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S. Hrg. 114–632 

DHS MANAGEMENT AND ACQUISITION REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 16, 2016 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

DAVID S. LUCKEY, Director of Homeland Security 

JEFFREY A. FIORE, U.S. Government Accountability Office Detailee 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN R. VIN ̃ A, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

MARIAN P. GIBSON, Minority U.S. Department of Homeland Security Detailee 

TIMOTHY D. MCCROSSON, Minority Office of Management and Budget Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BENJAMIN C. GRAZDA, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Lankford .............................................................................................. 20 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 25 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 26 

WITNESS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2016 

Hon. Russell C. Deyo, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Charles H. Fulghum, Deputy Under Secretary for Management and 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................... 7 

Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 9 

Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 10 

Michele Mackin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Deyo, Hon. Russell C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Joint prepared statement ................................................................................. 28 

Fulghum, Hon. Charles H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Joint prepared statement ................................................................................. 28 

Gambler, Rebecca: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Joint prepared statement ................................................................................. 56 

Mackin, Michele: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Joint prepared statement ................................................................................. 56 

Roth, Hon. John: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Deyo and Mr. Fulghum ............................................................................. 82 

Mr. Roth ............................................................................................................ 104 

Ms. Gambler and Ms. Mackin ......................................................................... 107 

(1) 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

MANAGEMENT AND ACQUISITION REFORM 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. This hearing will come to order. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing before us 

today, for your thoughtful testimony, and for your time here today. 

Unfortunately, I am going to have to leave at a little bit before 

3:00. We will probably turn it over to the capable hands of my 

Ranking Member here. 

Senator CARPER. I object. [Laughter.] 

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, then we have a problem. 

Senator CARPER. OK. I do not object. 

Chairman JOHNSON. This is an important hearing. We have been 

working on this project for about a year in a bicameral, and I 

think, a very bipartisan way. We have been working with the 

House Committee on Homeland Security, this Committee, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) really trying to address many of the problems that GAO has recognized in its ‘‘High-Risk List,’’ trying to authorize and put into statute the types of management reforms that 

the good folks, the dedicated people, at the Department of Homeland Security are trying to implement to pass on a stronger Department to the next Administration—which we really appreciate 

that. So, I do not want to take a whole lot of time in my opening 

statement. I just want to really encourage that process, in terms 

of DHS management and acquisition reform. 

The difference with what we do here in the Senate is—the House 

passed a bill with that combined into one bill. I think, just recognizing there may be some issues, we decided to separate those 2 

into 2 different bills. So, again, we are all about getting results 

here, in this Committee, trying to find areas of agreement. 

I do have to note—because yesterday we did hold a hearing 

where we talked about potential problems, in our visa programs, 
2 

and, during that hearing, I did ask questions about a pretty troubling incident that occurred at the San Bernardino United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) office, and I asked 

Director Sarah Saldan ̃ a and Director Leo ́n Rodriguez about that. 

Last night, we learned, shortly after the hearing, that the U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) supervisors are seeking information about who provided that information to Congress. 

I am very concerned that ICE’s management is seeking out those 

individuals in order to retaliate, or otherwise punish them, for providing information to Congress. So, I want to make it very clear, 

today, that our Committee will be monitoring this situation very 

carefully. 

The Federal Government has a very poor record of retaliation. 

We have held numerous hearings about this, and it is really quite 

shocking how often the Federal Government retaliates. But, I certainly will not stand for—and I do not think this Committee will 

stand for—any retribution against those who had the courage to 

come forward to reveal this incident. 

Federal law expressly protects Federal employees’ rights to furnish information to Congress—and any form of retaliation against 

Federal employees for furnishing information to Congress will 

not—and should not—be tolerated. 

So, this afternoon, I will be sending a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson about this matter and asking him to direct all DHS managers and employees to follow Federal law regarding whistleblower protection. And, Inspector General (IG) John 

Roth, I will also be sending a letter to you about this matter, formally requesting that you investigate the San Bernardino incident. 

With that, I will turn it over to my Ranking Member, Senator 

Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome back Under Secretary Russ Deyo, whom we 

have not seen for almost 24 hours—actually, a little bit longer than 

that—Deputy Under Secretary Chip Fulghum, John Roth, our DHS 

Inspector General, who I think we did see 24 hours ago, and GAO 

Directors Rebecca Gambler and Michele Mackin. It is nice to see 

you all. And, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important 

hearing, and to each of you for being here and for helping to guide 

us and for sharing your wisdom with us. 

As the Chairman has alluded to, our oversight, on this Committee, is usually focused on the men and women at the Department of Homeland Security who are working on the front lines at 

our airports, our land borders, and our coasts. But, backing up the 

Department’s front-line personnel is a dedicated cadre of professionals in the DHS Management Directorate. The Management Directorate controls the Department’s finances; it oversees the acquisition of assets and the procurement of services; it manages the Department’s information technology (IT) backbone; and it makes 

sure that all employees get the paychecks—the correct paychecks— 

as well as the benefits and salary that they have earned. And, as 

some of you have heard me say before—as my colleagues have 
3 

heard me say before—management really does matter. It does matter. 

Our friends from GAO and the DHS Inspector General have kept 

a close eye on the Department’s management and acquisition practices. We are grateful for that. And, as their testimony indicates, 

there have been a number of challenges in these areas since the 

Department’s creation about 13 years ago. And, the management 

of the Department, of course, continues to be on GAO’s ‘‘High-Risk 

List,’’ as Secretary Johnson continues his predecessors’ efforts to 

merge nearly 2 dozen agencies that were once spread across the entire Federal Government. 

Despite the massive undertaking of stitching together so many 

agencies with different missions and different cultures, we have 

seen a number of management successes at the Department over 

the years. We celebrate those. In fact, I was very pleased to hear— 

we were very pleased to hear that the Department has just taken 

another step toward getting off of the ‘‘High-Risk List’’ by improving the monitoring of its key management initiatives. And, that is 

definitely good news—and Secretary Johnson and his team deserve 

to be commended—and we commend you. 

But, as the Inspector General has noted before, addressing the 

Department’s long-term management challenges requires a commitment to building—and sustaining—I will say that again—a 

commitment to building and sustaining a culture that recognizes 

the need to act in a more unified, inclusive, and transparent manner. And, I could not agree more. That is why I strongly support 

Secretary Johnson’s ‘‘Unity of Effort Initiative,’’ which seeks to create more cohesion and efficiency across the Department by standing up joint operations. 

Last week, Secretary Jeh Johnson sat right here in front of us 

and told our Committee that he would like to see his management 

initiatives codified in law, so that the improvements he and his 

team are making can be sustained and made even stronger by the 

next Administration. I think that makes a lot of sense, and it is 

why I have joined our Chairman in cosponsoring two pieces of legislation that would seek to make permanent many of the management reforms that the Department has already instituted. In some 

cases, our legislation provides new authority or requirements. For 

example, the DHS management bill provides headquarters officials 

with additional authority that they can use to better oversee the 

activities of the components. It would also require DHS to report 

to GAO every 6 months on the progress being made to get off of 

the ‘‘High-Risk List.’’ 

The second bill focuses on improving the acquisition processes at 

the Department. Among other things, this bill would, for the first 

time, designate the Under Secretary for Management as the single 

leader accountable for all DHS acquisition programs. It would also 

vest the Under Secretary with the statutory authority to halt, to 

modify, or to cancel acquisition programs that are struggling or are 

not deemed to be viable. And, while I believe these bills provide a 

solid foundation for the Department to continue to mature and 

grow even stronger, I know they are not perfect. And, when something is not perfect, we should make it better. And, I look forward 
4 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 25. 

2The joint prepared statement of Hon. Deyo and Hon. Fulghum appears in the Appendix on 

page 28. 

to working with all of our colleagues on further ways to improve 

these bills. 

In closing, I just want to add I think it is important to remember 

that the Department, at the tender age of 13, is still a young organization—a teenager. And, given this fact, it needs proper guidance, firm rules, and strong oversight. And, that is where these 

bills and this hearing come into place. By working together, we can 

help give the Department—enable the Department, I think, but 

give them the tools that they need and the authorities they need 

to continue to mature and truly become ‘‘One DHS.’’ 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all. Welcome one and all. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And 13-year-olds can be quite difficult. 

[Laughter.] 

Thank you, Senator Carper. 

I would ask that my opening statement be entered into the 

record.1

With that, it is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if you will all rise and raise your right hand. Do you 

swear the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, 

God? 

Mr. DEYO. I do. 

Mr. FULGHUM. I do. 

Mr. ROTH. I do. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I do. 

Ms. MACKIN. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is Mr. Russ Deyo. Mr. Deyo is the Under Secretary for Management at the Department of Homeland Security. 

In this position, Mr. Deyo oversees the Department’s management 

programs, processes, and workforces. Secretary Deyo. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE RUSSELL C. DEYO,2 UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. DEYO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. 

I appreciate that. It is actually an honor to be here at this table 

with the Deputy Under Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Chip Fulghum. I could not have a better 

partner and leader. 

I am also very pleased with our working relationship with Inspector General Roth and with GAO, including with Ms. Gambler 

and Ms. Mackin. We work at an appropriate arm’s length, but have 

a good, collaborative relationship—and it is a pleasure to be here. 

Senator CARPER. Let the record show that the IG nodded his 

head affirmatively. [Laughter.] 

Mr. DEYO. Thank you for putting that on the record. 

Before I go further, Chairman Johnson, thank you for your opening comments. I understand your concerns, and I promise you I will 

personally follow up on this as well. But, I totally appreciate and 

understand your concerns. 
5 

I am going to be brief because we are familiar, but I thought I 

would try to just, at a high level, set the tone and the background 

for what we are seeking to address. The letter to me, the invitation, 

asked us to address 3 things: management and acquisition challenges historically faced by DHS, progress made in addressing 

those challenges, and potential reforms for outstanding challenges. 

And, I am going to address each of those very briefly, from my perspective—and my perspective, as many of you know, is based on 

my 25 years-plus experience at Johnson & Johnson, which, like the 

Department, is a highly decentralized organization with very different companies under the broad umbrella of health care. Just as 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is quite different from ICE, Neutrogena, the consumer skin care company, is 

very different from Johnson Pharmaceutical, a research organization. So, I have experience in trying to find that right balance between when stand-alone entities can work, independently, but 

when it is best for them to work together. And, I have tried to 

bring that experience to bear on what I have seen. 

As you know, I joined the Department last spring, basically a 

year into the Secretary’s ‘‘Unity of Effort Initiative,’’ which was 

based on some good work that had gone before, but, in my judgment, is very close to exactly the right balance between independence—Coast Guard acting on its own to deal with people lost at 

sea, but then, when it is appropriate and necessary, allowing for 

strong collaboration across the components to achieve our critical 

mission. 

The ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ addresses a number of critical areas, as you 

know, and I will very briefly cover them. 

You have to have a strategy. You have to have a forward-looking 

strategy that is reflective of the environment and the changing circumstances. Under ‘‘Unity of Effort,’’ the Office of Policy has that 

responsibility, working very closely with the components to come 

up with a strategy as well as appropriate policy improvements and 

high-level operational directives. 

Then you need senior groups of the leadership so that they can 

be engaged, involved, and have ownership of what is coming. So, 

we have the Senior Leadership Council and the Deputy Secretary’s 

Management Action Group, which are very much involved in that 

process. 

Importantly, you need to have mission-focused, cross-component 

budgeting, programming, and acquisition processes. And, I know 

that is heavily a tension today. I think we have worked hard at improving our acquisition process. A very quick example is obviously 

the Joint Requirements Council (JRC), where you have representatives of each component, led by a component leader, establishing 

the requirements. What are the needs that we are trying to address in this acquisition? What are the capabilities that we are trying to obtain, so that we can fulfill our mission responsibilities? 

It does not go forward in the acquisition and process until there 

is alignment and clear definition there. That is a very important 

and huge improvement. And, just to cut a little bit to the head of 

the chase, we have had a JRC in the past, and it was not sustainable. It disappeared. What we are trying to do here, with the help 

of your good legislation, is to make sure these improvements, at all 
6 

of these aspects, are sustainable and are in place for the next Administration and beyond. 

We also need coordinated operations when the components are 

working together, and that is where the Joint Task Forces (JTFs) 

and the work they are doing on the Southern Border is a good example—where components are working together in a common leadership structure—sharing data, sharing information, and working 

together to address very important mission-directed elements. 

An area that is directly within my area’s responsibility is coordinated and aligned administrative functions—and you made reference to this, Ranking Member Carper. We need strong and common finance processes, strong and common IT processes, strong 

and common human resources (HR) processes, and strong and common procurement processes. We are getting better at that because 

of the responsibilities of the chiefs of the lines of businesses that 

report to me, the Chief Information Officer (CIO), the head of 

human resources, and Mr. Fulghum, working across the components to come up with common approaches, common financial systems, and common IT systems—where they are collectively addressing what needs to be done to improve those systems, replace 

outmoded ones, and improve our cybersecurity. I am seeing it 

working every day—not that we cannot be better and not that we 

do not need increasing experience, but the alignment and the improvements are palpable. 

So, we are working on all fronts to make that better, and we will 

continue to improve. So, from my perspective, the ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ 

is a big improvement—the right balance of independence—and collaboration. And, the legislation that is being considered—the 2 

pieces of legislation—will go a long way to addressing what is, now, 

our biggest management issue, which is making it sustainable. 

And, in that regard, I will also note that some added benefits of 

the legislation are that it makes accountability clear, it has great 

transparency to you and to the American public, and, as you well 

know, it adopts and codifies many of the recommendations from the 

Inspector General and from GAO about how we should be operating. And, we embrace that. We accept that. We accept the accountability. We accept the recommendations that will make us 

better at what we are doing. And, making it sustainable will have 

a huge benefit for us—a huge benefit for us, so people do not have 

to redo, rethink, or restart. 

We need more experience. We will get better and better as we 

do more of these. We are well underway. Things are working. But, 

we just need to make it sustainable, and we will continue to improve it, as we go forward. 

So, unless there are any questions for me at this point, I would 

like to turn it over to Mr. Fulghum. I will note this: Before I arrived at DHS, he was the Acting Under Secretary for Management. 

His leadership has made a huge difference under the ‘‘Unity of Effort.’’ He started huge improvements with our approach to appropriations—excuse me, acquisitions—— 

Senator CARPER. How do you say—how huge? Like really huge? 

Chairman JOHNSON. With a ‘‘Y.’’ 

Mr. DEYO. To be candid, we have a great partnership, and I do 

not think we would—it is great to have somebody who is inside and 
7 

1The joint prepared statement of Hon. Fulghum and Hon. Deyo appears in the Appendix on 

page 28. 

familiar. I bring an outside perspective. We have very candid conversations. But, I have seen the impact of what he has done, personally, with his leadership, in getting us closer to a common financial system, improving our budgeting process, becoming mission-focused, and working on the acquisition piece. So, if you agree, I will 

ask Mr. Fulghum—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Let me introduce him—but, first of all, 

thank you, Secretary Deyo. I think we have been very impressed 

with your contribution to this as well. 

Mr. DEYO. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We are really thankful that you were able 

to come into government, not a real thank-filled job in many cases 

here. 

Mr. DEYO. Not every day. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, we appreciate your service. 

Our next witness is ‘‘Chip’’ Fulghum, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer at the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Fulghum leads several lines of 

businesses across the Department, including financial, human capital, and information technology management. Mr. Fulghum. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES H. FULGHUM,1

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT AND CHIEF 

FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FULGHUM. Good afternoon, sir. Chairman Johnson and 

Ranking Member Carper, thank you for allowing us to be here 

today to discuss this important topic. And, thank you to both the 

IG and GAO for their continued partnership. I refer to them—and 

they have heard me say this before—as our ‘‘personal trainers.’’ We 

might not like it when we are going through the exercise, but they 

make us better and they put us through our paces. 

Senator CARPER. That is nicer than some of the things they have 

been called. [Laughter.] 

Mr. FULGHUM. So, when I arrived at the Department in 2012, I 

saw many of the same challenges that had been well documented 

by GAO, the IG, and the Congress. And, when you look at those 

recommendations, they really center around 4 areas, as it relates 

to acquisition. 

First, is better documentation—and, in some cases, getting documentation as well as an improved requirements and definition 

process. They have recommended that we need focused oversight 

from the Department. We need better program managers that are 

certified. We need component acquisition executives that have clear 

accountability and whose offices are staffed properly. And, then 

they have repeatedly talked to us about a better linkage with 

science and technology (S&T), research and development (R&D), as 

well as test and evaluation. 

Over the past 2 years, I believe we have made substantial 

progress—and I would like to briefly highlight some of that. 
8 

Since 2012, no program has moved forward in the Department 

without the required documentation. All programs now have the required documentation, which includes a life-cycle cost estimate. As 

Mr. Deyo said, we have stood up an operator-focused Joint Requirements Council—and I want to underscore that—an operator-focused Joint Requirements Council. And, the first chairman of that 

Joint Requirements Council was a two-star admiral operator—to 

give us the right operational focus to make sure that we get the 

requirements right up front. 

We have made the tough calls when it comes to programs. We 

have canceled programs and we have paused programs, with the 

goal—the simple goal—of making sure we get it right—making 

sure that we deliver the right capability to the operator. 

We have elevated the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) 

into components, and there is now a clear relationship between the 

CAE and the Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) in the Department. 

We have required certification of program managers and we have 

addressed staffing shortfalls in various programs. 

We have improved our training. I believe the Homeland Security 

Acquisition Institute (HSAI) that Soraya Correa runs—our Chief 

Procurement Officer (CPO) runs—is an excellent program. It turns 

out we train about 8,000 folks a year in various courses. That is 

excellent—and we continue to improve that. 

And then, in terms of affordability, we require certifications now 

from the CFO in terms—the component CFO, when every program 

moves forward at a major milestone, they have to provide us with 

an affordability certification for the next 5 years. 

We have moved cost estimating to where I believe it belongs, 

which is with the Chief Financial Officer—and we are continuing 

to build that capability. And, as I said, now every program has a 

life-cycle cost estimate—every major program. 

We have better integration with S&T under the leadership of Mr. 

Deyo. We continue to build that partnership with S&T because 

they are a valued partner, especially at the front end of an acquisition. 

In short, all of these results culminate in years of work to reform 

acquisition in the Department—and this bill will drive us to 

sustainment. As I believe you said to us the other day, Senator 

Johnson, you said, ‘‘OK, here is the bill. Now we have to see you 

do it.’’ It increases accountability, it increases transparency, it increases efficiency, and it codifies the progress we have made. As 

our Secretary likes to say, it pours concrete over the hard work 

that the men and women in management have done. 

So, in short, under the leadership of Mr. Deyo, we have made 

huge progress over the last year. I believe we will continue to make 

progress. This legislation is important to the Department because, 

as I said, it codifies much of the progress we have made and it 

holds us accountable to ensure that we sustain it, which is key to 

getting off of the ‘‘High-Risk List.’’ 

So, with that, I welcome any questions you have at this time. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Secretary Fulghum. 

Our next witness is John Roth. He is the Inspector General at 

the Department of Homeland Security. In this position, Mr. Roth 

leads the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) independent audits, 
9 

1The prepared statement of Hon. Roth appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

investigations, and inspections of the programs and operations of 

DHS. Inspector General Roth. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Good afternoon, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

Carper, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me 

here to discuss critical management and acquisition functions at 

DHS. 

Acquisition management, which is critical to fulfilling the DHS 

functions or missions, is inherently complex and high risk. It is further challenged by the magnitude and the diversity of the Department’s procurements. Since its inception in 2003, the Department 

has spent tens of billions of dollars, annually, on a broad range of 

assets and services—from ships, to aircraft, to surveillance towers, 

to financial, human resource, and information technology systems. 

DHS’s yearly spending on contractual services and supplies, along 

with the acquisition of assets, exceeds $25 billion. Although the Department has improved its acquisition processes and taken steps to 

strengthen oversight of major acquisition programs, challenges to 

cost effectiveness and efficiency remain. 

DHS has taken many steps to strengthen department-wide acquisition management. 

For example, it has established the Acquisition Life Cycle Framework—a four-phase process to assure consistent and efficient operation of acquisition management, support, review, and approval. 

Second, it created the Office of Program Accountability and Risk 

Management (PARM) in 2011. This office oversees the acquisition 

work of the Department and its components as well as enforces 

DHS policies and procedures. 

Third, it established an Acquisition Review Board (ARB), which 

determines whether or not the components’ acquisitions meet specific requirements at key phases throughout the acquisition process. 

Fourth, DHS established a Joint Requirements Council to review 

high-dollar acquisitions and make recommendations to the Acquisition Review Board on cross-cutting savings opportunities. 

Lastly, it has increased component-level acquisition capability. 

For instance, the Department has appointed component acquisition 

executives to oversee and support their respective programs. It has 

also initiated various training and information-sharing programs 

within the components themselves. 

Although DHS has made much progress, we do not believe it has 

yet achieved the cohesion and sense of community to act as one entity working towards a common goal. The Department continues to 

face challenges establishing and enforcing a strong central authority and uniform policies and procedures. Many of DHS’s major acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take 

longer to deploy than planned, and deliver less capability than 

promised. 

We have analyzed the acquisition failures and have identified 3 

root causes. 
10 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. Gambler and Ms. Mackin appears in the Appendix on 

page 56. 

First, components do not always follow departmental acquisition 

guidance, which may lead to cost overruns, missed schedules, and 

mediocre acquisition performance. All of these have an effect on 

budget, security, and efficient use of resources. 

Second, components often do not engage in appropriate oversight 

of their own acquisition process. To protect the Department’s investments, components must properly manage assets throughout 

the life cycle. Our reviews of equipment maintenance contracts, for 

example, revealed that components need to improve oversight to 

ensure contractors provide the required services and correct maintenance deficiencies. 

Lastly, DHS needs better data and acquisition management 

tools. Strong management of Department programs requires accurate and reliable data, clear and well-communicated guidance, and 

a collaborative and unified environment. We have identified crosscutting programs in which better management, oversight, and 

guidance could have improved transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency. 

In the last few years, DHS has initiated significant reforms to 

the acquisition process and has exerted significant leadership to 

gain control over an unruly and wasteful process. However, I worry 

that the significant reforms, if not continuously enforced over time, 

could be undone. We believe that the passage of the 2 bills under 

consideration by this Committee, the DHS Headquarters Reform 

and Improvement Act of 2016 and the DHS Acquisition Reform and 

Accountability Act of 2016, will help DHS solidify the gains made 

in the discipline, accountability, and transparency of acquisition 

program management. These bills codify existing policy and relevant offices, provide the necessary authority for key personnel and 

mechanisms within the Department to effectively manage major acquisition programs, reinforce the importance of key acquisition 

management practices—such as establishing cost, schedule, and capability parameters—and include requirements to better identify 

and address poorly performing acquisition programs. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome 

any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, General Roth. 

Our next witness is Rebecca Gambler. Ms. Gambler is the Director of the Homeland Security and Justice team at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Ms. Gambler leads GAO’s work on DHS 

management and transformation, border security, and immigration. Director Gambler. 

TESTIMONY OF REBECCA GAMBLER,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GAMBLER. Good afternoon, Chairman Johnson, Ranking 

Member Carper, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify at today’s hearing to discuss GAO’s work on 

DHS’s efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions. 
11 

Since 2003, GAO has issued hundreds of reports addressing the 

range of DHS’s mission and management functions. And, we have 

made about 2,400 recommendations to strengthen the Department’s operations and management, among other things. DHS has 

implemented about 70 percent of these recommendations and has 

actions underway to address others. 

GAO also regularly reports to Congress on government operations that we have identified as high risk because of their great 

vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement—or the 

need for transformation. In 2003, we designated implementing and 

transforming DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 

agencies into one Department—and the failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and 

economic security. With DHS’s maturation and evolution, we have 

narrowed the scope of DHS’s high-risk area to focus on strengthening management functions—and those functions include human 

capital, acquisition, financial, and information technology management. 

GAO has established 5 criteria for removing areas from our 

‘‘High-Risk List.’’ Specifically, agencies must have: first, a strong 

commitment to, and top leadership support for, addressing the 

risks; second, an action plan; third, the capacity—including people 

and other resources—to address the risks; fourth, a program for 

monitoring progress; and, fifth, demonstrated progress in implementing corrective actions. 

The Department has made progress in meeting our criteria. In 

our 2015 update, we found that DHS had met 2 of our criteria— 

demonstrating leadership commitment and having an action plan— 

and had partially met the other 3 criteria. Since our 2015 update, 

DHS has made additional progress and has now also met the criterion of having a framework to monitor progress. 

To help the Department in addressing our high-risk criteria, 

GAO and DHS have agreed to 30 actions and outcomes across 

DHS’s management functions—and a number of these actions and 

outcomes are consistent with functions and responsibilities identified for the Department and its management chiefs in the proposed 

legislation on DHS management. 

With regard to the 30 actions and outcomes, DHS has fully, or 

mostly, addressed just more than half of them and has partially addressed, or initiated activities to address, the others. 

For example, within human capital management, DHS has developed and made progress in implementing a human capital strategic 

plan and a workforce planning model. However, DHS has considerable work ahead to improve employee morale. DHS has also taken 

steps to assess its various training programs, but has faced significant challenges in its efforts to consolidate its existing learning 

management systems. 

Further, within financial management, DHS has received a clean 

audit opinion on its financial statements since fiscal year (FY) 2013 

and has made progress addressing weaknesses in its internal controls over financial reporting. However, the remaining material 

weaknesses reported by auditors continue to hamper DHS’s ability 

to establish effective control over financial reporting and comply 

with financial management system requirements. My colleague Ms. 
12 

1The joint prepared statement of Ms. Mackin and Ms. Gambler appears in the Appendix on 

page 56. 

Mackin will share some more specific insights related to DHS acquisition management. 

As I close, I think it is important to note that DHS has made 

progress in addressing those issues that contributed to its designation as high risk. While this progress has been positive, DHS needs 

to continue to demonstrate measurable and sustainable progress in 

implementing corrective actions and achieving those actions and 

outcomes that we and the Department have identified. 

Efforts by the Department and by Congress, through proposed 

legislation and continued oversight, for example, are important to 

helping ensure that the Department has the people, processes, and 

systems in place to strengthen management functions and address 

remaining challenges. GAO will also continue to work constructively with the Department. For example, senior GAO and DHS officials have met routinely over the past 7 years to discuss the Department’s plans and progress in addressing this high-risk area 

and we will continue those constructive efforts. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to answer 

any questions Members have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Director Gambler. 

Our final witness is Michele Mackin. Ms. Mackin is the Director 

on the Acquisition and Sourcing Management team at the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office. In her capacity, Ms. Mackin 

leads GAO’s work on DHS acquisitions and navy ship building. Director Mackin. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHELE MACKIN,1 DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION 

AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. MACKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Ranking Member Carper and Members of the Committee. Thank you for 

having me here today to discuss DHS acquisition management and 

oversight. My statement is based on our work over more than a 

decade of reviewing DHS’s major acquisition programs—those expected to cost $300 million or more. 

The stakes are high at DHS when acquisitions are not properly 

managed. In addition to the potential for wasting taxpayer dollars, 

there is a risk that end users, such as border agents and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners, will not get the 

technologies or systems they need within required timeframes. 

As we have reported for many years, DHS acquisition policy reflects a ‘‘best practices’’ approach. Programs are not to proceed to 

the next milestone unless they have key acquisition documents in 

place. For example, if they do not have approved mission needs or 

requirements, they are not to begin buying capabilities. I note that 

the proposed acquisition reform bill reflects these sound practices. 

However, we found that DHS programs have not always followed 

these policies. As a result, programs have not delivered expected 

capabilities within cost and schedule targets. The Secure Border 

Initiative’s (SBI’s) SBInet and the Integrated Deepwater System 

Program (Deepwater) come to mind as some significant examples. 
13 

A continuing theme in our work has been the struggle to get all 

of the DHS components on board with following the acquisition 

policies. In 2005, we reported that DHS’s acquisition organization 

was fragmented among the components, and we said that if top 

leaders did not address this challenge, DHS would continue to deliver stop-gap, ad hoc solutions to its end users. 

When we reviewed the acquisition function a few years later, in 

2008, the picture was bleak. About a third of the major programs 

had proceeded with funding even though they did not have validated requirements. Just as troubling, two-thirds of the programs 

lacked approved cost estimates. We concluded that taxpayers were 

investing billions of dollars in major acquisition programs without 

appropriate oversight. 

We also found, in 2008, that the Joint Requirements Council had 

not met since 2006. This body was reinstated in 2014, and I note 

that the headquarters reform bill that has been proposed does outline this body’s roles and responsibilities. Having a Joint Requirements Council in place that validates requirements and attempts 

to eliminate redundancies across the Department is one of our 

high-risk acquisition outcomes. 

We did our next in-depth review in 2012, and, unfortunately, 

things were not much better. We continued to find that most programs lacked approved cost and schedule estimates as well as 

agreed-upon performance objectives even though these were required by policy. 

Based on the limited information available at that time, we 

found that cost estimates for 16 major programs had increased by 

166 percent. This was largely because cost estimates were not properly developed in the first place. 

Recently, however, we have seen real progress at the Department. For example, management is more focused now on ensuring 

that its major programs are affordable. Further, we found, in 2015, 

that costs had increased by $9.7, billion as measured against initial 

baselines. 

The good news is, this was the first time we could do such an 

assessment—because program documentation had improved. We 

attribute this, in large part, to the sustained attention of senior 

leadership in holding components and programs accountable. 

That said, the Department is not there yet. There are still some 

acquisition basics that are not ingrained in the culture. In addition 

to the cost, schedule, and requirements issues I have discussed, we 

found that program data have not been accurately reported, internally or externally, to Congress. And, workforce capacity and skills, 

such as program managers and cost estimators, continue to be a 

challenge. 

Moving forward, DHS will need to sustain the progress we have 

seen recently and ensure that its sound acquisition policies are followed at all levels of the Department. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Carper, this concludes my 

prepared remarks. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Director Mackin. 

I would like to first start with the Inspector General and the representatives from GAO. First of all, Director Mackin, how long 
14 

have you been working in this capacity and really doing audits on 

DHS? 

Ms. MACKIN. I was involved with the first report we did on the 

acquisition functions in 2005. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Director Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I have been covering this work, as a Director, for 

about 2 years, but, prior to becoming a Director, I worked on DHS 

management issues for several years. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. And, General Roth, I know time flies. 

You have been in this position not quite 2 years? 

Mr. ROTH. 2 years and 2 weeks. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, this is not a fair question, but, having 

gone through in my private sector business a lot of audits, both financial as well as quality audits—that type of thing, I mean, there 

is no doubt about it, good auditors are always going to find something. You can always find something to continuously improve on. 

I just want to get some sort of sense over that time of looking at 

DHS—let us say they started at zero—again, it was a significant 

challenge trying to combine 22 agencies—and the management 

challenge to finally getting to 100 would get them off of the ‘‘HighRisk List.’’ How far are they up on that scale? How much progress 

has been made? Again, I am not going to hold you to it, but I just 

kind of want to get some sort of sense. Director Gambler, you look 

like you are ready to hop in. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Absolutely. Based on our high-risk criteria, we 

would say that they are three-fifths of the way there. So, whatever 

that calculates into as a percentage—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. That would be 60 percent. [Laughter.] 

Ms. GAMBLER. We would say they are about three-fifths of the 

way there. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Director Mackin, would you give them a bit 

more than 60 percent or—— 

Ms. MACKIN. Yes, I certainly agree with what Ms. Gambler said. 

On the acquisition front, I will note, having looked at this evolve 

over 10-plus years, it is only very recently that we have started to 

see real progress. Obviously, the acquisition area is a subset of our 

overall high-risk area. So, we are seeing more accountability now, 

and we hope that the Department can keep that up at all levels— 

as I mentioned. 

Chairman JOHNSON. General Roth, do you want to kind of chime 

in? That was very subjective. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct, and, based on my limited experience thus far, 

there has been sustained leadership in this area, which I think is 

one of the key factors in moving forward on this. So, when I look 

at some of the older audits that we had done—and some of those 

were nightmare scenarios—the SBInet, for example, that had been 

mentioned earlier—we are out of those kinds of woods and in a different place. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. And these 2 gentlemen had a lot to do 

with that, so we certainly appreciate that. 

Have all 3 of you read the legislation? Do you have any problems 

with it? Again, based on what your recommendations are, we have 

tried to—I am sure we attempted to include those in that legisla-
15 

tion. Are you satisfied with it? Are there things that you are concerned about still? I will start with you, Director Mackin. 

Ms. MACKIN. I would say we have been through it, in detail, especially the acquisition bill, and it reflects quite a few of the findings and recommendations we have made over the years—and, obviously, codifies what we are on record as saying is a very sound 

‘‘best practices’’ acquisition approach. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Any glaring omissions? 

Ms. MACKIN. The only thing I would mention there is in the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) section, we have 

recommended the Department reflect funding gaps for individual 

programs over the FYHSP. That was one relatively minor issue 

that we might recommend you consider. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Director Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I would agree with my colleague. In the broader 

DHS management bill, a number of the functions and responsibilities that are identified within the management area are very consistent with GAO’s findings and include the actions and outcomes 

that we, and the Department, have agreed need to be addressed in 

order, to ultimately, meet GAO’s 5 criteria for getting off of the 

‘‘High-Risk List.’’ So, we see a lot of consistency between the language that is in the proposed bill and our high-risk actions and 

outcomes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Any omissions that you would want to mention? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Not that we would note. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. General Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. I would concur with GAO’s findings on this. I think 

this is exactly what the Department would need. It gives that imprimatur of legislation to what are current practices. But, again, 

what we always worry about is, with change of Administrations 

and changes in leadership, things can happen, things can fall off, 

and things can no longer be a priority. If it is in law, that is going 

to be less likely to happen. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Which is, of course, why we are trying to 

codify it. Secretary Deyo, I think you were the one that talked 

about how there was a Joint Requirements Council previously, but 

it was not sustained. Do you know why it was not? Can you point 

to what happened? 

Mr. DEYO. I do not. Do you know, Mr. Fulghum? I just know it 

did not—— 

Mr. FULGHUM. I think part of it was due to competing priorities. 

About the time it was formed, we were heavily focused on Hurricane Katrina and other things, and we just lost focus. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Oh, OK. Again, another reason for codifying 

this, so that does not happen. 

Secretary Deyo, I just have to talk to you a little bit about coming from the private sector. We had this discussion in our roundtable. Can you describe to me what is so difficult in government? 

We had this hearing yesterday about the IT system within USCIS, 

and there are systems in the private sector that do really what we 

need to do in so many of these agencies and departments—just getting common accounting. I imagine, in your previous life, Johnson 

& Johnson probably acquired different businesses. And, I was ac-
16 

quired, and, trust me, our accounting system switched over very 

quickly. What prevents it? Why does that not happen in government? 

Mr. DEYO. It is a great question. I am still learning. You do not 

have as much flexibility, so let us take the common financial systems, all right? Exactly what you described. At Johnson & Johnson, 

if there was an acquisition, no matter how large, the first thing 

that happened was to feed it into the common financial system, because how else can you plan and how else can you accurately report on a quarterly basis? 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, that would normally take how long? 

Mr. DEYO. First of all, you had the benefit of common definitions 

because everybody’s—we do not have common definitions, necessarily, in these financial systems—but it would be done in 6 

months, at most. It is just a matter of transitioning. And, since you 

had common definitions, even if you were doing it by hand, you 

could do it. Here, it is just more complicated and it just takes 

longer. 

In terms of what you are describing, in terms of the common financial system, we want to make sure we do it right. The GAO 

representatives talked about the risk of our internal controls and 

we are doing this in a staged way to ensure that we do it at the 

start of a financial year, so that we can manage it without the disruption. So, that is why this one is taking so long. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, just give me an example, and then I will 

turn it over to Ranking Member Carper. What do you mean you 

do not have common definitions? I mean, numbers are numbers. 

You know what I am saying? What is different in terms of definitions? 

Mr. DEYO. I will turn to my exemplary CFO. 

Mr. FULGHUM. So, one of the key foundational things we need to 

do in this Department is have a common data structure, what we 

call a ‘‘common account structure.’’ So, when these agencies were 

formed, they had unique accounting codes. And, so one of the 

things we have done is said, ‘‘OK, you can keep some of your 

unique accounting codes, but there are certain things in this Department that we need to simplify in terms of structure.’’ So, it is 

complicated. 

I would add to what the Under Secretary said, in terms of disparate systems—not modernized systems—the capacity to migrate 

to a new modernized solution, and the audit risk that is inherent 

when you migrate. And, the Department has only gotten 3 opinions 

in a row and, of course, takes that very seriously. 

So, we have taken a tiered approach to doing it. We are on a 

path to getting there. It is just going to take us some time—that, 

combined with limited resources. I mean, there is only so much 

money you can put toward this in any given year, given the competing priorities that we need to fund, in terms of operational capability. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Well, thank you. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Gambler, I feel like I would like to start this first question 

with you. Many times in my life, I have begun a sentence by saying, ‘‘If I were a gambler.’’ [Laughter.] 
17 

Have you ever used that? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I do not, but I have had other comments and jokes 

about the last name. 

Senator CARPER. Have you always been a Gambler? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I have always been a Gambler. 

Senator CARPER. Oh, good. Good. I want to start by asking why 

is it important to codify—and the rest of you may recall this, but, 

when we were trying to get him confirmed—and get the Secretary, 

the Deputy Secretary, and others confirmed—people, and my colleagues, would ask, ‘‘Why is it so important to get him confirmed?’’ 

And, we would say, ‘‘Well, it makes it clear that these folks have 

earned the imprimatur of the U.S. Senate.’’ We have vested our 

faith in them. And, let me just ask Mr. Deyo, is that true? Have 

you often seen that? 

Mr. DEYO. Yes. It does make a big difference—credibility and to 

have people listen, just as codification of these steps will make a 

huge difference to the component compliance, and all of our compliance, and our ability to make these a standard process. Once it becomes routinized, people will use it because they will see it works. 

But, we are not there yet. 

Senator CARPER. Alan Simpson used to be a Senator here. I do 

not know if he was on this Committee or not, but he was remembered for being very funny. But, he also said some memorable 

things that were not funny but were, I think, right on—dead on. 

He used to say: ‘‘Integrity, if you have it, nothing else matters. Integrity, if you do not have it, nothing else matters.’’ Think about 

that. 

I think the same is true of leadership. And, I would like to ask 

the Inspector General, Ms. Gambler, and Ms. Mackin just to reflect 

on this Department and the leadership of this Department—and 

the words that I just shared on leadership and the importance of 

leadership. And, just give us your readout, please. Mr. Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you. And, I have said this publicly in testimony 

as well as elsewhere. Secretary Johnson and his leadership team 

believe in oversight and believe in an independent Inspector General, which is not to say they always like what it is I say, but they 

believe in the office and believe that oversight makes a huge difference. 

Senator CARPER. Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I would say, particularly, as it relates to the highrisk area, we have seen extremely strong leadership, commitment, 

and support in addressing the high-risk areas and to working constructively with GAO on that. We have also seen a lot of commitment on the part of the Department and its top leadership to address the actions and outcomes and to address GAO’s recommendations. So, we have, I think, had a good, constructive working relationship and dialogue with them on these management issues. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Ms. Mackin. 

Ms. MACKIN. I certainly agree with that, and I think the integrity aspect comes into play, specifically, in the acquisition issues. 

We have not seen them overstate their progress and try to convince 

us that things are much better than they really are. 

Senator CARPER. Is that right? That is interesting. 

Ms. MACKIN. It is a very legitimate dialogue. 
18 

Senator CARPER. Maybe we should try that. [Laughter.] 

In our roles. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Speak for yourself. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman says to speak for myself. 

I think you said, Ms. Mackin, in your statement earlier, you said 

that you sensed progress, initially—maybe slower than you would 

have liked, but, in terms of ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ and making progress 

on these fronts with acquisition. But, I think you said—either you 

or Ms. Gambler said that, over time, the pace has sped up—has 

picked up. Who said that? Was that you or was that Ms. Gambler? 

Ms. MACKIN. Our observation, on the acquisition issues, is that 

it picked up quite a bit, I would say, in the last 2 years. 

Senator CARPER. And why do you suppose that is? 

Ms. MACKIN. Probably due to leadership. Probably due to just the 

acquisition organization beginning to mature. I mean, the current 

acquisition policy was implemented in 2008, so it is still relatively 

recent. Trying to get the reach down through the components to 

every program office has been a challenge. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Someone also spoke about 3 root causes. 

Mr. Roth, just go back and revisit that. Tell us again what you 

said. 

Mr. ROTH. Sure. The first thing is that components do not always 

follow departmental guidance. 

Senator CARPER. These are the 3 root causes for what? 

Mr. ROTH. For our lookback on some of the acquisition problems 

that we have seen in the course of our audits in the last 4 or 5 

years. First, components do not always follow acquisition guidance. 

Second, they do not do appropriate oversight of their own acquisition process. And, third, they need better data and acquisition 

management tools to be able to do their job. 

Senator CARPER. Sometimes, we pass legislation around here 

that addresses symptoms of problems, but not root causes. And, I 

would like to think that, in the legislation that we are considering—these 2 bills—we look at the root causes and the symptoms. 

But, when you think about root causes and the 3 that you just 

went through, is there anything in our legislation that is actually 

helpful in those regards? 

Mr. ROTH. It absolutely all is helpful in those regards. Having 

oversight of the Department, I think, is extraordinarily important. 

To be able to enforce discipline down into the component level— 

that is really where we see all of the problems. When we look at 

acquisition after acquisition, we can really show that if they had 

followed the Department’s guidance and had been appropriately supervising the acquisition process, this would not have been a problem. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Ms. Gambler, you mentioned in your 

testimony, I think you said that, of the 2,400 recommendations 

that you have personally given to this Department, some 70 percent of them have been acted on. And, my first thought is that 

sounds pretty good. Would those be 2,400 recommendations over 

like a 12-year period? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Yes, that was about 2,400 recommendations since 

2003—since the start-up of the Department. That is right. And, 

about 70 percent have been implemented—and I would just note 
19 

that the Department has actions underway to address others there. 

They are just not yet at the place where we would consider them 

fully implemented. 

Senator CARPER. I see. And, I am tempted to say, ‘‘Well, that is 

great progress,’’ but we do not know if maybe they have taken 70 

percent of like the easiest, least meaningful recommendations and 

done something with those, and the really tough ones are still out 

there. How would you characterize the apportionment of this 

progress? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Sure. Thinking about it, maybe, Senator, in the 

context of the DHS management areas and some of the recommendations that we have made there, and the related actions 

and outcomes, I think it is fair to say that DHS has really taken 

action to put in place some of the building blocks—some of the 

foundational kind of recommendations and actions and outcomes 

that need to be put into place to help address the high-risk area. 

I think where we need to continue to see progress, in terms of what 

they are continuing to work on, are some of those things that help 

to show that sustainable measurable progress over time. 

Senator CARPER. Good. And, the last question is: In the time before Jeh Johnson was confirmed as Secretary and became Secretary, and we had previous leadership in the Department—the 

Deputy was, for a while—I think for 4 years—Jane Holl Lute. Did 

you ever work with her? Did she ever come and meet with you 

folks? 

Ms. GAMBLER. She did. I would say for the last 7 or 8 years, we 

have enjoyed a very constructive dialogue with DHS over these 

high-risk issues, to include folks at all different levels within the 

Department, including the most senior levels. 

Senator CARPER. And, under the leadership of Secretary Jeh 

Johnson, who would you say, in the Department, you have the closest—at the senior level—working relationship with? Would it be 

the Deputy? Would it be the Under Secretary? 

Ms. GAMBLER. GAO’s leadership has had discussions with the 

Deputy Secretary and, I believe, with the Secretary, as well, on 

high-risk issues. I think we work most closely on kind of a regular 

basis with the Under Secretary for Management and his management chiefs. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Good. Thank you so much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

Before I turn it over to Senator Lankford and then to Senator 

Booker, I am going to apologize. This is the first time I have had 

to do this—leave a hearing before it is concluded. Obviously, the 

reason we called this hearing is to allow Senators to come in and 

really gain the understanding that I think Senator Carper and I 

have gained, in terms of this process—working with the House 

Committee on Homeland Security, their staff, our Committee, our 

Committee staff, GAO, the OIG’s office, and the good folks at the 

Department of Homeland Security. This is a pretty good work product, and certainly, from my standpoint, what I have been hearing 

in testimony here really confirms that point. We have good leadership. We have dedicated management. And, we have some very capable auditors watching this process. 
20 

So, I certainly feel very confident that these are 2 pieces of legislation that are well worth supporting. We are going to do everything we can on the part of this Committee to try and get these 

passed through the Committee, passed through the Senate, combined with the House bills, and signed into law, so that we really 

can codify this. But, I think I can trust some capable members here 

for figuring out how this thing is going to all wrap up. 

But, again, I really want to thank you for all of your efforts. I 

want to thank the Senators for attending. Kick the tires, ask the 

questions—but, in the end, I am hoping we can really get a good 

result here. So, with that, thank you. Senator Lankford. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Let me get a chance to get just a sense of this as well. My sense 

of it is—and I am trying to figure this out based on the timing of 

the request to try to codify this. If you had the same leadership in 

place that you have now, let us say for the next 5 years—which, 

obviously, there are transitions in leadership, Presidents, and all of 

that kind of stuff. If you had the same leadership there for the next 

5 years, would you ask for this codification at that point? Or, would 

you just assume the leaders that are in place know this is working 

and they would leave it alone, basically? Is this a sense that, just 

in case somebody coming next does not agree, we need to get this 

in place and make sure we hold it? 

Mr. DEYO. Thank you, Senator. I will take the first shot at that. 

We would certainly be in a better position if we knew we had 5 

years of continuity of leadership, because we are all so committed 

to this process at the senior level in the Department. But, even if 

we were not facing a transition, there is a large benefit to the codification of these processes because it reinforces and makes clear to 

everyone that it is a requirement that we follow. 

Second, it makes very clear the accountability of the individuals, 

including the Under Secretary for Management—— 

Senator LANKFORD. So, help me to understand what you gain by 

that, because right now—we talked about before, and I heard that 

testimony before, that, at times, we are not getting good supervision—it is not being enforced on this. So, what does that bring 

to bear once it is codified? Is that a discipline issue? Is that a structural issue? What do you gain by codifying this that you do not 

have now? 

Mr. DEYO. What we gain is reinforcing the legitimacy of what we 

are doing. We do not need it—we would keep doing what we are 

doing without the codification. 

Senator LANKFORD. So, the discipline processes are the same regardless? 

Mr. DEYO. There are some aspects of the legislation we might differ on, modestly, but, no, in terms of capturing exactly what we are 

trying to do and the process we are trying to follow, it would be 

totally consistent. Am I answering your question? 

Senator LANKFORD. I think so. 

Mr. FULGHUM. Sir, if I could just add, a key thing it does is codify the relationship between the component acquisition executive 

and the Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) in the Department. And, 
21 

I think that is a key, foundational piece of this legislation that we 

need. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. I am still trying to dig to try to figure 

this out as well. Is it a concern that, regardless of who the next 

President is—and I will not get into parties. Regardless of who the 

next President is, they are going to come back and try to shift this. 

So, I am trying to get a feel for this. How many different systems 

have been in place over, let us say, the last 10 or 15 years? Is this 

a product of, ‘‘We changed systems multiple times and, just when 

we get going, we have to change it. We do not have a good working 

system, now we feel like we have a good working system, let us 

pour concrete on it. Let us make sure we are actually running, because every time we turned around before, there was some new 

recommendation, and we had to change systems and cannot ever 

get measurable results? ’’ Because, obviously, being on the GAO 

‘‘High-Risk List’’ for quite a while is an issue, and I am trying to 

figure out—we are still on the GAO ‘‘High-Risk List’’ on some of 

these things. We have not shown yet they work, but you have a 

confidence they will work, and if they keep going—this seems to be 

what I am hearing—this is finally the structure that will work if 

we will just leave it alone. How far off am I on that? 

Mr. DEYO. We are confident that this system will work. I am confident because of my private industry experience. I am confident 

because of the clarity and the requirements that are made clear in 

it, the 4 steps you have to go through, that you have to have proper 

documentation, that there is oversight, and that if there is a problem, we step in and evaluate before you move forward. 

Senator LANKFORD. But, we do not know, we do not have a measurable result yet so that we know it is going to work. We think it 

is going to work—and it has had good results, initially. But, we are 

still in the same boat on some of these things. Am I right or wrong 

on that? 

Mr. DEYO. I would say, on some of the acquisitions, we have had 

some experience, now, that it is working. 

Mr. FULGHUM. Sir, I would say it is more about sustainment, 

which is one of the key elements of getting off of the ‘‘High-Risk 

List.’’ 

Senator LANKFORD. Sure. 

Mr. FULGHUM. I think we have demonstrated to GAO and the IG 

that this process, and the procedures we have in place, work. Now, 

we have to show that we can sustain it—and this legislation helps 

to codify that and to drive that sustainment. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. Mr. Roth, were you about to say something on that? 

Mr. ROTH. Simply that, while there is not a lot of evidence that 

this, in fact, works, it is the best practices across the entire acquisitions industry within the Federal Government. I would say that 

first. 

Second, we know what does not work because audit after audit 

has shown that, when they have failed to do the kinds of things, 

like the Life Cycle Acquisition Framework, for example, or the 

Joint Requirements Council or an Acquisitions Review Board— 

every time that does not happen, the acquisition gets into trouble. 

So, if we are doing autopsies on acquisitions—where it went 
22 

wrong—that is what we can see. So, we can see, certainly, that the 

absence of that is a cause of a problem, so we are hoping that having that sustained in concrete, as a matter of law, will assist in 

avoiding those kinds of problems. 

Senator LANKFORD. Sure, which goes back to my original question, and that is, somewhat, my confusion. You are finally getting 

to a process that everyone is nodding their head at and saying, 

‘‘This is a good process.’’ Why would the next group step in and 

change it? Has there been a history of something changing just 

when we get something good going? Or—why does it suddenly need 

a statute, now, when it actually is a working and functioning process? 

Mr. ROTH. I would say, if I could just jump in, it is about competing priorities. This was clearly a priority of the Secretary when 

he came in. He told me it was a priority. He has made it a priority. 

Senator LANKFORD. Right. 

Mr. ROTH. We cannot guarantee that there will not be other competing priorities for the next Administration. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. 

Mr. DEYO. I completely concur with that. It is exactly that. It is 

a demanding process and it takes discipline. As we do it more frequently and with a sustained approach, it will become much easier 

because people will be used to it. But, it is still a relatively new 

process—components are still adjusting and we are still adjusting. 

And, with competing priorities, the concern would be the focus on 

other things, and this slipping away, again. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. So let me just throw in one thing. Just 

processing what we do in this Committee all of the time, we tried 

to codify Executive Order (EO) 12866 on how rules are promulgated. It has been the Executive Order for 20-plus years, so every 

President—Republican or Democrat—has renewed it and said this 

is a good system for how we do it. So, we have tried to codify that, 

and the Administration has fought vehemently against us, saying 

we do not need to codify it, we have an Executive Order, and there 

is no reason to put this into concrete. And, my response has been 

that this is what Republican and Democrat Presidents have done. 

But, they are saying we lose the flexibility suddenly, and not to put 

this in law. 

And, it is interesting to me to now deal with this to say, ‘‘We 

found a process that works and we need you to move this out of 

Executive Action and put this into law.’’ 

And so, while you all are not responsible for articulating the 

White House’s policy on Executive Order 12866, for us, as we deal 

with this, it does seem odd to say that at times we are getting, ‘‘We 

have to have this in law to be able to hold it,’’ and at other times 

hearing, ‘‘Do not put that in law. We want the flexibility.’’ 

So, I think the driving point for me is, would you have wanted 

this when you came into this task—to know that this was already 

set, so it is non-negotiable, so you could work on other things? Or, 

where would you have been on this if you were entering into the 

dialogue? 

Mr. DEYO. I would have been thrilled that this was in place when 

I came to the Department. I should note that it is a rigorous process, but it does provide some flexibility. 
23 

Senator LANKFORD. As it should. 

Mr. DEYO. As it should. So, it gives management absolute accountability, but some discretion about how it handles each piece 

of the determination. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. 

Mr. FULGHUM. Sir, if I could say another thing. Oversight, at 

times, is uncomfortable for components. So, while there is flexibility in there, oversight is uncomfortable. And so, this codification 

helps with that authority, and it eliminates any question about it. 

Are we able to do it, today? Yes. Would this legislation help us? 

Yes, it would. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you for the extra minute. Now you are firmly back in the 

chair with the gavel next to you. Are you feeling rather nostalgic? 

Senator CARPER [Presiding.] A minute and 12 seconds. 

Senator LANKFORD. Yes, sir. Thank you. Thank you for the efforts. 

Senator CARPER. I just want to say, in front of God and the 

whole world, I thought those were excellent questions, and I 

thought the answers from Russ and Chip, especially on the last 

question, were very insightful and helpful. It was for me. I hope it 

was for you. 

I have just the last question, and then I have to run. But, this 

would be for Mr. Deyo and for Mr. Fulghum. Can you tell us how 

the Secretary’s ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ Initiative is building cohesion 

across the Department’s many components and offices? Just very 

briefly. 

Mr. DEYO. I think it has taken hold, and it is building cohesion. 

You can see it in multiple approaches. You can see it at a Senior 

Leadership Council (SLC) meeting when the component heads are 

around the table and talking about an issue and how they approach it. You can clearly see it in the budget process, with a mission focus on budget, rather than a component-by-component 

build—and that collaboration taking place. 

You can see it in the increased desire for human resources to 

provide training that cuts across components, so there is joint duty 

opportunities. I definitely see it in the administrative councils, be 

it the CIO councils or the CFO councils. Senators, we are so much 

better on cybersecurity because of our CIO council and that collaboration across all of the components with the authority that the 

chief CIO has to drive forward, improving our IT systems and improving our internal cybersecurity. That would not have been happening without the ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ and that awareness. 

Senator CARPER. Please, go ahead. 

Senator LANKFORD. Sorry. Let me ask a follow-up question on 

that as well. 

Senator CARPER. Just very briefly, because then I have to run. 

In fact, I have folks waiting to meet with me, and they are wanting 

me to come right now. 

Senator LANKFORD. You want to just keeping passing the gavel? 

Senator CARPER. Here is what I will do, and just close it out 

whenever you are ready, OK? 

Senator LANKFORD. Yes, will do. I just have a quick question. 
24 

Senator CARPER. Just ask the last one here, and turn out the 

lights. 

Senator LANKFORD. Deal. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Thank you, everyone. Great to see 

you. 

Senator LANKFORD [Presiding.] Let me ask this quick question 

that came up as a result of what Senator Carper was saying on 

this. If I recall correctly, there was a helicopter program a couple 

of years ago with the Coast Guard and—I cannot remember the 

other entity—but there was a collaboration issue on that, as well 

as on trying to get all of the folks to be able to talk together on 

it. Would what we are talking about solve that? 

Mr. ROTH. You are referring to an audit that we did on the H– 

60 helicopter program. 

Senator LANKFORD. That is it. 

Mr. ROTH. It was the Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine. Coast Guard had a facility that could do the maintenance on the CBP helicopters. They 

were the same helicopters. The Air and Marine program had not 

yet been brought under some of the departmental acquisition reform. It was not part of the Acquisition Review Board, for example, 

or the Joint Requirements Council. So, the Coast Guard had one 

set of requirements and CBP had one set of requirements. There 

is that sort of tribal competition, I would say, between 2 components that share similar missions. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thankfully, we have not had that on the 

Joint Strike Fighter at all. 

Mr. ROTH. No, I am sure that is not the case at all. [Laughter.] 

I am happy to say, as a result of that audit and as a result of 

the work that has happened in DHS, the whole Air and Marine 

program has now been placed under the Acquisition Review Board 

and an entire sort of life-cycle audit process. So, this was a win. 

Senator LANKFORD. What I am asking is—you are talking about 

codifying. Would it have solved that, actually? Because that was 3 

or 4 years ago, if I remember correctly. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct, and it would have solved this. 

Senator LANKFORD. So, it would have solved that. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Senator LANKFORD. If this was in place at that time. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. Since they have, unbelievably, turned 

this whole conversation over to a freshman Senator, let me just say 

thank you to all of you for the work that you are doing and the 

dedication that you put to this. This is not simple stuff—and I get 

that a lot of people are not engaged in this—but it matters because 

it involves billions of Federal tax dollars, and it takes dollars 

away—when we waste it—from things that really need to be done 

in extremely important areas. 

So the hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until March 

31 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the 

record. Thank you to all of you. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(25) 

A P P E N D I X 
26 

Statement of Ranking Member Tom Carper 

"DHS Management and Acquisition Reform" 

Wednesday, March 16,2016 

As preparedfor delive1y: 

Our oversight on this committee is usually focused on the men and women at the Department of 

Homeland Security working on the frontlines at our airports, our land borders, or our coasts. But 

backing up the Department's frontline personnel is a dedicated cadre of professionals in the DHS 

Management Directorate. The Management Directorate controls the Department's finances; it 

oversees the acquisition of assets and procurement of services; it manages the Department's IT 

backbone; and. it makes sure every employee gets the paychecks and benefits they've earned. As 

you can sec, and as my colleagues have heard me say before, 'management matters.' 

Our friends from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Inspector General have 

kept a close eye on the Department's management and acquisition practices. As their testimony 

indicates, there have been a number of challenges in these areas since the Department's creation 

about thirteen years ago. And the management of the Department, of course, continues to be on 

the GAO High Risk list as Secretary Johnson continues his predecessors' efforts to merge nearly 

two-dozen agencies that were once spread across the federal government. 

Despite the massive unde11aking of stitching together so many agencies with difTerent missions 

and cultures, we've seen a number of management successes at the Department over the years. In 

fact, l was very pleased to hear that the Department has just taken another step towards getting 

off the High Risk list by improving the monitoring of its key management initiatives. This is 

definitely good news, and Secretary Johnson and his team deserve to be commended. 

But as the Inspector General has noted before. addressing the Department's long-term 

management challenges requires 'a commitment to building- and sustaining- a culture that 

recognizes the need to act in a more unified, inclusive, and transparent way.' I couldn't agree 

more. That's why I strongly support Secretary Johnson's 'Unity of Effort' initiative, which seeks 

to create more cohesion and efficiency across the Department by standing up joint operations. 

Last week, Secretary Johnson told this Committee that he would like to see his management 

initiatives codified in law so that the improvements he and his team are making can be sustained 

and made even stronger by the next Administration. That makes a lot of sense to me. And it's 

why I've joined the Chairman in cosponsoring two pieces of legislation that would seek to make 

permanent many of the management reforms that the Department has already instituted. In some 

cases, our legislation provides new authority or requirements. For example, the DIIS 

management bill provides headquarters of1icials' additional authority they can use to better 

oversee the activities of the components. It would also require DHS to report to GAO every six 

months on the progress being made to get ofT the High Risk List. 

The second bill focuses on improving the acquisition processes at the Department. Among other 

things, this bill would, for the first time, designate the Under Secretary for Management as the 
27 

single accountable leader for all DHS acquisition programs. It would also vest the Under 

Secretary with the statutory authority to halt, modify, or cancel acquisition programs that are 

struggling or are not viable. While I believe these bills provide a solid foundation tor the 

Department to continue to mature and grow even stronger, I know they arc not perfect. And 

when something is not perfect, we should make it better. !look forward to working with all my 

colleagues on further ways to improve these bills. 

In closing, I think it's important to remember that the Department, at the age of thirteen, is still a 

young organization. Given this fact, it needs proper guidance, firm rules, and strong oversight. 

That's where these bills and this hearing come in. By working together, we can give the 

Department the tools and authorities it needs to continue to mature and truly become 'One DHS.' 
28 

Under 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF 

The Honorable Russell C. 

Under 

u.s. 

for 

The Honorable 

and Chief Financial Officer 

u.s. of Homeland 

Before the 

March 16, 2016 

SD-342 nirksen Senate Office 
29 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and other distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department's management and 

acquisition reforms and the legislation being considered by the Committee. The focus of this 

testimony is on the progress of broader management and acquisition reforms across the 

Department, as well as ongoing support for authorization of key reforms to sustain progress 

made. 

The Department, when formed, was an organization comprised of components with di!Ierent 

approaches, methods and policies regarding acquisition and management activities. Lacking was 

a departmental acquisition oversight structure, strong requirements development process, and 

centralized resource allocation to name a few examples. The major consequence of these myriad 

of efforts was a lack of a unified, departmental approach for the administration of the 

Department's management and acquisition efforts; efforts critical for the security of the nation. 

In order to create a more cohesive Department, Secretary Johnson launched the Unity ofEffbrt 

initiative, which established a more collaborative process for decision-making, including those 

that shape acquisition, resource allocation and other management functions. 

The momentum gained from the Secretary's landmark Unity olEffbrt initiative has resulted in a 

stronger management framework much earlier in the investment life cycle, as well as better 

integrating the Department's people, organizational structures, and operational capability. Better 

management starts with strong governance at the highest levels. Today, major decisions are 

2 
30 

regularly made by the Secretary's Leaders Council (SLC) and the Deputy Secretary's 

Management Action Group (DMAG). 

In the past year, the SLC and DMAG have made critical decisions around strategy, resource 

allocation, requirements, and operational planning. These decisions have produced: a more 

mission-focused budget; progress on the campaign plan for the Southern Border; maturation of 

the three pilot Joint Task Forces to unify operational planning; and the maturation of the Joint 

Requirements Council (.JRC) to improve the quality and validity of the Department's 

requirements generation and oversight process. By virtue of a stronger focus earlier in the 

investment life cycle, DHS is better positioned to execute strategies and budgets that ultimately 

close capability gaps. 

Under Unity of Effort, the Department has developed a more robust, up front strategy and policy 

capability, to ensure leadership priorities drive investments. To develop and coordinate long term 

strategy and analysis, the Department supports legislation that would elevate the senior DHS 

policy official position from that of an Assistant Secretary to an Under Secretary. This elevation 

would place DHS on a par with similar positions at other cabinet-level agencies. 

In the budget area, the Department has completely transformed its approach. Today, the budget 

process focuses on cross-Department mission areas rather than through component stove pipes. 

With the support of Congress, DHS is moving from more than 70 legacy appropriations to a 

common appropriations structure (CAS) to align common funding categories to DHS 

missions. In fact, the Department submitted the FY 2017 budget using the new CAS. 
31 

In the acquisition management area, DHS has focused on institutionalizing stronger oversight 

and governance structures and reforming the acquisitions process to build out solid requirements 

much earlier in the investment life cycle, where requirements are first conceived and developed. 

For example, a more mature JRC evaluates issues that cut across multiple components and 

makes recommendations to the DMAG that focus on maximizing the efficiency of investments 

and enhancing mission capabilities. The JRC projects full operating capability by the end of FY 

2016 and having Congress codify the JRC would cement a process that would endure for years to 

come. 

DHS also supports the Committee's intent to ensure the position of Chief Acquisition Officer 

(CAO) remains at the level of the Under Secretary for Management. As CAO, the Under 

Secretary for Management plays a direct role in the Department's management, administration, 

and oversight of approximately $18 billion spending annually through the acquisition process. 

The creation of a departmental acquisition executive structure and stafTto spearhead the 

management of the department's acquisition efforts was an important first step to address the 

Department's challenges. The Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) 

serves as the central oversight body from which DHS directs improvement of management, 

administration, and oversight of the Department's acquisition programs. The draft legislation 

clarifies various roles such as the PARM Executive Director, as well as the reporting relationship 

from the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) to the CAO. These proposed legislative 

provisions capture the progress DI-IS has made and would further strengthen oversight 

throughout the entire Department for the future. 

4 
32 

Through PARM, significant progress has been made to improve oversight of DI-IS's acquisition 

programs. These include a comprehensive update to MD-I 02, which serves as the principal 

acquisition policy directive; the assessment and remediation of skill gaps in the acquisition 

program management workforce; the afore-mentioned CAE structure, for which DI-IS now 

requires a qualified and experienced acquisition professional to oversee the organization's 

acquisition policies and efforts; the completion of all required documentation for major 

programs; and the expanded oversight authority of the Acquisition Review Board, which now 

focuses on major issues beyond program performance and effectiveness. 

Going forward, DHS will continue to improve acquisition management by increasing oversight 

of non-major programs; further refining the staffing review process to ensure the Department has 

a qualified workforce; continue developing the Acquisition Program Health Assessment tool; 

solidify an IT Agile development process; and, continue aggressive program monitoring, coupled 

with corrective actions, and cancelling or pausing poor-performing programs. 

In the procurement area, the Department has implemented several initiatives to strengthen 

relationships with industry partners. As indicated in earlier testimony, the Acquisition 

Innovations in Motion initiative has facilitated forums between senior Department officials and 

industry consortiums and has resulted in improvements to the quality and timeliness ofDI-IS 

contracting processes and information sharing, as well as the emerging ski lis required for 

acquisition professionals. These interactions have built trust and have driven more quality 

updates to DHS acquisition policies. 

5 
33 

Across management functions, the Department continues to make significant progress in 

implementing recommendations by the Ofiice of the Inspector General (OJG) and the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO). and has fully met three of the five criteria for GAO 

High Risk List removal. These advances have dramatically improved the effectiveness of 

management lines of business (i.e., finance, information technology, human capital, internal 

security, readiness support, procurement). In August 2015, the Under Secretary for Management 

and the Management Directorate's Chief Executive Officers (e.g., CFO, CIO, Chief Human 

Capital Officer) established key priorities and stretch goals to address pressing challenges. The 

proposed legislation incorporates various DHS practices as well as many recommendations from 

the OIG and GAO, which will ensure that the progress made thus far will have staying power for 

Administrations to come. 

The Department's collective task is to institutionalize improvements to support its primary 

objective: the effective execution ofDHS missions. The successful pilot of the Joint Task Force 

(JTF) structure has confirmed its value in integrating people and solutions at the southern border. 

Under this new structure, Components operate together, as more cohesive operating units, to 

achieve the objectives of the DHS Southern Border and Approaches Campaign: ensure effective 

enforcement and interdiction across land, sea and air and degrade transnational criminal 

organizations without impeding the flow of lawful trade, travel and commerce across borders. 

Task Force Directors are responsible for coordinating the border security resources of the 

Department for the southeast, southwest and for critical investigations. The leadership of the 

Joint Task Force Directors played a large role in the successful Departmental response to the 

6 
34 

increase in unaccompanied children and families in 2015. The Department was more prepared to 

address this surge than in 2014. While the Task Forces became operational on August 1, 2015, 

authorization of the JTF structure by Congress will ensure they remain an integral part of the 

Department's operating structure and that the JTFs have the requisite authority to carry out their 

duties to meet future challenges. 

Finally, establishing strong business and mission management processes and a robust outreach 

campaign to external partners are necessary but not sufficient to maximize the etJectivencss and 

longevity of the Unity of Effort initiative. Sustained support of the initiative will be greatly 

enhanced if the DHS career leadership and workforce have opportunities to serve in substantive 

joint positions in strong headquarters offices and the JTFs. A DHS Joint Duty program, 

authorized by Congress, will increase the professional development and promotion opportunities 

of the DHS workforce and further institutionalize the aims of Unity o{EffiJrt. 

Concerns Regarding Management Reform and Acquisition Draft Legislation 

With regard to the draft management reform and acquisition legislation, the Department is 

pleased that Congress, and more speei!ically this Committee, continues to work with the 

Department to improve management functions and, as indicated above, is generally supportive of 

the draft legislation. 

In some respects, however, DHS favors going further in institutionalizing efforts to integrate the 

Department. Although legislation is not specifically required to establish the Office of 

Community Partnerships (OCP), for example, legislation would permanently authorize the 

7 
35 

establishment of a DHS ot1ice to coordinate the DHS countering violent extremism activities and 

represent DHS in interagency engagement on this issue. 

The Department is seeking congressional authorization for the consolidation of headquarters 

Chemical, BiologicaL Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) programs into one office 

to improve external and internal coordination of CBRNE issues and oversight of CBRNE 

requirements and major CBRNE-related acquisitions. Similarly, DHS seeks congressional 

authorization to reorganize the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) to separate 

the operational functional responsibilities from the mission support functions to more effectively 

develop operational plans and budgets and provide better oversight of acquisitions, which DHS 

believes will enable better mission execution. 

With regard to procurement and acquisition specifically, the majority of the draft legislation 

provides increased transparency and accountability, both of which can reasonably be expected to 

result in better utilization of the resources entrusted to the Department. With that stated some of 

the provisions undoubtedly drafted in furtherance of increased transparency, accountability, and 

efficiency can reasonably be expected to have the opposite impact. 

For example, the draft legislation weakens the existing authorities of the Chief Procurement 

Officer (CPO) and confuses accountability over procurement decisions. The draft legislation 

provides the CPO with the authority to provide input concerning the hiring and performance of 

each Head of Contracting Activity (HCA). However, to ensure accountability of the CPO, the 

CPO needs the authority to appoint (or not) each HCA, provide input into the evaluation of each 

8 
36 

HCA, and approve (or not) the organizational placement of each HCA. Given the current 

language of the bill, if one or more procurements do not perform adequately, it will prove 

difficult to ascertain if accountability should rest with the CPO or the Component leadership 

regarding the selection and placement of the HCA. 

Additionally, the Department is concerned with the inclusion of oversight of the programs in 

sustainment (i.e. post Final Operating Capability (FOC) delivery- operational activities) in the 

role of the newly established Executive Director, as well as instituting a requirement tor 

inclusion of these operational activities in the Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report 

(CASR). The inclusion is not needed since programs in sustainment are required to annually 

update operations and maintenance cost estimates and affirm the lifespan for each of these 

former major acquisition programs. 

The GAO recommended in its audit "DHS Should Better Define Oversight Roles and Improve 

Program Reporting to Congress," dated March 2015, that the Department produce operations and 

maintenance cost estimates for programs in sustainment and establish responsibility for tracking 

sustainment programs' adherence to those estimates. In response, the then-Acting Under 

Secretary for Management, Mr. Chip Fulghum, directed Component Heads to annually update 

operations and maintenance cost estimates and affirm the lifespan for each of these former major 

acquisition programs. The Chief Financial Officer, as part of the Department's Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process, was directed to assess the alignment of the 

estimates with spending patterns for current services. These funding levels are addressed in the 

Department's annual Future Years Homeland Security Program. The change in process required 

9 
37 

by the bill would require significant additional resources aligned to the "Executive Director," and 

reduce the accountability of the appropriate DHS officials in the oversight of sustainment 

activities. The best interests of the Department will be served by clarity (and singularity) of 

responsibility and accountability; these responsibilities with the Executive Director and the 

CASR creates an environment of overlapping and muddled responsibility and accountability. 

The Department generally agrees with the acquisition bill's reporting requirements established 

for acquisition programs that breach their approved Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) cost, 

schedule, and performance thresholds, even though DHS prefers a case by case approval instead 

of one standard for all. The vast majority of the Department's breaches will be cleared within the 

allotted time frame. However, the Department is concerned that a very small number of programs 

may have instances where correction of a breach is not possible within the 210 days provided by 

the draft legislation. For example, a contract protest may occur that lasts greater than the allotted 

210 days. This leaves the Department with only one option - to halt or cancel the program. The 

Department understands and appreciates the Committee's concern, but requests that some option 

be available in these rare circumstances where a critical program is not able to resolve a program 

breach within the 21 0 days allotted by the legislation. In these instances, the Department would 

recommend providing additional reporting updates, hut allowing the Under Secretary for 

Management to extend the timeframe without halting or cancelling the program. 

Finally, the Department is concerned with the specificity with which "cloud computing" is 

addressed in the draft legislation. Information technology evolves too rapidly to include a 

specit1c type of technology in such legislation. DHS respectfully requests that the legislation 

10 
38 

focus on leveraging technology rather than specifying ·'cloud computing," which in the fullness 

of time may well go the way of the typewriter. 

Conclusion 

Jn conclusion, while there is always more work to do, the Department has made significant 

strides to improve management, including acquisition planning and execution. DHS has 

strengthened the Department's upfront strategy, planning and joint requirements capabilities, 

thereby addressing long standing weaknesses. According to the OIG and GAO, DHS has 

demonstrated significant progress in addressing auditors' recommendations for strengthening 

management functions, including strong progress especially over the past two years, improving 

acquisition policies. processes, and procedures. This includes strengthening the roles and 

clarifying the authorities of the Department's acquisition organizations and stakeholders. DHS 

has improved requirements development, resource allocation, and industry engagement. These 

efforts have produced more effective governance and significant improvements to current and 

future acquisitions. 

The Department, with the minor modifications previously discussed, fully supports the 

management reform and acquisition legislation being deliberated by this Committee. It captures 

the improvements the Department has made and provides greater clarity, transparency. and 

accountability. Further, it establishes and defines appropriate roles and authorities for ensuring 

proper acquisition governance and oversight. 

11 
39 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify regarding the management reforms and acquisition 

improvements the Department has made and to discuss the legislative proposals being considered 

by this Committee. 

12 
40 

Tflstimony Inspector Geuera.l 

J.ohn Roth 

.Before the Committe~ on 

Homeland Sec"(lrity and 

Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

''DHS Management and 

Acquisition Reform'' 

March 16, 2016 

2:00PM 
41 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS 

DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

. . . 

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. 'flJ:~··a~d~i;lil G:liscu~$~Q. •• i.n . . . riY .at~p~t 9f 

•....... ·. .. ·. . . .. . acqui'$ition . ay~it~. W.e. h:a.v!':' · 

~s •i :rrtajor 

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DH:S;•Our a1,1.dit ~ovevage 

. DHS 

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of Le~slaiive 

-41QO, or 

What We Found 

Acquisition management, which is critical' to 

fulfilling al'l DHS missions, is inherently complex 

and high risk. Although DHS has made much 

progress, it has not yet achieved the cohesion to 

act as one entity working toward a common goal' . 

The Department continues to lack a strong 

central' authority and uniform policies and 

procedures. Most of DHS' major acquisition 

programs continue to cost more than expected, 

take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver 

less capability than promised. Although its 

acquisition policy includes best practices, DHS 

routinely approves moving forward with major 

acquisition programs without appropriate 

internal' oversight. 

As DHS continues to build its acquisition 

management capabilities, it will need stronger 

departmental' oversight and authority, as well as 

increased commitment by the components to 

effect real' and lasting change. This commitment 

includes adhering to departmental' acquisition 

guidance, adequately defining requirements, 

developing performance measures before making 

new investments, and dedicating sufficient 

resources to contract oversight. All of this will 

better support DHS' missions and save taxpayer 

dollars. 

DHS Response 

With few exceptions, DHS and its components 

concurred with recommendations in these 

reports. DHS has taken many steps to 

strengthen department-wide acquisition 

management and has increased component-level 

acquisition capability. 
42 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Good afternoon Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member and Members of 

the Committee. Thank you for me to discuss management and 

acquisition functions at DHS. My today will focus on the 

w.cH'"-!S'"u""''c and challenges the Department has faced, progress 

challenges, and potential reforms to address 

Acquisition management, which is critical to fulfilling all DHS missions, is 

inherently complex and high risk. It is further challenged the 

and diversity of the Since its ln<:eJJn,on 

the Department has spent tens of dollars annually on a broad range 

of assets and services from ships, aircraft, surveillance towers, and nuclear 

detection equipment to financial, human resource, and information technology 

(IT) systems. DHS' on contractual services and supplies, along 

with acquisition assets, billion. 1 Although the Department has 

improved its acquisition processes and taken steps to strengthen oversight of 

major acquisition programs, challenges to cost effectiveness and efficiency 

remain. 

History 

The Department was established by combining legacy and 

new agencies, so DHS' earliest and slow to 

mature. DHS goods 

and services minimal management of requirements. In transition to 

DHS, seven agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency 

Management (F.EMA), and the Administration, 

(TSA) retained own procurement The expertise and of 

the seven offices mirrored their pre-DHS expertise and cctik.lctiJlH 

with staff ranging from 21 to 346. 

In 2004, DHS established an eighth acquisition office, the Office of 

Procurement under the direct supervision of the Office of the Chief 

to serve the DHS components and manage 

procurements. Staffing 

prevented procurement 

to monitor contractor 

Services and 

"Acquisition of Assets" were 

Finan cia] the Department's FY 2015 obligations for 

billion and its obligations for 
43 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Although the Chief Procurement Officer was given the responsibility of 

overseeing all acquisition activity across DHS, component heads had some of 

the same primary duties, resulting in confusion about who was ultimately 

accountable for acquisition decisions. and inconsistent management 

directives and a lack of guidance added to the confusion. 

The Department's initial investment review process intended to provide 

insight at key points in an investment's life cycle to assess cost, schedule, and 

performance lacked reviews and controls. For example, 

DHS did not require a to ensure that in a prototype an 

acquisition's design performed as encountered 

problems caused by ill-defined requirements in 

contracts. For example, development of the Information System 

(GIS) supporting the Coast Guard's Port Security Assessment Program 

commenced without identified GIS functional requirements. 2 

Recent Progress 

DHS has taken many steps to department-wide acquisition 

such as establishing an Acquisition Life Cycle Framework3 a 

to assure consistent and efficient acquisition management, 

support, and -and the Office of Program 

Accountability and Management in 2011. The framework is 

uc"'"isucu to ensure that program the tools, resources, and 

to execute acquisitions and that meet user 

requirements while complying with -rr···--·-

policies. 

PARM oversees major workforce, 

develops data. Within 

PARM, detennines components' 

acquisitions meet specific requirements at key phases throughout the 

acquisition process. DHS established a ,Joint Requirements Council4 to review 

Ann~T1c!1x A outlines the Department's acquisition life 

Joint Council is an executive-level 

components TSA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship C~nd lmmigmtion Services 

;md the Secret Service, as well as several components. The aims to mitigate 

redundant capabilities, fill capability gaps, harmonize capabilities and requirements across 

DHS. 

2 
44 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

high-dollar and make recommendations to the 

Board on cross-cutting savings 

Review 

DHS has also increased acquisition For instance, 

the Department appointed component acquisition executives to oversee and 

support their respective it also initiated monthly component 

acquisition executive forums to and share best nr,,rt1r0 

DHS has continued to enhance its acquisition workforce by 

centers of excellence for cost systems 

disciplines to promote best practices provide '""'"'"'le<ti 

The Secretary's April 2014 of Effort Initiative is aimed at achieving a 

unified culture to enhance homeland and derive efficiencies from the 

integration of operations. As of this initiative, the Deputy Secretary leads 

the Deputy's Management Group to discuss and decide on 

issues, including initiatives in requirements and 

reform. 

billion. Then, 

from the Office 

Office (GAO), 

$3.5 billion in 2008 to 

and~~ a 

as well as a wider of alternatives for 

first 6 from fiscal years 2003 through 2008, 

contracts grew from $655 million to $3.5 

response to recommendations 

(OIG) and the Government Accountability 

on noncompetitive contracts fell nearly 94 percent, from 

million in FY 2015; see 1. 

3 
45 

FYOS FY09 

Source: DHS OIG 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

FYlO FYU FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 

Although DHS has made much progress, it has not yet achieved the cohesion 

and sense of community to act as one entity working toward a common goal. 

The Department needs to continue toward a strong central authority and 

uniform policies and procedures. Most of DHS' major acqUlSltlOn nrnar,,rr 

continue to cost more than expected, take longer to 

deliver less capability than promised. its includes 

best practices, DHS sometimes approves moving forward with major 

acquisition programs without internal oversight. 

USCIS faces in its efforts to automate immigration 

benefits. After 11 years, USCIS made little in transforming 

its paper-based processes into an automated benefits 

proc•~s~nng environment. Past automation attempts have been hampered 

"'"''"'"'"' planning, multiple changes in direction, and inconsistent 

stakeholder involvement. USCIS deployed the Electronic Immigration 

in May 2012, but to date customers can online for 

about 90 types of benefits and As we 

r"'""'"t"rl in March 2016, the current ELlS does not ensure 

st:lli•eno1c1er involvement, system or the 

user support needed for an effective system. USCIS now estimates it will 

take 3 more years to address these issues over 4 years than 
46 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

estimated and an additional $1 billion to automate all benefit types. 

This delay will prevent USCIS from achieving its workload processing, 

national and customer service USCIS Automation 

vc.<o"'""" Remains 16-48, March 

2016). 

• As we in November 2015, FEMA has taken 

IT management and developed numerous IT planning 

has not coordinated, executed, or followed through on these 

to implement IT governance, in because 

Information Officer does not have sufficient and budget 

to lead the decentralized IT environment. As a 

result, FEMA's IT environment has become overly difficult to 

secure, and costly to maintain. In response to one of our 

recommendations, FEMA to implement and enforce a standardized, 

sufficiently defines and prioritizes the 

and maintenance for 

the IT Governance Board. 

~~~~~Wg11fl§:§.JLL!Jii'.JI!!lill!lr.Ll!1:12IJ'llill:!Q!l..J.l2!2/J11Q.!QflY., (or G-16-1 o, 

• The Department is the most efficient and effective 

composition of its motor fleet to meet mission 

due to limited DHS authority over rnoe>W>nn 

'-'"'-"'"v·""· We conducted three audits in area. Most in 

October 2015, we reported that the Federal Protective Service (FPS), 

based on its workforce, has too vehicles and too much for its 

vehicles. Also, FPS officers in the 

vehicles to commute to and from home without 

result, FPS may have missed 

insufficient oversight and cost were 

DHS Fleet not having enforcement authority to 

purchases. Because receive funding for 

fleets in their individual operational they make 

independent decisions about the number and type of vehicles needed to 

support their missions. llYE-£L!Lll!J!!,~£1IT~'i.l!!l'l.lr!Y:!.!~!!:if!..£o:.l.Jl£~'!Jd., 

(OIG-16-02, October 

5 
47 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• CBP's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) shows how a 

nr,nmrArn'" approach to address identified challenges can lead to success. 

is designed to automate border and become the central 

trade data collection system for all agencies; it will improve 

collection, sharing, and of information submitted to CBP and 

government agencies. When CBP development of ACE in 2009, 

CBP took time to assess and correct that led to the cost 

overruns and delays it 

was authorized to restart ucvcJ.u;.;•.tw;:uL 

The Agile 

software more oversight of 

contractors, more control over delivery and produce a full 

software product at the end of each increment cycle. We in May 

2015 that CBP is on track to meet its milestones to implement ACE. 

However, CBP has not ensured the internal control environment has kept 

pace with the of the ACE program. =""--~""-"...!..':-"'"'""-''= 

Components 

J.Jv''"'"" do not always follow acquisition cr111rt<1nrP 

may to cost overruns, missed and mediocre 

performance. All of these have an effect on budget, security, 

resources. 

• ln FY 2014, DHS spent $12.5 billion using Interagency 

(IAA).5 In 2016, we that components 

follow on reimbursable work 

100 of the 43 work 

agreements we $88 million -had not been 

a certified acquisition official before the components 

for the Review a certified acquisition official 

agreement is the appropriate 

used to circumvent Federal 

unmanned aircraft system resulted in expensive assets that are 

services to be 

6 
48 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

underused and may not be adding sufficient value to border security. In 

December 2014, we that CBP had invested about $360 million 

in its unmanned 

The 

• CBP did not and manage in Ajo, 

Arizona and made decisions that resulted in additional costs to the 

Federal Government, about $680,000 for each house that was 

built, which was more than the Ajo average home of 

$86,500. We about $4.6 million CBP on the that 

could have been 

to 

Management System 

management systems or 

In FEMA 

• In February 2014, we reviewed CBP's handling of the construction of its 

Advanced Training Center (ATC). CBP entered into two IAAs with the U.S. 

Corps of Engineers (USACE) to oversee the construction of Phase 

the ATC valued at more than $55 million. The IAA was 

executed in accordance with Federal, departmental, 

and component CBP did not u'"'"""-'"· an Government Cost Estimate or 
49 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

into the IAA with USACE. CBP was also unable to 

documentation its decision to approve modifications to the 

IAA. 

CBP also used reimbursable work authorizations, rather than the ATC 

IM, to transfer funds for construction contrary to statutory, 

regulatory, departmental, and component requirements. As a result, CBP 

circumvented key controls governing the use of !Ms, and ATC 

construction funding was obligated and transferred without the review 

and approval of component procurement officials. Additionally, CBP used 

reimbursable work authorizations for construction and other 

unauthorized purposes that extended the ATC acquisition. U.S. 

• In contrast, the Secret Service's acquisition management office 

exemplifies what can be accomplished when components follow the 

Department's In February 2015, we that 

the Secret Service's office 

Components not 

process, complied 

lHJ.IJ''""'c'nt:u some best 

We have observed that the components often have similar responsibilities and 

challenges, but many times and do not unify their 

efforts, cooperate, or share are not always willing to 

work together to realize economies of scale, the Department's cost 

effectiveness and cLtl'-'.lCllc\ 

• We found little cross-component coordination for assets that would be 

critical in an emergency. As inJ2!.~U~211ijgl'1LQLlll1&!:QJ2§D!l2c~ 

Communications 13-06, November we 

determine components could talk to each other in the event of a 

terrorist attack or other emergency. They could not. 1 of 479 radio 

8 
50 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

users we tested --- or less than one-quarter of 1 percent could access 

and use the specified common channel to communicate. 

2013, we that components were stillm<:!ejJcrld<or 

their current radio with no formal 

the Department. They used systems to record and manage radio 

and did not record radio in personal 

property systems. As a result, DHS was making management and 

investment decisions for the radio communication program using 

inconsistent, incomplete, and inaccurate real and property 

data. m~~;Q§_JQ_Mf!11QaiLll.§_lif!cr;!JQl&:illlJ'JY.I.!J.£fWQ!ll:.'[Qf;1IQ1"Jll;!§!J§I, 

(OIG-13-113, August 2013). 

Two years after our report on radio we were 

concerned about the of progress and decided to conduct a 

verification review. In May 2015, we discovered that components still 

cannot communicate on a radio channel during 

emergencies, daily operations, and events. The Department has 

Pv,,lnnf'li a draft communications plan and to 

radio activities, but could not 

and disseminating this 

DHS has taken measures to nnnrrmP 

2015). 

• Our 2013 audit of DHS' H-60 helicopter showed that one 

component would not cooperate with o_uvCinol 

and other efficiencies. CBP was 

with the Coast to upgrade its H-60 helicopters, even 

though both were converting the same helicopters. We 

estimated savings of about $126 million if the two components 

had successfully coordinated the conversion of CBP's H-60 helicopters at 

the Coast Guard's Aviation Logistics Center. A subsequent H-60 

Business Case Analysis by DHS' Office of Chief Readiness Support 

Officer, the Aviation Board, the Coast Guard, and CBP 

confirmed the cost savings of the Coast Guard convert the 

helicopters, but it was too late. J2l.:!..§:..L!::fd~!.:J£:1:iJ;2Q12t&l:E?:QJlliill1§.1fu:J!JJ~11, 

(OIG-13-89, May 2013). 

9 
51 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

I am pleased to report that now all aircraft aeau.isitio,ns 

investments must be submitted through the Joint 

Council, which was established to make better informed investment uec1;non;;, 

particularly to support a unified Department strategy. One area the 

council emphasizes is ensuring better integration of aviation assets. We hope 

that this process will help avoid future mismanagement. 

Components need to 

manage 

maintenance 

contractors 

• Specifically, in May 2015, we 

passengers could be coomi1rc>mise:d 

contracts valued at about $1.2 

of four 

and 

maintenance is performed on thousands 

units or is repaired as needed, is ready 

for operational use, and is operating at its full In to 

our recommendations, TSA agreed to develop, 

policies and to ensure its screening 

,..,,~,;,.,,.; and is operational while in 

• our March 2015 report on CBP's non-intrusive (Nil) 

Pnnn>rn"""'t maintenance contracts valued at approximately $90.4 

disclosed that CBP did not ensure contractors properly 

maintained screening equipment at ports of entry. In FY 2014, CBP 

awarded six contracts and one lAA to perform preventive and corrective 

maintenance of Nll equipment. CBP uses NII to screen cargo 

and conveyances for and other at land, sea, and air 

ports of entry w·ithout or unloading them. Although 

CBP monitored Nil not ensure that contractors 

and corrective maintenance on 

to contractual requirements and 

~-'""u'"'Hl!J!!:>. As a result, CBP's NII may not retain its full 

functionality or reach its maximum life, CBP with our 

recommendation to a to monitor service contractors' 

tct.uctmg validation steps for contractor-submitted 

10 
52 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• We also continue to see weak on service contracts. For 

in January 2016, we that TSA needs to its 

of the HR Access contract, which was awarded for recruiting 

processing, and other human 

TSA did not hold the contractor mcJne~tan 

identifiable information violations or for with 

In addition, TSA does not 

of contractor 

January 2016). 

• The Department encourages components to their own 

and guidance for nonmajor acquisitions with life 

of less than $300 million as as they are consistent with 

and intent of department-wide guidance. ln 2015, we reported 

that the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) lacked such guidance, 

contributing to the termination of a contract for convenience after 

more than $23 million for a prototype that was close to 

delivery. In addition, S&T's failure to and 

may hinder its to make well-informed de'Cl~>wns 

contracts, valued at million in FY 2013. ~!S2IQ:i..,g~U~:!ll~!Jdli 

15-38, February 2015). 

DHS needs better data and acquisition management tools 

Strong management of Department programs accurate and reliable 

data; clear and well communicated a collaborative, unified 

environment. We identified cross-cutting programs in which better 

management, and could have improved transparency, 

effectiveness, and e111Clency 

11 
53 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• In January 2016, we reported that CBP's 

program's records of SOG and other CBP com;)or1er1ts 

support SOG the determination of the program's 

SOG efficiency and effectiveness cannot be accurately 

without total costs or formal nPrtnrm 

• The Department does not processes to collect, verify, 

and track data necessary to decisions or ensure the most 

cost efficient use of resources. For example, in August 2015 we reported 

that DHS cannot effectively its warehouse needs because the 

components do not inventories of their warehouses. We 

found buildings that should not have been on the 

warehouse inventory, as well as buildings that 

classified as warehouses but were not. Department management also did 

not know about what DHS components store in their 

warehouses. reliable information, DHS management cannot 

make informed decisions to consolidate or close warehouses, 

demonstrate compliance with space reduction requirements, or reduce 

unnecess<lrY costs. 

an Clt'>nY'fWPfl V<A'>ICllH'C, 

cycle cost estimates. DHS needs these 

establish cost, schedule, and parameters, to 

performance. Yet, 

not consistently available or up to date, 

lPr>Rrtm,,n,t officials have it may be years before this issue 

addressed. 

Pending Legislation 

I believe that in the last few years DHS has instituted reforms to the 

acquisition process and has exerted to gain control over 

an and wasteful process. However, I worry that these '"~'"'"'"=' 

reforms, not continuously enforced over time, could be undone. We believe 

the passage of two bills under consideration by the Committee, the DHS 

12 
54 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

accountability, and transparency of its program 

management. These bills codify and relevant offices; the 

necessary authority for and mechanisms within the Department 

to effectively manage major acquisition reinforce the importance of 

key acquisition management as establishing cost, schedule, 

and capability parameters; include requirements to better and 

addreSS poorly nPrfr,rn1i 

Moving Forward 

Given the and risks of the 

continue to 

mission will continue to demand 

As DHS continues to build its ~~'1~""'"~·· 

stronger 

commitment by the eomjJOJ1CJ1ts 

commitment includes acquisition S'"''"'''"''~'·• 

adequately defining requirements, developing performance measures before 

dollars. 

new investments, and dedicating sufficient resources to contract 

All of this will better support DHS' missions and save taxpayer 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any nnP«tmn« 

you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

13 
55 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

DHS Acquisition Life Cycle Framework 

Analyze I Select 2A 

2B 

Sustainment Post-3 

Source: DHS OIG, based on DHS Chief Acquisition Officer 

June 13, 2014; and DHS Instruction Manual102-01-001 Acquisition Management 

Instruction/Guidebook, Appendix J, October 1, 201 L 

14 
56 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00p.m. ET 

Wednesday, March 16, 2016 

GA0-16-507T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate 

DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Progress Made, but Work 

Remains in Strengthening 

Acquisition and Other 

Management Functions 

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

and 

Michele Mackin, Director, 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
57 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Progress Made, but Work Remains in Strengthening 

Acquisition and Other Management Functions 

What GAO Found 

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to strengthen and 

integrate its management functions have resulted in it meeting three and partially 

meeting two of GAO's criteria for removal from the high-risk list (see table). 

Assessment of DHS Progress In Addressing the Strengthening DHS Management Functions 

High-Risk Area, as of March 2016 

resources 

X 

Partially met 

X 

2 

Source: GAO analysis of OHS documents, interviews, and prior GAO reports. I GA0-16-507T 

-.Met": There are no significant actions that need to be taken to further address this criterion 

~>.Partially met": Some but not all actions necessary to generally meet the criterion have been taken 

c.Not met": Few, if any, actions toward meeting the criterion have been taken. 

For example, DHS has established a plan for addressing the high-risk area and a 

framework for monitoring its progress in implementing the plan. However, DHS 

needs to show additional results in other areas, including demonstrating the 

ability to achieve sustained progress across 30 outcomes that GAO identffied 

and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. As of March 2016, 

DHS had fully addressed 10 of these outcomes but work remained in 20. 

GAO has reported on DHS's acquisition management for over 10 years. The 

department has struggled to effectively manage its major programs, including 

ensuring that all major acquisitions had approved baselines and that they were 

affordable. GAO has noted significant progress in recent reviews (see table). 

This progress is largely attributable to sustained senior leadership attention. 

GAO Findings and Recent Efforts by OHS to Improve Acquisition Management 

GAO Review GAO Finding DHS Progress 

November DHS's Joint Requirements Council (JRC). which The JRC was reinstated in 

2008 had been responsible for managing investment 2014; it is the subject of an 

portfolios and validating requirements, had not met ongoing GAO review. 

since 2006. 

April 2014 DHS's Acquisition Review Board rarely directed OHS leadership is discussing 

programs to make affordablllty tradeoffs, even in affordabi!ity at all program 

light of a 30 percent funding gap for the reviews to help ensure 

department's major acquisitions. adequate funding exists. 

March 2015 DHS needed to improve the quality of acquisition DHS has efforts unde!Way to 

data reported by components. address this issue. 

April 2015 Sixteen of the 22 programs GAO reviewed had DHS has continued to obtain 

agreed-upon acquisition program baseline cost, department-level approval for 

schedule, and performance objectives. program baselines as needed 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS documents, inteNiews, and prior GAO reports. I GA0-1S.507T 

To ensure that recent efforts are sustained, the department must continue to 

implement its sound acquisition policy consistently and effectively across all 

components. GAO has made numerous recommendations in this regard, which 

DHS has concurred with and is taking actions to implement. 

------------- United States Government Accountability Office 
58 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the 

Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security's (DHS) ongoing efforts to strengthen and integrate its 

management functions. In the 13 years since the department's creation, 

DHS has implemented key homeland security operations, achieved 

important goals and milestones, and grown to more than 240,000 

employees and approximately $66 billion in budget authority. We have 

issued hundreds of reports addressing the range of DHS's missions and 

management functions, and our work has identified gaps and 

weaknesses in the department's operational and implementation efforts, 

as well as opportunities to strengthen their efficiency and effectiveness. 

Since 2003, we have made approximately 2,400 recommendations to 

DHS to strengthen program management, performance measurement 

efforts, and management processes, among other things. DHS has 

implemented more than 70 percent of these recommendations and has 

actions under way to address others. 

We also report regularly to Congress on government operations that we 

identified as high risk because of their increased vulnerability to fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to 

address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. In 2003, we 

designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk because 

DHS had to transform 22 agencies-several with major management 

challenges-into one department, and failure to address associated risks 

could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic 

security.' Given the significant effort required to build and integrate a 

department as large and complex as DHS, our initial high-risk designation 

addressed the department's initial transformation and subsequent 

1

GAO, High-Risk Senes.· An Update, GA0-03-119 (Washington, DC .. January 2003). 

Page 1 GA0-16-507T 
59 

implementation efforts, to include associated management and 

programmatic challenges. 2 

Since 2003, the focus of the Implementing and Transfonning DHS highrisk area has evolved in tandem with DHS's maturation and evolution. In 

September 2011, we reported in our assessment of DHS's progress and 

challenges 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 

(9/11) that the department had implemented key homeland security 

operations and achieved important goals in many areas to create and 

strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. 3 However, we also reported 

that continuing weaknesses in DHS's management functions had been a 

key theme affecting the department's implementation efforts. While 

challenges remain for DHS across its range of missions, the department 

has made considerable progress in transforming its original component 

agencies into a single cabinet-level department and positioning itself to 

achieve its full potential. As a result, in our 2013 high-risk update, we 

narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening DHS 

management functions (acquisition, information technology [IT], financial. 

and human capital), and changed the name from Implementing and 

Transforming DHS to Strengthening DHS Management Functions to 

reflect this focus. We also reported in our 2013 update that the 

department needs to demonstrate continued progress in implementing 

and strengthening key management initiatives and addressing corrective 

actions and outcomes in order to mitigate the risks that management 

weaknesses pose to mission accomplishment and the efficient and 

effective use of the department's resources. 4 

also has responsibdity for other areas we have designated as high risk Specifically, 

2005, we designated establishing effective mechanisms for sharing and managing 

terrorism-related information to protect the homeland as high nsk. involving a number of 

federal departments, to include OHS In 2006, we identified the National Flood Insurance 

Program as high risk. Further, in 2003, we expanded the scope of the high-risk area 

involving federal information secunty, which was initially designated as high nsk in 1997, 

to mclude the protection of the nation's computeHellant cntlca! infrastructure See GAO, 

High-Risk Series An Update, GA0-09-271 (Washington. D.C January 2009); High-Risk 

Series: An Update, GA0-07-310 (Washington, D.C. January 2007); and High-Risk Series 

An Update, GA0-05-207(Washington, D.C .. January 2005) 

3

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in 

Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9111, GA0-11-881 

(Washington, D.C.· Sept 7, 2011) 

4

GAO, High Risk Series.· An Update, GA0-13-283 (Washington, D.C .. February 2013). 

Page 2 GA0-1G-507T 
60 

Acquisition management has been a key area of concern. Each year, 

DHS invests billions of dollars in its major acquisition programs to help 

execute its many critical missions. In fiscal year 2015 alone, DHS 

reported that it planned to spend approximately $7.2 billion on these 

acquisition programs, and the department expects it will ultimately invest 

more than $180 billion in them-' We have reported on DHS acquisition 

management issues since shortly after the department was established; 

our first report dates from 2005. 6 Our work since then has identified 

significant shortcomings in the department's ability to manage its portfolio 

of major acquisitions. 7 More recently, we have found that the 

department's senior leadership has taken sound actions that have led to 

improvements, although more needs to be done to ensure that DHS is 

well-positioned to effectively manage its major acquisition programs. 

In November 2000, we published our criteria for removing areas from the 

high-risk list.' Specifically, agencies must have (1) a demonstrated strong 

commitment and top leadership support to address the risks; (2) a 

corrective action plan that identifies the root causes, identifies effective 

solutions, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures 

in the near term, including but not limited to steps necessary to implement 

solutions we recommended; (3) the capacity (that is, the people and other 

resources) to resolve the risks; (4) a program instituted to monitor and 

independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective 

measures; and (5) the ability to demonstrate progress in implementing 

corrective measures. 

5

!n the fiscal year 2015 Future Years Homeland Secunty Program (FYHSP) report to 

Congress, DHS reported it planned to spend approximately $7.2 billion on 66 acquisition 

programs. In the fiscal year 2014 FYHSP report, DHS reported it planned to spend 

approximately $10.7 billion on 121 programs. DHS reduced the number of programs in the 

fiscal year 2015 FYSHP report for various reasons. For example, DHS removed programs 

that were designated non¥major acquisitions, had completed all acquisition activities, or 

been discontinued or combined w1th other programs 

6

GAO, Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create an 

Effective Acqwsition Orgamzation, GA0-05-179 {Washington, D.C .. Mar. 29, 2005) 

7

DHS defines major acquisition programs as those with Ufe-Cycle Cost Estimates of $300 

mi!!ion or more. For examples of past GAO work, see a !1st of related GAO products at the 

end of this statement 

8

GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, GA0-01-

159SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2000) 

Page 3 GA0-16·507T 
61 

This statement discusses: 

DHS's progress and actions remaining in strengthening and 

integrating its management functions, and 

further details on DHS's efforts to strengthen acquisition management 

and key efforts that remain to be completed. 

This statement is based on GAO's 2015 high-risk update report, our body 

of work on DHS acquisition management, which spans over 10 years and 

much of which was performed in response to requests by this committee, 

as well as other reports and testimonies we issued from March 2005 

through February 20169 For the past products, among other things, we 

analyzed DHS strategies and other documents related to the 

department's efforts to address the Strengthening DHS Management 

Functions high-risk area, reviewed our past reports issued since DHS 

began its operations in March 2003, and interviewed DHS officials. More 

detailed information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can 

be found within each specific report. This statement is also based on 

analyses from our ongoing assessment of DHS's efforts to strengthen 

and integrate its management functions since February 2015. We expect 

to report our final results from this work in our 2017 high-risk update. For 

our analyses, among other things, we analyzed DHS documentation, 

such as departmental guidance and plans, and met with DHS officials, 

including the Under Secretary for Management and other senior officials, 

to discuss DHS's efforts to address the Strengthening DHS Management 

Functions high-risk area. On January 29, 2016, DHS provided us with an 

updated version of its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management. We 

plan to analyze this update as part of our ongoing assessment of DHS's 

progress in addressing the Strengthening DHS Management Functions 

high-risk area. 

We conducted the work on which this statement is based from March 

2004 through March 2016 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

Page 4 

High Risk Series An Update, GA0-15-290 (Washington. D.C Feb. 2015) See 

related GAO products list at the end of this statement 
62 

DHS Has Made 

Progress in 

Strengthening Its 

Management 

Functions, but 

Considerable Work 

Remains 

DHS Progress in Meeting 

Criteria for Removal from 

the High-Risk List 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DHS's efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have 

resulted in progress addressing our criteria for removal from the high-risk 

list. In particular, in our February 2015 high-risk update report, we found 

that DHS had met two criteria and partially met the remaining three 

criteria. DHS subsequently met an additional criterion-establishing a 

framework for monitoring progress-and therefore as of March 2016, has 

met three criteria and partially met the remaining two criteria, as shown in 

table 1. 

Table 1: Assessment of Department of Homeland Security (OHS) Progress in 

Addressing the Strengthening DHS Management Functions High~Risk Area, as of 

March 2016 

Source GAO analysis ol DHS documents, •nterv1ews. aM pnor Gi10 reports i GAQ, 16·507T 

a·Met".There are no significant actions that need to be taken to further address this criterion. 

h"Partia!iy met": Some but not aU aci!Ons necessary to generally meet the crltenon have been taken 

,·Not met": Few, if any, actions toward meeting the criterion have been taken. 

Leadership commitment (met), We found in our 2015 report and have 

observed over the last year that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 

Homeland Security, the Under Secretary for Management at DHS, and 

Page 5 GA0~1S~507T 
63 

other senior officials have continued to demonstrate exemplary 

commitment and top leadership support for addressing the department's 

management challenges. Additionally, they have taken actions to 

institutionalize this commitment to help ensure the long-term success of 

the department's efforts. For example, in April 2014, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security issued a memorandum entitled Strengthening 

Departmental Unity of Effort, committing to, among other things, 

improving DHS's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 

processes through strengthened departmental structures and increased 

capability. 10 Senior DHS officials, including the Deputy Secretary and 

Under Secretary for Management, have also routinely met with us over 

the past 7 years to discuss the department's plans and progress in 

addressing this high-risk area, most recently in February 2016. 

Throughout this time, we provided specific feedback on the department's 

efforts. We concluded in our 2015 report and continue to believe that it 

will be important for DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership 

support and commitment to ensure continued progress in successfully 

executing its corrective actions through completion. 

Action plan (met). We found that DHS has established a plan for 

addressing this high-risk area. Specifically, in a September 2010 letter to 

DHS, we identified and DHS agreed to achieve 31 actions and outcomes 

that are critical to addressing the challenges within the department's 

management areas and in integrating those functions across the 

department In March 2014, we updated the actions and outcomes in 

collaboration with DHS to reduce overlap and ensure their continued 

relevance and appropriateness. These updates resulted in a reduction 

from 31 to 30 total actions and outcomes. Toward achieving the actions 

and outcomes, DHS issued its initial integrated Strategy for High Risk 

Management in January 2011 and has since provided updates to its 

strategy in nine later versions, most recently in January 2016. The 

integrated strategy includes key management initiatives and related 

corrective actions plans for addressing DHS's management challenges 

and the actions and outcomes we identified. For example, the January 

2016 strategy update includes an initiative focused on financial systems 

modernization and an initiative focused on IT human capital 

management These initiatives support various actions and outcomes, 

such as modernizing the U.S. Coast Guard's financial management 

Secretary of Homeland Security, Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort, Memorandum for DHS Leadership (Washington, O.C,· Apr. 22, 2014). 

Page 6 GA0-16-507T 
64 

system and implementing an IT human capital strategic plan, 

respectively. We concluded in our 2015 report and continue to believe 

that DHS's strategy and approach to continuously refining actionable 

steps to implementing the outcomes, if implemented effectively and 

sustained, should provide a path for DHS to be removed from our highrisk list. 

Capacity (partially met). In October 2014, DHS identified that it had 

resources needed to implement 7 of the 11 initiatives the department had 

under way to achieve the actions and outcomes, but did not identify 

sufficient resources for the 4 remaining initiatives. In addition, our prior 

work has identified specific capacity gaps that could undermine 

achievement of management outcomes. For example, in April 2014, we 

reported that DHS needed to increase its cost-estimating capacity and 

that the department had not approved baselines for 21 of 46 major 

acquisition programs." These baselines-which establish cost. schedule, 

and capability parameters-are necessary to accurately assess program 

performance. Thus, in our 2015 report, we concluded that DHS needs to 

continue to identify resources for the remaining initiatives; work to 

mitigate shortfalls and prioritize initiatives, as needed; and communicate 

to senior leadership critical resource gaps. In its January 2016 strategy 

update, DHS stated that the department had addressed capacity 

shortcomings it previously identified and self-assesses the capacity 

criterion as fully met. We are analyzing DHS's capacity to resolve risks as 

part of our ongoing assessment of the department's progress in 

addressing the Strengthening DHS Management Functions high-risk area 

and will report on our findings in our 2017 high-risk update. 

Monitoring (met). In our 2015 report we found that DHS established a 

framework for monitoring its progress in implementing the integrated 

strategy it identified for addressing the 30 actions and outcomes. In the 

June 2012 update to the Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, 

DHS included, for the first time, performance measures to track its 

progress in implementing all of its key management initiatives. DHS 

continued to include performance measures in its October 2014 update. 

However, in our 2015 report we also found that DHS could strengthen its 

financial management monitoring efforts and thus concluded that the 

department had partially met the criterion for establishing a framework to 

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its Portfolio to 

Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications w1th Congress, GAO~ 14-332 

(Washington, D.C. Apr 17, 2014) 

Page 7 GA0*16-507T 
65 

monitor progress. In particular, according to DHS officials, as of 

November 2014, they were establishing a monitoring program that would 

include assessing whether financial management systems modernization 

projects for key components that DHS plans to complete in 2019 are 

following industry best practices and meet users' needs. However, DHS 

had not yet entered into a contract for independent verification and 

validation services in connection with its efforts to establish this program. 

Effective implementation of these modernization projects is important 

because, until they are complete, the department's current systems will 

not effectively support financial management operations. DHS 

subsequently entered into a contract for independent verification and 

validation services that should help ensure the financial management 

systems modernization projects meet key requirements. As a result, we 

currently assess DHS to have met the framework to monitor progress 

criterion. As we concluded in our 2015 report and continue to believe, 

moving forward, DHS will need to closely track and independently 

validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and 

make midcourse adjustments, as needed. 

Demonstrated progress (partially met). We found in our 2015 report 

that DHS had made important progress in strengthening its management 

functions, but needed to demonstrate sustainable, measurable progress 

in addressing key challenges that remain within and across these 

functions. In particular, we found that DHS had implemented a number of 

actions demonstrating the department's progress in strengthening its 

management functions. For example, DHS had strengthened its 

enterprise architecture program (or blueprint) to guide and constrain IT 

acquisitions and obtained a clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 

consecutive years, fiscal years 2013 and 2014. DHS has continued to 

demonstrate important progress over the last year by, for example, 

obtaining a clean opinion on its financial statements for a third 

consecutive year. However, we also found in our 2015 report that DHS 

continued to face significant management challenges that hindered the 

department's ability to accomplish its missions. For example, DHS did not 

have the acquisition management tools in place to consistently 

demonstrate whether its major acquisition programs were on track to 

achieve their cost, schedule, and capability goals. In addition, DHS did 

not have modernized financial management systems, which affected its 

ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision 

making. Over the last year DHS has continued to take actions to address 

these challenges but they persist, as discussed in more detail below. As 

we concluded in our 2015 report, addressing these and other 

management challenges will be a significant undertaking that will likely 

Page 8 GA0·16·507T 
66 

DHS Progress in 

Achieving Key High-Risk 

Actions and Outcomes 

require several years, but will be critical for the department to mitigate the 

risks that management weaknesses pose to mission accomplishment. 

Key to addressing the department's management challenges is DHS 

demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across the 30 

actions and outcomes we identified and DHS agreed were needed to 

address the high-risk area. Achieving sustained progress across the 

actions and outcomes, in turn, requires leadership commitment, effective 

corrective action planning, adequate capacity (that is, the people and 

other resources), and monitoring the effectiveness and sustainability of 

supporting initiatives. The 30 actions and outcomes address each 

management function (acquisition, IT, financial, and human capital) as 

well as management integration. For example, one of the outcomes 

focusing on acquisition management is validating required acquisition 

documents in accordance with a department-approved, knowledge-based 

acquisition process, and the outcomes focusing on financial management 

include sustaining clean audit opinions for at least 2 consecutive years on 

department-wide financial statements and internal controls. 

We found in our 2015 report that DHS had made important progress 

across all of its management functions and significant progress in the 

area of management integration. In particular, DHS had made important 

progress in several areas to fully address 9 actions and outcomes, 5 of 

which it had sustained as fully implemented for at least 2 years. For 

instance, DHS fully met 1 outcome for the first time by obtaining a clean 

opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years and sustained 

full implementation of another outcome by continuing to use performance 

measures to assess progress made in achieving department-wide 

management integration. Since our 2015 update. DHS fully addressed 

another outcome as a result of actions it has taken to improve the 

maturity of its system acquisition management practices, leaving 

additional work to fully address the remaining 20 outcomes. As of March 

2016, DHS has also mostly addressed an additional 7 actions and 

outcomes-3 since our 2015 report-meaning that a small amount of 

work remains to fully address them. 

We also found in our 2015 report and continue to observe, that 

considerable work remains, however, in several areas for DHS to fully 

achieve the remaining actions and outcomes and thereby strengthen its 

management functions. Specifically, as of March 2016, DHS has partially 

addressed 9 and initiated 4 of the actions and outcomes. As previously 

mentioned, addressing some of these actions and outcomes, such as 

modernizing the department's financial management systems, are 

Page9 GA0·16-507T 
67 

significant undertakings that will likely require multiyear efforts. Table 2 

summarizes DHS's progress in addressing the 30 actions and outcomes 

as of March 2016, and is followed by selected examples. 

Table 2: GAO Assessment of Department of Homeland Security (OHS} Progress in Addressing Key Actions and Outcomes, as 

of March 2016 

""Fully addressed"· Outcome is fully addressed 

Partially 

addressedc lnitiatedd 

b"MosHy addressed": Progress is significant and a small amount of worlc remams 

0

"Partially addressed": Progress is measurable, but significant work remains 

Total 

d"!nlltated": Activities have been initiated to address the outcome. but it is too early to report progress. 

"Although March 2014 updates to most functional areas were mmor. there were more significant 

revisions to the financial management actions and outcomes, with some outcomes revised or 

dropped and others added. These revisions prevent the financial management actions and outcomes 

from being comparable on a one-for-one basis with those of prior years. Accordingly, our ratings of 

DHS's progress in addressing financial management actions and outcomes are not an !ndlcal1on of a 

downgrade to the department's progress. 

Acquisition management. DHS has fully addressed 1 of the 5 

acquisition management outcomes, mostly addressed 2 outcomes, 

partially addressed 1 outcome, and initiated actions to address the 

remaining outcome. For example, DHS has taken a number of actions to 

fully address establishing effective component-level acquisition capability. 

These actions include initiating (1) monthly Component Acquisition 

Executive staff forums to provide guidance and share best practices and 

(2) assessments of component policies and processes for managing 

acquisitions. DHS has also continued to make progress addressing the 

outcome on validating required acquisition documents in a timely manner. 

Specifically, the Under Secretary for Management provided direction to 

the components on submitting the outstanding documentation. We will 

continue to assess DHS's progress on this outcome. In addition, DHS has 

conducted staffing analysis reports that quantify gaps in acquisition 

personnel by position. Moving forward, DHS must develop and implement 

a plan for filling key vacant positions identified through its staffing analysis 

reports. Further, DHS should continue to improve its acquisition program 

Page 10 GA0~16-507T 
68 

management by effectively using the Joint Requirements Council, which it 

reinstated in June 2014, to identify and eliminate any unintended 

redundancies in program requirements, and by demonstrating that major 

acquisition programs are on track to achieve their cost, schedule, and 

capability goals. 

IT management. DHS has fully addressed 3 of the 6 IT management 

outcomes, mostly addressed another 2, and partially addressed the 

remaining 1. For example, DHS has finalized a directive to establish its 

tiered governance and portfolio management structure for overseeing and 

managing its IT investments, and annually reviews each of its portfolios 

and the associated investments to determine the most efficient allocation 

of resources within each of the portfolios. The department has also made 

progress in implementing its IT Strategic Human Capital Plan for fiscal 

years 2010 through 2012. However, in January 2015 DHS shifted its IT 

paradigm from acquiring assets to acquiring services, and acting as a 

service broker (i.e., an intermediary between the purchaser of a service 

and the seller of that service). According to DHS officials in May 2015, 

this paradigm change will require a major transition in the skill sets of 

DHS's IT workforce, as well as the hiring, training, and managing of staff 

with those new skill sets: as such, this effort will need to be closely 

managed in order to succeed. Additionally, we found that DHS continues 

to take steps to enhance its information security program. However, while 

the department made progress in remediating findings from the previous 

year, in November 2015, the department's financial statement auditor 

designated deficiencies in IT systems controls as a material weakness for 

financial reporting purposes for the 12th consecutive year. 12 This 

designation was due to flaws in security controls such as those for access 

controls, configuration management, segregation of duties, and 

contingency planning. Thus, DHS needs to remediate this longstanding 

material weakness. Information security remains a major management 

challenge for the department. 

Financial management. DHS has fully addressed 2 financial 

management outcomes, partially addressed 3, and initiated 3. Most 

is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies. in internal control 

such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity's 

financial statements wl!J not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis. A 

significant deficiency is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in internal control that 

is less severe than a matena! weakness, but is important enough to merit attention by those charged with governance 

Page 11 GA0·16·507T 
69 

notably, DHS received a clean audit opinion on its financial statements for 

3 consecutive years, fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, fully addressing 

2 outcomes. In addition, in November 2015, DHS's financial statement 

auditors reported that one of four material weaknesses in its internal 

controls over financial reporting had been reduced to a significant 

deficiency in connection with its remediation efforts. However, the 

remaining material weaknesses reported by DHS auditors continue to 

hamper DHS's ability to establish effective internal control over financial 

reporting and comply with financial management system requirements. 

DHS continues to make progress on three multi-year projects to 

modernize selected components' financial management systems. 

According to its January 2016 strategy update, DHS has made the most 

progress on its U.S. Coast Guard modernization project; whereas 

additional planning and discovery efforts need to be completed on its 

projects to modernize Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement financial management systems 

before DHS will be in a position to implement modernized solutions for 

these components and their customers. Without sound controls and 

systems, DHS faces long-term challenges in sustaining a clean audit 

opinion on its financial statements and in obtaining and sustaining a clean 

opinion on its internal control over financial reporting, and ensuring its 

financial management systems generate reliable, useful, and timely 

information for day-to-day decision making as a routine business 

operation. 

Human capital management. DHS has fully addressed 1 human capital 

management outcome, mostly addressed 3, and partially addressed the 

remaining 3. For example, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed a 

human capital strategic plan in 2011 that DHS has since made sustained 

progress in implementing, fully addressing this outcome. DHS also has 

actions under way to identify current and future human capital needs, an 

outcome it mostly addressed since our 2015 report due to progress 

implementing its Workforce Planning Model. However, DHS has 

considerable work ahead to improve employee morale. For example, the 

Office of Personnel Management's 2015 Federal Employee Viewpoint 

Survey data showed that DHS ranked last among 37 large federal 

agencies in all four dimensions of the survey's index for human capital 

accountability and assessment. Further, the survey data showed that 

DHS's scores continued to decrease in three index dimensions Uob 

satisfaction, leadership and knowledge management, and results-oriented 

performance culture) and remained constant in the fourth dimension 

(talent management). DHS has developed plans for addressing its 

employee satisfaction problems, but as we previously recommended, 

Page 12 GA0~16·507T 
70 

DHS needs to continue to improve its root-cause analysis efforts related 

to these plans. 13 

DHS has also developed and implemented mechanisms to assess 

training programs but could take additional actions. For example, in 

September 2014, we found that DHS had implemented componentspecific and department-wide training programs and that the five DHS 

components in our review all had documented processes to evaluate their 

training programs. 14 However, to fully achieve this outcome, DHS also 

needs to, among other things, issue department-wide policies on training 

and development and strengthen its learning management capabilities. In 

February 2016, we reported that DHS had initiated the Human Resources 

Information Technology (HRIT) investment in 2003 to address issues 

presented by its human resource environment, which with respect to 

learning management, included limitations resulting from nine disparate 

learning management systems that did not exchange information. 15 DHS 

established the Performance and Learning Management System 

(PALMS) program to provide a system that will consolidate DHS's nine 

existing learning management systems into one system and enable 

comprehensive training reporting and analysis across the department, 

among other things. However, in our February 2016 report we found that 

selected PALMS capabilities had been deployed to headquarters and two 

components, but full implementation at four components was not planned, 

leaving uncertainty about whether the PALMS system would be used 

enterprise-wide to accomplish these goals. We further found that DHS did 

not fully implement effective acquisition management practices and 

therefore was limited in monitoring and overseeing the implementation of 

PALMS and ensuring that the department obtains a system that improves 

its learning management weaknesses, reduces duplication, and delivers 

within cost and schedule commitments. We made 14 recommendations to 

DHS to, among other things, address HRIT's poor progress and 

ineffective management. DHS concurred with all14 recommendations 

and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. 

13GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better Determine 

Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans, GA0-12-940 

(Washington, D C Sept 28, 2012) 

14GAO, DHS Training: Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking, and Performance 

Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts. GA0-14-688 (Washington. D.C .. Sept 10, 2014) 

15GAO, Homeland Security: Oversight of Neglected Human Resources Information 

Technology Investment Is Needed, GA0-16-253 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2016). 

Page 13 GA0~16-507T 
71 

Management integration. DHS has sustained its progress in fully 

addressing 3 of 4 outcomes we identified and they agreed are key to the 

department's management integration efforts. For example, in January 

2011, DHS issued an initial action plan to guide its management 

integration efforts-the Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management. 

Since then, DHS has generally made improvements to the strategy with 

each update based on feedback we provided. DHS has also shown 

important progress in addressing the last and most significant 

management integration outcome-to implement actions and outcomes in 

each management area to develop consistent or consolidated processes 

and systems within and across its management functional areas-but, as 

we concluded in our 2015 update, considerable work remains. For 

example, the Secretary's April 2014 Strengthening Departmental Unity of 

Effort memorandum highlighted a number of initiatives designed to allow 

the department to operate in a more integrated fashion. Further, in its 

January 2016 update, DHS reported that in August 2015 the Under 

Secretary for Management identified four integrated priority areas to bring 

focus to strengthening integration among the department's management 

functions. According to DHS's January 2016 update, these prioritieswhich include, for example, strengthening resource allocation and 

reporting ability and developing and deploying secure technology 

solutions-each have stretch goals and milestones that are monitored by 

integrated teams led by senior DHS officials. However, given that these 

management integration initiatives are in the early stages of 

implementation, it is too early to assess their impact. 

We concluded in our 2015 report and continue to believe that in the 

coming years, DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated 

Strategy for High Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable 

progress in implementing its key management initiatives and corrective 

actions and achieving outcomes. In doing so, it will be important for DHS 

to 

maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained 

commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective 

actions through completion; 

continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and 

periodically report its progress to us and Congress; 

identify and work to mitigate any resource gaps and prioritize 

initiatives as needed to ensure it can implement and sustain its 

corrective actions; 

Page 14 GA0-16-507T 
72 

DHS Continues to 

Strengthen 

Acquisition 

Management, Though 

Key Efforts Need to 

Be Completed 

closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and 

sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse 

adjustments as needed; and 

make continued progress in achieving the 20 actions and outcomes it 

has not fully addressed and demonstrate that systems, personnel, 

and policies are in place to ensure that results can be sustained over 

time. 

We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in this high-risk area to 

determine if the actions and outcomes are achieved and sustained over 

the long term. 

Each year, DHS invests billions of dollars in its major acquisition 

programs to help execute its many critical missions. In fiscal year 2015 

alone, DHS reported that it planned to spend approximately $7.2 billion 

on these acquisition programs, and the department expects it will 

ultimately invest more than $180 billion in them. DHS and its underlying 

components are acquiring systems to help secure the border, increase 

marine safety, screen travelers, enhance cyber security, improve disaster 

response, and execute a wide variety of other operations. Each of DHS's 

major acquisition programs generally costs $300 million or more and 

spans multiple years. 

To help manage these programs, DHS has established an acquisition 

management policy that we found in September 2012 to be generally 

sound, in that it reflects key program management practices." However, 

we also have found that DHS has lacked discipline in managing its 

programs according to this policy, and that many acquisition programs 

have faced a variety of challenges. 17 These challenges can contribute to 

poor acquisition outcomes, such as cost increases or the risk of end 

users-such as border patrol agents or first responders in a disasterreceiving technologies that do not work as expected. 

Reflecting the shortcomings we have identified since 2005, we have 

made 64 recommendations to DHS on acquisition management issues; 

16GAO, Homeland Security: OH$ Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to 

Help Meet MISS/On Needs, GA0-12-833 (Wash>ngton, D.C: Sept 18, 2012). 

17GA0-12-833. 

Page 15 GA0-16-507T 
73 

2005 to 2008: A 

Decentralized Acquisition 

Management Structure 

Hampered Early Oversight 

Efforts 

42 of which have been implemented. Our findings also formed the basis 

of the five acquisition management outcomes identified in the high risk 

list, which DHS continues to address. As detailed below, DHS has fully 

addressed one outcome, mostly addressed two outcomes, partially 

addressed one outcome, and initiated efforts to address the final 

outcome. 

Outcome 1: Validate required acquisition documents in a timely 

manner (mostly addressed); 

Outcome 2: Establish effective component level acquisition capability 

(fully addressed); 

Outcome 3: Establish and effectively operate the Joint Requirements 

Council (partially addressed); 

Outcome 4: Assess and address whether appropriate numbers of 

trained acquisition personnel are in place at the department 

component levels (mostly addressed); and 

Outcome 5: Demonstrate that major acquisition programs are on track 

to achieve their cost, schedule, and capability goals (initiated). 

In March 2005, we reported that a lack of clear accountability was 

hampering DHS's efforts to integrate the acquisition functions of its 

numerous organizations into an effective whole. We found that DHS 

remained a collection of disparate organizations, many of which were 

performing functions with insufficient oversight, giving rise to an 

environment rife with challenges. For example, the Chief Procurement 

Officer had been delegated the responsibility to manage, administer, and 

oversee all acquisition activity across DHS, but in practice enforcement of 

these activities was spread throughout the department with unclear 

accountability. We concluded that unless DHS's top leaders addressed 

these challenges, the department was at risk of continuing to exist with a 

fragmented acquisition organization that provided stopgap, ad hoc 

solutions. 

In November 2008, we found that billions invested in major acquisition 

programs continued to lack appropriate oversight. While the acquisition 

review process DHS had in place at the time of our review called for 

executive decision making at key points in an acquisition program's life 

cycle, the process had not provided the oversight needed to identify and 

address cost, schedule, and performance problems in its major 

Page 16 GA0~16-507T 
74 

investments. Poor implementation of the process was evidenced by the 

number of programs that did not adhere to the department's acquisition 

review policy-of DHS's 48 major programs requiring milestone and 

annual reviews, 45 were not assessed in accordance with this policy. 

Furthermore, at least 14 of these programs had reported cost grow1h, 

schedule slips, or performance shortfalls. We found that poor 

implementation was largely the result of DHS's failure to ensure that the 

department's major acquisition decision-making bodies effectively carried 

out their oversight responsibilities and had the resources to do so. For 

example, although a Joint Requirements Council had been responsible 

for managing acquisition investment portfolios and validating 

requirements, the council had not met since 2006. 

We also found in November 2008 that acquisition program budget 

decisions had been made in the absence of required oversight reviews 

and, as a result, DHS could not ensure that annual funding decisions for 

its major investments made the best use of resources and addressed 

mission needs. We found almost a third of DHS's major investments 

received funding without having validated mission needs and 

requirements-which confirm a need is justified-and two-thirds did not 

have required life-cycle cost estimates. Without validated requirements, 

life-cycle cost estimates, and regular portfolio reviews, DHS cannot 

ensure that its investment decisions are appropriate and will ultimately 

address capability gaps. In July 2008, 15 of the 57 DHS major 

investments we reviewed were designated by the Office of Management 

and Budget as poorly planned and by DHS as poorly performing. Among 

other things, we recommended that DHS reinstate the Joint 

Requirements Council or establish another departmental joint 

requirements oversight board to review and approve acquisition 

requirements and assess potential duplication of effort. 

Page 17 GA0-16-507T 
75 

2008 to 2012: DHS 

Established, but Did Not 

Consistently Implement, a 

Sound Acquisition Policy 

In November 2008, DHS issued the initial version of Acquisition 

Management Directive 102-01-the policy in effect today-in an effort to 

establish an acquisition management system that effectively provides 

required capability to operators in support of the department's missions." 

DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and DHS Instruction 

Manual102-01-001, which includes 12 appendixes, establish the 

department's policies and processes for managing these major 

acquisition programs. In September 2012 we found that these documents 

reflect many key program management practices that could help mitigate 

program risks. Table 3 presents our 2012 assessment of the policy. 

Table 3: GAO Assessment of DHS's Acquisition Policy Compared to Key Prograrn·management Practices 

GAO key practice area Summary of key practices acquisition policy 

"'ld"'"e-ncctify:-'a-'ndc-va~li-cda-,te-ne-e-cdc-s---cc:cu-r-re-ntc-=cap8bi1itles should be identified to d6term1ne 1fthere is a gap between • 

the current and needed capabilities. A need statement should be mformed by 

a comprehensive assessment that considers the organization's overall 

miSSIOn 

Assess alternatives to select Analyses of Alternatives should be conducted early in the acquisition process 

most appropriate solution to compare key elements of competing solutions, including performance, 

costs, and risks. Moreover, these analyses should assess many alternatives 

across multiple concepts 

Clearly establish well-defined Requirements should be well defined and Include mput from operators and 

requirements stakeholders. Programs should be grounded 1n well-understood concepts of 

how systems would be used and likely requirements costs. 

Develop realistic cost est1mates A cost estimate should be well documented, comprehenstve, accurate, and 

and schedules credible. A schedule should identify resources needed to do the work and 

account for how long all activities will take Additionally, a schedule should 

identify relationships between sequenced activities. 

Secure stable funding that Programs should make trade-offs as necessary when working in a constrained 

matches resources to budget environment 

• 

• 

• 

• 

18The interim version of Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 replaced Management 

Direct1ve 1400, which had governed major acquisition programs since 2006. OHS 

originally established an investment review process in 2003 to provide departmental 

overs1ght of major 1nvestments throughout their life cycles, and to help ensure that funds 

allocated for investments through the budget process are well spent DHS issued updated 

versions of Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 in January 2010 and July 2015 

Page 18 
76 

Figure 1: Programs That Had Key Acquisition Documents Approved in Accordance 

with DHS Acquisition Policy, as of September 2012 

P;og;ams have ar. documents <lpprov<ld by the depo.rtmont as reqwred 

Programs have some documents approved by the department as required 

Page 19 GA0-16-507T 
77 

2012 to 2015: DHS 

Continued to Strengthen 

Acquisition Management, 

Which Highlighted 

Remaining Issues 

In 2012, most major programs lacked reliable cost estimates, realistic 

schedules, and agreed-upon baseline objectives, limiting DHS 

leadership's ability to effectively manage those programs and provide 

information to Congress. As a result, we were only able to gain insight 

into the magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of 77 programs we reviewed, 

but we found that their aggregate cost estimates had increased by 166 

percent. 

Additionally, we found that nearly all of the DHS program managers we 

surveyed in 2012 reported their programs had experienced significant 

challenges. Sixty-eight of the 71 respondents reported they experienced 

funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or their planned capabilities 

changed after initiation, and most survey respondents reported a 

combination of these challenges. 

DHS has concurred with and presented plans for addressing all of the 

acquisition management recommendations that we have addressed to 

the Secretary since September 2012, the implementation of which will 

enhance acquisition management. For example, in April2014, we found 

that the department's Acquisition Review Board rarely directed programs 

to make tradeoffs for affordability. We recommended that this board 

assess program-specific tradeoffs at all of its meetings, particularly in light 

of the fact that the department had identified a 30-percent gap between 

the 5-year funding needed for its major acquisitions and the actual 

resources expected to be available. DHS has since implemented this 

recommendation. 

Furthermore, in reviews completed in March, April, and October of 2015, 

we found that DHS had taken steps to improve oversight of its major 

acquisition programs and that it had begun to implement its 2008 

acquisition policy more consistently. Many of DHS's recent actions 

correspond to the high risk outcomes, as shown in the table 4. 

Table 4: Recent Efforts by DHS to Improve Acquisition Management 

GAO review date GAO finding 

Related high risk 

outcome 

March 2015 

March 2015 

March 2015 

DHS defined the role of the Component Acquisition Executive, the senior acquisition offictal Outcome 2 

within each component. 

DHS was tak1ng steps to improve the process for tracking major acquisition programs for Outcome 5 

overs1ght purposes 

DHS concurred with the GAO recommendation to produce operations and maintenance Outcome 1 

cost estimates for programs in sustainment 

Page 20 GA0~16-507T 
78 

October 2015 

Source GAO ! GA0-16-507T 

We noted that DHS should continue to improve its acquisition program management by Outcome 3 

effectively using the Joint Requirements Council, which was reinstated in 2014, to identify 

and eliminate any unintended redundancies 1n program requirements. 

DHS faced a unique challenge when it was formed-merging 22 separate 

entities into a single department-which included integrating the 

acquisition functions of its numerous organizations into an effective 

whole. The department is to be commended for the efforts its leadership 

has taken to address the acquisition management shortcomings we have 

identified over the past 10 years. However. in our April 2015 review, we 

continued to find enduring challenges to acquisition programs, such as: 

Staffing shortfalls-DHS reported that 21 of the 22 programs we 

reviewed faced program office workforce shortfalls pertaining to such 

positions as program managers, systems engineers. and logisticians 

Program funding gaps-we found that 11 of the 22 programs we 

reviewed faced funding gaps (projected funding vs. estimated costs) 

of 10 percent or greater, including five programs that faced gaps of 30 

percent or greater. 

Inconsistencies in how components were implementing the 

department's acquisition management policy-for example, we found 

that the funding plans for Coast Guard programs continued to be 

incomplete, in that they did not account for all of the operations and 

maintenance funding the Coast Guard planned to allocate to its major 

acquisition programs. These gaps in information reduce the value of 

the funding plans presented to Congress and obscure the affordability 

of Coast Guard acquisition programs. 

Further, as we noted in our most recent high risk update, the department 

has additional work to do to fully address the remaining acquisition 

management outcomes. To address these issues, we have, among other 

things, recommended that DHS assess program-specific affordability 

Page 21 GA0-16-507T 
79 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

tradeoffs at all acquisition review meetings and ensure that funding plans 

submitted to Congress are comprehensive and clearly account for all 

operations and maintenance funding that DHS plans to allocate to its 

programs. DHS concurred with these recommendations and is taking 

actions to implement them. For example, DHS established that 

department leadership would, during all acquisition program reviews, 

specifically address affordability issues and make explicit tradeoffs as 

necessary, and DHS officials told us that DHS leadership is discussing 

affordability at all program reviews to help ensure adequate funding 

exists. Additionally, DHS has continued to obtain department-level 

approval for program baselines as needed, and has initiated efforts to 

improve the quality of acquisition data reported by components. 

To ensure that recent efforts are sustained, the department must continue 

to implement its sound acquisition policy consistently and effectively 

across all components. We continue to track DHS's progress through 

ongoing reviews of the Joint Requirements Council, non-major program 

acquisitions, and our annual assessment of major acquisition programs. 

in addition to our high risk updates. 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and members of the 

committee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be happy to 

respond to any questions you may have at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca 

Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov or Michele Mackin at 

(202)-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to 

this statement include Larry Crosland, Jennifer Kamara, James Kernen, 

Emily Kuhn, Elizabeth Luke, Valerie Freeman, David Lysy, Taylor 

Matheson, Shannin O'Neill, Lindsay Taylor, Nathan Tranquilli, Katherine 

Trimble, and Shaunyce Wallace. Key contributors for the previous work 

that this testimony is based on are listed in each product. 

Page 22 GA0·16-507T 
80 

Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security: Weak Oversight of Human Resources Information 

Technology Investment Needs Considerable Improvement. GA0-16-

407T. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2016. 

Homeland Security: Oversight of Neglected Human Resources 

Information Technology Investment Is Needed. GA0-16-253. 

Washington, D.C.: February 11,2016. 

Immigration Benefits System: Better Informed Decision Making Needed 

on Transformation Program. GA0-15-415. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 

2015. 

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal 

Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GA0-15-171 SP. Washington, 

D.C.: April 22,2015. 

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Should Better Define Oversight 

Roles and Improve Program Reporting to Congress. GA0-15-292. 

Washington, D.C.: March 12,2015. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made, but More Work 

Remains in Strengthening Management Functions. GA0-15-388T. 

Washington, D.C .. February 26, 2015. 

DHS Training: Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking, and 

Performance Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts. GA0-14-688. 

Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2014. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made; Significant Work 

Remains in Addressing High-Risk Areas. GA0-14-532T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 7, 2014. 

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its Portfolio 

to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with Congress. 

GA0-14-332. Washington, D.C.: April17, 2014. 

Department of Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts to Improve Employee 

Morale and Fill Senior Leadership Vacancies. GA0-14-228T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12,2013. 

DHS Financial Management: Continued Effort Needed to Address 

Internal Control and System Challenges. GA0-14-106T. Washington, 

D.C.: November 15, 2013. 

Page 23 GA0~16-507T 
81 

(100706) 

Related GAO Products 

Information Technology: Additional OMB and Agency Actions Are Needed 

to Achieve Portfolio Savings. GA0-14-65. Washington, D.C.: November 

6, 2013 

DHS Financial Management: Additional Efforts Needed to Resolve 

Deficiencies in Internal Controls and Financial Management Systems. 

GA0-13-561. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2013. 

Information Technology: Additional Executive Review Sessions Needed 

to Address Troubled Projects. GA0-13-524. Washington, D.C .. June 13, 

2013. 

Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better 

Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action 

Plans. GA0-12-940. Washington, D.C .. September 28, 2012. 

Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment 

Management to Help Meet Mission Needs. GA0-12-833. Washington, 

D.C.: September 18, 2012. 

Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs 

Lack Appropriate Oversight. GA0-09-29. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2008. 

Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to 

Create an Effective Acquisition Organization. GA0-05-179. Washington, 

D.C.: March 29, 2005. 

Page 24 GA0·16~507T 
82 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Russell Deyo and the Honorable Charles Fulghum 

From Senator .John McCain 

"DHS Management and Acquisition Reform" 

March 16,2016 

i l 

Topic: DHS lS 

'-------· 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURiTY (SENATE) 

Question: As you know, this committee is currently working on a DHS acquisitions 

reform bill. I believe acquisitions reform is needed at DHS and support efforts by this 

committee to better protect the American taxpayer by addressing this important issue. I 

am concerned, however, that this bill merely codifies current DHS acquisition policies 

that have been in place since 2008 and does not go far enough to prevent costly schedule 

delays of major acquisition programs. 

Under current DHS acquisition policies, DHS continues to experience billions in cost 

overruns and delays. For example, an April 22, 2015 GAO report (GA0-15-17SP) found 

that only "two of the 22 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs it reviewed 

were on track to meet the initial schedule and cost parameters established after DHS's 

current acquisition policy went into effect in November 2008. Fourteen programs had 

experienced schedule slips, or schedule slips and cost growth, including five programs 

GAO reviewed because they were at-risk of poor outcomes and nine others. These 

programs' cost estimates increased by $9.7 billion, or 18 percent. GAO was unable to 

assess six programs because DHS leadership had not yet approved baselines establishing 

their schedules and cost estimates even though these baselines are required by DHS 

policy." 

How much docs DHS estimate it will ultimately spend on their current major acquisition 

programs? 

Response: Approximately $18 billion is spent annually through the acquisition process. 

This includes funding for programs in both acquisition and sustainment. 

DHS estimates that between FY 2012 and FY 2017, it will spend an average of $2.1 

billion annually of Procurement, Construction, and Improvement (PC&!) funding for all 

DHS Level l and 2 major acquisition programs. PC&! funding covers the Department's 

efforts for planning, engineering and purchase of assets prior to sustainment. 

I 
83 

Question#: I 

Topic: DHS acquisitions 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Refonn 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

LOfifill«o. HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

In addition, Secretary Johnson's Unity of Effort initiative, launched in April 2014, is 

creating more centralized acquisition processes. For example, the Department has 

transformed its approach to acquisition by establishing a DHS-wide Joint Requirements 

Council (JRC) to evaluate, from the viewpoint ofDHS as a whole, a component's needs 

on the front end of an acquisition. The JRC builds out solid requirements much earlier in 

the investment life cycle, where requirements are first conceived and developed. A more 

mature JRC will evaluate issues that cut across multiple components and makes 

recommendations that focus on maximizing the efficiency of investments and enhancing 

mission capabilities. The JRC projects full operating capability by the end of FY 2016. 

Having Congress codify the JRC would cement this process. 

Also under Unity of Effort, DHS launched the "Acquisition Innovations in Motion" 

(AliM) initiative, which creates learning opportunities for DHS by listening to those who 

participate in the acquisition process, both internally and externally. Under AliM, the 

Department consults with the contractor community about ways to improve the quality 

and timeliness of the Department's contracting process, and the emerging skills required 

for DHS acquisition professionals. AliM is improving private sector engagement and 

putting faster contracting processes in place. The synergies created by these combined 

efforts will further develop acquisition efficiencies. 

Question: Given the billions in cost overruns and schedule slips identified by GAO, 

please explain how codifying current DHS acquisition policies that have been in place 

since 2008 will remedy how DIIS procures goods, services, and major acquisition 

programs efficiently and minimize cost overruns? 

Response: Many of the acquisition challenges that have confronted DHS occurred either 

prior to or as the Department built and matured a robust acquisition policy, process, and 

monitoring capability and expertise. Having Congress codify existing acquisition 

processes would cement a process to endure for years to come. The draft legislation 

provides increased transparency and accountability, both of which can reasonably be 

expected to result in better utilization of the resources entrusted to the Department. DHS 

supports the Committee's intent to ensure the position of Chief Acquisition Officer 

(CAO) remains at the level of the Under Secretary for Management. As CAO, the Under 

Secretary for Management plays a direct role in the Department's management, 

administration, and oversight of approximately $18 billion annually spent through the 

acquisition process. The creation of a Departmental acquisition executive structure and 

staff to spearhead the management of the Department's acquisition etlorts was an 

important first step to address its challenges. The Office of Program Accountability and 

Risk Management (PARM) serves as the central oversight body from which DHS directs 
84 

Question#: I 

Topic: DHS acquisitions 

Hearing: DHS Management and , Reform 

-------·--···---- t= ,,;.,ry The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

improvement of management, administration, and oversight of the Department's 

acquisition programs. The draft legislation clarifies various roles such as the PARM 

Executive Director, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Financial Officer 

(CFO), as well as the reporting relationship from the Component Acquisition Executives 

(CAEs) to the CAO. These proposed legislative provisions capture the progress DHS has 

made and further strengthens oversight throughout the entire Department for the future. 

Through PARM, in close collaboration and coordination with other MGMT Offices, 

significant progress has been made to improve oversight ofDHS's acquisition programs. 

These include a comprehensive update to MD-1 02, which serves as the principal 

acquisition policy directive; the assessment and remediation of skill gaps in the 

acquisition program management workforce; the afore-mentioned CAE structure, for 

which DHS requires a qualitied and experienced acquisition professional to oversee the 

organization's acquisition policies and efforts; the completion of all required 

documentation for major programs; and the expanded oversight authority of the 

Acquisition Review Board, which now focuses on major issues beyond program 

performance and effectiveness. 

Question: Do you agree that DHS, instead of procuring major systems that potentially 

have substantial development and integration risks associated with them, should focus 

primarily on using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items which shortens development 

time and minimizes costly and duplicative research by the government? If yes, what have 

policies are in place to promote COTS in the acquisitions process? 

Response: DHS expects Components and programs to obtain products and services that 

satisfy agency requirements using the most economical means possible. DHS buys assets, 

supplies and services that range from simple commodity procurements to complex 

development acquisitions. DHS Acquisition policy, consistent with longstanding federal 

procurement statutes and principles, creates a general preference for the use of 

commercial items to acquire capabilities (after considering reuse of existing capabilities). 

This includes the use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) items, which otTer benefits 

such as for reduced development time, faster insertion of new technology, and lower lifecycle costs. This is generally the preferred method to acquire capabilities (along with 

reuse of existing capabilities), if the COTS solutions closely meet the mission and 

business requirements 

Maximum use of commercially mature technology provides the greatest opportunity to 

meet program cost, schedule, and performance requirements and is consistent with a 

tailored acquisition strategy. However, regardless of the extent to which a system is made 

up of commercial items, the program manager still engineers, develops, integrates, tests, 
85 

evaluates, delivers, sustains, and manages the overall system by tailoring the activities 

and artifacts in the Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC). The program manager needs 

to pay particular attention to the intended product use environment, particularly 

operational and business processes and practices, and understand the extent to which this 

environment differs from (or is similar to) the commercial use environment. Early 

identification of requirements, market research, demonstration of available COTS 

products in the intended environment and gap analysis are essential, and can be 

performed early in the Acquisition process. 

COTS products are typically designed to be used "as is" to meet general business needs, 

not a specific organization's needs or requirements, which may work well for many back 

office functions (e.g., Asset Management) or commodity technology components (e.g., 

Databases). However, in many cases, especially for more complex systems requirements, 

an off-the-shelf product may not satisfactorily meet the agency's mission needs. If a 

program purchases a "modified COTS product," which, by definition, is not a COTS 

product, or modifies a COTS product on its own to meet unique mission facing needs, the 

program must take into account that it may lose or limit the ability to use the vendor's 

subsequent product upgrades or to flnd a suitable replacement for the product from other 

commercial sources. 

Generally, materially modifying COTS products is high risk and is discouraged. 

Alternatively, if a mission program tries to modify mission-specific business processes to 

match a given COTS feature set, the users and/or mission effectiveness often suffer. For 

this reason, COTS solutions are recommended only when they closely align with 

business requirements. 

To maximize the effective use of commercial items, including COTS, the Department 

carefully considers modular approaches to systems development reducing business 

processes to the smallest practicable modular unit, that allow full consideration of COTS 

and other commercial item solutions to the maximum extent practicable with minimal 

loss of mission effectiveness. If COTS or other commercial solutions arc not suitable, the 

agency leverages modern Open Source frameworks and components to custom build 

capabilities in a user-centric fashion (as per the OMB USDS Playbook) which is the 

recommended approach to mitigate risk, reduce cost, and improve mission outcomes. 

When acquiring COTS products or other commercial items, the program manager still 

implements systems engineering processes in the SELC. Also, COTS is required to 

conform to standards and policy mandates, for example, for accessibility and security. In 

this context, integration encompasses the amalgamation of multiple COTS components 

into one deployable system or the assimilation of a single COTS product (such as an 
86 

enterprise resource planning system). In either case, the program manager is required to 

ensure that the system co-evolves with essential changes, reengincered business 

processes and apply commercial item best practices in the following areas: a) Adapting to 

commercial business practices while meeting mission essential requirements; b) COTS 

evaluation and gap analysis between the COTS capabilities and DHS requirements; c) 

Lifecycle planning (including sustainment, obsolescence and disposal); d) Relationship 

with vendors; e) The use of open standards as opposed to the use of proprietary 

implementations; f) Test and evaluation of COTS items which may be limited to external 

interfaces and integration, and operational test, due to lack of availability of COTS 

product internal design information; and g) Protection of intellectual property rights. 
87 

Question: The GAO report also found that six of the major acquisition programs lacked a 

baseline even though DHS acquisitions policy requires it. In addition, in September 

2012, GAO found ''that 43 of 63 of major acquisition programs lacked a departmentapproved baseline." 

What are the reasons to allow a major acquisition program to move forward without a 

baseline, violating DHS policy, and putting the American taxpayer at risk? 

Response: The Department has made significant progress since the period of time 

covered in GAO's report. The report did not mention the increased level of Headquarters 

oversight in the past two years. Since October 2014, we have held 30 Acquisition 

Review Boards (ARB) and all required Acquisition documentation was in place to 

support the Acquisition Decision Events. Substantive decisions were made at the ARBs 

that significantly int1uenced the performance of several programs. 

As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently testified, the Department of 

Homeland Security has made significant progress in overseeing the Department's 

acquisition portfolio. The GAO attributed that progress to the Departmental leadership's 

commitment to improve all aspects of acquisition through the Secretary's Unity of Effort 

Initiative. One of these major improvements has been the completion of acquisition 

documentation by the Department's programs. In 2015, the then Acting Deputy Under 

Secretary for Management, Chip Fulghum, directed the Office of Program Accountability 

and Risk Management (PARM), the Component Acquisition Executives (CAE), and 

Department's program managers to have complete sets of acquisition documentation for 

the current phase of the program. The programs complied with this direction, and as of 

December 31, 2015, all active major acquisition programs had the complete set of 

acquisition documentation. 

Question: Has DHS approved baselines for the six programs identified? If not, please 

explain. 

Response: Yes, DHS has approved baselines for all the programs, except the Acquisition 

Program Baseline (APB) Program for USCG Medium Range Surveillance aircraft which 

is currently being developed to support an upcoming Acquisition Decision Event. 
88 

Question#: 3 

Topic: major acquisitions portfolio 

' 

LHearing: DIIS Management and Acquisition Reform 

' 

I 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: GAO has stated that "D!IS's major acquisitions portfolio is not affordable" 

and recommended that DHS establish priorities to address funding gaps. 

Do you agree with this recommendation? 

Response: Yes, we concur with the recommendation that DHS establish priorities to 

address funding gaps, and we do prioritize funding across programs during our annual 

Program and Budget Review process. 

Question: Should the DHS acquisition bill address this concern raised by GAO? 

Response: We don't believe language is necessary. As noted in the following response, 

the Department has taken several steps to bolster program affordability oversight. 

Question: Has DHS implemented this recommendation? If yes, please explain how. 

If not, please explain why. 

Response: The Department has bolstered program affordability oversight between 

Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) 2-decision to enter the obtain phase, and ADE-3-

decision to enter the produce/deploy/support phase. The DHS Chief Financial Officer's 

February 5, 2016, and June 13, 2014, policy memorandums (and forthcoming DHS 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Instruction 101-01-00 I) require 

Component Senior Financial Officers (SFO) to certify via memorandum-prior to major 

investment milestone decisions-that sufficient resources are available throughout the 

five-year Future Year Homeland Security Program. Instruction 101-01-001, currently 

pending final review and publication, will also require the SFOs' memorandum to 

identify the monetary value of any proposed tradeoff's to keep the program affordable. 

Further, if program resources arc adjusted atler the issuance of the SFO memorandum, 

the Instruction requires Components to maintain affordability through tradeoffs, etc., and 

document changes during the Department's annual Program and Budget Review. 

I 

' 
89 

i 

i 

i 

I 

I 

I 

Question#: 4 

Topic: cost-type contracts 

Hearing: 1 Dl-lS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Does DIIS support the use of cost-type contracts when developing, producing, 

and deploying Major Acquisition Programs? If yes, please explain. 

Response: DHS supports the use of cost-type contracts when appropriate, including 

when developing, producing, and deploying Major Acquisition Programs. Use of costtype contracts in DHS has been in a downward trend over the last five years. DHS FY 

2015 obligations on cost-type contracts represents only 11.4% of its total obligations 

compared to 33% government-wide. Today, the preponderance ofDHS's cost-type 

contracts are for R&D services, as you would expect given the unknowns and cost risk 

associated with science and technology research. 

When used appropriately, a cost-type contract allows the government to avoid the costly 

contingencies that contractors would pass on to taxpayers if forced to offer their services 

on a fixed-price basis. Any blanket restrictions tied to a specific phase or type of 

acquisition program could have unintended consequences. These consequences include 

the potential for selecting inappropriate contract types, thereby exposing taxpayers to 

unnecessary risk premiums that contractors simply add to their prices. 

DHS should not be precluded from being able to usc cost-type contracts when it is in the 

government's interest to appropriately use such contracting tools or when it would save 

money. 
90 

Question#: 5 

Topic: cost overruns 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What policies has DHS developed and implemented to protect the American 

taxpayer from cost overruns when using cost-type contracts for Major Acquisition 

Programs? 

Response: MD-! 02, its implementing instructions and the ARB process govern 

decision making within DHS for acquisition program management. When the 

planners and requirements owners identify uncertainties, the technical risk, 

management risk, and therefore associated cost risk would result in contractors 

pricing maximum contingencies if a fixed price contract is selected by the 

government. In these instances, cost type contracts may be employed with a range 

of contract terms and management oversight methodologies to mitigate risks and 

control costs. For example, Earned Value Management System (EVMS) may be 

applied to integrate the statement of work, schedule, and cost to create an 

aggregate picture of performance, which helps ensure that day-to-day decisions on 

performance for development efforts are consistent with program objectives. EVM 

can help to identify cost and/or schedule overruns and to provide a forecast of final 

cost and schedule outcomes. Additionally, DHS contracts incorporate the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) cost principles which permit contractors to be 

reimbursed only for allowable and reasonable costs under cost type contracts. 
91 

,.-- Question#: :6 I 

Topic: cost-type acquisition contracts 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: i HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How many DHS Major Acquisition Programs (both Tier 1&2) are currently 

under cost-type acquisition contracts? How many of them have experienced cost 

overruns? 

Response: The Department currently has 15 major acquisition programs that have a cost 

type contracts. Of those programs, 2 are currently experiencing program cost 

overruns/cost breaches (TSA Technology Infrastructure Modernization Program and CBP 

Automated Commercial Environment). Program cost overruns are impacted by many 

factors, including the uncertainties when cost estimates are initially created that later in 

performance become clear. Cost contracts, used when the risk is high due to such 

uncertainties, provide the government greater transparency into contractor costs which 

are then audited to ensure the government is paying a fair price. 

i 
92 

Question#: 7 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Russell Deyo 

From Senator Kelly Ayotte 

"DHS Management and Acquisition Reform" 

March 16,2016 

Topic: innovative small businesses 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: 

Question: As you know, the Management Directorate aims to mobilize the most 

effective strategies to support DHS' mission to ''ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, 

and resilient against terrorism and other hazards." To that end, New Hampshire 

businesses are developing incredible technology and often just want to get it in front of 

decision-makers at DHS (in addition to other agencies). This process is often 

overwhelming. 

Small businesses are often the engines for creating innovative technologies that can help 

with the department's mission. For example, one company- from Hanover, New 

Hampshire- is developing a sensor by using molecularly imprinted polymers to provide 

real-time monitoring for bioterror agents. Another company based in Nashua, New 

Hampshire - has developed and commercialized a technology to send hyper-local 

emergency messages to any smart phone across the globe. 

How do you think the department can improve acquisition and procurement practices to 

be more responsive to innovative small businesses? 

Do you think that management can be improved to be more responsive? 

Response: Since our inception, DHS has made a commitment to support the federal 

public policy objective of small business inclusion in our acquisition program, including 

etTorts to be responsive to the small business community. 

As a result of this commitment, DHS was honored to again receive high marks for FY 

2015 from the Small Business Administration (SBA) for the significant accomplishments 

made in our small business contracting program. Since SBA started the letter grade 

Scorecard format in FY 2009, DHS has received a grade of"A'' or "A+" seven years in a 

row, the largest federal agency to have such a track record. This recognition is a 

reflection of the department's strong commitment to providing oppmiunities for all types 
93 

I Question#: 7 

Topic: innovative small businesses 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

l 

~imary: The 'Kelly Ayotte 

~>mmittee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

of small businesses to compete and win contracts in support of our vital mission to keep 

our nation safe. In FY 2015, about 14,000 companies representing all 50 states, 

Washington DC and five territories had DHS prime contracts. Of the 14,000, 

approximately 9,500 are small businesses; remarkably, of those 9,500, about 2,300 small 

businesses secured their first DHS prime contract. It is with profound appreciation for 

the work of our small business partners and the men and women of this Department that 

we renew our commitment to continue working closely with the SBA to further develop 

our leading edge small business program at DHS. 

The Dl-IS Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) serves as 

the focal point for small business contracting matters, and works closely with all DHS 

contracting organizations to implement the program. 

Major activities include the following: 

• Providing and managing content for the portion of the DHS website for small 

business interested in contracting with DI-IS located at www.dhs.gov/smallbusincss-assistance including points of contact, F AQs, marketing tips, 

information on outreach events for personal interactions, and small business 

prime and subcontracting opportunities. 

• Small Business Specialists in each buying activity; 

• Annual forecast of contract opportunities; 

• Outreach activities [including monthly vendor outreach sessions (VOS) featuring 

pre-arranged 15 minute appointments]; for example, in FY 2015, DHS hosted or 

participated in 50 small business outreach events; 

• Listing of large business prime contractors with subcontracting opportunities; 

• Mentor-protege program( a program for large business mentors and small business 

protcgcs);Annual small business awards ceremony recognizing outstanding DHS 

small business contractors and DHS employees who supported the small business 

program in exceptional ways; 

• Small Business Review Form for all procurements expected to exceed $150,000; 

• Establishing DHS-wide and Component small business goals by working with 

SBA 

• Annual three day internal small business training session; 

• Establishing multiple award contracts with built-in set aside authority (Section 

1331 of the Small Business Jobs Act); and 

• Identifying the number of small businesses each fiscal year that receive their first 

DHS prime contract. 
94 

r= 

Question#: 1 7 

i 

Topic: i innovative small businesses 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

I 

,----

I The Honorable Kelly Ayotte I Primary: 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Also, the DHS OSDBU serves on two government-wide councils, helps DHS support all 

of the federal small business contracting programs including the 8(a), HUBZone, Service 

Disabled Veteran, Women-Owned, and General Small Business Set-aside Programs, and 

works closely with the Office ofDHS Chief Procurement Ofticer to develop various 

small business participation strategies and processes. 

Interested small businesses are encouraged to visit the DHS website at 

"'"'w,dhs.gov/openforbusiness where detailed points of contact information is available. 
95 

Question#: 8 

Topic: outreach to small businesses 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

~-

Primary: The Honorable Kelly Ayotte 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I often hear that the process is overwhelming and burdensome-particularly for 

those businesses that don't have the resources or personnel to focus on this, yet have 

great products that can further the department's mission and help protect our homeland. 

Does the department have any initiatives that focus on outreach to small businesses? 

Where can I instruct companies who contact me about a product they believe will benefit 

our nation's homeland security objectives and mission to go for guidance and information 

about doing business with 01-JS'l 

Response: DHS has a robust small business contracting outreach program. For example, 

in FY 2015, DHS hosted or participated in 50 small business outreach events in a wide 

variety of formats and locations. Illustrations include: a DHS hosted monthly small 

business outreach event featuring pre-arranged 15 minute appointments with DHS small 

business personnel and DHS large business prime contractors; Congressional small 

business events; and events with organizations representing small businesses owned by 

minorities, women, veterans, and located in economically distressed areas. 

In addition to vigorously supporting all of the small business contracting programs 

outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, DHS has research and development 

opportunities for small businesses under the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 

program and a new program for non-traditional firms called the Silicon Valley Office 

(SVO). The SVO will cultivate a pipeline for non-traditional partners, companies who 

have typically never done business with the government, to develop solutions for our 

toughest homeland security challenges. 

The best way for companies that believe they have a product that will benefit our 

homeland security efforts is tor them to contact one of our Industry Liaison 

representatives at the following website: https://www.dhs.gov/department-homelandsecurity-industry-liaisons 

This group of DHS employees fosters communication with industry, including answering 

questions and providing guidance. 

I 

I 
96 

! Question#: i 9 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Russell Deyo 

From Senator Ron Johnson 

"DHS Management and Acquisition Reform" 

March 16,2016 

f-.--- I 

Topic: i GAO's High Risk List 

I 

Hearing: ! DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: I The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: 1 HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

I 

Question: Officials from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified 

that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) has established a plan to 

remove Strengthening DHS Management Functions from GAO's High Risk List. The 

plan includes 30 actions and outcomes critical to strengthening the Department's 

management functions, and GAO officials stated that DHS has fully addressed 10 of the 

30 actions and outcomes. 

Which of the remaining 20 actions and outcomes does DHS plan to fully address by the 

end of fiscal year 20 17? 

Response: DHS has set an aggressive goal of meeting the requirements of GAO's 30 

outcomes by the end ofCY 2017. Even after meeting GAO's outcomes, GAO may 

require DHS to demonstrate sustainment over a course of up to two years before rating 

outcomes as '·fully addressed." 

Currently, of the twenty remaining GAO outcomes, DHS believes that it has "fully 

addressed" two outcomes; ··mostly addressed" and is close to meeting six outcomes; and 

has "partially addressed" or ·'initiated" progress on the remaining twelve outcomes. As 

GAO looks toward publication of its next high risk series report, anticipated in February 

2017. DI-IS will continue to provide information regarding the Department's progress. 
97 

Question: A key initiative of the Secretary was to establish Integrated Product Teams 

(IPTs) to aid research and development in the Science and Technology Directorate, and 

to increase coordination and collaboration among Dl IS components. 

What processes arc in place to assess the efficacy of the IPTs'? 

Response: To ensure the effectiveness of the IPTs going forward, the Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T) built mechanisms for ongoing evaluation into the IPT 

process. S&T representatives and the individual!PTs will document lessons learned 

throughout the process. In addition, an independent after-action review (AAR) will 

follow each annual cycle, to identify lessons learned and recommend improvements for 

future years. The AAR will present an objective assessment of the process and validate 

linkages to the priorities ofDHS components, to demonstrate credibility with internal and 

external stakeholders. 

The AAR will provide recommendations for ensuring a sustainable, defensible IPT 

process by: 

• Evaluating the priority ranking methodology and any metrics used to assess 

component needs, for validity and transparency; 

• Evaluating the results of each IPT cycle, to assess whether it produced a 

reasonable set of high-priority gaps and corresponding R&D efforts 

(investments); and 

• Identifying lessons learned and recommending corrective actions and process 

improvements that can be implemented in future IPT cycles. 

Question: What lessons have been learned from the IPTs to improve coordination and 

collaboration on research and development issues among the components? 

Response: Key lessons learned from the IPTs involve acknowledging and reconciling 

existing differences among the IPTs and the components. For example, in anticipation of 

the next cycle of the IPTs, S&T is working across the IPTs to develop a standardized 

approach and criteria for prioritizing gaps and corresponding R&D. 

A similar lesson learned involved differences in terminology. The IPTs described their 

gaps and corresponding R&D efforts in several different ways (technologies, capabilities, 

programs, solutions), making it dit1icult to draw comparisons when attempting to 

perform priority ranking. For future cycles, S&T will work with the components to 
98 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

develop a common lexicon for the IPT process that is agreed to, accepted, and applied by 

all participants. 
99 

Question#: II 

Topic: cost and schedule estimate 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: fhe Honorable Ron Johnson 

-- Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: A reliable cost and schedule estimate is a fundamental aspect of any major 

acquisition program. Yet, as you know, a recent GAO review of several DHS major 

acquisition programs (GA0-15-171 SP) found that out of22 programs reviewed, only 16 

had cost estimates, and of those, almost half had substantial cost growth. 

What steps is DHS taking to assess and improve its cost and schedule estimating 

capabilities? 

Response: The Department has taken a very active role in overseeing our major 

acquisition programs to build DBS cost estimating capabilities. As part of Secretary 

Johnson ·s Unity of Effort Initiative, the Cost Analysis Division (CAD) was realigned to 

the Office of the Chief Financial Ot1icer (OCFO) in June 2014. As a result, there is a 

renewed emphasis in not only supporting the Acquisition Process but also to provide a 

closer link of cost estimates to the annual Program and Budget Review process. As of 

January 14, 2016, the Department has successfully closed the Acquisition Documentation 

gap. All major acquisition programs between Acquisition Decision Event (/\DE) 2A and 

3 have CFO-approved Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCEs). 

The DHS CAD is continuing to develop Independent Cost Estimates and Assessments on 

a focused approach, and review and approve LCCEs on all major acquisition programs 

for every /\DE 2A, 28, 2C, and 3. Ci\D is leading cross component initiatives that are 

aimed at enhancing the DHS cost estimating capability. This includes establishing and 

promoting best practices, building better analytical tools and access to data, and efforts to 

standardize training and certification ofDHS Cost Analysts. In addition, DHS 

components will continue to certify resource availability in line with their approved 

LCCEs tor acquisition programs in advance of A DEs, and the annual Program and 

Rudget Review process will continue to examine the affordability of major acquisition 

programs. DHS is committed to ensuring DHS has credible, accurate, reliable, and 

comprehensive cost estimates that lead to improved acquisition oversight and resourcing 

decisions. 

Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) personnel assigned to DHS 

components work closely with Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs), their staffs, 

and with program managers to review acquisition planning. Schedule development is 

one of the items that is subject to review and discussion. During these discussions, 

PARM expects program managers to provide details related to length and complexity of 

the schedule for each acquisition milestone, as well as all the factors that might influence 

successti.ll passage of that particular gate. Reviews are targeted to ensure schedules are 

realistic and achievable, based on the complexity of the work. Additionally, a quarterly 
100 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

_, _______ _j__ _____________________ _j 

Acquisition Program Health Assessment (APHA) is conducted to assess the current status 

of each program on the Master Acquisition Oversight List (MAOL), this includes a 

review of the schedule health for each program. 

Other steps DHS uses to improve schedule estimating occur during oversight of an 

acquisition program. Executive Steering Committees within the Components conduct 

frequent program reviews, to include the planned program schedule. During the reviews, 

the validity of the planned schedule is considered and guidance given to the program 

manger where adjustments are required. Prior to the program successfully moving 

through a major acquisition milestone, Acquisition Review Teams, at the DHS 

Directorate level, examine the program, including its schedule, looking for issues that 

might prevent successful execution. These issues are resolved prior to the Acquisition 

Review Board, the review that approves the program for advancement to the next phase 

of the acquisition cycle. 

Finally, once a month, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management convenes a board of 

his direct functional area senior leads who present updates of programs that are 

experiencing acquisition issues. This high level focus allows for immediate expert 

attention on programs and helps to keep programs on schedule. 
101 

Question#: 12 

~----~~~--~~~~-----------------------------------~ Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY 

Question: The DHS Office oflnspector General (OIG) recently reported that the 

Department's major acquisition programs often take longer, cost more, and deliver less 

than DHS initially planned. According to the OIG, one reason is that DHS "routinely 

approves moving forward with major acquisition programs without appropriate internal 

oversight." 

What actions is DHS taking to enhance its oversight of major acquisition programs? 

Response: The Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) currently has the administrative 

authorities necessary to ensure that acquisition executives and program offices follow 

Departmental policies. The Department has policies and procedures that limit cost 

overruns and schedule delays. First and foremost, the Department established Acquisition 

Management Directive (MD) I 02-01, and most recently revised the directive in July 

2015. MD 102-01 establishes the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework (ALF) and the 

Systems Engineering Life cycle by which the Department governs and oversees its 

acquisition programs. Further, it establishes the Acquisition Review Board, as well as the 

roles and responsibilities of its chair (the Chief Acquisition Officer 0/Under Secretary for 

Management), its members (Under Secretary for Science and Technology, General 

Council, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Chair of the Joint Requirements Council (JRC), 

the Executive Director of the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, 

and Management Line of Business Chiefs), and other acquisition stakeholders (including 

Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) and Program Managers). 

The ARB reviews each program's planning and acquisition documentation in accordance 

with MD 102-01, at predefined milestones called Acquisition Decision Events (ADE). 

At each ADE, the CAO, supported by the ARB, determines the program's readiness to 

progress to the next phase of the acquisition lifecycle. 

Each major program must have an Acquisition Decision Authority approved Acquisition 

Program Baseline (APB), informed by: 1) a Chief Financial Officer approved lifecycle 

cost estimate, 2) joint Requirements Council (JRC) validated operational requirements, 

and 3) the program's schedule. The APB establishes the cost, schedule and performance 

threshold values of the program, which are monitored by the program, Component, and 

Headquarters through program Full Operating Capability delivery. The APB also 

contains a Program integrated master schedule which is assessed for adequacy and 

realism during the ADE review and approval process. If a key schedule date is missed, 

this can trigger an inquiry into program status and if issues arc identified, corrective 
102 

LQ-,;.~ti;n#: 12 

Topic: appropriate internal oversight 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

action can be taken earlier minimizing the extent of schedule delays and cost overruns. 

Additionally, at each ADE, starting at ADE-2A, a memorandum certifying sufficiency of 

funding by the Component's Senior Financial Ofticer is required. This certified assertion 

ensures the program is adequately funded as it moves through the acquisition process. 

S&T also conducts a Technical Assessment of each major acquisition program prior to 

ADE-2A to inform the ARB of technical risks, ensure that adequate mitigation plans are 

put in place, and allow for appropriate monitoring of these technical risks by the ARB as 

the acquisition program progresses. 

Inside the Component-level are CAO-designated CAEs who support the overseeing 

major acquisition programs. Each CAE is responsible for Component-level acquisition 

policy and serves as the Acquisition Decision Authority for Component-level/non-major 

acquisitions. In September 2014, the Department further defined and clarified the roles 

and responsibilities of the CAEs in the memo, Unity of Effort Acquisition Review--

Component Acquisition Executive Policy. 

In certain cases, the CAO has established Executive Steering Committees (ESC), made 

up of Component and Headquarters executives, to provide additional support to programs 

between the ADEs. These ESCs do not hold ADEs, rather provide guidance and support 

throughout the lite of the acquisition program; especially when programs begin to deviate 

ti·om the defined cost, schedule and performance parameters. ESC actions minimize cost 

overruns and schedule delays. 

In addition to the acquisition policies and procedures, as part of the Secretary's Unity of 

Effort initiative, the Department established a JRC. The JRC provides oversight of the 

DHS requirements generation process, harmonizes efforts across the Department and 

supports prioritized funding recommendations. Requirements definition is an extremely 

important first step in limiting cost overruns and schedule delays. The establishment of 

the JRC and improvements in the requirements process is expected to further aid in 

limiting cost overruns and schedule delays. The Department expects to finalize and 

approve JRC policy in 2016. 

Through acquisition policies, oversight bodies and review procedures DHS aggressively 

works to limit cost overruns and schedule delays. 
103 

i Question#: 13 

Topic: life-cycle cost estimates 

Hearing: DHS Management and Acquisition Reform 

Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

-···· -

Question: GAO recently reported that 42 programs currently in sustainment have no lifecycle cost estimates because acquisition documentation requirements were waived by the 

Dl!S Under Secretary for Management. DHS agreed to "produce operations and 

maintenance cost estimates for programs in sustainment and establish responsibility for 

tracking" such programs' adherence to these estimates. 

What is the Department's progress in meeting these goals? 

Response: In March of2015, the Department assessed the list of programs with 

documentation waivers to determine whether each warranted a cost estimate based on 

OMB Circular A-ll's definition of a capital asset. The Department determined that 40 

capital assets in sustainment should update cost estimates. On April20, 2015, the Under 

Secretary for Management issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) to 

address the overseeing and tracking cost of Acquisition programs in sustainment. 

Recently the Department verified that 39 out of those 40 programs have updated the DHS 

Investment Evaluation, Submission, and Tracking System (INVEST) as requested in the 

ADM action to provide cost information for tracking costs and to estimate the final year 

of program sustainment. For the remaining outstanding program, the USCG Coastal 

Patrol Boat, the Coast Guard and DHS have been evaluating strategies to meet the intent 

of the ADM. Currently within the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), 

the Coast Guard allocates operations and sustainment to DHS missions and not to 

specific acquisition programs. This is done to maintain consistency in data reporting and 

to ensure that the level of effort Coast Guard applies towards DHS missions is 

appropriately captured. 
104 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable John Roth 

From Senator John McCain 

"DHS Management and Acquisition Reform" 

March 16,2016 

I. Inspector General Roth, in your written testimony, you state that ''[m ]ost of DHS' major 

acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than 

planned, or deliver less capability than promised. Although its acquisition policy includes 

best practices, DHS sometimes approves moving forward with major acquisition 

programs without appropriate internal oversight. 

• Arc there additional authorities, flexibilitics, or reforms that arc not currently in 

the draft of the DIIS acquisitions reform bill that should be included to address 

your concern that DHS major acquisition programs continue to cost more, take 

longer to deploy, and deliver less capabilities? 

Answer: 

I believe the passage of two bills under consideration by the Committee, the DHS 

Headquarters Reform and Improvement Act of2016 and the DHS Acquisition Reform and 

Accountability Act of2016, will help address my concern that DHS' major acquisition 

programs continue to cost more, take longer to deploy, and deliver less capabilities. 

These bills codify existing policy and relevant offices; provide the necessary authority for 

key personnel and mechanisms within the Department to effectively manage major 

acquisition programs; reinforce the importance of key acquisition management practices, 

such as establishing cost, schedule, and capability parameters; and include requirements 

to better identify and address poorly performing acquisition programs. 

2. Both the House passed and Senate draft bills include Nunn-McCurdy like language when 

there is a significant cost breach in a DHS major acquisitions program. The House bill 

however takes the language a step further and would prohibit the obligation of funds for 

the program if the under Secretary of Management after a certain period of time fails to 

certify that the program is back on track. 

• Do you agree that this type of language is needed to prevent DHS from 

mismanaging major acquisition programs costing the American taxpayer billions 

of dollars? 

Page 1 of 3 
105 

Answer: 

Both the House passed and Senate draft bills codify breach, component remediation 

requirements including remediation plan and root cause analysis, and breach correction. I 

believe this language will help DHS better manage major acquisition programs. A critical 

aspect of the legislation is the codification of the authority of the Under Secretary for 

Management to approve, halt, modify, or cancel acquisition programs, including the 

ability to prohibit a major acquisition program in breach from obligating funds under 

certain circumstances. The House passed bill (HR3572) prohibits the Under Secretary for 

Management (USM) from obligating funds for a major acquisition program ifUSM has 

not submitted remediation certification within 90 days following breach. I believe this 

provision could further ensure that DHS properly addresses significant cost breaches. 

3. In your testimony, you highlight your October 2015 report that showed that the Federal 

Protective Service (FPS) has too many vehicles and pays too much for them, wasting 

$2.5 million in taxpayer dollars. Has DHS addressed this problem? If not, what should 

be done to require DHS to better manage their vehicle fleet? 

Answer: 

DHS is taking steps to better manage its vehicle fleet. For example: 

• The DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Oftker (OCRSO) is chartering a 

working group to strengthen the DHS "Motor Vehicle Fleet Program Manual" with 

the overall goal of providing the Fleet Manager with appropriate oversight and 

enforcement authority. 

• OCRSO is working with components to strengthen the Home to Work (HtW) 

Transportation Manual. Revisions inclnde gnidance for periodic reauthorization of all 

approved HtW transportation anthorizations and an annual review of component HtW 

transportation programs. 

• OCRSO has completed the integration of DHS fleet data into the Consolidated Asset 

Portfolio and Sustainability Information System (CAPSIS). CAPS IS is designed to 

consolidate departmental real and personal property and sustainability management 

information. The system provides a single portfolio management system that includes 

performance management modules; it also integrates operational information from 

fleet card systems and GSA reports. 

• OCRSO required each component to review their HtW programs and snbmit requests 

for their HtW ntilization for approval by the Secretary. Additionally, OCRSO 

reqnired each component head to certify compliance with HtW transportation 

regnlations and DHS policy. 

Page 2 of 3 
106 

We have conducted a large body of work on DHS fleet management and made specific 

recommendations that we believe will remedy the problems encountered. We will be 

monitoring DHS/FPS response to our recommendation through our audit resolution 

process, and will report to the Department and the Congress if we think there is 

insufficient progress made in resolving these issues. 

Page 3 of 3 
107 

GAO u.s. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

441 G St. N.W. 

Washington, DC 20548 

April 29, 2016 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Subject: Responses to Questions for the Record; Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, March 16, 2016, Hearing on "DHS Management and Acquisition Reform." 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

This letter responds to your April 1, 2016, request that we address questions submitted for the 

record related to the March 16, 2016, hearing entitled DHS Management and Acquisition 

Reform. Our answers to these questions are enclosed and are based on our previous work and 

our knowledge of the areas addressed. If you have any questions or would like to discuss our 

responses, please contact Michele Mackin at mackll>m@g~o gov or call (202) 512-4841. 

Sincerely, 

{signed} 

Michele Mackin, 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Enclosure 
108 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Rebecca Gambler and Michele Mackin 

From Senator John McCain 

"DHS Management and Acquisition Reform" 

March 16, 2016 

1. DHS acquisitions management has been on the GAO high-risk list since 2005. 

You have found their acquisitions policy "to be generally sound, in that it reflects 

key program management practices." However, even with these sound policies, 

DHS procurements are facing billions in cost overruns and significant schedule 

delays. Are there additional authorities, flexibilities, or reforms that are not 

currently in the draft of the DHS Acquisitions Reform bill that should be included 

to further address GAO's high-risk list concerns and prevent billions in taxpayer 

dollars from being wasted? 

We have reviewed the draft DHS Acquisition Reform bill, and found that it reflects 

several of the findings and recommendations we have made over the years and that it 

would codify a number of acquisition management best practices. Additionally, the bill is 

consistent with the actions that GAO and the Department have agreed DHS needs to 

take to fully address our acquisition management high-risk list concerns. There is one 

minor addition from our work the committee may want to consider for the Future Years 

Homeland Security Program (FYSHP) section of the bill. Specifically, in Apri12014, we 

recommended the Department present the annual cost estimates and any anticipated 

funding gaps for individual programs in its FYHSP reports to better communicate funding 

needs to Congress. 1 

2. Both the House passed and Senate draft bills include Nunn-McCurdy like 

language when there is a significant cost breach in a DHS major acquisitions 

program. The House bill however takes the language a step further and would 

prohibit the obligation of funds for the program if the under Secretary of 

Management after a certain period of time fails to certify that the program is back 

on track. Do you agree that this type of language is needed to prevent DHS from 

mismanaging Major Acquisition programs costing the American taxpayer billions 

of dollars? 

We have reviewed the House passed and Senate draft bills, as well as current DHS and 

Department of Defense policies. Among other things, the draft bills establish both 

internal and congressional breach notification requirements; requirements for submitting 

remediation plans and root cause analyses; and steps that must be taken to correct 

breaches. The bills also include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that DHS fulfills 

1 GAO. Homeland Sewrity Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and 

Improve Communications with Congress. (Washington, D.C .. April17, 2014). 
109 

certain requirements, similar to DOD's Nunn-McCurdy restrictions. 2 For example, if 

DHS's Under Secretary for Management does not submit certain certifications to 

Congress within a specified timeframe, the House bill prohibits obligation of funds 

appropriated to the program. In contrast, if a program identifies substantial cost or 

schedule variances, the Senate draft bill establishes that DHS's Under Secretary for 

Management shall suspend the program, or make certifications to Congress, including 

that (1) the acquisition is essential to the accomplishment of DHS's mission; (2) there 

are no cost effective and timely alternatives; and (3) the program management structure 

is adequate to control cost, schedule, and performance. Our past work on trends in 

Nunn-McCurdy breaches from 1 g97 -2009 showed that DOD had rarely failed to certify a 

major defense acquisition program that had experienced a critical breach. 3 While we 

can't predict how the bills would affect DHS' management actions, we believe that the 

congressional reporting requirements in the bills would increase transparency into the 

status of programs with cost, schedule, and performance issues. 

3. GAO has stated that "DHS's major acquisitions portfolio is not affordable" and 

recommended that DHS establish priorities to address funding gaps. Should this 

committee require DHS to address this recommendation? 

In April 2014, we recommended the Secretary of Homeland Security require a body 

responsible for requirements reviews establish priorities across functional portfolios, 

such as cybersecurity, domain awareness, and law enforcement, to help the Department 

prioritize investments in an integrated manner and allocate resources accordingly4 We 

subsequently closed this recommendation as implemented based on actions taken by 

the Department Specifically, in November 2014, the DHS Deputy Secretary chartered a 

Joint Requirements Council (JRC). The JRC charter establishes the JRC's scope, 

mission, membership, and policies and procedures. For example, it specifies that its 

staff shall consolidate capabilities and requirements priorities across missions to inform 

council recommendations to the Deputy's Management Action Group. The charter also 

establishes that these recommendations shall support a balanced portfolio of 

investments by establishing priorities that combine near-term operational improvements 

with long-term strategic planning. The draft Senate bill focused on DHS headquarters 

reform would codify certain aspects of the charter, including these responsibilities. It 

states that, among other things, the JRC shall make prioritized capability 

2

10 U.S. C.§ 2433(e)(1)(8)(3). If DOD does not submit certain reports and certifications after certain unit cost 

breaches, "funds appropriated for military construction, for research, development. test, and evaluation, and for 

procurement may not be obligated for a major contract under the program." In addition, since 2009, if a program 

experiences a critical unit cost breach, there is a presumption of termination unless DOD submits certain written 

certifications to Congress within a specified time frame. 10 U.S.C. § 2433a. 

3

1n March 2011, we found that from 1997-2009 there had been 74 Nunn-McCurdy breaches involving 47 major 

defense acquisition programs. DOD did not recertify two programs-the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and the 

Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense- after a breach of the critical cost growth threshold and both were 

terminated. DOD terminated other programs that experienced breaches, but it was unclear whether the breach 

precipitated the termination. GAO, Trends in Nunn-McCurdy Cost Breaches for MaJor Defense Acquisition Programs, 

GA0-11-295R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2011). 
110 

Æ 

recommendations to the DHS leadership, and that the Secretary shall ensure that the 

Department's five-year funding plans in the FYHSP are consistent with the JRC's 

recommendations. We are continuing to monitor DHS's progress through an ongoing 

review of the JRC that will help us determine whether the JRC is in fact establishing 

priorities to address funding gaps.