U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

39–011 2014

113th Congress, 2d Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 113–89 

TEXT OF PROPOSED THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE 

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

TEXT OF PROPOSED THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT 

FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

JANUARY 29, 2014.—Message and accompanying papers referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed 


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To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 

123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 

(42 U.S.C. 2153(b), (d)) (the ‘‘Act’’), the text of a proposed Third 

Amendment to the Agreement for Co-operation Between the United 

States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) (the ‘‘Amendment’’). I am also pleased to transmit my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the 

Amendment, and an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 

Statement (NPAS) concerning the Amendment. (In accordance with 

section 123 of the Act, as amended by title XII of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277), 

a classified annex to the NPAS, prepared by the Secretary of State 

in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information, will be submitted to the Congress separately.) The joint memorandum submitted to me by the 

Secretaries of State and Energy and a letter from the Chairman of 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stating the views of the Commission are also enclosed. An addendum to the NPAS pursuant to 

section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403– 

1), as amended, is being submitted separately by the Director of 

National Intelligence. 

The proposed Amendment has been negotiated in accordance 

with the Act and other applicable law. In my judgment, it meets 

all applicable statutory requirements and will advance the nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States. 

Pursuant to the proposed Amendment, the Agreement for Co-operation Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed at Vienna May 11, 1959, as 

amended and extended February 12, 1974, and January 14, 1980 

(the ‘‘Agreement’’), would continue to provide a comprehensive 

framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the IAEA and facilitate our mutual objectives related to nonproliferation and the 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The primary purposes of the 

Agreement are to enable exports from the United States of nuclear 

material and equipment to IAEA Member States for research reactors and, in certain cases, for power reactors, and to enable transfers from the United States of small samples of nuclear material 

to the IAEA for safeguards and research purposes. 

Under the proposed Amendment, the term of the Agreement will 

be extended an additional 40 years for a total term of 95 years. 

The Agreement permits the transfer of material, equipment (including reactors), and facilities for nuclear research and nuclear 

power production. It does not permit transfers of Restricted Data, 

sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components of such facilities, or, unless specifically provided for in a supply agreement 

or an amendment thereto, transfers of sensitive nuclear technology. 


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In the event of termination of the Agreement, key nonproliferation 

conditions and controls continue with respect to material, equipment, and facilities subject to the Agreement. 

A more detailed discussion of the IAEA’s nuclear nonproliferation 

and peaceful uses activities is provided in the NPAS and in a classified annex to the NPAS submitted to you separately. 

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed Amendment to the Agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and 

will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense 

and security. Accordingly, I have approved the Amendment and authorized its execution and urge that the Congress give it favorable 

consideration. 

This transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of 

both sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Act. My Administration is 

prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as provided in section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30 days 

of continuous session review provided for in section 123 b., the 60 

days of continuous session review provided for in section 123 d. 

shall commence. 

BARACK OBAMA. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 2014. 


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THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT FOR C()"OPERATION 

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

The United SUites of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 

Desiring to amend the Agreement for Co-operation Between the UniteCi States of 

America and the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed at Vienna on 

May 11, 1959, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement for 

Co-operation"), 

Agree as follows: 

ARTICLE I 

1'. Article IV ·of the .Agreement for Co-operation is amended by deleting'the 

phrase "and the Appendix thereto" and the sentence "The Appendix may be 

modified by mutual consent of the Parties, without amendment of this 

Agreement." 

2. The Annex to the Agreement for Co-operation is amended by: 

a. deleting in Sectioli F thereof the sentence "Prior to'.any such transfer the 

recipient Member State or group of Member States shall agree to the 

levels for the application of physical protection set forth in the 

Appendix to the Annex, ~d to the maintenance of adequate physical 

protection measures in accordance with such levels."; 

b. deleting in Section F thereof the phrase "INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, 

published by the Agency and 'entitled: "The Physical Protection of 

NUclear Material"" and substifuting in lieu thereof "IAEA Nuclear 

Security Series No. 13 published by the Agency and entitled ''Nuclear 

Security Recommendatio~s on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 

and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/RevisiQn 5)""; and 

c. deleting the Ap'~dix thereto. 
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ARTICLEll 

years" 

ill 
(5) 

Presidential Determination No. 2014–07 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, January 17, 2014. 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy. 

Subject: Proposed Third Amendment to the Agreement for Co-operation Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

I have considered the proposed Third Amendment to the Agreement for Co-operation Between the United States of America and 

the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed at Vienna on May 

11, 1959, as amended and extended February 12, 1974, and January 14, 1980, along with the views, recommendations, and statements of the interested agencies. 

I have determined that the performance of the Third Amendment 

will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the 

common defense and security. Pursuant to section 123 b. of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(b)), I hereby approve the proposed Third Amendment and authorize the Secretary of State to arrange for its execution. 

The Secretary of State is authorized to publish this determination in the Federal Register. 

BARACK OBAMA. 


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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENT STATEMENT 

Pursuant to Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, 

with Respect to the Proposed Third Amendment to the Agreement between 

the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency 

Introduction 

This Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement ("NPAS") relates to the proposed 

Third Amendment (the "Amendment") to the Agreement for Cooperation between 

the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed 

at Vienna May 11, 1959, as amended February 12, 1974, and January 14, 1980 (the 

"Agreement"). Without a further amendment and extension, the Agreement would 

expire on August 7, 2014. The Amendment is being submitted to the President 

jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy for his approval. 

Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended ("the AEA"), provides that 

an NPAS be submitted by the Secretary of State to the President on each new or 

amended agreement for cooperation concluded pursuant to that section. Pursuant 

to section 123 a., the NPAS must analyze the consistency of the text of the 

proposed agreement with all the requirements of the AEA, with specific attention 

to whether the proposed agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth 

in that subsection. The NPAS must also address the adequacy of the safeguards 

and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the 

agreement to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to 

further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. 

With this statutory mandate in mind, this NPAS: (a) provides background 

information on the IAEA's activities (Part I); (b) describes the existing Agreement 

and the proposed Amendment to the Agreement (Part II); (c) describes the 

compliance of the Agreement as amended by the proposed Amendment with 

statutory requirements (Part III); (d) details other policy issues (Part IV); and (e) 

sets forth the conclusions and recommendation of the Department of State as 

contemplated by section 123 a. of the AEA (Part V). 

I. Background Information on the International Atomic Energy 

Agency 
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The International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA" or "Agency") was established in 

1957 by a multinational treaty (the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 

Agencyl)that grew out of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal in 1953. 

Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, it currently has 159 Member States. The United 

States, whose participation is based on its ratification of the Statute and on the IAEA 

Participation Ad, has been a designated member of the Board of Governors (the 

Board) since its inception. The designated members of the Board are chosen 

annually from those members "most advanced in the technology of atomic energy.,,3 

The United States has always been a strong supporter ofthe IAEA and its mission, 

making the largest regular contribution to the IAEA's annual budget as well as a 

significant yearly voluntary contribution. 

According to Article II of its Statute, the IAEA seeks" ... to accelerate and enlarge 

the contribution to atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity ... [and] ensure ... 

that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is 

not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." The IAEA's dual 

responsibilities have been described as (1) providing scientific and technical 

assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy to Member States; and (2) 

implementing a safeguards system designed to guard against the diversion of 

material being use in peaceful nuclear programs to military or nuclear explosive use. 

The IAEA plays a critical role in international nonproliferation efforts. All nuclear 

material and equipment provided to or through the IAEA is subject to the condition 

that it remain under IAEA safeguards, in accordance with the Agency's Statute and 

relevant safeguards documents. The IAEA's safeguards system has broad 

international support as a first line of defense against the misuse of nuclear material 

for military or explosive purposes. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons ("NPT,,)4 provides for IAEA safeguards on all the peaceful nuclear 

activities of such states to verify that no diversion to nuclear weapons use is 

occurring. As of December 2013, 172 Member States have brought into force or 

acceded to a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, and 122 

have brought into force or acceded to an Additional Protocol (AP) to their 

safeguards agreement. (The entry into force of a CSA and an AP is generally 

understood to be the global norm for safeguards.) 

I 8USTI093,TJAS 3873. 

2 P.L. 85-177, 71 Stat. 453; 22 USC Section 2021, et. Seq.; 42 USC Section 2079. 

) IAEA Statute, Art. VIAl. 

421 UST 483, TIAS 6839. 
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In addition to its nonproliferation activities, the IAEA's other major objective is to 

assist Member States in utilizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and striking a 

reasonable balance between the two missions is necessary to maintain the support of 

Member States for all of the IAEA's responsibilities, including its safeguards 

system. Article IV.2 of the NPT provides that "Parties to the Treaty in a position to 

do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other states or 

international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 

energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon 

States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing 

areas ofthe world." Many NPT parties consider Article IV the major quid pro quo 

for their acceptance of the NPT undertakings to foreswear nuclear weapons 

acquisition and to accept full-scope safeguards. 

Due to its statutory objectives and activities as directed by the Board of Governors, 

the IAEA does not constitute a proliferation threat. The IAEA has modest nuclear 

resources appropriate to its needs. It has no nuclear reactors but does possess small 

quantities of nuclear materials (primarily for safeguards samples and reference 

samples). It maintains a research laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, and conducts 

extensive theoretical studies and analyticallabotatory work in many areas, including 

food irradiation, medical applications of isotopes, radiation technology, and water 

resources. 

II. Description of the Existing Agreement and Proposed Amendment to the 

Agreement 

A. Description of the Existing Agreement 

On August 7, 1959, two years after the creation of the IAEA, the United States and 

the IAEA entered into the Agreement. The Agreement was amended in 1974 and 

again in 1980, first to extend its duration and to allow for the fueling of power 

reactors, and later to bring the Agreement into compliance with the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Act of 1978. 

Since its entry into force, the primary purpose of the Agreement has been to provide 

a legal foundation for the transfer of research reactor fuel and equipment from the 

United States to IAEA Member States that have not concluded an agreement for 

peaceful nuclear cooperation with the United States. The majority of supply 
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agreements' concluded under the Agreement have been for this purpose, but a few 

others have been concluded to allow the United States to provide power reactors to 

two states under the Agreement (Mexico at Laguna Verde and Yugoslavia «now 

Slovenia)) at Krsko). 

In addition to transfers made via supply agreements with Member States, the United 

States has transferred small quantities of source and special nuclear material for both 

safeguards purposes and research applications. The most likely transfers to occur 

under the Agreement after entry into force of the proposed Amendment will be 

additional transfers of research reactor fuel and equipment to Member States and 

transfers of material to the IAEA for research and safeguards cooperation with the 

IAEA. 

The procedure through which U.S.-obligated material and equipment are transferred 

through the IAEA under a supply agreement is typically as follows: 

1. A Member State informs the IAEA of its interest in acquiring fuel 

andlor equipment from the United States; 

2. After confirmation of U.S. interest in such a transaction, negotiations 

are begun on a supply agreement among the IAEA, the recipient and 

the United States (the scope of these agreements is usually limited to a 

particular transaction); 

3. The IAEA Board of Governors approves the supply agreement; the 

United States and the recipient also approve the trilateral agreement; 

the agreement is signed; and 

4. The necessary contractual arrangements are negotiated and U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission export license applied for and 

granted. 

In addition to the nonproliferation requirements which must exist in all supply 

agreements as required by the Agreement, the United States also exchanges 

diplomatic notes, which constitute an agreed understanding, with each supply 

agreement recipient state containing additional nonproliferation assurances. In these 

notes, the United States and the recipient state agree, inter alia, to a system of 

5 The Agreement refers to "supply agreements," but the IAEA Secretariat may also refer to supply agreements as 

"project and supply agreements." The two terms are often used interchangeably in current practice. 
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"fallback safeguards" if for some reason the IAEA is unable to undertake its 

safeguards responsibilities in the recipient state. The United States also reserves the 

right to be discharged of its obligations under the supply agreement and the right to 

require the return of the covered material under the supply agreement if certain 

conditions are not met. The United States can exercise these rights ifthe recipient 

state: 

a. does not comply with any provision ofthe supply agreement; 

b. does not accept safeguards as provided for by the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (and in some cases where appropriate, 

also the Treaty of Tlatelo1co); 

c. detonates a nuclear explosive device, terminates or abrogates IAEA 

safeguards, or terminates, abrogates, or materially violates an IAEA 

safeguards agreement; 

d. engages in, or assists, encourages, or induces any non-nuclear-weapon 

state to engage in activity involving source or special fissionable material 

and having direct significance for the manufacture of nuclear explosive 

devices; or 

e. enters into an agreement for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, 

materials, or technology to its sovereign control or to the sovereign 

control of a non-nuclear-weapon state except in connection with an 

international fuel cycle evaluation in which that the recipient state and 

the United States participate, or pursuant to any other relevant 

international agreement or undertaking to which such states subscribe. 

The principal U.S. obligation under the Agreement is to make available to the 

Agency pursuant to the Agency Statute for use in Agency activities 5,000 

kilograms of contained uranium-235 and will also, from time to time, make 

available to the Agency such additional quantities of special nuclear material, 

including contained uranium-235, as may be authorized by the United States. 

The uranium supplied may be enriched up to 20 per cent in the isotope uranium235, provided that the parties may agree to a higher enrichment with respect to 

uranium to be used in research or material testing reactors or for research 

purposes. 

Section 54a. ofthe AEA authorizes, subject to the provisions of AEA section 123, 

the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Department of Energy) to distribute to 

the Agency 5,000 kilograms of contained uranium-235, 500 grams ofuranium-233, 

and three kilograms of plutonium, together with the amounts of special nuclear 

material which will match in amount the sum of all quantities of special nuclear 

material made available by all other members of the Agency to June 1, 1960 
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(approximately 70 kilograms of contained uranium-235). Section 54a. also 

provides that notice of any written proposal by the Department of Energy to supply 

additional quantities needs to be given to Congress, and such export many not 

occur if within 60 days of continuous session of such notification, the Congress 

disapproves of the proposal by concurrent resolution. This section also authorized 

up to $50,000 worth of special nuclear material to be made available to the Agency 

in each calendar year, without charge, to assist and encourage research in peaceful 

uses or for medical therapy. 

The Atomic Energy Commission submitted a proposal to Congress to pennit 

supply of an amount of contained uranium-235, in addition to that specifically 

permitted by section 54a., in an amount necessary to support the fuel cycle of 

power reactors in Mexico and Yugoslavia having a total installed capacity of2,015 

megawatts ofnuc1ear energy. The NRC has informed us that, apart from the 

contained uranium-235 that has been supplied to those reactors, the total amounts 

of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, and plutonium supplied under the 

Agreement have not exceeded the statutory ceilings. 

B. Description of the Proposed Amendment to the Agreement 

The proposed Amendment extends the duration of the Agreement for an additional 

forty years, making the new expiration date August 7, 2054. Additionally, 

references in the Agreement to INFCIRC/225, the IAEA guidance document 

providing recommendations to Member States on appropriate physical protection 

standards, are updated by the Amendment to reflect the Board's 2011 adoption of 

the most recent version of the document to Revision 5. 

On November 29,2013, the Board of Govemors considered the proposed 

Amendment. The United States introduced the amendment, explained its purposes 

and beneficial effects for IAEA Member States, and sought Board authorization for 

the IAEA Director General to sign the Amendment. A few states who have 

previously concluded supply agreements with the United States took the floor in 

support of the proposed Amendment, and no states made statements opposing the 

Amendment. The Board agreed by consensus to authorize the Director General to 

sign the Amendment on behalf of the IAEA. 

III. Nature and Scope of Cooperation under the Proposed Amendment to 

the Agreement and Compliance with Statutory Requirements 
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The Agreement meets all applicable requirements of the AEA. Section 123(a) ofthe 

AEA requires agreements for cooperation to include the terms, conditions, duration, 

nature, and scope of the cooperation. The nature and scope of the cooperation 

authorized by the Agreement as amended by the proposed Amendment, as well as 

the types of cooperation excluded therefrom or permissible only by amendment 

thereto, are described in Section A below. 

A. Nature and Scope of Cooperation under the Agreement and the Proposed 

Amendment to the Agreement 

As noted above, the primary purpose of the Agreement as amended by the proposed 

Amendment will continue to be to provide a legal foundation for the establishment 

of supply agreements among the United States, the IAEA, and recipient state( s) to 

allow for the transfer of U.S.-obligated material and equipment. This will most 

commonly entail the transfer of research reactor fuel and equipment. The United 

States has previously transferred power reactor fuel and equipment via a supply 

agreement to two countries, but does not envision entering into supply agreements 

with additional countries for transfers of power reactors and/or fuel at this time. The 

United States may also utilize the Agreement as amended by the proposed 

Amendment to authorize the transfer of small quantities of source and special 

nuclear material to the IAEA for both safeguards purposes and research applications. 

Section A of the Annex of the Agreement provides that cooperation thereunder 

through a supply agreement requires the application ofIAEA safeguards with 

respect to all nuclear activities within the territory of a non-nuclear weapons state or 

group of Member States involved in any potential transfer. 

Section G of the Annex of the Agreement excludes cooperation through a supply 

agreement involving the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologl, unless specifically 

provided in the supply agreement or an amendment thereto. (The Administration 

cannot foresee at this time a circumstance in which it would authorize the transfer of 

sensitive nuclear technology through a supply agreement or a future amendment 

thereto.) 

I> Sensitive nuclear technology is defined in Section G as "any information (including information incorporated in 

equipment or facilities) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, 

fabrication, operation or maintenance of any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing 

of nuclear fuel, heavy water production, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium, or such other infonnation 

as the United States may designate prior to transfer of the information." 
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B. Compliance of the Agreement as Amended by the Proposed Amendment 

with Statutory Requirements 

U.S. law has added no new substantive requirements for agreements of this type 

since 1978. Moreover, the proposed Amendment makes no substantive change to 

the Agreement, except to extend its duration and update the physical protection 

provisions. As a result, there is no need to repeat in this NP AS the detailed 

analysis in the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared in 1979 by the 

Anns Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in connection with the Second 

Amendment to the Agreement, which concluded that the Agreement as amended 

by the Second Amendment meets all of the substantive requirements in the AEA 

and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 ("NNP A") for new or amended 

agreements for cooperation. 

In light of the fact that there have not been changes or additions to the 

requirements specified in the NNP A for such agreements for cooperation, and that 

the proposed Amendment does not reduce the substantive undertakings by the 

IAEA contained in the Agreement, the Agreement as amended by the Amendment 

will continue to meet all the requirements of the AEA. 

The primary purpose of the Amendment is to extend the duration of the 

Agreement, which will expire by its terms on August 7, 2014. The Amendment 

also updates the language in the Agreement regarding the guaranty that adequate 

physical protection will be applied to material and equipment subject to the 

Agreement. It also eliminates an Appendix to the Agreement that listed levels of 

physical protection, and replaced the reference to the minimum levels of physical 

protection applicable under the Agreement with a reference to the most recent 

guidelines published by the IAEA or any revision of those guidelines agreed to by 

the United States and the IAEA or the recipient Member State. These changes do 

not alter the substantive commitment of the IAEA or Member States who receive 

nuclear supply from the United States under a supply agreement pursuant to the 

Agreement to provide a guarantee of adequate physical protection over such U.S. 

supply. 

III. Other Non-Proliferation Policy Issues 

The Agreement is unique among the agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation 

of the United States. Most of the transfers pursuant to this Agreement are and will 

be to recipient countries that are not specifically identified in the Agreement, since 

the potential recipients could include any IAEA Member State. Before such 
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transfers can take place, a supply agreement will be required that identifies the 

recipient, the end use, and the kinds and amounts of materials and equipment to be 

transferred. These supply agreements and any exports from the United States 

pursuant to them will be subject to all the nonproliferation conditions highlighted 

above before any export from the United States may occur, and a Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission license will also be required. 

IV. Conclusions and Recommendation 

Entry-into-force of the proposed Amendment will provide the legal authority to 

permit continuation of mutually beneficial peaceful nuclear cooperation between 

the United States and the IAEA and between the United States and other IAEA 

Member States. 

On the basis ofthe analysis in this NPAS and pertinent information of which it is 

aware--including the provisions of the Agreement as amended by the proposed 

Amendment, the nature of the activities of the IAEA, and the strong history of 

cooperation between the United States and the IAEA with regard to nuclear 

nonproliferation--the Department of State has arrived at the following assessment, 

conclusions, views and recommendations: 

1. The safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use 

assurances in the Agreement as amended by the proposed Amendment are 

adequate to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to 

further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. 

2. The Agreement as amended by the proposed Amendment meets all the 

legal requirements of the Act and the NNPA. 

3. Execution of the proposed Amendment would be compatible with the 

non-proliferation program, policy, and objectives of the United States. 

4. Therefore, it is recommended that the President approve and authorize the 

execution of the proposed Amendment; and that the President determine that the 

performance of the proposed Amendment will promote, and will not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. 
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

January 15, 2014 

UNCLASSIFIED 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: John Kerry . t/?,e: 

Secretary of state/ 

Ernest Moniz » .... ~ Secretary of Energy ~ ) 

S/ES 201400536 

SUBJECT: Proposed Third Amendment to the Agreement for Co-operation 

Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) 

The United States and the IAEA have completed negotiations on the 

attached proposed Third Amendment to the Agreement for Co-operation 

Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (the" Amendment"). If you authorize execution of the Amendment, it 

will be signed by representatives of the United States and the IAEA. After 

signature, in accordance with section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended (the "Act"), the Amendment must be submitted to both 

houses of Congress for a review period of 90 days of continuous session. 

Unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted, the Amendment may be 

brought into force upon completion of the review period. 

The proposed Amendment would allow the Agreement for Co-operation 

between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, signed at Vienna May II, 1959, as amended February 12, 1974, and 

January 14, 1980 (the "Agreement"), to continue in force and thus continue to 

provide a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the 

lAEA and facilitate our mutual objectives related to nonproliferation and the 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The primary purposes of the Agreement are to 

enable exports from the United States of nuclear material and equipment to 

UNCLASSIFIED 
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UNCLASSIFIED 

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IAEA Member States for research reactors, and in certain cases power reactors, 

and to enable transfers from the United States of small samples of nuclear 

material to the IAEA itself for safeguards and research purposes. 

Under the proposed Amendment, the term of the Agreement will be 

extended an additional 40 years for a total term of95 years. 

The Agreement permits the transfer of material, equipment (including 

reactors), and facilities for nuclear research and nuclear power production. It 

does not pennit transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear facilities, or 

major critical components of such facilities, or unless specifically provided for 

in a supply agreement or an amendment thereto, transfers of sensitive nuclear 

technology. In the event of termination of the Agreement, key nonproliferation 

conditions and controls continue with respect to material, equipment, and 

facilities subject to the Agreement. 

A more detailed discussion of the IAEA' s nuclear nonproliferation and 

peaceful uses activities is provided in the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 

Statement ("NP AS") at Attachment 4, and in a classified annex to the NP AS 

submitted to you separately. An addendum to the NP AS pursuant to section 

lO2A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 US.c. 403-1), as amended, is 

being submitted to you separately by the Director of National Intelligence. 

In accordance with the provisions of section 123 of the Act, the proposed 

Amendment was negotiated by the Department of State, with the technical 

assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy. The proposed 

Amendment has also been reviewed by the members of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. The Commission's views are being submitted to you separately. 

In our judgment, the Agreement as amended by the proposed 

Amendment satisfies aU requirements of US. law for agreements of this type. 

We also believe that continued US. cooperation with the lAEA in the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy under the Agreement as amended by the proposed 

Amendment will be supportive of U.S. nonproliferation, foreign policy, and 

commercial interests. We recommend, therefore, that you determine, pursuant 

to section 123 b. of the Act, that performance of the Amendment will promote, 

and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and 

security; and that you approve the Amendment and authorize its execution. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
17 


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Recommendation 

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 3 -

That you sign the detennination, approval, and authorization at 

Attachment 1 and the transmittal letter to Congress at Attachment 2. (The 

transmittal will be held until the Amendment is signed.) 

Attachments: 

1. Draft Presidential detennination, approval, and authorization 

2. Draft transmittal letter to the Congress (To be held until after the 

Amendment is signed) 

3. Text of Proposed Third Amendment to the Agreement for Co-operation 

Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency 

4. Unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement 

5. Text of the Agreement for Co-operation Between the United States of 

America and the International Atomic Energy Agency, with 1974 and 1980 

Amendments 

UNCLASSIFIED 
18 


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CHAIRMAN 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

December 23,2013 

In accordance with the provisions of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, the u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviewed the proposed amendments to the 

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Atomic Energy: Cooperation in Peaceful Application. It is 

the view of the Commission that the proposed Agreement includes all of the provisions required 

by law and provides a sufficient framework for civilian nuclear cooperation between the United 

States and the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Member States. The Commission 

therefore recommends that you make the requisite positive statutory determination, approve the 

proposed amendrnents to the Agreement, and authorize its execution. 

Respectfully, 

Allison M. Macfarlane 

o