NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0309n.06

No. 21-6070

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINA THARP,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

APEL INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

OPINION

Before: NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Christina Tharp appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of her employer, Defendant Apel International, LLC (“Apel”), on her 

state law retaliation claim, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.280(1) (West). Tharp alleges Apel refused

to hire her as a permanent employee in retaliation for reporting to Apel’s human resources director 

that she was sexually harassed. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

From early September through mid-December of 2019, Plaintiff Christina Tharp was 

employed by a staffing company, Adecco USA, Inc. (“Adecco”), and assigned to a 90-day stint as 

a temporary worker at Apel. Tharp understood that unless and until Apel converted her from a 

temporary employee to a permanent employee, she was not an Apel employee, she would receive 

her pay from Adecco, and she was obligated to abide by the policies and procedures of the Adecco 

Employee Handbook. In other words, Tharp was not “entitled to any benefits or compensation 
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

2

from any [Apel] benefit plan, policy, or program.” (Commitment Sheet, R. 22-3, Page ID #92.) 

Notably, one policy in force at Apel and applicable to permanent employees was an absenteeism 

point system. Based on the frequency, duration, and cause of a permanent employee’s absence, 

that employee would receive points. Under Apel’s policy, an employee may be subject to 

termination after accumulating eight points over a twelve-month period.

Although Tharp’s assignment to Apel was temporary, Apel had a “policy and practice that 

temporary workers assigned to Apel could be considered for hiring as Apel employees after they 

had completed at least 90 days.” (Noe Aff., R. 22-6, Page ID ##140–41.) The opportunity to be 

converted to a permanent employee was contingent upon Tharp’s performance during her 

temporary assignment.

From the beginning, Tharp caused Apel problems. In her first two months assigned to 

Apel, she missed a shift nearly every week. Collectively, Tharp accumulated at least eight 

absences in two and a half months. Besides her excessive absenteeism, Apel also suspected Tharp 

of using drugs at work. Apel’s Human Resources Manager, Stephanie Noe, “had concerns that 

Ms. Tharp may have been abusing substances at work given that she had a purse that she would 

never leave in her work locker, she was often leaving her workstation clutching that purse, she was 

often in the bathroom with the purse, and she frequently appeared tired and distracted.” (Noe Aff., 

R. 22-5, Page ID #141.) Tharp was also the subject of a “Critical Incident Report.” On November 

20, 2019, Tharp’s supervisor alleged Tharp committed a “[k]nowing violation of a reasonable and 

uniformly enforced rule.” (Critical Incident Report, R. 22-15, Page ID #163.) Her supervisor 

complained that despite having been warned multiple times, Tharp was “constantly seen in the 

breakroom . . . taking breaks and lunches at unscheduled times.” (Id.) 
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

3

Considering all these problems, Noe indicated that “[she] had no intention of ever hiring 

[Tharp] as an employee due to the number of issues she had throughout that 90-day period. This 

became apparent within the first two or three weeks of Ms. Tharp’s assignment.” (Noe Decl., R. 

22-6, Page ID #142.)

On December 2, 2019, Tharp submitted to Noe a complaint alleging another employee had 

been sexually harassing her since September 2019. Later that same day, Apel Supervisor Mike 

Garnett reported to Noe that he had informed the accused harasser of the complaint against him 

and that he resigned immediately. Tharp reported that she never saw the harasser again after she 

submitted the complaint. Although the harasser no longer worker for Apel, the company wrapped 

up the investigation a few days later after receiving statements from two other employees verifying 

that Tharp had been sexually harassed.

Despite having her sexual harassment complaint resolved, Tharp continued to miss work. 

She called in sick to work on December 7 and December 9, 2019. Then, on December 16, 2019, 

Tharp again missed work, purportedly due to a back injury. The next morning, Noe emailed 

Adecco asking that Tharp be released from her assignment with Apel. Noe’s reason for 

terminating Tharp’s assignment was that Tharp had “7.5 points in a 3 month period and we only 

allow 8 in a 12 month period” and that Tharp “called in the past two Mondays.” (Noe Email, R. 

22-24, Page ID #188.) By the time Tharp was released from her assignment she had accumulated 

at least eleven total absences in less than four months.

Procedural Background

In February 2020, Tharp filed a single count complaint against Apel in Kentucky state court 

alleging that Apel violated the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) by declining to hire Tharp 
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

4

as a permanent employee after she submitted a sexual harassment complaint against an Apel 

employee. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.280(1) (West). Apel removed the action to federal court 

under diversity jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1441.1

Apel moved for summary judgment on Tharp’s claim arguing that she failed to proffer 

sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case. Specifically, Apel argued that Tharp’s claim of 

sexual harassment was not the cause of her termination. In any event, Apel argued, even if she had 

introduced evidence of a causal connection, she failed to demonstrate that Apel’s independent 

reason for terminating her was pretextual. The district court granted the motion, agreeing with 

Apel that that no dispute as to causation existed. Tharp timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

This Court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo. Est. of Romain v. City of Grosse 

Pointe Farms, 935 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is only appropriate where 

the movant has shown “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). A “factual dispute is genuine if it is 

based on evidence that a reasonable jury could use to return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Est. of Romain, 935 F.3d at 490 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court is not “to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth of the matter” but rather must “determine whether there is a genuine issue for 

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The court must construe the evidence in the record and all 

1

“[L]imited liability companies have the citizenship of each partner or member.” V & M 

Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Complete 

diversity exists in this case because Tharp is a citizen of Kentucky and all Apel’s members are 

non-Kentucky citizens.
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

5

inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Rachells v. Cingular 

Wireless Emp. Servs., LLC, 732 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2013).

Section 344.280 of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) prohibits two or more people 

from conspiring “[t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because [she] . . . 

has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any 

investigation[.]” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.280(1) (West). Retaliation claims under the KCRA 

are evaluated under the same standards as Title VII retaliation claims. Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 

556 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2009); Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Hous. Auth., 132 

S.W.3d 790, 802 (Ky. 2004). 

When a plaintiff’s claim of retaliation is based on circumstantial evidence, the claim is 

evaluated using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Abbott v. Crown 

Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792, 801–05 (1973). The burden first falls on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation by showing that: “(1) . . . she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of 

the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken 

against the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the 

adverse employment action.” Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008). 

Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to produce 

evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. If the defendant meets this 

burden, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that this legitimate reason is pretextual. Id. 

Here, Apel concedes that Tharp can satisfy the first three elements of the prima facie case, and 

therefore, the only element of the prima facie case in dispute is causation.
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

6

“To show causation, ‘a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference 

could be drawn that the adverse action would not have been taken’ in the absence of the protected 

conduct.” Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367, 381 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000)). In some circumstances, causation 

may be inferred solely from the close temporal proximity between the time when an employer 

learns of an employee’s protected activity and the time it takes an adverse action against that 

employee. Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Sch., 974 F.3d 652, 664 (6th Cir. 

2020). “Where an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns 

of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to 

constitute evidence of a causal connection for purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of 

retaliation.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008). “But where 

some time elapses between when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent 

adverse employment action, the employee must couple temporal proximity with other evidence of 

retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Id.; see also Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 435–36. 

Critically, the Supreme Court has expressed concern that “employees who see the 

proverbial writing on the wall that they are about to be fired should not be able to use Title VII 

protections to insulate themselves from adverse employment actions that were previously 

contemplated.” Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 507 (6th Cir. 2014). To 

prevent this, we have held that causation is lacking when an employer follows a pre-existing line 

of action regardless of the employee’s protected action. Id. (“‘[An employer] proceeding along 

lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of 

causality,’ but where an employer deviates from those lines, temporal proximity can certainly be 
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

7

evidence of causality.” (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (per 

curiam))).

Because Apel proceeded along previously contemplated lines when it declined to convert 

Tharp to a permanent employee, Tharp has failed to proffer sufficient evidence of causation. From 

the time Adecco assigned Tharp to Apel until she submitted the sexual harassment complaint—

approximately three months—Tharp missed work on at least eight occasions. Then, when Tharp 

would show up to work, her supervisor complained that she took excessive breaks despite being 

warned against such conduct. Worse still, Apel was concerned that Tharp was using drugs at the 

workplace. But most importantly, Noe testified that “[she] had no intention of ever hiring [Tharp] 

as an employee due to the number of issues she had throughout that 90-day period. This became 

apparent within the first two or three weeks of Ms. Tharp’s assignment.” (Noe Decl., R. 22-6, 

Page ID #142.)

Considering all this evidence, “the proverbial writing was on the wall” weeks before Tharp 

filed her sexual harassment complaint. To rebut the idea that she was not on track to be fired, 

Tharp relies primarily on her own self-serving testimony that Noe allegedly said she would begin 

the paperwork to convert Tharp to a permanent employee on the same day Tharp submitted her 

sexual harassment complaint. We recently acknowledged that “self-serving statements can create 

a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial.” Davis v. Gallagher, 951 F.3d 743, 750 

(6th Cir. 2020). However, even if the panel accepts Tharp’s testimony as true—that Noe really 

did say she intended to hire Tharp as a permanent employee—Tharp missed work on several 

occasions after this alleged conversation. These post-complaint unexcused absences were 

independently sufficient to not convert Tharp to permanent employee status. See Kuhn 
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

8

v. Washtenaw Cnty., 709 F.3d 612, 628 (6th Cir. 2013) (“This court has previously held that ‘an 

intervening legitimate reason’ to take an adverse employment action ‘dispels an inference of 

retaliation based on temporal proximity.’” (quoting Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 

463, 472 (6th Cir. 2012))).

In a final attempt to demonstrate causation, Tharp points to comparators to argue Apel was 

not actually proceeding along lines to terminate Tharp prior to her filing of the sexual harassment 

complaint. Essentially, her argument is that Tharp’s unexcused absences could not have led Apel 

to be on track to terminate her because Apel tolerated excessive absenteeism from other 

employees.

Tharp relies on four comparators to make her argument. However, three of the comparators 

were permanent employees unquestionably subject to Apel’s internal policies. The only 

comparator who is even remotely relevant, Shaila Russell, was terminated under similar 

circumstances. Russell was a temporary employee who racked up significant attendance points; 

but nevertheless, “due to [her] ability to be flexible, supportive and [a] quick learner,” Apel hired 

her for a permanent position. (New Employee Eval., R. 23–16, Page ID #314.) Approximately 

three weeks later, in light of Russell’s continued attendance issues, Apel decided to terminate her. 

Apel’s decision to hire Russell as a permanent employee supports the proposition that Apel would 

take a chance on a good employee with attendance problems, but if the attendance problems did 

not resolve, the employee would be terminated. That is not Tharp’s situation. Tharp was a bad 

employee with attendance problems. She was consistently taking unauthorized breaks, away from 

her workstation, and suspected of using drugs. 
No. 21-6070, Tharp v. Apel Int’l, LLC

9

Without the support of Russell as a comparator, Tharp’s case boils down to only her selfserving depositional testimony, which, as explained above, is simply not enough for a reasonable 

factfinder to conclude that she was not converted to a permanent employee in retaliation for filing 

a sexual harassment complaint. Any reasonably juror would see that the writing was on the wall 

long before Tharp submitted her complaint to Noe. Accordingly, Tharp’s filing of the sexual 

harassment complaint cannot reasonably be said to be the cause of Apel’s decision not to hire her 

as a permanent employee.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.