2021 IL App (1st) 200441-U 

Order filed: July 23, 2021 

FIRST DISTRICT

FIFTH DIVISION

 

No. 1-20-0441 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County

 ) 

v. ) 14 CR 18932

 ) 

GEORGE A. KRUEGER, JR., ) Honorable 

 ) Peggy Chiampas,

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Cunningham concurred in the judgment.

 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirmed the summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition, finding 

that defendant forfeited review of his claims on appeal by failing to raise them in 

his petition or argue them to the postconviction court. Even addressing the claims 

on the merits, we found that defendant failed to state the gist of a constitutional 

claim sufficient to survive first-stage dismissal.

¶ 2 The State charged defendant, George Krueger, with two counts of solicitation of murder 

and one count of solicitation of murder for hire for asking an undercover police officer to kill his 

ex-girlfriend, Theresa Merchant. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of solicitation of murder 
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and received a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction 

petition, alleging: (1) his counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) the State committed a 

violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) as well as other prosecutorial misconduct; and 

(3) he is actually innocent. The postconviction court summarily dismissed the petition at the first 

stage of proceedings. Defendant appeals the summary dismissal of his petition. We affirm.

¶ 3 In 2014, defendant was arrested for criminal damage to property for slashing the tires and 

smashing the windshields of two vehicles, one of which belonged to Merchant. While in jail, 

defendant approached a fellow inmate, Nelson Saldivar, and told him that he wanted Merchant 

killed. Saldivar informed the Cook County Sheriff’s Police, who arranged for a judicially 

authorized consensual overhear, whereby an undercover police officer, Andrew Gutter, posed as a 

hitman and visited defendant in jail while wearing a recording device. Defendant told Gutter that 

he wanted Merchant to be murdered because she was a witness against him in the criminal damage 

to property case, and he provided Gutter with a note containing: Merchant’s name, physical 

description, and home address; her place of employment and the hours she spends there; and the 

route she drives to and from work, and the year, make and model of her car. Defendant promised 

to pay Gutter between $3,000 and $4,000 for Merchant’s murder.

¶ 4 After defendant was charged with two counts of solicitation of murder and one count of 

solicitation of murder for hire, he filed a motion asking the court to order the State to produce any 

information regarding prior “dealings” between Saldivar and any law enforcement agency.

Defendant also issued a subpoena to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Department for all 

documents relating to Saldivar’s involvement with law enforcement agencies. 

¶ 5 At a hearing held on April 20, 2015, the trial court stated that it would conduct an in camera

review of all documents returned pursuant to the subpoena and tender any relevant documents to 
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the parties. In July 2015, the trial court informed the parties that it had reviewed the subpoenaed 

documents and decided not to release any of them, noting that they contained “sensitive material” 

and that “whether or not [Saldivar was] a government informant or has worked on other cases is 

irrelevant” to the criminal proceedings against defendant. 

¶ 6 Defendant moved the court to reconsider its decision not to turn over the subpoenaed 

documents as they were potentially relevant to the presentation of an entrapment defense. The 

State objected, noting:

“[W]e do concede that matters regarding [Saldivar’s] cooperation with this specific case is 

relevant and specifically we have tendered to counsel a transcript of the plea regarding 

[Saldivar’s] pending case while he cooperated in this case. And in addition, Judge, relevant 

would be [Saldivar’s] name, his date of birth, his criminal background. We will comply 

with all that, but anything beyond this case, Judge, *** is not relevant.”

¶ 7 Defendant responded that Saldivar’s prior dealings with law enforcement were relevant to 

show his knowledge of how to “work with a government agent as an informant *** to gain 

advantage for himself” and to show his motive “to procure the entrapment against [defendant] to 

get himself favor.”

¶ 8 The trial court denied the motion to reconsider.

¶ 9 Defendant also issued another subpoena for audio recordings of phone calls between 

Saldivar and law enforcement personnel. The trial court stated that it would listen to the audio 

recordings in camera to determine whether any of them were relevant to the defense but there is 

nothing further in the record regarding the court’s findings with respect to those audio recordings. 

None of the audio recordings were released to defendant.
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¶ 10 On November 8, 2017, pursuant to a negotiated plea, defendant pleaded guilty to one count 

of solicitation of murder. The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced him to 15 

years’ imprisonment.

¶ 11 Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction petition alleging that his counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by: misadvising him that his guilty plea would waive any Brady violations 

committed by the State; refusing to file an interlocutory appeal from the court’s denial of the 

motion to reconsider its decision not to turn over the subpoenaed documents; failing to request a 

pretrial evidentiary hearing regarding Saldivar’s reliability; failing to file a motion for substitution 

of judge; failing to raise a defense of entrapment; improperly advising defendant that he did not 

have any “mitigating factors” warranting a better plea deal and coercing him into pleading guilty; 

and failing to inform the court of the State’s plea deal with Saldivar on his own criminal cases that 

violated sentencing guidelines. Defendant also alleged that the State committed a Brady violation

by failing to disclose all of Saldivar’s “dealings” with law enforcement, and that the State 

committed additional prosecutorial misconduct by offering incentives to Saldivar to frame him. 

Finally, defendant asserted his actual innocence. 

¶ 12 In a 15-page written order, the postconviction court (which was different than the trial court 

that had accepted his guilty plea) addressed and rejected each of defendant’s arguments and 

summarily dismissed his petition as frivolous and patently without merit. The postconviction court 

never reviewed the documents that earlier had been reviewed in camera by the trial court, as 

defendant never asked it to do so. The record is unclear whether those documents were even made 

available to the postconviction court. Defendant appeals the summary dismissal of his 

postconviction petition. 
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¶ 13 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a method whereby a defendant can assert 

that his conviction or sentence resulted from a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 

ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020). The Act provides a three-stage process for adjudication of a 

postconviction petition. People v. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B, ¶ 15. This case falls 

within the first stage. During the first stage, the postconviction court must assess the petition, 

taking the allegations as true, and determine if it is frivolous or patently without merit such that it 

failed to state the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim. Id.; People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 

99 (2002). A petition may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if 

the petition has no arguable basis in either law or in fact. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. Our 

review of a first-stage dismissal is de novo. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B, ¶ 15. 

¶ 14 On appeal, defendant contends that his postconviction petition potentially states the gist of 

two meritorious constitutional claims: (1) that he was denied the right to confront the witnesses 

against him and (2) that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because he lacked all 

discoverable materials to assess whether he would have a viable entrapment defense at trial.

Defendant asks us to review the materials which the trial court reviewed in camera so as to 

determine whether, in fact, his postconviction petition states the gist of those two claims.

¶ 15 Initially, we note that the materials which the trial court reviewed in camera were not 

included in the record on appeal. After the record was filed, defendant filed a motion in this court 

on March 15, 2021, asking us to order the circuit court clerk to deliver a supplemental record 

containing the materials that had been reviewed in camera by the trial court. We entered an order 

on March 17, 2021, granting defendant’s motion “in part,” stating that “The materials shall be 

placed in a certified supplemental record by the clerk of the circuit court and filed instanter, under 

seal to be accessible only by justices of this court and court staff.” However, no such certified 
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supplemental record has been filed with us and thus the materials which were reviewed in camera

by the trial court have not been made part of the appellate record. As the appellant, defendant bears 

the burden of following up with the circuit court clerk’s office after the entry of the March 17 order 

and filing any necessary pleadings/motions ensuring the delivery of the certified supplemental 

record to support his claim of error. Generally, any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the 

record are resolved against the appellant and we presume that the order appealed from conformed 

to the law and facts of the case. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). However, in 

this case, the incompleteness of the record does not hinder our review, and we have made no 

presumptions against defendant or resolved any doubts against him. Instead, for the reasons that 

follow we hold that defendant has forfeited review of his claims by failing to raise them in his 

postconviction petition and that even in the absence of forfeiture defendant failed to state the gist 

of any constitutional claims.

¶ 16 First, we address the State’s contention that defendant has forfeited review of his claims 

on appeal. Our supreme court has held that “[t]he question raised in an appeal from an order 

dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed 

and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 

366, 388 (1998). Section 122-3 of the Act provides that “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of 

constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.”1 725 ILCS 5/122-

3 (West 2018). Given the prevailing standard of review and the plain language of section 122-3, 

1 Our supreme court has noted that waiver in the context of postconviction petitions is better referred to as 

“forfeiture.” See People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27.
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our supreme court has held that a claim not raised in a postconviction petition may not be asserted 

for the first time on appeal. People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 505 (2004).

¶ 17 Even given a liberal construction, defendant’s postconviction petition did not raise either 

of the claims he asserts now on appeal, i.e., the confrontation clause claim or the claim that his 

guilty plea was involuntary because he did not receive all discoverable materials related to a 

possible entrapment defense. Defendant also did not request that the postconviction court review 

the materials which the trial court earlier had reviewed in camera, and therefore those materials 

were not reviewed or relied on by the postconviction court when dismissing defendant’s petition 

as frivolous and patently without merit. As the claims asserted on appeal, including any issue 

arising from the postconviction court’s failure to review the in camera materials, were not raised 

in the petition, they are forfeited and may not be asserted for the first time on review of the 

summary dismissal order. 

¶ 18 Even if the claims had not been forfeited, we would affirm. Defendant’s first claim is that 

he was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. However, by pleading 

guilty, defendant waived several constitutional rights, including his right to confront his accusers. 

People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 370 (1999). Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of 

several constitutional rights, including the right to confront his accuser, due process requires that 

the record affirmatively show that the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. People v. 

Resendiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 180821, ¶ 26. Supreme Court Rule 402 requires that before accepting 

a guilty plea, the court must admonish defendant and determine that he understands: (1) the nature 

of the charge; (2) the minimum and maximum sentencing ranges; (3) that he has a right to plead 

not guilty, persist in that plea if it is already made, or plead guilty; and (4) that, by pleading guilty, 
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he waives the right to a jury trial and to confront the witnesses against him. Ill.S.Ct.R.402(a) (eff.

July 1, 2012).

¶ 19 The trial court here complied with Rule 402 when accepting defendant’s guilty plea and 

we specifically note the following colloquy: 

“THE COURT: You are waiving your right to cross-examine and confront any witnesses 

that would testify against you ***. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.”

¶ 20 Accordingly, defendant failed to state the gist of a confrontation clause violation.

¶ 21 Defendant’s second claim is that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because 

he lacked all discoverable materials to assess whether he would have a viable entrapment defense 

at trial. If those materials supported an entrapment defense, he would have pleaded not guilty. 

¶ 22 To prove entrapment, defendant must show that a State actor improperly induced him to 

commit the crime and that he lacked the predisposition to commit the crime. People v. Placek, 184 

Ill. 2d 370, 380-81 (1998). Defendant here failed to allege either of these facts in his petition and 

thus did not provide even an arguable basis or the gist of a claim of a viable entrapment defense 

that would have caused him to change his plea from guilty to not guilty. 

¶ 23 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary dismissal of defendant’s 

postconviction petition.

¶ 24 Affirmed.