RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3541-14T1

IN THE MATTER OF 

REGISTRANT J.S.

_______________________________

Submitted October 26, 2015 - Decided 

Before Judges Lihotz, Fasciale and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Essex County, ML No. 01070068.

Carolyn A. Murray, Essex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for appellant State of New Jersey 

(Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney

General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Maynard & Sumner, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent J.S. (James H. Maynard, on the 

brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.

The State appeals from an April 2, 2015 order terminating 

petitioner's obligations under the Registration and Community 

Notification Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, also known as Megan's 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 23, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

February 23, 2016
2 A-3541-14T1

Law.

1 The same order released petitioner from community 

supervision for life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4,2 and removed 

petitioner's name from the State Sex Offender Registry. The 

judge was asked to interpret the statute's requirement that 

termination from the registration requirements may be ordered 

"upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 

15 years following conviction." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). He found 

petitioner satisfied N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), calculating the time 

period began upon the entry of defendant's guilty plea. At the 

State's request the order was stayed pending appeal. The State 

now argues:

"Conviction" in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) means the 

date the judgment of conviction was entered. 

That section permits relief after 15 years 

of successful compliance with Megan's Law's 

registration requirements, which do not go 

into effect until the registrant is 

sentenced and the judgment of conviction 

entered.

We agree and reverse. 

 

1 Megan's Law requires "prescribed categories of sex 

offenders register with law enforcement agencies through a 

central registry maintained by the Superintendent of State 

Police. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1), 4(d)." In re Registrant N.B., 

222 N.J. 87, 89 (2015). 

2 "A 2003 amendment replaced all references to 'community 

supervision for life' with 'parole supervision for life.'" See

L. 2003, c. 267, § 1 (eff. Jan. 14, 2004)." State v. Perez, 220 

N.J. 423, 429 (2015).
3 A-3541-14T1

On January 14, 2000, petitioner pled guilty to two counts 

of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A.

2C:14-3(a), resulting from the assault of a thirteen-year-old 

child. The probationary sentence, imposed on November 13, 2000, 

included mandatory compliance with Megan's Law and CSL. In 

early 2015, petitioner moved to terminate his Megan's Law and 

CSL obligations. The applicable provision for seeking 

termination of the Megan's Law registration requirements, 

states: 

Except as provided in subsection g.[3] of this 

section, a person required to register under 

this act may make application to the 

Superior Court of this State to terminate 

the obligation upon proof that the person 

has not committed an offense within 15 years 

following conviction or release from a 

correctional facility for any term of 

imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, 

and is not likely to pose a threat to the 

safety of others.

 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).]

The State agreed petitioner met all statutory requirements, 

except the fifteen-year period of compliance. Over the State's 

objection, the judge accepted petitioner's position the fifteen-

 

3 "N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) prohibits persons convicted, 

adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for 

more than one sex offense as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), or 

aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), or sexual 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), from making application to 

terminate their registration obligations." In re Registrant

A.D., 441 N.J. Super. 403, 406 n.3 (App. Div. 2015). 
4 A-3541-14T1

year clock commenced on the day he pled guilty. Accordingly, 

the judge ordered termination of defendant's compliance with 

Megan's Law and CSL. 

The matter was initially listed on our excessive sentencing 

oral argument calendar. R. 2:9-11. We granted the State's 

motion for transfer to a plenary calendar. The question is a 

legal one, which we review de novo. State v. Revie, 220 N.J.

126, 132 (2014).

When we interpret a statute, "[t]he overriding goal is to 

determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to 

give effect to that intent." State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 

604 (2014) (quoting State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012)). 

First, we consider the plain language of the statute. 

In the construction of the laws and statutes 

of this state, both civil and criminal, 

words and phrases shall be read and 

construed with their context, and shall, 

unless inconsistent with the manifest intent 

of the [L]egislature or unless another or 

different meaning is expressly indicated, be 

given their generally accepted meaning, 

according to the approved usage of the 

language. 

[State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 232 (2010) 

(quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1).] 

We apply common sense in deducing the meaning of the 

Legislature's chosen language, drawing inferences based on the 

statute's structure and composition. Id. at 231-32. See also
5 A-3541-14T1

State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 180 (2010) (quoting State v. 

Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567 (2001)) ("Ordinarily, when a statute's 

language appears clear, 'we need delve no deeper than the act's 

literal terms to divine the Legislature's intent.'"). 

Second, "[i]f a plain-language reading of the statute 

'leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretive 

process is over.'" Hupka, supra, 203 N.J. at 232 (quoting 

Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 

N.J. 189, 195-96 (2007)). On the other hand, if we find an 

ambiguity in the statutory language, we turn to extrinsic 

evidence. Ibid. When such evidence is needed, we look to a 

variety of sources, "'such as the statute's purpose, legislative 

history, and statutory context to ascertain the legislature's 

intent.'" Thomas, supra, 166 N.J. at 567 (quoting Aponte-Correa 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323 (2000)). See also State 

v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 453 (resorting to legislative history 

for extrinsic aid in interpretation of statute), cert. denied, 

549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed. 2d 563 (2006).

Third, "[w]hen construing a statute in which 'the 

Legislature has clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by 

that definition.'" A.D., supra, 441 N.J. Super. at 410 (quoting 

Febbi v. Bd. of Review, 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961)). We also may 

consider "not only the particular statute in question, but . . . 
6 A-3541-14T1

the entire legislative scheme of which it is a part." Kimmelman 

v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129 (1987). 

This case turns on the meaning of "conviction," as it is 

used to define the commencement of the requisite fifteen-year 

period necessary for a petitioner to seek termination of Megan's 

Law and CSL registration requirements. The parties' positions 

are at odds. Petitioner asserts he was convicted on January 14, 

2000, the date he entered his plea. The State asserts 

petitioner was convicted on November 13, 2000, when the judgment 

of conviction imposed, in the first instance, Megan's Law and 

CSL requirements. 

The trial judge relied on State v. Baker, 133 N.J. Super.

398, 399-400 (App. Div. 1975), which distinguished "conviction"

from "judgment" when reviewing the predecessor statute to 

N.J.R.E. 609. The Appellate Division in Baker stated: 

"[t]he ordinar[]y legal meaning of 

conviction, when used to designate a 

particular stage of a prosecution triable by 

a jury, is the confession of the accused in 

open court, or the verdict returned against 

him by the jury, which ascertains and 

publishes the fact of his guilt; while 

'judgment' or 'sentence' is the appropriate 

word to denote the action of the court * * * 

declaring the consequences to the convict of 

the fact thus ascertained." 

[Id. at 401 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323 (Mass. 1872)).]
7 A-3541-14T1

We are mindful that generally, "when the Legislature uses 

words in a statute that previously have been the subject of 

judicial construction, the Legislature will be deemed to have 

used those words in the sense that has been ascribed to them." 

Thomas, supra, 166 N.J. at 567-68. However, this rule is not 

absolute and "'it is possible to interpret an imprecise term 

differently in two separate sections of a statute which have 

different purposes.'" Id. at 568 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, 

Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 194 (6th ed. 

2000)). Following our review, based on the reasons we discuss, 

we are convinced the Legislature did not intend to import 

Baker's definition of conviction when adopting N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

2(f). 

When interpreting a statute, we start with the principle 

that context matters. This court in Baker determined what 

constituted a permissible "prior conviction" to be used to 

attack the credibility of the State's witness. Baker, supra, 

133 N.J. Super. at 399-400. On appeal, the defendant argued the 

trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination of the witness,

after determining a conviction cannot be used to impeach the 

witness before judgment was entered. Id. at 400. Reviewing 

N.J.S.A. 2A:81-12, which has since been repealed, we concluded 

the statutory provision allowing introduction of a "conviction" 
8 A-3541-14T1

of a crime for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a 

witness was not limited to final judgments of conviction. Id.

at 401. Rather, "the logic of the situation compels the 

conclusion that a plea of guilty is as relevant as a judgment 

after sentence. The witness' credibility is equally affected by 

both and the sentence adds no more taint to that factor than is 

implicit in a plea of guilty." Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added). 

We also note Baker preceded adoption of the Criminal Code 

in 1978, which provides the framework for the statute now under 

review. Standing alone, "conviction" is not a defined term in 

the Code. When a provision is subject to differing 

interpretations, "it shall be interpreted to further the general 

purposes [of the Criminal Code] and the special purposes of the 

particular provision involved." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(c). See also

State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 14 (1993). Thus, the context in 

which the word "conviction" is used in the current Code,

generally and specifically, weighs heavily when discerning 

legislative intent. 

Megan's Law, which is a legitimate regulatory measure,

includes a pronouncement of its public safety objectives. Doe 

v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 73 (1995). In adopting the law and its 

companion legislation, see id. at 25 n.6 (listing related 

legislation adopted contemporaneously with Megan's Law), the 
9 A-3541-14T1

Legislature found: "The danger of recidivism posed by sex 

offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against 

children . . . require a system of registration that will permit 

law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when 

necessary for the public safety." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a). See also

Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 25 (explaining Megan's Law is 

designed "to aid law enforcement in apprehending sex offenders 

and to enable communities to protect themselves from such 

offenders"); In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996)

(reciting the sex offender registration law seeks "to protect 

the community from the dangers of recidivism by sexual 

offenders"). All of Megan's Law's provisions, "the requirements 

for registration, the provisions for notification, the Tiers, 

and the many other related parts, are tied together by the 

statement of legislative purpose . . . ." Poritz, supra, 142 

N.J. at 25. This objective must be respected and preserved when 

we construe the intent of the statutory language. 

The registration requirements of Megan's Law, as well as 

related legislation adopted at the same time, including CSL, are 

imposed at sentencing. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 (stating 

registration requirements); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8 ("When a 

defendant is found guilty of a sex offense, the court may, at 

the time of sentencing and in addition to any other disposition 
10 A-3541-14T1

authorized by law, order the continuation of a prior order or 

condition of bail that restricts the defendant's contact with 

the victim, or enter an order imposing such restrictions at the 

time of sentencing."). The registration requirement is presumed 

to be for life. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 21. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1) requires "[a] person who has been 

convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason 

of insanity for commission of a sex offense . . . shall register 

as required in subsections c. and d. of this section." The term 

"convicted" was chosen and paired with other events that 

transpire when a factfinder determines guilt or innocence 

interchangeably. This same terminology "convicted, adjudicated 

delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity" was not 

repeated in subsection (f).

Zeroing in on the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), the 

provision starts with the words: "a person required to register 

under this act . . . ." As noted, the event compelling 

registration occurs, not upon entering a plea, but at

sentencing. The word "conviction," used as the starting point 

for the offense-free period, requires an offender to prove he or 

she "has not committed an offense within 15 years following 

conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term 

of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later . . . ." Ibid.
11 A-3541-14T1

Thus, conviction is coupled with release from custody, and the 

time period mandated is the longer of the two events. Reading 

the statute, we conclude its design signals a desire to measure 

the offense-free time frame against fifteen years of compliance 

with the registration requirements. See also Poritz, supra, 142 

N.J. at 25 ("Our Legislature could reasonably conclude that risk 

of reoffense can be fairly measured, and that knowledge of the 

presence of offenders provides increased defense against them. 

Given those conclusions, the system devised by the Legislature 

is appropriately designed to achieve the laws' purpose of 

protecting the public."). 

Our conclusion is further supported by the use of similar

language when allowing termination of CSL, which provides:

A person sentenced to a term of parole 

supervision for life may petition the 

Superior Court for release from that parole 

supervision. The judge may grant a petition 

for release from a special sentence of 

parole supervision for life only upon proof 

by clear and convincing evidence that the 

person has not committed a crime for 15 

years since the last conviction or release 

from incarceration, whichever is later, and 

that the person is not likely to pose a 

threat to the safety of others if released 

from parole supervision.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c).] 

The provision adopted contemporaneously with Megan's Law mirrors 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) and permits an offender the opportunity to be 
12 A-3541-14T1

released from mandatory supervision upon completion of the 

fifteen-year offense free period. Naturally, the use of "[a] 

person sentenced" invokes entry of a judgment of conviction. 

Logically, the time period would not commence from the date of 

entry of a guilty plea. We find it anomalous to suggest the 

Legislature intended one time frame for termination of Megan's 

Law registration and a different time frame for release from 

CSL. 

When considering the statutory scheme as a unitary whole,

in light of its public safety purpose, we conclude the import of 

the statutory language requires, as a prerequisite for 

requesting termination from the registration requirements, an 

offender demonstrate a fifteen-year period of being offense-free 

and Megan's Law compliant. This can only occur after the 

registration requirements are imposed. 

We agree exacting precision in drafting statutes would 

obviate the need for judicial interpretation, such that had the 

Legislature used the term "judgment of conviction," rather than 

"conviction," any debate would have unmistakably ended. 

However, defendant's illustrations plugging a single definition 

into various statutes which use the word "conviction" are not 

persuasive precisely because this approach ignores the statutory 

context vital to understanding the Legislature's meaning. We 
13 A-3541-14T1

reject this attempt to isolate the single word "conviction," 

without reference to its use in the statute under consideration. 

For all the reasons stated, we are not persuaded the 

Legislature's failure to include "judgment of" to accompany 

"conviction," in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

6.4(c), was deliberate, as suggested by defendant. Rather, we 

are persuaded the context defining the fifteen-year period for 

termination of Megan's Law and CSL compliance commences upon 

imposition of the registration requirements, not before. 

As of this date, the required fifteen years has elapsed

from the date petitioner became subject to Megan's Law and CSL. 

Recognizing "'[a]n issue is "moot" when the decision sought in a 

matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the 

existing controversy[,]'" Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 

382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting New York 

S. & W. R. Corp. v. State Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 6 

N.J. Tax 575, 582 (Tax 1984), aff'd 204 N.J. Super. 630 (App. 

Div. 1985)), we conclude mootness does not preclude our review 

because the judge must actually review whether petitioner met 

the requirement to be offense-free, see A.D., supra, 441 N.J. 

Super. at 413, from March 31, 2015 through November 13, 2015. 

We also conclude the issue on appeal is an important matter of 

public interest and capable of repetition warranting our review. 
14 A-3541-14T1

City of Plainfield v. N.J. Dept. of Health & Senior Servs., 412 

N.J. Super. 466, 484 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 93 

(2010).

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.