### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE June 10, 200 9 S es sio n
RAYMOND CLAY MURRA Y, JR. v. J ES BE ARD
Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 04C1490 W. Dale Y oung, Ju dge

No. E2008-02253-COA- R3-CV - FILED JULY 9, 2009

This is the second appe al in a lega l malprac tice ca se filed by Raym o nd Clay Murray, Jr . (“the Client”) against Jes Beard (“the Attorney” ). In the first appea l, w e aff irmed the T ri al C o u rt ’s sanction aga inst the Attorney for discovery a buse which pr ohibited the Attorney fr om introducing any expe rt testimony at trial. Howeve r, a majority of this Court rever sed the Trial Court’s issuance of a de fault judgment as a further sanction aga inst the Attorney. We also aff irmed the Trial Court’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e a mou nt o f the Clie nt’ s dam a ge s tota le d $16 ,6 97 .3 8. W e re ma nd e d the c a se on the sole issue of liability. On rema nd , b o t h p ar t i es filed motions for summary judgment. The Tria l Co urt gra nte d the Clie nt’ s motio n for su mma ry jud gme nt an d f

ou ndtheAt torne y 1 00 % at f a ult fo r the Clie nt’ s d a ma ge s. Th e Tria l Cou rt the n de nie d the At torne y’ s mot ion fo r s umm ary jud gme nt, found that motion was filed in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P . 11, and aw arde d an additional $1,374.94 in d a ma ge s. Th e At torne y ap pe a ls ra isi ng se ve ra l issu e s. W e a ff ir m the Tria l Co urt’ s ju dg me nt i n all respe cts.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Circuit Court

Affir med; Case Rem anded

D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J., and J OHN W. M C C LARTY , J., joined.

Alan R. Bear d and Jes Bea rd, Chattanooga, T ennesse e, for the Appellant, Je s Beard.

John T. Rice, Chattanooga, T ennesse e, for the Appellee , Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr.A l t hough s om e of t he f oot not es have bee n om i t t ed, any re m ai ni ng foot not es cont ai ned w i t hi n t he quot ed t ext 1

a re in th e o rig in a l.
-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound
This is the second appe al in this legal malprac tice ca se fi led by Raymond Clayton Murra y, Jr. aga inst Jes Beard. Much of the pertinent information was set forth in our Opini on in the first appe al. We quote libera lly from that Opinion : 1

The fa cts perta ining to the underlying case are not in serious dispute. In ea

rly 2003, the Client re tained the Attorney to re prese nt him in an action to modify his c h i l d s u p port obligation. After the Client filed his petition, his former wife , Tina Louise Payne Murra y, fi le d a c ou nter c la im s e e kin g a

c hil d s up po rt

arr e a ra ge wi th i nte re st
u n d er t h e t erms of a

1996 court orde r. Following a trial in the Hamilton County C hance ry Court on S ep t ember 8, 2003, the Cha nc e llo r t oo k th e ma tte r u nd e r a dv ise me nt. The pa rties to the case at bar agree that, following the t rial, the Attorney told the C lient that he would li kely end up paying his former wi f ebetwee n $12,000 and $16,000. With the Client’s permission, t he Attorney e ntere d into settlement discussion s wi t h his former w ife’s attorney, W illiam H. Horton. On October 9, 2003, the Att orney a nd Mr. Ho rt o n ag ree d on the details of a settlement agre ement. Unde r the terms of the agre ement, the Client was to pay Ms. Murr ay $8,000 plus another $2,000 to Mr. Horton t o co v er h is attorney’s f ee. T he Client was to be re s p o nsible for pa ying court costs. Although the parties a llegedly agr eed on the terms of the settlement on Octobe r 9, 2003, an agre ed order

ref lecting the settlement wa s not then entere d.

In the meantime, on October 13, 2003, the Chance llor filed a memorandum opinion announc ing his decision. T h e Attorney contac ted t he Client around 4 p.m. on Oc tober 14, 2003, a nd told the Clie nt, ba se d u po n h is i nit ia l r e vie w o f p a rt of th e op ini on , th a t “ it looked like” unde r the opinion he would have to pa y his former w ife $15,000. During that same c onversation, the A ttorney told the Client that h e, the Attorney, ha d not completely re ad the memor andum opinion.

Th e fo l lowing day, Mr. Bea rd re ceive d a letter

from Mr. Ho rt on , s ta tin g, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:-3- Enclosed is an A gree d Orde r containing the Settlement Offe r you acc epted on October 9, 2003, a s well as a Bill ing Statement detai l ing Ms. Burkhart’s
a tto rn e y’ s f

e e s. If the Or de r m e e ts y our ap pr ov a l, ple a se sig n it a nd re turn it to u s so that w e ma y f ile it with the Court.

Als o , p le a s e f

o r w ar d u s tw o ( 2 ) c h e c k s , o n e in the amount of $8,000 and one in the amount of $2,000 as pr ov id ed for in the Se ttl e me nt andse ndthe c he c k to the Court.

If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to conta ct me.

The Attorney c alled the Client to notify him of the agre ed orde r

. H e d ir e c te d th e Cl ie n t t o d e li v e r th e c h e c k s to M r

. H orton’s of fi c e . T he Clie nt d e liv e re d th e c he c ks a t app ro xim a te ly 1 0:3 0 a .m. on October 15, 2003. At approximate ly 2 p.m., the Attorney ca lled the Client to advise him that he had re viewed the entire me morandum opinion, and that the Chance llor’s ruling was i n t h e C lient’s favor

. The Agr eed O rder

ref l ecting the settlement was filed with the c ourt the following day. . . .

The Client filed this a c ti o nf o r legal malpra ctice on Septe mber 17, 2004, al leging that the Attorney’ s “fa ilure to revie w Chance llor Brown’s Memor an d u m Opinion, fully understand its terms and
c on dit ion s p ri or

to a dv isi ng [the Clie nt] to makin g [si c ] a se ttl e me nt, fa ll [ sic ] b e low the app lic able sta nd ardof c are fo r t

ri a l la wy e rs in Ha mil ton Cou nty .” He fu rthe r a lle ge d th a t the At torne y’ s “ failu re to fully review and compr ehend Cha ncellor Brown ’s M emora ndum Op ini on be fo re e nte ri ng int o a n Agr e e d Or de r se ttl ing the iss ue ” a lso fell below the applicable standard of car e. Af ter the C l ient filed a motion for default, the Attorney filed an answe r on Novemb er 2 2, 20 04 . H e de nie d th a t he wa s g uil ty of ne gli ge nc e in h is
re pr e se ntatio n o f t

he Clie nt.

The C l ient serve d expert interrogatories upon the Attorney, which he f

ailed to answe r. On Jan u ar y 2 5 , 2006, the Client filed a motion to exclude expe rt testimony pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 37, cl a im in g th e A tt o r n e y h a d f a il e d to ti me ly r e s p o n d , o b je c t to, or reque st an extension of tim e to answe r t he expert interr ogatories. The Client requested that the trial court e nter a n order excluding “anyThe t r i al w as l at er c ont i nued t o J une 28, 2006. 2

-4- testimony , refere nce, or

witness, including the defe ndant, on any expert opinion for the trial of Febr uary 3, 2006.” 2
On May 2, 2006, the trial court e ntere d an orde r setting the
case for tria l on June 28, 2006. The A ttorney filed a motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2006. The trial court denie d the motion because it was not filed at lea st sixty days befor e the tria l as require d by Hamilton County C ircuit Court Local Rule 7.08.
Following a hearing on the Client’s motion to exclu de evidenc e, the tria l court ruled that the Attorney c ould not offer expert te sti mon y at tr ia l. Th e or de r e nte re d on thi s ma tte r state s a s f oll ow s:
This matter ca me on to be hea rd fully and f

inally on th e [ 2 7 ] thd a y o f

J u n e 2 0 0 6 u p o n [ th e Cl ie n t]’s Motion to Exclude Evidence

. Th e Cou rt having fo un d th a t [ the At torne y] is
u n w il li n g or unable to comply by producing re sponses to Expert Interrogatories, and the Court f inding the time for responding has expired and the Court further finding that the continuanc e of the case from Februa ry 3, 20 06 to Ju ne 2 8, 20 06 a nd[the At torne y] ha s st ill failed to c omply, it i s theref ore ORDERED that any e xpert testim o n y on behalf of [the Attorne y] shall be e xcluded f rom evidenc e. . . .
The re cord indicates that the Client filed an a mended motion for R u l e 3 7 s anctions at some time bef ore the trial. That docume nt is not in t he rec ord and the date it wa s hear d by the trial court is not identifi ed in the rec ord. Howe ver, the rec ord does indicate that the tr ia l c ou rt se nt a fa x to c ou ns e l on Ju ne27 , 2 00 6, the da y b e fo re tr ia l, statin g th a t the Clie nt’ s motio n wa s g rante d a ndthat th e tr ia l w ou ld be limited to proof of th e C l ient’s damage s. Neither the fax nor an order incorporating the court’s ruling is in the rec ord.

On the mornin g o f t

ri a l, the At torne y f

ile d a motion to
re c on sid e r, a sk ing the tr ia l c ou rt to s e t a sid e the defaul t ju dg me nt. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the Attorney’ s motion to re c o n s id e r o n th e b a s is th a t th e Ru le s o f Ci v il Pr o c e d u r e do not authorize the filing of such a motion. The At torney’s c ounsel thenT he un ders i gn ed f i l ed a s epar at e opi ni on concurr i ng i n part and di s s ent i ng i n part

. Speci f i cal l y, I di s agre ed 3

w i t h t he m aj ori t y’s concl usi on on t he s econd i s s ue t hat t he T r i al Co urt er r ed w hen i t ent er ed t he defa ul t j ud gm ent as to li a b ili ty

. -5-

mov ed to a me ndthe c apti on of that mo tio n to be ide nti fi e d a s a “Motion to A lter or Amend.” The c ourt denied this re quest, stating that the motion was still, in essenc e, a motion to reconsider . The trial court then r eaf

firmed its rul i n g from the pr evious day limiting t he trial to the issue of dama ges. The c ourt asked the Attorney whe ther he wa nte d to (1 ) e mpane l a jury to he ar the Clie nt’ s p ro of of da ma ge s, (2) waive the jury a nd have the court he ar the case , or (3) have the court e nter a n order

for the amount of damage s sought by the Cli ent without requiring him to pr esent any evidenc e. The Attorne y waived the jury trial, and the Client testified as to the damage s he had incurre d as a r esult of t he Attorney’s conduct. The trial court e ntere d a judgment aga inst the Attorney in the a m o u n t of $16,697.38. The Attorney a

ppeals.

Mu rra y v . B e ar d , No. E2006-01661- COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2437971, at *1-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. A ug. 29, 2007), no appl. perm. appeal filed

.

In the fir st appea l, the Attorney raised three issues. The first issue was whe ther the Trial Court er

red w hen it dism issed the Attorney’ s motion for summary judgment because it was not fi le d w ith in 6 0 d a ys of t ri al a s r e qu ir e d b y Ru le 7. 08 of the loc a l rule s o f the Ha mil ton Cou nty Circuit Court. Id ., at *3. We conclude d that the Trial Court did not e rr whe n it dism issed the motion for summary judgment in ac corda nce w ith its local rule

. Id ., at *4.

Th e A tt o r n e y ’ s s e c o n d is s u e w a s w h e th e r th e T r ia l Co u r t e rr e d w h e n it granted a default judgment on the issue of liability as a sanc tion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 37 afte r alre ady having granted a sanction precluding him from introducing e xpert testimony at trial. Id ., at *3. We conclude d that beca

use the Client had fa iled to establish that the Attorney ha d engage d in any new
sa nc tio na ble c on du c t a ft e r the origi na l sa nc tio n pr oh ibi tin g us e of e xp e rt te sti mon y w a s me te d o ut, the Trial Court er

red w hen it enter ed a de fault judgment. Id ., at *6-7. 3

The final issue in the first appea l sur rounded the propriety of t h e $ 1 6 , 697.38 jud gme nt e nte re d a ga ins t th e At torne y b y th e Tria l Co urt. W e a dd re sse d th is i ssu e a s f oll ow s:
Th e pa rt ie s h a d a f

ull he ari ng on the su bje c t of da ma ge s. There fore , the issue of da mages is not an open issue on rema nd. The pe rc e nta ge of

the se da ma ge s to be as se sse d ag a ins t the At torne y w illO b v i o u sl y , i f co m p ara t i v e fa u l t i s n o t an i ssu e o n rem an d , t h e A t t o rn ey w i l l b e li ab l e fo r all o f t h e d am ag es, 4

as s um i ng hi s l i abi l i t y i s s ho w n by a pr epon dera nce of t he evi dence.

A l t hough t he m ot i on f or s anc t i ons doe s not expr es s l y s t at e w het her t he Cl i ent com pl i ed w i t h t he t w ent y- one 5 day sa f e har bo r r ul e f ou nd i n R ul e 11, coun s el f or t he C l i ent affi r m at i vel y r epre s ent ed at o r al argum ent bef ore t he T r i al Cour t t hat he ha d com pl i ed w i t h t he s afe har bor r ul e. The A t t or ney di d not c hal l enge t hi s r epr es ent at i on a t t he hea r i ng. I n hi s br i ef

on a ppea l , t he A t t or ney s t at es t hat t he Cl i ent di d not pr ove t hat he c om pl i ed w i t h t he s afe har bor r ul e. The A tto rn e y d o e s n o t, h o w e v e r, a c tu a lly d e n y th a t th e C lien t c o m p lied w ith th e sa fe h a rb o r ru le

. B e c a u se th e A tto rn e y d id

no t and do es not ac t ual l y den y ei t her at t he t r i al court l evel or on appeal t hat t he sa fe h arbor r ul e had been com pl i ed

w i t h, w e cons i der t hi s i s s ue w ai ved.
-6-

depend upon the degre e of the Attorney’s fault as determined by the trier of fac t.

. . . 4

Th e jud gme nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is v a c a te d. Th is ma tte r i s rema nded fo r a t ri al on t he issue of liability. On rema nd, the trial court’s r uli ng prohibiting the Attorney from introduc ing expert testimon y w il l r e main in f u ll f o r c e a n d e f

f e c t.

. . . ( f

o o tn o te in the original).

Id ., at *7.

On re ma nd , th e Client fi led a mot ion fo r s umm ary jud gme nt. In su pp ort of his mot ion , th e Clie nt atta c he d t he exp ert a ff ida vit of Sa nd ra Bot t ( “ Bot t” ), wh o h a s b e e n li c e ns e d to prac tice law sinc e 1978. Bott stated:

[I] t is my opinion that by failing to read the e ntire Memora ndum Opinion of Chance llor Brown in the underlying case and by dire cting his client to settle the case prior to rea ding the Chance llor’s opinion, the De fe nd a nt f

a ile d to c on fo rm to the sta nd ard of c are app lic able to trial lawye rs in the State of Tennessee

. . . . [I] t is appar ent t hat had the de fe nd a nt r e a d th e e nti re Op ini on he wo uldha ve dis c ov e re d th a t hi s client had no obligati o n t o p ay any monies to his former wife. The De fe nd a nt’ s f

a ilu re to re a d the Me mor a nd um O pin ion in i ts e nti re ty
wa s th e pr ox imate c a us e of the Pla int if

f’ s d a ma ge s.
The Attorne y also filed a motion for summ ary judgment. The Attorney c laimed that even if the fa cts as set forth in the Cli ent’s motion for sum mary judgment we re true , the Client
ne ve rthe le ss h a d n o b a sis for reco ve ry “ be c a us e the c a se ha d b e e n s e ttl e d p ri or to the e ve nts
a lle ge dly giv ing ri se to the ma lpr a c tic e .” Th e Clie nt the n f ile d a mot ion fo r s a nc tio ns pu rs ua nt t o Rule 11 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. The Client claimed that the Attorney’ s motion for summary judgment e xcee ded the sc ope of this Court’s re mand an d violated Rule 11 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. 5T h e C erti ficate o f S erv i ce o n t h e A t t o rn ey ’s resp o n se t o t h e m o t i o n fo r su m m ary j u d g m en t an d t h e re sp o n se 6

t o t he s t at em ent of

undi s put ed m at er i al f ac t s w er e not s i gned.

Even t hough t he f i nal j udgm ent di d not pr ovi de a s pec i f i c dol l ar a m ount of t he j udgm ent , i n l i ght of our 7
p reviou s O p i n i o n i t did n o t ne ed t o be cau se w e rul ed t h at there h ad b een a fu l l he ari n g on da m ag es w h i ch t h e T ri al C o u rt f ound t ot al ed $16, 697. 38. A s quot ed pr evi ous l y, w e s t at ed t hat t he onl y r em ai ni ng i s s ue on r em and w as t he degr ee of th e A tto rn e y ’s fa u lt, if a n y

. -7-

A h e ar in g o n th e c o mp e ti n g mo ti o n s f o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t w a s c o n d u c te d on Dec ember 17, 2007. At the hea ring, the Attorney’ s lead c ounsel was not pre sent and the A ttorney
re qu e ste d a

c on tin uance. The At torne y ma de thi s r e qu e st e ve n th ou gh the At torne y w a s th e on ly signatory to his motion for summ ary judgment. In other words, the Attorney’s le ad counse l did not sign the Attorney’s motion for summary judgme n t

. T h e Trial Court denied the reque st for a continuance . During ora l argument, c ounsel for the Client informed the Tria l Court that he never
re c e ive d th e At torne y’ s r e sp on se to the Clie nt’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud gme nt o r the res po ns e to the Client’s statement of undisputed material fac ts. The Trial Court stated that it believed the 6 Client’s attorney that neither of the re sponses had be en re ceive d. The Trial Court then stated:

Acc ordingly, the Court most respectf ully dis m i sses . . . the Def endant’ s motion for summary j udgment. And t he C ourt finds that the Def endant’ s Motion for Summary Judgment is frivolous.

The Trial Court then grante d the Client’s motion for s ummary judgment and found the Attorney 10 0% lia ble for the Clie nt’ s d a ma ge s. Th e Tria l Co urt a lso gr a nte d th e Clie nt’ s mo tio n f or Rul e 7 11 sanctions. In a ddition to the origi nal j udgment of $16,697.38, the Trial Court awar ded the Client
a jud gme nt t ota lin g $ 1, 37 4. 94 fo r R ule 11 sa nc tio ns , wh ich re pr e se nte d atto rn e y f e e s a ndc os ts incurre d by Client in responding to the Attorney’ s motion for summary judgment. After his moti on to rec onsider wa s denied, the A ttorney filed this appe al ra ising four issues, which we quote:

#1. The Trial Court ab u s ed its discretion in denying the Appellant’s Reque st for continuanc e whe n Appe llant’s counsel failed to appeal to argue the Motion for Summary Ju dg e me nt.

#2 The Trial Court erre d in granting the Appe llee’s Motion for Summary Judgement whe n documents re lied on by the Appellee ’s expe rt in forming her opinions were not attac hed to her a ffidavit i n s u pport of the Motion for Summary Ju dg e me nt a s r e qu ir e d u nd e r Ten nesse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e Rule 56.06.

#3 The Trial Court abused its discretion in re fusing to consider the Ap pe lla nt’ s Mo tio n f or Sum mary Ju dg e me nt o r h is
re sp on se to the Ap pe lle e ’s Mo tio n f or Sum mary Ju dg me nt.-8- #4 The Trial Court abused its discreti o n i n granting Appe llee’s Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions against the A p p ellant for Ap pe lla nt’ s Mo tio n f

or Sum mary Ju dg e me nt.

Discussion

We f irst addre ss whether the Trial Court err ed when it failed to grant the Attorney’s motion for a continuance . In Sanjines v. Ortwein and Assocs., Inc, , 984 S.W.2d 907 (Tenn. 1998) , our Supreme Court e xplained that a trial court’s decision to gr ant or deny a re quest for a continuance is a matter:

entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Blake v . Plus

Mark, I nc. , 952 S.W.2d 41 3 , 415 (Tenn. 1997) . An appe llate court cannot int er fe re with the trial court’ s decision unless such de cision
c on sti tut e s a n a

bu se of dis c re tio n a nd cau se s p re jud ic e to the pa

rt y seeking the stay or c ontinuance. Id .; se e als o R ac he ls v . S te e le , 633 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. A pp. 1981).
Sanjines , 984 S.W.2d at 909.

Our S upreme Court further discussed t he abuse of discre tion standard in Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) , stating:

Under the abuse of discre tion stan d ar d , a trial c ourt’s ruling

“ wi ll be up held so lon g a s r e a so na ble min ds c a n d isa gr e e a s to propriety of the de cision made.” Sta te v . S c ott , 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Ten n. 20 00 ); State v. Gilliland , 22 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tenn. 2000)

. A trial court abuses its discretion only w hen it “ applie[s] an incor rec t legal standa

rd, or r eac he[s] a dec ision which is against logic or
rea soning that cause[ s] an injustice to the pa rty complaining.” Sta te v. Shirley , 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999) . The a buse of discr etion standard doe s not permit the appellate court to substitut e it s judgment for that of the trial court. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998)

. Eldridge , 42 S.W.3d at 85.

Th e re we re se ve ra l re a so ns wh y the Tria l Co urt r e fu se d to gr a nt a c on tin ua nc e . Fi rs t, t h e At t o rn ey ’s lead c ounsel neve r apprised the Tria l Court that he would be unable to attend the hearing and why h e would be a bsent. More important, howe ver, is the f act that the A ttorney’s motion for summary judgment was signed only by the Attorne y himself. The Attorne y was pre sent at the hea

r in g a n d c e r tain ly w a s ab le to ar g u e th e mo ti o n th a t h e h a d p r e p ar e d a n d f il e d. The Attorney ha d made the de cision to be one of his attor n ey s o f re cord, a nd we f ind no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court when it trea ted hi m as such. Based on these fac ts, we ca nnot conclude-9-

that th e Tria l Cou rt in a ny way abu se d its dis c re tio n w he n it re fu se d to gr a nt the At torne y’ s r e qu e st for a continuance

.

The next issue is the Attorney’s claim that the Client’s motion for summary judgment should have be en denie d beca use the “ documents re lied on by the Appellee’s expert i n forming her opinions we re n o t attache d to her a ffidavit in support of the Motion for Summary Judge ment as
re qu ir e d u nd e r T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f Civi l Pr oc e du re Rul e 56 .0 6. ” Th e do c ume nts the At torne y is ref erring to are the Chance llor’s initial memorandum opinion and this Court’s first opinion, both of which, obviously, were in the Trial Court’s file.

Intere stingly, t he Attorne y filed his own affidavit in response to the Client’s motion for summary judgment. In his aff idavit, the Att orney refe rs t o these same two documents, but they
are not attache d to his a ffidavit either. More importantly, we can f ind nowhere in the rec ord whe re the Attorney brin g s t h i s al leged de ficienc y to the Trial Court’s attention. In his re sponse to the Clie nt’ s mo tio n f

or su mmary ju dg me nt, the At torne y ma ke s n o me nti on of

the fa c t th a t th e se documents we re not attached to Bott’s aff idavit. Likewise, the Attorne y made a bsolutely no
re fe re nc e to this a lle ge d d e fi c ie nc y at th e he ari ng on the mot ion fo r su mma ry jud gme nt. Be c a us e this iss ue wa s raised f

or the first time on appea l, we conside r it waived. See Crossley Const. Corp.
v . Na t. Fire In s. Co. of H

ar tfo rd , 237 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) w here in we stated:

Ex c e p t f o r s o me li mi te d e x c e p ti o n s n o t ap p li c ab le h e r e , we will not consider issues, let alone c laims, raised for the first time on appea l. See City of Cookeville ex rel. Cookev ille Reg’l Me d. Ctr. v. Humphrey , 126 S.W.3d 897, 905-06 (Te nn. 2004) (noting the gene ral rule that “ questions not raised in t he trial court will not be entertained on appea l.” (quoting Lawr e nc e v . S tan

for d , 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) ). . . .

Th e At torney’s thi rdiss ue is h is c la im that th e Tria l Co urt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in ref using to consider the Attorne y’s motion for summary judgment or the Attorney’s r esponse to the Clie nt’ s mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud gme nt. De sp ite ho w this iss ue is p hr a se d b y th e At torne y, in h is brief w hat the Attorne y argue s is that the Trial Court err ed in de n y i n g h i s m o t ion for summary judgment and gra nting the Cli ent’s mot ion. In a rece nt Supreme Court opinion, the Court granted permission to appea l in order “ to provide further guida n ce re g arding the application of summary judgment in this S tate.” Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. , 271 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Tenn. 2008) . The Cou rt state d a s f

oll ow s: The moving party is entitled t o s u m m ary judgment only if the “plea dings, depositions, answers t o interrogatories, and a dmissions
on file, together with the aff idavits ... show that there is n o g en uine iss ue a s to a ny ma te ri a l f

a c t a ndthat th e mov ing pa rty is ent itl e d to
a jud gme nt a s a

ma tte r o f l a w. ” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; accor d Penley v. Honda Motor Co. , 31 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 2000) . The moving party h as the ultimate burde n of per suading the court that the re are no ge nu ine iss ue s o f ma te ri a l f a c t a ndthat th e mov ing pa rt y-10- is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. By rd

v . H all , 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)

. Acc ordingly, a properly s upported motion for summary judgment m u s t show that there are no genuine issues of
ma te ri a l f a c t a n d t h a t t h e m o v i n g p ar t y i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t a s a matter of law. See Staples v . CBL & Ass ocs., Inc

. , 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; McCarley v. W. Q uality Food Serv. , 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1 9 9 8 ). If the moving party fa ils to m ake this showing, the n “ th en o n

- m o v an t ’ s b u r d e nt o p ro du c e e ith e r s up po rt ing a ff ida vit s or discovery materia ls is not t riggere d and the motion for summary judg m en t fails.” McCarley , 9 60 S.W .2 d at 58 8; accord Staples , 15 S.W.3d at 88.
The moving party may ma k e the r equire d showing and there fore shift the burd en o f production to the nonmoving party by either: (1) aff

irmatively nega ting an essential ele ment of the
no nmo vin g p art y’ s c la im; or (2 ) s howi ng that th e no nmo vin g p art y cannot pr ove an e ssential element of the claim at t ri al. Hannan v. Alltel Publ'

g Co. , 2 70 S.W .3 d 1 , 5 (T e nn . 2 00 8) ; see also Mc Carley , 96 0 S.W .2 d at 58 8; By rd , 8 4 7 S. W

. 2 d a t 2 1 5 n

. 5

. Bo thme th o ds
re qu ir e so me thi ng mor e than a n a sse rt ion tha t th e no nm ov ing pa

rt y has no evide nce. Byrd , 847 S.W.2d at 215. Simil arly, the prese ntation of evidenc e t h at ra ises doubts about the nonmoving pa rt y’ s a bil ity to pr ov e his or

he r c la im i s a lso ins uf fi c ie nt. McCarley , 960 S.W.2d at 588. The moving party must either pr oduce evidenc e or ref

er to e vidence previously submitted by the nonmoving party that ne gates a n essential el ement of the nonmoving party’s claim or shows that the nonmoving party cannot prove an esse ntial el ement of the claim at trial. Hannan , 2 7 0 S. W

. 3 d a t 5

. We ha ve he ld that to ne gate a n e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t he c la im, the mov ing pa

rt y must point to ev i d ence that tends to disprove a n essential fa ctual claim made by the nonmoving party. Se e Bl air v . W . To wn M all , 130 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tenn. 2004)

. If the moving party is unable to make the re qu ir e d s ho wi ng , the n it s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud gme nt w ill fail. By rd , 847 S.W.2d at 215.
If the moving party makes a pr operly supporte d motion, then the no nmo vin g p art y is re qu ir e d to pr od uc e e vid e nc e of sp e c if ic fa c ts establishing that genuine issues of mate rial fa ct exist. McCarley , 960 S.W .2 d at 58 8; By rd , 847 S.W.2d at 215. The nonmovi ng party may satisfy its burden of pr oduction by:
(1) pointing to e vidence establishing material fa ctual disputes that were over- looked or ignore d by the moving party; (2) rehabilitating the evidenc e attac ked by the mo v i n g party; (3) producing a dditionalN o i s s ue i s ra i s ed a s t o w het her t hi s af f i davi t s i m pl y di s cus s ed f ac t s or w het her i t s et f or t h a n e xper t opi ni on 8
i n vi ol at i on of

t he di s cove r y s anc t i on.
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evidenc e esta

blishing t he existence of a ge nuine issue for tria l; or (4) submitting an a ffidavit expla ining the
ne c e ssi ty f

or fu rthe r d isc ov e ry pu rsuan t to Te nn . R. Civ. P ., Rule 56.06.
McCarley , 9 60 S.W .2 d a t 58 8; ac c or d B y rd , 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.6. The nonmoving party’ s evidenc e must be ac cepte d as true, and any doubts conce rning t h e exis tence of a ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct shall be re solved i n fa v o r of the nonmoving party. McCarley , 960 S.W .2 d at 58 8. “ A dis pu te d fa c t is ma te ri a l if it mus t be de c ide d in order to resolve the substantive c laim or defe nse at whic h the motion is d ir e c te d.” By rd , 8 47 S.W .2 d a t 21 5. A d isp ute d f a c t pr e se nts a genuine issue if “a re asonable jury could legitimately resolve that fac t in favor of

one side or the other.” Id

.
Be c a us e the re so lut ion of a mot ion fo r su mma ry jud gme nt i s a matter of law, we revie w the trial court’s judgment de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Bl air , 130 S.W.3d at 763. In addition,
we are re qu ir e d to re vie w the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the nonmoving pa

rty and to dra w all re asonable infere nces f avoring the nonmoving party. Staples , 15 S.W.3d at 89.

Ma rti n , 271 S.W.3d at 83-84.

In our f irst Opinion in thi s case , we a ffirme d the Trial Court’s sanction prohibiting the Attorney f

rom prese nting any testimony from experts. We r emande d the ca se to the Tria l Court solely for a

determination of the degre e, if a ny, of the Attorne y’s liability, having found that there ha d a lr e a dy be e n a

fu ll a ndfair he ari ng on da ma ge s. On re ma nd , the Clie nt fi le d the e xp e rt a ff ida vit of Bott who stated that the Attorney’s conduct fell below the appropriate standard of car e and wa s the pr ox imate c a us e of

the Clie nt’ s da ma ge s. Th e At torne y did no t (and c ou ld n ot) fi le a n a ff ida vit addre ssing w h e th e r h is c o n d u c t a t is s u e f e ll b e lo w th e s tan d a

r d o f c ar e

. I n s te a d , h e f

il e d his own aff idavi t s i m p l y s t at ing that a settlement had be en re ache d prior to the allege d malprac tice. The 8 issue of whether or not a settl ement had been rea ched doe s not directly addr ess the issue of w hether the Attorney’ s conduct fe ll below the ac cepted s t an d ar d o f ca re. Rathe r, it conce rns whethe r the Client suffere d any dama ges as a result of the malpra ctice. W e, howe ver, ha d fore closed the issue of dama ges in our first Opinion whe n we state d:

Th e pa rt ie s h a d a

full he ari ng on the su bje c t of da ma ge s. There fore , the issue of damages is not an open is sue on remand . The pe rc e nta ge of

the se da ma ge s to be as se sse d ag a ins t the At torne y w ill-12- depend upon the degre e of the Attorney’s fault as determined by the trier of fac t.

M u r r ay , 2 0 0 7 WL 2437971, at *7 (emphasis adde d). In a footnote we went on to explain: “Obviously, if comparative fault is not an is sue on remand, the Attorney will be liable for all of the da ma ge s, as s u ming his l iability is shown by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e.” Id. , at *7 n.5 (empha sis added).

The a ffidavit filed by the Attorne y does not put liabilit y or compa rative f ault at issue as the a ffidavit could not be consi dere d as expe rt testimony and is, theref ore, r eleva nt only to the issue of the a mount of the d am ag es, an issue c onclusively resolve d in our first Opinion. The
un dis pu te d mate ri a l f

a c ts de mon str a te that th e Clie nt’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud gme nt w a s p ro pe rl y su pp orte d b y th e e xp e rt

a ff id avi t of Bott w hic h e sta bli sh e d th a t: ( 1) the At torne y’ s c on du c t f e ll below the a

ppropriate standard of car e; and (2) the Attorney’s conduct was the proxim ate c ause of the C l i e n t ’ s d a m a g e s

. T h i s p r o o f w e n tu n c h a l l e n g e d

. T h e A t t o r n e y d i d n o t h i n g t o p l a c e l i a bil ity or compa rative f ault at issue. Ther efor e, per the clea r langua ge in our first Opinion, “ the Attorney will be liable for a ll of the damage s” beca use liability has been established by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Id. Acc ordingly, the Trial Court corr ectly gra nted the Client’s motion for summary jud gme nt.

The fina l issue is whether the T rial Court corr ectly gra nted the Client’s motion for Rul e 11 sa nc tio ns . T e nn . R. Civ . P. 11 .0 2 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: By presenting to the court (whethe r by signing, filing, submitting, or later a dvocating) a

pleading, written motion, o r o ther pa per, a n attorney o r unre prese nted party is certifying that to the best of the person’ s knowledge, information, and belief , formed a fter an inquiry
rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s,- (1) it is not being prese nted for any improper purpose, such as to hara ss or to cause unnece ssary de lay or ne edless incr ease in the cost of litigation;
(2 ) the c la ims , d e fe ns e s, and oth e r l e ga l c on te nti on s th e re in
are war rante d by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or rever sal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other fac tual contentions h ave evidentiary support or, if spec ifically so identified, a re likely to have evidentiary support afte r a r easona ble opportun i t y for f

urther investigation or discovery; a ndThe At t or ney does not c hal l enge t he am ount of da m age s a w ar ded under Rul e 11. 9

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(4) the de nial of factua l contentions are war rante d on the evidenc e o r, if specif

ically so identified, ar e re asonably ba sed on a lack of information or be lief.

If ther e i s a v i o l at ion of this Rul e, a c ourt is authorize d to impose sanctions which may include attorney f ees a nd other e xpenses. See Rule 11.03(2).

Th is c ou rt revi e ws the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to i mpo se sanctions under

an abuse of discre tion sta n d ar d , An dre ws v . B ibl e , 81 2 S. W .2 d 2 84 (Ten n. 19 91 ), a ndthe tr ia l ju dg e ’s de c isi on is entitled to great weight on appea l. Krug v. Krug , 838 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Sti ga ll v . Ly le , 119 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

The Trial Court f

ound that the whole purpose of the Attorne y’s motion for summary judgment was to contest the issue of damage s, which, as state d numerous ti m es al re ad y , was fore closed by this Court’s first Opinion. There fore , the Trial Court f ound that the Attorney’s motion for summary judgment wa s frivolous and filed in violation of Rule 11. We agre e that the Attorne y’s motion for summary judgment did not address the one rema ining issue on remand, i.e., the Attorn ey ’s l i ab i l ity. Because the Attorney’s motion for summary had no re asonable chanc e of
succe ss, we cannot c onclude that the finding of a Rule 11 violation wa s an abuse of discretion, and that finding must be affirmed. 9

Th e on ly i ssu e raise d by the Clie nt i s a re qu e st f or a tto rn e y f

e e s in c ur re d o n a pp e a l. Ex e rc isi ng ou r d isc re tio n, we de c lin e to a wa rda ny a tto rn e y f

e e s in c ur re d o n a pp e a l.

Conclusion

Th e jud gme nt o f the Tria l Co urt is a ff ir me d a ndthi s c a us e is re ma nd e d to the Cir c uit Court for Ha milton C ounty solely for collec tion of the costs below. Costs on appeal ar e taxe d to the Appellant, Jes Bea

rd, and his sure ty, for which e xecution may issue, if ne cessa ry.

__________________________________ D. MICHAEL SWI NEY, JUDG E