No

No. 98-449

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1999 MT 254

296 Mont. 311

989 P.2d 356

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF

MELVIN D. JOHNSON,

Petitioner and Respondent,

and

CORLISS A. JOHNSON,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial 

District,

In and for the County of Cascade,

The Honorable Robert S. Keller, Judge presiding.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (1 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Kenneth Olson, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent:

Marcia Birkenbuel, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 27, 1999

Decided: October 21, 1999G4

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ Corliss Johnson (Corliss) appeals from the Order entered by the Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Cascade County, denying her motion to enforce her Decree of 

Dissolution (Decree) by requiring Melvin Johnson (Melvin) to pay $7,192 as his share 

of their daughter’s medical related expenses. We affirm.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (2 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

¶ We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

¶ 1. Is the District Court’s finding that the Anasazi Foundation treatment does not 

qualify as a medical related expense contemplated by the Decree clearly erroneous?

¶ 2. Did the District Court err by failing to enter sufficient findings of fact to justify 

its denial of Corliss’ motion to enforce the Decree?

BACKGROUND¶ On April 15, 1992, the District Court entered a Decree dissolving 

Melvin and Corliss’ marriage. Under the Decree, Melvin was responsible for the 

medical, dental, optical, hospital and other medical related expenses of the parties’ 

three minor children and was required to maintain a supplemental insurance policy 

to cover those expenses not covered by Champus, his insurance provider.

¶ The court subsequently modified the Decree. Pursuant to the modification, Melvin 

became responsible for 58%, and Corliss for 42%, of the children’s medical, dental, 

orthodontic, optical, hospital and other medical related expenses not paid by 

insurance.

¶ In 1996, Corliss had problems with the parties’ daughter Hayley which led to 

police intervention. Hayley was taken to the Cascade County Juvenile Detention 

Center and, on her release, was placed in foster care for several months and ordered 

into counseling. Following unsuccessful local counseling, Corliss sought to admit 

Hayley to the Anasazi Foundation (Anasazi), an outdoor wilderness treatment 

program for behavioral problems, including drug and alcohol abuse, located in 

Arizona. She asked Melvin to pay his 58% share of the expenses for Hayley’s 

Anasazi treatment, but Melvin refused. Hayley subsequently was admitted to 

Anasazi for approximately two months, incurring $15,000 in expenses which were 

decreased to $12,400 by a scholarship. Corliss borrowed her 42% share of the 

remaining Anasazi bill from her mother and Melvin’s 58% share from her church, 

on the understanding that she would work in the church library 20 hours per week.

¶ In June of 1996, Corliss moved the District Court to enforce the medical related 

expense provision of the Decree by requiring Melvin to pay $7,192--58%--of the 

Anasazi bill for Hayley’s treatment. During the hearing on her motion, Corliss 

testified about the problems she had had with the parties’ older son, Dan, the positive 

results from his Anasazi treatment, and the similarities between Dan’s experience 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (3 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

and the problems and results she experienced with Hayley. She also testified that Dr. 

Catherine White, a pediatrician, prescribed treatment at Anasazi for Hayley, but did 

not recall Dr. White’s diagnosis or produce a copy of the diagnosis or referral. 

Finally, Corliss testified that a person could send a child to Anasazi without a 

medical referral and, in fact, the only purpose of the medical referral was to 

substantiate medical necessity and propriety of treatment for insurance purposes. 

Melvin testified Corliss simply decided Hayley was going to Anasazi for treatment 

and asked him to pay his share without giving a specific reason other than that 

Hayley was unmanageable. He further testified that Champus pays for treatment 

programs that are medically required. While Melvin agreed that Hayley had 

behavioral problems, he testified that, when Hayley lived with him, he observed 

disciplinary problems on which he worked with her and made progress. Following 

the hearing, the District Court orally found that Hayley’s Anasazi treatment was not 

a medical expense.

¶ Corliss subsequently moved for reconsideration of the court’s oral determination. 

The court denied her motion to reconsider and entered an order denying her motion 

to enforce the Decree’s medical related expense provision by requiring Melvin to pay 

58% of the Anasazi bill for Hayley’s treatment. Corliss appeals.

DISCUSSION¶ 1. Is the District Court’s finding that the Anasazi treatment does not 

qualify as a medical related expense contemplated by the Decree clearly erroneous?

¶ The modified Decree provides that Melvin is responsible for 58% of the children’s 

medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, hospital and other medical related expenses not 

paid by insurance. Corliss moved the District Court to enforce this provision by 

requiring Melvin to pay his share for Hayley’s treatment at Anasazi.

¶ At the conclusion of the hearing on Corliss’ motion, the District Court determined 

that the parties had agreed to send Dan to Anasazi for treatment, and that since 

Melvin had not agreed to send Hayley to Anasazi for treatment, the court could 

require Melvin to pay his share of the expenses for Hayley’s treatment only if 

Hayley’s treatment was considered a medical expense under the parties’ Decree. The 

court continued that it did not find that Hayley’s Anasazi treatment was a medical 

expense under the parties’ Decree, explaining that it did not have Dr. White’s 

referral, Champus denied payment for Hayley’s Anasazi treatment, and Corliss 

testified that a medical referral was not necessary to send a child to Anasazi for 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (4 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

treatment. The court subsequently entered its order finding "that said treatment 

does not qualify as a ‘medical related expense’ as contemplated by the Decree of 

Dissolution" and denied Corliss’ motion. Corliss contends the District Court’s 

finding disregarded the evidence, including the medical referral and Melvin paying 

for similar treatment for Dan. She further contends that, because Melvin is required 

to pay 58% of the medical expenses not covered by insurance, he cannot use the 

insurance denial to avoid paying his share.

¶ We review a district court’s findings of fact to determine whether the findings are 

clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence, if the trial court misapprehended the effect of the 

evidence, or if our review of the record convinces us that the district court made a 

mistake. Kovarik v. Kovarik, 1998 MT 33, ¶ 20, 287 Mont. 350, ¶ 20, 954 P.2d 1147, ¶ 

20 (citation omitted). Thus, we focus first on whether substantial evidence supports 

the court’s finding that the Anasazi treatment was not a medical related expense 

contemplated by the Decree.

¶ Melvin testified Corliss told him she was sending Hayley to Anasazi because Hayley 

was unmanageable and never indicated that a medical problem necessitated the 

Anasazi treatment. He further testified that Champus would pay for medically 

required treatment programs. In that regard, Corliss testified Champus refused to 

pay for Hayley’s Anasazi treatment. Moreover, while the parties agreed that Hayley 

had behavioral problems, Melvin testified that when Hayley lived with him, they 

made good progress on observed disciplinary problems when he set clear 

consequences for her actions and worked with her. In his view, Hayley’s problems 

were disciplinary, rather than medical, especially since Corliss applied to Champus 

for payment and payment was denied. On this record, we conclude that the District 

Court’s finding that the Anasazi treatment did not qualify as a medical related 

expense contemplated by the Decree was supported by substantial evidence.

¶ Corliss contends, however, that her testimony regarding Dr. White’s referral of 

Hayley to Anasazi for treatment supported her motion and the District Court erred 

in disregarding it. Her contention ignores our standard of review, which is not 

whether we could be persuaded to reach a different result after considering the same 

evidence, but whether the evidence supported the district court’s finding. Pfeifer v. 

Pfeifer (1997), 282 Mont. 461, 474, 938 P.2d 684, 692 (citation omitted).

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (5 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

¶ In any event, it is clear from the District Court’s oral determinations that it did not 

disregard Corliss’ testimony, but simply was not persuaded by the testimony absent 

Dr. White’s actual diagnosis and referral. Nor was the District Court obligated to 

accept Corliss’ unsubstantiated testimony on that subject. In In re Marriage of Nash

(1992), 254 Mont. 231, 235-36, 836 P.2d 598, 601, we held that a trial court was free 

to disregard a party’s unsubstantiated estimate of increased cost of living in another 

geographical area for purposes of obtaining a variance from the child support 

determined under the child support guidelines. Similarly, in In re Marriage of 

Feisthamel (1987), 227 Mont. 321, 328, 739 P.2d 474, 479, we concluded that the court 

did not abuse its discretion in valuing the parties’ home based on a dated appraisal 

rather than on the husband’s unsubstantiated estimate of its current value. Here, as 

in Marriage of Nash and Marriage of Feisthamel, the District Court was not bound by 

Corliss’ unsubstantiated testimony regarding Dr. White’s referral.

¶ Corliss also contends that the District Court ignored her evidence that Melvin paid 

for the same treatment for Dan and that Melvin’s payment of those expenses for Dan 

obligates him to pay for the same expenses for Hayley. Again, however, the District 

Court did not ignore this evidence. It specifically addressed the evidence at the end of 

the hearing, explaining that Melvin’s payment for Dan’s treatment was by agreement 

of the parties rather than under the Decree and, therefore, that payment was 

irrelevant to a determination of whether Hayley’s treatment was a medical related 

expense under the Decree.

¶ Corliss next argues that Melvin’s justification for refusing to pay Hayley’s Anasazi 

treatment expenses violates the express language of the Decree. She contends that, 

because the Decree required Melvin to pay 58% of "other medical related expenses 

for the minor children, which are not paid by insurance," Melvin cannot rely on 

Champus’ denial of the claim to justify his decision not to pay for the Anasazi 

treatment.

¶ It is true that the Decree clearly contemplated the possibility of medical related 

expenses not covered by insurance. That begs the question at issue here, however, 

because the Decree obligated Melvin only for "medical related expenses" not covered 

by insurance. Having concluded that the District Court’s finding that the Anasazi 

expenses were not medically related was supported by substantial evidence, we need 

not address this argument further.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (6 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

¶ Finally, Corliss asks this Court to take judicial notice of the myriad of medical 

diagnoses symptomized by "behavioral problems," but she advances no authorities 

under which it would be proper for us to do so. Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., requires 

an appellant to cite to authorities supporting the contentions made on appeal and we 

regularly decline to address unsupported issues or arguments. See, e.g., In re 

Marriage of Huotari (1997), 284 Mont. 285, 289, 943 P.2d 1295, 1298; In re Marriage 

of Lee (1997), 282 Mont. 410, 421, 938 P.2d 650, 657; Johansen v. State, Dept. of 

Natural Resources, 1998 MT 51, ¶ 24, 288 Mont. 39, ¶ 24, 955 P.2d 653, ¶ 24. Corliss 

having failed to comply with Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., with regard to her request 

for judicial notice, we decline to address that request further.

¶ We hold that substantial evidence supports the District Court’s finding that the 

Anasazi treatment does not qualify as a medical related expense contemplated by the 

Decree and the finding is not otherwise clearly erroneous.

¶ 2. Did the District Court err by failing to enter sufficient findings of fact to justify its 

denial of Corliss’ motion to enforce the Decree?

¶ Corliss urges that the total absence of findings by the District Court in its order 

denying her motion to enforce the Decree necessitates vacating the order and 

remanding for rehearing. She relies on such cases as In re Marriage of Bliss (1980), 

187 Mont. 331, 609 P.2d 1209 and Jones v. Jones (1980), 190 Mont. 221, 620 P.2d 850.

¶ In both Marriage of Bliss and Jones, we remanded for entry of specific findings. 

Our reasons for doing so were two-fold. First, the purpose of findings of fact is to 

provide a foundation for the court’s judgment and, as a result, the findings must set 

forth the determining facts upon which the court rests its ultimate facts and 

conclusions of law. Jones, 190 Mont. at 224, 620 P.2d at 851 (remanding for specific 

findings supporting the trial court’s ultimate finding of the best interest of the child). 

In Marriage of Bliss, the trial court failed to enter the statutorily required findings 

that substantial and continuing changes made the current child support provisions 

unconscionable. We stated that "[a]bsent the necessary findings, this Court will not 

independently search the record to determine if there is nonetheless an evidentiary 

basis for the order modifying the child support provisions." Marriage of Bliss, 187 

Mont. at 335, 609 P.2d at 1212. Our second concern was that, without adequate 

findings, this Court is forced to speculate as to the reasons for the court’s decision. 

Jones, 190 Mont. at 224, 620 P.2d at 852.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (7 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

¶ In the present case, however, we need not search the record for an evidentiary basis 

or speculate as to the reasons for the District Court’s decision. In its oral findings at 

the end of the hearing, the court relied on Corliss’ own testimony that anyone could 

send their child to Anasazi without a medical referral, Champus’ denial of payment 

of the Anasazi treatment, and Corliss’ failure to produce Dr. White’s alleged medical 

diagnosis and referral. These findings provided both an adequate basis for the 

court’s ultimate finding that the Anasazi treatment does not qualify as a medical 

related expense contemplated by the Decree and an adequate basis for our review.

¶ We hold that the District Court entered sufficient findings of fact to justify its 

denial of Corliss’ motion to enforce the Decree.

¶ Affirmed.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting.

¶28 I dissent. The decree, as modified, required Melvin to pay 58% of the children's 

medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, hospital and other medical related expenses not paid 

by insurance. Here, the insurance company refused coverage for Hayley's treatment at the 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (8 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM
No

Anasazi Foundation. Obviously the lack of insurance coverage does not mean that the 

treatment is not medically related. A contrary holding would nullify the entire provision 

requiring payment of expenses not paid by insurance. Rather, "medical[ly] related" has to 

be interpreted in the context of the parties' intent and practice. Melvin agreed that Hayley, 

like her brother, had behavioral problems. Furthermore, Melvin had previously paid for 

similar behavioral treatment for his son at the Anasazi Foundation. Given this history, and 

the fact that a pediatrician had referred Hayley to Anasazi, the treatment in question was 

clearly medically "related" as contemplated by the parties in their decree. Pursuant to Rule 

52(a), M.R.Civ.P., I would reverse for the reason that the District Court misapprehended 

the effect of the evidence. 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice James C. Nelson joins in Justice Leaphart's foregoing dissent.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-449_(10-21-99)_Opinion_.htm (9 of 9)4/9/2007 1:13:23 PM