IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 2, 2019 Session

SIMMONS BANK V. VASTLAND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 16-0864-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor

No. M2018-00347-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from a commercial lease dispute. The trial court summarily ruled that 

Simmons Bank, which acquired the tenant originally named in the lease in a merger, had 

the right to exercise a renewal option. The appellant landlord contends this was error 

because “(1) the plain language of the lease expressly indicated the option could only be 

exercised by the tenant originally named in the lease and (2) two events of default 

occurred [as a result of the merger] which precluded the exercise of the option under the 

plain terms of the lease.” The alleged events of default were that (1) the original tenant 

failed to “maintain its legal existence,” and (2) the original tenant transferred its interest 

to Simmons Bank by operation of law. We have determined that regardless of whether 

the lease was transferred to Simmons Bank by merger pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-

21-108(a)(2) “without reversion or impairment,” the parties agreed to restrict any transfer 

of the right to renew the lease to one entity, First State Bank, “the Tenant originally 

named” in the lease. Accordingly, and relying on the legal principle that a statute shall 

not be applied to construe a contract when the parties to the contract express a contrary 

intention, the agreed-upon renewal restriction in the lease controls. As a consequence, 

Simmons Bank does not have the right to exercise the renewal option. Therefore, we 

reverse the grant of summary judgment to Simmons Bank and remand this case to the 

trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the landlord. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Reversed and Remanded

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D.

MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J. and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Jeffrey H. Gibson and Hannah E. Webber, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,

Vastland Development Partnership.

06/27/2019
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Samuel T. Bowman and Sarah D. Murray, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,

Simmons Bank.

OPINION

In 2003, First State Bank entered into an agreement to lease space within a 

building owned by Vastland Development Partnership (“Vastland”) at 1720 West End 

Avenue in Nashville (the “Lease”). The Lease specifically defined “Tenant” as “First 

State Bank.” Addendum Two of the Lease granted First State Bank a renewal option 

under the following conditions:

Provided that as of the time of the giving of the First Extension Notice and 

the Commencement Date of the First Extension Term, (x) Tenant is the 

Tenant originally named herein, (y) Tenant actually occupies all of the 

Premises initially demised under this Lease and any space added to the 

Premises, and (z) no Event of Default exists or would exist but for the 

passage of time or the giving of notice, or both; then Tenant shall have 

the right to extend the Lease Term for an additional term of five (5) years 

(such additional term is hereinafter called the “First Extension Term”) . . . . 

Adhering to same above, the Tenant shall have the right to extend the Lease 

term for an additional term of two (2) five (5) year options, hereinafter 

called the “Second Extension Term” and the “Third Extension Term.”

(Emphasis added). The Lease also provided that First State Bank would be in default if it 

was “dissolved or otherwise fail[ed] to maintain its legal existence,” or upon “any 

assignment, subleasing or other transfer of Tenant’s interest . . . except as otherwise 

permitted in [the] Lease.”1

In May 2011, First State Bank exercised its first option to renew the Lease, and the 

Lease was extended to August 17, 2016. In September 2015, before the end of the first 

extension term, First State Bank merged into Simmons Bank. As a consequence of the 

merger, Simmons Bank was the surviving entity, and First State Bank no longer existed 

separately. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(1).

After the merger, Simmons Bank continued to occupy the property pursuant to the 

Lease. On January 19, 2016, Simmons Bank sent notice to Vastland that it intended to 

exercise the second option to renew the Lease. Vastland responded:

 

1

The tenant was not permitted to assign the Lease or sublease the premises without prior written 

consent of the landlord.
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[T]he Landlord disagrees that Simmons Bank has a valid contractual option 

to renew the Lease. Per Addendum Two of the original Lease . . . the tenant 

option to renew is subject to among other factors “Tenant is the Tenant 

originally named herein.” The original Tenant was First State Bank which 

is no longer the current Tenant. Therefore, the tenant’s option to extend the 

lease is invalid. 

Simmons Bank filed an action in Davidson County Chancery Court on August 5, 

2016, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that Simmons Bank could 

exercise the second renewal option under the Lease. Vastland filed an answer and 

counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief and unlawful detainer.2

After the parties engaged in written discovery, they filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, Vastland argued that Simmons 

Bank was not entitled to exercise the renewal option because Simmons Bank was not the 

original tenant named in the Lease. However, should the court find that Simmons Bank 

met the “original tenant” condition for renewal, Vastland argued that Simmons Bank 

could not exercise the renewal option because at least two events of default occurred 

prior to renewal—(1) the original tenant merged into Simmons Bank and failed to 

“maintain its legal existence,” and (2) the original tenant transferred its interest to 

Simmons Bank by operation of law. 

In its cross motion for summary judgment, Simmons Bank relied on Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 48-21-108, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) When a merger becomes effective:

(1) The corporation or eligible entity that is designated in the plan of 

merger as an entity surviving the merger shall survive, and the separate 

existence of every other corporation or eligible entity that is a party to 

the merger shall cease;

(2) All property owned by, and every contract right possessed by, each 

corporation or eligible entity that is merged into the survivor shall be 

vested in the survivor without reversion or impairment[.]

 

2

Before Vastland filed its answer and counterclaim, the parties agreed to a preliminary injunction 

allowing Simmons Bank to remain in possession until the dispute was resolved.
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Id. § 108(a)(1)–(2).3

Based on the foregoing statute, Simmons Bank argued that it acquired the contract rights 

of First State Bank “without reversion or impairment,” and accordingly, upon First State 

Bank’s merger into Simmons Bank, Simmons Bank became the original tenant named in 

the Lease. Simmons Bank also contended that while First State Bank lost its “separate 

existence” following the merger, it continued to exist as a part of Simmons Bank. 

Therefore, the “legal existence” default provision did not apply. 

After a hearing on January 19, 2018, the trial court found in favor of Simmons 

Bank, ruling:

The Court determines that Simmons Bank has the better argument. When 

the merger occurred, all of First State Bank’s contract rights under the 

Lease were automatically, by operation of law, vested in the surviving 

corporation, Simmons Bank. First State Bank did not cease to exist, even 

though its separate legal existence ceased. First State Bank continues to 

exist, not separately, but as part of Simmons Bank. Consequently, there is 

no breach under the “legal existence” default provision in the Lease. 

Consequently, Simmons Bank, by operation of the Tennessee merger 

statute, as amended in 2013, is the automatically vested Tenant originally 

named in the Lease. 

Additionally, although the merger effected a transfer by operation of law, 

the merger statute expressly provides for an automatic vesting of preexisting contract rights in the surviving corporation, Simmons Bank. This 

declaration of public policy and statement of substantive law should not be 

rendered surplusage by the general language of the Lease, particularly 

where as here, the result does not appear to disrupt any expressed intention 

of the parties regarding merger in the language of the Lease.

Vastland appealed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de 

novo without a presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, 

MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 

(Tenn. 1997)). Accordingly, this court must make a fresh determination of whether the 

requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Id.; Hunter v. Brown, 955 

 

3

The phrase “and every contract right possessed by” was added in 2013.
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S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tenn. 1997). In so doing, we consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s 

favor. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002).

Summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. 

ANALYSIS

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Simmons Bank has the right to exercise 

the renewal option in the Lease. Vastland insists Simmons Bank does not have the 

contractual right to exercise the renewal option in the Lease it acquired from First State 

Bank because the only party that has the right to exercise the renewal option is “the 

Tenant originally named herein,” and it is undisputed that the “originally named” tenant 

in the lease is “First State Bank.” Simmons Bank counters relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 

48-21-108, which affords Simmons Bank “every contract right possessed by” First State 

Bank “without reversion or impairment.” Based on this statute, Simmons Bank insists it 

is substituted for First State Bank as the original tenant named in the Lease by operation 

of law. 

The cardinal rule of contract construction is that the court must give effect to “the 

intent of the contracting parties at the time of executing the agreement.” Planters Gin Co. 

v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002). To ascertain that 

intent, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the contractual language. Id. at 889–

90. “[O]ne of the bedrocks of Tennessee law is that our courts are without power to make 

another and different contract from the one executed by the parties themselves.” 

Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 478 (Tenn. 2017). And, “[i]n the absence of 

fraud or mistake, a contract must be interpreted and enforced as written.” St. Paul 

Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bishops Gate Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1986). 

“This determination of the intention of the parties is generally treated as a question 

of law because the words of the contract are definite and undisputed, and in deciding the 

legal effect of the words, there is no genuine factual issue left for a jury to decide.” 

Planters Gin, 78 S.W.3d at 890.

As a rule of construction, applicable statutes that “subsist at the time and place of 

the making of a contract and where it is to be performed become part of the contract—

even where silent on this point—as fully as though expressly referred to or incorporated 

into the instrument.” 21 Steven W. Feldman, Tennessee Practice Series Contract Law and 

Practice § 8:23, Westlaw (database updated May 2019); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on 
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Contracts, § 30:19 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter Williston]. However, with a few 

exceptions, a statute is not applied to construe the contract when the parties to the 

contract express a contrary intention. Feldman, supra; Williston, supra. For example, 

“[i]n the context of a limited partnership, the written contract of the parties controls” 

unless “the express contract does not cover situations or questions which arise.” Barton v. 

Gilleland, No. E2004-01369-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 729174, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 

30, 2005) (citing Young v. Cooper, 203 S.W.2d 376, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947)). Only 

when questions arise will the statutes in the Tennessee Revised Uniform Limited 

Partnership Act apply to construe the contract. Id. Despite this general rule, courts will 

not enforce contractual provisions that violate the public policy of this state as embodied 

in our Constitution, statutes, common law, and prior court decisions. Baugh v. Novak, 

340 S.W.3d 372, 384 (Tenn. 2011). Here, it is undisputed that the lease provision at issue 

does not violate public policy. 

The Lease does not state that “Tenant” may renew the Lease. To the contrary, the 

Lease contains a restrictive provision that expressly restricts the right of renewal to the 

“Tenant originally named herein,” which is a clear contractual declaration that the right 

of renewal was restricted to “First State Bank,” not its successors or assigns. The 

significance of this restriction becomes more apparent when considered along with 

Paragraph 23(v) of the Lease, which defines an Event of Default that constitutes a 

forfeiture of the right of renewal to include when “there shall occur any assignment . . . or 

other transfer of Tenant’s interest . . . except as otherwise permitted in this Lease.” By 

reading these provisions in pari materia, it is readily apparent that the parties agreed that 

the right to exercise the renewal provision would be restricted to First State Bank, the 

tenant originally named in the Lease, not a successor tenant, and that the right of renewal 

could not be transferred. See Powell v. Clark, 487 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2015) (“[U]nder well-settled contract interpretation principles, we must read this 

[contractual provision] in pari materia with the entire agreement.”).

Courts must give effect to “the intent of the contracting parties at the time of 

executing the agreement,” and we do that by looking to the plain and ordinary meaning of 

the contractual language. Planters Gin, 78 S.W.3d at 889–90. Moreover, “courts are 

without power to make another and different contract from the one executed by the 

parties.” Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d at 478. The Lease restricts the right of renewal to First 

State Bank, which is both a clear and restrictive declaration, as distinguished from the 

more common reference to “tenant.” There being no allegations of fraud or mistake, the 

Lease must be “enforced as written.” St. Paul Surplus, 725 S.W.2d at 951. 

The foregoing notwithstanding, Simmons Bank contends the Lease was 

transferred to Simmons Bank by operation of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-

108(a)(2); thus, it possesses the contract right possessed by First State Bank at the time of 

the merger. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2) (“All property owned by, and every 

contract right possessed by, each corporation or eligible entity that is merged into the 
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survivor shall be vested in the survivor without reversion or impairment[.]”).4This 

contention, however, fails to appreciate the significance of the parties’ agreement to 

restrict the right to renew the Lease to the “Tenant originally named herein.” (Emphasis 

added). This is significant because, with a few exceptions that are not applicable here, a 

statute is not applied to construe the contract when the parties to the contract express a 

contrary intention.5See Feldman, supra; see also Williston, supra. Therefore, regardless 

of whether the Lease was transferred to Simmons Bank by merger pursuant to Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2) “without reversion or impairment,” the parties agreed to 

restrict the right to renew the Lease to one entity, First State Bank, “the Tenant originally 

named” in the Lease. As a consequence, Simmons Bank does not have the right to 

exercise the renewal option. 

For these reasons, Vastland, not Simmons Bank, was entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in favor of Simmons Bank is 

reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter 

summary judgment in favor of Vastland. 

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of appeal are assessed against Simmons 

Bank.

________________________________

 FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

 

4

Simmons Bank contends Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2) was incorporated into the Lease 

by operation of law and, therefore, governs the rights of the parties. We note, however, that one of the key 

phrases upon which it relies, “and every contract right possessed by,” was added in 2013. Prior to the 

2013 amendment, the statute read: “All property owned by each corporation or limited partnership that is 

a party to the merger shall be vested in the surviving corporation or limited partnership without reversion 

or impairment.” See Act of April 14, 1994, Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 776, § 41. The parties entered into the 

original Lease on March 12, 2003. Therefore, the 2013 version did not “subsist at the time and place of 

the making of the contract” and was thus inapplicable to the Lease’s construction. See Feldman, supra.

5

One exception to this rule applies to insurance contracts. “[S]tatutes that apply to an insurance 

policy not only become a part of the contract, but also ‘supersede anything in the policy repugnant to the 

provisions of the statute.’” Kiser v. Wolfe, 353 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Hermitage Health 

& Life Ins. Co. v. Cagle, 420 S.W.2d 591, 594 (1967)).