THE FINALO 

o 

r 

I 

I 

INDOCHINA MONOGRAPHS 

THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

by 

GENERAL GAO VAN VIEN 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WIISJ-/lNGTON, D.C., 1985 
Library or Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Vien, Cao Van, 

The final collapse. 

(Indochina monographs) 

Includes bibliographical rererences and index. 

I. Vietnamese Conflict. 1961-1975. I. Title. II. Series. 

DS557.7.V48 1983 959.704'3 8 1-607989 

First Printed 1983-CMH Pub 90-26 

'''or sale- by the Superintendenl or DocumentJ. U.S. Government !'rintH\g OfficeWashington, D.C. 2G-102 
Foreword 

General Cao Van Vien was the last chairman of the South 

Vietnamese Joint General Staff. For almost lcn years he 

worked closely with olher senior Vietnamese officers and civilian leaders and dealt with U.S. military and civilian representatives in Saigon. General Vien is therefore particularl y well 

qualified to give an account of the final yea rs from a South 

Vietnamese standpoint. The views and conclusions are his and 

not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or the De partmem of 

Defense. 

T his is one of a series of monographs written by officers 

who held responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and 

South Vietnamese armed forces. The General Research Corporation provided writing facilities and related support uncler an 

Army contract with the Center of Military History. The center 

published the other monographs informally and distributed 

them to major research libraries. It was felt, however, that 

General Vien's book would have a wider audience and de· 

served formal publication and sale. 

The center also published Vietnam From Cease·Fire to Capitulati01l by Col. Willi am E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, who tells 

the story with somewhat more attention to the American side. 

None of the authors auempted even semidefinitive ac· 

counts, but all wrote a few years after the end of the war while 

the evenlS were still fresh in their memories. They have provided useful, sometimes invaluable information and source material for serious historians, including those working on the 

forthcoming U.S. Army in Vietnam series. 

Washington. D.C. 

June 2 1, 1982 

'" 

JAMES L. COLLINS. JR. Brigadier General. USA 

Chief of Military History 

Preface 

This monograph presents the significant events during me 

last years and months of the Republic of Vicmam. This was 

not an easy assignmem. For nearly a decade before Saigon fell 

on 30 April 1975, I had served as chairman of the Joint 

General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 

During these years. r had overseen their growth and shared 

their victories as well as their setbacks. I fell what a mother 

must feel when her child suddenly dies an accidental death. My 

feeling of loss has been overwhelming. 

h is a sad slory indeed that the reader will find unfolding 

chapter after chapte r in this monograph. As a principal actor 

and wi mess, 1 find it a moral obligation to tell it as it was, for 

lhe sake of history and for all those who died for a cause in 

which they beli eved. Events have been reconstructed as far as 

it is possible from my personal knowledge, interviews with 

responsible officers, and from available documents. T o place 

my story in its proper historical perspective, I have thought it 

appropriate 10 begin with a brier summary of military and 

political events in the wake of the 1972 Communist offensive, 

then the circumstances in whi ch the Paris Agreement was 

signed. As I view it, the agreement was the turning point which 

set South Vietnam on ils inexorable course towa rd growing 

weakness and, finally, lOlal coll apse. 

I am thankful for the valuable contributions and assistance 

provided by all the individua ls involved in this project, without 

whom Ihis monograph could hardl y have been wrillen. I am 

especially indebted to Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, my former 

chief of stafT, and Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, commande r of 

I Corps, for their wea lth of accura te informa tion and their 

critical view of events thaI occurred not only in their realms of 

responsibility but also elsewhere. Brig. Gen. T ran Dinh T ho, 

assistant chier of staff J-3, and Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung. assistant chi ef of slafT J-2, of the J oint General StafT. Each in his 

own field of expertise contributed extensive dam and deep 

insight concerning friendly and enemy acti vities. Maj . Gen. 

Nguyen Duy Hinh, commander of the 3d Infantry Division, 
offered thoughtful comments and comributions concernmg 

significam events. 

A special debt of gratitude is owed Ll. Col. Chu Xuan Vien 

and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Colonel Vien, the last army attache 

serving at the Vi etnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has 

done a highly professional job of translating and editing and 

also assisted with the developmcm of the introduction. Ms. 

Bong. formerly a captain in the Republic of Vietnam armed 

forces and also a former member of the Vietnamese Embassy 

staff, spem long hours typing and editing and in the administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form. Finally, to 

all those who provided assistance and support in onc form or 

another but whose names do not figure here. I must say a 

special word of thanks. That this story could be put together 

and presented in its final form is entirely due to collective 

work for which I cannot rightly claim all credit. 

• 

CAO VAN VI EN 

General. ARVN 
Contents 

CIuJPI" '>lIgr 

I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 3 

2. THE SITUATION BEFORE THE PARIS AGREEMENT..................................................................... 9 

Earlier Peace Proposals " ................... ,' ... ' .. ,' .. '......... 11 

Arranging the Cease~Fi e ......................................... 16 

South Vietnamese ReaclionJ...... ....... ..... ... ....... ..... ..... 26 

3. THE MILITARY SITUATION AFTER T HE 

CEASE-FIRE, 1973-74.......................................... 27 

Rolt o/ ICCS ....... ....... ............ .... .......... ............. .... 27 

The Attempted Ltmd and Population Grab ................ 29 

Cuo Viet, Sa Huynh, HOllg Ngu, Trung Nghia, and 

Totlg Lt Chan.................................................... 3 1 

Communist Military Preparations .............. ,.............. 33 

Communist Policy and Straugy ......... " .............. ',..... 36 

4. PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, 1973-74 .................... 42 

Organization oj the Armed Forces............................. 42 

The Reduction in U.S. Military Aid......................... 46 

Air Force and Naval Aid ......... ............................... 48 

Replacement of Items arid Parts ................... ............ 50 

Fuel and Ammunition ..... ....... , ........................ , .. ,.,.. 5 1 

Forebodingsfor 1975 ... , .. , .. ,., .......... , ...... , .... ...... ,., .. 55 

5. T HE BEGINNING OF T HE END ............................ 58 

Ban Afe Thuol ............................. ..... .................. ,.. 68 

President Thieu:S Fateful Decision .......... , ............. , .. , 75 

6. THE ROUT IN THE HIGHLANDS ......................... 83 

General Phu s Plan ....................... ............ ............. 88 

The Flight ............... ....... ................... .................... 91 

Cawes and Resfllts ................................................. 93 

7. DEFEAT IN THE NORTH....................................... 96 

General TnwlIg's PlariS .......................................... 98 

Northem and Sou/hem M R-I................................. 103 

The Final Evacuation............................................. 106 

The Refugee Problem .............................................. 109 

The Final Days 0/ M R-1/ .................. .................... 11 7 

8. DEFENSE IN THE SOUTH ..................................... 122 

Regrouping and Rif!tting ........................................ 123 

'" 
CAop/t'r PtJKt 

High-Altitudt Bombing ................ ............ ............... 127 

The Situation in MR-III........................................ 129 

The Situation in MR-IV ........................................ 138 

9. THE LAST DAYS ................... ..... ... ........................... 14 1 

The Evacuation .................. ...... .... .... ..................... 146 

Saigo71....... ....... .. ........... ............... .. ... ..... ..... ....... ... 149 

10. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS ............. ... 154 

GLOSSARy............................ .......... ........ ....... .......... ... .... . 167 

.".,.,.. 

A. T he Role o f the Joint General StafL ........................ 169 

B. Testimony, 27 J anuary 1976, by Ambassador 

Graham Martin Before the Special Investigations 

Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee. Subject: T he Balance of Forces 

in Vietnaln .... .. .......... .. ........................ ... ....... .. ........ 172 

C. Testimony, 27 J anuary 1976, by Ambassador 

Graham Martin Before the Special Investigations 

Subcommittee of the House International Relations Commillee. Subject: EfTorts To Achieve a 

Negotiated Settlement With the Communists....... 175 

INDEX............... ................. ........................... .................... 179 

Tables 

No. 

1. Enemy Strength and Units,J anuary 1973 ...... ..... ....... 34 

2. U.S. Military Assistance, Fiscal Year 1975. ................ 48 

3. Ammunition Costs, Fiscal Year 1975 ......................... 52 

4. Total Ammunition Available, July 1974-February 

1975 ......................................................................... 52 

Maps 

I. South Vietnam, 1972, Area Lost 111 Enemy OfTenslve. ............................ ....... ....... .................... ..... ....... 10 

2. T he Battle of Phuoc Long. December 1974-January 

1975......................................................................... 59 

3. The Fall of Ban Me Thuot, 10- 18 March 1975.. ....... 70 

4. President T hi cu's Briefing Map. II March 1975....... 79 

5. The Fall of MRll , 14 March-2 April 1975................. 85 

\,111 
.\'1). Pag( 

6. Friendly Forces, Mililary Region 1, March 1975....... 97 

7. Enemy Forces, Mililary Region I, March 1975......... 98 

8. Conlingency Plan I, Use of QL 1 lO Da Nang, 19 

March 1975 .................... .. ...... .......... ....................... 100 

9. COnlingency Plan 2, Sealift lO Da Nang, 19 March 

1945................. .................................................. ...... 101 

10. The Fall of Xu an Loc. 9-22 April 1975..................... 131 

II. The Fall of Saigon, 25-29 April 1975..... ....... ........... 134 

ix 

THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

CHAPTER I 

Introduction 

When the RepubJic of Vietnam collapsed on 30 April 1975 

and ceased [0 exist as a nation , the world at large-friend and 

foe alike-was taken aback. The rapidity and relative ease with 

which the Communists look o\'cr South Vietnam struck many 

people, the enemy included, as something unbelievable. How 

could it be possible? they asked. \Vhy did South Vietnam go 

uncler so readily? What happened to the Vietnamese armed 

forces and the same army that had withstood so ga ll anlly the 

two ferocious Communist onslaughts of 1968 and 1972? Why 

did such a powerful army crumble so easily in a maller of days? 

The questions are many, btll the answers are difficult to 

obtain. Indeed. to answer all those questions in depth and 

objectively is nOt an easy task. The violent emotions and traumatic experience of such a tragic loss may tend to blur or even 

distort the true racts. Then too, reelings or guill, or the instinct 

or selr-preservation or the principals involved, has made it hard 

10 sort out fact rrom fiction, truth rrom pretense. While the 

most immediate causes of the final coll apse can readily be 

identified in the events that buill toward it , there are several 

other causal factors-some deep-rooted and distant, others 

untold or merely implied in the various accounts. 

As a nation, Vietnam has a long and arduous record of 

survival. Aside rrom the succession of monarchical dynasties, 

its history is mostly an account of wars fought to resist invasion. For Vietnam, a small country at the southern periphery 

of the gigantic "Empire of the Middle," lived under constant 

threats of subjugation. A thousand years of Chinese annexation, nine hundred years of independence, nearly one hundred years of French domination, and thirty yea rs of inte rnecine fighting make up the Vietnamese historical experience. 

During the long Chinese domination, three significant insurrections in A.D. 39, 248, and 542 by local leader·s-thc Trung 

sisters, Trieu Au, and Ly Bon, respectively-failed to regain 

national independence. But the Vietnamese tenaciously resisted complete assimilation even though the Chinese imposed 
4 nn: FINAL COLu\PSE 

their own political system, their customs, and their education 

and language. h is no small wonder thai Vietnam finally 

emerged from this as a free and independent nation with a 

culture slilllargcly intact. 

Independence began with the Ngo dynasty in 939. This was 

a prosperous and glorious period of Vietnamese history. 

During the first six centuries, our forefathers of the Le, Ly, 

and Tran dynasties successfully expanded the national territory 

southward to Champa, a belligerent and piratical kingdom. 

which was annexed in 1471. Under the outstanding leadership 

of Tran Hung Dao, our gallant troops and militia drove back 

massive Mongol invasions from the nOrLh in 1257, 1284, and 

1287. It was a feat unparalleled in history. for the Mongols had 

annexed China and were even on their way to conquer Europe, 

yet the Vietnamese managed to keep them at bay. Unfortunately, our nation was divided three times. The first secession 

happened in 1527 when Mac Dang Dung uied to usurp power 

from the Le, but it did not last long. The second division of 

1620 lasted through nearly two hundred years of intermittent 

wars between the Trinh who occupied the north and the 

Nguyen the south. Unity was restored only in 1802 when 

Nguyen Anh finally installed himself as emperor (Cia Long) 

with the help of the French. 

Il was this foreign help that brought about the subsequent 

domination by the French. During the eighty-odd years of 

French rule, there were also many insurrections, first by monarchists like Phan Dinh Phung and Phan Boi Chau who made 

the restoration of the old monarchy their cause, then by the 

Nationalists of the Vietnam Kuomintang Party whose leader, 

Nguyen Thai Hoc, and thirteen of his comrades paid for their 

patriotism on a French guillotine in 1930. At the end of 

World War II, a number of Chinese-backed Nationalist Party 

leaders returned from exile and tried to regain independence 

from the French. Loosely organized and plagued by divisiveness, they were beaten to the mark by the more determined 

and beuer-organized Communists, then calling themselves the 

Viet Minh, who almost effortlessly took control of the country 

in August 1945 and declared Vietnam an independent nation 

on 2 September 1945. By this time the French. with the support of the British, had come back to South Vietnam and 

worked their way through negotiation and intimidation to the 

north with the intention of restoring the old colonial regime. 

Negotiations between France and the Viet Minh failed: ten-
INTRODUCTION 5 

sions mounted and finall y developed into a full-scale war of 

resistance on 19 December 1946. 

The war raged for lhe next eight years. During its course, 

the Viet Minh gradually became more openly Communist and 

pressed the people on the "road to socialism." T heir actions 

brought about a pola ri za tion of political inclination, and by the 

time the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, after the French 

defeat at Dien Bien Phu, most non-Communist nationalists had 

made their choice. It was then that South Vi etnam came into 

being as a separate nation, determined to take its destiny into 

its own hands. T he whole country was now independent, divided between a Communist Slate in the nonh, supported militarily and economically by Russia and Communist China, and a 

nationalist state in the south, sponsored and backed by the 

United Slales and Olher non-Communist powers. Economic 

and military aid dispensed by the United States as an instrument of its poli cy of containment made South Vietnam an 

independent, anti-Communist state in Southeast Asia, and, 

when wa r resumed in the 1960s, the area became a testing 

ground for modem weapons, tactics, and ideologies of both 

worlds. 

Over the yea rs, it is true, U.S. military aid and, for some 

time, the assistance of U.S combat forces helped the Republic 

of Vi etnam build a viable force for self-defense. From an army 

of 170,000 equipped with obsolete weapons, lhe Republic of 

Vietnam armed forces finall y eme rged as a strong. modernly 

equipped force with over one million men under arms, second 

to none among non-Communist Asian countries. Its air force 

was ranked sixth in the world, and its best combat divisions 

rated as equal to their American counterparts. It is equally 

true, unfortunately, that in the process this impressive force 

had become overly dependent on U.S. money and equipment 

for its own sustenance and on U.S. air power for moral support as well as a shield and deterrent against outright invasion 

from the North. T here is no doubt that the South Vietnamese 

soldier could fight, and he did fi ght we ll! But for years he had 

leamed to do things the easy way. taking it for granted the 

needed supplies would never cease to flow and thal if he were 

in any kind of trouble "Big Bro ther" would always be there to 

"bail him out." Such was the psychological conditioning that 

helped the armed forces of South Vi etnam maintain morale 

and confidence and comforted the popul ation. 
6 TilE FINAL CO LLAPSE 

So, when the United States shifted its policy to negotiation 

and began withdrawing its forces from Vietnam under lhe 

expedient program of "Viemamization," the Republic of Vietnam armed forces we re not entirely prepared to take over, 

psychologically o r physically. How could they-without a substantial increase in the number of major combat units-effectively replace seven divisions, four brigades, and innumerable 

support units of the U.S. forces committed in Vietnam in 

addition to other non-Communist forces? No amount of training, equipment, or political exhortation could effectively fill 

the physical void or ease lhe feeling of insecurity that set in. 

OUf forces began to stretch and soon suffered the conse· 

quence. 

The enemy's offensive of 1972 dramatically brought to the 

surface the basic weakness of the Vietnamization process. 

Without U.S. support in air power and mobility, the Republic 

of Vietnam armed forces could hardly have held An Lac, de· 

fended Kontum. or reoccupied Quang Tri. Most lost areas 

remained lost, for it was now beyond our capabilities to take 

them back. But still, as long as U.s. air power was available, 

the overall balance of forces could be maintained, and the 

Republic of Vietnam stood a good chance of pulling through. 

TIlen came the turning point that changed it all. The Paris 

Agreement was served on South Vie tnam like a death warrant. 

TIle downhill course was set. Small wo nder the enemy claimed 

it was his victory; he had indeed won the first round. With U.S. 

forces comple tely gone, the enemy set about making prepara· 

tions for the final push. His hands were now completely free: 

no more U.S. air strikes, not even the remote chance of token 

retaliation. The balance of forces, which had been precariously 

maintained with U.S. air power, had tilted heavil y in his favor. 

The question of U.S. intervention was the foremost subject 

of concern for the Republic of Vietnam when it finall y became 

resigned to accepting the Paris Agreement. It was no ploy of 

playing " hard·to-get" when President Nguyen Van Thieu insisted on a guarantee of U.S. intervention as a condition for 

his endorsement. It was a matter of grave consequence that 

could spell the difference between life and death for the 

nalion. For probably, more than anyone e lse. he had come to 

realize that without sllch a shield, the Republic of Vietnam 

could hardly defend itself against the onslaught of the beLLer· 

equipped and beucr·supported regular divisions of lhe North 

Vietnamese Anny (NVA). Not only was intervention indispens. 
INTRODUCTION 7 

able militarily, but its guarantee could also bolster the morale 

of our amled forces. It was unthinkable to attempt to "hack it" 

alone without Big Brother's protection. Confidence returned 

when President Richard M. Nixon finally and solemnly promised to react vigorously in case of a serious violation of the 

Paris Agreemenl. The Republic of Vietnam lOok it as a national commitment on the part of the United States, far from 

suspecting that there would be such a thing as Watergate and 

that an angry Congress could so effectively prevent any U.S. 

president from honoring a commitment, albeit one given by a 

predecessor. In early 1975, the enemy apparently gambled thal 

he could overrun Phuoc Long without provoking any U.S. 

response. He won and became completely certain that the 

United States had now chosen to Slay away from the conflict 

for good. The road was thus clear for him to take the next big 

step toward final victory. 

If the 1973 Paris Agreement was the starting point for the 

demise of South Vietnam, and the absence of U.S. intervention 

was an encouraging sign to the enemy to proceed with his 

ultimate plan, it was the cutback in U.S. military aid that 

accelerated the whole process and made defeat inevitable. 

Conditioned as they were to fight a war at a certain level of 

supply, lhe Republic of Vietnam armed forces suddenly found 

it difficult to carry on at the greatly reduced level of U.S. 

appropriations for fiscal year 1975. For the first time in the 

war, whose intensity increased with every enemy escalation, 

our armed forces were in the decided position of underdog. 

Gone were their superior firepower and mobility, Ihe very 

things that helped maintain tactical balance aga inst an enemy 

who held lhe initiative. It now became clear that lhe most the 

anned forces could hope to achieve was a delaying action 

pending restoration of U.S. military aid to its former level. The 

irony of this uphill struggle was that the U.S. president was 

compelled to beg the Congress for something that it had 

willingly appropriated for the previous fiscal year. It failed (0 

come through perhaps because lhe aid was termed supplemental 

or additional instead of integral, which it really was. 

The big slash in appropriated funds made its tragic impact 

felt nOl only on the battlefield but also in the minds of South 

Vietnamese strategists as well. The ability to hold Icrritory. 

they felt, was a direct function of aid level. With the reduction 

now in force, perhaps it was no longer possible to maintain 

"territorial integrity." Il might be best, they reasoned, to tailor 
8 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

our defense effort (0 the aid appropriated. Simplistic as it 

might sound, the idea renected the realities of the silUation. 

Whatever the motives behind it. President 'TIlieu's decision 

early in 1975 to redeploy forces was certainly not taken lightly 

or without firm grounds. But it was also this fatcful decision 

that sel in motion a series of setbacks whose cumulative effect 

led to the final collapse. 

What really hastened South Vietnam's demise was the hasty 

and neglectful manner in which the redeployment was executed. Even if cautiously and correcdy carried out, a withdrawal of 

this magnitude would only stand a fair chance of success, given 

enemy strength and capabilities of pursuit. Military history 

abounds in examples of roulS; it is the reason why thealer 

commanders are extremely chary of tak.ing such a dangerous 

step. 

In the context of the Vietnam War whose political and 

military aspects were intimately entwined, such a retreat was 

predisposed to doom if no consideration were given to the 

Vietnamese civilians who depended on the troops for protec· 

lion and for whom the war was being fought. Our armed 

forces were not operating on foreign soil; their role and mis· 

sion differed from those of an expeditionary force. Removing 

them from an area without taking steps to evacuate the popula. 

tion amounted to sheer dereliction. The redeployment fiasco 

in Military Regions (MRs) II and I demonstrated the tragic fact 

that the population could not be separated from the troops 

and Ihat troop movements could be halted by a rushing mass 

of refugees. These are the faclS of the case. They explain the 

rapid moral and physical disintegration of an army that had 

fought well until undercut by events beyond its control. 
CHAPTER 2 

The Situation Before the Paris 

Agreement 

After the Communist offensive of 1972, the Republic of 

Vietnam armed forces were given the task of reoccupying all 

lost territory (Map 1). In (MR-I), Operation LAM SON 72 was 

launched with the participation of the 1st Infantry Division, the 

Airborne Division, the Marine Division, and otlter supporting 

units. 1 By 15 September 1972, Ihe city and greater part of the 

province of Quang Tri had been retaken. A new line of dc~ 

fense was established along Lhe Thach Han River, extending 

eastward toward the sea. The enemy's reaction in Quang Tri 

was violcm; at the same time he also lau nched several unsuccessful attacks aga inst the sOUllte rn pan of MR-1. 

In MR-II, operations were conducted La relieve enemy 

pressure around Kontum and Pleiku, to reoccupy the An Lao 

Valley in Binh Dinh Province, and to clear all main roads 

including National Route 14 between Kontum and Pleiku and 

National Routes 19 and 21. For this effort, II Corps was rein· 

forced with two Ranger groups (the equivalent of regiments) 

which had been reorganized and redeployed from IV Corps, 

(Corps areas and military regions were identical; that is, I 

Corps was responsible for MR-I, II Corps for MR- IJ, etc.) 

In MR-III, reinforced friendly forces successfully relieved 

enemy pressure around the city of An Lac. However, National 

Route 13 linking An Loc with Lai Khe remained closed, 

In MR-rV, the situation was one of firm friendly control. 

All skirmishes with the enemy were taking place on Cambodian 

territory. although a numbe r of small haml ets in Chuong 

Thien Province were still under enemy control. 

Generally speaking, the military situation during the second 

half of 1972 reflected a rough balance of forces confronting 

each other on the battlefield while the withdrawal of U,S, 

'The commiunenl of tht AirbOnL(' and thl' Marin(' Oivi$ions in MR-I had lefl Ih(' 

Joim General SlafT (JGS) .... ithom any gem'ral r('s('rv(' ror the first lime in the w;.r, 
SOUTH VIETNAM 

,on o A ..... , .. , .......... 01' . ....... 

• • • _ ..... I , ., , , , , 

, • _ 0., ... ", .. 

MAPI 
TilE SITUATION BEFORE TilE PARIS AGREEMENT II 

forces from Vietnam was in full progress. By 1973, however, 

the loss of U,S, tactical air support (including naval air) was to 

tip the balance in favor of the Communists, 

To cope politically with the emergency situation during 

1972, the central government of the Republic of Vietnam lOok 

several forceful actions, A Slale of manial law was proclaimed 

countrywide. deferments of draftees were drastically limited, 

and a ban was put on overseas travel for male citizens from 

seventeen to fortY+lhree years of age. The president was delegated full legislative powers by the National Assembly for a 

period of six months, from July to December 1972, in matters 

of defense and national economy. A more severe law governing the press was promulgated. and scheduled local elections 

of village and hamlet authorities were canceled. Instead, province chiefs received instructions to reorganize local administrations and to complete the appointment of village and hamlet 

chiefs within two months, 

Earlier Peace Proposals 

In military temlS, the 1968 Tet offensive had been a resounding defeat for the Communists but. politically and insofar as mass psychology was concerned, had given them a tremendous advantage. By and large. the American public 

became disenchanted with the war. General William C. Westmoreland's request for approximately two hundred thousand 

additional American troops had tended to reinforce the views 

of some that the Vietnam problem was hardly soluble militarily, On 3 1 March 1968 President Lyndon B, Johnson advanced 

a peace proposal ~md temporarily stopped the bombing of 

North Viel11am north of the 20th Parallel. He also declared his 

noncandidacy in the coming presidential cieClion, A month 

later North Vietnam agreed to the proposed talks. the fil'st 

session of which was held in Paris on 10 May 1968 between W. 

Averell Harriman and Xuan Thuy. Liule was accomplished. In 

a second effort. on 3 1 October 1968. President Johnson announced a cessation of bombing against all of Nonh Vielnalll. 

More talks were held. Nevenheless, no concrete result was 

reached after a long year of negotiating. 

As part of the peace-seeking process, on 7 April 1969, the 

government of the Republic of Vietnam proposed a six-point 

program: 

1. Withdrawal of enemy forces from South Vietnam. 
12 T H f: FINAl. COLLAPSE 

2. Cessation of enemy use of bases in Laos and Cambodia. 

3. National reconciliation. 

4. Peaceful unifica tion of North and South Vietnam. 

5. International controls and guarantees to prevent future 

attacks by Communist forces. 

6. Amnesty for Communist prisoners in the South if Lhey 

would renounce violence and abide by the laws. 

The National Liberation Front responded a month later by 

counterproposing, on 8 ay 1969, a ten-point peace plan to 

end the wa r: 

I. Respect the fundamental national rights o f lhe Vietnamese people as affirmed by the Geneva Accords. 

2. Unconditional withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops and 

remova l of their materiel and weapons. 

3. The problem of other armed forces in South ViclIlam 

to be solved by the Vietnamese among themselves. 

4. Organization of free and democratic elections to elect a 

constitutional national assembly and a coalitio n government. 

5. In thc interim period prior to elections, neither side to 

attempt to impose its political regime on thc population. 

6. South Vietnam to follow a peaceful and neutral foreign 

policy. 

7. The reunification of Vietnam to be implemented step 

by step through peaceful means without foreign interference. 

8. Both sides to avoid becoming party to any military 

alliance with foreign countries while waiting for reunification. 

9. The problem of release of prisoners of war to be discussed between the two sides. 

)0. U.S. and allied forces to be withdrawn under international control. 

T here were wide discrepancies be tween the two proposals. 

The main points of disagreemem were (I) South Vietnam 

emphasized the withdrawal of Communist forces, whereas the 

Communists emphasized unconditional withdrawal of American and allied troops; (2) South Vietnam proposed na tional 

reconciliation, but the Communists specifically asked for a new 

constitution and a coalition government (to which our side was 

most averse); (3) both sides spoke about intcOlational control, 
TilE SITUATION BEFORE TilE PARIS ACREEMENT 13 

but South Vietnam wanled it as a safeguard against future 

Communist attacks, while the Communists wanted it to super· 

vise the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops. The deadlock in 

negotialions caused by these irreconcilable differences lasted 

into the first months of 1970. In an apparent effort to show 

goodwill on its side, the United Stales had announced the 

wilhdrawal of 25,000 troops to be completed by August 1970 

and the full implemenlalion of the new Vietnamization program. The Communists responded aggressively by announcing 

the formation of a Provisional RevolUlionary governmelll of 

South Vietnam as of 10June 1969. 

While negotiations dragged on inconclusively, students and 

others in lhe United States staged massive anliwar demonstrations in many places during the final months of 1969. In the 

face of the enemy's apparent escalalion of the war, a cross· 

border operation was conducted into Cambodian territory by 

our forces on 29 April 1970. Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, heretofore inviolable, were destroyed and a great quantity of weapons, ammunition, and war materiel was captured. 

In early 1971, on 8 February, the armed forces of South Viet· 

nam launched an operation into lower Laos to destroy the 

enemy's communication and supply lines and storage depolS 

scattered along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The flow of enemy 

lroops and weapons had continued unabated into South Vietnam in spite of the negotiations being conducled. This oper· 

ation was partially successful but was hampered by bad weather and insufficient air support including helicopters. The Communists in the meantime refused to make any concessions in 

the peace talks. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce. the U.S. negotiator, candidly admiued that for the past two years there had 

nOL been any serious talks at all and thaL the peace conference 

was simply being used by the Communists as a forum for their 

propaganda. Ambassador Pham Dang Lam of the Republic of 

Vietnam reported the same thing LO his government. 

Throughout 197. the redeployment of U.S. forces continued according to plan, hand in hand with the Vietnamization 

program. Coordination between the U.S. Military Assistance 

Command. Vietnam (USMACV), and the Joint General Staff 

tiGS) was excellent and effectively met political needs. During 

the same year, the CornmunislS continued their rocket attacks 

on our major cities and even tried to breach the Demilitarized 

Zone (DMZ). Their flagrant actions led to the resumption of 

limited U.S. bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. 
14 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

The bombing campaign, however, failed to produce progress 

in the peace talks. Nor did it prevent the general offensive that 

the Communists eventually launched on 30 March 1972. The 

Paris peace talks were indefinitely suspended a month later. 

Such were the results of the "open" peace lalks in Paris. 

The situation we faced was similar to that in Korea some 

twenty years earlier. The same "talk and fight" tactic was used 

by the Communists in both instances with the same results. It 

was Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. presidential assistant for national 

security affairs, who brought about some measure of breakthrough b y dealing in secret with the other side. The war had 

been going on too long. he apparentl y reasoned, for the two 

sides to reconcile their differences, bury their hatchets, and 

trust each other. Each was suspicious that the other might have 

a trump card up his sleeve and was prepared to lise it to cheat 

his opponenl. Kissinger was convinced that the only way to 

foster mutual understanding and trust was through private 

contacts. More than anyone else, he recognized and came to 

va lue the role of the mediator. Not a Southeast Asia expert 

himself at the time, he had once been authorized by fonner 

Presidelll Johnson to get in touch with Mai Van Bo, the North 

Vietnamese represelllalive in Paris, through two mutual 

friends, both Frenchmen. 

When Nixon became president, he was persuaded by . Kissinger, now his national security adviser, to pursue pnvate 

contacts. As a result, Kissinger, with Nixon's permission, met 

with Xuan Thuy. the North Vietnamese negotiator, at the residence of Mr. Sainteny in Paris in August 1969. This was the 

start of private talks which were conducted in secrecy four 

times between February and April 1970 between Kissinger and 

Le Due '110, apparently without significant result.2. In September 1970, Kissinger and Le Due nl0 met again. This time the 

United States withdrew an earlier "mutual disengagement" 

proposal and suggested instead a "standstill cease-fire." The 

Communists demanded that the United States withdraw its 

support of the South Vietnamese govcrnmelll and replace it 

with a coalition government. The United States was thus asked 

to guarantee the political success of the Communists in South 

Vietnam as a precondition to the honorable exit of U.S. 

"Most mformalioll conc(,"lning the "C'Cret talb Ix:t .. "a:n Ilenry A. Kissinger and I.e 

Dllc T ho was obt:ilincd from at·rnard Kalb and Marvin Kalb. rnc~ (Roston and 

T oronto; Little. Bro wn and Co .. 197 .. ). 
THE SITUATION BEFORE TilE PARIS AGREEMENT 15 

troops. Some concessions were made on the U.S. side. but in 

the face of the extravagant Communist demands lhe secrel 

talks became deadlocked. 

Following the Cambodian cross-border operation and the 

Laos incursion, the United Slates made two major concessions: 

that U.S. forces would withdraw within six months afler an 

agreement was reached and that President Thieu would slep 

down one mOnlh before general elections lOok place. These 

proposals were turned down in a session held on 3 May 1971. 

In June, July, and August, Kissinger and Tho met five times. 

During these sessions. all proposals advanced by the United 

Slates were rejected by the Communists no matter how they 

were modified. Only during the laSl session. in September 

197 1, did the United States come to realize fully that Lhe 

Communists really wanted South Vietnam to be turned over to 

their control before the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The United 

States became aware of the Communists' true design only after 

three long years of secret talks! And it was also during the 

same session that the North Vietnamese realized that the 

Uniled Stales was definitely seeking an arrangement to end the 

war and not a cover for tOlal surrender! ' 

On 20 March 1972 the United Slates proposed the resumption of talks. North Vielnam at first agreed but later requested 

a postponement until 15 April. The United States then proposed 24 April but received no answer until 3 1 March. By this 

lime. however, the Communist general offensive of 1972 had 

been launched (on 30 t\·larch). In my opinion, by their cunning 

maneuvers and concealment. the North Viet namese had kept 

the United Slates in the dark as to the date of their offensive 

even though planning for this major invasion had started right 

after the failure of the last session of secret talks in September 

1971. 

The military situation in the South during April 1972 was 

such thaI the United Stales fea red a total collapse of lhe 

Republic of Vietnam. Again, Kissinger met with Tho on 2 May 

1972 and. faced with a deteriorating SilU3lion. proposed that if 

North Vietnam agreed to a cease-fire and release of U.S. prisoners of war-only thai and nothing else-all U.S. forces 

would be withdrawn within four months. However. the proposal mel with instant rejection, and Le Duc Tho was adamant in 

demanding the removal of the Republic of Vietnam govcm-

" Ibld .. lIP. 183-84 . 
16 THE fiNAL COLlJ\PSE 

menl and the installation of a coalition. To the United Slates 

this demand was equally unpalatable. The United States 

stepped up considerably the bombing of North Vietnamese 

military targets and proceeded to mine Haiphong Harbor and 

other waterways. Only after intercessions by Russia and Com· 

munist China were secret talks resumed between Kissinger and 

Le Due Tho in August, on the 1st, 14th, and 19th. During 

those sessions. although they still persisted in demanding 

President Thieu's resignation before a cease-fire, the Communists softened their position and recognized the existence of 

two govenments, two armies, and a third political component 

as an entity in itself. The Provisional Revolutionary government, of the Communists in the south, was ostensibly regarded 

by North Vietnam as a coequal of the Republic of Vietnam 

government. 

Arra1lging the Cease-Fire 

On 16 August 1972. Dr. Kissinger arrived in Saigon. I-Ie 

met with President Thieu and explained the political pressures 

in the United States and the influence these pressures might 

have on the approaching presidential election. He also affirmed President Nixon's determination to seek a solution for 

the Vietnam War. Then on 11 September 1972. Kissinger and 

Le Duc Tho met again in Paris. This time all clauses to which 

both sides had agreed during the talks in July and August were 

put on paper. In general ternlS. the agreements were as follows: Due to the existence of two governments. two armies. 

and other political forces in South Vietnam, national reconciliation, if it is to become a reality, should be achieved through 

mutual respect, and both sides should stop seeking to eliminate each other. South Vietnam should not be forced to accept 

either a Communist regime or any pro-American regime. 

TItUS, for the first time, the Communists refrained from demanding removal of lhe Republi c of Vietnam government. 

In the next session on 26 September 1972, North Vietnam 

added to the agreements the formation of a National Council 

of Reconciliation and Concord. The prospects were good, and 

hopes were high thal peace would soon come. On 8 October 

1972. Kissinger crossed the Atlantic for lhe nineteenth lime 

and again met with Le Due Tho. For the first time. the Communists agreed to treat politics and the fighting separately. 

North Vietnam and the United States would end the fighting 
TilE SITUATION BEFORE Tilt: PARIS AGREEMENT 17 

by agreeing to a standstill cease-fire. and a polilical solution 

for South Vietnam would be subject to discussions between the 

two parties concerned. The proposal was prepared by Le Duc 

Tho as a draft agreement in English. Thus ended a conversation between 1~0 deaf men that had lasted too many years. 4 

North Vietnam no longer demanded the removal of the Republic of Vietnam government and its replacement by a coalition. The draft agreement. however, still left many minor discrepanci es to be worked out. As it had been prepared and 

agreed to by Kissinger and Tho. the draft agreement covered 

nme Issues: 

I. The United States respects the independence. sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam. 

2. The cease-fire was to be effective twenty-four hours 

after the agreement was signed. All U.S. troops were (0 

be withdrawn from South Vietnam within sixty days. 

3. All prisoners of war were to be released within sixty 

days. 

4. An administrative structure called the National Council 

of Reconciliation and Concord was to be composed of 

three equal elements to be created to organize general 

elections. 

5. Reunification of Vietnam was to be implemented 

gradually through peaceful means. 

6. An International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICeS) was to be established. 

7. An international conference to guarantee peace was to 

be convened within thirty days. 

8. All parties were 10 pledge to respect the independence. 

sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia. 

9. The United States was to participate in the postwar 

reconstruction of North Vietnam and Indochina. 

Wilh President Nixon's blessing. Dr. Kissinger mel with Le 

Duc 1110 sixteen hours a day on 9 and 10 October. Discrepancies were reduced, and the two negotiators now agreed to the 

following timetable: 18 October-cessa tion of U.S. bombings 

and minings in North Vietnam; 19 October-Kissinger and 

Tho to initial the draft in Hanoi after President Thieu indicated his concurrence. 

'Ibid" p. 35'1. 
18 THE fiNAL CO LLAPSE 

The final agrecmclll was to be signed in Paris by the four 

" parties" involved (that is, the United SlaLes, North Vieloam, 

South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary government) o n 26 October, and the cease-fire was [0 be effeCli\'c 27 

October 1972. 

The prospects looked good. Both sides definitely wanted a 

cease-fire ( 0 take place before the U.S. presidential election; 

the North Vietnamese especiall y. for they were convinced 

President Nixon would be less ncxible after he was reelected. 

Info rmation about the agreement was duly lransmilled in general terms [ 0 the representative of the Republic of Vie tnam in 

Paris, but nothing was said about the agreement (eXL exchanged with North Vietnam or the limetable for its accep· 

lance. Dr. Kissinger was confident he could persuade our gOY. 

ernmen! to accept it. An unexpected development, however, 

brought a delay to the timetabl e. On II October the French 

Embassy in Hanoi was damaged by U.S. bombs, and Frendl 

Ambassador Pie rre Susini was criti ca lly injured. By the time Le 

Duc Tho was able LO complain in priva te to Kissinger, all 

bombing had been slopped.5 Talks continued, and a second 

timetable was worked out: 21 October-cessation of U.S. 

bombings; 22 October-agreement leXI initialed in Hanoi; 30 

October-official signing of the agreement in Paris. 

On 16 OClO ber. Dr. Kissinger re turned to Paris and the 

next day confe lTed with Xuan Thuy. Le Due 1110 had left 

earlier for Hanoi. This time Dr. Kissinger brought along two 

new faces to the meeting: Willi am Sullivan and George AI· 

drich. Together with the No nh Vietnamese, they wellt over the 

tex t of the agreement sentence by sente nce, clause by clause, 

and word by word. One of the two issues that required lengthy 

and heated discussions was replaci ng weapons, a{IlInUnilio n. 

and materiel lost, damaged. or worn o ut. The Communists 

wa nted o nl y Loken control of replaceme nts, whereas the United 

States thought control sho uld be tight. The second issue dealt 

with the release of political prisoners. The Communists linked 

it with the release of U.S. prisoners of war. The demand could 

not be mel, and aga in the talks were deadlocked. However, 

wit h the timetable in mind. Dr. Kissinger len fo r Saigon .

s 

I recall clearly that he arrived in Saigon o n 18 October, 

planning to sta y IWO days. The next mo rning the U.S. del ega· 

' IbId .. pp. 3~9. 361. 

I lIlId .. p. 360 
THE SITUATION BEFORE T H E PARIS AGREEMENT 19 

tion with Dr. Kissinger. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Gener. 

al Creighton W. Abrams, and Mr. Sullivan met at the 

Independence Palace with President Thieu. On the Vie tnamese 

side there were Vice President Tran Van Huong. Prime Minis· 

ter Tran Thien Khiem, Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam. Mr. 

Nguyen Phu Due. Mr. Hoang Duc Nha. and I. 

Dr. Kissinger began the session by handing the text of the 

agreement. in English, to President T hieu. He then explained 

with emphasis the points he thought advantageous for South 

Vietnam. The United States, he stressed, pledged to maintain 

its air bases in Thailand and to keep the Seventh Fleet ofT 

Vietnam to deter any attack by the Communists. Economic and 

military aid would continue for South Vietnam while the 

United States believed that secret understandings with Russia 

and Communist China would drastically reduce'the ir supply of 

war materiel to North Vietnam and permit the United States to 

withdraw its troops and recover its prisoners with honor. Dr. 

Kissinger also added that this was a good time to arrive at an 

agreement with the Communists because, after all, South Viet· 

nam did have an army of over one million men and did control 

eighty. five percent of its nineteen million population. South 

Vietnam, he was confidenl, would develop and prosper in the 

postwar period. The agreement, Dr. Kissinger concluded, was 

good and acceptable. However, he did not go into lhe details 

of the things yet to be solved and above all did not inform the 

South Vietnamese of the timetable for signing the agreement. 

Presidelll T hieu responded by saying he would study the text 

of the agreement, which was then given to Hoang Duc Nha, 

the president's private secretary. 

An emergency session of our expanded National Security 

Council was immediately convened to study the text of the 

agreement. Mr. Nha was the reporter for the session. Militaril y, 

this was to be a standstill cease·fire. While all U.S. and allied 

forces were to be withdrawn and all U.S. bases in SOllth Vietnam were to be dismantled, there was no mention of North 

Vietnamese troops. (It was estima ted that North Vietnamese 

forces in the South numbered ten divisions. In addition. North 

Vietnamese t!'Oops made up sixty to e ighty percent of the 

strength of Communist local units.) 

As chainnan of JGS. I voiced my opinion during the first 

session of the council that control of the cease·fi re would be 

extremely difficult and that a standstill cease·fire in a " leopard 

skin" pattern carried with it many dangers. There were to be 
20 THE ."INAL COLLAPSE 

no areas of regrouping and no lines of demarcation, which 

meant thal the enemy forces wodd be allowed to sLay where 

they were. But there was no doubt that they would not slay in 

their current locations. Ou( of their inherently aggressive 

nature, the Communists would certainly try, as soon as the 

cease·fire was announced. La break down into small units and 

penetrate our villages and hamlets, LO make their appearance 

on our Jines of communications, and La mark their presence by 

displaying their flags. To the proposed Ices. this would be 

proof enough of Communist control. In an unconventional waT 

without dearly defined lines, comrol of both population and 

territory is difficult to achieve. II would become many times 

more difficult and more complex in the prospective circumstances. A Vietnamcse jokingly remarked: "Before, we went 

into the jungle to hunt down the wild beasts. Now we have to 

take them illlo our arms and sleep with (hcm." It was just a 

joke. but it clearly made the point about putting up with the 

Communists. 

There was virtual cenainty that the Communists were not 

going to abide by the standstill cease-fire. Their actions in 

1954 had given us a strong indication as to what they would 

do this time. Also, enemy documents captured on 10 October 

1972, in the underground shelter of a district commissar in 

Quang Tin Province, attested to the fact thaI Communist 

troops and cadres had been studying the main issues laid out 

in the draft text of the agreement and had already received 

instructions for an appropriate line of action. 7 The documellls 

were later personally handed to Dr. Kissinger by President 

Thieu. The point President Thieu wanted to make was that by 

the time South Vietnam was given the draft text of the agreement on 18 October, on the Communist side the text had 

already been disseminated to the lowest levels for study and 

action. About the same time, an intelligence source in Tay 

Ninh Province also confimlcd to South Vietnamese and U.S. 

military authorities that a special study of the agreement draft 

had been made at the Communist po litical headquarters for 

the South. 

'At 1700 on 17 October 1972. Presidem In;cu ordcred thc captured locumems 

brought immediately to Saigon. A relay or three airc ... rl had dcli"crcd the documents 

by midnight. and the next morning President '(nieu handed thcm to Ur. Kiningcr. 

They re"ealed Ihal Communist uniu ",ere prepared to launch the "Land and Popula. 

tion G,.~b" campaign on 22 OCtober (972. 
TilE SITUATION BEFORE TilE PARIS ACREEMENT 21 

By far the most imponant military issue was the presence of 

the North Vietnamese Army. The situation in September 1972 

renected a rough balance of forces on the battlefield. Now that 

all U.S. forces would be redeployed without a reciprocal withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces, that balance would undoubledly lean toward the enemy. 

Politically, the National Security Council was mostly COllcerned about the proposed National Council of Reconciliation 

and Concord. Many discussions were onented toward this 

"third" political factor, and questions were asked. If this council could organize general elections in the future, then what 

kind of structure was it? In the event this council was created, 

what would become of the present government and how was it 

going to operate? Those were the things that needed to be 

clarified and, above all, considered in the light of the Vietnamese text. During the following session between Dr. Kissinger 

and President Thieu, these questions were put forward. and 

Kissinger promised to make the Vietnamese text available 

within l\\'enty-four hours. which he did. 

When the text came under examination, members of the 

National Security Council immediately realized that it was the 

onginal drafted by the North Vietnamese and definitely not a 

translated version of the English text. The syntax and vocabulary were specifically and purely Communist. Nonh Vietnamese style. It contained some rare peculiarities and particularly 

important but controversial tenns. The U.S. forces, for example. were called laconically but contemptuously, Quan My, 

which prompted the Vietnamese to remind the U.S. delegation 

that it should ask for a change to the more decent tenn, Quan 

Do; Hue Ky. To all knowledgeable Vietnamese in the South, the 

tel·m, Quau My. was derogatory and insolent although it was 

literally quite correct. 

A more important semantical issue was the National Coun~ 

cil of Reconciliation and Concord, defined as an "administrative structure" and rendered in Vietnamese, undoubtedly with 

pernicious design. as co cau chirlh qll)'e'l, meaning "government 

structure." It was thus entirely dear that the North Vietnamese 

saw the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord as an 

agency with full governmental powers and, in view of its composition, nothing less than a coalition government. Was this 

the true intention of the agreement? The Vietnamese text also 

mentioned three Viecnamese nalions. North and South Vietnam were only two. What was that third nation? If South 
22 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

Vietnam were to be Iwo nations. then it meum (he suzeraint y 

of (he SOllih Vietnamese government would be shared with 

someone e1sc. These were the major issues. 

Aflcr careful and minute examination, our governmcm 

came up with twenty-six changes in the draft agreement. While 

the discussions with the Americans were proceeding, a report 

from the Republic of Vicl11am Embassy in Washington, D.C., 

informed the government Ihal during an interview with the 

foreign press Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam had declared that peace negotiations in Paris were producing good results and lhal there wo uld be a three-sided 

coalition govemment of transition. The repon reinforced suspicions of deception. Who was trying to fool whom, and who 

was being fooled? This was an additional reason for Presidelll 

Thieu to harden his opposition to the agreemelll during the 

two sessions that took place on 22 October. During that night, 

a leuer addressed to Presidelll Nixon was drafted and signed 

by President Thieu and handed over to Dr. Kissinger. The 

letter pointed out all the shortcomings of the agreement and 

slaled the reasons why it could not be accepted as it was. 

Dr. Kissinger's private scenario for the acceptance and signing of the agreement was clearly in jeopardy. He sent a cable 

to Le Duc Tho to the effect that although the United States 

was prepared to sign the agreement on 31 October, it was 

becoming extremely difficult to keep lip with the timetable. At 

the same time, North Vietnam was informed that all U.S. 

bombings above the 20th Parallel were LO cease as of 25 

October. 

For his part, President Thieu weill on radio and television 

to make his point that the government of South Vietnam could 

not accept a coalition. North Vietnam in the meantime did not 

stand still. In an outbreak of propagandistic bombast, North 

Vietnam made public the text of the agreement, revealed the 

timetable agreed upon on 8 October, denounced President 

'11ieu for having undermined peace, and demanded that the 

United States sign the agreement on 31 October 1972. In the 

fa ce of these new developmenLS, Dr. Kissinger called a press 

conference to explain the lexl of the agreement to the American public. tn his words, "peace is at hand" and all lhat was 

required to wrap up the agreement was one more session with 

the North Vietnamese representative. 

During November, a great deal of correspondence was exchanged between Saigon and Washington, but no major 
T HE SITUATI ON BEFORE TilE PARIS AG REEM ENT 23 

changes were made in the tex t of the agreement. Also during 

the same month, U.S. C-5 Ga laxy cargo planes and ca rgo ships 

brought to Saigon a n important amo unt or war materiel and 

equipment, including F-5 and A-37 fighters, C- 130A cargo 

planes, helicopters, M-48 tanks, and l75-mm. anillery pieces. 

American bases and equipment were a lso IransfelTed intaci to 

the South Vietnamese armed forces. With this equipment J GS 

activated additional heavy anill ery, armor, and antiaircraft artillery units. New C-1 30A and F-5A squadrons were also 

formed. Somc of the equipmcnt provided, howeve r, could not 

be used immediately. It had been delivered for later use as 

replacement equipme nt in accordance with the provisions of 

the cease-fire agreement. This crash supply program, called 

ENUANCE PLUS, was a imed at both military and political goa ls. 

While it improved the capabilities of our armed forces, the 

United Stales also wallled to demonstrate that it was a reliable 

all y and was hoping that our government would be more 

flexible regarding acceptance of the agreement. 

President Nixon had given serious considera tion to the discrepancies brought up by the South Vietnamese government, 

and credit ought to be paid him here for havi ng ordered the 

ee~a min ti on of these discrepancies. They fell into two categan es: 

Majol· issues: (a) The Demilitarized Zone should be recognized as the border sepa ,-ating North from South Vietnam as it 

was so determined by the Geneva Accords. (b) There should 

be a token withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces (possibly 

about 25,000 men) to be reciprocated by a similar reduction in 

strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces. (c) T he ceasefire should take place on the whole telTitory of Indochina. (d) 

Arrangements should be made for an international control 

force strong enough and ready to take up positions when the 

cease-fire went into effecL 

Minor issues: (a) The translation should be revised so as to 

make the English and the Vietnamese texts idelllical and 

ensure that no misinterpretation could happen within the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord. (b) Arrangements should be made for all four panies to sign the official 

text of the agreement. 

On 9 November, Kissinger'S deputy, General Alexander M. 

Haig, Jr., arrived in Saigon. He delivered a personal letter 

from President Nixon and stressed the significance of the ENHANCE PLUS program. Since our government was still adamant 

472-606 0 - 85 - 2 QL 3 
24 TIlE FINAl. COL ..... \PSE 

in its pOSItiOn, General Haig indicated that if South Vietnam 

kept refusing to sign, the United States might go ahead and 

sign separately with the North. A few days earlier, on 5 November, the U.S. State Department had announced that 

Canada. Hungary. Indonesia, and Poland had agreed in principle [0 participate in ICeS. 

Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho mel again in Paris on 20 

Novembe r. Le Duc T ho arrived first and declared to the press 

that North Vietnam was suspicious of U.S. sincerity. Although 

he did not expli cith say so in his sta temenl, it was understood 

he referred to the recent shipment of wcapons and other war 

materiel to Saigon and the fll(1 thai Ihe Unit ed States had 

failed to sign the agrecmclll as originaJl v planned on 3 1 October. During this session with Le Duc 1110. Dr. Kissinger laid 

Ollt the demands of lhe Republic of Vietnam and the United 

Slates. The first few days of the talks wenl well and the mood 

was receptive. However, on 23 November, 1110 suddenly 

became tough. He rejected all U.S. proposals and again demanded the removal of the South Vietnamese government. 

Apparently he was acting on new instructions from Hanoi. Dr. 

Kissinger was taken aback by this about-face. He asked for an 

explanation, but the answers Tho gave him were unsatisfactory. At Dr. Kissinger's remark that the cessation of bombing 

above the 20th Parallel had been a goodwill gesture by the 

United States to help bring progress to the talks, Tho countered that the United Slates had come up with new demands. 

Both sides tenninated the talks on 25 November but agreed to 

meet again in early December.' At this juncture, Nguyen Phu 

Due, a special envoy of the South Vietnamese government, was 

sent to Washington to deliver a letter from President Thieu to 

President Nixon and to clarify the position of our government. 

On 4 December, Dr. Kissinger mel with Le Due Tho again 

in Paris and found him as intransigent as he had been in their 

last meeting. During the sessions that followed , the atmosphere became more relaxed, but no progress was made. Many 

issues were brought up again that were thought to have been 

solved. Dr. Kissinger left Paris on 13 December, but his assistants and experts remained to work out differences with their 

North Vietnamese counterparts. The deadlock this time, however, was real and ominous. 9 

'Kalb and Kalb. KisJl"'~. pp. '9'. 400. 'Ibid .. pp. 410-11. 
T H E SITUATION BEFORE T HE PARIS AGREEMENT 25 

After meeting with Kissinger and going over the situation 

In detail with him, President Nixon sent a cable to Hanoi, 

warning thal unless serious talks were renewed within sevent yeight hours. the Un ited States would resume bombing. In the 

absence of _ a favorable response, the United States began an 

intensified bombing campaign above the 20th Para llel, where 

bombing had been haILed since late October. The devastating 

power of 6-525 proved toO much for Nonh Vietnam and 

att ested to the ,·esoluteness of the U.S. position. In my opinion, North Vietnam was forced to return to the negotiating 

table. As a result, the most intensive of all U.S. bombing 

campaigns aga inst North Vie tnam was halted on 30 December. 

Eight days later, on 8 J anuary 1973, Dr. Kissinger mel with 

Le Duc Tho. Things went better this time. Both sides ca refully 

wenl over every clause, every section, eve ry sentence, and 

practica ll y every word of the tex t. On 14 J anuary, Dr. Kissinger 

reponed to President Nixon on progress. T he next day orders 

were issued for U.S. forces to halt all military activities against 

North Vietnam. 10 

On 16 January, General Haig arrived in Saigon. The government of South Vietnam still took exception to a few issues 

ra ised by lhe protocols. However, on 19 J anuary our government was informed that no more changes would be made and 

the agreeme nt was going to be initialed o n 23 J an uary and 

officially signed on 27 J anuary in Paris by the four parties 

involved. The cease-fire would go into effect at 8:00 A.M., 

Saigon time. on 28 January 1973. In addition, President Nixon 

wrote personally to President T hi eu on 2 1 J anuary. If South 

Vietnam rejected the agreement, Nixon warned, the United 

States would sign separately with North Vietnam and as a 

consequence all aid to South Vietnam would be cut off. But if 

South Vie tnam signed lhe agreement (I) the president of the 

United States would inte rcede more vigorously with the U.S. 

Congress for continuing aid to South Vietnam, and (2) the 

U.S. government pledged to "react vigorously" (0 any serious 

violation of the cease~ fire by the North. After many sessions 

with the National Security Council and after consulting val'ious 

personalities of the government and National Assembly, Pres ~ 

de nt Thieu wrote a letter of acceptance to President Nixon in 

which he also recommended a summit meeting right after the 

agreement had been signed. 

10 Ibid .• p. ~Hl. 
26 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

As in the Panmunjom talks in Korea tWO decades earlier. 

the negotiating table was used by the Communists as a forum 

for propaganda while their war aClions cominucd. "Talk and 

fight" has always been a basic Communist tactic. In dealing 

with the Communists. perseverance is the rule. and maximum 

demands must be made. Military pressure must be exerted as a 

means of obtaining political concessions. Objectively speaking, 

the Paris Agreement was not perrec!. The United States obtained a disengagement and recovered its prisoners of war. 

The Communists were allowed to maintain North Vietnamese 

forces in South Vietnam, but South Vietnam still funClioned as 

a nation with a government of its own. 

South Vietnamese Reactions 

In the fa ce of an imperfect agreement-there can never be 

a perfect agreement unless one side prevails and forces the 

other to surrender unconditionally-what could South Vietnam 

do to assure its survival? What militar), and political measures 

could be taken to mee t the new situation? In the light of the 

enemy's design as made known to us in captured documents 

and especially from lessons learned from the failure of the 

1954 Geneva Accords, JGS had worked out a contingency plan 

with the code name TRAN HUNC DAO II. This plan provided in 

considerable de tail all the measures 10 be take n in the face of 

any Illove by the enemy and was disseminated to sec tor echelon and to all combat battalions. It was because of this plan 

that South Vietnam was not caught by surprise and was able to 

anticipate and thwart every au empt by the e nemy to "grab the 

land and the population." 

On the political plane. a new five-year rural development 

program was initialed. and a political part)'. the Dan Chu 

[Democratic] Part), was formed in anticipation of the coming 

political struggle with the Communists. Leaders of the Dan 

Chu Party were mostly high officials of the South Vietnamese 

administra tion. By mid-1973. the government had been partialI)' reorganized. Finally. to improve efficiency and fosler a 

better understanding of national policies, (he government embarked on a Countll'wide training program ambitiously called 

an administrative revolution. Fifteen thousand South Vietnamese civil servants, representing all echelons, had completed this 

training by mid-1973. 
CHAPTER 3 

The Military Situation After the 

Cease-Fire, 1973-74 

In theory, the Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 termi. 

nated the war in Vietnam. However, while true peace preva iled 

in the Nonh, military connic! continued in the South. No 

clause in the Paris Agreement call ed for the withdrawal o f 

Communist forces, nor was there a ny understanding abollt 

keeping them at bay. Nonh Vielllam maintained its large 

forces in the South LO back an eventual political settlement to 

its advantage while standing ready to cope with all eventualities. Without effective international control machinery lO enforce the cease-fi re. enemy violations of the Paris Agreement 

were commillcd openly and deliberately. 

Role of ICCS 

Established by a protocol to the Paris Agreement, ICCS was 

the international body in charge of comrolling and supervising 

implememation of the agreement. The origina l members of 

ICCS were Canada, lndonesia. Hungary, and Poland, However, 

Canada soon became disenchanted and withdrew and was replaced by Iran, The responsibilities of ICCS were: (I) to follow 

the implementation of the provisions of the agreement through 

communication with the parties and on-the-spol observation 

where required; (2) to investigate violations on the request of a 

Four-Party or TWO-Parry Joint Military Commission (provided 

for in the agreement) or of any party, or in any case where the 

International Commission had adequate grounds for considering that there had been a violation; (3) when necessary, to 

cooperate with the FOUl'.Party or Two-Party Joint Military 

Commission in deterring and detecting violations, 

ICCS adopted for its operations the principles of consullalion and unanimity. In practice, this meant tha t when the 

commission could find no appropria te way to deal with a se rio 

ous violation, it wo uld report this to the parries to the agreemem and that the commission's reports had to be made with 
28 TIlE FINAL COL.LAPSE 

the unanimous agreement of all four members. In case unanimity could not be reached. the different views of members 

would be for'warded to the four parties or to the two South 

Vietnamese parties in lieu of repofts. The chairmanship of the 

commission was held in monthly lurn by each of the four 

members. 

From the outset ICeS was crippled by its own operating 

principles. Consuhalions and unanimity simply did not work; 

they depended entirely upon the willingness and objectivity of 

the members. It was impossible for ICeS to reach unanimous 

agreemclll on any maller for the simple reason thaI Poland 

and Hungary always refused to cooperate if the investigation 

was likely to WOJ-k [0 the disadvantage of the Communist side. 

Communist·initiated violations thus escaped investigation, 

except for the unique case of Sa Huynh (see below) where the 

Polish representative was chastised for having rendered an 

objective opinion. 

As to the control of armaments, munitions, and war materi· 

al introduced into South Vietnam after the cease-fire as replacements authorized by Article 7 of the agreement, ICCS 

was unable to come up with enforcement procedures and to 

make them mandatory for the two South Vietnamese parties 

concerned. As a resull, we had to work out our own procedures to implement this provision and were prepared to justify 

them to ICCS when required. This was a measure of goodwill 

demonstrated by our side. But what about the Communist 

side? Nobody, including ICCS, knew how much they had intro· 

duced into South Vietnam by way of the official points of entry 

of their own choice since the commission failed to install permanent observation teams as required by the agreement. ICCS 

was, therefore, reduced to lOlal impotence. It was a matter of 

world knowledge that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong 

openly resumed war on a large scale in South Vietnam, yet 

ICCS would not raise a finger. When Communist tanks. artillery. and troops forced their way into Phuoc Long and Ban Me 

TImot (see Chapter 5), ICCS did not even attempt an investigation. 

ICCS was short of personnel. In addition, non-Communist 

ICCS representatives were hampered in the performance of 

their tasks by the Communist members and by NVA units. A 

case in point was the deliberate detention of three Canadian 

officers by Communist forces in 1973. It 'vas a ploy to create 

difficulties for the Canadian representatives who the Commu-
TilE MILITARY SITUATION At-rER TilE CEASE-FIRE. 1973-74 29 

nists knew usually carried out their responsibilities with devotion and objectivity. The Canadians had to be discouraged and 

made to lose face. For a long time. the three Canadian officers. 

who were on an investigation mission. were kept incommunicado and were not even allowed to contact their embassy. T he 

Canadians finally withdrew altogether from ICCS and were 

replaced by the Iranians. T he Hungarians and Poles showed 

partiality toward the Communists. There were also indications 

that lhey actively helped them by spying. taking photographs, 

and drawing maps of our outposts and bases. And at the 

beginning of the cease-fire the Communists intended to use 

ICCS in still another way. 

The Attempted Land and P()pllialiotl Grab 

The enemy-com rolled area encompassed the DMZ, a great 

part of the jungled and unpopulated mountainous regions of 

the country, and twenly-one base areas. The standstill ceasefire thus gave the Communists a chance to stay mixed with 

South Vietnamese positions in an intricate pattern which had 

always been the enemy scheme. On the eve of the signing of 

the peace agreement. the Communists were highly confident of 

their chances for success after the cease-fire. They aimed to 

exploit it by "Land Grabbing and Population Nibbling." Their 

plan set forth specific guidelines for the Communist Party. the 

armed forces. and the people during three phases. I 

Phase I was to be devotcd to sctting in motion the appropriate propaganda and military mechanisms. First. all cadres. 

especiall y political commissars. were required to study the 

clauses of the agreement and to learn them by rote and, more 

importantly. be able to interpret lhem to Communist advantage. They were to brief and explain all details to the people 

and be prepared for discussions with our government officials. 

Many small propaganda teams were organized. One of their 

missions was to collect or confiscate all available sewing machines and blue and red malerials to make as many National 

Liberation From (NLF) flags as possible. On the cease-fire day 

the teams would go about urging people to fly NLF flags at 

lheir homes, in every hamlet. along riversides. and on the LOpS 

of trees and hills. This move was imended lO presem "proor' 

' -nus informallon was o bl3mc."d by J- 2 of JGS from oIplurc."d documCIlU. priSOIU'r$ 

o f wa r. r.lllicn. and agcnu. 
30 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

of Communist sovereignty over an area. The Communist propaganda learns also would entice people [0 join a petilion 

campaign in which lhey would ask South Vietnamese authorities to abolish mania I law, the curfew, and the mobilization 

law. The people would also be urged LO demand more liberties 

such as liberty of movement, of meeting, of speech and writing. of worship, and the like. The demand for liberty of movement, of course, implied thaI some refugees who had been 

resellied in pacified hamlets would be returned La their old 

farms which were under Communist control. Large Communist 

units were to be broken down into platoons and companies to 

occupy hamlets and vill ages and La control main roads and to 

hold those places until the arrival of ICCS representatives. 

Phase II was the implementation phase. The cease-fire 

would be announced by Hanoi, NLF. and Saigon radio broadcasts. Then, all enemy military. political, and proselytizing activities would be closely coordinated to cause confusion among 

the people and entice them to rise up and disrupt our pacification program. The enemy would also attempt to deSlroy our 

bases and key positions and would demand the disbanding of 

the armed forces. 

Phase III was the consolidation phase. Actions during this 

phase would depend on the outcome of Phases J and II, but 

the basic concept was to endeavor to strengthen and develop 

whatever had been accomplished to that poim and to cominue 

to frustrate all counteractions. It is worth noting that Lhe Communists were fully aware of the proposed date for the ceasefire, which had been initially set for 27 October 1972. On to 

October, a captured documem revealed that orders had been 

given for a last and final ··preparation·' prior to the cease-fire. 

The document contained many small details and corroborated 

other information on enemy plans. Our government. however, 

was not notified until 18 or 19 October and had no choice but 

to decline to sign the Paris Agreement. Although the enemy 

scheme to violate the cease-fire was disclosed, the Communists 

did not change their planned course of action. As a result. on 

the first day of peace. more than 1.000 violations were recorded. 

Again. as in 1954. the Communists called upon our cadres 

to talk to them and tried to persuade them to join the othcr 

side because. thcy argued, peace had come, and they were 

peace-IO\·ing people. Villages and hamlets that did not cooperale were threatened with attacks and shellings. Throughout the 
TilE MII. ITARV SITUATION AI'TI:.R Tilt: CEASE-F IRE . 1973-74 3 1 

countryside more Ihan 4:00 ham leis were occupied by Communist troops. Propaganda meetings were held in Binh Dinh and 

Quang Ngai Provinces. Roadblocks were set up to stop Iraffic 

on our main roads. Where"er they went, the Communisls 

planted their nags and then asked Ices to note and record the 

extent of their COIllI"OI. All Ihese activities took place nationwide and with great intensity. 

During 1973 the monthly average of enemy activities 

reached an all-time high of 2.980 incidents as compared with 

2.072 in 1972, the year of the enemy's big offensive. But the 

enemy actions were met with forceful reactions by our armed 

forces. fo:very hamlet was reoccupied as soon as it was penetrated, and e"ery road was cleared of roadblocks when lhey were 

set up. This was in fact a kind of game in which the Communists tried to ga in yardage by planting nags, which in tum were 

pulled down and replaced wilh national nags by our side, and 

in which ICeS umpires were called upon to officiate. Both 

sides were eager LO demonstrate to a confused ICCS the extent 

of their control merely by displaying their colors. But it was 

the Communists who started it all by going on the offensive. 

Our armed forces were forced to react in legitimate self-defense to keep their territory illlac!. 

Gila r,el, Sa I hl)'lIh, Hong NglI, Tnmg Nghw, and Tong Le Chan 

During 1973, besides small·sca1e activities related to the 

"land and popUlation grab" campaign described above, the 

Communists launched four division-size attacks, the four most 

important viola lions of the cease· fire agreement. Three of 

these attacks were aimed at securing strategicall y advantageous 

positions that could eventually serve as points of entry for war 

supplies and equipment. 

On the eve of the cease-fire. our marines launched a pre· 

emptive attack against the Cua Viet Naval Base. '1'le purpose 

of this operation was to deny the cnemy the opportunity and 

inclination to attack friendly rorces along the northern frollt 

lines prior to the cease·fire and to secure a position from 

which our troops could observe enemy river tranic to the 

occupied city of Dong Ha and provide tiS a rivcr route to 

Quang T .. i City. Despite intense U.S. air and naval gunfire 

support, the marine advance along the coast met strong enemy 

resistance. However, the Cua Viet Naval Base was secured just 

a few hours before the cease·fire went into effect. When the 
32 THE FINAL COl.1.J\PSE 

cease-fire began at 0800 on 28 January 1973, the ICeS team 

was not in place. On 30January the NVA began {O concentrate 

large units. including tanks and artillery, with intent to isolate 

and destroy the marine force at eua Viet. Though the marines 

fought bravely, they were forced La give up their positions and 

fall back to friend ly lines. In (he balllc, the marines lost most 

of two riOe companies and an M-48 lank company btu inflicted 

approximately 1.000 casualties 0 11 the enemy. 

T he seaport of Sa Huyn h had once been an e nemy base, 

duri ng the first Indochina war in fact. With a population of 

3,000 people, Sa Huy nh was an importa nt supply point of 

entry from the SOllth China Sea and was li nked by a moulll<tin 

corridor to western highl and COllnlr)'. T he corridor also 

marked the boundary between MR-I and MR- Il. O n 26 J anuary 1973, eleme nts of the NVA 2d Division began to exert 

heavy pressure on Sa Huynh and its main fire support base. 

The base was ovenvhelmed in the afternoon of 28 January. On 

29 January the enemy extended his allacks toward the north to 

Duc Pho District. Immediately our 2d Division, commanded by 

Brig. Cen. Tran Van Nhut, went into action. The coumerauack 

was brutal and decisive. Sa Huynh and its fire support base 

were recaptured on 16 February. Casualties were heavy on 

both sides. 

The Communist representatives in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission in Saigon immediately demanded an investigation. ICCS unanimously confirmed that Sa Huynh was territory belonging to South Vietnam. Unfortunately this decision 

was the first and last ICCS unanimous report in Vietnam from 

the time of the cease-fire to the end. After the investigation, 

the chief of the Polish delegation in Da Nang was relieved. 

The district town of Hong Ngu in Kien Phong Province lay 

astride the Bassac River some five miles from the Cambodian 

border. Because of its position, Hong Ngu blocked an excellent access route from Cambodia by way of the Bassac into 

South Vietnam. In March 1973, the NVA 1st Division launched 

an attack against the district town, apparently to seize and 

make it an inland port of elllry capable of serving enemy 

forces in both South Vietnam and Cambodia. The auack was 

repulsed by our 9th Division which drove the enemy back into 

Cambodian territory. 

In June 1973 the NVA F-IO Division launched a surprise 

auack and seized the populous village of Trung Nghia some 

six miles west of Kontum City. After a long and arduous 
THE MILITARY SITUATION AFTER TilE CEASE-FIRE. 197,-74 33 

operation which lasted into September. friendly forces retook 

the village. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. 

Tong Le Chan (or Tong Le Chon) base in MR-III was a 

border camp lying astride enemy lines of communication between War Zone C (Tay Ninh) and Binh Long and Binh 

Duong Provinces. Its presence forced the enemy to make long 

delOurs. As a result, on 25 March 1973 he began an illlense 

effort to force the evacuation of the base. The Army of the 

Republic of Vielllam (ARVN) 92d Ranger Battalion which 

manned the base found itself cut ofT from all communication 

and supplies by road; it was unable to conduct patrols around 

the base. Helicopter suppl}' became increasingly difficult due 

to heavy enemy antiaircraft fire. Supplies had to be d ropped by 

fixed-wing aircraft. During sixteen consecutive weeks, the 

enemy shelled the base 300 times, using more than 10,000 

assorted rounds. and lau nched eleven attacks by infantry and 

nine by sappers (assauh engineers). In the meantime. the 

enemy also stepped up propaganda activities urging the Rangers to evacuate the base. But the defenders held fast and 

successfully drove back all enemy attacks. By II April 1974 the 

situation within the base became ullerly untcnable. Thc badly 

mangled 92d Ranger Battalion finally had lo break out and fa ll 

back on An Loc. The commander, LI. Col. Le Van Ngon, was 

promoted ahead of schedule in recognition of his unit's va liant 

performance. 

Commurlist Military Preparalioru 

The Communists' regular armed forces had suffered heavy 

losses during the 1972 offensive. Also. the costs of the 1968 

Tet offensive were still felt in the enemy infrastructure and 

regional and guerrilla forces (Table I). Immediately after the 

conclusion of the Paris Agreement, therefore, Hanoi began to 

improve the combat capabilities of its main and local forces. 

strengthening main force units in tenns of firepower and mobility, reequipping and retraining local forces, and expanding 

the guerrilla organizations. During this time, our intelligence 

noticed that in North Vietnam the enemy's independent antiaircraft units were being integrated into divisional and regimental organizations with weapons ranging from SAM-2 to 

SAM-3 (surface to air missiles) and from 37-mm. to 100-mm. 

guns. Along the coast, the enemy's defensive forces were 

equipped with SAMLET. another missile recently supplied by 

Russia. 
34 THE FINAL C01..l.APSE 

TABU \-ENnIV Snll(NGTII "NO UNITS. JMWAR\· i!J7S 

T_ 

CembaL ........................................ . 

Administn li\'c lind fear s('I"\·i(e .... . 

Cuerrilla mrr.aSlruClUI"C ................. . 

Total ...................................... . 

DtlllJIOnJ 

inramry ........................................ . 

Siipper ..........................•................ 

Field ;arlilll'ry ................................ . 

Amiaircrafl ................................... .. 

Total .................... ............. ..... . 

s,pnftJlt Rrgr1lVfl/J 

Inrantry ......................................... . 

Sapper ........................................... . 

.'icld :artillery ................•................. 

Armor ............................................ . 

Antiaircraft .......... .......................... . 

Total ...................................... . 

II III " 

79,450 

35,2",0 

5.928 

120,618 

7 

31,200 

18.500 

11,017 

60.717 

, 

27.300 

17.315 

10.730 

55.345 

, 

29,050 167.000 

14,065 85, 120 

13,325 "'1.000 

56,440 293,120 

, 14 

1 

I ............... . 

I .................................... , ......... . 

8 , 4 , 

6 , • 11 , 1 2 ...... ......... . 

6 , 2 ............... . 

, 1 I .............. .. 

12 ................ ................ ............... . ,. 9 13 II 

17 

,. 

6 

10 

4 

l' 

62 

In South Vietnam the efTort was even more visible in the 

number of field guns. antiaircraft batteries. and radar systcms 

deployed. After the cease-fire until Ihe fall of Saigon, the 

Communists introduced twenty marc antiaircraft regiments 

equipped with all kinds of guns and a network of assorted 

radars providing a dcgree of control over the airspace of MR-J 

and much of MRs-II and -Ill. A new heat-seeking SA-7 missile 

was also introduced with its range increased from 9,000 to 

15,000 feet (altitude). For field artillery, they had a total of 430 

Russian-made 122-mm. and 130-mm. guns. Our troops in MRII and MR-III were facing a new enemy artillery capability. 

Hanoi also moved a great number of armored vehicles to 

the South. Of the 655 enemy armo red vehicles estimated to be 

in South Vietnam, many were introduced for the first time on 

the batllefield. Included were the tank-launched Scissors 

Bridge (MT -54 and MT -34) and the armored personnel carrier BTR-152 series. Also deployed wcrc airborne assault guns, 

ASU-75: the Soviet light artillery-tractor. M2: the I 52-mill. 
THE MIl.ITARY SITUATION ,u-n:R TilE CEASE-FIRE, 1973-74 35 

gun-howitzer, 020; and the 100-mm, antitank gun, T12, Other 

sophisticated weapons were reponed but not fully confinned 

by our intelligence. They included Ihe T -60 medium tank and 

SA-7s mounted in groups. Improved canned food from Peking 

was found on enemy soldiers. Local and guerrilla forces were 

equipped with B40 and B41 rockeLS, AK-47 rifles, and mortars. 

The enemy's effort to rebuild his general reserve was most 

significant. Hanoi withdrew the 312th, 308th, and 320B Divisions from Quang T ri Province to North Vie tnam; Ihe 316th 

Division from Laos to North Vietnam; and rebuilt the 341st 

Division. With the 308B, 3 16B, and the 968th in L'los, the 

Communists now had at least seven confirmed general reserve 

divisions. By the end of 1974, Hanoi had formed two army 

corps headquarters in MR- I and one in MR-III. Also several 

antiaircraft divisions were organized: the 671st. 673d. 675th, 

and 679th. Under direct conlrol of their headquarters in the 

South, they organized the M26 Armor Brigade, the 75th Artillery Division, the 377th AAA Division, the 5th Engineer Division, and the 27th Sapper Division. From Laos. the 559th 

Transportation Group was moved into Soulh Vietnam with its 

four organic elements: the 4 7 1st, 472d, 473d, and 541 Sl Transportation Divisions. 

In South Vietnam all independent infantry regiments were 

organi zed into divisions, such as the 3d Division with the 33d 

and 2741h Regiments in MR-III; 4th Division with 01 , 18B, 

and 95A eg iment s~ 6th Division with 24th, OTt , and 207(h 

Regiments; and the 8th Division with the ZI5th and ZI8th 

Regiments. The Communists did not exaggerate when they 

emphasized in their Twenty-First Plenum that they had nOI 

been stronger since 1954. Young recruits were still being 

drafted in the North. An estimated 200,000 reached southern 

battlefields after the cease-fire. But the most difficult problem 

for the Communists was to restore the ir infrastructure and 

network 10 the pre-1968 level (approximately 100,000). 

To maintain such an expeditionary force required a major 

logistical effort. During )973 the Communists substantially expanded their network of supply bases and hard-surfaced, allweather roads along the old Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in 

Laos. Truck convoys, sometimes more than 200 vehicl es, were 

sighted during daylight on these roads, bringing more men, 

more weapons, and morc materi al into South Vietnam. 

During 1974 the intricate road system Ihal made up the 1-10 

Chi Minh Trail was e nlarged and extended southward. Its main 
36 TIlE FINAL COLLAPSE 

north-south axis, formerly located mainly on I.....'l.olian and Cambodian territory. was now supplemented by a route on our side 

of the border, the Truong Son Corridor extending for nearly 

600 miles from the 17th Parallel to the northern edge of Tay 

Ninh Province. Lateral routes linked the corridor La the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail and some of the coastal areas. However, it was 

not yet an all-weather rOUle, and during the rainy season many 

pontoon bridges were needed to replace the wooden structures destroyed by high water and floods. 

In this expansion effort, the Communists attacked and overwhelmed all of our remOle highland bases and outposlS that 

might interfere with their supply corridor. These bases included Bu Bong. Bu Prang. Plei.OJereng, and Plci·Me. In addition. 

branches from the nonh·south axis were also built toward the 

eastern coastal plains. Bases and outposts (such as Dak Pek, 

Mang Buk, Plateau Gi, and Gia Vuc) which lay across these 

laterals were also overrun. (See below.) 

The enemy also buill an enormous network of fuel storage 

areas supplied by pipeline and pumping facilities. The pipeline 

network extended from the DMZ to the western edge of 

Quang Duc Province. The Communists also established several 

large storage areas containing many prefabricated houses and 

warehouses and reconditioned a number of airfields. In all, the 

enemy now controlled seven "light" and eight "medium class" 

airfields in South Vietnam, and two of the fields could be 

modified to accommodate jet fighters. 

In summary, because of this major logistical effort it was 

established that the NVA could sustain for eighteen months a 

general offensive of the type seen in 1972. Also, the time 

required to send personnel from the North into the South was 

reduced from four months LO approximately three weeks. 

Communist Policy O1ld Strattgy 

The protracted war in South Vietnam had innicled heavy 

losses on both sides, but the loll was notably heavier for the 

Communists. In an interview with an Italian reporter, Vo 

Nguyen Giap acknowledged a casualty figure of more than 

500.000 for North Vietnam. The Communist soldier, although 

hardened by party discipline and tempered by intensive indoc· 

(rination and watched closely by political cadres. nonetheless 

desired a real peace and hoped to be reunited with his family. 

Information from captured documents. prisoners. and rallicrs 
TilE MILITARY SITUATION AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE. 1973-74 37 

eSlablished the fact thaI in October 1972 when the cease-fire 

was almost accomplished. the Communist troops. as well as 

their cadres, were very excited. 11ley listened to BSC and 

VOA radio broadcasts every day and openly discussed the 

possibility of returning to North Vietnam. When the 28 OCIOber cease-fire failed 10 materialize. they could not conceal their 

despair. 

In the wake of the signing of the cease-fire agreement, 

directive No. 2/73 was issued by the Communist headquarters 

for the South. the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), 

providing specific propaganda guidance for the Communist 

Party and its armed forces and people. According to the document, the Paris Treaty was an "epoch marking" and "history 

making" victory for Communists in the Soulh. The Paris 

Agreement did not terminate Ihe conflict, however, but established a stale of ';half war-ha lf peace" in which political activities would take precedence over military operations. 

During March and April 1973. two different propaganda 

teams were dispatched to the South from the North. They 

were headed by General Van Tien Dung and by To HUll, a 

politburo member. The teams conducted many meetings, explaining to their troops that the Paris Agreement was just a 

"break-phase" in conquering the South and was only part of 

the Communist strategy of "talk and fight." The Communist 

Pany usually had a political "line" appropriate to each new 

development. At that time the " line" was to urge a threeclement government wilh the armed forces ready 10 cope with 

all eventualities. 

Communist propaganda had to cope wilh two contradictory 

alliludes and concepts. The first firmly supported the aim of 

the Paris Agreement to achieve a peaceful solution to the 

problem in Soulh Vietnam. The second advocated Ihe necessity of resuming the war and asserted that military action alone 

could lead to ultimate victory. Both of lhese concepls were 

thoroughly analyzed by the Communist Party in its directive 

No. 3/72 issued in early April 1973. This directive concluded 

thal Communist troops should trust the party policy and stral· 

egy of flexibility; the existing situation was described as a state 

of "peace in war" during which the Communists could exploit 

the legal aspects of the Paris AgreemenT. With their efficient 

propaganda machine and their political indoctrination methods, the Communis IS sought (0 reconcile Ihe two altitudes at 
38 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

the lowest level. h would be a subject of discussion among 

tfOOpS and cadres. 

Intelligence revealed thaI during a May 1973 meeting of 

provincial party leaders. presumably mid·level. it was conclud· 

cd that the South Vietnamese Revolution could only be 

achieved by armed violence through a "blitzkrieg"of the lype 

launched in 1968. (Noticeably absent was any mention of pol it· 

ica! struggle.) At another political meeting in July 1973, it was 

concluded that: "If the GVN did not implement the Paris 

Agreement by participating in a coalition government. the 

Communists had the capabilities 10 mount a general offensive 

and a general uprising." The scheme of a new offensive in the 

South was disclosed by a ralli er, a Lam Dong provincial party 

member. as a contemplated strategic raid against Hue and Da 

Nang in MR-1. The rallier's statements were supported by 

other information. In North Vietnam, pilots wcre conducting 

steppcd~up training missions, and acria l photos had revealed 

that in Laos the Communists had built a sand table mock~up of 

an airport with control tower, runway, and aircraft which 

looked just like the Da Nang Air Base. However, the rallier 

stressed that the offensive could come only aftcr the approval 

of both Russia and China, as had becn the case in 1968 and 

1972. Incidentally, during August and September 1973, Pre~ 

mier Pham Van Dong and Party Secretary Le Duan made trips 

to China and Russia. 

Throughout this time, the Communist forces in the SOllth 

endeavored to build and develop thcir stl'ength in preparation 

for subsequent campaigns. Its chairman, Nguyen Huu Tho, 

alleged during a press interview that the NLF did not plan to 

launch an offensive bUl would be in a favorable position if one 

became nccessary. In a radio broadcast on 15 October 1973 

Hanoi announced that Communist forces would repel any at~ 

tacks with appropriate measures and armed forces. COSVN 

directive No. 4/73 issued at the same time provided specific 

guidance fol' auacking "point by point," grasping partial victories, and advancing toward final victory. Communist forces 

might fight while making propaganda or propagandize first 

and fight afterwards. 

COSVN resolution No. 12 based on the report of the 

party's Twenty-First Plcnum and issued around December 

1973 or carly January 1974 was probably intcnded to improve 

the sagging morale thcn prevailing among Communist troops. 

Both documents claimed that the Communist forces in the 
THE MILITARY SITUATION AFTER TilE CEASE-FIRE, 1973-74 39 

South were stronger both militarily and politically than at any 

time since 1954. They should continue to engage in local 

actions and follow "war in peace" tactics while pretending 

publicly to observe lhe Paris Agreement. However, "local war" 

was inlerpl'eted to include allacks supported by all "armed 

services" and against such well-fortified positions as district 

seats or subsector headquarters, the rear bases of battalions 

and regiments, and division headquarters. In the political field 

emphasis was placed on the development of the infraslruclure. 

COSVN rcsolution No. 12 continued to guide the enemy 

throughout 1974. 

Toward the end of 1973, the Communis IS embarked on an 

extensive campaign against our remote outposts and bases. 

One by one, they were oven ... helmed, or the defenders were 

forced to evacuate. The enemy campaign continued unabated 

imo 1974, first with the commitment of regimental si1.e units; 

then with divisions, supported by armor, artillery, and antiaircraft weapons. In September 1973, the Lc-Minh (I'lci D'jercng) 

Base was the first to be overrun, followed by the Ngoc Bay 

Moumain Base in Kontum and the Bach Ma Mountain Base 

near Da Nang. In November, the Oak Song Camp was overrun, 

then the Kien Duc Base. Exccpt for the Rien Duc Base, which 

was retaken a week later by the 45th Regiment. all these 

outposts and bases remained under enemy control. 

On our side during 1973. we had frustrated the enemy's 

"land and population grab" tactic on the one hand and pushed 

ahead with rural pacification on the other. However, insofar as 

the remote OUlPOSlS were concerned. President Thieu's 

instructions forbade their evacuation. At all costs, they were to 

be defended and held. As it turned out, this policy proved 

politically but not militarily sound. It was fairly easy for the 

enemy to concentrate a force five or six times grcatcr than 

ours at any remote place and with abundant fire support overwhelm an outpost at will. To altcmpt to hold all remote outposts, therefore, amounted to sacrificing a substantial number 

of troops who could be employed effecliveiy elsewherc. But 

then our government still hoped the Paris Agreement would 

be observed to some extent. And thc maintenance of these 

outposts. although costly. was thought of as visible proof of 

the extent of Ollr comrol. Besides, abandoning these outposts 

would be tantamOUIll to turning over 10 the enemy a sizable 

pari of the national territory. 
40 TI-IF. FINAL COLLAPSt: 

In MR-I during early July 1974, (he enemy concemrated a 

large force composed of the 304B and 711 Divisions and 

clements of the 44th From (cleven infantry battalions). The 

thrust of his atlack enveloped the Da Trach Ranger Camp, 

Thuong Due District, and a series of Olltposts in the Que Son 

Valley. His eventual objective was the vital Quang Nam coastal 

plain. This situation created a serious threat to the city of Da 

Nang and represented a major challenge to I Corps. Our 3d 

Infantry Di"ision tried valianLly (0 impede the enemy advance. 

During the ensuing battle. I Corps reinforced the area with 

two infantry regiments. two Ranger groups, and two airborne 

brigades. Severe and bloody fighting continued through No· 

vember when the situation was brought under control. Enemy 

forces were driven from the coastal plain and pushed beyond 

the foothills. Also in September. when the fighting in Quang 

Nam reached its peak, NVA forces launched a concerted elTort 

in Thua Thien Province to cut National Route I between Hue 

and Da Nang. TIle enemy forces included three regiments of 

the 324 B Division. Da Nang and Phu Bai Air Bases received 

heavy arlillery and rocket altacks. 

In addition, in the southern I Corps area, the NVA 52d 

Brigade (reinfol'ced) overran the Cia Vue Border Camp and 

the Minh Long District Town. Coordinated actions by our 1st 

and 2d Infantry Divisions in their respective zones provided 

the margin of success, and by the end of 1974, the situation in 

I Corps was stabilized. Each side had more than 15,000 casualties in a six-month period. 

In MR-I1, the Communists began constructing twin roads 

in an easterly direction from the north·south main infiltration 

route. One road was north of Kontum and the other south of 

Pleiku. When completed they were LO meet at National Route 

19 cast of Pleiku City. This road system was designed 10 assist 

the enemy in isolating Kontum and Pleiku Provinces as well as 

11 Corps Headquarlers located in Pleiku City. Outpost 711 

located to the south of Pleiku City blocked the Communist 

elTort. In April 1974, twO regiments of the NVA 320th Division 

attacked this outpost. The 22d Division, reinforced with a 

Ranger group. was committed and during May successfully 

pushed back the attackers and defeated the NVA effort to 

complete the roads. Thereafter in the summer and early fall of 

1974, the NVA 3d Division based in Sinh Dinh Province cut 

coaslal Nalional Route 1 in the three northern districts of the 

province and threatened the Phu Cat Air Base. The 22d Divi· 
TilE MILITARY SITUATION AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, 1973-74 41 

sion moved from Pleiku to reinforce the two Ranger groups 

based in the province. II successfully cleared National Route I 

and pushed the NVA 3d Division back to its base area in the 

An Lao Valley by the end of the year. 

In MR-1I1. we retook the district lOwn of Due Hue in Hau 

Nghia Province whose Ranger battalion had been overwhelmed. In June simultaneous attacks were thrown by the 

enemy against three outposts west of Binh Duong Province 

(An Dien. Base 82, and Rach Bap). The battle to retake these 

outposts was particularly harsh. The enemy took advantage of 

his numerical advantage in artillery pieces and his abundant 

supply of ammunition, Our troops were lured into a predetermined area and were pounded mercilessly by deadly concentnHed fire. Losses were high on our part. Finally, only through 

a systematic counterbattery effort and the use of small assault 

teams could we silence the enemy's guns and reoccupy the 

OUlpost!. 

In the Mekong Delta our forces were on the offensive. A 

large-scale search and destroy operation was conducted against 

Tri Phap, long an enemy sanctuary in the Plain of Reeds (an 

area lying at the boundary convergence of three provinces: 

Kien Tuong. Kien Phong, and Dinh Tuong). The Communists 

reacted vigorously, and the three organic divisions of IV Corps 

were constantly lied up either in combat operations or in 

providing support and assistance to the Regional and Popular 

Forces, the ineffectiveness of which was a matter of grave 

concern. Because of this ineffectiveness, the enemy had gained 

control over several villages and hamlets in Kien Giang, An 

Xuyen, and Chuong Thien Provinces. The major weaknesses of 

the Regional Force and Popular Force units were low strength 

and low morale, the severity of which prompted JGS to conduct an investigation. As a direct consequence of the investigation, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi. commander of IV Corps and 

MR-IV, was relieved of his command and replaced by Maj. 

Cen. Nguyen Khoa Nam in November. The urgent mission 

entrusted to the new commander was 1O improve Regional 

Force and Popular Force units and make them effective combat 

unils. General Nam's efforts were crowned with remarkable 

success. 
CHAPTER 4 

Problems and Policies, 1973-74 

TIle first major problem ..... e had to face as a consequence of 

the Paris Agreement was how to counter the enemy's " ' and 

and population grab" campaign. The void lefl by the depar· 

Lure of U.S. and allied troops also created new chall enges. T he 

nalional economy was in a serious state with an increasing loss 

of foreign exchange, rising cost of living. and widespread unemployment. Defense expenditures remained, as they had 

always been. a major burden for the national budget. BUI there 

was no way the government could reduce this burden in the 

face of the constant military tlll-eal posed by the presence of 

NVA forces and the cOnlinued fighting. 

Our strategy immediately after the ccase-fire had four 

major objectives. First and foremost, we were determined to 

keep the national territory intact and to maintain full control 

over the population. If any area were seized by the enemy, the 

armed forces had to wrest it back at all costs. Second, the 

armed forces were to completc their reorganization with partic· 

ular emphasis on replenishing and reequipping units which 

had suffered significant losses during the enemy offensive of 

1972, restoring a sizable genera l reserve, and consolidating the 

territorial forces. Third, the armed forces would seek to improve and modernize all their aspeCls but especially their logistics, firepower, and mobility. Fourth, thc armed forces would 

continue to assist in the nalional pacification and development 

program and take part in other nationa l projects-such as the 

consolidation of the military territorial structure at the vill age 

level and the farmland reclamation and resettlement program-ali geared lO achieve the " three-self' goal of national 

policy (self-defense. self-managemen t. self-sufficiency). 

OrgalllUllion of the Anned Forces 

A major task of JGS in the ccase-fire period was to follow 

through with the improvement and modernization which had 

begun three years earlier and culminated in the crash delivery 
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES. 1973-74 43 

of equipment in November 1972. With the Paris Agreement in 

force it was understood that the armed forces would operate 

under the ceiling of equipment which had been delivered 

before the cease-fire. As a result. it was decided to concentrate 

on the formation and consolidation of combat units and the 

enhancement of firepower and mobility with available assets. 

The objectives were to reestablish a d ivision-size general reserve and to increase the strength and combat effectiveness of 

territorial forces. 

Plans had been developed to consolidate three Ranger 

groups-the 5th. 6th, and 7th-into a division. but the U.S. 

Defense Attache Office (USDAO) could not provide the necessary heavy weapons and equipmcm without violating the Paris 

Agreement. So the Ranger division plan was discarded and ~ 

repl aced by the more realistic formation of brigade- and battalion-size units. Four infantry brigades, two armor squadrons, 

and one mixed artillery battalion were activated by Tet of 

1975. The Marine and Airborne Divisions were thus augmented each by a fourth brigade: the 468th Marine Brigade and the 

4th Airborne Brigade. Two new Range r groups, the 8th and 

9th, were added to the reservc, along with two composite 

armor squadrons (M-42, M-41, and M-113) and onc mixed 

artillery baualion (I 55-mm. and I05-mm. howitzers) created 

with the training equipment of the Armor and Artillery 

Schools. All these units were held in reserve at the JGS level 

ready for deployment and intended to ro tate with equivalent 

units in the field. 

In addition, to increase the comba t effectiveness and tactical mobility of territorial forces. heretofore used mainly as 

battalions for outpost and guard dUlies, J GS transformed 

sector headquarters into mobile regional group commands, 

each capable of controlling from two to four Regional Force 

battalions and one four-piece artillery battery relieved from 

territorial duties. Thus the Regional Force battalions and territorial artillery batteries were effectively consolidated into the 

equivalent of regiments with mobile combat capability which 

were no longer bound by provincial boundaries. They were 

instead placed under· the direct comrol of corps commanders 

who could use them in any capacity required. The JGS plan 

called for the activation of twenty-seven such groups b)' June 

1975. This elTon was intended to free regular divisions from 

territorial concerns and give the military regions a sizable 

combat force to confront enemy territol;al units. 
44 T ilE nNAL COLLAPSE 

In a shuffie of senior officers in March 1974. Ll. Gen. 

Nguyen Van Manh, chief of stafT of JGS since 1969, was made 

deputy chairman of J GS for pacification and development in 

place of Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van La who retired because of old 

age. Genera l Manh, having served in his position for morc 

than four years, was due for replacement. Lt. Gen. Dong Van 

Khuyen, who was then commanding general of the Centra l 

Logistics Command, was designated to rcplace General Manh 

as chief of staff of JGS. A devoted and hard worker, Genera l 

Khuycn was to fill both positions until the final days. 

A Illost important event was the confirmation early in 1974 

of the discovery of oil in the continental shelf of South Viet· 

nam. In the aftermath of the Paris Agreement, economic development in the postwar period had become a much talked 

about subject since it was hoped that peace would be enforced 

and South Vietnam never be abandoned. News of the discovery of oil in late 1973 enhanced the prevailing optimistic 

mood. In that buoyant atmosphere, JGS, on governmental 

orders, worked ou( a plan to trim the total strength of the 

armed forces (0 one million. The plan was to be carried out 

unannounced during 1974. An initial four thousand servicemen reaching age limits or having completed twemy-five years 

of service were released as requircd by regulations. T hey were 

eannarked for transfer to jobs in the civilian sector to help 

organize various government-operated production centers. 

Army units were also given roles in this production plan. By 

the end of 1974, as a result, the total strength of the armed 

forces had dropped to 996,000 men, a level from which it was 

difficult (0 rebuild to the aUlhorized strength of 1, 100,000. 

For years the problem of maintaining full strength had 

proved to be a constant headache. Generally speaking, LO 

maintain a level of I, 100,000 men, a yea rly contingent of 

200,000 to 240,000 new recruits was required to overcome 

attrition caused by combat losses, normal deaths, desertions, 

and discharges from service. Thc manpower made available by 

the draft (of those of eighteen to thirty-nine as determined by 

the general mobilization law) and voluntary service only 

amounted to a scant 100,000 to 150,000 men, resulting in a 

perennial deficit of 90.000 to 100,000. 

Two reasons accounted for the inability to obtain enough 

replacements. First and foremost, the desertion rate was rather 

high, averaging 1.5 to 2 percent of lOta l strength monthly. 

Thus, by deseTlion alone the armed forces lost up to one-
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, 1973-74 45 

fourth of their total every year. Second, the recruits intended 

to make up for the deficit never filled the projected quotas due 

to extensive drart dodging. But even though the nation had 

been at war for over twenty years, very few deserters or drart 

dodgers chose to go over to the olher side in spite of the 

enemy's propaganda efforts. Most simply vanished into the 

cities to live the li\·cs of fu gitives or returned to live in their 

villages with the connivance and help of friends or relatives. 

Some deserters became restles.'i arter prolonged inaction or 

simpl) got tired of hiding. So they reenlisted in a different unit 

under a new name or with modified personal idcntification. 

Becausc of these reasons. lhe aClual strength of units. combat 

units in pa rticular. was sometimes unus ually low. Among other 

things. j GS required every comba t ballalion to musler a minimum of 500 men for operational duties (authorized strength 

was about 800). 

The reduction by 100,000 men should have had minimum 

impacl. However, owing to these other factors, the strength of 

units was seriously affected, and servicemen in general were 

given a false impression of peace prospects. As a result, the 

plan had to be rescinded when it became apparent that lhe 

Paris Agreement stood no chance of being respected and that 

a new Communist invasion was a foregone conclusion. The 

authorized strength of the armed forces was then restored to 

the previous level of 1,100,000 men. With the 100,000 spaces 

thus made available and the reassignment of additiona l troops 

arter inactivation of units no longer required. such as four 

railroad security battalions (reconstruction of the Trans-Viet 

Railroad was temporarily suspended because of budget limitations and the tactical situation) and four military police baltalions in charge of Communist prisoners. jGS made every effort 

to create additional Ranger, Airborne, and Marine units and to 

consolidate Regional Force battalions into regional mobile 

groups. 

To counter any large-scale violation of the peace agreement 

by the Communists, a contingency plan was worked oul by jGS 

and USDAO. It was a top secret arrangement whereby the 

United States agreed to provide our armed forces with appropriate support when required. A system of hot lines was established between the U.S. Support Command at Nakhon Phanom 

in Thailand and JGS. Our Air Force Headquarters and all four 

corps commanders were also given direct access to this system. 

Provisions of the plan, which was disseminated to corps com-
46 TIlE FINAL COLLAJ>S~: 

manders as a basis for their operational planning, included: (I) 

the constant updating of B-52 targets, (2) the activation of 

forward air comrol tcams equipped with appropriate radios 

and manned by English-speaking personnel who had pre\,jousIy worked with the U.S. Air Force. (3) In the case of a major 

offensive, our armed forces were to hold their lines for seven 

[0 fifteen days, allowing lime for the U.S. Congress to approve 

the employment of U.S. air power in South Vietnam. The JGSDAO plan also provided the procedures for requesting U.S. 

Air Force support. In spite of its apparent promise, the contingency plan was nevcr pUl to usc because the scale of enemy 

violations in 1973 and 1974 did not warrant a request for· 

intcrvemion. By the limc such intervemion was required, U.S. 

Air Force units were not available. 

Ule Rrductlol! 111 U.S. ,\/iltIQl)' Aid 

Ravaged by war for over a quartcr-century, South Vietnam 

had very litLie 10 comribute to the war effort except manpower 

and blood. Financially and materially, South Vielnam had to 

depend on military aid provided by the United States. the 

factor that largely decided the outcome of the war. On 2 April 

1973 Presidcm Thieu was received by President Nixon in the 

Western White House at San Clemente. Together the two 

leaders discussed problems related to economic and military 

aid to South Vietnam and examined the cominuing cease-fire 

violations and the Communist buildup. The visit shored up ollr 

confidence in continuing U.s. aid during the postwar period. 

Fully aware of the difficulties the United States was facing 

in its own house, economically and politically. the Republic of 

Vietnam made every effon to enforce austerity and to maimain 

and preserve invaluable military assets as soon as the cease-fire 

was in force. It was hoped that reductions in military aid, if 

and when made. would be timed and graduated to reflect a 

lrue impro\rement in the military situation on the one hand 

and the development of the national economy of SOUlh Vietnam on the other. 

During the £irst few months of 1973, following this belttightening policy and assuming that the enemy would respect 

the Paris Agreement to some extent, JGS and USDAO carne 

up with a fiscal year 1975 military aid budget recommendation 

of $1,600 million. President Nixon submilled a revised figure 

of $1,474 million to Congress, but, in addition, he asked for 
PROBLEMS AND POLIClES, 19"-74 47 

$474 million as a supplement to the fiscal year 1974 budget to 

cover increased ope.-ational expenses and the replacemenl of 

lost and damaged war material and another $266 million to 

make up for a deficit incurred in Ihe previous fiscal year. 

President Thieu sen! me, as chairman of jGS, to Ihe Uniled 

Slates in April 1974 to seek support for our aid request. At the 

Pen lagon. I made a presentation of the military situation in 

Soulh Vietnam, substantialed by documents and photographic 

evidence of the enemy's escalating violations and his massive 

movemen! of men and arms inlo the coulllry. Officials of the 

U.S. Oeparlmenl of Defense heartily assured me of their full 

support. Unfortunately, the U.S. Congress rejected all supple. 

mental aid requests and merely authorized a fiscal year 1975 

ceiling of $ 1 billion, of which only $700 million was finally 

appropriated. And lhis amOUIll included operational expenses 

ror USDAO ($46 million appropriated out of $100 million 

requested). The final appropriation came as a shock to the 

army and people or South Vietnam. It was cenain that the 

huge gap between requirements and resources that had just 

been created could never be closed no maller how much self· 

restraint was imposed and how well the budget was managed. 

Since the announcement or the cease· fire, our armed forces 

and people had staked their hopes on four possibilities. The 

first was that the Communists would respect the Paris Agree· 

ment. That meanl the fighting would die down and require· 

mcnlS for fuel and munitions would be reduced. The Commu· 

nists soon extinguished this hope. 

The second was thaI the national territory to be held could 

be gradually reduced and consolidated into smaller but more 

defensible areas. This would require revising our national de· 

fense strategy and consolidating the armed forces to make 

them powerrul enough to confront the enemy effeClively at the 

level or available military aid and our own national capabilities. 

This looked like a most realistic prospect. but carrying it out 

would certainly require a long time because of the rar.reaching 

psychological and political efTecls it was bound to create. 

Third, we hoped that other financial resources could be 

found to supplement military aid or eventually replace it aho· 

gether, as for example the exploitation or oil. which had just 

been discovered. or additional aid from other non~Communisl 

countries. However, this was only an expectation for the long 

term. 
48 TIl E FINAL CO LLAPSE 

Fourth, there was the possibility the U.S. Congress might 

review its decision once the furor against President Nixon had 

died down. After aU, U.S. credibility and prestige were at stake. 

and it was only reasonable to expect thal South Vietnam would 

be given lhe wherewitha l to defend itself after approximately 

45,000 young Americans had given their lives for the same 

cause. h was to this last hope that lhe armed forces and people 

of South Vietnam desperately clung. and it was with the belief 

thal somehow me additional aid would be provided that lhey 

sLOically endured all privations and willingly shed more blood 

to make up for the missing rounds of ammunition. 

A $300 million supplemental appro priation was requested 

on 2 January 1975, and this amount was boosted to $722 

million by President Ford's last-ditch effort on II April 1975. 

By the time the U.S. Congress finally rejected it, however, it 

was already too late for any kind of hope. The final verdict had 

been rendered. 

The $700 million appropriated for fiscal year 1975 only met 

about half of our austere requirements. Enemy-initiated actions 

in the meantime increased 70 percent as compared with the 

previous year. After deducting $46 million for USDAO operations, there remained $654 million for direct support (Tabk 

2), 

TAIII"'; 2-U.5. MII.IT .... RV ASS IST .... NCr.. f-"I SCA.I. YEAII 1975 

(1M ""I..."" ofdolbn) 

~"",'nU!n 

11<'<1""""""" .... Uou .... 

Air Forct' ......................................................................... . 

Anny .............................................................................. .. 

TOlal ....................................................................... .. 

Air Forct and Naval Aid 

$41 -1 

841 

1.283 

SI83 

.,. 

6501 

1,"<"",· 

'.' 

44 

54 

" 

Because of the meager funds allotted, the air force was 

compelled to (I) Inacti vate more than 200 aircraft including 

A-I fighter-bombers; 0-1 observation planes; a nd C-7. C- 11 9. 

and C-47 cargo planes. (2) Terminate ilS program of replacing 

F-5As with F-5E fighters. T he 36 F-5Es thai had been ordered 

were returned to the U.S. Air Force. and fu nds recovered were 

channeled to more vital operational and maintenance needs. 

(3) Call home 400 jet and helicopter pilot sludenlS undergoing 
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, 1973-74 49 

training in lhe Uniled Slales. Over 1,000 ainnan-trainees for 

flight and non flight jobs undergoing English language training 

were turned into infantrymen. This caused a most adverse 

psychological effect in the Vietnamese Air Force. (4) Reduce 

flight time for support and training, which in turn reduced fire 

support 50 percen! as compared with 1973-74 and reconnaissance 58 percent, gravely affecting ability LO keep track of 

enemy infiltration and provide observalion for operational 

areas and convoy prOlection. 

Helilift was down 70 percent. This affec ted most seriously 

medical evacuation as well as troop reinforcement and resupply, particularly in the Mekong Delta which is crisscrossed by a 

maze of canals and swamps and where for years the helicopter 

had been instrumemal in saving innumerable wounded soldiers 

and outposts in distress. The sudden scarcity of helicopters 

compell ed our troops to use hammocks and sampans for the 

evacuation of the wounded in some instances and greatly hampered the resupply of munitions. In addition, it also caused 

serious psychological readjustment problems. 

Regular airlift was down 50 percem. This affected moslly 

the mobility of general reserve units. Since the Airborne and 

the Marine Divisions were the only reserves ava ilable on a 

countrywide basis, their ability Lo move swiftly was of critical 

importance. During the Communist offensive of 1972. the Airborne Division was able to deploy from Saigon lo Pleiku and 

from Pleiku to MR-I within forty-eight hours. ThiS feat was 

accomplished with our own and U.S. aircraft without detriment 

to other airlift operations. But in 1975 the same operation in 

reverse took seven da ys and completely disrupted other airlift 

operations. The C-130A cargo aircraft, the airlift mainstay, was 

also used during the first few months of 1975 for bombing 

missions. But, constantly plagued by technical troubles such as 

wing cracks and fuel leaks in addition to cuts in flying time and 

a shortage of replacement parts, only four to eight out of a 

total of thirty-two C-130As were serviceable daily. 

Naval activities were reduced by an average or 50 percen!. 

River activities were cul 72 percent. This huge reduction required the inactivation of over 600 river craft and boalS, 240 of 

which belonged to (he Regional Forces. Grave effects were felt 

in control of waterways, particularly in MR-IV and coastal 

areas, escort for supply convoys. including convoys to Cambodia, and security for the main wateru'ays leading to Saigon. 

The defense or remo te outposts in the Mekong Delta and the 
50 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

security of military harbors in Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh, 

and Saigon, and the Saigon-Vung Tau artery were sCI;ously 

compromised. 

h was realized that troop mo\'cmenlS could be seriously 

impeded in the event of a major offensive because our assets 

were limited. To e nhance sealift capabilities. two rcpa ir ships 

were transformed into cargo and troop transports. TIle landing 

ship tank (LST) neet thus increased from six to eight ships. 

We had ea rli er requested and been promised six additional 

LSTs. T he air force tried to improve the low serviceability rate 

of its twO C-lSOA squadrons, and additional spare parts were 

requested to keep morc trucks in service. 

Replacement oj Items a"d Paris 

According to Articl e 7 of the Paris Agreement. our armed 

forces could replace arms, munitions, and war materiel damaged, worn out, or used up after the cease-fire. But the limited 

funds permitted only a few trucks, mnks, and artillery pieces fO 

be replaced during fiscal years 1973-74. No replacements 

could possibly have been made for fiscal year 1975, because 

most of the budget was needed for opera tional and maintenance re(luiremel1l'i more esseillial to the war elTort. As a 

resuh, not a single plane, ship, or boat was replaced after the 

cease-fire. And only 70 pel"celll of the most critical item. ammunition, could be replaced. By the e nd of 1974, the tOlal 

wonh of materiel awaiting replacemelll came to over $400 

million. In panicular, the program of replacing AN/PRC- IO 

radio sets with AN/PRC-25s had to be suspended . Half of the 

Popular Forces had to "make do" with the inferior and wal"-

worn AN/PRC-lO which was plagued with problems of spare 

parts and dry batteries. 

Only 33 percent ($24 million) of the amount required was 

ava ilable for replacement pans. TIle shortage of replacemelll 

parts greatly affected maintenance performance. The backlog 

of work. on unserviceable combat maleriel at troop and direct 

support units increased from fifteen to thirty days as a result. 

The percelllage of serviceable materiel and equi pment at troop 

units declined to the le"c1s shown: 
PROBLEMS AND POLlCn:S, 1973-74 

Item 

M-113 armored personnel carrier .......... ................... . 

f\1 -48 tank ...................................................... ......... .... . 

105- and 155-nun. howitzers ...................................... . 

175-mm. howitzers ................... ..... ........................... . 

M-79 grenade launcher ............................................. . 

2.5-ton truck ............................................................... . 5-l0n wreckers ............................................................ . 

Signal equipment ........................... ............................ . 

5 1 

PercclIwgr. of 

Requirement 

80-85 

75-80 

90-95 

60-75 

80 

80-85 

70-75 

90 

Over 4,000 vehicles transferred by U.S. and allied troops 

remained unserviceable for lack of spare pans. The in-country 

expon rebuilding program was also suspended because funds 

were unavailable. War and maintenance reserves Lhus were 

gradually used up until they disappeared from the shelves 

altogether when they were most needed to reequip ballered 

units retrieved from MR-I and MR-II at the end of March 

1975. 

Fuel alld Ammunition 

After austerity measures were taken in 1974, the consumption of diesel fuel and gasoline decreased 30 percent as com· 

pared with 1973. In spite of this reduction, $60 million, Or 13 

percent. of the tolal army budget, was still needed for fuel 

alone. Stock levels were deemed sa tisfactory, ranging from 

forty-five to sixty days, based on actua l consumption rates. 

However, withoul supplemental aid, OUr armed forces would 

have run out of fuel by mid-May 1975. 

Of the total army budget for fiscal year 1975 ($458 million), $239 million, or 52 percenl, was earmarked for ammuni· 

tion. This amount, however. only met 56 percem of true requirements. Within this ceiling, only $19.9 million could be 

made available each momh, whereas the previous monthly 

issue rate, July 1973 to February 1974, had amounted to $37.3 

million. Inflation further shrank lhe quantity of munitions purchased. On lhe average. in 1974, lhe cost or munitions increased 27.7 percent between lime of request and lime of 

appropriation (Table J). 
52 TilE FINAl.. COLLAPS E 

r "RU; A~l>tt NIT10 ' eo .... s. FISCAl, \ I'...I M 19 7:' 

(1), 0/1.00 .... R,,,mel t 

5.56·mm. nne ....... _ .. 

OO-mm. morta r , _'" ............ . 

8 1·mm, mortar .... ........................................ ...... o. 

J 05-llIIn. wil ~cr ....................... ............ ............... . 

155·lIIm. howil 7./;'r •.• ' .•.............•...............•..•..•.•...... 

FragnlCnllllion grcnade .......... .. .......................... . 

66-"lIn rockel (LAW) ..................... ....... . 

SO,07 

12.80 

25.67 

29.21 

40.9" 

1.95 

"1 .32 

o .. ,<>bn l'li l ..... ' ... 11;... ... 

$0.08 

I!H8 

27.80 

35.70 

60.3 1 

2.85 

72.35 

1'.- f<~"'·M ~ .. .... r • • ~ 

14 

6 

8 

22 

47 

46 

" 

In February 1974 we calculated that , even Wilh stringent 

fire discipline. by June 1975 the stock level would be down to 

57.000 short tons or only a lwenty.four day supply at the prccease·fire consumption rate. While hoping lhal supplemental 

aid would be provided, our armed forces took certain austerity 

measures. Harassme nt and interdiction fires were prohibited 

altogcther. Fire was authorized only when a target was visible. 

As a resuh, the monthly consumption rate during the fil'St 

eight months of fiscal year 1975 Ouly 1974 through February 

1975) amounted to only 19,808 short tons or 27 percent of the 

pre-cease-fire rate of 73,356 short tons per month. During the 

same period, enemy-initialed activities increased to 2,980 incidents per month as compared with the pre·cease-fire rate of 

2,072. An available supply rate per weapon per day was determined monthly for each of the four military regions based on 

budgetary allocations and past consumption experiences, for 

example, 1972 intensive combat rate (Table 4). The new supply 

rates fell far short of requirements, however, and MR com· 

manders constantly requested additional issues. TIle total of 

such requests for the period from July 1974 to February 1975 

amounted to $l64,981 ,OOO, of whichJGS could meet only 40.5 

percent. 

T AI I.E 4_ T OTAL AMMUNlnON AVAIt..-\Iu:.JULV 1974- I-'r.IRUARY 1975 

(R",,,,.h pn " .... .,..., ...... I).yl 

5.56-rnrn. rmc ... ................. ......... ............... ... .. ................................ . .. 

40·mm. gre ~ ......................................................................... ....... .. 

6O'lIIm. mortar ......... .......................................................................... .. 

BI-mm. mortar .................................................................................... . 

1.56 

0.2 

0.4 

1.1 

36 

0.8 

2.0 

2.8 
PRO BLEMS AND POLICIES, 1973-74 53 

TAIII.!!: .. -TOTAl. AloIJo.IlINITION AVAIIJ.III.f:. J lILV 19N- FEIIIWARV 197[).-(;ontinucd 

(Jr.""""' ...... W~,.... I).,. 

105_nun. hO .. ·jtlcr .............................................................................. .. 

155-mm ho"itlcr .... _ ......................... , .. , ... ". , .. ' ................................. .. 

Fr .. Il1Cnl lion grcnade (brig<ldc I'cr d,~,) 

f.6-mrn rockrl (I.I\W) ....... _ ...... _' .... . 

6,2 

< .• 

'iO.6 

4,5 

,on 

In'm,,,'r ,-, 

Il,o'r 

25.0 

16.2 

180.0 

8-1A 

Although pan of the Royal L'lO Arm) reser .. e ammunHlon 

\,'as transferred to our forces, the permanent srock level anI} 

amounted to between thirty and fony days' supply, far bclow 

the prescribed sixty-day leve l. By February 1975, days' supply 

of some ca tegories had plummeted to the safclY level: 

Mut/i/ion 

5.56-mm. rinc ................................................................. . "O-mln. gTcnadc ............................................................. . 6O-I1Ull. mo rtar ............................................................... . 

8 1-luln. 1l1o rtar ........................... .................................... . 

IOS-mnl. howitzer ........................................................... . 

ISS-mm. howitzer ........................................................... . 

Frag-.llcntation gl'cnadc ............................ ...................... . 

Bulallce 

011 /-land 

( DU)'J) 

3 1 

29 

27 

30 

34 

3 1 

25 

T aking into account order and shipping time which was usually 

forty-fi ve days, the problem of readjusting stock levels for 

fourteen ammunition depots thro ughout the country became 

increasingly difficu lt and costly because airlift was mandatory. 

If supplemental aid were not made available and if the intensity of combat remained at the level of late 1974, then all 

munition stocks would be exhausted by June 1975. After 

March 1975 the situation got completely out of hand as a 

result of the troop withdrawals from MR-I1 and MR-1. About 

half of the countrywide stocks were lost. In April 1975 stock 

levels at the four remaining munition depots in MR- III and 

MR- IV dropped to an all-time low of fifteen to twemy days' 

supply. 

The debates and votes in the U.S. Congress and the exact 

amount of military a id finally appropriated were too widely 
54 TIlE FINAL COLLAPSE 

known for our comfort. Both we and the enemy knew and 

could anticipate all the difficulties and weaknesses of our 

armed forces. To our side. it was a matter for anxiety; to the 

enemy. it offered an excellent opponunil),. The Communists 

first stepped up propaganda aimed al servicemen and their 

dependents. in particular those of the Regional and Popular 

Forces. Second, Ihe)' increased Iheir harassment and interdiction of our \illagt·s. hamlets, and outposts. By so doing. the 

Communists tried to demonstrate to the local troops and 

people thaI our forces no longer had enough ammunition to 

fire in their suppOrt, and our officers and the United Siales 

were leaving them to the mercy of the enemy. Then, aHcr a 

dramatic demonstration. the Communists would urge the local 

troops (0 abandon their outposts. 

To counter the enemy moves, a coulltrpvide effort was 

made to explain to the troops what economy of munitions 

really meanl. Soldiers were taught that economy simply meant 

not wasting, and they were assured that adequate supplies 

would be made available. The)' were encouraged to refrain 

from firing when the enemy could not be observed and to 

make e\'ery round count. I-Iowever, some undesirable practices-hoarding, speculating, and bartering-were detected in 

ce!'lain combat units in which troops and cadres had lost confidence or had become 100 preoccupied about the future. The 

most desired ilems were hand- and tube-launched grenades 

which had proved effective and hence had become sought after 

at the "grass-root" level. 

Thus the South Vietnamese soldier of 1974-75 marched 

illlO combal with the deep concern that his ammunition might 

not be replenished as fast as it was consumed and that, if 

wounded, he might have to wait much longer for evacuation to 

a hospital. The time of abundant supplies and fast helilifts had 

gone. It was now lhe turn of the soldier's family LO become 

concerned about his safety in the face of growing shortages. 

The most tragic result of the shOl'lage was increased casualties. 

A price in blood was paid by the soldier for every round of 

ammunition he was not issued afler the cease-fire. 

Aid and support from the United States had helped our 

armed forces successfully confront a powerful NVA armed with 

modern and sophisticated weapons; U.S. aid and support had 

prevemed outright and immediate subjugation and made possible the quest for a political solution of a free Soulh Viemam. 

To reduce that aid so drastically and so abruptly ended any 
PROULEMS AND POLICIES, 1973-74 55 

chance of success and gelleraled panic among the people and 

armed forces of South Vietnam while encouraging the Communists to accelerate their drive to conquer by force. 

ForfbodillgsJor 1975 

Thus in January 1975 an edilorial in the Nonh Vielilamese 

party journal lIoc Tap indicated that the Twenty-Third Plenum 

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had been 

held. This implied that a general offensive would soon be 

conducted in South Vietnam. Howevel', first the Communists 

were to consolidate Communist-controlled areas, "liberate" 

displlled areas, and bring war into areas we controlled. Also, 

this editorial revealed, the enemy was contemplating a((acking 

a number of cities including Saigon, Hue, Oa Nang, and Can 

Tho. According to the Communists, it would be logical when a 

number of provincial capitals had been taken, for the rest of 

the country to fall. The Twenty-Third Plenum also discussed 

lhe possibility of U.S. intervention. The enemy had not anticipated the blockade and the huge B-52 raids on Hanoi and 

Haiphong in 1972. Of course this time he did not exclude lhe 

possibility that the United States would return, but that chance 

was now considered very small. 

For future military efforts the Communists foresaw two 

possibilities. The first assumed a deterioration of the situation 

in the South, which NVA forces would try to speed up by 

conducting a general offensive. TIle second assumed a vigorous reaction by our forces which would be presented by the 

Communists as a South Vielilamese effort to resume the war. 

In this case, the Communists would "counterattack" with a 

great vigor and seize any "strategic opportunity" to launch a 

big offensive of the type seen in 1972. In possibility one, the 

Uniled States would be denied any good reason to intervene 

on the battlefield because the Communists would commit only 

those units already in the South and would portray the new 

conflict as a civil war. In possibility two, to deny the United 

States the opportunity for time ly intervention, the Communists 

would use all the forces at their disposal, including general 

reserves from the North. Whether Hanoi selected course one 

or lwO, primary emphasis was placed on the military conquest 

of the South by force of arms. 

Our government had concluded 1974 with an assessment of 

the military situation. A top-level meeting was convened on 6 

472-606 0 - 85 - 3 QL 3 
56 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

December 1974 at the Independence Palace and was chaired, 

as usual, by the president. The National Security Council 

members were there. as was the complete array of service and 

corps commanders. The estimate was lhal 1975 would be lhe 

year when the Communists would probably launch a general 

offensive to coincide with and upset our presidential election 

scheduled for October and the 1976 U.S. presidential campaign. The military balance undoubtedly favored the enemy; 

he had accumulated enough supplies to sustain a major offensive for an uninterrupted period of eighteen months at a level 

of intensity comparable to his offensive of 1972. 

The form of the new offensive would be a combination of 

his 1968 and 1972 campaigns, that is, attacks against major 

cities concerted with such field actions as interdiction of lines 

of communication. It was further expected that the enemy's 

priority targets would be Saigon, Hue, Da Nang, and Can Tho, 

in his belief that if these major cities-our central nerve centers-were taken he could expect to capture Jesser cities without a fight. Toward that end, there were indications that such 

NVA general reserve units as the 316th, 312th, 341st, and 

308th Divisions were preparing to move south. We estimated 

that the enemy would strike MR-II first in an effort to drain 

our reserves before he launched attacks in MR-I and MR-I11. 

To the enemy MR-IV would be only a diversionary battlefield 

where supporting activities such as harassments and traffic 

interdiction would take place. The ultimate goal of the offensive would be to force the creation of the National Council of 

Reconciliation and Concord and, finally, a coalition government. It was also estimated that the most favorable time for 

the enemy to initiate his errort would be in March. 

Such was our estimate of the situation. We made it in the 

light of hard imelligence. In the absence of specific guidance 

by the president, JGS took on itself the task of preparing for 

the next enemy move. Our major concern was how to reconstitute some general reserve for immediate usc. Certain measures 

were taken. some to cope with an emergency, others to face 

long-term eventualities. To strengthen the defense of Saigon, 

especially during the Tet holidays. JGS issued the following 

instructions: 

The IV Corps was Lo be prepared to release one of its three 

divisions. or at least a brigade-size task force of infantry, 

armor, and artillery, for immediate deployment to Saigon if 

needed. This division was to be deployed for permanent oper-
PR08LEMS AND POLICIES. 1973-74 57 

ational dUlies in the area spanning the boundaries of Long An 

and Dinh Tuong Provinces. Thus located, it could move to 

Saigon by road and ship within forty-eight to seventy-two 

hours. 

T he I Corps was told to rearrange its forces so that the 

Airbome Division could be redeployed to Saigon or elsewhere 

within seventy-two hours. 

Reconnaissance companies organic to the Ranger groups 

were directed to undergo training at Duc My and deploy to 

Saigon to reinforce the defense of the city. (These companies 

were later returned to their units after the Tet holidays.) 

Recruits undergoing training at the Quang Trung Training 

Center and students of the Thu Due Infantry School were to 

form four fully equipped infantry battalions for the defense of 

Saigon. At the same time, the Signal School at Vung Tau, the 

NCO School at Nha Trang. and the Artillery School and 

Ranger School at Due My were directed each to form a full), 

equipped battalion ready for deployment on orders of j GS. 

Two armor task forces were activated with assets of the 

Armor School to include M-48 and M-41 tanks and M-11 3 

armored personnel carriers. The two task forces were to sland 

ready for deployment within two and six hours, respectively. 

In summary, during 1974 our forces made every effort to 

retake important areas and population centers that the enemy 

had occupied. But our losses were high , and our forces became 

overextcnded. The Communists continued to commit units of 

ever-increasing size and expand their logistical system along 

our sidc of the Laotian and Cambodian borders. 
CHAPTER 5 

The Beginning of the End 

During 1973 and 1974, the enemy did not succeed in occu· 

pring any provincial capital of South Vietnam. At onc lime or 

another he had contemplated Kontum or Tar Ninh, but both 

cities proved to be beyond his reach. So he turned to PhuQC 

Long, the northernmost provincial capital of MR-Ill. and prepared [0 3n3ck it with two infantry divisions augmented by an 

infantry regiment and supponed by onc tank regiment, onc 

antiaircraft regimem, onc field artillery regiment, and several 

sapper (assault engineer) units. 

As early as October 1974, JGS had gathered enough informalion about the enemy's preparations and plans through 

technical intelligence. agenlS, and prisoners [0 predict lhe 

attack against PhuQC Long. The infonnation had many times 

been made available to III Corps Headquarters and the sector 

headquarters of Phuoc Long, and each time it was updated 

with new developments. Thus, there was no question of surprise when the attack finally materialized in the latter part of 

December 1974. 

The city of Phuoc Long lies sevenly-five air miles northeast 

of Saigon. The province itself is bounded to the north by 

Cambodia and was composed of four districts: Due Phong, 

Phuoc Binh, Bo Duc. and Don Luan (Map 2). Ils population of 

approximately 30,000 was mosdy Montagnard of the Slieng 

(Ma) and Mnong tribes, which make a living from lumbering 

and rubber harvesting. The remainder of the population consisted of Vietnamese merchants. plantation workers. and civil 

servants. The terrain is mountainous and blanketed by dense 

jungle which denies air observation. It was used by the enemy 

as a major base area. Phuoc Long City is linked to Saigon by 

Interprovincial Route lA and National Route 14. The same 

Route 14 also connects Phuoc Long with Quang Duc and Ban 

Me Thuo( 10 the northeast. The city's airfield, Song Be, had an 

asphalt landing strip capable of accommodating all cargo 

planes through C-130 classification. The morning mist usually 
THE UEGINNING OF TilE END 

_.-

MAP 2 

59 

THE BATTLE OF PHUOC LONG 

DtoeemHr 1174- J_-.rv 197fi 

o 20 MilES 

I I 

20 KILOMETERS 

lasts until 0800 or 0900 but during the ramy season may last 

until 1000 or 1100. 

The supply of Phuoc Long was ordinarily done by truck via 

Interprovincial Rout e IA and Nationa l Route 14. Local prod· 

ucts went to Saigon by the same route. Only one week after 

the cease·fire, however, the Communists cut this main suppl y 

artery at many places. Airlift by helicopters and propell er. 

driven planes then became the main supply means for the city 

and the four district towns. The monthly requirement was 400 

to 500 tons, moslly rice, salt, sugar, ammunition, and fu el. 

Beginning in August 1974, III Corps made a concer! ed error! 

with II Corps to open National Route 14 . The operation some· 

what relieved the burden on airlift resources which now were 

needed for the secure delivery of such critical items as ammu· 

nition, fue l, and medical supplies. However, on 14 December 

1974, the district town of Due Phong, whi ch lay astride the 
60 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

supply route, was overrun by the Communists, and PhuQe 

Long again became dependent on airlift. And airlift became 

increasingly coslly and unreliable due to the enemy's 3miair· 

cran fire. 

Phuoe Long was defended by five Regional Force battalions 

varying from 750 to 900 men; forty-eight Popular Force platoons, totaling approximately 1,000 men, mostly Montagnards; 

and four territorial artillery sections. This force was later augmented by the 2d Baualion of the 7th Infantry, two artillery 

sections from the 5th Division (six additional I05-mm. and 

four 155-mm. howitzers), and three reconnaissance companies 

of the 5th, 18th, and 25th Divisions. 

The battic for Phuoe Long began in the Jalter part of 

December 1974 and ended on 6 January 1975. On 13 Decern~ 

ber 1974, the Communists launched a probing auack against 

the district town of Don Luan but were driven back by the 

gallant local Regional Force baualion, effectively supported by 

the air force. The following night. 14 December, the enemy 

executed simultaneous lightning attacks against the district 

towns of Duc Phong and So Due. Both were immediately 

overrun and without indications of friendly resistance. An in~ 

vestigation failed to disclose the reasons for the rapid loss of 

these towns since almost all key commanders were missing. On 

the following night. 15 December, a fire support base de~ 

fended by Regional Force troops was attacked and also over~ 

run. Two 105-mm. artillery sections were lost to the enemy in 

this action. 

In the face of these successive setbacks, III Corps helilifted 

the 2d Baltalion of the 7th Infantry of the 5th Division from its 

base at Lai Khe into Phuoc Long. With this reinforcement. the 

sector headquarters conducted a counterattack and regained 

Bo Due on 16 December. By this lime, however, effective 

friendly forces in Phuoc Long comprised only the regular infantry battalion and two Regiona l Force battalions. More than 

3,000 disorganized Regional Force. Popular Force, and SelfDefense troops had fallen back to the city from outlying districts, but they badly needed reorganizing and reequipping. 

The regular infantry baualion was made responsible for the 

defense of the Phuoc Sinh District Town. which made up part 

of the city, and the Song Be Airfield where the 3d Logistical 

Command supply point was located. 

With full support of JGS, III Corps now undertook La bring 

in weapons. ammunition, and other equipment by C-130 cargo 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 61 

planes and CH-47 helicopters to resupply the garrison and to 

reequip the local troops who were being- regrouped in the city. 

On return trips the aircraft evacuated military dependents and 

other civilians in an effort to relieve the supply burden. Enemy 

pressure in the meantime increased around the city. Song Be 

Airfield was heavily shell ed, and air traffic was interdicted by 

antiaircraft fire in the northern and southwestern sectors. A C130 was hit while landing and lay helpless in the parking area. 

The next day another C-130 which had brought in supplies 

and a team of mechanics was hit while taking off and was 

destroyed. In addition to para lyz ing the airfield by shelling, the 

enemy also moved antiaircraft balleries closer to the city and 

the approach avenues used by helicopters and observation 

planes. Lai Khe, the command post of the 5th Infantry Division 

and the necessary refueling stop for helicopte rs on their way to 

Phuoc Long, was also brought under interdictory fire. 

In conjunction with their effort to close the airfield by 

increasingly intense fire , the North Vietnamese launched a 

second attack against the district town of Bo Duc and seized it 

again on the night of 22 December. Four days later the NVA 

7th Division renewed the attack against the district town of 

Don Luan and overran it. With this last success the enemy had 

gained control over the entire province, save for the capital 

and the district lown of Phuoc Binh. 

On the night of 30 December 1974, the NVA 7th Division 

and the newly activated 3d Division launched an altack against 

the district town of Phuoc Binh which was within the city's 

defense perimeter. The allackers were supported by a tank 

regiment and corps artillery. T he battle raged through the 

morning and into late afternoon when the distri ct headquarters 

was badly hit and its opera tions center destroyed. The district 

troops and the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry fell back to a 

new defense line around Song Be Airfield . Here they destroyed four enemy tanks at one end of the landing strip and 

killed or captured about fifty enemy. At about the same time 

an enemy clement, in a move to cut ofT the retreat route of the 

2d Battalion, pushed towa rd Ba Ra Mountain which dominated 

the city. After a full day of bitter fighting, the regular battalion 

and the district troops managed to fall back into the city where 

they joined provincial forces. The enemy now chose to confine 

his attack to daylight hours. He harassed our positions during 

the night. however. by indirect fire. 
62 TIlE FINAL COLLAPSE 

During (he day over 100 sorties had been flown by our air 

force in close support of the ground troops. All kinds of 

bombs had been used. including cluster bomb units. This concentralian of air support was made possible by JGS's tcmporary diversion of tactical aircraft from MR-II and MR-IV. At 

0600 on 1 January 1975, in an apparent attempt to obstruct air 

support activities of the 3d Air Division, the Bien Hoa Airfield 

was heavily shelled. Its landing strip was damaged and some 

buildings were set afire. Air traffic was suspended until 1300. 

At 0700 on the first the enemy, with lhe support of tanks, 

began driving his anack from the south into the city of Phuoc 

Long, but lhe advance was Slopped at lhe fOOL of the hill 

ascending toward lhe city. At the same time enemy tfOOpS 

encircled and this time overran Ba Ra Mountain despite maxi. 

mum activity by our air force. Upon overrunning Ba Ra Moun· 

tain, the enemy immediately installed artillery observation 

posts, and his 130·mm. guns began to fire accurately at targets 

within the city. Eight 105·mm. pieces and four 155·mm. pieces 

were hit by the enemy's accurate fire, and all became inactive 

by 3 January. Communications with the city were interrupted 

many times. As the battle developed, enemy antiaircraft bauer· 

ies were positioned on Ba Ra Mountain, and it became increas· 

ingly difficult for our aircraft, especially helicopters, to make 

their approach. 

Backed by adva ntageous defense positions and the effective 

support of our air force, troops in the city successfull y repelled 

several assaults by enemy troops and tanks at the southern 

perimeter. They held finn during the day of 2 January. Fifteen 

enemy tanks were destroyed by our air force and ground 

troops. The province chief requested medical evacuation for 

the wounded and supplies and reinforcements. At 1800, however, our radio relay station on Ba Ra Mountain was finally 

overrun and that communi cations link with the city was lost. 

The same day, 2 january, an emergency meeting chaired by 

President Thieu was held at the Independence Palace. Present 

were Vice President Tran Van Huong; Prime Minister Tran 

Thien Khiem; Lt. Gen. Dang Van Quang, presidential assistant 

for security; Lt. Gen. Tran Van Minh, commander in chief of 

the air force; Ll. Gen. Du Quoc Dong, commander of III 

Corps; Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, chief of stall of jGS and 

also commanding general of lhe Central Logistics Command; 

and I as chairman of jGS. The subject for discussion was 

whether or not to reinforce Phuoc Long and, if so, how much 
THE UEGINNING 0 "- TilE ~:ND 63 

reinforcement was needed III terms of troops and other resources. 

In his capacity as commander of III Corps. General Dong, 

after his briefing concerning the situation in MR-IlI and at 

Phuoc Long in particular, asked for at least one infantry division or the Airborne Division. His plan was to moullt a relief 

operation by helilifting the division into the city from the north 

with maximum support of taclical aircraft and helicopters and 

air-dropped supplies. General Dong Ihen offered to resign, 

citing his inability to improve the situation in MR-1I1 since he 

assumed its command three months earlier. Ilis offer was immediately rejected by President Thieu who was apparently 

morc conce rned with the qucstion of reinforcement. The plan 

was thoroughly examined but rejected for the following reasons: 

Troop reinforcement: JGS no longer held any unit in reserve. Both the Airborne and Marine Divisions were deployed 

in MR-I, and the situation there did not pemlit their withdrawal. The situations in MR-I1 and MR-IV also precluded removing any unit from those areas if stability were to be maintained. 

The same was equall y true of MR-I11 because the 18th and 

25th Di"isions were positioned to prevent the NVA CT -5 and 

CT -9 Divisions from pushing into Tay Ninh and Saigon. 

Airlift: All roads leading into Phuoc Long were cut and 

could not be cleared. Any relief operation would depend entirely on airlift to land and supply tl·OOpS. To mount the operation as planned, two UH-I squadrons and one CI-I-47 squadron would be required (0 augmem airlift assets of MR-III plus 

additional tactical aircraft. TIle UH-I squadrons could be diverted from MR-IJ and MR- IV, but the additiona l CH-47 

assets were nowhere available. The CI-I-47 squadrons of MRII and MR-IV, being newly activated units, were low in efficiency. Each squadron could only provide from four to six 

helicopters per day, and this was just about what each MR 

would require for its own daily emergency use. Moreover, the 

UH-I was incapable of flying nonstop from Bien Hoa to Phuoc 

Long and had to make a refueling stop. The CH-47 was also 

incapable of lifting a 155-mm. howitzer. 

As to suppl)., we could air-drop from high altitude the 

planned daily requirement of sixty to one hundred tons for a 

period of seven to ten days provided a large drop zone could 

be secured. But if supply had to be sustained beyond ten da ys, 

then airlift support for the other MRs might have to be sacri-
TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

ficed. It was also anticipated that losses in aircraft would be 

very high, given the enemy's antiaircraft deployment at Phuoc 

Long. And if heavy losses were inculTed, our air potential 

would be permanently reduced because no aid funds were 

available for replacements. 

Timing: Our forces in Phuoc Long would be unable to hold 

out much longer against the two au acking divisions despite 

advantageous defensive positions. If reinforcemem were decided on, it should be completed rapidly, within two or three 

days, before the city fell. If the Airborne Division were sem to 

Phuoc Long, the lime required to assemble the troops, airlift 

them, and prepare them for combat would be five to seven 

days. An infantry division from MR-IV would also need at least 

three days to make ready for combat at Phuoc Long. This was 

wha t it had taken the 21st Division when it redeployed to Chon 

Thanh in 1972. 

Strategic significance: On balance. Phuoc Long was much 

less important than Tay Ninh, Pleiku, or Hue, economically, 

politicall y, and d emographically. Given our reduced means at 

this particul ar juncture, if it were deemed necessary to hold 

territory, then it would be better to conserve our remaining 

assets for the defense of Tay Ninh and Hue rather than Phuoc 

Long. 

II was finally decided to reinforce Phuoc Long with assets 

ava ilable in MR-Ill. The Sist Airborne Ranger Group, because 

of its experience in the An Loc ba ttle of 1972 and its ability to 

fi ght in jungle areas deep in enemy-controlled territory, was 

selected for the job. Its missions were to support the defense 

of the city's southern perimeter, the most advantageous avenue 

of approach to the city, and to try to reoccupy Sa Ra Mountain. 

On 3 J anuary 1975 the tactical situation remained almost 

unchanged apart from an increase of enemy pressure on the 

southern perimeter. The dcfense perimetcr was now reduced 

to the marketplace, the provincial administrative compl ex, and 

the 1.-19 Airfield. All of our howitzers had been silenced by 

over 2,000 artill ery rounds concentrated on the administrative 

complex and the sector's operations center. Twenty tons of 

ammunition and supplies had been dropped accurately on a 

drop zone north of the sector headquarters from high-flying 

cargo planes (up to 12.000 feet). However, the enemy's intense 

artillery fires had made recovery of the supplies extremely 

difficult. Over 300 wounded were awaiting evacuation. It was 
TilE BEGINNING OF T~IE END 65 

planned to ship them out on the relUrn flights of the helicopters scheduled to land the airborne Rangers the next day, 4 

January. 

In the meantime at Bien Hoa, the 8 1 st Ranger Group had 

assembled IWO companies and readied them for combat. T he 

group commander had completed reconnaissance of a landing 

zone on the slope of a hill north of sector headquarters. Flight 

routes had also been selccted. On 4 January rain and clouds 

frustrated two landing 3Llempts. The enemy meanwhile increased his shelling and aLlacked, but our troops held. The 

sector operations center was repeatedly hit by artill ery fire and 

was finally destroyed. T he seclor deputy commander was killed 

instantly. and Lt. Col. Xuan. district chief of Phuoc Binh, was 

grave ly wounded. At the same time, enemy tanks were sighted 

west and south of the city. Communi cations between sector 

and III Corps headquarters were reduced to a single radio 

channe l after· the destruction of the operations center. 

On 5 J anuary at 0800, sixty tactical air sorties cleared a 

helicopter landing zone east of the city. At 0900 the first 

landing of one company of the Ranger group (120 men) was 

successfully completed. As soon as they landed, the airborne 

troops linked up with the garrision. At 1100 a wave of helicopters moved in to land another company and a headquarters 

detachment north of the provincial administration building. By 

the time the helilift was com pic ted at 1500, over 250 airborne 

troops had been inserted in the midst of deadly enemy artillery 

fire. Onl y one squad had been lost. Several heli copters were 

hit by antiaircraft fire, but all managed to escape. However, 

because of the enemy's intense fires, it proved impossible to 

evacuate the wounded as orginally planned. 

In the interim, enemy tanks had broken through Regional 

Force positions at the sector logistical support center and were 

moving into the city. Enemy sapper teams ca rried in by tanks 

rapidly set up blocking positions while the tanks advanced 

toward the sector headquarters and the province chiefs resi· 

dence which now served as his command post and that of the 

airborne Rangers. But the enemy was driven back, and the 

Rangers launched a counterattack to reoccupy positions that 

had been lost, in particular the sector logistical support center. 

Although their counterattack was fierce and gallant, the airborne troops failed to regain the lost positions. By this time 

they had suffered 50 percent casualties. Our M-72 rockets. 

moreover, were onl y innicting slight damage on the enelll)' 
66 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

tanks which for lhis ballie had been reinforced on both sides 

and were only partly filled with fuel. However, our gO-mm. 

recoilless antitank rifles pl'oved most effective. 

Late in the day. at 2100. lhe Ranger force sent in its report. 

The situation was desperate and not at all what sector had 

reported earlier [0 III Corps. Regional Forces were completely 

disorganized and had fled their positions when the tanks 

moved in. The Ranger commander decided La organize his 

defense around the province chiefs residence and the provincial administration building. During the night over 1,000 anillery rounds were fired on this area and the business district. 

On 6 January at 0900, enemy troops supported by tanks 

auacked again. The battle raged all day. At 2300 contact was 

lost with sector headquarters, but the airborne troops still 

maimained their communications. At 2400 the Rangers disen~ 

gaged and filtered out of (he city. 

The next morning, 7 January, at 1000 the airborne Rangers 

reported the position of a 50-man element and their headquarters somewhere north of the city. Another group was reported 

northeast of National Route 14 . From 9 to 15 January the 81st 

Ranger Croup Headquarters conducted a search and rescue 

operation. And II Corps joined in this operation around Route 

14 near the boundary of MR-U. After four days of search, 121 

airborne Rangers were retrieved by helicopters. TItus. the airborne force lost about half of its committed strength. Other 

troops and civilians from Phuoc Long also managed to find 

their way to safety at various places. A 10lal of over 1,000 

people, to include civilians, police, Regional Force troops, and 

men of the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry were thus rescued 

and returned to Saigon. But the province chief. the district 

chief of Phuoc Sinh, the infamry baualion commander, and 

over 3,000 troops failed to make it back to our lines. 

At the time of his attack against Phuoc Long, the enemy 

also launched attacks at two other places in MR-III: in the 

north of Tay Ninh and at Hoai Duc-Tanh Linh (Sinh Tuy 

Province). His aim was clearly to stretch our lines and prevent 

us from reinforcing Phuoc Long. The capture of Phuoc Long 

crowned the enemy's conscious and systematic efforts. Since 

December 1974 he had successively overrun the outlying dis~ 

tricts, and by the lime the battle began the city had been 

practically sealed ofT. The outcome of the battle could have 

been foreseen from the starr. To confront the NVA main force 

of two divisions and its complements of armor and anillery, all 
THE BEGINNING OF TIlE END 67 

the sector of Phuoc Long could put up was Regional Force 

troops, augmented a t the last minute by one regular baualion. 

The organiza tion for the defense was also incomplete. A 

sudden and last-minute change in the defense plan prevented 

Lhe ga rrison from o rganizing and consolidating its positions. 

The province chief proved unable to control his forces, and as 

a result his reports to III Corps were mostly inaccurate. 

The enemy in contrast e njoyed a tremendous numerical 

advantage. He also benefited from a few technical and tactical 

innovations. The armor of his tanks, for example, had been 

suppl emented to provide an air space or cushion and protect 

lhe sides of the veh icles from antitank rockets. Enemy sappers 

made no auempt to penetrate in small groups by night as they 

usually did in advan ce of the main force. Instead. in this ballie 

they were carried into the city by tanks with the main allacking 

force. The e nemy's artillery was accurate, and the intensity of 

its fire was frightening. Because of his advantage in firepower, 

he au acked only during daytime. He was also able to monitor 

our radio communications, and he knew in advance our every 

tacti cal move. 

T o best sum up what contributed to lhe loss of Phuoc 

Long, let us hear the comment of an airborne trooper, a 

veteran of An Loc, who had fought in the battle: 

The enemy troops were not so good and so courageous as we might 

have thought. There were simply too many of them. The cnemy's 

artillery fire was fierce and many limes more accurate lhan il had 

been during the battle of An Loc. Enemy tanks had something new 

and strange. Our M-72 rockets wcre unable to knock them out. We 

hit them; they stopped for a while then moved on. Our air support 

was not very effective; the planes new too high. If only ..... 1.' CQuid have 

had 8-52s like we did at An Loc! 

Militarily, the capture of Phuoc Long gave the enemy exlended control over a very large area. Three o f his base areas 

were now linked togelher in a conlinuous arc from the Cambodian border across norlhern MR-III with access routes toward 

Ham Tan on the coasl. Psychologicall y and politicall y, the loss 

of Phuoc Long, the firsl provincial capital of South Vietnam 

permanemly seized by the Communists, came as a shock to the 

population and lhe a rmed forces. The apparelll total indifference with which the United States and other non-Communist 

countries regarded this tragic loss reinforced the doubt the 

Vietnamese people held concerning the viability of the Paris 
68 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

Agreement. Almost gone was the hope that the United States 

would forcibly punish the North Vietnamese for their brazen 

violations of the cease-fire agreement. The people's belief in 

the power of the armed forces and the government was also 

deeply shaken. To the Communists Phuoc Long was not 

merely a military victory. What they had gained psychologically 

and poli tically was morc importam. It was their first big step 

toward tOlal military conquest, boldly taken yet apparently 

without fear of any reaction from the United States. What 

morc encouragement could the Communists have asked for? 

And what a good chance for them to step up propaganda 

against our government and to appea l to our troops to quit 

the ir ranks and join the Communists. 

Ban Mt Thuot 

Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu, who had commanded the 1st 

Infantry Division from October 1970 toJuly 1972, replaced Ll. 

Gen. Nguyen Van Toan as commander of II Corps in December 1974 upon the recommendation of Vice·President Tran 

Van Huong who had insisted on removing General Toan because of cha rges of corruption. President Thieu apparently 

gave in to his vice·president's insistence with reluctance be· 

cause he knew that despite the charges General Toan was a 

thoroughly competent field commander. General Toan was 

assigned as chief of armor and on 5 February 1975 was also 

given command of III Corps. He replaced General Dong, who 

had resigned a month earlier. The change of command in MRII contributed to the events that finally led to the coll apse of II 

Corps. 

The Communists. meanwhile. were preparing for their next 

major campaign with more confidence than ever, encouraged 

by the new U.S. hands-off policy. Indications were that MR-li 

would be the theater for the opening rounds of the campaign 

then in the making. By the end of January 1975, the NVA 

320th Division based at Duc Co (near Pleiku) was reported 

moving south toward the Darlac Plateau. The II Corps was 

alerted, but no significant action was taken apart from daily 

aerial attacks against enemy truck convoys. During February, 

Communist truck convoys were sighted almost daily moving 

south in great numbers along the western border routes. In 

one instance. toward the end of February, a convoy of several 
THE BEGINNING OF TIfE END 69 

hundred trucks was sighted and attacked by our air force with 

spectacularly destructive effect. 

Other NVA divisions-for example, the 3 16th, the 312lh, 

and the 341 sl-were also reported moving southward, but 

their destinations remained unknown. The 316th Division in 

particular concealed its movement toward Ban Me Thuot by 

cautiously approaching from lower Laos. Enemy documents 

captured on 5 March also revealed the movement of the engineer regiment of the F-IO Division from Kontum to Ban Me 

Thuot. From other fragmentary pieces of information, the 

enemy's preparations for a major offensive and plan of altack 

against Ban Me Thuot became obvious. In the preliminary 

phase the enemy planned to cut National Routes 14, 19, and 

21 to sever the highland provinces from the II Corps lowlands 

and by the same action preclude friendly reinforcement. The 

320th Division was to take up positions north of Ban Me 

Thuot and neutralize all outposts on Route 14 as well as the 

Phuong Duc Airfield. The F-IO Division would conduct the 

main attack from the southwest into the city along National 

Route 14 (Map 3). Precautions were taken to keep all preparations secret to obtain maximum surprise. 

T he II Corps G-2 had correclly compiled this estimate as 

early as mid-February, but unfortunately his warning was not 

given serious consideration by the corps commander who believed that the enemy's moves toward Ban Me Thuot were only 

diversionary or at most a secondary effort and that Pleiku 

would be the main objective. The disposition of II Corps 

accordingly reflected its commander's thinking. The entire 23d 

Division was deployed in the Pleiku area, leaving the task of 

defending Ban Me TIlUot to a Ranger group and provincial 

Regional Force and Popular Force units composed mostly of 

Montagnards. At the beginning of March when alerted to the 

NVA 320Lh Division movement toward Ban Me Thuot, II 

Corps simply sent a headquarters detachment and a regiment, 

the 53d of the 23d Division, back to Ban Me ThuoL The 53d 

Regiment was then assigned the task of operating south of the 

Phuong Due Airfield, and the Range r group was deplo yed in 

the Buon Ho area, some twenty mil es to the northeast. Reconnaissance teams of the 23d Division and of the Strategic Technical Directorate were dispatched into the border area around 

Ban Don Outpost to trace the movement of the 320th Division, 

but only small skirmishes wiLh company-size local enemy units 

resulted. 
70 

, 

I 

g-o!: 1/~23 ~ ............ , 

MAP3 

'\ ,,'t., 

• 

THE FINAL COLlAPSE 

, 

'. , 

I 

I 

• , 11/:iI1~ 

[g1320 

'\ s.n ,.,.,-.6 

...!!J, ~ ... .... Thuot l.Iv,,, ..... "J. ;..u, LmJ', L:J 

F=:I PHUONG Due AIRFIElO 

The enemy in the meantime had cffcClivcly blocked Na tion. 

al Route 2 1 from Ban Me ThuoL to Nha Trang. An unSliccessfu l clearing operation was conducted by Khanh I-foa Seclor, 

and the road remained blocked nonh of Khanh Duong District 

Town some fifty miles cast of Ban Me T huol. O n 5 March 

1975, lhe Communists auacked and overran Timan Man District Town on National Route 14, approximately halfway between Ple iku and Ban Me T huOl. T hus. communicalions by 

road fro m Ban Me 111UOt to Ple iku and II Corps Headquarters 

and to Nha Trang on the coast were effectively interdicted. 

and the isolation of Ban Me ThuOL was complclcd. 

The ballie o f Ban Me Thuot began on 10 March and ended 

on 18 March 1975. In lhc earl y hours of IO March. lhe F-IO 

Division supported by armor and anill cry launchcd a three· 
THE BI..:c INN ING OF THE END 7 1 

, 

\ 

\ 

\ 

,~ , 

\ 

, 

'-. , 

Ph"(JC An 

jig 1"·10 

THE FALL OF BAN ME THUOT 

10-18 March 1975 

::00 __ ". Enemy attac k 

= ¢ Airmobile movem enl 

x Roadblock 

o 10 M ILES 

,i-I --~~ Il -"~ERS 

pronged attack into the city. The first prong, conslstmg of 

tank·led infantry. was directed against the ammunition depot 

north of the city. The commande r of the depot, an a rmy 

captain, was kill ed while directi ng the defense, and the depot 

was o"errun in Ihe afternoon. The second enemy effort was 

directed against Phuong Duc Airfield where e nemy troops 

clashed violently with our 53d Regiment , and their advance 

became stalled. T he third and leading elTort. another combined infantry and tank attack, swiftly overran the L-1 9 Airfield and pushed imo Ihe city, establishing blocking positions 

as it moved. T he main target was the sector headquarter, 

which was encircled and attacked vigorously. An enem)' 1'-54 

lank was destroyed on the outer perimeter of the seCle r headqua rters. A litt le past noon the sector opera tions center was hit 
72 TilE FINAL COl.l..APSE 

by artill ery fire and destroyed. T he sector commander-province chief was forced to move to the detachment command 

post of the 23d Division. By this lime, however, the command 

and conlrol of Regional Force and Popular Force troops had 

become disorganized. Enemy troops and tanks now converged 

o n the 23d Division CP, and the baltle raged. By the end of 

the first day, three enemy tanks had been destroyed at this 

loca tio n. 

The Ranger group was immediately ordered to move to the 

city from Buo n 1-10, and this relief operation in effect began 

the same afternoon. But, being grea tl y impeded by the 

enemy's blocking positions, the Rangers did not accomplish 

much to reli eve the enemy pressure. At the same lime regional 

troops and armor clements operating in the Bu Prang area 

were also ordered back to Ban Me Thuot, but Lhey were 

blocked at a bridge le n miles southwest of the cit y. 

During the night of 10 March enemy forces were augment· 

ed by the 3 16th Division. The e ncirclement tightened around 

the 23d Division Headq uarters compl ex, and the fierceness of 

the attack increased by the hour. TIle deputy commander of 

the 23d Division at the detachment CP requested close air 

support. Our tactical aircraft made very accura te bombing runs 

and destroyed many enemy tanks. Unforlunately, one bomb 

struck the division's tactical operations center and destroyed it. 

Communica tions with 11 Corps Headquarters were lost from 

that time. 

O n 13 March the 7th Ranger Group was airlifted from MRIII to Pleiku and assigned to II Corps Headquarters to replace 

the 44th and 45th Regiments of the 23d Division which had 

been ordered LO Ban Me Thuot in an attempt to save the 

besieged city, by now under the virtual control of the e nemy. 

T he next day, 14 March, a relief force composed of the 45th 

Regiment and one battalion of the 44th was helilifted LO Phuoc 

An, a district town twenty miles east of Ban Me T lmot. where 

the baltered troops from the city's garrison, their dependents, 

and much of the civilian population had begun to converge. 

The adva nce of the relief column was slow and its counterat· 

tack ineffective. owing in part to the troubled morale of the 

troops whose dependents were being stranded in the city. A 

large number of troops of the relief force broke ranks and 

headed toward the city in sea rch of their dependents. 

On 16 March the commander of the 23d Division was 

slighlly wounded and was evacuated from the combat zone. On 
THE 8EGINNING OF THE END 73 

18 March Communist forces overran Phuoc An District Town. 

the last base for a relief elTort. All fighting for the city had now 

ceased, and the entire province of Darlac came under enemy 

comrol. In the. meantime. thirty miles farther east, at Khanh 

Duong. the 3d Airborne Brigade had taken up blocking positions on National Route 21 after arrival from MR-I the day 

before in an elTon to stop the advance of the enemy's F-IO 

Division toward the coast. The brigade also made an elTon to 

retrieve the baltered troops of MR-I1 who were retrealing 

from Ban Me ThuOI and Phuoc An in small groups mixed wilh 

the civilian population rushing toward Nha Trang. 

The loss of Ban Me Thuot resulted pl-imarily from a failure 

to field a sufficient force for the defense of the city when the 

altack began. The enemy achieved tactical surprise and. more 

importantly, a vast numerical superiority in committing three 

infamry divisions with supporting armor and artillery. The 

commander of 11 Corps failed to reassess his situation in lhe 

light of hard intelligence concerning the movemem of the 

NVA 320th and F-JO Divisions toward Ban Me ThuOt and 

ignored his G-2's assessment as well as that of JGS. His preconceived and inflexible opinion convinced him that the enemy 

would strike Pleiku and Kontum. the usual objectives of the 

enemy's main effort in the past. 

Underslandably, the 11 Corps commander's assessment led 

him to deploy the bulk of his forces in the Pleiku-Kontum area 

and to leave the defense of Ban Me Thuot mostly 10 forces of 

the Regional and Popular Forces. This was also reflected in his 

reinforcement of distant outposts like Buon Ho and Bu Prang 

with armor and regular forces. He did, however, consider 

moving the whole 23d Division 10 Ban Me Thuot at the end of 

February at the insistence of his G-2. But afler last-minute 

advice from the 23d division commander, the corps commander changed his mind and ordered the 44th and 45th Regiments 

to remain in Pleiku. 

When lhe movement of the F-IO Division was reported to 

him on 6 March and after enemy troops had overrun Thuan 

Man on National Route 14 and cut Route 2 I nonh of Khanh 

Duong. the II Corps commander began to have second 

thoughts. Concerned but still not convinced, he ordered one 

Ranger group to Ban Me T huot, not to reinforce the city's 

garrison but to take up positions at Buon Ho twenty miles to 

the nonh. He himself visited Ban Me Thuot on 8 March. 

inspected the city's defense organization. and ordered combat 
74 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

preparedness and, among other things. the issue of M-72 anti. 

lank rockets and TOW missiles. As an additional precautio n, 

he also ordered the dispersion of the ammunition depot. When 

the enemy auack finally materialized. however, the only troops 

ava il able for the defense of the city itself were the 53d Regiment and Regional Force and Popular Force tfOOpS. Caught 

short by the aU3ck. II Corps began reinforcing Ban Me T huOl, 

but the effort was piecemeal and too late in any event. By this 

lime all reinforcement roules had been effectively blocked. 

The enemy thus had a golden 0PP0rlUnilY for a surprise 

3lt3Ck in overwhelming force. He succeeded in conceali ng the 

movements of his major unilS which arrived in the Ban Me 

Thuot area largely undetected. The 3 16th Division. for example, maintained strict radio silence while o n the move. T he 

NVA 320th Division purposely left its command r'adio station 

behind in Duc Co, apparently to deceive ollr radio direction 

finding efforts. But this deceptio n scheme served no useful 

purpose simpl y because none of our electronic reconnaissance 

aircraft dared venture near Duc Co during that time. The F-IO 

Division kept its presence hidden by avoiding contact with our 

reconnaissance patrols. The enemy also cunningly selected Ullusual approach rOlltes for his armor, through jungles and 

alo ng streams. Finally, Regional Force and Popular Force Montagnard troops manning listening o utposts on the defense perimeter failed to report e nemy sightings or conduct a delaying 

aClio n. This enabled enemy units to advance to the city undetected and aHack sector headquarters. 

When the allack was launched o n 10 March, the e nemy 

forces directed their main effort at our command posts. the 

sector headquaners and the headquarters detachment of the 

23d Division which com rolled all defense forces in the area. 

T his effort paid off handsomely. I-lal'd pressed from the beginning by a heavy attack, the sector headqual'lers was unable to 

exercise effective coordinatio n and control. Its Regional Force 

and Popular FOI'ce troo ps and police graduall y became disorgani zed and fought incohesively. It was impossible for lhe 

seclor commander to re port accuratcly on the situatio n in the 

city, and when his operations center was destroycd by enemy 

artill ery fire, he was forced to move to the 23d Division CPo All 

organized resistance by Regio nal Force and Popul ar Force 

sector troops viTlua ll y stopped for lack of direction and control. The 23d Division CP was confronted with the same situation from the start. The pressure became particularly heavy 
TilE BEGINNING OF TilE t:NO 75 

when enemy tanks closed in and fircd from the outer dcfense 

perimeter. Air support was accurate and effective but too 

close. One bomb exploded on the CP itself causing loss of 

communications and effective coordination and control. 

The counterattack was doomed to failure from the starl. 

Phuoc An, whcl'e troops of the 44th and 45th Regiments as· 

sembled, was the way station for the civilian population fleeing 

the fighting. Here some of the new troops met their depcn· 

dents and disappeared into the streaming flow of refugees. 

Others, anxious about the fale of dcpendellls or relatives 

stranded in the embattlcd city, simply brokc ranks and fled in 

search of their families. As a result, it was impossible to assem· 

ble a cohesive combat force for the effort. Phuoc An. lhe last 

base for a counterattack, was overrun four days later by the FlO Division. Any hope for recapturing the city was gone. 

President Thiell S Falqul Decision 

During the first two mOlllhs of 1975, a number of U.S. 

congressmen made fact.finding visits to South Vietnam. In the 

face of the deteriorating military situation and in view of the 

impending congressional debates on the issue of supplcmen. 

tar), aid, our government extended a warm welcome to its 

influential visitors. Members of thc U.S. Congress had been 

urged LO see for themselves how South Vietnam was faring 

economica ll y. politically, and milita!ily before they should 

decide whether to grant what had been requested. Hence, the 

visits were awa ited with high expectation. 

The first visitor was Senator Sam Nunn, followed by Repre. 

sClllative Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey and Senator Dewey Ban· 

lett. Then came the main party, including both senators and 

representatives. jGS thoroughly briefed the first visitors on the 

current situation in South Vietnam. nle briefing centered on 

the insurmountable shortages Ihal would result without the 

$300 million supplemental aid and pointed out thc imminent 

danger of oven aggression which by now had become an 

obvious facl. The lasl visitors were not given any official brief· 

ings. but some congressmen took time to visit jGS and the 

permanent exhibit of captured Communist weapons at jGS 

headquarters. 

The backgrounds of the visiting congressmen were as di· 

verse as their opinions on the issue of U.S. aid. Some were for. 

OIhers were against it. Some came with open minds, and olhers 
76 THE FINAL COLLA I'SE 

appeared heavily prejudiced. Some were courteous and 

modest; others rude and contemptuous. Still others were com· 

plClcly detached and indifferent. But no matter who they were 

or how they behaved. all were received with equal warmth and 

sincerity. They were completely free to see whatever Lhey 

wished, to contac t anyone: progovernmcm or opposition 

groups; detainees or free people. 

The entire population of 50mh Vietnam, including the 

Communists. watched their movement and listened to their 

comments when possible. Speculation was rifc, and hopes were 

raised or stifled . Those who opposed President Thieu and 

wanted a coalition with the CommunislS expected the United 

Slales LO press our government for a change in attitude more 

to their liking and advantage. The moderates silently hoped 

that American leaders would thoughtfully examine the aid 

issue and that reasonably adequate military aid would be provided: first to allow us to defend ourselves and second to deter 

further Communist aggression. As for the Communists, they 

hoped for a complete aid cutoff which would destroy our 

armed forces. 

In general, the departing visitors left behind a feeling of 

pessimism. The atmosphere was charged with rumors and 

speculation, all detrimental to the national cause. In the United 

States. we were induced to believe, our government was considered incorrigibly corrupt, despotic, and repressive. Disenchanted a nd troubled by its own domestic difficulties. political 

and economic, the United Slates was no longer in a position to 

contribute to the war effort. Aid stood no chance of being 

increased; on the contrary, it would be trimmed further for 

American attention had shifted to the Middle East. 

No one read the signs and clues better than President 

Thieu himself. By the time the last visitor had departed he 

knew that there was no longer any hope for the $300 million 

additiona l aid. He also came to realize that the only possible 

future trend for U.S. military aid to South Vietnam was downhill. And apparently he made up his mind on the basis of these 

readings. What he had adamantly refused to do for the last two 

years, he was now resigned to accept. That was why the redeployment of our armed forces was attempted. 

The forceful attack against Ban Me TImot and the relative 

ineffectiveness of II Corps reactions seemed to act like a catalyst on the mind of President Thieu, the only man who made 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 77 

all the decisions as to how the war should be conducted. I So 

far it had largely been a maller of holding out against increasingly unfavorable odds. Overextended throughout the entire 

national territory to the last reserve unit, our armed fOI·ces 

certainly could not do much to alter such odds. Besides, reduced aid had in many ways affected their combat capabilities 

and, more than usually admiued, their morale as well. Under 

those circumstances. it had become obvious lhat something 

had Lo be done if South Viemam were to survive at all. 

For some time JGS. in its advisory and supporting role, had 

thou gill that the armed forces would stand a beller chance of 

holding if they had less territory to defend. From a military 

point of view. it was a sound idea, but politically it ran afoul of 

the publicly avowed "holding at all costs" stance that PI·csidcnt 

Thieu had embraced since the cease-fire. No doubt. thc president must have had second thoughts in his private moments. 

The deteriorating situation spoke for itself. First Phuoc Long. 

now Ban Me ThuOl. in just two months. What area would be 

next? Also, the bitLer aftertaste of those American lawmakers' 

visits was still lingering. 

So his mind must have been made up when President 

Thieu invited the prime minister. Lt. Gen. Dang Van Quang. 

his assistant for security affairs. and me for a working breakfast 

at the palace on I J March 1975, the day after Ban Me ThuOI 

was attacked. When coffee and food had been served and the 

attendants had left. he took out a small-scale map of South 

Vietnam and started the session by going over the military 

situation with which we were all completely familiar. Then he 

said mauer-of-factly: "Given our present strength and capabilities, we certainly cannot hold and defend all the territory we 

want." Instead we should redeploy our forces to hold and 

defend onl y those populous and flourishing areas which were 

really the most important. 

The conclusion struck us as one to which he must have 

given very careful consideration. It was as if he had been 

holding it back. and wanted now to impart the decision to just 

the three of us around the breakfast table. He outlined on the 

map (Map 4) those areas he considered important. They encompassed all of MR-III and MR-IV plus their territorial 

waters. Those few areas which happened to be presently under 

Communist control within this territory ought to be reoccupied 

'5« Ap~n hx A. 
78 T ilE FINAL COllAPSE 

at all cOSts. After all. this lerritory \\'as where our nationa l 

resources-rice. rubber, industries. clc.-were concentrated. 

This was by far our most populous and prosperous land. In 

addition. its contincmal shelf had ft'cenlly yielded oil. This was 

going to be OUl" untouchable heartland, the irreducible national stronghold: Saigon. its surrounding pro\'inccs, and the 

Mekong Delta. 

Continuing his impassioned monologue on geopolitics. 

P'"csidenl Thicu sounded perhaps a trine less assured when it 

came to MR-JI and MR-l. In the Central Highlands, he said, 

indicating the area by a sweeping mOlion of his hand, the Ban 

Me ThuOI area was more imponant than Kontum and Pleiku 

taken together, because of its economic and demographic preponderance. So were the coastal provinces of MR- IJ because 

they bordered on the potentiall y rich continental shelf. As to 

MR-I, it was large ly a matter of " hold what yo u can." Here he 

sketched his idea by drawing a series of phase lines cutling 

across the width of MR- I at different loca tions of the coastline 

from the nonh downward. If we were strong eno ugh, he said. 

we would hold the territory up to Hue or Da Nang. If not, 

then we could redeploy farther south to Chu Lai o r even Tuy 

H03. This way. he emphasized. we could redeploy our own 

capabilities, hold a mo re important part of o ur national territory with a beller chance of surviving and prospering as a 

natio n. 

And so, with a few preemptory statements, a momentous 

decision had been made. h s full implication was still not clear, 

but it certainl y carried wide ranging pro blems, militarily speaking. As the senior military advisor. I felt obliged to voice my 

o pinio n. I sa id something to the effect that this redeployment 

was indeed necessary, and I had embraced such an idea for a 

lo ng time. But so far I had kept it to myself and considered it 

an improper proposal. First of all, it conflicted with the prevailing natio nal policy, and. second, if I had made such a 

suggestion, it could well have been interpreted as an indica tion 

of defeatism. What I refrained from adding though was that I 

believed it was too late for any successful redeployment of 

such magnitude. Besides. it looked to me like a decision that 

precluded any unfavorable comment. After all, as commander 

in chief, it was the president's prerogative and responsibility to 

dictatc thc conduct of the war. I-Ie must have known exactly 

what he was doing. 
PAESIDENT THIEU'S BRIEFING MAP 

11_1m 

_ 

_ro __ 

........ _ ... _ ._._-

111111111\ _ .. """'"' ............ '0 .. _ 

, '----,--" , -- _._' ... 

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80 TilE FINAL COUJ\PSE 

However radical a departure from the currem srralcgy this 

decision may have been, it was cenainly the mosl logical thing 

any leader could do. It had been well over two years since the 

Paris Agreement was signed, and the situation was delcriorat· 

ing at an alarming ra te. The o nl y criticism Lhal one could make 

was (0 question why President Thieu had waited so long. In 

the meeting he gave no explanatio n or any indication of the 

steps in reaching his decision. It seemed to now natura ll y from 

the facts themselves. Previously, he had hoped il would be 

possible to hold o n {a remote and sparsely populated areas. If 

the Communists should violate the Paris Agreement, then 

Ices and the world at large would realize who was the culprit. 

And if lhe violations were too flagrant, President Thieu had 

hoped, and had been led to ho pe, the United Stales would 

justifiably take certain forceful actions in response as promised 

by President Nixon. 

For two years, however, the Communists had been esca lating their violations in number and scale to test the willingness 

of the United States to react. Whil e he was in office, it was 

true, President Nixon occasionally issued ..... arnings to Hanoi. 

But after his resignation o n 8 August 1974 J the promise of 

"vigorous reaction" became empty rhetoric. Even the attack on 

Phuoc Lo ng evoked no response in the United States. The 

negative altitude of most of the visiting American lawma kers 

deflated the last hopes. It was almost certain that the U.S. 

Congress was in no mood to see the war conti nued. much less 

appropriate additional money to prosecute it. If anything, its 

mind and book were closed for good . 

There was no other choice for President Thieu if he wanted 

to save wha t he could while there was still some chance of 

success. But it was already too late. A redeployment of our 

forces should have been carried out by mid-1974. At the latest, 

such a mo,'e should have been taken as soon as President 

Nixon resigned. As the principal architect of Vietnamization 

and the Paris Agreement. in our view, he was the only American official who bore the moral obligation of enforcing the 

cease-fire. He was also the only credible man who had the 

courage to take bold and forceful action when it was required. 

So it was then or never. 

The Communists certainly would have welcomed any territorial gain. and cease-fire boundaries could have been a subject of bargaining. We would have been much better off with a 

reduced but not infested territory. Such an arrangement would 
THE BECINNING 01' THE END 8 1 

have more closely resembled the 1954 agreement: a new demarcation line, regrouping of troops on both sides. etc.; two 

dean-cut zones instead of the purulent spots of the "leopard 

skin." Il could have been ideal for our own survival. Bm there 

were chances the Communists would have rejected il. Didn't 

they admit their mistake of agreeing to panitioning at Geneva? 

There was much less chance they would accept this solution 

again. After all, they had not gone through twenty years of war 

and hardship for nothing. 

By the lime Ban Me Thuot was lost, it was far too late. For 

one thing, the enemy was on a winning streak. For anolhcr, he 

had finally achieved a subslantial numerica l superiority. Extended and pressed Ihe way we were, Ihere was little chance 

we could disengage from any place without being pursued and 

pressed on fanher. 

There was also the problem of the local population and 

military dependents. Evacuating or failing 10 evacuate them at 

the appropriate time might be the key to success. No national 

leader in his right mind would ever think of deliberately abandoning the population to the mercy of the enemy. Yct concern 

for saving his military forces might compel him to do exactly 

thal. But experience had proved that most South Vietnamese 

fled the Communists if they could. And "population" also 

meant military dependents who were the source of comfon 

and support for the combat troops. It was unthinkable (0 try to 

separate them for any length of time because they always 

tended to get together. This was especially true considering 

the traditional Vietnamese family attachment and the marginal 

living conditions of the troops and their dependents in general. All this had to be carefully considered whenever an auempt 

was made to separate troops from their families for any 

lengthy period. 

In retrospect, the question is now raised as to the chance 

South Vietnam had of survivi ng if the redeploymelll had not 

been attempted. It sounds perhaps presumptuous at this time, 

but I believe the chances were good. For one thing, the selfgenerated collapse of morale among the troops and population-the direct consequence of the redeployment fiasco and 

the true catalyst of rapid disinlegralion-probably would not 

have happened, and we would still have had almost all our 

units intact, except perhaps part of the 23d Division. Even 

after Ban Me Thuot. the enemy would have had to stop and 

think twi ce before pressing o n with another offensive of that 
• 

82 T ilE FI NAL COLLA I'SE 

scale in MR-Il. The II Corps still had the 22d Division and the 

equi valent of two olher combat divisions plus two air d ivisions 

and enough logistical support to cominue fighti ng through the 

dry season. Witho ut the redeployment, J don't think the enemy 

would have succeeded in gaining much headway in MR- I 

either. T hen the situation would have dragged on as before, 

morc precariously in the face of dwind ling military aid and 

difficulties in reconstituting a general reserve. But definit ely it 

would not have deteriorated so rdpidly and exte nsively if the 

redeployme nt had no t been attempted a t all. 

T hat was the military prospect in the shorl term. After Ban 

Me T huOl. I think the enemy would have tried to pressure for 

a coa lition, and Preside nt T hie u might have been inclined to 

accept it. But even that would merely have been an interim 

modus vi ve nd i. T he Communists would have sought more mil. 

itary victori es with the objective of gaining still more polilical 

concessions. But could South Vie tnam have withstood the 

enemy's mounling pressure in the long ru n? 1 believe il all 

depended on the amount o f U.S. military aid. T he hard and 

cold fact was thaI without additional appropriations our armed 

forces wo uld have run out of fuel and ammunition by June 

1975. How could any army stand and fi ght without the essen· 

tial things with which to do the fi ghting? 
CHAPTER 6 

The Rout in the Highlands 

Two days after the historic mecting at the Independence 

Palace during which lhe redeployment stra tegy was discussed, 

President Thieu expressed his desire LO see Maj. Gen. Pham 

Van Phu, commander of II Corps. at his headquarters in 

Pleiku. By now, Ban Me ThuOL was uncler virtual cOlllroi of the 

Communists, and the [ramie efforts of II Corps Lo reoccupy it 

had been largely unfruitful. LeSt lhe chance of retaking this 

importam city slip by indefinitely, it was President Thieu's 

intent 10 review the situation with the field commander and to 

try to save it. Pleiku was also under pressure and being shelled 

sporadically by enemy artillery. This was no place for Lhe 

presidenl to visit. much less for a presumably imponant discussion. Concerned about the president's safety, Genera l Phu 

suggested another place, and after some deba te, Cam Ranh 

was selectcd. The meeting took place on Friday, 14 March 

1975. 

"nle mecting place befitted the occasion perfectly. It was a 

handsome building perched on the top of a sandhill. The 

building dated from 1966 when it was erected by U.S. forces to 

accommoda te President Johnson when he stopped over to visit 

U.S. troops. The same personalities who had auended the 

palace meeting three days earlier accompanied President Thieu 

to Cam Ranh: Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, LL. Gen. 

Dang Van Quang, and I. 

As was cuslOmary for every such meeting, the commander 

of II Corps began the session by giving a briefing on the 

friendly and enemy situation in his military region. The turn of 

events as he described it was definitely grave and his tone 

profoundly pessimistic. All the major axes of communica tion of 

MR-II, National Routes 14, 19, and 21 had been effectively cut 

by the enemy, and traffic had been stopped. The most important of these arteries, Route 19, which cut across the width of 

the country and served as 3 vital link between Pleiku and the 

coastal city of Qui Nhon, was blocked at Binh Khe by the 

entire NVA 3d Division; our 22d Division with its four regi-
84 Til E: "INAL COLLAPSE 

men IS and under (he energetic command of Brig. Gen. Phan 

Dinh Niem had tried unsuccessfully to dislodge enemy tfOOpS 

solidly e ntrenched in their blocking positions. Another NVA 

regiment was poised at Le Trung, a l a striking distance east of 

Plciku, and Pleiku itself was under heavy pressure from enemy 

artillery firc and was threatened with ground 3U3Cks from the 

east and the west (Map .5). As to Ban Me ThuOl, after two days 

of fierce fightin g the prospects of retaking it were not encouraging, given the present balance of forces and the virtual 

impossibility of moving troops by road. 

When the situation briefing was completcd, President Thieu 

pointedly asked the only and foremost question which had 

been preoccupying his mind. Was it at all possible for General 

Phu 10 retake Ban Me Thuol? As expecled, Ihe commander of 

II Corps did nOI commit himself to a positive llnd finn answer. 

He merely asked for reinforcemcms. Turning to me, President 

Thieu wamed to know whal resen'e force we could musler for 

the effort. But he must have known already. The last reserve 

unit, the 7th Ranger Group, had been sent to II Corps at 

General Phu's request when signs of the enemy offensive were 

still developing. Nothing really was left. 

This was the most critical juncture of the cntire war. Down 

10 the last chip, our armed forces now faced a showdown with 

an advcrsary who continuously upped his ante. The only major 

reserve unilS. the Airborne and Marine Divisions, had been 

commiLLcd in MR-l since 1972. Well before the attack against 

Ban Me Thuot, Presidem Thieu, apparently for political reasons, had decided to reassign the Airborne Division 10 the 

Saigon area. The newly created and combat-ready 468th 

Marine Brigade plus a Ranger group were to replace it. Thus, 

1 Corps would eventuall y ga in the equivalent of two brigades 

in return for the three brigades of the Airborne Division. Bul 

deployment of the promised Ranger group was countermanded by President Thieu himself in the face of the rapidly changing situation. The first Airborne Brigade to leave MR-I, the 

3d, was being sea-lifted to Saigon when it received orders on 

17 March to debark at Nha Trang and proceed to Khanh 

Duong on National Route 21 in an emergency move to stop 

the enemy's advance toward the coast after Ban Me ThuOl was 

lost. As combat erupted fiercely in the following days, the 3d 

Airborne Brigade was decimated and never returned to Saigon 

as intended. 
MAP 5 

14 March-2 April 1975 

Convoy ropta 

ARVN retreet 

NVA attack 

Ambush 

Roadblock 

o 21 MILES 

ft-----,,.;r.."".;OMETEFIS 
• 

• 

86 TilE FINAL COI.L\PSF. 

So at the very ~lage when a rcscryc was most needed, JCS 

could give General Phu nothing. It was as if, by asking something he had known all along, President Thieu wanted ever'yone to realize the impasse in which we had found ourselves 

and what was going to dicta te his next move. Again , as during 

the breakfast working session at the pahlce on II March. Presidelll T hieu stood up beside a map of South Vietnam and with 

Genera l Phu looking on alLeolivel}" launched into his explanation of the new strmegy to be adopted. By hand gcslUrcs, he 

skclehed on the map the general contour of the vila l areas 

which General Pilu was supposed to hold. Because of its economic and demographic pOlential, 8an Me T huDl was more 

important than Pleiku and K011lum taken together. It was now 

II Corps' tas k to redeploy its organic rorces in such a manner 

as to rcoccupy Ban Me Th uo t at all costs. T his was the presi. 

dent's order. 

President Thieu then asked Genera l Phu how he proposed 

to redeploy and which roule he had in mind for moving troops 

toward Ban Me Thuot. According to the II Corps commander, 

Na tional Route 19. which ran rrom Pleiku eastward to the 

coast, was impassable; his best division. the 22d had been 

unable to break through at Sinh Khe. National Route 14 , 

which connected Pl eiku wilh Ban Me ThuOl in a north-south 

axis, was also blocked at Thuan Man. north of Ban Me Thuo!. 

There was a chance to dear it, but it would be extremely 

difficult because our progress would be known to the enemy. 

So General Phu said he planned LO use Interprovincial Rotlte 

7B. This was a secondary route which, branching ofT Na tional 

Route 14 twenty miles south of Ple iku, ran southeasterly 

through Hau Bon (Cheo Reo) IOward Tuy Hoa on the coast. A 

narrow, ruggedly surraced track, Interprovincial Route 7B had 

long been ncgleCled and was out of use. Except for the immediately usable short stretch rrom Na tional Route 14 to Hau 

Bon, no one seemed to know its condition . It was known, 

however, thaI one or the major bridges across the Song Ba (Ba 

River) south or Cung Son had been destroyed beyond repair, 

and the road's te rminal streIch west or Tuy Hoa was unusable 

because of extensive mining by Korean forces a rew years 

earlier. However, the commander of II Corps seemed to know 

what he was going to do. Tactical surprise was the critical 

factor, he said, which weighed heavily in his choice. He simply 

requestcd JGS to provide river-crossing racililies. I immediately 

approved this req uest. 
TilE ROUT IN Til E III G ll w\NDS 87 

Moving a corps.sizc column of tl"OOpS, equipment. and vchi. 

des along a largely unknown road some 160 miles through the 

moulllains and jungles of the Highlands was a haza.-dous task 

of grea t ml'lgnilude_ Surprise would on ly wo rk if lhe movement 

were swift and unimpeded. But even the most optimistic com· 

mander could not rule out an e nemy presence and should take 

certain precautions_ This, afler all, used 10 be the enemy's 

favored lype of terrain whe re some of the bloodiest ambushes 

had been sprung against the French Union forces in the 1946-

1954 war. As chairman of J CS, I fe lt it imperalive 10 rcmind 

Gcneral Phu of the difficulties and hazards to be expcctcd and 

the sccurity measures to be taken. A ll'00P movement of this 

magnitude, crossing this terrain and going this dislance, re· 

qui red lhe Genera l to ensure securit y and proteClion along the 

entire route. The column should be organized to afford pro· 

tection for its lead element and its rear element as well as for 

the troops in be tween. Its commande r should also have ade· 

quale and appropriate signal communications and air covcr 

and dose air support, as required. 

Finally there wel'e lessons for which the Fre nch had paid a 

high price during the first Indochina war. I reminded him or 

the French failure in the allempl to eXlricate their troops from 

Lang Son in 1947. I also reminded General Phu of how in 

October 1950 the tWO columns of troops and vehicles com· 

manded by Colonels Le Page and CharlOn-lhe first moving 

out of That Khe northward and the latte r going from Cao 

Bang southward-had been annihilated in the foothills around 

Dong Khe along Colonial Route 4. Last, I spokc or how, on 

thc \'cf)' same typc or tcrrain and road that General Phu's 

column was to move, the famous Frcnch Mobile Croup GM100 was slaughte"ed on National Route 19 near An Khe in 

June 1954 and its rcmnanlS given the final coup de grace at 

Chu·Drck Pass on National Route 14 . Those were bloody and 

tragic lessons that any commandcr in the treacherous Central 

Highlands should have kept in mind. 

When the meeting drew to its end, and thc participants 

were prcparing to leave, General Phu suddenly made a person· 

al request to President Thieu. In an almost pleading tonc, he 

recommended that his subordinate, Col. Pham Van Tat, who 

com manded the Ranger forces in MR-II, be promoted to 

brigadier general. I didn't know Colonel Tat personally. I was 

told he was an able officer, but as a field commander he had 

no olltstanding crcdits on his combat record. While I had no 

472-606 0 - 85 - 4 QL 3 
88 TilE Io-INAL COLLAPSE 

outright objection, my opinion was that for his promotion to 

be justified Colonel Tal should wait umi) he had accomplished 

some substantial feat in comhal. President Thieu was undecid· 

cd; he hesitated and agreed with my reasoning. But Phu was 

insistent and repeatedly pleaded his case with the president 

who finally gave his consent. (After being promoted. Colonel 

Tal was designated to command the forces to be redeployed. 

This explained the insistence with which General Phu had 

urged the promotion of his most trusted subordinate. General 

Phu's two deputies. Brig. Gens. Tran Van Cam and Le Van 

Than, were not given any responsibilities in the redeployment 

except thai General Cam was assigned the vague job of "supervising" the total efTorl.) 

Arriving back in Saigon, I summoned Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh 

Tho, my assistant chief of staff J-3, and told him the details of 

the meeting. My chief of stafT, Ll. Gen. Dong Van Khu yen, was 

out of the country on a visit at the time. My instructions to 

Tho were to keep track of the redeployment movement and to 

give General Phu a hand, all in discretion, because this was 

essentially a top secret operation to be conducted by II Corps 

and to involve only its organic units. It was also a top secret 

operational order given directl y by the president as commander in chief to a field commander. Hence, JGS was unauthorized 

to initiate any orders for the redeployment of those army and 

air force components in the Kontum-Pleiku area not directly 

involved in the operation. 

Genpal Phil 's Plan 

l1lUS far, II Corps' efTorts to clear its vital lines of communication had been unsuccessful. From Qui Nhon, the 22d Infantry Division had pushed its three regiments westward as far 

as Binh Khe on National Route 19 but was unable to break 

through enemy blocking positions despite valiant attempts. 

From Pleiku, a combined armor-infantry task force composed 

of the 25th Ranger Croup and M-48 tanks of the 21st Tank 

Squadron had moved out [0 clear Mang Yang Pass but could 

progress no farLher than Le Trung. just fifteen miles east of 

Pleiku on National Route 19. In the meantime on National 

Route 14 an attempt by elements of the 23d Division to push 

sOUlh toward Ban Me T huot had been defeated halfway short 

of its targel. All of these actions had taken place before Ban 

Me Thuot was actually attacked. T he 6th Air Division at Pleiku 
TilE ROUT IN TilE IIIGlit.ANDS 89 

had only marginal airlift capabilities. It had taken the 23d 

Division three whole days from 12 through 14 March to helilift 

the 45th Regiment and two ballalions of the 44th Regiment to 

Phuoc An. Additional air mobility provided Genel·al Phu included one UM- 1 wing and four CH-47 helicopters from MRIV. Thus by the time President Thiel! ordered the reoccupation of Ban Me Thuol during the Cam Ranh meeting of 14 

March. the only rotlte ror II Corps forces still in the KontumPleiku area to move east was Interprovincial Route 7B. General Pilu did not have much choice. 

By this time, in the Kontum-Pleiku area, there remained 

only one battalion of the 44th Regiment, five Ranger groups 

(7th, 2 1 st, 22d, 24 th, and 25th), the 2 1 st Tank Squadl"On (M48), two 155-mm. artill ery battalions. one 175-mm. artillery 

battalion. and Regiona l and Popular Force units. In addition, 

there were logistical and SUppOrl units: the 20th Combat Engineer Croup. the 231 st Direct Support Croup, the army and air 

force ammunition depol wilh 20,000 tons of ordnance, the 

POL depol with a 45-day suppl y of fuel. and the food and 

subsistence depot with a 60-day supply. The mission assigned 

to General Phu was to move the bulk of these units to Nha 

Trang and from there conduct a countera llack to retake Ban 

Me Thuol. 

T he basic plan of the II Corps commander, fo r what really 

amo unted to a withd rawal from the Highlands, was to take the 

enemy by surprise. According to his chief of staff, after General Phu returned from the meeting with the president at Cam 

Ranh, he convened a limited staff meeling lale in the evening 

of the same da y during which he reponed President T hieu's 

orders and issued his own. Participants included newly promoted Brig. Gen. Ph am Van Tat; Brig. Gen. T rail Van Cam, 

deputy II Corps commander for operations; and Brig. Cen. 

Pham Ngoc Sang, commander of the 6th Air Division. A general plan of movement was briefly discussed, and it was decided 

that Ceneral Phu and elements of II Corps forward CP would 

move to Nha Trang by air together with Brig. Gen. Le Trung 

Tuong, commander of the 23d Division, who would proceed to 

Khanh Duong to take charge of the effort to stop the enemy's 

advance on National Route 2 1 and to try to reoccupy Ban Me 

Thuot. By this time, in addition to the 53d Regimem which 

was still battli ng fiercely at the Phuong Duc Airfield, the 23d 

Division controll ed the 45th Regiment and part of the 44 th at 
90 TIlE FINAl.. COLLAPSE 

rhuoe An. the 23d Ranger Group at Buon 1-1 0, and the 40th 

Regiment of the 22d Division al Khanh Duong. 

Genera l Tat was PUI in command of all II Corps troops to 

be redeployed from Ihe Konlum·Pleiku area La Tuy I-Ioa a long 

Interprovincial Roule 7B. Colonel Le Khac Ly was made responsible for the corps staff and all logistical units. T he whole 

operation was to be supe rvised by General Cam. 

T his was in general tcrms the disposition of troops for the 

movement planned by General Phu: The 20th Combat Engineer Croup would precede the lead column to restore the road 

and repair bridges as required. Armor elements were to be 

assigned to each convoy for its protection. Route security was 

(0 be provided by local Regional Force and Popular Force 

units. Finally. two Ranger groups and an armor troop were to 

form the I'ear guard. They were also the last units to move out 

of Pleiku on the morning of 19 March. 

Since the movement involved thousands of troops and hundreds of vehicles. artillery units. and other heavy equipment, a 

schedule was developed to accomplish it in four consecutive 

days. beginning 16 March. Each day. a convoy of 200-250 

trucks would move out of Pl eiku. This schedul e. as recorded 

by the chief of starr of II Corps. provided for the following: 

16 March: ordnance units, to include ammunition, POL. 

and some artillery units; approximately 200 trucks protected by 

armor. 

17 March: remaining artillery units. engineer and medical 

units; approximately 250 trucks protected by armor. 

18 March: 11 Corps Starr and Headquarters, MP units, part 

of the 23d Division Headquarters, and abo ut 200 me n of the 

44th Regimem, a lso protected by armor. 

19 March: rear guard to include Ranger groups and Ihe last 

armor element. 

The next day. 15 March, while the preparations were fevcrishly taking place, the 11 Corps commander new to Nha Trang 

wit h a few selected members of his stall. His deputy, General 

Cam, new to Tuy Iloa from where he was to meet the advancing column. Also, on 15 March a few milit ary vehicles depa rted 

Pl eiku in small groups. 

Since the redeployment was conceived and carried out in 

secrecy. no word was passed to province chiefs of Kontum. 

Pl eiku, a nd Phu Bon. On 17 March, the second da),. late at 

night, orders were given to the three Ranger groups in 

KOlllUIll to fall back to Pl eiku. Only then did the Kontulll 
THE ROUT IN THE HIGIHANDS 91 

province chief, Colonel Phan Dinh Hung. learn about the 

troop movement. Hastily, he went along but was ki ll ed in an 

ambush halfway between Pleiku and Kontum. 

The Flight 

On 16 March. the first convoy moved out of Pleiku as 

planned. But no sooner had the last truck departed than news 

of the movement reached the city. People soon began to leave 

the city by every means of transportation available, even on 

foot, taking whatever belongings Lhey could carry. They were 

later joined by refugees from Kontum , and together with the 

troops they came to form a long mass of humans and vehicles 

Oowing along the hazardous Route 7B. T he exodus from the 

Highlands had begun. 

T he first two days, 16 and 17 March, passed without seri· 

ous incidents. By the evening of 18 March, II Corps Headquarters had reached Hau Bon, Phu Bon Province. where a CP was 

established. It was in this area that all the convoys of the past 

three days and the human mass of refugees were stuck. T he 

advance toward the coast. still some one hundred miles away. 

was impossible because the engineers had not completed a 

pontoon bridge across the Ea Pa farther down the road. 

During the night e nemy troops, presumably local units or· 

dered to intercept the stalled column, began shelling and 

mounting ground auacks. The I-Iau Bon Airstrip, less than one 

mile from the 11 Corps CP, was overrun. Fighting continued 

into latc evening of the next day, 19 l\.'larch . By this time. 

wounded soldiers a nd refugees were lying all around. There 

was practicall y no control in town. Some unmly Monlagnard 

Regional Force and Popular Force troops began looting or 

broke ranks and ran away. crealing a chaotic commotion 

among troops and refugees. The situation became increasingly 

serious as each hour wenl by. Il was then that General Phu 

issued orders from Nha Trang for Colonel Dong, commander 

of the 2d Armor Brigade. to take command of the column. 

T he convoy moved out of Hau Bon the next day, 20 March , 

but could only progress fifteen miles. Phu Tuc, ahead on the 

road. had been overrun by the enemy. Still the convoy kept 

moving, fighting its way ahead. Air support was ca ll ed at 1600, 

but unfortu nately a few bombs were dropped by error on the 

lead e lements. Nearly an e ntire Ranger battal ion became casualties. This fatal inc ident further stall ed the movement and 
92 TilE FINAL COLI..APSE 

increased confusion and chaos among the tTOOpS and refugees. 

In a franlic effort to seek cover and escape, several soldiCI"S 

jumped into the river and were drowned. And at two ri vcrcrossing points. some tanks and vehicles were stuck in quicksand when Lhey tri ed (0 bypass the road. 

At Cong Son, some [orty miles from T uy 1-103, the convoy 

had to cross the Song Ba (Ba River) to continue the last leg of 

its journey on local Route 436 on the southern bank of the 

river. Beyond Cli ng Son, Route 7B had been mined extensively 

by Korean forces. A pomoon bridge had bee n brought to Tuy 

Hoa from Nha Trang, but it was impossible to move the bridge 

La Cung Son by road because of several enemy blocking positions. Finally, the bridge was ca rried to Cung Son piece by 

piece by CH-47 helicopters. 

On 22 March , the pontoon bridge was finally comple ted 

and the convoy crossed over onto Route 436 and proceeded 

cautiously toward Tuy Hoa. Because of the tremendous rush at 

the start, a pontoon soon collapsed, causing further losses in 

lives and vehicles. But it was quickly repaired, and what re ~ 

mained of the battered column soon made it safely to the 

other side of the river. 

It had taken seven days and innumerable casualties for the 

column to progress so far, but the remaining and final leg of 

the odyssey proved equally slow and even more hazardous. 

TIle distance was relatively short, but enemy blocking positions 

we re hard to dislodge. No sooner had the lead element re· 

sumed ilS march than it was stalled immediately by enemy fire . 

Effons to dear enemy blocking positions were slow and dim· 

cult. The column became bogged down again. It was raining 

and cold. And the enemy relentlessly kept up his harassing 

mortar fire. Because of extremely bad weather, the air force 

was unable to provide dose support. Tuy Hoa Sector had run 

out of reinforcemenlS, and the column had to rely on its own 

strength. Driven by desperation and compassion for the people 

who shared their 10L, the troops of the 34th Ranger Batta lion 

(7Lh Ranger Croup) finall y resolved to break through or die. 

Supported by a few remaining M-113s, they stormed ahead 

and systematically destroyed roadblock after roadblock. As 

soon as an enemy position was disposed of, lhe column rushed 

on, obli vious to all dangers ahead. An impatient civilian jeep 

suddenly surged ahead, passed lhe Rangers, and sped foolishly 

toward Tuy Hoa. Just a few hundred feet down Lhe road, it was 

blown up by enemy fire. 
TilE ROUT IN THE IIICI-ILANDS 93 

On 27 March. the final blocking position was dcstroyed. 

and the column at last moved on freely toward T uy Hoa. It 

was 2100 when the first vehicles reached thc city. No deliber. 

ale effort was ever made to take stock of the number of 

vehicles and people that finally made it to Tuy Hoa. How 

many people in the original column surlived the tragic jour~ 

ney. no one knew exacLly. Over 300 vehicles. both military and 

civilian. later drove up to the fuel supply station set up by the 

2d Logistic Command and asked for refueling. Also. approxi. 

mately 5.000 people sou gin sheller at a makeshift refugee 

center at Tuy Hoa tha t night. Others either proceeded to Qui 

Nhon or Nha Trang or went home to families and relatives in 

town. 

From a military point of view the withdrawal was a co ~ 

plete failure. Almost all the unilS withdrawn from the Konlum~ 

Pleiku area were disrupted. The chi ef of stafT, II Corps. Colo· 

ne1 Le Khac Ly. eSlimated that 5,000 out of 20.000 logistical 

and support troops were finall y retrieved. From the five 

Ranger groups, about 900 men reported to II Corps Head· 

quarters at Nha Trang. But the 34th Ranger Battalion, later 

dubbed "block destruction heroes" by the grateful refugces. 

lost only 50 perccnt of its strcngth. It was re tained at Tuy Hoa 

for the defense of the city. 

Causes alld Results 

Tactically, a retreat is a most difficult maneuver. It requires 

thc most minutc planning and strong leadership at all eche~ 

Ions. The rcdeployment of II Corps troops from Kontum and 

Pleiku was not, however. a retreat in a tactical sense. It was 

simply a scheduled movement of organized convoys with se lf~ 

defense capabilities. But the movement of the convoys was 

seriously impedcd by refugees and civili an vehicles and by 

road conditions and the lack of river~crossing facilities. The 

NVA 320th Division, which was thrown in pursuit onl y after 

the enemy learncd of the actua l redeploymcnl, could ncver 

have caught up with the column if river.crossing faci lities had 

been provided in time and if the now of refugees had been 

regulated. The element of surprise could have worked. h had 

indeed fo r the first few days. 

With hindsight it is easy to criti cize, but howev(.'r well justi. 

ficd his concepl of secrecy and tactical surprise, the II Corps 

commander should have worked Oul a detailed plan wilh his 
94 T il E fi NA L CO LLAPSE 

staff and exercised direct contfo l over the whole operation. 

Whatever planning he had done was limited, and only a few 

trusted subordinate commanders had contributed and knew 

abo ut it. Staff work was nonexistent. The chief of staff of II 

Corps, Colonel Le Khac Ly. admiued he was totally in the 

dark. The commander of the 23 151 Direct Support Group in 

Pleiku recall ed. in his own words: 

I didn ', know anythin g about redeployment ol'defs. O nly when an 

artill ery unit nearby hastil y assembled its men, equipment. and de· 

pcndcnts and load ed them on trucks, did I go Out and inquire about 

il. I was briefly tolrJ, "We're leaving town. Withdrawal o rders. You'd 

better hurry. " So I hurried back to my unit. loaded some good 

equipment on tnlcks and took ofT arter the 3nillcry convoy. I had no 

time to destroy anything. I didn't even repon my displacement to the 

2d Logistic Command. It was supposed to be kcpl secrcL. 

The corps commander's trust in some of his subordinates 

to ca rry OUI his o rde rs was not juslified . The entire withdrawal 

lacked unified and effective control from the start. General Tal 

only looked afLer his Ranger troops. Gcnera l Cam seemed to 

take no active pan in the whol e process. I-lis remote supervision was largel}' inconsequential. T he overall control of the 

movcment turned OUI to be exercised by the 11 Corps chie f of 

staff btu onl y up to Hau Bon although he had not been given 

this responsibility. 

The province chiefs of Phu Bon and Phu Ye n failed to 

provide road security and protcction. As a maHer of facl, thcy 

were unable to control their Regional Force and Popular Force 

units in performing this task. If they had. if the m ule had been 

protected and if "iver-crossing facilities had been provided in 

Lime, the outcome would cenainly have been much different. 

BUl excessive preoccupation with secrecy had precluded prea rrangeme nts whi ch could have looked perfectly normal under 

the pretext of a mad rehabilitation pmjecL. In fact, such a 

project had been planned for some time by JGS to include 

mine clearing on the teI'Tninal stretch of Interprovincial Route 

7B from Cung SOli to Tuy Hoa. 

Finally, the railure was also one of leadership at all echelons. Troops had nOt been briefed, discipline wa s not enforced, ('onstraints had not been imposed to avoid diso rder 

and chaos. In particular, troops had not been motivated lO take 

on the difficult lask of destroying enemy blocking positions, 

the fina l obstacles LO their 5un·ival. 
Tilt-. KOtrr IN TilE IIIGIII..M~DS 

Militaril~, the \\ilhdrawal had re<;ulted in a rOllt of strategic 

proportions. Al least 75 percelll of II Corps combat strength, 

10 include the 23d Infanll} Di"ision as well a<; Ranger. armor, 

anilleq, engineer, and signal units, had been tragicall} expendecl within ten days. The operat ion to reoccupy nan Me 

Thuo! failed to materialize simply because It Corps no longer 

had any combat troops. Comlllunist troops had taken over 

Kontum and Pleiku wilhout a fight. Elated by the unexpected 

mabrnitude of their victor)', thc NVA F-IO, 3 161h , and 320th 

Divisions were determined to push on. By this time, the Cllelll) 

knew thai all II Corps could assemble to stop his advance 

toward the coaSI was the 3d Airbome Brigade at Khanh 

Duong. 

Psychologically and politically, the sclf-inOicled defeat of II 

Corps in the Highlands amounted to a hOI-ri ble nightma re for 

the people and armed forces of South Vietnam. Confusion, 

worries, anxiety, accllsations, guilt, and a general feeling of 

distress began to weigh on everybody's mind. Rumors spread 

rapidly that territorial concessions were in the making. The 

immediate impact of the rumors was to unleash an uncontrollable surge of refugees seeking by all means and at all costs to 

leave whatever provinces remained of MR-Il. To the nonh 

MR-I also felt the repercussions. Ils population soon joined 

the refugees and battered troops streaming sOUlh along the 

coast. First. they rushed into Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, then 

moved on IOwaI'd Saigon. In the national capital itself, the 

opposition increased its activities and irreparably widened the 

government's credibility gap. Confidence in the armed forces 

also swung down to its lowest e bb. Demonstrators angrily 

demanded the replacement of President Thieu; they also vigorously ,'oiced anti-American sentiment. A pervasive hope still 

lingered, however, for some miraculous thing to happen that 

could save South Vietnam. 
CHAPTER 7 

Defeat in the North 

The situation in MR-I had regained some stability after I 

COI-PS had defeated lhe enemy effort to push into the coastal 

plain southwest of Da Nang in late 1974. II had been a real 

challenge to confront a three-division offensive directly threat· 

cning the region's heanland and also comain the unreleming 

pressure of Olher enemy divisions against the northernmost 

and southernmost areas. However. the losses incurred during 

this six-month campaign were heavy and hard to replace. 

Combat effectiveness of most I Corps units had decreased as a 

resuh. 

The Airborne Division withdrew in mid-March 1975 from 

the fon\'ard area of MR-I, which extended from the norrnern 

boundary of -nlU3 Thien Province to the Thach Han River just 

north of Quang Tn City. This left only the 1st Infantry Division and the 15th Ranger Croup for the defense of Phu BaiHue. To the no nh, the 369th Marine Brigade took over the 

area of operations vacated by the Airborne Division. The 

Marine Division had been pulled back to Da Nang where it was 

available for immediate defense of the city but its employmerll 

for other tasks s ubject to consultation. The Marine Division's 

fonner area of responsibility was bequeathed to the 14th 

Ranger Croup. All these units and the I SL Armor Brigade 

formed a task force under the I Corps forward CP at Hue. 

Under direct control of I Corps Headquarters were the 3d 

Infa ntry Division, largely responsible for Quang Nam Province, 

and the 2d Infantry Division based at Chu Lai and responsible 

for Quang Ngai Province and part of Quang Tin Province. 

Two Ranger groups, the 11th and 12th, augmented the 2d 

Division for the defense of its large area of operation (Map 6). 

Thus, to confront an enemy main force of five divisions and 

many separate regiments (Map 7),' I Corps could muster only 

'The mile uop:&r,Ue Ulranll)' regum:-nu were Ihe 41h. 51h. 61h. 271h. 31s1. 481h, 

5 151, 2701h. and 27151. Not sho .. II 011 Ihe map arc Ihree sapper regLlnt·nts: 51h. 451h, 

and 1261h (N:lVdl): ,hrel: armor reg,menls: 202d, 203d, and 573d: and 'welle anll:ur· 

C.-dr. and eight arllllery regiments. 
DEFEAT I N THE NORTH 

Quang Tn 

QUANG TRI I~ I ~ --..J<.;;ff! 

~ 361ft .... Hu." 

S c§J , 

QUANG NAM 

MAP 6 

QUANG TIN 

FRIENDLY FORCES 

MILITARY REGION 1 

M.rch 1975 

! I I j ....... I I I I 

•• ..-••• 0& 

QUANG NGAI 

97 

Ihree infanll-y divisions, one Marine division, four Ranger 

groups and an armor brigade. In addition, being adj acent to 

Nonh Viemam, MR-I could at any time be invaded by several 

enemy divisions held in reserve north of the 17th Parall el. So 

the tactical balance in terms of troop slrength and disposition 

heavily favored the enemy, and the situation, although seem· 

ingly stable, could change at any time. The enemy had recenlly 

been exerting his heaviest pressure against two areas between 

Hue and Da Nang a nd between Da Nang and Chu Lai. From 

all indications it was a major effort to interdict Na tional Route 
98 

MAl' 7 

TI-IE FINAL COLLAPSE 

ENEMY FORCES 

MILITARY REGION I 

Much 1975 

.. _ Alii. of snack 

... " u 

r ~r'-' I "fI ' -,r"--" 

Owng Ng.; 

QUANG NGAI 

I, lhe only communication route runnmg the length of MR-J 

like a backbone. 

Ceneral Trllollgs Plans 

This was the situatio n presented by the commander of I 

Corps, LL Cen. Ngo Quang Truong. to the president on the 

morning of 13 March 1975. The occasion was a lop-level 

meeting al lhe [ndependence Palace limited. as usual. to the 

prime minister, me as chairman of JGS, and the ubiquitous 

prcsidcllIial assistant for Securit), Affairs, Lt. Gen. Dang Van 

Quang. Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Toan. commander of IJI Corps, 
DEn: .... T IN TilE NORTII 99 

was also brought into the conference room after General 

Truong had finished his briefing. General Toan, in turn, gave 

a brier rundown of the situation in his military region. The 

picture he presented was mildly bright; no significant event 

had been recorded in Ihe past rew days. 

The president then addressed the conference in earnesl. 

First he made an a nalysis of the general situation and pointed 

out the difficulties we wefe facing in military aid. I-Ie admilled 

he did not entertain any hope of intervention by the U.S. Air 

Forcc in case South Vietnam wcrc subjected to an all-out 

offensive by North Vietnam. He sympathized wilh the difficulties and handicaps of the corps commanders. Up 10 now, he 

admitted, he had given many instructions lhat he knew could 

not possibly be carried out. 

The president said there was little he could do under the 

circumstances except to change strategy, to redeploy our 

rorces to hold those vital areas where our national resources 

wefe concentrated. Even ir we had to lose the jungle and 

mountainous areas to hold the remaining resource-rich areas 

(to include the continental shelO , stich losses would be definitely much beller than a coalition government with the Communists. The resource-rich areas defined in the president's 

new strategic plan included the Da Nang region ror MR-J. As 

part or the redeployment plan, conceived in private by the 

commander in chief himselr, the Airborne Division was slated 

to leave MR-1. Although this strategy was not mentioned at 

this meeting, the Airborne Division was to be rollowed by the 

l\,·farin e Division if possible without e ndangeri ng the J Corps 

defense posture. These moves would allow the reconstitution 

or a general reserve which was vital to the success of the 

president'S plan. President Thiell also instructed General Toan 

to temporarily withdraw his forces from An Loc (0 employ 

them wherever they \\'ere morc needed in MR-III. 

When the president completed his instructions, it was my 

turn, as chairman of JGS, to remind both corps commanders of 

the precautions (0 be taken when they withdrew the ir forces. 

On that cautious note, tht., m"eling ended. Even without 

le ngthy comments, the session had lasted exactly three and a 

half hours. 

During the next six days the milita,·y posture of MR-J 

became increasingly precarious. More and more refugees kept 

OOh'ing into Da Nang. It was almost impossible to regulate this 

human deluge. Important passes o n National Route I were 
100 

CONTINGENCY PLAN 1 

USE OF QL 1 TO DA NANG 

l' M.reh 197'!i 

( • Dlr~tlon of ,,,,, .. 1 

E".",y-n.ld t.mtory 

MAPS 

, 

• 

• 

, .-, 

TilE FINAL COLLAI'SE 

H-'", 

frequently jammed, delaying the movement of the Marine and 

the Airborne Divisions. 

It was precisely then lhal General Truong was called 10 

Saigon for a second meeting at the palace on 19 March 1975. 

The session began at 1100 Wilh Vice President Tran Van 

Huang also present. As expected. General Truong briefed lhe 

president on his MR-I withdrawal plan. This was well worked 

out, presenting a choice between two alternate courses. 

Course 1 assumed the use of National ROUle I. It prescribed two opposite but simultaneous withdrawals via National Route I from Hue to Da Nang and from Chu Lai to Da 

Nang (Map 8), 
DEfEAT IN TilE NORTH 

QUANG NAM 

CONTINGENCY PLAN 2 

SEALIFT TO DA NANG 

19 MB~h 1975 

• a 

............ , • , I f I 

• 

MAI'9 

DltClCtJon 01 ,et,eat 

Enemv·,.,.ld lenitory 

Pha •• Une 

A," to b. defended 

.. .. ' ... I J 

.. ~ ... "", .. " ... 

101 

Course 2 assumed enemy interdiction of National Route I 

and hence the necessity of withdrawing all troops into three 

enclaves: Hue, Da Nang, and Chu Lai (Map 9). However, Hue 

and Chu Lai were only to serve as layover stations for troops 

who wo uld be sea-lifted to Da Nang during the final stage. So 

Da Nang, the major enclave to be held as part of the redeployment plan, would become a stronghold defended by four divisions and four Ranger groups. 

Less than a week separated the two meetings at the palace. 

By the time of the second meeting, it was obvious that only the 

second course stood any chance of success. Any phased with-
102 THE FINAL COLLAPS E 

dr3wal along Na tiona l Route I had become almost impossible. 

The pressure that the enemy exerted on it had increased tremendously between Hue and Da Nang and bClween Da Nang 

and e hu Lai. Two Range r groups. the last units held in reserve 

by I Corps, had been thrown in to relieve the pressure, so far 

to no avail. The balance had been irretrievably lost. Besides, 

even without enemy pressure, 1 Corps could hardly conduct 

any major troop movement on an artery jammed beyond contTol during the last few days by refugees moving toward Da 

Nang. 

This was in summary what Genera l Truong wid the president. "We have only onc choice," he said, and "we had better 

act before it is 100 late." The onl y choice was to withdraw our 

troops toward Hue and Chu Lai as well as Da Nang and take 

advamage of existing fortifications in these cities, in particular 

those scalte red in the hilly terrain around Hue, in order to 

destroy e nemy troops to the maximum of our ability. General 

Truong had also hea rd unconfirmed reports that the Marine 

Division was to be redeployed to MR-Ul. If this should occur, 

it could affect General Truong's plan, and he accordingly 

asked for Presidc nI T hi eu's decision . 

President Thieu's position was excruciating. IL was he who 

had conceived and ordered the whole thing and already the 

redeployment from the Cemral Highlands had given signs of 

turning sour. Worst of all was the psychologlcal impact on the 

civilian population that now threa tened lO throw his plan into 

utter disarray. 

Understandably enough. when it came to giving specifi c 

instructions to his field commander, Pres idem Thicu sidestepped the withdrawa l plan altogether. Instead, he told General Truong to make an effort to hold onto whatever territory 

hc could with whatever forccs he now had. including the 

Marinc Division. Then turning aside and away from the problem, he asked General Quang to prepare a speech . I-Ie was 

going to address the people on TV, he said, to try to calm 

their emotions and let them know the government was going 

to defend Hue at all costs. He also seemed to ignore the 

refugee problem; neither he nor PI-ime Minister Khiem said 

anything about Gencnll T ruong's headache. But in contra st 

with the previous mee ting. there was a fecli ng of encouragement this time, if onl y because the momcntous withdrawa l 

decision had been SCI aside for the lime being. 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 103 

Nor/hem and Southen! i'dR-/ 

By 1800 the same day, 19 March, General Truong was back 

in Da Nang. As soon as his plane landed, he received an 

ominous repon from Lt. Gen. Lam Quang Thi, his deputy. 

who ca lled in from the I Corps forward CP at Hue. General 

T hi reponed that 130-mm. guns were pounding his headquarters area and that e nemy troops had just launched a large-scale 

attack with substan tial armor across the outermost defense line 

at the Thach Han. T he oven, all-out offensive of NVA units in 

MR-I had begun. For more tha n two yea rs since the cease-fire, 

the skirmish line established along the Thach Han River had 

been the "peaceful" demarcation line observed by both sides. 

It was also where a permanent ICCS team headquarters was 

installed and was the site for many prisoner exchanges. 

General Truong immediatel y reported to j GS and req uesled permission to employ the I Sl Airborne Brigade-the last 

brigade scheduled for withdrawal from MR-I-when the situalion so warranted. The brigade was being assembled at Da 

Nang and was preparing to depart for Saigon. President Thieu 

agreed to the request with one condition: the brigade could be 

retained, but it should under no circumstances be employed in 

combat. So the airborne brigade was only to play the role of a 

morale anchor. It was a good thing thal the president had 

come to realize its psychological va lue , but no doubt, in his 

own mind. he did not thi nk the brigade could do much to hel p 

ailer the situation. By this time, the I Corps commander was 

most unsure about what was really happening in his nonhernmost province. 

During the night of 19 March, all the forces manning the 

Thach Han defen se line, including three Regional Force 

groups, one Rangel' banalion, and armor clements, fell back to 

the My Chanh River. The entire province of Quang Tri came 

under enemy cOl1lrol. AI the My Chanh, the northern boundary ofThua Thien Province, the retreati ng troops established a 

new defense line on the southern bank. (See Map 7.) 

In the ea rly morning of 20 March, General Truong new to 

the forward CP of the Marine Division five miles from the My 

Chanh line. There he mel all major troop commanders in the I 

Corps fOf\\'ard area, and LOgether they reviewed the situatioll 

and discussed a pla n for the defense of Hue which the)' had 

been ordered to ho ld at all costs. The situa tion that confronted Genera l Tmong and his commanders at that lime was not 
104 TIn: FINAL COLLAPSE 

laO bad. Regular units and territorial forces werc in good 

shape; discipline was good; and morale was high. T he loss of 

Quang Tri might have some adverse effect on the troops. but 

it was not a big setback in itself. After all, most of the populalion had evacuated, and the bulk of the Marine Division had 

safely withdrawn to Da Nang. Command and cOnlro) were 

excellent, and the troops appeared unanimously resolved to 

hold Huc. 

On his way back to Da Nang. General Truong dropped by 

Hue for a visit with his deputy for territorial affairs. Maj. Gen. 

Hoang Van Lac. His confidence was enhanced after an inspeclion (our of the city and its troop dispositions. At 1330 President T hieu's articulate voice was heard on radio Hue. He 

addressed the people. the population of Hue in particular, and 

ordered the troops to defend the city at all costs. This was a 

much needed. albeit somewhat belated, shot in the arm, General Truong thought, but he was not sure or its effect. He left 

Hue, however, feeling confident and determined. 

Arriving back in Da Nang late in the afternoon, General 

Truong received a special delivery, flash message classified 

"Secret." It contained orders rrom the president relayed by 

J GS. Contrary to what he had proclaimed in the broadcast, 

President 111ieu now ordered that because of inability to simultaneously defend all three enclaves (Hue, Da Nang. Chu La i), 

the J Corps commander was rree. depending on the situation 

and e nemy pressure, to redeploy his forces for the defensc of 

Da Nang onl y. Thc last airbom e brigade was also di"ccted to 

proceed immediately to Saigon; it left before midnight. 

The situation in MR-J was becoming more serious each 

day. President T hicu's addrcss continued to be carricd ovcr 

the air during thc rollowing days, but it failed to reassurc the 

wary people or Hue. Their confide nce had been deeply shaken; 

they continued Lo pour out of thc city and made their way 

toward Da Nang. On 21 Mardl. with additional units brought 

from his rear, the enemy intensified pressure in the Phu Loc 

area and brought it to bear most heavily on a stretch or 

National Route 1 halfway bct.ween Hue and Da Nang whcrc 

the packed column or refugees was shell ed. TI1C 1st Inrantry 

Division immediately went into action and with massive artillery and tactical air support managed initially to relievc this 

pressure. But the balance of forces alrcady leaned heavily 

toward thc enemy. T he 1st Division held out until noon the 

next day. 22 March. At 1400 the 15th Ranger Group and 
DEt"EAT IN TilE NORTH 105 

elements of the 1st Regiment in the Phu Loc arca wcrc ovc,'-

comc by a superior enemy force . National Route I was elTectively cut, and there seemed lO bc no chance of clearing it 

again. Both the 15th Ranger Group and the I st Regiment 

sulTered heavy losses. 

In the face of this unexpccLCd setback and the virtual impossibility of" reopening Nationa l Route 1, the commander of I 

Corps issued orders 10 contract and consolidate lines for the 

derense of Huc. In the meantime, with increased naval transport made ava ilable to MR- I, the evacuation of civilian refugees and military dependents toward Da Nang had begun in 

earnest. Part of the heavy military equipment was also shipped 

out with the refugees. In the morning or 23 March, enemy 

guns began to bombard Huc. The shelling continued throughout the day; it was sparse and ine ffective, but its psychological 

effect on the people who were still stranded in the city was 

terrible. Terror soon gave way to frenzy and chaos. 

The silllation in lhe southern part of MR- I had begun to 

deteriorate following the loss of Hau Due and Tien Phuoc, two 

district towns of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Inrantry Division, augmented by the J 2th Ranger Group, had finall y managed to contain the enemy drive toward the provincial capital 

(Tam Ky) and the coastal plain. However, other remote bases 

located deep in the foothills could be overrun at any time. In 

the face of mounting enemy pressure, the I Corps commander 

on 16 March had ordered evacuation of two exposed district 

towns of Quang Ngai Province. Son Ha and Tra Bong. Other 

femotc outposts were also abandoned . The move conserved 

forces ror eventual defense or vital areas. As a resuit, a semblance or calm had been restored in both provinces. 

In the ea rl y morning of 24 March, major fighting broke out 

in Quang Tin Province. The NVA 711 th Division, the 52d 

Brigade (reinforced), and armor elements drove a vigorous 

attack against the city of T am Ky. Within the city, enemy 

sappe rs penetrated into the provincial jail and rel eased the 

prisoners 10 crea te disorder. By noon the city was overrun. 

The 2d Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division was then ordered 

to move toward Quang Tin to assist the local forces railing 

back from Tam Ky. TIle loss of T am Ky drove the population 

north toward Da Nang by the thousands. And in all probability. enemy sappers and artill ery fonvard observers ga ined 

access to the city b y mi xing with the throngs of refugees. 
106 THE n NAI. COLLAPSE 

In Quang Ngai Province the enemy effort also began and 

expanded rapidly the same day. Enemy sappers, provincial 

main force, and other local c lements look advalllage of the 

deteriorati ng situation and atlacked in force the airport. va rious military installations, and the villages located around the 

provincial capital. Na tional Rout e I was cul midway between 

the city of Quang Ngai and Chu Lai; Quang Ngai's access road 

to the coast was also Clit. In brief, within a single day lhe 

situation de terio rated beyond control. T he 2d Infantry Division itself had been baHcrcd eno ugh after rcpeated enemy 

3n3cks and was no longer capable of bringing reli ef to the 

embattled city. With I Corps approval, the sector troops of 

Quang Ngai fought their way toward the no rth during the 

night. In the early hours of the next day a few managed to 

reach Chu Lai. 

The Final EV(lcualiQn 

By the next day, 25 March , all I Corps forces had been 

ga thered into three strongholds: Da Nang (including Hoi An), 

Hue to the north, and Chu Lai to the south. The retreat 

toward these havens had been painful and costly. Most of the 

troops were weary and disheartened. For a long time they had 

been righting, battle after ball Ie, year in and yea r o ut, but 

never before had they felt as truly discouraged. Gone was the 

ho pe that someone would give them a hand and help them ( 0 

recover enough to confrolll the enemy again as of old. 

During this mOSt dispirited moment, anothe r message was 

dcli\'cred to I Corps. Presidential orders agai n: J Corps was Lo 

redeploy its th ree o rganic divisions for the defe nse of Da Nang 

with the Marine Division as a reserve. During the night General Tnlo ng ordered the 1st Inrantry Divisio n and other units in 

the Hue area to withdraw toward Da Nang. At the same time 

he instructed the 2d Infantry Division, along wit h the Quang 

Ngai sec tor troops and their dependents, to proceed to Re 

Island some twent y miles offshore rrom Chu Lai. 

The plan for the withdrawa l from Hue required the 1st 

Infantry Divisio n and its attached units to proceed to the Tu 

I-lien Estuary. Naval and engineer units would bridge the estuary to provide passage ror infantry troops who would then 

proceed to Da Nang by road. Marine units and their attached 

elements (to include armor) were to be retrieved by ship. J 

Corps forward CP was to direct and control the withdrawal. 
Df:fEAT I N T H E NORTH 107 

By morning of the following day. 26 Ma rch. the sea became 

rough. and extrication by ship was delayed. Nor was the estuary bridge in place in time 10 be of any use. By noon the tide 

had risen enough to prevent any atlempl to cross the estuary. 

By this time the enemy had discover"ed our movements and 

began to concentrate his artill ery fire upon Tu Hien and othe r 

pickup points. Command and control failed miserably. Hardly 

any discipline remained. Only abo ut one-third of the (roops 

finally made it to Da Nang. But no sooner had they reached 

the city than they melted away in search of their dependents 

and a way out. The only units thaI retained cohesion were the 

Marines. 

T he sea-lift of the southern forces to Re Island. in the 

meantime, encountered no grea t difficulties. The 2d Division 

and regional troops were picked up by ships and regrouped 

safely on the island where they spent some time reorganizing 

and recovering. This move proved sound and appropriate. 

give n the prevailing local circllmstances. At least these troops 

and their dependents did not add to the chaos in Da Nang 

where mailers were becoming worse each day. 

During 27 J\'larch the situation in Da Nang deleriorated by 

the houl". Inside the city, a wild and maddened popUlation 

made any defense practically impossible. From the outside the 

enemy pr'essed in, inexorabl y. unrelentingly. From the north 

the NVA 324B and 325C Divisions, augmented by an armor 

regiment and two artill ery regiments. advanced along the Elephant Valley and were enveloping the entire western nank of 

the city. To the south the 71 hh Division in coordi na tion with 

the 304th Division and forces of the 44th Front pressed on 

along the T hu Bon Ri ve r and attacked the district towns of 

Duc Duc and Dai Loc. Da Nang was now within range of 

enemyal'lillery. 

On the morning of 28 March, the commander of I Corps 

he ld an emergency meeting with all uni t commanders at his 

headquarters. Measures were take n to restore order and hastily 

to reorga ni ze batt ered units for the last-ditch defense of the 

city. But these effor-ts were unde rmined by a critical shonage 

of comba t troops. Cadre and troops retrieved from the redeployment of previous days were deta il ed to the Da Nang Garrison Command to maintain order. Str.lgglers were regrouped 

and directed to combat units, but they hardly made up for the 

losses incurred. 
108 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

At noon, a message from J-2/JGS warned lhal the enemy 

would auack Da Nang sometime during the night. Another 

order from JGS instructed the 151 Air Division [0 evacuate ils 

helicopters and Or ils jets to Phu Calor Phan Rang. An alert 

was immediately issued by 1 Corps lO all combat units on the 

defense line. Other aClions were taken to prepare for the 

worsl. By 1400 security no longer existed in the villages and 

hamlets surrounding Oa Nang. All territorial forces of the 

Quang Nam Seclor had melted away. The enemy had cul the 

road between Hoi An and Da Nang. The fuel storage depot 

and the ammunition depot were no longer functioning; their 

troops had already ned. Even al major installations and commands only key slafT members remained. 

Dusk had just set in when enemy artillery began to shell the 

airport and the naval base. I Corps Headquarters and numerous olher military installations were also bombarded. The 

enemy's fire was intense and fairl y accurate, undoubtedl y adjusted by observers inside the city. All the rounds were fired 

from the direction of Elephant Valley. The two 175-mm. batteries of 1 Corps immediately counterfired, guided by observation planes, but the resuits were minimal. TIle enemy kept on 

pounding mercilessly, and soon me defensive line gradually 

caved in. 

Genera l Tmong informed me of the situation. He also 

called the president and recommended immediate evacuation 

by sea. But during the conversation the president did not 

commit himself to any clear-cut order. He did not tell General 

Truong whether to withdraw or to hold and fight. He simply 

asked how many people could be extricated to safety in case of 

a withdrawal. Apparently he was apprehensive about the way 

things had turned out. This redeployment could well turn into 

another tragedy like the one which just happened in the Central Highlands. I-Ie wanted to spare himself the pain of another 

such order. 

As soon as the conversation ended, all communications with 

Saigon were disrupted by e nemy artillery fire. The situation by 

now had become entirely hopeless. Without hesitation, Cene,·-

al Truong decided to withdraw from Da Nang. He discussed 

the embarkation with Rear Adm. 1-10 Van Ky Thoai, the naval 

commander of MR-I Coastal Zone, then met with each of his 

subordina te commanders. ordering the displacement of all 

units during the night toward three embarkation points-the 
DEFEAT I N THE NORTI1 109 

end of Hai Van Pass, the fOOl of Non Nuoc (Marble) Moullla in, 

and tlle Hoi An Estuary. 

Before dawn the next morning, 29 March, a thi ck fog had 

set in along the coast. All ava ilable naval ships were at the 

rendezvous points as planned, but the tide was low; the ships 

could not beach; and the troops had to wade and swim toward 

the ships. By midmorning the embarkation was going smoothly. Neverlheless, when enemy artillery fire began to zero in on 

the beaches, and the opera tion became disorderly, many soldiers drowned; others were killed by enemy fire. When the 

ships left, ove r 6,000 Marines and 4,000 troops of the 3d 

Division and other units were on board. 

Tlte Refugee Problem 

One of the thorniest problems, which MR-I could hardly 

solve by itself, was the influx of refugees. It was not a new 

problem. Almost every signifi cant enemy offensive had created 

refugees. The population of MR-I was genuinely war)' of the 

ups and downs of a situation. The memories of Hue in 1968, 

Quang Tri in 1972. and numerous lesser hardships in between 

were still vivid and evoked many nightmares. It wa s as if the 

citizens of MR-I had been condemned to li ve in constant fear, 

ready to pack up and leave a t all times. The expected offensive 

had not yet erupted ; only a heavy pressure had been felt. But 

th e pressure was real and ominous. Especially for the sensitive 

and wary people of the nonhernmost provinces this was warning enough . 

In addition, the population of Central Vietnam, MR- I, and 

the nOJ"lhern part of MR-IJ had lived in constant fear of another partition ever since the Paris Agreement was signed in 

J anuary 1973. Short of a coalition with the Communists, which 

President Thieu's administrations would never accept, pal"lition 

seemed a plausible solution for the continuing war. Rumors 

proliferated and spread, at first about the possibility of a "vertical" partilion, the n about a " Iateral" partition at the 16th 

Parallel. In the wa ke of maj or tel·rilorial losses. Phuoc Long 

and Ban Me Thuot. and without the prospect of a comeback, 

people were convinced that concessions would have to be 

made sooner or later. Then suddenly Kontum and Pleiku were 

evacuated. The local population had not been alerted nor 

given any explanation. T he exodus from the Central Highlands 

was still under way when the Communists crossed the T hach 
110 TilE H NM. CO LLAPSE 

Han line :md seized Quang Tri o n 19 Marcil. Slill no ('xplana· 

lion, not a wo rd from the government. No doubt. people 

reasoned. all this must ha ve been pan of some arrangcmclll. 

Had the rumor turned oul to be true? Was partition to become 

a reality? 

On top of lhal, the Airborne Division was being withdrawn 

fro m MR-I, the division thaI, to popular hearts and minds, 

symbolized the o nl y credible protective and deterrent force to 

the exclusion of all o thers. This division was the vcry foundation of the ir confidence. What was happening, they as kcd ? 

They found lhe answer themselves. The centra) government 

was certainl)" not int ent on holding this pan of the national 

territory if it had withdrawn the Airborne Division. Without 

this backbone. they reasoned. MR-I could hardly be protected. 

I-lad not the Airborne Division been most inslrulllelllal in the 

reoccllpation of Quang Tri ? How could Da Nang have been 

defended last year without this highly professional unit? 

WithoUl hesitation. thercfol·e. people began to pack up and 

leave. At first it was only a trickle of wealthy individuals who 

could afford the air fare. Soon the trickle swelled illlo throngs, 

and the throngs finally IUrned illlo a frantic mass exodus when 

news of Pleiku and Kontum being abandoned reached MR-I. 

Civilians, military dependents, and civil servants began [0 evacuate I-Iue and other MR-I lowns by the thousands. They con· 

verged on Da Nang or went directly to Saigon if they had the 

means. RUlllors arose and spread: a pal'lition had been al"· 

ranged with the Communists; the government would surely 

abandon MR-I as it had Pleiku and Kontum. These rumors 

accelerated the exodus which was already taking on the speed 

and magnitude of a deluge. By thc time the prime minister and 

cabinet members ncw to Da Nang on 18 March to examine 

and try 10 solvc the rcfugce problem, the city was besieged by 

over half a million uprooted citizens. 

It was none 100 soon for aClion to be taken. General 

Truong himself had pleaded many limes with the prime minis· 

ler to help him solve the problem. The cxodus had become a 

national emergency that MR-I alone was hardly equipped to 

handle. The arrival of the central government delegation was 

just what everybody had expected. 

Before presiding over a session with governmental officials 

directly concerned with the refugee problem, Prime Minister 

Khiem was taken aside by General Truong for a briefing on 

the currelll military situation and his plan for (he withdrawal. 
DEFEAT I N THE NORTI-I III 

[n particular, Genera l Truong alerted him to the profound 

agitation among the population, The prime minister was taken 

aback. He did not suspect that the situation could have 

changed so rapidly. He instructed Genera l Truong to present 

his withdrawa l plan to the president before implementing it. 

Then he stepped into the adjoining main confe rence room 

where his cabinet ministers were waiting, 

All the province chiefs and mayors were there as were local 

military and civili an officials in charge of refugees and leaders 

of local charity organizations and other prominent personalitics who came to volunteer their services. [n rapid succession, 

the province chief and the mayor of Oa Nang presented their 

problems and recommendations concerning the status of refugees and measures of re lief. Among other things, they recommended: (I) that forceful disciplinary action be taken agail!st 

civil servants who had fled without orders; (2) that the government go on record to deny or correct the rumors which were 

spreading among the population; (3) that the evacuation of all 

dependents, military and civilian alike, be authorizcd to free 

our soldiers from their famil y burdens, 

The cabine t members were assembled on cach side of and 

bchind the prime minister. Together they rep rcsented the full 

power and authority of the administration. They listened with 

apparent concern . Unfortunatel y thcre was nothing they could 

do there and then. The consensus, however. was to give local 

authorities more latitude for soh'ing problems. Finally, the 

prime minister made a decision. An intcrminislcl'ial commission, headed by a deputy primc minister. would be sent immediately to Oa Nang to take charge of the refugees. thereby 

allowing [ Corps to concentrate on its milit ary problems. He 

also promised to requisition all ava ilable commerical ships to 

augment current transportation capabilities. But the most 

urgcnt problems remained unsohred; perhaps they could not 

bc solved at all. With a feeling of pen'asive uncertainlY. the 

mecting adjo urned. The prime minister and his ministers le ft 

immediately for Saigon. 

A week later the illtcnninistcl'ial commission materiali zed in 

Da Nang in the pel"son of a colonel and a captain from the 

Ministry of Social Affairs. They brought along a few checks for 

monetary support. By now MR-[ had been reduced to three 

enclaves packed with panicky refugees and Iroops: Da Nang, 

Hue. and Chu Lai . In contrast, local relief effons were most 

commendablc. The municipality of Oa Nang. the \'31'ious char-
11 2 TilE fINAL COLLAPSE 

ity organiza tions, and some prominem and respected private 

citizens in particular had been active and immensely helpful. 

RegreHably, the magnitude of the task al hand was simply 

beyond their capabilities. 

The wary people of Hue, including military dependents. 

had begun moving out in earnest on 17 March. National Route 

1 ( 0 Da Nang was packed with people and vehicles of all kinds. 

Part of the crowd of refugees sought a way out by sea. They 

besieged the POrl afTan My whi ch was busy unloading ammunition and other materiel for front-line units in the Quang TriHue area and at the same lime loading olher equipment to be 

evacuated LO Da Nang. All porL operations were interrupted for 

IWO valuable days because of this unexpected assault. Even 

landing craft still crammed with unloaded materiel were commandeered and ordered to leave port. After a whole day of 

explanation and persuasion, the refugees cleared the port and 

proceeded to the beaches at Thai Duong Thuong to wait for 

ships. On 21 March, two NVA divisions cut National Route I, 

the exit toward Da Nang for the refugees. The human mass 

then moved broadside toward the Cau Hai Sound and from 

there to the beaches beyond. 

All fishing boats in the area were hired or commandeered 

by the refugees, but there were not enough boats. All naval 

vessels were tied up in supply missions for the Ban Me ThuotQui Nhon area o r in troop transport. JGS negotiated without 

an official requisition for the only commercial ship available, 

the 2,000-ton Truong Thanh. On 23 March, in spite of a rough 

sea, it look on board over 5,000 refugees, including dependents of 1 st Infantry Division troops. Two days later the ship 

left for Da Nang, which was still a safe place. But the city was 

already crowded with other refugees. 

Hue was abandoned during the night of 25 March. T roops 

and the remaining civili ans re trea ted along the coast toward 

Da Nang. Tam Ky was overrun on 24 March. and Chu Lai 

evacuated on the 26th. The population of the twO southern 

pro\,jnccs, Quang Nga i and Quang Tin, also rushed towa rd Da 

Nang. 

On 26 March , General Truong scm his dcputy for tcrritorial affairs, Gcneral Lac, to Saigon to plead MR- I's case with the 

president , the prime minister, and me as chairman of JGS. The 

government should take immediate steps to all eviate the plight 

of the re fu gees stranded in Da Nang; the city was facing the 

danger of being torn asunder by chaos. Civil control was 
DEFEAT I N T ilE NORTH 11 3 

almost impossible to exercise, and if this siLUation continued it 

would be impossible for I Corps to pull through, much less 

defend anything. 

By this time the city was in ulter disorder and chaos. People 

moved about frantica ll y in search of relief and escape. All 

streets were 'packe ~ vehicles were unable to move. Il was 

impossible to move 340 critica ll y wounded servicemen the few 

miles be tween the h ospital and the airport. "The mass of 

people stranded in the city was estimated at approximately one 

and one-half million. T hey Look over every public building. all 

the public roads, and the harbor. T he chaos and disorde r were 

indescribable. Hunger, looting, and crimes were widespread . 

Traffic was impossible. To maneuver, tan ks had to make head· 

way by crushing people first.'· ThaI was the spectacle seen and 

reported by Lt. Gen. Le Nguyen Khang. deputy chairman of 

J GS after returning from a mission to Oa Nang. 

On 27 March came the first U.S. commercial j e t chartered 

for the evacuation. It had been planned to airlift about fourteen thousand people in dail y runs between Oa Nang and Cam 

Ranh . But news of the air evacua tion spread rapidly. Soon the 

airport was besieged by a frantic crowd, deserters included, 

who trampled the security fence, overwhelmed the guards, 

swamped the runways, and mobbed the aircraft. There was 

lotal chaos at plane side, and it took the guards half a day to 

restore some order. But as soon as another jet landed, the 

same disorderly commotion took hold of the crowd. Finally, it 

became so unsafe for the j ets themselves that the airlift had to 

be suspended altogether. T hen four military C-130 ca rgo 

planes tried La take ove r, but they could take only one load on 

29 March. 

At the harbor another unruly crowd look over the piers. A 

number of U.S. oceangoing vessels arri ving in Da Nang were 

ordered to anchor offshore. Then by barges and small boa ts 

(he refugees were taken to the ships. T he operation was slow, 

but it brought good res ults. As soon as each ship had taken 

aboard about 10,000 people, it was directed toward Cam Ranh. 

But soon the ships had to be redirected toward Vung T au and 

Phu Quoe Island whe n Nha Trang was evacua ted on I April. 

The long southbound voyage was painful and fatal to some 

refugees who were viclims of crimes and other acts of violence 

by unruly soldiers and by disguised enemy agents. T he elemenlS, hunger, and lhirst also look lheir loll , and a number of 

exhausled people fainted once put on shore. At Phu Q uae 
114 THE FINAL COl.LAPSE 

more than lcn Communist agents were denounced by the refugees for flagrant acts and were executed on lhe beaches of the 

island. 

During lhe night of 28 March, the Communists shelled and 

vigorously attacked Da Nang. In the morning of 29 March, the 

refu gees continued to leave by ba rges and tugboa ts unde r the 

enemy's mercil ess fire. More casualties occurred as the refugees desperately swam away from shore toward any floating 

vessel. The morc fortunate were rescued; the less fortu nate 

disappeared imo the sea. During the afternoon of 29 March, 

out of sheer Iud and audacity, a U.S. commercial jet sudde nly 

landed at Da Nang. look aboard over 300 refugees, and took 

ofT to the consterna tio n of Communist troops who did not 

know how to rcact. By this time Da Nang had been occupied 

by the enemy. and all evacua tion etTorts were officiall y stopped 

when the day was ovcr. Still the refugees continucd to make 

their way south by wha tever Illeans thcy could find in the days 

that fo llowed. 

In Olher limes tra nsportation for the million or so people 

stranded in Da Nang would have been provided by the local 

relief and resettlement cOlllmittee leasing ci"ilian facil ities. 

O nl y rarely wel'e nava l ships used and then onl y to augment, 

not supplant. the civilian etTort. During a meeting of the Central Relief and Resellicmeni Commiuee on 19 March. JGS 

briefed commiltce members about the rapidly changing military situation and warned that naval ships could no longer be 

made ava ilablc. JGS also J'ccommended to Deputy Primc Minister Dr. Phan Q uang Dan that (he gove rnment should ( I ) 

immedia tely requisition all domestic commc rcial ships. thirt een 

in all: (2) appeal to other countries. in particular the United 

States and those allics who had actively participated in (he 

Vietnam War, (0 assist with transportation; and (3) set up an 

agcnc), to coordinate the use of these facilities as the)' were 

providcd, 

T hese rccommendations were approved b)' Dr. Dan who 

immediately ord ered the Ministry of Public Works to ,'cquisition all domcstic ships in national wa tcrs at that time. Those 

few ships which were sai ling overseas were to be summoned 

home on an emergency basis. Unfortunatel y, thc ministe r of 

public works considered the requisition order too important 

and be)'ond his authority. Instead of signing the document. 

which was well within his prerogative to do, he submitted i( to 

Dr. Dan for his signature. During (his time Dr. Dan was busy 
DEFEAT IN TilE NORTH 115 

traveling to the pro,rinces of MR-II in his effort to select sites 

for resettlement centers. A valuable week had gone by before 

the requisition order was finally signed and carried OUL In the 

mealllime. because of an urgent requirement to evacuate dependenlS of the I st Division, JGS succeeded in arranging 

orders for the Truong Thanh (ilS owner had agreed to its usc). 

which accomplished its mission beautifully on 23 March. This 

was the only domestic ship to be of any use in the evacuation 

of refugees and military dependellls from MR-l. 

in the meantime Olher countri es J·esponded favorably to 

our appea l for assistance. The United States agreed to provide 

chartered commercial jets and sea transports. Australia would 

make a C-130 wing ava ilable, and the Republics of Korea and 

China offered the usc of their LSTs. But a week to ten days 

had to be allowed before these facilities could be ready for 

service in Vietnam. If onl y they had been available on 18 

March and if only we could have had the six LSTs that had 

been requested six months earli er, then perhaps the evacuation 

would have been carried out in an orderly and efficient way. As 

it turned out. the sheer number of refugees was overwhelming, 

and their state of mind precluded an)' auempt at orderl y extrication. 

How many refugees had been evacua ted no one knew, and 

it was hard to make an estimate. Btu there were legions of 

them overcrowding the relief centers of MR- IIt and those on 

Phu Quoc Island. The cities of Vung Tau and Baria also 

seemed to be taken over by refugees. When they became a 

maller of national concern, a contingency plan was worked out 

to resettle refugees in various areas, depending on province of 

origin. Those from Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were 

to be regrouped at Da Nang then directed toward permanent 

seulement centers in Cam Ranh and Ninh Thuan, Binh Timan, 

and Lam Dong Provinces. Uprooted Montagnards from Pleiku 

and Kontum Provinces were to be I·esettled in Lam Dong. The 

rapidly unfolding evcnts completely upset this original plan, 

however, because all resettl ement areas were loca ted in MR- II, 

which the government no longer controll ed by thc time Cam 

Ranh and Nha Trang were evacuated on I April. Many fami lies 

found lhemselves displaced several times during just one week. 

Makeshift refugee centers were hastily set up in Vung Tau, 

Phuoc Tuy Province. Phu Quoc Island, Can Tho, and Vinh 

Long Pro,rince. Of these. Vung Tau and Phu Quoc were the 
116 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

two most important centers, capable of accommodating be-

(ween 50,000 and 100,000 persons. 

Wherever it wen I, the refugee now brought along chaos 

and disintegration. The danger was such lhal President Thieu 

was compelled to ban refugees from the Mekong Della and the 

provinces surro unding Saigon. I-Ie himself lamented: " If we 

brought the refugees to some place, sooner or later lhal place 

wo uld be 10Slo" 

It \\135 obvio us tha t there was no way for I Corps to stand 

up to an all-out offensive from NOrlh Vietnam given the balance of forces at the lime and the rugged terrain of MR-J 

which gave the enemy tremendous tactical advantages. BUl the 

rapid deterioration of the situation was m QI"C the resuh of 

confu sion and morale collapse than e nemy pressure. The eci~ 

sion (0 redeploy forces, albeit u navoidable, was not entirely 

clear and firm in the case of I Corps. P"esident Thieu could 

not bring himself to give c1ear-cUl o rders to the corps com~ 

mander. Apparently the fiasco in MR-U weighed heavily on his 

mind and made him rel uctant to play the role of commander 

in chief agai n. Instead, being an astu te politician, he played on 

the connotation of wo rds, leaving their interpretation, including implications of his silence, to his confused field commander. President Thieu's ord er LO abandon Hue was issued barely 

one day after his resolve was made and he had promised in 

public to hold the "anciem capital cit y." T rue to his po litical 

instinct, however, President T hieu did not provide a time 

period for this evacuatio n. 

The separa ti o n of families seriously affected the morale of 

troops who, o ut o f impatience and anxiety, deserted their units 

to look for parents, wives, and children. In spite of effons of 

the Ceneral Political Warfare Depanmem to provide special 

care for military dependents, it was impossible to sort them 

out from the mass of refugees in the prevailing confusion and 

disorder. The troops withdrawing to Da Nang were more can· 

cerned with their dependents than with their units and the 

enemy. Given this chaotic situatio n, it was a matter of each 

individual trying to solve his own personal pro blems and those 

of his family. The disruption of withdrawing units was not 

caused as much by the enemy as by the coll apse o f troop 

morale. The challenge facing the I Corps commander was not 

merely a military problem, it was the failure of the government 

to solve a refugee crisis which already had gotten out of hand 

and doomed all military plans. 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 11 7 

The Final Days of MR-I/ 

When the highlands of MR-IJ fell under Communist control, II Corps lost most of its combat troops. In the coastal 

area, however, the 22d Division was still holding firm at Binh 

Khe on National Route 19 and at Tam Quan of nonhern Binh 

Dinh on (he coasl. Its 4 1 st and 42d Regiments were fighting a 

fierce seesaw batlle against the NVA 3d Division in the foothills of Binh Khe District west of Qui Nhon. (See Map 5.) Each 

hill, each strClch of road was wrestled back and forth between 

the two equally ferocious contenders. The outcome of the 

struggle was still undecided, but losses inniCled on the enemy 

were heavy. Freed now from its blocking mission at Le Trung, 

the NVA 95B Regiment moved east and joined forces with the 

NVA 3d Division. The pressure was particularly heavy, but the 

41st and 42d Regiments were still holding on 30 March. 

On the coast Communist reinforcements came south from 

Quang Ngai and began attacking Tam Quan (Bong Son) in 

force on 25 March. After three days our 47th Regiment was 

driven out of Tam Quan and fell back to the Phu Cat Air Base 

where it tried to establish a new line of defense on 28 March. 

By this time tJl e air base had been evacuated by (he 2d Air 

Division. The NVA 320th Division, after its altacks against the 

column on Interprovincial Route 7B, was now directing its 

effort toward Tuy Hoa. The entire F-I 0 Division, supported by 

tanks and artillery, was pushing east on National Route 21 

from Phuoc An and, by 27 March, had attempted vigorously to 

break through at Khanh Duong, held by the 3d Airborne Brigade. Elemellls of lhe NVA 3d Division had also infiltrated Qui 

Nhon City and cut its main access routes. AU local defense 

forces had evaporated, as if by magic, in the face of the mounting enemy pressure. The danger of being completely overwhelmed was such that II Corps was compell ed to order the 

22d Division. its only coherent combat force, to break COlllaCl 

and fall back to Qui Nhon. 

On 30 March, the 41st and 42d Regiments disengaged from 

Binh Khe on orders. The 42d Regimem commander, Col. 

Nguyen Huu Thong. was indignant; he pleaded with the divi~ 

sion commander nOt to wilhdraw. Said he: "Please, the situa~ 

tio n still doesn't warrant a withdrawal. If you do it now, it will 

be laugh to come back." But il was already too late. When the 

two regiments reached Qui Nhon during the night, lhey were 

engaged by enemy lroops already entrenched in the city. By 
118 THF "-INAL COLLAPSE 

this tillie, mo~t of the population and all local defellse force'> 

had Oed. The h,lrbor \\'as occupied; 0;0 were mosl of the 1a1l 

building ... Qui Thon was alreddy under viI tual control of lhe 

NVA 3d Di,ision. After IWO days of figilling. the 41st and -t2d 

Regiments, with naval gunfire 'iupport. opened a breach soulh 

of the cit)· and assembled 011 ;:1 beach four miles soulh of the 

harbor. At 0200 on I April. three na\'31 ships look ;lboard what 

remained of thc 22d Di\'ision. The commander of the 42d 

Regiment refused 10 evacuate and cOlllmincd suicide. 

In the meantime, the 47th Regiment had been driven out of 

Phu Cal Air Base where it had fallen back only two days 

earlier. In its wilhdraw.l1 toward Qui Nhan during the night, it 

ran into an ambu~ h al Phu Cal District Town. Enemy troops 

had overrun the town JUSt a few hours earlier. The body of the 

town ga rrison Regiona l Force battalion commander still lay in 

the front yard of the dislI'ict office; rather tha n surrender. he 

had pre ferred to commit suicide. The '47th lost about half of 

its troops and its commander. Colonel Le Cau, also took his 

life on the vcry site of the battlc. 111e regiment was totall y 

disrupted. When it \\'as regro uped later at Vung Tau, the 22d 

Infantry Divisio n numbered slight ly over two-thousand men. 

In the early hours of 2 April, the NVA 320th Division 

au acked Tuy l-Ioa and rapidly overran lhe lightly defended 

city. Shattered Regional Force and Popular Force troops retreated south toward Nha Trang. The II Corps deputy commander for operations, Brig. Gen. Tran Van Cam, and the Phu 

Yen Province chief were reported wounded and missing in 

aClio n. Twenty-five miles farther south, at Deo Ca Pass, the 

34th Ranger Battalio n, whose troops had so va liantly broken 

through enemy roadblocks on Inte rprovincia l Route 7B o nl y 

two weeks ea rl ier, was also att acked. It held o ut for a day 

before being ovenvhe lmed late at night on 2 April. 

By this time , the hatLie for Khanh Duong had been raging 

fiercely since 27 March when the NVA F-IO Division made an 

all-out attempt with armor support to break through toward 

the coast. The 3d Airborne Brigade fought billerly despite the 

enemy's murde rously accurate artillery fire. Several positions 

had changed hands mallY times. In lhe meantime, the suppl y 

route from Ni nh Hoa was also interdicted. Convoys for Khanh 

Duong were 3llacked and suffered heavy losses. Efforts to clear 

this route by Regional Force units augmented by troops of the 

Due My training complex were largely unsuccessful. Finally 

after a long week of very heavy fighting, positions he ld by the 
DEJ.'EAT IN TilE NORTII 119 

3d Brigade were ove rrun on 2 .\ pril. Only 300 paratroopers 

escaped and fell back lOward Nha Trang. SpUlTed by this 

victory, enemy tanks pushed onward and rapidly wok Due My 

and Ninh Hoa. The enemy was now poised for anack against 

Nha Trang. 

As with other cities and lOwns of MR-II during this time, 

disorder and chaos reigned at Nha Trang. No control existed 

in the city. The police and local defense forces had begun to 

disappear into the tide of refugees nowing south, Prisoners 

broke out of jail and created a chaoti c commotion throughollt 

the city by shooting haphazardl y with seized weapons. II Corps 

Headquart e rs was still in Nha Trang on 2 April. Late in the 

morning, Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc Timan, commandant of the 

NCO School at Due My, visited General Phu at cOllls head· 

quartel·s. They talked in private for about fifleen minutes, then 

both went to the Nha Trang Air Base. Ge neral Phu boarded 

his helicopter and fl ew away in sea rch of his remaining units. 

1·le re turned to Nha Trang at 1800 and reported to JGS that 

he was unable to make contact with any unit. Despite JGS 

orders to organize the defense of the air base in coordination 

with air force and naval units, General Phu departed by aircraft 

about thirty minutes late r without providing instructions for 

his staff or the air base commander. He did not return and was 

admitted to the Cong I-Ioa General Hospital in Saigon on 4 

April. General Phu was by then no longer mentally able to 

exercise command. Besides, there was practicall y nothing left 

for him to command. Disorganized and disheartened by this 

time, II Corps staff soon evacuated Nha Trang. 

Also on 2 April, under the unrelenting pressure of the NVA 

7th Di"ision, forces in the provinces of Lam Dong and Tuycn 

Duc retreated toward Phan Rang. And so, within less than 

three weeks, the force structure commanded and controll ed by 

II Corps had nearly reached total disruption. 

Like a plague, the refugees who swept south from MR-J 

and northern MR-ll brought chaos as they moved along. Phan 

Rang was in such a situation on 2 April. Civil servants, police, 

and popular forces simply quit their ranks and fled . More than 

half of the Regiona l Force battalion guarding the Phan Rang 

Air Base was missing. The province chief, Colonel Tran Van 

Tu. had left for Phan ·nlie t after ordering the destruction of 

some equipment and facilities. 

To redress the situation , it was decided that coastal Ninh 

Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces, the last two bastions of 

472-606 0 - 85 - 5 QL 3 
120 TIlE FINAL COLLAPSE 

MR-II, would be placed under the command and control of III 

Corps as of 4 April. (See Map I.) As reinforcement, III Corps 

sent the 2d Airbome Brigade to Phan Rang on 6 April. Reconnaissance learns of the Strategic Technical Directorate were 

also sent into the areas northeast and northwest of the city. At 

the same lime. a forward command post of III COI"PS with Lt. 

Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi, then commandant of the Infantry 

School, in charge, was established at Phan Rang Air Base. 

Order and security were soon restored within and around the 

city. The province chief of Ninh Thuan was also call ed back to 

reorganize the city's administration and defense. With a new 

command, fresh reinforcements, effective air support. and restored order. the situation was improving remarkably. Only 

sporadic skirmishes were reported. except for the pressure the 

NVA 7th Division was exening on the nonhwestern nank of 

Phan Thiet. Repons of reconnaissance teams also revealed the 

presence of the NVA 3d Division and elements of the F-IO 

Division at Cam Ranh. some thirty miles to the nonheast. 

In the meamime. faced with mounting pressure on lhe Bien 

Hoa-Long Khanh front, the III Corp commander, Ll. Gen. 

Nguyen Van Toan, decided to withdraw the 2d Airborne Brigade from Phan Rang to reconstitute his corps reserve. In its 

place, he sent a regimem of the 2d Infantry Division, newly 

refilled after being withdrawn from MR-I two weeks earlier; a 

Ranger group, also refilled after being extracted from Chon 

Thanh three ~ays earlier; and an M-113 squadron reconstituted from II Corps armor remnants. 

The troop replacemem was nearing completion when heavy 

fighting broke out on 4 April. The NVA F-IO Division, augmented by elements of the NVA 3d Division, auacked in force 

with armor and artillery support.. The Ranger group and the 

STD reconnaissance learns in positions north of Phan Rang Air 

Base suffered heavy losses. Faced with the danger of being 

immediately overwhelmed, General Nghi asked for the retention of an airborne battalion slated for withdrawal. On the 

morning of 15 April, the equivalent of two enemy d ivisions 

launched a two-pronged attack against the air base, defended 

by an airborne battalion and a Regional Force ballalion, and 

against the city where the regiment of the 2d Division was 

heavily engaged. At the same time, enemy troops cut National 

Route I at Ca Na some thirty miles to the southwest lO block 

the retreat route of our forces. At the air base, enemy troops 

overran our positions, and III Corps Headquarters lost contact 
DEt' EAT I N T ilE NORTH 121 

with its forward CP. The city proper was occupied by noon. 

The 2d Division Commander and elements of his only remaining regiment managed to withdraw to the beach and were 

retrie"ed by.a suppl y ship. A column of enemy troops and 

lanks immediately pushed southward 10 Ca Na. Here Ihey 

exchanged gunfire with our nava l ships, sank one supply ship, 

and damaged two o thers. (Our air force and navy had destroyed several enemy tanks when they had moved toward 

Phan Rang for the auack.) 

Thus Ihe entire province of Ninh T llUan fell into Communist hands on 16 April. Genera l Nghi, General Sang of the 6th 

Air Division, and the commander of the 2d Airborne Brigade, 

Col. Nguyen Thu Luong. were missing in action. The next day 

lhe district town of Thien Giao in Binh Thuan Province was 

overrun, and Phan T hi el fell on 18 April. The entire territory 

of MR- rJ was now under enemy control. 
CHAPTER 8 

Defense in the South 

On 26 March 1975, General Frederick C. Weyand, U.S. 

Army chief of staff, arrived in Saigon. Genera l Weyand had 

served in Vietnam for a long lime in many capacities. He had 

commanded in sliccession the 25th U.s. Infantry Division and 

the II U.S. Field Force and then became General Creighton W. 

Abrams' deputy and finally succeeded him as the last com· 

Olander of the Military Assistance Command. Because of his 

long association with our country, he was highly esteemed by 

Vietnamese military and political leaders. 

During his call on JGS, there was no formal briefing. Genereli Weyand and I only d iscussed the situation and exchanged 

ideas. I told General Weyand about the difficuhics we were 

encountering, and I made a single request: that the U.S. Air 

Force use its B-52s to bomb enemy troop concentrations and 

exposed base areas. I tho ught that if B-52s were made available, the confidence and morale of the population and troops of 

South Vietnam could be reslOred. However, Genera l Weyand 

explained to me that any new U.S. military intervention in 

Vietnam would have to be authorized by the U.S. Congress, 

and there was lillie chance our request would be approved. 

General Weyand's delegation and the U.S. ambassadol· then 

attended an official meeting with President Thieu at the 

Independence Palace. During this meeting the U.S. delegation 

brought up the following points: 

The government should explain the situation lO the people 

so they would not be confused by the falsehoods spread by the 

enemy. Vietnamese leaders should make more personal appearances on TV. 

JGS should receive gl·eater authority. 

JGS should seek a victory, even a small one, lO help faci litate the request for the $300 million additional aid. The Communist 5th Division in the Parrot's Beak area west of Due Hue 

offered an excellent target. 
DEFENSE IN TilE SOUTII 123 

The problem of war refugees should be solved. Particular 

allemion should be given to military dependents. They should 

be moved out of areas where balLles wer'e likely to be fought. 

All the problems pertaining to the government and the 

population were discussed by the pres idem and Prime Minister 

Khielll on one side and the U.S. delegation on the other. The 

question of handing over Illore authority to JGS, however, was 

not considered because it was a sensitive subject. Only President Thieu could solve that problem if he desired. From the 

military point of view, I fuHy agreed we needed a victory but, 

for the time being, there was no unit prepared to launch an 

operation to destroy the NVA 5th Division. This would have to 

await an appropriate opportunity. J also reiterated the emphasis we placed on the usc of B-52s to destroy concentrations of 

enemy units. This would have an excellent effect on the 

morale of Vietnamese troops and the population. I informed 

the participants about what JGS had been doing in the absence 

of B-52s. C-130s were dropping paHeLS of J1'-4 fuel drums 

containing scrapped oil and even 250-. 500- or 750-pound 

bombs. Evacuating military dependents from embattled areas 

might boomerang. In the absence of their families, the troops 

might have less spirit to fight. During the past, in the 1968 Tel 

offensive in particular and at remote outposts, there were instances when wives and children had given effective support in 

resupplying ammunition, evacuating the wounded, and even 

firin g machine guns. 

Rtgrollping lind Refitting 

After the loss of Ban Me TllUot and the 1'leiku-Kontum 

redeployment failure, combat uniLS of MR-II were entirely 

disorganized. Equipment losses amounted to 90 percent, but 

units still retained 30 percent of their M-16 rifles. The refitting task was planned as follows: 

Troops of the 23d Division were regrouped at Dong Ba 

Thin. 10 kilometers north of Cam Ranh. The 23d Division 

I-Ieadquarters was responsible e.or refining there. (Remnants of 

the 22d Di"ision were taken to Vung Tau.) 

Regional Force and I'opular Force troops organic to the 

Ban Me Thuot, KOllllllll, and Pleiku sectOI's were regrouped at 

the 1...'U11 Son Training Center to be used as replacement manpower. 
124 TilE FI NAL COLLAPSE 

Ranger and artillery troops were regrouped at their respec· 

live training cenLers at Due My. lhirty·fi\,c kilometers from Nha 

Trang. 

Armor troops were regrouped at the Armor Training 

Center at Long Thanh in Bien Hoa Province. 

The refilling process included organization, acceiertlled 

training, and equipping and psywar, based on the baualion as 

basic unit for the infanll1' and rangers, the four-piece battery 

for the artillery, a nd the troop for the armor. 

The refitting process brought good resulLs. The 23d Divi· 

sion was completing the activation of one regiment; twO 

Ranger battalions were reviewing the company phase of training; and two 1O.5-mm. batteries were training and receiving 

their equipment. Then the Khan h Duong fronl, defended by 

an airborne brigade, was broken through afler three days of 

bloody combal. Fighting spread rapidly, and the units being 

refitted at Duc My a nd near Cam Ranh were aga in disrupted 

and had to fall back southwa rd. 

Much additional maleriel was lost. This was all the Central 

Logistics Command and JGS had been able to assemble from 

reserve stocks, including maintenance reserves from the 1st, 

2d, and 4th Area Logistic Commands, and airlift to Cam Ranh. 

The materiel lost was enough to equip two infantry regiments, 

one lO5-mm. ba ttalion, one 155-mm. battery, and one M-48 

lroop . 

When MR-I troops arrived in MR-II in a state of total 

disarray, the refitting process for them was as follows: 

The basis for refi tting was ballalion, group, and brigade for 

the infantry, "angers, and marines; battery or twelve- piece battalion for the artillery; and troop for the armor. 

Priority was given to the Marine Division, the 2d Division, 

and the Airborne Rangers-units whose strength was relatively 

u,nimpaired when regrouped in Vung Tau-and the 22d Division. 

MR-I Headquarters, located at JGS, was responsible for 

regrouping regular and territorial troops under its command 

and directing them to the Van Kiep Training Center. These 

troops would be used to replenish the 2d and 3d Divisions on 

a priority basis. (The 1st Division was disbanded.) 

Regular and terrilOrial troops of MR-I1 were regrouped at 

the 22d Division to serve as replacement manpower. 

Headquarters of II Corps/MR-II was disbanded and its 

personnel reassigned to units undergoing relining. 
DEFENSE IN THE SOlITli 125 

The Ranger and Artillery Commands were responsible for 

regrouping all troops under the ir respective control at their 

rear base at Long Sinh. 

The Armor Command was responsible fOI' regrouping all 

armor troops at the Armor School. 

The Central Training Command was responsible for regrouping all students and cadre organic to military schools of 

MR-I and MR- II. directing them to schools in MR-Ill, and 

assuring that training be continued. Noncommissioned officer 

Sludellls were to ,'esume their tra ining at (he Quang Trung 

Training Center; cadets of the Dalat National Military Academy 

were to resume their (raining at the Long Thanh Infantry 

School; psywar students were to cOlllinue their schooling at 

the Psywa r Training Center in Saigon. 

The loca tions selected for refitti ng were as follows: the 

Marine Division wa s at the rea r base of the 4th Marine Battalion at Vung Tau; the 2d Division was at Binh Tuy; the 3d 

Division was at the Van Kiep Training Center; Ranger (roops 

were distribut ed among rear bases of some Ranger Groups at 

Long Binh; the 22d Division was at the National Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau; 3nillcry troops were at the rear base 

of the anillery baualion at Long Binh; and armor troops were 

at the Armor School at Long Thanh. 

T he maximum lime allowed for the refitting of a regiment 

or brigade was fifteen days. Units and commands were responsible for retrieving all material and equipment brought back by 

individuals or units, They had to make maximum use of serviceable equipment, turn in unserviceable items to the 332d 

Direct Suppon Group of the 3d Area Logistic Command at 

Long Binh, and submit requisitions to the Equipment Management Center of the Central Logistic Command, 

The 3d Area Logistic Command ..... as responsible for coordination with temporary refugee cente rs in MR-I1I, and the Navy 

Command was responsible for coordination with the refugee 

center at Phu Quoe to retrieve weapons from stragglers and 

tum them in to the 332d Direct Support Group for reissue 

after reconditioning. 

Direct support units, medium maintenance centers, and rebuilding bases were to increase their capabilities to pe rfol'ln on 

a twenty-four hour basis. Salvaging was to be pushed to recover parts, 
126 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

Fifty percent of all equipment of schools and training cenlers in MR-III and MR-JV was sent to the 3d Area Logistic 

Command to be diSlribuled to units. 

All reserve stocks on hand, including the maintenance neal, 

were shipped (0 Long Binh. 

All equipment airlifted or sea-lifted from the United Slales 

was to be processed at once for distribution as during the 1968 

Tel offensive and the 1972 summer offensive. 

The fesulls of the regrouping and refining effort were significanl. The 2d Division, reorganized with two regimcllls, one 

I05-nun. battalion, onc IS5-mm. battery, and one M-113 

troop, wem as reinforcement to the Ph an Rang from on 14 

March. One Marine brigade, reorganized with one twelve-piece 

105-mm. baualion, was deployed as reinforcemclll to the Long 

Thanh front in MR-UI on 10 April; a second brigade was 

undergoing training and in the process of receiving equipmcm. 

One Ranger group, reorganized with a four-piece l05-mm. 

battery, weill to the Dinh Tuong-Long An from as reinforcement to MR-IV; a second group was undergoing training and 

in the process of receiving equipmenl. The 22d Division, reorganized with two regiments, two twelve-piece I05-mm. ballalions, and two M-113 troops, was gradually deployed to the 

Long An front as reinforcement to MR-III in the latter part of 

April. One infantry battalion organic to the 3d Division was 

undergoing training and in the process of receiving equipment 

at the Van Kiep Training Cemer. 

In spite of maximum use of reserve stocks, newly arrived 

equipment. and more than half of the center's training equipment. 

and despite the increase in repair capabilities, the units which 

had been refilled suffered critical shortages in the following 

categories: 

I. M-27 grenade launchers and 60-mm. and Sl-mm. mortars: 

only 50 percent were available. 

2. M-16 ammunition clips: only three (instead of six) were 

issued per rifle. 

3. Signal equipment: 50 percem. Each company was equippcd 

with only one AN/PRC-25 or AN/PRC- l 0 radio set. 

4. Artillery pieces: sighting devices were missing. 

5. M-113s were missing radio equipment and machine gun 

shields. 

6. Trucks: only 10 percent were available. 
DEFENSE IN TIlE SOUTH 

7. Helmets and individual firsHlid packets: only 10 percelll 

were available. 

127 

In addition. the following units had been readied for 

combat but were still waiting for equipment: one M-113 troop. 

two M-48 troops, two 105-mm. battalions, one 155-mm. battalion, one Ranger group. and one infantry regiment. 

High-ALtitude Bombing 

During the last few months of the war, JGS used C- 130A 

cargo planes in tactical support missions in a desperate effort 

to increase firepower and compensate for the ineffectiveness of 

fighter bombers neutralized by enemy antiaircraft fire . Each C130 could carry eight pallets rigged with four JP-4 fuel drums 

containing waste oil. The pallets of oil drums were dropped 

from an altitude of fifteen to twenty thousand feel and the 

airplanes were guided on targets by radio. The destructive area 

of each sortie was 150 by 450 meters. 

Each C-130 could also carry eight pallets rigged with four 

GP 8 1-82 (250-500 Ib) or thrcc GP-1l7 (750 Ib) bombs. 

These bomb pallets were also dropped from fifteen to twenty 

thousand feet. TIle troops on the ground were jubilant when 

these bombing sorties were made; they described them as 

"mini B-52s" or "VieLnamese B-52s." When the bomb pallets 

were first dropped on Zone C in Tay Ninh, the population 

thought it was American B-52s. Rumors of intervention by the 

U.S. Air Force spread quickly. 

Near the end of the war, enemy troop concentrations and 

logistical bases were largely exposed and offered excellent targets for mass destruction weapons. As a result, during the 

visits of Mr. Eric von Marbod , deputy assistant secretary of 

defense (end of February 1975), and General Weyand, JGS 

made a special request for a weapon the Vietnamese Air Force 

could handl e. h was the 15,000-pound "daisy cutler" bomb 

that U.S. forces had dropped from C- 130s to clear landing 

zones in the jungle. Twenty-seven bombs were scheduled to be 

shipped with U.S. training specialists within one week. In midApril, three bombs arrived in Vietnam, followed by three 

others in the lasl two days of the war. A U.S. specialist also 

arrived to teach Vietnamese airmen how 10 assemble the fuse 

and strap the bomb in the aircraft. But lhe U.S. pilol who was 

scheduled to fly the aircraft did not arrive. In the face of 

urgent bailie needs and the danger of slocking Ihis kind of 
128 THE FINAL COLLAPSE 

bomb in Tan Son NhuL or in Long Binh, JGS and Air Force 

Headquarters had to select a good and experienced Vietnamese pilot for the first bomb run. Il was scheduled for midnight. 

The bomb-loaded C-130 look off but returned to land after 

twenty minutes in the air. Responsible officers at Air Force 

Headquarters and JGS were gripped with suspense. but the 

plane landed safely. II was only a minor technical failure. The 

plane Look off again half an hour later. 

Al 0 I 00 hours that night, the first " big bomb" was dropped 

on the enemy six kilometers northwest of Xuan Loc. The 

e ntire provincial city of Xuan Loc shook as if rocked by an 

earthquake; all lights went out; and the enemy radio station 

abruptly slopped transmilling. The headquarters of the NVA 

34 1 sl Division was struck and wiped out. Our troops were 

jubilant. "But docs the JGS have many of them?" asked Brig. 

Gen. Le Minh Dao. commander of the 18th Division. News 

spread among the population that our forces had been 

equipped with atomic bombs. The Communists later condemned South Vietnam and the United Stales for using massdestruction weapons. 

These improvisations proved very effective. If nothing else. 

they helped restore confidence among our tfOOpS. But shonages of munitions and fuel and a low serviceability rate allowed 

the C-130s to fl y only two to four sorties per day. 

During the 1972 offensive. we also suffered heavy losses, 

particularly in MR-I. But time and resources allowed JGS to 

regroup and refit all baltered units, infamry, armor, Rangers, 

and Regional and Popular Forces within one month. And after 

just one month. our armed forces were ready to retake the lost 

areas. The time bought on the battlefield depended chiefly on 

the powerful tactical air power of the U.S. forces, and most of 

all on the giant B-52 bombers. Without unlimited B-52 support our troops could hardly have held Kontum and An Lac; 

B-52 strategic bombers were used just like tactica l aircraft in 

close support of ground troops. 

In the rear area in 1972, C-5s, C-141s, and C-130s of the 

U.S. Air Force b!'Ought in equipment and materiel day and 

night, and our refitting effort succeeded admirably. At that 

time nothing was in short provision, f!'Om money to equipment. Our armed forces did not have to worry about shortages; their only concern was how to cope and keep up with (he 

rhythm with which equipment arrived. 
DEFENSE IN THE SOm'H 129 

The contrast was abysmal this lime. In place of the B-52s 

we had six 15,000-pound bombs: o ther equipment and materiel had to be improvised. By mid-April 1975, we had used up 

all stod.s ro r rcfilling ballercd units retl;cved from M R- I and 

II. At that late hour, cven if the $300 million additional military aid had been approved, it wo uld have been 100 late. 

The Situation ill MR-1/1 

After their victories in MRs-I and II, enemy forces began LO 

converge on MR-IU with a view to launching a direct aLLack 

aga inst Bien Hoa and Saigon, the very heart of the nation. 

Enemy regular divisions operating in MR-I (e.g., the 324B and 

325,h) and ;n MR-I1 (e.g., 'he 968,h, NT - 3, and F- IO) headed 

south. In addition, the divisions which had so far been he ld in 

general reserve also deployed into MR- III whe re they joined 

forccs with those already operating in that area (e.g., the CT5, CT-7, CT-9, and the newly creat ed 3d Division). In brief, 

the lOlal enemy force around Bien Hoa and Saigon during the 

last days amounted to fifteen NVA infantry divisions augmented and supported by a sapper division, an artillery division, 

some armor brigades, and SAM antiaircraft units. 

The enemy offensive was conducted on four different 

fronts. o n each by a force equivalent to a three-division army 

corps. To confront this impressive fOI'ce, III Corps could 

muste r only three o rgani c divisions; the 5th, 25th, and 18th; 

the 3d Armor Brigade; three Ranger groups; and a b"igade of 

the Airborne Divisio n. Although ot her units had been reorganized and refilled after their withdrawal fro m the north, their 

combat effectiveness was much less tha n before. It would certainly take more time and much more equipment to make them 

combat effective aga in. The 2d Division, which had suffered 

the fewest casualties. was refitted in a very shon Lime and 

deployed to Phan Rang onl y lO be disrupled again when thal 

city was overrun . By this lime, the 3d and 23d Divisions were 

also entirely destroyed and no longer existed as sllch. The 22d 

Division, which had los I about 40 percenl of ilS slrength, was 

refilled in one week and then deployed ( 0 Long An with two 

regiments to reinrorce the southwestern rIank of MR-III. 

Abollt 2,000 Rangers from MR-I and - II were organized in 

one group. refitted in haste, and deployed LO MR-IV al My 

Tho. The Airborne Division. which had suffered tremendous 

losses at Phan Rang and Khanh Duong, was now only 50 
130 THE FINAL COI.LA PSE 

percent strong, with two brigades. The Marine Division had 

about 6,000 tfOOp S remaining. TIley were quickl y reorganized 

into two brigades and 3u3ched to III Corps as reinforcement. 

In general, after the loss of MR-I and MR-II, total strength 

was reduced by about 50 percenl. 

The 18th Infantry Division was responsible for the Long 

Khanh (Xuan Loc) frolll, and its ta sks included reoccupyi ng 

Dinh Quan District Town on National Route 20, reestablishing 

normal traffic 011 Na tional Route I between Xuan Lac and 

Binh Tuy. and protecting the northern perimeter of the vital 

logistical base of Long Binh, National Route 15, and the Bien 

Hoa Air Base. During the enemy altack against Xuan Loc, the 

18th Division co ntrolled the followin g forces: its own three 

regiments, the 43d, 48th and 52d, augmented by the 8th regiment of the 5th Division; the 3d Armor Brigade (two M-4I/ M11 3 squadrons a nd one M-4 8 squadron), two Ranger battalions and two artill ery baualions (105-mm. and 155-mm.), all 

organized into three task forces, the 316th, 3 18th, and 322d; 

the 8 1 st Airborne Ranger Croup, and the 1 st Airborne Brigade 

(three infantry battalions and one 105-mm. battalion); and Regional Force and Popular Force forces organic to Long Khanh 

Sector, about four battalions. The 4th Air Division provided 

tactical air support. 

The Long Kha nh front was far more active than Tay Ninh 

and Binh Duong. On 9 April, the NVA 341 Sl and 3d Divisions 

established blocking positions at the Suoi Dati Ciay intersection which connected National Route 20 with the provi ncial 

city of Xuan Loe (Map 10) and heavil y shelled the Bien Hoa 

Air Base. the Headquarters of III Corps, and the Long Binh 

logistical base. Later in the ballle, the 341 st and 3d Divisions 

were augmcnted by anOlher division, the CT -7, thus making 

up a corps-size forcc of three divisions tryi ng to take Xuan 

Loc. After blocking National Route 20 at Suoi Dau Ciay, the 

enemy launched repeated attacks against the 52d Regiment 

defending the northwestern perime ter of the city. The 52d 

Regiment suffered heavy losses. At the same time the enemy 

effectively interdicted an armor task force sent to reinforce 

Xuan Loe. 

Arter a week-long ballle, National Route 20 remained 

blocked. As a result, III Corps had to reqliest reinforcement, 

and the 1st Airborne Brigade was heJilifted into Xuan Loc. In 

the meantime, helicopter resuppl y for the 18th Division was 

also augmented. and the division succeeded in enlarging the 
OEFENSt: IN TilE SOUTH 

~ 

XUAN LOC 

9·22 April 1975 

+-- -

ARVN defensive IIrell 

NVA IIttllck, 9 Apr 

ARVN relief force. 9 Apr 

Arell of contllct. 9 Apr 

ARVN retrellt. 22 Apr 

o • MILES 

" ____ ~, __ -"I 

o 41(ILOMETERS 

MAI'IO 

131 

XUlln LOC "", 

~43) 

~~~/' 1 

defense perimeter of the city. The enemy. with augmented 

forces. aU3cked the 1st Airborne Brigade somh of the city. The 

paratroopers fought most valiantly and inflicted heavy losses 

on the enemy who withdrew eastward. The airborne bl'igade 

pursued and badly mauled the enemy. In addition, tactical air 

and other bombing sonies fl own by the VNAF destroyed his 

command post. and the southeastern pel'imeter of Xuan Loc 

became quiet for a few days. 

But on the northwestern perimeter, after a forty-eight hour 

lull, the enemy resumed his push into the city and despite 

heavy losses managed to infiltrate some elements who immediately occupied the seminary area, the cathedral, and the diocesan office. The 18th Division reacted swirtly and sllccessrullv 
132 T il E FI NAL COLLA PSE 

and lOok over (went y enemy prisoners. Most of the prisoners 

wcre about sevCl'llcen yea rs old and declared they were newly 

recruited conscripts intmduced into the baul e area just three 

days earlier. They did no t know the terrai n and were afraid of 

the fi ghting and o f the anillery. After penetrating the cit y, they 

hid in lhe sewers and did no t fire any of the ir sevent y-ro und 

basic ammunition load. 

After many unsuccessful au acks from the no rth and south. 

the enemy finall y launched a new wave of atlacks against the 

48th Regiment o n the weste rn nank. Suppo rted by tanks. the 

altacking troops b roke th,"o ugh the line of defense, and commu nications were lost between lhe 18th Divisio n and the 48th 

Regiment comma nd post. altho ugh two of its battalio ns still 

maintained contact with the divisio n. III Corps could not clea r 

Na tio nal Route 1 between Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc. and the 

number of heli copters available for resuppl ying thc 18th Divisio n in the cit y and for medi cal evacuation continued to dwindl e. II was feal'cd the 18th Divisio n might become bogged 

down and eventually destroyed. The refore, with JGS approval , 

HI Corps finall y decided to evacuate Xuan Loc. 

On 23 April the entire 18 th Division, the I st Airbo rne 

Brigade , and Regio nal Fo rce and Popular Fo rce eleme nts extricated themselves from the city by a well-executed re t real alo ng 

Interprovincial Ro ute 2. This withdrawal succeeded admirably 

thanks to what Brig. Gen. Le Minh Dao, commander of the 

18 th Divisio n, call ed "surprise and diversio n." The movelllelll 

was well conceived and well coordinated; all troops and artillery pieces were withdrawn without significant losses. However, 

the province chie f of Lo ng Khanh , Colo nel Phuc, was fatall y 

wounded by a B-40 rocket fired at his j eep. At 1800 hours the 

same day, the 18 th Divisio n made its way by trucks from Lo ng 

Le to Long Binh base. Here it took a three-day resl and 

refilled befo re deploying again to defend the southeastern area 

of Bien Hoa. T he I st Airbo rne Brigade, meanwhile, was to Slay 

in Phuoc T uy Province to protect the access to Vung Tau. 

After mo re than twO weeks of fi e rce fi ghti ng, the 18th 

Division had suffered more than 30 percent casua lties. Its 52d 

Regiment, almost destroyed, had to be completely reorga nized 

and refilled. The losses were most serious since they included 

a great number of experienced and good commanders. The 

Regional Force and Popular Force units, howeve r. suffered the 

heaviest casuah ies and were deemed no longer combat effective. Only the 1st Airborne Brigade incurred light casua llics. 
DEFENSE IN THE SOUTII 133 

During the battle, air support was most effective. Tactical 

air sorties and CBU bombing missions broke up repeated 

enemy attacks; in particular·, the CBU-55s and "big bombs" 

played havoc in the enemy ranks. At the very least. an entire 

enemy regiment was nCOlriy wiped OUl. Refugees who later 

made the ir way through Xuan Loc reported having secn hundreds of enemy corpses scallered on the battleground. complete with weapons and battle gear; several of these bodies 

bore no marks of wounds. 

T he evacuation of Xuan Lac having been successrully completed, III Corps began consolidating its forces and prepared a 

plan which was submiued to J GS for the derense or the remaining MR- Ill te rritory and the Capital Milita ry Districl. As 

conceived by the III Corps commander, Ll. Gen. Nguyen Van 

Toan, the plan call ed for organi zing five maj or resistance centers. These centers were to extend their defense areas outward 

beyond the effecti ve range of enemy 130-mm. guns; they were 

talllamount to five different fronts so connected as to form an 

arc enveloping the entire area west, north, and east or Saigon: 

the Cu Chi front to the northwest. defended by the 25th 

Division; the Binh Duong front to the north. defended by the 

5th Division; the Bien Hoa front to the northeast, defended by 

the 18th Division; the Vung T au and QL- 15 (Na tional Route 

15) rroOl, defended by the I Sl Airborne Brigade, one battalion 

of the 3d Division, armor elements. and Regional and Popul ar 

Forces organic to the sector involved; the Long An front ror 

which the Capital Military District (CMD) Command was responsible (it had the reconstilUted remnants of the 22d Division). In particul ar. National Route 15 was to be kept open as 

the final re treat ro ute toward the sea ir need be (Map J 1). 

As field commander, Lt. Gen. T oan was delega tcd full 

powcr or decision, and he was to implement the plan with the 

full support or JGS. In a first move on 22 April, he withdrew 

lhe 25th Division from Tay Ninh, leaving the derense or this 

city to Ranger and territo rial forces. T he 25th Div ision rell 

back to Cu Chi whe re it established a line of defense covering 

Cu Chi and the western nank of CMD beyond the lau er's own 

defense pe rimeter. T he 18th Div ision, art er three days or rest 

at Long Sinh. took up positions on a line covering the easte rn 

part or Bien Hoa, thus releasing the 3d Armor Brigade and (he 

468th Ma rine Brigade ror the derense or the southern perimeter of Long Binh base. T he 1st Airborne Brigade, whi ch had 

fa ll en back rrom Xuan Loc, detailed aile of its battalions ror 
T·"tI 

, 

, 

') --... 1 

MAP 11 

To A" Loe: 

\ 

Cho"r,.."h 

A p 

-I -=~.IN H 

._ s." 

o 

c 
THE FALL OF SAIGON 

2&-21 April 117& 

<;---:> 

.. : .... e 

South V~m ... front 

AxI, of .......... y main .tteck 

AxI, of .... .,.,y l.condary .ttack 

o 10 Mlua 1>---,-, --" 

o 101(IlOMETI!RS 

, I, 

4&8

,f 

/ ~ • , 

I 

I 

f 

" 

, 

, 

\ 

, 

, 
136 THE FINAL COLLAPSt: 

the defense of Phuoc Tuy Sector while it deployed for (he 

protection of National Route 15 and sLUod ready to intervene 

in Vung Tau if necessary. 

After the successive evacuations of An Loc. Chon Thanh, 

and Xuan Loc, enemy pressure increased substantially in several directions poinling toward Saigon. National ROlile 22 connecting eu Chi with Tar Ninh was interdicted at several places. 

Convoys moving toward Tay Ninh for the supply of lhal city 

were frequemly ambushed. At the same time, the enemy 

stepped up shelling of Bien Hoa by rockclS and 130-mm. guns 

and openly moved troops toward the city from nonh of Binh 

Duong. War Zone D, and the Soi Loi-Ho Bo base area. Intelligence reports indicated that the e nemy was pressing toward 

Saigon from many directions. Each advancing corps included 

twO or three main force divisions suppol'lcd by artillery and 

armor. In the meantime. the friendly military situation deteri· 

orated rapidly in the wake of President Thieu's resignation on 

21 April 1975. (See Chapter 9.) Profiting from the political 

upheaval in Saigon and the general confusion and low morale 

among the population and troops. the enemy launched an all· 

out effort against Bien I-Ioa from the south and the southeast 

on 26 April. He began by attacking the Armor School at Long 

Thanh, overrunning the district town of Long Thanh and interdicting Na tional Route 15 connecting Saigon with Vung 

Tau. At the same time, enemy sappers seized the railway 

bridge southwest of Bien Hoa while his guns and rockets 

unceasingly pounded the air base. Enemy troops were now 

closing in on the munition depot complex of Thanh Tuy Ha in 

an attempt to destroy this depot and directly threaten Saigon 

from the southeast. 

Almost simultaneously, enemy infantry and armor had 

pushed into the Oat Do area after Binh Tuy had been evacuated on the same day with Xuan Loc. From there, the enemy 

attacked and overran the Van Kiep Training Center where a 

battalion of lhe 3d Division was undergoing reorganization 

together wit h Regional Force and Popular Force units. Friendly troops fell back to Vung Tau after destroying the Rach Hao 

Bridge to prevent lhe e nemy from advancing into the city by 

way of Nationa l Route 15. Vung Tau City was shell ed on 28 

April and with increased inte nsity during the night of 29 April. 

Other targets or enemy shelling included the airport and the 

Signal School on the city's outskirts. 
DEt' F.NSE IN TilE SOUTH 137 

During early March 1975, the enemy attempted to seize the 

Ba Den Mountain and the villages west of Tay Ninh to widen 

his infiltration corridor into the areas of Ho 80, Khiem Hanh, 

and Hicu Thien. On the Khiem I-Ianh-Hieu T hien front in 

particular, enemy forces met with vigorous reactions by the 3d 

Armor Brigade and the 25th Division and suffered casualties 

by the huncJreds. Nonetheless, the enemy persisted, and after 

overrunning the district town of Dau Tieng in Sinh Duong 

Province, he crossed the river and brought his armor and 

artillery into the Ho Bo-Boi Loi areas, thereby creating enormous pressure directly on the Capital Military District. 

Aftcr redeploying from Tay Ninh City to Cu Chi and organizing a defense line thel'e, the 25th Division repeatedly battled with enemy forces in the Duc Hoa-Duc I-Iue and Hieu 

Thien areas. Communication lines between Duc Hue and Hau 

Nghia Provincial City (Duc I-Ioa) and bctwecn Hieu T hien and 

Cu Chi wcrc interdicted by enemy blocking positions, resulting 

in several skirmishes in which the 25th Division tried both to 

clear the roads and to block the enemy push toward Saigon. 

However, enemy troops succeeded in penetrating into the Ba 

Diem-Hoc Mon area and were poised to cut the 25th Division's retreat route toward the capital and launch direct attacks 

against Saigon. During the day of 27 April and the night of 28 

April, Cu Chi was the target of continuous bombardment by 

rockets and artillery. Damage was heavy. In particular, a supply 

convoy moving from eu Chi to Hieu Thien was ambushed and 

severely mauled. Forty-five trucks were burned. In general, 

however, fight ing in the 25th Division's area of responsibility 

was much less intense than the fighting on the Bien Hoa front. 

Another enemy effort during the final phase involved the 

areas of Phu Ciao, Tan Uyen, and Co Mi, southeast of Binh 

Duong Province, Regional Force and Popular Force outposts 

were constantly attacked and overrun. Of particular note were 

the baules fought in the area north and northeast of Ben San 

where the 5th Division opposed the NVA CT -7 Division. The 

enemy design was (0 push into the eastern area of Binh Duong 

and the area northwest of Bien I-Ioa, but vigorous counterattacks by the 5th Division caused him sizable losses and his 

311Cmpt was completely thwartcd. 

No sooner had the 5th Division Slopped the enemy advance 

IOward the cast of Binh Duong than it had to confront other 

enemy 311acks from Chon Thanh-An Loc. After safely extricating themsel"es from An Loc, four Ranger battalions and Re-
138 THE HNAL COLLAPSE 

giona l Force and Popular Force unilS of the Chon Thanh 

District fought violent skirmishes with the enemy south of 

Chon Thanh. The enemy all3ckcd wilh prcplanncd artillery 

fire and annor.infamTY assaults, coordinated with other altacks 

against 5th Division unilS aucmpling (0 advance LOward Chon 

Thanh from Ball Bang on National Route 13. BUl with effective support of the air force, the Rangers at Chon Thanh 

inOicted heavy losses: morc than three hundred enemy tTOOp S 

killed and fourteen tanks destroyed in two days of continuous 

fighting. However, the enemy did not break comact; his troops 

still clung to the southeastern part of Chon ll1anh District in a 

determined effon to destroy the Rangers and sever their re· 

trea t route toward Lai Khc. Yet the Rangers managed to rail 

back to Lai Khe without signifi cant losses; they even brought 

back all their wounded although they had to leave behind the 

bodies or twenty commdes who had been killed in action. The 

rriendly rorces withdrawn rrom An Loc and Chon Thanh to· 

taled eight balLalions. six Ranger and two Regional Force, all 

under the command or Col. Nguyen Thanh CllUan. Together 

with the e ntire staff or the sector, they fell back to Lai Khe 

almost imact, still retaining 90 percent of their strength. All 

artill ery pieces or twO 105-mm. baualions were successfully 

he1ilifted to L.,i Khe, but four l55·mm. howitzers and over 

10,000 artillery rounds had to be destroyed on the spot before 

lhe retreat. 

The Situation ill 1\1/ R-/V 

In contraSt with the other three military regions, the situa· 

lion in MR-IV was relatively quiet except for constam but 

indecisive balding between the ARVN 9th Division and the 

NVA CT -5 Division in the area straddling the Cambodian 

border where Kien Tuong Province adjoins Svay Rieng. Enemy 

activities were lal'gcly confined to local ac tions against Region. 

al Force and Popular Force outposts, particularl y in the prov. 

inces of Chuong Thien and Kien Giang. BUl as of mid-March 

1975 and continuing into the ea rl y pan of April enemy harass· 

ment suddenly increased in cases and imensity. Most actions 

were now directed against logistical installations and the Regional Force units manning outposts a long National Rotlte 4. 

the main ari el), connec ti ng the J\lekong Delta with Saigon. 

Afler a long time spent in replacing earlier losses and 

refilling. the NVA CT-5 Division moved into MR-JV in the 
DEFENSE IN TIlE SOUTH 139 

area south\\'est of Tan An and allacked the district lown of 

Thu Thua, defended by Regional Force and Popular Force 

units. (Stt Map 11.) The enemy design was, once having seized 

Thu Thua, to move into a position to interdict National Route 

4 between Tan An and Phu Lam on the outskins of Saigon 

and prevent lhe ARVN 7th Division from reinforcing Saigon. 

But this aucmpt was defeated; the defending forces of Thu 

Thua dctenninedly drove back enemy forces and innicted 

heavy losses. Another enemy effort was directed against the 

district town of Ben Tranh, but here again the attack was 

broken up by the combined efforts of the defending 7th and 

91h Divisions. After a day of fighting, the enemy was forced to 

break contacl, leaving behind nearly two hundred dead and 

hundreds of weapons, including artillery and antiaircraft guns. 

AboUI twenty enemy troops were taken prisoner. Other enemy 

blocking positions set up south of Tan An and in the Ben 

Tranh area were compl etely cleared. As a result, normal traffic 

resumed on National Route 4 from Saigon to My Tho and 

beyond. 

I-laving penetrated into the remOle districts of the Upper 

and Lower U Minh areas, the enemy succeeded in keeping his 

supply line open from the border area of Ha Tien into Kien 

Giang and Chuong Thien Provinces. Sharply increased infiltration of troops, weapons, and supplies permitted the aClivalion 

of a new division, the NVA 8th Division which also contained 

tel'ritorial and independent units forme rl y under the control of 

the enemy's 3d MR. T he NVA 8th Division launched an attack 

aga inst the Can Tho defense perimeter in late March 1975. 

This was a two-pronged attack directed against the city of Can 

Tho, scat of IV Corps Headquarters, and against the Cai Von 

Training Center and the district town of Binh Minh of Vinh 

Long Province. In addition. the enemy also established blocking positions at Ba Cang, the usual sensitive spot between Can 

Tho and Vinh Long. The ARVN 2 1st Division and its armor 

troops repelled the attack al the outer perimeter of Can Tho 

and inniclcd over three hundred casualti es and capturcd nu· 

merous weapons. The all<lck abrainst Cai Von and Binh Minh 

was also quickly defeated. and only forty-eight hours later, a ll 

blocking posilions at Ba Cang had been eliminated. 

In brief, the main enemy effort in MR-IV was an attempt to 

interdict National Route 4, severing communication between 

Saigon and Can Tho. and to protect his infiltration corridor 

from the Parrot's Beak. T his was apparently a secondary effort 
140 T il E FI NAL COLLA PSE 

to support his p rincipal allack in MR-III which. of course, 

contained Saigon , the final objective of the war. During the 

final weeks all enemy independent regiments in MR- IV were 

grouped into new di visions, but they existed largely in name 

and on paper, not in combat effectiveness. This move was 

mostl y political and was made for its psychological effec ts. 

In contrast to his large-scale conventional military operations in olher pa rts of the country, the enemy's warfare in (he 

Mekong Della remained essentiall y guerrilla, seeking to undermine our government infrastructure and gain a measure of 

comTol over the bountiful economic resources of the region. 

Even whe n the fighting reached its peak in MRs-I. II, and lit 

during the first qual"tc r of 19 75, MR-IV cnjoyed rel ative peace 

and quiet. Unlil the lime lhe surrender order was given o n 30 

April 1975, no district lown was eve r seized or even temporarily controlled by the c nemy. 
CHAIYJ"ER 9 

The Last Days 

The loss of Ban Me ThuOL and the fai lure of the KonlumPleiku withdrawal caused a significant political upheaval in 

Saigon. Elements of the underground political opposition 

came into the open and held meetings to voice their antigovernment feelings. The government moved in and on 27 March 

1975. arrested a number of people suspected of plotting a 

coup. About the same lime, President Thicu instructed his 

prime mi nister to form a new cabinet. Given the deteriorating 

situation, probings and consultations look a long lime and ran 

into insurmountable obstacles. All political personalities who 

were willing to join the cabinet demanded impossible condilions. Opposition political circles all held President Thieu per· 

sonally responsible for the tragic military situation. They be· 

lieved he was no longer able to lead the country OUI of its 

predicamenl. After more than a week of unfruitful consulta· 

lions, Prime Minister Khiem finally resigned. He gave as the 

reason for his action the need to allow broader cabinet partici. 

pation by other political elements. 

On 2 April 1975, during an ordinary seSSion, the Senate 

adopted a resolution with forty-two votes for and about ten 

against, holding President Thieu responsible ror the deteriorat· 

ing situation and asking him to take immediate steps to form a 

broader cabinet. Rumors spread at once about a possible coalition government which Mr. Tran Van Lam and Mr. Tran Van 

Do were willing to lead. But nothing materialized; presumably 

the idea was rejected by President Thieu. 

Three days later, on 5 April, Mr. Nguyen Ba Can, Speaker 

or the House or Representatives, was designated as the new 

prime minister. On 8 April, a South Vietnamese F-5 bomber 

bombed the Independence Palace. This was the first time Ihe 

new palace had bee n bombed. The old palace was auacked in 

1960 by an ail' force A-I Skyraider during Mr. Ngo Dinh 

Diem's presidency. Rumors again circulated that the fale of 

South Vietnam had been decided and that the great powers 

had ;lgreed La give North Vietnam a free hand in unifying the 
142 TilE FINAL COLW\ PSE 

country. It \\'<.IS speculated that to save what we could the 

gO\'crnmcnt should send a plenipotentiary to Paris and ask the 

Fl'ench government to act as ofTicial intermcdiary in negotiations about to be conducted with the Communists. The deadline fOl' such a move was rumored to be 7 April, latcl' extended 

to 10 April. Deputy Prime Ministcr Tran Van Don. back from a 

liaison mission (0 the United States, reporled the same thing 

to thc president on 5 April. ~ut President Thieu appeared 

incredulous, 

During all this time. our forces had been retreating from 

the north, and the enemy was approaching Saigon, On 23 

April Xuan Loc was evacuated, The military situation deterioraLCd with every passing day althoughJGS made every efTort to 

provide SUppOrl for lhe field command and 10 reorganize and 

refit all ballered units for immcdiate deployment. 

Demands that Presidelll Thieu should resign and transfer 

his powers at once to General Duong Van Minh were resurrected in earnest. A coalition government led by General 

Minh, it was contended, stood a good chance of being accepted by the Communists; if so, more bloodshed could be averled, On Monday 2 1 April during a meeting at the Independence Palace, President Thieu announced his decision to step 

down, He insinuated that the United States wanted his resignation and that whether 01' not he consented. certain generals 

would press for it. He said he hoped that his move would help 

bring true peace to the country and military aid for the armed 

forces. As required by the constitution, he was prepared to 

transfer the presidency to Vice President Tran Van Huong. 

Finally. he asked the armed forces and the nationa l police to 

fully support the new president. 

In the evening of 21 April 1975, the televised transfer 

ceremony took place at the Independence Palace, In his fare· 

well speech intended for the government a nd the popUlation, 

President Thieu made a detailed analysis of the situation and 

the reasons for his resignation, For the first lime, he admitted 

having ordered lhe evacuation of Pleiku and Kontum because, 

he said, it was the incvitable course of action to take in the 

face of the deteriorating situation; but he also insisted thal the 

generals had failed him. 

The question most asked then and now concerns possible 

pressures behind President Thieu's resignation. Was it a decision he had made entil'e1y on his own? In his testimony before 

the Investigations Subcommittec of the House International 
T~t E LAST DA VS 143 

Relations Commitlee on 27 J anuary 1976, Ambassador 

Graham Martin affirmed that he played no significant role in 

persuading Mr. Thieu 1O resign. But he also confirmed that 

during a conversation with President Thie u on 20 April he 

gave the president inte lligence gathered by US DAO and CIA 

concerning the balance of forces at the time. 

I said it was my conclusion that almost all of his generals. although they would continue to fight. believed defense was hopeless 

unless a respite could be gained through the beginning of the negotiating process. 

And they did not believe such a process could begin unless the 

Presiden t left o r took steps to see that the process began immediately. 

I said it was my reelings [sir] that if he did not move soon, his 

generals wou ld ask him to go. 1 

Ambassador Manin emphasized the personal character of his 

opinions. He was speaking to President Thieu, as he put it, 

"only as an individual, not for the President or the Secretary of 

State, or even as the American Ambassador.·' 

As to the "generals would ask him 1O go" in Ambassador 

Martin's opinion, I am certain that on our side there was 

absolutely no pressure from any general to force him LO resign. 

But there could have been some misreading of one event. 

After retired Ll. Gen. Tran Van Don was appoi nted minister of 

de fen se in Mr. Can's cabinet, he summoned all ava ilable general officers for a meeting at JGS. This was in essence an introduction and fami liarization talk, but to outside rs it could we ll 

appear to have been something else, perhaps even a collusion 

for political purposes. But it was an open meeting allended by 

a broad audi ence, and there could be no misunderstanding as 

to its nature or intent. 

After President Huong took over, he immediately went 

about imposing certain forceful measures, among which was a 

formal ban on all overseas travel. Servicemen and civil servants 

who had fled to foreign countries were ordered to return 

within thirty days; if they failed to do so, the ir citizenship 

would be revoked, and all their belongings confisca ted. The 

only people that the new government would allow to go over-

''''nll: Vietl1:tm·C:IITlbodi:. Erne gency. 1975:' t'an III-Vietnam E\'acoation: TeSli. 

mony of Ambassador Grah<llll 1\ . M,lTIin (I-I caring before the Special Suocolllmitlec on 

hl\'Cs ti g-~tio s of the Commillee Oil luteru:uional Relations. Housc of Reprcscll\,uivcs. 

94th Congrcss. Sccond Se:uion. 27 Jam131), 1976): pp. 546-4 7. For full testimony on 

the COIlI·crsation. S("t· Appcndh: n. 

41 2-606 a - 85 - 6 QL 3 
144 Tllf: .' INAl. CO LLAPSE 

seas were the old and the ill; they were to be permitted to seek 

treatment oul of the country after posting a large bond. The 

money from those bonds would be used for relief of combatants at home. 

President Huong was intent on seeking General Duong Van 

Minh's participation in the government. He extended an invitation which was quickly declined by General Minh who demanded large powers for himself. General Minh had long been 

advised by a leftist military and political staff. His ambition had 

always been to become president himself. and he had hoped to 

be handed the presidency by President Thieu. Although 

rumors persisted that the Communists were willing LO negotiale a political arrangement only with General Minh, Mr. 

Huong, a believer in constitutional government, did not 

choose to transfer his presidency to General Minh without the 

consent of the Congress. 

In the meantime, the military situation became increasingly 

bad. In the afternoon of Sunday 27 April 1975, the defense 

minister, Mr. Tran Van Don, led a military delegation com· 

posed of general officers of JGS and the commander of CMD 

in an appearance before a meeting of both houses of Congress. By 1930, 138 senators and representatives were present. 

Mr. Don summarized the military situation: Saigon was now 

surrounded by fifteen enemy divisions under the control of 

three army corps. The Saigon-Vung Tau Highway had been 

cut, and enemy troops were advancing toward the Long Binh 

base. At 2020 the General Assembly voted (136-2) to hand 

over the presidency to General Duong Van Minh. The next 

day, Monday 28 April 1975 at 1730, General Minh was sworn 

in as president.:2 

There had been ea rlier rumors of a " Duong Van Minh 

solution." During the early part of April, the French Embassy 

and the French ambassador, Mr. Merillon, in particular, 

worked feverishly for a political solution to the war: an ar· 

rangemem between a government led by Genera l Minh and 

the Communists. On the American side, the State Depanment 

likfore l>residem Huong stepped down. he issued a decrcc rd,e\',ng me of ffi)' 

position as chairnlan of the Joint Cen('ral Starr. It was then up to the new prcsidelll to 

apI)()int my replaccmertt. I dcslgnated Lt. Cen. Don Van Khu)'en. my chIef of arr. as 

acting chainnan of the JCS. and left Vietnam on Monday afternoon. 28 April 1975. for 

the 7th flcct. 
TilE LAST DAYS 145 

was doubtful but had sOme reason to hope the Communists 

would accept a negotiated seulcmenl.:S 

Gencral Minh was much more confidcnt. According to a 

source close to him. Genera l Minh based his conviction of an 

eventual political arrangement with the Communists on these 

facts as he saw them: (I) The Communists did not have a solid 

infr3stl'Uctute in Saigon and its surrounding areas. Negotiations would allow the Communists more time for consolida ting 

their infrastructure. (2) The Provisional Revolutionary governmcnt was made up entirel y of Southerners who did not want to 

be dominated by North Vietnam. They preferred a "twO Vietnams" solution. (3) Il was believed that Communist China 

would prefer a divided Vietnam. Once unified, Viemam might 

become a threat to its southeastern border. (4) Gencral Minh 

believed that the French Ambassador could arrangc for fruitful 

negotiations. Finall y he concluded: "The Communists know 

that the people of South Vietnam don't like Communism. 

Since it is impossible for the Communists to kill them all. it is 

to their adva ntage to negotiate." 4 

In addition, on one occasion when he met with mc after 2 1 

April 1975, General Minh boasted he used to keep in constant 

touch with the other side by radio. It was a fact hc could not 

disclose before for fear of arrcst, but it was all right to tell me 

now. So he firmly believed that a government with him at the 

head would be acceptable to the Communists and that they 

would be willing to negotiate with him for a political solution. 

This was also why a large number of military officers and civil 

servants of all ranks elected to stay behind to work for the new 

governmenl. With the hope they could play some role in the 

new administration, some pcople even came back to Saigon 

with thcir fami li es after living in foreign countries for several 

years. As il turned out, North Vietnam had changed its mind. I 

understand that by late March, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon had 

received reports from onc of its agents who had penetrated the 

Communist Central Office for South Vietnam that North Vietnam was inclined LOward a military victory rather than a political arrangement. 

' In hi~ In timon) nu~ V,elnam·Cambodia Emngt"ncy. 1975." I'an III-VieUlam 

E\·at"ual,o n. pp. 008-9). Ambassador Marl1l1 laler shed some lighl on efforts to adue\'t" 

;II polilln l 5OIution to tht" "·ar. Stt Appe ndix C. 

'Th,s mformaliol1 W;U obtamed during my imc1'\';{"w o f M:aj. G",n. Ch:arlt"s J. 

T immt"s. U.S. Ann) (Rt" I.). 
146 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

General Minh waited in vain for a favorable word from the 

other side but nothing came. The response of the Communists 

was ominous: lhey bombed Tan Son Nhul Air Base the 

moment he was sworn in and shelled Saigon barely twelve 

hours later. Still a last-ditch elTon was 3llcmplcd by General 

Minh's people to contact the CommunisLS through their representative at Tan Son NItUl. BUI the answer was evasive and 

intimidating. It was then thai General Minh realized his hope 

was gone. He gave in to all Communist demands. 

General Minh personally admitted he had been duped by 

lhe Communists. He advised his closest aide and his son-inlaw, Colonel Nguyen Hong Dai. LO leave Vietnam. BUl General 

Min h was not the only one to be duped. Several other credulous Vietnamese were unable to leave because it was too late 

by the time they realized what had happened. Among those 

who elected to stay, however, a few military officers. civil servants, and artists, wrilers, etc., were treated well and given good 

positions in the new Communist government because of their 

past connections and service to the underground Communists. 

And so we came to realizc how deficient our sccUl;ty services, 

both military and civilian. had been in their elTort to prevent 

penetration by Communists and their agents. 

The E vacual;on 

The people who advocated appeasement and coa lition with 

the Communists believed that an immcdiatc cease-fire-certainly within twenty-four hours-would follow Genera l Minh's 

inauguration. But for others who had ncver compromised with 

the Communists and for whom a coalition meant certain death, 

the inauguration was a signal to pack and leave. For these 

people, the die-hard ami-Communists. a chapter of Vietnamese 

history had closed. It was a chapter written with the blood 

shed by hundreds of thousands of soldiers for a cause in which 

they believed. Even after President Thieu had stepped down, 

most of these people-among them the military officers and 

civil servants who had served under his regime and leadership-stili hoped to carryon the struggle. They were certainl y 

not Thieu's followers; they simply wanted to serve the cause 

for which they had been fighting. Now thaL an entirely new 

chapter had begun, they felt this was no place for them; it was 

better to leave it to those who believed the)' could compromise 

with the Communists. 
THE LAST DAYS 14 7 

The plan for evacuating American personnel and selec ted 

Vietnamese citizens must have been thoroughly worked Ollt by 

the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and based on lessons learned from 

the disorder and difficulti es encounte red during the evacuation 

of refugees from Da Nang and Nha Trang. Any contingency 

plans which existed were entirely ainight and werc carefully 

kept that way. On the Vietnamese side, neithcr the civilian 

government nor the military knew anything officially about 

these plans. The details remained secre t. No one was told, for 

instance, how many people the U.S. Embassy planned to evac· 

uate, what means were available to transport them, what procedures would be employed. or where or when the evacuees 

were supposed to meet for the journey. The military had only 

personal contacts, chiefly with U.S. counterparts who almost 

without exception ad"ised them to evacuate their families 

ahead of time. 

The dilemma then fa cing the military was that the ban on 

overseas travel was still being enforced. If a serviceman were 

to leave the country, he would become a deserter. Civilians 

who left would be charged with illegal exit. On the other hand, 

since the evacuation facilities were not under Vietnamese control, no one knew for certain how many refugees would be 

accommodated, where the final destination would be, and what 

forma lities or papers were needed. As a result, JGS did not 

issue any instructions concerning the evacuation. It was understood, however, that the number of evacuees was limited and 

highly selective. Those who were selected would be contacted 

by U.S. personnel and given proper guidance. This was in 

general what we on the Vietnamese side lea rned of lhe American plans. 

Only later did it become known that the contingency plan 

ror the evacuation had been worked out by lhe U.S. Embassy 

and DAD with the assistance of CINCPAC. The plan, code 

named TALON VISE. was conslantl y updaled to reflect requirements and assets available. It also e nvisaged the possibility of 

employing aircraft a nd a U.S. ground force for protection and 

security. The main concern , as it was lea rned from Ambassador Martin's later testimony, was to avoid chaos·causing 

frenzy. The goal was to extricale all American citizens. Vic tnamese nationals related to them, and those Vietnamese citizens \,'hose lives would be endangered if lhey stayed behind. 

The total number of evacuees falling inlO the last category was 
148 TilE fINAL COLLAPSE 

ultimately fixed at 50,000 o n 25 April, as Ambassador Martin 

later testified. 

Until 14 April, the Embassy had parole authority, that is. authority to waive issuance of U.S. visas only for the 2,000 orphans being 

airlifted to the United States. 

On 14 April, thc Embassy reccived parole aUlhority for alien 

relatives. physicall y present in Vietnam, of U.S. citizens who were 

physically present in Vietnam. 

On 19 April. the Embassy received parole authority for alicn 

rclati\'cs of U.S. citizens and Vietnamcse permanent residents not 

physically present in Vietnam if the relatives were beneficiaries of 

visa pctitions approved by the U,S, Immigration and Naturalization 

Service. 

On 25 April. the Embassy finally received parole authority for 

additional categories of relativcs and up to 50.000 high-risk Victnamese. TIlis was four days before thc final departurc from Victnam.' 

This is what actually happened : "High-risk" Vielnamese 

contacted were to furnish a list of relatives whom lhey wanted 

to have evacuated, After approval by the U.S. Embassy or 

DAO, a rendezvous point was given. and evacuees were told to 

bring along only a hand bag per person for valuable objects or 

articl es of utmost necessity. At the rendezvous point the evacuees were picked up by a bus and driven to the DAO compound, Here they were assigned LO large waiting rooms. The 

planes used in the evacuation airlift, large cargo types such as 

C- 141 s or C- 130s, would usually arrive late in the afternoon 

and park at the end of the runways at Tan Son Nhut, far from 

the air·port facilities. When evening came, usually al about 

1900 or 2000. well-screened buses would take those evacuees 

whose names appeared on a manifest, and who had been 

waiting in the DAO compound, directly to Lhe planes. The 

police and military security personnel knew aboUl these movements but did not interfere since their own families were 

among the evacuees, So the evacuees simply boarded the waiting planes without going through the formalities normally required by the Ministry of Interior and without any control 

whatsoever by airport authorities. In other words, as far as the 

government was concerned, it was an illegal exit. The airlift 

would continue throughoul the night and SlOp by early morning only (0 be resumed in the evening. It went well until 28 

April and was only suspended for good as of 29 April when 

• Ambauador Marlln·s leSlllno n)" II. 592_ 
THE LAST DAYS 149 

Tan Son Nhul Air Base was rendered unusable by heavy shelling and bombing. 

During the two last days, 29 and 30 April, the U.S. Embassy 

managed to evacuate about 11 ,600 additional people by helicopter and by barge. Also, a number of fishermen living in 

coastal areas and those refugees who made their way Oul by 

ships or boats were picked up by the U.S. 7th Fleet offshore. 

Judging from the effectiveness with which the evacuation was 

carried out, the number of people evacuated could have been 

much higher if there had been more time and if the circumstances had been different. 

Bul all in ail , the evacuation of 130,000 Vietnamese was an 

admirable feal in iLSelf, comparable in every aspect to a successful military operation. This was a far cry from what had 

happened at Da Nang, Nha Trang. and even Phnom Penh. 

Saigon 

By 25 April, the enemy's pressure seemed to be enveloping 

the entire Capital Military District. and his efforts against 

Saigon were stepped up from many directions. The territory 

controll ed by our forces was by now largely confined to the 

area bounded by Bien Boa in the nonheast, Long Thanh in 

the east, Lai Khe in the north, and Hoc Mon in the northeast. 

(See Map II.) Enemy advance clements had already made probing attacks on the outskirts of Saigon. During the night of 26 

April, sappers simu ltaneously attacked the Newport Complex, 

the Bien Hoa Highway Bridge nearby, and the telecommunications terminal complex at Phu Lam. The terminal was damaged but continued to function. The a irborne battalion guarding the Independence Palace was deployed to the Newport and 

quickly routed the enemy. Tr'affic immediately resumed be-

(ween Saigon and Bien Hoa. 

On the following night, 27 April, all Regional Force and 

Popul ar Force outposts along the East Vam Co River in Hau 

Nghia Province were allacked and overrun, thus exposing the 

entire western flank of Saigon to enemy penetration and 

attack. The 5th Division Headquarters at Lai Khe, north of 

Saigon, was also under allack. The Bien Hoa Air Base to the 

northeast was heavily shelled; fuel and ordnance blew up and 

burned fi ercely, and base operations were completely disrupted. But all aircraft had evacuated, partly to Tan Son Nhut and 

partly to Tra Noc in MR-IV. The 3d Air Division, assisted by 
150 TilE ."JNAL COLLAPSE 

U.S. Marines. began dcslroying all remaining facilities on lhe 

base. in particular the overhaul shop, Ihe computer installations. the calibration shop, and several storage areas. The 18th 

Division defense line at Trang Born was attacked and penetratcd. From rhuQc Let the 1st Airbomc Brigade had LO fall back 

to Vung Tau in. the face of an enemy armor and infantry 

assa ult . From Long Thanh, e nemy armor and infantl'Y advanced along Interprovincial Roule 25 toward lhe district town 

of Nhan Tracht overrunning Regional Force and Popular 

Force OUlposts along the way, and 3U3Ckcd and seized lhe 

town in the aflernoon of 28 April. The district chief and his 

troops fell back to the Thanh Tuy Ha ammunition depot for a 

last-ditch stand and fight. Saigon was thus completely surrounded and now lay within range of the enemy's 130-mm. 

guns. 

At 1800 on 28 April, the depl·essing inauguration of the 

new president, Gene ral Duong Van Minh, having just ended. 

three A-37s suddenly attacked Tan Son NhUl Air Basc. Anti· 

aircraft weapons opened fire from the Independence Palace 

and from naval ships docked along Bach Dang Quay. Two F5As scrambled, but the attacking aircraft new ofT. The damage 

caused by the sudden bombing raid was minimal; one bomb 

was dropped over the air base. another struck the Hoc Mon 

area. and another exploded in an open field near the Binh 

Trieu Bridgc. Air Force Headquarters finally confirmed that 

the three auacking aircraft were nown by Communists and had 

come from a d.istant air base under enemy control. Their 

launch and recovery point was probably Phan Rang because all 

carried wing-tip fuel tanks. Imelligence reports now warned of 

a possible second raid at 2 100, but lhe radar warning system 

was inoperative following the destruction of Bien !-loa Air 

Base. In retaliation, a "big bomb" sorti e was directed aga inst 

Phan Rang Air Base where the A-37s in all probability had to 

SLOp over for refueling if lhey had come all lhe way from Da 

Nang. Our F-5A fighters meanwhile kept constant watch from 

the air. During the night. III Corps headqU<lrters moved from 

Bien Hoa to Go Vap where it shared the headquaTlers of lhe 

Armor Command. 

From 0400 on 29 April, the JGS compound, Tan Son Nhut 

Air Base, and lhe Navy headquarters on Bach Dang Quay were 

shelled intermillcntly. TIle JGS compound and Bach Dang 

Quay sustained only minor damage. but !he des!ruc!ion at Tan 

Son Nlull Air Base was eXlensive. Parking areas, fuel dumps, 
THE LAST DAYS 151 

ammunition depots were all hil. Fires and explosions occurred 

at several places. The DAO Headquarters (old MACV com· 

pound) was also hit hut suffered only slight physical damage. 

Two U.S. Marine guards were fatally wounded. In conjunction 

with shellings, enemy troops also attacked and broke through 

the northern defense perimeter of the air base. By 0600 they 

were all driven back by a newly formed airhome battalion, but 

about the same time other Communist troops launched attacks 

at numerous places around the city. The situation at 0700 on 

29 April was as follows: 

In Long An Province, the 22d Division met with sporadic 

contacts, but it held firmly. 

In Hau Nghia Province (Cu Chi front), the sector headquarters lost contact with III COI-PS. 

In Binh Duong Province, the Lai Khe base was heavily 

shelled during the night, Ben Cat District Town was under 

attack, and National Route 13 was interdicted between Phu 

Cuong, the provincial capital, and l.ai Khe. Phu Cuong itself 

was penetrated by enemy sappers who sel up blocking positions at some places. 

In Bien Hoa Province, lhe Tan Uyen District Town was 

under heavy attack. Police and Popular Force troops broke 

ranks; the city itself was almost deserted. The Trang Born 

defense line had been broken at several places, and the 18th 

Division had fallen back to south of Long Sinh base. The 

257(h Marine Brigade defending to the north of Long Sinh 

was under attack. Long Binh base continued to be shelled and 

harassed. The large ammunition depot complex at Thanh Tuy 

Ha was also shelled and surrounded . 

Directly west of Saigon the 8th and 9th Ranger Groups 

were heavily attacked during the night. Casualties amounted to 

50 percent of their strength. T he Hoc Mon District Town was 

under aaack, its Regional Force and Popular Force troops had 

suffered heavy losses. National Route 1 connecting Saigon with 

Cu Chi was interdicted; traffic was impossible. T he Quang 

Trung Training Center was shelled and attacked throughout 

the night. At the Go Vap-Hanh Thong Tay logistical complex, 

Communist troops had surfaced and set up positions north 

and northeast of lhe area just as they had done during the 

1968 Tel offensive. 

In Cholon, the Nhi Thien Duong Bridge had been seized by 

lhe enemy, and the Phu Lam telecommunications complex had 

been shell ed and harassed. 
152 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

At 0900 on 29 April the Tan Son Nhu( Air Base was 

bombarded a second lime. Damage was extensive. AiTCI"aft in 

parking areas, including A-37s and in particular four C- 130s 

already loaded with bombs. were hit and exploded. Fires 

spread rapidly at every place. T he air base was completely out 

of operation and in disorder. Over 3,000 people who had been 

there since the day before (28 April) [0 wait for U.S. evacuation aircraft in the area behind the DAD compound became 

terrified and frantically ned the basco By 1000 Air Force Headquarters was no longer in comrol of its personnel. In the air, 

waves of U.S. helicopters swirl ed and hovered about tall buildings and in the DAO compound evacuating U.S. personnel. It 

was hard to distinguish U.S. from South Vietnamese helicopters. 

Also at 1000 on 29 April, III Corps reponed that the 

situation was criti cal. It had lost contact with Hau Nghia Sector 

Headquarte rs. The 25th Division continued to clash violently 

with the enemy and requested more helicopter support. T he 

Trang Born defense line was to ta ll y shattered, and the 18th 

Division was now battling the enemy south of Long Binh base. 

In the base itself, disorder prevailed; command and control 

were no longer possible. The Tan Uyen District Town had 

been overrun at 0900, and enemy troops were advancing 

toward Bien Hoa. III Corps was no longer receiving any air 

support. 

It was impossible for the CMD Command to relieve enemy 

pressure south of Saigon. Its commander, Ll. Gen. Nguyen 

Van Minh, requested troops from JGS to reinforce the southern defense pe,·imeter. Two out of three airborne Ranger companies held in reserve at JGS were immediately released for his 

usc. A Ranger group which was the n operating on National 

Route 4 south of Ben Tranh was called back to Can Duoc 

District Town on Interprovincial Route 5A at 1200 to be 

placed under CMD command. But the movement could not be 

carried out because helicopters were no longer available. Inte rprovincial ROllte 5A connecting Cholon with Can Duoc was 

also interdi cted at several places, and it was impossible to 

dislodge the enemy from the Nhi Thien Duong Bridge. 

Meanwhile, the Thanh Tuy Ha ammunition depot was badly 

hit and disintegrated in violent explosions. Contact with the 

depot was lost at 1300. Enemy tanks by now had appeared at 

Cat Lai and were firing at the ammunition unloading pier. 

Completely surrounded and isolated, left without support and 
THE LAST DAYS 153 

without reinforcement, the Capital Military District was waiting 

helplessly to be conquered. 

President Minh gave twenty-four hours for all U.S. personnel to leave Vietnam. The evacuation pmceeded feverishly 

throughout lbe night and was over at 0500 on 30 April. At 

1000 on 30 April 1975. P"esidenl Minh ordered our armed 

forces to stop fighting. And South Vietnam came under Communist control and no longer existed as a free nation. 
CHAPTER 10 

Conclusions and Observations 

South Vietnam was lost to the CommunislS. After Ihiny 

years of lest and trial on the Vi elllam baulcficld, their kind of 

war-whether call ed guerrilla war, revolutional-Y war, people's 

war, or war of liberation-finall y prevailed. This should be a 

warning to other countries that morc Vicmams are in store for 

the future . Conquered one by one, non-Communist countries 

are being gradua lly reduced in number to the extent that some 

day, perhaps, there will remain only the United States and 

three or four other powers surrounded by a much grciHc r 

number of Communist or Communist-leaning cOllntries. It is a 

somber prospect that we will probably face in the coming 

decades if we fail to rea li ze the deficiencies and mistakes of the 

past and come up with a new line of conduct for the fUlUre. 

Havi ng read the previolls chapters, the thoughtful reader 

should be able La see for himself some of the reasons for the 

collapse of South Vietnam. Some causes that this monograph 

points out, expli citly or implicitly. are, as the author saw them: 

( I) South Vietnam had to accept an agreement whi ch was 

much too disadvantageous to its surviva l: 11le Paris Agreement 

tilted the balance of power to the Communist side and gave 

North Vietnam a free hand to launch its offe nsive in 1975. 

(2) The pledge given by a U.S. president to react with vigor 

and which South Vietnam regarded as a national commitment 

could not be honored by the administration which succeeded 

him even when Communist violatio ns were blatant. 

(3) The unexpected huge slash in U.S. military aid for 

South Vielllam seriously affected the combat capability and 

morale of its troops and population. 

(4) President Thieu made a strategi c decision too late for it 

to have any chance of success although he aClcd alit of necessi· 

ty. The withdrawal of II Corps forces was 100 hasty and disorderly, resulting in the rapid coll apse of 1 Corps and II Corps. 

(5) South Vietnamese leaders fa iled to I'ealize that U.S. 

policy had shifted toward appeasement and accommodation 

with the Communists even at the price of reneging on a corn· 
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 155 

mitment t6 help an ally maintain independence. Therefore, 

they could not adjust to the realities of the post-Agreement 

period but continued ( 0 stake South Vietnam's fa te on the 

elusive and the impossible. 

Fina lly, after many years of continuous war, South Vietnam 

was approaching political and economi c bankruptcy. National 

unity no longer existed; no one was able to rally the people 

behind the national cause. Riddled by corruption and sometimes ineptitude and dereliClion, the government hardl y responded to the needs of a public which had grad ually lost 

confidence in it. Despite rosy plans and proj ects, the national 

economy continued its course downward and appeared 

doomed short of a miracle. Under these conditions, the South 

Vietnamese social fabric gradua lly disintegrated, influenced in 

part by mistrust. divisiveness, uncertainty, and defeatism until 

the whole nation appeared to some to resemble a rOllen fruit 

ready to fall at the first passing breeze. 

Aside from these major causes, there were of course other 

reasons to which the total failure can be attributed, reasons 

whose interplay in the areas of politics, economics, military 

action, and diplomacy can be traced far back in time. At the 

end of World War II, the American leadership of the free 

world could hardly be contested. But as far as Vietnam in 

particular and Southeast Asia in general were concerned U.S. 

foreign policy shifted many limes after 1945, beginning with a 

virtual absence of policy, then reaching a climax of involvement in a hot anti-Communist confrontation, and finally receding by installments toward accommodation. This change necessarily affected aid po licies and the conduct of the war in this 

part of the world. 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt never made up his mind 

whether to support the French desire to reclaim its Indochina 

colonies at the e nd of lhe war. Nor did the Truman administration have a clear-cut reaction to the connict that broke out 

in 1945 and 1946 between the French and the Vict Minh. T he 

U.S. government refused French requests for American planes 

and ships to transpol"l French troops to Indochina and similarly turned down appeals for American arms to help fight the 

Viet Minh. But the Truman administra tion also rebuffed appeals from Ho Chi Minh. In August and September 1945, 

while his forces were in control of Hanoi, Ho sent a request to 

President Truman through the Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS) asking that Vietnam be accorded '" the same status as the 

472-606 0 - 85 - 7 QL 3 
156 TilE FINAL COLUPSE 

Philippines" for a period of tutelage pending independence. 

From October 1945 until the following February, Ho Chi Minh 

wrote at leaSl eight leHers to President Truman or his secretary of state fonnally appealing for U.S. and U.N. intervention 

against French colonialism. There is no record that any of the 

appea ls were answered. No nintervention by the United States 

was tantamount to acceptance of the French. 1 

But even when Vietnam was granted limited independence 

as an Associated Slale of the French Union in March 1949 with 

Bao Dai as its head, lhe Truman administration did not fully 

support him, contending he was a weak leader and a puppet of 

lhe French. American policy toward Vietnam began to Lake 

shape only after Mao Tse-tung became master of China late in 

1949. Irs aim was then to block further Communist expansion 

in Asia. So when Russia and Communist China recognized Ho 

Chi Minh in January 1950, the United States immediately re -

sponded by recognizing Bao Dai in February and only three 

months later declared it would give France economic and military aid to take care of Indochina. From a modest start of $10 

million, this aid skyrocketed beyond the $ 1 billion mark by 

1954. The first Indochina war was thus fought with American 

money piped through French channels. 

When the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu and 

forced to sign the Geneva Accords in 1954, the Eisenhower 

administration's Na tional Security Council decided that the accords were a disaster and sought to prevent further Communist expansion in Viemam. The objectives set by the council 

were " to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam"-the new South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh 

Diem-"and to prevent a Communist victory through ali-Vietnam elections." The Republic of Vietnam now received direct 

aid from the United States. Its budding national Army, heretofore equipped and trained by the French, went through a 

complete reorganization. Professional soldiers. combat experienced but tainted by their French background, were released 

from service. A whole generation of new recruits and young 

draftees came into the ranks of the national Army, now called 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The goal was to 

ac tivate division-size forces under American guidance. American training methods and American equipment were used 

'Th~ summary of U.S. policy is based on tht' 1971 ,\'l'UI roor* Tiwus 't'nion of·lht' 

Pt'ntagon '·afJ"rs." 
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 157 

throughoul. To familiarize themselves with new command 

methods, ARVN officers look a mandatory "Command and 

Leadership" course. Later these officers also received training 

in various military schools in the United States. 

When elected to office, President john F. Kennedy trans· 

formed the limited· risk gamble of the Eisenhower administra· 

tion into a broad commitment to prevent Communist domina· 

tion of South Vietnam. But this commitment, although broad, 

never went beyond active supporl. It had to wait until the 

johnson administration to turn into active participation in the 

air and ground war, reaching a military peak of 543,500 men 

in early 1969. 

johnson's successor, President Nixon, immediately reversed 

the commitment course with Victnamization, a convenient by· 

product of his doctrine. Instead of confrontation, Nixon advo· 

caled negotiation, and his strategy for peace was based on 

"three pillars: willingness, strength, and partnership," as he 

put it. But if a single characteristic mainly distinguished the 

Nixon Doctrine from other U.S. national security principles 

since 1945, it was the emphasis that President Nixon now 

placed "on the role our partners must play in the common 

defense. " Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird was critical of the 

former administration's policy: 

From a standpoint of American defense policy, a real tragedy of 

Vietnam is that Vielnamization was not started much earlier than 

1969. through a policy of deliberately training and equipping the 

South Vietnamese forces (0 fight effectively against North Vietnam as 

well as to cope with internal securit y problems caused by Viet Cong 

activity. Such opportunities existed throughout the 1960's (and not 

just in Vietnam). Apparently, the opportunities were set aside in 

favol' of decisions to introduce substantial American involvements in 

all phases of the war. 2 

The basic infantry rifle, AR-15, later called M-16, was a 

case in point. The AR-l? was tested in Vietnam as early as 

1964. The Vietnamese Airbome Brigade considered it an ex· 

cellent weapon: light, easy to maintain, and accurate. The 

small cartridge could be carried in greater quantity by the 

infantryman, and the bullet had great penetrating and devas· 

tating power due to its high velocity; in sum, it was a rifle 

tailored for the Vietnamese soldier and the Vielnamese battle· 

I"-nle Nixon Doclrine: From POlerllial Despair 10 Nco.' Oppomrnilies," spe«h 

delivered by 5«relary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. 
158 nlE FINAL COLLAPSE 

field. Howevcr, only a liule over two hundred such rifles were 

brought over for actual lISC. The M- J 6 became the basic individual weapon of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) 

infantry years later, after the Communists had dramatically 

demonstrated the superiority of their AK-47s during the Tel 

offensive of 1968. The same was true of other weapons. Our 

troops were equipped with M-72 antitank rocket launchers and 

later with TOW missiles only after the Communists had begun 

to use their highly effective 8-405 and B-41 s. And only when 

Communist T -54 tanks and 130-mm. guns appeared on the 

battlefield did we receive any M-48 tanks and self-propelled 

175-mm. guns. These were only a few examples concerning 

Army weapons. 

Admilledly. dependence on sophisticated weapons and 

equipment posed an inevitable danger. Prior to 1954. fighting 

alongside French forces from a country not as rich as the 

United States, the National Army of Vietnam was trained for 

and conditioned to a compromise between human and material 

resources. But as of J 955, with the advent of direct military 

aid, our armed forces were trained in American tactics and 

strictly applied them during the years they fought side by side 

with U.S. forces. They were dubbed "rich man's" tactics because, based on science and technology, they substituted machines for human labor. Instead of marching, our infantry rode 

in trucks or M 113s. and a final assault was always preceded by 

maximum preparatory fire. When military aid was reduced, our 

forces plummeted from a state of material abundance to one of 

privation, and this seriously reduced our combat capabilities 

and troop morale. During 1974 jGS strove to devise methods 

to suit the new situation, but it was too late. 

What about the Communists? How did they manage with or 

without aid? The Communists finally conquered South Vietnam with Russian tanks and guns, but at the start of the first 

Indochina war whatever weapons the Viet Minh happened to 

have were primarily those left behind by the Japanese or seized 

from French forces. From scratch, the Viet Minh built an army 

that grew and matured through privations and hardship. Their 

war efforts were sustained by the war itself; their tactics, which 

were essentially "poor man's," substituted human muscle fo), 

machinery. In the early years of the war especially, the Communists in South Vietnam also sustained themselves by adhering to the rural population like a mislletoe. They raised huge 

sums by taxing commodities and local products. In spite of our 
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 159 

control measures. much of our nce and rubber production 

went imo Communist stocks. 

But after the Communists took over mainland China and 

beginning in 1950. the Viet Minh started receiving military aid 

from both China and Russia. For all its effectiveness, lhe foreign aid that North Vietnam received from China. Russia, and 

other Communist countries was discreet and kept in low profile as long as possible. The North Vietnamese Army had many 

Russian and Chinese advisers within its ranks, but the Communists never admitted this. In addition. the Communists always 

made a point of educating their troops and the population to 

rely only on themselves. Although of primary importance, aid 

was never credited for the victories which could hardly have 

been won without it. 

On the South Vietnamese side, the conduct of the war was 

largely defensive. Our goal was to contain Communist expansion within tlte national territory, and there was no question of 

an offensive to carry the war into North Vietnam. Only on two 

occasions did we cross the border and strike into enemy bases 

in Cambodia and Laos, but even these operations were merely 

part of lite defense and were never prescribed by a continued 

and deliberate strategy. The primary mission of our armed 

forces was always to pacify (that is, control) the national terrilOry, hence a twofold strategy: pacification in populated areas 

and search-and-destroy operations to eliminale major Communist forces in unpopulated areas. Throughout the war, this 

defensive stra tegy ke pt us constantly striving to catch up with 

~n enemy who always held the initiative. whether in tactics or 

In weaponry. 

In the early stages of the war, many uninformed people 

used to ask why we could not defeat the Communists when we 

greatly outnumbered them? The basic reason was that guerrilla 

warfare had ilS own operalional rules which were entirely different from those of conventional warfare. The enemy did not 

have any exposed or permanent installations to protect. He 

lived mixed with the population in our own territory or hidden 

in his bases or sancluaries. When he outnumbered us and had 

the upper hand, he struck: he avoided contact when he was 

weak. Afler a battle. his troops would disperse, refit, and train 

in some safe haven. It was easier to defeat guerrillas in Greece, 

Malaysia, and the Philippines. Those countries were peninsulas 

or islands; it was possible to limit or prevent infiltration of 

materiel and men from the outside. But South Vielllam shared 
160 TUE FINAL COUJ\PSE 

morc !han a thousand miles of common border with north 

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The border terrain was largely 

uninterrupted, with uninhabited jungles and mountains that 

offered unlimited base areas or sanctuaries from which the 

Communists in South Vietnam were constantly supported and 

reinforced by the North Vietnamese regular army. 

In contrast, we needed all the troops we had to guard and 

hold the important military and civilian installations; we had to 

provide security for the population in the villages and hamlets; 

in addition, we needed troops to conduct search-and-dcstroy 

operations or to react. Experts in guerrilla warfare usually 

estimate that the victor needs lcn to one superiority. If one 

side has only a five to one ratio over the other, the war will 

drag on indecisively; and if the guerrillas are only outnumbered two or three limes, they will win. By the time the combined strength of our forces and their allies reached the 

1,500,000 mark, as opposed to an estimated enemy strength of 

320,000 men, we could pacify all villages and hamlets and at 

the same time chase all major Communist units beyond our 

borders. The winning ratio in this case was only about 4.7 to 

1.0. But our ground troops, allied and Vietnamese, were eITeclively supported by U.s. ground-based and carrier-based air 

power. In addition, the organic firepower of U.S. infantry divisions was also tremendously helpful. 

The war in Vietnam thus ceased to be what many people 

erroneously called a "civil war." In its final stages it became a 

conventional war of aggression fought with abundant supplies 

of modem weapons and equipment provided by the Communist bloc. It was a war conceived, planned, conducted, and led 

by Communist North Vietnam behind screens labeled National 

Liberation Front and Provisional Revolutionary government of 

South Vietnam. 

Many of our friends suggested that we employ guerrilla 

tactics to fight the Communists in the areas under their control 

and even in their big sanctuary of North Vietnam. But such 

unconventional ventures were limited in number and scale; in 

particular, they were not fully supported by the local population. Successes were few and failures many. It is axiomatic that 

any population controlled by a native Communist apparatus 

for several years is firmly controlled. Potential opposition has 

been weeded out and most potential leaders liquidated or 

preempted by the Communist cadres. 
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 161 

Vietnam became truly independent only in late 1954. The 

Vietnamese people as a whole have not as yet reached a decent 

standard of education and knowledge. Many Vietnamese lived 

on the fringe of and endured the war for so long that lhey 

became totally indifferent to it. They needed. therefore. to be 

motivated. educated, and offered guidance. But democracy. a 

form of government completely novel to them. was not necessarily the best a'nswer. 

Attempts to respect certain democratic principles hampered 

the war effort of a nation struggling for survival. It was forbidden, for example. to take forceful or "antidemocratic" measures to solve problems of national discipline. mobilization. 

desertion, or draft evasion or for that matter problems of 

political life in general such as a defeatist opposition or proCommunism. There were many deficiencies in our control and 

neutralization of pro-Communist elemellls who lived and freely 

mingled with our own people. Even some relatives and dependellls of high-ranking Communist cadres lived in peace and 

freedom in the areas under governmental control. And after 

the collapse. some journalists. artists. politicians, and military 

officers who stayed behind were given responsible positions by 

the Communists. To my thinking, in all its actions, decisions, 

and policies, a nation at war' should first strive to deal effectively and conclusively with the wal". War is priority number 

one; all other problems are of lesser importance. 

In general, our mobilization policy succeeded only in meeting about half of all manpower requirements. We also achieved 

quite modest results in our effort to reduce the desertion rate 

and effectively control our manpower resources. Usually undcrstrengLh, our units had little opportunity for rOlation, rest, 

and recuperation. In addition, living conditions of our troops 

and their dependents were well below average standards. As to 

personnel policy, both the civilian government and the armed 

forces made regrettable errors. Assignments and promotions 

were often based on family or clan connections and more on 

personal trust than ability, achie\'emems, or integrity. Many 

offenses of officers and officials went unpunished, or loken or 

deferred punishment did not prevent others from doing the 

same. 

Although the population of North Vietnam outnumbered 

that of the South by two million, the requirement for replacements was particularly acute on the Communist side; even 

released prisoners of war were retrained and reemployed. 
. 162 TilE FINAL COLLAPSE 

North Vietnam also relied on general mobilization. but in can· 

trast to our system, theirs was strictly e nforced and draft evasions were kept to a minimum. In the South, many youths 

under draft age ( 15 to 17) were coaxed or coerced into Communist ranks. In genera l, the Communists enjoyed a solid rear 

area whose stability and security were mai ntained through the 

LOlalit3lian, party-controlled measures of a police Slale. 

In Korea. U.N. forces served under a single commandAmerican. President Syngman Rhee even allowed Korean citizens to serve in U.S. unilS when lhe situation had become 

utterly desperate. In Vietnam during the period of aclive 

American participation, however, we never achieved unity of 

command and thus violated one of the basic principlcs of war: 

no unified command existed to direct the various combat 

forces involved. The substitute principles of coopcration and 

coordination through understanding and goodwill as applied at 

all levels brought about good resu lts bccause commanders 

deli berately avoidcd clashes. Although certain minor clashes 

occurred due to personalities. misunderstandings, or complex. 

ities, they were largely insignificant. Bm without a single com· 

mand, our war effort suffered from inadcquate will, delayed 

dccisions, and incfficiclll lise of abilities and rcsourccs. 

In tactics our side came up with commendable innovations. 

The availability of M-113s and large helicopters made it possible to turn large-sca le operations that once involved many 

troops and days of marching into surgical-type operations requiring fewer t!"Oops and less time and frequent ly bringing 

about more concrete results. If our troops had to stay in any 

area longer, fire support bases could be set up with hardly any 

delay. But without going into a detailed discussion of various 

tactics used during the Vietnam War, it should be stressed that 

field commanders had to change tactics frequently because the 

cncmy always learned from cxperience and made every possible effort not to repeat the same mistake. 

In military intelligence, remarkable improvcmclll was 

achieved in our organizational structure and our technical colIcction capabilities. Beginning in 1968, we started to gel more 

intclligence, and it was morc accuratc than bcfore. Similarly in 

logistics, our structure was cxpanded and modernizcd to re· 

spond more efTectively to the requirements of all combat units 

in supply, maintenance, and other services. 

The Vietnamese Air Force's primary mission was to provide 

close air support and transportation for the ground forces. and 
CONCI.USIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 163 

it had very limited capabilities for the defense of the national 

airspace. As the Communists brought more and more antiaircraft units into South Vietnam, our close air support became 

less and less effective late in 1974. The Vietnamese Navy, 

equipped primarily for river patrols and interdiction of enemy 

coastal infiltration, was hardly a match for the more sophisticated Chinese Communist Navy during the shon but violent 

clash over the Paracel Islands in early 1974. 

In brief, apart from deficiencies in manpower and in personnel management, our armed forces demonstrated in many 

instances, especially in 1968 and 1972, that they we re fully 

capable of carrying out their mission, provided they were given 

adequate and timely material support. 

The war pursued by the Communists without interruption 

over the years was not purely military; it was a total war fought 

on other fronts as well: political, economic, diplomatic, etc. On 

the diplomatic front , North Vietnam succeeded in enlisting not 

only the support and assistance of "fraternal" Communist 

countries but also the backing of the "nonaligned" countries 

as well. By skillful maneuvering North Vietnam antagonized 

neither Russia nor Communist China and received indispensable benefits from both. According to diplomatic sources, 

North Vietnam received three or four times more aid from 

Russia and Communist China in 1974 than in previous years. 

The Communists clearly realized that as long as the United 

States kept its military aid at a certain level, South Vietnam 

would be able to stand and fighl. So they went all out and 

found effective ways to stop that aid. This was one of their 

'To a den'loping nalion. foreign in\'eSlmenL or aid is esscnLial ill Ihe na,cenL 

phase. Ho ,,·e,·er. il$ receipt must not preclude eve ry elTon to 51rive for self-sufficiency 

in Ihe shorlen lime IlOuible. for a political SIring is usually attached to all .. ideconomic o r military. 

When a reeipiem nalion is I<l\'aged by ... ar, as ... as South Vietnam, nalUr.ally it 

neros ~11 the aid it can get for a longer lime Ihan is u$uall)' rC(luired, In such a Glse. 

foreign aid should be made the object of a long.range plan delermining among other 

Ihings Ihe duration of Ihe aid. the amouOlS to be made a"ailabl,' each year. Ihe Iypes 

of commodities or equipment 10 be deli,'ered . etc. This allo ... s a recipienl nalion to 

kno ...... hal 10 do in ye .. rly p lanning and .. ·hal il can expecl and mUSI do in Ihe long 

term ... hen the aid ... ilI ine"itabl)' come 10 .. n l'nd. But aid should neve r be reduced 

sharply and suddenl)' because of Ihe serious material and moral impact on thc recipient nation. 'Ilie ideal aid policy should Slem from a sincere desire to help a rccipiclII 

nalion b«ome $l'lf-sufficienl alld self.supporling in Ihe shorlcSI time JlO$$iblc. 

It has becomc common for leaders o f aid-reech'ing nalions to be crilici1.ro for 

illeplitude and corruption. Some probably descr,e Ihe crilicism. If Ihey are incorrigi. 

ble, by all means Ihey should be replaced by morc deser"ing leadcrs. And if a country 

cannot e"entually produce a good leader. it docs not deser,c any aid al all; for no 

amount of aid can do any good if the country is going to collapse sooner or bIer. 
164 TilE FINAL COLlAPSE 

most devastating blows because it struck at the very foundation 

of the war itself. All the propaganda machinery of North Vietnam went into motion, echoed and amplified by the press and 

huge propaganda apparatus of the entire Communist bloc. 

Their worldwide machinations justified their kind of war, on 

the one hand. and effectively distorted understanding of our 

war effort on the other. To the people of the United Slales 

and the world at large, the war fought by OUf side was made to 

appear as an inhuman and evil war and the government of 

South Vietnam as an inept and corrupt administra tion deserving no aid.' 

The American press. many of whose papers were inclined 

against the war, did not do much to counter this. The cause 

for which we fought, thereforc, was either largely ignored or 

falsely portrayed. In addition, very vocal antiwar groups in 

America helped drown out the voices of reason and truth. One 

of these groups, the Indochina Resource Center which Ambassador Martin referred to in his House testimony, wa s an association of college professors, bishops, pastors, and nuns who 

circulated the infamous " pastoral letter" appealing for peace in 

Victnam by ending all military aid. 

Communist propaganda also played to the psychological 

inclinations and moods of the American public, re inforcing 

antiwar sentiments and the belief that the Vietnam War was a 

hopeless adventure that might drag on forever. Out of disenchantment and desperation, American students and youths 

were roused into violent antiwar demonstration. Moved and 

spurred by such actions and feelings, the U.S. Congress took 

steps to end U.S. military involvement and later to reduce 

military aid for South Vietnam. After the first Indochina war, 

people said with conviction that the French lost their war in 

Paris; we can now say with equal justice that the Vie tnam War 

was lost in America. 

Our enemy was determined, persistent, and experienced. 

This is a fact we cannot in all honesty deny. During his long 

years of struggle, a single, continuous, and unchanging politico-military strategy dictated his conduct of the war. His constant goal was to "liberate," that is, conquer, South Vietnam 

and unify the country through phases of a people's or revolutionary war in which his military forces played the decisive 

role. From time to time resolutions adopted afler important 

party meetings influenced certain war activities and sometimes 
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 165 

modified them, but they always pointed in the same general 

direction, the same conduct for the war. 

Our strategy didn't always have such continuity. While the 

Communists continued their war preparations after the Paris 

Agreement, our effort for some time was optimistically direct· 

ed toward economic development. To this effect, a plan was 

worked Oul to reduce military strength by 100,000 men and 

transfer the manpower into the economic production sector. 

BUl the plan had to be abandoned in lhe face of continued 

violations by the other side; by the time we came back to 

reality, valuable lime had been lost. 

The Communists never wOlTied about their losses. Every 

military action was as good as any other provided their politi. 

cal objective could be attained. Two of the foremost examples 

were the Tet offensive of 1968 and the Easter offensive of 

1972. In 1968 our situation was excellent in all respects, with 

remarkable progress being achieved in pacification and a prospect of the war coming to an early end. We finally believed we 

were able to see the "light at the other end of the tunnel." 

However, at this time the Communists suddenly launched 

three waves of suicidal attacks against our cities and towns, 

striking at our military and political centers of power. They 

spffered extraordinarily high losses but demonstrated that they 

were far from defeated and still able to do things nobody 

could expect or alllicipate. American and world opinion was 

stunned and in an uproar, and President Johnson decided nOt 

to run again. 

In 1972, in the face of the impasse in both open and secret 

negotiations and aware that the United States would not yield 

to their demands, the Communists decided to break the deadlock by striking across the 17th Parallel and in other places. By 

the end of 1972 many Communist battalions in South Vietnam 

were down to a hundred men. At the time of the attack, 

however, the situation was judged so critical in Washington 

that President Nixon made an equally desperate move-the 

offer to withdraw U.S. forces from Indochina within four 

mOlllhs after a cease·fire and the return of U.S. prisoners of 

war. Fortunately, the proposal was not palatable to the Com4 

munists at the time. 

Communist weaknesses and failures were well concealed 

and never successfully exploited by our side. In general, Communist troops were trained only to fight well·rehearsed battles. 

They were at a loss when initiative and quick reaction were 
166 Till:: fiNAL COLUPSE 

required to confront a new silUation or a surprise. BUL every 

mistake they made became an object of systematic self-criticism 

and was corrected in due course. Their tenacity and willingness to learn paid off handsomely. 

By contrast, on our side we never learned enough from past 

experience and never knew how to exploit our successes and 

achievements which orten went unrecognized. My own con tenlion is that. given the advantageous military position we enjoyed after the 1968 Tel offensive, if we had pursued our 

successes by morc forceful exploiting actions and larger-scale 

counterattacks. the Vietnam War could have been resolved 

then and there. It was common knowledge that the Communists had by then become entirely exhausted: indeed, it took 

them four years to recover their combat capability. Once, according to an unverified source, B-52s struck the Central 

Office for South Vietnam and disrupted this Communist nerve 

center. Unfortunately, we were not able to exploit this success. 

The advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses or both sides added up to the final collapse of South Vietnam. We can still learn rrom it and devise a sound policy for 

the ruture. but some day it will be too late: the Communist 

challenge is always there. 
ARVN 

BBC 

CBU 

CIA 

CINCPAC 

CMD 

COSVN 

DMZ 

CVN 

ICCS 

JGS 

LAW 

LST 

LTL 

MR 

NLF 

NVA 

OSS 

POL 

PRG 

QL 

RF 

RVNAF 

SAM 

TL 

TOW 

UN 

USDAO 

USMACV 

VNAF 

VOA 

Glossary 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

British Broadcasting Corporation 

Cluster bomb unit 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Commander in Chief, Pacific 

Capital Military District 

Central Office of South Vietnam 

Demilitarized Zone 

Govemmcnt of Vietnam 

International Commission for Control and 

Supervision 

Joint General StafT 

Light assaulL weapon 

Landing ship, lank 

Interprovincial route 

Military Region 

National Liberation Front 

Nonh Vietnamese Anny 

Office of Strategic Services 

Petroleum, oil. and lubricants 

Provisional Revolutionary Government 

National highway or route 

Regional F orees 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Surface-Io-air missile 

Provincial route (Republic of Vietnam) 

Tube-launched. optically-tracked. wire-guided 

United Nations 

United Stales Defense Attache Office • 

U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam 

Vietnamese Air Force 

Voice of America 

Appendix A 

THE ROLE OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF 

Surprisingly, JGSt the command body of an impressive 

three-service force. did not make any decisions on the conduct 

of the war it had been created to fight. Constitutionally and for 

all practical purposes, the president of the republic was the 

supreme commander of the armed forces. As such, he made all 

policy decisions as to how the war should be prosecuted. In 

defense and security mauers, he was advised by (he National 

Security Council whose members included the vice president, 

the prime minister, the minister of defense, and the chairman 

of jGS. To assist the president in plans and policies for pacification and development, a Central Pacification and Development Council was created; as chairman of jGS. I was made a 

member. Thus, the functions of the chairman of jGS, as far as 

naLional policies were concerned, were primarily advisory in 

nature. 

The national defense structure was reorganized by a presidential decree of july 1970, which also defined the functions 

and responsibilities of jGS. It was defined as an interservice 

staff, temporarily charged with the functions of an army command. The navy and air force had their own general staffs 

while the army did not, because most of its general staff functions were performed by jGS. In reality and in essence, therefore. jGS was an army gene ral stafT with supervisory authority 

over the other two services. Its chief. who was also army 

commander, was responsible to the minister of defense for the 

organization. training. and employment of the amled forces in 

accordance with policies determined by the president. The 

functions of jGS included 

employment of the armed forces for national defense and 

territorial pacification; 

organization and development of the armed forces; 

collection and exploitation of all tactical and strategic intelligence and counterintelligence; 

improvement, employment. maintenance, and management 

of the armed forces; 
170 TilE .'INAL COLU\PSE 

establishment of force structure plans and civilian personnel requirements; 

establishment of logistic plans; 

following up on the procurement of maLericl and eqUipment; 

training for all the armed forces; 

implementation of projects to improve the morale and the 

material living conditions of all personnel; 

combat research and development; 

drafting combined plans with allied forces as directed; 

preparation and promulgation of basic regulations governing the management of prisoners of war. 

From the functions so minutely laid out, it was clear that 

JGS was neither involved in lop-level decisions concerning 

strategy or the conduct of the war, which was the prerogative 

of the presidenL. nor was it responsible for implementing such 

strategy, which was the defense minister's responsibility. In 

reality, however, especially before April 1972, the defense min· 

ister was almost always bypassed in presidential consultations 

concerning the actual prosecution of the war and largely functioned as a budgct and manpower manager. In combat force 

utilization and operational mailers, the president always turned 

to the chairman of JGS for advice and recommendations, 

hence the chairman reponed to him directly. 

The four army corps were theoretically under operational 

control of JGS. However, due to the nature and extent of the 

combat operations which were usually fought at division or, at 

highest. corps level. operational responsibili ties were entirely 

delegated to corps commanders who. functioning as military 

regio n commanders for administrative matters at the same 

time. enjoyed the actual authority of theater commanders. JGS 

rarely if ever interfered with corps commanders' operational 

plans and decisions. except perhaps for cross-border operations or when general reserve units were involved. Sincc a 

military region commander was also primary executor of the 

national pacification and development plan in his own area, he 

exercised control over province chiefs and designated national 

resources, an authority never enjoyed by JGS. The powers and 

responsibilities of the corps commanders were so encompass· 

ing that they frequently reported directly to the president. 

from whom they also of len received direct orders and to whom 

they were directly responsible for the execution of presidential 

orders. 
AI'I'£NDIX A 171 

Each year jGS prepared and disseminated a plan for the 

military campaigns to be conducted in the following year. h 

was based on the friendly and enemy situation on the one 

hand and on the national or defense policies as promulga ted 

by the De fense Ministry or the president on the other. These 

yea rly campaign plans bore the designation AB followed by a 

three-digit number, such as AB-139. AB-140. etc. Beginning 

in 1967. with the participation of U.S. and other non-Communist forces, planning became a multi nation effon and me 

annual products were known as "Combined Campaign Plans." 

AB-142 was the first of such plans jointly signed by the chairman of JGSt the commander of U.S. MACV, and commanders 

of other allied forces. They contained de tailed instructions for 

corps commanders and the navy and air force commanders. 

Every quarter, and later every month, a meeting was held at 

JGS during which the situation in each military region was 

reviewed and examined concerning progress being made according to the AB plan. 

After the Paris Agreement wenl into effecl, j GS suspended 

these meetings because every military action had political implications. As a result, the same meetings were now held at the 

Independence Palace. chaired by the president in his capacity 

as supreme commander and usually attended by the vice president: the prime ministe r, who was also minister of defense; 

and the pr-.::sidenCs assistant for security. Lt. Gen. Dang Van 

Quang. During these meelings, it became a practice for each 

corps commander (or the navy or air force commander) to 

make a personal presentation of the situa tion in his area of 

responsibility. Discussions followed. and finally the president 

made decisions or issued orders and other necessary instructions. 
Appendix B 

TESTIMONY, 27 JANUARY 1976. BY AMBASSADOR GRAHAM 

MARTIN 

BEFORE THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF 

THE 

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMllTEE 

SUBJECT: THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN VIETNAM 

I told President Thieu the actual military order of battle 

and !.he analysis of the comparative forces each side could 

bring to bear provided a very grim picture. 

The conclusion was inescapable that should Hanoi rapidly 

move in for lhe kill it would be difficult for Saigon to last morc 

than a month, even with the most skillful and delennined 

defense. and probably not more than three weeks. 

I said thai while it was my opinion thal Hanoi wanted 

Saigon whole, not a pile of rubble. onc could not escape the 

possibility they might elect the latter, if there was no move 

toward negotiations. 

President Thieu asked about the prospects for additiona l 

military aid. I said that even if by some miracle it were now 

approved, it might preserve the opportunity for a better negotiating position, but it could not arrive in time to change the 

balance sheet he had just read. As of now the military balance 

arrayed against him was ovenvheJming. 

I said that anyone sitting in his chair, whether in Independence Palace, Downing Street, the Elysee, the Kremlin, in 

Peking, or in the White House had one problem in common. II 

was difficult to be sure they were gelling the whole truth. 

Some would shade reports for personal or bureaucratic 

advantage, others for fear of hurting him. others because they 

were afraid of him, others because they did not wish to be the 

conveyors of bad news. 

Whatever the reasons, it was difficult at times to perceive 

things as they really were. 
APPENDIX B 173 

I said I was speaking to him only as an individual, not for 

the presidenl or the secretary of state, or even as the American 

ambassador. 

I said I was speaking only as one who for a very long time 

had watched events in Southeast Asia and who for the past two 

years had worked very hard at understanding the interweaving 

of the fabric of Vietnamese affairs. 

I said the older I got, the more I knew that I did not know 

it all, and a reasonable doubt was always present. But it was a 

difficult lime, and perhaps my perceptions were as accurate as 

those of any other Westerner. 

A few things were very clear to mc. The military situation 

was very bad, and the Vietnamesc people held him responsible 

for it. The political class, both his supporters and his enemies, 

did not believe he could lead the country out of its presenl 

CriSIS. 

I said it was my conclusion that almost all of his generals, 

although they would continue to fight, believed defense was 

hopeless unless a respite could be gained through the begin. 

ning of the negotiating process. 

And they did not believe such a process could begin unless 

the president left or took steps to see that the process began 

immediately. 

I said it was my feeling that if he did not move soon, his 

generals would ask him to go. 

President Thieu asked whether his leaving would affect the 

vote in Congress. I said it might have changed some votes 

some months ago; it could not now change enough to affect 

the outcome. 

In other words, if his thought was [sic] to offer to resign if 

Congress assured a level of aid sufficient for South Vietnamese 

survival, that was a bargain whose day had passed, if indeed it 

had ever existed. 

After all his opponents would accept just as easily the dis· 

tortions that would be fed to them about his successor as they 

had about him. The important thing was perhaps the effect his 

leaving would have on the other side. 

I said I did not know the answer, but it seemed that most 

South Vietnamese now seemed to think it would facilitate ne· 

gotiations. 

I personally thought it would make lillie difference. Hanoi 

would be opposed to any strong leader. They would insist on a 

much weaker man, if indeed they were really interested in 
174 THE fiNAL COLLAPSE 

negotiating. But his colleagues feil it might buy time which was 

now the essential commodity for Vietnam. 

Some felt if the destruction of Saigon could be avoided, if 

an independent Vietnam could continue to exist. one might 

hope, even if reason recognizes the dimness of the hope, that 

things might improve. The conversation went on for about an 

hour and a half. 
Appendix C 

TESTIMONY, 27 JANUARY 1976, BY AMBASSADOR GRAHAM 

MARTIN 

BEFORE THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITIEE OF 

THE 

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMIlTEE. 

SUBJECT: EFFORTS To ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETrLEMENT 

WITH THE COMMUNISTS 

Question 11. Secretary Kissinger stated on 5 May 1975, thai 

the Soviet Union played "a moderately constructive role in 

enabling us to understand the possibilities for evacuation, both 

American and South Vietnamese, and for the possibilities that 

might exist for a political evolution." 

(a). What do you know about the Soviet role in the negotiations during the second half of April? 

Answer. My knowledge was confined to thaI expressed earlier in this hearing. thai is, the Soviets had informed the United 

Stales that Hanoi would not militarily interfere with our evacuation. 

(b). Do you agree with Kissinger's evaluation? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question 12. During the period prior to Minh's assumption 

of power, did the French Embassy in Saigon advise you thal if 

Minh replaced Thieu. the Communists would be willing to 

work out a political arrangement with Minh rather than seek a 

total military victory? 

A1lSwer. I think it might be more accurate to say that the 

sense of the question reflected the hope of the French that thal 

was what would come to pass. 

Question 12 (continued). If so, where did the French get lhis 

information? 

Answer. Most governments, including our own and that of 

France, are extremely chary about revealing their sources. The 
176 SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO "CIIIEVE " NECOTIATED SETrI .. EMENT 

correct answer is that I did not know where the French gOl this 

information. 

QUlj/ioll 13, Secretary Kissinger stated on 5 May 1975, that 

until 27 April the United States had "considerable hope" that 

NOI'lh Vietnam would not seek a purely military solution but 

would agree to a "negotiated solution" with Duong Van Minh. 

What factors caused the U.S, officials to have such expecta· 

lions? 

Answer. As the answer to this question may involve consider· 

ation of information not available to me in Saigon, I have 

asked the Department of Stale to supply this answer. It fol. 

lows: 

The secretary made this statement in the course of his press 

conference of 29 April, immediately following the evacuation 

of Saigon. 

These expectations were based on a reading of messages 

and public statements from the Communist side and on actions 

by the Republic of Vietnam side in the weeks before the fall of 

Saigon, 

As the secretary stated on 29 April, we had dealt with 

Hanoi and the PRG through different intermediaries and had 

been in a position to put in our views and to receive responses 

from the other side. He noted in particular (in a 5 May inter· 

view) that the Soviet Union played during the final weeks a 

moderately constructive role in enabling us to understand the 

possibilities there were for evacuation, both of Americans and 

South Vietnamese, and for the possibilities that might exist for 

a political solution. 

During the latter part of April, the Republic of Vietnam 

moved rather rapidly to comply with Communist demands or 

conditions for a political settlement. During March and early 

April, Hanoi had demanded the resignation of President 

Nguyen Van Thieu. This occurred on 21 April. The Communists then asked for the removal of his successor, specifying 

that General Duong Van Minh would be acceptable and a 

person with whom they would be prepared to talk. This 

demand was met, and General Minh was accordingly sworn in 

as president. In the meantime. Saigon complied as well with 

other demands, despite the fact that the demands escalated 

literally with every passing day. 

However, as the secretary noted in his 29 April press conference, for reasons which were unclear, the North Vietnamese 

changed their signals on the night of 27 April and appeared to 
APPENDIX C 177 

shift suddenly to a military option. T he possibility for a negoti. 

ated seulemenl was thus ruled oul. On 30 April Communist 

forces occupied Saigon, and General Minh was obliged to 

surrender the government and its armed forces unconditional· 

Ir· 

Queslion 14. With regard to the efforts between 19 and 27 

April to work out a political settlement with the Communists, 

involving changes in the Saigon government, what role did the 

Polish and Hungarian delegations to the International Com· 

mission for Supervision and Control play? 

Answer. My impression was that the two delegations referred 

to were somewhat stunned by the pace of events between 19 

and 27 April. It was my further impression that their role, as 

much as was possible at that stage, was designed to be helpful. 

Questio1l 14 (a). Did they transmit messages from the North 

Vietnamese to the embassy? 

Answer. T hey transmitted no direct messages, as such, of 

which I was aware. 

Question 14 (b). Did they provide the embassy with any 

" interpretations " of Hanoi's policy toward a political arrange· 

ment? 

Answer. Most certainly. Such " interpretations" by one of 

them were furnished almost on an hourly basis. 

Question 14 (c). If so, what did they tell the embassy? 

Answer. My impression was that one of them was simply 

hopelessly behind the curve of the events then unfolding or 

was trying to provide a deception center in its insistence that a 

"Minh" government would be acceptable to Hanoi and that a 

negotiated solution might still be possible. The other delega. 

tion was much more cautious, correct, and professional. 

Index Abram~, Ccnel<li Creighton W,: 19 

Air activities 

aid reduction effects: 48-50 

Ban Me TIlUot opcr.ltion: 72, 75 

Capital Military District: 1.50. 152 

cea~-(jre pc-riod: !II. 33 

high-attitude bombing: 127-29 

Military Region I: 104, 108, II !!. 114 

Military Region II: 72. 75, 89, 9 1, 92 

Military Region III: 59-66, 130-33. 138 

I'huoc Long operation: 59-66 

Saigon evacuation: 148-49 

United States; II. 13, 16, 18.22.25. 

!II. 148-49 

Air Divisio ns, SOUlI! Vietnamese 

lsi: 108 

2d: 117 

3d; 62. 149-50 

4th: ISO 

61 h: 88-89 

Aldrich. George: 18 

Ammunition: 51-53 

An:a logistic commands: 60, 93. 124-26 

Armed forces 

aid reduction (freeu: 48-55 

cease-lire period: 3!1-S6, 42-45. 48-55 

Military Region I: 96-97 

Military Region II: 88-90 

Military Rc:gion Ill: 50, 129-50, 132 

North Vietnamese: 33-36, 161-62 

PhuO( Long oper.uion: 60 

regrouping: 12.5-27, 132 

South Vietnamese: 42-45, 161-63 

Armor Command: 125 

AnnorSchool: 57, 136 

Artillery Command: 125 

Artillery School: 57 

Ban Me TbuOl 

capture: 68- 75 

recapture plan: 78, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 

95 

8ao Dai : 156 

Bartlett, Dewey: 75 

Battalions, South Vietnamese 

2d: 60, 6 1. 66 

34th: 92, 93 

34th Ranger. 118 

92d Ranger: 33 

Bien Hoa: 62, 65, 133, 134, 149-50 

Binh Khe: 117 

80, Mai Van: 14 

Brigades, North Vietnamese 

M26 Annor: 35 

52d: 40, 105 

Brigades, South Vietnamese 

1st Airbome: 103, 104, 130-33, 136, 

150 

In Annor: 96 

2d Airbome: 120 

3d Airbome: 73, 84, 95,11 7-19 

3d Annor: 129, 130, 133, 137 

4th Airbome: 43 

257th Marine: 151 

369th Marine: 96 

468th Marine: 43, 84, 133 

Bruce, David K. E,: 13 

Bunker, Ellsworth: 19 

Cam, Brig. Cell, Tr.m Van: 88-90, 94, 

II. 

Cam Ranh meeting: 83-88 

Cambodian operations: 13 

Can, Nguyen Sa: 141 

Capital Military Dislrict: 133, 144, 146, 

149-53 

Cau, Col. l.A::: 118 

Cease·fire period 

deployments: 56-57 

enforcement organilation: 27-29 

military operations: 31-33, !l9-41 

mililal')' reorganiz.uion: 3!1-36, 42-46 

str.llegy: 29-31. !l6-!l9, 42, 55-56 

mpplies: !l3-36, SO-55 

U,S. military aid: 46-50 

Central Logistics Command: 124 

Cl!'ntral OfficI!' for South Viemam: 37-39 

Cl!'ntral Relief and Rl!'seuleml!'ll\ Commit· 

tee: 11 4 

Cl!'ntral Training Command: 125 

CINCPAC: 147 

Combat Engin<.'Cr Croup: 89, 90 

Communiu propaganda: 29-3 1, 33, 

36-39,54, 163-64 

Corps, South Vietnamese 

I: 40, 57, 84, 96-98, 102-08, II I. 113, 

110 

II: 40, 59, 66, 68-75. 83-84. 86-91. 

93-95, 117-20, 124 

III: 58-68, 120-2 1,1 29,130,132,133. 

150-52 

IV: 4 1, 56-57, 139 
180 

Cua Viet Naval Rase: 3 1-32 

DOli, Col. Nguyen Hong: 146 

Dalal National Military AOIdemy: 125 

Da Nang: 40, 99, 104, 106-16 

Ibn Chu Pari y: 26 

Dan, Phan Quang: 11<1-15 

DOlO. Brig. Cen. u Minh: 128. 132 

o..,ploymenLS 

Ban Me Thum opttalion: 68-69, 7S-74 

QapilaJ Mililary District: 149, 150 

(case-fire period: 34, 35,40,56-57 

Military Region I: 40, 100,102-04, 108 

Military Rqion II: 68-69, 73-7 .. , 84 , 

90-91, 120 

Military Region III: &1, 65, 130, 132, 

"', 136 

Phuoc Long operation: 64, 65 

Desertions: 44 ...... 5 

Dir«t sUpPOri groups: 89, 94, 125 

Divisions, North ViCIn;imcsc: 32. 35, 40, 

41. 56. 61. 69, 72-75, 83, 93, 95, 

105, 107, 117_20, 128. 130. 137-39 

Divisions, South Vietnamese 

1st Infantry: 9, 40, 68, 96, 104, ]06, 

124 

2d Infantry; 32, 40, 96, 10~7. 120. 121, 124_26, 129 

3d Infantry: <10, 96, 105. 109. 124-26. 

129. 133. 136 

5th: 60, 66, 129, 130. 133, 137, 138. 

14' 

71h: GO. 61. 66, 159 

9th: ~2. "8, '39 

18th: 128-3 1, 1.53, 15()...52 

21st: 139 

22d: 40-41, 8'-84, 86, 88, 90, 117, 

118, 125-26, 129, 151 

23d: 69, 71-74. 88-00. 95, 123, 124, 

12' 

25th: 129, 153, 157. 152 

Airbornt': 9, 43, 49, 57, 84, 96, 99, 100. 

110. 129-30 

Marine: 9, 43. 49. 84, 96, 99, 100. 102, 

104, 106, 109. 124, 125. 130 

SIt alMJ Air Div;. ionll, South Vielnam· 

m. 

Do. Tran Van: 14 1 

DQn. Lt. Gen. Tran Van: 142, 143, 144 

Dong, Col.: 91 

Dong. U . G("n. Otl ~QC: 62, 63, 68 

Dong. Pham Van: 22. '8 

Ouan. Lc: 38 

Due My training complt'K: 57. 11 8 

Duc, Nguyen Phu: 19. 24 

Dung. C('nc:ral Van Ticn: 37 

THE FINAL COl.Ut.PSE 

ENHANCE hus program: 23 

Evacuation. 

Da Nang: 112-14 

imponanc(' of: 81 

Saigon: 146-49 

Ford. Gerald : 48 

Four·Pany J oim Military Commission: 32 

France: 4-5, 144, 1.5S-~ 

Fronts, Nonh Vietnamese 

44th: 40, 107 

Fuel suppli": 51 

Ciap. Vo Nguyen: 36 

Gov(Crnment of South Vi(Ctnam 

causes of d(Cf(Cat: 15-4-56 

c(caJC·fire strollqy: 55-57 

change of leadership: 141-46 

en,ergency restrictions or 1972: I I 

military aid problem: 46-48. 75-76 

Military Region I strategy: 98-102. 104. 

106. l OS. I IG 

Military Region II 51rategy: 85-84, 

86-88 

o p}xuition 10: 95 

peace negotiation!: 11_15, 16-25 

Phuoc Long strategy: 62-64 

rcdcploymenl Jlr.ategy: 77_78, 86-82 

refugu actions: 11 4-16 

reorganiution: 26 

Weyl3nd ddeg:uion: 122-25 

CrouP!. North Vietnamesc 

559th Tran'ponation: 55 

Croups. South Vklnam~ 

Combat Engin~r: 89. 90 

Direct Suppon: 89, 94,125 

Su {lUll Ranger Croups, Soulh Viet· 

namese. 

Haig. Ceneral Alexander M .. Jr.: 25-25 

Ilaiphong Harbor: 16 

lIarriman. W. Averell: II 

Hau Son Airstrip: 9 1 

1-10 Chi Minh Trail: 55-56 

Hong Ngu: 52 

Hue: 103-07, 112 

l'lung, Col. !'han Dinh: 91 

I-Iuong. Tran Van: HI, 62. 68. 100. 

142_144 

I-Iuu. To: 37 

Indochina RerouTce Center: 164 

International CommIssion or Control and 

Supc-rvision: 17,24,27-29.5 1.32 

J ohn50n. Lyndon 8.: I I. 14 
INDEX 

Joint Cen"",1 Staff: 75, 124, 145, 144 

air activities: 127, 128 

Capital Military Diurict role: I~, 152 

ce;ase-fire period: 26, 41-46, 57 

Military Region I role: 99, lOS, 104. 

108, 11 2-15 

Military Region II role: 75, 86-88, 94, 

Milit"' ary Region III role: 58, 50, 152, 

1S5, 142 

Military Region IV role: 41 

military reorganizatio n: 42-45, S6-57 

peace negotiation period: 15 

redeployment view: 77 

role of: 169-71 

Saigon evacu:nion role: 147 

Weyland delegation meeting: 122-23 

Khang, U . Cen. u Nguyen: lIS 

Khanh Duong: 118-19 

Khiem, Tran Thien: 19. 62, 82, 102. 

11 0- 11 . 125, 141 

Khuyen, LA. Cen. Dong Van: 44, 62, 88, 

144n 

Kissinger, Henry A.: 14-22. 24, 25 

KOnlum: 90-91, 95 

L-19 Airfield: 71 

La, LA. Cen, Ngu)'en Van: 44 

Lac, Maj. Cen. Hoang Van : 104, 112 

Laird. Melvin R.: 157 

Lam, Pham Dang: 15 

Lam, Tran V;an: 19, 141 

Land and population gnb campaign: 29-51 , 59 

Long Hinh: 155, 144, lS I 

Luong, Col. Nguyen Thu: 121 

Ly, Col. u Khat: 90, 95. 94 

McCloskey. Paul N. "Pen:": 75 

Manh. 1..1. Gen. Nguyen Van: 44 

Marbod. Eric von: 127 

Martial law: II 

Martin, Graham: 145, 1451'1. 147, 148, 

164. 172-77 

Menllon,J ean-Marit': 144 

Military aid 

cutNck of 1975: 7, 46-48. 75-76 

dependence on: 5 

high.altitude bombs: 127-28 

hislOry of: I S6-~ , 163 

North Vit'tnam: 158-59 

pelIct' negotiation period: 25 

reduction eITn:u: 7. 48-55, 82 

Military optontions 

1972: 9. II 

Ban Me Thuot: 70-75 

181 

Mililary opmuionl-Continued 

Capital Mililllry District: 142. 144, 146. 

149-55 

cealle-fire: period: 51-!l5. 56, 59-41 

high.ahitudt' bombing: 127, 128 

Military Region I : 9. 102-09 

Military Reglon II: 9. 70-75. 90-95, 

117-21 

Mililary Rqion Ill: 9. 60-61 , 64-66, 

1S0-35, 1S6-58 

Military Rt'gion IV: 9, 158-40 

pt'ace n~oliation pt'riod: 15 

Phuoc Long: 60-61. 64-66 

Mililary Region I 

ua$('.fil't' period: 54, 55, 40 

redeployment operationl: 96-98. 102-09, 11 . I't'fugee problC'm: 99-100, 102, 104-<15. 

109-16 

I't'grouping and refilling: 124-25 

statuI of 1972: 9 

IlratC'g)': 78, 98-102. 104, 106 

Military Region II 

Ban Me ThuOt oper-uien: 68-75 

cc:ue·fil't' period: 54, 40-41 

redeployment operations: 85-95 

refugee problem: 119 

regrouping and refilling: 125-24 

I't'tre"t from: 11 7-21 

status of 1972: 9 

stratl:'fY: 78. 83-84. 86-90 

Mililary RegiQn III 

cc;asc:-fire pcl'lod: 34 . 55, 41 

Phuoc Long operation. !:o8-68 

I't'tl't'at from: 129-58 

Itatus of 1972: 9 

strategy: 65-64, 77_78, 1S5 

Military Region IV: 9. 41, 77- 78, 158-40 

Minh, Ccn"",i Duong Van: 141. 144-46, 

IS' 

Minh, Ho Chi: 15S-S6 

Minh. 1..1. Gen. Nguyen Van: 152 

Minh. Lt. Cen. Tran Van: 62 

Nam, Maj. GC'n. NguyC'n Khoa: 4 1 

National Council of Reco nciliation and 

Concord: 16, 21 

Nation,,1 Liberation Front: 12, 29, 30, 

Natio" nal Security Council, South Viet_ 

namC'SC: 19-21,25,56 

National Security Council, U.S.: 156 

Naval activitic:1 

aid reduction eITn:u: 49-50 

cease·firC' period: 3 1 

Military Rqion I: 105, 108-09, 115-15 

Military Region II: 118. 12 1 
182 

Naval activities-Continued 

S;!Iigon evacuation: 149 

Unitw Stale$: 31,149 

Navy Command: 12S 

NCO School: 57. 11 9, 125 

Nghi, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Vinh: 41, 120, 121 

Ngoll. Lt. Col. ~ Van: " 

Nha, Hoang Due: 19 

Nha Tr.rong: 11 9 

Nhllt. 8rig. Gen. Tnm Van: 32 

Niem, Brig. Gen. Phan Dinh: 84 

Nixon, Richard M.: 7, 14.22-25,46,80. 

157, 165 

Norlh Vietnam 

Ban Me: 11\uOI opt'r;l.lion; 68-74 

bombing or: II , IS. 16. 18, 22, 25 

ccase-fire period: 28-3S, '6. 39-41 

Haiphong ltarbor mining: 16 

Military Region I OIX'r.ro,ions: 96-97. 

I03-Q8, 11 4 

Military Region II opcrlllions: 68-74, 

93.95, 117-21 

Military Region III operations: 58-62. 

64-68, 129_32, 136-38 

Military Region IVOper.ilI;ons: ISS-otO 

military ~rganilalion : ',..'6 

peuc negotiation pt'riod: 9,11-18,20, 22, 24-25 

rtmoc LQng operation: 58-62, 64-68 

propaganda aClh·;tics: 29-3 1, ". 

36-39,54, 163-64 

Saigon operations: 14 9-5l 

strategies: 29-l l, 36-39, 55 

Nunn, Sam: 75 

Om(e or Strategic: Sen'itts: 155 

Operation L\M SON: 72 

Paris Peace Agreement. Sn Peace negoti. 

ations, 

Peace negotiations 

agreemem discussions: 16--26 

J ohnson administration: 11_14 

NiKon administration: 14-26 

Nonh Vietll<llme$e role: 14- 18. 20. 22, 

24-25 

proposals: 11 - 16 

Sooth Viemamese role: 16. 18-25 

I'han Rang: 11 9--2 1 

I'hu 8 ai Air Base: 40 

Phu Cat Air Base: 40, 11 7, 11 8 

Phu, Maj. Gen. I'ham Van: 68, 73--74, 

83--84,86--9 1.93--94 , 119 

l'hu(, Col. Tnn Van: 132 

I'huoc An: 73, 75, 89 

l'huoc Long: 58--68 

I'huong Duc Airfield: 71. 89 

l'lcil:u: 91 . 95 

TIiE FINAL COLLAPSE 

Popular For(es 

Han Me Thuot operation: 69, 72, 74 

Capital Military I)inrict: 149, 151 

cease-fire period: 41, ~, 54 

Military Region II: 69, 72, 74 , 89-9 1. 

94,118,119 

Military Region III: 50, 130. 132, 133, 

136-38 

Military Region IV: 138. 139 

relJTouping: 125 

Provisional Revolutionary gO\'emmem: 

13, 16 

Quang, Lt. Gen. Dang Van: 62, 77, 83. 

98,102 

Quang Npi: 106 

Quang Trung Training Center. 57 

Qui Nhon: 117-18 

Ranger Command: 125 

Ranger Groups, South Vietnamese 

5th: 40 

61h: 43 

7th: 43. 72, 84, 89. 92 

8th: 43, 151 

9th: 43, 15 1 

11th: 96 

12th: 96 

141h: 16 

15th: 96, 10-1-05 

2 151: 89 

22d: 89 

23d: 90 

24th: 89 

251h: 88. 89 

8ht Airborne: 64-66,124. 150 

Ranger School: 57 

Refugees: 125 

government a(lion5: 110-11. 114- 16 

Mililary Region I: 99- 100. 102, 104 -05, 

109-16 

Military Region II: 91. 93. 95. 11 9 

Military Region III: 125 

Regiments. Nonh Vietnamese: 35 

Regiments, Soulh VietnamefC 

1st: 105 

2d : 105 

8th: 130 

23d: 89 

40th: 90 

4151: 117, 1\8 

42d: 117, 11 8 

43d: 130 

44th: 72, 73. 75. 89 

45th: 39, 77. 75. 75. 89 

48th: 130. 132 

52d : 130, 132 

55d : 69. 71. 74 
INDEX 

Regional Forc~s 

Ibn ~ Thuol operation: 69, 72. 74 

Capital Military District: 149. 15 1 

c~asc·fi ~ period: 41. 45. 49. 54 

Military Region I : 105. 107 

Military R~gion II: 69, 72. 74. 89-9 1. 

94. 118-20 

Military Regioll III: 60. 06. 67. 150. 

152, 155, 136-38 

Military R~gion IV: 41 . 138. 139 

Phuoc Long operation: 50, 66. 67 

regrouping: 123 

Roosevelt. Franklin D. : 155 

Sa Huynh: 32 

Saigon, ~ Capital Milita!,), Distrkt. 

Sang. Brig. Gen. Pham Ngoc: 89, 12 1 

Selr· ense trOOps: 60 

Signal School: 57 

Song Be Airfield: 58. 61 

Squadrons. South Vielnames~ 

2 1st Tank: 88. 89 Strnt~gic T~dmical Din:ctornte: 120 

Strntegy 

ceas~·fire period: 26. 29-31. 36-39. 42. 

45-46. 5[)"57 

Military Region I: 78, 98-102. 104.106 

Military Region II: 78. 83-84. 86-90 

Military R~gion 111 : 65-64. 77-78. 133 

Military Region IV: 77-78 

North Vietnamese: 29-31. 36-39. 55, 

163-66 

Phuoc Long operation: 63-64 

Redeployment : 77-82 

South Vielnamese: 159-61. 165. 166 

Sullivan. William: 18. 19 

Supplies 

ammunition: 5 1-53 

cease· fire period: 33-36. 48. 50-54 

fu el: 5 1 

high.altitude bombs: 127-29 

Military Region II: 89 

Military Region III: 59--61. 63. 64. 131. 

132. 136. 138 

North Vietnamese: 34-36 

peac~ negotiation period: 23 

Phuoc Long operntion: 59-61.63.64 

refitting: 123-27, 129. 132 

replacement problems: 50-51 

Susini. PieTTe: 18 

TAI.O~ VISE plan: 147 

Tam Ky: 105. 11 2 

Tam QUOIn: 117 

Tan Son Nhut Air Base: 146. 148-52 

Tat. Brig. Gen. I'ham Va,,: 87-90. 94 

Than. Brig. Gen. I.e Van: 88 

1'h i. Lt. Gen. Lam Quang : 103 

183 

Thieu. Nguy~n Va" 

ceas .... fire period: 39. 46. 47 

Military Region I role: 98-100. 102-04. 

108. 11 6 

Military Region II role: 68. 83. 84. 

86-88 

Military Region III role: 62-63 

opposition 10: IS, 16. 141 

peace negotiation role: 7. 16. 19-22. 

25 

redeployment strategy: 76-78. 80 refugee pmblem: 11 6 

resignation: 136. 142-43 

U.S. visit : 46 

WC)'land delegation meeting: 122-23 

Tho. I.e Due: 14-18.22.24.25 

Tho. Nguyen Huu: 38 

Tho. Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh: 88 

Thoai. ~ar Adm. Ho Van Ky: 108 

Thong. Nguy~n nuu: 117. 11 8 

Thu Due Infantry School: 57 

TIman, Lt . G~ . Pham Quoc: 119 

Thuy. Xuan: 11. 14. 18 

Timmes. Maj. Gen. CharksJ.: 14511 

Toan. Lt. Gen, Nguyen Van: 68. 98-99. 

120. 133 

Tong I.e Chan (Tong I.e Chon): '3 

TIUI~ HU~G DAO 11: 26 

Truman. Harry: 1 !l5. 156 

Trung Nghia: 32-33 

Truong. 1.1. Gen. Ngo Quang: 98. 100. 

102-08. 11 0-12 

Tu. Col. Tran Van: 119 

Tllong. Urig. Gen. I.e Tnmg: 89 

Tuy Hoa: 93. 118 

United States: 144-45 

bombing of North Vietnam: II. 13. 16. 

18. 22.25 

cease·fire contingency plan: 31. 45-46 

congreuional trips: 75-76 

Da Nang e\'acuation: 113-15 

military aid: 5. 7. 23. 46-48. 82. 127-28 

military operations: 13. 25. 31 

!X'ace negotiation role: 11. 13- 19. 

22-25 

public opinion: II. 13. 163-64 

Saigon evacuation: 147-51 

Vietnam policy dcvelopment : 155-58 

Vietnami1.ation program: 6. 13 

~ylal\d delega tion: 122-23 

withdrawal or troops: 9. I I. 13 

U.S. Defense "Ilach~ Office: 43. 45-47. 

147. 148. 151 

U.S. Department of Defcnse: 47 

U.S. Emhauy: 147-49 

U.S. Marines: ISO. 15 1 
\ 84 

U.S. Military A55iu.an~ Command, Virl. 

nam: IS 

U.s. Slale Dcpal'1mcm: 24. 144-45 

U.S. Suppon Command: 45 

Uni." Stt Air Dh'i$ioIlS, South Vietnam. 

C'sc; Banalions. Soulh Vieul:lmeJc: 

8rigades, North Vietnamese: 8ri. 

gades, SQuth Vietnamese; Corps, 

SOUlh Vietnamese; Divisions. North 

Vi('lnamesr-; Divisions, SotHh Viel. 

lIamCllr; Croups, North Viclnam('se; 

Croups. South Vietnamese; Ranger 

Groups, South Vietnam"e; R('gi' 

menu. North Vietnam"e; Rrgi. 

mo:nu, South Vietnamese. 

T HE FINAL COLLAPSE 

Vicn. ~nrr.d Cao Van: 19-20,47,63, 

77,78, 8S, 86, 87, 98, 122, 14411 

VIN Minh: 4-5. I !HI-59 

Vietnamtso: History: 3-8 

Victnamization prog ..... m: G, 13 

Vung Tau: 136. 150 

Wesunorclalld, General William C.: 11 

Weyland, Gcm:ral Ftwcrick C.: 122. 

127 

X~n. Lt. Col. Lc Van: 65 

Xuan L.oe: 1W-33 

U.S. OOVERNHEm' PRINTING OFFICE, 1985 0 - 472-606