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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 44768

In the Matter of the Estate of ROBERT 

ERNEST MELTON and HEDWIG 

“HEDY” MELTON, Deceased.

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JADIGWA MELTON, Personal 

Representative,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HEINZ ALT,

 Defendant-Respondent.

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Boise, December 2017 Term

2018 Opinion No. 2

Filed: January 4, 2018

Karen A. Lehrman, Clerk

________________________________________ )

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State

of Idaho, Boundary County. Hon. John R. Stegner, District Judge.

The district court’s decision is reversed. This case is remanded to the

district court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

No attorney fees or costs on appeal are awarded to either party.

Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, attorneys for appellant.

Mary W. Cusack argued.

Featherston Law Firm, Chtd, Sandpoint, attorneys for respondent.

Brent Featherston argued.

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JONES, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

In an appeal arising out of Boundary County, Appellant, Jadwiga Melton (“Jadwiga”),

challenges a district court’s determination that Respondent, Heinz Alt (“Heinz”), filed a timely 

claim against the Estate of Robert Ernest Melton (“Robert”) and Hedwig Melton (“Hedy”). Hedy 

died in 2008, and in 2010 Robert married Jadwiga. In 2013, Robert died. Jadwiga commenced 

joint probate proceedings for both Hedy and Robert, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-111,

because Hedy’s will was never probated. Heinz filed a creditor claim against the estate for 
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approximately to the penny $102,574.50, alleging that he loaned money to Hedy and Robert to 

build a home and in exchange they agreed to execute wills that would leave their estate to him.

Jadwiga filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Hedy was the only one who signed 

the promissory note and Heinz failed to bring a claim within three years of Hedy’s death. The 

magistrate court determined that, because Heinz failed to bring the claim against Hedy’s estate 

within three years of her death, his claim was barred by Idaho Code section 15-3-803. Heinz 

appealed and the district court reversed the magistrate court, holding that Heinz’s claim was 

timely, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-111, because Heinz brought his creditor claim 

within three years of Robert’s death. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Heinz, the biological son of Hedy and stepson of Robert, alleged that he loaned Hedy and 

Robert money so that they could purchase real property and construct a home in Bonners Ferry, 

Idaho. Heinz loaned the money on the condition that Robert and Hedy would execute wills 

leaving their estate to Heinz. Accordingly, Hedy executed a will directing all of her property to 

Robert, and, in the event that Robert predeceased her, to Heinz. Similarly, Robert executed a will 

directing all of his property to Hedy, and, in the event that Hedy predeceased him, to Heinz. 

Hedy passed away in 2008, and her will was not probated. In June 2010, Robert married 

Jadwiga, and he executed a new will that named Jadwiga as the sole heir to his estate. Robert 

passed away on July 4, 2013. Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate Proceedings, wherein 

she stated that Robert’s estate and Hedy’s estate could be joined, pursuant to Idaho Code section 

15-3-111, because a probate proceeding had not been initiated on Hedy’s estate. 

Heinz filed a Claim Against the Estate seeking $102,574.50 as repayment of his loan. 

Heinz attached two handwritten notes, which were signed solely by Hedy and stated that 

$102,574.50 was used to build a home in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Jadwiga filed a Notice of 

Disallowance with the magistrate court, asserting that Heinz’s claim was untimely because Heinz

failed to present it within three years of Hedy’s death and there was no documentation that 

Robert owed a debt to Heinz.

Jadwiga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which: (1) claimed that her Notice of 

Disallowance was timely; and (2) argued that Heinz’s claim was time-barred because Hedy was 

the only one who signed the promissory note and Heinz had failed to bring a claim within three 

years of Hedy’s death, as required by Idaho Code section 15-3-803(a). Heinz opposed the 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that: (1) his claim should be allowed because 

Jadwiga’s Notice of Disallowance was not timely; and (2) the proceeds of his loan to Robert and 

Hedy was a community debt and there was not an estate against which he could have filed a 

claim until Jadwiga opened a probate in 2014. 

On October 8, 2015, the magistrate court issued its Memorandum Opinion. The 

magistrate court first determined that Jadwiga’s Notice of Disallowance of Heinz’s claim was 

timely. Next, the magistrate court considered whether Heinz’s claim against Hedy’s estate was 

time-barred. The magistrate court determined that there was nothing in Idaho Code section 15-3-

111 that suggested that a creditor’s deadline to present a claim could be tolled merely because 

the estate was subsequently jointly probated. The magistrate court reasoned that the legislature

was capable of extending a probate-related statute of limitations period, as evidenced by its

extension of the three-year statute of limitations period to the spouse whose death occurs last (set 

forth in Idaho Code section 15-3-108). Thus, the absence of a similar extension as to the threeyear creditor’s bar (set forth in Idaho Code section 15-3-803(a)(1)) was dispositive. Ultimately, 

the magistrate court concluded that Heinz’s claim against Hedy’s estate was not presented within 

three years of her death; therefore, it was time-barred by Idaho Code section 15-3-803(a)(1). 

However, the magistrate specifically noted that Heinz could still proceed with his claim against 

Robert’s estate. Heinz appealed the magistrate court’s decision to a district court. 

After oral argument, the district court issued its Opinion on Appeal. First, the district 

court held that the magistrate court correctly determined that Jadwiga’s Notice of Disallowance 

as to Heinz’s claim was timely. Next, the district court considered whether Heinz’s claim against 

Hedy’s estate, which he did not bring within three years of her death, was time-barred by Idaho 

Code section 15-3-803. The district court began by noting that “[t]he three year limitation for 

creditors in I.C. § 15-3-803(1)(a) parallels the general time limit for probating an estate. I.C. § 

15-3-108 states: ‘No formal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment 

proceeding . . . may be commenced more than three (3) years after the decedent’s death.’” 

The district court went on to explain that the legislature amended Idaho Code section 15-

3-111 in 1995 to provide that the three year statute of limitation as to section 15-3-108 only 

applied to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The district court noted that “[a] 

basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or section addressing an 

issue controls over the statute that is more general,” and it reasoned that Idaho Code section 15-
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3-111 was a specific statute, while Idaho Code section 15-3-108 and 15-3-803(a)(1) were more 

general. Accordingly, the district court held that, because the three-year statute of limitation as to 

Idaho Code section 15-3-108 only applied to the spouse whose death occurred last, then “it 

would follow that the three year timeframe set out in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1) would also only apply 

to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuant to I.C. § 

15-3-111.” Further, the district court held that interpreting Idaho Code section 15-3-803(a)(1) as 

barring creditor’s claims against the estate of the spouse whose death occurred first when a joint 

probate was opened would produce an absurd result. That is, if the statute of limitations for the 

first spouse to die was not tolled, then the only estate to probate would be that of the second 

spouse to die. Ultimately, the district court: (1) affirmed the magistrate court’s decision that 

Heinz’s claim was timely disallowed by Jadwiga; and (2) reversed and remanded the magistrate 

court’s decision that Heinz’s claim against Hedy’s estate was barred by Idaho Code section 15-3-

803. 

The district court denied Heinz’s request for attorney fees; however, the district court 

determined that the time for Jadwiga to respond and object to Heinz’s claimed costs had not 

expired, and that it would make a decision once the time period for Jadwiga’s objection had 

passed. Subsequently, Jadwiga objected to Heinz’s request for attorney fees and costs arguing 

that he had failed to meet the requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a). 

Jadwiga appealed the district court’s decision.

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III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred when it construed the statutory language of Idaho Code 

section 15-3-111.

2. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same 

standard as the trial court. Gracie, LLC v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 149 Idaho 

570, 572, 237 P.3d 1196, 1198 (2010). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

 

1 Initially, this Court entered an order that conditionally dismissed the appeal because the 54(b) judgment contained 

a conclusion of law. On February 7, 2017, the magistrate court issued an Amended Judgment that removed the 

conclusion of law, but did not include a judgment as to the statute of limitations issue. On February 14, 2017, this 

Court withdrew the previous order, and ordered Jadwiga to file an Amended Notice of Appeal. On February 27, 

2017, the magistrate court issued a Second Amended Judgment that included a judgment relating to the statute of 

limitations issue. Jadwiga timely filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.
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show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts 

“should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 

(2010). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that the Supreme Court 

reviews de novo. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011).

Hayes v. City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 170, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court erred when it construed the statutory language of Idaho Code 

section 15-3-111 because the statute is not ambiguous. 

Jadwiga argues that the district court erred when it interpreted Idaho Code section 15-3-

111 to extend the creditor claim limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 15-3-803. Jadwiga 

reasons that statutory construction is only appropriate when a statute is ambiguous and that a 

statute is not ambiguous merely because there is more than one interpretation. Jadwiga maintains 

that Idaho Code 15-3-111 is not ambiguous; therefore, the district court erred when it failed to 

apply the statute according to its plain language. 

Heinz argues that the district court did not err in interpreting the probate code because it 

considered the probate code as a whole instead of focusing on a specific statute in isolation.

This Court exercises free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of 

law. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013).

The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative 

body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language 

of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in 

the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole, 

and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 

noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute 

so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language 

is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 

effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.

Id. at 361–62, 313 P.3d at 17–18 (quoting State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 

(2011)).

A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 

construction. Porter v. Board of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 

P.3d 671, 674 (2004) (citing Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 659, 

664 (2002)). However, “[a]mbiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations 
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are presented to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered 

ambiguous.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, 

legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of 

altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. 

Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, “if 

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without 

engaging in any statutory construction.” State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 

219 (1999). “[T]his Court has been reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and has 

been unwilling to insert words into a statute that the Court believes the legislature left out, be it 

intentionally or inadvertently.” Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 

89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015).

Idaho Code section 15-3-108 provides that “[n]o informal probate or appointment 

proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding . . . may be commenced more than three 

(3) years after the decedent's death.” I.C. § 15-3-108.

Idaho Code section 15-3-111 sets forth the statutory requirements for joint probate:

In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death of 

either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property of 

the decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died before any proceeding 

had been commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose death 

occurred first, the estates of both decedents may be joined for probate in a single 

proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose 

death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, 

applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The initial 

application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding shall contain a statement 

of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is based, in addition to all other 

statements required by this code to be made therein.

I.C. § 15-3-111.

Idaho Code section 15-3-803 sets forth the limitations on the presentation of 

creditor claims, and provides that:

(a) All claims against a decedent’s estate which arose before the death of 

the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof (except 

claims for state taxes), whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, 

liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not 

barred earlier by another statute of limitations or nonclaim statute, are barred 

against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the 

decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the following dates:

(1) three (3) years after the decedent’s death . . .
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I.C. § 15-3-803(a).

We find that the plain language of the statutes at issue, Idaho Code sections 15-3-108, 15-

3-803(a) and 15-3-111, is clear and unambiguous; therefore, this Court must only apply the 

words of the statutes to the facts at hand. See Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361, 313 P.3d at 17 

(“Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. . . . and words should be 

given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings.”).

Generally, Idaho Code section 15-3-108 provides that no probate may be commenced 

more than three years after the decedent’s death. I.C. § 15-3-108. However, Idaho Code section 

15-3-111 carves out a narrow exception to this three-year period when: (1) a marital community 

is dissolved by the death of a spouse; (2) the surviving spouse was entitled to all of the decedent 

spouse’s property; and (3) the surviving spouse died before any proceeding had been initiated on 

the estate of the spouse who died first. I.C. § 15-3-111. If these specific circumstances are 

present, then “the estates of both decedents may be joined for probate in a single proceeding” 

and “[t]he three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of 

the spouse whose death occurred last.” Id. In other words, while Idaho Code 15-3-108 typically 

requires probate proceedings to be initiated within three years of a decedent’s death, Idaho Code 

section 15-3-111 provides a narrow exception, which tolls the three-year period until to the

surviving spouse dies.

Idaho Code section 15-3-803(a) contains plain and unambiguous language and addresses 

a completely separate probate issue than the aforementioned statutes, i.e., the time during which 

claims against an estate must be brought. I.C. § 15-3-803 (emphasis added). It imposes a threeyear timeframe to bring a claim against a decedent’s estate, which begins to run at the decedent’s 

death. Id. at (a). 

Idaho Code section 15-3-111 specifically references 15-3-108; therefore, it makes sense 

to read the statutes together. Alternatively, Idaho Code section 15-3-111 makes no mention of 

Idaho Code section 15-3-803; therefore, it does not make sense to read the statutes together. This 

Court is reluctant to insert words into a statute that the Court believes the legislature left out, be 

it intentionally or inadvertently. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 159 Idaho at 89, 356 P.3d at 

382. The legislature has provided no indication that Idaho Code sections 15-3-111 and 15-3-803 

are related, other than the fact that they both address the general topic of probate.
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Further, the legislature has demonstrated that it has the ability to modify and create 

exceptions to general probate rules, i.e., under Idaho Code section 15-3-111, when a joint 

probate has been opened, the three year time period to open a probate does not begin to run until 

the death of the surviving spouse. The legislature could have also created an exception to extend 

the time period during which a creditor could bring a claim against a decedent’s estate. However, 

the legislature has not done so. Therefore, we are left to apply the clear and unambiguous 

language of the statute. See Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219.

We hold that the district court erred when it construed Idaho Code section 15-3-111 to 

extend the timeframe to bring a creditor claim against the estate of the first spouse to die. As a 

result, any claim against Hedy’s estate is barred pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-3-803(a),

because Heinz failed to bring a claim within three years of Hedy’s death. However, Heinz’s 

claim against Robert’s estate is not time-barred; accordingly, the case is remanded for further 

proceedings with respect to claims against Robert’s estate. 

B. Neither party is awarded attorney fees or costs on appeal.

Both parties requested attorney fees and costs on appeal. However, because the case has 

been remanded with respect to claims against Robert’s estate there is no prevailing party in this 

litigation. Accordingly, we do not award attorney fees or costs to either party. 

VI. CONCLUSION

We hereby reverse the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. Neither party is awarded attorney fees or costs on appeal. 

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices HORTON, BRODY and BEVAN, CONCUR.