The Battle 

of the Bulge

Commanding General,

United States Army, 

Europe

Senior Leader Staff Ride

BATTLEBOOK

Contents

The American Soldier

SSG Joseph Arnaldo, New Bedford, Mass.,

Infantry squad leader, comes off the line 

after 10 days in the Ardennes, 30 December 1944

(from “A Time for Trumpets”, Charles B. MacDonald) 
World War II & Battle of the Bulge Chronologies..................TAB A

World War II Allied Conferences.............................................TAB B

Allied Command Architecture & Order of Battle...................TAB C

The U.S. Army in December 1944...........................................TAB D

Biographical Sketches – Senior Allied Commanders...........TAB E

German Command Architecture & Order of Battle................TAB F

The German Army in December 1944.....................................TAB G

Biographical Sketches – Senior German Commanders.......TAB H

Comparative Military Officers’ Ranks.....................................TAB I

Equipment.................................................................................TAB J

The Defense of Bastogne........................................................TAB K

Casualties, Medical Statistics & Battle Losses..................TAB L

Suggestions for Further Reading....................................TAB M

Glossary....................................................................................TAB N

Code Names.................................................................TAB O
1

Tab A

World War II & Battle of the Bulge Chronologies

“But war is a ruthless taskmaster, demanding success 

regardless of confusion, shortness of time, and 

paucity of tools. Exact justice for the individual and 

a careful consideration of his rights is impossible. 

One man sacrifices his life on the battlefield and 

another sacrifices his reputation elsewhere, both 

in the same cause. The hurly burly of the conflict 

does not permit commanders to draw fine 

distinctions. To succeed, they must demand 

results, close their ears to excuses, and drive 

subordinates beyond what would ordinarily be 

considered the limit of human capacity. Wars 

are won by the side that accomplishes the 

impossible. Battles are decided in favor of troops 

whose bravery, fortitude, and especially, 

whose endurance surpasses that of the enemy’s: 

the army with the higher breaking point wins.”

 General George Marshall
2

World War II Chronology

Date Global Events Western Front Mediterranean Eastern Front Southwest Pacific Central Pacific China/Burma/

India

1939

Sep UK & FR declare 

war on GE

GE & USSR 

invade, divide 

Poland

Sino-Japanese 

War (1937-1945)

British Army 

deploys to France

Russo-Finish War 

begins

1940

Apr Churchill becomes 

Prime Minister

GE occupies 

Denmark, invades 

Norway

May GE invades NL, 

BE, FR

USSR occupies 

disputed 

Romanian territory

Jun FR falls; British 

Army evacuated 

from Dunkerque

Italy declares war 

on UK, FR

Jul GE begins air 

attacks against UK

British Fleet 

attacks IT Fleet

Aug Battle of Britain Italy invades Egypt 

from Libya

Sep JA invades IndoChina

Oct GE, IT, JA form 

Axis Pact

IT invades Greece GE troops enter 

Romania to protect 

oil fields

Nov HU, RO join Axis 

Pact

UK attacks IT fleet 

at Trianto

Dec GE reinforces IT in 

Greece

British open drive 

in North Africa
3

Date Global Events Western Front Mediterranean Eastern Front Southwest Pacific Central Pacific China/Burma/

India

1941

Mar US passes LendLease

Apr Russo-JA nonaggression pactGE invades 

Yugoslavia

BEF withdrawn 

from GR

GE reinf IT in North 

Africa; Rommel’s 

1st Offensive

May GE attacks Crete

Jun GE invades USSR

Jul US declares oil 

embargo vs JA

Sep GE torpedo atk on 

USS Green opens 

undeclared war in 

North Atlantic

Oct Lend-Lease 

extended to USSR

Dec GE, IT declare 

war on US

German offensive 

stopped before 

Moscow

JA Atks Philippines JA Atks Pearl 

Harbor

JA alliance with 

Thailand

Anglo-Amer Conf 

(Arcadia)

British drive for 

Tobruk

Leningrad 

besieged

1942

Jan UN declaration 

signed by 26 

nations

Rommel’s 2d 

Offensive begins

Soviet Winter 

Offensive makes 

limited gains

US & Filipino 

defenders 

withdraw to Bataan 

Combined Chiefs 

of Staff activated

JA captures Br N. 

Borneo, Invades 

Solomons

Feb Singapore 

surrenders

JA occupies 

Burma

Gen MacArthur 

reaches Australia

Mar Surrender of 

Bataan

Apr Doolittle Raid (on 

Tokyo)

May US surrender in 

Philippines

Battle of Coral Sea
4

Date 

(1942)

Global Events Western Front Mediterranean Eastern Front Southwest Pacific Central Pacific China/Burma/

India

Jun Rommel opens 

drive into Egypt

GE Summer 

Offensive in 

southwest USSR

Battle of Midway

Tobruk falls to Axis

Jul BR-US decision to 

invade N. Africa

GE captures 

Sevastopol

JA invades New 

Guinea

Aug Allies raid Dieppe, 

France

US landings on 

Guadalcanal

Sep Battle of 

Stalingrad begins

Oct BR attack at El 

Alamein

US Naval victory in 

Solomon Islands

Nov Allied landings at 

Casablanca, Oran, 

Algiers

Buna-Gona

GE moves into 

unoccupied FR

French resistance 

in N. Africa ends

1943

Jan Allied Conference 

at Casablanca

US Air Force joins 

bombardment of 

GE

Russian Leningrad 

Offensive

Feb Rommel breaks 

through Kasserine 

Pass, Tunisia

Battle of Stalingrad 

ends

Russian Campaign 

in Ukraine

JA resistance ends 

on Guadalcanal

Siege of Leningrad 

lifted

Mar Allied 

counteroffensive

GE 

counteroffensive

May Trident 

Conference in 

Washington

Axis forces in N 

Africa surrender

Allies attack New 

Guinea

Jul Allies invade Sicily

Aug Quadrant 

Conference in 

Quebec

GE abandon 

Kharkov

Fall of Mussolini Allied victory in 

Sicily

Sep GE reinforces IT

Oct IT declares war on 

GE

Allied landings in 

Salerno

Australian victory 

at Finschhafen, 

New Guinea

Stillwell’s Burma 

Campaign begins
5

Date 

(1943)

Global Events Western Front Mediterranean Eastern Front Southwest Pacific Central Pacific China/Burma/

India

Nov Cairo-Teheran 

Conferences.

UN Relief and 

Rehabilitation 

Administration 

established

Winter Line 

Campaign

Allies invade 

Bougainville &

Tarawa

Dec Soviets begin 

Winter Offensive

1944

Jan Landings at Anzio Soviet offensive 

enters Estonia

Unsuccessful 

Allied attack at 

Rapido River (IT)

Feb Allied bombing 

focuses on GE 

aircraft production

Invasion of 

Marshall Islands 

(Kwajalein)

Mar Attack on Cassino Soviets drive into 

Ukraine

Rabaul falls Attacks on Truk in 

Caroline Islands

Merrill’s Marauders 

advance into 

Hukwang Valley

Invasion of 

Admiralty Islands

Japanese ImphalKohima Offensive

Apr UN Organization 

for Educational 

and Cultural 

Reconstruction 

formed

Strategic bombing 

priorities shift to 

support Normandy 

Invasion

Allies attack 

Gustav line in IT

Odessa retaken by 

Soviets

Allied landings in 

New Guinea

Myitkina airfield 

captured by Allies

Jun Normandy Invaded Rome liberated Major Soviet 

offensive in Central 

Region and in 

Finland

JA fleet loses 

heavily in Battle of 

Philippine Sea

Strategic bombing 

campaign against 

Japan begins

GE launches first V 

weapons against 

UK

Jul UN Monetary and 

Financial 

Conference 

(Bretton Woods); 

creates IMF and 

World Bank

Breakout from 

Beachhead

Florence liberated Warsaw uprising Marianas invaded Slim’s Burma 

Offensive begins
6

Date 

(1944)

Global Events Western Front Mediterranean Eastern Front Southwest Pacific Central Pacific China/Burma/

India

Aug Allies rush for 

Seine River 

Crossings

Allies land in 

Southern France

Romania 

surrenders

Guam liberated JA invaders driven 

back from Indian 

frontier

Soviets reach East 

Prussia

Sep UNRRA allocated 

$50m to IT -- first 

commitment to 

former enemy

Brussels liberated

Market Garden

Soviets declare 

war on Bulgaria

Landings in 

Caroline Islands

OCTAGON 

Conference 

(Quebec)

German defense of 

German soil 

begins

Oct Dumbarton Oaks 

lays permanent 

UN groundwork

Forces from 

Southern France 

link up with Forces 

from Normandy

Soviets reach 

Yugoslavia, 

Czechoslovakia, 

and Poland

Leyte Invasion; JA 

Fleet suffers major 

losses

Begin final major 

offensive

Allied Offensives 

bog down

Nov Saipan airfields 

open for Allied 

bombing campaign

Dec GE 

counteroffensive 

Battle of the Bulge
7

Date Global Events Western Front Mediterranean Eastern Front Southwest Pacific Central Pacific China/Burma/

India

1945

Jan Soviet Winter 

Offensive liberates 

Warsaw

US landings on 

Luzon

Feb Yalta Conference Allies defeat 

Colmar pocket; 

end Battle of the 

Bulge

5th Army offensive 

in northern IT

Budapest liberated Battle for Manila 

begins

Landings on Iwo 

Jima

Mar US 9th Army drives 

to Rhine; 9th Arm 

Div crosses at 

Remagen

Soviets capture 

Danzig

Manila liberated

Köln falls Soviets advance in 

Czech, Hungary, 

Austria

Landings on 

Mindanao

Apr Roosevelt dies; 

Truman US 

President

US, UK forces 

cross Rhine in 

force

5th Army crosses 

Po River

GE resistance in 

East Prussia ends

San Francisco 

conference drafts 

UN Charter

US units reach 

Elbe River

Vienna falls

May V-E Day War ends War ends Soviets capture 

Berlin; war ends

Resistance ends 

on Mindanao

Resistance ends 

on Okinawa

British capture 

Rangoon

Jul Potsdam 

Conference

Carrier based 

planes join attack 

against Japan

Clement Atlee 

replaces Churchill

Aug Atomic bombing 

of Japan

Sep Japanese 

surrender 

accepted

war ends war ends war ends
8

Battle of the Bulge Chronology

1944

• June 6 - OPERATION OVERLORD, Allied forces invade French coast in Normandy.

• July 3 - Field Marshall Günther von Kluge replaces Gerd von Rundstedt as CINC-West.

• July 25 - Operation Cobra, US First Army breaks out of coastal enclave.

• August 1 - HQ, 12th Army Group activated, LTG Bradley commander; LTG Hodges assumes command US First 

Army, (V, VII & XIX Corps); US Third Army activated, LTG Patton commander, (VIII, XII, XX, & XV Corps).

• August 15 - US Seventh Army, LTG Patch (US VI, French I and II Corps; later US XV Corps) lands in southern France 

in Operation Anvil-Dragoon.

• 17 August - Field Marshall Model replaces von Kluge as Commander OB West.

• 31 August - HQ 6th Army Group LTG Devers, comes ashore and takes command in southern France. First French 

Arm, GEN de Lattre de Tassigny, assumes command of I & II Fr Corps.

• 1 September - GEN Eisenhower (SHAEF) assumes direct command of 12th Army Group from GEN Montgomery.

• 1 September – Field Marshall von Runstedt reappointed CINC West.

• 9 September - HQ, US Ninth Army, LTG Simpson, activated. VIII Corps assigned with mission to secure Brittany 

Peninsula and port of Brest.

• 10 September - US Seventh Army makes contact with US Third Army. GEN Bradley orders attack on 14 Sept thru 

West Wall: First Army seize crossing over the Rhine Cologne-Bonn-Coblenz; Third Army at Mannheim. Plans are 

aborted because of supply difficulties. V Corps arrives line Regné-Bastogne-Longvilly-Wiltz-Selagne-Arlon-Luxemburg 

City.

• 11 September - Recon patrol of 5th AD makes first entry into Germany.

• 12 September - V Corps’ 4th ID takes St. Vith. 28th ID crosses Our River and takes Sevenig and positions west of 

Grosskampengerg.
9

• 16 September - Hitler makes initial decision to conduct counteroffensive, directs planning to begin with 1 November as 

attack date.

• 17 September - Operations Market and Garden begin; goal is to secure axis across the Rhine River. 4th ID V Corps 

attempts to take Schnee Eifel and Brandscheid.

• 19 September – 4th ID repels German counterattack, gets onto Schnee Eifel.

• 22 September - Supply difficulties force GEN Eisenhower to make Antwerp principle objective for Allied Forces. All 

other attacks are limited.

• 26 September - US Ninth Army assigned sector on south of First Army, VIII Corps begins movement from Brest.

• 4 October - VIII Corps takes relives V Corps in Ardennes. V Corps shifts left towards Monshau-Losheim. 

• 6 October - MG Gerow returns from testifying in Washington, resumes command V Corps. 

• 15 October – Newly arrived 9th AD is assigned to VIII for training.

• 18 October - GEN Eisenhower issues plan for offensive. 21st Army group priority is open Antwerp. 12th Army group 

is to cross Rhine vic Cologne between 1-5 November.

• 21 October - GEN Bradley orders US First and Ninth Armies attack 5 November; US Third Army attack 10 November. 

Aachen surrenders to First Army.

• 22 October - US Ninth Army reassigned sector north of US First Army with XIX Corps.

• 2 November – US First Army begins new offensive in Hürtgen. 

• 9 November - Third Army begins major attack towards Sarre.

• 13 November – 82d A/BD is relieved in Holland and moves to reserve and reconstitute.

• 14 November - 8th ID begins replace 28th ID in Hürtgen; starts move to VIII Sector to reconstitute.

• 16 November - First and Ninth Armies open Operation Queen to close to Rhine River.

• 19 November - 8th ID completes relief of 28th ID.

• 27 November - 101 A/BD is relieved in Holland and reverts to reserve for reconstitution. 

• 28 November - Antwerp begins operations as major source of supplies for Allied Armies.

• 3 December – 83d ID from VIII sector begins relief of 4th ID in Hürtgen, moves to VIII to reconstitute.

• 11 December – 106th ID, with 14th Cav Gp attached, relieve 2d ID in Ardennes.
10

• 13 December - V Corps’ 2d ID, 78th ID, and 99th ID attack to take Roer and Urft Dams. US Third Army begins 

assault over Sarre Rive at Sarrelautern.

• 16 December - Battle of the Bulge begins with attacks by Sixth & Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies. 2d ID continues 

attack towards Wahlerscheid. 78th ID repels German attack vic. Rollesbrioch, unable take Kesternach. 99th ID holds in 

north but is forced back in south. 106th ID & 28th ID, attacked and forced back. 4th ID, and 9th AD attacked but 

generally hold. CCB 9th AD attached 106th ID to assist at St. Vith. 1st ID released by VII Corps; 10th AD released by 

XX Corps.

• 17 December - 82 A/BD and 101 A/BD released from SHAEF Reserve and ordered to Ardennes. Ninth Army 

releases 7th AD to VIII Corps and 30th ID to V Corps. 9th ID (VII) releases 47th IR to V Corps, moves to Eupen. 26th 

IR (1st ID) attached to 99th ID. 14th Cav Gp falls back on VIII north flank. 422d and 423th IR’s (106th ID) isolated on 

Schnee Eifel. 277th VGD and 12th SS Pz (1SS Pz Korps) fail to penetrate to Elsenborn. 3d Para and 1st SS Pz breaks 

thru along Rollbahn D to Honsfeld & Bullingen, turn SW. 18th VGD attacks N and S around Schnee Eifel. Elements of 

7th AD and 9th AD committed defense of St. Vith. 28th ID falls back slowly as LVIII SS and XLVII Pz Korps push 

towards Skyline Drive. CCR, 9th AD released by VII Corps to block Bastogne-Trois Vierges road. 4th ID stops LXXX 

and LIII Korps’ attacks vic. Osweiler and Dickweiler. 10th AD elements arrive Luxembourg City.

• 18 December - VII extends south taking over part of V Corps sector, takes control of 8th ID and 78th ID; releases CCA 

3d AD and 9th ID to V Corps. V Corps works to stabilize line Monshau-Buetgenbach-Malmedy-Stavelot; holds at 

Butgenback and Elsenborn, but 1st SS Pz penetrates south of Buetgenbach and Waimes. 26th IR reverts to 1st ID with 

mission to hold Buetgenbach to Waimes. 99th ID attached to Cdr, 2d ID. 30th ID recovers most of Stavelot, organizes 

defense of Malmedy-Stavelot. 422d IR and 423d IR (106th ID) attempt breakout from Schnee Eifel. 7th AD unable 

assist as engaged defending St. Vith. 28th ID disorganization nearly complete. 2 Pz Div and Pz Lehr smash almost to 

Bastogne-St Vith road thru CCR 9th AD. 4th ID and 10th AD south of breakthrough put under US Third Army. CCB 

10th AD remains with VIII to defend Bastogne. 

• 19 December - Allied commanders conferring at Verdun decide to halt offensives toward the Rhine and concentrate 

on reducing enemy salient in the Ardennes. Because of Ardennes counter-offensive, Field Marshal Montgomery orders 

XXX Corps, to assemble in Louvain-St Trond-Hasselt region to hold Meuse R line. US Ninth Army is ordered to go on 

the defensive. In US First Army area, VII Corps remains generally in place. In V Corps area, 2d and 99th IDs repel 

further attacks and start towards new defensive positions from which they will defend Elsenborn ridge. 9th ID (-47th IR, 

which is already in corps zone, and 60th IR) takes up defensive positions in 2d ID zone, relieving elements of 2d and 

99th IDs. 1st ID holds line E of Malmedy. CCA, 3d AD, relieves 18th IR, 1st ID, of defense of Eupen. 30th ID holds at 

Stavelot and engineers blow bridge across the Ambleve R there; keeps enemy from Stoumont in costly battle. CCB, 3d 

AD, is attached to corps to assist 30th ID. XVIII Corps (A/B) takes responsibility for region generally S of the Ambleve 

R, including Houffalize, key road center between St Vith and Bastogne, with mission of holding N Bank of enemy. 82d 
11

A/BD closing at Werbomont relieves 30th ID troops in that region. 3d AD, less CCA and CCB, passes to corps control 

and starts toward Hotton-Le Grand Pre area. In VIII Corps area, hope of relieving beleaguered 422d and 423d IRs of 

I06th ID in the Schnee Eifel fades. 7th and 9th ADs are aggressively defending region just E of St Vith. 112th IR, 28th 

ID, is attached to I06th ID. 28th ID is ordered to abandon Wiltz and return to friendly lines by infiltration; withdraw from

Diekirch area. 101st A/BD arrives at Bastogne, which enemy has almost encircled. Also employed in defense of 

Bastogne area are CCB of 10th AD and remnants of CCR, 9th AD, the latter coming under control of 101st A/BD. US 

Third Army forms provisional corps from former First Army units S of the Ardennes salient, 4th ID and 10th AD (-CCB); 

the corps is to hold enemy on S Bank of the penetration and plug gap existing between it and elements of 9th AD and 

28th ID near Ettelbruck. XX Corps begins withdrawal from hard-won positions E the Sarre. III Corps is ordered N for 

attack against S flank of enemy in the “bulge”. In XII Corps area, 35th ID halts attack to consolidate in preparation for 

relief. 4th AD and 80th ID are being transferred to III Corps.

• 20 December - 21st Army Group takes operational control of US forces N of Ardennes breakthrough, US Ninth and 

First Armies. In US Ninth Army's XIII Corps area, 84th ID is attached to First Army and starts to Marché (Belgium). 

102d ID takes responsibility for corps front. In XIX Corps area, 29th ID takes over defense of corps front. 2d AD is 

released as army reserve. In US First Army area, 2d and 99th IDs complete withdrawal to new defensive positions 

before Elsenborne Ridge and organize secondary defense lines. 277th and 12th SS Pz make slight penetration in line of 

99th ID W of Wirtzfeld but are sealed off and destroyed. 1st ID clears assigned region S of Eupen and contains attacks 

in Buetgenbach-Faymonville area. 9th ID takes over new zone on N Bank of corps. 30th ID, in Malmedy-Stavelot sector, 

is attached to XVIII Corps. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, CCB of 3d AD, is attached to 30th ID and assists in attack on La 

Gleize and Stoumont, which enemy defends effectively. Elements of 30th ID continue to defend Stavelot and Malmedy. 

3d AD (-CCA and CCB), upon closing in Hotton area, attacks eastward to secure Manhay-Houffalize road. 82d A/BD is 

attempting to establish contact with friendly forces in Vielsalm-St Vith area, pushing toward Vielsalm and Hebronval. VIII 

Corps units defending St Vith (7th AD, 106th ID, CCB of 9th AD, and 112th IR of 28th ID) pass to control of XVIII Corps. 

Enemy pressure on St Vith is undiminished. Elements of 10th AD, 101st A/BD, and 705th TD Bn fight their way out of 

local encirclement on perimeter of larger encirclement of Bastogne area. 101st A/BD extends defensive line to W and 

SW of Bastogne, assisted by remnants of CCR, 9th AD, and CCB, 10th Armd Div, both of which are later attached to it, 

along with 705th TD Bn and stragglers from other units. Marvie, SE of Bastogne, is cleared in course of tank battle. 25 

miles SE of Bastogne, 109th IR of 28th ID establishes defensive line Ettelbruck-Oberfeulen-Merzig and also has forces 

near Ermsdorf backing up CCA of 9th AD, to which it is attached. Enemy now holds Waldbillig, 6 miles W of 

Echternach. SW of Bastogne, 28th ID HQ and remnants of 110th IR block Neufchateau-Bastogne highway. In effort to 

halt enemy, engineers block roads and demolish bridges as far W of Bastogne as St Hubert. During day, operational 

control of corps passes to Third Army. In US Third Army area, III Corps moves its HQ from Metz to Arlon (Belgium), and 

4th AD and 26th and 80th IDs are assembling in Arlon-Luxembourg area. Elements of CCB, 4th AD, push to Bastogne 

area and make contact with 101st A/BD and 10th ADs are temporarily attached to VIII Corps. 80th ID takes up reserve 

battle positions on heights N and NE of Mersch. In Prov Corps area, LTG Patton strengthens corps by attaching 5th ID, 
12

CCA of 9th AD, and I09th IR of 28th ID. CCA, 9th AD is further attached to 10th AD. CCA, 10th AD, withdraws to 

assembly area as 4th ID moves up to take over its positions near Echternach. Tanks assist 12th IR of 4th ID in futile 

effort to relieve isolated infantry in Echternach. 

• 21 December -US Ninth Army is reinf by Br 51st ID as its zone expands. XIX Corps releases 2d AD to First Army; 

takes over VII Corps sector at 2400. Under its command, in current positions, are 104th, 83d, 5th Armd (-CCR), 8th, 

and 78th IDs, from N to S. XIII Corps takes over former XIX Corps front and 29th ID. XVI Corps releases 75th ID to 

First Army. In US First Army 60th IR, 9th ID is detached from 104th ID and moves to Ouflet in Belgium. VII Corps is to 

operate against N flank of German Salient. In V Corps area, 9th ID, reinf by 102d Cav Gp, rounds up enemy in 

Monschau area. 99th ID breaks up enemy formations with arty fire. CCA, 3d AD, reverts to parent unit and moves from 

Eupen to Werbomont area. 1st ID contains further attacks toward Elsenborn ridge. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, CCB of 

7th AD withdraws from St Vith at night; CCA contains attack near Poteau; CCR clears Vielsalm-Poteau road. CCB, 9th 

AD, is attached to 7th AD. 82d A/BD’s 504th PIR clears Cheneux and Monceau, forcing enemy back across the 

Ambleve R; 505th improves positions from the Salm at Trois Ponts to vicinity of Grand Halleux; 508th and 325th Glider 

Inf occupy line Vielsalm-Hebronval-Regne, making no contact with enemy; div makes contact with friendly troops in St 

Vith area. 30th ID is unable to take La Gleize and Stoumont; continues to defend Stavelot and Malmedy. 3d AD, to 

which CCA reverts, contains enemy at Hotton; continues efforts to secure Manhay-Houffalize road. 84th ID is 

organizing perimeter defense of Marché. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy lays siege to Bastogne and 

extends westward; crosses Neufchateau-Bastogne highway in force. Ammunition and food supplies of Bastogne 

garrison are running low. Prov Corps troops are transferred to XII Corps. CCA, 10th AD, tries unsuccessfully to recover 

Waldbillig. CCA of 9th AD and CCR of 10th AD are formed into CCX, 10th AD. 4th ID repels attacks toward Consdorf 

and Osweiler; is out of communication with troops in Echternach. 10 IR, 5th ID, is attached to 4th ID. XII Corps opens 

forward CP in Luxembourg. 

• 22 December - In First Army's V Corps area, Germans breach lines of 1st ID at Buetgenbach and of 9th ID in 

Monschau Forest but are unable to exploit their success. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, withdrawal of delaying forces in St 

Vith area through 82d A/BD line begins. 82d A/BD is under strong pressure along the Salm in Trois Ponts area. 30th ID 

column captures Stoumont. 3d AD maintains roadblocks at strategic points and attempts to clear Hotton area. VII 

Corps, reconstituted to consist of 75th and 84th IDs and 2d AD, is rapidly concentrating in Durbuy-Marche area of 

Belgium and organizing defensive line. 84th ID completes perimeter defense of Marche and establishes 

counterreconnaissance screen to Sand SW. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, Brig Gen McAuliffe, acting CG 101st 

A/BD, refuses German demand for surrender of Bastogne. Garrison is holding under heavy fire and sharp attacks. 28th 

ID troops blocking road SW out of Bastogne at Vaux-Ies-Rosieres are forced back to Neufchateau. US ammunition 

shortage is becoming acute and weather conditions prevent aerial resupply. III Corps begins northward drive to relieve 

Bastogne. On W, 4th AD columns reach Burnon and Martelange. 26th ID, to right, marches about 16 miles before 

making contact with enemy in Rambrouch-Grosbous area. After 5-mile advance, 80th ID runs into stiff resistance at 

Merzig and Ettelbruck but clears most of Merzig. XII Corps, in new zone along E border of Luxembourg, attacks with 4th 
13

ID SW of Echternach but is held to small gains. 10th AD maintains positions NE of Luxembourg and straightens lines. 

5th ID closes N of Luxembourg.

• 23 December - In US First Army's V Corps area, 1st ID restores line at Buetgenbach, as does 9th ID in Monschau 

Forest. 60th IR reverts to 9th ID. 5th AD is attached to corps. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 7th AD, remnants of I06th ID, 

112th IR of 28th ID, and CCB of 9th AD withdraw from St Vith area as planned, moving through lines of 82d A/BD. 

Assault on La Gleize by 30th ID is unsuccessful. 3d AD passes to control of VII Corps in place. In VII Corps area, 3d 

AD attempts to clear Hotton-Soy road but makes little headway; loses key road junction SE of Manhay. Germans 

penetrate 84th ID positions between Hargimont and Rochefort. 4th Cav Gp, with mission of screening along Lesse R, 

organizes defensive positions between Ciney and Marché. CCA, 2d AD, organizes Ciney for defense and starts toward 

Buissonville. 75th ID, in corps reserve, establishes outposts along the Ourthe R. In US Third Army area, improving 

weather conditions permit extensive air support, particularly in Bastogne area, where supplies are dropped to the 

garrison. In VIII Corps area, enemy continues to press in slowly on Bastogne. In III Corps area, CCA of 4th AD clears 

Martelange and continues 2 miles up Arlon-Bastogne highway while CCB, on secondary road, drives to Chaumont, from 

which it is ousted in counterattack. CCR begins drive toward Bigonville (Luxembourg). 26th ID's 104th IR clears 

Grosbous and pushes on to Dellen and Buschrodt; 328th occupies Wahl. 80th ID seizes Heiderscheid and holds it 

against counterattacks; finishes clearing Merzig; takes Kehmen; continues to battle enemy at Ettelbruck. Roadblocks on 

diy's S flank are turned over to XII Corps. In XII Corps area, attack SW of Echternach still gains little ground. 10th AD 

continues action to shorten and improve its line. 35th ID passes to Third Army control.

• 24 December - In V Corps’ area, 1st ID repels another enemy bid for Buetgenbach. 5th AD closes in Eupen area and 

is held in reserve. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 30th ID overruns La Gleize and releases CCB, 3d AD. 82d A/BD is under 

strong pressure in Manhay area; loses Manhay, although elements of 7th AD are pressed into action in that region. 

17th A/BD is being flown to France from England and subsequently operates under VIII Corps. In VII Corps area, 

Germans reduce 3d AD's roadblock at Belle Haie, on road to Manhay; CCR columns attacking E from Hotton and W 

from Soy clear Hotton-Soy road. Elements of 75th ID enter combat for first time: 290th and 289th IRs are attached 

respectively to CCR and CCA, 3d AD. In 84th ID zone, Germans drive through Verdenne. CCA, 2d AD, reaches 

Buissonville; 4th Cav Gp, attached to 2d AD to cover its assembly and maintain contact with adjacent units, makes 

contact with British at Sorinne. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, heavy fighting continues around Bastogne 

perimeter. The city is badly damaged by air attacks. 11th AD, released from SHAEF reserve to corps on 23d, is held in 

mobile reserve W of the Meuse. Combat engineers are guarding Meuse R line and blocking approaches to bridges. In 

III Corps area, CCB of 4th AD is meeting lively opposition S of Chaumont, as is CCA at Warnock; CCR seizes 

Bigonville. 318th IR (-), 80th ID, is attached to 4th AD. 6th Cav Gp (TF Fickett) arrives from XX Corps front to guard W 

flank of corps in Neufchateau area; 6th Cav Rcn Sq is assigned sector between 4th Armd and 26th IDs. 26th ID 

secures Rambrouch and Koetschette but is held up at Arsdorf and Hierheck. 80th ID contains determined 

counterattacks. In XII Corps area, 5th ID, to which 10th IR has reverted, relieves left flank elements of 4th ID and 
14

attacks toward Haller and Waldbillig, making slow progress. 2d Cav Gp, designated TF Reed, relieves right flank units 

of 4th ID along the Moselle. CCA, 10th AD, captures Gilsdorf and Mostroff on Sauer R.

• 25 December - In US First Army area, V Corps maintains defensive positions and has only light patrol contact with 

enemy. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD, to shorten line, withdraws from Vielsalm salient upon order, pulling back to 

general line Trois Ponts-Basse-Bodeux-Bra-Manhay. 7th AD is reinf by 424th IR, 106th ID; tries vainly to recover 

Manhay. 30th ID clears region N of the Ambleve R between Stavelot and Trois Ponts. VII Corps, directed to go on the 

defensive, conducts limited attack to stabilize right flank of First Army. 3d AD attacks toward Grandmenil and 

crossroads just E, which enemy has recently seized, and reaches edge of town; is establishing defensive line in WerpinAmonines area. TF cut off in Marcouray radios that it is starting toward Soy through enemy territory. 84th ID recovers 

Verdenne, but an enemy pocket remains between there and Bourdon. CCB, 2d AD, seizes Celles, blocking enemy's 

westward advance on Dinant; reconnoiters to Sorinne and Foy Notre Dame; CCA occupies Havrenne. In US Third 

Army area, VIII Corps maintains Bastogne perimeter against pressure from all sides. In III Corps area, CCR, moving to 

W flank of 4th AD from Bigonville launches surprise attack and gains road from Vaux les-Rosieres to Chaumont; CCB 

and CCA seize Chaumont, Hollange, and Tintage. 26th ID TF begins struggle for Eschdorf, gaining weak hold there; 

other elements of the div clear Arsdorf. 319th IR 80th ID, clears its sector to the Sauer and makes contact with 26th ID; 

assisted by 317th IR, contains counterattacks and drives almost to Kehmen. Ettelbruck is found clear. 

• 26 December - In US First Army area, army halts enemy's westward drive short of the Meuse. German supply lines 

are now overextended, and stalled armor becomes a lucrative target for aerial attacks. XVIII Corps (A/B) maintains 

defensive positions and defeats enemy efforts to break through to the Meuse. In VII Corps area, 3d AD stabilizes its 

front except on left, where contact has not yet been established with 7th AD; seizes Grandmenil and heights S of SoyHotton road. 84th ID reduces enemy pocket between Verdenne and Bourdon; hurls back enemy thrust toward Menil. 

2d AD repels counterattacks in Celles area and against Havrenne and Frandeux, inflicting heavy losses on enemy. In 

US Third Army area, armored units break through to Bastogne. In III Corps area, forward tanks of CCR, 4th AD, push 

through Assenois to Bastogne, but vehicles are unable to follow. 101st A/BD is temporarily attached to corps. CCA, 9th 

AD, is detached from 10th AD, XII Corps, and attached to 4th AD for employment on W flank. 26ID closes along the 

Sauer, winning Eschdorf in lively battle, and begins crossing. 80th ID, after clearing Scheidel, is halted in Kehmen area 

and transferred in place to XII Corps. Intercorps boundary is adjusted accordingly. 35th ID is attached to III Corps to 

assist in action against S flank of Ardennes salient. In XII Corps area, 5th ID improves positions in Echternach area and 

takes Berdorf. 6th AD, transferred to corps from XX Corps, moves into Luxembourg and relieves 10th AD. Latter 

passes to XX Corps control. 109th IR reverts to 28th ID (VIII Corps) from attachment to 10th AD.

• 27 December - In US First Army's XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 30th ID maintains defensive positions while regrouping. 

508th PIR, 82d A/BD, continues drive NE of Bra. 7th AD recaptures Manhay early in day. 9th AD is reinf by 112th IR of 

28th ID. In VII Corps area, Germans are infiltrating toward Sadzot in zone of CCA, 3d AD, where front line is held by 

289th IR. 84th ID clears pocket in Verdenne area. 2d AD columns envelop Humain and clear stubborn resistance 

• 

• 
15

there. 83d ID, upon closing in Havelange area, begins relief of 2d AD. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 17th A/BD 

takes over Meuse R sector. In III Corps area, trucks and ambulances roll into Bastogne on road opened by CCR, 4th 

AD, ending siege of the city. 4th AD and reinforcements from 9th AD and 80th ID are broadening corridor to Bastogne 

and attempting to open Arlon-Bastogne highway. From S bank of the Sauer, 35th ID attacks northward between 4th AD 

and 26th ID, 137th IR taking Surre and 320th, Boulaide and Boschleiden. 26th ID pushes northward through 101st 

A/BD, clearing Mecher-Dunkrodt and Kaundorf. In XII Corps area, 80th ID checks attack in Ringel area and blocks 

roads N and NE of Ettelbruck. 6th AD takes responsibility for sector S of the Sauer between Ettelbruck and Mostroff. 

Beaufort, N of Waldbillig, falls to 11th IR, 5th ID. 4th ID patrols find Echternach undefended. In XX Corps area, 90th ID 

patrols aggressively and conducts raids to keep enemy pinned down. 5th Ranger Bn is attached to 95th ID.

• 28 December - GEN Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery meet at Hasselt (Belgium) to plan offensive. In V 

Corps area, final enemy effort to force 1st ID from Elsenborn defenses fails. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, corps zone is 

relatively quiet. CCB, 9th AD, and 112th IR move into position to back up 3d AD and 75th ID. In VII Corps area, 75th 

ID, less 289th IR and 290th IR, is attached to XVIII Corps. Germans infiltrating in sector of CCA, 3d AD, take Sadzot 

but are driven out. 83d ID is relieving 2d AD and takes responsibility for sector E of line Buissonville-Rochefort; 

elements push into Rochefort. 2d AD regroups. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 11th AD is transferred to corps 

from SHAEF reserve. III Corps makes limited progress against delaying opposition between Sauer and Wiltz Rivers. 

35th ID continues drive on S flank of enemy salient despite very heavy fire SW of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. 26th ID makes 

slight progress toward Wiltz. Elements of 80th ID attached to 4th AD revert to parent unit. 6th AD is transferred to 

corps from XII Corps. XII Corps is ordered on the defensive in afternoon. 80th ID repels attack for Ringel.

• 29 December - In US First Army area, V Corps front is quiet, with both sides on the defensive. XVIII Corps (A/B) zone 

is also virtually static. 75th ID is attached to corps and takes over zone of 7th AD. VII Corps mops up infiltrators and 

patrols. 83d ID releases 33Ist IR to 3d AD; attacks toward Rochefort with 329th, making slow progress In US Third 

Army area, VIII Corps prepares for drive on Houffalize. 11th AD moves to vicinity of Neufchateau. 87th ID is released 

to corps from SHAEF reserve. In III Corps area, CCA of 4th AD opens Arlon-Bastogne highway. 35th ID is clearing 

Villers-Ia-Bonne-Eau-Lutrebois region; advance elements make contact with 101st A/BD forces at Marvie, SE of 

Bastogne. 26th ID continues toward Wiltz against increasing resistance. Units in Bastogne (101st A/BD, reinf, and 

elements of 9th AD) revert to VIII Corps. 6th AD is transferred to III Corps from XII Corps and assembles between Arlon 

and Neufchateau.

• 30 December - In US First Army's XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 7th AD releases 424th IR to 106th ID. 75th ID holds 

positions previously occupied by 424th IR. VII Corps turns over region SW of line Marche-Namur to British. Germans 

abandon Rochefort. In US Third Army area, VIII Corps opens drive on Houffalize. 11th AD progresses slowly and at 

heavy cost. 87th ID takes Moircy but loses it in counterattack later in day. 9th AD is ordered to Sedan area as SHAEF 

reserve. In III Corps area, Germans again attempt to cut Arlon-Bastogne highway and isolate Bastogne, reaching 
16

Lutrebois and surrounding 2 cos of 137th IR, 35th ID, in Villers-Ia-Bonne-Eau. On left flank of corps, 6th Cav Gp is 

relieved by elements of VIII Corps.

• 31 December - In US Third Army area, VIII Corps takes command of 4th AD. Elements of 87th ID capture close in on 

Moircy. CCR, 11th AD, drives to Pinsamont and Acul while CCB attacks Chenogne. In III Corps area, one 6th AD 

column secures high ground near Wardin; another advances to outskirts of Rechrival. 35th ID is unable to relieve 

isolated forces in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, and they are presumed lost. Germans still hold Lutrebois. 26th ID repels 

counterattack and reorganizes. Corps arty places TOT's on Wiltz.

1945

• 1 January - US Third Army continues Ardennes counteroffensive with VIII and III Corps. In VIII Corps area, 87th ID 

takes Moircy and Jenneville. 11th AD attacks with CCA toward Hubermont, stopping E of Rechrival, and with CCB 

clears Chenogne and woods to N. CCA, 9th AD, drives toward Senonchamps. 101 A/BD, in Bastogne area, gives fire 

support to 11th AD on its left and 6th AD (III Corps) on its right. 17 A/BD relieves 28th ID in Neufchateau area. III Corps 

contains enemy salient SE of Bastogne. 4th AD holds corridor into Bastogne and supports 35th ID with fire. 35th ID 

partially clears Lutrebois and reaches crossroads SE of Marvie, but makes no headway in vicinity of Villers-Ia-BonneEau (Belgium) and Harlange (Luxembourg). In region E of Bastogne, 6th AD takes Neffe, Bizery, and Mageret, but then 

loses Mageret. Germans launch offensive, designated Operation NORD WIND, against US Seventh Army. In XV Corps 

area, two-pronged enemy thrust forces I06 Cav Gp, 44th ID, and 100th ID to give ground. 44th ID bears brunt of 

enemy's fight flank drive, which penetrates positions NW of Rimling. 100th ID, caught between the 2 attack forces, 

withdraws its right flank, exposed by withdrawal of TF Hudelson (VI Corps); enemy Infiltrators are cleared from Rimling, 

on left flank. Elements of TF Harris (63d ID) help check enemy. 141st IR, 36th ID, moves up to plug gap between XV 

and VI Corps. In VI Corps area, enemy drives salient into left flank of corps S of Bitche. TF Hudelson’s thin line is 

pushed back on left to Lemberg-Mouterhouse area. 45th ID contains enemy along line Philippsbourg-NeuhoffenObersteinbach and mops up infiltrators in Dambach. Reinforcements from TF Herren (70th ID) and 79th ID are rushed 

to 45th ID, whose boundary is moved W. CCB, 14th AD, moves to guard Vosges exits. 79th ID's right flank is extended 

to include Rhine sector from Schaffhouse to Gambsheim area.

• 2 January - In Br Second Army's XXX Corps area, 53d Div assumes responsibility for Marche-Hotton sector (Belgium), 

relieving US 84th ID; boundary between XXX Corps and US VII Corps is adjusted. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 

Gerimont falls to 87th ID; Mande St Etienne to 11th AD; and Senonchamps to CCB, 10th AD (attached to 101 A/BD), 

and CCA, 9th AD. 4th AD protects and enlarges corridor leading into Bastogne from the S and helps III Corps clear 

woods near Lutrebois. In III Corps area, 6th AD's CCB enters Oubourcy and Michamps but is driven out of latter; 

unsuccessfully attacks Arloncourt; CCA takes Wardin; div withdraws to high ground W of Michamps-Arloncourt- Wardin 

for night. 35th ID continues fight for Lutrebois. 28 Cav Sq of TF Fickett (6 Cav Gp) is committed between 134th IR and 
17

137th IR, 35th ID. 26th ID's 101st IR advances N in area SW of Wiltz. US Seventh Army CP is moved from Saverne to 

Luneville. In XV Corps area, enemy pressure forces 44th ID's right flank back past Gros Rederching and causes 100th 

ID's right flank to fall back farther. In VI Corps area, Germans maintain pressure against reinf 45th ID, particularly on its 

W flank, former zone of TF Hudelson. Fighting occurs at various points along Bitche salient. TF Herren's 276th IR 

takes up switch positions in Wingen-Wimmenau-Rosteig area. CCA, 14th AD, organizes outposts at Vosges exits 

around Bouxwiller. Center and right flank units of corps begin withdrawal to prepared positions on Maginot Line. 79th 

ID takes over S portion of Rhine R line held by TF Linden (42d ID).

• 3 January - -21 Army Group: US First Army starts counteroffensive to reduce enemy's Ardennes salient from N. VII 

Corps attacks SE toward Houffalize with 2d AD followed by 84th ID on right, and 3d AD followed by 83d ID on left. 2d 

AD gains Trinal, Magoster, positions in Bois de Tave, Freineux, Le Batty, and positions near Belle Haie. 3d AD takes 

Malempre and Floret and from latter continues SE on Lierneux road to Groumont Creek. 75th ID, after attack passes 

through its line, continues mopping up S of Sadzot. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82 A/BD, in conjunction with VII Corps' 

attack, thrusts SE, improving positions. As a diversion, 30th ID pushes small forces S of Malmedy and then withdraws 

them as planned. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, elements of 87th ID are temporarily surrounded in woods E of St 

Hubert. 17th A/BD attacks N late in day in region some 5 miles NW of Bastogne. NE of Bastogne, 101st A/BD and 50Ist 

PIR are clearing Bois Jacques. TF Higgins (elements of 101st A/BD and CCA, l0th AD) is organized to block enemy 

attacks toward Bastogne. CCA, 4th AD, continues to defend corridor into Bastogne. 28th ID defends the Meuse from 

Givet to Verdun. In III Corps area, 6th AD repels enemy thrusts W of Michamps and places heavy arty concentrations 

on Arloncourt, Michamps, and Bourcy; to S, attempts to clear high ground near Wardin and takes road junction S of the 

town. 35th ID gains about two thirds of Lutrebois and crossroads W of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau (Belgium) but is unable to 

take Harlange (Luxembourg). East of Harlange, 26th ID continues attack in region N of Mecher-Dunkrodt and Kaundorf. 

6th Army Group: Is assigned defense of Strasbourg. In US Seventh Army area, XV Corps withstands further pressure 

and on left slightly improves positions. Germans deepen penetration at boundary of 44th ID and 100th ID, entering 

Achen, from which they are ousted in counterattack. CCL, Fr 2d AD, pushes into Gros Rederching but is unable to clear 

it. Attempt by 44th ID to relieve French there fails. 36th ID (-RCT 141) assembles near Montbronn. In VI Corps area, 

enemy expands Bitche salient, entering Wingen and Philippsbourg. 45th ID withstands pressure against Reipertsweiler, 

NW of Wingen, and contains attacks in Sarreinsberg-Meisenthal area. Center and right flank elements of corps 

complete withdrawal to Maginot positions.

• 4 January - In Br Second Army area, XXX Corps opens offensive W of the Ourthe R, protecting US First Army right. 

From Marche-Hotton road, 53d ID drives S abreast US VII Corps. Br. 6 A/BD meets determined opposition S of 

Rochefort. In US First Army's VII Corps area, 2d AD captures Beffe, contains counterattacks near Devantave, seizes 

Lamormenil, and reaches edge of Odeigne. 3d AD takes Baneux, Jevigne, and Lansival and gains bridgehead at

Groumont Creek. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82 A/BD advances its line to include Heirlot, Odrimont, wooded heights N 

and NE of Abrefontaine, St Jacques, Bergeval, and Mont de Fosse; on extreme left patrols push to the Salm. In US 

Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID attack is halted by resistance near Pironpre. Attack of 17 A/BD evokes strong 
18

reaction in Pinsamont-Rechrival-Hubermont area. Enemy attacks in 101st A/BD sector are ineffective. In III Corps 

area, 6th AD is repeatedly attacked in Mageret-Wardin area E of Bastogne, and withdraws to shorten line. 35th ID 

clears Lutrebois but is still unable to take Harlange. 26th ID gains a few hundred yards. In US Seventh Army's XV 

Corps area, 44th ID tries vainly to clear Frauenbergand Gros Rederching. In limited attack, 36th ID takes hill between 

Lemberg and Goetzenbruck. In VI Corps area, 45th ID, continuing fight to reduce Bitche salient, drives to outskirts of 

Wingen; attacks NE across Wingen-Wimmenau road to ease pressure on Reipertsweiler; fights to open ReipertsweilerWildenguth road, taking Saegmuhl and making contact with elements cut off in Wildenguth; clears about half of 

Philippsbourg. TF Linden's line along the Rhine is extended to include zone held by TF Herren

• 5 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 2d AD's main effort against Consy makes little headway; elements 

move toward Dochamps and clear part of Odeigne. 3d AD is slowed by rear-guard action in Bois de Groumont but 

seizes Lavaux and enters Lierneux. 75th ID moves to Aisne R. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82nd A/BD makes progress 

all along line and repels counterattacks near Bergeval. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID meets resistance 

near Bonnerue and Pironpre, W of Bastogne. Rest of corps maintains defensive positions. In III Corps area, 35th ID 

continues to fight for negligible gains. Fr First Army is to take responsibility for defense of Strasbourg upon relief of US

elements in that area by French. Relief is scheduled for 2400 but is interrupted by enemy attack. In US Seventh Army 

area, XV Corps clears Germans from Frauenberg and Gros Rederching. VI Corps makes slow progress against Bitche 

salient in 45th ID sector. Most of Wingen and rest of Philippsbourg are cleared. On corps right flank, Germans 

establish bridgehead across the Rhine in Gambsheim area, crossing between Kilstett and Drusenheim and overrunning 

Offendorf, Herrlisheim, and Rohrweiler. TF Linden, hit while executing reliefs, launches two-pronged assault toward 

Gambsheim: TF A moves from Weyersheim to W bank of Landgraben Canal; TF B attacks from Kilstett but is stopped 

just N of there.

• 6 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 2d AD and 84th ID make converging attacks toward Consy, taking 

positions E and W of the town, respectively. 2d AD continues toward Dochamps, completes occupation of Odeigne, 

and makes contact with 3d AD on Manhay-Houffalize road. 3d AD cuts Laroche-Salmchateau road at its intersection 

with Manhay-Houffalize road and captures Fraiture, Lierneux, and La Falise; 83d Armd Rcn Bn clears Bois Houby. In 

XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD consolidates. To protect its left flank, 30th ID attacks S toward Spineux and Wanne 

with 112th IR, 28th ID. In US Third Army's VllI Corps area, enemy gets tanks into Bonnerue, lightly held by 87th ID. 

87th ID makes limited attack toward Tillet. In III Corps area, 6th AD holds against repeated counterattacks. 35th ID 

attacks into woods NE of Lutrebois and maintains positions in Villers-Ia-Bonne-Eau area; 6 Cav Sq of TF Fickett is 

committed near Villers-Ia-Bonne-Eau. In XII Corps area, 80th ID's 319th IR crosses Sure R near Heiderscheidergrund 

and captures Goesdorf and Dahl. US Fifteenth Army becomes operational. Maj Gen Ray E. Porter is in command. In 

US Seventh Army's XV Corps area, attack to restore MLR on right flank of 44th ID halts on line extending along Sedge 

of Bois de Blies Brucken to area just N of Gros Rederching. In VI Corps area, 45th ID makes slow progress against left 

and center of Bitche salient and on E contains counterattacks on Philippsbourg. Germans continue build up W of the 

Rhine on E flank of corps. 79th ID clears Stattmatten (where encircled elements of TF Linden are relieved), 
19

Sessenheim, and Rohrweiler; reaches edge of Drusenheim. Further efforts of TF Linden to gain Gambsheim are 

fruitless.

• 7 January - In Br Second Army's XXX Corps area, 53d ID takes Grimbiermont. In US First Army's VII Corps area, 

coordinated attacks of 2d AD and 84th ID toward Laroche-Salmchateau road, intermediate objective before Houffalize, 

make notable progress. Dochamps and Marcouray fall. Only rear guards remain in Consy area. 3d AD seizes Regne, 

Verleumont, Sart, and Grand Sart. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82 A/BD, in rapid advance of 2-3 miles, clears most of 

angle formed by Laroche-Salmchateau road and Salm R. Some elements secure positions on ridge just N of Comte; 

others, during advance to Salm R line, clear Goronne, Farniers, Mont, and Rochelinval. 112th IR seizes Spineux, 

Wanne, and Wanneranval. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID continues attack on Tillet and is engaged 

sporadically in Bonnerue area. 17th A/BD takes Rechrival, Millomont, and Flamierge and reaches outskirts of 

Flamizoulle. In III Corps area, 6th AD remains under strong pressure in Neffe-Wardin region E of Bastogne. 35th ID 

makes limited attack toward Lutrebois-Lutremange road, halting just short of it. In XX Corps area, CG 94th ID takes 

command of sector previously held by 90th ID. Boundary between US Seventh Army and Fr First Army is shifted N, 

giving French responsibility for Strasbourg area. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, 45th ID, on left flank of Bitche 

salient, reaches heights overooking Althorn and overcomes final resistance within Wingen. On corps E flank, 79th ID 

organizes TF Wahl (elements of 3I3th IR, 315th IR, and 222d IR; CCA of 14th AD; 827th TD Bn) to operate in N part of 

div front since enemy threat to Maginot Line positions S of Wissembourg is serious. Germans drive back outposts at 

Aschbach and Stundweiler. In Gambsheim bridgehead area, efforts of 314th IR, 79th ID, to clear Drusenheim are 

unsuccessful; Fr 3d Algerian Div takes over attack toward Gambsheim from Kilstett.

• 8 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 4 Cav Gp and 84th ID pursue enemy on right of corps to Marcourt and 

Cielle; other elements of 84th ID start clearing woods S of main road junction SE of Manhay, 2d AD drives on Samree, 

CCA moving S from Dochamps and CCB pushing SE along Salmchateau-Samree Road. 3d AD gains intermediate 

objective line, taking Hebronval, Ottre, Joubieval, and Provedroux. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD consolidates 

along line Grand Sart-Salmchateau-Trois Ponts and clears Comte. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy drives 

87th ID units from Bonnerue and maintains pressure in Tillet region. Some 17th A/BD elements gain and then lose high 

ground N of Laval and others are forced out of Flamierge. In III Corps area, 6th AD recovers lost ground in NeffeWardin sector. TF Fickett occupies zone between 35th ID and 26th IDs, along high ground before Villers-Ia-Bonne-Eau, 

Betlange, and Harlange. In US Seventh Army's XV Corps area, enemy enters Rimling. 100th ID and 36th IDs improve 

positions in local attacks. In VI Corps area, 45th ID makes slight progress against W flank of salient; TF Herren 

becomes responsible for E flank. 79th ID withstands pressure near Aschbach and moves reinforcements to SoultzRittershoffen area. Enemy checks efforts to reduce Gambsheim bridgehead. 314th IR is unable to advance in 

Drusenheim or SE of Rohrweiler. CCB, 12th AD, attacks with 714th Tank Bn toward Herrlisheim.

• 9 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 84th ID mops up near Consy, takes commanding ground at Harze, and 

clears woods S of main crossroads SE of Manhay. 2d AD continues toward Samree, which is subjected to heavy arty 
20

fire. 83 Div attacks through 3d AD, gaining line from Bihain-which is entered but not captured-W to point NE of Petite 

Langlir. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD finishes mopping up within its zone. In 30th ID sector, 424th IR (I06th ID) 

takes over Wanne-Wanneranval region, formerly held by 112th IR (28th ID). In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th 

ID continues to fight near Tillet; elements are clearing Haies-de-Tillet woods. 506th PIR, 101st A/BD, attacks with CCB, 

4th AD, and CCB, 10th AD, toward Noville, gaining 1,000 yards. 501st PIR takes Recogne. III Corps launches attack to 

trap and destroy enemy in pocket SE of Bastogne. 90th ID attacks through 26th ID toward high ground NE of Bras, 

taking Berle and crossroads on Berle-Winseler road. 26th ID's gains are slight but include heights NW of Bavigne. 

CCA, 6th AD, coordinating closely with 134th IR of 35ID, advances to high ground SE of Marvie and feints toward 

Wardin. I37th IR of 35th ID attacks Villers-Ia-Bonne-Eau. US Seventh Army's XV Corps area, local attack by 100th ID 

gains Hill 370, S of Rimling, but since this region is becoming untenable, div withdraws left flank to Guising to tie in with

44th ID. VI Corps makes very slow progress against Bitche salient, but TF Herren's 276th IR occupies Obermuhlthal. 

On NE flank of 79th ID, German tank-infantry attack against 242d IR, TF Linden, overruns Hatten and reaches 

Rittershoffen; counterattack drives Germans back to Hatten and partly regains that town. In Gambsheim bridgehead 

region, CCB of 12th AD seizes part of Herrlisheim, but 79th ID is still thwarted in Drusenheim and SE of Rohrweiler. 

Elements of 232d IR along canal E of Weyersheim are ordered back to organize Weyersheim for defense.

• 10 January - In Br Second Army's XXX Corps area, 51st ID, which has taken over attack from 53d ID, reaches 

Laroche. In US Ninth Army's XIX Corps area, 78th ID, in local attack, reaches slopes of hills overlooking Kall R. US 

First Army prepares to broaden attack on 13th, VII Corps thrusting toward line Houffalize Bovigny and XVIII Corps 

toward St Vith. In VII Corps area, most of Laroche-Salmchateau road, intermediate objective of corps, is cleared. 84th 

ID patrols toward Laroche. 2d AD captures Samree and clears Laroche-Salmchateau road within its zone. 83d ID takes 

Bihain, advances slightly in region N of Petite Langlir, and crosses Ronce R east of Petite Langlir. In XVIII Corps (A/B)

area, elements of 82 A/BD secure bridgehead across Salm R near Grand Halleux. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 

87th ID captures Tillet. Renewing attack toward Noville. 101st A/BD clears portion of Bois Jacques. 4th AD units, 

having passed through 6th AD, attack NE with elements of 101st A/BD toward Bourcy but cease attack upon order. III 

Corps continues attack, with greatest progress on right (E) flank. On left flank, 6th AD furnishes fire support for 

neighboring VIII Corps units and outposts N sector of line reached by 4th AD. Elements of 35th ID take Villersla-BonneEau and high ground NW. Betlange falls to 6 Cav Sq and Harlange to 28 Cav Sq. One 90th ID regt advances from 

Berle to heights overlooking Doncols; another fights indecisively for Trentelhof strongpoint. Elements of 26th ID reach 

high ground SW of Winseler. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, elements of 45th ID enter Althorn, on left flank of 

Bitche salient, but are unable to clear it. Otherwise, the salient is unchanged despite continued fighting about its 

perimeter. On 79th ID's N flank, indecisive fighting occurs at Hatten; bn of 315th IR is committed there and 2d Bn, 242d 

IR, recalled; another bn of 315th IR assembles in Rittershoffen. To S, enemy maintains Gambsheim bridgehead. 

Elements of CCB, 12th AD, are virtually surrounded at Herrlisheim, but tanks sever enemy lines in order to reinforce 

infantry within the town.
21

• 11 January - In US Ninth Army's XIX Corps area, 78th ID finishes clearing hill positions overlooking Kall R. In US First 

Army's VII Corps area, Laroche, in 84th ID sector, is cleared of enemy; 4 Cav Gp patrol covers portion E of the Ourthe 

R. 83d ID secures road junction on Bihain-Lomre road and attacks Petite Langlir and Langlir. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 

75th ID takes up positions along Salm R that were held by 82d A/BD. I06th ID assumes control of right of 30th ID zone. 

In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID's 347th IR finishes clearing Haies-de-Tillet woods and occupies Bonnerue, 

Pironpre, Vesqueville, and St Hubert, from which enemy has withdrawn. Germans are also withdrawing from 17th A/BD 

zone in vicinity of Heropont, Flamierge, Mande St Etienne, and Flamizoulle. In III Corps area, Germans are retiring from 

pocket SE of Bastogne. Elements of all divs of corps are converging on Bras. 6th AD takes over sector E of Bastogne 

formerly held by 4th AD (VIII Corps); elements attack toward Bras, clearing woods near Wardin. 35th ID gains 

additional high ground in Lutrebois-Lutremange area. TF Fickett clears Wantrange and attacks Tarchamps, then moves 

into zone of TF Scott (mainly 26th ID units) as it advances on Sonlez. TF Fickett reaches Sonlez by midnight and 

makes contact with 90th ID. Elements of TF Scott clear forest E of Harlange then, in conjunction with TF Fickett, secure 

heights SW of Sonlez. 90th ID overcomes resistance around Trentelhof, cuts Bastogne-Wiltz road at Doncols, and 

advances on Sonlez. 26th ID improves positions on right flank of corps. In XII Corps area, 80th ID takes Bockholz-surSure and high ground S of Burden. 2d Cav Gp clears Machtum, enemy's last position W of the Moselle. In US Seventh 

Army's VI Corps area, 45th ID clears Althorn, at W of Bitche salient, but falls back under enemy pressure in WildenguthSaegmuhl-Reipertsweiler region. 276th IR makes limited gains on heights between Lichtenberg and Obermuhlthal. 

Enemy renews attacks against 79th ID's Maginot positions S of Wissembourg, reinforcing troops in Hatten, where 2d Bn 

of 3I5th IR is enveloped, and wresting about two thirds of Rittershoffen from 3d Bn, 3I5th IR. Elements of CCA, 14th 

AD, counterattack from Kuhlendorf but are stopped short of Rittershoffen. CCB, 12d AD, withdraws from Herrlisheim 

and takes up defensive positions W of Zorn R.

• 12 January - In US First Army VII Corps area, 2d AD attacks in vicinity of junction of Manhay-Houffalize and LarocheSalmchateau roads: CCA takes Chabrehez, continues about a mile S in Bois de Belhez, and reduces strongpoint E of 

Bois de St Jean; CCB captures Les Tailles and Petite Tailles. On 3d AD right, 83d Armd Rcn Bn drives S through TF 

Hogan (CCR) at Regne, crosses Langlir R, and clears Bois de Cedrogne E of Manhay-Houffalize road and blocks road 

there running W from Mont Ie Ban. TF Hogan moves to Bihain and clears high ground SW of the town. 83d ID 

completes capture of Petite Langlir and Langlir and gains bridgehead S of Langlir-Ronce R. In XVIII (A/B.) Corps' I06th 

ID sector, bridgehead is established across Ambleve R south of Stavelot. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy 

continues withdrawing. 87th ID takes Tonny, Amberloup, Lavacherie, Orreux, Fosset, Sprimont, and road junction NE of 

Sprimont. 17th AIB Div recaptures Flamierge. Flamizoulle is found to be heavily mined. Renuamont, Hubermont, and 

villages to SW are held by light, delaying forces. In III Corps area, CCA of 6th AD captures Wardin and advances to 

within a few hundred yards of Bras; 357th IR mops up Sonlez and continues to high ground SE of Bras; 359th IR repels 

attacks on crossroads NE of Doncols. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, enemy has shifted from aggressive 

offensive to stubborn defensive in Bitche salient. Efforts of 45th ID to regain ground lost on 11th are only partly 
22

successful. 14th AD attacks to relieve 3I5th IR, 79th ID, in Hatten and Rittershoffen; CCA clears part of Rittershoffen. 

Situation in Gambsheim bridgehead is unchanged.

• 13 January - In Br Second Army area, XXX Corps' Ardennes mission is completed as 51st ID Div reaches Ourthe R 

line southward from Laroche. In US First Army area, VII Corps pushes steadily toward Houffalize. On right flank, 4th 

Cav Gp and 84th ID clear several towns and villages. CCA, 2d AD, reaches positions about 11/2 miles N of Wibrin; 

CCB advances in Bois de Cedrogne to points 5-6 miles due N of Houffalize. 3d AD's CCR cuts Sommerain-Cherain 

road at its junction with road to Mont Ie Ban and contains Mont Ie Ban while CCB takes Lomre. After clearing passage 

through woods S of Langlir for 3d AD, 83d ID mops up and regroups. XVIII Corps (A/B) opens offensive, employing 

I06th ID on right and 30th ID on left. I06th ID, with 424 IR on right and 5I7th PIR on left, attacks SE from junction of 

Ambleve and Salm Rivers toward La Neuville-Coulee- Logbierme- Houvegnez line, reaching positions near Henumont. 

30th ID drives S from Malmedy area toward Ambleve R, gaining positions near Hedomont, in Houyire woods, and in 

Thirimont area. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, advance elements of 87th ID reach Ourthe R and make contact 

with British. 17th AIB Div takes Salle, N of Flamierge, without opposition. 11th AD, which has relieved elements of 

101st and 17th A/BDs, attacks N with CCR and CCA along Longchamps-Bertogne axis, cutting Houffalize-St Hubert 

highway near Bertogne. Bertogne is enveloped. 506th PIR, 101st A/BD, seizes Foy, on Bastogne-Houffalize highway; 

327th Glid Inf advances through 501st PIR in Bois Jacques toward Bourcy. In III Corps area, 6th AD drives northward, 

CCB partially clearing Mageret. 90th ID drives enemy from Bras and gains Hill 530. 35th ID and TF Fickett are pinched 

out near Bras. 26th ID moves units into positions NE and E of Doncols as boundary between it and 90th ID is moved 

W. In US Seventh Army area, XXI Corps (MG Frank W. Milburn) becomes operational, assuming responsibility for 

defense of left flank of army and taking control of I06th Cav Gp and I03d ID in place. It is to continue organization of 

defensive positions. In VI Corps area, 45th ID makes minor gains against Bitche salient. TF Herren (- 274th IR) moves 

to right flank of corps. 14th AD takes command of Hatten Rittershoffen sector, assisted by 79th ID: CCA and 3d Bn of 

3I5th IR continue to fight in Rittershoffen; CCR secures W third of Hatten and makes contact with 2d Bn of 3I5th IR; 

efforts of CCB to cut roads N and NE of Hatten fail. 

• 14 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 84th ID gains its final objectives, taking Nadrin, Filly, Petite Mormont, 

and Grande Mormont. 4th Cav Gp patrol makes visual contact with US Third Army patrol. 2d AD seizes Wibrin, 

Cheveoumont, Wilogne, and Dinez. 3d AD takes Mont Ie Ban and Baclain. 83d ID clears Honvelez and high ground 

near Bovigny. In XVIII (A/B) Corps' I06th ID sector, 5I7th PIR clears Henumont and continues S; 424th IR secures 

Caulee and Lagbierme. Same elements of 30th ID attack toward Hedamant and Thirimant, night 13-14, and take 

Hedamant befare dawn; other elements clear Villers and Ligneuville and gain bridgeheads across Ambleve R at these 

points. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 17th A/BD's 507th PIR secures Bertagne, from which enemy has fled, and 

I94th Glid Inf takes Givroulle; both regts continue to Ourthe R. TF of CCA, 11th AD, clears Falize woods and drives 

along Langchamps-Compagne highway until stopped by heavy fire. 101st A/BD continues attack toward Noville 

Rachamps-Bourcy area. Elements are forced out of Recogne and Foy, but both are regained in counterattacks. Enemy 

is cleared from Cobru. Tank TF of CCB, 11th AD, followed by infantry TF, enters Noville but withdraws under intense 
23

fire. In III Corps area, CCA of 6th AD clears woods E of Wardin and captures Benonchamps; CCB finishes clearing 

Mageret. Elements of 90th ID drive toward Niederwampach. Having cleared small packets during night, 26th ID moves 

combat patrols against enemy S of Wiltz R. In XX Corps area, 94th ID opens series of small-scale attacks to improve 

defensive positions in Saar-Moselle triangle S of Wasserbillig, a strongly fortified switch position of West Wall; 376th IR 

takes Tettingen and Butzdarf. 95th ID moves two bns to objectives in Saarlautern bridgehead area and then withdraws 

them as planned. In US Seventh Army's XXI Corps area, 142d IR of 36th ID moves to I03d ID zone to cover relief of 

that div by TF Herren. In VI Corps area, enemy continues vigorous defense of Bitche salient. 45th ID makes slight 

gains along its perimeter. 14th AD battles enemy in Rittershaffen and Hatten. 

• 15 January - In Br Second Army's 12 Corps area, in preparation for Operation BLACKCOCK-to clear triangular enemy 

salient between the Meuse and Roer-Wurm Rivers from Roermond southward-elements of 7th AD seize Bakenhoven 

(Holland) about a mile NW of Susteren as line of departure far main attack by 7th AD on left flank of corps. On US First 

Army's VII Corps right, 84th ID consolidates. 2d AD clears Achouffe, Mont, and Tavernaux and sends patrols to Ourthe 

R and into Hauffalize, which has been vacated by enemy. 3d AD attacks with CCR toward Vaux and Brisy, taking Vaux, 

and with CCB toward Cherain and Sterpigny. Elements of CCA are committed as reinforcements. Bn of 83d ID attacks 

Bavigny but is unable to take it. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 75th ID attacks across the Salm before dawn and seizes 

Salmchateau and Bech. 106th ID consolidates and clears Ennal. 30th ID takes Beaumant, Francheville, Hauvegnez, 

and Pont; improves positions S of Ligneuville; clears N part of Thirimant. V Corps opens offensive to clear heights 

between Buellingen and Ambleve and to protect left flank of XVIII Corps. 1st ID, reinf by 23d IR of 2d ID, attacks SE 

with 23d IR on right, 16th IR in center, and 18th IR on left; gains Steinbach, neighboring village of Remanval, and N half 

of Faymanville, but is held up S of Buetgenbach by heavy fire. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, CCA of 11th AD 

takes Campagne and Rastadt and reaches Vellereux; falls back W of Vellereux under counterattack in Rau de Vaux 

defile. CCB bypasses Neville and clears woods to E. 506th PIR, 101st A/BD, occupies Neville. In III Corps area, 6th 

AD, employing 320th IR of 35th ID, overcomes house-to-house resistance in Oubaurcy; CCB takes Arlancourt; CCA 

clears heights SW of Langvilly. 358th IR of 90th ID meets unexpectedly strong resistance as it resumes NE attack; 1st 

Bn makes forced march into 6th AD sector to attack Niederwampach from Benanchamps area and gains town after arty 

barrage by 14 FA bns. 357th IR battles strong points in and around RR tunnels along Wiltz R valley while 359th IR 

starts to Wardin. In XX Corps' 94th ID zone, 1st Bn of 376th holds Tettingen and Butzdorf against counterattack while 

3d Bn takes Nennig, Wies, and Berg. Issues preliminary instructions for attack against Calmar Pocket by Fr First Army, 

which for some time has been engaged in aggressive defense of the Vosges. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, 

local actions occur around Bitche salient perimeter. 14th AD continues fight for Rittershaffen and Hatten.
TAB B

World War II Allied Conferences

“Never in history was there a coalition like that

of our enemies, composed of such heterogeneous 

elements with such divergent aims...Even now 

these states are at loggerheads, and, if we can 

deliver a few more heavy blows, then this artificially 

bolstered common front may suddenly collapse with

a gigantic clap of thunder.” 

Adolf Hitler

 (upon ordering the attack through the Ardennes)
2

The first involvement of the United States in the wartime conferences between the Allied nations 

opposing the Axis powers actually occurred before the nation formally entered World War II. In 

August 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met 

secretly and devised an eight-point statement of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter, which 

included a pledge that the Allies would not accept territorial changes resulting from the war in 

Europe. 

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the wartime conferences focused on establishing 

a second front. At Casablanca in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to fight until the 

Axis powers surrendered unconditionally. In a November 1943 meeting in Egypt with Chinese 

leader Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to a pre-eminent role for China in 

postwar Asia. The next major wartime conference included Roosevelt, Churchill, and the leader 

of the Soviet Union, Josef Stalin. Meeting at Tehran following the Cairo Conference, the "Big 

Three" secured confirmation on the launching of the cross-channel invasion and a promise from 

Stalin that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan. 

In 1944, conferences at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks created the framework for 

international cooperation in the postwar world. In February 1945, the "Big Three" met at the 

former Russian czar’s summer palace in the Crimea. Yalta was the most important and by far 

the most controversial of the wartime meetings. Recognizing the strong position that the Soviet 

Army possessed on the ground, Churchill and an ailing Roosevelt agreed to a number of 

compromises with Stalin that allowed Soviet hegemony to remain in Poland and other Eastern 

European countries, granted territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and outlined punitive 

measures against Germany, including an occupation and reparations in principle. Stalin did 

guarantee that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within six months. 

The last meeting of the "Big Three" occurred at Potsdam in July 1945, where the tension that 

would erupt into the cold war was evident. Despite the end of the war in Europe and the 

revelation of the existence of the atomic bomb to the Allies, neither President Harry Truman, 

Roosevelt’s successor, nor Clement Attlee, who mid-way through the conference replaced 

Churchill, could come to agreement with Stalin on any but the most minor issues. The most 

significant agreement was the issuance of the Potsdam Declaration to Japan demanding an 

immediate and unconditional surrender and threatening Japan with destruction if they did not 

comply. With the Axis forces defeated, the wartime alliance soon devolved into suspicion and 

bitterness on both sides. 
3

World War II Conferences & Treaties

Conference /Treaty Date Participants Highlights

Molotov-Ribbentrop 

Treaty

August 23, 1939 Germany, Soviet 

Union

Hitler and Stalin sign nonaggression pact which 

meant the Soviets would 

not intervene if Poland were 

invaded. Hitler later 

invaded Russia (June 22, 

1941).

Atlantic Conference August 1941 Great Britain, US FDR and Churchill approve 

the Atlantic Charter that 

supported selfdetermination, a new 

permanent system of 

general security (a new 

League of Nations), and the 

right of people to regain 

governments abolished by 

dictators.

Moscow Conference September-October 

1941

Great Britain, US, 

Soviet Union

Allied aid to Soviet Union 

systematized.

Washington Conference 

(ARCADIA)

December 1941-

January 1942

Great Britain, US Agreement to follow 

Churchill’s “Europe First” 

strategy; Declaration of the 

United Nations.

Washington (2d) 

Conference

June 1942 Great Britain, US Agreed to give higher 

priority to peripheral 

strategy over cross-channel 

invasion of Europe; agreed 

to share as “equal partners” 

in A-bomb research.

Casablanca Conference 

(SYMBOL)

January 1943 Great Britain, US FDR and Churchill agree to 

step up Pacific war, invade 

Sicily, increase pressure on 

Italy and insist on an 

unconditional surrender of 

Germany.
4

Washington Conference 

(TRIDENT)

May 1943 Great Britain, US Plans for invasion of Italy, 

stepped-up Pacific war, 

increased air attacks on 

Germany.

Quebec Conference 

(QUADRANT)

August 1943 Great Britain, US D-Day Set for May 1, 1944; 

Southeast Asia command 

reorganized for war on 

Japan; Gilberts and 

Marshalls set as first 

objectives in central Pacific 

offensive.

Moscow Conference October 1943 Great Britain, US, 

Soviet Union, 

China

Tentative plans for 

cooperation in postwar 

Europe; Joint 4-power 

declaration includes China; 

Chiang-Kai-shek invited to 

a meeting at Cairo.

Cairo Conference 

(SEXTANT)

November 1943 Great Britain, US, 

Soviet Union, 

China

Agreement on military 

operations in China against 

Japanese; promise of 

postwar return of 

Manchuria to China and of 

freedom for Korea.

Teheran Conference 

(EUREKA)

November 1943 Great Britain, US, 

Soviet Union

Plans for two-front war 

against Germany, for later 

Russian participation in war 

against Japan, and for 

postwar cooperation. 

Cairo (2d) Conference December 1943 Great Britain, US, 

Turkey

Anakim postponed, Ike 

command.

Bretton Woods July 1944 Delegates of 44 

nations

Establishment of 

International Monetary 

Fund and Bank.

Dumbarton Oaks August 1944 Great Britain, US, 

Soviet Union, 

China

Agreement on 

establishment of U.N., 

disagreement on veto in 

Security Council.
5

Quebec (2d) Conference 

(OCTAGON)

September 1944 Great Britain, US Broad plans for global war; 

FDR agreed to Churchill 

plan for Greece and Istrian 

attack, due to fear of Russia 

in Balkans; FDR agreed to 

continue Lend-Lease to 

rebuild Britain's economy; 

tentative agreement on 

Morgenthau Plan for 

postwar Germany; FDR 

still unwilling to recognize 

De Gaulle.

Yalta Conference 

(ARGONAUT)

February 1945 Great Britain, US, 

Soviet Union

Plans for dealing with 

defeat of Germany; Stalin 

agreed that Poland would 

have free elections and that 

the Soviets would attack 

Japan within three months 

of the collapse of Germany. 

Soviets receive territory in 

Manchuria and several 

islands.

San Francisco 

Conference

April 22, 1945 Delegates of 46 

nations

United Nations Charter 

approved establishing a 

Security Council with veto 

power for the Big Five (US, 

Great Britain, France, 

China, and Soviet Union) 

and a General Assembly.

Potsdam Conference 

(TERMINAL)

July – August 1945 US, Great Britain, 

Soviet Union

Pres. Truman met with 

Stalin and Churchill (Attlee 

after British election) and 

agreed that Japan must 

surrender or risk 

destruction; Atomic bomb 

successfully tested on July 

16 and then dropped on 

Hiroshima on August 6, 

1945; agreement on 

principles governing 

treatment of Germany.
TAB C

Allied Command Architecture

& Order of Battle

“I have just made a momentous decision.

I shall go over to the counter-attack,

that is to say here, out of the Ardennes,

with the objective - -

Antwerp.”

 Adolf Hitler, 16 September 1944

“It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping 

the strength of German forces on the western front 

 and that the crust of defenses is thinner, more brittle, 

and more vulnerable than it appears on G2 maps

 or to troops in the line.” 

 12th Army Group Intelligence Summary, 12 December 1944
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE

12th U.S. Army Group (Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley)

Assignment of divisions to corps and corps to armies varied throughout the war and frequently 

changed, even in the midst of battles. The alignment of divisions and corps shown here depicts the 

12th Army Group organization as of the end of the battle in January, 1945.

First U.S. Army (Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges)

V Corps (Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow)

1st Infantry Division (The Big Red One). Brig. Gen. Clift Andrus. The most experienced American 

infantry division. North Africa, Sicily, D-Day, Normandy, Aachen, and the Huertgen Forest.

2nd Infantry Division (Indianhead). Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson. Normandy and the attack 

across France and against the Roer River Dams.

5th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver.

9th Infantry Division (Octofoil). Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig. North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, and 

the Huertgen Forest. 

78th Infantry Division (Lightning). Maj. Gen. Edwin P. Parker, Jr. Supported 2nd Infantry 

Division's attack on the Roer River dams, its first combat action.

99th Infantry Division (Checkerboard). Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer. Held a defensive front in the 

Ardennes since November 1944, its only action.

VII Corps (Maj. Gen. Joseph Lawton Collins)

2nd Armored Division (Hell on Wheels). Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon. North Africa, Sicily, 

Normandy, and around Aachen.

3rd Armored Division (Spearhead). Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose. Normandy, the pursuit across 

France, and costly fall battles around Aachen.

83rd Infantry Division (Thunderbolt). Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon. Normandy, Brest, and the 

Huertgen Forest.

84th Infantry Division (Railsplitters). Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling. First action in November 

1944 around Aachen.
9

XVIII Airborne Corps (Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway)

7th Armored Division (Lucky Seventh). Brig. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck. Pursuit across France, 

heavy fighting near Metz in September and in Holland in October.

30th Infantry Division (Old Hickory). Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs. Normandy; repelled German 

counterattack at Mortain; and at Aachen.

75th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett. First action in September.

82nd Airborne Division (All American). Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin. Sicily, D-Day, Normandy, 

and Holland.

Third U.S. Army (Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.)

III Corps (Maj. Gen. John Millikin)

4th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey. Normandy; heavy fighting in Lorraine and the 

drive to the Saar River.

6th Armored Division (Super Sixth). Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow. Normandy, Brittany, and in 

Lorraine.

26th Infantry Division (Yankee). Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul. Heavy combat near Verdun in 

September. In December, it had only recently been pulled from the line and sent into the Ardennes to 

absorb replacements.

35th Infantry Division (Santa Fe). Maj. Gen. Paul W. Baade. Normandy; repelled German 

counterattack at Mortain; Lorraine.

90th Infantry Division (Tough Ombres). Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet. Heavy losses in first 

engagements in Normandy; Metz; drive to Saar River. Two division commanders relieved.

VIII Corps (Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton)

9th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard. Untested before the Battle of the Bulge.

11th Armored Division (Thunderbolt). Brig. Gen. Charles S. Kilburn. Untested before the Battle of 

the Bulge.

17th Airborne Division (Golden Talon). Maj. Gen. William M. Miley. Untested before the Battle 

of the Bulge.

28th Infantry Division (Keystone). Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota. D-Day; Normandy; Siegfried Line; 

heavy combat in Huertgen Forest. Made the disastrous attack on Schmidt. One division commander 

relieved and another killed.
10

87th Infantry Division (Golden Acorn). Brig. Gen. Frank L. Culin, Jr. Brief battle experience in the 

Saar, but the division's first real test of battle was near Bastogne.

101st Airborne Division (Screaming Eagles). Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. D-Day, Normandy 

and Holland.

106th Infantry Division (Golden Lions). Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones. Completely untested when put

into the line in the Ardennes.

XII Corps (Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy)

4th Infantry Division (Ivy). Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton. D-Day; Normandy, Siegfried Line, and 

Huertgen Forest.

5th Infantry Division (Red Diamond). Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin. Normandy; heavy casualties in 

fall fighting for Metz.

10th Armored Division (Tiger). Maj. Gen. William H. H. Morris, Jr. Lorraine, Metz, drive to the 

Saar River.

80th Infantry Division (Blue Ridge). Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride. Normandy; hard fight for

Moselle River crossing in September; drive to the Saar River.

Ninth U.S. Army (Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson)

XIII Corps (Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem)

102nd Infantry Division. Brig. Gen. Frank A. Keating.

XVI Corps (Maj. Gen. J. B. Anderson)

Not Operational

XIX Corps (Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain)

29th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhardt.

8th Infantry Division. Brig. Gen. W. G. Weaver.

104th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen.
11

21 Br Army Group (Fld. Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery)

XXX Corps (Lt. Gen. Sir Brian G. Horrocks)

79th Armored Division (Special). Maj. Gen. Sir Percy C. S. Hobart.

First Canadian Army (Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar)

I (British) Corps (Lt. Gen. J. T. Crocker)

II Corps (Lt. Gen. G. G. Simmonds)

51st (British) “Highland” Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. T. G. Rennie.

Second (British) Army (Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey)

VIII Corps (Lt. Gen. E. H. Barker)

XII Corps (Lt. Gen. Neil M. Ritchie)

Guards Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Alan H. S. Adair.

43rd “Wessex” Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. G. I. Thomas.

53rd “Welsh” Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. R. K. Ross
TAB D

The US Army in December 1944
2

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN DECEMBER OF 1944

 

The Army of the Battle of the Bulge was the mightiest force the United States had ever 

raised. In his 12th U.S. Army Group, General Omar N. Bradley commanded more soldiers than 

any American general had ever led before. Bradley's three field armies were arrayed across the 

front lines along the German borders: the Ninth Army, under Lt. Gen. William Simpson in the 

extreme north (not directly involved in the Ardennes battle), the First Army, under Lt. Gen. 

Courtney Hodges in the center, and the Third Army, under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., in the 

south. Arriving from the invasion of Southern France, the 6th U.S. Army Group, under 

command of Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers, had also fallen into line with its Seventh Army, under Lt. 

Gen. Alexander Patch, and a French army. By the fall of 1944, the Army had grown to a strength 

of almost eight million soldiers, a staggering number considering that the service had counted 

only about 180,000 on its rolls in 1939.

Nonetheless, in the fall of 1944, the Army had a serious personnel problem. The 81 rifle 

squads of a typical infantry division numbered a total of only 3,240 riflemen. The remainder of 

the 14,000 soldiers of the division performed other tasks. Some, including the artillery, armor, 

tank destroyer units, and others, were of the combat arms. The remainder handled the essential 

supply and administrative tasks to keep the division in action. The situation in the division 

repeated itself at higher echelons. At the field army level (roughly 350,000 men), about one 

soldier in seven was in the front line. In the European theater as a whole, Omar Bradley 

estimated that only one soldier out of fifteen fought with a rifle. Although riflemen were the 

minority in the Army, they suffered the highest casualty rate--83 percent in Normandy. Bradley 

later reported that three out of every four casualties came from a rifle platoon, and that the rate of 

loss in rifle platoons was 90 percent. Thus there began in Normandy and continued through 

December of 1944 a severe infantry shortage in Europe, compounded by Army decisions to send 

more riflemen to the Pacific. As the Battle of the Bulge started, Bradley was working hard to 

solve the problem, and found that the only way was to assign men from other skills--including 

antiaircraft artillerymen, now that the German Air Force seemed largely defeated--to the infantry. 

The Army was far more lavishly equipped than its enemy, but in almost every category of 

weaponry, the Germans had superior hardware. Tanks are the best example. Until 1935 in 

American doctrine, the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that accompanied the Infantry. 

Experiments with mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the Chief of Infantry in 

1938 declaring that a 75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival armies fought the 

Battle of France with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had already 

experimented with the 88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm gun for 

tanks. In the spring of 1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of Europe, the 

largest gun on an operational American tank was still a short-barrelled, low-muzzle-velocity 

75-mm, the standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. At the same time, 

Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barrelled, high-muzzle-velocity 75s, and the Tiger carried 

the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank destroyer, a fast, 

heavily-gunned, lightly-armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It mounted a 3-inch, 

high-muzzle-velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for more power to 

cope with German tanks brought the M18, with a 76-mm gun, into service in 1944. The M18 
3

had a shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The M36, an M10 

redesigned to accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. On none of 

these vehicles was the armor comparable to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, appropriately 

armed to be "killer tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the fight.

 Anti-tank weapons were a similar case. The American 2.36-inch rocket launcher, or 

"bazooka," was too small to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful 

aim against soft spots. This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a 

massive German tank loomed so close that he could hear the squeak of the bogies. The Germans 

adopted an 88-mm Panzerfaust, a rocket-propelled shaped-charge grenade that was about twice 

as powerful as the American bazooka. When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 

505th Parachute Infantry, his men tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. 

Gavin later wrote that "As for the 82nd Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank 

weapons until it began to capture the first German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had 

truckloads of them. We also captured German instructions for their use, made translations, and 

conducted our own training with them. They were the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the 

war." The U.S. did not even initiate a project for a more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 

1944.

In two areas, however, the United States had a distinct advantage. The Garand 

.30-caliber M1 semi-automatic was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of the war. No other 

rifle matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability. In artillery, too the 

American Army had the edge. It was not that the artillery was qualitatively better than German 

equipment, although the U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart 

of the same caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery, was multiplied by the best 

equipment and techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination. "I do not 

have to tell you who won the war," George Patton said in 1945. "You know our artillery did." 

General George C. Marshall agreed when he wrote that "Webelieve that our use of massed heavy

artillery fire was far more effective than the German techniques," concluding that "our method of 

employment of these weapons has been one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns 

throughout the world."

As the Battle of the Bulge began, the 12th Army Group was maneuvering 31 divisions 

and was well on the way to solving the serious supply problems that had halted its advance on the

German borders in September. Both soldiers and their leaders were confident of their own 

abilities and of the prospects for victory.

 

 

AMERICAN ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

American artillery played a crucial part throughout the Battle of the Bulge. Without the battalions 

at Brig. Gen. Anthony McAuliffe's disposal, the defenders of Bastogne would probably never have 

been able to hold against the German attacks. The same was true across the Ardennes front, and 

although the artillery did not react strongly to the initial attacks on 16 December because the 

German bombardment disrupted communications and many units were hampered by having to 

displace rapidly to the rear to keep from being overrun, the guns soon came into their own. Bad 
4

weather also hampered observation of fire on the first day. Nonetheless, the artillery at Monschau 

literally stopped a German attack by itself, and in the V Corps sector, the 99th Infantry Division 

Artillery helped that green unit to hold its ground for two days, until the V Corps artillery on 

Elsenborn Ridge began to carry the burden. The weight of fire was tremendous: on the night of 17 

December, for example, one V Corps infantry battalion was covered by a defensive barrage of 

11,500 rounds. As the American defense solidified, particularly on the northern and southern 

shoulders of the German penetration, the artillery really began to make itself felt. By 23 December, 

the artillery brought 4,155 guns into action and fired 1,255,000 rounds of ammunition during the 

course of the battle.

In many cases, artillery did not need to destroy the enemy to have the desired effect. Often, artillery 

fire diverted the German attacks from their axis of advance and derailed the German scheme of 

maneuver, even without causing much physical damage. Most of the firing involved conventional 

artillery, although some 210,000 rounds of ammunition had been fitted with the new and highly 

secret VT (variable time) or POZIT fuze, which detonated the shell by external influence in close 

vicinity of the target, without explosion by contact. The VT fuze allowed artillery to detonate 

above ground, thus spending its effect much more effectively against troops in the open. Claims 

were made that the VT and POZIT fuze played an important part in winning the battle. The truth 

seems to be that, however effective such ammunition was, very little of it was fired before January 

1945.

As at Bastogne, artillery took over much of the effective anti-tank combat, with 155-mm guns 

particularly successful in attaining mobility kills. Artillery was successful not just in the indirect 

fire mode, however, but also in direct fire. Post-battle examination of destroyed German tanks 

showed that many of them had been put out of action by howitzer fire. The Antiaircraft Artillery 

Gun Battalions assigned to the various corps played an important role as well. Trained to deliver 

indirect fire in the traditional artillery fashion, the AA gunners also had a 90-mm weapon that 

packed a powerful punch because of its high muzzle velocity. Antiaircraft batteries were therefore 

successful throughout the Ardennes in the anti-tank role. Once artillery spotter aircraft were able to 

fly, the gunners also had considerable success in breaking up concentrations of both tanks and 

troops before they were able to deliver attacks against American positions.

The many American artillery battalions would have been less effective, however, had they not been 

directed by the most effective fire direction system used by any nation during the war. American 

forward observers could call down an enormous weight of fire on their selected targets, mixing 

divisional and corps fires with the fires of the mortar units organic to the infantry regiments. 

Indeed, German commanders later criticized American artillery fire as "methodical, schematic, and 

wasteful." It was also true that American gunners sometimes allowed gaps to develop at division 

and corps boundaries where they failed to provide overlapping fire between zones. Nonetheless, 

the system functioned when it was needed, and the successful defense of Elsenborn Ridge by V 

Corps units (among many similar cases) depended on the accuracy and weight of the defensive 

concentrations that V Corps Artillery fired, particularly on the night of 17/18 December. Much of 

the artillery's effectiveness came from well-trained forward observers dedicated to their supported 

infantry and armor units, for "men counted as much as weight of metal," as the official historian 

wrote. In the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, to cite only one case, 32 forward observers out of a 

total of 48 became casualties in six days of battle.
5

Artillery organization: American corps commanders had a considerable amount of artillery at 

their disposal and were always seeking more. The case of V Corps, which at one point had 37 field 

artillery battalions, is typical:

V Corps Artillery:

187th Field Artillery Group

751st Field Artillery Battalion

997th Field Artillery Battalion

186th Field Artillery Battalion

196th Field Artillery Battalion

190th Field Artillery Group

62nd Field Artillery Battalion

190th Field Artillery Battalion

272nd Field Artillery Battalion

268th Field Artillery Battalion

200th Field Artillery Battalion

955th Field Artillery Battalion

406th Field Artillery Group

76th Field Artillery Battalion

941st Field Artillery Battalion 

953rd Field Artillery Battalion 

987th Field Artillery Battalion

Division Artillery, Divisions Assigned to V Corps:

1st Infantry Division Artillery

5th Field Artillery Battalion

7th Field Artillery Battalion 

32nd Field Artillery Battalion

33rd Field Artillery Battalion

30th Infantry Division Artillery

113th Field Artillery Battalion

118th Field Artillery Battalion

197th Field Artillery Battalion

230th Field Artillery Battalion

2nd Infantry Division Artillery

12th Field Artillery Battalion

15th Field Artillery Battalion

37th Field Artillery Battalion

38th Field Artillery Battalion

78th Infantry Division Artillery

307th Field Artillery Battalion

308th Field Artillery Battalion

309th Field Artillery Battalion

903rd Field Artillery Battalion

9th Infantry Division Artillery

26th Field Artillery Battalion

34th Field Artillery Battalion

60th Field Artillery Battalion

84th Field Artillery Battalion

99th Infantry Division Artillery

370th Field Artillery Battalion

371st Field Artillery Battalion

372nd Field Artillery Battalion

(Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick)
TAB E

Biographical Sketches –

Senior Allied Commanders

 Thirteen Commanders of the Western Front

 Front row, L to R: General Patton, General Bradley, General Eisenhower, 

 General Hodges, General Simpson 

 Second row: General Kean, General Corlett, General Collins, 

 General Gerow, General Quesada 

 Third row: General Leven C. Allen, General Charles C. Hart,

 General Truman C. Thorson 

 Photographed in Belgium, 10 October 1944 
2

American Commanders

General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces

Promoted to five star rank on the eve of the German 

counteroffensive through the Ardennes, Eisenhower 

was the senior officer in the European Theater of 

Operations and commander of the Allied coalition 

against Hitler. Born in the little east Texas town of 

Denison in 1890, he graduated from the U. S. 

Military Academy at West Point in 1915 with a 

commission in the infantry. World War I brought 

the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel and service 

with training the Army's new tank corps, but 

Eisenhower was disappointed that he never had the 

chance to command in France during the fighting. 

He was promoted to major in 1920 and held that 

rank through the next sixteen years of service in the 

small interwar Army, serving in various staff 

positions and, occasionally, with troops. He did not 

command a battalion until 1940. The key to his 

professional development was an early assignment 

in Panama with Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, operations 

officer on General John J. Pershing's staff during 

World War I in France and at that time commanding an infantry brigade. Conner tutored 

Eisenhower in the military art and, most significantly, caused him to think deeply about the 

problems of coalition command. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School at 

Fort Leavenworth, the acknowledged portal to future advancement, and two years later from the 

Army War College, Eisenhower served on the War Department General Staff, where he worked in 

the Office of the Chief of Staff while Douglas MacArthur led the Army. He subsequently worked 

again for MacArthur in the Philippines and returned to the United States as a lieutenant colonel in 

1939 for battalion command in the 15th Infantry, duty as regimental executive officer, and then as 

chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. Thereafter, Eisenhower became chief of staff of the 

newly-activated IX Corps and then of Third Army. It was in that position that he first gained 

national attention, being credited with the battle plan by means of which Lt. Gen. Walter Kruger's 

Third Army decisively defeated Lt. Gen. Ben Lear's Second Army in the famous Louisiana 

Maneuvers of 1941.
3

Almost immediately, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall summoned Eisenhower to 

Washington, where he soon made the younger man chief of the War Plans Division of the general 

staff and quickly promoted him to major general. Developing plans that were then in formulation, 

Eisenhower sketched the basic strategy of establishing a base in the United Kingdom and attacking 

Germany by amphibious landings in France. In June 1942, Marshall named him the commanding 

general of the new European Theater. In only a few months, Eisenhower had earned Marshall's full 

trust. Marshall saw in him a man who had the vision to execute the strategy that the Allies had 

agreed upon. After commanding the 1942 Allied landings in North Africa and the subsequent

campaign in Tunisia, Eisenhower went on to command the Allied assault on Sicily and the Italian 

mainland, in the process gaining valuable experience not only in coalition command, but also in the 

difficult problems of amphibious operations. At the end of 1943, he was named Supreme Allied 

Commander for the invasion of Europe and directed the SHAEF effort to "utilize the resources of 

two great nations . . . with the decisiveness of a single authority." This was never easy, but in 

Eisenhower, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill found a man 

whose single-minded dedication to the goal of Allied unity was equal to the task. Following the 

success of the Allied landings at Normandy on 6 June 1944, the buildup of the beachhead, the 

breakout at St. Lo, the destruction of a large part of the German Army in the west in the Falaise 

Pocket, and the race across France in September, 1944, Eisenhower's armies stood on the very 

frontiers of the Reich by the early fall -- far ahead of the most ambitious predictions of staff 

planners. It was at that point that a shortage of supplies imposed by a paucity of good ports and 

overextended lines of supply from the Norman beaches caused the Allies to pause and allowed the 

Germans to regroup and solidify their defenses along the Westwall fortifications, known to 

Americans as the Siegfried Line

Eisenhower's perpetual good humor was often strained by the problems involved in keeping the 

Allied coalition firmly wedded to a single strategy, and in coping with the strong personalities of 

many of his subordinates. His perennial problems were Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law 

Montgomery, commander of British 21st Army Group, and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., 

commander of Third U.S. Army -- two men who were, as General Omar N. Bradley remarked in 

1978, "two sides of the same coin." Some British commanders, and in particular Montgomery and 

his mentor, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, saw Eisenhower as 

"a nice chap; no general," and thought him unsuited to command the ground battle, although they 

agreed he was superb at the political level. American commanders, including Patton and Bradley, 

often complained that Eisenhower forgot that he was an American and was unable to say no to 

Montgomery. By November of 1944, however, Eisenhower had firm control of SHAEF and 

imposed his will in his subordinates. Although at least one major disagreement lay in the future, he 

had disposed of Montgomery's often-expressed preference for a single thrust toward Berlin and 

insisted on a broad-front strategy with the industrial heartland of Germany as the ultimate goal. (Dr. 

Charles Kirkpatrick)

_______________________________________________
4

Lieutenant General Omar Nelson Bradley

Commanding General, 12th U.S. Army Group

Born in Clark, Missouri, in 1893, Bradley was a West Point classmate of Eisenhower and graduated 

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1915 with a commission in the infantry. Like Eisenhower, he 

did not serve in battle during World War I, but instead 

made a reputation as a trainer of troops. After teaching at 

West Point, graduating from Command and General Staff 

School, and serving in various troop assignments, Bradley 

went to Fort Benning, Georgia, where from 1929 through 

1933 he had the most important assignment of his early 

career. Teaching at the infantry school while Brig. Gen. 

George C. Marshall was assistant commandant, Bradley 

earned Marshall's confidence and regard. Thereafter he 

was a "Marshall man," one of the select handful of 

officers to whom Marshall later looked to command the 

mobilization Army. After graduating from the Army War 

College and again serving at West Point, Bradley in 1938 

served on the War Department General Staff. Marshall 

promoted him over the grade of colonel to brigadier 

general in 1941 and made him commandant of the 

Infantry School. Soon, he commanded both the 82nd and 

28th Infantry Division during their training and, as a 

major general, went overseas to serve with Eisenhower in North Africa. There, he took command 

of II Corps during the battles in Tunisia and, promoted to lieutenant general, led that corps in the 

invasion of Sicily in 1943. At that time, he was under command of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., 

who led Seventh Army. Selected by Eisenhower as the American ground commander for the 

invasion of Europe, Bradley went to England and took over First U.S. Army, commanding it in the 

assault at Normandy and the exploitation from the beachhead. With the activation of 12th Army 

Group in July, 1944, Bradley moved up to a command that included First Army and Third Army, 

under command of Patton (by then Bradley's subordinate), and eventually of the Ninth Army (in 

September 1944) and Fifteenth Army (after the Battle of the Bulge) in the advance across France 

and to the borders of Germany. Bradley's 12th Army Group eventually numbered 1.3 million men, 

the greatest force ever to serve under one American field commander.

Bradley ran the Veterans Administration at the end of the war and became Chief of Staff of the 

Army in 1948. In 1949 he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army and became the first 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He held that post through the Korean War until he retired in 

1953. He wrote his war memoir, A Soldier’s Story, in 1951, and subsequently authored another 

memoir in collaboration with Clay Blair. He died in New York City in 1981. (CK)

_______________________________________________
5

Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee

Commanding General, Communications Zone

John Lee was a Regular Army officer, a West Point graduate of 1909, and, like so many of the 

officers who were to hold key positions in the European theater, an engineer. Between 1909 and 

1917 his assignments included tours of duty in the Canal 

Zone, Guam, and the Philippines, as well as the zone of 

interior. During World War I he served first as aide to 

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, commanding general of the 

89th Division and later Army Chief of Staff, and then as 

chief of staff of the 89th Division, actively participating in 

the planning and execution of the St. Mihiel and MeuseArgonne offensives. In the course of his overseas duty he 

was awarded the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service 

Medal, and was twice decorated by the French 

Government. During most of the period between wars 

Lee held the usual peacetime engineer assignments, 

principally on rivers and harbors projects. In 1940 Lee 

was given command of the San Francisco Port of 

Embarkation and promoted to brigadier general; a year 

later he took command of the 2d Division; and in 1942 he 

was again promoted.

The history of U.S. logistics of the war in Europe is basically the history of the Services of 

Supply (SOS) and its successor on the continent, the Communications Zone; and the logistical 

story is therefore inseparably associated with the officer who in May 1942 was designated by 

General Marshall to command the SOS. General Lee was commanding the 2d Division at Fort 

Sam Houston, Texas, when on 3 May Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the 

War Department SOS, summoned him to Washington for the new assignment. 

The choice of General Marshall and General Somervell thus brought to the job a man of varied 

experience and an officer with a reputation as an able organizer and strict disciplinarian. It also 

brought to the job a controversial personality, for about Lee and his position most of the 

controversies over theater organization and command were to rage for the next three years.

Lee arrived in Washington on 5 May and in a series of conferences in the next two weeks laid 

the basis for the SOS organization in the United Kingdom. A staff was selected within the next 

week. On 14 May General Lee held the first meeting of his service chiefs, at which he read the 

draft of a directive indicating the lines along which General Marshall and General Somervell 

desired to have the SOS organized. Before leaving Washington, acutely aware of the difficulties 

faced by the SOS in 1917-18, General Lee also called on Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, 

commanding general of the American Expeditionary Forces SOS in World War I, hoping to 

profit from his experience and thus avoid a repetition of the errors of that period. On 23 May 

1942 General Lee left the United States with nine members of his staff and with basic plans for 

the organization of the SOS in England. 

The fledgling theater headquarters in the United Kingdom was to be organized “along the 

general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services.” 
6

These were to be grouped under the SOS and commanded by General Lee. More specifically, 

General Lee was given the following powers:

[He was] invested with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission including, but not 

limited to, authority to approve or delegate authority to:

a. Approve all plans and contracts of all kinds necessary to carry out the objectives of 

this directive.

b. Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to 

civil service rules.

c. Purchase any necessary supplies, equipment, and property, including rights in real 

estate practicable of acquirement.

d. Adjudicate and settle all claims.

e. Take all measures regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute 

the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding, and delivery of personnel, equipment, 

and supplies for the conduct of military operations.

The directive of 14 May thus assigned broad powers to the SOS, and for this reason it developed 

into one of the most controversial documents in the history of the theater. It undoubtedly bore 

the strong influence of General Somervell, who was acutely conscious of the difficulties 

experienced by the SOS in World War I. But the attempt to limit the top U.S. headquarters to a 

minimum of administrative and supply functions and to assign them to the SOS was the cause of 

a long struggle between the SOS and the theater headquarters and the basic reason for the several 

reorganizations which the two headquarters underwent in the next two years.

Lee was indefatigable in his rounds of inspections of field organizations, and was fully aware of 

the criticism generated by his use of a special train for that purpose. The acquisition of such a 

vehicle had been strongly urged on him by General Harbord. The train was intended as a 

timesaver, and that it undoubtedly was. General Lee refused to bow to the criticism, convinced 

in his own mind that the train was fully justified. As attested by members of his staff, it was a 

work train, and an instrument of torture. General Lee set a grueling pace on his inspection trips, 

and it was rare when a meal was served on the train during daylight hours, for most runs were 

made at night. The day’s work, consisting of inspections & conferences, normally began at five 

in the morning and lasted until evening. Most of the staff members who accompanied the SOS 

commander considered the trips agonizing ordeals and would have avoided them if possible.

One other criticism of the SOS commander was probably more justified. Lee assigned some 

officers to positions of authority and responsibility whose qualifications were at times obscure. 

He was exceedingly loyal to these subordinates, usually placing full confidence in them. This 

otherwise admirable trait sometimes put him in difficult positions, and his own reputation often 

suffered from their actions and unpopularity. In any event, the atmosphere at the ETOUSA-SOS 

headquarters was not consistently conducive to the best teamwork.

However inaccurately these circumstances may have reflected the real efficiency of the SOS, it is 

an inescapable fact that General Lee at least gave poor first impressions and did not always 

immediately inspire the confidence of the various commanders of the theater. Both General 

Andrews and General Devers were at first disposed to make a change in the command of the 

SOS when they assumed command of the theater. The former commanded the theater only a few 

months. General Devers, after a second look at the operations of the SOS, was satisfied that 

General Lee was doing a very satisfactory job. General Eisenhower’s reactions were similar. 

While he initially had doubts of Lee’s ability to create an efficient supply organization and was 
7

fully aware of the complaints of the combat commanders and the tensions between the various 

headquarters, he finally decided to abandon at least temporarily any thought of replacing the 

SOS commander, to put complete faith in him, and to trust in the ability of his organization to 

support the American forces in the coming operation. While the top-level organization and 

functioning of the SOS left something to be desired, and while there were shortcomings in the 

supply procedures within the SOS, observers from the Army Service Forces generally agreed 

that its field organization was functioning well and that the qualms felt by some commanders 

regarding the SOS’s ability to support the cross-Channel operations were unjustified. (Extracted 

from Ruppenthal, Roland G., Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume I, May 1941-September 

1944, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1953)

_______________________________________________

Major General Courtney H. Hodges

Commanding General, First U.S. Army

Courtney Hodges was born in Perry, Georgia, on 5 January 

1887 and entered the U. S. Military Academy in 1904. Not 

well grounded academically, he was “found” deficient in 

mathematics and resigned after one year. Had he graduated, he 

would have been a member of the Class of ’08 and, as such, 

some seven years senior to the men under whom he eventually 

served in Europe, Bradley and Eisenhower, both members of 

the Class of ’15. On 5 November 1906, Hodges enlisted in the 

Army as a private and—a great rarity of the pre-World War I 

Army—earned a commission from the ranks in 1909, just one 

year behind his USMA classmates. In 1916, he took part in the 

Punitive Expedition into Mexico against Pancho Villa. 

During World War I, he won a Distinguished Service Cross 

and a Silver Star during the Meuse-Argonne offensive and rose 

to the rank of temporary lieutenant colonel, commanding an 

infantry battalion in the 5th Division. In the last days of the war, 

he personally led a reconnaissance across the Meuse River and into the main German battle 

positions. In forty hours of battle, his position became the spearhead of the attack that finally put 

the Army across the Meuse in force. 

Hodges met Bradley when they taught at West Point together from 1920-1924, where then-Major 

Hodges was a member of the Tactical Department. Bradley commented that he was perhaps the 

first non-graduate to teach tactics to cadets and “ironically, he was a profound inspiration to the very 

corps that had earlier rejected him.” Bradley thought him the “quintessential Georgia gentleman,” 

and the most modest man he had ever met. Hodges was an exceptional marksman and was at that 

time the Army’s leading light in the national rifle matches. 

While George C. Marshall was Assistant Commandant at the Infantry School—the famous 

“Benning Renaissance” of 1927-1930—Hodges served there as a member of the Infantry Board and 
8

made a strong favorable impression on Marshall. While there, the already close friendship with 

Omar Bradley, who was also a member of the faculty, flourished. In 1933-1934, Bradley and 

Hodges were classmates at the Army War College. Thereafter, Hodges served in the Philippines 

before returning to the United States in 1941 to become Chief of Infantry, and therefore responsible 

for the organization and training of what the Army still saw as its primary arm. In 1943, Hodges 

assumed command of Third U.S. Army from Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. He did well in that 

assignment, convincing Marshall that, despite his age—he was fifty seven—he was not too old to 

go to war. Hodges arrived in Europe to understudy Bradley as deputy commanding general of First 

Army and ultimately to take command when Bradley was promoted to command 12th Army Group. 

Bradley and Hodges were alike in many ways, and thought much the same way about fighting the 

war. That prompted some to remark that, when Hodges took over First Army from Bradley, “the 

new broom swept nothing.” Bradley’s aide de camp, Maj. Chet Hansen, commented that Hodges 

was not an inspiring presence as a soldier, looking “like a small town banker in uniform.” Bradley, 

he thought, exuded confidence and firmness. Hodges, on the other hand, seemed “more worrier 

than warrior.” That was the view of many of his subordinates. Maj. Gen. Charles Corlett, XIX 

Corps commander, complained that Hodges didn’t understand what was really going on in the 

depleted infantry divisions that were fighting in the Huertgen Forest, despite his frequent telephonic 

demands for information. Hodges, moreover, clearly played favorites, a fact that his subordinates 

couldn’t fail to note. He doted on Maj. Gen. Joe Collins, VII Corps commander. Hodges and 

Corlett, on the other hand, barely could exchange a civil word. Others saw Hodges differently. 

Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin delivered a complimentary verdict that still said nothing about his 

virtues as an Army commander:

 I had served under Hodges earlier in the Philippine Islands in the 1930s. He was a fine Soldier

 with a distinguished record in World War I, quiet in manner and thoughtful and considerate in

 his relations with his subordinates. He was highly regarded in the peacetime army.

Even with their years of friendship and mutual esteem, Bradley remained concerned about Hodges 

and his abilities. “I began to fret privately,” he wrote years later, because “Courtney seemed 

indecisive and overly conservative. I hoped that my veteran First Army staff—Bill Kean in 

particular—would keep a fire under him.” Eisenhower seems to have shared the same worries, 

fearing that Hodges, separated from First Army staff, “might lack drive.” Ultimately, however, 

assessing the comparative merits of his major commanders, Bradley concluded that Hodges “was on 

a par with George Patton, but owing to his modesty and low profile, he has been all but forgotten.” 

(CK)

_______________________________________________

Lieutenant General George Smith Patton, Jr.

Commanding General, Third U.S. Army

Patton was born in California in 1885 to a wealthy family. Throughout his youth, he evidenced 

what appears in retrospect to have been dyslexia, which helps to account for the curious spelling 

that characterizes his memoir, War As I Knew It (1945), and that made academics extremely 

difficult for him. After attending the Virginia Military Institute for a year, he entered the U.S. 

Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1909 as a lieutenant of Cavalry. Early 
9

assignments in and around Washington, D.C., gave him an acquaintance with Secretary of War 

Henry Stimson, who was coincidentally to occupy the same post during World War II. He 

competed in the modern Pentathlon at the 1912 Oympics in Stockholm. He attended the French 

Cavalry School at Saumur, following which he became an instructor at the Mounted Service 

School at Fort Riley. There, he wrote the Army manual for the saber. In 1916, Patton convinced 

Gen. John J. Pershing to assign him as a supernumerary aide de camp for the Punitive Expedition 

into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa. Patton established a reputation for daring during the 

following months, as well as becoming well-known to the future commanding general of the 

American Expeditionary Forces in World War I.

Selected to serve on Pershing’s staff in 1917, Patton went 

to France and then obtained a transfer to the new tank 

corps, where he was one of the principal staff officers 

responsible for organization and training of the new arm. 

A temporary lieutenant colonel in command of the 304th

Tank Brigade, he participated in the St. Mihiel Offensive, 

where most of his tanks suffered mechanical failures, to 

his chagrin, and where he did most of his fighting on foot. 

In the later Meuse-Argonne Offensive, he again led tanks, 

this time as a temporary colonel. He was wounded in 

action in the latter battle and ended World War I with a 

Distinguished Service Cross, several Silver Stars and a 

number of French decorations.

In 1919, Patton commanded a brigade in the tank training 

establishment at Fort Meade, Maryland. Major Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, who had spent the war training tank 

crewmen, commanded one of his battalions. In that year 

he reverted to his permanent grade of major and returned to the horse cavalry. Over the next 

twenty years, he commanded a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry at Fort Myer, served two tours in 

Hawaii, was a staff officer in the Office of the Chief of Cavalry, graduated from the Command 

and General Staff School and then the War College. He was promoted to colonel in 1938 and 

assumed command of the 3rd Cavalry. Elderly by Gen. George Marshall’s standards in 1940, 

Patton still obtained promotion to brigadier general and a brigade command in the 2nd Armored 

Division, which he subsequently commanded with conspicuous success as major general in the 

famous Louisiana Maneuvers. Later in 1941, he formed the I Armored Corps at the Desert 

Training Center

In 1942, he commanded troops in the landings in North Africa, Operation TORCH, going ashore 

around Casablanca. After the disaster at Kasserine Pass, he assumed command of II Corps and 

led it throughout the Tunisian Campaign until April, 1943, when he took command of Seventh 

Army for the landings in Sicily in July. There, his earlier touchy relations with British 

commanders flowered and bloomed in a rivalry with Montgomery. His successes in the Sicilian 

campaign were overshadowed by the infamous slapping incident in a U.S. military hospital that 

resulted in his reassignment to a purely nominal command in the deception operation in England, 

Operation FORTITUDE.

In January of 1944, he was named to command Third Army and began organizing and training 

the force that went ashore in France on 6 July and became operational under 12th Army Group 
10

command on 1 August. In that position, he was under command of Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, 

who had been his subordinate in II Corps in Tunisia and in Seventh Army in Sicily. Their 

relationship was not always an easy one. Patton argued, unsuccessfully, for the long 

envelopment of German forces at Falaise. His subsequent operations to cross the Seine and 

exploit across France won him a reputation as America’s premier tank general.

Later appreciations of Patton’s abilities have been mixed—in part because of his enormous ego 

and volatile personality. He always sought the limelight and seemed to have no better 

understanding for operations in an Allied context than did his principal rival, Montgomery. 

Unabashedly American, Patton believed that U.S. forces could have, and should have, been 

given priority in operations in western Europe, and that this would have led to an earlier end to 

the war. One recent critique that spared no Allied general, Montgomery included, reached the 

conclusion that Patton’s reputation was overdrawn. According to that view, he did not so much 

pursue the Germans across France as simply follow them, inasmuch as his forces were not 

actually in contact much of the time. When Patton came up against a determined defense at 

Metz, he did not perform well, a fact that bolstered the argument that, particularly in the pursuit, 

he was “the best traffic cop in the history of the U.S. Army.” American opinion, and particularly 

that of the armor community, held an entirely different view and pointed to his tactical 

innovations and intuitive feel for the battlefield. 

There is no doubt, however, that his personality limited his effectiveness, and that his 

impulsiveness—as in the slapping incident—limited his opportunities. Patton’s taste for 

publicity and his rivalry with Montgomery often increased Eisenhower’s difficulties. He was no 

easy subordinate, and Bradley actually did not want him as commander of Third Army. Like 

Montgomery, however, he engendered enormous loyalty from the soldiers under his command, 

who performed brilliantly for him.

Patton was critically injured in an automobile accident near Mannheim in December of 1945 and 

died of his injuries twelve days later in Heidelberg. (CK)

_______________________________________________

Lieutenant General William Hood Simpson

Commanding General, Ninth U.S. Army

Born 19 May 1888 and raised in the north-central Texas town of Weatherford, William Hood 

Simpson developed a respect for the frontier values of hard work, determination, and a cheerful 

calmness in the face of adversity. Despite what would soon painfully emerge as extremely poor 

academic preparation, Simpson received an appointment to the US Military Academy at West 

Point in 1905. He entered the Academy that summer, joining the other members of the Class of 

1909, including a “turn-back” from the Class of 1908 – George S. Patton, Jr. Patton and another 

member of the Class of 1908, Courtney H. Hodges, had failed mathematics during Plebe year. 

Patton had been allowed to re-enter West Point with Simpson’s class; Hodges, however, was not 

allowed to re-enter and he enlisted in the Regular Army as a private.

Simpson became a popular, well-liked member of the class and was noted for his good nature if 

not for his scholarship. The 1909 yearbook describes him as “Cheerful Charlie”, and the entry 
11

includes this description of his usual demeanor: “The slow cracking of that aboriginal visage 

terminates in a beaming countenance of good will that no glumness can withstand.” This 

outstanding trait would serve him well in later years and would be remarked upon by virtually all 

who worked for him.

In January 1910, Simpson accompanied his regiment to the 

Philippines where he saw combat in the bloody, nasty, and 

confused fighting against the Moro insurgents. In 1916 

Simpson and his regiment were dispatched to the Mexican 

border to deal with Pancho Villa’s irregulars and the 

troubles caused by the turmoil of the Mexican revolution. 

From his base in El Paso, Simpson participated in General 

Pershing’s Mexican Punitive Expedition.

When the US entered World War I, Simpson had been 

assigned as aide-de-camp to Major General George Bell, 

Jr., the El Paso Military District commander. This 

fortunate assignment proved to be Simpson’s ticket to 

France – and combat duty. Unlike Eisenhower and 

Bradley, Simpson managed to get overseas and into the 

fighting when his boss, Bell, assumed command of the 33d 

Infantry Division at Camp Logan, Texas, in July 1917. 

Simpson escorted the division to Brest, France, in April 

1918.

Promoted June 1918, Major Simpson gained invaluable 

experience during his unit’s 7 months of combat, especially after assuming duties as the Division 

Operations Officer in August 1918. He added immeasurably to his knowledge of high-level staff 

procedures by serving as the division’s Chief of Staff from the Armistice in November 1918 

until he returned to the States in June 1919. After serving the final months of overseas service as 

a temporary lieutenant colonel, Simpson reverted to his permanent rank of captain on 20 June 

1920. However, the following day Simpson was promoted a permanent major, where he would 

stay for the next 14 years.

Simpson’s experiences between the wars are similar to those of most of his contemporaries and 

include a combination of staff, command, instructor, and student assignments. Simpson’s 

assignment to the Chief of Infantry’s office was a significant and positive step in his career. He 

was assigned as the battalion commander of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, in June 1925. Major 

Simpson arrived at the Army War College in Washington, D.C., in August 1927. Along with 

him reported his new War College classmate, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Simpson was selected to command the 9th Infantry Regiment at Fort Sam Houston, TX, in June 

1940. Less than 4 months later, he became a brigadier general and was transferred to Camp 

Wolters, Texas, to assume command of the Infantry Replacement Training Center. Simpson 

must have continued to demonstrate outstanding performance of duty in his several assignments 

because in October 1941 he received one of the highest complements a soldier can get – the two 

stars of a major general and command of a division. 

Simpson assumed command of the 35th Infantry Division, then forming up for its initial training 

at Camp Robinson, AR, in October 1941. Continuing to build his fine reputation as an 
12

outstanding trainer of troops, Simpson began a rapid succession of training commands. From 

October 1941 until September 1943, he commanded the 35th Division in Arkansas and 

California, then the 30th Infantry Division at Fort Jackson, SC, and finally the XII Corps, also at 

Fort Jackson. Each of these units was, for him, a training command – someone else would take 

them into combat. Simpson, however, wanted to capitalize on his combat experience from the 

Philippines, Mexico, and World War I France. In October 1943, he began a command tour that 

would eventually lead him into combat, taking charge of the Fourth Army – later to be 

redesignated the Ninth Army – and received his third star.

It is primarily Simpson’s personal nature that has prevented recognition of his army’s 

outstanding performance. Selfless and steady, Simpson placed teamwork and mission 

accomplishment above publicity and personal recognition. Had he sought the limelight, like the 

better known Patton, or had he been more colorful, it seems highly probable that Ninth Army’s 

significant accomplishments would have been more widely reported. As it was, by the time 

Simpson and the Ninth Army became operational in Europe and began to achieve significant 

successes, there seemed to be only one army commander and only one army to stir the war 

correspondents’ imagination and generate headlines – George Patton and his Third Army. 

Simpson, who seemed actively to avoid publicity, remained in the background, identified in 

reporters’ dispatches as “the Ninth Army commander” and rarely by name. This contrasts to the 

reporters’ habit of virtually always referring to Patton’s unit as “Patton’s Third Army”. To 

Simpson, such personal recognition was unnecessary.

Simpson’s operations officer credits his army commander for why the Ninth Army staff worked 

so well: 

General Simpson’s genius lay in his characteristic manner, his command presence, his 

ability to listen, his unfailing use of his staff to check things out before making decisions, 

and his way of making all hands feel that they were important to him and to the Army...I 

have never known a commander to make better use of his staff than General Simpson.

General Simpson retired from active service for reasons of health shortly after the end of the war 

and was promoted to four-star rank on the retired list in 1954. General Simpson died in 1980 at 

age 92. (Extracted from J.D. Morelock, Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the 

Battle of the Bulge, Chapter 4, NDU Press, Washington D.C., 1994)

_______________________________________________

Major General Leonard T. Gerow

Commanding General, V Corps

Born in Petersburg, Virginia, Leonard T. (Gee) Gerow was a 1911 graduate of the Virginia Military 

Institute. A good friend of Bradley and Eisenhower, he served in the Mexican Punitive Expedition 

and in France in World War I, winning the Distinguished Service Medal. Bradley and Gerow met 

in 1924 when they were classmates in the Advanced Infantry Course at Fort Benning. He graduated 

first in the class; Bradley, second. Marshall selected Gerow to head War Plans Division of the 

WDGS. “He was an outstanding gentlemen and soldier—cool, hard-working, intelligent, well 

organized, competitive—clearly destined for high rank and responsibility.”
13

In March of 1939, Gerow became chairman of the special board for the development of tactical 

doctrine at Fort Benning, and then was Chief of Staff of the Provisional 2nd Division (later 2nd

Infantry Division) at Fort Sam Houston. He remained in that position until the end of 1939. 

Gerow was a senior control officer with Third Army during the 1940 Louisiana maneuvers. 

After promotion to Colonel, he was assistant commandant of the Infantry School.

Gerow was promoted to brigadier general in October 

1940, well before Patton, Clark, Spaatz, or Eisenhower, 

and was assigned to duty with the 8th Infantry Division at 

Fort Jackson. In December of that year, he became Chief, 

War Plans Division, WDGS.

Gerow remained at War Plans until February of 1942, 

when he was promoted to major general and took 

command of the 29th Infantry Division at Fort Meade. He 

took the division to England in October 1942, and was 

subsequently appointed Commander of Field Forces, 

European Theater of Operations.

At the age of 53, Gerow took command of V Corps in 

July of 1943. At that time, he was one of the youngest 

generals to be given command of a major American 

formation. He commanded V Corps during all of its 

operations from Omaha Beach on D-Day through January of 1945. These operations included 

Normandy; the Breakout; the liberation of Paris, during which event the was the first American 

general to enter that city; the capture of Compeigne, St. Quentin, Charlesville, Sedan, Bastogne, 

and the city of Luxembourg; penetration of the Siegfried Line; the Huertgen Forest, and the 

Battle of the Bulge. Gen. Omar Bradley considered Gerow one of his most trustworthy 

subordinates.

Gerow was promoted to lieutenant general on 1 January 1945 and assumed command of the 

Fifteenth Army on 15 January. Upon his return to the United States that year, he became 

Commandant of the Command and General Staff School, where he remained until January of 

1948, when he assumed command of Second Army at Fort Meade.

Gerow retired on 31 July 1950. He was temporarily recalled to active duty in April 1951 and 

served as a member of the Army Logistical Support Panel in the Office of the Chief, Army Field 

Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia. While in retirement, Gerow was promoted on the retired list to 

the rank of general, under the Act of 19 July 1954. He died at Fort Lee, Virginia, on 12 October 

1972 and was buried in Arlington Cemetery. (CK)

_______________________________________________
14

Major General Joseph Lawton Collins

Commanding General, VII Corps

Born in New Orleans in 1896, Collins graduated from West 

Point in 1917. He did not serve in the AEF but was ordered 

to duty with the Third Army in occupation of Germany in 

May of 1919. He taught at West Point from 1921 through 

1925 and then attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning. 

From 1927 through 1931, he was an instructor at Benning. 

Promoted to major in 1932, Collins was next a student to the 

Command and General Staff School in 1933, whereupon he 

was ordered to the Philippines. He graduated from the Army 

Industrial College in 1937 and the Army War College in 

1938, serving as an instructor there until 1941. In that year, 

he was appointed as chief of staff of VII corps in Alabama.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Collins became chief of 

staff to Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commander of the 

Hawaiian Department. Promoted to temporary brigadier 

general in 1942, Collins took command of the 25th Infantry 

Division and led it in battle at Guadalcanal and New Georgia, 

establishing a reputation as an effective and vigorous combat 

commander. In March of 1944, he was ordered to England, 

where he assumed command of VII Corps for the Normandy 

landings. VII Corps landed at Utah Beach and then secured the Cotentin Peninsula and the port 

of Cherbourg in June and July. In July, VII Corps was the spearhead for the breakout at St. Lô 

and played a major part in the envelopment of German Seventh Army at Falaise.

Young, attractive, vigorous, and well –spoken, Collins was a good corps commander who 

consistently delivered results. As a consequence, he was Omar Bradley’s favorite commander 

and a particular favorite of Eisenhower’s. Hard driving and able, he had a gift for appearing at 

the correct point on the battlefield to influence events, as he demonstrated particularly at La 

Fiere, behind Utah Beach, where he orchestrated the resources of VII Corps to support a river 

crossing at a critical moment.

He was impatient with those who lacked his mental agility, however, and was quick to relieve 

officers from command, occasionally impulsively. In fact, far more division commanders were 

relieved of command in VII Corps than in any other corps in the European Theater of 

Operations. 

Collins became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1949, succeeding Bradley. He remained in the 

Army at Eisenhower’s request after that tour was over as the U.S. Representative on the Military 

Committee and Standing Group of NATO, 1953-1956. He was briefly Eisenhower’s personal 

representative to Vietnam with the rank of ambassador. He retired in 1956. Collins died in 

Washington, D.C., on 12 September 1987. (CK)

_______________________________________________
15

Major General Troy H. Middleton

Commanding General, VIII Corps

Troy H. Middleton was born in Mississippi in 1889 and 

earned the B.S. from Mississippi A & M College in 1909. 

He enlisted in the Army in 1910 and was commissioned 

into the infantry in 1912. He took part in the Punitive 

Expedition into Mexico in 1917. During World War I, he 

had combat commands in the 47th and 39th Infantry 

Regiments in the American Expeditionary Forces, taking 

part in the Aisne-Marne campaign, the St. Mihiel offensive, 

and the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He rose to the rank of 

temporary colonel by 1918 and was decorated with the 

Distinguished Service Medal for his part in the MeuseArgonne offensive. During World War I, Middleton 

commanded in combat and was awarded the Distinguished 

Service Medal for actions in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. 

Middleton then served as an instructor at the Infantry 

School at Fort Benning from 1919 through 1921. He graduated from the Command and General 

Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1924, and from the Army War College in Washington, D.C., 

in 1929. He was Professor of Military Science at Louisiana State University from 1930 to 1936. 

In 1937, he retired from the Army as a colonel to accept the post of Dean of Administration and 

later acting Vice President of that institution. 

Recalled to service in January of 1941, Middleton was assigned to the Infantry Training Center 

from 1941 through 1942, and then in March of 1942 to the 4th Motorized Division and, in April, 

to the 36th Infantry Division. He was promoted to brigadier general in June of 1942 and to major 

general in October of that year. He assumed command of the 45th Infantry Division, which he 

led through 1944. In March of that year, he took command of VIII Corps, which he commanded 

until the end of the war. 

Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, and Patton all had a high regard for Middleton's brilliant 

leadership in Operation COBRA and in subsequent battles across western Europe. His reputation 

was that he was a corps commander of extraordinary abilities. He was awarded the 

Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star during the 

war.

Retiring from the Army again, Middleton returned to LSU and, in 1950, was appointed to the 

university presidency. Middleton continued to serve the Army in numerous consultative 

capacities. He resided in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, until his death in 1976. (CK)

_______________________________________________
16

Major General Manton S. Eddy

Commanding General, XII Corps

Manton Eddy was born in 1892 in Chicago. He entered the 

Regular Army in November of 1916 and was commissioned 

in the infantry before World War I. He served with the rifle 

and machine gun units of the 4th Infantry Division in France 

and was wounded in action in August of 1918. After the war, 

he served on the Infantry Board from 1921 to 1924, and then 

was Professor of Military Science at Riverside Military 

Academy from 1925 through 1929. He graduated from 

Command and General Staff School in 1934 and remained 

there as an instructor in tactics until 1939. 

Eddy became the G2 of III Corps in 1940, a position he 

retained until assigned to command the 114th Infantry 

Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division in 1942. He was 

promoted to brigadier general in March of that year and to 

major general in August, whereupon he assumed command 

of the 9th Infantry Division. General Eddy commanded the 

9th Infantry Division in campaigns in Tunisia, Sicily, and 

Normandy. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the capture of the 

port of Cherbourg. By July of 1944, he had been chosen to command XII Corps, and was 

assigned to the newly-activated Third Army. 

Eddy had a sound, if unspectacular, record as a combat commander. Reporting on his 

achievements with the 9th Infantry Division in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy, the press 

called Eddy “the country’s most brilliant division commander.” That reputation was not 

enhanced by his physical appearance; even his greatest admirers commented that he looked like a 

Midwest school teacher. Eddy was somewhat more tentative as a Corps commander and had a 

tendency to control his divisions very closely, a trait that quickly brought him into conflict with 

the dynamic Maj. Gen. John “P” Wood, who commanded the 4th Armored Division. He seemed 

to worry too much about the other corps commanders and whether they were doing better than 

he. Too, he was not nearly as audacious as Patton, and in the advance from Avranches worried 

constantly about the Third Army’s flanks, which Patton had left to XIX Tactical Air Command 

to secure. For his part, Patton regarded Eddy as a very sound commander upon whom he could 

depend.

After the war, Eddy became Commandant of Command and General Staff College, deputy 

commander of EUCOM, and commanding general of Seventh Army. He retired as a lieutenant 

general. Aside from the DSC, Eddy received the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf 

Cluster, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, two Bronze Star Medals, the 

Air Medal, and the Purple Heart. (CK)

_______________________________________________
17

Major General Matthew B. Ridgway

Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps

Ridgway graduated from West Point in April 1917, deployed 

to the Mexican border, but was assigned to teach Spanish at 

West Point in September 1918, missing his chance to join the 

American Expeditionary Forces in France. Ridgway’s career 

was quite unusual. After teaching Spanish, he stayed on at 

West Point as executive for athletics and graduate manager of 

athletics. He then shipped out for Tientsin, China, where he 

served a tour with the 15th Infantry, arriving before George C. 

Marshall’s tour as commander ended. He then became 

executive assistant to MG Frank McCoy on a special mission 

to regularize relations between the United States and 

Nicaragua. He moved on to become a member of the 

Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation on the BolivianParaguayan border dispute. After two years in Panama he 

went to the Philippines in 1932 to serve as military advisor to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. He then 

returned to the United States, attended the Staff College and the War College, and joined the War 

Plans Division in September 1939, just as Marshall became Chief of Staff. In March 1942 he 

was promoted to brigadier general and became assistant division commander of the 82nd Infantry 

Division. Ridgway helped lead the conversion of the Division into the first U.S. airborne 

division and then became its commander. In March 1943 he took the 82nd into North Africa, and 

then to Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio.

On D-Day Ridgway jumped with the division into Normandy. In August 1944 he became 

Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, before Operation Market Garden, and James 

Gavin took command of the Division. During the Battle of the Bulge his corps headquarters 

assumed command of the 30th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division as well as the 82nd

Airborne Division.

After leading his corps to victory in Europe, Ridgway was promoted to lieutenant general and 

commanded the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, later becoming the deputy Supreme Allied 

Commander there, 1945-46. He was posted to the United Nations Military Staff Committee 

where he simultaneously served as the United States Representative and as chairman of the InterAmerican Defense Board. He commanded the Caribbean Command, 1948-49, and then served 

as Deputy Chief for Administration, Department of the Army. During the Korean War he 

commanded 8th Army, halting the Chinese counteroffensive and replacing General Douglas 

MacArthur as commander of all UN forces in Korea. He then became NATO Supreme Allied 

Commander and ended his career as Army Chief of Staff (1953-1955). Ridgway published his 

memoir, Soldier, in 1956. (Dr. Hal Nelson, BG(ret))

_______________________________________________
18

Major General Charles Hanson Corlett

Commanding General, XIX Corps

Charles H. Corlett was born in Nebraska in 1889 and was 

commissioned into the infantry from the United States 

Military Academy in 1913. During World War I, he served 

in the Signal Corps in the American Expeditionary Forces. 

He resigned from the Army in May of 1919 and became the 

manager of a cattle company until 1920, when he reentered 

the service. He was an instructor at the Coast Artillery 

School in 1925 and 1926 and at Command and General 

Staff School from 1927 through 1931. He served on the 

War Department General Staff from 1934 through 1938. 

From 1938 to 1940, he was Provost Marshal in Hawaii. In 

1940 and 1941, he commanded the 30th Infantry Regiment,

and then was chief of staff of IX Corps. Corlett was 

promoted to brigadier general in September of 1941 and to 

major general in September of 1942.

From 1942 through 1943, he was commanding general of 

Task Force Kiska, for the fighting in the Aleutian Islands. 

In 1944, he commanded 7th Infantry Division with great success in the fighting at Kwajalein 

island. In part because of his experience with amphibious operations, he was then reassigned to 

the European Theater of Operations, to assist in the landings in Normandy. Corlett assumed 

command of XIX Corps in 1944 and commanded it until 1945, when he took command of 

XXXVI Corps. During the war, he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal with 

second Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star, and the Legion of Merit.

Corlett did not find a warm reception when he arrived in England. The commanders planning 

Operation OVERLORD were frankly uninterested in using the fruits of his experience with 

amphibious operations in the Pacific. As a consequence, Corlett was sensitive about the regard 

in which he was held and did not seem to get on very well with his Army commander. Difficult 

personal relationships were not enhanced by the fact that he was ill soon after his arrival in 

Europe, evidently of serious high blood pressure. Throughout the fighting in Normandy, Corlett 

felt neglected by Bradley and Hodges and was jealous of the intimate relationship both of his 

superiors had with the VII Corps commander, Collins. Throughout the fighting in France, 

Corlett was, among the Corps commanders, the “odd man out.” (CK)

_______________________________________________
19

Major General Clarence R. Huebner

Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division

Clarence Huebner enlisted in the Army in 1910, rose 

through the ranks to Sergeant and was commissioned in 

1916. He served in most of the major World War I battles 

with the First Division—in spite of wounds—earning two 

Distinguished Service Crosses, a Distinguished Service 

Medal, and a Silver Star, and ending the War as an acting 

Lieutenant Colonel. He had commanded a company, 

battalion, and regiment of the First Division in combat.

In the small post-war Army, Huebner was an instructor at 

the Infantry School for five years and at the Command and 

General Staff College for two years. He was recognized as 

an expert student and teacher of combined arms tactics. He 

graduated from all of the relevant Army schools and was 

promoted to Colonel in 1941.

Huebner took command of the First Division in North 

Africa when higher headquarters became convinced that 

Terry Allen was losing perspective on issues beyond the Division. Huebner insisted on 

discipline and tough training, and he won the respect of the senior officers who continued with 

the Division. He led the First Division in the Sicily invasion and then brought it to England to 

train for operations in Northwest Europe. He commanded the division across Omaha beach, 

across northern France and Belgium, and into the Huertgen Forest. By mid-December he had 

been informed that he would rise to command V Corps when MG Gerow moved up to command 

an Army, but that change did not take place until 15 January 1945. He commanded V Corps 

until the end of hostilities, then served as chief of staff of U.S. Forces in Europe and acting 

commander of European Command before retiring in 1950 as a lieutenant general. (HN)

_______________________________________________

Walter M. Robertson

Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division

Walter Robertson started his Army service at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and then became a 

junior officer in the 24th Infantry Regiment with service at the Presidio of San Francisco and Ft. 

Missoula, Montana. He served in the Inspector General Directorate of the Army Expeditionary 

Forces in France and then had normal school and troop assignments after the war. 

His assignments were largely centered on Fort Sam Houston, home of the 2nd Infantry Division, 

and before he became the Division Commander in late 1941 he had commanded two of its three 

regiments (9th and 23rd) and had served as its Assistant Division Commander. He led the 

Division through the Louisiana Maneuvers, subsequent tests of the use of liaison and artillery 

spotter airplanes, and an experiment in airlifting an infantry division. He then led the Division 
20

through a change of station from Fort Sam Houston (its 

home since 1919) to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it 

spent the winter in training for winter warfare, including 

equipment tests and exercises on skis and snowshoes. These 

culminated in division-sized winter maneuvers conducted in 

northern Michigan. 

He moved the division to Northern Ireland in October 1943, 

where a lack of training areas limited training to small unit 

drills. The division staged into Southern Wales in mid-April 

1944 and came across Omaha Beach on D+1 behind the 1st

and 29th divisions as part of V Corps. Robertson led the 

Division in the fight for St. Lo, in the breakout across 

France, in the hard fighting on the German border, and on 

into the German heartland. He commanded XV Corps in 

Austria, 1945-46 and then became deputy commanding 

general, 6th Army before retiring in June 1950. (HN)

_______________________________________________

Major General Norman D. Cota

Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division

Norman D. Cota was born 30 May 1893 at Chelsea, 

Massachusetts, and graduated from the United States Military 

Academy in April, 1917. An infantryman, he was first 

assigned to training duty in the United States, and then as an 

instructor at the Military Academy, entirely missing overseas 

duty in World War I. From 1920 through 1924 he served 

principally as a finance officer. Cota graduated from the 

Army War College in 1936.

From 1938 to 1940, he taught at the Command and General 

Staff School. In November, 1940, he became executive 

officer of the 16th Infantry at Fort Jay, New York, followed in 

March of 1941 by assignment as G-2 of the 1st Infantry 

Division. In July of 1941, he became divisional G-3, a post he 

held until June of 1942. While assigned as G-3, he devised 

and carried out extensive amphibious training exercises for the 

division. He became division Chief of Staff in June of 1942, 

while the division was preparing for movement overseas.

In February 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general and 

assigned to British Combined Operations Headquarters in London. Through the spring and summer 

of 1943, he represented the US in a series of Anglo-American conferences on combined operations 
21

techniques and amphibious operations. In October of 1943, he became Assistant Division 

Commander of the 29th Infantry Division and began training that division for the landings in France.

Cota distinguished himself through personal gallantry while serving as Assistant Division 

Commander of the 29th Infantry Division during the Normandy landings, and was decorated with 

both the Distinguished Service Cross and the British Distinguished Service Order. 

A member of his Weapons Section while teaching at the Infantry School in 1930, Cota had known 

Bradley for years. For his part, Bradley considered Cota a good friend. After relieving Maj. Gen. 

Lloyd Brown from command of the 28th Infantry Division during the hedgerow fighting in France, 

Bradley assigned it to the ADC of the 9th Infantry Division, who was mortally wounded a few hours 

after taking command. His next choice, in August, was Cota, largely because of his heroism at 

Omaha Beach. In his postwar analysis, Bradley concluded that Cota led the 28th Infantry Division 

with great distinction, and that the division “soon became one of the toughest and most dependable 

in my command.”

After the war, Cota brought the division back to the United States and was assigned in 1946 as 

commanding general of the Fourth Service Command at Fort Jackson. He retired as a major general 

in June, 1946. He died on 4 October 1971. (CK)

_______________________________________________

Major General Leland Stanford Hobbs

Commanding General, 30th Infantry Division

Hobbs graduated from West Point in 1915, where he was 

noted for athletic prowess, lettering in football, basketball and 

track all four years and earning the 1915 Army Athletic Saber. 

He was commissioned in the Infantry and served with the 

Punitive Expedition to Mexico in 1916-17. Hobbs then was 

aide-de-camp to MG Arthur Murray and Brigadier George

Trent before returning to West Point as an instructor and 

coach, 1920-24. He served in a number of small unit 

assignments before attending the Command and General Staff 

College, graduating in 1934 and then graduating from the 

Army War College in 1935. He served as Chief of Staff, Third 

Army, 1937-39 and then attended the Naval War College, 

graduating in 1940. He served as Chief of Staff, Trinidad 

Sector from 1941 until the spring of 1942, when he was promoted to brigadier general and 

assigned as Assistant Division Commander, 80th Infantry Division.

In September 1942 Hobbs was promoted to major general and became Commanding General, 

30th Infantry Division. He retained command until September 1945, when he assumed command 

of III Corps for a short period before taking command of the 2nd Armor Division. He served in a 

succession of command and staff positions until January 1953, when he retired as a major 

general. He died in 1966. (HN)

_______________________________________________
22

Major General James M. Gavin

Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division

James Gavin enlisted in the Army at age 16, before finishing 

high school, but was recognized as a bright, talented young 

Soldier. He earned an “at large” appointment to West Point, 

graduating in 1929. He tried but failed to become a military 

pilot and then joined the 25th Infantry in Arizona. During the 

1930’s he served in a succession of unit-level assignments 

and attended the Command and General Staff College. He 

then served as a Tactical Officer at West Point until 1941, 

when he returned to troop duty. 

Gavin was among the first to attend jump school and by 1942 

was a colonel commanding the 505th Parachute Infantry 

Regiment. He jumped with his troops in Sicily and Salerno, 

establishing a reputation for leading from the front. He 

maintained that reputation when he jumped with lead 

elements as Assistant Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Normandy after 

being promoted to brigadier general. He was promoted to major general and became Division 

Commander on the eve of Operation Market Garden and continued in command of the Division 

until the end of the war in Europe. He was serving as acting commanding general of XVIII 

Airborne Corps in mid-December 1944 in LTG General Ridgway’s absence but led his division 

in the heavy fighting after it deployed to the north shoulder of the Bulge.

Gavin served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-51, and then returned to Europe, where he was 

Commanding General, VII Corps, 1952-54. He returned to the Pentagon to serve on the Army 

Staff, but retired in 1958 as a lieutenant general rather than have to continue to defend before 

Congress military programs he felt endangered American security. He became CEO of Arthur 

D. Little. He left private life briefly to become President Kennedy’s Ambassador to France, and 

he was never completely comfortable in the private sector, engaging in debate over Vietnam 

policies and briefly considering a run for the Presidency. As one of his classmates noted, “He 

might often march to the beat of a different drummer, but he always marched with the flag.”

Gavin published five books: On to Berlin, Airborne Warfare, War and Peace in the Space Age, 

France and the Civil War in America, and Crisis Now. (HN)

_______________________________________________

Major General Robert C. Macon

Commanding General, 83rd Infantry Division

Macon graduated from the Virginia Polytechnique Institute in 1912 and was commissioned in 

1916, serving initially with the 19th Infantry Regiment and then with the 15th Infantry Regiment 

in China (1920-22). After attending the Infantry Officer’s Course at Ft. Benning, he served as 

PMS&T at VPI for four years. He attended the two-year course at the Command and General 
23

Staff School and then spent two years in the Panama Canal Department, first as G-4, then G-3. 

He graduated from the War College in 1934 and served as an instructor at the Infantry School, 

1934-39. He then served as G-3 Plans officer for VII Corps Area until August 1940, when he 

took command of the 6th Armored Infantry while tests of the armored infantry concepts were 

being conducted. He then became G-3 of the 4th Armored Division before commanding the 7th

Infantry Regiment in the 3rd Infantry Division in North Africa. When he was promoted to

Brigadier General in 1943 he became assistant division commander of the 83rd Infantry Division 

and assumed command in January 1944. He commanded the division until the end of the war, 

then became military attaché to Moscow, 1946-48, and Deputy Commanding General Army 

Field Forces, 1949-52, until he retired. (HN)

_______________________________________________

Major General Alan W. Jones

Commanding General, 106th Infantry Division

Alan Jones attended the University of Washington, 1914-

1917, and joined the U.S. Army in the summer of 1917. He 

was commissioned in the Infantry in 1919 and did not see 

action with the American Expeditionary Forces. He served 

with the 45th Infantry in the Philippines and then served five 

years as an instructor at the Infantry School (1924-29), where 

his professionalism and tactical skills brought him to George 

Marshall’s attention.

He attended the Command and General Staff School, 1934-

36, and graduated from the Army War College in 1938. He 

then served with the 19th Infantry in Hawaii until 1941, when 

he joined the Operations and Training Division of the War 

Department General Staff for nearly a year. 

He returned to troop training in March 1942, when he was 

promoted to Brigadier General and became Assistant Division 

Commander of the 90th Infantry Division. He remained in that position until February 1943, 

when he became Commanding General, 106th Infantry Division as it was being formed. He 

commanded the Division throughout its training, equipping and exercise cycle and brought it into 

line near St. Vith on 11 December 1944. Jones was hospitalized for wounds in 1945 and retired 

in October 1945. (HN)

_______________________________________________
24

Major General Ernest N. Harmon

Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division

Ernie Harmon graduated from West Point in April 1917, 

was commissioned in the Cavalry, and began his career at 

Ft. Ethan Allen, Vermont. He deployed to France with “F” 

Troop of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the only U.S. Cavalry 

unit that saw battle action with the AEF (in the Vosges 

sector during the St. Mihiel offensive). He returned to the 

United States in 1919 and attended the Cavalry School at Ft. 

Riley before being assigned to the faculty at West Point, 

where he taught mechanical drawing, served as backfield 

coach for the football team, formed the Academy’s first 

lacrosse team, and participated in the 1924 Olympics in the 

modern Pentathlon. He then joined the 6th Cavalry 

Regiment at Ft. Oglethorpe for two years before being 

assigned as PMS&T at Norwich University (1927-31). He graduated from the two-year 

curriculum at the Command and General Staff School in 1933 and then from the Army War 

College in 1934. He commanded a squadron of the 8th Cavalry at Ft. Bliss and then was 

assigned to the War Department General Staff.

When the Armored Force began to take shape in 1939, he was the G-4 and later became its Chief 

of Staff. He was instrumental in the formation of the 2nd Armored Division and became its 

Commanding General before its deployment to North Africa. He commanded the 2nd Armored 

until the spring of 1943, when he served briefly as deputy corps commander, II Corps, during the 

crisis following the German attack at Kasserine Pass, before taking command of the 1st Armored 

Division for the remainder of the campaign in Tunisia. He commanded the 1st through Sicily and 

the early fighting in Italy before being assigned back to command the 2nd Armored Division in 

the European Theater of Operations. He commanded the division until the end of the war. He

was commanding general of the Constabulary forces in Germany, 1946-47, and then returned to 

the United States where he served as Deputy Commanding General, Army Ground Forces until 

his retirement in February 1948. He served as President of Norwich University, 1950-1965. 

(HN)

_______________________________________________

Major General Maurice Rose

Commanding General, 3rd Armored Division

Maurice Rose was killed in action while commanding his division on March 30, 1945. One of 

the best sketches of this fine leader is found in an unofficial history of the division published in 

Germany shortly after V-E Day:

“Major General Maurice Rose (1899-1945) was a soldier’s soldier. Immaculate, 

ruthless in his calculated destruction of the enemy, he was qualified by his experience, 

achievement, and character to lead the spearhead of the first Americans. General Rose 
25

came up form the ranks. He joined the U.S. Army in 1916 

as a buck private and served on the Mexican border. Upon 

graduating from the first Officer Training Course at Fort 

Riley, Kansas, in 1917, he was commissioned in the infantry 

and sent overseas with the 89th Division. In France he was 

wounded at St. Mihiel, but went back to fight through the 

entire Meuse-Argonne offensive.

“During World War II General Rose served with the 

three greatest of American Armored Divisions: in Africa 

and Italy with the 1st, “Old Ironsides”; and 2nd, “Hell on 

Wheels”; finally throughout the climactic western European 

at the head of his own 3rd Armored Division, “Spearhead”.”

That excellent sketch omits interwar service. Rose attended the 

Infantry school and served briefly on the faculty there before 

becoming a professor of Military Science and Tactics at Kansas 

State University. He served in Panama, 1932-35 and then 

attended the two year course at the Command and General Staff 

School at Ft. Leavenworth. He served as an instructor with the Pennsylvania National Guard for 

two years and the attended the Army Industrial College, graduating in 1940. He commanded a 

battalion from July 1940 until July 1941 and then became Executive Officer, First Armored 

Brigade until he became Chief of Staff of the 2nd Armored Division (1942-43), serving with that 

division through the invasion of North Africa. He was promoted to Brigadier General in June 

1943 and became Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Armored Division. He had already 

assumed command of the 3rd Armored Division when he was promoted to Major General in 

September 1944. (HN)

_______________________________________________

Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck

Commanding General, 7th Armored Division

Robert Hasbrouck graduated from West Point in 1917, and 

joined the Coast Artillery. He sailed for France with the 62nd

Coast Artillery in June 1918, and had limited duty at the Front 

before the Armistice. In 1919 Captain Hasbrouck was assigned 

to the Polish Relief Mission at Fort Zegne, Poland. When 

released from that duty he transferred to the Field Artillery, 

attended the Field Artillery School and joined its faculty. He 

later became professor of military science and tactics at 

Princeton University. He attended Command and General Staff 

College (class of 1933) and commanded the 68th Field Artillery 

(Mechanized) at Fort Knox before attending the Army War 

College (class of 1937).
26

In April 1941 Hasbrouck took command of the 22nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion in the 4th

Armored Division at Pine Camp, New York. He then served briefly with the 1st Armored 

Division at Ft. Knox before joining the 8th Armored Division in August 1942 to command a 

Combat Command. He deployed to England in August 1943 to become the chief of staff of First 

Army Group during the buildup for the liberation of France. He served on that staff as it 

transitioned into 12th Army Group, and in September 1944 took command of the 7th Armored 

Division when MG Sylvester was relieved. He continued in command of the Division until the 

end of the war and retired for disability as a major general in 1947. (HN)

_______________________________________________

Major General Elwood Richard Quesada

Commanding General, IX Tactical Air Command

Elwood Quesada was born in Washington, D.C., and 

educated in the Washington public schools and Wyoming 

Seminary Preparatory School in Pennsylvania. In 1924, he 

was a student at the University of Maryland and working as a 

lifeguard at the Tidal Basin when an Army Air Service pilot 

invited him to come to Bolling Field for a ride in an Army 

airplane. The conversation led to Quesada’s enlistment in the 

Army in 1924 and flight training at Brooks Field, the Army’s 

primary flight school in San Antonio, Texas. He graduated 

from primary flight school in February of 1925, a student of 

Lieutenant Nathan Twining, a future Air Force Chief of 

Staff. He then attended a pursuit course at Kelly Field for six 

months, where he became friends with Thomas White, 

another future Air Force Chief of Staff, and associated with 

Charles Lindberg, who was stationed at Kelly Field. Upon 

completing flight training in September of 1925, he was

commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve and 

released from active duty.

In 1927, he competed for one of a handful of Regular Army 

positions that opened in the Air Service and was selected. 

Assigned to Bolling Field in Washington, he became familiar 

with many types of aircraft, including amphibians, and became the pilot for Major General James 

E. Fechet, Chief of the Air Corps. In April of 1928, he flew Fechet to the Labrador crash site of 

the German aircraft Bremen, the first airplane to cross the Atlantic from east to west. For a year 

thereafter, he served as Fechet’s flying aide.

In January of 1929, he became part of the crew of the Question Mark, a Ford tri-motor under 

command of then-Major Carl Spaatz and then-Captain Ira C. Eaker for its record-setting 

endurance flight. Quesada served as assistant military attaché in Havana and flying officer for 

the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba from 1930 through 1932. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 

1932 and became aide to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Trubee Davison, and then chief 
27

pilot for the New York-Cleveland airmail route in 1933-1934. In that year, he had a brief tour at 

the Infantry School, where he served as George C. Marshall’s pilot and met then-Maj. Omar 

Bradley. 

Later in 1934, he served on the staff of the GHQ Air Force and, in the fall, reported to Maxwell 

Field, Alabama, to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Promoted to captain in 1935, he then 

attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. It was only when he left 

there in the spring of 1937 that Quesada got his first real operational flying assignment, when he 

became a flight commander in the 1st Bombardment Squadron at Mitchell Field, Long Island. In 

1938, he was sent to Argentina to assist in developing its air force. He was an air observer in 

London in 1939 and was assigned to the War Department General Staff in 1940 with the rank of 

major.

In July, 1941, he assumed command of the 33rd Pursuit Group at Mitchell Field and was 

promoted to lieutenant colonel in January 1942, to colonel in March, and to brigadier general in 

December, when he assumed command of the 1st Air Defense Wing.

In early 1943, he went to North Africa to command the 12th Fighter Command and served as 

deputy commander of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force. In October, 1943, he reported to 

England, where he became commander of the IX Fighter Command of the 9th (Tactical) Air 

Force. He was promoted to major general in April of 1944 and commanded the IX Tactical Air 

Command in Europe until the end of World War II.

Quesada returned to the United States in June of 1945 as assistant chief of staff for intelligence. 

In March, 1946, he commanded the Third Air Force at Tampa briefly, and then became chief of 

the Tactical Air Command. He was promoted to lieutenant general in October of 1947. He 

feuded with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, about Vandenberg’s 

decision to reduce the size and strength of Tactical Air Command, and finally retired from active 

duty in 1951.

Outspoken, occasionally to the point of rudeness, Quesada inspired either deep loyalty or total 

antagonism in his subordinates. As he matured as a commander, he increasingly won the respect 

and admiration of those who worked for him. He remained on the outside of the Air Force 

establishment because he did not subscribe to the strategic bombing doctrine that defined the 

service. His determination to make close air support work made enemies among those officers 

who were primarily concerned with gaining independence for the Air Force. Ground force 

leaders thought highly of him, as might be expected. Bradley believed Quesada had contributed 

more to winning the war than had George Patton, and placed Quesada fourth in his listing of the 

thirty most important American generals, behind only Walter Bedell Smith, Spaatz and Courtney 

Hodges. Significantly, excepting only Spaatz, Bradley rated Quesada far above any other Air 

Force general.

His decorations included: Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying 

Cross, Air Medal, Companion of the British Order of the Bath, French Legion of Honor, French 

Croix de Guerre with Palm. (CK)

_______________________________________________
28

Brigadier General Otto Paul Weyland

Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command

O.P. "Opie" Weyland was born in California in 1902 and educated in Texas. He graduated from 

Texas A & M with a BS in mechanical engineering in 1923 and with a commission in the U.S. 

Army Air Service. After flight training at Brooks and Kelly fields, he was posted to the 12th 

Observation Squadron at Fort Sam Houston. He later returned to Kelly Field as an instructor. 

Promoted to first lieutenant in June 1930, he went to Hawaii as 

commanding officer of the 4th Observation Squadron at Luke 

Field. He again served at Kelly as instructor in 1934, and in 

1935 became chief of the Observation Section, with promotion 

to captain that March. He attended both the Air Corps Tactical 

School at Maxwell Field and the Command and General Staff 

School at Fort Leavenworth In June of 9139, he went to 

Washington as assistant to the chief of Aviation Division in the 

National Guard Bureau. He was promoted to major in March 

1940 and to lieutenant colonel in December 1941, the latter 

while he was in Panama, commanding the 16th Pursuit Group 

and acting as chief of staff of the 6th Air Force. In 1942, he 

was promoted to colonel and was assigned to Washington as 

deputy director of air support at Headquarters, Army Air 

Force. 

In September of 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general, 

and was assigned in Europe in November to command the 84th

Fighter Wing. Four months later, he became commanding 

general of the XIX Tactical Air Command, supporting Third 

U.S. Army. By January 1945 Weyland had become a major 

general and finished the air war against Germany, participating 

in six major campaigns and called by Patton "the best damn general in the Air Corps". 

After the war, he served briefly as assistant commandant at Fort Leavenworth, and in June 1946 

went to Washington as assistant chief of plans at Headquarters, Army Air Force. When the Air 

Force became a separate service, he was assigned to Plans and Operations. From 1948 through 

July of 1950 he was deputy commandant of the National War College in Washington. In July 

1950 he was briefly commanding general of Tactical Air Command until going to Headquarters, 

Far Eastern Air Force in Tokyo as vice commander for operations.

In April 1951 he returned to Tactical Air Command and was promoted to lieutenant general, and 

in June went back to Tokyo as commanding general of Far Eastern Air Forces and the United 

Nations Air Forces when Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer had a heart attack. He 

commanded through ten major campaigns in the Korean war. He was promoted to four-star 

general on July 5, 1952. He stayed in Japan to help that nation reorganize its air defense forces 

and aircraft industry, and became known as the "father of the new Japanese air force." He again 

returned home, in May 1954, as commanding general of Tactical Air Command. 

Weyland was decorated with two Distinguished Service Medals, the Silver Star, the 

Distinguished Flying Cross (for personally leading a bomber formation against important 
29

Communist targets in North Korea when weather prevented fighter cover and escort), the Legion 

of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, and Air Medal, as well as awards from Great Britain (Commander, 

Order of the British Empire--for air cover of Normandy Invasion), France, Luxembourg, 

Belgium, Korea, Thailand, Philippine Islands, Japan and Brazil. He retired from the Air Force in 

July of 1959 and died in September of 1979. (CK)

_______________________________________________

British & Canadian Commanders

General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery

Commanding General, 21st Army Group

Montgomery was born in 1887 and entered Royal 

Military College, Sandhurst, in 1907, being 

commissioned into the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 

1908. He served in the First World War from 1914 

onward, and was wounded in the First Battle of Ypres, 

after which he was promoted to captain and awarded the 

Distinguished Service Order. He was Brigade Major in 

the 112th Infantry Brigade in 1915 and general staff 

officer in the 33rd Division and at IX Corps in 1917. In 

1918, he was promoted to brevet major and assigned as 

general staff officer in the 47th Division. Temporary 

promotion to lieutenant colonel followed. In 1918, he 

commanded the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, in action.

He attended Staff College at Camberley in 1920 and in 

1921 became Brigade Major in the 17th Infantry Brigade, 

followed by assignment as Brigade Major in the 8th

Infantry Brigade in 1922. In 1923, he was a general staff 

officer in the Territorial Army’s 49th Division. In 1925, he returned to his regiment to command 

A Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Warwicks. As a lieutenant colonel in 1926, he was on the 

directing staff at the Staff College at Camberley. In 1931, he commanded the 1st Battalion, 

Royal Warwicks, in Palestine and Egypt, followed in 1934 by a post as Senior Directing Staff at 

the Indian Army Staff College in Quetta and promotion to colonel. 

As war neared, Montgomery remained in command positions. In 1937, promoted to Brigadier, 

he commanded the 9th Infantry Brigade in England. In 1938, he became a major general and 

took command of the 8th Division in Palestine. In August of 1939, he returned to the U.K. and 

assumed command of the 3rd Infantry Division, which he took to France as part of the British 
30

Expeditionary Force. After returning to England in 1940, he was promoted to lieutenant general 

and took command of V Corps, followed by command of XII Corps in 1941. In August, he was 

called to Egypt to take command of Eighth Army, and was knighted in November of 1942 in 

recognition of his successes against the Afrika Korps. He was promoted to full general at the 

same time. He continued to operate in North Africa until Tunisia fell to Allied arms. He then 

led the British Eighth Army in the invasion of Sicily. In January of 1944, Montgomery took 

command of the 21st Army Group in England and began preparing for the invasion of Europe.

No one was neutral about Montgomery. He had a gift for irritating other officers—not only 

those that did not like him, but also those that did—and was often rude and nearly always 

overbearing. Evidently personally insecure, he had a mania for always being right, a trait that 

led him after the war to construct arguments about his plans for the D-Day attack on Caen that 

have since stirred immense controversy and passionate books by his detractors and defenders 

alike. 

Montgomery’s reputation as a brilliant battlefield commander stemmed from the western desert. 

In fact, however, he was a mediocre commander in an Allied setting, little understanding the 

demands of coalition warfare, as his smugness and narrowness of view testified. His frankly 

unbelievable arrogance and chronic tactlessness in dealing with Eisenhower throughout the 

campaign in western Europe underscored that failure, and very nearly led to his dismissal from 

command. By the time of the fighting in Normandy, he was not performing at his best, though 

he still believed that only he knew how to fight a battle properly. His innate caution and 

predilection for detailed preparation before a battle slowed his momentum to a plod and caused 

him to miss fleeting opportunities the rapidly changing situation offered. To be fair, the 

Commonwealth armies had been essentially tapped out on manpower since 1942, and Churchill 

had stressed to Montgomery the need to hold casualties to a minimum. Such a crucial political 

consideration obviously affected Montgomery’s willingness to take risks in battle.

Infuriating as he frequently was, there was much to admire in Montgomery, and not least his 

tactical acumen and determination to stick to his own principles. His victories in North Africa 

had made him a hero to the British people and much of the British and Commonwealth armed 

forces, and soldiers admired him, trusted him, and were willing to fight for him, no small 

consideration. He was essential to the British Empire. Winston Churchill summed Montgomery 

up by saying of him: “In defeat, unthinkable; in victory, insufferable.”

After World War II, Montgomery was showered with honors, including being made a Knight of 

the Garter and being granted a peerage as Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. From 1946 

through 1948, he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, following his mentor, Field Marshal 

Viscount Alanbrooke. As Carlo D’Este phrased it, the office went from arguably the best CIGS 

ever to a man who was equally arguably “the most undistinguished CIGS in memory.” 

Montgomery squabbled with the other service chiefs and did not get along with the politicians at 

Whitehall. He did better as Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO under Eisenhower, and 

retired in 1958. He wrote a number of books, including a fulsome memoir that justified his 

conduct of the Normandy campaign. Montgomery died in 1976 at the age of eighty-eight. (CK)

_______________________________________________
31

General Sir Miles Dempsey

Commanding General, Second British Army

Miles Dempsey was one of the original “Monty men,” having a relationship with Montgomery 

that reached back into the 1930s. Dempsey was appointed a second lieutenant in the Royal 

Berkshire Regiment in 1915 and earned a Military Cross and Mention in Dispatches in France, 

where he was also wounded in action. In the interwar years, he served in Iraq and returned to the 

United Kingdom where he attended Staff College at Camberley. There, he was one of Bernard 

L. Montgomery’s students and made a favorable impression on him that Montgomery later 

described as frank admiration. In 1940 he was a Brigadier commanding the 13th Infantry 

Brigade in France and, unlike many, came out of the Battle of France with his reputation as a 

commander intact. 

The consequence was an appointment to command of XII 

Corps in North Africa after the Battle of Alamein and the 

opportunity for further distinction in the pursuit of 

Rommel’s Afrika Korps westward to Tunisia. In fact, 

Montgomery had specifically asked for Dempsey's 

assignment to his command as soon as he took over Eighth 

Army. In 1944, Dempsey commanded Second British 

Army capably, his soldiers bearing the brunt of the battles 

around Caen. 

After VE-Day, Dempsey took command of Fourteenth 

Army from Field Marshal Slim and commanded it through 

the liberation of Malaya. He remained in that theater as 

Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Asia. 

In 1946 he was promoted to General and took over the 

Middle East Command. Dempsey retired from the Army in 

1947 and died in 1969.

Like Crerar, who commanded First Canadian Army, Dempsey had little chance to stand in the 

limelight while under Montgomery’s command. In general, he is today regarded as a highly 

competent professional soldier, but not as a tactical genius. An ardent student of military history, 

Dempsey had an unusually retentive memory and an unique skill for reading maps and extracting 

tactical information from them. As Carlo d’Este reported, “Dempsey would soon leave his army 

staff in awe over his ability to remember everything he saw on a map, to bring a landscape 

literally to life in his mind even though he had never actually seen it. This talent proved 

particularly important during the crucial battles around Caen in June and July 1944.” Many in 

the British Army regarded Dempsey as the leading expert on combined operations. Others, 

however, regarded Dempsey as simply colorless and introverted, and thought he lacked the 

ruthlessness and drive required of an Army commander. The American verdict, as enunciated by 

George Patton, was that Dempsey was just a “yes man” for Montgomery. (CK)

_______________________________________________
32

Lieutenant General Sir Neil Ritchie

Commanding General, XII Corps

Born in 1897, Neil Ritchie attended Royal Military College and was commissioned into the 

Black Watch in December, 1914. In 1915, he was wounded at Loos and, upon recuperation, 

assigned to the 2nd Battalion, Black Watch, in the Middle East. There he won both the 

Distinguished Service Order and the Military Cross. He spent most of the 1920s and 1930s on 

various staffs, and commanded the 2nd Battalion, The King’s Own Royal Regiment, in 1938.

Neil Ritchie was in many ways the image of a general officer. Personally wealthy, he also had 

an impressive personal appearance—vigorous and thorough—and a strong personality. 

Handsome and authoritative, he was good-humored in a 

slightly heavy-handed way. Correlli Barnett noted that there 

was “bovine strength about him,” but that he was bright, liked 

and trusted, absolutely honest, and straight-forward. None of 

these things made him an effective commander of Eighth 

Army in 1942, however.

Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck selected Ritchie in early 

1942 to command Eighth Army. It was an unfortunate choice, 

for while Ritchie was a brilliant staff officer, he was almost 

totally lacking in command experience. As events transpired, 

he was completely unable to fight Eighth Army effectively 

against Rommel, and Auchinleck relieved him of command in 

April of 1942.

Ritchie was the exception to the rule that a failed commander 

never got another chance in the British Army. Unusually 

fortunate, Ritchie had a patron in Field Marshal Alan Brooke, 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, having served Brooke as Brigadier General Staff in II Corps 

of the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders in 1939-1940, and in the same post when Brooke 

was General Officer Commanding Southern Command in 1940. Brooke concluded that 

Ritchie’s failure had really been the fault of Auchinleck and gave him another chance. There 

was much to argue in favor of that decision. Ritchie had really been too junior for Army 

command in 1940—he was still a major in 1937. He had been in an impossible position, lacking 

the lavish supply that Montgomery later enjoyed in that post, and did his duty as best he could, 

never losing heart or self control, and never blaming others for his own failures. In fact, 

Auchinleck had written an enthusiastic efficiency report on Ritchie after his relief, though he 

recommended the man not be given independent command. Reduced in grade to major general, 

Ritchie commanded a division in training and was then promoted back to lieutenant general in 

1944 and assigned to command XII Corps. For the balance of the war, Ritchie performed very 

successfully and was widely regarded as a very capable corps commander—as recognized by the 

conferral of the degree of Knight of the Order of the British Empire in 1944.

In 1945, he became General Officer Commanding, Scottish Command. In 1946, he was 

promoted to full General and the following year assigned as commander in chief, South East 

Asia Land Force, and awarded the degree of Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. In 
33

1949, he served as Commander of the British Army Staff in Washington, D.C. He retired in 

1951and was awarded the degree of Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire. In 1952 he 

moved to Canada to work for Mercantile and General Insurance Company of Canada. He died in 

Canada on 11th December 1983. (CK)

_______________________________________________

Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks

Commanding General, XXX Corps

Brian Horrocks was born in 1895 in India, where his father 

was an Army surgeon. He was an indifferent student and 

did not do well academically at Sandhurst, not receiving an 

appointment to a regiment until World War I began. In 

August 1914, he was commissioned in the 1st Battalion, 

Middlesex Regiment and sent to France. By the end of 

October, he had been severely wounded and taken prisoner, 

remaining in German hands until the end of the war. After 

returning to England, he was assigned to the forces serving 

in Russia in 1919, and was again taken prisoner by the 

Bolsheviks, this time for ten months.

This was an unpromising start for any officer, and his 

subsequent duty in the 1920s and 1930s did not particularly 

mark him for advancement. He did so badly on the 

examination for Staff College that he almost did not get to 

attend. He then obtained several important appointments in 

the War Office and in the coveted post of Brigade Major 

before going to Camberley to teach at the Staff College.

Horrocks took command of the 2nd Middlesex Regiment, British Expeditionary Force, in May of 

1940, serving in the 3rd Infantry Division under Montgomery, upon whom he made a strong 

favorable impression. A month later, he was a brigade commander, and in 1941 was promoted 

to Brigadier. In 1941, he became a division commander and, in August of 1942, a corps 

commander in the Western Desert under Montgomery.

He first commanded the 44th Infantry Division. In March 1942, he took command of the 9th

Armored Division where he quickly established his authority by demanding to know why so 

many of the division’s vehicles would not run. “You”, he said, “know all about mechanical 

things. As an infantryman, I don’t. However, in the infantry division I have just come from, 

almost all the vehicles are serviceable. Perhaps you would care to explain why so many of yours 

are not.” Horrocks commanded his division from a tank turret, giving orders by radio.

He was an exceptionally successful corps commander in the desert, and later commanded his 

corps at Salerno, where he was severely wounded. He recovered just in time to assume 

command of XXX Corps in August of 1944.
34

Discussions of Brian Horrocks always include superlatives, with descriptive phrases such as 

“dynamic and able” being usual. He had the personal mannerisms of a country squire, but that did 

not conceal the fact that he was probably the most able British corps commander in the second half 

of World War II. He was a popular commander, not just with British commanders and the soldiers 

they led, but also among the Americans, who admired his style and calm professional skill in the 

costly Normandy battles. Horrocks served as XXX Corps commander until the end of the war and 

then commanded the British Army of the Rhine. He was medically retired in 1949 and became a 

well-known public figure. He wrote two books about his military career. Horrocks died in January 

of 1985. (CK)

_______________________________________________
TAB F

German Command Architecture

& Order of Battle

The German Army’s better formations in

the Second World War had no superiors in the world

in two military skills particularly:

exploiting the offensive breakthrough,

and holding ground tenaciously on the defense.

 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, p129
2
3
4
5
6

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

OB-West (Commander-in-Chief, West) (von Rundstedt)

Army Group B (Model)

Fifth Panzer Army (von Manteuffel)

XLVII Panzer Korps (von Lüttwitz)

2nd Panzer Division. Experienced; reorganized after heavy losses in Normandy; had more than 

100 tanks and assault guns and many veterans still in its ranks.

9th Panzer Division. A veteran division that fought in Normandy. With attached Tiger tanks, the 

division had just over 100 tanks.

Panzer Lehr Division. Virtually destroyed in Normandy; rebuilding when committed to 

counterattack Third Army in the Saar region. No time to replace men and tanks before commitment 

in the Ardennes, but beefed up with attachments.

26th Volksgrenadier Division. Destroyed many times on the eastern front; rebuilt to a strength of 

17,000 men.

Führer Begleit Brigade. Built around a cadre of troops from Hitler's headquarters guard. 

Included a tank battalion from the Großdeutschland Panzer Division (still on the eastern front) 

and some infantry troops from that division. Strongly reinforced with assault guns, as well as 

both 88-mm and 105-mm artillery.

LXVI Korps (Lucht)

18th Volksgrenadier Division. Formed in September around a cadre from an air force field 

division, with fillers from air force and navy units. At full strength, and with two months of 

experience on the defensive.

62nd Volksgrenadier Division. Rebuilt almost from scratch from a division destroyed on the 

eastern front. Many Czech and Polish conscripts who spoke no German.

LVIII Panzer Korps (Krüger)

116th Panzer Division. A proud unit that suffered heavy losses in Normandy and the Huertgen 

Forest, but filled with good caliber replacements. Over 100 tanks and antitank and assault guns.
7

560th Volksgrenadier Division. Formed from occupation troops in Norway in summer 1944. 

Poorly trained, but troops quickly gained battle experience and had fought effectively in France.

XXXIX Panzer Korps (Decker)

167th Volksgrenadier Division. Destroyed on the eastern front, re-formed from air force ground 

troops while stationed in Hungary.

This corps took over control of other units at the end of December.

Sixth Panzer Army (Dietrich)

I SS Panzer Korps (Priess)

1st SS Panzer Division ("Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"). Among the most powerful German 

formations, it had 22,000 men. Division had a reputation for daring and ruthlessness.

3rd Parachute Division. Practically destroyed in Normandy, it was rebuilt in Holland from rear 

echelon air force ground troops. Both troops and commanders were inexperienced.

12th SS Panzer Division ("Hitler Jugend").. Rebuilt following heavy losses in Normandy and 

had around 22,000 men. Short of experienced junior officers.

12th Volksgrenadier Division. Suffered heavy losses in Russia in summer 1944. Rebuilt and 

fought well around Aachen.

277th Volksgrenadier Division. Only about 1000 veterans. A weak division.

150th Panzer Brigade. A makeshift formation quickly put together to meet the needs of the 

special missions Hitler assigned to Otto Skorzeny.

II SS Panzer Korps (Bittrich)

2nd SS Panzer Division ("Das Reich"). The division had been in heavy fighting in Russia and 

then in Normandy, but was rebuilt during the fall with better than average replacements. Had a 

reputation for brutality.

9th SS Panzer Division ("Hohenstaufen"). Rebuilt after heavy losses in Normandy and Holland. 

Few veterans, but excellent soldiers. Badly short of transport.

LXVII Korps (Hitzfeld)

3rd Panzergrenadier Division. Transferred from Italy in summer 1944. Lost heavily in fighting 

around Metz and Aachen. Refitted hurriedly, it lacked 20 percent of its troop strength and 40 

percent of its equipment.
8

246th Volksgrenadier Division. Virtually destroyed on eastern front, the rebuilt division also lost 

heavily in fall fighting around Aachen.

272nd Volksgrenadier Division. Virtually destroyed in Normandy and hastily rebuilt.

326th Volksgrenadier Division. Rebuilt following withdrawal from France with generally 

inexperienced and poorly trained troops.

Seventh Army (Brandenburger)

LIII Korps (von Rothkirch)

9th Volksgrenadier Division. Heavy losses in Romania in Fall of 1944, refitted and moved to 

Denmark for training.

15th Panzergrenadier Division. Transferred from Italy in late summer of 1944 and served as a 

"fire brigade" around Aachen and the Vosges. Not fully refitted for the Ardennes.

Führer Grenadier Brigade. Formed from troops used in the outer defenses of Hitler's 

headquarters, the brigade fought a brief, but costly, action in Russia before arriving in the Ardennes.

LXXX Korps (Beyer)

212th Volksgrenadier Division. Heavy losses on eastern front, but kept a large cadre of 

experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. Above average replacements. The best 

division in the Seventh Army.

276th Volksgrenadier Division. Formed from the shell of another division destroyed in 

Normandy. Had a number of hospital returnees, but not enough to make up for other poorly trained 

replacements and inexperienced leaders.

340th Volksgrenadier Division. Had more veterans than most, but considerably under strength 

after fighting around Aachen.

LXXXV Korps (Kniess)

5th Parachute Division. Virtually destroyed in Normandy, refitted over the fall, and had nearly 

16,000 men. Both division commander and regimental commanders inexperienced in combat.

352nd Volksgrenadier Division. Rebuilt with air force and navy replacements to a strength of 

13,000. Division poorly trained and lacked experienced officers.

79th Volksgrenadier Division. Totally destroyed in summer 1944 on the eastern front (one man 

survived). Rebuilt from men culled from rear area headquarters.
TAB G

The German Army in December 1944

Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper 
2

THE GERMAN ARMY IN DECEMBER 1944

The German Army in 1944 had long since passed the peak of its power. Yet no American or 

British soldier who had fought in North Africa or Italy would be inclined to take any part of that 

army lightly, not even the static, or coastal defense, divisions that had manned the fortifications 

along the Norman coast. According to an old British military adage, "He who has not fought the 

Germans does not know war." American troops agreed. During the breakout from the Normandy 

beachhead, Major General Raymond O. Barton, commanding the 4th Infantry Division, visited one 

of his battalions, urging it on with assurances that the German formation in front of it was only 

second rate and not much of an opponent. A young S-2 lieutenant remarked: "General, I think 

you'd better put the Germans on the distribution list. They don't seem to realize that."

An important part of the German Army's fighting capacity was its rigorous selection process for, 

and equally rigorous professional education system of, both officers and noncommissioned officers, 

and the ability of those men to transmit combat skills to their soldiers. German divisions 

demonstrated an astonishing ability to rebound in a matter of weeks from shattering casualties, as 

long as a reasonable cadre of the officers remained to train the replacements. A mere handful of 

German officers accomplished apparent miracles of training and leadership. At the beginning of 

the war, German officers comprised only 2.86 percent of the total army strength, and declined in 

relative size as the war went on. By contrast, officers were 7 percent of the total strength of the U. 

S. Army (growing to 15 percent by the Vietnam War). Unit consciousness and solidarity helped 

make the German Army an effective fighting force. German leadership capably welded individual 

soldiers into cohesive units such that the company was the primary group, whereas in the American 

Army the usual primary group was the squad or, at the largest, the platoon.

Fighting in Normandy and across France from June through September of 1944 depleted the 

German army in the west, literally destroying many divisions and seriously damaging more. From 

the equipment point of view, Field Marshal Model considered the retreat across the Seine almost as 

great a disaster as the Falaise Pocket. Only 100 to 120 of the 1,300 tanks and assault guns 

committed to the Battle of Normandy ever made it back across the Seine. The average panzer 

division in September had less than ten tanks. The Germans had lost an additional 15,000 vehicles 

of other types, with corresponding effects on tactical mobility and sustainability of forces. The 

paradox of Hitler's "stand fast" strategy in Normandy was this: he had used up his Panzer divisions 

in the hedgerows of Normandy (ideal infantry terrain), while Rommel cried for infantry. When the 

Allies reached good tank country, Model had nothing left with which to stop them except infantry, 

which was of marginal value there.

In preparation for the upcoming offensive in the Ardennes, Hitler gave orders on 2 September to 

raise twenty-five new divisions to become available between 1 October and 1 December. Those 

twenty-five and the eighteen raised in July and August were designated Volksgrenadier divisions, a 

title intended to appeal to national and military pride. Some of the divisions were assigned new 

numbers in the 500 series, but others carried numbers belonging to divisions that had been totally 

destroyed, for Hitler had on 10 August forbidden the practice of erasing such divisions from the 

army rolls.
3

The organization and equipment of the Volksgrenadier division reflected the German army 

tendency, current since 1943, to reduce manpower in combat divisions while increasing their 

firepower. Early in 1944, the army reduced the standard infantry division from about 17,000 to 

about 12,500 officers and men. The Volksgrenadier division was even smaller, at 10,000. It 

generally had three infantry regiments with two rifle battalions apiece and a smaller slice of organic 

service troops. Equipment varied with availability, but the attempt was to arm two platoons in each 

company with the 1944 model machine pistol, add more field artillery, and provide a slightly larger 

complement of antitank weapons and assault guns. The ideal of fourteen assault guns (the standard 

accompanying weapon for the German infantry in the attack) per division was seldom realized. 

About three-fourths of the divisional transportation was horse-drawn. One unit, the Füsilier

battalion, was equipped with bicycles. The Füsilier battalion customarily served as the division 

reserve, and replaced the reconnaissance battalion in the division organization. By 1944 it was 

clear that an army that customarily fought on the defensive had a diminished need for 

reconnaissance units.

In general, the personnel policy was to bring survivors of divisions destroyed on the eastern front to 

Germany, there to be used as cadres in the formation of new divisions, and finally sent to the 

western front as the veteran core of these inexperienced formations. Ranks were not as closely 

tied to position in the German Army as in the American. By 1944, division commanders were 

frequently colonels, but might as easily be lieutenant generals. Officers from captain through 

colonel commanded regiments. Generally speaking, a German Army colonel was both more senior 

and more experienced than his American counterpart.

Equipment

Generally speaking, German weapons were superior to those issued to American soldiers.

Tanks: Until 1935 in American doctrine, the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that 

accompanied the Infantry. Experiments with mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the 

Chief of Infantry in 1938 declaring that a 75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival 

armies fought the Battle of France with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had 

already experimented with the 88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm 

gun for tanks. In the spring of 1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of 

Europe, the largest gun on an operational American tank was still a short-barrelled, 

low-muzzle-velocity 75-mm, the standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. At the 

same time, Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barrelled, high-muzzle-velocity 75s, and the Tiger 

carried the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank destroyer, a fast, 

heavily-gunned, lightly-armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It mounted a 3-inch, 

high-muzzle-velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for more power to cope 

with German tanks brought the M18, with a 76-mm gun, into service in 1944. The M18 had a 

shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The M36, an M10 redesigned to 

accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. On none of these vehicles was 

the armor comparable to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, appropriately armed to be "killer 

tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the fight.
4

Infantry Anti-Tank Weapons. The American 2.36-inch rocket launcher, or "bazooka," was too 

small to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful aim against soft spots. 

This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a massive German tank loomed 

so close that he could hear the squeak of the bogies. The Germans adopted an 88-mm Panzerfaust, 

a rocket-propelled shaped-charge grenade that was about twice as powerful as the American 

bazooka. When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 505th Parachute Infantry, his men 

tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. Gavin later wrote that "As for the 82nd 

Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank weapons until it began to capture the first 

German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had truckloads of them. We also captured German 

instructions for their use, made translations, and conducted our own training with them. They were 

the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the war." The U.S. did not even initiate a project for a 

more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 1944.

Rifles. The Garand .30-caliber M1 semi-automatic was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of 

the war. No other rifle matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability.

Artillery. The U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart of the same 

caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery, however, was multiplied by the best equipment 

and techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination.

Comparative Fire Power of U.S. and German 1944-Type Infantry Divisions

(By TOE)

Category U.S. German

Strength 14,037 12,769

Rifles & carbines 11,507 9,069

Pistols 1,228 1,981

Submachine guns 295 1,503

Light MGs and automatic rifles 539 566

Heavy MGs 90 90

60-mm mortars 90 -

81-mm mortars 54 48

120-mm mortars - 28

Bazookas 558* 108**

Flame throwers - 20

U.S. .50-cal MG; German 20-mm AA gun 237 12

37-mm AT guns 13 -

57-mm AT guns 57 -

75-mm AT guns - 35

75-mm infantry howitzers - 18

105-mm howitzers 54 36

U.S. 155-mm howitzers; German 150-mm 12 18

* Also 2,131 rifle grenade launchers

**Either Panzerfausts or antitank rifles
TAB H

Biographical Sketches – Senior German 

Commanders

 “All Hitler wants me to do is cross a river, 

 capture Brussels, and then go on and take Antwerp. 

 All this in the worst time of the year through 

 the Ardennes where the snow is waist deep and 

 there isn’t room to deploy four tanks abreast 

 let alone armored divisions. 

 Where it doesn’t get light until eight and it’s dark 

 again at four and with re-formed divisions 

 made up chiefly of kids and sick old men... 

 and get the job done by Christmas!” 

 Sepp Dietrich
2

Feldmarschall Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt, OberbefehlshaberWest (Commander-in-Chief, West)

Born 12 December 1875 at Aschersleben in the Harz 

mountains and a graduate of the prestigious 

Hauptkadettenanstalt at Gross-Lichterfelde, von Rundstedt 

began active military service 22 March 1892 and earned a 

commission as lieutenant in the 83d Royal Prussian Infantry 

Regiment on 17 June 1893. After ten years of regimental 

service he passed the entrance examination for the 

Kriegsakademie in Berlin. After graduating, he was appointed 

to the Great General Staff, on which he served until 1909. He 

then served on General Staff with troops as a captain in a 

corps headquarters.

Just finishing a tour of command of an infantry company 

when war broke out in 1914, he was assigned as operations 

officer in the 22d Reserve Infantry Division, which 

participated in the great attack across France with the First 

German Army. In 1915 he was promoted to major and sent to

the eastern front as a division chief of staff. The fighting along the Narew River line in the summer 

of 1915 resulted in mobile warfare, and von Rundstedt got a taste of maneuvering troops in an 

advance that extended more than 250 miles. Before the end of the war, he had also served as a 

corps chief of staff.

He remained in the 100,000-man German army at the end of the war, commanding the 18th Infantry 

Regiment as a colonel (his first troop command since 1914). As a major general, he was chief of 

staff of a military district. Promoted to lieutenant general, he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division. 

In 1934, as general of infantry, he commanded 1st Army Group. In 1938, he led the Second Army 

in the occupation of the Sudetenland.

He resigned from the army in 1938 in protest against Hitler's policies, which he thought would lead 

to a war for which Germany was grossly unprepared. He retired as a colonel-general and was 

appointed colonel-in-chief of the 18th Infantry Regiment, a distinction he valued highly. As a field 

marshal, he customarily wore his marshal's rank insignia on the uniform of a colonel of the 18th 

Infantry Regiment. With the invasion of Poland in 1939, he accepted recall to active duty and 

commanded army groups with distinction in Poland, Belgium, and France. Hitler promoted him to 

field marshal after the fall of France in 1940. In 1941 he commanded Army Group South in 

Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of Russia. Hitler relieved him of command in Russia at the 

end of 1941, although von Rundstedt gave impaired health (he had a heart attack in early 

November) as the reason. In March 1942, he was appointed commander-in-chief, west, with 

headquarters in France. By 1944, however, Hitler had given actual command of the army groups in 

France to von Rundstedt's subordinates and himself retained command of the operational reserve. 

The old man joked that his sole military prerogative was to change the guard at his headquarters. In 

July 1944, Hitler once again relieved him, but again reappointed him C-in-C West on 5 September. 
3

His professional reputation did as much as his abilities to bring order out of the chaos of the German 

forces on the west and, aided by the Allies' supply difficulties, von Rundstedt stabilized the front. 

He remained in command through the Battle of the Bulge, which was not his plan and in which he 

had no faith, and was finally dismissed from command in March of 1945. He died in Celle on 24 

February 1953.

A soldier for more than half a century, von Rundstedt learned the lessons of World War I well and 

insisted on increasing fire support and mobility for the infantryman. He approved of tanks but did 

not envision the kind of rôle for them that such advocates as Heinz Guderian pressed for. Fluent 

enough in French to have passed the army's interpreter examination, he could also speak English. 

Stiff, formal, dedicated to his profession, he led a simple life and was indifferent to money or 

possessions. Yet he was affable to subordinates, extravagantly polite to women, smoked too much, 

and enjoyed an occasional drink.

Unlike men such as Rommel and Guderian, he preferred to command from a headquarters, rather 

than from the front line. He felt that commanders at the front risked becoming so involved in the 

local fight that they lost perspective on the entire battle (a failing to which Erwin Rommel was 

occasionally prone). He refused to become immersed in details and preferred to work from a 

1:1,000,000 map, from which he could take in the entire situation at a glance. Thus he depended 

heavily on his chief of staff, who happened to be Erich von Manstein early in the war. It was a 

particularly successful professional relationship.

Almost seventy years old in 1944, von Rundstedt was a soldier of the old school, widely admired by 

the German officer corps. Hitler disliked him intensely, partly because of the social class of officers 

he represented and partly because he knew that von Rundstedt referred to the Fuehrer in private as 

"the Corporal." By the fall of 1944, his age was showing. Many of his associates saw him for what 

Hitler intended him to be—a figurehead.

At SHAEF headquarters, it was Rundstedt "whom we always considered the ablest of the German 

generals," as Eisenhower later said. Even Bernard Montgomery, rarely given to praising other 

generals, said "I used to think that Rommel was good, but my opinion is that Rundstedt would have 

hit him for six. Rundstedt is the best German general I have come up against." 

The following quotations reveal a little about the inner man:

- On the 1944 Ardennes Counteroffensive: “If old von Moltke thought that I had 

planned the offensive he would turn over in his grave.”

- On freedom of action: “You see the guard posted outside. If I want to post him on 

the other side of the house I must first ask permission of Berchtesgaden.” (Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick 

& COL French MacLean)

_______________________________________________
4

Feldmarschall Otto Moritz Walter Model

Commanding General, Army Group B

Born 24 January 1891 in Gentheim, near Magdeburg, the son 

of a teacher, Model was not a member of the military 

aristocracy of Germany. He attended a classical gymnasium 

in Erfurt where he excelled in Greek, Latin and history. In 

1908 he became an officer cadet in the Kriegsschule, and in 

1910 he was appointed in the 52nd Infantry Regiment. He 

served on the western front between 1914 and 1916, was 

severely wounded in 1915, and attended an abbreviated 

general staff officer course in 1916. He returned to the front as 

a brigade adjutant and company commander and was again 

badly wounded. He served in various staff assignments from 

1917 through 1919 and entered the post-war Reichswehr. He 

commanded a company in the 8th Infantry Regiment between 

1925 and 1928, was a staff officer from 1928 through 1933, 

and commanded a battalion in the 2nd Infantry Regiment in 

1933-1934. As a battalion commander, his favorite saying 

was "Can't that be done faster?" In 1934 he became 

commander of the 2nd Infantry. Despite not having a 

technical background, Model found himself appointed to the technical warfare section of the War 

Ministry in 1935. He was already a strong advocate of motorization and visited the Red Army to 

study these questions. His drive contributed to considerable progress in weapons modernization. 

At the outbreak of war, he was Chief of Staff of IV Corps.

In three years of hard fighting on the eastern front, Model earned the distinction as "the Führer's 

Fireman" for his ingenuity which enabled him to salvage apparently hopeless situations. One of the 

few officers who enjoyed Hitler's complete trust, he was also appreciated by his peers. Heinz 

Guderian called him "a bold inexhaustible soldier . . . the best possible man to perform the 

fantastically difficult task of reconstructing the line in the center of the Eastern Front." In Russia he 

established a reputation as a "lion of the defense." In January 1944, at age fifty-three, he became the 

youngest field marshal in the German army.

As a lieutenant, Model earned a reputation as an ambitious and conscientious officer who was not 

afraid to speak his mind, but who formed no close fellowships with his fellow officers. That pattern 

characterized his entire career. Juniors regarded him as a hard taskmaster and peers thought of him 

as fractious. Utterly lacking tact, he freely criticized his superiors. Although he considered himself 

to be apolitical, he made the most of all of his contacts with the Nazi Party, developing an attitude 

that his fellow generals found difficult to understand. When he became an army commander he 

appointed a Waffen-SS officer as his aide-de-camp, which his fellow Army officers interpreted as 

kowtowing to the party.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein commented on Model's extraordinary and ruthless drive, as well 

as his self-assurance and determination, and particularly his personal courage. "He was always to 

be found in the most critical sector of any front he commanded," von Manstein wrote. Units he 

commanded often suffered very heavy casualties. Model often issued direct orders to the smallest 

of units and, unlike von Rundstedt, would sometimes lead them personally into action. During the 
5

battle of the Bulge, one German lieutenant met Model near St. Vith; he wrote in his diary that 

"Generalfeldmarschall Model himself directs traffic . . . a little, undistinguished-looking man with a 

monocle." 

F. W. von Mellenthin, who served under Model as a staff officer, wrote that "in purely military 

terms, he was an outstanding soldier. In addition, he was a good and capable staff officer but 

inclined to rely too much on his own judgment and knowledge without as a rule being responsive to 

advice. He was a much better tactician than he was a strategist, and defensive positions were more 

to his taste than wide-ranging offensive operations. He possessed an astounding talent for 

improvisation, and there can be no disputing the originality of his conduct of affairs." Other 

judgements were similar: " . . . he trusted no one but himself. He wanted to have every single thing 

under his own control. Lacking confidence in others, he found it difficult to delegate tasks and 

responsibilities." "His manner was rough," according to von Manteuffel, "and his methods were not 

always acceptable in the higher quarters of the German Army, but they were both to Hitler's liking."

General Hans Speidel (Rommel's chief of staff) observed that "his keen tactical eye was not 

balanced by an instinct for the possible. He thought too highly of his own ability, was erratic, and 

lacked a sense of moderation. Although he had been schooled in strategy, he could not rid his mind 

of the details of tactical leadership."

Sixteen years von Rundstedt's junior, he treated the old man with respect but ran his army group 

pretty much as he pleased. For his part, von Rundstedt was no admirer of Model, whom he once 

described as having the makings of a good sergeant major. Still the two men managed to tolerate 

one another successfully. Model was appalled when he learned that Friedrich Paulus had 

surrendered to the Russians at Stalingrad. "A field marshal," he said, "does not become a prisoner. 

Such a thing is just not possible." On 21 April 1945, he committed suicide near Düsseldorf, rather 

than surrender to American forces. (CK & FM)

_______________________________________________

General der Panzertruppen Hasso Eccard von Manteuffel 

Commanding General, 5th Panzer Army

Born in Potsdam on 14 January 1897, Manteuffel graduated from the Berlin-Lichterfelde cadet 

academy, and joined the 3d Brandenburg Hussar Regiment as a second lieutenant in 1916. He 

served on the western front as a lieutenant of infantry and was wounded during the battle of the 

Somme. In 1919, he continued fighting on Germany's eastern frontier as a member of the 

para-military Freikorps, but was then taken into the Reichswehr.

He transferred to the cavalry, commanded a squadron as a lieutenant, and then served seven years as 

a regimental adjutant. He adopted then-Major Heinz Guderian's ideas about the possibilities of 

armor. He joined the inspectorate of Armored Forces in 1934, shortly after Guderian became its 

chief of staff. In 1935 he was assigned to the 2nd Panzer Division as a squadron commander of a 

motorcycle rifle battalion. During the attack on France, he commanded the 7th Rifle Regiment of 

Rommel's 7th Panzer Division.
6

He disagreed with the attack on Russia but nonetheless 

volunteered for combat duty. He commanded an infantry 

regiment in the attack on Russia, and with particular 

distinction in the failed drive on Moscow. His army 

commander, Generaloberst Walter Model, threatened to 

court-martial him during the subsequent retreat when von 

Manteuffel called off an attack because his troops could 

hardly move in the deep snow. The division commander 

circumvented Model's intention by sending von Manteuffel 

with the advance party for the division's transfer to France. 

By 1944, von Manteuffel had commanded a division in 

North Africa and led the elite Grossdeutschland panzer 

division on the eastern front. He so impressed Hitler that 

the Führer jumped him past corps to command the 5th 

Panzer Army on the western front, under Model's overall 

command. 

General von Manteuffel was remarkably forthright in his discussions with Hitler about the 

upcoming battle. He had personally reconnoitered the American forward positions facing the Our 

River. He determined that the U.S. 28th Infantry Division's 110th Infantry pulled back its outposts 

from the river at night. He also found that the division's 112th Infantry, on the German side of the 

Our, occupied widely spaced positions. Thus von Manteuffel argued to Hitler that the artillery 

preparation should be withheld, so that his assault troops could quietly cross the river while the 

artillery fire instead hit the American positions a mile or so back, along what was known as Skyline 

Drive. Hitler agreed to this.

In general, von Manteuffel argued that a shorter artillery preparation would accomplish as much as 

a long one, while lessening the Americans' alertness. He wanted to attack well before daylight, at 

0600, rather than an 1000. Because the day was short, a 1000 attack would give him only six hours 

of light on the crucial first day of fighting. Instead, he wanted to attack aided by "artificial 

moonlight," created by bounching the light of antiaircraft searchlights off of the clouds. "How do 

you know you will have clouds?" Hitler asked. Von Manteuffel responded: "You have already 

decided there will be bad weather."

Contemporaries described von Manteuffel as personally gentlemanly and courteous. and as 

professionally intense, demanding, and energetic. His efficiency reports for combat command 

described him as "indefatigable" and "a daredevil, a bold and dashing leader." Other formal 

evaluations considered that he was "quick thinking, tactically able to take in the whole situation at a 

glance." General Hermann Balck and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, themselves exceptional 

armored commanders, described von Manstein as "an exceptional Panzer commander." Manteuffel 

was forty-seven years old in 1944, considered young for an army command. At 5 feet, 2 inches, and 

120 pounds, his physique was also not prepossessing, and he frequently suffered from migraines. 

(CK)

_______________________________________________
7

Oberstgruppenführer Joseph "Sepp" Dietrich

Commanding General, 6th Panzer Army

Dietrich was born 28 May 1892 in Bavaria and apprenticed in the hotel business. In 1911 he 

volunteered in the 4th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment and attended an NCO school in 1912. He 

went to war in 1914 with the 6th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment and was a corporal in the 10th 

Infantry in 1916-1917, being further assigned into the elite Sturm, or assault, troops in 1917.

In January 1918, Dietrich was posted to the 13th Assault Tank 

Detachment. At St. Quentin, on 21 March, he commanded a tank 

in the first tank attacks the German army ever conducted. He later 

fought in tank actions at Villers-Cotterets in July 1918. At the end 

of the war he was a highly decorated sergeant, having won both 

first and second classes of the Iron Cross and medals from Austria 

and Bavaria as well.

He was a member of the Freikorps irregular military formations 

that proliferated after the fall of the monarchy, and fought in 

Silesia in 1921. In 1928 he joined the SS and began a rapid rise 

through the ranks of that organization to command of the SS 

Wachtbataillon Berlin, later named the Leibstandarte SS Adolf 

Hitler. He was well acquainted with Hitler and saw him often 

through the 1930s. 

When war came, he led the Leibstandarte at regimental strength in 

Poland; at brigade strength in the attack on Greece; and at division strength in France and in Russia. 

Unlike his counterparts in the German army, Dietrich did not have a formal military education. His 

was the direct leadership style of the NCO. Army officers who formed a positive impression of the 

man attempted to help him improve his military education. General Baron von Fritsch, 

commander-in-chief of the German Army by 1938, helped Dietrich by lending his war-college 

notes, and also personally instructed him. At the invitation of the Army, Dietrich took part in many 

planning exercises in the late 1930s as well.

A successful division commander, Dietrich rose to corps command in Russia and finally to army 

command on the western front. By 1944, he had begun to have doubts about Hitler's quality as a 

military commander and had started to distance himself from the Führer. His chief military 

virtue was his tenacity and determination. He exemplified the self-taught noncommissioned 

officer, rough in personality and manners, in contrast to the aristocrats who dominated the 

German army. All agreed that he was a great natural fighter and front-line leader of men. In the 

Battle of the Bulge, his lack of staff training and strategic grasp were decisive shortcomings, 

because he continued to try to fight his way forward against stiff opposition instead of switching 

the main German effort behind von Manteuffel's successful advance.

Nicolaus von Below, Hitler's military adjutant, said of Dietrich: "Unpretentious, not erudite but 

equipped with common sense, he commanded everyone's respect because of his honest character." 

F. W. von Manteuffel, who observed Dietrich's leadership in Russia, wrote that he "was undeniably 

a most courageous fighting soldier," but "could never have held high command without the backing 

of well-trained staff officers from the regular army." Otto Skorzeny, himself a bold SS soldier and 
8

leader of many special operations, said of Dietrich that "He gave to the Waffen SS a style and an 

esprit de corps which may possibly be compared only with Napoleon's Imperial Guard." (CK)

_______________________________________________

General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger

Commanding General, 7th Army

Born 1892 in Augsburg, Erich Brandenberger was fifty-one 

years old during the Hürtgen Forest fighting. Brandenberger 

entered German Army in 1911 as a Field Artillery officer. 

He fought in World War I with the 6th Bavarian Field 

Artillery Regiment, where he won both the Iron Cross 2nd

and 1st Class; he was wounded during this conflict. After 

World War I, Brandenberger remained in the Reichswehr as 

a General Staff officer. During the 1939 Polish Campaign, 

he served as chief of staff for the XXIIIrd Army Corps. He 

assumed command of the 8th Panzer Division in 1941 and led 

this unit into Russia during Operation Barbarossa.

During the Russian Campaign, Brandenberger commanded 

the LIXth Army Corps (Army Group Center) at Welikye 

Luki) and the XXIXth Army Corps (Army Group South 

Ukraine) in 1943 at the Dneiper River. He was promoted to 

General of Artillery () in August 1943, then laterally 

named to General of Panzer Troops.

Brandenberger assumed command of the 7th Army in August 1944, and he assumed command of 

the19th Army (Army Group G) in March 1945. He was awarded the Knight’s Cross as CO of the 8th

Panzer Division, and received the Oak Leaves as CO of the XXIXth Army Corps. He was a prisoner 

of war from the end of the war until 1948. Erich Brandenberger died 21 June 1955 in Bonn.

Seemingly always calm and unflappable, Erich Brandenberger performed at his best during 

adversity. (FM)

_______________________________________________
TAB I

Comparative Military Officers’ Ranks

“The enemy is in a bad way...

his situation is such that he cannot stage

a major offensive operation.”

 21st Army Group Intelligence Summary,

14 December 1944

“Tomorrow, the heavies’ll start firing again.

We’ll begin the final offensive.

By the day after tomorrow, we’ll be in Liege.

In four days Antwerp will be ours.”

Comments of a German Soldier, 15 December 1944
Jargon What they do British US German

(None) (None) (None) Reichsmarschall

Five Star Command very large formations such as 

Army Groups or Expeditionary Forces

Field Marshal General of the 

Army

Generalfeldmarschall or 

Reichsführer-SS

Four Star Command Field Armies subordinate to Army 

Groups or Expeditionary Forces

General General Generaloberst or 

SS Oberstgruppenführer

Three Star Command Corps (usually three divisions) or 

serve on very high level staffs

Lieutenant 

General

Lieutenant 

General

General (der Inf, Art, etc.)

or SS Obergruppenführer

Two Star Command divisions (about 20,000 soldiers) 

or serve on very high level staffs

Major General Major General Generalleutnant or 

SS Gruppenführer

One Star Assist division commanders, command 

separate formations (smaller than divisions)

Brigadier Brigadier 

General

Generalmajor or 

SS Brigadeführer

(None) (None) SS Oberführer

Colonel Command regiments Colonel Colonel Oberst or 

SS Standartenführer

Lieutenant 

Colonel

Command battalions (three to a regiment) Lieutenant 

Colonel

Lieutenant 

Colonel

Oberstleutnant or 

SS Obersturmbannführer

Major Staff officer, executive officer of a battalion Major Major Major or

SS Sturmbannführer

Captain Command companies Captain Captain Hauptmann or

SS Hauptsturmführer

First 

Lieutenant

Staff officer, executive officer of a company Lieutenant First 

Lieutenant

Oberleutnant or

SS Obersturmführer

Second 

Lieutenant

Platoon Leader Second 

Lieutenant

Second 

Lieutenant

Leutnant or

SS Untersturmführer
TAB J

Equipment

German Tiger – La Gleize, Belgium, August 2001 

German Panther – 

Grandmenil-Manhay, Belgium, August 2001 
2

American and British Armies shared many classes of equipment and between them equipped all 

of the French and Polish forces engaged on the continent. The United States Army was far more 

lavishly equipped than the German Army, but in almost every category of weaponry, the 

Germans had superior hardware. Tanks are the best example. Until 1935 in American doctrine, 

the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that accompanied the Infantry. Experiments with 

mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the Chief of Infantry in 1938 declaring that a 

75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival armies fought the Battle of France 

with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had already experimented with the 

88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm gun for tanks. In the spring of 

1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of Europe, the largest standard gun 

on an operational American tank was still a short-barreled, low-muzzle-velocity 75-mm, the 

standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. Some models of the M4, and 

particularly the British Firefly variant, carried higher velocity weapons, notably the 76-mm gun. 

At the same time, however, Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barreled, high-muzzle-velocity 

75s, and the Tiger carried the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank 

destroyer, a fast, heavily-gunned, lightly-armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It 

mounted a 3-inch, high-muzzle-velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for 

more power to cope with German tanks brought the M18, with a 76-mm gun, into service in 

1944. The M18 had a shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The 

M36, an M10 redesigned to accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. 

On none of these vehicles was the armor comparable to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, 

appropriately armed to be "killer tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the 

fight.

Anti-tank weapons were a similar case. The American 2.36-inch rocket launcher, or "bazooka," 

lacked the power to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful aim against 

soft spots. This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a massive German 

tank loomed so close that he could hear the squeak of the bogies. The Germans adopted an 

88-mm Panzerfaust, a rocket-propelled shaped-charge grenade that was about twice as powerful 

as the American bazooka. When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 505th 

Parachute Infantry, his men tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. Gavin 

later wrote that "As for the 82nd Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank weapons 

until it began to capture the first German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had truckloads of 

them. We also captured German instructions for their use, made translations, and conducted our 

own training with them. They were the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the war." The U.S. 

did not even initiate a project for a more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 1944, and 

distribution of that weapon was not widespread even at the time of the Korean War.

In two areas, however, the United States had a distinct advantage. The Garand .30-caliber M1 

semi-automatic rifle was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of the war. No other rifle 

matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability. In artillery, too, the American 

Army had the edge. It was not that the artillery was qualitatively better than German equipment, 

although the U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart of the same 

caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery was multiplied by the best equipment and 

techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination. "I do not have to tell 

you who won the war," George Patton said in 1945. "You know our artillery did." General 

George C. Marshall agreed when he wrote that "We believe that our use of massed heavy 

artillery fire was far more effective than the German techniques," concluding that "our method of 
3

employment of these weapons has been one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns 

throughout the world."

American soldiers entered battle with uniforms not well suited to field duty, a fact that became 

even more evident in bad weather and when winter came. Overshoes or galoshes were never in 

adequate supply, and the consequence was a higher rate of non-battle casualties caused by 

frostbite and trench foot. A brief flirtation with a camouflage utility uniform was quickly ended 

when Americans discovered that the SS used a field uniform almost identical in design. 

American load-bearing equipment was little changed from the First World War. Many soldiers 

quickly rid themselves of what they saw as pointless encumbrances, among them the gas mask 

and the bayonet.

ALLIED EQUIPMENT

U.S. Army Infantry Weapons

Caliber Weight Rate of Fire Range*** Crew

M1 Carbine .30 5.5 pounds 40-50 rpm 300 m -

M1 Garand .30 9.5 pounds 30-50 rpm 460 m -

BAR .30 19.4 pounds 550 rpm** 600 m -

Thompson .45 10.5 pounds 700 rpm** 170 m -

.30 cal MG .30 33 pounds* 400-500 rpm** 1100 m 3

.50 cal M2 .50 84 pounds* 450-550 rpm** 2200 m 3

Bazooka M9 2.36-inch 16 pounds 10 300 m 2

*Weight without tripod or other mount.

**Cyclic rate of fire.

***Maximum effective range.

.30 cal Heavy Machine Gun
4

Bazooka

Rifle Grenade

Weapons, left to right: Soldier is holding a .45-cal. Thompson submachine gun M1928A1.

60mm Mortar M2; British Anti-Tank Gun; .30-cal. U.S. Rifle M1 with Bayonet M1; .30-cal. Browning light 

Machine Gun M1919A4; hand grenades; .45-cal. M1911A1 pistol; .30-cal. U.S. Rifle M1903 with grenade 

launcher M1; .30-cal. Browning Automatic Rifle M1913A2.
5

U.S. Army Mortars

Mortar Weight Rate of Fire Range Crew

60 mm M2 42 pounds 18 rpm 1800 m 3

81 mm M1 136 pounds 18 rpm 2900 m 3

4.2-inch M24 650 pounds 20 rpm 5400 m 7

60mm Mortar

81mm Mortar
6

4.2-inch Mortar (“4-Deuce”)

M-1 57mm Anti-Tank Gun

 Range 9,230 m maximum

Muzzle Velocity 2800 ft/sec

Weight 2810 pounds

Penetration 82mm of armor at 500 m

Mount towed

M-7 105mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (Priest)

Chassis M4A3 Tank

Howitzer M2A1 105mm howitzer

Range 10,980 m

Shell Weight 33 pounds

Rate of Fire 8 rpm

Crew 6

Notes Armored division artillery
7

M-2A1 105mm Towed Howitzer

Caliber 105mm 

Range 10,980 m

Shell Weight 33 pounds

Rate of Fire 8 rpm

Crew 6

Notes Infantry division artillery

M-1 155mm Howitzer

Caliber 155mm

Weight 12,000 pounds

Range 14,700 m

Shell Weight 95 pounds

Rate of Fire 2 rpm

Crew 6

Notes Infantry Division Artillery

M-1A1 155mm Gun

Caliber 155mm

Weight 30,600 pounds

Range 22,860 m

Shell Weight 95 pounds

Rate of Fire 1 rpm

Crew 6

Notes Corps artillery
8

M-2 8-inch Howitzer

Caliber 8-inch

Weight 31,700 pounds

Range 16,660 m

Shell Weight 200 pounds

Rate of Fire 1 rpm

Crew 6

Notes Corps artillery

Cromwell Tank

Weight 30.8 tons

Speed 27 mph maximum

Range 173 miles

Armament 75 mm gun

Secondary 2 x .30-cal. Machine gun

Armor 76 mm maximum in turret;

63 mm maximum in hull

Crew 5

Churchill Tank

Weight 40 tons

Speed 12.5 mph 

Range

Armament 75 mm gun

Secondary 2 x .30-cal. Machine gun

Armor 152 mm maximum

Crew 5
9

M4A1 Sherman

Combat Weight 30,300 kg

Speed 34 km/h

Range 412 km

Armament 75mm Gun M3 

90 rounds 

Secondary 2 x .30 caliber MG

1 x .50 caliber MG 

Armor Maximum 76mm

Minimum 13 mm

Crew 5

Sherman "Firefly" M4 Variant

Combat Weight 32,700 kg 

Speed 40 km/h 

Range 451 km

Armament 76.2mm ROQF 17-pounder 

Mk IV or VI with 77 rounds

Secondary 1 x .30 caliber MG

Armor Maximum 76mm

Minimum 13 mm 

Crew 5

Light Tank Stuart M5A1

Combat Weight 15,500 kg

Speed 58 km/h

Range 161 km

Armament 37mm Gun M6 

Secondary 3 x .30 caliber MG 

Armor Maximum 64mm

Minimum 10 mm

Crew 4
10

Allied Tactical Aircraft

Aircraft Maximu

m Speed

Maximum 

Range

Armament Ordnance 

Load

Service 

Ceiling

Number in 

Service

Spitfire Mk 

XIV

440 mph 850 miles 2 x 20mm 

cannon; 2 x .50-

cal. MG

500 pounds 43,000 feet 960

Typhoon 412 mph 510 miles 8 x 20mm 

cannon

2,000 

pounds or 8 

rockets

35,200 feet 3,270

P-38J

Lightning

410 mph 2,250 miles 1 x 20mm 

cannon; 4 x .50-

cal. MG

3,200 

pounds

44,000 feet 6,780

P-47D

Thunderbolt

430 mph 590 miles 6 x or 8 x .50-

cal. MG

2,500 

pounds or 

10 rockets

42,000 feet 12,560

P-51D

Mustang

440 mph 2,100 miles 6 x .50-cal. MG 2,000 

pounds or 6 

rockets

41,900 feet 7,970

Spitfire
11

P38

P47

P51
12

GERMAN EQUIPMENT

Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98

Shown w/Grenade Launcher (“Schiessbecher”)

Caliber 7.92mm

Operation bolt action rifles

Construction Mauser design; wooden stock

Magazine five round clip

Weight 9 pounds

Range 800 meters maximum

Schiessbecher

Rifle Grenade Device for the GEW98

Types of Grenades HE, AP, smoke, illumination

Firing Positions prone, kneeling, standing

Range 250 meters in horizontal fire; maximum range 400 meters. When

Used as a mortar, 25 to 75 meters.

Grenadier Load 10 HE and 5 AT grenades. 

Remarks The Germans characteristically used it as a squad mortar and anti-tank 

weapon. One grenadier per rifle squad.

Maschinenpistole 40 (MP40)

Caliber 9mm

Operation blowback operated machine pistol

Construction metal and plastic with folding stock

Magazine 32 rounds

Rate of Fire 500 rpm (cyclic) or 180 rpm (normal)
13

Maschinenpistole 44 (MP44)

Caliber 7.92mm

Magazine 35-38 round magazine

Range 600 meters maximum effective range

Remarks Issued principally to airborne units.

Maschinengewehr 42 (MG42)

Caliber 7.92mm

Rate of Fire cyclic-up to 1,400 rpm; practical-250-500 rpm, depending on the mount

Ammunition 50-round metallic-link belt

Range effective range of 2000 to 2500 yards as HMG; 600-800 yards on bipod.

Mounts Vehicle, tripod (heavy MG), bipod (light MG)

Remarks Introduced new, simple locking system and easy barrel changing method.

Maschinengewehr 34 (MG34)

Caliber 7.92mm

Rate of Fire cyclic- 900 rpm; practical- 100-120 rpm (light), 300 rpm (heavy)

Ammunition 50-round metallic-link belt or by drums

Range effective range of 2000 to 2500 yards as HMG; 600-800 yards on bipod.

Mounts Vehicle, tripod (heavy MG), bipod (light MG)

Remarks Largely replaced by the MG42 in infantry units by 1944
14

Stielhandgranate 24

Weight 1.36 pounds

Length 14 inches

Delay 5 seconds

Charge .365 pounds TNT

Eihandgranate 39

Weight 8 ounces

Delay 5 seconds

Charge 4 ounces TNT

Panzerfaust 30

Length 41 inches

Weight 11 pounds

Charge shaped charge anti-tank grenade

Range 30 meters optimum

Penetration 200 mm of armor at 30 meters

Raketenpanzerbüchse 54 (also known as the Panzerschreck)

Length 5.5 feet

Weight 20 pounds

Charge 88mm shaped charge (7 pounds)

Range 115 meters optimum

Penetration 200 mm of armor
15

Leichter Granatenwerfer 36 (50 mm Mortar)

Caliber 50mm

Weight 31 pounds

Range 570 yards

Rate of Fire 12-20 rpm

Schwerer Granatenwerfer 34 (81mm Mortar)

Caliber 81mm

Weight 124 pounds

Range 2625 yards maximum

Rate of Fire 10-12 rpm
16

Granatenwerfer 42 (120mm Mortar)

Caliber 120mm

Weight 616 pounds

Range 6600 yards maximum

Rate of Fire Rate of fire and overall fire support comparable to 105mm howitzer

Leichte Feld Haubitze 18

Caliber 10.5 cm

Weight 4320 pounds

Range 13,480 yards maximum

Ammunition HE, smoke, sabot, incendiary, illuminating

Remarks Standard divisional direct support artillery
17

Feld Haubitze 18/40

Caliber 15 cm

Weight 12,096 pounds

Range 14,630 yards maximum

Ammunition HE, AP, smoke, anti-concrete

Remarks Standard divisional general support artillery

Mörser 18 (210mm Howitzer)

Caliber 21 cm

Weight 36,740 pounds

Range 18,300 yards maximum

Ammunition HE, anti-concrete
18

Panzerabwehrkanone 40 (PAK 40)

Caliber 75 mm

Weight 3136 pounds

Range 1000 yards maximum

Ammunition AP

Remarks Penetration at maximum effective range – 102mm of armor; pictured is the 97/38 

variant with Solothurn muzzle brake

Panzerabwehrkanone 43/41C (PAK 43/41C Antitank/Antiaircraft Gun)

Caliber 88 mm

Weight 9660 pounds

Range 16,200 yards horizontal

Ammunition AP, AA

Rate of Fire 15-20 rpm

Remarks Penetration at 1500 yards – 130mm of armor
19

Nebelwerfer 41

Caliber 150mm

Weight 1,195 pounds

Range 7,330 yards maximum

Rate of Fire 6 rounds/90 seconds

Sturmgeschütz III (Stu.G. III)

Weight 26.35 tons Engine Maybach, 295

Length 22.5’ Range 124 miles (62 miles cross-country)

Height 7’ Speed 20 mph (15 mph cross-country)

Width 9’8” Crew 4

Armor Main gun 7.5 cm Stu.K.40 L/48 with 49 rounds 

Maximum 81 mm Secondary 1 x MG34

Minimum 20 mm Penetration 84mm of armor at 500 yards; 72mm of 

armor at 1000 yards

Remarks The vehicle was based on the PzKpfw. III chassis. The Stu.G.IV, also 

found in Normandy, was based on the PzKpfw. IV chassis, used the same gun and 

had a similar performance.
20

Sturmgeschütz 38t (Stu.G. 38t)

Weight 16.65 tons Engine Czech EP4, 150 hp

Length 20.7’ Range 124 miles (62 miles cross-country)

Height 6’10.5” Speed 23 mph (15 mph cross-country)

Width 8’7.5” Crew 4

Armor Main gun 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 with 41rounds 

Maximum 60 mm Secondary 1 x MG34

Minimum 10 mm Penetration 84mm of armor at 500 yards; 72mm of 

armor at 1000 yards

Remarks The vehicle was based on the Czech 38t light tank chassis.

Schwerer Panzerspähwagen 8 Rad (Sd.Kfz. 231)

Weight 8.35 tons Engine 8-cylinder, 155 hp

Length 19’1” Speed 51 mph maximum

Height 7’10” Crew 4

Width 7’3” Range 110 miles cross country, 190 miles on roads

Armor Armament 1 x 2cm KwK36; 1 MG 34 machine gun.

Maximum 15mm

Minimum 8mm

Remarks This is typical of the variety of light armored fighting vehicles and reconnaissance 

vehicles used in German armored divisions.
21

PanzerKampfwagen IV, Ausf. G

Weight 26 tons Engine Maybach, 295bhp

Length 19’4” Range 130 miles (80 miles cross-country)

Height 8’6” Speed 20 mph maximum (15 mph cross-country)

Width 9’7” Crew 5

Armor Main gun 7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 with 79 rounds

 Maximum 60 mm Secondary 2 x 7.92 mm MG34

 Minimum 20 mm

PzKpfw V, Ausf. D (Panther)

Weight 43 tons Engine Maybach, 700 bhp

Length 22’ Range 124 miles (62 miles cross-country)

Height 9’4” Speed 20 mph (15 mph cross-country)

Width 10’9” Crew 5

Armor Main gun 7.5 cm KwK 42 L/70 with 79 rounds

 Maximum 100 mm Secondary 2 x 7.92 mm MG34 or MG42 machine gun

 Minimum 16 mm
22

PzKpfw VI (Tiger)

Weight 60 tons Engine Maybach 12-cyl gasoline, 700 bhp

Length 27’ Range 121 miles

Width 12’3” Speed 24 mph (11 mph cross-country)

 Crew 5

Main Gun 88mm w/92 rounds Secondary 2 x 7.92mm MG34

Effective Range 3000m AP, 5000 m HE

Produced 1,350, July 1942 - August 1944
TAB K

The Defense of Bastogne

 Noville 
2

THE DEFENSE OF BASTOGNE

Situation: Following the German attack in the Ardennes on the morning of 16 December 1944, Lt. 

Gen. Courtney Hodges, commanding First U.S. Army, asked Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commanding 

12th Army Group, for permission to use the two airborne divisions that constituted the theater 

reserve. Agreeing with Hodges' concerns, General Dwight D. Eisenhower on 17 December 

released the 101st Airborne Division, then resting and refitting at Camp Mourmelon, France, for 

movement to Belgium. Hodges sent the 101st to VIII Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. Troy 

Middleton. VIII Corps had taken the full force of the 5th Panzer Army's attack, and on 17 

December the Germans stood within eleven miles of the crucial road and rail junction of Bastogne. 

The commander of the 101st Airborne, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was at that time in the 

United States, and his deputy, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, was in England. Command thus 

devolved on Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, the divisional artillery commander. McAuliffe 

went ahead of the division to Bastogne where he conferred with Middleton, who was preparing to 

move the corps headquarters from the city. By the slenderest of margins, the 101st reached the city 

before the advancing Germans and immediately began to construct a defense during the night of 18 

December and morning of 19 December. Understanding that the Germans needed Bastogne and 

the complex of roads radiating from it in order to continue their attack to the west, Middleton on 19 

December gave McAuliffe a single terse order: "Hold Bastogne." To achieve this, Middleton 

attached a number of units to McAuliffe's division. In addition to the 805 officers and 11,035 

enlisted men of the 101st Airborne, McAuliffe also commanded forty tanks of Combat Command 

B, 10th Armored Division; a tank destroyer battalion; two battalions of 155-mm artillery; and a 

collection of soldiers from many units -- dubbed Team SNAFU -- and available as replacements.

American Forces: Under command of Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, in acting command of 

101st Airborne Division

101st Airborne Division (Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe)

501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell)

502d Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis)

506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Col. Robert F. Sink)

327th Glider Infantry Regiment (Col. Joseph H. Harper)

321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Edward L. Carmichael)

907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Clarence F. Nelson)

377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Harry W. Elkins)

463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. John T. Cooper, Jr.)

81st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion (Lt. Col. X. B. Cox, Jr.)

326th Airborne Engineer Battalion (Lt. Col. Hugh A. Mozley)
3

Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division (Col. William L. Roberts)

3d Tank Battalion (Lt. Col. Henry T. Cherry)

20th Armored Infantry Battalion (Maj. William R. Desobry)

54th Armored Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. James O'Hara)

420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Barry D. Browne)

705th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Lt. Col. Clifford D. Templeton)

755th Field Artillery Battalion

969th Field Artillery Battalion

German Forces: XLVII Panzerkorps (General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von 

Lüttwitz)

Initial attacks:

2 Panzerdivision (Oberst Meinrad von Lauchert)

Panzer Lehr Division (Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein)

26 Volksgrenadierdivision (Oberst Heinz Kokott)

600 Pionier Battalion

15 Volkswerferbrigade

766 Volksartilleriekorps

 Reinforcing units for later attacks:

9 Panzerdivision (Generalmajor Harald von Elverfeldt)

116 Panzerdivision (Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg)

3 Panzergrenadierdivision (Generalmajor Walter Denkert)

15 Panzergrenadierdivision (Oberst Hans-Joachim Dekert)

Führer Begleit Brigade (Oberst Otto Remer)

Progress of the Defense: None of the German divisions attacking Bastogne was at full strength, 

and some were considerably depleted. Panzer Lehr had only 40 percent of its tanks, 60 percent of 

its guns, and 60 percent of its authorized strength. Because of previous battle losses, the 26th 

Volksgrenadierdivision was lacking one regiment. The 2nd Panzerdivision was at 80 percent 

strength, but one of its regiments of grenadiers was on bicycles and therefore unfit for offensive 

operations; that regiment was used only for replacements. Units that later reinforced XLVII 

Panzerkorps ranged in strength from 50 to 70 percent.

At Gen. Middleton's orders, Col. Robertson had already constituted three teams from Combat 

Command B and dispatched them to defend villages to the southeast, east, and northeast of 

Bastogne. Team Desobry pushed to Noville; Team Cherry to Longvilly, and Team O'Hara to 

Marvie. All promptly came under heavy pressure. McAuliffe organized the 101st Airborne into 

regimental task forces and distributed them to the perimeter of Bastogne. By 20 December,
4

German attacks had constricted the perimeter around Bastogne and encircled the town on the next 

day. Lacking enough strength to overwhelm the defenders, Lüttwitz sent a note to McAuliffe on 22 

December, demanding his surrender. On hearing about the demand, McAuliffe's immediate reply 

was "Aw, nuts." When discussing what sort of reply to send to the Germans, Lt. Col. Harry W. O. 

Kinnard, G3 of the 101st, suggested that McAuliffe simply repeat his earlier remark. German 

attacks continued through the day, although not well coordinated and only in company strength 

against various parts of the perimeter. 

On 23 December the weather cleared and American airpower began to play a part, parachuting vital 

supplies, including artillery ammunition, to the defenders, while fighter-bombers attacked German 

armor. Thus strengthened, American morale stiffened, and the defenders repulsed renewed attacks 

by additional units of XLVII Panzerkorps on 24 and 25 December. The day after Christmas, the 

Germans attacked again with battalion-sized infantry and armor teams, but were held off by 

American defenses arrayed in depth and by heavy artillery concentrations. At 1600 that afternoon, 

American tanks of the 4th Armored Division broke through to relieve the town. Fighting continued 

over the next two days as the Germans attempted, but with no success, to crush the corridor that 

Gen. George S. Patton's troops had opened to Bastogne. In the end, the 101st Airborne Division, 

Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division, and their attached units suffered just over 

2,000 casualties in the defense of Bastogne, while attacking German forces lost 7000 killed in 

action and more than 200 armored vehicles.

Significance of the Action: Most of the fighting in defense of Bastogne was, like elsewhere in the 

Battle of the Bulge, a series of small unit actions. The 101st Airborne had the advantage of fighting 

on interior lines of communication, so that it could rush reinforcements to any threatened part of its 

perimeter. The Germans, on the other hand, were operating on inadequate roads that made it 

difficult to concentrate force and more difficult to keep the forward units supplied. Tactical 

organization played its part as well. Organizing the defenses as teams of infantry, armor, and

artillery gave the 101st great flexibility. More important was the greater firepower that the 

defenders enjoyed. When alerted for movement to Belgium, the divisional artillery took much 

more ammunition than it normally would have planned for. Once in Bastogne, the divisional 

artillery was reinforced by a number of other battalions, so that McAuliffe could usually plan on 

using up to ten artillery battalions, although the need to conserve ammunition remained acute 

throughout the siege. The principal use of artillery was against armor. On 20 December, for 

example, seven battalions fired 2,600 rounds solely at German armor, and artillery fired both 

indirect and direct fire missions against tanks throughout the battle. Aggressive infantry patrolling 

gave good early warning of German attacks, and any tanks that penetrated the American defenses 

were destroyed after they were separated from their supporting infantry. By comparison, the 

Germans had very little artillery to support the attack and never really attempted to silence the 

American artillery through counterbattery fire.

Fortunately for the defenders, German attacks throughout the siege were piecemeal and conducted 

without great vigor. In part, this was a reflection of the fact that few senior German commanders 

really believed in the plan they were trying to carry out. In part, it was a consequence of the 

inadequate road network that slowed down the German advance and made it hard to concentrate 
5

force at the decisive moment, and then to resupply the forward units when they needed it. In part, it 

was a result of the secrecy with which Hitler had carried out his plans, since the German tactical 

commanders only knew their missions a couple of days before the attack. Thus they had inadequate 

time to conduct reconnaissance and consider both what might go wrong and how they would 

respond to it. Finally, it was also partly due to the generally lower state of training and generally 

lower morale of the German forces employed at that point in the war.

For the Americans, the successful defense of Bastogne and the link-up with elements of Third 

Army attacking from the south spelled the end of the German offensive effort in the Ardennes. 

Denied the road net of which Bastogne was the center, and delayed so long that the overall plan for 

the dash across the Meuse River and on toward Antwerp became impossible to execute, the 

German commanders finally persuaded Hitler to allow them to withdraw toward the Siegfried Line, 

salvaging what they could of the forces they had thrown into battle.

“At 1630 on December 26, 1944, one of three M4 Sherman medium tanks

of the Third Army’s 4th Armored Division breaks through and makes contact

with members of the 101st Airborne Division defending Bastogne, in a painting

by John Paul Strain.”
6

“NUTS”

At 1130 on 22 December, four Germans, a major, a captain, and two enlisted men, came up the 

road to Bastogne from Remoifosse carrying a large white flag. They were met on the road by 

T/Sgt Oswald Y. Butler and S/Sgt Carl E. Dickinson of Company F, 327th Glider Infantry, and 

PFC Ernest D. Premetz of the 327th Medical Detachment.

Premetz could speak German. The captain could speak English. He said to Butler, “We are 

parlementaires”.

The men took the Germans to the house where Lieutenant Leslie E. Smith of Weapons Platoon, 

Company F, 327th Infantry, had his command post. Leaving the two German enlisted men at the 

command post, Smith blindfolded the two officers and led them over the hill to the command 

post of Captain James F. Adams, commanding officer of Company F. Adams called 2d Battalion 

headquarters in Marvie, Battalion called Regiment in Bastogne, and the 327th Headquarters 

called the 101st Division, relaying the word that some Germans had come in with surrender 

terms. The rumor quickly spread around the front that the enemy had had enough and that a 

party had arrived to arrange a surrender. Many of the American defenders crawled out of their 

cover.

Major Alvin Jones took the terms to General McAuliffe and Lieutenant Colonel Ned D. Moore 

who was acting Chief of Staff. The paper called for the surrender of the Bastogne garrison and 

threatened complete destruction otherwise. It appealed to the “well known American humanity” 

to save the people of Bastogne from further suffering. The Americans were to have two hours in 

which to consider. The two enemy officers would have to be released by 1400 but another hour 

would pass before the Germans would resume their attack.

Colonel Harper, commanding the 327th, went with Jones to Division Headquarters. The two 

German officers were left with Captain Adams. Members of the staff were grouped around 

General McAuliffe when Harper and Jones arrived. McAuliffe asked someone what the paper 

contained and was told that it requested a surrender.

He laughed and said, “Aw, nuts!”. It really seemed funny to him at the time. He figured he was 

giving the Germans “one hell of a beating” and that all of his men knew it. The demand was all 

out of line with the existing situation.

But McAuliffe realized that some kind of reply had to be made and he sat down to think it over. 

Pencil in hand, he sat there pondering for a few minutes and then he remarked, “Well, I don’t 

know what to tell them”. He asked the staff what they thought and Colonel Kinnard, his G3, 

replied, “That first remark of yours would be hard to beat”.

General McAuliffe didn’t understand immediately what Kinnard was referring to. Kinnard 

reminded him, “You said ‘Nuts!’”. That drew applause all around. All members of the staff 
7

agreed with much enthusiasm and because of their approval McAuliffe decided to send that 

message back to the Germans.

Then he called Colonel Harper in and asked him how he would reply to the message. Harper 

thought for a minute but before he could compose anything General McAuliffe gave him the 

paper on which he had written his one-word reply and asked, “Will you see that it’s delivered?”. 

“I will deliver it myself”, answered Harper. “It will be a lot of fun.” McAuliffe told him not to 

go into the German lines.

Colonel Harper returned to the command post of Company F. The two Germans were standing 

in the wood blindfolded and under guard. Harper said, “I have the American commander’s 

reply”. The German captain asked, “Is it written or verbal?”. “It is written”, said Harper. The 

German captain translated the message. The major then asked, “Is the reply negative or 

affirmative? If it is the latter I will negotiate further.”

All this time the Germans were acting in an arrogant and patronizing manner. Colonel Harper 

was beginning to lose his temper. He said, “The reply is decidedly not affirmative!”. Then he 

added, “If you continue this foolish attack your losses will be tremendous”. The major nodded 

his head.

Harper put the two officers in the jeep and took them back to the main road where the German 

privates were waiting with the white flag. He then removed the blindfolds and said to them, 

speaking through the German captain, “If you don’t understand what ‘Nuts!’ means, in plain 

English it is the same as ‘Go to Hell!’. And I will tell you something else – if you continue to 

attack we will kill every goddamn German that tries to break into this city.”. The German major 

and captain saluted very stiffly. The captain said, “We will kill many Americans. This is war.” 

It was then 1350. “On your way, Bud”, said Colonel Harper, “and good luck to you”. The four 

Germans walked on down the road. Harper returned to the house, regretting that his tongue had 

slipped and that he had wished them good luck.
8

The Christmas Message

24 December 1944

Merry Christmas!

HEADQUARTERS, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

Office of the Division Commander

What’s merry about all this, you ask? We’re fighting – it’s cold – we aren’t home. All true, 

but what has the proud Eagle Division accomplished with its worthy comrades of the 10th Armored 

Division, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and all the rest? Just this: We have stopped cold 

everything that has been thrown at us from the North, East, South, and West. We have 

identifications from four German Panzer Divisions, two German Infantry Divisions and one German 

Parachute Division. These units, spearheading the last desperate German lunge, were headed 

straight west for key points when the Eagle Division was hurriedly ordered to stem the advance. 

How effectively this was done will be written in history; not alone in our Division’s glorious history 

but in world history. The Germans actually did surround us, their radios blared our doom. Their 

Commander demanded our surrender in the following impudent arrogance:

December 22d 1944

“To the U.S.A. Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne:

“The fortune of war is changing. This time the U.S.A. forces in and near Bastogne have been 

encircled by strong German armored units. More German armored units have crossed the river 

Ourthe near Ortheuville, have taken Marche and reached St. Hubert by passing through HompreSibret-Tillet. Libramont is in German hands.

“There is only one possibility to save the encircled U.S.A. troops from total annihilation: 

that is the honorable surrender of the encircled town. In order to think it over a term of two hours 

will be granted beginning with the presentation of this note. 

“If this proposal should be rejected one German Artillery Corps and six heavy A. A. 

Battalions are ready to annihilate the U.S.A. troops in and near Bastogne. The order for firing will 

be given immediately after this two hours’ term.

“All the serious civilian losses caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the 

well-known American humanity.

The German Commander”

The German Commander received the following reply:

22 December 1944

“To the German Commander:

N U T S !

The American Commander”

Allied Troops are counterattacking in force. We continue to hold Bastogne. By holding 

Bastogne we assure the success of the Allied Armies. We know that our Division Commander, 

General Taylor, will say: “Well Done!”

We are giving our country and our loved ones at home a worthy Christmas present and 

being privileged to take part in this gallant feat of arms are truly making for ourselves a Merry 

Christmas.

A. C. McAuliffe

Commanding
TAB L

Casualties, Medical Statistics,

& Battle Losses

 Sherman – Wibrin, Belgium, August 2001 
2

Casualties

“Some thirty-two U.S. divisions fought in the Ardennes, where the 

daily battle strength of U.S. Army forces averaged twenty-six divisions and 

610,000 men... (T)he cost of victory was staggering. The final tally for the 

Ardennes totaled 41,315 casualties in December to bring the offensive to a 

halt and an additional 39,672 casualties in January to retake lost ground. 

The SHAEF casualty estimate presented to Eisenhower in February 1945 

listed casualties for the First Army at 39,957; for the Third Army at 35,525; 

and for the British XXX Corps, which helped at the end, at 1,408... Sickness 

and cold weather also ravaged the fighting lines, with the First, Third, and 

Seventh (in Alsace) Armies having cold injury hospital admissions of more 

than 17,000 during the entire campaign. No official German losses for the 

Ardennes have been computed, but they have been estimated at between 

81,000 and 103,000.” (from “Ardennes-Alsace”, CMH Pub 72-26. Figures 

below are from Weigley, “Eisenhower’s Lieutenants”).

Category Killed Wounded Missing Total

U.S. Army, 16 Dec 44 – 2 Jan 45

(defensive phase) 4,138 20,231 16,946 41,315

U.S. Army, 3 – 28 Jan 45

(offensive phase) 6,138 27,262 6,272 39,672

U.S. Army – total 10,276 47,493 23,218 80,987

British (incl. Canadian) Army 1,408

Allied Total 82,395

German Army (estimates) 81,834 –

103,900
3
4
5
6
7
TAB M

Suggestions for Further Reading

The “Red Ball Highway” was the US response 

to keeping the rapidly advancing Allied armies 

sufficiently supplied with the “sinews of war” as 

ever-lengthening lines of communication put 

increasing strains on the over-burdened logistics system. 

Truck convoys rolled over this highway day and night, 

 moving supplies from the beachheads to the fighting front. (from Morelock, Generals of the Ardennes, NDU Press, 1994) 
2

General Histories

Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the 

Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944 – May 7, 1945. New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1997. 

This book reflects Ambrose’s two great strengths as a chronicler of front-line combat told in the 

words of the men who fought it and as Eisenhower’s biographer. The work is broader than the 

Ardennes, but Ambrose’s coverage of this campaign alternates between gripping tales of 

desperate men heroically holding on to obscure crossroads and generally perceptive accounts of 

decision making at the theater level. By leaving out the middle, however, Ambrose at times 

seems to give Eisenhower sole credit for actions that were actually taken by subordinate 

commanders. (Hal Winton)

Cole, Hugh. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, 1965.

Begin any study of the Battle of the Bulge with this book, one of the very few that offers 

professional soldiers the opportunity to study tactical operations in coherent detail. Cole discusses 

the strategic backgrounds of the battle; Hitler's rationale and operational planning for the offensive; 

troops and terrain; why commanders made the decisions they made; and the development of the 

battle in great detail and in orderly chronological and geographical sequence. The book includes 

good maps in text and a supplement of ten detailed fold-out maps at the back -- the only really 

useful maps of the battle that are in print. The author knows what he is talking about. A graduate 

of the Command and General Staff School, he served during World War II as an intelligence officer 

on Third Army staff. After the war, he was Deputy Theater Historian in Europe and thereafter 

worked at the Army's Center of Military History, where he also wrote another volume in the series, 

The Lorraine Campaign. This book is based on original documentation and interviews with 

participants and commanders at all levels. Most newer books really only sift through the 

information that older books present and do not offer original research, basic research and analysis 

that Cole and his fellow Army historians did after World War II. (Charles Kirkpatrick)

Dupuy, Ernest. St. Vith: Lion in the Way: The 106th Infantry Division in World War II. 

Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949, and subsequently reprinted.

This book, which Russell Weigley considers one of the better divisional histories, details the fate 

of the 106th Infantry Division, two regiments of which eventually surrendered in the Battle of the 

Bulge -- a battle that began for the division some six days after it arrived in Europe. (CK)
3

Dupuy, Trevor N., David L. Bongard, and Richard C. Anderson Jr. Hitler’s Last Gamble: 

The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 – January 1945. New York: Harper Collins, 1994.

The operational-level assessments in this work are at times questionable, but they are offset by its 

excellent and quite detailed tactical analyses. Succinct unit histories of engaged divisions on 

both sides, informative personality sketches of German and American division and corps 

commanders, excellent maps, and pithy summaries of major and minor engagements make this 

one of the most appealing and useful tactical studies of the Bulge in the last twenty years. (HW)

Graham, Cosmas and Albert Cowdrey. The Medical Service in the European Theater of 

Operations. Washington, D. C., CMH, 1992.

This is the official history of the medical services in the European theater. It is also one of the best 

sources available for use in staff rides devoted to operations in the Ardennes or the Huertgen. The 

hospital and evacuation crisis of late 1944 affected operations, morale, and manpower. 

Unanticipated high casualties in October and December swamped the system and required 

tremendous ingenuity to solve. The chapters about the evacuation system and the medics in retreat 

(December) and in the attack are also quite interesting and useful to a staff ride. (Scott Wheeler)

Hogan, David. Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945. 

Washington, D. C.: CMH, 2000.

Hodge’s First Army played a central role in the battles from Normandy to the Rhine. Hogan’s 

account of the operation of the First Army command post is invaluable to anyone trying to 

understand how an army headquarters functions in wartime. The maps are excellent, and the 

discussions about the various functional and special staff sections are very interesting. Hogan also 

provides good analyses of the primary staff officers who served in the First Army HQ. (SW)

Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

The ground-breaking book that finally explained the Allies' great advantage in being able to 

decipher much of the German operational radio traffic, Lewin's book gives some of the basis for 

Eisenhower's and Bradley's assurance about German intentions and their well-conceived 

countermeasures. (CK)

MacDonald, Charles. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge. New 

York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985.

A long-time colleague of Hugh Cole at the Center of Military History, and himself the author of a 

number of volumes in the official history series and an unacknowledged co-author of a number of 

books credited to other historians, MacDonald brought a different approach to his book about the 

Battle of the Bulge. In 1944, at 22 years of age, MacDonald was a rifle company commander in the 

2nd Infantry Division. He led the fight in a crucial V Corps battle in front of the towns of Krinkelt 
4

and Rocherath, a desperate battle in which he won a Silver Star and one of his soldiers a Medal of 

Honor. While his book is a careful and responsible tactical analysis of the fighting, MacDonald 

focused on two other factors that were crucial in the eventual American victory: the fighting quality 

of the individual American soldier and the character of American command and leadership at all 

levels. Because MacDonald was a gifted writer, his book is very readable. Because he fought in 

this battle, his wrote with great understanding of the conditions. Nonetheless, his analysis of the 

fighting was dispassionate and measured. A superb book about the Battle of the Bulge, A Time for 

Trumpets is the ideal companion volume to Cole's official history. While Cole analyzed the tactics 

in unmatched detail, MacDonald gives the reader a clear picture -- a soldier's picture -- of the 

intangibles of leadership and courage that made all the difference in those small unit actions. Those 

who wish more detail on the company-level battle should refer to MacDonald's classic memoir, 

Company Commander (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947, and reprinted many times 

subsequently). (CK)

This book remains the best book for staff rides focusing on the tactical and operational levels of 

War during the Battle of the Bulge. MacDonald was a company commander in the 2d Infantry 

Division and his experiences illuminate his analysis and conclusions. MacDonald sets the 

strategic and operational stage before he describes and analyzes the tactical level. The book is 

especially good in its coverage of the North Shoulder, which MacDonald argues was the critical 

sector of the battle operationally. This book gives a superb account of the tactical operations, 

especially in the first seven days of the battle. (SW)

MacLean, French. Quiet Flows the Rhine: German General Officer Casualties in World War 

Two. Winnipeg, Ont.: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996.

This is a masterful study of the German Army’s senior officer casualties in the war. There is 

nothing like it for our army since we suffered so few general officer casualties. Not surprisingly, 

most general officer deaths occurred on the Eastern Front, where most of the German generals 

served. (SW)

Mansoor, Peter. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 

1941-45. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999.

This is one of the best accounts of how the United States Army mobilized, trained, fielded, and 

commanded infantry divisions in the Second World War. Mansoor’s point is that American 

infantry divisions performed magnificently against the more experienced, and often better armed, 

German divisions in Italy, France, Belgium, and Germany. The American divisions learned from 

their mistakes and corrected a remarkable number of problems in the field. He also points out the 

numerous weaknesses in the training and personnel systems of the US Army during the war. This 

section is very good food for thought about how to mobilize a large army for an emergency such 

as World War Two. Finally, Mansoor provides excellent biographical discussions of a number of 

infantry divisions and the generals who commanded them. (SW)
5

Morelock J.D. Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge.

Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994. 

Written while Morelock was an Army Colonel on active duty, this account fills in the gaps left in 

other works by explicitly examining one commander at each echelon from theater to combat 

command. The resulting protagonists are Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, 

Omar Bradley as commander of Twelfth Army Group, William Simpson as commander of Ninth 

Army, Troy Middleton as commander of VIII Corps, Alan Jones as commander of the ill-fated 

106th Infantry Division, and Bruce Clarke as commander of Combat Command B, 7th Armored 

Division. Although one could perhaps take issue with several of these choices, the book’s real 

credibility derives from the judiciousness of Morelock’s assessments as he parcels out praise and 

blame to his subjects. (HW)

Ruppenthal, Roland. Logistical Support of the Armies. 2 Volumes. Washington, D. C.: CMH, 

1995. 

This two-volume work is the best account of the history of logistical operations in Europe in 

World War Two. The old saying that ‘professionals do logistics and amateurs do tactics’ makes 

sense when one reads these volumes. As Eisenhower’s memos to Marshall and the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff indicate, the logistical situation and requirements drove much of the strategic and 

operational thinking and decisions of the campaign. There probably would not have been a 

Huertgen Forest campaign in 1944-45 had the US Army not literally run out of supplies in 

September 1944. Ruppenthal explains why the corps’ and divisions were running on empty at 

the end of the rapid pursuit of the Germans across France, and he tells the very interesting story 

of how the logistical troops and their commanders rectified that situation in a remarkably short 

time. Alas, there is too little about coal here. (SW)

Votaw, John. Blue Spaders, The 26th Infantry Regiment, 1917-1967. Wheaton, Ill.: Cantigny 

First Division Foundation, 1996.

The First Infantry Division Museum and association published this interesting account of the 26th

Infantry in the two world wars. The Blue Spaders were in the thick of the fighting to take 

Aachen and the Stolberg Corridor. Later they helped turn the Huertgen Forest from the north. 

Finally, they destroyed the 12th SS Panzer Division in the Battle of the Bulge. Anyone in the 

First Infantry Division doing a staff ride of the Huertgen or of the Ardennes ought to use this 

book along with MacDonald’s books. (SW)

Weigley, Russell. Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 

1944-1945. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

An analysis of the fighting in Europe by one of the most respected American military historians, 

this book is probably one of the best of the critical accounts that takes into account the occasionally 

high tension that existed among Allied commanders -- particularly in times of stress, such as during 
6

the Battle of the Bulge, and particularly between Montgomery and American commanders, as 

refereed by Eisenhower. See chapters 17 and 25-30. (CK)

Although nearly two decades old, this detailed examination of Allied command relationships in 

the European Theater of Operations remains one of the standard accounts. Weigley’s assessment 

of the interplay of personalities is perceptive and his grasp of tactical and operational detail is 

remarkably sound. As in Ambrose’s work the treatment of the Ardennes campaign is set solidly 

in the context of the operations that preceded and followed it. This book also benefits from 

Weigley’s long study of the American Army’s institutional history. (HW)

Wheeler, James Scott. The Big Red One: America’s Legendary 1st Infantry Division from 

World War I to Desert Storm. Lawrence, KS, 2007.

“An exceptionally fine work of scholarship, written with a storyteller’s verve. The Big Red One 

is not just a vivid account of the nation’s most venerable division, but a compelling yarn for 

anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Army.” Rick Atkinson, author of An Army at Dawn

and In the Company of Soldiers: “A rousing battle history of the Army’s most renowned major 

combat unit and the best history to date of any of the Army’s active duty combat divisions.”

First Hand Accounts

Bradley, Omar. A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951; and Bradley, with Clay 

Blair. A General's Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

These are the memoirs of the senior American commander in the battle. Bradley's 1951 memoir, 

based on the diary kept by Chester Hansen, his aide, is as reserved as Eisenhower's writing. In the 

later book co-written by Clay Blair, Bradley was less reticent and freely vented his frustration and 

anger not only with Montgomery, but also with George Patton and with General Eisenhower. In A 

Soldier's Story, read chapter 21, "Counteroffensive." (CK)

Butcher, H. Three Years With Eisenhower. London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1946.

If you can get your hands on this book, read Part Five: Cross Channel Invasion, which includes 

material on the Battle of the Bulge. This is the diary that Butcher, naval aide de camp to 

Eisenhower, kept throughout the European war, and is occasionally quite candid. The book is easy 

to use because the heading of each page indicates the date of the entry. (CK)

Collins, J. Lawton. Lightning Joe: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1979.

VII Corps was early the designated counterattack force, although Collins had some difficulty 

marshalling divisions because the fighting tended to engulf whatever units became available. (CK)
7

Eisenhower, Dwight. Crusade in Europe. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948.

Here you can read Eisenhower's own account of why the German attack did not unduly worry him. 

Note, however, that this book (because of official secrecy) could not mention the fact that 

Eisenhower regularly got the fruits not only of the breaking of German codes, but also of the 

Japanese diplomatic code. A recently discovered fact that bears on the issue is that Hitler discussed 

his forthcoming offensive with Baron Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin. Oshima duly 

reported the conversation to Tokyo. In the process, American naval code-breakers copied and 

decrypted the message and evidently passed the information on to Eisenhower. This book was 

based on official diaries kept by his aide de camp and other members of his personal staff and is 

often more remarkable for what it does not say than for what it does. Nowhere in the book, for 

example, does his frustration with Field Marshall Sir Bernard Law Montgomery come out as it does 

in his private correspondence. This is a valuable retrospective account of the fighting as seen by the 

supreme commander. See chapter 18. (CK)

Gavin, James. On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander 1943-1946. New York: The 

Viking Press, 1978; and Matthew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin. Soldier: The Memoirs of 

Matthew B. Ridgway. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956.

These are accounts of the 82nd Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps actions during the 

Battle of the Bulge. The XVIII Corps played an important role in holding the northern shoulder of 

the Bulge, west of the Salm River. Neither Gavin nor Ridgway shrink from critical comments about 

their fellow commanders. In Gavin's book, see the chapter "The Winter War" (pp. 193-266). (CK)

Patton, George. War as I Knew It. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947.

Patton kept a full diary during the war and based this book on portions of it. See Part Two, chapter 

4, for the relief of Bastogne. Supplement this account, written very much with future evaluations of 

his generalship in mind, with selected portions of Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers 1945-45

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974). The story of how Patton's Third Army staff functioned to plan 

the relief of Bastogne is well worth studying. (CK)

Price, Frank. Troy H. Middleton: A Biography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 

1974.

Based on interviews with Middleton when he served as president of LSU, and written by an 

historian who did not have as good an understanding of military affairs as one might desire, this 

book unfortunately does not tackle the big questions: Middleton's initial dispositions; the decision 

to order 28th Infantry Division to stand fast, regardless of losses; and the loss of the 106th Infantry 

Division. Nonetheless, this is a good portrait of a corps commander highly regarded by Eisenhower 

and Bradley. See chapter 17. (CK)
8

Smith, Bedell. Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe 1944-1945. New York: Longmans, 

Green & Co., 1956.

Smith was Eisenhower's peppery chief of staff and was in a unique position to observe the 

decision-making process at SHAEF headquarters. In this book, he outlines the key decisions he 

believes Eisenhower made throughout the war. See Chapter 3. (CK)

Wilson, George. If You Survive. New York: Ivy Books, 1987.

George Wilson joined the Fourth Infantry Division in Normandy in mid June. He was greeted by 

his company commander with the promise that, if he survived the next several days of combat, he

would be promoted to first lieutenant. He survived, but was not promoted until December. Wilson’s 

account is invaluable to anyone studying the psychological aspects of war as well as to those 

interested in small unit combat and personal experiences. (SW)

Some Final Recommendations

There are many German biographies and memoirs that tell various parts of the story, but there is not 

yet a first-rate operational history. That, however, is soon to appear. Watch for the forthcoming 

publication of volume 7 in the German official history series, Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive: 

Der Krieg im Westen, im Mittelmeerraum und in Ostasien 1943-1944/1945. If you don't read 

German, the book will also be published in English translation by Oxford University Press. These 

histories, issued by the German Military History Research Office, have been widely praised by 

historians throughout the world and are likely to be the definitive word from the German side. 

(CK)
TAB N

Glossary

 “The pious Greek, when he had set up altars to all the 

 great gods by name, added one more altar, 

‘To the Unknown God’. 

 So whenever we speak and think of the great captains 

 and set up our military altars to Hannibal and 

 Napoleon and Marlborough and such-like, let us add 

 one more altar, ‘To the Unknown Leader’, that is, 

 to the good company, platoon, or section leader who 

 carries forward his men or holds his post, and often 

 falls unknown. It is these who in the end do most 

 to win wars. The British have been a free people 

 and are still a comparatively free people; and 

 though we are not, thank Heaven, a military nation, 

 this tradition of freedom gives to our junior leaders 

 in war a priceless gift of initiative. So long as this 

 initiative is not cramped by too many regulations, 

 by too much formalism, we shall, I trust, continue 

 to win our battles - sometimes in spite of our 

 higher commanders.” 

Field Marshal Lord Wavell
2

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

AAF Army Air Forces (US)

AAR After Action Report

ABC American-British Conversations (January-March 1941)

Abn Airborne

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

AD Armored Division

Adm; Admin Administrative

ADO Assistant Directorate of Organization (US)

ADSEC Advance Section, Communications Zone

AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force

AEF Allied Expeditionary Force

AF Air Force

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters

AFSC Air Force Service Command

AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle

AG Adjutant General

AGF Army Ground Forces (US)

A Gp Army Group

AIS Allied Information Service

Ammo Ammunition

AMSO Air Minister for Supply and Organization

ANCXF Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force

Anlage Appendix or Annex

Anzio Site of Anglo-American amphibious assault, January 1944, on the West 

coast of Italy

AP Armor piercing

APC Armored Personnel Carrier

Armd Armored

Arty Artillery

ASF Army Service Forces

ASP Ammunition Supply Point

ASW Anti-submarine warfare; Assistant Secretary of War

AT Antitank

ATS (Women’s) Auxiliary Territorial Service

Avgas Aviation Gasoline

Axis, The Alliance of Germany and Italy, later including Japan and other nations, 

that opposed the Allies in World War II

Bailey Bridging Military bridging designed by British engineers

Bangalore Explosive charge used for clearing barbed wire and detonating land mines

BAR Browning automatic rifle

Bazooka American shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BC Bomber Command (British)
3

BCC(L) BOLERO Combined Committee (London)

BCC(W) BOLERO Combined Committee (Washington)

Bd Board

Bde Brigade

Beachmaster Person who directed troop and equipment movements onto and off the 

beaches

BEF British Expeditionary Forces

Belgian Gates Steel gates used either as barricades or underwater beach obstacles. 

Constructed of steel angles and plates on concrete rollers. Also known as 

Element “C”

BLE Bataillon de Légion Étrangère (Foreign Legion Battalion), French

Blitzkrieg German offensive operations characterized by rapid-moving tank attacks 

supported by dive bombers, artillery, and mounted infantry

Bn Battalion

Bocage Hedgerow country in Normandy characterized by small fields bounded by 

embankments overgrown with trees and shrubs

Br Branch; British

Br COS British Chiefs of Staff Committee

BSCC BOLERO-SICKLE Combined Committee

BUCO Buildup Control Organization

CA Corps d’Armée (Army Corps), French

CAO Chief Administrative Officer

CAD Civil Affairs Division

CATOR Combined Air Transport Operations Room

Cav Cavalry

Cbl Cable

CCA, CCB, CCR Combat Command A, B, and Reserve in a US Armored Division

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff (US-British)

CCAC Combined Civil Affairs Committee

CG Commanding General

Chespaling A wood and wire matting laid on beaches wherever needed to provide 

footing for vehicles

CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff (British)

CinC Commander in Chief

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief (British usage)

Cir Circular

Classes of Supply

 I Rations

 III Fuels & lubricants such as gasoline & coal

 V Ammunition & Explosives

 II & IV All other supplies and equipment for which allowances may (Class II) or 

may not (Class IV) be established, as, for example, clothing, weapons, 

construction, and fortification materials

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding Officer
4

Co Company

CofEngrs Chief of Engineers

CofS Chief of Staff

CofT Chief of Transportation

Com Committee

Combined Involving forces of more than one nation 

Comd Command

Comdr Commander

COMZ Communications Zone – that portion of a theater of operations behind the 

Combat Zone

Conf Conference

COS Com British Chiefs of Staff Committee

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)

CP Command Post

CPS Combined Staff Planners

CWS Chemical Warfare Service

DB Division Blindée (Armored Division), French

DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff

DD Duplex Drive (land and water propulsion) and flotation system fitted on 

various vehicles – especially tanks – in amphibious landings

D-Day Exact day for the beginning of an operation 

DFL Division Français Libre (Free French (Infantry) Division)

DI Division d’Infanterie (Infantry Division), French

DIA Division d’Infanterie Algérienne (Algerian Infantry Division), French

DIA (27th) 27th Division d’Infanterie Alpine (Alpine Infantry Division), French

DIC Division d’Infanterie Coloniale (Colonial Infantry Division), French

Dieppe Raid Amphibious assault by British and Canadian troops on the coast of France 

in August 1942 – repelled with heavy losses

DIM Division d’Infanterie Marocaine (Moroccan Infantry Division), French

Dir Directive; Director

Div Division

DMM Division Marocaine de Montagne (Moroccan Mountain Division), French

DOD Department of Defense (US)

DQMG(L) Deputy Quartermaster General (Liaison) (British)

DSC Distinguished Service Cross

Dtd Dated

DUKW 2 1⁄2 ton 6x6 Amphibian Truck (“Duck” in Army slang)

Dumb Barge An unpowered barge that could be beached

Dunkerque Seaport in northern France from which British and Allied forces were 

withdrawn in a last minute escape after defenses collapsed in the face of 

German attacks, May 1940 

DZ Drop zone for paratroopers and air-dropped supplies

EACS European Allied Contact Section

Ech Echelon
5

EM Enlisted men

Eng; Engr Engineer

ETO European Theater of Operations

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, United States Army

EUCOM European Command, successor to USFET

Exec Executive; Executive Officer

Ex O Executive Officer

FA Field Artillery

FAAA First Allied Airborne Army

Falaise Gap Opening between US and British advances north and south of the town of 

Falaise (south of Caen) through which many German soldiers escaped in 

August 1944

FCNL French Committee of National Liberation

FECOMZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone

FFI Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior), the 

‘Maquis’ Resistance

Fifth column Subversive organization working in a country for an invading army

Flail Tank fitted with heavy chains on a revolving drum that beat the ground in 

front of the tank to clear mines

FLAK Antiaircraft artillery fire or gun

FO Field Order

Führungsgruppe (German) Operations Group

Führungsstab (German) Operations Staff

Funnies Special armored assault teams developed under Major General Sir Percy 

Hobart that operated unusual vehicles such as flail tanks (also “Hobart’s 

Funnies”)

FUSA First US Army

FUSAG 1st US Army Group

G-1 ACofS for personnel - the staff office responsible for personnel matters 

(US & Combined Headquarters)

G-2 ACofS for intelligence - the staff office responsible for intelligence on 

enemy operations and capabilities (US & Combined Headquarters)

G-3 ACofS for operations - the staff office responsible for plans and operations 

(US & Combined Headquarters)

G-4 ACofS for supply - The staff office responsible for logistics (US & 

Combined Headquarters)

G-5 ACofS for civil affairs - the staff office responsible for civil affairs (US 

and Combined Headquarters)

G-6 Short-lived division of SHAEF which dealt with public relations and 

psychological warfare

Gen Bd Rpt General Board Report

Gen. St. d. H. Generalstab des Heeres (General Staff of the German Army)

GFRS Ground Force Replacement System

GHQ General Headquarters
6

GO General Order

Gooseberry Harbor constructed of sunken ships used to shelter small craft

Goum A Moroccan infantry company-sized unit (made up of Goumiers)

Goumier Ethnic Berber Moroccan mountain infantryman

Gp Group

GPA General Purchasing Agent

Grand Alliance World War II coalition of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 

Union

Green Books Works in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II

Grenadier Honorific for German infantry

GTM Groupement de Tabors Marocains (Group of Moroccan Tabors). A GTM

is roughly equivalent to a regiment. It comprises 3 Tabors (1 Tabor = 1 

Battalion) & each Tabor comprises 3 Goums (1 Goum = 1 Company)

HE High Explosive

Hedgehog Portable obstacle, made of three crossed angle irons

Heeresgruppe (German) Army Group

H-Hour Exact minute for the beginning of a military operation

Hist Historical; Historian

HQ; Hq Headquarters

ID Infantry Division

Incl Inclosure

Ind Indorsement

Inf Infantry

Int; Intel Intelligence

Interdiction Cutting an enemy’s line of communication by firepower (including aerial 

bombardment) to impede enemy operations

Interv Interview

ISS Identification of Separate Shipments to Overseas Destinations

Jabo German slang for Jagdbomber (fighter-bomber)

Joint Including elements from more than one service.

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff; Leaders of all services meeting to resolve issues and 

make decisions affecting more than one service (US)

Jedburgh Team Small, specially trained teams of Allied officers and men dropped behind 

enemy lines to aid resistance groups

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

JPS Joint Staff Planners

JSM Joint Staff Mission (British mission to Washington)

Jt Joint

Kampfgruppe German equivalent of task force; combat team

KTB Kriegstagebuch (German war diary)
7

LBV Landing Barge, which was capable of carrying either supplies or vehicles 

and could be beached

LCI(L) Landing Craft, Infantry (Light)

LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized

LCT Landing Craft, Tank

LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle & Personnel

LD Line of Departure

Lend-Lease Act passed March 1941 allowing President Roosevelt to sell, transfer title 

to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of equipment to any 

country on which US defense was thought to depend

Liberty Ships Mass-produced US cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 tons which 

were designed for speedy construction early in the war and served as the 

work-horse in ocean shipping

Ln Liaison

Lobnitz pierheads Huge steel structures towed to the Normandy beaches to provide the 

unloading facilities for LCTs, LSTs and coasters in the Mulberries

Log Logistical

LSD Landing Ship, Dock

LST Landing Ship, Tank

Ltr of Instr Letter of Instructions

Luftwaffe German air force

LVT (1) Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Unarmored (Mark I) “Alligator”

M1 (Garand) US Semiautomatic infantry rifle

M4 (Sherman) US Medium Tank

M5 (Stuart) US Light Tank

M10 US Tank Destroyer with 3-inch gun

M29 “Weasel” tracked cargo carrier

Maquis Guerilla fighter in the French resistance

MG Machine gun

Midway Key naval battle between the US Pacific Fleet and Japan’s Combined 

Fleet, 4 June 1942

Mil Mission Moscow US Military Mission to Moscow

Min Minutes

(-) (Minus) Understrength, or with components detached

MOI Ministry of Information (British)

Mov & Tn Br Movements & Transportation Branch

MOVCO Movement Control

MSR Main Supply Route

MT Ship Liberty Ship converted for maximum vehicle-carrying purposes

MT80 Motor Transport gasoline, 80-octane

MTB Motor Transport Brigade

Mtg Meeting

MTS Motor Transport Service

Mulberry Artificial harbor built of sunken ships and concrete caissons, forming a 

breakwater within which floating docks were assembled
8

NAAFI Navy Army Air Force Institute (British)

NATO; NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations; North African Theater of 

Operations, US Army

Naval Gruppe West German coastal artillery located in Normandy

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

Nebelwerfer German multiple rocket projector

NOIC Naval Officer in Command

NUSA Ninth US Army

NYPOE New York Port of Embarkation

OB Order of Battle--organization and composition of a military force

Oberkommando (German) Headquarters of an army or higher military organization

OB WEST Oberbefehlshaber West (Headquarters, Commander in Chief West 

[France, Belgium, and the Netherlands]), highest German ground 

headquarters of the western front

OCofEngrs Office, Chief of Engineers

OCofT Office, Chief of Transportation

OCMH Office, Chief of Military History

OKH Obercommando des Herres (German Army High Command)

OKL Obercommando der Luftwaffe (German Air Force High Command)

OKM Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (German Navy High Command)

OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command)

OP Observation Post

OPD Operations Division, War Department

Opn Operation

OQMG Office of the Quartermaster General

ORC Organized Reserve Corps

Ord Ordnance

OSS Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency

Ost battalions Non-German volunteer troops from east-European countries

OWI Office of War Information

P&O Plans & Operations Division, War Department, successor to OPD

Panzer Armor (German)

Panzer Division German Armored Division

Panzerfaust German handheld antitank rocket launcher

Panzergrenadier German mechanized or semi-armored organization, or infantry soldiers 

within such an organization

Panzergruppe West Control headquarters for armored forces established by the Germans in 

November 1943 to control those decisive forces in any large-scale 

counterattack against Allied landings along the Channel coast

PC&R Gp Port Construction and Repair Group

Pillbox Low-roofed concrete emplacement for machine gun or antitank gun

Plng Planning

(+) (Plus) Overstrength, or with attached units
9

PLUTO From “pipeline under the ocean” – a cross-Channel underwater pipeline 

planned for bulk POL deliveries to the far shore

PMS&T Professor of Military Science & Tactics

POINTBLANK Allied long-range bombing program (Combined Bomber Offensive) from 

Britain against Germany

POL Petroleum (gasoline or diesel fuel), Oil, and Lubricants

POW Prisoner of War

POZIT US proximity fuze for artillery and antiaircraft

Prcht Parachute

PRD Public Relations Division, SHAEF

Prep Prepared; preparation

PROCO Projects for Continental Operations, as system of requisitioning supplies 

and equipment for special operations

PSO Principal Staff Officers

PWE Political Warfare Executive

PzD Panzer Division – German Armored Division

Q(L) Quartermaster (Liaison)

QM Quartermaster

RA Regular Army

RAF Royal Air Force (UK)

RAP ROUNDUP Administrative Planners

Rations--C, D, K C was a balanced meal in a can; D was a fortified chocolate bar; K was a 

box meal more nourishing and palatable than C rations

RCA Régiment de Chasseurs d’Afrique (French Regiment of African Chasseurs

(Light Cavalry))

RCP Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (French Regiment of Parachute 

Chasseurs (Airborne Infantry in this case))

RCT Regimental Combat Team

Rec Records

Rgt Regiment

Rhino ferry A barge constructed of bolted ponton units and propelled by an outboard 

motor

RI Régiment d’Infanterie (French Infantry Regiment)

RIC Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale (French Colonial Infantry Regiment)

RICM Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (French Moroccan Colonial 

Infantry Regiment – the reconnaissance regiment of the 9th DIC)

RMLE Régiment de Marche de la Légion Étrangère (French Foreign Legion)

RSAR Régiment de Spahis Algeriens de Reconnaissance (French Regiment of 

Algerian Reconnaissance Spahis)

RSM Régiment de Spahis Marocains (French Regiment of Moroccan Spahis)

RTA Régiment de Tirailleurs Algeriens (French Algerian Tirailleurs)

RTM Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains (French Moroccan Tirailleurs)

RTO Rail Transportation Officer

RTS Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (French Senegalese Tirailleurs)
10

RTT Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens (French Tunisian Tirailleurs)

S1 Personnel and administrative staff officer, or adjutant, of a brigade or 

smaller unit

S2 Intelligence staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit

S3 Operations staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit

S4 Logistics staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit

SAC Supreme Allied Commander

SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force

Second Front Invasion of Western Europe by Anglo-American forces to relieve the 

Eastern (first) Front

SFHQ Special Force Headquarters

SGS Secretary, General Staff

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

Sitrep Situation Report

SO Special Operations

SOE Special Operations Executive

Sommerfeld track A matting made of wire netting reinforced with steel, used in the same 

manner as chespaling

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SOS Services of Supply

SP Self-propelled

Spahi French colonial reconnaissance soldier

SPOBS Special Observer Group

SS Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard) Nazi unit originally created to serve as Hitler’s 

bodyguard; later expanded to oversee intelligence and security and to 

provide large combat organizations (Waffen-SS) that fought alongside 

German Army formations

Stf Staff

SUP Single Unit Pack, a method of crating vehicles

Svc Service

T Towed

Tabor Moroccan battalion-sized unit, comprising company-sized Goums, French

Tac Tactical

TAC Tactical Air Command

Tactical Air Force Generic name for the Allied ground support air forces and air commands

T/BA Tables of Basic Allowance

TC Transportation Corps

TCC Troop Carrier Command

TD Tank Destroyer

T/E Tables of Equipment

Tel Telegram; teletype

Teller Mine German land mine

Tetrahedra Pyramid-shaped obstacles made of angle iron
11

TF Task Force

Tirailleur Literally, ‘sharpshooter’, French colonial infantryman

TIS Theater Intelligence Section

TO&E; T/O&E Tables of Organization & Equipment

Todt Organization German organization for military construction (e.g. the Atlantic Wall and 

West Wall defensive lines)

TOT Time On Target; a method of timing artillery fire from various points to 

fall on a given target simultaneously

TUP Twin Unit Pack, a method of crating vehicles

TURCO Turn-Round Control

TUSA Third US Army

TWX Teletype message

U-boat German submarine

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

USAAFUK US Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom

USAFBI US Army Forces in the British Isles

USANIF US Army Northern Ireland Force

USFET US Forces in the European Theater, successor command to ETOUSA

USSBS US Strategic Bombing Survey

USSTAF US Strategic Air Forces

VGD German Volksgrenadier Division

VT US proximity (“variable time”) fuze

V-weapons German secret weapons planned as revenge for the bombing of Germany--

the V-1 “buzz bomb” was a primitive cruise missile; the V-2 was the first 

operational ballistic guided missile

Wacht am Rhein “Watch on the Rhine”; German code name for 1944 Ardennes 

counteroffensive (Battle of the Bulge)

Waffen-SS Combat arm of the SS (Schutzstaffel, Elite Guard); Military formation of 

the Nazi Party, in effect a partial duplication of the German Army

WD War Department

Wehrmacht German Armed Forces – land, sea, and air – not including the

Waffen-SS

WO War Office

WPD War Plans Division, War Department, predecessor of OPD
TAB O

Code Names

“The sudden attacks and seemingly overpowering

array of six enemy divisions...should not be

misinterpreted. The quality of the divisions

involved, the piecemeal efforts to launch small-scale

attacks, and the apparent lack of long-range

objectives would seem to limit the enemy threat...

the day’s events cannot be regarded as a

major long term threat.”

 12th Army Group Intelligence Summary,

16 December 1944

 “Allied Forces yesterday repulsed a number of 

 local counter-attacks.” 

 SHAEF Communiqué of 17 December 1944
2

ABC-1 The agreements resulting from the Anglo-American military staff

conversations held in Washington in January – March 1941

ABERDEEN Chindit stronghold near Manhton, Burma

ACHSE German plan for the defense of northern Italy

ALACRITY Plan for the entry of a British force into the Azores, October 1943

ALAMO Code for US Sixth Army while operating as a special ground task 

force HQ directly under GHQ SWPA

ALPHA US 3d Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 3d 

Infantry Division landing beaches in the Cavalaire-St. Tropez area

ALPHA Plan to defend Kunming and Chungking

ANAKIM Plan for recapture of Burma

ANVIL Plan for the Allied invasion of southern France, finally executed as 

Operation DRAGOON in August 1944 

ARCADIA First of the major US-British staff conferences following US entry 

into the war, held in Washington, December 1941-January 1942

ARGONAUT Yalta Conference, February 1945

ARGUMENT USSTAF air operations against German aircraft factories, Feb ‘44

AVALANCHE Invasion of Italy at Salerno

AXIOM Mission sent by SEAC to Washington and London in Feb ’44 to 

urge CULVERIN

BACKHANDER Task force for operations on Cape Gloucester, New Britain

BARBAROSSA German offensive against USSR, 1941

BARCLAY/MINCEMEAT Deception operations aimed at misleading Axis forces as to the 

actual date & location of the Allied landings on Sicily

BARRISTER Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK and PICADOR)

BAYTOWN British invasion of Italy on Calabrian coast

BAZAAR Plan for American air support of USSR in event of Japanese attack 

on Soviet Union. Also code name for US survey project of air 

facilities in Siberia

BEAVER Training exercise held in the Slapton Sands area in England in 

March 1944, employing elements of the VII Corps and simulating 

the later assault on UTAH beach

BENEFICIARY Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by means of a 

combined airborne-amphibious attack on St. Malo

BETA Plan to open port on coast of China

BIGOT Special security category and procedure to protect the 

OVERLORD plan

BIRCH Christmas Island

BLACK Plan for capture of Dakar (later PICADOR and BARRISTER)

BLACKCOCK British XII Corps operation to clear enemy salient between the 

Meuse and Roer-Wurm Rivers from Roermond southward

BLACKPOOL Chindit roadblock on railroad near Namkwin, Burma

BLEACHER Tongatabu

BLOCKBUSTER Canadian II Corps offensive in Calcar-Udem-Xanten area

BOBCAT Borabora
3

BODYGUARD Allied deception plans designed to cloak the timing and location of 

OVERLORD while drawing German attention to the Pas de Calais

BOLERO Buildup of US troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in 

preparation for the cross-Channel invasion

Bombardons Cruciform structures designed for mooring off the Normandy 

beaches to provide floating breakwaters in deep water

BRADDOCK II Dropping of small fuze incendiaries to European workers for use in 

sabotage operations

BRAID Cover name for General Marshall during Casablanca Conference

BRASSARD Operations against the island of Elba

BREWER Operations in the Admiralties

BRIMSTONE Plan for capture of Sardinia. Cancelled

BROADWAY Drop site for Chindits, about 50 miles northwest of Indaw, Burma

BUCCANEER Plan for amphibious operation in Andaman Islands. Cancelled

BUFFALO VI US Corps breakout from Anzio beachhead, May 1944

BULLFROG Plan for operation against Arakan (Burma) coast

BUTTRESS British operation against toe of Italy

CAMEL US 36th Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 

36th Infantry Division landing beaches in the Frejus-St. Raphael 

area

CANNIBAL Unsuccessful British offensive against Akyab (Burma) in 1943

CAPITAL Attack across the Chindwin River to Mandalay

CARBONADO Revised BETA

CARPETBAGGER Project to drop supplies and agents to the French resistance

CARTWHEEL Converging drives on Rabaul by S. Pacific and SWPA forces

CASANOVA US 95th Infantry Division diversionary action during operations 

against Metz

CATCHPOLE Operations against Eniwetok and Ujelang Atolls, Marshall Islands

CAUSEWAY Operations against Formosa

CHAMPION Late 1943 plan for general offensive in Burma

CHATTANOOGA CHOO CHOO AEAF operations against enemy train movements in France 

and Germany

CHARNWOOD British operation to seize Caen, launched 8 July 1944

CHASTITY Plan for the construction of an artificial harbor in the Quiberon 

Bay area on the southern coast of Brittany

CHESTNUT Advanced air drop on Sicily by 2 SAS to disrupt communications, 

12 July 1943

CLEANSLATE Invasion of Russell Islands

CLIPPER British XXX Corps offensive to reduce Geilenkirchen salient

COBRA First US Army operation to break out of the Normandy lodgment, 

launched 25 July 1944

COCKADE Diversionary operations in 1943 to pin down German forces in the 

west

COMET British plan, not carried out, for an air drop on 7 September 1944 

in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area
4

CORKSCREW Conquest of Pantelleria

Corncobs Blockships deliberately sunk off the Normandy beaches to form 

partial breakwaters known as Gooseberries, to shelter small craft

COTTAGE Invasion of Kiska, 1943

CRICKET Malta portion of ARGONAUT conference

CROSSBOW A general term used by the Allies to refer to the German longrange weapons program and to Allied countermeasures against it

CUDGEL Planned small scale operation on Arakan coast, Burma. Cancelled

CULVERIN Plan for assault on Sumatra

CYCLONE Task force for Noemfoor

DELTA US 45th Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 

45th Infantry Division landing beaches in the Ste. Maxime area

DEXTERITY Operations against Cape Gloucester, New Britain

DIADEM Allied spring offensive and advance on Rome, May-June 1944

DIRECTOR Task force for invasion of Arawe, New Britain

DIXIE Mission of US observers to Chinese communists

DRACULA Plan for attack on Rangoon, 1944

DRAGOON The Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944. Name 

changed from ANVIL due to concern that the name had been 

compromised

DUCK I, II, III First in the series of training exercises held in the Slapton Sands 

area in England, during January-February 1944, to test all aspects 

of amphibious operations, including mounting, assault, and logistic 

support. Involved mainly elements of the V Corps simulating the 

later assault on OMAHA beach

ECLIPSE Name given in November 1944 to posthostilities plans for 

Germany

ELKTON Plan for seizure of New Britain, New Guinea, and New Ireland 

area

END RUN Task force of GALAHAD survivors used in drive on Myitkyina, 

Burma

ENIGMA Strategic level German radio communication encryption system

EUREKA Tehran conference, November – December 1943, where Western 

allies agreed to Stalin’s appeal for a Channel crossing to open the 

‘second front’ in the spring of 1944

FABIUS I-VI A series of final rehearsals for the cross-Channel operation, 

involving the US V Corps and British forces, April-May 1944

FANTAN Fiji Islands

FIREBRAND Invasion of Corsica, 1943

FISCHFANG February 1944 German counteroffensive against VI US Corps in 

Anzio beachhead

FLAX Air operation to disrupt flow of German air transports from Italy to 

Sicily and Tunisia
5

FLINTLOCK Operations in the Marshall Islands

FORAGER Operations in the Marianas

FOREARM Kavieng

FORTITUDE Allied deception operations designed to convince the Germans of 

an invasion of Western Europe in the Pas de Calais area

FORTUNE Planning group located in Algiers (July 1942)

FOX Last major training exercises conducted by V Corps, March 1944

FRANTIC Allied shuttle bombing of Axis-controlled Europe from bases in 

UK, Italy, and USSR

FRY Occupation of four islands in Lake Comacchio, Italy

FUSTIAN British airborne landing at Primasole Bridge, Sicily, 13-14 July 

1943

GALAHAD American long range penetration groups (Burma)

GALVANIC Operations in Gilbert Islands

GARDEN see MARKET-GARDEN

GOBLET Invasion of Italy at Cotrone. Cancelled

GOLD Normandy beach assaulted by British 30 Corps, 6 June 1944

GOLDFLAKE Movement of Canadian I Corps from Italy to ETO

GOODWOOD British attack to break out of the Normandy lodgment in late July 

1944, coinciding with US Operation COBRA

Gooseberries Partial breakwaters formed off the Normandy beaches by the 

sinking of blockships known as Corncobs, to shelter small craft

GRANITE Plan for operations in POA in 1944

GRAY Plan for capture and occupation of the Azores

GREENLIGHT One of the special OVERLORD supply procedures designed to 

expedite the delivery of ammunition and engineer fortification 

material in lieu of scheduled shipment of other supplies in the first 

phases of the cross-Channel operation

GREIF German deception operation in support of the Ardennes 

counteroffensive, 1944

GRENADE 21 Army Group large-scale offensive from the Roer to the Rhine

GRENADE Ninth Army supporting attack for Operation VERITABLE

GYMNAST 1941 plan for invasion of North Africa

HABAKKUKS Artificial landing fields made of reinforced ice

HALPRO Halvetrson Project – bombing detachment for China-Burma-India 

HANDS UP Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by means of a 

combined airborne-amphibious attack on Quiberon Bay

HARDIHOOD II Aid to Turkey, Phase II

HARLEQUIN British exercise in September 1943 to establish marshaling and 

embarkation procedures for a cross-Channel operation

HERCULES German plan to invade Malta. Cancelled

HOLLY Canton Island

HURRICANE Assault force for Biak, New Guinea

HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943
6

ICEBERG Invasion of the Ryukyu Islands

ICHIGO Japanese operation to take US air bases in east China

INDEPENDENCE Plan for First French Army attack against German garrisons on 

French coasts, December 1944

INDIGO Plan for movement of troops to Iceland

INTERLUDE Rehearsal for Morotai operation

JUNO Normandy beach assaulted by Canadian 3d Division, 6 June 1944

JUPITER Plan for operations in northern Norway

LADBROKE Glider landing at Syracuse, 9 July 1943

LEVER Operation to clear area between Reno and southwest shore of Lake 

Comacchio, Italy

LIGHTFOOT British offensive operations in Libyan Desert, launched from El 

Alamein, October 1942

LINNET I Planned airborne drop at Tournai, Belgium, September 1944

LINNET II Planned airborne drop at Aachen-Maastricht Gap, September 1944

LONDON XVIII Airborne Corps phase line near Wesel, Germany

LUCKY STRIKE 21 Army Group plan calling for an eastward drive and the capture 

of the Seine ports as an alternative to plans for the earlier capture 

of Brittany, considered by planning staffs in May and June 1944

MAGNET Plan that superseded RAINBOW-5 after US entry into the war, 

providing for the shipment of American forces to Northern Ireland

MAGNETO Yalta portion of ARGONAUT Conference

MAILFIST Capture of Singapore, 1945

MALLORY MAJOR Air offensive against Po River bridges, Italy

MANNA British occupation of southern Greece

MARKET-GARDEN Airborne & armored operation intended to establish a bridgehead 

across the Rhine in the Netherlands, September 1944. Operation 

MARKET involved seizure of bridges in the Nijmegen-Arnhem 

area, and Operation GARDEN was to open a corridor from 

Eindhoven northward toward Germany

MARS US task force (5332d Brigade (Provisional)), CBI

MATTERHORN Plan for operating B29s from Cheng-tu against Japan

MERCANTILE Manus Island

MICHAELMAS Task force for seizure of Saidor, New Guinea

MILEPOST Project to build up stocks in the Far East in preparation for the 

entry of the USSR into the war against Japan

MINCEMEAT/BARCLAY Deception operations aimed at misleading Axis forces as to the 

actual date & location of the Allied landings on Sicily

MODICUM Party sent to London to present Marshall Memorandum, April 

1942

Mulberries The artificial harbors constructed off the Normandy beaches

MUSKET Projected landing on heel of Italy near Taranto, 1943
7

NABOB Northern Island

NARCISSUS Commando raid on a lighthouse near the main Sicily landings, 10 

July 1943

NEPTUNE Operation to transport assault troops and equipment across the 

Channel to Normandy

NEST EGG Plan for occupation of Channel Islands in case of German collapse 

or surrender

NEW GALAHAD American long-range penetration groups (Burma)

NEW YORK XVIII Airborne Corps phase line in Ringenberg-Krudenberg area, 

Germany

NOBALL Term used by the air forces in referring to target sites in their 

attacks on long-range weapons

NORDWIND German counterattack in Alsace, January 1945

OCTAGON Second Quebec Conference, September 1944

OLIVE Attack on Gothic Line, Italy

OLYMPIC Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan

OMAHA Normandy beach assaulted by US V Corps, 6 June 1944

ORANGE Prewar plan of operations in event of war with Japan

OVERLORD The invasion of northwest Europe in the spring of 1944

PANTHER British 10 Corps drive across the Garigliano River, Italy

PARIS XVIII Airborne Corps phase line west of Erle, Germany

PERSECUTION Assault force for Aitape operations, New Guinea

Phoenixes Concrete caissons towed across the English Channel and sunk to 

form the main breakwaters for the artificial harbors

PICADOR Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK, later BARRISTER)

PICCADILLY Drop site for Chindits, Burma

PIGSTICK Limited operation on south Mayu Peninsula. Cancelled

PLOUGH, PLOUGH FORCE Project for training US and Canadian volunteers for snow 

operations in northern Norway

PLUNDER Montgomery’s northern crossing of the Rhine, March 1945

POINTBLANK The Combined Bomber Offensive from Britain against Germany

PRICELESS Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations

PROVIDENCE Occupation of Buna area, New Guinea, 1942. Cancelled

PUGILIST Attack on Mareth Line, Tunisia, 1943

QUADRANT The first Quebec Conference, August 1943

QUEEN 12th Army Group operation on Roer Plain between Wurm and Roer 

Rivers

RAINBOW Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis 

aggression involving more than one enemy

RAINBOW-5 US military plan designed to implement that portion of ABC-1 

which applied to the UK in the event of US entry into the war
8

RAINCOAT Assault on Camino hill mass, Italy

RANKIN I, II, III Plans for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the 

German position

RASHNESS Revised CARBONADO plan

RAVENOUS IV Corps plan for recapture of northern Burma

RECKLESS Assault force for Hollandia operation

REDLINE Radio circuits set up in September 1944 for messages to and from 

the Supreme Commander

RENO SWPA plans for operations in the Biskmarck Archipelago, along 

northern coast of New Guinea and thence to Mindanao, P.I.

RHUMBA Plan for reversing BOLERO and transferring US forces, supplies, 

and logistic structure from the United Kingdom to the Continent

RO Japanese air operation to augment Rabaul air forces and delay 

Allied offensives

ROAST Operation to clear Comacchio Spit, Italy

ROGER Capture of Phuket Island, off Kra Isthmus, Burma

ROMEO French commando force landing at Cap Nègre during Operation 

DRAGOON

ROMULUS Arakan part of CAPITAL plan

ROOSTER Operation to fly Chinese 22d Division to Chihchiang

ROSE Ruhr pocket, April 1945

ROSES Efate

ROSIE French naval force landing southwest of Cannes, Operation 

DRAGOON

ROUNDHAMMER Original codename for OVERLORD. Cross Channel operation 

intermediate in size between SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP

ROUNDUP Various 1941-43 Anglo-American plans for a cross-Channel attack

RUGBY Airborne force dropped to rear of southern France assault beaches 

in Operation DRAGOON

SATIN Plan for US II Corps operation against Sfax, Tunisia. Cancelled

SATURN Establishment of British forces in Turkey prior to Turkey’s entry 

into the war

SAUCY Limited offensive to reopen land route from Burma to China

SEA LION Planned German invasion of UK. Cancelled

SEXTANT The Cairo Conference of November 1943

SHARPENER Supreme Commander’s advance command post at Portsmouth, 

May 1944

SHELLBURST SHAEF advance headquarters at Tournières

SHINGLE Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy

SHIPMATE Enlarged SHAEF forward headquarters near Portsmouth, replacing 

SHARPENER

SHO Japanese plan to counterattack US forces in western Pacific

SICKLE Name which in 1943 was given to the US air force buildup in the 

United Kingdom to distinguish it from the ground and service 

force buildup, known as BOLERO
9

SITKA Force taking islands of Levant and Port Cros, Operation 

DRAGOON

SLAPSTICK Airborne drop at Taranto, Italy

SLEDGEHAMMER Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in 1942, 

designed either to take advantage of a German collapse or as a 

sacrifice operation to aid the Soviets

SOAPSUDS Early code name for TIDAL WAVE

SPOONER New Zealand

SPRING Canadian attack, July 1944, coinciding with Operation COBRA

STARKEY Threat directed in 1943 against the Pas de Calais

STALEMATE Invasion of the Palaus

STATESMAN Early code name for TIDAL WAVE

STRANGLE Air operations to destroy German rail, road, and sea 

communications south of the Pisa-Rimini line, March-May 1944

SUMAC Australia

SUPERCHARGE British 30 Corps breakout, Egypt, 1942

SUPERCHARGE Revised plan of assault on Mereth Line, March 1943

SUPER-GYMNAST Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, 

combining US and British plans and often used interchangeably 

with GYMNAST

SWORD Normandy beach assaulted by troops of British 3d Division, 6 June 

1944

SWORDHILT Plan for a combined airborne-amphibious operation to seize the 

area east of Brest, August 1944

SYMBOL Casablanca Conference, January 1943

TALISMAN Early name for posthostilities plans for Germany

TALON Akyab part of CAPITAL plan

TARZAN India-based portion of general offensive in Burma

TED Task force in Aitape area, New Guinea

TERMINAL Potsdam Conference, July 1945

THUNDERBOLT Offensive in Metz area

TIDALWAVE Low-level heavy bomber attack on Ploesti, Romania, 1943

TIGER The final rehearsal for the UTAH Beach assault by units of the VII 

Corps

TINDALL Threat directed against Norway in 1943

TOGO Second phase of ICHIGO operation

Tombola A flexible 6-inch underwater pipeline designed to discharge POL 

tankers anchored offshore at Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes

TOPFLIGHT Signal for release of press information on D-Day in Normandy

TORCH The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November 1942

TOREADOR Airborne assault on Mandalay

TORNADO Assault force for Wakde-Sarmi area, New Guinea

TOTALIZE Post-COBRA attack in France

TRACTABLE Post-COBRA attack in France

TRADEWIND Force for Morotai
10

TRANSFIGURE Plan for airborne operation to capture and control important road 

nets in Paris-Orléans area, 16-17 August 1944

TRIDENT Washington Conference, May 1943

TULSA First outline plan for operations directed at the capture of Rabaul

TWILIGHT Plan to base B-29s in CBI

TYPHOON Task force for Sansapor-Mar operation, New Guinea

ULTRA British operation to intercept and decrypt German radio 

communications (ENIGMA)

UNDERTONE Seventh Army operation to breach the West Wall and establish a 

bridgehead over the Rhine in the Worms area, March – April 1945

UTAH Normandy beach assaulted by US VII Corps, 6 June 1944

VARSITY FAAA operation in support of Operation PLUNDER

VERITABLE 21 Army Group plan for a Canadian attack between the Maas and 

the Rhine, January – February 1945

VICTOR I Panay and Negros Occidental operation

VICTOR II Cebu, Bohol, and Negros Oriental operation

VICTOR III US Eighth Army operations against Palawan

VICTOR IV US Eighth Army operations against Sulu Archipelago and 

Zamboanga area of Mindanao

VICTOR V US Eighth Army operations against western Mindanao

VULCAN Final ground offensive to clear Tunisia, 1943

Wacht am Rhein “Watch on the Rhine”; German 1944 Ardennes counteroffensive 

(Battle of the Bulge)

WADHAM Threat directed against the Cotentin Peninsula in 1943

WEBFOOT Rehearsal for SHINGLE

Whale Flexible steel roadway, made of bridge spans and resting on 

pontons, forming the piers for the artificial harbors

WHITE POPPY Nouméa, New Caledonia

WIDEWING SHAEF headquarters at Bushy Park, near London

X Australia

YOKE All US organizations working with Y-Force, CBI

ZEBRA US-sponsored Chinese divisions in east China

ZIPPER Plan for assault on Malaya, 1945