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i 

20–821 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–134] 

NAVAL DOMINANCE IN 

UNDERSEA WARFARE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 14, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

JODI BRIGNOLA, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 1 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Jabaley, RADM Michael E., USN, Program Executive Officer for Submarines . 5 

Richard, RADM Charles A., USN, Director, Undersea Warfare Division (N97) 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 31 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 29 

Richard, RADM Charles A., joint with RADM Michael E. Jabaley ............. 34 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

FY16 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan chart ........................................................... 53 

FY17 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan (Draft) chart .............................................. 54 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 57 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 63 

Mrs. Walorski ................................................................................................... 61 

(1) 

NAVAL DOMINANCE IN UNDERSEA WARFARE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 14, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. We want to thank our witnesses for being with us 

today. And as you probably know, they have concluded votes so we 

probably will have a limited number of members. Limited meaning 

probably Mr. Courtney and I. But these hearings are important not 

for the members that are here but for the transcript that is made. 

So this is an important hearing for us. 

And we certainly appreciate both of you gentlemen, one, your 

service to our country, but also your willingness to be here with us 

today. 

I am going to be very brief and submit my opening remarks for 

the record. But I just want to point out that we have with us today 

two very distinguished gentlemen: Rear Admiral Charles A. Richard of the United States Navy. He is the Director of Undersea Warfare Division (N97). And also, Admiral, we understand that you 

have been nominated for your third star and we look forward to 

your service that you will be doing continuing for the United States 

Navy. 

And also Rear Admiral Michael E. Jabaley, who is the Program 

Executive Officer for Submarines. And, Admiral, we thank you for 

your service and for being here. 

And with that, I am going to yield to my good friend, the ranking 

member, Mr. Courtney. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. And again, thank you for 

your great work on this subcommittee. 

Again, in the interest of moving along, I am going to also ask 

that my written remarks be entered for the record. 
2 

You know, just to briefly summarize, both of these witnesses are, 

you know, perfect voices in terms of the questions that I think the 

subcommittee wants to explore this afternoon. As we had a discussion today at the conference committee, this subcommittee, I think, 

has a pretty strong record in terms of being able to sort of move 

the process along for the undersea fleet over the last 6 or 7 years, 

with the plus-up to the Virginia program, helping the Virginia Payload Module really also get off the ground, as well as promoting the 

National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which, you know, Randy and 

I are convinced is really not just a way of sort of avoiding, you 

know, budget problems for shipbuilding, but also giving tools to the 

navies and the shipbuilders to maximize efficiencies and, again, 

bring every cent of resource to, again, a priority that I think Admiral Richardson called fundamental or foundational to our national 

defense. 

So again, we look forward to your testimony, as Randy said. I 

think we will make a good record. 

There are a couple of members that did say they still intended 

to pop in. So again, welcome and thank you for your great service. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. FORBES. And I want to compliment Mr. Courtney for his 

work on this hearing. This was something that was important to 

him and helped direct the tenor of it and where we are going. So, 

Joe, thank you for your work in this entire area. 

And with that, Admiral Richard, we are going to look to you, and 

we welcome any comments that you might make. Both of you, we 

will submit your written statements for the record. 

And with that, Admiral, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF RADM CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, DIRECTOR, 

UNDERSEA WARFARE DIVISION (N97) 

Admiral RICHARD. So, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, members, and staff, thank you for the invitation to speak here 

today on the undersea roadmap. 

My name is Rear Admiral Charles Richard, Director, Undersea 

Warfare. I have submitted my full statement to the committee, 

which I now ask be made a part of the hearing record, and I would 

like to give a brief opening statement. 

But before I begin, I would like to thank this committee for the 

tremendous support you have provided, that you just alluded to, to 

the entire submarine community in recent years. Without that support, the success we have achieved in the undersea domain would 

not have been possible. 

The undersea forces of the United States Navy provide significant, unique capabilities to the fleet and to the joint force commanders: Persistent, undetected, assured, far-forward access, and 

the influence that access provides. Should it be necessary, these 

forces can also attack at a time and place of our choosing to maximize the desired effects and minimize the risk to American lives. 

The Chief of Naval Operations’ top priority continues to be to 

maintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic deterrent 

triad because it is foundational to our survival as a nation. As you 

can see on the first chart, the one to the left, this requires a force 
3 

of no smaller than 10 operational ballistic missile submarines. To 

do that, we must procure 12 Ohio replacement SSBNs [nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines], no less, to provide this force 

and we must start in fiscal year 2021. The first Ohio replacement 

must be on patrol by fiscal year 2031. There is no margin left to 

further extend the Ohios [Ohio-class submarines]. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

Admiral RICHARD. Now more broadly, we will employ a domaincentric system of systems approach to maintain undersea warfare 

superiority in the future, with submarines as a premier node in 

that system. This will enable a truly disaggregated warfighting approach. The demand from our operational commanders for this capability is strong and growing. Our combatant commanders are 

unanimous in their desire for significantly more attack submarine 

presence than we can provide. 

However, while a demand for submarines is strong, the submarine force structure will get worse before it gets better, as you 

can see on the second chart, the one to the right. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Admiral RICHARD. This decline is not the result of some recent 

decision, it is the consequence of budget decisions taken over not 

just years, but decades. The undersea forces have pulled all reasonable levers to address this issue and will continue to investigate potentially effective ways to improve the presence of our limited number of SSNs [attack submarines] during the shortfall time period. 

But it bears noting that while most of the measures taken will increase SSN forward peacetime presence, none of them increase the 

number of SSNs available to surge in the event of conflict. 

The only solution to inadequate surge capacity is to build more 

attack submarines. One potential option available that we continue 

to explore is procuring a second Virginia-class submarine in fiscal 

year 2021. We will shift to the chart. 

Our industrial base can build this ship. If built, the second fiscal 

year 2021 Virginia-class submarine would fill about 27 percent of 

the late 2020s attack submarine shortfall. It is a matter of resources and we are placing a high priority to address that challenge. 

The Navy is reexamining the requirement for the minimum number of fast attack submarines as a part of an overall Force Structure Assessment. The current requirement is 48, but that was developed over a decade ago in a much different strategic landscape. 

Many of the underlying assumptions in the 2006 work have 

changed and it may result in the requirement going up. This is a 

consequence of returning to a time of major power competition between recognized states. 

Rear Admiral Jabaley and I are here today to provide an update 

on our plan to provide as much of the necessary future undersea 

capability and capacity available within constraints. The following 

are key interlocking pieces that represent the backbone of the 

Navy’s lean integrated undersea investment strategy. 

First, it is mandatory that we sustain our survivable sea-based 

nuclear deterrent with at least the same level of at-sea presence as 

today. This is priority number one and underpins all other facets 

of our strategy. 
4 

Two, all three submarine types go through large drops between 

2025 and 2030 that are beyond fiscal and shipyard capacity to address. SSN procurement must be our second priority, as dictated by 

the force structure trough, also with an undersea strike capacity 

shortage between 2025 and 2030 caused by the decommissioning of 

the guided-missile submarines. Beginning with the second Block V 

Virginia-class submarine, all follow-on ships will include a fourmissile tube Virginia Payload Module [VPM]. But even with the incorporation of VPM, the loss in undersea strike capacity will only 

be partially regained by 2044. 

Three, as the SSN force structure gets smaller and the importance of its unique forward access grows, additional payloads are 

likely to be needed and employed. We have efforts underway to add 

new missile, torpedo, unmanned, and sensing capabilities to the 

force. We thank this committee and Congress for the support that 

has enabled many of these payloads, such as some unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned undersea vehicles, to already begin to 

enter the fleet. 

Four, the smaller SSN force structure will require each boat to 

cover more physical territory and a wider array of new undersea 

targets and deliver an expanded set of capabilities that span the 

spectrum of military operations. The Navy appreciates the work 

the committee and the Congress have done to assure that we efficiently and effectively restart the production line for our heavyweight torpedoes and also to improve the next generation of future 

torpedo and missile capabilities. 

And finally, we will maintain our focus on the acoustic spectrum, 

but explore opportunities and challenges in emerging aspects of the 

environment. The future undersea force must build on the advances of the acoustic superiority program and maintain our momentum, but must also master challenging environments, such as 

electromagnetic maneuver warfare and cyberspace. A critical enabling technology we must pursue is Low Probability of Intercept, 

Low Probability of Detection Communications. 

The United States is fortunate to have what is by any objective 

measure the finest undersea force in the world. We face significant 

challenges to maintaining our undersea superiority, but we understand the challenges and are executing a realistic and economically 

feasible plan to address them. 

And then finally, I am excited to be a submariner in the Navy 

today. The men and women who are operating today and will operate in the future are some of the best and brightest and operate 

some of the most advanced pieces of military machinery at the far 

reaches of the world. 

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you 

today. And I would like to yield to Rear Admiral Jabaley so that 

he may make his statement, and then be happy to answer questions afterwards. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Richard and Admiral 

Jabaley can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral Richard. 

Admiral Jabaley, we are glad to have you here and look forward 

to your comments. 
5 

STATEMENT OF RADM MICHAEL E. JABALEY, USN, PROGRAM 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR SUBMARINES 

Admiral JABALEY. Good afternoon Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member Courtney, and members of the committee. My name is 

Rear Admiral Michael Jabaley, I am Program Executive Officer for 

Submarines. 

It is an honor and privilege to testify before this subcommittee 

today, and I would like to thank you for your long and unwavering 

support of our Nation’s undersea warfare programs. 

We are entering an especially dynamic period of undersea force 

development that I am excited to discuss today. I have submitted 

my full statement to the committee, which I ask be made part of 

the hearing record, and I will now make a brief opening statement. 

Admiral Richard discussed the Navy’s number one priority, the 

Ohio replacement SSBN. To expand on the criticality of the timing 

requirement for delivery of the first Ohio replacement, remember 

that the Navy has stretched our current fleet of Ohio-class SSBNs 

by extending the ship’s life from 30 to 42 years. However, it cannot 

be extended any further. The result is that our current fleet of 

Ohio-class submarines will begin retiring at one per year starting 

in fiscal year 2027. The Navy can wait no longer to replace this 

critical asset. 

As a result, in addition to the roughly $700 million in RDT&E 

[research, development, test, and evaluation] funding, this is the 

first year that the Navy has requested SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] advance procurement [AP] funding, $773 million for 

fiscal year 2017, to begin construction of the first ship in 2021. This 

AP funding will be used to complete the detail design of the ship. 

Stable funding is necessary to achieve delivery by 2028 and patrol 

by 2031. 

On cost, the Navy takes its stewardship of taxpayer funds for 

this program very seriously. The Ohio Replacement Program effort 

began, first and foremost, with establishing the right requirements 

for the program. 2015 saw the completion of a number of significant benchmarks in the program’s life cycle. In August 2015, the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, or JROC, validated the 

Ohio Replacement Capabilities Development Document defining 

the authoritative, measurable, and testable capabilities needed to 

perform the mission. The program also went through the Navy’s 

Gate 4 review process this past November, ensuring the proper 

requirements are in place and establishing the program’s technical 

baseline. 

Controlling that technical baseline going forward is equally critical in ensuring program success and diminishing the potential for 

cost overruns in the future. The Ohio Replacement Program has instituted formal and rigorous change control in management of the 

program’s technical baseline to ensure that the platform requirements are maintained and controlled at the appropriate level. 

Presently, the program is preparing for the Navy Gate 5 review 

and the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board in August. Following those events, I would be happy to provide the committee an 

updated cost estimate for the program. 

As this subcommittee is well aware, the Navy’s greatest challenge is to replace the current fleet of SSBNs, while rigorously con-
6 

trolling cost to allow continued shipbuilding of other classes, both 

surface ship and submarine, in accordance with the Navy’s 30-year 

shipbuilding plan. 

While the Ohio Replacement Program clearly requires a significant funding effort, increasing ship procurement funding for SSBN 

recapitalization is historically consistent with the ‘‘41 For Freedom’’ 

and Ohio-class procurement periods. During these years, ship pro- curement funding was increased $5 billion to $7 billion per year, 

adjusted for inflation, compared to all other post-Korean war years. 

We appreciate the subcommittee’s special interest in this matter. 

One method of controlling and even reducing cost is through the 

use of innovative acquisition and contracting strategies. The Navy 

would like to thank the subcommittee for including continuous production authority for Ohio replacement in the House version of the 

fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. This authority 

would play a key part in reducing schedule risk for both the U.S. 

and the U.K. [United Kingdom] SSBN missile tube construction 

programs, as the missile compartment projects to be a critical path 

in the construction timeline. 

In addition to schedule risk reduction, continuous production authority will assist the program in achieving maximum economic advantage. Procuring high-volume, high-value components such as 

missile tubes in continuous production lines will provide savings 

opportunities through manufacturing efficiency, increased learning, 

and the retention of critical production skills. 

On the attack submarine, the Navy continues to deliver Virginia- class submarines ahead of schedule and within budget. The program has been delivering ships for 11 years now with 12 delivered, 

11 under construction, and 5 more under contract. Over the program’s duration and with this subcommittee’s assistance, we have 

cut construction span by 2 years and achieved significant savings 

through the use of multiyear procurement contracts with advanced 

procurement and economic order quantity funding, effectively allowing the Navy to purchase 10 subs for the price of 9 in our most 

recent Block IV construction contract. 

Our budget request this year includes advance procurement 

funding for long-lead-time material for the first ships of Block V, 

and we are committed to identifying further savings. As Admiral 

Richard stated, since the Navy will fall below the force structure 

requirement of 48 attack submarines in the late 2020s, it is critical 

that we continue to deliver Virginia submarines ahead of schedule 

and within contract cost at a pace of two per year for as long as 

fiscally possible. The second Virginia in fiscal year 2021 would, in 

particular, be the most valuable addition to the shipbuilding plan 

as it would deliver just as the Navy starts to fall below the 48 SSN 

requirement and will be in service for the entire remainder of the 

trough. 

The technology for the Virginia-class program has evolved dynamically over the span of the program, most recently with the addition of the VPM in Block V. As Admiral Richard discussed, the 

VPM concept was introduced to address the eventual loss of guided 

missile strike capability in the mid-2020s when the Navy’s four 

SSGNs [nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines] retire, reducing Navy-wide undersea strike volume by almost two-thirds. 
7 

VPM is the optimal material solution to recapitalize undersea 

strike without substantially changing a mature and stable submarine design. VPM provides Virginia-class submarines with a 

greater than three times increase in payload capacity at less than 

15 percent cost increase per SSN. VPM is currently planned for introduction starting with the second Block V ship in fiscal year 2019 

and will be integral to the remainder of the Virginia-class submarine build, resulting in a total of 19 Virginia-class submarines 

with this additional payload capacity. 

A final major technical development in Virginia-class submarines 

is acoustic superiority, the first significant capability improvement 

in Virginia arrays or coatings since its initial design. This initiative 

is in accordance with the Chief of Naval Operations’ undersea 

dominance mandate to pace the future threat. This program guarantees our submarines acoustic superiority in the undersea domain 

through the mid-century. The South Dakota Insertion Program will 

serve as technology demonstrator for acoustic superiority when this 

technology is outfitted on USS South Dakota in 2018. 

As the shipbuilders continue producing two Virginia-class submarines per year, along with the introduction of Ohio replacement 

[OR] and Virginia Payload Module and acoustics superiority, there 

will undoubtedly be a significant increase to the workload of the 

nuclear shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy has developed the 

optimal Submarine Unified Build Strategy for concurrent OR and 

Virginia-class production using the guiding principles of affordability, delivering Ohio replacement on time, maintaining Virginia- class performance with a continuous reduction in cost, and maintaining two shipbuilders capable of delivering nuclear powered submarines. 

I would like to emphasize that both shipbuilders were equal partners in coming to a consensus that serves both the Navy and the 

industrial base well. We also enlisted a team of acquisition professionals to provide an independent assessment of the submarine 

enterprise. This extensive analysis resulted in the final agreement. 

General Dynamics Electric Boat will be the prime contractor and 

delivery yard for Ohio replacement, while about 22 percent of the 

labor hours for Ohio replacement will take place at Newport News 

Shipbuilding. Both contractors will continue delivering Virginiaclass submarines. The Navy plans to negotiate Virginia delivery 

details at each block contract, ensuring workload is apportioned between the two to best support the goals and priority of Ohio replacement and then Virginia deliveries. Presently, the Navy is 

looking at the feasibility of constructing two Virginia-class submarines in the same years we construct Ohio replacement. In addition to providing a report to Congress, I would be happy to brief 

the subcommittee on the results of this analysis when complete. 

In conclusion, I would like to thank the chairman, the ranking 

member, and the committee and staff for your continued support 

of our endeavors on behalf of our sailors and civilians and for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Jabaley and Admiral 

Richard can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. 
8 

I know that some of our members may have flights to catch to 

get out of here, so I am going to defer my questions until the end. 

And with that, I would like to recognize Mr. Courtney for any 

questions he may have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the chairman said, 

you know, even though we don’t have a full boat here in terms of 

members, the record that is being created is incredibly important 

and useful. 

And, you know, I would just note, Admiral Jabaley, your comments on continuous production as we go into conference is extremely helpful in terms of, you know, focusing folks from both 

chambers on the value of what this subcommittee did. And we, I 

am sure, will not just excerpt it, may frame it to the conference 

committee. So again, your testimony here, to both of you, I just 

want to reassure you, this is extremely valuable and important. 

I am just going to ask a couple questions and then defer to the 

other members. Again, you both testified that the 2021 second Virginia class is a priority for the Navy in terms of trying to mitigate 

the trough. And, I guess again, I just would ask you to just sort 

of confirm, you know, your confidence level in terms of the shipyards being able to handle that. And then also, if you have any— 

I know you said a report will be coming on the later years, but just, 

you know, in terms of where the shipbuilding plan was, you know, 

6 months ago, 18 months ago versus today, you know, whether, 

again, the confidence level is growing as far as the industrial base, 

you know, capacity to handle that order. 

Admiral RICHARD. Ranking Member, I mean, I will start off with, 

we have long aspired for additional attack submarine capability. 

We have known that this trough was coming for a long time. The 

requirement is 48 and, you know, we are in a world environment 

that has changed since 2006. And without speculating on the outcome of the Force Structure Assessment, I am pretty confident that 

the value of each attack submarine we have is only going to go up. 

And then, so now that we have this opportunity, there is a clear 

warfighting demand signal for it and that is driving us to, you 

know, look for every opportunity to provide this. 

Admiral Jabaley is going to talk for a second in terms of the ability to deliver it, and then I will finish with some thoughts in terms 

of how we will go about putting a priority towards the resources, 

sir. 

Admiral JABALEY. So Admiral Richard talked about the strategic 

landscape and why it is so important that we maximize the opportunity for submarine force structure any way we can. We also 

talked about how the 2021 submarine, in particular, is important 

because it delivers in time to start filling almost the entirety of the 

trough with one additional submarine in every year. 

From a shipbuilding standpoint, what gives us confidence that 

we can affordably produce this submarine while we begin the production of the Ohio replacement is a couple of things. First, as the 

design of the Ohio replacement SSBN continues to mature and we 

know with better and better fidelity what that ship will look like 

and how we are going to build it, we are able to work with the 

shipbuilders to produce a more detailed, integrated enterprise plan 

for construction of Ohio replacement and Virginia simultaneously. 
9 

And as that process has matured, what we have come to understand is that the real value is in continuing the steady cadence on 

the Virginia side because you can do that, the initial stages of Ohio 

replacement, without a significant overlap or competition between 

the two programs. 

The facilities that we are building to produce the Ohio replacement are separate and distinct from those that we are using for 

Virginia-class submarine. There is obviously an overlap in terms of 

the workforce, the personnel required, but because the Virginia- class build span at that time should still be nearing 5 years, we 

anticipate a bit of a setback when we incorporate the Virginia Payload Module, but it will quickly get back down to 60 months or 5 

years. The Ohio replacement initial hull is scheduled for a 7-year 

build span. So adding in the second Virginia in 2021, coincident 

with starting to build the first Ohio replacement, we are confident 

that we can do that without a significant capacity expansion on the 

part of the shipbuilders. 

As I mentioned, we are not yet done analyzing what it would 

take to do that throughout the entirety of the Ohio replacement 

build, because you get the stackup of parallel production of Ohio 

replacements as you get further and further into the build. So 

when you are looking at authorizing the second Ohio replacement 

in 2024 and then the third one in 2026 and then one year thereafter, so by the time you are in 2026 and 2027, you have three and 

now four and then five Ohio replacements in parallel production. 

We are convinced that we would have to expand the facilities to 

sustain two-per-year Virginias during that timeframe. And as the 

details become more and more clear, then we will be able to cross 

that out and the Navy will be able to make rational trades between 

capacity here and capacity elsewhere. But we are convinced that 

the fiscal year 2021 second ship is achievable without a significant 

investment in facilities for the shipbuilders. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And one other question. You mentioned, Admiral 

Jabaley, the acoustic superiority initiative with the South Dakota. 

Why is that a priority? I mean, there is obviously a lot of sort of 

defense press that talks about, you know, is the undersea realm 

really going to be as opaque as in the past and metadata, et cetera. 

Maybe if you can just sort of elaborate about whether—you know, 

why the acoustic superiority investment? 

Admiral JABALEY. Sure. I will make a brief remark, and then let 

Admiral Richard address it from the requirements standpoint. But, 

you know, my career in submarines started, I got the end of the 

Cold War, I was stationed in Italy when the Berlin Wall fell and 

the Soviet Union pulled all of their ships out of the Mediterranean. 

And then for a couple of decades, a decade and a half, you know, 

we really thought that submarine warfare had changed to a littoral-based event. 

In the last 6 or 7 years, we have witnessed a renewed effort on 

the part of peer competitors, in particular Russia, with building 

high-end, very advanced, very quiet nuclear submarines. My predecessor had a model of the Severodvinsk built to place outside his 

office so he could look at it every day when he went to work as 

PEO Subs [Program Executive Officer Submarines] and remind 

himself of what the threat is. That model remains there outside my 
10 

office now. The Severodvinsk is operational, has deployed. And the 

ability of the Russian Navy to produce a very quiet submarine is 

clear. And they, by every indication, will continue to do so. 

So we never want to be in a situation where we have acoustic 

parity. We want acoustic superiority because we want to have that 

advantage in the undersea domain no matter what we do. 

So at this point, I will turn it over to Admiral Richard to discuss 

the requirements and how they were derived for acoustic superiority. 

Admiral RICHARD. Thank you, sir. 

And, Ranking Member, if I could, undersea, it is always a competition. And the United States has long had acoustic advantage 

over its adversaries, potential competitors. But we don’t take that 

for granted. And there is always efforts on both sides attempting 

to close that gap. 

We think we have found a significant opportunity that acoustic 

superiority is designed to exploit. To go into more detail, I would 

like to offer you a classified briefing on this subject, but it is a very 

exciting opportunity that we think we can exploit to maintain our 

acoustic advantage well into the future. 

There is another point that I would like to address. You mentioned the idea of the oceans going transparent. We have long— 

starting with our ballistic missile submarines, we actually have 

programs that look at both ballistic and attack submarines, have 

worked to ensure the security of that force. So we are looking well 

into the future, decades. And it is a physics-based, intel-informed 

program to see are there are any phenomenologies that might be 

used to either find our submarines or that we ourselves could exploit to go find competitors’ submarines. And in that work, the notion that the oceans are going transparent happens about every 5 

years, insert the latest technology. I myself was in that program 

over 30 years ago. In the 1980s, it was satellite sensing; today, it 

is unmanned undersea vehicles and big data. 

What I would like to point out is the physics undersea are brutal. 

Electromagnetic waves, radio waves travel short distances in 

water. So the opportunity to use a sensing technology like radar 

doesn’t exist. Acoustics does, but it gets distorted and it takes great 

skill to be able to interpret that. So we are very confident in terms 

of our ability both to hide our own submarines and then exploit 

what is available so that we may find someone else’s submarines. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thanks so much for joining us today and thanks for 

your service to our Nation. 

I wanted to put in perspective, you spoke about AUVs [autonomous underwater vehicles], and we are seeing—with weapons applications in these emerging adversarial UAV systems. I want to 

get your perspective on where that leaves our forces looking at a 

future adversarial force with these AUVs. 

First of all, what are our platforms capable of doing? Can we 

deter them? And what size and scope of that adversarial UAV force 

should we expect in the years to come—I am sorry, AUVs. 
11 

Admiral RICHARD. Unmanned undersea vehicles I think that you 

are referring to, Congressman—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Admiral RICHARD [continuing]. Of course. So, one—I don’t want 

to use a Navy term. We are at all ahead flank, you know, maximum speed ahead in our ability and desire to exploit unmanned 

undersea vehicles, the technology. We intend to field a family of 

systems. We have some in the fleet now. We have conducted realworld missions, forward deployed. And I would like to offer you a 

classified brief on the details, I think you would be pretty impressed if we had a chance to show you. And then behind that, we 

have larger systems that are underway. 

So, one, we are learning how the technology works and what you 

can use it for, which then enables us to understand what might be 

done against us in the same way such that then we can be prepared to counter the use of those technologies. 

And I just referred to the SSBN and attack submarine security 

program. They have active efforts to understand what our vulnerabilities might be to that type of technology and that type of 

system and then prepare our countermeasures, whether that be 

technology or operational concepts to be ready should they be employed against us, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask this. Tell us about the new and emerging technologies in electromagnetic systems. And are the technologies there available to be used in these autonomous underwater vehicle systems? 

Admiral RICHARD. Congressman, absolutely. Many of the pieces 

in an RF [radio frequency] system benefit from Moore’s law, right, 

the ability—the rate that processing improves. In fact, so new architecture, such as a software-defined radio, where most of the 

work that is done is done in software and not hardware. UUVs [unmanned underwater vehicles] are an ideal place to exploit that 

technology. 

But the other piece we have to be mindful of as we push down 

those lines is what parts of the system do not get to exploit advances. Antennas, for example, are not affected by Moore’s law, and 

we have to be equally creative in overcoming those limitations so 

that we can put end-to-end systems together. 

And again, the final point is, we use technology to accomplish 

missions, right, not the other way around. And so we will go look 

at the missions that we have to accomplish and look at a wide 

range of technologies, whether it be new or old, to find the best 

way to go accomplish the tasks we have been given. 

Mr. WITTMAN. In looking at our rivals’ efforts in anti-access/area 

denial efforts, how does the Navy look at being able to, within that 

scope, determine how you would most effectively deploy and apply 

these autonomous underwater vehicle systems? 

Admiral RICHARD. Again, Congressman, I would go back to you 

use a system of systems approach. Right? And so you analyze the 

capabilities that a potential competitor has put together in terms 

of his system and then determine what vulnerabilities, weaknesses, 

asymmetric advantages can you bring to bear. The submarine force 

itself has long been one of the asymmetric advantages the United 
12 

States could bring to bear. Unmanned technologies enable us to extend that further. 

You may have heard in the past the term dull, dirty, and dangerous applied to the use of unmanned systems. I think that is too 

limiting. It is dull, dirty, dangerous, or otherwise impossible, that 

we should start with a mission that it is not possible to do today, 

utilize this technology, and further find ways to extend the advantage the undersea forces provide to the Nation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. In the realm of UUVs, there is a lot of technology 

that occurs very quickly and we would hope that it could be applied 

quickly. Under the current system of acquisition and procurement, 

are we capable of taking the technology that develops literally on 

a daily basis, put that into practice, and apply it and get it to the 

fleet within a quick realm of time? 

Admiral JABALEY. Yes, we are. It requires a multifaceted approach, but we—there are several opportunities for us to do rapid 

prototyping and, as we call it, you know, getting things wet. 

So the operation that Admiral Richard alluded to was one that 

we conducted on the USS North Dakota. And it was especially impressive because it occurred between her delivery and before the 

start of her PSA [Post Shakedown Availability]; so a ship that was 

delivered out of construction and was deployment ready right 

away. And what we did is installed a dry deck shelter on her and 

then took two commercially available UUVs, the Remus 600s, and 

she did a real-world operation where she deployed those UUVs on 

a rotating cycle so they could go off and do the work the submarine 

didn’t want to have to do, and the submarine could do other things 

while the UUVs were out there. 

And so through the leadership of Commander, Submarine Forces, 

Vice Admiral Mike Connor and now Vice Admiral Joe Tofalo, that 

program was instituted and run through the Undersea Warfare 

Chief Technology Office through the assistance of NUWC [Naval 

Undersea Warfare Center] Newport, NUWC Keyport, Submarine 

Development Group 5, Det UUV [Detachment Unmanned Undersea 

Vehicles] out in Bangor, Washington; they all worked together to 

field that operation and produce a real-world mission completion 

which was very impressive. 

We continue to do the same things exploring every opportunity 

and with the philosophy of ‘‘let’s test these things out, let’s see 

what we can do for developing the concept of operations, and then 

figure out what we want to go buy.’’ We are also doing the same 

with submarine-launched unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]. The 

Blackwing UAV is a 3-inch launcher-deployed aerial vehicle that 

communicates back to the ship and relays full motion video out to 

line-of-sight distance and greatly expands the reach of the submarine sensors. So we are able to do this. We are using alternate 

methods within the acquisition framework to test items out, figure 

out what works, and then figure out what we want to buy as a 

Navy. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
13 

Admiral Jabaley, just to follow up on Mr. Wittman’s questions, 

as you are going through and testing these different AUVs or even 

the UAVs, what are some of the risks that you foresee in testing 

these platforms, and what precautions do you feel need to be addressed in order to kind of address any potential liabilities? 

Admiral JABALEY. I would say that the two biggest risks are 

cyber and then the energy source. So any time you deal with a 

commercial off-the-shelf item, you have to make sure you understand what the provenance is of the components that go into it, the 

programming that goes into it, where the circuit boards came from. 

So we have a very rigorous process to go through that with the contractor and understand what it is that we are buying. 

The second thing, the energy source, everything that we are testing will be deployed from a submarine, so we have very critical 

safety standards for items that we bring on to the submarine. Lithium ion batteries have a checkered history, so we are working very 

hard to use what is called a ‘‘Speed to Fleet’’ program to develop 

a safe way to store, charge, use, recharge lithium ion batteries in 

unmanned vehicles that will be deployed from submarines. 

Both of those risk items are manageable. We have very active 

and, as I said, rigorous programs to ensure that we don’t incur a 

risk that we are not willing to accept. 

Ms. GABBARD. Integrating these technologies into the current 

Navy surface and subsurface platforms is something that we have 

talked more of. Of other military applications, do you see any capacity for these systems to be implemented or used by the SEALs 

[Sea, Air, Land teams] or any special warfare units? 

Admiral JABALEY. Absolutely. And there are things that we are 

testing—again, I would be happy to brief you in classified session— 

that do just that. But many of the—many of the vehicles that are 

being developed, some are deployable from either a submarine or 

a surface ship, some are from submarines only, some are from surface ships only, but we look at the whole span of capability and 

how best to use it in both a whole Navy and even a joint environment. 

Ms. GABBARD. Great. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to do what lawyers say not to do and ask a question 

I don’t know the answer to. I just play a Congressman on TV too. 

It’s crazy. 

So here is the question. So you said, Admiral Richard, that you 

had a period where, I mean, things—every 5 or 10 years, everybody 

said something is dead, it is never going to happen again, we are 

never going to have conventional war, we are never going to have— 

we are never going to have open ocean battles or under ocean battles anymore, and this—but this happens. We are going through a 

period where we thought there would be counterterrorism and 

COIN [counterinsurgency] forever, now we are coming out of that 

too. 
14 

Here is the question, did we lose in any way the ability to fight 

in the Arctic, or have you guys been doing this the whole time 

while we have been screwing around in the desert? 

Admiral RICHARD. Congressman, first, before I answer your direct question, what I was referring to is the notion that the oceans 

are going transparent. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. 

Admiral RICHARD. That is what I was specifically referring to. 

As far as the Arctic goes, you are quite correct, the submarine 

force never left the Arctic. Right? We have maintained a periodic 

drumbeat of operations and exercises. We most recently completed 

ISEX 16 [Ice Exercise 2016], where we go up, we take two submarines, we do tactical development, we verify our procedures 

work. It is a great source of information, both for the Navy and the 

Nation, on the changing conditions up in the Arctic. This involves 

putting up an ice camp for several weeks, a large number of personnel. And while it is a submarine force-focused exercise, the 

broader Navy, as well as the joint force, takes advantage of it. 

So there are a number of demonstrations of search and rescue capability, use of unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles, as well as 

the Department of State and other interagency folks took advantage of it as a forum to show United States leadership on Arctic 

issues. ISEX 16 followed the one in 2014, and we have been doing 

this every 2 to 3 years. 

Mr. HUNTER. You have been doing them. 

Admiral RICHARD. We have, yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. So this is not secret. I know this because I talked 

to General Dunford 2 days ago and he told me this over the phone 

so it is not secret, so I am going to go ahead and throw it out there. 

There is no icebreaking capability called for in an Arctic competitor 

clash, there is no icebreaking capability that is in the OPLAN [operation plan]. Is that because you don’t need it? And you can tell 

me, we can do it classified or talk now. This is the question I don’t 

know the answer to. 

Admiral RICHARD. Congressman, I would need to take your question for the record. I can’t speak authoritatively about our capabilities or lack of capabilities in the Arctic beyond what we have inside 

the submarine—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you need icebreakers in the Arctic? 

Admiral RICHARD. The submarine force does not need icebreakers. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does not need. 

Admiral RICHARD. The submarine force does not. 

Mr. HUNTER. Is there a limit to—so there is no—are you saying 

ice cannot get thick enough environmentally for you to not be able 

to break it? Does that make sense? Did I say that right? 

Admiral RICHARD. No. The ice is not a limitation to our ability 

to operate in the Arctic. There is a limit to the amount of ice that 

a submarine might need to go surface through if it needed to come 

up. But we are quite capable of operating submerged for very long 

periods of time, and that is not a limitation in the Arctic for us. 
15 

Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, you got anything good? That answers my 

question. 

And by the way, thanks not just for what you do—I mean, me 

and Mr. Moulton have gone and gotten shot at and stuff a few 

times. And I don’t even want to go in a submarine, even on top of 

the water. Really. I have been invited. I don’t want to go on one, 

in one, underwater. Appreciate what you guys do. It is pretty 

amazing how smart you are and how well you execute. I am just 

happy we have you. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I now will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts. See if he has a response to that. Mr. Moulton is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MOULTON. No, no, no. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did grow 

up on the water, but I have never been in a submarine myself, so 

I don’t know how scary it might be. 

But, you know, I am going to ask some fairly sort of—follow my 

fellow marine’s lead and ask a question I don’t know the answer 

to. But it is a much more high level question. What are the things 

that keep you up at night? What are the things that you worry 

about, not just the short-term battles that you have to fight with 

the budget and everything, but in the next 10 to 20 years, what 

are some of the challenges that you think—and I am sure you 

would have a great—and it would probably be easier to answer this 

question in a classified setting and you could cite specific examples 

of things enemies are developing or whatnot. But what are the 

things that you worry about that the American public should 

know? 

Admiral RICHARD. Congressman, I will go first on that. And if I 

could, I would start with the things I don’t worry about. Right? I 

have very high confidence in our forces, their leadership, and our 

ability to execute the missions that we have been asked to do 

today. And I don’t need to go into a classified forum to tell you 

what I am worried about. 

What keeps me up at night is my fear that this Nation takes for 

granted the benefits it achieves from strategic deterrence. Right? 

We have not had nuclear use for over 70 years. So we have enjoyed 

70 years of nuclear nonuse. We have enjoyed 70 years of no major 

power war. We have had wars in the last 70 years. You all have 

been parts of them. Right? And we have lost great amounts of 

blood and treasure. But that pales in comparison to the level of violence that was World War II. And I submit that strategic deterrence is a key reason that this world has not had to endure a sacrifice like that. 

And so when it comes time for the Nation to make the decision 

to recapitalize its strategic forces, a decision that this Nation has 

wisely made twice in the past and paid a small premium to buy 

us a defense against our only existential threat, I worry that we 

have been so successful over—that is what the point behind chart 

1 is. We have been doing this for a long time. This goes back to 

the early 1960s. 

Mr. MOULTON. Yeah. I guess, you know, my concern with that— 

and I agree with you fundamentally. And there is no one in this 

room who thinks that we don’t have to have a successful nuclear 
16 

deterrent. We are all on the same page there. There are some disagreements on the details of how you get there. 

And one of the things that concerns me is that we have to be 

very serious about deterring Russia, especially under Putin, who is 

completely unpredictable. And I think, you know, it is not inconceivable that he could use nuclear weapons in a first-use scenario. 

But we also have to be concerned about nuclear terrorism. And the 

problem with a nuclear-armed terrorist is that the conventional deterrence doesn’t work at all. It is really meaningless, in fact. 

So we have to balance our—you know, how much we spend on, 

for example, our strategic forces versus nonproliferation efforts to 

secure fissile materials. Can you just comment on that a bit and 

how you see that equation playing out in the next 10 years? 

Admiral RICHARD. Well, Congressman, what I would offer is, one, 

I agree with you. The obligation of the United States Navy and the 

Department of Defense is defend the Nation against all the threats 

that it faces, not some selective subset. And this capability is not 

designed to defend or deter against every threat that the Nation 

faces, but it is designed to deter against the stack that there is no 

other way for us to do that. 

And so, again, having twice made a decision at about the same 

order of magnitude, I think it would be prudent for the Nation to 

make it again. And then additionally, if necessary, find the capability and resources necessary to deter against additional threats 

such as a nuclear-armed terrorist. 

Mr. MOULTON. Sir. 

Admiral JABALEY. Congressman Moulton, first I would like to remind you, I am sure you already know, but the submarine that we 

will start building next March will be the USS Massachusetts, and 

it will be delivered in 2022. But I don’t want to wait until then to 

get you onboard a submarine. So we will take an opportunity to get 

you onboard. And if you can pull your friend with you, that would 

be great. 

The things that keep me up at night are much more at the tactical level. My friend, Admiral Richard, is paid to think at the strategic level. I am paid to work at the tactical level. So the thing that 

keeps me up at night is the amount of work that the submarine 

industrial base is going to have to ramp up to accomplish over the 

next two decades. I don’t think we can underestimate the significance of that process both in terms of facilities expansion, manpower resource expansion, the sheer act of figuring out how to 

build two separate classes of submarine in the same places at the 

same time and get everything in line to proceed to completion in 

time for me to deliver that first Ohio replacement platform so his 

requirement for continuous strategic deterrence from the undersea 

forces is executed. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you gentlemen very much. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time. 

Mr. FORBES. The distinguished gentleman from Texas who consistently fights to have a submarine or carrier homeported in his 

district, Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thanks. That is an inside joke. I live in the 

desert. And so—and I don’t have any shipbuilders either. Noah’s 

Ark was built in the desert, but that didn’t work, so—I don’t have 
17 

any questions since I wasn’t here for the opening statements. I 

yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is 

recognized. 

I am sorry. If I could, the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. If my colleague from Rhode Island would like to go 

first, I am happy—— 

Are you sure? All right. Thank you so much. 

Hi, gentlemen. I am going to sort of segue from Mr. Hunter and 

Mr. Moulton. I am going to be going on a submarine in 4 days, July 

18. So I am very much looking forward to it. And thank you both 

for all that you do. 

But—so I also have the honor of representing the north part of 

Florida. And you know there is a lot of naval activity in Panama 

City region. And I had the chance recently to go and tour an incredible operation that is building some of these fantastical—is 

that a word? Is that a word? I am making it up. Okay—these technology-driven underwater miracles that do so much. And while I 

was there, I was looking at all that was being done. And I thought, 

what is not being done that would be beneficial to the Navy? So 

that is what my question, following up on what my colleagues—Mr. 

Moulton was asking, what keeps you up at night. What would you 

like to—if you could have the technology dream, what would you 

like to have developed that would help you and let you sleep better? 

Admiral JABALEY. Thank you very much, ma’am. And North 

Florida is dear to my heart. I have a son in flight training in Milton, Florida. But he has spent a few days in Panama City. I think 

that was spring break. 

But the thing that I would like, I would divide into two things. 

You know, what would I do if I had the technological ability and 

then what would I do if I had the fiscal ability. From a technological ability, the two things that I have asked my team to look 

at for the future attack submarine, the one beyond Virginia, is, 

number one, a holistic integral way of employing and deploying unmanned underwater vehicles. Everything we have done to date has 

been through repurposing of an existing interface between the submarine and the ocean. We have used torpedo tubes, we have used 

signal ejectors, we have used the dry deck shelter. We have even 

used the trash ejector as a way to get a payload out of the submarine to employ it. 

I would like some organic means of designing the submarine 

from the ground up that would seamlessly integrate UUVs. You 

know, the dream, actually, would be if you have ever seen remora, 

so those are the little fish that suck onto the big fish and go along 

and seem to not affect the big fish at all, ride in the stream, and 

then when it is time for them to go off and do something, they do, 

and then they come back. So that is forward-thinking. It is different from anything we have done. And it will take a while to get 

there. But since I am dreaming, that would be my technological 

leap. 

The second one on that is, at some point, we are going to have 

to move beyond a rotating mechanical device to push the ship 
18 

through the water. Because although we are not there yet on the 

oceans being transparent, one of the biggest things that causes 

noise to be radiated into the water is the rotating machinery and 

the propulsor itself moving through the water and exciting various 

parts of the stern of the submarine to radiate noise. So the field 

of biomimetics is very interesting to me. 

Again, when you look at nature in action and you think, boy, it 

would be great if we could design something that would take that 

leap forward and get us into a realm that would be acoustic self 

unlike anything we have ever done before. So those, again, very far 

off, very out there type ideas, but things that we need to be thinking about to get there eventually. 

And then from a fiscal constraint, we have talked about the need 

to build the Ohio replacement, we have talked about the need to 

build two-per-year Virginias. But the one thing that we are not 

able to afford right now is an immediate recapitalization of the special operations forces capacity of the SSGNs. So they have the ability to carry two dry deck shelters, which is very valuable to our 

brothers and sisters in the special operations forces community. 

And in order to make it affordable, the Virginia Payload Module 

is focused on strike warfare alone, Tomahawk missiles, other potential payloads. So it does not recapitalize that dual dry deck shelter capability. We will have to do that at some point. And we are 

working on ways to do that affordably, but it is not in the plan 

right now. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Do you have anything? If not, I will yield back. 

Admiral RICHARD. Admiral Jabaley, that—you see why he has 

his job. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Well, I will tell you gentlemen that if there is place 

that the dreams can come true, it is Florida. And so we will take 

this information back and see—I think that—it is the remora fish. 

Right?—that we can name the new—we have named it. 

All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Now the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin my 

questions, I just wanted to say I know that we are going to be 

recessing after today and not coming back until September. And I 

am not sure how many hearings we are going to have between now 

and the end of the year. But let me just say what a distinct privilege it has been to serve with you, and I deeply appreciate your 

leadership on the subcommittee and the Congress and everything 

you have done for our fleet, particularly our submarines and our 

sailors, men and women, who serve our Nation’s military. You have 

made a difference, and I am grateful for your friendship and your 

leadership. 

To our witnesses, thank you, Admirals, for being here, for your 

service to our Nation. I know that Mr. Courtney touched on this 

earlier, but we recently learned that after evaluating the prospect 

of a second attack sub in 2021, even with the Ohio replacement 

production ramping up, the Navy believes it can squeeze a second 

Virginia-class submarine into its construction plan. I am certainly 

thrilled with this prospect, and I know the capacity that Electric 

Boat in Quonset-Davisville in my district have for ramping up and 
19 

taking on this challenge, as well as the folks in Groton, Connecticut. But can you elaborate on what went into this decisionmaking process, just to enlighten us? 

Admiral RICHARD. Congressman Langevin, thank you for the 

question. And we have long aspired, right, for additional attack 

submarine capacity. The requirement is 48. We have long known 

that we would have a shortfall in the late 2020s. And then even 

beyond that, the world situation has changed. We are back in a 

time of major power competition, which adds even more value to 

each additional submarine that we can add. And that that makes 

this opportunity for a second Virginia in 2021 the last best opportunity that we have to address that attack submarine shortfall. 

What I was trying to show in the second chart up here is the effect of that submarine. They are the light pink blocks that paint, 

if you will, across the trough. Right? So the one decision, this one 

submarine, addresses 27 percent of that shortfall. Anything that 

we do after this point, the ship doesn’t get delivered in time to affect that. That makes it our last best chance. And then beyond 

that, we have analyzed to the point that we have industrial base 

capacity to build that ship. And I would like to turn it over to Admiral Jabaley to go into more detail on that point. 

Admiral JABALEY. Thank you, Admiral Richard. 

And thank you, Congressman Langevin. So the—it is important 

to remember that, until 2011, the Navy’s ship—long-range shipbuilding plan continued Virginias at two per year out through 

2029. The 2009 shipbuilding plan was the last one before 2011. 

And it was two per year through 2029, at which point we would 

have reached 48 SSNs, and it would drop to one, two, one, two, 

one, two going on, which is what you need to maintain a force of 

48 when the submarines have a 32-, 33-year lifespan. 

In 2011, when the Navy completed—had completed the initial 

cost estimate on the Ohio replacement, we were forced to reduce 

the Virginia-class build rate to one per year during the years that 

we were building Ohio replacement as a fiscal measure. It is still 

a fiscal challenge to do so. But as Admiral Richard mentioned, the 

combination of the change in the strategic landscape with the resurgence of Russia, the ascendance of China, the combatant commanders stating the need for additional attack submarine deployed 

presence, it has become clear that building additional submarines 

is the only thing that will satisfy that combatant commander need 

and the only thing that will help improve submarine force structure inventory. 

At the same time as that, we have gained better knowledge on 

the Ohio replacement design and better fidelity and maturity of the 

integrated enterprise plan to improve the facilities, increase the 

manpower, and design the throughput of all the sections and the 

modules that become the submarine for both Virginia class and 

Ohio replacement simultaneously. So as we learn more and understand that better, we have gained more and more confidence that 

we can do it from a shipbuilding standpoint. Now the process is, 

okay, how much will it cost to add that additional submarine and 

how can the Navy best afford it? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is welcome news. And I am hopeful for that 

prospect, that it comes to be. 
20 

Just finally, strengthening our network security and protecting 

against cyber attacks requires a partnership, of course, among government, industry, academia, and security researchers. How is the 

Navy collaborating with these entities to put best practices into effect? What steps are being taken to secure submarine systems from 

cyber attacks? 

Admiral JABALEY. It is a great question, Congressman, and it is 

one that is at the forefront of my mind. As a matter of fact, I just 

had an hour-and-a-half classified brief this morning on the very 

topic. So I can’t go into the details, but—so I look at cybersecurity 

in three distinct parts. 

The first is the cybersecurity of our industrial base. We want to 

make sure that our contractors fully understand the requirements 

for protecting the information, the design information, the operation information, and the maintenance information for everything 

that we build for the submarine force. And we are very hard on 

them. It is a very rigorous process to ensure that their IT [information technology] systems are adequate and well protected. You 

know, the stories are plentiful of U.S. military designing something 

and then only a couple of years later, something coming out in another part of the world that looks extremely similar because that 

design information has been siphoned off somehow. 

So I tell everyone that I never want to see anything in the undersea domain that looks remotely like what we are building. I know 

we are building the best, and we need to protect it and keep it to 

ourselves. 

The second bucket is the protection of the systems themselves. 

And this is one where we do have a very robust collaboration with 

industry, academia, the warfare centers, and the national labs. So 

the ability to protect the systems on a submarine, it is a bit of a 

different calculus than in a system that is continuously connected 

to the global information grid because submarines disconnect for a 

majority of their time at sea. That doesn’t mean they are any less 

vulnerable. And it is important to remember that and understand 

that. 

So we have—what we have done recently is formed a team, and 

operating principally with Raytheon out in Manassas, done a cyber 

vulnerability assessment on the Virginia information systems. And 

the initial results look very good, but there are things that we have 

learned and that we will go fix. 

And finally, the third bucket is offensive cyber operations. And 

I can’t talk about that at all except to say that our submarines 

have capabilities that you would be very interested in understanding and they are out there using it on a daily basis. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for that answer, Admiral. I have been 

out to the Raytheon facility and I have gotten that brief on the vulnerability testing. And I am glad that it is happening, among other 

things. 

But Admiral Jabaley, Admiral Richard, thank you both for your 

service. And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I just have two closing questions to pose. One, Admiral Jabaley, we know that you have talked about the importance 

of the authority for continuous production. But if the Navy does not 

get that this year, can you tell us what is the practical impact, in 
21 

terms of cost and schedule, if Congress doesn’t provide that authority? 

Admiral JABALEY. The practical impact would be a loss of the opportunity of 1 year to start the continuous production and get 

that—really, really twofold. First, get the cost savings on the next 

group of missile tubes that will be procured. And then the second 

is, it would delay by 1 year the ability of that missile tube industrial base, we have several venders that produce those for us, it 

would delay the ability of us to begin that ramp-up to a stable production cadence. And in doing so, you would delay the ability to 

really start going down the learning curve, which as I am sure you 

know, the ability of a manufacturing production enterprise to incorporate lessons learned as you build subsequent articles and do it 

in less time at less expense. So it is really an opportunity lost. You 

know, would we still be able to build missile tubes? Obviously we 

would, but without the cost and schedule benefit of continuous production starting now. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral Richard, we sometimes in this committee and sometimes with the Pentagon, sometimes in our discussions, we talk in terms that we understand, but we don’t paint pictures for the public. And we sometimes gloss over things because 

we just tend to know them and just assume them. 

You talked earlier about the deficit we would have between the 

48 submarines that we need and the 41 we will end up with, and 

then talked about the fact that, with everybody’s realization of 

where the world is going now, that that number 48 is probably 

going to increase. Paint the picture for us to give to our other policy 

makers. Don’t just tell us that it doesn’t meet the need we have 

or, you know, our combatant commanders—what is the risk to the 

United States of America and to our national defense if that gap 

is too large? 

Admiral RICHARD. Mr. Chairman, so first, it is important, I 

think, to look at, you know, what has changed. Right? I have alluded to a number of assumptions. So in 2006, we had a very different relationship with Russia. And the relationship we have now 

may require additional forces to set conditions that we would like 

to have. Right? If we don’t have those forces, right, we will be challenged to go execute the plan that we want to go to. In 2006, we 

didn’t have countries, more than one, operating ballistic missile 

submarines capable of attacking the homeland directly. We may require additional force to provide an adequate level of security 

against an issue like that. We have not seen a level of operations 

by other forces, other countries, like we are seeing now. It will constrain our ability to take up preferred courses of action in order to 

deter that type of operation. So it constrains the geographic reach 

that you have, it controls the amount of time that it takes in some 

cases to accomplish what you want to accomplish, and it may constrain the choices we have to make because we didn’t have a full 

range of available options to give our leadership. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Mr. Courtney, I believe, had a couple of followup questions. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Jabaley, in some other settings, you have talked about, 

again, that trough, and, you know, possible strategies to mitigate 
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the trough. Obviously, we talked about the second sub in 2021. I 

mean, one other sort of, I think, normal reaction looking at the tile 

chart there is whether or not there is a way to maybe, again, push 

out the Los Angeles-class subs, the ones in gold there, to maybe 

push them out another year or two to help, again, with mitigating 

the depth. And is that something that you guys are looking at? 

Admiral JABALEY. Oh, absolutely, sir. When we made that 

change, which resulted in the trough, made the change of going to 

one-per-year Virginias, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] chartered a study that said: Okay. Go tell me how I can mitigate the 

risk that is incurred by the fact that I have now produced a trough 

where I am below 48 SSNs. And the study returned three principal 

actions. 

The first was to improve the build span of Virginia-class submarines. The USS Virginia was initially planned to deliver in 7 

years, or 84 months. She was delivered in 86 months, which is 

pretty good. But we needed to get—one way to get more subs in 

the force is to turn them out earlier. So we have taken 2 years off 

of that build span. Mississippi, which is our fastest delivery to 

date, delivered in 62 months. So that is a full 2 years ahead of 

where we were on the Virginia, the lead ship of the class. 

The second way to mitigate that risk was exactly what you said, 

selected life extension of Los Angeles-class submarines. So as every 

submarine in the fleet nears its end of life, at about the 5- or 6- 

year point, we sit down and sharpen the pencils and extrapolate 

out the use of the fuel in the reactor core and start doing a material condition assessment on the status of the ship’s hull itself, the 

tanks, the pressure hull, the superstructure in the sail, and make 

sure that we understand what would have to be done to that ship 

in order to extend its life. 

And we also look at the deployment schedule of that ship. Because there are some times where the final deployment as compared to the decommissioning date will leave about a year, a year 

and a half of time after it ends its final deployment. And so maybe 

you would only need to extend it 4 or 5 months of life, and then 

you could get another full 6-month deployment out of it before decommissioning. So we do all that comparison and then do kind of 

a cost-benefit analysis. First, is it safe to do so. Second, what maintenance would we have to insert into an availability 2 or 3 years 

before the end of life. And then we sign up to do it and extend the 

life. 

The third means of mitigating that risk was selected extension 

of deployments beyond the nominal 6 months to the 7- or 8-month 

length. And we have done that extensively throughout the submarine force. That has a counterproductive effect as well because 

on deployment, you are underway upwards of 85 percent of the 

time so you are expending more fuel. So that has a direct impact 

on the ability to extend late in life on the second step, as it were. 

So those three steps have been going on for really almost the last 

10 years, and they have produced a benefit. However, that benefit 

has primarily been felt in the presence side of the naval equation. 

You know, how many ships can I keep on deployment at any one 

time and satisfy the combatant commanders’ peacetime mission requirements? What it cannot do is provide a projection benefit. You 
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know, delivering submarines earlier has a slight one, but extended 

deployments and extension of life are very minimal impacts on the 

amount of submarines you can surge in the time of wartime. The 

only way you can do that is actually add ships to the shipbuilding 

plan. And that is another reason why that second ship in 2021 is 

so valuable. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Well, again, thank you to both of you. I 

mean, your testimony has just been really very focused and clear. 

And that is, again, the kind of tools we will need over the next 

month or so with the defense bill. So, again, thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Admiral, I think you may have just answered it. 

The chart is based on an optimum deployment schedule that is, you 

said, 6 months. So all of that assumes an optimal deployment 

schedule. Is that correct? Or does that already have built into it the 

extensions and everything else that you are talking about that we 

could buy more time on boats and that kind of thing? 

Admiral JABALEY. That chart is simply an inventory chart. The 

benefit you get out of every submarine on that chart is one place 

you can swing the needle. So, for instance—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. So what would that—I guess, and maybe that is 

classified, I don’t know, but what would that chart look like if, in 

fact, you said we would go to 7-month deployments? 

Admiral JABALEY. It would look exactly the same, because that 

chart does not portray—what you are talking about is a presence 

chart. So, you know, a requirement of, you know, if—for instance, 

for the SSGNs, we have a 1.0 presence requirement. There has to 

be one SSGN on deployment in the LANT [Atlantic Ocean] and one 

in the PAC [Pacific Ocean] at all times. And that type of a chart 

would be modified by how long the deployment is and—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. So this is just strictly the number of boats? 

Admiral JABALEY. This is how many submarines do we have in 

commission—how many attack submarines do we have in commission at any one time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, gentlemen, as everybody has thanked you for 

your service, we once again do that. Thank you so much for taking 

time to be with us on this afternoon. And we appreciate all the advice and counsel you continue to give to this subcommittee. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 14, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 14, 2016 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 14, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 14, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Admiral RICHARD. From a national perspective, the United States does need icebreakers to develop and maintain icebreaking capability and capacity to meet national interests and enhance safety and security in the changing Arctic region; 

therefore the Navy fully supports the U.S. Coast Guard’s efforts to recapitalize its 

aging icebreaker fleet. The Navy, along with other agencies, worked with the Coast 

Guard and Department of Homeland Security in developing operational requirements for their icebreaker program. Additionally, we are supporting the Coast 

Guard’s acquisition efforts. 

For the Navy specifically, icebreakers currently play a minor role in naval operations because Arctic operations are primarily conducted by Navy undersea and air 

assets, which can provide year-round presence without an icebreaker. With the exception of two Combat Logistics Force ship classes, the Navy’s current surface combatants are not capable of operating in the extreme harsh environment of sea-ice 

conditions, even with the support of a Coast Guard icebreaker. Navy surface combatants conduct Arctic exercises only in open water conditions during the summer 

melt season. The Navy is studying the options and costs involved with ice-hardening 

surface ships, but there is currently no requirement for the significant investment 

and re-design of Navy ships to support this capability from surface assets because 

our undersea and air assets fulfill current Service and Combatant Command operational requirements in the Arctic. 

The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014–2030 lays out a phased approach, balancing 

the demands of current requirements with investments in the development of future 

capabilities to keep pace with the changing environment. As part of this effort, the 

Navy will examine the role that icebreakers will play in partnering with the Navy 

and National assets to provide safe navigation, infrastructure, communications, and 

maritime domain awareness in the Arctic Region. [See page 14.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 14, 2016 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. As expressed in the FY2017 NDAA Report, there is concern that the 

requirements for the restarted Next Generation Countermeasures (NGCM) program 

do not reflect lessons learned and technology advancements made since the program 

was put on hold several years ago. What is the rationale for calling for a single 3′′ 

diameter device for both internal and external launch requirements? 

It is our understanding that existing external launchers can accommodate larger 

and significantly more advanced 6′′ next generation countermeasures that would 

also enable room for program growth. Does the Navy plan to re-evaluate and consider other approaches including development of more capable 6′′ external countermeasures along with incremental enhancements to existing 3′′ countermeasures? 

Admiral RICHARD. The Navy is developing a brief in response to the direction 

given in the FY17 NDAA Report. The brief will describe the Navy’s plan to achieve 

the most cost effective and advanced torpedo defense capability for the submarine 

force and will be presented to the House Armed Services Committee no later than 

30 September 2016. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Our national laboratories serve as excellent resources and work 

closely with the DOD on numerous projects. Can you tell us how you are utilizing 

these national laboratories, and what types of work they are assisting the submarine community with? 

Admiral RICHARD and Admiral JABALEY. The Navy has existing contracts with 

University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC) and Federally Funded Research and 

Development Centers (FFRDC) and our National Laboratories. The expertise of 

these organizations consists of sensor development, such as refining acoustic capabilities to improvements in how the U.S. Navy operates current systems around the 

globe. 

Undersea Warfare has unique and critical needs that require specialized knowledge, skills and experience that reside in the Naval Warfare Centers and UARCs. 

In particular, the Naval Warfare Centers provide a bridge between the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) community and the U.S. Submarine Force. 

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) uses the Naval Warfare Centers and UARCs 

to directly support and, at times, lead a multitude of Science and Technology (S&T) 

programs directly contributing to the vitality and lethality of the U.S. Submarine 

Force. This work includes modeling and simulation, sensor development, algorithm 

development, test and evaluation, undersea sensor designs, active sonar automation 

and clutter rejection, component and system integration for technology transition 

into existing programs of record and the submarine force. 

An example of historic work with our National Laboratories includes the development of a new sorbent material for removing carbon dioxide from submarine 

atmospheres with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). This novel 

material is being introduced in the atmospheric control equipment on the Ohio Replacement SSBN. A current effort with Sandia National Laboratory is the development of a battery monitoring system for lithium-ion batteries that will be fielded 

in the next generation of UUVs that will be launched from U.S. submarines. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI 

Mrs. WALORSKI. In 2004, NAVSEA initiated a research effort to address the need 

for a large-deck torpedo defense program. The focus of the R&D initiative was to 

optimize torpedo detection, classification, and anti-torpedo countermeasure performance in aft sector coverage. Is this still a valid requirement for the surface navy? 

If so, please describe any current and future efforts to address this requirement, including but not limited to specific programs, schedules, and funding. 

Admiral RICHARD. Yes, this is still a valid requirement for the surface navy. A 

Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Torpedo Warning System (TWS) 
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was approved in March 2012 to address large-deck torpedo defense needs. The TWS 

coupled with the Countermeasure Anti-Torpedo (CAT) make up the overall hard-kill 

torpedo defense system known as the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System 

(ATTDS). The CAT CDD is currently in Navy staffing. The ATTDS system is installed on five CVNs as part of a rapid fielding effort. The ATTDS program schedule 

and PB17 Surface Ship Torpedo Defense funding are provided below. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. In 2010, the CNO issued an Urgent Operational Need for the 

Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) program to address torpedo threat vulnerabilities and a lack of defense of Navy’s High Value Units (HVUs). 

Have the threat scenarios that caused CNO to accelerate deployment of the 4 Surface Ship Torpedo Defense systems in parallel with its continued program development diminished? 
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Please describe your view of the current and foreseeable threats from torpedoes, 

the validity of any requirement to address these threats, and any current and future 

efforts to address this requirement, including but not limited to specific programs, 

schedules, and funding. 

Understanding the Navy accelerated this program to meet urgent operational requirements what types of improvements have been made in SSTD performance with 

this ongoing development and maturation approach? 

Admiral RICHARD. The threat scenarios and vulnerabilities are classified, but did 

not diminish and are comparable to those of 2010. The Navy has installed the AntiTorpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) on five CVNs, providing improved torpedo defense capability. ATTDS is comprised of the Torpedo Warning System (TWS) 

and Countermeasure Anti Torpedo (CAT) programs. Recent ATTDS testing, completed in July 2016, resulted in a successful demonstration of salvo capability that, 

once validated, will be fielded on the ATTDS capable CVNs. Additional detailed 

analysis and reconstructions from the testing are scheduled for completion in September. It is our expectation that the detailed analysis will likely identify additional 

opportunities for further development and capability enhancement. The current 

ATTDS program schedule and PB17 Surface Ship Torpedo Defense funding are provided below. [See chart and table above.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Mr. MOULTON. Many academic research institutions have long and successful 

records of engagement with both the U.S. Navy and separately with the leading 

companies in the Information Technology sector, especially in Silicon Valley and 

Cambridge. Given SECDEF Carter’s articulation of the ‘‘Third Offset Strategy’’ and 

his recent overhaul of the Defense Innovation Unit–Experimental (DIUx), is there 

a unique and important role for these academic institutions in ensuring naval dominance? 

Admiral RICHARD and Admiral JABALEY. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIUx)— 

The Navy does have long and successful records of engaging with academic research 

institutions. Experimental initiatives began in August 2015 through DIUx with the 

intention of accelerating technology to our warfighters. It is an additional way to 

engage with technology developers and will help us reach industry research institutions that have not traditionally assisted the Navy in solving security challenges. 

We have engaged DIUx in areas where they can assist in identifying new technology 

that has the potential to quickly solve naval challenges. 

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