1

Filed 8/18/22 In re I.G. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re I.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D080227

 (Super. Ct. No. EJ004712)
2

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Michelle D. Pena, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

N.W. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders 

in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 dependency proceedings for 

her minor daughter, I.G., in which the juvenile court found that the Indian 

Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) did not apply to her case. 

Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the San Diego County Health and 

Human Services Agency (Agency) did not meet its initial ICWA inquiry duty 

under section 224.2 because it did not make reasonable efforts to contact the 

maternal grandfather regarding I.G.’s possible Native American heritage. 

The Agency concedes that we should conditionally reverse the jurisdictional 

and dispositional orders and remand the matter for the limited purpose of 

compliance with ICWA and section 224.2. Based on our review of the record, 

we agree with Mother and the Agency. Accordingly, we will conditionally 

reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders and remand the matter 

with directions for the limited purpose of compliance with ICWA and section 

224.2.

1 All statutory reference are to the Welfare and Institution Code unless 

otherwise specified.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

On November 30, 2021, the Agency filed a section 300, subdivision 

(b)(1) petition for then two-year-old I.G., alleging that she was at substantial 

risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the willful or

negligent failure of her parent to supervise or protect her adequately from the 

conduct of a custodian with whom she had been left. In its detention report, 

the Agency stated that both Mother and T.M., I.G.’s father (Father), denied 

that they had any Native American heritage. The Agency stated its belief 

that ICWA did not apply to I.G.’s case and recommended that the juvenile 

court make such a finding.

At the detention hearing on December 1, the court inquired about I.G.’s 

possible Native American heritage. Father’s counsel represented that Father 

would testify that he did not have any Native American heritage. Mother’s 

counsel represented that Mother reported that she had Native American 

heritage, indicating that the maternal grandmother had told Mother about 

such heritage when she was very young. Her counsel provided the court and 

the Agency with the maternal grandmother’s name and phone number and 

identified the tribe as the Cherokee Wolf Clan. The court deferred its 

decision on the application of ICWA to I.G.’s case, pending an inquiry by the 

Agency into her Native American heritage. The court then found the Agency 

had made a prima facie showing in support of its petition and detained I.G. in 

out-of-home care.

2 Because Mother’s sole contention on appeal challenges the compliance 

by the Agency with its initial ICWA inquiry duties, we limit our discussion of 

the facts and procedural history to information necessary to determine that 

issue.
4

In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency stated that it had 

contacted the maternal grandmother, who reported that she had lived with 

the Cherokee Wolf Clan on a reservation in Yuma, Tennessee. The maternal 

grandmother reported that Mother and another daughter had attended 

schools on the reservation. She stated that they were recognized by the State 

of Tennessee as part of the Cherokee Wolf Clan and she was attempting to 

get her family enrolled through the Apache tribe. Mother told an Agency 

social worker that she had been raised by her mother (i.e., the maternal 

grandmother) and her stepfather (i.e., the maternal step-grandfather), and 

she had only recently started to rebuild her relationship with her biological 

father (i.e., I.G.’s biological maternal grandfather). The maternal 

grandfather occasionally called Mother. Mother gave the social worker 

several character letters, including a letter from the maternal grandfather 

that was attached to the report. The Agency recommended that the court 

find that there was reason to believe I.G. was an Indian child and order it to 

conduct further inquiry regarding I.G.’s possible status as an Indian child.

The Agency stated that it had sent certified letters and e-mails to 11 

federally recognized Cherokee and Apache tribes inquiring about I.G.’s 

possible status as an Indian child. The Agency subsequently received 

responses from many of those tribes, each of which stated that I.G. was not 

an enrolled member or eligible for enrollment.

At the January 2022 pretrial status conference, the Agency’s counsel 

informed the court about its ICWA inquiries and stated its belief that 

sufficient inquiry of federally recognized tribes had been made regarding

I.G.’s possible status as an Indian child. The court deferred making any 

findings on the application of ICWA pending further responses from the 

tribes contacted by the Agency.
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In a February addendum report, the Agency stated that its ICWA 

specialist was unable to locate the Cherokee Wolf Clan as a tribe included in

the federal registry and concluded that it therefore did not meet the criteria 

for ICWA notice. The Agency learned that the Cherokee Wolf Clan was part 

of the Cherokee Nation consortium.

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on February 24, 

the court found that the petition’s allegations were true, declared I.G. a 

dependent of the court, removed her from Mother’s custody, and placed her in 

foster care. The court further found that the Agency had made a reasonable 

inquiry to determine whether I.G. is or may be an Indian child under ICWA. 

Based on the Agency’s inquiry, the court found there was no reason to know 

that I.G. is an Indian child. The court therefore found, without prejudice, 

that ICWA did not apply to I.G.’s case.

On March 10, Mother filed a notice of appeal, challenging the February 

24 jurisdictional and dispositional orders.3 On June 14, the Agency filed a 

combined motion to augment the record and motion to dismiss the appeal 

based on mootness. On June 24, we issued an order stating that this court 

would consider those motions concurrently with this appeal.

DISCUSSION

I

ICWA Inquiry Duties

Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation 

of Native American children from their tribes through adoption or foster care 

placement. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Isaiah W.).) ICWA 

3 Father has not appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
6

provides: “In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court 

knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party 

seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an 

Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's 

tribe” of the pending proceedings and their right to intervene. (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1912(a); see also, Isaiah W., supra, at p. 8.) California law also requires 

such notice. (§ 224.3, subd. (a) [“If a court [or] a social worker . . . knows or 

has reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved, notice pursuant to 

[ICWA] shall be provided for hearings that may culminate in an order for 

foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, 

or adoptive placement . . . .”].) Both ICWA and California law define an 

“Indian child” as a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is 

eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a 

member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)

Effective January 1, 2019, sections 224.2 and 224.3 were enacted, 

setting forth California’s current ICWA inquiry and notice requirements for 

juvenile dependency cases. (Stats. 2018, ch. 833, §§ 5, 7.) Under sections 

224.2 and 224.3, the Agency and the juvenile court are generally obligated to: 

(1) conduct an initial inquiry regarding whether there is a reason to believe 

the child is an Indian child; (2) if there is, then further inquire whether there 

is a reason to know the child is an Indian child; and (3) if there is, then 

provide ICWA notice to allow the tribe to make a determination regarding 

the child’s tribal membership. (See In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 

1048-1052; In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882-885.)

Specifically, section 224.2, subdivision (a), imposes on the juvenile court 

and the Agency “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a 

child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be, or has been filed, is 
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or may be an Indian child[.]” (Italics added.) Section 224.2, subdivision (b), 

establishes the Agency’s duty of initial inquiry, providing:

“If a child is placed into the temporary custody of [the 

Agency] . . . , [the Agency] . . . has a duty to inquire whether 

that child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not 

limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian 

custodian, extended family members, others who have an 

interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or 

neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child 

and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is 

domiciled.” (Italics added.)

Section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of further inquiry, providing: 

“If the court [or] social worker . . . has reason to believe that an Indian child 

is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information to 

determine that there is a reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the 

court [or] social worker . . . shall make further inquiry regarding the possible 

Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as 

practicable.” Before the juvenile court can find that ICWA does not apply to a 

child’s case, it must make a finding that “due diligence as required in this 

section [has] been conducted.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

We review a juvenile court’s findings that the Agency has made 

reasonable inquiries regarding a child’s possible Native American heritage 

under ICWA and that the Agency has complied with ICWA's notice 

requirements, or that no such notice is required, for substantial evidence. (In 

re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 57.)
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II

Noncompliance with ICWA Initial Inquiry Duties

Mother contends, and the Agency concedes, that substantial evidence 

does not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to 

I.G.’s case and, in particular, that substantial evidence does not support its 

finding that the Agency complied with its initial inquiry obligations under 

section 224.2. We agree.

Mother asserts that the Agency’s initial ICWA inquiry was deficient 

because it failed to ask I.G.’s maternal grandfather about the possibility of 

her Native American heritage, despite the fact that the Agency had received 

from Mother a copy of a letter from him in support of Mother in this case. 

The record does not show that the Agency contacted the maternal 

grandfather, much less asked him about any possible Native American 

heritage. The Agency’s duty to make an initial inquiry into I.G.’s possible 

Native American heritage applies to “extended family members,” which term 

includes the maternal grandfather. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The Agency 

concedes, and we agree, it failed to comply with its initial ICWA inquiry duty 

in this case.

Because substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s 

findings at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing that ICWA did not apply 

to I.G.’s case and that the Agency complied with its initial ICWA inquiry 

obligations regarding I.G.’s possible Native American heritage, we conclude 

the court erred by finding at that hearing that ICWA did not apply to her 

case.

We further conclude that the Agency inquiry error is prejudicial and 

requires conditional reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders
9

with remand of the matter for the limited purpose of compliance with the 

inquiry provisions of ICWA and section 224.2. Because the failures in this 

case concerned the Agency’s state statutory duties to inquire regarding I.G.’s 

possible Native American heritage, we must reverse the orders if the error is 

prejudicial under the state law standard for prejudicial error. (Cal. Const., 

art. VI, § 13 [“No judgment shall be set aside . . . unless, after an examination 

of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion 

that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; People 

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [miscarriage of justice may be found 

when court concludes it is reasonably probable result more favorable to 

appellant would have been reached in absence of error].) As Mother notes, 

there currently is a split of authority among the California courts of appeal 

regarding how to apply this general state law standard for prejudicial error to 

juvenile dependency cases in which agencies and/or juvenile courts have 

failed to satisfy their statutory duties of inquiry regarding a child’s possible 

Native American heritage. (See, e.g., In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 

201, 206-207 [agency’s failure to conduct ICWA inquiry is per se reversible 

error and miscarriage of justice]; In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 80 

[reversal and remand required because agency’s failure to make adequate 

inquiry made it impossible for parent to show prejudice]; In re H.V. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 433, 438 [same]; In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 556 

[same]; In re N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 484 [same]; cf. In re Antonio R.

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 435 (Antonio R.) [error is prejudicial if 

information that could have been obtained from extended family members is 

likely to be meaningful in determining whether child is Indian child]; In re 

Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744-745 (Benjamin M.) [reversal 

required where record indicates there was readily obtainable information 
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that was likely to bear meaningfully on question of whether child is Indian 

child]; In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 774, 779 [failure to comply 

with duty of initial inquiry is harmless error unless record and any proffer by 

appellant suggest reason to believe child may be Indian child]; In re A.C.

(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1065, 1071 [failure to comply with inquiry duty 

is harmless error unless appellant makes offer of proof or other assertion of 

Native American heritage]; In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 

1430-1431 [unless appellant makes representation of Indian heritage, there 

can be no prejudice and no miscarriage of justice requiring reversal].) The 

California Supreme Court has yet to address this question or otherwise 

resolve the current split of authority.

However, for purposes of our disposition of this appeal, we need not, 

and do not, weigh in on this highly disputed question of the proper standard 

for prejudicial error in cases in which agencies and/or juvenile courts have 

failed to satisfy their statutory duties of initial and continuing inquiry under 

section 224.2. Rather, we conclude that regardless of the particular standard 

for prejudicial error applied, there has been a miscarriage of justice in the 

circumstances of this case based on the failures of the Agency to satisfy its

statutory duties of initial and continuing inquiry. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) 

For example, if we were to apply the apparent “middle ground” standard set 

forth in Antonio R. and Benjamin M., prejudicial error would clearly be 

shown. Because the Agency did not satisfy its initial inquiry duty, we cannot 

know what information such inquiry might have revealed regarding I.G.’s 

possible Native American heritage. Based on its failure to reasonably inquire 

of I.G.’s maternal grandfather (for whom it had contact information)

regarding her possible Native American heritage, we must presume that 

there was readily obtainable information from him that was likely to bear 
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meaningfully on the question of whether there is reason to believe that she is 

an Indian child under ICWA. (Cf. Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435 

[where agency fails to discharge its initial duty of inquiry and juvenile court 

finds ICWA does not apply, “the error is in most circumstances . . . prejudicial 

and reversible”]; Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 745-746.)

III

Motion to Augment and Motion to Dismiss Appeal

On June 14, 2022, the Agency filed combined motions to augment the 

record and dismiss the appeal as moot. In its motion to augment, the Agency 

asks that we augment the record with two documents: (1) Exhibit A, which is 

its addendum report filed with the juvenile court on June 6, 2022; and (2) 

Exhibit B, which is the juvenile court’s minute order for its June 7, 2022

hearing. The Agency argues that augmentation of the record with 

information regarding events occurring after the February 24, 2022

jurisdictional and dispositional orders challenged on appeal is appropriate 

and would show that it has made additional inquiry regarding whether I.G. 

may be an Indian child. In particular, the Agency represents that the 

information would show that it has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to 

contact I.G.’s maternal grandfather. Exhibit A attached to the motion to 

augment indicates that an Agency social worker made an attempt on June 3, 

2022, to reach the maternal grandfather, but was unable to leave a voicemail 

message because the phone number’s voicemail had not been set up. Exhibit 

A also indicates the social worker made a similar unsuccessful attempt on 

June 6, 2022 to reach the maternal grandfather. Exhibit B attached to the 

motion to augment is a copy of the minute order for a special hearing on June 

7, 2022 indicating that the juvenile court granted the Agency’s unopposed 
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request to continue the matter until July 5, 2022 to allow further ICWA 

inquiry to be made.

In her opposition to the motion to augment, Mother argues that the 

Agency’s motion to augment the record was untimely filed and improperly 

seeks to augment the record with new evidence occurring after the February 

24, 2022 jurisdictional and dispositional orders that are challenged on appeal.

In an appeal challenging an order in a juvenile dependency proceeding 

in the San Diego County Superior Court, a respondent “must serve and file 

any . . . motion [to augment the record] . . . within 15 days after the 

appellant’s opening brief is filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.416(d)(2).4) On 

May 13, 2022, Mother filed her appellant’s opening brief. Accordingly, the 

Agency had 15 days thereafter (i.e., until Tuesday, May 31, 2022 as extended 

for the Memorial Day holiday weekend) to file a motion to augment the 

record. (Rule 8.416(d)(2).) Because the Agency did not file its motion to 

augment the record until June 14, 2022, we may deny its motion as untimely 

filed, absent any good cause shown for its untimeliness. The Agency’s motion 

to augment does not show any good cause for its untimeliness. Accordingly, 

we deny its motion to augment. (Rule 8.416(d)(2).)

Assuming arguendo that the Agency’s motion to augment was timely 

filed or it had shown good cause for its untimeliness, we nevertheless would 

deny that motion because it seeks to augment the record with information 

that occurred after the February 24, 2022 jurisdictional and dispositional

orders being challenged by Mother on appeal. (See, e.g., In re Zeth S. (2003) 

31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [absent exceptional circumstances, appellate court should 

not consider postjudgment evidence]; In re Heather B. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 

4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
13

11, 13 [appeal reviews correctness of judgment or order as of time of its 

rendition upon record of matters which were before juvenile court for its 

consideration].) “Augmentation does not function to supplement the record 

with materials not before the trial court. [Citations.] Rather, normally ‘when 

reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will 

consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment 

[or order] was entered.’ [Citation.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, 

Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) “The augmentation procedure cannot 

be used to bring up matters occurring during the pendency of the appeal 

because those matters are outside the superior court record. [Citation.]” (In 

re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 456 (K.M.).) Because the Agency’s 

motion seeks to augment the record with information that arose after the 

February 24, 2022 orders being appealed, we would deny its motion 

regardless of its untimeliness.5 (Cf. K.M., supra, at p. 459 [denied motion to 

augment record with new postjudgment evidence].) In re Allison B. (2022) 79

Cal.App.5th 214, cited by the Agency, is factually and procedurally inapposite 

to this case and does not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion.

The Agency also filed a motion to dismiss the instant appeal based on 

mootness, citing the post-February 24, 2022 order information that it sought 

5 The Agency’s motion to augment does not alternatively request that we 

consider its motion to be a request for judicial notice. Nevertheless, 

assuming arguendo the Agency had made such a request, we would deny its 

request to take judicial notice of Exhibits A and B, which consist solely of 

information arising after the orders being appealed and are therefore 

irrelevant to the sole contention on appeal (i.e., whether the juvenile court 

erred by finding at the February 24, 2022 jurisdictional and dispositional

hearing that the Agency had made reasonable ICWA inquiry regarding 

whether I.G. was an Indian child and that, based thereon, ICWA did not 

apply to her case).
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to have augmented as part of the record as discussed above (i.e., Exhibits A & 

B), which information it argued would show that it had complied with its 

ICWA inquiry duties. However, because we have denied the Agency’s motion 

to augment the record with that information (and any alternative request for 

judicial notice of that information), we conclude there is no information in the 

record showing that the instant appeal is moot or that we cannot grant 

effective relief in this case.6 Accordingly, we deny the Agency’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders issued on February 24, 2022

are conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court 

with directions that within 30 days of the remittitur the Agency must file a 

report demonstrating its compliance with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and 

section 224.2, subdivision (b) and, if required, conduct further inquiry under 

section 224.2, subdivision (e). Within 45 days of the remittitur, the juvenile 

court must conduct a hearing to determine if the Agency’s inquiry satisfied 

its statutory duty of inquiry. The juvenile court has the discretion to adjust 

these time periods on a showing of good cause.

If neither the Agency nor the juvenile court has reason to believe or to 

know that I.G. is an Indian child, the orders issued on February 24, 2022,

shall be reinstated. Alternatively, if after completing the inquiry the Agency 

6 In any event, assuming arguendo that Exhibits A and B were properly 

augmented in the record or we were to take judicial notice of them, we would 

conclude that those exhibits do not necessarily show, as the Agency asserts, 

that it has fully complied with its ICWA inquiry duties. Rather, it appears 

that the Agency’s social worker, at most, made two unsuccessful attempts to 

contact the maternal grandfather.
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or the juvenile court has reason to believe that I.G. is an Indian child, the 

court shall proceed accordingly.

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.