USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

USSOCOM

Research Topics

2011
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against 

terrorist networks.

Priorities. • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

 • Develop and support our people and their families.

 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, YC-3, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Ministerial Reform Advisor; 

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute and JSOU Associate 

Fellow

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Brian H. Greenshields 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Senior Lecturer, DoD Analysis, Naval 

Postgraduate School

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Adjunct Faculty, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 
On the cover

Top left. Night training mission, two CV-22 Osprey 

aircraft, assigned to the 58th Special Operations 

Wing, at Kirtland AFB. 

Top right. A U.S. Army Special Operations soldier 

scans for insurgents during an engagement in the 

Sangin District area, Helmand Province, Southern 

Afghanistan. 

Bottom left. Marines from the 1st Marine Special 

Operations Battalion discuss their imminent jump 

2,500 feet above Camp Pendleton, California. 

Bottom right. Naval Special Warfare combatantcraft crewmen operate a Rigid Inflatable Boat from 

a forward location. 

USSOCOM

Research Topics

2011
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-44-X
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

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Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line ,

February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski 

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect 

Approaches , February 2009, Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, 

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White 

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual , March 2009 

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the 

Present as Future , April 2009, Roby C. Barrett 

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent , May 2009, 

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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(16–19 March 2009)

Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection ,

July 2009, William G. Perry

Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security 

Environment , July 2009, Russell D. Howard 

Manhunting: Counter-Network Operations for Irregular Warfare ,

September 2009, George A. Crawford 

Irregular Warfare: Brazil’s Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas , 

September 2009, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies , 

December 2009, Haider A.H. Mullick

Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens , January 2010 , 

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Report of Proceedings, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Society Symposium, Irregular Warfare 

and the OSS Model (2–4 November 2009) 

U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 

Future , March 2010, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach , April 2010, 

Thomas H. Henriksen 

2010 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays , May 2010

vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................ ix

Preface ................................................................................................... xi

A. Priority Topics ................................................................................... 1

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs) ............................................. 7

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations ......................................11

D. Interagency Operations ................................................................... 17

E. Regional and Cultural Studies ...........................................................23

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues ............................................... 29

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years ............................................. 37

ix

Foreword

T The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

2011 Research Topics list is intended to guide research projects 

for Professional Military Education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, research fellows, and others writing about special operations during 

this academic year. Research is one of the cornerstones of JSOU’s academic mission as we strive to produce publications to meet joint Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) operational and planning needs. Each year representatives from USSOCOM, the Theater Special Operations Commands 

(TSOCs), SOF chairs from the war colleges, and JSOU senior fellows 

develop a list of salient issues confronting SOF in the near term. The list 

is vetted through the components and TSOCs to ensure that research will 

advance SOF missions and support SOF interests. The final recommendations for research topics are approved by the USSOCOM commander. 

These topics, concepts, and processes reflect the challenges of winning the current conflicts and meeting the needs for the conflicts most 

likely to face us in the foreseeable future. This alone speaks to the need 

for more debate, research, and study. If you have any questions about this 

document, JSOU Press in general, or how JSOU can assist you in your 

academic research, contact the director of Research, jsou.research@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Kenneth H. Poole

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

xi

Preface

This list represents an effort to list and categorize special operations-related research topics presented to PME students, JSOU 

part-time senior fellows, and other SOF researchers. The commander of the USSOCOM places high emphasis on SOF students writing on timely, relevant, SOF-related topics. This list is a guide to stimulate 

ideas; topics may be narrowed, broadened, or otherwise modified as 

deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school writing requirements or individual 

experiences). 

Sections A through F contain new topic categories with major ideas/concepts for 2011 from which topics can be derived, depending on the interest/experience of the researcher and the desired level of detail. Section A 

(Priority Topics) identifies those topics of particular importance that the 

commander, USSOCOM has selected for special emphasis. Each of these 

seeks to expand SOF understanding of specific challenges and to suggest 

techniques and procedures to increase SOF efficiency in addressing them. 

The Priority Topics reflect a consensus of those participating in the topics 

project as being particularly useful in addressing immediate SOF needs 

and in building future capabilities. Topics focus on the following:

a. Achieving greater understanding of the structure and functioning of terrorist networks through social networking tools and 

other initiatives

b. Employing social marketing techniques and other best practices 

to address terrorist networks

c. Developing assessment protocols to determine effectiveness of 

effort against those networks. 

Other topics solicit fresh insights into combating terrorism through 

direct and indirect approaches; developing new intelligence architectures; 

countering radicalization by working through local indigenous persons; 

and exploring the role for SOF in political warfare, coercive diplomacy, 

and active security campaigns.

Section G is a list of topics retained from previous years. 
xii

Limited TDY funding will be available from JSOU for researchers (e.g., PME students) to support their projects (e.g., to conduct interviews or visit USSOCOM or component headquarters). These research 

“grants” are subject to approval by the director, JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department depending on the topic selected and the value added to the 

project. Share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis advisors, and 

other colleagues and feel free to submit additional topics for inclusion in 

updated editions. 

JSOU Press has released several publications that may relate to your 

topic of interest; see the complete list at http://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 
1

A. Priority Topics

A. Priority Topics

Topic Titles

A1. Combating terrorist networks (CbTNs) in law enforcement and military contexts 

A2. Preparing SOF for interface with host-nation governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in foreign internal defense (FID)

A3. Winning the battle of the narratives 

A4. Preparing SOF for future irregular warfare crises 

A5. Cultural motivators for insurgent actions 

A6. Measuring progress and effects in an irregular warfare environment 

A7. Educating “3D” operators 

A8. SOF efforts to develop networks for combating terrorism 

A9. SOF leveraging of existing CbTNs within partner countries 

A10. Drawing on law enforcement “displacement” tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTPs) for irregular warfare operations 

Topic Descriptions

A1. Combating terrorist networks (CbTNs) in law enforcement and 

military contexts

There are significant differences in the approaches followed by law 

enforcement/justice officers in their confrontations with criminal 

elements and by the military in their operations against terrorists 

and their networks. There are also situations where the boundaries between crime and terrorism become blurred, and it is unclear 

who has the lead authority. In fact, terrorists, depending on circumstances, can be considered either as criminal or military threats. 

What should be the relationship between CbTNs in a justice and 

law enforcement context, and CbTNs as a military operation governed by the law of land warfare and directed by national command 

authorities as a warfighting activity? Should law enforcement/justice and military counterterrorist activities be segregated and pursued separately or should they be addressed as an integrated whole? 

Identify the overlaps and gaps in the legal authorities that affect law 
2

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

enforcement/justice and military collaboration. How can SOF assist 

U.S., bilateral, and international law enforcement bodies in pursuing terrorist networks in ways that are consistent with the rule of law 

and that do not compromise subsequent criminal prosecutions?

A2. Preparing SOF for interface with host-nation governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in foreign internal defense (FID)

SOF needs to develop and exercise the capability to build relationships with and, when appropriate, advise host-nation governments, 

IGOs, and NGOs. SOF are skilled in Defense issues; Diplomatic 

and Development skills can be developed through education and 

experience.

How must SOF education change to provide its “3D” (Diplomacy, Defense, Development) operators with the skills to interface 

with host-nation governments, IGOs, and NGOs in the course of 

conducting persistent-engagement FID? Because of the complexity 

of the skill sets to be developed and the tasks to be performed, this 

study should clarify the differences between training and education 

and address how each must be addressed through the PME systems.

A3. Winning the battle of the narratives

Crafting a credible narrative is a central requirement to countering the influences of irregular threats. Our adversaries exploit their 

knowledge of local history, culture, and religion to affect perceptions 

by framing their actions positively. Any area of operations is filled 

with supportive, conflicting, complementary, and distracting narratives about what is going on. How do we win the battle of the narrative while conducting irregular warfare? What steps are necessary 

to establish and sustain the most credible and visible narrative of 

what is going on and why? This study should also address the development of counternarratives designed to undermine and discredit 

those of our adversaries, a particularly difficult task as emotional 

scenes of violence and destruction move quickly from mobile phones 

to the news media.

A4. Preparing SOF for future irregular warfare crises 

Irregular warfare covers a broad spectrum of international engagement from indirect military peacetime support to combat operations. How will or can SOF develop a sufficient number of trained 

and educated “Lawrences of Arabia” to address crises that lurk 

beyond our contemporary awareness? Discuss the right mix of 
3

A. Priority Topics

cultural awareness that is necessary for SOF units. Is a multitiered 

approach necessary to develop cultural awareness? Provide recommendations for an effective balance among language training (does 

everyone need advanced language skills?) and the “softer” skills such 

as sociology, anthropology, and psychology. How might preparation 

protocols affect SOF unit size, structure, and employment options?

A5. Cultural motivators for insurgent actions

Drawing on the admonition to “know your enemy,” what cultural 

factors motivate an insurgent to fight? This study should pursue an 

anthropological approach to study the insurgent as he sees him/

herself. What are the roles of the family, village, tribe, province, 

and state in shaping that self image? How does the concept of honor 

affect motivation? How do traditions such as Pashtunwali assist 

in determining the tribe’s response to the presence of foreigners? 

Examine the role of local, regional, and international news media in 

influencing insurgent motivation, especially in the coverage of issues 

and incidents.

A6. Measuring progress and effects in an irregular warfare 

environment

How should we define and measure progress and effects from 

activities conducted within an irregular warfare environment? 

Distinguish between measures of performance and measures of 

effectiveness in assessing progress and success. This study should 

attempt to describe what success looks like when working against a 

violent extremist organization. Once we define success, what is our 

“theory of victory” to achieve it?

A7. Educating “3D” operators

The development of an extensive body of 3D (Diplomacy, Defense, 

Development) warriors requires that all operators, not just leaders, 

receive the necessary education and experience. How do we educate 

SOF senior NCOs and warrant officers to become the effective 3D 

operators required by the challenges of contemporary and future 

irregular warfare environments? How can USSOCOM best develop 

special operators with a broad working knowledge of stakeholders, 

capabilities, and partner agendas in the diplomacy and development 

functional areas? Discuss how such educational initiatives can make 

important contributions to the transition of SOF senior NCOs from 

tactical experts into interagency-savvy operators.
4

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

A8. SOF efforts to develop networks for combating terrorism

The complexity of contemporary international security challenges 

has made it apparent that the U.S. is not able to absorb unilaterally 

the resource costs of conducting sustained operations in multiple 

regions. One solution could be for the U.S. to achieve it national 

security objectives by building the capacity of other forces from 

countries that pursue similar objectives. How can SOF activities to 

assist in building partner-nation security capacity be specifically targeted to support the development of local and regional networks for 

combating terrorism?

A9. SOF leveraging of existing CbTNs within partner countries

As with most military organizations, SOF understandably interpret most challenges, at least in the short term, from their national 

and cultural perspectives. Experience teaches, however, that other 

countries can field capabilities that, while perhaps not as developed 

as our own, are well suited to address conditions on the ground and 

simultaneously contribute to the achievement of both their own 

and U.S. security objectives. How can USSOCOM best take advantage of existing CbTNs that are already functioning within partner 

countries? What can be done to attract the collaboration of partner, 

regional, and other countries to contribute to a common effort?

A10. Drawing on law enforcement “displacement” tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTPs) for irregular warfare operations

Displacement of criminal activity is well understood in law enforcement circles. It describes the phenomenon whereby eliminating a 

form of criminal activity in one area means that the activity will 

move elsewhere, change form, or become replaced by another form. 

How can the law enforcement TTPs developed to confront displacement contribute to USSOCOM, SOF, and TSOC strategies and 

operations to address the global dispersion of terrorist organizations and the networks that support them? Consider the fact that 

within the contemporary irregular warfare environment, organized 

crime characteristics frequently find expression in the activities of 

the insurgents. Though their specific goals are likely to vary, the 

close cooperation and reinforcement that takes place between terrorists/insurgents and criminals mean that similarities emerge in 

organization, resourcing, and operations. This study should look 

at case studies such as Mexico and suggest ways that a comprehensive “whole-of-government” approach, working through the U.S. 
5

A. Priority Topics

Government interagency process, can be applied to the phenomenon 

of displacement, no matter the irregular warfare or criminal context 

in which it is encountered. 

7

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

B. Combating Terrorist Networks 

 (CbTNs)

Topic Titles

B1. Balancing combating-terrorist activities with other irregular warfare 

missions

B2. Targeting and manipulating subnetworks to combat terrorist 

networks

B3. Combating-terrorist lessons learned from the war on drugs

B4. Distinguishing between terrorist and criminal groups and networks

B5. Optimizing SOF organization and C2 for CbTNs

B6. Making the USSOCOM case for combating terrorist resources to the 

U.S. Government interagency community

B7. “Out-of branch” and interagency community opportunities for SOF 

advancement

B8. SOF efforts to undermine terror network TTPs

B9. Terrorist networks as formal structures

B10. SOF combating-terrorist roles within the United States

Topic Descriptions

B1. Balancing combating-terrorist activities with other irregular warfare missions

Currently USSOCOM is focusing considerable effort on counterterrorism as contrasted with other components of irregular warfare. 

How do counterterrorism practices need to be reshaped to support 

more effectively—or at least not to undermine—other irregular warfare and balanced approaches? This study should identify specific 

SOF capabilities, doctrinal elements, and TTP that are uniquely 

applicable to the combating-terrorist mission set. Consider whether 

perceived points of friction among irregular warfare missions are 

merely a consequence of designating a priority of one mission over 

another.
8

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

B2. Targeting and manipulating subnetworks to combat terrorist 

networks

The ability to gather intelligence and locate indications and warnings 

of potential terrorist attacks are central to defending the U.S. and 

its allies against transnational terrorist attacks. How can SOF better 

influence and manipulate lower level networks with both direct and 

indirect links to transnational terrorist organizations? How can the 

targeting and manipulation of subnetworks operated by transnational criminal groups, gangs, and warlords work from the bottom 

up to disrupt transnational terrorist organizations? This study will 

examine policies and TTP for such interventions. How does SOF 

coordinate its actions with the U.S. Government interagency community, law enforcement/justice officers, partner nations, allies, 

IGOs, and NGOs?

B3. Combating-terrorist lessons learned from the war on drugs

U.S. operations targeting narcoterrorists in Colombia and elsewhere 

have resulted in robust partnerships among military operations, 

Department of Justice-directed law enforcement and justice programs, other members of the U.S. Government interagency community, and host-nation organizations. This study will assess whether 

those relationships and the paradigm they represent can be replicated in efforts to combat terrorist networks. What lessons can be 

drawn from the U.S. experiences in the war on drugs and, particularly, from the successes achieved by “Plan Colombia” and applied to 

CbTNs?

B4. Distinguishing between terrorist and criminal groups and 

networks

Tactical operators generally focus on a narrow range of issues—such 

as rules of engagement, resourcing, population engagement, and end 

states—that do not necessarily require the differentiation between 

terrorist and criminal networks. However, transnational terrorist 

and transnational criminal organizations pose different and significant legal, political, and diplomatic challenges at the operational and 

strategic levels. How do both the intelligence and operational communities distinguish between terrorists and organized crime groups 

and their supporting networks? Discuss how such analysis assists in 

the pursuit of both types of security threats.
9

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

B5. Optimizing SOF organization and C2 for CbTNs

It is recognized that the flexibility of terrorist networks makes it 

essential that SOF organizations and C2 capacities display the agility 

to adapt to current and future challenges. How can U.S. SOF organizational and C2 structures be optimized to produce maximum 

effects when engaged in CbTNs? Besides improving interactions 

within the U.S. Government interagency environment, assess the 

consequences of building relationships with the private sector, academia, and other governmental and NGOs. Also examine the pros 

and cons of employing reach-back capabilities to include identifying 

both sources and content. 

B6. Making the USSOCOM case for combating-terrorist resources to 

the U.S. Government interagency community

A persistent drag on USSOCOM’s ability to obtain the necessary 

resources for CbTNs is a lack of understanding about what SOF 

need to conduct such operations. How does USSOCOM make the 

case with other agencies, including those from the non-Department 

of Defense (DoD) members of the U.S. Government interagency 

community, for obtaining those resources required by SOF for 

combating counterterrorism? This study will provide specific recommendations for building strong lines of communication with DoD 

laboratories to ensure they understand SOF missions, capabilities, 

technology needs, and resource requirements.

B7. Out-of branch and interagency community opportunities for SOF 

advancement

Broader interaction with the U.S. Government interagency community and NGOs is essential for developing skilled SOF. As part of the 

effort to develop the most qualified SOF warriors for combating terrorists, should out-of-branch internships or tours of duty with nonDoD members of the U.S. Government interagency community and/

or non-U.S. Government organizations become options for careerprogression opportunities? Recommend where in the career development pipeline such assignments should be available and identify 

the opportunity costs for accepting such assignments. Discuss the 

kinds of policies necessary to make sure that individuals pursuing such options are not penalized professionally through career 

stagnation. 
10

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

B8. SOF efforts to undermine terror network TTPs

While there is understandably a great deal of public focus on the terrorist use of improvised explosive devices, it is important for SOF 

to have a detailed understanding of the full range of TTPs that are 

available to terrorists and their networks. What specific policies and 

strategies should SOF develop to interdict, usurp, corrupt, or prevent 

a terrorist network from executing the range of options available to 

them. This study will use historical case studies to identify and analyze in detail the factors involved with each terrorist tactic to include 

required resources, financial support, training, TTPs, and personnel. 

Based on these assessments, identify vulnerabilities inherent in each 

terror network tactic. 

B9. Terrorist networks as formal structures

A familiar observation is that “it takes a network to defeat a network.” Other views contend that the notion of a terrorist organization or network is overstated. Do terrorists consciously employ 

networks to support their activities? Is the concept of a network

a contrivance that merely explains observed behavior in familiar 

terms while minimizing the complexity of the challenges of combating terrorists? Assess the extent to which the emphasis on networks 

creates tunnel vision at the planning and execution levels. The study 

should explore the operational perspectives of terrorist groups and 

suggest how they might regard their support systems. What are 

the indispensible components of an efficient and effective terrorist group? Suggest ways that SOF can successfully counter terrorist 

groups that lack central direction and consist of small, distributed 

cells operating quasi-independently in a self-directing fashion. 

B10. SOF combating-terrorist roles within the United States

Because of legal constraints (Posse Comitatus), policy, and tradition, lead combating-terrorist responsibility within the borders of 

the United States rests outside the DoD. Given the complexity of 

the combating-terrorist challenges and the evolving relationships 

within the U.S. Government interagency community, it is possible 

to anticipate situations in which SOF intervention may become a 

necessary combating-terrorist option. DoD U.S. SOF have a role 

to play in combating terrorists within the territory of the United 

States? The study will identify those situations during which a SOF 

response might be appropriate, what sort of SOF organization and 

TTPs would be involved, and what modifications to Posse Comitatus 

would be required.
11

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy 

 and Operations

Topic Titles

C1. Maximizing SOF influence operations during irregular warfare

C2. Obtaining enablers, sustainment, and support from conventional 

forces

C3. Creating baseline DoD-wide irregular warfare understanding and 

operational competence

C4. Avoiding the creation of destabilizing and adversarial organizations

C5. SOF role in stability operations

C6. Providing nontraditional logistics support for SOF

C7. Establishing local relationships for strategic irregular warfare 

success

C8. Sustaining career development while building regional expertise

C9. Helping the partner nation build government legitimacy

C10. The “American way” of irregular warfare

C11. Characteristics of future warfare

Topic Descriptions

C1. Maximizing SOF influence operations during irregular warfare

The understanding and support—or at least the neutrality—of a 

variety of audiences is necessary for the successful prosecution of 

irregular warfare operations. Target audiences include the populations of the host nation and the contiguous region, the populations 

of the U.S. and its partner nations, and the intergovernmental and 

nongovernmental organizations whose collective endorsement is 

essential. How can U.S. SOF optimize their influence operations to 

obtain maximum effects in the achievement of irregular warfare 

strategic objectives? The study will take a fresh look at how to synchronize the interagency community capabilities of public affairs, 

public diplomacy, psychological operations (PSYOPs), and strategic 

communications under the umbrella of information operations. 

How are desired end states defined? How do practitioners in each 
12

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

discipline coordinate their activities to ensure consistency in their 

messaging that is perceived as credible by each target audience? How 

can the U.S. harmonize communication programs fielded by host 

nations, partner nations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations? What metrics should be established to accurately 

assess effectiveness?

C2. Obtaining enablers, sustainment, and support (ESS) from conventional forces

Currently, support of SOF provided by General Purpose Forces 

(GPF) is ad hoc and within Service-specific rotational schedules. As 

GPF and SOF units become more distributed, ESS becomes more 

of a critical issue. SOF requires dedicated Service support to ensure 

long-term sustainment for mission-specific equipment and personnel. What must the combatant commands and Services provide ESS 

to enable SOF to engage in irregular warfare operations in pursuit of 

irregular warfare strategic objectives? Identify those authorities for 

training, manning, and equipping SOF that reside in the Services 

and the combatant commands and inhibit essential ESS for SOF 

pursuing long-term, persistent engagement strategies. Present recommendations to eliminate or mitigate those points of friction.

C3. Creating baseline DoD-wide irregular warfare understanding and 

operational competence

The officer and pending enlisted PME policies establish irregular 

warfare as a learning objective for Joint PME. Currently there is 

no standardized structure guiding how irregular warfare is to be 

taught. Additionally, irregular warfare has not achieved a core competency level of importance and is usually offered only as an elective. How can the DoD institutionalize irregular warfare instruction 

throughout Service and Joint PME programs so as to establish a 

baseline of irregular warfare understanding and operational competence? The study should assess if it is sufficient to prepare a single 

package of instruction for all Services or if individual packages, 

tailored for specific services, would be more effective. What can be 

done to ensure the expandability of the initial program?

C4. Avoiding the creation of destabilizing and adversarial 

organizations

Experience teaches that the creation of foreign military and law 

enforcement capacity has, from time to time, created situations in 

which units have been used by the host-nation government against 
13

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

internal groups or have shifted their loyalties and have become 

adversaries of the central government and/or the U.S. What steps 

can be taken to reduce the likelihood that SOF assistance to the 

development of partner-nation security capacity does not result in 

forces that are employed to suppress internal dissent? The study will 

consider specific cases in which SOF-trained organizations transfer 

their loyalties to individual criminals, warlords, or other leaders who 

then employ them for their own uses as destabilizing or adversarial 

organizations.

C5. SOF role in stability operations

Stability operations have emerged as a priority mission that diverges 

functionally from the activities traditionally forming the core tasks 

of irregular warfare. What role should SOF play in the conduct of 

the stability operations component of irregular warfare? Examine 

whether and how SOF should develop forces and capabilities that 

address reform of governance, civil security and control, rule of law, 

and economic development components of stability operations. 

C6. Providing nontraditional logistics support for SOF

SOF require equipment solutions and sustainment packages that 

typically rely on less logistical support than General Purpose Forces 

(GPF). What nontraditional means for support should be considered 

to meet the unique requirements of enabling small, dispersed SOF 

to operate in austere environments? Could nontraditional include 

acquiring support and resources from NGOs, partner countries, 

regional neighbors, and/or the host nation? Develop recommendations for how SOF resourcing requirements can be included within 

the GPF deployment planning process. Who determines the rules 

and priorities for support allocations? 

C7. Establishing local relationships for strategic irregular warfare 

success

Because of manpower shortfalls, a counterinsurgent effort may 

include establishing local paramilitary or militia forces to maintain 

security in isolated areas. How do SOF establish relationships and 

work with local militias, paramilitary, civilian forces, and other nonstate actors to achieve success within an irregular warfare environment? Consider how SOF organize, train, and employ such forces in 

a counterinsurgency setting. How does the U.S. or coalition influence and control these militias to further U.S. national security 

interests without derailing the current strategy? Include a survey 
14

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

of successful case studies in which militias acted as a legitimate 

military force providing security and promoting the rule of law on 

behalf of the local government as well as those cases where reliance 

on such forces failed.

C8. Sustaining career development while building regional expertise

Experience teaches that the development of regional experts is 

central to the success of persistent irregular warfare engagement. 

How can SOF recruit, train, employ, and retain regionally focused 

experts—that is, the new Lawrences—for long-term engagement 

within crisis areas conducting irregular warfare campaigns without 

doing irreparable harm to their professional careers? This study will 

explore ways to absorb nonmainstream career paths in ways that 

continue to grow leadership within the DoD while sustaining the 

required culturally focused relationships and language proficiency. 

Identify regional locations, including tribes and clans, in which 

long-term engagement is possible and necessary within the context 

of U.S. Government policy. What training opportunities within 

the U.S. Government interagency community exist to develop such 

regional expertise? What are the concrete professional and personal 

benefits to developing and maintaining regional expertise? Discuss 

ways to mitigate the risk of regional experts “going native” and of 

managing individuals if their regions of expertise no longer remain 

a U.S. Government priority. 

C9. Helping the partner nation build government legitimacy

The transition to host nation or international civilian responsibility is a critical enabler for a political decision to redeploy U.S. forces 

from an area of operations. Thus the recognition and acceptance 

of credible local governance by the population is absolutely essential. How can SOF improve their ability to influence the population 

to acknowledge the legitimacy of local government authority and 

thus achieve U.S. strategic objectives? Discuss the necessary balance 

between narrative and action to ensure that what is said and heard 

matches as closely as possible with what is actually happening on 

the ground. Additionally, explore ways that SOF can assist in the 

achievement of strategic goals without being perceived by the population as the agent of that success while ensuring that the local government receives credit earned for effective governance.
15

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

C10. The “American way” of irregular warfare

To what extent does an “American way” of irregular warfare exist 

and what adaptations are necessary to ensure future success? 

Should there be a “Grand strategy” of irregular warfare that commits the entire U.S. Government to a specific irregular warfare 

effort? Compare and contrast American IW with other successful 

and unsuccessful IW efforts (British, French, Russian, Israeli, South 

American—several examples are possible, even American efforts in 

Vietnam). This study should examine the interagency process implications of developing an irregular warfare strategy that employs a 

“whole-of-government” approach. Identify the opportunities offered 

by the engagement of the U.S. Government interagency community while noting possible political and economic limitations on the 

development of the next generation of irregular warfare strategy. 

What is a truly interagency paradigm? How does USSOCOM assist 

with the education of all potential partners about irregular warfare 

requirements and make known its requirements? 

C11. Characteristics of future warfare

It has been stated that armed forces generally mistakenly prepare for 

the last war and not the next war. A classic example is France preparing to refight World War I and being unprepared for innovative 

German tactics in World War II. Can we determine what the characteristics of the next war or significant conflict will be? While we are 

still acclimating to a COIN fight against a nonstate actor, and while 

we anticipate some sort of cyber attack (a cyber version of Pearl 

Harbor or otherwise cyber-heavy war), are these truly the characteristics of future conflicts or developments in ongoing conflicts? 

What developments or breakthroughs are other nations (or nonstate 

actors) making? How do developing trends (reference the joint operating environment or other observational and/or predictive documents) such as microtechnology, social networking technologies and 

phenomena, and biomedical research (i.e., these areas may not necessarily be the definitive ones determined for study) affect either the 

future of warfare or the future environment? Although this question 

may not be SOF-specific, SOF may have a better perspective (at least 

in the SOF-related aspects of this), and there may be SOF portions of 

the larger answer. 

17

D. Interagency Operations

D. Interagency Operations

Topic Titles

D1. Building on existing USSOCOM relationships within the interagency community

D2. Improving message quality to achieve greater communication effects

D3. Improving USSOCOM contributions to theater security cooperation 

activities

D4. Improving relations with Department of State (DoS) and other interagency partners for irregular warfare

D5. Modifying interagency policies and authorities to meet combatingterrorist concerns, irregular warfare, and other challenges 

D6. USSOCOM support to the interagency management system during 

crises

D7. Improving SOF operational and tactical understanding of the interagency community 

D8. Removing barriers to interagency information sharing and operational effectiveness

D9. Operationalizing the whole-of-government approach to combating 

terrorists for irregular warfare

D10. Eliminating friction points and barriers within the country team

Topic Descriptions

D1. Building on existing USSOCOM relationships within the interagency community 

What is the current state of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between USSOCOM and the relevant components of the 

U.S. Government interagency community? What can USSOCOM 

do to improve the effectiveness of those relationships? Examine how 

institutional culture and biases are contributing both positively and 

negatively to interagency efforts toward a unified effort on irregular 

warfare issues. What are non-DoD U.S. Government interagency 

partners doing to confront the irregular warfare problem set? Suggest steps that USSOCOM can take to gain a clearer understanding 

of the perspectives and objectives of U.S. Government interagency 
18

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

partners. What role can best practices and lessons learned from the 

USSOCOM Interagency Task Force play in improving USSOCOM 

functioning within the broader U.S. Government interagency 

environment?

D2. Improving message quality to achieve greater communication 

effects

A basic principle of effective communications has always been to 

“speak with one voice.” This challenge becomes more difficult as 

messaging migrates from the parent organization into the broader 

U.S. Government interagency community. To what extent is the 

consistency and control of messages possible within the complex 

environment of the U.S. Government interagency community? The 

study will identify the organizational issues that must be addressed 

to improve the communication effects of external strategic communications and public diplomacy, suggest ways for the interagency 

community to capture and incorporate the communication and 

messaging best practices from individual U.S. Government agencies, 

and state how the interagency community can apply new technologies and techniques to the challenges of competing with other messaging agendas and narratives.

D3. Improving USSOCOM contributions to theater security cooperation activities 

Geographic unified commands are the primary vehicles for planning 

and implementing U.S. military theater security cooperation activities. How can USSOCOM more effectively partner with the Department of State country teams and Geographic Unified Commands 

to improve the quality of Theater Security Cooperation Planning 

and Implementation? Examine how TSOCs can involve themselves 

more extensively in long-term planning efforts, especially multiyear 

funding and authorities, to allow for persistent engagement. Assess 

how effectively FID and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) 

programs are integrated as elements of security cooperation activities and contingency operations. How can FID and IDAD initiatives 

gain greater inclusion with increased effectiveness? Through the use 

of case studies, suggest ways that relationships and trust established 

with indigenous peoples can be sustained through the handoff to 

follow-on forces.
19

D. Interagency Operations

D4. Improving relations with Department of State (DoS) and other 

interagency community partners for irregular warfare

As with the entire U.S. Government interagency community, the 

USSOCOM and the DoS reflect quite different organizational cultures. What specific initiatives are necessary to generate understanding, build relationships, and improve the cooperation between 

USSOCOM, DoS, and the rest of the U.S. Government interagency 

community to achieve strategic success in irregular warfare operations? Examine the implications for interagency cooperation within 

an area of operations to include ways to gain access to the appropriate expertise present within the embassy’s country team and 

an understanding of the complex bureaucratic structures within 

the host-nation government. What can be done to increase mutual 

understanding and cooperation between SOF and the country team? 

What organizational structures and networks are available to SOF to 

pursue collaborative relationships with host-nation civilian agencies 

and nonmilitary security forces? Assess whether provincial reconstruction teams in some form are the appropriate venues for such 

interaction. 

D5. Modifying interagency policies, and authorities to meet combating-terrorist concerns, irregular warfare, and other challenges

The complex structure of the U.S. Government interagency environment frequently makes it confusing for the SOF warrior to understand the terms of interaction with diplomatic counterparts within 

the DoS, other U.S. Government partners, and the host nation and 

with development partners within the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID), IGOs, and NGOs. This challenge becomes particularly acute as USSOCOM develops future 

capabilities, tries to make current ones more relevant, and expands 

its relationships within and outside the U.S. Government. What policies and authorities exist within the U.S. Government interagency 

community to guide interagency workings? If necessary, how can 

those be modified to meet emerging requirements? More specifically, 

what initiatives within the U.S. Government interagency community are necessary to streamline the process of defining or changing 

authorities and policies to allow for the effective employment of a 

whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism, irregular warfare, and other security challenges?
20

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

D6. USSOCOM support to the interagency management system 

during crises

The interagency planning teams established under the International 

Management System (IMS) have become the primary venues for 

interagency planning and implementation at the national, regional, 

and country team levels. USSOCOM retains unique capabilities and 

operational roles that require close collaboration with non-DoD 

members of the U.S. Government interagency community, especially 

with the Departments of State and Justice. How can USSOCOM 

best support the IMS when the Country Reconstruction Team and 

Stabilization Group (CRSG), Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and 

Advance Civilian Team (ACT) planning teams are established for a 

specific crisis? How can USSOCOM best gain entry to the IMS planning venues, especially at the strategic level?

D7. Improving SOF operational and tactical understanding of the 

interagency environment

It is increasingly clear that SOF will be employed as critical components of the whole-of-government approach to confronting national 

security threats. Thus SOF warriors will increasingly find themselves 

interacting with representatives of the diverse mix of organizations 

that make up the U.S. Government interagency community. What 

can be done—perhaps beginning with the development of a clear 

concept of what the interagency community is and does—to make 

the U.S. Government interagency environment accessible to SOF, 

particularly at the operational and tactical levels? Identify existing 

protocols for guiding the functioning of the interagency process 

and, where appropriate, suggest new initiatives for achieving greater 

interagency efficiency and effectiveness. What specific steps are necessary to improve SOF understanding of the process?

D8. Removing barriers to interagency information sharing and operational effectiveness

How do we remove the barriers that restrict the exchange of information and inhibit the operational effectiveness of the U.S. Government interagency community as it seeks to achieve strategic national 

security objectives? This study will identify the points of friction and 

incompatibility within the interagency process and suggest ways that 

USSOCOM’s capabilities can be integrated to synchronize desired 

end states, strategy development, and the planning and execution of 

presidential decisions.
21

D. Interagency Operations

D9. Operationalizing the whole-of-government approach to combating terrorists for irregular warfare

Significant improvements have been made in coordination, cooperation, and collaboration across the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) force in support of combating 

terrorist and irregular warfare objectives. However, there remain 

impediments to leveraging the unique capabilities of the various 

actors across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) spectrum to 

ultimately defeat the irregular threat. What specific initiatives are 

necessary to operationalize the whole-of-government approach to 

combating terrorism and conducting irregular warfare? What are 

the root causes of the impediments to real change? Beyond considerations of policy and authority, how do we best position and structure 

the U.S. Government interagency environment to eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic drag, flatten the C2 structure, and enhance the 

effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach?

D10. Eliminating friction points and barriers within the country team

As with the U.S. Government interagency community in Washington, D.C., there are friction points and barriers to cooperation that 

inevitably exist within the country team structures on the ground. 

Identify and examine those friction points and barriers. What 

can be done to eliminate them to improve efficiency and advance 

the achievement of national security objectives? What role can 

USSOCOM play in optimizing country team functioning? Drawing on specific case studies from high threat countries or regions, 

identify what measures have both succeeded and failed and suggest 

specific initiatives for improvement in country team structure, interface, and functioning.

23

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

Topic Titles

E1. Best practices for developing regional expertise

E2. Developing strong relationships with partner nations, IGOs, and 

NGOs

E3. Tailored educational and training preparation for SOF missions

E4. Developing SOF language skills to engage multilingual populations

E5. Understanding different and contradictory international 

perspectives

E6. Preparing SOF for encountering tribal and sectarian traditions

E7. SOF’s role in emerging areas of instability

E8. Recruiting cultural and regional expertise

E9. Professional development paths for regional experts

E10. Determining wider applicability for the Korean Augmentation to the 

U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program

E11. Targeting methodologies, lethal and nonlethal

Topic Descriptions

E1. Best Practices for developing regional expertise

SOF traditionally rely heavily on operating within unfamiliar cultures. How do different SOF components prepare their personnel to 

establish and sustain relationships with indigenous peoples? Identify 

which SOF organizations require a regional orientation and determine specific recommendations for training, education, and force 

generation to develop and sustain necessary expertise for both individuals and organizations. What best practices are available to assist 

in developing the essential regional expertise necessary to conduct 

sustained SOF activities in a wide variety of complex environments? 

This study will survey the education programs conducted by IGOs, 

NGOs, and other international players to discern whether they 

might be helpful in assessing and improving SOF cultural education.
24

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

E2. Developing strong relationships with partner nations, IGOs, and 

NGOs

Frequently we create tension with the host nation, allies, and other 

partners because we compartmentalize or withhold information 

that should be shared. Sharing intelligence, meshing capabilities, 

and providing operational support for shared efforts require SOF to 

coordinate with a variety of organizations beyond the scope of the 

U.S. Government interagency environment. How can the Special 

Operations Community develop stronger partnerships and more 

collaborative relationships with international partners to include 

IGOs and NGOs? Identify the essential cross-cultural communications skills sets and recommend how they can be developed and sustained among the Special Operations Community. Which skills are 

necessary to develop general competencies that transcend diverse 

cultural and regional lines? Which skills are unique to a specific 

situation or mission?

E3. Tailored educational and training preparation for SOF missions

This study will examine the challenges of balancing general cultural awareness with the requirement to develop regional expertise 

targeted on a specific area of interest. Do all SOF warriors need to 

receive the same levels of education and training and to achieve the 

same degrees of competence to be effective? Determine whether 

cultural training should focus on recognizing universal cultural 

attributes or emphasizing specific regions and cultures. What role 

might SOF units play in building upon general cultural awareness 

to provide an additional layer of specialized regional education and 

training? Identify the educational and training experiences that are 

necessary to prepare for specific SOF missions. Discuss how these 

educational and training requirements can be managed within the 

timeframe of a SOF career-development path.

E4. Developing SOF language skills to engage multilingual 

populations

SOF have long recognized the benefits of speaking with indigenous 

forces and local citizenry in their native tongues. Experience teaches 

that there is no more effective way to build a local relationship than 

by leveraging language skills as a bridge to cultural assimilation. 

How do we provide SOF the language capabilities to engage the multilingual citizenry they encounter within the cultures in which they 

operate? This study will explore alternatives for developing language 
25

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

skills and creating incentives for sustaining proficiency. Might the 

payment of incentive pay, patterned after flight and other proficiency 

pay, be a practical motivator? Consider payments based on levels of 

proficiency and assignment to a language-required position. How 

might the availability of increased global immersion opportunities meet the goals of language proficiency without creating career 

friction by keeping an individual away from necessary operational 

assignments?

E5. Understanding different and contradictory international 

perspectives

How can the special operations training and education system best 

enable special operators to understand non-U.S. perspectives and 

to engage effectively even when those perspectives differ from our 

own? This study will go beyond the substantive information that is 

available about a region to discussing ways to immerse SOF within 

the process of developing, sustaining, and modifying perspectives consistent with the cultural principles and assumptions of the 

region. For example, when does an indigenous statement reflect a 

strongly held cultural value rather than merely an effort to test the 

SOF warrior to ascertain cultural awareness? Assess the effectiveness and practicality of engaging foreign military officers and NCOs 

to build long-term relationships and networks within their regions 

of specialization. Should USSOCOM consider the establishment of 

a special operations center for strategic studies (such as the Africa 

Center for Strategic Studies) to ensure persistent engagement with 

the complex workings of culture rather than merely with its general 

expressions?

E6. Preparing SOF for encountering tribal and sectarian traditions

How do we prepare SOF to gain a functional understanding of the 

complex historical and cultural environments regularly encountered 

within the tribal and sectarian traditions of the Middle East, Africa, 

and Asia? Discuss methods employed by operators in the field to 

deal with the diversity they experience with host-nation officials, 

opinion leaders, indigenous populations, and various internal and 

external stakeholders. The presentation of contemporary case studies, country and regional analyses, and regional policy initiatives are 

especially appropriate for this topic. Assess the relevance of existing, 

older studies of specific areas of interest that lack relevance because 

of their reliance on outdated information that does not capture 
26

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

current conditions. Determine at what point we should commission 

fresh studies.

E7. SOF’s role in emerging areas of instability

Where are the emerging areas of instability that will threaten U.S. 

interests within the next 5 to 10 years, and what roles might SOF 

play in addressing those threats? This study will define instability and threat, identify their relevance to emerging U.S. security 

concerns, and isolate those unstable areas that do not necessarily 

pose concerns to the U.S. or its interests in the targeted timeframe. 

Examine factors such as ungoverned spaces and the consequences 

of unexpected destabilizing events such as the earthquake in Haiti. 

Do some areas of instability demand greater attention than others? 

What are the implications of such prioritization for the realignment 

of U.S. Special Forces Groups? Examine whether areas of highest 

instability and threat require the development of subregional alignments in terms of cultural awareness and language preparations.

E8. Recruiting cultural and regional expertise

During World War II the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was able 

to scrub the first and second generation immigrants and others with 

extensive direct experience with culture and language (e.g., missionaries, journalists) to identify potential recruits. For instance, the 

OSS was able to distinguish between native speakers and those with 

school-boy proficiency, a luxury that rarely exists today. In today’s 

environment, which would be the most effective: to recruit individuals from a region with direct knowledge of culture, custom, and 

language and then teach them SOF skills or to select SOF personnel 

from the normal recruiting stream and train them to some agreed 

level of cultural and language awareness? Also consider whether 

such individuals need to be SOF trained or whether it is sufficient to 

employ them as guides to navigate the cultural terrain. What implications would this option have for funding and current authorities? 

Identify the risks and benefits of recruiting from indigenous and 

immigrant populations and suggest ways to mitigate the negative 

and amplify the positive effects. Address what ages and education 

levels should be targeted for indigenous and immigrant recruitment.

E9. Professional development paths for regional experts

There is considerable and understandable concern that the development of skilled and responsive regional expertise presents a risk if 

such specialization creates a career cap on promotion and a limit on 
27

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

assignment opportunities. What can be done to create a professional 

development path that allows the SOF warrior to acquire and utilize region-focused skills for the purpose of serving long-term and 

repetitive assignments without jeopardizing career advancement? 

Examine how the individual Services regard and implement existing regional programs such as the Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) 

Hands Program as a guide to assessing acceptance of additional specialization. Who and how can incentivize participation in such programs, and what quality control measures must be in place to ensure 

they are properly managed?

E10. Determining wider applicability for the Korean Augmentation to 

the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program

Since July 1950, the KATUSA Program has provided opportunities 

for sustained relationship building and cultural interaction within 

the structure of U.S. forces. Would expanding the KATUSA Program to include other countries make a significant contribution to 

increased regional expertise? This study will provide an historical 

overview of the KATUSA Program as well as other historical cases 

where similar initiatives were attempted. Could an Afghan augmentation to the U.S. Army Program (AATUSA) generate sufficient positive effects in the areas of organizational language skills, regional 

expertise, local knowledge, and relationship sustainment. How 

might a pilot program for integrating host-nation soldiers into U.S. 

military units be developed and implemented? Identify the benefits 

and risks of such an innovation. Discuss the personnel management, 

funding, and training issues associated with KATUSA Programs 

transplanted to elsewhere in the world.

E11. Targeting methodologies, lethal and nonlethal

This study is a compilation and summary of multiple targeting 

techniques, tactics, and procedures. It would be used to familiarize 

troops with the processes and procedures as well as the informational needs in conducting targeting. While not a final authoritative 

text, it would be a starting point to inspire the forces to creatively 

pursue targets while ensuring the pertinent points of information 

are covered so that commanding officers can know that all has been 

done in accordance with doctrine and law. 

29

F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

Topic Titles

F1. TSOC modifications to meet mid- and long-term requirements

F2. Security Force Assistance (SFA) synchronization within the interagency environment and regional/country level

F3. Leadership understanding of international complexity

F4. Effectiveness of USSOCOM international engagement programs

F5. Exploitation of technology and information for irregular warfare 

engagement

F6. External assistance for closing SOF capability gaps

F7. Preparing SOF advisors

F8. Transitioning to broader international engagement

F9. Providing legal understanding and legal support for SOF

F10. Effectiveness of programming authority transfers

F11. SOF roles in preparing advisory teams for conventional forces

F12. Identifying best practices within high reliability organizations

F13. Education tools for SOF

F14. SOF characteristics

F15. SOCEUR-NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) relationships

Topic Descriptions

F1. TSOC modifications to meet mid- and long-term requirements

What are the mid- and long-term capability requirements for TSOCs 

and what modifications to TSOC organizational structure, personnel qualifications, and assignment policies may become necessary 

to address those requirements? Examine what training personnel 

should receive prior to TSOC assignment (not just qualifications as 

stated)—for example, regional, strategic/operational planning, interagency, basic SOF knowledge (for non-SOF personnel), and staff procedures. Conclusions should focus on the relationships with other 

TSOCs, USSOCOM, and the geographic combatant commands. 

How might these linkages differ in the future given the trends identified in the Strategic Appreciation USSOCOM? The study will also 
30

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

consider the importance of TSOC relationships with the non-DoD 

U.S. Government interagency environment, private sector, academia, 

and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations as 

sources of best practices to address a full range of management challenges. What will be the relationships between TSOCs and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces, Joint Special Operations 

Task Forces, and Special Operations Task Forces during drawdowns 

of General Purpose Forces and realignments of SOF?

F2. Security Force Assistance (SFA) synchronization within the interagency environment and regional/country level

USSOCOM proponency for SFA involves considerable coordination and collaboration within DoD, the non-DoD U.S. Government 

interagency community, and numerous external players in the process. How does USSOCOM ensure synchronization of SFA mechanisms and processes to include, among other issues, education, 

training, and relationship building within the U.S. Government 

interagency community and beyond? Address the capacity to synchronize regional and country-level planning, SFA plans to connect 

regional efforts to desired strategic effects, and potential venues for 

addressing SFA-related activities that could be employed by all geographic combatant commands and unified combatant commands. 

Operationally, how can SFA integration support all aspects of GCC 

partner-building activities from the tactical through the ministerial 

levels? Discuss how SFA integration would guide the development 

of host-nation capacity across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains in support of GCCs and country teams. What legal 

authorities must be addressed and, if necessary, adjusted to enable 

such SFA integration?

F3. Leadership understanding of international complexity

It is essential that USSOCOM leadership possess sufficient academic 

and cultural awareness to understand and respond to the perspectives and viewpoints of both our coalition partners and our adversaries. What types of academic and cultural knowledge, skills, and 

abilities are needed by USSOCOM leadership to develop and implement a balanced strategy? How can any gaps be addressed to develop 

a comprehensive program of preparation? This study will suggest 

the necessary levels of preparation required and identify the appropriate leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities at ascending levels 
31

F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

of responsibility. At what point along the career-progression path 

should the preparation begin? What role can the commissioning 

sources such as the Service academies and ROTC play in introducing the academic and cultural awareness program? How can necessary education and training be incorporated into the existing PME 

system?

F4. Effectiveness of USSOCOM international engagement education 

programs

This study has a two-fold purpose:

a. Evaluate the effectiveness of existing USSOCOM international 

engagement education programs that are designed to develop 

capabilities within foreign government ministries

b. Present specific recommendations on how to upgrade, expand, 

and support such programs as essential tools for building expertise at the strategic and operational levels to complement the 

training efforts targeted at the tactical level. 

How effective are current educational programs in serving as instruments of USSOCOM international engagement programs? What 

expansions and modifications are necessary to support PME programs that are targeted at the operational and strategic levels within 

foreign militaries and their associated governmental agencies? The 

research should consider a range of options, many if not most of 

which already exist in some form and that can be incorporated into 

a fresh initiative. What are the target audiences for such education? 

Consider the impact of restrictions placed on the transfer of military 

information to partner nations without reimbursement.

F5. Exploitation of technology and information for irregular warfare 

engagement

The rapid advances in technology and its management present a 

variety of challenges for SOF warriors operating on the ground. 

How can technology and the information revolution be exploited 

to enhance the availability of state-of-the art equipment for SOF? 

Discuss how the introduction of new technology can enhance SOF 

responses to security threats such as hybrid conflict. Similarly, 

what can be done to enhance SOF access to timely and accurate 

knowledge databases tailored to the requirements of irregular warfare within environments of persistent conflict? Because responsibility for managing both technology and information resides in 

various agencies, examine how USSOCOM can enhance its U.S. 
32

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

Government interagency community relationships to sustain a high 

level information-sharing capacity. 

F6. External assistance for closing SOF capability gaps

How can USSOCOM draw on the expertise and resources contained 

within U.S. Government agency laboratories, industry, and academia to assist in identifying and addressing gaps in SOF capabilities? Discuss how relationships with those organizations can provide 

SOF operators the information and technology they require in a 

timely manner. Recommend ways to ensure that such organizations 

are aware of and understand the specific SOF needs in the field. How 

can the model of the interagency Special Operations Support Teams 

(SOSTs) be expanded and adapted to establish structures for the 

exchange of requirements and solutions? Examine the legal implications of such relationship building both within and without the U.S. 

Government interagency environment to preclude both real and 

perceived conflicts of interest. How can it be assured that SOF-contracted projects, equipment, and services include operator integration during the development process?

F7. Preparing SOF advisors

Selecting and preparing SOF advisors present several complex challenges, especially when confronting the human terrain issues of our 

own cultural perspectives, biases, and tendencies. What educational 

and training programs are necessary to develop the skill sets to prepare SOF to serve in the complex role of advisor to indigenous populations and institutions? Discuss the development of an evaluation 

program to assess and select those best suited for an advisory role. 

Would the pool of eligible candidates include Rangers? Examine lessons learned from past advisory missions to identify which specific 

skills must be developed within those SOF assigned to contemporary 

and future advisory positions. How should those skills be taught, by 

whom, and where?

F8. Transitioning to broader international engagement

USSOCOM presently focuses as much as 75 percent of its activities within the USCENTCOM area of operations. As new operational requirements dictate shifts in orientation, what steps must 

USSOCOM take to prepare SOF to transition their focus to allow 

for persistent engagement within the other unified combatant commands? Explore how cultural reorientation and language skill development can be accomplished by SOF for their respective regions. 
33

F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

How can SOF balance their shifts in focus while sustaining their 

engagement with General Purpose Forces designated to support 

irregular warfare in various environments? 

F9. Providing legal understanding and legal support for SOF

SOF are involved with apprehending, safeguarding, and transferring terrorist suspects to the custody of other organizations. Consequently, they need to be aware of the basics of U.S. domestic and 

international law to steer clear of needless legal entanglements and 

to avoid running afoul of laws and jeopardizing the success of the 

overall mission. How can USSOCOM provide SOF with a working 

knowledge of the local, tribal, and host-nation laws of the regions 

in which they operate? This study will examine the feasibility of 

developing a legal support structure to provide basic legal education, intervention, and advice in the complexities of law related to 

counterterrorism and other related activities. How do we identify 

and make available subject matter experts on local, tribal, and hostnation law as a way to preempt violations caused by an innocent lack 

of awareness? Similarly, how can expertise in governance, policing, and legal procedures support SOF operations? Examine how 

SOF can develop sufficient practical legal knowledge without being 

weighed down by the complexity of an increasingly legalistic operational environment.

F10. Effectiveness of programming authority transfers

As with any organization, programming and expenditures perform 

as critical enablers for the achievement of operational goals. Recent 

shifts in programming authorities from USSOCOM to the components were intended to maximize the effects of expenditures to 

meet specific mission requirements. How successful has the transfer of programming authority been from USSOCOM to the individual components in enabling the intended technology and TTP 

transitions from SOCs to the TSOCs? Based on that assessment, 

how might the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process 

be adjusted to gain maximum positive effects? Identify the relevant 

measures of effectiveness and suggest what modifications may be 

necessary. How do such initiatives balance the broader USSOCOM 

requirements with the needs of the individual components?

F11. SOF Roles in preparing advisory teams for conventional forces

All the military services have deployed advisory teams in support 

of global contingency missions. Some of these include military 
34

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

transition teams, Air Force advisors, stability transition teams, and 

modular brigades augmented for SFA. Drawing on the long tradition of SOF engagement in FID operations, what role can SOF play 

in the training and preparation of advisory teams from the conventional forces of all the military services who are assuming expanded 

responsibilities for such missions?

F12. Identifying best practices within high reliability organizations

Much can be learned from exploring the structures and TTPs of 

high reliability organizations such as aircraft carriers, hospital emergency rooms and wildfire-fighting teams. What best practices might 

SOF derive from them to improve their own operations? Consider 

shared areas of interest to include redundancies, mindfulness, avoidance of failure, complexity reduction, and cultural and leadership 

development. 

F13. Education tools for SOF

How do we educate SOF warriors in the range of USSOCOM critical documents—that is, USSOCOM Strategy, Strategic Appreciation, 

USSOCOM Pub 1, Systemic Operational Design, and other tools? 

How do we translate these from strategy into operational art? How 

does DOTMLPF apply, and is it even transferable to another culture? 

Since the strategies are designed for the U.S., what is required to 

educate SOF personnel to make the conversion to help other nations 

to develop a national strategy? 

F14. SOF characteristics

SOF has been heavily emphasizing DA, with the possibility/perception that it comes at the expense of other requisite SOF skills. This 

may be an unintended result of, or perpetuate itself in, SOF selection (training) and/or the type of service member drawn to SOF. If 

SOF is emphasizing DA to the detriment of other skills, what are 

those skills (likely they are the same UW/IW/COIN/FID/SA skills 

classically developed and practiced by SOF), how can we best reassert them in SOF, and how can we apply them in current and future 

conflicts (addressing the causes of terrorism/insurgency and not just 

“whacking moles”)? Although this question seems oriented against 

Army SF, how does it apply to Navy SEALs, 6 SOS or other Air Force 

advisors, or other Air Force SOF, MARSOC, etc. (even General Purpose Forces?) as they engage in UW/IW/COIN/FID/SA?
35

F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

F.15 SOCEUR-NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) relationships 

Examine current relationship (formal and informal) and recommend methods to better synchronize/coordinate efforts. How can 

the efforts of each be maximized in the USEUCOM area of responsibility to achieve U.S. and USEUCOM strategic objectives? Will or 

should these relationships (formal/informal) change when NSHQ is 

a separate U.S. command? Will/should it change when the NSHQ is 

FOC and capable of deploying as a NATO SOF HQs? Identify possible friction/flash points and recommend solutions. 

37

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years

Topic Titles

G1. What initiatives are necessary to improve SOF capabilities to understand local, global, and regional terrorist networks?

G2. Operationalizing combating terrorism: Direct and indirect 

approaches 

G3. Countering radicalization: How do we identify and recruit the 

appropriate indigenous persons and leverage them to improve SOF 

understanding and effectiveness at the local level?

G4. How to build capabilities to conduct local, regional, and global 

assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness

G5. How to expand capabilities to identify, locate, target, and disrupt key 

components of terrorist networks

G6. SOF contributions to a new intelligence architecture for 

counterterrorism

G7. Phase 0, SOFt power: Role for SOF in political warfare, coercive 

diplomacy, and active security campaigns

G8. Integrating General Purpose Forces (GPF) and SOF operations in 

irregular warfare

G9. Building an irregular warfare force for the future

G10. Retooling Special Forces for the 21st century counterterrorism effort

G11. What capabilities can and should be developed to provide support to 

the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental counterterrorist network?

G12. Turning the hot war cold: Suggestions for the increased emphasis on 

the indirect lines of operation to combat terrorist networks

G13. Engaging the constructive, credible Muslim Ummah to counter 

violent extremist ideology

G14. Capability to synchronize DoD/DoS networks to counter terrorist 

networks

G15. How can Islamic religious tenets be employed to counter terrorist 

activities and slow the recruitment of new extremists?
38

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

G16. What are the appropriate metrics for DoD to assess irregular warfare operations?

G17. Hearts and minds: Human influence operations in irregular warfare

G18. Refining the indirect approach, irregular warfare strategy and 

operations

G19. Game theory and the warrior diplomat: Understanding competitive 

and cooperative decision making and their applications to interagency interaction

G20. Impact of organizational (agency) cultures on effective interagency 

interaction

G21. Analyze interagency C2, planning, and operational mechanisms 

employed during contingency operations where the interagency 

community leads

G22. What steps can the DoD take to encourage the engagement of the 

whole of government in the counterterrorism effort, thus maximizing best practices while reducing redundancy and costly overlap 

with other U.S. Government agencies, partner and cooperative 

countries, and multinational organizations? 

G23. Interagency community turf battles

G24. Best practices of providing cultural education in preparation for SOF 

operations 

G25. Supporting U.S. southwest border stability in a crisis period: Potential SOF assistance to struggling Mexican security institutions and 

U.S. CONUS defense

G26. Leveraging academic support for special operations 

G27. Strategic culture analysis: Predictive capacity for current and future 

threats

G28. Natural resources battlefield

G29. SOF intellectual capital

G30. Law and legal institutions 

G31. U.S. SOF training of foreign military/security forces “to enhance 

their capacity” in counterterrorism, COIN, and FID is a major strategy of the U.S. and USSOCOM overseas contingency operations, but 

have those efforts generated the desired results? 

G32. Diplomatic agreements to support rapid SOF support for other 

nations
39

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

G33. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

G34. SOF interaction with host-nation Ministry of Interior (MoI) 

resources

G35. Influence and relationship between USSOCOM and the military 

services 

G36. Training systems for USSOCOM and its components 

G37. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)

G38. Use of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) systems

G39. Use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) systems 

G40. Planning for Joint special operations for the indirect approach

G41. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling partners

G42. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations

G43. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement 

agencies (LEAs)

G44. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism?

G45. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: Best practices, future 

requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other U.S. 

agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options

G46. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations 

and organized crime?

G47. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: Case studies and 

theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism

G48. Poverty is a pawn: The myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism and 

how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

G49. Terrorist safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned areas

G50. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of SOF 

in this strategy?

G51. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date

G52. Organizing interagency community for irregular warfare campaigns
40

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

G53. Strategic theories on irregular warfare

G54. Operational art design for irregular warfare-centric campaigns

G55. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations

G56. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare

G57. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare

G58. Conventional/SOF cooperation

G59. Embassy role in U.S. Government irregular warfare effort

G60. Legislative requirements for effective interagency campaigns

G61. Country team approach

G62. Cultural awareness

G63. Are culture, religion, and worldview factors in motivating irregular 

warfare?

G64. Cultural knowledge in irregular warfare campaign planning

G65. Regional studies

G66. How is strategy developed for special operations and what is the 

framework for such development?

G67. Why is Phase 0 important and how can SOF support the geographic 

combatant commander strategy: Informing the joint conventional 

community

G68. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop irregular warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications)

G69. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations

G70. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies

G71. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development

G72. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare: Preparing for joint 

SOF combat command 

G73. Cross area-of-responsibility operations

G74. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the counterterrorism 

effort 

G75. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population
41

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

Topic Descriptions

G1. What initiatives are necessary to improve SOF capabilities to 

understand local, global, and regional terrorist networks? 

For SOF to be successful in defeating and deterring terrorist networks, we must first understand our operational environment, 

whether physical or virtual. To do this, we need the cognitive skill 

sets to provide SOF with local, global, and regional understandings 

of those environments. Historical context is essential for understanding current conditions and to avoid becoming trapped in the 

centuries-old role of under informed westerners confronting radical 

Islamic forces. What is a “network”? How do they find strength in 

their cultural surroundings? What outcomes against terrorist networks are truly possible and acceptable? This study examines current SOF capabilities to learn about and share awareness of terrorist 

network structures, strengths, and vulnerabilities. It then moves forward to propose steps to improve current capabilities while seeking 

initiatives to fill existing gaps.

G2. Operationalizing combating terrorism: Direct and indirect 

approaches 

Experience teaches that fighting and winning within the counterterrorism effort are separate, though complementary, endeavors. Fighting requires direct action to kill or capture terrorists and destroy 

their support networks. However, is reliance on such quick, decisive, 

and measurable missions reflective of a winning strategy? How does 

such a mindset hinder or help win a war when the ultimate effects 

of such operations may not be apparent for months or even years? 

Thus, is the reliance on Direct Action missions to attrit terrorists 

effective beyond force protection or the defense of strategic interests 

within the broader war on terror? Winning must ultimately be about 

indirect actions intended to eliminate the environment that enables 

terrorists to flourish and operate. Winning is also about eliminating 

sanctuaries, an effort inevitably requiring a mix of direct and indirect actions. This study proposes a “right mix” of direct and indirect 

actions to assure the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. What 

is the correct force structure to win and win decisively? What does 

“operationalizing intelligence” mean to collectors, analysts, planners, and operators? How does the process of operationalizing look 

when successfully implemented?
42

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

G3. Countering radicalization: How do we identify and recruit the 

appropriate indigenous persons and leverage them to improve 

SOF understanding and effectiveness at the local level? 

One of the lessons of the counterterrorism effort is that “radical” 

Islamic thought and practice represent a very complex and diverse 

mix of groups and agendas. However, by simply labeling terrorists 

and their networks as “Al Qaeda” or some other shorthand reference 

without a more detailed understanding of their nature runs the risk 

of missing important characteristics that are essential to the successful engagement of these networks. Such generalizations also tend to 

assign credit and prestige to Al Qaeda, even when the group and its 

proxies may have nothing to do with a specific situation. SOF need 

to become far more sophisticated in their understanding of Islam in 

general and in categorization of Islam’s radical elements. This study 

surveys the relevant Islamic groups, their belief structures, and their 

agendas. For example, what are the differences between an Iraqi 

Jaysh al-Mahdi follower who adheres to Wilayat al-Fiqh as a political philosophy and an Iranian who espouses similar beliefs? Once 

the differences are identified and understood, what can be done to 

leverage them to achieve success in the counterterrorism effort? How 

do we counter radicalization by identifying, recruiting, and working with indigenous assets with special emphasis on parents and 

relatives?

G4. How to build capabilities to conduct local, regional, and global 

assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness 

Credible assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness are 

essential to sustained and successful counterterrorism operations. 

This study explores the purpose of such assessments, USSOCOM’s 

authorities to conduct assessments, the assumptions and components that drive the assumption process, and the complex interactions required with other combatant commands and the wider 

interagency community to ensure the most complete assessment 

products. Assessments allow the joint force to determine the effects 

associated with counterterrorist network operations: the impact 

upon the terrorist network, the effect upon the targeted populace 

and other actors, the effect upon other elements within the operational environment, and the requirements for future joint force contributions to counterterrorist network operations. This study also 

includes an overview of planning assumptions to include the understanding of the terrorist network, emerging effects, and the changing 
43

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

conditions within the operational environment to determine the 

accuracy of understanding, effectiveness of operations, and the 

course corrections required for future operations.

G5. How to expand capabilities to identify, locate, target, and disrupt 

key components of terrorist networks 

Central to any counterterrorism effort is the capability to engage 

the full spectrum of a terrorist network and to render the network 

unable or unwilling to continue to function. This study examines 

techniques by which parallel organizations can be established to 

compete with and neutralize components of existing terrorist networks. Engagement of such networks can be either led or enabled 

by the DoD functioning by, with, and through interagency, multinational, and/or nongovernmental partners. Activities may involve 

direct actions focused on specific nodes or links of interest; they may 

also employ indirect methods addressing some aspect of the operating environment and thus rendering ineffective the node or link of 

interest.

G6. SOF contributions to a new intelligence architecture for 

counterterrorism 

In the late summer of 2008, the Defense Science Board (DSB) identified key security issues that, if not addressed, could lead to future 

military failure. One of these was a lack of deep penetration capabilities needed for developing actionable intelligence against individual 

terrorists and terrorist groups. More broadly, the DSB underscored 

the need for a new architecture that no longer focused on mainly 

fixed installations, but on people and activities “hiding in plain 

sight” and collection that would be “close-in, intrusive, and must 

achieve deep penetration.” The DSB pointed to SOF as one of the 

“enduring pockets of innovation, agility, and prudent risk-taking” 

within DoD. Using the DSB findings as a point of departure, this 

study will address specific steps that SOF can take to enhance new 

counterterrorism intelligence collection efforts in appropriate and 

feasible ways. Overview reading: Defense Imperatives for the New 

Administration, Defense Science Board, August 2008.

G7. Phase 0, SOFt power: Role for SOF in political warfare, coercive 

diplomacy, and active security campaigns 

There is a need to assist the DoD and the interagency community 

to understand and integrate Phase 0 operations into the preparation of the environment in support of irregular warfare. This study 
44

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

explores the strategic utility of SOF to achieve U.S. policy objectives in nonwar and preventive-war scenarios. It is relevant to theater and SOF strategists, campaign planners, the irregular warfare 

community, and the interagency community. The discussion should 

include the achievement of strategic effects in periods of political warfare (e.g., secret warfare, ideological warfare, and flexible 

deterrent options)—also known as “Grey” SOF—during coercive 

diplomacy and as part of COCOM persistent and adaptive Phase 

0 theater campaigns. The research should explore the ways and 

means SOF achieves high levels of strategic performance in pursuit of national political goals; identify the optimal cooperation and 

team arrangements among SOF, DoD, and the wider U.S. Government interagency environment to achieve both military and political 

objectives; identify the best war-prevention measures SOF can perform; and recommend any necessary changes to the current security 

assistance environment to develop strategically sound, long-term, 

adaptable campaign lines of operation.

G8. Integrating General Purpose Forces (GPF) and SOF operations in 

irregular warfare 

The integration of GPF and SOF operations in irregular warfare 

environments raises many familiar questions. This study identifies 

the most persistent of these and proposes answers that seek to formalize the relationship between the complementary efforts. What 

lines of authority delineate SOF and GPF-controlled portions of 

an area of operation? When is one component the supported and 

the other the supporting within a specific operation? What are the 

mechanisms for the deconfliction of GPF and SOF rules of engagement? What are the mechanisms for ensuring the resolution of other 

interoperability issues that may arise? How does SOF gain equitable 

access to GPF-controlled sustainment and mission enablers such as 

transportation, communication, intelligence resources, and UAV 

support?

G9. Building an irregular warfare force for the future 

Emerging thought contends that SOF may not be adequately prepared to interact with indigenous populations in the variety of 

operational environments in which the irregular warfare counterterrorism effort will be fought and won. Do such shortcomings 

exist? If so, how can SOF better prepare itself for its global missions 

by addressing these shortcomings through employment of proxies, 
45

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

irregulars, or surrogates? Propose procedures to identify those with 

particular aptitudes for cultural awareness, intercultural communication, and language proficiency. What indicators in secondary 

school curricula can assist in alerting recruiters to individuals with 

appropriate skill sets? Increasing numbers of school systems offer 

and sometimes require Spanish language proficiency. Are similar 

mandates available for Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Russian, and so on? 

What is cultural awareness? How should proficiency levels in cultural awareness be introduced and managed? Should training be 

focused on individual soldiers, units, or force-wide capabilities? How 

should cultural awareness training be tailored for different Military 

Occupational Specialties (MOSs), duty positions, and grades? Is cultural awareness sufficient for SOF to meet mission requirements? 

Should standards for specific cross-cultural capabilities be introduced to expand individual and unit SOF proficiencies across multiple geographical areas? 

G10. Retooling Special Forces for the 21st century counterterrorism 

effort 

This research topic focuses on U.S. Army Special Forces and potential changes in how they operate to address the counterterrorism 

effort and related threats. How practical is it to have U.S. Army Special Forces prepare themselves primarily for unconventional warfare and FID missions while retaining the capabilities for support 

of remaining core SOF missions? With a narrower lane to travel, 

how can the training of language and cultural skills be upgraded 

to address the specific requirements of unconventional warfare and 

FID? What initiatives are available to establish and sustain stronger and more credible relationships with host-nation personnel? Is 

there utility in forward deploying Special Forces units to draw on 

improved infrastructures and opportunities for immersion in local 

and regional cultures? Consider historical examples and outline 

potential benefits and drawbacks to these approaches. Shifting to 

the future, how might such initiatives better prepare Special Forces 

units to identify, understand, prepare for, and confront emerging 

threats? Conduct assessments of the ODAs, ODBs, and Groups with 

an eye toward suggesting changes in their structures and skill sets. 

Is a 12-man ODA too large, too small or just right? Are its skill sets 

in need of a fresh assessment? Might the communication sergeant 

become the “Computer Surveillance/Attack Sergeant”? Is the Special 

Forces education and training system outdated? Are we getting the 
46

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

maximum benefit from the “brainpower” of ODA members? What 

specific steps are necessary to field the most efficient and effective 

Special Forces capability for the future?

G11. What capabilities can and should be developed to provide support to the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental 

counterterrorist network? 

Joint Forces possess a variety of direct and indirect services, products, and resources to enable counterterrorist network disruption 

operations as well as programs to encourage local development, 

governance, and security. This study identifies possible Joint Force 

contributions that are both appropriate and acceptable to partners 

in the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental counterterrorist network. The resulting program may include training, security 

assistance, education, command and control, logistics, ISR, funding, 

support to civil authority, information operations, and direct action 

missions.

G12. Turning the hot war cold: Suggestions for the increased emphasis 

on the indirect lines of operation to combat terrorist networks 

It is commonly accepted that indirect action and lines of operation

are central to the efforts to defeat terrorists and their networks. Even 

so, it would appear that direct action missions are the preferred 

choice. This study surveys historical examples, lessons learned, and 

best practices to provide a comprehensive overview of the strategic, long-term nature of the indirect process. Examples such as the 

Marshall Plan and case studies from the Cold War serve as support for indirect thinking. What do SOF operators and leaders need 

to relearn about indirect planning and operations? Suggestions to 

improve the quality of indirect efforts should focus on preparing the 

irregular-warfare operational environment through the use of information operations, population influence, strategic communication, 

and civil-military operations.

G13. Engaging the constructive, credible Muslim Ummah to counter 

violent extremist ideology 

This topic continues to be one of growing interest among members of the Intelligence community who are seeking strategies for 

countering radicalization or changing the attitudes of those who 

are already extremists. Focusing primarily on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 

Yemen, Algeria, Pakistan, and Europe, what can the U.S. Government do to reduce information barriers among 10–40 year-old 
47

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

Muslims? Which U.S. policies should be either increased or reduced 

to enhance positive engagement of the constructive Muslim Ummah 

organization? Also, how does the U.S. support or encourage credible 

Muslim voices without discrediting them through our endorsement 

or support? Identify avenues and methodologies to positively engage 

the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology. Further, look to other nations such as India (home to more 

Muslims than Pakistan), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali as venues for similar initiatives. For instance, 

are the techniques that are appropriate in Egypt also appropriate in 

Indonesia or elsewhere?

G14. Capability to synchronize DoD/DoS networks to counter terrorist 

networks 

The complexities of terrorist networks require the establishment and 

synchronization of counterterrorism networks that field the necessary capabilities from the DoD, DoS, and throughout the wider U.S. 

Government interagency community. Such arrangements remain 

elusive as stovepipe relationships and legislation prohibiting collaboration among various agencies limit network functioning. This study 

looks at how terrorist groups form their social networks and in what 

areas of interest they operate. As we consider the emerging concept 

of “communities of interest” built around social networking, is network the best way to conceptualize both terrorist and counterterrorist structures? What specific steps are necessary to synchronize 

DoD/DoS counterterrorist structures so they more efficiently bridge 

organizational boundaries? How do we construct counterterrorist 

structures that mirror those of our adversaries? How do we ensure 

that the emerging counterterrorism structures reach down to the 

operational level and are not blocked by the temptation to over-classify the flow of essential information?

G15. How can Islamic religious tenets be employed to counter terrorist activities and slow the recruitment of new extremists? 

Islamic extremists justify their behavior by invoking religious principles and elements of faith. This study turns the tables by challenging these claims and suggesting alternative Islamic interpretations 

that discredit terrorist behavior. Survey re-education programs 

such as in Singapore and other countries that use religious teachers to meet with captured extremists or terrorists to challenge their 

interpretation of Islamic teachings, discredit their justifications 
48

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

for violent conduct, and reframe Islamic teachings as condemning violent acts rather than endorsing them. Instead of relying on 

imprecise terminology and labels, what Islamic words and verses 

exist that reject the violence committed and “justified” by religion? 

For instance, the often-used terms such as jihadist and mujahedeen

are, in fact, positive terms that bolster the prestige and morale of the 

Islamic extremist. What Islamic words convey negative judgment 

on a terrorist or evil doer? How can we carefully use Islamic beliefs 

against the extremists? What is the true meaning of fatwas and their 

role in Islamic culture? Propose approaches that originate with credible Islamic voices, not with non-Islamic, noncleric, nonreligious 

scholars. What primary source secular materials exist that highlight 

the hypocrisy and internal contradictions contained in the writings 

and actions of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Pointing out 

that such groups are opportunistic as much as they are ideological 

or religious can serve as an effective way to undermine their propaganda and presumed righteousness. 

G16. What are the appropriate metrics for DoD to assess irregular 

warfare operations? 

The measurement of success in irregular warfare operations is 

extremely difficult because of the absence of “cookie-cutter” solutions to address any given situation and the need to develop specific 

metrics on a case-by-case basis. This study tackles the challenge 

of determining how irregular warfare operations can be viewed as 

effects-based when existing measurements of success are so rudimentary. Active engagement with academia and the application of 

assessment and analysis tools already used by social scientists can 

greatly assist in irregular warfare evaluation efforts. Contrast the 

need for an “inside out” assessment model that considers people, 

adversaries, and environmental perspectives with the traditional 

U.S. “outside in” approach. How do we arrive at data baselines 

against which to measure effectiveness? How do we measure the 

impact of irregular warfare activities (beyond killing the terrorists) 

in achieving geographic combatant command, DoD, and national 

strategic goals? What is the measurement of effect(s) for FID in 

terms of partner preparedness vs. SOF relationship building? What 

are the lines of operation for other SOF activities, and how can those 

measurements be captured? How do we define success, and how do 

we measure it? How do we measure good enough? How do we assess 

when no action is better than action that, though successful, may 
49

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

result in huge strategic costs? What are the time horizons across 

which we should measure?

G17. Hearts and minds: Human influence operations in irregular 

warfare 

At the core of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and the indirect 

approach lies the concept of hearts and minds. SOF is deeply engaged 

in both counterinsurgency (COIN) and the indirect approach; therefore, the winning of the hearts and minds of indigenous peoples 

is central to their missions. Despite the significance of hearts and 

minds to SOF, the concept is often treated as a buzzword—a phrase 

that is taken at face value with little analysis, historical grounding, 

or precise understanding of what it entails. Its application also differs in recent history and in different theaters. This study looks at the 

concept of hearts and minds from a fresh perspective with the goal 

of deepening understanding of the concept and its relevance to the 

struggle against terrorism. Is winning the compliance and cooperation of the population a more relevant understanding of the task? 

After all, populations need to see good reasons to support government efforts, though not necessarily to like their government. Has 

the emphasis on kinetic operations produced negative consequences 

for hearts-and-minds efforts because of friendly fire/collateral 

damage incidents or because SOF are seen as supporting an unpopular government? How do we address religion (hearts and souls) as a 

component of the hearts-and-minds challenge? This research should 

capture the techniques and best practices as we know them from 

irregular warfare experiences. Are we changing minds/opinions, or 

are we simply seeking common ground where interests match? What 

steps do we need to take to at least keep the population neutral? Are 

hearts-and-minds efforts a method or line of operation rather than 

an objective? 

G18. Refining the indirect approach, irregular warfare strategy and 

operations 

The proper coordination and application of effort in the areas of 

governance, development, security, economics, and social structures 

can result in the unbalancing of our adversaries and/or the alteration of environmental conditions. Such indirect approaches normally require a long-term commitment and challenge the patience 

of politicians and publics. Based on lessons learned, this study 

reviews the essential issues of indirect action with an idea of refining 
50

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

the paradigm to account for inevitable long-duration involvement. 

Attention must be paid to the various leverage points so as to gain 

maximum effect. These include goals/desired end states, levels of 

operational risk, access of U.S. forces and resources, U.S. “anti-bodies,” preconflict vs. conflict roles, security vs. nonsecurity threats, 

regional players (e.g., EU, AU, ASEAN, OAS), and independent players (e.g., UN, ICRC, business/industry). What are the indirect action 

lessons learned? How do we prioritize various indirect approaches? 

How do we prepare domestic, partner, and host-nation publics to 

understand and accept the long-term nature of indirect action? The 

study recognizes the theoretical influence of rhetorical studies and 

strategic communication theory such as inoculation theory, cultivation theory, and the two-step communication process.

G19. Game theory and the warrior diplomat: Understanding competitive and cooperative decision making and their applications to 

interagency interaction 

When conducting interagency collaboration or negotiations, most 

participants are trained to approach the bargaining table as if they 

are engaged in a zero-sum game—that is, if another agency wins, 

my agency loses. This approach reflects classic competitive decision 

making. How can the introduction of game theory shift the negotiation paradigm from competitive to cooperative decision making? 

Drawing on the assumption that it is in the best interests of each 

participant to cooperate with the others, what techniques are available to teach that all participants benefit from cooperative decision 

making models? How might game theory assist in developing lasting 

interagency decision models that can also be further applied to stateto-state negotiations?

G20. Impact of organizational (agency) cultures on effective interagency interaction 

Understanding different organizational cultures is essential in 

seeking to reconcile different approaches for dealing with interagency issues. The goal is to achieve a unity of action by identifying 

complementary approaches in framing and addressing a specific 

challenge. Unique organizational cultures determine such things 

as decision-making models, communication styles, goal expectations, operational structures, and resource flows. This study explores 

these dimensions within the DoD, DoS, and other key participants 

in the interagency process. How do these differences affect both 
51

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

positive and negative interagency interaction? How might best practices in different agencies be documented and adapted throughout 

the interagency community? Part of the design of the interagency 

community, especially the respective Intelligence nodes within the 

Intelligence community, was to foster competition. The organizational culture within the DoS is very different from that within the 

DoD or CIA, leading in part to differing Intelligence estimates. This 

competition was intended to ensure that decision makers had different opinions to weigh against one another. Does the creation of the 

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) run the risk of undermining 

this competition in favor of consensus assessments? What procedures can be developed to ensure that decision makers in all functional areas have different opinions to weigh against one another? 

G21. Analyze interagency C2, planning, and operational mechanisms 

employed during contingency operations where the interagency 

community leads 

The interagency community has successfully led contingency-based 

operations, many with irregular warfare parameters. Around the 

globe, the interagency community leads on a daily basis the U.S. 

Government efforts in combating terrorism, counter-finance, counter-criminal business enterprise, counter-drug, and other security 

missions. During the secret war in Laos (Vietnam War era), the 

covert and paramilitary efforts of the U.S. Government, in conjunction with SOF, were led by the U.S. ambassador and his country team with operational control over both U.S. military and civil 

assets. Successful COIN cases exist where DoS-led efforts, enabled 

by U.S. SOF and other military forces, advanced U.S. interests and 

achieved strategic political objectives (e.g., El Salvador, Operation 

Enduring Freedom, Philippines, and security assistance to Greece 

after World War II). Efforts to win the drug war and assist Plan 

Columbia are interagency community-led, specifically by the U.S. 

ambassador and his military group (MILGRP). However, important differences in approach persist. This study analyzes the various 

methods that different agencies employ. For example, the military 

uses a very structured planning process (MDMP), but the DoS utilize a different method. How does each department’s planning processes differ, and what we can do to fill the gaps resulting from these 

differences? Should we plan on using similar processes, and if not, 

how do we bridge gaps that might result? Study and analyze interagency community-led contingency-size task force operations to 
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identify and synthesize best practices in strategic and operational 

planning, C2, and implementation. Identify the vital role SOF can 

play in these indirect applications of military power. Identify best 

uses of GPF to facilitate these operations. Recommend a 21st century task organization for the country team. This would include the 

MILGRP, which would optimize contingency operations when led 

by the interagency community. What are the risks? What challenges 

and strategic opportunities will dictate the use of interagency task 

forces? Consider the use of an interagency task force to accomplish 

soft-power campaigns over extended periods. What are the implications of having non-DoD departments (e.g., DoS/DoJ/DoE) in 

charge of DoD elements? Is the DoD prepared to place DoD assets 

under the control of OGA commanders?

G22. What steps can the DoD take to encourage the engagement of 

the whole of government in the counterterrorism effort, thus 

maximizing best practices while reducing redundancy and costly 

overlap with other U.S. Government agencies, partner and cooperative countries, and multinational organizations? 

The skill sets and resources necessary for the successful prosecution of the counterterrorism effort reside throughout the U.S. Government. One of the weaknesses of the interagency process is the 

absence of a clear mandate for who is authorized to contribute to 

the requirements generated by the counterterrorism effort. What 

specific steps are necessary to identify and engage the full range of 

U.S. Government capabilities? One of the recurring problems is that 

of information sharing. What can be done within the interagency 

community to break down stovepipes and flatten the dynamic process of information exchange? How can DoD improve its capabilities to share information with the U.S. Government interagency 

community, partner and cooperative countries, and multinational 

organizations?

G23. Interagency community turf battles 

As experiences in Afghanistan and elsewhere have taught, the military frequently finds itself in the position of performing tasks normally performed by DoS or other U.S. Government agencies because 

the magnitude of the work precluded those normally responsible 

from doing it. This reality raises important political/social theory 

questions about the tension among organizations that have been 

given formal mandates/charters to perform while resources have 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

been given to another organization, and capabilities perhaps reside 

with yet a third. What examples of both success and failure exist 

in such complex situations? How can objective after-action reports 

prepared by external reviewers (and not intended merely to assess 

blame) assist in identifying best practices in interagency relationships? What are the underlying obstacles to creating a synchronized 

interagency process to execute the counterterrorism effort and 

other theater missions and objectives? How can we convince others 

within the U.S. Government to muster resources towards a common 

goal when no individual and independent agency is subordinate to 

another? How do interagency players overcome the restrictions of 

their legal responsibilities, capabilities, and capacities and yet provide the fullest support to a whole-of-government effort? Do we need 

an interagency commission with representatives from the DoS, DoD, 

DNI, DoJ, and other agencies to run the counterterrorism effort? 

Does such management-by-consensus stifle real leadership? Examine various options or approaches, taking into account the human 

factors involved, with recommendations of how to better run the 

whole-of-government machinery without creating another cumbersome layer of bureaucracy. How do we manage/resolve conflicting 

agency missions to achieve true interagency solutions? How do we 

develop practical nonhierarchal C-2 structures to enable SOF, GPF, 

and other government agencies to work together on the battlefield?

G24. Best practices of providing cultural education in preparation for 

SOF operations 

SOF traditionally place a heavy reliance on operating within unfamiliar cultures. Cultural awareness and language proficiency are the 

building blocks of cultural education. How do different SOF components prepare their personnel to conduct operations with indigenous populations? Do specific education methods work better for 

certain missions? How does language proficiency assist with cultural 

education? Which elements of culture are essential to prepare SOF 

for down-range experiences? Do NGOs, international governmental organizations, and other international players conduct education programs that may be helpful in assessing and improving SOF 

cultural education? How might cultural immersion programs assist 

SOF preparations? Identify standards for determining how much 

education is sufficient in a given situation.
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G25. Supporting U.S. southwest border stability in a crisis period: 

Potential SOF assistance to struggling Mexican security institutions and U.S. CONUS defense 

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recent articulation of 

the U.S. Joint Operational Environment (JOE) highlights a real 

potential for Mexico becoming a failed state. Sustained pressures 

from organized crime- and gang-fed violence increasingly point to 

weakening Mexican military and security institutions, while at the 

same time entrenched government corruption undermines the most 

serious reform efforts. JFCOM—in a judgment that may have been 

characterized as excessive just a few years ago—highlights Mexico’s 

weakening institutions as a threat to Western Hemispheric security 

generally, and especially as a U.S. Homeland Security problem of 

“immense proportions.” Visible increases in Mexican cross-border 

violence immediately following the JFCOM report’s release were 

underscored by Phoenix, Arizona being named the top U.S. kidnapping center and the second highest in the world as a consequence of 

Mexican gang and paramilitary violence. Individual U.S. states, in 

response, have begun to formulate their own plans for border crisis. 

The possibility of a sudden catastrophic collapse with ensuing mass 

border crossings, humanitarian crises all point to the broadest U.S. 

support requirements being implemented, and anticipatory planning 

or actions undertaken ahead of time. The U.S. State Department’s FY 

2009 Strategic Mission Plan: U.S. Mission to Mexico has declared four 

major policy goals. These potentially benefit from the direct or indirect support of U.S. SOF to appropriate Mexican institutions and to 

CONUS military, law enforcement, and interagency organizations: 

enhancing common border security, increasing security of a shared 

North American homeland, strengthening Mexican law enforcement and judicial capabilities, and helping Mexico consolidate 

and strengthen its governmental institutions and the rule of law. 

Research under this topic examines the ways in which U.S. special 

operations components—and especially the roles of U.S. NORTHCOM and the interagency community—can effectively support such 

U.S. policy goals in today’s operational environment that blurs distinctions between U.S. and Mexican requirements.

G26. Leveraging academic support for special operations 

The SOF community, in the form of Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS), was an innovator in the recruiting and use of academic specialists—for example, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

and linguists—to advance irregular warfare initiatives. Support in 

the early days was typically enthusiastic. While productive relationships have continued to some extent, recent years have seen 

far less enthusiasm in academia for defense and security interaction. Sometimes the response is outright rejection and hostility. In 

a 2008 effort to reinvigorate what decades earlier had been productive relationships, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates oversaw 

the development of what was called the Minerva Consortia. This 

initiative included academic outreach and a number of programs 

that included the creation and deployment of Human Terrain Teams 

(HTTs), document exploitation for key areas of interest to both 

scholars and military planners, religious and ideological studies, and 

other applications of history, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology expertise residing in U.S. universities. Some of these 

programs, however, particularly the HTTs under U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) management, have proven 

controversial in academia and in reviews of implementation and 

effectiveness. While SOF has its own priorities and approaches, concepts for leveraging academic support for special operations should 

be considered in light of such controversies and problem areas. This 

study addresses how SOF can most productively use expertise found 

in U.S. universities and academic research centers to advance SOF 

knowledge, skills, initiatives, and operations. It will consider concepts, approaches, specific activities and programs, and the overall nature, appropriateness, and potential of academic/university 

relationships. 

Overview readings are Speech to the Association of American 

Universities (Washington, D.C.) as delivered by Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., 14 April 2008 and Robin 

Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (Yale 

University Press, 1996).

G27. Strategic culture analysis: Predictive capacity for current and 

future threats 

Many feel that strategic culture analysis holds significant promise for 

interpreting and understanding how different states approach matters of war, peace, strategy, and the use of military force. Strategic 

culture analysis emerged from Cold War requirements to understand and possibly predict Soviet nuclear behavior. Strategic culture 

fell out of favor as a concept after the fall of the Soviet Union. More 

sophisticated than its Cold War construct, strategic culture now 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

explores belief systems, values, climate, resources, geography, classical text, defense concepts, military doctrine, economic resources, 

and a country’s technological base. Given their structures and purposes, are Al Qaeda and other transnational, nonstate terrorist, and 

criminal groups appropriate candidates for strategic cultural analysis? Consider state-like attributes such as military forces, an international economic base, a sophisticated communication network, 

a system of social services, and clearly articulated international 

security objectives. Can strategic culture analysis of transnational, 

nonstate actors identify strategic personalities, define strategic perspectives, and ultimately predict strategic behavior? Is strategic culture analysis a viable tool for understanding current and predicting 

future terrorist threats?

G28. Natural resources battlefield 

Competition for natural resources such as oil, water, food, and wood 

has led to conflict throughout history. Research is necessary to identify contemporary vulnerabilities, security measures, and the location of any seams. Second-order effects on population, land use, 

and economic activity are also of immediate concern. More specifically, the study identifies potential natural resource battlefields and 

their roles in future acts of terrorism and wider aspects of irregular 

warfare. Examples include oil and natural gas reserves sited amidst 

Iran, Russia, and China. What are the implications of U.S. petroleum security commitments to the Gulf states? Discuss the use of oil 

(controlling supply/artificial price manipulation) by oil-producing 

nations to blackmail/damage western economic systems. Analyze 

historical trends from the creation of the OPEC cartel to the present to deter-mine if there is precedent to attempt long-term damage 

through cartel policies. What roles might SOF play in such security 

scenarios? Examine the current structure of indigenous internal 

security and military forces as they relate to petroleum infrastructure security (oil refineries, wells, pipelines, and offshore facilities). 

What are some emerging security threats to natural resources? 

What integrated security operational concepts will be required? 

How would those concepts integrate local MoD, MoI, and commercial resources into a comprehensive security infrastructure for 

petroleum and other natural resources? How can SOF integrate with 

local Special Security Forces (SSF), typically under the direction of 

the MoI? How do proposed security concepts enhance coordination 

among MoIs, MoDs and SOF?
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G29. SOF intellectual capital 

Develop a framework for selection and assessment for the next generation of SOF leaders based on understanding of the strategic level 

of security policy. Discuss how to build a requisite academic body of 

knowledge to support this framework and explain how it might be 

integrated into the existing military education system as pertains to 

SOF leaders.

G30. Law and legal institutions 

Analyze perspectives from senior lawyers coming out of Iraq and 

Afghanistan on developing rule of law and legal institutions. Discuss 

obstacles to this development, akin to a lessons-learned analysis. 

Collect and examine viewpoints of Staff Judge Advocate personnel 

who have served on Joint Special Operations Task Forces, capturing 

unique issues in providing legal and rules of engagement advice to 

SOF.

G31. U.S. SOF training of foreign military/security forces “to enhance 

their capacity” in counterterrorism, COIN, and FID is a major 

strategy of the U.S. and USSOCOM overseas contingency operations, but have those efforts generated the desired results? 

For more than 50 years, SOF has taken the lead role in DoD for 

training indigenous forces in counterterrorism, FID and COIN 

skills. Because of the capacity-building requirements of the effort, 

this strategy has become a major component of DoD’s efforts in 

North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin 

America. After all these years, is there sufficient evidence that the 

U.S. commitment of personnel and material resources been successful in developing the intended capacity in local security forces? 

Furthermore, does the development of capacity even matter if the 

host-nation government is not willing to employ those forces as we 

intended, or at all? This study looks at the track record of SOF training and answers the question, “How do we know if it is working?” 

What are specific cases of both success and failure? Why do the outcomes vary? Is the mission truly to “build capacity,” or is it merely to 

establish a sustained presence on the ground? SOF has operated in 

places like the Philippines and Colombia for many decades. Should 

we keep doing it, or should we dramatically change how we do it? 

What are the standards for success? What steps should be in place to 

increase the likelihood of success? To what level and extent should 
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host-nation forces be trained and what technologies/resources 

should the U.S. provide them? 

G32. Diplomatic agreements to support rapid SOF support for other 

nations 

U.S. SOF possess training, equipment, and mobility capabilities that 

far surpass those of many nations’ police and military forces. In the 

event of a crisis, particularly those involving U.S. persons and interests, the employment of U.S. SOF could be the most effective and 

credible response. Recent and ongoing concerns over weapons of 

mass destruction, piracy, and transnational terrorists are relevant 

examples. However, most sovereign governments are adverse to the 

employment of another nation’s military forces within their state 

boundaries. Despite many cases of extensive training and coordination between U.S. and host-nation militaries, the host-nation government still may not be well informed about the shortcomings of 

their own forces, the capabilities of U.S. SOF, and the capabilities of 

U.S. SOF to respond to an immediate threat. Should the U.S. establish diplomatic agreements with other countries prior to a crisis to 

formalize U.S. response options and streamline diplomatic decisions 

in the event of a time-sensitive crisis? Understanding that decisions 

in crisis situations are of a political nature, who should participate in 

the discussions leading to such agreements? What provisions should 

such agreements contain? To what extent should such agreements 

commit the U.S. to supporting a particular government against 

internal threats? What can be done to minimize friction between 

the ambassador/country team and the SOF deployed to the area? 

What provisions with the host nation are necessary for testing the 

response system?

G33. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

This study examines the nature of SFA missions within the context 

of complementary operations and multiple participants. How do we 

determine if a SFA mission set is a SOF or General Purpose Force 

requirement? How do we clearly define SFA? How can USSOCOM 

best organize itself to accomplish the mission of SFA proponency? 

How can the U.S. Government seamlessly integrate DoS, DoD, and 

other members of the interagency community into SFA programs? 

How can IGOs and NGOs make contributions consistent with their 

capabilities and agendas? What needs to be done to gain IGO and 

NGO investment in the process? Examine the issues, similarities, 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

and differences among SFA, Security Assistance, and FID missions. What makes them similar? What makes them different? Are 

those differences merely semantic? FID is supposed to be a noncombat operation. When threat conditions introduce the need for 

combat, FID is more rightly categorized as COIN or support to 

COIN. Should SFA be categorized as combat or noncombat? Could 

it be both? If SFA is a noncombat activity, what approaches become 

appropriate in combat?

G34. SOF interaction with host-nation Ministry of Interior (MoI) 

resources 

In the Middle East and other regions, MoIs normally have internal security forces that resemble special operations organizations 

in their structure and functions. They may be called Special Security Forces or Paramilitary Forces, but they operate as an arm of the 

police. Frequently they are larger than the special operations components of the host-nation military assisted by U.S. SOF. This study 

examines the structure and functioning of such organizations. How 

are they used to protect the ruling government and provide stability 

both within the country and the region? How can U.S. SOF interface 

with these units to improve internal security conditions and build 

counterterrorism capacity? If necessary, how can SOF counterbalance these MoI units within the internal security context?

G35. Influence and relationship between USSOCOM and the military 

services 

The USSOCOM commander is tasked with conducting SOF core 

activities across a spectrum of missions. To do so, USSOCOM relies 

on the military services for the recruitment, training, development, 

retention, and assignment of SOF personnel. This relationship is central to USSOCOM’s abilities to accomplish the assigned missions. 

This study surveys the current relationships and influences between 

USSOCOM and the military services, with particular emphasis on 

issues concerning SOF personnel. Determine whether and where 

there are gaps in these relationships. What can be done to close these 

gaps? What influence does the USSOCOM commander require over 

military service management of SOF personnel, their incentives 

and retention, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) development, 

assignments, and promotion/career management opportunities 

to effectively accomplish the USSOCOM mission? What steps can 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

be taken to improve the required coordination and cooperation 

between USSOCOM and the military services?

G36. Training systems for USSOCOM and its components 

The rapid procurement and fielding of new equipment and evolving 

technologies present a variety of training challenges. At the same 

time, the standardized training of common tasks remains a familiar 

requirement. This study takes a comprehensive look at ways to provide timely and effective training on new equipment and other systems as fresh initiatives come on line and become forward deployed. 

Who is responsible for developing training programs and ensuring 

that they remain current and relevant? Identify the best ways to train 

the end users in such fast-moving environments. Which media are 

most effective in providing that training? How useful is a simulation 

system that is networked for all receiving components and organizations to access and/or download, especially when deployed? What 

roles can Web-based applications play? Survey ongoing and future 

innovations to address training program development, delivery, 

assessment, and sustainability. Are the Joint Training System (JTS) 

and the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) 

useful tools to users in the field? Is feeding the system more resource 

intensive than originally envisioned? If it needs improvement, how 

can we make it better? Consider also efficiencies to be gained for 

current training approaches. For instance, resources, throughput 

capacity, and practicality have driven USSOCOM components to 

establish multiple training venues for the same skill set (e.g., military fee-fall, combat dive, and snipers). What is the best process for 

USSOCOM to establish a baseline SOF standard for a particular 

skill set? How should those baselines be evaluated and sustained at 

required proficiency levels? What potential advantages accrue to the 

establishment of a SOF Training Center of Excellence (SOFTCOE) 

for the standardization and consolidation of SOF common skills 

training? Might a USSOCOM “Training and Education Command” 

represent a more comprehensive approach to training, standardization, and innovation? Review the Joint Special Operations Task 

Force (JSOTF) mission set and make a recommendation on the best 

training a unit can do to prepare for the JSOTF mission. Should 

USSOCOM certify units for the JSOTF mission? If so, what are the 

standards and procedures for awarding such a certification?
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

G37. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) 

UASs have provided enhanced capabilities to address a variety of 

operational requirements. The purpose of this study is to explore 

the utility of employing UAS assets to support irregular warfare 

operations. How can multimission UASs assist in nontraditional 

environments? What specific capabilities can UASs bring to irregular warfare activities? Which irregular warfare strategies and tasks 

are appropriate for UASs? Identify specific employment profiles for 

using UASs in irregular warfare situations. Consider such missions 

as humanitarian relief operations, civil affairs, disaster response and 

the resulting hybrid threats they may impose on COIN and irregular 

warfare operations. 

G38. Use of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) systems

Unmanned Ground Systems (UGVs) have provided enhanced capabilities to address a variety of operational requirements. The purpose 

of this study is to explore the utility of employing UGV assets to 

support irregular warfare operations. How can UGVs assist in nontraditional environments? What specific capabilities can UGVs bring 

to irregular warfare activities? Which irregular warfare strategies 

and tasks are appropriate for UGVs? Identify specific employment 

profiles for using UGVs in irregular warfare situations. Consider 

such missions as humanitarian relief operations, civil affairs, disaster response, and the resulting hybrid threats they may impose on 

COIN and irregular warfare operations.

G39. Use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and Unmanned 

Surface Vehicle (USV) systems 

Maritime unmanned systems have provided enhanced capabilities 

to address a variety of operational requirements. The purpose of this 

study is to explore the utility of employing UUV and USV assets to 

support irregular warfare operations. How can UUV/USVs assist in 

nontraditional environments? What specific capabilities can UUV/

USVs bring to irregular warfare activities? Which irregular warfare 

strategies and tasks are appropriate for UUV/USVs? Identify specific 

employment profiles for using UUV/USVs in irregular warfare situations. Consider such missions as humanitarian relief operations, 

civil affairs, disaster response, and the resulting hybrid threats they 

may impose on COIN and irregular warfare operations.
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G40. Planning for joint special operations for the indirect approach 

This study focuses on planning approaches for JSOTF strategic and 

operational missions in current and future environments. It would 

particularly focus on SOF core activities that typically involve indirect approaches to achieving strategic objectives, such as unconventional warfare, SFA, and FID. The study should identify classic 

campaign planning constructs and investigate how SOF joint headquarters (TSOC, JSOTF) conduct campaign planning in the current 

environment. Consideration should include planning for future SOF 

organizations such as expeditionary task forces that incorporate service combat multipliers as inherent parts of the force. Conclusions 

and recommendations should be provided that confirm or advance 

changes to SOF planning procedures.

G41. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy: Enabling partners 

Our partners and allies do not view the counterterrorism effort as 

a global problem and often have a problem with preemptive strategies. Counterterrorism is often viewed from the perspective of the 

host nation and its relations with its bordering states. Gather, analyze, and consolidate best practices in combating-terrorism strategy 

that could be useful at a regional level—similar to a counterterrorism Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan. What are some 

important regional factors and issues with combating terrorism? 

What are some useful policy, strategy, and operational techniques 

for consideration when developing a host-nation’s counterterrorism 

IDAD plan? This study should be a regional specialist topic—analyze 

selected partner nation(s) facing common problems to determine 

U.S. priorities and appropriate methods of assistance. 

G42. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations 

Analyses of groups using terrorist activities have resulted in typologies of different sorts (e.g., groups with political aspirations, ideological/religious motivations, financial/criminal basis; and Rapoport’s 

four historical “waves”). Review these typologies, looking for differences and commonalities. Assess our experience with Al Qaeda 

against them and assess the utility of each. Apply the results of these 

analyses to the current geopolitical climate to discuss possible future 

terrorist activities. This effort may support strategic and perhaps 

operational planning.
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

G43. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 

The focus is how to make LEAs work complementary with SOF. At 

least 75 percent of successful counterterrorism operations are as a 

result of law enforcement or other internal security forces (nonmilitary); in combat, much intelligence to run down terrorists can come 

from police access to population. SOF will never achieve effectiveness and strategic utility in combating terrorism if it disregards 

coordination, cooperation, and combined operations with LEAs. 

Ascertain roles for SOF to operate in conjunction with LEAs, both 

international and host nation when operating abroad; identify policy 

and regulatory changes, including budget, needed for SOF to operate in this domain. Recommend unique training and equipping 

requirements for SOF to perform this function. Illustrate the role 

of community policing and international law enforcement in combating terrorism, then explain why SOF is failing to operate in this 

medium, hamstringing our efforts to fully prosecute counterterrorism plans designed by USSOCOM. This project could describe a successful indirect strategy for overseas contingency operations and one 

which SOF could perform well.

G44. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism? 

A lack of understanding in how people in a given society see 

things—you cannot influence them, neither with your message nor 

your largesse. Acquaintance with language, culture, and local customs is only the first step in entering into a foreign environment. 

This study would provide analyses of specific terrorist or insurgent 

organizations highlighting how their cultural background has influenced their choices and actions. Show how cultural values determine 

the correctness or rationality of specific terrorist actions. Objective is 

to raise awareness in this area and lead to additional studies of specific terrorist organizations focused on the culture that shapes their 

operational planning, decisions, actions, and reactions.

G45. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: Best practices, 

future requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and 

other U.S. agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory 

options 

Discuss and analyze the following statements: The intelligence community is moving beyond need to know to need to share. Counterterrorism operations need to be in the share business, and lessons 

observed from Iraq show success in this area. Agencies, tactical to 

national, need to share information because target sets are illusive; 

and the most current information/intelligence supports operations. 

The counterterrorism mission is global in scale, and the ability to 

have the most current intelligence, at all levels, predictive in nature 

(as applicable), is available to planners at any possible time. Each 

day this topic is more relevant. U.S. SOF must acknowledge that 

HUMINT is essential in this business.

G46. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations and organized crime? 

Consider one of two approaches:

a. The global operating environment is changing to where transnational criminals and transnational terrorist organizations are 

“cooperating” to replace the state-sponsored system with a new 

system of business enterprise to raise funding. As this threat 

becomes larger, it will work to delegitimize international regulatory control over business and trading. Study this phenomenon as it relates to national security interests and threats to the 

U.S.; ascertain what requirements and capabilities SOF needs 

to thwart this threat. Describe current nexus, identify costs to 

national interests, predict trends, and provide solutions using 

SOF. 

b. Treasury officials in many countries, with a U.S. lead, have been 

successful in interdicting the flow of terrorist and drug networks 

through transnational cooperation, particularly since 9/11. 

Establish a compendium of best practices and lessons learned 

from the most successful of those rooting out terrorist financing.

G47. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: Case studies and 

theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism 

Discuss and analyze the current U.S. Government strategy for counterterrorism through this lens, with recommendations for adjustments. The Shining Path in Peru is a great case study for excessive 

governmental response to terrorism. Another approach is to reexamine USSOCOM CONPLAN 7500; using the unclassified threat 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

model, campaign framework, and method, determine if the strategy 

is sufficient to achieve U.S. goals and which aspect are necessary to 

reach U.S. goals. What is missing? What is unnecessary or insufficient and why?

G48. Poverty is a pawn: The myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism 

and how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

Terrorist leaders prey on the poor as a pool for foot soldiers, suicide 

bombers, and both witting and unwitting supporters through various means of exploitation. However, the vast majority of terrorist 

leaders do not come from poverty, but rather from the middle (Zarqawi) and even upper classes (bin Laden). How can governments 

mitigate this exploitation of the poor, knowing that poverty cannot 

be extinguished? Discuss the mix of conditions that serve to create 

fertile territory for developing terrorist actors. Establish a list of conditions (e.g., poverty, religious fervor, education levels, distribution 

of wealth) that when existing concurrently, create an environment 

for growing terrorist actors. Will SOF need to prepare for contingencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

G49. Terrorist safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned spaces 

The intelligence apparatus of the U.S. Government has fairly precise 

locations for terrorist safe havens throughout the world. Moreover, 

U.S. SOF, coupled with interagency partners, arguably has the capability to terrorize the terrorist in selected locations such as training 

camps and marshaling areas. Examine needed changes in policy, 

force structure, and legalities for the U.S. Government, with or without host-nation cooperation/approval, to affect these strikes against 

terrorists in their safe havens—that is, no longer make them safe. 

History is replete with examples of rear-area attacks destroying critical nodes of command and control, demoralizing the enemy, and 

degrading his ability to go on the offensive. Determine which are the 

most problematic of current and future safe havens—that is, which 

provide most succor and protection to terrorists and fellow travelers.

G50. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist 

terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of 

SOF in this strategy? 

Despite all the effort U.S. policy makers and media pundits have 

contributed to talking about the problem, no one has produced a 

satisfactory answer. Because this question has not been properly 

examined and appropriately answered, the U.S. largely plays a game 
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of “whack a mole” in a global landscape where the moles look like 

everyone else. If insights to an answer were developed and successfully advocated, the potential for success in the counterterrorism effort would increase exponentially. Obviously, such a strategy 

would involve multiple instruments and might even change the classical way in which some instruments like to view themselves. What 

will be the SOF role?

G51. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date 

The counterterrorism effort has occurred for 5 years in Iraq and 6 

years in Afghanistan. Since their respective beginnings, much experience has been garnered in both countries. While many lessons 

have been learned, much has yet to be realized. These unlearned lessons need to be explored to determine if they are of value for learning and if so, what lessons are we missing or failing to understand? 

Information operations do not seem to be effective, campaign planning continues to be conducted in the absence of the host nations, 

and operations are still being run without complete integration. 

Who needs to learn these lessons and why they are important may 

help in the successful desired outcomes to these current conflicts.

G52. Organizing interagency community for irregular warfare 

campaigns 

The current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the struggle in 

interagency coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort. As these 

events blur into the long war, the U.S. needs to review whether an 

organizational structure exists to fight irregular warfare from an 

interagency design. Who has the lead, when do they lead, and why 

is an agency/organization in the leadership role? What is the process 

used to make the interagency design function properly? How does 

USSOCOM fit into the interagency design?

G53. Strategic theories on irregular warfare 

What approaches can be considered for the study of irregular warfare as a traditional (nationalistic) or nontraditional underdog. Like 

unconventional study, Is there merit in approaching irregular warfare from the position of the insurgent/terrorist? This writing could 

begin with a review of current unconventional-warfare doctrine and 

experience to determine if they need to be revalidated or require 

rethinking. 
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G54. Operational art design for irregular warfare-centric campaigns 

This study should focus on the development of a format of campaign 

designs for SOF planners specifically and conventional planners generally. The design would be meant to ensure the proper application 

of SOF in the fight. This view is important because little exists to 

help planners, SOF, or otherwise.

G55. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations 

This topic is one that is undefined, except for a planning guide in 

Appendix B of Joint Publication 3-07.1 written several years ago. 

A methodology for framing the situation faced by a host nation 

to determine an IDAD strategy is absolutely necessary. The Civil 

Affairs course provides a political-social analysis guide as an initial 

starting point. However, it is not widely known, disseminated, or 

understood by the conventional military. Case studies (such as El 

Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan) to highlight success and failure in 

this endeavor are a good study vehicle.

G56. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare 

This topic could be a basis for strategic special operations theory 

and/or serve as a primer for geographic combatant command planners. If we do not understand how to create strategic effects, SOF 

becomes less effective. To better understand, identify what is the 

range of strategic effects that might be of use to SOF—that is, how 

SOF produces each of those types of strategic effects, looking at case 

studies with effective and ineffective creation of strategic effects.

G57. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare 

Advising host-nation counterparts is a slow process (requires time). 

We suffer with time conditions that cause pushing rather than guiding counterparts to a resolution of a problem. A need exists to teach 

the art of advising, much like what was done during the Vietnam 

era, yet no time goes to adequately train advisors. The other condition of time is length of service “in the box” by the respective services. These vary from 4 to 6 months to a year. Nothing effective can 

be achieved in 4 to 6 months. Advising/mentoring tours need to be 

at least 18 months, and an effective handoff to the incoming advisor is necessary. Finding and interviewing Vietnam-era advisors 

would greatly benefit this study. Examine conventional SOF cooperation to include the impact on both U.S. SOF and NATO/partner 

SOF. As conventional forces drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan the 
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general assumption is that the SOF role will increase. What impact 

will this increased requirement have on U.S. SOF? If NATO SOF 

support dwindles or ceases, what impact will that have on the future 

U.S. SOF requirement in Afghanistan? What should their focus 

be? What impact will this long-term requirement have on U.S. SOF 

(individual, collective, global)? 

G58. Conventional/SOF cooperation 

Conventional forces and SOF have coordinated and cooperated to an 

unprecedented degree in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, SOF 

have developed a reliance on conventional forces for certain battlefield operating systems (e.g., maintenance, logistics, and quick reaction forces). Discuss the impact of the potential drawdown of GPF 

in theater on this reliance on SOF units in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility.

G59. Embassy role in U.S. Government irregular warfare effort 

This topic would explore initiatives for restructuring the DoS—Do 

they go far enough to address the requirements for the long war/persistent conflict of the 21st century? Should more of a regional hierarchy exist to DoS than independent embassies that can report directly 

to the President of the U.S.? How can/should SOF better work with 

embassies in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long war? How can 

interagency-SOF synergy at the embassy level better achieve U.S. 

interests?

G60. Legislative requirements for effective interagency campaigns 

This topic would review current and pending legislation required to 

establish organizations and authorities to effectively conduct irregular warfare and large-scale FID for combating terrorism. It could 

also suggest who should write this interagency campaign.

G61. Country team approach 

In an era of irregular warfare, SOF may find itself deployed in a 

number of countries and supporting the ambassador’s country 

team. Does SOF need specific representation on the country team 

or is the normal representation sufficient? In either case, how would 

this work? What interaction is appropriate or required? Who is in 

charge of what? How are disputes resolved? How can this support be 

revived, updated, or replaced to ensure that U.S. players in a given 

country are working for common causes?
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G62. Cultural awareness 

Understanding of culture will assist in finding an enemy’s weakness, especially in irregular warfare where the enemy will resort to 

any action to achieve objectives. The need is to understand what is 

acceptable to that enemy, what is not, what his cultural constraints 

are, and what does not constraint his actions. This information will 

permit development of successful courses of action. Population’s 

trust/will is culturally based, and the effective understanding of it 

is critical to a successful outcome. Three areas of potential study 

follow: a) regional specific information for a culture and population, 

b) generic information on awareness, and c) tools to rapidly get specific information on a culture to operators. 

G63. Are culture, religion, and worldview factors in motivating irregular warfare? 

Cultural education must include orientation on comparative analysis of religions of the world. Americans have a secular culture; some 

estimates put 80 percent of the rest of the world as more faith based. 

Many of the conflicts throughout world history have been motivated 

by religion. Warrior culture is the way in which violence is valued 

and managed by the collectivity, and it varies from culture to culture. Research how each group handles violence and threats against 

the collectivity; three example questions follow:

a. Is fighting a recognized road to high status? 

b. Are fighters separated from the group in some formal way—

as we do with our military—or are they integrated and 

interspersed?

c. Are there forms of warfare/fighting seen as higher status than 

others? 

G64. Cultural knowledge in irregular warfare campaign planning 

This lack of cultural understanding also has led to confusion. 

Because some cultures do not like to be confrontational, their 

acknowledgement is believed to be agreement. The fact, however, 

is they are only agreeing that they understand a position or proposal vs. accept it. The lack of cultural understanding is a handicap 

in achieved outcomes by set time schedules. Examine the need to 

understand the actors in the environments that the campaign will be 

conducted. How can this lead to some understanding of the motivations of these actors? How can this better prepare planners to tailor 
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the campaign plan toward influencing those actors in accordance 

with the commander’s intent? 

G65. Regional studies 

Review regional studies to better meet the needs of the combatant 

commanders. Courses that look at the regions from a strategic and 

operational perspective are desired, illustrating the linkage between 

the countries within a given commander’s area of responsibility 

as well as the adjacent countries. Many of the countries currently 

engaged in the conflict were drawn in Europe and do not reflect 

what is occurring in either the country or the region. Ethnic groups 

straddle those borders and are unrecognized by the people, and the 

numbers of languages further complicate the region. This writing 

is an opportunity to leverage the revamped discipline of geography, 

which is now more than maps and physical terrain. Geography is 

now a multidisciplinary study area involving traditional geography 

as well as aspects of sociology, geology, political science, and economics (and some cultural anthropology may also exist).

G66. How is strategy developed for special operations and what is the 

framework for such development? 

This question should consider the operational role of SOF in each 

of the phases (0-V) and assess the effectiveness of their employment 

in those phases. Afghanistan and Iraq could serve as case studies. 

The unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan are excellent 

examples of pre-phase III operations. They lead into two questions: 

a. How does the U.S. Government as well as DoD consider SOF use 

a. in all campaign phases?

b. What are effective employment techniques in terms of strategy 

b. and operational art for SOF/interagency synchronization to 

include measures of effectiveness?

G67. Why is Phase 0 important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: Informing the joint conventional community 

Phase 0 can be described in terms of anti-insurgency, in the same 

manner that the Army delineates between antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Phase 0 is rapidly becoming an outdated term. 
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G68. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop irregular warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications) 

This topic would study the value of creating internships for SOF in 

successful companies or organizations to develop a knowledge base 

of nonmilitary functions (e.g., power-economic and diplomatic). 

Strategic communication could be explored from a marketing point 

of view. Strategic thinking at the multinational should also be considered. Computer operation and electronic transfer of funds could 

be examined because are often the terrorist’s means of moving illegal money around the world. Also respond to the question, what 

academic credit should be granted from the internship (M.A. or 

Ph.D.)?

G69. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations 

Assess the actual impact of arresting religious leaders and/or entering into mosques/madrassas as a tactic against Islamic extremists. 

The thesis posed via this topic is that when we are oversensitive and 

overstate Middle East sensitivities, we hamstring our efforts. Costs 

and benefits are associated with this type of approach. Can the real 

protagonists of terror be stopped using this method? Consider U.S. 

public opinion, reprisals against the U.S., reaction of coalition partners, and other factors.

G70. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies 

SOF has played an increasingly critical role in the international 

response to complex humanitarian emergencies. The liaison between 

these two elements requires that SOF understand the diversity of 

nongovernmental organization (NGO) objectives and organizational cultures. This topic could take an approach of the division 

of labor involved or education of SOF (e.g., on NGO capabilities, 

limitations). Give advantages and disadvantages of “collaborating” 

with NGOs. Include a discussion of the International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organizations. The 

relationships between SOF and other U.S. contractors could also be 

explored.

G71. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development 

Provide a collection of personal SOF accounts throughout recent 

history. While this perspective has been done (e.g., in support of 

briefings and courses), a research-paper-length compendium will 
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yield not only lessons learned but aspects of strategy, revolutionary 

thinking, and command-and-control issues for future planners and 

commanders from interviews with senior SOF leaders. The finished 

product will benefit SOF leaders as a handbook on relationships with 

interagency community and coalition partners and furnish a range 

of considerations for SOF noncommissioned officers and officers. 

Some travel may be involved, or the collection could be gleaned from 

individuals living near the respective PME schools; this topic is ideal 

for a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) 

or School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) student because of 

access to a wide range of distinguished SOF senior leaders supporting the SOF elective at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

G72. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare: Preparing for 

joint SOF combat command 

Explore organizing Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) 

at the O6 level of command and the associated leader competencies required, based on actual experiences of recent commanders of 

combined JSOTFs. Offer solutions of successful wartime leadership 

techniques for ongoing and near-future senior SOF leaders, anticipating wartime commands during counterterrorism efforts. Derive 

key lessons learned from the research for possible incorporation into 

current leader development methodologies.

G73. Cross area-of-responsibility operations 

At the operational level, command and control as well as support relationships need to be well-defined early on in the operation. Examine the supported/supporting relationships between 

USSOCOM and conventional forces belonging to the regional combatant commander and/or Joint Task Force commander. This topic 

could be discussed in the context of tactical operations, then at the 

operational level. 

G74. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the counterterrorism effort 

Address the question of creating an African unified command or 

a U.S. subunified command within Africa in order to protect U.S. 

national interests. Analyze a proposal to establish a political-military organization, such as an African regional Joint Task Force/

Special Operations Command within Africa, to promote democratic 

initiatives and influence regional stability. Discuss roles and capabilities for Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations (CA/CMO) and 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSSOCOM and SOF Issues

interagency partners, framing operational preparation of environment throughout Africa, FID opportunities in the region, and the 

rising U.S. national interests in Africa.

G75. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population 

Determine the effectiveness of a full PSYOP campaign in an area 

where most of the intended audience is illiterate. Using detailed 

analysis, develop possible operations—taking in account the literacy 

and technology of targeted audiences—for future PSYOPs in these 

environments. How do we reach and educate such audiences?