December 2010 

NASA/TM-2010-216877 

 

Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C) 

Design Overview and Flight Test Results from 

NASA’s Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) 

Cornelius J. Dennehy/NESC 

Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 

Raymond J. Lanzi and Philip R. Ward 

Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Virginia 
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December 2010 

NASA/TM-2010-216877 

 

Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C) 

Design Overview and Flight Test Results from 

NASA’s Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) 

Cornelius J. Dennehy/NESC 

Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 

Raymond J. Lanzi and Philip R. Ward 

Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Virginia 
Available from: 

NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 

7115 Standard Drive 

Hanover, MD 21076-1320 

443-757-5802 

Acknowledgments 

The authors wish to express their appreciation to their MLAS teammates, their 

peer reviewers, their engineering support contractors, their NESC management 

and colleagues, the WFF Code 598 Branch (their GPS Lab in particular), and the 

Wallops Rocket Club staff for their diverse contributions towards ensuring the 

success of the GN&C team on this exciting flight test project. The authors also 

wish to express special thanks to Joel Simpson, Jim Beaty, Brett Vincent, Carl 

Snow, Dan Yuchnovicz, Bob Beil, Omar Torres, and Brian Tibbetts for their 

noteworthy personal technical contributions to the success of the MLAS GN&C 

system. Dee Bullock, an NESC technical editor, is acknowledged for her detailed 

review and editing of this paper. Scott Glubke, the GSFC Code 590 Chief 

Engineer, is acknowledged for his thoughtful review of and detailed commentary 

on this paper. 

The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in the report is for accurate reporting and does not 

constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
iii 

Table of Contents 

1.0 Introduction and Background .......................................................................................... 1

2.0 Baseline Orion Launch Abort System Design ................................................................. 3

3.0 MLAS Pad Abort Flight Test Objectives......................................................................... 4

4.0 MLAS Design Concept ...................................................................................................... 4

4.1 Passive Flight Control ...................................................................................................... 6

5.0 MLAS Pad Abort Flight Test Operations ....................................................................... 7

4.2 Landing and Recovery System (Decelerator) Events Overview ...................................... 9

6.0 MLAS FTV Elements ...................................................................................................... 10

7.0 Driving Technical Issues for MLAS Design and Development ................................... 12

7.1 Critical Event Command Initiation Methods ................................................................. 12

7.2 Initial Turning Maneuver During Early Boost ............................................................... 14

7.3 Aerodynamic Stability.................................................................................................... 14

7.4 Relative Separation Distances ........................................................................................ 15

7.5 Parachute Loads Management ....................................................................................... 16

7.6 GN&C Instrumentation .................................................................................................. 17

7.7 System Verification Methods ......................................................................................... 18

8.0 Flight Test Results............................................................................................................ 20

9.0 Conclusions and Lessons Learned .................................................................................. 26

10.0 References ......................................................................................................................... 27

List of Figures 

Figure 1. Orion LAS. .................................................................................................................... 3

Figure 2. MLAS ‘back of the napkin’ drawing. ........................................................................... 5

Figure 3. Refined MLAS ‘back of the napkin’ drawing. ............................................................. 5

Figure 4. MLAS FTV on launch stool at Wallops Island. ........................................................... 6

Figure 5. MLAS pad abort flight test concept of operations. ....................................................... 8
iv 

Figure 6. MLAS FTV flight configuration (left) and expanded view (right). ............................ 11

Figure 7. Definition of GN&C Coordinate Frame. .................................................................... 11

Figure 8. Reorientation initiation (ROI) and CM release decision logic flow. .......................... 13

Figure 9. Nominal trajectory traces and event constraint lines for WFF Range Control Center 

manual operator decision guidance. ............................................................................ 14

Figure 10. MLAS FTV shortly after abort motor ignition: ground view (top)/ helicopter view 

(bottom)....................................................................................................................... 22

Figure 11. MLAS CM ground track. ............................................................................................ 23

Figure 12. MLAS vehicle’s transverse attitude response (boost and coast phases). .................... 24

Figure 13. MLAS CM altitude versus range. ............................................................................... 25

Figure 14. CM altitude versus time. ............................................................................................. 25

List of Tables 

Table 1. Key GN&C constraints and design goals. .................................................................. 19

Table 2. Test scenarios used to verify flight software and ground command operator. .......... 20

Table 3. Predicted versus as-flown summary trajectory quantities. ......................................... 23
v 

Acronyms 

ACM Attitude Control Motor 

AoA Angle of Attack 

Cd Drag Coefficient 

Ck Shock Factor 

CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 

CG Center of Gravity 

CM Crew Module 

COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 

CPAS CEV Parachute Assembly System 

CxP Constellation Program 

DOF Degree of Freedom 

ESMD Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 

FBC Forward Bay Cover 

FF Forward Fairing 

FTV Flight Test Vehicle 

GLN-MAC Gimbaled LN-200 with Miniature Airborne Computer 

GN&C Guidance Navigation and Control 

GPS Global Positioning System 

IMU Inertial Measurement Units 

JNS Javad Navigation System 

L&RS Landing & Recovery Systems 

LAS Launch Abort System 

LAV Launch Abort Vehicle 

LES Launch Escape System 

LPD Landing Parachute Demonstration 

LV Launch Vehicle 

MLAS Max Launch Abort System 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

OS Objective System 

PortOSim Portable Object Simulation 

RF Radio Frequency 

ROI Reorientation Initiation 

SRM Solid Rocket Motor 

TDT Technical Discipline Team 

TV Thrust Vector 

TVC Thrust Vector Control 

WFF Wallops Flight Facility 
Abstract 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) designed, developed and flew the 

alternative Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as risk mitigation for the 

baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort system (LAS) already in 

development. The NESC was tasked with both formulating a conceptual 

objective system (OS) design of this alternative MLAS as well as 

demonstrating this concept with a simulated pad abort flight test. The 

goal was to obtain sufficient flight test data to assess performance, 

validate models/tools, and to reduce the design and development risks 

for a MLAS OS. Less than 2 years after Project start the MLAS simulated 

pad abort flight test was successfully conducted from Wallops Island on 

July 8, 2009. The entire flight test duration was 88 seconds during which 

time multiple staging events were performed and nine separate critically 

timed parachute deployments occurred as scheduled. Overall, the asflown flight performance was as predicted prior to launch. This paper 

provides an overview of the guidance navigation and control (GN&C) 

technical approaches employed on this rapid prototyping activity. This 

paper describes the methodology used to design the MLAS flight test 

vehicle (FTV). Lessons that were learned during this rapid prototyping 

project are also summarized. 

1.0 Introduction and Background 

In June 2007, the Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 

(ESMD) requested the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Engineering and 

Safety Center (NESC) undertake the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Project. The MLAS 

was named after Maxime (Max) Faget. Dr. Faget was the lead designer of the Mercury space 

capsule and developed its abort system called the “Aerial Capsule Emergency Separation 

Device”. It was in his honor that the MLAS was named. His innovative spirit and his team’s 

rapid development of new technologies formed the inspiration for the MLAS Project. 

The charter for the MLAS Project was to develop, design, and test an alternate concept for the 

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Launch Abort System (LAS). MLAS would be 

theoretically capable of extracting the Orion vehicle from the Launch Vehicle (LV) at any time 

from crew ingress at the launch pad through staging and ignition of the second, or upper, stage of 

the Ares I crew LV. The MLAS Project would conclude with at least one full-scale unmanned 

pad abort test suitable for demonstrating the viability of this alternate LAS concept. The MLAS 

Project would be run independently from the Constellation Program (CxP) and Orion Project in 

order to minimize impact on in-line program resources. It was dictated that off-the-shelf 

hardware and existing technology would be used on MLAS wherever possible. Design and 

development work previously accomplished by the NESC would be leveraged for this project. 

Previous work includes the CEV Smart Buyer Design, Composite Crew Module, and the 

Alternate Launch Abort System. 
2 

The NESC cultivates a problem-solving and technical assessment organizational model that 

permits it to rapidly assemble inter-center, interdisciplinary engineering teams. This is typically 

done by exploiting the pre-established Technical Discipline Teams (TDT) built and maintained 

by each of the fifteen NASA Technical Fellows. The TDTs are the networking mechanism used 

by NESC to gain access to technical knowledge, expertise and contacts at all the NASA Field 

Centers. This NESC infrastructure was used to form the NASA-wide MLAS Project team. For 

example, members of the Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) TDT (see Reference 1) 

were recruited to serve on the MLAS GN&C team and other members were subsequently 

recruited to serve as peer reviewers of the GN&C team’s work. 

Teams were formed based primarily on engineering disciplines and the subsystems of the flight 

test vehicle (FTV). Several of the NASA Technical Fellows served as leaders of these sub-teams. 

The teams were purposefully kept small to allow for closer technical interaction, technical 

agility, and faster design and development decision making. In addition, the existing internal 

quick response business processes of the NESC were leveraged to rapidly implement new 

engineering support contracts and hardware procurements with industry and to also help 

establish the programmatic partnerships with the management, engineering, fabrication, 

integration, and range support elements at NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). 

The MLAS GN&C team was formed in July 2007 and was given the responsibility for modeling, 

simulating and analyzing the trajectory and attitude dynamics of the MLAS FTV during its 

simulated pad abort flight. The GN&C team members ensured that the flight test occurred within 

the envelope defined by the requirements, and they constructed the nominal target flight timeline 

and trajectory. All of the MLAS trajectory and attitude flight instrumentation equipment, 

including the Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) and Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, 

were selected by the GN&C team. These navigation sensors were chosen to generate flight test 

data that would permit post-flight reconstruction of MLAS vehicle trajectory and attitude 

dynamics. Analyses performed by the GN&C team determined ballasting, motor alignment, and 

launch stand angle requirements. Over the course of the MLAS Project the GN&C team worked 

closely with System Engineering and Integration, Aerodynamics, Landing and Recovery System 

(L&RS), Propulsion, Avionics, Software, Structures, and Loads & Dynamics teams and also 

with the MLAS Chief Engineer. 

MLAS team members and the facilities used were distributed across the country. To offset this, 

team cohesion was maintained by creating a virtual team environment. This meant frequent 

teleconferences using virtual meeting technology supplemented by periodic Co-Locations. These 

Co-Locations were week-long gatherings of the entire MLAS team which were held roughly 

once per month during the early and middle phases of the MLAS Project. Component and scalemodel testing, loads analysis, and most of the design was performed at sites across the country, 

with results integrated with the team during the Co-Locations. The Co-Locations were organized 

working sessions, not formal meetings or design reviews and were proven to be useful to 

facilitate rapid decision-making, ensure common understanding between team members, and to 

generally build teamwork. Focused MLAS Configuration Control Board meetings were an 

essential forum for the entire team to review critical system design trades, analysis results, 

hardware and software problems, vehicle assembly and operational steps and to then formulate 

project decisions as a group for rapid responsive action. 
3 

2.0 Baseline Orion Launch Abort System Design 

A brief overview of the baseline Orion LAS is given here to provide some background context 

for the MLAS design and concept of operations. As part of the overall CxP architecture the 

Orion CEV will have a LAS to remove the crew to safety (i.e., away from the LV) in the event of 

an emergency either on the pad or during ascent. Orion’s current tower-based LAS evolved from 

the Launch Escape System (LES) used for the Mercury and Apollo Programs (the Gemini 

Program employed aircraft-style ejection seats for abort functions). The Orion Project-designed 

LAS will use tractor nozzle rocket motors to pull the crew module (CM) from the top of the Ares 

I LV and move it to a safe distance where it will parachute to Earth. The design contains a tower 

motor assembly attached to the forward (top) of an ogive fairing that encases the CM of the 

Orion vehicle (see Figure 1). The Orion LAS tower has three motors: the abort motor, the 

attitude control motor (ACM), and the jettison motor. The reverse-flow abort motor propels the 

LAS away from the LV upon initiation of an abort. The ACM, through eight modulated nozzles, 

provides launch abort vehicle (LAV) stability and re-orients the LAV for the different phases of 

flight. After reaching a safe altitude and distance from the LV, the LAS will release the CM. The 

CM drops from the fairing assembly and the landing parachutes are deployed. Simultaneously, 

the jettison motor will carry the LAS away from the CM. 

The development of the LAS ACM system hardware and uncertainty in the controllability of the 

LAV in the transonic abort regime were major challenges facing the Orion team and were drivers 

for the ESMD leadership to initiate and complete the MLAS Project. 

Figure 1. Orion LAS. 
4 

3.0 MLAS Pad Abort Flight Test Objectives 

At the start of the MLAS Project, the following four primary objectives were identified for the 

pad abort flight test: 

1. Demonstrate that the side-mounted abort concept is feasible for all abort conditions and 

for a nominal launch. 

2. Evaluate the capability of the MLAS to lift the CM from the launch pad to an altitude 

high enough and with enough distance downrange to permit the CM to execute a nominal 

landing. 

3. Demonstrate proper MLAS pad abort initiation and event sequencing. This includes 

flying a stable trajectory, LAS and fairing separation, and re-orienting and stabilizing the 

CM to a recovery condition. 

4. Obtain flight test data that will be used to: determine the structural loads and the integrity 

of the LAS, fairings and CM during the pad abort; characterize the aerodynamic 

environments experienced by the FTV during the abort, fairing separation, and reorientation; and characterize the separation dynamics between the LV interface, the LAS, 

fairings and CM. 

One additional MLAS Project objective was to use the experience gained with MLAS to develop 

a NASA capability for a ‘skunk works’ like rapid prototype design, fabrication, and testing. This 

was an opportunity to expose many NASA engineers to a rapid prototype development project. 

This also prevented the diversion of CxP resources away from their own development activities. 

Intense technical interactions and brainstorming sessions between the engineers on the MLAS 

team, with their diverse backgrounds, experience levels, and disciplines, were very common in 

this dynamic working environment. The significant design innovations, process improvements, 

and clever problem solutions that emerged from these interactions greatly benefited the project. 

4.0 MLAS Design Concept 

Beginning in August 2007, the GN&C team supported the initial design of the MLAS pad abort 

FTV. The origins of the tower-less MLAS FTV can be traced to the initial notional ‘back of the 

napkin’ drawing (see Figure 2) that was conceived during a CEV Smart Buyer Design study 

outbrief brainstorming session in March 2006. 
5 

Figure 2. MLAS ‘back of the napkin’ drawing. 

Subsequently a refined MLAS drawing (see Figure 3) was provided to NESC in June 2007 by 

Scott “Doc” Horowitz, the Associate Administrator for the ESMD at the time MLAS was 

initiated, as a notional point of departure for the early system level trades and vehicle 

configuration studies. 

Figure 3. Refined MLAS ‘back of the napkin’ drawing. 
6 

In parallel with their initial design work on the FTV, the GN&C team also supported the 

development of MLAS objective system (OS) concepts and addressed the need for clear 

traceability of the envisioned OS to the pad abort FTV. Fundamentally, the MLAS FTV was 

designed to reduce the risks associated with the passive aerodynamic stabilization approaches 

used on prime OS candidate design concepts. 

Multi-disciplinary system work requiring very tightly coupled technical relationships between 

the GN&C team and the Aerodynamics, Structures, and L&RS teams, as well as the MLAS 

Chief Engineer, were required. It is interesting to compare the final MLAS FTV prelaunch 

physical configuration (see Figure 4) with the original notional drawings depicted in Figure 2 

and Figure 3. One can clearly see that the MLAS abort system concept differs from Orion LAS 

in that it uses side-mounted abort motors instead of a tower-tractor abort motor design that pulls 

the CM from above. The tower abort motor has been designed out of the MLAS concept and the 

CM fully encapsulated in a forward fairing (FF). 

Figure 4. MLAS FTV on launch stool at Wallops Island. 

4.1 Passive Flight Control 

Multiple MLAS system-level flight-control design trades were conducted very early in the 

project. Various mechanisms were considered for maintaining control over the vehicle and 

accomplishing its pitchover turn along the desired launch azimuth. Active guidance with 

concepts using thrust vector control (TVC) and potentially active aerodynamic surface control 

were considered. Since, at the time the MLAS Project was initiated, the highest technical risk for 

the baseline Orion LAS design was the ACM, the team shifted its focus to MLAS design 

concepts that eliminated or mitigated the need for complex flight controls. The GN&C team 

considered and analyzed several passive stabilization schemes for MLAS pad abort boost, coast 
7 

and re-orientation flight phases. These passive flight control concepts were investigated to 

reduce design and development risk for this compressed-schedule flight demonstration project. 

Ultimately, a passive approach was selected based on its fundamental simplicity and anticipated 

relative ease of implementation. Cost and schedule constraints, along with the observation that 

the TVC method is a flight proven vehicle control technology, were the primary drivers that led 

to the adoption of a purely passive flight control approach. The cost and complexity of 

designing, building and testing an active closed-loop TVC system (including the necessary 

testbeds to integrate and validate TVC hardware & software) for this rapid prototype, shortduration, initiative did not trade well against the passive flight control scheme. The GN&C 

design and development approach leveraged the WFF Sounding Rocket Program expertise, 

experience, modeling/simulation tools, and flight hardware to the maximum extent possible. 

Independent simulations were performed of the vehicle’s trajectory/attitude dynamics. The 

results of the WFF Portable Object Simulation (PortOSim) flight-control simulation tool were 

favorably compared with the results obtained with the generic simulation flight-control 

simulation tool from Langley Research Center. These comparisons provided early confidence in 

the feasibility of the team’s design concept. Independently generated outputs from another 

GN&C tool, called the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories, were also periodically 

compared with the PortOSim outputs to perform a technical crosscheck on the MLAS flight 

performance in general as well as the boost, coast skirt and CM simulator separation dynamics in 

particular. 

The decision to fly with passive control drove the GN&C modeling, simulation and analyses 

efforts. The GN&C team performed in-depth analyses to fully characterize and understand the 

sensitivity of the FTV flight performance to the relative relationship between the vehicle’s 

center-of-gravity (CG) and the resultant thrust vector (TV) produced by the solid rocket motors 

(SRM) used to propel the FTV. Significant effort was expended to identify and validate the 

specific error sources that made knowledge of the resultant TV orientation uncertain, as well as 

those error sources that introduced uncertainty into the determination of the vehicle’s CG 

location. 

The decision to fly without active closed-loop feedback control also drove the necessity to 

perform several stages of detailed mass properties testing and the associated mandatory need to 

rigorously track, model and manage any mass changes that occurred due to modifications in the 

baseline vehicle design. It was also necessary to develop and implement a simple, physically 

realizable vehicle ballasting strategy to ensure static stability during the boost and coast flight 

phases. 

5.0 MLAS Pad Abort Flight Test Operations 

Figure 5 illustrates the MLAS pad abort flight test concept of operations adopted after extensive 

trade studies and system analysis. From the perspective of the GN&C discipline, the MLAS FTV 

was an unguided, fin-stabilized projectile, using aft-mounted SRMs to carry the primary article 

under test, in this case the FF and the encapsulated CM simulator, to the desired altitude, range, 

and dynamic pressure conditions for reorientation and recovery. 

The SRMs were canted so that their TVs nominally intersected on the centerline at the axial 

station of the CG just after launch. This was done to limit the effect of thrust asymmetries. A 
8 

spherical bearing interface was used to transfer the thrust loads into the vehicle at the CM heat 

shield. The pivot point of this interface was also placed near the CG to ensure that motor cage 

misalignments would not produce large thrust moments. 

The MLAS FTV was launched from a fixed stool on Launch Pad 1 on NASA’s Wallops Island 

and achieved its turn toward the desired launch azimuth using two mechanisms: 

1. Launch stool tilt angle: four degrees from vertical along the launch azimuth. 

2. Vehicle radial CG offset: approximately one inch from the centerline along the launch 

azimuth. 

Figure 5. MLAS pad abort flight test concept of operations. 

Upon burnout of the SRMs, about six seconds after ignition, the boost skirt was separated via the 

frangible joint separation device. Four fixed drag plates presenting a total effective drag area of 

36 square feet were used to ensure positive separation acceleration between the forebody and the 

aft boost skirt. The actual MLAS flight test demonstration began next with the stable coast 

phase. This phase demonstrated the passive stability of the FTV during unpowered flight. The 

powered ascent phase would place the FTV at an altitude of about 7000 feet and roughly 3000 

feet downrange east of the launch site. 

When the vehicle decelerated to a velocity corresponding to a flight dynamic pressure of 100 

pounds per square foot (psf), the coast skirt, including its four fins, was separated using an 

identical frangible joint separation device and drogue parachute. This was followed by an onboard timer-sequenced reorientation maneuver beginning with deployment of the two drogue 

parachutes mounted to the nose of the FF. The two drogue parachutes attached to the FF served 

to re-orient the FTV to a heat shield-forward attitude in preparation for release of the CM 
9 

simulator from the FF. A byproduct of the drogue chute deployment was loss of horizontal 

velocity, and thus placing the vehicle on a nearly vertical trajectory. 

During the subsequent descent, at a programmed altitude of 3300 feet, the separation nuts were 

fired and the CM simulator was ‘dropped out’ of the aft-facing FF. This would initiate the 

landing parachute demonstration (LPD). Two drogue parachutes mounted on top of the CM 

forward bay cover (FBC) were deployed via static lines attaching the drogue bags to the FF. At a 

programmed duration of 9.2 seconds after CM release, the FBC was jettisoned, pulling the four 

main parachutes out of their deployment bags that were mounted in the FBC and away from the 

CM. The CM main parachutes possessed a 5-second reef at 26.5 percent of their total inflated 

area prior to fully inflating to increase load sharing through synchronous deployment. 

The entire flight would last approximately 90 seconds from booster ignition until the last element 

of the FTV impacted the ocean. All of the elements landed in the ocean off the coast of the 

launch site. The coast skirt, boost skirt and CM simulator were later recovered. 

4.2 Landing and Recovery System (Decelerator) Events Overview 

The L&RS major events begin with the separation of the coast skirt and end with deployment of 

the CM main parachutes. L&RS operational events are: 

1. Coast Skirt Drogue Deployment – The single drogue deployment was designed to 

achieve a separation distance between the coast skirt and FTV that was adequate to 

deploy the reorientation drogues without entanglement with the coast skirt. 

2. Reorientation Drogue Deployment – Dual drogues were designed to reorient the FTV and 

dampen the FTV motions to the following conditions that were to be provided by the 

Orion LAS for the CEV parachute assembly system (CPAS) during a pad abort: 

a. CM Down-Range Distance at Separation > 3300 ft 

b. CM Separation Altitude > 3300 ft 

c. CM Handoff Lateral Rates < 40 deg/sec 

d. CM Handoff Angle of Attack (AoA) < 40 deg 

e. CM Handoff Dynamic Pressure < 40 psf 

f. CM Handoff Roll Rate < 80 deg/sec 

3. CM Drogue Deployment – As the initial event in the LPD, the CM drogues were deployed to 

decelerate and stabilize the CM in preparation for main parachute deployment. 

4. FBC Release/Main Parachute Extraction – The primary objective of the LPD was to use the FBC 

and CM drogues to extract the four main parachutes in an attempt to achieve a high degree of 

load sharing through synchronous deployment. 

5. CM Main Parachute Full Deployment – This was the final event that decelerated the CM 

to a steady-state descent rate prior to splash down. The only project requirement was to 

achieve steady-state descent prior to splashdown since CPAS main parachutes were not 

available for the test. 

Reference 2 provides an overview of the ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS FTV 

for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after 

separation from the fairing. 
10 

6.0 MLAS FTV Elements 

As illustrated in Figure 6, the MLAS FTV is comprised of four major physical elements: the FF, 

CM simulator, coast skirt, and boost skirt. The elements were attached by frangible joints and 

bolts; allowing separation at appropriate intervals during the flight test. The elements were 

integrated into the FTV at the WFF, and were then moved by truck and barge to the Wallops 

Island launch site. WFF was chosen to fabricate and launch the MLAS FTV because it had the 

required assembly, test and launch facilities and a decades-long history of sounding rocket 

testing. On an historical note: the LES for the Mercury Program was also tested at WFF in the 

late 1950s. 

The distinctive shape of the FTV came from the Sears-Haack body shape chosen by the 

Aerodynamics team for the fairing and the short, but wide, dimensions of the boost and coast 

skirts. The height of the integrated FTV was approximately 400 inches tall from the tip of the 

nose to the lowest point of the boost skirt fins. The diameter of the shell of the coast skirt and the 

boost skirt was approximately 216 inches. The launch weight of the FTV was approximately 

48,000 lb. A description of the major individual MLAS vehicle elements is given below. 

Boost Skirt: The boost skirt was the aftmost element of the FTV and contained the motor cage 

that held the SRMs in place. The individual motors were installed in the motor cage within the 

boost skirt, and each one was canted inward. A frangible joint was used to attach the boost skirt 

to the coast skirt. Four fixed drag plates were mounted near the bottom of the boost skirt, in such 

a way that they would extend into the free stream, to ensure a rapid separation of the boost skirt 

from the rest of the FTV. Four fins were mounted on the boost skirt to help provide passive 

stabilization during the short (six-second) powered flight phase. 

Coast Skirt: The coast skirt was attached to the bottom of the FF to provide passive 

aerodynamic stability. The coast skirt had four fins that provided passive stabilization during the 

coast phase of the test flight, which lasted approximately nine seconds. The four coast skirt fins 

were identical to the four fins mounted on the boost skirt. A single aft-facing drogue mortar was 

mounted on the inside wall of the coast skirt to deploy a drogue parachute from the coast skirt 

The coast skirt was mated to the FF with a frangible joint. 

Forward Fairing: The FF encapsulated the CM simulator, and the combined package was 

called the forward assembly. The shape of the FF was based on a Sears-Haack body to minimize 

drag. The FF contained 1423 lbm of lead ballast in the nose to place the X-axis CG as far 

forward as possible and to provide a minimum of 10-percent body diameters of static stability 

margin during the powered and coast phases of flight. Additional lead ballasting in the motor 

trough1

 provided a small Z-axis CG offset to provide an initial pitch-over moment. The FF 

housed the two mortar-deployed drogue parachutes that were used to reorient the forward 

assembly from the vehicle attitude during the coast phase to a heat shield-forward attitude in 

preparation for separation of the CM simulator and the execution of the LPD. 

 

1

 Vertical protuberances were placed on the outer mold line of the FF to simulate side-mounted motors. Underneath 

these structures were large channels in the fairing – motor troughs – that provided space for ballast as well as 

avionics, cameras, etc. 
11 

Figure 6. MLAS FTV flight configuration (left) and expanded view (right). 

CM Simulator: The MLAS CM simulator approximated the shape and mass of the Orion CM. 

The CM was attached to the FF using four frangible bolts/nuts. The CM simulator carried 

antennae, avionics wiring and connectors, two IMUs, a data processor, data recorders, and 

cameras. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the GNC frame and the MLAS vehicle frame 

used by the structural engineering team. The GNC frame will be used to represent most of the 

data that will be presented in this paper. 

Figure 7. Definition of GN&C Coordinate Frame. 
12 

7.0 Driving Technical Issues for MLAS Design and Development 

Both the GN&C and the L&RS teams were constrained, or at least strongly influenced, by the 

following top-level project requirements, needs and MLAS vehicle attributes: 

 No active closed-loop flight control elements – passive aerodynamic stability with 

modest static margins. 

 Multiple propulsive, aerodynamic, mechanical, electrical and sensor performance, and 

operational dispersions (uncertainties). 

 Abort SRMs that provided a fixed and finite propulsive capability with thrust dispersions, 

which exceeded current industry capabilities. 

 The need to passively affect a vehicle pitchover maneuver shortly after abort motor 

ignition to establish a downrange component of velocity early in flight. 

 The need to maximize the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components to 

minimize development costs and schedule – in particular, there was the need to identify 

rapidly available, low cost, flight-proven GN&C instrumentation to permit accurate postflight trajectory and attitude reconstruction. 

 Use of components with flight pedigree in equivalent operating environments to reduce 

performance risk and development testing. 

 Availability of required equivalent parachute drag area in flight-proven COTS packages; 

 Parachute material availability – Some KevlarTM materials had excessive lead times 

compared to nylon (nylon was used when possible). 

 Achieving satisfactory relative separation distances between vehicle elements, identifying 

ways of ensuring positive separation between the elements of the test article that were 

shed during various phases of flight proved to be one of the most challenging parts of the 

design effort. 

 System verification with accurate predictions of FTV trajectories, both nominal and 

dispersed these trajectories and associated metrics established and verified basic MLAS 

flight performance in general and were the main driving basis from which many other 

detailed parachute system design requirements were derived. New trajectory predictions 

were needed soon after each major model change or update to ensure overall design 

compliance. 

 Minimizing, or at least managing, parachute loads in the face of continuous vehicle mass 

growth over the project duration and no alternative to fundamentally alter the parachute 

design or material. 

 The need to have a redundant capability to precisely sequence the timing of critical flight 

test events. 

The technical issues associated with these project requirements, constraints and influences are 

described below. 

7.1 Critical Event Command Initiation Methods 

Early in the MLAS systems design phase it was initially thought that the timing and sequenced 

commanding of critical flight test events could all be established prior to flight and implemented 

with the standard pre-set on-board avionics timers typically used on sounding rockets. On-time 
13 

activation of the coast skirt separation/reorient-sequence initiation command and the CM 

separation command were of particular importance. 

Subsequently, several months into the project, the Monte Carlo flight performance simulations 

showed large enough dispersions in the MLAS trajectory such that the simple pre-set avionicsevent timer-event command concept had to be abandoned and alternative techniques developed 

and tested. 

After careful consideration of all feasible alternatives, the MLAS Project team implemented two 

independent methods of activating the coast skirt separation/reorient-sequence initiation 

command and the CM separation command. A flight-termination receiver was activated using 

the WFF Range system infrastructure and an on-board flight processor with event-triggering 

decision logic, which were both incorporated into the MLAS FTV design. The logic flow for 

initiating the reorientation initiation (ROI) and CM release (separation) command functions is 

shown in Figure 8. 

In the WFF Range Control Center, the command logic was implemented manually using visual 

cues from a single fixed-scale graphical display of total Earth-relative velocity and altitude (see 

Figure 9). The ROI was commanded by the ground operator when the vehicle crossed the 

constant dynamic pressure constraint line on ascent. CM release was commanded by the ground 

operator as the vehicle descended through a 3300-foot constraint line. 

Figure 8. Reorientation initiation (ROI) and CM release decision logic flow. 
14 

Figure 9. Nominal trajectory traces and event constraint lines for WFF Range Control Center 

manual operator decision guidance. 

7.2 Initial Turning Maneuver During Early Boost 

It was determined early in the concept formulation that producing a thrust moment by offsetting 

the vehicle CG from the centerline was the most effective means of producing the initial vehicleturning maneuver, also referred to as the pitchover maneuver. This permitted the establishment 

of a downrange component of velocity early in flight. Flowing from this design decision were 

stringent requirements on CG management, along with requirements on aerodynamic stabilizing 

moments to prevent the vehicle from nosing over too far. The vehicle turn could have been 

accomplished entirely by a radial CG offset. However, a tilt offset of the vehicle launch stool by 

four degrees toward the launch azimuth was deemed prudent by both the GN&C team and WFF 

Range safety personnel. 

7.3 Aerodynamic Stability 

Conventional aerodynamic fins were used on the MLAS FTV, rather than the grid fins2

envisioned for the MLAS OS vehicle, in order to reduce project and schedule risks. The coast 

fins and boost fins were iteratively sized during concept formulation to accomplish the following 

objectives: 

1. Provide sufficient aerodynamic stability during boost to ensure that the resulting 

trajectory dispersion was small enough for the vehicle to meet its test condition insertion 

 

2

 Grid fins, also known as lattice fins, are often used as a lifting and control surfaces for highly maneuverable 

aerodynamic vehicles. Deployable grid fins have been used on the Russian Soyuz TM-22 spacecraft to provide 

aerodynamic stabilization during an abort either on the pad or during atmospheric flight. The main advantages of a 

grid fin are its low hinge-moment requirement and good high AoA performance characteristics. 
15 

goals. It was desired that the aerodynamic pitching frequency of the vehicle would be 

representative of the closed-loop bandwidth frequency of a guided objective system 

under the action of a TV control system. 

2. Provide sufficient aerodynamic stability during the coast phase of flight to accommodate 

and dampen the angular impulse delivered by the asymmetric thrust of unmatched motors 

during tail-off. 

Early analysis demonstrated that a ‘rule of thumb’ static margin of 10-percent body diameter 

would be sufficient to accomplish both goals. For manufacture, it was desired that all eight fins 

be identical, so the fins were sized together to yield a minimum static margin of 21.7 inches for 

both the boost and coast configurations. After exiting the design phase and during the build 

phase, the FTV’s CG location was rigorously managed to maintain this static margin in the boost 

and coast phase configurations. 

7.4 Relative Separation Distances 

Finding ways of ensuring positive separation between the elements of the test article that were 

shed during various phases of flight proved to be one of the most challenging parts of the design 

effort. To this effect, a GN&C-led Tiger Team was established during concept formulation to 

trade a number of mechanisms for accomplishing piece-part separation. 

The boost skirt separation was accomplished using four fixed drag-plates sized initially to 

provide 2 g of relative acceleration between the forward and aft bodies. This approach has been 

used successfully to accomplish drag separation of sounding rocket stages. The performance loss 

associated with having the plates out in the flow during boost was considered an acceptable trade 

for the simplicity of the approach. A rule of thumb criterion of 1 g relative acceleration was 

determined prudent, and the plates were sized with margin in the initial design. This margin was 

steadily eroded during the vehicle build phase by mass ‘creep’ and aerodynamic effects 

discovered in computational fluid dynamics. However, the final pre-launch analysis showed just 

over 1 g of separation acceleration. 

The coast skirt separation was accomplished utilizing a mortared drogue (originally ordered as a 

spare reorient drogue). Initially, a rule-of-thumb requirement levied to maintain 200 feet of 

separation between the coast skirt and forward assembly at the time the reorient drogues are 

mortared out. This was later relaxed to 200 feet of separation at time of reorient drogue 

parachute line-stretch. 

A reorient-then-release baseline of the MLAS test vehicle was established in the earliest days of 

the design effort. One byproduct of this concept was that a large amount of rotational energy 

would be imparted into the forward assembly, which would require significant parachute hang 

time allowances to dissipate. During this time, much of the horizontal velocity of the MLAS was 

also scrubbed off. The significance of this is that there remained no effective means to reliably 

develop significant lateral separation between the FF, the FBC, and the CM during final descent. 

The team was forced to rely upon differential drag accelerations on the various objects and a 

somewhat risky parachute deployment timing sequence was set up to race the CM into the water 

before the FF could overtake it and potentially foul the main parachutes. At the second 

Independent Technical Review milestone, in April 2008, a timing concept was presented by the 
16 

GN&C team that accomplished the goals of maintaining adequate vertical separation between the 

FF and the CM at CM splash. This separation was quickly erased by mass gains in the FF, which 

occurred during fairing segment fabrication. The vertical separation was regained by lowering 

the CM release by 1000 feet; however, these gains were lost again by additional mass gains in 

the FF that occurred during FTV assembly. 

In the end, no requirement was established to prohibit re-contact between the FF, the FBC, and 

the CM. The only mechanism for developing lateral separation between the three objects was 

differences in the transient response to the wind variations with altitude. It was not expected that 

these would be enough to guarantee separation margin with respect to parachute diameters 

(especially the large diameter main parachutes on the CM). The MLAS Project Management was 

willing to accept this as a risk, as long as the analysis showed that there was sufficient time to 

deploy the main parachutes and achieve descent equilibrium velocity prior to a potential recontact event. The final pre-launch analysis verified this and showed the FF overtaking both the 

FBC and the CM prior to splash. The FBC was nominally predicted to maintain a 320-foot 

vertical separation distance from the CM during the flight. The FF was predicted to overtake the 

FBC at an altitude of 820 feet (at ~10 seconds after CM main parachute line stretch). The FF was 

predicted to overtake the CM at an altitude of 165 feet, at 16 seconds after CM main parachute 

line stretch. 

7.5 Parachute Loads Management 

Of all the technical areas on MLAS where the GN&C and L&RS teams interacted, the problem 

of determining, managing and minimizing parachute loads was probably the most dynamic point 

of technical intersection. Addressing the parachutes’ loads issues was an almost constant battle 

on MLAS. This situation arose primarily out of the necessity to procure, very early in the project, 

low-risk readily available parachutes in flight-proven COTS packages. This had the effect of 

setting a bound on parachute load-capability performance very early in the project in return for 

project cost and schedule benefits. 

During each of the three major MLAS analysis cycles of parachute forces, the primary influence 

on parachute loads were: 

 Continuous FTV mass increases during the development life cycle, 

 Improved knowledge of the FTV aerodynamic performance, 

 A fixed and finite amount of propulsive capability, and 

 The results of trajectory optimizations by the GN&C team to increase the probability of 

achieving the stated mission success goals. 

The vehicle mass increases continued well after the last planned parachute force analysis cycle, 

prompting a final but unplanned parachute force analysis cycle. Parachute force is directly 

proportional to the dynamic pressure and drag area. Since the parachutes were selected very 

early in the vehicle design cycle, preserving the safety factors in the parachute elements was of 

continuous concern to both the L&RS and GN&C teams and was carefully monitored as the 

project progressed towards launch. 

The GN&C team initially supported the L&RS team by providing a set of FTV trajectories, 

which were then analyzed to develop a set of performance requirements for the landing system 
17 

components. The performance requirements were to essentially meet the drag area requirement 

and always maintain a minimum factor of safety of 1.6 over the range of possible trajectories. To 

derive the trajectories the L&RS team, the GN&C team performed special sets of Monte Carlo 

dispersed simulations using the portable object simulation (PortOSim) tool to characterize a wide 

range of possible trajectories and parachute deployment conditions. The state vectors, along with 

the vehicle mass properties and aerodynamics database, provided the data needed to determine 

parachute forces during all deployment. To develop upper and lower bounds for the parachute 

forces, the GN&C team provided three state vectors that encompassed 90 percent of the 

predicted trajectories. These were referred to as the shallow, nominal and steep trajectories. The 

shallow trajectory typically was characterized by a lower apogee altitude, higher dynamic 

pressure and greater downrange distance than the nominal trajectory. The steep trajectory had a 

higher apogee altitude, lower dynamic pressure and smaller downrange distance than the 

nominal trajectory. 

Each state vector (shallow, nominal and steep) was used to drive a simulation of parachute 

deployment forces and thus, was a point estimate for each trajectory and not dispersed. This 

approach was taken for two reasons: 1) The GN&C team trajectories could bound the expected 

flight conditions – including the 99th percentile trajectory, and 2) the critical performance 

parameters of the selected parachutes, primarily the drag coefficient Cd, and opening shock 

factor Ck were well known from flight test. A range of Cd was analyzed for the CM descent on 

the drogues and mains to ensure that the CM could achieve a steady-state rate of descent prior to 

splashdown. 

7.6 GN&C Instrumentation 

GN&C instrumentation was required for accurate post-flight trajectory and attitude 

reconstruction. There was a strong push by project management for the GN&C team to identify 

low-cost COTS sensors for this purpose. The GN&C team identified suitable instrumentation 

less than two months after project initiation. Three IMUs and two GPS receivers were selected as 

the on-board GN&C instrumentation set. The Avionics team then assumed responsibility for 

procuring, physically accommodating, electrically integrating and interface testing the IMU and 

GPS receiver flight hardware as part of their overall Avionics subsystem development effort. The 

requirements for, and performance of, final pre-launch functional verification testing of the 

IMUs and the GPS when the FTV was mounted on the launch stool was the responsibility of the 

GN&C team. 

A total of three Gimbaled LN-200 with Miniature Airborne Computer (GLN-MAC) IMU sensors 

were flown on the MLAS FTV. This specific choice of IMU was made very early in the MLAS 

Program, in August 2007, based on its performance capabilities, relatively low cost, low 

mass/power/volume, extensive sounding rocket flight heritage, and off-the-shelf availability. The 

GLN-MAC IMU is a standard piece of GN&C equipment used on most of the Wallops sounding 

rockets. Therefore, the level of engineering familiarity the MLAS Wallops team members had 

with this type of IMU was also a factor in this unit’s selection. The general operating and 

technical performance characteristics of the GLN-MAC IMU are provided in Reference 3. 

Two IMUs were mounted on the avionics pallet inside the CM simulator. A passive vibration 

isolation system was installed between the avionics pallets and the vehicle structure. This 

redundant pair was mounted inside the CM to provide the vehicle rate, acceleration, and attitude 
18 

data throughout the flight. The IMU-1 and IMU-2 data was both recorded onboard the FTV and 

sent to the ground via radio frequency (RF) telemetry. 

A third identical IMU was mounted in the FF to provide relative motion dynamics information 

during the CM separation. The IMU-3 data was captured only via RF telemetry to the ground. 

IMU-3 was added to provide a redundant measurement of the FF/CM separation dynamics that 

would complement the imagery of the separation event taken by the high-speed camera system. 

The high-speed camera system was the primary means of obtaining information on the relative 

motions of the FF and the CM during dynamics information during the CM separation. 

The Javad Navigation System (JNS) JNS100 50-channel single-frequency global navigation 

satellite system receiver board, with raw data and position solution output rate up to 100 Hz, was 

selected for use on MLAS by the GN&C team. Similar to the IMU selection, this choice of GPS 

receiver was made very early in the MLAS Program, in July 2007, based on its performance 

capabilities, relatively low cost, low mass/power/volume, and availability. Unlike the GLNMAC IMU, at the time of its selection for MLAS the Javad JNS100 GPS receiver was not a 

standard piece of GN&C equipment used on the Wallops sounding rockets. However, there was 

a high level of engineering familiarity with this particular receiver, on the part of the GN&C 

team members, from prior experience on NASA’s Autonomous Flight Safety System Project and 

other efforts. This working familiarity with the JNS100 was also a factor in this unit’s selection. 

It is interesting to note that the JNS100 has since been selected as the Next Generation GPS 

receiver for the Wallops Sounding Rocket Program. The general operating and technical 

performance characteristics of the JNS100 GPS receiver board are provided in Reference 4. 

For flight on the MLAS FTV, this JNS100 receiver board was packaged by WFF engineering 

into a GPS receiver unit. After buildup, the MLAS GPS Receiver units were acceptance tested in 

the Code 598 GPS Development and Test Laboratory at Wallops. In a manner very similar to the 

IMU integration process, the two JNS100 GPS Receivers were each integrated into the Avionics 

pallets inside the CM Simulator. These receivers benefited, as the IMU did, from the passive 

vibration isolation system installed between the Avionics pallets and the vehicle structure. 

During the phases of flight leading up to CM release, these receivers were fed by two patch 

antennae mounted on the outer mode line of the FF. Upon CM release, a lanyard switch was used 

to switch the GPS receivers to two patch antennae mounted on the CM. This redundant GPS data 

was used by the on-board flight computer to trigger the ROI sequence and the CM release events 

in accordance with the logic discussed above. 

7.7 System Verification Methods 

Nearly all requirements allocated to the GN&C team were verified by analysis. The team 

primarily utilized the PortOSim 6-degree of freedom (DOF) simulation tool, which served as the 

Project’s end-to-end predictor of MLAS flight performance. PortOSim is a software application 

that supports engineering modeling and simulation of launch-range systems and subsystems, as 

well as the vehicles that operate on them (Reference 5). It is a flexible, distributed, objectoriented, and real-time simulation. A scripting language is used to configure an array of 

simulation objects and link them together. The script is contained in a text file, but executed and 

controlled using a graphical user interface. 
19 

A PortOSim multi-body model of the MLAS FTV system was first developed and validated. 

That model was then used to track the effects of vehicle design changes, and as-built variations 

from the design on the ability of the MLAS to meet many of these requirements. Monte Carlo 

simulations were used to provide the Systems Engineering and Project Management teams with 

figures of merit relating to the a priori estimated rate of satisfaction of the various requirements 

levied upon the test vehicle flight characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the primary requirements 

tracked by the GN&C team, along with the results from the final 1000-run Monte Carlo 

simulation performed shortly before launch; along with the related quantities observed during 

flight using the GPS and IMU sensor complement. 

Table 1. Key GN&C constraints and design goals. 

MLAS Flight Parameter Constraints

& Design 

Goals

Monte 

Carlo 

% Rate 

Flight Observation 

CM Deployment Sequence 

Initiation Altitude 

> 3300 ft 98.8 Sequence initiation began with first threshold 

crossing detected on-board at 3407-ft above pad 

reference. (CM released at 3250-ft above pad ref.) 

CM Deployment Range > 3300 ft 

from shoreline

94.5 4004 ft from shoreline 

CM Lateral Rate at Release < 40 d/s 95.9 7.3 d/s 

CM AoA at Release < 40 deg 96.7 1.2 deg 

CM Roll Rate at Release < 80 d/s 100 4.1 d/s 

Dynamic Pressure at CM 

Release 

< 40 psf 94.3 37.9 psf 

Dynamic Pressure at ROI < 100 psf 97.0 89.0 psf 

Dynamic Pressure at FF 

Drogue Deployment 

< 100 psf 98.1 37.9 psf 

Max Alpha Total During 

Boost 

< 30 deg 100 14.6 deg 0.4s after first motion 

5.5-deg peak during turn 

Max Alpha Total During 

Coast 

< 30 deg 100 2.4-deg peak coast AoA seen at L+12.8-s 

Dispersion Sensitivity 

Dispersion sensitivity analyses were initially performed early in the project to gain insight into 

which design parameters drove flight performance. It was determined early that the vehicle was 

most sensitive to the System CG Radial Location Uncertainty contributor. Much effort went into 

managing the radial CG knowledge and uncertainty throughout the design, fabrication, and 

integration phases of the MLAS Project. 

Unmodeled Aerodynamic Phenomena 
20 

Concern was expressed over the potential for unmodeled aerodynamic phenomena to adversely 

affect the vehicle flight characteristics during the boost and coast phases of flight. It was the 

assertion of the GN&C team that the aerodynamic uncertainty model developed and used in our 

dispersion analysis adequately bounded these types of effects. Given these magnitudes of 

perturbations, aerodynamic uncertainty effects presented trajectory deviations approximately one 

order of magnitude lower than those resulting from radial CG perturbations. 

Event Deployment Algorithm Verification 

A battery of 17 distinct test scenarios (see Table 2) was created to stress-test and boundary-test 

the ROI and CM release event triggering algorithms that were to be deployed in flight software 

as well as from a human-operated ground command system. Each scenario was modeled in the 

end-to-end 6-DOF mission simulator. The simulations were played into a GPS RF simulator 

attached to a JNS100 GPS receiver for data capture. The flight software developer used the 

resulting data files to test the flight computer. The simulations were also played into the WFF 

Range Display Network in the Range Control Center to train the Flight Control Console 

operator, and verify that he was prepared to issue command functions for the MLAS flight test. 

Table 2. Test scenarios used to verify flight software 

and ground command operator. 

Id Description 

1 Nominal Trajectory 

2 Steep Trajectory 

3 Shallow Trajectory 

4 Near 3300-ft Altitude Trajectory 

5 Apogee Occurs at 100-psf Q 

6 Straight-Up Trajectory 

7 Nominal Left-Azimuth Trajectory 

8 Nominal Right-Azimuth Trajectory 

9 270-deg Roll Case 

10 Boost Skirt Fails to Separate 

12 Reorient Drogue Deployment Failure 

13 Apogee below 3300 ft 

14 Back-range Trajectory 

15 Parallel to beach North 

16 Parallel to beach South 

17 1 Motor Fails to Ignite 

8.0 Flight Test Results 

The MLAS FTV was successfully launched on July 8, 2009 at 1026 Zulu. Figure 10 shows the 

MLAS FTV shortly after abort motor ignition: the top image was captured by a ground based 

WFF range camera and the bottom image was taken from a camera mounted on a helicopter 

hovering offshore from the launch pad. Trajectory and flight dynamics data were gathered using 
21 

the two on-board JNS100 GPS receivers and three GLN-MAC IMU platforms. Review of video 

and event monitoring data by the Avionics team has shown that all flight events occurred as 

planned. 

The GN&C team used a 6-DOF multi-body end-to-end mission simulation in the WFF Range 

Control Center as a means of developing a pre-flight estimation of the vehicle response to 

measured atmospheric conditions (winds, density, pressure, etc.) for the purpose of assessing 

launch commit constraints. The simulated responses of the vehicle, including the effects of wind 

as obtained from the final (L-3 minute) pre-launch balloon sonde3

, represent the baseline 

nominal predictions for comparison with the actual flight performance. Key trajectory 

parameters, derived from flight data and simulation, are summarized in Table 3. The ground 

track is depicted in Figure 11. The launch time was selected to yield light winds. Generally, the 

winds were from the northwest; although, from 1000 feet to the ground, the wind direction veers 

from a north to a northwest direction causing the hook seen in the ground-track (Figure 11) 

toward the end of flight during the CM descent. 

An in-depth analysis was performed to ascertain the degree to which the actual as-flown boost 

phase and coast phase vehicle dynamics matched pre-flight predictions. Due to the relative 

sensitivities of the trajectory to various perturbations, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the 

steepness of the as-flown trajectory was caused by a perturbation in the effective moment arm in 

the vehicle pitch plane. The amplitude of the vehicle turn is directly related to the moment arm 

between the TV and the CG. During the boost phase, there will be no difference in the effect of a 

CG perturbation and of a net TV misalignment/offset. There is no reason to expect that such a 

perturbation would be fixed in time; however, there is no realistic means to attempt to estimate a 

time-varying moment arm shift given the available data set. Fixed moment arm reductions, in 

both the MLAS body Y-axis and the MLAS body Z-axis directions were modeled in the postflight matching simulation by a static reduction of the radial CG offset. Figure 12 shows the 

vehicle’s transverse attitude response during the boost and coast phases of flight for an iteration 

where the simulated CG was moved toward the centerline axis by 0.23 inches in the MLAS body 

Z-axis direction, and by 0.08 inches in the MLAS body Y-axis direction. 

 

3

 The sonde is a device typically used by the WFF Range to make in-situ meteorological measurements of the 

atmosphere which a sounding rocket, or in this case the MLAS FTV, will fly through. Some, called GPS-sondes, are 

equipped with GPS receivers to obtain precise positioning information during data collection and some are simple 

balloons with reflectors that are skin-tracked by range radars during their data collection periods. Data collected 

includes wind, density, static pressure and speed of sound. 
22 

Figure 10. MLAS FTV shortly after abort motor ignition: ground view (top)/ helicopter view 

(bottom). 
23 

Table 3. Predicted versus as-flown summary trajectory quantities. 

Summary Data Actual Pre-Flight Predict 

(Using L-3m Sonde) 

Magnitude of 

Miss 

Peak Altitude 7018-ft @10:26:23.0Z 6621-ft @10:26:21.9Z 397-ft 

(0.75-sigma) 

Impact Range/Azimuth 4555-ft / 125.4degT 

@10:27:12.4Z 

5592-ft / 124.2degT 

@10:27:11.6Z 

1042-ft 

(0.73-sigma) 

Peak Velocity 699-ft/sec @10:26:06.2Z 688-ft/sec @10:26:06.0Z 11-ft/sec 

(1.1-sigma) 

Peak Mach Number 0.613 @10:26:06.2Z 0.602 

@10:26:06.0Z 

0.011 

(1.3-sigma) 

Peak Dynamic Pressure 517-psf @10:26:06.2Z 498-psf @10:26:05.98Z 19-psf 

(1.25-sigma) 

Burnout Roll Rate 9.9-deg/sec 

@10:26:07.5Z 

2.7-deg/sec 

@10:26:07.0Z 

7.2-deg/sec 

(1.00-sigma) 

Figure 11. MLAS CM ground track. 
24 

Figure 12. MLAS vehicle’s transverse attitude response (boost and coast phases). 

A key thing to note from Figure 12 is that there is a close match between flight observation and 

simulation in both the amplitude and frequency of the vehicle attitude response during both the 

boost and coast phases of flight. Thus, in order to match aerodynamic pitching frequencies 

between flight and simulation, the dynamic pressure profile, the aerodynamic forces, the 

aerodynamic force distribution, and the first/second-moments of the mass distribution must all 

match. The unlikely alternative is to have a fortuitous cancellation of errors. In order to match 

the magnitude of oscillation, the initial conditions and disturbance-force environment, caused 

primarily by the radial CG offset, must also match. By observing the first attitude peak after 

launch, it is apparent that the vehicle aerodynamic pitch and yaw damping is higher than that 

computed in the simulation model. This was an expected result. The simulation is fitted with 

models that compute the damping forces and moments from each fin; however, damping effects 

originating from body aerodynamic effects were neglected. Given the close match in lateral 

attitude dynamics, dispersion in the TV-to-CG moment arm was the most plausible scenario 

found for explaining the steepness of the as-flown trajectory when compared to the simulated 

pre-launch trajectory prediction. 

Figures 13 and 14 depict the CM altitude versus range and the CM altitude versus time, 

respectively. Figures 13 and 14 show the position data from the GPS receivers alongside the preflight predictions made with the wind, density, static pressure and speed of sound data from the 

L-3 minute balloon sonde. The as-flown flight trajectory was somewhat steeper than that which 

was predicted in the pre-flight simulation; however, the trajectory deviation from the prediction 

was within 0.75 standard deviations in all directions. 

The actual pad abort test flight was conducted in very close agreement with this operations 

concept. All the key flight test events occurred in the prescribed sequential order and, at within 

acceptable tolerances of, the exact pre-planned time and flight dynamic conditions. 
25 

Figure 13. MLAS CM altitude versus range. 

Figure 14. CM altitude versus time. 
26 

9.0 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 

The launch of the MLAS FTV occurred at 0626 EDT on July 8, 2009, from a launch stand on 

Pad 1 at the WFF launch site on Wallops Island. This MLAS flight test at Wallops Island marked 

the first successful pad abort test for a human spaceflight vehicle since 1966. Ignition of the 

boosters initiated the powered ascent phase, which ended with booster burnout about six seconds 

later. The powered ascent phase placed the FTV at an altitude of 7018 feet and roughly 3000 feet 

downrange east of the launch site. The flight test demonstration began next with the stable coast 

phase. This phase demonstrated the passive stability of the FTV during unpowered flight. 

Following the coast phase was the re-orientation maneuver using two drogue parachutes to 

change the FTV attitude to heat shield-forward; concomitantly, the horizontal velocity was 

scrubbed resulting in a nearly vertical trajectory. When the FTV dropped below 3300 feet, the 

LPD began. The CM simulator impacted the water at 72.6 seconds after booster ignition. The 

entire test flight lasted a total of approximately 88 seconds from ignition until the last element of 

the FTV impacted the ocean. This flight test was the culmination of a nearly 2-year effort to 

design, build, and fly an alternate launch abort system capable of recovering the crew of NASA’s 

next generation human spacecraft in event of emergency. 

The primary ‘big picture’ lesson learned from the MLAS experience was the great extent to 

which the design and integration of a launch abort system can impact and influence the overall 

Launch Vehicle-Spacecraft system design, overall system reliability, and performance 

capabilities. One must always keep in mind that a LAS is fundamentally part of the LV used to 

place the crew in orbit. In the vast majority of launch operations, where liftoff and ascent are 

nominal, the abort system will not be used and will be jettisoned. Therefore the abort system 

must be designed to not interfere with the safe operations of, or degrade the nominal 

performance of, the LV. Striking the correct balance between LV and abort system requirements 

is a hard optimization problem often necessitating multiple interrelated system-level trade 

studies. Designers must also carefully consider the demanding flight performance requirements 

placed upon an abort system. For example, the LAS must be able to perform flawlessly at any 

point over a wide spectrum of operational regimes. These range from the zero altitude/zero 

velocity state while sitting on the pad prior to launch, then continuing through problematic 

transonic conditions, and finally during exoatmospheric flight until shortly after first stage 

burnout separation. Consider that the abort system also must stabilize and control the orientation 

of the crew’s capsule as it flies not only in the forward direction but in the backward direction as 

well. Satisfying all these competing requirements while minimizing deleterious impacts on the 

LV and avoiding the potential pitfall of introducing over-complexity into the overall system, 

presents a number of unique and demanding abort system engineering challenges for NASA and 

its industry partners. 

Several other important lessons learned came out of this MLAS flight test experience are worth 

highlighting: 

1. The need for all team members to look beyond their immediate discipline task to think, 

speak up, and act like Systems Engineers for the benefit of the project. 

2. The need for planned periodic crosschecks of critical analytical results by having 

technical ‘shoot outs’ between different engineering groups using different tools/methods 

to independently generate analytical products. 
27 

3. The need for periodic and informal face-to-face peer reviews; the emphasis should be on 

reviewing the details of modeling assumptions, analytic methods, uncertainty 

assumptions, simulation results, control law algorithm designs, software code, etc., and 

not on preparing formal presentations and responding to action items. 

4. The L&RS system design was trajectory driven much more than initially anticipated. 

Therefore, project management should consider the advantages of integrating the 

functions of the GN&C and the L&RS teams into one unified technical team; the nature 

and size of MLAS Project naturally allowed close, almost daily, technical interaction 

between the GN&C and the L&RS teams but on larger, more traditional, projects having 

separate teams could lead to inefficiencies and technical disconnects. 

5. The need for stringent mass properties testing, and vehicle mass properties configuration 

control measures and routine periodic reports, especially on a passively controlled 

vehicle. 

6. The degree of difficulty in safely and reliably performing precision alignment of the solid 

rocket abort motors was initially underestimated. 

7. The need to manage and limit insidious unchecked vehicle mass growth which erodes 

flight performance, degrades system design robustness, increases parachute loads and 

generally diminishes the probability of overall mission success. Associated with this is 

the need to incorporate realistic growth margins into the vehicle’s design to mass budget. 

In addition, this can be mitigated in part by defining a robust set of structural loads 

requirements as early as possible in the project design cycle. 

8. A rapid prototyping activity like MLAS can be accomplished using virtual meeting 

technologies supplemented by periodic Co-Locations of the entire team and by 

leveraging modern online concurrent data sharing and configuration management 

capabilities. 

10.0 References 

1. Dennehy, C. J.: “The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) GN&C Technical 

Discipline Team (TDT): Its Purpose, Practices and Experiences.” AIAA Guidance, 

Navigation, and Control Annual Conference, Hilton Head, South Carolina, August 2007, 

AIAA-2007-6332. 

2. Taylor, S. P.; Kelley, C.; Magner, E.; Peterson, D.; Hahn, J.; and Yuchnovicz, D.: “A 

Review of the MLAS Parachute System.” 20th AIAA Aerodynamic Decelerator Systems 

Technology Conference and Seminar, May 47, 2009, Seattle, Washington, AIAA Paper 

2009-2991. 

3. Anon.: NASA Sounding Rocket Program Handbook. Sounding Rockets Program Office, 

Suborbital & Special Orbital Projects Directorate, Goddard Space Flight Center, Wallops 

Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Virginia, 810-HB-SRP, June 2005, www.nsroc.com. 

4. Javad Navigation Systems, Inc.: JNS100-GG Operator’s Manual. December 2006, 

http://www.javad.com/jns/index.html?/jns/support/manuals.html [cited 2/15/2008]. 

5. Lanzi, J.: Port-O-Sim Object Simulation Application. NASA Tech Briefs, September 

2009, http://www.embeddedtechmag.com/component/content/article/5668 [cited 9/10/2008]. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

2. REPORT TYPE 

Technical Memorandum

 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C) Design Overview and Flight 

Test Results from NASA's Max Launch Abort System (MLAS)

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

 6. AUTHOR(S)

Dennehy, Cornelius J; Lanzi, Raymond J.; Ward, Philip R.

 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

NASA Langley Research Center

Hampton, VA 23681-2199

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546-0001

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L-19963

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NASA

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Subject Category-16 Space Transportation and Safety

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14. ABSTRACT

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Engineering and Safety Center designed, developed and flew the alternative Max 

Launch Abort System (MLAS) as risk mitigation for the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort system already in development. The NESC 

was tasked with both formulating a conceptual objective system design of this alternative MLAS as well as demonstrating this concept with 

a simulated pad abort flight test. Less than 2 years after Project start the MLAS simulated pad abort flight test was successfully conducted 

from Wallops Island on July 8, 2009. The entire flight test duration was 88 seconds during which time multiple staging events were 

performed and nine separate critically timed parachute deployments occurred as scheduled. This paper provides an overview of the guidance 

navigation and control technical approaches employed on this rapid prototyping activity; describes the methodology used to design the 

MLAS flight test vehicle; and lessons that were learned during this rapid prototyping project are also summarized.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Flight test vehicle; Guidance navigation and control; Max Launch Abort System; NASA Engineering and Safety Center

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