******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TERRANCE EASTON

(AC 35112)

Lavine, Bear and Borden, Js.

Argued March 18—officially released August 19, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Hon. Lawrence L. Hauser, judge trial referee

[motion to suppress]; Devlin, J. [judgments].)

Craig A. Sullivan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Emily D. Trudeau, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

BORDEN, J. The defendant, TerranceEaston, appeals

from the judgments of conviction rendered by the trial

court after his entry of three conditional pleas of nolo

contendere pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a following the court’s denial of his motion to suppress both

a fingerprint record and an analysis of his DNA.1

In

this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to suppress because: (1)

the identifying information was confidential under General Statutes § 54-76l and could not be released without

a court order; (2) his DNA was gathered in violation of

his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination;

and (3) he met the necessary burden of showing that

a warrant affidavit contained a falsehood or material

omission as part of a hearing pursuant to Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667

(1978). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was arrested on July 15, 2010, and

was charged with possession of a controlled substance.

He subsequently was charged after arrest in two informations, each involving a count of home invasion, a

count of sexual assault, and a count of burglary. The

Bridgeport Police Department identified the defendant

through a fingerprint record obtained from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The defendant filed a

motion to suppress the fingerprint identification and

DNA sample taken by a buccal swab as part of his initial

arrest. The defendant then amended the motion to suppress to allege a Franks violation. The trial court rendered an oral decision denying the motion to suppress.

Following the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion

to suppress, the defendant entered conditional pleas of

nolo contendere to each of the three dockets of charges

pursuant to § 54-94a. The court rendered judgments

encompassing all charges against the defendant on July

27, 2012. This appeal followed.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present case. On July 11, 2010,the Bridgeport

Police Department processed the scene of a home invasion and sexual assault committed by an unknown perpetrator. The police believed the incident was likely

linked to a similar home invasion and sexual assault

that had occurred on March 28, 2010, also committed

by an unknown perpetrator. The investigating officers

collected latent fingerprints from a windowsill of the

victim’s apartment and sent them to the state police

forensic laboratory for processing. John Brunetti, a fingerprint examiner at the state police forensic laboratory, entered the fingerprints into the Connecticut

Automated Fingerprint Identification System. He discovered that the fingerprints recovered from the crime

scene matched those of an individual in the database,

who could only be identified by a state identification

number. Brunetti contacted James Viadero, a captain
in the Bridgeport Police Department, and provided him

with the state identification number. Brunetti told Viadero, however, that he could not release the identity of

the individual whose fingerprint record matched the

fingerprints from the crime scene because the number

was attached to a youthful offender file. Brunetti

informed Viadero that, pursuant to a policy of the state

police forensic laboratory, the information related to a

youthful offender—including the identity of the

offender—could not be released without a court order.

Instead of seeking a court order, Viadero contacted

Lisa Skelly, a special agent with the FBI, to obtain the

identity of the individual. Viadero provided the state

identification number to Skelly, who entered it into the

FBI’s criminal justice information system and received

a match along with a fingerprintrecord. The FBIrecords

matched the state identification number to the defendant. The police prepared a search and seizure warrant

for the defendant’s fingerprints to confirm the match

with the latent fingerprints taken from the July 11, 2010

crime scene. When the police located the defendant on

July 15, 2010, he was in possession of marijuana. He was

arrested and charged with possession of a controlled

substance. As part of the booking process, the police,

after having procured a warrant to obtain the defendant’s fingerprints, took his fingerprints and secured a

DNA sample by buccal swab. Testing revealed that the

defendant’s DNA matched DNA samples taken at both

the March 28, 2010 and July 11, 2010 crime scenes.

The defendant was charged in separate informations.

The court, Hauser, J., heard evidence at the hearings

on both the motion to suppress and the Franks claim.

The court determined that the defendant had no liberty

interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in the

confidentiality of his juvenile offender fingerprint

records. The court then stated that in the event there

was a liberty interest or reasonable expectation of privacy, the doctrine of inevitable discovery would nevertheless have applied to the police department’s seizure.

The court also found that the defendant voluntarily had

consented to giving a DNA sample by buccal swab and

thus waived any right to object to the DNA sample.

With respect to the Franks claim, the court concluded

that the defendant had not met his burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that there

was a falsehood or material omission in the warrant

affidavits. Accordingly, the court, in an oral ruling,

denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The defendant thereafter entered a conditional plea

of nolo contendere to each of the charges in the three

informations. The court, Devlin, J., sentenced the

defendant to a total effective term of forty years of

incarceration, suspended after twenty-eight years, followed by thirty-five years of probation. This appeal

followed.
I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

denied his motion to suppress on the ground that he

did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

his youthful offender records. He argues that § 54-76l

2

confers a right of confidentiality as to the fingerprint

records of youthful offenders, which, in turn, creates

a reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, bars

the release of such records in the absence of either a

warrant obtained pursuant to the fourth amendment

or procedural due process pursuant to the fourteenth

amendment.3 We disagree.

We first set forth the standard of review pertaining

to a motion to suppress. ‘‘[O]ur standard of review of

a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection

with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of

fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous

in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole

record . . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court

are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must

determine whetherthey are legally and logically correct

and whether they find support in the facts set out in

the court’s memorandum of decision . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn.

42, 92, 890 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1197, 126 S.

Ct. 2873, 165 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2006).

A

We first address the defendant’s fourth amendment

argument. The defendant argues that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to suppress because he

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his juvenile

offender fingerprint records released by the FBI, as

conferred by § 54-76l.

4 We disagree.

‘‘The touchstone to determining whether a person

has [the ability] to contest an allegedly illegal search

is whether that person has a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the invaded place. . . . Absent such an

expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications. . . . In order to meet this

[threshold inquiry] . . . a two-part subjective/objective test must be satisfied: (1) whether the [person contesting the search] manifested a subjective expectation

of privacy with respect to [the information searched];

and (2) whether that expectation [is] one that society

would consider reasonable. . . . This determination is

made on a case-by-case basis. . . . Whether a defendant’s actual expectation of privacy . . . is one that

society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves

a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances. . . . Furthermore, [t]he defendant bears the

burden of establishing the facts necessary to demonstrate a basis for standing . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Kalphat, 285 Conn. 367, 374–75,

939 A.2d 1165 (2008).
Section 54-76l controls the confidentiality of youth

offender records. The defendant relies on the part of

the statute that provides, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he records

or other information of a youth . . . including fingerprints, photographs and physical descriptions, shall be

confidential and shall not be open to public inspection

or be disclosed except as provided in this section

. . . .’’5 General Statutes § 54-76l (a). Section 54-76l read

in its entirety, however, does not apply to federal agencies, and therefore does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the defendant’s fingerprint

records held by the FBI.

As a state law, the confidentiality restrictions under

§ 54-76l do not extend to those records held by the FBI

because no language in the statute provides for that

extension. ‘‘When construing a statute . . . we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in

context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Adams, 308 Conn. 263, 270, 63 A.3d 934 (2013).

The text of § 54-76l is not ambiguous as to its applicability to federal agencies. The text explicitly states that

only ‘‘fingerprints . . . submitted to the State Police

Bureau of Identification’’ shall be considered confidential. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54-76l (a).

Nowhere in the text of the statute is there mention of

any applicability to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The defendant has not demonstrated any textual evidence of such, and we therefore decline to read an

ambiguity into the statute. We thus conclude that the

court did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment

rights when it denied his motion to suppress.6

B

We next turn to the defendant’s procedural due process argument.7 The defendant argues that language of

our Supreme Court conferring procedural due process

rights on juvenile offender status; see State v. B.B., 300

Conn. 748, 17 A.3d 30 (2011); State v. Angel C., 245

Conn. 93, 715 A.2d 652 (1998); State v. Matos, 240 Conn.

743, 694 A.2d 775 (1997); results in his having a vested

liberty interest in the confidentiality of his fingerprint

records. The defendant argues that, pursuant to that

liberty interest, procedural due process necessitates
that the police obtain a court order to gain access to

his fingerprint records, as prescribed by § 54-76l. He

also argues that due process required that the police

provide him with notice that his records were being

sought and an opportunity to contest the search. We

find all of these arguments unavailing.

‘‘In reviewing a procedural due process claim, we

must first determine whether a protected liberty or

property interest is involved. If it is, then we must determine the nature and extent of the process due . . . .’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 508, 72 A.3d 367 (2013).

Only if a liberty interest is established, then, ‘‘[w]hether

the defendant’s rights to due process were violated is

governed by the balancing test set forth in Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d

18 (1976).’’ Frauenglass & Associates, LLCv.Enagbare,

149 Conn. App. 103, 110, 88 A.3d 1246 (2014). We conclude that the defendant had no liberty interest in his

juvenile fingerprint records. Our Supreme Court has

noted that ‘‘[a]ny [special treatment] accorded to a juvenile because of his [or her] age with respect to proceedings relative to a criminal offense results from statutory

authority, rather from any inherent or constitutional

right.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. B.B., supra, 300 Conn. 752–53; State

v. Angel C., supra, 245 Conn. 104. The mere mention

of talismanic language such as ‘‘confidentiality,’’ even

when coupled with a procedure for disclosure to the

public, does not create a constitutional right.

Although our Supreme Court has recognized confidentiality from public disclosure as one of the benefits

granted as part of juvenile offender status; see, e.g.,

State v. B.B., supra, 300 Conn. 754; State v. Fernandez,

300 Conn. 104, 123, 12 A.3d 925 (2011); it has never

recognized that a liberty interest exists in maintaining

the confidentiality of fingerprint records. The United

States Supreme Court, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Connecticut

appellate courts have similarly not addressed whether

such an interest exists. Those few other jurisdictions

that have examined the confidentiality of juvenile

records have uniformly rejected the notion of a liberty

interest in those records. See, e.g., United States v.

T.E.S., United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 98-

4423, 1998 WL 774144, *3 (4th Cir. November 6, 1998)

(rejecting procedural due process interest in confidential juvenile records) (decision without published opinion, 165 F.3d 913 [4th Cir. 1998]); United States v. Jiles,

658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied,

455 U.S. 923, 102 S. Ct. 1282, 71 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1982);

Doe v. Madison, Docket No. 3:09-CV-2005 (JCH), 2010

WL 3829186, *7 (D. Conn. September 22, 2010) (same).

We find the analysis set forth in these decisions convincing.
A conferral of confidentiality by statute does not create a liberty interest in the continuity of that confidentiality. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has noted that ‘‘[t]he simple fact that state law

prescribes certain procedures does not mean that the

procedures thereby [ac]quire a federal constitutional

dimension.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) United States v. Jiles, supra, 658 F.2d

200. Section 54-76l, although a ‘‘safeguard . . . helpful

to the state in ensuring that such records [will] not be

released to the general public, [does] not create a [due

process] interest on behalf’’ of the defendant. Id.

This reasoning is particularly compelling, given the

specific procedural due process that our Supreme Court

has provided juvenile offenders. Our Supreme Court

has articulated that only the designation of ‘‘juvenile

offender’’ status was a liberty interest subject to due

process. ‘‘[I]f a statute vests a juvenile with the right

to juvenile status, then that right constitutes a liberty

interest, of which the juvenile may not be deprived

without due process; i.e., notice and a hearing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. B.B., supra, 300

Conn. 753; see also State v. Angel C., supra, 245 Conn.

103–104; State v. Matos, supra, 240 Conn. 749. That

status is expressed in a variety of benefits, including

segregation from other defendants older than age eighteen; General Statutes § 54-76h; more lenient sentencing; General Statutes § 54-76j; determination of

delinquency rather than a criminal conviction; General

Statutes § 54-76k; and erasure of records after the juvenile becomes twenty-one years of age, provided that

he has not been convicted of certain felonies prior to

attaining age twenty-one. General Statutes § 54-76o.

Those cases cited by the defendant speak only to the

termination of all the benefits of being a juvenile in

the criminal justice system, in violation of due process

rights for juveniles set forth by the United States

Supreme Court. See State v. B.B., supra, 753; see also

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16

L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). A due process right that arises

from a person’s status as a juvenile does not translate

automatically to a liberty interest in the confidentiality

of records relating to that juvenile. The defendant’s

procedural due process claim therefore fails.

II

We next address the defendant’s claim that the DNA

sample, taken by buccal swab subsequent to his arrest

but before he was advised of his fifth amendment rights

pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479–80,

86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. E.2d 694 (1966), violated his fifth

amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The

trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress

the results of the DNA sample analysis, finding that the

defendant had consented to the administration of the

swab. We agree that the court properly denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress, but for different

reasons.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. Following the defendant’s arrest on July 15, 2010,

the Bridgeport police served a warrant on him to collect

his fingerprints. At the same time, Kimberly Biehn, a

detective with the Bridgeport Police Department, took

a DNA sample by means of a buccal swab. Biehn testified at a hearing before the court that the defendant

consented to the DNA collection. Biehn utilized two

swabs to collect saliva from the defendant and placed

them within a kit for processing. Following the collection, the defendant signed a form waiving his Miranda

rights. On July 19, 2010, a warrant was prepared to test

the DNA on the defendant’s buccal swab. The swab

was subsequently analyzed and determined to contain

DNA matching the DNA samples taken at the March

28, 2010 and July 11, 2010 crime scenes.

‘‘The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person . . . shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Although the text does not delineate the ways in which

a person might be made a witness against himself . . .

we have long held that the privilege does not protect

a suspect from being compelled by the State to produce

real or physical evidence. . . . Rather, the privilege

protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with

evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.’’

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582,

588–89, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990). The

operative question this court must address is whether

the defendant’s DNA sample is testimonial in nature.

The test for whether an act is testimonial is well

settled. ‘‘[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate

to a factual assertion or disclose information.’’ Doe v.

United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 101 L.

Ed. 2d 184 (1988). We conclude that DNA samples taken

by a buccal swab are not a form of communication, but

rather, a form of physical evidence that is not testimonial in nature.

The defendant’s DNA sample is analogous to a blood

sample, which the United States Supreme Court has

concluded is not communicative or testimonial in

nature. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765, 86

S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). Blood samples are

not considered testimonial because, beyond providing

the blood, a person’s actions or statements are ‘‘irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on [laboratory] analysis and on that alone.’’ Id. Buccal swab

evidence, like ‘‘blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither [the defendant’s] testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by the [defendant]

. . . .’’ Id. We conclude that, in the taking of the defendant’s DNA, ‘‘[n]ot even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the

[defendant] was involved either in the extraction or in

the chemical analysis’’ and the procurement is therefore

not governed by the fifth amendment. Id.

III

The defendant finally claims that the trial court

improperly determined that he had failed to meet his

burden of showing that the warrant affidavit contained

a falsehood or material omission. See Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 171. The defendant claims that,

because the Bridgeport police were aware of the confidentiality restrictions of § 54-76l, they intentionally or

recklessly omitted the restrictions from the warrant

affidavits for seizure of the defendant’s fingerprints and

the multiple warrants for his arrest. Consequently, he

claims that the warrants and all associated evidence—

including the fingerprints and the buccal swab evidence—should have been suppressed. We agree with

the court that the defendant failed to meet his burden

of proof.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. During the preparation of the search warrant for

the defendant’s fingerprints, the arrest warrant, and the

warrant for the examination of the DNA sample on the

buccal swab, the affiant officers included information

about the latent fingerprints and palm prints found at

the July 11, 2010 crime scene. The warrant affidavits

included a statement informing the reviewing court that

the state identification number received from the state

Automated Fingerprint Identification System was tied

to a youthful offender file. The affidavits did not include

language, however, informing the court that the youthful offender files were to be kept confidential under

state statute, but instead, only stated that ‘‘due to the

youthful offender status the Connecticut State Police

Lab, [could not] confirm the identification of [the] individual . . . .’’8

‘‘In Franks v. Delaware, [supra, 438 U.S. 155–56] . . .

the United States Supreme Court held that where the

defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that

a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with

reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the

affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false

statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause,

the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held

at the defendant’s request.’’(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weinberg, 215

Conn. 231, 237, 575 A.2d 1003, cert. denied, 498 U.S.

967, 111 S. Ct. 430, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1990).9

When reviewing a claim pursuant to a Franks hearing,

‘‘the [United States] Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
longstanding rule that there is an underlying presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting

a warrant.’’ State v. Dolphin, 195 Conn. 444, 457, 488

A.2d 812, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 833, 106 S. Ct. 103, 88

L. Ed. 2d 84 (1985). Whether there were falsehoods

or material admissions in a warrant affidavit for the

purposes of a Franks hearing is a ‘‘mixed question of

law and fact that [receives plenary review] on appeal.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Batts, 281

Conn. 682, 696, 916 A.2d 788, cert. denied, 552 U.S.

1047, 128 S. Ct. 667, 169 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2007). ‘‘Not all

omissions . . . even if intentional, will invalidate an

affidavit. . . . In fact, an affiant may omit facts that he

believes to be either immaterial or unsubstantiated.’’

(Citations omitted.) State v. Bergin, 214 Conn. 657, 666,

574 A.2d 164 (1990).

To void a warrant, the defendant is required to demonstrate the ‘‘allegation of perjury or reckless disregard

. . . by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .’’

Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 156. ‘‘[T]he test for

determining whether an affiant’s statements were made

with reckless disregard for the truth is not simply

whether the affiant acknowledged that what he [or she]

reported was true, but whether, viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts

as to the truth of his [or her] statements or had obvious

reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he

[or she] reported.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Thatcher, 71 Conn. App. 516, 526, 802 A.2d 908,

cert. denied, 261 Conn. 940, 808 A.2d 1134 (2002).

During the Franks hearing, the defendant argued that

any mention in the affidavits of the state identification

number associated with him was misleading to the

reader in a way that obfuscated the allegedly illegal

identification process under the confidentiality restrictions of § 54-76l. This argument presupposes that the

defendant’s analysis of the constitutional protections of

§ 54-76l was not only accurate, but that the Bridgeport

Police Department necessarily would have had the clairvoyance to anticipate such an interpretation despite the

fact that our courts had not interpreted such a claim.

Inasmuch as we have rejected the defendant’s interpretation of § 54-76l; see part I of this opinion; we conclude

that the affidavits contained no material omissions or

falsehoods. Moreover, the court is presumed to know

the law, and does not need its inclusion within an affidavit. See State v. Kunick, 141 Conn. App. 288, 295, 61

A.3d 561, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 936, 66 A.3d 498 (2013).

Consequently, the defendant’s claim fails.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The trial court had consolidated three informations against the defendant. In an information dated July 16, 2010, the defendant was charged with

possession of a controlled substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a279 (c); in an information dated July 22, 2010, the defendant was charged

with burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101
(a) (1), aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-70a (a) (1) and home invasion in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-100aa; in an information dated October 17, 2011, the defendant was

charged with burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-101 (a) (3), home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa,

sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70

(a) (1), and robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a134 (a) (3).

2 General Statutes § 54-76l provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The records or

other information of a youth . . . including fingerprints, photographs and

physical descriptions, shall be confidential and shall not be open to public

inspection or be disclosed except as provided in this section, but such

fingerprints, photographs and physical descriptions . . . of a person subsequently adjudged, or subsequently presumed or determined to be eligible

to be adjudged, a youthful offender shall be retained as confidential matter

in the files of the bureau and be opened to inspection only as provided in

this section. . . .

‘‘(b) The records of any such youth, or any part thereof, may be disclosed

to and between individuals and agencies, and employees of such agencies,

providing services directly to the youth . . . .

‘‘(c) The records of any such youth, or any part thereof, may be disclosed

upon order of the court to any person who has a legitimate interest in the

information and is identified in such order. Records orinformation disclosed

pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed. . . .’’

3 The defendant additionally claimed violations of article first, §§ 7 and

8, of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant failed to provide a

separate analysis of his claims under the constitution of Connecticut. We

therefore decline to review those claims. See State v. Geisler, 222 Conn.

672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

4 The defendant does not challenge the disclosure of his fingerprint record

by the state to the FBI. Although the record does not reflect the circumstances under which the FBI received the defendant’s fingerprints, we need

not address the issue because it was not raised as part of the original motion

to suppress or on appeal; see Brown v. Employer’s Reinsurance Corp., 206

Conn. 668, 671 n.3, 539 A.2d 138 (1988); and he specifically disclaimed any

such challenge in oral argument before this court.

5 At the time of the incidents underlying the present case, the statute did

not set forth an exception with respect to the release of records for law

enforcement officials conducting criminal investigations. Following the

defendant’s arrest, § 54-76l (b) was amended by No. 10-180, § 5, of the 2010

Public Acts to exempt law enforcement officials and prosecutorial officials

conducting legitimate criminal investigations from the confidentiality

requirements. As it is not clear that the amendment was designed to apply

retroactively, we view the statute’s language as it applied to the defendant

at the time of his arrest. See State v. Graham, 56 Conn. App. 507, 510, 743

A.2d 1158 (2000).

6 Because we have rejected the defendant’s fourth amendment claim in the

present matter, we need not address his claim that the trial court improperly

determined that the doctrine of inevitable discovery applied to his juvenile records.

7 We note, as pointed out by the state, that it was not clear whether the

defendant was attempting to argue a procedural or substantive due process

claim. Nevertheless, we believe that after examining the arguments before

the trial court that the procedural due process issue was raised and preserved

adequately for appeal, and that the defendant adequately briefed the claim.

8 The full text of each of the three affidavits prepared as part of the

warrants served on the defendant all contain essentially identical language:

‘‘On July 13, 2010 Detective Mark Graham brought the latent fingerprint

lifts to the Connecticut State Police Forensic Lab for further analysis. John

Brunetti of the Connecticut State Police Forensic Lab, a latent print examiner, entered the latent prints into [the] Automated Fingerprint Identification

System (AFIS). An AFIS search resulted in the development of a viable

candidate pertaining to the submissions . . . .

‘‘Bridgeport Detectives were advised that due to the youthful offender

status the Connecticut State Police Lab, cannot confirm the identification

of this individual . . . and they would need a known set of [fingerprints],

and palm prints from this individual to confirm the findings.

‘‘Detectives were informed that the Federal Bureau of [Investigation] is

able to run State ID numbers. Bridgeport Police Captain James Viadero

contacted Special Agent Lisa Skelly of the FBI, and advised her of these
findings. On July 14, 2010, Captain Viadero received a fax from the FBI,

that Connecticut State Police SPBI State ID . . . belongs to [the defendant] . . . .’’

9

In the present case, the state elected to waive the necessary preliminary

showing, and the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on the alleged

Franks violation.