**United States**

**Department of Agriculture**  **Marketing and Regulatory**  **Programs** Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

# Final **Rule for the Status**  **of the European Union Regarding Virulent**  **(Exotic) Newcastle**  **Disease (**  **E ND) and**  **Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)** 

**Environmental Assessment, April**  **2012**

# Final **Rule for the Status of the** 

**European Union Regarding Virulent**  **(Exotic) Newcastle**  **Disease ( E**  **ND) and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenz**  **a (HPAI)** 

**Env ironmental**  **As sessment,**  **Ap ril**  **2012**

**Ag ency** **Contact for the Final**  **Rulemaking** Mr. Javier Vargas Case Manager National Center for Import and Export Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 38 Riverdale, MD 20737

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–

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– 5964 (vo ice and TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.

## Table of Contents
**I. Need**
**................................ ................................**  **........................ 1**  **II. A lternatives** 
**................................ ................................**  **............. 2**  **III. Potential Environmental Impacts**
**................................ ..........**  **7 IV.**  **Ag encies Contacted** 
**................................ ............................**  **20 V. References** 
**................................ ................................**  **............ 21**  **Ap pendix**  **A . Threatened and Endangered Birds Federally** 

**Listed in the United States and Its Territories 1**  

## I. Need The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates the importation of animals and ani mal products into the United States to guard against the introduction of animal diseases. APHIS’ regulations allow for the importation of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other bird s from regions considered as free of or low risk for V irulent (Exotic) Newcastle Disease ( END ) and Highly

Pathogenic Avian Influenza ( HPAI ) under specified conditions

. APHI S evaluated the END and HPAI risk associated with importation into the United State s of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry

carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from the 25 Member States of the European Union (EU) which cons tituted the EU in the year 2006 , collectivel y referred to as the Euro pean Union

- 25 1 (EU

- 25 )

. APHI S’ evaluation of the EU

- 25 found that this region meets the requirements for being recognized as a region free of END and HPAI

. Th is rulemaking is needed to allow the importation of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or pr oducts of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from the EU

- 25 because there is no scientific basis for trade restriction. Allowing the trade of these commodities would be consistent with internationally recognized standards a s found in the 200 9 World Organization for Animal Health (commonly referred to as the Office of International des Epizooties (OIE)) Terrestrial Animal Health Code for END ( 10.13 ) and HPAI ( 10.4 ) (OI E , 2009 a; OI E, 2009 b )

. In response to this rule amendment, APHI S anal yzed the potential disease risks (in “APHI S Risk Evaluation of the Importation of Highl y Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Virulent Newcastle Disease ( END) Virus from a European Union Region of Twent y - five Member States ” (USDA

– APHI S, 20 1 1 ) ) and environmental effects associated with this action. This environmental assessment (EA) addresses potential environmental impacts related to the amendment of APHI S’ regulations to include the EU

- 25 as a region free of END and HPAI with regard to the i mportation of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from that region to the United States. This EA has been prepared to comply with the provisions of the National Environme ntal Policy

Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 4321 , et. seq.) as prescribed in implementing regulations adopted

1 European Union
- 25 (EU
- 25) was defined as including the Member States: Austria, Belgiu m, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.**2** by the Council on Environmental Quality ( Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §§ 1500

– 1508), USDA’s NEPA regulations (7 C FR part 1b), and APHI S’ NEPA implementing procedures (7 CFR part 372). The Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing regulations require s that environmental documents are made available to agencies and persons who may

be interested or affected. The notice of availability of the EA for the proposed rule and comment period were provided ( Jul y 19 , 2011, 76 FR 42595 , Docket No. APHIS

200 9

- 00 94 ) to ensure review and input to this EA from the public. APHIS received 4 public comments; however, none c oncerning the EA for the proposed rule for the comment period extending from this Federal Register notice of availability to September 19 , 2011. 

## II. **Al ternati**  **ve s**  The two alternatives considered in this EA include : (1) the no action alternative in which the current regulations would remain unchanged, continuing to omit the EU

- 25 from the list of regions considered as free of END and HPAI , and, therefore, would not allow the importation of live birds, poultry

carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcas ses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from that region to the United States ; and (2) the rule amendment of 9 CFR part 94 , which would designate the EU

- 25 as free of END and HPAI and would, therefore, allow the importation of live birds, poul try carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from the EU

- 25 under certain conditions. 

### A. **No Ac**  **tion** Currently , APHI S regulation (9 CFR § 94.6) restricts the importation of poultry carcasses, meat, parts or products of poultry carcasses , and eggs (other than hatching eggs) into the United States from regions where END or an y subtype of HPAI is considered to exist, allowing onl y cooked products or consignment directly to an approved esta

blishment i n the United States. Th ese conditions were considered to present a low disease risk with negligible environmental effects (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 )

. APHI S regulations for the importation into the United States , from regions where END or HPAI is considered to ex ist , allow importing poultry carcasses and parts and products of poultry carcasses only

if they have been cooked throughout to reach a minimum int ernal temperature of 74 o C. Inregions where HPAIis considered to exist, APHI S requires that carcasses and parts or products of carcasses, including meat, of poultry , game birds, or other birds may be imported if they

are accompanied by

a**3** certificate that is signed by a full

- time, salaried veterinarian of the government agency

responsible for animal health in the region , and that specifies that the articles we re cooked to this specification (USDA

– APHI S, 2011 ). Carcasses of game birds may not be imported from regions where any subty pe of HPAI is considered to exist, except for those consigned to a museum, educat ional institution or other establishment which has provided evidence that it has the equipment, facilities, and capabilities to store, handle, process, or disinfect such articles so as to prevent the introduction or dissemination of HPAIinto the United St ates, as approved by the Administrator (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 )

. Eggs (other than hatching eggs) of poultry , game birds, or other birds from regions where END exists may be imported into the United States only if

— (1) the eggs are accompanied by a health cer

tificate regarding the flock of origin , and meet certain other conditions; (2) the eggs are consigned directl y to an approved establishment for breaking and pasteurization; (3) the eggs are imported under permit for scientific, educational, or research purposes; or (4) the eggs are imported under permit and have been cooked or processed and will be handled in a manner that prevents the introduction of END into the United States. Table eggs from END

- affected regions may onl y enter the United States i f accompanied b y official certification verifying that

—  the flock was visited within the last 90 day s ,  the eggs were packed and sealed ,  the cull birds were test ed , and
 there is no indication of the presence of the disease within 50 kilometer ( km ) for th e last 90 day s (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 ). Recently , APHI S added an alternative pathway for the importation of table eggs from regions where END is considered to exist based on testing and certification by

the competent national veterinary authority

. The certifi cation must state that within the last 90 day s the flock

- of

- origin was inspected and no evidence of communicable diseases of poultry was found , and that the eggs were packed and sealed with a seal of the competent veterinary

authority

. Certification must also be made that the flock of origin of the eggs was free of END based on a testing regimen using virus isolation from cull birds, and verification that the weekl y cull rate did not exceed 0.1 percent. Egg drop s yndrome must be a notifiable disease in th e region of origin , and certification must indicate that in the**4** past 90 day s there were no reports of egg drop s yn drome in the flock(s) of origin or within a 50

- km radius of the flock of origin (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 ). Legal entry

of live birds into the United States is allowable under permit and controlled through existing quarantine and testing measures in quarantine facilities operated or approved b y APHIS (9 CFR 93.205 ). In addition, live birds or poultry , including hatching eggs, must be a ccompanied b y of

ficial certification that, as far as it has been possible to determine, during the 90 day s prior to movement, the poultry were not exposed to communicable diseases of poultry , including END and HPAI , and the premises were not within a quarantine area for s uch disease

. The birds must not be vaccinated with a vaccine for the H5 or H7 subty pe of avian influenza or transit regions where END or HPAIof any subt ype is considered to exist or where vaccination for H5 or H7 subty pes of avian influenza is used for d isease control

. All birds are subject to appropriate testing for END and HPAI prior to their release from quarantine (USDA

– APHI S, 2011 ). It must also be certified that the hatching eggs were not derived from birds vaccinated for either H5 or H7 subty pes of avian influenza

. Hatching eggs from regions not designated in 9 CFR 94.6 as free of END and HPAI must be quarantined upon arrival. Imported hatching eggs are required to be transported from the port of entry to the hatchery

in a vehicle sealed by USDA , and hatched and brooded under the supervision of the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVI C) in the State of destination. The poultry hatched from these eggs must remain in quarantine for at least 30 day s following hatching. The hatchery must meet specific biosecurit y standards , and be inspected and approved by the AVI C prior to issuance of the import permit. During quarantine, the hatching eggs and poultry from such eggs are subject to inspection and diagnostic testing to verify that they are free of END and HPAI

. Hatching eggs from regions APHI S considers free of END and HPAImust be accompanied by official certification , but do not undergo quarantine (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 ). Hatching eggs imported from any part of the world must be accompanied by a veterinary health certificate issued b y a national government v eterinarian of the exporting country and a USDA import permit. C ertification include s statements that the flock of origin was free of communicable disease , and the premises w ere not in an area under quarantine (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 ). The no action alternative would leave the current importation regulations unchanged. Under this alternative, the member states identified in this rulemaking as the EU

- 25 would continue to not be listed collectively as a region free of END and HPAI and, therefore, would not be allowed to**5** export live birds, poultry

carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds to the United States. The status in the EU

- 25 as free of END and HP AI is not reflected in the current import regulations. The continuance of such unsupported trade restrictions would be contrary to U.S. obligations under international trade agreements. 

### B. Rule A **mendment** APHI S

–V eterinary S ervices (VS) evaluated the ris k of END and HPAI from the EU

- 25

. Based on our evaluation of representative Member States and the European Commission regulation and implementation , APHI S is recogniz ing the EU

- 25 as free of both END and HPAI and recogniz ing the EU

- 25 as a single region for which import requirements will be uniformly

applied in the EU Poultry Trade Region (USDA

– APHI S, 2011 ). The region contains all of the European Union (EU) Member States (MS) which constituted the EU in the year 2006 that we collectively

refer to as the European Union

- 25 (EU

- 25). APHI S based th e evaluation of the END and HPAI status of the EU

- 25 on the performance measures found in Title 9 CFR 92.2 using the documentation submitted by the European Commission (EC ) , Food and Veterinary

Office reports, EC legislation, reports to World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the site visit. The April 2008 VS site visit to the EC in Brussels and five representative EU Member States (Cy prus, Denmark, German y, the Netherlands and Poland) was conducted to eva luate their avian disease status and how uniformly EC legislation is implemented an d enforced throughout the EU

- 25 (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 ). The rule amendment alternative would amend the current regulations to add the EU

- 25 to the list of region s APHIS conside rs as free of END and HPAI . In doing so, this alternative would allow the importation of live birds, poultry

carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds under specified conditions from the EU

- 25 . The rule amendment would add the EU

- 25 to the list of END

- and HPAI

- free regions in 9 CFR 9 4.6 and appl y the movement restrictions found in 9 CFR 92.3

. Title 9 CFR 92.3 recognize s the quarantine measures and movement restrictions implemented by the EC for c ertain diseases , and bans the importation into the United States of animals and animal products that are prohibited movement in the EU as a result of the quarantine (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 ). In summary , APHI S will take the following approach to mitigate potential END and HPAI risks associated with imports of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from the EU

- 25 into the United States :**6** 1. T he scope of the restrictions currentl y def ined in 9 CFR § 94.6 will be expanded to appl y to all EU

- 25 Member States. 2. In the event of an outbreak of END or HPAI, the movement restrictions defined in 9 CFR § 92.3 will apply to the EU

- 25 for avian diseases and recognize the quarantine or restrict ion areas established by

the EC. 3. T he competent veterinary authority of the individual EU

- 25 MS will be required to certify that the poultry , including hatching eggs, or the poultry

from which exported poultry meat and poultry products were derived orig inated in the EU

- 25 and had never resided in a region under restrictions for the presence of END or HPAIin domestic poultry for the last 90 day s prior to export to the United States

. However, officiall y sealed shipments of hatching eggs are allowed to have transited zones that are affected with HPAIinside the EU

- 25. In the case of movement restrictions put in place following the detection of END or HPAI in wild birds or in racing pigeons, APHIS will recognize the duration of restrictions as imposed by the EC upon the affected zone. 4. T he competent veterinary authority of the individual EU

- 25 MS will be required to certify that the shipment of hatching eggs that has transited HPAI affected regions within the EU

- 25 MS travel under seal issued by

the competent veterinary authority . The seal number must be listed on the health certificate that accompanies the shipment. The veterinarian who applies the seal must provide a signature under the seal number. Seals should not be broken until the shipment reache s its first US port of entry

. Hatching egg shipment s with seals that are not intact will be rejected at the first U

. S

. Port of Entry

by the VS port official. 5. T he competent veterinary authority of the individual EU

- 25 MS will be required to certify that the farms of origin for the poultry , poultry meat, or poultry

products did not receive birds within the last 30 day s from outside the poultry trade region or from areas under restrictions for END or HPAI within the poultry trade region. 6. T he competent veterinary authorit y of the individual EU

- 25 MS will be required to certify that the birds, or the birds from which hatching eggs derived, were not vaccinated for subty pes H5 or H7 avian influenza

. 7. The products must not have commingled with poultry m eat or poultry products derived from other poultry that were not from the EU

- 25 or were in an y restriction zones established because of the presence of END or HPAI. 8. Equipment or transport used for the live poultry from which the**7** poultry meat or poultry products were derived from the farm of origin to the slaughtering establishment must not have been used previously

for transporting live poultry that do not meet the above requirements, unless the equipment and materials have first been adequatel y cleane d and disinfected (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 )

. 

## III. **Potential Env ironmental Impacts** 
The diseases of concern , with regard to allowing the importation of live birds, poultry

carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds from 25 Member States of the EU , are END and HPAI. APHI S prepared a risk assessment, “APHI S Risk Evaluation of the Importation of Highl y Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Virulent Newcastle Disease ( END) Virus from a European Union Region of Twent y - five Member States , ” to evaluate the risk of both END and HPAI introduction to the United S tates as a result of allowing importation of these commodities from the EU

- 25 (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 ). APHI S evaluated the status of the EU

- 25 with regard to its infrastructure and control measures in place for these diseases, including an assessment of disease surveillance measures, import practices, laboratory capacity , emergency

response procedures, and other factors that could influence the risk of disease introduction into the United States. APHI S concluded that the overall risk of introducing either END or HPAI into the United States through the import of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds , or other birds from the EU

- 25 to be very low. However, APHIS recognizes that limited END and HPAI outbreaks are likel y to continue to occur in the region

. Therefore, APHI S intends to appl y the conditions found in 9 CFR 92.3 in the event of future outbreaks of either END or HPAI in the “APHI S

- define d poultry

trade area.” The restriction areas will include all protection, surveillance , and buffer zones established around END or HPAIoutbreaks in domestic poultry , and the infected zones established around o utbreaks of END or HPAI in wild birds and pigeons held in captivity (including pigeons held for racing, exhibition, breeding , and fattening). APHIS will require the competent veterinary authority of the individual EU

- 25 Member State to certify that the li ve birds or poultry , including hatching eggs, exported to the United States , or the poultry from which exported poultry

meat and poultry

products originated in the EU

- 25 and had never resided in a region under restrictions for the presence of END or HPAI i n domestic poultry for the last 90 day s. In the case of movement restrictions put in place following the detection of END or HPAIin wild birds or domestic (racing) pigeons, APHI S will recognize the duration of restrictions as imposed by the EC upon the i nfected zone (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 )

.**8** 

### A. **Background** END is caused b y an avian param yx ovirus

. P aramy xoviruses isolated from avian species have been classified b y s erological testing into nine seroty pes designated APMV

- 1 through APMV

- 9; N ewcastle disease v irus (NDV) has been designated APMV

- 1. Since its recognition in 1926, END is regarded as being endemic in many countries. Prophylactic vaccination is practiced in all but a few of the countries that produce poultry on a commercial scale ( OI E , 200 2 a ; OI E , 2009 b ; OI E , 2009 d)

. NDV can be a human pathogen causing transient, usually localized infections

. Reported infections have been non

- life threatening and usually not debilitating for more than a day or two. The most frequently reported and best substanti ated clinical signs in human infections have been eye infections, usually

consisting of unilateral or bilateral r eddening, excessive tear production, edema (abnormal accumulation of fluid beneath the skin) of the eyelids, conjunctivitis (swelling, inflammation, or infection of the membrane lining the eyelids) , and sub

- conjunctival hemorrhage (bleeding underneath the ey e)

. Although the effect on the eye may be quite severe, infections are usually

transient and the cornea is not affected. Reports of other c linical s ymptoms in humans infected with NDV are less well substantiated, but suggest a more generalized infection may sometimes occur resulting in chills, headaches , and fever, with or without conjunctivitis. There is evidence that both vaccinal and viru lent (for poultry) strains of NDV may infect and cause clinical signs in humans. There is no evidence of human

- to
- human spread (OI E, 200 9 d)

. Avian influenza is caused by infection with viruses of the famil y Orthomy xoviridae , placed in the genus influenzavirus A. Influenza A viruses are the only

orthomy xoviruses known to affect birds and m an y species of birds have been shown to be susceptible to infection with influenza A viruses

. A quatic birds are a major natural reservoir of these viruses, but the over

whelming majority

of isolates have been of low pathogenicity

for chickens and turkey s. Influenza A viruses are classified into subty pes on the basis of their haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) antigens. At present, 16 H subty pes (H1

–H16) and 9 N subt ypes (N1

– N9) are recognized

. To date, the highly virulent influenza A viruses that produce acute clinical disease in chickens, turkey s , and other birds of economic importance have been associated onl y with the H5 and H7 subty pes ; h owever, m ost viruses o f H5 and H7 subty pe isolated from birds have been of low virulence for poultry

. Due to the risk of a H5 or H7 virus of low virulence becoming virulent b y mutation, all H5 and H7 viruses have been identified as notifiable avian influenza (NAI ) viruses**9** (OIE , 200 9 a )

. Depending on the species, age , specific characteristics of the viral strain involved, environmental factors and co

- infection , the highl y pathogenic disease, in fully

susceptible birds, may

vary from one of sudden death with little or no overt cl inical signs to a more characteristic disease with variable clinical presentations including respiratory signs, such as ey e and nasal discharges, coughing, and dys pnea (difficult breathing) , swelling of the sinuses and/or head, apath y, reduced vocalization , marked reduction in feed and water intake, cyanosis (discoloration of skin) of the unfeathered skin, wattles , and comb, incoordination and nervous signs and diarrhea

. In laying birds , additional clinical features include a marked drop in egg production usually

accompanied by

an increase in numbers of poor quality eggs . Ty picall y, high morbidity is accompanied by high and rapidly escalating unexplained mortality

. However, none of these signs can be considered distinctivel y characteristic of a particular disease

. In addition, low pathogenicity

avian influenza (LPAI ) viruses, which may cause mild or no clinical disease, or may produce a spectrum of clinical signs the severit y of which may approach that of highl y pathogenic avian influenza, particularl y if exac erbating conditions or co

- infections are present (OIE, 2002 b; OIE , 200 9 a ; OI E , 2009 c )

. Avian influenza viruses are subject to official control and the virus has a high risk of spread from the laboratory ; consequently , a risk assessment should be carried out to determine the level of biosecurit y needed for laboratory

diagnosis and chicken inoculation; characterization of the virus should be conducted at biocontainment level 3 2 , at least. Countries lacking access to such a specialized national or regio nal laboratory should send specimens to an OIE Reference Laboratory (OI E, 200 9 c )

. The potential for impacts on the human environment from the importation of live birds, poultry

carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game b irds, or other birds from the EU

- 25 are dependent upon the ability

of mitigation measures or mitigative factors to prevent the introduction of END or HPAI via the biological pathway s of transmission of the diseases. This section addresses the potential environmental impacts that could occur under the alternatives considered. 

### B **. No A ction** 

2 A biosafety level is the level of the biocontainment (or laboratory biosafety) precautions required to isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed facility. The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1 to the highest at level 4. In the United S tates, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified these levels. In the European Union, the same biosafety levels are defined in a directive. Biocontainment level 3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or pro duction facilities in which work is done with indigenous or exotic agents (including bacteria and viruses) which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease after inhalation.**10** The no action alternative would not allow live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds to be imported from the EU

- 25 ; that is, it would maintain the current rules governing the importation of these commodities. This alternative would have no potential effect on human health or the environment. This alternative, however, is inconsistent with our commitments under international trade agreements. 

### C. Rule A **mendment A lternative**  The rule amendment alternative would allow the importation of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or othe r birds from the EU

- 25 under specific conditions designed to prevent the introduction of END and HPAI into the United States. Any

potential for impacts to the human environment would be the result of exposure to the END and /or HPAI virus via a breakdown i n the se requirements designed to mitigate the risk of exposure to the virus by United States poultry . Animal health, the phy sical environment, and public health are addressed as components of the human environment in the United States that have the potent ial to be impacted in the event that the END or HPAI virus were to be introduced to United S tates poultry as a result of the rule amendment to list the EU

- 25 as free of END and HPAI and , therefore , allowing importation of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry

carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds

. Also, other environmental review considerations for the protection of the human environment are addressed in this section of the EA.

**a. Virulent (**  **Exotic )**  **New castle Dis**  **ease (END)** END is a disease caused by avian paramy

xovirus ty

pe 1 viruses. END is known to affect more than 250 bird species, with varying levels of mortality . In general, the END viruses are separated into five pathoty pes base d on the clinical signs se en in chickens , ranked from as ymptomatic to highl y pathogenic t yp es. In some bird species, the less virulent END viruses do not cause clinical signs or mortality ( OIE , 2002 b; OI E , 200 9 b ; OI E , 200 9 d)

. Chickens are known to be particularly susceptible to the strains of the virus causing virulent END. In chickens, mortality rates resulting from virulent END infection can be as high as 100 percent
. Inthe field definitive diagnosis of END in chickens is difficult because the clinical signs exhibited by

in fected chickens can vary widely and a combination of clinical signs and laboratory tests must be used to confirm the presence of the disease (O IE , 200 2 b; OI E , 2009 b ; OI E , 2009 d)

. **1. A nimal**  **Health 11**  In fected birds shed the END virus in respiratory secretions and in feces so that END viruses are spread between birds b y either the ingestion or inhalation routes

. Depending on the pathot ype of the END virus in question, the average incubation period ranges from 2 to 15 day s ( USDA

– APHI S, 2011 ). Biosecurit y measures are generall y effective in preventing END introduction and spread. If END is not present in poultry flocks, biosecurity

measures that significantl y lower the potential for introduction of the disease include:

 preventing contact between existing flocks and any live bi rds or poultry with unknown health status, pet birds, and wild or feral birds , such as gulls, pigeons or cormorants;
 quarantine for at least 30 day s of all newl y acquired birds of species with the potential to transmit END;
 vaccination of chickens, aviary birds, birds in breeding farms, and birds in zoos;
 routine surveillance measures, including the use of sentinel 3 birds to monitor vaccinated flocks ; and
 maintaining good biosecurity

. Vaccination of poultry may prevent development of clinical signs, but does not completely

prevent the END virus from replicating or being shed by infected birds ( Alexander 2003 )

. If an outbreak of END were to be discovered, implementation of appropriate biosecurit y and quarantine measures could prevent the further spread of the infection (USDA

–APHI S , 2011 ). These measures, in addition to those discussed above, include:

 establishing a protective zone around the area that includes the infected flock(s) , and a larger surveillance zone around the protective zone, with appropri ate surveillance and restrictions on the movement of poultry

and poultry

products;
 depopulation of all infected and potentiall y exposed birds;
 identification of an y animals moved into the flock and monitoring of their source;
 identification and monitoring of any flock or individual birds in contact with birds recently moved from the infected flock;
 appropriate disposal of carcasses and associated animal products; and
 extensive cleaning and disinfection of premises following

3 Sentinels are unvaccinated fully susceptible animals used to monitor for the presence of a disease agent.**12** depopulation of infected flock(s ) with appropriate disinfectant products. Because of the potentially high mortality in infected birds and the need to depopulate infected animals, the animal health consequences of the introduction of END resulting in an outbreak of the disease in the Uni ted States are significant. The primary environmental impacts from the mitigation and control measures described above result from the disposal of large numbers of contaminated carcasses and associated animal products , such as feces or animal litter , from an outbreak of END. The impact of such disposal activities would be proportionate to the size of the outbreak

. However, the likelihood of introduction of END into the United States as a result of the legal importation of live birds or poultry and poul try products for the EU

- 25 was found to be negligible

. Further, APHI S has in place broad and effective disease control measures that would be undertaken to minimize the potentially high animal health impacts from an END introduction and a subsequent outbr eak. For the rule amendment alternative , all of the above preventive and disease containment measures will be followed. All of the measures described above are required by the 25 EU countries with respect to the surveillance for, prevention of, and control of outbreaks of END through the harmonized measures established by the EC

. These measures are compatible with OI E Terrestrial Animal Code in terms of biosecurity , monitoring, and other restrictions , and the periods of time for which the conditions mus t be maintained in order for a region to be classified as END free (O IE , 200 9 b )

. USDA

–APHI S prepared a risk evaluation document that accompanies this e nvironmental a ssessment (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 ). The conclusion in this document is that, assuming all relev ant guidelines and requirements from the regulations are followed, while the impacts of an outbreak of END would be potentially

substantial, the risk of introduction of END into the United States , or the risk of an outbreak as a result of the rule amendment for 25 EU countries importing live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry

carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds is low. **b. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HP**  **AI)** HPAIis a disease caused by influenzavirus A genus viruses. Influenza A virus ty pes also include viruses that cause influenza in humans, horses, pigs , and dogs. While it is ty pical for an influenza virus to infect only a host

- specific species (i.e., equine influenza in horses or canine influenza in dogs ), occasionally

the se viruses will infect other species. Influenza**13** viruses can also change often through mutation, shift , or drift, causing the emergence of new t ypes of viruses with differing pathogenicity ( Sway ne 2003 )

. Of the three general categorie s of influenza viruses (A, B, and C), only ty pe A is known to infect avian species. Avian influenza viruses are classified as either high or low pathogenicit y. In general, all avian influenza viruses are highly contagious and cause different effects in i nfected avian species depending on the strain with which the bird is infected and the species of bird infected

. Additional f actors such as the immune status of the infected animal , environmental conditions and secondary infections can also influence effec ts on infected birds . Low pathogenicity

viruses generall y cause mild disease in poultry , while high pathogenicity

viruses can result in 90 to 100 percent mortality in infected flocks. Isolation and identification of the virus and its pathoty pe in the lab oratory

are required for definitive diagnosis of HPAI ( OI E , 2002 b; OI E , 2009 a)

. HPAIviruses are primarily spread within infected flocks through contact with feces, saliva , and nasal secretions. HPAI viruses have been detected in large quantities in fe cal matter. HPAI can also be transmitted through contaminated feed, water, clothing, broken eggs , or other fomites 4 . The average incubation period of HPAI is reported to be 3 to 5 day s ( OI E , 2002 b ) . For purposes of establishing the guidelines for monito ring and control of HPAI, OIE considers the incubation period to be 21 day s (OIE, 200 9 a)

. A ll avian species should be considered to be susceptible to infection by avian influenza viruses (OI E , 2002 b ; Perkins and Sway ne, 200 1 ) . The measures for controlli ng the introduction of HPAI into uninfected flocks are similar to the measures described above for END. In general, these methods include:

 preventing contact between health y birds and birds of unknown health status that could potentially transmit HPAI;
 quarantine of newl y acquired birds for at least 30 day s before introduction into an existing flock;
 practicing good biosecurity ; and
 routine disease surveillance.

4 A fomite is an object that may be contaminated with infectious organisms and serve in their transmission.**14** If an HPAI outbreak were to be detected, measures for controlling the spread of the outbre ak are also similar to the measures used for controlling END outbreaks. In general, these measures include:

 immediate quarantine of suspect flocks;
 epidemiologic investigation;
 establishing protective and surveillance zones around infected flock(s);
 depo pulation of infected and potentially exposed birds;
 appropriate disposal of carcasses and associated animal products; and ,  extensive cleaning and disinfection of affected premises. Because of the potentially high mortality in infected birds and the need to depopulate infected animals, the animal health consequences of the introduction of HPAI resulting in an outbreak of the disease in the United States are significant. The primary environmental impacts from any of the mitigation and control measures desc ribed above would result from the disposal of large numbers of contaminated carcasses and associated animal products , such as feces or animal litter , from an outbreak of HPAI. The impact of such disposal activities would be proportionate to the size and duration of the outbreak

. However, the likelihood of introduction of HPA I into the United States as a result of the lega l importation of live birds or poultry and poultry products from the EU

- 25 was found to be very low

. Further, APHI S has in place broa d and effective disease control measures that would be undertaken to minimize the potentially high animal health impacts from HPAIintroduction and any subsequent outbreak that would be no different than that of an outbreak of domestic origin

. All of the animal health control measures described above are required b y the 25 EU countries with respect to the surveillance for, prevention of, and control of outbreaks of HPAI through the harmonized measures established by

the EC. These measures are compatible with the OIE Terrestrial Animal Code including the appropriate standards that must be met for biosecurit y, monitoring, quarantine and movement restrictions , and other conditions that must be met in order for a country to be classified as HPAI free (OI E , 20 0 9 a)

. USDA

–APHI S prepared a risk evaluation document that accompanies this e nvironmental a ssessment (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 ). The conclusion in this document is that, assuming all relevant guidelines and requirements from the regulations are followed, although the impacts of an outbreak of HPAI would be potentially

substantial, the risk of introduction of HPAI into the United States , or the risk of an outbreak as a result of the rule amendment**15** for 25 EU countries importing live birds, poultry carcasses, parts o r products of poultry

carcasses, and eggs of poultry , game birds, or other birds is very low. The H5 and H7 influenza viruses have the potential to change from a low pathogenic virus into a highl y pathogenic virus capable of causing death in most infected poultry

. The “Asian” strain of H5N1 avian influenza virus has been transmitted from infected birds to mammals. Inaddition to wild birds and domestic poultry, infection with th is H5N1 virus has been found in domestic cats, tigers, leopards, dogs, swine , and humans. Th is H5N1 virus has the potential to kill the infected subjects. Avian influenza virus can survive in phy sical environments (such as water and manure) for man y days depending on the environmental conditions. Humans are the primary

spreade rs of avian influenza virus between flocks through clothing, footw ear , hands, and equipment (Trampel, 2006)

. END is transmitted through direct contact between healthy birds and the bodily discharges of infected birds, specificall y feces and secretions fr om the nose, mouth, and ey es. It spreads rapidly among birds in confinement, such as commercially

raised chickens. Like HPAI, END can be spread b y feed, water, tools, premises, human clothing and shoes, from an infected flock to a health y flock . Often i t is spread b y vaccination and debeaking crews, manure haulers, rendering

- truck drivers, feed

- delivery personnel, poultry buy ers, egg - service workers, and poultry farm owners and employees ( Seal et al, 2000 ; USDA

–APHI S, 2003). If an introduction of HPAI o r END into United S tates poultry were to occur, potential impacts to the phy sical environment could result from disposal of carcasses due to death from disease and depopulation of poultry herds or disposal of contaminated bedding and manure. USDA’s authority , under the Animal Health Protection Act , provides for the control and eradication of serious foreign animal disease agents; ty pically , these efforts include depopulation and disposal of affected or exposed livestock , and of domestic commercial birds. Because of its statutory authorities for protection of human health and the environment, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA ) (both S tate and local authorities) could be consulted by

USDA

–APHI S for technical assistance regarding poultry carcass d isposal. Similar to EPA’s support role to USDA in providing technical assistance and guidance on carcass disposal options, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) would coordinate the Federal government’s surveillance of wild migratory

birds for the pr esence of highl y pathogenic avian influenza and coordinate Federal surveillance with related surveillance activities of S tate fish and wildlife agencies

. The U.S. DOI is also the primary Federal **2. Phy sical**  **Environment 16**  department responsible for addressing avian influenza matter s in wild, free

- ranging bird species. Disposal methods for poultry carcasses include rendering, landfill, incineration, and on

- farm burial or burning

. If not handled properly , disposal of infected animals and materials could impact air, water, and soil quality , and potentiall y release the live END or HPAIvirus into the environment. Factors influencing proper disposal methods include the volume of infected animals and contaminated materials, geographic features of the area (e.g. water resources and soi l ty pe), other phy sical environment considerations (such as weather and temperature), and available funds, equipment, and personnel. T he use of disinfectants to prevent the transfer of the END or HPAI virus from surfaces could impact the phy sical enviro nment
. If not used properl y, disinfectants could end up in sewage s ys tems and potentially impact aquatic s ys tems, impact air qualit y or terrestrial ecos ys tems during use, and cause health problems, such as dermal or respiratory impacts to workers using th em. As part of an animal disease eradication program, disinfection of equipment, transport vehicles, and/or premises where infected poultry

were maintained would be necessary to prevent mechanical transfer of the HAPI or END virus. Disinfectants used for such purposes would have to be registered for specific use with EPA and used according to label requirements. Label instructions for a disinfectant would be provided for its proper application to prevent potential environmental impacts associated with th e use of the registered product (EPA , 2008 ; Pollard et al., 2008)

. END can be considered a human pathogen , producing transient, usuall y localized, infection

. Reported infections have been non

- life threatening and usually

not debilitating for more than a day or two. The most frequentl y reported and best substantiated clinical signs in human infections have been the result of accidental exposure to the agent in a laboratory

setting resulting in ey e infections usually consisting of unilateral or bilatera l reddening, excessive tear production, edema (abnormal accumulation of fluid beneath the skin) of the eyelids, conjunctivitis (swelling, inflammation, or infection of the membrane lining the ey elids) and sub

- conjunctival hemorrhage (bleeding underneath th e eye)

. Although the effect on the eye may be quite severe, infections are usuall y transient and the cornea is not affected. Reports of other clinical sy

mptoms in humans infected with the virus that causes END are less well substantiated, but suggest a m ore generalized infection may sometimes occur resulting in chills, headaches , and fever, with or without conjunctivitis. There is evidence that both vaccinal and virulent (for poultry) strains of the virus that cause END may infect and cause clinical **3. Public Health** **17** sign s in humans. There is no evidence of human

- to
- human spread (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 )

. The risk from avian influenza is generall y low to most people, because the viruses do not usually

infect humans. However, confirmed cases of human infection from several sub ty pes of avian influenza infection have been reported since 1997. Most cases of avian influenza infection in humans have resulted from direct contact with infected poultry (e.g., domesticated chicken, ducks, and turkey s) or surfaces contaminated with secr etions or excretions from infected birds. The spread of avian influenza viruses from one ill person to another has been reported very rarely , and has been limited, inefficient , and unsustained. During an outbreak of avian influenza among poultry , there i s a possible risk to people who have contact with infected birds , birds that died from the disease or surfaces that have been contaminated with secretions or excretions from infected birds (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 )

. Sy mptoms of avian influenza in humans have ran ged from t ypical human influenza

- like sy

mptoms (e.g., fever, cough, sore throat, and muscle aches) to ey e infections, pneumonia, severe respiratory diseases (such as acute respiratory

distress), and other severe and life

- threatening complications. The sy

mptoms of avian influenza depend on the strain of the virus that caused the infection (USDA

–APHI S, 2011 )

. The World Health Organization (WHO) has reported cases of the “Asian” strain of H5N1 avian influenza in humans in Asia, Africa, the Pacific, Europe , and the Near East. In donesia , Egy pt and Vietnam have reported the highest number of human H5N1 cases , to date , with mortalities of up to 60 percent , especiall y in cases where patients were hospitalized late in the illness. Despite the high mortality, human cases of H5N1 remain rare to date. The most significant risk factor for human H5N1 infection is direct contact with sick or dead poultry or wild birds (USDA

–APHIS, 2011 )

. In North America , there have been two reports of AI tr ansmission to humans, in C anada and New York. However, in the most extensive outbreak of avian influenza (HPAIH5N2) to occur in the United States 5 the re were no cases of transmission to humans

. InNovember 2003, a patient with serious underlying medical conditions was admitted t o a hospital in New York with respiratory s ymptoms but recovered after a few weeks. Initial ly laboratory tests identified the influenza A virus as H1N1 ; however, s ubsequent confirmatory tests showed that the patient had been infected with an H7N2 avian in fluenza A virus

. However, no contact with infected birds or poultry could be documented in this case

.

5 This outbreak occurred in February 2004 in Texas.**18** In February

2004, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency announced an outbreak of avian influenza A (H7N3) in poultry in the Fraser Valley region of Britis h Columbia. Health Canada reported two human cases of laboratory

confirmed influenza A (H7) , one in a person involved in culling operations and one in a poultry worker w ith close contact with infected poultry

. Both patients developed conjunctivitis (eye infection) and other flu

- like sy

mptoms and their illnesses resolved after treatment with antiviral medication. Another group of approximately 10 other poultry workers exhibited conjunctival and/or upper respiratory s ymptoms after having contact with poultry ; however laboratory testing did not confirm infection

. S hould a substantial foreign animal disease outbreak occur in the United States , f armers and their families could suffer psychologically from the loss of animals, including blood lines maintained over man y generations , the loss of control over their business due to animal movement restrictions , disruptions in community life , and from stress over their financial future

. Further, these losses would affect the farming community as a whole. **a. Environmental Executive Orders** Some executive orders such as Executive Order 13045 ( Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safet y Risks ) , and Executive Order 12898 ( Federal Actions t o Address Environmental Justice in Minority

Populations and L ow - In come Populations ) , and departmental or agency directives require special environmental reviews in certain circumstances. In considering these additional environmental review requirements, n o circumstance that would trigger the need for special environmental reviews is involved in implementing the action considered in this document. The rule amendment alternative presents no risk to the health or safety

of children , and will not result in di sproportionately high and adverse human health and/or environmental effects on an y minorit y populations and/or low

- income populations in the United States. **b. Endangered Species A** **ct** Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and its implementing regulati ons require Federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likel y to jeopardize the continued existence of threatened or endangered species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. APHIS considered the potential eff ects of this rulemaking on threatened and endangered species and designated critical habitat. All federally listed bird species in the United States and its Territories (appendix A ) may be susceptible to END and HPAI , although susceptibility of different ty

pes of birds may be variable. **4. A dditi**  **onal Environ**  **** **m ental**  **Review Consider**  **** **a tions** **19** APHI S conducted a risk anal ys is that concluded the overall risk of introducing either END or HPAI into the United States through the import of live birds, poultry

carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and egg s of poultry , game birds , or other birds from the EU

- 25 to be very low

. This determination is based on the following for the EU

- 25 (USDA

– APHI S, 2011 ) :

• the region has an effective veterinary infrastructure capable of identifying and applying control meas ures to eradicate incursions of END or HPAI in domestic poultry ;
• the region has a comprehensive legislative framework in place to ensure consistent implementation of EC legislation by all EU

- 25 M ember S tates . EC services provide resources to review and inspect for compliance ;
• END and HPAI are notifiable (reportable) diseases in the region ;
• a ppropriate surveillance is in place with the capacity to effectivel y and quickly

detect the presence of END or HPAI, even in the absence of clinical signs ;
• l a boratory confirmation capabilities are effective , and laboratory testing procedures are well documented and standardized ;
• END and HPAI eradication programs include implementation of appropriate quarantine and surveillance zones, with monitoring of those zones and movement restrictions. Procedures for establishing and lifting quarantines are sufficient to prevent further spread of disease ; and,

• c ontingency

plans, standard operating procedures , and biosecurit y measures for emergency

response are well doc umented , and relevant personnel are well resourced and trained. Based upon the low likelihood that END or HPAI would become establish ed in the United States as a result of poultry imports from the EU

- 25 , and the effectiveness of the movement restrictions included i n 9 CFR § 92.3 , the effect of an END or HPAI outbreak on federally listed endangered or threatened birds, birds proposed for listing as threatened or endangered, or designated critical habitat would be no different than a domestic outbreak of eith er disease such that the implementation of the final rulemaking is expected to have no effect

.**20** 

## IV **. A gencies**  **Contacted** Environmental and Risk Analy sis Services Policy and Program Development Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Ag riculture 4700 River Road, Unit 149 Riverdale, MD 20737 Regionalization Evaluation Services National Center for Import & Export Veterinary

Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 38 Riverda le, MD 20737 Regulatory

Anal ys is and Development Policy and Program Development Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 118 Riverdale, MD 20737**21** 

## V. References Alexander, D. J. , 2003. “Newcastle Disease.” In Diseases of Poultry , 11th ed. Saif, Y. M., H. J. Barnes, A. M. Fadl y, et al (E ds). Iowa, Blackwell Publishing : 64

- 87. EPA

— See U

. S

. Environmental Protection Agency. FWS

— See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service OI E

— See World Organization for Anima l Health. Perkins, L .E.L ., and Sway ne , D.E., 2001. Pathobiology of A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 (H5N1) Avian i nfluenza v irus in s even g allinaceous s pecies. Vet Pathol 38: 149

– 164

. Pollard, S.J.T., Gordon , A.W. , Hickman, P

. I ., Rupert , L. , Hough, D

. M. , G auntlett, S

. F. , Howson, A

. H

. , Gay ford , P., and Gent , N., 2008. Exposure a ssessment of c arcass d isposal o ptions in the e vent of a n otifiable e xotic animal d isease: Application to avian i nfluenza v irus Environ. Sci. Tech., 42, 3145

– 3154. Seal B. S., King, D.J., and Sellers , H.S., 2000. The avian response to Newcastle disease virus. Developmental and Comparative Immunology 24 (2000) 257

- 268

. Sway ne, D. E., and Halvorson , D. A. , 2003. “Influenza” in Diseases of Poultry , 11th ed. Saif, Y. M., H. J . Barne s, A. M. Fadl y, et al (Eds). Iowa, Blackwell Publishing: 135

- 106. Trampel, D.W. , 2006. Manure disposal following an outbreak of avian influenza on a commercial poultry farm. Odor and Nutrient Management, Summer 2006 EDC

- 129

- 32, Vol. 9, I ssue 2. USDA

–APHI S

— See U

. S

. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

. USFWS

–TESS ─See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service U

. S

. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA

–APHI S), 2011

. APHIS Risk Evaluation of the Importation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Virulent Newcastle Disease (

E N D) Virus from a European Union Region of Twenty

- five Member States (March , 2011, revised March, 2012 ).**22** U

. S

. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service , 2003. Exotic Newcastle Disease: A deadly disease that affects poultry and pet birds. Program Aid No. 1739 , Issued March 2003. [Online.] Availab le: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pub_ahend.html [2009, Aug. 26.] U

. S

. Environmental Protection Agency , 2008. Frequently a sked questions: Pandemic f

lu. [Online.] Available: http://www.epa.gov/pandemicflu/faq.htm [2009, Aug. 26.] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species Sy stem. http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/SpeciesReport.do last acccessed April 5, 2012. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2002 a . Newcastle Disease , Animal Diseases Data ; Technica l Disease Card

. [Online.] Available: http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A160.htm [2009, July 27.] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2002 b

. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influ enza , Animal Diseases Data ; Technical Disease Card

. [Online.] Available: http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A150.htm [2009, July

27.] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2 00 9 a . Terrestrial Animal Health Code , Chapter 2.7.12: Avian Influenza. [2009, July 27.] World Organization for Animal Health ( OI E), 2009 b

. Terrestrial Animal Health Code , Chapter 10.13: Newcastle Disease. [Online.] Available: http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.10.13.htm [2009, July

29.] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2009 c . Chapter 2.3.4: Avian Influenza. [Online.] Available: http://www.oie.int/eng/Normes/mmanual/2008/pdf/2.03.04_AI.pdf [2009, Aug. 26.] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2009 d

. Terrestrial Diagnostic Manual , Chapter 2.3.14: Newcastle Disease. Available: http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mmanual/A_summry .htm [2009, July 29.]**1** 

## Ap **pendix A** 
**. Threatened and**  **E ndangered**  **B irds** 

**F ederally**  **L isted in the United States and**  **I ts**  **T err**  **itories (USFWS**
**– TESS,**  **20 12**  **). 2** 

Appendix 1. Threatened and endangered birds federall y - listed in the United States and its territories (USFWS, TESS, 2012).

**Scientific Name Comm**  **on Name Critical**  **Habitat (Y/N)**  **Lis ting** 

**Status*** Accipiter striatis venator Puerto Rican sharp

- shinned hawk N E Acrocephalus familiaris kingi Nihoa millerbird N E Acrocephalus luscinia Nightingale reed warbler N E Aerodramus vanikorensis bartschi Mariana gray swiftlet N E Agelaius xant

homus Yellow

- shouldered bla ckbird Y E Amazona vittata Puerto Rican parrot N E Ammodramus maritimus mirabilis Cape Sable seaside sparrow Y E Ammodramus savannarum floridanus Florida grasshopper sparrow N E Amphispiza belli clementeae San Clemente sage s parrow N T Anas laysanensis Laysan duck N E Anas wyvilliana Hawaiian (=koloa) duck N E Aphelcoma coerulescens Florida scrub

- jay N T Brachyramphus marmoratus Marbled murrelet Y T Branta (=Nesochen) sandvicensis Hawaiian goose N E Buteo platypterus bru nnescens Puerto Riacn broad

- wi nged hawk N E Buteo solitarius Hawaiian (=’Io) hawk N E Campephilus principalis Ivory

- billed woodpecker N E Caprimulgus noctitherus Puerto Rican nightjar N E Charadrius alexandrinus nivosus Western snowy plover Y T Charad rius melodus Piping plover Y E;T Chasiempis sandwichensis ibidis Oahu elepaio Y E Colinus virginianus ridgwayi Masked bobwhite (quail) N E Columba inornata wetmorei Puerto Rican plain pigeon N E Corvus hawaiiensis Hawaiian (=’alala) crow N E Corvus ku baryi Mariana (=aga) crow Y E Corvus leucognaphalus White

- necked crow N E Dendroica chrysoparla Colden

- cheeked warbler N E Dendroica kirtlandii Kirtland’s warbler N E Empidonax traillii extimus Southwestern willow flycatcher Y E Falco femoralis septe ntrionalis Northern aplomado falcon N E;XN Fulica americana alai Hawaiian coot N E Gallinula chloropus guami Mariana common moorhen N E Gallinula chloropus sandvicensis Hawaiian common moorhen N E Grus americana Whooping crane Y E;XN Grus canadensis p ulla Mississippi sandhill crane Y E Gymnogyps californianus California condor Y E;XN Halcyon cinnamomina Guam Micronesia kingfisher Y E**3**

cinnamomina Hemignathus lucidus Nukupu’u (honeycreeper) N E Hemignathus munroi Akiapola’au (honeycreeper) N E Hemignathus procerus Kauai akailoa (honeycreeper) N E Himantopus mexicanus knudseni Hawaiian stilt N E Lanius ludovicianus mearnsi San Clemente loggerhead shrike N E Loxioides bailleui Palila (honeycreeper) Y E Loxops caeruleirostris Akekee Y E Loxops cocc ineus ochraceus Maui akepa (honeycreeper) N E Loxops coccineus coccineus Hawaii akepa (honeycreeper) N E Megapodius laperouse Micronesian megapode N E Melamprosops phaeosoma Po’ouli (honeycreeper) N E Moho braccatus Kauai ‘o’o (honeyeater) N E Myadestes lanaiensis rutha Molokai thrush N E Myadestes myadestinus Large Kauai (=kamao) thrush N E Myadestes palmeri Small Kauai (=puaioho) thrush N E Mycteria americana Wood stork N E Numenius borealis Eskimo curlew N E Oreomystis bairdi Kauai creeper Y E Oreomystis mana Hawaiian creeper N E Palmeria dolei Crested honeycreeper N E Paroreomyza flammea Molokai creeper N E Paroreomyza maculata Oahu creeper N E Pelecanus occidentalis Brown pelican N E Phoebastria (=Diomedea) albatrus Short

- tailed albatros s N E Phoenicoparrus andinus Andean flamingo N PE Picoides borealis Red

- cockaded woodpecker N E Pipilo crissalis eremophilus Inyo California towhee Y T Polioptila californica californica Coastal California gnatcatcher Y T Polyborus plancus audubonii Audobon’s crested caracara N T Polysticta stelleri Steller’s eider Y T Pseudonestor xanthophrys Maui parrotbill (honeycreeper) N E Psittirostra psittacea ‘O’u (honeycreeper) N E Pterodroma phaeopygia sandwichensis Hawaiian dark

- rumped petrel N E Puffin us auricularis newelli Newell’s Townsend’s shearwater N T Puffinus heinrothi Heinroth’s shearwater N PT Rallus longirostris levipes Light

- footed clapper rail N E Rallus longirostris obsoletus California clapper rail N E Rallus longirostris yumanensis Yuma clapper rail N E Rallus owstoni Guam rail N E;XN Rostrhamus sociabilis plumbeus Everglade snail kite Y E Somateria fischeri Spectacled eider Y T Sterna antillarum Least tern N E Sterna antillarum browni California least tern N E**4**

Sterna dougallii dougallii Roseate tern N E;T Strix occidentalis caurina Northern spotted owl Y T Strix occidentalis lucida Mexican spotted owl Y T Telespyza cantans Laysan finch (honeycreeper) N E Telespyza ultima Nihoa finch (honeycreeperP N E Tympanuchus cupido att

wateri Att water’s greater prairie

chicken N E Vermivora bachmanii Bachman’s warbler N E Vireo atricapilla Black

- capped vireo N E Vireo bellii pusillus least Bell’s vireo Y E Zosterops conspicillatus conspicillatus Bridled white

- ey e N E Zosterops roten sis Rota bridled white

- eye Y E *E=endangered T=threatened PE=Proposed for listing as endangered PT=Proposed for listing as threatened XN=experimental population