_______________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice: Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 18, 2007 

JODIE VEGA, Conservator of the Estate of 

JEFFREY HURLEY, a Minor, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 129436 

LAKELAND HOSPITALS AT NILES AND 

ST. JOSEPH, INC., ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL 

ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BETH VANDERAH 

and MICHAEL SPEERS, Personal 

Corepresentatives of the Estate of DAVID ALAN 

SPEERS, M.D., Deceased, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

MARKMAN, J. 

We granted leave to appeal to determine whether the insanity saving 

provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to medical malpractice claims. The trial 

court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that the 

insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice 

claims and, thus, that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals 

affirmed. Because we conclude that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) 
does apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiff’s 

claim. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The alleged medical malpractice occurred on December 13, 1999, when the 

claimant was 11 years old. Plaintiff, the claimant’s mother, alleges that, as a result 

of the defendant physician’s misdiagnosis, the claimant sustained severe, 

permanent mental impairment. Plaintiff sent a notice of intent to bring an action 

to defendants on November 8, 2001. As a result, the period of limitations was 

tolled for 182 days from November 8, 2001, to May 9, 2002, and the period of 

limitations expired on June 12, 2002. Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 11, 

2002. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, 

concluding that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does not apply to 

medical malpractice claims and, thus, that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. In a 

two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 267 Mich App 565; 705 

NW2d 389 (2005). After initially denying plaintiff’s application for leave to 

appeal, 475 Mich 854 (2006), this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration, vacated its previous order denying leave to appeal, and granted 

plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. 477 Mich 957 (2006). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A trial court’s ruling on a summary disposition motion is a question of law 

that this Court reviews de novo. Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29, 34; 729 NW2d 

2
 
 

 

 

488 (2007). Questions of statutory interpretation are also questions of law that 

that this Court reviews de novo. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS 

Generally, a medical malpractice action must be commenced within two 

years after the action accrued. MCL 600.5805(6). Plaintiff concedes that she did 

not file a complaint within the two-year period of limitations. However, plaintiff 

argues that the claimant is insane and, thus, that the insanity saving provision of § 

5851(1) applies.1 

MCL 600.5851(1) provides, in pertinent part: 

Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if the 

person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act 

is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the 

person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the 

disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry 

or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.[2] 

MCL 600.5851(7) provides, in pertinent part: 

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (8), if, at the time 

a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a person under 

section 5838a the person has not reached his or her eighth birthday, a 

person shall not bring an action based on the claim unless the action 

is commenced on or before the person’s tenth birthday or within the 

period of limitations set forth in section 5838a, whichever is later. 

1

 MCL 600.5851(2) defines “insane” as “a condition of mental derangement 

such as to prevent the sufferer from comprehending rights he or she is otherwise 

bound to know and is not dependent on whether or not the person has been 

judicially declared to be insane.” Whether the claimant is “insane” is not at issue 

in this appeal. 

2

 It is undisputed that § 5851(8), which applies to claimants who have 

suffered injuries to their reproductive systems, does not apply in this case. 

3
 
 

 

If, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a 

person under section 5838a, the person has reached his or her eighth 

birthday, he or she is subject to the period of limitations set forth in 

section 5838a. 

MCL 600.5838a(2) provides, in pertinent part: 

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action 

involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced 

at any time within the applicable period prescribed in section 5805 

or sections 5851 to 5856 . . . . 

The lower courts held that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does 

not apply to medical malpractice claims. The Court of Appeals dissent, on the 

other hand, concluded that “although MCL 600.5851(7) may limit a claim for 

malpractice that accrued before the age of eight, its plain language does not limit 

those plaintiffs whose claims accrued after the age of [eight]-- as in the present 

case.” 267 Mich App at 577 (Jansen, J., dissenting). 

The saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to claimants who are under 18 

years of age or insane “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection[] (7),” and it 

allows a claimant to file an action within one year after the disability is removed.3 

The first sentence of § 5851(7) states that if the medical malpractice claimant was 

3

 MCL 600.5838a(2) provides, in pertinent part, “except as otherwise 

provided in section 5851(7) or (8), the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 

years after the date of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim.” 

Therefore, even under the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1), a medical 

malpractice claimant only has six years to file a complaint. The only medical 

malpractice claimants who would have longer than six years to file a complaint 

would be those claimants whose claims accrued at a very young age. See § 

5851(7) and (8) (the longest time claimants would have under these provisions is 

10 and 15 years, respectively, and they would only have that long if their claims 

accrued at birth). 

4
 
 

 

less than eight years old when the claim accrued, the claimant must file a 

complaint before his tenth birthday or before the period of limitations expires, 

whichever is later. The medical malpractice claimant in the instant case was 11 

years old when the claim accrued, and, thus, the first sentence of § 5851(7) is not 

applicable. The second sentence of § 5851(7) states that if a medical malpractice 

claimant was eight years of age or older when the claim accrued, as in this case, 

the period of limitations set forth in § 5838a applies. MCL 600.5851(7) does not 

state anything about when an insane medical malpractice claimant must 

commence an action. Therefore, § 5851(7) does not preclude application of the 

insanity saving provision of § 5851(1).4 

Section 5851(7) states that if the claimant was eight years old or older when 

the claim accrued, “the period of limitations set forth in § 5838a” applies; contrary 

to defendants’ suggestion, it does not state the corollary, i.e., that the saving 

4

 Defendants argue that if the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies 

to medical malpractice claimants, the entire second sentence of § 5851(7) will be 

rendered meaningless. We respectfully disagree. The first sentence of § 5851(7) 

states that if the medical malpractice claimant was less than eight years old when 

the claim accrued, the claimant must file suit before his tenth birthday. Therefore, 

it is logical to include a second sentence that explains when a medical malpractice 

claimant must file a suit if that claimant’s claim accrued when the claimant was 

eight years old or older. The fact that the second sentence does not change the 

outcome of the instant case does not make it meaningless. In addition, the second 

sentence could be read to mean that the minority saving provision of § 5851(1) 

does not apply to medical malpractice claimants whose claims accrued when they 

were eight years old or older. We do not address this issue because plaintiff does 

not argue for application of the minority saving provision of § 5851(1); plaintiff 

only argues for application of the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). 

5
 
 

 

provision of § 5851(1) does not apply. See Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 650; 677 

NW2d 813 (2004) (a saving provision is not a period of limitations). As the Court 

of Appeals dissent explained: 

Clearly, the first part of MCL 600.5851(7) sets out a specific 

time that a person under the age of eight must file his or her claim, 

i.e., before the tenth birthday if the claim accrued before the age of 

eight. MCL 600.5851(7). But the second sentence, which is 

applicable here because plaintiff was over the age of eight at the 

time of claim accrual, contains no language limiting the application 

of the saving provision for insanity. MCL 600.5851(7). The second 

sentence of MCL 600.5851(7) only states what the limitations period 

will be for those plaintiffs whose claim accrues past the age of eight. 

In other words, although the standard two-year limitations period 

applies for those plaintiffs past age eight, it does not simultaneously 

limit the saving provision of subsection 1, which provides that the 

period of limitations for an insane plaintiff does not begin to run 

until, “1 year after the disability is removed . . . although the period 

of limitations has run.” MCL 600.5851(1) (emphasis added).[5] 

* * * 

Therefore, I would find that, although MCL 600.5851(7) may 

limit a claim for malpractice that accrued before the age of eight, its 

plain language does not limit those plaintiffs whose claims accrued 

after the age of [eight]--as in the present case.[6] The only direction 

the statute gives is to the “period of limitations set forth in section 

5838a . . . .” MCL 600.5851(7). This plain language does not 

5

 This last sentence is not altogether correct, in our judgment, because the 

period of limitations begins to run when the claim accrues, but § 5851(1) allows 

minors and insane persons to bring their claims within one year after the disability 

is removed “although the period of limitations has run.” 

6

 To the extent that the Court of Appeals dissent can be read to mean that if 

a medical malpractice claimant was under the age of eight when the claim accrued, 

he cannot rely on the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1), we respectfully 

disagree because, as discussed throughout this opinion, we believe that the 

insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to all insane claimants. 

6
 
 

 

simultaneously limit the application of MCL 600.5851(1). [267 

Mich App at 576-578 (Jansen, J., dissenting).] 

The insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 

in subsection[] (7) . . . .” MCL 600.5851(7) states that if a medical malpractice 

claimant is less than eight years old when the claim accrued, the claimant must file 

suit before he is ten years old or before the period of limitations expires, 

whichever is later; but, if the medical malpractice claimant is eight years old or 

older when the claim accrued, the claimant must file suit before the period of 

limitations expires. MCL 600.5851(7) states nothing about an insane medical 

malpractice claimant. That is, nothing in § 5851(7) prohibits an insane medical 

malpractice claimant from taking advantage of the insanity saving provision of § 

5851(1).7 

Defendants argue that the first phrase of § 5851(1) conditions the 

application of all remaining clauses in that subsection on the inapplicability of § 

5851(7). That is, they argue that if § 5851(7) is applicable, i.e., if the plaintiff is 

7

 This position is consistent with this Court’s order in Dantzler v Hughett, 

456 Mich 922 (1998). In Dantzler, the Court of Appeals had held that the medical 

malpractice claimant was not insane for purposes of § 5851(1). This Court 

reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court because 

there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the medical 

malpractice claimant was insane for purposes of § 5851(1). There would have 

been no need to remand the case to the trial court for a determination whether the 

medical malpractice claimant was insane if the insanity saving provision of § 

5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice claimants. 

7
 
bringing a medical malpractice claim, § 5851(1) is not applicable. We respectfully 

disagree. 

MCL 600.5851(1) begins, “Except as otherwise provided in subsection[] 

(7) . . . .” Contrary to defendants’ contention, this language does not mean that if 

§ 5851(7) is applicable, § 5851(1) is not applicable. Instead, it simply means that 

if § 5851(1) is inconsistent with § 5851(7), § 5851(7) is controlling. For example, 

if the claimant was four years old when his medical malpractice claim accrued, 

under § 5851(1), the claimant would have until he was 19 years old to file a 

complaint. However, under § 5851(7), the claimant would only have until he was 

ten years old to file a complaint. Because § 5851(1) states “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided in subsection[] (7),” § 5851(7) would be controlling under those 

circumstances. On the other hand, if the claimant was four years old when the 

medical malpractice claim accrued and was insane, the insanity saving provision 

of § 5851(1) would apply because nothing in § 5851(7) prohibits application of the 

insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). That is, § 5851(7) does not “otherwise 

provide[]” anything with regard to the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). 

Therefore, § 5851(7) does not prohibit application of the insanity saving provision 

of § 5851(1) to medical malpractice claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Because we conclude that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does 

apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 

8
 
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiff’s 

claim. 

Stephen J. Markman 

Clifford W. Taylor 

 Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

9
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

JODIE VEGA, Conservator of the Estate of 

JEFFREY HURLEY, a Minor, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 129436 

LAKELAND HOSPITALS AT NILES AND 

ST. JOSEPH, INC., ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL 

ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BETH VANDERAH 

and MICHAEL SPEERS, Personal 

Corepresentatives of the Estate of DAVID ALAN 

SPEERS, M.D., Deceased, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 

Under the plain language of the statutes involved, Jeffrey Hurley or a 

person suing on his behalf has until one year after Jeffrey’s disability is removed 

through death or otherwise to bring his claim. Accordingly, I concur with the 

majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s 

claim as untimely, and the Court of Appeals erred by affirming that result. 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

 Elizabeth A. Weaver 

 Marilyn Kelly