MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2023	ME	69

Docket: Aro-23-24

Argued: September	14,	2023

Decided: November	9,	2023

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	LAWRENCE,	and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

CASSIDY	HOLDINGS,	LLC

v.

AROOSTOOK	COUNTY	COMMISSIONERS et	al.

CONNORS,	J.

[¶1] The	question	presented	is	whether,	under 36	M.R.S.	§	844	(2023),	

the	Aroostook	County	Commissioners (the	Commissioners) and	the	State	Board	

of	 Property	 Tax	 Review	 have	 concurrent	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear an	 appeal	 of	 a	

municipality’s	denial	of	a tax	abatement	application	by Cassidy	Holdings,	LLC

(Cassidy),	which	 owns nonresidential	 property	 with	 an	 equalized	 municipal	

valuation	 of	 $1	 million	 or	 greater.	 Because	 the	 statute’s	 plain	 language	

establishes	 concurrent	jurisdiction,	we	affirm	 the	Superior	 Court’s	judgment

determining	 that	 the	 Commissioners	 have	jurisdiction	 over	 an	 appeal	 of	 the	

abatement	decision	and	remanding	the	matter	to	the	Commissioners.
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I.	 BACKGROUND

[¶2]		“The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	Superior	Court’s	decision	

and	 are	 supported	 by	 the	 record.” Hurricane	 Island	 Found.	 v.	 Town	 of

Vinalhaven,	2023	ME	33,	¶ 2,	295	A.3d	147.

[¶3]	 Cassidy	owns	nonresidential	property	with	an	equalized	municipal	

valuation	 of	$1 million	 or	greater in	the	City	 of	Caribou.	 	After	 the	City’s	tax	

assessor	provided	a	valuation	of	Cassidy’s property,	Cassidy	requested	a	partial	

abatement	 of	 its	 2021	 property	 taxes,	 which the	 City’s Board	 of	 Assessors	

denied.		The	City	does	not	have	a	board	of	assessment	review,	so	Cassidy	next	

appealed	 the	 Board	 of	 Assessors’	 decision	 to	 the	 Commissioners.	 The	

Commissioners	 concluded	 that they	 lacked	 subject	 matter jurisdiction	 and	

declined	to	hear	the	appeal.

[¶4]		Cassidy	then	appealed the	Commissioners’	decision	to	the	Superior	

Court pursuant	to	Maine	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	80B.		See 36	M.R.S.	§	844(1)

(“Either	party	may	appeal	from	the	decision	of	the	county	commissioners	to	the	

Superior	 Court,	in	 accordance	with	 the	Maine	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure,	 Rule	

80B.”).

[¶5]		The	Superior	Court	(Nelson, J.)	concluded	that	the	Commissioners	

erred	in	determining	that	they	lacked jurisdiction	over the abatement	appeal	
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and	remanded	the	case	for the	Commissioners	to	proceed	on	the	merits.		The	

Commissioners	 timely	appealed	 that	decision.

1		See 14	M.R.S.	 § 1851	 (2023);	

M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).

II.	 DISCUSSION

A. We	interpret	the	meaning	of	section	844	de	novo.

[¶6] When the	Superior	Court	acts in	an appellate	capacity,	we	directly	

review	 the	 operative	 administrative	 decision	 “to	 determine	 whether	 the	

findings	are	unsupported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record,	and	whether	

there	was	any	abuse	of	discretion	or	error	of	law.”		Penkul	v.	Town	of	Lebanon,	

2016	 ME	 16,	 ¶	 14,	 136	 A.3d	 88 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 Here,	 the	

Commissioners	 concluded that	 they	 lacked	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 Cassidy’s

abatement	appeal,	which	is	a	determination of	law;	therefore, we	evaluate	that	

decision	by	reviewing	de	novo	any	relevant	statutory provisions.	 Desfosses	v.	

City	 of	 Saco,	 2015	 ME	 151,	 ¶	 8,	 128	 A.3d	 648.	 	We	 begin	 by	 examining the	

statute’s	plain	language, considering	the	“entire	statutory	scheme	to	achieve	a	

harmonious	result.”		Wister	v.	Town	of	Mount	Desert,	2009	ME	66,	¶	17,	974	A.2d	

903.		If	the	statute is	clear,	we end	our	review,	and	apply the	plain	meaning	to	

1		Although this	is	an	interlocutory	appeal,	on	February	15,	2023,	we	issued	an	order	allowing	the	

appeal	 to	proceed	under	an	established	exception	 to	 the	 final	judgment	rule.		See	Fichter	v.	Bd.	of	

Envtl.	Prot.,	604	A.2d	433,	436	(Me.	1992);	Bar	Harbor	Banking	&	Tr.	Co.	v.	Alexander,	411	A.2d	74,	76	

(Me.	1980).
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interpret	the	provision at	issue.		Desfosses,	2015	ME 151, ¶	8,	128	A.3d	648.	 If	

the	 statute	 is	 ambiguous,	 we	 proceed	 to	 using	 other	 interpretive	 tools	 to	

construe	the	statute.		See,	e.g.,	Damon v. S.D. Warren Co.,	2010	ME	24,	¶	10,	990	

A.2d	1028.

B. The	 plain	 language	 of	 section	 844	 provides	 for	 concurrent	

jurisdiction	before	either	the	Commissioners	or	the	State	Board.

[¶7]	 	 The	 Commissioners	 argue	 that	 the	 language	 of	 36	 M.R.S.	 §	 844	

grants exclusive	 jurisdiction	 to	 the	 State	 Board	 over	 appeals	 of	 abatement	

decisions	 regarding	 nonresidential	 property	 with	 an	 equalized	 municipal	

valuation	 of	 $1	 million	 or	 greater, while	 Cassidy	 argues	 that	 the	 statutory	

language	 provides	 concurrent	 jurisdiction	 for	 such	 appeals	 before	 the	

Commissioners	and	the	State	Board. 2

[¶8]		To	set	this	question	in	context, 36	M.R.S.	§§	841-849 (2023) set	out	

the	 avenues	 pursuant	 to	 which	 a	 taxpayer	 may	 seek	 an	 abatement	 of	 its	

municipal	 property	 taxes. The	 taxpayer must	 start	 by	 filing	 a	 written	

2	 	 The	 Commissioners	 also	 point	 to	 Central Me. Power	 Co.	 v.	 Town	 of	 Moscow,	 649	 A.2d	 320	

(Me. 1994),	 as	 being	 dispositive	 regarding	 whether	 they	 have	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 the	 abatement	

appeal.		In	Town	of	Moscow,	we	said,	“When	a	taxpayer	challenges	the	assessment	of	nonresidential	

property	with	a	municipal	valuation	exceeding	$500,000,	appeal	from	the	municipal	determination	

is	 to	 the	 Board	 of	 Property	 Tax	 Review.”	 	Id. at 322.	 	 Whether	 another	 governmental	 body	 was	

authorized	to	hear	the	taxpayer’s	challenge	was	not	an	issue	in	that	case,	and	we	did	not	evaluate	the	

jurisdiction	 for	 abatement	 appeals	 beyond	 the	 State	 Board’s	 authorization	 under	 section	 844(2).		

See id. at	 321-26.	 	Therefore, our	 holding	 here	is	 consistent	with Town	 of	Moscow’s holding.	 	 The	

Legislature	 has	 since	 amended	 section	 844(2)	 to	 raise	 the	 valuation	 threshold	 from	 $500,000	 to	

$1,000,000.		P.L. 1995,	ch.	262, §	7.
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application	with	the	assessors	or	the	municipal	officers.		36	M.R.S.	§	841(1).		If	

that abatement	application	is	denied,	the	taxpayer	may	then	appeal	the	decision	

to	the	municipality’s	board	of	assessment	review	according	to 36 M.R.S.	§	843.		

If,	 as	 here, the	 municipality	 does	 not	 have	 a	 board	 of	 assessment	 review,

appeals	of	abatement	decisions	are	governed	by	36	M.R.S.	§	844.

[¶9]	 	 Under	 36	 M.R.S.	 §	 844(1),	 a	 property	 owner	 who	 applied	 for	

abatement	with	the	assessors	or	municipal	officers	and	was	denied	“may	apply	

to	the	county	commissioners	within	60 days	after	notice	of	the	decisions	from	

which	 the	 appeal	 is	 being	 taken	 or	 within	 60	 days	 after	 the	 application	 is	

deemed	to	have	been	denied.”

[¶10]	 	 If	 the	 property	 owner	 is	 appealing	 an	 abatement	 decision	

regarding	 nonresidential	 property	 valued	 at	 $1	 million	 or	 greater, then

36 M.R.S.	§ 844(2)	becomes	relevant	and provides:

Notwithstanding	 subsection	 1,	 the	 applicant	 may appeal	 the	

decision	of	the	assessors	or	the	municipal	officers	on	a	request	for	

abatement	with	 respect	 to	nonresidential	property	 or	properties	

having	an	equalized	municipal	valuation	of	$1,000,000	or	greater,	

either	separately	or	in	the	aggregate,	to	the State	Board	of	Property	

Tax	Review	within	60	days	after	notice	of	the	decision	from	which	

the	appeal	is	taken	or	after	the	application	is	deemed	to	be	denied.		

If	 the	 State	 Board	 of	 Property	 Tax	 Review	 determines	 that	 the	

applicant	 is	 over-assessed,	 it	 shall	 grant	 such	 reasonable	

abatement	 as	 it	 determines	 proper.	 	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	

subsection,	“nonresidential	property”	means	property	that	is	used	

primarily	 for	 commercial,	 industrial	 or	 business	 purposes,	
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excluding	 unimproved	 land	 that	 is	 not	 associated	 with	 a	

commercial,	industrial,	or	business	use.

(Emphasis	added.)

[¶11]		The	issue	before	us is	the	interplay	between	subsections	1	and	2	

of	section	844	and	whether	subsection	2 requires	an	owner	of	nonresidential	

property	valued	at	$1	million	or	greater	to	pursue	adiscretionary appeal	before	

the	State	Board and	not	the	county	commissioners.

[¶12]		In	interpreting	statutory	language,	“[w]ords	and	phrases	shall	be	

construed	according	to	the	common	meaning	of	the	language.”		1	M.R.S.	§	72(3)

(2023).	 	 We often	 look	 to	 dictionaries	 to	 identify	 that	 common	 meaning.		

See, e.g., State	v.	Blum,	2018	ME	78,	¶	9,	187	A.3d	566;	Hum.	Rts.	Def.	Ctr.	v.	Maine	

Cnty.	Comm’rs	Ass’n	Self-funded	Risk	Mgmt.	Pool,	2023	ME	56,	¶	22,	301 A.3d

782 (“The plain meaning	of	the	[statutory]	language	may	be	determined	by	its	

dictionary	definition.”).

[¶13]	 Section	 844(2)	 opens with	 the	 phrase “[n]otwithstanding	

subsection 1.”	 	Several	 dictionaries	 define “notwithstanding” as	 “in	 spite	 of.”		

Notwithstanding,	 New	 Oxford	 American	 Dictionary	 (3d	 ed.	 2010);	

Notwithstanding,	 American	 Heritage	 Dictionary	 of	 the	 English	 Language	

(5th ed.	 2016);	 Notwithstanding,	 Webster’s	 New	 World	 College	 Dictionary	
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(5th ed.	2016).		Therefore, the	common	meaning	of	 this	opening	phrase	is in	

spite	of	subsection	1;	that	is,	subsection	1 does	not	affect subsection	2.

[¶14]		We	turn	next	to	the	word	“may.”	 Title	1 M.R.S.	§	71(9-A) (2023)

provides	in	relevant	part	that	“‘[s]hall’	and	‘must’	are	terms	of	equal	weight	that	

indicate	 a	 mandatory	 duty,	 action	 or	 requirement. ‘May’	 indicates	

authorization	 or	 permission	 to	 act.”	 The	 New	 Oxford	 American	 Dictionary	

defines	“may”	as	expressing	permission.	May,	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	

(3d	ed.	2010).		The	Maine	Legislative	Drafting	Manual3 similarly	provides:

(3)	 May.	 “May”	 means	 “is	 permitted	 to,”	 “is	 authorized	 to,”	 “is	

entitled	to”	or	“has	power	to.”	 “May”	authorizes	or	permits	rather	

than	commands.

Example:

The	 commissioner	 may	 call	 a	 special	 meeting	 when	

necessary.

If	 calling	 a	 special	 meeting	 is	 discretionary,	 “may”	 is	 the	 proper	

word.	 If	the	commissioner	is	required	to	call	a	special	meeting,	use	

“the	commissioner	shall.	.	.”

Office	of	the	Revisor	of	Statutes,	Maine	Legislative	Drafting	Manual,	pt.	III,	ch.	2,	

§	1(A)(3)	at	101	(1st	ed.	Oct.	1990,	rev.	Oct.	2022).

3 We	have	looked	to	this	manual	repeatedly.		E.g., Manirakiza	v.	Dep’t	of	Health	&	Hum.	Servs.,	2018	

ME	10,	¶	10,	177	A.3d	1264; Jacob	v.	Kippax,	2011	ME	1, ¶	31,	10	A.3d	1159.
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[¶15]	 	The	 Legislature’s	 use	 of	 “may”	in	 section	 844(2) is	particularly	

significant	given	its forceful	use	of	language like	“shall”	or	“must”	in	other	parts	

of	 the	 statute.	 	See,	e.g., 36	M.R.S.	 §	 583	 (2023) (“Appeal	 from	an	abatement	

decision	rendered	under	section	841	shall be	to	the	State	Board	of	Property	Tax	

Review.”	(emphasis	added));	36	M.R.S.	§	1118	(2023) (“Appeal	from	a	decision	

rendered	under	section	841	or	a	recommended	current	use	value	established	

under	 section	 1106-A	 must be	 to	 the	 State	 Board	 of	 Property	 Tax	 Review.”	

(emphasis	added)).

[¶16]		In	sum,	consistent	with	the	opening	“notwithstanding”	clause,	use	

of	the	term	“may”	makes	plain	that	an	applicant	is	permitted	to appeal	to	the	

State	 Board	 but does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 Board	 is	 the	 exclusive	 body	 with	

jurisdiction	to	hear	the	appeal.		Rather,	the	applicant,	at	its	option,	may	choose	

to	appeal	either	to	the	State	Board	or	to	the	county	commissioners.4

4		Because	we	rule	based	on	the	plain	reading	of	the	statute,	we	need	go	no	further.		See	Cobb	v.	Bd.	

of	Counseling	Professionals	Licensure,	2006	ME	48,	¶	13,	896	A.2d	271	(holding	that	we	do	not	defer	

to	an	agency’s	interpretation	of	an	unambiguous	statute).		We	note,	however,	that	in	support	of	their	

interpretation	of	the	statute,	the	Commissioners	cited	Maine	Revenue	Services	Property	Tax	Division	

Tax	Bulletin	No.	10,	in	which	the	agency	interpreted	section	844(2)	to	require	that	these	appeals	go	

to	the	State Board.		Originally,	however,	this	guidance	allowed	the	appeals	to	proceed	to	the	County	

Commissioners	or	the	State	Board	of	Property	Tax	Review.		Days	after	the	Superior	Court	entered	

judgment	in	 this	case,	 the	Maine	Revenue	Service’s	guidance	changed	and directed	appeals	 to	 the	

State	 Board	 without	 mention	 of	 the	 Commissioners.	 	 In	 making	 that	 change,	 the	 agency	 did	 not	

acknowledge	that	it	was	changing	its	position;	did	not	explain	why	it	was	doing	so;	and,	given	this	

lacuna	in	explanation,	did	not	indicate	that	it	had	reflected	upon	any	relevant	reliance	interests.

An	agency	is	free	to	change	its	mind	in	its	interpretation	of	a	statute.		See	Good	Samaritan	Hosp.	v.	

Shalala,	508	U.S.	402,	417	(1993).		But	if	it	does	so,	the	agency	must	acknowledge	that	it	is	making	a	
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III.	 CONCLUSION

[¶17]	 	 We	 conclude that	 the	 statute	 is	 clear.	 	 Section	 844	 allows	 a	

property	 owner	 to	 appeal	 an	 abatement	 decision	 directly	 to	 county

commissioners	 or	 to	 the	 State	 Board	 of	 Property	 Tax	 Review	 when	 the	

municipality	 does	 not	 have	 a	 board	 of	 assessment	 review and the	 taxed	

property at	issue	is	nonresidential	property valued	at	$1	million	or	greater.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

change, explain	why, and	give	due	consideration	to	the	serious	reliance	interests	on	the	old	policy.	

Charles	Koch,	Jr.	&	Richard	Murphy,	Admin.	L.	&	Prac., Review	of	policy	changes §	11:30.25,	Westlaw	

(database	updated	February	2023) (At	the	time	Cassidy	had	to	decide	where	to	appeal,	the	agency	

was	indicating	it	could	go	to	the	Commissioners).	 See	also	FCC	v.	Fox	Television	Stations,	Inc., 556	U.S.	

502,	 515 (2009) (“An	agency	may	 not	 .	 .	 . depart	 from	a	 prior	 policy sub	 silentio.”);	Nat’l	 Cable	&	

Telecomms. Ass’n	v.	Brand	X	Internet	Servs., 545	U.S.	967,	981	(2005)	(“Unexplained	inconsistency	is,	

at	most,	a	reason	for	holding	an	interpretation	to	be	an	arbitrary	and	capricious	change	from	agency	

practice	under	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act.”);	Encino	Motorcars,	LLC	v.	Navarro,	579	US.	211,	

221-22 (2016)	(noting	that	agencies	must	acknowledge	the	fact	of	change,	offer	good	reasons	for	the	

change,	 take	 cognizance	 of	 reliance	 interests,	 and	 explain	 why	 they	 are	 “disregarding	 facts	 and	

circumstances	that	underlay	or	were	engendered	by	the	prior	policy”	(quoting	Fox Television Stations,

Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1811));	Smiley	v.	 Citibank	 (S.D.),	N.A.,	517	U.S.	735,	742	 (1996)	 (“sudden	and	

unexplained	 change”	 or	 “change	 that	 does	 not	 take	 account	 of	 legitimate	 reliance	 on	 prior	

interpretation”	may	be	arbitrary); Nat’l	Lab. Rels. Bd. v.	Lily	Transp. Corp.,	853	F.3d	31,	36	(1st Cir.	

2017)	 (noting	 that	 the	 Justices	 in	 Fox were	 unanimous	 in	 their	 “acceptance	 of	 the	 view,	 often	

expressed,	that	an	agency	is	not	forever	bound	by	an	earlier	resolution	of	an	interpretive	issue,	but	

that	a	change	must	be	addressed	expressly,	at	least	by	the	agency’s	articulate	recognition	that	it	is	

departing	from	its	precedent” and	that	“an	about-face	on	a	rule	owing	to	facts	changed	from	those	

underlying	the	prior	view	requires	that	the	new	facts	be	addressed	explicitly	by	reasoned	explanation	

for	the	change	of	direction”).
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Peter	T.	Marchesi,	Esq.,	and	Michael	D.	Lichtenstein,	Esq.	(orally),	Wheeler	&	

Arey,	P.A.,	Waterville,	for	appellant	Aroostook	County	Commissioners

Roger	L.	Huber,	Esq.	(orally),	and	Emily	A.	Belanger,	Esq.,	Farrell,	Rosenblatt	&	

Russell,	Bangor,	for	appellee	Cassidy	Holdings,	LLC

Aroostook County Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2022-2

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY