ARMY CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS

Cost Increases in 

Flood Control 

Projects and 

Improving 

Communication with 

Nonfederal Sponsors

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Committee on Environment and Public 

Works, U.S. Senate

December 2013

GAO-14-35

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-35, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Environment 

and Public Works, U.S. Senate

December 2013

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Cost Increases in Flood Control Projects and

Improving Communication with Nonfederal Sponsors

Why GAO Did This Study

For fiscal year 2012, Congress 

appropriated almost $1.7 billion to the 

Corps for its Civil Works program to 

construct a wide range of projects, 

including flood control projects. Flood 

control projects require congressional 

authorization and appropriations. 

Nonfederal sponsors, such as a state 

or local government, also provide 

funds. When Congress approves a 

project for construction, it authorizes a 

total cost for the project based on 

estimates prepared by the Corps, and 

this authorized cost provides the basis 

for the project’s maximum cost. 

GAO was asked to review issues 

related to flood control projects. This 

report examines (1) the extent to which 

cost increases occurred and the 

primary factors that contributed to the 

differences between estimated and 

actual costs, (2) the extent to which the 

Corps communicated with and 

provided updated information to 

nonfederal sponsors, and (3) Corps 

guidance on communication with such 

sponsors and ways, if any, to improve 

such communication. GAO surveyed 

Corps officials on all 87 flood control 

projects identified by the Corps as 

budgeted for construction in any fiscal 

year from 2004 to 2012, selected 8 for 

further review covering each Corps 

division, reviewed project documents 

and Corps communication guidance, 

and interviewed Corps officials and 

nonfederal sponsors.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Corps take 

steps to ensure compliance with its

guidance calling for communications 

plans. The Department of Defense 

concurred with the recommendation.

What GAO Found

The majority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) flood control projects 

budgeted for construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced cost 

increases, including inflation. Specifically, 59 of 87 flood control projects during 

this period experienced increases from their original authorized cost to their 

current estimated project cost or their total expenditures at closeout, according to 

information provided by Corps officials. However, according to a Corps official, as 

of September 2013, no projects had cost increases that exceeded their maximum 

allowable cost as defined by law. Various factors other than inflation contributed 

to cost increases among the 8 projects GAO selected for further review. Factors 

included design changes, less than optimal federal funding, underestimated 

costs, and contract cost changes. For example, 6 of the 8 projects had design 

changes due to unforeseen site conditions and changes in design criteria 

following Hurricane Katrina. According to Corps officials, receiving less than 

optimal federal funding increased the costs of 3 of the 8 projects GAO reviewed. 

Corps officials also said that receiving less than optimal federal funding meant 

that 2 projects had to break up their work into smaller segments, and 1 project 

had to extend its completion schedule. The Corps has some efforts under way 

intended to better manage costs. 

The extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated 

information to nonfederal sponsors varied among the 8 projects GAO selected for 

further review. Specifically, Corps officials and sponsors told GAO that the Corps 

usually communicated Corps policy changes affecting projects by telephone or email as soon as they occurred. In addition, the Corps’ communication with the 

sponsors on project scope and design changes was generally effective among 

the projects, according to Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors with whom 

GAO spoke. However, some sponsors told GAO the Corps was less timely in 

providing updated cost information. For example, a representative of one 

sponsor told GAO that the sponsor had not received the required quarterly cost 

report on a regular basis. 

The Corps has guidance regarding communication between the Corps and its 

nonfederal sponsors. Specifically, Corps guidance directs project delivery teams 

to develop a project management plan that includes a communications plan. 

However, GAO found that 3 of the 8 projects GAO reviewed did not have a 

communications plan as called for by guidance. Because the communications 

plan provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish a 

communications strategy and determine the needs of the project delivery team, 

without such a plan, the Corps may be missing opportunities to assess their 

communication needs. Developing such a plan may help Corps or sponsor staff 

understand the team’s communications needs when they join the project delivery 

team; for projects where there is significant turnover, understanding the team’s 

needs is especially important. 

View GAO-14-35. For more information, 

contact Anne-Marie Fennell at (202) 512-3841

or fennella@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Letter 1 

Background 3

A Majority of Projects Experienced Cost Increases Due to Various 

Factors 10

The Extent to Which the Corps Communicated With and Provided 

Updated Information to Nonfederal Sponsors Varied 18

Communications Plans Called for by Guidance Were Not Always 

Developed, and Corps Officials and Nonfederal Sponsors 

Suggested Ways to Improve Communication 20

Conclusions 23

Recommendation for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments 24

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Appendix II Flood Control Projects Budgeted for Construction, Fiscal 

Years 2004 to 2012 30

Appendix III Descriptions of Eight Flood Control Projects Selected for 

Further Review 33

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 40

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: Projects Selected for Further Review from the Corps’ Civil 

Works Divisions 28

Table 2: List of Flood Control Projects Budgeted for Construction 

in Any Fiscal Year from 2004 to 2012, by Division and 

District 30

Contents 
Page ii GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Figures

Figure 1: Locations of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil 

Works Divisions and Districts 4

Figure 2: Major Steps in Developing a Flood Control Project 7

Abbreviations

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

WRDA Water Resources Development Act

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 20, 2013

The Honorable David Vitter

Ranking Member

Committee on Environment and Public Works

United States Senate

Dear Senator Vitter:

For fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) received 

an appropriation of almost $1.7 billion for its Civil Works program to 

construct a wide range of water resources projects, including flood control 

projects, such as levees, floodwalls, dams, and reservoirs. Flood control 

projects require congressional authorization and appropriations. The 

Corps also typically receives funds from each project’s nonfederal 

sponsor, which may be a state, tribal, county, or local government or 

agency. When Congress approves a flood control project for construction, 

it authorizes a total cost for the project based on cost estimates prepared 

by the Corps, and this authorized cost provides the basis for the project’s 

maximum allowable cost. The Corps must seek new spending authority 

from Congress before spending more than the maximum allowable cost. 

In an era of budgetary constraints, cost increases in Corps flood control 

projects can delay the completion of the projects.

You asked us to review issues related to the costs of flood control 

projects and the Corps’ communication with its nonfederal sponsors. This 

report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred in flood 

control projects budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 

2012 and the primary factors that contributed to the differences between 

estimated and actual costs; (2) the extent to which the Corps 

communicated with and provided updated information to its nonfederal 

sponsors on changes to Corps policies, project scope and design, and 

estimated versus actual costs; and (3) Corps guidance on communication 

with nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials 

and sponsors to improve such communication. For purposes of this 

report, a flood control project refers to a project with structural features 

such as levees, floodwalls, channels, dams, and reservoirs that is 

constructed for the purpose of managing the risk of flooding along rivers 

and coastal areas.

To determine the extent to which cost increases occurred in flood control 

projects and the primary factors that contributed to differences between 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

estimated and actual costs, we reviewed relevant provisions of the laws, 

regulations, policies, and procedures governing the Corps’ process for 

developing flood control projects and generating cost estimates. We also 

interviewed officials at Corps headquarters and its cost engineering 

center of expertise. The Corps identified 87 new or ongoing flood control 

projects that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 

to 2012,1 and we surveyed Corps officials associated with the projects to 

obtain project cost estimates at key milestones, the current total project 

cost or total expenditures at project closeout, and the primary reasons for 

cost increases. We received responses from Corps officials for all 87 

projects, for a 100 percent response rate. From those 87 projects, we 

selected a non-probability sample of 8 projects that were budgeted for 

construction in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012 for further review.2 This 

sample included 1 project randomly selected from each of 7 divisions3

and 1 project judgmentally selected from the New Orleans District that 

also met our selection criteria.4 The 8 projects were the Brays Bayou 

project in Texas, the Little Calumet River project in Indiana, the Larose to 

Golden Meadow project in Louisiana, the Monarch-Chesterfield project in 

Missouri, the Muddy River project in Massachusetts, the Napa River 

project in California, the Roanoke River Upper Basin project in Virginia, 

and the Turkey Creek Basin project in Kansas and Missouri. For these 8 

projects, we reviewed project documents and interviewed Corps officials 

and representatives of nonfederal sponsors to obtain more detailed 

information about project cost increases and the reasons for those 

increases. 

To determine the extent to which the Corps communicated with and 

provided updated information to its nonfederal sponsors, we interviewed 

 

1

Our work focused on flood control projects budgeted for construction in any fiscal year 

from 2004 to 2012 because these projects had gone through the Corps’ project 

development processes and had project cost estimates developed by the Corps at key 

milestones. 

2

We selected projects that were budgeted for construction from fiscal years 2009 to 2012 

to enhance our ability to speak with Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors who had 

worked on the projects and were knowledgeable about the reasons for cost increases.

3

The Corps’ Civil Works program has eight divisions. However, the Pacific Ocean Division 

had no flood control project that was budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 

2009 to 2012.

4

The congressional requester expressed interest that we include one of the projects in the 

New Orleans District in our sample. We included a project that met our selection criteria.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Corps district officials and sponsors of the eight projects selected for 

further review to obtain information on the communication that occurred 

on those projects. To examine Corps guidance on communication with 

nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials and 

sponsors to improve such communication, we reviewed Corps civil works 

guidance on communication with nonfederal sponsors, interviewed Corps 

headquarters officials and district officials and sponsors of the eight 

projects selected for further review, and obtained copies of 

communications plans, if available, for the eight projects. Because this is 

a non-probability sample, the experiences and views of Corps officials 

and sponsors of the eight projects are not representative of, and cannot 

be generalized to, all Corps flood control projects. Appendix I contains 

more detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology of 

our review.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to December 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Corps is the world’s largest public engineering, design, and 

construction management agency. Located within the Department of 

Defense, the Corps has both military and civilian responsibilities.5

Through its Civil Works program, the Corps plans, designs, constructs, 

operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources projects for 

purposes such as flood control, navigation, and environmental 

restoration. The Civil Works program is organized into 3 tiers: a national 

headquarters in Washington, D.C.; 8 regional divisions that were 

established generally according to watershed boundaries; and 38 districts 

nationwide (see fig. 1).

 

5

The Corps’ Military program provides, among other things, engineering and construction 

services to other U.S. government agencies and foreign governments. This report only 

discusses the Civil Works program.

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Figure 1: Locations of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil Works Divisions and Districts
 

Page 5 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Corps headquarters primarily develops policies and provides oversight. 

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, appointed by the 

President, establishes the policy direction for the Civil Works program. 

The Chief of Engineers, a military officer, oversees the Corps’ civil works 

operations and reports on civil works matters to the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Civil Works. The eight divisions, commanded by military 

officers, coordinate civil works projects in the districts within their 

respective geographic areas. Corps districts, also commanded by military 

officers, are responsible for planning, engineering, constructing, and 

managing projects in their districts. Districts are also responsible for 

coordinating with the nonfederal sponsors, which may be state, tribal, 

county, or local governments or agencies. Each project has a project 

delivery team of civilian employees that manages the project over its life 

cycle. The team is led by a project manager and comprises members 

from the planning, engineering, construction, operations, and real estate 

functions.

In addition, the Civil Works program maintains a number of centers of 

expertise to assist Corps division and district offices.6 One of these 

centers is the Cost Engineering and Agency Technical Review Mandatory 

Center of Expertise located in Walla Walla, Washington, which provides 

technical support and assistance to the districts on cost engineering 

issues, such as developing cost estimates and performing mandatory 

agency technical reviews of cost estimates included in all decision 

documents. 

The Corps’ Civil Works program receives funding annually through the 

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act or an omnibus 

appropriations act. These acts have typically appropriated a sum to each 

civil works appropriation account, including investigations, construction, 

and operation and maintenance, to fund projects related to the nation’s 

water resources. The funds appropriated to the Corps are “no year” 

funds, which means that they remain available to the Corps until spent. 

Historically, committee reports accompanying each annual appropriations 

act have specifically listed individual investigations, construction, and 

 

6

The centers of expertise assist the Corps divisions and districts in the planning, design, 

and technical review of civil works projects. The Corps established the centers to 

consolidate expertise, improve consistency, reduce redundancy, and enhance institutional 

knowledge, among other things. For a full list of the Corps’ centers of expertise, see 

http://www.usace.army.mil/about/centersofexpertise.aspx. 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

operation and maintenance projects, and the amount of funds designated 

for each project.

Through fiscal year 2005, applicable law and an Army policy allowed the 

Corps to enter into, and commit the federal government for the full 

amount of, contracts that spanned more than one fiscal year (called 

“continuing contracts”), even though the Corps may not have received 

appropriations to cover the full contract amount at the time the contracts 

were awarded. However, beginning with the fiscal year 2006 Energy and 

Water Development Appropriations Act, Congress limited the use of the 

Corps’ continuing contract authority. In response, the Corps developed 

new continuing contract clauses that limited the government’s obligations 

to only the funds available at a specific time for the contracts, as opposed 

to any anticipated future funding, and required the contractor to stop work 

when the available funds were exhausted.

The major steps in developing a flood control project are shown in 

figure 2.

Continuing Contract 

Authority 

Process for Developing 

Flood Control Projects
 

Page 7 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Figure 2: Major Steps in Developing a Flood Control Project

Usually, the Corps becomes involved in flood control projects when a 

local community perceives or experiences a flooding problem that is 

beyond its ability to solve and contacts the Corps for assistance. If the 

Corps does not have the statutory authority required for studying the 
 

Page 8 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

problem, the Corps must obtain authorization from Congress before 

proceeding.7 Studies have been authorized through legislation, typically a 

Water Resources Development Act (WRDA),8 or, in some circumstances, 

through a committee resolution. Next, the Corps must receive an 

appropriation to study the project, which it seeks through its annual 

budget request to Congress.

After receiving authorization and an appropriation, studies are conducted 

in two phases: reconnaissance and feasibility. A Corps district office 

conducts a reconnaissance study at full federal expense to determine if 

the problem warrants federal participation in a feasibility study and how 

the problem could be addressed.9 During this phase, the Corps also 

assesses the level of interest and support from nonfederal entities that 

may become sponsors. If the Corps determines that further study is 

warranted,10 the district office typically seeks agreement from the local 

sponsor to share costs for a feasibility study. The target for completion of 

the reconnaissance phase is 6 to 12 months from initial obligation of 

federal funds to a signed feasibility cost-sharing agreement.

Cost sharing for feasibility studies for flood control projects is 50 percent 

federal and 50 percent nonfederal. The cost of a feasibility study is 

established through negotiation of the project management plan, which is 

an agreement between the Corps and the nonfederal sponsor that 

defines project objectives and project-specific quality control procedures. 

The purpose of the feasibility study is to further investigate the problem 

and make recommendations on whether the project is worth pursuing and 

how the problem should be addressed. Corps guidance states that typical 

feasibility studies should be completed in 18 to 36 months. According to 

the Corps, the district office conducts the study and the needed 

environmental studies and documents the results in a feasibility report 

that includes a total project cost estimate based on the recommended 

 

7

If the Corps has previously performed a study in the geographic area for a similar 

purpose, a new study can be authorized by a resolution. If the Corps has not previously 

investigated the area, the study needs to be authorized through legislation.

8

Congress enacted WRDAs in 1974, 1976, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000, 

and 2007. Each WRDA authorized numerous projects and programs.

9

The cost of a reconnaissance study generally is limited to $100,000.

10The Corps estimated that about 20 percent of all reconnaissance studies result in a 

recommendation to conduct a feasibility study. 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

plan. The Chief of Engineers reviews the report and decides whether to 

sign a final decision document, known as the Chief’s Report, 

recommending the project for construction. The Chief of Engineers 

transmits the Chief’s Report and the supporting documentation to 

Congress through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and 

the Office of Management and Budget. Congress may authorize the 

project’s construction in a WRDA or other legislation.11 When Congress 

approves a flood control project for construction, it typically authorizes a 

total cost for the project based on estimates prepared by the Corps.

Most projects are authorized during the preconstruction engineering and 

design phase. This phase usually overlaps with the feasibility phase. The 

purpose of the preconstruction engineering and design phase is to 

complete any additional planning studies and all of the detailed, technical 

studies and designs needed to begin construction of the project. Once the 

project has been authorized for construction and funds have been 

appropriated, the district enters into a cost-sharing agreement with the 

local sponsor. The degree of cost sharing required can vary by project 

but, since the passage of WRDA 1986, construction costs of flood control 

projects can be shared under a formula of 65 percent federal and 35 

percent nonfederal. The Corps seeks funds to construct the project 

through the annual budget process. After Congress appropriates funds, 

the construction phase can begin. Construction is generally managed by 

the Corps but performed by private contractors. During construction, 

Congress may enact scope or cost changes.

A flood control project can take many years to complete. Once 

construction is completed, the Corps usually turns over operation and 

maintenance of the project to the nonfederal sponsor, which then bears 

the full cost.

When Congress authorizes a specific amount of money for a project, this 

authorized project cost provides the basis for the project’s maximum cost. 

Section 902 of WRDA 1986, as amended,12 defines the maximum project 

 

11The Corps estimated that about 75 percent of all feasibility studies result in a project 

authorized for construction.

12Pub. L. No. 99-662 § 902, 100 Stat. 4183 (1986), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 

2280 (2013). For purposes of this report, we use “section 902 of WRDA 1986” to refer to 

this provision as amended.

Maximum Project Cost
 

Page 10 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

cost as the sum of (1) the authorized cost, with the costs of unconstructed 

project features adjusted for inflation; (2) the costs of modifications that 

do not materially alter the scope of the project, up to 20 percent of the 

authorized cost (without adjustment for inflation); and (3) the cost of 

additional studies, modifications, and actions authorized by WRDA 1986 

or any later law or required by changes in federal law. The maximum cost 

is known as the 902 limit.

As interpreted by the Corps, the 902 limit applies to the following types of 

flood control projects unless the project’s authorization states otherwise:

• Projects authorized by WRDA 1986 and any subsequent WRDA or 

other authorizing law.

• Projects authorized before WRDA 1986 with new construction 

authorized after the act’s passage if the project was completely 

reauthorized. If only a project component was authorized after WRDA 

1986, then only that component would be subject to the 902 limit.

• Projects authorized before WRDA 1986 and modified by any 

subsequent law, unless specified in later legislation.

Each district with an ongoing construction project is to update the 902 

limit established for the project to account for inflation every time a new

cost estimate or benefit-to-cost ratio is calculated. If the project’s 

estimated costs are approaching the 902 limit, the project delivery team 

may start preparing a post-authorization change report to seek an 

increase in the project’s authorized cost.13 If the project’s actual costs 

reach the 902 limit, construction must stop until the project gets a new 

authorization that increases the project’s costs and, therefore, its 902 

limit.

The majority of the Corps flood control projects budgeted for construction 

from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced cost increases, including 

inflation. However, no projects had cost increases that exceeded their 

maximum allowable cost, or 902 limit, as defined by law. Various factors 

other than inflation contributed to cost increases among the eight projects 

 

13A post-authorization change report is a decision document that may be required when 

project features have changed significantly or if the estimated costs have changed 

substantially after authorization.

A Majority of Projects 

Experienced Cost 

Increases Due to 

Various Factors
 

Page 11 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

we selected for further review. The Corps has some efforts under way 

intended to better manage costs.

At least two-thirds of the 87 flood control projects budgeted for 

construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced increases, 

including inflation, from their original authorized cost to their current 

estimated project cost or their total expenditures at closeout, according to 

information provided by Corps officials.14 Specifically, 59 projects had cost 

increases, including 12 completed projects and 47 that were 

uncompleted.15 In addition, 7 projects had cost decreases, including 3 

completed projects and 4 uncompleted projects.16 One uncompleted 

project experienced no change from its authorized cost to its current total 

project cost. We were unable to compare costs for 20 projects—3 

completed and 17 uncompleted—because they did not have an 

authorized cost or total expenditures at closeout or were undergoing 

reevaluation and did not have a current total project cost estimate.

Based on survey responses, of the 59 projects with cost increases, 34 

had maximum allowable cost limits as defined in Section 902 of WRDA 

1986. According to the Corps official responsible for tracking 902 limits, 

as of September 2013, none of those 34 projects had cost increases that 

exceeded its 902 limit. In addition, according to survey responses, 13 of 

the 59 projects did not have 902 limits because the project (1) was 

authorized before WRDA 1986, (2) had no authorized cost, or (3) had a 

not-to-exceed limit, to which the 902 limit does not apply.17 The remaining 

12 projects we reviewed were completed and, therefore, our survey 

question regarding 902 limits did not apply.

 

14We were unable to quantify the difference between the original authorized cost and the 

current total project cost or total expenditures at project closeout because we determined 

that the survey data were not reliable for that purpose. For more information, see 

appendix I. 

15An uncompleted project refers to a project that was authorized for construction but not 

yet completed at the end of fiscal year 2012. 

16Costs decreased because certain features had been eliminated due to project changes 

or design improvements, project scope had been reduced, or construction schedules had 

been accelerated.

17In some instances, Congress authorized projects for construction at a total cost not to 

exceed a specified amount, meaning that the cost was capped and could not be adjusted 

for inflation or other reasons.

At Least Two-thirds of 

Flood Control Projects 

Experienced Cost 

Increases
 

Page 12 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Similarly, survey responses indicated that 29 of the 59 projects with cost 

increases had received at least one additional authorization from 

Congress that increased the project’s authorized cost and, therefore, its 

maximum allowable cost if the project was subject to the 902 limit.18 A 

Corps flood control project can receive an increase in its authorized cost 

in one of two ways. First, the Corps can submit a post-authorization 

change report with a new total project cost estimate to Congress. Based 

on this report, Congress can then reauthorize the project at a higher cost 

in legislation, such as a WRDA. Second, Congress can also reauthorize a 

project without having received a post-authorization change report from 

the Corps. In either case, if the project’s actual costs reach its 902 limit 

before congressional action, construction must stop until the project gets 

a new authorization that increases the project’s costs.

Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors from the eight projects selected 

for further review identified various factors other than inflation that 

contributed to cost increases on all eight of the projects. Some of these 

projects were impacted by more than one factor. Appendix III contains 

detailed information on the eight projects. The factors identified were as 

follows:

• Design changes. Design changes due primarily to unforeseen site 

conditions and changes in design criteria following Hurricane Katrina 

contributed to increased costs on six of the projects we reviewed. 

Specifically, on four projects, design changes occurred due to 

unforeseen site conditions. Corps officials on the Turkey Creek project 

said that a tunnel that could not be accessed prior to construction was 

found to be in such poor condition that it had to have major 

rehabilitation work performed. Work to fix the deteriorated tunnel cost 

$10 million more than had originally been estimated.19 Corps officials 

on the Little Calumet project said during construction they 

encountered a former landfill along one portion of the river that had 

not been discovered during the preconstruction site investigation. This 

condition did not provide a usable foundation for a levee, so the 

 

18We also identified three flood control projects for which, as of fiscal year 2012, the Corps 

was in the process of developing post-authorization change reports to seek an increased 

authorized cost for the project.

19In this report, cost increases are presented in the dollar values for the years in which 

they were determined, not in constant dollars. 

Various Factors 

Contributed to Cost 

Increases on Eight 

Projects
 

Page 13 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

design had to be changed to convert the section from a levee to a 

sheet pile wall.20 These changes increased costs by approximately 

$645,000, according to a post-authorization change report dated 

March 2012. On the Napa River project, after the initial designs were 

completed in 1997, a vineyard was planted next to an area that had 

previously been identified as a flowage easement.21 The Corps had to 

analyze various alternatives and decided to build a levee encircling 

the vineyard. Building this additional levee cost $200,000, but it was 

able to serve as a disposal area for some of the material excavated 

from the project. Finally, on the Roanoke River project, the sponsor 

said that the Corps spent several years redesigning portions of the 

project following the discovery of areas contaminated with hazardous 

waste. Several sections of the project relating to river channels had to 

be dropped as a result of the redesign.

Other projects we reviewed had to have portions redesigned because 

the Corps changed its design criteria following Hurricane Katrina. 

Specifically, the Corps updated its guidance on the design of I-walls 

used as flood barriers.22 On projects that were either in the design 

stage or under construction, but with unconstructed features, officials 

had to determine whether their designs met the new criteria. For 

example, on two projects we reviewed, portions of the project had to 

be redesigned to comply with the new criteria. Corps officials on the 

Little Calumet project said that costs increased significantly because 

the new criteria required the redesign of three sections of the project. 

However, officials were unable to specify by how much costs 

increased. According to a Corps official, detailed cost estimates of the 

preliminary designs were not prepared. The official added that cost 

estimates used during planning were initial estimates and did not 

provide a reliable basis with which to compare the cost of the 

redesigned sections. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors of the 

 

20A sheet pile wall is a row of piles made from timber, steel, or prestressed concrete that 

are driven into the ground to retain earth or prevent water seepage.

21According to the Corps, a flowage easement is privately owned land on which the Corps 

has acquired the perpetual right, power, privilege, and easement permanently or 

occasionally to overflow, flood, and submerge land in connection with the operation and 

maintenance of a water resources development project.

22U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Circular 1110-2-6066, Engineering and Design: 

Design of I-Walls, April 1, 2011. The circular defines an I-wall as “a slender cantilever wall, 

embedded in the ground or in an embankment that rotates when loaded and is thereby 

stabilized by reactive lateral earth pressures.” 
 

Page 14 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Larose to Golden Meadow project said the changes in design criteria 

could significantly increase the costs to construct elements of the 

project. Corps officials said they are in the process of preparing a 

post-authorization change report and, therefore, could not provide an 

estimate of the increases at the time of our report. Corps officials 

expect the report to be completed in 2014.

• Less than optimal federal funding. According to Corps guidance, the 

Corps is to include project funding in its budget submission at a level 

that a project can use effectively and efficiently in a given fiscal year, 

which we refer to in this report as optimal federal funding. Receiving 

less than optimal federal funding increased the costs of three of the 

eight projects we reviewed, according to Corps officials. Officials for 

two projects—Napa River and Turkey Creek—said their projects 

received less than optimal federal funding, so they had to break up 

the work into smaller segments than initially planned. Officials added 

that doing so was more costly because it required contractors to 

mobilize and demobilize their construction equipment and crews more 

frequently. A Corps official on the Turkey Creek project said that the 

cost of issuing additional contracts could be quantified but that the 

Corps does not specifically track these types of costs. The official said 

that contracts have typically been issued in lump sums, so 

mobilization and demobilization costs have not been explicitly broken 

out. In addition, on the Napa River project, a Corps document cited 

two instances when modifications were required for ongoing 

construction contracts due to a lack of funding, which lengthened the 

construction schedule and increased costs by about $12 million. 

Similarly, Corps officials on the Larose to Golden Meadow project said 

that, over the last several years, the project schedule had been 

pushed back because the project had not been receiving optimal 

federal funding. The officials added that over the 41 years that the 

project has been under construction, they had not consistently 

received enough funding, which had resulted in a longer completion 

schedule and increased costs. Although the officials could not quantify 

by how much, they said costs generally increased due to inflation and 

higher material prices. For example, officials said that the cost of steel 

sheet piling increased from $3.25 per square foot in 1963 to an 

average $40.00 per square foot from 2006 to 2011.

• Underestimated costs. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors of four 

projects said that costs increased on their projects due to differences 

between early Corps cost estimates and those developed later during 

project design. For example, Corps officials on the Larose to Golden 

Meadow project said that on one of the pumping plants, they initially 
 

Page 15 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

estimated a construction cost of $800,000. But after additional 

analysis and geotechnical borings,23 and in order to handle the actual 

site conditions, they redesigned the project features, which raised the 

cost to $10.7 million. On the Muddy River project, nonfederal 

sponsors said that the Corps’ early cost estimates were too low 

because the Corps used national averages that were lower than what 

actual costs would be in the New England corridor where the project 

was located. As a result, sponsors said that they developed their own 

estimates for budgeting purposes of $78.5 million. However, a Corps 

official said that the Corps adjusted for regional differences for cost 

estimates prepared during the project. On the Brays Bayou project, 

the nonfederal sponsor said that differences between the authorized 

cost and the cost included in the initial project partnership agreement 

resulted from the Corps’ low estimates of land acquisition and 

associated costs, pipeline costs, utilities, and bridge adjustments. 

However, Corps officials attribute all cost increases since project 

authorization to the change from a diversion element to a downstream 

channel structure. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors on the 

Roanoke River project agreed that the project’s original cost 

estimates, which were used for authorization, were not realistic. Corps 

officials said that the feasibility study conducted in the mid-1980s was 

not done to the same level of detail as more recent studies. As a 

result, the cost estimates developed in the feasibility study were not 

as accurate as they could have been.

Corps officials said they have taken actions to improve cost estimates. 

For example, in 2007, the Corps established a cost engineering 

center of expertise where, according to a Corps official, cost estimates 

in decision documents supporting congressional authorization are 

reviewed for accuracy and, in 2008, the Corps updated its costestimating guidance. Additional guidance issued in draft in 2009 

further directs project delivery teams to perform a cost and schedule 

risk analysis for all decision documents for projects requiring 

congressional authorization with a total project cost estimate 

exceeding $40 million, whereby specific cost risk analysis methods 

are to be used to develop contingency. According to a Corps official, 

performing a cost and schedule risk analysis allows the project 

delivery team to identify high-risk areas that could impact a project’s 

cost or schedule, as well as areas for early mitigation efforts.

 

23Geotechnical boring refers to drilling holes in the ground to obtain information on soil 

conditions.
 

Page 16 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

• Changes in contract costs. Corps officials said that differences 

between contract estimates and actual contract awards can lead to 

cost increases. On the Muddy River project, the Corps awarded a 

contract for the first phase of the project that was $8 million higher 

than the Corps’ original estimate. A Corps official on the project 

explained that the cost estimates used by contractors in submitting 

bids for the project may have been based on a different set of 

assumptions regarding such factors as the future cost of materials 

and fuel. The Corps official added that this multiyear contract did not 

have an escalation clause for increases in fuel or materials, so the 

contractors likely made different assumptions to reduce their risk. In 

addition, costs could be affected by contract modifications. For 

example, on the Monarch-Chesterfield project, a Corps official said 

that several modifications during construction accounted for increased 

costs of approximately $1.2 million. Some of these modifications 

included additional engineering support for a specialized railroad 

closure structure, further design of a pump station, plan changes to 

locate a fiber optic cable, and design changes to better accommodate 

storm sewers.

• Natural events. Natural events, including flooding and hurricanes, 

caused damage to two projects—Turkey Creek and Larose to Golden 

Meadow. Repairing the damage added to project costs. For example, 

a Corps official on the Turkey Creek project said that, during the 

construction of the tunnel, the bypass pipe system used to divert the 

flow of Turkey Creek was repeatedly washed out due to flooding and 

had to be replaced, which increased the total project cost by 

approximately $3.5 to $4 million.

• Continuing contracts. Corps officials said that the policy change 

limiting the use of continuing contracts increased costs on one 

project.24 Corps officials on the Roanoke River project said that, as a 

result of breaking the one contract into smaller contracts, costs 

increased due to the loss of economies of scale. However, Corps 

 

24The Corps modified its policy to conform with a change in law prohibiting the agency 

from entering into a contract that commits an amount in excess of the amount 

appropriated for that project, plus any amounts available from carryover or 

reprogramming; the policy’s effect is that the Corps can no longer commit the federal 

government for the full amount of contracts that span more than 1 fiscal year. The Corps 

may still enter into continuing contracts, but in doing so, it only commits to contractor 

earnings for the first fiscal year.
 

Page 17 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

officials said they could not indicate by how much costs increased 

because costs were not calculated for contracting scenarios that did 

not occur.

• Additional analysis. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 

Works required Corps officials on the Monarch-Chesterfield project to 

analyze the probability of the project causing measurable flood 

damages outside the protected area. The additional analysis delayed 

the start of construction for almost 7 years, and the measures to 

address flooding caused by the project added $13 million to the cost 

of the project.

In a memorandum dated February 20, 2013, the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Civil Works expressed concerns that civil works projects, 

once authorized, did not appear to be managed for completion within 

approved cost estimates and also identified a need for a systematic 

approach to monitor and manage project cost increases, given continued 

fiscal constraints. The memorandum stated that, without controls to 

closely track and minimize cost increases on a year-to-year basis, more 

projects would be in jeopardy of needing statutory increases in their 902 

limits. Because of these and other concerns, the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Civil Works requested information from the Corps that 

included a proposed plan to manage and control costs in the future. In 

response, in 2013, the Corps formed the Project Cost Management 

Working Group, which identified several actions intended to better 

manage costs, such as requiring formal high-level approval of changes 

above appropriate thresholds and using formal processes and industry 

best practices to reduce overall cost and project duration. A Corps official 

said that the Corps developed an interim measure to identify projects that 

have exceeded their authorized project cost and reasons for the cost 

increase. However, the official said that this interim measure focuses on 

those projects eligible for inclusion in the fiscal year 2015 budget 

submission and projects in the fiscal year 2013 work plan. The official 

said that determining how to integrate the interim measure into the 

existing budget and execution processes is planned for fiscal year 2014.

The Corps Has Some 

Efforts Under Way 

Intended to Better Manage 

Project Costs
 

Page 18 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

For the eight projects we selected for further review, the extent to which 

the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to 

nonfederal sponsors varied. Specifically, Corps officials and nonfederal 

sponsors told us that the Corps usually communicated changes in Corps 

policy as soon as they occurred. The Corps’ communication with the 

nonfederal sponsors on project scope and design changes was generally 

effective among the projects, according to Corps officials and nonfederal 

sponsors we spoke with. However, some sponsors told us the Corps was 

less timely in providing updated cost information. The Corps 

communicated changes to sponsors as follows:

• Corps policy changes. Seven of the eight projects we reviewed were 

affected by at least one policy change. Corps officials and nonfederal 

sponsors for these projects told us that Corps district officials usually 

notified the sponsors by telephone or e-mail as soon as the policy 

changes were issued. In some instances, Corps officials also held 

meetings to discuss the policy changes with the sponsors. For 

example, Corps officials from one project told us they contacted the 

sponsor directly to communicate the discontinuation of the use of 

continuing contracts. The Corps was ready to award the continuing 

contract but instead had to issue smaller contracts, resulting in time 

delays and increased costs. A representative of one sponsor also 

described instances when he learned about a policy change 

unexpectedly. For example, the sponsor told us that the Corps notified 

him by telephone about a policy change regarding the use of 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds to construct 

the project’s recreational features.25 Initially, Corps district officials and 

the sponsor expected to receive ARRA funding for the construction of 

the recreational features. Subsequently, Corps headquarters decided 

to not allow the use of ARRA funds for these features. However, 

based on the expectation that they would receive ARRA funding, the 

Corps district office had already started the competitive bidding 

process for construction of the recreational features when the sponsor 

learned of the decision made by Corps headquarters. As a result, the 

 

25ARRA provided funds to states and localities, among other things. ARRA’s stated 

purposes include to preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery; assist 

those most impacted by the recession; provide investments needed to increase economic 

efficiency by spurring technological advances in science and health; invest in 

transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide longterm economic benefits; and stabilize state and local government budgets. Pub. L. No. 

111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).

The Extent to Which 

the Corps 

Communicated With 

and Provided Updated 

Information to 

Nonfederal Sponsors 

Varied 
 

Page 19 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Corps district office had to delay the bidding process, and the sponsor 

had to find alternative funding sources for the recreational features.

• Scope and design changes. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors 

from six of the eight projects told us they had experienced scope or 

design changes on their projects. According to Corps officials and 

sponsors of these projects, communication regarding project scope or 

design changes was generally effective. For example, Corps officials 

from one project told us they conferred with the sponsor on design 

changes and regularly communicated with the sponsor through 

meetings and telephone calls. The sponsor for this project told us that 

Corps officials had quickly communicated any design changes. In 

another example, Corps officials on the project stated that design 

changes were continually communicated to the sponsor at weekly 

meetings. When there were design disagreements between the Corps 

and the sponsor, the officials said that Corps engineering staff met 

with the sponsor to reach an acceptable solution.

• Cost changes. Under Corps guidance, the project partnership 

agreement between the Corps and the nonfederal sponsor is to 

require the Corps to provide a quarterly cost report to the sponsor.26

The report is to include such items as updated projections of project 

costs, the amount of the sponsor’s required contribution for the next 

fiscal year, and the total financial obligations of the Corps and the 

sponsor for any additional work incurred. However, sponsors for two 

projects told us the Corps was less timely in providing updated cost 

information. Specifically, a representative of a sponsor of one project 

told us that the sponsor had not received these reports on a regular 

basis and, at times, the Corps provided the report several months 

after the fiscal reporting period had closed. And another sponsor told 

us, in many instances, the Corps gave the sponsor a week to provide 

their share of the funding for cost increases, but the sponsor wanted 

the Corps to notify them of cost changes as soon as they occurred.

Corps officials from two projects told us they also used informal 

methods to communicate cost changes to sponsors. For example, 

Corps officials from one project told us they immediately notified the 

 

26For example, the 2009 model agreement includes a provision stating that the Corps will 

provide a quarterly cost report to the nonfederal sponsors. According to a Corps 

headquarters official, this provision was added to the model agreement following WRDA 

1988. 
 

Page 20 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

sponsor by telephone or in writing if there were new costs during the 

design and construction of the project. Officials from another project 

said if the sponsor had questions regarding cost changes, the sponsor 

would request a meeting. Sponsors from two projects also described 

informal means of receiving information from the Corps regarding cost 

changes. Specifically, a sponsor from one project told us the Corps 

immediately notified the sponsor about potential cost changes via 

telephone or e-mail, and the changes were discussed at weekly 

meetings. The sponsor of the other project requested to receive cost 

change reports before they were officially approved by the Corps.

Corps guidance directs project delivery teams to develop a 

communications plan for their projects, but three of the eight projects we 

selected for further review did not have a communications plan. Further, 

the Corps does not have an effective means for ensuring that project 

delivery teams have, in fact, developed a communications plan. Corps 

officials and nonfederal sponsors we spoke with suggested a variety of 

ways to improve their communication.

Corps guidance, issued in 2009, directs project delivery teams to develop 

a project management plan that includes a communications plan for each 

project phase over the life of a project.27 Communications plans should be 

updated when new stakeholders join a project, or whenever deemed 

necessary, according to a headquarters official. The communications plan 

provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish 

a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project 

delivery team—specifically, who needs what information, when they will 

need it, how it will be given to them, and by whom. According to Corps 

 

27U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, PROC 2000, PMP Development, May 2009; U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, REF 8005G, PMP Content, May 2009; and U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, REF 8006G, Communications Plan, May 2009. This guidance applies to all 

Corps projects, including flood control projects.

Communications 

Plans Called for by 

Guidance Were Not 

Always Developed, 

and Corps Officials 

and Nonfederal 

Sponsors Suggested 

Ways to Improve 

Communication 

Corps Guidance Calls for 

Developing 

Communications Plans, 

but Some Project Delivery 

Teams Did Not Always 

Do So
 

Page 21 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

guidance, the communications plan may include such items as methods 

for (1) evaluating the effectiveness of the project’s communication 

strategy and (2) accessing information between scheduled 

communications. Communications plan templates are available on the 

agency’s internal website for use by the project delivery teams, according 

to Corps headquarters officials. Each project delivery team also has the 

flexibility to develop a communications plan that meets the specific needs 

of the individual project and its sponsors.

We found that three of the eight projects we selected for further review 

had not developed a communications plan. A Corps official from one of 

the projects told us a plan was not developed as the district office and 

nonfederal sponsors handled their communications through an ad hoc 

communications group operating during the project’s construction phase. 

A Corps official from the second project told us the project management 

plan was drafted in 1990, and the agency did not call for a 

communications plan at the time. However, according to a headquarters 

official, ongoing projects should have developed a communications plan 

after the Corps’ guidance regarding communications plans was issued in 

2009. The project manager for the third project was unsure why a plan 

had not been developed since he had only recently been assigned to the 

project. The sponsors of the three projects without a communications plan 

agreed that a communications plan would be beneficial. Specifically, one 

sponsor noted that communication with the Corps was “excellent,” but 

added that communication responsibilities are substantial and should be 

formally acknowledged, and another sponsor indicated a communications 

plan would have been helpful when a new project manager was assigned.

The Corps’ regulation on managing its business processes recognizes 

the importance of project management plans in facilitating and 

maintaining effective communication with nonfederal sponsors throughout 

a project’s duration.28 Additionally, a Corps regulation issued in fiscal year 

2000 states that district officials are responsible for approving project 

management plans, and guidance states that these should include a 

communications plan.29 However, as stated previously, we found that 

 

28U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Regulation 5-1-11, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Business Process, rev. Nov. 1, 2006. 

29U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100, Planning Guidance 

Notebook, Apr. 22, 2000; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, REF 8006G, Communications 

Plan, May 2009. 
 

Page 22 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

three of the eight projects we selected for further review had not 

developed a communications plan. Because the communications plan 

provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish 

a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project 

delivery team, without such a plan, the Corps may be missing 

opportunities to assess their communication needs. For example, a 

communications plan may help Corps or sponsor staff understand the 

team’s communications needs when they join the project delivery team; 

for projects where there is significant turnover, understanding the team’s 

needs is especially important.

Corps officials and sponsors we spoke with generally acknowledged their 

communication was adequate but offered suggestions on how 

communication could be improved. These suggestions apply to all flood 

control projects and fall into the following three categories:

• Understand the sponsors’ needs. Most of the Corps officials we spoke 

with recognized that sponsors’ needs vary. For example, Corps 

officials told us some sponsors had worked with the Corps before and 

had a better understanding of the Corps’ processes. Other sponsors 

had not partnered with the Corps previously and were unfamiliar with 

the federal appropriations process and budget cycle, among other 

things. In these cases, Corps officials told us they had to spend more 

time educating the sponsor about the agency and its processes. In 

addition, Corps officials and sponsors told us the high turnover of 

project managers during the life of a project presents a challenge in 

terms of communication. For example, one project we reviewed has 

had 12 different project managers since 2004. One sponsor from 

another project told us that communications with the Corps became 

less frequent after a new project manager started. Corps officials from 

one project told us the terms of communication with sponsors are set 

out in the project’s communications plan, and it is useful to have this 

information in writing when project managers change. In addition, 

another sponsor suggested face-to-face meetings between the Corps 

and sponsors prior to the start of a project and whenever new officials 

join the project.

• Communicate more frequently. Some Corps officials and nonfederal 

sponsors told us that more frequent communication would enhance 

overall communication. For example, one sponsor stated that more 

proactive communication by the Corps would have helped the 

sponsor learn sooner that the Corps had overspent on the project’s 

Corps Officials and 

Sponsors Offered 

Suggestions to Improve 

Communication 
 

Page 23 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

design. The sponsor became aware of the Corps’ overspending when 

reviewing a financial report from the agency. Another sponsor stated 

that, with more frequent communication, they would expect their input 

on project decisions to increase and that more frequent 

communication would help the Corps’ understanding of the project 

area. Corps officials from another project said that more frequent 

communication with sponsors would prevent “surprises.” Further, a 

Corps official and sponsors we spoke with said projects benefit from 

frequent, face-to-face communication at the start of a project and 

throughout the project.

• Provide more information. Nonfederal sponsors and Corps officials 

suggested communication could improve if the Corps provided more 

information about the project. For example, Corps officials and a 

sponsor from one project said that, in addition to the quarterly cost 

reports, the Corps sends letters to the sponsors explaining the 

reasons for any cost increases. Corps officials from another project 

said that sponsors liked to periodically receive by e-mail a one-page 

summary that includes updates on the project’s status and costs. A 

sponsor told us the Corps should respond when sponsors provide 

input or ask for information. For example, the sponsor told us the 

Corps sent a letter asking the sponsor to pay its share of a cost but 

did not provide a description of the cost. However, the sponsor said it 

cannot just pay what the Corps asks. Instead, it needs documentation 

of how local money is spent.

Corps guidance on communications plans includes many of the 

suggestions made by Corps officials and sponsors. For example, the 

guidance directs Corps officials to talk with sponsors to understand their 

information needs and expectations when developing the project’s 

communications plan.

The Corps recognizes the importance of having good communication with 

nonfederal sponsors of civil works projects. Guidance calling for project 

delivery teams to develop a communications plan as part of their project 

management plan, and then updating it as needed, provides an 

opportunity for the Corps and the sponsors to assess communication 

needs throughout the project. However, some project delivery teams have 

not developed a communications plan for their projects as called for by 

guidance. Without such plans, the Corps may be missing opportunities to 

assess and improve communication with its nonfederal sponsors, 

Conclusions 
 

Page 24 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

especially on projects where there is significant turnover of project 

managers.

To improve communication between the Corps and nonfederal sponsors 

of flood control projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers take steps to ensure that flood control project delivery 

teams comply with agency guidance to develop communications plans for 

flood control projects.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review 

and comment. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix IV, the 

department concurred with our recommendation. The department stated 

that the Corps recognizes the importance of planning and executing 

communications for flood control projects and will be taking steps to 

address the recommendation. The Corps also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General 

of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the appropriate congressional 

committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
 

Page 25 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Anne-Marie Fennell

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

This report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred in 

flood control projects and the primary factors that contributed to the 

differences between estimated and actual costs; (2) the extent to which 

the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to its 

nonfederal sponsors on changes to Corps policies, project scope and 

design, and estimated versus actual costs; and (3) Corps guidance on 

communication with nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by 

Corps officials and sponsors to improve such communication. For 

purposes of this report, a flood control project refers to a project with 

structural features such as levees, floodwalls, channels, dams, and 

reservoirs that is constructed for the purpose of managing the risk of 

flooding along rivers and coastal areas. Our work focused on flood control 

projects budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012 

because these projects had gone through the Corps’ project development 

processes and had project cost estimates developed by the Corps at key 

milestones.

To determine the extent to which cost increases occurred and the primary 

factors that contributed to differences between estimated and actual 

costs, we reviewed relevant provisions of the laws, regulations, policies, 

and procedures governing the Corps’ process for developing flood control 

projects and generating cost estimates. We also interviewed officials at 

Corps headquarters and its cost engineering center of expertise located 

in Walla Walla, Washington. The Corps identified 87 new or ongoing flood

control projects that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year 

from 2004 to 2012. We surveyed Corps officials associated with the 

projects to obtain project cost estimates at key milestones, the current 

total project cost or total expenditures at project closeout, if applicable, 

and the primary factors that contributed to cost increases, among other 

things. Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors. 

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce 

errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, 

difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information 

available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing 

them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took 

steps in developing the questionnaire and collecting and analyzing the 

data to minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, social science 

survey specialists designed the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO 

staff who had subject matter expertise. Then, we pretested the draft 

questionnaire with a number of Corps officials to ensure that the 

questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to understand. We 

received responses from Corps officials for all 87 projects, for a 100 

percent response rate. For the 87 projects, we compared the project’s 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

original authorized cost and its current total project cost or total 

expenditures at project closeout, if applicable. Twenty projects did not 

have an authorized cost or total expenditures at project closeout, or they 

were undergoing reevaluation and did not have a current total project 

cost, so we could not compare costs for those projects. We were unable 

to quantify the difference between the original authorized cost and the 

current total project cost or total expenditures at project closeout for each 

of the 67 projects we could compare because we determined that the 

survey data were not reliable for that purpose. Specifically, Corps 

guidance provided differing definitions of total project cost, and it was 

unclear from the survey data whether all respondents had used the same 

definition.1

From the 87 projects, we selected a non-probability sample of 8 projects 

that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012 

for further review, including 1 project randomly selected from each of 7 

divisions2 and 1 project judgmentally selected from the New Orleans 

District that met our selection criteria of projects budgeted for construction 

in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012.3 We narrowed our selection to 

projects that were budgeted for construction during this period to enhance 

our ability to speak with people who had worked on the projects and were 

knowledgeable about the reasons for cost increases. Table 1 lists the 8 

projects selected for further review.

 

1

The Corps planned to issue updated guidance on cost definitions in September 2013. 

2

The Corps’ Civil Works program has eight divisions. However, the Pacific Ocean Division 

had no flood control project that was budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 

2009 to 2012.

3

The congressional requester expressed interest that we include one of the projects in the 

New Orleans District in our sample. We included a project that met our selection criteria.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Table 1: Projects Selected for Further Review from the Corps’ Civil Works Divisions

Project and location Division

Brays Bayou, TX Southwestern

Little Calumet River, IN Great Lakes and Ohio River

Larose to Golden Meadow, LA Mississippi Valley a

Monarch-Chesterfield, MO Mississippi Valley

Muddy River, MA North Atlantic

Napa River, CA South Pacific

Roanoke River Upper Basin, VA South Atlantic

Turkey Creek Basin, KS & MO Northwestern

Source: GAO analysis of Corps data.

Note: Because the Pacific Ocean Division had no flood control project that was budgeted for 

construction in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012, we did not include it in our review.

a

This project is from the New Orleans District, making two projects selected for further review from the 

Mississippi Valley Division.

For each project, we interviewed Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors, 

reviewed project documents, and prepared a descriptive summary of the 

project and the reasons for any cost increases.

To determine the extent to which the Corps communicated with and 

provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors, we interviewed 

Corps district officials and representatives of the sponsors of the eight 

projects selected for further review to obtain information on the Corps’ 

communication with, and provision of updated information to, the 

sponsors regarding changes to Corps policies, project scope and design, 

and estimated and actual costs, and analyzed the supporting documents 

they provided.

To examine Corps guidance on communication with nonfederal sponsors 

and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials and sponsors to improve 

such communication, we reviewed Corps civil works guidance on 

communicating with its sponsors and interviewed Corps headquarters 

and district officials and representatives of the sponsors of the eight 

projects selected for further review. We also obtained copies of 

communications plans, if available, for the eight projects. Because this is 

a non-probability sample, the experiences and views of the Corps officials 

and sponsors of the eight projects are not representative of, and cannot 

be generalized to, all Corps flood control projects.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to December 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Flood Control Projects Budgeted 

for Construction, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012

Page 30 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Table 2 lists the 87 flood control projects in the eight divisions of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers that the agency identified as budgeted for 

construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012.

Table 2: List of Flood Control Projects Budgeted for Construction in Any Fiscal Year from 2004 to 2012, by Division and 

District

Division District Project Name and Location

Great Lakes Chicago Des Plaines River, IL

Great Lakes Chicago Little Calumet River, IN

Great Lakes Chicago McCook and Thornton Reservoirs, IL

Great Lakes Huntington Buchanan County, VA 

Great Lakes Huntington Dickenson County, VA

Great Lakes Huntington Grundy, VA

Great Lakes Huntington West Columbus, OH

Great Lakes Louisville Indianapolis, White River (North), IN

Great Lakes Louisville Metropolitan Louisville, Beargrass Creek, KY

Great Lakes Louisville Metropolitan Louisville, Pond Creek, KY

Great Lakes Louisville Metropolitan Region of Cincinnati, Duck Creek, OH

Great Lakes Louisville Mill Creek, OH

Great Lakes Louisville Ohio River Greenway Public Access, IN

Great Lakes Pittsburgh Saw Mill Run, Pittsburgh, PA

Mississippi Valley Nashville Comite River, LA

Mississippi Valley New Orleans Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, LA

Mississippi Valley New Orleans Larose to Golden Meadow, LA

Mississippi Valley New Orleans New Orleans to Venice, LA 

Mississippi Valley New Orleans Southeast Louisiana, LA

Mississippi Valley New Orleans West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, LA

Mississippi Valley Rock Island Loves Park, IL

Mississippi Valley St. Louis Alton to Gale Organized Levee Districts, IL & MO

Mississippi Valley St. Louis East St. Louis, IL

Mississippi Valley St. Louis Meramec River Basin, Valley Park Levee, MO

Mississippi Valley St. Louis Monarch-Chesterfield, MO

Mississippi Valley St. Louis St. Louis Flood Protection, MO

Mississippi Valley St. Louis Ste. Genevieve, MO

Mississippi Valley St. Louis Wood River Levee, IL

Mississippi Valley St. Paul Crookston, MN

Mississippi Valley St. Paul Grand Forks, ND - East Grand Forks, MN

Mississippi Valley St. Paul Sheyenne River, ND

Appendix II: Flood Control Projects 

Budgeted for Construction, Fiscal Years 2004 

to 2012
Appendix II: Flood Control Projects Budgeted 

for Construction, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012

Page 31 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Division District Project Name and Location

North Atlantic Baltimore Lackawanna River, Olyphant, PA

North Atlantic Baltimore Washington, D.C. & Vicinity

North Atlantic Baltimore Wyoming Valley, PA

North Atlantic New England Muddy River, MA

North Atlantic New York Passaic River Preservation of Natural Storage Areas, NJ

North Atlantic New York Ramapo River at Oakland, NJ

North Atlantic New York Raritan River Basin, Green Brook Sub-Basin, NJ

North Atlantic Philadelphia Molly Ann’s Brook at Haledon, Prospect Park and Paterson, NJ

Northwestern Kansas City Blue River Basin, Kansas City, MO

Northwestern Kansas City Blue River Channel, Kansas City, MO

Northwestern Kansas City Kansas Citys, MO & KS

Northwestern Kansas City Missouri River Levee System, IA, NE, KS, & MO

Northwestern Kansas City Turkey Creek Basin, KS & MO

Northwestern Omaha Antelope Creek, NE

Northwestern Omaha Big Sioux River, Sioux Falls, SD

Northwestern Omaha Missouri National Recreational River, NE & SD

Northwestern Omaha Perry Creek, IA

Northwestern Omaha Wood River, Grand Island, NE

Northwestern Portland Mount Saint Helens Sediment Control, WA

Pacific Ocean Honolulu Iao Stream Flood Control, Maui, HI 

South Atlantic Jacksonville Arecibo River, PR

South Atlantic Jacksonville Cedar Hammock, Wares Creek, FL

South Atlantic Jacksonville Portugues and Bucana Rivers, PR

South Atlantic Jacksonville Rio de la Plata, PR

South Atlantic Jacksonville Rio Guanajibo, PR

South Atlantic Jacksonville Rio Puerto Nuevo, PR

South Atlantic Savannah Oates Creek, Richmond County, GA 

South Atlantic Wilmington Roanoke River Upper Basin, Headwaters Area, VA

South Pacific Albuquerque Alamogordo, NM

South Pacific Albuquerque El Paso, TX

South Pacific Albuquerque Rio Grande Floodway, San Acacia to Bosque Del Apache, NM

South Pacific Los Angeles Los Angeles County Drainage Area, CA

South Pacific Los Angeles Santa Ana River Mainstem, CA

South Pacific Los Angeles Tropicana And Flamingo Washes, NV

South Pacific Sacramento American River Watershed (Common Features), CA

South Pacific Sacramento American River Watershed (Folsom Dam Modifications), CA

South Pacific Sacramento American River Watershed (Folsom Dam Raise), CA
Appendix II: Flood Control Projects Budgeted 

for Construction, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012

Page 32 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Division District Project Name and Location

South Pacific Sacramento Guadalupe River, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Kaweah River, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Marysville/Yuba City Levee Reconstruction, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Mid-Valley Area Levee Reconstruction, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Napa River, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Sacramento River Bank Protection Project, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Sacramento River, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, CA

South Pacific Sacramento South Sacramento County Streams, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Stockton Metropolitan Flood Control Reimbursement, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Tule River, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Upper Sacramento Area Levee Reconstruction, CA

South Pacific Sacramento West Sacramento, CA

South Pacific Sacramento Yuba River Basin, CA

South Pacific San Francisco Petaluma River, CA

Southwestern Ft. Worth Johnson Creek, Upper Trinity Basin, Arlington, TX

Southwestern Ft. Worth Lower Colorado River Basin (Wharton/Onion), TX

Southwestern Galveston Brays Bayou, Houston, TX

Southwestern Galveston Sims Bayou, Houston, TX

Southwestern Tulsa Arkansas City, KS

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 33 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

This appendix presents information provided by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers on the eight flood control projects we selected for further 

review. Dollars have not been adjusted for inflation.

The Brays Bayou project is located in the metropolitan area of Houston, in 

Harris County, Texas. The project consists of channel improvements and 

storm water detention basins on upper Brays Bayou and a diversion 

channel in the lower portion of Brays Bayou. The nonfederal sponsor is 

the Harris County Flood Control District.

Brays Bayou is part of the Buffalo Bayou Watershed. The feasibility report 

for Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries was completed in 1988, and the Chief 

of Engineers’ report was signed in 1990. The Chief’s Report gave a total 

cost for the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries project of $727,364,000 and 

also broke out the costs for each of the six tributary plans within the 

project. The estimated total project cost for Brays Bayou was 

$299,133,000. The Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1990 

authorized the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries project for construction at a 

total cost of $727,364,000, but it did not specify an amount for Brays 

Bayou.

Funds to initiate preconstruction engineering and design were 

appropriated in fiscal year 1990. In 1995, the project was divided into two 

separable elements—a detention (upstream) element and a diversion 

(downstream) element. Subsequently, section 211(f) of WRDA 1996 

authorized Brays Bayou as a demonstration project, which gave the 

nonfederal sponsor the lead in designing and constructing the project and 

let it be reimbursed for the federal share of the completed discrete 

segments approved by the Corps. In 1996, the nonfederal sponsor 

obtained approval from the Corps to do a general reevaluation of the 

diversion element in the lower portion of Brays Bayou because of 

regulatory restrictions on diversions to other watersheds. In the 

meantime, the sponsor proceeded with the detention element in the 

upstream portion. Funds to initiate construction were appropriated in 

fiscal year 1998. The project cooperation agreement for the design and 

construction of the detention element was signed in March 2000, and 

construction began in June 2000. The sponsor’s general reevaluation 

report of an alternative to the diversion separable element was approved 

in April 2009. The project cooperation agreement was amended in March 

2010 to combine the detention element and an alternative to the diversion 

element into one project. The total estimated project cost presented to 

Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $571,660,000.

Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Brays Bayou, Houston, 

Texas
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 34 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

The Larose to Golden Meadow project is located in Lafourche Parish, 

Louisiana, about 28 miles southwest of New Orleans and about 25 miles 

inland from the Gulf of Mexico along Bayou Lafourche. The project 

consists of a ring levee approximately 48 miles in length along both banks 

of Bayou Lafourche, enlargement of about 3 miles of an existing levee, 

and construction of two floodgates that will be used for navigation and 

hurricane protection purposes. The nonfederal sponsor is the South 

Lafourche Levee District.

Larose to Golden Meadow was originally called the Grand Isle and 

Vicinity project. The Chief’s Report for Grand Isle and Vicinity estimated 

the total cost of Larose to Golden Meadow at $7,857,000.The Flood 

Control Act of 1965 authorized the Grand Isle and Vicinity project for 

construction at a federal cost of $5.5 million, but it did not specify the 

name Larose to Golden Meadow. Funds to initiate preconstruction 

engineering and design were appropriated in fiscal year 1967. The first 

general design memorandum was issued in 1972, and funds to initiate 

construction were appropriated in fiscal year 1972. A local cooperation 

agreement was provided by the South Lafourche Levee District and 

accepted on behalf of the United States in 1973, and construction started 

in 1976. The project did not have any modifications until WRDA 1999 

authorized the conversion of the Leon Theriot floodgate into a lock, 

conditional on a determination that the conversion was technically 

feasible, environmentally acceptable, and economically justified; such a 

determination was documented in an evaluation report approved in 2005.

Section 7015 of WRDA 2007 required the Corps to do a 120-day study to 

see what modification would be required to provide the level of protection 

necessary to achieve the certification required for a 100-year level of 

flood protection in accordance with the National Flood Insurance 

Program. The study, which was completed in May 2009, estimated that 

the project was as much as 10 feet below the new 100-year level of risk 

reduction, and it would cost $681 million to bring the project to the 

authorized elevations described in the 1972 general design 

memorandum. A post-authorization study, which was started in May 

2009, is to determine the cost to complete the project, including bringing 

the project into compliance with the new design criteria issued following 

Hurricane Katrina and other updated requirements. Since the Larose to 

Golden Meadow project was authorized before WRDA 1986, the Section 

902 cost limit of WRDA 1986 does not apply. However, the project 

delivery team, under its own initiative, was conducting a 902 review as 

well. The total estimated project cost presented to Congress for fiscal 

year 2012 was $474 million.

Larose to Golden Meadow, 

Louisiana 
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 35 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

The Little Calumet River project is located in a primarily urban area in 

northwest Indiana, stretching westward to the Indiana-Illinois state line. 

The project includes the construction of levees, floodwalls, and closure 

and appurtenant structures. The nonfederal sponsor is the Little Calumet 

River Basin Development Commission.

A design study of the area was authorized by WRDA 1976. A general 

design memorandum for phase 1 was prepared in 1982 that included a 

number of preliminary designs to address flooding in the area. A feature 

design memorandum detailing the design recommended by the district 

engineer was completed in 1983. The July 1984 Chief’s Report sent to 

Congress recommended the district engineer’s design. However, WRDA 

1986 authorized a design that was referenced in the 1982 Phase I 

General Design Memorandum, but not recommended in the Chief’s 

Report, at a total project cost of $87.1 million. There was no feasibility 

study because the requirement to conduct a feasibility study started in the 

1990s. A general design memorandum was signed in April 1989, the local 

cooperation agreement was signed in August 1990, funds to initiate 

construction were appropriated in fiscal year 1990, and construction 

started in September 1990.

In May 1999, Corps headquarters approved a post-authorization change 

report to extend the eastern end of the project area, and the project 

cooperation agreement was amended to include the scope change. In 

2000, the district prepared a post-authorization change report to modify 

the project and increase the authorized project cost to $198 million, and 

the project cooperation agreement was amended again. Congress 

reauthorized the project at $198 million in the Energy and Water 

Development Appropriations Act of 2006. Another post-authorization 

change report to increase the authorized cost was prepared in March 

2012. The report had been approved by the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Civil Works and was awaiting congressional action in September 

2013. In January 2013, the project’s cost to date was $248 million.

The Monarch-Chesterfield project is located along the right bank of the 

Missouri River in the vicinity of Chesterfield, Missouri. The project 

consists of raising the existing levees on the Missouri River and 

Bonhomme Creek along with relief wells, a sheet pile cutoff, and berms to 

control underseepage. Other features include roadways, railroad and 

roadway closure structures, retaining walls, relocations, pumping stations 

with gravity structures, and environmental mitigation features. The 

nonfederal sponsor is the Monarch-Chesterfield Levee District.

Little Calumet River, 

Indiana 

Monarch-Chesterfield, 

Missouri
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 36 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

The feasibility report, which was approved in December 2000, estimated 

the total project cost to be $58,090,000. The project was authorized for 

construction in WRDA 2000 at a total cost of $58,090,000, subject to the 

completion of a favorable Chief’s Report by December 31, 2000. The 

Chief’s Report was signed on December 29, 2000. Funds to initiate 

preconstruction engineering and design were appropriated in fiscal year 

2001, and funds to initiate construction were appropriated in fiscal year 

2004. The project cooperation agreement was signed in February 2008, 

and construction began the same year. The total estimated project cost 

presented to Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $68,688,000.

The Muddy River is a 3.5 mile urban waterway located in eastern 

Massachusetts in the communities of Boston, Brookline and Newton. The 

flood control portion of the project primarily involves dredging sediment to 

increase conveyance, removal and replacement of undersized culverts, 

and restoration of streambanks. It also has an environmental component. 

Phase I involves installing larger box culverts, day-lighting two sections of 

the river, and modifying a bridge and culvert headwall for flood risk 

management. Phase II involves dredging of the river for both flood risk 

management and ecosystem restoration. The nonfederal sponsors are 

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the city of Boston, and the town of 

Brookline.

After severe flooding in 1996, the city of Boston, the town of Brookline, 

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, and nonprofit community groups developed a 

comprehensive plan to identify and address issues affecting the river, 

which was issued in January 1999. Local interests went to their 

congressional delegation and convinced them of the need for a project. 

WRDA 1999 directed the Corps to evaluate the study prepared by local 

interests to determine whether the plans were in the federal interest, 

among other things, and report back to Congress no later than June 30, 

2000. The Corp’s draft evaluation report, dated June 2000, determined 

that the plan met some of the requirements of a federal project. However, 

continued Corps involvement would require preparation of a decision 

document that evaluated alternatives and met other requirements. Based 

on the Corps’ draft evaluation report, the project was authorized for 

construction in WRDA 2000. Once the project was authorized, the Corps 

had to prepare the required decision documents. The final report with an 

estimated total project cost of $62,830,000 was submitted to Corps 

headquarters for approval in September 2003. Corps headquarters 

prepared a Chief’s Report, which it forwarded to the Assistant Secretary 

Muddy River, 

Massachusetts
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 37 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

of the Army for Civil Works in December 2003. In July 2004, the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works expressed support for the flood 

control component of the project but determined that the ecosystem 

restoration elements had a unit cost that was too high to support as a 

federally implementable plan and therefore were not justified. However, 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works later agreed that the 

Corps would build the environmental restoration portion of the project if 

Congress provided funding for that purpose.

Funds to initiate preconstruction engineering and design were 

appropriated in fiscal year 2001. Funds to initiate construction were first 

appropriated in fiscal year 2003, and the project partnership agreement 

was signed in 2011. The first construction contract was awarded on 

August 10, 2012. However, there was a bid protest, so construction did 

not begin until 2013. The total estimated project cost presented to 

Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $79,800,000. 

The Napa River project is located in the city and county of Napa, 

California. The Napa River drainage basin is just north of San Pablo Bay 

and approximately 40 miles northeast of San Francisco, California. The 

project consists of channel modifications to provide the project area with 

100-year level of flood protection from Napa River and Napa Creek. 

Channel modifications include overbank excavation, vertical walls, 

floodwalls, levees, bridges, pumping stations, and flowage easements. 

The project also includes recreation trails and major ecosystem 

restoration. The nonfederal sponsor is the Napa County Flood Control 

and Water Conservation District.

The Napa River Flood Control Project was authorized by the Flood 

Control Act of 1965 substantially in accordance with the Chief’s Report at 

an estimated cost of $14,950,000. The project received an additional 

authorization in WRDA 1976 to modify the scope of the project to include 

Napa Creek. The project has no 902 limit because it was authorized 

before WRDA 1986.

Funds to resume preconstruction engineering and design were 

appropriated in fiscal year 1989. A general reevaluation report was 

prepared in 1995. The Final Supplemental General Design Memorandum, 

dated October 1998, was approved May 1999. Funds to initiate

construction were appropriated in fiscal year 2000, the project 

cooperation agreement was signed in February 2000, and construction 

began in December 2000. A Section 215 agreement for construction of a 

Napa River, California
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 38 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

portion of the project by the nonfederal sponsor was signed in January 

2002, and the sponsor completed construction in fiscal year 2002. A 

limited reevaluation report, which was approved in August 2005, 

determined that, based on the benefit-cost ratio, the project still had a 

federal interest. The project cooperation agreement was amended in 

2007, which provided the acceleration of the sponsor’s required cash 

contribution to the government. The total estimated project cost presented 

to Congress for fiscal year 2010—the last year the project was budgeted 

for construction—was $402,770,000.

The Roanoke River Upper Basin project is located on the Roanoke River 

in the city of Roanoke, Virginia. The project includes about 6.2 miles of 

channel widening, flood proofing at two locations, training walls to prevent 

floodwater intrusion into low areas along the river, and a flood warning 

system. Recreation facilities consist of a 9.5-mile recreation trail along the 

project reach, trail access, and parking areas. The nonfederal sponsor is 

the city of Roanoke.

The Chief’s Report was finalized in 1985, and the project was authorized 

by WRDA 1986 at a total project cost of $21 million. Funds to initiate 

preconstruction engineering and design were appropriated in fiscal year 

1986. A general design memorandum, dated May 1989 and approved in 

January 1990, was the basis for design and construction of the project. 

The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1990, 

reauthorized the project for $29 million. The project started receiving

construction funds in 1990, and a local cooperation agreement was 

signed in June 1990. A supplement to the local cooperation agreement 

was signed in January 1993 to reimburse the sponsor for flood proofing 

the hospital. The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 

2004, increased the authorized total cost to $61.7 million. In 2005, the 

first construction contract was awarded for work on the flood control 

features. The project was physically completed in October 2011. The 

Roanoke Logperch, which is located in the project area, was listed as an 

endangered species in 1989 and will be monitored until at least 2015. 

Once the monitoring is completed, the project will be fiscally closed out.

Turkey Creek Basin drains Johnson and Wyandotte Counties in Kansas, 

as well as a portion of Kansas City, Missouri. Turkey Creek parallels 

Interstate Highway 35 for much of its length and flows through a tunnel 

into the Kansas River approximately 3 miles upstream of the Missouri 

River. The project consists of approximately 10,000 feet of urban channel 

Roanoke River Upper 

Basin, Virginia

Turkey Creek Basin, 

Kansas and Missouri
Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood 

Control Projects Selected for Further Review

Page 39 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

modification, a levee section, the raising of two railroad bridges, 12.7 

acres of riparian planting, and four large drainage interceptor pipelines. 

The nonfederal sponsors are the city of Kansas City, Missouri, and the 

Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas.

Major flooding occurred in the Turkey Creek Basin in 1977 and 1993. The 

feasibility study was completed in December 1998, and the project 

received its first funding for preconstruction engineering and design in 

1998. The Chief’s Report was finalized in 1999, and the project was 

authorized by WRDA 1999 at a total project cost of $42,875,000. Major 

flooding occurred again in 1998, so the Corps conducted a general 

reevaluation from 1999 to 2003 to determine whether any modifications 

needed to be made based on information from the 1998 flood. Based on 

the findings of the general reevaluation, the project expanded 

significantly, and costs increased to $73 million. The Consolidated 

Appropriations Resolution, 2003, modified the project to authorize 

construction substantially in accordance with recommendations in a final 

Chief’s Report if a favorable report was completed by December 31, 

2003, at a total project cost of $73,380,000. The act also gave the Corps 

the authority to give the sponsor credit for its share of the costs of 

construction work completed before the project cooperation agreement 

was signed if the work was integral to the project. A final Chief’s Report 

was completed in December 2003. Preconstruction engineering and 

design was completed in September 2004. Funds to initiate construction 

were first appropriated in fiscal year 2004, and a project cooperation 

agreement was signed in July 2006 following completion of tunnel work 

by the sponsor. In 2009, the Corps finished the tunnel construction 

started by the sponsor. The total estimated project cost presented to 

Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $108 million.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 40 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 41 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-14-35 Flood Control Cost Overruns

Anne-Marie Fennell, (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. 

In addition to the individual named above, Vondalee R. Hunt (Assistant 

Director), Elizabeth Beardsley, Heather Dowey, Cindy Gilbert, Susan 

Malone, and Kyle Stetler made key contributions to this report. Important 

contributions were also made by Cheryl Arvidson, Dan Royer, and Kiki 

Theodoropoulos.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361407)
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