* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 9/17/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JERILYN BURGESS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-7018 (D.C. No. CV-94-534-B) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.1 See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(explaining

the five-step sequential process). -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Jerilyn Burgess appeals from an order of the district court affirming the decision of the Secretary to award he r benefits for a closed period of time--December 29, 1988 through July 31, 1990. Ms. Burgess asserts that she has not regained the ability to work and her benefi ts should continue. We affirm. "We review the Secretary's decision to determine wh ether her factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole and whether she applied the correct legal standards . Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support a conclusion." Castellano v. Secretary of Health & H uman Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)(citations and quotation omitt ed). The administrative law judge determined at step fiv e 1 that as of July 31, 1990, Ms. Burgess had regained the ability to perfo rm the full range of sedentary work. Ms. Burgess argues this determination was in correct because the administrative law judge did not correctly evaluate her mental impairments which-3-

are the result of her use of narcotic pain reliever s. In particular, Ms. Burgess argues the administrative law judge incorrectly int erpreted the medical assessment form filled out by the consulting psychologist, Dr. Gordon. Ms. Burgess cites to Cruse v. United States Department of Health & HumanServices , 49 F.3d 614 (10th Cir. 1995) to support her argument. Ms. Burg ess raises no argument as to the administrative law judge’s determination that h er physical impairments have resolved sufficiently to permit her to perform sede ntary work. Ms. Burgess originally claimed disability only due to back problems and resulting pain. On appeal, the district court rema nded the case finding that the record was not sufficiently developed to determine whether Ms. Burgess had the physical ability to engage in substantial gainful a ctivity during the relevant time period. On remand, the administrative law judge, s tating that he was unsure what additional information the district court desired, ordered both an orthopedic and a mental consultation. Physically, Ms. Burgess was noted to have been enro lled at a junior college taking computer sciences and accounting since January 1990. She takes two classes a semester with three to four hours of home work a week per class. She handles the time in the classroom well as long as s he can stand up when she needs to. She has a grade point average of 3.14. She al so works in the bursar’s office doing accounting and data entry for four hours a day as part of a work-study-4-

program. She drives seventeen miles each way to sc hool every day. She does not do heavy housework and does no yard work. Ms. Burg ess stated that she felt she could work in the bursar’s office eight hours a dayif she could stand when she needed to. She likes to take an afternoon nap when she can to rest her legs. Dr. Gordon noted that her chief complaint was of pa in resulting from her back problems. Dr. Gordon noted that Ms. Burgess d id show depression and anxiety features. He concluded she had a moderate dysthymic disorder and could be addicted to the narcotic analgesics she takes. He determined that while she might have chronic pain syndrome, it was not severe . He concluded that Ms. Burgess was capable of performing sedentary work an d “must be considered to be a viable member of our work force.” Appellant’s Ap p. Vol. II at 306. As part of his evaluation, Dr. Gordon filled out th e “Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental)” for m. He rated Ms. Burgess in most areas as “fair.” The form defines the word “f air” to mean that the individual’s ability to function is seriously limit ed, but not precluded.
In Cruse , we held that, according to the form’s definition, a marking of “fair” on the medical assessment form was evidence of disability. 49 F.3d at 618. Ms. Burgess urges us to apply that holding without consideration of the rest of the record. This we will not do. As noted supra , p.2, we review the record as a whole (as does the administrative law judge in making hi s original determination).-5-

In Cruse , we not only reviewed the rating on the medical as sessment form, but also examined the doctors’ written notes which clea rly supported a finding of a severe mental impairment. 49 F.3d at 616, 618-19. The administrative law judge is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” he receives. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Fu rther, the administrative law judge may reject a professional’s opinion, if the p rofessional’s conclusions are not supported by that professional’s own records. Cf. Castellano , 26 F.3d at
1029. Here, no evidence supports Dr. Gordon’s ratings on the medical assessment form. Dr. Gordon concluded that Ms. Burgess is cap able of working. Indeed, Ms. Burgess even agreed that she could work if her need to stand could be accommodated. Ms. Burgess’ current ability to hold a part-time job while going to school and maintaining an excellent grade point average belies any attempt to claim that any mental dysfunction she may have affe cts her to the point of disability. We caution counsel against attempting to apply case holdings without first examining whether the facts underlying his client’s claims support application of the holding. At no time prior to the psychiatric c onsultation had Ms. Burgess claimed any mental impairment. Indeed, at the hear ing on remand, counsel stated that this was “solely an orthopedic case.” Appella nt’s App. Vol. II at 179. Only-6-

after Cruse was decided (and on appeal to the district court), did counsel advance the argument that Ms. Burgess was disabled due to amental impairment. We have not, nor will we, elevate the blanket use of acase holding over the proper examination and consideration of the record as a wh ole. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby Circuit Judge