IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

KATHERINE WHITT, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

MARCO MEZA, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0256 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2021-003483

The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Stanley David Murray, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale

By Stanley David Murray

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

State 48 Law Firm, Scottsdale

By Bryce Johnson, Robert Hendricks, & Stephen Vincent

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 2-27-2024
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which 

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Marco Meza (“Father”) appeals several rulings in the decree 

dissolving his marriage to Katherine Whitt (“Mother”). We vacate the 

characterization of the Chase bank account (“Chase account”) that Father 

co-owned with his mother (“Grandmother”) as community property

because Grandmother’s non-marital property cannot be transmuted to the 

community. As a result, we also vacate the equalization judgment for the 

community bank accounts and offer instructions on the pre- and 

post-marital portion of the Chase account. We affirm the superior court’s 

calculation of the community’s equitable lien on Father’s separate real 

estate. But we vacate and remand the vehicle equalization judgment

because the evidence does not support the amount of the community’s 

interest found by the court. We affirm the rest of the decree.

1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father married in 2015 and have three children. 

Father opened the Chase account with Grandmother before the marriage

and they deposited their earnings into the Chase account. After the 

marriage, Father and Grandmother continued to deposit their earnings into 

the Chase account. Mother and Father used the Chase account to pay for 

living expenses during the marriage, though they also had bank accounts 

1 The parties raise other issues that do not meet the criteria for 

publication. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(b); ARCAP 28(b). We address those 

issues in a separate, contemporaneously filed memorandum decision. See

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(h); Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 594, ¶ 2, n.3 (App. 

2017).
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

3

in their names.2 The Chase account had a balance of around $42,000 on the 

marriage date. It grew to around $98,500 on the date of service. The day

after service, Grandmother withdrew the entire balance.

¶3 Father bought a home before the marriage but paid the 

mortgage with community funds during the marriage. Mother agreed the 

home is Father’s separate property but asserted the community had an

equitable lien. The parties also owned five vehicles, two bought during the 

marriage. Father bought the other three vehicles before the marriage but 

made payments with community funds.

3

¶4 As relevant to this appeal, the superior court awarded Mother 

$51,212 as an equalization judgment for her share of the “community 

depository accounts.” The court awarded the home to Father and found 

Mother’s interest in the community’s equitable lien on the home was 

$14,469. The court found one vehicle (Rav4) was Father’s separate property,

awarded one vehicle to Mother (2006 Acura), and awarded the three other 

vehicles to Father (Subaru, 2007 Acura, and Toyota Highlander) with an 

equalization judgment of $15,625 owed to Mother.

¶5 Father sought post-decree relief, which the superior court 

partially granted on an issue irrelevant to the appeal. After the court 

entered an appealable decree, Father appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and (2) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure

(“Rule”) 78(c).

2 According to Mother’s pretrial statement, the subject bank accounts 

had these balances at the time of service: Mother’s Bank of America account 

#5269 ($612); Mother’s Bank of America account #3881 ($822); Father’s 

BBVA account #4246 ($291); Father’s BBVA account #4659 ($5,038); Father 

and Grandmother’s joint Chase account ($98,530).

3 Father does not dispute Mother’s value assessment for the vehicles 

at the time of service. The vehicle’s values are as follows: 2006 Acura 

($4,370); 2009 Toyota Highlander ($8,353); 2014 Subaru Impreza ($27,015);

and 2007 Acura MDX ($6,250). Although the fifth vehicle, the Rav4, was 

never assigned a value, Mother conceded that it was Father’s sole and 

separate property.
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Have to Make Written Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law After It Directed the Parties to Submit 

Proposed Decrees.

¶6 Father argues that the superior court erred by failing to make 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 82(a). Neither 

party requested findings under Rule 82(a). But Father argues on appeal that

the court invoked Rule 82’s requirement for written findings and legal 

conclusions when it ordered the parties to submit proposed decrees. We 

disagree.

¶7 For Rule 82(a) to apply, a party must request findings. See 

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 82(a)(1) (“If requested before trial, the court must make 

separate findings of fact and conclusions of law.”) (Emphasis added.). Rule 

82(a) does not encompass the court’s authority to order parties to submit 

proposed forms of a decree. The court’s authority to request proposed 

judgments comes from its “inherent power to do those things which are 

necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.” Fenton v. Howard, 118 

Ariz. 119, 121 (1978). Thus, the court did not invoke Rule 82 when it ordered 

the parties to submit proposed decrees.

¶8 Without the requirement that the superior court make written 

findings, our standard of review presumes the superior court found every 

fact necessary to support its decision. See Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,

249 Ariz. 289, 297, ¶ 19 (App. 2020); Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 135 (App. 

1990). We will affirm the decree if it is supported by reasonable evidence 

and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding it. See 

Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App. 2015).

B. The Superior Court Erred by Finding the Entire Chase Account

Was Community Property.

¶9 Father and Grandmother had a joint Chase account at the time 

of the marriage with a balance of around $42,000. Mother did not dispute 

the $42,000 amount and conceded that Grandmother continued to deposit 

unspecified amounts into the Chase account throughout the parties’ 

marriage. Mother also recognized that the parties used the Chase account 

for “community expenses” during the marriage. And the parties agreed 

that Father continued to deposit his earnings into the Chase account. While 

Father made withdrawals from the Chase account throughout the marriage, 

there was no evidence that he used these funds for separate expenses. 
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

5

Neither party offered evidence that Grandmother withdrew her funds from 

the account until she withdrew all funds after service.

¶10 After the trial, the court adopted Mother’s position that the 

entire Chase account was community property and ordered Father to pay 

an equalization judgment of $51,212 “for Mother’s share of the community 

depository accounts.” The court reached the $51,212 amount as follows. The 

total amount in all accounts was $105,293. Half of that amount was $52,646. 

The court awarded Mother her named accounts, which totaled $1,434—

subtracting $1,434 from $52,646 leaves $51,212—the amount of the 

equalization judgment.

¶11 Father argues that the entire account was not transmuted to a 

community account because it contained marital and non-marital property. 

Father also claims the approximately $42,000 in the account on the marriage 

date is undisputedly Grandmother’s non-marital and Father’s separate 

property, and it was error to award Mother any of those funds.

¶12 Grandmother has an undisputed but undetermined interest 

in the pre-marital funds in the Chase account and the funds she deposited 

into the account during the marriage, less anything she withdrew. Mother

argues that because Father failed to trace his pre-marital separate property 

and Grandmother’s deposits and withdrawals, the entire account became 

commingled and is, therefore, community property. Not so.

¶13 Grandmother’s funds in the account are not marital property

and can never become such because she was never married to Father or 

Mother. In a dissolution proceeding, the court has the authority to assign 

each spouse their sole and separate property and equitably divide the 

community property, but it lacks the authority to assign non-marital 

property. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (authorizing the court to divide property

in a dissolution). As a result, Grandmother’s funds are not subject to 

transmutation simply because they were combined in an account 

containing the parties’ community property. See In re Marriage of Cupp, 152 

Ariz. 161, 164 (App. 1986) (The rule of “transmutation of separate property 

to community property occurs only when the identity of the property as 

separate or community is lost.”). Because Grandmother was not a spouse 

in the dissolution, her property is neither “separate” nor “community.”

Grandmother’s funds are non-marital property and not subject to 

transmutation.

¶14 As between Mother and Father, the funds Father deposited 

after the marriage are presumably community property. See A.R.S. 
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

6

§ 25-211(A) (All property acquired during the marriage by either spouse is 

community property unless an exception applies.). But that does not allow

the superior court to order Father to pay Mother one-half of all funds in the 

account. Mother had no right to any share of the funds Grandmother 

deposited into the account. See A.R.S. § 14-6211(A) (“During the lifetime of 

all parties an account belongs to the parties in proportion to the net 

contribution of each to the sums on deposit unless there is clear and 

convincing evidence of a different intent.”).

¶15 Father also asserts that the $42,000 account balance on the 

marriage date is not subject to allocation because it was a combination of 

Grandmother’s and Father’s pre-marital funds. See A.R.S. § 25-213(A) (The 

property a spouse owned before marriage is that spouse’s separate 

property.). A spouse’s pre-marital property remains separate property 

unless transmuted by agreement or operation of law. Potthoff v. Potthoff, 128 

Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1981). “The mere fact that the property was

commingled does not cause it to lose its separate identity, as long as the

separate property can still be identified.” Cupp, 152 Ariz. at 164; see also

Cooper v. Cooper, 130 Ariz. 257, 259 (1981) (same); Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. 

App. 89, 95 (1976) (Commingling does not cause transmutation “so long as 

the funds remain traceable.”). Father has the burden of proving with clear 

and satisfactory evidence what portion of his funds should not be found

transmuted. Cooper, 130 Ariz. at 259-60.

¶16 At least some of the $42,000 account balance on the marriage 

date was traceable and did not lose its identity. See Cupp, 152 Ariz. at 164 

(Separate funds remained traceable where spouse bought “easily 

identifiable assets” with commingled separate funds “within a very short 

time after receiving those funds.”). The Chase account fluctuated during 

the marriage, but it never fell below $39,400. And there is no evidence in 

the record that Father used the Chase account for separate expenditures

during the marriage. Thus, some funds in the account on the marriage date 

are identifiable despite the later addition of community funds. See Cupp, 152 

Ariz. at 164. The superior court erred when it included all funds in the 

Chase account as community property. While Father and Grandmother 

may dispute their share of the pre-marital funds ($39,400), the community 

has no interest in them.

¶17 As to any amount above the $39,400 balance, the superior 

court must determine Grandmother’s non-marital interest in the Chase 

account before it can determine the community’s interest. We vacate the 

allocation of “the community depository accounts” and remand for 

reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

7

C. Grandmother May Be an Indispensable Party in Determining the 

Ownership of the Chase Account.

¶18 The parties dispute whether Grandmother was an 

indispensable party to the litigation over the Chase account. We need not 

decide on that issue because we are remanding the case to correct the 

abovementioned errors. Still, we address their arguments to guide the court 

because the issue may arise on remand. See Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 

126, 131, ¶ 17 (App. 2019); State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361, 366, ¶ 18 (App. 2011).

¶19 Neither party asked the court to join Grandmother as an 

indispensable party, and the court did not order her to be joined. Whether 

a party is indispensable4 (sometimes called a necessary party) is a mixed 

question of fact and law that must be determined on the facts of each case 

and that we review de novo. See Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9, 14, ¶ 19 (App. 

1998); Friends of Black Forest Reg’l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 80 P.3d

4 Before the 1966 amendments to the Arizona Rules of Civil 

Procedure, parties to an action were known as three types:

(1) Proper parties: Parties who may be joined because the 

case involves a common question in which a person has an 

interest, but complete relief may nevertheless be granted 

without joinder.

(2) Necessary parties: Parties who should be joined 

because complete relief cannot be granted without joinder, 

but that party’s interest is severable. Siler v. Superior Court, 83 

Ariz. 49, 54 (1957).

(3) Indispensable parties: Parties who must be joined 

because the case cannot be adjudicated without such party’s 

involvement. Bolin v. Superior Court, 85 Ariz. 131, 134-35

(1958); Siler, 83 Ariz. at 54.

2 Ariz. Prac., Civil Trial Practice § 11:5 (2d ed.) (cleaned up). The supreme 

court amended Rule 19 in 1966 to discard the “judicial gloss in terms of 

indispensable, necessary, and proper parties.” See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19, State 

Bar Committee Note to 1966 Amendment; see also Riley v. Cochise County, 10 

Ariz. App. 55, 58 (1969). The 1966 amendments retained the “basic principle 

that parties must be joined where this is required by ‘equity and good 

conscience.’” See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19, State Bar Committee Note to 1966 

Amendment (citations omitted). The supreme court adopted restyled rules 

in 2017 but did not change the thrust of Rule 19.
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

8

871, 881 (Colo. App. 2003). Although Father did not raise the issue below, 

the failure to join an indispensable party is not waivable and may be raised 

for the first time at the appellate level. City of Flagstaff v. Babbitt, 8 Ariz. App. 

123, 127 (1968); Gerow, 192 Ariz. at 14, ¶ 19. So a court should always be 

mindful of the risk of entering a voidable order if an indispensable party is 

not joined. See Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, 254 Ariz. 255, 262, ¶ 26 

(2022) (“Voidable orders or judgments, in contrast, are binding and 

enforceable, enjoy all of the ordinary attributes of a valid order or judgment 

until they are reversed or vacated, and may only be modified on direct 

appeal or by a proper and timely post-judgment motion.”) (cleaned up); 

Babbitt, 8 Ariz. App. at 127 (A judgment rendered without an indispensable 

party is merely voidable and not void.).

¶20 A court may join a third party in a domestic relations action 

when joinder is “necessary for the exercise of its authority.” A.R.S. 

§ 25-314(D). A party is indispensable when their “interest in the controversy 

is such that no final judgment or decree could be entered, doing justice 

between the parties actually before the court and without injuriously 

affecting the rights of others not brought into the action.” Gila Bend v. Walled 

Lake Door Co., 107 Ariz. 545, 549 (1971); see also Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 33(c) 

(Courts must use the civil procedure rules in family cases for joinder, 

interpleader, or intervention.); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (A party is necessary 

when the court cannot provide complete relief in their absence, the absent 

party’s interests would be impaired or impeded by a judgment, or an 

existing party may be subject to substantial risk of inconsistent 

obligations.). Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 19 aims to ensure the joinder 

of all interested parties in a single action and avoid a multiplicity of 

litigation. Ariz. Title Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Kelly, 11 Ariz. App. 254, 255 (1970). And 

a party who should be joined but refuses to participate may be brought in 

as a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff. Vance v. Vance, 124 Ariz. 1, 4

(1979).

¶21 Based on the current record, Father’s argument appears to 

have merit. Mother argues Grandmother was not an indispensable party 

because her interests likely aligned with Father, who could protect 

Grandmother’s portion of the Chase account but failed to do so. Father 

argues it was necessary to join Grandmother because her interest in the 

Chase account was adverse to his pre-marital separate property and the 

community interest, and, without her, there is a substantial risk of 

inconsistent obligations.
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

9

¶22 Based on the facts here, Father could not adequately represent 

Grandmother’s interest without her agreeing to the representation because 

their interests are adverse. The greater Grandmother’s interest in the 

account is, the smaller Father’s and the community’s interests would be. 

Because Grandmother was not afforded the opportunity to assign her 

interest or be joined as a party, she could not participate in determining 

how much of the Chase account she owned. Grandmother had a right to 

appear and protect her property interest, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) 

(Joinder is necessary if disposing of a person’s interest in their absence may 

“as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect the 

interest.”), or to waive her right to appear. Due process requires that before 

an individual is deprived of a property interest, that person must have 

notice and an opportunity to be heard. Johns v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 169 

Ariz. 75, 79 (App. 1991) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 

(1971)).

¶23 As noted, Grandmother withdrew all funds in the account the 

day after service. This withdrawal did not protect her interest or prevent 

more litigation over the funds. Father or Mother could demand repayment 

of the community’s share of the account from Grandmother, which might 

lead to rulings inconsistent with the decree. Moreover, on this record, 

Grandmother’s share may be even more than the amount she withdrew if 

her total deposits minus withdrawals exceed the sum she took. This risk 

reinforces the need to either obtain Grandmother’s waiver or join 

Grandmother as an indispensable party despite her withdrawal of the 

funds and the fact that the equalization judgment was against Father, not 

her. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii).

¶24 Mother also argues that Grandmother was not an 

indispensable party because, like Gerow, 192 Ariz. at 15, ¶¶ 22-23, the decree 

resolved the dispute between Mother and Father without adversely 

affecting Grandmother’s interests. But this fact is unknown, as the superior 

court’s decree awarding the entire account to Father subject to an 

equalization judgment to Mother did not resolve what the community 

funds were. As a result of the error, the equalization judgment awarding 

Mother one-half of the fund’s value created a substantial risk of inconsistent 

obligations for Father. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). Thus, Grandmother 

appears to be an indispensable party.

¶25 On remand, the superior court can determine whether 

Grandmother is indispensable. If she is, Grandmother may waive her right 

to participate or agree to have Father represent her interest. We leave it to 

the court to fashion an appropriate path forward with the issue before it.
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

10

D. The Court Correctly Determined the Marital Lien on the 

Community Home.

¶26 Mother did not dispute that the community home was 

Father’s separate pre-marital property. She claimed the community had an 

equitable lien because the parties paid the mortgage on Father’s separate 

property with community funds throughout the marriage. When Father 

refinanced the home loan in July 2019, Mother signed a disclaimer deed.

¶27 The superior court awarded the home to Father and 

determined that Mother’s share of the equitable lien was $14,469. We apply 

de novo review to the court’s characterization of assets or debts as 

community or separate, but we review the court’s division of those assets 

and debts for an abuse of discretion. Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 559, 

¶ 13 (App. 2019).

1. Father Failed to Show Prejudice When the Superior Court 

Mistakenly Listed the Home as Community Property Because the 

Court Awarded the Home to Father as His Separate Property.

¶28 Father argues the superior court erroneously characterized 

the home as community property in the decree based on the following

language: “Father is awarded the following community property as his sole 

and separate property . . . [a]ll right, title, interest, and equity in the real 

estate consisting of the home . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Although the decree 

lists the home as community property, this misstatement is harmless error

because the court awarded the home to Father as his separate property.

Mother received half of the community’s equitable lien in the home, 

suggesting she had no ownership interest in the separate property home.

¶29 Even so, Father contends the error is not harmless because by 

characterizing the home as community property, the superior court “must”

have factored the $60,000 in equity into the equitable division of property,

which “may have spurred the trial court to award Mother more than it 

otherwise would have.” Father fails to explain how or what specific 

property division was inequitable because of the misstatement. As a result,

we reject the unsupported argument.

2. Father Waived His Argument That the Court Should Use a 

Different Date to Calculate the Community’s Equitable Lien.

¶30 Father argues it was error to use the date of the marriage 

(November 10, 2015) instead of the date Mother signed the disclaimer deed 

(July 18, 2019) in calculating the equitable lien under the formula outlined
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

11

in Drahos v. Rens, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985), and Barnett v. Jedynak, 219 Ariz. 

550 (App. 2009) (“Drahos/Barnett formula”).

¶31 Father did not argue about which date to use before the trial.

Instead, he argued that Mother had no interest in the home. In his post-trial 

motion to alter or amend the decree, Father argued for the first time about 

which date (marriage or refinance) should be used. Arguments raised for 

the first time in a post-trial motion are typically waived. See Conant v. 

Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290, 293-94 (App. 1997).

¶32 Father argues that waiver should not apply to him because he 

could not have raised the Drahos/Barnett formula error before the court 

issued the decree. We reject the argument. Father knew of Mother’s 

proposed Drahos/Barnett calculation at trial yet maintained that the 

community had no equitable lien. He could have objected to Mother’s 

position and raised his alternative Drahos/Barnett calculation at trial.

5 Thus, 

Father has waived the argument.

E. The Subaru is Father’s Separate Property, and the Record Does Not 

Support the Amount of the Vehicle Equalization Judgment.

¶33 As noted above, the decree addressed five vehicles. It 

awarded Mother the 2007 Acura and Father four vehicles, including a Rav4

and a Subaru. Mother did not dispute that the Rav4 and Subaru were

Father’s pre-marital separate property. But Mother sought an equalization 

judgment for half the Subaru’s value because they used community funds 

for some Subaru car payments after the marriage. The court awarded 

Mother a $15,625 equalization judgment for her share of the vehicle equity

without explaining how it arrived at the figure.

¶34 Father argues the superior court erred because it awarded 

him only “one-half of all right, title, interest, and equity” in the Subaru and 

the Toyota Highlander without awarding the other half to Mother. This was 

harmless error. The court did not award Mother the “other half” of these 

vehicles but awarded her an equalization judgment. On remand, the court 

5 Our supreme court issued its opinion in Saba v. Khoury, 253 Ariz. 587 

(2022), two weeks before trial. Thus, to the extent that that Father now relies 

on the Saba opinion, it was available at the time of his pretrial statement 

(September 21, 2022), trial (September 27, 2022), and opening brief

(September 28, 2023). Father’s failure to argue it until the reply brief waives 

the issue.
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

12

should amend the decree to clarify that it awarded Father all interest in the 

Subaru and Highlander referred to in the decree.

¶35 Father also asserts that the decree erroneously listed the Rav4

and Subaru as community property and assigned them to Father as his 

separate property. This is also harmless error. Though the wording in the 

decree purports to award “the following community property” to Father, 

these two vehicles were undisputedly Father’s pre-marital separate 

property. There was also no evidence of the Rav4’s value, so the court could 

not have considered it in calculating the equalization judgment. The 

incorrect language does not warrant reversal.

¶36 Father contends it was error to include the value of the Subaru 

in the equalization judgment because it was his separate property. See 

A.R.S. § 25-213(A). Property bought before marriage on credit or with 

borrowed funds acquires the status of separate property at the time of the 

purchase. See Brucklier v. Brucklier, 253 Ariz. 579, 583, ¶ 16 (App. 2022)

(Property acquires its character as community or separate depending on its 

owner’s marital status at the time of acquisition.). And regardless of the 

community or separate nature of the funds used to satisfy the debt, it 

remains such. Flynn v. Allender, 75 Ariz. 322, 325 (1953) (citing 41 C.J.S., 

Husband and Wife, § 483); Brucklier, 253 Ariz. at 584, ¶ 21 (“Commingling 

can transmute financial accounts but not tangible assets.”).

¶37 While the Subaru was and remains Father’s separate 

property, the community has an equitable lien for the community funds 

used to pay toward the separate debt. See Flynn, 75 Ariz. at 326; see also 

Cameron v. Cameron, 148 Ariz. 558, 559 (App. 1985). Father argues that the 

appropriate equitable lien calculation is the formula outlined in Valento v. 

Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, 482, ¶¶ 14-16 (App. 2010), which calculates a

community’s equitable lien for a depreciating asset. The Valento formula is 

valid for calculating a lien on a depreciating asset. But in Cameron, we also 

affirmed an equitable lien calculation that deducted the car’s depreciation

from the principal payments made by the community. 148 Ariz. at 559. The 

court could have used either method, but it used neither.

¶38 The superior court has the discretion to determine the best 

method for calculating an equitable lien to “achieve substantial justice 

between the parties.” Saba, 253 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 16 (quoting Cockrill v. Cockrill,

124 Ariz. 50, 54 (1979)). Mother’s burden was to prove the community’s 

interest in Father’s separate property. See DeFrancesco v. DeFrancesco, 248 

Ariz. 23, 24, ¶ 4 (App. 2019) (The burden of proof is on the party asserting 

an interest in the other spouse’s property.). Mother’s only evidence was the
WHITT v. MEZA

Opinion of the Court

13

purchase price ($34,495) and the Subaru’s current value ($27,015). The 

record does not show how the current value corresponds to the amount the 

community contributed in car payments. As a result, we vacate the vehicle 

equalization judgment and remand for reconsideration.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶39 Mother requests an award of attorney’s fees and costs on 

appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. While neither party took unreasonable 

positions, the financial disparity between the parties warrants awarding 

Mother her reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal after compliance with 

ARCAP 21. As the prevailing party on appeal, Father is entitled to his costs 

under A.R.S. § 12-342(A) after compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶40 We affirm the community’s equitable lien on Father’s 

separate property home and the trial attorney’s fees award. We vacate the 

equalization judgment for the parties’ bank accounts because the court 

characterized the entire Chase account as community property. On remand, 

the court must determine whether Grandmother is an indispensable party,

determine her interest in the Chase account, separately determine the 

separate or community nature of the funds in the Chase account, and 

exercise its discretion to allocate the community funds consistent with 

A.R.S. §§ 25-213 and -318. We also vacate the vehicle equalization judgment

and remand for reconsideration because the record does not support the 

amount attributed to the community’s interest in Father’s separate 

property, the Subaru. Because we vacate the two equalization judgments

and remand for reconsideration, it may affect the spousal maintenance 

analysis and award. Thus, we instruct the court to reconsider the 

maintenance award on remand. If there is a change to the spousal 

maintenance award, the court must also reconsider the child support order.