[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 13134 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:11

- cr - 20739

- DMM

- 17

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintif f

- Appellee,

versus JEREMIAH JENKINS, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (February 11, 2015) Before WILLIAM PRYOR , MARTIN and JULIE CARNES , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 14-13134 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 1 of 52 Je remiah Jenkins appeals his 12

- month custodial senten ce following the revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Jenkins argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied on unproven facts in imposing his sentenc e . He also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately consider all of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I. We review t he reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only if the district court made a clear error in judgment. United States v. Pugh , 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)

. A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and impose a term of impr isonment if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In determ ining an appropriate sentence following the revocation of supervised release , “the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the cri minal history of the violator.” U nited States Sentencing Guideline s c h. 7, p t. A (3)(b). Reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence is a two

- part process that requires us to ensure that first, the district court did not commit a significant procedural error, and second, that the sentence is substantively reasonable. Gall v.

Case: 14-13134 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 2 of 53 United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Tome , 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).

“ A sentence may be procedurally unreasonabl e if the district court improperly calculates the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately ex plain the chosen
sentence. ” United States v. Gonzalez , 550 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)

. Jenkins cannot show that the district court committed a significant procedural error. At his revocation of supervised release hearing, the government introduced evidence that Jenkins had been arrested in Iowa and was subject to two arrest warrants in Georgia

. Although Jenkins argues that the re was insufficient evidence for the district cou rt to find that he committed offenses in Iowa and Georgia, the distri ct court made no such finding. Instead, the court stated only that the arrest and arrest warrants showed that Jenkins had left the Southern District of
Florida without permission

— which i tself violated the conditions of Jenkins’ s supervised release. 1 Revocation Tr. 17 , July 17, 201 4 (“And so am I considering those arrests at least in connection with his departure from the district, although I’m not concluding that he committed those crimes.”)

.

1 Jenkins does not dispute that he left the Southern District of Florida without permission.

Case: 14-13134 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 3 of 54 Nor can Jenkins show that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. In evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, “[w] e consider the totality of the circumstances and evaluate whether the sentence achieves the sentenci ng purposes stated in § 3553(a).” United States v. Sarras , 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009)

. “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound d iscretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay , 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted)

. As such, the district court need not specifically address every mitigating factor raised by the defendant in order for the sentence to be substantively reasonable. See United States v. Snipes , 611 F.3d 855, 873 (11th Cir. 2010). In addition, the fact that a sentence is well below the statutory maximum sentence weighs in favor of reasonableness.
See Gonzalez , 550 F.3d at 1324

. In this case, Jenkins’s 12

- month sentence was one month above the high end of hi s advis ory Guidelines range, but well below the 24

- month statutory maximum for his offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Although Jenkins contends that the district court improperly balanced the § 3553(a) factors , his sentence is not substantively unreasonable simply because the district court failed to specifically address every mitigating factor he raised

. See Snipes , 611 F.3d at 873. Similarly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to place great er emphasis on

Case: 14-13134 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 4 of 55 Jenkins’s criminal history than on his acceptance of responsibility because the weight to give any particular § 3553(a) factor is within the discretion of the trial
court. See Clay , 483 F.3d at 743. For these reasons, Jenkins has not established that his sentence was either procedurally or substantively un reasonable. AFFIRMED. Case: 14-13134 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 5 of 5