J-S33019-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KAREEM SANDERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 353 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0002068-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2022

Appellant Kareem Sanders appeals pro se from the order denying his 

first timely Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant contends 

that his plea counsel was ineffective resulting in an involuntary guilty plea. 

We affirm. 

We summarize the facts based on the Commonwealth’s factual 

summary at Appellant’s guilty plea hearing. On February 28, 2018, the victim 

Danny Cancel was involved in a “fender bender” with a red car, a verbal 

argument ensued with the red car’s driver, and Mr. Cancel retrieved a revolver 

and shot the red car, which drove off. N.T. Plea Hr’g, 5/13/19, at 25. Mr. 

Cancel drove away, pulled into a gas station, and entered the station to pay 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546.
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for his gas. Id. at 26. Inside Mr. Cancel’s vehicle were several passengers, 

including Mr. Cancel’s minor daughter, who was in the back seat and testified 

at the plea hearing, and Ms. Selena Perrin, who was in the front passenger 

seat. Id. at 26, 47.

While Mr. Cancel was inside the store, Appellant and his friend, 

Cassieam Hicks, approached the passenger side of Mr. Cancel’s vehicle. Id.

at 26. Appellant opened the front passenger door while holding a firearm and 

began screaming at Ms. Perrin. Id. Mr. Cancel saw the disturbance, exited

the store, and approached his vehicle, where words were exchanged. Id. Mr. 

Cancel retrieved his five-shot revolver,

2

fired the weapon, and killed Mr. Hicks. 

Id. Mr. Cancel then shot and wounded Appellant, who was attempting to flee. 

Id. at 27. Mr. Cancel emptied his revolver, Appellant stopped, and Mr. Cancel 

turned to run. Id. at 28. Appellant fired two shots, with one bullet killing Mr. 

Cancel.3 Id. The bullet struck Mr. Cancel’s side, travelling from his back to 

his front. Id. at 29. 

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2 Appellant’s guilty plea hearing did not always detail certain events, e.g., how 

Mr. Cancel retrieved his revolver.

3 At this juncture, the trial court noted the Commonwealth’s position that 

Appellant was under an unreasonable belief that self defense was justified. 

N.T. Plea Hr’g, 5/13/19, at 28 (referencing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b)); id. at 29 

(assistant district attorney explaining that Mr. Cancel was the aggressor after 

the “fender bender,” Mr. Cancel escalated by firing at Mr. Hicks, but when Mr. 

Cancel “had no ammunition [and] he was no longer a threat,” Appellant shot 

and killed Mr. Cancel).
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After the Commonwealth summarized the facts, the trial court 

conducted an on-the-record guilty plea colloquy of Appellant, which we quote

in further detail below. We state the subsequent procedural history as 

presented by the PCRA court:

On May 13, 2019, [Appellant] entered a guilty plea to one count 

of voluntary manslaughter, and one count of possession of 

firearms. On the same day, he was sentenced to not less than 10 

nor more than 20 years in [prison] on the voluntary manslaughter 

charge, and a concurrent 5-10 year sentence on the firearm 

charge. 

On January 3, 2020, [Appellant] filed a pro se [PCRA] petition. In 

his petition, he identified three issues: (1) unlawfully induced plea, 

(2) ineffective assistance of [plea] counsel, and (3) unreasonably 

extensive sentence.[4] On January 30, 2020, the court appointed 

Matthew Rapa, Esq. as counsel for [Appellant] and directed 

Attorney Rapa to file an amended PCRA or appropriate Turner/ 

Finley[5]letter within thirty days. On February 19, 2020, Attorney 

Rapa filed a motion to withdraw as counsel along with

accompanying Turner/Finley Letter. On March 5, 2020, 

[Appellant] filed a motion to proceed without counsel. On March 

9, 2020, the court scheduled a hearing for the motion to withdraw 

as counsel for May 14, 2020. The court also issued a notice of 

intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907[, which stated that 

it “does not find that there is any basis upon which a hearing is 

necessary to decide this matter”].

. . . On October 6, 2020, [Appellant] filed his response to the 

court’s notice of intent to dismiss. On October 14, 2020, the court 

scheduled a hearing for [Appellant’s] motions for December 21, 

2020. In [Appellant’s] response to the court’s notice of intent to 

dismiss, he asserted that Attorney Rapa’s Turner/Finley letter 

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4 The PCRA court essentially quoted Appellant’s PCRA petition verbatim. See 

Pro Se PCRA Pet., 1/3/20, at 1.

5 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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was defective and that the court should not have permitted him 

to withdraw as counsel.

PCRA Ct. Order, 1/11/21, at 1 n.1 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

Appellant’s Rule 907 response also claimed that PCRA counsel was ineffective 

by not raising plea counsel’s ineffectiveness because Appellant denied that he 

intentionally killed Mr. Cancel. Rule 907 Resp., 10/6/20, at 1. The PCRA 

court, however, did not immediately enter an order granting Attorney Rapa 

permission to withdraw.6

On January 11, 2021, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

Order, 1/11/21. Appellant timely appealed and timely filed a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.7

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the PCRA court err[] by denying PCRA relief where 

Appellant established by a preponderance of evidence that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed 

to object to defective colloquy and protect [Appellant] from 

pleading guilty to a crime he is innocent of committing?

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6 During the pendency of this appeal, the PCRA court notified this Court that 

it failed to enter an order granting Attorney Rapa permission to withdraw. 

PCRA Ct. Op., 3/9/21, at 1. On April 14, 2021, this Court remanded, while 

retaining jurisdiction, to have the PCRA court enter the order granting 

Attorney Rapa permission to withdraw, which the trial court entered on May 

7, 2021.

7 On February 4, 2021, the PCRA court directed Appellant to file his Rule 

1925(b) statement within twenty-one days. Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

statement was postmarked on February 24, 2021, but docketed on March 1, 

2021. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 911 A.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (stating, “[p]ursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, a document is 

deemed filed when placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing” 

(citation omitted and formatting altered)).
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2. Was [plea] counsel ineffective for not properly informing 

[Appellant] of defenses as well as the elements of voluntary 

manslaughter so [Appellant] could make a knowing[] and 

intelligent plea; [Appellant] expressed protestation of 

innocence during colloquy?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion for not advising 

[Appellant] of the elements of the crime or distinguishing the 

plea from an Alford8type of plea when Appellant asserts 

factual innocence?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We summarize Appellant’s arguments for his first two issues together, 

as they are interrelated. In support of his first issue, Appellant argues that 

plea counsel was ineffective by failing to object to a defective colloquy. Id.

at 16. In support of his second issue, Appellant argues that plea counsel was 

ineffective by not discussing potential defenses and stating the elements of 

voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 21. 

By way of background, the trial court stated the elements of voluntary 

manslaughter, including an unreasonable belief of self defense, and Appellant 

repeatedly indicated he understood the trial court. N.T. Plea Hr’g, at 18-22. 

After the Commonwealth recited the factual basis for Appellant’s plea, the 

following exchange occurred: 

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8 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). “An Alford plea is a nolo 

contendere plea in which the defendant does not admit guilt but waives trial 

and voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly consents to the imposition of 

punishment by the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Snavely, 982 A.2d 1244, 

1244 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
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The court: . . . Now, you heard what the District Attorney stated, 

correct?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: And you understand this is his summary of the facts of 

this case; do you understand that?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: This is what he’s saying the Commonwealth can prove 

in this case?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: Do you admit to firing two shots at Danny Cancel on

February 28th, 2018 in Lehigh County?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: Do you admit that one of these shots struck him and 

killed him?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: And do you admit to all the facts and circumstances 

that [the assistant district attorney] and your attorney placed on 

the record as to how it was told?

[Appellant]: No.

The court: Well, okay. Do you admit that [Mr. Cancel] shot and 

killed your friend Mr. Hicks, correct?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: All right. And do you admit that you, after that, you 

pointed your weapon at him and fired two shots at him, correct?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: All right. Now, is there any part of the facts that you 

take issue with?
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[Appellant]: Yeah. [The assistant district attorney] said it was a 

fact that I had my gun out; it wasn’t. And he said it was a fact 

what I said to Ms. Perrin. I didn’t say that.

The court: Okay. All right. But you did pull your gun out at some 

point?

[Appellant]: After I got shot, yes.

The court: After you got shot?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: He struck you?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: Okay. All right.

[Appellant’s counsel]: The problem we have is that with [Mr.] 

Cancel’s child -- I believe she was 14 or 15 at the time -- indicates 

that [Appellant] had the gun out,[9] and --

The court: I understand that.

[Appellant’s counsel]: So that’s where --

The court: What injuries did you sustain?

[Appellant]: Two fractured ribs and a collapsed lung and a gunshot 

wound to my chest.

The court: Okay. So that was after Cancel shot you?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: Okay. All right. And then -- but at some point, his 

weapon was empty and you shot him, correct?

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9 Appellant’s counsel noted that if Mr. Cancel’s daughter’s testimony was 

believed, Appellant’s “provocation would negate self defense, and that would 

have been a jury question.” N.T. Plea Hr’g at 34.
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[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: All right. So you admit to that, right?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: Okay. Is that sufficient?

[Assistant district attorney]: Yes.

[Appellant]: No, I didn’t know his gun was empty. How was I 

supposed to know that?

The court: All right. Well, you admit that you shot him?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: And you admit that at least one of those rounds that 

you shot, one of the two rounds that you shot him with killed him,

correct?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: And you admit it was your intent to kill him when you 

fired at him, correct?

[Appellant]: No. No. That wasn’t my intent to kill him. I was 

shooting in self defense. Imperfect self defense.

The court: Well, yeah, I understand that, but you can intend to 

kill somebody and still have imperfect self defense. I mean, you 

usually don’t point a gun and fire it at somebody unless you intend 

to kill them. That’s why I’m asking the question.

[Appellant]: Okay.

The court: All right. So, you weren’t shooting at him with the 

intent to wounding him; am I correct?

[Appellant]: I mean, I didn’t have no intent at the time.

The court: You were reacting?
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[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: I get it. I get it.

[Appellant]: I wasn’t thinking let me kill him.

The court: I understand. He was struck - it went into his --

[Assistant district attorney]: It went into his -- there was an injury 

to his arm.

The court: The left arm?

[Assistant district attorney]: The left arm and through his chest.

The court: So it went through the left arm into the chest?

[Assistant district attorney]: The most likely scenario is it goes 

into the left arm and into the chest and it goes to the lung, the 

pulmonary artery, and --

The court: So it was a side shot. It shot into the side?

[Assistant district attorney]: It was a side shot, but the forensic 

pathology indicates the direction is back. The anatomical direction 

is back. So, yes. It was a side shot.

The court: All right. Right? Do you admit to that?

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: You satisfied with that?

[Appellant’s plea counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

[Assistant district attorney]: Yes.

The court: And once again, just so you understand, the agreement 

is voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm prohibited 

with a fixed 10 to 20 sentence.

[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: Do you understand that?
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[Appellant]: Yes.

The court: All right. Based on what I’ve heard, I find the plea is 

voluntary and understandingly tendered, and I will accept the 

plea. Please have [Appellant] endorse the plea on the information 

for each count. I have reviewed the guilty plea colloquy form. I’m

satisfied [Appellant] has answered all the questions on the form 

and has signed the form.

N.T. Plea Hr’g, at 39-43 (formatting altered). Appellant stated that no one 

threatened him to plead guilty and that he was pleading guilty of his own free 

will. Id. at 43. 

With respect to the guilty plea colloquy form referenced above, 

Appellant initialed and signed the guilty plea colloquy form, which among 

other questions, asked Appellant if his lawyer explained “the elements of the 

crime or crimes that [he was] pleading guilty to?” Guilty Plea Colloquy, 

5/13/19, at 3. Appellant checked “Yes” and initialed the page. Id. Having 

summarized the relevant background, we next summarize Appellant’s 

arguments.

In support of his first issue, Appellant argues that he denied intentionally 

killing the victim and maintains that he only acted in self defense. Appellant’s 

Brief at 16. Appellant asserts that given his claim of self defense, plea counsel 

should have objected, the trial court should have refused the plea, and the 

PCRA court erred by dismissing his petition. Id. at 19. With respect to his 

second issue, Appellant argues that plea counsel was ineffective by not stating 
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the elements of voluntary manslaughter or informing him of any alternative 

defenses. Id. at 20-21. 

In reviewing Appellant’s claims, we are guided by the following 

principles:

[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal 

error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions.

* * *

We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the 

factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. 

Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal 

determination.

* * *

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered), appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 

2019). 

A criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel extends to the 

plea process, as well as during trial. Under the PCRA, allegations 

of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will 

serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the 

petitioner to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the 

defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice 

was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.
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To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. This 

is not a stringent requirement. The reasonable probability test 

refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 235 A.3d 387, 391 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered).

In Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920 (Pa. Super. 2001), this 

Court explained the prejudice required as 

similar to the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to all postsentence attempts to withdraw a guilty plea. The law does not 

require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision 

to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [the 

defendant’s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and 

intelligently made.

Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed that 

he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving 

involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the record clearly 

demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during 

which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature 

of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is 

established. A defendant is bound by the statements he makes 

during his plea colloquy, and may not assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he 

pled.

McCauley, 797 A.2d at 922 (citations omitted and formatting altered). We 

add that a valid guilty plea colloquy inquires into the factual basis for the plea 

and the nature and elements of the charges. See id.

Criminal homicide includes voluntary manslaughter, which is defined by 

the Crimes Code in relevant part as follows:
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(a) General rule.—A person who kills an individual without lawful 

justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the 

killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting 

from serious provocation by:

(1) the individual killed . . . 

(b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.—A person who 

intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary 

manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the 

circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the 

killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles 

of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(a)-(b); see also id. § 2501.

Under Chapter 5, self defense falls under the defense of justification, 

which is a complete defense to criminal liability. See id. § 502. Section 

505(a) of the Code provides:

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.—

The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when 

the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the 

purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 

such other person on the present occasion.

Id. § 505(a). 

However, Section 505(a) is limited by Section 505(b)(2): 

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section 

unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 

himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual 

intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:

(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily 

injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same 

encounter; or

(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using 

such force with complete safety by retreating . . . .
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Id. § 505(b)(2). Finally, a “specific intent to kill can be inferred from the use 

of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 610 A.2d 931, 938 (Pa. 1992) (citation omitted and formatting 

altered).

Instantly, following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s order denying relief. 

Firstly, with respect to Appellant’s argument that he denied intentionally killing 

Mr. Cancel, he fails to recognize that even when acting in self defense, a 

specific intent to kill can be inferred from firing a gun at the victim. See id. 

Therefore, to the extent Appellant denies shooting Mr. Cancel with an intent 

to kill, because Appellant failed to establish an error of law, he did not establish 

plea counsel’s ineffectiveness. See id.; Brown, 235 A.3d at 391 (explaining 

that a defendant must plead and prove counsel’s error caused him to enter an 

involuntary plea). Second, the record, as summarized herein, reflects that 

the trial court and Appellant’s lawyer explained, and Appellant understood, all 

of the elements of the crimes at issue. See, e.g., N.T. Plea Hr’g, at 18-22; 

Guilty Plea Colloquy at 3. Third, Appellant failed to identify any alternative 

defense such that his plea was involuntary or unknowing. See Brown, 235 

A.3d at 391. Therefore, Appellant’s boilerplate allegation does not satisfy his 

burden that plea counsel was ineffective. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-

44. In sum, Appellant’s first two issues are generally premised on a 

misunderstanding of the legal definition of an intentional killing and imperfect 
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self defense. For these reasons, because Appellant failed to establish plea 

counsel should have objected on the basis of a misstatement of the law, a 

defective colloquy, and by not stating the elements of voluntary 

manslaughter, Appellant did not establish plea counsel was ineffective. See 

Brown, 235 A.3d at 391; McCauley, 797 A.2d at 922 (stating requirements 

for a valid guilty plea colloquy). 

Lastly, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

stating the elements of persons not to possess a firearm and voluntary 

manslaughter. Appellant’s Brief at 24-26. Appellant further argues that his 

plea was involuntary under Alford, and that plea counsel threatened Appellant 

that he would receive a life sentence if he did not accept the plea. Id. at 28.

Initially, to the extent that Appellant argues the trial court erred by not 

stating the elements, such a claim could have been raised in a pre- or postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea or on direct appeal. Appellant did 

neither and therefore he cannot raise this issue for the first time in his PCRA 

petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Further, the record establishes that the 

trial court actually stated the elements for voluntary manslaughter, and that

Appellant signed a written guilty plea colloquy indicating that his counsel 

explained all of the elements of the offenses at issue and no one forced him

to accept the plea. See N.T. Plea Hr’g, at 18-22; Guilty Plea Colloquy at 3, 8. 

Appellant is bound by, and cannot contradict, his colloquy. See McCauley, 

797 A.2d at 922. Further, Appellant waived his Alford plea argument as it 
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was not within his Rule 1925(b) statement or otherwise raised in his PCRA 

petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). Finally, to the extent that Appellant 

argued that PCRA counsel was ineffective by not arguing plea counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, PCRA counsel cannot be ineffective for raising a meritless 

claim. See Commonwealth v. Bradley, --- A.3d ---, ---, 2021 WL 4877232, 

at *7, 19 (Pa. filed Oct. 20, 2021) (providing that a PCRA petitioner may raise 

claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for the first time on appeal); 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1210 (Pa. 2006) (stating 

“[c]ounsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim”). 

For these reasons, because Appellant failed to establish his plea counsel was 

ineffective, the PCRA court correctly denied relief. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d 

at 1043-44.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/06/2022