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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

JOHNNIE J. GAMBLE, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

 Appellee. 

) 

) Court of Appeals No. A-11042

 Trial Court Nos. 1SI-10-282 CR 

 & 1SI-10-407 CR

 O P I N I O N 

) 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 2428 — September 19, 2014 

Appeal from the District Court, First Judicial District, Sitka, 

David V. George, Judge. 

Appearances: Kelly Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, and 

Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. 

Jean E. Seaton, Assistant District Attorney, Sitka, and Michael 

C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard, Judge, and 

Hanley, District Court Judge.* 

Judge ALLARD. 

After being charged with three counts of violating a domestic violence 

protective order, Johnnie J. Gamble was found incompetent to stand trial and committed 

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for 90 days in an effort to restore him to 

competency.1

 At the end of the 90-day commitment, the trial court concluded that Gamble 

was competent to proceed to trial, despite his attorney’s continuing objections that Gamble 

could not meaningfully participate in his own defense. Gamble was subsequently 

convicted of two counts of violating a protective order. 

Gamble appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that he was 

competent to stand trial. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the trial 

court’s ruling. 

Facts and proceedings 

The State charged Gamble in two separate cases with three counts of 

violating a domestic violence protective order. Shortly after Gamble’s arraignment, 

Gamble’s attorney requested a competency evaluation of Gamble to determine if he was 

legally competent to stand trial. 

Dr. Lois Michaud, a forensic psychologist at API, conducted a competency 

evaluation of Gamble on January 19, 2011. Dr. Michaud reported that Gamble was very 

delusional and would be unable to consult with his attorney in a rational manner or present 

a rational defense. She observed that Gamble’s delusions included his belief that he had 

already been to trial and that he needed to talk to a physicist because, in his words, “the 

theory of causality, cause and effect, everything is created by God and every physical thing 

possibly has already happened and can happen again.” Dr. Michaud concluded based 

on the intensity and intrusiveness of Gamble’s delusions that he was not competent to 

stand trial. 

See AS 12.47.100. 

– 2 – 2428 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Superior Court Judge David V. George, sitting as a district court judge, found 

Gamble incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to AS 12.47.110(a), Judge George then 

ordered Gamble committed to API for 90 days for further evaluation and possible 

restoration to competency. 

Near the end of the 90 days, Dr. Michaud re-evaluated Gamble and 

concluded that his mental condition had improved under the structured setting of the 

psychiatric hospital and that he was now competent to stand trial. At the subsequent 

competency hearing, Dr. Michaud testified that when she first interviewed Gamble in 

January, his delusional ramblings and the intrusiveness of his delusional thoughts made 

him very difficult to interview. Gamble had greatly improved by the time he was reevaluated, and his delusions were significantly “less intrusive” than before. Dr. Michaud 

concluded that while Gamble’s delusions had not entirely disappeared, they no longer 

presented the same barrier to coherent and rational communication as before. 

However, Dr. Michaud specifically warned the court and the parties that 

exposure to an unstructured environment (like jail or trial) could cause Gamble’s delusions 

to become more intrusive, and that Gamble’s attorney “would be the first to know” if 

Gamble began to experience the type of active delusions that would render him 

incompetent. 

Gamble’s attorney disagreed with Dr. Michaud’s conclusion that Gamble 

was competent to stand trial. The attorney argued that the nature of Gamble’s delusions 

— his belief that everything happens in a loop, and that everything has happened before, 

including his trial — meant that Gamble was unable to effectively assist in his own 

defense, and that his case should therefore be dismissed under AS 12.47.110(b). 

Judge George concluded that the mere existence of Gamble’s delusions, 

standing alone, did not necessarily prevent him from communicating with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding with his attorney or otherwise prevent him from meeting 

– 3 – 2428
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the standard for competency. After observing Gamble’s demeanor at the second 

competency hearing, the court found that Gamble was doing better and that he was not 

in one of his “more agitated states.” The court further found that Gamble “appreciate[d] 

the nature of the proceedings,” understood the role of the parties and court, and was able 

to speak and convey thoughts to his attorney, including his various disagreements with 

his attorney’s litigation strategy. The court therefore found Gamble competent to stand 

trial and scheduled a trial calendar call for the following month. 

At the calendar call a month later, Gamble’s attorney indicated that he 

continued to have difficulties communicating with Gamble. He requested that the trial 

judge communicate directly with Gamble to determine how Gamble would like to proceed. 

Judge George spoke to Gamble about the various options, and Gamble decided that he 

wanted to go to trial, that he wanted a jury trial, and that he wanted the two cases 

consolidated. The judge granted these requests and also made the following findings: 

I should note for the record, there has been some concern in 

the past about Mr. Gamble’s mental state .... Today I found 

that he is responsive to the Court’s inquiry; he appears to have 

a grasp of the understanding [of] his options and has been able 

to express himself and do so coherently and I don’t have any 

reason to ... believe that he’s not able to proceed at this time. 

So I want to make that finding for the record. 

A week later, on the morning of trial, Gamble’s attorney renewed his motion 

to dismiss under AS 12.47.110(b). Gamble’s attorney again argued that the nature of 

Gamble’s delusions — his belief that everything had happened before and could happen 

again — made it impossible to communicate meaningfully with Gamble regarding his 

defense, and that he was not competent to stand trial. 

In response to the renewed motion, the prosecutor offered to leave the 

courtroom so the defense attorney could supplement the record with any specific examples 

– 4 – 2428
 
 

 

 

of the communication problems he was having with Gamble. But the defense attorney 

indicated that he did not have anything to add to his argument at the earlier hearings. 

The judge then asked the defense attorney whether he believed Gamble’s 

situation was any different than it had been at the last calendar call — that is, whether 

Gamble’s condition had deteriorated in the week since the judge made his most recent 

findings related to Gamble’s competency. The attorney indicated that the situation was 

the same. Based on this response, the court declined to revisit its prior competency ruling 

and reaffirmed its ruling that Gamble was competent to proceed. 

The case then went to trial. The jury convicted Gamble of two counts of 

violating a protective order and acquitted him of the third count. 

This appeal followed. 

Did the trial court err in finding Gamble competent to stand trial? 

Under Alaska law, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if, as a result 

of a mental disease or defect, the defendant is “unable to understand the proceedings 

against the defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own defense.”2 This standard 

necessarily incorporates the federal constitutional standard for competency to stand trial, 

which requires a defendant to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings 

against him and to have a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding.3 

2 AS 12.47.100(a). 

3 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 

– 5 – 2428 
 

 

 

 

 

A defendant who is incompetent to stand trial may not be tried, convicted, 

or sentenced for the commission of a crime so long as the incompetency exists.4 The 

conviction of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial violates due process of law.5 

Because the integrity of the judicial proceeding is at stake when the 

competency of a criminal defendant is in question, a trial court has a duty to order a 

competency evaluation whenever there is good cause to believe that the defendant may 

be incompetent to stand trial.6 Additionally, because a defendant’s mental state may 

deteriorate under the pressures of incarceration or trial, a trial court is required to be 

responsive to competency concerns throughout the criminal proceeding.7 

In the current case, Gamble does not dispute the trial court’s finding on the 

first prong of the competency standard. That is, Gamble does not dispute that he 

understood the proceedings against him. Instead, his challenge is exclusively to the 

second prong of the competency test — whether he could participate in his own defense 

and consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.8 

Gamble asserts on appeal, as he did below, that the nature of his delusional 

beliefs — which made him believe that everything had already happened — prevented 

4 AS 12.47.100(a). 

5 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see also McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 

653, 658 (Alaska 1977) (“The accuracy of the factfinding process, the philosophy of 

punishment and the appearance of fairness in the adversary system are severely compromised 

by the conviction and sentencing of a defendant who is unable to consult with his attorney 

and rationally understand the charges against him.”). 

6 Leonard v. State, 658 P.2d 798, 799 (Alaska App. 1983). 

7 See Smiloff v. State, 579 P.2d 28, 36 (“[T]he duty to determine competency is not 

one that can be once determined and then ignored.”); AS 12.47.100(b). 

8 See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. 

– 6 – 2428
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

him from being able to assist in his defense or communicate with his attorney with a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding. 

But as the Alaska Supreme Court has previously recognized, “[t]he presence 

of some degree of mental illness is not an invariable barrier to prosecution.”9

 A defendant 

may have some degree of impaired functioning but still be “minimally able to aid in his 

defense and to understand the nature of the proceedings against him.”10 To a large extent, 

therefore, “each case must be considered on its particular facts.”11 

Here, the record indicates that the trial court took the competency concerns 

raised by the defense counsel very seriously. The court held multiple hearings on 

Gamble’s competency, including a full evidentiary hearing at which the forensic 

psychologist testified and was questioned by the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and 

the judge. Moreover, the court did not simply defer to the psychologist’s opinion.12 

Instead, the court made its own independent findings and continued to make additional 

findings at later hearings, demonstrating the court’s awareness that Gamble’s situation 

was not necessarily stable and that the highly intrusive delusions that previously presented 

a barrier to his competency could quickly return. 

On appeal, Gamble argues that the trial court should have deferred to the 

defense attorney’s assertion that Gamble was unable to assist in his defense because the 

defense attorney was the only person in a position to make that assessment. 

9 Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted). 

10 Id. (citations omitted). 

11 Id. 

12 See Adams v. State, 829 P.2d 1201, 1207-08 (Alaska App. 1992) (Bryner, C.J., 

concurring) (determination of competency is ultimately a legal matter, not a medical matter 

and superior court’s deference to psychologist’s opinion amounted to a failure to exercise 

judicial discretion and constituted an independent ground for reversal). 

– 7 – 2428
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We agree that a defense attorney is in a unique position with regard to 

assessing a defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense and that a defense attorney’s 

assessment of the defendant’s functioning is therefore an important factor for the court 

to consider.13 But ultimately the question of whether the defendant is competent to stand 

trial is a determination that the trial court must make independently based on all of the 

information before it.14 Thus, just as it would be error for the trial court to defer to the 

forensic psychologist’s assessment of Gamble’s competency, so too would it be error for 

the trial court to simply adopt the defense attorney’s perspective of the defendant’s 

incompetency, without making its own independent determination based on all the 

information before it. 

We note that despite being given the opportunity to provide more specific 

information to the trial court regarding the communication problems with Gamble, the 

defense attorney stated that he had no further information for the court to consider. We 

also note that the attorney did not request an additional forensic competency evaluation. 

Nor did the attorney assert that Gamble’s functioning had deteriorated since the previous 

hearing or that the court should make new findings on Gamble’s competency. Instead, 

the defense attorney repeated his previous argument — that the nature of Gamble’s 

13 See, e.g., McKinney, 566 P.2d at 660 (recognizing that a defense attorney’s opinion 

on the client’s competency or incompetency is an important, but not dispositive, factor for 

trial court to consider in its competency determination); see also ABA Criminal Justice 

Mental Health Standards 7-4.2 & commentary (addressing criminal defense attorney’s ethical 

obligations to raise competency concerns even over defendant’s objection and even though 

it may result in longer pre-trial detention and/or the stigma of institutionalization). 

14 See, e.g., Adams, 829 P.2d at 1207-08; United States v. Weston, 36 F. Supp.2d 7, 

9 (1999) (citations omitted) (“[I]t is the duty of the District Court to make a specific judicial 

determination of competency to stand trial, rather than accept psychiatric evidence as 

determinative of this issue.”). 

– 8 – 2428
 
delusions alone made Gamble incompetent to stand trial, and that the case should be 

dismissed on that basis. 

Given the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 

rejecting this argument and in finding that Gamble was competent to stand trial. 

Conclusion 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court. 

– 9 – 2428