VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2 WINTER 2018
THE VERY FEW, THE PROUD

Women in the Marine Corps,

1977–2001

Colonel Nancy P. Anderson, USMC (Ret)

The Very Few, the Proud documents a generation of changes 

to accession and assignment policies pertaining to women 

seeking to serve in the U.S. Marine Corps between 1977 and 

2001. This history intentionally ends at the threshold of the 

Global War on Terrorism—the gateway to current history. 

Anderson’s research follows the changes in social and gender 

distinctions, definitions of combat and combat support, and the belief—by voters, legislators, and military leadership—in the value of using the best person to fill a military billet 

regardless of gender. The Very Few, the Proud draws upon hundreds of personal accounts 

of women who served during the period, personal archives of Marine Corps leaders, and 

journalistic accounts of the treatment of women in and by the U.S. military.

8.5 x 11 | 280 pp | August 2018

Email history.division@usmcu.edu for a print or digital copy.

STORY TO TELL

Marine Corps History is accepting article and book review submissions for 2019.

Marine Corps History publishes twice a year, and the editors are currently looking for new articles and book reviews on all topics within the long history of the Corps: Civil War, SpanishAmerican War, Banana Wars, WWI, WWII, Korea, Cold War, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and women and minorities in the military. We are particularly interested in masters and PhD 

students who are ready to venture into scholarly publishing. Articles must be at least 4,000 

words, footnoted according to Chicago Manual of Style, and focus on some 

aspect of the Corps either directly or indirectly, including foreign marines 

and joint operations.

For more information about submission guidelines or history books available for 

review, please contact the managing editor at stephani.miller@usmcu.edu.
WINTER 2018 1

PRESIDENT

Marine Corps University

Brigadier General William J. Bowers

...

DIRECTOR

History Division

[vacant]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Paul J. Weber

...

HISTORIES BRANCH

Douglas Nash, Dr. Fred Allison (oral histories), Paul W. Westermeyer, Dr. Breanne 

Robertson, Dr. Seth Givens 

...

HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCH

Annette D. Amerman (Branch Head)

Kara R. Newcomer, Mike Westermeier, Dr. 

Jordan Malfoy, Cassandra Bennett

...

ARCHIVES BRANCH

Alisa Whitley (Branch Head)

Steve Coode, John Lyles, Nancy Whitfield, 

Dr. James Ginther Jr. , Alyson Mazzone

...

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCH

Angela J. Anderson (Branch Head) 

Jason Gosnell, Robert A. Kocher, Younghee Krouse, Stephani L. Miller, Jeffrey 

Moravetz

...

MARINE CORPS

HISTORY DIVISION

2044 Broadway Street

Quantico, Virginia 22134

Telephone (703) 432-4877

www.history.usmc.mil

...

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Department of the Navy

Headquarters Marine Corps

3000 Marine Corps Pentagon 

Room 2B253

Washington, DC 20530-3000

OFFICIAL BUSINESS 

PCN 10600011300

ISSN 2381-375X

Director’s Foreword 3

Paul J. Weber

ARTICLES

“How Will the Americans Behave in a Pitched Battle?”: 6

The 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, and the Capture of Hill 142, 

6 June 1918

Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Dec)

Planning for War: The Marine Corps in Contingency Planning 27

for Indochina and South Vietnam, 1951–65

Edward T. Nevgloski

The Creation of the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Platoons: 42

A Study in Marine Corps Ingenuity

William F. Nimmo, with Henry Beaudin

HISTORY IN ACTION

Enduring Value: Advancing the Understanding 66

of the Tet Offensive with the Frederick Vogel Collection

Alisa Whitley

Core of the Corps: 71

Cayuga County Marines in the First World War

Annette D. Amerman

IN MEMORIAM

Major Gary W. Cozzens, USMCR (Ret) 75

Major General Lawrence H. Livingston (Ret) 77

Edward T. Nevgloski

Lieutenant General William R. Maloney (Ret) 82

Fred H. Allison

REVIEW ESSAY

The Second World War in Colour and Weird War Two: 86

Intriguing Items and Surprising Stuff from the Second World War

Reviewed by Major Peter L. Belmonte, USAF (Ret)

 Volume 4, Number 2 Winter 2018

Cover art: Guardian Angel Guns, by Maj 

A. Michael Leahy, oil on linen. As Sikorsky 

UH-34 helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 drop off members 

of a 1st Marine Division reconnaissance 

team, a Bell UH-1E Iroquois gunship from 

Marine Observation Squadron 2 darts 

overhead, looking for enemy troops halfway up the mountain slopes. Maj Leahy 

was a port machine gunner on a UH-34.

Art Collection, National Museum of the 

Marine Corps
Scholarly Debate

Marine Corps History is a peer-reviewed, scholarly publication, and in that 

tradition we recognize that the articles published here are not the official 

or final word on any topic, merely the beginning of a conversation. If 

you think an author missed the target or failed to deliver, please join the 

debate by submitting an article for consideration. Email the managing 

editor at stephani.miller@usmcu.edu for deadlines and author guidelines.

BOOK REVIEWS

Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy Shaped Religion 89

and State in Modern America

Reviewed by Michael Westermeier

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking 92

in the Post–Cold War Era

Reviewed by Joshua Tallis, PhD

Faces of the Civil War Navies: An Album of Union 94

and Confederate Sailors

Reviewed by Christopher N. Blaker

Vietnam’s High Ground: Armed Struggle for the Central Highlands, 96

1954–1965

Reviewed by Tal Tovy, PhD

Long Journeys Home: American Veterans of World War II, Korea, 99

and Vietnam

Reviewed by Keith D. Dickson, PhD

Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day 102

Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, PhD

Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994 104

Reviewed by Colonel Walter G. Ford (Ret)

My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness 106

Reviewed by Colonel Rod Andrew Jr., USMCR (Ret)

 Volume 4, Number 2 Winter 2018

2

NOW AVAIL ABLE

The Legacy of Belleau Wood

100 Years of Making Marines 

and Winning Battles

AN ANTHOLOGY

The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 

Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles examines the Marine 

Corps during the last century, 

doing two things it does best: 

making Marines out of civilians 

and winning battles in defense 

of the United States. This anthology of articles demonstrates how 

Marines continue to follow in 

the footsteps of their Great War 

forebears, who fought the wars at 

hand while planning for the wars 

to come, refining and innovating 

tactics and organization so that 

the Corps remained relevant and 

effective in a rapidly changing 

technological environment.

8.5 x 11 | 368 pp | May 2018
Originally from Portland, OR, Paul Weber enlisted in the Marine Corps 

on 9 November 1982, reporting to San Deigo, CA, for recruit training on 

2 February 1983 and attending military occupational specialty (MOS) 

school at Fort Bliss, TX, as a Hawk pulse acquisition radar repairman. 

Selected for Officer Candidates School (OCS) in the summer of 1984, 

he attended OCS and The Basic School in 1985, eventually ending up 

in air defense. Weber earned a master’s degree in U.S. history while the 

Marine officer instructor at Miami University and retired in January 

2006. He reported to History Division as the deputy director in February 2010 and is currently the acting director.

FOREWORD

DIRECTOR’S

As this foreword was being composed, the 

75th anniversary of the 2d Marine Division (2d MarDiv) storming ashore on Betio 

Island, Tarawa Atoll, in the Gilbert Islands was at 

hand. Fittingly, History Division sent a team to Camp 

Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina, to give a presentation about the fight for the Tarawa Atoll to a 

large group from the current ranks of 2d MarDiv on 

20 November, the anniversary of the first day of that 

monumental battle. 

Overall, 2018 has been a busy year for History Division with many such presentations delivered around 

the country. Two historians visited I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to give presentations to primarily first-term enlisted Marines at Marine Corps 

Air Stations Yuma and Miramar, Marine Corps Air 

Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, and Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. The team spoke to 

more than 6,000 Marines about the basic history of 

the Corps, dispelling some of the myths and legends 

that have grown larger over the years. Recruiting Station St. Louis, Missouri, invited a historian to give a 

presentation about the World War I Marines who enlisted out of St. Louis and the impact they had on the 

community and the Marine Corps. 

Other projects of interest encompass a narrow 

swath of our history: first, a continuing effort to definitively identify the flag raisers in Joe Rosenthal’s 

iconic photograph of the event on Iwo Jima; and second, as an outreach effort, History Division sent a 

historian to Marine Forces Southern Command to 

discuss the Guadalcanal campaign.

Throughout 2018, the division commemorated 

the centennial of World War I’s end with numerous 

projects and published products, including articles in 

Marine Corps History and three books: The Bravest Deeds 

of Men: A Field Guide for the Battle of Belleau Wood by 

Colonel William T. Anderson, USMCR (Ret); Reducing the Saint-Mihiel Salient, September 1918 by Colonel 

Walter G. Ford (Ret); and The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 

100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles, an Anthology, edited by Paul Westermeyer and Dr. Breanne 

Robertson.

3

Paul J. Weber
4 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

The division-wide commemoration of the World 

War I centennial hit a high note with a three-day symposium featuring an eclectic group of speakers, ranging from academics to amateur historians. Then in 

November, several historians gave presentations at 

a Marine Corps Heritage Foundation-hosted conference covering the Vietnam War with a focus on 1968. 

History Division also published books on several 

other topics this year. Colonel Nancy P. Anderson’s 

(Ret) The Very Few, The Proud: Women in the Marine 

Corps, 1977–2001 marked another centennial with its 

publication—that of women’s acceptance for duty into 

the Marine Corps in 1918—and was launched at the 

Women Marines Association’s biennial convention, 

held this year in Arlington, Virginia. The division also 

released Death in the Imperial City: U.S. Marines in the 

Battle for Hue, 31 January to 2 March 1968 by Colonel 

Richard D. Camp (Ret).

Planning is already underway to mark yet another 100th anniversary: the founding of the Marine 

Corps History Division. Major General Commandant 

George Barnett established the division on 8 September 1919. The division’s first director was Major Edwin 

N. McClellan, who had just completed a seven-monthlong collection trip through the battlefields and support areas in France and Great Britain earlier that 

year to gather “historical data pertaining to activities 

of Marines during the operations in Europe.” He was 

well suited to both jobs and got History Division off 

to a great start. McClellan authored more than 100 

articles and other pieces over the years, and is widely credited with the idea of celebrating the Marine 

Corps’ birthday with a suitable event each year. McClellan left History Division in 1925 for other Marine 

Corps duties, but returned for another two-year stint 

as director in 1931. He retired from active service in 

1936. 

History Division will celebrate its centennial with 

a reception in early September 2019, and we hope to 

gather as many alumni and family as possible to mark 

the event. It also will be commemorated in the pages 

of Marine Corps History’s Summer 2019 edition with 

several articles about the history of the division.

The new year also brings the 75th anniversary 

of the Allied invasion of Northern Europe in Normandy, France, marking the beginning of the end for 

German hegemony on the continent. A team of Marine Corps historians submitted a paper for the Normandy 75 International Conference (sponsored by 

Britain’s University of Portsmouth Business School) 

covering topics including Marine Corps support of 

the landings, Office of Strategic Services operations, 

and several alternative scenarios. While Normandy 

was primarily an Army affair, there were Marines on 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s planning staff, and 

the four battleships and three heavy cruisers would 

have included Marine detachments aboard, as well. 

The team’s proposal was accepted and they will be attending the conference in July 2019 to deliver their 

findings. 

At the end of 2018, the Corps bids a fond farewell 

to Ms. Lin Ezell, the founding director of the National 

Museum of the Marine Corps located in Quantico, 

Virginia. Ezell came on board in the summer of 2005 

and guided the museum through its initial construction and fitting out, securing its accreditation, and 

the second-phase construction now nearing completion. Prior to her time with the Corps, Ezell worked 

with the Smithsonian Institution for 21 years and with 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

for 10 years before that. We wish her the best in her 

retirement. Fair winds and following seas.

In this issue of Marine Corps History, you will find 

an article detailing the assault on Hill 142 during the 

opening battle of Belleau Wood in 1918 (fitting in the 

centennial year of World War I’s end) and two articles 

discussing the Vietnam War, one on the origins and 

early evolution of the Combined Action Program and 

one discussing the Corps’ role in contingency plans 

for Indochina and South Vietnam prior to the start 

of the conflict. In addition, you will find a piece from 

History Division’s Historical Reference Branch on the 

World War I service of Marines from Cayuga County, New York, and one from the Archives Branch on 

the recently donated Frederick Vogel Collection, as 

well as a number of fascinating book reviews, and 
WINTER 2018 5

three pieces marking the recent passing of Marines.

If you have not seen an article on an aspect of Marine Corps history that interests you, we encourage 

you to begin the research process and consider writing a piece to submit to Marine Corps History magazine. The editors are always eager to publish new and 

unique research into the Corps’ history to deepen the 

pool of knowledge and scholarly discussion. The deeper the pool, the more interesting and engaging this 

publication will be.

Semper Fidelis, 

Paul J. Weber

Deputy Director

Marine Corps History Division

and Gray Research Center 

• 1775 •
“How Will the Americans 

Behave in a Pitched Battle?”

THE 1ST BATTALION, 5TH REGIMENT, 

AND THE CAPTURE OF HILL 142, 6 JUNE 1918

By Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Dec)1

At 0345 on 6 June 1918, First Sergeant Daniel 

A. Hunter assumed his position in front of 

the Marines from 67th Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment. A portly veteran with graying 

hair and more than 20 years of service, Hunter was a 

legend in the Corps. As he strode in front of his company, he looked left and right to ensure that the ranks 

were properly aligned. When he heard a whistle blow 

signifying the attack, Hunter raised his cane above 

his head and brought it down in a sweeping motion, 

pointing toward the company’s objective more than 

1,000 yards distant: Hill 142, held by German forces. 

The company moved forward in what was the opening 

battle of Belleau Wood, a month-long action that has 

become a defining moment in Marine Corps history.2

While there had been other local actions involving the offensive by American forces, most notably 

1

 The quote in this piece’s title is from LtCol Ernst Otto, German 

Army (Ret), “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, 

June 1918,” Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute Press) 54, no. 11 (November 1928): 941. Maj Gary Wayne Cozzens, USMCR, passed 

away on 31 July 2018. Major assistance for this article was provided by the late George B. Clark, Col Walt Ford (Ret), LtCol 

Pete Owen (Ret), and Angela Anderson. For more about Cozzens, see p. 75.

2

 Elton E. Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die: Memoirs of a 

World War I Marine (Novato, CA; Presidio Press, 1993), 17; Dick 

Camp, The Devil Dogs at Belleau Wood: U.S. Marines in World War I 

(Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), 75; and George B. Clark, 

Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World War I (Novato, CA: Presidio 

Press, 1999), 102. Clark’s Devil Dogs is considered by many to be 

the best single-volume history of the Marines in World War I.

the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division stopping the 

German attack at Cantigny at the end of May, this assault by the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, though local 

in nature, would set the tone and example for the 4th 

Brigade for the remainder of the war. It would also be 

the first sustained effort by the Marine Corps to provide committed forces to an extended land campaign; 

until then, Marines had only been used in amphibious 

actions. It brought the Corps into the high-intensity, 

high-casualty realm of modern war. No longer was 

the Corps merely the Navy’s police force. Finally, the 

assault would inspire confidence in French forces, 

credibility inside the American Expeditionary Forces 

(AEF), and respect among the German military and 

establish a reputation for the Marine Corps that is 

still recognized to this day.

As the untried Americans entered the war, the 

Germans wondered, “How would the Americans behave in a pitched battle?”3

 An undated order from the

German 28th Division to its soldiers, captured on 8 

June, read: 

Should the Americans to our front even 

temporarily gain the upper hand, it would 

leave a most unfavorable effect for us as regards the morale of the Allies and the duration of the war. In the fighting that now 

confronts us, we are not concerned about 

3

 Otto, “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, June 

1918,” 941.

6
WINTER 2018 7

the occupation or non-occupation of this or 

that important wood or village; but rather 

as to the question as to whether AngloAmerican propaganda, that the American 

Army is equal to or even superior to the 

Germans, will be successful.4

This article seeks to trace the actions of the 1st 

Battalion, 5th Regiment, on 6 June 1918 as a limited 

attack at the beginning of the epic battle in the game 

preserve of Belleau Wood. It also seeks to highlight 

the individual roles played by some of the veteran Marines—the “old breed”—of the battalion and their impact on new Marines. In the year between America’s 

entry into the war and the fight for Belleau Wood, the 

ethos instilled by veteran Marines into the young volunteers early in their training paid off as the veterans 

became casualties and the new Marines continued to 

carry the fight to the Germans.

Over There

When John W. Thomason Jr. penned his definitive 

work on the 4th Brigade in World War I, Fix Bayonets, 

he wrote of

a number of diverse people who ran curiously to type, with drilled shoulders and a 

bone-deep sunburn, and a tolerant scorn 

of nearly everything on earth. Their speech 

was flavored with navy words. . . . Rifles 

were high and holy things to them, and they 

knew five-inch broadside guns. They were 

the Leathernecks, the Old Timers: collected from ship’s guards and shore stations all 

over the earth to form the 4th Brigade of 

Marines, the two rifle regiments, detached 

from the navy by order of the President for 

service with the American Expeditionary 

Forces. They were the old breed of American regular, regarding the service as their 

home and war as an occupation; and they 

transmitted their temper and character and 

view-point to the high-hearted volunteer 

4

 David C. Homsher, “Securing the Flanks,” Marine Corps Gazette

90, no. 11 (November 2006): 82.

mass which filled the ranks of the Marine 

Brigade.5

The 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, was formed at 

Quantico, Virginia, during the last two weeks of May 

1917 under the command of Major Julius S. Turrill. 

At least two members of the battalion already wore 

the Medal of Honor: Captain Roswell Winans (then a 

first sergeant) for actions in the Dominican Republic 

on 3 July 1916, and Marine Gunner Henry L. Hulbert 

for actions during the Philippine-American War (also 

referred to as the Philippine insurrection) on 1 April 

1899.6 The battalion moved by train from Quantico 

to Long Island, where it boarded the USS DeKalb (ID 

3010) and sailed for France on 14 June 1917, arriving on 

26 June at Saint-Nazaire, where it disembarked on 27 

June. The battalion spent the winter of 1917–18 training in the Breuvannes area of France. On 17 March 

1918, the battalion deployed to the Verdun area, where 

it participated in minor actions against the Germans. 

Its first attack occurred on the night of 17 April, for 

which Second Lieutenant Max D. Gilfillan and Sergeant Louis Cukela were awarded the Croix de Guerre 

5

 Capt John W. Thomason Jr., Fix Bayonets! (New York: Charles 

Scribner’s Sons, 1926), x–xiii. This book is considered by many to 

be the finest fictional book written about the Marines in World 

War I. Though classified as fiction, it is thinly veiled fiction and, 

in many cases, Thomason uses actual names of the Marines of the 

49th Company. The first chapter, “Battle-Sight,” is the story of 

the attack on Hill 142. Thomason was not an original member of 

the 49th Company that began the assault on 6 June. Research by 

the late George B. Clark indicates that Thomason arrived with 

replacement troops on 7 June. See John W. Thomason Jr., The 

United States Army Second Division Northwest of Chateau Thierry 

in World War I, ed. George B. Clark (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 

2006); and John W. Thomason Jr., “Second Division Northwest 

of Chateau Thierry, June 1–July 10, 1918,” unpublished manuscript, 1928, Personal Papers, 1918–1950, Dolph Briscoe Center 

for American History, University of Texas at Austin, 223n807. 

The former is perhaps the most accurate book written about 

the battle of Belleau Wood, yet it was not published until 2006. 

Thomason wrote the report in the 1920s, but quit in frustration 

after several of the high-ranking officers involved in the battle 

tried to sanitize his account. 

6

 Hulbert was later killed in action at Blanc Mont on 4 October 

1918.
8 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Table 1. 4th Brigade Table of Organization, 6 June 1918

Brigade Headquarters

(BGen James G. Harbord, U.S. Army)

5th Regiment 

(Col Wendell C. Neville)

8th Machine Gun Company 

(Capt John H. Fay)

Headquarters Company

Supply Company

1st Battalion 

(Maj Julius S. Turrill)

17th Company (Capt Roswell Winans)

49th Company (Capt George W. Hamilton)

66th Company (1stLt Walter T. H. Galliford)

67th Company (1stLt Orlando C. Crowther [KIA])

2d Battalion 

(Maj Frederic M. Wise)

18th Company

43d Company

51st Company

55th Company

3d Battalion 

(Maj Benjamin S. Berry [WIA]; later 

Maj Maurice E. Shearer)

16th Company

20th Company

45th Company

47th Company

6th Regiment

(Col Albertus W. Catlin)

73d Machine Gun Company

Headquarters Company

Supply Company

1st Battalion 

(Maj Maurice E. Shearer; later 

Maj John Arthur Hughes)

74th Company

75th Company

76th Company

95th Company

2d Battalion 

(Maj Thomas Holcomb)

78th Company

79th Company

80th Company

96th Company

3d Battalion 

(Maj Berton W. Sibley)

82d Company

83d Company

84th Company

97th Company

6th Machine Gun Battalion 

(Maj Edward B. Cole)

15th Company (Capt Matthew H. Kingman)

23d Company (Capt George H. Osterhout Jr.)

77th Company (Capt Louis R. de Roode)

81st Company (Capt Augustus B. Hale)

Note: KIA=killed in action; and WIA=wounded in action.

Source: Adapted from Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, rev. 3d ed. (Quantico, VA: Marine 

Corps History Division, 2014), 33.
WINTER 2018 9

for their actions.7

 In this action, the battalion suffered 

its first casualty when Corporal John L. Kuhn was 

killed. Kuhn and Privates George C. Brooks and Walter Klamm received citations for their actions.8

In late May, the Germans launched the Chemin 

de Dames offensive toward Paris and the 4th Brigade 

was transferred to the Château Thierry sector about 

72.4 kilometers (km) east of the capital city. The second of June found the 2d Infantry Division, of which 

the 4th Brigade was a part, occupying a 4.8-km gap in 

the French lines south of Belleau Wood, beginning at 

Lucy-le-Bocage and extending westward. Holding the 

right flank of the 4th Brigade’s line was 1st Battalion, 

5th Regiment. While there, the 17th and 66th Companies, along with some elements of the 5th Regiment’s 

8th Machine Gun Company, would be deployed to 

support the 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, at Les Mares 

Farm. On 2 June, when the Americans reorganized 

their defensive positions, the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, were withdrawn and became a 

brigade reserve located at Bois de Veuilly near Marigny. That respite would last until the early morning 

hours of 6 June. The battalion was on the verge of 

making the most extensive attack in the history of the 

7

 Cukela later received the Medal of Honor for actions at Soissons on 18 July 1918.

8

 George B. Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I: Battalion Histories Based on Official Documents (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015), 26–28, 32.

Marine Corps to date; it numbered 22 officers and 953 

enlisted—a total of 975 men.9

The Objective

Alternating woods and wheat fields covered the entire 

9

 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 30–32.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments, 4th Brigade, arrive at the front, 

June 1918.

Art Collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps

A Marine Corps officer in the field during World War I. This is how 

Capt Hamilton and 1stLt Crowther likely would have looked on 6 June. 

In this era, Marine officers and senior noncommissioned officers carried canes. Company Commander, John W. Thomason Jr. Ink on paper.
10 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

region. In late spring, the woods were green and the 

wheat in the fields was thigh-high and beginning to 

ripen and turn gold. Red poppies grew throughout the 

wheat fields and other open areas. Numerous boulders 

were interspersed throughout the woods, providing 

natural defense for the German machine gunners who 

had fortified their positions.

The north-facing position the Marines occupied on Hill 176 was in heavy timber. About 300 

meters to the north was another belt of woods, thick 

with underbrush. Between Hill 176 and Hill 142 lay 300 

meters of wheat fields that the Marines would have 

to cross before reaching their objective. Dense woods 

covered both sides of the hill. Beyond, the hill sloped 

down gently to the north with more wheat. Tall pines 

and hardwood grew on the nose of the hill. A long, 

John W. Thomason Jr., “Second Division Northwest of Chateau Thierry, 1 June–10 July 1918,” unpublished manuscript, 1928, 

Personal Papers, 1918–1950, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin

Map 1. Belleau Wood area, June 1918, showing Hill 142 in the upper portion.
WINTER 2018 11

curving valley of wheat with tree-lined streams continued to the north.10

Lying just north of the 1st Battalion’s position on 

the forward slope of Hill 176, Hill 142 was a 2-km-long 

tree-covered ridge running roughly north-south with 

ravines on either side (see map 1). “Hill” was a misnomer; the name was more of an American designation 

for a series of connected low-lying hills. Contemporary local maps identified it as “Position 142” with 

brooks running through ravines to either side of Hill 

142, but this too was misleading as there was no water 

in the “brooks.” One brook sprung at Champillon and 

passed north along the west side of Hill 142, while the 

other sprung at Bois de Champillon, passing along the 

10 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry in World War I, 81–82. 

east side of Hill 142.11 The east and north sides of the 

hill were especially steep and covered with boulders 

and underbrush, making it ideal for defense. To the 

north of Hill 142 was the town of Torcy, held by the 

Germans.12

The German Defenders

The German Chemin de Dames offensive began on 27 

May 1918 between Soissons and Rheims. The Germans 

quickly overran the French and were temporarily 

halted at the Marne River by fresh American troops, 

in some places only 72.4 km from Paris. The Germans 

spent the day of 4 June strengthening their positions 

around Bouresches. Initially facing the 5th Regiment 

was the 460th Infantry Regiment, while opposite the 6th 

Regiment was the 461st Infantry Regiment, both of the 

237th Division, one of four divisions making up the German IV Reserve Corps. The 197th Division had its 237th 

Infantry Regiment on the left flank on Hill 142 with two 

battalions in line and one in support. The 28th Infantry Division was in reserve and would be available to 

support the regiments of the 237th Infantry Division if 

needed. On 5 June, the IV Reserve Corps issued orders 

that all offensive operations were to be suspended.13

This disposition of German forces would prove 

extremely fortunate for Major Turrill’s battalion, as 

there was confusion between the 460th Infantry Regiment and the 237th Infantry Regiment as to which stream 

was the division boundary. In a fortuitous twist of fate 

for the Marines, Hill 142 appeared to have been the 

boundary between the 127th and 237th Divisions. As a 

result, the Germans had a difficult time coordinating 

their defenses.14 The table of organization for German 

units specified 850 men per battalion, three battalions of 2,550 men to a regiment, and three regiments 

11 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry in World War I, 74. 12 Homsher, “Securing the Flanks,” 88.

13 Otto, “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, June 

1918,” 943; and Thomason, The United States Army Second Division 

Northwest of Chateau Thierry in World War I, 89–90. 14 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry in World War I, 74.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Maj Julius S. Turrill, commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, 

shown here photographed as a captain.
12 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

comprising an infantry brigade of 7,650 soldiers.15

Defending Hill 142 were four companies of the 

460th Infantry Regiment, heavily supported by Maxim 

machine guns.16 Then-first lieutenant Thomason, himself a member of the 1st Battalion’s 49th Company, 

described the defenders: “A company of German infantry and a machine gun platoon lay in the threecornered clump of trees on the forward slopes of Hill 

142, in the sector northwest of Chateau-Thierry. . . . By 

the white piping on their uniforms, they were Prussians, and by the ugly, confident look on them, with a 

touch of Berlin swank, they were Prussians of a very 

good division; and there were no better soldiers in the 

world.”17

At 274.3 meters from where the Marines were 

to cross the line of departure, across an open wheat 

field, the 9th Company of the 460th Regiment occupied 

the first woods extending from the ravine on the east. 

Beyond that, a heavy machine gun detachment from 

the 273d Regiment was positioned in a low, thick coppice in woods to the west of the Champillon ravine. 

In underbrush and tall pines to the left was the 10th 

Company, 462d Regiment. To the east in a square patch 

of woods were the 10th and 11th Companies, 460th Regiment, and the 12th Company in reserve north of them.18

15 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry in World War I, 76. 16 Clark, Devil Dogs, 102. The self-powered, water-cooled machine 

gun was designed by American inventor Hiram S. Maxim in 

1884; it fired at a rate of up to 600 rounds per minute. In 1887, it 

was introduced to the German Army, which quickly developed 

its own version of the Maxim machine gun and manufactured 

12,000 of them by the beginning of World War I in August 1914. 

“How the Machine Gun Changed Combat during World War I,” 

Norwich University online, accessed 19 November 2018; and Paul 

Cornish, “Machine Gun,” International Encyclopedia of the First 

World War, accessed 19 November 2018. 

17 Col John W. Thomason Jr., . . . and a Few Marines (New York: 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), 475. Though a fictional short story, 

Thomason describes the attack on Hill 142. The actual German 

defenders might not have been Prussian. Swank is defined as ostentation or arrogance of dress or manner; swagger.

18 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry in World War I, 84; and Otto, “The Battles for the 

Possession of Belleau Woods, June 1918,” 944.

Orders to Attack

At approximately 2225 on the night of 5 June 1918, the 

4th Brigade issued Brigade Order No. 1 for the next 

morning’s attack, directing the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, supported by the 8th Machine Gun Company 

(Captain John H. Fay) and 23d Machine Gun Company (Captain George H. Osterhout Jr.), to seize Hill 

142, with the attack to commence at sunrise (0345) 

on a frontage of 800 meters.19 It was after midnight 

when Colonel Wendell C. Neville, commanding officer of the 5th Regiment, arrived at the 1st Battalion’s 

command post, located in the basement of the powerhouse in Marigny to issue the order to Turrill.20 In 

part, that order read

1. The enemy holds the general line Bouresches-Bois de Belleau-Torcy-BussiaresGandeelu-Chezy-on-Orxios. The French 

167 D.I. [Division Infantry] is on the left 

of this Brigade and attacks June 6th in 

the direction of the Bussiares Wood.

2. The Brigade will attack on the right of the 

French 167 D.I. Objective from the Little 

Square Wood 400 Meters S.E. of Calvaire 

to the brook crossing 174.0–263.4.21

 (a) The attack between the brook of 

Champillon (inclusive), Hill 142, and 

the brook which flows from 1 kilometer N.E. of Champillon, inclusive 

will be made by the 1st Bn., 5th [Regi19 Times are confusing, even in source documents. Located in 

northern France, the sun would rise on Hill 142 at about 0348. 

See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Sunrise/

Sunset Calculator, accessed 28 December 2017. The Allies used 

Western European Time, while the Germans used Central European Time, which was one hour ahead of the Allies. Both sides 

used daylight savings time. Otto, “The Battles for the Possession 

of Belleau Woods, June 1918,” 942. 

20 Capt George W. Hamilton letter to Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, 19 November 1919, quoted in Mark Mortensen, 

George W. Hamilton, USMC: America’s Greatest World War I Hero

(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 210.

21 The map used by U.S. forces in this attack was Chateau-Thierry 

Sector, June 6–July 16, 1918, at 1/20,000 scale. Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Map Service, 

1944).
WINTER 2018 13

ment], supported by the 8th and 23d 

Cos. Machine Guns.22

Due to the lateness of the hour, only company 

commanders Captain George W. Hamilton, 49th 

Company, and First Lieutenant Orlando C. Crowther, 

67th Company, were told of the attack and given a 

map of the area. Platoon commanders and senior 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were allowed to 

22 Field Orders No. 1, 4th Brigade, June 5, 10:25 p.m., as cited in 

2d Division, Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington, 

DC: American Battle Monuments Commission, 1944), 11, 102.

look at their company commander’s map (map 2).23

French Army units were to be on Turrill’s left 

flank and Major Benjamin S. Berry’s 3d Battalion, 

5th Regiment, on the right flank. The two companies 

of the battalion conducting the initial assault were 

forced to travel 3.2 km over unfamiliar ground in the 

dark to their attack position on Hill 176. Even more 

concerning to the Marines, there had not been time 

23 The map referred to was the old Meaux-50,000 hachured map 

produced by Depot de la Guerre in 1832 and corrected in 1912. It 

was almost worthless. Hachure refers to the short lines used for 

shading and showing surfaces in relief and in the direction of the 

slope. Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of Chateau Thierry in World War I, 81.

Reprinted courtesy of the Marine Corps Gazette

Map 2. Hachured map similar to the ones given to Capt George W. Hamilton and 1stLt Orlando C. Crowther early on the morning of 6 June.
14 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

to bring up hot chow and they had not been fed.24

Holding a position on Hill 176 just south of Hill 

142 was Major Berton W. Sibley’s 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment, which had occupied the position since 2 June. 

At 2100 on 5 June, Major Frank E. Evans, adjutant of 

the 6th Regiment, sent Sibley a message notifying him 

that two companies would relieve his battalion “sometime tonight.”25 Hamilton’s 49th Company arrived at 

its attack position on Hill 176 at 0240 on 6 June and he 

spent the next 20 minutes searching for the commanding officer of the company from the 3d Battalion, 6th 

Regiment, he was relieving. It was just getting light 

and a relief based on doctrine was not possible, so 

Hamilton told the defenders not to fire at any movement forward of their position. He then moved his 

company into an open area across from the Germans. 

He next moved to his left and found the 67th Company had just assumed their attack position at 0345, 

but there was no sign of the French on their left flank 

or the 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, on his right. Hamilton located Second Lieutenant Thomas W. Ashley of 

the 67th Company’s right platoon, and informed him 

his company was moving forward.26

The Attack

The time designated for the attack, 0345 on 6 June, 

found the two companies of Major Turrill’s 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, formed in four waves per company 

on Hill 176 to the east of Champillon and west of Belleau Wood. In these two companies were 11 officers 

and 475 enlisted men. The 67th Company’s mission 

was to sweep down the left side of Hill 142 and into 

the wheat fields below. The 49th Company was to support the Marines of the 67th Company on their left 

flank and capture the crest of the hill and the road 

below it. Though not tasked in the brigade order, the 

15th Machine Gun Company (6th Machine Gun Battalion) was positioned in Champillon and ready to 

provide support. Their fire had a telling effect on the 

10th and 11th Companies of the 460th Regiment. The bat24 Mortensen, George W. Hamilton, USMC, 210; and Clark, The 

Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 32.

25 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 218. 26 Mortensen, George W. Hamilton, USMC, 210.

talion’s other two companies, the 17th (Captain Roswell C. Winans) and 66th (First Lieutenant Walter 

T. H. Galliford), and the 8th Machine Gun Company 

were in defensive positions at Les Mares Farm awaiting relief by French troops before they would rejoin 

their parent battalion.27

Major Turrill arrived at the attack position shortly before 0345 from Champillon. He made a significant 

command decision when he commenced the attack 

27 Galliford was temporarily attached to the 66th Company from 

the 17th Company from 1 to 9 June as commanding officer and 

returned to the 17th Company on 10 June. The actual commanding officer of the 66th Company was Capt Raymond F. Dirksen, 

who was sick in the hospital. U.S. Marine Corps Muster Rolls, 1893–

1958, microfilm publication T977, 460 rolls, Record Group (RG) 

127, ARC identifier 922159, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, DC; Thomason, The United 

States Army Second Division Northwest of Chateau Thierry, 83–84; 

and Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 32–33.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Capt George W. Hamilton, commanding officer, 49th Company, 1st 

Battalion, 5th Regiment.
WINTER 2018 15

on schedule with two rifle companies supported by 

one machine gun company rather than asking to postpone the attack until the arrival of his whole battalion.

American artillery had been firing on the German positions and assembly areas since 0315, and while 

not knowing the exact trace of the German positions, 

the barrage was effective in suppressing them.28 Dawn 

was just beginning to break when the two companies 

moved north from their positions on Hill 176 into a 

wheat field. Their initial objective, on the other side of 

the wheat field, was a copse of trees on the top of Hill 

142 occupied by German infantry, heavily supported 

by machine guns.

The Germans began firing on the Marines after 

only 18.3 meters. The Marines advanced through the 

first wheat field, guiding center, and although encountering stiff resistance, quickly overran the 9th 

Company. The 9th Company sent up a red rocket—the 

signal for the German artillery to fire a barrage. On 

the left, the 67th Company came under fire from the 

Maxim machine guns in the Champillon ravine and 

suffered heavily in officer and NCO casualties. The 

49th Company soon overran the 10th Company, 462d 

Regiment, as it moved down the hill, but immediately 

took fire from the 10th and 11th Companies of the 460th 

28 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 83–84.

Regiment in the square woods.29 The 49th Company 

went through the square woods, but most of the two 

German companies were bypassed, effectively isolating them.30

While training under French troops at Bourmont, the Marines had been taught to attack in four 

waves. These tactics were a holdover from Napoleonic 

warfare, which theorized that two or three of the front 

ranks would be cut down in the assault, allowing the 

fourth rank to capture the objective. The Marines also 

were taught to go to the ground when taking heavy automatic fire and to respond with automatic weapons 

and hand grenades. Hamilton commented, “I saw immediately that such tactics would not do in this case. 

They might work against one nest, or two, but here 

was a nest broader than our battalion front and containing more machine guns than we had automatics. 

(No heavy machine guns attacked with us, and none 

joined us until several hours later.)”31

The Germans could not miss the Marines advancing on them in dawn’s light with the first rays of 

the sun shining on them. At this point, the Marines 

began to suffer heavy casualties and, according to doctrine, the second line moved into the first line and 

the fourth line moved into the third line. Shortly after 

that, casualties became so heavy that the Marines went 

to ground and advanced as best they could. Captain 

Hamilton later wrote that the Marines “hadn’t moved 

fifty yards when they cut loose at us from the woods 

ahead—more machine guns than I had ever heard before. Our men had been trained on a special method 

of getting out machine guns, and, according to their 

training, all immediately lay flat.”32

29 The “square woods” was not shown on the Marines’ maps. It 

would cause problems later in the day when Hamilton would 

misinterpret his objective and extend too far forward, eventually 

withdrawing back to his objective on the forward slope of Hill 

142. Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest 

of Chateau Thierry, 84. 30 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 85. 31 Mortensen, George W. Hamilton, USMC, 211–12. 32 Kemper F. Cowling, comp., and Courtney R. Cooper, ed. “Dear 

Folks at Home - - -”: The Glorious Story of United States Marines in 

France as Told by Their Letters from the Battlefield (Boston, MA: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 126.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Ground over which the 49th Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines attacked on 6 June 1918. German machine guns in woods took heavy toll.
16 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

First Lieutenant Jonas H. Platt, 49th Company, 

described the initial advance: 

Across the fields we raced, banging down 

the boches as we went, and into the woods. 

Machine guns rattled and men dropped. 

There we started to form again, while I tried 

to count my men. Suddenly a machine gun 

far ahead opened up spitefully. . . . I crawled 

a bit ahead to see what was happening. 

. . . There, grouped about a captured German machine gun, were ten of my missing 

men having the time of their lives, banging 

away with this captured gun at anything 

that looked like a boche.33

Turrill remained in his position watching the 

fourth wave move forward when First Lieutenant Gilfillan and his platoon of the 66th Company arrived 

at 0430. Turrill sent them forward and then established his post of command on the north edge of the 

woods on Hill 176. At about 0515, the remainder of 

33 Capt Jonas Platt, “Holding Back the Marines: They Would Go 

to Germany and Bag the German Army,” Ladies Home Journal, 

September 1919, 114. Boche or bosche was pejorative slang used by 

French and American soldiers to refer to German soldiers.

the 66th Company arrived and were committed to 

the action. The 8th Machine Gun Company arrived 

next and provided support to the attack. Company 

D, 2d Battalion, 2d Engineers, came up at 0530 and 

was initially put into the line as infantry to help repel 

German counterattacks and then were used to help 

fortify the position on Hill 142. Captain Winans and 

the 17th Company arrived at 0537 and were committed to the right of Hamilton’s 49th Company. Unfortunately, the 23d Machine Gun Company would not 

arrive until the afternoon, too late to support the attack.34 Captain Keller E. Rockey, the battalion adju34 Cowling and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home - - -,” 87–88.

Courtesy of George C. Marshall Foundation

The Marines advanced over open ground and were greeted by German machine gun fire. 5th Marines at Champagne, France 1918, by John 

W. Thomason Jr.

John W. Thomason Jr., “Second Division Northwest of Chateau Thierry, 1 

June–10 July 1918,” unpublished manuscript, 1928, Personal Papers, 1918–1950, 

Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin

Map showing movement of the 49th and 67th Companies, 1st Battalion, 

5th Regiment, on the morning of 6 June 1918.
WINTER 2018 17

tant, reported to brigade that things were going well.35

At 0537, Captain Rockey reported to Colonel Wendell 

Neville at 5th Regiment, “17th Co. going into deployment from old first line [Hill 176]-8th M G [Machine 

Gun] Co. already forward. Things seem to be going 

well—No engineers are in evidence—Can something be 

done to hurry them along—The advance is about one 

kilometer. Major Turrill up forward with the line.”36

Among the first killed was Second Lieutenant 

Walter D. Frazier of the 49th Company. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, 

Navy Cross, Silver Star, and Croix de Guerre for “extraordinary heroism.”37

35 Keller Rockey commanded the 67th Company earlier. He 

would later command the 5th Marine Division on Iwo Jima during World War II and retired as a lieutenant general in 1950. 

Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 83, 87; and Clark, Devil Dogs, 100.

36 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 36. 37 George B. Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th 

Marine Brigade (Pike, NH: Brass Hat, 1993), 18. Original awards 

were the Army Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and Silver 

Star Citation. See also George B. Clark, A List of Officers of the 

4th Marine Brigade (Pike, NH: Brass Hat, 1995), 3–20; Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 2–52; and 

Jane Blakeney, Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955: Armed Forces 

Awards, Flags (Washington, DC: Guthrie Lithograph, 1957).

The waves of Marines were moving forward 

when a German artillery shell exploded within their 

ranks and a man cried out. One of the young Marines 

of the 67th Company called out, “Hey, Pop, [First Sergeant Hunter] there’s a man hit over here!” Hunter’s 

reply was immediate and terse: “C’mon, goddamnit! 

He ain’t the last man who’s gonna be hit today.”38 Moving forward across the wheat field, Hunter was hit 

twice, and twice he regained his feet and continued 

to advance.39

Early in the fight, First Lieutenant Orlando 

Crowther, commanding officer of the 67th Company, 

also was hit twice; the second wound proved fatal. He 

had made it across the wheat field to the first woods 

and had taken out one machine gun crew and was in 

the process of attacking a second machine gun position when he was shot in the throat and killed instantly.40 Crowther was not alone; eight other Marines were 

killed in the attempt to silence the gun. For his actions, Crowther was awarded the Distinguished Ser38 Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die, 17–18. 39 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

25; Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 35; and Camp, 

The Devil Dogs at Belleau Wood, 75–77. 40 Mortensen, George W. Hamilton, USMC, 78.

Art Collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps

Untitled (Belleau Wood), by SSgt Kristopher J. Battles. Oil on canvas on hard board panel.
18 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

vice Cross and the Navy Cross.41 After Crowther fell, 

remaining Marines led by Corporal Prentice S. Geer 

charged with bayonets and captured the machine gun. 

One of the Marines grabbed the muzzle of the gun and 

pushed it over, losing his hand in the process. They 

repelled a counterattack. Geer was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, and Silver Star; 

he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in July.42

Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland, second in 

command of the 5th Regiment, went forward to take 

charge of the attack. At 0600, he requested support 

for the left flank of the 67th Company because the 

French had not yet moved up and the American flank 

was open. Colonel Neville deployed the 51st Company of the 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment—the brigade 

reserve—initially to Champillon; it then moved up the 

Champillon ravine and formed a right angle to the 

67th Company. Machine guns were brought forward 

to provide support to the position.43

At 0430, the German 273d Regiment had reported 

that it was under attack and both flanks were giving 

ground, but that the center was holding. After the 

Marines swept over Hill 142 and continued north, the 

12th Company, 460th Infantry, conducted a local counterattack. The regiment requested reinforcements and 

the 25th Jaeger Battalion of the 7th Saxon Regiment, the 

brigade reserve, was committed to action. The Americans did not record the time, but German records indicate this action was over by 0600.44

Initially, the Germans thought they could hold 

the line, but at 0610 the 273d Infantry Regiment requested artillery on its old position, and fire fell on Hill 142. 

At 0715, the 273d Infantry reported that it had been as41 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade,

13.

42 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

18. Because the muster rolls indicate only “wounded,” not the nature of the wounds, it is has not been possible to identify the 

Marine who lost his hand nor the specific injury that resulted in 

him losing his hand; however, since he grabbed the gun’s muzzle, 

his hand may have been shot off. 

43 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 89. 44 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 86–87.

saulted by a brigade of American troops, and at 0810, 

the infantry brigade of the 197th Division reported to 

the 237th Division that it was being attacked by French, 

American, and British troops.45

The attack stalled at this point, but the “old 

breed,” in the presence of Captain Hamilton and senior NCOs, carried the day. They moved up and down 

the lines, getting men to move forward and, in some 

cases, actually kicking them to their feet. Although 

the Germans on the southern edge of Hill 142 had 

been routed, some of the Marines were dazed and disoriented and hesitated to seize the advantage. Hamilton gathered five or six NCOs and told them, “Here is 

our direction. We go about a mile farther. When you 

come to a road, just over the nose of the hill, halt and 

dig in.” Yelling at the top of his lungs, Hamilton ran 

the length of the line, urging his men forward telling 

them, “We had ’em on the run.”46

It was also at this point that the Marine Corps’ 

45 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 90.

46 Mortensen, George W. Hamilton, USMC, 212.

Art Collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps

Machine Gunner, by Col John W. Thomason Jr. Pencil on paper.
WINTER 2018 19

investment in marksmanship paid off. Marines were 

inflicting casualties on the Germans with individual 

rifle shots at 274.3 meters. Private Walter H. Smith of 

the 49th Company wrote, “Then it became a matter 

of shooting at mere human targets. We fixed our rifle 

sights at 300 yards [274.3 meters] and aiming through 

the peep kept picking off the Germans. And a man 

went down at nearly every shot.”47 As they closed on 

the German positions, rifle shots were replaced with 

bayonets and rifle butts, and the Germans suffered extensive casualties. 

The Marines of the 67th and 49th Companies 

surged forward through the wheat and went over 

Hill 142 before occupying positions on the hill’s forward slope about 0700. The 67th Company quickly 

overlapped and swept through the German 9th Company on its left. Unexpected support came from the 

10 machine guns of Captain Matthew H. Kingman’s 

15th Machine Gun Company of the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion, described as “ten guns from the 15th Company, which obtained excellent overhead fire on enemy reserves and assembly points. When objective was 

reached the guns took up new positions to conform to 

the line established.”48

At 0630, Captain Rockey had again reported 

to brigade that all was going well, and at 0710 he reported to division that all objectives had been taken 

and the position was being consolidated. Without a 

doubt, Hamilton was the key to the Marines’ success 

that day. As the Marine attack got bogged down, he 

moved up and down the line, urging individual Marines to their feet and moving forward again. As his 

company moved through the woods, he sent prisoners to the rear, and at one point took an Iron Cross 

off of a German officer. The Germans began to withdraw and the Marines fired on them as they fled. 

The 49th Company moved through the first copse 

47 George B. Clark, ed., Devil Dog Chronicle: Voices of the 4th Marine Brigade in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 

2013), 163.

48 Maj Littleton W. T. Waller Jr., Final Report of the 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion (Pike, NH: Brass Hat), 15; and LtCol Frank E. Evans, “Demobilizing the Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette 4, no. 4 

(December 1919): 303–14.

of trees and came on another wheat field full of red 

poppies. Once again, the Marines had to rush across 

the open wheat field to the next line of trees defended by German infantry supported by machine guns. 

Hamilton commented that by every machine gun 

there was a dead gunner, and it was only by rushing 

the guns the Marines were able to take them as there 

were too many guns with mutually supporting fire.49

The two assault companies moved up the northern edge of Hill 142. The 67th Company halted at 

that point, while Hamilton continued to move to the 

northeast, possibly to seize the square woods northeast of Hill 142. Before the Germans halted his forward movement, three of his Marines actually entered 

the village of Torcy, announcing they held the town 

but needed immediate reinforcements. The remainder 

of Hamilton’s company made it as far as the square 

woods between Hill 142 and Torcy before being forced 

to fall back to Hill 142.50

Platt and his men charged again, crossed another 

wheat field, and entered another wood holding many 

dead Germans. Platt’s men halted their advance momentarily to collect souvenirs until he moved them 

forward again. During this third rush, Platt tripped 

and fell behind his advancing Marines. When he 

caught up with them, they had stopped in yet another 

wood and were in groups of twos and threes.51

Gradually rounding up his platoon, Platt moved 

to evaluate the situation. He ran into a first sergeant 

(who he later identified only as “Chuck” but who 

must have been First Sergeant Hunter, as the 67th 

Company was on the left of Platt’s 49th Company) 

and 20 Marines from the company on his left.52 When 

Platt asked Hunter where his company commander 

was, Hunter responded that it was him; the rest of 

the Marines in the company were dead. Hunter also 

told Platt that he was going after the Germans, an 

idea that Platt tried to talk Hunter out of executing. 

49 Cowling and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home - - -,” 127.

50 Clark, Devil Dogs, 210n41.

51 Platt, “Holding Back the Marines,” 114.

52 See Robert Asprey, At Belleau Wood (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 

Sons, 1965), 151. Hunter also was known as “Beau.”
20 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Hunter promised he would not move forward and 

Platt went to look for Captain Hamilton.53 Sometime 

later, Hunter was hit a third time and was killed in 

action that morning. Hunter would be awarded the 

Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, and Silver 

Star “for extraordinary heroism in action. He fearlessly exposed himself and encouraged all men near 

him, although he himself was wounded three times.”54

Having reached the bottom of the hill, Hamilton looked for the road he thought was his objective. 

Upon reaching a road, Hamilton began to reconsider 

his objective when he received fire from his flanks and 

rear. He studied his map and found that he had advanced a half mile too far. Seeing a large number of 

Germans in the town of Bussiares to the northwest 

and fearing death or capture, Hamilton ordered his 

men to return to Hill 142. On the return up the hill, 

Hamilton ran into First Lieutenant Platt with about 

a platoon of men and sent him back up Hill 142. On 

the way back to the crest of Hill 142, Platt and his 

men successfully broke up a German counterattack 

and took out several machine gun nests, but Platt sustained a serious leg wound.55 Platt continued to direct 

his platoon. He charged and drove off a German machine gun crew and supervised the establishment of 

a defensive position before being evacuated. He was 

awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, 

and Silver Star for his actions.56 

Hamilton’s company continued through the second wood—his actual objective and where he should 

have halted his men. However, he was looking for an 

unimproved road that was on his map. At this point, 

the Germans were retreating rapidly, so Hamilton 

continued down the nose of Hill 142 in search of the 

road with one platoon. Moving north and entering 

open ground at the base of Hill 142, Maxim machine 

guns opened up on the Marines from both flanks. As 

Hamilton continued to move north with an automat53 Platt, “Holding Back the Marines,” 114.

54 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

25; Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 35; and Camp, 

The Devil Dogs at Belleau Wood, 75–77.

55 Mortensen, George W. Hamilton, USMC, 212–13.

56 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

38.

ic rifle team, most of the platoon veered to the left to 

take out a German machine gun nest.

About that time, Hamilton spotted a road to his 

front with a good bank to offer protection, but he had 

overrun his objective and was just a few hundred meters short of the town of Bussiares to the left front. 

Most of the Germans had retreated at this point, but 

one company was forming for a counterattack when 

Hamilton realized he was too far forward. He soon 

sent his Marines back with the intent to occupy the 

nose of the hill and reorganize and dig in.

Hamilton went back up the hill in “a drainage 

ditch filled with cold water and shiny reeds. Machine 

gun bullets were just grazing my back and our own artillery was dropping close.” He finally occupied his objective and reorganized the 49th Company as well as 

the leaderless 67th Company. Hamilton then sent Marines to link up with French forces on his left and the 

3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, on his right, but he could 

not make satisfactory liaison until the next day.57

Upon arriving back on Hill 142, Hamilton discovered that the 67th Company had lost four out of five 

officers, including its commanding officer, First Lieutenant Crowther, while the 49th Company had only 

Hamilton. Hamilton assumed command of both companies and established a defensive position, which was 

completed about noon.58 By 0800, the French 167th 

Division had belatedly started moving forward.59

Captain Winans sent a message to battalion stating that his 17th Company was to the right of Hamilton but there was nothing to his left and the Germans 

were working around that flank. In response, Winans 

sent “10 then 20 men to help and protect his flank.” He 

encouraged battalion to “get something in to plug the 

hole on our left.” He also reported: “We don’t know 

whether there are Marines on our right. Can’t establish liaison to right or left yet. . . . We have a good 

position but can’t extend anymore.” He then notes 

“Hamilton is o.k.”60

57 Cowling and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home - - -,” 127–28.

58 Clark, Devil Dogs, 105–6.

59 2d Division, Summary of Operations in the World War, 10, 11; and 

Clark, Devil Dogs, 106. 60 Clark, Devil Dogs, 110.
WINTER 2018 21

At 1045, the French liaison incorrectly sent word 

that the Americans had more than 300 prisoners. 

Eventually, 1 officer and 15 enlisted captives were sent 

to the rear.61 Although the 23d Machine Gun Company did not arrive in time to support the assault, six 

guns of the 81st Machine Gun Company were ordered 

to Hill 142 to support the 1st Battalion. The Germans 

attacked the consolidated position on Hill 142 on several occasions but were repulsed. At 1310, Turrill reported the French advancing on his left flank and the 

immediate threat of attack from that flank was over.62

The Germans had taken a beating at the hands of 

the untried Americans, and they knew it. The Americans struck the 1st Battalion, 460th Infantry, and practically annihilated the 9th Company of that battalion, 

although a few members of that company had fought 

their way out of the encirclement with bayonets. The 

10th and 11th Companies had dug into a patch of woods 

southwest of Torcy. The two German companies beat 

back Hamilton’s attack and were soon joined by the 

12th Company, and these units held until nightfall.63

At 0840 on 6 June, Brigadier General James Harbord sent the following message to the commanding 

general of the 2d Division:

The French did not relieve elements on the 

left of my line until 3.00 a.m. this morning 

instead of 9 o’clock last night as expected. 

Our attack between brooks on either side 

of Hill 142 started with two companies and 

half a machine gun company on the front 

line. At 6.30 our line was considerable distance ahead of the French and had to be 

halted to wait for them. At 7.01 a.m. report 

was received that both 1st and 3d battalions 

of the 5th Regiment had reached their objectives. There had been some heavy shell 

fire, rifle and machine gun fire. Several 

men killed and quite a number wounded. 

61 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 88. 62 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 89.

63 Otto, “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, June 

1918,” 944.

Figures as to casualties will be hurried as 

soon as received. Sixteen prisoners, including one officer, were reported captured by 

5.50 a.m. . . . . At 7.10 reported that our position was being consolidated as rapidly as 

possible and that our front line had thrown 

out strong posts in front of the position.64 

At 0950, Captain Hamilton sent what was probably the most succinct report of the battle to battalion:

Elements of this Company [49th] and the 

67th Company reached their objective, but 

because very much disorganized were forced 

to retire to our present position which is 

on the nose of Hill 142 and about 400 yds. 

[365.8 meters] N. E. of square woods. Our 

position not very good because of salient. 

We are intrenching [sic] and have four machine guns in place. We have been counterattacked several times but so far have held 

the hill. Our casualties are very heavy. We 

need medical aide badly, cannot locate any 

hospital apprentices and need many. We 

need artillery assistance to hold this line 

tonight. Ammunition of all kinds is needed. The line is being held by detachments 

from the 49th, 66th, and 67th Company & 

are very much mixed together. George W. 

Hamilton65

On the right flank, Captain Hamilton led his 

company and consolidated its gains with the remainder of the 67th Company, which had lost all but one 

of its officers. For his leadership, he was awarded the 

Distinguished Service Cross, the Navy Cross, the Silver Star, and the Croix de Guerre.66

64 Maj Edwin N. McClellan, “Capture of Hill 142, Battle of Belleau Wood, and Capture of Bouresches,” Marine Corps Gazette 5, 

no. 3 (September 1920): 284.

65 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 38. 66 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

20–21.
22 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

German Counterattacks

Throughout the remainder of the day, the Germans 

launched at least five major counterattacks against the 

Marines’ newly established position. The first, conducted by the 12th Company, 460th Infantry, and the 

26th Jaeger Battalion, occurred as the 49th Company 

withdrew from their advance position back to their 

objective on Hill 142.67

The 26th Jaeger Battalion was sent forward to close 

the gap left by the 2d Battalion, 237th Infantry Division, 

but the counterattack failed to dislodge the Marines 

from the hill. The 237th Infantry Division was ordered to 

retake all lost ground at any cost, but spent the remainder of the day in futile attempts to dislodge the Marines. Attacks continued by numerous German units 

through the remainder of the day, but none penetrated the Marines’ lines. The 197th Division had lost about 

2,000 casualties during the period 4–6 June and the 273d 

Regiment reported the loss of 13 officers and 405 men 

on 6 June.68 Hamilton described these counterattacks: 

And now came the counter-attacks—five 

nasty ones that came near driving us off the 

hill—but—we hung on. One especially came 

near getting me. There were heavy bushes 

67 Clark, Devil Dogs, 104–5. 68 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 90.

Awards for 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment’s Attack on Hill 142, 6 June 1918

Original awards include the Army Distinguished Service 

Cross (DSC) and Silver Star citations. The Navy Cross 

was not established until 1919. When the Navy Cross was 

approved and awarded to Marines for their actions on 

Hill 142 long after the action, the citation was commonly 

a duplicate of the original DSC citation; the same was 

done for Army and Navy Medal of Honor citations.

In some cases, the award was for providing an “example to hereto untried troops,” which usually meant the 

Marine was recommended for the award because he was 

killed in battle. In the middle of June, Brigadier General 

James Harbord, commanding the 4th Marine Brigade, 

sent a memo to his company commanders stating that 

he did not want to see any more recommendations for 

Marines to be awarded the DSC solely because they had 

been killed in battle.1

1

 Clark, A List of Officers of the 4th Marine Brigade, 3–20; 

Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine 

Brigade, 2–52; and Blakeney, Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 

1861–1955.

all over the hill, and the first thing I knew 

hand grenades began dropping near. One 

grenade threw a rock which caught me behind the ear and made me dizzy for a few 

minutes.69

While consolidating their position during one 

of these German counterattacks, Captain Hamilton discovered a line of about 15 Germans and five 

light machine guns setting up about 18.3 meters from 

the Marine line. Gunnery Sergeant Ernest A. Janson (who went by the name Charles F. Hoffman at 

the time) moved forward, screaming and firing his 

rile, and in the process took on the Germans; after 

several minutes of strenuous hand-to-hand fighting, he killed several and routed the remaining Germans. Janson was awarded the Medal of Honor, 

69 Cowling and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home - - -,” 128.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Valley below Belleau Wood on way to Vaux road; Lucy-le-Bocage in 

background.
WINTER 2018 23

Silver Star, and Croix de Guerre for his actions.70

At 1310, Turrill sent a message to regiment notifying them that the French had come up and oc70 Cowling and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home - - -,” 128; and Clark, 

Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 23. Born 

Ernest August Janson on 17 August 1878, Janson spent 10 years 

in the Army before he enlisted in the Marine Corps at Marine 

Barracks Bremerton, WA, under the name of Charles F. Hoffman. On 3 January 1921, he submitted a letter to Headquarters 

Marine Corps requesting that his record be corrected to reflect 

his given name (Ernest August Janson). According to the letter, 

Janson enlisted in the U.S. Army in late 1899 but deserted about 

July 1900. On 10 November 1900, Janson reenlisted in the Army 

as Charles Hoffman. He honorably served in the Army under the 

name Hoffman before enlisting in the Marine Corps on 14 June 

1910 under the same name. Headquarters accepted the request in 

late January 1921 and corrected all of Hoffman’s service records 

to the name of Janson. Janson retired from the Marine Corps as a 

sergeant major on 30 September 1926. 

cupied positions on his left flank, thereby helping 

to alleviate some of the pressure the battalion was 

experiencing.71 Around midnight, the Marine positions on Hill 142 were consolidated and a defense 

was established. The square woods to the northeast 

were not occupied, but it was untenable to either 

side and the road running in front of the hill was 

covered by Marine rifles. At 0400 on 7 June, the 45th 

Company of the 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, came 

up on the right flank and the defensive situation was 

somewhat stabilized. 

The 9th Company, 462d Regiment, and the 9th 

Company, 460th Regiment, had both been practically annihilated. A vigorous counterattack was 

launched by the 12th Company, 460th Infantry, but 

was stalled when its commander fell. The regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Friederich Tismer, decided further attacks would produce severe 

casualties and ordered a withdrawal. Accordingly, 

during the night, the German 10th and 11th Companies withdrew to Torcy, taking their wounded with 

them. The 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, were in sole 

possession of Hill 142. The old breed’s leadership 

had carried the day, but at a catastrophic cost in 

killed and wounded.72

Hamilton summarized the seizing of Hill 142 and 

the work of Turrill’s understrength battalion:

After the counter-attacks we settled down 

to the work of digging in. Gee, it was a long 

day! The night proved to be worse, and on 

account of my flanks I was more worried 

than I cared to admit. The Boches went up 

the valleys to our right and left and from 

their flares I thought we were all but surrounded. Two more companies had come 

up [17th and 66th], however, and the fire 

from the rifles and auto-rifles of several 

hundred men must have made the Germans 

nervous, too, for about dawn they went 

71 Clark, Devil Dogs, 107. 72 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 91; Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War 

I, 39; and, Otto, “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, 

June 1918,” 945.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

GySgt Ernest A. Janson (Charles F. Hoffman), 49th Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment.
24 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

back and only left several machine guns to 

worry us during the next day.73

In the end, Major Julius Turrill led his two understrength companies to seize Hill 142, overwhelming the remaining German defenders and driving 

them off the high ground. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, 

and Croix de Guerre for extraordinary heroism in 

leading his command under heavy enemy fire.74 The 

battalion adjutant, Captain Rockey, was also awarded 

the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, and Silver Star for extraordinary heroism in carrying forward 

the attack and organizing and holding the position.75

Late that night, Rockey sent a message to Hamilton: “The rations sent to you tonight are for all companies . . . our ration truck was struck by a shell and 

rations are scattered all over the county. This is the 

best we can do tonight.”76

The battalion’s casualties were horrendous; one 

source set the number of 1st Battalion’s killed, wounded, and missing at 14 officers and 318 enlisted men.77

Sometime on 7 or 8 June, Turrill’s battalion received 

a group of replacements, but they could in no way replace the experience of those who were killed in the 

attack on Hill 142. The Old Breed no longer existed. 

Additionally, the 8th Machine Gun Company lost 10 

men and the 51st Company from the 2d Battalion reported 1 officer and 45 men were casualties. The 45th 

Company of the 3d Battalion that had come up to support the 1st Battalion’s right flank suffered 2 officers 

and 71 men as casualties.78

Consequently, Thursday, 6 June 1918, was the 

most catastrophic day in Marine Corps history up to 

that point, with the 4th Brigade suffering 31 officer 

and 1,056 enlisted casualties. As many casualties were 

73 Cowling and Cooper, “Dear Folks at Home - - -,” 129. 74 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

47.

75 Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 

40.

76 Clark, Devil Dogs, 109–10. 77 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 39.

78 Thomason, The United States Army Second Division Northwest of 

Chateau Thierry, 91.

suffered on that single day as in the Corps’ preceding 

143 years of existence.79 When Major Frederic Wise’s 

wife asked him “How are the Marines?” he replied, 

“There aren’t any more Marines.”80

Conclusion

The capture of Hill 142 and subsequent battle for Belleau Wood have gone down as a defining moment in 

the annals of Marine Corps history. The battalion 

would continue to fight for the possession of Belleau 

Wood with the other units of the 4th Brigade until 26 

June, when Major Maurice E. Shearer, commanding 

officer of 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, would send the 

message “Belleau Woods Now U.S. Marines Entirely.”81

Though the Marines suffered heavily in their first 

pitched battle, the Germans suffered far worse. A few 

days after the capture of Hill 142, an unmailed letter 

was found on the body of a dead German. Intended to 

be sent to his father, the letter said, “The Americans 

are savages. They kill everything that moves.”82

In a report dated 17 August 1918, General Richard von Conta, commanding the 4th Reserve Corps that 

faced the Marine brigade, wrote:

Fighting Value: the 2d American [Division] 

may be described as a very good division, 

and, might even be considered as being fit 

for shock troops. The numerous attacks 

by the two Marine regiments at Belleau 

Woods were executed vigorously and without regard for the consequences. Our fire 

did not affect their morale sufficiently to 

interfere appreciably with their advance; 

their nerves had not yet been used up. . . . In 

spirit the troops are lively and full of grim, 

but good-natured, confidence. Indicative is 

the expression of a prisoner “We kill or get 

killed.”83

79 Clark, Devil Dogs, 101, 128. 80 Clark, Devil Dogs, 207. 81 Clark, Devil Dogs, 202. 82 Clark, Devil Dogs, 112–13.

83 Otto, “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, June 

1918,” 962.
WINTER 2018 25

Table 2. Awards for 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment’s attack on Hill 142, 6 June 1918 (continued next page)

Name Unit Award Remarks

Pvt Joseph M. Baker 67th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross

1stLt Albert P. Baston 17th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star WIA

GySgt Edward T. Bayman 66th Company Silver Star

1stLt Robert Blake 17th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross

Pvt Ernest E. Borah 17th Company Silver Star

Sgt John Casey 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star WIA

Sgt Raymond P. Cronin 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star KIA

1stLt Orlando C. Crowther Commanding officer, 67th CompanyDistinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star, Croix 

de Guerre

KIA

Sgt John H. Culnan 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star WIA

Pvt John M. Fackey 67th Company Silver Star

Sgt John V. Fitzgerald 67th Company Silver Star

2dLt Walter D. Frazier 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star, Croix 

de Guerre

KIA

1stLt Earl W. Garvin 17th Company Silver Star, Croix de Guerre

Cpl Prentice S. Geer 67th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

1stLt Max D. Gilfillan 66th Company Silver Star, Croix de Guerre WIA

2dLt Bernhardt Gissell (USA) 17th Company Silver Star, Croix de Guerre

Cpl Arnold D. Godbey 67th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

Capt George W. Hamilton Commanding officer, 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross

Pvt John Harris 67th Company Silver Star WIA

Cpl Charles G. Hawkins 67th Company Silver Star

It was the “old breed of American regular” embodied by Major Julius Turrill, Captain George 

Hamilton, First Lieutenant Orlando Crowther, First 

Sergeant Daniel Hunter, and Gunnery Sergeant Janson who—along with others like them—not only carried the day at Belleau Wood, but also “transmitted 

their temper and character and view-point to the 

high-hearted volunteer mass which filled the ranks of 

the Marine Brigade.” And in that they found victory; 

not only on Hill 142 and Belleau Wood, but also at 

Soissons, Saint-Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and the Argonne 

Forest and in crossing the Meuse River on the last 

night of the war.84

Epilogue: “That’s ‘Pop’ Hunter”

Major Turrill sent a message to the 5th Regiment at 

84 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 39.

0725 on 7 June requesting that the battalion’s dead be 

buried at Champillon and notifying the regiment he 

would send his dead to that town.85 However, the remains of those Marines killed in action were initially 

interred in Cemetery 29 on the road leading from Hill 

142 to Torcy. Replacements were brought forward to 

replenish the depleted Marine ranks. One of the replacements’ jobs was to bury the dead. Author George 

B. Clark relates how an old-timer passing by stopped 

to watch the burial detail and occasionally would salute a body. One of those brought in for burial was 

dressed in the forest green uniform of the Marines 

with a first sergeant’s chevrons and seven hashmarks 

for seven enlistments. Dangling from his neck was a 

whistle and his pistol flap was unhooked. The oldtimer, taking note of the dead man, saluted sharply, 

85 Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I, 39.
26 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

turned to one of the new Marines burying the casualities, and said, “Get a blanket, soldier. Wrap him up 

proper. That’s ‘Pop’ [Daniel] Hunter.”86

Perhaps Private Elton Mackin of the 67th Company wrote a fitting tribute to First Sergeant Hunter 

86 Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die, 44.

Table 2. Awards for 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment’s attack on Hill 142, 6 June 1918 (continued)

Name Unit Award Remarks

Pvt Arthur Hopper 67th Company Silver Star WIA

MG Henry L. Hulbert 66th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

1stSgt Daniel A. Hunter 67th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star KIA

GySgt Ernest A. Janson 49th Company Medal of Honor, Silver Star, Croix de Guerre

Pvt John Kukoski 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

GySgt Charles F. McCarthy 17th Company Silver Star, Croix de Guerre WIA

Sgt Dave W. McClain 67th Company Croix de Guerre

1stSgt Thomas J. McNulty 66th Company Silver Star, Croix de Guerre WIA

SgtMaj Carl J. Norstrand 17th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

Pvt Pleas Parker 67th Company Silver Star

Cpl Robert C. Pitts 17th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Croix de Guerre

1stLt Jonas H. Platt 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star WIA

Maj Keller E. Rockey Battalion adjutant Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

Lt (Junior Grade) Richard O’B. 

Shea (USN)

Battalion assistant 

surgeon

Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

GySgt Charles J. Smith 67th Company Silver Star

2dLt Vernon L. Somers 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star KIA

GySgt Sidney Thayer Jr. 17th Company Silver Star

Maj Julius S. Turrill Battalion commanding officerDistinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star (2), 

Croix de Guerre (2)

Sgt Arthur F. Ware 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star KIA

Cpl Eugene W. Wear 49th Company Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, Silver Star

Capt Roswell Winans Commanding officer, 17th CompanySilver Star, Croix de Guerre

Notes: KIA = Killed in action; and WIA = Wounded in action.

Source: Clark, Citations and Awards to Members of the 4th Marine Brigade, 2–52.

and the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment’s legacy on Hill 

142: “Little crosses stand above the dead. They do not 

tell how men died. They hide the bitter human stories of the war. They seldom stand alone. Men see to 

that.”87

• 1775 •

87 Mackin, Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die, viii.
27

Planning for War

THE MARINE CORPS IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING 

FOR INDOCHINA AND SOUTH VIETNAM, 1951–65

By Edward T. Nevgloski1

The origins of the U.S. Marine Corps’ initial 

involvement in the Vietnam War is a littleknown part of the conflict’s historiography.2

In the nearly 50 years since the first combat unit arrived in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), or South 

Vietnam, military historians have yet to explore why 

it was U.S. Marines landing, as opposed to the Army, 

and why of all places in the RVN they landed at Da 

Nang on 8 March 1965. Underscoring this apparent 

oversight in the collective history of the conflict is 

the broad acceptance of the idea of a hastily planned 

landing and subsequent counterinsurgency campaign 

championed by the Marines. However, a thorough 

analysis of the volumes of documents pertaining to 

the planning for intervention in the RVN proves this 

to be a flawed characterization of the tasks assigned 

to the Marines in contingency plans drafted nearly a 

decade earlier. 

What was the Marines’ role in Da Nang and in 

1

 Edward T. Nevgloski is the LtCol Edwin N. McClellan Research 

Fellow at Marine Corps History Division. He is currently working on his PhD in war studies from King’s College in London, 

England.

2

 The term Vietnam War can be confusing and sometimes misleading, depending on the historian and the context of its usage. The 

war between the French and the Viet Minh, from 1946 to 1954, 

is referred to as the First Indochina War. The period from 1955 

to 1960 is a transitional period. The Vietnam War as typically 

discussed includes only the period involving full and direct U.S. 

military action from 1961 to 1975. However, for purposes of this 

paper and unless otherwise stated, the term Vietnam War will 

generally include all three periods.

larger contingency plans? The absence of a comprehensive study to answer these questions adds to an 

already inaccurate and misleading historiographical 

account of the planning origins and how Marines 

came to be so deeply involved. The purpose of this article is to address these historiographical oversights by 

explaining the Marines’ conceptual roles in contingency plans developed between 1951 and 1965. This affords 

the opportunity to correct a grave misinterpretation 

perpetuated by historians lacking a clear understanding of the war and military planning for intervention 

before 1965.

Nearly every study of America’s military intervention in Vietnam begins with the description of 

this “hasty” landing in the wake of an increase in insurgent activity around Da Nang and elsewhere in the 

country. The controversial Pentagon Papers describes it 

as a watershed event in the history of the war presenting a “major decision made without much fanfare—

and without much planning. Whereas the decision to 

begin bombing North Vietnam [the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)] was the product of a year’s 

discussion, debate, and a lot of paper, and whereas the 

consideration of pacification policies reached talmudic [sic] proportions over the years, this decision created less than a ripple.”3

 This rather common depiction 

of the landing could not be further from the truth. 

3

 Mike Gravel, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History 

of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, vol. 3, Senator Gravel 

Ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 433.
28 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Even before the 8 March landing, planners considered the Marines essential to an array of contingencies for defending the south. Senior U.S. military 

officials would see to it that civilian officials followed 

these plans, though some were more difficult to convince than others. On the eve of the landing, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton proposed 

to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Army’s 173d Airborne 

Brigade should take on the security mission at the airfield and other key facilities and installations instead 

of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). His 

sole reasoning was that any American military action 

had to be inconspicuous so as not to attract attention 

for fear of further destabilizing the situation there. In 

McNaughton’s view, the image of Marines equipped 

with tanks and artillery pieces storming ashore from 

amphibious ships could do further damage. Conversely, he judged that Army airborne forces signaled a 

“limited, temporary nature of the U.S. troop deployment” since they carry less equipment and “look less 

formidable” than a Marine amphibious force.4

McNaughton’s proposal received strong opposition from the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 

U.S. ambassador to the RVN, Maxwell D. Taylor, as 

well as from General William Westmoreland and Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, the commander of all 

U.S. forces in the Pacific, including South Vietnam. 

Admiral Sharp justified his rejection of McNaughton’s 

last-minute proposal by referencing the seven active 

contingency plans governing American military intervention in Indochina that explicitly assigned Marines 

to Da Nang. Sharp insisted that, because “the situation 

in Southeast Asia has now reached a point where the 

soundness of our contingency planning may be about 

to be tested,” there was neither the time nor the need 

to make changes to previously approved plans even if 

the political and military objectives were slightly different.5

 In addition, he argued that, from a planning 

and preparation perspective,

4

 Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, 402.

5

 Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 1 March 1965, Greene Papers, 3093, Box 3, Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA, 3.

since the origination of OPLAN 32 in 1959, 

the Marines have been scheduled for deployment to Da Nang . . . contingency plans 

and a myriad of supporting plans at lower 

echelons reflect this same deployment. As 

a result, there has been extensive planning, 

reconnaissance, and logistics preparation 

over the years. . . . I recommend that the 

MEB be landed at Da Nang as previously 

planned.6

Sharp deemed McNaughton’s request to replace 

the 9th MEB with the 173d Airborne Brigade “imprudent,” particularly since military planners determined 

this region of the country required a lighter, mobile, 

and more self-sustaining force.7

 Like Sharp, Westmoreland also argued in favor of deploying Marines to 

Da Nang:

Almost all contingency plans developed 

through the years for Southeast Asia involved marines in the northern provinces 

of South Vietnam, and if one of the contingencies should come about, I wanted to go 

with the plan. In view of a lack of logistical 

installations or support troops, a marine 

force trained and equipped to supply itself 

over the beach was preferable to an airborne force lacking logistical capabilities.8

President Lyndon B. Johnson and McNamara agreed, 

ending McNaughton’s proposal. The 9th MEB proceeded to Da Nang as planners intended.

In the early years of potential direct U.S. military involvement, from 1959 to 1962, amphibious 

ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet carrying the 9th MEB 

responded repeatedly to Communist advances in Indochina. On each occasion, the Seventh Fleet acted 

according to contingency plans developed years earli6

 Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, DC: Marine Corps History and Museum Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1978), 9.

7

 Shulimson and Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam. 8

 William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: 

Doubleday, 1976), 149.
WINTER 2018 29

er to counter aggression in the region. Determined to 

prevent America’s regional allies from falling to Communism, President John F. Kennedy kept close watch 

over Indochina and pledged to intervene, militarily, 

if necessary. During the Laos crisis of 1962, however, 

President Kennedy told his senior White House aide, 

Walt Whitman Rostow, that if he committed U.S. 

military forces to prevent Indochina from becoming 

a collection of Chinese satellite states he would do so 

in Vietnam, not in Laos. According to Rostow, Kennedy’s rationale that southern Vietnam was the more 

logical choice was, among other reasons, because of its 

“direct access to the sea” and geography that “permitted American air and naval power to be more easily 

brought to bear.”9

 That same year, the Geneva Accords 

9

 William L. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 

1960–1963 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985), 34.

of 1962 (or Declaration of the Neutrality of Laos) prohibited all parties involved in the conflict from basing 

military forces and equipment there and shifted the 

U.S. military’s attention back to the RVN, making the 

South China Sea an important part of planning. Less 

than three years later, the 9th MEB waded ashore at 

Da Nang. 

Long before Kennedy’s edict, discussions among 

U.S. military planners on the prospects of military intervention in Indochina included some of the same 

rationalizations on sea power, Marines, and, among 

other key locations, Da Nang. Whether blunting a 

North Korean-style invasion of Indochina and, later, 

the RVN by Chinese and DRV forces, or curtailing 

an insurgency threatening to overtake all of Southeast Asia, Marines were sure to play a role based in 

part on the reasons Kennedy highlighted and the Marine Corps’ mission, functions, and doctrine of the 

Marine Corps History Division

Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific theater.

Marine Corps History Division

Indochina and the Ho Chi Minh trail network.
30 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

time.10 By the time the conflict reached the point of 

full American military intervention under President 

Johnson, contingency plans provided for a significant Marine contribution to defend the country’s five 

northern provinces.

The relationship between the Marines and the 

conflict in South Vietnam dates as far back as the 

First Indochina War between the Viet Minh independence movement and the combined French colonial 

forces, including those from Laos, Cambodia, and 

Vietnam. The Viet Minh offensive of 1954, featuring 

Chinese-made tanks and artillery, ended with several captured or abandoned French outposts north 

of Hanoi and a high command pulling its combat 

units closer to the capital to prevent its capture. After nearly eight years of fighting, France saw the war 

as unwinnable unless the United States and Britain 

provided direct military assistance. One such French 

request included “twenty thousand Marines” to seize 

the seaport at Haiphong before opening an escape 

route between Hanoi and the port for safe passage of 

French forces to Da Nang.11 With the exception of the 

size of the Marine contingent, the request mirrored 

a study presented to the French three years prior in 

1951.12 President Dwight D. Eisenhower concluded in 

both instances that, without concurrences from Congress or the support of U.S. allies, intervention was 

not in America’s best interest.13

The 1954 Geneva Accords officially ended the 

war and partitioned Vietnam into two countries. The 

war’s end also marked the beginning of America’s deliberate planning to defend the RVN from an invasion 

by the DRV and China. Early plans for the commitment of U.S. forces entailed substantial Marine involvement. Like plans for contingencies elsewhere in 

the world, the Marine Corps tied its doctrine, operat10 Alexander S. Cochran Jr., “American Planning for Ground 

Combat in Vietnam, 1952–1965,” Parameters 14, no. 2 (Summer 

1984): 64–65. 11 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the First Indochina War, 1947–1954

(Washington, DC: Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat, 

Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 180–81.

12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the First Indochina War, 1947–1954. 13 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the First Indochina War, 1947–1954.

ing concepts, equipment acquisitions, officer education, and unit training to what it anticipated to be its 

role in the south. By 1962, the Marines were focusing 

on a conventional scenario, even though military planners on the Joint Chiefs’ staff shifted their attention 

to a Communist-inspired insurgency and U.S. support for a national pacification effort. Although combating guerrilla forces and pacifying the population 

consumed a great deal of the Marine Corps’ attention, 

the Service envisioned that it would still deploy combat units to repel a ground invasion and for sustained 

conventional military operations. 

Civilian and military officials debated committing U.S. combat forces to end the stalemate and 

reunify the two Vietnams. Foremost on the minds 

of military planners was the potential for a North 

Marine Corps History Division

I Corps Tactical Zone and northern provinces.
WINTER 2018 31

Korean-style invasion to seize the south’s major cities 

and seaports and the capital in Saigon. Agreements 

coming out of Geneva to hold national elections likely 

prevented an invasion, though few in President Eisenhower’s cabinet expected the north to remain idle. 

Anticipating Communist aggression, Eisenhower’s 

national security team began work in 1955 on a security policy vis-à-vis an American military response. 

The result was National Security Council Memorandum 5602/1 and a U.S. Department of Defense initiative to develop contingency plans for direct military 

involvement.14 A planning cell under the supervision 

of the Joint Chiefs explored several scenarios requiring 

a direct U.S. military response. The cell formalized 

its findings in June 1956 with Limited War Plan–

Indochina.15 Aimed at repulsing “overt aggression” by 

China and the DRV, the plan outlined the American 

military response in two distinct phases: a massive 

allied air bombardment of invading formations, including the potential use of nuclear weapons, and the 

introduction of U.S. and allied ground forces to seize 

select military objectives in the south and the north.16

Critical to the success of the opening phase was 

a South Vietnamese “delaying action from the 17th 

parallel to the hill mass around Tourane” to buy time 

for U.S. forces to arrive and form the counterattack.17

Three U.S. Army regimental combat teams and two 

Marine regimental landing teams served as the vanguard of an American-led campaign estimated to take 

14 Willard J. Webb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Prelude to the 

War in Vietnam, 1954–1959 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), 

132.

15 Limited War Plan–Indochina (revised 26 November 1956), as 

cited in A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 5, Planning the War (McLean, VA: BDM Corp., 1980), 3-6. 16 Limited War Plan–Indochina (revised 26 November 1956), 3-6; 

Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960—

The United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, U.S. Army, 1985), 270; and U.S. Policy in Event 

of Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam, JCS 1992/479 enclosure to 

Memo JCS to SECDEC, 9 September 1955, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-

48) (2), Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA, 

Washington, DC.

17 Tourane was the French name for Da Nang at the time. See 

Webb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Prelude to the War in Vietnam, 

1954–1959, 132.

between 9 and 12 months to complete. The mission 

was to seize and defend the seaports and airbases at 

Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon, where additional forces and supplies were to arrive before counterattacking Viet Minh forces (and potentially Chinese) 

south of the 17th parallel.18 Their objective was to destroy or push all Communist forces north of the 17th 

parallel and reestablish the demarcation line.

That same year, the Army conducted its own 

study of the situation in Indochina. Campaign Plan–

North Vietnam, like Limited War Plan–Indochina, 

highlighted many of the same points and offered a 

few changes. In its plan, an Army division would lead 

the counterattack north of Da Nang in conjunction 

with amphibious landings by Marines in the DRV 

to cut off Viet Minh escape routes and to seize key 

military bases on the coast.19 Afterward, the Marines 

would join the Army for a follow-on attack against 

the port at Haiphong before moving west along the 

Red River valley and seizing Hanoi.20 The end state 

was a reunified Vietnam under control of the RVN’s 

government, thereby ending the conflict entirely and 

halting China’s advances in Indochina and Southeast 

Asia. Planners estimated the counteroffensive alone 

to take three months to complete with another eight 

months to clear and secure Viet Minh base areas in 

the mountains north of Hanoi.21

The headquarters for all American military forces in the Pacific produced its own blueprint for conflict in Indochina, which was identical to the Army’s 

Campaign Plan–North Vietnam, but with one major 

difference whereby amphibious landings north of the 

17th parallel were contingent upon the intensity of the 

resistance at Da Nang and the high probability of success. Confident that a framework for American mili18 A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 6, Conduct 

of the War, book 2, Functional Analyses (McLean, VA: BDM Corp., 

1980), 3–7.

19 Plan for U.S. Participation in Event of Viet Minh Aggression 

in Vietnam, Appendix to Memo, JCS for CINCPAC, 11 July 1956 

as cited in Spector, Advice and Support, 270. 20 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-7; U.S. Policy 

in Event of Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam, JCS, 1992/479; 

and Spector, Advice and Support, 270. 21 Spector, Advice and Support, 271.
32 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

tary action was in place, the Joint Chiefs delegated 

sole detailed planning and coordination responsibilities to the Pacific Command’s multi-Service planning 

cell.22

With ownership of detailed planning and coordination, the senior joint U.S. military command in 

the Pacific theater began work on Operations Plan 

(OPLAN) 46-56.23 Defeating a ground invasion by a 

combined Chinese-DRV force or by North Vietnamese forces acting alone was still the primary concern 

as was the timely arrival of U.S. forces and RVN holding actions between Da Nang and the demilitarized 

zone. Two major changes surfaced as a result of the 

Pacific Command’s more detailed planning effort. The 

first was that OPLAN 46-56, unlike its predecessors, 

restricted the use of nuclear weapons. The second was 

the realization of a more complex Communist ground 

invasion scheme. 

Based on their study of the terrain and geography, planners did not foresee the Communists limiting their invasion to one axis of advance, particularly 

if there was the potential for direct U.S. ground and 

air involvement. Instead, planners believed the Communists would rely on as many as three attack routes. 

The first and most direct route took invasion forces 

south across the demilitarized zone along National 

Highway 1 (the only north-south road in Indochina) to 

capture the major cities of Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, 

Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, and Phan Thiet.24 Communist 

forces also might attack via the Lao panhandle along 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail network. With this particular 

route, invading forces could move south before turning east into South Vietnam at the central highlands 

and capturing the border towns of Kon Tum, Pleiku, 

and Ban Me Thuot straddling National Highway 14. 

Planners assessed that the Communists’ goal was to 

22 See Webb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Prelude to the War in 

Vietnam, 1954–1959, 132; and Limited War Plan–Indochina, 3-6. All 

four Services had planners on the staff of the Joint Chiefs and at 

the Pacific Command to ensure their interests and capabilities 

were understood during planning. 

23 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-7, 3-8. 24 Cochran, “American Planning for Ground Combat in Vietnam, 1952–1965,” 64.

cut the country in half.25 The third route planners considered began in northern Laos and traversed the full 

length of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through the central 

and southern part of the country and into eastern 

Cambodia along the Mekong River, putting invading 

forces within easy striking distance of Saigon.26 Most 

expected enemy forces to use a combination of the 

three routes to deceive and overwhelm American and 

RVN command-and-control and defenses.

The opening phase of any combined AmericanRVN military response to the most simple or complex 

invasion was to keep the Communists north of Da 

Nang and to use ground forces and supplies for both 

land- and sea-based counteroffensives. Several coastal 

points were vitally important since, according to Vietnam War historian Dr. Alexander S. Cochran Jr., planners expected U.S. forces would deploy to “Vietnam 

by sea and a few by air” and be “resupplied through 

coastal ports.”27 As detailed planning continued, the 

Joint Chiefs approved a list of ground and aviation 

commands for the military response. Planners earmarked the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, both in Japan, for operations to seize the 

Hai Van Pass just north of Da Nang where National 

Highway 1 traversed the Truong Son mountain range 

and emptied into the enclave.28 Optimistic that the 

Marines could slow the pace of invading forces with 

a hasty defensive line and buy time for additional 

American and allied forces to counter the offensive, 

planners wanted an additional Marine contingent to 

remain at sea for use in amphibious landings at various points on the southern and northern Vietnamese 

coasts.29

When planners surmised that the Communists 

might consider alternate and multiple invasion routes, 

25 Cochran, “American Planning for Ground Combat in Vietnam”; and Spector, Advice and Support, 268. 26 Cochran, “American Planning for Ground Combat in Vietnam.”

27 Cochran, “American Planning for Ground Combat in Vietnam.”

28 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-7; and Spector, Advice and Support, 268–70. 29 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 5; and Spector, Advice and Support.
WINTER 2018 33

they realized Saigon might not be the only seat of government at risk. The Thai capital at Bangkok and the 

Laotian capital of Vientiane also were at risk of becoming Communist targets.30 Their theory prompted 

senior military officials to consider drafting a more 

expansive plan and to include Thailand and Laos 

as part of their overall Indochina defense strategy. 

Events internal to South Vietnam and the greater Indochina region compelled Pacific Command to more 

critically assess North Vietnam’s intentions, as well as 

those of China, and the means by which the Communists might overcome the advantages the U.S. military 

held in technology and firepower.

The rationale behind American plans centered 

on the type of conflict into which the Joint Chiefs 

believed U.S. forces were entering. In 1959, the Communists started to view reunification in terms of years 

and not as a result of a single overt military invasion. 

Graham Cosmas wrote in MACV: The Joint Command in 

the Years of Escalation that the DRV recognized that a 

conventional invasion, with or without China, would 

not achieve reunification. Instead, it would have to 

combine “large-scale military campaigns with widespread popular uprisings” to realize this goal.31 Getting 

the support of the people would take time. Cognizant 

of America’s pledge to protect the south from invasion 

and of its advantages in military technology and firepower, the north decided instead to present numerous 

conventional and unconventional challenges to RVN 

officials and U.S. officials and their allies to resolve. 

Beginning first with the rise of the Communist Pathet 

Lao insurgency in Laos in 1957, the north put pressure on the south by creating instability on its borders. Then, in 1960, the DRV set conditions for war 

in the RVN when it revised its 1946 constitution. In 

it, the ruling Lao Dong (Vietnamese Workers) Party 

drafted a proclamation directing its forces to prepare 

to defend the north and liberate the south. The same 

decree gave formal rise to the southern branch of the 

30 Spector, Advice and Support. 31 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 

U.S. Army, 2006), 72. MACV = Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam.

Lao Dong, known formally as the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP), with the mission of undermining the 

RVN government and stirring resentment among the 

southern people toward their government and military.32

Recognizing the United States was likely to 

suspect DRV involvement in violating the Geneva 

Accords by undermining the RVN government, Communist officials attempted to conceal their actions by 

encouraging nationalists and other non-Communist 

organizations to participate in reunification efforts. 

These groups formed the National Liberation Front 

(NLF) in December 1960, the majority of which was 

Communist.33 The growth of the movement prompted 

the Lao Dong to form the Central Office for South 

Vietnam (COSVN) to coordinate all political and military activities south of the demilitarized zone. Under 

COSVN’s direction, the NLF carried out day-to-day 

guerrilla actions in the south. Similar to Mao’s people’s 

war in China, the NLF’s strategy consisted of military 

operations at the regional, provincial/district, and village levels to wage a guerrilla campaign to gain the 

support of the population and control the countryside 

before “consolidating and expanding the base areas” 

and to strengthen “the people’s forces in all respects 

. . . in order to advance to building a large, strong armed 

force which can, along with all the people, defeat the 

enemy troops and win ultimate victory.”34 The result 

was a massive expansion of the NLF in slightly more 

than two years. According to Cosmas’s estimates, the 

32 According to Douglas Pike, there are numerous interchangeable titles historians use to describe the political and military 

organizations associated with the war. The NLF, referred to by 

South Vietnamese officials as the “communist traitors to Vietnam,” or Viet Cong (VC), was a politico-military Communistdominated nationalist insurgency seeking to liberate the country 

and reunify the north and the south. It was the successor to the 

Viet Minh (the precursor to the NLF), which was a collection 

of Communist and nationalist organizations formed to oust the 

Japanese and French between 1944 and 1954. The official title of 

the NLF’s fighting arm was the People’s Liberation Armed Forces, or PLAF. See Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and 

Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).

33 See Pike, Viet Cong, 82. 34 Cosmas, MACV, 72.
34 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

NLF grew “from about 4,000 fulltime fighters in early 

1960 to over 20,000,” with as many as “20 battalions, 

80 separate companies, and perhaps 100 platoons of 

widely varying personnel strength,” the bulk of which 

COSVN deployed in and around Saigon.35 The NLF 

formed battalion-size units specifically to conduct 

conventional operations in the central highlands and 

northern provinces.36

The NLF adhered to the same tactics the Viet 

Minh used against the French. Fighting units consisted of three elements: main forces, provincial or district units, and local guerrilla forces. The uniformed 

and well-armed, organized, and equipped main forces 

consisted of battalion- and regimental-size units who 

took their orders directly from the COSVN and subordinate regional headquarters. These main forces were 

for major operations and attacks against large French 

(and later American) formations only. The provincial 

and district units were a composite of guerrilla and 

main force units operating at the company and battalion levels. Although equipped and organized similar to the main forces, these units were not nearly as 

capable. Their primary role was small-scale raids and 

other offensive actions. 

The least capable armed component outside the 

“estimated 20,000 combat troops counted by the allies” was the village-level local guerrillas.37 Formed into 

platoons or smaller units, guerrillas received their orders from district and village officials. Ill-equipped 

and untrained, guerrillas lived among the people and 

harassed South Vietnamese, French, and American 

units as they moved through or near villages. Their 

greatest attribute was conducting reconnaissance for 

the main forces as well as providing logistics support 

and partially trained replacements.38 All levels of the 

Communist armed division relied upon the villages 

for food, clothing, recruits, labor, and medical supplies. Most of their weapons and ammunition, however, came from the DRV or were fabrications. As early 

as 1962, the NLF built base areas in the rural areas and 

35 Cosmas, MACV.

36 Cosmas, MACV. 37 Cosmas, MACV, 72–73.

38 Pike, Viet Cong, 79.

outside the RVN government’s sphere of control and 

influence. The Marines’ long-term plan in the northern provinces was to retake these areas, along with the 

enclaves, one at a time.

Successful incursions into Laos and inconspicuous interference in the south’s deteriorating domestic 

affairs shifted the momentum in favor of the Communists. Instability in the south increased as the Communists’ political cadres, educated and trained in the 

north just after the partitioning of Vietnam, returned 

to their hamlets and villages to play on the fear and 

anger of disenfranchised farmers and to challenge 

the legitimacy of the RVN government.39 Promising 

sweeping land reforms in exchange for their loyal support—and punishment for their betrayal—the initial 

wave of political cadres made immediate gains among 

the people living in the rural areas and away from the 

large and more prosperous cities. At the same time, 

Chinese and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) advisors and equipment outfitted district and main force 

units. To ensure an endless flow of weapons and ammunition, the NVA carved out new infiltration routes 

leading to and from South Vietnam and expanded existing pathways.

The Pacific Command’s responsibility to plan for 

military action brought about a less centralized and 

unconventional way of thinking as well as a broader 

perspective emphasizing greater awareness of the regional situation and not one focused solely on the 

RVN. The principal issue prompting planners to revisit their earlier planning considerations was the 

potential for invading forces to use new and multiple routes. Since two of the three anticipated routes 

crossed through neighboring Laos and Cambodia, the 

security and stability of those countries were important to the South Vietnamese government. Border 

control, therefore, was important. Due to the RVN’s 

geographic disposition and the presence of Communist forces in Laos and Cambodia, planners saw value 

in developing more inclusive U.S. action. 

The conditions in Laos, more so than in Cambodia and the RVN, convinced planners that a new and 

39 Pike, Viet Cong, 82.
WINTER 2018 35

comprehensive series of plans reflecting simultaneous 

actions in different parts of Indochina was necessary. 

Known as Operations Plan 32: Defense of Indochina 

(OPLAN 32), the successor to OPLAN 46-56 was 

American’s first real attempt to bring together military forces from throughout Southeast Asia to contain Communism and, specifically, to prevent the fall 

of Indochina entirely.40 The series of plans consisted 

of actions in the RVN to counter both a conventional 

ground invasion and an insurgency, as well as actions 

to defeat DRV-backed insurgencies threatening Laos 

and Thailand. Actions specific to South Vietnam fell 

under OPLAN 32-59.

OPLAN 32 consisted of four distinct phases to 

counter or combat Communist aggression: Phase IAlert; Phase II-Counterinsurgency; Phase III-Direct 

North Vietnamese attack; and Phase IV-Direct Chinese attack. In Phase I, U.S. forces were to assemble 

and to make preparations to respond to deployment 

orders regarding either or both scenarios. Phase II “extended from the time the United States decided to 

take military action against a Communist insurgency 

until the friendly government regained control or 

the conflict escalated into a full-scale local war.”41 Although Phase III put American forces in action against 

the DRV specifically, Phase IV dealt with actions 

against China in the event of its direct involvement 

in any ground invasion.42 Concerning the Marines, 

Phase II entailed a “scaled-down version of the Phase 

40 The number 32 signifies the overall purpose of the plan, which 

was to defend Indochina. With each plan’s revision, planners attached the year in which the original work on the plan began 

(i.e., OPLAN 46-56 began in 1956). For specific situations in the 

RVN and in Laos that might be unrelated to the other, different numbering conventions existed. For example, OPLAN 37-64 

was to stabilize the south, while OPLAN 99-64 was the effort to 

stabilize Laos, but only after the 1962 Geneva Accords made Laos 

off-limits to U.S. plans to protect South Vietnam. Each subplan 

provided specific guidance for confined missions or to achieve a 

specific result (e.g., OPLAN 34-64 Covert Actions in North Vietnam). Regardless of the specific situation, location, and mission, 

all plans fell under the overall OPLAN 32 construct. See A Study 

in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-4. 41 CINCPAC Command History, 1960 (Honolulu, HI: Headquarters 

of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, 1961), 21–24. CINCPAC 

= Commander in Chief, Pacific.

42 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-5.

III deployment, with a portion of the Marine force going to Da Nang and two Army brigades to the Saigon 

area.”43 In Phases III and IV, a full Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) would deploy to Da Nang, with an 

Army division deploying to Qui Nhon and the central 

highlands and an Army airborne brigade to Saigon.44

These forces were to assist RVN forces in blocking the 

Communist attack down the coast and against Saigon. 

Their principal mission was to defend the developed 

coastal areas, thereby freeing RVN units to take the 

offensive. 

OPLAN 32 architects, unlike those of previous 

plans, conceded to the idea that an insurgency was 

likely and that by inciting instability in a neighboring 

country the Communists were attempting to divert 

U.S. attention and, if possible, military resources away 

from South Vietnam. The final draft of OPLAN 32 left 

open the possibility for American ground forces to 

“engage in unspecified counter-guerrilla activities” after turning back the anticipated ground invasion.45 In 

the event of calling on U.S. forces to counter an insurgency, planners decided the same enclaves used as part 

of the defensive and counterattack against the ground 

invasion would still serve as bases of operations. 

The presence of Communist forces in Laos that 

had remained in place by the Geneva Accords left 

the Royal Lao Government (an ally to the United 

States) and neighboring Thailand vulnerable to influence and attack. As the situation in Laos intensified, planners focused on developing a Lao-specific 

branch plan. With this in mind, the Pacific Command 

added OPLAN 32-59 (L) in June 1959 to prepare for 

unilateral U.S. military action to restore “stability and 

friendly control of Laos in the event it was threatened 

by Communist insurgency.”46 A theme common to all 

of the operation plans for Indochina was the rapid 

43 Cosmas, MACV, 188. 44 Cosmas, MACV. 45 Cosmas, MACV. 46 Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States 

Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, vol. 2, From Military Assistance to 

Combat, 1959–1965 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 

Department of the Navy, 1986), 26; and Norman B. Hannah, The 

Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD: Madison 

Books, 1987).
36 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

deployment of conventional military forces. OPLAN 

32 (L) was no different, but this time America’s quick 

response was for securing airfields and the Mekong 

River crossing points connecting Seno and Vientiane, 

Laos, to Thailand. Those actions included a sizeable 

Marine air-ground commitment.

President Kennedy’s election in 1960 brought 

with it several dramatic changes to U.S. military policy toward Indochina. It also impacted joint military 

planning and the Marine Corps’ potential role in the 

war there. The first change came with President Kennedy’s pledge to rebuild the U.S. Armed Services. Allan R. Millett explained in Semper Fidelis: The History 

of the United States Marine Corps that under Kennedy, 

the Marine Corps “began a five-year surge in readiness 

that brought it to its highest level of peacetime effectiveness by the eve of the Vietnam War.”47 Kennedy’s 

rationale for restoring traditional military capabilities 

was to ensure that the United States possessed both 

feasible and credible counters to Soviet leader Nikita 

Khrushchev’s encroachment into Western Europe. 

The most significant change, however, would be Kennedy’s pledge to counter Khrushchev’s declaration to 

support unconditionally wars of national liberation 

around the world. Indigenous rebellions and popular 

insurgencies in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and 

in other parts of Central America, Africa, and Indochina were but a few examples.48

Countering Soviet support for wars of national 

liberation was one of Kennedy’s first directives to 

the Joint Chiefs. He tasked the Service chiefs with 

developing and including special warfare and counterinsurgency doctrine in Service training and professional military education. At the same time, Kennedy 

increased defense spending to prepare the Services to 

fight conventional wars. The Services responded to 

Kennedy’s Flexible Response policy by overhauling 

47 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States 

Marine Corps (New York: Free Press, 1980), 543.

48 Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961: Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal 

Security Act and Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session, 

Testimony of Dr. Stefan T. Possony, June 16, 1961 (Washington, DC; 

Government Printing Office, 1961).

Service-specific roles and responsibilities to meet his 

mandate for providing courses of action other than 

the nuclear option championed by President Eisenhower in his New Look initiative beginning in 1953.49

Despite Kennedy’s interest in special/counterinsurgency warfare, he and Secretary McNamara wanted a 

Marine Corps “capable of sustained combat” against 

a peer competitor and on land.50 The Marine Corps 

was already moving in that direction. A decade earlier, the 19th Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, 

stressed that the Service build a “solid foundation of 

competence in conventional land warfare,” adding 

that “if the occasion demands it” Marine forces will be 

“capable of moving in and fighting side by side with 

Army divisions.”51

In 1951, Marine Corps doctrine writers began 

emphasizing a quick-strike capability as opposed to 

the Army’s heavier and more deliberate land warfighting doctrine focusing on both offensive and defensive 

thinking. Service doctrine under General Cates centered on creating a force capable of seizing and holding 

objectives, such as seaports and airfields, to support 

the arrival of a larger Marine and Army force. Under 

Flexible Response, however, the Marines would not 

return immediately to amphibious ships waiting offshore. Instead, they would continue limited offensive 

and defensive operations to support the larger ground 

campaign as well as keeping lines of communication 

and resupply routes open for Army forces fighting farther inland. Rather than operating from ships, base 

49 Flexible response or flexible deterrent options refer to a U.S. defense strategy that offered a wide range of diplomatic, political, 

economic, and military options to deter an enemy attack. The 

term flexible response first appears in Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, 

USA (Ret), The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Row, 

1960), which sharply criticized U.S. national security policy. 

Eisenhower’s New Look approach relied heavily on the capacity 

for a devastating assault with nuclear weapons—massive retaliation—to fight Soviet military provocations, regardless of whether 

they involved nuclear weapons or not. The Eisenhower administration thought it could deter all forms of aggression by the Soviet Union and China without maintaining expensive and large 

conventional military forces.

50 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 546.

51 Col John E. Greenwood, “The Pre-war Era,” Marine Corps Gazette 56, no. 9 (September 1972): 37.
WINTER 2018 37

areas similar to the beachheads of the Second World 

War would provide the Marines with intermediate 

logistics support, artillery emplacements, and shorebased command-and-control nodes. With additional 

capabilities, the Marine force could extend or duplicate their beachheads farther inland, if necessary.52

While the Marine Corps improved its warfighting capacity, Pacific Command planners considered 

with great certainty that a DRV-sponsored insurgency was now the most likely threat to the RVN and 

that the long-anticipated conventional invasion was 

less likely. Counterinsurgency warfare and military 

support to political, social, and economic concepts 

received greater attention. Up to this point, U.S. advisors concentrated on preparing RVN forces to repel 

a conventional ground invasion. After conventionally 

organized and equipped NLF battalions routed Army, 

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), units in 1961, President Kennedy sent his chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

General Maxwell Taylor, to South Vietnam to assess 

the situation and recommend a way forward. Taylor’s 

trip led to the establishment of a new command structure, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), and the quadrupling of American 

personnel supporting its mission. He brought back a 

profound understanding of the conflict and a cautious 

tone concerning America’s direct military involvement in the fighting.53

Unlike Taylor, the Joint Chiefs resisted widening America’s advisory-and-assistance role. Although 

Commandant General David M. Shoup had a close 

professional relationship with Kennedy, it did not 

prevent him from being one of the more vocal opponents of America’s and the Marine Corps’ potential 

involvement in the conflict, particularly in a counterinsurgency role.54 Shoup did just enough to convince 

Kennedy that the Marine Corps followed his directive to incorporate counterinsurgency warfare into 

52 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 546–47.

53 Maxwell D. Taylor, Report on General Taylor’s Mission to Vietnam

(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1961), 8.

54 Frank Wallace, Kennedy’s General: A Story of Uncommon Courage

—The Remarkable Life of David M. Shoup (Berkeley, CA: Minuteman Press, 2013).

its doctrine and training. Historian Howard Jablon 

observed in an article on General Shoup that, despite 

Shoup’s many accomplishments, he failed to convince 

Kennedy that “counterinsurgency warfare was unrealistic” and that the Marines were not suited for nationbuilding.55 Given the option, Shoup wanted to keep 

from involving Marines in these types of conflicts.

The Pacific Command offered few deviations to 

their theories on both an overt and covert Communist 

takeover of the RVN. With President Kennedy’s deep 

interest and concern that wars of the future would be 

both conventional and involve the people and guerrilla elements (as witnessed in Cuba, French Indochina 

and Algeria, and China), planners wanted to produce 

options in the event U.S. forces had to confront either 

or both. To be able to fight an insurgency, while at the 

same time having the resources in place to counter a 

conventional invasion, planners identified locations 

along the Mekong River stretching from Thailand 

across Laos and the RVN to the Tonkin Gulf and other positions south near the Cambodia-RVN border.56

This main line of resistance, supported by the other 

allied nations making up the Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization (SEATO) included armor and infantry 

forces as part of an anti-infiltration scheme designed 

to halt the flood of Communist advisors and equipment entering the country from North Vietnam.57

These were the same locations planners considered to 

be potential border crossing points for the conventional ground attack, if it materialized.

In either instance, Marines would play a much 

larger and preemptive role than Pacific Command 

planners had conceived and studied with the idea of 

deploying U.S. ground forces in advance of an invasion and before the insurgency grew out of control. 

One plan called for a MEB to establish “secure base 

55 Howard Jablon, “General David M. Shoup, USMC: Warrior 

and War Protestor,” Journal of Military History 60, no. 3 (July 

1996): 513.

56 See Cochran, “American Planning for Ground Combat in Vietnam.”

57 Created in 1954, SEATO was a response to the demand that 

the Southeast Asian area be protected against Communist expansionism. A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-8.
38 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

areas” at Da Nang and other coastal locations.58 They 

also envisioned that a separate and larger MEF would 

either pass through Da Nang to carry out operations 

against the insurgency or stay “anchored on the coast 

to preserve additional amphibious option.”59 Meanwhile, a second MEF (minus the brigade at Da Nang) 

would remain at sea “to quarantine South Vietnam 

to degree necessary to significantly reduce Viet Cong 

sea infiltration.”60 They continued stressing the importance of amphibious operations against the DRV to 

draw Communist forces away from the demilitarized 

zone and Laos-Cambodia-RVN triborder region. 

Roughly 205,000 U.S. combat and support personnel 

(six divisions) were to support this plan, including 

nearly 85,000 Marines.61

To prepare the Marine Corps for the range of 

potential tasks, General Shoup directed the Landing 

Force Development Center at Quantico to develop a 

classified advanced base staff exercise centered on the 

volatile security situation in and around Da Nang. The 

goal was to orient officers to the conflict and enhance 

their understanding of the Marine Corps’ prospective 

area of operations. He also wanted to glean ideas and 

concepts from their planning to improve Service-level 

thinking on the conflict and how the military command in South Vietnam could best deploy and employ Marine forces. All Marine officers assigned as 

students at both the Amphibious Warfare School and 

Command and Staff College in Quantico between 

1963 and 1965 participated in a planning exercise titled Operation Cormorant.The scenario involved the 

deployment of a reinforced MEF at Da Nang in an effort to stabilize and defend the enclave in the face of a 

growing insurgency and looming Communist ground 

invasion.62

58 “Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Point Paper on Options 

in South Vietnam,” March 1964, Greene Papers, 3093, Box 3, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

59 “Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Point Paper on Options 

in South Vietnam.”

60 “Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Point Paper on Options 

in South Vietnam.”

61 Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, 108. 62 Francis J. Kelly, “Advance Base Problems,” Marine Corps Gazette 

51, no. 11 (November 1967): 47–49.

Given the security situation, a common trend 

Shoup noted was that students saw pacification of the 

populated areas as a critical task and that it would 

require a significant number of Marines to secure and 

hold pacified rear areas. No less important was their 

regard for conventional military operations. When 

the 9th MEB landed at Da Nang in 1965, a large number of the Marine officers assigned to the command 

were uniquely familiar with the security situation in 

Da Nang and the tasks assigned to them as a result 

of their Operation Cormorant planning experiences.63

Regardless, Shoup was no more willing to get Marines 

involved in a purely counterinsurgency role. Instead, 

he stressed the Marine Corps’ neutrality: “We do not 

claim to be experts in the entire scope of actions required in counterinsurgency operations. We do stand 

ready to carry out the military portions of such operations and to contribute to such other aspects of the 

counterinsurgency effort as may be appropriate.”64

In the aftermath of widespread civilian unrest 

brought on by the insurgency, religious indifferences, 

repeated changes in the RVN government and military leadership, and ongoing pleas for land and social 

reforms, U.S. planners replaced OPLAN 32-59 with 

OPLAN 32-64 in early 1964.65 The central theme of 

planning shifted from defending the south from an 

outside threat to stabilizing the country in spite of 

several internal threats. At the same time, to increase 

pressure on the north to cease its support for the NLF, 

the Joint Chiefs recommended an air campaign featuring a highly scrutinized list of 94 industrial and 

military targets to cripple the country’s economy and 

ability to provide the necessary warfighting materials and resources to sustain the war.66 Some of the 

63 “Da Nang Revisited,” Marine Corps Gazette 49, no. 5 (May 

1965): 1.

64 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 548. Shoup’s statement comes from an 

excerpt of his 1963 comments to the U.S. House Armed Services 

Committee. See Hearing on Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1964, 

Before the House Armed Services Committee, 88th Congress (January 

1963) (testimony of Gen David M. Shoup, USMC), 909. 

65 South Vietnam endured failed military coup attempts in 1960 

and again in 1964. A successful military coup in November 1963 

ended the presidency and life of Ngo Dinh Diem.

66 Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, 108. 
WINTER 2018 39

perspectives from previous plans gained new life. In 

OPLAN 32-64, planners reintroduced three invasion 

routes that were identified in earlier plans, only this 

time they looked to these locations as crossing points 

for insurgents and NVA forces slipping into the south 

from the north, Laos, and Cambodia.67 The plan established border control points to monitor these areas 

specifically. OPLAN 32-64 called attention to several 

major sea and coastal infiltration points as well. 

Pressure to involve American ground forces accelerated in 1964 after a series of ARVN battlefield 

setbacks convinced U.S. political and military officials that the South Vietnamese government could not 

win the war. A once-cautious General Westmoreland, 

who assumed command of USMACV in June, contemplated implementing the defensive line outlined 

in OPLAN 32-59. In his proposal to the Joint Chiefs 

to consider the measure, he suggested deploying mobile light infantry units near the demilitarized zone to 

both delay invading forces and clear and hold guerrilla 

base areas and surrounding Saigon with an elaborate 

system of defenses formed around air cavalry units and 

mechanized and armor divisions extending north and 

west of the capital city.68 In keeping with the plan, Marine forces would operate in the northern provinces, 

where they were to establish beachheads adjacent to 

the largest enclaves and where any number of beaches 

could be used for landing Marines and resupplies.69 If 

the Communist ground invasion never materialized, 

the role of U.S. ground forces was to advise and build 

the RVN’s military’s fighting capacity in conjunction 

with support for national pacification programs to 

reinforce the population’s confidence in the government. OPLAN 32-64 represented more than just a new 

plan; it reflected the way the United States viewed the 

evolving situation in South Vietnam. 

The Johnson administration considered the NLF 

closer to overthrowing the RVN government than at 

any time in the past decade, reigniting both private 

and public debates over America’s direct intervention. 

With each passing day, Communist political cadres 

67 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 5:3-10–3-12. 68 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 5.

69 A Study in Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 6, 168.

and guerrilla forces seemingly increased in numbers, 

popularity, and overall strength. Hanoi viewed the 

NLF’s gains as an opportunity to increase pressure in 

the demilitarized region, infiltrating more than 12,000 

soldiers in 1964 as compared to the 7,900 in 1963.70 In 

the northern provinces, the Marine Corps watched 

closely as the contact between the ARVN and the 

main forces and NVA increased in frequency and lethality. In areas where NVA units were purportedly 

infiltrating, Chinese and Soviet weapons and ammunition surfaced in large quantities, as did reports of 

soldiers in uniforms and equipment typically worn by 

the Chinese military.71 Official intelligence reports described the once relatively quiet northern provinces 

as a flashpoint. Main force attacks there, compared 

with the rest of the country, increased from 6 percent in 1963 to 13 percent in 1964.72 Although the total 

number of enemy killed country-wide decreased from 

20,573 in 1963 to 16,785 in 1964, the number killed in 

the northern provinces tripled from 664 to 1,887.73

During 1963, 10 percent of the ARVN soldiers killed 

came as a result of fighting there, an increase of nearly 

25 percent.74

In light of the increase in NVA activity, Johnson 

approved intelligence collection operations off North 

Vietnam, over the demilitarized zone, and along the 

Ho Chi Minh trail. He also encouraged the RVN government and military to go on the offensive against 

the NLF. The results of the latter, however, were not 

what Johnson expected. American military advisors 

reported wholesale corruption and incompetence at 

the highest levels of the military and low morale in 

the ranks as the primary reason for the ARVN’s failures. Johnson sought a wider role for U.S. forces, and 

70 Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March–September 1965 (Pearl Harbor, HI: Headquarters Fleet Marine Forces 

Pacific, 1965), 12. 

71 Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March–

September 1965, 13. 72 Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March–

September 1965.

73 Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March–

September 1965. 74 Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March–

September 1965.
40 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

the Tonkin Gulf incidents in August 1964 gave him 

the justification he needed to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of 

the United States and to prevent further aggression.”75

By the end of 1964, the South Vietnamese population’s diminished confidence in their government 

and the ARVN was impacting the country’s daily 

affairs. The ever-present fear of yet another military 

coup, coupled with the continuing trend of battlefield 

defeats, threatened the decades-old American effort 

to build a strong central government and national 

military in South Vietnam. The consensus was that 

the country was sure to collapse if the RVN government, with the assistance of the United States, did 

not reverse the “losing trend.”76 During an official visit 

in January 1965, one of President Johnson’s top national security advisors, McGeorge Bundy, remarked 

that “the situation in Vietnam is deteriorating and 

without new US action, defeat appears inevitable—

probably not in a matter of weeks or even months, 

but within the next year or so. There is still time to 

turn it around, but not much.”77

Still at an impasse as to the depth and degree of 

direct U.S. military involvement, Johnson was nonetheless resolute in keeping the south free from Communism despite the desperate political and military 

situations. He believed he was doing as much as he 

could politically. Militarily, however, Johnson acknowledged that there was still more the United States 

could, and would likely have to, do. He reached a decision point when the NLF attacked U.S. forces based 

at Pleiku and Qui Nhon on 7 and 10 February 1965, 

killing a combined total of 33 servicemembers and 

75 The Tonkin Gulf incident consisted of two engagements between DRV Navy torpedo boats and the American destroyers 

USS Maddox (DD 731) and USS Turner Joy (DD 951) off the coast 

of North Vietnam on 2 and 4 August 1964. House Joint Resolution 1145 passed on 7 August 1964, permitting Johnson to take 

the necessary action to defend U.S. forces and the RVN from 

Communist aggression. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. 20, Ninetieth Cong., Second Session, 1968 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

2010), 1.

76 Gen Westmoreland and other civilian and military officials frequently used this expression to describe the direction of the war.

77 Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, 309. 

destroying or damaging 52 aircraft.78 Similar to the 

attack against the RVN-U.S. airbase at Bien Hoa outside Saigon on 1 November 1964, NLF guerrillas infiltrated multiple layers of security with relative ease 

before attacking aircraft revetments and personnel 

billeting. Unlike in the days following the events at 

Bien Hoa, however, Johnson responded to the Pleiku 

and Qui Nhon attacks with Operations Flaming Dart 

I and II. For the next three weeks, U.S. aircraft struck 

an NVA compound located at the port city of Dong 

Hoi in southern DRV and infiltration routes leading 

into the RVN from across the demilitarized zone and 

from Laos. Johnson and senior members of his cabinet 

viewed the air strikes as retaliatory actions and the 

first steps in pressuring North Vietnam to end its support of the NLF.79

Following a mid-February 1965 inspection tour 

of the military bases supporting the Flaming Dart airstrikes, General Westmoreland’s deputy commander, 

Army general John L. Throckmorton, voiced his concerns about the security of these installations as well 

as the protection of U.S. servicemembers and aircraft, citing the attacks at Bien Hoa, Pleiku, and Qui 

Nhon as evidence to back his concerns.80 Troubled by 

his deputy commander’s assessment, Westmoreland 

sought permission from Admiral Sharp to employ the 

9th MEB, afloat in the South China Sea since January, to secure the Da Nang airbase.81 Westmoreland’s 

request for Marines—the second such request in three 

months (the first came after the Bien Hoa attack)—

renewed the debate between civilian and military officials regarding the use of U.S. ground forces and the 

capacity in which they were to be employed.

The arrival of the 9th MEB marked the end of 

78 John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Office of Air Force 

History, 1988), 17, 31. 

79 Schlight, The War in South Vietnam, 31. 80 USMACV to CINCPAC, 20 February 1965, Box 237, Subject 

files, Office of the Secretary of Defense History, Washington, 

DC, hereafter USMACV February memo; and E. C. Janicik, 

Southeast Asia Force Deployment Buildup, Part 1, 1965, Incident for 

Defense Analysis Report R-137 (Washington, DC: Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, 1968), 33.

81 USMACV February memo; and Janicik, Southeast Asia Force 

Deployment Buildup.
WINTER 2018 41

the advisory-and-assistance era and opened a new 

phase of American involvement. The absence of any 

study on the Marines’ arrival from the historiography 

of the Vietnam War leads many to view the Da Nang 

landing as hasty, though long before the landing the 

Marine Corps already owned a vital part of the plan 

for combating Communist ground forces and stabilizing Indochina and the RVN from the start. Multiple 

plans directing military intervention during the later 

stages of the First Indochina War put Marines as the 

vanguard of any U.S. force committed to the region. 

Although the circumstances prompting the landing at 

Da Nang were different than planners originally anticipated, the idea that it would be Marines landing 

there and operating beyond Da Nang was anything 

but hastily decided or new. Even after securing Da 

Nang, there was still a predetermined plan for what 

the Marines would do next; yet for reasons unknown, 

historians tend to overlook the central purpose of 

both, lessening the meaning and significance of the 

Marine commitment to the RVN and perpetuating a 

misleading view of their intended role. 

• 1775 •
The Creation 

of the Marine Corps’ 

Combined Action Platoons

A STUDY IN MARINE CORPS INGENUITY

By William F. Nimmo, with Henry Beaudin1

The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Platoons 

(CAPs) in the Vietnam War became a significant component of the Corps’ counterinsurgency strategy to pacify the rural countryside.2

 The 

Marine Corps’ general strategy, at least in part, was 

to clear and hold the land in its enclaves and expand 

the territory held like a spreading inkblot. Once an 

area had been cleared of Viet Cong by troops from the 

Marine or Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 

infantry, adequate security forces were needed to stay 

in the villages to hold and protect them so enemy 

1

 William F. Nimmo holds a juris doctor degree from Loyola Law 

School, Los Angeles, CA. He spent nearly 40 years as a criminal 

trial lawyer. He was an assistant CAP leader in CAP Alpha 7 

near Hue in 1967 and 1968. Assisting in the research for this article was Henry Beaudin, a former CAP Marine, who served in 

1969 and 1970, southwest of Da Nang. Author’s statement: as the 

author researched the Combined Action Program’s creation, he 

discovered that the extant historiography on CAP either were 

not precisely accurate or dealt with the program’s creation only 

briefly. This work makes extensive use of the primary sources 

available to paint a very detailed picture of the program’s creation and the preparations of the villages in advance of implementation with effective civic action programs. 

2

 The historiography can be a bit vague about the proper use of 

CAP. For our purposes, CAP refers to Combined Action Platoons; when referring to the Combined Action Program as a 

whole, we will use the full reference and not the acronym.

forces could not easily return.3 The task of protecting the village was the theoretical duty of a Popular 

Force platoon, if one existed in the cleared village, 

consisting of approximately 35 Popular Force soldiers. 

They were the lowest rung of the Vietnamese military structure, poorly trained, paid only half of what 

the regular ARVN soldiers were paid, and received 

no benefits. They were either under the age of 20 or 

older than 30; those between 20 and 30 were not eligible to elect for Popular Force duty.4

 An incentive to 

joining the Popular Forces was that the soldiers could 

stay in their home villages and work the rice fields 

3

 There were several categories of enemy forces operating in 

South Vietnam. Viet Cong is the general term the Americans used 

for enemy forces that were not officially part of the North Vietnamese Army. It refers to political operatives, small insurgent 

cells, local force platoons and companies, and organized larger 

main force units (company and battalion size) that operated on 

a wider geographical basis. Such forces were routinely referred 

to in Marine Corps command chronologies and intelligence records of the time as Viet Cong and are distinguished only by the 

force organizational size and purpose. The author’s usage of Viet 

Cong is based on how enemy forces were identified in the Marine 

Corps source documentation consulted.

4

 III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) Command Chronology (ComdC), January 1966, RF/PF Improvement, item number 

1201002108, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War 

Documents Collection (USMCHD Vietnam War Docs), Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, hereafter Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 3.

42
WINTER 2018 43

or other family business while providing protection.5

Many villages throughout the Marine Corps’ area 

of responsibility had Popular Force platoons, usually 

placed around or near military bases or along main 

supply routes. Unfortunately, the Popular Force soldiers were not up to the job of protecting the villages. 

In assessing the situation in October 1965, III Marine 

Amphibious Force (III MAF) found that the Popular 

Force platoons’ quality of performance and reliability 

were questionable.6 

Each of the three major Marine Corps enclaves—

Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Chu Lai—had substantially different populations and levels of Viet Cong saturation 

and organization. Even in the populations where the 

enemy had less power, the Popular Forces were not effective in providing security against enemy activities, 

especially at night. Throughout the life of the Combined Action Program, as it eventually came to be 

known, Marines were used to train, motivate, and assist Popular Force platoons to hold their villages once 

cleared of enemy forces.7

 As a force multiplier, the 

program involved embedding, or brigading, a squad 

of Marines and a U.S. Navy corpsman into a Popular 

Force platoon in the villages where each was located. 

The Marines lived in the villages full time with the 

Popular Force soldiers. 

With Marines in the leadership billets, they 

worked together to defend the villages and to interdict 

and suppress Viet Cong activity. The Marines worked 

hard to raise the level of competence, reliability, and 

fighting spirit of the Popular Forces, a task that would 

5

 Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience (McLean, VA: Office of Naval Research Group 

Psychology Programs, 1969), 37.

6Operations of the III MAF, Vietnam, Fleet Marine Force Pacific 

(FMFPac), 1 October 1965, item number 1201001017, folder 001, 

USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and 

Archive, 2.

7

 When the program was first initiated, embedded units were 

referred to as Joint Action Companies (JACs); as the program 

evolved, they became known as Combined Action Companies 

(CACs) and finally as Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). While 

the name for the units evolved throughout the program’s life, this 

article refers to them generally by the last-used term, CAP(s), 

unless specifically discussing a period during which the platoons 

were referred to as JACs or CACs.

prove challenging during the course of the war. The 

official Combined Action Program unit table of organization was 14 Marines, a U.S. Navy corpsman, and 

34 Vietnamese Popular Force soldiers.8 These numbers 

were not always met, however.

A further goal was to try to win over conflicted 

populations by demonstrating through conduct and 

civic action that the United States was there to help. 

The Combined Action Program involved aggressive 

day and night patrolling, holding regular medical 

clinics, and participating in civic action projects to 

improve village life, when possible. In 1969, the program’s peak year, platoons conducted 149,000 patrols, 

day and night. Serving in a CAP was dangerous duty. 

During the nearly five years of their existence, approximately 500–525 CAP Marines were killed in action. 

The available documentation of those killed in action 

lists 488 names, but it is likely that several deaths were 

left off while the program was still under the administrative control of infantry or other Marine battalions.9

While the enemy kills were not the measure of success for the program, CAPs accounted for more than 

4,900 enemy killed in action.10 The Combined Action Program, which rapidly evolved and expanded, 

started out as an innovative experiment to defend a 

vulnerable section of the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) of Phu Bai, one of the Corps’ priority enclaves in the beginning stages of the war. The account 

of how the CAPs were created is a study in classic Marine Corps ingenuity in the face of limited resources. 

The following is a detailed history of their creation.

Background and Context

The Marine Corps was the first of the U.S. military 

branches to land in force in Vietnam. The Corps’ 

area of responsibility was the I Corps Tactical Zone 

8

 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, table A-1, A2. 9

 Rick Schelberg, “CAP KIA Lists,” CapMarine.com. Before CAPs 

became more organized, battalions recorded their members who 

were killed in action (KIA). In the authors’ examination of the 

chronologies, it was discovered that several were not recorded on 

the cited lists. The authors therefore estimated.

10 Fact Sheet [combined action force], 31 March 1970, item number 1201061098, folder 061, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 31, enclosure 8.
44 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

(ICTZ), known to most as I Corps, one of four military zones in South Vietnam. It comprised the five 

northernmost provinces of the country. At the northern end of I Corps was the demilitarized zone (at the 

17th parallel) that separated the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam (DRV), the north, from the Republic of 

Vietnam (RVN), the south. At I Corps’ southern end 

was the southern border of the Quang Ngai Province.

When the Marines entered Vietnam in spring 

1965, they quickly established three enclaves: Da Nang 

(established 8 March), Phu Bai (established 14 April), 

and Chu Lai (established 7 May). The Corps’ theory 

was to establish and secure these enclaves and then 

to expand control into the surrounding countryside. 

The strategy was to clear and hold the land against the 

enemy so that the RVN government could stabilize 

and gain back the territory that had been lost. Prior to 

the landing on 8 March, there were only 200 Marines 

in Vietnam. Following the initial landing at Da Nang, 

the number increased to 5,075. A third battalion landing team and a fighter squadron came ashore on 10 

April, increasing the number of Marines on shore to 

6,500. A fourth battalion, landed 14–15 April, brought 

the total to 8,150 Marines, and an additional 5,000 

Marines landed at Chu Lai in early May, increasing 

the numbers again to 13,150 in all three enclaves. This 

Courtesy of Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, 

adapted by Marine Corps History Division

Map showing where the first three combined action-patrolled villages 

were located.

Courtesy of Cpl Ed Matricardi

From the Phu Bai River at Thuy Phu village, looking out across the vast 

rice fields. The South China Sea lies directly east about 8.8 km.
WINTER 2018 45

movement of Marines into the desired positions in 

Vietnam resulted in an intense scene of activity.11 On 

5 May, the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) 

was formed and assumed command for all Marines in 

Vietnam. 

Geographically, I Corps was a long north-tosouth section of the central part of Vietnam. The 

landward littoral zone at the time contained vast and 

rich fields of rice, giving way to foothills and then rising, at some points rapidly, to become the Annamese 

Cordillera (commonly referred to as the Annamite 

range or mountains), which run north to south for the 

length of I Corps’ interior. The mountains are covered 

in large patches of triple-canopy jungle all the way 

west into Laos. 

Between 80 and 90 percent of the population 

lived in the littoral zone in small rice-farming villages. 

11 Operations of the III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPAC, March–

September 1965, item number 1201001016, folder 001, USMCHD 

Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 

part A, 5, 17, and Part B, 21, 26, 29.

Aside from a few larger population centers, such as 

Hue City and Da Nang, the hamlet was the natural 

and fundamental community structure for the farmers and their families. Several hamlets were grouped 

together as a village for governmental administrative 

purposes. Many hamlets were represented by their 

own chiefs, and the whole was represented by a village 

chief.12 The Marines’ three enclaves fell within this littoral zone.

The Phu Bai enclave was established on 14 April 

when Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler, the commander 

of Regimental Landing Team 3, sent units of his 2d 

Battalion, 3d Marines, to secure the airfield and the 

Army’s 8th Radio Research Unit (RRU) facility, until the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, could land and take 

over the Phu Bai defense. The mission was to defend 

the Phu Bai airfield and the 8th RRU. This unit was an 

important key to locating enemy units through radio 

12 LtGen Ngo Quang Truong, Territorial Forces (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 30.

Courtesy of Cpl Ed Matricardi

Village boys herding their buffalo along a river trail in Thuy Phu village.
46 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

intercept techniques, and General William C. Westmoreland wanted a force to protect it.13

After 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, landed in Da 

Nang, 512 Marines of the battalion were lifted by helicopter to Phu Bai to relieve the units from 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, and establish the defense of area. 

By 16 April, the battalion was fully offloaded and 

positioned to take command of the Phu Bai enclave. 

Although the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, were part of 

the 4th Marine Regiment, they were under the command and control of Colonel Wheeler’s 3d Marine 

Regiment. Colonel Wheeler had the ultimate responsibility for the defense of both Da Nang Air Base and 

Phu Bai.

The Marines had originally been allowed an official TAOR of only two squares miles. This was sim13 Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines 

in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, DC: 

History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 

1978), 22.

ilar to Da Nang, where the Marines were originally 

confined within the airfield perimeter and a certain 

limited area to the west of the airfield. From approximately March through July, the Vietnamese took a 

cautious approach to the expansion of the Marine 

areas of responsibility. The Marines were ready and 

anxious to spread out to defend their areas and to 

expand control of the enclaves, but the ARVN commanders were cautious for two reasons. The Communists had told the population that the Americans 

were coming in to take over the country. Despite the 

fact that the top ARVN commanders also wanted the 

Marines to spread out, they needed to move slowly 

so as not to encourage belief in the Communist propaganda.14 General Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander 

of I Corps, expressed another, perhaps more realistic concern. He was afraid that the Marines would 

not be able to handle the pacification aspects of the 

mission, especially in the populated areas south of 

14 Lewis Walt, interview with Martin Russ, 31 July 1976, tape 

6329–30A, Oral History section, Marine Corps History Division, 

segment beginning at 26:42.

Courtesy of Cpl James Ellison

Typical village trail scene in the Phu Bai rice-growing lowlands.

Courtesy of Historical Reference Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division

The Vietnamese commanding general of I Corps, Nguyen Chanh Thi 

(center), was instrumental in the approval of the Combined Action 

Program and supported the program during its expansion in 1966 to 

Da Nang and Chu Lai.
WINTER 2018 47

the Da Nang airfield. Implicit was a fear of incidents 

that would antagonize the population.15 For the Phu 

Bai area of responsibility, this reluctance meant a serious limitation on the Marines’ ability to adequately 

secure a portion of the area immediately adjacent to 

the base that was critical for base defense.

The Zone A Defense Problem

The Phu Bai military facilities, the airfield, and the 

8th RRU straddled Vietnam’s Highway 1, which ran 

through the Phu Bai base area, angled northwest to 

southeast. Highway 1 was Vietnam’s national highway 

and it ran the length of the country from north to 

south, but the term national highway is deceptive; it 

was a two-lane paved road that sometimes resembled 

a county road in middle America more than it did a 

major thoroughfare. 

South of Highway 1 was a vast open area of ridges and hills, variously barren or covered with brush, 

which finally morphed into jungle in the southernmost sector. This area was near the mountains that led 

to Laos, and it was from here that the greatest enemy 

threat would likely come. It was nearly uninhabited 

for several miles to the Ta Trach River, and despite the 

fact that this area was not in the initial TAOR, it was 

necessary for the Marines to immediately explore and 

control to prevent an attack on the military installations at Phu Bai. 

The command records show that 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, very soon after landing—despite the initial TAOR limitations—began patrolling several thousand meters south of its perimeter.16 By 7 May, the 

TAOR was extended to include this southern area, 

making the TAOR now 38 square miles.17

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, in its defense of 

the Phu Bai perimeter and the 8th RRU, began an ag15 Operations of the III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPAC, March–

September 1965, part B, 21.

16 “Narrative,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 April 1965, 

item number 1201045069, folder 045, USMCHD Vietnam War 

Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 2.

17 “Statistical Highlights,” Operations of the III MAF, Vietnam, 

FMFPAC, 1 March 1965, item number 1201001016, folder 001, 

USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and 

Archive, part B, 25–27.

gressive campaign of patrolling and ambushing within its enlarged TAOR. The Marines used four rifle 

companies, Headquarters and Service Company, and 

Company C of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, along 

with the support of engineers, tanks, other armor, and 

artillery, to defend the perimeter and to patrol. They 

continued this patrolling for months, exploring the 

entirety of the TAOR, pinpointing the Viet Cong 

routes of ingress into the TAOR from the jungles, and 

blocking their activity on the main routes to the rice 

lowlands.18 

The full defense of the Phu Bai military installations from the surrounding areas, however, posed a 

problem. To the north and east was a semicircle of 

three villages bounded by the Dai Giang River. From 

the perimeter of the air base, it was difficult to see 

up to and into these villages. The apron between the 

airfield and the villages was at least a kilometer wide 

and more in some places. The hamlets themselves were 

densely vegetated; so even at close range, it would be 

impossible to see any distance into them. The villages 

provided enough cover that an enemy mortar team or 

ground assault unit could get close enough to cause 

substantial damage. This area was known as Zone A. 

These three villages and their hamlets had a total 

population of approximately 10,000 people, primarily 

subsistence rice farmers who had no electricity or running water. They worked in their fields during the day 

and went to bed by nightfall. The roads were all dirt, 

and the houses were made of bamboo framing with 

palm-thatched roofs and outer walls. Villagers cooked 

18 “Narrative,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 June 1965, 

item number 1201045070, folder 045, USMCHD Vietnam War 

Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 1–7; “Narrative,” 

3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 July 1965, item number 

1201045071, folder 045, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 1–6; “Narrative,” 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, ComdC, 1 August 1965, item number 1201045072, 

folder 045, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam 

Center and Archive, 1–8; “Close Combat,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 September 1965, item number 1201045073, folder 

045, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center 

and Archive, 1–7; and “Close Combat,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

ComdC, 1 October 1965, item number 1201045074, folder 045, 

USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and 

Archive, 1–8.
48 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

food over open fires and ate fish from the river and 

rice from their fields. 

In each of these villages was a 30- to 40-man village Popular Force protection platoon tasked with 

protecting the village from the Viet Cong. In reality, 

however, they were no match for the enemy forces. 

They were poorly trained, and information showed 

they rarely patrolled to protect the village. Village officials hid at night.19 It was also known at this time 

19 Capt John J. Mullen Jr., “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam,” Individual 

Research Papers Collection, Capt John J. Mullen Jr. 1968–69, 

COLL/3953, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA. 

Photo by SSgt C. Duris, courtesy of Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

LCpl Thomas E. Reilly (right) points out information to his squad leader, Sgt David W. Sommers. This combined patrol is from Joint Action Company 2 at Thuy Tan village.

Courtesy of Cpl Ed Matricardi

A village fisherman pushing his boat out to the fishing grounds near 

Thuy Phu village.
WINTER 2018 49

that the Viet Cong exercised domination over these 

villages.20 They taxed the villagers and spread propaganda.21 

In the 21 April 1965 negotiations with General 

Nguyen Van Chuan, commanding general of the 1st 

ARVN division, Phu Bai TAOR parameters were 

agreed. Zone A would remain in the ARVN’s control.22

While the Marines quickly established control of their 

territory and maintained a commanding presence in 

the area, Zone A continued to bother Lieutenant Colonel William W. Taylor, the commanding officer of 3d 

Battalion, 4th Marines. Taylor made a formal request 

to Colonel Wheeler’s 3d Marines command that the 3d 

Battalion, 4th Marines’ TAOR be extended to include 

Zone A and that the Popular Force platoons remain 

under Marine technical direction. Taylor felt that the 

TAOR was overly restrictive and prevented an adequate defense of the airfield and the 8th RRU. He 

insisted that the Popular Forces be uniformed so they 

could be easily identified and offered that the Marines 

would provide the Popular Forces with uniforms if 

the ARVN would not provide them.23 The request was 

granted, and it became official and operational on 21 

June 1965. 

Expansion into Zone A

From early June onward, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

pursued a dedicated and thorough civil affairs program to learn more about Zone A and to prepare for 

the moment when they were given full operational access to the area. First Lieutenant John J. Mullen was 

the adjutant and civil affairs officer for 3d Battalion, 

20 “Joint Company, Intelligence,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

ComdC, 1 September 1965, item number 1201045073, folder 045, 

USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and 

Archive, 3.

21 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam,” C-4.

22 Commanding Officer to Commanding General, 9th Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade, “Hue-Phu Bai defense arrangements,” 

21 April 1965, 3d Marines, ComdC, April 1965, item number 

1201037030, folder 037, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 29.

23 “Zone A Hue Phu Bai,” 3d Marines, ComdC, 1 June 1965, item 

number 1201037034, folder 037, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, 

Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, tab 1.

4th Marines, and in that position directed or coordinated much of the activities involved.24

In early June, immediately following a meeting 

Lieutenant Colonel Taylor had with the village officials, the battalion began sending well-staffed medical clinics to all three villages on a semiregular basis. 

These mobile medical clinics were accompanied by a 

platoon from the infantry. This was not just for security; the infantry units were observing and learning 

about the villages as they provided security for the 

clinics.

By 15 June, it was known that the area of operations would be expanded into Zone A effective 21 June. 

On 15 June, First Lieutenant Mullen visited the district chief and the Popular Force platoon commanders to outline the plan to move Marines into the three 

villages for assessment and security operations. On 17 

June, Mullen, along with the S-3 (the battalion operations chief), the S-2 (the battalion intelligence chief), 

the S-1 (the administrative chief), and a platoon from 

the reconnaissance battalion conducted a motorized 

patrol of all three villages. This was described as an 

observation patrol to familiarize the personnel aboard 

with the village characteristics and the Zone A terrain 

features.25

At 0730 on 21 June, the TAOR expansion went 

into effect. The battalion was also given operational 

control of the Popular Forces platoons in those villages.26 That morning, infantry Company K (-), Headquarters and Services Company (-), one platoon of 

Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, the battalion commander, the S-1, the S-2, and the S-3 patrolled 

through the southernmost village of Thuy Phu to familiarize the battalion personnel with the area and to 

24 Situation Reports (SITREPs) no. 56–85, 3d Marines, 1–2 June 

1965, item number 1201037035, folder 037, USMCHD Vietnam 

War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, hereafter 

SITREPS no. 56–85.

25 SITREPS no. 56–85, 15–17 June 1965; and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 June 1965, item number 1201045070, folder 045, 

USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and 

Archive, 4.

26 “Joint Action Report,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 

September 1965, item number 1201045073, folder 045, USMCHD 

Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 1.
50 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

become acquainted with the population. This movement, which would be carried out during three days, 

was called Operation Neighbor.27

For the next two days, Lieutenant Mullen and his 

team of battalion representatives went to each of the 

villages and conducted thorough surveys of each area. 

They assessed the Popular Force soldiers, the village 

officials, the nature of the terrain, and possible enemy 

approaches to and through each village, and they considered artillery concentration points. On each initial 

village contact, Mullen reported, the nucleus of the 

civil affairs operation was present. This included him 

as the civil affairs officer, an S-3 representative, the 

S-2, the counterintelligence officer, the engineer’s officer, a medical officer, the Vietnamese liaison officer, 

and an interpreter. During the first day it was decided, 

Mullen reported, to convene a civil-military advisory 

council with the goal of meeting soon for mutual cooperation and assistance.28

Lieutenant Mullen followed up the survey with 

meetings in the villages. On 28 June, a delegation 

went to Thuy Tan, the village grouping directly east 

of the base. They met with the village chief, the Popular Force platoon commander, and the Popular Force 

corpsman. They discussed a number of issues, including a medical program, locations for organized sales 

of goods to Marines, possible engineering projects, 

and local defense plans.29 On 30 June, the delegation 

went to the northernmost village of Thuy Luong. The 

records document that the delegation included the 

civil affairs officer (Mullen), a doctor, the chaplain, 

the provost marshal, and the S-2. They met with the 

village chief, the Popular Force platoon commander, 

and three village elders to discuss possible programs 

and problems in the village.30

27 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 1 June 1965, item number 

1201045070, folder 045, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 5; and SITREPS no. 56–85, 

20–21 June 1965. The notation (-) after company or unit names 

indicates the company or unit is not a full-strength company/

unit but is less some of its elements.

28 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-2, C-3.

29 SITREPS no. 56–85, 28 June 1965.

30 SITREPS no. 56–85, 30 June 1965.

On 30 June, the village survey was deemed complete. The battalion used Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, to scout, by patrol and by ambush, 

many of the Zone A areas previously forbidden to 

the Marines. The infantry was now able to regularly 

send night patrols around the outside of the perimeter 

wire, which improved the security of the base and the 

airfield.

During this time, the civil affairs program was 

in full force. On 3 July, Lieutenant Mullen went to 

the American consulate in Hue City and met the 

leading Buddhist layman in the area. They visited a 

Buddhist hospital and an orphanage and arranged a 

meeting for the Catholic chaplain from 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, to meet the Buddhist bishop of the area. 

Mullen was trying to find projects for the villages that 

would benefit Catholics and Buddhists alike. In the 

Zone A villages, Catholics made up about 5 percent 

of the population, with the rest being Buddhists. Both 

groups in the villages got along with each other.31

In July, the medical aid missions to each of the 

Zone A villages continued on a regular basis. They consistently drew more than 100 patients. The reconnaissance patrols also continued. They were now entering 

and patrolling through the interiors of the villages and 

increasing their forays as time progressed. Company 

C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, began learning about 

and assessing the skills and competence of the Popular 

Forces, conducting several patrols with them, including a few night ambushes. 

Lieutenant Mullen had been closely involved 

with the expansion, pacification, and security efforts 

in Zone A since the beginning. He had been charged 

with developing the civil affairs program, which was 

inseparably tied to the Zone A security issues. Mullen stated that by mid-July he became concerned that 

the program was not progressing enough and that the 

situation was “status-quo.” He meant that the Marine 

patrols were meeting no resistance, the Popular Force 

platoons were not patrolling, and the village officials 

31 1stLt Paul Ek, interview with LtCol D. J. Hunter, 24 January 

1966, transcript, item number USMC0046, Oral History Section, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Texas Tech Vietnam 

Center and Archive, 66, hereafter Ek oral history. 
WINTER 2018 51

still had to hide at night. He learned that the Viet 

Cong were still taxing the villagers, and evidence of 

propaganda was present.32

Of primary importance was the fact that the Marines were getting no intelligence—one of the prime 

products of a civil affairs program—of enemy activity 

from the villagers. To address the problem, Mullen 

called a meeting with all three village chiefs (although 

the command records show a meeting between Mullen and only two of the village chiefs on 17 July).33 

Lieutenant Mullen reported that the village 

chiefs, without reservation, expressed gratitude for 

the Marines’ effort and an appreciation that their villages were better off than ever before. They conveyed 

to Mullen that the missing element was security from 

the Viet Cong for the villagers. The chiefs declared 

that they were loyal to the government of the RVN 

and would like to help if they could but that none of 

the people could give information without the fear of 

reprisal. The Popular Force soldiers were no match for 

the Viet Cong, and Mullen said they “acted accordingly,” which likely means the Popular Force soldiers 

confined themselves to the village headquarters at 

night rather than aggressively pursuing the Viet Cong, 

thereby protecting themselves and their families.34

Mullen said he had an epiphany about the crux 

of the problem. The Marines had carried out their civil affairs program by the book, but they had neglected 

the important factor of security for the population. 

He understood now why they were not receiving any 

intelligence.35 This was a crucial observation. Mullen 

concluded that Marines were needed in Zone A on a 

more permanent basis.

The Creation of Combined Action

Lieutenant Mullen brought the situation to the atten32 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-4, C-5.

33 SITREPS no. 86–116, 3d Marines, 16 July 1965, item number 

1201037037, folder 037, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive.

34 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-4, C-5.

35 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-4.

tion of Major Cullen C. Zimmerman, the executive 

officer. They discussed the problem, and Mullen recommended that Marines be assigned to the villages to 

provide the missing security element. Major Zimmerman was receptive to the idea and called a meeting of 

the major figures involved. 

The precise details and timeline of the combined 

action concept’s origin, the manner of approval, the 

selection of its commander, and the process of the 

selection of Marines for the program are rife with 

inconsistent accounts. The sources—including the 

combination of original records, recorded interviews, 

unrecorded interviews, written documents, missing 

interviews, and other missing documents—have made 

it difficult to determine certain facts precisely. Compounding the problem are the various studies and 

academic papers that have relied, with different degrees of accuracy, on the records available at the time 

of their writing. Regarding the historical outcome, 

however, these inconsistencies are only marginally 

important to the essence of how the combined action 

units came into existence and how they were initially 

employed.

The meeting called by Major Zimmerman regarding Lieutenant Mullen’s observations and recommendations was attended by the S-3, the S-2, Mullen, 

and Zimmerman. Mullen writes that all agreed to the 

concept of assigning troops to the villages except for 

the S-3. The S-3 (operations) was worried about the 

utilization of troops and the plan’s impact on causalities. Once they moved past his dissent, three plans 

were proposed and discussed.36

The first plan was to have one company from the 

battalion be responsible for all aspects—civic action 

and security—for one village. According to Mullen, 

this plan was rejected for several reasons: 1) each company would be reduced to two rifle platoons, which 

would make them less effective for other combat missions; and 2) there was concern that there would be 

no continuity or unity of effort among the villages. 

The second plan was to make one infantry company 

responsible for all of the villages in Zone A, which was 

36 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-5.
52 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

also rejected, because it would deprive the battalion 

of a whole maneuver element that could prove decisive in an operation.37

The third plan was to use a smaller group of Marines to supplement the Popular Force soldiers, and 

it was accepted. They discussed whether the group 

should be a platoon or a squad for each village and 

decided that the squad would be the best use un37 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-5, C-6.

der the circumstances.38 Mullen reported, seemingly 

with enthusiasm, that the squad was decided upon 

as a “revolutionary” and “speculative” concept.39 Major Zimmerman, in an oral history interview, confirmed that the concept of the CAP was the product 

of a number of Marines throwing around ideas and 

38 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-6. Mullen’s report does not indicate the specific circumstances, but it is likely that they were a lack of large Viet Cong 

forces; a squad was sufficient to deal with the number of enemy 

they were likely to encounter.

39 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-6. 

Photo by WO Jim Smith, courtesy of Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

The chief of Thuy Phu village pointing out to Gen Walt the surveyed artillery concentrations in connection with the Combined Action Program. To 

the general’s right is LtCol William Taylor, commander of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. On the far left is 1stLt John J. Mullen, one of the creators 

of the Combined Action Program. It is believed that standing behind the village chief is 1stLt Paul Ek, the first commander of the Joint Action 

Company (JAC).
WINTER 2018 53

finally settling on one that seemed to make sense.40

It is not totally clear who originated the combined action concept. Mullen does not take credit for 

it in his 1968 written study, and Major Zimmerman, 

when asked about the topic in an interview, was also 

equivocal about Mullen’s role in developing the concept. General Lewis W. Walt, the former commander of all Marine forces in Vietnam—in his memoirs, 

Strange War, Strange Strategy—credits Lieutenant Mullen “unequivocally” as originally coming up with the 

40 Maj Michael Duane Weltsch, “The Future Role of the Combined Action Program” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College, 1991), 59; and Weltsch, interview with 

Col Cullen Zimmerman, 10 March 1991. 

idea. General Walt stated this in the context of mentioning that others have tried to take credit for the 

concept’s origination.41 It should be clear, regardless of 

who uttered the first words about combining Marines 

and Popular Force soldiers, that Lieutenant Mullen 

played an important role in the creation of the combined action concept.

Once the concept was agreed upon, Major Zimmerman presented it to the battalion commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, who approved. Mullen 

41 Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report 

on Vietnam (New York: Funk and Wagnall’s, 1970), 105.

Photo by SSgt C. Durie, courtesy of Historical Reference Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division

Lt Paul Ek discussing a tactical situation with the police chief and an interpreter in one of the Joint Action Company villages.
54 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

believed it was presented on 20 July 1965.42 Major 

Zimmerman says that Taylor asked him to develop 

the details of the proposed combined force so that 

he could present it to the chain of command. Taylor 

said that once Zimmerman finalized the plans, he 

presented them to his regimental commander, Colonel Wheeler. And eventually, he presented them to 

Major General Walt and Lieutenant General Victor 

H. Krulak.43 The precise timing of the presentation 

to Generals Walt and Krulak is unclear. The program 

was implemented too quickly for there to have been a 

lengthy approval process. 

Major Zimmerman wrote in 1968 that the 

concept in his mind was not the Marines’ use of indigenous troops during the Banana Wars, but the 

British practice of brigading British troops with native units.44 In a 1991 telephone interview with Duane 

Weltsch, Zimmerman elaborated that he had drawn 

from his knowledge of the British Army’s experiences 

in nineteenth century India.45 He felt this concept 

would leave the Popular Force platoons intact and 

allow them to better assume responsibility on their 

42 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-6.

43 Weltsch, “The Future Role of the Combined Action Program,” 

60.

44 LtCol C. Zimmerman, review of The Betrayal, by LtCol William 

R. Corson, Marine Corps Gazette 52, no. 9 (September 1968): 14–15.

45 Weltsch, “The Future Role of the Combined Action Program,” 

59. It is unclear how much influence or impact the Marine Corp’s 

Banana Wars legacy had on the formation or the expansion of the 

Combined Action Program. Zimmerman is clear that he drew 

up the original plan and presented it to LtCol Taylor and that 

he drew on the British nineteenth-century experience of brigading troops with indigenous units. 1stLt Ek, who became the first 

commanding officer of the JAC unit, was later interviewed and 

commented that the program was patterned after the approach 

during the Banana Wars and that he understood it had also been 

done in Malaysia. Ek oral history, 9. 1stLt Mullen makes no mention of the historical origin of the concept. It is fair to state that 

the Corps’ experience in working with indigenous troops in the 

past, especially the experience in Nicaragua in the late 1920s, was 

a significant part of Marine Corps history. It is likely that the 

spirit of that history entered into the thinking of those involved 

in the creation and the expansion of the Combined Action Program. LtCol Richard J. Macak Jr., “Lessons from Yesterday’s Operations Short of War: Nicaragua and the Small Wars Manual,” 

Marine Corps Gazette 80, no. 11 (November 1996): 56–62. 

own when the Marines eventually left the area. He 

also wrote that during the discussion phase, one idea 

had been to continue the existing policy but to use the 

Marines in a U.S. Special Forces-style advisory role, 

but that concept was rejected.46 

The timetable shows that the concept moved 

quickly to execution. By 1 August, at least three squads 

had gone through a week’s training and were prepared 

to enter the villages. Major Zimmerman said that he 

hand-picked all of the Marines. He instructed the 

company commanders to give him a full squad of volunteers, but not the best men from each company. He 

did not want the companies to sacrifice their capabilities, but he did insist on quality Marines. He went 

through the service records of each Marine and had to 

reject some who he felt were not qualified. Zimmerman said they ended up with experienced sergeants 

who had several years in grade and with corporals who 

at one time or another had filled the role of a squad 

leader.47

First Lieutenant Paul R. Ek was brought in from 

the 3d Marine Regiment and given command of the 

program. Historian Jack Shulimson suggests that 

Lieutenant Ek was specially selected in response to 

discussions that Lieutenant Colonel Taylor had with 

Colonel Wheeler.48 While no documentation of this 

exists in the official records, this version of events 

makes sense. Colonel Wheeler, as commander of the 

3d Marine Regiment, was responsible for the defense 

of the Phu Bai base and the airfield. He was in a senior 

and direct command position to Lieutenant Colonel 

Taylor. It would be in his best interests to make sure 

this unique program was successful and the base was 

fully protected. Lieutenant Ek was also an excellent 

choice because he spoke Vietnamese to near fluency 

and had been assigned to work counterinsurgency earlier in the year as an advisor with the Special Forces 

in Vietnam.49

On 23 July, Lieutenant Mullen, in his capacity 

46 Zimmerman, review of The Betrayal. 47 Weltsch, “The Future Role of the Combined Action Program,” 

60–61.

48 Shulimson and Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 65, 133. 49 Ek oral history, 1.
WINTER 2018 55

as civil affairs officer, held an advisory council in the 

officer’s mess with all the village chiefs, the hamlet 

chiefs, and the Popular Force platoon leaders located 

in the TAOR. The records state that mutual military 

and civilian problems were discussed. The officials 

were then taken on helicopter tours of the area. The 

records show that the reaction of the civilian officials 

was “very” favorable.50 An inference can be drawn from 

this meeting that the plan to bring in more Marines 

to secure the population was being presented to the 

relevant officials so that they could prepare the people 

and troops they represented.

On 25 July, according to Lieutenant Mullen, 

Lieutenant Ek arrived and was briefed that night. 

He began work immediately. In an interview in January 1966, after he rotated back to the United States, 

Ek provided his insights into the program and how 

he set about developing it into a functioning unit, 

with Marines fully integrated into the Popular Force 

platoons. While Lieutenant Mullen must be given 

credit for helping to create the concept and for laying 

the groundwork with his civil affairs program for a 

smooth entry of Marines into the villages, Lieutenant 

Ek must be given credit for taking the concept to the 

next stage. Ek trained the Marines and used his language skills to integrate the forces into working units. 

In his mission to secure the airfield, he developed, 

during a two-month period, a counterinsurgency program based on an understanding of the villages and 

their people.

After the selection of the Marines was complete, 

Lieutenant Ek trained them for about a week before 

they went out into the field on operations. This training was geared to teach them all aspects of counterinsurgency warfare, including techniques of population 

control and the role of civic action. He said they were 

thoroughly briefed on intelligence. They needed to 

know what to look for and what means would be used 

to gather important information. He trained them in 

the political and military structure of Vietnam and 

taught them important local rules. He felt it was critical for them to know their place in any setting of peo50 SITREPS no. 86-116, 3d Marines, 23 July 1965.

ple before they entered a village. He wanted to teach 

them as much about Vietnam and the Vietnamese 

people as possible so they could live with the villagers as part of the community, while still carrying out 

their military mission.51 Lieutenant Mullen must have 

been an invaluable resource in the military and political structure, as well as some of the local rules, since he 

had been studying these matters since May as the head 

of the civil affairs program.

Combined Operations Begin

The Joint Action Company (JAC), as it was named 

at the time of its origin, was formed on the record 

on 1 August 1965. After training, the Marines were 

introduced into their villages and training with the 

Popular Forces, and operations began very soon. The 

chain of command was established with Marines in 

all leadership billets. The Marine sergeant became 

the combined unit platoon commander. The Popular Force commander became the executive officer 

of the platoon and second in command, performing the same role as a platoon sergeant in a Marine 

Corps platoon. With 30–40 men in the Popular Force 

platoon, they were divided into squads. The Marine 

corporals became squad leaders of a combined squad 

of four Marines and one squad of Popular Force soldiers. Lieutenant Ek was viewed by the village chiefs 

as their superior, although he said he treated them as 

equals.52 The Vietnamese district chief was Lieutenant 

Ek’s superior, although Ek said the district chief, who 

was a Vietnamese Army captain, treated him as his 

equal. Ek said that all of the Vietnamese officials and 

military personnel were cooperative. He cites the likelihood that the 1st ARVN Division commander sent 

word down for all to cooperate fully with this Marine 

effort.53

At first the JAC units did not focus on the villagers, but on learning the village well and working 

with their Popular Force counterparts.54 Lieutenant Ek continued his training of the Marines, and he 

51 Ek oral history, 7.

52 Ek oral history, 4.

53 Ek oral history, 13.

54 Ek oral history, 12.
56 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

trained them as a unit with the Popular Forces.55 This 

worked out well, and by design, it created a bond between the Marines and the Popular Forces. The classes 

were conducted either by Ek or by his executive officer, a Vietnamese lieutenant. They conducted classes 

on scouting, patrolling, hand and arm signals, population control, intelligence needs, marksmanship, and a 

variety of other skills that they would need to be able 

to work together.56

The first JAC patrol occurred on 3 August 1965. 

The squad was trucked out to Thuy Tan Village and 

55 Ek oral history, 8, 27.

56 Ek oral history, 8.

arrived at 0925. The records do not show how long 

they stayed that day, but the typical daytime patrols in 

those first weeks were from early in the morning until 

midafternoon. All patrols at this time were trucked 

out from the command center at Phu Bai. The ride to 

the village would be no more than 10 minutes. On 6 

August, three squads were sent out, one to each of the 

three villages. All three JACs began a regular routine 

of daylight patrols and activities in their respective 

villages. 

There are no descriptions of these early patrols, 

so we can only speculate about their composition and 

routes. Lieutenant Ek instructed the Marines to learn 

the village while integrating into the Popular Forces 

Photo by Sgt Reid, courtesy of Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Cpl Earl J. Suter and a Popular Forces soldier work on the construction of a bamboo barracks for the first squad of the Joint Action Company, 

which lived with the villagers of Thuy Luong. All of initial Joint Action Company squads were in joint projects with their Popular Force soldiers 

and hand-built barracks for the Marines out of bamboo, tin, and thatch.
WINTER 2018 57

through patrols and other security missions. The Marines had topographical maps and compasses, which 

along with a lot of patrolling, resulted in learning a 

village during a period of weeks. Each one of the villages was several square kilometers in size with multiple hamlets that contained networks of trails, houses, 

and thick vegetation.

On any operation, Ek had one or two Popular 

Force soldiers paired with a Marine. This gave the Marines the ability to closely observe how the Popular 

Forces handled themselves, and it gave the Marines 

the opportunity for personal training in the field. Ek 

says that close relationships were formed between the 

Marines and the Popular Forces. He remembered that 

once, a wedding was held up for two hours for the patrol to return so the Marines could attend. Lieutenant 

Ek seemed satisfied that the Marines and the Popular 

Forces came to trust each other, and if something happened, the Popular Forces could be depended upon 

for support because of the personal bonds that had 

been established. At the end of his tour in late September 1965, Ek remarked how the Popular Forces 

had improved in discipline and military manner. They 

carried their rifles like Marines, they always put on a 

cover when they went outside, and every day another 

Popular Force soldier showed up with a Marine-like 

haircut. Lieutenant Ek reported that the patrolling 

and ambush techniques of the unit as a whole were 

excellent.57 

There was pressure to get night ambush or night 

patrols out as soon as possible.58 The security of the 

people was important to start the flow of local intelligence, but the immediate security of the base from any 

surprise, mortar or ground attack, required nighttime 

coverage of the potential inbound routes. At Thuy Luong or Thuy Tan, an enemy force could cross the river 

at any time. Likewise, a nighttime force could pass 

through Thuy Phu, which backed up to the hills leading to the mountains where the known enemy base 

camps were located. Since the April arrival of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, there had been multiple contacts 

with groups of Viet Cong that were large enough to be 

taken seriously. During September 1965, 3d Battalion, 

57 “Combined Action Company Report,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, folder 045, 1 September 

1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center 

and Archive, A-2.

58 Ek oral history, 8.

Courtesy of Cpl Pete Nardie

A Citroen sedan, familiar in Vietnam in the 1960s, drives on the main 

road through CAC 4 at Loc Bon village. The building in the background 

became the Marines’ barracks by 1966.

Courtesy of Cpl Pete Nardie

The central area of Loc Bon village on Vietnam’s national Highway 1. 

The Marines are shown in the process of building bunkers and stringing 

concertina wire for extra security. The photo shows the daytime radio 

watch position, ca. 1966.
58 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

4th Marines, documented sightings of 259 Viet Cong 

in or near the TAOR.59

Intelligence from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, as 

they were preparing to conduct an operation to search 

the jungle in the southern part of the TAOR, suggested that there was a potential for more organized Viet 

Cong units that had only temporarily gone up into the 

mountains because of Marine presence.60 The intelligence reports showed two enemy local force platoons 

had operated in the Zone A area. One platoon was 

the Huong Thuy platoon of 25 fighters, who had been 

operating in the village of Thuy Phu to the immediate 

south of the airbase along Highway 1. The An Nong 

platoon had operated in the village of Loc Bon, also 

known as An Nong, along Highway 1 to the south of 

Thuy Phu village. The intelligence report showed that 

both platoons had moved up into the jungle and operated exclusively from there once the Marines arrived 

in the Phu Bai area. 

According to Lieutenant Ek, the Viet Cong dominated the villages. He observed that there were no active enemy troops in the villages and they were left 

alone as long as the villagers paid their taxes or provided rice. Estimates have been made that there was 

a 20–35 percent domination of the village by the Viet 

Cong.61 One of the villagers’ great fears was the threat of 

acts of terror against them if they did not pay taxes to 

the Viet Cong or against village officials who worked in 

opposition to their goals. Lieutenant Ek felt, as did others involved, that the village chief and the Viet Cong 

had an unspoken agreement that if the Popular Forces 

did not aggressively patrol at night they would not be 

attacked. In essence, the village chiefs ruled the day, and 

the enemy forces ruled the night.62

59 “Intelligence Section,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item 

number 1201045073, folder 045, 1 September 1965, USMCHD 

Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive.

60 Ek oral history, 18; and “Operation order 27–65,” 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045072, folder 045, 1 August 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam 

Center and Archive, Appendix 1, A-1-3, A-1-4.

61 “Report: Joint Action Company (b) Intelligence,” 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, folder 045, 1 September 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, enclosure 18, 3.

62 Ek oral history, 25.

The night patrols started soon and by 22 August 

1965, in all three villages, night ambush or night reconnaissance patrols went out on a regular basis. Between 

12 and 18 September, the Marines were staying in the 

villages overnight, coming into the base only one day. 

During this time, both day and night patrols occurred 

on a daily basis.63

The Phu Bai TAOR had been expanded at the 

time of the Zone A initial expansion to include another village and another Popular Force platoon, but 

a JAC unit was not placed there until late August. The 

village was Loc Bon, south of Phu Bai on the junction 

of Highway 1 and the Nong River. The Nong River, 

which emptied into a large bay several kilometers 

from the highway, flowed from south to north, coming out of the mountains, where the enemy forces were 

based in the jungle areas. The Nong River route—the 

river and the land routes following the river—would 

be active grounds for contacts between the Marines 

and the enemy. A JAC unit started operations in Loc 

Bon on or about 31 August 1965. The records show the 

first patrol going out that day.64

As the Marines were integrating into the Popular Forces and building an operating unit, Lieutenant Ek turned his attention to the population. He 

reported that it took a while to build trust with the 

villagers. One of the first things he did was to reframe 

the villagers’ view of the Marines as a source of financial gain. The Marines who had gone out earlier had 

given candy to children, cigarettes to adults, and paid 

higher-than-value rates for food. Ek stopped Marines 

from buying anything from the villagers for a period 

of time and banned the giving of candy and cigarettes. 

Over time, this accomplished his goal of setting the 

Marines and the villagers on a more equal footing. He 

instructed the Marines to sit down and talk with the 

63 “Daily journal,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045072, folder 045, 1 August 1965, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, Texas Tech 

Vietnam Center and Archive; and “Daily journal,” 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, folder 045, 1 September 1965, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War 

Documents Collection, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive.

64 “Daily journal,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045072, 1 August 1965, 34.
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people using sign language or other means, rather than 

giving out candy and cigarettes. He cited one example 

on a night patrol in a village where a boy called out 

“cigarette.” When the cigarette was not forthcoming, 

the boy said to the Marines, “You number 10.”65 Being 

exposed on a night operation could be deadly. Such 

incidents, instigated by villagers’ expectations of the 

Marines as a source of treats, could reveal a patrol’s 

location to any enemy forces in the area. 

It took three or four weeks, but with all the night 

patrols, the Viet Cong stopped coming to the villages 

to collect taxes, to hand out propaganda, or to rally 

support. Lieutenant Ek reported that in this time, 

Marines got on “thoroughly intimate” terms with the 

people. They were no longer pestered for candy and 

cigarettes, and they were sold goods at Vietnamese 

prices.66

Ek also introduced the concept of population 

control. It was important to know everyone who 

was in the village. At that time, adult villagers were 

required to carry an identification card. Without 

warning, the Marines and the Popular Forces would 

cordon off a segment of a hamlet, approximately one65 Ek oral history, 9–11.

66 Ek oral history, 11.

kilometer square, and gather all the males for an identification check. They made sure the villagers were 

registered with the district and that the village chief 

knew them. Lieutenant Ek said that they apologized 

for the inconvenience and the people seemed to accept the procedure. According to Ek, the procedure 

took between two to three hours and occurred just as 

dawn was breaking.67 

The Marines also checked the village marketplaces randomly for outsiders purchasing supplies for the 

Viet Cong. There was a limit of 12 pounds of rice per 

day that anyone could purchase. On more than one 

occasion, they caught individuals—mostly women—

purchasing larger quantities of rice. On one occasion, 

five women bought 80 pounds of rice. Investigation 

showed that it was purchased for enemy forces based 

a few kilometers away in a nearby district.68 The more 

the JACs built trust with the people and kept them 

secure, the more intelligence of this nature would flow 

into the units. 

Lieutentant Ek used the tool of civic action projects to build relationships with the villagers. They did 

not perform random acts, but helped when a need was 

67 Ek oral history, 15.

68 Ek oral history, 16.

Courtesy of 2dLt Richard M. Cavagnol

1stLt Wayne Henderson (left), a forward observer with Company I, 3d 

Battalion, 12th Marines, providing artillery support to the JAC units in 

Phu Bai. This photo was taken while they were out checking on artillery 

concentrations in Thuy Phu villages. Standing next to Henderson are 

two Marines from the JAC.

Courtesy of Cpl Ed Matricardi

Thuy Phu village market.
60 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

discovered. For example, the season was especially dry, 

and the village wells had not been dug deep enough to 

compensate. The Marines helped to dig deeper wells 

so the villagers did not have to carry fresh water as 

far. In another example, rains had washed away the 

ends of a bridge, leaving a gap of 1.5 feet that carts or 

vehicles could not cross, making it more difficult to 

get their goods to market. The Marines started working on the bridge and filling it in with anything they 

could find, and several villagers who saw this pitched 

in, and it became a joint project.69 

Soap was a luxury to the villagers at this time 

and it was conserved. The Marines provided soap to 

as many people as possible at the medical clinics, but 

they also started a baby washing service as a teaching 

tool. The Marines set up an assembly line system with 

one Marine washing a child, another rinsing the child, 

and a third dressing the child.70 It is unknown what 

real effect this project had, but it may have softened 

the Marines’ image and brought them closer to the villagers. Stories such as this often spread from hamlet to 

hamlet as villagers gathered at the markets and other 

venues and exchanged news.

Intensified Operations

and Mission Change

Lieutenant Ek left the unit to rotate home on 25 September 1965, and Lieutenant Mullen replaced Ek as 

the company commander. The unit’s name was soon 

changed to Combined Action Company (CAC).71 This 

change was made because the command felt that this 

reflected better the character of the unit. Mullen said 

the reasoning was that it was not a joint operation 

between units but one combined unit made up of 

69 Ek oral history, 23–25.

70 Ek oral history, 24.

71 “Operation Plan,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item 

number 1201045074, folder 045, 7 October 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive. The 

last operation plan in September, dated 30 September 1965, set 

out dates in October using the heading “Joint Action Company,” 

but the first operation plan in October refers to the unit as Combined Action Company. The October chronology also lists the 

unit as Combined Action Company.

men from each country.72 In late 1967, the name was 

changed again to Combined Action Platoon (CAP) 

due to a potential unfortunate meaning of the word 

cac to the Vietnamese.73 CACs were assigned unit 

numbers (CAC 1, CAC 2, etc.). CAC 1 was assigned 

to Thuy Luong, the northernmost village in Zone A. 

CAC 2 was placed in the village of Thuy Tan at the 

eastern flank of Phu Bai Air Base. CAC 3 was positioned immediately south of Phu Bai Air Base in the 

village known as Thuy Phu (sometimes referred to as 

Phu Bai village). CAC 4 was placed the furthest south 

in the village of Loc Bon, along the Nong River.

Mullen made some immediate operational 

changes in the program, suggesting that he had a different opinion regarding the enemy threat and the 

need to confront it. First, he moved the Marines to 

the villages on a permanent basis; he began a program 

of saturation patrolling; and he demanded 100 percent 

alert at night. Operationally, he emphasized ambush 

and multiambush patrols. He also intensified combined training and concentrated it on marksmanship 

and small unit tactics, and he placed a new emphasis 

on population control and intelligence gathering.74 

In the time period when Lieutenant Mullen took 

command of the combined action program, the patrol 

protocol—at least in CAC 3 at Thuy Phu village—was 

for all Marines to go out on night patrol with 10–15 

Popular Force soldiers. They would leave at darkness 

and not return until daybreak. Patrol routines varied. 

Some nights they would go straight to an ambush site, 

and others they would patrol for a long period and 

then set up an ambush late, close to daybreak. When 

Private First Class Claude Martin first arrived at 

what was known as CAC 3 in very late September or 

early October, they stayed in the village headquarters 

building located on the highway, which was the main 

road through the village. Soon, the Marines and the 

Popular Force soldiers built a crude structure using 

72 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” Annex C, C-11.

73 CAC and CAP are interchangeable terms, and they are used 

here as they were used at the particular time period being discussed.

74 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-9.
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bamboo framing and corrugated walls and roof. At 

that time, the sergeant, the corpsman, and the radioman remained based out of the village headquarters 

building and the rest of the Marines used the shack 

for their quarters.75

There had been no significant contacts between 

combined action units and enemy forces at the time 

Lieutenant Mullen took over. Intelligence, however, 

showed a potential threat nearby. One of the infantry battalion’s thrust points (focus of operations) had 

been near the jungle to the direct south of CAC 3 and 

CAC 4. This area generally follows the Nong River 

south into the jungle and into the mountains and was 

a main route for units east of Phu Bai to get to the 

lowlands. It would become even more important as a 

route in the future. The village where Loc Bon was located was once the base and operating area of the Viet 

Cong local force platoon called the Loc Bon or the 

An Nong platoon. The intelligence showed that when 

the Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, arrived and 

began their operations, the Loc Bon platoon moved 

its base into the jungle several kilometers south of the 

village.76 

A major change to the philosophy of the program 

also occurred when Lieutenant Mullen assumed command. Previously, the ultimate goal of the mission had 

been to secure the Phu Bai Air Base from possible attack through the Zone A villages. That goal remained, 

but the program was broadened in the direction of a 

full-fledged effort to increase good relationships with 

the people and improve their welfare. Mullen was involved with Zone A from the beginning, and it appears that he incorporated his civil affairs orientation 

into the military integration of the Marines with the 

Popular Forces. Mullen proposed his new concept and 

the battalion commander approved and directed this 

new mission be put into effect, the elements of which 

were:

75 Claude Martin, interview with author, 4 May 2018. Martin is 

a former CAC Marine from Thuy Phu Village during November 

1965.

76 “Intelligence Section,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 

item number 1201045072, folder 045, 1 August 1965, USMCHD 

Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 

A-1–A-4. 

1. Secure the populated areas and deny their 

use to the enemy, thereby supporting the 

battalion primary mission and providing 

security for the civilian population.

2. Establish and maintain an effective civic 

action program, in conjunction with local 

officials, for the purpose of improving the 

welfare of the people, increasing good relationships between the people and friendly 

forces, establishing an effective intelligence 

network; and

3. Train the Popular Force platoons so that in 

the future they would be capable of protecting their own villages without U.S. troop 

assistance.77

Mullen said that the “intensified” operations began immediately.78 The first major contact between a 

CAC unit and the enemy occurred on 27 September. 

An ambush patrol from the Loc Bon CAC, known as 

CAC 4, was heading out toward the incoming enemy route to intercept Viet Cong coming toward the 

village. They went out approximately 1.5 kilometers 

from the headquarters into a prime area on the enemy 

routes from the jungle and encountered a group of 20 

Viet Cong, and a firefight began. 

Two enemy fighters and one Marine were killed. 

The enemy broke off contact and headed back up toward the hills. Corporal Edwin J. Falloon was in the 

point team and was the first combined action Marine to die in Vietnam. Two men on the patrol were 

wounded. The weapons found on the dead fighters 

were a semiautomatic rifle and a Chinese submachine 

gun.79 The weapons suggest that this was a Viet Cong 

local force company, quite likely the Loc Bon company that had been pushed up into the jungle when the 

Marines entered Phu Bai. A group of 20 was too big 

77 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-9, C-10.

78 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” Annex C: C-10.

79 “Intelligence Section, Close Combat,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, folder 045, 1 September 

1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center 

and Archive, enclosure 4, 5.
62 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

to simply hold rallies or spread propaganda leaflets.80

Lieutenant Mullen sensed that after this incident 

the population gained more confidence in the CACs’ 

ability to protect and secure them from the enemy. 

He saw that the Popular Force soldiers were becoming more efficient. Intelligence began to come in on a 

regular basis, first through the village chief and then 

directly by the people. The National Police began to 

take the CACs more seriously too and started actively 

providing them with intelligence. By November, 75 

percent of the CAC operations were based on intelligence. Viet Cong activity in the villages ceased. 

Mullen noted that the villagers and the Marines had 

totally accepted each other. He stated that one of the 

greatest hallmarks of the program’s success was that 

eventually village officials stayed in their own homes 

again during the night.81

Following the 27 September incidents, there 

were several more contacts between CACs and the 

enemy forces. Most of these were either in CAC 3 or 

CAC 4 on the outer edges of the villages, consistent 

with groups coming down from the mountains. Both 

of those CACs sat on the direct trail from the Viet 

Cong jungle camps. Whatever intelligence was provided resulted in the CACs catching fighters coming 

into the village. There is a high likelihood that these 

ventures into the village were to obtain rice.82

The local force Viet Cong units depended on 

tax collections to support their operations. They also 

depended on rice grown by the villagers in the lowlands. When they were pushed up into the mountains, 

rice and other foodstuffs became difficult to obtain. 

They could not grow rice in the jungle camps, but they 

needed it daily to survive, so they had to come to the 

80 “Intelligence Section, Close Combat,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, enclosure 10, 5.

81 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program,” C-10, C-11.

82 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, 

folder 045, 1 September 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, 

Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive; and 3d Battalion, 4th 

Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045074, folder 045, 1 October 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam 

Center and Archive. 

lowland villages to obtain it and other supplies. The 

Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, had learned 

through captured enemy fighters that the typical 

procedure was to make contact with a designated 

rice supplier, who delivered the rice to a collection 

point.83 Rice was always an issue, but before the local 

Viet Cong units were driven up into the hills, they 

had easy access to foodstuffs.84 

In November 1965, CAC 3 experienced incidents 

three nights in a row. On the night of 29 November, 

however, the CAC 3 patrol heading out to attempt to 

intercept Viet Cong coming down from the mountains ran into an inbound group of 20 enemy. A sustained firefight ensued that resulted in four confirmed 

kills at the firefight site and the capture of a wounded 

Viet Cong corpsman the next day. Three weapons 

were captured, including a Chinese K50 submachine 

gun and a French-made MAT-49 submachine gun 

(used extensively in the first Indochina war), along 

with 718 piasters (Vietnamese currency) was found 

on one of the bodies.85 There were few reasons, aside 

from the intent to purchase rice and other supplies, 

for Viet Cong forces to be carrying money on a night 

patrol. They had not been to a village yet and they 

were coming from the jungle camps. The amount of 

money found was substantial. For comparison, Lieutenant Ek said that tax payments to the Viet Cong in 

the Zone A villages for villagers with a concrete house 

were 500 piasters. Villagers with thatched roof houses 

paid 300 piasters.86 

Intelligence gathering and security efforts worked 

hand in hand to make for stronger and safer CACs. 

The more the CACs were trusted, the more intelligence came in from more sources. Consequently, the 

CACs gained more power to protect their villages. 

83 “S-2 Report, 4 June 1965,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, 

item number 1201045070, folder 045, 1 June 1965, USMCHD 

Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive.

84 “Intelligence Section, Close Combat,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201045073, 5.

85 “Intelligence,” 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, ComdC, item number 

1201045075, folder 045, 1 November 1965, USMCHD Vietnam 

War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 1, 2, 7, 19.

86 Ek oral history, 11.
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Lieutenant Mullen remained as the program commander through April 1966.87 

Expansion of the 

Combined Action Concept

While the original Phu Bai combined action units 

were technically an experiment, the concept soon became an accepted part of the Corps’ counterinsurgency pacification strategy. The Phu Bai CACs became a 

model for future CACs and they were an inspiration 

to General Walt and the III MAF command.

The Marine command realized that the Popular 

Force platoons occupied hamlets and villages in key 

places to protect military installations and main supply routes. While the Marines were able to clear those 

areas of Viet Cong forces, however, the Popular Force 

soldiers proved inadequate to hold the cleared villages. A vacuum was created, and when the Marines 

moved on, the Viet Cong flowed back in and began 

their insurgent activities again.88 By October 1965, in 

the opening words of the FMFPac command chronology summary, the Marines were experiencing “more 

and more emphatically, the realities of counterinsurgency war.”89

General Walt tried to protect his rear areas from 

attack and at the same time aggressively move into 

uncleared areas to clear them with as many maneuver 

battalions as he could afford. The cumulative military 

installations at Da Nang were the nerve centers of the 

Marine Corps operation in Vietnam. At Da Nang was 

the main Marine Corps’ air base, which could handle 

planes of any size and began to rival the traffic of 

the busiest airports in the world. There was a large 

peninsula to the east of the air base across the Han 

River, on which were located several important facilities including the III MAF headquarters and the main 

87 Mullen, “Modifications to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam,” C-11.

88 Operations of the III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPac, item number 

1201001017, folder 001, 1 October 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War 

Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 2, 15. 

89 “Summary,” Operations of the III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPac, 

item number 1201001017, 1.

Marine helicopter base for the entire TAOR. There 

was also a sizeable city in the middle of the area and 

a deep-water port where sometimes ships would line 

up for days to bring critical shipments of supplies into 

Vietnam. Protecting this operation was of the highest 

priority.

Da Nang was vulnerable to attack. Scattered in 

and around the Da Nang military complex were numerous villages and hamlets. Close to Da Nang the 

population was dense. The villages and hamlets extended out into the countryside for several kilometers 

in all directions. The villages, with plenty of vegetation, could and did easily hide enemy troops readying 

to make ground assault on the airbase, mortar attacks, 

and even rocket attacks. 

In July 1965, an enemy attack against the airport 

occurred from the south that destroyed two Lockheed 

C130 Hercules transport planes and one Convair F-102 

Delta Dagger jet fighter and damaged others. This attack caused the Vietnamese to open up the territory 

immediately south of Da Nang for clearing by the Marine infantry. 

On 28 October 1965, a group of Viet Cong commandos attacked the Marble Mountain Air Facility 

in Quang Nam Province, the naval hospital under 

construction, and the Mobile Construction Battalion 

9 (MCB-9) camp. The commandos destroyed 19 and 

damaged 21 more of the 60 helicopters based there. At 

the same time, 50 miles to the south at Chu Lai, the 

enemy destroyed two Douglas A-4D Skyhawk fighter 

jets at the Marine air base.

On 30 October 1965, in an area several kilometers 

southwest of Da Nang, Marine infantry clearing forces were attacked by a force of 300–400 main force Viet 

Cong. Company A of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 

was at an established company base camp on a slight 

rise called Hill 22. There were a total of 154 Marines 

on the hill and 81 men on the perimeter when they 

were attacked in the early morning hours. Preceded 

by mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles, the attackers 

were able to break though Company A’s wire on the 

northwest side. The attack lasted approximately an 

hour before the attackers could be ejected from the 
64 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Company A perimeter. The action resulted in 16 Marines killed and 45 wounded. Confirmed enemy killed 

were 47, although it was believed that more than 100 

dead fighters were carried from the battlefield. It was 

later learned that the attackers came from three Viet 

Cong main force companies and two local force companies.90 The 3d Marine Division wrote that it “was 

first large scale attack on Marine positions in any of 

the TAORs.”91

These attacks and other incidents factored into 

the III MAF assessment to better protect the rear areas. They pursued control of the Popular Force platoons so that more Marine and ARVN forces could 

move forward to clear and drive the Viet Cong and 

their main force units out of the TAOR. Da Nang 

and the Quang Nam Province had 34 Popular Force 

platoons.92 Many were located in key areas that would 

provide protection for the massive military presence 

at Da Nang. General Walt recognized both the value 

and the weakness of the Popular Force platoons, and 

the command realized the key was to gain command 

control of all Popular Forces in the I Corps.93

Bolstered by the success of the CACs in Phu Bai, 

Walt envisioned placing CACs to the extent possible 

in selected Popular Force platoons. Following the positive results in the Phu Bai area CACs and influenced 

by the potential of more attacks on Da Nang and the 

Marble Mountain area, General Walt had the support 

of the ARVN command to expand CAC and take control of the Popular Forces. 

General Walt pursued permission to take command of the Popular Forces. He first was given authority in late November 1965 over eight Popular Force 

platoons in the Da Nang Air Base general area. The 3d 

90 “After action report for 31 October 1965,” 1st Battalion, 1st 

Marines, ComdC, item number 1201019166, folder 019, October 

1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center 

and Archive.

91 3d MARDIV, ComdC, item number 1201025033, folder 025, 1 

October 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 7–8.

92 Operations of III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPac, item number 

1201001017, 15.

93 Operations of III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPac, item number 

1201001017, 1, 2, 16, 17.

Battalion, 9th Marines, began training Popular Forces 

on 7 December 1965.94 The training of these Popular 

Force platoons from the perimeter locations of the Da 

Nang Air Base continued throughout January 1966.95

By 17 February 1966, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, took 

over as the air base defense battalion. They reported 

on 18 February 1966 that a CAC had been formed during this period and the individual units were in six 

locations around the perimeter of Da Nang Air Base.96

There were many more Popular Force platoon locations, however, where CACs would be appropriate 

and useful.

General Walt next pursued authority over all 

Popular Force units in I Corps, submitting a formal 

request on 5 January 1966. On 28 January, Walt was 

granted written permission by General Thi, commander of I Corps, for command and control over all 

Popular Forces in I Corps.97 In a letter dated 4 February 1966 to the commanding general of the 3d Marine 

Division, General Walt directed that the commanders in each TAOR coordinate closely with each Popular Force unit in their area of operations; to provide 

communications, supporting arms, and reserve forces; and to place Marines with selected Popular Force 

units. He also directed that Popular Force units in 

proximity to each other be formed into CACs (companies.) He stressed the role that the Popular Forces 

would play: “The importance of the Popular Forces 

to provide security for the rear areas which will allow Marine/ARVN combat forces to move forward, 

cannot be overstated.”98 In the Da Nang TAOR, Walt 

94 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201057001, 

folder 057, 1 December 1965, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, cover page, 2.

95 “Civil Affairs,” 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201057002, folder 057, 1 January 1966, USMCHD Vietnam 

War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 4.

96 “General Concept of Operations During the Reporting Period,” 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, ComdC, item number 1201055037, 

folder 055, 1 February 1966, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas 

Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 4.

97 Maj Charles W. Driest, Combined Action Platoons: A Possible Role 

in the Low-Intensity Conflict Environment (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

School of Advance Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, 1989), Exhibits A-1 through A-5.

98 Driest, Combined Action Platoons, Exhibit A-5.
WINTER 2018 65

would need all the resources he could muster to clear 

and hold the 54 villages and 241 hamlets, covering 

395 square miles, with a population of 265,767. For 

comparison, the Phu Bai TAOR had 9 villages and 62 

hamlets, covered 76 square miles, and had a civilian 

population of 36,131.99

The process of expansion started almost immediately. Internal Vietnamese political turmoil brought 

the expansion of the program to a virtual standstill. In 

June 1966, after three months, the program began to 

regain its thrust.100 By July, there were at least 19 CACs 

in the Da Nang enclave placed in critical areas around 

the airfield and covering the peninsula where the Marble Mountain facilities were located.101 Some of these 

CACs were placed to the immediate north and to the 

west/northwest of the airfield, as well, to protect those 

flanks.102 Five CACs were farther out along the southwest inland main supply to the Dai Loc District. They 

helped to protect the main supply route (a dirt road) 

and the western flank of the TAOR.103 Eight Marine 

infantry battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, and 

the 1st Military Police battalion, in an ongoing effort 

to drive out the presence of the Viet Cong, conducted saturation patrolling throughout the Quang Nam 

Province, including the areas where CACs were placed 

in the outlying areas. The total number of patrols dur99 Operations of III MAF, Vietnam, FMFPac, item number 

1201001017, 17,18,19,20.

100 Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, FMFPac, item 

number 1201001060, folder 001, 1 June 1966, USMCHD Vietnam 

War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, part A, 4.

101 “CAC Chronology,” 1st Military Police Battalion, ComdC, 

item number 1201010115, folder 010, 1 July 1966, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, enclosure 5, 1.

102 “Popular Force, Combined Action Company weekly report,” 

3d Marines, ComdC, item number 1201037064, folder 037, 1 June 

1966, USMCHD Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, enclosure 57, 2.

103 “Op-Plan 66,” 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, ComdC, item number 1201040003, folder 040, 1 July 1966, USMCHD Vietnam War 

Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 66, 1; and “Significant Events,” 20 and 23 July, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, ComdC, item number 1201039078, folder 039, 1 July 1966, USMCHD 

Vietnam War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, 

enclosure 1, 42, 45.

ing July 1966, including ambush patrols, was 5,820.104

While Da Nang was a first-priority expansion, 

the Chu Lai enclave also began working with the Popular Forces to form CAC units. Unlike Da Nang, Chu 

Lai was not built in a highly populated area. The Marines selected Chu Lai as a base due to its geographic 

location and its suitability to build a full-length combat airfield. It was a new base with an airfield that 

had been constructed in May 1965. There were fewer 

existing Popular Force platoons in Chu Lai, but the 

Marines there also began working with Popular Forces. By the end of summer 1966, several CAC units had 

been established there in a similar pattern to protect 

the flanks of the airfield, the supply routes, and other 

military installations from ground and mortar attacks. 

The expansion of CAC continued in spurts for 

the next three years. In mid-1967, the program became 

an independent organization under the direct command of III MAF and took on its most well-known 

name, the Combined Action Program. At this time, 

the individual platoons were called Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). The original units in Phu Bai 

remained the basic model for CAPs everywhere, until 

the program phased into totally mobile units beginning after the Tet offensive of 1968.

• 1775 •

104 Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, FMFPac, item 

number 1201001066, folder 001, 1 July 1966, USMCHD Vietnam 

War Docs, Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive, part A, 16.
HISTORY IN ACTION

Enduring Value

ADVANCING THE UNDERSTANDING 

OF THE TET OFFENSIVE 

WITH THE FREDERICK VOGEL COLLECTION

By Alisa Whitley1

As a part of the Marine Corps History Division, the mission of the Archives Branch is to collect, preserve, and provide access to primary source documentation pertaining to the history 

of the U.S. Marine Corps. A vast collection of personal 

papers comprises a major portion of this documentation. The Archives Branch maintains more than 5,600 

collections of correspondence, diaries, photographs, 

maps, scrapbooks, and other personal items created 

and collected by Marines ranging from privates to 

commandants. As an ever-growing section of the archives, the Personal Papers Collection receives approximately 125 new donation offers annually. These 

donation offers are evaluated by a team of archivists 

to determine whether the archives is the appropriate repository for the items being offered. Offers are 

reviewed on a case-by-case basis. If the materials are 

deemed to have lasting historical value, a recommendation to accept them into the permanent holdings is 

referred to the president of Marine Corps University 

for a final decision. Upon acceptance, collections are 

arranged and described, and then made available to 

researchers. 

1

 Alisa Whitley holds a master of library and information science degree with a focus on archival management from the University of Pittsburgh. Following graduate school, she worked as 

an archivist for the National Society Daughters of the American 

Revolution. She has been serving as an archivist for the Archives 

Branch, Marine Corps History Division, since 2006 and as the 

branch head since May 2018. 

Many of the collections are donated by the Marines whose service they document. Whenever possible, Archives Branch requests that donors bring their 

collections to Quantico, Virginia, in person. Meeting 

the donor enables archivists to better understand the 

context of the creation and use of the materials. It was 

under these circumstances that Archives received one 

of its newest collections: the personal papers of Frederick J. Vogel.

Frederick Vogel was commissioned as a first lieutenant in the Marine Corps in June 1965. He served 

a total of 42 months in combat in Vietnam (1967–69 

and 1971–72). During this time, he served with the 1st 

Marine Division Headquarters, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, and 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Subsequently, he served with the Phoenix Program as 

a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) field commander in Hoi An Province and later as a field advisor with the Vietnamese Sea Commandos under U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—Studies and 

Observations Group (USMACV-SOG).2

Vogel was released from active duty in July 1972. 

2

 For information on the Phoenix Program, read Col Andrew R. 

Finlayson (Ret), “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: the Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and its Role 

in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70,” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 

(2007): 59–69; William Rosenau and Austin Long, The Phoenix 

Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 

Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2009); and Douglas 

Valentine, The Phoenix Program (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 

2000).

66
WINTER 2018 67

As a reservist in Thailand, he served as liaison officer 

between Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand and the Royal Thai Army/Navy/Marine Special 

Operating Forces for more than eight years. He retired 

from the Marine Corps Reserve as a colonel in 1995.

In April 2016, Archives was contacted by now 

colonel Vogel, who indicated he had some Vietnam 

photos he was interested in donating. Archives receives many donation offers every month, so he was 

sent the collection statement and a request to send in 

the materials he was interested in donating. Approximately a week later, Archives received digital scans of 

Vogel’s photographs and copies of books he had prepared using the photos. An initial review of Vogel’s 

photographs confirmed that this was a very unique 

collection that held great research potential. Though 

Vogel’s scans were of high quality, Archives always endeavors to obtain original photographs. Luckily, Colonel Vogel readily agreed and also was willing to deliver 

them in person.

Later that month, he brought all his photograph 

albums to Quantico, and he spent a couple of hours 

discussing his experiences in Vietnam and Thailand. 

At the end of this meeting, he donated 23 photograph 

albums. 

Once the collection was officially accepted, it 

was processed by removing as many photographs as 

possible from the albums while maintaining the original order and subject of each folder. The collection is 

arranged primarily in chronological sequence by album. The collection also contains Vogel’s service records, newspaper clippings, propaganda posters, and a 

variety of other documents, though photographs comprise the majority of the collection. 

The images from Vietnam include Marines on 

patrol, scenes from Hue City, Marines around Phu 

Loc, a flamethrowing tank, a change of command ceremony, aerial views of the area, an enemy situation 

map, Da Nang, and Vietnamese locals.

The photographs from his service with the Mitraphap Education Foundation (a joint Thai-U.S. 

foundation to foster friendship and cooperation 

between the Thai and U.S. military forces) include 

parachutists, hand-to-hand combat demonstrations, 

exhibitions of Thai culture, and musical presentations.

The final processed collection consists of three 

boxes of material primarily related to Vogel’s service 

as the executive officer of 1st Force Reconnaissance 

Company in Vietnam during the Tet offensive from 

1968 to 1969 and with the Mitraphap Education Foundation. There is also a small amount of material related to his father, Raymond W. Vogel Jr., who was a 

naval aviator killed during the Korean War.

Hue was the major focus of the Tet offensive, 

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company diving team after clearing the 

Silver Bridge.

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

1st Force Reconnaissance Company Diving Team at USMACV compound in Hue-Tet 1968. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company also 

served as infantry in Hue, bringing them under constant mortar and 

small arms fire. The destruction in the city was substantial.
68 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

which began on 30 January 1968. Passing through Hue 

was Highway 1, an important supply line that made 

the city a valuable asset. The city also provided access 

to the Perfume River. On the night of 30–31 January, 

the Viet Cong forces attacked and were able to rapidly 

occupy most of the city. During the next month, the 

Marines and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

gradually drove them out during intense house-tohouse fighting. With 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, Vogel led a diving team under intense fire into 

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Street scene in Hue 1968. Two blown-out tanks sit on either side of the 

street; a third disabled tank is just out of the picture. The remains of the 

tank crews were still at their stations.

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

“Among all the lasting images, though, it was the faces of the children 

that remain the most vivid. In the midst of war, they still projected 

innocence, hope, and promise. These young girls near Hue, with Sgt 

Hughes, are forever etched in my memory,” said Col Vogel.

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

According to Vogel, “the Quang Nam PRU leadership was second to 

none—dedicated, courageous, some say ruthless—and the enemy feared 

and respected them.”

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

A provincial reconnaissance unit en route to a joint operation on Go 

Noi Island, Vietnam, deep in the heart of enemy-controlled territory.
WINTER 2018 69

Hue to reconnoiter the approaches across the Perfume 

River and to prepare the advance of Marine infantry 

units to recapture the Citadel. 

Later in the Vietnam War, small teams of Vietnamese special police, led by American military and 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel, were 

tasked with destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure. 

These special police units were called provincial reconnaissance units (PRUs), and Vogel served as a 

PRU commander from February to September 1969. 

Vogel’s last tour in Vietnam was with USMACVSOG and the Naval Advisory Group. The Vietnamese Sea Commandos were launched by patrol torpedo 

Frederick J. Vogel Collection, COLL/5577, 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Col Vogel said of the action, “Returning from a mission to the DMZ 

[demilitarized zone], fatigue written on my face. We sailed north for 

anywhere from 8 to 12 hours, looping far out to sea to avoid enemy 

radar, then made a dash to the coast. The team launched by rubber 

boat to about 1,000 yards offshore, then swam into the target area to 

conduct the operation.”

(PT) boat to raid along the north Vietnamese coast 

between February 1971 and February 1972. These commandos were experts at black operations against the 

enemy. They would infiltrate enemy territory by small 

boat and then conduct combat operations ashore, 

mostly at night.

Colonel Vogel left active duty in 1972 and pursued a career in government, serving as an operation 

officer with the CIA and as a foreign service officer 

with the Department of State. During this time, he 

continued to serve in the Marine Corps Reserve. In 

that capacity, he served as liaison officer between Joint 

U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand and the Royal 

Thai Special Operation Forces for almost nine years. 

As deputy chief of mission and periodically charge 

d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, Laos, he 

also supported the U.S. POW/MIA task force. He retired from the Department of State in 2004.

Since Colonel Vogel supplied high-quality scans 

of the images from his collection (and with the help of 

Archives’ summer intern), archivists were able to place 

a large portion of these images on the branch’s Flickr 

page. On 7 September 2017, Archives was honored to 

have Colonel Vogel come to the History Division to 

deliver a talk on his career, during which his photographs were displayed on a wall-size LCD screen.3

 

Colonel Vogel’s collection has helped fill a significant gap in the holdings of the Archives Branch. In 

2014, Archives received the papers of Colonel Andrew 

R. Finlayson, who was a force reconnaissance platoon 

commander and wrote the books Killer Kane: A Marine 

Long-Range Recon Team Leader in Vietnam, 1967–1968

(2013) and Rice Paddy Recon: A Marine Officer’s Second 

Tour in Vietnam, 1968–1970 (2015) about this service. 

Archives also maintains the papers of Major Michael 

R. Lamb, who served with 1st Force Reconnaissance 

Company in Okinawa, Japan, and was a parachute 

test jumper in 1964, as well as the papers of Bart Russell who served in 1st Force Reconnaissance Company 

in Vietnam from 1966 to 1967. With 2018 marking the 

3

 For access to these photographs, please visit USMC Archives 

albums on Flickr.
70 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

50th anniversary of the Tet offensive, these collections 

will be of great interest to researchers. No archives 

can exist without generous donations of material such 

as Colonel Vogel’s. It is through sharing these items 

that Archives Branch is able to preserve not only his 

story, but the stories of those Marines with whom 

he served—especially those who did not return from 

Vietnam. 

• 1775 •
HISTORY IN ACTION

Core of the Corps

CAYUGA COUNTY MARINES 

IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

By Annette D. Amerman1

On 6 April 1917, the United States entered the 

First World War against Germany. At the 

start of the war in 1914, the Marine Corps’ 

manpower stood at fewer than 11,000 Marines strong. 

They were relegated to small detachments on ships, 

garrison duty at naval bases, and expeditionary duty. 

All this would change, as would the mission of the 

Marine Corps, thanks to the war. By 1918, the size of 

the Corps had exploded to 1,503 officers and 51,315 enlisted men. This allowed the Corps to send a brigade 

of Marines (two infantry regiments and one machine 

gun battalion) to serve with the Army’s 2d Infantry 

Division in France. The Corps also was able to send 

a second brigade to France, but it was relegated to 

duty with the Services of Supply—guard duty, quartermaster duties, and replacements. Two brigades would 

create a division-level unit and Army general John J. 

Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary 

Forces, did not want a division of Marines in France. 

Men from small towns and large cities joined the 

ranks of those who had served in places such as China, 

Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Men from 

one county in upstate New York are the focus of this 

piece—the men of Cayuga (pronounced kay-you-ga) 

1

 Ms. Amerman is the head of the Historical Reference Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division. She started with History Division in 1995 as an intern, and later served as a research assistant. 

She returned to the division in 2003 and was promoted to branch 

head in November 2017. This piece is adapted from a presentation given at the Cayuga Museum of History and Art in Auburn, 

NY. Ms. Amerman, a native of Cayuga County, researched and 

presented this to the gathered audience on 1 June 2018. 

County who joined the Corps in World War I. Cayuga 

County boasts being the home of Secretary of State 

William H. Seward, President Millard Fillmore, and 

in her later years, abolitionist Harriet Tubman.

Cayuga County was formed in the days after the 

American Revolution as the Military Tract of Central 

New York; it consisted of nearly 2 million acres of land 

set aside to compensate New York soldiers for their 

participation in the war.2

 Utilizing the New York state 

database of World War I military service records for 

2

 Elliot G. Storke, History of Cayuga County, New York, 1789–1879 

(Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1879), 32.

Map courtesy of David Benbennick 

Cayuga County, NY, is shown highlighted in red.

71
72 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

1917–19, which are now available online courtesy of genealogy research website Ancestry, it was determined 

that 9,007 men from New York joined the Marine 

Corps.3 Of that number, only 94 were from Cayuga 

County, and the overwhelming majority were inducted via the recruiting station in Syracuse (table 1). 

Of the 94 Marines from Cayuga County, 37 percent served in France. Of those Marines, 68 percent 

were in combat, and of those in combat, 41 percent 

were killed or wounded. Of course, there were Marines who served in combat in locations other than 

France—six Marines served in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or Cuba. One of the most interesting 

facts to come out of the research is that 13 Marines 

(of the 94) enlisted on 20 August 1918. One explanation might be that the recruiters in Syracuse were at 

the New York State Fair enticing men into the Corps; 

however, 20 August was a Tuesday and the fair had 

yet to start for the year, so the reason for such a large 

number enlisting on the same day remains a mystery 

to be researched and solved.

The most prominent Marine from Cayuga 

County to serve in World War I was Leonard Earl 

Rea, born in Auburn, New York, on 14 March 1897. 

Rea was the son of a tea shop owner. He enlisted on 19 

April 1917 and was sent to Parris Island, South Carolina, for recruit training. When his training was complete, Rea was sent to Quantico, Virginia, where he 

joined the 5th Regiment, which was bound for France 

that summer. Rea was promoted to corporal just before shipping over to France; he must have impressed 

his superiors during the next eight months because 

he was recommended for a commission and it was approved in April 1918. While attending 1st Corps Officer School in Langres, France, Rea missed the battles 

of Belleau Wood and Soissons, but was in combat in 

the battles of Saint-Mihiel and Blanc Mont. He was 

cited in orders for “unusual heroism, coolness, zeal 

and good judgment at the southwest corner of the 

3

 Statistical data compiled from the “New York, Abstracts of 

World War I Military Service, 1917–1919,” Adjutant General’s Office, Series B0808, New York State Archives, Albany, NY. Accessible via ancestry.com. 

Bois de Bonveaux [sic]” on the days of 12–16 September. At Blanc Mont on 4 October, Rea was wounded 

in action, and despite being unable to move without 

help, he refused to leave his men or the line until he 

received a direct order from his commanding officer. 

For this, he was awarded the Distinguished Service 

Cross, and the Navy later also awarded him the Navy 

Cross. Rea went on to serve in the Corps through the 

interwar period and World War II and rose through 

the ranks, retiring as a brigadier general on 30 November 1953.4

Many of the Marines from Cayuga County who 

made it to France and were in combat were wounded 

or killed. Benjamin F. Reister, born in Fleming on 6 

December 1893, enlisted on 13 February 1917 in Syra4

 Leonard E. Rea, official military personnel file, National Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis, MO.

Table 1. Number of men joining the Marine Corps by town, 

Cayuga County, 1917–19 

New York town Number

Auburn 64

Weedsport 5

Scipio 3

Port Byron 3

Locke 3

Owasco 2

Genoa 2

King Ferry 2

Cayuga 2

Sennett 2

Moravia 1

Martville 1

Fleming 1

Aurora 1

Ledyard 1

Meridian 1

Source: Statistical data compiled from the “New York, Abstracts 

of World War I Military Service, 1917–1919,” Adjutant General’s 

Office, Series B0808, New York State Archives, Albany, NY. Accessible via ancestry.com.
WINTER 2018 73

cuse, just before the United States declared war. Reister was sent to Parris Island for recruit training and 

was then assigned to the ship’s detachment of the USS 

New Hampshire (BB 25) for a short period before being reassigned to the 5th Regiment, bound for France. 

Reister saw action in every major battle with the 5th 

Regiment until 4 October 1918, when he was wounded 

in the leg during the Battle of Blanc Mont. He was 

evacuated but likely succumbed to infection and died 

just five days later. For his actions throughout the war, 

Reister was posthumously awarded the Silver Star as 

well as the French Croix de Guerre; his body was returned home to rest in St. Joseph’s Cemetery in Fleming.5

5

 Entries for R, “Interments,” St. Joseph’s Cemetery, Auburn, NY, 

accessed 19 May 2018.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

1stLt Leonard E. Rea after the war.

Not all Marines who made it to France were 

infantry Marines. Ronnell W. Ranf was born on 6 

January 1896 in Silver Springs and resided in Auburn 

when he enlisted on 31 July 1917. Like many before 

him, he was sent to Parris Island for recruit training, 

but upon completion he was assigned to the 1st Marine Aviation Squadron in Cape May, New Jersey. He 

continued his education in aircraft mechanics as the 

unit moved from New Jersey to Mineola, New York, 

to Lake Charles, Louisiana, and then on to France in 

the summer of 1918. Ranf was promoted to corporal 

in May 1918 and to sergeant in June. Ranf was one of 

the several dozen Marine mechanics sent to the British aviation school in Eastleigh, England, where he 

later fell victim to the influenza. He survived the flu 

but did not see actual combat or frontline experience 

before being sent home at the end of the year. He was 

discharged in February 1919 and returned home to 

Auburn.6

To this day, many Marines still rest on French 

soil, lovingly cared for by the men and women of the 

American Battle Monuments Commission. Clarence 

L. Clark, born on 29 January 1896 in Weedsport, is 

one of them. Clark enlisted in Syracuse on 5 May 

1917 and was sent to recruit training in Philadelphia. 

Like Rea and Reister, he joined the 5th Regiment, 

but upon arrival in France he was reassigned to the 

6th Machine Gun Battalion. 

Apparently bored with his service, Clark went 

absent without leave (AWOL) for a day; upon his 

return, he was found guilty and served 10 days loss 

in pay, but continued to serve in the Corps. In June 

1918, in the midst of the opening days of the Battle of 

Belleau Wood, he was gassed. He recuperated from 

the gas through the summer and early fall and returned to his unit in October. Regrettably, on 2 November, just days before the Armistice, Clark was 

killed in action. His parents asked that his body remain in France with his fellow Marines, so today, 

6

 Annette D. Amerman, “Integration of US Marine Corps Aviation with the Royal Air Force in the First World War: Legacy 

and Impact” (master’s thesis, University of Birmingham, 2018), 

Appendix B, 153.
74 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Clark rests in the Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery.7

While Cayuga County is not the largest county 

in New York, and certainly not the most famous, 

when the United States entered World War I, the men 

of the county stepped up and did their duty. These 

stories are but a few of the Cayuga County men who 

joined the Marine Corps during the First World War, 

exemplifying the “Core of the Corps.”

• 1775 •

7

 “Clarence Lee Clark,” American Battle Monuments Commission, accessed 20 May 1918.

Photo courtesy of Hubert Caloud

Headstone of Pvt Clarence L. Clark in Oise-Aisne American Cemetery 

and Memorial.
IN MEMORIAM

Major Gary W. Cozzens, 

USMCR (Ret)

20 JANUARY 1956–31 JULY 2018

Gary Wayne Cozzens was born in Hobbs, New 

Mexico, on 20 January 1956 and grew up in 

Portales, New Mexico. In 1978, he graduated 

from Eastern New Mexico University with a bachelor’s degree in history and political science and was 

then commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Marine 

Corps. During more than two decades as a Marine 

infantry officer, Cozzens commanded two rifle companies—Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and 

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (known as Suicide Charley)—and Headquarters and Service Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. He also served as the 

inspector-instructor for Company E, 2d Battalion, 23d 

Marines, and participated in Operation Desert Storm 

(1990–91). 

For his service, Cozzens was awarded several decorations: the Southwest Asia Service Medal, National 

Defense Service Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal, and the Korea Defense Service Medal. He retired from the Marine Corps Reserve 

as a major in 1999 with more than 20 years of service. 

From 1994 until 2013, Cozzens served as director 

of career and technical education, emergency management and distance education, for the Region IX Education Cooperative, covering several school districts 

in south central New Mexico. Much of Cozzens’s life 

and career, however, centered around his love of history, including the history of his home state and of 

the Marine Corps. In 2011, he was recognized with the 

Governor’s Award for Historic Preservation. He wrote 

articles for New Mexico history publications and authored the books The Nogal Mesa: A History of Kivas and 

Ranchers in Lincoln County (2011), Capitan New Mexico: 

from the Coalora Coal Mines to Smokey Bear (2012), Tres 

Ritos: A History of Three Rivers, New Mexico (2015), and 

Teufelhunden!: A Bibliography of the United States Marine 

Corps in the World War I Era (2017). He was also a significant contributor to Marine Corps History magazine. 

From 2013 to 2016, Cozzens managed the Lincoln Historic Site in Lincoln, New Mexico, a historic 

landmark that at the time included 16 buildings, six of 

which were museums. He also served as the president 

Photo courtesy of Shirley Crawford

Gary Cozzens at the Lincoln State Monument in Lincoln County, NM.

75
76 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

of the Lincoln County Historical Society and was a 

board member of Fort Stanton, Inc., a nonprofit organization that manages the Fort Stanton Historic Site 

in New Mexico.

Gary Cozzens passed away on 31 July 2018 at the 

age of 62 in Nogal, New Mexico. He is survived by 

his wife, Shirley Crawford, his daughter and granddaughters, and his three sisters and their families. A 

memorial was held on 14 August 2018 at the Capitan 

Cemetery in Capitan, New Mexico. 

• 1775 •
IN MEMORIAM

Major General Lawrence 

H. Livingston (Ret)

5 NOVEMBER 1940–28 SEPTEMBER 2018

By Edward T. Nevgloski

Born only a few miles from Fort Defiance in 

northwest Ohio on 5 November 1940, Major 

General Lawrence Herbert Livingston epitomized his hometown’s name. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1960 after a year of schooling at Defiance 

College. Livingston spent his first enlistment with the 

2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

Before the end of his career, he would lead a battalion 

and regiment in the 2d Marine Division and retire as 

its commanding general in 1997.1

Livingston reenlisted in 1964 wearing the rank 

of sergeant, and in late 1966, the Marine Corps reassigned him to the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, 

1st Marine Division, III Marine Amphibious Force, in 

South Vietnam, where he led hundreds of combat patrols, ambushes, and direct-action raids into the hills 

and valleys surrounding the major Marine air base at 

Da Nang. The targets were the elusive Communist 

guerrillas and the main forces of the National Liberation Front. His knack for making contact with the enemy earned him the Bronze Star with combat “V,” two 

Purple Hearts, the Navy Commendation with combat 

“V,” and the nickname “Rhino,” not only because of his 

physical stature but also due to the way he fearlessly 

charged at the enemy during firefights.2

 Participating 

in the Tet offensive in early 1968, his battalion com1

 MajGen Lawrence H. Livingston official biography, Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division (MCHD), Quantico, VA.

2

 Livingston official biography.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

MajGen Lawrence H. Livingston.

77
78 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

mander nominated him for the Meritorious Commissioning Program.3

 Returning to the United States as 

a staff sergeant and completing Officer Candidates 

School, he departed Quantico, Virginia, for his first 

assignment as a new second lieutenant and infantry 

officer.4

Livingston spent the next 30 years forging his 

name in the memories of thousands of Marines in all 

three active divisions and an exchange assignment 

with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. During his illustrious career, Livingston held some of the most challenging command and staff assignments an infantry 

officer could hope to occupy. His Fleet Marine Force 

experience included time as a platoon commander in 

the 5th Marine Division from 1968 to 1970 after its 

wartime activation; in the 1st Marine Division from 

1976 to 1980, where he was a company commander, 

battalion operations officer, and battalion executive 

officer in the 5th Marines; and in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as the operations officer for Marine Aircraft Group 15 for one year in 1983, before heading 

back to the 2d Marine Division for duty as the 6th 

Marines’ regimental executive officer. From 1984 to 

1986, he was the commanding officer of 3d Battalion, 

4th Marines, which at that time was in the 2d Marine Division. Livingston deployed with the battalion 

to the Mediterranean Sea as part of the first special 

operations capable 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

3

 The Meritorious Commissioning Program, or MCP, was one of 

several programs for eligible and qualified enlisted Marines to 

receive a commission. The MCP required Marines to have a college background and, before being eligible for promotion to the 

grade of major, to obtain a bachelor’s degree in any field of study. 

The prospective candidates must have demonstrated exceptional 

leadership potential to serve as commissioned officers. Nominated by their command, the candidates, after a thorough physical 

and medical screening, attend Marine Corps Officer Candidates 

School for 10 weeks in Quantico, VA. Graduates receive their 

commissions as second lieutenants and are assigned for additional training at The Basic School.

4

 Livingston official biography. The nickname “Rhino” was relayed to the author during a discussion with Col John W. Ripley 

(Ret) in July 2003. Ripley was the former director of the Marine 

Corps History Division, a Marine advisor, and close friend of 

Livingston.

(26th MEU[SOC]) and participated in Operation El 

Dorado Canyon and the air strikes against Libya in 

April 1986. In 1990, he took command of the 6th Marines and spearheaded the 2d Marine Division’s assault 

into Kuwait to recapture Kuwait City during Operation Desert Storm.5

Livingston also had a penchant for training and 

preparing Marines for war. From 1970 to 1971, he was 

the mortar platoon commander and a staff officer 

with the Basic Infantry Battalion and helped transition the battalion into the Infantry Training School, 

known today as the Infantry Training Battalion, at the 

School of Infantry West at Camp Pendleton, California. From 1973 to 1976, Livingston supervised the making of Marines as company commander and battalion 

and regimental operations officer at the Marine Corps 

Recruit Depot San Diego, California. While there, he 

received a bachelor of arts degree in both economics 

and business administration from Chapman College. 

His final training assignment was as the tactics group 

chief and operations officer of The Basic School from 

1980 to 1983.6

When not in the Fleet Marine Force or training 

Marines for war, Livingston was a dedicated student 

of war. His education included the Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico from 1972 to 1973, the Armed 

Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1980, and 

the National War College in Washington, DC, from 

1986 to 1987.7

Like every good field Marine officer before and 

after him, Livingston paid his dues at Headquarters 

Marine Corps, though both of his assignments there 

would come late in his career. From 1987 to 1990, he 

was head of both the Joint Strategic Planning Branch 

and the Eastern Regional Branch of the Plans Division. Then, as a newly promoted brigadier general, 

Livingston returned to Headquarters Marine Corps as 

the assistant deputy chief of staff for the Force Structure Implementation, Plans, Policies and Operations 

Department from 1991 to 1992 before moving back to 

5

 Livingston official biography.

6

 Livingston official biography.

7

 Livingston official biography.
WINTER 2018 79

Camp Lejeune to assume the post of base commanding general from 1992 to 1995.8

It was Livingston’s tour as an infantry advisor 

to the 1st Battalion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps 

(1st VNMC) from 1971 to 1972, and his role in helping 

defeat the North Vietnamese Army’s (NVA) invasion 

of South Vietnam in 1972, however, that solidified his 

reputation as one of the most competent and gallant 

Marines ever to have worn the uniform. It also explains why his Marines, during his first tour in South 

Vietnam, referred to him as “Rhino.” 

When the Easter offensive began on 30 March 

1972, then-captain Livingston was at Fire Support 

Base Pedro about 80.5 kilometers west of the ancient 

imperial city of Quang Tri. Assigned to the battalion as the assistant advisor with its Bravo command 

element in the summer of 1971, Livingston had with 

him a small cadre of Marines to help him plan and 

execute operations. Through the previous months, enemy activity had increased. After an engagement with 

an NVA company that ended with 32 enemy fighters 

dead, Livingston sensed an offensive was imminent, 

particularly after finding a map on one of the enemy 

bodies pinpointing the location of every fire support 

base in the area.9

 Following an enemy sapper attack on 

Fire Support Base Pedro on 4 April 1972, the brigade 

withdrew the battalion back to the Ai Tu Combat 

Base northeast of Quang Tri City. There Livingston 

and the battalion’s senior advisor, Major Robert C. 

Cockell, worked with the battalion staff to prepare 

for a counterattack against thousands of NVA forces 

penetrating south of the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam. 

During the initial days of fighting at and around 

Fire Support Base Pedro, Livingston found himself 

in a tank battle to prevent his and other VNMC battalions from decimation. During the course of several 

days, he would use South Vietnamese M48 Patton 

8

 Livingston official biography. 

9

 Maj Charles D. Melson and LtCol Curtis G. Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War that Would Not End, 1971–1973 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1991), 66.

medium tanks and U.S. aircraft to engage the enemy 

with such precision and effectiveness that one Marine 

advisor commented later that Livingston likely “had 

more experience with nose-on-nose tank battles than 

any other U.S. Marine.”10

During the next six months, Livingston—on at 

least four occasions—demonstrated the kind of courage and defiance that you read about in books. On 

12 April, Livingston and the Bravo command were 

searching an area overrun by a much larger NVA unit 

when the company he was with captured an enemy 

soldier and began the process of interrogating him. 

Within seconds, Livingston and the South Vietnamese Marines came under enemy attack. According to 

the citation commending Livingston for his actions, 

the large volume of enemy fire killed the Vietnamese 

Marine officer with Livingston and killed or wounded 

several others. The citation reads: “Without hesitation 

and with complete disregard for his own safety, Captain Livingston braved intense enemy fire to recover 

the body of the Vietnamese officer and to remove several wounded to a protected area.” Sensing the enemy 

prisoner had viable intelligence, Livingston continued 

questioning him to learn the enemy disposition. Reorganizing the embattled and shocked Vietnamese 

company, he pushed the enemy back with supporting 

artillery fire and inflicted “serious damage to a larger 

enemy unit nearby,” thereby saving “an untold number 

of friendly casualties.” For his timely and courageous 

actions, he received the Silver Star.11

A little more than a month later, on 25–26 May, 

Livingston and the 1st VNMC battalion were just 

north of the ancient capital of Hue deployed in a series of company blocking positions to protect a major avenue of approach to the city from the north and 

northeast. On the evening of 25 May, the battalion 

identified three NVA tracked vehicles and an enemy 

force of unknown size approaching the main defensive line from the west. Livingston moved to where he 

estimated the enemy might attempt to penetrate the 

10 Melson and Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 69–70. 11 “Valor Awards: Lawrence Herbert Livingston,” Military Times

Hall of Valor Project database, accessed 6 December 2018.
80 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

line. Using artillery to halt and disperse the enemy, at 

sunset he requested support from a Lockheed AC-130 

gunship and directed its fire on the enemy vehicles 

and troops in their covered positions, destroying the 

vehicles. Throughout the night, the enemy forces targeted the companies with mortars and recoilless rifle 

fire. Livingston boldly moved about the blocking position to assess the situation. At 0530, two NVA battalions, under the cover of their own machine gun, 

recoilless rifle, and mortar fire, began their assault 

from the west.12

As the enemy closed on the battalion command 

group, Livingston moved to an exposed position to 

guide aircraft onto the target. Unaware that two enemy soldiers had closed within 20 meters of Livingston, the South Vietnamese Marines cut them down 

with rifle fire. An oblivious Livingston ordered the 

aircraft to drop their flares behind the enemy assault 

force, silhouetting them. According to his Bronze Star 

summary of action, “Captain Livingston continued 

to call and direct air strikes for the next eight hours” 

from an exposed position. His actions “not only staved 

off a major enemy effort to penetrate the defenses of 

Hue, but also resulted in the destruction of two battalions of the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, as evidenced by over 250 enemy dead left on the 

battlefield.”13

As American airpower and the tenacity of South 

Vietnamese military forces pushed the NVA back 

north of Quang Tri City, Livingston continued to do 

his part to ensure the battalion was able to secure the 

areas under its control. In July, the 1st VNMC Battalion was to conduct a helicopter-borne assault in NVAcontrolled areas northeast of the city and to close 

Route 560, a major enemy resupply and reinforcement 

route leading into Quang Tri. The assault began on 

the morning of 11 July. As the helicopter-borne assault 

forced the landing zone it came under intense enemy 

machine gun and rifle fire, damaging several aircraft. 

The helicopter directly behind Livingston’s burst into 

12 Summary of Action for the award of the Bronze Star with combat distinguishing device for Capt Lawrence H. Livingston, Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, MCHD.

13 Melson and Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 102–3.

flames after being hit by machine gun fire, killing 30 

South Vietnamese Marines and the U.S. Marine aircrew. After landing, and with the entire force under 

heavy enemy fire, Livingston ran to assist his wounded 

Vietnamese radio operator. Carrying him to a nearby 

rice paddy and out of the way of enemy fire, Livingston bandaged his radio operator’s wounds. Taking the 

radio from his operator but unable to make communication with his command element, he made contact 

instead with an aircraft flying overhead to relay his requests for fire support. Using naval gunfire from ships 

off the coast, Livingston would eventually secure the 

battalion’s flanks.14

As the fighting raged, Livingston made his way 

from place to place, trying to push the Marines forward and out from their exposed positions. Seeing 

his naval gunfire spotter, First Lieutenant Stephen G. 

Biddulph, shot in both legs by enemy fire, Livingston 

rushed to his aid. Recalling the battle years later, Biddulph remarked that Livingston ran toward him under the trained eye of enemy rifle and machine gun 

fire and “came sliding in beside me like a man stealing 

second base.”15 

Finally finding his command element and the 

battalion commander, he organized the beleaguered 

South Vietnamese Marines into an assault force, 

picked an initial objective, oriented them, and charged 

forward. The objective, according to Livingston’s 

Navy Cross citation, was an enemy trench comprising its main defenses. Without hesitation and despite

“the continuing heavy concentration of hostile fire, he 

began the assault on the initial objective—a treeline 

approximately 50 yards distant. Although blown from 

his feet by explosions and periodically delayed to reform and redirect his casualty-riddled force, he forged 

ahead, leading the Vietnamese Marines into the enemy-infested trench lines of the objective and a subsequent hand-to-hand battle. Upon seizure of the initial 

portion of the trench line, Captain Livingston shed 

his combat equipment, emerged from the trench line, 

14 Summary of Action for the award of the Navy Cross to Capt 

Lawrence H. Livingston, Biographical File, Historical Reference 

Branch, MCHD.

15 Melson and Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 115.
WINTER 2018 81

and exposed himself to a hail of enemy fire to reach 

and carry his wounded naval gunfire spotter to a position of relative safety.”16

Captain Livingston and a number of other Marine advisors, leading battalions of South Vietnamese 

Marines, along with American airpower, eventually 

retook and held Quang Tri City and the rest of the 

northern portion of South Vietnam. By 22 October, 

South Vietnamese forces reestablished the original 

16 Melson and Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 289. 

line of demarcation. Livingston returned to the United 

States and continued his remarkable career. 

After nearly 40 years in a Marine uniform, Major General Livingston retired to his avocado ranch 

in Bonsall, California, on 1 January 1998. A humbled 

Livingston returned to Defiance, Ohio, to be honored 

as one of the state’s most highly decorated combat veterans.17 On 26 June 2010, the state of Ohio named the 

scenic Defiance County Road 424 the Major General 

Lawrence H. Livingston Highway.18 On 28 September 

2018, Livingston passed away peacefully at the age of 

77 while surrounded by his wife, Karen; his two sons, 

Laurence and Michael, and their wives; his daughter, 

Jessica; five grandchildren; and numerous other relatives and close friends.19 Services for General Livingston were held 5 November 2018.

• 1775 •

17 “Livingston Will Be Remembered for Selfless Service to the Nation,” Crescent-News (Defiance, OH), 26 October 2018. 18 “Major General Lawrence H. Livingston Highway: U.S. 424,” 

Exploring the River Region, Northwest Ohio’s River Region (blog), 15 

August 2011. 

19 “Obituary: Lawrence H. Livingston, November 5, 1940–September 28, 2018,” Dignity Memorial, accessed 6 December 2018. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, by PFC E. J. Young

MajGen Lawrence H. Livingston, commanding general, 2d Marine Division, tours migrant camp facilities aboard Camp Bravo in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, on 16 October 1996. This U.S. Atlantic Command 

operation deployed the Air Contingency Force of II Marine Expeditionary Force, to process more than 100 Chinese migrants.
IN MEMORIAM

Lieutenant General 

William R. Maloney (Ret)

13 OCTOBER 1929–13 NOVEMBER 2018

By Fred H. Allison

Lieutenant General William R. Maloney passed 

away 13 November 2018. He was an accomplished and wise leader of Marines in both 

combat and peace. General Maloney had the privilege 

of commanding Marines at several levels, including a 

rifle platoon in combat, an aircraft squadron in combat, an aircraft group, and, uniquely, all three activeduty aircraft wings in succession. 

He was born on 13 October 1929 in Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania, to James and Elizabeth Maloney. He 

graduated from West View High School and attended 

Brown University, where he was a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps midshipman. Upon graduation, 

he was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant and 

entered The Basic School (TBS). He graduated TBS on 

15 December 1951 and was sent to Korea, where he was 

in combat by 4 February 1952. 

In Korea, he commanded a platoon of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, into combat in the area known as 

the Hook. General Maloney was awarded the Bronze 

Star for his Korean War service. Upon return to the 

United States, he was assigned as executive officer of 

Marine Barracks, Naval Air Rocket Test Station Dover, New Jersey. He applied for and was accepted for 

flight training. His desire to fly melded with his combat experience. In an oral history interview, he said, 

“The only time that we could ever get our head out 

of the trenches in Korea was when the [Vought F4U] 

Corsairs or the [Douglas] ADs [Skyraiders] were overhead. . . . And, the best way to get anybody who was 

hurt back to some medical care was with helicopters 

. . . I thought the air-ground team was pretty nifty.”1

1

 LtGen William R. Maloney, intvw with Benis M. Frank, 5 January 1989, transcript (Oral History Section, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA), hereafter Maloney intvw. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

LtGeneral William R. Maloney.

82
WINTER 2018 83

He was “winged” in March 1955 as a naval aviator. 

Maloney was given his wish of aircraft type, the Douglas AD Skyraider, and joined Marine Attack Squadron 

333 (VMA-333). Later, he transitioned to helicopters, 

and while assigned to Marine Observation Squadron 

2 (VMO-2) in 1958, he flew the Kaman HOK-1 Huskie 

helicopter and the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog aircraft. 

In Headquarters Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1) from 1960 through 1962, Maloney also 

flew Sikorsky H-34 Seahorse helicopters as a presidential copilot for presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and 

John F. Kennedy. He was impressed with President 

Kennedy’s down-to-earth character, saying, “When we 

would drop him off [referring to flying President Kennedy back to the White House after a trip], Caroline 

would be running and Jacqueline Kennedy would be 

with her . . . like any other man coming home from 

work.”2

 

In July 1966 as a major (promoted to lieutenant colonel four months later), he took command of 

VMO-6 in Vietnam in combat. The squadron flew 

Bell UH-1E Hueys, conducting escort missions, extractions, tactical air coordination, and medical 

evacuation. Squadron Marines turned their Hueys 

into gunships by affixing guns and rocket pods onto 

the aircraft with field-expedient mounts. Then-major 

Maloney believed in leading from the front and took 

his turn at flying combat sorties. He became especially capable as an airborne tactical air coordinator, 

directing complex and dynamic combat air missions. 

One senior officer remarked that he exhibited “cool, 

level headed judgment and presence of mind” in these 

operations.3 Maloney believed that flying Hueys in 

VMO-6 was the best of combat flying. “At the end 

of a mission, [you] have all of the good feelings that 

warriors want to have. One, we were able to shoot. 

We could pull the trigger. The other helicopter guys 

couldn’t do that. But we also had what they had, we had 

that warm, fuzzy feeling you have when you get some2

 Maloney intvw.

3

 LtGen William R. Maloney official military personnel file, fitness report comments of Col Victor A. Armstrong, 10 November 

1976, working file of Oral History Section, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. 

body who is hurt back to medical attention,” he said.4

He spoke from personal experience. In a mission for which he was awarded a Distinguished Flying 

Cross, Maloney escorted a flight of Boeing Vertol CH46 Sea Knights on an emergency extraction of three 

wounded Marines. While the CH-46s attempted to 

pick up the three Marines, Maloney suppressed enemy 

fire with attack runs in his Huey. However, intense 

enemy fire kept the Sea Knights from safely landing 

in the zone. When other supporting aircraft, fixedwing, and helicopter gunships arrived, Maloney took 

control and directed their strikes on enemy positions. 

Despite the additional fire power, enemy fire continued to keep the evacuation helicopters from picking 

up the now four wounded Marines. Maloney then flew 

into the zone and retrieved two of the wounded. He 

stayed over the zone in his Huey and turned its guns 

and rockets on the enemy to suppress enemy fire as a 

second Huey picked up the other two wounded Marines. 

During his tenure as commanding officer of 

VMO-6, his squadron flew 10,455 combat missions, all 

without an operational accident. Lieutenant Colonel 

Maloney was awarded a Silver Star medal, the Legion 

of Merit, a Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Air 

Medal with numeral 21 for his Vietnam combat service. 

In July 1972, now-colonel Maloney took command of Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), the 

largest and most diverse, displaced, and complex air 

group in the Marine Corps. Although the Marine 

Corps, by and large, was out of Vietnam, elements 

of MAG-36 participated in key combat operations. 

In 1972, during the Easter offensive in which North 

Vietnamese conventional forces attempted a major 

invasion of South Vietnam, two MAG-36 composite 

helicopter squadrons, Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 164 (HMM-164) and HMM-165 provided 

unparalleled combat support to South Vietnamese 

Marines fighting to defend Quang Tri. Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), a 

MAG-36 squadron flying Lockheed Martin KC-130 

tankers, provided essential aerial refueling support 

4

 Maloney intvw. 
84 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

for strike fighters during the Easter invasion and 

the following Operation Linebacker air offensive. In 

Operation Marhuk, a Marine hunter-killer action, 

Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMA-369) 

Bell AH-1J Sea Cobras deployed aboard Navy landing 

platform, docks (LPDs). HMA-369’s AH-1J gunships 

struck at clandestine light shipping that shuttled supplies from Soviet or Chinese freighters off the coast 

into North Vietnam. HMA-369 crews sunk numerous 

sampans (small boats) during Operation Marhuk. In 

Operation End Sweep, MAG-36 Sikorsky CH-53 Sea 

Stallions swept North Vietnamese harbors of mines 

as American involvement ended in the Vietnam War 

in early 1973.

Maloney served in key leadership billets as Marine Aviation rebuilt and modernized after Vietnam. 

His leadership and wisdom were critical in these often difficult times. In June 1977, now-brigadier general Maloney became the assistant wing commander 

of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), though he 

also served as commanding general of the 5th Marine 

Amphibious Brigade. Promoted to major general on 

31 January 1978, Maloney became the 3d MAW’s commanding general. He took command of the 1st MAW 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

MajGen William R. Maloney (left) walks with MajGen William H. Fitch after the change of command ceremony on 6 June 1980 in which Gen 

Maloney turned over command of the 1st MAW to Gen Fitch.
WINTER 2018 85

in the Western Pacific in May 1979 and was given an 

additional assignment as commanding general of III 

Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). The following 

June, General Maloney was assigned as commanding 

general of 2d MAW. He remains the only Marine officer to ever command all three of the Marine Corps’ 

active duty aircraft wings, and he did this within a 

span of three years. 

General Maloney also served a number of tours 

as a staff officer. At the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis from July 1963 to June 1966, he was assigned 

as a leadership instructor and later as an executive assistant to the academic dean. In June 1967, he served as 

assistant secretary to the general staff at Headquarters 

Marine Corps working directly for the Commandant, 

General Leonard F. Chapman Jr. Following this tour, 

he served on the staff of the Sixth Fleet commander as 

amphibious warfare officer and fleet Marine officer. 

After promotion to brigadier general in 1975, Maloney 

served as the director of information at Headquarters 

Marine Corps, handling Marine Corps public affairs 

with tact and wisdom. In 1981, now as a major general, 

Maloney served as the director of operations, J-3, Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. 

After promotion to lieutenant general, Maloney 

served in two top leadership positions at Headquarters Marine Corps. From July 1982 to June 1983, he 

was the deputy chief of staff for Plans, Programs, and 

Operations, then he became the deputy chief of staff 

for Manpower and remained in that position until he 

retired in 1985. 

General Maloney was truly both a warrior and a 

scholar. While on active duty, he completed his master 

of arts degree from Stanford University in 1963 and 

his master of science degree in international affairs 

from George Washington University in 1970. 

Even after retiring from active duty, Maloney 

continued to serve the Marine Corps. From 1989 to 

1991, he served as the chairman of the board of directors of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. He 

remained a dynamic and devoted supporter of Marine 

Corps history throughout his retirement years. 

General Maloney’s love for the Corps was only 

superseded by the love he had for his family. He married his beloved Virginia Fellows in 1953; their marriage lasted 65 years. Virginia passed away six months 

prior to the general’s death. Their only child, Lisa, and 

her husband, Jonathan Crotty, are the parents of three 

children: Matthew, William, and Lauren. 

• 1775 • 
REVIEW ESSAY

Major Peter L. Belmonte, USAF (Ret)1

The Second World War in Colour. By Ian Carter. (London: Imperial War Museums, 2017. Pp. 120. £14.99 paperback.)

Weird War Two: Intriguing Items and Surprising Stuff from the Second World War. By Peter Taylor. (London: Imperial 

War Museums, 2017. Pp. 192. £14.99 cloth.)

World War II was so vast and complex that it is not 

surprising there should be vestiges of it—relics and 

ideas—that are to be found in museums and private 

collections around the world. The two books reviewed 

in this article showcase some of these items in the 

form of artifacts and photographs found in Britain’s 

Imperial War Museums (IWM).

Some artifacts are bizarre, humorous, or confusing. Peter Taylor, a former employee at the IWM, has 

compiled many such items in Weird War Two: Intriguing Items and Surprising Stuff from the Second World War. 

The book, a delightful compendium of weird facts, interesting artifacts, and trivia associated with World 

War II, is divided topically. A brief, one-page introduction to each topic is followed by photographs, illustrations, and captions. Most of the photographs are 

of items in one of the museums, while others are archival photographs designed to illustrate some aspect 

of each topic. Posters are also prominently featured.

Much of the material concerns Britain’s Armed 

Forces and home front, but there is also some information about the United States and Germany. Most 

of the captions and text are lighthearted and humorous—if such a thing can describe anything associated 

with World War II—and it is an easy read. Taylor 

wrote this book “to amuse and baffle you, and to pro1

 Maj Peter L. Belmonte, USAF (Ret), holds a master’s degree in 

history from California State University, Stanislaus, and is the 

author of several books including Days of Perfect Hell: The U.S. 

26th Infantry Regiment in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, October–November 1918 (2015) and, with coauthor Alexander F. Barnes, Forgotten Soldiers of World War I: America’s Immigrant Doughboys (2018).

vide a tiny testament to the creativity, inventiveness 

and, above all, silliness that can flourish even in the 

darkest times” (p. 7). Indeed, he sets the tone of the 

book by summarizing the war in just three sentences.

In the text and captions, we learn about unusual 

items, programs, and occurrences. We learn about carrot popsicles, innovated as a result of sugar rationing 

(the photograph of three young children eating carrot 

popsicles does not inspire confidence in the taste of 

these “treats”). The section on secret agents contains 

many intriguing tidbits. For example, there are two 

interesting mug shots of Lieutenant Colonel Dudley 

W. Clarke, a British spy who was supposed to deliver 

important papers to Egypt. Instead, Clarke, in disguise, was arrested for cross-dressing in Madrid. We 

also learn that one official was “concerned that agents 

dropped into Spain would be given away by the lack 

of garlic on their breath. To make the ‘smelly substance’ more pleasant to eat, he added it to chocolate 

bars” (p. 125).

The ingenuity of prisoners of war, coupled with 

hours and days of boredom, led to extremely creative 

escape attempts. In his “Great Escapes” chapter, Taylor includes a wartime photograph of what appears 

to be a large sack of mail; the sack actually contained 

Dutch prisoner of war (POW) C. Link, who tried to 

mail himself out of Colditz, Germany. Also included 

is a blueprint drawing of a two-man glider planned 

for another escape attempt from Colditz. To be built 

from bed boards and sheets stiffened with porridge, 

the aircraft might have been airworthy. We also learn 

that British intelligence created fake charitable orga86
WINTER 2018 87

nizations whose purpose was to send games to POWs 

held in Germany. Some of these games contained 

maps and compasses cleverly hidden within them. 

Taylor includes a cover letter from one such organization, the Prisoners’ Leisure Hours Fund. The letterhead contains its address in Bolt Court on Fleet Street 

in London; its fictitious board of directors includes 

men with the surnames Freeman and Underhill, and 

its secretary is named Miss Freda Mappin. POWs also 

put their talents to other creative endeavors. For example, British major Denis Houghton made a flute 

from “two stirrup pumps, two fire extinguishers, brass 

parts from 15-inch naval guns, bicycle spokes, a spring 

from a broken watch and a package of sewing needles” 

(p. 186). The result pictured in the book looks like a 

professionally made instrument. POW bird fanciers at 

a Bavarian Stalag built 27 nesting stations. Men watching the birds could also observe guard movements 

during escape attempts without arousing suspicion. 

One bird watcher, Peter Conder, escaped “dragging 

17 notebooks of bird observations with him. Amazingly he made it, and after the war he became head of 

the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)” 

(p. 187).

Also depicted is “Nellie, a mechanized excavating machine designed to dig its way toward the enemy in a 5ft deep trench” (p. 109). Winston Churchill 

is shown admiring the machine: “it took a him a long 

time to admit that it was a pretty useless throwback 

to the tactics of the previous war” (p. 109). There is 

also a photograph of what appears to be a model or a 

mock-up of one of the giant sea fortresses that “were 

positioned off Britain’s coast and estuaries to protect 

them from enemy ships and planes” (p. 110). As many 

as 265 men lived on the forts in six-month shifts. Apparently, claustrophobia, called “fort madness,” was a 

danger for some of the men who lived in the support 

columns below sea level.

We are treated to photographs of a photo reconnaissance Supermarine Spitfire fighter aircraft painted camoutint pink to blend with the sky, and the HMS 

Kenya (14) was painted Mountbatten pink (a blend of 

lavender and gray named for British admiral of the 

fleet Louis Francis Mountbatten, first Earl of Burma) 

to make it more difficult to see at dawn and dusk. And 

what sailor would not want to serve aboard the HMS 

Menestheus (M 93), “converted into a floating brewery 

to supply soldiers in the Pacific with beer” (p. 168)?

The second book under consideration features 

World War II artifacts of a different sort. Ian Carter’s 

The Second World War in Colour is a collection of color 

photographs from the archives of the IWM, where 

Carter served as the senior curator of photographs. 

Carter has selected a variety of full-color images from 

the archives to illustrate Britain’s war effort in a general way. Most of the photographs are from “a select 

band of official photographers serving with the British armed forces, using a stock of Kodachrome film 

obtained from the United States” (p. 8). Unfortunately, Carter gives the name of only one photographer, 

Charles E. Brown, who was apparently a civilian aviation photographer. It might be that the names of the 

other photographers are unknown. The selected photographs cover a variety of subjects, from the home 

front to war in the air, on land, and at sea. The author 

introduces each section of photos with a two-page 

narrative. With the captions, these are enough to give 

a general overview of the war. Each caption, of course, 

sheds light on the subject of the image. The color images, as the back-cover text claims, “bring an immediacy rarely felt through black and white photograph.”

Some of the photographs, though mundane, 

show us a part of the war we normally do not consider. 

One such picture shows a soldier in a supply office being issued his “demobilization suit,” a suit of civilian 

clothes given to soldiers being discharged. The man is 

holding a suit coat and choosing a shirt, much as any 

man shopping for clothes today would be doing.

Subtle details that are lost in black-and-white 

photographs are brought to life when viewed in color. 

From the “fruit salad” on the tunics of General Dwight 

D. Eisenhower and his staff, to the splashes of orange 

prevalent on clothing, hats, and ribbons of Dutch 

citizens dancing in the streets after the liberation of 

Eindhoven in September 1944, shown on a two-page 

spread, these little details add to our effort to understand the period. Another photograph shows a Royal 

Air Force Avro Lancaster bomber crew preparing for 
88 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

a mission. The men are clustered together, checking 

their gear; of note are the two bright yellow boxes 

containing homing pigeons to be used in case the crew 

had to crash-land or ditch the craft.

Other interesting photographs include a British Fairey Swordfish torpedo bomber—looking like it 

would be at home in the 1920s—in flight, and a British warship transiting the Suez Canal while a small 

Egyptian civilian sailboat passes by. A photograph of 

a French priest baptizing a baby within five miles of 

the front line nicely depicts the navy blue-and-white 

pattern on the cuffs and lower portion of the priest’s 

vestment, as well as his gold-embroidered stole and 

the red collars and aprons of the two attending altar boys. There are only a couple of photographs of 

ground combat, notably British heavy and medium artillery crews in action. The home front is represented 

by various air raid scenes, an agricultural shot, and 

an image of women manufacturing ammunition in 

an underground factory. There is also an interesting 

image of convalescent soldiers, clad in their hospital 

blues, relaxing outdoors while nurses tend to them.

Compendiums of World War II photographs are 

fairly common, and the U.S. Army is represented by 

at least one volume of color photographs (see Jonathan Gawne’s U.S. Army Photo Album: Shooting the War 

in Color, 1941–1945, U.S.A to ETO [1996]). Carter’s volume is a nice addition to works on World War II in 

photographs.

Neither book is footnoted, the only annotations 

being indications of where in the IWM the photographs are located. Both books should be considered 

works of popular history rather than scholarly works. 

As such, they would appeal to general readers, although World War II specialists will find things of 

interest in both.

• 1775 •
BOOK REVIEWS

Michael Westermeier1

Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy Shaped Religion and State in Modern America. By Ronit Y. Stahl. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. 384. $39.95 cloth.)

“There are no atheists in foxholes” is an oft-cited 

trope regarding faith in the military. However, there 

are relatively few scholarly explorations of faith in 

the military and fewer still on the impact and influence of the American military chaplain corps on faith 

in America. Recently, social historians examined the 

impact and influence of the American military on 

American society and vice versa. Dr. Ronit Stahl’s 

book, Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy 

Shaped Religion and State in Modern America, seeks to 

navigate a proverbial political and cultural minefield 

to posit an interesting take on the evolving nature of 

religion-state interaction in twentieth- and twentyfirst century America.

Stahl argues that “over the twentieth century . . . 

chaplains built—in concrete policy and as figurative 

symbols—state-sponsored American religion. Whether anchoring the ‘band of brothers’ or sidestepping 

the My Lai massacre, chaplains deployed religion to 

achieve American military goals and sanction imperial aims” (p. 14). She goes on to contend that the American military chaplaincy, through exchanges between 

the federal government and faith groups, evolved and 

then sought to remake American society in its own 

image (p. 14). The state, through the chaplaincy, “quietly legitimized multiple claims to truth” by commissioning chaplains from several different faiths 

1

 Mike Westermeier was an Army field artillery officer from 

2004 to 2011 and later worked as a park ranger at Fredericksburg, 

VA, and Spotsylvania National Military Park after receiving his 

master’s degree in military history from Norwich University. He 

took a position as the unit historian with Marine Corps History 

Division in 2017.

but requiring them to address the spiritual needs of 

servicemembers of all faiths (p. 8). Military chaplains 

were used to promote an early twentieth-century progressive concept of moral monotheism by coopting 

American Judeo-Christian religious groups—namely 

liberal Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—to remake 

the military as a staunchly moral but religiously tolerant organization. The ultimate goal was to use the 

military as a social incubator to spread this ideology 

across American society.

The initial chapter of Enlisting Faith does a fine 

job of supporting this argument. Stahl takes the 

reader through the build-up of the American Army 

for World War I and the Progressive Era clergy’s desire to professionalize and modernize the American 

military chaplain corps. Religious instruction was 

seen as a beneficial component of building a large 

and effective army, as inculcation of morality would, 

in theory, have the practical effect of combating the 

“immoral” tendencies of soldiers that led to venereal 

disease casualties and disciplinary problems. Additionally, modeling cooperation among faith leaders 

was seen as a way of unifying Americans from diverse 

backgrounds by highlighting commonalities amongst 

Judeo-Christian religions and thus aiding American 

nationalistic goals for waging a modern total war.

The subsequent chapters highlight the evolution of the chaplaincy after World War I and its efforts to mobilize religious fervor to support American 

war aims in the lead-up to and during World War II. 

The interwar period saw the development of moral 

monotheism, a concept in which the Judeo-Christian 

concept of God was combined with early to mid89
90 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

twentieth-century standards of ethical living (pp. 

52–53). Stahl also points to the chaplaincy’s efforts to 

promote the ideals of just war to combat an increasing 

American trend toward pacifism in preparation for 

the looming war against fascism in the 1930s. Finally, 

Stahl provides a fascinating look at the Chaplain Jim

radio program during World War II and how the military used it to assure wives and sweethearts that their 

loved ones were receiving spiritual and emotional care 

even though they were far from home, as well as to 

present the military’s concept of American religious 

pluralism to the home front.

It is in chapter four, however, that Stahl begins 

to hit some discordant notes in her otherwise fascinating symphony. It begins with the discussion of how 

World War II Army chaplains in the European theater of operations assumed responsibility for lectures 

dubbed “sex morality” with the intent of curbing the 

young soldiers’ sexual impulses (p. 117). Stahl begins to 

discuss rape in World War II and writes, “The exact 

number of rapes that occurred during and after the 

war is unknown, in part because rape is a weapon of 

war” (p. 120). Although she may not intend it, the implication when this unsupported statement is made 

within a discussion of American military activity in 

Europe during World War II is that the U.S. military 

used rape as a weapon. However, she contends on the 

next page that American chaplains distributed pamphlets against rape and that the American military 

court-martialed and executed soldiers for rape. Rape 

for the American Army in World War II was an individual criminal act perpetrated by individual soldiers, 

abhorred by military and religious leadership, prohibited by military regulations, and punished accordingly. While she may be referring to the widespread 

sanctioned rape of German women by Soviet soldiers, 

it seems out of place to make that statement about 

an American Army that actively sought to discourage 

and prosecute rape cases in wartime.

Stahl’s next chapter covers the evolution of 

American religious ideology at the beginning of 

the Cold War as the military and American JudeoChristian faith groups combined to form a moral 

monotheism counter to the avowedly atheist dogma 

of Communism. This was critical because Western 

nations had to develop their own ideology to define 

their position against a Communist one. She explains 

how this expressed American dedication to freedom 

of religion also created problems in America’s new 

standing conscript army, as drafted servicemembers 

sought accommodation for their individual religious 

practices in a highly regimented and tradition-bound 

institution. The role chaplains played as mediators, 

counselors, and collaborators for the faiths they represented and the military they served is quite fascinating and would bear further study.

Stahl next dives into the quagmire that is the debate over America’s role in the Vietnam War. There is 

a thoughtful and well-documented discussion of how 

major faith groups in America argued about and reconciled support or opposition to the Vietnam War. 

However, her argument is hindered when she discusses chaplains as “moral vanguards” failing to challenge 

a pervasive American practice of war criminality in 

Vietnam, specifically the My Lai Massacre (p. 207). 

The note in this section references Nick Turse’s book 

Kill Everything that Moves: The Real American War in 

Vietnam (2013), a controversial work that promotes 

the argument that the American military pursued a 

policy of atrocity against the Vietnamese as their primary war strategy. Stahl recommends Turse’s work as 

“an expose [sic] of American war crimes in Vietnam 

that highlights how the military encouraged immoral 

behavior” (p. 321). Turse is criticized for oversimplification of the military war crimes investigation files 

and ignoring the fact that many atrocity stories were 

propaganda fabrications by the North Vietnamese.2

Unfortunately, by citing Turse, the same criticisms 

can be levelled at Stahl’s interpretations regarding 

chaplains failing to take a moral stand against alleged 

American atrocities in Vietnam if those atrocities 

were not, in fact, as pervasive as she may have been 

2

 Gary Kulik and Peter Zinoman, “Misrepresenting Atrocities: 

Kill Anything that Moves and the Continuing Distortions of the 

War in Vietnam,” Cross Currents: East Asian History and Cultural 

Review e-Journal, no. 12 (September 2014): 163–67. 
WINTER 2018 91

led to believe.3 Additionally, cruelty is a feature of 

all wars. Why, for instance, does Stahl not condemn 

U.S. Army Air Corps chaplains in the Pacific for not 

challenging U.S. military leaders who ordered the firebombing of Tokyo and subsequent mass slaughter of 

Japanese civilians? 

The ultimate flaw in Stahl’s work is that she 

takes individual agency out of the decision to enter 

the chaplain corps by assigning chaplains as primarily mindless adherents to their particular faith group. 

A counterpoint is presented by Joseph O’Donnell, 

CSC (Catholic Order Congregation of the Holy Cross 

[Congretio a Santa Cruce]), who served as a Catholic 

Navy chaplain in Vietnam: “I am a player, a teammate, 

a consultant, an idealist living in reality. Credibility 

is not a given in the military, as it is may be [sic] in 

civilian churches or denominational institutions. One 

earns his or her place by being there, by listening, by 

keeping secrets, by speaking when it is time and not 

speaking when it is not.”4

 While there undoubtedly 

were and are religious leaders more interested in corporate promotion of sects over selfless ministry, the 

vast majority enter military ministry with a desire 

to help their fellow humans physically and spiritually regardless of the constraints placed on them by 

a denomination. This might be out of the scope of 

Stahl’s book, but it would have been nice to see even 

3

 The My Lai Massacre, however, is a particularly astounding instance of failure by the chaplain corps, and the U.S. Army as a 

whole, to address an atrocity. It seems unfair to use this instance 

to paint all chaplains with the same brush.

4

 Joseph F. O’Donnell, “Clergy in the Military—Vietnam and After,” in The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the 

Twenty First Century, ed. Doris L. Bergen (Notre Dame, IN: Notre 

Dame University Press, 2004), 222.

a short discussion on this. Chaplains in Enlisting Faith

are lumped into groups: Catholic, Liberal Protestant, 

Jewish, Evangelical, Buddhist, or Muslim. They are thus 

assumed to wholly sponsor and promote one of these 

groups within the military or use the military to promote social acceptance of their particular faith rather 

than sincerely minister to a very needful flock in particularly dire straits.

Overall, Enlisting Faith provides a new and 

thought-provoking perspective on the interaction of 

faith and government in the United States and how it 

has evolved through the twentieth century. Although 

there are some contentious spots in this book, the 

subject matter is too fraught with emotion and political charge to truly avoid controversy. Stahl did a 

tremendous amount of research through a plethora of 

primary sources and it certainly shows in her mastery 

of the material, although a reorganization of the notes 

chapter in future editions of the book for easier reference and a separate bibliographic essay on the archival 

sources would be welcomed. Enlisting Faith is a good 

contribution to the historical argument surrounding 

the ever-changing landscape of religion in America 

and its impact on the military, and it should provide a 

firm base for further exploration of the interaction of 

religion and state in America.

• 1775 •
92 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Joshua Tallis, PhD5

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post–Cold War Era. By Peter D. Haynes. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pp. 304. $49.95 cloth.)

it, is a deemphasis of the systemic forces shaping strategy development in favor of a great men of history approach (and they are nearly all men). This is, however, 

ultimately a minor complaint. Haynes’s contribution 

is quite clearly to shed light on a complicated, messy 

process inside the Pentagon by which individual and 

institutional agendas and worldviews have an enormous influence on the direction of strategy articulation. While larger forces—global, economic, political, 

etc.—are no doubt at play in strategic development, 

Haynes’s insight into the inner workings of this personality-driven process is a definitive contribution to 

understanding why the Navy says what it does.

This latter point on the human factor in Navy decision making further widens the community of readers that may find this book valuable, including scholars 

interested in defense policy at large. The subtext across 

much of Haynes’s chapters speaks to the competing 

necessities of individual people, commands, or military Services, reminiscent of the bureaucratic politics 

model, which carries relevance across the Department 

of Defense. Haynes paints a story of the relationship 

between the Navy and the Marine Corps, for example, 

and how its vacillations have affected Navy strategy—

from the two Services attempting to align under the 

. . . From the Sea white paper in the early 1990s, to the 

fundamental tensions between the Marine emphasis 

on written doctrine and the Navy’s preference for operational prerogative at sea.

Throughout, Haynes’s most illuminating discussions include the tensions over strategy at the individual level, which itself is often a reflection of the 

larger institutional conflicts at play. One interesting 

subnarrative includes Fleet Forces Command’s Admiral John B. Nathman’s (Ret) preference for blue 

water, high-end capabilities pitted against the more 

mixed approach—the 3/1 Strategy championed by the 

U.S. Navy captain Peter Haynes’s (Ret) Toward a New 

Maritime Strategy is a compelling read for those in the 

small but energetic naval strategy community. More 

importantly, Haynes’s book is a must-read for those 

engaged in naval works but disengaged from the process and thought of strategic development.

The author demonstrates a historian’s knack for 

narrative, chronological storytelling with a particular focus on the key decision makers who shaped the 

pockmarked process of developing America’s naval 

strategy, from the sunset of the Cold War to the present. This narrative arc bends, however subtly, toward 

an eventual embrace of a maritime—as opposed to a 

distinctly naval—form of viewing the world. Maritime, 

in Haynes’s context, speaks to a systemic understanding of the relationship between the U.S. Navy and the 

post–World War II American-led system. This concept stands in contrast with the Navy’s longstanding, 

threat-oriented naval perspective, agnostic of the Service’s unique capacity to safeguard the arteries of commerce that sustain American influence worldwide. 

Haynes takes the reader through the development of 

every major strategic statement drafted by the Navy 

from the late 1980s through 2007, punctuating his discussion with an eye for detail and personal dynamics 

that only comes from spending a career as a strategically engaged Navy officer.

The easiest critique of Haynes’s book, structured 

as it is around the Navy’s embrace of a more systemic 

understanding of the world and the Navy’s role within 

5

 Joshua Tallis is a research analyst at CNA, a nonprofit research 

and analysis organization located in Arlington, VA. He received 

his PhD in international relations at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, where he studied at the Handa Centre for the 

Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. The opinions in this 

review are his own and do not necessarily represent the position 

of CNA.
WINTER 2018 93

Navy’s deputy chief for operations, plans and strategy, 

Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr. (Ret).6

 Throughout, 

of course, is the more fundamental strategic struggle 

brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which is personified in tensions between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Colin L. Powell and proponents of Navy-driven strategy within the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (CNO).

Meanwhile, some individuals chronicled by 

Haynes do not represent sources of institutional conflict but larger changes taking place throughout the 

Navy. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski (Ret), for 

example, is not only an important part of the story in 

his own right, but reflects a wider cast of characters 

championing technology and driving toward a conversation on network-centric warfare. Haynes’s story 

culminates in the achievement of a maritime strategy, 

6

 The 3/1 Strategy recognized the change in the national security 

environment since 11 September 2001 and that the Services had 

to be prepared for major combat operations but also for three 

new mission sets: the global war on terrorism, stability operations, and homeland security and defense.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007), 

which is told in the guise of a great men of history narrative through the unlikely guidance of CNO admiral 

Michael G. Mullen (Ret).

Perhaps the greatest contribution to glean from 

Toward a New Maritime Strategy is just how critical it 

is for the Navy to understand (and take charge of) its 

own strategic narrative. The book illuminates how 

passionately a small cohort of naval officers thinks 

about strategy, and by contrast demonstrates just how 

dispassionately the Navy as an institution has historically regarded its responsibility to foster strategic 

thought. Toward a New Maritime Strategy should be required reading for upwardly mobile officers. The book 

demonstrates just how significant individual agency is 

in advancing the Navy’s understanding of its strategic 

position in the maritime commons.

• 1775 •
94 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Christopher N. Blaker7

Faces of the Civil War Navies: An Album of Union and Confederate Sailors. By Ronald S. Coddington. (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016. Pp. 440. $32.95 cloth and e-book.)

navies consisted primarily of skilled industrial laborers from the coastal states. Moreover, the Union Navy 

also employed African American seamen during the 

Civil War, two of whom are included in this volume. 

Craig L. Symonds notes in the book’s foreword that, 

while the Union Army did not begin enlisting African American soldiers until 1863, the U.S. Navy had 

accepted African Americans for service since 1775 and 

continued to do so during the war.

Rather than focus on the admirals and career 

captains who were tasked with formulating strategies and planning naval operations, Coddington highlights many of the war’s lesser-known seafarers, many 

of whom were junior officers and enlisted sailors who 

volunteered for service at the outbreak of war. Because 

personal photographs were more often purchased and 

distributed by officers than enlisted men, 60 of the 77 

men highlighted in Coddington’s work are commissioned officers. The oldest man featured is John Faunce 

of the U.S. Revenue Marine Service, who as a 55-yearold captain of the U.S. Revenue cutter Harriet Lane 

(1857) was present just outside Charleston Harbor, 

South Carolina, on 12 April 1861 when Confederate 

guns fired on Fort Sumter and the war officially began. The youngest is Richard Rush of the Union Navy, 

who at the age of 15 entered the U.S. Naval Academy 

in 1863 and later went on to organize and publish the 

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in 

the War of the Rebellion, a comprehensive 30-volume 

collection of primary and secondary sources detailing 

the naval history of the Civil War (1894–1922).

The inclusion of 23-year-old First Lieutenant 

Charles H. Bradford of the U.S. Marine Corps reminds 

readers that Marines fought alongside the sailors of 

their sister Service during the many surface actions 

and landing operations of the war. When Union rear 

admiral John A. Dahlgren called for men to storm the 

Ronald S. Coddington’s Faces of the Civil War Navies 

offers a prolific anthology of biographies that explores 

the lives of 77 Americans who served in the Union and 

Confederate navies during the American Civil War.

As with the preceding three volumes of the author’s 

Faces of the Civil War series—of which this volume is 

the first to focus on the sea Services—it includes the 

accounts of those for whom period photographs could 

be located and obtained. Four-inch-by-two-and-ahalf-inch photographic cartes de visite (literally, calling cards), or card portraits, were often taken before 

a sailor reported for duty and were left behind with 

loved ones to serve as wartime vestiges. By masterfully 

employing these historical images alongside detailed 

profiles of each man’s life and service, Coddington 

achieves his goal of humanizing the Civil War by allowing readers to better understand the reasons these 

men fought, the hardships they endured at sea, and 

the ways in which they sometimes gave their lives.

Of the more than 3 million men and women who 

served in the American Civil War, little more than 

100,000 served in the navies. Sailors on both sides of 

the conflict saw action along the Atlantic coastline—

where Union forces blockaded the South and ironclad 

warships clashed for the first time in history—and on 

the many river systems winding throughout the United States, where respective “brown-water navies” vied 

for control of the country’s interior. The demographic makeup of those sailors differed from that of the 

ground Services. Whereas the Union and Confederate 

armies were predominantly made up of farmers and 

workhands hailing from the country’s heartland, both 

7

 Christopher N. Blaker is editorial manager for Historical Society of Michigan’s magazines. He also is coeditor of U.S. Marines 

in Afghanistan, 2010–2014: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(2017).
WINTER 2018 95

Confederate-held Fort Sumter in September 1863, 

Bradford and 132 other Marines, as well as more than 

250 sailors, volunteered. Following a bombardment of 

the fort by Union artillery, the sailors and Marines assaulted the position but were soon met by overwhelming musket and cannon fire. Bradford was gravely 

wounded in the attack and later died of his wounds 

in a Charleston hospital. The amphibious assault on 

Fort Sumter ultimately failed, though the Navy and 

Marine Corps had better luck storming Fort Fischer 

in North Carolina in January 1865.

Perhaps the best treasures found in this volume 

are the photographs themselves. Coddington notes 

that the generation that fought in the Civil War was 

the first to grow up with access to cameras and photography equipment, arguing that “photography individualized the identity of the common soldier and 

sailor” (p. xviii). Each image allows readers to carefully 

study the uniform, posture, and expression of its subject, which presents as many new questions as it answers. Fortunately, Coddington’s painstaking research 

allows him to describe where each sailor was born and 

raised, the vessels he served on during the war, which 

actions he participated in, and—if he survived the conflict—what he did during the postwar period. Left unanswered are many personal questions about the men 

themselves. What was he thinking while he prepared 

to go to war? Was he fighting for an ideological purpose or out of obligation? Did he believe the war to 

be a moral crusade or a necessary evil? Though readers 

will never learn the answers to such questions, studying the faces of those 77 men as they prepared to go 

to war allows for a greater understanding than would 

exist otherwise.

Faces of the Civil War Navies ultimately transports 

readers through the Civil War’s many campaigns and 

skirmishes across the country and on the seas, providing a lens through which the conflict can be viewed in 

a fresh and unique way. While this volume’s emphasis 

on photography suggests that it would better serve as 

a cultural companion piece to more traditional works 

on the war as opposed to a standalone history, the 

author nevertheless finds success in chronicling the 

storied history of both navies during all stages of the 

conflict. Expertly researched and vividly written, Coddington’s work contributes much to the continuing 

historiography of the American Civil War. Historians 

and history buffs alike who are interested in the Civil 

War—as well as those fascinated by early photography 

of the mid-nineteenth century—will find this volume 

an enlightening and engaging work of history.

• 1775 •
96 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Tal Tovy, PhD8

Vietnam’s High Ground: Armed Struggle for the Central Highlands, 1954–1965. By J. P. Harris. (Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 2016. Pp. 522. $45.00 cloth.)

Diem’s. In spite of Ho Chi Minh’s diplomatic efforts, 

the referendum was never held, and by 1957, he started preparing to renew the military conflict to bring 

about the full unification of Vietnam. Along with this 

gradual escalation came the deterioration of the security situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), or 

South Vietnam—both of which were also connected 

to the Buddhists’ protest against their oppression by 

Diem. In addition, with the entry of John F. Kennedy 

to the White House, the American involvement deepened. This deterioration on one side and the increase 

of the American involvement characterize the second 

period (1959–65), the end of which can be marked by 

the Americanization of the war, which started in the 

first half of 1965 toward the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

Vietnam’s High Ground reviews in detail the military history of this interim period which, as mentioned above, has hitherto evaded a serious discussion. 

The focus of his book is the Central Highlands, currently called the Western Highlands (Tay Nguyen in 

Vietnamese). This region is a plateau, bordering Laos 

and northeast Cambodia, two states that served as a 

safe haven for the Communist forces during the Vietnam War. The area is inhabited by many ethnic minority groups, whom the French called montagnards, 

or mountain men, and whom the Vietnamese had 

considered “savages” (p. 3). These ethnic groups have 

fought throughout their history against various armies 

that were trying to take control of the area, including 

the French and the South Vietnamese. This is the subject of the first chapter, which provides a geographic, 

historical, and ethnographic overview of the area. This 

is necessary not just as an introduction to the history 

of the region but also to detail its complexity, especially the political and demographic aspects. This chapter 

lays the foundation for understanding the attitudes 

Military history of the Vietnam War, both the French 

phase (1946–54) and the American involvement (1965–

73), usually focuses on the analysis of the campaigns 

and the battles conducted by the various forces, including the strategies and tactics employed by all sides 

and additional issues related to the military essence of 

the war, such as the deployment of air power, riverine 

operations, etc. The years between the two wars (i.e. 

between the termination of the French phase and the 

Americanization of the war), are generally thought of 

as an interim period and are discussed in the research 

mostly in its political aspect. However, one must 

not forget that in the Vietnamese narrative, the entire period between the declaration of independence 

(September 1945) and the fall of Saigon (April 1975) 

is viewed as one historical entity: the 10,000 days war, 

as the title of Michael Maclear’s book Vietnam: The Ten 

Thousand Day War (1980) testifies. Understanding this 

interim period is very important for understanding 

the second phase of the war, as well as for closing the 

historical cycle of the first phase. As this book by J. 

P. Harris testifies, it also has an important military 

dimension. 

The period between 1954 and 1965 can be divided 

into two subperiods. The first (1954–59) is characterized by recovery and restoration after the grueling 

war against France. During this time, the two states 

established in Vietnam settle down, with emphasis on 

strengthening the political rule of their leaders, as established by the Geneva Accords in 1954, separated by 

the 17th parallel. This agreement also stipulated that a 

general referendum be held within two years, allowing 

the Vietnamese people to decide whether they wanted 

to live under Ho Chi Minh’s regime or under Ngo Dinh 

8

 Dr. Tal Tovy is an associate professor at the history department 

of Bar Ilan University, Israel. 
WINTER 2018 97

of the ethnic minorities of the Central Highlands toward nations and states that had tried to subordinate 

them. It also describes the history of the region during 

the war against the French, the incursion of the Viet 

Minh into the Central Highlands, and the attitude of 

the native population toward these trends and events. 

One of the most interesting trends was the recruitment of the montagnards both by the French and by 

the Viet Minh to help their war effort, a trend that 

continued throughout the years of American involvement.

The two following chapters describe the history 

of the area during Diem’s regime as president of the 

RVN and the renewal/return of war to the Central 

Highlands toward the end of the 1950s. These chapters demonstrate the fact that the political events in 

Vietnam—the end of the French rule and the creation 

of two new states—had a very small effect on the pseudopolitical tendencies of the people of the highlands, 

who continued their ages-long resistance toward those 

who interfered with their traditional lifestyle or who 

tried to subject them to modern political and national 

systems. During this period, the war was waged between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 

and the Viet Cong, and later also the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which was penetrating the RVN at 

the time. All these forces repeatedly tried to harness 

the ethnic minorities within their military efforts, 

sometimes using coercion and terror. At this time, as 

Harris shows, American involvement increased, as elements from the 5th Special Forces Group, the Green 

Berets, arrived in the area. These “A Teams” organized 

the villagers into several counterinsurgency (COIN) 

programs, the main one being the Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group (CIDG) as well as the Strategic Hamlet Program. These programs and the beginning of the 

American intervention are the subjects of the fourth 

and fifth chapters, while the sixth chapter, dedicated 

to 1963, serves as an interim summary of the chronological discussion. It also evaluates the effectiveness of 

the COIN programs and analyzes the military escalation in the Central Highlands. The year marked a double turning point in the history of the war in Vietnam. 

At the beginning of November, Diem was murdered 

during a military coup; this was followed three weeks 

later by the assassination of President Kennedy. South 

Vietnam deteriorated into a state of political instability, and President Lyndon B. Johnson was sucked into 

a similar vortex in the middle of an election year.

The intensity of the events following November 

1963 is extensively discussed in the seventh and eighth 

chapters. The pessimistic reports submitted to Johnson by his military advisors, especially Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell 

D. Taylor, together with Johnson’s need to counter 

the Republican propaganda claims about the lack of 

a suitable American response to worldwide Communist aggression, caused the United States to step up its 

military involvement in Vietnam. At the same time, 

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the 

Viet Cong took advantage of the instability in the 

south and increased their military pressure, including stepping up the infiltration of Communist forces 

from Laos to South Vietnam. Thus, the Central Highlands area, which borders Laos, became the focus of 

intensive battles. 

The main part of the book, chapters 9–13, is dedicated to describing 1965 in great detail. During this 

year, the American involvement increased, as the first 

Marine units arrived in the RVN, followed by U.S. 

Army divisions. Gradually, the American forces found 

themselves directly fighting the Communist forces, 

with the peak of this activity being the campaign in 

the Ia Drang Valley toward the end of the year. The 

end of the book deals with the events following the Ia 

Drang campaign and discusses the importance of the 

area in the military history of the Vietnam War.

The reader is exposed to a rigor of research that 

deals in a deep and detailed manner with the military 

and political history of a critical battle zone during the 

Vietnam War. However, this book has additional merits. First, there is a discussion of the transition from 

the French period to the American. Harris points to 

a clear military (and political) continuity between 

the two periods, although the intensity of the fighting was comparatively low. Second, the analysis of the 

American activity in the Central Highlands area explains the change from focusing on COIN programs 
98 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

(e.g., CIDG) of the Green Berets to General William 

C. Westmoreland’s Big Unit War concept. Thus, the 

book becomes a research that explains the military 

changes the American forces underwent, with the 

Central Highlands area serving as a test case to these 

dramatic changes. Reading into the military history of 

the Vietnam War points to similar processes that took 

place in other geographical zones of South Vietnam, 

such as the Mekong River delta. However, there is no 

deep research into this important zone paralleling 

Harris’s extensive research. This brings us to another 

important point.

The last chapters are dedicated to the Ia Drang 

campaign, which was the first large-scale encounter 

between the American forces and the NVA as well as 

regular Viet Cong units. The campaign resulted in an 

American victory, mainly because of the DRV plan to 

invade the RVN from Cambodia to the shore, thus bisecting it. However, the results of the campaign had a 

long-term impact on the future strategy of both the 

United States and the DRV, lasting at least until the 

Tet offensive at the beginning of 1968. As far as General Westmoreland was concerned, the Ia Drang Valley campaign was clear proof that the continuation of 

the COIN program was irrelevant, since the fighting 

was carried out by regular units of the NVA, and that 

therefore the United States should rely on its technological superiority, firepower, and mobility to achieve 

military decision. On the other side, encountering the 

full military might of the United States convinced 

General Vo Nguyen Giap that his army was incapable 

of coping with American superiority, causing him to 

revert to attrition strategy until the Tet offensive. 

The extensive discussion in Harris’s book provides 

an excellent portrayal of the operational and tactical 

background of the strategies employed by the United 

States and the DRV against each other until 1968.

Harris’s research makes an extensive and impressive use of archival material, mostly American, 

but also including translated Vietnamese documents. 

The analysis of the primary sources is backed by diverse secondary literature relevant to the discussions 

in the various chapters. The focus of the book is the 

historical-military analysis of a specific geographic 

area. However, Harris embeds this analysis within a 

wider discussion about the development of the war 

in Vietnam, complementing it with geographic, ethnographic, and political reviews, providing the reader 

with a complete picture. Thus, the reader can keep 

track of the wide historical context and balance the 

micro against the macro views. This is an advanced 

book about the Vietnam War, and should be tackled 

after having read some general books about the war, 

such as Spencer C. Tucker’s Vietnam (1999) and others. Reading Vietnam’s High Ground may trigger the 

reader to conduct their own in-depth research about 

other geographic regions in South Vietnam similar to 

Harris’s achievement or to take up the research at the 

point where Harris stopped, from 1966 until the end 

of the American involvement (January 1973) or until 

the end of the war (April 1975). In this reviewer’s opinion, such additional research will add conviction to 

Harris’s arguments about the importance of the Central Highlands in the political and military history of 

the Vietnam War.

• 1775 •
WINTER 2018 99

Keith D. Dickson, PhD9

Long Journeys Home: American Veterans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. By Michael D. Gambone. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2017. Pp. 288. $45.00 cloth.)

1945 and 1975, and these changing circumstances in 

American society shaped perceptions of veterans. 

During those 30 years, America had ended one war 

and fought two others. The full-scale mobilization required to fight World War II placed the burden of sacrifice on the large majority of Americans. However, 

while World War II service offered a degree of clarity 

and sense of purpose, service in Korea and Vietnam 

were more problematic for American society. Korea 

occupied a middle ground between World War II and 

Vietnam. The Korean War became increasingly unpopular, as Americans became far less willing to rally 

to support its limited and ambiguous objectives. The 

Korean War lacked open public opposition or criticism of the purpose of the war. The Vietnam War became an unpopular war through the perceived race 

and class inequalities of those drafted into service to 

fight it. It was unique in that open political opposition, a vigorous and highly visible antiwar movement, 

and the growing public perception of the war as unjust and unwinnable played a significant part in shaping public perceptions of returning veterans. 

Gambone finds that “the personal responses to 

war among veterans were remarkably consistent over 

three decades” (p. 92). Those who served in World War 

II, Korea, and Vietnam, either as draftees or as volunteers, tended to serve for largely the same reasons—

personal preference and social context representing 

a desire to maintain the traditional obligation of a 

citizen to serve in the military at the behest of the 

nation during times of crisis. The author highlights 

the often-overlooked aspect of the rapidly changing 

economy of the United States from 1945 to 1975 that 

was part of every returning veteran’s experience. The 

transition from a nationalized war economy in 1945 

to a free-market consumer economy created pressures 

for employers to assimilate the millions of returning 

The theme of this book is the returning veteran and 

social perceptions, especially how and why these perceptions were created. Michael Gambone’s study is intended to shatter commonly held shibboleths about 

veterans who served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Misapprehensions about veterans in general, he 

notes, have now hardened into history. Veterans and 

their role and place in modern American society have 

been largely ignored, a minority group as yet unappreciated or discovered by social historians. Gambone 

seeks to explore assumptions about veterans’ service, 

sacrifice, and recognition from these three wars and 

compare the perpetuated myths with reality.

The book is divided into four sections, each examining a unique part of the veteran experience: joining the military, wartime experience, the transition 

from warrior to veteran, and postwar employment 

and activism. Gambone’s research reveals that the 

social context of wartime service is important. Much 

depends on whether or not the public accepts that the 

war was honorable, and therefore, public perception 

will shape the veteran’s ability to make the postwar 

adjustment necessary to return to society (p. 81). Just 

as important to public perception of veterans is society’s image of the American military during wartime. 

Gambone asserts that veterans from previous wars 

“had the strongest influence on the social acceptability of military service” (p. 11) and that “public support 

for conscription paralleled a larger public consensus 

that tended to support social, political, and economic 

institutions after 1945” (p. 32). 

American culture changed significantly between 

9

 Dr. Keith D. Dickson is a professor of military studies at the 

Joint and Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University. His most recent book is No 

Surrender: Asymmetric Warfare in the Reconstruction South, 1868–

1877 (2017).
100 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

veterans. Korean War veterans returning to a growing and prosperous economy after their service was 

completed found themselves at a disadvantage. Vietnam War veterans left one America and returned to 

a changed one, one ravaged by social and political 

turmoil and rampant inflation. During this 30-year 

period, most veterans, even with federal assistance 

programs, found that they had to make the necessary 

life and work transitions largely on their own. Gambone notes that postwar American society has consistently portrayed veterans of all three wars as outcasts, 

who are prone to crime and antisocial behavior. Gambone’s research, based on a wide variety of primary 

sources, indicates that this perception has no basis 

in fact. He finds that feelings of alienation, isolation, 

frustration, and anger appear to be a common part 

of the veteran postwar experience. Although Vietnam 

War veterans are viewed as the only veterans who reflect these feelings, Gambone indicates that veterans 

of World War II and Korea had similar, though less 

open and documented, responses. In fact, Gambone 

concludes that veterans as a whole largely made a successful transition to peacetime society. 

The author’s approach relies on life course theory

—the idea that social context not only defines the 

veteran, but also establishes public perceptions, stereotypes, and social status. World War II veterans, 

returning from the battlefronts as part of a national 

struggle for total victory, were perceived over time 

as representing the best of America. The confusing 

and frustrating war in Korea had far less influence on 

American society than the Second World War; the 

war itself seemed far away and more of a political morass within the Cold War than a battle for the survival 

of the free world. The Korean veteran returned to a 

largely indifferent society, eager to push aside the unpleasantness of the war and enjoy the economic fruits 

of victory reaped in 1945. In Vietnam, a combination 

of professionals, volunteers, and draftees fought a war 

that had none of the rhetoric that stirred public support. As the war escalated with no end in sight, the 

American public lost confidence in both the government and the military. The returning Vietnam veteran 

was excoriated as a dupe, a sociopath, and a victim all 

at the same time. 

The overview of the veteran as activist at first 

appears a bit curious. Gambone recounts that a few 

veterans during World War II and Korea opposed 

the ongoing wars, but the movements were miniscule 

and largely unrecognized. It is undoubtedly because 

of Vietnam that Gambone highlights activism. During Vietnam, veterans exploited a sympathetic media, 

joined nationwide peace demonstrations, organized 

protests, and created an organization that actively agitated to encourage draft resistance and became one of 

the centerpieces of the counterculture, culminating in 

the testimony of John F. Kerry before the U.S. Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee in 1971. Kerry claimed 

to be speaking on behalf of veterans who had borne 

the mental and physical traumas of war and yet were 

derided for their antiwar stance. 

Gambone’s approach strikes the reader at times 

as something of a preliminary research report. The 

same information is repeatedly used to support different themes throughout the book. He makes some tentative findings, based on excellent empirical research, 

but is not fully confident in his conclusions, holding 

back, perhaps, because what is necessary for his conclusions to be validated is to match his research with 

an in-depth study of American society and culture 

from 1945 to 1975—an enormously daunting task, but 

perhaps a critical one to serve as the essential background to understand where veterans fit into the social and cultural landscape of American life. Although 

Gambone explores how military service was understood in America and the social perceptions that led 

young men to volunteer and to accept conscription 

willingly, he only touches on this aspect of American 

society that would lead him in a direction he was not 

prepared to address. In some ways, this analysis should 

be at the heart of Gambone’s argument. Life course 

theory combined with a thoughtful study of American social norms related to military service would 

reveal a great deal about the connection between expectations of those who entered the military and the 

expectations they had upon leaving service. 
WINTER 2018 101

He also only touches on changes in warfare and 

their effect on wartime experiences of individual servicemembers, but does not provide a complete discussion of the relationship between the changing conduct 

of warfare during 30 years and the understanding of 

war and its purpose. Some experiences of veterans in 

certain roles (supply, administration, maintenance) or 

in certain Services (shipboard routine, airbase operations) may remain consistent; but the number of veterans actually involved in combat steadily decreased 

between World War II and Vietnam, and new technologies, weapons, tactics, and capabilities completely reshaped the battlefield and directly influenced 

the experiences of veterans dealing with these new 

aspects of warfare. New modes of warfare may have 

had a greater influence on postwar assimilation than 

Gambone recognizes. 

Certainly of note is the interesting body of research used in this study. Primary sources predominate, 

as would be expected for this kind of broad-based approach, to provide a more measured analysis of veterans as part of American social history. Gambone used 

a number of unexpected sources, such as records from 

corporate industry, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

files, and the records of the National Urban League. 

It is clear that Gambone has made an admirable start, 

opening both a new channel for social history and 

new lanes of exploration related to the collective experience of the American veteran.

• 1775 •
102 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Richard L. DiNardo, PhD10

Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day. By Marc Milner. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. 

400. $26.95 paperback.)

forced 3d Canadian Infantry Division. Milner’s work 

focuses on the 3d Canadian Infantry Division and its 

actions from 6–10 June 1944. Milner goes into considerable tactical detail at times. His scholarly research, 

which is extensive, is well supported by knowledge of 

the local microterrain, a clear indication of several visits to the battlefields themselves. 

Several points emerge from Milner’s analysis of 

the actions of the 3d Canadian Infantry Division. The 

first is the prescience of the initial planners of the invasion, Frederic Morgan’s COSSAC (chief of staff to 

the supreme Allied commander) staff, in regard to the 

German reaction to a landing in Normandy. They correctly predicted that the Germans would attempt to 

mount a major attack with three panzer divisions on 

both sides of the Mue River, between Caen and Bayeux, France. 

The second point of Milner’s analysis was that 

the German counterattack, when it did occur, was not 

as effective as it could have been because the Germans 

often got in their own way. Confused command relationships, rivalries between the army and the Schutzstaffel (SS), excessive haste, and SS officers more 

concerned with massacring Canadian prisoners than 

in executing counterattacks, often served to reduce 

the effectiveness of German attacks when they were 

mounted. 

Finally, Milner shows just how close-run a thing 

the opening stage of the Normandy campaign was. 

A successful attack by the powerful German forces 

in the battle area could have threatened not just the 

Canadians at Juno Beach, but also the British forces 

at Gold and Sword beaches. That the Germans failed 

was due, above all, to the tactical skill and rock-ribbed 

If any army has been overlooked concerning its involvement in the Normandy campaign, it is the Canadian Army. While entire forests have been consumed 

on works covering the American, British, and German armies, the Canadian Army has received relatively short shrift. Some of this was, as Marc Milner notes, 

self-inflicted. At times, even the Canadian official history understated the extent of the Canadian Army’s 

critical contribution to the success of the Normandy 

invasion. Milner’s work offers a much-needed corrective. 

The Canadian Army had previously played a major role in World War I. By 1918, the Canadians were 

regarded by the Germans as Britain’s shock troops. 

For the Germans, any concentration of Canadian 

units presaged a major offensive. Milner shows convincingly that initially the Canadian Army was slated 

to play a key role for any future invasion of Europe. 

For a variety of reasons, however, which Milner delves 

into in some detail, the Canadian role in a crosschannel invasion during World War II was drastically 

reduced. Likewise, the initial commander of the Canadian forces in Britain, Lieutenant General Andrew 

L. McNaughton, came to be regarded by the British as 

unpalatable. He was replaced by General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar, who, while not enjoying the full 

confidence of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, 

was still regarded as a much better choice. 

Ultimately, the Canadian participation in any 

Normandy landing was reduced to a heavily rein10 Dr. Richard L. DiNardo is professor of national security affairs 

at U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, 

VA, and is a prolific author of works on military history.
WINTER 2018 103

toughness of the soldiers of the 3d Canadian Infantry 

Division. This is a story too long obscured, and Milner 

makes sure that the Canadians get their due. 

Milner’s work is well-researched and crisply written, although at times the tone can come across as a 

bit defensive. Nonetheless, Milner has made a major 

contribution to the historiography of the Normandy 

campaign. Students of the campaign, ranging from 

the most serious to the most casual, will profit from 

reading this work.

• 1775 •
104 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Colonel Walter G. Ford (Ret)11

Eyewitness to Chaos: Personal Accounts of the Intervention in Haiti, 1994. By Walter E. Kretchik (Lincoln: Potomac 

Books, University of Nebraska Press, 2016. Pp. 240. $34.95 cloth and e-book.)

the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (1998), 

which summarizes the American intervention in 

Haiti in some detail. Eyewitness to Chaos draws from 

research for that book and 42 oral history interviews 

addressing the personal experiences of those planning 

and executing Operation Uphold Democracy and the 

United Nations (UN) mission in Haiti in 1993–94.

Kretchik points to the strategic geographic location of Haiti relative to the United States and the 

importance the United States places on ensuring the 

corresponding stability of Haiti. The strategic value 

of Haiti precipitated a continuing involvement of the 

United States in Haiti’s domestic and international 

relations, including a 19-year period of management 

of Haitian affairs beginning in 1915 that directly involved the U.S. Marine Corps in law enforcement 

by a national police force, the Gendarmerie d’Haiti. 

Recurring ruthless coups and dictatorships through 

the decades and U.S. interventions prevailed. With 

this background, Kretchik zooms in on the first free 

presidential elections in Haiti in decades in December 

1990, when leftist Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected 

president. Just nine months into his controversial 

presidency, in September 1991, Aristide was deposed 

in a coup by a junta led by the Army commander-inchief, Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras. Aristide fled 

for his life while thousands of his supporters were arrested, tortured, and murdered by Cédras’s henchmen.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and 

the UN quickly condemned Cédras’s actions, calling 

for the restoration of Aristide as president. The author details a laborious two years of back-and-forth 

deliberations by the UN, OAS, and U.S. government 

officials on actions for restoring the democratically 

elected Aristide as an internationally astute Cédras 

played a game—seemingly accepting and then rejecting proposed solutions. Kretchik defines how the 

Walter E. Kretchik leverages his 1994–99 experiences 

as a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel assigned to produce 

a history of the Army’s role in the mid-1990s U.S. intervention in Haiti with his strength as a professor 

of history at Western Illinois University to author 

this brilliant narrative on America’s relationship with 

Haiti. While Eyewitness to Chaos focuses on the U.S. 

Army’s efforts to return a democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power in Haiti, it is 

of far greater value than a mere record of that effort 

and should be the minimal required reading for any 

U.S. government official or nongovernment organization or charity involved with Haiti.

The enduring value of Kretchik’s work is the very 

detailed history of Haiti’s cultural development since 

Christopher Columbus landed in the Americas: how 

Haiti became the country it is today after centuries 

of armed force and intimidation in day-to-day living. 

He devotes significant pages to this culture grounded 

in slavery, internal conflict, revolution, forced change 

of leadership at all levels, government by torture and 

coercion, and bullying. Appreciating this cultural underpinning and the history of multiple interventions 

by the United States provides both a framework for 

future interactions with Haiti and the compelling 

foundation for understanding the necessity for U.S. 

efforts in Haiti to be wrapped inside a multinational 

effort.

Among his other works, Kretchik coauthored 

Invasion, Interdiction, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of 

11 Col Walter G. Ford (Ret) is the former editor of Leatherneck

magazine and publisher for the Marine Corps Association. He is 

the author of Marine Corps History articles on the Marine Corps 

Reserve in World War I and the recently released Reducing the 

Saint-Mihiel Salient, September 1918 (2018), one of the History Division’s U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative 

Series.
WINTER 2018 105

American military was designated to plan for both 

peacemaking (forcible entry) and peacekeeping actions and how diplomatic discussions deferred actions 

as the UN established missions such as the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti and the UN 

Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), to ensure the junta was 

respecting individual human rights.

The author’s description of what became the 

Harlan County Incident provides a clear example of 

Cédras’s manipulation of the UN, OAS, and United 

States bureaucrats. Representatives of Cédras and 

Aristide agreed with UN and OAS mediators that 

Aristide would appoint a new army commander, Cédras would take early retirement, and Aristide would 

return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. On 11 October 

1993, the USS Harlan County (LST 1196), a U.S. Navy 

landing ship, tank assigned to take a group of Americans and Canadians, designated as the Joint Task 

Force-Haiti Assistance Group, to Port-au-Prince, 

sailed to begin preparations for a peaceful return of 

Aristide to power. The ship was met by small boats 

blocking anchorage and large, hostile mobs on the 

pier, all in front of international news cameras. Harlan County was forced to turn away and eventually 

returned to Virginia, yielding Cédras a victory and 

a black eye for the United Nations and the United 

States. The United States had, about this same time, 

suffered devastating losses in Somalia and there was 

no stomach by the administration or Congress for 

taking another risk.

The author describes in some detail the UN 

decisions to conduct planning for a military intervention, with the United States Atlantic Command 

(USACOM) in Norfolk, Virginia, in charge, and the 

mishaps associated with limited-access compartmentalized planning by USACOM and the designated invasion force, XVIII Airborne Corps (Joint Task Force 

180), headquartered in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Planning for simultaneous peacekeeping operations 

was delegated by USACOM to 10th Mountain Division (Joint Task Force 190), an XVIII Airborne Corps 

unit headquartered in Fort Drum, New York, with its 

limited staff and little experience.

With negotiations at an impasse, on 30 July 1994, 

the United Nations authorized a U.S. military forcible intervention to reinstate Aristide, and Kretchik 

points to yet another challenge. In September 1994, 

with 82d Airborne Division troops in the air, the 10th 

Mountain Division embarked in U.S. Navy ships underway to Haiti, and Army Rangers and Green Berets ready to make an assault, U.S. President James 

E. “Jimmy” Carter announced that an agreement was 

reached with Cédras. At this very last minute, the 

82d Airborne Division turned for home, and the remaining assault forces, trained for combat, became a 

peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance force. Cédras 

again demonstrated his acute understanding of the international forces at play; the agreement allowed him 

more time in office and freedom to depart carrying 

his wealth and closest associates with him into exile. 

There follows a detailed description of the challenges faced by Army combat units conducting humanitarian operations, limited cooperation between 

the regular Army units and Special Forces, replacement of those initial forces with other Army units, 

the introduction of a U.S. Marine task force (Special 

Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean, 

commanded by Colonel Thomas S. Jones) in Cap Haitian, and the United Nations declaring a secure and 

stable environment in Haiti in January 1995.12 In his 

final pages, Kretchik outlines the ensuing long-term 

multinational intervention in Haiti, noting that “in a 

curious twist on what happened to Haiti in 1915, the 

six-month-long 1994 U.S.-led multinational intervention has now evolved into a long-term multinational 

intervention commitment” (p. 174). Therein lies the 

caution and counsel that Eyewitness to Chaos be required reading for government and nongovernmental 

representatives prior to any involvement with Haiti.

• 1775 •

12 For more on Marines in Operation Uphold Democracy, read 

Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, A Skillful Show of Strength: 

U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991–1996 (Washington, DC: History 

and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2003).
106 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

Colonel Rod Andrew Jr., USMCR (Ret)13

My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness. By Howard Jones. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 

Pp. 504. $34.95 cloth.)

men. Other factors contributed as well: poor morale and low training levels within the division; the 

stress and bitterness from the high casualty rate suffered throughout the division during the previous two 

months from an unseen enemy; the difficulty in distinguishing Viet Cong from civilians who posed no 

legitimate threat; poor intelligence on the presence or 

absence of civilians in the village; the fog of war in the 

initial stage of the assault on the village; the incompetence of Calley and poor leadership of his company 

commander, Captain Ernest L. Medina; and orders 

that seemed either implicitly or explicitly to condone 

the killing of civilians.

Jones succeeds in displaying the human side of 

most of the characters in the story, including several 

Vietnamese victims and survivors, but he does not 

shrink from assigning blame or credit where they are 

due. Senior officers added to the shame of My Lai, 

including the battalion commander, brigade commander, assistant division commander, division commander, and numerous staff officers. They showed 

criminal negligence in failing to investigate the allegations or blatantly lied to protect their careers. 

President Richard M. Nixon was clearly concerned 

with the political damage that might result from the 

incident, not about the truth of what happened or 

seeing that the guilty were punished. Some enlisted 

men refused to obey orders to kill civilians, though 

they failed to report what they saw. Most admirable in 

Jones’s book are Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson 

Jr., pilot of a Hiller OH-23 Raven observation helicopter, and his two crewmen, Specialists (E-4) Lawrence 

M. Colburn and Glenn W. Andreotta, as well as the 

pilots of two Bell UH-1 Iroquois (or Huey) helicopters who intervened in an attempt to stop the carnage. 

Thompson landed his helicopter at the scene and tried 

to persuade Calley and another lieutenant to stop the 

In the last days of March 1971, a military court sentenced U.S. Army first lieutenant William L. Calley Jr. 

to life in prison for his role in the atrocities that had 

occurred at the village of My Lai three years before, 

in which as many as 504 Vietnamese civilians were 

murdered by American troops of 1st Battalion, 20th 

Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division.

American soldiers deliberately killed hundreds of old 

men, women, children, and babies. Though Calley was 

the only soldier convicted of wrongdoing in the massacre, dozens of other officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted troops participated, and 

a number of more senior officers ignored evidence 

and suppressed the story to protect their own careers. 

No event of the Vietnam War caused more controversy, shame, and acrimony among Americans or had 

a more negative impact on their perception of their 

nation’s cause. Though My Lai has been the subject of 

numerous books, articles, and documentaries, Howard Jones’s balanced, insightful, and well-researched 

account may be the most comprehensive and useful 

yet published. 

Jones attempts to explain how the massacre occurred, displaying a rare balance between sympathy 

for the stress and uncertainty of the combat infantrymen involved, combined with revulsion for the acts 

that many of them committed. Many factors, both 

institutional and personal, contributed to the tragedy. Training in the laws of land warfare and proper 

treatment of civilians was virtually nonexistent in the 

23d Infantry Division, both for officers and enlisted 

13 Col Rod Andrew Jr., USMCR (Ret), is professor of history at 

Clemson University, SC. He has written numerous books and 

shorter monographs on American military history. The latter include his works on Operation Starlite and the Khe Sanh Hill 

Fights, published by Marine Corps History Division as part of 

the Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series.
WINTER 2018 107

killing, and then landed a second time, placing his 

aircraft between the American troops and terrified 

civilians and evacuating those he could. Meanwhile 

Colburn, his crew chief, rescued an eight-year-old boy 

from a drainage ditch full of dead and dying villagers. 

Thompson was the first and most vocal soldier to report the killings.

Jones’s coverage of these events is illuminating 

and fair overall, though in a few places his lack of 

familiarity with the military leads to awkward statements. Jones refers to NCOs in operational units as 

“drill sergeants” (p. 23), a term usually restricted to 

recruit trainers at basic training. More concerning 

is the book’s inadequate description of command relationships (who reported to whom), perhaps partly 

reflecting the author’s fuzzy understanding of them. 

This is a potentially serious issue when attempting to 

assess blame for alleged failures in reporting. Without reading other sources, for example, one would 

not know how responsible Major Frederic W. Watke 

was for failure to pass on reports he received from 

his subordinates. Watke, the immediate superior of 

Warrant Officer Thompson, was the company commander of the aero scout company of helicopters that 

was part of the 123d Aviation Battalion, which presumably was in some sort of temporary (or organic?) 

supporting role to the infantry battalion (or brigade, 

or 23d Infantry Division) in the My Lai area—again, 

it is not clear. Jones appears to fault Watke for dereliction in reporting the incident. It turns out that, 

while Watke’s own unit did not commit the crimes, he 

did relay Thompson’s report to the infantry battalion 

commander within 15 minutes of hearing it and then 

to his own aviation battalion commander later that 

night. Given what incomplete information there is on 

this command relationship in Jones’s book, most military officers would conclude that Watke did all that 

could be expected of him.

Despite his generally skillful coverage of the 

events surrounding the massacre, Jones makes his 

most unique contributions in the second half of the 

book. First, he provides the most detailed coverage yet 

of the trials of Calley and Medina. Second, he provides illuminating analysis of the effect of the evolving 

scandal on American public opinion once it began to 

unfold in the media in late 1969. For doves, the My Lai 

incident was simply the “result and symbol of what 

was wrong” (p. 3) with American involvement in Vietnam. More hawkish Americans came to see Calley as 

a scapegoat for the flawed military policy of senior 

officers and government officials that was standing 

in the way of American victory. Both factions made 

false assumptions about the affair—antiwar activists 

believed events like massacres on the scale of My Lai 

were typical in Vietnam, while the other side continued to believe that the civilians at My Lai were 

killed accidentally. For both groups, the Calley trial 

strengthened the consensus that something was seriously wrong with the war effort, though for different 

reasons. Meanwhile, many military officers then serving or recently returned from Vietnam bitterly denounced Calley for bringing dishonor to the uniform 

and undermining their own troops’ efforts. Many 

pointed out that their units suffered from the same 

stresses as Calley’s but did not resort to such shameful 

acts.

Jones does not use My Lai to scourge the U.S. 

Army or military institutions in general. He credits 

Army investigators such as Colonel William V. Wilson, Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the prosecuting attorneys at Calley’s court martial, and other 

officers for their moral revulsion at the crimes and 

their determined efforts to see justice done. Like the 

outwardly ordinary soldiers who somehow committed barbaric acts, other soldiers who were on the right 

side of justice and morality were, in the end, ordinary 

human beings as well. And though it was too late for 

the My Lai victims, the Army as an institution subsequently took important steps to improve the training given to soldiers on the treatment of civilians and 

continues to do a far better job in this area than it did 

prior to 1968.

Jones’s scholarly judgment is sound. First, he 

understands well, and explains well, that while it is 

important to grasp what happened at My Lai, it will 

always be impossible to know everything for sure. 

Mountains of conflicting testimony in the various investigations and trials make that impossible. He also 
108 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

knows that, while it is important to understand why 

My Lai occurred so that steps can be taken to avoid 

future wartime atrocities, it is doubtful they can be 

prevented altogether. There is no neat, clinical solution to be found in new doctrinal publications on the 

laws of land warfare or better training for combat 

troops. Such reforms were necessary and positive but, 

after all, the Abu Ghraib prison crimes in Iraq followed several decades of improved training and did 

not even occur under the stress of combat. In the end, 

he suggests, there is a factor that goes beyond training or the circumstances in which soldiers find themselves, and perhaps it is best described by the term 

character (p. 396); some individuals will resort to savagery, some will refrain, and some will take a stand 

against it. The ultimate answer then, to what prevents 

or causes events like My Lai is found somewhere in the 

nobility and the darkness of the human heart. Jones 

sensibly does not claim to offer all the answers when 

it comes to My Lai, but he has produced an extremely 

well-researched and fascinating account that asks the 

right questions.

• 1775 •
WINTER 2018 109

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Marines in World War II

25 works in series | paperback

This History Division series is devoted to U.S. Marines in World War II and was originally published 

for the education and training of Marines as a part 

of the U.S. Department of Defense’s observance of 

the 50th anniversary of victory in that war. These 

in-depth studies written by Marine Corps historians 

cover the conflict from the opening moves in 1939 to 

securing the surrender of Japan in 1945.

Digital editions of all titles are available on the History Division website at www.usmcu.edu/historydivision. Print copies 

can be requested at history.division@usmcu.edu as available.

The Journal of Military History 

A quarterly publication of the Society for Military History

The Society for Military History

George C. Marshall Library

Virginia Military Institute

Lexington, Virginia USA 24450

www.smh-hq.org jmhsmh@vmi.edu

Individual Subscription: $70

Institutional Subscription: $120

Add $10 for postage outside

the U.S. and Canada

Student online access: $25/year
110 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 4, NO. 2

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Marines in the Korean War

11 works in series | paperback

This History Division series is devoted to U.S. Marines in the Korean War and was originally published for the education and training of Marines as a 

part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s observance 

of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war. These 

in-depth studies written by Marine Corps historians cover the conflict from the recapture of Seoul in 

1950 to the signing of the Armistice in 1953.

Digital editions are available of all titles on the History Division website at www.usmcu.edu/historydivision. Print copies 

can be requested at history.division@usmcu.edu as available.

JUST RELEASED!

A New Conception of War

John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare

Ian T. Brown

6 x 9 | 368 pp | December 2018

A New Conception of War traces the origins and development of the combat 

theory the Marine Corps came to call “maneuver warfare” in the post-Vietnam 

years. The text follows two strands that ultimately merge into the codification of maneuver warfare doctrine in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting. 

The first strand focuses on the conflict theories of Colonel John Boyd, USAF, 

which were shaped by a career during the Cold War and his own passion for 

challenging conventional wisdom in the search for new and useful ideas. The 

second strand covers a period of institutional soul-searching within the Marine Corps after Vietnam, driven by the Corps’ historical desire to adapt itself 

to the exigencies of the day and thus remain a useful contributor to national 

defense. A New Conception of War uses new and previously unpublished material from the major players, including excerpts from the transcript of Boyd’s 

“Patterns of Conflict” briefing.

To preorder your copy, send request and mailing address to MCU_Press@usmcu.edu.
HAPPY BIRTHDAY,

HISTORY DIVISION

Join Marine Corps History Division in 2019 as we celebrate 100 years as the keepers of the 

Corps’ history by contributing articles to a special birthday edition of Marine Corps History. 

Summer 2019 submissions should focus on key elements of history and how those actions 

or the people involved helped to preserve and promote the history of the Marine Corps. 

Email the managing editor at stephani.miller@usmcu.edu for more information.
Ringed by Fire

U.S. Marines and the Siege of Khe Sahn

21 January to 9 July 1968

Colonel Richard D. Camp and 

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard A. Blasiol

COMING SOON

The Bravest Deeds of Men

a field guide to the 

battle of belleau wood

Colonel William T. Anderson 

In a series of battles across France in 

World War I, the U.S. 2d Division fought 

for control of an area called Bois de Belleau (Belleau Wood) near the town of 

Château-Thierry. It was here in this former hunting preserve in June 1918 that 

the Marines of the 4th Brigade won fame 

and glory. Those visiting the site of one 

of the most epic struggles in Marine Corps history will find this 

field guide a useful tool as you explore the battlefield in more 

depth than has been previously available. This guide contains a 

battlefield tour itinerary that visits the historically significant 

locations and provides explanatory notes about the events and 

units involved.

MORE IN THE

Marines in the Vietnam War

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

MORE IN THE

U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION’S

New Releases

Email history.division@usmcu.edu for a print or digital copy.
Marine Corps History

Issues of Marine Corps History can be found on the History Division 

website at www.usmcu.edu/HDPublishing.