Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

Joint Special Operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ students and leaders for consideration by the SOF 

community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the US Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of 

the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, senior 

and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international 

security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, 

outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. 

JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special Operations 

Forces and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational 

priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency and US military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, President

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Institutional 

Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution Stanford 

Univ. and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

George Emile Irani

Ph.D., International Relations

Toledo International Center for 

Peace and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force

USAFSOS Commandant

Brian A. Maher

Ed.D., Education

JSOU Vice President

Michael C. McMahon

Lt Colonel, U.S. Air Force

JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department Director

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

Kenneth H. Poole

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU 

Associate Fellow

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, LLC and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

William S. Wildrick

Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow


The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

Executive Report

JSOU First Annual Symposium

2–5 May 2006

Hurlburt Field, Florida
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, 

at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-15-6
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

USSOCOM, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Previous Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, September 2005, J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005, Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006
vii

Foreword

This report provides a summary of the Joint Special Operations 

University (JSOU) first annual symposium. The symposium 

theme was “Countering Global Insurgency,” the choice based on 

its relevancy to the ongoing worldwide conflict and recently published 

results of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Feedback from participants was overwhelmingly positive, and we believe the symposium 

was a great success. Noteworthy is that the symposium was an academic forum. The views of the participants are their own and do not 

represent the U.S. Government or their respective organizations. 

The most powerful symposium theme is the perspective that we 

need to focus on the goals of our opponents and not their tactics. 

What is it that our opponents want? Terrorism is one of the tactics they use, but Osama bin Laden and his cohorts are not nihilists solely interested in destroying the world or their society. Their 

agenda, though it is destructive and antithetical to our concept of 

liberal democracy, is broader than terrorism for terrorism’s sake. 

This perspective leads into the associated thought that we must look 

at the conflict from our opponents’ perspective. How do they view the 

conflict? How are they organized to best achieve their goals? 

Once we develop a better and more in-depth understanding of 

our opponents, we must analyze how we are organized and assess 

whether it is effective given the type of conflict and the makeup of 

our opponent. We also need to evaluate the applicability of using traditional counterinsurgency strategies in fighting the current conflict. 

Do we need to modify or develop new strategies in order to prevail? 

Are the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, the international community, and our critical international partner nations 

organized in an efficient and effective manner to prosecute this conflict? The symposium did not answer definitively these questions, 

but it did provide a forum to further their discussion. 

By analyzing both our opponents and ourselves, we can build an 

effective strategy to defeat our enemies. Using a term from the QDR, 

we are in a “Long War,” and we must understand all the dimensions 

and factors within the conflict. The Countering Global Insurgency 

symposium added significantly to the dialogue and understanding of 

the current conflict. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

ix

Symposium Agenda

Tuesday, 2 May Pre-Symposium JSOU Fellows Meeting

Wednesday, 3 May

0830-0930 Keynote address: LTG William G. Boykin, Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting 

Support

1000-1115 Keynote address (and discussion): Mr. Wade Ishimoto, 

senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

1130-1300 Luncheon speaker: Mr. Ralph Peters, retired military 

intelligence officer, essayist, and novelist, the most recent 

being a Stackpole publication, Never Quit the Fight

1315-1645 Panel 1, Counterinsurgency, and discussion

Moderator: Mr. James A. Bates, JSOU Unconventional 

Warfare Studies coordinator

Panelists:

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski (USA, Ret.), former Combined 

Joint Special Operations Task Force commander in 

Afghanistan

Mr. Chris Mason, former policy officer with Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group at U.S. Department of 

State and political officer on the Provincial Reconstruction 

Team in Paktika Province, Afghanistan

Dr. David Kilcullen, chief strategist in Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State

Dr. Tom Marks, National Defense University Counterterrorism Fellows Program

Thursday, 4 May 

0810-1115 Panel 2, Countering Terrorist Networks, and discussion

Moderator: Dr. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., manager of Strategic 

Studies Department at Sandia National Laboratories
x

Panelists:

Dr. James JF Forest, director of Terrorism Studies and 

assistant professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military 

Academy

Dr. Jonathan David Farley, professor at the Center 

for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford 

University

Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley, president of Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc., Albuquerque and member of Defense 

Intelligence Agency Advisory Board

1130-1300 Luncheon speaker: Captain Dick Couch (USN, Ret.), 

novelist with former Underwater Demolition, SEAL, and 

CIA service; most recent book, Down Range

1315-1615 Panel 3, International Dimensions, and discussion

Moderator: Mr. Scott W. Moore, JSOU Strategic Education 

coordinator

Panelists:

Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (USA, Ret.), founding director of the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism 

Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University and former 

chair of the department of Social Sciences and founding 

director of the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point

Dr. George Emile Irani, senior project manager (Africa and 

Middle East) for Toledo International Center for Peace, 

Madrid, Spain

Dr. Sebestyen Gorka, executive director of Institute for 

Transnational Democracy and International Security, 

Hungary and author of more than 80 published pieces 

regarding terrorism, Central European reform, and organized crime

Major Thomas Copinger-Symes, principal desk officer in 

the Directorate of Counterterrorism and U.K. Operations 

in U.K. Ministry of Defense, which includes responsibility for strategic planning in support of other agencies—for 

example, the Center for Special Operations (CSO) at the 

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

Friday, 5 May

0830-1145 USSOCOM CSO Update (classified)
xi

Key Insights

The term “terrorism” is often a barrier to understanding in our 

present fight because we fail to distinguish adequately between 

the method (i.e., tactic) and logic of action. 

An insurgency is defined as an “organized movement,” and terrorism is a weapon often used by insurgents to achieve their goals, 

the overarching goal being to obtain legitimacy as a movement. 

Each different type of insurgency requires different countermeasures. The counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches of the 1960s 

cannot simply be templated; many traditional COIN approaches 

can be counterproductive.

What we are doing today is not exactly COIN, but COIN is the 

closest model for what we are facing.

We need to explore all “Long War” attributes and capabilities we 

can bring to the strategic level—alliances, international policing 

and law enforcement, preventative foreign internal defense (FID), 

interagency and international assets. 

Insurgency is a war of ideas, not of people. Seldom, if ever, has a 

country defeated an insurgency by killing insurgents.

Two typical organizational types constrain and drive behavior 

within the global insurgency: rule-based (bureaucracies) and 

relationship-based (networks). At the operational and strategic 

levels of analysis, organizational structure is very important. 

While employing international networks to counter the Al Qaeda 

terrorist network, SOF strategists should know that one cannot 

task a true network—that is, networks must be persuaded. 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1

JSOU Symposium 2006

Introduction

The Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, 

Florida) inaugural symposium 2-5 May 2006—Countering 

Global Insurgency—attracted 122 participants. The event 

was designed to present and discuss relevant issues to the special 

operations community with perspectives from experts on the theme. 

A vigorous dialogue was maintained throughout the symposium, 

giving participants much to consider as they returned to their organizations to continue working the issues. 

The symposium was framed by two keynote speakers, addressing 

global insurgency versus Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), criticality of partner nations to assist in fighting asymmetric threats, and 

the views of senior leaders in Washington. Three panels provided the 

substance and framework for the discussions and official perspectives for a way ahead. In addition, two eminent authors, Mr. Ralph 

Peters and Captain Dick Couch (U.S. Navy, Ret.), offered perspectives on the symposium theme and other relevant topics during less 

formal lunchtime discussions. 

This report summarizes the high points of the keynote addresses, 

panel discussions, and luncheon speakers in order to stimulate the 

thinking of national security professionals and leaders of special 

operations forces (SOF) who could not attend the symposium. JSOU 

would like to thank all who participated in this year’s event and is 

confident that participation was professionally rewarding for all.

JSOU president, Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, opened 

the symposium with the USSOCOM perspective. He brought several 

issues that the USSOCOM commander and his staff are addressing, 

such as identifying the current threat and its capabilities, the goals 

of the adversary, and how to deny the enemy’s achievement of these 

goals. His remarks included a brief discussion of the future of SOF 

and areas that the USSOCOM staff is working to posture SOF for the 

upcoming decade and beyond. 

3

JSOU Symposium 2006

Symposium Presentations 

and Discussion

Lieutenant General William Boykin, Keynote Address

From the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, General Boykin 

spoke to symposium participants, beginning by qualifying his 

remarks as personal opinion and not that of the federal government. 

He then offered his view on the differences between terrorism and 

insurgency. An insurgency is defined as an “organized movement,” 

and terrorism is a weapon often used by insurgents to achieve their 

goals, the overarching goal being to obtain legitimacy as a movement. 

Combating terrorism requires a primarily military approach, but a counterinsurgency effort requires a holistic approach, 

using every one of the elements of national 

power. Perhaps the key element where the 

adversary has a distinct advantage is in the information operations 

arena, as demonstrated by the use of the Internet and the Middle 

East news networks such as Al Jazeera. 

In the second part of his address, General Boykin spoke about 

some current issues facing parts of the intelligence community. The 

National Security Act of 1947 established the intelligence structure for the U.S. government, which remained basically unchanged 

until 2004. New legislation in 2004 better addressed the asymmetric 

threats faced by the U.S. and provided a framework for improved 

cooperation between the stakeholders in the intelligence community. 

Several initiatives are being implemented or developed with respect 

to Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence structure. Among 

these are the launching of two important studies to improve intelligence capability of the DoD, training and fielding of numerous tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) teams in the Army and Marine 

Corps, and building the intelligence fusion capability among the 26 

member-nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

In addition, efforts towards “operationalizing intelligence” are producing real effects. The conduct of intelligence operations is a new 

concept, aided by establishing a Joint Intelligence Operations Center 

... a counterinsurgency 

effort requires a holistic 

approach ...
4

JSOU Symposium 2006

(JIOC) in each combatant command; developing intelligence campaign plans integrated with operational plans; and by more general 

purpose forces, developing a “bottoms up” approach to intelligence 

collection, similar to the techniques applied by SOF. In response to 

field commanders requesting more actionable intelligence, General 

Boykin stated, “Take action, you’ll get intelligence.”

Mr. Wade Ishimoto, Keynote Address

Like General Boykin, Mr. Ishimoto qualified his remarks as personal opinion and not that of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). 

His address focused on three topics:

a. Answer to the question, What are we fighting

b. Dissection of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

document published in February 2003

c. Two new DoD initiatives discussing stability operations and 

threat finance. 

Immediately after 11 September 2001, the government had problems defining and analyzing the current threats as panic ensued. 

Terrorism is not the end game; the toppling of the U.S. and other 

nations’ governments is the end game. We should be concerned 

with many ongoing insurgencies all over the world, several in our 

own hemisphere. Insurgents in many cases are using the concept of 

interlocking directorates, talking and banding together in an effort 

to achieve their goals. These types of threats cannot be defeated by 

military solutions alone; all elements of national power must be harnessed if we are to be victorious. We cannot simply “throw money” 

at this threat. An important part of the approach to enhancing our 

efforts against the current threat is to “train for the known, educate 

for the unknown” (source, General Peter J. Schoomaker). 

A review of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism offered 

insights into the goals and objectives section of the document. Where 

you find terrorism in the document, you can replace it with insurgency, 

Mr. Ishimoto suggested. Similarly, where you find terrorist, you can 

replace it with insurgent. As stated in the strategy, the goals remain: 

a. Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

b. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists.
5

JSOU Symposium 2006

c. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 

exploit.

d. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.

The key elements to achieving the first goal are twofold: share intelligence information and improve our information operations capability. We are sharing intelligence between U.S. government agencies 

and between our partner nations better than ever before; however, 

we must set specific objectives in the information operations arena 

and work hard to gain an advantage in this area. With respect to the 

second goal, geography favors the adversary 

in most regions of the world. Insurgents can 

and do find sanctuary in bordering countries 

of Afghanistan and Iraq and will continue to 

do so. A positive step to deter this activity is 

the training and advising of partner nation police forces, which has 

reaped benefits in several countries, notably Iraq. Again, our information operations activity is a key element for achieving the goal of 

denying sponsorship and support of the insurgents. An objective tied 

to this goal is to “strengthen and sustain the international effort to 

fight terrorism,” the elements of which include “working with willing 

and able states, enabling weak states, persuading weak states, and 

compelling unwilling states.” The last element implies the use of military force and should not be undertaken at the expense of the other 

three elements. 

Underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit have been 

reduced by several initiatives. Mr. Ishimoto related several examples 

in the Pacific and European command theaters, both by working 

with partner nations, training, and fighting the war of wills/ideas. 

Again, information operations play a critical role in these continuing 

efforts. As for the final goal, Mr. Ishimoto related that we as a nation 

must apply risk management to protecting the populace, property, 

and interests as well as the protection of U.S. democratic principles. 

We simply cannot protect everything, he advised.

The third component of Mr. Ishimoto’s speech dealt with the 

requirement and approval to build and improve capacity to conduct 

stability operations. This DoD directive has critical, far-reaching 

implications within DoD and also to interagency partners. We have 

seen the fruits of this directive in stability operations in Iraq. 

... geography favors 

the adversary in most 

regions of the world.
6

JSOU Symposium 2006

The DoD directive regarding threat finance focuses primarily on 

the military’s tasks in identifying, collecting intelligence, and interdicting threat financial networks. This initiative also has important 

interagency implications and concentrates on cyberspace, global 

reach. It is also one of many efforts complementing the National 

Strategy addressed above. Mr. Ishimoto also discussed the Regional 

Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program as one of many efforts 

to interact with partner nations that looks promising for significant 

results with relatively small resourcing requirements. 

Panel 1, Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Moderator: Mr. Jim Bates

Countering global insurgency must be a collective U.S. National 

Interagency construct that is shaped by the diplomatic, economic, 

legal, informational, intelligence and military elements of national 

power for the Long War. The U.S. should apply the following DoD 

engagement strategy: 

a. U.S. support to insurgencies will deter, disrupt, undermine, 

neutralize, and/or replace regimes that sponsor, support, and 

give sanctuary to transnational and traditional insurgents.

b. U.S. support to our allies Host Nation (HN) Internal Defense 

and Development (IDAD) Strategy Plans must utilize Security 

Assistance (SA) and apply the principles of Foreign Internal 

Defense (FID) by properly executing the three phases of FID: 

indirect, direct, and combat operations. 

c. The principal tool HNs utilize in their IDAD strategy is COIN. 

The U.S. must provide the appropriate advisers and trainers 

(interagency and DoD) that understand the principles and 

engagement strategy of SA, FID, IDAD; think like the insurgents; and have the capabilities to help the HN formulate and 

execute a IDAD Strategy Plan to deter, disrupt, undermine, 

neutralize, and ultimately destroy the insurgents. 
7

JSOU Symposium 2006

Colonel Joe Celeski (USA, Ret.)—Strategic Aspects of COIN

Colonel Celeski relates the strategic aspects to specific desired 

actions:

a. Enhance our strategic level of understanding in analyzing 

insurgency; we already are adept at operational and tactical 

levels, but strategic “art” on this form of warfare is missing. 

b. Avoid relegating COIN to low-intensity conflict (LIC) or military 

operations other than war (MOOTW) and thereby inhibiting 

understanding the strategic aspects of this form of warfare. 

c. Establish a Center of Excellence that promotes strategic level 

thinking and develops strategic leadership for this form of 

warfare. 

d. Consider the correct strategic concepts that we want to adopt 

within the context of global insurgency; from these concepts 

will flow the correct alignment of strategic resources and 

assets. Otherwise, we will have a strategic mismatch. 

e. Ensure organizations are strategically aligned for countering 

the global insurgency (i.e., U.S. Air Force and Navy). 

f. Explore all Long War attributes and capabilities we can bring 

to the strategic level—alliances, international policing and 

law enforcement, preventative FID, interagency and international assets.

g. Prioritize our efforts in line with national strategy and goals 

for the U.S. over the next 50 years—adopt a long-term strategic outlook.

Mr. Chris Mason—Generational Warfare

Mr. Mason defines insurgency as a war of ideas, not of people. Seldom, 

if ever, has a country defeated an insurgency by killing insurgents. 

However, while the U.S. military speaks to ideas (e.g., rural development, rural security, and cultural awareness), the mindset on the 

ground remains firmly entrenched in the primacy of the kill or capture mission—killing people, not ideas. Examples are the fate of the 

disbanded Provisional Response Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan—the 

low priority of their vestigial Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) 

elements for assets—inattention to cultural, language training, and 

the continuing focus on battalion-level “sweep” operations.
8

JSOU Symposium 2006

The U.S. thinks in terms of “shaping operations for 4 months, 

decisive operations for 4 months, and Phase IV operations for 4 

months.” In contrast the Taliban is thinking in terms of “shaping 

operations for 50 years, decisive operations for 40 years, and Phase 

IV operations forever.” Specifically, the Taliban embody the classic 

strategy of the flea: “To kill the dog, make it chase a thousand little 

flea bites around and around until it drops from exhaustion.” And 

as if supportive, that’s exactly what the U.S. is doing—the Taliban 

has succeeded in getting the U.S. to fight the war using the Taliban’s 

game plan.

The Taliban could easily lose 20,000 men a year (killed in action) 

for 10 years without the slightest operational impact. The Soviets 

killing nearly a million Pashtuns did not slow down the Mujahideen. 

The Taliban will happily sacrifice 35 or 50 insurgents in a village 

in order to provoke collateral damage that costs U.S. support of the 

entire village for 100 years, exactly the same tactics used against the 

Soviets.

In just 3 years, the Taliban insurgency has regained significant political control of four Afghan provinces—Zabol, Oruzgan, Dai 

Kundi, and Ghazni—and their strength is growing. If the U.S. does 

not transform the way it thinks, trains, and fights, the U.S. will lose 

the Long War. 

Dr. David Kilcullen—Countering Global Insurgency

Dr. Kilcullen views Al Qaeda as a grass-roots movement seeking to 

change the status quo through violence, subversion, terrorism, and 

open warfare. Because this description better fits an insurgency 

(rather than classical terrorism) paradigm, COIN approaches may 

be more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism 

theory. 

Being a global insurgency (not a campaign in a single country or 

district), traditional 1960s COIN approaches cannot simply be templated. In particular, the effects of globalized media and transnational 

threat linkages make many traditional COIN approaches counterproductive. Consequently, we need “Counterinsurgency Redux”—a 

re-thought of COIN for globalized conditions. Based on this analysis, 

Dr. Kilcullen proposes considering a strategy of “disaggregation” that 

seeks to dismantle or break the links in the global insurgency. The 

result would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war.
9

JSOU Symposium 2006

Dr. Tom Marks—Revolution in Revolution: Insurgency 

in Global Insurgency

Dr. Marks sees the term “terrorism” as often a barrier to understanding in our present fight, because we fail to distinguish adequately 

between the method (i.e., tactic) and logic (i.e., strategic category) of 

action. Critical distinction is that insurgents have and seek to expand 

their mass base, thereby construct a counter state (i.e., clandestine 

infrastructure). Pure terrorism seeks to attack the innocent.

Insurgencies, of course, seek a proper mix in their use of “weapons systems” with terror being just one possibility. In the present age 

of globalism, however, local insurgencies 

have increasingly adopted terror as a 

strategy. It is their continued links with 

a mass base that distinguish them from 

pure terrorists. What we face as our foremost foe, in fighting global insurgency, are terrorist groups that have 

their origins and maintain links with local and regional insurgencies 

using opportunities provided by globalism to strike against their “far 

enemies”—especially the U.S.

While the Salafists may be our principal foe, we overlook at our 

peril the reemergence of left-wing impulse. Maoist movements, for 

instance, are a serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia and 

South Asia. The perception is that the U.S. is the premier foe and 

the leading enemy of humanity. We see local instances of the two 

major enemy groups making common cause (e.g., in the Philippines, 

where the Maoists and the Islamists have conducted at least some 

joint training). 

Local insurgencies are, for the U.S., theaters in the new global 

struggle, but we labor under serious misconceptions concerning 

insurgencies. The misconceptions include the following:

a. Misrepresenting the essentially political nature of insurgency, 

allowing the kinetic component to dominate our response, 

regardless of our verbiage to the contrary

b. Misunderstanding that insurgencies are dynamic, taking 

on different characters (and different numbers of insurgent 

groups) depending upon the moment

c. Failing to give proper respect to the doctrinal underpinnings 

of insurgent action, ignoring what they say, write, and do.

... local insurgencies have 

increasingly adopted 

terror as a strategy. 
10

JSOU Symposium 2006

Proper COIN response remains what it has always been—that 

is, get in place that which is correct (addresses the linchpins of the 

insurgency) and is sustainable (as defined by you), then play for the 

breaks. COIN strategy attacks insurgent strategy. COIN operational 

art develops concepts that address the fundamental components of 

insurgent strategy. COIN tactics dominate human terrain. Strategically, the issue in COIN is always legitimacy. Operationally, the focus 

of all campaign construction is the neutralization of the insurgent 

counter state. Tactically, all politics are local; nothing is possible 

without local security.

The vehicle for accomplishment is “the grid,” dividing up the problem physically, conceptually, and functionally to divide and seal off 

the battle space; determine tasks; assign responsibilities; establish 

coordination; dominate the population; safeguard critical infrastructure; strike insurgent units, networks, and bases; and win the hearts 

and minds of the populace (i.e., address the roots of the problem).

Panel 2, Countering Terrorist Networks

Moderator: Dr. Robert Spulak

A panel on “countering terrorist networks” supposes that we are 

fighting terrorists who are organized into networks. Not surprisingly, 

the consensus of the previous panel was that we are facing a global 

insurgency. The question of whether to call the enemy “terrorists” or 

“insurgents” is still open for discussion, but first, What about networks? We have heard that the insurgents are organized into cells 

and that “it takes a cell to fight a cell.” In the past we have also been 

told, by John Arquilla and others, that it takes a network to fight a 

network.

The idea of networks has become pervasive in modern military 

thought. In many ways all our potential enemies are thought of as 

networks. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) mission (as 

shown on their Web site) is to provide “combatant commands, Joint 

Staff, and other customers with responsive, effects-based, precision 

targeting options for selected networks and nodes in order to carry 

out national security and military strategies of the United States 

during peace, crisis, and war.”

We are also encouraged to view our military forces as networks. 

Part of the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” was to leverage 
11

JSOU Symposium 2006

information technologies for allowing our forces to fight more effectively as networks. Network-centric warfare is defined (promising 

much) as “an information-superiority enabled concept of operations 

that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased 

speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, 

increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”

Viewing terrorist enemies as networks is natural, in part, because 

we identify threats as individual terrorists and need to describe how 

they operate together to perform terrorist acts. The unclassified 

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSPWOT) explicitly identifies our enemies as networks. The NMSP-WOT 

consistently uses the term “network” to describe the nature of the 

enemy as well as their survivability, critical vulnerabilities, centers 

of gravity, and key resources.

Whether terrorists or a global insurgency, the first goal of the 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is to “defeat terrorists 

and their organizations.” And our task, according to Dr. Kilcullen, is 

to take out the global leadership. Is the global leadership a network? 

In response, Panel 2 addressed several important questions:

a. Is knowledge of the organization of terrorists the critical factor 

(e.g., relative to identification of individual terrorists or their 

capabilities)? That is, does it matter a great deal whether they 

are a network or some other kind of organization? Can you 

attack an organization, per se?

b. Can we know how the terrorists are organized in enough 

detail to matter? Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations seem 

to be difficult to penetrate. And in John Keegan’s book, Intelligence and War, he concludes, “Even real-time intelligence is 

never real enough. Only force finally counts.”

c. What is a network? How does it differ from other organizations?

d. Are terrorists really networks or is a network an abstract 

structure we are imposing on them? Is it useful?

e. How do you analyze and attack a network (or other organization)? Why is attacking a network different from attacking 

forces organized in any other way? How do you predict and 

measure the effectiveness of an attack against a network?
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Dr. Jim Forest—Combating Terrorism Networks: Agency Theory 

and Teenage Exploits

In the computer world, network connections rely on common 

languages (protocols) to establish levels of trust in the integrity of 

financial and information transactions. These protocols ensure that 

what is sent from one location in the network is received unaltered 

in another location of the network. There are additional dimensions 

of trust, such as an understanding that the sender and recipient are 

who they claim to be, financial transactions are secure, and “nobody 

is listening or watching” to what you are doing online.

The protocols of human networks also exist; trust is established 

by various social mechanisms (e.g., family, neighborhood, tribe, and 

clan) and shared beliefs (e.g., religion and academic discipline). Trust 

is a vital component to any organization, including networked organizations. For the global Islamic insurgency network, trusted relationships are established via common ideology, shared experience, 

religious knowledge (in addition to the social mechanisms described 

above); in essence, we must gain a comprehensive understanding 

of the different protocols that represent the various levels of trust 

within this network. 

In the computer world, hackers (a number of them highly-skilled 

teenagers) attack networks by infiltrating and corrupting nodes and 

protocols. If you attack the network nodes, you get one kind of result 

(e.g., if you attack amazon.com, people will just go to barnesandnoble.com). But if you can corrupt/damage the protocols, you can 

impact the entire network (hence why Microsoft Internet Explorer 

and other browser vulnerabilities are so critical and have to constantly update your software). Overall, if you diminish the ability 

of the network to support critical transactions, people will find the 

network less valuable; thus, it may be useful to adopt the hackers’ 

strategies and tactics against terrorist networks.

Human networks have vulnerabilities that can be exploited, bonds 

of trust that can be broken in order to degrade the network capabilities. We should focus on issues of preference divergence rather than 

ideology (e.g., strategic and tactical directions, financial accountability, and methods and responsibilities for maintaining network 

security). We should also increase levels of suspicion and mistrust in 

the network (e.g., make funds “disappear” for no reason, then have 
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a big-screen TV conspicuously delivered to the family of someone 

responsible for financial transactions) and discredit perceptions of 

good (e.g., competence, trustworthiness) of key members. In summary, while identifying and apprehending network nodes (individual 

terrorists) are still important, we must act as follows:

a. Degrade the integrity of their networks.

b. Diminish the capability (e.g., of reliable communication, 

financial transactions, command and control, and operational security). 

c. Exploit the agency problems (e.g., divergence of preferences 

over ideology, direction of strategy; information, funding, 

and the authority and credibility with respect to the use of 

violence to achieve goals) and discredit the belief systems 

and values (i.e., corrupt the protocols) that bind the nodes 

together (e.g., demonstrate hypocrisy and misinterpretations 

of the Koran—i.e., info ops). 

d. Avoid doing things that strengthen their network bonds.

Dr. Jonathan David Farley— Breaking Terrorist Cells

Dr. Farley discussed how mathematics can be used as a tool to 

understand the effectiveness of attacks against terrorist cells by disconnecting command and control from top to bottom. His discussion 

was based on his published work in this area, including “Breaking 

Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making),” Studies 

in Conflict & Terrorism, 26:399–411, 2003. 

The primary example of mathematical analysis that Dr. Farley 

discussed was graph theory, where terrorist organizations are modeled as graphs with individuals as nodes and their connections as 

edges. Among other things, mathematics can be used to estimate the 

probability that the removal of a certain number of nodes (terrorists) 

will create a cut set that eliminates the ability of all the terrorists 

to communicate with the leadership. Dr. Farley also discussed the 

application of other mathematical techniques for guiding the use of 

resources against terrorist organizations and was candid about the 

real-world limitations of mathematical analysis. Overall, Dr. Farley’s 

presentation stimulated good discussion about the effectiveness of 

modeling terrorist organizations and the application and limitations 

of mathematical analysis. 
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Dr. Jessica Turnley—Countering Terrorist Networks: The Role of 

Organizational Structure

As an anthropologist, Dr. Turnley shared that an organization is a 

group of people with a common purpose where collectivity is more 

than just connectivity. A common purpose makes a qualitative difference, and organizational structure is the pattern(s) of connections 

among the group of people with a common purpose.

Two typical organizational types constrain and drive behavior 

within the global insurgency (and while no organization is purely one 

or the other, all organizations exist somewhere between the two):

a. Rule-based (bureaucracies) have actors that exist independent of the organization, and there is a high division of labor. 

These organizations are heavily process-oriented, focused on 

formalism (rules and administration), and concerned with 

reliability. Loyalty is given to processes and offices, not persons, and the organizations exist over time.

b. Relationship-based (networks) have actors that are defined by 

the relationships, and there is a low division of labor. Because 

loyalty is given to persons, networks are one-dimensional 

descriptions of multi-dimensional phenomena. In addition, they 

are ephemeral but do not address the dynamics of change.

The table below compares the two archetypical organizations and 

gives some implications for action. 

Organizational 

Characteristic

Organization Type Implications for 

Rule-Based Networked Action

Unit of significance Function Individual Harder to eliminate 

functions in networks

Power and 

authority

Derived from 

location of 

function

Derived from 

characteristics 

of individual

Individuals matter in 

networks

Source of solidarity 

(how individuals 

invest in group)

Rules Trust Impacts how one engages with/infiltrates 

a network

Inclusion Tends to depend 

upon achieved 

characteristics

Tends to depend 

upon ascribes 

characteristics

Individuals occupy 

relatively stable places 

in networks

Dynamics of change Inherent in the 

rules

Exogenous to the 

network

Need other analytic 

techniques to introduce dynamics to 

networks
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Based on this analysis, we can make an operational assessment 

of networks. With respect to offensive characteristics, networks can 

exhibit a swarming capability and thus a common purpose can 

develop. On one hand, swarming can “emerge,” and no resources are 

diverted to organizational development. On the other hand, swarms 

can be difficult to control and manage. Networks have a low division of 

labor. This distributed functionality makes the destruction of a function difficult; networks have 

the ability to rapidly “repair” 

the network by replacing 

individuals, but it is also difficult to perform complicated 

tasks requiring high levels of 

specialized knowledge and 

extensive coordination.

With respect to the effectiveness of a network structure to defend 

an organization, the low division of labor reduces vulnerability to 

[functional] decapitation and contributes the potential for quick 

action as command decisions are made locally. On the other hand, the 

network structure reduces the certainty of command and increases 

reliance on key individuals. Networks also allow actor self-definition 

through multiple channels. Redundant information channels allow 

rapid redefinition of communication channels based on need and the 

ability to quickly “repair” or construct new networks. But role choice 

freedom can reduce responsiveness to a common purpose. The low 

division of labor increases information flow since everyone is a collector and analyst, but it creates the potential for fragmentation of 

information.

Networks can contribute to speed of action, again through the low 

division of labor and increased information flow, but the low division of 

labor also leads to the lack of repositories of deep, specialized knowledge. Actor self-definition through multiple channels also leads to 

increased speed since the multiplicity of operational networks allows 

rapid redefinition of communication and other channels based on 

need but leads to a lack of predictability and reliability of response. In 

addition, networks have the ability to grow through addition of “modules,” which reduces recruitment time and leads to high situational 

knowledge. Again, however, the modularity leads to lack of control 

over subnetworks and high reliance on key individuals.

... networks have the ability to rapidly 

“repair” the network by replacing 

individuals, but it is also difficult to 

perform complicated tasks requiring 

high levels of specialized knowledge 

and extensive coordination.
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Networks can also be combat multipliers because of the ease of 

growth, where additions can lead to qualitative changes in capabilities. It is easy to add high levels of local knowledge. On the other 

hand, friction can arise from the lack of control over subnetworks 

and high reliance on key individuals. Networks contribute to mission flexibility because of the devolution of authority to the local level 

(nodes) allowing tailoring of missions to local conditions, but networks also have the potential for organizational fragmentation.

In summary, organizations are collections of connected people 

with a common purpose. The characteristics and attributes of structure (patterns of connection) do constrain and drive behavior in organizational contexts. Organizational structure may matter less at the 

tactical level; but at the operational and strategic level, organizational structure is very important.

Panel 3, International Dimensions

Moderator: Mr. Scott Moore

Until just recently, insurgencies have been regarded in doctrine as 

being national problems. Insurgency is defined as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 

use of subversion and armed conflict.” The national response—counterinsurgency—is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, 

economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 

to defeat insurgency.” Fueling our post-9/11 strategic debate is the 

realization that the apparent global orchestration of terrorist activities by Al Qaeda and associated movements challenges the preeminence of the nation-state that has been the international norm since 

the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 

One could debate whether and to what extent the nation-state 

construct is truly at risk and under attack by terrorists and other 

non-state actors. Panel 3 was charged to accept that after 9/11 the 

U.S. Government with the help of international allies decided to send 

a message to the terrorists and to the sovereign nations of the world 

that terrorism is an unacceptable and illegitimate form of political 

violence that will no longer be tolerated. 

In the foreword of the 2006 National Security Strategy, President 

Bush characterizes the strategic alternative for America as facing 
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“...a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear—isolationism and protectionism, 

retreat and retrenchment—appeals to those who find our 

challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities.... 

This Administration has chosen the path of confidence.... 

We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving 

them for future generations.... We seek to shape the world, 

not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better 

instead of being at their mercy.” 

The foreword closes with the President describing the second pillar 

of our National Security Strategy as “...confronting the challenges of 

our time by leading a growing community of democracies”...to face 

problems that reach across borders. He acknowledges the international dimensions of our strategy by stating, “Effective multinational 

efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown 

that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must 

continue to lead.”

To lead effectively, the U.S. seeks to recognize and understand the 

relevant dimensions of the kind of war we are fighting. In the interest of stimulating a rich debate about the consequences of waging 

an international long war on terrorism, terrorists, or insurgents, 

Panel 3 addressed these key questions: 

a. What are the international implications of the GWOT under 

U.S. leadership?

b. Does the threat from Al Qaeda and its associated movements 

qualify as a global insurgency, and if so, what are the lessons 

learned for countering insurgencies that are relevant to this 

global campaign?

c. Assuming that it is important for us to clearly define the 

threat as a prerequisite for developing and executing a strategy to counter it, what are the most important distinctions 

between counterterrorism (CT) and COIN strategy, and how 

do these distinctions change our actions?

d. Though admittedly difficult, and perhaps even unrealistic, 

there is much talk about the need for the U.S. to harness and 

focus all of the elements of U.S. national power in a concerted 

war effort against global terrorism. What can realistically be 
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done to harness and focus international power to wage and 

win the war?

e. The people are the prize in this conflict as the populace provides the basis for legitimacy and success for insurgents—

terrorists or the Government(s)—but countering the threat 

from terrorists and insurgents is not a priority for most of the 

global populace. How can sovereign governments of the world 

win over their people without compromising either the war or 

the principles over which it is being fought? 

Brigadier General Russ Howard (USA, Ret.)—Global Insurgency? GWOT?

The title of the symposium suggests that we are fighting a global 

insurgency against a networked enemy and therefore our actions 

should be guided by counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposition 

that the GWOT should be viewed as 

a “global insurgency” is misleading. 

Instead, there are several ongoing 

insurgencies that collectively have global impact. The typology outlining 14 different types of insurgencies (mostly from Dr. Steve Metz, 

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute) argues that four 

different types are ongoing in Iraq: 

a. Anarchist conducted by international fighters

b. Traditionalist conducted by Sadr’s militia

c. Preservationist conducted by former Ba’athists

d. Commercial conducted by criminal elements in Iraq. 

In the early stages of the GWOT, policy makers discounted the 

notion of insurgency because the “revolutionary insurgency” model 

familiar to them was not a factor. Then once policymakers realized 

that insurgency was a factor, they tried to counter it using “revolutionary insurgency” methods and failed. Each type of insurgency 

requires different countermeasures. 

Brigadier General Howard also shared that the U.S. is not 

engaged in a GWOT, nor is the nation mobilized that way, citing 

World War II as the comparative model. Thirty six percent of the U.S. 

gross domestic product (GDP) was directed toward that war effort, 

and 16.6 million men and women were in uniform when Japan surrendered. Presently, the U.S. devotes 4 percent of its GDP toward the 

war effort, and there are only 2 million men and women in uniform. 

The proposition that the GWOT 

should be viewed as a “global 

insurgency” is misleading. 
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Dr. George Irani—GWOT Challenges and Recommendations

Alternatively, Dr. Irani argues that since September 2001, the U.S. 

has adopted a confrontational approach towards Arabs and Muslims. 

The trauma of the criminal and terrorist attack on the Twin Towers 

was used as justification to give free reign to the use of raw military 

power and heavy political intervention in the Middle East. The staging ground for this new policy was Afghanistan, a well-known base 

for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. A traditional and sane U.S. concern for stability was quickly set aside to be replaced by a crusade 

towards democratization of Arabs and Muslims. The GWOT is a war 

on an abstraction that cannot be won by traditional military means.

Beneath the GWOT façade, we are witnessing an arm-wrestling 

match between the U.S. led by Britain and France on one hand; and 

Iran, Syria, and their allies on the other hand. In terms of international/multilateral cooperation to track and contain emerging 

threats, the situation is not too promising despite the mobilization 

of the “coalition of the willing” to fight the war in Iraq. The “willing” 

have seen their numbers dwindling as was dramatized, for instance, 

by the decision of Spain to remove its troops from Iraq. 

In order to stabilize a fragile and unstable Middle East, much 

more sensitive attention must be paid to interrelated local and 

regional factors. The Middle East today is in transition. Westerninspired ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism have failed dismally. We are 

assisting in the formation of new, 

black-and-white Arab and Islamic 

identities based on reconstructed 

notions of history, religion, and 

culture coupled with a growing 

hatred of anything that has to 

do with the U.S. culture. For the 

remainder of this century, the U.S. 

and the West will have to figure out 

a viable modus vivendi with the 

Islamist forces that are slowly but surely gaining power (witness the 

wins of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas overwhelming 

victory in Palestine). 

We are assisting in the formation of new, black-and-white 

Arab and Islamic identities 

based on reconstructed notions 

of history, religion, and culture 

coupled with a growing hatred 

of anything that has to do with 

the U.S. culture.
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Having recharacterized the threat and the nature of our struggle 

in the Middle East, Dr. Irani concluded by offering his prescription 

for success: 

a. The U.S. will have to seriously contribute to the resolution of 

the Palestinian Israeli conflict as a truly neutral party.

b. Gradually withdraw direct and active military presence and 

return to the benign and enlightened presence that characterized U.S. profiles in the past. 

c. America ought to replace hegemonic designs with policies 

that are sensitive to societies who are in desperate search for 

their role in the global community. 

d. As America’s ethnic composition is changing, U.S. foreign 

policy ought to reflect this change. 

e. Return to the United Nations and the rule of international 

law, and work out a role for the Europeans in coordination 

with the various governments in the Arab and Islamic countries. 

f. Lastly, discretely encourage emerging civil societies in the 

Middle East—both secular and religious—to work together at 

defining what shape their societies will have in the future.

Dr. Seb Gorka—The International Dimensions of the Long War

There are those who would argue that while Al Qaeda is a murderous and deadly organization, it does not pose an overarching threat 

to the community of Western democratic nations. To these people, a 

key point must be made:

Al Qaeda, the most powerful terrorist group of the modern 

age (killing thousands in a matter of minutes) has achieved 

something that the Soviet Union never did—the mass 

murder of Americans (and other nationals) on U.S. soil and 

later Spain and the U.K. 

And yes, while this mutation of the 1980s Mujahedeen movement does not possess regiments of T-82 tanks or batteries of 

SS-20 missiles, it is more disturbing than the USSR was in one key 

respect. For although Khrushchev may have rhetorically promised 

to “bury us,” he and his Kremlin successors never did in fact take 

the step against America and its allies. He and his administration 
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never initiated conflict because were fundamentally rational actors 

constrained and deterred by the thought of nuclear retaliation. In 

contrast, bin Laden is wholly different. He has declared repeatedly 

that he has the intention to use weapons of mass destruction as 

soon as he can acquire them. Against his ilk, deterrence policy has 

no hold. 

To the question of whether or not the current conflict is to be 

understood as a global insurgency and how much can prior lessons 

of counterinsurgency help us to fight Al Qaeda, Dr. Gorka agreed 

with Dr. Kilcullen who said, “What we are doing today is not exactly 

COIN, but COIN is the closest model we have to the situation we are 

in fact facing.” As a result, the principles of counterinsurgency are 

most useful. Nevertheless we have to understand that we are not 

limited strictly to a counterinsurgency scenario because Al Qaeda is 

not limited to the nation-state envelope.

We need to be realistic about what can be achieved through 

public diplomacy and information policies as well as understanding exactly who the target audience of such campaigns truly are. 

The job of the people such as Karen Hughes, when addressing the 

populations that are potentially in agreement with bin Laden, or who 

are simply indifferent, should not in the first instance be to make 

America look good. 

What we need today is to arrive at a theory of victory rather than 

reducing ourselves to relying on a strategy of tactics. We need to 

not only learn the lessons of prior insurgencies and terrorist campaigns but also practice them, and most importantly, we need to 

return to the basics and understand in its marrow the core principle 

that General Carl von Clausewitz left for us. When he discussed the 

connection between war and politics, his meaning was not as we 

often understand it today—that is, war is some isolated activity that 

occurs when politics runs out of options. 

Clausewitz’s description of war as a “continuation of politics by 

other means” was nothing more than an illumination of the unity of 

both activities. While it may be trite to say that politics is war, what 

von Clausewitz really meant to emphasize is that war is politics and 

as such, victory will only come if we are clear about the desired political goal, and we will only achieve that goal if all the tools of politics, 

not just force, are deployed to that end.
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Major Tom Copinger-Symes—Global Counterinsurgency or Global 

Counterterrorism: What’s in a Name?

In Major Copinger-Symes’s view, the GWOT is not an insurgency 

because the U.S. government is not threatened. True or not, the rest 

of the world thinks that the U.S. Department of Defense is running 

the war. Perhaps the U.S. is “sweating the small stuff,” asking rhetorically whether the margin of error lies in the difference between CT 

and COIN or in that we are not doing either of them very well? 

Reviewing and comparing the British doctrinal principles of COIN 

versus CT, Major Copinger-Symes concluded that the enduring principles of COIN should apply to the GWOT. Those principles are as 

follows:

a. Ensure political primacy and a clear political aim.

b. Build coordinated government machinery.

c. Develop intelligence and information.

d. Neutralize the insurgent.

e. Plan for the long term.

Luncheon Speakers

Mr. Ralph Peters

Mr. Peters offered views on the current insurgency in Iraq and shared 

his knowledge of the region. He provided a description of the strategic setting in which the U.S. must operate to counter the global 

insurgency. Mr. Peters shared insights about the shattering of traditional societies and the resultant affect upon regional and global 

security. One outcome is the advent of the series of suicidal bombers 

who employ an imaginative precision weapons system as a religions 

act, thereby seizing international attention. Mr. Peters’ talk provoked 

a vigorous and challenging question-and-answer period concerning 

U.S. strategic approaches to countering terrorism.

Captain Dick Couch (U.S. Navy, Ret.)

Captain Couch highlighted the high state of SOF training and related 

how this innovative, realistic, and challenging training ensures success on the field and creates a mindset of confidence, competence, 

and commitment. Several vignettes were offered as sterling examples 

of the warrior ethos, learned in stressful training environments that 
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closely paralleled actual combat. Captain Couch praised this generation of special operations warriors, recognizing those participants in 

uniform at the outset for their service in Afghanistan and Iraq. He also 

provided views on the capabilities of coalition special operations. 

Summary/Next Steps

The inaugural JSOU Symposium was a success from the standpoint 

of sharing information and insights from senior government officials 

and panelists. Participants gained an appreciation for the complexity of the threats we are facing and the ramifications of U.S. and 

partner nation courses of action against these complex threats. As 

with most events of this type, much was accomplished outside of 

the agenda activities as new relationships were forged. The challenge 

following this symposium is to answer the question, What is next? 

In response, JSOU is investigating appropriate topics and venues for 

next year’s symposium. 

The JSOU summary of presentations and discussions provides 

the following benefits:

a. Serves as a record for those in attendance and a baseline for 

further discussion. 

b. Informs those who could not participate about what transpired 

and join the dialogue among colleagues on topics covered. 

c. Facilitates briefing senior SOF leaders about the topics and 

encourages them to consider key concepts as they develop 

future plans and operations.

JSOU appreciates the support of the Fellows and friends who 

contributed to the success of this symposium through their presentations and participation in the strategy debate. 

JSOU Symposium 2007

The Joint Special Operations University will hold its next symposium 

1-4 May 2007 at Hurlburt Field, Florida on issues of strategic importance to the special operations community.