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Filed 2/17/23 P. v. Anamani CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TOTI ANAMANI,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 A163772

(San Francisco City & 

County

Super. Ct. No. 21008826)

Defendant’s postrelease community supervision (PRCS)

was revoked and reinstated in September 2021, and he appeals 

from the trial court’s order extending his PRCS termination date 

373 days beyond the original three-year term. The trial court set 

the new termination date after concluding that defendant’s 

supervision had been tolled for two periods of time (the tolling 

periods). Defendant concedes that PRCS may be tolled when a 

defendant absconds from supervision. (Penal Code1, § 3456, 

subdivision (b).) However, he contends that he was incarcerated 

in Solano County during the tolling periods, and there was no 

basis to toll and extend his PRCS. We find that the trial court 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise stated.
2

did not have a sufficient basis to toll defendant’s PRCS and 

reverse the portion of the court’s order extending defendant’s 

PRCS termination date.

BACKGROUND

After his release from prison, defendant was placed on 

PRCS on October 3, 2018.

On September 9, 2021, the San Francisco Adult Probation

Department (APD) filed a petition to revoke defendant’s PRCS,

alleging that defendant “failed to report upon release from Solano 

County custody,” and “suffered a new arrest on 1/21/21 in 

Fairfield.” The probable cause declaration attached to the

petition stated that, as conditions of his PRCS, defendant was 

required to comply with all instructions from the APD and was 

prohibited from engaging in illegal conduct. According to the 

declaration, defendant violated these conditions as follows: 

“[Defendant] failed to report to this Department upon release 

from Solano County custody. While on warrant status 

[defendant] was arrested in Fairfield, California on 11/18/19. An 

arrest warrant was obtained on 11/20/19. Because the warrant 

appears to have been removed from the system, another warrant 

was obtained on 10/6/20.”

2 The APD recommended that the court 

2 The last two quoted sentences discuss the warrants

obtained from the San Francisco Superior Court on November 20, 

2019, and October 6, 2020. The record does not contain any 

details regarding the other warrant mentioned in the declaration

(i.e., the basis for defendant being “on warrant status” as of 

November 18, 2019).
3

set a new PRCS termination date of June 11, 2023, based on 617 

days that defendant’s supervision had allegedly been tolled.3 

On September 10, 2021, the court held a hearing, appointed 

counsel for defendant, revoked defendant’s PRCS, and continued 

the matter for arraignment. At a subsequent hearing, defendant 

admitted that he was in violation of his PRCS, with the 

prosecutor and defendant stipulating that the “PRCS report 

dated September 8, 2021” served as the factual basis for 

defendant’s admission.4

The court reinstated defendant’s PRCS and continued the

matter for sentencing, directing the parties to submit briefing on

defendant’s PRCS termination date. The prosecutor asked the 

court to adopt the termination date calculated in the PRCS 

report. Defendant argued that he had reached his maximum 

PRCS term. His counsel filed a declaration stating that 

3 The 617 days were broken down into the following three 

periods: May 15, 2019, to May 31, 2019, when defendant’s PRCS 

was revoked for an unrelated PRCS violation; November 20, 

2019, to August 11, 2020, when the first San Francisco warrant 

at issue in this case was outstanding; and October 6, 2020, to 

September 4, 2021, from issuance of the second San Francisco 

warrant to its service.

4 The reporter’s transcript refers to the “PRCS report dated 

September 8th, 2021.” The supervising agency seeking to revoke 

PRCS is required to include, along with the petition, “a written 

report that contains additional information regarding the 

petition, including the relevant terms and conditions of [PRCS], 

the circumstances of the alleged underlying violation, the history 

and background of the violator, and any recommendation.” 

(§ 3455, subd. (a).) This required information is set forth in the

APD’s “Declaration for Probable Cause Hearing,” and this

declaration appears to be the referenced “PRCS report.”
4

defendant had been arrested in Fairfield, California, on 

November 18, 2019, and that he was arraigned in the current 

matter “based on” that arrest. Counsel declared that defendant 

was in custody in Solano County from November 18, 2019, until

his transfer to San Francisco jail on September 4, 2021. 

Defendant argued that, because a person “in the state’s actual 

custody is a status that in no situation can be described as 

absconding,” and because tolling under section 1203.2 could not 

extend a maximum PRCS term, the court should terminate his 

PRCS on its own motion.

The court declined to adopt either proposed PRCS 

termination date. Instead, the court determined that defendant’s 

supervision had been tolled from November 20, 2019, until 

August 11, 2020, and from October 6, 2020, until January 21, 

2021, for a total of 373 days. The court set a PRCS termination 

date of October 10, 2022.5 Defendant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

The Legislature set a maximum three-year term for PRCS. 

(§§ 3455, subd. (e); 3456, subd. (a)(1).) At issue in this appeal is 

whether the trial court properly established the tolling periods 

and set a PRCS termination date of October 10, 2022. Both 

parties agree that time during which a defendant absconds from 

PRCS does not count when calculating a PRCS termination date. 

(§§ 3455, subd. (e); 3456, subd. (b).) However, they disagree 

5 In supplemental briefing requested by this court, the 

parties informed us that defendant’s PRCS was not terminated

on October 10, 2022. Defendant remains on PRCS, so this appeal 

is not moot.
5

about whether defendant absconded during the tolling periods, 

and they also disagree about whether PRCS can be extended 

beyond the maximum term to account for time during which 

supervision is revoked pursuant to section 1203.2. As set forth 

below, we find no basis for the trial court’s tolling.

“A person shall not remain under supervision or in custody 

pursuant to this title on or after three years from the date of the 

person’s initial entry onto [PRCS], except when his or her 

supervision is tolled pursuant to Section 1203.2 or subdivision (b) 

of Section 3456.” (§ 3455, subd. (e); see also § 3456, subd. (a)(1)

[the supervising agency “shall maintain postrelease supervision 

over a person . . . until . . . [¶] . . . the person has been subject to 

postrelease supervision pursuant to this title for three years at 

which time the offender shall be immediately discharged from 

postrelease supervision.”].) However, “[t]ime during which a 

person on postrelease supervision is suspended because the 

person has absconded shall not be credited toward any period of 

postrelease supervision.” (§ 3456, subd. (b).) 

Although the parties disagree over whether a three-year 

maximum PRCS term can be extended to account for time during 

which PRCS is revoked under section 1203.2, subdivision (a), we

need not decide this issue because section 1203.2 was not a basis 

for the trial court’s ruling.

6 Defendant’s PRCS was revoked once 

on May 15, 2019, and reinstated on May 31, 2019, and the court 

6 Defendant discusses tolling under section 1203.2, 

subdivision (a) in his opening brief in “an abundance of caution,” 

while acknowledging that the court did not appear to base its 

tolling decision on that statute. 
6

next revoked his PRCS in September 2021. The trial court 

determined that the tolling periods ran from November 20, 2019, 

until August 11, 2020, and from October 6, 2020, until January 

21, 2021. The tolling periods were thus not based on the court’s

revocation of PRCS under section 1203.2, leaving only the 

question of whether section 3456, subdivision (b) supported the

court’s tolling analysis. 

Because tolling under section 3456, subdivision (b) occurs 

when “the person has absconded,” we must determine the 

meaning of the word “absconded.” As this is a question of 

statutory interpretation, we conduct an independent review of 

the statute. (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166.) “In 

doing so, ‘ “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the 

lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ ” 

(Ibid.) “We begin by examining the words of the statute, 

affording them ‘ “ ‘their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing 

them in their statutory context’ ” ’ [citation], for ‘ “if the statutory 

language is not ambiguous, then . . . the plain meaning of the 

language governs.” ’ ” (People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 

603.) 

Neither party claims that section 3456, subdivision (b) is 

ambiguous, and both parties agree that the plain meaning of the 

word “abscond” governs. “Abscond”—although not defined in the 

Penal Code—has an ordinary meaning of “to depart secretly and 

hide oneself.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2022) 

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abscond> [as of 

February 10, 2023]; cf. People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 
7

610 [quoting the dictionary definition of absconding as 

“depart[ing] secretly and hid[ing] oneself”].) Black’s Law 

Dictionary similarly defines “abscond” as “[t]o depart secretly or 

suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest, prosecution, or service of process.” 

(Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).) The question, then, is 

whether there is sufficient evidence that defendant departed

secretly and hid himself from supervision during the tolling 

periods. (Cf. People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899,

917 [sentencing determinations subject to substantial evidence 

review].) 

Here, the court did not make an express finding that 

defendant absconded from PRCS during the tolling periods, and

we find no support in the record for an implied finding. The APD 

did not allege that defendant absconded in the PRCS revocation 

proceeding, and defendant made no such admission. Instead, the 

PRCS report stated that defendant violated the condition to obey 

all instructions from the APD when, on an unspecified date, he 

“failed to report to this Department upon release from Solano 

County custody.” There is no evidence showing when defendant 

was “release[d] from Solano County custody,” the exact date of 

his missed reporting, or how much time passed between it and 

defendant’s November 18, 2019 arrest. The “program referrals” 

section of the PRCS report indicates that defendant last reported 

on October 31, 2019, but the record does not reveal when 

defendant was required to report after that date. Defense

counsel below declared that defendant was incarcerated in Solano 

County from November 18, 2019, through September 4, 2021 
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(which includes the tolling periods), and the Attorney General 

concedes this fact on appeal. In addition, the record does not 

establish whether the APD was aware or unaware of defendant’s 

whereabouts (although we note that the APD obtained the first 

warrant at issue on November 20, 2019, only two days after 

defendant was arrested in Fairfield). The record thus provides no 

factual basis to conclude that defendant absconded during the 

tolling periods by departing secretly and hiding himself from

supervision.

DISPOSITION

The court’s order extending defendant’s PRCS termination 

date for 373 days to October 10, 2022, is reversed. As defendant’s 

three-year PRCS term has expired, the matter is remanded for 

the trial court to enter an order terminating defendant’s PRCS.

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, ACTING P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.

People v.Anamani (A163772)