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86–149 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–138

REBALANCE TO ASIA II: SECURITY AND DEFENSE;

COOPERATION AND CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 25, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., PENNSYLVANIA

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening statement ... 1

Davidson, Dr. Janine, senior fellow, Center for a New American Security, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 27

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Green, Dr. Michael J., senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair, Center 

for Stragic and International Studies, Washington, DC ................................... 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Helvey, Hon. David F., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Office 

of Security and Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ........ 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement .................... 17

Yun, Hon. Joseph Y., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................ 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

REBALANCE TO ASIA II: SECURITY AND 

DEFENSE; COOPERATION AND CHALLENGES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin, Murphy, Rubio, and Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, good afternoon. Let me welcome you all to 

the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs. 

Senator Rubio, the ranking Republican member, will be joining 

us shortly. 

This is our second hearing on the Rebalance to Asia policy. In 

our first hearing, we assessed the rebalance values element, including human rights, democracy, and good governance programs, and 

I thought that hearing was very, very constructive. 

This hearing will deal with the defense and security challenges 

in the East Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly timely given the 

Shangri-La dialogue on defense that will take place on May 31. In 

addition, General Dempsey is visiting the region this week. So I 

think the timing of this hearing is particularly appropriate. 

In this hearing we will look at whether the rebalance is on track 

to achieve the administration’s goal of strengthening strategic alliances, deepening partnerships, building a stable, productive, and 

constructive relationship with China, and empowering regional 

institutions to tackle shared challenges and peacefully resolving 

conflicts. 

A stable and cooperative regional security environment is necessary for the free flow of commerce and ideas. The region is 

undergoing a significant transition with signs of security dilemmas 

and potential arms races. Our constructive engagement in the 

region can help ensure the transition takes place in a positive way, 

ensuring regional peace and security. 

A rebalance is about supporting our allies, partners, and interests in the region as together we face pressing security challenges. 

For the last six decades, our policy has been about constructive 

engagement, developing partnerships, and working with countries 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

in that region. And for the last six decades, we have seen countries 

such as Japan, South Korea, and China develop sophisticated 

economies, which certainly furthers United States interests in the 

region. 

But it is particularly appropriate that we have this hearing today 

considering the escalating threat of North Korea, the increasing 

prevalence of cyber attacks, which is becoming a dominant concern 

on our security interests, and the rising maritime tensions in the 

South and East China Seas, including piracy and other transnational crime. And we must continue to engage China in a constructive dialogue on all these issues. We must deepen our United 

States-China military-to-military dialogue to address many of the 

sources of the insecurity between our two countries. We need China 

to understand and respect our cyber security concerns. The April 

13 agreement to establish a United States-China cyber security 

working group is an encouraging development and I look forward 

to our witnesses’ observations as to the merit of that agreement. 

China’s support for the recent U.N. Security Council resolution 

on North Korea was a positive move toward securing peace in the 

region. I am pleased to hear that China remains fully committed 

to the six-party talks goal of verifiable, peaceful, denuclearization 

of the Korean Peninsula. 

On North Korea more broadly, we must remain vigilant and take 

threats seriously while not rewarding bad behavior. We must continue to work closely with our allies, Japan and Korea in particular, to maintain security on the Korean Peninsula while ultimately pursuing denuclearization. The Helsinki process model 

could be helpful in dealing with North Korea as a confidence-building measure to discuss not just nonproliferation, as the six-party 

talks did, but security, economics, environmental, and human 

rights concerns. 

We look forward to talking more about our new Republic of 

Korea-United States combined counterprovocation plan and celebrating the 60th year of our strong alliance with the Republic of 

Korea when President Park Geun-hye arrives in Washington next 

month. 

On maritime conflicts, it is in our national interest to protect free 

commerce along the world’s busiest maritime trade routes and ensure unimpeded access to the maritime commons of the AsiaPacific. To that end, we must support the establishment of rulesbased regional norms which discourage coercion and the use of 

force. Instability undercuts economic growth for the United States 

and for all of Asia. Competition for energy and fishery resources 

only exacerbate the rising maritime tensions. Countries with competing claims should explore joint management of resources to promote peaceful coexistence. 

I was encouraged by the April 10 agreement between Japan and 

Taiwan to jointly share fishing resources in disputed areas of the 

East China Sea. Malaysia and Brunei established a joint petroleum 

revenue area in 2009. These examples represent significant diplomatic achievements which I hope will be followed by other such 

agreements. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and, in 

particular, Indonesia, has shown active leadership on these issues. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

I hope that an ASEAN-China agreement can be reached on a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea. 

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 

UNCLOS, is another important means to building a rules-based 

order for the region. We should ratify it, but even without Senate 

ratification, we must continue to adhere to UNCLOS practices. 

Our rebalance also must embrace critical military-to-military 

programs to help professionalize the East Asian region’s militaries 

to better address regional challenges. But equally critical is how we 

engage these militaries to integrate core U.S. values: human rights, 

the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. In Indonesia, 

our military-to-military relationships helped them successfully 

transition to civilian control and promote rule of law. 

But emerging partnerships also present significant challenges. 

Burma has made progress, but we must engage their military in 

a careful, measured, and systematic fashion. We must continue to 

press Burmese forces to make progress on human rights and to 

protect and respect all ethnic groups. 

Within every challenge lies opportunity. Positive military-tomilitary engagement creates opportunities to advance human 

rights. Likewise, the threat of North Korea is an opportunity to 

work more closely with Japan, Korea, and China to find a solution. 

The rebalance will shift more resources and attention to the region 

and create more opportunities for positive engagement. 

I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about the 

state of our alliances, our programs to make the region safer, and 

how we will maintain the rebalance in the face of our overall 

defense spending cuts. 

I thank our witnesses from both our panels for being here. On 

our first panel, we are pleased to have with us today Joseph Yun, 

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. Mr. Yun’s previous 

assignment was as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the 

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was sworn in as Deputy Assistant Secretary on August 10, 2010. Mr. Yun is a career 

member of the Senior Foreign Service class of minister counselor. 

His overseas assignments have been in South Korea, Thailand, 

France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. 

We are also pleased to have with us today the Honorable David 

F. Helvey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Previously 

he served as the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and 

was the principal director for East Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. 

Prior assignments in the Office of Secretary of Defense include 

Country Manager for China, Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and Senior Advisor for China Policy and Integration. He has 

also served as a senior intelligence analyst for China military and 

political affairs at the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

So we have two experts on our first panel that can help us 

understand the security challenges that we face in Asia today and 

how the rebalance will be implemented to advance U.S. interests. 

So we will start with Mr. Yun. 

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STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH Y. YUN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks 

also to Senator Murphy and for inviting myself and my good friend 

David to testify on this important topic today. 

Before we begin, I would like to thank you for your work on 

building bipartisan consensus on engaging the Asia-Pacific. As you 

have already noted, this is the second hearing under your chairmanship already on this topic of Rebalance to Asia. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make brief 

remarks and submit a more detailed written response for the 

record. 

U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific reflects the recognition that 

U.S. prosperity and security will be defined increasingly by what 

happens in the region and how we engage the region. The AsiaPacific is home to two-thirds of the world’s population and many 

of the world’s fastest growing economies. It offers enormous opportunities but also challenges for U.S. political and economic interests. The annual flow of U.S. investment to East Asia nearly doubled from $22 billion in 2009 to $41 billion in 2011. U.S. exports 

to the Asia-Pacific now total over $320 billion, and the region is 

home to 3 of the top 10 U.S. export markets. 

This region is also home to some of our most enduring security 

partners. In Japan, we currently station close to 50,000 ActiveDuty U.S. servicepersons. In Korea, we have some 30,000 servicepersons, and of course, we also have important treaty alliances 

with Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 

As our response to recent events in North Korea demonstrate, 

there is no uncertainty about United States military and defense 

resolve in responding to security challenges in the region. And of 

course, my colleague from the Pentagon, Mr. Helvey, will get into 

more detail on these issues. 

However, Mr. Chairman, it is also very important to note that 

security and defense cooperation is only one part of our engagement. Many challenges, both present and future, will be nonmilitary. So as we deepen our military engagement, we are also 

engaging with our partners and allies in our economic, political, 

and people-to-people initiatives to demonstrate our longer term 

commitment to the region. We do this by making progress on bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements. We do this 

by coordinating on law enforcement and counterterrorism initiatives, by adopting programs to combat trafficking, and by advancing good governance, democracy, and human rights under the important pillar of our active participation in building regional architecture that strengthens stability, security, and economic growth 

throughout the region. To this end, we will deploy our most senior 

officials. 

In June, Secretary Kerry will participate in the ASEAN Regional 

Forum ministerial meetings, and in July, Secretary Kerry and 

Treasury Secretary Lew will be joined by their Chinese counterparts for the fifth meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In October, President Obama will attend the 

APEC summit in Bali and his third East Asia summit and his fifth 

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U.S.-ASEAN summit in Brunei. We believe these multilateral 

institutions will deepen our security ties and strengthen our alliances in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, I also want to emphasize by taking this opportunity that we in the State and Defense Department have the closest of coordination to ensure our military presence and operations 

in the region match our diplomatic goals and objectives. These 

include what we do together to advance freedom of navigation, to 

counter proliferation and counter terrorism, and what we do 

together for the respect of human rights and the rule of law. And 

they also include how we operate for humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief and, of course, our Nation’s own ability to respond 

to security challenges of the region. And as you know, Mr. Chairman, in most of our missions in the region, we have the defense 

attache ́’s office that reports to the chief of mission and works very 

closely with Foreign Service officers from the State Department. 

An example of how we are doing this is our close cooperation 

with Japan on consolidation and realignment issues of our forces 

there, which seeks to maintain a sustainable military presence and 

preserve peace and security in the region. 

As we continue to work with DOD to enhance our partnership, 

build local capacity to deal with threats and disasters, and to promote democratic values, our security assistance resources are very 

important. In particular, I would highlight foreign military financing, FMF, and international military education and training, 

IMET. Those funds have been critical in our engagement in the

region. 

Through these assistance programs and working together with 

DOD, it remains vital that the United States continues to demonstrate, through intensive and sustained nonmilitary engagement 

as well, our firm and unwavering commitment to the region. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify. I am very 

pleased to answer any questions you and the members of the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH Y. YUN

Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and members of the subcommittee, thank you very 

much for inviting me here today to testify on this important topic. I would like to 

thank you for your work to build a bipartisan consensus on the importance of engaging the Asia-Pacific region and advancing U.S. interests there. We value working 

with you and look forward to continuing to work closely with you and other Members of Congress in the future. 

United States policy toward East Asia and the Pacific reflects the profound recognition that the future prosperity and security of our Nation will be defined by 

events and developments in the region. While our commitments to other regions remain strong, it is also important to recognize just how significant East Asia and the 

Pacific are to the United States. Home to two-thirds of the world’s population and 

the world’s fastest growing economies, the Asia-Pacific offers growing opportunities 

and challenges for U.S. strategic interests. Placing U.S. interests in context, the annual flow of U.S. investment into East Asia has increased from $22.5 billion in 2009 

to $41.4 billion in 2011. U.S. exports to the Asia-Pacific totaled over $320 billion 

in 2012 after growing nearly 8 percent since 2008. 

As the region rapidly grows and transforms, visible, sustained, U.S. commitment 

is increasingly essential. 

Our commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is demonstrated in a number of ways, 

including through security and defense-related cooperation. However, I would like 

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to emphasize that security and defense cooperation is only one part of the policy and 

to provide you with the larger context of our engagement with the region. 

Though we continue to face military challenges in the region, nonmilitary issues 

are critically important to American and East Asian prosperity and security and 

necessitate a broad diplomatic approach. Although our security and defense commitments remain strong and unequivocal, we must put more emphasis on strengthening our nonmilitary engagement. 

As our response to recent events in North Korea demonstrates, and as Secretary 

Kerry emphasized on his recent trip to Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, there is no doubt 

about U.S. military resolve in the region when it comes to threatening behavior. 

Indeed, our allies and partners continue to tell us that our clear and visible military 

presence is reassuring to them and contributes to the stability of the region. But 

what they also tell us is that, as we deepen our military engagement, we should 

continue also to emphasize the diplomatic, development, economic, and people-topeople engagement in order to demonstrate our longer term commitment to our 

rebalance strategy. To be sure, there are those in the region who have doubts about 

our ability to sustain our high level of engagement, particularly in the current fiscal 

environment. But we continue to reassure them that our commitment is strong and 

enduring, because, as a Pacific nation, the United States prosperity and security are 

inherently tied to the region. 

To date we have demonstrated our commitment through intensive engagement at 

every level, including interacting with our regional partners at the highest levels. 

Last year, that high-level engagement included 35 bilateral meetings, 6 trilateral 

meetings, 32 multilateral meetings, and numerous strategic dialogues. The result of 

these engagements was progress on trade agreements, closer coordination on law 

enforcement and counterterrorism initiatives, and advancing antihuman trafficking 

measures, and other efforts to advance good governance, democracy, and human 

rights in the region. And we will continue to press forward this year. In June, Secretary Kerry will participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meetings 

in Brunei, demonstrating U.S. commitment to the region and support for strengthened regional institutions. At the fifth meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and 

Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington in July, Secretary Kerry and Treasury 

Secretary Lew will be joined by their Chinese counterparts for a discussion of challenges and opportunities on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. In October, President Obama will attend the APEC summit in Bali, his third East Asia 

summit in Brunei, and the Global Entrepreneurship summit in Kuala Lumpur, all 

of which showcase our commitment to comprehensive regional engagement. 

Our cooperation with the region is not limited to top-level engagement. It also extends to ordinary citizens, including young people. Public diplomacy initiatives, such 

as educational and cultural exchange programs with citizens from across the AsiaPacific region, are increasing grassroots support for partnering with the United 

States. In addition, we are utilizing new outreach platforms such as social media 

and the innovative American cultural spaces in Rangoon and Jakarta, to reach 

younger audiences, highlight the multidimensional nature of U.S. foreign policy, and 

foster direct and long-term relationships with broader and more diverse populations. 

Our Asia-Pacific policy is multifaceted. Security takes a number of forms and 

should not be defined or characterized solely by our military engagement. Here are 

the key areas of our focus. 

Asia’s future stability and security are linked to its prosperity and economic development. We are boosting U.S. trade in the region, increasing investment flows, and 

deepening economic integration, all of which will benefit U.S. businesses and help 

create jobs here at home, while also creating improved and more inclusive development outcomes in the region itself. Inward investment accounts for over 2 million 

American manufacturing jobs, a number we are working to increase. Similarly, exports generate over 10 million jobs for American workers. Asia’s prosperity is America’s prosperity, and we will continue our work to secure markets for U.S. goods and 

services and welcome tourists, students, and investors to our shores. Establishment 

of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with 11 partners will be one 

of the cornerstones of our ‘‘rebalance’’ toward the Asia-Pacific. Our promotion, 

through the TPP, APEC, and elsewhere, of a regional economic architecture in 

which the rules are open, transparent, free, and fair helps U.S. businesses gain 

access to this dynamic region and further integrate the regional economy under a 

set of high-standard trade and investment rules. Meanwhile, State Department missions in the field are stepping up their commercial promotion efforts to supplement 

the Commerce Department’s mission to promote exports, tourism, education, and 

investment opportunities within the United States. 

We are also engaging with an emerging and growing regional architecture of robust regional institutions and multilateral agreements that result in a more positive 

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political and economic environment for the United States and strengthen regional 

stability, security, and economic growth. Multilateral institutions are positioning 

themselves to better handle territorial and maritime disputes such as in the South 

China Sea. Through engagement with multilateral structures such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), we are able to encourage a peaceful resolution of contentious transnational issues and discourage escalation of tensions. 

By developing our relationships with partners and emerging leaders, and deepening cooperation across the region, we are strengthening U.S. national security, 

promoting economic growth and trade, and creating a better platform from which 

to tackle transnational challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking. 

This kind of cooperation very much includes China. We want China and the countries of the region to partner not only with us, but with each other and multilaterally so that we can deal with shared challenges like cyber security, climate change, 

and North Korea, which were significant points of discussion with the Chinese on 

Secretary Kerry’s most recent trip. 

At the heart of our efforts to contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, secure, and stable region is a desire to expand democratic development and human rights. Our 

commitment to advancing freedom, democracy, and the rule of law has manifested 

itself in our steadfast support for reform and opening in Burma, where positive developments on a range of concerns of the international community have allowed us 

to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. However, there is still a great deal to 

be done, for example in terms of the widespread abuses targeting Muslims, including ethnic Rohingya. We will continue to press for improvements with governments 

that fall short on human rights and democracy issues while supporting those promoting the values we share. We work closely with key allies and partners to find 

ways to support the return of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights 

standards to Fiji. 

So, as we deepen our traditional security ties and build on our alliances to deter 

and defend against military and nonmilitary threats to the United States and the 

region, we will continue to seek peaceful resolution of disputes and confront emerging challenges that could harm U.S. national security interests. We will do so in a 

way that engages our partners, helps build multilateral cooperation and solutions, 

encourages economic growth and prosperity, and promotes democratic development 

and human rights. Each element of our engagement strategy is mutually reinforcing. And thus far, Asian states have warmly welcomed our efforts. 

Of course, the stability that has enabled the Asia-Pacific’s remarkable economic 

growth over the past decade has long been upheld by the U.S. military. And we are 

seeking to ensure that our military activities, force posture, and presence enable us 

to improve our cooperation with our allies and partners and respond to current as 

well as emerging security challenges and threats. Together with our Department of 

Defense colleagues, we have begun work on a comprehensive defense strategy 

review to develop a force posture and presence in the region that can better respond 

to nontraditional security threats, protect allies and partners, and defend U.S. 

national interests. And in our military-to-military engagement throughout the region, we continue to emphasize norms regarding respect for human rights, civilian 

populations, and the law. 

As our military cooperation around the Asia-Pacific continues to evolve and adapt 

to 21st century challenges, we strive to optimize our military force posture so that 

it is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. 

An example of how we’re doing this is our close cooperation with Japan on consolidation and realignment issues. 

The Japanese Government’s March submission of the landfill permit request for 

construction of a replacement Marine Corps Air Station to the Okinawa Governor, 

together with the April bilateral announcement of a Consolidation Plan, are significant milestones in our bilateral partnership and important steps closer to realizing 

the vision of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Both sides have reaffirmed that the 

Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko remains the only viable alternative 

to the current location of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. 

We take our alliance responsibilities seriously. The Consolidation Plan will help 

us maintain a sustainable U.S. military presence in Japan with a reduced impact 

on crowded urban areas. This step will also help ensure the strength of the U.S.-

Japan Alliance and promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Due to 

its geographic location, Okinawa plays a crucial role in the defense of Japan and 

the preservation of peace and security in the region. U.S. forces on Okinawa are 

ready to respond to regional contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters. We recognize the impact that our bases have on local communities, 

and we are committed to continuing to address those concerns. 

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In addition to this work with Japan, we are also strengthening and modernizing 

our longstanding treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. This year marks the 60th anniversary of our alliance with 

the Republic of Korea, a linchpin of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Our 

cooperation has evolved over the years into a truly global partnership, and we are 

working together in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of 

Somalia. The United States is steadfast in its commitment to the defense of the 

ROK, and both governments fully support the modernization of our alliance, including the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Strengthening our alliance includes 

both preparing for and deterring North Korean aggression. Building on our successful counterterrorism partnership with the Philippines, we are expanding our security engagement to focus on building the Philippines’ military and law enforcement 

agencies’ indigenous capacity in order to address areas of common interest in maritime security, disaster relief, and nonproliferation. 

Our force posture initiative with Australia, another close ally, supports a more 

flexible and resilient capability to respond to contingencies across the region and 

globally. Our Defense Strategic Talks with Thailand have yielded a new Joint Vision 

Statement that is a blueprint for our 21st century security partnership and a reflection of Thailand’s key role in our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Given the strategic 

importance and collective significance of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, we have increased our military engagement with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, 

Brunei, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. The U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Pacific Partnership program brings the best of our partners’ military expertise and capabilities 

to multiple Pacific Island countries to help meet critical infrastructure, water, sanitation, and health challenges. 

We also continue to seek improved military-to-military relations with China by 

advancing our successful high-level dialogues and exchanges, as well as expanding 

our cooperation on counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief activities. Strengthening our military and broader economic and security relationship with China is a critical component of our rebalance. Let me be 

clear that we have no interest in containing China, but rather our policy is designed 

to increase cooperation with China on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global 

issues. 

The United States has also played an important role in ensuring continued crossstrait stability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our one-China policy. 

The United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This longstanding policy contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the 

Taiwan Strait, and we welcome the progress that has been made in cross-strait relations in recent years. 

Turning to Southeast Asia, our engagement builds upon the principles of good 

governance and respect for human rights. Following the restart of our military relationship with Indonesia after that country’s democratic transformation, it remains 

important to continue to provide technical assistance and support to Indonesia’s 

military reform, professionalization, and modernization process. Other priorities in 

the military-to-military relationship include a focus on maritime security and interoperability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These same principles also apply to assistance programs that support the Indonesian National 

Police—a significant contributor to security forces and the primary implementer of 

counterterrorism strategies and programs in Indonesia. Among countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia provides the greatest number of troops to peacekeeping missions worldwide and is also building a training center for peacekeepers that the U.S. 

Government strongly supports. 

In Burma, we are increasingly hearing from civil society activists and other reform advocates that the United States can and should help the Burmese military 

shed its legacy of decades of oppressive rule to become a modern force subordinate 

to civilian rule that respects human rights and is held accountable for its actions. 

To that end, we are currently looking at ways to support nascent military engagement—such as exposure to standards on human rights, international humanitarian 

law, humanitarian assistance, and civilian-control of the military—that would encourage further political reforms. We continue to ask the Burmese Government to 

demonstrate concrete progress in achieving respect for human rights, national reconciliation, democratization, and an end of military ties to North Korea. 

While bilateral efforts across the Asia-Pacific are demonstrating positive results, 

we are also working trilaterally. Our trilateral defense talks, including those with 

Japan and Australia and with Japan and the Republic of Korea, help coordinate our 

defense policies, and in tight budget times, reinforce synergies and promote interoperability to deal with regional and global challenges. These trilateral arrangeFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ments allow us to work together to address a range of issues, such as humanitarian 

disaster response efforts and counterpiracy operations, while leveraging and learning from major allies’ knowledge and experience on security issues from across the 

region. They also ensure that, working together, we are better able to coordinate on 

threats such as those from North Korea. 

We are working with regional partners, including China, through numerous mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asian Defense Ministerial 

Mechanism Plus to build military and civilian capacity to respond to natural disasters and to support humanitarian relief efforts. Following the devastating experiences of the 2010 earthquake, tsunami, and ensuing Fukushima nuclear disaster in 

Japan and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, nations in the Asia-Pacific are keenly 

aware of the importance of regional cooperation to respond to natural disasters. 

Since 1995, the United States has invested more than $155 million in disaster risk 

reduction efforts in the region and in 2012 provided an additional $23 million for 

disaster risk reduction programs that save lives at the time of disasters. From May 

7 to 11, the United States will also participate in the third ARF Disaster Relief 

Exercise (DiREX) to be held in Thailand. The Pacific Command (PACOM) sponsors 

a range of exercises hosted by our partner nations that include broad regional participation. My Department of Defense colleague can speak more specifically about 

those exercises, but I would stress the strong political will to promote closer cooperation, build on essential capabilities, and ensure that, in the face of disaster or 

threat, the United States and its partners are able to operate effectively and respond smoothly together. 

The Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense and 

PACOM to support military engagement throughout the region in a way that enhances our partnerships, builds local capacity to deal with threats and disasters, 

and promotes democratic values and development. For the United States to continue 

to meet our security objectives in the region and build long-term, meaningful partnerships to deal with emerging challenges, security assistance resources are critical 

to our mission. In particular, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) programs play a key role by building partner capacity, including strengthening maritime domain awareness capabilities, 

working with partners as they develop and professionalize their armed forces, and 

enhancing our partner capabilities and interoperability to work with the United 

States to address emerging challenges, both internationally, and in the region. 

Our engagement on the military front is formulated in concert with our allies and 

partners in the region and will continue to reinforce the other aspects of our AsiaPacific policy. Our security efforts will continue to underpin stability, and provide 

reassurance to the region as we concurrently focus on fostering economic growth, 

increasing coordination on transnational issues, strengthening people-to-people ties, 

and encouraging democratic development. It is increasingly vital for the United 

States to demonstrate in concrete terms our firm and unwavering commitment to 

the Asia-Pacific region, not only through our military presence and alliances, but 

also through our engagement in the full range of issues important to countries in 

the region. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify on our engagement with and 

commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. I am pleased to answer any questions you 

may have.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Helvey. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID F. HELVEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. HELVEY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and members of the 

subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me here today to 

testify on this important topic. 

I would like to commend the committee for its ongoing efforts to 

highlight the challenges and opportunities that the United States 

faces in the Asia-Pacific. 

As President Obama has stated, the decision to rebalance toward 

the Asia-Pacific reflects a fundamental truth: the United States 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

has been and always will be a Pacific nation. Generations of U.S. 

service men and women have fought to help advance the security 

of this region. The efforts help support our fundamental goal in the 

Asia-Pacific to advance security so that broader efforts to promote 

prosperity and to expand human dignity across the Asia-Pacific 

region will continue to grow and to flourish. 

The core element of the Department of Defense’s approach to the 

Asia-Pacific remains our network of alliances and partnerships. 

Together with our allies, we are working to reinvigorate and modernize these relationships to ensure they remain relevant to the 

challenges that we will face in the future. 

For example, in Australia, we are enhancing our combined 

defense posture and we recently signed a space situational awareness sharing agreement, the first bilateral arrangement of its kind. 

In Japan, we continue to deepen our bilateral efforts on ballistic 

missile defense, as most recently demonstrated by our plan to 

introduce a second ground-base X-band radar, TPY–2 radar. 

In Korea, in the face of continued provocations from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the United States has reaffirmed 

its longstanding commitment to provide and strengthen extended 

deterrence to the Republic of Korea using the full range of United 

States military capabilities. 

Working with the Government of the Philippines, we are developing a long-term plan to enhance their maritime capabilities, and 

we are also jointly examining options to increase our rotational 

presence there. 

And in Thailand, we reached a historic milestone last November 

when we jointly signed a new United States-Thai joint vision statement for the defense alliance, the first foundational alliance document we have had with Thailand in over 50 years. 

Beyond the progress we are making in modernizing our longstanding treaty alliances, we are also enhancing our defense relationships with regional partners. We are particularly pleased by 

the progress we continue to make in deepening our defense partnership with India where Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter is 

spearheading an initiative to expand our bilateral defense trade 

and to increase coproduction and codevelopment. 

In Southeast Asia, we are excited by the growing defense relationships with important regional partners such as Indonesia and 

Vietnam. 

And in Oceania, we have overcome longstanding obstacles in our 

military-to-military relationship with New Zealand that will allow 

exciting operational cooperation that we have not seen for over 25 

years, including military staff talks and ship visits to U.S. military 

ports. 

The United States-China relationship is also a central part of our 

overall rebalance efforts. We are continuously pursuing a more sustained and substantive military-to-military relationship, which is 

underscored by the chairman’s recent visit to China. We believe it 

is not only in the interests of both China and the United States, 

but also in the region as a whole. In all our discussions with the 

Chinese, we continue to urge the importance of increased communication between our militaries and enhanced transparency about 

the intentions behind China’s military modernization. We are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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pleased to note that just days ago, China accepted a United States 

proposal to form a working group on cyber issues under the auspices of the civilian-military strategic security dialogue. 

While not a treaty ally, Taiwan is an important partner in the 

region, and we welcome the progress that has been made in crosstrade relations in recent years. We take seriously our responsibilities as laid out in the Taiwan Relations Act and believe that the 

preservation of stability in the Taiwan Strait is fundamental to our 

interests in promoting peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. 

Alongside our attention to our bilateral relations, we are deepening U.S. multilateral security engagement throughout the region. 

Multilateral engagement helps us to strengthen habits of cooperation and to promote trust and transparency and to build regional 

capacity. This is one reason that we have decided to increase funding for regional exercises and our support for participation by developing countries in multilateral training and exercise programs. 

The second element of U.S. defense strategy in Asia is our efforts 

to enhance our defense posture. We have committed to developing 

a posture that is more geographically distributed, operationally 

resilient, and politically sustainable. Some key efforts in this

regard include our efforts to enhance missile defense posture by 

deploying the second radar to Japan and the deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense system, or THAAD, to Guam. The 

recent announcement of a new plan for the consolidation of the 

U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa is another example of 

this, as are the initiation of rotations of U.S. marines to Darwin 

and the arrival just last week of the first of up to four littoral combat ships that will all be rotating through Singapore. 

The third element of our defense strategy in Asia is shifting our 

long-term capacity investments toward the Asia-Pacific region. As 

the United States continues to draw down our military presence in 

Afghanistan, we are increasingly freeing up our capacity that can 

be reinvested in Asia. This includes our commitment to employ 60 

percent of our forward-deployed naval forces in the Pacific by 2020, 

but it also includes a broader effort to shift air and ground capabilities, special operations forces, and our intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance assets back to the Asia region. 

We are also prioritizing investments in our budget to develop 

platforms and capabilities that have a direct applicability and use 

in the Asia-Pacific region. These investments include programs 

such as the Virginia class nuclear-powered submarine, P–8 maritime patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Sensor, air 

dominance and strike capabilities such as the fifth generation Joint 

Strike Fighter, a new stealth bomber, and the KC–46 tanker 

replacement. 

In addition to investments in hardware and technical capabilities, we are also investing in our people in language and culture 

skills, regional and strategic affairs to ensure that we cultivate

the intellectual capital that will be required to make good on our 

rebalance. 

The final element of our defense strategy is promoting a continued commitment to those principles that we believe are essential 

to building a safe and secure world where all can prosper. These 

include our commitment to free and open commerce, open access

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to the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains, adherence to

the rule of law, and to the principle of settling disputes through 

peaceful means without coercion. These core principles guide the 

decisions the Department of Defense makes every day and connects 

our strategic rebalance to the values that are important to peace 

and security throughout the world. 

At its core, the Department of Defense’s Rebalance to Asia is 

about supporting a system that the United States, our allies, and 

partners have benefited from for the past 60 years. This system 

has not only enabled millions to move out of poverty, it has also 

facilitated tremendous democratic reforms, economic growth, and 

prevented deadly conflicts and the devastating casualties and 

destruction that they can bring. That is why the United States has 

been deeply engaged in the Asia-Pacific for generations, and that 

is why we will remain a Pacific power for generations to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for giving me the opportunity 

to testify before your subcommittee today, and I look forward to 

answering any questions that you or your colleagues may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Helvey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HELVEY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and members of the subcommittee, thank you very 

much for inviting me here today to testify on this important topic. I’d like to commend the committee for its efforts to highlight the ongoing challenges and opportunities the United States faces in Asia and for its continued commitment to U.S. 

engagement in the Pacific region. We in the Department of Defense greatly appreciate the bipartisan support this committee has offered for growing U.S. engagement 

in Asia and we look forward to working closely with the Congress and our interagency colleagues to support a whole-of-government approach in this critical region. 

As President Obama has noted, the decision to rebalance toward Asia reflects a 

fundamental truth—‘‘the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific 

nation.’’ Generations of U.S. service men and women have fought, bled, and died to 

help advance the security of this region, to protect cherished freedoms and democracy, and to make possible the tremendous economic growth that has transformed 

the daily lives of men, women, and children across the Asia-Pacific region. And so, 

the decision to rebalance toward Asia not only reflects our belief that the future 

security and prosperity of the United States is dependent upon Asia’s success but 

also reflects the deep and binding ties of our past. 

It is also important to note that the U.S. approach to Asia will continue to be, 

as it always has been, a whole-of-government effort. Our defense and security policies, while essential, do not exist in a vacuum, but serve to support an over-arching 

purpose. As we have for the past 60 years, the Department of Defense works to 

advance security so that broader efforts to promote prosperity and expand human 

dignity across the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow and flourish. 

The core element of the Department’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region remains 

our network of alliances and partnerships. Our treaty allies—Australia, Japan, the 

Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand—have formed the bedrock of our 

security engagement in Asia for over 60 years. Together with our allies, we are 

working to reinvigorate and modernize these alliances to ensure they remain relevant to the challenges we will face in the future. 

In Australia, we continue to broaden and deepen our robust relationship into new 

areas to meet emerging needs in both the region and across the globe. Our efforts 

to enhance our combined defense posture through the rotation of U.S. Marines to 

Northern Australia will provide expanded opportunities for U.S. and Australian 

forces to train and exercise together and will promote security cooperation with a 

wide range of partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, we are pursuing new 

bilateral initiatives in areas such as space and cyber that will be particularly relevant to global security in the 21st century. For example, at the Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations last year Secretary Panetta and the Australian Minister for 

Defence signed a memorandum of understanding to relocate a U.S. Air Force space 

situational awareness C-Band radar to Australia. And just last month the U.S. and 

Australia signed a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) sharing agreement—the first 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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bilateral arrangement of its kind—which will permit an advance exchange of this 

data. 

In Japan, we have seen strong momentum on the defense side over the last year. 

We are taking steps to further strengthen our alliance, and to ensure its relevance 

against the full spectrum of possible regional security challenges. Through our ongoing Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue, we are exploring ways to improve 

interoperability and strengthen bilateral defense cooperation. We are discussing the 

future of our alliance to ensure that the alliance remains adaptive in the face of 

21st century threats. We continue to deepen our bilateral efforts to deter ballistic 

missile threats in the region and beyond. Japan remains our most important partner in regional ballistic missile defense, as most recently demonstrated by our plan 

to introduce a second TPY–2 radar. This radar will provide critical added protection 

against continued North Korean threats and provocations. We are also steadily upgrading our capabilities resident in Japan, as the recent introduction of the MV–

22 into Okinawa, and our plans to introduce the F–35, demonstrate. 

In Korea, our shared efforts to establish a Strategic Alliance 2015 are ensuring 

a shared vision for the future that will deter aggression and maintain peace on the 

Korean Peninsula as well as expand security cooperation across the region. The 

foundation of our alliance remains a steadfast commitment to maintain peace on the 

Korean Peninsula. North Korea remains a security threat because of its pursuit of 

nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, its willingness to proliferate 

weapons in contravention of its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and its willingness to engage in provocative and destabilizing behavior. In the face of these provocations, the United States has reaffirmed 

its longstanding commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the 

ROK, using the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. Through a bilateral 

Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, our two countries are developing a tailored 

deterrence strategy to improve the effectiveness of extended deterrence against 

North Korean nuclear and WMD threats. 

As the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, we look to our key allies, 

Japan and the Republic of Korea, to help us shape and influence the regional agenda. We have put significant effort into developing the Defense Trilateral Talks, 

which gives us the opportunity to engage in dialogue with counterparts from Japan 

and the ROK and seek areas of trilateral cooperation such as HADR, informationsharing, and maritime security. We continue to work toward trilateral intelligence 

sharing and joint operations. Trilateral cooperation strengthens deterrence and contributes to stability in the region, especially in the face of North Korea’s ongoing 

missile programs and efforts to develop nuclear weapons. 

We are also ensuring our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand are robust 

and able to contribute to security across the region. Working with the Government 

of the Philippines, we are developing a long-term plan to enhance the capabilities 

of the Philippine Armed Forces, especially in the maritime domain. In addition to 

our regular bilateral trainings which enhance interoperability between the U.S. and 

Philippine militaries, we are jointly examining options for increasing our rotational 

presence in ways that serve our mutual interests. 

In Thailand, we reached a historic milestone last November when Secretary 

Panetta and Thailand’s Minister of Defense jointly signed a new U.S.-Thai Joint 

Vision Statement for the Defense Alliance, the first foundational alliance document 

in over 50 years. Our new vision directs the relationship in important areas such 

as improving readiness and interoperability and enhancing regional security in 

Southeast Asia and beyond. 

Beyond the progress we are making in modernizing our longstanding treaty alliances, we are also enhancing our defense relationships with regional partners. One 

of our most important relationships is our bilateral defense partnership with India. 

India and the United States share common values and interests, and we support 

India’s growing role in strengthening regional security, protecting shared domains, 

countering terrorism, and bolstering international nonproliferation. 

Our defense relationship with India has never been stronger, and it continues to 

mature on both the strategic and operational levels. We are particularly pleased by 

the progress we continue to make in our military-to-military engagements and expanded bilateral defense trade. The United States and India are working together 

to address bureaucratic impediments that hamper our ability to fully realize the 

possibilities of our defense partnership. Deputy Secretary Carter has spearheaded 

an initiative to streamline our bureaucracy that will help better realize the potential 

of our defense trade relationship, including with efforts to increase coproduction and 

codevelopment. 

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In Southeast Asia and Oceania we are excited by the growing defense relationships with important regional partners. In recent years we have been working closely with the Indonesia Ministry of Defense to support their efforts to establish more 

capable, responsible, and transparent defense institutions. This includes training 

and discussions to enhance civilian institutional leadership and capacity-building, as 

well as operational cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance and international peacekeeping. 

Similarly, we have made tremendous strides in our bilateral defense relationship 

with Vietnam. In 2011, we signed the first bilateral Defense Memorandum of 

Understanding between our two countries, expanding cooperation beyond legacy of 

war issues into areas of importance for the region, including search and rescue operations and disaster relief. And with New Zealand, we have overcome longstanding 

obstacles to enter a new era of military-to-military relations. New Zealanders have 

fought alongside Americans in every modern war, and our recent signature of the 

bilateral Washington Declaration and subsequent changes of U.S. defense policy on 

New Zealand provides a common vision for defense cooperation that will allow exciting operational cooperation not seen for over 25 years, including military staff talks 

and New Zealand ship visits to U.S. military ports. 

We are also cautiously optimistic about the positive steps toward reforms that we 

have seen from the Burmese Government. As a result, DOD is beginning a cautious 

and calibrated defense engagement intended to advance the ongoing reform movement and encourage adherence to international norms of behavior in the areas of 

human rights and rule of law. This engagement is very limited and has included 

DOD participation in the 2012 U.S.-Burma Human Rights Dialogue led by the State 

Department and the participation of two mid-level Burmese military officers to observe humanitarian portions of the 2013 COBRA GOLD Exercise. We look forward 

to discussing with Congress the appropriate scope and scale of defense engagement. 

Normalization of defense relations can only occur if Burma continues its efforts to 

democratize, improves its human rights record, implements national reconciliation 

efforts with ethnic groups, and severs its military ties to North Korea. 

The U.S.-China relationship is also a central part of our rebalancing efforts and 

a critical component of our efforts to broaden and deepen defense relations with regional partners. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful 

China that plays a greater and more responsible role in world affairs. We are continuously pursuing a more sustained and substantive military-to-military relationship, which we believe is not only in the interests of both China and the United 

States, but also the region as a whole. As part of this effort, we are working to build 

practical cooperation and dialogue in areas of shared mutual interest. For example, 

we have invited China to participate in the annual Rim of the Pacific Exercise. We 

are also looking to expand our opportunities for frank and open dialogue, which we 

believe promotes trust and transparency, and reduces the risk of miscalculation or 

misunderstanding. To this end, we are increasing senior-level engagements, including visits by the Secretary of Defense, the PACOM Commander, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who was just in China earlier this week), the Secretary 

of the Navy, and reciprocal visits by Chinese counterparts. Just days ago, China 

also accepted a U.S. proposal to form a working group on cyber issues under the 

auspices of the civilian-military Strategic Security Dialogue. In our discussions with 

the Chinese, we continue to urge enhanced communication between our militaries, 

and increased transparency about the intent behind China’s military modernization 

effort. 

The United States has also played an important role in ensuring continued crossstrait stability. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our one-China policy, 

the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary 

to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This longstanding 

policy contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan 

Strait, and we welcome the progress that has been made in cross-strait relations 

in recent years. 

Alongside our attention to bilateral relations, we are deepening U.S. multilateral 

security engagement in the region. Multilateral engagement helps us strengthen 

habits of cooperation that promote trust and transparency, and build regional capacity to respond to transnational challenges such as natural disasters, piracy, proliferation, and trafficking. 

We welcome the leadership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) and believe a strong ASEAN will be essential for regional peace and stability. We are particularly pleased with a relatively new forum, the ASEAN Defense 

Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which has made rapid progress toward action-oriented multilateral defense cooperation. In the few years since former Defense 

Secretary Robert Gates attended the inaugural ADMM-Plus ministerial in 2010, the 

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ADMM–Plus has stood up five staff-level Experts’ Working Groups and will hold no 

less than three multilateral exercises this year. The Experts Working Groups focus 

on HADR, Military Medicine, Peacekeeping Operations, Counter Terrorism, and 

Maritime Security, and have developed work plans aimed at sharing best practices 

and undertaking practical cooperation that builds capacity and increases interoperability. The ADMM–Plus HA/DR–Military Medicine Exercise that will take place in 

June represents a historic advance in ASEAN-led defense cooperation. 

Bringing together ASEAN members, the United States, China, Russia, India, the 

Republic of Korea, and Japan, for multilateral exercises is critical to building regional interoperability and capacity to maintain peace and security and respond to 

shared challenges. This is one reason we decided to increase funding for regional 

exercises and support for the participation by developing countries in multilateral 

training and exercises. 

The second element of U.S. defense strategy in Asia is our efforts to enhance our 

defense posture. U.S. forward defense posture plays an important role in the 

Department’s efforts to shape the security environment in Asia. Shortly after this 

administration came into office, it began to lay the intellectual foundation for the 

importance of U.S. forward presence and posture and how best to develop it in key 

regions. The 2010 QDR outlined the core elements that continue to inform how we 

are pursuing enhancements to our posture; in the Asia-Pacific we seek a posture 

that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. 

To achieve this posture, the Department is modernizing U.S. basing arrangements 

with traditional allies in Northeast Asia, continuing to build up Guam as a strategic 

hub in the western Pacific, and expanding access to locations in Southeast Asia and 

the Indian Ocean Region. 

As U.S. forces return from Afghanistan and reset globally, one of our top priorities 

is to have forces present and positioned in the Pacific to assure regional allies and 

partners, deter threats to regional stability, and prevail in conflicts if necessary. We 

are also taking steps to respond to evolving threats in the region: for example, in 

light of the growing North Korean missile threat, we are enhancing our missile defense posture, including a second TPY–2 radar system to Japan, the deployment of 

a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system to Guam, as well as the increases to our Ground-Based Mid-course Defense system for homeland defense. 

We are making steady progress in our efforts to realign U.S. forces across Japan, 

to ensure our presence is sustainable for the life of the alliance. The centerpiece of 

this effort is in Okinawa. We recently announced a new plan for the consolidation 

of the USMC presence on Okinawa, as Marines relocate to Guam and after MCAS 

Futenma is relocated to a new facility in the northern part of the island. Prime Minister Abe’s recent submission of the landfill permit application to the Okinawa Governor for the Futenma Replacement Facility has reinforced our conviction that this 

plan is achievable and represents the best outcome for the alliance and for the people of Okinawa. 

We are also working to enhance our combined defense posture on the Korean 

Peninsula. As a part of this process, we are working with the Republic of Korea to 

complete the transition of wartime operational control from the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command to the ROK military by December 2015. We are also working to consolidate our footprint on the peninsula, a process that will result in a more 

efficient U.S. posture and that will allow us to return land in the Seoul area to the 

ROK. Over the last few years, we have made great strides in improving our combined defense posture by enhancing intelligence and information-sharing, strengthening operational planning, developing capabilities to address the North Korean ballistic missile threat, enhancing combined exercises, and increasing interoperability. 

In 2011, the Prime Minister of Australia and President Obama agreed to establish 

a rotational U.S. Marine Corps presence in northern Australia of up to 2,500 

Marines and to increase cooperation between our two Air Forces. The first rotation 

of approximately 200 U.S. Marines was successfully conducted from April–September of last year, and the second rotation of Marines arrived in Darwin last week. 

The United States also agreed to closer cooperation between the Royal Australian 

Air Force and the U.S. Air Force that has resulted in increased rotations of U.S. 

aircraft through northern Australia. These two initiatives further enhance the capabilities of both partners by increasing opportunities for combined training and 

enabling both countries to work together even more effectively to pursue common 

interests. 

Our efforts in Australia also help support our commitment to establish an expanded defense presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean, which will 

ensure the United States is postured for a wider array of challenges we face across 

the region, including natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and the proliferation 

and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and illicit goods. To this end, we 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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have agreed with the Government of Singapore to forward deploy up to four Littoral 

Combat Ships. The first of these ships, the USS Freedom, arrived last week, where 

it was warmly received by our Singaporean hosts and the region more broadly. 

Similarly we are also exploring with the Government of the Philippines, opportunities to increase rotational presence of U.S. forces that are geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. 

The third element of our defense strategy in Asia is shifting our long-term capacity and investments toward the Asia-Pacific region. As the United States continues 

to draw down our military presence in Afghanistan, we are increasingly freeing up 

capacity that can be reinvested in Asia. This includes our commitment to employ 

60 percent of our forward-deployed naval forces in the Pacific by 2020, but it also 

includes a broader effort to shift air and ground capabilities, special operations 

forces, and ISR back to the Asian region. 

Additionally, the Department has made a long-term commitment to invest in critical capabilities that will sustain the United States ability to deter and respond to 

any contingency or crisis we may face in the region. In particular, this includes investing in those capabilities that will ensure U.S. forces can maintain access and 

the ability to operate freely in all environments, including those where our power 

projection operations are challenged by adversaries. 

As part of this effort, we are prioritizing investments in our budget to develop 

platforms and capabilities that have direct applicability and use in the Asia-Pacific 

region. The Department has also made a commitment to ensuring our newest and 

most cutting-edge technologies will be deployed first to the Asia-Pacific region. 

These investments include programs to sustain undersea dominance, such as the 

Virginia-class nuclear powered submarine, increased payload, the P–8 maritime 

patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Sensor. We are also focused on sustaining and expanding our air dominance and strike capabilities, through such investments as the fifth-generation Joint Strike Fighter, a new stealth bomber, the 

KC–46 tanker replacement, cruise missiles, and ISR platforms. We are also protecting our investments in future-focused capabilities that are so important to this 

region, such as cyber, science and technology, and space. 

In addition to investments in hardware and technical capabilities, we are also investing in our people: in language and culture skills, regional and strategic affairs—

to ensure that we cultivate the intellectual capital that will be required to make 

good on our rebalance. And we are turning the great ingenuity of the Department 

to the Asia-Pacific region intellectually, to develop new operational concepts and 

ways of engaging partners and deterring and defeating adversaries. 

The final element of our defense strategy is promoting a continued commitment 

to those principles that we believe are essential to building a safe and secure world 

where all can prosper. These include our commitment to free and open commerce; 

open access to the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains; adherence to the 

rule of law; and to the principle of settling disputes through peaceful means, without coercion. These core principles guide the decisions the Department makes every 

day and connects our strategic rebalance to the values that are important to peace 

and security throughout the world. 

This is one reason why we continue to reiterate the importance of agreed-upon 

rules of the road in areas such as the maritime domain. Situations, such as those 

in the East and South China Sea, have the potential to provoke miscalculations or 

misunderstandings that could unintentionally escalate into conflict. For this reason, 

the United States has been clear about our policy in these areas: the United States 

pursues a principles-based policy on maritime disputes. The United States does not 

take a position on the question of ultimate sovereignty in these situations and encourages all parties to employ diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolution 

of these types of matters. The United States has a national interest in the continued 

guarantee of navigational rights and freedoms provided for under international law. 

We are particularly concerned about the potential for an accident or misinterpretations of tactical intentions brought about by the operation of vessels and aircraft in 

proximity to one another and urge all parties to remain vigilant with regard to 

adherence to safe operating procedures. 

At its core, the Department’s efforts to rebalance to Asia are about supporting a 

system that the United States, our allies, and partners, have benefited from for the 

past 60 years. This system has not only enabled billions of individuals to move out 

of poverty, but has also facilitated tremendous democratic reforms, economic growth, 

and prevented deadly conflicts and the devastating casualties and destruction they 

can bring. The fortunes of the United States and our people are inextricably tied 

to the Asia-Pacific region. This is why the United States has been deeply engaged 

in the Pacific for centuries and why we will continue to remain a Pacific power in 

the centuries to come. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to testify before your 

committee today. I look forward to answering any questions you or your colleagues 

may have.

Senator CARDIN. I thank both of you for your testimony and for 

your service to our country. 

Before turning to a round of questioning, I want to recognize 

Senator Rubio for any opening comments that he would like to 

make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

a few minutes late. I will keep my comments brief. 

I appreciate your interest in organizing this hearing on what has 

arguably been the administration’s linchpin of the so-called rebalance toward East Asia. 

As we have read, the administration has taken high-profile steps 

to shore up the idea of a renewed focus on this important region, 

including Presidential participation in regional forums, the deployment of 250 marines in Australia, and rhetorical assurances that 

its request to dramatically reduce defense spending will not come 

at the expense of defense commitments in Asia. 

But our friends in the region are carefully watching whether 

America’s stated commitments to the region are matched by our actions and, more importantly, by our resources, be they diplomatic 

or military. This is especially important given growing geopolitical 

competition in Asia, and the significant resources being spent by 

many countries in the region on their military capabilities. 

From my standpoint, it is important that we clearly understand 

that the administration’s promises include things that are new and 

innovative and things that will be considered game changers 

regarding America’s security commitments in the region. For example, I would like to see more conversation about how NATO or 

other close alliances around the world can contribute to this rebalance, as they have in the past in other parts of the world. 

I do welcome the recent deployment of military assets to the 

region, as well as the decision to increase the number of missile 

interceptors in Alaska. It is a welcome development, given the rhetoric emanating out of North Korea. This renewed focus on missile 

defense is important, given the President’s earlier cuts to these 

programs, but the way in which administration officials have 

implied that many of these resources could be withdrawn do raise 

questions in the region about the duration of our commitment. 

I am very interested in asking questions. So let me just close by 

echoing what I have heard both witnesses say, and that is the 

United States has long been a Pacific power and I think it is critical that we continue to strengthen our existing alliances with 

Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and we help these partners 

also strengthen their relationships to each other. And I also think 

it is a good time to reinvest in relationships with India and hopefully incorporate their security concerns into our regional 

engagement. 

So thank you both for your service to our country and for being 

here today and to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Secretary Helvey, let me start with you, if I might. Secretary 

Hagel is reported to be representing the United States at the May 

31 Shangri-La Dialogue. Can you just share with this committee 

what the United States hopes to achieve in its participation at this 

meeting? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, sir, thank you very much. 

Obviously, I do not want to preempt my leadership in terms of 

what Secretary Hagel may say. But the opportunity for him to participate at the Shangri-La Dialogue will certainly afford us a platform to talk about our strategy for the Asia-Pacific through a 

speech, through interactions with senior leaders there. 

In addition to the speech, there will also be an opportunity to 

meet and interact with senior officials from countries that are 

sending their representatives to the dialogue. So it is part of establishing strong people-to-people relationships with counterparts and 

continue to develop the network that is so critically important to 

accomplishing things in the region. 

Senator CARDIN. I saw a tentative agenda in which U.S. participation was pretty dominant, at least in the first section on our policies on Asia. It seems to me that that region is going to be looking 

at that conference to judge the sincerity of the United States rebalancing strategy as far as security issues in Asia. 

President Obama made it very clear in his speech—I believe it 

was in Australia—that sequestration would have no impact on the 

commitment we have to strengthen our security commitments in 

Asia. 

Secretary Yun, I am curious as to how the Chinese are responding to these developments. We need China’s cooperation as it 

relates to North Korea, and there have been at least some positive 

signs that China shares our concern and wants to make sure that 

the Korean Peninsula is free of nuclear weapons. 

What impact does the realignment of United States military 

presence in Asia have on our relationship with China? 

Mr. YUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me take your questions 

bit by bit because you have got a number of questions there. 

On North Korea, let me try to frame it a little bit. As you know, 

Secretary Kerry was out there only 2 weeks ago. I accompanied 

Secretary Kerry in his stops both in Beijing, in Seoul, and Tokyo. 

And I would say, you know, of course, in Tokyo and Seoul, we conveyed very strongly to our alliance partners what our side has done 

on security defense, military side, as well as commitment that they 

will be defended. That includes extended deterrence. 

With China, the discussions were long and deep, Chinese side, 

and this was coming from all of their leadership. Secretary Kerry 

had met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, as well as 

State Councillor Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang. And their 

point was that they are prepared to engage us in really unprecedented ways in terms of depth and breadth of discussions because 

they too are committed to denuclearization. And as a start, this 

week we have had the chairman of the six-party talks, Wu Dawei, 

in town, and of course, we have Chairman Dempsey in Beijing, as 

well as Deputy Secretary Bill Burns in Beijing. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19

So, Mr. Chairman, in answer to your question, on our side, on 

the diplomatic side, we have got a series of engagements that are 

lined up, and this will be the beginning, I believe, of very in-depth 

discussion with the Chinese side. 

Regarding your second part of your question on how do Chinese 

feel about our renewed focus on Asia; I think there is serious concern on the Chinese side whether this is aimed at them. And our 

response has been, no, it is not aimed at them. It is because we 

perceive our interests, economic interests, our global interests as 

being in Asia, which is why we are going to expend resources. 

In regards to resources, Mr. Chairman, on the diplomatic side, 

you will have noticed the fiscal year 2014 budget which includes, 

both on the diplomatic side, as well as the foreign assistance side, 

requests for an increase of, I think, about 7 percent or so, which 

is kind of more than what other bureaus are doing. So I would like 

to put in a plug for that, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

There have been widely reported episodes of attempted cyber 

attacks against the United States. The origin of some of those 

attacks appear to be China, at least it has been reported that way. 

Now we have some form of an agreement of cooperation that was 

entered into on April 13. We all agree that is a positive sign. But 

is this really sincere or is this an effort being made to perhaps distract us and to perhaps for us to be less on guard? The vulnerability to cyber attack is real, what role does the Rebalance to Asia 

play as far as protecting America against cyber attacks? 

Mr. YUN. First, Mr. Chairman, I will talk a little bit and then 

I will turn it over to my colleague, Mr. Helvey, too. 

Again, in the same trip, I would say Secretary Kerry had a 

lengthy, lengthy conversation on cyber issues with the Chinese 

leadership. Really, there are two dimensions of cyber issues. And 

of course, China and the United States are most significant players 

in cyberspace, and it is very important for us to have a deeper 

understanding together with us. 

And one part of that issue is what I would call business and commercial issues where there have been thefts of business secrets, IP, 

intellectual property, being violated, and I think U.S. business has 

suffered quite a bit at this. And of course, there is another element 

which is the government involvement, state involvement in cyber 

theft. 

And so based on these two issues, we have reached an agreement 

with the Chinese that we will begin a working group that will 

report to what we call the SSD channel, that is the Strategic and 

Security Dialogue. And so we will be having a working group meeting with the Chinese very soon on this. I expect this will happen 

probably before the big dialogues take place in July. 

So let me see if David has something to add. 

Senator CARDIN. I would appreciate it if you could also just tell 

us how sincere you believe the Chinese would be. I assume there 

are the two baskets of what you are talking about. A lot more problems can be caused in cyber, including actual attacks. But you are 

looking at the commercial theft issues, as well as some security 

issues. How detailed have we gotten? And how much of a commitment is there? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

Mr. YUN. Mr. Chairman, these are commitments to begin discussions by forming a working group. So I think it will be premature 

to make any comment on how detailed their commitment is, how 

sincere it is. So, Mr. Chairman, maybe after the first meeting, we 

can report back to you for a better answer to your questions on 

those. 

Senator CARDIN. Secretary Helvey, did you want to add anything? 

Mr. HELVEY. Yes, sir, just very briefly. 

Within the Department of Defense, we are working to enhance 

awareness of a variety of different types of cyber threats. We are 

also developing cyber dialogues as part of our bilateral discussions 

with our allies and partners around the region, again to enhance 

awareness among others of threats and also best practices, things 

like cyber hygiene to reduce the risk that you could be targeted or, 

if you are targeted, to limit the damage that could happen from 

that. 

With China, obviously, we are supporting the State Department 

in an interagency approach to engage the Chinese. We are very 

optimistic about the beginning of this cyber working group under 

the Strategic Security Dialogue. This is an important topic for discussion between the two sides, and we very much look forward to 

participating. 

Senator CARDIN. I would just caution. There are cyber criminals 

that you point out are trying to steal—cyber theft. And there are 

cyber soldiers out there trying to harm or to get a security advantage over the United States. Both we believe are concerns from 

China. So I hope that we are going into this with our eyes fully 

open and recognizing that there are very serious issues here. Dialogue is always helpful. I am for that. But I hope that we are not 

going to compromise on our aggressive action to protect this country against cyber mischief. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Helvey, I wanted to ask you about NATO. What role 

do you see for NATO in the Rebalance to Asia? We have worked, 

obviously, together with NATO in Afghanistan and in other places. 

Is there a role for NATO potentially? Are we exploring that? What 

is your view or what is the administration’s view with regards to 

how we could work with NATO and those assets to help with the 

military component of our rebalance and pivot? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, Senator Rubio, I would say that we have had 

some very initial discussions with NATO partners about the AsiaPacific, but we do not have—there is very little role, I think, that 

has been defined to date about how NATO can play in the AsiaPacific region—NATO as an institution. 

We have had some discussions with our European partners outside of the context of NATO where we find that we have shared 

values and principles as we look toward the Asia-Pacific, and we 

are identifying areas where we can work together to either engage 

in China or to cooperate with other countries in the Asia-Pacific 

region to support common goals. 

Senator RUBIO. One more question, this one with regards to

China’s military. Obviously, we are aware that in this country we 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

have civilian control over the military. Obviously, the commander 

in chief is a civilian. 

How would you describe or what is our understanding of the 

civilian control over military decisions that are made? And in 

particular, I am curious whether it is the military buildup or military decisions in China are the result of military orders that are 

separate from civilian leadership. Are they integrated? What is our 

understanding of that chain of command within the Chinese military structure? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, sir, the Chinese military is an institution of 

the Chinese Communist Party. The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, also the President of China, Xi Jinping, is 

the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. And so the principle of civilian control of the military is embodied in that one individual who presides over the Central Military Commission. 

In terms of the military buildup in China, military modernization 

is something that has been going on for decades. It is something 

that I think has enjoyed a great deal of support among both military and civilian leaders in China. I do not view it as being it is 

just something that the military is doing. Having a stronger military is something that has been a key part of China’s modernization across the board. 

Senator RUBIO. I understand the structure of the chain of command. I guess what I am wondering is are there indications that 

we have of any kind that the military officials in China act with 

a certain level of independence from civilian—for example, do they 

make their own decisions irrespective of what some of the civilian 

priorities might be? Your answer is that it is largely confined to the 

existing structures—our view that they pretty much stay within 

those confines? 

Mr. HELVEY. We have seen evidence and cases in the past where 

there might be frictions or perhaps miscues between the military 

authorities and the civilian authorities in China. This is something 

that Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping himself 

have sought to strengthen, to try to avoid those types of miscues 

and to improve coordination across the bureaucracy. 

Senator RUBIO. And I do not expect you to comment on this particularly because we just do not know a lot of this. But I will tell 

you the context in which I raise it primarily is with these territorial disputes that continue to arise. And the question that I often 

have is, is that a priority of the civilian government that they want 

to push and create some of these conflicts, or is it an emboldened 

military leadership that wants to stretch out and feel its—kind of 

spread its wings a little bit and show what it is capable of doing? 

And I just do not know the answer to that, but it is something we 

want to watch. 

Secretary Yun, I wanted to ask you about some comments Secretary Kerry made about the military rebalance. This is a quote. 

‘‘I am not convinced that increased military ramp-up is critical yet. 

You know, the Chinese take a look at that and say, what is the 

United States doing? They are trying to circle us. What is going on? 

And so, you know, every action has its reaction. I think we have 

to be thoughtful about, you know, some sort of how we go forward.’’

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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And then in a press conference in China on the 13th of April, he 

said the following statement. ‘‘If the threat disappears—i.e., North 

Korea denuclearizes—the same imperative does not exist at that 

point in time for us to have that kind of robust, forward-leaning 

posture of defense.’’

My question is, how do those comments line up with what I 

think has been a pretty clear indication, I hope, from the administration that, in fact, one of the ways we intend to have influence 

in the region is to be able to live up to our security obligations to 

our allies because if you put yourself in the position of some of our 

allies in the region and they see the Secretary of State saying these 

sorts of things, I think it raises some concerns about whether our 

military commitments are there. 

So my question is—obviously, it is a better question for me to ask 

of Secretary Kerry the next time we have him before the full committee. But what is your take on how you reconcile these comments 

with what I thought was a pretty clear indication that we needed 

to have a more robust military presence in the region, not just

vis-a-vis what is happening with North Korea, but in general, to 

assure our allies that they do not have to go on a buying and 

spending spree on their military hardware because we are going to 

live up to our security commitments? 

Mr. YUN. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

I think what we are hearing from the region is that there has 

to be a balance between military presence, as well as nonmilitary 

presence, and this is what I also try to emphasize in my remarks. 

That is, U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific cannot be only military, that it has to have economic content, it has to have content 

such as climate change, education, all those. And I believe that was 

the central point of Secretary Kerry’s remarks you just quoted. 

On the second issue——

Senator RUBIO. And I am sorry to interrupt. I understand what 

you are saying. I agree with what you are talking about. We do not 

just want to be a military power. We want to be an economic and 

diplomatic one and have influence in the region. 

But his comments—and it is not fair to you, I imagine. So I just 

want to say this for the record. His comments did not talk about 

a balance. His comments talked about if the United States builds 

up militarily, there is going to be a counterreaction from China, 

and he also goes on to say if North Korea denuclearizes, then 

maybe we do not need as much of a robust military presence in the 

region. My only point—and I do not expect you to answer for him. 

I do not think that is fair. 

But my only point is I think these comments are concerning to 

our allies in the region who—on the one hand, we are saying do 

not worry, we are serious about our security commitments, and on 

the other hand, they are hearing but those security commitments 

are going to be balanced against our concern that China may not 

like it. 

So I am sorry to interrupt you but I wanted to put that on the 

record. Thank you. 

Mr. YUN. If I may, regarding the second comment on North 

Korea specific, again I think his point was that the additional 

assets we put out there, including the THAAD in Guam, as well 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23

as other missile defense, was specifically aimed because North 

Korean capability had increased, and if there were no longer the 

threat, then it could be adjusted. Again, I do not think there was 

anything that was misleading about that, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. I apologize. I am not claiming that the Secretary 

is misleading us. On the contrary, I am concerned he was actually 

being brutally honest about the administration’s position with 

regards to the region. And I hope that is not its position because 

our allies in the region want to make sure that not only are we 

saying these things, but we are actually in a position to do something about the security commitments. 

My last point for the record. I want to be clear. I actually believe 

the region would be more stable and more peaceful if the United 

States has the capability and the commitment to live up to its security obligations. 

But thank you for your service and thank you for being here. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Let me pick up a little bit where Senator Rubio left off in terms 

of the military buildup in China. Can you put some numbers on 

that, dollars spent over the last 10 years, percent of GDP? 

Mr. HELVEY. I can get you some specifics in terms of the dollar 

figures on an annual basis for the past decade, sir. But I mean, in 

very broad terms, China’s defense budget has increased by over 10 

percent for the past two decades. I think the most recent budget 

increase from this past March was again over 10 percent to something like $120 billion. 

The concern that we have is the pace of this military expenditure, as well as the scope of the investments. China is investing in 

a comprehensive modernization of its military, and this is something that we have documented annually in our reports to Congress on military and security developments involving the Peoples 

Republic of China under the National Defense Authorization Act 

for fiscal year 2000. 

Senator JOHNSON. So if they are spending $120 billion per year, 

can you break that out for me in terms of personnel versus procurement, weapons systems, ships? 

Mr. HELVEY. If I can get that for you in the response for the 

record, sir, I would appreciate that.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information requested for the record by 

Senator Johnson was not supplied from the Defense Department by 

the time this hearing went to press.]

Mr. HELVEY. The challenge is that there is not a whole lot of 

transparency in terms of China’s military spending. I mean, they 

have been able to provide to the United Nations some very gross 

breakdowns in terms of personnel accounts, operations, and equipment. But beneath that level, it is very difficult to establish exactly 

what the budget—which line items for the budget——

Senator JOHNSON. What area, just in general, of buildup is of 

greatest concern to the United States? Is it their naval buildup? 

Mr. HELVEY. Sir, I would say that there is a number of different 

capabilities that we are paying very careful attention to. China’s 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

investments in its nuclear and nuclear capable forces is something 

that we are watching very carefully, investments in its undersea 

warfare capabilities, including submarines, both nuclear-powered 

and conventionally diesel-powered submarines, as well as its longrange conventional precision strike weapons systems, both ballistic 

and cruise missiles. These are part and parcel of what we in the 

Department of Defense refer to as an antiaccess and area denial 

type of strategy which, if put into place and executed, could be 

intended to limit the ability of the United States or other militaries 

from operating in the western Pacific. 

Senator JOHNSON. So when we go about our rebalancing, then 

are we very specifically trying to counter those buildups? I mean, 

is our rebalancing directly related to their buildup? 

Mr. HELVEY. I think the best way to characterize it, sir, is the 

rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is not about China. It is about 

what we are doing with our allies and partners in the region, and 

China can potentially be a partner in this regard. It is what we are 

doing to support and sustain the regional political and economic 

system that has persisted for the past six decades. In this respect, 

the success of the rebalance hinges on having a positive and productive relationship with China. So absolutely, the rebalance is not 

about China. 

What China does, though, of necessity does impact how we think 

about the region and how others think about the region as well. 

Senator JOHNSON. Talk a little bit about the areas where we

actually cooperate where we have agreement with China versus the 

areas that will create stress in the relationship. Either witness can 

answer that one, or both. So we will start with the best area of cooperation. 

Mr. YUN. Sir, I would say we cooperate in a number of fields, and 

even I would count North Korea as one of them in which China has 

hosted the six-party talks for a long time. 

And another area we do cooperate is in the trade area. I mean, 

we have an enormous amount of trade and investment in each other’s country. Certainly this amount of trade—there will be problems, but there has to be substantial cooperation in order for this 

to go on. 

I would also say in the education field. There are tremendous 

amounts of Chinese students in the United States, and there are 

now increasing amounts of American students in China. 

And then some further areas of cooperation we are looking at is 

economic development in Southeast Asia. We have an agricultural 

cooperation project with China on Timor-Leste. 

So I would not minimize our cooperation agenda with China, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. Senator Cardin talked a little bit about cyber 

security issues that have come to light and been publicized. And by 

the way, I appreciate the fact the administration is highlighting 

that. I think information, sunlight is probably the best cure there. 

Can you speak a little bit in terms of what has transpired over 

the last 10 years in terms of just intellectual property and China’s 

cooperation with us trying to protect United States intellectual 

property? 

Mr. YUN. This is a serious issue, IP issues, with China, and we 

have got a number of companies that have suffered from theft of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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IP from the Chinese side. They include some of our optical glass 

wear, as well as, of course, computer information technology. And 

this is a discussion that we have, as you know, under the strategic 

and economic dialogue, and we will continue to have these discussions. We have raised company-specific issues, as well as general 

issues, and this is something that is very serious. Again, Secretary 

Kerry raised it with all four leaders he met with. 

Senator JOHNSON. So as with cyber, we are talking about awareness, we are talking about dialogue, about a working group. Anything concrete occurring that you can report on? Are we proposing 

some not only carrots but sticks? And has there been any success 

in terms of actually enforcement of IP protection? 

Mr. YUN. I cannot cite any successes so far, but of course, the 

problem areas are huge. Let me study the issue and get back to 

you on how we have approached this issue, for example, in WTO 

being one of the multilateral rules, whether that has seen any 

results. But I have not seen any assessment of successes. 

Senator JOHNSON. Let me just conclude. I guess for the record, 

I look at China really as a 1.2 billion person opportunity for the 

United States. But until China, I think, starts enforcing things like 

IP and we really come to grips with the cyber security threat, it 

is going to be very difficult moving forward. So I want to fully cooperate with China, and I certainly want to encourage the administration to continue to highlight the problems and try and get some 

resolution of those issues. But, again, in case my questioning 

sounded a little more hostile, it is not. It is really looking toward 

how we can cooperate. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, clearly, intellectual property and cyber are 

security issues. There is no question about it. They are also economic issues, and we do intend to hold a hearing on the economic 

issues of the rebalance. So we will get into this again. We may also 

get into currency manipulation in China. We certainly will bring up 

the impact that TPP will have on the economics of that region. So 

there is a lot of matters that, Senator Johnson, you are raising that 

are critically important to the United States. And I just want to 

concur. We all want a very productive relationship, mutually beneficial relationship with China, but there are serious issues that 

need to be addressed. 

I want to ask you one or two more questions. Hopefully we can 

cover this pretty quickly. 

Traditionally Australia and New Zealand have been very active 

with the Pacific island countries. China, in the last decade, has 

given a lot more attention to the Pacific islands. As we rebalance 

in Asia, how does China’s participation in the region, particularly 

with the Pacific island countries, affect policies that we might wish 

to pursue? 

Mr. YUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would say there are a number of intersections on how we work 

together with China on the Pacific islands and ocean space. 

Certainly one of them is fisheries, and these are very important 

resources especially for islands like Samoa, Palau, the Marshall 

Islands. So we have our own approach, obviously. We have a compact with some of these countries that protect our fishing rights. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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And so that is one area that we are working very closely with the 

Pacific islands. 

Second is our participation in the Pacific Islands Forum, PIF. 

And that is where all the leaders of the Pacific islands, as well as 

Australia and New Zealand, and we participate. And this is becoming a very important forum, how the United States with enormous 

equities in the Pacific islands deal with these islands, as well as 

outside powers principally, as you mentioned, China. I mean, there 

is an issue. Are we expending the right amount of resources to help 

development, to help overcome some of the problems in the Pacific 

islands? Because in the end, of course, China has really upped 

their game in the Pacific islands. Are we competing effectively? 

And that is a question we are trying to step up. Last year, Secretary Clinton went to participate in the Pacific islands. So it is 

very much in our mind, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I think it should be priority, and I appreciate your saying that. 

Talking generally now on maritime security issues, I mentioned 

in my opening statement the fisheries agreement between Japan 

and Taiwan. I also mentioned the Brunei-Malaysia agreement on 

petroleum. 

Historically the United States has taken the position that maritime disputes need to be resolved peacefully through negotiation 

between the parties and with some orderly process. But these disputes are somewhat frozen in time. They have been there for a 

long, long time. And they could very well mushroom at any time 

with an incident. 

Has the United States looked at using some form of cooperative 

agreements on resources as a model to make progress on some of 

the disputes that exist in that region? 

Mr. YUN. Thank you, sir. 

I wish they would remain frozen in time. The problem is they do 

not. As you can imagine, there are no resolutions. Nobody is ever 

going to give up their claim. So really, the question is, How do you 

manage it? 

One of the models of managing is through joint use, joint exploration, joint agreement. But, of course, in problem cases, each country wants joint use, joint exploitation to be under their sovereignty, 

and that is when it becomes a problem. If all countries were to 

shelve their sovereignty issues and have joint exploration, I think 

that would work out quite well. And there are a number of examples where they have done that. They include ones between Thailand and Malaysia and I think Thailand and Burma have entered 

into joint exploration. So there are some good examples, and we are 

trying to encourage them. But the problem has been in very deeply 

rooted ones. Each country, all the countries will not give up their 

sovereignty, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Secretary Helvey, talking about sovereignty, the agreement to 

allow the Republic of Korea to take wartime command back to the 

country. Does that have any significant impact on the United 

States security commitments on the Korean Peninsula? 

Mr. HELVEY. No, sir, it does not. In fact, the plan that we have 

in place, as we work toward that OPCON transition, Strategic 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Alliance 2015, is a mechanism by which we are actually strengthening our alliance as we are working to prepare and meet the joint 

certification requirements to enable the ROK to take on this responsibility. So far from diminishing our commitment. It is actually 

strengthening it, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. So that does not change the troop levels. 

Mr. HELVEY. We are committed to maintaining the 28,500 troop 

level, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, we thank both of you again for your testimony and for your service. 

We will now go to the second panel. I am pleased to introduce 

Dr. Janine Davidson who is a senior fellow at the Center for a New 

American Security and assistant professor in the School of Public 

Policy at George Mason University in Arlington, VA, where she 

teaches courses on national security policymaking, strategy and 

civil-military relations, and public policy. 

Dr. Davidson began her career in the United States Air Force 

where she was an aircraft commander, senior pilot for a C–130 and 

C–17 cargo aircraft. She flew combat support and humanitarian air 

mobility missions in Asia, Europe, in the Middle East and was an 

instructor pilot at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Welcome. It is a 

pleasure to have you here and thank you for your service. 

You are joined by Dr. Michael Jonathan Green, who is the senior 

vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, an associate professor at the Edmund A. 

Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Dr. 

Green served on the staff of the National Security Council from 

2001 to 2005, first as the Director for Asian Affairs and then as a 

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and 

as Senior Director for Asia. 

It is a pleasure to have both of you before our committee. We will 

start with Dr. Davidson. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JANINE DAVIDSON, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, Chairman Cardin and members of the 

committee, for the opportunity to speak with you today on the 

important topic of the U.S. rebalance in the Asia-Pacific. 

Although most of the significant policy moves here are economic 

or diplomatic, they are of course enabled by a stable and peaceful 

environment. So my comments today will focus on the role of the 

U.S. military in the rebalance. 

Now, my perspective on this topic has been shaped not only by 

my most recent experience serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans where I had the responsibility for U.S. 

global defense posture policy, but also by my experiences at the 

beginning of my career when I served as an Air Force officer and

C–130 pilot stationed at Yokota Air Base, Japan. Flying missions 

throughout the region, including training exercises in Korea and 

Southeast Asia, the evacuation of the Philippines following the 

eruption of Mount Pinatubo, and also in support of POW/MIA repatriation initiatives in Vietnam gave me a front-row view of how our 

engagement in the region builds relationships and promotes peace. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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So in the interest of time, let me just cut to my bottom line up 

front. America’s forward-postured and actively engaged U.S. military has been and will continue to be a smart investment for the 

American people. 

Now, let me just provide three reasons why I believe this is true 

and how it works. 

First, preventing conflict is much better than fighting wars. Our 

military posture in the region, most notably our bases in Japan and 

Korea and previously the Philippines, has underwritten decades of 

peace and enabled the region’s extraordinary economic successes of 

the past 20 years. Thus, the first imperative must be to sustain our 

core deterrence posture and continue to assure our Northeast Asian 

allies against the existential threat posed by a nuclear-armed 

North Korea. As tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula or in the 

South China Sea, the reaffirmation of the security guarantee can 

prevent a destabilizing arms race among nervous countries in the 

region. 

Second, remaining forward-postured is a more effective way to 

promote stability compared to projecting power from our bases at 

home. During times of rising tensions or crises, visibly sending 

forces from the continental United States can not only take too 

much time to be effective, but may also be seen as provocative or 

escalatory, ironically increasing rather than calming tensions. 

Third, remaining forward is an efficient way to promote stability. 

Home-porting ships, for example, closer to their areas of operation 

saves 3 to 4 weeks in transit times and requires one-third fewer 

ships in the inventory, thus saving billions of dollars in acquisition, 

operations, and maintenance costs. Thus, when budgets are tight, 

we can actually get more for less by positioning a larger percentage 

of a smaller force forward, especially in places like Japan or Korea 

where the governments share the costs to build and maintain our 

facilities. 

Going forward, however, we must recognize that this is not the 

same Asia in which we based our forces at the end of World War 

II. Although North Korea continues to menace our allies and now 

even our homeland, necessitating our sustained military commitment in the northeast, vibrant, growing economies across Southeast Asia are enhancing their own militaries and learning to work 

together and with us to promote security and stability across the 

rest of the region. Our presence, policy, and military posture must 

adjust to these changing dynamics. 

New modes of military-to-military engagement and new partnerships will promote stability and burden-sharing throughout the region. The U.S.-hosted RIMPAC, for example, which is the world’s 

largest multilateral maritime exercise, allows militaries from over 

20 countries, including China in 2014, to develop shared norms for 

maritime security. So in addition to promoting interoperability and 

building partner capacity where needed, such military-to-military 

engagement enhances personal relationships and develops modes of 

communication that can prevent mishaps and unintended escalation in future crises. 

Over time, as partner militaries improve their own capability 

and capacity, the possibility of burden sharing increases, ultimately 

preserving U.S. resources as local actors are better able to respond 

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to regional security challenges and to contribute to other multilateral operations in and out of the region. 

So the Obama administration’s strategic approach to the military 

in Asia is wise. They are focused on remaining operationally resilient vis-a-vis core threats in Northeast Asia, while also becoming 

more geographically distributed to address the changing dynamics 

in the southeast. New moves in Australia, Singapore, and elsewhere in the region reflect this vision while also remaining respectful of the domestic political issues in these countries. 

So in closing, I believe that America must remain engaged in this 

vibrant and growing region in ways that will promote the multilateral cooperation, interoperability, and burden-sharing that will 

underwrite the next 70 years of growth and security. I hope Members of Congress will continue to protect this investment and to 

also make the case to the American people for why our military 

presence in the Asia-Pacific remains vital for America’s national 

interests. 

Thank you for having me here today and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Davidson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANINE DAVIDSON

Thank you, Chairman Cardin and members of the committee. I am honored to testify today on the important topic of the U.S. ‘‘rebalance’’ in the Asia-Pacific. I began 

my career as an Air Force officer and C-130 pilot stationed in Yokota Air Base, 

Japan (1990–1993) where I flew missions throughout the region, including multiple 

bilateral training exercises in Korea and Malaysia, the evacuation of the Philippines 

following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, and in support of our POW/MIA repatriation 

initiatives in Vietnam. Most recently, I served for 3 years as the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for plans, where I had the responsibility for U.S. global defense 

posture policy. As such, I helped develop options for the military’s part in the rebalance and was also the cochair for the U.S.-Australia Working Group. Having left 

government over a year ago, my comments today reflect my personal views, not 

those of the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Government, or the Center for 

a New American Security. 

Although most of the significant policy moves for America’s ‘‘rebalance’’ strategy 

are rightly focused on economic and diplomatic engagement, such activities are 

enabled by a stable and secure region. Thus, my comments today will address the 

importance of the Asia-Pacific to U.S. interests as a whole; how a new U.S. role in 

the region can better address emerging challenges and opportunities; and more 

specifically, how a forward postured and engaged U.S. military can support this 

strategy. 

The United States in the Region 

For 70 years America’s sustained forward presence in Asia has been a stabilizing 

force. As the foundation for our key alliances, our military posture in the region has 

underwritten decades of peace and enabled the region’s extraordinary economic successes of the last 20 years. Sustained American military leadership in Asia, through 

which flows 40 percent percent of global trade 1 and which represents nearly a quarter of global GDP,2 has paid dividends in peace and prosperity for America and the 

world. In short, America’s military posture in Asia has been a smart investment for 

the United States. 

Looking to the future, the economic importance of a rising Asia is clear. Maintaining peace and stability in this region is thus vital to America’s continued prosperity. 

But this is not the same Asia in which we based our forces at the end of WWII. 

Although North Korea continues to menace our allies—and now our homeland—

necessitating our sustained military commitment in the Northeast, vibrant growing 

economies across Southeast Asia are enhancing their own militaries and learning 

to work together and with us to promote security and stability across the rest of 

the region. Our presence, policy, and military posture must adjust to these changing 

dynamics. America must remain engaged in this vibrant and growing region, but 

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in ways that promote the multilateral cooperation, interoperability, and burdensharing that will underwrite the next 70 years of growth and security. 

Security Challenges Old and New 

For all the advances in the past few decades, the region still faces a number

of challenges—some familiar, some emerging. North Korea is edging closer to deploying nuclear warheads deliverable by long-range ballistic missiles and has an untested young leader who may still be consolidating his grip on power. China, despite 

a small dip in its economic growth rate, remains a rising strategic competitor to the 

United States with expanding military capabilities and potentially destabilizing domestic problems. Regional maritime disputes abound in the Asia-Pacific and while 

they don’t present challenges as fundamental as those of China and North Korea, 

the risk of miscalculation among claimants increases the chances of sparking conflict, applying pressure on the United States to intervene in defense of its treaty 

allies. Asia is replete with nontraditional security threats as well. Given the importance of Asian shipping lanes, piracy is an enduring challenge as is the potential 

for international terrorist plots emanating from the region. Global climate change 

threatens to exacerbate these challenges over the coming decades through more 

severe natural disasters that will no doubt require military responses. Finally, welldocumented offensive cyber activities in Asia further threaten stability. 

In light of these issues, there is a need for a new model of U.S. leadership in the 

region. Washington must take the steps necessary to secure American economic and 

security interests, assure allies and partners and promote multilateral cooperation 

and adherence to international law. However, although a U.S. presence is widely 

desired by our partners and allies in the Asia-Pacific, a heavy-handed approach 

could undermine U.S. interests and inadvertently reverse longstanding peace and 

stability in the region. Simultaneously, the United States should recognize that 

there is a trend developing of strengthening intra-Asian security relationships in 

Asia. Instead of trying to insert itself into this activity, the United States should 

let it develop organically. While U.S. military planners must continue to plan for 

worst-case contingencies, these plans represent only a part of a larger strategy that 

integrates ‘‘partners’’—not ‘‘host-nations’’—and works in a measured, cooperative 

fashion to promote sustained peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. 

The Value and the Logic of Forward Stationed American Forces 

As Senator McCain made clear in his recent speech at the Center for a New 

American Security, America’s current economic challenges and the debilitating gridlock in Congress, have led many in Washington to call for retrenchment. But the 

idea that disengaging from the world would be in America’s best interest is misguided. American forward military presence remains a wise investment in a globally 

interconnected world, especially in this fiscally constrained environment, for the following reasons.3

First, as our decade-long experience in Iraq and Afghanistan should suggest, preventing wars is undoubtedly cheaper than fighting them. To the extent that America’s presence in Asia can continue to deter enemies from launching attacks that kill 

innocent people and destabilize the global economy, we will save taxpayer dollars 

and precious lives. 

Second, our presence in Asia assures allies that there is no need for them to overmilitarize or, worse, to develop destabilizing nuclear arsenals. If the United States 

were to retrench from the region and create doubts about its commitment to the 

defense of South Korea or Japan, both of those countries, and maybe some others 

in the region, would be pressured by their publics to develop nuclear weapons. 

Although the immediate motivation would be protection against an increasingly belligerent North Korea, a nuclear arms buildup in Northeast Asia would be perceived 

as a threat to other countries and have destabilizing spillover effects across the 

region. Given the potential ripple effects of instability beyond the Asian region, this 

is not a ‘‘new normal’’ anyone in the world should want to see emerge across this 

region.4

Third, forward stationing military assets, especially naval ones, is more efficient 

than rotating military forces from bases at home on an as-needed basis. In addition 

to host-nation financial support, port facilities in allied nations provide a forward 

location for periodic maintenance, saving resources in transit time. Thus, as budgets 

shrink, having a larger percentage of a smaller force forward, is a prudent economic 

choice. 

Fourth, forward stationed forces are better positioned to manage tensions and to 

facilitate collective responses to crises. Deploying forces all the way from the United 

States in times of crisis not only takes more time than might be available; it can 

also be seen as provocative and escalatory. In contrast, having forces in theater conFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ducting regular bilateral and multilateral exercises and other training activities, 

allows for sustained engagement with ally and partner militaries. Such engagement 

promotes interoperability, builds capacity where needed, and, importantly, develops 

personal relationships among military professionals that can pay dividends during 

crises. Over time, as partner militaries improve their own capability and capacity, 

the possibility of burden-sharing increases, ultimately preserving U.S. resources as 

regional actors are better able to respond to regional security challenges and to contribute to other multilateral operations. 

Finally, these steady state activities with our partners and allies promote burdensharing in and out of the region in a self-reinforcing fashion. For example, our 

antipiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa are fully multilateral, with 7 of the 27 participating nations coming from Asia. These real-world multilateral operations, like 

the myriad exercises conducted with partners in Asian waters, further develop rules 

of engagement, interoperability, and shared values for professional militaries that 

respect human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control. Such lessons and common operating frameworks can be brought to bear in places like the Straits of 

Malacca or the South China Sea, where multilateral cooperation can similarly 

address piracy and trafficking issues or mitigate potential territorial disputes and 

freedom of navigation issues. 

The ‘‘Rebalance’’ and the American Military 

The Obama administration’s emphasis on the importance of Asia is a reflection 

of the rising economic role the region plays and the interdependence of our economies. Thus, the economic and diplomatic engagement is the core of the rebalance 

policy. That said, the military has an important supporting role in America’s overall 

Asia-Pacific engagement, as peace and stability in the region enables economic prosperity and free flows of trade. 

The Pentagon’s strategic approach here is wise. Our military posture in Asia is 

meant to be ‘‘operationally resilient’’ vis-a-vis core threats, while also becoming more 

‘‘geographically distributed’’ to address the changing dynamics in Southeast Asia. 

Recognizing that each of the emerging powers in the region has its own interests 

and domestic political considerations, the Obama team also asserted that U.S. military posture should be ‘‘politically sustainable.’’ Thus, while the Pentagon had a 

vision for the long-term changes they might want to see in the region, their adage 

was to ‘‘go slow and consult’’ with regional partners before making dramatic changes 

that might have negative diplomatic repercussions. Thus, the term ‘‘rebalance’’ is 

more appropriate than ‘‘pivot,’’ as the former connotes a more gradual process and 

one that makes adjustments in approach and activities, rather than a simple and 

abrupt repositioning of forces. Moreover the changes are to occur within the region 

as more emphasis is placed on activities and engagement in Southeast Asia (while 

holding strong in the Northeast), as well as across regions, as more American 

resources are made available following the large-scale wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Our military posture in the Asia-Pacific should adjust to the changing dynamics 

and capabilities of emerging partners, while also taking care not to abandon longstanding arrangements that are still working or are still needed. Thus, the first imperative must be to sustain our core deterrence posture and continue to assure our 

Northeast Asian allies against the existential threat posed by a nuclear-armed 

North Korea. Our longstanding posture in this region, including nearly 30,000 

troops in South Korea and an additional 50,000 in mainland Japan and Okinawa, 

are the key to remaining ready to respond to emerging crises. Our bases in Guam, 

which will absorb approximately 5,000 marines from Okinawa, also provide airfields 

and naval ports for a more dispersed footprint and thus promote a more operationally resilient posture. 

Although we need not—and should not—build large new American bases across 

the region, we should also be cautious as we make changes to our legacy basing 

arrangements. As our experience in the Philippines demonstrates, executing a precipitous departure can shock relationships and limit future options. That said, 

where ally countries host our military forces, we must remain conscious of the fact 

that these are not our territories. In places like Japan and Korea, decades of political change and economic growth have altered significantly the local environments 

in which our forces reside. Our posture must account for such shifts, taking an evolutionary, not revolutionary, approach. As the recent adjustments in Okinawa and 

Korea demonstrate, it is possible to make changes to our traditional posture model 

that meet our operational requirements while also respecting our allies’ political 

realities and the need for change.5

Elsewhere in the region, where a robust U.S. footprint would not be desirable or 

practicable, new modes of military engagement by the United States should be 

designed to enhance regional stability. Changing dynamics and challenges in the 

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ASEAN region present opportunities for constructive U.S. military engagement. 

ASEAN countries are thickening bilateral ties among each other across the region 

and promoting cooperative approaches to shared challenges. In contrast to our partners in Europe who are decreasing defense spending, many Asian countries are 

investing in new defense capabilities and building their military capacity.6 The U.S. 

role here should be to promote such regional engagement by hosting some of the 

larger multilateral military exercises, such as RIMPAC7 (Rim of the Pacific) and 

participating in activities hosted by others when invited, such as ADMM, (ASEAN 

Defense Ministers’ Meeting) or PITCH BLACK (multilateral air forces exercise 

hosted by Australia). The fact is, the United States has convening authority in the 

region such that if our military is due to participate, others will sign on. Thus, just 

by showing up, the U.S. presence can act as a powerful catalyst for multilateral cooperation with very little investment. 

As such activity expands, however, it is important that the United States along 

with its allies and other regional militaries ensure that China also has the opportunity to participate. Regular participation in military exercises builds confidence 

among participants, dismisses Chinese misperceptions about ‘‘encirclement’’ or ‘‘containment,’’ and promotes shared norms for multilateral cooperation. Additionally, 

should tensions rise over territorial disputes or other issues, the military-to-military 

relationships forged through such engagement can provide a valuable avenue for 

communication that can avoid miscalculations or unintended escalation. 

Being forward postured is the downpayment that enables all of this engagement. 

The enhanced rotational Marine Corps presence in Australia as well as the four littoral combat ships to be stationed in Singapore are steps in the right direction. The 

agreement with Australia reflects the shared desire to enhance interoperability on 

the very important amphibious role for which the U.S. Marine Corps is so proficient. 

The plan to start small with 250 marines and grow eventually to 2,500, reflects the 

flexible ‘‘go slow and consult’’ approach. The engagement should be assessed each 

year, lessons should be incorporated, and each country should remain flexible along 

the way to the larger partnership. Meanwhile, the LCS, is the right platform for 

the maritime challenges in the region. U.S. forces’ participation in the region’s multilateral and bilateral exercises on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/

DR) not only improves local capability and capacity to respond locally to such crises, 

but also enhances the general interoperability among all of the militaries participating that will pay dividends in cooperative military responses to future crises of 

any sort. 

These new models of engagement can be replicated elsewhere in the region. 

Although the United States traditionally thinks of Southeast Asia as a maritime 

domain, for many of the countries in the region their armies are the dominant military branch. Thus, we might consider more army-to-army engagements and partner 

capacity-building efforts focused on land forces as a complement to our many maritime efforts. 

Going forward, discussions with the Philippines and Vietnam are also promising. 

From a U.S. perspective, operating agreements in new places enhance our own operational resiliency while military-to-military engagement promotes stability. We 

must, however, remain savvy about the rising tensions in the region. As we promote 

stronger bilateral ties through military engagement, we must find a balance 

between assuring our allies and accidentally emboldening them to take more provocative actions that might enflame tensions. Our allies should not mistake our 

enhanced engagement throughout the region as an effort to encircle China or as 

carte blanche to fan the flames over territorial disputes. In short, we should affirm 

our commitment to defend our allies against attack; while also making it clear that 

we do not condone military aggression. 

The Immediate Challenge 

With Asian defense budgets rising and weapons proliferating, the United States 

must continue to serve as a moderating influence in the Asia-Pacific region, promoting shared values for the rule of law, human rights, and good governance. The 

low-cost, high-payoff initiatives outlined here should be protected as we allocate our 

stressed defense dollars. As Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, asserted, the 

Pentagon is ‘‘turning the great ingenuity of our Department to the Asia-Pacific 

region, not only in hardware and technical investments, but intellectually—in language and culture skills, regional and strategy affairs.’’ 8 Congress should support 

such investments that underwrite our rebalance in the Asia-Pacific. 

But for countries in Asia, the uncertainties created by political gridlock in Washington can have a destabilizing effect. Strategic competitors like China are 

emboldened by American political dysfunction and officials and strategists in allied 

and partner countries fear that the United States will not remain committed to the 

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region, despite rhetoric to the contrary. It is imperative that the United States 

sends strong signals to allies like Japan and South Korea that we are adapting our 

security relationships to the changing strategic environments. Our partners must 

believe that they can count on continued U.S. presence and leadership. Lack of faith 

in U.S. commitment will lead to further hedging by our partners and allies; and 

such uncertainty will complicate an already complex web of security relations in the 

region with the greatest long-term economic importance to the United States. Congress has a vital role to play, not only in budgeting and oversight, but also in affirming our commitment to our allies and in speaking directly to the American people 

about the importance of Asia and our national interests there. 

In closing, let me express my gratitude to the committee for its attention to this 

important issue and for providing me with the opportunity to speak with you today. 

Thank you.

————————

End Notes

1 ‘‘Malacca Strait is Strategic Chokepoint,’’ Reuters, 4 March 2010; http://in.reuters.com/article/

2010/03/04/idINIndia-46652220100304. 2World Trade Organization, Statistics Database: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDB

CountryPFReporter.aspx?Language=E. 3Miche`le Flournoy and Janine Davidson, ‘‘Obama’s New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S. 

Foreign Deployments,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July/August, 2012, pp. 53–63. 4 ‘‘Rising Voices in S. Korea, Japan Advocate Nuclear Weapons,’’ Voice of America, February 

12, 2013; http://www.voanews.com/content/rising-voices-in-south-korea-japan-advocate-nuclearweapons/1604309.html. 5 In Okinawa, the overall number of marines will be reduced from approximately 18,000 to 

10,000 by moving some to Guam, Hawaii and elsewhere in the region. In Korea, U.S. military 

personnel are moving to less populated parts of the country to accommodate growth in more 

urban areas. Karen Parish, ‘‘U.S., Japan, Agree on Okinawa Troop Relocation,’’ Defense News, 

April 27, 2012; http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=116105; T.D. Flack, ‘‘Yongsan 

Relocation Plan Moving Forward,’’ Stars and Stripes, July 10, 2005, http://www.stripes.com/

news/yongsan-relocation-plan-moving-forward-1.35625. 6 ‘‘Military Spending in Southeast Asia,’’ The Economist, March 21, 2012; http://www.

economist.com/node/21551056. 7 ‘‘PACOM Supports China Invite to RIMPAC 2014,’’ Navy Times, September 19, 2012;

http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120919/NEWS/209190323/PACOM-supports-China-inviteRIMPAC-2014. 8 ‘‘The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective,’’ Ash Carter, speech delivered 

Asia Society, New York City, August 1, 2012; http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?

SpeechID=1715.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Dr. Green. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL J. GREEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GREEN. Chairman Cardin and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to talk about the Rebalance to Asia. 

Today, virtually all of our allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific 

region want to increase security cooperation and engagement with 

the United States in large part because of the rise of China. But 

many of them trade more with China than they do with us, including Japan, Korea, Australia, three of our most important allies. 

And so none of them wants to be ever put in a position where they 

have to choose between Washington and Beijing. 

So therein lies the environment within which we need to 

strengthen our partnerships. We need to be ambitious, but we need 

to be subtle. We are not always good at subtle, but we are going 

to have to be. 

I agree with Dr. Davidson. I think the administration’s rebalance 

is generally the right strategy. CSIS was asked by the Congress to 

do an independent assessment of the strategy, which I co-led with 

my colleague, David Berteau. We had some specific quibbles which 

are available in the report. But let me focus on five areas that 

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concern me going forward about how we are working with allies 

and partners. 

First, Senator Rubio and Senator Johnson asked about the maritime disputes in the first island chain. One thing that concerns me 

is that we, in the United States or in the administration, do not 

have a clear consensus on what is behind these disputes. Some people argue that it is nationalism. Others argue it is resources. 

I think the underlying theme in these disputes along the first

island chain in the East China Sea and the South China Sea is 

China’s pursuit of what in the PLA has called the ‘‘Near Sea’’ doctrine, dominance over the waters near their coast, which is a logical thing for any rising power to do. But it puts this in a particular 

context. 

And frankly, we have not always been consistent in how we articulate our interests and our commitments. We do not have a position on these territorial claims, but we need to be crystal clear and 

consistent that we will oppose efforts at coercion against partners 

and allies. 

A second concern. If we are going to strengthen these partnerships and especially in a time of limited resources, we need to be 

much more agile and smart about how we do partnership capacity 

building. We ought to be doing a lot more building of equipment 

together, submarines, jets. We need to fix our broken foreign military sales, FMS, system so we can get things to allies and partners 

when they need them. And we need our Pacific Command and the 

Pentagon and the White House to be thinking through what capacity we want our partners to have and look for opportunities to 

advance that dialogue. 

The third issue. We need to do a better job networking our alliances. For three administrations, we have built trilateral partnerships: Japan-Korea-United States; Japan-United States-Australia. 

They are more important than ever. Right now the Japan-Korea 

leg is a bit broken. We are not going to fix the historical issues 

between those two countries, but we need to be doing more to keep 

them both focused on common operating procedures, intelligence 

sharing, and the kind of things that add to everyone’s security in 

the region. 

The fourth concern. Dr. Davidson touched on our realignment 

strategy. We found in our independent assessment that the idea of 

dispersing our forces is very logical. We face ballistic missile 

threats. Dispersal is one answer to that. We have more requirements for engagement across Southeast Asia and the southeastern 

part of the island chain. Dispersal is necessary for that. And we 

want our alliances with Japan and Korea to be sustainable, and so 

taking the pressure off Okinawa and Seoul makes a lot of sense. 

I understand in Congress there is a lot of frustration with the 

administration’s realignment plan. The budgets are slippery. The 

politics are complicated. But the bottom line is Prime Minister Abe 

in Japan has publicly committed to implementing the Futenma 

replacement plan in Okinawa. President Park Geun-hye and her 

predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, are 100 percent behind our plans to 

realign forces around Camp Humphreys. It would be unfortunate 

if frustration over flaws in these plans—and there are flaws—

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caused us to do a cold stop in place. We would lose a lot of credibility, a lot of momentum. 

Finally, the security dynamic in the region is becoming more 

complicated in cyberspace, outer space, and in the nuclear realm. 

We have dialogues with our allies on these areas. We need to really 

ramp them up. We need to be making sure that we are credible to 

them in terms of our doctrine and our capabilities for the expanding and complicated nuclear threat from North Korea and with the 

Chinese nuclear military modernization. We need to be talking to 

them about cyberspace and outer space so that we have some common operating procedures, we understand what our roles and missions are, what capabilities we think we each need so that we are 

able to jointly deal with these challenges. I know the Department 

of Defense is working on these things, but we have fewer resources 

and the problems are more complex, and we are going to have to 

step our game up considerably in this region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL J. GREEN

Chairman Cardin, Senator Rubio, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you 

for asking me to testify before you today. 

For two centuries the United States has pursued policies that kept Asia and the 

Pacific open to our trade and our values and that prevented a rival hegemon from 

closing the region off to us. Today Asia is returning to the center of global affairs, 

and Americans knows it. Sixty percent of our exports go to the region now and polls 

show that for the first time Americans consider Asia to be the most important part 

of the world to our national interests. 

However, just as global power is shifting to Asia, power dynamics within Asia are 

also shifting. Some scholars argue that we are returning to a Sino-Centric system 

in Asia, pointing out that China trades more with America’s major allies—Japan, 

Korea, and Australia—than the United States does. This thesis is popular in Beijing, of course, where the forces of history are measured primarily through such material metrics. However, these trade figures miss something more fundamental 

about prevailing Asian views of their own region’s future. That vision is one in 

which regional integration is guided by the kind of open and rules-based order we 

have sought throughout our history of engagement with Asia. Recent surveys by the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and other institutes have 

demonstrated that a growing number of elites across Asia are embracing democracy 

and the rule of law as essential Asian values. Burma’s transition, despite remaining 

pitfalls, stands as an example of this trend. And Burma’s leaders tell me that their 

example was Indonesia; and Indonesia’s example of democratic transition was 

Korea. 

China stands out in the region as a country where the elite do not yet embrace 

these norms, and polls across the region demonstrating wariness of China’s rise reflect this to some extent. The so-called ‘‘Beijing consensus’’ of authoritarian economic 

development may resonate in other parts of the world, but among the major states 

of the Asia-Pacific region this is not an attractive ideology. Nor, frankly, is there 

that much of a consensus in Beijing about the so-called ‘‘Beijing consensus.’’

In terms of U.S. interests, therefore, the key is to ensure that the future vision 

of Asian order is written by all the powers in the region without fear of coercion, 

and with confidence in American forward presence and engagement. China’s rise 

may be the central issue in Asia, and every administration since Richard Nixon’s 

has worked on improving trust and cooperation with China. That will be even more 

important and challenging in the years ahead. However, to get China right (as Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, and a number of us have argued in a series of reports 

at CSIS), we have to get Asia right. 

Today, almost every country in the region wants closer ties to the United States 

because of China’s growing power. We must remain mindful that none wants to ever 

be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing, but the appetite for increased 

engagement across the Pacific is strong. 

Last year CSIS was asked by the Congress and the Department of Defense to conduct an independent assessment of the administration’s strategy for realigning our 

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forward presence and expanding engagement in the Asia-Pacific. After extensive investigation, a team I led with my colleague, David Berteau, determined that the 

general thrust of the administration’s so-called ‘‘rebalance’’ to the region was consistent with U.S. interests and resources. Frankly, despite the hype about a ‘‘pivot’’ 

to Asia, we found that the policy largely built on existing plans and policies started 

in the Bush and even Clinton administrations. 

There were a number of areas, however, where we determined that the administration’s strategy was flawed in terms of either concept or communication to the 

Congress. The Defense Department has addressed a number of these areas and I 

would single out Deputy Secretary Ash Carter and Assistant Secretary Mark 

Lippert in particular for taking the initiative to ensure better articulation and 

implementation of the Department’s policies. Four broad areas of concern remain 

with respect to engagement of allies and partners, however. 

First, I do not believe that there is a consensus within the administration about 

why there are growing tensions along the First Island Chain, which extends from 

the Japanese archipelago through the Senkaku Islands, the Philippines, and the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Some administration officials’ comments 

seem to suggest that the Philippines, Japan or Vietnam are provoking Beijing and 

that our goal should be to prevent these allies and partners from entrapping us in 

an unwanted confrontation with China. Others see the disputes as the result of China’s effort to establish dominance over its so-called Near Sea and to complicate any 

U.S. intervention in security crises along the Asian littoral. The assessment of this 

struggle is fundamental to our understanding of what deterrence and reassurance 

strategies are necessary with our allies and partners. I would place more of the causality on the second factor—China’s pursuit of a Near Sea strategy—but if the 

administration is worried about our allies entrapping us in a conflict, then it is important to understand that insecurity on their part makes accidental conflict more 

likely. We should be deepening our security cooperation and working through these 

maritime security problems with them so that we are inside their decisionmaking 

loop and able to both reassure and advise on de-escalation strategies in the event 

of a crisis. The administration also needs to establish greater consistency of message. We cannot say enough that while we do not take a position on the territorial 

disputes themselves, we do have a strong national interest in ensuring that coercion 

is not used against our allies or any nation seeking peaceful resolution of these territorial issues. This goes to the fundamental question of who decides the future 

regional order and how it will be decided. 

Second, we have not established a coherent vision of what partnership capacity 

is necessary in the region. If we did, our allies and partners would know what it 

is. Instead, I have heard from senior Australian and Japanese defense officials who 

say that they cannot find an authoritative voice in the administration who can tell 

them what requirements we would like them to have. The Air Force tells their Air 

Force and the Navy tells their Navy, but we need a top-down integrated assessment 

of the capabilities we think our allies and partners need to support the larger strategic goals in the region and then we need a comprehensive plan to build that 

capacity. The decision to review the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines will provide an 

important opportunity to do just that with Japan; recognizing, of course, that the 

Japanese side will appropriately have a view on the capabilities they would like us 

to retain or strengthen. In Korea we have made progress along these lines with the 

planning for Wartime Op/Con transfer in 2015. However, the U.S. vision of partnership capacity across the region has to be integrated in PACOM and the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense on a region-wide basis. We did this in the 1980s when the 

Soviet buildup prompted the U.S. maritime strategy at PACOM and a common 

vision for the capabilities we and our allies needed to maintain deterrence and the 

common defense. 

Third, we need to sustain our support for networking of alliances, particularly 

through trilaterals such as the U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-India, or U.S.-

Japan-Korea groupings. Unfortunately, and through no fault of the administration’s, 

the Korea-Japan leg is very weak right now. Seoul refused last year to sign a basic 

agreement on military information-sharing with Japan and contentious politics over 

history have prevented much forward movement. Yet given North Korean provocations, this is probably the most important of the trilaterals to get on track. I do 

not think the United States can solve the historical and territorial issues complicating Japan-ROK relations, but we can make clear to both allies that moving forward is a priority for us. I know that your two witnesses from the administration 

are working this, but frankly, they will need backup from the White House as well. 

Fourth, we need to keep moving forward on realignment of our forces. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has committed to implementing the Futenma Replacement Facility 

(FRF) plan and we should support him. We concluded in our CSIS assessment that 

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37

this plan was the best of a series of politically complicated options. With Prime Minister Abe’s personal commitment the prospects are improving and worth pursuing. 

The same stands for our plans for consolidation of U.S. bases in Camp Humphreys 

and other facilities in Korea. I know from our CSIS assessment that there is frustration in Congress with the vague cost estimates and complicated politics of the 

realignment plan, and we had a number of adjustments we recommended in the 

report, including built-in reviews of progress with the Congress. However, a stopin-place with respect to realignment plans would undercut support for our presence 

and confidence in our ability to execute strategy. Ultimately, realignment makes 

sense in terms of dispersing assets in the face of new ballistic missile threats; 

improving engagement along the Asian littoral and the southern part of the First 

Island Chain; and reducing the burden of a concentrated military presence in places 

like Seoul and Okinawa. 

Finally, we need to recognize that the threat environment is constantly evolving 

in this region, particularly with respect to nuclear, cyber and outer space challenges. 

We need constant dialogue with our allies to ensure that our extended deterrent 

capabilities and doctrine with respect to nuclear threats are credible to them; that 

they have the necessary capabilities—particularly missile defense—and that we are 

developing the necessary capabilities and doctrine to ensure credible deterrence and 

defense in cyber and outer space. We have dialogues on all these areas with our 

key allies, but we have considerable work to do before we begin to turn those dialogues into joint strategies.

Senator CARDIN. Well, once again, I thank both of you for being 

here and for your testimony. 

It is very clear that this administration is committed to the rebalance in Asia, meaning a stronger U.S. presence in that region 

on security issues. That is clear by the steps that have already 

been taken by this administration on troop movement. It is also 

true when you take a look at the President’s budget that he submitted to Congress where additional resources are made available 

to East Asia and the Pacific. 

For those countries that depend upon the United States for security, that is good news. They welcome that announcement and the 

actions that are taken. But as has already been pointed out, one 

major country in that region is not exactly thrilled with greater 

United States military and security presence, that being, of course, 

China. 

China is a very strategic player. They are very calculating in all 

decisions that they make, very much focused on the impact it has 

on their country, and they certainly want a stable region, but they 

are not exactly thrilled by having more United States military 

presence in the region. We need China’s cooperation on North 

Korea to resolve that in a peaceful manner. 

So the question has been asked by, I believe it was, Senator 

Johnson or Senator Rubio or myself what does the United States 

do—as it rebalances with greater security presence in Asia—to 

build a more constructive relationship with China? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Well, thank you for the question. 

This is one of the issues that we talk about a lot. There is no 

perfect answer. We often think of the need to assure allies and to 

deter aggression from anyone in the region requires a robust presence. But it is a bit of a black art. Right? Because as you start to 

do that, then you get to the top of the curve, as you just pointed 

out, and maybe start to provoke the very behavior that you are trying to prevent. So the problem is you never know where you are 

on the curve and you do not know where that point on the curve 

is. 

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And so what it requires, I think in my opinion, is robust engagement and dialogue all along the way, which is part of what I think 

the strategy is. And like I said in my remarks and in the previous 

panel, as they pointed out, some of these territorial disputes, for 

instance, are going to persist. People will have their own sovereign 

interests and they will have their own domestic politics that they 

have to consider. So this is where military-to-military engagement 

focused on shared interests like humanitarian assistance, disaster 

relief pays off in other ways. When you have shared norms for 

operating in the region, you can have military-to-military relationships developed over time where you can use those in times of crises to tamp down crises. 

I do not think it is a perfect science. I do think it is an art. But 

I do believe that you have to take a long-term approach to this very 

problem where you continue to reassure the Chinese especially. 

One other element. When America shows up on some of these exercises or in anything, they act as a really powerful catalyst. Other 

people show up and you get more robust multilateral cooperation. 

I think it is really important that as we continue to do that and 

as the actors in the region do that themselves, that they continue 

to include China in those activities. If they actively or accidentally 

do not include China, then it will only feed that very dynamic that 

you described. 

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Green. 

Dr. GREEN. It is a hard question. Nobody knows exactly where 

the tipping line is between dissuasion and provoking what scholars 

call a security dilemma, that China starts reacting so much we create the problem we are trying to avoid. I would emphasize three 

tools that will help us. 

First, every President since Richard Nixon, no matter what they 

said on the campaign trail, when in office made it very clear they 

were going to work hard to not only maintain but expand the scope 

of United States-China relations. And every President in one way 

or another has done that. So the first tool is we need to, at the 

Presidential level and the Congress, make it clear to Beijing that 

that bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy continues and 

we want to work on more stuff together with China, and we are 

going to try to nurture and grow this relationship. 

The second tool, I think, is we need to recognize—and it is important that Beijing recognize—the rebalance came in the wake of a 

series of quite aggressive Chinese moves in 2009 and 2010 in the 

East China Sea and the South China Sea. And the demand side 

was important in this equation. It was our allies and partners who 

were calling for more U.S. engagement and more U.S. presence in 

this period. So we should not be apologetic about that. 

I think the effect on China was important. What happened after 

the rebalance and the strategic guidance in 2012, including the 

announcement of the Marine deployments, was that the Chinese 

started coming back to their Southeast Asian counterparts and 

agreeing to a code of conduct discussion on how they would handle 

the South China Sea. 

So the region is demanding this cooperation with the United 

States—and they do not want too much of it, as I said. They do not 

want to be confronting Beijing if they do not have to—I think that 

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has an actually quite important effect on China. Now, the Chinese 

side will continue to argue it is containment, but I think they have 

drawn a lesson. They imposed a self-inflicted wound and on-side 

goal in 2010 by pushing their neighbors closer to us. And that is 

not something we should be apologetic about. 

And finally, we have to be consistent. That is why I mentioned 

consistency in our declaratory policy and our understanding of 

what is happening with these territorial disputes. Part of the problem with the rebalance, or the so-called pivot, was it looked reactive and in many ways was reactive. And we, for a variety of reasons, got in a position where we had to, in effect, double down and 

demonstrate we were committed to the region. We probably should 

not have gotten there in the first place. We should not get to the 

point where we are having to adjust suddenly because the balance 

of power is out of whack. 

That is partly why forward presence is important. As Dr. Davidson said, if we have to surge from the homeland, that is provocative. If we are there and have partnerships and have presence, the 

dissuasion effect is there without the provocation. 

So we let ourselves in 2009 get in a place—and 2010—where we 

had to, because of demand side pull from our partners and allies, 

demonstrate our commitment, and that fueled some of this rhetoric 

in Beijing about containment. So consistency is also key. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for those responses. 

Dr. Davidson, you mentioned military-to-military. Let me put 

this question to both of you in context. The White House issued a 

security sector assistance policy in April 2013 that I agree with. It 

says one of our goals is to promote universal values such as good 

governance, transparent and accountable oversight of security 

forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and 

effective justice, and respect for human rights. I fully agree with 

that. As we deal with security issues in countries, we should be 

always promoting good governance values. 

Well, some of the countries in Asia that we are dealing with 

where we are looking at military-to-military, their record in this 

regard is not exactly the best. So how do we balance our concerns 

for human rights with our military-to-military relationships? You 

can pick whatever country you want, but I will mention Vietnam 

because it is a country that has received a great deal of attention 

and one in which we have made substantial improvements in our 

relationship over the last several years, and yet, its record in regards to good governance is not where we need it to be and there 

is a great deal of interest in military-to-military. So how do we balance that? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. This is a bit of a conundrum on the one 

hand because some of the countries, just in general, who have the 

most problems are the ones who need the most engagement. On the 

other hand, there is a need to balance carrots and sticks. Right? 

So I am personally not of the opinion that completely removing 

engagement and isolating any country is going to help the problem. 

That said, we cannot continue to throw good efforts after bad over 

time. So I think that what we need to do is have engagement but 

then also have firm dialogue and conversation about whether or 

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not that engagement will be enhanced or whether it will be continued over time if the countries in question can clean up their act. 

In general, military-to-military engagement, I think, is a positive 

force for enhancing the kinds of professionalized militaries that you 

are talking about. We have a longstanding history of doing that 

well, and we had a lot of mistakes along the way. I think we should 

be learning from those experiences in the cases that you cite. 

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Green. 

Dr. GREEN. The capacity of Vietnam and Burma, or Myanmar, is 

instructive in this regard. They are both countries that want to 

engage with our military more. They are both countries that have 

in different places and different ways human rights or democracy 

or governance concerns. 

In the case of Vietnam, the military is not engaged in extensive 

repression at home, but the system denies religious freedom and 

has problems with governance, corruption, and obviously although 

there are reforms in Hanoi, obviously limitations on political 

expression. So in the case of Vietnam, I think we press our case 

in a variety of ways. There are legislative tools to do that. There 

are diplomatic tools to do that, in particular on religious freedom. 

But the military I think we can engage more broadly. 

Burma is different. The Burmese military is actively engaged in 

11 different counterinsurgencies. It would be very hard for us to 

engage in IMET or E–IMET or other forms of military exchange, 

to vet the officers. It would be, frankly, hard to find officers who 

were not in some way or another connected with some pretty 

brutal—you can call them counterinsurgencies. You can call them 

repression. You can call it forced resettlement. So I do not think 

personally we can go to IMET or E–IMET with a country like 

Burma, or Myanmar, right now. 

But there are other things we can do. I was in Burma last summer and spent time with the Ministry of Defense. They are interested in training their troops. They hand out to every second lieutenant a piece of paper that says Myanmar is now a democracy. I 

said, is that all it says? And they said, yes, that is basically it. We 

can engage, I think, not through IMET or traditional channels but 

in other ways in helping them think through how do they train, 

how do they create a doctrine and a training program to understand what militaries do in democracies. 

So we are going to have to be agile and do it case by case. And 

those two countries, illustrate, I think, the kind of menu we need 

to think about. 

Senator CARDIN. I think you both raised very valid points there. 

I would point out with a country such as Vietnam, it is reasonable for us to insist upon mechanisms to improve good governance 

as the price of admission for a military-to-military operation. 

I understand your original comments, Dr. Davidson, about avoiding conflict is always better than having to fight a war, and I agree 

with that completely. And having a country that has a sustainable 

economy and good governance makes it much more likely that we 

are going to have an ally and not a country that will present problems in the future. So, yes, we want to build up a sophisticated, 

professional military capacity within these countries. That is absolutely correct. We do. And military-to-military helps. But if they do 

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not have the good governance structure, it is not going to provide 

the security we need to avoid the type of conflicts in the future. So 

it seems to me that we really need to make this an understanding 

up front, particularly in a country like Vietnam. 

Now, you raise a very good point about Burma. That is a different situation. It is a much more complicated situation. And our 

expectations in Burma—are on a different time schedule than Vietnam. Both have significant problems. But we can, I think, manage 

in both countries to make progress on good governance. 

Let me ask one last question dealing with the forward deployment. You raise a good point that it is a lot easier to have troops 

in place than having to move troops in for any reasons. But part 

is also the perception of America. We want our engagement in Asia 

to bring about a positive view of America to the people of Asia. We 

want them to look at us as an ally and friend. We would like them 

to be customers of our products. We would like them to share our 

values. But if they look at us more as just coming over to knock 

someone over the head that they do not seem to have a concern 

about, that might well present some problems for America advancing its values. 

So as we look to this rebalancing with a greater U.S. presence, 

a greater security presence, how do we go about doing that in a 

way that maximizes the popular view of America in Asia that in 

the long term would have a very positive impact on America’s 

interests? Any suggestions? 

Dr. GREEN. Sure, thank you. Yes, a few suggestions. 

One: the countries where we have troops or bases that have the 

largest footprint, Japan and Korea, are the countries in Asia where 

we are most popular. And so we need to sustain that high level of 

support in the countries where support for the alliance is highest. 

We need, I think, to remember that these are countries that have 

per capita GDP’s comparable to our own that are very successful. 

A place like Futenma, the Marine Corps air station in Okinawa, 50 

years ago was surrounded by fields and rice paddies. Now it looks 

like downtown Bethesda where I live. Yongsan, the major Army 

base in Seoul, might as well be in Manhattan. That is why realignment is important. 

We also need to find ways to give our allies more ownership of 

bases. OPCON transition in Korea, giving wartime command—

transitioning that to Korea is an example. In Japan, people like me 

and others in the administration have talked about joint use of 

facilities for a long time. The Japanese ground self-defense forces 

would like to collocate some of their infantry regiments with our 

Marines so they can learn how to do amphibious operations. And 

for bureaucratic reasons, we have been slow rolling them. We ought 

to be looking at ways to have flags that are not only Japanese and 

American flags on these bases, but actually Japanese commanders 

commanding the bases. We ought to be shifting toward that so that 

there is more ownership of our presence to make it sustainable. 

And finally, I think we have an asset in our National Guard and 

Reserves who performed amazingly well in Southwest Asia and 

Afghanistan and Iraq and who represent our whole country geographically and who are coming home. And I think in a variety of 

ways we can look at rotating guard and reserve units in small 

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units to engage in this region. It will show the best examples of 

civil-military relations. There are specialty skills the guard and 

reserves have. And it will really introduce Asia to communities 

across this country. 

So those are a few examples where we ought to be, I think, more 

agile on the question you raise. 

Senator CARDIN. Do you both agree with the assessment that 

was given by the last panel that the transfer of the wartime military command in the Republic of Korea to Korea from the United 

States—that there is not a risk factor looking at what is happening 

in North Korea today? Is that a realistic change that will take 

place in 2015 without affecting U.S. security interests? 

Dr. DAVIDSON. Yes, I do agree with the previous panel with 

David Helvey on that. We worked closely with the Koreans for 

years. I think that it reflects a success story in partnership actually 

that the Koreans are ready, willing, and able to take on the operational control. 

The military that we have on the peninsula are incredibly professional, and they have been working for years to make sure that 

this transition goes well. And it has been pushed off once or twice 

because they did not think it was time. So I think that is sort of 

a good news and bad news story because I do think that they are 

going to make sure that they are ready by the time it happens. And 

I do think they are tracking to do that. 

Dr. GREEN. I think we should proceed with plans for wartime 

OPCON transition for the reasons that Dr. Davidson said. Korea 

is ready. It is a sovereign country. And also there is a military or 

operational problem to having this seam. In peacetime they command; in wartime we command. That 24- or 48-hour transition 

when you are going from one commander to the other is a very vulnerable moment in the midst of any crisis with North Korea. And 

so a seamless sequence of knowing who is going to be in command 

at every stage of a crisis would be advantageous to us, especially 

given North Korea’s more provocative moves. Changing hats, 

changing jobs, once we go to a full crisis, is not the kind of bureaucratic game you want to play. So it makes sense to move forward. 

I am a little more concerned, though, than the previous panel 

about how we are doing. There is a process for validating that we 

are ready to do this transition. And my concern—and we put this 

in our independent report on forward engagement that CSIS conducted for the Congress and the Pentagon. My concern is, first of 

all—and we can make that available. 

But my concern is, first, that while very capable colonels in U.S. 

Forces Korea are validating that we are ready—I think there also 

needs to be a higher level check from the Congress and from OSD, 

and also from the White House to make sure we have really put 

in the capabilities that we said Korea had to have before we were 

ready for this. 

And the second concern is not capabilities per se, but the signal. 

There is considerable opposition still within Korea to doing this 

because particularly conservatives are worried this sends a signal 

of weakness to the North. And we should not take that lightly. 

So I would proceed, but I would not go through the kind of automatic validation and testing we are doing now. I would elevate it, 

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and I think the Congress and the President need to think this 

through and make it clear that it has been thought through so that 

we can have confidence in the capabilities and that we are not 

sending the wrong signal as we move to this next stage in the 

alliance. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I thank both of you for your testimony. I 

think it has been extremely helpful in understanding the challenges of our policies in this region. As I said at the beginning of 

this hearing, this our second hearing in a series. We will be having 

further hearings dealing with other dimensions of the rebalance 

policy. Your participation has been extremely valuable. So thank 

you all very much. 

With that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Æ

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