No. 82-313 

IN THE SUPREIm COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1.983 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

SHERYLE SO RICHARDSON, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

WAYNE LYNN RICHARDSON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula 

Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Ronald MacDonald, Missoula, Montana 

Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Plissoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Terry Wallace, Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: December 2, 1952 

Decided: February 4, 1983 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

On April 2, 1982, the District Court of the Fourth 

Judicial District issued findings of fact, conclusions of law 

and an order finding the parties' original decree of divorce 

unconscionable and modifying that decree. Wayne Lynn 

Richardson now appeals the modifications of the original 

decree. 

Sheryle Jo and Wayne Lvnn Richardson were married on 

June 3, 1966. Five children were born to the couple during 

their marriage. A petition for dissolution of the marriage 

was filed bv Sheryle on January 12, 1979. The parties 

entered a voluntary separation agreement on February 26, 

,1979, which settled their property rights and other marital 

coilcerns and obligations. The agreement was incorporated 

into the final decree of dissolution, also dated February 26, 

The clauses of the separation agreement relevant to this 

appeal are: 

Child Support: Commencing on the 1-0 day of March, 

1979, Second Party [husband] agrees to pay to First 

Party [wife] as and for support and maintenance of 

the children, the sum of One Hundred and No/l00 

Dollars ($100.00) per month, per child, said 

payments to continue until each child shall have 

gained majority, or become emancipated, married, or 

die, whichever occurs at an earlier date, and upon 

the occurrence of such an event, no subsequent 

payment shall be made. All payments to be made 

hereunder shall be made through the Office of Clerk 

of Court. 

XVIII . 

Maintenance: Commencing on the 10 day of March, 

1979, Second Party agrees to pay to First Party as 

and for her maintenance the sum of Five Hundred and 

No/100 Dollars ($500.00) per month, said payments 

to continue until First Party shall remarry, die, 

or until the youngest child of -- the parties shall 

reach the age of eighteen years, whichever occurs 

at an earlier date, and upon the occurrence of such 
event no subsequent payment shall be made . . , " 

(emphasis supplied.) 

Sheryle Richardson remarried on November 14, 1981. At 

that time, her child support payments had increased to 

approximately $126.00 per month, per child, or $629.00 per 

month. The maintenance payments had also increased to 

$629.00 per month. The maintenance payments ceased upon her 

remarriage. Subsequently, Sheryle filed a motion to increase 

her child support payments on the grounds that her $629.00 

per month decrease in income made the child support payments 

unconscionable. 

A hearing was held February 3 and February 8, 1982, 

following which the child support payments were increased to 

$225.00 per month, per child. The increase in child support 

is approximately equivalent to the maintenance payments lost 

due to the remarriage. 

In appealing this increase, Wayne Richardson presents 

this Court with the following issue: 

Is the remarriage of a former spouse, which by the terms 

of the Decreee terminates maintenance, a substantial change 

in circumstances allowing for an increase in the child 

support payments? 

We hold that in this particular case, it is and affirm 

the decision of the District Court. 

We have repeatedlv held in dissolution cases that the 

findings of the District Court will not be overturned unless 

clearlv erroneous. Tidhall v. Tidball (1981), Mont. 

-1 - , 625 P.2d 1147, 1150, 38 St.Rep. 482, 485. The 

decision of the District Court to increase the child support 

payments was not clearly erroneous. 

Sheryle voluntarily remarried and thus forfeited her 

maintenance payments. The District Court is not forbidden 
from considering voluntary reductions of income as a reason 

for modifying child support payments. In Rome v. Rome 

(19811, Mont . , 621 P.2d 1090, 38 St.Rep. 50, we 

held that the District Court may consider an ex-husband's 

vo1unta.r~ reduction of income when determining whether child 

support payments should be lowered. In Rome, we stated: 

"Although we hold tha.t a reduction in ability to 

pay brought about through a voluntary change in 

circumstances is not, in itself, su-fficient to 

mandate a modification of support, neither do we 

approve the view that self-imposed changes can 

never be considered as reasons for modification. 

The better approach is to allow the judge to 

consider the nature of the changes and the reasons 

for the changes, and then to determine whether, 

under all the circumstances, a modification is 

warranted. " Supra, Mont. at , 621 P.2d at 

1092, 38 St.Rep. at 52. 

Here, the District Court judge considered all the 

circumstances before determining that a modification was 

warranted. The undisputed findings indicate that Sheryle's 

current income is approximately $680 per month, including 

$523 per month from her current husband's income. 

Disregarding her current husband's income, Sheryle Richardson 

lost $629 per month when she remarried. In comparison, 

Wayne's gross personal income for 1981 was nearly $57,000, or 

$4800 per month. 

Further, it is apparent from the maintenance clause of 

the 1979 separation agreement that maintenance was to be 

used, in part, for support of the children. The clause 

specifically provides that if Sheryle does not die or remarry 

prior thereto, her maintenance payment will cease when the 

youngest child of the parties attains the age of eighteen. 

Here there is a recognition of greater need for maintenance 

during the time the children must be supported. 
Irrespective of our view of the proof, there is 

substantial credible evidence to support the District Court 

and therefore, the order modifying payments is affirmed. 

We concur: