This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0462

Raymond Darrel Pfarr, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed November 17, 2014

Affirmed

Larkin, Judge

Chippewa County District Court

File No. 12-CR-10-160

Raymond Darrel Pfarr, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Gilbertson, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Larkin, 

Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for 

postconviction relief, arguing that the state improperly impeached him at trial, his trial 

attorneys were ineffective, and his appellate attorney was ineffective. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Raymond Darrel Pfarr with 

third-degree criminal sexual conduct. A jury found Pfarr guilty, and the district court 

sentenced him to serve 72 months in prison. Pfarr appealed to this court, arguing that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and we affirmed. State v. Pfarr, No. 

A11-592, 2012 WL 1149329, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Apr. 9, 2012). 

Later, Pfarr filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Pfarr argued that the 

district court erred by allowing the state to impeach him at trial with his custodial 

statements because he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and the police ignored his request for counsel during the

interrogation. Pfarr also argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective. Lastly, Pfarr 

argued that his appellate attorney was ineffective because he met with Pfarr for only one 

hour during the appellate process and he “should have raised constitutional issues in [the] 

direct appeal.” 

The postconviction court concluded that Pfarr’s “claims that the state improperly 

impeached him and that his trial attorneys were ineffective are barred because they could 

have been raised in his direct appeal.” The postconviction court further concluded that 
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Pfarr’s “claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective failed to allege sufficient facts to 

entitle him to relief on that basis.” The postconviction court therefore denied Pfarr’s 

petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

A postconviction court must hold a hearing on a petition “[u]nless the petition and 

the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to 

no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). We review summary denial of a petition 

for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 

(Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on 

an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. 

(quotation omitted). 

I.

Pfarr argues that his claims of improper impeachment and ineffective assistance of

trial counsel “should not be procedurally barred.” 

When “direct appeal has once been taken,” all issues raised in the appeal, and all 

issues “known but not raised, will not be considered [in] a subsequent petition for 

postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 

(1976). “This rule applies if the defendant knew or should have known about the issue at 

the time of appeal.” King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2002). There are two 

exceptions to the Knaffla rule. First, a claim will not be barred if its novelty is so great 

that its legal basis was not reasonably available when direct appeal was taken. Roby v. 

State, 531 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. 1995). Second, even if the claim’s legal basis was 
4

sufficiently available, substantive review may be allowed “when fairness so requires and 

when the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct 

appeal.” Russell v. State, 562 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). 

Pfarr argues that he “could not have possibly known these newly discovered issues 

at the time of direct appeal.” But Pfarr’s claims of improper impeachment and

ineffective assistance of trial counsel are based on events that occurred at trial and that 

were known or should have been known at the time of his direct appeal. See Wright v. 

State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that “[p]ostconviction review of 

claims other than ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and ‘new evidence’ is barred

because these claims are based on evidence in the trial record, and therefore these 11 

claims were known or should have been known to Wright at the time of his direct 

appeal”); White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 2006) (“All of these claims can be 

decided on the basis of the district court record and are therefore Knaffla-barred on this 

postconviction review.”). 

For example, Pfarr alleged that one of his trial attorneys “was ineffective due to a 

conflict of interest.” As support for that allegation, Pfarr submitted a letter that his

attorney sent him explaining that he had represented one of the witnesses against Pfarr at 

a juvenile-detention hearing. But the letter was dated September 16, 2010, which was 

before the trial date in this case. And on appeal, Pfarr concedes that he “attempted to 

address this issue before trial at an omnibus hearing.” Thus, Pfarr knew about this issue 

at the time of his direct appeal. See Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013)

(“Given all of these facts, we hold that Sontoya either knew or should have known about 
5

trial counsel’s representation of the victim’s cousin, and his claim is therefore barred by 

the Knaffla rule.”).

Pfarr further argues that “the issues raised on Post-Conviction were in fact novel.” 

But Pfarr does not present a novel legal issue, and he relies on application of

longstanding cases such as Miranda and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052 (1984), to support his claims.

Lastly Pfarr argues that “his extraordinary circumstances be considered” in the 

“interests of fairness and justice.” “Claims decided in the interests of justice require that 

the claims have substantive merit, and that the defendant did not deliberately and 

inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 94 

(Minn. 2006) (citation and quotations omitted). The record is clear that Pfarr was aware 

of the impeachment and trial counsel issues at the time of trial. Pfarr states in his brief 

that after the prosecutor improperly impeached him at trial, he was left “stuttering and 

stammering in front of the jury in what would have appeared to be someone attempting to 

lie.” Pfarr also states that he attempted to address his trial attorney’s purported conflict of 

interest “before trial at an omnibus hearing.” Pfarr knew of those issues, and he does not 

establish that his failure to raise the issues on direct appeal was excusable. Therefore, we 

do not consider the claims in the interests of justice. See id.

In sum, the postconviction court did not err by concluding that Pfarr’s claims of 

improper impeachment and ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally barred.
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II.

Pfarr claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective and that the district court 

should have held an evidentiary hearing on that claim. To receive an evidentiary hearing 

on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must allege 

facts that, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two-prong 

test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 

511, 516 (Minn. 2012). Under that test, “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the 

ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. And “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. An appellate court 

“need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is determinative.” 

State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). And “[t]he petitioner must 

overcome the presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of 

reasonable representation.” Wright, 765 N.W.2d at 91 (quotation omitted).

An evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is 

not warranted when a petitioner’s arguments “are presented solely as argumentative 

assertions without factual support,” or when the petitioner “does not identify any issues 

that his counsel should have pursued but did not.” Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 391 

(Minn. 2010); see also Wright, 765 N.W.2d at 91.
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In his petition for postconviction relief, Pfarr alleged that his appellate attorney 

met with him for only one hour and that his attorney “should have raised constitutional 

issues in [the] direct appeal.” Pfarr did not identify which constitutional issues he 

believes his attorney should have pursued. On appeal, Pfarr argues that it was not 

necessary to explicitly identify the constitutional issues because “it was obvious what 

issues appellate counsel . . . should have pursued.” But “generalized allegations of 

incompetence [of counsel] are not reason for an evidentiary hearing.” Fratzke v. State, 

450 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Minn. 1990). Pfarr’s reliance on what he believes is obvious is

insufficient. He had the burden to identify for the postconviction court “any issues that 

his [appellate] counsel should have pursued but did not.” Davis, 784 N.W.2d at 391. 

Moreover, “[a]ppellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct 

appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if she could have legitimately concluded that it 

would not prevail.” Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 2008) (quotation 

omitted). “And counsel has no duty to include claims which would detract from other 

more meritorious issues.” Davis, 784 N.W.2d at 391 (quotation omitted). For example, 

Pfarr argues that one of the “obvious” claims his appellate counsel should have raised 

was his improper-impeachment claim. But suppressed statements can generally be used 

for impeachment purposes. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1221

(1975) (stating that “the shield provided by Miranda is not to be perverted to a license to 

testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior 

inconsistent utterances”). 
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In sum, Pfarr did not allege facts that would satisfy the two-prong test of 

Strickland. He did not explain how his attorney’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness or how, but for his attorney’s errors, the result of the appeal 

would have been different. The postconviction court therefore did not err by summarily 

rejecting Pfarr’s claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective. See Davis, 784 N.W.2d 

at 391.

III.

Pfarr raises additional issues that were not raised in the postconviction court. For 

example, he claims that his statement to the police was not voluntary. And he makes

several complaints regarding his appellate attorney that he did not raise below. Because 

he did not raise these issues in his petition for postconviction relief, we do not consider 

them. See Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 2005) (“It is well settled that a 

party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction 

relief” (quotation omitted)).

In conclusion, “a postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” 

Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 167 (quotation omitted). In this case, the postconviction court 

properly applied the law and its decision is not against logic or the facts in the record. 

The postconviction court properly reasoned that Pfarr’s claims of improper impeachment 

and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were Knaffla barred because Pfarr knew or 

should have known about the claims at the time of his direct appeal. And the 

postconviction court properly concluded that Pfarr’s “general claim of ineffective 
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assistance of appellate counsel is . . . insufficiently specific to warrant an evidentiary 

hearing.” There is no basis for this court to reverse.

Affirmed.