy support structure, C13 - no evidence of crushing, C14 -

caboose,'Cl5 - other): C5

6.05 Impacting Object (11 - locomotive, 12 - coupler, 13 - sill, 14 -

axle, I5 - bar stock, 16 - plate stock, 17 - I-beam, 19 - rail,

110 - forging/casting, Ill - tractor, 112 - trailer, 113 - no

evidence of impacted object, 114 - caboose, 115 - other): 12 115

6.06 Object Impacted (01 - locomotive, 02 - box car, 03 - tank car, 04

- coal car, 05 - tractor, 06 - trailer, 07 m cargo, 08 - cask, 09 - structural concrete, 010 - building, 011 - bridge, 012 - automobile, 013 - no evidence of impacted object, 014 - caboose,

015 - other): 03 02

6.07 Explosion Event (significant damage to: El - train or truck

vehicles, E2 - surrounding structural members, E3 - cratering of

ground, E4 - cargo, E5 - none): El E2 E4

6.08 Fire Duration (note: if 9,999 - see section 4.2.02): 9,999

minutes

6.09 Torch Duration (note: if 9,999 - see section 4.2.02): 9,999

minutes

6.10 Rocketing Distance: 425 feet

6.11 Weight-of Rocketed Object: 10,000 pounds

6.12 Burial Event. (B1 - evidence of burial larger than 24 hours, B2 -

evidence of burial shorter than 24 hours, B3 - no evidence of

burial): B3

6.13 Ambient Temperature: 570 F

6.14 Vehicle Damage (thousands of dollars): 1,500

6.15 Other Property Damage (thousands of dollars): 13,064

6.16 Number of Fatalities: 0

6.17 Vehicle Type Involved in Accident (V1 - unit train, V2 - passenger train, V3 -. mixed train cargo, V4 - tractor trailer, V5 - tandem

trailer, V6 - unit truck, V7 - other): V3

6.18 Cargo Type Involved in Accident (ZI - flamable, Z2 - explosive,

Z3 - toxic, Z4 - ordinance, Z5 - radioactive, Z6 - other): ZI Z2

Z3 Z6

6.19 CAS Registry Numbers for Cargo Involved in Accident: None

A-13
Table A.4

Alabama River Derailment Data Summary Sheet

1.0 ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION 4

1.01

1.02

1.03

1.04

1.05

1.06

1.07

1.08

1.09

1.10

1.11

Date of Accident: January 19, 1979

Time of Accident: 0740

Rail, Highway or Both: R

Location: Hunter, Alabama

Railroad and/or Trucking Co. Invo

Freight Train No. AM 118

Accident Report No.: ATL 78 F R018

Source: NTSB

Title: Accident File

Location of Document: REA

Location of Additional Information:

No. of Drawings/Photos: 2

)l ved: Illinois Central Gulf

NTSB

2.0 ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

2.01 Initiating Event (derail, skid, overturn,

head to tail, head to head, tail to tail,

Collision with bridge

2.02 Cause: Improper lading

2.03 Number of Vehicles Involved: 72

2.04 Speed of Impact: 8 mph

2.05 Distance of Fall: 75 feet

2.06 Weather Conditions: Cloudy, dawn

2.07 Ambient Temperature: 450 F

2.09 Description of Vehicles Involved: 3 locomo

2 blkd flat cars, 1 tank car, 46 loads, 19 e

2.10 Adjacent Structures or Natural Formations:

Alabama River

2.11 Description of Cargo Involved in Accident:

pipe cars, 1 tank car with fuel oil

2.12 Elevation of Vehicles at Time of Accident:

2.13 Description of Surface Impacted: Pipe to 1

cars to river

explosion, collision,

head to side, fall):

tive units, 1

mpties

RR bridge

caboose,

over the

Two 54 in. O.D.C.I.

RR bed on bridge deck

)ridge, car to bridge,

3.0 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

3.01 Description of First Event: Eight 54 in. pipes were strapped

together in 2 groups of 4 each. The 2 groups laid in tandem

3.02 Description of Second Event: The pipes were then chained and

blocked with wood sprags nailed to the car deck.

3.03 Description of Third Event: Sprags were not predrilled and later

split loosening the load which was already unstable because of the

"4-together" configuration. (Note: 3 pipes fastened in this

fashion- would have been stable).

A-14
3.04 Description of Fourth Event: One of the loose pipe snagged the

bridge superstructure bringing down one span

3.06 Summary of Sequence of Events: 5 loaded cars dropped into the

Alabama River

4.0 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1 POST ACCIDENT EVENT DATA

4.1.01 Truck or Rail Car No. 1: 5 cars in river were damaged

4.1.02 Truck or Rail Car No. 2: Bridge was seriously damaged

4.1.06 Evidence of Crushing: None

4.1.07 Evidence of Impact: One of the 54 inch pipes impacted against a

bridge truss

4.1.08 Evidence of Falling: 5 cars fell into the river as the bridge

collapsed

4.1.09 Evidence of Puncture: Not applicable (N/A)

4.1.10 Evidence of Bending/Deformation of Support Members: N/A

4.1.11 Evidence of Tearing Structural Members: N/A

4.1.12 Evidence of Projectiles Distance Traveled, Size/Weight of

Projectile: None

4.1.13 Other Evidence of Severe Structural Damage: See above

4.2 THERMAL/EXPLOSION DAMAGE DATA

4.2.01 Type of Fire(s) and Fuel(s) Involved and Amounts: None

4.2.05 Evidence of Torch or Plume Fire: None

4.2.06 Evidence of Rocketing: None

4.2.07 Evidence of Explosions: None

4.2.10 Evidence of Burial/Duration: Cars were in the river and mud

4.3 LEAK OR SPILL DATA

4.3.01 Substance(s) Leaked or Spilled: The tank car filled with fuel oil

was reported not to be leaking

6.0 KEYWORD SUMMARY OF REPORT

6.01 Vehicle Class (R - rail, T - truck, C - rail & truck): R

6.02 Speed of Impact: 8 mph

6.03 Falling Distance: 75 feet

6.04 Crushing Events (Cl - locomotive, C2 - box, C3 - coal car, C4 -

flat car, C5 - tank car, C6 = tractor, C7 - trailer, C8 - unit

truck, C9 - heavy cargo, ClO - tank truck, Cli - bridge, C12 -

heavy support structure, C13 - no evidence of crushing, C14 -

caboose, C15 - other): C13

6.05 Impacting Object (II - locomotive, 12 - coupler, 13 - sill, 14 -

axle, 15 - bar stock, 16 - plate stock, 17 - I-beam, 19 - rail,

I10 - forging/casting, Ill - tractor, 112 - trailer, 113 - no

evidence of impacted object, 114 - caboose, 115 - other): I10

A-15
6.06 Object Impacted (01 - locomotive, 02 - box car, 03 - tank car, 04

- coal car, 05 - tractor, 06 = trailer, 07 - cargo, 08 - cask, 09 - structural concrete, 010 = building, 011 - bridge, 012 -

automobile, 013 - no evidence of impacted object, 014 - caboose,

015 - other): 011

6.08 Fire Duration: 0 minutes

6.09 Torch Duration: 0 minutes

6.10 Rocketing Distance: 0 feet

6.11 Weight of Rocketed Object: 0 pounds

6.12 Burial Event (B1 - evidence of burial larger than 24 hours, B2 - evidence of burial shorter than 24 hours, 83 - no evidence of

burial): B1

6.13 Ambient Temperature: 450 F

6.14 Vehicle Damage (thousands of dollars): 76

6.15 Other Property Damage (thousands of dollars): 2,000

6.16 Number of Fatalities: 0

6.17 Vehicle Type Involved in Accident (Vi - unit train, V2 - passenger

train, V3 - mixed train cargo, V4 - tractor trailer, V5 - tandem

trailer, V6 - unit truck, V7 - other): V3

6.18 Cargo Type Involved in Accident (Z1 - flammable, Z2 - explosive,

Z3 - toxic, Z4 - ordnance, Z5 - radioactive, Z6 - other): Z1 Z6

ff4

A-16
jI

Table A.5 Legend

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

Report Source

FRA

NATL, yea?

NCHI, year

N/HAB

NOAK, yeai

N/RHR

NS

NTSB

r, report #

r, report #

, report #

Federal Railroad Administration

Department of Transportation, Federal

Department of Transportation, Federal

National Transportation Safety Board,

Department of Transportation, Federal

National Transportation Safety Board,

Not Stated

National Transportation Safety Board

Railroad Administration, Atlanta Office

Railroad Administration, Chicago Office

Highway Accident Brief

Railroad Administration, Oakland Office

Railroad Highway Report

I

Accident Description

HtoS Col.

Vhc1

Head to Side Collision

Vehicle
Table A.5

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Location Source Report Date Accident of Description Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Alabama

Huntsville NTSB 82-1 9/15/81 HtoS Col. 2 30 NS Y(60M) Cargo Tank

California

Tracy NTSB 76-1 3/9/75 HtoS Col. 2 50 NS N Gondola Car

Florida

Plant City N/RHR-78-2 10/2/77 Train-Truck 8 70 NS Y(17M) Pickup Truck

Georgia

Aragon N/RHR-75-1 10/23/74 Train-Bus 2 6 0 Y(NS) Bus

Illinois

Beckemeyer N/RHR-76-3 2/7/76 Train-Truck 2 NS 0 N Pickup Truck

Elwood N/RHR-76-2 11/19/75 Truck-Train 2 82 0 N Train

Loda N/RHR-71-1 1/24/70 Train-Truck 2 79 0 Y(NS) Tanker Truck

00

Continued on next page

ED
Table A.5

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

,0

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Iowa

Des Moines N/RHR-77-2 7/1/76 Train-Car 2 30 0 N Auto

Louisiana

Goldonna N/RHR-78-1 11/28/77 Train-Truck 2 56 0 Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Kenner Modern Bulk 11/25/80 Train-Truck 3 17 0 Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Trans

Kenner NTSB 81-1 11/25/80 HtoS Col. 3 25 NS Y(122M) Cargo Tank

Missouri

Gera NCHI79FRO19 1/11/79 Train-Truck 2 35 0 N Truck/Trailer

Boutte N/HAB-80-1 12/15/78 Train-Truck 2+ NS 0 N Truck/Trailer

Nebraska

Edgar NTSB 76-201 8/31/76 Train-Truck 2 NS 0 N Truck/Trailer

North Platte NS NS Train-Truck 2 NS 0 Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Stratton N/RHR-77-1 8/8/76 Train-Bus 2 57 0 N Bus

Nevada

Ocala NOAK79FRO23 12/18/78 Train-Truck 2 45 0 Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Continued on next page
Table A.5

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

rD0

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report e Date Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

New York

Congers N/RHR-73-1 3/24/72 Train-Bus 2 25 0 N Bus

Mineola NTSB 82-2 3/14/82 HtoS Col. 2 65 NS Y(20M) Van

North Carolina

Sellers NATL78FROll NS Train-Truck 2 79 0 NS Truck/Trailer

Oklahoma

Collinsville NTSB 72-1 4/5/71 HtoS Col. 2 71 NS N Truck

Marland N/RHR-77-3 12/15/76 Train-Truck 12 90 0 Y(NS) Tanker Truck

Oregon

Lafayette NS 9/8/76 Train-Bus 2 50+ 0 N Bus

Pennsylvania

Southampton NTSB 82-3 1/2/82 Train-Truck 3 20 NS Y(135) Trailer

Yardley N/RHR-76-4 6/5/75 Train-Truck 3 63 0 N Truck/Trailer

Continued on next page

(to
"I ,

v/

Table A.5

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Location Source Accident Description of vel. ht. Y/N Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Virginia

Tazewell

West Virgina

Woodland

NTSB 76-135 NS Train-Truck 2 31 0 Y(NS) Trailer

FRA C-8-72 NS Train-Vhcle 2 40 NS NS Earthmover

I'
Table A.6 Legend

Truck Accidents

r•3

Report Source

BMCS

CONF

DOT

DOTHS

N/HAB

N/HAR

NS

NUREG/CR

PATRAM

Accident Description

Bldg Col.

Brdg Ovtrn

HtoH Col.

HtoS Col.

HtoT Col.

Mltpl Col.

NS Trk. Fire

Ovtrn Col.

Trailer Sep.

Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety

Conference

Department of Transportation

Department of Transportation

National Transportation Safety Board, Highway Accident Brief

National Transportation Safety Board, Highway Accident Report

Not Stated

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Contractor Report

Conference on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials

Building Collision

Bridge Overturn

Head to Head Collision

Head to Side Collision

Head to Tail Collision

Multiple Collision

Not Stated Truck Fire

Overturn Collision

Trailer Separation

0A
f

.f

Table A.6

Truck Accidents

!

ro

(.o

ReorDteci dt No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Arizona

Buckeye N/HAB-80-1 11/15/78 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Tractor Truck

Gila Bend BMCS 76-4 NS HtoH Col. 6 80 0 Y(NS) Car, Motorcycle

Arkansas

Brisco NS 4/27/76 Overturn 1 40 30 Y(NS) Roadbed

Camden N/HAB-80-2 4/13/78 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Pickup Truck

Jasper N/HAR-81-1 6/5/80 Explosion 1 63 38 N Hillside

Little Rock N/HAB-80-1 1/27/78 HtoH Col. 3 NS 0 N Truck/Trailer

California

Coachella N/HAR-80-6 4/23/80 HtoH Col. 2 60 NS N Bus

Coalinga N/HAB-80-1 12/15/78 HtoH Col. 12 47 0 N Mltpl Cars

Corona N/HAR-75-7 2/28/75 Mltpl Col. 84 50 0 Y(NS) Mltpl Cars,

Trucks

El Centro

35 MI W N/HAR-75-6 3/8/74 HtoH Col. 2 45 NS N Semi Trailer

Lemoore N/HAR-83-02 10/8/82 HtoH Col. 3 55 NS N Van

Los Angeles NS NS Explosion 6 0 0 Y(NS) None

Continued on next page
Table A.6

Truck Accidents

r'3

Location Report Source Date of Accident of Avel. Falht. yFire Object Struck Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Los Angeles NS NS HtoH Col. 6 55 0 Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

California (continued)

Los Angeles N/HAR-80-5 3/3/80 StoS Col. 3 45 NS Y(55M) Tank Truck

Martinez N/HAR-77-2 5/21/76 Brdg Ovtrn 1 35 22 N Ground

Oakland (near) N/HAR-83-01 4/7/82 HtoH Col. 3 55 NS Y(162M) Car

Ontario NS 11/4/74 Collision 1 50 0 Y(NS) Tree, Sign,

Steel, Concrete

Wall

Sacramento NS NS Overturn 4 NS 0 Y(4H) Roadbed, Cars

Sacramento

(near) N/HAR-74-5 11/11/73 Collision 1 67 NS N Concrete

San Bernardino N/HAR-81-2 11/10/80 HtoH Col. 24 55 NS N Semi Trailer

San Francisco San Jose News 3/81 Overpass 2 55 64 N Pickup Bay Run Off Truck, Ground

Ventura N/HAR-72-4 8/18/71 HtoH Col. 13 60 0 Y(60M) Car

Willow Creek N/HAR-83-05 2/24/83 Skid 2 38 NS N Bus

Winterhaven BMCS 79-2 4/4/79 Collision 2 NS 0 Y(NS) Parked Car

Colorado

Canon City N/HAR-82-3 11/14/81 KtoS Col. 3 56 NS Y(170M) Tractor

Continued on next page

d. . ,'
A w~

Table A.6

Truck Accidents

M13I

Location Report RepourtcDat Date of Accident Desof Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire je Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) vel.(ft.) h. Y/N (dur) Object Description Sruck

Fleming NS 9/29/77 HtoH Col. 2 110 0 Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Colorado (continued)

Golden NS 6/10/74 Collision 1 35 0 Y(5H) Rock Wall

Golden BMCS 8-186. NS Overturn 1 95 30 NS Roadbed,

Guardrail

Kit Carson BMCS 8-097 NS HtoH Col. 2 120 NS Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Kit Carson BMCS 8-089 NS HtoH Col. 2 110 NS Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Silverthorne BMCS 8-028 NS Collision 2 55 15 Y(NS) Guardrail

District of Columbia

Washington BMCS 76-2 NS Mltpl Col. 2 NS NS NS Car

Florida

Gretna N/HAR-72-3 8/8/71 HtoH Col. 2 50 2 N Car

Homestead BMCS 7-178 NS HtoS Col. 2 51 NS Y(NS) Truck/Trailer

Ocala N/HAR-83-04 2/28/83 HtoT/HtoS 22 55+ NS Y(120M) Semi

Georgia

Atlanta N/HAR-78-5 6/20/77 HtoH Col. 7 45 0 N Cars, Truck

Atlanta

Continued on next page
Tabl e A.6

Truck Accidents

Location Report Source Date Accident of 

Description 

Accident Nof Avel. Fallht. yFire Object Struck Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

W 1-20 N/HAR-75-4

Georgia (continued)

I~. r4

Attapulgus

Dalton

Doraville

Hamilton

Leslie'

Lithonia

Loganville

Ludowici

Richmond Hill

Savannah

Waco

Illinois

Gibson City

Rosecrans

BMCS 4-206

N/HAB-80-1

N/HAB-80-2

H/HAR-76-5

N/HAB-80-2

BMCS 80-2

N/HAB-80-1

N/HAB-80-1

N/HAB-80-1

N/HAB-80-1

N/HAR-72-5

5th PATRAM

pg 804-806

BMCS 5-030

8/21/73

12/15/73

12/14/78

7/21/78

6/6/75

4/4/77

1/8/80

6/20/78

5/2/78

6/19/78

7/6/78

6/4/71

Skid, HtoS

HtoH Col.

HtoH Col.

Mltpl Col.

HtoH Col.

HtoH Col.

HtoS Col.

HtoS Col.

HtoS Col.

HtoH Col.

Jackknife

HtoH Col.

2 45 NS N

2

2

3

7

2

2

2

3

3

2

2

90

NS

NS

50

NS

35

NS

NS

NS

NS

40

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Y(NS)

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y(+15M)

Truck/Trailer

Truck/Trailer

Motorcycle, Dump Truck

Bus

Car

Car

Car

Car

Car

Car

Car

Car

NS Jackknife

Collision

1 NS NS NS Roadbed

1 55 0 Y(NS) Bridge Barrier 4/29/76

Continued on next page

(toa-
1ifITable A.6

Truck Accidents

I

ro

Location Report Date of Accident NO.f vel. ht. y/NFire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Indiana

Chesterton NS NS Jackknife 1 55 20 N Guardrail

Indianapolis BMCS 75-5 6/13/75 Overturn 1 50 18 NS Roadbed

Iowa

Winthrop N/HAB-8O-1 5/2/78 Overturn 1 NS 0 N Roadbed

Kansas

Kansas City BMCS 7-064 8/6/76 Cargo Loss I NS 0 Y(NS) Roadbed

Leon N/HAB-80-2 5/15/78 HtoH Col. 3 NS 0 Y(NS) Car

Mayetta BMCS 80-1 1/6/80 HtoH Col. 2 50 0 Y(NS) Pickup Truck

Wichita NUREG/CR-0992 NS Overturn 1 NS NS NS Roadbed

Kentucky

Beattyville N/HAR-78-4 9/24/77 Runaway 17 36 0 Y(5H) Roadbed

Carroll City DOTHS602826 8/75 HtoH Col. 3 60 0 Y(105M) Car/Trailer

Continued on next page
Table A.6

Truck Accidents

00

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Louisiana

Baton Rouge NS NS Overturn 1 NS 0 Y(NS) Roadbed

Lake Charles N/HAR-82-4 8/27/81 Skid 26 30+ NS N Semi Trailer

Ramah N/HAB-80-2 12/16/78 Mltpl Col. 4 NS 0 Y(NS) Bridge Column

Maryland

Bethesda BMCS 78-2 3/14/78 Mltpl Col. 3 70 40 N Car

Frostburg N/HAR-81-3 2/18/81 HtoS Col. 17 50+ NS N Truck

Hagerstown N/HAB-80-1 1/30/79 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Truck/Trailer

N. Carrollton N/HAR-71-9 6/19/70 Skid, HtoT 2 NS NS N Truck

Massachusetts

Belcherstown NS NS Collision 1 60 25 N Utility Pole

Braintree N/HAR-74-4 10/18/73 Overturn 1 55 0 Y(NS) Roadbed

Michigan

Detroit NS 2/7/77 Collision 1 45 30 Y(NS) Bridge Barrier

Flint BMCS 5-076 8/19/76 Collision 1+ NS 20 Y(NS) Bridge Rail,

Roadbed

Continued on next page

. I
F

Table A.6

Truck Accidents

I

t•

•o

No. Acc. Fall Fire ObetSrc

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N Object Struck

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Minnesota

Floodwood BMCS 5-169 NS HtoH Col. 3 105 0 NS Truck/Trailer

Mississippi

Waynesboro N/HAR-82-2 10/12/81 HtoH Col. 3 35 NS N Car/Pole

Missouri

Fisk BMCS 7-064 NS Collision 1 55 45 NS Bridge, River

Keytesville NS 4/7/77 Collision 1 55 30 N Bridge Barrier

Kansas City N/HAB-80-2 7/13/77 Collision 1 55 0 N Bridge Column

St. Louis N/IHAR-79-3 9/25/77 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Car

North Carolina

Hertford NS 1/10/78 Explosion 2 NS 0 Y(NS) NS

Marion N/HAR-78-6 1/25/78 HtoH Col. 2 70 0 N Pickup Truck

Morganton NS 4/27/78 HtoH Col. 2 75 0 N Truck

North Dakota

Freeman BMCS 80-3 3/12/80 HtoH Col. 4 40 0 Y(NS) Cars

Continued on next page
Table A.6

Truck Accidents

0

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N Description LoatinSource Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur)

New Jersey

Bordentown N/HAR-75-3 10/19/73 Side Col. 4 55 50 Y(NS) Car

Elizabethtown NS 9/27/77 Explosion 1 0 0 Y(NS) NS

Turnpike

Exit 8 N/HAR-73-4 10/17/73 Side Col. 3 65+ 0 Y(30M) Guardrail

New York

Alden N/HAB-80-1 3/15/78 Collision 4 NS 0 N Car

Brant DOTHS801925 6/21/75 Collision 1 55 35 NS Post, Roadbed

Brooklyn N/HAR-71-6 5/30/70 Explosion 1 0 0 Y(NS) NS

Buffalo DOTHS600979 3/19/71 HtoH Col. 2 55 0 NS Truck/Trailer

Buffalo DOTHS600974 3/24/71 Overturn 1 60 NS NS Roadbed

Hamburg D0THS601762 4/10/72 Overturn 1 40 NS NS Roadbed

Locke NS NS Jackknife 21 NS 0 Y(NS) Building

Moreau N/HAB-80-1 8/13/78 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Truck/Trailer

Ohto

Ashtabula Newscast 4/1/81 Overturn 1 NS NS NS Roadbed

Valley View N/HAR-77-3 8/20/76 Mltpl Col. 11 50 0 Y(NS) Mltpl Cars

Continued on next page

a . ,
p

Table A.6

Truck Accidents

!-

Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location SorcAcietof vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Oklahoma

El Reno BMCS 6-606 NS HtoH Col. 2 50 31 N Truck/Trailer

Stroud BMCS 6-046 NS Collision 1 45 25 Y(NS) Guardrail

Oregon

Portland DOT 72-5 11/18/72 -. Side Col. 1 NS 0 N Concrete Wall

Pennsylvania

Clarion BMCS 69-5 NS Collision 1 20 13 N Bridge

Fulton County N/HAB-80-1 2/22/79 Overturn 1 NS 0 N Ground

Indiana N/HAR-80-3 9/22/79 HtoH Col. 2 70 NS N Car

Lamar N/HAB-80-1 2/7/79 Run Off Rd 2 NS 0 N Guardrail

Lancaster Cnty N/HAR-72-1 2/6/72 Collision 1 55 NS N Guardrail

Mt. Pleasant N/HAB-80-1 2/14/79 Trailer Sep. 2 NS 0 N Car

N. Cumberland BMCS 3-208 NS Overturn 2 55 0 N Roadbed

Washington NS NS Collision 1 50 0 Y(3H) Guardrail

Washington NS NS Overturn 7 50 0 N Roadbed

Warfordsburg N/HAB-80-1 5/5/79 Overturn 1 70 0 N Roadbed

Continued on next page
Table A. 6

Truck Accidents

I

Po

Location Report Date of Accident Nof ACvel. Fallht. Firy/N Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Rhode Island

West Greenwich N/HAB-80-1 1/26/79 Bldg Col. 1 NS 0 N Building

Tennessee

Adams BMCS 69-3 NS HtoH Col. 3 110 0 N Truck/Trailer

Carthage BMCS 70-8 NS Collision 1 55 50 N Railing

Church Hill NS 1/14/76 HtoH Col. 3 70 NS Y(85M) Truck/Tractor

Knoxville

(east of) Knoxville News 4/29/81 NS Trk. Fire 1 NS 0 Y(NS) None

Koko N/HAB-80-1 10/17/78 HtoS Col. 3 NS 0 N Pickup Truck

Memphis BMCS 73-8 NS Mltpl Col. 4 100 0 N Truck/Trailer

Nashville N/HAR-74-2 7/27/73 Bridge 1 55 65 N Bridge Barrier,

Fall Off Ground

Oak Ridge CONF 090174 NS Overturn 1 55 7 NS Ditch

Texas

Cotulla N/HAR-72-6 9/5/71 Ovtrn Col. 2 60 0 Y(NS) Microbus

Eagle Pass N/HAR-76-4 4/29/75 Overturn 51 55 0 N Concrete Wall

Fairfield BMCS 6-012 NS Overturn 1 60 30 Y(NS) Bridge Barrier

Fischer City BMCS 78-3 12/8/78 HtoS Col. 2 55 0 NS Bus

Continued on next page

(%f 14 V,
r

Table A.6

Truck Accidents

(IJ3

No. Acc. Fall Fire ObetSrc

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. YiN Object Struck

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Texas (continued)

Fort Worth BMCS 6-183 NS Overturn 1 55 30 N Roadbed

Fort Worth NS NS Jackknife 1 55 55 N Bridge Rail

Houston N/HAR-77-1 5/11/76 Overturn 1+ 54 15 N Freeway Roadbed

Luling N/HAR-81-4 11/16/80 Skid 1 55 NS N Ditch

Mesquite BMCS 6-012 NS HtoH Col. 2 105 0 N Truck/Trailer

San Antonio DOTHS800650 9/24/71 Overturn 1 60 0 N Roadbed

Stratford BMCS 6-026 NS HtoH Col. 2 110 NS NS Truck/Trailer

Utah

Bountiful DOTHS801500 10/5/72 Collision 1 65 20 NS GuardrailRdbed

Delta N/HAR-80-2 9/12/79 HtoS Col. 2 55 NS N Van/Bridge

Farmington DOTHS602309 1/23/73 Overturn 1 70 0 NS Roadbed

Salt Lake City DOTHS801499 10/16/72 Overturn 1 70 0 Y(3H) Roadbed

Salt Lake City DOTHS820160 NS Collision 1 55 20 Y(NS) Roadbed

Scipio N/HAR-79-1 8/26/77 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Van

Continued on next page
Tabl e A.6

Truck Accidents

4:b

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Location Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Virginia

Hanover City N/HAB-80-1 12/17/79 HtoH Col. 2 NS 0 N Car

Lynchburg H/HAR-73-3 3/9/72 Overturn 1 25 0 Y(22H) Rock

Quantico Columbus, OH 2/19/81 Bridge 1 55 80 N Brdg Under

News Run Off Structure

Triangle N/HAR-81-6 2/18/81 Collision 1 60 25 N Guardrail

Washington

Pasco BMCS 10-058 NS HtoH Col. 4 110 NS NS Truck/Trailer

Seattle N/HAR-76-7 12/4/75 Jackknife 35 52 0 N Support Column

Wyoming

Baggs NS 8/2/74 Side Col. 2 NS 0 Y(NS) NS

Laramie N/HAR-80-1 8/22/79 HtoH Col. 3 68 0 N House, Vehicle

.1 a. YA
'F,

Table A.7 Legend

Train Accidents

Report Source

ASME

DOT

FRA

ICC

NATL, year,

NCHI, year,

NDCA, year,

report

report

report

report

report C,

NOEN,

NFTW,

N/HZM

NMKC .

year,

year,

American Society of Mechanical Enginec

Department of Transportation

Federal Railroad Administration

Interstate Commerce Commission

Department of Transportation, Federal

Department of Transportation, Federal

Department of Transportation, Federal

Office

Department of Transportation, Federal

Department of Transportation, Federal

Office

National Transportation Safety Board,

Department of Transportation, Federal

Office

Department of Transportation, Federal

Office

Department of Transportation, Federal

Railroad

Railroad

Railroad

Railroad

Railroad

Administration,

Administration,

Administration,

Administration,

Administration,

Atlanta Office

Chicago Office

Washington D.C.

Denver Office

Fort Worth

year, report #

Hazardous Material Accident Report

Railroad Administration, Kansas City

Railroad Administration, New York City

Railroad Administration, Oakland Office

NNYC, year, report #

NOAK,

N/RAR

NS

year, report #

National Transportation Safety Board,Railroad Accident Report

Not Stated

Continued on next page
Table A.7 Legend Continued

Train Accidents

Report Number

NSEA, year

Accident Description

Brdg Col.

Brdg Fail

Drl Col.

HtoH Col.

HtoS Col.

HtoT Col.

Int. Fire

Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Seattle Office

Bridge Collision

Bridge Failure

Derail Collision

Head to Head Collision

Head to Side Collision

Head to Tail Collision

Internal Fire

:==!

(wJ

Continued on next page

10
• ,

Table A.7

Train Accidents

-.1

Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Location Source Accident Description of vel. ht. Y/N Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Alabama

Florence N/RAR-79-2 9/18/78 HtoH Col. 2 T 15 12 N Train

Hunter NATL78FRO18 1/19/79 Brdg Col. 72 8. 75 N Bridge

Muscle Shoals NATL79FRO01 10/8/78 HtoH Col. 2 T NS 0 N Train

North Castle N/RAR-77-9 1/16/77 Derail 22 43 21 N RR Bed, RR Car

Alaska

Hurricane N/RAR-76-3 7/5/75 HtoH Col. 2 T 40 0 N Train

Talkeetna NSEA77FRO05 12/1/76 Derail 71 NS 25 N RR Bed, RR Car

Arizona

Benson N/RAR-75-2 5/24/73 Explosion 12 45 0 Y(SH) NS

Benton NFTW79FRO18 12/25/78 Derail 137 45 23 Y(3H) Bridge, RR Cars,

River

Dequeen NFTW79FRO20 1/13/79 Derail 105 25 20 N RR Bed, RR Car

Raso NOAK79FRO17 12/10/78 Derail NS 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Rone NFTW79FRO14 12/4/78 Derail 125 15 14 N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

0!

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Arkansas

Gilmore NFTW79FRO19 1/8/79 Derail 97 55 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Hartman NFTW79FRO08 2/27/77 Derail 109 40 0 Y(200M) RR Bed, RR Car

Lewisville N/RAR-78-8 3/29/78 Derail 47 35 0 Y(24H) RR Bed, RR Car

Poping-Ozark NFTW79FRO12 11/9/78 Derail 131 38 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Possum Grape

(near) N/RAR-83-06 10/3/82 HtoS Col. 2 50 30 Y(120) Freight Car

California

Andesite NOAK79FRO12 11/26/78 Derail 70 NS 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Bradley NOAK79FRO01 10/4/78 Derail 56 30 0 Y(5D) RR Bed, RR Car

Hayward N/RAR-80-10 4/9/80 Derail 1 52 30 Y(60M) RR Bed, RR Car

Indio N/RAR-74-1 6/25/73 HtoH Col. 2 T 60 0 Y(NS) Train

Kelso N/RAR-81-7 11/17/80 HtoH Col. 2 118 NS N Caboose

Oroville NOAK79FRO1l 11/20/78 Derail 61 30 10 N RR Bed, RR Car

Pinole NOAK79FRO13 12/1/78 Derail 73 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Roseville DOT 4187 4/28/73 Explosion 289 0 0 Y(32H) NS

San Francisco N/RAR-79-5 1/17/79 Int. Fire 2 NS 0 Y(2H) NS

Santa

Margurita NOAK79FRO05 10/18/78 HtoH Col. 2 T 25 0 N Train

Continued on next page
I -7

'J

Table A. 7

Train Accidents

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl of (mph) vel. (ft.) ht. Y/N (dur) OectStu Description

California (continued)

Surf N/RAR-81-1 5/22/81 Derail 3 60 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Therman N/RAR-83-1 1/7/82 Derail 61 57 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Thousand Palms N/RAR-80-1 7/24/79 HtoT Col. 2 T 20 0 Y(NS) Train

Vidal NOAK79FRO25 2/5/79 Derail 78 45 15 N RR Bed, RR Car

Colorado

Lambert NDEN76FR137 7/9/76 Derail 38 60 5 N RR Bed, RR Car

Connecticut

Darian N/RAR-70-3 8/20/69 HtoH Col. 2 T 60 0 N Train

North Canaan N/RAR-77-4 7/13/76 HtoH Col. 2 T 20 0 N Train

Sound View N/RAR-72-1 10/8/70 Drl. Col. 2 T 60 0 Y(2.5H) Train

Delaware

Wilmington N/RAR-76-7 10/17/75 HtoH Col. 3 T 25 0 N Train

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

0•

Location Report Date of Accident Nof vel. ht. y/NFire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

District of Columbia

Washington NDCA76FR151 7/18/76 Derail 84 36 25 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car,

Highway

Washington N/RAR-82-6 1/13/82 Derail 1 10 NS N Wall

Florida

Crestview N/RAR-79-11 4/8/79 Derail 119 35 NS Y(60H) RR Bed, RR Car

Lochloosa N/RAR-81-9 5/26/81 Derail 1 76 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Pensacola N/RAR-78-4 11/9/77 Derail 37 35 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Westlake Wales FRA C71-72 NS Derail 123 50 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Youngstown N/RAR-78-8 2/26/78 Derail 145 45 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Georgia

Covington NATL79FRO25 2/19/79 Derail 80 25 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Pembroke NATL79FRO21 2/7/79 Derail 134 31 5 N RR Bed, RR Car

Rupert NATL76FR219 9/11/76 Derail 108 50 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Vinings NATL79FRO16 1/15/79 Derail 60 35 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
V1

Table A.7

Train Accidents

!

No. Acc. Fall Fire ObetSrc

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N Object Struck

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Illinois

Bartonville NCHI77FRO16 NS Derail 97 52 20 NS RR Bed, RR Car

Chicago N/RAR-77-10 2/4/77 HtoH Col. 2 T 9.5 NS N Train

Chicago N/RAR-73-5 10/30/72 HtoH Col. 3 T 50 0 N Train

Chicago NCHI79FRO04 10/29/78 HtoH Col. 2 T 20 0 N Train

Chicago N/RAR-76-9 1/9/76 HtoH Col. 2 35 NS N Rail Car

Cresent City N/RAR-72-2 6/21/70 Derail 113 43 0 Y(56H) RR Bed, RR Car

Decatur N/RAR-75-4 7/19/74 Yard Col. 595 8.5 0 Y(NS) RR Cars

Elburn NCHI77FRO25 2/21/77 Derail 105 53 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Flagg NCHIRR76118 6/28/76 Derail 140 60 12 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car,

Bridge

Gorham NCHI78FRO30 NS HtoH Col. 2 T 50 NS Y(NS) Train

Harvey N/RAR-80-3 10/12/79 HtoH Col. 2 T 58 0 N Train

Maquon N/RAR-73-4 5/24/72 HtoH Col. 2 T 80 0 Y(NS) Train

Morrison NCHIRR76184 8/22/76 Derail 128 35 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Northbrook NCHI77FRO12 12/20/76 Derail 103 30 20 N RR Bed, RR Car,

Bridge

Salem N/RAR-72-5 6/10/71 Derail 18 90 0 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Stratford NCHI79FRO18 1/9/79 Derail 83 50 0 Y(1OM) RR Bed, RR Car

Springfield N/RAR-81-5 10/30/80 Derail 1 63 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

I

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Source Accident Description of vel. ht. YIN Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Dsritn

Indiana

North Haven N/RAR-77-6 10/19/76 HtoH Col. 2 T 20 0 Y(NS) Train

Sullivan N/RAR-84-02 9/14/83 HtoH Col. 2 35 0 N Caboose

Veedersburg NCHI76FR112 6/25/76 Derail 47 44 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Wheatfield FRA B-8-72 NS Derail 109 40 NS Y(2H) RR Bed, RR Car,

Storage Tank

Iowa

Cedar Rapids NMKC79FRO17 12/25/78 Derail 13 NS 22 N River, Ice

Central Groove NMKC79FROO9 11/28/78 Derail 104 20 10 N RR Bed, RR Car

Cudley FRA B272BN1 NS Derail 93 60 NS Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Des Moines N/RAR-76-8 9/1/75 Derail 63 25 0 Y(4D) RR Bed, RR Car

Emerson N/RAR-83-02 6/15/82 Derail 1 74 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Gordons Ferry NMKC79FRO30 1/28/79 Derail 104 26 35 N Miss. Rvr, RR

Cars

Northwood NMKC77FRO1O 1/23/77 Derail 104+ 40 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Pacific Jnctn N/RAR-83-09 4/13/83 HtoH Col. 2 47 NS N Caboose

Woodburn NMKC79FRO23 1/12/79 Derail 106 50 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page

%,
1 'S

Table A.7

Train Accidents

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu Location Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Kansas

Atchison

Fort Scott

Hecla

Lawrence

Lehigh

Malvern

Kansas/Missouri

Fort Scott/

Liberal

NMKC79FRO24

NMKC79.FR036

NMKC79FROO1

N/RAR-80-4

DOT B23-70

N/RAR-75-1

1/17/79

3/11/79

10/5/78

10/2/79

11/19/69

7/5/74.

HtoH Col.

Derail

HtoS Col.

Derail

Derail

Derail

2T

147

2T

20

36

21

60

25

32

80

27

77

0

6

0

NS

0

NS

Y(100M)

N

N

N

Y(NS)

N

Train

RR Bed,

Train

RR Bed,

RR Bed,

RR Bed,

RR Car

RR

RR

RR

Car

Car

Car

IA

NMKC79FRO20 1/3/79 Derail 68 50 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Kentucky

Fort Knox

Hanson

Mularaugh

Stepstone

N/RAR-83-07

NDCA79FRO20

N/RAR-81-1

NATL77FRO07

3/22/83

1/7/79

7/26/80

11/8/76

Derail

Derail

Derail

Derail

1

115

1

54

28

42

35

38

NS

0

NS

20

N RR

N RR

Y(5760M)RR

N RR

Bed,

Bed,

Bed,

Bed,

RR

RR

RR

RR

Car

Car

Car

Car

Continued on next page
Table A. 7

Train Accidents

!

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Louisiana

Livingston N/RAR-83-05 9/28/82 Derail 1 40 NS Y (80) RR Bed, RR Car

Meeler N/RAR-75-9 5/30/75 HtoH Col. 2 T 48 0 N Train

Taft N/RAR-73-6 2/21/73 HtoH Col. 2 T 43 0 Y(NS) Train

West Monroe NFTW79FRO08 10/24/78 Derail 105 10 6 N RR Bed, RR Car

Maryland

Baltimore N/RAR-78-1 6/12/77 HtoH Col. 2 T 30 0 Y(NS) Train

Corsey FRA C-17-72 NS Derail 55 55 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Germantown N/RAR-81-6 2/9/81 HtoH Col. 2 88 NS NS Train

Seabrook N/RAR-79-3 6/9/78 HtoH Col. 2 T 35 NS N Train

Massachusetts

Beverly N/RAR-82-1 8/11/81 HtoH Col. 2 19 NS N Train

Somerville N/HZM-81-1 4/3/80 HtoS Col. 2 4 NS N Tank Car

Continued on next page

V

0'
Tabl e A.7

Train Accidents

I,

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl of (mph) vel. (ft.) ht. Y/N (dur) OectStu Description

Michigan

Kopje

(Woodlnad) NCHI78FRO24 NS Derail 38 34 8 NS RR Bed, RR Car

Lansing NCHI79FRO15 12/28/78 Derail 74 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Minnesota

DeGraff NMKC76FR126 7/4/76 Derail 61 NS 0 Y(3M) RR Bed, RR Car

Forbes NMKC76FRO59 NS Derail 119 30 30 Y(2H) RR Bed, RR Car

Hills NMKC79FRO12 NS Derail 44 NS NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Nashau NMKC79FR011 1/30/78 Derail 55 40 9 N RR Bed, RR Car

Mississippi

Goodman N/RAR-77-3 6/30/76 Derail 13 88 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Laurel N/RAR-69- 1/25/69 Derail 144 30 0 Y(60H) RR Bed, RR Car

Missouri

Crystal City N/RAR-84-01 7/18/83 Derail 94 52 25 N RR Bed, RR Car

Dexter NMKC79FRO03 10/10/78 HtoH Col. 2 T NS 0 N Train

Dresden NMKC79FRO25 1/23/79 Derail 38 50 8 N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

!~

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl of (mph) vel. (ft.) h. Y/N (dur) OectStu Description

Missouri (continued)

Kansas City NMKC79FRO15 12/16/78 Derail 155 20 24 Y(20M) RR Bridge, RR

Bed, RR Car

Randles NMKC79FRO33 2/9/79 Drl. Col. 2 T 25 0 N RR Bed, RR Car,

Train

Springfield NMKC79FRO22 1/10/79 Derail 124 56 16 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Montana

Belt N/RAR-77-7 11/26/76 Derail 126 38 NS Y(12H) RR Bed, RR Car

Browning NSEA79FRO03 10/23/78 Side Col. 2 T 25 30 N Train

Butte NSEA79FRO13 12/18/78 Derail 81 26 0 NS RR Bed, RR Car

Curry FRA C-7-72 NS Derail 84 50 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Essex NSEA79FRO01 10/3/78 Derail 35 59 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Glacier Park N/RAR-80-6 3/14/80 Derail 10 37 12 N RR.Bed, RR Car

Greycliff NSEA79FRO06 11/3/78 Derail 74 55 12 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Havre NSEA79FRO08 11/14/78 Derail 81 60 18 N RR Bed, RR Car

Lohman N/RAR-79-7 3/28/79 Derail 14 74 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Zurich .NSEA79FROO9 12/8/78 HtoH Col. 2 T 35 0 N Train

Continued on next page

C
P

Table A.7

Train Accidents

"-I

Location Report Date of Accident Nof ACvel. Fallht. yFire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Nebraska,

Angora N/RAR-80-7 2/16/80 HtoH Col. 2 T 49 0 N Train

Arlington NMKC79FRO31 1/31/79 Derail 82 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Crete N/RAR-71-2 2/18/69 Derail 169 52 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Glenville NS 5/19/76 Derail 70 68 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Gothenburg NMKC79FRO35 3/12/79 Derail 109 60 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Hastings N/RAR-77-1 8/2/76 Derail .119 45 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Josselyn NMKC7FROO6 NS Derail 116 70 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Marsland NMKC79FR026 1/25/79 Derail 110 45 40 N RR Bed, RR Car

Potter NMKC77FRO04 11/13/76 Derail 90 NS 0 Y(1M) RR Bed, RR Car

Ralston N/RAR-77-8 12/16/76 Derail 12 53 40 N RR Bed, RR Car

Nevada

Elburz NOAK76FR127 7/4/76 Derail 41 NS 10 N RR Bed, RR Car

Hoya NOAK79FR015 12/4/78 HtoH Col. 2 T 22 0 Y(2.5H) RR Cars

New Jersey

Edison N/RAR-79-10 4/20/79 HtoH Col. 2 T NS 0 Y(5M) Truck, Machinery

Linden N/RAR-80-12 7/9/80 Derail 2 30 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

00

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

New Mexico

Des Moines NDEN79FROO1 10/25/78 Derail 62 23 NS N RR Bridge, RR

Bed, RR Car

New York

Brooklyn N/RAR-82-2 7/3/81 HtoH Col. 2 12.7 NS N Subway Car

Dobbs Ferry N/RAR-81-4 11/7/80 HtoH Col. 2 10 NS Y(15M) Power Car

New York City N/RAR-75-8 1/2/75 HtoH Col. 2 35 NS N Rail Car

NY City Subway N/RAR-79-8 12/12/78 Derail 8 NS 0 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car,

Concrete Wall

NY City Subway N/RAR-79-8 1/15/79 Derail 10 NS 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

NY City Subway N/RAR-79-8 2/14/79 Derail 10 NS NS N RR Bed

NY City Subway N/RAR-79-8 3/21/79 Derail 8 NS 0 N RR Bed

Oneonta N/RAR-74-4 2/12/74 Derail 125 32 0 Y(7D) RR Bed, RR Car

North Carolina

Laleview N/RAR-80-10 4/2/80 HtoH Col. 2 T 35 0 N Train

Spencer N/RAR-78-3 10/8/77 Side Col. 2 T 50 0 N Train, RR Bed, RR

Car

Continued on next page

8)
',t.'

Table A.7

Train Accidents

1I

Location Report Date of Accident Nof ACvel. Fallht. yFire Object Struck

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

North Dakota

Fairmont NMKC79FRO19 12/31/78 Derail 83 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Walcott NMKC79FRO34 2/17/79 Derail 64 48 15 N RR Bed, RR Car

White Earth NMKC79FRO21 1/7/79 Derail 77 45 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Ohio

Albany FRA C-68-72 NS Derail 93 30 NS Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car,

Creek Bed

Circleville Columbus, OH 2/17/81 Derail 490 NS 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

News

Cleveland N/RAR-75-3 5/8/74 Brdg Col. 96 33 25 N Drawbridge

Columbus ICC 4036 NS Derail 29 43 0 Y(2H) RR Bed, RR Car

Huntington FRA B-3-72 NS Derail 108 38 NS Y(3H) RR Bed, RR Car

Leetonia N/RAR-76-2 6/6/75 HtoH Col. 2 T 29 0 N Train

Leetonia NCHI79FRO05 11/1/78 HtoH Col. 5 32 0 N Train

Lodi NCHIRR76081 5/30/76 Derail 72 57 15 Y(2H) RR Bed, RR Car

Pettisville N/RAR-76-10 2/4/76 HtoH Col. 2 T 70 0 Y(NS) Train

Pemberville NCHI79FRO12 12/3/78 Derail 185 35 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

St. Louisville Utica News NS Derail 83+ 25 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

D1

Location Report Date of Accident Nof ACvel. Fallt. yFire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Ohio (continued)

Wooster NCHI79FRO08 11/18/78 HtoS Col.. 2 T 23 0 N Train, Tower

Wooster NCHI77FRO13 12/23/76 Derail 131 30 15 Y(1OM) RR Bed, RR Car

Oklahoma

Alva NFTW79FRO28 3/21/79 Derail 83 42 5 N RR Bed, RR Car

Leonard ASME RAIL

TRANSPORT

PROCEEDINGS NS Derail 23 35 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Mustang N/RAR-75-6 9/1/74 HtoH Col. 2 T 40 0 Y(NS) Train

Sallisaw NFTW79FRO11 11/6/78 Derail 52 37 60 N RR Bed, RR Car

Oregon

Huntington NSEA79FRO12 12/18/78 Derail 97 60 20 N RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page

A
(!I ! r,

0?

Table A.7

Train Accidents

I,

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Source Accident Description Vhcl of (mph) vel.(ft.) h Y/N (dur) OectStu Description

Pennsylvania

Big Run NNYC79FRO31 2/13/79 Derail 74 34 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Bristol N/RAR-82-5 3/29/82 HtoH Col. 2T 22 0 N Train

Bryant NNYC79FRO21 NS Derail 98 30 5 N RR Bed, RR Car

Culmerville NNYC79FRO03 10/10/78 Derail 145 35 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Herndon N/RAR-73-3 3/12/72 HtoH Col. 2 T 60 0 Y(NS) Train

Munch N/RAR-79-6 1/31/79 HtoH Col. 2 T 30 0 N Train

North Wales N/RAR-80-11 7/17/80 HtoH Col. 2 39 NS N Electric Car

Philadelphia N/RAR-80-5 10/16/79 2HTOT CL. 3 T 28 0 N Trains

Royersford N/RAR-80-2 10/1/79 HtoH Col. 2 T 45 0 N Train

Weatherby NNYC78FA015 NS Derail 145 NS 30 NS RR Bed, RR Car

South Carolina

Denmark NATL79FRO13 1/7/79 Derail 103 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Florence N/RAR-78-6 2/24/78 Derail 20 20 0 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

(7'

No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Tennessee

Brownsville NATL77FRO20 2/17/77 Derail 101 49 20 Y(4H) RR Bed, RR Car

Fosterville FRA C-5-72 NS Derail 123 47 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

N Johnsonville N/RAR-82-4 12/28/81 HtoH Col. 2 25 45 N Caboose

Pulaski R/RAR-76-6 10/1/75 Derail 14 65 40 N RR Bed, RR Car

Roddy NATL79FRO12 12/24/78 Derail 231 44 6 N RR Bed, RR Car

Waverly N/RAR-79-1 2/22/78 Derail 120 35 0 Y(6H) RR Bed, RR Car

Texas

Britton NFTW79FRO16 12/10/78 Derail 98 25 7 N RR Bed, RR Car

Cotulla N/RAR-74-3 12/1/73 HtoH Col. 2 T 40 0 Y(1.5H) Train

Dallas San Jose News 2/21/81 Derail 60 NS 50 Y(4H) RR Bed, RR Car,

Bridge

Garland NFTW77FRO07 3/20/77 Derail 44 NS 0 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Houston N/RAR-75-7 9/21/74 Yard Col. 503 20 0 Y(9H) RR Cars

Houston N/RAR-72-6 10/19/71 Derail 88 45 45 Y(5H) RR Bed, RR Car

Marquez NFTW79FRO05 10/13/78 Derail 94 30 0 N RR Bed, RR Car,

Timber Brd?

Paxton N/HZM-80-1 9/8/79 Derail 56 30 15 Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Continued on next page

I:
Table A.7

Train Accidents

!,

No. Acc. Fall Fire. Object Struck

Location Report Date of Accident of vel. ht. Y/N OectStu

Source Accident Description Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Texas (continued)

Temple N/RAR-83-08 3/17/83 HtoH Col. 8 35 NS N Freight Car

Tyler NFTW79FROO7 10/22/78 Derail 79 45 12 N RR Bed, RR Car

Utah

Lakeside NDEN76FR111 6/25/76 Derail 52 NS 10 N RR Bed, RR Car,

Lake

Virginia

Arlington N/RAR-73-2 4/27/72 UtoH Col. 2 T 60 0 N Train

Colonial Hghts N/RAR-83-04 5/5/82 Derail 1 64 40 Y (8D) RR Bed, RR Car

Crewe N/RAR-82-3 11/28/81 KtoS Col. 3 27 NS N RR Car

Elma N/RAR-79-4 12/3/78 Derail 12 79 NS Y(NS) RR Bed, RR Car

Franconia N/RAR-71-1 1/27/70 Derail 1 65 NS N Embankment

Jarratt N/RAR-76-11 5/5/76 Derail 58 72 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Rockfish N/RAR-83-10 4/3/83 Derail 1 48 NS N Landslide

Continued on next page
Table A.7

Train Accidents

U,=

Location Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck Sourtc Source Accident Accident Decipinof Description Vhcl (mph) vel.(ft.) h. Y/N (dur) OectStu Description

Washington

Deer Park NSEA79FRO02 10/4/78 Derail 41 23 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Ephrata

(Naylor) NSEA79FRO21 2/28/79 Derail 65 50 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Kalama NSEA76FRO28 9/7/76 Derail NS 52 35 N RR Bed, RR Car,

River

Kapowsin NSEA79FRO23 3/6/79 Brdg Fail 45 10 15 N River, Bridge

Tacoma NSEA79FR025 3/22/79 Derail 122 23 0 N RR Bed, RR Car,

RR Bridge

Tukailla NS 10/8/77 HtoH Col. 2 T 50 NS Y(NS) Train

Wenatchee N/RAR-76-1 8/6/74 Explosion 201 10 0 Y(NS) NS

West Virginia

Orleans Road N/RAR-80-9 2/12/80 HtoH Coi. 2 T 38 0 N Train

South Ruffner NDCA79FRO28 2/4/79 Side Col. 2 T 78 5 N Train

Welch N/RAR-81-2 9/6/80 HtoS Col. 2 38 NS NS Freight Car

Continued on next page

4
4 4'

Table A.7

Train Accidents

!,

Report Date of Accident No. Acc. Fall Fire Object Struck

Location source Accident Description of vel. ht. YIN Vhcl (mph) (ft.) (dur) Description

Wisconsin

Columbus NCH179FRO09 11/24/78 Derail 70 50 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Cylon FRA C-15-72 NS Derail 95 45 NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Franksville NCHI79FRO28 3/15/79 Derail 81 40 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Milawukee NCHI79FRO17 1/7/79 Derail 55 38 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Sturtevant NCHI79FRO24 2/12/79 Derail 84 40 NS N RR Bed, RR Car

Wyoming

Dale Junction NDEN79FRO07 1/22/79 Derail 121 40 40 Y(56H) RR Bed, RR Car

Granite N/RAR-79-12 7/31/79 Derail 85 75 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Hermosa N/RAR-81-3 10/16/80 HtoH Col. 2 40 NS N Caboose

Leroy NDEN79FRO02 11/3/78 Derail 92 60 0 N RR Bed, RR Car

Ramsey N/RAR-79-9 3/29/79 HtoH Col. 2 T 48 0 N Train

Red Desert NDEN77FRO01 NS Derail 66+ NS NS NS RR Bed, RR Car

Sheridan N/RAR-72-4 3/28/71 Yard COL. 14 15 0 N RR Cars

Wamsutter NDEN77FRO07 2/23/77 Derail NS-T 67-54 0-0 N RR Bed, RR Car,

Side Col. Train
I:t

7
APPENDIX B

List of Tables

Page

B.1 Petroleum Industry Accident Data Summary, 1973-1981 ......... ......... B-3

B.2 Distribution of Velocities for Truck/Semitrailers Involved

in Fatal and Injury Accidents in California, 1958-1967 ................ B-5

.B.3 Distribution of Estimated Original Vehicle Velocities for

All Types of Accidents, North Carolina, 1979-1981 ..................... B-7

B.4 Distribution of Estimated Vehicle Impact Velocities for

All Types of Accidents, North Carolina, 1979-1981 ..................... B-8

B.5 Distribution of Train Velocities at Rail-Highway

Grade-Crossing Accident/Incidents Involving Motor

Vehicles, 1975-1982 ..... B 10

B.6 Summary of Objects Struck and Type of Accident for

Accidents Involving U.S. Private and For-Hire Motor

Carriers, 1973-1983 B-11

B.7 Objects Struck During California Accidents, 1975-1983 ................. B-12

B.8 Objects Struck During California Accidents, Reordered

According to Type of Accident, 1975-1983 .... 00. 00000.00000"S..00 B-15

, o5o o o o oo o o o o o o o

B-i
I

I'
APPENDIX B

Truck Accident Data

B.1 Introduction

This appendix summarizes both the highway accident data which form the

basis for the distribution of accident scenarios and the estimates of the

probability distributions used in the probabilistic analysis of future truck

accidents involving the transport of spent nuclear fuel. The primary sources

of data are the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS), American Petroleum

Institute (API), California Highway Patrol (CHP), and the California

Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) reports on highway accidents. In

addition, a Sandia report- on severe accidents was the source of fire duration

distributions and estimates of the probability of a fire.

Section B.2 discusses the data used to estimate the truck accident

rate. Section B.3 discusses the distributions of truck velocities. Section

B.4 covers the distribution of train velocities used to analyze rail-highway

grade crossing accidents. Section B.5 discusses the distribution of objects

struck, and, finally, Sections B.6 and B.7 cover the fire accident data.

B.2 Truck Accident Rate

Information concerning truck accidents involving motor carriers of

property that operate in interstate commerce is available in reports published

by the BMCS of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).B. 1

-B8 1 3 Truck

accidents are defined by the BMCS as occurrences involving a motor vehicle

operated by a motor carrier subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Regulations (49 CFR 390-397) resulting in (1) the death of one or more human

beings; (2) bodily injury to one or more persons who, as a result, receives

medical treatment away from the scene of the accident; and/or (3) total damage

to all property aggregating dollar damage at or above the dollar damage

threshold limit based on actual cost or reliable estimates.

Prior to 1973, the BNCS tabulated only those truck accidents with damage

of $250 or greater involving for-hire carriers, i.e., trucking firms that haul

freight owned by another party. Since 1973, the BMCS has also tabulated

B-1
accidents involving private, i.e., firms using their own, or leased, vehicles

as part of their commercial operation to transport their own goods, as well as

accidents of for-hire carriers. However, since 1973, the total vehicle miles

have not been included in the BMCS reports. The accident rate for the period

1960-1972, 2.48xi0- 6 accidents/vehicle-mile, is an estimate; however, (1) it

is based on the experience some years ago, and (2) it is not clear what is

defined as a truck. This definition is important because pickup trucks and

vans, i.e., non tractor/semitrailer trucks, tend to have an accident rate

closer to that of automobiles. Therefore, it was decided not to base the

accident rate for this study on the BMCS data.

Another source of truck accident data is the database maintained by the

API consisting of information supplied by petroleum industry companies.

Accident data is available for the API for the period 1968 through 1981 for

large trucks.B' 14-B' 18 Although a precise definition of an accident is not

included in the reports, an accident rate based on the API data was used in

this study. The API accident rate data was judged to be more reliable because

shipments involving hazardous materials are usually more tightly controlled

than shipments involving non-hazardous materials. In addition, the API data

was judged to be most applicable to spent fuel shipment because trucks that

transport gasoline type products are of similar size and weight to trucks that

transport spent fuel. The API data is expected to be conservative because the

average trip length of a gasoline truck is less than 28 miles and involves all

types of roads. This will result in a higher accident rate than an accident

rate based on cross-country trips that involve primarily interstates.

To allow for the imposition of the national speed limit in 1973, only the

data from 1973 through 1981 was used to estimate a truck accident rate. Table

B.1 summarizes the API accident data for the years 1973 to 1981. The

estimated accident rate, 5.94Exi0-6 accidents/truck-mile, is higher than the

rate based on the BMCS data.

B-2
Table B.1

Petroleum Industry Accident Data Summary, 1973-1981A/

No. of No. of No. of Truck Accident Rate/

Year Compy. Trucks Accidents Miles x 1000 Truck-Mile

1973 73 20,046 3,804 508,783 7.48 10-6

1974 73 20,147 3,151 469,804 6.71 10-6

1975 69 29,071 4,089 779,260 5.25 10-6

1976 70 22,748 3,528 585,609 6.02 10-6

1977 69 21,508 2,784 519,446 5.36 10-6

1978 68 19,113 2,562 404,748 6.33 10-6

1979 63 21,414 2,889 467,939 6.17 10-6

1980 62 21,970 2,391 455,324 5.25 10-6

1981 81 21,158 2,445 465,571 5.25 10-6

Total 197,175 27,643 4,656,484 5.94 10-6

Avg/year 21,908 3,071 517,387

a/ American Petroleum Institute.B.14-B.18

B-3
B.3 Distributions of Velocity for Truck Accidents

The velocity of the truck at the time of an accident is an important

parameter in determining impact forces on cargos involved in highway

accidents. This parameter, in combination with the angle of impact, is an

estimate of the impact velocity of the cask at the time of the accident. The

impact velocity, in combination with the cask orientation and the object

struck or subsequent interaction of the truck with its environment after the

accident begins, determines the forces and damage experienced by the cask.

Thus, the distribution of truck velocities at the time of an accident is one

of the necessary inputs into the probabilistic analysis of accidents involving

spent fuel casks.

Considerable effort went into attempting to accumulate a database of

accident data from past events which reasonably reflects what might be

experienced by trucks transporting spent fuel casks in the future. To this

end, annual reports on motor vehicle accidents, as accumulated by the CHP

formed the basis for developing an appropriate collection of accident

statistics.B.19-B. 2 9 Although data from several classifications of accidents

have been reported, e.g., all injury accidents, injury truck accidents, and

all fatal accidents, we chose to estimate the desired distribution of

velocities on fatal and injury accidents involving truck/semitrailers.

The distribution of velocities covering the years 1958-1967 is given in

Table B.2. An important question with regard to the use of the data in Table

B.2 as a basis for estimating velocities for future truck accidents is whether

the traffic conditions in the 1958-1967 time period is comparable to traffic

conditions which can be expected to be experienced in the future. Prior to

1959 California highway speed limits were 55 mph for automobiles and 45 mph

for trucks (defined as trucks with three or more axles and any truck or truck

tractor pulling one or more trailers) and cars with trailers. In 1959 the

motor vehicle code was changed to limit cars to 65 mph; however, trucks and

cars with trailers were still limited to 45 mph except on highways with four

or more lanes (at least two lanes in each direction), where the speed limit

was 50 mph. In 1963, the motor vehicle code was changed to limit cars on

B-4
Table B.2

Distribution of Velocities for Truck/Semitrailers Involved in

Fatal and Injury Accidents in California, 19 58 -1 9 67a/

Number of Fractional Cumulative

Velocity Accidents Percent Percent

(mph) (M) (M)

0 1,774 6.41 6.41

1-10 4,143 14.96 21.37

11-20 4,122 14.89 36.25

21-30 4,248 15.34 51.59

31-40 4,733 17.09 68.69

41-50 7,264 26.23 94.92

51-60 1,173 4.24 99.15

61-70 171 0.62 99.77

>70 63 0.23 100.00

Total 1

a/ California Highway Patrol.B 1 9 B2 9

B-5
freeways to 70 mph while trucks and cars with trailers were restricted to 50

mph on all highways.

The speed limits were again changed in 1967 to allow trucks and cars with

trailers to travel up to 55 mph over all highways. These regulations remained

in effect until superseded by the national speed limit in 1973. Because the

speed limits during the 1958-1967 time period were lower than the present 55

mph limit for all vehicles, the velocities in Table B.2 may be biased towards

lower velocities. However, by choosing fatal and injury accidents, rather

than all accidents (including non injury accidents), this bias has been

somewhat compensated for because injury and fatal accidents generally involve

higher velocities.

Accident data from North CarolinaB.30 was used to estimate the effects of

braking on impact velocity. Tables B.3 and B.4 summarize the distribution of

velocities for accidents involving all types of vehicles resulting in

fatalities, injuries, or property damage for the years 1979-1981. In Table

B.3, the velocities are based on estimates of the original vehicle velocity

while in Table 8.4 the velocities are estimates of the velocity at impact. As

discussed in Section 5.0, a comparison of these two distributions was used as

a basis for adjusting the distribution of truck velocities for the effects of

braking during the evolution of an accident prior to vehicle impact.

B.4 Distribution of Train Speeds at Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

The U.S. DOT Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) defines rail-highway

grade-crossing accidents as any impact between railroad on-track equipment and

an automobile, bus, truck, motorcycle, bicycle, farm vehicle, or pedestrian at

a highway-rail grade crossing in which the amount of damage done to railroad

equipment is at least a specified damage threshold limit. If the impact

causes damage to railroad equipment less than the dollar damage threshold

limit, it is classified as an incident. Prior to 1975, the damage threshold

limit was $750 and only rail-highway grade-crossing accidents were tabulated

by the FRA.B- 3 4 In 1975, the threshold was increased to $1750 to account for

B-6
Table B.3

Distribution of Estimated Original Vehicle Velocities for All

Types of Accidents, North Carolina, 1979-1981Wa

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1979 1980 1981 Total Avg. Pct. Pct.

(mph) (M) (%)

0 512 214 188 914 305 0.14 0.14

1-5 22,191 19,976 19,205 61,372 20,457 9.25 9.39

6-10 20,335 18,655 17,865 56,855 18,952 8.57 17.96

11-15 13,846 12,697 12,051 38,594 12,865 5.82 23.77

16-20 20,417 18,965 18,042 57,424 19,141 8.65 32.43

21-25 17,336 16,388 16,100 49,824 16,608 7.51 39.94

26-30 23,336 21,472 21,582 66,390 22,130 10.01 49.94

31-35 33,147 33,147 34,030 100,324 33,441 15.12 65.06

36-40 17,245 16,317 16,075 49,637 16,546 7.48 72.54

41-45 22,028 21,049. 21,156 64,233 21,411 9.68 82.22

46-50 16,144 14,889 14,315 45,348 15,116 6.83 89.06

51-55 15,336 14,301 14,784 44,421 14,807 6.69 95.75

56-60 3,559 3,492 3,261 10,312 3,437 1.55 97.31

61-65 2,071 1,907 1,991 5,969 1,990 0.90 98.21

66-70 1,621 1,604 1,476 4,701 1,567 0.71 98.92

71-75 751 685 719 2,155 718 0.32 99.24

76-80 603 584 539 1,726 575 0.26 99.50

81-85 134 127 143 404 135 0.06 99.56

>85 1243 855 807 2,905 968 0.44 100.00

Not Statedb-/ 45,590 43,290 42,526 131,406 43,802 N/A N/A

a/ University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center.B. 3 0

b/ Excluded from percentage calculations.

B-7
Table B.4

Distribution of Estimated Vehicle Impact Velocities for All

Types of Accidents, North Carolina, 1979-1981A'

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1979 1980 1981 Total Avg. Pct. Pct.

(mph) (%) (M)

0 818 413 412 1643 548 0.26 0.26

1-5 30,831 29,125 29,181 89,137 29,712 14.08 14.34

6-10 29,236 28,273 28,026 85,535 28,512 13.51 27.85

11-15 20,279 19,905 19,811 59,995 19,998 9.48 37.33

16-20 26,955 26,958 26,423 80,336 26,779 12.69 50.02

21-25 18,904 18,386 18,619 55,909 18,636 8.83 58.85

26-30 23,914 23,301 23,023 70,238 23,413 11.09 69.94

31-35 19,368 19,123 18,706 57,197 19,066 9.03 78.98

36-40 15,991 15,091 14,589 45,671 15,224 7.21 86.19

41-45 11,589 10,866 10,554 33,009 11,003 5.21 91.41

46-50 9,754 9,249 8,726 27,729 9,243 4.38 95.79

51-55 4,936 4,945 4,730 14,611 4,870 2.31 98.10

56-60 2,056 2,028 1,861 5,945 1,982 0.94 99.03

61-65 818 678 691 2,187 729 0.35 99.38

66-70 697 687 673 2,057 686 0.32 99.71

71-75 250 241 239 730 243 0.12 99.82

76-80 262 251 205 718 239 0.11 99.93

81-85 58 55 52 165 55 0.03 99.96

>85 94 87 73 254 85 0.04 100.00

Not Stated!b/ 60,635 50,952 50,261 161,848 53,949 N/A N/A

a/ University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center.B.30

b/ Excluded from percentage calculations.

B-8
the effects of inflation. Also, at this time, the FRA started to include

rail-highway grade-crossing incidents in their grade crossing accident

data.B'31-B' 38 This resulted in a substantial increase in the reported number

of impacts between trains and other mobile objects in the grade-crossing

accident data after 1975. Because of the difference in types of events

recorded, only the rail-highway grade-crossing accident data after 1974 was

used.

Table B.5 presents the distribution of train velocities at grade-crossing

accidents/incidents involving motor vehicles. The reliability of the train

accident/incident velocity at rail-highway grade-crossings can be considered

good because railroad locomotives are equipped with accident recorders to

record the train's velocity prior to, during, and after the accident, although

on a very crude scale. The recorded train velocity while probably no more

accurate than 5 to 10 mph, is certainly more reliable than after-the-fact

velocity estimates made by investigating officers at highway accident sites.

B.5 Highway Accident Object Frequency

Data were collected from several sources to estimate the frequency of

impact with particular objects. Two of the primary data sources were the

CALTRANS for all vehicles and the BMCS for trucks.

Table B.6 presents the truck highway accident data obtained from the BMCS

for the years 1973 through 1 9 8 3 .B'4-B-13 The object struck (for collision

accidents) or accident type (for noncollision accidents) are categories as

given by the BMCS. These categories are divided into nonfixed-object

collisions, fixed-object collisions (for collision accidents), ran-off-road

accidents, impact-with-roadbed accidents, or other noncollision accidents (for

noncollision accidents). The BMCS data were divided this way in order to

provide subcategories that would correspond with-those defined by the CALTRANS

in their reports on objects struck during highway accidents.

Table B.7 presents the primary objects struck during highway accidents,

as reported by the CALTRANS for all vehicles for 1975 through 19 8 3 .B'39-B'47

All object struck subcategories are as defined by the CALTRANS and the object

numbering system follows the CALTRANS convention.

B-9
Distribution of Train

Table B.5

Velocities at Rail-Highway Grade-Crosping Accident/Incidents

Involving Motor Vehicles, 1975-198Z2/

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total Pct Pct.

(mph) (%) (M)

0-9 3,887 3,793 3,923 4,098 3,788 3,224 2,715 2,125 27,553 33.79 33.79

10-19 2,221 2,428 2,339 2,431 2,303 1,950 1,724 1,364 16,765 20.56 54.35

20-29 1,919 2,098 2,152 2,097 2,042 1,589 1,459 1,257 14,611 17.92 72.27

30-39 1,365 1,511 1,600 1,582 1,457 1,277 1,061 935 10,788 13.23 85.50

40-49 960 1,026 1,086 1,106 985 887 825 742 7,617 9.34 94.84

50-59 391 433 419 382 351 330 279 294 2,879 3.53 98.37

60-69 109 127 119 95 87 96 94 97 824 1.01 99.38

70-79 61 59 68 62 51 49 55 56 461 0.56 99.94

80-89 4 6 8 2 2 2 4 1 29 0.04 99.98

>90 8 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 17 0.02 100.00

Total.k! 10,95 T 1,4-82 TTnI, Wl119067T V7 8,222 n,-f 8f-4 TU7F. OT

a/ U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Rail-Highway

Grade-Crossing Accident/Incidents Bulletins.B34B.41

b/ Excludes accidents of unknown velocities.

0

3.
Table B.6

Summary of Objects Struck and Type of Accident for Accidents ;nvolving

U.S. Private and For-Hire Motor Carriers, 1973-19832!

Fra.

Type of Accident Total Avg.k/ Pct. Remarks

(%)

I. Nonfixed Object Collision

w/ Commercial Truck

w/ Automobile

w/ Pedestrian

w/ Bus

wI Train

w/ Bicyclist

w/ Animal

w/ Motorcycle

wI Other or Not Specified

Subtotal

42,848

143,573

4,493

1,477

2,575

1,259

2,111

2,680

16 157

3,895

13,052

408

134

234

114

192

244

1 469

TMM

12.88

43.15

1.35

0.44

0.77

0.38

0.63

0.81

4.86 Note 1

II. Fixed Object Collision Note 1

Collision Accidents Subtotal

III. Ran Off Road

IV. Impact with Roadbed

Jackknife

Overturn

Subtotal

V. Other Noncollision Accidents

Separation of Units

Fire

Cargo Loss/Spillage

Cargo Shift

Other or Not Specified

Subtotal

Noncol. Accidents Subtotal

29,476 2,680 8.86

246,649 22,423 74.12

30,104 2,737 9.05 Note 1

18,184

27 792

1,033

3,219

1,433

1,139

3 213

1,653

,20527

93.9

293

130

104

292

5.46

8.35

0.31

0.97

0.43

0.34

0.97

86,117 7,829 25.88

Total Accidents 332,766 30,251 100.00

a/

b/

Nqot~e 1:

U.S. Oena.tmeni of Transportation, Bureau

Safety.B 5.

Based on 11 year period.

Object distribution from California TASAS

Table B.8.

of Motor Carrier

accident survey, see

B-Il
Table B. 7

Objects Struck During California Accidents, 1975-1983v/

Fra.

Object Struck Total Avg.-- Pct.

(M)

1. Side of Bridge Railing 9,473 1,053 0.82

2. End of Bridge Railing 1,689 188 0.15

3. Pier, Column, Abutment 810 90 0.07

4. Bottom of Structure (Overhead Bridge

Structure) 639 71 0.06

5. Bridge End Post in Gore (Older Bridge

w/Protective Island) 275 30.6 0.02

10. Light or Signal Pole 8,384 932 0.72

11. Utility Pole 8,140 904 0.70

12. Pole (Type Note Stated) 454 50 0.04

13. Traffic Sign/Sign Post 9,687 1,076 0.83

14. Other Signs Not Traffic 333 37 0.03

15. Guardrail 25,354 2,817 2.18

16. Barrier 41,432 4,604 3.57

17. & 30. Wall (Concrete/Wood/Sound) 3,751 417 0.32

18. Dike or Curb 69,134 7,682 5.96

19. Traffic Island 2,590 288 0.22

20. Raised Bars (Delineation Bars, as

Traffic Islands w/o Curb) 67 7.4 0.01

21. Concrete Object (Headwall, Drop Inlet) 921 102 0.08

22. Guidepost, Culvert, Postmile Marker 9,020 1,002 0.78

23. Cut Slope or Embankment 22,403 2,489 1.93

24. Over Embankment 12,758 1,418 1.10

25. In Water 45 5.0 0.004

26. Drainage Ditch 7,850 872 0.68

27. Fence 13,701 1,522 1.18

28. Trees 8,392 932 0.72

29. Plants 5,111 568 0.44

40. Natural Material on Road 1,785 198 0.15

41. Temporary Barricades, Cones 1,337 149 0.12

42. Other Object on Road 10,517 1,169 0.91

43. Other Object off Road 10,153 1,128 0.87

44. Overturned 61,848 6,872 5.33

45. Crash Cushion 1,199 133 0.10

98. Unknown Object Struck 975 108 0.08

99. No Object Involved 9,386 1,043 0.81

00. Other Vehicle 801,256 89,028 69.02

B-12
Table B.7 Continued

Fra.

Object Struck Total Avg.b/ Pct.

(%)

Total Primary Object Struck 1,160,869 128,985 100.00

XX. Not Stated 180 20 N/A

YY. Not Applicable 239,655 26,628 N/A

ZZ. Invalid Code 164 18 N/A

Total Accidents 1,165,097 129,455 N/A

a/ TASAS Selective Record Retrieval.B'39B.47

b_/ Based on 9 year period.

N/A Not applicable.

B-13
The CALTRANS accident data were reordered according to the accident

categories defined in Table B.6. The result is Table B.8. Certain objects in

Table B.8 were combined because of the similarity of these objects when

considered in structural analysis calculations. The BMCS and the CALTRANS

data on the object frequencies were combined to derive the probability of

occurrences of the different accident scenarios.

B.6 Truck Fire Duration Distributions

The thermal response of the cask during a truck fire depends on the

temperature of the fire, location of the fire relative to the cask and the

duration of the fire. The type and amount of combustible materials will

significantly affect the duration of a fire. Thus, the fire duration

distribution will vary for different accident scenarios. For example, a fire

involving a collision with a tanker truck can be expected to last longer than

a fire involving a collision with an automobile or a collision with a

noncombustible fixed object. To assess the probabilities of a truck cask's

experiencing different thermal response levels, five fire duration

distributions were developed. These distributions were associated with

automobile collisions, truck collisions, collisions with fixed objects, other

collisions including overturns and jackknifing, and noncollision fires. The

basis for these distributions was the fire duration program developed by

Sandia.B. 4 8 These distributions are summarized in Table 5.5.

B.7 Probability of Fire

Not all truck accidents will involve a fire; thus it is necessary to

estimate the probability of a fire given an accident. The likelihood of a

fire can be expected to vary between accident scenarios. Several sources

provided statistical information for several types of accidents.B' 1-B- 1 3 ,

8 -

4 8

The probabilities of a fire given each of the different accident scenarios

used in this study and listed in Table 5.9, are based on the statistics

presented in the Sandia report on severe accidents.B- 4 8

B-14
Table B.8

Objects Struck During California Accidents

Reordered According to Type of Accident, 1975-19832!

Fra.

Type of Accident Total Avg.b-/ Pct. Remarks

(%)

I. Nonfixed Object Collision

40. Natural Material on Road

41. Temporary Barricades, Cones

42. Other Object on Road

98. Unknown Object Struck

00. Other vehicle

Subtotal

II. Fixed Object Collision

1-2. Side or End of Bridge Railing

3. Pier, Column, Abutment

4. Bottom of Structure

5. Bridge End Post in Gore

10-12. Light, Signal, Utility or Other

Type Pole

13-14. Traffic Sign/Sign Post or Other

Signs

15. Guardrail

16. Barrier

17&30. Wall (Concrete/Wood/Sound)

18-20. Dike, Curb, Traffic Island or

Raised Bars

21. Concrete Object (Headwall, Drop

Inlet)

22. Guidepost, Culvert, Postmile Marker

45. Crash Cushion

Subtotal

Collision Accidents Subtotal T

1,785

1,337

10,517

975

801,256

198

149

1169

108

8,9028

1,240

90

71

30.6

0.15

0.12

0.91

0.08

69.02

11,162

810

639

275

0.96

0.07

0.06

0.02

Note 1

Note 2

16,978 1,886

10,020

25,354

41,432

3,751

1,113

2,817

4,604

417

71,791 7,977

921 102

9,020 1,002

1,199 133

193,352T2

.TO=. T11213

1.46

0.86'

2.18

3.57

0.32

6.18

0.08

0.78

0.10

1.93

1.10

0.004

0.68

1.18

0.72

0.44

0.87

III. Ran Off Road

23. Cut Slope or Embankment

24. Over Embankment

25. In Water

26. Drainage Ditch

27. Fence

28. Trees

29. Plants

43. Other Object off Road

Subtotal

22,403

12,758

45

7,850

13,701

8,392

5,111

10,153

80,413

2,489

1,418

5.0

872

1,522

932

568

1,128

Note 3

Note 3

B-15
Table B.8 Continued

Fra.

Type of Accident Total Avg.A/ Pct. Remarks

(M)

IV. Impact with Roadbed

44. Overturned 61,848 6,872 5.33

V. Other Noncollision Accidents

99. No Object Involved 9,386 1,043 0.81

Noncollision Accidents Subtotal I15, TULT80

Total Accidents 1,160,869 128,985 100.00

All LLNL calculations are based on static analysis. Static force is defined

as ultimate static force at which complete collapse of object occurs.

a/ TASAS Selective Record Retrieval.

b/ Based on 9 year period.

Note 1 Assume worst case that truck goes off bridge. Distributions of bridge

heights and surfaces below bridges determined from Engineering

Computer Corporation (ECC) survey in Appendix 0.

Note 2 Distribution of bridge column size determined from ECC survey in

Appendix D.

I

Note 3 Distribution of soil types and

Appendix D.

surfaces determined from ECC survey in

B-16
B.8 References

B.1 1969 Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property, Bureau of Motor

Carrier Safety, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC, December 1970.

B.2 1970 Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property, Bureau of Motor

Carrier Safety, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC, March 1972.

B.3 1971-1972 Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property, Bureau of Motor

Carrier Safety, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC, May 1974

B.4 1973 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, July 1975.

B.5 1974 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, 1975.

B.6 1975 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, 1976.

B.7 1976 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, October 1977.

B.8 1977 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, May 1980.

Bureau

U.S.

Bureau

U.S.

Bureau

U. S.

Bureau

U.S.

Bureau

U.S.

of Motor Carrier

Department of

of Motor Carrier

Department of

of Motor Carrier

Department of

of Motor Carrier

Department of

of Motor Carrier

Department of

B-17
B.9 1978 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property, Bureau of Motor Carrier

Safety, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC, May 1980.

B.10 1979 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, 1980.

Bureau

U.S.

of Motor Carrier

Department of

B.11 1980-1981 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property, Bureau of Motor

Carrier Safety, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC, August 1982.

8.12 1982 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property, Bureau of Motor Carrier

Safety, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC, May 1983.

8.13 1983 Accidents of Motor Carriers of Property,

Safety, Federal Highway Administration,

Transportation, Washington, DC, October 1984.

Bureau

U.S.

of Motor Carrier

Department of

B.14 Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents in the Petroleum Industry for 1977,

American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, May 1978.

8.15 Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents in the Petroleum Industry for 1978,

American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, August 1979.

B.16 Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents in the Petroleum Industry for 1979,

American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, June 1980.

8.17 Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents in the Petroleum Industry for 1980,

American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, September 1981.

B-18
B.18 Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents in the Petroleum Industry for 1981,

American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, August 1982.

B.19 1957 Annual

Sacramento,

B.20 1958 Annual

Sacramento,

B.21 1959 Annual

Sacramento,

B.22 1960 Annual

Sacramento,

B.23 1961 Annual

Sacramento,

Statistical Report,

CA, May 1958.

Statistical Report,

CA, May 1959.

Statistical Report,

CA, May 1960.

Statistical Report,

CA, May 1961.

Statistical Report,

CA, May 1962.

Department of California Highway Patrol,

Department of California Highway Patrol,

Department of California Highway Patrol,

Department of California Highway Patrol,

Department of California Highway Patrol,

B.24 1962 Traffic Accident Statistics, Department of California Highway

Patrol, Sacramento, CA, May 1963.

B.25 1963 Traffic Accident Statistics, Department of California Highway

Patrol, Sacramento, CA, May 1964.

B.26 1964 Traffic Accident Statistics, Department of California Highway

Patrol, Sacramento, CA, May 1965

B.27 1965 Traffic Accident Statistics, Department of California Highway

Patrol, Sacramento, CA, April 1966.

B.28 1966 Report of Fatal and Injury Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents,

Department of California Highway Patrol, Sacramento, CA, July 1967.

B- 19
B.29 1967 Report of Fatal and Injury Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents,

Department of California Highway Patrol, Sacramento, CA, July 1968.

8.30 E. G. Hamilton, Single, Variable Tabulations for 1979-1981 North

Carolina Accidents, University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research

Center, Chapel Hill, NC, September 1977. --

B.31 Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents/Incidents Bulletin for the Year

Ended December 31, _ 1975, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad

Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.

B.32 Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents/Incidents Bulletin for the Year

Ended December 31, 1976, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad

Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC,

December 1977.

B.33 Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 43, Calendar

Year 1977, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, July 1978.

B.34 Rail-Highway Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin No. 1,

Calendar Year 1978, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,

U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, October 1979.

B.35 Rail-Highway Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin No. 2,

Calendar Year 1979, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,

U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, September 1980.

B.36 Rail-Highway Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin No. 3,

Calendar Year 1980, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,

U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, June 1981.

B-20
B.37 Rail-Highway Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin No. 4,

Calendar Year 1981, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,

U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, June 1982.

B.38 Rail-Highway Crossing Accident/Incident and Inventory Bulletin No. 5,

Calendar Year 1982, Office of Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,

U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, June 1983.

B.39 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Statewide Accident Sunmary for Year

1975, State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA,

October 1979.

B.40 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Statewide Accident Summary for Year

1976, State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA,

October 1979.

B.41 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Total Statewide Accidents for Year

1977, State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA,

May 1978.

B.42 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Statewide Accident Summary for Year

1978, State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA,

April 1979.

B.43 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval, Summary Only, All Accidents for the

Year 1978, State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento,

CA, August 1984.

B.44 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval, Summary Only, All Accidents for the

Year 1979, State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento,

CA, August 1984.

B-21
B.45 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Statewide Accidents for Year 1981,

State of California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA,

April 1982.

B.46 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Statewide Summary 1982, State of

California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA, May 1983.

B.47 TASAS Selective Record Retrieval Statewide Summary 1983, State of

California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, CA, April 1984.

B.48 R. K. Clarke, et al., Severities of Transportation Accidents, Sandia

National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, SAND77-0001, 1977.

B-22
APPENDIX C

List of Tables

Page

C.1 Railroad Accident Rate, 1975-1982 ..................................... C-2

C.2 Distribution of Types of Railroad Accidents, 1975-1982 ................ C-5

C.3 Distribution of Train Velocities, Collisions, Main Line,

1979-1982 ..... . .. . . .. . .9 . .*** .** ....** ....................... C-6

C.4 Distribution of Train Velocities, Derailments, Main Line,

1979-1982 ............................................................. C-7

C.5 Distribution of Train Velocities for Rail-Highway

Grade-Crossing Accidents/Incidents Involving Motor

Vehicles, 1975-1982 . . .. . .. ............................... 4se... C-8

C.6 Distribution of Train Velocities, Other Accidents, Main Line,

1979-1982 ........................... ...................... ...... C-9

C.7 Railroad Fires Survey Results ......................................... C-11

C-i
*1
APPENDIX C

Railroad Accident Data

C.1 Introduction

This appendix summarizes both the railroad accident data which form the

basis for the estimates of accident scenarios and the probability

distributions used in the probabilistic analysis of future train accidents

involving the transport of spent nuclear fuel. The primary sources of data

were the statistical reports of railroad accidents produced by the Office of

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the U. S. Department of

Transportation (DOT). 'I-C'7 A Sandia report on severe accidents was the

source of estimates of the probability of fire duration distributions.C.8

Section C.2 discusses the data used to estimate the railroad accident rate and

distribution of types of accidents. Section C.3 discusses the distributions

of train velocity at the time of an accident; Section C.4 discusses the fire

duration distribution.

C.2 Railroad Accident Rate

Federal law (49 CFR 225) requires all railroads to file monthly

accident/incident reports with the Office of Safety, FRA of the U. S. DOT. A

railroad is defined, by regulation, as any system of surface transportation of

persons or property over rails. It includes line-haul freight and passenger

railroads; switching and terminal railroads; and passenger-carrying railroads

including rapid transit, commuter, scenic, street, subway, elevated cable, and

cog railways.

Train accidents are defined by the FRA Office of Safety as any event

involving on-track railroad equipment that results in damage to railroad ontrack equipment, signals, track or track structure, and roadbed at or

exceeding the dollar damage threshold. Prior to 1975, the threshold was

$750. Since 1975 this limit has been adjusted, to account for inflation, from

$1750 in 1975 to $4100 in 1982, the last year available for use in this

study. Although initially adjusted biennially (i.e., every two years), since

1977 the adjustment has been annual. The yearly threshold limits are included

in Table C.1.

C-I
Table C. 1

Railroad Accident Rate, 1975-1982/

Number

Train Miles of Accident Damage

Year X 1000 Accidents Rate Threshold

1975 755,033 8,041 1.06E 10-5 $1,750.00

1976 774,764 10,248 1.32E 10- 5 $1,750.00

1977 750,042 10,362 1.38E 10- 5 $2,300.00

1978 751,964 11,277 1.50E 10- $2,600.00

1979 763,429 9,740 1.28E 10-5 $2,900.00

1980 717,662 8,451 1.18E 10- 5 $3,200.00

1981 676,216 5,781 8.55E 10-6 $3,700.00

1982 573,369 4,589 8.OOE 10- 6 $4,100.00

Total 5,762,479 68,489 1.19E 10-5

a/ U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad

Administration, Accident/Incident BulletinsC.1-C.7

a

t

C-2
In addition to train accidents, the FRA Office of Safety compiles and

reports statistics on two related events: train incidents, and non-train

incidents. Train incidents are defined as events involving on-track railroad

equipment that result in the reportable death and/or injury or illness of one

or more persons, but do not result in damage at or beyond the damage

threshold, as defined in the previous paragraph. Non-train incidents are

defined as events which result in a reportable death, injury, or illness

arising from the operation of a railroad but not from the movement of railroad

on-track equipment.

Damage to casks containing spent nuclear fuel will necessarily involve

severe accidents (hence significant damage); thus, for this project, train

accidents formed the basis for estimating railroad accident rates. Because of

the effect of the damage threshold levels on the reported accidents, data from

the period 1975 to 1982 were used to estimate the accident rate used in this

study. The estimated railroad accident rate, 1.19x10- 5 accidents/trainmile/year, is the ratio of the number of reported accidents to the total miles

for the 1975 to 1982 period.

Table C.1 presents the train mileage and number of accidents, as well as

rate and damage threshold for each year during 1975 to 1982. Train-miles, for

this report, is defined as the sum of the locomotive miles, yard switching

miles, and motor train miles as tabulated for each year by the FRA. The FRA

defines a locomotive mile as the movement under its own power of a locomotive

the distance of one mile whether coupled or without cars. This item covers

miles run by locomotives in road services and in train and yard switching

service. Switching miles are computed at the rate of 6 miles/hour for the

time actually engaged in such service. A motor train-mile is a movement under

its own powerof a motor train a distance of one mile.

Accident severity varies between accidents, thus the level of damage that

a cask might experience during an accident depends on the type of accident.

Therefore, train accidents were subdivided into four types--collisions,

derailments, rail-highway grade-crossing accidents, and other types of

accidents. Data relevant to this distribution, derived from the FRA reports,

C-3
is given in Table C.2. Again, the distribution of accident types is based on

the accidents during the 1975-1982 period. The important statistics are the

percentages, for each type of accident, of all accidents presented in the

bottom row of the table. For example, 13.41% of the train accidents were

collisions.

Approximately 36% of the collisions involved derailment of at least one

car.C'8 These were grouped with the original derailment accidents. Derailment

accidents were further partitioned into accident scenarios based on the events

following the derailment. Accident scenarios considered included the car(s)

falling over a bridge or embankment, hitting a slope or a structure, or

rolling over. Categorization of derailment accidents into scenarios was not

found in the literature. Thus, a distribution was developed based on similar

statistics for truck accidents. This distribution is included in Fig. 2-5.

To distinguish between the severity of accident scenarios, some of the

accident scenarios were further subdivided, e.g., derailments involving a

car's hitting a structure were subdivided into hitting small and large

columns, abutments, and other accidents. Categorization of accidents into

these types of scenarios was based on the Eggers study.C. 9

C.3 Impact Velocity Distribution

The forces imposed on the cask at the moment of impact during an accident

depend on the impact velocity of the cask or impacting object. Since impact

velocity is a function of velocity and angle of impact, it is necessary to

estimate the distributions of train velocities. Information on the train

velocity at the time of an accident was derived, again, from the FRA data.

Reliability of these statistics can be considered good since railroad

locomotives are equipped with recorders to record the train's velocity prior

to, during, and after the accident. The scale, although crude, is more

reliable than the velocity estimates made by investigating officers at highway

accident sites.

Distributions of train velocities based on accidents occurring on main

lines during 1979 to 1982 are summarized in Tables C.3 through C.6 for

C-4
Table C.2

Distribution of Types of Railroad Accidents, 1975-1982-a/

Rail-Highway Accident

Train Train Grade-Xing Other Total Damage

Year Collisions Derailments Accidents Accidents Accidents Threshold

1975 1,002 6,328 248 463 8,041 $1,750.00

1976 1,370 7,934 352 592 10,248 $1,750.00

1977 1,362 8,073 323 604 10,362 $2,300.00

1978 1,476 8,763 286 752 11,277 $2,600.00

1979 1,425 7,482 248 585 9,740 $2,900.00

1980 1,201 6,442 246 562 8,451 $3,200.00

1981 776 4,366 199 440 5,781 $3,700.00

1982 572 3,383 178 456 4,589 $4,100.00

Total Ta "-'7- 7T 2,0 T

Fra.

Pct.(%) 13.41 77.05 3.04 6.50

a/ U.S. Department

Accident/Incident

of Transportation,

BulletlnsC-I-C.7

Federal Railroad Administration,

C-5
Table C.3

Distribution of Train Velocities, Collisions, Main Line, 1979-1982•/

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total Pct. Pct.

(mph) (M} (M)

1-10 136 112 85 59 392 46.12 46.12

11-20 70 46 32 34 182 21.41 67.53

21-30 44. 31 17 25 117 13.76 81.29

31-40 23 26 24 19 92 10.82 92.12

41-50 9 19 10 9 47 5.53 96.65

51-60 4 6 4 0 14 1.65 99.29

61-70 2 1 0 0 3 0.35 99.65

71-80 1 1 0 0 2 0.24 99.88

81-90 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 99.88

91 0 1 0 0 1 0.12 100.00

Total.! 289 T77 T T

F

o

Ia/ U.S. Department

Accident/Incident

of Transportation,

BulletinsC.1-C. 7

Federal Railroad Administration,

Excludes accidents of unknown velocities

C-6
Table C.4

Distribution of Train Velocities, Derailments, Main Line, 1979-1982Y!

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total Pct. Pct.

(mph) (M) (%)

1-10 1,736 1,278 793 587 4,394 40.42 40.42

11-20 841 634 416 359 2,250 20.70 61.12

21-30 783 616 444 340 2,183 20.08 81.20

31-40 325 333 238 195 1,091 10.04 91.24

41-50 202 191 137 129 659 6.06 97.30

51-60 64 60 54 61 239 2.20 99.50

61-70 19 6 10 6 41 0.38 99.88

71-80 6 1 2 1 10 0.09 99.97

81-90 1 1 0 1 3 0.03 100.00

91 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 100.00

Total-/ T,77 TW T,7W 1,70 T66MU

a/ U.S. Department

Accident/Incident

of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration,

BulletinsC.1lC.7

b/ Excludes accidents of unknown velocities

C-7
Table C.5

Distribution of Train Velocities for Rail-Highway

Accidents/Incidents Involving Motor Vehicles,

Grade-Crossing

1975-1982-a

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total Pct. Pct.

(mph) (%) (%)

0-9 3,887 3,793 3,923 4,098 3,788 3,224 2,715 2,125 27,553 33.79 33.79

10-19 2,221 2,428 2,339 2,431 2,303 1,950 1,729 1,364 16,765 20.56 54.35

20-29 1,919 2,098 2,152 2,097 2,042 1,587 1,459 1,257 14,611 17.92 72.27

30-39 1,365 1,511 1,600 1,582 1,457 1,277 1,061 935 10,788 13.23 85.50

40-49 960 1,026 1,086 1,106 985 887 825 742 7,617 9.34 94.84

50-59 391 433 419 382 351 330 279 294 2,879 3.53 98.37

60-69 109 127 119 95 87 96 94 97 824 1.01 99.38

70-79 61 59 68 62 51 49 55 56 461 0.56 99.94

80-89 4 6 8 2 2 2 4 1 29 0.04 99.98

>90 8 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 17 0.02 100.00

Total- / 109725 11,482 1,716 11,857 11,067 9,402- 8,222 6,873 1

a/ U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Rail-Highway

Grade-Crossing Accident/Incidents BulletinsB. 3 4 -B' 4 1

0

b/ Excludes accidents of unknown velocities
Table C.6

Distribution of Train Velocities, Other Accidents, Main Line, 1979-1982a•/

Year Fra. Cum.

Velocity 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total Pct. Pct.

(mph) (%) (M)

1-10 83 83 60 59 285 17.59 17.59

11-20 73 46 53 56 228 14.07 31.67

21-30 104 93 59 59 315 19.44 51.11

31-40 89 104 58 63 314 19.38 70.49

41-50 72 65 64 61 262 16.17 86.67

51-60 35 38 26 23 122 7.53 94.20

61-70 13 16 7 13 49 3.02 97.27

71-80 7 9 14 7 37 2.28 99.51

81-90 0 1 3 2 6 0.37 99.88

91 0 0 0 2 2 0.12 100.00

Totalk/ W ,62

a/ U.S. Department

Accident/Incident

of Transportation,

BulletinsC. 1-C.7

Federal Railroad Administration,

Excludes accidents of unknown velocities

C-9
collisions, derailments, highway grade-crossing accidents, and other accidents

respectively. The percentages and cumulative percentages shown in the bottom

two rows of each table were used to estimate probability distributions for

train velocities. The estimation procedure is discussed in Appendix G.

C.4 Probabilities of Fire and Fire Duration Distributions for Train Accidents

There is very little useful data regarding the occurrence of fires and

the properties of the fire, such as duration, given a train accident. Table

C.7 presents the results of surveys of train fires, compiled by the National

Fire Protection Association for the years 1976-78 and 19 8 2 - 8 3 .c'1O,'C11 Over

this time, for the railroads surveyed, approximately 1.24% of all railroad

fires occur as a result of a collision or derailment. This is interpreted

probabilistically as the (conditional) probability, given a fire, that the

cause of the fire is either a collision or derailment. On the other hand, the

probability of interest for this study is the (conditional) probability, given

a collision (or a derailment), that a fire also occurs. To derive the latter

probability from* the former, it is necessary to have some estimate of the

probability of a fire given an accident. The necessary data to estimate this

probability was not found. Therefore, the Sandia study estimate of the

probabilities of a fire's occurring, given an accident scenario was used.C'8

No information was found regarding the duration of fires resulting from

train accidents. Therefore, the simulated estimates for fire duration as

developed in the Sandia study were used.C-8

C-10
Table C.7

Railroad Fires Survey ResultsA/

Year Pct.of

Category 1976 177 1978 1982 1983 Total Avg. Total(%)

Class I Railroads Surveyed:

Trackage Surveyed (miles):

Total Class I Trackage (miles):

Percentage of Total (%):

.22

129,382

240,250

53.85

16

116,405

236,351

49.25

16

94,509

233,956

40.40

NA

NA

NA

N/A

22

NA

NA

N/A

76

340,296

710,557

N/A

19.0

113,432

236,852

47.89

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Number of Fires due to

Collisions and Derailments

Brake Shoe Sparks

Electrical Components

Engine Exhaust Sparks

Car and Van Heaters

Fuses

Hot Journal Boxes

Materials in Transit

I. C. Engines

Other

Subtotal

Operations and

18

198

34

354

34

13

20

19

23

63

-7M

Transportation

24

157

35

23

10

10

33

64

10

22

14

115

136

17

12

7

19

22

14

58

19

188

53

120

3

7

11

5

25

82

11

22

6

69

117

20

59

29

-33

Number of Fires due to Maintenances and Services

Smoking

Electrical

Flammable Liquids

Heaters and Appliances

Burning on Right-of-Way

Spontaneous Ignition

Welding, Cutting, Brazing

Other

Subtotal

23

28

3

72

11

18

74

41

20

26

10

69

12

27

55

43

13

26

3

78

1

9

64

26

12

63

42

195

17

5

11

8

8

78

19

22

7

29

8

15

63

24

16

8

202

13

607

87

721

300

709

76

42

94

118

80

303

86

124

29

317

149

89

315

163

174

63

1,106

136

1,722

17.4 1.24

144.2 10.30

60.0 4.28

141.8 10.12

15.2 1.09

8.4 0.60

18.8 1.34

23.6 1.68

16.0 1.14

60.6 4.33

17.2 1.23

24.8 1.77

5.8 0.41

63.4 4.55

29.8 2.13

17.8 1.27

63.0 4.50

32.6 2.33

254.4 181

34.8 2.48

12..6 0.90

221.2 15.79

27.2 1.94

344.4 24.59

640.2 49.7T

Number of Fires due to Outside or Undetermined Causes

Exposure Fires

Lightning and Storms

Trespassing (including Arson)

'Other

Undetermined Causes

Subtotal

56

7

272

29

346

7TM

50

9

170

51

318

25

33

193

16

92

27

6

269

27

359

-ý - mcGrand Total 1,756 1,248 993 1,534 1,472 7,003 1,400.6 100.00

a/

N/A N/A

National Fire Protection Associationc.8,C.9

Information not available at time of table preparation

Not applicable

C-11
C.5 References

C.1 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 145, Calendar Year 1976, Office

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, December 1977.

C.2 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 146, Calendar Year 1977, Office

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, August 1978.

C.3 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 147, Calendar Year 1978, Office

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, October 1979.

C.4 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 148, Calendar Year 1979, Office

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, July 1980.

C.5 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 149, Calendar Year 1980, Office

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, June 1981.

C.6 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 150, Calendar Year 1981, Office

Safety, Federal Rai.lroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, June 1982.

C.7 Accident/Incident Bulletin No. 151, Calendar Year 1982, Office

Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

Transportation, Washington, DC, June 1983.

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

of

C.8 R. K. Clarke, et al., Severities of Transportation Accidents, Sandia

National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, SAND77-O001, 1977.

C-12
C.9 P. Eggers, Severe Rail and Truck Accidents: Toward a Definition of

Brounding Environments for Transportation Packages, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, NUREG/CR-3499, 1983.

C.10 Fire Protection Handbook, 15th Edition, G. P. McKinnon, Ed., National

Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 1981.

C.11 R. L. Best, National Fire Protection Association, Railroad Section,

Quincy, MA, private communication, 1985.

C-13
V
APPENDIX D

List of Figures

Page

0-1 Single column bent bridge structure configuration ..................... D-8

D-2 Multi-column bent bridge structure configuration ...................... D-9

D-3 Column stiffness for four bridge types ................................ 0-13

D-4 Force-displacement curves for single, square bridge columns ........... D-16

D-5 Force-displacement curves for single, rectangular bridge columns ...... D-17

D-6 Force-displacement curves for multi, square bridge columns ............ D-18

0-7 Force displacement curves for multi, rectangular bridge columns ....... D-19

List of Tables

Page

D.1 Type of Soil Adjacent to Interstate 5 from San Diego

County/Orange County Line to Los Angeles County/Kern County Line ...... D-3

D.2 Type of Soil Adjacent to Interstate 80 from Davis, California

to Nevada Border ...................................................... D-4

D.3 Type of Surface below Bridges on Interstate 80 from Davis,

California to Nevada Border ..................................... .... 0-5

0.4 Bridges Along Interstate 5 from San Diego County/Orange

County Line to Los Angeles County/Kern County Line

Classified by Height ................................................... D-7

0.5 Twenty-Four Representative Column Configurations for Calculating

Force-Displacement Curves ............................................. 0-11

0-i
S
APPENDIX 0

Highway Survey Data and Bridge Column PropertiesA/

D.1 Introduction

One important element in calculating shipping cask responses to accident

loads is object hardness. When a shipping cask strikes a soft surface such as

sand, the response of the cask is much less than when striking a hard object

such as a concrete column. Thisý appendix presents the data and evaluation

results on two major subjects related to hard objects:

1) Statistical data on the total number of bridges, bridge heights, and

surface conditions adjacent to highways, and below bridges,

2) The characteristics of bridge columns.

D.2 Survey

D.2.1 Surface Conditions Adjacent to Highways and below Bridges

The hardness of earth surfaces adjacent to highways can vary over a wide

range. This variability can have a significant effect on the loadings that

could be imposed on a cask or any other impacting object. The water and land

(hard rock, soft rock/hard soil, and tillable soil) distribution along

proposed spent fuel shipment routes between the east coast and west coast was

initially estimated using agricultural soil survey data and geological highway

maps for the United States.*D3 ,' 4 The initial distributions estimated from

these sources were considered to be indicative of the types of surfaces which

could be impacted along highways in the various regions of the United

States. However, since highway construction and landscaping can greatly

affect the adjacent surroundings, the initial distributions were used to

select representative portions of Interstates 5 and 80 in California to

a/ The Engineering Computer Corporation (ECC) was the subconbrlco6 that

performed the highway surveys and bridge column analyses.u,

D-1
perform detailed highway surveys and to establish final distributions along

highways.

A 133-mile portion of Interstate 5 was selected for the study. This

portion of highway starts from the borderline between San Diego County and

Orange County and ends at the borderline between Kern County and Los Angeles

County. This portion of highway contains 20 miles of suburban, 50 miles of

city, and 63 miles of rural area. The terrain which this portion of the

highway crosses is essentially flat for 70 miles, rolling hills for 41 miles,

and mountains for 22 miles. The types of earth adjacent to the highway were

classified into three groups: tillable soil, non-tillable soil, and hard

rock. The survey was performed by viewing the California Department of

Transportation (CALTRANS) photo log. The result of the survey is summarized

in Table D.1. Although the highway crossed the Santa Susana Mountains, no

hard rock, such as granite, was identified in the survey.

A similar highway survey of earth types adjacent to 122 miles of the

roadway along a section of Interstate 80 from Davis, California, to the Nevada

border was then performed. This section of Interstate 80 crosses the Sierra

where numerous outcroppings of granite rock occur. The result of the soil

survey is summarized in Table D.2. The survey also included the types and

frequencies of surfaces that could be impacted below a bridge. These surfaces

were classified into four categories: roadbeds, railbeds, water, and earth.

The result of the survey is summarized in Table D.3.

D.2.2 Highway Bridges

The same portion of Interstate 5 was used to compile statistical data on

the number of bridges, bridge heights, and the size of columns. A two-step

procedure was used in compiling data.

Step 1: View the California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS)

photo log (a motion picture of the roadway as viewed by a motorist).

Estimate the bridge column sizes and the number of bridges.

D-2
Table 0.1

Type of Soil Adjacent to Interstate 5 from San Diego

County/Orange County Line to Los Angeles

County/Kern County Line

Adjacent Soil Type

(miles)

County Tillable Nontillable Hard Rock Total

Orange 44.27 0.12 0 44.39

Los Angeles 62.65 5.80 0 68.45

16.39 3.60 0 19.99

Total 123.3 9.5U

D-3
Table D.2

Type of Soil Adjacent to Interstate 80 from

Davis, California to Nevada Border-al

r

Adjacent Soil Type

County Tillable Nontillable Hard Rock Total

Yolo 2 0 0 2

Sacramento 18 0 0 18

Placer 60 2 3 65

Nevada 29 6 0 35

Sierra 1 1 0 2

Total MT• T I

A/ 122-mile highway through mountainous terrain from Davis, California, to

the California-Nevada borderline.

D-4
Table D. 3

Type of Surface below Bridges on Interstate 80 from

Davis, California to Nevada Bordera

Surface below Each Bridge

(bridge totals)

County Road River Earth Railroad Total

Yolo I 1 0 1 3

Sacramento 7 0 0 1 8

Placer 22 5 1 1 29

Nevada 12 6 0 1 19

Sierra 0 0 0 0 0

Total 17 IT T W

a/ 122-mile highway through mountainous terrain from Davis, California, to

the California-Nevada border line.

D-5
Step 2: Review the general plans for several of the bridges to confirm

the column sizes identified by visual inspection through the photo log

and to obtain bridge heights.

Table 0.4 presents the result of the survey for the total number of

bridges tabulated according to the bridge heights. Along the 133-mile

roadway, 121 bridges were counted. Only 3 bridges exceed 50 feet in height. -•

The rate is approximately 0.91 bridges/mile.

While collecting data about the bridge rate, information was also

collected on all of California state and interstate highways. The total

number of bridges in California is 12,574 and the miles of state and

interstate highways is 15,183. This is very close to the detailed survey

results of Interstate Highway 5.

D.3 Bridge Column Structural Characteristics

In order to estimate the response of a cask when impacting a bridge

column, it is necessary to determine the level of hardness for that particular

column. The level of hardness is normally represented by the forcedisplacement curve.

This subsection describes the approach used to develop the forcedisplacement curves for various column designs and the results of the detailed

sensitivity study.

From the survey of Interstate 5, two typical bridge constructions are

commonly seen along interstate highways: single-column bent bridge and multicolumn bent bridge, as shown in Figs. D-1 and D-2 respectively. Most of the

bridge columns are either square or rectangular. Bridge span lengths and

column bent widths vary from bridge to bridge. Since more than 12,000 bridges

exist on state and interstate highways in California, estimating the column

force-displacement curve for each bridge is a very complex task. In order to

control the task, 13 different sizes of column cross-sections from 1 ft x I ft

to 4 ft x 64 ft were selected. In combination with the number of bents, a

total of 24 column configurations were selected for sensitivity study in

D-6
Table D.4

Bridges Along Interstate 5 from San Diego

County/Orange County Line to Los Angeles C unty/Kern

County Line Classified by Heighta'

Bridge Height

(ft)

County 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90

Orange 3 4 16 4

1 3 7

Los Angeles 1 3 17 6 1

7 16 2 2

5 18 1 1 1 1

Total T r2 7T IT I T T T

Total Mileage - Total Bridges -

133 milesi/

121

a/ Each set (left/right pair, on/off ramps, etc.) counts only once.

Special truck lanes in northern Los Angeles County are not counted.

D-7
, 45-O' -

1 71/2

2

4' - 6"

2" 51/2 Square or

rectangular

column

Section

280'

60' 80"'-I 80'----8 600

F 7tL HL/r7

Elevation

.Figure D-1 Single column bent bridge structure configuration.

D-8
ý-8 4f -6W!

Section

Elevation

Figure 0-2 Multi-column bent bridge structure configuration.

D-9
developing force-displacement curves. Table D.5 lists all column

configurations selected for the sensitivity study. Some of the column

dimensions, such as 32 ft x 32 ft, 16 ft x 16 ft, are not real structures.

The inclusion of these dimensions in the analytical study is to help develop a

set of continuous curves.

All 24 different configurations

according to the shape of columns, i.e.,

bents, i.e., single-bent or multi-bent.

basic cases for the sensitivity study a!

0.5.

were categorized into four groups

square or rectangular, and number of

These four groups formed the four

s listed below and indicated in Table

Case A:

Case B:

Case C:

Case 0:

Bridges with square columns and single-column bents.

Bridges with rectangular columns and single-column bents.

Bridges with square columns and multi-column bents.

Bridges with rectangular columns and multi-column bents.

0.4 Column Stiffness Sensitivity Study

The sensitivity study

bridge column 4 feet above

the column (bottom of pier).

30 feet.

assumed that a shipping cask would strike the

the rough surface, or 6 feet above the bottom of

The study includes column heights of 20 feet and

For a single-bent column, the assumption is that the bottom of the column

is pinned and the top of the column is fixed. A normalized static force of

1,000 kips is applied at 6 feet above the bottom of the column to represent

the impact force of the shipping cask. Deformation at the point of impact is

calculated for all column sizes of both cases A and B. The stiffness of the

column is determined from the applied force and calculated deformation.

For the multi-bent configuration, the bridge is assumed to be a four-span

bridge, which is most commonly seen along interstate highways. A beam-element

D-10
Table 0.5

Twenty-Foir Representative Column Cohfigurations for

Calculating Force-Displacement Curves

Class Number of Bents Shape of Column Column Size

(cross-section)

I ft x 1 ft

2 ft x 2 ft

4 ft x 4 ft

A Single Square 8 ft x 8 ft

16 ft x 16 ft

32 ft x 32 ft

4 ft x 1 ft

4 ft x 2 ft

B Single Rectangular 4 ft x 8 ft

4 ft x 16 ft

4 ft x 32 ft

1 ft x 1 ft

2 ft x 2 ft

4 ft x 4 ft

C Multi Square 8 ft x 8 ft

16 ft x 16 ft

32 ft x 32 ft

4 ft x 1 ft

4 ft x 2 ft

4ft x 8 ft

0 Multi Rectangular 4 ft x 16 ft

4 ft x 32 ft

4 ft x 64 ft

D-I1
model along the bridge roadway was developed to represent the bridge

superstructure. The bridge is assumed to be pinned at both ends. At each

pier location, the multiple-bent column configuration is modeled by a space

frame pinned at the bottom of the frame structure. The combined bridge

superstructure and column space frames formed the total bridge design. A

normalized static force of 1,000 kips is applied 6 feet above the bottom of

the column. The deformation at the point of impact' is calculated by the

Structural Analysis Program 6 (SAP6) program. The force-deformation

relationship is used to determine the stiffness of the columns for each

pier. This process is performed on all the column sizes for cases C and D.

Figure D-3 presents the results of this sensitivity study.

0.5 Force-Displacement Curve

The force-displacement curve was developed by following similar

procedures to those described in the stiffness calculation. The same four

groups (Cases A through 0) were used. All the column sizes given in Table D.5

were included in the sensitivity study. During this exercise, column capacity

was considered in resisting axial force, shear force, and bending moment.. The

angle of impact to the column was also considered. The impact was analyzed

for every 150 angle. The smallest column capacity for resisting impact at the

various impact angles is selected to represent the column capacity. In

estimating column capacity, the following assumptions were made to simplify

the problem:

1. Vertical reinforcement is 2%

2. fc' - 3,250 psi

3. Tensile stress capacity of concrete - 0.1 fc' - 325 psi

4. Ties are determined by the following formula

A .0Shf c' AgL _ I (D.1)

Ash = 0.30 St hc T (A

0-12
Case A : Square column, single-bent, column size 0' x 0'

Case B: Rectangular column, single-bent, column size 4' x D'

Case C: Square column, multi-bent, column size D' x 0'

Case 0: Rectangular column, multi-bent, column size 4' x 0'

A.-

1011

C

C%

0 2 4. 8 16 32

Column size D (ft)

64

Figure 0-3 Column stiffness for four bridge types.

0-13
or

Afsh 0.12 St h f c (0.5 + 1.25 Pe (D.2)

y

where

Ash - area of transverse'hoop bar, ft 2

fc' - specified compressive strength of concrete, psi

hc M total depth of shear head cross-section, ft

St - vertical spacing of ties, ft

Pe - maximum design axial load lbs

Ag - gross area of section, ft2

Ac = area of concrete enclosed by tie, ft 2

fy- specified yield strength of re-bar, psi

5. Height of column is 20 feet.

6. Distance from the face of concrete to the center of vertical

re-bars is 3 inches.

7. Moment magnification due to slenderness is ignored.

8. P - A effect is ignored.

From assumption number 3, an axial force capacity was calculated for each

different column size (cross section). For the flexural capacity, the

Reinforced Column (RECOL) computer code was used to estimate column strength

at yield point. These axial and flexural capacities of a column are combined

with the results from the stiffness calculation as generated in the bridge

model by using the SAP6 computer code to correlate the force-displacement

relationship for each different column size.

These force-displacement relation curves used to relate the column yield

force and displacement at the location of impact are listed in

D-14
Figs. D-4 through D-7 for all the column sizes listed in Table D.5. The

possible dominant failure modes are identified in each curve. For example,

for each column size, we identify whether a plastic hinge or a sudden shear

failure occurs first. The shear capacity for a column is based on the

equation

1/2 A hf Yd

Vu 2 (fc') 1 2 bd + sh (D.3)

where

b - width of compression face, ft

d - distance from extreme compression fiber to centroid of tension

reinforcement, ft

s - tie spacing, ft.

D-15
X Indicates plastic

moment yield ooint.

0 Indicates point at

Which sudden shear

106 failure occurs

105~

32 Ft X 32 Ft

Dashed line indicates

shear failure occurs first

I16 Ft X 16 Ft

8 Ft X 8 Ft

/

4 Ft X 4 Ft

2 Ft X 2 Ft

ir

a.t

0

LL 103i

102

101

100

-Solid line indicates

plastic hinge occurs

first.

1 Ft X 1 Ft

0 0.01 0.02

Displacement at location impact, Ft

0.03

Figure 0-4 Force-displacement curves for single, square bridge columns.

0-16
106

X Indicates plastic 0 Indicates point at which

moment yield sudden shear failure

point occurs

4 Ft X 64 Ft

Dashed line indicates

shear failure occurs first

4 Ft X 32 Ft

4 Ft X 16 Ft_ K_ -- - - - -- - - - - - - - -

4 Ft X 8 Ft

4 Ft X 4 Ft

4 Ft X 2 Ft

4 Ft X 1 Ft

0

UI

103

102

Solid line indicates

plastic hinge occurs

first

101

100

0.01 0.02 0.03

Displacement at location impact, Ft

Figure D-5 Force-displacement curves for single, rectangular bridge columns.

D-17
X Indicates plastic

moment yield

(0 Indicates point at

which sudden shear

106

105

104

point

/

/

/

/

laiure occurs 32 Ft X 32 Ft ..-- X--

Dashed line indicates

shear failure occurs first

16 Ft X 16 Ft

fX

.

/

/

8 Ft X 8 Ft

4 Ft X 4 Ft 9 ,,.- X

LL 103

102

101

Solid line indicates

plastic hinge

occurs first

1 Ft X 1 Ft

100

0.01 0.02 0.03

Displacement at location impact, Ft

Figure 0-6 Force-displacement curves for multi, square bridge columns.

D-18
106

105

X Indicates plastic

moment yield

point

) Indicates point

at which sudden

shear failure occurs

/

/

-I

I

4 Ft X 64 Ft - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Dashed line indicates

shear failure occurs

first 4 Ft X 32 Ft

4 Ft X 16 Ft

4 Ft X 8 Ft

4 Ft X 4 Ft - -------------------------

/

163

4 Ft X 2 Ft

102

4 Ft X 1 Ft

101

100

0.01 0.02 0.03

Displacement at location impact, Ft

Figure D-7 Force-displacement curves for multi, rectangular bridge columns.

D-19
0.6 References

0.1 Assessment of the Stiffness Characteristics of Bridge Substructure

Components Encountered along a Section of Interstate 5, Engineering

Computer Corporation, Sacramento, CA, February 1985. A contractor report

to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

D.2 R. Imbsen, et al., Soil and Terrain Surveys, Engineering Computer

Corporation, Sacramento, CA, January 1985. A contractor report to the

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

0.3 Soil Survey, United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Chemistry

and Soils, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC.

D.4 Geological Highway Map, American Association of Petroleum Geologist,

Tulsa, OK.

D.5 University of Southern California, Structural Analysis Program 6 (SAP6),

University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 1980.

0.6 Engineering Computer Corporation, Reinforced Column (RECOL), Engineering

Computer Corporation, Sacramento, CA, 1983.

D-20
APPENDIX E

List of Figures

Page

E-1 Preliminary truck casks with three types of shielding, used for

static load analysis........................ . ...... ... . .. ........ . E-1.0

E-2 Preliminary rail casks with th ree types of shielding, used for

static load analysis.............................. .. . ... .. .. .. .. . .. E-11

E-3 Representative cask models used for truck and rail cask analysis ....... E-13

E-4 Deformation of truck cask during 60 mph impact by a 21-inch I-beam .... E-15

E-5 Distribution of plastic strain in outer shell due to I-beam impact .... E-16

E-6 Static force versus deflection for endwise loading of truck cask ...... E-18

E-7 Static force versus deflection for sidewise loading of truck cask ..... E-19

E-8 Static force versus deflection for endwise loading of rail cask ....... E-20

E-9 Static force versus deflection for sidewise loading of rail cask ...... E-21

E-10 Loading conditions on trees and poles ........................ E-24

E-11 Finite element mesh for two-element inner-wall model by truck cask ..... E-37

E-12 Lead slump in truck cask at 60 mph impact............................. E-39

E-13 Strain in lower steel structure for truck cask impact at 60 mph ....... E-40

E-14 Velocity versus time for truck cask impact at 60 mph .............. E-41

E-15 Finite element mesh for-rail cask ................. ....... E-43

E-16 Lead slump in rail cask at 90 mph impact ....................... E-45

E-17 Strain in lower steel structure for rail cask impact at 90 mph ........ E-46

E-18 Velocity versus time for rail cask impact at 90 mph ................. E-47

E-19 Model of a truck cask impacting an unyielding surface ................. E-48

E-20 Truck cask impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph ............... E-50

E-21 Impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph - maximum plastic

strain location ............................................. E-52

E-22 Rail cask impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph ................. E-53

E-23 Rail cask impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph - maximum

plastic strain location ........................................ E-55

E-24 Full side drop geometry including impact limiters ..................... E-56

E- i
E-25 Deformations of truck cask during 60 mph side drop (side view) ........ E-58

E-26 Distribution of plastic strain at end of impact (outer shell) ......... E-59

E-27 Comparison of 2-0 deformations with 3-0 deformations at

the center of the cask ................................................ E-60

E-28 Equivalent damage technique ........................................... E-62

E-29 Soil model comparison with penetration test data ...................... E-75

E-30 Finite element mesh for drops on soils ................................ E-76

E-31 Maximum plastic strain location on truck cask for impact

at 60 mph on soft rock ................................................ E-79

E-32 Maximum plastic strain location on rail cask for impact at

60 mph soft rock ...................................................... E-81

E-33 Locomotive sill cross section ......................................... E-86

E-34 Sidewise off-center locomotive sill impact ............................ E-87

E-35 Thirty mph sidewise off-center sill impact ..... ; ...................... E-88

E-36 Thirty mph sidewise off-center sill impact-maximum plastic strain

location .............................................................. E-91

E-37 Model configurations for sidewise head-on sill impact ................. E-92

E-38 Sidewise head-on sill impact at 30 mph ................................ E-93

E-39 Thirty mph sidewise head-on sill impact-maximum plastic

strain location ....................................................... E-95

E-ii
APPEKDIX E

List of Tables

Page

E.1 304 Stainless Steel Structural Properties ................... E-4

E .2 Lead Structural Properties . .. .. ... .. . . ... I ....................... . E-6

E.3 Uranium Structural Properties ...................... . ........ E-7

E.4 Balsa Wood Structural Properties............................. ... E-9

E.5 Summary of Static Loading Calculations for Six Preliminary

Cask Designs .............................. ................... E-12

E.6 Bounding Crush Loads Comparison with Crush Loading

Capabilities of the Truck and Rail Casks..................... ... E-22

E.7 Quasi-Static Force Evaluation for Objects Potentially Impacted ...... E-26

E.8 Impact Velocities Required to Include Cab and Rail Car

Crush Energy Absorption ...................... .................... E-30

E.9 Truck Cask Strain Response to Impact on Unyielding Surface

at Various Cask Orientations .. .. ... .. . .................... .. ...... E-32

E.10 Rail Cask Strain Response to Impact on Unyielding Surface

at Various Cask Orientations .. . .. ... .. ............... ..... . ....... E-33

E.11 IMPASC Endwise Impact Benchmark Calculation Against NIKE 2-D .......... E-34

E.12 Sumimary of Truck Cask Endwise Impact Results ...................... E-38

E.13 Summary of Rail Cask Endwise Impact Results ........................... E-44

E.14 Results of Truck Cask Sidewise Impact on. an Unyielding Surface ...... E-51

E.15 Results of Rail Cask Sidewise Impact on an Unyielding Surface ....... E-54

E.16 Comparison of Equivalent Damage Technique Result with Real

Surface Impact Results .. .. ... .... .... .... ...... ... . .......... ......... E-66

E.17 Soil Parameters . .. .............. . . . ........................ E-69

E.18 Plate Bearing Test Simulation with NIKE 2-D........................ E-71

E.19 Summary of Soil Types and Range of Soil Parameters.................... E-72

E.20 Selected Soil Parameters for this Study ......................... E-74

E.21 Summary of Cask Responses to Endwise Impact~s on Real Surfaces ......... E-77

E-i ii
E.22 Results of Truck Cask Sidewise Impacts on Real Surfaces

(without Impact Limiters) ............................................. E-80

E.23 Results of Rail Cask Sidewise Impacts on Real Surfaces

(without Impact Limiters) ............................................. E-82

E.24 Interface Force for Water Impact (All Results Listed in Multiples

-qf Cask Weight, No Impact Limiters or Cab Crush Included) ............ E-85

E.25 Results of Sidewise Off-Center Sill Impact Against Truck Cask ......... E-90

E.26 Results of Sidewise Head-on Sill Impact Against Truck Cask ............ E-94

E.27 Estimated Response Of Rail Cask to Impact by Train Sill ............... E-97

E-iv
APPENDIX E

Structural Analysis

E.1 Introduction

This appendix provides the structural models developed and the analyses

performed to determine the responses of the representative truck and rail

casks to a wide range of impact loads. The family of DYNA and NIKE computer

codes were used extensively to calculate the responses of the casks.E.1,E.2

In Section E.2, the material properties used in the process for selecting

the representative casks and evaluating the responses of the representative

casks are presented. In Section E.3, the static analyses evaluations of

different cask designs used to select the representative cask are presented.

In Section E.4, the types of mechanical loading conditions that can

affect the strain response of a cask in an accident are discussed. In

Section E.5, the quasi-static load evaluation performed for minor accidents

are presented. In Section E.6, the structural model and strain response of

the two representative casks to impacts on an unyielding surface are

discussed. In Section E.7, the response of the two representative casks to

impacts on real objects is estimated.

E.2 Materials Properties

Spent fuel casks must be designed and fabricated to national codes and

standards or equivalent requirements. Although there is no specific section

in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) pressure vessel code

applicable to spent fuel casks, the industry has used the ASME code

extensively for designing and fabricating spent fuel casks. In this study, to

the extent possible, properties of materials were taken from the ASME code.E. 3

Although it is preferred to use probability distributions for material

properties that are based on actual fabrication data, discrete bounding values

from the ASME code were used in this study. This approach was taken to

simplify the modeling and analysis. If distribution had been used, the

modeling and analysis would have been unnecessarily complex and unwarranted

for the scope of this study. Consequently, conservative material properties

E-1
based on the ASME code were used with loading calculations to estimate seal

and weld damage to the representative casks.

Using ASME code properties, limiting plastic strain criteria were used in

estimating the response and damage to the representative casks. In this case,

the maximum strains would be associated with end-on impact caused by lead

slump. Large local strains would be generated at the junctions of the inner

containment shell and outer shell with the end closure. Ideally, weld joints

would not be present in these areas where high local strains could occur.

However, even if welds were present in these areas, most strains would be

highly concentrated and could cause only local cracking. Since the extent of

lead slump deformation would be limited, it would not be likely that the inner

containment would completely rupture. Furthermore, the primary membrane

strain on the inner containment cylinder would be compressive and a small

fraction of the selected strain levels. The large strains developed at the

discontinuities would be highly localized and oriented axially. On the outer

shell, the primary membrane strains would be tensile. Even if complete

separation from the end plate is postulated, the deformation of the lead would

also limit the primary membrane strain to a small fraction of 30% strain.

Consequently, the outer shell would remain intact and continue to maintain the

integrity of the lead shielding. In conclusion, the postulated local strains

on the order of 30% would not result in breaching of the cask but may result

in local cracking.

Instead of evaluating specific closure and penetration designs, it was.

assumed for comparative purposes that closure and penetration seals fail when

the strain level in the inner shell exceeds 0.2% (S1). This approach was

based on a review of current cask designs and their ability to withstand

impact forces with large strains. Temperature effects on the material

properties were included in the analysis performed. Strain-rate effects were

not included for most material properties for the following reasons:

(1) There is no standard set of strain-rate properties in the ASME code

or adopted by industry.

E-2
(2) Strain-rate effects generally improve material yield and ultimate

strength by 0-30%, but reduce ductility. When strain-rate effects

are included for the cask structural materials, then they should be

included for surface materials such as rock and concrete. In

general, the improvement of material strength properties is greater

for ductile type metallic materials than for ceramic type

materials. For the purpose of evaluating representative casks

impacting representative surfaces, the inclusion of strain-rate

effects is not warranted and their exclusion is reasonably

conservative.

(3) The strain effect in reducing the structural material ductility was

accounted for by using conservative static ultimate strain values

for the structural materials.

E.2.1 304 Stainless Steel

Material properties were obtained for 304 stainless steel from the ASME

code.E' 3 The properties are tabulated in Table E.1. The elastic-plastic

material model used a bilinear fit representation with isotropic hardening.

No strain-rate effects were included. The material model used was Material

Type 3 in the NIKE 2-0/DYNA 2-D family of finite element codes; the 2-D

designation indicating that two-dimensional modeling was performed.E'1,E'2

These codes use an updated geometry to calculate strains. Therefore, it was

necessary to use true stress and true strain data, rather than the engineering

stress and strain data provided in the ASME code. In order to approximate a

value for ultimate true stress, based on ultimate engineering stress, data

from Conway, et al., was used.E' 4 The stress/strain data of Conway, et al.,

was not for SA-240, but for another 304 stainless. This, however, provided a

means to interpolate a value of true stress for a given engineering stress

from the ASME code.

75,000 -. 71,300 a - 85,730

76,390 -71300 9Utrue (E.,)

9'7,760 - 85,730(E)

OU true 94,475 psi

E-3
304 Stainless

Table E.1

Steel Structural Properties

Elastic modulus

Hardening modulus

Poisson's ratio

Engineering ultimate stress

True ultimate stress

Engineering ultimate strain

True ultimate strain

Yield stress

Density

E

En

Oueng

Outrue

Cueng

Cutrue

Qy

P

m

I

27.6x10 6 psi

2x10 5 psi

0.29

75x10 3 psi

94.5xi0 3 psi

0.40

0.34

25xI0 3 psi

7.44x10- 4 lb-sec2 /in 4

E-4
The ultimate engineering strain value provided by the ASME code of 40% is

equivalent to a true strain value:

Utrue In (1 eueng) + (E.2)

- In (I + 0.4)

- 0.34.

The ultimate strain percentage used in this study is 30% (S3 ) to accommodate

for the effects of strain rate on the reduction of ductility. The hardening

modulus was calculated as follows:

En 94,4 75 - 25,000 = 2 x 105psi. (E.3) En 0.34 - .00091

E.2.2 Lead

The material properties used for lead in this study are presented in

Table E.2.E.5 A bilinear fit was used to represent the elastic-plastic

material. Strain hardening was used,. with isotropic hardening in all

calculations. It is considered to be unnecessarily conservative to exclude

the strain-rate effect for the lead. The hardening modulus is more

significant than the elastic modulus for lead because the lead shield yields

relatively easily on impact. The hardening modulus used in this study

compares well with the test results reported by Counts and Payne.E' 6

Additional benchmarking testing is required to define the lead properties and

bonding effects at the cask inner shell with high confidence.

E.2.3 Uranium

The material properties used for uranium are summarized in Table

E.3.E'7 A bilinear fit was used to model its elastic-plastic characteristics

for stress/strain.

E-5
Table E.2

Lead Structural Properties -f

.b.

Elastic modulus

Hardening modulus

Poisson's ratio

Yield stress

Density

E - 2.22x106 psi

En - 4.5x,0 4 psi

v- 0.43

ay - 500 psi

p - 1.06x10- 3 lb sec2 /in4

E-6
Table E.3

Uranium Structural Properties

Elastic modulus

Hardening modulus

Poisson's ratio

Yield stress

Density

E -

En"

V0y

p26xi06 psi

Ix10 6 psi

0.21

4.6x00 4 psi

1.74x10- 3 lb-sec2 /in 4

E-7
E.2.4 Balsa Wood

An elastic-plastic model was selected for modeling the balsa wood.E8

The material properties used are tabulated in Table E.4.E8 Material Type 10,

from DYNA 2-D, was used for the wood material model.

E.3 Preliminary Cask Designs and Cask Selection

Six preliminary cask designs were developed to perform screening analyses

to assess their responses to high-loading conditions. The designs included

the use of three types of gamma shielding materials: lead, depleted uranium,

and steel. Three truck and three rail casks were developed using each type of

shielding. The pertinent materials and dimensions for the six preliminary

cask designs are provided in Figs. E-1 and E-2 for the truck and rail casks,

respectively.

Static force evaluations were performed using the NIKE 2-D finite element

computer code for the six casks. The loading conditions applied on each of

the casks are illustrated in Table E.5. In case (a), a pressure load was

applied on one end over the entire closure region of the cask in increments of

200 psi with the other end of the cask resting on an unyielding surface. In

case (b), a circular cross-section of the cask was loaded in increments of 200

psi over the top area of the cask with the bottom resting on an unyielding

surface. In case (b), the model had a unit or one inch thickness. The yield

force results of the two loading calculations for each of the six casks are

summarized in Table E.5. The lead cask yielded at significantly lower loading

conditions in all cases. Based on these results, the lead shielded cask was

selected for developing a representative cask design for impact analysis.

E.4 Mechanical Loading Conditions Caused by Accidents

Mechanical loading conditions on a cask caused by an accident can result

in damage to the inner shell of the cask. Mechanical loading conditions

include impact, puncture (including missiles), and crush. Two representative

cask designs were developed as shown in Fig. E-3: one for truck shipments and

one for rail shipments of spent fuel. The representative truck cask

E-8
Table E.4

Balsa Wood Structural Properties

Elastic modulus

Poisson's ratio

Yield stress

Sheer modulus

Density

E -

Oy

Gp5.9x10 5 psi

0.0

1.7x103 psi

2.95x10 5 psi

1.35x10- 5 lb-sec 2/in4

E-9
P7.0

!

Dim Thickness Material

(in.)

-- Cask

centerline

A

B

C

E

-Shield

193

4-B

A

B

C

E

D

E

Truck Cask 1

0.5

1.25

5.25

13.75

Truck Cask 2

0.5

1.25

4.25

12.75

Truck Cask 3

12.25

19.00

304SS

304SS

Lead

304SS

304SS

304SS

Depleted

uranium

304SS

Steel

Steel

.11w

t 7.0

-I L. -I

Figure E-1 Preliminary truck casks with three types of shielding, used

for static load analysis.

E-10
Dim Thickness

,(in.)

Rail Cask 1

A 0.5

B 1.5

C 5.25

E 26.0

Rail Cask 2

A 0.5

B 1.5

C 4.0

E 24.8

Rail Cask 3

D 12.25

E 30.75

Material

304SS

304SS

Lead

304SS

304SS

304SS

Depleted

uranium

304SS

Steel

Steel

Figure E-2 Preliminary rail casks

static load analysis.

with three types of shielding, used for

E-1 1
Table E.5

Summary of Static Loading Calculations for Six Preliminary Cask Designs

aL

Loading

Configuration

Case (a),

endwise

D. f

Cask

Type

Yield

Force (lbs)

ENDWISE LOADING

Truck

Lead

Depleted uranium

Steel

Rail

Lead

Depleted uranium

Steel

3,300,000

8,000,000

11,000,000

8,000,000

17,000,000

40,000,000

SIDEWISE LOADING

Case (b),

sidewise Truck

Lead

Depleted uranium

Steel

Rail

Lead

Depleted uranium

Steel

1,600,000

11,000,000

26,000,000

260,000

3,700,000

11,500,000 v

E-12
Dim Truck

inches

A 1.5

B 0.5

C 1.25

D 7.0

E 13.75

F 38.25

Rail

inches

3.0

1.5

2.5

8.0

38.0

58.0

All material is 304SS

except that noted otherwise

Figure E-3 Representative cask models used for truck and rail cask analysis.

E-13
(Fig. E-3) design uses the same dimensions as the preliminary lead truck cask

design (Fig. E-1). The truck cask design allows transport of a single PWR

fuel assembly. The representative rail cask design (Fig. E-3) dimensions

differ from the preliminary lead rail cask design (Fig. E-2). The capacity of

the rail cask is 21 PWR fuel assemblies which reflects the greater capacities

of anticipated cask designs. Each design uses helium in the cask cavity.

Typically, as discussed in Sections E.6 and E.7, the dynamic force caused

by impact on a hard surface can be in the range of 1-10 million pounds on the

representative truck cask depending on the impact velocity (velocity component

perpendicular to the surface impacted), the cask orientation, and the hardness

of the surface. The strain at the inner wall of the cask can exceed 30% (S3)

at impact velocities greater than 75 mph. The dynamic forces generated by

impacts on a hard surface are even higher for the rail cask compared to the

truck cask because of the larger size and weight of the rail cask.

The possibility of puncture of the cask by a high energy-density object

was evaluated. It was concluded that a high velocity I-beam would have the

highest energy density of probable missiles generated in an accident and that

the I-beam represented the bounding case for the puncture of a cask wall.E. 9

Assuming that the I-beam is the bounding case, the representative truck cask

was analyzed with DYNA 3-D (the 3-D designation indicating that threedimensional modeling was performed) for impact by a high energy I-beam.

The representative truck cask and I-beam were modeled using two planes of

symmetry. The truck cask model included the inner and outer steel walls and

the lead shielding but did not have end closures or impact limiters. The back

side of the cask was supported by an unyielding surface. The 40 foot WF-21/96

I-beam was modeled as 1/4 of the length unit with an equivalent weight.

The impact velocity was 60 mph, resulting in an impact force of

40,000 pounds by the I-beam. The deformations due to the impact are shown in

Fig. E-4. The impact caused the cask wall to flatten locally and the I-beam

to yield significantly at the point of impact. A maximum plastic strain of 5%

developed in the outer wall of the cask as shown in Fig. E-5. The maximum

E-14
Figure E-4 Deformations of truck cask during 60 mph impact by a 21-inch

I-beam.

E-15
TIME = 6.00102E-03

CONTOURS OF EFF. PLASTIC STRAIN

MIN= 0. IN ELEMENT 1200

MAX= 4.940E-02 IN ELEMENT 921

CONTOUR VALUES

A- 0.

B= 6.00E-03

C= 1.20E-02

D= 1.80E-02

E= 2.40E-02

F= 3.OOE-02

G= 3.60E-02

H= 4.20E-02

I= 4.80E-02

;IFigure E-5 Distribution of plastic strain in outer shell due to I-beam

impact.

E-16
stress and shear in the outer wall were 34,950 psi and 19,500 psi,

respectively. The I-beam did not penetrate the cask wall.

In comparison with the I-beam impact, the train sill impact discussed in

Section 7.4 on the truck cask is more severe. The impact force exceeded 9

million pounds and the strain was 20% for a 60 mph impact. Therefore, it was

concluded that the impact by a train sill is a more severe accident that may

cause high local strains and stress to the cask walls. Due to the larger'size

and weight of the rail cask, it was also concluded that the impact of a train

sill on the rail cask is more severe than the impact by an I-beam.

The possibility of crush of the representative casks by a heavy object

was evaluated. Static force evaluations of the representative casks shown in

Fig. E-3 were performed using the NIKE 2-D finite element computer code. As

discussed in Section E.3, the loading conditions applied on each of the

representative casks are the same as those used for the preliminary cask

designs in Table E.5. The force deflection characteristics for each of the

representative casks are shown in Figs. E-6 through E-9. The force where

general yielding of the cask body occurs was selected for comparing their

loading capabilities with the bounding crush loads from NUREG/CR-3498.E. 9

In Table E.6, typical crush loads that could occur in real accidents are

compared with the crush loading capabilities of the representative casks. The

bounding crush load is a 200-ton locomotive that would rest on the rail cask

by its sill. Both the truck and rail cask can support the weight of the

locomotive without yielding.

Based on severe accident data, the frequency of occurrence of impact

loads is at least a factor of 10 times higher than for puncture or crush

loads. Therefore, since impact can generate higher loads and can occur more

frequently, it is concluded that impact loads dominate the potential

mechanical loading environment and only impact loads will be considered

further.

E-17
0

-2

-3

-4- E

.- 5

-6

-7

-8

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Force on cask (millions of lbs.)

Figure E-6 Static force versus deflection for endwise loading of truck cask.

E-18
.5

4

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

-7

-8

-9

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Force on cask (millions of Ibs.)

Figure E-7 Static force versus deflection for sidewise loading of truck

cask.

E-19
0

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.4

E -0.5

CL

•E -0.6

"• -0.7

' -0.8

-0.9

-1.0

-1.1

-1.2

-1.3 5 10 15

Force on cask (millions of lbs.)

Figure E-8 Static force versus deflection for endwise loading of rail cask.

E-20
-14-

-18

M-22

-26

-30

-34

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Force on cask (millions of Ibs)

Figure E-9 Static force versus deflection for sidewise loading of rail cask.

E-21
Table E.6

Bounding Crush Loads Comparison with Crush Loading

Capabilities of the Truck and Rail Casks

Bounding Crush Truck Cask Rail Cask

Force Description Resultant Force Capability Capability

(lbs) (lbs) (lbs)

For highway accidents 60 thousand 1.6 million 1.6 million

the weight of a 60,000

pound truck with its

contents. Weight is

carried across truck

frame width.

For railway accidents 400 thousand 1.6 million 1.6 million

the weight of a 200

ton locomotive. Weight

is distributed across

the train sill.

w

E-22
E.5 Quasi-Static Loads Due to Minor Accidents

In Section E.4, the minimum static force required to yield either the

representative truck or rail cask was determined to be 1.6 million pounds.

The static force required to yield the impacted object completely is in most

cases significantly less than 1.6 million pounds. The static force required

to yield either the representative truck or rail cask was compared with the

force required to collapse potential objects to screen out low resistance

objects from further analysis.

The maximum force that an object can generate during a high velocity

impact was estimated using quasi-static methods. D'Alembert's principle was

used to establish static force equivalent to the inertial force caused by

deceleration. It was concluded that objects such as automobiles or truck

trailers cannot generate forces greater than 400,000 pounds even at high

velocities.

The static force required to collapse an automobile is less than

50,000 pounds.E'IO The maximum impact forces for rail cars and truck tractortrailers are estimated from the static forces reported for the crash tests of

spent fuel casks.E'll,E.12 The quasi-static forces for concrete structures

such as walls, columns, and abutments were estimated from the mechanical

loading analyses of the roadside structures given in Appendix D.

The method used to determine the maximum impact force trees and posts

could resist was a one-dimensional (1-D) beam hand calculation to determine

the limit moment. The loading condition we assumed is shown on Fig. E-lOa. A

plastic hinge forms when the entire tree/pole cross section yields at the

location of maximum moment as shown in Fig. E-lOb. A yield stress of

8,400 psi is assumed, based on three times the allowable for Douglas

fir.E. 13 The bounding force (force to produce plastic hinge) for a solid

circular Douglas fir cross section is P - 233.38R3 lbs, where R is the radius

of the tree in inches.

The bounding force for a pole, assuming a yield strength of 36 ksi, is

P - 1000 R(R2- R 1 + 1 - t- (E.4)

F 0

0

E-23
(a)

,-Tree or pole

/777/77777

(b)

i.

elastic plastic

Plastic hinge forms when the entire cross section yields

Figure E-1O Loading conditions on trees and poles.

E-24
where

Ro - the pole outside diameter, inches,

Ri - the pole inside diameter, inches,

t - the pole wall thickness, inches.

Two examples of minor target bounding forces follow: a 1.5-foot-diameter

Douglas fir tree has a bounding force of 1.7x40 5 lbs, and a 10-inch-diameter

standard schedule pole has a bounding force of 2.95x,0 4 lbs.

Low-resistance objects such as trees, road signs, electricity poles,

motorcycles, passenger cars, trailers, and trucks can be screened out based on

static analysis. Assuming that the impact force is linearly applied, the

force/unit length that could cause local deformation can be estimated. The

representative cask can resist a linear force of 100,000 pounds/foot to

generate a strain of less than 0.2% ($i) at the inner shell. The linear force

to crush objects in many accidents is much less than 100,000 pounds/foot.

Table E.7 lists objects that are typically impacted in an accident, many of

which do not generate a maximum total force greater than 400,000 pounds or a

linear force greater than 100,000 pounds/foot.

Stronger and more massive objects, such as trains, bridge columns,

abutments, and real surfaces such as roadbeds are analyzed in Section E.7.

E.6 Impacts on Unyielding Surfaces

Impact calculation for the representative casks onto unyielding surfaces

were divided into two categories: those where the cask structural response is

essentially elastic and those where the cask structural response is elasticplastic. The elastic response evaluations discussed in Subsection E.6.1 were

performed primarily using the 1-D beam element code IMPASC.E' 1 4 The elasticplastic response evaluations discussed in Subsection E.6.2 were performed

using the DYNA and NIKE family of computer codes.

E-25
Table E.7

Quasi-Static Force Evaluation for Objects Potentially Impacted

Object Total Force Linear Force

(lbs) (lbs/ft)

Truck Cask

Endwise 3,300,000

Sidewise 1,600,000 100,000

Rail Cask

Endwise 13,000,000

Sidewise 1,600,000 100,000

Auto 50,000 <10,000

Truck Tractor 100,000 <17,000

Truck Trailer 450,000 <70,000

Train 2,000,000 >250,000

Motorcycle 20,000 <10,000

Bus 300,000 <50,000

Sound Wall 50,000 <50,000

4 x 4 Column 900,000 >225,000

E-26
E.6.1 Elastic Response of the Cask

In order to perform the response calculation, it is essential that a

proper computer code be selected. This computer code(s) must have the

following special capacities or features:

1. Can provide dynamic impact analysis

2. Can analyze oblique impact

3. Can analyze impact limiter nonlinear behavior

4. Can analyze lead slump effect

5. Can be run inexpensively.

Three computer codes were selected, NIKE 2-0/3-D, DYNA 2-D/3-D,E 2 and

IMPASC.E 1 3 Each code has its special features, but also has weaknesses in

meeting all the requirements. NIKE 2-D/3-D and DYNA 2-D/3-D are two of the

most powerful finite element codes for dynamic impact analysis. They meet all

the requirements listed above except that they are expensive to run.

Especially when dealing with oblique impact and nonlinear impact limiters, the

required 3-D modeling can result in costly calculations.

In order to manage the large amount of analysis required for this ttudy,

a code had to be found that could do analysis less expensively. The IMPASC

code was selected. IMPASC was developed specifically for dynamic impact

analysis of shipping casks to assess whether they meet the 10 CFR 71 design

requirements. It has a special feature for handling oblique impact. This

code can also analyze nonlinear behavior of the impact limiter, and is

inexpensive to run. The deficiency is that IMPASC cannot assess the leadslump effect.

The approach benchmarked the IMPASC results with DYNA/NIKE results to

assess the lead slump, and then used the IMPASC code to run production

calculations for impacts on an unyielding surface. From the sensitivity study

E-27
performed with the DYNA/NIKE codes in Subsection E.6.1.3, it was found that

lead slump will not occur under any conditions as long as the axial force on

the cask is smaller than 40 g. This is also the level at which it could be q

assured that the strain on the inner shell is less than 0.2% (Sl) and the

closure seal is functional, since the impact limiter is designed to completely

absorb the energy of this impact force level.

Sensitivity studies were performed to show that the inclusion of the cask

contents does not significantly change the strain levels in the cask. The

sensitivity studies included the following: lumping the weight of the

contents at the bottom end of the cask, modeling the contents as elements with

mass but no stiffness in the cask cavity, and modeling the contents with mass

and an estimated stiffness to simulate fuel bundles and the fuel basket.

Liquids such as water are not contained in the cask, because helium is the

coolant. The resulting changes in stress-strains and g loads for the various

models were not significant for the purposes of this study.

E.6.1.1 Truck Cask Impact

The IMPASC code was used to perform impact analysis on an unyielding

surface for the truck cask. The analysis was done by varying the other two

parameters: cask orientation angle and impact velocity. The cask response

was calculated for the cask orientation angles of 00, 100, 300, 500, 700, and

900 and impact velocities of 30 mph, 38 mph, and 45 mph. The impact velocity

is defined as the velocity component in the direction perpendicular to the

impact surface. The 00 cask orientation angle represents impact to the side

of the cask, whereas the 900 cask orientation angle represents impact to the

end of the cask.

For the 900 angle case, the effects due to the truck cab crushing and

lead slump pressure were included. The effects of lead pressure were

calculated using NIKE and are discussed in Subsection E.6.1.3. The effects of

the cab crush for front-wise impacts, which can be taken into account by

increasing the impact velocity required to give equivalent strain, was

estimated using an energy balance. The energy absorbed by the cab is

estimated as

E-28
Ea - FI x d (E.5)

where F, is the impact or crush force of the truck cab in inches and d is the

total distance the cab can be crushed in inches.ElII The kinetic energy

required to cause the same response for the cask when the cab crush is

included is estimated as

(1 MV')C = Ea (I~ MV2)WC(E6

where M is the mass of the truck and cask in Ibs; V2 is the impact velocity in

ft/sec used to find the strain, taking into account cab crush energy

absorption; and V, is the impact velocity in ft/sec without cab crush energy

absorption as used in IMPASC code calculations. The mass of the truck was

taken from SAND77-0270.E'II The velocity required to cause the same cask

response when cab crush is considered is

2 2 Ea + MV 2

" M " (E.7)

The effects of cab crush are included only for impact velocities up to

60 mph; at higher velocities the cask will break from its tie-downs and leave

the truck without any velocity reduction caused by truck cab crush.E.11

Table E.8 summarizes the velocities required to cause the same cask response

when cab crush is included as compared to the velocities without cab crush.

The effective impact velocity to take into account cab crush, V2 , is used to

determine the strain for a given impact velocity as calculated by the IMPASC

code. For instance, the strain at 30 mph as calculated by IMPASC for a truck

cask is assumed to occur at 34.6 mph when cab crush is taken into account.

E-29
Table E.8

Impact Velocities Required to Include Cab and

Rail Car Crush Energy Absorption

Velocity without Velocity with Velocity with

Crush Cab Crush Rail Car Crush

(mph) (mph) (mph)

30 34.6 35

45 48.2 48.5

60 62.4 62.8

-W

E-30
The strain variation with cask orientation angle for various impact

velocities are given in Table E.9. From these results it was concluded that

for the representative truck cask the endwise and sidewise strain responses

bound the strain responses for all cask orientations. For cask orientations

from 0-90o the structural strain responses can be linearly interpolated

between the sidewise and endwise strain responses. The strain is 0.2% (SI) at

the impact velocity of 32 mph for sidewise impacts and 38 mph for endwise

impacts.

E.6.1.2 Rail Cask Impact

The IMPASC code was used to perform these analyses. The analysis was

done by varying the other two parameters, i.e., cask orientation angle and

impact velocity. The cask response was calculated for the cask orientation

angles of 00, 100, 300, 500, 700, and 900 and impact velocities of 30 mph, 45

mph, and 60 mph. The impact velocity is defined as the velocity component in

the direction perpendicular to the object surface. The 00 cask orientation

angle represents the impact to the side of the cask, whereas the 900 cask

orientation angle is the impact to the end of the cask. The results of this

sensitivity study are given in Table E.10. As done for the truck cask, for

the 900 angle case we included the effects of lead slump pressure and crushing

the front end of the rail car transporting the cask. Table E.8 summarizes the

velocities required to include the rail car crush effects. From the results

it is concluded that for the representative rail cask, the endwise and

sidewise strain responses bound the strain responses for all cask

orientations. For cask orientations from 0-900, the structural strain

responses can be linearly interpolated between the sidewise and endwise strain

responses. The strain at the inner wall is 0.2% (Sl) at the impact velocity

of 55 mph for sidewise impacts and 38 mph for endwise impacts.

E.6.1.3 IMPASC and NIKE Comparison

The IMPASC code was benchmarked for endwise impacts at 30 mph on an

unyielding surface against the NIKE computer code. Table E.11 summarizes the

pertinent results for the representative truck and rail casks. For the truck

E-31
Table E.9

Truck Cask Strain Response to Impact on Unyielding

Surface at Various Cask Orientations

Strain

Impact Velocity

Cask Orientation (mph) Angle 30 3845 (0)

0 0.175 0.270 0.650

10 0.133 0.210 0.260

30 0.115 0.180 0.255

50 0.107 0.180 0.244

70 0.064 0.081 0.115 90a/ 0.060 0.200 2.00

a/ Includes effects of cab crush and lead slump for 900 impact

0

E-32
Table E.1O

Rail Cask Strain Response to Impact on Unyielding

Surface at Various Cask Orientations

Strain

Impact Velocity

Cask Orientation (mph)

Angle 30 45 60 (0)

0 0.046 0.135 0.235

10 0.027 0.057 0.091

30 0.027 0.059 0.096

50 0.026 0.059 0.088

70 0.015 0.031 0.060

9(La/ 0.05 1.00 7.00

Includes effects of cab crush and lead slump for 900 impact

E-33
Table E.li

IMPASC Endwise Impact Benchmark Calculation

Against NIKE 2-0 .1~

.0

Truck at 30 mph Rail at 30 mph

Unbonded

Bonded ElasticElastic Plastic

NIKE 2-D IMPASC NIKE 2-D NIKE 2-D IMPASC

Force

(g) 37.5 45.0 36 36 28.6

o -9543. -12200 -6732 -12035 -7100

axial

(psi)

Maximum 25.8 26.5 25.3 25.8 26.5

deflection

of limiter

(inches)

Maximum 0.00077 N/A 0.00038 0.0012 N/A.

plastic

strain or

effective

strain if

elastic (0)

,Z Z,

E-34
cask calculations, the material properties of Section E.2 and cask

configuration of Fig. E-15 were used. In the NIKE calculation the lead was

assumed to be unbonded from the stainless steel shells, whereas in the IMPASC

calculation the lead was assumed to be bonded. The calculated impact force

was approximately 38 g at 30 mph and the impact limiter deflection was

approximately 26 inches in both calculations. Rail cask calculations were

made with NIKE for bonded and unbonded lead. The results for the bonded lead

are in good agreement with the IMPASC results which are also based on the

assumption of bonded lead. The effect of assuming the lead unbonded is

primarily an increase of the stress and strain on the inner shell of the cask

caused by the lead pressure. From this benchmark comparison it was concluded

that significant lead slump would not occur and the plastic strain is less

than 0.2% ($I) when the axial impact force on the cask is less than 40 g.

E.6.2 Elastic-Plastic Response by Cask

Elastic-plastic calculations were necessary when cask impact forces

exceeded 40 g. Several of the capabilities of the DYNA and NIKE finite

element codes that are critical to such calculations are (1) elastic-plastic

material models, (2) sliding interfaces, (3) dynamic solutions, and (4) the

ability to solve large deformation problems. The cask models include a 304

stainless steel inner wall, lead shielding and a 304 stainless steel outer

wall. Each of the materials was modeled as a bilinear elastic-plastic

material. The material properties used are summarized in Section E.2. The

calculations were performed for endwise and sidewise impacts. The cask

responses to impacts at other cask orientations are assumed to be bounded by

the endwise and sidewise response results.

E.6.2.1 Endwise Impacts

Endwise impact calculations were performed for the representative truck

and rail casks striking an unyielding surface. The casks were dropped from

several heights onto an unyielding surface to obtain their responses over a

range of impact conditions. The casks were modeled as 2-D axisymmetric

composite cylinders with closures as shown in Fig. E-5. MAZE was used to

E-35
generate the finite element meshes. DYNA 2-D/NIKE 2-0 were used to perform

the impact calculations.E'.15

E.6.2.1.1 Truck Cask Impact

The truck cask was modeled using two elements for the inner shell as

shown in Fig. E-11. The results of the endwise impact calculations are -

summarized in Table E.12. The sudden deceleration of impact caused the lead

shielding to slump and the cask length to decrease as shown in Fig. E-12 for

the 60 mph impact. The maximum strain conditions occur at the inner wall at

the flange joint as shown in Fig. E-13 for the 60 mph impact. The velocity

changes with time, or decelerations, of the steel structure and the lead

shielding were significantly different as shown in Fig. E-14 for the 60 mph

impact. All impact calculations were terminated after reboun•bccurred. The

lead slump is determined by finding the void between the cask steel body and

lead shield. For example, consider a truck cask impacting at 60 mph. The

time for the lead and the steel to reach zero velocity is extrapolated from

Fig. E-14 as 19 msecs. Then the curves on Fig. E-12 are extrapolated to 19

msecs. This gives 16.5 inches of axial displacement at the top of the lead,

and 4.2 inches in the steel at the top of the lead cavity. The relative

displacement is the lead slump, and is (16.5 - 4.2) 12.3 inches.

An average interface deceleration force was calculated for the cask at

each impact velocity by averaging the interface force over the time it took

the steel structure to come essentially to a stop as shown in Fig. E-14. For

example, consider the truck cask impacting at 60 mph. The time for the total

steel mass to come nearly to a stop is 6 msecs as determined from Fig. E-14.

The steel interface force acting for the first 6 msec of impact ranges from a

high of 373 g to a low of 143 g, therefore the average interface force is the

sum of the forces divided by 2 or 258 g. The average interface deceleration

force was used to estimate the cask response to impacts on real surfaces as

discussed in Section E.7.

E-36
Figure E-11 Finite element mesh for two-element inner-wall model by truck

cask.

E-37
Table E.12

Summary of Truck Cask Endwise Impact ResultsA/

Interface Deceleration Strain Lead

Velocity Force Inner Shell Slump

(mph) (g) (M) (in)

30 38 0.077 0

45 90 3.60 4

258 23.3 12.3

90E/ 353 36.2 24

A' Cab crush not included in analysis.

.•/ Impact limiter not included in analysis.

E-38
4..

0) I

0.

~~1

0.000

-1.000

-2.000

-3.000

-4.000

-. ,000

-61000

-7.000

-6.000

-4.000

-10.000

-11.0•0

-12.000

-13.000

-14.0•0

-15.000

Time (sec.)

Figure E-12 Lead slump in truck cask at 60 mph impact.

E-39
Min(-) =0

Max(+) =2.33E-01

I

Figure E-13 Strain in lower steel structure for truck cask impact at 60 mph.

E-40
C

I-

<C

-t .000C402

-t .50&EO2

-2 .000E440

-2 .500402

-3 .0=0442

-6.000t$02

-4 JOO[402

-7.0=0402

-7.5=04w2

-4 .0=04=

-4.3001C+02

- .~ODC4O3

-t .4=0C0

P

Time (sec.)

Figure E-14 Velocity versus time for truck cask impact at 60 mph.

E-41
E.6.2.1.2 Rail Cask Inmpact

The rail cask was modeled using two elements for the inner shell as shown

in Fig. E-15. The results of the endwise impact calculations are summarized

in Table E.13. The lead slump that occurred in the rail cask is shown in

Fig. E-16 for the 90 mph impact. The strain condition in the steel structure

at the end of impact is shown Fig. E-17 for the 90 mph impact. The velocity

change for the steel structure and lead shielding is shown in Fig. E-18. The

average interface deceleration force was calculated from Fig. E-18 for the

90 mph impact with the method discussed in Subsection E.6.2.1.1 for the truck

cask.

E.6.2.2 Sidewise Impacts

Two-dimensional plane strain analyses without impact limiters or end

enclosures were performed for sidewise impacts on an unyielding surface to

estimate the 3-D responses for the casks. This approximate 2-D method

overestimates strain responses of the representative casks, particularly for

impact velocities less than 60 mph and for impacts on soft surfaces such as

soil. The 2-D method was benchmarked in Subsection E.6.2.2.3 with a

3-D impact analysis that modeled the representative truck cask with impact

limiters and end closures. This approximate method eliminates the need to

perform a series of 3-0 sidewise impact analyses.

The 2-D truck cask models were developed using the SLIC interactive mesh

generator.E. 1 6 The dimensions in the SLIC command file were modified to

generate the rail cask models. The cask models do not include contents. DYNA

2-0 (2), an explicit 2-0 hydrodynamic finite element program, was used to do

the plane strain analysis.

E.6.2.2.1 Truck Cask Impact

For unyielding surface impacts, a vertical symmetry plane was used in the

modeling as shown in Fig. E-19 to reduce the solution cost. The calculations

were performed for three different truck cask initial velocities: 30 mph, 60

mph, and 90 mph. The calculations were terminated when the cask started to

E-42
i i i W j i v i i i i

I IO'ý

Figure E-15 Finite element mesh for rail cask.

E-43
Table E.13

Summary of Rail Cask Endwise Impact Results.a/

Interface Deceleration Strain Lead

Velocity Force Inner Wall Slump

(mph) (g) (%) (in)

30 36 0.12 0.5

45 103 1.9 6.0

901/ 425 24.3 24.8

Cab crush not included in analysis.

b/ Impact limiter not included in analysis.

E-44
4.

E

"-'a

G.O0

-1 .000

-2.000

-4.000

-6.000

-6.000

-7.000

-6.000

-0.000

-to-coo

-11.0Am

-12.G00

-13.000

-14.o00

-18.000

-17.O0

-18.000

-194.00

-20.000

-21.000

-22 A0

-13.000

-24.000

-25.000

-29.000

-27.A00

Time (sec.)

Figure E-16 Lead slump in rail cask at 90 mph impact.

E-45
ean6L. LI-3 U~-4 UL JaO LBOIS pnJqs eol a .OJ. Nse3 pedWL le 06 -qdw 

(+)Xekv LO-ý3'VZ 

-UMl~ H 0 
-1.OOOE+02

-2.OOOE+02

-3.OOOE+02

-4.OOOE+02

-Steel

-5.OOOE+02

" -6.OOOE+02 4-

0 -7.OOOE+02

>. -8.000E+02

Lead

-9.OOOE+02

M- -1.OOOE+03

X -1.110E+03

-1200E+03

-1.300E+03

-1.400E+03

-1.500E+03

uJ wi W wi Bu IU 48 Iii inW

CN i It D R 11 .

Time (sec.)

Figure E-18 Velocity versus time for rail cask impact at 90 mph.

E-47
14.000 .. . . . . . . . . ... . . . '

12.000

10.000

8.000

6.000

4.000

ta

CO. 0.000 2 

0.00

4..

._ -2.000

-4.000

-6.000

-8.000

-10.000

-12.000

-14.000 t I I I I I I I I I

(' (4 t6 Cd A Cd Cd d

Diameter, inches

Figure E-19 Model of a truck cask impacting an unyielding surface.

E-48
rebound. The sudden deceleration caused the cask to flatten as shown in

Fig. E-20.

For the 30 mph impact, the cask experienced 160 g's and sustained a

maximum effective stress of 36,000 psi and maximum plastic strain of 5.9% in

the steel shells. For 60 mph, the g's increased to 342, the maximum effective

stress increased to 45,300 psi and the maximum plastic strain increased to

14%. These results are summarized in Table E.14. The location of the maximum

plastic strain is shown in Fig. E-21 for the 60 mph impact.

E.6.2.2.2 Rail Cask Impact

Calculations were performed for the rail cask with initial velocities of

30 mph and 60 mph. The 30 mph calculation was terminated when the cask

started to rebound. The 60 mph calculation was terminated when the cask

started to fold on itself. The sudden deceleration caused the cask to flatten

considerably and, in the 60 mph case, to develop a plastic hinge as shown in

Fig. E-22. The cask contents would to some degree resist the formation of the

plastic hinge. However, the cask contents were not modeled.

For the 30 mph impact, the cask experienced a force of 29 g's and

sustained a maximum effective stress of 32,400 psi and maximum plastic strain

of 4.1% in the steel shells. For 60 mph, the g's increased to 47, the maximum

effective stress increased to 37,400 psi and the maximum plastic strain

increased to 7.2%. These results are summarized in Table E.15. The location

of the maximum plastic strain is shown in Fig. E-23 for the 60 mph impact.

E.6.2.2.3 Three-Dimensional Sidewise Impact

A 3-D truck shipping cask was modeled for the side-drop analysis with

impact limiters. As shown in Fig. E-24, the model includes the inner and

outer steel shells, the lead shielding, the steel end caps, and the balsa wood

impact limiters. The finite element model was generated using SLIC, an

interactive mesh generator. The impact limiters were not tied to the cask,

conservatively allowing them to slide relative to the cask because any bolt

retaining forces that could be present are unknown. Two planes of symmetry

E-49
.4

Figure E-20 Truck cask impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph.

E-50
Table E.14

Results of Truck Cask Sidewise Impact on an Unyielding Surface

Cask impact velocity (mph) 30 60 90

Time at which rebound starts (sec) 0.0085 0.008 0.0075

g load on cask (g) 160 342 547

Maximum effective stress (psi) 36,000 45,300 63,100

Maximum plastic strain (%) 5.9 14. 23.1

E-51
Min(-) = 0

Max(+) = 1.40E-01

Figure E-21 Impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph - maximum plastic

strain location.

E-52
Figure E-22 Rail cask impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph.

E-53
Table E.15

Results of Rail Cask Sidewise Impact on an Unyielding Surface

Cask impact velocity (mph) 30 60

Time at which rebound starts (sec) 0.048 N/A

g load on cask (g) 29 47

Maximum effective stress (psi) 32,400 37,400

Maximum plastic strain (%) 4.1 7.2

i

E-54
Min(-)0

Max(+W 7.20E-02

Figure E-23 Rail cask Impact on unyielding surface at 60 mph - maximum

plastic strain location.

E-55
N.

I `ýF9

-~N

U -

Lead ///

Inner shel •End&

Outer shellcap

Lead

Impact

limiter

L4, L

... F -9#

Figure E-24 Full side drop geometry including impact limiters.

E-56
were incorporated to reduce the model's complexity. The inner and outer steel

shells were modeled using the thick shell option in DYNA 2-D.

The impact velocity was 60 mph, resulting in deceleration of 108 g's and

the deformation shown in Fig. E-25. The cask bowed because it was supported

by the impact limiters around the end caps. The center of the cask impacted

the unyielding surface at almost 60 mph. The contact area increased to

approximately half the length of the cask when impact was complete and rebound

started to occur. The strain distribution shown in Fig. E-26 indicates that

the maximums occur at the center of the cask. The maximum effective stress

was 42,500 psi; the maximum plastic strain was 8.7%; and the maximum shear

stress was 24,400 psi.

The calculation of the full side-drop with impact limiters showed several

things. First, the cask bows when the ends impact first because of the impact

limiters. Second, as the cask bows and the center of the cask impacts the

unyielding surface, the center of the cask is still traveling at almost full

speed. The bowing does not slow down the center of the cask.

A thin slice of the cask was isolated at the center and compared with a

2-0 plane strain calculation with the same impact velocity of 60 mph. The

deformations are virtually the same as shown in Fig. E-27. The stresses and

strains also compared favorably. Since the deformed slopes compared so

closely, it was concluded that 2-D calculations can be used to represent

3-D impacts on surfaces at 60 mph and greater.

E.7 Impacts on Real Objects

Ideally, it would be desirable to perform the response calculations

assuming both representative casks and real impact surfaces. This can be done

using either DYNA 2-D/3-0 or NIKE 2-D/3-0 computer codes. However, given that

computer runs have to be performed to cover many variations in cask

orientation angle, surface hardness, and impact velocities, expense precludes

the use of DYNA or NIKE codes for each case.

E-57
I

'Figure E-25 Deformations of truck cask during 60 mph side drop (side view)

E-58
time • 2.99004e-02

contours of eff. plastic strain

min- . in element 3561

max- 8.686e-02 in element 3163

contour values

a. 8.69e-03

b 1.7qe-g2

c- 2.61e-02

d. 3.47e-02

e .4.3qe-02

f 5.21e-02

6.0e-02

6.95e-02

i- 7.82e-02

Figure E-26 Distribution of plastic strain at end of impact (outer shell).

E-59
3-D Calculations 2-D Calculations

Figure E-27 Comparison of 2-D deformations with 3-D deformations at the

center of the cask.

E-60
To simplify the otherwise massive finite element analyses necessary to

analyze a representative, i.e., a deformable cask impacting a deformable

surface, an equivalent damage technique was devised. Using the equivalent

damage technique described in Subsection E.7.1, the cask response was

estimated for impacts on real surfaces.

E.7.1 Equivalent Damage Technique

In the equivalent damage technique, the total deformation, and thus the

total energy absorption caused by impact, is divided into two parts. The

basic assumption is that the total energy of the falling cask is absorbed by

deformation of the cask itself and the surface that it hits. In order to

estimate how much of the energy is absorbed by the surface, the cask is

modeled as a rigid body, and the surface is modeled as an energy-absorbing

medium. Using this model, the impact force on the rigid cask can be

determined for several velocities. In order to accomplish the necessary

analyses, the characteristics of several real target surfaces must be

determined.

The energy absorbed by the cask itself is estimated by modeling a

deformable cask impacting an unyielding surface. Impact forces and

corresponding cask deformations are determined for different impact velocities

using this model. In a real situation both the cask and surface would

deform. Taking the deformations from the two separate calculations and

summing them gives a conservative estimate of the total deformation when a

real cask hits a real surface. Since the force required to cause a 0.2%

strain (Sl) in the cask is known, the product of this force and the sum of the

separately calculated deformations, calculated for the same force,

conservatively gives the total deformation energy. By equating this total

deformation energy to the kinetic energy, an equivalent velocity can be

calculated. This equivalent velocity is then used to modify the curves

generated by use of the IMPASC code (in which only an unyielding surface can

be modeled) to take into account the effect of the real surface. Figure E-28

shows the analysis for the case of vertical end-drop without limiters.

E-61
-t-

(a) Rigid cask

impacts real

surface

V2 (FN g -1

(b) Representative cask

impacts unyielding

surface

(W~ 9= 2Si

(c) Representative cask

impacts real

surface

(F) 3

g W 2(ds1 + do)

Figure E-28 Equivalent damage technique.

E-62
To illustrate the application of the equivalent damage technique, this

discussion is restricted to the case of cask end-drop without limiters and a

strain of 0.2% (S$) even though this technique was used to calculate cask

responses for other orientations, for casks with limiters, and higher strain

levels.

In case (a), the representative truck or rail cask is impacted onto an

unyielding surface so that all the kinetic energy is absorbed by the cask.

The strain response of the cask is calculated as a function of impact

velocity. Assuming constant deceleration during impact, 'the deceleration

force can be estimated from an energy balance:

V

2

(1) g " - deceleration force in g for unyielding surface (E.B)

ci

where F is the force of impact in pounds, W is the cask weight in pounds, g is

the gravitational constant in ft/sec2 , V, is the impact velocity in ft/sec,

and dcl is the cask deformation in inches.

The cask deformation, dcl, is related to the maximum strain on the inner

wall where the 0.2% strain (SI) level is defined. The deceleration force,

cask deformation, and the maximum strain at the inner wall are calculated over

,a range of impact velocities. The deceleration force, (F/W)g, is identified

where the 0.2% strain (Sj) level occurs.

In case (b), a rigid body with the same outer dimensions as the cask is

impacted onto real surfaces such as hard rock, soft rock, and tillable soil.

All the kinetic energy is then absorbed by the surface. The deceleration

force can be estimated by

F 2

(F) g - - deceleration force in g of a rigid cask

1 on a real surface (E.9)

E-63
where V2 is the impact velocity in ft/sec and ds, is the penetration into the

surface in inches Again the deceleration force is calculated over a range of

impact velocities. The impact velocity V2 is determined for the same impact

force identified in case (a) at the 0.2% strain (SI) level.

In case (c), the representative cask is impacted onto real surfaces. The

impact velocity and kinetic energy are absorbed by both the cask and the

surface. The deceleration force can be estimated by

+dg 1- deceleration force in g of a sici representative cask on a real surface (E.10)

where V3 is the impact velocity corresponding to the 0.2% strain (S1 ) level,

and dsl and dc, are the penetration into the surface and cask deformation,

respectively, as calculated separately for the same force. By equating

Equations E.9 and E.10, the velocity V3 is calculated:

V2 ( V2 V-2(ds 1 dcl) >d2( V3 ( M) (EO 

A higher impact velocity is required to give equivalent damage for the

case where energy is absorbed by both the cask and the surface. The

equivalent damage technique was conservatively applied by assuming that either

the cask or the impacted surface absorb all of the impact energy. The

resulting average force on the cask was then used to estimate the strain on

the inner shell. Consequently, the strain is significantly overestimated in

those cases when significant energy is absorbed by both the cask and the

surface.. As shown by the benchmark calculation, this approach over

compensates for the simplifying assumptions made to develop the equivalent

damage technique.

E-64
This equivalent damage technique was benchmarked by impacting the

representative truck cask on soft rock and then comparing the calculated

strain with the estimated strain from the equivalent damage technique for the

same impact conditions.

To simplify the comparison, the impact limiter was not included in the

benchmark analysis. The representative cask was impacted at 30 mph on the

soft rock surface. The cask response to the impact is summarized in

Table E.16. The cask response using the equivalent damage technique is also

summarized. The percentage strain response for the actual case is 5.4%

compared to 14.3% estimated using the equivalent damage technique. In this

benchmark case, it was assumed that all of the energy is absorbed by the soft

rock, because the resultant force is lower than that resulting from an

equivalent drop onto an unyielding surface* From this benchmark calculation

it was concluded that the equivalent damage technique as used in this study

overestimates the cask response, yet provides reasonable results for

estimating purposes.

E.7.2 Soil Impacts

A simple soil model was developed and benchmarked for evaluating impacts

on soil with the representative casks as discussed in Subsections E.7.2.1 and

E.7.2.2. The responses of the representative casks for endwise impacts on

soil were estimated in Subsection E.7.2.3 using the equivalent damage

technique. The responses of the casks were calculated with 2-D cask models in

Subsection E.7.2.4 for sidewise impacts.

E.7.2.1 Soil Model

Three surfaces are considered to represent a range of credible impact

scenarios. The surfaces considered simulate a hard rock, a soft rock

including concrete, and tillable soil. Real surfaces exhibit complex

characteristics but can be considered to deform elastically during the early

part of the impact, followed by an energy dissipation phase. The exact nature

of the energy dissipation mechanisms is not well known; therefore, a

reasonable and simple elastic-perfectly plastic formulation was used. The two

E-65
Table E.16

Comparison of Equivalent Damage Technique Result

with Real Surface Impact Results

Real Cask Rigid Cask

on Soft on Soft Real Cask on Equivalent

Rock Rock Unyielding Damage

Surface Surface Surface Technique

Cask Velocity (mph) 30 30 28.4 30.0

Duration of Impact (msecs) 17 7.5 17.0 17.0

Interface Force at Impact (g) 203 222 222.0 222.0

Maximum Plastic Strain (%) 5.4 N/A 14.3 14.3

Lead Slump (in) 6 N/A 6.12 6.12

~1'

i

E-66
parameters used in this formulation, namely the initial elastic modulus and

the yield stress, can be calibrated to approximate an equivalent energyabsorbing medium. To provide the calibration, penetration dataE'1 9 were used

as discussed in Subsection E.7.2.2. Reasonable predictions of penetration

were possible using the equivalent elastic-plastic formulation.

The material parameters required by the bilinear computer model, an

elastic-plastic model referred to as Material Type 3 in the NIKE/DYNA input

manuals, are

E - Young's modulus, psi,

v - Poisson's ratio, unitless,

a y - yield strength, psi,

p - density, lb-sec2 /in 4 ,

0 m hardening parameter, unitless,

En - hardening modulus, psi,

Olult and o3ult = principle stresses at ultimate stress state, psi.

A suitable range of yield stresses had to be determined for use within

the elastic-perfectly plastic model. The standard method for predicting soil

failure is the Mohr-Coulomb failure criterion, which states that soil will

fail in shear at a value proportional to the applied confining pressure, which

varies with soil depth. Even if it is assumed that yielding begins at a

stress level equal to the failure stress (corresponding to the elasticperfectly plastic response assumption), it is necessary to consider a range of

failure stress levels.E' 17

To calculate the failure stress, oult, the data of J.M. Duncan, et al.,

were used to provide an extensive list of soil parameters.E' 18 Also, a

E-67
relationship between the deviatoric failure stress, (01 - 03)f, the friction

angle, 0, and the cohesion intercept is given by Duncan with the formula

(01 - 03)f -

2c cos 0 + 2a3 sin 0

1 T-- i Tn (E.12)

The deviatoric failure stress is related to the ultimate deviatoric

stress as follows:E' 1 7

(oI - 03)f = Rf(oI - 03)ult. (E.13)

where Rf is the failure ratio. Because (01 - 03)f is always less than

(01 - 03)ult, the value of Rf is always less than 1, usually 0.5-0.9. Duncan

lists soil parameters for about 150 soils. If, for a particular type of soil,

e.g. sandy clay, the largest 0, c, and 03, and the lowest value for Rf are

selected, a conservative value for the deviatoric failure stress can be

calculated. Rearranging equation (E.13) gives:

(01 - 03)

0ult lult" Rf + a3ult (E.14)

w

For an elastic-plastic model it is conservative to use the ultimate stress as

the yield stress to estimate the maximum force on the cask.

From Duncan's data a summary of the conservative parameters found for 12

general categories of soils is given in Table E.17.

E-68
Table E.17

Soil Parameters

Soils Max B Max c Max oa3 Min Rf Oy

(0) (tons/ft 2 ) (psi) (unitless) (psi)

Rockfill 53 0 728 0.51 12051

Sandy Gravel 58 10.01 728 0.57 15107

Clayey Gravel/Clayey Sand 34 2.6 504 0.55 2847

Silty Sand/Sandy Silt 53 0.54 219 0.57 3277

Sand 49 0 1104 0.63 11892

Silty Clay 33 3.3 222 0.58 1161

Lean Clay 3 1.10 93.33 0.52 118

Fat Clay 4 1.5 156 0.65 196

Silt 45 0 115 0.57 1090

E-69
E.7.2.2 Soil Model Benchmark Calculations

The soil model was benchmarked by comparing with test data. This was

accomplished in two phases. The first was an analytical plate bearing test.

This test is often used to evaluate soils, subgrades, and pavements,

especially in road design, and uses the modulus of subgrade reaction, k, which

is measured in situ with a plate bearing test. The test involves loading a

circular disk, or stack of disks, usually 30 inches in diameter, at a

specified deflection rate, and measuring the deflection at a predetermined

load, usually 10 psi. The modulus k is calculated as follows:

k -R , psi/in, (E.15)

where

p - unit load on plate, psi

A - deflection of plate, inches.

The results obtained for the modulus of subgrade reaction, k, were compared

with predicted valuesE-18 and are summarized in Table E.18. The purpose of

this check was to verify that the selected elastic plastic material model

produced results that were not completely out of line. The results indicate

that for elastic loads, the model significantly over-predicts the soil

stiffness. The over-prediction is conservative for this study.

The second phase of the benchmark process was a review of work presented

by C.W. Young,E.20 and a comparison of his results with the soil model

results. Young's method was developed to predict depth of earth-penetrating

projectiles. Young uses a material parameter, which he calls S, in his

formulation and has tabulated values of S for a large variety of soils.

Typical values of S from YoungE. 2 0 are listed in Table E.19 with the bilinear

soil parameters.E'.1,E.19,E.21

From Table E.18 it is concluded that the parameters used to model soils

can vary over a wide range for different types of soil and rocks. Also the

types of soils and rocks can vary significantly within a specific land

region. To make the work manageable in analyzing impact with surfaces, the

E-70
Table E.18

Plate Bearing Test Simulation with NIKE 2-D

Soil Calculated k Predicted kE'19

(psi/in) (psi/in)

Dense .San3

E 10 psi 1100 300 or more

v- 0.3

Sandy Clay

E - 5x103 psi 750 200-300

v - 0.3

Hard Sand 3

E - 5x10 3 psi 840 300-800

v - 0.48

E-71
Table E.19

Summary of Soil Types and Range of Soil ParametersE-1,E-I,E 2 1

Range of Soil Parameters

Bilinear Model Parameter Soil Constant,

Soils E v

(ps i)(A) (e f-b

Clay 50-38,000 0.1-0.5 100-3,000 4-50

Silt 300-500 0.3-0.35 1,000-3,500 8-50

Sand 1,000-28,000 0.15-0.4 2,800-15,000 4-12

Soft Rock 20,000-2,000,000 0.1-0.4 10,000-16,000 0.8-5

Hard Rock 5,000,000-26,000,000 0.12-0.4 12,000-25,000 0.3-0.8

Concrete 3,000,000-5,000,000 0.1-0.2 3,000-8,000 0.8-3

E-72
surfaces were classified into three groups: hard rock, soft rock including

concrete, and tillable soil. The material properties selected to represent

each of these groups are tabulated in Table E.20. The range of values for the

parameters and Young'sE. 2 0 soil constant S are tabulated for each group.

In Fig. E-29, the impact forces calculated using the elastic plastic

model are plotted for impact on each of the three surfaces by a rigid truck

cask as a function of impact velocity. Impact force ranges calculated using

experimental formulasE.20 and a rigid truck cask are also plotted for general

S soil constants for comparison. For each of the groups there is good

agreement between the DYNA 2-0 results and the experimental ones.

E.7.2.3 Endwise Impacts on Soil

In order to use the equivalent damage technique to estimate the response

of the representative casks for endwise impacts on real surfaces, the impact

forces had to be calculated. These analyses were 2-D axisymmetric dynamic

finite element analyses, using the code DYNA 2-D. A typical mesh is shown in

Fig. E-30. The model includes an unyielding cylindrical falling body which

has the same weight and radius as the representative truck and rail casks. A

slideline was included between the unyielding cask and the surface. Slideline

type three, sliding with voids, was selected from the DYNA 2-D Users Manual.

The other possibility, slideline type four, was rejected because the penalty

formulation required some adjustment depending upon the stiffness of the soil

and the impact velocity, which was not suitable for a parametric study. The

impact forces were calculated at four velocities, 30, 60, 90, and 120 mph.

The impact forces are summarized in Table E.21 for the representative truck

and rail casks.

E.7.2.4 Sidewise Impacts on Soil

Two-dimensional plane strain analysis without impact limiters or end

closures were performed for sidewise impacts on the three surfaces to estimate

the 3-D responses of the two representative casks. The 2-D truck and rail

cask models were developed using the MAZE interactive mesh generators. The

cask models do not include contents. DYNA 2-D was used to calculate the

responses. E-73
Table E.20

Selected Soil Parameters for this Study

Represented Bilinear Model Parameter Soil Constant, S

Surface v ( Rage

(psi) (PA) (sec/qflb)

Soil 6,000 0.4 1,000 5-50

Soft Rock, 3,640,000 0.2 4,000 1-5

Concrete

Hard Rock 7,000,000 0.28 25,000 0.3

E-74
1000 1-

I.-

e• '- 100

0.

E

10

1

- - - - ~ - - - - - - Harc

ýS=l

- - - - - - - - _ - - -S ,soft=

Soil

- - - -- -S =

I •I I

).3

rock

1.0

rock

5.0

so

0 30 60

Impact velocity, MPH

90 120

S = Soil constant

Figure E-29 Soil model comparison with penetration test data.

E-75
Al1

Figure E-30 Finite element mesh for drops on soils.

E-76
Table E.21

Summary of Cask Responses to Endwise Impacts on Real Surfaces

Impact Force

(g) Truck Cask Rail Cask

Surface Type Surface Type

Hard Soft Hard Soft

Velocity Rock Rock Soil Rock Rock Soil

(mph)

30 1050 250 12 -- 420 16

60 1310 270 26 ..-- 110

90 1340 -- 40 -- 600 200

120 1360 290 54 -- .-- 

E-77
E.7.2.4.1 Truck Cask Impacts

The truck cask response to endwise impacts on hard rock surfaces was

essentially the same as the response to impact on an unyielding surface.

Since the cask stiffness is less for sidewise impacts, sidewise impact

analyses were performed only for impacts on soil and soft rock. The

calculations were performed for 30 mph and 60 mph impacts on soil and 30 mph

and 90 mph impacts on soft rock. The effective plastic strain distribution at

the time the maximum occurs is shown in Fig. E-31 for the 60 mph impact on

soil. The results of the impact calculations are summarized in Table E.22.

The maximum strain response of the cask was 2.45% and 7.62% at the inner shell

for the 30 mph and 60 mph impacts on the soil. The strain response at the

inner shell was 5.03% and 13.6% for the impacts on the concrete surface at

30 mph and 90 mph, respectively.

E.7.2.4.2 Rail Cask Impacts

As was done for the truck cask, sidewise impact analyses were performed

for the rail cask for impacts on soil and soft rock. The calculations were

performed for 30 mph and 60 mph impacts on soil and 30 mph and 90 mph impacts

on soft rock. The effective plastic strain distribution at the time the

maximum occurs is shown in Fig. E-32 for one of the cases studied. The

results of the impact calculations are summarized in Table E.23. The maximum

strain responses at the inner shell for impacts on soil were 2.17% and 3.37%

at 30 mph and 60 mph, respectively. The maximum strain responses of the rail

cask was lower than those of the truck cask because of its greater

flexibility.

E.7.3 Water Impact

An analysis of water impact for wedge shaped bodies is provided in the

literature for use in ship hull design.E' 2 2 ,E. 2 3 A phenomenon, substantiated

during an experimental investigation of flat bottom slamming at the Naval Ship

Research and Development Center, is described wherein, during flat bottom

slamming, air is trapped between the impact surface of the falling body and

the water surface, thereby cushioning the impact.E. 2 3 Thus the impact angle

E-78
Max(+) = 8.47E-02

Figure E-31 Maximum plastic strain location on truck cask for impact at 60

mph on soft rock.

E-79
Table E.22

Results of Truck Cask Sidewise Impacts on Real Surfaces

(without Impact Limiter)

Strain at Inner Wall

(M)

Surface Type

Velocity Soil Soft Rock

(mph)

30 2.45 5.03

60 7.62 --

90 -- 13.6

'3

E-80
Min(-) = 0

Max(+) = 3.37E-02

Figure E-32 Maximum plastic strain location on rail cask for impact at 60

mph on soft rock.

E-81
Table E.23

Results of Rail Cask Sidewise Impacts on Real Surfaces

(without Impact Limiter)

Strain at Inner Wall

(%) Surface Type

Velocity Soil Soft Rock

(mph)

30 2.17 3.78

60 3.37 --

90 -- 10.10

S

E-82
producing the highest impact force is not 900, but 870. An approximation of

the impact force on a cask falling into a body of water is made by integrating

the pressure, over an area equal to the cask end cross sectional area:E.23

x

2

p(x) -1⁄2pV1 [ L

M fL(90 - OM - 2 - L 2z: (L 2 

_- 0

V

(E.16)

and

Force - I q p(y)dy (E.17)

where

y = Lx, ft,

q - 2 L (x - x2) , ft1

B - compliment of deadrise angle, 0,

p mass density of water, lb/ft 3 ,

L = cask diameter, ft,

V - cask impact velocity, ft/sec,

z - 0 (i.e., assume that impact acceleration, 1 g, is

negligible).

E-83
Using Simpson's Rule for integration, the interface forces were

calculated for the two unyielding casks with the same external dimensions as

the representative casks for four impact velocities and three cask

orientations. For the large diameter rail cask, the loads due to impact on

water can be quite high for the 870 impact angle. However these loads drop

off rapidly for other impact angles. The results of the calculations are

summnarized in Table E.24. The equivalent damage technique is used to estimate

the strain response of the casks to the calculated impact forces.

E.7.4 Train Sill Impact

E.7.4.1 Impact on Truck Cask,

Two scenarios were evaluated for a locomotive sill impacting a truck

cask: the sill impacting the cask sidewise head-on; and the sill impacting

the cask sidewise off-center. The cross-section of the model used to simulate

a locomotive sill is shown in Fig. E-33 and consists of two plates connected

with two large I-beams. E.9 The sill was modeled as a solid object with

modified properties. For the sidewise head-on impacts the sill was modeled as

a plate 3.5 inches thick to approximate its axial strength. For the sidewise

off-center impacts the sill was modeled as a plate 11.5 inches thick to

approximate its bending strength. In both cases, the density of the sill was

calculated for a locomotive weight of 200 tons.

The sill was first modeled as shown in Fig. E-34 to impact at a point at

450 on the truck cask from the sidewise head-on position. Calculations were

-made with the locomotive sill impacting the cask at velocities of 30 mph and

60 mph. In both cases, the cask moved away from the sill at an angle and

achieved a velocity lower than the initial sill velocity. Also, the sill

underwent a slight rotation and remained undamaged. However, the cask

sustained large deformations where the sill scraped across it. Also as

illustrated in Fig. E-35, the sudden acceleration caused the cask to flatten.

,For the 30 mph impact, the cask experienced a force of 110 g's and

sustained a maximum effective stress of 40,100 psi and maximum plastic strain

of 7.5% in the steel shells. For 60 mph, the force increased to 206 g's, the

E-84
Table E.24

Interface Force for Water Impact

(All Results Listed in Multiples of Cask Weight,

No Impact Limiters or Cab Crush Included)

Unyielding Truck Cask Unyielding Rail Cask

Impact Orientation Impact Orientation

Velocity 870 450 00 870 450 00

(mph)

30 17.7 0.9 12.6 37.8 1.9 10

60 70.8 3.6 50.4 151.3 7.6 39

90 159.3 8.5 119 340.5 17.1 88

120 283.2 14.5 203 605.3 30.4 155

E-85
0

!!;L-I 5 3/4--H

W33X241

Tee (TYP)

135/8t

t

3/8

1 381

13/1,6,---o-

- . - . - -

I I

3.0

Dimensions in inches

Figure E-33 Locomotive sill cross section.

E-86
Figure E-34 Sidewise off-center locomotive sill impact.

E-87
o 0

Figure E-35 Thirty mph sidewise off-center sill impact.

E-88
maximum effective stress increased to 50,000 psi, and the maximum plastic

strain increased to 12.8%. These results are summarized in Table E.25. The

location of the maximum plastic strain is shown in Fig. E-36.

For the sidewise head-on impact, the complete 2-D strain truck cask model

was analyzed for impact with the locomotive sill. This model was used only

for the impact at 30 mph; based on these results, symmetry was used for the 60

mph impact to reduce the solution cost. The modeling is shown in Fig. E-37.

In both cases, the cask achieved a velocity higher than the sill velocity and

the sill was undamaged. However, the cask sustained large deformations in the

impact zone. Also, the sudden acceleratio~n caused the cask to flatten as

shown in Fig. E-38.

For the 30 mph impact, the cask experienced a force of 138 g's, a maximum

effective stress of 50,000 psi, and a maximum plastic strain of 12.4% in the

steel shells. For 60 mph, the force increased to 265 gins, the maximum

effective stress increased to 65,000 psi, and the maximum plastic strain

increased to. 20%. These results are summarized in Table E.26. The location

of the maximum plastic strain is shown in Fig. E-39.

None of our cask models included contents. For the truck cask, the mass

of the contents is not large compared to the mass of the cask. The truck cask

is very much like a thick-walled cylinder and under the severe impact

conditions, it is able to support itself. For the rail cask, the mass of the

contents is very large compared to' the mass of the cask. Also, the rail cask

is like a thin-walled cylinder. Under the severe impact conditions, it is

unable to support itself. Thus, contents are very important to the rail cask

calculations and should be modeled to provide more accurate impact forces and

g loads and to support the cask as it collapses.

Our comparison of the maximum effective stresses and plastic strains

sustained by the two casks for the different impact conditions shows that the

sidewise sill head-on impact into the truck cask is the most severe. The offcenter impact is less severe because the sill transfers less energy as it

strikes a glancing blow to the cask. The truck cask impacting on the

unyielding surface is less severe than the sidewise head-on impact. However,

the maximum g loads occur in the impacts on an unyielding surface. The

E-89
Table E.25

Results Sidewise of Off-Center Sill Impact Against Truck Cask

Locomotive sill velocity (mph) 30 60

Locomotive sill velocity (in/sec) 528 1056

Duration of impact (sec) 0.012 0.011

Velocity at end of impact (in/sec) 425 637

Angle of departure of cask (0) 52 42

g load on cask (g) 110 206

Maximum effective stress (psi) 40,100 50,800

Maximum plastic strain (%) 7.5 12.8

Maximum plastic strain at inner shell(%) 2.3 3.8

E-90
Max(+ = 7.54E-02

Figure E-36 Thirty mph sidewise off-center sill impact-maximum plastic

strain location.

E-91
30 mph model

] 60 mph model

Figure E-37 Model configurations for sidewise head-on sill impact.

Note use of symmetry for 60 mph case.

E-92
Figure E-38 Sidewise head-on sill impact at 30 mph.

E-93
Table E.26

Results of Sidewise Head-on Sill Impact Against Truck Cask

Locomotive sill velocity (mph) 30 60

Locomotive sill velocity (in/sec) 528 1056

Duration of impact (sec) 0.0125 0.0135

Velocity at end of impact (in/sec) 575 1130

g load on cask (g) 138 265

Maximum effective stress (psi) 50,000 65,000

Maximum plastic strain (%) 12.4 20

Maximum plastic strain at inner shell (%) 3.7 6.0

E-94
Min(- 0

Max(+) = 1.24E-01

Figure E-39 Thirty mph sidewise head-on sill impact-maximum plastic strain

location.

E-95
sidewise head-on impact causes severe local deformations before the cask is

accelerated to its final speed. Also, the locomotive sill has some give to

it. These combined effects soften the impact. The rail cask endures the

least severe stresses, strains, and g loads, yet it sustains the most severe

deformations. This is because the rail cask is more ductile than the truck

cask, causing a very soft impact.

E.7.4.2 Impact on Rail Cask

The response of the representative rail cask was estimated for impacts

with a train sill by using the truck cask results. The response was estimated

by multiplying the truck cask results for the train sill impact times the rail

cask results for the unyielding surface impact and dividing by the truck cask

results for the unyielding surface impact. The estimated responses of the

representative rail cask to impacts by a train sill are summarized in

Table E.27. The estimated strains are conservatively high because of the

greater size and weight of the rail cask compared to the truck cask.

E-96
Table E.27

Estimated Response of Rail Cask to Impact by Train Sill

Strain Response

Impact Orientation

Velocity 00 450

(mph)

30 2.3 1.4

60 3.6 2.3

E-97
E.8 References

E.1 J. 0. Hallquist, NIKE 2-D: An Implicit, Finite-Deformation, Finite

Element Code for Analyzing the Static and Dynamic Response of TwoDimensional Solids, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore,

CA, UCRL-52678, 1979, and Revision 1, NIKE 2-0: An Implicit, FiniteDeformation, Finite Element Code for Analyzing the Static and Dynamic

Response of Two-Dimensional Solids, Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCID-18822, 1981.

E.2 J. 0. Hallquist, User's Manual for Dyna 2-D--An Explicit 'TwoDimensional Hydrodynamic Finite Element Code with Interactive Rezoning,

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCID-18756, Rev.

2, 1984.

E.3 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, The American Society of

Mechanical Engineers, United Engineering Center, 345 East 47th Street,

New York, NY 10017, July 1983.

E.4 J. B. Conway, R. h. Stentz, and J. T. Berling, Fatigue, Tensile, and

Relaxation Behavior of Stainless Steels, Technical Information Center,

Office of Information Services, United States Atomic Energy Commission,

Oak Ridge, TN, 1975.

E.5 Safety Analysis Report for the NLI-1O-24 Shipping Cask, Docket No.

70-9023, National Lead Industries, Inc., Wilmington, DE, February 1976.

E.6 J. Counts and J. B. Payne, Evaluation of Analysis Methods for Type B

Shipping Container Impact Problems, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,

Los Alamos, NM, LA-6640-MS, 1979.

E-98
E.7 Consolidated Safety Analysis Report IF-300 Shipping Cask "Appendix I",

Docket No. 70-1220, General Electric Company, San Jose, CA, January

1971.

E.8 C. R. Adams, et al, A Comparison of Analytical Techniques for Analyzing

a Nuclear-Spent-Fuel Shipping Cask Subjected to an End-on Impact, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, NUREG/CR-2018, 1981.

E.9 P. Eggers, Severe Rail and Truck Accidents: Toward a Definition of

Bounding Environments for Transportation Packages, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, NUREG/CR-3498, 1984.

E.10 N. E. Shoemaker, et al., Consumer Information Crash Test Program, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, DOT HS-802011, September

1976.

E.11 M. Huerta, Analysis, Scale Modeling, and Full-Scale Tests of a Truck

Spent-Nuclear-Fuel Shipping System in High Velocity Impacts Against a

Rigid Barrier, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM,

SAND77-0270, 1978.

E.12 M. Huerta, Analysis, Scale Modeling, and Full-Scale Tests of a Railcar

and Spent-Nuclear-Fuel Shipping Cask in a High Velocity Impact Against

a Rigid Barrier, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, SAND78-

0458, Febuary 1980.

E.13 Uniform Building Code, International Conference of Building Officials,

Whittier, California, 1979.

E.14 T. A. Nelson, et. al., SCANS - Shipping Cask Analysis System, Vol. 1,

Impact Analysis Code User's Manual, Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCID-20674/Vol. 1, Draft Report to be

published, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,

NUREGICR-4554, 1986.

E-99
E.15 J. 0. Hallquist, MAZE, An Input Generator for DYNA 2-D and NIKE 2-0,

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCID-19029, June

1983.

E.16 M. A. Gerhard, SLIC, Interactive Graphic Mesh Generator, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-52823, September

1979.

E.17 G. F. Sowers, Introductory Soil Mechanics and Foundations:

Geotechnical Engineering, Fourth Edition, MacMillan Publishing Company,

New York, NY, 1979.

E.18 J. M. Duncan, P. Byrne, K. S. Wong, and P. Mabry, Strength, StressStrain and Bulk Modulus Parameters for Finite Element Analyses of

Stresses and Movements in Soil Masses, University of California at

Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, UCB/GT/80-01, 1980.

E.19 W. Yoder, Principles of Pavement Design, Second Edition, J. Wiley and

Sons, New York, NY, 1975.

E.20 C. W. Young, "Depth Prediction for Earth-Penetrating Projectiles",

Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, Proceedings of

the American Society of Civil Engineers Vol. 95, No. SM3, Proceedings

Paper 6558, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY, May

1969.

E.21 J. E. Bowles, Foundation Analysis and Design, Second Edition, McGrawHill, New York, NY, 1977

E.22 H. Wagner, Uber Stoss und Gleitvorgange an der Oberflache von

Flussigkeiten," Zeltschrift Fur Angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik,

August 1932.

E-100
E.23 S. L. Chuang, "Experiments on Slamming of Wedge-Shaped Bodies," Journal

of Ship Research, September 1967.

E-101

APPENDIX F

List of Figures

Page

F-1 Fire modeling of casks ................................................ F-3

F-2 Modeled cask dimensions for TACO input ................................... F-8

F-3 Lead mid-thickness temperatures for truck cask versus

duration of regulatory fire ............. 00.........0.**............. F-14

F-4 Lead mid-thickness temperatures for rail cask versus

duration of regulatory fire .......... o ..... .o........ .. ........... F-16

F-5 Initial heat flux on truck cask for various fire conditions

(1-D model) ....... o......... . ............ .. ................. 0 ......... F-19

F-6 Heat flux on truck cask versus duration of 14750 F and 1825°F fires .... F-21

F-7 Integrated heat flux on truck cask versus duration of

1475°F and 1825°F fires ... ........................................ F-22

F-8 Lead mid-thickness temperature for truck cask versus

duration of 1825°F fire ................ o........................... F-23

F-9 Heat flux on rail cask versus duration of 1475°F and 1825°F fires ..... F-25

F-1O Lead mid-thickness temperature for rail cask versus

duration of 1825°F fire .............. ,*................................ F-26

F-11 Initial 'and average heat flux on truck and rail cask

versus flame temperature ... .. .............. ............. . ............. F-27

F-12 Cask on ground with tangent flame front .............................. F-29

F-13 Cask on ground--distant from flame front .............................. F-30

-F-14 Fraction of heat load from nonengulfing fires ......................... F-32

List of Tables

Page

F.1 Material Thermal Properties ........ ............................... F-11

F.2 Internal Heating from Fuel Assemblies ................. o......o........... F-12

F-i
Ar -.
APPENDIX F

Thermal Analysis

F.1 Introduction

This appendix provides the thermal models developed and the analyses

performed to determine the responses of the representative truck and rail

casks to a wide range of fire conditions. The computer code TACO-2D was used

to perform the calculations.F'I

In Section F.2, the types of thermal loading conditions that can effect

the temperature response of a cask in an accident are discussed. The highest

loading condition is caused by large, long-duration fires and is selected for

further evaluation. In Section F.3, the thermal loading conditions on a cask

caused by real fire conditions are discussed. Referenced fire conditions and

modeling are defined for evaluating real fire effects on casks.

In Section F.4, the thermal model and transient temperature response of

the two representative casks to regulatory fire conditions are discussed. In

Section F.5, the transient temperature response of the two representative

casks is estimated for different heat loading conditions and a wide spectrum

of real fire conditions defined by fire duration, temperature, and location.

F.2 Thermal Loading Conditions Caused by Accidents

Thermal loading conditions on a cask caused by an accident can result in

cask temperature increases. The thermal loading conditions include fires,

torch fires, and cask burial. Typically, as discussed in Section F.5, a fire

can heat a cask at an average heat flux of 5,000 Btu/hr-ft 2 from several

minutes to several hours. The total heat absorbed in a fire can be 1,000 to

50,000 BTU/ft 2 depending on the fire temperature, location, and duration.

Torch fires can heat a localized area of a cask at rates 1.5 to 2.5 times

higher than a fire, but in comparison to fires, do not deposit large

quantities of heat into the cask. As demonstrated in torch fire tests at

Sandia,F' 2 no significant localized damage occurs to the cask even at the high

heating fluxes because the heat is quickly dissipated to other portions of the

cask thus limiting the rise in the local temperature.

F-I
Burial of the cask can cause the temperature of the cask and contents tL

rise because of the decay heat from the fuel. Burial of the cask can cause

thermal isolation, where the decay heat from the fuel may have to be

transferred through the surrounding material causing the burial. The decay

heat flux from the fuel in a cask is typically 50-350 Btu/hr-ft 2 depending

primarily on the number of fuel assemblies, their burnup, and their time out

of a reactor. The decay heat flux from the fuel assemblies is 15-50 times

lower than that which can be typically absorbed from a fire. The cask, which

is relatively large and not easily buried, would have to be buried for several

days before any significant damage to the cask could occur that could result

in radioactive releases.

Based on severe accident data, the frequency of occurrence of fires is at

least 10 times higher than for torch fires or complete burial of a cask.

Therefore, since fires can generate higher heat loads and can occur more

frequently, it is concluded that fires dominate the potential thermal

environment and only fires require further evaluation.

F.3 Reference Fire Conditions and Modeling

In Fig. F-1(a), a three-dimensional (3-D) model of a cask engulfed in a

real fire is given. The heat transfer from the fire to the cask can vary with

time and position along the length and around the diameter of the cask. The

effects of the fire can be significantly different on the various components

located on the cask. To simplify the heating analysis of the cask and its

components, currently licensed cask designs were reviewed to relate the

temperatures at the middle portion of the cask to the temperatures of the

other positions of the cask, particularly the closure seals. The location of

valve boxes was also considered because they could be exposed to heat loads

and temperatures approaching this middle portion of the cask. From this

review, it was concluded that the temperature response and damage to the cask

and its components could be conservatively bounded by analyzing the middle

portion of the cask and using the four temperature response levels defined in

Section 4.0 for the centerline of the lead shielding. Using this approach,

the 3-D model in Fig. F-1(a) is reduced to the two-dimensional (2-0) model in

Fig. F-1(b) for analysis.

F-2
Impact

limiter

a) Three-dimensional

cask fire model

Cask

b) Two-dimensional

cask fire model

Figure F-1

c) One-dimensional

cask fire model

Fire modeling of casks.

F-3
In a real engulfing fire, the spent fuel cask is partially shielded from

the heat by either the transport vehicle or the ground. In real fires the

amount of heat transferred to the cask differs significantly from that from a

hypothetical totally engulfing fire, represented by the one-dimensional (1-D)

model in Fig. F-1(c).

The role of convection from the flame may be significant for cases in

which the cask is enclosed within or very near the flame while on either the

ground or the vehicle. There does not appear to be sufficient experimental

evidence to formulate any general rule to evaluate convection coefficients in

this geometry. Also the flame temperature can vary significantly along the

diameter of the cask. A common analytical approach is to consider the flame

to be isothermal, with a single value for emissivity and a conservatively high

temperature to attempt to account for the convective effects, since these are

the most highly variable and difficult effects to measure and to model.

In the case of engulfing fires, the radiative heat load from an

isothermal fire to the cask can be calculated as follows:F' 3

Qr -oAA Cs f(T_ 4 Ts)4 (F.1)

where

Qr - radiant heat load per unit length and time, Btu/ft-hr

o - Stefan-Boltzman constant , Btu/hr-ft 2 -oK 4

Cs-f - configuration factor, unitless

As = area of cask exposed to flame, ft 2 /ft

Tf = flame temperature, absolute, OR

F-4
Ts'o ' initial cask surface temperature, absolute, OR

For a real fire the configuration factor for two gray, diffuse bodies

exchanging heat is given by:

1 , ft 2 /ft As Cs f A s-o F 1-fs-VV (F.2)

where

Af = area of flame involved, ft 2/ft

Fs-f - geometric view factor from cask to fire, unitless

Ef - flame emissivity - 0.9, unitless

Cs - cask surface emissivity - 0.8, unitless

and all other terms are as previously defined.

If it is assumed as shown in Fig. F-1(b) that no significant fire exists

below the horizontal centerline and within the diametral dimension of the

cask, the geometric view factor from the cask to the fire below the centerline

for one side of the lower portion of the cask is given by:

(AsFs-f)B -W-, f/ft (F.3)

where

r - radius of cask, ft

F-5
for a 2-D infinitely long cylinder. The area-configuration factor calculated

using Equation F.2 is:

(AsCsf)B - 2 ft 2 /ft

f 2+

(F.4)

Assuming that the cask is completely engulfed by the fire above the

centerline, the area-configuration factor above the centerline is given by:

(AsCsf)A - lire , ft 2/ft (F.5)

where

1 effective emissivity f

Adding the results

configuration factor

of Equations F.4 and F.5 together, the total areafor a real fire is:

s + + irre , ft 2 /ft

f s

(F.6)

A hypothetical regulatory engulfing fire is shown as a l-D fire in

Fig. F-1(c). The regulatory fire is defined as having a fire temperature of

1475°F, a flame emissivity of 0.9, and a fire duration of 0.5 hour. The areaconfiguration factor for the regulatory fire is:

F-6
(AsCs-f)T - 21rc , ft 2/ft (F.7)

Then the ratio of the heat load of real fires to a hypothetical uniform

fire is the ratio of Equations F.6 and F.7:

[r C f + 

+1

iI + 1/2 - 0.78 (F.8)

Qh re

for the same flame emissivity of 0.9, cask surface emissivity of 0.8, fire

temperature, and cask surface temperature.

Based on Equation F.8, a higher flame temperature is required for the

cask to absorb the same amount of heat for a real fire compared to a

hypothetical fire. As derived in Section F.5, the hypothetical regulatory

fire with a fire temperature of 1475 0F generates the same heat load on a cask

as a 1700 0F real fire. The reference fire conditions are defined to be the

1700OF real fire that generates the same heat load as the regulatory fire.

The l-D model (Fig. F-1(c)) can be used to approximate the 2-0 model

(Fig. F-1(b)) provided that the heat loading conditions are appropriately

accounted for.

F.4 Cask Temperature Response to Regulatory and Reference Fire Conditions

The transient thermal response of a representative truck and rail cask to

an engulfing reference fire was analyzed using TACO.F'I A l-D model of the

casks engulfed by the regulatory fire simplifies the calculation and predicts

reasonably well the thermal response of the major volume of the casks. This

model is used to estimate the cask response to the reference 1700°F real fire

engulfing a cask. Figure F-2 shows the geometry of the modeled casks.

The initial temperature distribution within each cask from heat generated

by the spent fuel was established before subjecting the cask to the modeled

F-7
F

Dimension

A

B

C

D

E

F

Truck cask (in.)

6.75

0.50

13.75

1.25

18.25

0.25

Rail cask (in.)

30.00

1.50

38.00

2.50

42.50

0.25

Figure F-2 Modeled cask dimensions for TACO input.

F-8
fire environment. The steady-state evaluation was performed using TACO, with

the assumption that the neutron shield tank is filled with water. The heat

transfer through the water is by conduction and natural convection. A

convenient way to model the natural convection is through the use of an

effective conductivity for the water. Holman gives a relationship for

effective conductivity of a fluid in a horizontal cylindrical annulus as:F. 4

ker k e C(Gr 6 Pr)r, unitless (F.9)

where

ke - effective thermal conductivity, Btu/hr-ft-OF,

k - thermal conductivity, Btu/hr-ft-*F,

Gr6 - Grashof 6 Number gp263AT, V22 unitless

Pr - Prandtl Number, unitless

g - gravitational constant, ft/sec2

8 - volume coefficient of expansion, 1/*F

6 - annulus width, ft

p - density, lb/ft 3

p - dynamic viscosity, lb/sec-ft

AT - temperature difference across annulus, OF

F-9
r - 0.29 for 6 x 103 s GrPr < 106

0.20 106 s GrPr < 108

C - 0.11 for 6 x 103 S GrPr < 106

0.40 106 1 GrPr < 108.

This expression was evaluated over the expected temperature range, and an

average value of effective conductivity of water as a function of bulk

temperature was used.

Table F.1 tabulates the material thermal properties used in the

analysis. Table F.2 lists the internal heat assumed for the fuel assemblies

within the two casks. A uniform value of 1.0 Btu/hr-ft 2 -°F was used to

represent natural convective heat removal from the cask surface.

The results of the steady-state analysis for the casks show a surface

temperature of 147 0 F for the truck and 242 0F for the rail cask.

For the regulatory fire, only radiation heat transfer occurs. The heat

flux from a hypothetical engulfing fire on the surface of the cask due to

radiation heat transfer is given by:

q - oe(T• - T ) , Btu/hr-ft 2 (F.1O)

where

Ts - cask (neutron shield) surface temperature, absolute, °R

and all other terms are as previously defined.

It is next assumed that before being engulfed by fire, the water leaks

out of the neutron shield tank. Heat transfer in the annulus is now through

the combined modes of radiation across the gap and convection and conduction

F-10
Table F.1

Material Thermal Properties

Stainless Steel

Density

Temperature

(OF)

50

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

2372

Lead

Density

Melt Point

Latent Heat

Temperature

(OF)

50

250

619

1500

1832

Water

Density

Specific Heat

Temperature foci

140

176

212

284

494.2 lb/ft 3

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-ft-°F)

7.92

8.64

9.72

10.86

12.06

13.5

14.46

16.92

708.5 lb/ft 3

621.5 0F

10.25 Btu/lb

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-ft-0 F)

19.97

19.2

10.4

8.64

8.64

62.43 lb/ft 3

1.0 Btu/lb°F

Eff. Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-ft-OF)

2.76

3.01

3.25

3.46

4.34

Specific Heat

(Btu/lb)

0.107

0.11

0.120

0.133

0.138

0.144

0.150

0.170

Specific Heat

(Btu/lb)

0.031

0.032

0.0332

0.034

0.0328

F-1I
Table F.2

Internal Heating from Fuel Assemblies

Heat Load

(KBtu/hr)

Truck Cask 6.82

Rail Cask 71.4

F-12
through the air. As in the case for water, the same relationship holds, but a

single value of effective thermal conductivity of the air as a function of

bulk temperature can lead to serious errors. The equation for total heat

transfer in the annulus is:

qo(T4 -T4) 2Ke(Ts - Ti)

qa d+ ln(de /d Btu/hr-ft

an 7 1 1)Co

(F. 11)

where

di - neutron shield inner diameter, ft

do - neutron shield outer diameter, ft

Ke - effective air thermal conductivity, Btu/hr-ft-OF

T, - neutron shield inner diameter temperature, absolute, OR

and all other terms are as previously defined.

Solving this equation over the entire expected temperature range for both

surfaces of the annulus and then using an interval halving technique results

in a constant value for the effective air thermal conductivity, with a maximum

root-mean-square error in the total heat transferred of less than 2.5%, for

equal surface emissivities between 0.3 and 0.5.

The temperature response of the representative truck cask was calculated

for the regulatory fire with a flame temperature of 1475*F, a flame emissivity

of 0.9, and a cask surface emissivity of 0.8. The temperature at the middle

of the lead shield thickness is plotted in Fig. F-3. The cask temperature

reaches 500 0F (T1 ) in 1.08 hours and 600*F (T2 ) in 1.35 hours. As the lead

mid-thickness temperature increases beyond the 600OF (T2 ) level., the lead at

F-13
11001

1000-

I I I I I I I I I I I I T 4

900

U.

70 0 T T

E 600

w 500,

. 400

300

S200-

100

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4

Time, hours

Figure F-3 Lead mid-thickness temperatures for truck cask versus

duration of regulatory fire.

Z

F-14
the outer shell starts to melt. The lead melts at the inner shell in

2.1 hours as the mid-thickness temperature reaches 650°F (Y3 ). The 10500

temperature (T4 ) level is reached in 3.3 hours.

The temperature response of the representative rail cask was also

calculated for the hypothetical engulfing fire. The temperature at the middle

of the lead shield thickness is plotted in Fig. F-4. The cask temperature

reaches 5000F (T1 ) in 1.35 hours, and 600OF (T2 ) in 1.8 hours. As the lead

mid-thickness temperature of the lead increases beyond the 600°F (T2 ) level,

the lead at the outer shell starts to melt. The lead melts at the inner shell

in 2.6 hours as the mid-thickness temperature reaches 6500F (T3 ). The 1050OF

temperature (T4 ) level is reached in 5.1 hours.

These temperature response and heat flux results for the regulatory fire

were used to evaluate real fires.

F.5 Cask Response to a Spectrum of Real Fire Conditions

In order to calculate the thermal response of a cask to a real engulfing

fire, certain fire parameters are required. The principal parameters required

are fire temperature, flame emissivity, convection velocities, and fire

duration. These fire parameters depend upon variables that include type of

fuel, amount of fuel, the fuel-air mixture, fire geometry, local temperatures,

humidity, and wind conditions. Based on the information provided, the fire

temperatures range from 1400 to 24000F, flame emissivities range from 0.4 to

1.0, and convection velocities range from nearly 0 to 20 feet/second.F'5F-IO

The initial heat flux from a hypothetical engulfing fire on the surface

of the cask is given by:

-ai(4 _ Tso) + h (Tf - Tso) , Btu/hr-ft 2 (F.12)

where

F-15
11

11

U.

a

C.

0. 5j

Time, hours

Figure F-4 Lead mid-thickness temperatures for rail cask versus

duration of regulatory fire.

F-16
h - convective heat transfer coefficient, Btu/hr-ft 2 -OF

and all other terms are as previously defined.

Experimentally determined values for the convection heat transfer

coefficient in an engulfing fire have been determined.F'7 The values given

for an 8.53 inch diameter cylinder range from 5.2 to 15.8 Btu/hr-ft 2 -OF as a

perimeter mean. These values can be scaled within the scaled Reynolds Number

by the following relationship:

h - h dref 0.195 . ref~T (=)hrft (F.13)

where

href - reference convection heat transfer coefficient, Btu/hr-ft 2 -OF

dref - reference diameter - 8.53 inches,

d - diameter, inches

as long as the scaled Reynolds Number is within the range of applicability.

The scaled Reynolds Number is given by:

Re - Re ref( d -) 0.805 unltless

ref

(F.14)

where

Re - scaled Reynolds Number, unitless

F-17
Reref - reference Reynolds Number - 73,725.

The scaled values of the convection heat transfer coefficient are found to be:

3.9 to 11.9 Btu/hr-ft 2 -°F for the truck cask,

and

3.3 to 10.1 Btu/hr-ft2-OF for the rail cask.

Figure F-5 gives the initial heat flux on the surface of the truck cask

as a function of flame temperature, flame emissivity, cask emissivity, and

convection heat transfer coefficient. This figure provides a wide spectrum of

fire conditions which can be related to the regulatory fire conditions in

terms of initial heat fluxes. For example, from Fig. F-5, it is determined

that an engulfing fire with a flame temperature of 1300*F, a flame emissivity

of 0.9, a cask emissivity of 0.8, and a convection heat transfer coefficient

of 5 Btu/hr-ft 2 -OF generates the same initial heat flux to a cask surface as a

regulatory fire. For these specific conditions, the initial response of the

cask would be essentially the same as its initial response to a regulatory

fire. The initial heat fluxes for a rail cask are similar.

A sensitivity study was performed to compare the response of the

representative cask for different fire conditions and initial heat fluxes to

the responses calculated for the regulatory fire. The initial heat flux to

the cask when engulfed by a regulatory fire is:

q - 17,646 Btu/hr-ft 2 for the truck cask and

q - 17,510 Btu/hr-ft 2 for the rail cask.

F-18
ef = Flame emmissivity

es = Cask emmissivity

h = Convection heat

transfer coeficient

(BTU/hr-ft2 -

0 F)

/ 0.9 0.8 5

/

/

/

/

/ 0.9 0.8 0

0.9 0.6 5 / r/

4-

4-

z

ca

4-

k':

t3

/

/ 40

30

/

/

/

//

/ 0.9

,// 0.4

0.4

0.6

0.8

0.6

0

5

/ 5

/

IRegulatory

Initial heat flux

equal to that of

20 - regulatory fire L --1 

//

.0

0.4 0.8 0

fl lR f

-9

.-I 100, ,.

V,'d Vld 0J 6V

.00,

.00-

101

1000 1200 1400 1600 1800

Flame temperature, oF

2000

Figure F-5 Initial heat flux on truck cask for various fire

conditions (1-D model).

F-19
The second fire for comparison was chosen arbitrarily, but within the

limits of real fires. The flame temperature was chosen to be 1825°F, flame

emissivity of 0.9, and a surface emissivity of 0.8. The initial heat flux to

the cask is:

q - 35,260 Btu/hr-ft 2 for the truck cask and

q - 34,650 Btu/hr-ft 2 for the rail cask.

Thus the initial heat flux is about double that caused by the regulatory

fire for each of the casks.

The variations of the heat flux for the regulatory and 1825°F fires are

plotted in Fig. F-6 as a function of time for the truck cask. The heat flux

drops rapidly and then decreases slowly because the water jacket acts as a

thermal barrier. The heat fluxes after about 1 hour are reduced to 4,500

Btu/hr-ft 2 for the regulatory fire and 6,750 BTU/hr-ft 2 for the 1825°F fire.

The integrated heat flux absorbed into the cask is plotted in Fig. F-7 for the

regulatory and 1825°F fires. The integrated flux rises rapidly at first until

the thermal barrier heats up and then limits the heat flux to the cask. The

centerline temperatures for the lead shield are plotted in Figs. F-3 and F-8

for the regulatory and 1825 0 F fires, respectively. For the regulatory fire,

lead melt starts after 1.35 hours and takes 0.75 hours to complete all the

melting. As would be expected for the 1825 0 F fire with a heat flux 1.5 times

higher than lead, melt starts at 0.9 hours and is completed after 0.5 hours or

times which are 1.5 times shorter than the regulatory fire. The times to -

reach the melting temperatures and to melt the lead are actually determined

when the total integrated heat flux values of approximately 6,000 Btu/ft 2 and

9,000 Btu/ft2, respectively, are reached.

The cask heat-up rate and temperature are primarily determined by the

heat flux from the fire because the heat from the fuel bundle is about

41 Btu/hr-ft 2 . Therefore, it is concluded that the time it takes a specific

fire to heat the cask to a specific temperature is approximately proportional

to the average heat flux or heat load to the cask.

F-20
40

35-

30

25

4-

• 20

15

10 - 1825* fire 17 'fr

5-

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

Time, hours

Figure F-6 Heat flux on truck cask versus duration of 14750 F and

18250 F fires.

F-21
CM

Time, hours

Figure F-7 Integrated heat flux on truck cask versus duration of

1475°F and 1825°F fires.

F-22
U..

0-

V

0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9

Time, hours

Lead mid-thickness temperature for truck cask versus

duration of 1825*F fire.

Figure F-8

F-23
The transient thermal analysis for the rail cask was performed in a

manner similar to that used for the truck cask. The variations of the heat

fluxes for the regulatory and 1825 0F fires are plotted in Fig. F-9 as

functions of time. As with the truck cask case, the heat flux drops rapidly

and levels off because the water jacket acts as a thermal barrier. The heat

fluxes after about I hour are reduced to 4,500 Btu/hr-ft 2 for the regulatory

fire and 7,000 BTU/hr-ft 2 for the 1825 0 F fire. These results are similar to

those calculated for the truck and indicate that these heat flux values apply

to a wide range of cask sizes. The cask will heat up at a rate determined by

the heat flux from the fire. The time to reach a particular temperature for

the cask is determined by the heat flux. The centerline temperatures for the

lead shielding are plotted in Figs. F-4 and F-10 for the regulatory and 1825 0F

fires, respectively. For the regulatory fire, the lead melting begins about

1.8 hours after the fire initiation and is complete at about 2.6 hours. For

the 1825 0F fire, the lead melt begins at 1.2 hours and is complete within 1.8

hours. These melting times are nearly proportional to the fire heat fluxes or

heat loads.

In Fig. F-11, the heat flux on the surfaces of the truck and rail cask is

plotted as a function of flame temperature, flame emissivity of 0.9, and cask

emissivity of 0.8. The initial heat flux is given. Also, the average heat

flux values are given at 1 hour durations for the 1475°F and 1825°F fires.

As derived in Section F.3, the heat load ratio of a real fire to a

hypothetical fire is 0.78 for the same flame temperature. To absorb the same

heat load per unit time from a real engulfing fire compared to a hypothetical

engulfing fire, the average heat flux on the cask has to be increased. The

required heat flux is 1.28 times higher for a real fire. From Fig. F-11 it is

determined that a flame temperature of 1700*F is required to provide an

average flux of 6,400 Btu/hr-ft 2 which is 1.28 times higher than the heat flux

derived from regulatory conditions. Therefore, it is concluded that a 1700OF

real fire provides a heat load to the cask and results in temperature

responses similar to those for a 1475 0F regulatory fire.

F-24
O25

4-

=20

S15

Z 18250 fire

10 14750 fire

5

IiIII I I I

00 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0

Time, hours

Figure F-9 Heat flux on rail cask versus duration of 14750 F and

1825 0 F fires.

F-25
70

6OO

a600: E

.4..

• 200-

100 -

0

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

Time, hours

Figure F-10 Lead mid-thickness temperature for rail cask versus

duration of 1825°F fire.

F-26
er eC h

0.9 0.8 0

Initial fluxI1825'F fire

.C

C

.5

14750 F regulatory fire

Estimated average

1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200

Flame temperature, *F

Initial and average heat flux on truck and rail cask

versus flame temperature.

Figure F-11

F-27
The heat load to the cask also varies with the location of the fire with

respect to the cask. For the case in which the flame front is just tangent to

the cask, as shown in Fig. F-12, the geometric view factor to the part of the

cask below the horizontal centerline is:F.11

AsFs_f -•= ft 2/ft (F.15) a

The geometrical view factor to the upper portion of the cask is given by

the relationship:

AsFs-f - - , ft 2 /ft (F.16)

where

6 - ir -2 tan (W-_), radians

h - flame height, ft

Finally, for the case in which the cask is removed a distance from the

flame front as shown in Fig. F-13, the geometric view factor from the entire

cask to the flame is given by:F'11

AsFs-f -r[tan- ( )+ tan-l r)], ft 2 /ft (F.17)

where

x - separation distance, ft

F-28
Figure F-12 Cask on ground with tangent flame front.

F-29
7

h

+) D=2r

Figure F-13 Cask on ground--distant from flame front.

F-30
As . r(r + f) , ft 2 /ft

- tan-1 ( h-4 ) tan -1-h2 r ), radians

h -x 2hr

and all other terms are as previously defined.

Evaluating these expressions over a range of distances relative to the

cask diameter results in the family of curves for the heat load on the cask

relative to the engulfing fire value Versus the separation distance divided by

the cask diameter as shown in Fig. F-14. The total heat load drops rapidly

from the reference regulatory value as the distance from the fire increases.

In addition at distances removed from the flame, a lower value of emissivity

for the cask surface is likely since a blackening of the surface from soot in

the flame is less probable, leading therefore to even lower heat loading. In

addition to lower heat loading, the cask involved in a nonengulfing fire is

able to reject heat by reradiation and natural convection to the environment.

F-31
0.8

Tf = 14750 F

ef = 0.9

e$ = 0.8

0.6 ý--

Cu

0

4..

Cu

4..

Cu

S

4..

Cu

S

0.4

0.2

0

N %%

N.

-S

-S

-S

-S - -S -S - -S

Flame height, h

25' I Truck

15' 

T

25' } Rail

15'

I I I

0 1 2 3

Scaled separation distance, X/D

4 5

Figure F-14 Fraction of heat load from nonengulfing fires.

F-32
References

F.1 P. J. Burns, TACO-2D - A Finite Element Heat Transfer Code, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory Report, Livermore, CA, UCID-17980, Rev. 2,

January 1982.

F.2 M. G. Vigil, A. A. Trujillo, H. R. Yoshimura, HNPF Spent Fuel Cask

Temperature Response; Torch Impinging on Water Filled Neutron Shield,

Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, SAND82-0704, March 1982.

F.3 W. H. McAdams, Heat Transmission, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1954.

F.4 J. P. Holman, Heat Transfer, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1976.

F.5 R. K. Clarke, et. al., Severities of Transportation Accidents, Sandia

National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, SLA-74-001, July 1976.

F.6 Final Report on Assessment of Rail Cask Performance in Railroad Accident

Environments, Ridihalgh, Eggers and Associates, Columbus, OH, June 1977.

F.7 L. H. Russel, and J. A. Canfield, "Experimental Measurement of Heat

Transfer to a Cylinder Immersed in a Large Aviation-Fuel Fire%, Journal

of Heat Transfer, August 1973.

F.8 B. E. Bader, "Heat Transfer in Liquid Hydrocarbon Fuel Fires",

Proceedings-International Symposium for Packaging and Transportation of

Radioactive Materials, January 1965.

F.9 B. Hagglund, and L. Persson, The Heat Radiation from Petroleum Fires, FOA

Report C 20126-d6(A3), Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Huvudenhet 2, July

1976.

F.1O L. Orloff, and J. de Ris, Froude Modeling of Pool Fires, Technical Report

FMRC J. I. OHON3.BU RC81-BT-9, Factory Mutual Research, October 1983.

F-33
F.11 R. Siegel, and J. R. Howell, Thermal Radiation Heat Transfer, McGrawHill, New York, NY, 1972.

F-34
APPENDIX G

Probability Estimation Techniques

G.1 Introduction

Assessment of the probability of the potential responses of a cask to

various accident scenarios depends on (1) the description of the distributions

of the accident parameters given an accident, and (2) integration of these

probability distributions over the appropriate subranges of values of the

accident parameters. An important accident parameter is the velocity of the

transporting vehicle, either truck or train, at the time of the accident. The

distribution of vehicle velocities at the point of an accident is unknown;

however, there are data which can be used to estimate the distribution of

velocities either subjectively, as in the case of trucks, or recorded, as for

trains. In Section G.2, a method of estimation, called maximum entropy, is

described for developing the distribution of vehicle velocities using observed

velocities at past accidents. This method was applied to both trucks and

trains to develop estimates of the appropriate probability distributions of

velocity. Given descriptions of the distributions of vehicle velocities.and

other accident parameters, assessment of the probability of potential cask

responses involves integrating several probability functions. The integration

process is described in Section G.3. Specifically, Section G.3 describes an

approximation, based on sums of discrete probabilities, to the integration of

the continuous distributions.

G.2 Maximum Entropy Method of Estimation

Given the historical data on velocities of vehicles involved in

accidents, there are several methods, such as least squares, maximum

likelihood, and density estimation, which can be used to estimate the

probability distribution of velocities. Most methods require some

identification of the form (family) of the probability distributions. Several

distributions and mixtures of distributions were fitted to the accident data

but no one family consistently fit all the data.

G-1
Since a specific parametric family of distributions was not readily

identifiable, a reasonable approach is to evaluate a nonparametric estimate of

the probability distributions of velocity. Although not as powerful, i.e., it

has a greater uncertainty, the nonparametric approach allows the data to

determine the form of the distribution of velocities rather than forcing the

distribution to be of some specific type, e.g., normal or lognormal. If a

specific distribution is used and it is not correct, then estimates of

probabilities derived from the incorrect distribution can be biased

significantly. Thus, we chose to estimate the distributions of velocity

nonparametrically.

To determine a nonparametric estimate of the distributions of velocity,

we based the estimates on the maximum entropy method of estimation. This

approach is based on information theory and provides a procedure for

estimating a probability distribution, with maximum entropy, consistent with

the information available about a random variable. Subject to certain

conditions and the appropriate interpretation of probability,G'I it can be

shown that the entropy function

K

Hk-9 ""' PK) E Pi log Pi (G.1) k=1

measures the amount of "uncertainty" represented by a probability distribution

(Pi, -.. , PK) for a variable X (where it is assumed that X is discrete and has

range xI, ... , xK). Given some information about the distribution of X, such

as its expected value and variation or uncertainty, a reasonable criterion for

estimating the probability distribution pl, -.- , PK is to maximize the entropy

function, (G.i), consistent with the information available, i.e., if Vo'0 ao2

are the expected value and variance, to estimate P'l -' Pk such that

K

E xkPk = Po

k-1

G-2
(G.2) K

E

k-1

(X 11)2 2

(k - 0 Pk - G

That is, an estimate of the probability distribution pl, -.- , PK is the set of

values PI' ... Ik such that

H(pl, ... , IPk) - max H (P1 9".". PK)

(PI, ... )

(G.3)

subject to the constraints

K

k E I k 1 k-i

K

E Xk Pk Po

k-1

K

X

k-1

(X o2 2

Introducing Lagrangian multipliers A., A1' A2

constraints, the estimated probabilities are

associated with the three

Pi , e- [A 0 +A 1 x i +A 2(xi-P.) 21 (G.4)

G-3
where

K

A0 - log E

k-1

e-[A 1 xk+A 2 NXk110) 2 1 (G. 5) -.f

and A,, A2 are solutions to the equations

-1 K -[Alx k+A2 (xk-P1o) 2]

n1 Z xk e k-1 - 11O (G.6)

(G.7)

-I K

n1 £

k-1

2 -[A xk+A2(xk-Po)] 2 (Xk _ 11o) eOo

where

K -[AlXk +A 2(xk-P.o) 2]

iin Ze

k-1

(G.8)

Thus, a discrete probability distribution can be constructed

entropy and which equals the specified mean and variance. In

of the methodology, we used the mean and the variance of the

on velocities as the available information.

which maximizes

our application

historical data

If the variable X is considered to be a continuous variable, i.e., its

probability distribution has a density function, the estimated density

function f(x) can be approximated, based on maximizing entropy, using the

identity

dp - f(x)dx . (G.9)

G-4
Approximating the density function by a discrete relative histogram

[(Apk, Axk) : k-1, ... , K],

f(xk) = -. (G610) 0 xk

However, in our notation Apk f Pk and, assuming a partition of the (finite)

range Rx of X into N equal subintervals of length Ax,

Ax - Rx/N (G.11)

the maximum entropy estimate of f(xk) is

-rne[A0+AAixk+AA 2 (xk-Po) 21

?(xk) lime (G.12) A+O RXIN-

- -[XO+XlXk+X 2 (Xk-Po)2]

FIX/N

for sufficiently small A.

The estimated probability distribution, as described by the estimated

cumulative distribution function, is based on cumulative sums of the ?(x )'S,

interpolating for x - xk. This is the method used to estimate the probability

distributions for vehicle velocities prior to and at the point of an

accident. The uncertainty of using the sample information for specifying

po and a2 was not quantified, nor was the sensitivity investigated for the

predicted probabilities of the various response states. Some parametric

G-5
estimates of the distributions of velocities were analyzed, and these would

provide same basis for an investigation of sensitivity.

G.3 Discretized Probability Integration

Estimation of the probability that the response of a cask to an accident

is a specific response state, e.g., R(2,3), between 0.2% (S1 ) and 2% (S2 )

strain and between 600°F (T2 ) and 650°F (T3 ) lead mid-thickness temperature,

is based on evaluating a pair of double integrals of probability distribution

and density functions (see Equation 5.23). Some of the probability

distribution and density functions are known analytically, but some, for

example the distributions of velocities estimated by the method of maximum

entropy, are only known numerically. In either case, the integration is

complex and cannot be done analytically. Instead, evaluation of the-estimated

probabilities is based on the identity, given the appropriate conditions,

b K(A) J H(t)dt - lim Z [H(tk + AU) - H(tk - A1)]atk (G.13)

a A-O k-1

" K-A) [H(tk + AU) - H(tk - A)]Atk

for sufficiently small A . In this application, the function H(t) itself

Involves the integral of probability distributions and density functions.

The computer code TASP was developed to perform the necessary summations

to approximate the probability integrals (in addition, the code contains all

the appropriate probabilities). In each case the code partitions the range of

integration into an appropriate number of subintervals to integrate over a

probability distribution. When appropriate, the code conservatively evaluates

a function at the upper (lower) limit of a subinterval to assure that the

eitimated probability is conservative. However, the estimate is not overly

G-6
conservative because a reasonable number of subintervals are used for the

approximation. Thus, in the context of the inputs, the estimated

probabilities are considered good estimates.

G°4 References

G.1 E. T. Jaynes, "Information Theory and Statistical Mechanisms", Physical

Review, Vol. 106, No. 4, May, 1957, pp. 620-630.

G-7
0
APPENDIX H

List of Figures

Page

H-i Impact of weighted steel cylinder into a rigid rail ................... H-5

H-2 Finite element mesh for one-quarter of the cylinders .................. H-6

H-3 Deformed shapes of the cylinder impacting a rail (DYNA 3-D

analytical solutions) .............................. ................... H-7

H-4 Mesh of steel nose cone ............................................. H-8

H-5 Location of tied and sliding interfaces ............................... H-9

H-6 Sequence of deformed configurations ................................... H-10

H-7 Computed and experimental force-displacement curve. The

steps in the curves correspond to void closures ....................... H-li

H-8 Calculational mesh for the oblique rod impact problem ................. H-12

H-9 Deformed shapes of a rod impacting an oblique rigid wall .............. H-13

H-10 Another view of a rod at 300 ps ......................................... H-14

H-li Final profiles at 3000 ps (a) experiment and (b) computed ............. H-15

H-i
So
APPENDIX 9

Benchmarking for Computer Codes Used in Impact Analyses

H.1 Introduction

Several computer codes were used in the structural impact analyses to

estimate cask responses for the various accidental impact loading conditions

in this study. Impact is a governing loading condition in the cask structural

evaluation. The results and conclusions stated in this report rely on the

adequacy of these codes to estimate structural response. Impact is a loading

condition which can generate large amounts of energy during a very short

duration of impact. During the impact, energy changes form from potential

into kinetic, and into strain energy. After the initial impact, the cask has

a potential for bouncing back into the air depending on the target hardness

and the property of impact limiters. Rigid body motion is involved during

this process. In order to estimate the structural damage due to the second

impact, i.e., the other end of the cask hitting the target after bouncing

around in the air, the computer code needs to have a special capability of

handling rigid body motion. Most of the finite element computer codes

available today cannot handle the rigid body motion and, therefore, were not

selected for this study. To assess cask response to the impact orientation,

i.e., the angle between the cask longitudinal axis and the target surface, the

selected computer codes need to have the capability of handling impact at an

angle. Impact limiters play an important role in cask response. During

impact, the limiter will enter a nonlinear region. The selected computer

codes need to be capable of handling nonlinear impact-limiter responses.

The representative casks selected in this study use a lead layer for

shielding. In order to model the lead behavior inside the inner and outer

steel shells, the computer codes need to be capable of handling sliding

between two surfaces of different materials. Not every computer code can

satisfy all these specified requirements. Certain computer codes may be

capable of meeting partial requirements. It is necessary that the user

understands the limitations of the codes selected.

H-i
Three computer codes were selected to perform various types of impact

analysis in this study. They are DYNA 2-D/3-0, NIKE 2-D/3-D (the 2D130

designation indicating that either two-dimensional or three-dimensional

modeling can be performed), and IMPASC (part of the SCAN system). All three

codes were developed and maintained at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

through other programs in the Laboratory. The limitations of each code are

understood. During the course of calculating cask response, the analytical

group worked very closely with the code development group. In many cases, the

codes were modified to suit the specific.needs of this study. There is high

confidence that these codes were properly used within code capability in

calculating cask response when subjected to impact loads. The qualifications

of users is only part of the concerns in assuring adequate analytical

solutions.

The next question is how can the selected computer codes simulate the

impact conditions and the structural response. To answer this question,

computer codes are generally benchmarked by comparing their results against

one or more of the following: (1) results from closed form engineering

solutions, (2) test data, and (3) other computer codes which have been

benchmarked. This appendix presents benchmark codes for DYNA 3-0. The other

codes, DYNA 2-0, NIKE 2D/3-D, and IMPASC have been benchmarked against DYNA 3-

D, hence this benchmark test also generally applies to the other codes.

To date, these codes have not been benchmarked for predicting lead

slump. Although at least one foreign country has performed impact tests with

lead casks and used DYNA 2-D for benchmarking, these results are proprietary

and cannot be disclosed. Therefore all of the calculations done in this study

with DYNA and NIKE were performed assuming conservative lead properties and

boundary conditions that over predict lead slump and the strain on the inner

wall of the representative cask models.

H.2 Benchmark Calibrations for DYNA 3-D

H-2
H.2.1 Impact of Cylinder into Rail

The steel cylinder shown in Fig. H-i is impacted into a long rigid rail

at 1676 cm/sec. Attached to the ends of this cylinder are weights of 62.3 M

dyne. An experimental test was conducted and the final configuration was

measured.

One quarter of the cylinder was modeled by using DYNA 3-D with two planes

of symmetry using the mesh illustrated in Fig. H-2. This mesh contains 3432

elements. Elastic-perfectly plastic behavior was assumed for the steel with a

yield strength of 0.0131 Mbar.

Deformed shapes at approximately millisecond increments are shown in Fig.

H-3. At 6.4 ms the cylinder can be seen to have completely rebounded with its

final deformed shape. A maximum residual dent of 1.53 inches was

calculated. A maximum dent of 1.44 inches was measured at the same location

in an experimental test.

H.2.2 Nose Cone Analysis

Figure H-4 shows the DYNA 3-D mesh (6074 nodes, 4356 elements) used to

model a steel (yield strength - 0.0048 Mbar, Et - 0.0138 Mbar) nose cone that,

on impact, has been designed by Sandia Laboratories in Livermore to limit the

resultant force transmitted to the aft section.H'l The mass of the aft

section is mocked with a high-density material,. 131,477 gm/cm3 , in the top

rows of elements.

This problem is interesting from a code development viewpoint because it

exercises the sliding interface logic. Five interfaces are defined of which

two are tied. The locations of these interfaces are depicted in Fig. H-5.

Deformed shapes at 3,000 ps intervals are shown in Fig. H-6. At

15,000 ps the peak deformation is reached and the nose cone begins to rebound.

Comparisons with experimental data from a static test showed excellent

agreement with the calculation.H'I The final shape obtaining in the

experiment was very close to the final computed shape. In Fig. H-7, the

computed force deflection curve from DYNAP is compared to the experiment.

Only minor discrepancies exist.

H-3
H.2.3 Oblique Impact of Rod

An aluminum rod 30.5 cm long and 0.638 cm in diameter impacts a rigid

wall oriented at 100 at a velocity of 20,170 cm/sec. The material behavior is

simulated with material model 11 using the properties defined in UCRL8 0 4 6 5 .H'2 Fig. H-8 shows the DYNA 3-D calculational mesh.

The computed results showed good agreement with the experimental profiles

up to 600 ps. At later times the experiments showed more curvature in the

rod. Four factors probably contributed to these late time discrepancies.

o coarse zoning,

o inaccurate material properties,

o rigid wall approximation to armor plate,

o lack of interface friction.

Figure H-9 shows a sequence of deformed configurations. Figure. H-10

shows a view of 300 ps to illustrate the cross-sectional zoning. Figure H-1I

shows the residual experimental profile for comparison to the computed result

at 3,000 ps.

H-4
22.9 em (Dia.)

Figure H-i Impact of weighted steel cylinder into a rigid rail.

H-5
Figure H-2 Finite element mesh for one-quarter of the cylinders.

H-6
t a 0.0tr Iitm 1.0 inS t -20 - 2.0 ms

t a S.0 IM t a 4.0 IMs t a 6.4 Wns

Figure H-3 Deformed shapes of the cylinder impacting

analytical solutions).

a rail (DYNA 3-D

H-7
HIGH DENSITY

MATERIAL

I Va 574 cm/8

V

9.65 cm

a V

Figure H-4 Mesh of steel nose cone.

H-8
• -- '-• • •TIED INTERFACES

)ING

ERFACESu r

Figure H-5 Location of tied and sliding interfaces.

H-9
t = 0.0

t = 3000 ps

t = 6000 ps

t =9000 ps

t = 12000 ps t = 15000 ps

Figure H-6 Sequence of deformed configurations.

H-10
x 4480

40

30

C

0J

20

10

0 10 20 30 40

DISPLACEMENT (mm)

Figure H-7 Computed and experimental force-displacement

steps in the curves correspond to void closures.

curve. The

H-11
Figure H-8 Calculatlonal mesh for the oblique rod impact problem.

H-i2
I

E

I I

I

4%

j

t - 0.0 S t = 400 in t - 800 PS t = 1200 ps

0*4\

4ýs

t = 1600 As t = 2000 ps t = 2400O t - 2800 Ps

Figure H-9 Deformed shapes of a rod impacting an oblique rigid wall.

H-13
0.

Figure H-10 Another view of a rod at 300 Vs.

H- 14
ad

Figure H-11 Final profiles at 3000 ps (a) experiment and (b) computed.

H-15
References

H.1 M. Chiesa and M. Callabresi, "Nonlinear Analysis of a Mitigating Steel

Nose Cone," Computers and Structures, Vol. 13, Sandia National

Laboratories, Livermore, CA, 1981, p. 295.

H.2 D. J. Steinberg and M. W. Guinan, A High-Strain Constitutive Model for

Metals, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL80465, 1978.

H-16
NRC FORM 238 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I. REPORT NUMBER (Asugoedby TIDCo odd Val. No., Mfay)

N2.411 NE2REG/CR-4829, Vol. 2

32,.22 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET UCID-20733

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3 LEAVE BLANK

Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and

Railway Accident Conditions 4. DATE REPORT COMPLETED

,ppendices MONTH YEAR

B A~UToRoSI April 1986

L.E. Fischer, C.K. Chou, M.A. Gerhard, C.Y. Kimura, 6. DATE REPORT ISSUED

R.W. Martin, R.W. _____________________________________ Mensing, M.E. Mount, M.C. Witte February MONTRHr 1987 YEAR

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Incf•AEuP C10*j B. PROJECT/TASKIWORK UNIT NUMBER

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

P. 0. Box 808, L-197 B. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

Livermore, California 94550 A0397

10. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADORESS (MCAu#* Zo Cm I ls. TYPE OF REPORT

Division of Reactor System Safety Technical

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research b. PERIOD COVERED Ilm ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555 12. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

13. ABSTRACT r"20 ward4 or lmil

This report describes a study performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

to evaluate the level of safety provided under severe accident conditions during the

shipment of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. The evaluation is performed using

data from real accident histories and using representative truck and rail cask models

that likely meet 10 CFR 71 regulations. The responses of the representative casks are

calculated for structural and thermal loads generated by severe highway and railway

accident conditions. The cask responses are compared with those responses calculated

for the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. By comparing the responses it is

determined that most highway and railway accident conditions fall within the 10 CFR 71

hypothetical accident conditions. For those accidents that have higher responses, the

probabilities and potential radiation exposures of the accidents are compared with those

identified by the assessments made in the "Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and other Modes," NURE-0170. Based on this

comparison, it is concluded that the radiological risks from spent fuel under severe

highway and railway accident conditions as derived in this study are less than risks

previously estimated in the NRm-0170 document.

IS. AVAILABiLITY 14. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS - *. KEYWORDSIOESCRIPTORS

spent fuel casks

Severe hihway and railway accident conditions

b. IDENTIFIERSIOPEN-ENDED TERMS

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