TS

NOT MEASUREMENT

SENSITIVE

 DOE-HDBK-3010-94

 December 1994

DOE HANDBOOK

AIRBORNE RELEASE FRACTIONS/RATES

AND RESPIRABLE FRACTIONS FOR

NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Volume II - Appendices

U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT

Washington, D.C. 20585

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy.

Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and 

Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; (615) 576-8401.

Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology

Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; 

(703) 487-4650.

Order No. DE95004711
DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Page i

VOLUME II: APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Tables and Figures from Source Documents with Data Used in this Study

APPENDIX B Example Facilities
DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Page ii
DOE-HDBK-3010-94

APPENDIX A

Table and Figures from Source Documents

with Data Used in this Study
DOE-HDBK-3010-94
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-i

LIST OF TABLES

Table A.1. Fractional Release During Air Drying of Concentrated Plutonium 

Nitrate Solutions (using 0.72 g plutonium as a source). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Table A.2. Fractional Release During the Heating of Pools of 

Plutonium Nitrate Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

Table A.3. Uranium Results -- Engineering Scale Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3

Table A.4. Mass Airborne from Pressurized Release of Uranine Solution . . . . . . . . . . . A-4

Table A.5. Mass Airborne from Pressurized Releases of UNH Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5

Table A.6. Median AED of Particles Produced by Pressurized Releases 

of Uranine Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-6

Table A.7. Median AED of Particles Produced by Pressurized Releases of UNH . . . . . . A-7

Table A.8. Mass Airborne from Flashing-Spray Releases of Superheated Liquids . . . . . A-8

Table A.9. Median AED of Particles Produced by Flashing-Spray Releases 

of Superheated Uranine Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-9

Table A.10. Airborne Releases of 10 g/l Uranine Solution, Releases Resulting 

from a Free-fall Spill in Static Air ................................ A-10

Table A.11. Airborne Releases of 208.7 g U/l Solution, Releases Resulting from a 

Free-Fall Spill ................................................ A-11

Table A.12. Median AED Particle Size Generated by a Free-Fall Spill in 

Static Air, 10 g/l Uranine Solution ................................ A-12

Table A.13. Median AED Particle Size Generated by a Free-Fall Spill in 

Static Air, 208.7 g U/l Solution .................................. A-13

Table A.14. Mass Airborne from Slurry Spill (source volume 1 liter, 

height 3 meters) ............................................... A-14

Table A.15. Size of Particles Produced by Slurry Spills .......................... A-15
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-ii

Table A.16. Mass Airborne from Sucrose Solutions Spills (source volume 1 L, 

source height 3 m) ............................................. A-15

Table A.17. Size of Particles Produced by Sucrose Solution Spills .................. A-16

Table A.18. Fractional Airborne Release of Selected Isotopes in 30 Percent 

n-Tributyl Phosphate in a Kerosine-Type Diluent During Combustion ..... A-16

Table A.19. Results From Burning 30% Kerosine/Tributylphosphate (TBP) ........... A-17

Table A.20. Small Scale Test Results ........................................ A-18

Table A.21. Large Scale Test Results ........................................ A-19

Table A.22. Comparison Between Exploding Wire Aerosol and Droplet Fume 

in Liquid Suspension .......................................... A-21

Table A.23. Summary of Source Fractions Involved in Aerosol Formation ........... A-21

Table A.24. Fractional Release From Unalloyed Plutonium Rods During 

Oxidation and Cooling .......................................... A-22

Table A.25. Plutonium Released During the Oxidation of Large Metal Pieces Above 

Ignition Temperatures .......................................... A-22

Table A.26. Fractions of Plutonium Released by Combustion Under Specific 

Conditions .................................................. A-23

Table A.27. Fractions of Radioactivity Generated Under Specified Conditions ........ A-24

Table A.28. Oxidation of Plutonium at 123EC - Summary of Results ............... A-25

Table A.29a. Oxidation of Plutonium Above, and in the Region of, the Ignition 

Temperature, Summary of Experimental Results ..................... A-26

Table A.29b. Oxidation of Plutonium Above, and in the Region of, the Ignition 

Temperature, Summary of Experimental Results on Particle Formation .... A-27

Table A.30. Combustion of Plutonium in Air-Nitrogen Mixtures ................... A-28
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-iii

Table A.31. Detail of Plutonium Ignitions and Residue Analysis From 

Plutonium-Sodium Ignitions ..................................... A-29

Table A.32. Penetrator Oxidation ........................................... A-30

Table A.33. Amount of Plutonium Entrained in Air from the Heated Oxide 

(the 15 to 44 u fraction from the air oxidation of unalloyed 

plutonium metal above ignition temperatures) ........................ A-31

Table A.34. Partially Oxidized Plutonium Oxalate Release Rates (in wt%/hr) ......... A-31

Table A.35. Plutonium Oxalate Release Rates (in wt%/hr) ........................ A-32

Table A.36. Plutonium Fluoride Release Rates (in Wt% release per hour) ............ A-33

Table A.37. Fractional Release From Solids Remaining After Evaporation 

of Plutonium Nitrate Solutions (0.72g plutonium used, 2 hours 

sampling time.) ............................................... A-34

Table A.38. Percentage of Total Radioactivity on Surface Measured by 

Different Sampling Techniques .................................. A-35

Table A.39a. TiO Powder Airborne, Powder Release Above Chamber (PRAC) 2 ........ A-36

Table A.39b. Median AED of Particles Produced by TiO Powder Release 2

Above Chamber (PRAC) ....................................... A-36

Table A.40a. Mass Airborne from Pressurized Release of DUO Powder .............. A-37

Table A.40b. Median AED of Particles Produced by Pressurized Releases of DUO ...... A-38

Table A.40c. Mass Airborne from Pressurized Releases of TiO Powder 2 .............. A-39

Table A.40d. Median AED of Particles Produced by Pressurized Releases of TiO 2 ...... A-40

Table A.40e. Mass Airborne from Low-Pressure DUO Releases .................... A-41

Table A.40f. Median AED of Particles Produced by Low-Pressure DUO Releases ...... A-41
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-iv

Table A.41a. Airborne Release of TiO Powder Traced with Uranine, Releases 2

Resulting From Free-Fall Spill in Static Air ......................... A-42

Table A.41b. Median Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter Particle Size Generated 

by a Free Fall Spill in Static Air, Traced TiO Powder 2 ................. A-43

Table A.41c. Airborne Releases of DUO Powder, Releases Resulting from a Free 

Fall Spill in Static Air .......................................... A-44

Table A.41d. Median Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter Particle Size Generated 

by a Free Fall Spill in Static Air, DUO Powder ....................... A-45

Table A.42. Summary of Release Fraction Data ................................ A-46

Table A.43a. Particle Resuspension Caused by Car Traffic on an Asphalt Road ........ A-47

Table A.43b. Particle Resuspension Caused by a 3/4-Ton Truck Traffic on an 

Asphalt Road ................................................. A-49

Table A.44. Size Distribution of Soil Used in Experiments ....................... A-52

Table A.45. Mass and Cs Activity of Samples collected in Soil 137

Aerodynamic Entrainment Experiments ............................ A-53

Table A.46. Fractional Airborne Releases of Uranium During the Burning 

of Contaminated Wastes ........................................ A-55

Table A.47. Fractional Release During Burning of Combustible Material 

Containing Uranium Compounds ................................. A-56

Table A.48. Fractional Release During Burning of Flammable Materials 

Containing Plutonium Nitrate .................................... A-57

Table A.49. Results from Burning Mixed Waste ............................... A-58

Table A.50. Size of Aerosols from Burning Contaminated Combustibles ............. A-58

Table A.51. Results from Burning Contaminated Polychloroprene (PC) .............. A-59

Table A.52. Results from Burning Contaminated Polystyrene (PS) ................. A-60
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-v

Table A.53. Results from Burning Contaminated Polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA) .... A-61

Table A.54. Results from Burning Contaminated Cellulose ....................... A-63

Table A.55. Results of Plenum Filter Particulate Analysis ........................ A-65
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-vi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure A.1. Diagram of Apparatus Used in Air Drying of Shallow Pools 

of Concentrated Plutonium Nitrate Solution ......................... A-66

Figure A.2. Diagram of Apparatus Used to Determine Fractional Releases 

During Heating of Pools of Plutonium Nitrate Solutions ................ A-67

Figure A.3. Radioactive Aerosol Release Facility, 242-B Building ................. A-68

Figure A.4. PARE Modification for Pressurized Liquid ......................... A-69

Figure A.5. Sampling for a Pressurized Release with High Volume Samplers ......... A-70

Figure A.6. PARE Modification for Flashing-Spray Experiments .................. A-71

Figure A.7. Sampling for a Free-Fall Spill with High Volume Samplers ............. A-72

Figure A.8a. Laboratory Apparatus Used in Measuring Fractional Airborne Release .... A-73

Figure A.8b. Schematic Diagram of Experimental Apparatus ...................... A-74

Figure A.9. Diagram of Fire Test Facility .................................... A-75

Figure A.10. CARE Combustion Apparatus ................................... A-76

Figure A.11. 316-liter Test Vessel ........................................... A-77

Figure A.12. 400-cubic meter Test Vessel ..................................... A-78

Figure A.13. Facility for the Investigation of Uranium Releases During Solvent Fires . . . A-79

Figure A.14. Uranium Releases During Solvent Fires ............................ A-80

Figure A.15. Schematic Diagram - Plutonium Burning Apparatus ................... A-81

Figure A.16. Schematic Diagram Equipment for the Study of Release from 

Ignited, Bulk, Metallic Plutonium ................................. A-82

Figure A.17. Particle Size Distribution by Weight of Oxide Entrained in Run 2 ........ A-83
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-vii

Figure A.18. The Pu reaction system ... ....................................... A-84

Figure A.19. Particle Size Distribution of Pu Aerosol From Combustion in Air 

and Surrogate IHE Gas ......................................... A-85

Figure A.20. Particle Size Distribution of Pu Aerosol From Combustion at 450EC 

and 650EC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-86

Figure A.21. Schematic Drawing of the Apparatus Used ... ........................ A-87

Figure A.22. Aerosol Data with Fitted Log-Normal ... ........................... A-88

Figure A.23. Oxidation of Plutonium at Room Temperature. Size Distributions 

of Particulate Oxide Entrained in the Airstream ...................... A-89

Figure A.24. Particle Size Distributions Produced by Oxidation of Plutonium 

Under a Variety of Conditions ................................... A-90

Figure A.25. Summary of Outdoor Burning Experiments, General Layout ............ A-91

Figure A.26. Laboratory Experimental Apparatus ............................... A-92

Figure A.27a Apparatus for Measurement of Release Rates of Overheated 

Plutonium Powders ............................................ A-93

Figure A.27b Release Rate Apparatus ........................................ A-94

Figure A.28. Distribution of Particles Entrained in Air with a Velocity 

of 100 cm/sec from Plutonium Oxalate-Oxide Mixture Heated to 

700EC. (1156 particles sized optically) ............................. A-95

Figure A.29a Distribution of Particles Entrained by Air with a Velocity of 

100 cm/sec from Plutonium Fluoride at Ambient Temperature ........... A-96

Figure A.29b Distribution of Particles Entrained in Air with a Velocity of 

100 cm/sec from Plutonium Fluoride Heated to 700EC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-97

Figure A.29c Particle Entrained in Air at 100 cm/sec from 1 g PuF Powder at 4

1000EC (303 particles sized at 100X) .............................. A-98

Figure A.30. Size Distribution of Particles Released During Run N-5a ............... A-99
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-viii

Figure A.31. Smair Sampler ...............................................A-100

Figure A.32. PARE Modification for Powder Release Above Chamber 

(PRAC) Experiments ...........................................A-101

Figure A.33a PARE, Pressurized Airborne Release Equipment .....................A-102

Figure A.33b PARE Experiment ............................................A-103

Figure A.34. Schematic Diagram of Test Apparatus .............................A-104

Figure A.35a Total Dust Generation Rate with One Standard Deviation 

Confidence Limit versus Drop Height .............................A-105

Figure A.35b Total Dust Generation Rate versus Material Mass Flow, Each with 

One Standard Deviation Confidence Limit ..........................A-106

Figure A.35c Total Dust Generation Rate versus Moisture Content, Each with 

One Standard Deviation Confidence Limit ..........................A-107

Figure A.35d Entrained Air Normalized to Material Mass Flow versus Drop Height .....A-108

Figure A.35e Entrained Air Normalized to Material Mass Flow versus Material 

Mass Flow ...................................................A-109

Figure A.36. Schematic of Facility to Simulate Aerosol Generation During Building 

Collapse .....................................................A-110

Figure A.37a Tracer Source and Resuspension Sampling Tower .....................A-111

Figure A.37b Rotating Cowl and Impactor .....................................A-112

Figure A.38a ZnS Particle Size Distribution as Disbursed onto Road .................A-113

Figure A.38b Schematic Showing Experimental Design for Particle Resuspension 

from an Asphalt Road Caused by Vehicle Passage ....................A-114

Figure A.39. Wind Tunnel Sampling .........................................A-115

Figure A.40. Size Distribution of Soil Used in Experiments .......................A-116
Appendix A. Source Data

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-ix

Figure A.41. Uranium Dioxide Powder Size Distribution by Whitby Centrifuge ........A-117

Figure A.42. Stainless Steel Screen and Support Used in Burning of Flammable 

Materials ....................................................A-118

Figure A.43. CARE Combustion Apparatus ...................................A-119
DOE-HDBK-3010-94

A-x

Appendix A. Source Data
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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.9. Median AED of Particles Produced by Flashing-Spray Releases of Superheated Uranine Solution

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.15. Size of Particles Produced by Slurry Spills

(Table B.4 - Ballinger and Hodgson December 1986)

Table A. 16. Mass Airborne from Sucrose Solutions Spills

(source volume 1 L, source height 3m)

(Table B.1 - Ballinger and Hodgson December 1986)

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DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.17. Size of Particles Produced by Sucrose Solution Spills

(Table B.2 - Ballinger and Hodgson December 1986)

Table A. 18. Fractional Airborne Release of Selected Isotopes in 30 Percent n-Tributyl Phosphate in a KerosineType Diluent During Combustion

(Table I - Mishima and Schwendiman June 1973)

lActivity measured in all samples except residue.

2

Experiment ended when flame self-extinguished. Usually 5 to 10 ml of liquid remained.

*

Percent of total activity collected.

ND Not Detectable.

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DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.22. Comparison Between Exploding Wire Aerosol and Droplet Fume in Liquid

Suspension

(Table III - Carter and Stewart September 1970)

Notes: (1) Fraction Pu in suspension by centrifuge.

(2) Fume from droplets at 660oC.

Table A.23. Summary of Source Fractions Involved in Aerosol Formation

(Table IV - Carter and Stewart September 1970)

Notes: (a)

(b)

(1)

(2)

Geometric mean.

95% confidence limit.

Massive U does not melt after ignition unless there is an external heat supply.

Heat losses cause self extinguishing unless some form of insulation (oxide) is

present.

Height of fall approximately 0.75 m.

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.44. Size Distribution of Soil Used in Experiments

(Table 1- Sutter August 1980)

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.49. Results from Burning Mixed Waste

(Table A.5 - Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

Table A.50. Size of Aerosols from Burning Contaminated Combustibles

(Table 4- Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

(a) Polymethylmethacrylate.

(b) Polychloroprene.

(c) Polystyrene.

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.51. Results from Burning Contaminated Polychloroprene (PC)

(Table A. 1- Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis October 1987)

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DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.52. Results from Burning Contaminated Polystyrene (PS)

(Table A.2 - Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

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DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.53. Results from Burning Contaminated Polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA)

(Table A.3 - Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.53. Results from Burning Contaminated Polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA)

(continued)

(Table A.3 - Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.54. Results from Burning Contaminated Cellulose

(Table A.4 - Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

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Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.54. Results from Burning Contaminated Cellulose (continued)

(Table A.4 - Halverson, Ballinger and Dennis March 1987)

(a) Heat flux = 23 kW/m2 in all other runs.

(b) Airflow = 8 lpm in all other runs.

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DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix A. Source Data

Table A.55. Results of Plenum Filter Particulate Analysis

(Table 3- Arnold 1986)

a - Based on Matrix weight of media + separator (w/o frame) - filterS with >19 g Pu have media & separator loaded into drums

b - Based on Matrix weight of entire filter (w/o packaging) - filters with > 5 g Pu but < 19 g are placed into waste boxes uncrushed (12/box)

c - Based on Matrix weight of entire filter (w/o packaging) - filters with < 5 g Pu are crushed & then placed into waste boxes (30/box)

d - Particulate weight for FU2B 1st stage includes all filter media; all media disintegrated upon being subjected to mechancial stressing

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Appendix A. Source Data

Figure A.8a. Laboratory Apparatus Used in Measuring Fractional Airborne Release

(Figure 1a - Mishima and Schwendiman June 1973)

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

Figure A.27b. Release Rate Apparatus

(Figure 1 - Mishima, Schwendiman and Radasch July 1968)

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

Figure A.33b. PARE Experiment

(Figure 3 - Sutter August 1983

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

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Appendix A. Source Data

Figure A.42. Stainless Steel Screen and Support Used in Burining of Flammable Materials

(Figure 3 - Mishima and Schwendiman April 1973)

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Appendix A. Source Data

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APPENDIX B

Example Facilities
DOE-HDBK-3010-94
DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix B

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-v

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-v

1.0 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

2.0 PLUTONIUM RECOVERY FACILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

2.1 Facility Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

2.1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

2.1.2 Facility Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

2.1.3 Confinement Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-5

2.1.3.1 Vessels and Piping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-5

2.1.3.2 Gloveboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-5

2.1.3.3 Airlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-6

2.1.3.4 HVAC System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-9

2.1.4 Existing Structural Studies ............................. B-11

2.1.5 Facility Support Systems ............................... B-14

2.1.5.1 Nuclear Incident Monitors ....................... B-14

2.1.5.2 Nuclear Criticality Design Mitigation & Control Systems . . B-14

2.1.5.3 Fire Mitigation Design and Practices ................ B-15

2.1.5.4 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems ................. B-15

2.1.5.5 Fire Suppression System ........................ B-15

2.1.5.6 Air Sampling Systems .......................... B-16

2.1.5.7 Liquid Sampling Systems ........................ B-16

2.1.5.8 Cold Chemical Storage and Supply ................. B-17

2.1.5.9 Facility Control Room .......................... B-17

2.1.5.10 Electrical Power Distribution ..................... B-18

2.1.5.11 Process and Instrument Air ...................... B-18

2.1.5.12 Breathing Air ................................ B-19

2.1.5.13 Steam and Condensate System .................... B-19

2.1.5.14 Domestic Water .............................. B-20

2.1.5.15 Chilled Water Systems ......................... B-20

2.1.5.16 Sanitary Sewer System ......................... B-21

2.1.5.17 Chemical Farm ............................... B-21

2.1.5.18 Diesel Fuel Oil System ......................... B-21

Page B-i
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Appendix B

2.2 Process Description ....................................... B-22

2.2.1 Overview ......................................... B-22

2.2.2 Detailed Process Descriptions ........................... B-25

2.2.2.1 Feed Preparation .............................. B-25

2.2.2.2 Dissolving Line .............................. B-27

2.2.2.2.1 Oxide Dissolution ...................... B-27

2.2.2.2.2 Residue Dissolution .................... B-29

2.2.2.2.3 Metal Dissolution ...................... B-30

2.2.2.3 Tank Farm .................................. B-33

2.2.2.4 Sampling ................................... B-35

2.2.2.5 Wet Processing Line ........................... B-36

2.2.2.5.1 Ion Exchange ......................... B-36

2.2.2.5.2 Eluate Evaporation ..................... B-38

2.2.2.5.3 Peroxide Precipitation ................... B-40

2.2.2.5.4 Filtrate Evaporation .................... B-42

2.2.2.6 Dry Processing Line ........................... B-42

2.2.2.6.1 Calcination .......................... B-42

2.2.2.6.2 Hydrofluorination ...................... B-44

2.2.2.6.3 HF Scrubbing System ................... B-47

2.2.2.7 Reduction Line .............................. B-47

2.2.2.8 Vessel Vent ................................. B-51

2.2.3 Process Associated or Byproduct Operations ................. B-53

2.2.3.1 Button Closeout and Storage ..................... B-53

2.2.3.2 Solid Waste/Residue Handling .................... B-54

2.2.3.3 Chemical Preparation and Storage .................. B-55

2.2.3.4 Hydrogen Fluoride Storage and Supply .............. B-59

2.2.3.4.1 HF Storage Tank ...................... B-59

2.2.3.4.2 HF Evaporator ....................... B-59

2.3 Hazard Identification ...................................... B-62

3.0 H-7 PRODUCTION SUPPORT LAB .............................. B-81

3.1 Facility Description ....................................... B-81

3.1.1 Overview ......................................... B-81

3.1.2 Facility Structure .................................... B-81

3.1.3 Confinement Systems ................................. B-81

3.1.3.1 Gloveboxes and Hoods ......................... B-82

3.1.3.2 Airlocks ................................... B-82

3.1.3.3 HVAC System ............................... B-83

3.1.4 Existing Structural Studies ............................. B-86

3.1.5 Facility Support Systems ............................... B-87

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Appendix B

3.1.5.1 Nuclear Incident Monitors ....................... B-87

3.1.5.2 Nuclear Criticality Design Mitigation & Control Systems . . B-87

3.1.5.3 Fire Mitigation Design and Practices ................ B-88

3.1.5.4 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems ................. B-88

3.1.5.5 Fire Suppression System ........................ B-88

3.1.5.6 Air Sampling Systems .......................... B-89

3.1.5.7 Cold Chemical Storage and Supply ................. B-89

3.1.5.8 Facility Control Room .......................... B-90

3.1.5.9 Electrical Power Distribution ..................... B-90

3.1.5.10 Instrument Air ............................... B-90

3.1.5.11 Breathing Air ................................ B-91

3.1.5.12 Steam and Condensate System .................... B-91

3.1.5.13 Domestic Water .............................. B-91

3.1.5.14 Chilled Water Systems ......................... B-92

3.1.5.15 Sanitary Sewer System ......................... B-92

3.1.5.16 Diesel Fuel Oil System ......................... B-92

3.2 Process Description ....................................... B-92

3.2.1 Overview ......................................... B-92

3.2.2 Liquid Sampling Lines ................................ B-93

3.2.3 Solid Sampling Lines ................................. B-94

3.2.4 Emission Spectroscopy Line ............................ B-95

3.2.5 Mass Spectrometry Line ............................... B-95

3.2.6 Raschig Ring Line ................................... B-96

3.2.7 Thermal Analysis Line ................................ B-96

3.2.8 Atomic Absorption Line ............................... B-96

3.2.9 Solid Waste and Residue Handling ........................ B-96

3.3 Hazard Identification ...................................... B-96

4.0 H-21 TRU-WASTE FACILITY ................................... B-103

4.1 Facility Description .................................. B-103

4.1.1 Overview ................................... B-103

4.1.2 Facility Structure ............................. B-103

4.1.3 Facility Support Systems ........................ B-103

4.1.3.1 HVAC System ........................ B-103

4.1.3.2 Fire Suppression System ................. B-105

4.1.3.3 Electrical Power Distribution .............. B-105

4.1.3.4 Domestic Water ....................... B-105

4.1.4 Real-Time Radiography Unit ..................... B-105

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Appendix B

4.2 Description of Operations .................................. B-106

4.2.1 Receiving and Inspection of Waste Drums ................... B-106

4.2.2 Storage of Waste Drums ............................... B-107

4.2.3 Radiation Monitoring ................................. B-107

4.2.4 Shipping .......................................... B-107

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Appendix B

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure B-1 H Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4

Figure B-2 Plutonium Recovery Facility First Level Floor Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-7

Figure B-3 Plutonium Recovery Facility Second Level Floor Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-8

Figure B-4 Plutonium Recovery Facility Ventilation System .................. B-10

Figure B-5 Plutonium Recovery Facility Simplified Flowpath Diagram .......... B-23

Figure B-6 Oxide Dissolution Line ................................... B-28

Figure B-7 Residue Dissolution Line .................................. B-31

Figure B-8 Metal Dissolution Line ................................... B-32

Figure B-9 Ion Exchange Line ...................................... B-37

Figure B-10 Eluate Evaporation ...................................... B-39

Figure B-11 H2O2 Precipitation Line ................................... B-41

Figure B-12 Calcination Line ........................................ B-43

Figure B-13 Hydrofluorination Line ................................... B-46

Figure B-14 Reduction Line ........................................ B-48

Figure B-15 Vessel Vent ........................................... B-52

Figure B-16 Plutonium Recovery Facility Second Level Floor Plan .............. B-56

Figure B-17 HF Supply ........................................... B-60

Figure B-18 HF Evaporator ......................................... B-61

Figure B-19 H-7 Production Support Lab Floor Plan ........................ B-84

Figure B-20 H-7 Production Support Lab Ventilation System .................. B-85

Figure B-21 H-21 TRU Waste Facility Floor Plan ......................... B-104

LIST OF TABLES

Table B-1 Plutonium Recovery Facility Hazard Identification ................ B-65

Table B-2 Production Support Lab Facility Hazard Identification .............. B-98

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Appendix B

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Appendix B

1.0 PURPOSE

This appendix provides the operational descriptions and material quantities upon which the

example calculations in Chapter 7 are based. The examples included in this document were

originally developed for the purpose of demonstrating a hazard analysis process and,

subsequently, for basic hazard analysis training. The operations and material quantities

described do not specifically correspond to any actual facility and should not be directly

compared to actual operations. The example is a composite whose various features are based

on historical and current plutonium processes and operations throughout the DOE weapons

complex. Numerical values based on actual operations have been altered, and specific

operational and design inadequacies have been included for the purpose of example. The use

of this material as a basis for example calculations is considered preferable to independently

documenting calculations for existing facilities.

This appendix presents facility descriptions followed by basic hazard identification tables for

the operations described. The descriptions are at a level sufficient to identify accident

scenarios and perform source term calculations.

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Appendix B

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Appendix B

2.0 PLUTONIUM RECOVERY FACILITY (H PLANT)

2.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

2.1.1 Overview

The H Plant Plutonium Recovery Facility (PRF) became operational in early 1970. It was

originally planned to recover plutonium from oxide residues generated elsewhere and from

certain residues generated within the building. A second mission that was added to the

facility during construction was to purify plutonium metal received from offsite via

dissolution and reformation. The product of the plant is plutonium metal buttons. The major

waste streams are acidic and caustic low level liquid waste and solid TRU and low level

waste. For the foreseeable future, the H-Plant will only be required to operate at about 25%

of its historic capacity.

A schematic of the H Plant Area is provided as Figure B.1 on the following page. The H

Plant building (H-1) is a two story structure approximately 300 feet long and 160 feet wide

on the west structural wall and 130 feet wide on the east exterior wall. It is immediately

adjoined by three other structures associated with its operation. On the west side, the H-17

building Plutonium Vault Facility annex serves as an intermediate storage point for H Plant

feedstock as well as product buttons awaiting shipment. On the southeast corner, the H-7 

Lab annex provides analytical support to the H Plant processes. Lastly, on the north face of

the building, the H-21 TRU Waste Drum Holding Facility has been constructed to hold 

sealed waste drums awaiting shipment to site storage. 

Other significant installations in the vicinity of the plant include the external Chemical Feed

area (H-3) consisting of chemical storage tanks and delivery systems, the small H-5 structure

at the southwest corner of the building housing the standby diesel generator, the area exhaust

stack 230 feet southwest of H Plant, and the H-8 Liquid Waste Treatment Facility located

approximately 300 feet south of H Plant.

2.1.2 Facility Structure

The H-1 structure is a two-story reinforced-concrete structure. The exterior walls are

supported on continuous wall footings ranging from 4 to 8 feet square and 15 to 20 inches

thick. The ground floor is an 8-inch-thick reinforced concrete slab. The main support

columns on the first floor are 22-inch diameter reinforced concrete cylinders which support

the second floor slab. Reinforced concrete beams anchored to the columns provide the

remainder of the support for the second floor slab. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

The exterior ground walls are 14-inch-thick bearing type (i.e., reinforced concrete). Some

interior walls, particularly in the processing section, are reinforced-concrete load bearing

walls. The remaining process interior walls are double gypsum board over metal studs or

metal lath and plaster. The interior walls in office space are single gypsum board over metal

studs outside of the areas with load-bearing walls.

The second floor reinforced concrete slab is 6 inches thick and was poured monolithically

with the concrete beams. The main support columns on the second floor are 20-inch 

diameter cylinders, and a beam arrangement similar to that supporting the second floor slab

exists to support the 6-inch-thick roof slab. The exterior bearing walls on the second floor

are 10-inch-thick reinforced concrete. All roof surfaces are covered with metal decking

overlaid by a rigid buildup four-ply incombustible insulation and finally covered by coal-tar

pitch and gravel. The roof is flat with down spouts to facilitate drainage.

2.1.3 Confinement Systems

The principal sources of confinement are vessels/piping, gloveboxes, airlocks, the HVAC

systems, and lastly the facility structure itself. As the structure has already been briefly

discussed, this section will concentrate on the first four items.

2.1.3.1 Vessels and Piping

All internal glovebox vessels are mounted to the glovebox structure itself. The normal

material of construction is 304L stainless steel alloy except for special uses such as the

hydrogen peroxide precipitation vessels that are made of Pyrex. All tanks external to

gloveboxes are seismically mounted to the structure floor. Piping leading to external tanks is

sheathed stainless steel double pipe with leak detection points for the annular region at piping

low points.

2.1.3.2 Gloveboxes

Gloveboxes used in the H Plant are typical 304L stainless steel units machined to a smooth

surface inside. The gloveboxes have double walls below the windows filled with lead and

water extended polyester for shielding purposes. The windows are 0.5 inch plate glass with,

on average, 1 inch of transparent leaded glass and lexan mounted over them on the external

glovebox frame. Certain gloveboxes, such as the hydrofluorination unit in the wet line, have

Benelex sheets and additional lead mounted on the exterior glovebox surface and thicker

windows for additional shielding. The hydrofluorination unit also has sliding panels of

Benelex which are placed over the windows of the box when access is not needed. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Potentially flammable materials such as Benelex are painted with intumescent paint to retard

fire propagation.

The glovebox units are seismically anchored to and grouted into the concrete floors of the

facility. Complete documentation drawings are not available, but the floor on the operating

side of three gloveboxes was opened to verify this condition. Verification was successful and

the floors have since been repaired.

2.1.3.3 Airlocks

The H Plant is divided into airlock zones to minimize the chance of spreading contamination. 

One set of airlocks separates those rooms containing radionuclide-handling equipment from

the rest of the processing enclosure. A second set of airlocks separates the processing

enclosure from the general use areas of the building. 

The primary airlocks isolate the operating and maintenance rooms associated with

gloveboxes, the TRU waste drumming station, the exhaust HEPA plena room, the vessel 

vent room, and the cold chemical makeup room from the rest of the facility. The use of the

two-room configuration per box is also designed to minimize contamination as entry into the

gloveboxes for maintenance and repair is not conducted in the same room where manual

monitoring and operation of the box will occur. 

The primary airlocks consist of an enclosure defined by two doors. One set leads to a

glovebox room (or one of the other areas noted above), while the other set leads out into a

corridor. Both the outer and inner doors have a combination lock for entry. A hand and

shoe monitor is installed in the airlock for use when exiting the potentially contaminated

area. 

The secondary airlocks separate the facility control and instrumentation rooms as well as

general use space from the primary processing enclosure. There are three of these units on

the first floor and one emergency airlock exit to the outside at the northeast corner of the

building in the processing enclosure. These airlocks function exactly like the primary

airlocks, with the exception of the emergency exit, which is alarmed and has crash bars for

opening the doors.

The location of the airlocks in the facility is designated by an AL on the floorplans of the

facility provided as Figures B.2 and B.3. Where the A and the L are separate, it indicates

two independent airlocks related to one glovebox line. One airlock leads to the operating

side of the line, while the other leads to the maintenance side of the line. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.1.3.4 HVAC System

The ventilation system, which is depicted in Figure B.4, consists of two independent oncethrough airflow systems, a recirculating nitrogen system for the metal reducing line, and a

vessel vent system that ties back into the main building exhaust. All exhaust goes through

High Efficiency Air Particulate (HEPA) filters before entering an underground tunnel where

it is joined by exhaust from other nearby facilities and exits from the H Plant stack. 

There are six ventilation supply fans for the building. These centrifugal fans operate in sets

of two, with one always serving as an automatic start standby fan in the event of failure of

the running fan. Two of the fans serve the "clean" areas (System A) (i.e., general access)

and four of the fans serve the production areas (Systems B and C). The "clean" areas are

designed to have 8 air changes per hour, while the production areas are designed to have 14

air changes per hour. The system is designed to keep the temperature at 75° F and 50%

humidity in the summer, 70° F in the winter, and to keep all glovebox temperatures below a

maximum of 100° F.

All supply air is prefiltered, filtered, and heated or cooled as appropriate before entry into

the building environment. Fail-shut, tornado-proof supply air dampers are provided at each

inlet as well. All glovebox ductwork in the building is constructed of galvanized steel

piping. 

System A sends all of its exhaust through plenum A, which has two HEPA filter banks in

series. It is basically a straight through system. System B has three main branches. The

first consists of supplied air serving corridors and various areas that are not expected to be

routinely contaminated. This branch, like System A, moves straight through the building to

Plenum B where there are four HEPA filter banks in series. The second branch is glovebox

airflow for the feed preparation glovebox, the dissolving line, the sample glovebox, and the

wet processing line. Air entering the associated maintenance rooms is admitted into these

gloveboxes through glovebox-mounted HEPA filters. It exhausts through glovebox mounted

HEPA filter units as well, and joins up with exhaust air from the third branch discussed

below before entering Plenum C.

An additional set of supply fans divert a portion of this airflow through an air dryer to the

calcination and hydrofluorination lines, which are considered System C. The air drying

system includes a multi-stage dehumidifier to produce 68° F air with a dewpoint of -40° F. 

This low moisture content is necessary to produce an acceptable product. These calcination

and hydrofluorination gloveboxes have piped-in supply air headers, but inlet air still passes

through a glovebox-mounted HEPA filter. This air is exhausted through glovebox mounted

HEPA filters and progresses to Filter Plenum C.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Nitrogen is supplied from outside the building to inert the metal reduction line. Inerting is

specifically intended to prevent excessive oxidation of the product metal, not to preclude

plutonium metal buttons from burning (a highly unlikely event). However, the inerting

system provides residual fire prevention benefit as well. Nitrogen is recycled through

Plenum D, which has two HEPA filter banks in series, and is regularly bled off the system

to join production exhaust at the inlet to Plenum C. Nitrogen can also be diverted from this

system to inert the feed preparation glovebox if desired.

The final flowpath in the building is associated with the vessel vent system. Offgases vented

from liquid-bearing vessels in gloveboxes and process rooms are drawn to this system. The

vessel vent system contains a scrubber that uses 15% potassium hydroxide to neutralize

entrained nitric acid vapors. The scrubbed gases are then transferred back to the main

process exhaust plenum by two small centrifugal blowers.

For the production areas, negative pressure at specific supply and exhaust inlet points is

controlled by pneumatically operated dampers. These units respond to signals from

differential pressure detectors. Typical differential pressures maintained between areas and

atmosphere are listed below:

Clean Areas - 0.1" WG

Secondary Air Locks - 0.15" WG

Regulated Production Areas- 0.2" WG

Primary Air Locks - 0.25" WG

Operating Rooms - 0.3 " WG

Maintenance Rooms - 0.4 " WG

Gloveboxes - 0.9 " WG

Differential pressure readout and low-level alarms are available in the facility control room. 

Local gage indications of differential pressure are available at each glovebox as well. An

automatic mechanical sequencer controls restart of fans following loss of ventilation to

prevent overpressurizing the facility. This unit will also trip supply fans if an exhaust fan

fails and the standby unit does not come on.

2.1.4 Existing Structural Studies

The PRF was designed and built in accordance with standards of the M&O contractor at the

time of construction. These standards were based on the Uniform Building Code. The PRF

was considered to be a Class 1 structure capable of withstanding a static live load of 1000 psf

acting simultaneously on the whole outer surface. However, complete design drawings do 

Page B-11
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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

not exist, and questions have been raised as to how exactly corporate standards were followed

during construction. 

An independent study of the facility was performed by Brown and Associates in 1985. This

study relied on extensive facility walk-throughs, review of available documentation, and

limited radiography and core tap examinations. The study concluded that the PRF is, in fact, 

a robust structure, and that the design basis equivalent tornado of 119 mph from UCRL15910 would not cause significant damage to the structure. The bulk of the remainder of the

study dealt with seismic issues. 

Site-specific response spectra used in the evaluation were defined in an independent study

conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These response spectra provided

surface accelerations at an average soil depth. For return periods of one in 1000 years and 

one in 10,000 years, acceleration levels are 0.13g and 0.26g. The 1985 structural 

assessment reached the following conclusions about expected seismic damage up to and

including a level of 0.30 g:

g-Level Probable Damage

 0.1 Small movement of gypsum board walls. Minor cracking.

 0.12 Large cracking in gypsum board walls. Generically supported

piping fails. 

 0.15 Onset of potential for utility equipment failures. Highest value 

at which continued supply of electrical power can be assumed. 

Represents threshold of ventilation unavailability due to loss of

power. 

 0.18 General failure of non-concrete walls. Onset of failure of

supported process piping.

 0.21 Onset of minor cracking of non-shear internal concrete walls. 

Onset of external glovebox connection pipe and wiring failure. 

From 10% to 20% of the tanks other than plutonium process

tanks fail.

 0.24 Onset of minor external wall cracking. Spalling of internal

concrete walls possible.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

g-Level Probable Damage

 0.26 Gloveboxes may begin to sag. Spalling of external walls

possible. From 5% to 10% of the plutonium process tanks in

first story tank farm fail.

 0.30 Building wide failure of tanks other than plutonium process

tanks. All gloveboxes sag, and 10% to 20% of the plutonium

process tanks fail. Possible large cracking of internal non-shear

concrete walls. It is expected that the building shell will remain

intact. 

The statement that the building shell will remain intact is stated to be an "expectation" as

opposed to a "conclusion" in the Brown and Associates study because of concerns that the tie

spacing in columns might be too large. Even with this concern, the majority of the columns 

in the building were judged adequate. However, column A-17, the support unit located at 

the L-shaped hinge on the north face of the building, was considered a potential problem. 

The irregular shape of the PRF structure allows a significant moment to develop at this

location and it was considered unlikely but possible for column A-17 to exhibit brittle shear

failure. If such a failure occurred, Brown and Associates estimated dominoing failures could

lead to partial collapse of the building around the cafeteria, "clean" office space, and the feed

preparation, dissolving, and sampling gloveboxes. At this point, the moment characteristics 

of the new building shape would be considered survivable for the remainder of the structure. 

A project to provide additional support for column A-17 was developed as a result of this

study, but the estimated funding has not been made available. 

Based on column and beam locations, this partial collapse case would be expected to include

the following process equipment in the collapse zone: (1) the vessel vent scrubber, knockout tank, and blowdown tank; (2) the impactor, weighing and batching, and furnace stations 

of the feed preparation glovebox; (3) the metal dissolving glovebox; (4) the back-end half of

the residue dissolving glovebox; and (5) the sample glovebox. Outside the partial collapse

zone, the base conclusions of the study would remain valid (i.e., gloveboxes would remain

upright, but limited sagging could occur, glovebox piping and electric connections could 

fail). 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.1.5 Facility Support Systems

2.1.5.1 Nuclear Incident Monitors

Twelve sets of two nuclear criticality incident monitors each detect and alarm in excessive

radiation fields. These detectors are spaced so as to provide overlapping coverage by a

minimum of three detectors at any point in the facility. They provide flashing light and bell

ringing indications when activated. The units are designed to alarm on any internal failure 

and receive power via an uninterruptable power supply.

2.1.5.2 Nuclear Criticality Design Mitigation and Control Systems

With the exception of the tanks in the vessel vent room, the plenum deluge catch tank, and 

the utility room reboiler and its associated condensate tank, all vessels within H Plant are

geometrically favorable in design. Tanks in gloveboxes are slab tanks with a nominal 

interior width of 3 inches with reinforcing stay-bolts and weep holes to detect corrosion 

before it can alter control dimensions. Tanks outside gloveboxes in the wet line tank farm 

are annular vessels with a maximum interior annular diameter of 2 inches. These vessel 

sizes ensure a subcritical condition for all flowsheet plutonium concentrations, thus 

preventing a criticality from inadvertent transfer of a solution to the wrong tank. The vessels

previously mentioned that are not geometrically favorable are equipped with borated raschig

rings to prevent criticality from inadvertent plutonium accumulation due to abnormal

conditions.

Glovebox sumps are built into the bottom of all wet process enclosures well below the level 

of any vessels. Each glovebox is equipped with three separate slab sumps. The sumps are

sized so that, in combination, they can hold all of the liquid in the largest vessel in a 

glovebox when sloping of the lower surface causes overflow from one sump to go to the next

sump in line. All sumps are equipped with liquid level detectors that provide local and 

remote alarms and shut the inlet valves for the main process liquid streams.

The process solution tank farm area has been sized so that all of the liquid available in the

tanks should be able to spread across the floor in a thin enough layer to preclude a criticality

from occurring due to leaks. However, as an additional safeguard, the storage tank areas 

have metal-grating floors elevated over a pit filled with borated raschig rings. 

All vessels and storage arrays in H Plant have been spaced so as to maintain the materials at

geometrically favorable spacings. All transfers of material, whether feedstock, product, or

waste pails, are limited to one unit at a time. Portable and in-line holdup monitors are used 

to measure plutonium accumulation in systems as well.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.1.5.3 Fire Mitigation Design and Practices

Whenever possible, construction materials are noncombustible or fire resistant. As 

previously noted, the exterior walls and roof of the building are cast-in-place concrete having 

a minimum 3-hour fire rating. The concrete interior walls and gypsum board over steel stud

walls have minimum 2- and 1-hour fire ratings, respectively. Major structural components 

of the gloveboxes and process material are made of noncombustible material. Where

potentially combustible shielding has been used, such as Benelex, it is coated with 

intumescent paint to minimize chances of ignition in all but the most severe fires.

Flammable liquids are not allowed in gloveboxes as part of the combustible loading control

program in effect. Potentially combustible wipes are limited by this program as well to

approximately 10 in line at any one time, a number normally associated with shutdown

cleaning in the gloveboxes as opposed to processing. In normal operation, non-installed

combustibles in the operating areas are limited to operator logs and procedure manuals. 

When maintenance on gloveboxes is in progress, tent construction material is made of fireresistant materials.

The major potential sources of fixed combustibles, aside from Benelex shielding on certain

gloveboxes, are electrical wiring and glovebox gloves. Wiring is installed in accordance 

with appropriate codes and housed in conduits or sealed raceways. Wiring penetrates

gloveboxes through pave connectors to prevent an insulation fire from progressing into

gloveboxes. The glovebox gloves are made of materials such as Hypalon and will melt and

burn at elevated temperatures. However, the number of gloves is limited, and storage of 

used gloves in a line after removal is forbidden by procedure.

2.1.5.4 Fire Detection and Alarm System

The plant has three types of fire detectors available: ionization, photoelectric, and thermal. 

All three are used in individual processing rooms, while only thermal detectors are used in

gloveboxes and ventilation plenums. Exceeding the setpoint on any detector will initiate an

alarm in the operating area, the facility control room, and the site fire department. Failure 

of a detector and interruption of signal flowpath by such means as a wire break will initiate 

an alarm as well. 

2.1.5.5 Fire Suppression System

All areas of H Plant are equipped with automatic wet-pipe sprinklers in the overhead that

actuate at temperatures slightly higher (approximately 155° F) than the fire detection alarm

setpoints. A dedicated set of thermal detectors in gloveboxes and rooms are used to provide 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

initiation input to the sprinkler system, which is equipped with fusible links in the process

areas as a backup means of initiation. Nozzle arrangement in the system is in accordance 

with NFPA standards and will blanket a room as well as direct spray to glovebox walls. 

A thermal detector-activated deluge system is available for all HEPA plenums as well. This

system actuates when air temperature coming to the plenum is above 180° F, providing a

continual spray of firemain water upstream of the HEPA plenums. Series demisters are

available to protect the plenum from a large flow of water drops. This system and any of 

the sprinkler systems can be activated manually as well.

2.1.5.6 Air Sampling Systems

There are two air sampling systems in the H Plant, a high- and a low-volume system. The

high-volume system has 26 units in the operation and maintenance rooms and the vessel vent

room (2 per room) and an additional 15 exhaust duct samplers. Each of these units draws

30 cfm.

There are an additional 50 low-volume air samplers designed to detect airborne 

contamination in airlocks, regulated corridors, and non-glovebox handling operations such as

waste and button assay, drum packaging, etc. These units draw 5 cfm. Both systems use

impaction collection and photomultiplier tube detection and provide local audio and visual

alarms. However, only the high-volume system provides remote alarm capability in the

facility control room. The motive force for both the low- and high-volume air samplers is 

one of two centrifugal exhausters located in the HEPA plenum room on the second floor. 

These units discharge into the central facility exhaust duct downstream of the main exhaust

fans. 

There are also two low-volume air samplers downstream of the HEPA filters for each 

plenum. These units have remote alarm capability in the facility control room. Continuously

on-line filter media particulate samplers are provided for stack exhaust as well. These media

are manually collected and sampled at prescribed intervals.

2.1.5.7 Liquid Sampling Systems

Liquid samples are taken from interior glovebox vessels using an installed sampling system. 

This system consists of a small centrifugal pump that draws liquid through a liquid-liquid

eductor and recirculates it back to the tank. The eductor draws liquid through a bypass line

around the pump as well. When the required recirculation time is complete, a small sample

vial with a diaphragm seal lid is inserted into a sample holder on the bypass line. Opening 

of a single valve fills the vial, which can then be isolated and removed from the holder. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

 This vial is transferred to the laboratory annex for analysis in a CRC canister mounted on the

back of the glovebox.

For tanks external to gloveboxes, a similar sampling method is used in the sampling 

glovebox. This glovebox has three separate pumps and sample lines for three general types 

of solution (e.g., pre-ion exchange process solutions, post-ion exchange process solutions, 

and waste solutions). Vials are removed from the sample glovebox via an airlock on the

maintenance side of the cabinet and placed in plastic waste pails for transfer to the laboratory

annex. Different colored labels are used to distinguish samples from different systems. 

2.1.5.8 Cold Chemical Storage and Supply

Cold (i.e., not radioactively contaminated) liquid feed chemicals are kept in stainless steel

storage tanks on the second floor of the H-Plant. The tanks are grouped together in six 

major sections, each of which is surrounded by a small retaining dike. All tanks are 

equipped with sightglass level indication, and certain tanks have local and remote alarms to

minimize operational disruptions. Tanks that will be mixed with water or that can 

experience stagnation problems over a short period of time are equipped with agitators. 

Although the cold chemical area is separated from the rest of the facility by an airlock, it is

intended that this area remain uncontaminated. To support this goal, all chemical feed lines

that go to gloveboxes or contaminated tanks on the first floor are equipped with liquid seal

pots on the first floor to prevent drawing liquid from the first floor back into the feed tanks.

Some liquid chemicals that are used in small amounts and prepared to the right concentration

by manually mixing with water in tanks are kept in bottles stored in a distinct room. Other

distinct storage rooms include the 35% H2O2 55-gallon drum storage room, the ion exchange

resin storage room, the dry chemical storage room, and the HF evaporator room. The HF

evaporator room houses the small evaporator that is heated to generate HF gas from the 

liquid HF transferred into the building from the chemical farm.

2.1.5.9 Facility Control Room

The H Plant control area is located outside the regulated production area. It provides

monitoring capability for significant process parameter indications, such as temperatures,

flowrates, and levels for all glovebox and tank farm operations. Operational controls for

gloveboxes and tanks are provided at local control stations and are not available in the 

control room. Local control stations are equipped with a shutdown switch that shuts all airoperated liquid supply valves and secures power to glovebox equipment when operated. 

Lights in the control room illuminate to indicate when shutdown switches have been used.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

The ventilation system (e.g., ventilation sequencer, differential pressure readouts, damper

positions) is monitored in the control room as well. Unlike process controls, however, the

ventilation system is also operated from the control room via an installed control panel. 

Significant parameters and alarms for support buildings, such as the H-8 Liquid Waste

Treatment Facility receipt tank levels, are also provided in the control room. One of two

primary facility announcing system controls is located here as well.

2.1.5.10 Electrical Power Distribution

H Plant is provided with split bus redundant normal power, auxiliary power from the plant

diesel, and safe shutdown power from uninterruptable power supplies (UPS). Normal power 

is received from two separate public utilities. Utility A provides power to one main bus via

the 32 substation, while Utility B provides power to the other main bus via the 33 substation. 

Automatic transfer switches will connect a given bus to the other substation upon loss of

power from one supplier. 

Auxiliary power is provided to the facility by a 850- kw diesel generator located adjacent to

the main building in H-3 B. This small building is constructed in a manner identical to the

main building. Loss of power from both normal sources will automatically start the diesel 

and commence a timing sequence that will transfer auxiliary busses to the diesel once it is

running at rated speed. Typical time for power restoration is on the order of 10 seconds. 

Upon restoration of power, the ventilation fans will automatically restart in the appropriate

sequence.

There are three separate UPS in H Plant. The first is dedicated to the criticality alarm 

system and will provide operational power to the criticality alarm system for up to 3 hours. 

The second UPS provides power to the air sampling system and local glovebox control 

panels for approximately 1 hour. The final UPS supplies the facility control room for 

approximately 0.5 hours.

The building grounding system serves two functions. As the building electrical ground, it 

offers a path to ground for electrical faults, providing additional protection along with 

breakers and fuse blocks and allowing "bleedoff" of static electrical charges. Its second 

function is to provide a "bleedoff" path to ground in the event lightening strikes the building.

2.1.5.11 Process and Instrument Air

Process and instrument air represent two branches of flow from a single source. Filtered air 

is drawn into one of two air compressors (on-line and standby units) rated for 300 scfm and 

125 psig discharge pressure. The compressor outlet passes through drying towers to one of 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

two surge receivers. Downstream of the receivers, reducing valves are used to provide an 

80-psig plant air line and a 65-psig instrument air line. Low-pressure alarms are provided on 

each line.

The process air line provides air to the process itself. Examples of its use include mixing air 

jets, purges and sparges, automatic samplers, and air to the calcining unit for oxidation. 

Purge flows and calcining and hydrofluorination air come off of a reduced pressure 30-psig 

branch. Calcining and hydrofluorination air go through another drying tower to produce air 

with a dewpoint of -40° F. In all cases, restriction orifices minimize potential flow inside

the glovebox in the event of a line failure.

The instrument air line provides air at 65 psig for all pneumatic instruments and valves. 

Restriction orifices are used in this system as well to minimize interior glovebox flows in the

event of a line failure. 

2.1.5.12 Breathing Air

As in the case of process and instrument air, filtered breathing air is drawn into one of two

redundant compressors and discharged to receiving tanks. Maximum flowrates and pressures

are 450 scfm and 115 psig. A low-pressure alarm is provided on the receiving tank, which

allows 5 minutes of breathing air for eight people to exit from any ongoing jobs.

Downstream of the receiving tanks, supplied breathing air passes through two stages of

cellulose fiber filters that remove particles greater than 20 μm in diameter. Reducing valves

maintain a pressure of 30 psig on the system, which serves sets of manifolds in all of the

operating and maintenance areas. A monitoring system is provided inline with the main

header, which measures temperature, pressure, and O2, CO2, and H2O concentration levels. 

An alarm is provided when one of these parameters goes out of a specified band. All alarms

on the system are received in the control room and at individual manifold stations.

2.1.5.13 Steam and Condensate System

Steam is received from the site boilerhouse via a 150-psig main. Before entry into the

building, it is reduced in pressure to 60 psig. Steam branch lines for use in the facility are

reduced to a nominal pressure of 35 psig.

General building use steam condensate is collected in tanks in the utility area and pumped

back to the boilerhouse. Boilerhouse steam also serves as the heat source for the reboiler

tank in the utility room. Condensate from the reboiler is collected separately from the

general building use condensate and sampled prior to transfer back to the boilerhouse. If 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

contamination is present, the liquid in the tank can be diverted to the H-8 Liquid Waste

Treatment Facility. 

The reboiler is the source of steam for a separate steam cycle serving vessels in the glovebox

lines. Condensate from this steam is collected in one of two raschig ring tanks in the vessel 

vent room where it is sampled. If no detectable contamination is present, it is recycled to 

the reboiler for steam generation. If contamination is present, it is diverted to the H-8 

Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. Steam lines for dissolvers and evaporators are encased in

sheath housings so as to not come in direct contact with process fluids, therefore, the most

likely source of contaminant would be from the ion exchange line heat exchanger. Steam

pressure is kept greater than dissolver or evaporator pressure so that if any leak does

develop, steam and condensate will flow into the process vessel. Three confirmed

contamination incidents have occurred due to leaks, but contamination of process condensate

has not historically been a major problem.

2.1.5.14 Domestic Water

The domestic cold water main is supplied from site utilities and is equipped with multiple

redundant backflow preventers at various points in the system. One branch serves general

building needs, a second serves utility needs, and a third serves process needs. The first two

branches are disposed of through the sewage system.

The process water branch consists of three separate headers. The first provides water to

safety showers in the operating and maintenance rooms. The second provides flushing water

for some vessels and is used only in shutdown or maintenance configurations. Both of these

lines lead to the wet line tank farm waste tanks either through normal process flow or

through special drains for the safety showers. The third branch of the process water system

feeds the plant chilled water system that is housed in the vessel vent room. 

2.1.5.15 Chilled Water Systems

There are two distinct chilled water systems in H Plant. The first is located in the facility

utility room and serves as the chilled water supply for general use. The second is the

cooling system for process heat exchangers. It consists of a raschig ring tank in the vessel

vent room, which is the initial entry point for process water. This unit serves as the head

tank for a chiller and its associated pump and provides loop flow branching off to specific

heat exchangers. The process system is periodically sampled for contamination and pumped

to the H-8 Liquid Waste Treatment Facility if contamination is found.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.1.5.16 Sanitary Sewer System

The sanitary sewer system accepts effluent from washrooms, showers, clean utility system

drainage or blowdown, etc. It serves as a conduit to deliver waste water to the site sewage

plant.

2.1.5.17 Chemical Farm

The chemical farm is a collection of storage tanks and support systems located approximately

60 feet to the south of H Plant. Storage tanks are provided for nitric acid, potassium

hydroxide, and hydrogen fluoride, with the areas around both tanks diked to hold the 

majority of the fluid in the vessels. Two major gas systems are associated with the chemical

farm as well. One consists of two nitrogen supply vendor package nitrogen systems. Each

system is composed of a large vertical, double-insulated annular vessel for liquid nitrogen

with a net supply capacity of 350,000 scf of nitrogen. The vendor supplied system vaporizes

the nitrogen and supplies it initially at 90 psig. Tapoffs at this point are used to pressurize

the chemical storage tanks as the driving force for transfer into the H-Plant building. 

Nitrogen pressure is reduced to 15 psig before transfer into the building, where it is used for

inerting the metal reduction line and the feed preparation line as necessary. 

The second gas system supplies argon from a bank of compressed gas cylinders located along

the south wall of the H-1 building. The argon flow in the building passes through gas

purifiers to remove trace oxygen and moisture before reaching the metal reduction furnaces

where argon is used to establish an inert atmosphere. 

2.1.5.18 Diesel Fuel Oil System

The fuel oil supply source for the standby diesel generator is a 5000 gallon underground

storage tank on the west side of building H-3 B. This tank is a new installation and currently

meets all regulatory requirements. The old tank was removed in compliance with RCRA

regulations after it began to leak. The new tank is equipped with automatic pumps that are

actuated by a level switch in the diesel fuel day tank. This system ensures there is always a

minimum of 100 gallons of fuel in the day tank.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

2.2.1 Overview

Figure B.5 provides a basic flowpath for facility processing operations. H Plant accepts

plutonium oxide, metal, or residue received from outside the plant as well as certain high

assay residues generated by plant operation. Oxides and residues receive initial processing in

the feed preparation glovebox, where small metal scrap can be burned to oxide and

recoverable residue chunks are reduced in size. A chainveyor takes these materials in

packaged batches to the appropriate dissolution lines. Metal returns for recycle processing

require no initial handling and are introduced into the metal dissolution glovebox directly by

means of an airlock on the maintenance side.

The dissolution line is composed of three gloveboxes in series with each box being a

complete glovebox. Therefore, although physically joined, there is no means of passing

material from one glovebox to the other. The first two gloveboxes in the line are the oxide

and residue gloveboxes, which use a nitric acid dissolution process. The third glovebox is 

the metal line, which uses a sulfamic acid dissolution process. Upon completion of the

dissolution and accountability measurement process, plutonium-bearing solutions are pumped

via glovebox gear pumps to Tanks #1 through #6 located in the tank farm on the maintenance

side of the wet processing line.

The wet processing line is a continuous line composed of three gloveboxes (ion exchange,

H2O2 precipitation, and evaporation) joined together in the same fashion as the dissolving 

line, although there is a piping transfer line passing from the precipitation line to the

evaporation line. All of the direct contact process and waste liquid tanks are stored in walled

enclosures on the maintenance side of the wet processing line to minimize chances of

contaminating multiple rooms and to provide proximity to a central sampling glovebox. 

After appropriate chemical adjustments, the dissolver solutions are transferred through the

ion exchange columns. Product eluate is transferred to tanks #7 and #8, while waste effluent

and wash solutions go to tanks #9 through #12. The acid concentration of the eluate is

increased, and then it is transferred to the feed evaporator in the evaporation glovebox. The

plutonium concentration of the liquid is increased in the evaporator to a level sufficient to

obtain good product yield in precipitation. The evaporator bottoms are transferred to tanks

#13 and #14 to serve as precipitator feed, while the distillate is transferred to tanks #17 

through #19 to await transfer to the H-8 liquid waste handling facility.

The precipitation line makes a peroxide cake out of the plutonium in solution. This cake is

dumped automatically in holding containers from a rotary drum filter and then manually 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

placed in a chainveyor for transfer to the drying line. Filtrate from precipitation still 

contains recoverable quantities of plutonium in solution, so it is transferred to the filtrate

evaporator in the evaporation line. There the volume is reduced by a factor of approximately

10 and residual peroxide is broken down from the heat. The recoverable bottoms are

transferred back to dissolver tanks #1 through #6 for recovery, and the distillate again goes 

to waste tanks #17 through #19.

The dry line consists of three separate operations in series gloveboxes similar in arrangement

to the dissolver lines. These operations are calcination, hydrofluorination, and HF 

scrubbing. The calcining glovebox has temporary storage capability for peroxide cake. 

Individual batches are first manually placed into a drying oven that provides an initial low

temperature drying cycle. The peroxide cake is then manually dumped into the calciner

hopper where the unit screw feeder moves it into the calciner.

Air exiting the calciner often has significant quantities of entrained plutonium even after

passing through a separator due to the flaky nature of the peroxide cake and various design

difficulties with the air flowpath in the calciner. Therefore, the calciner exhaust is passed

through a nitric acid scrubber that dissolves entrained plutonium. The liquid used in the

scrubber normally contains recoverable quantities of plutonium by the time a calcination 

cycle is complete and is transferred to dissolver tanks #1 - #6 for recovery. 

The calcining tube and its associated screw feeder extend through the calcining glovebox wall

and into the hydrofluorination line. At the end of the screw feeder, there is a machined

paddle wheel which scoops the calcined plutonium oxide to a dropoff into a small vessel. 

The paddle wheel has been machined so as to maintain a physical isolation barrier between

the calciner and the hydrofluorinator. The feed vessel serves as a hopper for the

hydrofluorinator screw feeder. Plutonium oxide is reacted to plutonium fluoride in the

hydrofluorinator and is collected in cans at the opposite end of the unit. The plutonium

fluoride is sent by conveyor to the metal reduction line. 

The hydrofluorinator is designed to use excess HF, which must be scrubbed before it is

exhausted from the building. The HF scrubber line accomplishes this with potassium

hydroxide in a venturi scrubber. The liquid from this scrubber normally has only waste

concentrations of plutonium and is transferred to tanks #20 and #21 for eventual disposal as

liquid waste. 

The reduction line is an inerted glovebox where plutonium fluoride is mixed in a magnesium

oxide crucible with calcium metal and a pyrotechnic initiator. The crucible is then sealed in 

a pressure vessel and hydraulically locked into a reduction furnace. The reduction furnace 

heats the mixture, and the firing of the pyrotechnic initiator commences the reduction 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

reaction without the necessity of bringing the furnace system itself to high temperatures and

pressures and maintaining them. Upon completion of the reduction cycle, the charge is

cooled and the crucible broken. The plutonium metal button formed is separated from the

sand slag and crucible and passed through an airlock to the pickling station where it is

consecutively dipped in nitric acid and water, drilled to obtain a small sample for analysis,

weighed and packaged for transfer to assay. 

There are other aspects of the production operation that are not captured on the simplified

flowsheet. Between the dissolving line and the wet processing line, there is a sample

glovebox that consists of three sampling pumps for pre-ion exchange solutions, post-ion

exchange solutions, and waste solutions. This glovebox is used to draw samples from the

chemical tank farm. There is also the vessel vent system, located before the feed preparation

glovebox. This system consists of a fan that draws a vacuum on process vessels to pull

acidic vent gases through a potassium hydroxide scrubber before discharge to the exhaust

system. A final modification of note is that waste solutions can be diverted to any of the

waste tanks (#9 - #12, #17 - #21) if process upsets have led to excessive accumulation from

any one process. 

Other activities carried out in H Plant include assay and temporary storage. Special assay

facilities and a vault are provided for product buttons. A contiguous area of the facility is

used to store solid waste pails, assay them, and package them in TRU waste drums.

2.2.2 Detailed Process Descriptions

2.2.2.1 Feed Preparation

The feed preparation glovebox line serves to process oxides and residues as necessary to

prepare them for dissolution. This effort consists of burning metallic fragments to oxide,

breaking up large residue pieces into smaller pieces, weighing, batching, and temporarily

storing material to be processed. The following stations are provided in the glovebox:

- Airlock entry;

- Unpackaging;

- Bag-in/Bag-out port

- Impactor;

- Furnace;

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

- Weighing and Batching;

- Storage;

- Chainveyor.

There is a hood on the maintenance side of the glovebox that allows placement of material in

an airlock that can be opened from the operating side of the glovebox. The airlock is

designed with 12" by 12" replaceable inlet and outlet HEPA filters. Oxide is received

directly from the H-12 Plutonium Vault Facility. At the access hood, the oxide can is

removed from its outer containment vessel and swiped for contamination. It is then placed in

the airlock. Residue processed in H Plant consists largely of slag generated in the button

forming process, which is brought to the hood in a sealed red plastic pail. The pail is opened

in the hood, and the internal doubly bagged package is placed in the airlock.

The unpackaging station is simply an open area for removing the material from its primary

packaging and placing it in a critically safe metal can. An automatic can opener is provided

for opening sealed cans. Oxide cans and plastic bags are removed with glovebox waste

through either a bagport or a Central Research Canister.

Oxide that has no metal fines or other contaminants is moved down to the weighing station

where a dissolver batch is prepared and placed in a charge can. Incompletely oxidized

material must be burned to oxide before it is sent to the dissolving line. This is accomplished

in a small electric muffle furnace located in the glovebox, which can attain maximum

temperatures on the order of 1200° F. The unit is sized to oxidize an entire plutonium metal

button if necessary, and is insulated sufficiently to prevent exterior surface temperature from

rising above a maximum of 125° F. It draws combustion air from the process air system via

a small process air line with backflow preventers, and offgas from the furnace is routed to the

vessel vent system. The complete burning and cooldown cycle is controlled by an automatic

timer. The timer will not allow the furnace door to be opened before a preset minimum time

has passed. The door is also interlocked with a temperature signal to prevent opening the

door before the burn cycle is complete.

Cans of magnesium oxide are provided wherever oxide is handled in the glovebox. If metal

fines were to ignite while the material was unpackaged, heat transfer through the stainless

steel glovebox floor should put out the small fire. However, procedure calls for pouring the

sand over the material to ensure this is the case. 

Slag residues normally require some size reduction prior to dissolution. This is conducted in

a small impactor installed in the glovebox. The device is mounted so as to prevent vibration

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

transfer to the glovebox itself, and is equipped with a hopper that physically prevents

operators from reaching into the impaction area. The machine also is interlocked to shut off

if the gloveport covers for this area are not in place during operation.

The impactor provides output material less than 1 inch in particle size. This material is then

weighed and batched in the same manner as oxide. Only one set of impacted residue is

allowed unbatched at a time to prevent inadvertent mixing of already assayed material, and

the impactor unit is monitored continuously for holdup.

Once material has been placed in one of the spring-loaded batching cans, it can temporarily

be placed in a shielded metal storage rack. The storage compartment can hold up to six

batching cans at a time. When material is needed in the appropriate dissolving line, the

chainveyor access door is opened and the batch can is placed in one of the carriers on the

chainveyor system. The carrier is then sealed and the operator directs the material to either

the oxide or the residue dissolution line.

2.2.2.2 Dissolving Line

The dissolving line consists of three physically separate gloveboxes installed as a single

mounted unit. The three gloveboxes are for oxide, residue, and metal dissolution 

respectively. Feed to the oxide and residue gloveboxes comes from the feed preparation

chainveyor. Feed to the metal dissolution glovebox is provided by a hood and airlock

arrangement identical to that on the feed preparation glovebox. Feed material for the metal

dissolution line comes directly from the H-12 Plutonium Vault Facility and consists of 

recycle material ready for processing upon receipt.

2.2.2.2.1 Oxide Dissolution

A simple representation of the oxide dissolution process is presented as Figure B.6. 

Plutonium oxide is dissolved in a concentrated nitric acid solution with fluoride

catalyst (from potassium fluoride) at near boiling temperatures. Aluminum nitrate

nonahydrate is added once dissolution is complete to minimize corrosion and break up

any plutonium and fluoride complexes formed. The dissolver solution is transferred

via air eductor vacuum through a cartridge filter to the vacuum run tank. The liquid

is then transferred to the accountability tank through another cartridge filter by means

of a liquid-to-liquid mixing eductor. From the accountability tank, liquid is

transferred via a small gear pump to tank farm vessel #1 or #2.

The dissolver is a 30-liter slab vessel with a mechanical agitator. Numerous

connection lines to the dissolver include a purge/flush line, a sample line, chemical 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

addition lines, vessel vent connection, and instrumentation support lines. The vent

line is always open, and as a secondary precaution, a weighted plug on the oxide

charging port is designed to blow out below the rated pressure of the vessel. 

Level and temperature indication are available for the dissolver vessel. The

temperature signal is used to control the steam inlet valve to the dissolver heating

block mounted on the bottom of the dissolver. It will completely close the valve if

dissolver temperature reaches 206° F. The sump level interlock will shut the airoperated valves controlling nitric acid flow to the glovebox on high sump level. 

Finally, the dissolver vessel itself is continuously checked for plutonium holdup by an

installed monitor.

The in-line filter elements used are 20-μm cartridge filters that can be backflushed

with nitric acid or air/nitrogen if desired. The vacuum run tank is identical to the

dissolver vessels. The liquid-to-liquid eductor system, which transfers the product

solution to the accountability tank, mixes 35% nitric acid with the product solution to

dilute it and reduce temperature. Liquid samples are drawn from the accountability

tank by means of a sampling system previously described (section 2.1.5.7). This

system can also take samples from the dissolver vessel. The accountability tank is a

150-liter slab tank. Its instrumentation and piping is similar to that of the dissolver

vessels. After sample analysis in the H-3 lab annex, the solution is transferred by a

small gear pump from this tank to tank #1 or #2 in the tank farm located on the

maintenance side of the wet processing line. There, 35% nitric acid is added to 

create a total volume of ≈ 200 liters to reduce plutonium concentration to the range 

of 5 - 7 g/l. 

 2.2.2.2.2 Residue Dissolution

The residue dissolution line is essentially identical to the oxide dissolution line with

one major and one minor exception. The major exception is that material is added to

the stirred dissolver slowly to avoid a process eructation. Residue chunks are poured

into a hopper that supplies material to a screw feed conveyer. The conveyer drops

residue into the solution at a controlled rate via a sealed entry port. The minor

difference between the residue line and the oxide line is that the dissolver and 

vacuum run tanks are 20-liter vessels, and the accountability tank is a 125-liter 

vessel. Product solution from this line is transferred to tank #3 or #4 in the tank 

farm located on the maintenance side of the wet processing line. There, 35% nitric

acid is added, creating a total volume of ≈ 160 liters to reduce plutonium

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

concentration to the range of 5 - 7 g/l. A schematic of this system is presented as

Figure B.7.

2.2.2.2.3 Metal Dissolution

Recycle metal dissolved in the H-Plant is received in a ready-to-process form. This

metal contains an impurity whose dissolution is not desired. The metal dissolution

process is designed to dissolve all of the plutonium metal while leaving behind an

intact residue that is removed for shipment elsewhere. A schematic of this process is

presented as Figure B.8. The metal is placed in a small 7-liter spray chamber and the

lid on the system is locked. Then, 14% sulfamic acid is added to the 40-liter slab

vessel below the spray chamber. Plutonium metal will dissolve in sulfamic acid in the

temperature range of approximately 70° F to 195° F. However, a plutonium hydride

sludge will form at temperatures below about 120° F, and accelerated dissolution of

the impurity will occur at temperatures above 160° F. These two points effectively

define the desired operating range. The steam flow control valve on the heat

exchanger inlet line is controlled by a temperature sensor on the slab tank. Based on

both the flowrate of the dissolving solution and the steam pressure, the valve is fully

open at a temperature of 70° F and completely shut at a temperature of 125° F. 

 

The dissolution reaction is exothermic and can accelerate above the desired upper

temperature limit if temperature is not adequately controlled. It also produces

hydrogen gas as a byproduct, and the production rate will increase with increasing

temperature. This is more of a problem at the start of the reaction when sulfamic acid

concentration is at its peak. In any case, the solution temperature must be controlled,

and a potentially dangerous byproduct must be handled safely.

The basic operation of the system is a simple acid spray loop, where acid is

transferred from the slab vessel by a small centrifugal pump and passes through a

steam heat exchanger and an in-line cartridge filter before it is sprayed onto the metal. 

This liquid drains out of the spray chamber through an always open overflow line into

the slab vessel. The 7-liter spray chamber has an always open vent line to the vessel

vent system and a fail high temperature detector. A hydrogen detector samples the

offgas to the vessel vent system, and a flame arrester is provided in the vent line

before it exits the glovebox. The temperature detector provides signals to a hightemperature alarm if the temperature of the spray chamber outlet overflow exceeds

148° F and an interlock turns off the centrifugal pump if temperature exceeds 155° F. 

If hydrogen offgas concentration exceeds 2.5% (lower flammability

limit in air is 4.0%), the pump is also automatically turned off. Without additional

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

flow of heated acid, the reaction rate in the spray chamber, and thus the rate of

hydrogen production, will decrease rapidly.

When dissolution is complete, the product solution is diverted into a 150-liter

accountability slab tank. The spray chamber slab tank is then filled with 4% nitric

acid that is recirculated through the spray chamber to passivate hydride if any is

formed due to errors or unforeseen circumstances. This solution is then diverted to

the accountability tank as well. Residue material is removed from the spray chamber

and packaged for transfer from the facility. If any hydride is found, it is placed in a

small milliliter plastic bottle with 4% nitric acid to keep it wet and passivated. A

small portion of this material is transferred to the lab annex for assay and then

returned to the oxide dissolution line, where it is added to the dissolver along with a

special reduced oxide charge.

Before sampling and transfer out of the glovebox, 35% nitric acid is added to the

accountability tank for additional cooling and to raise the acid concentration. An inglovebox sampling system is used, and a gear pump is again used to transfer the

product solution to tank #5 or #6 in the tank farm. There, 35% nitric acid and a

limited amount of 64% nitric acid are added to reduce plutonium concentration to the

range of 5 to 7 g/l and increase acid concentration. 

The slab tanks have mechanical agitators, purge and chemical addition lines, always

open vessel vent lines, and blowout plugs. Temperature and level indication are

provided for both vessels, and pressure indication is provided for the spray chamber

slab vessel. Installed detectors monitor plutonium holdup in both lines. Temperature

indication for the steam heat exchanger is available as well. The sump level interlock

stops major chemical addition to the glovebox as in all liquid processing gloveboxes.

 

2.2.2.3 Tank Farm

The tank farm consists of three separate enclosures containing annular storage tanks for

process plutonium solutions and waste. There are a total of 21 tanks in the tank farm, which

is located on the maintenance side of the wet processing line. It is placed there so the

potential for tank leaks exists in only one maintenance room as opposed to multiple rooms or

operating rooms. An additional advantage of placement in this room is immediate proximity

to the sample glovebox, which minimizes the length of sample piping runs.

The tank farm enclosures are stainless steel rooms designed for ease of cleaning in the event

of contamination from leaks. These enclosures are equipped with small exhausters leading to

the room exhaust header to maintain them at a slight negative pressure with respect to the

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

maintenance room itself. The tanks themselves have support braces and mounts extending

through the steel floor into the facility concrete floor below. In doing so, the braces pass

through a shallow sump filled with borated raschig rings, which lies below an elevated steel

grating upon which personnel walk. This sump is designed to ensure a criticality will not

occur even if multiple tanks void their contents into this sump. 

The tanks in this system are equipped with ever open vents to the vessel vent system and

pressure relief valves that direct flow to the raschig ring sump. Level indication is available

for each tank. High- and low-level alarms are provided locally and in the facility control

room. Supply piping to and transfer piping from each tank goes to common headers to

minimize the number of piping runs outside gloveboxes in the facility. Flow can be initiated

to or from a given tank by remotely operated air-operated valves on individual tank piping

leading to the headers. This capability was added to the system after initial construction to

minimize the need for personnel to be in the actual tank farm area. Actuation of the airoperated valves is done at the appropriate local operating room control panel. 

Lines going to and from the sample glovebox have identical air-operated isolation valves, but

three separate headers with three separate sampling systems are used to minimize

contamination and sampling error. The three systems are for pre-ion exchange dissolver

solutions, post-ion exchange product solutions, and low-level waste solutions.

The tanks located in the three tank farm enclosures and their principal functions and

capacities are listed below:

Enclosure #1

#1 - Oxide dissolution storage tank 250 liters

#2 - Oxide dissolution storage tank 250 liters

#3 - Residue dissolution storage tank 250 liters

#4 - Residue dissolution storage tank 250 liters

#5 - Metal dissolution storage tank 250 liters

#6 - Metal dissolution storage tank 250 liters

#9 - Ion exchange effluent tank 400 liters

#10 - Ion exchange effluent tank 400 liters

#11 - Ion exchange effluent tank 400 liters

#12 - Ion exchange effluent tank 400 liters

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Enclosure #2

#7 - Ion exchange eluate tank 235 liters

#8 - Ion exchange eluate tank 235 liters

#13 - Precipitator feed tank 190 liters

#14 - Precipitator feed tank 190 liters

#15 - Sump spill receipt storage tank 235 liters

#16 - Spare non-waste tank 235 liters

Enclosure #3

#17 - Distillate waste tank 400 liters

#18 - Distillate waste tank 400 liters

#19 - Distillate waste tank 400 liters

#20 - HF scrubbing waste tank 400 liters

#21 - HF scrubbing waste tank 400 liters

In actual practice, the tanks are not filled to their maximum capacity due to requirements to

maintain a minimum level of freeboard.

2.2.2.4 Sampling 

The sampling glovebox line is located directly north of tank farm enclosure #1 between the

maintenance sides of the dissolving line and the wet processing line. It consists of three

distinct sampling systems of the type previously described in section 2.1.5.7 and a slab 

vessel. The principal function of this glovebox is to draw liquid samples in 20-ml sample

vials. Liquid is recirculated from the tank selected through a pump in the glovebox and back

to the source tank. When sufficient recirculation or mixing occurs, the sample vial is 

inserted into the system and a sample drawn. A secondary purpose of this glovebox is to

recirculate tanks if necessary for mixing.

The three sampling systems provided in the glovebox are completely independent and do not

share pumps or piping. The first system samples the dissolver solution tanks (#1 through #6)

before the ion exchange process has occurred. If a spill has occurred in a glovebox sump,

necessitating the need to collect the solution in tank #15, the first sample system is used to

sample this tank. The spare tank, #16, is normally jumpered into this system as well if it is

being used. The second system samples the ion exchange eluate and precipitator feed tanks

(#7, #8, #13, and #14). The third system samples the waste holding tanks (#9 - #12, #17 -

#21). 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

The sampling glovebox also serves as the entry point for recycling sample solutions for

recovery. Excess sample solutions are collected in 2-liter plastic bottles in the H-7 analytical

lab. When one of these bottles is full, it is capped, bagged out of a glovebox, and placed

inside a steel can that is locked shut. It is then hand-carried to the maintenance side of the

sampling glovebox. The bottle is entered into the glovebox via an airlock and its contents 

are manually poured into a 100-liter slab tank identical in description to those found in the

dissolving lines. Periodically, this tank is sampled and sent to the ion exchange feed tanks

where any necessary chemistry adjustments are conducted. 

2.2.2.5 Wet Processing Line 

The wet processing line encompasses three gloveboxes that handle plutonium solutions to

produce solid plutonium peroxide precipitate. These gloveboxes are the ion exchange line,

the peroxide precipitation line, and the evaporation line. As with the dissolving line, the 

three gloveboxes are distinct but joined together structurally.

2.2.2.5.1 Ion Exchange

The ion exchange process is presented schematically as Figure B.9. It consists of

three ion exchange columns in series with support equipment and piping. The

columns themselves are 6-inch-diameter, 5.5-feet-tall Pyrex cylinders with flanged

heads on top and bottom. Each column holds approximately 24 liters of Dowex 21-K

anion resin or equivalent. The system is designed so that the plutonium processed in 

a given cycle will normally be absorbed on the first two columns, with the last 

column serving only as a safeguard against breakthrough.

The contents of four or five dissolving tanks are passed through the ion exchange

columns in a complete extraction cycle. As noted in discussing the dissolving line,

ion exchange feed concentration is adjusted to decrease the plutonium concentration

to the range of 5 to 7 g/l. This prevents plutonium sulfates from forming and also

assists in minimizing the chances of plutonium existing in the wrong valence in

solution. Plutonium is loaded on the resin by pumping the dissolver solutions through

the columns (upflow) after any additional chemical adjustments have been performed. 

Suction is taken on the appropriate tank by a gear pump in the ion exchange glovebox

which directs flow through a filter and a steam-heated heat exchanger. The heat

exchanger serves to raise solution temperature initially to approximately 120° F to

decrease the loading time. The effluent from the ion exchange columns is transferred

to effluent storage tanks #9 through #12 in the tank farm.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

After loading, the resin is washed with 35% nitric acid to remove impurities absorbed

on the resin. This wash cycle is directed to the effluent storage tanks as well. The

columns are then eluted (downflow) with 4% nitric acid, which produces a purified

plutonium nitrate solution that is directed to eluate tanks #7 and #8 in the tank farm. 

The final portion of the cycle consists of providing a reconditioning flow of 35% nitric

acid through the columns. These cycles are also conducted at approximately 120° F to

shorten cycle time. All of the flow alignments associated with this cycle are

conducted by operator repositioning of manual valves. Temperature sensors on the

columns or on the outlet of the heat exchanger provide an alarm at 128° F and will

shut the air-operated steam inlet valve if temperatures reach 135° F. Vent lines are

also provided on the ion exchange columns, which go to the vessel vent system. 

Temperature, flow, and pressure indications for the system are provided locally and in

the facility control room. The sump level interlock stops major chemical addition to

the glovebox as in all liquid processing gloveboxes. 

2.2.2.5.2 Eluate Evaporation

It is necessary to evaporate a portion of the eluate solution to provide peroxide

precipitation feed concentrated enough for efficient product formation. This is

accomplished in the evaporation line, which has two virtually identical evaporation

systems. One is used for evaporation of ion exchange eluate, and the second is used

for evaporation of precipitation filtrate. A simple schematic of the eluate evaporation

system is provided as Figure B.10.

The evaporator unit itself is constructed of steel mesh reinforced Pyrex and consists 

of three critically safe cylinders joined by critically safe tubes. The system draws

solution to the center, or evaporator portion of the unit, by gravity flow from a small

slab head tank mounted in the overhead of the glovebox. This head tank is filled 

from eluate storage tanks #7 and #8 via a gear pump in the glovebox. Sloping lines

lead to a reboiler that is heated by process steam in sheathed heating coils. Bottoms

are drawn off to provide precipitation feed via a manually set throttle valve. A

condenser cooled by chilled water is used to liquify the distillate from the unit, which

is then pumped to tank farm vessels #17 through #19. Bottoms leaving the evaporator

are driven by gravity and evaporator pressure through a cartridge filter and a chilled

water heat exchanger to one of two pencil tanks in the glovebox. These tanks are

critically safe because bottoms concentration cannot be known exactly, and the

potential for excessive concentration exists. The bottoms are sampled via a small inglovebox sampling line to verify plutonium concentration before pumping to tank farm

vessels #13 and #14.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

The evaporators are equipped with a level, temperature, and pressure indication. 

Flow indication is available for all streams, as is temperature indication for exiting

streams. Level indication is used to automatically control the feed inlet valve. 

Temperature indication controls the steam inlet valve, and is backed up by an

automatic shutoff of the valve for high pressure. The evaporator column is also

equipped with a pressure relief valve that lifts at 10 psig and leads to the glovebox

sump. It initiates an alarm upon lifting. The pencil tanks are also equipped with

relief valves leading to the glovebox sump. As in other liquid lines, the sump level

interlock stops major chemical and feed addition to the glovebox.

2.2.2.5.3 Peroxide Precipitation

A simple schematic of the peroxide precipitation system is provided as Figure B.11. 

After chemical adjustment as required, the precipitate feed is drawn from tank farm

vessels #13 and #14 by a gear pump and sent to the peroxide precipitation vessel. 

Initially, the solution transfer to the precipitation vessel is as a single batch. A

commercial packaged refrigeration unit provides a source of chilled water that

circulates through coils located within the vessel. The precipitation vessels are

constructed of Pyrex and maintained at approximately 60° F to suppress peroxide

decomposition. 

When the desired temperature has been obtained, a batch addition of 35% hydrogen

peroxide is made to the precipitation vessel. As the peroxide precipitate forms, a

slurry develops that cascades over into a digestion vessel that is also maintained at

approximately 60° F. Hydrogen peroxide is added to the digestion vessel almost to

the point at which liquid will overflow from the digester to the rotary drum filter. 

When a distinct separation has occurred between liquid and precipitate in the digester,

indicating a stable condition, the liquid is vacuum-drawn through the drum filter, and

nitrate solution and peroxide addition begins at a continuous rate. 

The reaction is completed in the digestion vessel, and the final slurry cascades over

into the vacuum drum filter. Liquid is drawn through the filter media to the drum

center by a vacuum, leaving the peroxide precipitate cake on the filter media. As the

drum revolves, the cake is washed by a dilute nitric acid spray and then cut off the

media by a fixed horizontal knife known as a doctor blade. The peroxide cake falls

off into a storage container mounted on a load cell. When full, the container is

replaced on the load cell, sealed, and sent by chainveyor to the calcination line.

Filtrate from the drum is collected in a slab tank and transferred to the evaporation

line. The slab tank and the precipitation vessels are steel mesh, reinforced Pyrex 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

vessels. They are equipped with constant rpm, motor-driven agitators that are

designed to prevent formation of fine precipitate. The lid over the vessel is fitted

with a blow-out plug in the event of overpressurization of the vessel. Temperature

control is provided by chilled water flowing through coils in the vessels. This water

is continuously recirculated through package chillers mounted in the bottom of the

glovebox. Make-up water to these chillers is provided by process water.

The filtrate slab vessel is made of Pyrex reinforced with stainless steel. It is equipped

with level indication, an always open line to the vessel vent system, and a blow-out

plug. Temperature indication controls chilled water flow rate and, on high 

temperature indication, shuts hydrogen peroxide and plutonium feed supply valves and

turns off the plutonium feed gear pump. The load cell is equipped with both local

and remote weight readouts, and an alarm. As in other liquid lines, the sump level

interlock stops major chemical and feed addition to the glovebox.

2.2.2.5.4 Filtrate Evaporation

This system is identical to the eluate evaporation system previously described. It

concentrates the filtrate, which contains greater than discard limits of plutonium. The

bottoms from the unit are sampled to verify concentration and then transferred to the

dissolver solution storage tanks as recycle material. The distillate is discharged to

waste storage vessels #20 and #21 in the tank farm. 

2.2.2.6 Dry Processing Line

The dry processing line consists of three distinct but structurally joined gloveboxes that turn

peroxide cake into plutonium fluoride. These gloveboxes are the calcination line, the

hydrofluorination line, and the HF scrubbing line. The dry processing line does not draw 

room air in for ventilation as previous lines did. It is supplied dry air via ducting, and is

equipped with humidity alarms. Dry air is needed to ensure material is not contaminated 

with water. Such contamination could prevent formation of an acceptable product.

2.2.2.6.1 Calcination

The calcination line turns plutonium peroxide cake into plutonium oxide for feed to

the hydrofluorination line. A simple schematic of the line is provided as Figure B.12. 

Temporary storage racks for plutonium peroxide containers are available in the

calcination line to allow feed to accumulate for a calciner run. This material is

initially placed in a drying vessel that pulls air through at ambient temperature for the

first cycle and elevates the temperature to approximately 130° F for the second cycle. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

This initial drying cycle allows the use of lower temperatures in the actual calciner,

thereby producing an oxide that is easier to fluorinate. 

Upon completion of the initial drying cycle, the cake is manually placed in the

calciner feed hopper where a screw auger drives it into the cylindrical calcining 

vessel. Dry air is passed countercurrently through the calciner, which operates at

approximately 700° F. The internal sheath of the calciner rotates during operation to

ensure even heating. This rotation is driven by a hydraulic unit mounted in the floor

of the glovebox. The auger drives the product plutonium oxide out of the calciner 

and through the glovebox wall into the hydrofluorination line.

Due to the flaky nature of the peroxide cake and design difficulties with the air

flowpath within the calciner, the offgas from the unit normally has recoverable

quantities of plutonium even after passing through a baffle separator. Therefore, a

scrubbing column is installed in the line as well. It is a 6-inch-diameter stainless steel

pipe containing 64% nitric acid. The acid is recirculated via an airlift pump and

cooled as necessary via a chilled water heat exchanger. The acid, containing the

dissolved plutonium oxide, is periodically bled from the tank manually. New acid 

can be added manually as well. 

The acid bled from the scrubber is collected in two stainless steel pencil tanks in the

glovebox. These tanks are equipped with level instrumentation and relief valves that

discharge to a sump in the vessel. A gear pump in the glovebox discharges the vessel

contents to one of the dissolver solution storage tanks through a cartridge filter after a

sample has been drawn from the interior glovebox sampling system to verify

plutonium concentration. The air exhausting from the scrubber goes through a

knockout pot and to the vessel vent system.

The glovebox sump is alarmed, but there is no interlock because liquid enters the

glovebox only by manual opening of valves. The drying unit and the calciner are 

both electrically heated and are equipped with high temperature shutdown interlocks.

2.2.2.6.2 Hydrofluorination

As noted above, the hydrofluorination unit is physically joined to the calcining unit by

common piping. The auger that drives material through the calcining unit stops at a

dropoff point. At this point, the plutonium oxide is scooped up by a paddle wheel

machined to maintain a physical isolation barrier between the calciner and the

hydrofluorinator. This wheel drops the oxide into a 6-inch-diameter cylinder with a

slow moving stirrer to prevent clumping. The feed auger for the hydrofluorinator is

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

located at the bottom of this cylinder. The cylinder is sized sufficiently to allow for

holdup during a product run to account for the shorter residence time of the calciner. 

Normally, however, a significant portion of the lag space is not used as the calciner is

simply fed at less than its full capacity rate.

 

A drawing of the hydrofluorination system is provided as Figure B.13. The rotary

tube hydrofluorinator provides high temperature contact between the plutonium oxide

generated in the calciner and a counter-current stream of hydrogen fluoride gas in dry

air to generate plutonium fluoride. The reaction occurs in two zones within the unit,

the first of which is heated to approximately 750° F and the second to approximately

1100° F. Fluorinated product passes through a breech seal and is deposited via high

temperature isolation valves into a 6-inch-diameter metal product chamber. The

chamber is isolated from the hydrofluorinator, and an outlet valve to the metal

chamber is opened. Product flows out with the assistance of a dry air purge and is

deposited in a container on a load cell. The container is manually placed in a

chainveyor for transfer to the button reduction line.

The offgas from the hydrofluorinator contains sufficient HF gas that, if left untreated,

it could cause a severe corrosion problem in ducting. As a result, the offgas from the

unit passes into the final glovebox in the dry line where a caustic scrubbing system

neutralizes the offgas before passing it on to the vessel vent system.

The hydrofluorination line is heavily shielded due to the high-neutron density

associated with the interaction between alpha particles from the plutonium and

fluorine. The dry line operating and maintenance rooms are segregated into two

halves by shielding walls, which separate the calciner from the hydrofluorinator. The

hydrofluorination glovebox itself is covered by a Benelex wall with sliding cabinet

doors over the windows and gloveports. A second Benelex wall several feet from the

cabinet further compartmentalizes the operating room. Operators normally enter the

inner compartment and access the glovebox windows only to load product containers

and place them into the chainveyor.

The hydrofluorinator system is designed to run with minimal operator supervision. 

The valves for loading product are remote-controlled air-operated valves, and a 

remote readout for the load cell is provided as well. The rotary unit in the

hydrofluorinator is motor driven instead of hydraulically driven to reduce maintenance

requirements. Fluorine detectors in the exhaust ventilation and in the operating rooms

are designed to shut the air-operated HF inlet line and turn off the hydrofluorinator if

2 ppm of HF is detected.

Page B-45
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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.2.2.6.3 HF Scrubbing System 

 

As noted above, the last glovebox in the dry line scrubs the hydrofluorinator offgas. 

In this system, 35% KOH is circulated by a small centrifugal pump into a venturi

scrubber, where it is intermixed with the hydrofluorinator offgas. The scrubbed

mixture than passes into a 6-inch-diameter tank, where the offgas bubbles up through

35% KOH and passes on to the vessel vent system.The centrifugal pump takes suction

on this small KOH tank and sends the solution through a chilled water heat exchanger

to remove the heat generated by the neutralization reaction. This liquid then goes

back to the venturi scrubber. Periodically, liquid from the system can be blown down

to scrubber waste tanks #20 and #21 via an air-operated valve.

A pH detector provides remote readout, a low pH alarm, and a low-low signal that

automatically opens the 35% KOH supply line. The level detector that controls the

liquid outlet line from the collection tank will also override the PH signal to the

supply line if tank level is too high. A temperature sensor in the collection tank also

provides control input to the chilled water inlet valve on the heat exchanger. This

glovebox is the only one in the dry line equipped with a sump and associated level

alarms and interlocks.

2.2.2.7 Reduction Line

Plutonium fluoride powder is received in the reduction line via a chainveyor from the

hydrofluorination glovebox. There is a limited storage area with two storage spaces available

in a rack, but the normal practice is to begin the reduction procedure as soon as plutonium

fluoride is received for two main reasons. The first is, again, the desire to keep plutonium

fluorides in line for as limited a time as possible from an ALARA perspective. The second 

is to keep the material dry so that moisture-induced pressure rises do not occur in the actual

metal formation step. The reduction line is inerted, but standard procedure is that plutonium

fluoride cannot be left cumulatively standing in the hydrofluorinator glovebox and the

reduction line more than 24 hours and then used in the process. It must be heated in an

argon atmosphere in a small muffle furnace in the reduction line and resampled before it can

be used in the process.

The reduction process is schematically represented in Figure B.14. The first step in the

reduction procedure is to use one of the two balances in the line to prepare a plutonium

fluoride charge. The load cell, like all of the load cells used in H-Plant, is a basic pressuresensitive transducer with digital readout of weight in grams. The plutonium fluoride charge

container is then placed in a slightly recessed well in the glovebox floor near the preparation

station.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Calcium and pyrotechnic charges are brought into the line via an airlock on the back wall of

the glovebox. In-line storage of these materials is prohibited, and only the quantities needed

for a given charge are brought into the glovebox. The weight of the calcium charge is

reverified, and then the plutonium fluoride, calcium, and two pyrotechnic initiators are 

loaded into a magnesium oxide crucible. The initiators reduce the ignition temperature

required for commencing the reduction reaction, thus reducing the ultimate reduction 

pressure. 

The crucible is then moved to the loading station, where it is placed inside a stainless steel

reduction vessel packed with sand. The reduction vessel is mechanically a simple steel can 

of sufficient dimensions to withstand an internal pressure of 700 psig at 3100° F. It serves 

as the pressure vessel for the reduction reaction, while the inner magnesium oxide crucible

prevents intermetallic reactions that would ruin the product from occurring between molten

plutonium and the walls of the can. After loading, the pressure vessel is covered with a

stainless steel lid that will be sealed to the reduction furnace head by a copper gasket

designed to fit machined grooves on the lid.

The reduction vessel is then placed in the recessed portion of the hydraulic piston face. 

There are two pistons in the line, one for each furnace. They lift the reduction vessel up and

seal it against the top of the furnace shell. Each furnace is a cylindrical stainless steel vessel

with interior water-cooled induction coils, with power supplied by a common 30-kW, 10-kHz

motor generator set. The piston raises the pressure vessel until it is inside the induction coils

and seals the furnace with approximately 24,000 pounds total force. Interlocks prevent

energizing the heating coils and deenergize them if the hydraulic pressure is at any value

below its normal full rating or if the piston is not raised to its full stroke height.

The reduction furnace is evacuated by one of two small vacuum pumps, and the chamber is

then pressurized to 5 psig with argon. An opening is provided in the furnace head for a

manifold inlet that allows evacuating and inerting the furnace. Inerting is required because

oxygen in the furnace would cause plutonium oxide formation, thus reducing product yield. 

Argon is used instead of nitrogen for the same reason, with plutonium nitride being the

contaminant of concern.

The reduction process begins with a gradual heating of the pressure vessel. At a temperature

in the range of 60° C to 150° C the pyrotechnic initiator will fire and the highly exothermic

reduction reaction will commence, as noted by a sharp increase in temperature indication on

the outer wall of the pressure vessel. Temperatures within the pressure vessel will rise to

levels sufficient to melt the reaction products and ensure that the calcium/fluoride residue

slags will remain molten long enough to allow the elemental plutonium to coalesce in the

bottom of the pressure vessel. The control system has a timing unit that will secure heat to

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

the furnace if the reduction reaction does not begin within a set time period. The same

control circuit will initiate another timing cycle that will not allow lowering of the piston and

retrieval of the pressure vessel until a 6-hour cooling period has been completed.

After the reduction reaction has occurred, the induction coils are deenergized and a small

argon purge is initiated while the furnace cools for 3 hours. The piston is then lowered,

dropping the pressure vessel out of the reduction furnace. The pressure vessel is removed,

undisturbed, and placed in one of six recessed wells, where it is allowed to cool for an

additional 4 hours. At the end of this time, the pressure vessel is placed in a dumper. This

simple mechanical device merely inverts the chamber, dumping the plutonium button, and the

sand, slag, and crucible onto a stainless steel pan. At this point, the maximum temperature 

of the material should be no more than 100° F.

A hammer is used if necessary to break up the crucible, and the finished button is moved to

the pickling station. This station and the remaining equipment, though structurally part of 

the same glovebox, are separated from the rest of the reduction line by an airlock. The

button is moved through this airlock and dipped in a small (2 liters) bath of 35% nitric acid

to dissolve any slag adhering to the button. The acid is then washed off the button by

immersion in an identical water bath.

The button then moves to the sampling station where a 3/8" drill is used to obtain a small

turning sample for analysis. The sample is placed in a small glass vial and transported to the

H-7 analytical lab. The button moves on to a weighing station, where it is independently

weighed twice. The weight of the button is recorded and assigned a tracking number on the

accountability computer. Then it is placed in a steel can that is crimp-sealed. The steel can

is bagged out of the glovebox and sealed by an electrically heated portable bag sealer. The

complete package is then sealed inside a second steel can.

Historically, this unit has experienced failure of the furnace pressure seal on four occasions 

in the early to mid-1970's. In two of these instances, small fireballs travelling the length of

the glovebox were observed as the inerting system was not routinely used at that time. In

these cases, minor damage to glovebox gloves occurred and contamination was released to 

the operating room. However, there was no indication of major plutonium losses from the

reduction crucible. The cause of the multiple pressure seal failures was traced to improper

gasket design or use and, on one occasion, bypassing of piston interlocks. The last instance

in 1976 involved reuse of a deformed gasket. No such incidents have occurred since the

concluding investigation in 1976, which also resulted in the decision to use pyrotechnic

initiators to reduce ultimate reduction pressure. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.2.2.8 Vessel Vent

The vessel vent room is essentially the utility room for the plutonium processing line. It

houses the vessel vent system, the process steam condensate tanks, and the process chilled

water compressor. 

A drawing of the vessel vent system is provided as Figure B.15. It consists of a typical

packed column scrubbing system with the flow-driving equipment contained in small

gloveboxes. The purpose of the system is to draw acidic vapors from the tanks to pass them

through a weak caustic solution for neutralization. The scrubbed vapors can then be sent to

the main exhaust plenums without creating potential concerns relating to chemical interaction

with filters. 

The vessel vent header in each glovebox is sloped to drain any liquid entering the header into

small knock-out pots. The drain line entering each knock-out pot has its end submerged in a

liquid seal in order to maintain negative pressure in the vessel vent system. Vapors passing

into the header pass through a cyclone separator in the vessel vent room, which disengages

any residual liquid into a 2-foot-diameter knock-out tank filled with borated raschig rings. 

The vapor then enters the bottom of a packed bed scrubber, bubbling up through a liquid

sump containing borated raschig rings, and then passes through the main bed of raschig 

rings. 15% KOH is flowing downward through the packed bed as the neutralizing medium. 

Vapors exit the scrubber through a series of demister pads and are then drawn into the small

blower glovebox where one of two centrifugal blowers sends them to join the main exhaust

ventilation upstream of HEPA filtration.

KOH solution at the bottom of the scrubber is drawn by one of two on-line pumps through a

heat exchanger to the top of the scrubber tower where it is sprayed onto the packed bed. 

The small centrifugal pumps used in this system are, like the air blowers, housed in a small

glovebox. The heat exchanger uses process chilled water to prevent heat buildup due to the

exothermic nature of the neutralization reaction. The flow in this loop is periodically 

directed to a raschig ring blowdown tank to remove depleted caustic and water generated by

neutralization. This tank and the knock-out tank can be recirculated for sampling or directed

to the liquid waste header leading to the H-8 treatment facility by a small centrifugal pump

located in the pumping glovebox.

Level indication is available for all of the tanks in this system. Temperature indication is

provided for the heat exchanger outlet and the scrubber tower sump. A pH measurement

device is also used to control the rate of blowdown and fresh caustic addition. Although the

drawing provided shows only one system, there are actually two of each tank to allow

maintenance on one tank while the other continues to support operation. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Two raschig ring-filled process steam condensate tanks are located in the vessel vent room. 

They receive condensate from steam heat exchangers in the process. Recirculation, 

sampling, and transfer lines are provided along with a centrifugal pump not located in the

pumping glovebox. Condensate is periodically sampled to verify it is not contaminated and

then returned to the reboiler in the facility utility room.

The final major system, housed in the vessel vent room, is the process chilled water system. 

It consists of a raschig ring-filled chilled water supply tank, a package commercial

refrigeration unit, and a centrifugal driving pump that is also not located in the pumping

glovebox. The purpose of this system is to provide a source of process cooling water that is

not directly tied into the plant water mains. This tank is periodically sampled as well and

flushed to the sanitary sewers upon verification that the water is not contaminated.

2.2.3 Process Associated or Byproduct Operations

To provide a complete description of the operation of H-Plant, it is necessary to discuss 

some operations that are not a distinct process and/or are not conducted in the glovebox 

lines. The four major items in this category are (1) button closeout and storage, (2) solid

waste/residue handling, (3) chemical preparation and storage, and (4) hydrogen fluoride

storage and supply.

2.2.3.1 Button Closeout and Storage

Double-canned buttons are removed from the reduction line maintenance room and taken to

the assay room where the package is weighed again followed by calorimetric assay to

generate confirmatory readings. The accountability computer system then generates a bar

code that is affixed to the outer can. Depending on available space and whether or not

loading operations are occurring in the Plutonium Vault Facility (PVF, H-17), the can is then

either placed in the local storage vault or transferred to the PVF to be placed in a shipping

container and stored. 

The local storage vault is located on the first floor in the northeast corner of the H-1 

building. The walls of the vault are 14-inch reinforced concrete, and a steel cage is placed

over the entry door to the vault and over the vault ceiling. There are three storage racks

along the walls of the vault and three smaller storage racks mounted on the vault interior

floorspace. The storage racks along the walls are bolted to the floor and the walls, while the

interior racks are bolted to both the floor and to stiffening rods mounted in the floor that run

up the backside of the racks. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

The racks are four positions high and provide a total of 114 storage positions. The vault is

reserved for storing buttons (nominally 78 positions) or selected high assay wastes that are to

be processed for recovery (nominally 36 positions). The buttons are double canned, while 

the residues will be double wrapped in plastic and contained in sealed, hard plastic pails. 

The shelving design maintains a safe separation between the stored units for criticality limits

larger than the administrative/design flowsheet limits for buttons or high assay residues.

2.2.3.2 Solid Waste/Residue Handling

Glovebox waste is removed through airlocks or bagports in a 12-mil PVC bag sealed with

plastic tape. The waste is placed inside another plastic bag that is sealed with tape, and the

entire package is placed in a 5-gallon pail that is sealed with tape. Readings are taken with a

portable monitor at the generation point to verify limits have not been exceeded in the

package, in which case it would have to be reintroduced into the glovebox and broken down

into several waste packages. 

Lag storage for waste pails that have not been assayed is available in the drumming area. A

small room is equipped with two high storage racks along the wall with a maximum storage

capacity of 25 pails. An adjacent room has two 3 high racks with 40 spaces for lag storage

of assayed pails. Up to 20 additional pails can be stored if necessary in marked positions

along unused walls in corridors within the regulated area.

The waste drumming room contains a pulsed high analyzer (PHA) that is used for assay

measurement of waste pails. This room also contains a ventilated waste hut where workers 

in protective suits remove assayed waste bags from the plastic pails and place them in DOTapproved 55-gallon drums. These drums are then sealed and subsequently smeared to verify

no surface contamination is present on the drum. They are then moved to the drum counting

station for confirmatory measurement of plutonium content.

The drum counting room makes use of two separate NDA instruments. A control computer

for the two devices combines the results via an operator-selected algorithm based on type of

waste assayed to produce a single value estimate. About 20 drums can be temporarily stored

in the floorspace of the drum assay room, but normal practice is to move the drums to the

TRU waste storage building soon after completion of assay.

Low-level solid waste that is generated largely outside the gloveboxes or in maintenance

activities is either placed in drums or in fire retardant treated wooden boxes. The boxes are

generally reserved for waste activities that can be expected to fill a complete box. These

materials are temporarily stored in the hallways of the TRU waste storage building until they

are removed for disposal.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Residues for recovery are generally handled in a manner very similar to TRU waste except

that storage must occur in the button vault or in the PVF.

2.2.3.3 Chemical Preparation and Storage

Chemical preparation and storage is carried out in the outside chemical tank farm and on the

second floor of the H-1 building. The outside chemical tank farm contains the following

large storage tanks:

1. 64% Nitric Acid - 4000 gallons

2. 35% Nitric Acid - 8000 gallons

3. 35% Nitric Acid - 8000 gallons

4. 35% Potassium Hydroxide - 5500 gallons

5. 100% Hydrofluoric Acid - 1500 gallons

6. Liquid Nitrogen - 3500 gallons

7. Liquid Nitrogen - 3500 gallons

From the storage tank, -380° F liquid nitrogen is vaporized in an evaporator that is part of 

the package unit. Nitrogen gas is generated at 90 psig and enters the plant supply manifold. 

One header takes 90 psig nitrogen to pressurize chemical storage tanks for transfer to the H-1

building. Another branch reduces pressure to 15 psig for transfer of nitrogen into the H-1

building. This branch enters the building in the utility room where it passes through one of

two dryer units before entering the building header.

All of the process chemical storage tanks are transferred into the H-1 building by nitrogen

overpressure. The tanks are equipped with level and pressure indicators, overflow lines,

relief valves, and are surrounded by dikes designed to hold the majority of the material in

each tank. The HF storage system will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

A diagram of the second floor of the H-1 building is presented again as Figure B.16. The

individual storage tanks located on the second floor are noted on the diagram and listed

below:

Tank Farm Volume (l) Transfer Method

Tank Farm #1

N-1 64% Nitric Acid Storage - 1500 Pump

N-2 35% Nitric Acid Storage - 4000 Pump

N-3 4% Nitric Acid Storage - 1500 Pump

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

Tank Farm Volume (l) Transfer Method

Tank Farm #2

D-1 64% HNO3 Oxide Dissolver Head Tank - 30 Gravity

D-2 64% HNO3 Residue Dissolver Head Tank - 20 Gravity

D-10 35% HNO3 Dissolver Dilution Head Tank - 1000 Vacuum

D-20 20% Potassium Fluoride Batch Tank - 50 Gravity

D-30 35% Aluminum Nitrate Storage Tank - 100 Pump

D-31 35% Aluminum Nitrate Head Tank - 20 Gravity

D-40 14% Sulfamic Acid Batch Tank - 250 Gravity

D-50 4% HNO3 Flush/Dilution Head Tank - 150 Gravity

S-10 15% Caustic Scrubbing Head Tank - 1000 Pump

Tank Farm #3

D-51 64% HNO3 Concentration Tank - 75 Gravity

D-60 Sodium Nitrate Batch Tank - 50 Gravity

D-61 Ferrous Sulfamate Batch Tank - 50 Gravity

P-1 HNO3 Multi-Purpose Tank - 50 Gravity

Tank Farm #4

I-1 35% HNO3 Wash/Recondition Tank - 1500 Pump suction

I-10 4% HNO3 Elution Head Tank - 250 Pump suction

P-10 35% H2O2 Feed Tank - 400 Pump

P-20 4% HNO3 Precipitate Wash Head Tank - 200 Pump

Tank Farm #5

C-1 64% HNO3 Offgas Scrubbing Head Tank - 100 Pump

C-2 4% HNO3 Dilution Tank - 100 Gravity

H-1 35% KOH Head Tank - 1000 Pump

Tank Farm #6

MP-1 Multi-Purpose Drain Tank - 2000 Pump

S-1 35% KOH Storage Tank - 2000 Pump

S-2 15% KOH Storage Tank - 2000 Pump

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

The tank farm groupings are based on placing tanks approximately over the process they feed,

except for the main interior storage tanks. Each tank farm grouping is surrounded by a dike

to contain spilled liquid.

All tanks have sightglass level indication, which is monitored hourly and during filling

operations. Certain tanks are also equipped with alarming level indication. These alarms are

for the purpose of informing operators so as to maintain operational continuity, not to prevent

imminent hazards. Internal bulk storage tanks N-1, N-2, N-3, S-1, and S-2 are provided with

low level alarms to alert operators that the sources of makeup feed for process head tanks

need to be refilled. These tanks are also equipped with high level alarm indication as they

are filled from the large outside storage tanks in the H-3 chemical feed area. Ion exchange

head tanks I-1 and I-10 and precipitator head tanks P-10 and P-20 are provided with low level

alarms to avoid needless interruption of the process cycle that would trigger lengthy

procedural requirements for restoration. Scrubbing system tanks S-10, C-1, and H-1 are

alarmed to avoid interrupting scrubbing operations that would require shutdown of vessel

vent, calcination, or hydrofluorination processes. A master alarm sounds at three locations in

the tank farm area and at an individual alarm panel on the north wall of the area. The master

alarm also sounds in the facility control room. All tanks in which mixing occurs and those

that contain chemicals prone to stratification are equipped with agitation impellers.

There are four chemical storage rooms on the second floor. The first houses bottles of liquid

chemicals, which are manually mixed with water in small tanks. These bottles are kept in

storage cabinets. The only other source of bottled chemicals on the second floor is the

flammable liquids storage cabinet, which contains cleaning supplies. It is located against the

outer south wall of the liquid chemical storage room.

The H2O2 storage room holds up to 11 55-gallon drums of 35% hydrogen peroxide at a time. 

A portable pump and tubing is used to empty these drums into the hydrogen peroxide feed

tank. The resin storage room contains up to five drums of Dowex 21-K resin at a time. 

Various equipment used in the tank farm is stored both in this room and the hydrogen

peroxide drum storage room. The dry chemical storage room contains calcium metal in one

storage cabinet, pre-weighed reduction charges of calcium in a second cabinet, various dry

chemicals in small bottles in a third cabinet, and pyrotechnic initiators in a fourth cabinet. A

small storage bin for 12 calcium charges and one for 12 initiators are also located in the

maintenance room of the reduction line. 

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

2.2.3.4 Hydrogen Fluoride Storage and Supply

The HF storage and supply system for H-Plant consists of two major parts. The first is the

storage tank and associated vessels in the external chemical tank farm. The second is the HF

evaporator located on the second floor of the H-1 building.

2.2.3.4.1 HF Storage Tank

A drawing of the HF storage system is provided as Figure B.17. The HF storage tank

is a heavily insulated monel vessel equipped with a level detection system and

temperature and pressure indication. Liquid hydrogen fluoride is transferred out of the

tank by applying a nitrogen overpressure of 75 psig to the system. Double-walled

pipes deliver the liquid to the second floor of the H-1 building.

Nitrogen lines penetrate the vessel in three other locations to provide for tank purging

as necessary. The purge exhaust line ties off the tank relief valve line. It directs

purge flow to a knock-out tank and then into a scrubber filled with 35% KOH. The

plant air main is used to drive a jet pump that accelerates purge flow and provides

good intermixing between the air flow and the scrubbing solution. This simple

scrubber vents directly to the atmosphere. 

The tank relief valve is set to lift at 150 psig, a pressure that is not considered

attainable absent a major fire. A pressure sensor in the relief outlet line sounds an

alarm in the H-1 control room when the relief lifts. The gas released when the relief

valve lifts is directed to the main exhaust stack.

2.2.3.4.2 HF Evaporator

The HF evaporator, represented in Figure B.18, is located in a dedicated room on the

south side of the chemical tank farm area. The location allows the unit to be directly

over the dry processing line, which allows gaseous HF to be piped directly to the

hydrofluorinator without having to pass through intervening rooms or corridors. 

Liquid HF is piped through the exterior wall of the evaporator room. The evaporator

is a 15-inch diameter cylinder sitting in a water bath on a scale. The scale has been

calibrated both for the weight of the bath and the evaporator vessel so that the weight

of HF can be directly read at all times. The water bath is equipped with a standard

heating element that maintains the bath at approximately 70° F to boil HF. The bath

is recirculated by a small centrifugal pump that directs the water through a heat

exchanger and back to the bath. The chilled water inlet valve to the heat exchanger is

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

normally open only enough to maintain a small flow through the heat exchanger. A

temperature detector on the bath controls the position of the inlet valve to allow for

quick compensation of temperature fluctuations. The bath heating element is

controlled by a thermostat, but the bath temperature signal provides an alarm and

deenergizes the element if temperature exceeds 76° F. The pressure sensor on the

gaseous HF outlet line will also shut off the heater if pressure begins to rise

continuously.

A level sensor on the evaporator controls the position of the liquid HF inlet valve. 

Nitrogen purge lines are provided on the system as well. They exhaust to the HF

storage tank scrubbing system. The final major feature of the evaporation system is

the installed rupture disc and relief valve. The rupture disc is designed to fail at 14

psig. The resultant pressurization of the piping between the rupture disc and the relief

valve will cause the installed pressure sensor to trigger an alarm locally, in the dry

line operating room and in the main control room. The sensor's signal will also cause

the liquid HF supply valve to the evaporator to shut. 

The evaporator relief valve will lift at approximately 20 psig. The relief line will pass

through a single HEPA filter installed to preserve the integrity of the radiological

envelope within airlock areas. The line then passes through the ceiling of the room to

a roof vent elevated 15 feet above the actual roof of the building. This release will be

accompanied by an audible alarm on the roof triggered by the evaporator pressure

sensor. The limited flowrate needed to relieve pressure from the evaporator will not

create a significant personnel hazard due to the elevation of the roof vent.

The evaporator room itself is equipped with fluorine detectors, which are also in the

ventilation exhaust header. These units alarm in the same locations as the pressure

relief alarms.

2.3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

This document presents in tabular form the hazards identified by the team evaluating the H-1

Plutonium Recovery Facility. It follows the process flow of the facility as it would occur,

and then identifies potential hazards in supporting activities in accordance with the building

layout. The two general types of hazards identified are as follows:

A - Material of concern for release or a potential hazard in direct contact with a

material of concern.

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Appendix B; Plutonium Recovery Facility

B - Hazard in the vicinity of material of concern that could be relevant to an event

affecting material of concern.

Standard industrial hazards are not included unless they represent a potential hazard type B. 

In that case, the focus of identification is on basic parameters to support examining the

potential affect on materials of concern, not standard worker safety issues. This practice is in

keeping with the definitions of both hazard and standard industrial hazard in DOE-STD-3009-

94. 

The initial effort has largely relied upon procedural and flowsheet limits to produce an initial

definition of facility hazards that reflects actual conditions anticipated. This is generally

adequate for the overall examination envisioned, but it is essential for the initial effort as a

minimum. Unreal numbers based on mathematical dose or high criticality limit

considerations should not be used without appreciation of the actual conditions underlying

those constructs. Blindly applying such numbers can result in significant confusion in the

hazard analysis process. Evaluations can become distorted, resulting in the utility of

subsequent results obtained being questionable. For example, consider the case where a

criticality limit exceeds by an order of magnitude what a given process can actually handle

based on concerns about stability of other process materials, such as ion exchange resin, in

radiation fields. Pretending the criticality limit is the amount of material actually present is

interfering with objective assessment of what may be a more significant safety issue than that

for which the unrealistic material quantity is being postulated.

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Appendix B

3.0 H-7 PRODUCTION SUPPORT LAB

3.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

3.1.1 Overview

The H-7 Production Support Lab was built as a research lab in 1962 and modified to adjoin

with and support H Plant operations. It provides analytical support to the plutonium 

recovery facility (H-1). Its main purposes are (1) to analyze process samples to verify

flowsheet expectations and (2) to analyze finished product material to verify product

specifications are met. All operations are on a laboratory as opposed to a process scale.

3.1.2 Facility Structure

The H-7 lab is a single-story concrete structure. The foundations of the building are

horizontal reinforced concrete footings varying from 2 to 5 feet square and approximately 

1-foot thick. The ground floor is a 6-inch-thick reinforced concrete slab. The main support

columns are 18-inch-diameter reinforced concrete cylinders tied to both the floor slab and the

exterior walls. 

The exterior walls are 8-inch-thick reinforced concrete block walls. Several main dividing

walls in the interior of the building are non-reinforced concrete block, with the other process

interior walls being double gypsum board over metal studs. The interior walls in office 

space are single gypsum board over metal studs.

Precast concrete beams resting on the main columns support the roof, which is composed of

2-hour fire-rated prestressed, precast concrete twin-tee panels covered with a 3-inch-thick

lightweight concrete topping. All roof surfaces are covered with metal decking overlayed by

a rigid buildup four-ply incombustible insulation, covered by coal-tar pitch and gravel. The

roof is flat with downspouts to facilitate drainage. 

3.1.3 Confinement Systems

The principal sources of confinement are gloveboxes and hoods, airlocks, the HVAC 

systems, and the facility structure itself. This section will concentrate on the first three 

items.

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

3.1.3.1 Gloveboxes and Hoods

Gloveboxes used in the H Plant are typical 304L stainless steel units machined to a smooth

surface inside. The gloveboxes are mounted on stantions anchored to and grouted into the

concrete floors of the facility. The windows are 0.5-inch plate glass with 0.25 inches of 

lexan mounted over them on the external glovebox frame. All gloveboxes in the analytical

laboratory are equipped with plexiglass and lexan end hood units that have airlock doors to

allow entry and exit of samples from the glovebox. Many sampling gloveboxes consist of

several small units bolted together in a line with airlock doors separating each major section. 

The typical steel hood is 4.5-feet tall, 3.5-feet wide, and 2.5-feet deep. A vertically sliding

pane of 0.25 inch thick safety glass moves on track mounting equipped with limiting stops 

for upward motion. These stops ensure that for normal operation the hood will be pulling a

minimum of 150 cfm of room air to prevent any potential contamination backflow. Only

aliquots of samples, as opposed to the full concentration sample material, are handled in the

hoods. 

3.1.3.2 Airlocks

The lab is divided up into airlock zones to minimize the chance of spreading contamination. 

One set of airlocks separates those rooms containing radionuclide-handling equipment from

the rest of the processing enclosure. A second set of airlocks separates the processing

enclosure and HEPA filtration plenums from the general use areas of the building. One

individual airlock separates the H-7 building from the H-1 building at the sample transfer

location. 

The primary airlocks isolate the eight analysis rooms from the rest of the operating area. 

Unlike the processing line rooms, the analytical line rooms are not separated into 

maintenance and operating sides so that one airlock can serve as an entry point to the

complete room. 

The primary airlocks consist of an enclosure defined by two doors. One set leads to a

glovebox room (or one of the other areas noted above), while the other set leads out into a

corridor. Both the outer and inner doors have a combination lock for entry. A hand and 

shoe monitor is installed in the airlock for use when exiting the potentially contaminated 

area.

The secondary airlocks separate the facility utility room, change room, and office space from

the primary processing enclosure. There are four of these units in the building, and they

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

function exactly like the primary airlocks. The location of the airlocks in the facility is

designated by an AL on the floorplan of the facility provided as Figure B.19.

3.1.3.3 HVAC System

The ventilation system, depicted in Figure B.20, consists of two independent once-through

airflow systems. All exhaust goes through High Efficiency Air Particulate (HEPA) filters

before entering an underground tunnel, where it is joined by exhaust from other nearby

facilities and exits from the H Plant stack.

There are four ventilation supply fans for the building. These centrifugal fans operate as sets

of two, with one always serving as an automatic start standby fan in the event of failure of

the running fan. Two of the fans serve the "clean" areas (System A), which are general

access, and two of the fans serve the remainder of the analytical and HEPA plenum areas

(System B). The "clean" areas are designed to have 6 air changes per hour, while the

production areas are designed to have 10 air changes per hour. Overall, the system is

designed to keep temperature at 75° F and 50% humidity in the summer, 70° F in the 

winter, and to keep all glovebox temperatures below a maximum of 100° F.

All supply air is prefiltered, filtered, and heated or cooled as appropriate before entry into 

the building environment. Fail shut, tornado-proof supply air dampers are provided at each

inlet as well. All ductwork in the building is constructed of galvanized steel. 

System A sends all of its exhaust through plenum A, which has two HEPA filter banks in

series. It is basically a straight through system. System B directs air to the production areas

and rooms. Air can then discharge via any one of three paths. Exhaust air from analytical

area corridors and the HEPA plenum area are bled off by one set of exhaust fans via a twostage HEPA filter plenum. Room air filtering in from the corridors is drawn through hoods

by another set of exhaust fans and passes through four stages of HEPA filtration. Other 

room air is drawn into the gloveboxes via glovebox-mounted HEPA filters. It then passes

through the glovebox and is drawn by the final set of exhaust fans though the glovebox

mounted exhaust HEPA filters into a four-stage HEPA filter plenum. All exhaust air

eventually passes into an underground tunnel leading to the H plant stack.

For the analytical areas, negative pressure at specific supply and exhaust inlet points is

controlled by pneumatically operated dampers. These units respond to signals from

differential pressure detectors. Typical differential pressures between areas and atmosphere

maintained are listed below:

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

Clean Areas - 0.1" WG

Secondary Air Locks - 0.15" WG

Regulated Analytical Areas - 0.2" WG

Primary Air Locks - 0.25" WG

Analytical Rooms - 0.3" WG

Gloveboxes - 0.9" WG

Differential pressure readout and low-level alarms are available in the facility utility room. 

Local indications of differential pressure are available at each glovebox as well. An

automatic mechanical sequencer controls restart of fans following loss of ventilation to

prevent overpressurizing the facility. This unit will also trip supply fans if an exhaust fan

fails and the standby unit does not come on.

3.1.4 Existing Structural Studies

The H-7 building was not built in accordance with any one set of identifiable contractor

standards. The site study "Building H-7 Design Criteria" identifies what criteria the building

construction is believed to correlate with and notes modifications made in accordance with the

changed mission to support H-Plant operations. 

An independent study of the facility was performed by Brown and Associates in 1987. This

study relied on extensive facility walk-throughs and review of available documentation. The

study concluded that the H-7 facility is structurally sound and would withstand the design

basis equivalent tornado of 119 mph from UCRL-15910 without significant damage. The

seismic resistance of the facility, however, is substantially weaker than that of H-Plant.

Site-specific response spectra used in the evaluation were defined in an independent study

conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These response spectra provided

surface accelerations at an average soil depth. For return periods of one in 1000 years and

one in 10,000 years, acceleration levels are 0.13g and 0.25g. The 1987 structural assessment

reached the following conclusions about expected seismic damage:

g-Level Probable Damage

 0.1 Threshold of serious effects. Exterior walls are overstressed and

experience minor cracking. Interior gypsum board walls begin

to fail. Interior unreinforced concrete block walls intact but

show signs of distress. Connection points between girders and

support columns experience some weldment failure. 

Generically supported piping fails due to differential displacement.

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 g-Level Probable Damage

 0.12 Onset of potential for utility equipment failures. Highest value

at which continued supply of electrical power can be assumed. 

Represents threshold of ventilation unavailability due to loss of

power. Interior unreinforced concrete block wall cracking and

possible localized failures. General failure of non-concrete

walls. 

 0.13 Major cracking in external walls. Onset of external glovebox

connection pipe and wiring failure. Excessive slippage due to

failed weldments between girders and columns on the south wall

of the building causes partial collapse of roof in the ventilation 

and HEPA plenum area (i.e., southeast quadrant, ≈ 25% of room). 

 ≥ 0.15 General building collapse.

3.1.5 Facility Support Systems

3.1.5.1 Nuclear Incident Monitors

Four sets of two nuclear criticality incident monitors each detect and alarm in excessive

radiation fields. These detectors are spaced so as to provide overlapping coverage by a

minimum of three monitors at any point in the facility. They provide flashing light and bell

ringing indications when activated. The units are designed to alarm on any internal failure

and receive power via an uninterruptable power supply.

3.1.5.2 Nuclear Criticality Design Mitigation and Control Systems

There are only two major contaminated liquid holding tanks in the H-7 building. These are

the plenum deluge catch tank and the waste holding tank, each of which are equipped with

borated raschig rings to prevent criticality during abnormal conditions. During normal

operation, there is no reason to believe critical accumulations of plutonium in the tanks can

occur. 

All transfers of material, whether samples, sample recycle, or waste pails, are limited to one

defined critically safe unit at a time.

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3.1.5.3 Fire Mitigation Design and Practices

Whenever possible, construction materials are noncombustible or fire resistant. The exterior

walls and roof of the building have a minimum 2-hour fire rating while the concrete interior

walls and gypsum board over steel stud walls have minimum 2- and 1-hour fire ratings

respectively. Major structural components of the gloveboxes and process material are made

of noncombustible material. 

Combustible liquids are not allowed in gloveboxes as part of the combustible loading control

program in effect, except for one 50-ml bottle of a hexone-based solvent used for sample

extractions. Potentially combustible wipes are limited by this program as well to

approximately six in line at any one time. In normal operation, non-installed combustibles in

the operating areas consist of desks, chairs, papers and books, electrical insulation, and

flammable liquid storage cabinets. The latter normally contain several liter bottles of a

hexone-based extraction solvent and/or several bottles of flammable chemicals such as ether,

as well as miscellaneous cleaning chemicals.

A reasonable amount of clutter, largely in the form of empty sample vials (glass or impactresistant plastic), tools, and glassware, can be found in analytical gloveboxes. However, the

major sources of combustible material in lab gloveboxes are electrical wiring, glovebox

gloves, sample label paper, and possibly sample vials if temperatures become hot enough. 

Wiring is installed in accordance with codes and housed in conduits or sealed raceways. 

Wiring penetrates gloveboxes through pave connectors to prevent an insulation fire from

progressing into gloveboxes. The glovebox gloves are made of materials such as Hypalon

and will melt and burn at elevated temperatures. However, the number of gloves is limited,

and storage of used gloves in a line after removal is forbidden by procedure. 

3.1.5.4 Fire Detection and Alarm System

The lab has three types of fire detectors available: ionization, photoelectric, and thermal. All

three are used in individual rooms, while only thermal detectors are used in gloveboxes and

ventilation plenums. Exceeding the setpoint on any detector will initiate an alarm in the

operating area, the facility control room, and the site fire department. Failure of a detector

and interruption of signal flowpath by such means as a wire break will initiate an alarm as

well.

3.1.5.5 Fire Suppression System

All analytical areas of the lab are equipped with automatic wet-pipe sprinklers in the

overhead, which actuate at temperatures slightly higher (approximately 155° F) than the fire

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

detection alarm setpoints. A dedicated set of thermal detectors in gloveboxes and rooms are

used to provide initiation input to the sprinkler system, which is equipped with fusible links

in the process areas as a backup means of initiation. Nozzle arrangement in the system is in

accordance with NFPA standards and will blanket a room as well as directing spray to

glovebox walls.

 

A thermal detector-activated deluge system is available for all HEPA plenums as well. This

system actuates when air temperature coming to the plenum is above 180° F, providing a

continual spray of firemain water upstream of the HEPA plenums. Series demisters are

available to protect the plenum from a large flow of water drops. This system and any of the

sprinkler systems can be activated manually as well.

3.1.5.6 Air Sampling Systems

There are two air sampling systems in the lab, a high- and a low-volume system. The highvolume system has 16 units in the analytical rooms themselves and an additional 10 exhaust

duct samplers. Each of these units draws 30 cfm. There are also 25 low-volume air 

samplers designed to detect airborne contamination in airlocks, regulated corridors, utility

areas, etc. These units draw 5 cfm. Both systems use impaction collection and

photomultiplier tube detection and provide local audio and visual alarms. Only the highvolume system, however, provides remote alarm capability to the data logger in the facility

utility control room. The motive force for both the low- and high-volume air samplers is one

of two centrifugal exhausters located in the HEPA plenum room. These units discharge into

the central facility exhaust duct downstream of the main exhaust fans. 

There are also two low-volume air samplers downstream of the HEPA filters for each 

plenum. These units have remote alarm capability in the utility room as well. Continuously

on-line filter media particulate samplers are provided for stack exhaust as well. These media

are manually collected and sampled at prescribed intervals.

3.1.5.7 Cold Chemical Storage and Supply

Cold (i.e., not radioactively contaminated) liquid feed chemicals are kept in storage

compartments in the analytical rooms themselves. The compartments are normally cabinets

with locking doors except for the flammable liquid storage cabinets, which are constructed in

accordance with NFPA and RCRA requirements.

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

3.1.5.8 Facility Control Room

The H-7 facility does not have a designated control room. Remote alarms for the air

sampling system, fire detection and suppression, ventilation pressure, etc. are available in the

utility room, which has designated shift operators to detect an alarm at the panel or via the

remote indicator horns spaced throughout the utility room. Ventilation system controller

status readout and remote controls are available by the alarm panel as well and are logged

hourly.

3.1.5.9 Electrical Power Distribution

The H-7 facility is provided with split bus redundant normal power, auxiliary power from the

facility diesel, and critical indication power from uninterruptable power supplies (UPS). 

Normal power is received from two separate public utilities. Utility A provides power to 

one main bus via the 32 substation, while Utility B provides power to the other main bus via

the 33 substation. Automatic transfer switches will connect a given bus to the other

substation upon loss of power from one supplier. 

Auxiliary power is provided to the facility by a 250-kw diesel generator located in its own

compartment in the utility area. Loss of power from both normal sources will automatically

start the diesel and commence a timing sequence that will transfer emergency busses to the

diesel once it is running at rated speed. Typical time for power restoration is on the order of

10 seconds. Upon restoration of power, the ventilation fans will automatically restart in the

appropriate sequence.

There are two separate UPS in the H-7 facility. The first is dedicated to the criticality alarm

systems and provides operational power for up to 3 hours. The second UPS provides power

to the air sampling system and the ventilation readout panel for approximately 1.5 hours.

The building grounding system serves two functions. As the building electrical ground, it

offers a path to ground for electrical faults, providing additional protection along with

breakers and fuse blocks and allowing "bleedoff" of static electrical charges. Its second

function is to provide a "bleedoff" path to ground in the event lightening strikes the building.

3.1.5.10 Instrument Air

Instrument air is generated by a small compressor unit in the utility room. It provides air for

a variety of small users, the most significant being the automatically controlled dampers on

the ventilation system. These units fail in their current position upon loss of instrument air. 

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

Filtered air is drawn into one of two air compressors (on-line and standby units) rated for 

200 scfm and 100 psig discharge pressure. The compressor outlet passes through drying

towers to one of two surge receivers. Downstream of the receivers, reducing valves are used

to provide two independent 60 psig instrument air lines.

3.1.5.11 Breathing Air

As in the case of process and instrument air, filtered breathing air is drawn into one of two

redundant compressors and discharged to receiving tanks. Maximum flowrates and pressures

are 450 scfm and 115 psig. A low-pressure alarm is provided on the receiving tank which

allows 5 minutes of breathing air for eight people to exit from any ongoing jobs.

Downstream of the receiving tanks, supplied breathing air passes through two stages of

cellulose fiber filters that remove particles greater than 20 μm in diameter. Reducing valves

maintain a pressure of 30 psig on the system, which serves sets of manifolds in all of the

operating and maintenance areas. A monitoring system is provided inline with the main

header, which measures temperature, pressure, and O2, CO2, and H2O concentration levels. 

An alarm is provided when one of these parameters goes out of a specified band. All alarms

on the system are received in the control room and at individual manifold stations.

3.1.5.12 Steam and Condensate System

Steam is received from the site boilerhouse via a 150-psig main. Before entry into the

building, it is reduced in pressure to 60 psig. Steam branch lines for use in the facility are

reduced to a nominal pressure of 35 psig.

Steam is used as an energy supply for the hot water and building heating systems. General

building use steam condensate is collected in tanks in the utility area and pumped back to the

boilerhouse.

3.1.5.13 Domestic Water

The domestic cold water main is supplied from site utilities and is equipped with multiple

redundant backflow preventers at various points in the system. One branch serves general

building needs, a second serves utility needs, and a third serves process needs. The first two

branches are disposed of through the sewage system.

The process water branch consists of three separate headers. The first provides water to

safety showers in the operating and maintenance rooms. The second provides water to

analytical room sinks. The third provides cooling water needed by analytical instruments. 

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

Discharge from these lines is drained to a raschig ring waste water tank in the ventilation fan

and plenum area, where it is ultimately disposed of to the H-8 liquid waste treatment facility.

3.1.5.14 Chilled Water Systems

There chilled water vendor package units are located in the facility utility room and serve as

the chilled water supply for general use.

3.1.5.15 Sanitary Sewer System

The sanitary sewer system accepts effluent from washrooms, showers, clean utility system

drainage or blowdown, etc. It serves as a conduit to deliver waste water to the site sewage

plant.

3.1.5.16 Diesel Fuel Oil System

The fuel oil supply source for the backup power diesel generator is an 800 gallon

underground storage tank immediately outside the building. The currently installed tank does

not meet all regulatory requirements and is the subject of investigation for potential soil

contamination remediation. A project for a replacement tank is currently underway. The 

tank is not equipped with automatic pumps, and the diesel fuel day tank is filled by a

manually operated pump.

3.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

3.2.1 Overview

There is no systematic flow of material through the H-7 laboratory facility. Liquid and solid

samples are received in maximum transfer quantities of 30- and 5-sample vials, respectively. 

Liquid samples are normally received in one of the two liquid sampling lines. Metal, oxide,

peroxide, or fluoride samples are delivered directly to the solid sampling line. These lines

then prepare smaller samples for other analytical gloveboxes.

In general, samples are introduced into lines via hood units located at either end of a line. 

Samples are then prepared and analyzed in the gloveboxes or prepared and removed from the

gloveboxes for counting. The principle outputs of the gloveboxes are normal solid waste,

unused sample material for recycle to the process, and low level-liquid waste generated by

dilution of samples for counting.

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Gloveboxes handling high-plutonium content solutions collect the unused sample portions of

these solutions in two-liter plastic jugs. When these jugs become full, they are removed 

from the glovebox, placed inside a metal pail, and transferred back to the H-1 sampling line

for recycle into the process. In a similar manner, solids are collected in individual vials until

a preset limit is reached. The old limit was 10 sample vials, which has been adjusted down

to 5 due to changes in transfer procedures in the Plutonium Recovery Facility. The vials are

placed inside a metal can, which is sealed and removed from the glovebox for transfer to the

H-1 feed preparation line to be burned to oxide for recycle into the process.

Solid waste is normally removed from the gloveboxes via bagports. Low-level liquid waste

generated during the formation of aliquots is fed to a drain, which leads to a 200-gallon 

liquid waste collection tank in the ventilation fan and plenum room. When this tank becomes

full, it is sampled and sent to the H-8 liquid waste treatment facility.

Minimum critical quantities of plutonium are not handled in any one glovebox, and all

analytical gloveboxes are generically limited to 400 grams of plutonium. This limit is not

reached when gloveboxes are operating. The procedures of the lab are currently being

reviewed to determine if operating inventories can be reduced sufficiently to make the lab a

Hazard Category 3 facility.

3.2.2 Liquid Sampling Lines

There are two identical liquid sampling lines due to the larger number of liquid samples

processed as compared to solid samples. Each sampling line contains a storage rack that can

hold up to 30 20-ml sample vials at a time. The glovebox consists of three major stations: 

(1) the densitometer station, (2) the aliquotting station, and (3) the extraction and drying

station.

The densitometer station serves to allow density measurements of plutonium solutions if

desired. The aliquotting station has a small water supply station that also houses the lowlevel waste drain. At this station, a small portion of the sample can be diluted by several

orders of magnitude to allow for later counting.

The extraction and drying station contains a 50-ml bottle of a hexone-based solvent, which is

used to extract plutonium from americium for a small portion of a sample. The plutonium

transfers to the organic layer, an aliquot of which is then pipetted to a stainless steel disc and

evaporated under an infrared lamp. The disc is then sealed with a thin coating and removed

from the glovebox for counting. Americium aliquots are prepared from the aqueous layer and

either dried or transferred to a small vial for counting.

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Several types of counting devices are available in the liquid sample line rooms. The most

significant are the simple alpha and gamma scintillation detectors used for measuring

plutonium and americium respectively, and the x-ray fluorescence unit. This unit is 

contained in a shielded enclosure in the corner of the room. The unit is constructed so that it

is not physically possible for an operator to get his hands into the path of the primary or

secondary beams, and warning lights are activated in the room and the outside corridor when

the unit is activated. The unit is operated in accordance with ANSI standards in the NBS 

111 publication.

3.2.3 Solid Sampling Line

The solid sampling line contains one rack that can hold up to 10 sample vials awaiting

analysis, and 1 metal storage container that can hold up to 5 sample vials awaiting return to

H-1 for recycle into the main process. The glovebox consists of five major stations: (1) the

densitometer station, (2) the preparation/dissolution station, (3) the aliquotting station, (4) the

extraction and drying station, and (5) the titration station.

The densitometer station and the aliquotting station are essentially the same as their

counterparts in the liquid lines. The preparation/dissolution station is the first unique feature

of the solid sampling box. It is necessary because all solids must pass through a liquid phase

before final analysis. Small metal samples are easily dissolved in hydrochloric or nitric 

acids. Plutonium fluoride is dissolved in nitric acid with an aluminum complexing agent, 

and plutonium peroxide is dissolved in acid containing an oxidizing or reducing agent (i.e.,

permanganate or iodide). Plutonium oxide is normally mixed with potassium pyrosulfate and

fused in a small muffle furnace provided at the station. The resulting solid is easily 

dissolved in nitric acid.

The extraction and drying station performs the same operations as the same section does in

the liquid lines as well as one additional major operation. This operation is the extraction of

neptunium from the aqueous americium layer by use of small ion exchange columns made of

laboratory glassware. This operation is conducted on solutions obtained from product metal

samples, with the neptunium obtained being plated out on a stainless steel disc in the same

manner as plutonium. 

The titration station is used to dissolve small metal samples of plutonium in hydrochloric

acid. The resulting solution is reduced by the addition of titanium chloride and titrated to an

endpoint with cerric ammonium nitrate solution. This operation is used to determine the

relative purity of the original sample.

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

The same types of counting devices found in the liquid sample line rooms are found in the

metal sample line rooms.

3.2.4 Emission Spectroscopy Line

The emission spectrometer is used primarily to measure impurities in plutonium metal. It is

also used to prepare samples for the x-ray diffraction analysis unit installed in the room. The

line consists of three major stations: (1) the diffraction sample preparation station, (2) the

spectrometer sample preparation station, and (3) the emission spectrometer station.

The diffraction sample preparation station has a storage rack capable of holding 10 sample

vials. A metal storage container that can hold up to five sample vials awaiting return to H-1

for recycle into the main process is located at this station as well. A mortar and pestle are

provided in the station to grind non-metallic samples into fine powder. The sample obtained

is sealed in a plastic pipe cap by Teflon or Mylar film before being removed from the

glovebox via the hood box on the entry end of the line. It is examined for contamination in a

separate laboratory hood and then taken to the diffractometer sample chamber. The x-ray unit

is operated in accordance with ANSI standards and is equipped with warning lights that

activate in the room and in the hallway when the unit is on. Respirators are worn whenever

the sealed sample is in transit in the room, and a contamination check is made before

removing the respirator after transfer. 

The spectrometer sample preparation station also has a storage rack capable of holding 10

sample vials. The first step in preparation is to dissolve the sample in acid and then

precipitate the sample in a slurry form. The slurry is dried under an infrared lamp and

converted to oxide in a small muffle furnace. In the final step of sample preparation, the

oxide obtained is pelletized in a sodium fluoride matrix.

Individual pellets are introduced into the emission spectrometer station and inserted in the

unit's electrode rod. The pellet is vaporized once it is in place, and impurities are detected

from their spectral emissions. The emission spectrometer itself is built into the glovebox,

with the physical bulk of the unit outside the box. 

3.2.5 Mass Spectrometry Line

Like the emission spectrometer, the mass spectrometer is built into the mass spectrometry

glovebox with the bulk of the unit outside the glovebox. The line receives small liquid

samples from the liquid or solid sampling lines and is equipped with a 20-position storage

rack. Analysis is performed on small samples dried and oxidized with a heated filament. 

These samples are transferred through a vacuum lock into the automated mass spectrometer. 

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

Computer readouts from the instrument provide estimates of isotope quantities for specific

elements.

3.2.6 Raschig Ring Line

New and used raschig rings are examined in this room, with used rings being examined in a

small glovebox. The major tests are: (1) neutron absorption test using a packaged source 

and absorption instrument, (2) chemical stability test performed by immersion in a heated

nitric acid bath, and (3) physical strength test performed by rotating in a tumbler.

3.2.7 Thermal Analysis Line

This line serves to allow thermal characterization of samples, including metallic plutonium. 

A 10-position storage rack is provided for sample vials, and a storage can for up to 5 

leftover sample vials awaiting recycle to the process. Differential thermal analysis measures

the endothermic or exothermic response of sample material to heating over a selected

temperature range. Thermogravimetric analysis determines the weight change of sample

material over a selected temperature range. A small arc welding unit is provided in the box

for sealing sample holders prior to measurement.

3.2.8 Atomic Absorption Line

This small line receives samples generated in the liquid or solid handling lines. An

automated atomic absorption unit integral to the glovebox receives a supply of acetylene gas

from a vendor-supplied bottle stored in the room. This gas provides a small flame into 

which the sample is aspirated. Differences in light transmission as the sample passes through

the flame are used to determine quantities of selected impurities in the original sample. The

line is equipped with a 20-position sample vial storage rack. 

3.2.9 Solid Waste and Residue Handling

All solid waste is taken to the Plutonium Recovery Facility pail assay area upon generation.

3.3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

This document presents in tabular form the hazards identified by the team evaluating the H-7

Production Support Lab. It examines each of the major activities and areas of the facility. 

The two general types of hazards identified are as follows:

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Appendix B; Production Support Lab

A - Material of concern for release or a potential hazard in direct contact with a

material of concern.

B - Hazard in the vicinity of material of concern that could be relevant to an event

affecting material of concern.

Standard industrial hazards are not included unless they represent a potential hazard type B. 

In that case, the focus of identification is on basic parameters to support examining the

potential affect on materials of concern, not standard worker safety issues. This practice is in

keeping with the definitions of both hazard and standard industrial hazard in DOE-STD3009-94. 

The initial effort has largely relied upon procedural and activity limits to produce an initial

definition of facility hazards that reflects actual conditions anticipated. This is generally

adequate for the overall examination envisioned, but it is essential for the initial effort as a

minimum. Unreal numbers based on mathematical dose or high criticality limit

considerations should not be used without appreciation of the actual conditions underlying

those constructs, as blind application of such numbers can distort evaluation results.

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Appendix B

4.0 H-21 TRU-WASTE FACILITY

4.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

4.1.1 Overview

The H-21 TRU-Waste Facility is used to store and ship transuranic waste generated as a

result of operations in the H-Plant Area. The building consists of four areas; the storage 

bay, the loading dock, the real-time radiography (RTR) room and employee office space. 

The storage bay provides short-term storage of 55-gallon transuranic waste drums. It has a

capacity of 320 waste drums, with an additional capacity for up to 12 rejected drums 

awaiting return. Limited space away from drum storage is also provided for short-term

storage of several large waste crates. The maximum inventory of radioactivity allowed in the

H-21 facility is 10,000 grams of weapons-grade plutonium. A single drum of TRU waste

may contain up to 200 grams of weapons-grade plutonium. Material handling equipment 

used in this facility consists of common industrial stock items, such as electrical forklifts,

barrel huggers, and slings. The layout of the H-21 facility is presented in Figure B.21.

4.1.2 Facility Structure

The H-21 facility is a 4,000 ft2 Butler style building. It is a single story, metal frame, metal

panel building with reinforced concrete footings, foundation an floors. The building frame is

constructed of welded plate and wide flange columns and beams. The roof and walls consist

of ribbed interlocking steel panels that provide shelter from normal atmospheric phenomena. 

4.1.3 Facility Support Systems

4.1.3.1 HVAC System

Heating and ventilation is provided by a ceiling mounted heater and blower system supplied

by a single intake duct on the roof. Air is introduced into the office area, from which it

flows through the storage bay to the loading bay. Exhaust is through one-way outlets in both

the storage bay and the loading bay, as well as through gaps in the loading bay door

openings. A single air conditioning unit is located outside and adjacent to the facility,

providing cool air to the building.

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Appendix B; H-21 TRU Waste Facility

4.1.3.2 Fire Suppression System

The H-21 fire protection system is a wet-pipe sprinkler system employing automatic heatactivated sprinklers in the overhead designed to actuate at 100° C. Activation of the 

sprinkler sounds a building-wide audible alarm and also triggers an alarm at the local fire

station. The H-21 facility fire protection system is not seismically qualified.

4.1.3.3 Electrical Power Distribution

The H-21 facility is provided with normal power received from a local utility. No backup or

redundant power is available. The building grounding system serves two functions. As the

building electrical ground, it provides a path to ground for electrical faults, affording

additional protection along with breakers and fuse blocks and allowing "bleedoff" of static

electrical charges. Its second function is to provide a conducting path to ground in the event

of lightning strike.

4.1.3.4 Domestic Water

Domestic, industrial, and fire-fighting water is drawn from a 30.5 cm cast iron water main

extending from the south. Effluent from this system is disposed of through the sewage

system.

4.1.4 Real-Time Radiography Unit

The RTR unit is a filmless radiography machine operating at approximately 420 kV and

10 mA. Trained RTR personnel view the real-time X-rays which are displayed on a

television monitor. RTR personnel look for wave motion on the X-ray display which is the

indicator of free liquids within the waste drums. The X-ray images are videotaped to create 

a permanent record as drums are scanned.

Drums undergoing RTR examination are placed on a cart and positioned inside a shielded

room. The X-ray tube and imaging system are located on opposite sides of the shielded 

room and are positioned to scan the drum. The tube and imaging system remain fixed in

position while the cart is mechanically jostled. Safety interlocks prevent the X-ray tube from

operating if a shielded door is open. The unit is operated remotely from the RTR control

panel located in the facility office area.

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Appendix B; H-21 TRU Waste Facility

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS

The H-21 TRU-Waste Facility serves as a radioactive and hazardous waste and shipping

facility and prepares new certified waste drums for plant-wide use. The building is in

operation 24 hours per day for five days each week. The real-time radiography unit is used

to evaluate the contents of waste drums.

4.2.1 Receiving and Inspection of Waste Drums

The H-21 facility receives drums of waste produced by the adjacent H-Plant. Drums of 

waste are inspected according to the procedures titled "Waste Drum Inspection Process" and

"Dock Area Inspection Process." The received waste is moved into the staging area where

drums are inspected for dents or other damage. Waste drum identification is verified by the

Tamper Indicating Device (TID) number. Drums can be rejected for any reason, such as

bulges, dents, loose bolts, holes, loose packaging, incomplete paperwork, exceeding weight

limit, or liquids in the drum. The H-Plant is notified of the intent to return the rejected 

drum, and the material is moved to the reject staging area prior to return.

TRU-Waste drums are examined through RTR by non-destructive testing (NDT) personnel

prior to storage or staging for shipment to verify compliance with drum requirements, 

mixture requirements, and that no free liquids are present. The Shipping Operations 

Manager is immediately notified if free liquids are suspected to be present. During RTR

examination the drum is mechanically jostled and passed in front of the X-ray tube and

imaging system. RTR acceptance criteria include the following:

• Drums require a rigid liner and a minimum of one sealed poly liner inside the

rigid liner. The rigid liner is secured with a retaining clamp and bolt.

• No free liquid can be present in the waste.

• Metal or glass wastes may contain up to 10% combustibles by volume as

estimated by RTR examination.

• All pressurized containers in drums must show clear evidence that container

integrity has been destroyed, removing the potential for residual container

pressurization. Examples include aerosol cans and pressurized-gas bottles.

After RTR inspection the drum is moved back to the staging area. Drums containing free

liquids are placed inside a catch pan for secondary containment should the drum leak or

rupture.

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Appendix B; H-21 TRU Waste Facility

4.2.2 Storage of Waste Drums

The TWF has a total storage of 90 cubic yards of TRU-waste. Rejected drums awaiting

return are included in the allowed inventory, although they are not stacked and therefore the

number staged is limited. The maximum permitted dose rate of a single drum is 200 mrem

per hour, although normally observed dose rates are far below the limit. Drum storage 

cannot exceed 4 layers and a lateral spacing cannot be less than 18 inches between drums. 

All banding and palletting of drums is performed at floor level. Drums are placed on pallets,

where they are coated with fire retardant and separated by sheets of plywood. Banding is

required on the fourth tier of drums. Main egress routes between stacks are at least 44 

inches greater than the width of the widest load.

4.2.3 Radiation Monitoring

Contamination surveys are performed at each shift change (every 8 hours) using swipes and

an alpha particle instrument. Smears are taken form the walking area, routinely used

equipment, miscellaneous drums, and pallets. Smear readings above 20 dpm require

decontamination. A weekly radiation exposure survey monitors gamma and neutron radiation

activity. Instruments are used to survey gamma and neutron activity near the outside of the

drums. All waste drums to be shipped receive a final survey.

4.2.4 Shipping

TRU-Waste drums are shipped out of the H-21 facility via truck trailer to the onsite storage

location. Truck trailers are inspected and surveyed prior to backing up to the H-21 loading

dock. Once in place, the trailer wheels are chocked, and a visual inspection is conducted to

verify that the trailer is in place and secure.

TRU-Waste drums are loaded onto the trailer one at a time using an electric forklift equipped

with a barrel hugger. Cardboard is placed between barrel tiers when more than one layer of

drums is configured on the trailer. Drum are placed so as to ensure proper weight

distribution over the trailer axles. Each tier of drums is then banded.

After loading, trailers are surveyed for gamma and neutron radiation. The loading document

is reviewed for accuracy, and if no discrepancies are found the paperwork is signed. The

loaded trailer then receives a final inspection. The trailer is closed and sealed, the chocks 

are removed, and the truck pulls away from the H-21 loading dock.

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CONCLUDING MATERIAL

Review Activities:

DOE Field Offices National Laboratories Area Offices

DP AL ANL Argonne

EH CH BNL Brookhaven

EM ID INEL Golden

ER NV LANL Kirtland

NE OR LLNL Los Alamos

NS RFO ORNL Rocky Flats

RL PNL

SR SNL

SF

SRO

Preparing Activity:

DOE DP-31

Project Number:

SAFT-0013