U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

86–489 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–164 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S RESPONSE TO THE 

ATTACK ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, 

LIBYA, AND THE FINDINGS OF ITS INTERNAL 

REVIEW FOLLOWING THE ATTACK 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 7, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOHN A. BONSELL, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK ON U.S. FACILITIES IN

BENGHAZI, LIBYA, AND THE FINDINGS OF ITS INTERNAL REVIEW FOLLOWING THE

ATTACK

FEBRUARY 7, 2013

Page 

Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 10 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ...................... 19 

Appendix A ............................................................................................................... 98 

Appendix B ............................................................................................................... 100 

Appendix C ............................................................................................................... 103 

Appendix D ............................................................................................................... 142 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S RESPONSE TO 

THE ATTACK ON U.S. FACILITIES IN 

BENGHAZI, LIBYA, AND THE FINDINGS OF 

ITS INTERNAL REVIEW FOLLOWING THE 

ATTACK 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, 

Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, Graham, Vitter, Blunt, Lee, and Cruz. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Barry 

C. Walker, security officer. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, 

professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff 

member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, 

counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William 

G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and Russell L. 

Shaffer, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional 

staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; 

Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member; Anthony J. Lazarski, 

professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff 

member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A. 

Kulenkampff, Brian F. Sebold, and Lauren M. Gillis. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jeffrey Fatora, assistant to Senator Nelson; 

Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Brian Nagle, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin; 

Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman, 

assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator 

Blumenthal; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly, 

Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Mary Naylor, assistant to 

Senator Kaine; Jim Catella, assistant to Senator King; Joel Starr, 

2 

assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to 

Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; Joshua 

Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter; Charles Prosch, assistant to 

Senator Blunt; Peter Blair, assistant to Senator Lee; and Brooke 

Bacak, assistant to Senator Cruz. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Today the committee 

welcomes the Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, to testify about the Department of Defense’s (DOD) response to the deadly terrorist attack on the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility and 

Annex in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 and 12 of last year and 

the findings of its internal review following that attack, including 

lessons learned from Benghazi. 

I want to remind colleagues that we will be receiving testimony 

next Tuesday morning on the impacts of sequestration and/or a 

full-year Continuing Resolution (CR) on DOD and our witnesses 

there will be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Department’s 

Comptroller, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

I hope that today’s hearing will inform this committee of any 

changes that have been made or are being proposed to the posture 

of U.S. forces overseas to respond to similar terrorist attacks in the 

future as we saw in Benghazi and DOD’s assessment of the recommendations that are included in the Secretary of State’s Accountability Review Board (ARB) that affect DOD’s installations or 

operations overseas. 

In November, DOD released a timeline of its response to the assault of September 11 and 12 in Benghazi, including the decisions 

made on the deployment of various forces based in the United 

States or overseas. A copy of this timeline will be put in the record. 

I think we each have it and it will be included in the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

3 


207ful5.eps

Timeline of Department of Defense Actions on September 11-12, 2012 

All times are Eastern Daylight Time (EDT, Washington, DC) 

and Eastern European Time (EET, Benghazi) 

Tuesdav September 11 2012 

EDT II EET 

~3:42 pm //9:42 pm The incident starts atthe facility in Benghazi. 

3;S9 pm 1/9:59 pm An unarmed, unmanned, surveillance aircraft is directed to reposition overhead 

the Benghazi facility. 

4:32 pm I/IO:32pm The National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, after receiving initial 

reports of the Incident from the State Department, notifies the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Joint Stilff. The information is quickly passed to 

Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. 

5:00 pm /ll1:00pm Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey attend a previously scheduled meeting 

with the President at the White House. The leaders discuss potential responses 

to the emerging situation. 

5:10 pm //11:10 pm The diverted surveillance aircraft arrives on station over the Benghazi facility. 

~S:30 pm //11;30 pm All surviving AmeriCan personnel have departed the facility. 

6:00-8:00 pm 1/ 

12:00·2:00 am Secretary Panetta convenes a series of meetings in the Pentagon with senior 

officials including General Dempsey and General Ham. They discuss additional 

response options for Benghazi and for the potential outbreak of further Violence 

throughout the region, particularly in TuniS, Tripoli, Cairo, and Sana'a. 

During these meetings, Secretary Panetta directs (provides verbal authorization) 

the following actions: 

1) A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon, stationed in Rota, Spain, 

to prepare to deploy to Benghazi, and a second FAST platoon, also stationed 

in Rota, Spain, to prepare to deploy to the Embassy in Tripoli. 

2) A EUCOM special operations force, which is training in Central Europe, to 

prepare to deploy to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe. 

3) A special operations force based in the United States to prepare to deploy 

to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe. 

During this period, actions are verbally conveyed from the Pentagon to the 

affected Combatant Commands in order to expedite movement of forces upon 

receipt of formal authorization. 

~6:30 pm 1/12:30 am A six-man security team from u.s. Embassy Tripoli, including two DoD 

personnel, departs for Benghazi. 
4 

Chairman LEVIN. According to the timeline, within 20 minutes of 

the assault on the State Department’s Temporary Mission Facility 

DOD’s first action was to redirect an unmanned surveillance platform from a mission over Darnah, Libya, to provide better awareness of the events on the ground in Benghazi. 

Following consultations at the White House, Secretary Panetta 

convened a series of meetings in the Pentagon to discuss options 

for expanding DOD’s response, as well as to prepare for the potential outbreak of further violence throughout the region. During 

these meetings, Secretary Panetta authorized a number of deployVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB

207ful6.eps
5 

ments. I hope that Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey will 

provide the committee with details on the circumstances that led 

them to these decisions. 

Since September, there’s been a great deal of focus on the supporting role that the Marine Corps guards play in many U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. The Marine Corps did not have an element 

in Benghazi as it was not an embassy, but a Temporary Mission 

Facility. The committee will be closely monitoring the use of these 

marines. Our National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment 

of the mission of the Marine Security Guard (MSG) program, 

whether it should be expanded, and a report to Congress on the results of this review. 

More immediately, the provision requires the Secretary to develop a plan to increase the number of marines in the MSG program by up to 1,000 marines to improve security at our embassies, 

consulates, and other diplomatic facilities. Based on Secretary of 

State Clinton’s recent testimony before Congress, it is clear that 

the State Department and DOD are already consulting on this review. 

The Secretary of State’s ARB focused on the need to ensure the 

State Department puts greater focus on high-risk, high-threat 

posts, as well as posts where the host nation, despite having the 

will to protect diplomatic facilities, does not have the capacity to 

protect them. 

In some cases, these posts are located in countries where DOD 

and the State Department have assistance programs with similar 

objectives. These are perhaps areas where the two Departments 

can explore whether additional collaboration is appropriate. 

During Secretary of State Clinton’s recent testimony before Congress, she emphasized the importance of properly resourcing U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM reached full operational 

capability less than 5 years ago and has been what’s called an 

economy-of-force effort to date. 

The events of last September raise questions about the adequacy 

of DOD’s resourcing with respect to AFRICOM in terms of funding, 

assigned personnel, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. As an example, until the beginning of the current 

fiscal year, AFRICOM did not have a dedicated Commander’s In 

Extremis Force, which is an emergency standby force, but rather 

it shared its force with U.S. European Command. 

In recent years, the committee has sought to provide DOD with 

flexible AFRICOM-specific authorities to support the burgeoning 

requirements of the command, such as the African Cooperation Authority, targeted train-and-equip authorities to support deployments of the African Union mission in Somalia, and flexible military construction authorities. The committee looks forward to 

learning whether any additional actions might be taken to further 

support AFRICOM’s programs and operations. 

Unfortunately, today much of the discourse about the events surrounding the deadly attack against our facilities and people in 

Benghazi have focused on the preparation and dissemination of unclassified talking points that were prepared at the request of Congress by our Nation’s intelligence professionals and approved by 

6 

their most senior leadership. These talking points are relevant, but 

even more relevant than finding out, as Secretary Clinton said, 

why these militants decided as they did, is to find those militants 

and bring them to justice and to do everything that we can to prevent it from ever happening again. 

Since the events in Benghazi, individuals and groups with the 

same motivations as those that attacked the U.S. facility in 

Benghazi have attempted to expand their territory in the nation of 

Mali, as well as take hostage dozens of innocent civilians and attempt to destroy a natural gas facility in Algeria. Today the United 

States is providing its unique enabling capabilities to the French 

military operations and the deployment of African forces from nations around the region. 

As Secretary Panetta has stated repeatedly, it is critical that the 

United States continue to pursue those groups and individuals 

seeking to attack the United States and our interests. I expect the 

Secretary and the Chairman this morning will provide their assessment of the threat that’s posed by these groups to regional and 

international security, as well as our effort to counter their operations. 

The four Americans that our Nation lost last September were 

among the very best expression of what it means to be an American—hard-working, energetic, optimistic, dedicated, not just to furthering the interests of their own Nation, but to ensuring that others could enjoy the same freedom and opportunity that we hold so 

dear. We honor the sacrifice of those Americans and in their name 

we will do everything that we can to prevent a repetition of 

Benghazi. 

Since this is likely Secretary Panetta’s last hearing before this 

committee—and a broad smile has now appeared upon his face— 

I want to take a moment to offer my personal thanks to Secretary 

Leon Panetta, for your service to our country, for your leadership 

at DOD. Secretary Panetta, you have exhibited qualities of honesty, candor, humility, fair-mindedness, and a great sense of 

humor. All of those were essential during the tenure that you had 

as Secretary. So, we thank you, Leon, for your service to our Nation and for your great cooperation as well with this committee. 

[Applause.] 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree with the last part of your statement there. I hold both 

of our witnesses in the highest regard, and in the case of Secretary 

Panetta, I just whispered to my friend, Senator McCain, that two 

of my favorite Democrats in the House were Mineta and Panetta, 

and that has always been the case. In fact, I rejoiced at the time 

that you received the positions and the appointments that you have 

had. 

It’s long overdue that this committee is holding a hearing to examine the facts surrounding the terrorist attacks in Benghazi on 

September 11, 2012, that left four Americans dead: Ambassador 

Christopher Stevens, Information Management Officer Sean Smith, 

7 

and two embassy security personnel, Glen Doherty and Tyrone 

Woods—deaths that I believe could have been prevented. 

What’s become clear over the last 5 months is that the United 

States is woefully unprepared for what occurred in Benghazi. What 

has also been clear is that following the attack, the administration 

provided the American people inaccurate information about the 

true nature of the catastrophe and those events in Benghazi. In my 

discussions with the most senior administrative officials, I’ve been 

told that on the night of the tragedy, although there was confusion 

about the nature of the first attack on the compound where the 

Ambassador was located, the second wave of attacks, which was on 

the annex, were ‘‘unequivocally a terrorist attack.’’ I have no doubt 

about that, that they were. 

This was apparent because an angry mob doesn’t use coordinated 

mortars and rocket propelled grenades (RPG). So I have no question about that in my mind. 

Despite the clear evidence, it took this administration over a 

week to publicly admit, as many of us knew already, that it was 

a terrorist attack, not simply a protest that turned violent, as Ambassador Susan Rice adamantly and incorrectly insisted. While 

some may downplay the difference, I can’t. Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists were involved in the murder of four Americans, including 

our U.S. Ambassador to Libya. This fact should call into question 

the effectiveness of our counterterrorism strategy today in North 

Africa and beyond. 

I hope our hearing today will provide the committee with a thorough accounting of the facts leading up to the attack, as well as 

what has been done in months following to ensure that this tragedy doesn’t happen again. In the months leading up to September 

11, there were no fewer than four significant attacks against the 

western interests in the city. 

I’d like to have you go ahead and put that timeline chart back 

up there and leave it up during the course of this hearing, because 

each member up here has a copy of this and there are certain 

things that happened we all know. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

8 

Senator INHOFE. We know that on May 22, the Red Cross was 

hit with an RPG. They left town. We know that on June 11, the 

British Ambassador’s motorcade was attacked by an RPG. They left 

town. We know that on April 10, the United Nations convoy was 

hit by an improvised explosive device (IED), and on June 6, the 

U.S. Consulate was attacked with a bomb, and many, many, many 

other things. But we stayed; we didn’t leave. 

While I understand the State Department has primary responsibility for the protection of American diplomats around the world, 

I also understand that DOD plays an important supporting role to 

this effort. I expect our witnesses to explain today why, given the 


207ful1.eps
9 

clear indicators and warnings that threats to the United States’ interests in Benghazi and throughout North Africa were growing, 

was DOD not placed on a heightened alert status or adequately 

postured to respond in a timely manner to a contingency of this nature, especially on the anniversary of September 11? 

Our witnesses have repeatedly stated that there were no military 

assets available in the region that could have acted in time potentially to avert this disaster, and I have to ask, why not? The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directs that we will ‘‘rebalance toward the Asian Pacific,’’ and goes on to say that in Africa 

and Latin America, ‘‘we will develop innovative, low-cost, and 

small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.’’ I 

don’t agree. That’s no way to achieve our security objectives. 

Benghazi highlights the strategic risks of this new strategy in 

places like Africa, risks certain to be magnified by looming defense 

cuts. 

This committee must get a thorough accounting of exactly what 

was known and when and what DOD did to respond to the escalating situation in Benghazi and why it was not better prepared. 

Additionally, our witnesses should address whether or not the current relationship between the State and the Defense Departments 

is sufficient to meet the security demands of our overseas presence. 

I’ve made over 100 African country visits. I know Africa, and 

what happened in Benghazi vividly illustrates what I’ve been talking about for a long period of time, that is the growing threat to 

the United States’ interests on the African continent from terrorist 

groups such as Al-Shabab, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and 

Boko Haram. 

General Ham, the Commander of AFRICOM, who has been doing 

a great job with limited resources, I must say, said back in 2011 

that terrorist organizations in East Africa, in the deserts of North 

Africa and Nigeria, ‘‘have very explicity and publicity voiced intent 

to target westerners and the United States specifically.’’ Secretary 

Panetta, the same year you said: ‘‘The longer you delay, the longer 

you avoid trying to assign some assistance there, the more dangerous these groups become and the greater the instability that develops here. There are elements there in Central Africa that either 

have ties to al Qaeda or that present the forces of terrorism in 

their own, and that’s what’s dangerous.’’ 

As bad as everything that I’ve stated is, what I think is worse 

is the cover-up. It was obvious from the information we had on 

September 11 that the second wave—not the first wave, the second 

wave; we have two different waves there; we had the compound, 

which we’ll talk about in more detail during the questions, and 

then we had the annex—but that the second wave of attacks on the 

annex were unequivocally a terrorist attack, and we knew it right 

at the time. 

Despite this information, Ambassador Rice said something that 

was totally false to the American people on all five major Sunday 

news shows, implying that the attacks were in response to an antiIslam video that spurred protests across the region. In this sense, 

you are probably the wrong witness to have here because you’d be 

unfamiliar with who actually instructed her to say that and gave 

10 

her that faulty information. But that’s something we hope that 

we’ll be able to get and that’s something that can’t be ignored. 

We sit around all day long and talk about the resources that we 

should have and don’t have, not just here, not just in this part of 

the world, but all over the world, and that’s fine. I think we all understand that. But that’s not the big problem here. The big problem 

here is the cover-up that nobody talks about and that’s the tragedy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Panetta. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary PANETTA. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today 

to discuss the terrorist attacks on our facilities in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. Before I go into my testimony, let me just state 

my deepest thanks to all of you for the support and friendship that 

I’ve had with all of you on both sides of the aisle. I have had the 

honor to in many ways live the American dream as the son of 

Italian immigrants in the various capacities that I’ve had to serve 

this country. The greatest privilege I think I’ve had is to serve as 

an elected member in the House of Representatives and have the 

opportunity to work with many of you in that capacity, and then 

as a member of the executive branch had the opportunity to work 

with you as well. 

I thank you for your dedication to the country and I thank you 

for your willingness to serve the United States. 

On that tragic day, as always, DOD was prepared for a wide 

range of contingencies. Just to remind you that the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in the 6 months prior to that attack identified some 281 threats to U.S. diplomats, diplomatic facilities, embassies, ambassadors, and consulates worldwide, and obviously Benghazi was one of those almost 300 areas of concern. 

But unfortunately, there was no specific intelligence or indications of an imminent attack on that U.S. facility in Benghazi. 

Frankly, without an adequate warning there was not enough time, 

given the speed of the attack, for armed military assets to respond. 

That’s not just my view or General Dempsey’s view. It was the 

view of the ARB that studied what happened on that day. 

In the months since the tragedy at the Temporary Mission Facility and the nearby annex in Benghazi, we’ve learned that there 

were actually two short-duration attacks that occurred some 6 

hours apart. Again, there was no specific intelligence that indicated 

that a second attack would occur at the annex, which was located 

some 2 miles away. 

The bottom line is this: that we were not dealing with a prolonged or continuous assault, which could have been brought to an 

end by a U.S. military response very simply. Although we had 

forces deployed to the region, time, distance, the lack of an adequate warning, events that moved very quickly on the ground prevented a more immediate response. 

Despite the uncertainty at the time, DOD and the rest of the 

U.S. Government spared no effort to do everything we could to try 

to save American lives. Before, during, and after the attack, every 

11 

request DOD received we did, we accomplished. But again, four 

American lives were lost and we all have a responsibility to make 

sure that that does not happen again. 

The four Americans who perished in Benghazi—Ambassador Stevens, Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and the five 

embassy security personnel, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods—all 

were heroes and all were patriots. I had the opportunity to join the 

President, Secretary Clinton, and other officials at Andrews Air 

Force Base for the dignified transfer ceremony when the bodies of 

those heroes were returned home. I had the opportunity to meet 

with their families. 

I believe we all have a solemn responsibility to these families 

and to all the diplomatic personnel who put themselves at risk, to 

find out exactly what happened, to bring those involved to justice, 

to make sure that we’re doing everything possible to prevent it 

from happening again, and to ensure the safety of our personnel 

and facilities worldwide. 

To that end, DOD has fully supported efforts by Congress and 

the State Department to review the events and decisions surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. We have made every effort to respond promptly to numerous requests for additional information, to 

provide briefings, and to provide testimony to members and committees in Congress. 

In fact, General Dempsey and I were among the very first U.S. 

Government senior officials to brief Congress on this tragedy. We 

appeared before this committee on September 14, 2012, 3 days 

after the attack, and provided the best information we had at that 

point as to what had taken place. 

Additionally, DOD participated in classified briefings and answered questions from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, even 

when we were not called to testify. We’ve also provided all requested support to the ARB that was co-chaired by Ambassador 

Pickering and by Admiral Mullen. 

Based on the information we’ve compiled and the reviews that 

we’ve conducted, let me describe for you DOD’s response to the 

events on September 11, some of the lessons that we’ve learned, 

and the adjustments we are making to our global force posture 

given continuing unrest throughout North Africa and the Middle 

East. In fact, in many places, if we get a heads-up that we need 

the changes we’ve made have already resulted in early decisions to 

deploy additional security or withdraw diplomatic staff in advance 

of a crisis from Central America to Khartoum, from Tunisia to 

Yemen, from Egypt to Mali, and others. 

While DOD does not have the primary responsibility for the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world, we do work 

closely with the State Department and support them as requested. 

In the months prior to the Benghazi attack, as I’ve said, we received from the Intelligence Community almost 300 reports on possible threats to American facilities around the world. Over the 

course of the day on September 11, General Dempsey and I received a number of reports of possible threats to U.S. facilities, inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
12 

cluding those in Cairo, Egypt. But there were no reports of imminent threats to U.S. personnel or facilities in Benghazi. 

By our best estimate, the incident at the Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi began at about 3:42 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time 

on September 11. The Embassy in Tripoli was notified of the attacks almost immediately and within 17 minutes of the initial reports, about 3:59 p.m., AFRICOM directed an unarmed and unmanned surveillance aircraft that was nearby to reposition overhead the Benghazi facility. My understanding is that that unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) arrived about 1 hour and 11 minutes 

after the attack had begun and was focused on the primary facility 

there to try to determine what was taking place. 

Soon after the initial reports about the attack in Benghazi were 

received, General Dempsey and I met with President Obama and 

he ordered all available DOD assets to respond to the attack in 

Libya and to protect U.S. personnel and interests in the region. It’s 

important to remember that, in addition to responding to the situation in Benghazi, we were also concerned about potential threats 

to U.S. personnel in Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Sanaa, and elsewhere 

that could potentially require a military response. 

In consultation with General Dempsey and AFRICOM Commander General Ham, I directed several specific actions. First, we 

ordered a Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) stationed in Spain to prepare to deploy to Benghazi. A second FAST 

platoon was ordered to prepare to deploy to the Embassy in Tripoli. 

A Special Operations Force (SOF) which was training in Central 

Europe was ordered to prepare to deploy to an intermediate staging 

base in Southern Europe, Sigonella, and a SOF based in the United 

States was ordered to deploy to an intermediate staging base in 

Southern Europe as well at Sigonella. 

Some have asked why other types of armed aircraft were not dispatched to Benghazi. The reason simply is because with armed 

UAVs, AC–130 gunships, or fixed-wing fighters with the associated 

tanking, you have to provide air refueling abilities, armaments— 

you have to arm all the weapons before you put them on the 

planes—targeting and support facilities were not in the vicinity of 

Libya. Because of the distance, it would have taken at least 9 to 

12 hours, if not more, to deploy these forces to Benghazi. 

This was, pure and simple, in the absence, as I said, of any kind 

of advance warning, a problem of distance and time. Frankly, even 

if we were able to get the F–16s or the AC–130s over the target 

in time, the mission still depends on accurate information about 

what targets they’re supposed to hit, and we had no forward air 

controllers there. We had no communications with U.S. personnel 

on the ground. As a matter of fact, we had no idea where the Ambassador was at that point to be able to conduct any kind of attacks on the ground. 

The quickest response option available was a Tripoli-based security team that was located at the Embassy in Tripoli. To their credit, within hours this six-man team, including two U.S. military personnel, chartered a private airplane deployed to Benghazi. Within 

15 minutes of arriving at the annex facility, they came under attack by mortar and rocket-propelled grenades. Members of this 

13 

team, along with others at the annex facility, provided emergency 

medical assistance and supported the evacuation of all personnel. 

Only 12 hours after the attacks had begun, all remaining U.S. 

Government personnel had been safely evacuated from Benghazi. 

Looking back, our actions in the immediate aftermath of these 

attacks have been subject, obviously, to intense scrutiny and review. But let me share with you the conclusion of the ARB, which 

I believe accurately assessed the situation: ‘‘The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not 

enough time, given the speed of the attacks, for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were underway soon after Washington received initial 

word of the attacks and continued throughout the night. The board 

found no evidence of any undue delays in decisionmaking or denial 

of support from Washington or from the military combatant commanders. Quite the contrary, the safe evacuation of all U.S. Government personnel from Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack 

and subsequently to Ramstein Air Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. Government coordination and military response and 

helped save the lives of two severely wounded Americans.’’ 

Still, after all of that, it is clear that there are lessons to be 

learned here and steps that must be taken to ensure that we’re 

doing everything possible to protect our personnel and our facilities 

abroad. So in concert with the State Department and the Intelligence Community, we are in the process of developing enhanced 

security for U.S. persons and facilities in the wake of Benghazi. 

There will always be a tension between mission effectiveness for 

personnel, the ability to get out and do what they’re supposed to 

do in these countries, and their physical security. We’re committed 

to steps that avoid a bunker mentality and yet we still must afford 

greater protection from armed attack. 

We’re taking steps along three tracks. First, host nation capacity. 

We have been able to better assess and build up the capabilities 

of host governments to provide security for U.S. personnel and facilities. The fact is, as you all know, that our embassies and consulates depend on host country personnel to provide the first line 

of security. This episode raises concerns about the ability of some 

newly-established or fragile governments to properly secure U.S. 

diplomatic facilities. 

To address these concerns, we are working with the State Department in considering how DOD can better help host nations enhance the security provided to our diplomatic facilities. Where permissible and appropriate, in collaboration with the Secretary of 

State and the U.S. Chief of Mission in the affected country, we believe that DOD can assist in their development using a range of security assistance authorities to train-and-equip those forces in the 

host country, and we are doing exactly that. 

Second, we have to enhance diplomatic security. We have to 

harden these facilities. We again are working with the State Department to try to reassess diplomatic security overall, to determine what changes may be required. We assisted the State Department in the deployment of an interagency security assessment 

team to evaluate the security level at 19 vulnerable diplomatic facilities, including our Embassy in Libya, and we’re in the process 

14 

of developing recommendations on potential security increases, as 

required. 

As part of this review, we have also considered how the role, mission, and resourcing of the MSGs could be adapted to respond to 

this new threat environment. In the near-term, we’ve agreed with 

the Department of State to add 35 new MSG detachments—that’s 

almost 1,000 marines—over the next 2 or 3 years, in addition to 

the 152 detachments that are in place today. We’re working with 

State to identify those specific locations for the new detachments 

and we will identify any necessary resource and force structure adjustments in order to support this initiative. 

Although there was not a MSG detachment posted to the 

Benghazi Temporary Mission Facility, based on our review of all 

embassy security incidents that occurred in September 2012, in 

Tunis, in Cairo, in Khartoum, and in Sanaa, we have initiated coordination with the Department of State to expand the Marine 

Corps’ role beyond their primary mission of protecting classified information. As some of you know, their primary mission is not providing outside security. Their primary mission is to protect classified information. But we believe that we can try to augment their 

role in terms of providing greater security protection as well. 

This could include the expanded use of non-lethal weapons, as 

well as additional training and equipment to support the embassy 

regional security officer’s response options when host nation security force capabilities are at risk of being overwhelmed. 

Third, enhanced intelligence and military response capacity. We 

are focused on enhancing intelligence collection and ensuring that 

our forces throughout the region are prepared to respond to crisis, 

if necessary. The U.S. military, as I’ve said, is not, and frankly, 

should not, be a 9-1-1 emergency service, capable of arriving on the 

scene within minutes to every possible contingency around the 

world. The U.S. military has neither the resources nor the responsibilities to have a firehouse next to every U.S. facility in the world. 

We have some key bases, particularly in this region. We have some 

key platforms from which we can deploy. We have forces on alert 

and we’re prepared to move. But our ability to identify threats, to 

adjust posture, to prevent plots, and to respond to attacks to our 

personnel at home and overseas depends on actionable intelligence 

and it always will. 

Therefore, we’re working with the State Department and the Intelligence Community to ensure that our collection and analysis is 

linked with military posture and planning. We’re working to enhance our intelligence collection, to improve the responsiveness of 

contingency assets, and to adjust the location of in extremis reaction forces. At the same time, we’re working closely with State to 

ensure that they have our best estimate of response times for each 

at-risk diplomatic facility, so that they can make the best informed 

decisions about adjustments to their staff presence in areas of increased security threat. 

We’ve deployed key response forces abroad. We have reduced 

their response time. But let me again say to you that even those 

forces that are on a tight alert time of N+2, notice plus 2 hours, 

to be able to get on a plane, once those forces are put on airlift, 

15 

it still requires many hours in that part of the world to fly long distances in order to be able to respond. 

I firmly believe that DOD and the U.S. Armed Forces did all we 

could do in the response to the attacks in Benghazi. We employed 

every asset at our disposal that could have been used to help save 

lives of our American colleagues. We will support efforts to bring 

those responsible to justice and we are working with the task force 

involved and headed up by the FBI to do just that. 

As I said, going forward we intend to adapt to the security environment to ensure that we’re better positioned and prepared to 

support the Department of State in securing our facilities around 

the world. But in order to be able to effectively protect the American people and our interests abroad at a time of instability, we 

must have an agile and ready force able to quickly respond. 

Above all—and forgive me for being repetitious—we have to end 

the cloud of budget uncertainty that hangs over DOD and the entire U.S. Government. I have to use this opportunity to express 

again my greatest concern as the Secretary of Defense, and frankly, 

one of the greatest security risks we are now facing as a Nation, 

that this budget uncertainty could prompt the most significant 

military readiness crisis in more than a decade. 

DOD faces the prospect of sequestration on March 1. If Congress 

fails to act, sequestration is triggered. If we also must operate 

under a year-long CR, we would be faced with having to take about 

$46+ billion out of the defense budget and we would face a $35 billion shortfall in operating funds alone for our Active Forces, with 

only a few months remaining in the fiscal year. 

Protecting the warfighters, protecting the critical deployments 

we have, we’re going to have to turn to the one area that we have 

in order to gain the funds necessary, and that’s reduction in maintenance. This will badly damage our national defense and compromise our ability to respond to crises in a dangerous world. 

The responsibility of dealing with this crisis obviously rests with 

the leadership of the Nation. I know the members of this committee share the deep concerns that I have raised about sequestration, and obviously, I urge you to do whatever you can to try to 

avoid this threat to our national defense. 

The State Department and the Intelligence Community obviously 

also must be provided the resources they need in order to execute 

the missions that we expect of them, including the enhancements 

that I’ve described today. Whatever steps are required to be taken 

to properly posture U.S. forces for possible emergency response operations, those steps would be seriously impacted by the readiness 

crisis caused by uncertain resources. 

We have a responsibility, and I take that responsibility seriously, 

to do everything we can to protect our citizens. That responsibility, 

however, rests with both the executive branch and Congress. If we 

work together, we can keep our Americans safe. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. LEON E. PANETTA

Chairman Levin and Senator Inhofe, members of the committee: I appreciate the 

opportunity to be here today to discuss the terrorist attacks on our facilities in 

Benghazi on September 11, 2012. 

16 

On that tragic day, as always, the Department of Defense (DOD) was prepared 

for a wide range of contingencies, but unfortunately there were no specific indications of an imminent attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi. Without adequate warning, there was not enough time given the speed of the attack for armed military assets to respond. In the months since the tragedy at the Temporary Mission Facility 

and nearby Annex in Benghazi, we’ve learned these were actually two short duration attacks that occurred some 6 hours apart. This was not a prolonged assault 

which could have been brought to an end by a U.S. military response. Despite the 

uncertainty at the time, however, DOD and the rest of the U.S. Government spared 

no effort to save American lives. 

The four Americans who perished in Benghazi—Ambassador Chris Stevens, Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and security personnel Tyrone Woods, and 

Glen Doherty—were heroes and patriots. I had the opportunity to join President 

Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other U.S. officials at Andrews Air Force Base for 

the dignified transfer ceremony where the bodies of these heroes were returned 

home. I also had the opportunity to meet with the families of the fallen. We have 

a solemn responsibility to these families, and to all diplomatic personnel who put 

themselves at risk, to find out exactly what happened, to bring those involved to 

justice, and to make sure we are doing everything possible to ensure the safety of 

our personnel and facilities worldwide. 

To that end, DOD has fully supported efforts by Congress and the State Department to review the events and decisions surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. We 

have made every effort to respond promptly to numerous requests for additional information, briefings, and testimony from members and committees in Congress. In 

fact, General Dempsey and I were among the first U.S. Government senior officials 

to brief Congress on this tragedy when we appeared before this committee on September 14, 2012, 3 days after the attacks. 

Additionally, the Defense Department participated in classified hearing and answered questions before the Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, and Homeland Security 

oversight Committees. We also provided all requested support to the Accountability 

Review Board, the independent investigative panel co-chaired by Ambassador Pickering and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. 

Based on the information we’ve compiled and the reviews we have conducted, let 

me describe for you DOD’s response to the events of September 11, some of the lessons learned, and the adjustments we are making to our global force posture given 

continuing unrest throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In fact, the 

changes we’ve made have already resulted in early decisions to deploy additional security, or decisions by the State Department to withdraw diplomatic staff in advance of a crisis. 

DOD’S RESPONSE ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

While DOD does not have primary responsibility for the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world, we work closely with the State Department and 

support them as requested. In the months prior to the Benghazi attack, we had received several hundred reports on possible threats to American facilities around the 

world. Over the course of the day on September 11, General Dempsey and I received 

a number of reports of possible threats to U.S. facilities—including those in Egypt— 

but there were no reports of imminent threats to U.S. personnel or facilities in 

Benghazi. 

By our best estimate, the incident at the Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi 

began at 3:42 p.m. eastern daylight time on September 11th. The Embassy in Tripoli was notified of the attacks almost immediately and within 17 minutes of the initial reports—at 3:59 p.m.—U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) directed that an unarmed, unmanned, surveillance aircraft that was nearby to reposition overhead the 

Benghazi facility. 

Soon after the initial reports about the attack on Benghazi, General Dempsey and 

I met with President Obama and he ordered all available DOD assets to respond 

to the attack in Libya and to protect U.S. personnel and interests in the region. It 

is important to remember that in addition to responding to the situation in 

Benghazi, we were also concerned about potential threats to U.S. personnel in 

Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Sana’a, and elsewhere that could potentially require a military 

response. 

In consultation with Chairman Dempsey and AFRICOM Commander General 

Ham, I directed several specific actions: 

• A Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon, stationed in 

Spain to prepare to deploy to Benghazi; 

• A Second FAST platoon to prepare to deploy to the Embassy in Tripoli; 

17 

• A Special Operations Force, which was training in Central Europe, to 

prepare to deploy to an intermediate staging base in Southern Europe; and 

• A Special Operations Force based in the United States to deploy to an 

intermediate staging base in Southern Europe. 

Some have asked why other types of armed aircraft were not dispatched to 

Benghazi. The reason is because armed UAVs, AC–130 gunships, or fixed-wing 

fighters with the associated tanking, armaments, targeting and support capabilities 

were not in the vicinity of Libya and because of the distance, would have taken at 

least 9 to 12 hours if not more to deploy. This was, pure and simple, a problem of 

distance and time. 

The quickest response option available was the Tripoli-based security team. Within hours, this six-person team, including two U.S. military personnel, chartered a 

private airplane and deployed to Benghazi. Within 15 minutes of arriving at the 

Annex facility, they came under attack by mortar and rocket propelled grenades. 

Members of this team, along with others at the Annex facility, provided emergency 

medical assistance and supported the evacuation of all personnel. Only 12 hours 

after the attacks began, all remaining U.S. Government personnel had been safely 

evacuated from Benghazi. 

Looking back, our actions in the immediate aftermath of these attacks have been 

subject to intense scrutiny and review. Let me share with you the conclusion that 

the Accountability Review Board reached: 

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply 

was not enough time given the speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military 

assets to have made a difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were 

underway soon after Washington received initial word of the attacks and 

continued through the night. The Board found no evidence of any undue 

delays in decision making or denial of support from Washington or from the 

military combatant commanders. Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation of 

all U.S. Government personnel from Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein Air Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. Government coordination and military response and helped save 

the lives of two severely wounded Americans. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Still, it is clear that there are lessons to be learned and steps that must be taken 

to ensure we are doing everything possible to protect our personnel and facilities 

abroad. In concert with the State Department and the Intelligence Community, we 

are in the process of developing enhanced security for U.S. persons and facilities in 

the wake of Benghazi. There will always be a tension between mission-effectiveness 

for personnel and their physical security. We are committed to steps that avoid a 

bunker mentality and yet still afford greater protection from armed attack. We are 

taking steps along three tracks. 

1. Host Nation Capacity 

First, we have to be able to better assess and build up the capabilities of host 

governments to provide security for U.S. personnel and facilities. The fact is that 

our embassies and consulates depend on host country personnel to provide security, 

and this episode raises concerns about the ability of newly established or fragile governments to properly secure U.S. diplomatic facilities. 

To address these concerns, we are now considering how DOD can better help hostnations enhance the security provided to our diplomatic facilities. Where permissible 

and appropriate, and in collaboration with the Secretary of State and the U.S. Chief 

of Mission in the affected country, we believe that the Defense Department can assist in the development of host-nation forces using a range of security assistance authorities to train and equip these forces. 

2. Enhanced Diplomatic Security 

Second, we are supporting the State Department’s efforts to look at hardening facilities and re-assessing diplomatic security. To determine what changes may be required, we assisted the State Department in deployment of Interagency Security Assessment Teams to evaluate the security level at 19 vulnerable diplomatic facilities, 

including our Embassy in Libya, and we are in the process of developing recommendations on potential security increases required. 

As part of this review, we have also considered how the role, mission, and 

resourcing of the Marine Security Guards could be adapted to respond to this new 

threat environment. In the near term, we have agreed with the Department of State 

to add 35 new Marine Security Guard detachments over the next 2 to 3 years, in 

addition to the 152 detachments in place today. We’re working with State now to 

18 

identify specific locations for the new detachments. We will identify any necessary 

resource and force structure adjustments to support this initiative. 

Although there was not a Marine Security Guard detachment posted to the 

Benghazi Temporary Mission Facility, based on our review of all Embassy security 

incidents that occurred in September 2012, in Tunis, Cairo, Khartoum, and Sana’a, 

we have initiated coordination with the Department of State to expand the Marines’ 

role beyond their primary mission to protect classified information. This could include expanded use of non-lethal weapons, and additional training and equipment, 

to support the Embassy Regional Security Officer’s response options when host nation security force capabilities are at risk of being overwhelmed. 

3. Enhanced Intelligence and Military Response Capacity 

Third, we are focused on enhancing intelligence collection and ensuring that our 

forces throughout the region are prepared to respond to crisis, if necessary. 

The U.S. military is not and should not be a global 9–1–1 service capable of arriving on the scene within minutes to every possible contingency around the world. We 

have forces on alert and prepared to move, but our ability to identify threats, adjust 

posture, prevent plots and respond to attacks to our personnel at home and overseas 

depends on actionable intelligence. 

Therefore, we are working with the State Department and the Intelligence Community to ensure our collection and analysis is linked with military posture and 

planning. We are working to enhance our intelligence collection, improve the responsiveness of contingency assets, and adjust the location of in-extremis reaction forces. 

At the same time, we’re working closely with State to ensure they have our best 

estimate of response times for each at-risk diplomatic facility, so that they can make 

the best informed decisions about adjustments to their staff presence in areas of increased security threat. 

AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE DEMANDS ADEQUATE RESOURCES

I firmly believe that DOD and the U.S. Armed Forces did all that we could do 

in response to the attacks in Benghazi. We employed every asset at our disposal 

that could have helped save the lives of our American colleagues. We will support 

efforts to bring those responsible to justice. 

Going forward, we intend to adapt to the security environment to ensure we are 

better positioned and prepared to support the Department of State in securing our 

facilities around the world. But in order to be able to effectively protect the American people and our interests abroad at a time of instability we must have an agile 

and ready force, and above all, we must end the cloud of budget uncertainty that 

is hanging over the Department and the entire U.S. Government. 

That brings me to my greatest concern right now as Secretary, and frankly the 

greatest security risk we are facing as a nation, which is the budget uncertainty 

which could prompt the most significant military readiness crisis in more than a 

decade. 

Right now, DOD faces the prospect of sequestration beginning March 1. If Congress fails to act and sequestration is triggered, and if we also must operate under 

a year-long continuing resolution, we would be faced with a significant shortfall in 

operating funds for our Active Forces with only 7 months remaining in the fiscal 

year. This will damage our national defense and compromise our ability to respond 

to crises in a dangerous world. 

The responsibility of dealing with this crisis rests with the leadership of the Nation. I know that the members of this committee share the deep concerns I have 

raised about sequestration, and I urge you to do the responsible thing and avoid 

weakening our national defense. The State Department and Intelligence Community 

also must be provided with the resources they need to execute the mission we expect 

of them—including the enhancements I’ve described today. 

Whatever steps are required to be taken to properly posture U.S. forces for possible emergency response operations would be seriously impacted by the readiness 

crisis caused by uncertainty or dramatically reduced resources. The responsibility to 

protect our citizens rests with both the administration and Congress. 

Thank you. 

19 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Secretary Panetta. 

General Dempsey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Inhofe. I will compress my opening remarks, just if you would 

allow me to endorse what the Secretary just said, in particular the 

part about the effect of sequestration. 

I would also say that this hearing continues our full support to 

every effort and every request to understand and learn from this 

tragic event. 

I want to also commend the men and women of our Nation’s diplomatic corps. They are selfless and courageous. They do hard 

things in hard places. I’ve stood with them in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where their words are America’s reputation and where their 

outstretched hand is America’s promise. 

In Benghazi, we lost four fellow servants of the Nation—Chris 

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. To their 

family and friends, I offer my personal condolences. We mourn 

their deaths even as we honor their service. We honor them most 

by taking what we learned from their loss to prepare for an uncertain future. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA 

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting us to address the attacks in Benghazi on 11 September 2012. As 

Secretary Panetta stated, we have fully supported every effort and every request to 

understand and learn from this tragic event. 

Allow me to begin by publically honoring the service of our State Department colleagues. The men and women of our Nation’s diplomatic corps are selfless and courageous. They do hard things in hard places. I have stood side-by-side with them 

in Iraq and in Afghanistan where their words are America’s vision, where their 

deeds are America’s reputation, and where their outstretched hand is America’s 

promise. 

In Benghazi, we lost four fellow servants of the Nation—Chris Stevens, Sean 

Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. To their family and friends, I offer my personal condolences. They were among the very best our Nation has to offer the world. 

They acted bravely for our Nation and for the Libyan people. We mourn their deaths 

even as we honor their service. 

We honor them most by taking what we learn from their loss to prepare for an 

uncertain future. We must keep working together—as we are doing here today—to 

adapt our missions and our forces in order to advance America’s national interests. 

Our own security depends on our ability to build relationships even under the most 

challenging of conditions. 

The conditions in Libya and all of North Africa were then and remain highly dynamic. The balance of influence is shifting. The social contract between the governed 

and the government is being negotiated in the streets. Mobile technology and social 

media have helped to accelerate the pace of change. Weaker security institutions are 

facing more empowered non-state actors. Included in this combustible mix are terrorists seeking to capitalize on the chaos. 

Although today we are focused on Benghazi, we must not forget that it was September 11 everywhere. On that day, we were postured to respond to a wide array 

of general threats around the globe. We positioned our forces in a way that was informed by and consistent with available threat estimates. In fact, U.S. facilities in 

many countries throughout the Africa Command and Central Command areas were 

operating under heightened force protection levels. 

As events unfolded, we assessed the situation based on the available intelligence. 

We considered the risk to U.S. Government personnel as protests broke out across 

20 

the region. General Carter Ham’s sound judgment proved critical as we analyzed 

the complex, rapidly evolving situation and our range of response options. 

Our military was appropriately responsive. We acted quickly once notified of the 

attacks on the Temporary Mission Facility. As a result of our posture and our ongoing operations, we were able to divert an unarmed, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to Benghazi within minutes. It arrived on the scene approximately an hour 

later. 

We also repositioned forces based on direction from the President of the United 

States and Secretary of Defense. We deployed a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team 

to Tripoli while a second team prepared to deploy. We directed the deployment of 

a Special Operations Force in the United States and one already in Europe to intermediate staging bases. We also provided C–17 airlift for medical evacuation. We did 

what our posture and capabilities allowed. 

This does not mean we accept the status quo as sufficient for this new security 

environment. We have worked closely with the State Department over the last several months to help improve the security of our diplomatic missions. Our work has 

been informed by the recommendations of the Accountability Review Board for 

Benghazi. I commend Ambassador Tom Pickering and my predecessor Admiral Mike 

Mullen for their valuable work. 

Specifically, the military has deployed some of our best security experts alongside 

State Department personnel to reassess the threat to many high-risk diplomatic 

posts. We anticipate that this will result in a request to increase our presence at 

the most vulnerable posts. We are looking at how to resource a request for 35 Marine Security Guard detachments at new locations. We have also adjusted the alert 

posture of security augmentation forces in the most volatile areas. But, we are not 

done adapting to the emergent security landscape. We will continue to work with 

the State Department and Congress to examine additional, proactive options for improving security. 

In closing, I offer my sincere thanks to this committee for your dedication to keeping our military strong. I share your commitment to supporting those who serve in 

both a military and diplomatic capacity to keep America immune from coercion. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Dempsey. 

Let’s have a 7-minute round for the first round to get to everybody, and if we need a second round we can do that. We got a little 

bit of a late start here this morning. 

Mr. Secretary, you ended up with your plea on sequestration and 

the need to avoid it, and I totally agree with you. There, I think, 

is near universal agreement, perhaps universal on this panel, 

about the devastating impacts that sequestration is likely to have 

on DOD and on other Federal agencies as well. 

I believe, as you do, that it is incumbent on Congress and the executive branch to work together to avoid sequestration. Toward 

that end, I as one member of the Senate have advocated for a balanced solution to sequestration that includes both revenues and 

spending cuts. I’ve suggested a specific proposal that would raise 

revenues by closing loopholes that some corporations use to avoid 

taxes by shifting income outside of the United States. I’ve worked 

with colleagues and in the Senate on suggested solutions. I will 

continue to do so and your clarion call here this morning I hope 

will encourage all of us to work in any way that we can to avoid 

sequestration. 

Now, yesterday you spoke in Georgetown, announced a series of 

steps that the Department will have to take almost immediately 

with respect to deployments, maintenance, contracts, other obligations if Congress and the President don’t act soon to address the 

issue. We’ve received memoranda from other senior DOD officials 

laying out steps that would have to be taken if sequestration is not 

avoided. 

Can you give us a timetable? You’ve already announced some actions that you’re taking, which you’re putting in place now, so that 

21 

even if we can avoid sequestration in the next few days or a week 

from now or 2 weeks from now, some things are being taken even 

before the end of February and before we know whether we can 

avoid sequestration. Can you tell us, first of all, whether or not 

these actions would be reversible if, in fact, we avoid sequestration 

in, say, a week from now or 2 weeks from now? Do you echo the 

President’s call for a balanced approach to avoid sequestration, to 

include both spending cuts and additional revenues? 

Secretary PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me indicate, 

and I think General Dempsey can add to this, the reason we’re 

having to do this and take actions now is because we’re operating 

at a spend rate right now that envisions that we would have gotten 

a fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill. Unfortunately, we have no 

fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill. We have a CR. 

But we’ve been operating at least in these first months based on 

a spend rate that is in line with what we thought we were going 

to get for fiscal year 2013. If sequester hits on March 1 and then 

if we get a CR, as opposed to getting an appropriations bill, then 

we’re going to be obligated to take out almost $46 billion plus out 

of our budget. That would have to take place in the remaining 

months of this fiscal year. 

If we protect the warfighters, if we protect those in Afghanistan, 

if we protect some of our critical deployments, we’re looking at having to take most of that, as I said, out of readiness. So what we’re 

trying to do is to slow down that rate of spending that’s going on 

so it will not require as deep a dive as we’re going to have to have 

in readiness—so what we’re doing and what I’ve urged the Chairman and the Service Chiefs is to take steps to try to implement 

savings now. 

We’ve implemented a freeze on hiring. We’ve implemented a 

freeze on temporary hires. We’re probably going to impact about 

46,000 jobs. We are impacting about 46,000 jobs just by doing that. 

We’re cutting back on maintenance. We’re cutting back on other 

areas in order to try to find what we can. 

Most of this is reversible. Most of this, if we don’t get sequester, 

we’re going to be able to reverse and be able to get back on track. 

But obviously if we hit sequester then—some say sequester might 

just happen for a period of a few weeks, which I doubt, frankly, if 

it goes into effect. But the impact of sequester then will multiply 

the impact on our readiness. 

Look, there’s only one way to deal with this. I’ve been saying it 

time and time again and I think there are members here that 

agree. You have to address the larger deficit issue, and to address 

a large deficit issue in my own experience, having participated in 

every budget summit that we’ve had in past years, you have to be 

able to develop a balanced package in order to do that. That’s just 

the nature of dealing with the size deficits that you have. 

My preference, frankly, is that Congress would do the big deal, 

get it done, get this behind us, detrigger sequester, stop this constant uncertainty, this month-to-month situation where we don’t 

know what the hell we’re going to get. That should end. 

In the absence of that deal, obviously I’ll support whatever package you can put together to try to detrigger sequester, whatever 

you can do to make sure this doesn’t happen. I cannot imagine that 

22 

people would stand by and deliberately hurt this country in terms 

of our national defense by letting this take place. 

General DEMPSEY. I’ll only add briefly that most of the things 

we’re doing are reversible. That is our goal, that they would be reversible. But even if you reverse them, it will take some time, and 

I can’t predict that yet. We’re trying to stretch readiness. 

I want to make sure you realize one other thing. We took the decision on the carrier postponement very seriously because there’s a 

human dimension to this. If you’re getting ready to deploy, you 

cancel your rent, potentially you cancel your apartment, you sell 

your car, you cancel education classes. There’s a human aspect to 

this. Now we postpone it and they’re still there. So the effects are 

felt even now. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, I guess that ends my time. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the skunk is about to arrive at the picnic, but I’d like to 

share a couple of things, first of all clarify some things to make 

sure that we all understand things that are incontrovertible facts. 

The National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, after receiving the initial reports of the incident from the State Department, notified the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint 

Staff. This information quickly passed on to the two of you, is that 

correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator INHOFE. I have a great deal of respect for General Ham 

and his two predecessors after we developed AFRICOM. I was 

somewhat significant in that effort. Of course, AFRICOM, with the 

exception of Egypt, has the continent and it has the control of that. 

It would have operational control of DOD assets in the event that 

action in and around Libya would be necessary. 

Now, AFRICOM consistently faces resourcing shortfalls. I know 

that sometimes you don’t hear this loud and clear, but we do over 

a period of time. We know you can’t continue to expand into new 

areas, as we did in AFRICOM. Let’s keep in mind, we didn’t have 

any activity there, and you know this, prior to the time that we 

made the conscious decision after September 11, the original September 11, that we have a serious problem in Africa and we’re 

going to have to deal with that problem. We came up with the idea 

of forming five African brigades. A lot of these things are going on 

right now. 

Did you have any conversation, either one of you, with General 

Ham regarding the security situation in North Africa prior to these 

attacks the subject of today? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, I’m in almost continual touch with 

General Ham. He provides me regular reports from AFRICOM as 

to the issues he’s dealing with. There is no question that that area 

of that combatant command has increased in terms of the threats 

that we’re dealing with and it’s increased in terms of the issues related to going after elements of al Qaeda. 

Senator INHOFE. Did he ever request additional assets there, Mr. 

Secretary? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, my view was whatever General 

Ham asked, we did more than try to respond. 

23 

Senator INHOFE. I know you did, and we did, too. I’ve talked to 

him about this and we know that the assets just weren’t available 

when you look at the other places. It’s not as if only one place is 

on fire. They’re all on fire right now and this is the problem that 

we have. 

The Washington Post columnist said that the President had a 

briefing with the Principals Committee to review the threats and 

the mitigation of the threats. This would have been the day before. 

The Principals Committee, it’s my understanding, is made up of 

the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and some others. 

Were the two of you at this hearing or this meeting? It would 

have been the day before, September 10. 

Secretary PANETTA. I believe I recall being at a meeting that 

looked at what the potential threats were as a result of going into 

September 11. 

Senator INHOFE. I have a chart over here, and I’m sure you’ve 

had a chance to see it. No one questions the chain of events that 

happened. On the left side are the things that happened prior to 

all of this, what I consider to be warning signals that anyone 

should be able to look. 

Recognizing the resource problem that we have, what was the assessment of the threat in Libya at the time of this Principals Committee meeting, either one of you? 

General DEMPSEY. If I could, Senator, the meeting is a routine 

monthly review of counterterror operations worldwide. 

Senator INHOFE. It happened to be on the 10th, yes? 

General DEMPSEY. Right. It wasn’t uniquely focused on North 

and Western Africa, although clearly North and Western Africa are 

areas of emerging threat. 

Senator INHOFE. I’m sure that subject was there. I can’t imagine 

it wouldn’t be with all the problems that are on that chart and that 

you’re aware of. 

The only thing I’d say in criticism of you, Mr. Secretary, is you’ve 

said so many times and you gave such a passionate plea to resolve 

this problem. You’ve talked about the problem that is there. You 

can’t continue to look at Congress when, in fact, we have in the 

President’s own budget in the 4 years, the first 4 years that he was 

there, $5.3 trillion in deficit. It’s an oversimplification, but you can 

say that almost all of government under his budget has increased 

by about 10 percent, except for the military, except for defense. 

Now, I can debate that with anyone who wants to debate, but 

that has to be said because this is a problem that we have dealt 

with and you’ve talked about. But we have to get on record that 

this administration has not given the priorities to the military, and 

that’s my statement. You can either agree with or not agree with. 

We’re going to have to do something about it. 

About an hour and 20 minutes after the first attack on the 

Benghazi compound, Secretary Panetta, you and Chairman 

Dempsey were at the White House for a pre-scheduled meeting on 

a different topic at that time. I think that’s when Tom Donilon 

came in and informed all of you and the President about what happened in Benghazi. Is that about the right timeframe? 

24 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. I think we have regular meetings with 

the President. This was one of our weekly meetings with the President. I should tell you that just before I went into that meeting I 

got an update that there had been the attack there. So it was 

something I introduced to the President. 

Senator INHOFE. Oh, I see. Okay, that’s a good clarification. 

Let me do this in the interest of time. I want to make two definitions here. One would be the definition, I call it the compound, 

some call it the ‘‘Temporary Mission Facility.’’ It doesn’t really matter what you call it. That was what would be comparable to an embassy, it was a compound. 

One attack was on the compound. The other was on the annex. 

That was about an hour later and that was about a mile away. So 

those two things we want to clarify. I think both of you would 

agree those, it could be argued, are separate attacks that took 

place. 

The other definition that I’d want in terms is either these two 

attacks or one or the other would be classified as a spontaneous 

eruption of violence or a planned terrorist attack. I think CBS reported that the counterterrorism officials—okay, let me just run 

through this real quick here, if you’d give me a little tolerance 

here, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We do have to stick to our 7-minute rule. So 

a little tolerance, of course. 

Senator INHOFE. A little tolerance, all right. 

Chairman Dempsey, at the time of the meeting at the White 

House took place, about 11 o’clock, how would you have characterized the attack—or either one of you—on the compound, not the 

annex; the compound? 

General DEMPSEY. At that point I didn’t know. I just knew there 

were Americans—— 

Senator INHOFE. It could have been either one, couldn’t it? 

General DEMPSEY. That’s right. 

Senator INHOFE. It could have been a spontaneous thing or it 

could have been preplanned. We don’t know that right now. 

General DEMPSEY. Right. 

Senator INHOFE. But I would have to ask you the same question 

about the annex. Wouldn’t you agree that that was a preplanned 

terrorist attack unequivocally? 

Secretary PANETTA. At the time, obviously, when this was going 

on, we weren’t sure what was taking place there. But when I later 

found out that you had RPGs and mortars and there was an attack 

on that second facility, there was no question in my mind it was 

a terrorist attack. 

Senator INHOFE. My position on that would be that they knew 

that at the time, because I’ve talked to several different people who 

stated that they knew it, and unequivocally that would have been 

a terrorist attack. 

Of course, the thing I’m getting at, do you agree, Mr. Secretary, 

that it was unequivocally a terrorist attack on the annex? 

Secretary PANETTA. When I appeared before this committee 3 

days afterwards, I said it was a terrorist attack. 

Senator INHOFE. Very good. That’s what John Brennan said also, 

and he used the word ‘‘unequivocally.’’ I would have to say that 

25 

we’ll have to understand some time, someone’s going to have to ask 

the question: If that was true and we knew all of that at the time 

on that Sunday that this presentation by Ambassador Susan Rice, 

before all of America said it was: ‘‘we have today is that, in fact, 

this was not a preplanned, premeditated attack.’’ 

I won’t even ask you to respond to that, but I think it’s important 

that people understand that everybody knew on that Sunday that 

it was a preplanned, premeditated attack. 

Thank you for your tolerance, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey. 

There were, as you point out in your testimony, two attacks, one 

on the compound, one on the annex. But as the time chart indicates, there seems to be a significant gap between the first attack 

and the annex at midnight and the deployment of mortars and 

RPGs. Did that indicate to either of you that it took a while for 

them to organize themselves to conduct a full-blown attack on the 

annex, that, in fact, it was something akin, General Dempsey, to 

one of a meeting engagement, where they seized an opportunity 

and then they quickly fill in and supplement their firepower and 

begin a much more coordinated attack, suggesting there was a degree of improvisation here as well as planning? 

General DEMPSEY. The second one, Senator, was clearly much 

more deliberate, much more planned, but probably was as well opportunistic, because the people had moved from the Temporary 

Mission Facility. There was a considerable gap. 

But I would say two things in addition. First, we accept the general timeline. Also—because it’s consistent with the ARB. 

Second, though, is the gap didn’t cause us to do anything differently. We acted based on the first attack and it was a matter 

of time and distance at that point. 

Senator REED. But the timing of the attack suggests—and it’s 

very difficult to sort out—a degree not only of planning, but improvisation; is that a fair judgment? 

General DEMPSEY. I haven’t thought about the word ‘‘improvisation.’’ It was very well-executed. They dropped six mortar rounds 

on a roof at some distance. That was pretty well done. 

Secretary PANETTA. I think there’s no question that it was deliberate, it was opportunistic. I really believe that a lot of this was 

precoordinated, particularly with regards to the second attack. 

Senator REED. Very good. 

Going forward, Secretary Panetta, you have already indicated 

that you’re going to augment embassy security personnel with additional Marine Corps forces. You also point out, which I think was 

not entirely apparent before this attack, that the Marine Corps’ 

major mission was internal security and protection of classified 

documents. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator REED. Now you’re talking about an enhanced mission. 

Can you suggest some aspects of this enhanced mission? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. Thanks. The MSGs actually have 

fundamentally three missions: principally the protection of classiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
26 

fied materials. They have a secondary mission of helping to protect 

the personnel who occupy the embassy; and the third one is support for communications. 

What we’re looking to do is, in select locations around the world, 

with the support and collaboration of the State Department and 

with the Marine Corps, obviously, who have to build this, is to, let’s 

call it, thicken certain locations. But to be clear, we will never be 

able to put a Marine Corps security detachment into a country 

which is located in a hostile area. The host nation has to guarantee 

at some level the protection of our facilities or we should make a 

decision to thin it out or potentially close it. 

Senator REED. Another related aspect of this issue is that clearly, 

even with this expanded role, that security at diplomatic missions 

is the responsibility of the State Department and the resources for 

that, other than the Marine Corps presence, are State Department 

resources, and those resources in your view to complement what 

you’re doing should be enhanced, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. We are working with the 

State Department and that’s why we came up with this almost 

1,000 more marines that we would try to deploy at those embassies 

that are identified as the most vulnerable. 

Senator REED. Let me follow up on the issue of AFRICOM, because it is our newest unified combatant command. You have taken 

steps to provide them with more ready reaction forces, for want of 

a better term. Can you indicate the current posture of what General Ham has available, understanding it’s a big area of responsibility (AOR), with long distances, and if you don’t have adequate 

intelligence, it’s hard to even preposition resources to react. But 

what have you been doing to help? 

General DEMPSEY. I would never drag you into our internal processes, but we have an annual process called the global force management process, where combatant commanders and Service Chiefs 

collaborate on distribution of the force worldwide based on the 

threat assessments, national security interests. 

AFRICOM is particularly challenged because of the commitments 

we have elsewhere, but also because of the lack of basing and authority to place facilities internal to the continent. As a result, most 

of their resources reside in southern Europe or afloat when we 

have them. 

In terms of what we’ve done to augment, he will have, effective 

1 October, his own commander’s in extremis force. We have positioned Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams and put them on a various changing level of alert posture. So if you think about response, 

it’s a combination of alert posture and flight time, with the necessary, if you can get it, access into a country to land and flow. We 

are better postured today to respond to preemptive requests from 

the State Department, in other words left of bang, than we were. 

When something happens, it becomes a far different situation. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

27 

Secretary Panetta, I join with all others in thanking you for your 

many years of service. It’s been an honor to have known you and 

I appreciate your leadership of DOD. I’m sure you will continue to 

contribute in the future, and we will miss you. 

General Dempsey, I was just going over your written statement 

and I have to admit it’s one of the more bizarre statements that 

I have ever seen in my years in this committee. When you’re talking about the Benghazi issue you say: ‘‘We positioned our forces in 

a way that was informed by and consistent with available threat 

estimates.’’ Then you go on to say: ‘‘Our military was appropriately 

responsive,’’ even though 7 hours passed and two Americans died 

at the end of that. Then you go on and say: ‘‘We did what our posture and capabilities allow.’’ 

There’s a base at Souda Bay, Crete, General. There’s a base 

there. It’s about an hour and a half flight by a—I’ve forgotten the 

kind of plane that I took when I went to Benghazi. Included in all 

of those factors on that board there, there was a message sent, an 

urgent message sent back to the State Department on August 15 

that ‘‘they could not,’’ the consulate, ‘‘withstand a sustained attack 

on the consulate.’’ 

On September 11, I will argue that there was no outpost in all 

of our diplomatic corps that had that sequence of events, these 

warnings, including many warnings from our Ambassador about 

the lack of security, including even a message that was found in 

the rubble of the consulate by a CNN reporter weeks later. 

So for you to testify that our posture did not allow a rapid response—our posture was not there because we didn’t take into account the threats to that consulate, and that’s why four Americans 

died. We could have placed forces there. We could have had aircraft 

and other capabilities as short a distance away as Souda Bay, 

Crete. 

So for you to testify before this committee that they were consistent with available threat estimates is simply false. That our 

military was appropriately responsive—what would have been an 

inappropriate response, since any forces—no forces arrived there 

until well after these murders took place and obviously your capabilities allowed you to be positioned to intervene very shortly? 

Finally, all of this is a result of the so-called light footprint. After 

Qadafi fell many of us made it very clear that they needed our 

help—secure the arms caches, help them secure their borders, a lot 

of technical assistance. But because of the light footprint, we did 

not provide. So it was almost predictable, almost, maybe not predictable, that bad things were going to happen in Libya, because 

here was a fledgling government that had never governed before, 

without the assistance that we could have provided them with. 

I begged you, Secretary Panetta, for example, to send a hospital 

ship over there to help treat their 30,000 wounded. What did we 

do? We sent a couple to hospitals in the United States of America. 

So I’ll be glad to hear your response, General Dempsey, as to 

how the available threat estimates you were informed by, how our 

military was appropriately responsive since four people died 7 

hours later, with the thousands—hundreds of airplanes, ships, 

planes, and men and women who are serving available in that part 

28 

of the world; and how did you do what your posture and capabilities allowed? 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Senator. Let me begin by saying 

I stand by my testimony, your dispute of it notwithstanding. But 

I would like to say that we based—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Perhaps you can give me some facts that would 

substantiate it. 

General DEMPSEY. Sure, I will, Senator. We base our response on 

the combined effects of what we get from the Intelligence Community—and that’s the network of intelligence agencies—as well, importantly, based on what we get from the State Department and 

the chief of mission and chief of station in the country. 

Senator MCCAIN. Did you ever get the message that said they 

could not withstand a sustained attack on the consulate? 

General DEMPSEY. I was tracking that intelligence. I was tracking through General Ham—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Did you receive that information? 

General DEMPSEY. I did, and I saw it—— 

Senator MCCAIN. So it didn’t bother you? 

General DEMPSEY. It bothered me a great deal. But we never received a request. 

Senator MCCAIN. Then why didn’t you put forces in place to be 

ready to respond? 

General DEMPSEY. Because we never received a request to do so, 

number one; and number two—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You never heard of Ambassador Stevens’ repeated warnings about the lack of security? 

General DEMPSEY. I had, sir, through General Ham. But we 

never received a request for support from the State Department, 

which would have allowed us to put—— 

Senator MCCAIN. So it’s the State Department’s fault? 

General DEMPSEY. I’m not blaming the State Department. I’m 

sure they had their own assessment. 

Senator MCCAIN. Who would you blame? 

General DEMPSEY. Sorry, sir? 

Senator MCCAIN. Who is responsible, then? It is clear that an assessment was made that they could not withstand a sustained attack on the consulate, with it being September 11 and many other 

indications that are on that board over there and the various attacks that have already taken place. 

General DEMPSEY. I stand by the report of the ARB. But I would 

also say, Senator, I was also concerned at that time with Sanaa in 

Yemen, Khartoum, Islamabad, Peshawar, Kabul, Baghdad. We had 

some pretty significant intelligence threat streams against those 

places as well. 

Senator MCCAIN. I’ve seen some of those estimates and none of 

them rose to the level of the threat in Benghazi. Did they rise to 

that level, that they could not withstand a sustained attack? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. They did? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, they did. 

Senator MCCAIN. So basically you’re saying what our postures— 

our capabilities allowed, you did what our capabilities allowed. We 

29 

didn’t have the capability to station forces as short as Souda Bay, 

Crete? 

General DEMPSEY. There were forces—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Do we have those capabilities? 

General DEMPSEY. We do have those capabilities, but even 

those—— 

Senator MCCAIN. But we didn’t use those capabilities. 

General DEMPSEY. Sir, based on time, distance, and alert posture, as I said to Senator Reed a moment ago, they wouldn’t have 

gotten there in time. 

Senator MCCAIN. It’s an hour and a half flight, General, if you’d 

have had them based there at Souda Bay, Crete. 

Finally, I would ask again both of you what I asked you last 

March when 7,500 citizens of Syria had been killed. It’s now up to 

60,000. How many more have to die before you recommend military 

action? Did you support the recommendation by then Secretary of 

State Clinton, and then head of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) General Petraeus, that we provide weapons to the resistance 

in Syria? Did you support that? 

Secretary PANETTA. We did. 

Senator MCCAIN. You did support that? 

General DEMPSEY. We did. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for appearing here today. I also want to add my voice to those here, Mr. Secretary, in thanking you for your long service to our country, and 

we wish you well as you return to your walnut farm and your 

grandchildren in California. 

General, I’d like to look more broadly at the challenges that we 

face in Africa. I want to acknowledge that on September 11, 2012, 

when this tragic incident occurred, that you were fighting a war in 

Afghanistan, you were conducting counterterrorism missions all 

over the globe, training troops, patrolling our skies and seas, hunting war criminals, and providing humanitarian relief. Despite that 

enormous mission load, you’ve clearly taken the deaths of these 

four State Department employees in Benghazi to heart as if they 

were your own. We will learn from this. We will do everything possible to ensure that doesn’t happen again. Secretary Clinton made 

that clear in her compelling testimony over the last weeks and I 

know you share that point of view. 

So again, turning to Africa, I know that we’ve conducted training 

and developed partnerships with a number of African militaries for 

years, I think in North Africa as well as in the Sahel. Talk a little 

bit about those training relationships, those formal ties, and how 

they’re going to help us deny extremists the opportunity to develop 

footholds in that part of the world? Specifically, should we be expanding training missions like Operation Flint Walk or building 

other DOD-State Department partnership programs in the 

AFRICOM AOR? 

General DEMPSEY. The short answer is yes, but I won’t stop at 

the short answer. The threat network that exists in North Africa 

and West Africa is a group of disparate organizations, some of 

30 

which aspire to and have, in fact, embraced the al Qaeda ideology, 

who network themselves and syndicate themselves as they find 

common cause, or to take advantage of ungoverned space. 

So to your point, Senator, what we’re seeing here in the aftermath of, call it what you will, the wave, the Arab Spring, the 

changes in North and West Africa which have created some 

ungoverned space, is, in fact, a place where we have to be very 

careful not to allow these movements to take sanctuary. 

We are always best at addressing those working through partners, whether they’re bilateral partners. It’s a little challenging 

now to have a relationship with a bilateral military force that is 

itself brand new in some of these countries. So we’ve been also 

working with regional security apparatus, for example African 

Union Mission in Somalia, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. 

To your point, though, we do have to do more to enable those 

partners to control that ungoverned space so that it doesn’t become 

a sanctuary. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, if I could. 

Senator UDALL. Please, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary PANETTA. We’ve learned a lot about how to confront 

terrorists and al Qaeda-affiliated groups, not only from what we’ve 

done in the Federally Administered Tribul Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan and Iraq, but the fact is that we have some very effective 

operations in Yemen. General Ham did an outstanding job in Somalia, where a few years ago we thought Somalia had no chance 

to be able to stabilize. But as a result of the countries in the region, 

as well as our providing some direct assistance there to assist the 

forces there and to be able to get the intelligence they needed to 

go after Al-Shabab, we have had a very effective operation there at 

undermining al Shabab and their strength in Somalia. 

We’re taking the same lessons, General Ham is taking the same 

lessons and applying those to other areas in the region, trying to 

determine how can we best assist the countries in the region 

through intelligence, through training, through our presence, be 

able to ensure that we develop better security in their countries as 

well. He’s doing a great job at developing that capacity. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Secretary, would you—are you suggesting, I 

should say, that part of what we’ve done in Somalia and what we 

see developing in these other countries is by focusing on resource 

shortages, creating more educational opportunities, using smart 

power, if you will, we’re seeing some success? It’s conditional success, but what’s happening in Somalia gives us hope that there’s 

further utility for these approaches? 

Secretary PANETTA. I agree with that. 

Senator UDALL. Could I turn, since you’re here—and I know this 

is on everybody’s mind—to sequestration. Would you lay out your 

thoughts generally or specifically? In particular, if we allow sequestration to take hold would that require fundamental change in our 

National Military Strategy? 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. I’d have to—as I’ve said, look, the $487 billion that we were handed through the Budget Control 

Act to be able to reduce the defense budget over 10 years, we understood that we had a responsibility to do our part with regards 

31 

to deficit reduction. But we wanted to do it in a way that wouldn’t 

hollow out the force or make these across-the-board cuts that would 

hurt every area of the military. 

So we developed a strategy, a defense strategy, that we thought 

represented what the force of the 21st century ought to look like. 

Then we built a budget based on that. We’ve recommended savings 

pursuant to that budget that were incorporated in our fiscal year 

2013 budget. Frankly, we were doing the same thing for fiscal year 

2014. 

If sequester takes place and we suddenly have another half a 

trillion dollars that I have to take out of the defense budget in an 

across-the-board fashion, frankly, the defense strategy we put in 

place I’d have to throw out the window, and it would clearly seriously impact particularly on maintenance and readiness. As I said, 

we would have a terrible readiness crisis. 

But as time went on and the erosion that would take place in our 

capabilities, instead of being a first-rate power in the world, we’d 

turn into a second-rate power. That would be the result of sequester. 

Senator UDALL. General Dempsey, if I could follow up on the Secretary’s general analysis of where we are. We’re talking about increasing the number of Marine Corps security personnel at our embassies. If sequestration went into effect, how would that affect our 

other missions? I think this is—you’re potentially robbing Peter to 

pay Paul. 

General DEMPSEY. That’s right. We haven’t done that analysis, 

but what I will say is it would cause us—we’d have to go back and 

look at our national security interests, as we always do, and make 

sure that we’re addressing them in the right priority. I think where 

you would see it affect us most quickly and most prominently is in 

the—last year we talked about rebalancing to the Pacific. We also 

talk internally about the balance we have vertically. If rebalancing 

to the Pacific is a horizontal activity, vertically we have to decide 

how much of the force can we have forward, how much rotational, 

how much in the Homeland. That balance would change and you’d 

have less ability to project power forward, which means you’re less 

able to deter enemies and assure allies. That’s a significant change. 

The second place is in the defense industrial base. We would 

have significant challenges in our factories, in our depots, that will 

have a long-term effect. 

Senator UDALL. I know my time has expired and you may want 

to answer this for the record later. But we’re just finally, it feels 

like, getting a handle on operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for our personnel, and what I hear you implying in that answer is that we’re 

going to go right back to a one-to-one or a one-to-two even 

OPTEMPO for our men and women in uniform. We’ve asked a lot 

of them over the last 12 years. We’ve really stressed the force. 

General DEMPSEY. I can answer that really quickly. You won’t 

find this Chairman arguing that we need to do more with less. 

You’ll find me arguing that if that happens, we need to do less with 

less. 

Senator UDALL. We’ll leave it there. Thank you again, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Chambliss. 

32 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you and I have been friends for all of my now 

going on 19 years in Congress. I value that friendship and I’m very 

appreciative of your service to our country and your commitment 

to our country. 

Gentlemen, both of you have in previous statements as well as 

in your comments today used the term ‘‘terrorist attack,’’ ‘‘deliberate attack,’’ ‘‘precoordinated attack,’’ as well as other adjectives 

to describe this incident. Mr. Secretary, you have been a leader in 

the Intelligence Community, of course being at the CIA, so you’ve 

been on both sides of the issue, providing intelligence as well as receiving intelligence. Would you consider this incident to be an intelligence failure? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think that some of the initial assessments 

that were made, they should have taken more time to assess the 

full situation as to what had taken place. In intelligence, like everything else, you make some initial assessments and then you go 

back and you look at it and look at it again, get more information, 

build a picture of what took place, and then, based on that, hopefully provide a much more accurate picture of what had taken 

place. I think some of the initial assessments here were not on the 

money. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, how would you respond 

as to whether or not this was an intelligence failure? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, we get asked that question a lot, actually, after anything happens. This one I actually think of more 

as an intelligence gap. I think there is an impression—there’s two 

impressions that have worked against us over time. One is that we 

can be as responsive as necessary. That’s not always the case. 

There are some issues of time and distance and basing rights and 

overflight rights that actually affect us in our ability to be responsive. 

The second one is that we can—we’re all-seeing and all-knowing. 

There are some places on the planet where we have some gaps and 

I think North Africa is probably one of them. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. To both of you: If you had had intelligence 

that there was a storm brewing among this group of individuals, 

however we characterize them, with respect to an attack at some 

point in time on that facility in Benghazi, obviously you’d have 

been prepared for it; is that a fair statement? 

Secretary PANETTA. There’s no question. The example of that is 

we’ve had a number of other embassies that have faced, like Khartoum, that we thought there was a real threat to Khartoum. We 

had advance intelligence that that was the case and we were prepared to move people out. As a matter of fact, the Embassy took 

steps to move some people out. We’ve done that there. We’ve done 

that in several other areas. Where we get that kind of advance notice, we can respond. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. You’re familiar with the timeline that’s on 

that chart over there. Suffice it to say that there were attacks on 

the Embassy—excuse me, on the compound—beginning in March 

2012. There were a series of other attacks on western assets, both 

U.S., Red Cross, U.K. Was the President aware of that timeline of 

all of those incidents that occurred? 

33 

Secretary PANETTA. I’m not sure. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Were each of you aware of each of those incidents that had occurred? 

General DEMPSEY. We were. Every week General Ham sends a 

report to the Secretary of Defense on events in his AOR and he 

copies me. He had been tracking the security situation in Libya. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Would that report not go to the President? 

General DEMPSEY. No, not routinely. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Would you not have discussions with the 

President about hot spots around the world and what was going 

on? 

General DEMPSEY. No, we do. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Do you know of any other place in the world, 

General Dempsey, where this number of attacks had occurred over 

this period of time? 

General DEMPSEY. I do actually, Senator. This was not a unique 

situation. In looking back at it, of course, it looks like it should 

have been crystal-clear that there was an attack imminent. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Where else outside of Afghanistan, outside 

of Iraq, have we had weapons fired on a compound, where we had 

a U.K. armored vehicle attacked, where we had a bomb thrown 

over the compound wall, where we had a U.N. special envoy attacked, where we had RPG attacks, and so forth and so on? Where 

outside of Afghanistan would that have happened? 

General DEMPSEY. Yemen, notably. We’ve had a great deal of 

challenges in Yemen. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. We had that at our Embassy at Yemen? 

General DEMPSEY. A consistent threat stream against the Ambassador personally, yes. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. So what response have you made in Yemen? 

General DEMPSEY. At the request of the Embassy, we have a 

Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team there to thicken their defenses, 

and we also have aircraft located in a nearby country that can respond in extremis. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. So that’s the second time you’ve used the 

phrase the State Department didn’t request or in this instance in 

Yemen apparently the State Department did request. General 

Dempsey, I take that as a very weak response and reaction to this 

incident. You are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You knew what 

was happening in Benghazi. You failed to respond in a way that 

provided security to that particular U.S. mission complex, when apparently you did respond in a positive way in Yemen, you say. Am 

I correct in that? 

General DEMPSEY. You’re incorrect in saying I failed to respond 

to a request. Look, what we do, in collaboration with our agency 

partners, is we try to distribute our resources. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General, you—— 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t distribute them personally. 

Senator CHAMBLISS.—said earlier in response to Senator McCain 

that you were aware of the August cable from Ambassador Stevens 

in which he said security at Benghazi is not adequate; am I correct? 

General DEMPSEY. I was aware of, Senator—yes, of course, I was 

aware of it, because it came in in General Ham’s report. General 

34 

Ham actually called the Embassy to see if they wanted to extend 

the special security team there and was told no. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Why was that the case, and who was it that 

said we do not need additional security at Benghazi to General 

Ham? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t know where that decision was eventually made. But it’s in the ARB results. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. My time is up, but your responses, General 

Dempsey, are very inadequate, and in my opinion, the same kind 

of inadequacy for the security that you provided at that consulate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Panetta, let me thank you for your service, and General Dempsey, yours also. Secretary Panetta, we’re going to miss 

you. There’s many people who have served with you longer than I 

have, but I can imagine the fondness they have grown and the relationships you’ve had. I can only imagine if we’d had a few more 

dinners we’d have had the same. 

General Dempsey, for your service I want to thank you, too. 

You’ve been most kind when I’ve been over to the Pentagon in trying to help me understand more of how we can totally secure our 

country and make it a better world. 

West Virginia’s proud to house the State Department Diplomatic 

Security Training Center, and the agents who fought bravely very 

likely might have been trained in that part of our great State. I understand also that pilots from the West Virginia National Guard 

out of our Clarksburg, WV, were some of the first to respond. They 

changed mission quickly and were ready to get resources into 

Libya, and it shows the strong force that the Guard and the support role the Guard plays. 

So with that, gentlemen, I have just a few questions. First of all, 

I was here and I say one of my most profound moments and times 

of being a Senator was when I heard Admiral Mullen at that time, 

before he retired. The question was asked of him, what’s the greatest threat the United States of America faces? I thought I’m learning about the different hot spots of the world and all the different 

things that were going on and the challenges we had as a Nation 

defending ourself in the world, and I was ready to hear. He said, 

without skipping a beat, the debt of our Nation is the greatest 

threat we face as a Nation. 

I took that so seriously, and I’ve been committed to a large fix, 

a big fix, the Bowles-Simpson approach, which is the three-pronged 

template. We have had a hard time moving forward on that. 

Now we’ve come down to where we’ve said if we didn’t get the 

fix we would have sequestering. So we’re faced—the American public is watching us, engaging what we do, and what we say—if we 

do what we say and fulfill our promises. If we can’t come to the 

financial fix the country needs, sequestering is our penalty. We 

don’t want to penalize and, like you say, hollow out the force, if you 

will. 

How can we help fulfill our promise to the American people that 

we’ll, since we can’t come to this—I hope we can. I hope we avoid 

35 

it. But if we don’t, is there language we could give you to live with 

the amount of sequestering that the cuts will bring? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, there is no fix here. I have to tell 

you that it would be irresponsible for Congress to allow sequester 

to go into place. Sequester was not designed as a mechanism that 

was supposed to happen. It was designed to be so nuts that everybody would do everything possible to make sure it didn’t happen. 

That’s what sequester was about. 

Now to say somehow we can’t come together to figure out what 

savings we have to put in place in order to not trigger sequester, 

so I guess we’ll just have to let sequester happen, I think is irresponsible. 

Senator MANCHIN. Would you not agree if you were still sitting 

in Congress and we can’t come to an agreement—I would hope that 

we could come to an agreement, that we can find a $4 or $5 trillion 

swing over 10 years, is what’s been recommended. There’s going to 

have to be reform and have to be revenue and there has to be cuts 

in spending, and everyone has to participate. 

I look at the spending and I look over the period of time. I think 

you and I have spoken about that. This is the least amount of 

drawdown post-war that we have asked for, but it seems to be 

doing the most damage. I think you were telling me the timing of 

it is hitting you harder than anything else; is that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator MANCHIN. If I can move on to General Dempsey. General, my question is, what is happening in Mali right now? If you 

can give me a little oversight on that. There’s a weak central government, a strong al Qaeda presence, rampant armed militants. 

When you look at Mali, are there any lessons from Benghazi that 

can be applied to our security posture there? 

General DEMPSEY. To what’s happening, the French have had 

some good success in pushing the armed groups north into the 

northern desert. The important point now would be to have the 

ECOWAS forces that they’re training flow in behind them. Then at 

some point Mali will need help with its governance challenges because at some level these are also disputes between the Touregs 

and the northern Malians and the southern Malians. 

But I do think there’s always lessons to be learned. In terms of 

learning from Benghazi, I think, to your point about—we’ve been 

in close touch with the Embassy in Bamako. They’ve thinned out 

the ranks a bit. That’s a prudent measure. 

As the Secretary said earlier, Senator, the way you avoid these 

issues in the future is somewhat with hardening, somewhat with 

early decisionmaking. When the security situation appears to be 

moving in a negative direction, the decision to either reinforce or 

to thin or to close needs to be taken in a timely fashion. 

Senator MANCHIN. Secretary Panetta, after September 11 we undertook a whole-of-government approach to make sure our intelligence systems are integrated. Can you tell me if something has 

gone wrong there and did we miss something? I’m hearing people 

have legitimate concerns, great concerns, and our hearts go out and 

prayers go out to the families of our four brave Americans we lost, 

and we want to prevent that from happening. But did something 

break down, sir, that we can repair? 

36 

Secretary PANETTA. Look, there obviously were a number of reforms on the intelligence agencies coming out of September 11, and 

I can tell you from my own experience that I think there was—we 

have developed tremendous teamwork within the Intelligence Community, in which we share information, we go after targets together, we develop the best analysis that we can on the threats 

that are confronting the country. 

The problem that happens here—and this is something that does 

need attention—is whether or not we have the best intelligence assets, the best intelligence resources in the areas where we need 

good information. We have a lot of assets around. We have a lot 

of resources that are there. We have signals intelligence (SIGINT), 

we have human intelligence (HUMINT). But if you have an area 

where you don’t have resources there, if you don’t have good intelligence, then it’s going to create a gap, as General Dempsey said. 

I think with regards to those specific individuals that were involved in this attack, there was a gap. We didn’t have the intelligence that would have given us a heads-up that this kind of thing 

was going to happen. That is something that we do need to pay attention to. 

Senator MANCHIN. My time is up. Thank you both. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to share in what all of my colleagues have said about your 

distinguished service, Secretary Panetta, and how grateful we are 

for everything that you’ve done for our country, deeply appreciate 

it. I thank you both for being here. 

I wanted to follow up, General Dempsey, as I understand it, you 

received briefings from General Ham that would include intelligence reporting as well as the reports from the State Department, 

and you received those regarding the situation in Libya, including 

the information about the prior attacks within Benghazi, including 

those on our consulate; is that right? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator. We get reports weekly from 

each combatant commander. 

Senator AYOTTE. So as the ARB found, and the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee did a report on this 

as well, but the ARB had said that there was a clear and vivid picture of a rapidly deteriorating threat environment in eastern Libya. 

Would you agree with that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay, thank you. One of the things you had 

said is that, Mr. Secretary, that you were aware that Ambassador 

Stevens, of his cable, that said the consulate could not withstand 

a coordinated attack; is that right? 

Secretary PANETTA. Correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. General, you had said that previously you were 

aware of that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I was aware of the communication back 

to the State Department. 

Senator AYOTTE. You said that the State Department didn’t request assistance; is that right? General, I believe you said that? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

37 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did you ever bring that to the attention of Secretary Clinton? This is a pretty surprising and shocking, important 

cable to receive from an ambassador, that where our people are 

housed could not withstand a coordinated attack. Did you ever 

speak with Secretary Clinton about that? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, as I mentioned in my testimony, 

NCTC had identified almost 281 facilities that were under a threat 

of one kind or another. To deal with that, that’s not our responsibility. That’s the State Department’s responsibility. 

Senator AYOTTE. I just would add my straightforward question, 

I think, and in particular to both of you, particularly to General 

Dempsey, you said you were aware of the cable. Did you ever bring 

it to Secretary Clinton’s attention, given that it said from our Ambassador that the consulate could not withstand a coordinated attack? Yes or no? 

General DEMPSEY. I did not. The cable was actually to the State 

Department, not to me. 

Senator AYOTTE. I understand. But you were aware of it. It’s a 

pretty important cable. You said you were also aware of the deteriorating security situation. 

General DEMPSEY. As a result of our meetings on the 

counterterrorism globally. 

Senator AYOTTE. But you did not bring it to Secretary Clinton’s 

attention? 

General DEMPSEY. I did not. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did you ever bring it to the President’s attention, either of you? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

General DEMPSEY. No. 

Senator AYOTTE. Based on the deteriorating security situation, 

we have this map that has the potential military bases in the area. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

38 

Senator AYOTTE. As I understand it, we have F–16s at Aviano; 

is that true? 

General DEMPSEY. That’s correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. Were they deployed that night? 

General DEMPSEY. They were not. 

Senator AYOTTE. Why not? 

General DEMPSEY. For a couple of reasons. First, is that in order 

to deploy them it requires the—this was the middle of the night, 

now. These were not aircraft on strip alert. They’re there as part 

of our commitment to NATO and Europe. So as we looked at the 

timeline, it was pretty clear that it would take up to 20 hours or 

so to get them there. 

Second, Senator, importantly, it was the wrong tool for the job. 

Senator AYOTTE. I guess it’s not clear to me why would—you said 

in your testimony that we were on heightened alert on September 

11—why it would take over 20 hours. We know that flight time for 

an F–16 is certainly not 20 hours, even if we were to refuel from 

Aviano. Given the deteriorating security situation that you’ve described, it really is—I don’t understand why we didn’t have armed 

assets somewhere in the area that could have responded in time at 

least for the second attack on the annex. That’s not clear to me. 

I think that is insufficient as we look at what happened here. 

But I do have a follow-up question. Secretary Panetta, you said 

that you were in a briefing with the President of the United States. 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. I believe it was about 5 o’clock our time. You 

had just learned about the incident on the consulate. What conversation did you have with the President? What did he ask you 


207ful2.eps
39 

to do as a result of this attack? Throughout the night what communications were you having with him? Can you tell us on a timeline 

as to who was calling the shots there; if it wasn’t him, another 

member of the White House? 

Secretary PANETTA. At the time, we were concerned about Cairo 

and demonstrations in Cairo. Then we had just picked up the information that something was happening, that there was an apparent 

attack going on in Benghazi. I informed the President of that fact, 

and he at that point directed both myself and General Dempsey to 

do everything we needed to do to try to protect lives there. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did he ask you how long it would take to deploy 

assets, including armed aviation to the area? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. He basically said, do whatever you need 

to do to be able to protect our people there. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did you have any—so he didn’t ask you what 

ability we had in the area and what we could do? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, I think he relied on both myself as Secretary and on General Dempsey’s capabilities. He knows generally 

what we’ve deployed in the region. We’ve presented that to him in 

other briefings. So he knew generally what was deployed out there. 

But as to specifics about time, et cetera, et cetera, no, he just left 

that up to us. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did you have any further communications with 

him that night? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did you have any other further communications—did he ever call you that night to say ‘‘how are things going, 

what’s going on, where’s the consulate?’’ 

Secretary PANETTA. No. But we were aware that as we were getting information on what was taking place there, particularly when 

we got information that the Ambassador, his life had been lost, we 

were aware that that information went to the White House. 

Senator AYOTTE. Did you communicate with anyone else at the 

White House that night? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

Senator AYOTTE. No one else called you to say, ‘‘how are things 

going?’’ 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. Since then, has the President asked you, 

‘‘why weren’t we able to get, in light of the second attack that occurred 7 hours later, armed assets there in order to help those who 

were left and attacked in the annex?’’ 

Secretary PANETTA. The President has made very clear to both 

myself and General Dempsey that, with regards to future threats, 

we have to be able to deploy forces in a position where we can more 

rapidly respond. 

Senator AYOTTE. But just to be clear, that night he didn’t ask 

you what assets we had available and how quickly they could respond and what we could do to help those individuals? 

Secretary PANETTA. The biggest problem that night, Senator, was 

that nobody knew really what was going on there. 

Senator AYOTTE. There was no follow-up during the night, at 

least from the White House directly? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, no, there wasn’t. 

40 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. I would, if I could just correct one thing. I 

wouldn’t say there was no follow-up from the White House. There 

was no follow-up to my knowledge with the President, but his staff 

was engaged with the National Military Command Center pretty 

constantly throughout the period, which is the way it would normally work. 

Senator AYOTTE. But no direct communication from him? 

General DEMPSEY. Not on my part, no. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here today. Of course, thank you for 

your service. We’re incredibly grateful for all that you do. 

Secretary Panetta, you said in your November remarks to the 

Center for American Security about al Qaeda: ‘‘We’ve slowed the 

primary cancer, but we know that the cancer has also metastasized 

to other parts of the global body.’’ Presumably, you’re including 

Yemen, Somalia, Mali, and elsewhere. How would you recommend 

reorganizing our strategy to stem the growing and changing al 

Qaeda global threat? 

Secretary PANETTA. We are working on that with the other agencies involved. What is needed here is a comprehensive strategy 

overall that focuses on al Qaeda and its various affiliates to make 

sure that they have no place to hide. We’ve obviously done a very 

effective job in the FATA, done a good job in Afghanistan, Iraq. 

We’re doing a good job in Yemen and Somalia. 

As these affiliates are beginning to appear elsewhere, in Mali 

and North Africa, in Syria, we have to develop a comprehensive 

strategy that allows us to be able to develop operations against 

them wherever they’re at. We’re in the process of working on that 

strategy. We have already implemented some steps to try to deal 

with that. But we really do need to take a big picture view of all 

of the elements of al Qaeda and how we can best make sure that 

they have no place to hide. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I have some specific follow-up questions 

that I’ll submit for the record, but they may be classified, the answers, so that’s why I’ll submit them separately. 

I want to turn to cyber. According to recent reports, the Pentagon 

has approved a major expansion of its U.S. Cyber Command to include growing its ranks from approximately 900 to 4,900 personnel 

cyber warriors. According to these same reports, there will be three 

types of forces: those who will fortify DOD’s own networks; those 

who will help commanders abroad plan and execute offensive attacks; and those who will protect critical infrastructure like power 

grids and power plants. 

Needless to say, this is absolutely necessary to protect our Nation against what is becoming a leading security threat. However, 

I’m particularly interested in the last group, those who will protect 

national infrastructure. The majority of this critical infrastructure 

is owned and operated by the private sector. Given this, will the 

military rely on the National Guard, which is able to operate under 

both titles 10 and 32 authorities? 

41 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, your description of how we are trying 

to prepare the force is accurate. We clearly don’t have authority to 

do all of that, but we are trying to grow the right force so that if 

it became necessary and we had the authority to do all of those 

things we would be prepared. 

The National Guard will always be part of any endeavor. I think 

we’ll find the right balance of Active and Guard as we move ahead. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Are there any particular obstacles that you 

can see now in terms of using the Guard with a greater deal of responsibility in cyber? 

General DEMPSEY. No, not uniquely, not any obstacles that we 

don’t have as well on the Active side. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. A broader question. How do you see our 

plan for recruiting and retaining enough cyber personnel, particularly ones capable of working in the offensive side? One idea that 

I had considered thinking through is, we do Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), but imagine doing ROTC specifically for cyber 

personnel. So you’re getting these young men and women coming 

out of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford and 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute who are some of the country’s 

greatest engineers early on, to hone their skills for cyber defense 

and cyber attack missions within the DOD. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, let me just say, in talking to Keith 

Alexander at the National Security Agency, he does not have any 

shortage of young people that want to be part of that effort. They 

view it as an opportunity to get involved, be on the cutting edge 

of the technology with regards to cyber, develop tremendous skills 

there, and be able to then go out and use those skills in the private 

sector. So he has a lot of young people, a lot of young very bright 

people, who are anxious to participate in this effort. 

General DEMPSEY. To include coming out of our military academies. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Now turning to the subject of the hearing, 

Benghazi specifically. I would like to talk a little bit about what 

you’ve learned from these events and how you would advise the 

next Secretary of Defense to better prepare for similar events and 

how DOD should adapt to the next generation, including obviously 

the metastazation of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and cyber 

attacks, both of which obviously pose very serious threats to the security of our Homeland. 

I’m specifically concerned that this was an attack in a country 

that the United States helped liberate from decades of dictatorship. 

That day, September 11, 2012, witnessed demonstrations in other 

countries that were part of the Arab Spring, countries that were 

supported—that we supported the voice of democracy. But throughout these countries we continue to see jihadists and fundamentalist 

movements align against us and against our interests, and perhaps 

funded by some of the Gulf countries. 

What leverage should we be using with the Gulf governments to 

address the support for groups that threaten our security? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I’ve testified here, and I certainly would 

give this guidance to my successor, in dealing with these threats 

you have to address each area of concern. First of all, you have to 

develop better host country capabilities. That’s one of the gaps 

42 

right now in some of these countries that we just saw, they have 

not been able to develop a sufficient host force that provides that 

kind of security. We have to work with them. We have to bring as 

much leverage as we can on these countries, that they have a responsibility to be the first line of security for our embassies, and 

we have to help them develop the training and capabilities that are 

necessary to do that. 

Second, we have to harden these facilities. We do have to 

strengthen the security around some of these embassies, be able to 

develop, add the additional marines that are necessary to try to 

help provide that security as well, and ensure that they have the 

right training for the security guards that are around that embassy. 

Third, we need better intelligence. We just absolutely have to 

have good intelligence. Whatever we do, wherever we’re located, if 

we don’t get that advance intelligence, that heads-up that we need, 

there isn’t any way that we can respond in time. So we have to 

have better intelligence as to what these groups are doing. 

Then lastly, we have to have a response force in the vicinity to 

be able to respond quickly. Once we get a heads-up, once we get 

an indication that something’s going to happen, forces have to be 

in place and have a shorter response time in order to be able to 

deploy. There’s no question these response times were too long, and 

so we’re trying to shorten that. 

But I also want to just let you know that we are dealing with 

the problem of distance in that area. It takes hours to be able to 

respond. It’s just the nature of being able to notify people, get them 

ready, get airlift there, make sure they can move quickly, and then 

fly to the target. All of that has to be considered. 

But the more heads-up we get, the better off we can respond. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you both very much again for your 

service and your testimony. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having the hearing. 

Secretary Panetta, you will be missed. You’ve served our Nation 

well. You will be missed. General Dempsey, thank you for your 

service. 

Now, this is a hearing about Benghazi. We’ve talked about sequestration, which is important. I just want to make sure that we 

understand what happened on September 11 regarding Benghazi. 

Your testimony as I understand it, Secretary Panetta, is that you 

talked to the President of the United States one time? 

Secretary PANETTA. Talked to him on September 11 with regards 

to the fact that we were aware that this attack was taking place. 

Senator GRAHAM. One time? 

Secretary PANETTA. Right. 

Senator GRAHAM. What time did you tell him that? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think that was approximately about 5 p.m. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, about 5 p.m. 

Secretary PANETTA. About 5 p.m. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Dempsey, did you ever talk to the 

President of the United States at all? 

43 

General DEMPSEY. I was with the Secretary that same time. 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you talk to the President? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. You talked to him how many times? 

General DEMPSEY. The same one time. 

Senator GRAHAM. How long did that conversation last? 

General DEMPSEY. We were there in the office for probably 30 

minutes. 

Senator GRAHAM. So you talked to him for 30 minutes one time 

and you never talked to him again, either one of you? 

General DEMPSEY. Until afterwards. 

Senator GRAHAM. Until after the attack was over? 

General DEMPSEY. That’s right. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Were there any AC–130 gunships within 1,000 miles of 

Benghazi, Libya? 

General DEMPSEY. No, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Were there any AC–130 gunships within 2,000 

miles of Benghazi, Libya? 

General DEMPSEY. I would have to go back and look at a map 

and figure out the distance. The nearest ones I was aware of 

were—— 

Senator GRAHAM. You said the F–16 was not a good platform to 

defend the consulate. What would have been the appropriate platform? 

General DEMPSEY. The appropriate platform, Senator, would 

have been to have boots-on-the-ground ahead of the event. After 

the event is in conduct, it would be very difficult to have a—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s just—would an AC–130 have been a good 

platform to help defend the consulate after the attack? 

General DEMPSEY. If we had the adequate understanding of what 

was on the ground so that we weren’t killing—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is there a saying in the military, when you go 

into harm’s way we have your back? 

General DEMPSEY. Of course, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Don’t you think that saying has been undermined here? How can people in the military or the foreign service 

believe we have their back when, after over seven—one, did you 

know how long the attack was going to last, Secretary Panetta? 

Secretary PANETTA. No idea. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, it could have lasted for 2 days. 

Now, my question is, was one airplane anywhere in the world deployed in the aid of the consulate? Did anybody launch an airplane? Was any airplane launched anywhere in the world to help 

these people? 

Secretary PANETTA. We ultimately did launch 130s to go in and 

rescue the people. 

Senator GRAHAM. When were they launched? 

Secretary PANETTA. They were launched in the period of time 

when the team went in there and when we concluded that the attack was concluded. We said we have to get the people out of there 

and that’s when we—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Was any airplane launched anywhere in the 

world before the attack was concluded? 

44 

General DEMPSEY. If you’re talking about a strike aircraft, no, 

Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Was any soldier en route to help these people 

before the attack was concluded? 

Secretary PANETTA. We had deployed the FAST teams and they 

were—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Were they—— 

Secretary PANETTA.—on orders to move. 

Senator GRAHAM. Was anybody in motion before the attack concluded to help these people, anybody? 

General DEMPSEY. Only the personnel that were in Tripoli. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Was any DOD asset ever deployed to 

help these people before the end of the attack? 

General DEMPSEY. Would you rephrase? Would you repeat the 

question? 

Senator GRAHAM. Was any DOD asset, aircraft, or individual soldier, ever sent, put in motion, to help these people before the attack was over? 

General DEMPSEY. If I could, as soon as we knew there was an 

attack the National Mission Force and the FAST Teams began preparing to deploy. 

Senator GRAHAM. My question is, did anybody leave any base 

anywhere to go to the aid of the people under attack in Benghazi, 

Libya, before the attack ended? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, because the attack ended before they 

could get off the ground. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. We didn’t know how long it would 

last. 

Now, back to the threat assessment. These 281 threats that 

we’ve received, can you go back and look and see if any of these 

threats have a cable from a U.S. Ambassador saying if we’re attacked, the consulate is attacked in a coordinated fashion, we cannot defend the consulate, and oh, by the way, there are al Qaeda 

flags flying over government buildings? Is there any other situation 

of these 281 that rise to that level, because I want to know about 

it if there is? 

Secretary PANETTA. The State Department would have the answer to that question. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Let’s talk about the State Department. 

General Dempsey, it seems to me that General Ham kept you pretty well informed. 

General DEMPSEY. I agree with that. 

Senator GRAHAM. I agree with that, too. Did General Ham on 

that night ever suggest that a military asset—did he order a military asset in motion and someone told him to stand down? 

General DEMPSEY. No. In fact, he was with us in the Pentagon 

that day. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, so he was with you. 

Now, you knew about the cable from Ambassador Stevens because General Ham informed you of it; is that correct, General 

Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. In a written weekly report. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So when Secretary Clinton testified a 

few weeks ago that she had a clear-eyed assessment of the threat 

45 

we faced in Libya, is that really a credible statement if she didn’t 

know about the Ambassador’s cable on August 15, saying we can’t 

defend this place? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t know that she didn’t know about the 

cable. 

Senator GRAHAM. She said she didn’t. 

General DEMPSEY. Then that’s a—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Are you stunned that she didn’t? 

General DEMPSEY. I would call myself surprised that she didn’t. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Are you surprised that the President of the United States never 

called you, Secretary Panetta, and say, how is it going? 

Secretary PANETTA. Normally in these situations—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Did he know the level of threat—— 

Secretary PANETTA. Let me finish the answer. We were deploying 

the forces. He knew we were deploying the forces. He was being 

kept updated as to the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I hate to interrupt you, but I have limited 

time. We didn’t deploy any forces. 

Secretary PANETTA. No, but—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you—wait a minute. 

Secretary PANETTA. It was over by the time—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Secretary, you didn’t know how long the 

attack would last. Did you ever call him and say, Mr. Secretary, 

it looks like we don’t have anything to get there any time soon? 

Secretary PANETTA. The event was over before we could move 

any assets. 

Senator GRAHAM. It lasted almost 8 hours, and my question to 

you is: During that 8-hour period, did the President show any curiosity about how is this going, what kind of assets do you have helping these people? Did he ever make that phone call? 

Secretary PANETTA. Look. There is no question in my mind that 

the President of the United States was concerned about American 

lives. 

Senator GRAHAM. With all due respect—— 

Secretary PANETTA. I think all of us were concerned about American lives. 

Senator GRAHAM.—I don’t believe that’s a credible statement if 

he never called and asked you, are we helping people, what’s happening to them. 

Secretary PANETTA. As a former chief—— 

Senator GRAHAM. We have a second round and we’ll take it up 

then. 

Secretary PANETTA. As a former chief of staff to the President of 

the United States, the purpose of staff is to be able to get that kind 

of information, and those staff were working with us. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think it’s a typical response of the 

President of the United States to make one phone call, do what you 

can, and never call you back again to ask you, how is it going, by 

the way? Show any frustration we don’t have any assets in there 

to help these people for over 7 hours? 

Secretary PANETTA. The President is well-informed about what is 

going on. Make no mistake about it. 

46 

Senator GRAHAM. That is interesting to hear. We’ll talk about 

that in the second round. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both, Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, for 

being here this morning. Secretary Panetta, thank you so much for 

your long and very important service to this country. 

I think, as you all have pointed out, that it is important for the 

administration to continue to be open and upfront about what happened in Benghazi. I think it’s important for us to look in a factual, 

objective way, to the extent that we can, at what has happened 

here and to try and address that; and that grandstanding and finger-pointing is not really helpful. 

So I appreciate your willingness to look at what happened here. 

As has been acknowledged, the bottom line is that our agencies 

didn’t do enough to protect our people on the ground and we have 

to do better. As the ARB pointed out, there were security failures, 

there were leadership and management deficiencies. I appreciate 

that Secretary Clinton took responsibility for that and that we are 

looking at recommendations to address that. So thank you for your 

willingness to be part of that process. 

One of the things that happened in the follow-up to the ARB was 

an effort by the Senate to address the transfer of funds that the 

State Department requested to provide the necessary resources to 

address security risks and to transfer the personnel to meet mission imperatives around the world. I’m pleased that again this 

week the Senate has tried to do that. I certainly hope the House 

will take up that legislation and pass it so that we can address the 

resources that are required to make sure this doesn’t happen again 

in our embassies and missions around the world. 

Both the ARB and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee reports pointed out that Congress and 

the administration share in the responsibility for making sure that 

those resources are available. 

Now, my question really goes to a follow-up to what Senator 

Graham was discussing, and I understand it was raised earlier. It’s 

something that I raised with Deputy Secretary Nides before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and it does have to do with 

what capacity we have in dangerous regions to provide support 

from the military when we have diplomatic missions and embassies 

that get into trouble. 

I wonder if you could—you’ve talked about the fact that we don’t 

have or did not at the time of Benghazi have those assets in the 

region. But can you talk about what kind of coordination you envision going forward to address areas where there is potential risk? 

Obviously, Northern Africa and the Middle East are certainly these 

days those kinds of areas. What kind of communication and coordination are we doing to address this? 

Secretary PANETTA. We have worked with the State Department 

on a team to assess the different embassies there to determine 

what are the additional steps that have to be taken in order to provide security and also what additional steps do we need in order 

to ensure that we have the intelligence necessary to give us a 

heads-up. 

47 

So we are taking steps. We’re going to provide another almost 

1,000 marines as detachments to be able to target those embassies 

that are most vulnerable. In addition to that, obviously, we’re going 

to try to do what we can to strengthen the host nations’ capabilities 

to provide security. I know the Intelligence Community is working 

to develop better intelligence, to be able to give us a heads-up. 

Frankly, we’re doing the same thing. We’re deploying forces to the 

area and giving them much shorter response times, so that if we 

do have to deploy them, they’ll be able to get up in the air and to 

the area in a more rapid fashion. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Is there going to be an ongoing structure to 

do that, an ongoing system that will be put in place, so that it’s 

not just this one review of what the circumstances are, but for the 

foreseeable future we’ll expect to have communication and coordination between DOD and State? 

Secretary PANETTA. We are doing that and we are trying to develop a tighter team that can work together to make sure that we 

protect our lives abroad. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, I understand that in earlier testimony you acknowledged that there are gaps in our intelligence and what we 

know, and that better intelligence would have given us a heads-up 

about what we might have needed in the region. Will some of the 

assets that are used in Afghanistan be redirected to AFRICOM for 

future use, do you think? 

General DEMPSEY. As assets become excess capacity anywhere, 

we have that process, as I mentioned to Senator Reed, called the 

global force management process, where we do it on an annual 

basis, but then monthly, we meet to redistribute as necessary as 

threats go up and down. So, yes, absolutely, I would expect that 

over time additional assets would be made available. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Reports suggest that AFRICOM has been 

under-resourced because of Afghanistan. Is there a reprioritization 

that we should be doing as we are drawing down forces in Afghanistan and looking at what we need to do? Given the challenge of, 

the potential challenge of sequestration if we can’t act in Congress 

to address that—and I certainly hope that we can; I think it’s responsible for us to do that. But how do you expect that 

reprioritization to occur, given the budget challenges we’re facing? 

General DEMPSEY. First, I’d like to suggest a little different 

wording. You said is AFRICOM disadvantaged because of Afghanistan. The answer is no. The resources we have that are in Afghanistan are there because that’s where the threat, the greatest threat 

to the homeland resides, in western Pakistan and in some cases, 

northeastern Afghanistan. So those are direct threats to the homeland. It’s Afghanistan, but it happens to be where the threat is. 

So as the threat migrates and changes, we reprioritize. To your 

point about sequestration, yes, you will see a definite degradation 

if we have to absorb both the magnitude and the mechanism of sequestration. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Just to be clear, I suggested that 

other reports have indicated that they may have been underresourced. So I didn’t intend to make that accusation, but really 

just to raise it as a question. 

48 

So thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to both of you for being here today and thank you for 

your service and all you do for our country. 

I certainly appreciate and respect the fact that, as you acknowledged in your opening statements, it isn’t possible for you to be all 

things to all people. It’s not possible for you to be anywhere in the 

world within notice of only a few minutes, and we need to keep 

that in mind as we look at this sad, unfortunate situation. 

We also recognize the concern that you have for U.S. personnel 

everywhere around and respect what you do for them. 

I do want to follow up a little bit on some of the questions that 

Senator Graham was asking a few minutes ago. Secretary Panetta, 

a few minutes ago you indicated that we didn’t have boots-on-theground, we didn’t deploy forces, because the attack came to an end. 

But as Senator Graham pointed out, this is an attack that lasted 

nearly 8 hours from start to finish. So at some point there had to 

have been a decision made not to deploy them. At what point in 

that timeframe was it made, or was it not made, until after the attack had ended, nearly 8 hours after it began? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, again, just to bring you back to the 

events as they took place, there was this initial attack on the facility at Benghazi. Within an hour or so that ended, and, very frankly, we thought that was the end of what had occurred there, and 

we had no intelligence that a second attack would take place at the 

annex, 2 miles away. 

Senator LEE. But we didn’t know. We didn’t know. What we did 

know was that a lot of people were still unaccounted for. So the immediate attack was perhaps not visibly underway, but you weren’t 

certain that there wouldn’t be more fighting. 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, you’re not certain about what 

may or may not happen. But the issue of whether or not you suddenly deploy a platoon or a team into an area, you still have to determine whether or not the situation requires the deployment of 

that force there. Frankly, when we were told that the attack was 

over we immediately—although we had the forces in place, we 

would have responded if something had indicated more, we had no 

intelligence to indicate that that was the case. 

Senator LEE. Okay, and to what point are you referring right 

now? You were talking about the initial attack on the compound? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct, that’s correct. 

Senator LEE. So was that decision revisited hours later when in 

the early hours of the morning Benghazi time another pretty considerable attack came about? 

General DEMPSEY. Let me make sure. Once the attack occurred, 

we started moving forces. It didn’t matter really whether there was 

another attack. We were moving the forces, and as they were moving we would direct them where they were needed. I actually 

thought they would likely be needed in Tripoli, but they were moving. Nothing we did slowed that process down. 

Senator LEE. Did they get to Tripoli? 

General DEMPSEY. They did. They’re there now. 

49 

Senator LEE. Why didn’t they move forward to Benghazi? 

General DEMPSEY. There was no need to do it by the time they 

got there. 

Senator LEE. How did you know there was no need to do it? 

General DEMPSEY. Because everybody was out of Benghazi. 

Senator LEE. Okay, and yet it took another 23 days, as I understand it, to secure the compound after the attack had completed, 

had ended. So why did it take 23 days to secure the compound? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, we were not requested to secure 

that compound. When the FBI decided to go in and then requested 

us to provide security, we did. 

Senator LEE. After the FBI requested that, at that point? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator LEE. But again going back to the early morning hours 

Benghazi time when there was still fighting going on, how did you 

know that that was the end of it? Or are you saying it didn’t matter at that point because you had removed all the Americans from 

the compound and from the annex? 

General DEMPSEY. What I’ve said, Senator, is that when we put 

the forces in motion, they continued in motion until they arrived 

at the location. 

Senator LEE. At what point did you put them in motion? 

General DEMPSEY. Immediately, but there’s notification to liftoff 

and then there’s transit time. It was a significant amount of time. 

Senator LEE. Had they been on alert or at a higher state of alert, 

could you perhaps have gotten them there faster? 

General DEMPSEY. I think, yes, they could have. We routinely 

leave forces at N+6. Some of them were at N+4, some of them were 

at N+2. No one is ever sitting there on the tarmac waiting, but we 

do dial up and dial down the alert posture. 

Senator LEE. Looking back, given that it was an important anniversary, September 11, was there good reason to have put them at 

a higher state of alert than they were? 

General DEMPSEY. Looking back is a lot clearer than looking forward. I will tell you that as part of this study that the Secretary 

of Defense described we have changed our alert posture globally. 

The question is whether we can sustain it over time. It’s challenging to sustain those kinds of alert postures. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, 

General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta. 

Mr. Secretary, your testimony is where I’m going to start, and an 

observation and then some questions. The line that I find the most 

provocative: ‘‘That brings me to my greatest concern right now as 

Secretary and, frankly, the greatest security risk we are facing as 

a Nation, which is budget uncertainty, which could prompt the 

most significant military readiness crisis in more than a decade.’’ 

That’s a provocative statement, ‘‘greatest security risk as a Nation.’’ Iran, North Korea, al Qaeda, including al Qaeda in the 

Maghreb. But I gather the thrust of the point is our ability to respond to any of those security threats is completely dependent 

50 

upon a national security posture that is informed by budget decisions rather than budget indecision. 

Yesterday, it was announced that you had approved a decision to 

take the USS Harry Truman and the USS Gettysburg and delay 

their deployment pursuant to a U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) desire that they be deployed in the Middle East, and 

to delay the deployment purely because of the effect of the March 

1 sequester and the now-increasing likelihood that that would happen. I regret that you had to make a decision of this kind, to sacrifice our Nation’s readiness. You were faced with the choice of deploying a second carrier in the Middle East that could provide some 

additional security, including in the area that we’re talking about 

at this hearing. Instead, you decided to keep that carrier 

homeported in Norfolk because of budgetary concerns. 

You shouldn’t have had to make that decision. The safety of the 

men and women we have deployed in Afghanistan, in the Middle 

East, and Pakistan is at stake and the very matters we’re talking 

about at this hearing are at stake when you have to make a decision of that kind, the ability of our military to respond to crises in 

some volatile parts of the world. 

You didn’t cancel the carrier deployment because this part of the 

world suddenly was safer. Our ability to respond is at stake and, 

as you pointed out in an earlier answer, this also affects individual 

morale of individuals who subleased apartments. There was an article this morning in the Virginian Pilot. It said, ‘‘Airman Carly 

Grice, 20, of Kentwood, LA, said she had been excited to go on the 

first deployment. ‘‘This was a letdown. Actually, I’m disappointed,’’ 

said Grice. She joined the Navy in August and hopes to make a career in the service. She wonders whether that’s realistic, given the 

budgetary issues.’’ 

The military today is filled with 20-year-olds or newly-minted 

lieutenants or others who will be the future leadership of our military. There’s probably someone in the military right now, General 

Dempsey, who will be a future head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

But I suspect that virtually all of them are wondering whether a 

career in the military is realistic given what they’ve seen from this 

body, what they’ve seen in terms of the budget that might inform 

whether they can make that a realistic choice. 

I hope Congress is taking notice of your provocative comment, 

which, I think, is an accurate one. The decision regarding the Truman is going to be the first of many, I suspect, unless we do something to replace sequester. We all know sequester was never intended to happen, Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned. We should, in 

my view, finish last year’s appropriations process, enact deficit reduction to align the sequester with the budget process, do a meaningful budget process, and make the decisions exactly as you described. 

You did a national security review inside DOD and then let that 

drive some budgetary decisions. We’re letting our budget drive national security. Even worse, we’re letting budgetary inaction drive 

national security, and I fear greatly for our security posture as a 

result of where we are right now. 

So, Mr. Secretary, I gather we’re likely to see a whole lot of 

things like the Truman announcement yesterday that would potenVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
51 

tially weaken our readiness, demoralize our Active Duty men and 

women, and leave us less safe, unless we find an alternative to sequester. 

Secretary PANETTA. I truly hope that that does not become the 

case. Senator, we can do this right. The United States of America 

is the strongest military power on Earth. We’re the strongest democracy on Earth. If we have to reduce the budget, as we do, $487 

billion, I can get that done pursuant to a strategy that protects the 

strongest military on Earth. 

There is no reason why an arbitrary legislative mechanism that 

was designed, not because it was good policy, but because it was 

bad policy, to drive action, should now take place. I cannot imagine 

that Congress would simply stand by and let that happen because 

the consequences are just as you’ve described. If we go into sequester, then we are going to have to take steps to implement another 

$500 billion in cuts in a way that will, make no mistake, hollow 

out the force and weaken the United States of America as a military power. 

We don’t have to do that. This is a self-inflicted wound. We do 

not have to do this. That’s why I think the General and I, we’re 

trying to take steps to prepare for that, should it happen. But we’re 

trying to do it in a way that makes these steps reversible, so that 

we can again get back to the business of defending this country. 

But if this continues and if this happens, then you are absolutely 

correct, this is the beginning of a number of steps we’re going to 

have to take that are going to badly damage our readiness. 

Senator KAINE. What does it mean, when CENTCOM has decided that there should be two carriers in the Middle East and decides purely because of sequester we can’t do that, what does that 

mean to our readiness posture and what message does it send to 

allies and adversaries? 

Secretary PANETTA. First, I’m going to assure you, and I think 

General Dempsey can speak to this, we’re going to do everything 

we can to make sure that we are prepared to deal with the threat 

from Iran. We will have one carrier there. We will deploy other 

forces there so that we can hopefully fill the gap. But our hope had 

been that we could have two carriers, which would give us the 

flexibility to have the kind of rapid response that we will need if 

we have to deal with a crisis there. 

Senator KAINE. In terms just of the sheer organizational effort, 

I assume it’s thousands of hours for your personnel to try to figure 

out how to contort your budget to comply with the sequester, that 

would much better be spent looking forward and working on a fiscal year 2014 budget. 

Secretary PANETTA. You bet. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, I’d like to begin by thanking 

the two of you for being here this morning and for your extended 

service. I will say, Secretary Panetta, I regret that you and I have 

not had the opportunity to work together since I’m a new member 

of this committee. But I will tell you, you have over many years 

52 

earned a reputation for being fair-minded, for looking for bipartisan compromise, and for looking for solutions. 

Indeed, I will pass along a comment that was made to me by a 

more senior Republican on this committee about you, in which you 

were characterized as a ‘‘straight shooter,’’ which as you know in 

Washington is both a rare compliment and a very high compliment. 

So I want to thank you for your principled dedication to this country and your long service. 

I want to likewise thank you, General Dempsey, for your service, 

your many decades defending the Nation, and your passionate commitment to standing with the men and women of the military and 

protecting the interests of the United States. 

It is my hope that this hearing can be a helpful moment in terms 

of learning productive lessons learned from the tragic attack at 

Benghazi. What I would like to focus on principally is the window 

between when the attack began and 5:15 a.m. in the morning when 

Navy SEALs Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods lost their lives. 

There are roughly 71⁄2 hours there. 

I recognize that in any military conflict one inevitably faces the 

proverbial fog of war. But what I’d like to ask you to do is use the 

20–20 hindsight we have now. If you could go back in time with 

the knowledge you have today and play it over again, if at 9:42 

p.m. Benghazi time when the first attack began you knew that at 

5:15 a.m. two former SEALs would be on the roof of that annex and 

would face mortar fire, what specifically could have been done if we 

had that knowledge—and I recognize that is a hypothetical, but if 

we had that knowledge—what military options would there have 

been to prevent that loss of life and to stop that attack at the 

annex? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, as you said, it’s tough to respond to 

a hypothetical. As long as we’re talking about hypotheticals, the 

best that would have happened here is that we would have had a 

heads-up and we would have had troops on the ground to protect 

that facility. That’s the best scenario and that’s what works the 

best. 

Once an attack takes place, the biggest problem you have is getting accurate information about exactly what is taking place in 

order to then develop what response you need to do it. You can’t 

just willy-nilly send F–16s there and blow the hell out of a place 

without knowing what’s taking place. You can’t send AC–130s 

there and blow the hell out of a target without knowing what’s taking place. You have to be able to have good information about what 

is taking place in order to be able to effectively respond. 

Senator CRUZ. So in your judgment, if I understand you correctly, the most effective means would have been to have boots-onthe-ground? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator CRUZ. If—and again this is a hypothetical—at 9:42 p.m. 

you had received a direct order to have boots-on-the-ground to defend our men and women there, what is the absolute fastest that 

that could have been carried out? 

General DEMPSEY. Based on our posture at the time, it would 

have been N+6 plus transit time with the closest ground force 

53 

available. So you’re looking at something best case between 13 and 

15 hours. 

Senator CRUZ. So if I understand your testimony correctly, in 

your military judgment there was no way conceivably to get troops 

on the ground sooner than 13 to 15 hours? 

General DEMPSEY. That’s correct. 

Senator CRUZ. How about assets like an AC–130. If you had received an order at the outset to deploy an aircraft like an AC–130, 

what would have been the absolute fastest it could have arrived at 

Benghazi? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t even know exactly where they were, 

but I know there were no AC–130s anywhere near North Africa 

that night. 

Senator CRUZ. I’d like to also spend a few moments on the decisionmaking as this crisis unfolded. I take it neither of you received 

the hypothetical order at any point to get boots-on-the-ground immediately? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, that’s right. 

Senator CRUZ. Now, both of you mentioned that at 5 p.m. Washington, DC, time you met with President Obama for a regularly 

scheduled meeting, during which you discussed the attack at 

Benghazi that had happened about an hour and 20 minutes earlier. 

You said the total meeting lasted roughly 30 minutes. How much 

of the meeting would you estimate covered Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. We teed up that issue when we walked into 

the Oval Office, so I would say that the first 15 or 20 minutes were 

spent on the concern about that, as well as Cairo and what might 

happen there. 

Senator CRUZ. After that 15 or 20 minutes discussion of 

Benghazi, do I understand your testimony correctly that neither of 

you had any subsequent conversations with the President the rest 

of that day and that evening? 

Secretary PANETTA. We continued to talk. I think we teed up 

some other issues that we were dealing with at the time to inform 

the President, and then once that concluded we both went back to 

the Pentagon and immediately I ordered the deployment of these 

forces into place. 

Senator CRUZ. In between 9:42 p.m. Benghazi time when the 

first attack started and 5:15 a.m. when Mr. Doherty and Mr. 

Woods lost their lives, what conversations did either of you have 

with Secretary Clinton? 

Secretary PANETTA. We did not have any conversations with Secretary Clinton. 

Senator CRUZ. General Dempsey, the same is true for you? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator CRUZ. One final question because my time has expired. 

Senator Lee asked you about securing the compound and noted 

that it took some 23 days to do so, and I think to the astonishment 

of many viewers, we had CNN crews discovering what appeared to 

be sensitive documents, rather than U.S. forces or law enforcement. 

I just want to make sure I understood your answer correctly, in 

that you said that you were not requested to secure the compound 

and had you been requested to secure the compound, in your judgVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
54 

ment, the U.S. military could have done so and it could have done 

so effectively? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cruz. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Panetta, as I’m sure everybody said, this is your last 

time before this committee. We certainly want to take an opportunity to thank you for your extraordinary service as Secretary and 

all the other accolades and services that you have provided to the 

people of the United States. So I too want to echo my sincere 

thanks. 

General Dempsey, thank you too for your continued service as we 

go forward. 

The September 11 attack drew attention to the use of local militia by the Department of State for protection in Benghazi. On the 

night of the attack, security consisted of three armed militia members as well as four locally hired unarmed guards and five armed 

Diplomatic Security agents. I understand that the three militia 

personnel were members of the February 17th Martyrs Brigade, 

which is a local militia that participated in the anti-Qadafi uprising. 

Documents recovered from the post indicated that, while the 

local militias trained with U.S. officials for this role, militia members were generally expected to provide their own weapons and 

their own ammunition in order to protect. 

To what extent has DOD also relied on such arrangements in 

high-threat areas in which central government forces did not fully 

control the territory, such as Afghanistan? How should the committee view the use of local militias for force protection? Both of 

you, if you can answer this question, please. 

General DEMPSEY. During my time in Iraq, we had third-country 

nationals who provided contracted support, as well as some U.S. 

contractors for support. We never reached the point where, in my 

time there, we were using Iraqis, for example. Now, I do know that 

it’s common practice in most countries to use local bodyguards and 

local security forces, so it is the norm, not the exception. 

Senator HAGAN. Typically that’s with the country, though, that 

has an organized government. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I think that’s a fair characterization. 

Secretary PANETTA. It’s something you see in tribal societies, obviously. We see that in Afghanistan, where they’ve developed local 

militias in some of the different areas, to provide security. I think 

the key there is that sometimes it works very well as a way to secure that community, depending on the quality of the militia involved, and sometimes it can get out of control. 

Senator HAGAN. Secretary Panetta, in your opening statement 

you suggested DOD is looking at how you can assist the development of host nation forces using a range of security assistance authorities to train and equip these forces. I chair the Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, which does have jurisdiction over DOD’s train-and-equip authorities, and I’d be interested 

in hearing whether you think DOD currently has the authority to 

55 

conduct these training operations or whether you would need to 

seek new authorities? 

Secretary PANETTA. I feel pretty good about the authority we 

have now in the ability to go in. Again, you have to have the country, the host country, actually request this kind of assistance and 

this kind of training. But if they’re cooperative and if they want 

this kind of help, we have the capability and the authorities to help 

provide that. 

Senator HAGAN. Are the host nation forces you’re looking to engage members of the military, civilian law enforcement, or are 

these local guard forces that would be employees of the diplomatic 

post? 

Secretary PANETTA. We can work with whatever security forces 

that that particular country wants to get trained. We can help provide the training necessary. It’s up to the country as to just exactly 

what kind of security they’re going to provide around an embassy. 

Senator HAGAN. What is your comfort level if they decline to 

have assistance with training? 

Secretary PANETTA. It makes me very nervous. 

Senator HAGAN. Then what’s Plan B in that case? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think Plan B, in that instance, is that you 

do have to do everything possible to harden that embassy, make 

sure it’s secured, make sure that we have the marines in place to 

try to provide additional security, make sure that they have the additional security hired with the embassy to protect it in that event, 

and make sure that we have the ability to respond quickly if we’re 

asked to be able to go in and do what we have to do to help those 

that are located in the embassy. 

Senator HAGAN. Did you feel comfortable with the training of the 

local militia in Libya? 

Secretary PANETTA. Not at all. I think it was having been at the 

CIA, we did some work to try to assist the militias, the opposition 

forces that were involved against Qadafi at the time. But as usual, 

in this instance these are groups that are pretty dispersed and represent a number of different opposing elements. It’s not a well-coordinated opposition, and I think that was the case with the militias. 

Senator HAGAN. I guess I was concerned when I read, too, about 

them providing their own ammunition and weapons. 

Secretary PANETTA. It’s not—Libya—as we’ve pointed out, these 

countries that are going through the transitions that have taken 

place since their various revolutions, one of the areas that’s hurting 

is the quality of their ability to provide security to the embassies 

that are located in their country. That’s a problem that we’re having to confront more and more in that part of the world. 

Senator HAGAN. We certainly need to take in mind, as I’m sure 

you do, the safety and security of our Embassy personnel first and 

foremost. 

A variety of organizations have been named in media reports as 

responsible for the attack against our U.S. facilities in Benghazi 

and more recently on the British Petroleum (BP) facilities in Algeria. Some of these organizations are familiar names, but others, 

such as the Ansar Al-Sharia, are not well known. Of the violent extremists operating in North Africa, are there any groups or individVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
56 

uals DOD has designated as eligible for targeting under the authorization for use of military force? Also, how is such a determination made? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, al Qaeda and its affiliates are at 

the top of the list. If it’s al Qaeda and al Qaeda-related, then obviously we do have authorities to be able to go after them. But in 

order to do that, you have to identify who the individuals are, what 

is the threat that they constitute. The lawyers then review that 

and determine whether or not that’s somebody who can actually be 

targeted. 

General DEMPSEY. There are a handful of high-value individuals 

or high-interest individuals who have been designated. In terms of 

those perpetrators of the Benghazi attack, we continue to try to develop the intelligence, so to this point none of them have been designated, although we work with other agencies to try to build the 

intelligence case to do so. 

Senator HAGAN. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Panetta, congratulations on a very interesting and distinguished career. I’m honored to have served with you in the 

House of Representatives and to have been your colleague. I wish 

you the best in your future endeavors. 

Having said that, you were very forceful today in talking about 

sequestration. I heard you in the media yesterday making a very 

forceful statement about how irresponsible it would be not to fix 

this before it goes into effect. Let me just suggest this. 

Our colleagues at the other end of the building in the House of 

Representatives came forward with a bill. They put it into bill language. They had it scored. They passed a rule. They voted on it and 

sent it to us. Agree with it or not, they came up with a specific answer to it, and there’s been no answer back from the Senate side. 

The President made a pronouncement about it a few days ago. 

Mr. Secretary, you can’t score a speech. You can’t score general 

concepts. When you see the President, tell him we’d be happy to 

hear his specific views about how those revenues should come in 

to fix this problem because, frankly, people from my side of the 

aisle have been calling on the President for specific suggestions, 

specific proposals that you can score, that you can put in bill language, and we haven’t had that for over a year. So when you see 

the President, please make that suggestion to him. 

Now, General, let me ask you this. I don’t see where the intelligence gap is that you mentioned in response to Senator 

Chambliss’ question. He asked if this was an intelligence failure 

and you said no, it’s an intelligence gap. Then in fleshing out the 

testimony, it seems that you knew everything you needed to know: 

the militia fire onto the compound, the IED attack on the UN, the 

attack on the Red Cross, the abduction of Red Cross workers, the 

Red Cross deciding then to pull out of Benghazi; the same thing 

with the United Kingdom, an RPG attack on them. The United 

Kingdom got the message and pulled out. 

57 

Yet, we didn’t take the same message, apparently. We didn’t 

make the same decisions at least from the attacks on the United 

States and U.S. interests. 

Are you suggesting that there was something else that you needed to know from intelligence sources? Or are you suggesting in the 

alternative that really the only thing missing was a request from 

the State Department? You got it in Yemen and you acted on it. 

You didn’t get that request from the State Department officially on 

Benghazi, so you didn’t make arrangements for security there. 

Would you clear that up? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. Thanks for the opportunity, Senator. 

First of all, what I did know is what I was told in General Ham’s 

weekly reports, which reflected a deteriorating security situation in 

Eastern Libya. 

Senator WICKER. Let me interject there. 

General DEMPSEY. Sure. 

Senator WICKER. Did those come up through the military personnel on the country teams? 

General DEMPSEY. No. These are reports directly from the combatant commander to the Secretary of Defense. 

Senator WICKER. Where did the combatant commander get his 

information? 

General DEMPSEY. He’s in constant touch with those deployed 

throughout the region, defense attaches, and in some cases—— 

Senator WICKER. The defense attache would be a member of the 

country team? 

General DEMPSEY. Sure. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Then proceed ahead. 

General DEMPSEY. Okay. So I was made aware that a cable expressing that concern had been sent. I didn’t read the cable myself. 

I’m reflecting what I knew from General Ham. 

Furthermore, I don’t know whether the cable on the 16th of August resulted in any request from the Embassy team in Tripoli to 

the State Department. All I can tell you is we didn’t get a request 

at DOD. So I’m not suggesting that State got it and didn’t do anything with it. I don’t know what—I think the internal deliberations 

in Tripoli were still ongoing. 

What I can tell you with great confidence is we didn’t get any 

request for additional security. 

Senator WICKER. Did you know that the Red Cross had been attacked, that Red Cross workers had been abducted, and that the 

Red Cross subsequently suspended their Benghazi operation? Did 

you know that? 

General DEMPSEY. I did. 

Senator WICKER. You did, okay. Did you know that the United 

Kingdom had undergone an attack and that they had decided to 

close their mission in Benghazi? 

General DEMPSEY. I did. 

Senator WICKER. Did you then know about the attack on American interests? 

General DEMPSEY. Through the course of the summer? 

Senator WICKER. Through General Ham, you knew about the attacks on the United States. 

58 

General DEMPSEY. General Ham was very good about reporting 

the deteriorating security situation in Libya. 

Senator WICKER. You did not feel that you as Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff were in a position based on that to make a 

decision to send in extra security for those American interests 

there? 

General DEMPSEY. I’d like to answer that in two ways. First, this 

deteriorating situation in Libya wasn’t unique. It was in the context—I know that some will suggest it was the worst thing going 

on. It was among the worst things going on. So in context, the 

threat streams in Libya were equaled elsewhere with equally significant and threatening intelligence. 

Second, that’s not what we do. We don’t impose resources into a 

country without the permission, the request of the host nation or 

the country team in a country. 

Senator WICKER. Do you get military resources close by and 

ready to respond, or must you wait for a State Department request 

to do that also? 

General DEMPSEY. We adjust alert postures according to intelligence where we think the threat is highest. 

Senator WICKER. In retrospect, do you wish you had adjusted 

your alert posture? 

General DEMPSEY. In retrospect, looking backwards, in hindsight—— 

Senator WICKER. 20–20 hindsight. 

General DEMPSEY.—sure. 

Senator WICKER. What would you have done? 

General DEMPSEY. First of all—— 

Senator WICKER. Would you have put them in Crete? Would you 

have put them in Libya? 

General DEMPSEY. Given the kind of attack that occurred, if they 

weren’t in the immediate vicinity they would not have been able to 

affect the outcome. As we’ve discussed previously, this has to be 

some combination of early decisions. 

Senator WICKER. Secretary Panetta, lessons learned. It seems 

that two factors that allowed this situation to go from bad to worse 

were the very same ones that allowed the first September 11 attacks to succeed: First, the lack of effective intelligence-sharing. I 

think enough Americans knew what they needed to know to know 

this was really, really bad. Second, stovepiped communications between organizations that are supposed to be working together on 

these sorts of things toward common goals. 

So 11 years after September 11, my final question to you: Do you 

believe we’re any closer to breaking down these institutional barriers, and what steps has DOD taken in this regard in response to 

the Benghazi incident? 

Secretary PANETTA. First of all, I do believe, again based on my 

experience at the CIA, involved with intelligence issues there, that 

the Intelligence Community is working much better in terms of 

sharing information, working together, developing the teams necessary to be able to gather intelligence, sharing that intelligence 

between the entire community. They’re much better at doing that 

and much more effective. 

59 

I think the problem remains that it is the gaps on intelligence 

resources that are out there that, no matter how good your sharing 

is concerned, if you don’t have the information from a resource out 

there there’s going to be a gap and you’re going to have the problems that we saw happen here. We have to be able to fill those 

gaps. We have to be able to get better HUMINT, better SIGINT, 

into those areas that we don’t have good information on. That’s 

number one. 

Number two, we have to—in response to this, what we have done 

is to make sure that we deploy those FASTs that are out there. 

We’ve located them in key areas. We’ve reduced their response 

time. We now have airlift associated with them. The fact is some 

of these FASTs did not have airlift; airlift we would have had to 

deliver from other areas. We now have airlift that is associated 

with those teams. So we have taken a number of steps to try to 

improve our ability to respond. 

Senator WICKER. When did you take that last step, on the airlift? 

When did you impose that last? 

Secretary PANETTA. We did that early on, soon after what happened. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was sitting here and whenever Senator Graham questions witnesses it’s always—I’m an old prosecutor, too, and he is quite the 

cross-examination expert and he does a withering cross-examination of witnesses when he’s trying to make a point. 

I started to feel sorry for you, Secretary Panetta. Then I thought 

for a minute about who you are and what you have done in this 

Nation’s capital, the service you have provided at the White House, 

at the Pentagon, at the CIA, in Congress, the years and years of 

valuable service that you have given to this country. Then I realized you’d be just fine. You didn’t need my help with Senator Graham’s questioning at all. I thank you for those years of service. 

General Dempsey, I want to clarify that you have said today that 

once the attack occurred you were moving forces. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. Now, I want to ask, is anybody 

here from the State Department in the audience? If you’re here 

from the State Department, would you raise your hand? 

[One hand raised.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay, we have one hand from the State Department. I say that because I have a history that I have been involved in doing oversight on embassy security. This history goes 

back to 2009 when the contracting subcommittee that I chair did 

a hearing on the embarrassment of ArmorGroup and their ability 

to protect the Embassy in Kabul. 

After that hearing in 2009, ArmorGroup was let go. Then there 

was a February 2010 hearing of this committee on security contracts in contingencies, and it was a sensational hearing and I 

mean that in both senses of the word, because there was informaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
60 

tion that came out at that hearing that, if I were at the State Department, I would want to absorb it and get busy. 

Now, a report based on that hearing was issued in a classified 

nature weeks before September 28. But the public report came out 

on September 28. In that report it said that local Taliban was 

working with warlords to provide guards and weapons for use in 

EOD Technology’s contracts. It came out that they were failing to 

adequately investigate the guards’ previous employment, which resulted in the company’s hiring individuals who had previously been 

fired for sharing sensitive information, security information, with 

Taliban warlords; failure to appropriately vet guards, some of 

whom, according to U.S. intelligence reports, may have been involved in anti-American activities. 

Now, all that information was out in a classified way several 

weeks before September 28—and was out in public September 28. 

Guess who the State Department gave the contract to for guarding 

Kabul on September 29? EOD Technology. Then, of course, they 

were fired for failure to perform, because they could never perform 

adequately. 

Now, we actually—then they wanted to litigate. Now, meanwhile 

guess who’s still guarding? We still had Aegis guarding, which was 

another problem contractor at Kabul. We still have ArmorGroup. 

Then we did a contract with Aegis. Now, Aegis finally took over 

this summer. 

Now, I urge you to take a look—you don’t have to, Secretary Panetta. You can read a novel. But General Dempsey, I hope you will 

look at the article that was written January 17 in Foreign Policy 

magazine about Aegis at the Kabul Embassy and the problems that 

have already surfaced about them. 

Now, I have talked to Patrick Kennedy about this and his staff 

has come over and briefed my staff that they believe Aegis is doing 

just fine. 

The end of this, I have to tell you: the umbrella contract for high- level security at embassies is a $10 billion contract over 5 years, 

and it’s tasked out to eight different companies. I won’t go into the 

IG report on the background checks that have been done on the 

eight. But the people that are at Kabul now, it’s $100 million a 

year we’re paying them. 

I can’t believe we can’t use the marines in these situations. 

Somebody has to do a cost-benefit analysis. All that I told you— 

can you imagine the amount of money that we’ve spent fooling 

around with these contractors that weren’t getting the job done? 

Can you imagine the time we’ve spent on this and the money that 

has been spent? 

I really would like, General Dempsey, for you to talk about the 

cost-benefit of putting marines on our embassies when we are in 

contingencies and why in the world this is so hard for us to get our 

arms around, and where is the analysis that shows me we’re saving any money? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, just to react briefly to what would be 

necessarily a much longer conversation, the marines are not— 

that’s not their role. That’s not what they do for the Nation. Could 

it be at some point? Potentially. I’d hate to think we’d make that 

decision based on cost. But it would require a longer conversation. 

61 

Senator MCCASKILL. I guess my point is, God forbid we have 

something happen at Kabul, but if we did, a hearing like this 

would look like child’s play if you look at the history of what’s gone 

on in terms of the guard force at Kabul. I want to be reassured 

that private contractors are working in these situations, but when 

we do a $10 billion umbrella with the ability to do tasks out for 

Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Jerusalem, and it’s costing the kind of 

money it’s costing, and we know that these embassies are going to 

be targets, it just worries the heck out of me that we are going to 

be in another one of these situations where it’s uncomfortable to 

talk about hindsight instead of foresight. 

So I would really like you to look at the highest levels, at a 

macro level, because the War Contracting Commission said we 

should not be using private contractors on embassies when we have 

this kind of heightened security risk. I really think it’s time for us 

to do a gut check on whether or not we should, in fact, be relying 

on inept local militia or inept contractors. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, let me just commend you for the 

work you’ve been doing with regards to these kinds of contracts 

and the quality of individuals that are involved. 

The reality is that the State Department, as a matter of fact, my 

old agency, rely on these kinds of contracts for security and that’s 

a reality. Anything you can do to try to make sure that these individuals are well-trained, do the job, and that we’re not wasting 

money would be extremely helpful, because right now we depend 

a great deal on that kind of contracting. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there a way we can get back to the point, 

Secretary Panetta, that we’re not relying on a contract force to do 

what is inherently a government function? It’s almost like I hit a 

brick wall every time I talk about this. Why is it that this has to 

be a contract function? Why can’t we use the best-trained military 

in the world to protect our most valued assets in our most dangerous places? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the reality, just speaking with regards to my old agency, is that we’re deployed in so many areas 

that you can’t expect the military to pop up there and provide that 

kind of protection; they have to get security on site and get it from 

the very best people that they can contract with. That has become 

the reality that we’re dealing with. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because of the need to integrate into the 

community and therefore if you have military it stands out? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I can see that, particularly under the aegis 

of the intelligence agency. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But for embassies it seems to me that this 

shouldn’t be such a hard reach. 

Thank you both. Thank you, General Dempsey. I hope you enjoy 

the California weather. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

62 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service to this country. We are 

so much in your debt for time after time answering the call. Thank 

you very much. 

Major—General Dempsey—much better being a general. Thank 

you for everything you have done for our forces and for our country. 

I want to express my condolences to all the families who have 

suffered losses in this tragedy; and that we will do everything we 

can to make sure it never happens again. 

Earlier in the hearing, Mr. Secretary, you said that it is not 

DOD’s job to be 911. So the question that struck me is: So when 

this happens, and it happens so fast and so quick that when you 

respond in an hour it may already be over by that time. Are we 

relying on the home country to be 911? If so, as you go through 

what they’re providing to us—you mentioned some are not up to 

the quality of others at this time. But how are you making that decision that we have people in harm’s way and we’re relying on a 

host nation that might not be up to taking care of our people? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, it’s very important that the ambassador determine what is the situation and whether or not 

there’s a need for action. The 911 is basically the host country that 

has to respond quickly and provide immediate security around. If 

that’s not there, you have to have security within the Embassy 

itself. If that’s not there, you have to have intelligence that gives 

you a heads-up that it’s a dangerous situation and it’s subject to 

an attack. Then if that’s not there, obviously we have to be hopefully in a place where we can be able to respond if we have to. 

That’s your overall 911 to try to deal with situations in the embassies that are out there. 

Senator DONNELLY. Because my concern is, as much as some of 

these host nations are our friends, that their ability obviously is 

not as successful as our ability in defending our own. So how do 

you determine, other than the ambassador telling you, hey, we 

think we’re here or we think we’re there? Are there reviews done 

at DOD when you look at say in a Benghazi or—I don’t want to 

go city by city for obvious security reasons, but when you look at 

these? How often do you determine, we’ll take a look at this this 

week and see where we are security-wise? I know State is a big 

part of that as well. 

Secretary PANETTA. The best thing we did was State asked us to 

join a team that would look at security at 19 embassies and determine what exactly was needed there in order to better secure those 

facilities. I think based on that it gives us the opportunity to then 

deploy additional marines if we have to and take additional steps 

to try to make sure that those embassies are not vulnerable. 

So we do work with the State Department when asked to try to 

help provide some guidance with regards to security. 

Senator DONNELLY. How often is a review done in some of these 

places, for instance a Benghazi? Is it on a when the ambassador 

says, hey, things are getting a little tougher, or every couple of 

weeks is it looked at as this has deteriorated or has gotten better? 

What kind of matrix is used? 

Secretary PANETTA. The primary matrix for that has to rest with 

the State Department and the ambassador within that country to 

be able to review just exactly what is the degree of threats that 

63 

they’re confronting and then what actions they should take in order 

to deal with that. 

DOD is in a position where we will respond. If we’re asked to do 

something, we will do it. But we’re not out there basically making 

judgments about what embassies are secure or not secure, what are 

the threats in the various embassies. You have to leave that up to 

the chief of station and chief of mission to be able to make that determination. 

Senator DONNELLY. With our noncombatant evacuation operations plans that we have, we have approximately 285 diplomatic 

missions out there. How far along are we in having plans for all 

of them? 

Secretary PANETTA. As you said, we have a number of embassies 

that are out there in the world, and not all obviously are Benghazi 

or Tripoli or Tunisia. The reality is that in most countries in the 

world we can rely on the host country to provide security. They’re 

there, they’re willing to do it, and they do a good job. 

There are some of these embassies in some of these more volatile 

countries that are of concern, and those were the 19 that were designated by the State Department as ones we had to look at more 

closely and then try to develop a better approach to providing security, because their part of the problem is the host countries are not 

very good at providing that kind of security. 

Senator DONNELLY. It seems this is so much of a distance and 

time challenge, that when it happens, how quickly can we respond, 

how far away are we. Is there almost like a playbook for ambassadors, for the people in those facilities, that here’s the steps to follow, jump on these immediately; if this doesn’t click, we go to this; 

if this doesn’t click, we go to that? 

Secretary PANETTA. The best playbook—I’ll let the General respond to this as well. The best playbook is an ambassador who 

says: We have serious security problems here; we are threatened, 

and therefore we need to take steps to reduce the number of personnel in our Embassy; we need to take steps to evacuate if we 

have to. We can then prepare our forces to be able to provide help 

in that situation. That’s the best kind of situation in terms of being 

able to respond. 

General DEMPSEY. Just if I could add, Senator. Each Embassy 

has a resident security officer, well-trained, and an emergency action plan for every Embassy. Generally speaking, it’s updated annually, because I’ve sat on country teams in various jobs. Then the 

attaches are integrated into that process as part of the country 

team. 

So that process exists. What Secretary Clinton asked me to do 

soon after Benghazi was to collaborate with her to see if we could 

make improvements to that system. 

Senator DONNELLY. General, thanks again for your service. 

Mr. Secretary, it’s been an honor to have you serve in our Government. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you very much 

for your being here. I’d like to associate myself with Senator Cruz’s 

64 

comments, that I only regret being a first-year Senator, Mr. Secretary, and not be able to work with you, although I am in the 

process of hiring a legislative assistant for this committee. So if you 

go back to California and get nostalgic for Washington, let me 

know, will you? I somehow think that’s rather unlikely. [Laughter.] 

Secretary PANETTA. Been there, done that. [Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I want to follow up on a question from Senator 

McCain. The Crete base. I don’t know the capacity, but given that 

that was pretty close in terms of transportation time, why was that 

not an option to get people there faster? Was it a question of who 

and what is at the Crete base? General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. The bases that we have in southern Europe 

in the Mediterranean area generally speaking have aircraft. The 

first point I made is that it wasn’t the right tool for the particular 

threat we faced. 

Second, the aircraft we have in Europe generally are there in 

support of NATO and on a different alert posture. That was not 

among the forces—the aircraft were not among the forces that we 

had at heightened alert. The heightened alert related to these 

boots-on-the-ground capabilities that could preemptively get into an 

embassy or into a compound to thicken its defenses if we had reason to do so. 

Senator KING. Those types of troops were not at the Crete base 

at the time of this? 

General DEMPSEY. No. 

Senator KING. Now, to follow up, you talk about how everybody 

wants a fire station next door, it doesn’t work. On the other hand, 

in this case, as you testified, there was about a 13- to 15-hour practical limitation. I gather since this incident you’re trying to shorten 

that. Do you have a target? What would we like to be able to do, 

particularly in these hot spots, which we can identify in advance? 

General DEMPSEY. We’re not done making adaptations, but what 

we did initially was take these Commander’s In Extremis Forces, 

and the FASTs. The standard has generally been N+6 to lift off, 

plus transit time. So we can reduce the alert posture and we do so, 

watching not only intelligence, but also watching things like the social media, because sometimes these events crop up out of the social media, believe it or not. 

Second then—but you still can’t reduce the transit time. That is 

the limiting factor in AFRICOM, in particular. When I say we’re 

not done making adaptations, we’ve asked each of the Services to 

examine their capability to build additional reaction light forces, 

small, rapidly deployable forces, a small Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force (MAGTAF) for the Marine Corps, for example, MAGTF and 

the Army is looking at some options as well, to increase the number of these resources across the globe. 

The limiting factor, though, will always be basing, especially in 

AFRICOM. 

Senator KING. So you are moving the fire stations nearer. 

General DEMPSEY. We’re trying to build more firemen. The question is whether I can build the stations to house them. 

Senator KING. I got it. 

Secretary Panetta, a question that doesn’t really relate to today’s 

discussion, but you’re in a unique position. This committee is conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
65 

sidering a nominee to be your successor, Senator Hagel, and later 

today I’m going to be at a hearing of the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence, talking to John Brennan. Could you give a brief assessment of those two gentlemen and their capabilities and readiness to assume these important positions? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, that’s something that the committees now have the opportunity to evaluate. But in my view, both 

of them are outstanding individuals that have a great deal of experience and capability to be able to perform in an outstanding fashion in each of their jobs. Senator Hagel is someone who served in 

the military, worked up here on the Hill, understands the issues 

that are involved there, and I think can be a very effective leader 

at the Pentagon. 

John Brennan is somebody I worked with as Director of the CIA 

and continued to work with in this capacity. I always found him 

to be very responsible about how we can effectively conduct operations against al Qaeda and against those that would attack this 

country. He is, as somebody said, a straight shooter, somebody who 

gives you his best opinion. He doesn’t play games. He’s someone 

who I think can really honestly represent the best protection of this 

country in that job. 

Senator KING. Thank you very much. I also want to thank you 

for your forthright comments today about the sequester. Ironically—as I’ve taken some notes on what you’ve said and what you 

said in your statement—it appears that as of today the greatest 

threat to American national security is the U.S. Congress. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Let me mention this. After Senator Nelson, the first round will 

be over. There may be a number of us that would want a few minutes on a second round, and you two witnesses have been here for 

about 3 hours and you may need a 5- or 10-minute break. The 

question is do you want that immediately following Senator Nelson 

or do you want to go right through? I can’t guarantee you how 

many Senators will come back and want 2 or 3 minutes each. 

Secretary PANETTA. I think if we can take a short break it would 

be helpful. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right after Senator Nelson we will then have 

a 10-minute break. 

Senator NELSON. Do you need a short break before? What’s your 

pleasure, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Since you ask—— 

Senator NELSON. I’ll make it quick. 

First of all, thank you, Mr. Secretary. You’ve been an old and 

dear friend and you have served your country exceptionally well. 

Thank you. 

I want to just hit a couple of things, because we’ve had accusations made here that there was 7 hours of warning. The truth is 

when—now, I’ll give you some leading questions and if you will just 

answer what you can in an unclassified setting. The so-called first 

attack was not an attack of shooting, was it? Wasn’t it suddenly 

the guards out front disappeared and suddenly people just walked 

into the compound? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

66 

Senator NELSON. This occurred until someone fire-bombed the 

main building, which housed the ambassador and the mission; is 

that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator NELSON. Then a response team coming from a nearby location tried to get there by one route and determined that route 

was not the correct one and went another route; is that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. Correct. 

Senator NELSON. But then they got there, got inside, rescued one 

of the people, but in the process of getting them out, in all of the 

smoke and the fire, the ambassador was not retrieved from the 

building. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. Then things stopped and they stopped 

for a number—as the rescue team and the survivor retreated to the 

annex, which was some distance away. I don’t recall the amount 

of distance. 

Secretary PANETTA. About a couple of miles. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. So everything stopped. An hour or 2 

later, then there was an attack on the annex. Is it true that the 

main building at the annex was not penetrated? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. Then that subsided; is that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator NELSON. Then for a period of some 3 hours or more nothing happened. Then the attack of the mortars, which is going 

through the roof. That’s what killed the two that were there in that 

building. 

Secretary PANETTA. I think they were actually on the roof. That’s 

how they got—— 

Senator NELSON. I see. Then that’s a lot different from saying 

that suddenly you had 7 hours of warning, that what appeared to 

start stopped, a retreat to an annex, an attack there that was successfully repelled and stopped, and then hours later a mortar attack. So I would, Mr. Chairman, like the record to show that what 

has been characterized here is in the evaluation of the decisionmakers about their ability to get a response team in there—is it 

also correct that the response team from Tripoli were landing on 

or about the time that the mortar attack started? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s about right. When they landed, they 

immediately went there and came under fire. 

Senator NELSON. Finally, I’d just say, going to the sequester, to 

respond to these kind of attacks in the future—and there will be 

these kinds of attacks in the future—sequester certainly wouldn’t 

put you into a better position in order to respond, would it? 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely not. We’d have a hard time trying 

to provide the resources that we would need in order to be able to 

do this. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General DEMPSEY. If I could—— 

Senator NELSON. General? 

General DEMPSEY. I want to make just one comment related to 

your chronology because I think it’s important. Once we started 

moving forces, nothing stopped us, nothing slowed us. The only adVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
67 

aptation we thought about making was for a period of time we 

thought we were going to be entering a hostage rescue because we 

didn’t know where the ambassador was. But once we started forces 

moving, they didn’t slow, they didn’t stop. 

Senator NELSON. You didn’t know the situation with regard to 

the ambassador until hours later, when, in fact, some Libyans had 

come into that facility and tried to rescue him and found him at 

that point unresponsive from smoke inhalation. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

We’re going to take a 10-minute recess. 

[Recess from 1:25 p.m. to 1:36 p.m.] 

Chairman LEVIN. We have two Senators, one of whom is here 

and the other one who is coming, who have not had a first round. 

Senator Blunt is the first of those two Senators who has not had 

a first round, so I’m now going to call on Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your indulgence. I was at a press conference talking about a mental 

health bill that I think, General Dempsey, will have some real impact on people who have left the military, and they’re looking at 

the community health centers as a mental health model. 

One question I have. I saw, General Dempsey, in your comments 

over the weekend—I think it was on ‘‘State of the Union’’—that 

looking back you don’t know of anything you could have done differently. Was that your response? 

General DEMPSEY. That was my response, yes, Senator. 

Senator BLUNT. How about looking forward? What would you do 

differently or what are we—let’s do that in two questions. One, 

what would you do differently if the same circumstance occurred 

again? What are you doing to prepare for a different kind of response? 

General DEMPSEY. Two things. One is the ARB, the PickeringMullen review board, made 29 recommendations and both the 

State Department and DOD have accepted and will implement all 

of those. 

Separately, Secretary Clinton and I agreed to a review of embassy security in any number of locations, the result of which will 

be to focus on 19 of them to try to improve their security situation. 

We also, internally to the Joint Staff and with the combatant 

commanders, worked on a white paper, described as ‘‘The New 

Norm,’’ to account for the lack of host nation capability in some 

parts of the world. The Secretary already mentioned that some of 

the results of that include the augmentation of the MSGs, changing 

the posture level, directing combatant commanders to have additional forces as reaction forces. So we’re continuing with—— 

Senator BLUNT. With ‘‘The New Norm,’’ are we repositioned in a 

way in this dangerous part of the world and many areas you have 

both mentioned today where we could respond now quicker than 7 

hours? If we had the same 7-hour window, could we get somebody 

there? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, in many places the answer is yes. 

The limiting factor in Africa are bases, frankly. We don’t have a 

base architecture, with the exception of Djibouti on the east coast, 

68 

where we could position forces. So what that requires is earlier decisionmaking collaboratively with the State Department and I’ll describe them as preemptive requests. The earlier decisionmaking 

can be to close an embassy, as we did recently—I say ‘‘we’’; the 

State Department did—in the Central African Republic. It can be 

thinning it out, as they did in Khartoum. Or it can be asking for 

additional security forces. 

Senator BLUNT. On one other area, I know at least for the first 

several years after September 11 there was always an active discussion of what was going to happen on September 11. Now, on 

September 10 Zawahiri did a video where he actually talked about 

al-Libbi, the Libyan, being killed by Americans, and how they must 

get even. Secretary Panetta, are you aware, was there any evaluation of what that might mean and whether we should be thinking 

about how to respond to that threat? 

Secretary PANETTA. My recollection is that that was all part and 

parcel of looking at the general counterterrorism situation that we 

were concerned about in the region. The issue, frankly, that was 

probably more preeminent the day before was what would be the 

impact of that video that was coming out that inflamed a lot of the 

situation in the area. 

Senator BLUNT. I would have thought from the Zawahiri video 

that there would have been some sense that Libya could be a target. I don’t know if we have stepped back from our view that al 

Qaeda was able to do things, and I’m not saying this was a total 

al Qaeda operation, but clearly al Qaeda’s out there talking about 

a Libyan that was killed and how we needed to get even with the 

Americans for that the day before all this happened. It concerns me 

that there appears not to have been the evaluation that I think 

went on pretty aggressively for the first 8 years or so after September 11. I hope one thing surely we’re getting out of this is that 

there are still terrorists in the world and they still want to do us 

harm. 

Secretary PANETTA. No question about that. Senator, there are 

elements of al Qaeda throughout that part of the world, and they 

represent a continuing threat in that part of the world. That’s why 

we’re doing the operations we’re doing in Yemen. That’s why we’re 

doing the operations in Somalia and, frankly, that’s why we’re assisting the French with regards to al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb. 

We do have to be vigilant about the elements of al Qaeda, where 

they are, where they can be, and the kind of threat that they represent. 

Senator BLUNT. My last question will be: Did we call on anybody 

else who had friendly forces in Benghazi to come to our assistance? 

The Turks? People we had helped in that area recently by coming 

to their assistance, did we ask for any help that might have already been on the ground there? 

General DEMPSEY. The only military forces were the 17 February 

Militia and the call went to them immediately, because they had 

been supportive of us ever since the overthrow. 

Senator BLUNT. There were no alternative security forces—— 

General DEMPSEY. No. 

Senator BLUNT.—that other countries had? 

69 

General DEMPSEY. None that we were aware of. 

Senator BLUNT. That we could have called on? If we weren’t 

aware of them, I guess we didn’t call on them. 

Now, we had come to the aid of—I think there was an attack on 

someone from Turkey within the previous month, and we had sent 

some people to that scene. I’ve always wondered why we didn’t try 

to further secure the people we had there, if we couldn’t get people 

there. You’re telling me, General, that there was really nobody to 

call on? 

General DEMPSEY. I’m telling you that I wasn’t aware of any, nor 

was the Commander of AFRICOM. 

Senator BLUNT. Are we evaluating whether we’re going to use 

groups like February 17 again or not? 

General DEMPSEY. Absolutely. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, thank you so much for 

your testimony for the last number of hours. Of course, Secretary 

Panetta, I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service to 

our country. You came out of retirement to help this country and 

serve in very challenging times, and my very best to you in your 

future endeavors. Of course, you did an outstanding job at both the 

CIA and at DOD, and especially today as we talk about the need 

to coordinate the efforts across various departments, I think, your 

experience will be very much missed. You led the men and women 

of both organizations with tremendous competence, passion, and 

conviction. I thank you very much. 

Of course, I am very envious of the fact that you get to go back 

to a beautiful place, the Monterey Peninsula, a place that I’ve visited often. 

For the Americans who lost their lives in Benghazi—Ambassador 

Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty— 

they were heroes and they represented our country proudly. While 

I understand that there are often risks involved in diplomatic 

work, I want to ensure, as do all of us, that we do everything we 

can to ensure the safety and security of our people who take on 

these assignments in often dangerous circumstances. 

Now, the State Department’s ARB described a gap in intelligence 

coverage for the area and it is one of their findings, number 4. Mr. 

Secretary, drawing from your experience at DOD and the CIA, in 

your estimation what caused this gap in intelligence? Was it a 

tasking prioritization issue with just too many areas to watch? Or 

are there structural impediments within or among the intelligence 

organizations that led to the tragedy in Benghazi? How would you 

improve the situation? 

Secretary PANETTA. It’s a huge challenge. Obviously, our ability 

to develop the sources that we needed in going after al Qaeda in 

Pakistan was critical. The same thing was true in Afghanistan, to 

be able to go after the targets there, develop those resources. In 

Yemen, we had to develop a whole base of better sources in order 

to be able to conduct the operations there. The same thing was true 

in Somalia. 

70 

So there’s a whole issue of prioritizing what are those areas 

where we have to develop essential resources in order to get better 

intelligence. I’m sure that was one of the things involved here. 

Second, there was a situation where Libya to some extent and 

what happened in Libya—I’m sure that there was an effort to try 

to develop the security capabilities within Libya so that they could 

develop their own resources to try to assist in providing that information. Sometimes if that—normally in most countries, it isn’t just 

our ability to use our own sources. We in many places rely on other 

countries and their intelligence sources to be able to add to our intelligence. Libya was having a much more difficult time being able 

to do that. I think it’s for those reasons we didn’t have the kind 

of intelligence we should have had. 

Senator HIRONO. So in places such as Libya, which is an emerging new government, that goes into your assessment of the 

prioritization that needs to occur? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator HIRONO. Having learned from what happened, if we are 

in that kind of a situation where we really can’t rely on the capacity within the country’s forces, I think that probably leads to a 

more heightened priority for those areas in terms of the safety of 

our people. 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. It’s obvious now that, recognizing that 

we try to do what you can to develop your own sources, try to develop the other country’s capabilities with regards to intelligence, 

and develop other approaches that we have in terms of technology, 

being able to gather the kind of intelligence we need. 

Senator HIRONO. Is that happening? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes, it is. 

Senator HIRONO. I don’t know if there are—can you cite to a very 

specific thing that is fostering this kind of change as a result of our 

tragedy in Benghazi that you can talk about? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the Intelligence Community, recognizing the recommendations that came out of the accountability report, are taking steps to try to ensure that that gap no longer exists. 

Senator HIRONO. So in terms of just the coordination, there are 

some specific steps that are being taken to coordinate between 

State, the Intelligence Community, and DOD? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct, trying to improve the ability 

to get the intelligence, get it to the State Department, and then the 

State Department, based on that, can make decisions as to whether 

or not they should request our help. 

Senator HIRONO. Now, in listening to your earlier testimony, I 

think that some of it was that there seemed to be gaps in terms 

of the information you were getting as to what was happening in 

Benghazi. So have steps been taken to make sure that those kinds 

of communications occur instantaneously or while the event is occurring? 

Secretary PANETTA. Steps I know are being taken to try to improve that intelligence capability. 

Senator HIRONO. Can you talk a little bit more—I think I still 

have a little bit of time—on what the impact of sequestration 

71 

would be in terms of our ability to safeguard our men and women 

in these hundreds of embassies and offices throughout the world? 

Secretary PANETTA. If sequester did take place and we had to 

take the amount of money that is required by sequester, clearly the 

one place we’d have to go is into our readiness and maintenance 

accounts. Readiness would require that we had to reduce training 

for our military in each of the branches. So that the problem you 

ultimately confront is that, while you have capable, trained people 

in the war zone and elsewhere, that you lack the capability to have 

well-trained individuals that you can deploy elsewhere. That creates a real readiness crisis for us. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. 

Senator Blumenthal is next. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join my colleagues in thanking you, Secretary Panetta, 

for your extraordinary service to our Nation and the personal association and time that you’ve devoted to all of us on this panel and 

other Members of Congress. 

General Dempsey, thank you as well for your service, and to both 

of you for your very forthright and credible and significant testimony today explaining some answers to questions that are painful, 

I think, for all of us and I know for you, having attended the services and ceremonies in honor of these brave patriots and heroes, as 

you called them, and also your knowledge personally of them. 

I am struck, as Senator Kaine was, by the provocative, I would 

prefer to call it powerful, statement that you’ve offered regarding 

the effect on the Nation’s readiness in the event of sequester. Like 

Senator Kaine and other members of this panel, I believe that we 

ought to do everything we can to avoid those catastrophic consequences of across-the-board cuts. I share your alarm about them, 

not only in the effect on deployments, but also on the readiness 

that results from adequate training and preparation, which in turn 

affects our ability to respond to crises like Benghazi. 

All of us are fond of saying that our people are our greatest 

asset, which is true. The failure to provide the training and career 

opportunities to them that are needed, I think, would be one of the 

most catastrophic consequences of sequester. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator Blumenthal, if I could. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Please. 

Secretary PANETTA. Specifically, with regards to something that’s 

in your State, Electric Boat, and the magnificent workforce that’s 

up there that puts our submarines together, if we’re in a situation 

where we have to cut back on maintenance and cut back on that 

kind of production, the worst thing that could happen is losing the 

skills in that kind of workforce, because once they’re laid off or 

once they don’t have a job, the ability to be able to regain that kind 

of expertise is not easy to do. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Not only not easy to do; sometimes impossible to do. 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s right. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Our defense industrial base is often 

unappreciated, our civilian workforce and the tremendous skills 

72 

they bring to the production at Electric Boat; likewise at Pratt and 

Whitney, where the Joint Strike Fighter engines are produced; 

similarly at Sikorski, where helicopters are made; across Connecticut, across the country. I think the defense industrial base is 

under threat, and it is the skilled, dedicated workforce that is the 

companion asset to our men and women in uniform that are so important. 

I would hope that, whatever the results in the next month, that 

we can continue to keep in place that workforce. I think you share 

that view. 

Let me turn to another area of personnel that I think is very important. Because you are here for your last time—and I know you 

will deeply regret not appearing before this panel. You can agree 

with me because you’re not under oath. I’m taking advantage of 

your being here to raise a question about an area that, I think, is 

very important, the decision of the Pentagon and the Department 

of Veterans Affairs (VA) to abandon the plan for a unified health 

care records system, announced very recently. 

This decision is a tremendous setback for an effort that really 

has been ongoing for years, if not decades, to provide for a streamline in timely process, faster decisions on benefits, less duplication 

of medical testing, more efficient, cost-effective treatment for both 

physical and mental health needs. This single unified health care 

system has been a longstanding goal and I am very regretful and 

disappointed that the decision has been made to abandon it after 

devoting a billion dollars, I think so far, a billion dollars, to create 

it. I would invite your explanation. 

Secretary PANETTA. Thank you, Senator. First of all, let me say 

I do not believe that the idea of developing ultimately that unified 

system has been abandoned. What we wanted to do was we knew 

that developing that system has taken years, it’s going to take 

more years, it’s going to cost a great deal of money as we do that. 

But in the interim we have to do everything necessary to create 

interoperability between the VA and the DOD so that doctors who 

are dealing with these individuals can bring that information together. 

We can do that interoperability using existing systems, and we’ve 

been able to do it at some of the institutions. We wanted to develop 

that at about nine other institutions to do that. We can get that 

done by July of this year, and that’s why we wanted to stress that. 

But I want to assure you that the work on an ultimate single 

system that will require new technology to be able to get that accomplished is still going to continue to be worked on. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. That’s good news, and it also conflicts 

with some of the news reports I’ve seen, which, to quote one, ‘‘Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and VA Secretary Eric Shinseki announced on Tuesday that they were scrapping the one-time plan to 

create an integrated electronic recordkeeping system.’’ You are saying that you and Secretary Shinseki are not doing so? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. We’re not scrapping that. Our intent is 

obviously to continue working on that. But what we wanted to do 

was to create this interoperability sooner and on a faster track so 

we could provide the information doctors need in order to be able 

to create some symmetry between DOD and the VA. 

73 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So if I can articulate it a different way, in 

oversimplified layman’s language, in effect you’re adopting a first 

stage solution that involves interoperability, but proceeding with 

the larger system and longer term more effective single health care 

records system that’s contemplated? 

Secretary PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you very much to both 

of you for your testimony today. It’s been very helpful, and thank 

you for your service as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re going to begin a second round and we’re 

going to have a 3-minute second round, and then our witnesses 

must leave by no later than 2:30 p.m. and I hope before because 

we have a vote scheduled for 2 p.m. 

I just have two questions. The first has to do with the question 

which was asked to you by Senator Graham. I think both of you 

answered this, I think mainly you, Secretary Panetta, about how 

many times did you talk to the President during the day of these 

events. I think your answer was once during. I think, General, you 

also indicated once during. 

Then there was a question as, you mean he never got back to you 

to find out what was going on? I think you were starting to say, 

Mr. Secretary, that he has a number of other sources of important 

information, including his own chief of staff, and I presume too the 

chairman of the National Security Council or others that he would 

be in touch with could call, who were much closer at hand in the 

White House to him than you are at DOD. 

Do you know how many times that day, if any, the President 

talked to his chief of staff or to the National Security Council people? 

Secretary PANETTA. I don’t know how many times he was in contact, but we were in contact with the staffs there. There was a DC, 

which is a deputies meeting, of the National Security Council that 

met at I think 5 or 6, 6 or 7 p.m. that evening, in which everybody 

was represented, including obviously the National Security Council 

team, as well as the teams from State and elsewhere, CIA, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 

In addition to that, obviously our staffs were in constant touch 

with the White House to alert them as to what was taking place 

and what information we had. So, it’s just the nature of the White 

House that Presidents of the United States make use of a broad 

sphere of staff that are involved with these issues to work these 

issues and continue to be in touch with him as to what’s taking 

place. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, relative to those unclassified talking 

points that were prepared at the request of Congress by the Intelligence Community that were erroneous, through no fault of her 

own Ambassador Rice used them, bore the brunt of the criticism 

for the use, although she didn’t prepare them. Are you familiar, either of you, with those talking points and did the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), participate in the production of those talking 

points, do you know? 

Secretary PANETTA. We did not and we were not aware of the 

talking points at the time. 

74 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know whether or not DIA was part of 

the Intelligence Community which prepared those talking points? 

Secretary PANETTA. I am not aware that they were involved in 

that. I think it was the DNI that prepared the talking points. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you. You don’t know how he could 

have been—have you talked to him as to how he could not have 

known or how they could not have known that the talking points 

that they handed to Ambassador Rice and others were erroneous? 

Secretary PANETTA. I have not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to try to do this fast here, one more run at this same 

issue that no one else seems to be wanting to talk about. It could 

be argued that there are two attacks, one on the compound, one on 

the annex. I’m not sure how close they were together, but let’s just 

assume that that’s one of the possibilities. Let’s forget about the 

compound one. Just the annex attack. 

The Intelligence Community has said that it’s irresponsible for 

any terrorist professional not to know that it was a planned terrorist attack at the moment the RPG and the six coordinated mortars took place. I think almost everyone else agrees with that. That 

happened right on the same day or the morning after because it 

was in the middle of the night. 

Secretary Panetta, do you believe that unequivocally at that time 

we knew that this was a terrorist attack? 

Secretary PANETTA. There was no question in my mind that this 

was a terrorist attack. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, good. I was going to say that and I appreciate that very honest answer. That took place, that realization 

took place, at the time that the RPG and all these sophisticated 

things, such as the coordinated attack took place; is that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. My own experience was that RPGs show up 

and these other arms show up, that there’s something that’s 

planned here. 

Senator INHOFE. This was a planned terrorist attack. I was going 

to suggest—— 

Secretary PANETTA. It’s a terrorist attack. I think Secretary Clinton and others also identified it as a terrorist attack, and that was 

my view. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Brennan, who is going to be having a hearing later on today that I will not be able to attend, I would consider 

him to be one of the foremost intelligence experts around, with 

what, 20 or 25 years experience; would you agree with that? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes, indeed. 

Senator INHOFE. He stated to me and will state again this afternoon the same thing you just said, that we realized at that moment 

it was a planned terrorist attack. 

Now, the only question I want to ask you, and I’ll ask you for 

an answer now and I doubt if you will have a very good answer— 

but after that I’d like to have you think about it and give an answer for the record—and that is, with everyone agreeing, including 

Secretary Clinton, that right after this took place that it was, in 

fact, a planned terrorist attack, how in the world could Ambassador 

Rice say, ‘‘The information’’—this is 5 days later—‘‘The informaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
75 

tion, the best information, and the best assessment we have today 

is that, in fact, this was not a preplanned, premeditated attack’’? 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, I was not involved in the talking 

points that were presented to her, but obviously the Intelligence 

Community provided an assessment to her and she relied on that 

assessment when she went on the news. 

Senator INHOFE. I certainly believe that it was to the benefit of 

the administration to try to push that. But it didn’t work, and I 

would only suggest that people pay attention not to that fact, because to me, with all the things we’ve been talking about, this is 

one of the really significant things that has not yet been explored. 

I appreciate your very straightforward and honest answer to that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

As I stated during the February 7, 2013, hearing, there was no question in my 

mind that the attack on September 11, 2012, was a planned terrorist attack. As the 

Department of Defense was not involved in the preparation of Ambassador Rice’s 

talking points, I am unable to comment further on the details included in those talking points, and I refer the committee to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for further information. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask about—as I understand it, General Dempsey, 

you had, I don’t know if it was on a show, but Senator Blunt had 

asked you, that looking back you didn’t know anything you could 

do that could be done differently. As I understand it, we had a security team in Tripoli. Six of them came to Benghazi. They arrived 

about 15 minutes at the annex before the second attack. Is that 

right? 

They had two DOD personnel with them, remnants of the site security team that were in Tripoli. Originally, we had a larger site 

security team in Benghazi, so they had to charter a plane to get 

there. That surprises me, to think about the fact that you testified 

earlier that you were aware from what Ambassador Stevens said 

that the consulate couldn’t withstand a coordinated attack; the assets that we did have in theater, that they’d actually have to go 

out and try to charter a plane to get somewhere. 

Why wouldn’t we have an Osprey, a standard helicopter, any 

aviation assets there to be able to get to an area within country 

to provide assistance, in light of the fact that there was a deteriorating security situation, in light of the fact that you were aware 

that the Ambassador had said that the consulate couldn’t withstand a coordinated attack? 

General DEMPSEY. Thanks, Senator. While you were out I actually made sure I was clear about how I knew what I knew. Everything I knew was from General Ham’s report to the Secretary 

through me. 

Second, in terms of—we didn’t have an official DOD presence in 

Libya. 

Senator AYOTTE. But I’m shocked that we had to rely on chartering a plane. Why wouldn’t we have something there, some kind 

of aviation asset that would allow us to get from Tripoli to 

76 

Benghazi, in light of what we knew about the security situation 

and the attacks listed on that board? 

General DEMPSEY. I would just reiterate, we didn’t have an official DOD presence in Libya. 

Senator AYOTTE. But two DOD personnel had to charter a plane. 

I think about what it takes to charter a plane. If we had had aviation, some form of aviation assets there, we could have gotten to 

Benghazi sooner; would you agree? 

General DEMPSEY. If they had a plane, sure, they would have 

gotten there sooner. 

Senator AYOTTE. Also, I wanted to ask you, Secretary Panetta. 

You had said that you didn’t end up deploying based on a response—I think Senator Graham had asked you, why didn’t we 

have people going, moving? We had them on deployment status, 

but we didn’t have them moving. I believe you said you thought 

that it was because it was over after the first attack. 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, the forces were moving. We had deployed these FASTs. They were moving. We did not in any way 

stop the movement forward. The problem was taking them then 

and deploying them to Benghazi. By the time we reached that 

point, the attack was over and we had evacuated all of the people 

out of Benghazi. 

Senator AYOTTE. But were planes flying? Were troops moving? 

The minute this attack occurred we had an ambassador missing. 

Were people going to Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. We had alerted all of these task forces to be 

in place, to move in that direction, and they were moving to get 

there. The problem we had, as I’ve explained, is again the issue of 

time and distance and being able to move them quickly enough to 

respond before the event was over. That just was not the case. 

The board that was headed up by the Ambassador and Admiral 

Mullen came to that conclusion. There was no time or space available to be able to respond in time. That was their conclusion. 

Senator AYOTTE. I know my time is up, but when I look at your 

testimony or the list that we were given, on page 2, there’s a list 

of prepare to deploy, prepare to deploy, prepare to deploy. It’s not 

deployment, actually going toward Benghazi. So it doesn’t seem to 

me that we were moving with a sense of urgency, given that we 

had an ambassador missing. 

General DEMPSEY. If I could just help with that one, Senator. 

The process as you tell a unit to prepare to deploy, when they report readiness you tell them to move. That’s just a piece of the 

process. There was nothing that held them up. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I’d like unanimous consent to 

put this map into the record here, as part of the file. 

Chairman LEVIN. That would be fine. Can you tell us what map 

that is? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. It talks about different airbases, naval 

bases, surrounding Benghazi, Libya. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator GRAHAM. So I’ll put that in the record. 

77 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Senator GRAHAM. One, you’ve been both very candid. Thank you. 

I want to make sure I understand what you said about Syria. 

Both of you agreed with Petraeus and Clinton that we should start 

looking at military assistance in Syria; is that correct? 

Secretary PANETTA. That was our position. I do want to say, Senator, that obviously there were a number of factors that were involved here that ultimately led to the President’s decision to make 

it non-lethal—I supported his decision in the end. But the answer 

to your question is yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. For both of you? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s certainly up to the President to make all 

these decisions. 

Who was in charge in Benghazi? Were you in charge, Secretary 

Panetta? 

Secretary PANETTA. What do you mean, in charge? 

Senator GRAHAM. As running the operation, trying to find a way 

to save our Ambassador who was lost, trying to prevent our people 

from being killed, providing assistance to people who were under 

attack. A simple question. If the families ask me, would it be fair 

to say that you were in charge? 

Secretary PANETTA. It’s not that simple. I think the people that 

were in charge were the people on the ground—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you say Secretary Clinton was in 

charge? 

Secretary PANETTA. Pardon me? 

Senator GRAHAM. Was Secretary Clinton in charge? 


207ful3.eps
78 

Secretary PANETTA. The people that were in charge were the Ambassador there at Benghazi during the course of the attack—— 

Senator GRAHAM. But they were trying to save their lives. They 

weren’t in charge. Somebody had to be in charge of coordinating assistance. Was it you, the Secretary of State, or the President? Who 

was in charge? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think we’re all in charge in the sense of 

trying to move our forces as quickly as possible to save lives. 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you ever talk to Secretary Clinton at all 

that night, September 11? 

Secretary PANETTA. Not that night, but obviously we had people 

in touch with her and—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you as Secretaries of Defense and State 

ever consult each other before the attack was over? 

Secretary PANETTA. Did we consult? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, did you talk? Did you individually talk 

with each other? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

Senator GRAHAM. When did you talk to the President after your 

initial meeting around 5 p.m.? When did you talk to him again? 

Secretary PANETTA. I’m not sure. 

Senator GRAHAM. Was it on September 12? 

Secretary PANETTA. It could very well have been that I—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you go to bed that night? Did you go to bed 

before the attack was over? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. I was at DOD. 

Senator GRAHAM. Nor did you, General Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. No. We were—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you know if the President went to bed before the attack was over? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t know, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you know who was talking to the President 

at the White House? 

Secretary PANETTA. I assume the chief of staff was talking to the 

President. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you know—but you don’t know? 

Secretary PANETTA. I don’t know. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you, either one of you, understand some of 

the frustrations we have? This is the first time in 30 years we lost 

control of an ambassador and no small deal. 

I would just conclude, Mr. Chairman, saying I want to know 

more about what the—finally, do you know if the President knew 

of these prior attacks, March, April, June? 

Secretary PANETTA. I can’t. 

Senator GRAHAM. I want this committee to continue to ask questions about what the President knew before and during this attack. 

Apparently, we’re going to have to call other people. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, if I could just say, we share your 

frustrations. Any time you lose four Americans—— 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s not about your caring. I know the President cares. It’s not about that. It’s about were we ready. We looked 

hard at the Bush administration. They screwed up a bunch. So 

79 

you’re going through nothing they weren’t going through. We’re 

trying to learn. 

You will be missed, Leon Panetta, you have served this country 

well. General Dempsey, thank you. But this to me is system failure 

at every level before, during, and after. The President of the United 

States deserves credit for Osama bin Laden. He was hands on. We 

need to find out where he was at and what he was doing here. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Panetta, I want to say also that I think you’ve done a 

great job both at the CIA and here and in your other jobs. Frankly, 

I think you and Secretary Gates are two of the great public servants in these kinds of jobs in the history of the country. He knows 

I think that and I want you to know I think that as well. 

I am concerned when Senator Graham asks who was in charge 

and there’s not an answer. Somebody should have known that 

night that there is one focal point. Maybe I guess at the end of the 

day it’s the President, though the President doesn’t seem to be very 

engaged. I think that’s a concern. 

You said, I believe, to Senator Ayotte that you thought—what 

time did you—when did you think the attack was over? 

General DEMPSEY. Could I help with the answer, who was in 

charge? 

Senator BLUNT. You could have helped when the question was 

posed earlier. 

General DEMPSEY. It was pretty tough actually. 

Senator BLUNT. All right. Who was in charge? 

General DEMPSEY. The responsible agent inside of a country for 

security until the introduction of DOD is the resident security officer (RSO), who works for the ambassador, in collaboration with—— 

Senator BLUNT. I think what Senator Graham was asking, 

though, was who was in charge of our response from here. You 

can’t just be talking with no thought of conclusion. 

General DEMPSEY. Okay, but I can help with that concern. I got 

that. So internal to the country, before we arrive, it’s the RSO. 

Once we arrive, it’s the combatant commander, the Commander of 

AFRICOM. 

I want to assure you, had we been able to—there’s been a whole 

bunch of speculation about we were risk-averse, we needed the 

country’s permission to come in. If we had been able to get there 

with anything, we’d have gone in there under the command of the 

Commander of AFRICOM. 

Senator BLUNT. Of the marines that were on the plane in Rota, 

Spain, did eventually—did those marines eventually go to Tripoli? 

General DEMPSEY. They did. 

Senator BLUNT. Why were they taken off the plane and told to 

change from their uniforms to other clothes? 

General DEMPSEY. At the request of the host nation, relayed 

through the Embassy. 

Senator BLUNT. How much did that slow that response up? 

General DEMPSEY. Probably 30 minutes. 

Senator BLUNT. Now, I’ve read other places an hour and a half 

to 2 hours. You think 30 minutes? 

80 

General DEMPSEY. I’m saying that it would—that’s my estimate. 

I just know that it was an occurrence. 

Senator BLUNT. Why did they go to Tripoli instead of Benghazi? 

General DEMPSEY. By the time they were arriving there, there 

was no one left in Benghazi. 

Senator BLUNT. When did we get the last person out of Benghazi 

that we brought out? 

General DEMPSEY. I’d have to look at the timeline. 

Secretary PANETTA. I think it was within 12 hours we had moved 

all of the people there out. 

Senator BLUNT. Did they go to Germany? 

General DEMPSEY. We did move them to Ramstein. 

Senator BLUNT. A question I’ve had since the very start of this 

is why didn’t somebody ask them at that time what happened before this all started, which would have solved the question about 

whether there was a demonstration going on or not. I asked that 

question once before, and only the FBI was allowed to talk to them, 

which made no sense to me at all and still makes no sense to me. 

We’re talking to people who were in Algeria a few days ago. We 

were talking to them the next day. I don’t know of anybody that’s 

really talked directly on this committee, Mr. Chairman, to people 

who were in Benghazi and who within 12 hours were somewhere 

where they could have been talked to, to ask what happened. 

Now, I’ll go back to my original question, Secretary Panetta. 

When did you think that the activity was over and under some reasonable level of control? 

Secretary PANETTA. It was soon after the second attack, and at 

that point our biggest concern, Senator, was the fact that we 

couldn’t find the Ambassador. We were then teeing up the rescue 

team to get ready to go in because we thought we had a hostage 

rescue mission that we were going to have to conduct. 

Senator BLUNT. The second attack was the attack that was over 

around midnight? 

Secretary PANETTA. At the annex, that’s correct. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of areas of brief inquiry. I want to make sure I understand your testimony from earlier this morning correctly, that you 

said post-September 11 the State Department requested additional 

security in Yemen and DOD has provided that additional security? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, no. Pre-September 11. 

Senator CRUZ. Oh, that was pre-September 11. 

Secretary PANETTA. Right. 

Senator CRUZ. Is it correct then that had the Department of 

State responded to the request from the Ambassador for additional 

security and requested from DOD additional security, that that 

would have been provided in Benghazi as well? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. If we’d have been asked, we would have 

responded. But I was going to make it clear: I’m not clear on 

whether the Embassy in Tripoli ever sent a request. I don’t think 

they did. I think they were still in internal deliberations inside of 

Tripoli. 

81 

Senator CRUZ. If the State Department had requested additional 

security so that there were additional boots-on-the-ground in 

Benghazi, is it your military judgment that that would have prevented the loss of four lives, including our Ambassador, in 

Benghazi on September 11? 

General DEMPSEY. Honestly, not dodging the question, that’s a 

hypothetical that’s just actually hard to process. I think, first of all, 

the request would have come in to put augmentation in Tripoli, 

and then the question would have been could you get to Tripoli and 

back. But we could very well have put lift there to support it. It’s 

so hypothetical, I just can’t answer it. 

Senator CRUZ. In your judgment, would additional troops on the 

ground in Benghazi have prevented the loss of life from the assault 

that we sustained? 

General DEMPSEY. Additional or any troops on the ground in 

Benghazi would have added to the security of the consulate. 

Senator CRUZ. One other topic that has not been focused on yet. 

A lot of this focus has been on the events of September 11 and September 12, and I’d like to shift to the nearly 5 months that have 

transpired since then and ask about the topic of retribution. A 

number of terrorists murdered four Americans, including the U.S. 

Ambassador. To the extent you are able in an open hearing, I 

would like to know what our progress is in tracking down those 

terrorists and exacting serious retribution? 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, a fuller explanation ought to be 

done in a more classified setting. But what we have is, an FBI 

team was immediately assembled that involves the CIA plus DOD, 

and that team has made very good progress in identifying individuals that were associated with that attack. We now have a list of 

those that we are all looking for to determine exactly where they’re 

located. I think the Department of Justice is part of that team, and 

also trying to see what kind of cases can be developed should we 

either be able to capture or detain them in some way. 

Senator CRUZ. Two final questions. Had the compound been secured in a timely manner rather than 23 days later, do you think 

that would have assisted in the effort to track down who committed 

these acts of terrorist? 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, hard to tell what the crowd did there 

and what that scene looked like. Obviously, the ability to get into 

a scene and gather evidence, just based on my own legal background, anything you find can help you make a case. 

Senator CRUZ. My final question. In the months that have followed since then we have seen other terrorist attacks. We have 

seen, tragically, a suicide bomber in Ankara in Turkey, and we 

have seen the horrific attack in Algeria that murdered, among others, two Texans, Victor Lovelady and Frederick Buttaccio. Do you 

think the lack of a public visible response and retribution for this 

terrorist attack may have had the effect of emboldening those who 

would seek to do harm and take the lives of Americans? 

Secretary PANETTA. Senator, these people are emboldened, period. Their basic intent is to go after our citizens, to go after our 

facilities, to attack us in any way possible. I don’t think we ought 

to be surprised that they are making every effort to try to do that 

in every location that is convenient for them. 

82 

So I would just tell you that I am not surprised by the fact that 

we see these attacks taking place, because that is what this enemy 

does, and that’s why we having to do everything possible to make 

sure that al Qaeda never has that opportunity. 

Senator CRUZ. Do you agree with the reports that have suggested 

that Osama bin Laden was emboldened by what he perceived as 

the lack of a vigorous response of the United States to prior terrorist attacks and that that was a contributing factor to September 

11, 2001? 

Secretary PANETTA. They were planning that for a long time. I 

think a lot of this has been gone over time and time again, but the 

reality is that at some point, I think, they were going to try to conduct an attack that would make clear to the world their intent to 

come after the United States, and they were successful at doing 

that. 

I will tell you this, that as a result of what happened on September 11 and the fact that we have gone at them in every way 

possible, I think, it is because of that effort that we have been able 

to deter attacks up to this point. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cruz. 

Thank you, Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, for coming 

here today for this important hearing. We are grateful to both of 

you for your service to our Nation. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

1. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary Panetta, since Benghazi, what has changed in 

terms of real-time coordination between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 

Department of State (DOS) to respond to threats against diplomatic facilities? For 

example, how was the DOD–DOS response to last week’s embassy attack in Turkey 

different from what it would have been pre-Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. DOD–DOS communication regarding the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities remains a strong point in the relationship between the two agencies. Coordination between the Departments during and after events like the attacks in Benghazi and Turkey is timely and thorough; my staff and I enjoyed nearly 

seamless cooperation and information exchange with our counterparts during those 

time periods. 

2. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary Panetta, what was DOD’s specific role in sharing 

information about and responding to this attack? 

Secretary PANETTA. Less than half an hour after I was notified of the attack, General Dempsey and I attended a previously-scheduled interagency meeting at the 

White House where we discussed potential responses to the emerging situation. Immediately after that meeting, I provided verbal authorization for the deployment of 

the forces I outlined in my testimony. We constantly shared information with our 

interagency partners throughout the crisis. 

3. Senator MANCHIN. General Dempsey, on the Interagency Security Assessment 

Teams (ISAT) that visited 19 high-threat diplomatic posts, what new roles in diplomatic security are being contemplated for DOD to assume moving forward? 

General DEMPSEY. DOD is developing new approaches to work with DOS to protect U.S. personnel and activities. As before, DOS remains the lead for the security 

of our diplomatic missions and DOD will continue to support. Our emphasis is on 

proactive decisionmaking, more widely distributed reaction forces, and adaptable 

alert postures. Our combatant commanders are assessing ways that we can provide 

early reinforcement to threatened U.S. facilities as well as posture military forces 

within the geographic combatant commands to respond to increasing indications and 

83 

warnings of an attack. The Departments will continue to share and monitor indications and warnings at all locations in order to increase force protection levels, provide DOD security augmentation early, and begin the process of ordered departures 

and reductions in staff to proactively reduce the risk to U.S. citizens and facilities 

as situations develop. When indicated by situations and warnings, the geographic 

combatant commanders (GCC) will adjust the alert postures of their security augmentation forces. In addition to GCCs regularly engaging with Chiefs of Mission on 

security issues, we will also work with DOS to increase emphasis on host nation 

security arrangements and capabilities. 

4. Senator MANCHIN. General Dempsey, since high-threat environments are highly 

fluid, will these assessments be formalized in an ongoing process to ensure we don’t 

fall back into business as usual? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. DOS and DOD have developed a more proactive approach 

to the ‘‘New Normal’’ global unrest. Our GCCs are working with Chiefs of Mission 

in high threat areas to update their emergency action plans to account for the ‘‘New 

Normal.’’ These plans will include more specificity on proactive actions to be taken 

and planned response times. The Departments will continue to share and monitor 

indications and warnings at all locations in order to increase force protection levels, 

provide DOD security augmentation early, and begin the process of ordered departures and reductions in staff to proactively reduce the risk to U.S. citizens and facilities as situations develop. When indicated by situations and warnings, the GCCs 

will adjust the alert postures of their security augmentation forces. 

Additionally, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will continue deployments of Regional Survey Teams (RST), under the Integrated Survey Program, 

to collect and produce detailed tactical planning data for diplomatic facilities and 

supporting interests overseas for possible contingency operations. The RST products 

provide critical information for reactive measures (contingency operations), but do 

not include vulnerability assessments. SOCOM hosts an annual conference to determine the following year’s survey locations based on the DOD and DOS priorities and 

a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) threat analysis. 

5. Senator MANCHIN. General Dempsey, will Congress be briefed on the results 

of the assessments when they are complete? 

General DEMPSEY. DOD and DOS are working together to conduct the assessments. A combined brief can be arranged. 

6. Senator MANCHIN. General Dempsey, I understand that the military has forces 

designated as the ‘‘global response force’’ or other quick-response-type forces. I 

would appreciate a staff-level update on those forces and their response times. 

Would you arrange that staff update in the next 3 weeks? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, we will coordinate a brief with the committee and your 

office. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

AFRICOM RESPONSE

7. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, Dr. Cynthia Watson, a professor at the 

National War College, stated, ‘‘U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) hopes to avoid 

that traditional combatant command goals of warfighting in favor of war prevention, 

making its orientation quite different from other parallel organizations.’’ Do you 

agree with this assessment? 

Secretary PANETTA. U.S. combatant commands are prepared to conduct the full 

spectrum of assigned missions. AFRICOM was designed with a particular emphasis 

on synchronizing security and stabilization efforts with whole-of-government diplomatic and development tools during every phase of conflict management, from war 

prevention to warfighting and war recovery. 

8. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, do you think that this mission focus prohibited AFRICOM from being effective in responding to the Benghazi incident? 

Secretary PANETTA. The lack of specific intelligence or indications of an imminent 

attack, coupled with the speed of the attack, meant that there was not enough time 

for armed military assets to respond. The Accountability Review Board (ARB) 

shared this view. 

84 

9. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, the AFRICOM commander has testified 

that intelligence and surveillance continue to be a challenge and that more assets 

are needed. You also insist that better intelligence would have given the agency a 

heads-up and enhanced its ability to provide better support to Benghazi. Do you 

think that more assets in the region would have provided DOD with more timely 

intelligence about events in Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. With the benefit of hindsight, I would say yes. For example, 

if we had more Predators airborne and in the area we could have provided more 

intelligence on events in Benghazi. However, while the Predator has proven to be 

one of our most effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, it is greatly affected by weather conditions and would have to travel a good 

distance from its takeoff and landing base in order to be overhead Benghazi. We 

continue to evaluate where the most optimum locations to base our ISR assets given 

the constraints and limitations placed on us with respect to geography and resources. 

10. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, according to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) report, AFRICOM did not have 

a dedicated U.S. Special Operations Forces Commander’s in-Extremis Force (CIF). 

It shared one with U.S. European Command (EUCOM), which was too far away to 

rapidly respond. Largely in response to the September 11, 2012, attacks in Benghazi 

that killed the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other Americans, a dedicated 

SOF CIF was established in early October 2012. Please explain how the AFRICOM 

CIF will be used. Will it be positioned in a location that gives it the flexibility to 

respond more quickly in times of regional crisis like Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. CIFs are used at the discretion of the commanders to respond 

to contingencies in their areas of responsibility (AOR). The establishment of the 

AFRICOM CIF was planned before the events in Benghazi, and I am pleased that 

force is now available to the commander of AFRICOM as of the beginning of this 

fiscal year. AFRICOM’s response capabilities are challenged by the size of the continent and the lack of basing rights and authority to place facilities on the continent. As a result, most of AFRICOM’s resources will continue to reside in southern 

Europe or afloat for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent upon us in the DOD, 

then, to work and plan closely with our DOS colleagues to ensure their planning 

and risk management strategies take such logistics factors into consideration. 

11. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, do you think that it could have made 

a difference in Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. Taken by itself, the addition of a CIF alone is unlikely to have 

changed the outcome in Benghazi. However, I believe our current approach—which 

combines proactive measures such as hardening facilities and improving intelligence 

and warning—and improving response and reaction posture will help to prevent 

such an event from happening in the future. 

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

12. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, during a hearing on December 20, Assistant Secretary Nides of DOS told me that ‘‘unprecedented cooperation’’ between 

DOS and DOD occurred in the aftermath of the Benghazi attacks. Those efforts entailed sending 5 interagency support teams to 19 posts in 13 countries, sending 35 

additional marine detachments (225 marines) to serve as deterrents, and plans to 

build new barracks where feasible to house the security teams and marines. It obviously shouldn’t take a tragic event like this one to ignite unprecedented cooperation 

between DOS and DOD. How do we ensure that this is the standard way of doing 

business in the future? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I mentioned, our coordination with our DOS colleagues 

was excellent during and after the Benghazi attacks. The experience did provide a 

number of lessons on how DOS and DOD personnel in the field interact when U.S. 

facilities and personnel are at risk overseas. I can tell you that DOD is absorbing 

and propagating those lessons with a significant emphasis on tying our plans and 

posture to those of DOS. This will require new internal processes for us, many of 

which are already underway. 

13. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, how would you assess the interaction 

between DOD/military combatant commanders and DOS at the time of the attack? 

85 

Secretary PANETTA. Senior DOD leadership and the National Military Command 

Center were in close coordination with former Secretary Clinton and her staff as 

well as the operations center at DOS during and after the attacks. 

14. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, the HSGAC report faulted both DOD 

and DOS for the fact that they had not jointly assessed the availability of U.S. assets to support the Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi in the event of a crisis. 

Is this something that should have happened? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I mentioned, our coordination with our DOS colleagues 

was excellent during and after the Benghazi attacks. The experience did provide a 

number of lessons on how DOS and DOD personnel in the field interact when U.S. 

facilities and personnel are at risk overseas. I can tell you that DOD is absorbing 

and propagating those lessons with a significant emphasis on tying our plans and 

posture to those of DOS. This will require new internal processes for us, many of 

which are already underway. 

15. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Panetta, do we have plans to jointly assess the 

security of diplomatic facilities in the future? 

Secretary PANETTA. We participated in the deployment of ISAT with DOS to 

evaluate the security level at 19 diplomatic facilities in some of the most vulnerable 

locations, including our Embassy in Libya, and we are in the process of developing 

recommendations on potential security increases required. DOD personnel can and 

do participate in security assessments as part of the country team. Finally, and 

most importantly, some of the new processes we are currently developing will make 

it easier for DOD to support the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities in a proactive 

fashion, and to make doing so part of our standard operating procedure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

JIHADIST MOVEMENTS AND FUNDING

16. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, in the wake of the Arab Spring, in 

countries where people rose up and overthrew corrupt regimes hoping to usher in 

the freedoms associated with democratic rule, we are now watching jihadist and 

fundamentalist movements aligned against our interest move into those areas and 

take root. Who is funding these movements and what are, or should, DOD and the 

broader U.S. Government be doing to stem this support? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

17. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, is there evidence that funding is coming from Gulf countries? If so, what leverage should we use to address their support 

for groups and movements that threaten our security? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

18. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, as al Qaeda’s footprint expands in a 

decentralized manner, so too must its funding streams. From where does this funding come—both geographically, but also the means? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

19. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, is the funding coming primarily 

through criminal activities like kidnap for ransom, piracy, or drug and arms smuggling? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

20. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, how do we effectively stem the flow 

of money? 

Secretary PANETTA. DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter 

threat finance, but DOD can play a critical role working with other departments 

and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries’ ability to derive 

revenue from licit and illicit activities. DOD works very closely with the Department 

of Treasury, U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as the National Intelligence 

Manager for Threat Finance. In addition to these excellent partnerships, DOD supports other U.S. departments and agencies and works with partner nations to deny, 

disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries’ ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively. DOD brings unique capabilities, 

such as planning, intelligence analysis, and the integration of intelligence into operations. DOD developed and sharpened these capabilities over the past decade 

86 

through the establishment of and work with the Iraq Threat Finance Cell and Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell. 

21. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, you have stated that we have to better assess and build up the capabilities of host governments to both provide security 

for U.S. personnel and facilities and to build more long-term and effective 

counterterrorism forces. How do you respond to those who say the United States 

wasted over $1 billion since 2005 in training security forces, securing borders, and 

reducing poverty in North and West Africa, leaving us to face an adapting enemy 

that is well-resourced and potentially deadlier than ever? 

Secretary PANETTA. The U.S. Government has worked to train, equip, organize, 

and support African partner forces to counter shared threats and to enable them 

to do a better job in providing for the security of their territory and populations. 

The partnership and ongoing engagement with these militaries has helped develop 

key capabilities. Our efforts in countries like Mauritania, Chad, and Niger have 

been focused on the counterterrorism mission and we are also getting a strong return on our investments. Chad, which is actively engaged in combat in Mali, stands 

out as a key success. However, it is also important to note two factors that can limit 

our ability to build regional capability: the lack of capacity that characterizes many 

governments in the region, and the risk of political or institutional instability. To 

address these issues, we work with African forces to find areas where we can best 

enable partner units. Further, development and humanitarian assistance for the region, which is primarily funded through DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development, contribute to stabilizing partner nations and we believe they have had 

some successes that enable military engagement. 

22. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, in addition to preparing to respond 

to the next attack or incident, what can or should DOD do to preempt the growth 

and spread of al Qaeda and its adherents and affiliates and strengthen U.S. abilities 

to proactively counter efforts to radicalize and recruit the next generations of terrorists or violent extremists? 

Secretary PANETTA. The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental, 

multi-national effort to combat al Qaeda. DOD undertakes key activities to support 

this strategy, including: training, advising, and assisting partner security forces; 

supporting intelligence collection on al Qaeda; conducting information operations 

against al Qaeda; and, when appropriate, capturing or killing al Qaeda operatives. 

DOD also works to help enable our intelligence and law enforcement partners, both 

in the United States and overseas, in their efforts to counter this threat. 

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

23. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, in Arab Spring 

countries, the Intelligence Community—particularly human intelligence—is facing 

the challenge of reestablishing intelligence assets and sources with access to the 

new governments and evolving leadership. How do you assess our Intelligence Community capabilities in these countries? 

Secretary PANETTA and General DEMPSEY. DOD has referred this question to the 

Director of National Intelligence as head of the Intelligence Community, in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108– 

458). 

24. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how do you assess DOD’s Intelligence Community capabilities? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

25. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, does DOD remain intent on creating its own Defense Clandestine Service (DCS)? If so, why is 

this necessary and not duplicative of the National Clandestine Service? 

Secretary PANETTA. [Deleted.] 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

26. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how do you ensure that in creating such similar services, you don’t run the risk of stovepiping collection efforts and intelligence activities—problems that contributed to our failure 

to see and preempt the attacks of September 11 over 11 years ago? 

87 

Secretary PANETTA and General DEMPSEY. The DCS, under the authority, direction, and control of the Director, DIA will foster closer collaboration with key Intelligence Community partners by integrating collection and streamlining coordination 

processes. DOD policies, procedures, and agreements are in place to govern defense 

human intelligence (HUMINT), provide the rules under which DCS personnel will 

operate to accomplish their defense mission, ensure coordination of operations, and 

prevent stovepiping. 

27. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, drones have 

proven themselves to be effective both for intelligence collection and for targeting 

and destroying designated terrorists or terrorist facilities. How would you characterize the relationships between DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 

terms of command and control of the drones and their specific missions? 

Secretary PANETTA. The DOD and CIA cooperate closely on many national security efforts. I can provide further details of that relationship in a classified forum. 

General DEMPSEY. There is a strong and close relationship between the DOD and 

the CIA, including operations of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). While DOD operates under title 10 and its limitations, the CIA operates under other authorities. 

DOD performs the command and control of all drone activities operated by DOD 

personnel; however, intelligence sharing occurs between the two entities when the 

mission and target sets cross agency/department lines of responsibility. 

COMBATANT COMMANDS

28. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, the relevance 

of AFRICOM to our national security has become more pronounced; yet, it remains 

the only regional combatant command that is neither in the United States nor its 

AOR. While sensitivities may remain with basing in the region, why did the recent 

DOD study on a potential relocation focus on the United States rather than also 

considering a move to the continent? 

Secretary PANETTA. The study was completed in accordance with congressional 

language contained in the House Armed Services Committee Report accompanying 

H.R. 1540, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012; which requested an assessment of the cost-benefit of maintaining AFRICOM headquarters 

in Stuttgart, Germany, versus relocating the headquarters in the United States. 

DOD conducted the study by assessing the strategic and operational risks associated 

with both locations (Germany vs. United States) as well as the relevant costs for 

moving the headquarters to the United States. 

General DEMPSEY. House Report 112–78, accompanying H.R. 1540, the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, requested an alternative basing review for AFRICOM. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) assessed 

strategic and operational factors along with the relevant costs of moving the headquarters to continental United States (CONUS). 

The study identifies significant operational concerns associated with relocating 

AFRICOM to CONUS-specifically, access to AOR and assigned forces. It is the commander’s judgment that AFRICOM would be less effective in CONUS given shared 

forces with EUCOM; currently these commands are colocated in Europe. With respect to costs, the study estimates that annual recurring costs could be reduced by 

half if relocated to CONUS, with the initial investment being recovered in 2 to 6 

years. 

Given the imperative of operational effectiveness, it has been decided that 

AFRICOM will not relocate to the United States. 

29. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how will 

AFRICOM be resourced to ensure it can match growing interests and engagement 

in Africa? 

Secretary PANETTA. AFRICOM recognizes that Africa is a ‘‘low-cost, small-footprint’’ theater and that adequate resources to conduct every desired engagement, exercise, and other military-to-military activities will not be available. AFRICOM 

works in close collaboration with other agencies to employ the full range of U.S. 

Government tools and authorities in the most efficient ways possible. Detailed planning and vigorous prioritization of available resources enable AFRICOM to focus on 

the activities that are most critical to U.S. and regional security. DOD will continue 

to identify any additional authorities and funding AFRICOM needs to accomplish 

its mission. 

General DEMPSEY. We continually assess AFRICOM’s requirements against both 

our global requirements and available resources to achieve the right balance. We 

88 

also work with our partners to build partner capacity in the region to address 

emerging threats and bring optimal capabilities to bear in a timely manner. 

30. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, are you confident that the overlap of logistics and resources with EUCOM will suffice? 

Secretary PANETTA. EUCOM and AFRICOM coordinate closely and their physical 

proximity in Germany enables good planning and optimization of available resources. AFRICOM will continue to identify opportunities to realize efficiencies and 

flexibility through assigned resources. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. We continually assess EUCOM’s and AFRICOM’s overall 

resource requirements including their logistics requirements to ensure the appropriate balance. During crises, these two combatant commands are well-positioned to 

be mutually supporting as well, which helps mitigate risk. Additionally, our regional 

allies and partners can share in the immediate burden, ensuring adequate logistical 

resources are available to support contingencies. 

31. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, you have said that as the size of the 

military is reduced, DOD will continue to grow its Special Forces cadre, with a projection from 64,000 today to 72,000 by 2017. How do you foresee our force placement 

shifting throughout the world given this combined growth in Special Forces, but decrease in overall personnel? 

Secretary PANETTA. Our SOF have been deploying at a high operational tempo 

since September 11—higher than DOD goals—which has resulted in a degradation 

of our SOF’s ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations and concerns about 

the force and our SOF families fraying. The growth of SOF that was directed in the 

2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews was predicated on establishing a force 

capable of meeting our operational tempo goals to allow predictability in deployments and the ability to make sure our SOF are properly trained for the full range 

of special operations. It is also important to recognize that increasing the number 

of SOF takes several years due to the requirement to increase the throughput of 

our SOF training school houses and the immutable fact that it takes several years 

to produce a fully-trained SOF operator. After nearly 10 years of responsibly expanding the force, we are on track to level off growth in 2015, and posture SOCOM 

for persistent, long-term engagement with security partners around the globe. We 

are looking at SOF posture as we continue to work out the details of DOD’s plans 

to support our defense strategy and the effects that service personnel drawdowns 

will have on our global presence. 

32. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Panetta, as you said, the National Security 

Agency does not have a shortage of people interested in being part of U.S. Cyber 

Command’s efforts. ‘‘They view it as an opportunity to get involved, be on the cutting edge of the technology with regards to cyber, develop tremendous skills there, 

and be able to then go out and use those skills in the private sector.’’ After investing 

time and resources into developing these skills, how will DOD retain such personnel 

so they don’t simply go out and use those skills in the private sector? 

Secretary PANETTA. DOD recognizes that the competition from the private sector 

for the same competencies and capabilities is significant. To address this challenge, 

DOD must ensure its recruitment, training, retention, and compensation policies 

and strategies are flexible and responsive to this emerging domain. Therefore, DOD 

is actively developing strategies for the effective recruitment, development, retention, and competitive compensation of highly qualified and skilled personnel in the 

cyber workforce, both military and civilian. We recognize the need for significant investments of time and resources to build and maintain a competent and cuttingedge cyber workforce, and we are investing now. As necessary, DOD will work with 

the Office of Personnel Management and Congress to seek necessary hiring and retention authorities. While no decisions have been made, these may include directed/ 

expedited hiring authorities, critical skill retention bonuses, and special pays. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

DEFENSE INTERNAL REVIEW

33. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, DOD reportedly has conducted an internal 

review of the Benghazi attacks. I would like to understand what the major findings 

are of the review and what steps have been taken to answer those major findings. 

What was the focus of the DOD internal review of the Benghazi attacks and what 

were the major findings? 

89 

Secretary PANETTA. An exhaustive review of the Benghazi events has established 

that DOD responded appropriately to the attacks. Our coordination with our DOS 

colleagues was excellent during and after the Benghazi attacks. The experience did 

provide a number of lessons on how DOS and DOD personnel in the field interact 

when U.S. facilities and personnel are at risk overseas. I can tell you that DOD is 

absorbing and propagating those lessons with a significant emphasis on tying our 

plans and posture to those of DOS. Lastly, we fully support the recommendations 

of the ARB. We stand ready to assist in the implementation of these recommendations. 

34. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, what specific steps have been taken that 

address the major findings from the DOD internal review of the Benghazi attacks? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I mentioned, DOD conducted an exhaustive review of the 

Benghazi events and the experience did provide a number of lessons on how DOS 

and DOD personnel in the field interact when U.S. facilities and personnel are at 

risk overseas. We fully support the recommendations of the ARB. We stand ready 

to assist in the implementation of these recommendations. 

35. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, are there any steps which DOD would like 

to take but feels it does not possess enough resources to execute or implement? 

Secretary PANETTA. One of the greatest security risks we are now facing as a Nation is that this budget uncertainty could prompt the most significant military readiness crisis in more than a decade. This would badly damage our national defense 

and compromise our ability to respond to crises in a dangerous world. Compounding 

this risk on the African continent is the lack of basing and the inability to place 

facilities in African countries. Most of the limited resources we have that are dedicated to AFRICOM reside in southern Europe or are afloat. 

DISTANCE AND RESPONSE TIME CHALLENGES

36. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, although specific information regarding 

an attack on the Benghazi facilities was not sufficient to increase the alert level of 

forces that could intervene in a timely manner, there were numerous indications of 

increased risk across Northern Africa in general. During the hearing, I mentioned 

several incidents of violence that occurred across Libya, including in Benghazi. Additionally, you remarked ‘‘we were also concerned about potential threats to U.S. 

personnel in Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Sana’a, and elsewhere that could potentially require a military response.’’ What modifications, if any, have been made since the 

time of the Benghazi attacks to the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

(CCIR) as they relate to potential terrorist threats to try to improve the warning 

time available to combatant commanders? 

Secretary PANETTA. The concerns I expressed regarding the events of September 

11–12, 2012, were the result of events on the ground in the Middle East and North 

Africa. Diplomatic facilities in several countries were reporting actualized threats, 

and we had to be prepared for additional violence after Friday prayers the next day. 

Through the crisis, I was pleased with General Ham’s awareness of the situation, 

AFRICOM’s staff coordination, and their collaboration with SOCOM, the Joint Staff, 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am not aware of any changes made 

to General Ham’s CCIR. 

37. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, have the indications and warnings used 

to trigger posture changes, such as changes to alert status and forward-basing 

movements, been altered for AFRICOM and/or EUCOM based on the large distances 

between the EUCOM forces and the AFRICOM theater and within the AFRICOM 

theater itself that make rapid response difficult? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes, AFRICOM continually analyzes, and where necessary, 

makes adjustments to its plans and capabilities. AFRICOM’s response capabilities 

are challenged by the size of the continent and the lack of basing rights and authority to place facilities on the continent. As we jointly develop long-term risk mitigation measures with DOS, we have also made adjustments to our posture to ensure 

we are able to respond should contingencies arise. 

38. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, does DOD ever posture forces based on 

increased levels of general threats in a region, even if site-specific intelligence may 

not be available? 

Secretary PANETTA. I hesitate to engage in hypotheticals, since each high-threat 

situation is unique and will require a tailored response from the U.S. Government. 

90 

Our threat review process in ongoing and DOD is able to modify our force posture 

in response to known and assessed potential threats. We do not require intelligence 

specific to a single site in order to change our force posture; we may adjust on 

threats to multiple sites. 

39. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, given that Benghazi is relatively more accessible than the majority of the AFRICOM AOR, what initiatives, if any, are being 

pursued to improve strategic access to AFRICOM (e.g., detachments, acquisition and 

cross-servicing agreements, et cetera)? 

Secretary PANETTA. AFRICOM continually evaluates and, where necessary, adjusts its resources and posture to enable the accomplishment of assigned missions. 

AFRICOM’s response capabilities are challenged by the size of the continent and the 

lack of basing rights and authority to place facilities on the continent. Where we 

can, we are arranging access agreements for improved access for U.S. assets, but 

we expect most of AFRICOM’s resources will continue to reside in southern Europe 

or afloat for the foreseeable future. 

FLEET ANTITERRORISM SECURITY TEAMS

40. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, the closest Fleet Antiterrorism Security 

Team (FAST) to Benghazi was in Rota, Spain, approximately 1,500 miles away. You 

indicated that we have taken ‘‘a number of steps’’ to improve our ability to respond 

to include having airlift associated with FASTs. What airlift platforms are associated with the FASTs (e.g., C–130s, C–17s, et cetera)? 

Secretary PANETTA. Airlift platforms typically dedicated to the movement of Marine Corps FASTs are any of several variants of the C–130. 

41. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, in addition to associating airlift with the 

FASTs, what additional steps have been taken to improve their ability to respond 

in a timely manner to evolving crises? 

Secretary PANETTA. In addition to the enormity of staff work and operational considerations that have contributed to improving our response capability, my staff has 

worked closely with the Joint Staff and the GCCs to ensure response capabilities 

are aligned to potential requirements. Our current approach, which we are developing jointly with DOS, combines proactive measures such as hardening facilities 

and improving intelligence and warning, with improved response times and reaction 

posture for contingencies. 

42. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, what posture change procedures, if any, 

have been made with respect to FASTs for response to remote locations in Africa, 

especially Central, Western, and Southern Africa, given the extreme distances that 

need to be traveled if FAST intervention is required? 

Secretary PANETTA. There are several changes that occur in the wake of a security 

crisis—both immediate and the enduring. Our immediate reaction in the wake of 

crisis involves posturing assets to support operational requirements and in anticipation of an increased demand signal. In September, we moved naval assets such as 

the USS Iwo Jima and the USS New York with their Marine Expeditionary Units 

from the Arabian Sea to the Mediterranean. We also deployed ground assets (a 

Stryker Battalion) from Europe and positioned Special Operations Elements for possible action. To create a more enduring change, we are working closely with GCCs 

to ensure DOD assets and forces can respond to protect American facilities and personnel overseas, as well as working with DOS to integrate our posture and other 

factors (e.g., distance and time) into their planning. 

43. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, given the extreme distances involved, has 

there been any effort or are there any plans to station a FAST in AFRICOM’s AOR, 

and if so, what obstacles and challenges have been encountered? 

Secretary PANETTA. The inherent challenge to operating in Africa is sustainment. 

The distances associated with movement are just one consideration that is universal 

in planning for operating on the continent. Our previous experiences in Africa—particularly in East Africa—have demonstrated the value in developing strong, capable 

partners in the region. While we continuously look for ways to increase our access 

in the region, we are not presently considering stationing a FAST in Africa. We are, 

however, committed to identifying threats where they exist and where they are developing as well as ensuring our forces are prepared to respond to these threats. 

91 

GENERAL HAM’S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

44. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, well before the attacks on Benghazi, according to you, General Ham offered to extend the stay in Libya of the special security team ‘‘and was told no’’ by DOS. What reason was General Ham given as to 

why the offer to extend the special security team was denied by DOS? 

General DEMPSEY. We asked DOS’s intentions regarding requesting an extension 

of the 16-man Site Security Team, noting that the Joint Staff would support the request but would need time to gain necessary approvals. In their response to the 

Joint Staff, DOS stated they were not requesting an extension of the site security 

team beyond the August date and were in the process of integrating local security 

into U.S. Embassy Tripoli operations. 

45. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, what forces, if any, did General Ham request be placed on increased alert after the initial attack on Benghazi that occurred 

at approximately 9:40 p.m. Benghazi time? 

General DEMPSEY. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, General Ham 

ordered the CIF, which was conducting training in Croatia, to move to Sigonella, 

Italy, and subsequently to Souda Bay. Additionally, one FAST platoon was ordered 

to Benghazi and one FAST to Tripoli. On 12 September, one FAST deployed to Tripoli, and with all personnel evacuated from Benghazi, the other moved to Souda Bay, 

Crete, to posture in response to any additional regional unrest. 

46. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, did DOS ask for assistance in securing the 

attack site after the Americans had been evacuated to facilitate the post-incident 

investigation? 

General DEMPSEY. I am not aware of any formal or informal request to secure the 

attack site. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) did request support to travel 

to Benghazi to support their investigation. 

47. Senator INHOFE. General Dempsey, did General Ham offer to help secure the 

Benghazi site after the attack in order to facilitate timely investigation of the incident to improve pursuit of the terrorists? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN NORTHERN AFRICA

48. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) directed low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security 

objectives in Africa and Latin America. Does the growing terrorist threat in Africa, 

and the lack of warning of this attack in Benghazi, indicate we are under-resourcing 

our counterterrorism efforts in Northern Africa? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the growing terrorist threat in Africa and the lack of 

warning of the attack in Benghazi suggest we need to do more to understand the 

threat and, by extension, continue to refine our assessment of the resourcing of U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts in Northern Africa. The low-cost and small-footprint approach is largely driven by the access and placement enjoyed by host nation personnel. Our strategic security objectives in many parts of the world, particularly in 

Africa, are best achieved by, with, and through partner nations. Increasing our understanding of the threats there, and further assisting our partners to counter that 

threat, is a sound way ahead for the United States. 

49. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, in addition to our support of the French 

in their fight against terrorists in Mali, what other steps is DOD taking to address 

the growing terrorist threat in Northern Africa? 

Secretary PANETTA. We are working to deny safe haven to al Qaeda in the Lands 

of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and to other affiliated violent extremist organizations, to prevent attacks on U.S. interests. The United States is working with regional partners to reduce the cross-border flows of weapons and fighters, and to help 

these countries degrade AQIM and build the capacity of partner nations in the region. The U.S. Government has very good cooperation with the countries of the region—especially Mauritania, Niger, and Chad—and is helping to develop the capabilities of those countries to pursue shared objectives. 

50. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Panetta, given the surprise associated with the attacks in Benghazi, is DOD rethinking our approach to noncombatant evacuation operations in less accessible regions, such as Western, Central, and Southern Africa? 

92 

Secretary PANETTA. DOD has strengthened its relationship with the Departments 

of State and Health and Human Services to ensure that all of the Departments understand their roles and responsibilities during evacuation operations. DOD recently 

(February 26, 2013) issued updated guidance DOD Directive 3025.14 ‘‘Evacuation of 

U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad.’’ The new guidance has eliminated confusing language on when we can conduct noncombatant 

evacuation operations and directs all GCCs to draft, plan, and exercise evacuation 

and reception plans with the goal of being able both to evacuate and receive noncombatants regardless of the situation. This change directly addresses situations 

like Benghazi and gives DOD more flexibility when conducting an evacuation operation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

REQUEST TO EXTEND SITE SECURITY TEAM

51. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, during the hearing, you remarked that 

‘‘General Ham actually called the Embassy to see if they wanted to extend the special [site] security team (SST) there and was told no,’’ and you went on to say this 

request was in the Benghazi ARB results. While I do not doubt General Ham made 

the request, the exchange is not in the ARB. When did General Ham ask to extend 

the SST and who did he ask? 

General DEMPSEY. Our support to U.S. Embassy Tripoli had been ongoing since 

September 2011. The SST originally deployed for 120 days and was subsequently 

extended twice in response to DOS requests. The SST was not a standard security 

team configuration and was specifically created to meet the needs of DOS reestablishment of U.S. Embassy Tripoli. The combatant commander and my staff were in 

periodic contact with DOS to determine the progress of embassy reestablishment 

and what the continuing security requirement was. As coordinated with DOS, the 

SST mission was complete August 3, 2012. During the 11 months of DOD support 

to DOS, we only received requests to provide security at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, not the consulate in Benghazi. 

52. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, who turned down the request and 

what reasons were given for not extending the SST? 

General DEMPSEY. In an email exchange on July 11 and 13, 2012, the Joint Staff 

notified DOS that the DOD SST deployment authorization was set to expire on August 4, 2012. We asked what DOS’s intentions were regarding requesting an extension of the 16-man SST, noting that the Joint Staff would support the request but 

would need time to gain necessary approvals. In their response to the Joint Staff, 

DOS stated they were not requesting an extension of the SST beyond the August 

date and were in the process of integrating local bodyguards into Embassy Tripoli 

operations. 

THREAT STREAM

53. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, in your testimony during the hearing, 

you comment in regards to the attacks on Benghazi that ‘‘looking back at it, of 

course it looks like it should have been crystal clear that there was an attack imminent.’’ When questioned, you stated there were similar threat streams and hostile 

acts at the Embassy at Yemen. You strengthened the security of the Yemen Embassy based upon the request from the Ambassador, yet absent a request from the 

DOS, no similar measures were provided in Libya. In the future, if threat streams 

and significant activities are present in vicinity of an American mission that indicates an imminent attack, will you take a proactive role to recommend and provide 

additional security measures? 

General DEMPSEY. DOD is developing new approaches to work with DOS to protect U.S. personnel and activities. As before, DOS remains the lead for the security 

of our diplomatic missions and DOD will continue to support. But recognizing that 

security situations can evolve quickly, DOD is looking at ways to emphasize 

proactive capabilities. Our combatant commanders are assessing ways that we can 

provide early reinforcement of threatened U.S. facilities as well as posture military 

forces within the GCCs to respond to increasing indications and warnings of an attack. The Departments will continue to share and monitor indications and warnings 

at all locations in order to increase force protection levels, provide DOD security 

augmentation early, and begin the process of ordered departures and reductions in 

staff to proactively reduce the risk to U.S. citizens and facilities as situations deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:12 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86489.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
93 

velop. When indicated by situations and warnings, the GCCs will adjust the alert 

postures of their security augmentation forces. 

54. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Dempsey, in an era of tightening budgets, it is 

imperative we take a holistic view of this security problem. How do you ensure the 

interagency process works to coordinate effectively the whole of U.S. Government 

resources in order to provide adequate security at our diplomatic missions in highthreat/high-risk areas? 

General DEMPSEY. DOD is developing new approaches to work with DOS to protect U.S. personnel and activities. DOS remains the lead for the security of our diplomatic missions and DOD will continue to support. But recognizing that security 

situations can evolve quickly, DOD is looking at ways to emphasize proactive capabilities. Our combatant commanders are assessing ways that we can provide early 

reinforcement to threatened U.S. facilities as well as posture military forces within 

the GCCs to respond to indications and warnings of an attack. In addition to GCCs 

regularly engaging with Chiefs of Mission on security issues, we will also work with 

DOS to increase emphasis on host nation security arrangements and capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT

55. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, did General Ham 

make any request for assets or support that were denied by you or anyone in the 

DOD chain of command? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

General DEMPSEY. No. 

56. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, did the individuals 

on the ground in Benghazi make any requests for support that were denied? 

Secretary PANETTA. No requests made to DOD were denied. Before, during, and 

after the attack, every request DOD received was met. 

General DEMPSEY. No, DOD met all requests made by DOS. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROY BLUNT

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS UNIFIED HEALTH CARE RECORDS SYSTEM

57. Senator BLUNT. Secretary Panetta, you responded to Senator Blumenthal 

about recent reports regarding the abandonment of the unified health care records 

system. What is DOD doing to ensure the $1 billion devoted to this integrated electronic recordskeeping system is not going to be wasted? 

Secretary PANETTA. Both DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have 

confirmed their continuing commitment to delivering an integrated Electronic 

Health Record (iEHR) for all servicemembers and veterans. DOD and VA have been 

working on two very important efforts simultaneously. First, we are committed to 

ensuring that all health data for an individual can be brought together into a seamless electronic health record (EHR). Second, we are both committed to modernizing 

and replacing our legacy health information technology systems. While the plan had 

been to design, build, and implement a single new system, a combination of cost, 

schedule, and risk factors, as well as advancements in the commercial EHR marketplace, all contributed to the need to reassess our way ahead. This is an opportunity 

to reduce risk and achieve the intended result at a reduced cost to the taxpayers 

and is not intended to be a less comprehensive solution. Our shift in strategy is not 

a departure from purpose but rather a refinement in the route we will take to get 

there. We took a step back and found we could make important changes to simplify 

the program and maximize our chances of success, cut costs, and get the benefits 

to veterans and servicemembers sooner. By doing so, we believe that our 

servicemembers, veterans, and all taxpayers win. 

Since March 2011, DOD and VA have spent approximately $350 million, not $1 

billion, to develop and pilot capabilities to facilitate the exchange of information between us and to improve the information accessible to doctors and patients in both 

DOD and VA medical systems. The important work that has been done over the 

past few years remains a crucial part of our planned way ahead and is not wasted. 

58. Senator BLUNT. Secretary Panetta, what is DOD’s plan to ensure a comprehensive EHR for servicemembers? 

94 

Secretary PANETTA. Both DOD and VA have confirmed their continuing commitment to delivering an iEHR for all servicemembers and veterans. In the near-term, 

we are focusing on data interoperability to ensure that all health data for an individual is brought together into a seamless EHR. This data interoperability work will 

be completed by 2014, creating a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record for all 

servicemembers and veterans, thus achieving the President’s vision of every separating servicemember having his or her information available for a smooth transition to veteran status, whether it is to coordinate the delivery of health care or 

achieve rapid adjudication of benefits. In addition to this work, we are also committed to modernizing and replacing our underlying legacy health information technology systems in as cost effective a manner as possible. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MICHAEL S. LEE

COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY CLINTON

59. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how many times did 

you talk with Secretary Clinton about Benghazi before the attack? 

Secretary PANETTA. I do not recall discussing the security of our facilities in 

Benghazi with Secretary Clinton prior to the attacks. 

General DEMPSEY. We had regular meetings to discuss global threats, including 

the security situation in North Africa and Libya, in particular, prior to the Benghazi 

attack. 

60. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, was there any mention 

of a need for increased security? 

Secretary PANETTA. No requests for additional security were made to DOD. 

General DEMPSEY. There were ongoing discussions within the interagency about 

the security situation. I was aware of concerns about security in Libya through General Ham’s reporting. After the DOS decision to not extend the SST in Libya, there 

was no request for additional DOD security forces. 

61. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do you feel that you 

should have talked with Secretary Clinton more? 

Secretary PANETTA. I am sure that all of us wish we had better information, 

warning, and time to work together to avoid this tragedy. 

General DEMPSEY. I discussed security in the Middle East and North Africa with 

Secretary Clinton on multiple occasions. 

62. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, should you have encouraged Secretary Clinton to increase security? 

Secretary PANETTA. I am sure that all of us wish we had better information, 

warning, and time to work together to avoid this tragedy. 

General DEMPSEY. We were aware of the security challenges in Benghazi, but rely 

foremost on DOS’s regional security officers to assess the threats and develop emergency action plans. Defense attache ́s are integrated into this process and make recommendations as well. 

63. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, once the attack started, did you ever communicate with Secretary Clinton? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

General DEMPSEY. Not directly. But, through the National Joint Operations and 

Intelligence Center (NJOIC) we were monitoring and coordinating with DOS and regional commanders throughout the night. 

64. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what about the President? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

General DEMPSEY. Secretary Panetta and I had a previously scheduled meeting 

with the President at 5 p.m. and discussed the Benghazi attack with him during 

this meeting. 

65. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, at what point did your 

communications stop with them? 

Secretary PANETTA. I continued my communication with the President and with 

Secretary Clinton regularly. 

95 

General DEMPSEY. I did not talk directly to the President again that evening. 

However, the NJOIC continued to coordinate with the White House Situation Room 

throughout that night and until all our personnel were evacuated from Benghazi. 

66. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what time did you go 

to sleep? 

Secretary PANETTA. I don’t recall the exact time, but I received regular updates 

on the situation throughout the night. 

General DEMPSEY. Sometime after midnight when I was notified that all Americans were evacuated from the annex and the first wave was transported to Tripoli. 

I was also briefed when the second wave departed Benghazi for Tripoli around 4 

a.m. 

67. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, how frequently were 

you updated on what was occurring in Benghazi from the initial attack? 

Secretary PANETTA. I was personally updated on the Benghazi situation several 

times daily. 

General DEMPSEY. The Deputy Director of Operations through the NJOIC provided regular updates. The watch team provided senior leader updates to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, and Joint Staff leaders frequently as significant 

reporting occurred. Additionally, the Joint Staff stood up a crisis management team 

to augment the NJOIC through October 1, 2012. This team provided 24/7 monitoring focused on the events in Libya, as well as ongoing regional unrest near U.S. 

Embassies in Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen. 

68. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, when did you stop receiving updates regarding the safety and security of Americans in Benghazi? 

Secretary PANETTA. I first received word less than 1 hour after the attack in 

Benghazi. I continue to receive regular updates regarding Americans in Libya. 

General DEMPSEY. When they were evacuated back to Tripoli and then out of 

Libya. However, I continued and continue today to receive updates on our regional 

posture in North Africa. 

69. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, did anyone ever recommend to the President in your short meeting with him that we should send 

troops into Benghazi? If so, what was his reaction? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I stated during my testimony before the committee, the 

President ordered all available DOD assets to respond to the attack in Libya and 

to protect U.S. personnel and interests in the region. The President was not advised 

to commit conventional troops to Libya. 

General DEMPSEY. Upon hearing these initial reports, the President ordered us to 

use all available DOD assets to respond to the attack and save the lives of U.S. personnel in Libya and to protect U.S. personnel and interests throughout the region. 

The Secretary of Defense ordered two Marine Corps FAST platoons from Rota, 

Spain—one to Tripoli, one to Benghazi; a special operations team from EUCOM that 

was conducting a training mission in Central Europe; and a special operations task 

force from the east coast of the United States. These forces were ordered to muster 

and move to an intermediate staging base. Before they arrived in place, the attack 

in Benghazi had concluded. 

EMBASSY SECURITY PROCEDURES

70. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, once an American compound is attacked by terrorists, as was Benghazi, who is in command of the rescue 

and secure mission? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Secretary of State is responsible for the security of diplomatic facilities abroad. If a military operation to rescue personnel or secure a facility under attack were to be undertaken, the officials in the military chain of command, including the relevant GCC, would typically command such an operation. 

General DEMPSEY. DOS is responsible for diplomatic security. DOD can be requested or directed to take the lead for activities such as a rescue operation. Once 

DOD is in the lead then the GCC is in charge. The GCC is responsible for military 

operations to provide rescue or security; however, the commander of the rescue team 

or on-scene commander would exercise tactical command and control for the mission. That on-scene commander and those rescue forces could be resourced from 

myriad choices including but not limited to the GCC’s CIF, Special Purpose Marine 

96 

Ground Task Force, or a crisis response force that the commander deems necessary 

to employ. 

71. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, who runs point on 

overseeing the evacuation of Americans? 

Secretary PANETTA. During an evacuation, the U.S. Ambassador is the senior U.S. 

Government authority for the evacuation. Historically, when the Ambassador orders 

the departure of personnel, DOS accomplishes the majority of evacuations using 

commercial transportation (scheduled or chartered). However, DOS may request 

DOD assistance based on the nature of the threat or the lack of availability of alternative forms of transportation. When DOS requests DOD assistance in an evacuation, the Secretary of Defense authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to coordinate the deployment and employment of U.S. forces in support of an evacuation. The Chairman then monitors U.S. force participation in the protection and 

evacuation of noncombatants. 

General DEMPSEY. The evacuation of Americans is a DOS responsibility. DOD will 

provide support upon request from DOS. 

72. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, why were U.S. military 

base alert levels not on high alert, despite the 211+ warnings of attacks on U.S. 

property and personnel abroad? 

Secretary PANETTA. The U.S. military’s alert posture is based on specific and credible intelligence. Our base alert posture was reflective of the assessed threat level. 

General DEMPSEY. Each GCC’s staff conducts ongoing threat analysis and assessments for bases within the GCC’s AOR. As a result of this analysis and resulting 

decisions, U.S. facilities in more than 16 countries across the Middle East and North 

Africa were operating under heightened force protection levels. All GCCs had conducted extensive threat assessments and had postured forces accordingly; however, 

there was no specific intelligence regarding an attack on a particular military base. 

73. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, because we couldn’t 

get to Libya in time, how do we plan on protecting other embassies in Africa? 

Secretary PANETTA. DOD is prepared to respond to requests for support to our 

embassies in Africa, and has responded to DOS requests on the continent since the 

attack in Benghazi. DOD continues to work with DOS to mitigate future risks, particularly through increasing our intelligence and warning efforts, supporting the 

hardening of diplomatic facilities, and developing proactive security support for 

posts, when needed. 

General DEMPSEY. Regardless of location, security is foremost the responsibility 

of the host nation working with the U.S. mission and through the regional security 

officer. As threats emerge, we assess them closely within the interagency to determine the appropriate response. DOD may posture forces in response to these threats 

or in response to requests from DOS. The North African region presents significant 

challenges due to its sheer size, the potential for rapidly occurring instability, and 

access requirements for our forces. Recognizing that security situations can evolve 

quickly, DOD continues to examine ways, working within the interagency, to emphasize proactive capabilities and to be responsive to emergent threats. 

74. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what recommendations 

do you have to DOS in order to bolster security? 

Secretary PANETTA. We fully support the recommendations of the ARB, which 

former Secretary Clinton accepted. We stand ready to assist in the implementation 

of these recommendations. 

General DEMPSEY. DOD partnered with DOS to conduct assessments of high risk 

diplomatic facilities. The recommendations are being implemented. 

75. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, do you feel that it 

should be DOD that is responsible to protect embassies and U.S. officials overseas? 

Secretary PANETTA. I believe DOD has a responsibility to protect U.S. embassies 

and officials overseas when our support is requested by DOS. The responsibility for 

assessing when that support is needed resides with the Secretary of State. DOD personnel can and do contribute to the overall intelligence picture that is produced by 

the Intelligence Community, which informs these assessments. 

General DEMPSEY. DOS is the appropriate lead for embassy security overseas, and 

DOD will continue to work closely with DOS to provide support on request. 

76. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, who made the decision 

to wait 23 days before entering Benghazi after the attack to secure the compound? 

97 

Secretary PANETTA. This was not a DOD decision; we provided security support 

to the FBI’s investigatory trip to Benghazi when requested. 

General DEMPSEY. The FBI was the lead on the investigation. 

77. Senator LEE. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, when did you recommend to the President that U.S. personnel be sent to secure the compound and 

what was his response? 

Secretary PANETTA. DOD supported the FBI movement to the compound upon receipt of an official request from the FBI. The details of this support are classified. 

General DEMPSEY. When the FBI decided to go into the compound, they asked us 

to provide security, and we did. We were not asked to provide security at the compound before then, and I did not make a recommendation to the President to do 

so. 

[Appendixes A through D follow:] 

98 

APPENDIX A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRESS 

RELEASE REGARDING DETAILED TIMELINE 


207FUL7.eps
99 


207FUL8.eps

During those meetings, the official said, Panetta verbally ordered two fleet antiterrorism 

security team, or FAST, platoons to prepare to deploy from their base in Rota, Spain. The 

secretary also issued verbal prepare-to-deploy orders for a U.S. European Command special 

operations force then training in Central Europe and a second special operations force based 

in the United Stales. 

At 6:30 p.m. EDT, according to the timeline, a six-person security learn, including two DOD 

members, left the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli for Benghazi. 

The official noted the Pentagon's National Military Command Center staff, within hours of 

the attack, began planning support and contingency operations with transportation and 

special operations experts, as well as with representatives from the four services and Africa, 

Europe and Central commands. By 8:39 p.m., the official said, the command center had 

started issuing written orders for the forces the secretary had alerted. 

At 11 p.m. EDT, the official said, a second unmanned, unarmed surveillance aircraft relieved 

the first, and at 11:15 p.m. -- around 5 a.m. Sept. 12 in Benghazi -- the second U.S. facility 

there, an annex near the consulate, carne under mortar and rocket -propelled grenade fire. 

By I :40 a.m. EDT Sept. 12, the first wave of Americans left Benghazi for Tripoli by 

airplane, with the second wave, including the bodies of the fallen, following at 4 a.m. A C-17 

aircraft, under Africom direction, flew the evacuees from Tripoli to Germany later that day, 

the official said. 

As the timeline makes clear, the official said, the evacuation took place before the FAST 

platoons or special operations forces arrived, although all were converging on Libya --

noting repeatedly that DOD leaders lacked a clear picture of enemy, civilian and American 

positions in the area. 

"There are people out there who have suggested that an overhead surveillance aircraft could 

have perfect visibility into what was happening on the ground, and on that basis alone, you 

could send in a tearn," the official said. "That is not necessarily how things work." 

An overhead surveillance aircraft operating at night over a city can't always help military 

members separate friend and foe on the ground, the official said. 

"You get a lot of good information from a surveillance aircraft, ... but it doesn't necessarily 

provide you a complete and instant picture of what is happening on the ground .... [fyou're 

going to undertake military action, you'd better have solid information before you decide to 

take the kinds of steps that are required·to effectively complete a military mission of this 

sort," the official told reporters. 

Over the roughly 12 hours between the start of the attacks and the time the last Americans 

were evacuated from Benghazi, the official said, defense leaders postured forces to meet any 

contingencies that might develop, as there was no way to know in the early, "murky" stages 

whether the situation would be resolved within hours, days or longer. 

"We absolutely had our forces arrayed in a way that could potentially respond to events that 

might unfold," the official said. "We are an excellent military -- the finest in the world. 

We're always prepared. But we're neither omniscient nor omnipresent." 
100 

APPENDIX B—RESPONSE TO A CONGRESSIONAL 

REQUEST FOR A TIMELINE AND ENCLOSED TIMELINE 


207FUL9.eps
101 


207FUL10.eps

Timeline of Department of Defense Actions on September 11~12, 2012 

All times are Eastern Daylight Time (EDT, Washington, DC) 

and Eastern European Time IEET, Benghazi) 

Tuesday September 11 2012 

EDT II EEr 

-3;42 pm 1/9;42 pm The Incident starts at the facility in Benghazi. 

3;59 pm II 9:59 pm An unarmed, unmanned, survelliance aircraft is directed to reposition overhead 

the Benghazi facility. 

4:32 pm II 10;32pm The National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, after receiving initial 

reports of the incident from the State Department, notifies the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Jomt Staff. The information is quickly passed to 

Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. 

5:00 pm //11;00pm Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey attend a previously scheduled meeting 

with the President at the White House. The leaders discuss potential responses 

to the emerging situation. 

5:10 pm 1111:10 pm The diverted surveillance aircraft arrives on station over the Benghazi facility. 

-5:30 pm If 11:30 pm All surviving American personnel have departed the facility. 

6:00-8:00 pm /I 

12:00~2:00 am Secretary Panetta COnvenes a series of meetings in the Pentagon with senior 

officials including General Dempsey and General Ham. They discuss additional 

response options for Benghazi and for the potential outbreak of further violence 

throughout the region, particularly in Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, and Sana'a. 

During these meetings, Secretary Panetta directs (provides verbal authorization) 

the following actions; 

I) A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon, stationed in Rota, Spain, 

to prepare to deploy to Benghazi, and a second FAST platoon, also stationed 

in Rota, Spain, to prepare to deploy to the Embassy in Tripoli. 

2) A EUCOM special operations force, which is training in Central Europe, to 

prepare to deploy to an Intermediate staging base in southern Europe. 

3) A spedal operations force based in the United States to prepare to deploy 

to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe_ 

During this period, actions are verbally conveyed from the Pentagon to the 

affected Combatant Commands in order to expedite movement of forces upon 

receipt of formal authorization, 

-6:30 pm 1/12:30 am A six-man security team from U.S. Embassy Tripoli, including two DoD 

personnel, departs for Benghazi. 
102 


207FUL11.eps

-7:30 pm II 1:30 am The American security team from Tripoli lands in BenghazI. 

-8:30pm /1 2:30 am The lIIallonal Mllitary Command Center conducts a aenghazi Conference CaU 

with representatives from AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, SOCOM, 

and the four services. 

8:39pm /1 2:39 am 

8:53pm II 2:53 am 

As ordered by Secretary Panetta, the National Military Command Center 

transmits formal authorization for the two FAST platoons, and associated 

equipment, to prepare to deploy and for the EUCOM special operations force, 

and associated equipment. to move to an intermediate staging base in southern 

Europe. 

AS ordered by Secretary Panetta, the National Military Command Center 

transmits formal authorization to deploy a special operations forcel and 

associated equipment, from the United States to an intermediate staging base 

in southern Europe, 

-11:00 pm II 5:00 am A second, unmanned, unarmed surveillance aircraft is directed to relieve the 

initial asset still over Benghazi. 

~11:15 pm II 5:15 am The second facility in Benghazi comes under mortar and rocket propelled 

grenade fire, 

Wednesday, September 12, 2012 

12:05 am I j6:0Sam AFRICOM orders a C-17 aircraft in Germany to prepare to deploy to libya to 

evacuate Americans, 

~1:40 am 117:40 am The first wave of American personnel depart Benghazi for Tripoli via airpiane. 

-4:00 am II 10:00 am The second wave of Americans, including the fallen, depart Benghazi for Tripoli 

via airplane. 

8:15 am /1 2:15 pm 

1:17 pm 1/7:17 pm 

1:57 pm /1 7:57 pm 

The C~17 departs Germany en route Tripoli to evacuate Americans. 

The C-17 departs Tripoli en route Ramstein, Germany with the American 

personnel and the remains of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, 

and Glen Doherty. 

The EUCOM special operations force, and associated equipment, arrives at an 

intermediate staging base in southern Europe. 

2:56 pm 1/8:56 pm The FAST platoon, and associated equipment, arrives in Tripoli. 

3:28 pm //9:28 pm The special operations force deployed from the United States, and associated 

eqUipment, arrives at an intermediate staging base in southern Europe. 

4:19 pm 1/ 10:19 pm The C-17 arrives in Ramstein, Germany. 
103 

APPENDIX C—REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY 

REVIEW BOARD FOR BENGHAZI 


207FUL12.eps
104 


207FUL13.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 2 -

The Benghazi attacks represented the first murder of a u.S. ambassador 

since 1988, and took place 11 years to the day after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11,2001. Ambassador Stevens personified the U.S. commitment to a 

free and democratic Libya. His knowledge of Arabic, his ability to move in all 

sectors of the population, and his wide circle offriends, particularly in Benghazi, 

marked him as an exceptional practitioner of modern diplomacy. The U.S. Special 

Mission in Benghazi, established in November 2011, was the successor to his 

highly successful endeavor as Special Envoy to the rebel-led government that 

eventually toppled Muammar Qaddafi in fall 2011. The Special Mission bolstered 

u.S. support for Libya's democratic transition through engagement with eastern 

Libya, the birthplace of the revolt against Qaddafi and a regional power center. 

The Benghazi attacks took place against a backdrop of significantly 

increased demands on U.S. diplomats to be present in the world's most dangerous 

places to advance American interests and connect with populations beyond 

capitals, and beyond host governments' reach. With State Department civilians at 

the forefront of U.S. efforts to stabilize and build capacity in Iraq, as the U.S. 

military draws down in Afghanistan, and with security threats growing in volatile 

environments where the U.S. military is not present - from Peshawar to Bamakothe Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)is being stretched to the limit as never 

before. DS overall has done a fine job protecting thousands of employees in some 

273 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. No diplomatic presence is without 

risk, given past attempts by terrorists to pursue U.S. targets worldwide. And the 

total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the 

U.S. government to be present in places where stability and security are often most 

profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent. 

The Benghazi attacks also took place in a context in which the global 

terrorism threat as most often represented by al Qaeda (AQ) is fragmenting and 

increasingly devolving to local aftiliates and other actors who share many of AQ's 

aims, including violent anti-Americanism, without necessarily being organized or 

operated under direct AQ command and control. This growing, diffuse range of 

terrorist and hostile actors poses an additional challenge to American security 

officers, diplomats, development professionals and decision-makers seeking to 

mitigate risk and remain active in high threat environments without resorting to an 

unacceptable total fortress and stay-at-home approach to U.S. diplomacy. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
105 


207FUL14.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 3 -

For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to 

obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of 

success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding 

resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government 

department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department 

managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. There is 

no easy way to cut through this Gordian knot, all the more so as budgetary 

austerity looms large ahead. At the same time, it is imperative for the State 

Department to be mission-driven, rather than resource-constrained - particularly 

when being present in increasingly risky areas of the world is integral to U.S. 

national security. The recommendations in this report attempt to grapple with 

these issues and err on the side of increased attention to prioritization and to fuller 

support for people and facilities engaged in working in high risk, high threat areas. 

The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to 

support State Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small percentage both 

of the full national budget and that spent for national security. One overall 

conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge 

and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks 

and meet mission imperatives. 

Mindful of these considerations, the ARB has examined the terrorist attacks 

in Benghazi with an eye towards how we can better advance American interests 

and protect our personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. This 

Board presents its findings and recommendations with the unanimous conclusion 

that while the United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must 

work more rigorously and adeptly to address them, and that American diplomats 

and security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an 

inherently risky profession. Risk mitigation involves two imperatives -

engagement and security - which require wise leadership, good intelligence and 

evaluation, proper defense and strong preparedness and, at times, downsizing, 

indirect access and even withdrawal. There is no one paradigm. Experienced 

leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and 

adequate funding and personnel resources are essential. The selfless courage of the 

four Americans who died in the line of duty in Benghazi on September 11-12, 

2012, as well as those who were injured and all those who valiantly fought to save 

their colleagues, inspires all of us as we seek to draw the right lessons from that 

tragic night. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
106 


207FUL15.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 4 -

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW 

A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012, 

resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel, Ambassador Chris 

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; seriously wounded two 

other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the 

destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex. 

FINDINGS 

In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board 

for Benghazi determined that: 

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun 

fire, and the use ofRPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two 

separate facilities - the SMC and the Annex - and en route between them. 

Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities 

and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the 

attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, 

which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity. 

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels 

within two bureaus of the State Department (the "Department") resulted in a 

Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly 

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place. 

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a "shared 

responsibility" by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post, 

resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That 

said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with 

Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi. 

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi's staffing, with 

talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often 

on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished 

institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
107 


207FUL16.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 5 -

Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in 

Benghazi on the day ofthe attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it 

was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and 

Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive 

realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission 

was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related 

requests, especially those relating to staffing. 

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the 

appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to 

perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced 

with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and 

installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included 

heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows, 

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the 

Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, 

security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an 

Internal Defense Notification System. 

Special Mission Benghazi's uncertain future after 2012 and its "non-status" as a 

temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and 

personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the 

working-level in the field, with very limited resources. 

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post, 

Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was 

inadequate. At the same time, the SMC's dependence on the armed but poorly 

skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs' Brigade (February 17) militia members 

and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for 

security support was misplaced. 

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to 

improvised explosive device (lED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and 

June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months 

and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador 

Stevens' visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special 

Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
108 


207FUL17.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 6 -

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the September 

11, 2001 terrorist attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible 

threats against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11 anniversary. 

Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken the anniversary 

into account and decided to hold all meetings on-compound on September 11. 

The Board found that Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to 

Benghazi independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his 

trip was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap 

between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador's trip 

provided for minimal close protection security support and were not shared 

thoroughly with the Embassy's country team, who were not fully aware of 

planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat 

of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative 

trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the 

leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on 

Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his 

judgments. 

Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli, 

and Benghazi functioned collegiaUy at the working-level but were constrained 

by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels. 

Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared 

to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered 

to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations. 

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures 

and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the 

Libyan response fell short in the facc of a series of attacks that began with the 

sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed 

attackers. 

The Board found the responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be 

inadequate. The Board's inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 

17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in 

summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously. 

The Board found the Libyan government's response to be profoundly lacking 

on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and near absence of 

UNCLASSIFIED 
109 


207FUL18.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 7 -

central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government 

did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the 

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan 

government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate 

remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies ofthe deceased from Benghazi to 

Tripoli on September 12. 

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi 

performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their 

colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every 

possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean 

Smith. 

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not 

enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference. 

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical 

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence 

community's understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential 

threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist. 

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two 

bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in 

their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given 

the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government 

protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that 

any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty. 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 

With the lessons of the past and the challenges of the future in mind, the Board 

puts forward recommendations in six core areas: Overarching Security 

Considerations; Staffing High Risk, High Threat Posts; Training and Awareness; 

Security and Fire Safety Equipment; Intelligence and Threat Analysis; and 

Personnel Accountability. 

o VERA RCHfNG SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 

UNCLASSIFIED 
110 


207FUL19.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 8 -

I. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond 

traditional reliance on host government security support in high risk, high 

threat! posts. The Department should urgently review the proper balance 

between acceptable risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas. 

While the answer cannot be to refrain from operating in such environments, the 

Department must do so on the basis of having: 1) a defined, attainable, and 

prioritized mission; 2) a clear-eyed assessment of the risk and costs involved; 3) 

a commitment of sufficient resources to mitigate these costs and risks; 4) an 

explicit acceptance of those costs and risks that cannot be mitigated; and 5) 

constant attention to changes in the situation, including when to leave and 

perform the mission from a distance. The United States must be self-reliant and 

enterprising in developing alternate security platforms, profiles, and staffing 

footprints to address such realities. Assessments must be made on a case-bycase basis and repeated as circumstances change. 

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine OS organization and 

management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy 

planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent 

creation of a new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High 

Threat Posts could be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for 

OS reorganization. 

3. As the President's personal representative, the Chief of Mission bears "direct 

and full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the 

personnel for whom [he or she is] responsible," and thus for risk management 

in the country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional 

Assistant Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of 

Mission in executing this duty. Regional bureaus should have augmented 

support within the bureau on security matters, to include a senior OS officer to 

report to the regional Assistant Secretary. 

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts 

(military, security, humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas 

to support OS, identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries), 

and regularly evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts. 

1 The Board defines "high risk, high threat" posts as those in countries with high to critical levels of politi cal 

violence and terrorism, governments of v,leak capacity, and security platforms that fall well below established 

standards. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
111 


207FUL20.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 9 -

5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of 

temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater 

flexibility for the use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) 

sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made available for security 

upgrades at such facilities. 

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the 

Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the 

regional bureau. The support cell should work to expedite the approval and 

funding for establishing and operating the post, implementing physical security 

measures, staffing of security and management personnel, and providing 

equipment, continuing as conditions at the post require. 

7. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs' report of January 1999 called for 

collocation of newly constructed State Department and other government 

agencies' facilities. All State Department and other government agencies' 

facilities should be collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area, 

unless a waiver has been approved. 

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO and other relevant 

offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including 

immediate steps to deal with urgent issues. The report should also include 

reviews offire safety and crisis management training for all employees and 

dependents, safehaven standards and fire safety equipment, and 

recommendations to facilitate survival in smoke and fire situations. 

9. Tripwires are too often treated only as indicators of threat rather than an 

essential trigger mechanism for serious risk management decisions and actions. 

The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to 

perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires. 

10.Recalling the recommendations of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs, the 

State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost 

Sharing Program at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2 

billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up to ten-year program addressing that 

need, prioritized for construction 0 f ncw facilities in high risk, high threat areas. 

It should also work with Congress to expand utilization of Overseas 

UNCLASSIFIED 
112 


207FUL21.eps

UNCLASSlflED 

-10-

Contingency Operations funding to respond to emerging security threats and 

vulnerabilities and operational requirements in high risk, high threat posts. 

II. The Board supports the State Department's initiative to request additional 

Marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program - as well as 

corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also 

recommends that the State Department and DoD identify additional flexible 

MSG structures and request further resources for the Department and DoD to 

provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts. 

STAFFING HIGH RISK HIGH THREAT POSTS 

12.The Board strongly endorses the Department's request for increased DS 

personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security 

Deployment teams, as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of 

such action. 

13.The Depmtment should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at 

high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical 

personnel, the temporary duty length (TDY) length should be no less than 120 

days. The ARB suggests a comprehensive review of human resources 

authorities with an eye to using those authorities to promote sending more 

experienced officers, including "When Actually Employed" (W AE) personnel, 

to these high risk, high threat locations, particularly in security and management 

positions for longer periods of time. 

14. The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat 

posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff 

(LES) and management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded 

and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and 

translators. 

IS.With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the 

Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its 

language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including 

DS, and receive greater resources to do so. 

TRAINING ANDAwARENESS 

UNCLASSIFIED 
113 


207ful22.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- II -

16.A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit 

DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival 

as well as Chief of Mission protective detail training. 

17.The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should 

collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk 

management decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign 

Service Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk, 

high threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best 

practices and lessons learned. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training should 

be mandatory for high risk, high threat posts, whether an individual is assigned 

permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status. 

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT 

IS.The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security 

equipment for safehavens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA 2 facilities, as 

well as high threat Inman facilities. 

19.There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the 

State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures 

additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and 

trains personnel on their use. 

20.DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for 

greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post. 

INTr:r.UGr:NCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS 

21.Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi 

attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even 

likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors 

showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving 

'''Inman buildings" arc diplomatic facilities that meet the mandatory minimum physical security 

standards established after the 1985 Inman Report about the 1983 Embassy and Marine barracks 

bombings in Lebanon. "SECCA" refers to the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act of 1999. passed by Congress after the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 

Embassy bombings. SECCA mandated setback and other standards ror newly acquired 

diplomatic faei 1 ities. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
114 


207ful23.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 12 -

security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk 

calculations. 

22. The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the 

DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS 

components, regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to 

get key security-related threat information into the right hands more rapidly. 

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTAf!JUTY 

23.The Board recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a 

breach of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but is instead 

addressed through the performance management system. However, the Board 

is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior 

officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential 

basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a 

revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this 

end. 

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the 

ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the OS agents and Annex team 

who defended their colleagues; the Tripoli response team which mobilized 

without hesitation; those in Benghazi and Tripoli who cared for the wounded; 

and the many U.S. government employees who served in Benghazi under 

difficult conditions in the months leading up to the September 11-12 attacks. 

We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to 

recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the 

highest ideals of government service. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
115 


207ful24.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 13 -

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS 

On April 5, 20 11, then-Special Envoy to the Libyan Transitional National 

Council (TNC) Chris Stevens arrived via a Greek cargo ship at the rebel-held city 

of Benghazi to re-establish a U.S. presence in Libya. The State Department had 

been absent from Libya since the Embassy in Tripoli suspended operations and 

evacuated its American personnel on February 25, 20 II, amidst an escalating 

campaign by Muammar Qaddafi to suppress violently a popular uprising against 

his rule. 

Benghazi, the largest city and historical power center in eastern Libya, was 

the launching point for the uprising against Qaddafi and a long time nexus of antiregime activism. It also served as the rebel-led Transitional National Council's 

base of operations. Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) had long felt neglected and 

oppressed by Qaddafi, and there had been historic tensions between it and the rest 

of the country. Throughout Qaddafi's decades-long rule, eastern Libya 

consistently lagged behind Tripoli in terms of infrastructure and standard ofliving 

even as it was responsible for the vast majority of Libya's oil production. Stevens' 

presence in the city was seen as a significant sign of U.S. support for the TNC and 

a recognition of the resurgence of eastern Libya's political influence. 

Benghazi was the seat of the Senussi monarchy until 1954, the site ofa U.S. 

consulate, which was overrun by a mob and burned in 1967, and the place where 

Qaddafi began his 1969 revolution against the monarchy. Qaddafi's subsequent 

combination of oppression and neglect enhanced the city's sense of 

marginalization, and its after-effects were felt more widely in the eastern region 

where a Salafistjihadist movement took root. Iihadis from Benghazi engaged in 

Afghanistan against the Soviets and took up arms against U.S. forces in the post2003 Iraq insurgency. Many of them reemerged in 2011 as leaders of anti-Qaddafi 

militias in eastern Libya. 

Stevens initially operated from the Tibesti Hotel in downtown Benghazi. He 

was accompanied by a security contingent of 10 Diplomatic Security agents whose 

primary responsibilities were to provide personal protective services. Stevens' 

mission was to serve as the liaison with the TNC in preparation for a post-Qaddafi 

democratic government in Libya. By all accounts, he was extremely effective, 

UNCLASSIFIED 
116 


207ful25.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 14 -

earned the admiration of countless numbers of Libyans, and personified the U.S. 

government commitment to a free and democratic Libya. 

Benghazi, however, was still very much a conflict zone. On June 1,2011, a 

car bomb exploded outside the Tibesti Hotel, and shortly thereafter a credible 

threat against the Special Envoy mission prompted Stevens to move to the Annex. 

On June 21,20 11, he and his security contingent moved to what would become the 

Special Mission Benghazi compound (SMC). By the end of August 2011, the 

walled compound consisted of three sections (Villas A, B, and C) on 13 acres. 

(Use of Villa A was discontinued in January 2012, when the SMC footprint was 

consolidated into the Villas Band C compounds, some eight-acres tota1.) 

On July 15,2011, the United States officially recognized the TNC as 

Libya's legitimate governing authority although Qaddafi and his forces still 

retained control over significant portions ofthe country, including Tripoli. The 

TNC continued attacking the remaining Qaddafi strongholds, and Tripoli fell 

earlier than expected at the end of August. The TNC immediately began moving 

the government from Benghazi to Tripoli. By early September, 21 members of 

State Department Mobile Security Deployment teams were in Tripoli with the 

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in preparation for the resumption of operations of 

the U.S. Embassy, which Ambassador Gene Cretz officially re-opened on 

September 22, 2011. From September 2011 onwards, Embassy Tripoli was open 

with a skeleton staff built on temporary duty (TDY) assignments, to include the 

DCM and Regional Security Officer (RSO). (The fall of Tripoli took place shortly 

after Embassy Tripoli lost its assigned staff and bureaucratically ceased to exist, 

pursuant to Department regulations regarding the length of time a post can remain 

open in evacuation status.) 

Although the TNC declared that Tripoli would continue to be the capital of a 

post-Qaddafi Libya, many of the influential players in the TNC remained based in 

Benghazi. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he 

departed Libya on November 17, 2011, after which the Special Envoy position was 

not filled. Stevens was replaced by an experienced Civil Service employee who 

served for 73 days in what came to be called the "principal officer" position in 

Benghazi. After November 2011, the principal officer slot became a TDY 

assignment for officers with varying levels of experience who served in Benghazi 

anywhere from 10 days to over two months, usually without transiting Tripoli. In 

December 2011, the Under Secretary for Management approved a one-year 

continuation of the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, which was never a consulate 

UNCLASSIFIED 
117 


207ful26.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 15 -

and never formally notitied to the Libyan governmcnt. Stevens arrived in Tripoli 

on May 26, 2012, to replace Cretz as Ambassador. 

Throughout Libya, the security vacuum left by Qaddafi's departure, the 

continued prcsence of pro-Qaddafi supporters, the prevalence of and easy access to 

weapons, the inability of the interim government to reestablish a strong security 

apparatus, and the resulting weakness of those security forces that remained led to 

a volatile situation in which militias previously united in opposition to Qaddafi 

were now jockeying for position in the new Libya. Frequent clashes, including 

assassinations, took place between contesting militias. Fundamentalist influence 

with Salatl and al Qaeda connections was also growing, including notably in the 

eastern region. Public attitudes in Benghazi continued to be positive toward 

Americans, and it was generally seen as safer for Americans given U.S support of 

the TNC during the war. However, 20 I 2 saw an overall deterioration of the 

security environment in Benghazi, as highlighted by a series of security incidents 

involving the Special Mission, international organizations, non-governmental 

organizations (NOOs), and third-country nationals and diplomats: 

• March 18,2012 - Armed robbery occurs at the British School in Benghazi. 

• March 22, 2012 - Members of a militia searching for a suspect tire their 

weapons near the SMC and attempt to enter. 

• April 2, 2012 - A UK armored diplomatic vehicle is attacked after driving 

into a local protest. The vehicle was damaged but occupants uninjured. 

• April 6, 2012 - A gelatina bomb (traditional homemade explosive device 

used for tlshing) is thrown over the SMC north wall. 

• April 10, 2012 - An lED (gelatina or dynamite stick) is thrown at the 

motorcade of the UN Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi. 

• April 26, 2012 - Special Mission Benghazi principal officer is evacuated 

from Intcrnational Medical University (IMU) after a fisttlght escalated to 

gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security personnel and IMU 

security. 

• April 27, 2012 - Two South African nationals in Libya as part of U.S.-

funded weapons abatement, unexploded ordnance removal and de mining 

project are detained at gunpoint by militia, questioned and released. 

• May 22,2012 - Benghazi International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 

building struck by rocket propelled grenades (RPOs). 

• May 28,2012 - A previously unknown organization, Omar Abdurrahman 

group, claims responsibility for the ICRC attack and issues a threat against 

the United States on social media sites. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
118 


207ful27.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 16 -

• lune 6, 2012 - IED attack on the SMC. The lED detonates with no injuries 

but blows a large hole in the compound's exterior wall. Omar Abdurrahman 

group makes an unsubstantiated claim of responsibility. 

• June 8, 2012 - Two hand grenades target a parked UK diplomatic vehicle in 

Sabha (800 km south of Benghazi). 

• June 11,2012 - While in Benghazi, the British Ambassador's convoy is 

attacked with an RPG and possible AK-47s. Two UK security officers are 

injured; the UK closes its mission in Benghazi the following day. 

• June 12,2012 - An RPG attack is made on the ICRC compound in Misrata 

(400 km west of Benghazi). 

• lune 18, 2012 - Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi. 

• July 29,2012 - An IED is found on grounds of the Tibesti Hotel. 

• luly 30, 2012 - Sudanese Consul in Benghazi is carjacked and driver beaten. 

• July 31, 2012 - Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers abducted in Benghazi. 

• August 5, 2012 - ICRC Misrata office is attacked with RPGs. ICRC 

withdraws its representatives from Misrata and Benghazi. 

• August 9, 2012 - A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker is 

abducted from the Islamic Cultural Center in Benghazi and released the 

same day. 

• August 20,2012 - A small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat's 

vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi. 

It is worth noting that the events above took place against a general 

backdrop of political violence, assassinations targeting former regime officials, 

lawlessness, and an overarching absence of central government authority in eastern 

Libya. While the lune 6 lED at the SMC and the May ICRC attack were claimed 

by the same group, none of the remaining attacks were viewed in Tripoli and 

Benghazi as linked or having common perpetrators, which were not viewed as 

linked or having common perpetrators. This also tempered reactions in 

Washington. Furthermore, the Boar<;l believes that the longer a post is exposed to 

continuing high levels of violence the more it comes to consider security incidents 

which might otherwise provoke a reaction as normal, thus raising the threshold for 

an incident to cause a reassessment of risk and mission continuation. This was true 

for both people on the ground serving in Libya and in Washington. 

While the June lED attack and the RPG attack targeting the UK convoy in 

Benghazi prompted the Special Mission to reduce movements off compound and 

have a one-week pause between principal officers, the successful nature of Libya's 

UNCLASSIFIED 
119 


207ful28.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 17 -

July 7, 2012, national elections - which exceeded expectations - renewed 

Washington's optimism in Libya's future. Nevertheless, the immediate period 

after the elections did not see the central government increase its capacity to 

consolidate control or provide security in eastern Libya, as efforts to form a 

government floundered and extremist militias in and outside Benghazi continued to 

work to strengthen their grip. At the time of the September attacks, Benghazi 

remained a lawless town nominally controlled by the Supreme Security Council 

(SSC) - a coalition of militia elements loosely cobbled into a single force to 

provide interim security - but in reality run by a diverse group oflocal Islamist 

militias, each of whose strength ebbed and flowed depending on the ever-shifting 

alliances and loyalties of various members. There was a notional national police 

presence, but it was ineffectual. By August 2012, Special Mission Benghazi would 

evaluate the worsening security situation and its implications. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
120 


207ful29.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 18 -

"J was at the foot of the wide marble staircase when the breakthrough occurred. 

Fanatical knife-carrying intruders, bleeding Fum cuts received as they were 

pushed through broken windows, ran down the hall. Putting on gas masks and 

dropping tear gas grenades, we engaged them on the stairs with rifle butts. In 

seconds tear gas saturated the area. We then moved into the vault, securing the 

steel combination door, locking in ten persons... My greatest fear, which I kept 

to myself; was that gasoline for the generator would be found, sloshed under the 

vault door and ignited. When afier minutes this did not happen, our hearts sank, 

nonetheless, as outside smoke wafted in and we knew the building had been set 

afire. " 

-- First-person account of the June 5, 1967 mob siege of the then-US. 

Consulate in Benghazi 

TlMELINE OF THE ATTACKS 

September 11-12, 2012 

(All times are best estimates based on existing data 

and should be considered approximale.) 

The Prelude - the Ambassador's Arrival 

Ambassador Chris Stevens arrived in Benghazi, Libya on September 10, 

2012, accompanied by two temporary duty (TDY) Assistant Regional Security 

Officers (ARSOs) from Tripoli. It was the Ambassador's first visit to Benghazi 

since he departed as then-Special Envoy in November 2011. With the 

Ambassador's arrival, there were eight Americans at the Special Mission 

compound (SMC) on September 10-11,2012, including the Ambassador; 

Information Management Officer (IMO) Sean Smith, who arrived in Benghazi one 

week earlier to provide TDY communications and management support; and five 

Diplomatic Security (DS) agents (three assigned on short-term TDY to Benghazi -

"TDY RSO", "ARSO 1" and "ARSO 2" - and the two who traveled from Tripoli 

to provide protection for the Ambassador during his visit - "ARSO 3" and "ARSO 

4"). The eighth American, the TDY Benghazi principal officer, completed his 13-

day assignment and returned to his full-time job in Tripoli the morning of 

September 11, leaving seven Americans at the compound. Ambassador Stevens 

was scheduled to remain in Benghazi until September 14, and his visit was timed 

in part to fill the staffing gaps between TDY principal officers as well as to open 

an American Corner at a local school and to reconnect with local contacts. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
121 


207FUL30.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 19 -

I n the absence of an effective central government security presence, the 

Special Mission's Libyan security contingent was composed of four armed 

members of the February 17 Martyrs' Brigade (February 17) - a local umbrella 

organization of militias dominant in Benghazi (some of which were Islamist) and 

loosely affiliated with the Libyan government, but not under its control. They 

resided in a guest house building on compound. Normally four members resided 

on the Special Mission compound near the front gate, but on September 11 one had 

been absent for several days, reportedly due to a family illness. The Special 

Mission also had an unarmed, contract local guard force (LOF), Blue Mountain 

Libya (BML), which provided five guards per eight-hour shift, 24/7, to open and 

close the gates, patrol the compound, and give warning in case of an attack. 

After the Ambassador's arrival at the Special Mission on September 10, 

ARSO I gave the Ambassador a tour of the SMC and pointed out the safe area and 

escape hatch windows in the Ambassador's room in Villa C. Later that afternoon, 

the Ambassador visited the Annex for a briefing. He then met with the City 

Council at a local hotel for dinner, an event at which local media invited by the 

Council showed up unexpectedly, despite U.S. efforts to keep the Ambassador's 

program and movements from being publicized. 

Securitv Environment on September 11 Preceding Attacks 

In consultation with the TDY RSO and mindful ofthe threat environment 

and the September 11 anniversary, Ambassador Stevens did not leave the SMC on 

September II, but rather held meetings there. At approximately 0645 local that 

morning, a BML contract guard saw an unknown individual in a Libyan Supreme 

Security Council (SSC) police uniform apparently taking photos of the compound 

villas with a cell phone from the second floor of a building under construction 

across the street to the north of the SMC. The individual was reportedly stopped 

by BML guards, denied any wrongdoing, and departed in a police car with two 

others. This was reported to ARSOs 1 and 2. Later that morning they inspected 

the area where the individual was seen standing and informed the Annex ofthe 

incident. There had not been any related threat reporting. The local February 17 

militia headquarters was informed of the incident and reportedly complained to the 

local sse on the Special Mission's behalf. The Ambassador reviewed a Special 

Mission-drafted complaint to local authorities on the surveillance incident; 

however, it was not submitted due to the typically early closure of Libyan 

government offices. Later on September 11, the Ambassador was informed by his 

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tripoli of the breach of the Embassy Cairo 

UNCLASSIFIED 
122 


207ful31.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 20 -

compound that had occurred that day and briefly discussed the news with ARSO 3. 

The TDY RSO was also informed of the Cairo compound breach by his Regional 

Security Officer counterpart in Tripoli and shared the information with colleagues 

at the Annex. 

At approximately 1940 local, Ambassador Stevens and an accompanying 

ARSO escorted a Turkish diplomat to the SMC's main exit at the north C1 gate, 

where nothing out of the ordinary was noted. Some 30 minutes later, between 

2010 and 2030 local, a UK security team supporting a day visit by British 

diplomats dropped off vehicles and equipment at the SMC (per arrangements made 

after the UK diplomatic office in Benghazi suspended operations in June 2012). 

When the UK security team departed via the C1 gate at about 2030 local, there 

were no signs of anything unusual, including no roadblocks outside of the 

compound, and traffic flowed normally. 

Ambassador Stevens and IMO Sean Smith retired for the night to Villa C at 

about 2100 local, while ARSO 4 watched a video in the Villa C common space. 

ARSOs 1, 2, and 3 were sitting together outside and behind Villa C; the TDY RSO 

was working in the workspace building referred to as the "Office" or "TOC" 

(Tactical Operations Center), near the Villa B compound, which was connected to 

the Villa C compound by an alleyway. From the TOC, the TDY RSO could 

monitor a series of security cameras placed in and around the perimeter of the 

SMC. The ARSOs were each armed with their standard issue sidearm pistol; their 

"kits," generally consisting of body armor, radio and an M4 rifle, were in their 

bedroom/sleeping areas, in accord with Special Mission practice. 

The Attack on the Special Mission Compound 

An SSC police vehicle, which had arrived at the main compound gate (C1) 

at 2102 local, departed at 2142. The Special Mission had requested that a marked 

SSC police car be posted outside of the compound 24/7, but in practice a car was 

there only intermittently. The Special Mission had requested this presence again, 

specifically for the duration of the Ambassador's visit. A subsequent local press 

report quotes an SSC official as saying that he ordered the removal of the car "to 

prevent civilian casualties." 

Around the same time, the TDY RSO working in the TOC heard shots and 

an explosion. He then saw via security camera dozens of individuals, many armed, 

begin to enter the compound through the main entrance at the C 1 gate. He hit the 

UNCLASSIFIED 
123 


207ful32.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 21 -

duck and cover alarm and yelled a warning over the radio, and recalled no such 

warning from the February 17 or BML guards, who had already begun to flee to 

points south and east in the compound, towards the Villa B area. ARSOs 1 and 2 

heard an attack warning from the BML guards passed on over the radio. The TDY 

RSO also alerted the Annex and Embassy Tripoli by cell phone. 

The other three ARSOs behind Villa C also heard gunfire and explosions, as 

well as chanting, and responded immediately along with ARSO 4, who was inside 

Villa C. Following the SMC's emergency plan, ARSO I entered Villa C to secure 

the Ambassador and IMO in the safe area and to retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4 

moved to retrieve their kits, which were located in Villa B and the TOC. ARSO 1 

in Villa C swiftly located the Ambassador and IMO Smith, asked them to don body 

armor, and led them into the safe area in Villa C, which ARSO 1 secured. He then 

reported their whereabouts by radio to the TDY RSO in the TOC. ARSO I, armed 

with an M4 rifle, shotgun and pistol, took up a defensive position inside the Villa C 

safe area, with line of sight to the safe area gate and out of view of potential 

intruders. ARSO 1 gave his cell phone to the Ambassador, who began making 

calls to local contacts and Embassy Tripoli requesting assistance. 

From Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his 

kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the 

Ambassador, and where ARSO 2's kit was located. (ARSO 2's sleeping quarters 

were in the TOC, making him the designated "TOC OHicer" in their emergency 

react plan.) ARSO 3, upon not finding the Ambassador in the TOC, ran to Villa B 

to get his kit; ARSO 2 remained in the TOC with the TDY RSO and shared 

notification and communication duties with him. At Villa B, ARSO 3 encountered 

ARSO 4, who was also arming and equipping himself, and the two then attempted 

to return to Villa C. They turned back, however, after seeing many armed 

intruders blocking the alley between Villas Band C. ARSOs 3 and 4, 

outnumbered and outgunned by the armed intruders in the alley, returned to Villa 

B and barricaded themselves in a back room, along with one LGF member whom 

they had encountered outside Villa B. 

Attack Continues, Use o(Fire as a Weapon 

Sometime between 2145 and 2200 local, armed intruders appear to have 

used filled fuel cans that were stored next to new, uninstalled generators at the 

February 17 living quarters near the C 1 entrance to bum that building. The crowd 

UNCLASSIFIED 
124 


207ful33.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 22-

also lit on fire vehicles that were parked nearby. Members of the crowd then 

moved to Villa C. 

In Villa C, ARSO 1, who was protecting Ambassador Stevens and IMO 

Smith in the safe area, heard intruders breaking through the Villa C front door. 

Men armed with AK rifles started to destroy the living room contents and then 

approached the safe area gate and started banging on it. ARSO 1 did not want to 

compromise their location in the safe area by engaging the intruders, and he 

warned the Ambassador and IMO Smith to prepare for the intruders to try to blast 

the safe area gate locks open. Instead the intruders departed, and the lights in Villa 

C appeared to dim. ARSO 1 realized that smoke from tires set inside the villa, 

away from his vantage point, was reducing the light and visibility. (There was no 

line of sight to Villa C from the Villa S/TOC compound where the TDY RSO and 

three ARSOs were barricaded. The TDY RSO in the TOC did not see smoke 

emerge on the view from the camera near Villa C until shortly after 2200 local.) 

As smoke engulfed the Villa C safe area, ARSO 1 led Ambassador Stevens 

and IMO Smith into a bathroom with an exterior window. All three crawled into 

the bathroom, while the thick, black smoke made breathing difficult and reduced 

visibility to zero. ARSO 1 tried to seal the door with towels and provide some 

ventilation by opening the window. Instead, opening the window worsened 

conditions and drew more smoke into the bathroom, making it even more difficult 

to breathe. ARSO 1 determined that they could no longer stay in the safe area and 

yelled to the others, whom he could no longer see, to follow him to an adjacent 

bedroom, where there was an egress window. ARSO I crawled on his hands and 

knees through a hallway to the bedroom, unable to see, while yelling and banging 

on the floor to guide the Ambassador and IMO Smith to safety. ARSO 1 opened 

the window grill and exited the building, collapsing onto a small, partly enclosed 

patio, at which point he believed he was being fired upon. Immediately following 

his exit, ARSO I realized the Ambassador and IMO had not followed him out the 

window. He then re-entered Villa C through the egress window several times to 

search for his colleagues while under fire by the intruders outside. He was unable 

to locate the Ambassador or IMO Smith, and severe heat and smoke forced him to 

exit the building to recover between each attempt. After several attempts, he 

climbed a ladder to the roof where he radioed the TOC for assistance and 

attempted unsuccessfully to ventilate the building by breaking a skylight. Due to 

severe smoke inhalation, however, ARSO I was almost unintelligible, but the TDY 

RSO and ARSO 2 in the TOC finally understood him to be saying that he did not 

have the Ambassador or IMO Smith with him. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
125 


207ful34.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 23 -

While Villa C was under attack, armed individuals looted Villa B's interior 

and attempted to enter the area where ARSOs 3 and 4 were barricaded. The 

intruders carried jerry cans and were seen on security cameras trying to dump them 

on vehicles outside the TOC, but they were apparently empty. A group of 

intruders also attempted unsuccessfully to break down the TOC entrance. 

Annex Responds. DS Agents Rallv for Further Rescue Efforts 

Just prior to receiving the TDY RSO's distress call shortly after 2142 local, 

the head of Annex security heard multiple explosions coming from the north in the 

direction of the SMC. The Annex security head immediately began to organize his 

team's departure and notified his superiors, who began to contact local security 

elements to request support. The Annex response team departed its compound in 

two vehicles at approximately 2205 local. The departure of the Annex team was 

not delayed by orders from superiors; the team leader decided on his own to depart 

the Annex compound once it was apparent, despite a brief delay to permit their 

continuing efforts, that rapid support from local security elements was not 

forthcoming. 

While the TDY RSO continued to man the TOC and communicate with 

Tripoli, the Annex, and Washington, ARSO 2 used a smoke grenade to obscure his 

movements from the TOC to Villa B, where he joined ARSOs 3 and 4 who were 

barricaded inside. By this point, the first group of attackers appeared to have 

receded. The three ARSOs then drove an armored vehicle parked outside of the 

TOC to Villa C, where they assisted ARSO 1, who was in distress on the roof, 

vomiting from severe smoke inhalation and losing consciousness. ARSOs 2, 3, 

and 4 repeatedly entered Villa C through the egress window, at times crawling on 

their hands and knees through the safe area due to heavy smoke and the lack of air 

and visibility. 

Near the SMC, the Annex team hoped to bring along friendly forces from 

militia compounds located along their route. The Annex team stopped at the 

intersection to the west of the Cl entrance and attempted to convince militia 

members there to assist. There was periodic, ineffective small arms fire in the 

team's location from the direction ofthe Special Mission. 

Unable to secure additional assistance, the team moved on to the SMC. The 

February 17 living quarters and adjacent vehicles were burned, and heavy smoke 

UNCLASSIFIED 
126 


207ful35.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 24-

was pouring out of the still smoldering Villa C. The Annex team made contact 

with the four ARSOs at Villa C. Some Annex team members went to retrieve the 

TDY RSO from the TOC, while other Annex team members joined the ARSOs in 

their search for the Ambassador. 

During their searches of the Villa C safe area, the ARSOs found and 

removed the body ofIMO Smith with Annex security team assistance. The team 

checked for vital signs and verified that IMO Smith was already deceased, 

apparently due to smoke inhalation. Other Annex security team members and the 

TDY RSO joined up with the ARSOs again to enter Villa C via the egress window 

but were unable to locate Ambassador Stevens despite mUltiple attempts. Heat and 

smoke continued to be limiting factors in their ability to move farther into the safe 

area. When the TDY RSO attempted to enter Villa C through the front door, the 

ceiling collapsed. During these rescue attempts, an ARSO received a severe 

laceration to his arm. 

Second Phase Attack on the Compound Evacuation to the Annex 

At the urging of the Annex security team and friendly militia members, who 

warned that the compound was at risk of being overrun, the TDY RSO and four 

ARSOs departed for the Annex without having found Ambassador Stevens. As the 

Annex team provided cover fire, the five DS agents' fully armored vehicle 

departed and took hostile fire as they left the SMC and turned right out of the Cl 

entrance. The driver, ARSO 1, reversed direction to avoid a crowd farther down 

the street, then reverted back to the original easterly route towards the crowd after 

a man whom the DS agents believed to be with February 17 signaled them to do 

so. Farther ahead, another man in a small group of individuals then motioned to 

them to enter a neighboring compound, some 300 meters to the east of the Cl 

entrance of the Special Mission compound. The DS agents suspected a trap, 

ignored this signal, and continued past. The group along the route then opened fire 

at the vehicle's side, shattering and almost penetrating the armored glass and 

blowing out two tires. While the identities of the individuals who fired upon the 

DS agents is unknown, they may have been part of the initial wave of attackers 

who swarmed the SMC earlier that night. A roadblock was present outside this 

compound and groups of attackers were seen entering it at about the time this 

vehicle movement was taking place. 

ARSO I accelerated past the armed crowd and navigated around another 

crowd and roadblock near the end of the road, driving down the center median and 

UNCLASSIFIED 
127 


207ful36.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 25 -

into the oncoming lane at one point to bypass stopped traffic. Two cars followed, 

with one turning off and the other following them with its lights off until it turned 

into a warehouse area not far from the Annex. The DS vehicle then proceeded to 

the Annex, arriving around 2330 local. There the ARSOs joined Annex personnel 

and took up defensive positions, to await the Annex security and Tripoli response 

team. The situation was relatively quiet. Wounded personnel received medical 

support. 

Back at the SMC, the Annex security team at Villa C used small arms fire 

and took defensive positions to respond to an apparent second phase attack, which 

lasted about 15 minutes and included small arms fire and at least three rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs) launched from outside the C3 gate. With their many 

and repeated attempts to retrieve the Ambassador having proven fruitless and 

militia members warning them the SMC could not be held much longer, the Annex 

team departed the SMC, carrying with them the body ofIMO Smith. They arrived 

back at the Annex and moved to take up additional defensive positions. 

Embassy Tripoli Response 

Upon notification of the attack from the TDY RSO around 2145 local, 

Embassy Tripoli set up a command center and notified Washington. About 2150 

local, the DCM was able to reach Ambassador Stevens, who briefly reported that 

the SMC was under attack before the call cut off. The Embassy notified Benina 

Airbase in Benghazi of a potential need for logistic support and aircraft for 

extraction and received full cooperation. The DCM contacted the Libyan President 

and Prime Minister's offices to urge them to mobilize a rescue effort, and kept 

Washington apprised of post's efforts. The Embassy also reached out to Libyan 

Air Force and Armed Forces contacts, February 17 leadership, and UN and third 

country embassies, among others. Within hours, Embassy Tripoli chartered a 

private airplane and deployed a seven-person security team, which included two 

U.S. military personnel, to Benghazi. 

At the direction of the U.S. military's Africa Command (AFRlCOM), DoD 

moved a remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft which arrived over the 

SMC shortly before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed 

surveillance aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of 

personnel from the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 

12. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
128 


207ful37.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 26 -

Uncertainty on Ambassador Stevens' Whereabouts 

U.S. efforts to determine Ambassador Stevens' whereabouts were 

unsuccessful for several hours. At approximately 0200 local, Embassy Tripoli 

received a phone call from ARSO 1 's cell phone, which he had given to the 

Ambassador while they were sheltered in the safe area. A male, Arabic-speaking 

caller said an unresponsive male who matched the physical description of the 

Ambassador was at a hospital. There was confusion over which hospital this might 

be, and the caller was unable to provide a picture of the Ambassador or give any 

other proof that he was with him. There was some concern that the call might be a 

ruse to lure American personnel into a trap. With the Benghazi Medical Center 

(BMC) believed to be dangerous for American personnel due to the possibility 

attackers were being treated there, a Libyan contact of the Special Mission was 

dispatched to the BMC and later confirmed the Ambassador's identity and that he 

was deceased. 

BMC personnel would later report that at approximately a 115 local on 

September 12, an unidentified, unresponsive male foreigner - subsequently 

identified as Ambassador Stevens - was brought to the emergency room by six 

civilians. The identities of these civilians are unknown at the time of this report, 

but to the best knowledge of the Board these were "good Samaritans" among the 

hordes of looters and bystanders who descended upon the Special Mission after the 

DS and Annex teams departed. With the clearing of smoke, Ambassador Stevens' 

rescuers found him within a room in the safe area of Villa C, did not know his 

identity, pulled him out through an egress window, and sought medical attention 

for him. Although the Ambassador did not show signs of life upon arrival at the 

BMC, doctors attempted to resuscitate him for some 45 minutes before declaring 

him deceased, by apparent smoke inhalation. 

Attacks on the Annex 

Just before midnight, shortly after the DS and Annex security teams arrived 

from the SMC, the Annex began to be targeted by gunfire and RPGs, which 

continued intermittently for an hour. Annex security personnel engaged from their 

defensive positions, which were reinforced by DS agents. Other personnel 

remained in contact with Embassy Tripoli from the Annex. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
129 


207ful38.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 27 -

The seven-person response team from Embassy Tripoli arrived in Benghazi 

to lend support. It arrived at the Annex about 0500 local. Less than fifteen 

minutes later, the Annex came under mortar and RPG attack, with five mortar 

rounds impacting close together in under 90 seconds. Three rounds hit the roof of 

an Annex building, killing security officers Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. The 

attack also severely injured one ARSO and one Annex security team member. 

Annex, Tripoli, and ARSO security team members at other locations moved 

rapidly to provide combat first aid to the injured. 

At approximately 0630 local, all U.S. government personnel evacuated with 

support from a quasi-governmental Libyan militia. They arrived at the airport 

without incident. The DoD unarmed surveillance aircraft provided visual oversight 

during the evacuation. Embassy Tripoli lost communication with the convoy at 

one point during transit, but quickly regained it. 

Evacuees, including all wounded personnel, departed Benghazi on the 

chartered jet at approximately 0730 local. Embassy Tripoli staft~ including the 

Embassy nurse, met the first evacuation flight at Tripoli International Airport. 

Wounded personnel were transferred to a local hospital, in exemplary coordination 

that helped save the lives of two severely injured Americans. 

Embassy Tripoli worked with the Libyan government to have a Libyan Air 

Force C-130 take the remaining U.S. government personnel from Benghazi to 

Tripoli. Two American citizen State Department contractors traveled to the airport 

and linked up with the remaining U.S. government personnel. While awaiting 

transport, the TDY RSO and Annex personnel continued to reach out to Libyan 

contacts to coordinate the transport of the presumed remains of Ambassador 

Stevens to the airport. The body was brought to the airport in what appeared to be 

a local ambulance at 0825 local, and the TDY RSO veritied Ambassador Stevens' 

identity. 

At 1130 local, September 12, 2012, the Libyan government-provided C-130 

evacuation flight landed in Tripoli with the last U.S. government personnel from 

Benghazi and the remains of the four Americans killed, who were transported to a 

local hospital. 

In coordination with the State Department and Embassy Tripoli, the 

Department of Defense sent two U.S. Air Force planes (a C-17 and a C-130) from 

Germany to Tripoli to provide medical evacuation support for the wounded. At 

1915 local on September 12, Embassy Tripoli evacuees, Benghazi personnel, and 

UNCLASSIFIED 
130 


207ful39.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 28 -

those wounded in the attacks departed Tripoli on the C-17 aircraft, with military 

doctors and nurses aboard providing en route medical care to the injured. The 

aircraft arrived at Ramstein Air Force Base at approximately 2230 (Tripoli time) 

on September 12, just over 24 hours after the attacks in Benghazi had commenced. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
131 


207ful40.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 29 -

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 

1. The attacks in Benghazi were security-related, resulting in the deaths of 

four U.S. personnel after terrorists attackcd two separate U.S. government 

facilities - the Special Mission compound (SMC) and the Annex. 

Identification of the perpetrators and their motivations are the subject of an 

ongoing FBI criminal investigation. The Board concluded that no protest took 

place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks, which were unanticipated in 

their scale and intensity. 

ADEQUACY QF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior 

levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special 

Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly 

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place. 

Through the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed over 100 

individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents, and viewed hours of video 

footage. On the basis of its comprehensive review of this information, the Board 

remains fully convinced that responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and 

damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the 

terrorists who perpetrated the attack. 

Overriding Factors 

This is not to say, however, that there are no lessons to be learned. A 

recurring theme throughout the Board's work was one also touched upon by the 

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs in 1999. Simply put, in the months leading up to 

September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as 

a "shared responsibility" in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and 

decisions on policy and security. Key decisions, such as the extension of the State 

Department presence in Benghazi until December 2012, or non-decisions in 

Washington, such as the failure to establish standards for Benghazi and to meet 

them, or the lack of a cohesive staffing plan, essentially set up Benghazi as a 

UNCLASSIFIED 
132 


207ful41.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 30 -

floating TDY platform with successive principal officers often confined to the 

SMC due to threats and inadequate resources, and RSOs resorting to fieldexpedient solutions to correct security shortfalls. 

Communication, cooperation, and coordination bctween Washington, 

Tripoli, and Benghazi occurred collegially at the working-level but were 

constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at senior 

bureau levels. The DS Bureau's action officers who worked on Libya are to be 

commended for their efforts within DS and across the Department to provide 

additional security resources to Benghazi. Action officers in the Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs' (NEA) Office of Maghreb Affairs and Executive Office showed 

similar dedication in collaborating on solutions with their DS counterparts and 

responding to TDY staffing demands. However, in DS, NEA, and at post, there 

appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and 

empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations. 

The DS Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to 

Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high 

threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to 

growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA Bureau's front office showed a lack of 

ownership of Benghazi's security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for 

the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with 

their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for 

increased security for Benghazi. 

Further shortfalls in Washington coordination were manifested by the flawed 

process by which Special Mission Benghazi's extension until the end of December 

2012 was approved, a decision that did not take security considerations adequately 

into account. The result was the continuation of Special Mission Benghazi with an 

uncertain future and a one-year expiration date that made allocations of resources 

for security upgrades and personnel assignments difficult. 

Another key driver behind the weak security platform in Benghazi was the 

decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility, not officially notified 

to the host government, even though it was also a full time office facility. This 

resulted in the Special Mission compound being excepted from office facility 

standards and accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) and the Overseas Security Policy Board 

(OSPB). Benghazi's initial platform in November 2011 was far short ofOSPB 

UNCLASSIFIED 
133 


207ful42.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 31 -

standards and remained so even in September 2012, despite multiple fieldexpedient upgrades funded by DS. (As a temporary, residential facility, SMC was 

not eligible for OBO-funded security upgrades.) A comprehensive upgrade and 

risk-mitigation plan did not exist, nor was a comprehensive security review 

conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012. The unique circumstances 

surrounding the creation of the mission in Benghazi as a temporary mission outside 

the realm of permanent diplomatic posts resulted in significant disconnects and 

support gaps. 

Personnel 

The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi's staffing to 

be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi. 

Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post's security posture and 

high risk, high threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional 

knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard 

work alone, although the Board found ample evidence of both in those who served 

there. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of Locally Employed Staff (LES) 

who would normally provide a backstop of continuity, local knowledge, and 

language ability. This staffing "churn" had significant detrimental effects on the 

post's ability to assess adequately both the political and security environment, as 

well as to provide the necessary advocacy and follow-through on major, essential 

security upgrades. 

The Board determined that DS staffing levels in Benghazi after Embassy 

Tripoli re-opened were inadequate, decreasing significantly after then-Special 

Envoy Stevens' departure in November 2011. Although a full complement of five 

DS agents for Benghazi was initially projected, and later requested multiple times, 

Special Mission Benghazi achieved a level of five DS agents (not counting DoDprovided TDY Site Security Team personnel sent by Embassy Tripoli) for only 23 

days between January I-September 9, 2012. 

As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of five 

TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the 

daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel 

platform. From discussions with former Benghazi-based staff, Board members 

concluded that the persistence ofDS leadership in Washington in refusing to 

provide a steady platfonn of four to five DS agents created a resignation on the 

UNCLASSIFIED 
134 


207ful43.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 32 -

part of post about asking for more. The TDY DS agents resorted to doing the best 

they could with the limited resources provided. 

Furthermore, DS 's reliance on volunteers for TDY positions meant that the 

ARSOs in Benghazi often had relatively little or no prior DS program management 

or overseas experience. For a time, more experienced RSOs were sent out on 

longer term TDYs, but even that appeared to diminish after June 2012, exactly at 

the time the security environment in Benghazi was deteriorating further. It bears 

emphasizing, however, that the Board found the work done by these often junior 

DS agents to be exemplary. But given the threat environment and with very little 

operational oversight from more experienced, senior colleagues, combined with an 

under-resourced security platform, these agents were not well served by their 

leadership in Washington. The lack of Arabic-language skills among most 

American personnel assigned to Benghazi and the lack of a dedicated LES 

interpreter and sufficient local staff also served as a barrier to effective 

communication and situational awareness at the Special Mission. 

Required security training for DS agents prior to service in Benghazi 

consisted of the High Threat Training Course (HTTC). However, domesticallybased DS agents who had not served abroad did not have the opportunity to receive 

RSO training before serving in Benghazi. In addition, after April 2012 all 

personnel scheduled to serve in Libya for over 30 days were required to take the 

Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training. IMOs, who also served as the 

"management officer" at post, did not, as a prerequisite, receive any basic 

management or General Services Officer (GSO) training to prepare them for their 

duties. 

The Board determined that reliance on February 17 for security in the event 

of an attack was misplaced, even though February 17 had been considered to have 

responded satisfactorily to previous, albeit less threatening, incidents. The four 

assigned February 17 guards were insufficient and did not have the requisite skills 

and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security on a 2417 basis for an eightacre compound with an extended perimeter wall. In the days prior to the attack 

and on September 11,2012, one was absent. Over the course of its inquiry, the 

Board also learned of troubling indicators of February 17's loyalties and its 

readiness to assist U.S. personnel. In the weeks preceding the Ambassador's 

arrival, February 17 had complained about salaries and the lack of a contract for its 

personnel. At the time of the attacks, February 17 had ceased accompanying 

Special Mission vehicle movements in protest. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML) 

UNCLASSIFIED 
135 


207ful44.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 33 -

unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and 

control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled. 

Physical Security 

Given the threat environment, the physical security platform in Benghazi 

was inadequate. It is incumbent upon the Board, however, to acknowledge that 

several upgrades and repairs took place over 2012. DS provided additional 

funding for the Local Guard Force (LGF), February 17, and residential security 

upgrades, including heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area 

egress windows that helped save the life of ARSO 1 on the night of September II, 

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa 

C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security 

cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense 

Notification System. Because OBO does not fund security upgrades for 

"temporary" facilities, DS also identified non-traditional funding streams to fund 

physical security upgrades and worked with the IMOs, NEA and Embassy Tripoli 

to move funds and supplies to Benghazi. The Engineering Security Office (ESO) 

in Cairo provided strong technical support and regularly visited. Following the 

June 2012 IED incident, which blew a large hole in the compound wall, DS, OBO, 

Tripoli, NEA and ESO Cairo immediately responded to Benghazi's request for 

assistance. Tripoli identified OBO funds that could be used to fix the wall, and 

ESO Cairo traveled to Benghazi on June 8 to provide technical support. The TDY 

IMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial 

management staff, and Libyan professionals on statements of work, contracts and 

funding for the emergency repair of the SMC wall and for the other physical 

security upgrades, as well as ongoing electrical repairs. New upgrades remained a 

challenge, however, due to a lack of cash reserves and contract and procurement 

expertise, which meant Benghazi had to rely on Tripoli for further processing. 

The Board found, however, that Washington showed a tendency to 

overemphasize the positive impact of physical security upgrades, which were often 

field-expedient improvements to a profoundly weak platform, while generally 

failing to meet Benghazi's repeated requests to augment the numbers ofTDY DS 

personnel. The insufficient Special Mission compound security platform was at 

variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards 

with respect to perimeter, interior security, and safe areas. Benghazi was also 

under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
136 


207ful45.eps

Security Planning 

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 34 -

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the 

September 11,2001, terrorist attacks, although DS did not issue a worldwide 

caution cable to posts related to the anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and his DS 

agents had taken the anniversary into account by deciding to hold all meetings at 

the SMC that day rather than making any moves outside. 

The Ambassador chose to travel to Benghazi that week, independent of 

Washington, as per standard practice. Timing for his trip was driven in part by 

commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap between principal officers in 

Benghazi. His trip had been put off earlier in the summer, and the September 10-

14 dates were not decided upon well in advance. The Board found that plans for 

the Ambassador's trip provided for minimal close protection security support, and 

that Embassy country team members were not fully aware of planned movements 

off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this 

nature and scale on the U. S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security 

incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government 

advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused 

Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments. 

IMPLEMENTA110N OF SECURiTY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES ON SEPTEMBER 11-12. 2012 

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and 

procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those 

systems themselves and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series 

of attacks that began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission 

compound by dozens of armed attackers. In short, Americans in Benghazi 

and their Tripoli colleagues did their best with what they had, which, in the end, 

was not enough to prevent the loss of lives of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, 

Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. At the same time, U.S. security 

professionals prevented a further loss of life and helped ensure the safe 

evacuation of remaining American personnel in Benghazi 12 hours after the 

attacks began. 

As noted in the preceding section, physical security at the Special Mission 

was insufficient. The SMC perimeter was breached immediately, providing no 

reaction time to the five DS agents on compound. There was no advance warning 

regarding the group of attackers approaching outside the SMC prior to the attack, 

UNCLASSIFIED 
137 


207ful46.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 35 -

and no sign of them on surveillance cameras outside the Cl gate until the attack 

was underway. The Board learned that, as of the time ofthe attacks, the Special 

Mission compound had received additional surveillance cameras, which remained 

in boxes un installed, as technical support to install them had not yet visited post. 

In addition, the camera monitor in the local guard force booth next to the C 1 gate 

was inoperable on the day of the attacks, a repair which also awaited the arrival of 

a technical team. 

Some aspects of physical security upgrades did perform as intended - in 

particular, the safe area in Villa C, which prevented intruders from entering and the 

TOC door, which protected the DS agents from attackers trying to enter. Also, the 

installation of exits in the window grates of the Villa C safe area allowed ARSO 1 

to escape the fire, and those exits were the entry point for him and other DS agents 

and Annex personnel to make mUltiple attempts to rescue and recover Sean Smith 

and Ambassador Stevens. 

The Board found the responses by both BML and February 17 to be 

inadequate. No BML guards were present outside the compound immediately 

before the attack ensued, although perimeter security was one of their 

responsibilities, and there is conflicting information as to whether they sounded 

any alarms prior to fleeing the Cl gate area to other areas of the SMC. Although 

the unarmed BML guards could not be expected to repel an attack, they had core 

responsibility for providing early warning and controlling access to the compound, 

which they had not always performed well in the past. In the final analysis, the 

Board could not determine exactly how the Cl gate at the Special Mission 

compound was breached, but the speed with which attackers entered raised the 

possibility that BML guards left the C 1 pedestrian gate open after initially seeing 

the attackers and fleeing the vicinity. They had left the gate unlatched before. 

The Board's inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards 

alerted Americans at the SMC to the attack or summoned a February 17 militia 

presence to assist expeditiously once the attack was in progress - despite the fact 

that February 17 members were paid to provide interior security and a quick 

reaction force for the SMC and the fact that February 17 barracks were in the close 

vicinity, less than 2 km away from the SMC. A small number of February 17 

militia members arrived at Villa C nearly an hour after the attack began. Although 

some February 17 members assisted in efforts to search for Ambassador Stevens in 

the smoke-filled Villa C building, the Board found little evidence that February 17 

UNCLASSIFIED 
138 


207ful47.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 36 -

contributed meaningfully to the defense of the Special Mission compound, or to 

the evacuation to the airport that took place on the morning of September 12. 

In contrast, DS and Annex personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed 

with courage and an overriding desire to protect and rescue their colleagues, in a 

near impossible situation. The multiple trips that the DS agents and Annex 

security team members made into a burning, smoke-filled building in attempts to 

rescue Sean Smith and Ambassador Stevens showed readiness to risk life and limb 

to save others. They ultimately were unable to save Sean Smith and Ambassador 

Stevens, due to the intensity of the heat and smoke and a lack of resources, 

including breathing apparatus. The DS agents' decision to depart the SMC without 

the Ambassador came after they had all suffered smoke inhalation due to multiple 

rescue attempts, and amidst a renewed attack that continued as they departed the 

compound. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to protect, 

rescue, and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, and that the bravery of 

the DS agents present in Benghazi helped prevent a further loss of life, particularly 

given their assistance in defending the Annex. 

The Board found that the lack of non-lethal crowd control options also 

precluded a more vigorous defense of the SMC. The Board also determined that 

the lack of fire safety equipment severely impacted the Ambassador's and Sean 

Smith's ability to escape the deadly smoke conditions. On the other hand, the DS 

agents' tactical driving training, as well as their fully-armored vehicle, saved their 

lives when they were attacked by weapons fire en route from the SMC to the 

Annex. In addition, the DS emergency medical training and the DS-issued 

personal medical kit saved an ARSO's life after he was severely injured by a 

mortar attack at the Annex. 

The Board found the Libyan government's response to be profoundly 

lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and a near total 

absence of central government influence in Benghazi. The Libyan government did 

facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the 

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. It also facilitated 

the departure of the charter plane carrying the Tripoli rescue team to Benghazi, and 

provided a Libyan Air Force C-130 that was used to evacuate remaining personnel 

and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi on the morning of September 12. 

Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi communication, cooperation, and 

coordination on the night of the attacks were effective, despite multiple channels of 

UNCLASSIFIED 
139 


207ful48.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 37 -

communication among Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, and AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as multiple channels of communication within 

Washington itself. Embassy Tripoli served as a lifeline to Benghazi throughout the 

attacks, marshalling support from Washington, Stuttgart and elsewhere, including 

quickly organizing the charter plane that sent the seven-person reinforcement team 

to Benghazi. At the direction of AFRICOM, DoD moved a remotely piloted, 

unarmed surveillance aircraft to Benghazi, which arrived over the SMC shortly 

before the OS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance 

aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of personnel from 

the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 12. 

Embassy Tripoli staff showed absolute dedication and teamwork in 

mobilizing to respond to the crisis, with the DCM, DATT, Political, and other 

country team sections reaching out to a wide range of contacts in Tripoli and 

Benghazi to secure support; the Public Affairs team monitoring social media sites 

and recording a log of Mission calls; the Embassy nurse providing invaluable 

guidance on caring for the wounded evacuated from Benghazi; and a Consular 

officer donating blood that helped save the life of a wounded colleague. 

Throughout the crisis, the Acting NEA Assistant Secretary provided crucial 

leadership guidance to Embassy Tripoli's DCM, and Embassy Tripoli's RSO 

offered valuable counsel to the DS agents in Benghazi. 

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was 

not enough time given the speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military assets to 

have made a difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were underway soon 

after Washington received initial word of the attacks and continued through the 

night. The Board found no evidence of any undue delays in decision making or 

denial of support from Washington or from the military combatant commanders. 

Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation of all U.S. government personnel from 

Benghazi twelve hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein Air 

Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. government coordination and 

military response and helped save the lives of two severely wounded Americans. In 

addition, at the State Department's request, the Department of Defense also 

provided a Marine FAST (Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team) as additional 

security support for Embassy Tripoli on September 12. 

Overall, communication systems on the night ofthe attacks worked, with a 

near-constant information flow among Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington. Cell 

phones were the main method of contact, but lacked redundancy. Radio 

UNCLASSIFIED 
140 


207ful49.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 38 -

communications between the Annex and the SMC also worked well, thanks to 

prior coordination between the two. 

Shortly after receiving the initial notification from Embassy Tripoli at 

approximately 1545 EST, the State Department Operations Center notified the 

interagency, including the White House, of the Special Mission attack by secure 

conference call and email alerts. The Operations Center and the Diplomatic 

Security Command Center (DSCC) were exemplary in eliciting information from 

Tripoli- and Benghazi-based colleagues without overloading them. 

IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION A VAlLABILlTY 

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical 

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the 

intelligence community's understanding of extremist militias in Libya and 

the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats 

were known to exist. 

Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the 

conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions 

cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of 

specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist 

attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security 

and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning 

intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was 

possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated, 

sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and 

understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of 

foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi. The latter 

information failed to come into clear relief against a backdrop of the lack of 

effective governance, widespread and growing political violence and instability 

and the ready availability of weapons in eastern Libya. There were U.S. 

assessments that provided situational awareness on the persistent, general threat to 

U.S. and Western interests in eastern Libya, including Benghazi. Board members, 

however, were struck by the lack of discussion focused specifically on Benghazi. 

Benghazi's threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the 

"gelatina" bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to 

have reached a critical point before September 11. The July 7 elections, about 

UNCLASSIFIED 
141 


207ful50.eps

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 39 -

which there had been some trepidation regarding the security situation, passed with 

less violence than expected and were followed by Ramadan, when incidents are 

usually lower. Before September 11, a patchwork of militias in Benghazi had 

assumed many, ifnot all, of the security functions normally associated with central 

government organs, as the government had little authority or reach in Benghazi. 

There seemed to be no attempt, however, to link formally the many anti-Western 

incidents in Benghazi, the general declarations of threat in U.S. assessments and a 

proliferation of violence-prone and little understood militias, the lack of any 

central authority and a general perception of a deteriorating security environment 

to any more specific and timely analysis of the threat to U.S. government facilities. 

Board members found that there was little understanding of militias in 

Benghazi and the threat they posed to U.S. interests. One prime factor behind this 

knowledge gap was that eastern Libya is home to many militias, which are 

constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming. Furthermore, many 

individuals are associated with more than one militia. Understanding of February 

17, in particular, was further limited by the fact that it is an umbrella organization, 

made up of many different militias with differing ideologies, some of which are 

extremist in nature. 

The Board determined there were no warnings from Libyan interlocutors. 

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PERSONNEL 

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two 

bureaus in critical positions of authority and responsibility in Washington 

demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability 

appropriate for the State Department's senior ranks in their responses to 

security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating 

threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection. 

However, the Board did not find that any individual U.S. Government 

employee engaged in misconduct or willfully ignored his or her responsibilities, 

and, therefore did not find reasonable cause to believe that an individual 

breached his or her duty so as to be the subject of a recommendation for 

disciplinary action. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
142 

APPENDIX D—SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS REPORT ON 

BENGHAZI 


207FUL51.eps
143 


207FUL52.eps

While our country spent September 11,2012, remembering the terrorist attacks that took place 

II years earlier, brave Americans posted at U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, were 

fighting for their lives against a terrorist assault. When the fight ended, U.S. Ambassador to 

Libya John C. (Chris) Stevens and three other Americans were dead and U.S. facilities in 

Benghazi were left in ruin. We must remember the sacrifice that these selfless public servants 

made to support the struggle for freedom in Libya and to improve our own national security. 

While we mourn their deaths, it is also crucial that we learn from how they died. By examining 

the circumstances of the attack in Benghazi on September 11 'h, we hope to gain a better 

understanding of what went wrong and what we must do now to ensure better protection for 

American diplomatic personnel who must sometimes operate in dangerous places abroad. 

We are cognizant that the Congressionally-mandated Accountability Review Board (ARB) of the 

Department of State has now issued its important and constructive report and that other 

Congressional committees are investigating the Benghazi attack as well. Each makes significant 

contributions to our collective understanding of what transpired and what we must do going 

forward. 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC), pursuant to its 

authority under Rule XXV(k) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, Section 101 ofS. Res 445 

(108th Congress) and Section 12(e) ofS. Res 81 (I 12th Congress), has a unique mandate to 

investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental agencies, especially when matters 

that span multiple government agencies are involved. Over the years, HSGAC has spent much 

time and dedicated considerable resources to understanding the challenges inherent in national 

security interagency relationships, and it is through this lens that we have examined and drawn 

lessons from the attack in Benghazi. 

Since the 112'h Congress is drawing to a close, this investigation has necessarily been conducted 

with a sense of urgency and with focused objectives. Our findings and recommendations are 

based on investigative work that the Committee has conducted since shortly after the attack of 

September 11,2012, including meetings of members and staff with senior and mid-level 

government officials; reviews of thousands of pages of documents provided by the Department 

of State, Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community (IC); written responses to 

questions posed by the Committee to these agencies; and reading of publicly-available 

documents. 

In the report that follows we provide a brief factual overview of the attacks in Benghazi and then 

discuss our findings and recommendations. 

Brief Overview of the Benghazi Attacks 

The attacks in Benghazi occurred at two different locations: a Department of State "Temporary 

Mission Facility" and an Annex facility ("Annex") approximately a mile away used by another 

agency of the United States Government. On September ll'h, Ambassador Stevens was in 

Benghazi, accompanied by two Diplomatic Security (OS) agents who had traveled there with 

him. Also present were three other DS agents and a Foreign Service Officer, Sean Smith, who 

were posted at the Temporary Mission Facility ("facility" or "'compound"). There were also three 
144 


207FUL53.eps

members of the February 17 Brigade, a Libyan militia deputized by the Libyan government but 

not under its direct control, and four unarmed local contract guards protecting the compound. 

During the day on September 11 th, the Ambassador held several meetings on the compound and 

retired to his room at approximately 9:00 p.m. local time. About 40 minutes later, several agents 

and guards heard loud shouting, noises coming from the gate, as well as gun tire, and an 

explosion. A closed-circuit television monitor at the facility's Tactical Operations Center 

("'TOC") showed a large number of armed people Howing unimpeded through the main gate. 

One of the OS agents in the compound's TOC triggered an audible alarm, and immediately 

alerted the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and OS headquarters in Washington. These notifications 

were quickly transmitted from the Department of State to the Department of Defense. OS 

headquarters maintained open phone lines with the OS personnel throughout the attack. That 

same OS agent also called the Annex to request assistance from security personnel there, who 

immediately began to prepare to aid the U.S. personnel at the diplomatic facility. 

When the allack commenced, four OS agents and Foreign Service Ofticer Smith were in or just 

outside the same building where the Ambassador was spending that night. A fifth OS agent was 

in the Toe when the terrorist attack began. Ambassador Stevens, Smith, and one OS agent 

sought shelter in the building'S safe haven, a fortified area designed to kecp intruders out, while 

the other three agents went to retrieve additional weapons and tactical gear such as body armor, 

helmets, and ammunition. After retrieving their gear, at least two of the OS agents sought to 

return to the building where the Ambassador was. On the way back, however, the OS agents 

encountered attackers. The lone OS agent with the Ambassador reported via radio that he was 

secure within the safe haven, allowing the two agents who had left in search of weapons to seek 

refuge in the same building where they had armed themselves. The third OS agent who had gone 

to the TOe to retrieve his gear, stayed there with the OS agent who had been manning the TOe 

since the beginning of the attack. 

The attackers started to set several of the compound's structures on fire, using diesel fuel found 

on site, and groups of attackers tried to enter several buildings on the compound. The attackers 

did not succeed in entering the TOe, but did succeed in entering the building where Ambassador 

Stevens was staying and the building where the two OS agents were seeking refuge. No safe 

havens were breached during the initial assault. The attackers spread the diesel fuel throughout 

the building where the Ambassador was hiding, and ignited it, causing the building to fill with 

smoke. 

When the smoke became so thick that breathing was difficult, the OS agent attempted to lead the 

Ambassador and Smith to escape through a nearby window. The agent opened the window to 

make sure it was safe to leave, and stepped out but then realized he had become separated from 

the Ambassador and Smith. The agent radioed the TOe, requesting assistance and returned 

numerous times to the building to look for the Ambassador and Smith. When the other agents 

arrived, they also took turns entering and searching the building. Though they were able to find 

and remove Smith's body, they were unable to find Ambassador Stevens. 

After being notificd about the attack, Annex personnel had attempted to contact the February 17 

Brigade, other militias, and the Libyan government to ask for assistance. After gathering 
145 


207FUL54.eps

necessary weapons and gear, at approximately 10:04 p.m., six security personnel and a translator 

left the Annex en route to the facility. Prior to reaching thc facility, they again attempted to 

contact and enlist assistance from the February 17 Brigade, other militias, and the Libyan 

government. By 10:25 p.m., the security personnel from the Annex had entered the compound 

and engaged in a IS-minute firefight with the armed invaders. The team reached the 

Ambassador's building at 10:40 p.m. but was unable to find him due to the intense fire and 

smoke. 

At II :15 p.m., the Annex security personnel sent the OS agents (who were all suffering from 

smoke inhalation from their continuous search for Ambassador Stevens and Smith) to the Annex, 

and followed there later, both groups taking fire while en route. 8y this time, an unmanned, 

unarmed surveillance aircraft began circling over the Benghazi compound, having been diverted 

by the Department of Defense from its previous surveillance assignment over another location. 

Soon after the Americans returned to the Annex, just before midnight, they were attacked by 

rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms fire. The sporadic attacks stopped at 

approximately 1:0 I a.m. 

U.S. government security personnel who were based in Tripoli had deployed to Benghazi by 

chartered aircraft after receiving word ofthe attack, arriving at the Benghazi airport at I: IS a.m. 

They were held at the airport for at least three hours whi Ie they negotiated with Libyan 

authorities about logistics. The exact cause of this hours-long delay, and its relationship to the 

rescue effort, remains unclear and merits further inquiry. Was it simply the result of a difficult 

Libyan bureaucracy and a chaotic environment or was it part of a plot to keep American help 

from reaching the Americans under siege in Benghazi? 

The team from Tripoli finally cleared the airport and arrived at the Annex at approximately 5 :04 

a.m., about ten minutes before a new assault by the terrorist began, involving mortar rounds fired 

at the Annex. The attack concluded at approximately 5:26 a.m., leaving Annex security team 

members Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty dead and two others wounded. The decision was then 

made to leave the Annex. Libyan forces, not militia, arrived around 6:00 a.m. with 50 vehicles 

and escorted the Americans to the airport. Two planes carrying all remaining U.S. personnel then 

left Benghazi. The first flight departed between 7:00 a.m. and 7:40 a.m. (agency timelines vary 

on this point) and the second at 10:00 a.m. 

***** 

American government officials outside of Benghazi learned of the attack shortly after it started at 

3:40 p.m. EST (9:40 p.m. Benghazi time). OS agents, in addition to notifying personnel at the 

Annex, immediately alerted officials at the U.S Embassy in Tripoli and the Department of State 

Headquarters in Washington, D.C. As noted earlier, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) at 

the Department of Defense (DOD) directed an unarmed surveillance aircraft to the skies over the 

Benghazi compound at 3 :59 p.m. EST. It arrived there at 5: 10 p.m. EST (II: 10 p.m. Benghazi 

time). At 4:32 p.m., the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon alerted the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, and the information was shared with Secretary of 

Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStatl: General Martin Dempsey. 

Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey were at the White House for a previously scheduled 

3 
146 


207FUL55.eps

meeting at 5:00 p.m. and so were able to brief the President on the developments in Benghazi as 

they were occurring. 

From 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. EST, Secretary Panetta met with senior DOD officials to discuss the 

Benghazi attack and other violence in the region in reaction to the anti-Muslim video. The 

Secretary directed three actions: 1) that one Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon 

stationed in Rota, Spain, deploy to Benghazi and that a second F AS']' platoon in Rota prepare to 

deploy to Tripoli; 2) that U.S. European Command's In-extremis Force, which happened to be 

training in central Europe, deploy to a staging hase in southern Europe; and 3) that a special 

operations force based in the United States deploy to a staging base in southern Europe. The 

National Command Center transmitted formal authorization for these actions at 8:39 p.m. A 

FAST platoon arrived in Tripoli the evening (local time) of September 12th, and the other forces 

arrived that evening at a staging base in Italy, long after the terrorist attack on the U.S. facilities 

in Benghazi had ended and four Americans had been killed. 1 

I The details of this narrative are based on briefings to the Committee in November 2012~ as well as publicly 

available documents describing the narrative provided by the Depal1ment of State and the Department of Defense. 
147 


207FUL56.eps

Key Findings and Recommendations 

Finding 1. In the months leading up to the attack on the Temporary Mission Facility in 

Benghazi, there was a large amount of evidence gathered by the U.S. Intelligence 

Community (I C) and from open sources that Benghazi was increasingly dangerous and 

unstable, and that a significant attack against American personnel there was becoming 

much more likely. While this intelligence was effectively shared within the Intelligence 

Community (IC) and with key officials at the Department of State, it did not lead to a 

commensurate increase in security at Benghazi nor to a decision to close the American 

mission there, either of which would have been more than justified by the intelligence 

presented. 

Security decisions concerning U.S. facilities and personnel overseas are informed by several 

different types of information. including classified threat reporting trom the IC; cables and spot 

reports from U.S. diplomatic posts, which describe local incidents and threats; and publicly 

available information. Prior to the attack, the IC and the Department of State were aware ofthe 

overall threat landscape in Libya and the challenges facing the new Libyan government in 

addressing those threats. This understanding evolved over time, consistent with broader changes 

in the nature of the threat, and also based on reported incidents and attacks in Benghazi and other 

parts of Libya in 2012. 

The Committee has reviewed dozens of classified intelligence reports on the evolution of threats 

in Libya which were issued between February 2011 and September II, 2012, We are precluded 

in this report from discussing the information in detail, but overall, these intelligence reports (as 

the ARB similarly noted) provide a clear and vivid picture of a rapidly deteriorating threat 

environment in eastern Libya-one that we believe should have been sufficient to inform policymakers of the growing danger to U.S. facilities and personnel in that part of the country and the 

urgency of them doing something about it. This information was effectively shared by the IC 

with key officials at the Department of State. For example, both the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for International Programs in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Charlene Lamb, who 

was responsible for the security at more than 275 diplomatic facilities, and former Regional 

Security Officer (RSO) for Libya Eric Nordstrom, who was the principal security adviser to the 

U.S. Ambassador in Libya from September 21,2011 to July 26,2012, told the Committee that 

they had full access to all threat information from the IC about eastern Libya during the months 

before the attack of September 11,2012. 2 Yet the Department failed to take adequate action to 

protect its personnel there. 

Tbis classified intelligence reporting was complemented by open-source reporting on attacks and 

other incidents targeting western interests in Libya during the months prior to the September II, 

2012 attack. The RSO in Libya compiled a list of 234 security incidents in Libya between June 

2011 and July 2012,50 of which took place in Benghazi] The document describes an array of 

incidents, including large-scale militia clashes, protests involving several hundred people, and 

the temporary detention of non-governmental organization (NGO) workers and of U.S. 

diplomatic personnel in Benghazi. Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy noted in a 

Charlene Lamb and Eric Nordstrom, interviews with Committee staff, December 2012. 

3 U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya, Regional Security Office, "Security Incidents since June 2011." 
148 


207FUL57.eps

briefin¥ for the Committee, that Libya and Benghazi were "t1ashing red" around the time of the 

attack. 

The incident reporting shows that western facilities and personnel became an increasing focus of 

threats in the spring 0[2012. For example, on April 2, 2012 in Benghazi, a British diplomatic 

vehicle was attacked by a mob of demonstrators. Four days later, on April 6th , a crude 

improvised explosive device (lED) was thrown over the wall of the U.S. facility in Benghazi, 

causing minimal damage. A spot report on the day of the event stated that shortly after the event 

two individuals were questioned. The suspects included onc current and one former guard 

employed by Blue Mountain Group, the company which supplied the unarmed Libyan contract 

guards responsible for screening visitors to the U.S. compound- underscoring the potential risk 

of an insider threat in Benghazi. 5 Four days afterthat, on April 10th , also in Benghazi, a crude 

lED was thrown at the convoy of the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya. 6 

Other publicly reported incidents occurred during this time £i'ame, but there are four that we 

believe are particularly noteworthy. Taken as a whole, they demonstrated the capability and 

intent of Benghazi-based Islamist extremist groups to conduct a significant attack against U.S. or 

other western interests in Libya: 

On May 22, 2012, the International Committee for the Red CrosslRed Crescent (JCRC) 

building in Benghazi was hit by two RPG rounds, causing damage to the building but no 

casualties. Several days later, the Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel 

Rahman claimed responsibility for this attack, accusing the ICRC of proselytizing in 

Libya 7 

On June 6, 2012, the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi was targeted by an 

lED attack that blew a hole in the perimeter wall. Credit for this attack was also claimed 

by the Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, which said it carried out 

the attack in response to the reported drone strike on al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi 

in Northern Waziristan. 8 

On June 11,2012, an attack was carried out in Benghazi on the convoy of the British 

Ambassador to Libya. Attackers fired an RPG on the convoy, followed by small arms 

fire. Two British bodyguards were injured in the attack. This attack was characterized 

afterwards in an incident report by the Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security as a "complex, coordinated attack."g 

4 Committee Member briefing, November 14, 2012. 

S REDACTED, e-mail message to DS-IP-NEA, April 6, 2012. 

(, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya, Regional Security Office, "Security Incidents since June 2011." 

'Ibid. 

S Ibid. 

"REDACTED, e-mail message to DS-IP-NEA; DSCC~E TIAlPll; DSCC~E TIAilTA; DSCC~C DS Seniors, 

"Benghazi ~ SR ~ Attack on British Ambassador Motorcadc~ 06112012," June 11,2012. 
149 


207FUL58.eps

On June 18,2012, the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi was stormed by individuals 

affiliated with Ansar al-Sharia Libya (AAS), allegedly because of "attacks by Tunisian 

artists against Islam." 10 

Overall, the threat to western interests in eastern Libya and in Benghazi spccifically was high 

even prior to the attack of September II, 2012. Reviewing these incidents, an unclassified open 

source report by a contractor to AFRICOM noted in July 2012 that: 

"Nonetheless, Benghazi has seen a notable increase in violence in recent months, 

particularly against international targets. These events point to strong anti-Western 

sentiments among certain segments of the population, the willingness ofSalafi-jihadi 

groups in the city to openly engage in violence against foreign targets, and their capacity 

to carry out these attacks." II 

Taking classified reporting on the increasing dangers in eastern Libya together with the open 

source incidents should have provided a clear picture ofthe dangers for American personnel in 

Benghazi unless their security were greatly improved, 

Finding 2. Notwithstanding the increasingly dangerous environment in eastern Libya in 

2011 and 2012, the U.S. government did not have specific intelligence of an imminent 

attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi. The lack of such actionable intelligence may reflect 

a failnre in the Ie to focus sufficiently on terrorist groups that have weak or no operational 

ties to core al Qaeda and its main affiliates. 

While the IC had developed and adequately shared gencral threat information on terrorist groups 

and Islamist extremist militias in eastern Libya prior to the attack, it did not have specific 

warning that this attack was to take place on September II, 2012. Intelligence capabilities that 

provide early, specific warnings have played a critical role in preventing terrorist attacks against 

U.S. facilities overseas and in the homeland in the last decade. 12 There were no such warnings 

available for Benghazi before the attack of September 11,2012. Why? 

First, there may not have been significant or elaborate advance planning for the attack. In a 

hearing before our Committee on September 19, 2012, National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC) Director Matthew Olsen described the attack as "opportunistic" and stated that the IC 

had no indication of "significant advanced planning or coordination for this attack." 13 

10 lIadeel AI-Shalchi, "Gunmen attack Tunisian consulate in Benghazi," Reuters, June 18,2012. 

bttp://wwv..reuters.eomlarticlc"20 12/06/ 18/us-libya-gunmen-tunisia-idLSBRE85Hl V620 1:20618; Michel Cousins, 

"Tunisian Consulate in Benghazi attacked," Lihya Herald, June 18,2012. 

http:;";"~V\\·w .libvahcrald. comi20 [2/06· 18 .ltuni siaIJ-~DnsLllate-in-12~J)ghazi -aUac ked:' 

II Navanti Group, Security Conditions in Benghazi. Libya, July 12.2012. 

12 However, as discussed later in this report, reliance solely on early warning intelligence is insufficient for making 

security improvement decisions. 

U Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing before the llomeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, United States Senate, 11th Cong., September 19, 2012. (Statement of Matthew Olsen, Director, 

NCTC). 

7 
150 


207FUL59.eps

Ilowever, the activities of local terrorist and [slamist extremist groups in Libya may have 

received insufficient attention from the [C prior to the attack, partially because some of the 

groups possessed ambiguous operational ties to core al Qaeda and its primary affiliates. For 

example, public statements by Libyan officials and many news reports have indicated that Ansar 

al-Sharia Libya (AAS) was one of the key groups involved in carrying out this attack on the U.S. 

facility in Benghazi. The group took credit on its own Facebook page for the attack before later 

deleting the post. U.S. officials viewed AAS p,rior to the attack as a "local extremist group with 

an eye on gaining political ground in Libya." 4AAS has not been designated as a foreign terrorist 

organization by the U.S. government, and apparently the IC was "not focused" on this group to 

the same extent as core al Qaeda and its operational afliliates. 15 

This finding has broader implications for U.S. counterterrorism activities in the Middle East and 

North Africa. With Osama bin Laden dead and core al Qaeda weakened, a new collection of 

violent [slamist extremist organizations and cells have emerged in the last two to three years. 

These groups are not all operationally linked to core al Qaeda or in some cases have only weak 

ties to al Qaeda. This trend is particularly notable in countries such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and 

Syria that are going through political transition or military conflict as a result ofthe political 

upheavals referred to as the "Arab Spring.,,16 

While such groups do not always have strong operational tics to al Qacda, they adhere to a 

similar violent [slamist extremist ideology. As an unclassified August 2012 report by the Library 

of Con~ress noted, AAS in Libya shares common symbols (the black flag) and ideology with al 

Qaeda. 7 This Committee has spent several years focusing on the role that this ideology plays in 

motivating homegrown violent Islamist extremists, most of whom have no direct ties to al 

Qaeda. A similar phenomenon, though potentially much more dangerous, is at work with respect 

to many of these nascent terrorist groups, and is leading many of them to shift their focus from 

local grievances to foreign attacks against U.S. and other western facilities overseas. 

Recommendation: U.S. intelligence agencies must broaden and deepen their focus in Libya, and 

beyond, on nascent violent [slamist extremist groups in the region that lack strong operational 

ties to core al Qaeda or its main affiliate groups. 18 One benefit of doing so would be improved 

tactical warning capabilities, the kind of which were not present at Benghazi, but might have 

been even for an "opportunistic" attack. 

14 Eli Lake, "Ansar al Sharia's Role in Benghazi Attacks still a Mystery," The Daily Beast, November 5, 2012, 

hltr:/:\\'\ ... w ,thedai[ybeas1.c()ITl/article~ 2012/ I I i05/ansar-aJ-sharia-s-role-in-b~m.dlaLj -at18cks-sti lJ-a-nwsterv. html 

15 Ibid. 

16 For a general discussion of this phenomenon: Robert F. Worth, "AI Qaeda-Inspired Groups, Minus Goal of 

Striking U.S.", The New York Times, October 27,2012, 

htur e,\Y2~,W. 11 yti nICS.co mi20 1 2/1 0/2 8/world:' m idd le~ast ;"(11-'-1 aed a-i !lSP i r~d-groll ps-rn i nus-2.oal-o [-striking -us. html 

17 Federal Research Division, Library ofCongress,AI-Qaeda in Libya: A Pr~/ile, August 2012. See, e.g., the 

discussion of two local Libyan Islamist-oriented militias-Ansar al~Sharia and al-A 'hrar Libya-which are 

described as broadcasting "typical al-Qaeda-type propaganda on the Internet."(33), http://freeheacon.com/wQ: 

contcl'11/uploads'ZO 12: I Oil.Oe -AQ-I.ibva.pdf 

I H As discussed further, infra, the State Department and the Ie must also think beyond "warning" intelligence of 

specific attacks when making security decisions. This is one of the key lessons ofthe Accountability Review Board 

(ARB) Reports on the 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 

8 
151 


207FUL60.eps

Finding 3. The absence of specific intelligence about an imminent attack should not have 

prevented the Department of State from taking more effective steps to protect its personnel 

and facilities in Benghazi. 

This finding reflects earlier conclusions of the 1985 Advisory Panel on Overseas Security 

("Inman Report") and the 1999 Accountability Review Board report on the attacks on the U.S. 

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which both warned the Department of State against becoming 

too reliant on tactical intelligence to determine the level of potential terrorist threats. The Inman 

report points out that "it would be foolhardy to make security decisions on the basis of an 

expectation of advance warning of peril." 19 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb stated that the level and kind of attack at Benghazi 

was something they had never seen before anywhere in the world. 2D However, given clear 

warnings that threats were increasing in the Benghazi area, the Department of State should not 

have waited for a specific incident to happen or expected the delivery of tactical intelligence of a 

specific. imminent threat before taking additional steps to protect its diplomats or, if that was not 

possible, to close the Benghazi facility. 

Recommendation: In providing security for its personnel around the world, the Department of 

State must fully consider the types of attacks that could take place given the strategic threat 

environment, even in the absence of imminent warning intelligence. 

Finding 4. Prior to the terrorist attacks in Libya on September 11,2012, it was widely 

understood that the Libyan government was incapable of performing its duty to protect 

U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel, as required by longstanding international 

agreements, but the Department of State failed to take adequate steps to fill the resulting 

security gap, or to invest in upgrading the Libyan security forces. 

A host country's responsibility to protect and safeguard a foreign nation's diplomatic personnel 

and facilities in its country has been codified in several international treaties,21 including the 

1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, whieh states that "[tlhe receiving State is under 

a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the consular premises against any intrusion 

or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the consular post or impairment of its 

dignity.,,22 The Treaty also states that "[t]he receiving State shall treat consular otlicers with due 

19 Inman Report, Report of the Secretary of State's AdvisOlY Panel on Overseas Security. (June 1985). 

httn://I.vww .f3s.org/jrp/threat'inman/, 

20 Charlene Lamb, interview with Committee staff, December 6, 2012. 

"See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. CiT. 1986) (Bark, J.), (citing 2 C. Hyde, International Law 1249 

(1945)) ("The principle that host states have a special responsibility to ensure that foreign embassies and the 

personnel inside them are free from threats of violence and intimidation is 'solidly entrenched in the Law of 

Nations.'''). 

22 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Adopted April 24, 1963, entered into force, March 19, 1967) Art. 31; 

see also The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 22 (Adopted April 18, 1961, entered into torce, 

April 29, 1964). 

9 
152 


207ful61.eps

respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or 

dignity.,,23 

A host country's protection of an American embassy or other diplomatic facilities is one of the 

most important elements of security at that facility, but it is not the only one. A facility's own 

security, such as its U.S. Marine Corps Security Guards, DS agents, and in some cases, private 

security guards under contract, is also critical to its overall security posture. States whose 

governments do not exercise full control over their sovereign territory, or that have a limited 

security capability, cannot be counted on to safeguard U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. 

This is usually true, of course, in the aftermath of a revolution or civil war - as was the case in 

Libya - where the provision of protective services by the host nations is unpredictable at best. In 

those instances, the Department of State must improve one or more ofthe other three protectors 

of mission security within its control: Marine Corps Security Guards, Dipolmatic Security 

agents, or private security contractors. 

In February 2011, the revolution began to end Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi's autocratic rule of 

Libya. Between February and October of2011, Libya was consumed with intense fighting 

between anti-government groups and Qadhafi's regime. On October 20,2011, opposition forces 

conquered the last Qadhafi stronghold in Sirte and killed Qadhafi. Qadhafi's death ended the 

revolt but left open the question of who would govern Libya and how. 

Just days after Qadhafi's death, Libyans turned to the interim Transitional National Council 

(TNC), established in the spring 0[2011, to improve security and begin (he process of 

reconstituting national institutions. 24 However, the TNC faced numerous challenges and 

"struggled to calm the incendiary regional and factional disputes or exert control even over its 

own militias.,,25 Since no cohesive opposition group emerged from the civil war, the TNC had to 

contend with various armed factions that "remained a law unto themselves. ,,26 

On July 7, 2012, Libyan voters participated in the first national election since 1965 and elected 

200 members to the General National Congress. 27 The election of the General National Congress 

represented a significant political achievement, but the formation of a new government was still 

under negotiation when the attacks in Benghazi occurred three months later in September. Civil 

order had not yet been restored. According to one expert review, "la]ttacks on international 

targets, a series of aggressive attacks by armed Salafists on religious buildings around the 

country, and an assassination campaign against senior security officers have fueled widespread 

criticism of interim leaders since early 2012.,,28 

Given the unstable political and security situation, particularly in eastern Libya, the Libyan 

government was unable to provide security protection to foreign diplomatic facilities in a manner 

23 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Adopted April 24, 1963, entered into [orce, March 19, 1967) Art. 40. 

24 Christopher M. Blanchard, Congressional Research Service, l.ihya: Transition and U.S. Policy, October 18, 2012 

(16). 

2S Adam Nossitcr and Karccm Fahim, "Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official Promises Elections and a More Pious 

State," New York Times, October 24, 2011, AID. 

26 Ibid. 

27 Blanchard (17). 

28 Blanchard (6). 

10 
153 


207ful62.eps

consistent with international law. That is why the Department of State relied in part on a local 

militia, the February 17 Brigade, to provide protection for the Benghazi facility, as well as 

unarmed Libyan guards under contract with a private security firm. Throughout 2012, 

Department of State officials questioned the February 17 Brigade's competence and expressed 

concerns about its abilities. 29 U.S. Department of State personnel were also concerned about the 

involvement of members of the February 17 Brigade in the extrajudicial detention of U.S. 

diplomatic personnel in at least one incident in Benghazi. 30 Eric Nordstrom, told the Committee 

that while the February 17 Brigade did provide some protection and would likely respond to an 

attack, they clearly needed additional training. 31 Only limited training ever occurred. 

Some U.S. personnel also questioned the Brigade's loyalty to the Libyan government and their 

capacity or desire to safeguard American interests. 32 In June 2012, an RSO in Benghazi wrote, 

"Unfortunately, given the current threat to the diplomatic mission, the militia members not 

currently on the [four-man team stationed at the facility] have expressed concern with showing 

active open support for the Americans in Benghazi.,,3] Notably, the contract between the State 

Department and the February 17 Brigade had expired by the time of the attack. In a handoff 

email to his replacement on August 29,2012, the principal U.S. diplomatic omcer in Benghazi 

wrote that the contract with the militia "lapsed several weeks ago" but that they were still 

operating under its terms. He said that "[t]his is a delicate issue, as we are relying on a militia in 

lieu of the central authorities and [Feb 17 Brigade] has been implicated in several of the recent 

detentions. We also have the usual concerns re their ultimate loyalties. But they are competent, 

and give us an added measure of security. For the time being, J don't think we have a viable 

alternative.'']4 In early September, a member ofthc Fcbruary 17 Brigade told another RSO in 

Benghazi that it could no longer support U.S. personnel movements. The RSO also asked 

specifically if the militia could provide additional support for the Ambassador's pending visit 

and was told no. 35 

Thc ability of the Libyan government to provide surge forces to rescue or evacuate personnel 

from the Benghazi facility was also extremely limited. The Department of State recognized this 

Iimitation. 36 As early as February 1,2012, RSO Nordstrom statcd in a memo to his supcriors that 

the political situation in post-revolution Libya "was fragile" and that "[ m ] any basic state 

institutions, including emergency services and tourist facilities are not yet fully operational.,,]7 

29 Sec, for example, REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, January 4, 2012; or REDACTED, e·mail 

message to REDACTED, April I, 2012. 

30 "Security Incidents since June 2011," U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya, Regional Security Office and REDACTED, 

email (0 DS-IP-NEA, "Benghazi RSO Spot Report," March 15,2012. 

31 Eric Nordstrom, interview with Committee staff, December 7, 2012. The State Department did provide some 

training to members of the Brigade. 

32 See, for example, REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, January 4. 2012; or REDACTED, e-mail 

message to REDACTED, April 1,2012. See also, REDACTED, email (0 REDACTED, June 17,2012. 

33 REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, June 17,2012. 

"REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, "Benghazi Hand·oITNotes," August 29, 2012. 

35 REDACTED, e-mail message to Charlene Lamb, "Ambassador's protective detail in Benghazi," September 20, 

2012. 

_,6 The Security Failures of Benghazi: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. 

Congress, 112'" Cong., October 10,2012. (Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer, Tripoli, Libya from 

9/21111 - 7/26112). 

17RSO Eric Nordstrom, Memorandum (0 DS/DSS/TJAlOSAC, "OSAC Crime and Safety Report," February 1,2012. 

11 
154 


207ful63.eps

Nordstrom noted that "various factions and militias continue to vie for power in the absence of a 

stable political and security environment, often resulting in violence.,,3 

This view of the Libyan government's inadequate security capabilities persisted through the 

attack on September II, 2012. Communications from U.S. personnel in Libya continued to 

repeat the same conclusions stated by Nordstrom earlier in February. For instance, an early 

August cable from the Tripoli Embassy to the Department of State in Washington, states that 

even though the TNC had established a Supreme Security Council (SSC) to stabilize the security 

situation in Benghazi, its own commander had said that the SSC had "not coalesced into an 

effective, stable security force.,,39 Further, the cable warned that the "absence of a significant 

deterrence, has contributed to a security vacuum that is being exploited by independent actors.,,40 

Similarly, an August 20,2012 security update reported that other diplomats believed the SSC 

was "'fading away,' unwilling to take on 'anyone with powerful patrons from powerful 

tribes. ,,,41 That same month, OS personnel reviewing tripwires for an ordered departurc42 of the 

post - that is, political, security, and intelligence benchmarks which would prompt diplomatic 

officials to close a facility or modify its operations - stated that "[mJission opinion is that Libyan 

security forces are indifferent to the safety needs ofthe U.S. mission.,,43 On September 11,2012, 

the day ofthe attack, the "Weekly Report" prepared by Department of State officers on the 

security situation in Benghazi described the frustrations of an SSC commander that the police 

and security forces were "too weak to keep the country secure. ,,44 

Prior to Ambassador Stevens' visit to Benghazi in September 2012, the U.S. mission in Benghazi 

had made a request to thc Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs for additional security in Benghazi 

to support the visit. At a minimum, these requests included appeals for a 2417 police presence 

consisting of a vehicle and personnel at each of the compound's three gates 45 The only Libyan 

government response appears to have been an SSC police vehicle parked in front of the front 

gate (which, as the ARB noted, sped away as the attack began). 

Though a few members of the February 17 Brigade and the Libya Shield militia assisted the 

Americans on the night of the attack, the security that these militias and the local police provided 

to U.S. personnel was woefully inadequate to the dangerous security environment in Benghazi. 

The unarmed local contract guards also provided no meaningful resistance to the attackers. The 

Department of State's Inspector General had previously found that concerns about local security 

guards were not limited to Libya. A February 2012 Department of State Inspector General (IG) 

report found that more than two-thirds of 86 diplomatic posts around the world surveyed 

38 Ibid. 

"REDACTED, e-l11ail message to REDACTED. "The Guns of August: security in eastern Libya," August 8, 2012. 

40 Ibid. 

41 REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, "Benghazi Weekly Report, Special Eid al-Fitr Edition," August 

20.2012. 

42 Under an ordered departure, all U.S. diplomatic personnel and their famiUes are instructed by the Chief of Mission 

to leave the post 

4) Benghazi Assessment o(Tripwires Breached as of August 13. 2012. 

44 REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, "Benghazi Weekly RepoI1," September 11, 2012, (1). 

45 REDACTED, e-mail message to Charlene Lamb, "Ambassador's protective detail in Benghazi," September 20, 

2012. 

12 
155 


207ful64.eps

reported problems with their local guard contractors. Of those posts that reported problems with 

their contractors, 37 percent said there was an insufficient number of local guards and 40 percent 

said there was insufficient training46 The IG found that overseas diplomatic posts, particularly 

those in high-threat situations beyond Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan urgently needed best-value 

contracting, which takes into account the past performance of contractors:7 

Recommendation: When it becomes clear that a host nation cannot adequately perform its 

functions under the Vienna Convention, the Department of State must provide additional security 

measures of its own, urgently attempt to upgrade the host nation security forces, or decide to 

close a U.S. Diplomatic facility and remove U.S. personnel until appropriate steps can be taken 

to provide adequate security. American personnel who serve us abroad must often work in high 

risk environments, but when they do, we must provide them with adequate security. That clearly 

was not the case in Benghazi on September II, 2012. 

Recommendation: The Department must conduct a review of its local guard programs and 

particularly the use of local guard contractors at high-risk posts who do not meet appropriate 

standards necessary for the protection of our personnel or facilities. 

Finding 5. The Benghazi facility's temporary status had a detrimental effect on security 

decisious, and that fact was clearly known by DS personnel in Benghazi and to their 

superiors who nevertheless left the American personnel in Benghazi in this very dangerons 

situation. The Department of State did not take adequate measures to mitigate the facility's 

significant vulnerabilities in this high-threat environment. 

The Department of State opened the temporary mission in Benghazi in 2011 after the revolution 

against the Qadhafi government began because eastern Libya was the headquartes of the 

opposition to Qadhafi, and the embassy in Tripoli had been closed due to security concerns. The 

temporary mission was first located in a hotel and then moved, based on security concerns, to the 

compound referred to as the Temporary Mission Facility:8 After the U.S. Embassy was 

reopened in Tripoli when Qadhafi was overthrown, the Department of State initially planned to 

close the Benghazi facility in late 2011:9 However, in December 2011, the Department decided 

to extend its presence in Benghazi until December 2012. In the memo approving this decision. 

the Department stated that the facility would be a "smaller operation" but noted its importance to 

eastern Libyans and the assistance it could provide to the embassy in Tripoli5o 

The temporary status of the Benghazi facility contributed to its vulnerability. For example, DS 

agents stationed in Benghazi were always on temporary duty assignments, remaining there for 

relatively short periods, otten no longer than a month. As Nordstrom noted, having temporary 

46 State Department, Office ofInspector General, Review of Best-Value Contracting/or the Department of State 

Local Guard Program and the Utility of Expanding the Policy Beyond ffigh- Threat Posts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan, February, 2012 (9). 

47 Ibid. (5) 

48 Alex Tiersky and Susan Epstein, Congressional Research Service, Securing U.S Diplomatic Facilities and 

Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, November 26, 2012, (3). 

49 REDACTED, e-mail message to DS-IP-NEA and REDACTED. September 13. 2012. 

50 NEA-Jeffrey Feltman, Action Memo to Under Secretary Kennedy, December 27.20 II, (2). 

13 
156 


207ful65.eps

duty agents made "developing security procedures, policies, and relationships more difficult."sl 

The temporary status also made it difficult to procure funds for security upgrades. A briefing 

paper prepared for a meeting of Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Eric 

Boswell and then-Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz noted, "Due to the ambiguity surrounding 

the duration of the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, RSO Ben~hazi has encountered funding issues for 

projects that are commonplace at most U.S. missions.,,5 The Committee received conflicting 

evidence with regard to whether the temporary Benghazi facility was on the Security 

Environment Threat List- a semiannual document that aids DS management in the allocation of 

overseas security resources and programs 53 In any event, it is hard to imagine there were more 

than a few Department of State missions anywhere in the world that were in a more dangerous 

environment than Benghazi. 

In the December 2011 memo approving the Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi, the 

Department of State noted the need for corrective security measures for the facility. According to 

RSO Nordstrom, the Department of State never consulted with him about the security 

requirements of the facility before the December 2011 action memo was sent to Under Secretary 

Kennedy for approval. 54 The memo approved by Kennedy indicated that the Department of State 

would" rapidly implement a series of corrective security measures as part of the consolidation of 

the State footprint.,,55 However, the memo lacked details as to the security standards to be 

followed and the resources required to implement the security measures. The absence of 

dedicated resources contributed to the constraints under whieh those in Washington and 

Benghazi would operate throughout 2012. 

During 2012, however, the Department did make a variety of field expedient security 

enhancements, including: 

The installation of concrete jersey barriers; 

The installation of four vehicle barriers for access control and anti-ram protection; 

Increased compound lighting; 

The installation of barbed wire on top of the existing perimeter wall to raise height and on 

top of the interior chain link fence to create secondary barrier; 

The installation of platforms for property and street surveillance; 

The construction oHour guard booths; 

The installation of steel grillwork on windows; 

The installation of emergency releases on select windows grills for fire/emergency exit; 

The replacement of several wooden doors with steel doors with appropriate locking 

hardware; 

Sandbag emplacements for internal defense purposes; and 

5] The Security Failures of Benghazi: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. 

Congress, 112" Cong., October 10,2012. (Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer, Tripoli, Libya from 

9121111 -7/26/12). 

52 Diplomatic Security Issues Only Briefing paper for March 6, 2012 meeting of Assistant Secretary Boswell and 

Ambassador Cretz. 

5J Eric Nordstrom, interview with Committee staff, December 7, 2012. 

5'lbid. 

55 NEA-Jeffrey Feltman, Action Memo to Under Secretary Kennedy, December 27, 2011, (2). 

14 
157 


207ful66.eps

Hardening villas with safe rooms with a stccl door. 56 

But these physical security upgrades were insufficient to deter or repel the dozens of armed 

attackers that swarmed the compound, unimpeded, on September 11,2012. As discussed in more 

dctail bclow, the facility lacked the type of pedestrian barriers that could have slowed the 

attackers, even though the Department of State Inspector General and an earlier Accountability 

Review Board had each recommended the installation of such barriers at diplomatic posts in 

high-risk places like Benghazi. 

Because the Benghazi facility was temporary, no security standards applied to it. 57 While 

existing security standards require meaningful physical barriers to slow pedestrian access ror 

permanent U.S. diplomatic facilities, there were few meaningful physical barriers at the 

Benghazi facility that would slow pedestrian access other than the closed gate. Once the gate was 

opened, there were no other physical impediments at that access point to keep anyone out of the 

facility's grounds or slow their assault. 

Having additional physical barriers to reinforce the gate might have delayed the breach of the 

compound, giving those inside morc time to prepare for the attack. For example, some 

permanent diplomatic facilities have a compound access control (CAC) point, a "mantrap," or 

both. Both of these types of barriers act as gates or enclosures that are used to limit the 

movement of pedestrians entering a diplomatic facility. While a CAC is primarily installed in 

conjunction with a pedestrian entrance, a mantrap is typically installed in conjunction with a 

vehicle gate or barrier. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb, a CAC was not 

in place at Benghazi due to time and money constraints. She estimated a CAC there would have 

cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. 58 No mantrap was in place either, though the reason for 

that is less clear. Unfortunately, we will never know ifthe additional investment in either a CAC 

or mantrap would have provided the time needed to save the lives of Ambassador Chris Stevens 

and Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith because of the fires set by the terrorists. 

The absence of mantraps has been identificd as a security vulnerability at least twice in the last 

ten years by the Department of State. According to a 2009 Department of State Inspector General 

Rcport, the 2004 Accountability Review Board regarding the attack on the U.S. consulate in 

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia recommended the installation of pedestrian barriers at U.S. diplomatic 

facilities overseas.59 During that attack, terrorists exited their vehicle and quickly breached the 

perimeter after being st0fcped by the entrance's anti-vehicle barrier. The attackers killed six and 

wounded several others. 0 

Five years later, the Department of State Inspector General found that the absence of approved 

security standards or recent directives from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security regarding the 

installation of mantraps resulted in a fewer number of mantraps at overseas posts than required 

56 REDACTED, e-mail message to DS-IP-NEA and REDACTED, September 13, 2012. 

57 Charlene Lamb and Eric Nordstrom, interviews with Committee staff, December 2012. 

58 Charlene Lamb, interview with Committee staff, December 6,2012. 

59 Department of State, Inspector General, Review Q(the Department's Implementation Q(l\Jantraps, Report Number 

ISP-I-09-29, February 2009, (2-3). 

60 Attack on U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah, James C. Oberwetter, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, On-theRecord Briefing, leddah, Saudi Arabia, December 7, 2004 http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/39516.htm 

15 
158 


207ful67.eps

worldwide. At the time, 25 percent of critical threat posts that responded to the TO's survey did 

not have or request a mantrap and 39 percent of posts rated as a high threat post that responded 

to the survey also had no mantraps, plans for a mantrap, or were unable to accommodate 

mantraps. The numbers were worse for low and medium threat posts. According to the 

Department of State 10 report, the average cost of installing mantraps at a U.S. diplomatic post 

(including related infrastructure) is approximately $55,000 61 

In determining the amount of additional security to provide to the Benghazi facility, the 

Department of State did not conduct ajoint analysis or confer with other agencies, such as DOD 

or members of the Ie. For U.S. diplomatic facilities at greatest risk, such as Benghazi, more 

interagency analysis of security needs must be done to identify gaps in security and take the steps 

to address them. Since the attack in Benghazi, the Department of State and the Department of 

Defense have jointly begun this important work, focusing initially on the highest threat facilities 

around the globe,62 but that should have happened before the attack. 

Resourcing for security is a joint responsibility of the Executive Branch and the Legislative 

Branch. The Department of State's decisions regarding security at the Benghazi facility were 

made in the context of its budget and security requirements for diplomatic facilities around the 

world. Overall, the Department of State's base requests for security funding have increased by 38 

percent since Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, and base budget appropriations have increased by 27 

percent in the same time period. Other security funding provided beyond that in supplemental 

appropriations bills has been nearly entirely for diplomatic facilities in just three countries-Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan."} Less has gone elsewhere and very little is available to the temporary 

facilities such as the one in Benghazi. 

Importantly, funding requests for baseline diplomatic security programs'" have not been fully 

funded in any year since FY 2010. These accounts fund local guards, security technology, OS 

agents, and maintenance, construction and security upgrades for facilities. The Administration 

requested almost $2.4 billion for the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and Embassy 

Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) accounts in fiscal year 20 II (the Department 

of State's two largest diplomatic security accounts), but the House of Representatives 

recommended a funding level that was $127.5 million less than the President's Budget request. 

The Senate restored $38 million of the funding in the final enacted appropriations bill for that 

year. In fiscal year 2012, the gap was larger: Congress enacted appropriations for diplomatic 

security that were $275 million less than was requested. 65 

6\ Department of State, Inspector General, Review a/the Department's Implementation QlAlantraps, Report 

Number ISP-I-09-29, February 2009, (3). 

62 Committee member briefing, November 14, 2012. 

63 Congressional Research Service (CRS), e-mail message to Committee staff, December 20, 2012. For example, 

CRS noted all Overseas Contingency Operations enacted and requested for the Worldwide Security Protection 

account in Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 were for facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, there was 

approximately $1.5 billion funding for Iraq embassy "security and overhead cover" in FY 2012. 

64 According to CRS, these include State Department accounts for Worldwide Security Protection (WSP); Embassy 

Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM); Diplomatic Security, Counterterrorism within the Diplomatic and 

Consular Programs; and Diplomatic Security within the Border Security Program. 

65 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Volume /.. Department of State Operations Fiscal Year 

2013 (February 13,2012), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2012, P.L. 112-74. 

16 
159 


207ful68.eps

At the same time, Congress has generally been responsive in providing supplemental and 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds to the Department of State - more than $1.7 

billion since 2007 - in response to emergent, security-driven funding requests, although 

primarily for facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, there was no supplemental or 

OCO request made by the President for additional diplomatic security enhancements in FY20 I 0 

or FY20 11. 66 Neither the Department of State nor Congress made a point of providing additional 

funds in a supplemental request for Libya, or more specifically, Benghazi. 

Congress' inability to appropriate funds in a timely manner has also had consequences for the 

implementation of security upgrades. RSO Nordstrom stated that Continuing Resolutions had 

two detrimental effects on efforts to improve security in Benghazi. First, the Department of State 

would only allow funds to be expended at a rate of 80 percent of the previous year's 

appropriations level, so as not to risk a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. Second, in the 

absence of a supplemental appropriations or reprogramming request, security funds for Benghazi 

had to be taken "out of hide" from funding levels for Libya because Benghazi was not included 

in previous budget requests. 67 

Recommendation: The Department of State should establish a mandatory process to determine 

what security standards are applicable to temporary facilities to ensure that they are adequately 

protected. 

Recommendation: In the future, more interagency joint assessments or analyses of security 

needs must be done for U.S. diplomatic facilities at greatest risk. Ajoint assessment could not 

only improve our government's ability to identify security gaps, it would make all agencies more 

aware of assets available to meet security challenges and those available to respond to a crisis. 

Recommendation: The Administration and Congress must work together to provide sufficient, 

steady, and timely funding resources to secure diplomatic facilities and personnel worldwide. 

Finding 6. The Department of State did not adequately support security reqnests from its 

own security personnel in Benghazi. 

Throughout 2012, the number of OS agents temporarily deployed to Benghazi fluctuated, 

decreasing to as low as one agent for a six week period in March and April 2012 due to visa 

problems. 68 At the time of the attack, there were three DS agents who were stationed in Benghazi 

and two more who accompanied the Ambassador there from Tripoli. RSO Nordstrom said that 

security personnel in Tripoli were sometimes used to augment Benghazi security when 

necessary 69 

66 Alex Tiersky and Susan Epstein, Congressional Research Service, ,)'ecuring lJ..)'. Diplomatic Facilities and 

Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, November 26,2012, (15). 

67 Eric Nordstrom, interview with Committee staff, December 7, 2012. 

6S REDACTED, c-mail message to REDACTED, October 1, 2012. 

69 Eric Nordstrom, interview with Committee staff, December 7, 2012. 

17 
160 


207ful69.eps

As conditions changed in late spring and early summer, officers in Tripoli and in Washington 

had good situational awareness of the growing threats in Libya and especially in Benghazi, 

However, the Department of State did not provide enough security to address the increased 

threats and did not adequately support field requests for additional security, For example, in 

March 2012 the Tripoli Embassy had requested five full-time security positions for Benghazi. 

However, a day after sending this request, Nordstrom was told that Washington had capped the 

number of agents in Benghazi at three, even though the request for five agents was consistent 

with the December 20 II action memo approved by Under Secretary Kennedy to extend the 

duration of the Benghazi facility,70 In addressing the March request for five OS agents, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Lamb questioned RSO Nordstrom about the fact that two of those five 

requested positions would be used for non-personnel security related duties-one [or driving and 

one to secure a computer,71 Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb asked that local employees be 

hired for these positions since they were arguably not related to security.72 Later, two local 

nationals were hired to fulfill these duties. In July Embassy officials in Tripoli requested a 

minimum of three OS agents for Benghazi. 

Nordstrom also testified that he would have preferred to extend a DOD support team, which 

DOD provided to the Department of State on a non-reimbursable basis, that was scheduled to 

depart in August 2012. The 16-person Site Security Team (SST) was stationed in Tripoli, but on 

occasion some of its members also helped with security in Benghazi. The team's deployment had 

previously been extended twice, Nordstrom said he though that requesting an extension would 

have "too much political cost," and he was not told to do SO.73 In July 2012, Nordstrom had sent 

a request, via eable approved by Ambassador Stevens, for a minimum of 13 temporary U.S. 

security personnel-which he said could be either OS employees or SST personnel, or a 

combination of both-to support needs in Tripoli, 74 Nordstrom said he never received a response 

to that request. 75 Though the Department of State never formally asked DOD to extend the SST 

team, at the time of the attack several members of the SST were still in Tripoli for other 

purposes, and two participated in the rescue effort the night of the attack. 

In the Department's late 2011 plan describing a transition to "locally staffed operations," one of 

the reasons given for that transition was that "OS does not have sutlicient resources to sustain the 

current level of the security assets in Libya.,,76 Lamb commented on this issue in her interview 

with the Committee, stating that it was hard to sustain large numbers of OS agents on short-term 

tours because there is not a floating pool of agents so that to fill a gap in Libya she needed to 

create a gap elsewhere,77 

70 Eric Nordstrom, e,mail message to REDACTED, March 29, 2012. 

71 Charlene Lamb, interview with Committee staff, December 6,2012. 

n Ibid. 

73 The Security Failures of Benghazi: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. 

Congress, 112'h Cong., October 10, 2012. (Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer from September 21 -

July 26, 2012). 

74 12 Tripoli 690, July 9, 2012. 

75 The Security Failures of Benghazi: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. 

Congress, 112'h Cong .. October 10, 2012. (Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer from September 21 -

July 26, 2012). 

76 DS/IP/OPO/FPD, Proposal for Security Support to RSO Tripoli. 

77 Charlene Lamb, interview with Committee staff, December 6, 2012. 

18 
161 


207FUL70.eps

Finding 7. Despite the inability of the Libyan government to fulfill its duties to secure the 

facility, the increasingly dangerous threat assessments, and a particularly vulnerable 

facility, the Department of State officials did not conclude the facility in Benghazi should be 

closed or temporarily shut down. That was a grevious mistake. 

The Department of State kept the Benghazi facility open despite the inability ofthe Libyan 

government to fulfill its duties to secure the facility and the increasingly dangerous threat 

environment that American intelligence described. Though diplomatic security officials in Libya 

repeatedly considered and discussed the adequacy of security at the Benghazi facility, we found 

no evidence that any official ever recommended closing the facility even though the facility's 

vulnerability remained high, particularly in relation to the limited number and quality of the 

security personnel on site including the militia, the contracted guards, and DS agents on shortterm assignments. 

In the months leading up to the September 11,2012 attack, U.S. personnel sitting on the 

Benghazi Emergency Action Committee (EAC}-the interagency entity responsible for 

assessing the security of the facility-met several times to discuss the growing threats in eastern 

Libya, and whether additional actions to protect U.S. personnel ought to be taken. As late as 

August 15,2012, an EAC was convened and resolved to update the "tripwires" for the facility. 

The updates were to include a new category, "suspension of operations," under which diplomatic 

personnel remain present at a post but limit activity off U.S. grounds. Notes from that meeting 

show that joint security exercises were carried out with Annex security personnel that same 

month, and that conditional manpower requests and the revised set of tripwires were sent to the 

Embassy in Tripoli for review. A Department of State document shared between officials in 

Tripoli show various "tripwires" in Benghazi were, in fact, set off weeks before September II, 

2012n Following a bomb attack on a Libyan Army colonel in August, the principal U.S. 

diplomatic officer in Benghazi wrote that "[g]iven our small size, there is really no distinction 

between authorized and ordered departure from Ben~hazi: if we lose one more person, we will 

be ineffectivc ... we are already at a skeleton crew." 

Still, no additional security was provided to the facility in Benghazi and there was no ordered 

evacuation. RSO Nordstrom said the inability of the host nation to provide security is a 

significant tripwire. Yet neither he nor, to his knowledge anyone else at the Department of State, 

recommended the Benghazi post be closed. 80 

Despite the Department of State's initial determination that the facility in Benghazi would be a 

temporary one, as time progressed, some Department of State officials believed U.S. diplomats 

needed to remain there longer than they initially expected. Just weeks before his death and even 

78 REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, August 30,2012. Subject: "Latest tripwires for Tripoli and 

Benghazi," which included an attached document entitled "Benghazj assessment of tripwires breached as of 

8/31/2012" 

79 REDACTED, e-mail message to REDACTED, August 6, 2012, "Security Incident Involving Embassy Vehicle 

Driven by DOD Personnel." 

80 Eric Nordstrom, interview with Committee staff, December 7, 2012. 

19 
162 


207ful71.eps

after there had been attacks against the facility and other western targets in Benghazi, 

Ambassador Stevens continued to make the case that the Department of State needed a long term 

presence in Benghazi. 81 

A number of other western governments also continued to maintain a presence in Benghazi 

throughout the summer and fall of 20 12. Under Secretary Kennedy noted that diplomats for Italy, 

France, Turkey and the United Nations remained in Benghazi during that time period. 82 

One option American officials did consider was co-locating the American government facilities 

in Benghazi. By December 27,2011, officials had "come to the conclusion that co-location is the 

best and most economical option for" a continued presence in Benghazi. They also recognized 

that there were administrative hurdles to this-such as finding a suitable location large enough 

for the presence of all personnel. 83 The ARB report on the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 

attacks recommended that, "When building new chanceries abroad, all U.S. government 

agencies, with rare exceptions, should be located in the same compound. ,,84 The Department of 

State should also examine whether similar standards should be adopted for the co-location of 

temporary facilities. 

Finding 8. The Department of Defense and the Department of State had not jointly assessed 

the availability of U.S. assets to support the Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi in the 

event of a crisis and although DOD attempted to quickly mobilize its resources, it did not 

have assets or personnel close enough to reach Benghazi in a timely fashion. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has a longstanding cooperative relationship with the 

Department of State, providing support for evacuation and security of diplomatic facilities. 85 For 

Libya, responsibility for DOD support for diplomatic missions primarily rested with AFRICOM 

and its Combatant Commander, General Carter F. Ham, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. 

AFRlCOM is one of DOD's six geographic combatant commands and is responsible for all DOD 

operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent (with the exception of 

Egypt), its island nations, and surrounding waters. The command is also responsible to the 

Secretary of Defense for military relations with 54 African nations, the African Union, and 

African regional security organizations. It was established in February 2007 and became a standalone command in October 2008. The reason for establishing AFRICOM grew out of concerns 

about DOD's division of responsibility for Africa among three geographic commandsEuropean Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command 

(PACOM)-and worries that security in Africa was receiving less attention than it required 

based on the increasing presence of Islamist extremists and terrorists there. 

81 "Benghazi.docx," document attached to email of August 31, 2012. 

82 Committee member briefing, November 29,2012. 

Hl NEA -Jeffrey Feltman, Action Memo to Under Secretary Kennedy, December 27, 2011. Re: "Future of 

Operations in Benghazi, Libya" 

84 Accountability Review Hoard, Bombings of the (jS F.mbCL"Isies in lV"airohi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 

August 7. /998, (January 8, 1999). NB: The facility in Benghazi was a lease and not new construction. 

85 Committee member briefing, November 14,2012, 

20 
163 


207ful72.eps

Since its creation, AFRICOM has been involved in a number of operations in Africa, with a 

focus on training African forces and engaging in counterterrorism activities in the Horn of 

Africa. Unlike many of the other geographical combatant commands, AFRICOM was developed 

to maintain a light footprint. 86 It maintains a single base on the entire continent, in Djibouti,. In 

the spring of2011, AFRICOM directed U.S. support to the NATO military operations in Libya, 

and in October 2011, it established ajoint task force to command and control post-conflict U.S. 

operations related to Libya. Since DOD assumes responsibility for evacuation of diplomatic 

personnel, U.S. citizens, and designated host nation and third country nationals in crises, 

AFRICOM was responsible for working with Department of State officials in Libya to develop 

and coordinate Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) plans for the diplomatic facilities 

within the region. 87 But the Department of State did not know how long it would take DOD to 

evacuate personnel at the Benghazi facility in the case of a crisis, naturally making it more 

difficult for the Department of State to ensure it had adequate security at the facility. 

In addition, General Ham did not have complete visibility of the extent and number of 

government personnel in Benghazi in the event that a NEO was required. 88 If sufficient time had 

been available for such an evacuation, we are concerned that this limitation could have impeded 

AFRICOM's ability to respond and fulfill its mission responsibility. 

AFRICOM's lack of operational assets near Benghazi hindered its capacity to evacuate U.S. 

personnel during the attacks. The Djibouti base was several thousand miles away. There was no 

Marine expeditionary unit, carrier group or a smaller group of U.S. ships closely located in the 

Mediterranean Sea that could have provided aerial or ground support or helped evacuate 

personnel from Benghazi. AFRICOM also lacked a dedicated Commander's In-extremis Force 

(CIF)-a specially trained force capable of performing no-notice missions. As a result, General 

Ham was forced to call on the European Command's CIF whose location in Eastern Europe 

prevented it from getting to Benghazi before the four Americans were killed and all other U.S. 

personnel were evacuated. We note that AFRICOM later received an independent CIF in 

October, 2012.'9 DOD and AFRICOM tried to provide effective support on September 11th, but 

given the nature of the attack in Benghazi and the distance of their assets from Benghazi, they 

were tragically unable to do so. 

Recommendation: DOD and the Department of State must jointly perform comprehensive crisis 

defense and evacuation planning for personnel at U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide, 

particularly in high risk environments to determine whether DOD can provide timely support and 

evacuation capabilities, and assist the Department of State in deciding whether to keep facilities 

open. 

86 Fiscal Year 20 J 3 !Vational Defense Authorization Budget Request from US. European Command and us. Africa 

Command: Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 112!h Congress, February 29, 2012. 

(General Carter Ham, Commander, United States Africa Command). 

http: "vv\\w.africom.mi J:gctAt1icle.asp?art -4 t 33 

87 Joint Chiefs of StafT, IVoncomhatant Evacuation Operations, Report 3-68, December 23,2010, I-I. 

http://w\vw.dtic.rnilidoctrine/new Dubs/ip3 68.pdf. 

88 General Carter Ham, Combatant Commander for Africa Command, briefing Chairman and Ranking Member, 

December 6,2012. 

89 General Carter Ham, Counterterrorism in Africa, Homeland Security Policy Institute event, December 3, 2012. 

According to General Ham, DOD had been developing this force since 2011. 

21 
164 


207ful73.eps

Recommendation: Because Africa has increasingly become a haven for terrorist groups in 

places like Libya and Mali, DOD should provide more assets and personnel within range on land 

and sea to protect and defend both Americans and our allies on the African continent. 

Finding 9, Although the September 11, 2012 attack in Benghazi was recognized as a 

terrorist attack by the Intelligence Community and personnel at the Department of State 

from the beginning, Administration officials were inconsistent in stating publicly that the 

deaths in Benghazi were the result of a terrorist attack, 

One of the key lessons of this Committee's six-year focus on the threat of violent Islamist 

extremism is that, in order to understand and counter the threat we face, we must clearly identify 

that threat. During the Committee's investigation into the Fort Hood massacre, for example, we 

found systemic problems with the way the military addressed violent Islamist extremism in its 

policies and procedures (treating this specific threat within the broader context of "work place 

violence"),90 Similarly, while we welcomed the Administration's release last year of a national 

strategy and implementation plan for countering radicalization domestically, 91 we expressed our 

disappointment in the Administration's continued refusal to identify violent Islamist extremism 

as our enemy,92 The enemy is not a vague catchall of violent extremism, but a specific violent 

Islamist extremism. It is unfair to the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims not to distinguish 

between their peaceful religion and a twisted corruption of that religion used to justify violence. 

There are related lessons to be learned from the Administration's public comments about 

Benghazi, which we believe contributed to the confusion in the public discourse after the attack 

about exactly what happened. 

The NCTC and U.S. law define terrorism as the "premeditated, politically motivated violence 

perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.,,93 Senior 

officials from the IC, the Department of State, and the FBI who participated in briefings and 

interviews with the Committee said they believed the attack on the mission facility in Benghazi 

to be a terrorist attack immediately or almost immediately after it occurred. 94 The ODNI's 

90U.S. Senate, Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism 

Lessons From the U.S Government's Failure to Prevent the Fori lIoodAttack, 112th Cong., 1st sess, February 3, 

2011.7,9. 

91 The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism 

in the United States, December 2011. 

91 "Lieberman, Collins React to Administration's Countering Violent Extremism Strategic Implementation Plan," 

Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, press release, December 8, 201 L 

http://www .hsgac. senate.gov/medialmajority-mediallieberman-coll ins-react -to-administrations-countering-violentextremism-strategic-implementation-plan 

93 The National Counterterrorism Center, Terrorism Definitions, August 27, 2010. 

http:':"\\ ww. netc. gO\// site/other/ definit ions.htm] 

94 Committee member briefings, November 14,2012 and November 29, 2012. 

22 
165 


207ful74.eps

spokesman also has publicly said, "The intelligence community assessed from the very 

beginning that what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack." 95 

In short, regardless of questions about whether there had been a demonstration or protest outside 

the Temporary Mission Facility in advance of the attack, the extent to which the attacks were 

preplanned, or the role of an anti-Islamic video which had sparked protests at the U.S. embassy 

in Cairo and elsewhere earlier on September 11 t\ there was never any doubt among key officials, 

including officials in the IC and the Department of State, that the attack in Benghazi was an act 

of terrorism. 

For example, two emails from the State Department Diplomatic Security Operations Center on 

the day of the attack, September 11, and the day after, September 12,2012, characterized the 

attack as an "initial terrorism incident" and as a "terrorist event." 96 Agencies and offices 

responsible for terrorism, including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the CIA's 

Office of Terrorism Analysis, and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, were immediately 

involved with gathering information about the attack. Indeed, how could there have been any 

doubt in anyone's mind that, when a large number of armed men break into a U.S. diplomatic 

facility, set fire to its buildings, and fire mortars at Americans, that it is by definition a terrorist 

attack? 

However, the IC's assessment was not reflected consistently in the public statements made by 

Administration officials, several of whom cited the ongoing investigation, in the week following 

the attack: 

On September 12th, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attributed the attack to "heavily 

armed militants" who assaulted the compound ... " Her suspicion was that the people 

involved in this "were looking to target Americans from the start." She also noted that we 

"continue to apply pressure on Al Qaeda and other elements that are affiliated ... ,,97 

Also that September 12th President Obama, referring to the anti-Islamic video, said "we 

reject all efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others. But there is absolutely no 

justification to this type of senseless violence ... " He went on to add, "Of course, 

yesterday was already a painful day for our nation as we marked the solem memory of 

the 9111 attacks," and that "No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this ~reat 

nation, alter that character, or eclipse the light of the values that we stand for.,,9 

However, that same day, the President had the following exchanges with Steve Kroft in a taping 

for the CBS news program 60 Minutes: 

95 "Sources: Office of the DN[ cut "al Qaeda" reference from Benghazi talking points, and CIA, FB[ signed off," 

CBS News, November 20,2010. http://v'iww.cbsncws.com/8301-505263 16'!.-5755~328/~ourccs-officc-of:·thc~dnicLlt-:at:qat;qa-:rcfercrycc;-fm!ll·bcngha.zHaJki.J:Ig-points-and-,cia-Jbi.-sigllCd.-QfF 

'16 See, for example, REDACTED on behalf of the OS Command Center, email message, "Terrorism Event 

Notification - Libya," September 12, 20[2. 

97 Secretary Hillary Clinton, "Rernarkson lheDeathsof American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya," Treaty Room, Septemberl2, 

2012. 

98 President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya," Rose 

Garden, September [2,2012. 

23 
166 


207ful75.eps

Mr. Kroft: Do you believe that this was a terrorist attack? 

The President: Well. it's too early to know exactly how this came about, what group was 

involved, but obviously it was an attack on Americans and we are going to be working 

with the Libyan government to make sure that we bring these folks to justice one way or 

the other .. " 

Mr. Kroft: That doesn't sound like your normal demonstration. 

The President: As I said, we're still investigating exactly what happened, I don't want to 

jump the gun on this. But - you're right that this is not a situation that was - exactly the 

same as what happened in Egypt. And - my suspicion is- is that there are folks involved 

in this who were looking to target Americans from the start. So we're gonna- make sure 

that our first priority is to get our folks out safe, make sure that our emhassies are secured 

around the world. And then we are gonna go after - those folks who carried this out... 

This is also obviously a reminder that for all the progress that we've made in fighting 

terrorism, that we're living in a volatile world. And, you know, our troops, but also our 

diplomats and our intelligence officers they're putting their lives on the line every single 

day in some very dangerous circumstances ... 

But I think we also also have to understand that, we have to remain vigilant. And that 

even as we - continue to apply pressure on Al Qaeda and - other elements that are 

affiliated-that in big chunks of the world, in Northern Africa and the Middle East. 

you've got - a lot of dangerous characeters. And we've got to make sure that we're 

continuing to apply pressure on them ... 99 

Two days later, during a September 14,2012, White House press briefing, Press Secretary Jay 

Carney was asked to respond to senators' characterizations of the incident as a terrorist attack 

following a briefing by Secretary Panetta and others: 

[Unidentified Reporter]: Jay, one last question -- while we were sitting here -- Secretary 

Panetta and the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs briefed the Senate Armed Services 

Committee. And the senators came out and said their indication was that this, or the 

attack on Benghazi was a terrorist attack organized and carried out by terrorists, that it 

was premeditated, a calculated act of terror. Levin said -- Senator Levin -- I think it was a 

planned, premeditated attack. The kind of equipment that they had used was evidence it 

was a planned, premeditated attack. Is there anything more you can -- now that the 

administration is briefing senators on this, is there anything more you can tell us? 

Mr, Carney: Well, 1 think we wait to hear from administration otlicials. Again, it's 

actively under investigation, both the Benghazi attack and incidents elsewhere. And my 

point was that we don't have and did not have concrete evidence to suggest that this was 

not in reaction to the film. But we're obviously investigating the matter, and I'll certainly 

-- I'm sure both the Department of Defense and the White House and other places will 

have more to say about that as more information becomes available. 

99 President Barack Obama, interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, CBS, September 12, 2012, transcript. 

24 
167 


207ful76.eps

Then, on September 16th , during one of several similar appearances on the Sunday news 

programs, Ambassador Susan Rice had the following exchange with David Gregory of NBC's 

Meet the Press: 

Gregory: Can you say definitively that the attacks on - on our consulate in Libya that 

killed Ambassador Stevens and others there security personnel, that was spontaneous, 

was it a planned attack? Was there a terrorist element to it? 

Ms. Rice: Well, let us-- let me tell you the-- the best information we have at present. First 

of all, there's an FBI investigation which is ongoing. And we look to that investigation to 

give us the definitive word as to what transpired. But putting together the best 

information that we have available to us today our current assessment is that what 

happened in Benghazi was in fact initially a spontaneous reaction to what had just 

transpired hours before in Cairo, almost a copycat of-- of the demonstrations against our 

facility in Cairo, which were prompted, of course, by the video. What we think then 

transpired in Benghazi is that opportunistic extremist elements came to the consulate as 

this was unfolding. They came with heavy weapons which unfortunately are readily 

available in post revolutionary Libya. And it escalated into a much more violent episode. 

Obviously, that's-- that's our best judgment now. We'll await the results of the 

investigation ... 100 

On September 18th , President Obama said on the Late Show with David Letterman that 

"extremists and terrorists used this (referring again to the anti-Islamist video) as an excuse to 

attack a variety of our embassies, including the consulate in Libya." 

A definitive response to the question of whether Benghazi was a terrorist attack was given by 

NCTC Director Matthew Olsen during a hearing before this Committee on September 19,2012. 

Olsen was asked by the Chairman whether he "would say that Ambassador Stevens and the three 

other Americans died as a result of a terrorist attack." 101 Director Olsen responded that, 

"[c]ertainly, on that particular question, I would say yes. They were killed in the course ofa 

terrorist attack" on our diplomatic mission in Benghazi. 102 

After Olsen's September 19th appearance before the Committee, other Administration officials 

stated with more certainty that Benghazi was a terrorist attack. For example: 

On September 19th , referring to Matthew Olsen's statements that Benghazi was a terrorist 

attack, Victoria Nuland stated "We stand by comments made by our intelligence 

100 Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice, Keith Ellison, Peter King. Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea Mitchell, 

interview by David Gregory, Aleet the Press, NBC, September 16, 2012, transcript. 

http://W\\lvv.lnsnbe.rnsn.com/id/49051097.us 'meet the rress-transcri pt5. t/september-benj ami n-netanyahu-slisanricc-kcith-cllison-nc1t.:r-king-bDb-\vllod\'vard-iellr~y-goldberg-andrea-rnitchelll 

101 Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, United States Senate, 112\h Cong., September 19, 2012. (Statement of Matthew Olsen, Director, 

NCTC). 

102 Ibid. 

25 
168 


207ful77.eps

community who has first responsibility for evaluating the intelligence and what they 

believe we are seeing.~l103 

On September 20th, Jay Carney said, "It is, I think, self-evident that what happened in 

Benghazi was a terrorist attack. Our embassy was attacked violently, and the result was 

four deaths of American officials. So again, that's self evident..." 104 

On Seplember 21 '" Secretary Clinton said, "What happened in Benghazi was a terrorist 

attack, and we will not rest until we have tracked down and brought to justice the terrorist 

who murdered four Americans." 105 

On September 24th , however, when one of the co-hosts of the television program The View asked 

the President to clarify what she perceived to be discrepancies in the public record regarding the 

Administration's position about whether Benghazi allack was an act of terrorism, the President's 

answer was not as definitive: 

Joy Behar: It was reported that people just went crazy and wild because of this antiMuslim movie, or anti-Muhammad, I guess, movie. But then I heard Hillary Clinton say 

that it was an act of terrorism. Is it? Whal do you say? 

The President: Well, we're still doing an investigation. There's no doubt that the kind of 

weapons that were used, the ongoing assault, that it wasn't just a mob action. Now, we 

don't have all the information yet, so we're still gathering it. But what's clear is that 

around the world, there's still a lot of threats out there. And that's why we have to 

maintain the strongest military in the world. That's why we can't let down our guard 

when it comes to the intelligence work that we do, and staying on top of not just al Qaeda 

- the traditional al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan - but all these various fringe 

groups that have started to develop ... 106 

***** 

Director Olsen's statement on September 19,2012 before this Committee was also significant 

because he mentioned ties to al Qaeda. He said: 

At this point, what I would say is that a number of different elements appear to have been 

involved in the attack, including individuals connected to militant groups that are 

prevalent in eastern Libya, particularly in the Benghazi area. As well, we arc looking at 

103 Department of State Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Press Briefing, September 19,2012, transcript. 

104 Press Secretary Carney, press briefing, The White House, September 20.2012, transcript. 

105 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "Remarks With Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar Before Their 

Meeting." Treaty Room. September 21. 2012. 

105 President Obama, interview by Joy Behar. The View. September 24, 2012. 

http: "WW\-\'.voutubc.com:v,:atch?v=Hdni iX I a528 

26 
169 


207ful78.eps

indications that individuals involved in the attack may have had connections to al Qaeda 

or al Qaeda's affiliates, in particular al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. 107 

Olsen's acknowledgement was important because, in talking points that were prepared the 

previous week by the IC for Congress, a line saying "we know" that individuals associated with 

al Qaeda or its affiliates participated in the attacks had been changed to say: "There are 

indications that extremists participated," dropping the reference to al Qaeda and its affiliates 

altogether. IDS Members of the IC differed over whether or not this information should remain 

classified. It is nevertheless noteworthy that the analyst who drafted the original talking pointsa veteran career analyst in the intelligence community believed it was appropriate to include a 

reference to al Qaeda in the unclassified talking points. The senior analyst concluded that the 

infonnation could be made public because of the claims of responsibility made by Ansar alSharia, which has been publicly linked to al Qaeda. 109 

In addition to the change deleting al-Qaeda, a reference to "attacks" in Benghazi was changed to 

"demonstrations." 110 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper and representatives 

from the CIA, the State Department, NCTC and the FBI told this Committee that the changes 

characterizing the attacks as "demonstrations" and removing references to al-Qaeda or its 

affiliates were made within the CIA and the IC, while the change from "we know" to 

"indications" was made in response to an FB I request. They also testified that no changes were 

made for political reasons, that there was no attempt to mislead the American people about what 

happened in Benghazi, and that the only change made by the White House was to change a 

reference of '"consulate" to "mission." 111 

To provide a full account of the changes made to the talking points, by whom they were made 

and why, DNI Clapper offered to provide the Committee with a detailed time line regarding the 

development of the talking points. At the time of writing this report, despite repeated requests, 

the Committee had yet to receive this timeline. According to a senior IC otlicial, the time line has 

not been delivered as promised because the Administration has spent weeks debating internally 

whether or not it should turn over information considered "deliberative" to the Congress. The 

September 28,2012 public statement from the ODNI confirmed the IC's judgment "that some of 

those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al Qa'ida.,,112 

107 Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, United States Senate, 112'h Cong., September 19, 2012. (Statement of Matthew Olsen, Director, 

NCTC). The ODNI also released a statement on September 28, 2012 which confirmed that the Ie had "assess[ed] 

that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida." See Statement by the 

Director of Public Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence, Shawn Turner, on the intelligence related to the 

terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, September 28, 2012. 

IDS Committee member briefing, November 29, 2012. 

10'1 Committee member briefing, November 29, 2012. 

ttO Sources: Office of the DNI cut "al Qaeda" reference from Benghazi talking points, and CIA, FB! signed off, CBS 

News, November 20, 2010 

III Committee member briefing, November 29, 2012. 

112 "Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence, Shawn Turner, on the 

intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya," Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, press release, September 28,2012. 

27 
170 


207ful79.eps

We anticipate that the ongoing investigation into these attacks by the FBI will provide important 

new details about exactly which violent Islamist extremists carried out the attack, the extent to 

which it was planned, and their precise motivations. But as everyone now acknowledges, there is 

no doubt that Benghazi was indeed a deliberate and organized terrorist attack on our nation. If 

the fact that Benghazi was indeed a terrorist attack had been made clear from the outset by all 

Administration and Executive Branch spokespeople, there would have been much less confusion 

and division in the public response to what happened there on September 11, 2012. 

Much of the public discussion about the Benghazi attack has focused on whether a protest took 

place in Benghazi prior to the attack. While the IC worked feverishly in the days after the attack 

to identify the perpetrators of the attack, they did not place a high priority on determining with 

certainty whether a protest had in fact occurred. The IC's preliminary conclusion was that there 

had been a protest outside of the mission prior to the attack, making this assessment based on 

open source news reports and on other information available to intelligence agencies. The IC 

later revised its assessment and the Accountability Review Board has since "concluded that no 

protest took place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks." 113 

The unnecessary confusion in public statements about what happened that night with regards to 

an alleged protest should have ended much earlier than it did. Key evidence suggesting the 

absence of a protest was not widely shared as early as it could have been, creating or contributing 

to confusion over whether this was a peaceful protest that evolved into something more violent 

or a terrorist attack by an opportunistic enemy looking for the most advantageous moments to 

strike. 

As early as September 15'h, the Annex team that had been in Benghazi during the attack 

reported there had been no protest.' 14 This information was apparently not shared broadly, and to 

the extent that it was shared, it apparently did not outweigh the evidence decribcd above that 

there was a protest. The next day, the President of Libya's General National Congress, Mohamed 

Yousefel-Magariaf, also stated on the CBS News show Face the Nation that the attack was 

planned and involved Al Qaeda elements. 

On September 15th and 16''', officials from the FBI conducted face-to-face interviews in 

Germany of the U.S. personnel who had been on the compound in Benghazi during the attack. 

The U.S. personnel who were interviewed saw no indications that there had been a protest prior 

to the attack. Information from those interviews was shared on a secure video teleconference on 

the afternoon of the 16'h with FBI and other IC officials in Washington; it is unclear whether the 

question of whether a protest took place was discussed during this video conference. liS 

Information from those interviews was written into FBI FO-302 interrogation reports and sent 

back to the FBI headquarters. Nearly a week later, on or around September 22nd, key 

information from those interrogation reports was disseminated by the FBI in Intelligence 

Information Reports (IIRs) to other agencies within the IC. 116 By that date, however, the IC had 

!l3 Accountability Review Board, Department of State, December 19, 2012, 4. 

114 Acting Director Michael Morell, briefing Senator Collins, November 28, 2012. 

115 Committee member briefing, November 29, 2012. 

116 Ibid. 

28 
171 

[Whereupon, at 2:26 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ 


207FUL80.eps