COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DAQUAN CHARLES McCLAM, A/K/A 

 CREVANTE DURAN BEASLEY, S/K/A 

 DEQUAN CHARLES McCLAM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3349-02-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MAY 4, 2004 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public Defender Commission, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. 

Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 DaQuan Charles McClam (appellant), also known as Crevante Duran Beasley, appeals 

from his bench trial conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he contends the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 

he was trespassing and, thus, that the search of his person incident to his arrest for trespass was 

invalid.1

 We hold probable cause supported an arrest for trespassing and, under the procedural 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 Appellant concedes he did not present to the trial court the issue of whether the officer 

had authority to effect a full custodial arrest for trespass, a misdemeanor offense, or whether the 

officer should instead have released appellant on a summons. Thus, on appeal, we consider only 

the issue presented to the trial court--whether the officer had probable cause to arrest for trespass. 

We assume without deciding, for purposes of this appeal only, that if probable cause to arrest for 

trespass existed, the search was constitutional. 
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posture of this case, that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress did not constitute 

reversible error. Thus, we affirm appellant’s conviction. 

 An appellant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

“presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal. In making such a 

determination, we give deference to the factual findings of the trial court and independently 

determine whether the manner in which the evidence was obtained [violated] the Fourth 

Amendment.” Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002) 

(citations omitted); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 

1659, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996). An appellant has the burden to show that, when the 

evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial court’s denial 

of his motion to suppress constituted reversible error. Murphy, 264 Va. at 573, 570 S.E.2d at 

838. 

 Code § 18.2-119 provides in relevant part as follows: 

If any person without authority of law goes upon or remains upon 

the lands, buildings or premises of another, or any portion or area 

thereof, . . . after having been forbidden to do so by a sign or signs 

posted by [the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in 

charge thereof] . . . at a place or places where [the sign or signs] 

may be reasonably seen . . . , he shall be guilty of [trespass in 

violation of this code section,] a Class 1 misdemeanor. 

Trespass is a willful act requiring criminal intent. Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 

70-71, 366 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1988). A defendant who pleads and proves, to the satisfaction of 

the trier of fact, a bona fide claim of right as an affirmative defense may not be convicted of 

trespass. Id. at 70-71, 366 S.E.2d at 277-78. “[A] bona fide claim of right is a sincere, although 

perhaps mistaken, good faith belief that one has some legal right to be on the property. The 

claim need not be one of title or ownership, but it must rise to the level of authorization.” Id. at 

71, 366 S.E.2d at 278. 
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 Evidence sufficient to provide probable cause to arrest for a crime such as trespass need 

not be evidence sufficient to convict for that offense. Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 

101, 107, 582 S.E.2d 448, 451 (2003). 

The legal standard of probable cause, as the term suggests, relates 

to probabilities that are based upon the factual and practical 

considerations in everyday life as perceived by reasonable and 

prudent persons. The presence or absence of probable cause is not 

to be examined from the perspective of a legal technician. Rather, 

probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the 

officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy 

information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. 

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981). “‘The substance of all 

the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for the belief of guilt. And this means 

less than evidence which would justify condemnation or conviction.’” Slayton, 41 Va. App. at 

107, 582 S.E.2d at 451 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 

1310, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1879 (1949) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Here, Richmond Police Officer Brian Hixson was personally aware of the numerous “No 

Trespassing” signs posted conspicuously at the entrances to the Ruffin Road Apartment Complex 

and on all apartment buildings. Also, Hixson was operating with the authority of the 

management of the apartments to enforce that “No Trespassing” policy. When Hixson 

questioned appellant about his presence in the apartment complex’s parking lot with Demetries 

Morgan on October 17, 2000, Hixson had in his possession a list of lessees generated by 

management that same date and given to him no more than one hour earlier. Appellant indicated 

he personally did not live in the complex and was visiting Morgan. However, appellant knew 

only Morgan’s nickname. Further, Morgan’s name did not appear on Hixson’s list of lessees, 

and appellant was not then accompanied by a person who was a lessee. Those facts provided 

Hixson with probable cause to arrest appellant for trespassing. Compare Jones v. 
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Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 229, 232-34, 443 S.E.2d 189, 191-92 (1994) (holding officer 

lacked probable cause to arrest for trespassing where policy included ban for particular people 

but permitted residents “to have visitors and guests on the property” and officer, who did not 

know defendant, failed to inquire whether defendant was guest of resident who was standing 

with defendant on complex property immediately before defendant fled from police). 

 Appellant contends Hixson’s knowledge that Morgan resided in a particular apartment 

with a named leaseholder deprived Hixson of probable cause for his arrest. We disagree. The 

record established that someone reported Morgan resided in apartment 2205A with Patricia 

Thomas and that another officer went to that apartment and spoke with a woman who identified 

herself as Patricia Thomas and also claimed that Morgan resided there with her. These 

representations, if believed by the fact finder at trial, may have provided appellant with a defense 

to a charge of trespass. Reed, 6 Va. App. at 70-71, 366 S.E.2d at 277-78. However, these 

representations were not binding on Officer Hixson and did not defeat Hixson’s conclusion that 

he had probable cause to arrest. 

 For these reasons, we hold probable cause supported an arrest for trespassing and, under 

the procedural posture of this case, that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress did not 

constitute reversible error. Thus, we affirm appellant’s conviction. 

Affirmed.