2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-19-2004 

# M or r i s sey v . L uze r ne C omm P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-4346

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/2111 NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

__________ No. 03-4346

__________ MARY A NN MO RRISSEY Ap pellan t,
v. LU ZE RN E C OU NT Y C OM M UN ITY CO LL EG E; R ICH AR D A M ICO ,

In di vi dua llyandas Supe rv is orof LCC C, Appellees.

__________ On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt For th e M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania (Civ. A. No. 02-1511) Distri ct Judge: Honorable James M. Munley

__________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit L. A.R. 34.1( a)

September 28, 2004

___________ Be for e: R OT H, B AR RY , and GA RT H, Circu it Judges

(Opinion Fi led: Oct ober 19, 2004)

__________ OPI NION

__________-2-

Ga rth, Circu it Judge : This appealrequir es us to de cide whether Mary Ann Morrissey

intr oduced suffici ent evi dence to sur vive summary

judgment i n her age and gender discr iminat ion and retaliation suit against L uzerne C ounty Com mun ity College (“LC CC ”) and R ichard Amico, indi vidually and as supervi sor of LCCC. The Distri ct Court c oncluded that she did n ot, find ing tha t she fa iled to p resen t evide nce o f discr imina tory intent. W e w ill aff ir m. I. Because we write exclusivel y for the benefi t of the parti es who are well a cquaint ed with the facts and procedural posture of the present act ion, we will recount only those matter s rel evant t o the is sues befor e us. Morri ssey , who is a femal e over si xty year s of age , wa s aful l- ti me s ci enc e de par tme ntte chn ic ian at

LCCC du ri ng t

he r el evantti me period. In December 1999, Morri ssey applie d for an Ins truction Support Assist ant (“ISA”) position with LCCC . On M ay 12, 2000, after completing several intervi ews, M orris sey rec eive d a le tter in for min g he r tha t she had bee n se lecte d fo r the pos ition
. How ever, in June 2000, Richard Amico, Associate Dean of Hum an Resources, infor med Morri ssey

that a compl aint

had bee n fil ed reg ardi ng the fil li ng of the ISA posit ion due to t

he procedure followed i n the hiring proces s. LCCC policy granted unsuccessf

ul candi dates t

he right to appealhiri ng decisi ons to the Presi dent of the1 LCCC’s Employe e Recruitment, Search and Selection Procedures (A mended June 27, 2000) provides, in p ertinen t part: Applicants who wish to appeal hiring decisions may do so by contacting

the Human Resources Department within ten (10) workday s of notification of non-selection. The Associate Dean of Human Resources will promptly schedule a meeting with the President to hear the applicant’s appeal. The President may take action to terminate the search, tempora rily rescind an appoin

tment, and/or re- institute a new sea rch if the Presiden t is persuaded that the applicant has presented a basis warranting such actions. A328.
2 Hrinko complained, inter alia , that “I am unawar e of any basis upon which a finding could be made that

Ms. Morris sey

‘demonst rated be tter inte rpersonal and pr

oblem solving skills that are critical to the success of this position.’” A150. -3- colle ge. 1 In the i nstant

case, t he complaint , fil ed by anot her LCCC employee, Michael Hrinko, al leged that the search commit tee used c rit eria ( inter

personalskil ls) not
men tioned in the jo b des cription or the v acan cy anno unce men t. 2 LCCC ’s the n-Presi dent Jon La rson reque sted that the proce ss be review ed. Am ico subseq uently drafted a repo rt on th e initial job search proc ess, no ting tha t Hrin ko’s a ppea l was base d on (1) his possessi on of both the “minimum posit ion quali ficat ions” and bet ter pos iti on qualif icat ions than Morrissey and (2) hi s lack of knowle dge “of anybasis upon whic h a finding c ould be made that Ms. Morrissey

demonstrat ed inte rpersona l and probl em solving skills that are critical to the succe ss of this position.” A 154. Th e report concluded t

hat, although t

here was no basi s to Hrinko’ s stat ement that he was bette r qualif ied to f ulfil l the pos iti on requir ements than Morrissey , he was nonethe less “ correct in his assertion that

“the search committ ee used cri teri a (int erpers onal ski lls ) not-4-

mentioned i n the job de scri ption, nor the vac ancy announcement.” A157. After revi ew of Amico’s repor

t, Pr esident

Larson recommended that the s earch be t erminat ed and a
new search instituted . Larso n no ted tha t: while it appears t o me that t

he search c ommittee ha s sele cted the most quali fied candidat e for the posit ion, Mr. Hri nko’s appealappears t o be just ifie d since t he candidat e was not sel ected bas ed on the meri t of her qua lifi cati ons exactly as they are cont ained i n the job va cancyposit ing. A183. As a result , the posit ion of ISA was posted a gain in J uly 2000. After int erviews for

the second pos ting of t he ISA positi on, another candi date, M ark Ch om an, w ho w as n ot a c and idate in th e fir st po sting , wa s sele cted for the p ositio n. Chom an possessed more technical background, more experience and w as the best qualif ied of the ca ndid ates fo r the po sition, ina smu ch as he w as ran ked s ignific antly hig her afte r the inter view s an d pr ese ntati on t han M orris sey or any o ther can did ate. In March 2003, Morris seyreti red from LCCC, citi ng health problems and a hostile w ork e nviro nm ent. Morrissey

file d her seven- count complaint on August 27, 2002 in the Dis tri ct Court for t

he Middle District of

Pennsylvania, alle ging age and gender discr iminat ion and retal iati on in contr aventi on of Titl e VII of the Ci vil Right s Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. § 2000 et seq. (“Tit le VII”) , the Age Discrimination in Employ ment Act, 29 U.S. C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA ”), and t

he Pennsy lvania

Human Relations Act, 43 P A . C ONS . S TAT . A NN . § 951 et se q. (“PH RA ”), as w ell as a v iolation of h er Fo urteen th A men dm ent righ ts pursu ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Distri ct Court gr anted LCCC’s motion for s ummary judgment on-5-

all cou nts. M orrissey the n filed a time ly appea l. Our rev iew of

a district court’s grant of su mm ary judgmen t is plenary, and we a re req uire d to app ly the sa me test th e dis trict c our t sho uld hav e util ized initia lly. Chipollini v. Spencer

Gifts, Inc. , 814 F .2d 89 3, 896 (3d C ir. 1987 ) (en b anc). W e are re quired to
exam ine the evide nce o f reco rd in the light m ost fav orab le to M orrissey, as th e party opposin g sum mary judgm ent, and resolve all reasonable inferences in h er favor. Matsushit

a Elec. I ndus. Co. v. Zenith Radi o Corp. , 475 U .S. 574 , 587 ( 198 6). “T his standar d is appl ied with a dded rigor in employ

ment discriminat ion cases , where int ent and cred ibility ar e cru cial is sue s.” Stew art v. R utger s, The State U nivers ity , 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir . 1997) ( quoting Robinson v. PPG Indus. Inc. , 23 F .3d 11 59, 11 62 (7 th Cir. 1994 ). The Distri ct Court ha d subject matter juri sdict ion over t

he federalclai ms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplement al jurisdi ction ove r the PHRA claims purs uant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a ). We have jurisdi ction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. We turn fir st t o Morrissey ’s age and gende r disc rimination cla ims under t he ADE A, the PHRA, and Title VII. Morris seycontends t hat both he r age and gender discr iminat ion cla ims shoul d have survi ved summary j udgment under t he McD onn ell Douglas indir ect evi dence standard. She fur ther cont ends that

her age di scri minati on clai ms should, in the a lter native , have sur

vived summary

judgment under

the dir ect3 See Narin v. Lowe r Merion S

ch. Dist. , 206 F.3d 323, 331 (3d Cir. 2000) (using the McDonnell Douglas framework in an A DEA cont

ext); Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc ., 71 F.3d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir.1995) (stating that PHRA claims are analy zed under McDonnell Douglas “consistently with interpreta tions of Title VII”).

-6- evidence s tandard e nunciat ed in Price Waterhous e v. Hopkins , 490 U .S. 228 (198 9). A. McD onnell Douglas Disparate treatm ent claims bro ught un der Title V II, the AD EA and the P HR A are analyzed using t

he famili ar thr ee-st ep framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U .S. 792 (197 3). 3 Under this analy sis, (ste p one) the pl ainti ff must fi rst make a prim a facie showing of disc rimination by establ ishi ng that ( i) she belongs t o a protec ted class; (ii) sh e app lied fo r and wa s qua lified fo r a job th e em ployer w as trying to fill; (iii) though quali fied, she was rej ected; and (iv) circumst ances give rise to an inf erence of unlawful di scri minati on such as might occur when the posi tion i s fil led by a person not

of the p rote cted clas s. Jone s v. Sch ool D istrict of P hilade lphia , 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999 ). Step two: once the pla inti ff has est ablis hed a prim a facie case of di scri minati on the burden shi fts t o the defendant “to articulate some le giti mate nondisc riminatoryreason for the employ ee’s r eject ion.” McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802. St ep three : the burden then shi fts back t o the pla inti ff who must show that t he nondiscriminat oryreason artic ulate d by th e de fen dan t is in fact a pre text for d iscrim inati on. Id . at 804. In thi s appeal, we find it unnecessar

y t o consider

steps one and two of the McD onnell Douglas sc heme . S te p on e i s no t c ont es te d, andit is cl ear th atLCCC satisfied step tw o by pro fferin g a leg itimate n ond iscrimin atory reaso n fo r its failure to-7-

pro mo te M orris sey, i.e
. , that i t followed established procedures in t erminating the firs t search and c ond ucting a new search base d on a clarifie d job desc ription, w hich re sulted in the hiring of the most quali fied candi date. At issue he re, t hen, i s whether Morri ssey satisfi ed her burden of show ing that LCCC ’s proffered reason for the adverse emp loymen t action wa s not th e true re ason for the decisio n bu t was instead pretex tual. To avoid summaryjudgment i n a Titl e VII or ADEA action after the employ er has proffered a

legitimate nondi scri minatory reason for

an adverse e mployment acti on, the plaintiff (her e Morrissey) must produc e evidence whic h: (1) casts suffici ent doubt upon each proffer ed reason s o that a fact fi nder could r easonably conclude t

hat each r eason was fabric ation, or (2) a llows a fac t finde r to i nfer that dis crimination was more l ikely than not
a m otiv ating or d eterm inati ve c aus e of actio n. See F uente s v. Pe rskie , 32 F.3d 759 ( 3d Cir. 19 94). In stead o f po inting to evide nce f rom wh ich a factfin der co uld rea sona bly conclude t

hat dis crimination was t he more li kely

cause of her f

ailur e to rec eive the prom otion, M orrissey prin cipally tries, pu rsuan t to the f irst Fuentes prong, t o cast doubt on L CC C’s exp lana tion
. To discredi t the e mployer ’s proffe red reas on, the plaintiff cannot merely show that “the employ er’s de cisi on was wrong or mistake n.” Fuentes , 32 F.3d at 765. Rather , the plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibil ities , inconsist encies, incoh erenc ies, or co ntradic tions in the em ployer’s p roffe red leg itimate re ason s for its acti on that a

reasonabl e factfinder could r ationa lly find the m unworthy of cr edence.” Id.-8-

(citation s om itted). H ere, M orrissey cla ims sh e has cast do ubt o n LC CC ’s legitim ate nondiscr iminat oryreason by establ ishi ng that ( 1) the s earch coul d not be te rminate d since she was alr eady s elect ed; (2) Hrinko never compl ained that the origi nal job pos ting fa iled to conta in a speci fic not ation of “inte rpersona l ski lls ” and (3) t here was nothi ng wrong with the f

irst job sear ch. We address e ach asser tion se ri at im. First , the record pl ainly indicates t

hat, upon an appeal fr om any hiring deci sion, the presid ent “m ay take ac tion to te rmina te the se arch, te mp orarily rescin d an a ppo intme nt, and/or r e-ins tit

ute a new sear ch.” A328. Clearly , the n, Pres ident Lar son’s deci sion t o reinst itut e a new search di d not run afoulof establ ished hi ring pr ocedures. Even so, Morrissey

argues t hat LCCC’s decisi on to grant the appealwas virt

ually unprecedent ed, thus re nder ing it im plaus ible, inco nsisten t, contra dictory or w eak. W e are m ost he sitant, however, to f

ind a deci sion i nconsist ent with an employe r’s us ual mode of operation where that

decisi on is ful ly

consist ent with wri tten pol icy . Absent addi tionalevidence reveal ing the e mpty for malism of LCCC’s compliance with it s procedur es, t he mere fact that LCCC rarel y, if ever , grant ed appeals is i nsuffici ent, in and of i tsel f, to give ris e to a
reas ona ble in fere nce of d iscrim inato ry mo tive. Second, the record c ontradi cts Morri ssey ’s ass erti on that Hri nko never complai ned about the fail ure of the firs t job pos ting t o refer t o inter personalskil ls. Hrinko did i n fact make such an all egati on, and Amico’s r eport, which was submitt ed to Pres ident Lar son, fou nd t hat a llega tion to b e m erito riou s.-9-

Third, LCCC found Hrinko’s a ppeal t o have merit

because Morris seywas not select ed based on the merit of her quali ficat ions exactly as they were set for

th in t he job vacancyposti ng, and Morris seyadduces no evi dence showing that dete rminati on to be pretext ual. Morrissey

argues t hat the re was nothi ng procedural ly flawed in t

he initial search procedure. In so arguing, she cit es the deposition tr anscript of two individuals, one of whom was on the init ial s earch committ ee. Morris seyfirs t cit es to t he testimony of Dr. Nancy Kost eleba, a search c ommittee member, for the pr oposit ion that there was nothing wrong wit

h the initialjob post ing. Kost eleba’ s deposition revea ls, however, that she had no knowledge of t he specif ics of t he appeal i nsti tuted by

Hrinko, which sig ni fic an tly u nd er m in es , if no t d es tro ys, t he pr ob ati ve va lu e o f s uc h t es tim on y. Morrissey

also ci tes t o the deposi tion t esti mony of John Will s, t hen-Vice-Pr esident

of Academ ic Affairs, who opined that he thought the initi al proceeding resulted i n the most qualif ied pers on being sel ected for the job. He admitted, though, t hat he di d not know abo ut th e “le gal p art” o f the claim
. At best, theref

ore, Morri ssey

has shown that

two LCCC offici als, who were not involved in the appealprocess, found the i niti al job s earch t o be sound. We do not t hink th ata fa ct fi nde r c oul d r eas onabl ycon stru e thes e i sol at ed s tate ment s t o mean that LCCC invidi ously

discr iminat ed against

Morrissey

because of her

age or sex. The following factualpredicate remains unchall enged: one, that LCCC had a policy of all owing unsuccessf

ul appli cants t o appeal; two, that pursua nt to t hat poli cy, an unsuccess ful4 We note that Morrissey’s § 1983 cla im is based upon LCCC’s alleged violation of the Equal Protection clause and Title VII . To make out a claim under the Equal Protection clause, a plaintiff must prove that she suffered purposeful or intentional discrimination on the basis of gender. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977). Consequently, the showing pla intiff must make for § 1983 gender discrimination is the same as for Title VII

claims. See Stewart v. Rutgers, The State Univ. , 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir.1997). Inasmuch as Morrissey

failed to support her claims of gender discrimination under Title VII , her § 1983 claim fails as well. -10- candidat e, Michael Hrinko, appeal ed; thr ee, t hat in r esponse, Preside nt Larson r equested an appropri ate re view, res ulting in a det aile d report drafte d by Amico, which outlined Hrinko’s compl aint, noting bot h the meri tori ous and basel ess part s ther eof; four, that upon reviewing t

he report , Pres ident Lar son grant ed the appealand re-i nsti tuted a new search, a presumpti vely appropri ate exer cise of hi s discr etionarypower, as se t fort h in the writt en hiri ng procedures ; and fi ve, that the second post ing res ulted in the most qual ifie d
can did ate b eing sele cted
. Ag ainst this factua l predic ate, M orrissey’s a ssertion s are in suff icient to c om pel a finding of

pretext . Morris seyhad to show “not mere ly that t he employ er’s proffered reason was wrong, but

that it was so pla inly

wrong that i t cannot

have been the employe r’s r eal re ason.” Keller v . Orix Credi t Alliance, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir . 199 7). Accordingly , we hold that Morris seycannot defeat summary j udgment on her age and gender di scri minati on clai ms under the s cheme of proof set out in McD onn ell Douglas. 45 Because the record re flects that Morrissey r elied exclusively on Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) in trying to plac e President Larson’s other a cts in the record, we express no opinion as to whether Morrissey could have

otherwise introduced such evidence by establishing its admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). -11- B. Price W aterhouse We therefore move on t o Morrissey ’s argument that s he was entitled to s urvive
summ ary judgmen t under Pri ce Water hou se. Under Justi ce O’Connor’s cont roll ing opinion in Price Waterhouse , if a p lai nt iff

“s ho w [s ] b y direct

evidencethat an illegitima te crit erion was a s ubstant ial f actor in the deci sion, ” the burde n of persuas ion shi fts t o the employe r “to s how that the decisi on would have been the s ame absent di scri minati on.” 490 U.S. at 276. A plaintiff attempting to prove discrimination by di rect evidence faces a “high hurdl e.” Connors v. Chrysl er Financi al Corp. , 160 F.3 d 97 1, 97 6 (3 d C ir. 19 98)
. Specifi call y, the evi dence must demonst rate t hat the “decisi on makers plac ed substantial negati ve reli ance on an il legitimate criterion in r eaching t heir dec isi on.” Id. Here, Morris seyreli es exclus ively on certa in agei st re marks made by Pr esident Larson in an unrelated

case b roug ht aga inst LC CC in the D istrict Co urt for the M iddle Dis trict o f Pe nns ylvan ia. See Merkle v. Luzerne County Community College , No. 02- 051 5, (M .D. P a. filed J une 1 9, 200 3). M orrissey ask ed the Distric t Cou rt in this ca se to take j udicia l noti ce of the fac tual f indings in Merkle , which al legedl y demonst rate t hat Presid ent L arson wa nted to force the retire men t of ce rtain ad minis trative em ployees in 1998 based on their age. 5 While the Dis tri ct Court, for reas ons that remain uncl ear, f

aile d to rul e on Morrissey ’s reque st, we have no difficulty concludi ng that s uch a request , even-12-

if co nsid ered , sho uld hav e be en r ejec ted. The Federal Rule s of Evidence pr ovide that court s may onl y t ake judi cial notice of facts out side t

he tri al rec ord that

are “not subject to reas onable di spute. ” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A judicia lly

notice d fact must

eithe r be genera lly

known within the j urisdi ction of the trial c ourt, or be capabl e of accurat e and ready determi nation by

resort to sourc es wh ose acc ura cy can not reas ona bly be que stion ed. See id. ; Werner v. Werner , 267 F.3d 288 , 2 95 ( 3d C ir . 2 001 ). Fac ts ad ju di ca te d i n a pr io r c as e f al l s hor t o f thi s s tandard . A s we have previously st ated, “[t]aking judi cial notice of the truth of t he content s of a fil ing from a rel ated action could r each, and per haps breach, the boundari es of proper judici al notice .” Werner , 267 F.3d at 295 (declining to t ake judi cial notice of board minut es fil ed in sep arate a ction in volv ing se parate parties); see als o Libert y Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rotc hes Pork Packers, Inc. , 969 F.2d 1384 ( 2d Cir. 1992) (“Facts adjudic ated i n a prior case do not m eet eithe r test of in dispu tability conta ined in Ru le 201 (b): they are not u sually common knowledge, nor are they derived f

rom an unimpeachabl e source . ”); United Stat es v. Jones , 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir . 1994) ( stat ing that the effect

of judic ially not icing a fac t is to prec lude th e opp osing party from introdu cing c ontrar y eviden ce an d esse ntially direct a verdic t agai nst hi m as to the noticed fact). As such, we conclude that it would be improper for

eithe r thi s Court, or the Dis tri ct Court, to consi der the s ubstance of the factualrecord i n the unrel ated Merkle cas e. As Morrissey

proffers no other di rect e vidence, we hold that Morrissey

cannot-13-

survive sum mary judgm ent on he r age discrimina tion claims un der Price Waterhous e. III. Proceeding to consider

Morrissey ’s cl aims of ret aliation, we note at t he outset that although Morri ssey ’s cl aims of ret aliation ar e brought under Titl e VII and the PHRA, the
ana lytical f

ram ew ork for eac h is id entic al. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. , 283 F.3d 561 , 5 67 ( 3d Ci r. 200 2) (analy si s f orTitle VII , ADEA, andPHRA re ta li at io n cl ai ms identi cal). In order

to est ablis h a prim a facie case of ret aliation, a plai ntiff must show: (1) that he or she engaged in a protected activi ty; (2) that his or her employer took an adverse employment

acti on; and (3) a causal link bet ween the two. See id. at 567-68. To o btain su mm ary judgm ent, the e mp loyer mu st show that the trier of fact co uld not concl ude, as a mat

ter of l aw, (1) t

hat ret aliatory

animus played a role in the employe r’s dec isi onmaking process and (2) t hat it had a deter

minati ve effect on t

he out com e of

the p roc ess. Krouse v. American St erilizer, Co. , 126 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 1997). These t

wo factors may

be met eit

her by establ ishi ng plaintiff’s inabil ity to rai se a genuine issue of material fact as t o one or more elements of the plaintiff’s prim a facie case or, if t

he employer offers a legit imate non-retali atory r eason for the adverse employment

acti on, whether t

he employ er’s proffered expl anati on was a pretext for retal iatio n. Id. The Distri ct Court of

fered both alte rnati ve grounds for granti ng LCCC ’s moti on for summary

judgment on Morris sey ’s ret aliation cl aims. We concl ude that Morrissey-14-

has failed to subm it suffic ient ev idenc e to sh ow pretex t. A. Prima F acie Case Morrissey

avers t hat she compl ained of gender discr iminat ion to Amico upon hearin g that sh e had not se cured the IS A p osition . With in six m onth s of c om plainin g to Am ico, M orris sey lea rne d th at sh e did not get th e IS A p ositio n af ter th e se con d po sting
. We first not e that

Morrissey ’s inf

ormal complaint to Amico of gender discr iminat ion, a lbeit

in somewhat vague and conc lusory terms, consti tutes protect ed acti vity , thus sati sfy ing the f irst element in the prim a facie cas e. See Sumner v. U.S. Postal Ser

vice , 899 F.2 d 20 3, 20 9 (2 nd C ir. 1990) (not ing that protect ed acti vity

include s infor mal pr otes ts t o managemen t). In add it ion, Morris sey ’s fa il ure t o obta in t he ISA positio n con stitutes the adve rse em ployme nt actio n, w hich s atisfies th e seco nd ele men t in the prim a facie case. Whether Morrissey

rais ed a genuine i ssue of material f act as to the final element–the causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
em plo ymen t actio n–i s m ore pro blem atic. In tr yi ng to est ablis h the causa l connect ion, Morri ssey argues t hat she was deni ed the ISA position only

six months after

complaini ng of gender di scri minati on. We have
reco gni zed the p rob ative valu e of tem por al pr oxi mity in retal iatio n ca ses. Farrell v. Planters Lifes avers Co. , 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). Whether the causa l connecti on may be i nferred s olely from the cl ose proxi mity in ti me between the prot ected acti vity and the adver se acti on is dependent upon the particular fact ual ci rcumstance s in a-15-

giv en c ase . Id. In Krouse , for instance, we held that an all egedly

retal iator

y employ ment acti on occurri ng ninete en months aft er the protect ed acti vity did not, standi ng alone, supp ort a fin ding of a c ausa l link. W e stated that the timing mu st be “u nusu ally suggestive” of ret aliatory motive befor e a causallink wil l be inf erred. 126 F.3d at 503. We do not believe the si x month durati on between the time Morrisse y compla ined to Amico and the time LCCC filled the ISA positi on is “unusua lly suggestive” of retaliatory motive. We m ust therefore loo k to other circum stantial evidence o f retaliatory anim us. See Krouse , 126 F.3d at 504 (“When temporal proximity bet ween protect ed acti vity and all egedly

retal iator

y conduct

is mis sing, courts may look to the int ervening period for other evidence of retali atory ani mus.”). Morrissey s ubmits that she was also the vic tim of

a patte rn of

antag onism follow ing h er com plaint. T his an tagon ism alle gedly manifest ed its elf i n the fol lowing ways : (1) she was displ aced from her or iginaloffice; (2) LCCC requir ed Morrissey to be int erviewed during the second s elect ion while on s ick leave, something neve r before r equired of a candidat e; and (3) Morrissey , unlike the other
can did ates , wa s no t info rme d ab out the form at of the in terv iew s. LCCC contends t

hat the re is suffici ent evi dence to r ebut the se all egati ons. That
ma y be tru e, bu t in so arg uin g L CC C m isco nstru es th e na ture of M orris sey’s b urd en. M orrissey is o nly require d to rais e a ge nuin e issue of fa ct as to th e cau sal con nectio n to establish her prim a facie cas e. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 ( 1981) (st ating t hat burden of

establ ishi ng a prim a facie case is not6 We finally note that the part ies faile d to brief

the rema ining iss ues of qua

lified immu

nity (raised by L CCC) and pu

nitive da mages ( raised by Morrissey

). The Di strict Cou

rt faile d to discuss these issues after finding that Morrissey had not provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could re asonably

conclude that she was the sub

ject of illegal d

iscrimina tion. We like

wise need not a

ddress these issue s. -16- onerous). Morrissey

has tes tifi ed to thi s int ervening antagonis m, which, when consi dered togethe r with t

he six month dur ation be tween the pr otect ed acti vity and adverse a ction, at a minimum, rai ses a fact ual question about t

he causal link. We thus conclude t hat Morrissey

did meet t

he low thres hold for es tabli shing a prim a facie case of retaliation. B. Pret ext Neverthel ess, Morrissey ’s cl aims fai l because she has not present ed suffici ent evidence to rebut LCCC ’s legit imate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

acti on . See Krouse , 126 F.3d at 501. A jury

could not r easonably

conclude, based upon the s cant evi dence adduced by Morrissey , that LCCC’s proffered r eason for the failur e to p rom ote w as m ere p retex t. See discuss ion supra at pa rt IIA
. The Distri ct Court, theref ore, commit

ted no error in ent ering s ummary judgment for LC CC on t he r etalia tion claim s.

IV. For the for egoing rea sons, t he Distr ict Court ’s order granti ng summary j udgment in favor of LCCC will be aff irmed. 6