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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S QUADRENNIAL

DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

JACK REED, Rhode Island

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

BILL NELSON, Florida

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

JOHN WARNER, Virginia

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

DAVID S. LYLES, Staff Director

LES BROWNLEE, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

OCTOBER 4, 2001

Page

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Lt. Gen.

Bruce Carlson, U.S. Air Force, Director for Force Structure, Resources

and Assessment, Joint Staff ................................................................................ 84

(III)

(1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S QUADRENNIAL

DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a.m. in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Carnahan, Warner, Inhofe, Roberts, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.

Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director;

and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel;

Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff

member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Maren

Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter

K. Levine, general counsel; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff

member; and Terence P. Szuplat, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Republican

staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L.

David Cherington, minority counsel; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member;

Gary M. Hall, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, minority

counsel; Suzanne K. L. Ross, research assistant; Joseph T. Sixeas,

professional staff member; Cord A. Sterling, professional staff

member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F. Walsh,

minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert, Gabriella Eisen, Thomas

C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members’ assistants present: Menda S. Fife, assistant

to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator

Lieberman; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka;

William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator

Carnahan; Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman; J. Mark

Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine

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Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant

to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee

meets today to receive testimony on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and

Lt. Gen. Bruce Carlson, Director for Force Structure, Resources

and Assessment on the Joint Staff. Deputy Secretary of Defense

Wolfowitz played a key role in overseeing and shaping the QDR.

Lt. Gen. Bruce Carlson played a leading role in ensuring that this

review took account of the views of the military leadership, and we

welcome you both to the committee this morning.

Before we begin, allow me just to take a moment to commend our

civilian defense and military leadership for the outstanding professionalism and the dedication that they have shown in the weeks

since the horrific attacks of September 11. Everyone in this country

and the international community now knows in this war on terrorism our unity is strong.

This committee and entire Congress stands with the President as

we track down, root out, and relentlessly pursue the terrorists and

their networks behind those attacks, and go after the states that

support and harbor those terrorists and those networks.

Congress established the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1999 to

ensure a regular and comprehensive examination of our Nation’s

defense strategy and force structure best suited to implement that

strategy. Congress intended the QDR to be the road map that the

Department of Defense and Congress would follow in building the

future years defense program.

This year the QDR assumed special significance because Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified it would include the

results of his Defense Strategy Review and would play a major role

in shaping the administration’s fiscal year 2003 budget request. In

his assessment of this QDR, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton, stated that the strategy and

recommendations that it outlines ‘‘are a major step toward’’ meeting the twin challenges of ensuring that U.S. forces can protect and

advance U.S. interests in the near term as well as transform to

meet future security challenges.

However, he also stated that, ‘‘While the QDR sets the broad direction for transforming to meet defense demands of the future,

there remains a need for a more comprehensive road map that will

sustain the tenuous balance between strategy and resources.’’

This QDR seems to me to be full of decisions deferred. ‘‘Decisions’’ are often couched in the future tense—decisions that will be

made or actions that will be taken at some undefined point in the

future. Indeed, as the QDR states, ‘‘This report represents not so

much an end but a beginning.’’ Rather than the comprehensive

road map to the force of the future envisioned by Congress, this review largely, to borrow General Shelton’s words, ‘‘provides a vision.’’

Included in this vision are several conceptual changes that are

collectively termed a ‘‘paradigm shift’’ for a ‘‘new force-sizing construct.’’ Each of these changes raises important questions for this

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committee and for this country. First, homeland security is ‘‘restored’’ as the military’s ‘‘highest priority.’’ In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the need for homeland defense is surely clearer than ever. But less clear from the QDR is how the military will rearrange itself to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil

and support civilian authorities in managing their deadly consequences, or how the military will interact with the new Office of

Homeland Security.

The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard

Meyers, testified at his confirmation hearing 3 weeks ago that,

‘‘this whole issue of homeland defense or homeland security needs

a lot more thought.’’ The committee looks forward to specifics on

the administration’s thinking on this important issue within the

context of its overall defense review and strategy.

Second, the QDR embraces a so-called ‘‘capabilities-based model’’

for planning purposes that emphasizes how an adversary might

challenge U.S. forces rather than where that challenge might occur.

The QDR report acknowledges that this approach is a ‘‘concept,’’

and the committee welcomes testimony on the specific implications

that this conceptual approach will have on how we modernize, size,

and deploy our Armed Forces.

Finally, the QDR states that U.S. forces must ‘‘remain capable of

swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two

theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes’’ and that U.S.

forces must be capable of ‘‘decisively defeating an adversary in one

of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing America’s will and removing any future

threat it could pose.’’ The committee welcomes testimony of the

specifics behind such a strategy, whether and how such a strategy

would impact force structure, and how this strategy differs from

the existing requirement that U.S. forces be able to fight two Major

Theater Wars (MTWs) nearly simultaneously.

In my judgment, as well as that of many others, terrorism is the

most immediate threat to our security. It has also been a concern

to many of my colleagues, particularly those on the Emerging

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, as well as former colleagues Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. However, even

as we address this most immediate and significant threat, we must

remember it is not the only threat. The United States must maintain ready and versatile military forces capable of conducting other

operations, from deterring and defeating large-scale cross-border

aggression to participating in smaller-scale contingencies, to dealing with drug trafficking. We needed military forces to meet all

these threats before September 11, and we need military forces to

meet these threats after September 11.

Senator Warner and I asked the General Accounting Office

(GAO) to conduct a review of the Quadrennial Defense Review in

the coming months, and I know that the Department will cooperate

with the GAO in its effort to analyze the QDR for the committee.

Today’s hearing will be the first in a series over the coming

weeks, including hearings to receive testimony from experienced

outside observers on the QDR and testimony from the Intelligence

Community on the terrorist threat to the United States. This committee is determined to work with the administration to use our

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military forces wisely, to preserve a high quality of life for U.S.

forces and their families, to sustain readiness, and to transform the

Armed Forces to meet the threats and the challenges of tomorrow.

I am going to call on Senator Warner and ask that Senator

Carnahan’s statement and a copy of the QDR be inserted in the

record after his remarks. Before I do so I wanted to say the following. It is necessary that Secretary Wolfowitz leave at noon, which

is a change in our schedule and which we are happy to make to

accommodate him. However, that then requires that we continue

this hearing with Secretary Wolfowitz and General Carlson at a

later time.

We do want to accommodate Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and so

after Senator Warner has his opening statement we will turn to

Secretary Wolfowitz and General Carlson for their statements. We

will then have just a few minutes today to each ask questions, and

we will pick that up at a later time. Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In view of the

schedule of our distinguished guest and witness here this morning,

I will defer delivering my statement, asking that it be put in the

record along with the statements of Senator Thurmond and Senator Sessions. I will make two brief observations.

Our President, George Bush, has acted with extraordinary courage in the aftermath of September 11. I look back to his landmark

speech at The Citadel when he gave his vision as a candidate for

President as to how our national security structure should be reshaped to meet the changing threats of the world. It is just remarkable to think that that was done months and months before he was

elected President and then of course this incident.

I know from speaking with you that the Department was moving

in several directions prior to September 11. Understandably you

had to retrench in this document to meet the deadlines of issuing

it, which were important. At the same time you had to leave the

document flexible, such that as you continue to learn from the 11th

and the changing threats to the world—threats that we really

never envisioned could have happened—you could move forward

with directing the security policy of this country.

A difficult task, Mr. Secretary and General, and I commend the

Secretary of Defense, yourselves, and the former Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and now the present chairman, the present

chairman having had a great deal to do with this document in the

preparation of it.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statements of Senators Carnahan, Warner, Thurmond, Sessions and the QDR Report follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wish to welcome Secretary Wolfowitz and General

Carlson. Today, we will begin to assess the findings and recommendations of the

Quadrennial Defense Review. As the primary blueprint of America’s military, this

document must lay out clear objectives for the size, shape, and posture of the United

States Armed Services.

The world changed September 11, 2001, and the Armed Forces must transform

to meet the needs of today’s security environment. I hope that we will use this hearVerDate 11-SEP-98 11:07 Apr 17, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 77281.085 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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ing to clarify the Defense Department’s role in confronting terrorist threats, and determine the future structure of our military establishment.

I believe that this QDR proposes several improvements in force planning to meet

the most pressing threats to our Nation. Previously, the military was designed according to a strategy for fighting two major theater wars, simultaneously. In addition, the Armed Services prepared for combat against particular nations that might

threaten vital American interests.

The new QDR proposes a different approach—the creation of a ‘‘capabilitiesbased’’ force. Rather than anticipate wars against specific nations, the Defense Department will try to design its requirements according to the United States’ actual

defense needs. Our capabilities will be shaped by the missions the United States

is most likely to pursue. Instead of a two-major theater war strategy, the military

will effectively prepare for homeland defense, small contingencies, peacekeeping,

and weapons of mass destruction protection.

The new QDR is not a model of clarity. While defining several military requirements and potential threats to American security, it uses a great deal of ambiguous

language to outline the shape of military’s transformation.

But upon review, I believe it does promote a sound military structure for the future that will meet the security demands of the 21st century. I believe to fulfill the

requirements of this document we will need:

• strong investments in airlift platforms, such as C–17s;

• a bigger long range bomber arsenal with modern aircraft such as the B–

2;

• continued advancements in tactical aircraft for all the services;

• greater joint capabilities; and

• improvements in our readiness to address assymetric threats, such as

chemical and biological weapons

This means we must be ready to defend America’s interests at home and abroad

at a moment’s notice.

Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by highlighting one particularly significant

sentence in this document: ‘‘Protecting the American homeland from attack is the

foremost responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces.’’ America’s military is currently

mobilizing to do just that. I believe that armed with a suitable vision for transformation we will be ready to take on these threats. We will win this war on terrorism, and we will continue to prepare our forces to meet the emerging dangers of

the 21st century.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for holding this important hearing on

the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review. I join you in welcoming

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz back before the committee, and in welcoming Lieutenant General Carlson, the Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment,

for the Joint Staff. We look forward to your testimony.

As mandated by Congress, we received the QDR report this week. It is important

to note, this is not the end of a process, but the beginning. It is the beginning of

implementing the vision our President laid out in speeches at the Citadel in September 1999 and at the National Defense University in May 2001, when he called

for a primary emphasis on homeland security and the transformation of our Armed

Forces to be able to deter, detect and defeat the very different threats we will face

in the 21st century. It is the beginning, also, of the dialogue between Congress and

the executive branch on providing the resources to fully support this new national

military strategy.

This is clearly a critical juncture in our military history, and in the history of our

Nation. Even before the tragic events of September 11, the United States had assumed a unique leadership role in the world, especially in the realm of international

security. In the aftermath of the cowardly acts of terrorism of September 11, virtually all of the civilized world has been shocked into the recognition that terrorism

is an insidious evil that must be quickly and effectively eliminated. United in purpose like never before, the world community joins the United States in taking the

actions necessary to rid the world of these despicable terrorist networks and restore

a sense of global confidence and security. Likewise, here at home, we must have a

strong sense of security, especially against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States Armed Forces can, and will, rise to meet this current challenge.

We must also prepare now for future challenges.

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It had become increasingly apparent in recent years that this post-Cold War world

was unexpectedly divisive, with very different enemies than in the past. What is

now clearer than ever is that we must act quickly and decisively to transform our

Armed Forces by developing and fielding the capabilities that will enable us to

counter future adversaries, regardless of how they attempt to confront us. This requires a bold shift in thinking about our national security. The QDR you have provided to Congress this week provides us the bold thinking and leadership we need

to move ahead.

We have experienced a great tragedy in our Nation and a blow to our sense of

security and freedom. We do not know from where the next challenge to our freedom, security and vital national interests will come, but of one thing we can be

sure—it will come, and we must be ready.

Because we cannot predict with certainty where, when, and with whom we will

have to fight—if, regrettably, deterrence fails—we must have balanced land, sea and

aerospace forces that are characterized by exceptional lethality, precision, flexibility

and versatility. We must have robust, balanced forces capable of responding to anticipated contingencies, forces that can quickly adapt to unanticipated contingencies,

and forces that provide the Nation a hedge against uncertainty—both now, and in

the future.

With the QDR, you have presented a strategy that focuses on how future adversaries will seek to attack us, rather than focusing on who and where those adversaries might be. That is the dynamic, forward thinking we need to prepare us for the

broad spectrum of threats our Nation will face.

Gentlemen, I commend you, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff for the prudent, thorough process you have undertaken to review our

defense strategy and key functional components of the Department in this Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). At a time when the Department is fully engaged in

planning and conducting military operations in response to the tragic events of September 11, you have met your obligation to provide a comprehensive Quadrennial

Defense Review to Congress, on time. You are to be commended for this accomplishment achieved under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

The framers of our Constitution anticipated the future needs of our Nation well,

establishing interdependent branches of Government to ensure thorough discussion

and debate on matters of high national interest, such as our national security strategy and our military strategy. I look forward to the dialogue, discussion and debate

ahead as we craft a defense plan that will realistically address our defense needs—

both now, and in the future.

I thank you both for your extraordinary service to our Nation, and for your testimony today. I cannot overstate the importance and urgency of this process that enters a new phase today—a collective effort to size, organize, train and equip the

types of forces our Nation requires and our leadership role in the world demands.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Thank you Mr. Chairman:

Welcome Mr. Secretary and General Carlson. I want to join Chairman Levin and

Senator Warner in expressing my appreciation to you for your appearance here this

morning. I know you are dealing with many pressing issues as the Nation prepares

to strike at the individuals who issued the orders to and supported the group of terrorists who carried out the heinous attack on our country.

Mr. Chairman, I consider the requirement for Quadrennial Defense Review one

of the more significant accomplishments during my tenure as Chairman of the

Armed Services Committee. Although the report we received earlier this week does

not fully address all the issues required by the enacting legislation, I believe it accomplished its primary goal of reviewing our defense strategy and stimulating debate on the future of our Armed Forces. I look forward to receiving the budget request for fiscal year 2003, which in my judgment will provide us a better appreciation of the true implications of the QDR.

Secretary Wolfowitz, although I believe the report avoided the difficult decisions

on force structure and modernization programs, it is significant in that it changes

our defense planning from a ‘‘threat-based’’ model to a ‘‘capabilities-based’’ model.

This is a significant reversal of the Cold War mentality and will allow the Department to focus on the variety of the threats that we will face in the coming decades.

The ‘‘capabilities-based’’ approach is long overdue and will revolutionize our defense

planning.

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Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the details on the QDR, but more important, I look forward to its implementation as reflected in the next budget request.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

Secretary Wolfowitz, General Carlson thank you for coming before us today to explain the Quadrennial Defense Review and to answer our questions. I know Secretary Wolfowitz has been working overtime to help build a coalition to fight the

evil that is terrorism. General Carlson, you have a very important duty as Director,

Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate and must have had a significant input into the QDR.

As you have testified previously, we need to transform our forces to meet the challenges of tomorrow while remaining strong today. The QDR describes its shift from

being a threat responsive document to becoming a capabilities based document. This

can be a promising new way to develop and plan for our force level needs. However,

the QDR was short on detail on the actual forces which the Department of Defense

thinks we will need today, next year, 10 years from now and in the decades to come.

I have been told that more detail will become available in the fiscal year 2003 budget submission. I hope that you can provide some of that detail today.

We in the Senate hold our responsibility to protect our Nation as our foremost

duty. We need the flesh to be added to the bones of the QDR so that we may know

how best to proceed.

I expected tough decisions to be made. I anticipate that they will. Perhaps this

will be in the termination of major weapon system procurement programs to fully

fund the next generations of transformational capabilities. Perhaps that will mean

short term sacrifice in exchange for long term gain, however, the cowardly attacks

of September 11 puts this in doubt. Perhaps the budget paradigms of September 10

are no longer valid, but if this is the case where does the administration expect to

find the money. If the money needed for transformation is not to be found in offsets within the Defense Department budget, then where do you propose we get it?

I am worried that the forces for the status quo prevailed over those standing for

transformation. Frankly, I expected some broken china and some protest, perhaps

even protest from myself, but it seems to me that we have just agreed on the status

quo. For instance, I read in a Pentagon press release, quoting a Senior Defense Official who is referring to the QDR that it ‘‘is a concerted effort to try to concentrate

on those items which the Secretary, the Defense Secretary, the Chairman, the Vice

Chairman, the service secretaries, the service chiefs, the combatant commanders,

and the lead Under Secretaries in the Department have all agreed upon.’’ While

these were certainly the right people to provide input into the QDR, I am surprised

that all have agreed upon its final form. It has been my experience that to achieve

consensus over such a broad group that the status quo ends up being the only acceptable answer to all the parties. Perhaps I am wrong in this assessment, and I

hope you can show me today where I am wrong.

Again, I think all of us, at least I can say this for myself, want to provide you

the resources you need to keep us secure, to keep us dominant on the battle fields

of today and the battlefields of the future, be this on the land, at sea, in the air,

or even in space. But to do this we need the details of your vision of transformation.

Another question I have, and one I suspect Secretary Rumsfeld has asked, what

are your standards for success? I have read of the general capabilities you desire

for our Armed Forces, but by which yard-stick will you know you have achieved your

goals? I too want to know these standards. It makes it easier to authorize expenditures when I know what they are for and how they will be measured.

I also have questions about some of the finer points of the QDR. For instance,

you state your commitment to address OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO concerns,

while at the same time committing up 5 percent of the forces for new experimentation programs. As I see it, adding new exercise requirements does not help to reduce the OPTEMPO–PERSTEMPO burden on our forces. If this is so, it is not apparent in the QDR report.

I applaud your continued focus on ballistic missile defense and space defense, and

your commitment to understand and counter the asymmetric threats which might

confront us. I think you also recognize the need for strength in our traditional combative competencies in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, in the active, Reserve, and National Guard forces.

Indeed the QDR calls for ‘‘building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across

the spectrum of possible force requirements, both functional and geographic.’’ This

sounds great, but I would like you to answer the next level of questions. What conVerDate 11-SEP-98 11:07 Apr 17, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 77281.085 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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stitutes a robust force? Is it a 600 ship Navy, a 20 division Army? Is it a 300 ship

Navy and a 10 division Army? Or is it something else? We want and need to know

these answers.

Secretary Wolfowitz, General Carlson you are confronted with the immediate need

to fight the battle against terrorists today, a very time- and resource-intensive endeavor, while at the same time stepping back and looking toward the future to determine what we will need to transform our forces in the decades to come. We need

you to do both, and I suspect you will do both well.

Again, I am glad that you are here and look forward to hearing your statements

and listening to your answers to our questions.

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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Secretary

Wolfowitz.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. BRUCE CARLSON,

U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT, JOINT STAFF

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for the change in schedule. As you know, Secretary Rumsfeld

is traveling and I have been asked to come to a meeting in his

place. But I will be happy to come back here and discuss this extremely important subject at greater length.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me just assure you, Secretary Wolfowitz,

that we can understand scheduling changes these days, and I know

everyone on this committee is supportive of what you are about. So

do not worry about inconveniencing us. We will just pick it up at

a later time.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me also say that we appreciate enormously the spirit of unanimous bipartisanship with which Congress

has worked with the President in the last few weeks in addressing

this incredible crisis that we face. In fact, I think we are being

challenged now in yet another way. It has sometimes been said facetiously that Washington cannot handle more than one crisis at

a time, and that was with reference to crises that were much

smaller than the one we face as a country now.

The subject we are addressing today, the Quadrennial Defense

Review, is really how we address the condition of our Armed Forces

10 years from now. Some people might say, well, you surely cannot

handle that at the same time that you are conducting a major campaign against terrorism worldwide. It is going to be a challenge,

but I think it is a challenge to which we have to rise.

We have to do both. We have to deal with the present, but we

have to think beyond the present to the future and recognize that,

just as we were taken by surprise on September 11, the surprises

of 10 or 15 years from now may be very different from what we

are going to contend with today.

On September 11, or really the day after, on September 12, we

asked ourselves the question: Given what had just happened, given

the campaign that we were obviously heading into, did it make any

sense to complete the Quadrennial Defense Review in the form that

it had essentially reached as of the time of the terrorist attacks,

or should we just simply put it on a shelf and start it all over

again?

We concluded, after some careful thought, that it was very important to complete it, not just because we had a statutory deadline, but because we think that the Quadrennial Defense Review

has set some very important directions whose importance and accuracy is only confirmed by the events of September 11. To us, September 11 means primarily that we need to move in those directions more rapidly and with more resources than we would have

envisioned before these attacks. But we think the directions are

fundamentally correct.

As the report says, these directions do represent a paradigm shift

in the way the Department thinks about its long-term requireVerDate 11-SEP-98 11:07 Apr 17, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77281.085 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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ments. A paradigm shift is difficult for even a small organization.

For an organization of several million people, uniformed and civilian, it is a very big task and it is not one that can be done overnight. We thought it is important to get on with it.

I am not going to even attempt to read my testimony. I know

members of this committee read very well. I would urge you to read

it, if you are interested, because a great deal of thought has gone

into this statement.

I would like to call your attention to page six where we list six

of the important ways in which we think the events of September

11 have confirmed the direction set in the Quadrennial Defense Review. First and most obvious, but I think also most important, the

emphasis on establishing homeland defense as the top Department

priority. Mr. Chairman, I think you have noted there is a great

deal of work to be done in defining what those requirements are,

and indeed one of the conclusions we reached in the review is that

we are just as a country, as a Department, at a very early stage

of figuring out what the role of the Department of Defense might

be, for example, in responding to a major act of terror with weapons of mass destruction. We have to accelerate that work and get

moving with it even faster. It is not something, obviously, to put

on the shelf.

A second emphasis in the new paradigm is the emphasis on uncertainty and surprise. Of course, one wants to have better intelligence. We are looking at ways to improve our intelligence, ways

to reduce the possibility of surprise. But I think it is a mistake to

think that the answer to the possibility of surprise is simply to improve your intelligence so that you will not encounter surprise. You

have to figure that surprise has been a fact of military history

throughout the years, throughout the decades, and you need to

have forces that have the flexibility to respond to the unexpected,

not simply to preview and predict the unexpected. Some time you

are going to miss, and when you miss you need to be flexible and

have a range of tools to respond.

Third, is the emphasis on contending with asymmetric threats.

We just saw one of the most horrible and most potent of asymmetric threats directed against us on September 11. There are a variety of others. The basic principle that people who decide to take on

the United States are not going to look to challenge our naval superiority or challenge our ability to dominate the skies in any place

our Air Force flies; they are going to look for places where we are

weak and they are going to try to attack those weaknesses, and we

need to figure out how to deal with them.

We talked about developing new concepts of deterrence, not to

throw away the old ones, I want to emphasize, but to add to them

techniques for deterring people whose motivations may be different. In the case of September 11, of course, we saw the problem

of deterring people who may be prepared to commit suicide and

who may be able to conceal their identity in some degree.

We talk very importantly about a capability-based strategy rather than a threat-based strategy. As we think about the future, as

we think about the next decade, it is in my view difficult to predict

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based strategy is one that focuses on the kinds of threats we might

face, the kinds of capabilities that might confront us, and also the

kinds of capabilities that might be able to give us some unique advantages.

Finally, in this Quadrennial Defense Review we have tried to expand the concept of risk, which in the past has been seen in fairly

narrow terms of the risk associated with our current war plans and

whether we have the forces to execute our current war plans. That

remains a very important dimension in assessing risk, but, as the

report notes, we believe there are at least three other dimensions

that need to get great attention as well: the risk that can be imposed on our current forces if we are assigning them too many

tasks with too few forces and stretching either the force as a whole

or particular elements of the force, leading to reduced readiness

and even people leaving the military because of excessive wear and

tear on their families, essentially. We call that the force management risk.

A second dimension is the future capabilities risk, the risk that

we will underinvest, that we will focus so much on our current war

plans that we will underinvest in the capabilities that are needed

10 and 15 years from now.

Finally, what we call the institutional risk, the risk that we will

not be good stewards of the Nation’s resources, with two harmful

effects: the risk that we will be wasting resources and, while there

may be more resources available now, there is even less room for

waste; and also the loss of confidence and loss of efficiency that

comes when you are muscle-bound and do not appear to be a good

steward.

There is a great deal else in the document. I tried to summarize

a lot of it in my testimony. I think one of the most important

things has been setting the goals for what a transformed force

needs to be able to do. I want to emphasize, a transformed force

does not mean a force that is 100 percent transformed. These are

just very crude estimates, but my feeling would be that 10 or 20

percent of the capability is transformed and that that transformational capability allows the more traditional capabilities,

what we call legacy forces, to perform their missions more effectively.

On page 10 of my testimony and in the document itself, we lay

out what, after very careful deliberation by the Secretary of Defense with the senior leadership of the Department, we concluded

were the six top priorities for transformation. These are not selected at random. I think they are very important. They cover a

range including, very importantly, the problem of protecting our

critical bases of operations, including U.S. territory, as we have discovered, from attacks, including possibly attacks with weapons of

mass destruction.

I have believed for a long time now and have been persistent

throughout the development of the QDR that the fourth transformational goal that we list there, that is the capability to have

high-volume precision strike at various ranges, including long

ranges, is a major transformational capability. I have believed it is

one that has to be approached not simply as an air component or

even simply as a ground component, but that integrating air and

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ground capabilities is something that could make us be truly transformational in terms of our ability to take out targets at long distance.

We had an early experience of this during the Gulf War 10 years

ago, when our most effective means for finding Iraqi Scud missiles

was putting very brave Special Forces people on the ground in

western Iraq. When they got there, and they found targets, we did

not have the kind of integration with our air capability to make

that bravery effective.

I think we see now as we contemplate operations in parts of the

world that we never really thought about a month ago that more

of that capability to strike targets at long range through complementary use of air and ground capabilities is a capability that

we would like to have today and we certainly can envision needing

in the future.

Those are the things with which we have tried to drive this. Let

me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that you talked about

decisions deferred. There are a great many decisions that have

been made, and the decision to undergo a paradigm shift is a fundamental decision. It was made not by some small group of civilian

analysts in a closet figuring out what the military ought to do. It

was made after literally dozens of hours of deliberations by the

Secretary of Defense with the senior military and civilian leadership of the Department.

I have been a participant I think by now in five major defense

reviews in one form or another, including the development of the

base force 10 years ago. I have never seen that level of senior guidance directed to the task, and I think a number of the decisions

that are made in this document, including some that I have just

discussed, are the product of a very strong consensus for change in

the Department.

The philosophy is that many of the details of those changes are

not ones to be dictated in a centralized manner by people who may

not be in full touch with the problems, but to bring some of those

issues forward in a variety of ways, starting with the fiscal year

2003 program review. These are obviously decisions that we need

to take in close coordination and consultation with you and with

the entire Congress. The implementation of a paradigm shift of this

magnitude even in the best of circumstances would require the

closest of cooperation between the executive branch and Congress.

To do it under conditions where we were simultaneously fighting

the war makes it even more incumbent upon us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SECRETARY PAUL WOLFOWITZ

I. INTRODUCTION

It has now been 3 weeks since the strikes against the Pentagon and the World

Trade Towers. Words cannot describe the horror of what the entire world witnessed

that day.

In the wake of these terrible assaults, our initial horror has given way to a mixture of intense sadness, quiet anger, and resolute determination: We will deal decisively with the terrorist network that is responsible for this horror—and those who

aid and abet their barbaric assaults on all civilized people of all religions everywhere in the world.

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But as we prepare for the battles ahead, we must recognize that these strikes

were not just an act of war—they were a window into our future:

A future where new enemies visit violence on us in startling ways;

A future in which our cities are among the battlefields and our people are among

the targets;

A future in which more and more adversaries will possess the capability to bring

war to the American homeland; and

A future where the old methods of deterrence are no longer sufficient—and new

strategies and capabilities are needed to ensure peace and security.

These attacks were an assault on our people and our way of life; but they were

also a wake-up call—one that we ignore at our peril.

We therefore have two missions before us today:

First, to prepare for a war that is already upon us—to break the network of terrorist states and terrorist organizations responsible for these acts, and cripple their

ability to threaten our people with further violence.

Second, to prepare for the future—to transform our Armed Forces so they can defend America and her allies against the many different and dangerous threats we

will face in the 21st century, to ensure that we can deal with the surprise of the

next decade and the decade to come.

Both of these missions are critical and urgent:

What is at stake in the first is our lives and our way of life;

What is at stake in the second is the lives and the futures of our children and

grandchildren.

II. THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The American people breathed a sigh of relief when the Cold War ended a decade

ago.

They looked around and saw we were a superpower with no obvious adversary

capable of destroying us.

They saw democracy spreading across the globe.

They saw a powerful economic expansion creating unprecedented prosperity.

And there was a temptation to believe that this favorable circumstance was a permanent condition.

On September 11, America learned that it was not.

The September 11 attacks have awakened us to a fundamental reality: the 21st

century security environment will be different from the one we faced in the 20th

century—but just as dangerous.

To ensure our safety and freedom in the decades ahead, we need to understand

the change that has taken place—and the lessons it holds for our future.

Lesson 1: Surprise is Back

Military history is full of surprises. Indeed, surprise happens so often that it’s surprising we’re still surprised by it. We ought to expect it.

Yet during the Cold War, our security environment had an appearance of predictability. We knew our adversary—an expansionist empire, with forces ready to march

across Europe, surrogate armies seeking to overthrow our allies and install puppet

regimes around the world, and a massive nuclear arsenal pointed at U.S. cities.

We understood this threat—and developed an effective strategy to deter and eventually to defeat it.

In the 21st century, the threat is not nearly as clear. Until a few weeks ago, many

questioned whether there are even any threats anymore, even though a vast array

of dangerous military capabilities are spreading into the hands of multiple potential

adversaries—many of whom hate America and our allies and friends, wish to harm

our people, and are not afraid to strike U.S. territory in previously unimaginable

ways.

The September 11 strikes caught us by surprise. We must prepare ourselves for

the virtual certainty that we will be surprised again.

One scholar of Pearl Harbor said that the reason we were surprised then was because of ‘‘a poverty of expectations—routine obsession with a few dangers that may

be familiar rather than likely.’’ It has been a recurring problem through military

history.

As we have painfully learned in recent weeks, the likely dangers of this new century will be quite different from the seemingly familiar dangers of the past century.

Threats that were previously considered ‘‘improbable’’ may in fact become the likely

threats of the future.

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nable threats, the consequences for our people and our way of life might be even

more horrible.

We must constantly strive to perfect our intelligence, but we must also realize

that there is no such thing as perfect intelligence—there will always be gaps in our

intelligence. Adapting to surprise—adapting quickly and decisively—must therefore

be a condition of planning.

We must not take the lesson from September 11 that terrorism is the new, predictable threat of the 21st century—to do so could be a terrible mistake and leave

us exposed to different challenges in the next decade.

Therefore we face the enormously demanding task of fighting an extraordinarily

difficult kind of war and at the same time preparing for the future.

The next challenge we face may not be a terrorist attack at all, but something

entirely different—it might even be a return to the past with nation states invading

their neighbors.

Future adversaries may employ even bolder forms of terrorism. These could include cyber attacks, advanced conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to strike at

our people and our way of life.

The element of surprise—and the reality of little or no warning—must be understood as a critical feature of the security environment America faces—and one we

must factor into our defense planning for the decades ahead.

Lesson 2: The Era of Invulnerability is Over

The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers were the first assaults on

U.S. territory since World War II—and the first attack on our capital by a foreign

enemy since the War of 1812.

It is no accident that no adversary has struck our capital for 189 years. For most

of our history, the United States has been blessed with the security advantage of

excellent geography—a continental nation with friendly neighbors and two vast

ocean buffers.

To get to U.S. territory, an adversary first had to get past our Armed Forces, who

protected our shores by land, sea and air.

The arrival of the atomic age changed that. During the Cold War we faced, for

the first time, an adversary capable of visiting destruction on our cities and our people in a matter of minutes.

The end of the Cold War did not restore our previous invulnerability—to the contrary, as the recent attacks on Washington and New York demonstrate, we are witnessing a dramatic expansion of the deadly zone of conflict to our population centers. War used to be something that took place on foreign soil. No longer.

This threat will only grow worse in the coming years. Here is why:

The information revolution that is fueling the world economy is also putting dangerous technologies into the hands of multiple adversaries, many of whom despise

our nation and wish to harm our people.

Along with the globalization that is creating interdependence among the world’s

free economies, there is a parallel globalization of terror, in which rogue states and

terrorist organizations share information, intelligence, technology, weapons materials and know-how.

This technology will allow new adversaries to get past our Armed Forces and

strike our territory without having to confront and defeat them.

As technology proliferates, with each passing year our enemies will possess an increasing capability to bring war to the American homeland.

What this means is that, in the 21st century, we can no longer count on conflicts

remaining contained within their region of origin far from our shores. It means that

future wars may well include a home front.

Lesson 3: Our Adversary Has Changed

In addition to the spread of more powerful weapons, we will also face new adversaries in the decades ahead—with different motivations and different capabilities.

Some may simply seek regional hegemony, and see the U.S. as a roadblock to

their ambitions. Others may be motivated by hatred of America, and the traditions

of freedom and religious toleration we represent.

Our new adversaries may be, in some cases, more dangerous than those we faced

in the past.

They may not possess the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads capable of ending life on earth that the Soviet Union did—but they may be more likely to use the

increasingly powerful weapons in their possession.

Their decision-making is not subject to the same constraints that earlier adversaries faced. Usama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il answer to no one.

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They can use the capabilities at their disposal without consultation or constraint—

and have demonstrated a willingness to do so.

They may be less likely to be discouraged by traditional deterrence. The threat

of massive U.S. retaliation certainly did not stop the September 11 assault on the

Pentagon or the World Trade Towers. We cannot be certain it will stop other adversaries.

What this means is we need a new approach to deterrence for the 21st century.

What worked against the Soviet threat, may not work against the threats we face

in the decades ahead.

We are now facing enemies that are increasingly capable—and willing—to bring

war to the American homeland. We must find new ways to deter them.

Lesson 4: Their Objectives Are the Same as Tyrants of the Past

The terrorist movements and totalitarian regimes of the world have a variety of

motives and goals. But the same thing unites our enemies today, as it did in the

past: a desire to see America driven into retreat and isolation.

Usama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il and other such tyrants all want

to see America out of critical regions of the world, constrained from coming to the

aid of friends and allies, and unable to project power in the defense of our interests

and ideals.

By holding our people hostage to terror and fear, their intention is for America

to be intimidated into withdrawal and inaction—leaving them free to impose their

will on their peoples and neighbors unmolested by America’s military might.

This is why terrorist states harbor terrorist movements like al-Qaeda—these

groups serve their ends.

That is why our challenge today is greater than winning the war against terrorism. Today’s terrorist threat is a precursor of even greater threats to come.

It is no coincidence that the states harboring, financing and otherwise assisting

terrorists, are also in many cases the same states that are aggressively working to

acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and

the means to deliver them.

They have learned from the Gulf War that challenging American forces head-on

doesn’t work—so they have turned increasingly to developing asymmetric capabilities.

Along with WMD and other capabilities to threaten our homeland, they are developing new advanced conventional capabilities—‘‘access denial’’ weapons such as

anti-ship cruise missiles, quiet diesel subs, advanced sea-mines, air defense systems

and radars.

All of these capabilities serve their common objective of keeping America out of

their regions and unable to project force in the defense of freedom.

This threat is as great as any we faced during the Cold War. Peace and freedom

in the 21st century depend on our ability to counter it at all levels.

We must defeat the terrorist network responsible for the September 11 assaults.

But just as importantly, we need to prepare now for the emerging threats we will

face in the next decade and beyond.

Each of these tasks by themselves is an enormous challenge, but we have the

challenge of doing both at the same time.

III. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

For the past several months, the senior civilian and military leaders of the Defense Department have been working to examine the emerging threats we will face

in the coming decades—and develop a new defense strategy to meet them.

The result of those efforts is the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was sent to

Congress on September 30th.

The QDR was largely completed before September 11. Yet, in important ways,

these attacks confirm the strategic direction and planning principles that resulted

from this review, particularly its emphasis:

On establishing homeland defense as the top Department priority;

On preparing for uncertainty and surprise;

On contending with asymmetric threats;

On developing new concepts of deterrence;

On replacing a threat-based strategy with a capabilities-based strategy;

and,

Balancing deliberately the four different dimensions of risk.

The attack on the United States on September 11 will require us to move forward

more rapidly in these directions—even while we are engaged in the campaign

against terrorism.

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On September 11, new dangers arrived sooner than expected. With the pace of

technological change today, we must expect that other new dangers could emerge

just as quickly—and with just as little notice—in the future as well.

To meet the challenges over the horizon, we must transform our Armed Forces

more rapidly, more creatively, and even more radically than we had previously

planned.

As we do so, we must recognize another fact: it is in the nature of surprise that

the surprise of the next decade is likely to be something entirely different from the

surprise we just experienced.

It is a fact of life that countries frequently prepare to fight the last war. We spent

much of the 1990s planning to re-fight the Gulf War. As we think ahead to the year

2010 and beyond, we should not assume that the war we will fight then will resemble the one we are preparing to fight today.

So as we prosecute this war against terrorism today, we must at the same time

begin developing the force that will fight and win the wars of the future.

That is goal set for us by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Capabilities-based Approach

The strategy outlined in the QDR is built around four key goals that will guide

the development of U.S. forces and capabilities, their deployment and use:

Assuring allies and friends of the United States’ steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;

Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could

threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends;

Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s military

capability and supporting infrastructure; and

Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.

We cannot and will not know precisely where and when America’s interests will

be threatened, or when, or even how America, its friends and allies will come under

attack.

To meet this reality and the key strategic goals and, we need to shift the basis

of defense planning from a ‘‘threat-based’’ model that has dominated thinking in the

past to a ‘‘capabilities-based’’ model for the future.

This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters.

Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to

achieve their objectives.

Such an approach would examine our vulnerabilities, and develop new capabilities

and new strategies to defend ourselves.

As we have painfully learned, our open borders and open societies make it easy

and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they live and work.

We know that our dependence on space satellites and computer information networks make those networks attractive targets for new forms of attack.

We know that the ease with which potential adversaries can acquire advanced

conventional weapons will present us with new challenges in conventional war and

force projection.

We know that our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for

missile proliferation which, combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and

biological weapons of mass destruction, will give future adversaries the ability to

hold our populations hostage to terror and blackmail.

Future adversaries will likely develop new means with which to exploit these

vulnerabilities and threaten the United States.

We must develop defenses against known and emerging threats—and develop new

approaches for detecting new threats.

Some we can identify today with confidence—ballistic and cruise missiles; nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction; weapons of mass disruption

such as information warfare and attacks on critical information systems, capabilities

to attack and cripple our space assets. Still others may be a surprise.

Adopting a capabilities-based approach to planning requires that the Nation

maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops new areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to adversaries. It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new circumstances, while experimenting with

the development of new military capabilities. In short, it requires the transformation of U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America’s asymmetric advantages well into the future.

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21st Century Deterrence

To contend with surprise and the challenge of asymmetric threats, we also need

a new approach to deterrence.

The threats we face in the 21st century will be multifaceted—our deterrence strategy must be as well. Just as we intend to build ‘‘layered defenses’’ to deal with missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of ‘‘layered deterrence’’ in

which we develop a mix of capabilities—both offensive and defensive—which can

dissuade and deter a variety of emerging threats at different stages.

We must dissuade potential adversaries from developing dangerous capabilities in

the first place—by developing and deploying U.S. capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete.

For example, America’s overwhelming naval power discourages potential adversaries from investing in building competing navies to threaten freedom of the seas—

because, in the end, they would spend a fortune and not accomplish their strategic

objectives.

In the same way, we must develop a broad range of new capabilities that, by their

very existence, dissuade and discourage potential adversaries from investing in

other hostile capabilities.

For example, effective space defenses could discourage adversaries from developing new capabilities to threaten our critical assets in space. Effective missile defense

could similarly discourage potential adversaries from investing in ballistic missiles

that threaten U.S. and allied population centers.

At the same time, we also need to strengthen the capability to deter future adversaries from aggression and coercion, by increasing the capability of our forward-deployed forces and global striking power to respond rapidly to threats.

We must maintain the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression in critical regions. To do this, we will need forces and capabilities that give the President an even wider range of military options.

Implementing such a multi-layered deterrence strategy requires that we improve

our intelligence capabilities, our capability for long-distance force projection, and our

capability to integrate our joint forces, and that we maintain a credible offensive nuclear deterrent.

It also requires a transformation of our forces.

Transformation

Transformation is about more than our technology; it is about innovative concepts

of operating and configuring our forces, adjustments in how we train and base our

people and materiel, and how we conduct business day to day.

The goal of transformation is to maintain a substantial advantage over any potential adversaries in key areas such as information warfare, power projection, space

and intelligence.

A transformed force must be able to:

Protect critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and

friends) and defeat NBC weapons and means of delivery;

Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant ‘‘access-denial’’ environments;

Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective information

operations;

Provide persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement with high-volume

precision strike, through a combination of complimentary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges, and in all weather

and terrain;

Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and

Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop effective joint

operational capabilities.

If we can do this, we can reduce our own chances of being surprised and increase

our ability to create our own surprises, if we choose. A stealthy F–117 over Baghdad

is one example of the nexus of intelligence, technology, and planning—they didn’t

know we were there until the bombs started to explode. We must enhance our ability to create such surprises in the future, although how we do so may require fundamental shifts in the systems we use.

As we do so, our ability to conduct effective joint operations becomes even more

critical than before. Successful future operations will require a flexible, reliable, and

effective joint command and control architecture that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain and protect American forces across the battlefield.

The Department will examine options for creating standing joint task forces that

will develop new concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric military advantages and will

aim at achieving more rapid and more effective military responses.

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We will identify the capabilities U.S. military forces will need to deter or defeat

adversaries likely to rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare. We will

emphasize developing new concepts of operations to address challenges posed by mobile targets and weapons of mass destruction; integrating long-range strike aircraft

with troops on the ground; and putting key intelligence into the hands of decision

makers and warfighters far more quickly than in past engagements.

New Force Sizing Construct

If we are to contribute to peace and security, we must also determine how U.S.

forces should best be sized and arranged to meet the challenges of the new century.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has relied on a formula known

as the ‘‘two Major Theater War’’ approach to size our forces. As the civilian and

military leaders of the Department reviewed this approach, we concluded that it had

several shortcomings:

It did not specifically address the full range of threats to the U.S. homeland.

It did not account for demands placed on our forces by small-scale contingencies.

It placed excessive emphasis on preparations for decisively defeating adversaries

after war broke out, rather than bolstering capabilities and forces to deter adversaries from challenging the U.S. in the first instance, and

It over-optimized U.S. forces for two specific regional conflicts, at the expense of

preparations for other contingencies and future challenges.

In the QDR, we are proposing a new, more comprehensive approach. U.S. forces

will maintain the capability to:

Defend the American homeland.

Deter conflicts in four critical areas of the world, by demonstrating the ability to

defeat enemy attacks, and do so far more swiftly than in the past or even today.

Defeat aggressors in overlapping timeframes in any two of those four areas.

At the direction of the President, decisively defeat one of these two adversaries—

to include invading and occupying enemy territory.

Decisively impose our will on any one aggressor of our choosing.

Conduct a limited number of contingencies short of war in peacetime without excessive stress on our men and women in uniform.

The approach we are proposing will give the U.S. sufficient forces to prevail in

two nearly simultaneous conflicts. Where it differs from the previous sizing construct is that in one conflict, we will have sufficient force to occupy the adversary’s

capital and replace the regime, while in the other, our forces will be sufficient to

prevail over enemy forces and repel an act of aggression—much as we did in the

Persian Gulf War—but without marching on, and occupying the capital.

Since neither aggressor would know in which conflict the President might choose

to occupy a capital—and where we might choose to simply repel and defeat an act

of aggression—the prospect of a total defeat would remain as a strong deterrent.

But because the U.S. will not require a second occupation force, this approach will

free up resources for other critical priorities

This shift is not simply a matter of cost savings. Even with the current consensus

for increased defense spending, we still should not waste the taxpayers’ dollars to

prepare for wars we will not fight in the 21st century. The goal is to permit us to

better balance near-term risks with the long-term challenges of preparing for the

new kinds of war we may fight, and new adversaries we may face, in 2010 and beyond.

The Four Dimensions of Risk

The Quadrennial Defense Review has also identified a new approach to assessing

and managing risk.

In recent years, the Department has defined risk narrowly in terms of war plans,

without sufficient emphasis on other dimensions of risk-to people, modernization,

and transformation.

After the end of the Cold War, the size of the force was reduced by some 40 percent. But at the same time, our men and women in uniform were asked to take on

more and more new missions—that did not fall within the two major theater war

construct.

This put enormous stress on our Armed Forces. They saluted smartly, and did

their best. But to accomplish the new missions they were assigned, while at the

same time being prepared to meet the requirements of the two-war approach, they

put off investments in critical areas. This exacerbated the effect of the mismatch

between strategy and resources.

The effect was to crowd out critical investments in modernization, maintenance,

infrastructure, and procurement of new ships, aircraft and armored vehicles; in the

transformational R&D necessary to field new 21st century capabilities; in personVerDate 11-SEP-98 11:07 Apr 17, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 77281.085 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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nel—funds for pay, housing, and healthcare—while our forces were deployed all

across the globe.

It is important, as we try to close the gap between strategy and resources that

we invest the new resources in a balanced way to address the different dimensions

of risk.

We intend to change this. Henceforth, in addition to the operational risks associated with our ability to execute war plans, the Department must also take into account the force management, institutional and future challenges risks in determining how to allocate resources.

Resources

Finally, the loss of life and damage to our economy from the attack of September

11, 2001 should give us a new perspective on the question of what this country can

afford for its defense.

Last week in Brussels, I told our allies that this assault is a wakeup call for us

all about the importance of investing adequately and providing for security.

To think we can’t afford what we need to deter the adversaries of tomorrow and

underpin our prosperity, and by extension, peace and stability around the globe, is

simply wrong. These costs do not begin to compare with the cost in dollars and

human lives if we fail to do so.

Secretary Rumsfeld has often talked about the situation in 1950, when General

Omar Bradley urged President Truman to spend at least $18 billion on defense. The

Joint Chiefs gave an even higher estimate at $23 billion, and the services’ estimate

was higher still at $30 billion. But the President and Congress said we couldn’t afford that much—$15 billion was as much as we could afford.

Six months later, we were suddenly in a war in Korea, and we could afford $48

billion—just fine.

Today, sadly, we’re experiencing what Yogi Berra called ‘‘de ́ja` vu all over again.’’

The U.S. Armed Forces underpin our Nation’s prosperity and way of life. We don’t

get our ‘‘peace dividend’’ by short-changing them. We get it from the peace, security

and prosperity they make possible.

This Nation can afford to spend what is needed to deter the adversaries of tomorrow and to underpin our prosperity.

IV. CONCLUSION

If we are to preserve our ability to defend freedom in the 21st century, we must

prepare now for a world in which future adversaries will strike at our people and

our territory in previously unimaginable ways.

We must take the assaults in New York and Washington as a warning to the even

more unfathomable dangers that lay ahead.

Our adversaries have now shown their willingness to slaughter thousands of innocent civilians in a devastating strike. If they had the capability to kill millions of

innocent civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?

What a tragedy it would be if we let our preparations for the future be numbered

among the casualties of September 11.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Carlson.

General CARLSON. Sir, with your permission I will just submit

my statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Carlson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. BRUCE CARLSON, USAF

Three weeks ago the terrorist strikes against the Pentagon and the World Trade

Center shocked the world. Today, we who serve in uniform are focused on taking

down the network of terrorist organizations responsible for these acts and all those

that support them. As General Shelton said in his farewell remarks at Fort Myer

on Monday, our brave soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen are

ready for this challenge.

But even as we fight this war on terrorism, we must also continue our efforts to

transform our military. To ensure we remain ready, in the years ahead, to meet

America’s future security challenges.

That’s why this year’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is so timely and so important. The report, released by Secretary Rumsfeld on 30 September, will be an

important guidepost as we continue our transformation efforts in the years ahead.

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During the past months, senior military officers, to include the Joint Chiefs and

the commanders in chief (CINCs), were all heavily engaged in the QDR process.

Their involvement ensured the best military advice was made available to the

Secretary and was taken into consideration by his team. Additionally, this high level

of engagement ensured that this QDR was well-grounded on strategic requirements.

I would like to emphasize two key points:

First, the QDR faced two critical tasks: ensuring the near-term ability of the force

to protect and advance U.S. interests worldwide; and transforming our forces to

meet the security challenges of the future.

The difficulty, of course, is addressing these two challenges simultaneously. In my

view, the program recommendations and defense strategy outlined in the QDR, if

matched with the necessary resources, will move us toward accomplishing both;

while balancing the associated near-, mid-, and long-term risks.

The second point I want to make is that we have much more work to do to. Including detailed studies and analysis. The QDR is not the endgame. It is an important step forward along the path of transformation.

We believe that the QDR moves us in the right direction—toward achieving a sustainable balance between strategy and force structure—and a balance between the

demands of today with those of the future.

Achieving this balance, and maintaining it, will take a lot of hard work both by

those in uniform and those in the Department of Defense. It will also require the

continued support of this committee. But it is essential that we get this right if our

Armed Forces are to remain the finest fighting force in the world.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

We will have 4-minute rounds in light of the change in circumstances here. Mr. Secretary, the QDR indicates that substantial additional work and planning will have to be devoted to the

subject of homeland security. The report mentions that the Department of Defense will review the establishment of a new unified

combatant commander to help address complex inter-agency issues

and provide a single military commander to focus military support.

However, on Tuesday Secretary Rumsfeld announced that he has

designated the Secretary of the Army as the Department of Defense’s executive agent for all homeland security matters. How is

the designation of the Secretary of the Army as the DOD’s executive agent for all homeland security matters consistent with the

Goldwater-Nichols legislation that removed service secretaries from

operational matters and assigned them the mission of organizing,

training, and equipping the services’ forces?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, that is an interim measure

and an emergency measure, taken because we needed somebody

and somebody with the skills and enormous competence of Secretary White to handle our suddenly enormous emergency requirements. He in fact was appropriately insistent on accepting that responsibility that it be understood and made clear that it was interim. He has an 18-hour day job already, Secretary of the Army,

and we have just added another 18 hours and there are only so

many months that we can keep stretching him that way.

That is a temporary fix and we will be working with you and

coming back with something that will sustain us longer term.

Chairman LEVIN. What are the practical consequences of the

QDR recommendations for military end-strength or for force levels?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The way we approach the question of force

levels and end-strengths—let me first describe the way we were approaching it prior to September 11.

Chairman LEVIN. Because we only have 4 minutes each, do we

know yet what the practical impact will be regarding end-strengths

and force levels in terms of numbers or structure?

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Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No. We took the current force structure

and the current end-strengths as a starting point. We identified for

the services targets for efficiencies, and prior to September 11 we

were prepared to make those very specific quantitative targets and

I think we will go back to some version of that, with the notion

that the first place to look for efficiencies are things that you do

not want to be doing. One of the last places is end-strength and

probably the very last place is force structure.

So we are trying to get the resources that we need to do transformation at the same time that we stay as close as possible to an

end strength that will make the force management risk acceptable

and a force structure that will make the operational war-fighting

risk acceptable.

The first estimate by the Joint Chiefs in an exercise called Positive Match came up with a preliminary assessment, which I think

is reported in the QDR, that we can execute the new strategy with

the current force structure at moderate levels of risk in most scenarios, although there are some where the risk would be high.

That is work that we have to take further. There are some people

who believe that possibly one could keep those moderate levels of

risk with a different force structure, but then you get into the issue

of whether you can keep acceptable OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO

with a lower end-strength.

Chairman LEVIN. So that is not resolved yet?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is preliminarily resolved as, what

sounds like a status quo answer, which is current force structure,

current end-strength.

Chairman LEVIN. Then my last question: The Army has established a goal of fielding the first components of the Objective Force

by fiscal year 2010, but as part of that plan to field interim brigade

combat teams at the rate of one per year starting in fiscal year

2003. Does the QDR change the fielding rate for interim brigade

combat teams or the date of first fielding of the Objective Force, do

you know?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, it does not.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I certainly commend Secretary Rumsfeld, yourself,

and all in the Pentagon during this period of extraordinary leadership that each of you, both civilian and uniformed, exhibited.

Turning to the events of the 11th, we saw from within the cities

and towns and villages of this great Nation came the enemy. My

question goes to the doctrine of posse comitatus, which in 1878 was

laid down on the premise that our forces in uniform should never

be used in any way that would be interpreted that they were policemen. It is well and good and it has served this Nation these

100-plus years, but it seems to me it is time to re-examine that

doctrine.

I will soon be forwarding to you a series of questions on this matter. These enemies that struck us of recent came from within the

civilian mix. Albeit legally or illegally or whatever their citizenship

status may have been, they came from the streets of the USA. It

seems to me that when that type of catastrophe happens, we have

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to bring together every asset of the United States of America irrespective of where it comes, military or civilian.

I was momentarily late coming to this hearing because we are

honoring firefighters and public service officers who gave their lives

and also those who were wounded in the tragedy that we experienced on the 11th.

So give it some thought. Do you agree with me that it is time

to take a look at this?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I agree very strongly. We in the Department of Defense assume that if we are hit with a catastrophe of

the many kinds that one can now unfortunately imagine more vividly that, whatever people think beforehand, they are going to come

and say: ‘‘What else can you do?’’ We in certain areas can do more

than anyone else in the country because of the special capabilities

we have, because of the unique organizational capabilities of the

Department, and it would be better to think through in advance

what kind of civilian control and what relationship with civilian

authorities rather than improvising.

Senator WARNER. Particularly if we befall the tragedy of chemical or biological attack, where there would be a massive number of

casualties, I think we’d have to bring in the military instantly to

help with medical aid, transportation assistance, and in any number of ways.

Quickly moving to a second concept, deterrence. Throughout the

history of mankind military forces were looked upon primarily as

first to deter an enemy from striking. How do we now invoke that

doctrine, given that there are people who are willing to surrender

their lives to bring harm to the people of this great Nation?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is very difficult, Senator. I

would not pretend to have the answer, but I think deterrence still

works on the probably much greater number of people who want

to protect their lives. One of the things I am struck by is, by the

way, the experience seems to be that some of these brave souls

when they are taken into custody, suddenly they are willing to talk

and say a great deal. I do not know whether it is because these are

not the ones who are ready to commit suicide or whether people

under some circumstances will and under some circumstances will

not. But we need to figure out how to get to people like that.

Chairman LEVIN. You are using the word ‘‘brave souls,’’ I take

it, ironically?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely, ironically. Sorry. I thank you

for clarifying that.

Senator WARNER. Force planning is important. For some time the

United States has been operating with a requirement to fight and

win two nearly simultaneous conflicts. How has this document

changed that concept?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It has not changed the idea of being able

to handle two nearly simultaneous conflicts or, I think, the terms

of the document, in overlapping time frames. We continue to believe that that is an important requirement because it helps you

if there is trouble in one place, to keep it from erupting in other

places.

What we have changed is the notion of having to have the capability in two different places simultaneously to achieve a kind of

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overwhelming victory. I guess to be tangible about it, we have a requirement to be able to deter conflict in four critical regions of the

world. One of the goals of our transformational capabilities, by the

way, is to try to improve the deterrence capability of our forwarddeployed forces.

We have a requirement to defeat aggression in any two regions

in near simultaneous time frame. By defeat we mean the kind of

defeat that we inflicted on Iraq in 1991, which is a lot more than

just stopping them. It was pretty much tearing them apart. But it

was not marching on to occupy their capital, which is what is

euphemistically in our language called a decisive defeat.

Speaking about how we size our forces, we think it is important

to have forces large enough that, should the President decide, he

can impose that kind of decisive defeat.

Senator WARNER. The short answer is the fundamentals of that

document have not been abandoned?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The fundamental of being able to handle

two things at once has not changed.

Senator WARNER. Fine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Carnahan.

Senator CARNAHAN. The QDR states that the Defense Department will now be placing new emphasis upon counterterrorism

across Federal, State, and local first responders, drawing on the capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard. The National Defense Authorization bill requires that DOD better define the role of

the National Guard’s weapons of mass destruction civil support

teams. These teams are being trained to decontaminate affected

areas and to help with medical aid.

I was wondering if you could describe what you feel is the importance of these programs and detail your commitment to honing our

abilities to respond to such attacks.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think these teams are extremely important and they are critical to our ability to identify early if there is

the kind of attack that would require bringing in the special capabilities. If you identify an attack as a biological attack or a chemical attack, the faster you identify it the faster you can respond, and

those teams are really critical to our response time.

I know this has been an initiative led by Congress. We applaud

that initiative and we are implementing it as fast as we can.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you.

One question for General Carlson. The QDR places a great emphasis on expanding America’s ability to project power deep into

Central and East Asia. This committee has often stated support for

increasing our long-range bomber capability to accomplish this

goal. Now this document has indicated that the Air Force is developing plans to increase basing in the Pacific and the Indian

Oceans.

Would such a plan include developing permanent shelters for B–

2 bombers, say on Guam, for instance?

General CARLSON. Ma’am, I think it would be appropriate to wait

until the services have developed those plans and then we will

have to determine whether it would require shelters or whether

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they think that deploying weapons or other mitigating equipment

would be useful.

Senator CARNAHAN. Would the Defense Department begin to consider the expansion of our B–2 fleet?

General CARLSON. I am sure it will be one of the options that the

Air Force considers.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.

Senator Hutchinson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON

Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

for holding the hearing today.

Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your extraordinary leadership and

the great job that you and Secretary Rumsfeld are doing in this

time of crisis. Be assured, as my colleagues have repeatedly assured you, of our support and the support of Congress in this time.

You alluded to in your opening comments the operational goals

of the transformation effort, the number one operational goal being

to protect critical bases of operations, U.S. homeland forces, forces

abroad, allies and friends, and defeating chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) weapons

and their means of delivery. I know much of this had to have been

written prior to the September 11 attack, but it is surely very relevant, and I think it is appropriate that that is the number one

operational goal.

Yet, I believe we have had a very misguided approach in recent

years as to our vaccine acquisition strategy. We have invested tens

of millions of dollars in an acquisition strategy that has failed and

the fact is that we do not today have adequate supplies of anthrax

vaccine to vaccinate our troops even as we go through a troop

buildup and send them into the Middle East, I believe, vulnerable.

The recommendations of the report that was mandated by section 218 of last year’s National Defense Authorization Act regarding vaccine production prepared by the Department and released

recently recommends the creation of a government-owned, contractor-operated facility. I would like you to comment on that recommendation and in general your thoughts on our vaccine acquisition strategy.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As you know, Senator, one of the problems

with our vaccine acquisition has been problems in production at

one particular facility. That I think has been the principal thing

that set us back, at least in the time that I have been able to look

at it.

I think the events of September 11 really do put all of that subject in my view in a different and more urgent light, and I think

we have got to press ahead with every option that can give us capability against biological weapons as quickly as possible. There

are some issues of risk that have to be weighed, but I think one

weighs those risks in a very different light after September 11 than

one would have before.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Mr. Secretary, our strategy has been based

upon the idea, and I think contrary to previous recommendations

back in the early nineties, it has been based upon a total reliance

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upon the commercial sector to provide that, and it has obviously

failed. While we all hope for FDA approval of that vaccine production and that we can get some immediate relief, it is my conviction

that in the long term the vaccine needs for the military are unique

and are not going to be necessarily commercially appealing and

that we are going to continue to have those kinds of problems if

we rely solely upon the commercial sector in the future.

Has the Department made a decision regarding whether we continue to rely on what I think has been a very failed approach to

whether we are going to move and follow the recommendations of

the section 218 report? If not, at what point do we expect that decision to be made?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We have not really gotten to that yet,

Senator. We need to with some urgency. I think even the commercial vaccine sector has to be looked at in a different way. I think

a lot of companies have gone out of the vaccine business because

of the way in which we have assigned risks, the way in which we

have tended to put liability on companies, and I think not only the

military, but civilians, have got to look at whether that is really the

result we want, given some of the threats we face out there.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Well, I certainly agree it is something that

must be dealt with with great urgency. I appreciate that you have

been very responsive to me and I look forward to working with you

and the administration on what is a very serious problem, not only

for force protection, but for our civilian population.

Thank you.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was going to get into several areas, but there will not be time

because of the scheduling. I have taken the time to go to Fort

Lewis and view the interim brigade combat team (IBCT). Mr.

Chairman and Senator Warner, I suggest that you encourage as

many members of this committee as are willing to make that trip

to do that. It was very rewarding to me.

Now, Secretary Wolfowitz, I was very gratified you mentioned a

minute ago, you said that we all read very well, but sometimes our

interpretation of what we read is not always the same. I am going

to read a quote out of your report: ‘‘Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function. The

test of a core activity is whether or not it is directly necessary for

war-fighting. If a function is highlighted as core, DOD will invest

in process and technology to improve performance.’’

I was delighted to read that. My interpretation of that is that we

recognize we are going to have to have some core capability within

Government, in other words logistics centers. I would ask first of

all if that interpretation is accurate.

Second, when you say ‘‘invest in process and technology to improve performance,’’ I believe this is something that is absolutely

necessary, because many of our logistics centers have World War

II technologies and they cannot really function efficiently until that

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investment is made. Would you respond to that? Maybe you too,

General Carlson, because I know you are familiar with air logistics

centers.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think absolutely, clearly the thrust of

that language is to try to make sure that where things can be done

by the private sector, they are probably better done and more efficiently done and we can conserve our resources and particularly

our very specialized manpower for the core capabilities.

But sometimes a core capability is something that looks like a civilian function, but it has to be taken into battle with you, so it

is different, or it has to meet performance standards that are

unique to the military and therefore it is different. So it is something that has got to be looked at.

Senator INHOFE. I think you addressed that in this last sentence

that I did not read. It says: ‘‘In these areas, DOD will seek to define new models of public-private partnerships to improve performance.’’ I agree with that. I believe that can be done, because you

accomplish not just the benefits that are natural from the private

sector, but also the fact that you have government control of those

core functions.

Did you have any comment on that, General?

General CARLSON. No, sir, I do not have any comment.

Senator INHOFE. Fine.

I would like to ask both of you: In your report you say ‘‘access

to key markets and strategic resources.’’ I know that you have been

watching and are aware of some of the discussion and debate that

has gone on concerning our dependency for 56.6 percent of our oil

from foreign sources, half of that being from the Middle East. An

extreme way of presenting that, which I have done on the floor several times, would be it is ludicrous to assume that we should be

dependent upon Iraq for our ability to fight a war against Iraq.

As you look down the road today and then 10 years from now,

what you are doing in this report, where do you see that dependency going and how important is that to you in terms of our capabilities?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, I think the dependency is a serious

strategic issue. I really would have to defer to the Energy Department people on what the projections are, but my sense is that that

dependency is projected to grow, not to decline. I think you are

right to point out that it is not only that we in a sense would be

dependent on Iraqi oil, but the oil is a weapon. The possibility of

taking that oil off the market and doing enormous economic damage with it is a serious problem.

I do think that energy conservation and energy production are

part of the answer. I also think you have to reduce the number of

people who have their hands on that kind of trigger, who can disrupt world markets.

Senator INHOFE. I do agree with that. My time is up, but I would

only say that any one incident, once we are as dependent as we are

in terms of our ability to fight a war, could be extremely disruptive.

We have had these, the Exxon Valdez things, or things that are intentional. So I would hope that you keep that in mind as a real

critical thing in terms of our capabilities in the future.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will. Thank you, Senator.

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Senator INHOFE. Well, if my time is not up I will go on for a

while here.

Chairman LEVIN. You got an extra minute. Congratulations. It

will not happen again. [Laughter.]

Let us see. Senator Roberts is next.

Senator ROBERTS. These same kind of tactics were used by Oklahoma during the K State football game. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. Did it do them any good?

Senator ROBERTS. Well, yes. They won, as a matter of fact. Actually, we won, but the score did not indicate that, Mr. Chairman.

Do not take that out of my time, please.

I have a follow-up in regards to the question by the chairman on

who plays the lead role in regards to terrorism at DOD, and I was

not quite sure about your response, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for

coming. Thanks to the General for the work you do.

We had on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee

about a year ago four people from DOD come down and talk to us

about terrorism and homeland security. I asked them to sit in

order of their authority or command, and they did not know where

to sit.

So we said: All right, special operations and low-intensity conflict

(SOLIC) is in charge. Then DOD had some different ideas and we

said: All right, the Secretary will designate somebody. We thought

it was going to be SOLIC. I read in the press it is going to be John

White. I have no real quarrel with that. Then you have indicated

to the chairman that that is not permanent, or you are going to

continue to work with that once Governor Ridge comes to town.

Where are we with that?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, earlier this year, in part precisely at

Congress’ advice, we in fact designated the assistant Secretary of

SOLIC as the person in charge. We do not have a confirmed assistant secretary yet. We have a crisis of a magnitude that we had not

anticipated, and we have a new Cabinet level officer working on

this with whom we are going to have to engage closely.

So as an interim measure, we concluded that the best way to fill

this gap for the time being was to ask John White to do double

duty.

Senator ROBERTS. I see. So it is interim?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is interim, and I think we have to really

go back to the ground floor to think through what is needed, and

it may indeed be an entirely new position.

Senator ROBERTS. We have a pretty good hearing record in that

regard, and I would urge you to take a look at that. We will be

happy to make it available.

Leap-ahead technology, seed corn. The subcommittee I am privileged to serve on is in charge of the research in regards to our technology and our advantage as we fight this asymmetrical warfare.

By the way, thank you for the QDR. The last one was numbersdriven; it was not policy-driven, with all due respect. This one is

certainly driven by transformation and what happened on September 11.

But you say a level of 3 percent DOD spending per year, that is

the ability to allow us, not only now but 5 years, 10 years from

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now, to maintain our superiority. My question is, will the Department reach this goal in fiscal year 2003 budget submission?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Certainly I know it is a great concern of

the Secretary of Defense, and I am assuming if we do not there will

be very good reasons for not. It is near the top of the defense planning guidance directive.

Senator ROBERTS. I want to buttress the remarks by my distinguished colleague from Arkansas who is trying to do everything he

can to make sure the warfighter has access to the proper safeguards in regards to biological terrorism or warfare. If you see the

program that is put together by the Center for International Strategic whatever it is, CSIS—Center for International Strategic—

what is the ‘‘S’’ for?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. ‘‘Studies.’’

Senator ROBERTS. Okay, ‘‘Studies.’’ All right, thank you. You

have to learn the acronyms.

They have something called Dark Winter and it is a Power Point

presentation that I urge you to see. I know that Senator Warner

has seen it. Some of us have seen it. That is something that is a

very serious situation. Obviously, the military would be called in

during a situation like that. I cannot think of anything that is more

important right now than to focus on this.

Senator Hutchinson has tried to point out that we cannot do it

all in the private sector. I am not saying not do any of it in the

private sector, but my goodness, we have to get involved in that.

I noted your response to him. I just wanted to underscore the importance of that and that bioterrorism now I think is numero uno

on the public’s mind.

I know your answer is that I am sure you will do that, because

my time has expired.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, we will do that, Senator.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The QDR has been anxiously awaited. I know you have had a lot

going on in recent weeks, and it is good to receive it. I would just

add how much I appreciate, Secretary Wolfowitz, your leadership

and General Carlson and others in the past few weeks to prepare

our Nation to exert force if need be around the world in an effective

way.

I have been very pleased. I traveled around my State a lot in the

last several days and weeks and people are complimenting you favorably. The American people, I think, feel good about our military

and what you are doing today.

With regard to the QDR, I am troubled and concerned that

maybe the status quo tended to prevail. I had expected some disruption, some broken china perhaps, some protests, even protests

from myself, at some changes that we might have expected to see.

It looks like we just continued our general direction.

There is good transformation, which I support. But I noticed a

Pentagon press release quoting a senior defense official referring to

the QDR. He said: ‘‘It is a concerted effort to try to concentrate on

those items in which the Secretary’’—the Defense Secretary—‘‘the

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Chairman, the Vice Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, the service

secretaries, the service chiefs, the combatant commanders, and the

lead under secretaries in the Department have all agreed upon.’’

I guess those are the right people to be involved in a QDR strategy, but I am concerned that maybe we work too hard to achieve

consensus and perhaps not enough change. Would you comment on

my concern?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think there is both there, Senator. The

consensus did not come because everybody said in the beginning

that this is the way to do it. It took a great deal of push from the

Secretary. We have a different way of structuring forces. We have

different ways of measuring risks.

I think at the same time there can be too much measuring things

by broken crockery. We have a big organization with lots of people

with good ideas and I think you need to lead them and encourage

them to bring those ideas to the surface. But there is real change

here. This is not the QDR that would have been produced if we had

just gone on autopilot 6 months ago.

Those sessions that the Secretary held with those senior people

that you mentioned were driven over and over again by the Secretary, by his ideas, by his insistence that the course we are on

does not work, that there is a mismatch between strategy and resources, that we are sizing our forces based on the construct of occupying two capitals at the same time when we have much higher

priorities than doing that, by some very serious debate about this

issue of what is long-range precision strike.

I have to say that in my view there is a place where the Army

was right against some of the people—and I do not mean my colleagues in the Air Force; I mean some of my civilian colleagues—

who tended to think long-range strike is a mission for air forces.

In my view it is a mission for both together. Frankly, I think we

still have a longer way to go.

I think consensus is important at the end of the day, because you

have to take a very big organization and move it with some coordination in one direction. But it was not the direction it was headed

on 8 months ago.

Senator SESSIONS. Consensus is valuable. Certainly dissension

and serious division is not healthy, and you have achieved that

consensus, and I know that you and Secretary Rumsfeld have challenged this Department to rethink everything that you are doing.

So I have no doubt that we are going to make some progress.

As I understand it, on forces we are basically unchanged. On the

two MTWs we are not fundamentally changed.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, I would say it depends on what you

mean by ‘‘fundamental.’’ We are still talking about two conflicts in

overlapping time frames, but we are not talking about two MTWs

sized the way they were sized before.

Senator SESSIONS. My time is up. I would just mention two

things. We have had some recent meetings with Secretary Aldridge

over the destruction of poison gases that are stored in Alabama and

other places. I believe he is going to fix that, but there is a loss

of confidence in the community in the Army’s ability to do that

safely. So we are going to have to re-establish that, number one.

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Number two, we just learned that the cost of that whole national demil program has gone from $17 billion to $24 billion. Before that

it was much lower than $17 billion, so that number is just escalating. I think you have a real challenge to do that safely. No community can expect this dangerous gas to be destroyed recklessly or in

an unsafe manner, but that is a lot of money by any standards, $24

billion. I think it is worth your personal attention.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It will get it. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that Secretary

Wolfowitz’s time is very short, so I am going to submit the majority

of my questions for the record.

Mr. Secretary, I would just like to ask you a couple of quick

questions. One is what changes, if any, were made in the QDR as

the result of the September 11 attacks? I know the majority of

work was done prior to the attacks. Specifically, had you intended

that homeland defense would be the Department’s top priority

prior to the attacks on September 11?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Definitely, and that was one of the important things that defined this paradigm shift. I would say the principal change is that prior to September 11 we were envisioning as

a last thing to try to close this was to make some projections of

what savings we plan to achieve through efficiencies or eventually,

if necessary, through cuts in end strength and force structure. Let

me back up and say it a little differently—what we envisioned was

the investment requirement for transformation and modernization

and looked at how a projection of how that could be achieved

through a combination of efficiencies and cuts on the one hand and

new resources on the other.

Frankly, given the new situation and given the many new resource requirements that are coming down, we thought that any

such projection would at this point be kind of meaningless. So we

backed off of that.

But with respect to this question of detail on force structure and

detail on end-strength, we did not simply take status quo because

that was convenient. We took status quo in terms of force structure

after the Positive Match exercise that assessed the current force

structure as roughly meaning the current strategy.

That by the way is a change, because with the old strategy there

was a serious risk entailed in the current force structure. We took

the current end-strength as the starting point because we know

there are already very high PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO problems in the forces even with the numbers that we have. We think

in some of the services, they may be able to manage that down better, in which case they can look at end-strength reductions. But the

most important thing is they not do it in a way that creates very

high and dangerous OPTEMPOs and PERSTEMPOs in the process.

That is a starting point, but it was not selected because we like

status quo. It was selected because we sensed at the current endstrength and current force structures we were just at about a point

of serious strain in the force.

Senator COLLINS. My second question with regard to homeland

defense is: Is the Pentagon giving consideration to creating a single

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combatant commander to manage the Pentagon’s domestic security

efforts?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, we are, Senator.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Collins, thank you.

Both of our witnesses, we thank you. We will continue this hearing in the near future at a time to be determined, and good luck.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

1. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, the committee recently received two legislative

initiatives from Secretary Rumsfeld. The first initiative was a request for authority

for the Secretary of Defense for the duration of a war or national emergency, consistent with the fundamental purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, to reorganize those components of the Department that the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to support such emergency. In addition to noting that the Nation has been living under a state of national emergency for one reason or another

for several decades, I do have a few questions about this proposal.

First of all, can you confirm that I am correct that the Nation has been living

under a national emergency of one kind or another for several decades?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In 1976, the National Emergencies Act terminated powers

and authorities possessed as a result of any declaration of national emergency in

effect when that Act became law. The Act also provided an automatic termination

provision on the anniversary date of all subsequent declarations of national emergency unless the President continued the declaration beyond that date, notified Congress and published his decision in the Federal Register. Since 1976 the Nation has

at various times lived under declarations of national emergency. Presidential Proclamation 7463 of September 14, 2001, ‘‘Declaration of National Emergency by Reason

of Certain Terrorist Attack,’’ remains in effect today.

2. Senator LEVIN. What is the duration of all national emergencies declared since

1950?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. From 1950 until enactment of the National Emergencies

Act in 1976, national emergencies continued until terminated by law or act of the

President. Since enactment of the National Emergencies Act, all declarations of national emergency have terminated on the anniversary date of the declarations unless the President decided to continue the declarations beyond that date, notified

Congress and published his decision in the Federal Register.

3. Senator LEVIN. The sectional analysis for the proposal states that the Secretary

of Defense has acquired ‘‘enormous additional responsibilities’’ due to the horrific

events of September 11. Could you describe those ‘‘enormous additional responsibilities?’’

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Responsibilities that the Secretary of Defense has acquired

since the attacks of September 11 include running the combat air patrol mission

over the United States, helping to build a coalition of supporting nations for our war

on terrorism, conducting the military aspects of that war in Afghanistan, coordinating military support to civil authorities in our Nation, and supervising the Department’s response to the attack on the Pentagon to include support for the families

of the victims.

4. Senator LEVIN. Can you tell me what you believe are the fundamental purposes

of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I consider the fundamental purposes of the GoldwaterNichols legislation to be to strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense; to improve military advice provided to the President, the National Security

Council, and the Secretary of Defense; to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to

those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; to provide for more efficient use of defense resources; to improve joint officer management policies; and otherwise to enhance the

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effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department.

5. Senator LEVIN. Finally and most importantly, can you tell me what kind of reorganization the Secretary might want to make to respond to the national emergency declared by President Bush by reason of the September 11 terrorist attacks?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are studying a variety of ways to reorganize the Department of Defense, in concert with changes to the Unified Command Plan, to ensure a comprehensive, efficient and effective response to terrorism. Accordingly, I

am unable to provide specifics at this time. However, we will provide you with details as our review progresses.

ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN OFFICERS IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, the other legislative proposal would authorize

the Secretary of Defense to establish an additional position of Under Secretary of

Defense and three additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Why would the broad legislative authority referred to in the above question be

necessary if you are requesting an additional under Secretary of Defense and three

Assistant Secretaries of Defense?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are currently considering a broad range of potential reorganization ideas but they are not yet sufficiently developed to present to Congress.

In general, however, we support legislation providing increased discretionary authority in the Secretary of Defense to organize the Department in a manner he determines will best accomplish the Department’s missions.

7. Senator LEVIN. It appears that the additional Under Secretary would be assigned the responsibilities currently required to be assigned to an Assistant Secretary of Defense to provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program

planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the

Defense department for combating terrorism—is that correct?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No decision has been made regarding the combating terrorism function within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We will provide you with

details as our review progresses.

8. Senator LEVIN. Can you tell us what duties Secretary Rumsfeld has in mind

for assignment to the three additional assistant secretaries of defense?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We have not reached any conclusions regarding what assignments three additional assistant secretaries might have. We will provide you

with details as our review progresses.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

9. Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Secretary, in the QDR you state that ‘‘to identify the

best available solutions to emerging operational challenges, the defense strategy will

employ military field exercises and experiments.’’ You go on to state that these exercises represent a ‘‘critical phase’’ in the transformation of our military. The QDR

states that ‘‘DOD will explore the need to establish a joint and interoperability

training capability, including a Joint National Training Center, . . .’’ and that

‘‘DOD will consider the establishment of a Joint Opposing Force and increasing the

Joint Forces Command exercise budget.’’ Describe your plan for doing this.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Department is currently studying a variety of options

for enhancing experimentation and exercises to further DOD’s transformation goals.

These studies are wide-ranging and involve the Military Departments, the Joint

Staff, the Joint Forces Command, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They

will focus on mechanisms to strengthen joint operations in support of the six operational goals outlined in the QDR report. The initial results of these studies will

be reflected in the fiscal years 2004–2009 defense program.

10. Senator LIEBERMAN. What are your goals regarding joint operations?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Future military responses will require the rapid movement

and integration of joint and combined forces. The QDR outlined goals in five areas

for strengthening joint operations.

To be successful, operations will demand a flexible, reliable, and effective joint

command and control architecture that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain,

and protect U.S. forces across the battlefield in a timely manner. The Department

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will examine interoperable standards, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures

to facilitate this integration.

The Department also will develop proposals to establish a prototype for Standing

Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters. The headquarters will provide uniform,

standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise among commands.

In addition, the Department will examine options for establishing Standing Joint

Task Forces (SJTFs). SJTF organizations will seek to develop new concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric military advantages and joint force synergies.

To strengthen the Secretary of Defense’s management of the allocation of joint deterrent and warfighting assets from all Military Departments, the QDR calls for the

establishment of a joint presence policy. Establishing a joint presence policy will increase the capability and flexibility of U.S. forward-stationed forces and aid in managing force management risks. It will also allow for better coordination in the readiness and tempo of operations of all U.S. forces.

DOD will pursue actions to sustain the force more effectively and efficiently. Specific areas will include a dramatically improved deployment process and accelerated

implementation of logistics decision support tools.

11. Senator LIEBERMAN. What percentage of your budget will be allocated for joint

operations?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Achieving the Department’s transformation objectives requires joint forces that are more responsive, networked, scalable, task organized

into modular units, and capable of integration into joint and combined operations

than are today’s forces. Toward those ends, the Department is working on a number

of fronts to enhance jointness, including strengthening joint command and control,

improving joint military organizational arrangements, and enhancing joint exercises

and experimentation. The Department does not explicitly identify separate funding

for joint operations.

12. Senator LIEBERMAN. What is the long-term vision regarding jointness?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Enhancing jointness is a means for achieving the defense

policy objectives of assuring allies and friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and decisively defeating

any adversary. The Department’s vision for jointness is to greatly improve the performance of U.S. military forces by training, experimenting, and operating jointly

to better meet future challenges. DOD must develop the ability to integrate combat

organizations with joint forces capable of responding rapidly to events that occur

with little or no warning.

13. Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Secretary, strategy implies a method of applying limited means to best achieve our security ends, or objectives. The QDR does a good

job of identifying our key security objectives, such as homeland defense, projecting

power in an anti-access environment, the need to control space, and so on. What

is not clear, however, is how we plan to meet these objectives. What is our initial

concept for controlling space?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The initial concept for controlling space is to determine the

environment in which DOD assets will be operating, provide the necessary protection to ensure their availability to the warfighter and to deny that same ability to

an adversary as required. The Department of Defense has initiated a modernization

effort to increase the current Space Surveillance Network capability. This increased

capability will be accomplished through multiple paths to include upgrades of

ground based radar and optical sensors as well as a space-based augmentation. This

upgraded Space Situational Awareness capability will provide the DOD with the

ability to evaluate the space environment, which includes the determination of

spacecraft locations, environmental effects (solar flares, etc.), and any changes to

spacecraft locations. This information will provide the DOD with the battlespace

characterization of the space environment. The Department is also developing a protection architecture that will be used to ensure space asset survivability against

near- and far-term threats. The DOD is also continuing the development and demonstration of terrestrial—based temporary/reversible counter-communications, navigation, and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities that will allow the U.S to deny

the use of space based assets to an adversary in times of conflict.

14. Senator LIEBERMAN. How do we plan to defeat enemy anti-access capabilities?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The defense strategy rests on the assumption that U.S.

forces have the ability to project power worldwide. The United States must retain

the capability to send well-armed and logistically supported forces to critical points

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around the globe, even in the face of enemy opposition, or to locations where the

support infrastructure is lacking or has collapsed.

The QDR emphasizes the need for new investments that would enable U.S. forces

to defeat anti-access and area-denial threats and to operate effectively in critical

areas. Such investments will include: addressing the growing threat posed by submarines, air defense systems, cruise missiles, and mines; accelerating development

of the Army Objective Force; enhancing power projection and forcible entry capabilities; defeating long-range means of detection; enabling long-range attack capabilities; enhancing protection measures for strategic transport aircraft; and ensuring

U.S. forces can sustain operations under chemical or biological attack.

15. Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Secretary, it would seem that you would have to

have some ideas along these lines to inform your priorities with respect to modernization, force structure, R&D and experimentation. Strategy is fundamentally

about setting priorities to inform choices. What are your priorities with respect to

modernization?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Department has a three-fold modernization strategy.

First, we seek to exploit research and development opportunities to ensure that the

United States maintains its decisive lead in transformational technologies. Specific

priorities within the research and development program include information systems, stealth platforms, unmanned vehicles, and smart submunitions. Second, the

Department’s modernization strategy focuses on advancing the six critical operational goals for transformation outlined in the QDR. These are:

• Protecting bases of operations at home and abroad and defeating the

threats of CBRNE weapons. Key investments in this goal include anti-terrorism and force protection programs, chemical and biological countermeasures, and a layered missile defense program.

• Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective information operations. We must invest in robust information operations capabilities, with priority given to computer network defense.

• Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-denial environments. As a priority, the Department is investing in anti-submarine, anti-cruise missile, countermine, chemical and biological weapons

defense, and counter-air defense capabilities. DOD also aims to enhance

power projection and forcible entry capability, accelerate development of the

Army’s Objective Force, enable long-range attack capabilities, and enhance

protection measures for strategic transport aircraft.

• Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement. Modernizing to achieve this objective will require substantial investment in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) initiatives, including for our Special Operations Forces. Also

critical are the acceleration of Trident submarine conversions to guided

missile submarines and the procurement of small diameter munitions, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and ISR-capable unmanned aerial vehicles,

such as Global Hawk. We are also stressing the need to defeat hard and

deeply buried targets.

• Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems. DOD will

modernize the aging space surveillance infrastructure, enhance the command and control structure, and evolve the space control system to one capable of providing space situational awareness.

• Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop

interoperable Joint C4ISR. Funding here will focus on achieving an integrated joint and combined end-to-end command, control, communication,

computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability.

Third, we recognized in the QDR that our legacy forces are crucial to defeating

current threats and must therefore be sustained in the near-term. Selective recapitalization will focus on tactical aircraft, where the average age is at unprecedented

levels, Abrams tanks, B–1 bombers, Navy ship self-defense, and amphibious assault

vehicles.

16. Senator LIEBERMAN. If unknown at this time, when do you anticipate having

a full-scale strategy?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Department has described a comprehensive defense

strategy, articulated in the 2001 QDR Report, that outlines four defense policy goals

and an array of tenets that support those goals. The Department is now conducting

a combined program/budget review to develop for submission to Congress a defense

program and budget that effectively underwrites this strategy. In addition to the

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program/budget review, a range of other implementing steps are now underway that

will enable the Department to further realize the QDR’s goals.

17. Senator LIEBERMAN. When strategies are formulated, they are done so with

an idea toward the kind of resources-human and material—that will be available

to sustain them. I assume that in formulating your strategy you identified the kind

of resources—force structure levels, budget levels—that you would need to execute

the strategy successfully. Do you know what resources will be required for your

strategy?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In undertaking the QDR, we had a general appreciation for

the resources available for defense. However, we were determined to make the review strategy-driven, and thus did not explicitly address resource requirements. Before the September 2001 attacks, DOD had planned for gradual increases in defense

spending accompanied by roughly corresponding increases in available resources realized through internal efficiencies. In light of the markedly increased requirements

associated with the unfolding U.S. war against terrorism, however, these prior estimates of available resources are no longer accurate. At this juncture, the Defense

Department is developing new estimates of needed funding while maintaining its

commitment to realizing internal efficiencies.

In terms of force structure levels, the QDR used today’s current Active and Reserve Forces as the baseline from which the Department will develop a transformed

force for the future. The current force structure was assessed across several combinations of scenarios on the basis of the new defense strategy and force-sizing construct, and the capabilities of this force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk, although certain combinations of warfighting and smaller-scale contingency scenarios present high risk. As our transformation efforts mature, producing

significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force, DOD

will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed

Forces.

18. Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Secretary, I applaud Secretary Rumsfeld’s decision

to accelerate the conversion of Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines

(SSBNs) to the nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarine (SSGN) configuration, and to accelerate our efforts with respect to unmanned aerial vehicles, such

as Global Hawk. Such decisions seem consistent with the strategy outline in the

QDR, as I understand it. The prioritized resources that are listed in the QDR appear selective, especially without any indication of the status of the many other defense priorities. Discuss your rationale for selecting to mention some resources but

not others.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The 2001 QDR Report is a change-oriented document that

cited specific programs, such as the SSGN and Global Hawk programs, as illustrative of the kind of transformative efforts that will characterize the strategic direction of the Department in the years to come. The detailed deliberations on the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget submission, which are currently underway, will

produce a more comprehensive prioritization of program and budget matters.

19. Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Secretary, the discussion of risk management is an

important, positive addition to this QDR. However, the risk framework presented

seems generic. Military organizations have long been concerned with the ability to

field sufficient forces; the efficacy of their operations; their ability to modernize in

a timely way; and the need to establish efficiencies. It seems to me that our risk

management must be more precisely defined. For example, if our ability to defeat

anti-access forces is critically dependent upon our ability to develop a capacity to

destroy critical mobile targets at extended ranges, and to conduct highly distributed,

highly networked operations, how are we hedging against the risk that these kinds

of capabilities may not be achievable at the requisite levels, or that the threat may

emerge more quickly than we can develop them?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As noted in the QDR Report, adopting this risk framework

is just the beginning of the Department’s effort to manage and assess risk. The Department is actively working to frame the risks identified in the QDR in a number

of internal activities. The next step is to develop metrics for assessing risks, including metrics associated with meeting our transformation goals. These metrics, in

turn, will help to highlight the types of tradeoffs that you identify.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN

HOMELAND SECURITY

20. Senator CARNAHAN. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Carlson, the QDR

states, that ‘‘the Defense Department will place new emphasis upon counter terrorism training across Federal, State, and local first responders, drawing on the capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard.’’ The National Defense Authorization bill

requires the Defense Department to better define the role of the National Guard’s

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. These teams are being trained

to de-contaminate affected areas, and help provide medical aid.

Would you please describe the importance of such programs, and detail your commitment to honing our abilities to respond to such attacks?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. These are important programs. However, let me clarify the

mission of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). It

is to support civil authorities at a domestic Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear

or High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) incident site by: identifying chemical, biological

and radiological agents or substances; assessing current and projected consequences;

advising on response measures; and assisting with appropriate requests for additional state support. They do not decontaminate affected areas—only themselves

and their equipment. Their medical capability is limited to providing aid only to the

team and advising the on-scene incident commander.

With regard to the training of state and local first responders, the Department

has programmed sufficient funds to enable each WMD-CST to conduct at least one

exercise a month with their local and state first responders.

The Department of Defense is committed to improving our Nation’s response to

such attacks. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified Homeland Security

as the Department’s highest priority. It also directed the Department to undertake

a comprehensive study of Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions,

and associated resources. The study builds on recent assessments of Reserve component issues that highlight emerging roles for the Reserve components in the defense

of the United States, among other areas.

This study will provide options and recommendations on the roles and responsibilities that the Reserve components will play in Homeland Security. It is scheduled

for completion in the second quarter of 2002. We will use the results to focus the

Department of Defense’s efforts in support of the President’s National Homeland Security Strategy.

General CARLSON. The National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) provide a unique response capability as a part of DOD’s

emerging role in homeland security. WMD-CSTs were established to provide support

to the lead Federal agency in response to a nuclear, chemical or biological attack.

Programs such as these enable our Nation to apply some of the military’s highly

specialized and often unique skills in support of a coordinated emergency response

to a WMD event. Department of Defense is firmly committed to providing WMDCSTs the best training and equipment, and we will continue to develop and improve

our capability to respond to WMD attacks.

CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

21. Senator CARNAHAN. The QDR states that ‘‘rapid proliferation’’ of chemical, biological, nuclear and other asymmetric threats ‘‘gives rise to the danger that future

terrorist attacks might involve such weapons. . . . Globalization has increased the

availability of technologies and expertise needed’’ to create these types of weapons.

Secretary Wolfowitz, according to a recent GAO report, the Defense Department

is currently unaware of exactly how many protective systems it has, or what its true

requirements are, because of faulty inventory systems. Last week, I offered an

amendment to the Defense Authorization bill urging the Defense Department to

make sure that all DOD employees—civilians and military personnel were protected

from chemical or biological attacks. Would you please comment on the GAO’s findings, and describe the importance of remedying this problem?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The GAO report to which you refer concludes that the Department under estimated risk to military operations by (1) analyzing requirements

based on individual equipment items and not ensembles (i.e., suit, gloves and boots),

and (2) combining this service data into a consolidated DOD inventory position,

which is obscured by service-specific shortages.

The Department recognizes the added value of assessing risk based on complete

ensembles for each service. The data to perform such assessments is already presented in the Joint Service NBC Defense Logistics Support Plan (Appendices A and

D) and the Joint Service CB Defense Annual Report to Congress (Annex E). The

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GAO correctly observes that the components of an ensemble vary among the services. The mix of old and new technologies within each service’s inventories complicates the definition of a complete ensemble and also affects interoperability

among the services. We rely on the services’ understanding of their Basis of Issue

(BOI) to provide risk assessments for complete ensembles. Other factors pertinent

to this issue are the fiscal constraints and the realities of deployment scenarios. As

such, the services also manage risk by using the industrial base to surge and

produce quantities for an individual component. This mitigates the risk implied

from limited resources.

The Department will apply risk against complete ensembles in future analysis

and will provide appropriate guidance to the services to conduct a detailed evaluation of risk of complete ensembles against wartime requirements in preparation of

the next Annual Report to Congress and Logistics Support Plan. The Department

will also continue to mitigate risk by using the industrial base method. The data

regarding industrial surge capability to support this methodology will be included,

as it currently is, in future Chemical and Biological Defense program (CBDP) Logistics Support Plans.

The Department supports the implementation of a fully integrated inventory management system to manage chemical and biological defense equipment and the use

of such system to prepare the required Annual Report to Congress and the Annual

Logistics Support Plan. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is actively involved in

a Business System Modernization (BSM) Program to replace the current legacy system by fiscal year 2005, which will interface with the services. It will be state of

the art and base on the best commercial practices. Replacement of these current legacy systems will give us the greatest opportunity to integrate with the system(s)

used by each service. Meanwhile the Department has established a single focal point

for gathering and disseminating data to all entities requiring information, including

the Annual Report to Congress and the Logistics Support Plan, on the management

of the standard chemical-biological ensemble currently fielded to the Joint

Warfighter.

F/A–18 AIRCRAFT

22. Senator CARNAHAN. The QDR indicates that the Defense Department has decided to increase aircraft carrier battlegroup presence in the Western Pacific.

General Carlson, will this decision increase the importance of Navy aircraft such

as the F/A–18 operating in that area?

General CARLSON. The increase in presence of an aircraft carrier battlegroup in

the Western Pacific is part of a reorientation of global posture done to account for

new world challenges. One of the goals of reorienting the global posture stated in

the QDR is to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary’s military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement. The current Asian theater overseas presence posture is concentrated in Northeast Asia based on containing aggression by the former Soviet Union. As outlined in the QDR and Defense

Planning Guidance, a reorientation of posture must be accomplished in conjunction

with transformation to meet potential threats throughout the Asian Theater such

as increasing presence and capabilities in the Western Pacific. The capability of a

carrier battlegroup, which includes the F/A–18, is unmatched by any other nation

in the world today. The shift in carrier battlegroup presence focuses our limited carrier assets in response to today’s changing strategic environment.

23. Senator CARNAHAN. General Carlson, would the Department consider acquiring additional Navy tactical aircraft?

General CARLSON. The increase of aircraft carrier battlegroup presence in the

Western Pacific will be offset by a decrease in aircraft carrier battlegroup presence

in the rest of the world. This change in presence in the Western Pacific will not require additional Navy tactical aircraft.

B–2 BOMBER

24. Senator CARNAHAN. General Carlson, The QDR places a great emphasis on expanding America’s ability to project power deep into Central and East Asia. This

committee has often stated support for increasing our long range bomber capabilities to accomplish this goal. Now, this document has indicated that the Air Force

is developing plans to increase basing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Would such plans include developing permanent shelters for B–2 bombers on

Guam and/or Diego Garcia?

General CARLSON. The Department of Defense is investigating a number of options designed to improve DOD ability to project power, including forward basing

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or staging various segments of the force. As you know, the U.S. military presently

has the ability to strike with B–2s from your home state of Missouri to anywhere

in the world as we exhibited in both Serbia and Afghanistan. Basing or staging our

forces closer to where they are needed would lessen the time and fuel required to

strike an adversary, but may necessitate new agreements with foreign governments

and the deployment of additional personnel overseas. The Department of Defense

will continue to investigate options to improve DOD projection of power—to include

the forward basing of B–2s—but a decision has not, to my knowledge, been made.

25. Senator CARNAHAN. General Carlson, will the Defense Department begin to

consider expanding our B–2 fleet?

General CARLSON. Examining and assessing our total joint warfighting capability

is an on-going process in the Department of Defense. Our goal in transforming the

force is to achieve the objectives of the new defense strategy. At this point in the

DOD transformation effort, it is premature to state that an increase in the B–2 fleet

is necessary.

26. Senator CARNAHAN. General Carlson, please describe importance of expanding

American ‘‘access’’ to targets in this region of the world.

General CARLSON. The Central and East Asian regions have evolved both in importance to world economy and in susceptibility to large-scale military competition.

As we have seen in Afghanistan, the governments of some of these states may be

susceptible to overthrow by radical or extremist groups who, in turn, may harbor

terrorist organizations. With the capabilities of the B–2, we have the ability to

strike targets anywhere in the world. Expanding our access to these areas of the

world will not only benefit our security, but also increase stability in this critical

region.

27. Senator CARNAHAN. The QDR states: ‘‘The distances are vast in the Asian theater. The density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other

critical regions. The United States also has less assurance of access to facilities in

the region. This places a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure

agreements and on developing systems capable of sustained operations at great distances with minimal theater-based support.’’ Mr. Secretary, General, would you

please comment on this passage?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad arc of instability that stretches from the Middle East to

Northeast Asia, the region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional

powers. The governments of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by

radical or extremist internal political forces or movements. Many of these states

field large militaries and possess the potential to develop or acquire weapons of

mass destruction.

Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility exists

that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral—from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan—represents a particularly challenging area.

The reorientation of the global posture takes account of these new challenges.

New combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed

forces; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets;

information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal, and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations have the potential to be a significant force multiplier for forward stationed forces, including forcible

entry forces. One of the goals of reorienting the global posture is to render forward

forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary’s military and political objectives

with only modest reinforcement.

Based on changes in the international security environment, DOD’s new strategic

approach, and the transformed concept of deterrence, the U.S. global military posture will be reoriented to:

• Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces

in critical areas of the world.

• Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable

U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises in the absence of permanent

ranges and bases.

• Redistribute forces and equipment based on regional deterrence requirements.

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• Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, pre-positioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters

against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other

means to deny access to U.S. forces.

Accordingly, the Department has made the following decisions affecting the Asian

theater:

• The Secretary of the Navy will increase aircraft carrier battlegroup presence in the Western Pacific and will explore options for homeporting an additional three to four surface combatants, and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), in that area.

• The Secretary of the Air Force will develop plans to increase contingency

basing in the Pacific. The Secretary of the Air Force will ensure sufficient

en route infrastructure for refueling and logistics to support operations in

the Western Pacific.

• In consultation with U.S. allies and friends, the Secretary of the Navy

will explore the feasibility of conducting training for littoral warfare in the

Western Pacific for the Marine Corps.

General CARLSON. We believe the Asian theater to be of great importance to the

national security of the United States. To better protect U.S. interests, the Department of Defense must have the ability to project force to any region should the need

arise. Force projection requires the military to maintain the ability to defeat the efforts of U.S. adversaries. The Asian theater, because of the vast distances both on

the Asian continent and in the Pacific, poses a time-distance challenge to U.S. forces

both in engaging targets and logistic support. This challenge may be partly mitigated through forward basing or staging our forces and development of systems that

are able to fight at long distances with little forward support. This is one of the

challenges that the transformation of the U.S. military will address.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

REGIONALLY TAILORED FORCES

28. Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the Department’s new strategic planning

calls for maintaining ‘‘regionally tailored forces’’ forward stationed and deployed in

Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and Middle East/Southwest Asia

to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the

United States, its forces, allies, and friends. How does this differ from existing policy?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The reorientation of U.S. military global posture takes account of new challenges, particularly anti-access and area-denial threats, and

emerging capabilities (e.g., new combinations of immediately employable forward

forces, and expeditionary capabilities). The new approach places higher priority on

strengthening our forward deterrent posture with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement and, where necessary, assuring access for follow-on forces. A key objective of U.S. transformation efforts over time will be to increase the capability of America’s forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent

effect and possibly allowing for reallocation of forces now dedicated to reinforcement

to other missions.

RAPID TRANSFORMATION OF ARMED FORCES

29. Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you indicate

that: ‘‘To meet the challenges over the horizon, we must transform our Armed

Forces more rapidly, more creatively, and even more radically than we had previously planned.’’ What time period are you contemplating when you say ‘‘we must

transform our Armed Forces more rapidly?’’

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the course of the QDR, we came to understand that our

transformation efforts cannot wait two or three decades to produce results. Many

of the problems we will confront could well be present this coming decade. Now, as

we fight a war on terrorism, we see a new urgency to transform our forces.

Nevertheless, transformation is not an end state. Rather, it is the combination of

those ongoing processes and activities that result in the discovery of new or fundamental shifts in underlying rule sets, creating new sources of power, and yielding

profound increases in U.S. military competitive advantages. Toward that end, the

Department has already commenced the process of transformation. Through our

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service and joint experimentation initiatives, the latter orchestrated primarily by

the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), we are aggressively pursuing concepts and initiatives that could have a profound impact on how we organize our forces and conduct military operations. This coming summer, JFCOM will

conduct the first in a scheduled series of major joint field experiments, which we

have coined ‘‘Millennium Challenge 2002.’’ It is our intent to garner lessons from

this effort and directly apply them as part of the transformation process.

In addition, the services have articulated concepts for waging warfare on the future battlefield and have identified transformational initiatives to accomplish these

visions. Continued support and fielding of systems critical to our transformational

efforts is required as we forge ahead with these goals. To lend support to the Department’s transformational initiatives, the Secretary recently established the Directorate for Force Transformation and vested this new office with the responsibility

of advising the Department on transformation strategies. Though still in an embryonic stage, we view this directorate as a critical focal point to our efforts. The rapidity with which we can commence the transformation process is bounded only by our

willingness to change, to evolve, to explore, to experiment, and to a degree, by the

availability of funding. To sustain these efforts we welcome and look forward to your

continued interest and support.

IMPACT ON OUR ALLIES

30. Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the Gulf War and the current effort to

eliminate terrorism and those that support it demonstrate that the United States

must rely on coalitions to achieve its goals. How is the perceived requirement to

form coalitions to execute our military operations addressed in the QDR?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Through the QDR, the Department of Defense has developed a new strategic framework to defend the Nation and secure a viable peace.

This framework is built around four defense policy goals of assuring allies and

friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and coercion

against U.S. interests, and, if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

These defense policy goals are supported by an interconnected set of strategic tenets that comprise the essence of the new U.S. defense strategy. One of these tenets

is ‘‘Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships.’’ As witnessed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO’s invocation of Article V demonstrates

the commitment of America’s partners to collective defense, which bolsters the security of the United States. The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has

specific military implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing

interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and

experimentation.

REVIEW OF THE ACTIVE RESERVE MIX

31. Senator THURMOND. General Carlson, to support the revised strategy, the Department will continue to rely on Reserve Component forces. To ensure the appropriate use of the Reserve Components, the Department plans to undertake a comprehensive review of the active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions and

associated resources.

The current crisis places additional emphasis on this review. When do you expect

to start and complete this critical review?

General CARLSON. The Department is currently developing alternatives for conducting the study. The initial report is anticipated to be completed in the May/June

timeframe.

REORIENTING THE U.S. MILITARY GLOBAL POSTURE

32. Senator THURMOND. General Carlson, based on changes in the international

security environment, Department of Defense’s new strategic approach, and concept

of deterrence proposed by the Quadrennial Defense Review, there will be a need to

improve mobility, including airlift, sealift, prepositioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts.

While you are calling for these improvements, there is a need to modernize and

to replace or repair the existing infrastructure. How would you prioritize the allocation of fiscal resources to support these demands?

General CARLSON. To meet our Nation’s global responsibilities, our ability to move

and sustain combat forces virtually anywhere in the world must be maintained. The

increased reliance on strategic lift to support global military requirements remains

critical and represents a major priority for future planning. Our new strategy reVerDate 11-SEP-98 11:07 Apr 17, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 77281.085 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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quires continued commitment to presently programmed improvements to our en

route infrastructure. Establishing new en route infrastructure to meet non-traditional deployment requirements presents additional strains on fiscal resources. We

will begin to address these issues in our ongoing fiscal year 2003 program and budget review. We are also continuing to evaluate our infrastructure requirements as a

function of overseas presence and overseas basing analyses to support the new strategy. We expect to complete these analyses during 2002 and will use the results in

subsequent planning and programming.

STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS AND TASK FORCES

33. Senator THURMOND. General Carlson, the Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledges that excessive operational demands on the force have taken a toll on

military personnel. Despite this realization, the Quadrennial Defense Review calls

for establishing Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters for each regional combatant commands and Standing Joint Task Forces to focus on critical operational goals.

Will you be able to achieve these objectives within the current manpower ceilings

and how will these new organizations impact the operational tempo of our Armed

Forces?

General CARLSON. The Department is studying several different concepts for implementation of the Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations. We will not

have a definitive answer to your questions until these concepts have been refined.

A key milestone in this process will be the Millennium Challenge Joint Experiment,

planned for the summer of 2002. The results of this experiment will provide a baseline for evaluation of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters options.

Operational tempo remains a key concern, as it was during evaluation of Standing

Joint Task Forces and Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters within the Quadrennial Defense Review. We are committed to ensuring that implementation of the

Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations will not adversely affect operational

tempo.

RECAPITALIZATION OF THE LEGACY FORCES

34. Senator THURMOND. General Carlson, with all the emphasis on transforming

our Armed Forces, which will take some time, we must not forget the readiness of

our legacy forces. In my judgment, this will be a significant challenge since modernization has been underfunded for the past 10 years. What are your immediate

needs for recapitalizing the legacy force?

General CARLSON. As the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 report highlights, the

Department plans to transform today’s force while also selectively recapitalizing legacy systems. Legacy force recapitalization is especially challenging because of the

underfunding you mentioned that has occurred since the end of the Cold War.

The task of identifying which specific legacy systems to recapitalize as we transform the force is being addressed in our ongoing fiscal year 2003 program and budget review. It would be premature for me to comment on the results of this review.

The outcome will be available in the President’s budget scheduled for delivery to

Congress early next year.

HIGHEST PRIORITY NEEDS

35. Senator THURMOND. General Carlson, based on the conclusions in the Quadrennial Defense Review, our strategic focus will shift from Europe toward Asia. This

shift will require a new basing structure, en route facilities and, most important,

an increased reliance on strategic lift. What are the increased requirements for strategic lift and how soon will the Department meet this requirement?

General CARLSON. The increased requirements for strategic lift to support a shift

in strategic focus from Europe to Asia have not been specifically quantified. However, the Quadrennial Defense Review established the target for completing identification of global strategic lift requirements, which include contingencies beyond Europe. We are also reassessing our mobility requirements based upon the mix of new

near- to mid-term threats and missions. As stated in the Quadrennial Defense Review, follow-on mobility analyses will be completed in the coming years to ensure

we meet the strategic mobility requirements of the new strategy.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

36. Senator SANTORUM. Mr. Secretary, with respect to research and development,

the Quadrennial Defense Review states that:

‘‘A robust research and development effort is imperative to achieving the Department’s transformation objectives. DOD must maintain a strong science and technology (S&T) program that supports evolving military needs and ensures technological superiority over potential rivalries. Today and well into the foreseeable future, however, DOD will rely on the private sector to provide much of the leadership

in developing new technologies.’’

This is hardly a new concept. Yet, even now, the Department of Defense fails to

adequately budget resources need to produce ‘‘leap ahead’’ advances to propel the

transformation of our military. Instead, Congress has continually added to the S&T

portion of the budget requests submitted by the President.

With this in mind, why are we to believe that DOD will adequately budget for

critical S&T investments?

Because industry profits from the serial production of ‘‘legacy systems,’’ how will

DOD incentivize or leverage new R&D from the commercial world?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is the Department’s goal to fund S&T at a level adequate

to ensure the technological superiority of our Armed Forces. We have consistently

supported investment that, at a minimum, sustains 0 percent real growth in S&T

funding. It is now the Department’s goal to grow the S&T investment to be 3 percent of the total Defense budget by fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2002 President’s

budget request for S&T is $8.8 billion, which is an increase of 17 percent over the

fiscal year 2001 request of $7.5 billion, and almost matches the fiscal year 2001 congressional appropriation of $9.1 billion. We will continue to make progress toward

reaching the 3 percent goal. In addition, we realize many of today’s technology leaders are firms having little or no experience contracting with DOD and the Department has worked with the congressional committees in developing ‘‘Other Transaction Authority’’ to make it easier to do business with these firms.

DOD-SPONSORED RESEARCH

37. Senator SANTORUM. Mr. Secretary, can you explain how Department of Defense-sponsored research in American universities will help to propel this transformation initiative?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. DOD-sponsored research at universities underpins the development of future military capabilities in two ways. First, universities are worldclass research performers in science and engineering fields important to national defense. Second, investment in university research pays additional dividends through

the associated training of scientists and engineers, thereby helping to ensure the future availability of talent needed for defense research and development. Universities

are prolific sources of new knowledge and understanding, as well as future scientists

and engineers, in the DOD Basic Research program, the portion of DOD Science and

Technology where their involvement is greatest. With the benefit of hindsight, we

can see patterns of prior research, much of it performed at universities, that

spawned today’s revolutionary military capabilities, including the Global Positioning

System, stealth, night vision, and precision strike. We expect equally important new

capabilities to emerge over the long term from today’s investments in university research in areas such as those pertinent to nanotechnology, smart materials and

structures, information technology, human-centered systems, compact power, and

biomimetics.

SHORT-RANGE TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS

38. Senator SANTORUM. Mr. Secretary, if anti-access issues will challenge the military in the 21st century, and if projecting power is a key factor to be achieved to

meet these future threats, how do current short-range tactical aviation programs

such as the F/A–18 E/F Super Hornet, F–22 Raptor, and Joint Strike Fighter address this requirement?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Future U.S. force projection will require a broad range of

capabilities due to the uncertainty of the threats that may develop. The principal

combat aircraft being acquired now, such as the F/A–18E/F, F–22 and Joint Strike

Fighter (JSF), will complement other existing and planned capabilities to give the

U.S. the ability to project power wherever that may be necessary. The U.S. bomber

force, cruise missiles, and forward-deployed carrier or ground-based tactical aviation

must provide the capability to reach out and strike at well-defended targets on short

notice across intercontinental distances. While long-range bomber forces, as well as

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naval ship- and submarine-launched missiles can currently provide such capabilities, they cannot provide the tempo of operations, and consistent pressure on the

enemy that the F/A–18E/F, F–22, and JSF can provide.

The versatility of tactical aviation, complemented by long-range strike systems

and unmanned combat air vehicles ensures the ability to work inside the enemy’s

tactical decision loop, and deny sanctuary. Therefore, tactical aircraft such as F–22,

JSF, and F/A–18E/F will be critical enablers to counter the 21st century anti-access

threats, including advanced surface-to-air missiles, fighters, cruise missiles, theater

ballistic missile sites, and weapons of mass destruction. These new tactical aircraft

provide substantially longer un-refueled ranges than currently deployed fighters, are

much more survivable, and with advanced mission systems and advanced air-to-surface and air-to-air munitions, are far more lethal. They also have smaller logistics

footprints, the ability to air refuel, and, if necessary, can carry external fuel tanks

for even greater range. The ‘‘quick turn’’ capability of these aircraft, combined with

affordable numbers, will give the U.S. the ability to persist and hold broad expanses

of the enemy’s battlespace at risk 24 hours a day. This cannot be done with current

‘‘long-range’’ systems alone. These enhanced capabilities permit the new generation

of advanced fighter aircraft to travel long ranges and project power around the globe

into areas current aircraft are unable to penetrate.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

39A. Senator SANTORUM. General Carlson, if homeland defense is to become a top

national security goal, what is the best way to see that this mission is met in terms

of force structure?

General CARLSON. The first step in this process is to determine the appropriate

homeland security role for the Department of Defense so that force requirements

and capabilities can be ascertained. At the present time, the Department of Defense

homeland security role is still emerging. Once we know the requirement, we can

then assign and apportion force structure based on the priorities of the National

Command Authorities and within the context of the global spectrum of missions

that the Department of Defense is required to execute.

39B. Senator SANTORUM. Do you advocate assigning this new role to the Reserve

Components since they are already ‘‘forward deployed’’?

General CARLSON. The question of the appropriate roles and missions for the Reserve Components will be addressed by an upcoming Department of Defense review

that is discussed in the Quadrennial Defense Review report. The review will need

to be closely linked with emerging Department of Defense homeland security requirements to determine the most effective mix of both active, Reserve and National

Guard personnel to carry out the mission. Currently, a number of Guard and Reserve units have important roles in our war plans, so changes to the Reserve Component roles will need to be assessed with regard to the effect on these plans. Although homeland security is of paramount importance, all roles and missions for the

Reserve Components must be assessed across the full spectrum of military operations.

39C. Senator SANTORUM. If so, does this mean National Guard units will required

to give up their combat support role?

General CARLSON. This question is an important one to be addressed during the

upcoming Department of Defense Reserve Components review which will look at the

active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources.

Changes to the National Guard combat support role will need to be assessed in

terms of the effect on competing war plan requirements.

39D. Senator SANTORUM. How might assigning the National Guard or Reserves

on this mission impact the personnel tempo and operational tempo of our active

duty forces?

General CARLSON. In recent years, as both active and Reserve Force structure has

been reduced, the Department of Defense has increasingly depended on the Reserve

Components to help mitigate the increased personnel tempo and operational tempo

of our Active Component forces. Prior to the September 11 attack on the U.S.,

Guard and Reserve units and individuals were fulfilling both support and operational requirements on a global basis. Now, many Guard and Reserve units and

personnel have been mobilized or are augmenting our Active Component forces in

the global war on terrorism. An examination of appropriate active and Reserve roles

and missions to fulfill homeland security requirements will need to assess the impact on both the personnel tempo and operational tempo of our Total Force.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS

40A. Senator SANTORUM. General Carlson, since information operations are identified as a key concept in future conflicts facing the United States as well as a key

capability the United States will need to develop, do you advocate the ability of

United States forces to wage offensive information operations against those elements that are a threat to the United States?

General CARLSON. Information operations encompass activities across the spectrum of military engagement, from peacetime through crisis and armed conflict. Offensive information operations therefore include peacetime actions taken to shape

the environment and influence the behavior of adversaries as well as actions to deny

an adversary the use of his information capabilities in crisis and conflict. Offensive

and defensive information operations, together with robust and reliable command,

control, communications, and computer systems and timely, accurate intelligence,

are essential to attaining information superiority and accomplishing our military objectives both in peacetime and in war. If we can control information in future battles, by influencing the enemy to capitulate or by denying him the ability to comprehend the battlespace and execute command and control of his forces while protecting our ability to do those things, we will prevail more quickly and at lower cost.

In peacetime operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, we

still seek to shape the environment in which our forces must accomplish their missions. We do this by coordinating the use of information operations capabilities

against our adversaries with other informational activities, such as public affairs

and civil-military operations, focused on friendly or neutral audiences. By planning

and executing these activities the same way we would a wartime campaign, we can

influence the thinking and behavior of foreign audiences, neutralize adversary propaganda, and ensure that the American public is informed about the efforts of American service members to promote peace and stability in the world.

It is important to remember, however, that the military represents only one element of national power, which must be synchronized and integrated with the United

States Government’s other diplomatic, economic, and informational activities. The

more successful we are in integrating the military’s shaping efforts with those of

other United States Government agencies, the more effective our efforts to promote

American values will be.

40B. Senator SANTORUM. What if these threats are not posed by nation states or

even states, but rather by transnational actors (e.g. al Qaeda)?

General CARLSON. The rapid development and explosive proliferation of information-based technology means that military operations within the information domain

are becoming as important as those conducted in the domains of land, sea, air, and

space. Information technology provides one way for potential adversaries to attack

the United States and our allies. We know from other countries’ military literature

that a number of nations are considering the development and implementation of

computer network warfare capabilities. We have seen attempts by a variety of nonstate actors to gain unauthorized access to, or otherwise degrade, our information

systems. Thus, the threat to our military information and information systems by

non-state and/or transnational actors is real and must be taken seriously. Faced

with an attack of this nature by a non-state actor, an offensive information operations capability such as computer network attack may offer the most effective

means of defeating the adversary’s efforts.

Transnational actors such as al Qaeda also depend upon a supportive environment from which they can plan and execute operations against the United States.

Psychological operations are an offensive information operations capability that can

help deprive a hostile transnational actor of active support, or even turn public opinion against it. Loss of a supportive environment will degrade the capabilities of a

hostile non-state actor even when conventional military action against that actor is

not an option.

40C. Senator SANTORUM. Will it be acceptable to shutdown or cripple countries

that host these transnational actors?

General CARLSON. The extent to which United States military forces will degrade

any adversary county’s ability to perform normal functions is a matter for the National Command Authorities to decide, in keeping with national strategic objectives.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

41. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Secretary, at the heart of the QDR is the drive toward

a strategy driven budget rather than a budget driven strategy. I agree with this approach, and will do everything I can to help ensure that the resources you need are

available. While I understand that the real investment strategies (transformation

initiatives) will be made with the submission of the fiscal year 2003 budget, would

you indicate where the Department is now in reaching investment and programmatic decisions based on the QDR and other reviews?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Detailed deliberations on the development of the defense

component of the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget submission are currently underway. These deliberations are focused on making tangible progress toward meeting the Department’s six critical operational goals for transformation and supporting the global war on terrorism.

42. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Secretary, could you address specifically what role our

Guard and Reserve Forces were considered to play in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) prior to September 11, vs. the role for which they are now being considered? Prior to the attacks, did the Department foresee the impending requirement

for a new framework of homeland defense in which our Guard and Reserve play

such a critical role?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. During the QDR development process, the participants acknowledged that there was a significant role for the Reserve components (RC) in

homeland security, but the exact scope of that role was assigned to the follow-on

review of the RC.

Following the terrible destruction of September 11, it was clear that the first military response to a major disaster within the continental United States could well

be by Reserve Forces, not by Active forces. The RC has always been viewed by their

community leaders as the first military responders. The September attacks resulted

in a clearer picture of the need for trained and ready RC forces to respond to domestic missions. As stated by Secretary Rumsfeld during the release of the QDR–2001

Final Report, there will be a follow-on comprehensive review to address the role of

the RC in meeting our national military strategic objectives. This review will include a determination of the exact roles and missions for our Reserve Components

in Homeland Security.

43. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Secretary, the QDR addresses the fact that the performance of human resources intelligence (HUMINT) must be optimized, and following

the September 11 attacks, there appears to be an acknowledgment that the decline

in our investment in Human Intelligence has created a weakness in our intelligence

collection. Apart from the issue of quantity, how do you plan to address the issue

of quality of collection?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Following the Gulf War and the intelligence lessons

learned from that conflict, DOD directed quite a lot of attention to human resources

intelligence (HUMINT). Most notably, the Defense HUMINT Service was established in 1995, which consolidated under the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,

overall responsibility for DOD HUMINT (DHS) policy, plans and operations. One of

the keystones of DHS strategic vision has been to capitalize on the existing global

presence afforded DOD by the Defense Attache ́ System and other forward deployed

DHS resources. These were brought to bear immediately after the outbreak of conflict on September 11, 2001.

In order to enhance the quality of the HUMINT collection to support the war effort, we have initiated a number of actions. These include:

• We reprioritized the tasking of existing DOD HUMINT resources. We forward deployed to the theater and other areas of known or suspected terrorist activities, DHS [deleted] officers, strategic debriefers and linguists. We

are cooperating fully with the tactical intelligence assets of our deployed

military forces, as well as with those of other intelligence organizations. We

are seeing the results of this effort in the quality of intelligence we are developing from our interrogation of enemy prisoners, exploitation of captured

documents, and effective use of sources.

• Using the funds Congress appropriated to enhance our intelligence effort,

we are in the process of identifying and hiring as contractors former military and intelligence personnel with HUMINT, language and other professional expertise that would otherwise take a very long time to ‘‘grow.’’

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These personnel are beginning to come onboard, and will make a major difference in the development of HUMINT to support operations.

• We are aggressively pursuing cooperative relationships with other Government agencies to ensure proper focus and synergy of effort. We are also

working very hard with our allies to develop sources.

SHIPBUILDING STUDY

44. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Secretary, several studies feed into the preparation of

the QDR, including one undertaken by Under Secretary Aldridge on the future of

shipbuilding. Besides the brief reference to force structure numbers for our naval

forces found in the QDR, are there any other conclusions or results of that study

which you could share with this committee?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In addition to QDR input regarding naval force structure,

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD(AT–

L))-led Shipbuilding Study, concluded that several additional efforts should be initiated to address the Navy’s longer-term needs and assist in transforming the naval

force of the future. USD(AT&L) tasked the Secretary of the Navy to develop a plan

that lays the course for at-sea experimentation, simulation, and warfighting with

the goal of identifying tactics, doctrine and technology requirements to support future Navy forces. USD(AT&L) chartered a Defense Science Board task force to review aircraft carrier utilization in the future. The task force is expected to complete

deliberations in Summer 2002. USD(AT&L) also initiated a study to review the effectiveness of a mix of surface combatants with differing capabilities and displacements. Finally, we initiated a very-high-speed ship research program that will help

shape the future Navy.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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