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CHINA’S MARITIME AND OTHER

GEOGRAPHIC THREATS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 30, 2013

Serial No. 113–103

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Perry Pickert, Ph.D., retired career intelligence officer ....................................... 7

Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D., visiting lecturer of political science, University 

of Massachusetts Dartmouth .............................................................................. 14

Mr. Rick Fisher, senior fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center ................................................................................... 19

Mr. Steven Mosher, director, Population Research Institute ............................... 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats: Prepared statement ............................................................. 4

Perry Pickert, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 11

Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................. 16

Mr. Rick Fisher: Prepared statement .................................................................... 21

Mr. Steven Mosher: Prepared statement ............................................................... 34

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 50

Questions submitted for the record and written responses from: ....................

Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D. ....................................................................... 51

Perry Pickert, Ph.D. ...................................................................................... 53

Mr. Rick Fisher ............................................................................................. 54

(1)

CHINA’S MARITIME AND OTHER GEOGRAPHIC 

THREATS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2255 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good morning. The hearing is convened. And 

I recognize myself for an opening statement. Red China—and I 

don’t hesitate to call it Red China—is the threat of the 21st Century. Since its birth as a Communist country 64 years ago this 

month, untold misery has befallen the world’s most populous nation. Millions were killed in establishing their Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. And millions have been killed since then, millions killed, 

for example, in the Cultural Revolution of 50 years ago, and in the 

regular repression since. Today its extravagant claims do not allow 

for autonomy of belief or systems unless those systems are within 

their own control of the dictators in Beijing. It has established a 

concerted effort against any religion that does not worship at the 

altar of Mao, be it any flavor of Buddhism, Christianity, or other 

faiths. The Falun Gong and the Uighurs have been singled out for 

special persecution. 

Some perhaps believe that Mao is a harmless print on a poster 

or a t-shirt. In reality, Mao joins the ranks of Hitler and Stalin as 

the 20th Century’s worst characters in butchering millions of his 

fellow citizens. 

One of our witnesses, Steve Mosher, in his book, ‘‘Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World’’ quotes Mao telling a 

stunned Khrushchev, ‘‘So what if we lose 300 million people? Our 

women will make up for it in a generation.’’

Lest one think Mao a dusty old historical anachronism, foreign 

policy columnist Fareed Zakaria, if I got that right, in the Washington Post October 24th, ‘‘It appears that the party is choosing 

older Mao methods of crackdown, public confessions, and purification campaigns.’’ What exactly does that mean? 

There are millions of prisoners of conscience today in labor 

camps in China according to a new report by the Center for International Media Assistance, where the National Endowment for Democracy, ‘‘China’s media environment remains one of the world’s 

most restrictive in 2012.’’

2

Crimes such as rumor mongering on the internet can land one 

in indefinite detention. Authorities censor and harass international 

reporters or deny their visa applications or renewals. Physical attacks on foreign media members are a disturbing and a growing 

trend. And their long reach extends overseas. One of our witnesses 

today, Steve Mosher, had his promising academic career in the 

United States as the first American social scientist allowed to carry 

out field work in Mao’s China. It was derailed over some outspoken 

criticism of China some years ago. 

Today we look at China’s external posture toward its bordering 

states. That is the purpose of this hearing. But China has menaced, threatened, and even attempted to absorb its neighbors, notably Tibet and Taiwan, and has clashes with virtually every bordering state. The subcommittee will examine China’s threatening 

maritime and territorial claims. 

For those who attempted to dismiss the thought of a threat as 

being an overstatement, let’s not forget that China expanded its 

land mass by 50 percent when it invaded and occupied Tibet in the 

1950s. Notice the disturbing pattern. 

If China borders you or borders water that is anywhere near you, 

let’s say the Pacific Ocean, it will assert every conceivable claim to 

wrest your sovereignty or territory from you, including threats, 

provocations, stunts, protests, and gunboat diplomacy, all while 

whining in the international forums that are available to it about 

its treatment, about how they’re being treated. This is to say nothing of its routine conduct in international affairs: Industrial espionage; piracy; forced organ transplants by religious practitioners 

that it has murdered; IP violations; currency manipulation; and 

even bad and deadly dog food, I might add. 

In the New York Times magazine’s Sunday, October 27th, in an 

article entitled, ‘‘A Game of Shark and Minnow,’’ the author writes,

‘‘China’s currently in disputes with several of its neighbors. 

And the Chinese, having become decidedly more willing to 

wield a heavy stick, there is a growing sense that they have 

been waiting for a long time to flex their muscles. And that 

time has finally arrived.’’

Again, Farad Zakaria writes that, ‘‘Diplomats have worried that 

China has been circulating new maps of the region in which a previously dotted demarcation line that China claims in the South 

China Sea,’’ instead of a dotted line, it now is a solid line. This is 

far from a new problem. Yet, the situation has not reserved the 

scrutiny that it does seriously deserve. 

After a trip to the region, I reported to the House in late 1998, 

‘‘The pattern of Chinese naval bases in the Spratly,’’ meaning the 

Spratly Islands, ‘‘shows an encircling strategy of energy-rich islands and intimidating military presence along the vital sea route.’’ 

I argued then ‘‘The U.S. Government must end its silence about the 

Chinese military buildup in the Spratly.’’ Multiple administrations 

and Secretaries of State have, unfortunately, thought since then 

that we cannot disturb our second largest trading partner or that 

the situation they would hope will improve on its own. 

Worse yet, the New York Times magazine piece reports, ‘‘The 

Americans pointedly refused to take sides in the sovereignty disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Feb 12, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\103013\85315 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

putes.’’ The magazine correctly notes, ‘‘China’s behavior as it becomes more powerful along with the freedom of navigation and control over the South China sea lanes, which are being threatened, 

will be among the major global political issues of the 21st Century.’’

I would argue that to believe China’s apparent expansionism is 

accidental or inevitable sells our adversary short. And we helped 

create this monster, this threat, by granting a permanent normal 

trade relations with what was then and still is the world’s worse 

human rights abuser. This is something we never did with the Soviet Union. We never granted most favored nation status with the 

Soviet Union. And that is why Soviet communism went down and 

why dictatorship in China has emerged as a great threat to all of 

us, not just its own people. 

There is a longstanding deliberate strategy in China to expand, 

provoke, challenge, and ultimately dominate the region and then 

the world. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the director of the Asia-Pacific programs at the United States Institute of Peace, said, ‘‘Nothing in China happens overnight. Any move you see was planned 

and prepared for years, if not more. So, obviously, this maritime 

issue is very important to China.’’

Our witnesses today paint a bleak and compelling picture. Steve 

Mosher has written prolifically on our topic today. Perry Pickert 

describes China playing a far more sophisticated game of statecraft 

than what we are playing. And Rick Fisher states succinctly, ‘‘We 

are in a cold war with China.’’ Far from minding its own business, 

as a good neighbor, China—and that is what they would do if they 

were minding their own business. China, instead, is an international menace with grand designs. Marxism may be on its last 

ash heap of a history, but Marxist-oriented one-party rule tragically has characterized China for more than 60 years. 

Our Pentagon’s announced strategy of a strategic pivot to Asia 

will be hollow if we are not clear about the main threat in this theater. Its maritime claims are dubious. Its grand designs must be 

opposed by the free world if peace is to be preserved. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

4


85315f-1.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

China's Maritime and Other Geographic Threats 

Good morning, the hearing is convened, I recognize myself for an opening 

statement. 

Red China is the threat of the 21 st Century. Since its birth as a Communist 

country 64 years ago this Friday, untold misery has fallen on the world's most populous 

nation. Millions killed in the Cultural Revolution of 50 years ago and regular repression 

since. Today, its extravagant claims do not allow for autonomy of belief or systems 

outside its control. It has staged a concerted effort against any religion that does not 

worship at the altar of Mao, be it any flavor of Buddhism, Christianity or other faiths. The 

Falun Gong and the Uyghurs have been singled out for special persecution. 

To some, perhaps, Mao is a harmless print on a poster or a T-shirt. In reality, he 

joins the ranks of Hitler and Stalin as the 20th Century's worst, in butchering millions of 

his fellow citizens. One of our witnesses today, Steve Mosher, in his 2000 book 

Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World, quotes Mao telling a "stunned" 

Khrushchev, "So what if we lose 300 million people. Our women will make it up in a 

generation" Lest one think Mao a dusty old historical anachronism, foreign policy 

columnist Fareed Zakaria writes in The Washington Post, October 24, "It appears that 

the party is choosing older, Mao-era methods of crackdowns, public confessions and 

purification campaigns." 

What exactly does that mean? There are millions of prisoners of conscience 

today in labor camps. According to a new report by the Center for International Media 

Assistance for the National Endowment for Democracy, "China's media environment 

remained one of the world's most restrictive in 2012." "Crimes" as minor as "rumor 

mongering" on the Internet can land one in indefinite detention. Authorities censor and 

harass international reporters, or deny their visa applications or renewals. Physical 

attacks on foreign media members are a disturbing and growing trend. 

And their long reach extends overseas. One of our witnesses today, Steve 

Mosher had his promising academic career in the United States as the first American 

social scientist allowed to carry out fieldwork in Mao's China derailed over outspoken 

criticism of China some years ago. 

Today, we look at China's external posture toward its bordering states. It has 

menaced, threatened and even attempted to absorb its neighbors, most notably Tibet 

and Taiwan- and has clashes with virtually its every bordering state. The 

subcommittee will examine China's threatening maritime and territorial claims. For those 

tempted to dismiss the thought of a threat as an overstatement, let's not forget that 

China expanded its land mass by 50 percent when it invaded and occupied Tibet. 
5


85315f-2.eps

Notice the disturbing pattern: if China borders you or water anywhere near you (say, the 

Pacific Ocean), it will assert every conceivable claim to wrest your sovereignty or 

territory from you, including threats, provocations, stunts, protests and gunboat 

diplomacy, all the while whining in international forums about its treatment. This is to 

say nothing of its routine conduct in international affairs: industrial espionage, piracy, 

forced organ harvesting of religious practitioners, IP violations, currency manipulation, 

and even deadly dog food. 

In The New York Times Magazine Sunday October 27, in an article entitled, "A 

Game of Shark and Minnow," the author writes "China is currently in disputes with 

several of its neighbors, and the Chinese having become decidedly more willing to wield 

a heavy stick. There is a growing sense that they have been waiting a long time to flex 

their muscles and that that time has finally arrived." Fareed Zakaria writes that, 

"Diplomats have worried that China has been circulating new maps of the region in 

which a previously dotted line demarcating Beijing's claims in the South China Sea now 

appears as a solid line." 

This is far from a new problem, yet this situation has not reserved the scrutiny or 

seriousness it deserves. After a trip to the region, I reported to the House in late 1998, 

"The pattern of Chinese naval bases in the Spratlys shows an encircling strategy of the 

energy-rich islands and an intimidating military presence along the vital sea route." I 

argued then, "The U.S. Government must end its silence about the Chinese military 

buildup in the Spratlys." Multiple administrations and Secretaries of State have 

unfortunately thought we can't disturb our second largest trading partner or that the 

situation will improve on its own. Worse yet, The New York Times Magazine piece 

reports, "The Americans pointedly refuse to take sides in the sovereignty disputes." 

The Magazine correctly notes, "China's behavior as it becomes more powerful, 

along with freedom of navigation and control over South China Sea shipping lanes, will 

be among the major global political issues of the 21 st century." I would argue that to 

believe China's apparent expansionism is accidental or inevitable sells our adversaries 

short. And we helped create this monster by granting permanent normal trade relations 

(PNTR), something we never did for the Soviet Union. 

There is a longstanding deliberate strategy to expand, provoke, challenge and 

ultimately dominate the region and then the world. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the 

director of Asia-Pacific programs at the United States Institute of Peace, said. "Nothing 

in China happens overnight. Any move you see was planned and prepared for years, if 

not more. So obviously this maritime issue is very important to China." 

Our witnesses paint a bleak and compelling picture. Steve Mosher has written 

prolifically on our topic today, Perry Pickert describes a China playing a far more 

sophisticated game of statecraft than we are, and Rick Fisher states it succinctly, "We 

Are in a Cold War with China." 

Far from minding its own business as a good neighbor, China is an international 

menace with grand designs. Marxism may be on the ash heap of history, but Marxist 

oriented one-party rule tragically has characterized China for more than 60 years. Our 

Pentagon's announced strategy of a strategic pivot to Asia will be hollow if we are not 

clear about the main threat in the theater. Its maritime claims are dubious; its grand 

designs must be opposed by the free world. 

2 
6

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And, with that, I would ask my ranking 

member for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. I would like to thank you and thank all of our witnesses 

for appearing today. 

I will make note that one of the witnesses is Dr. Peter SandbyThomas, a visiting professor from University of Massachusetts in 

my own district. And I appreciate your being here today, as I appreciate all of the witnesses for being here today and look forward 

to your testimony. 

We are joined by Representative Lowenthal. Welcome. 

The United States has a clear national interest in promoting the 

peaceful resolution of maritime and other territorial disputes in 

Asia. Since World War II, the United States has played the leading 

role in maintaining peace and stability in the Pacific. It is, therefore, appropriate that the United States have an active and direct 

role in resolving the disputes in the South and East China Seas. 

Yet, we must be sure that our policies and actions do not inadvertently heighten regional tensions. 

China’s maritime and territorial disputes with its neighbors date 

back to conflicts of the Nineteenth and 20th Centuries. Most were 

seriously exacerbated by the tensions of the Cold War. In addition, 

most of these disputes have deep historical roots and are fought 

with bitter emotion. Achieving their peaceful resolution will not be 

easy. It is, therefore, essential that the United States continue to 

support a collaborative process free of aggression, coercion, or the 

threat of force amongst all parties involved. This will require patience, perseverance, and deft diplomacy on our part, even as tensions in the region continue to escalate. 

The United States has made clear it will uphold our security 

commitments and treaty allies and partners in the region. And we 

will make sure that we are strong in stating that. Now is not the 

right time to change that tact. In that regard, continued U.S. support for the development of a multilateral code of conduct between 

China and the association in southeast Asian nations is essential. 

A binding code of conduct would considerably reduce tensions in 

this region. 

I applaud the administration’s effort to ensure freedom of the 

navigational rights in this region as well as new initiatives to help 

allies and partners strengthen their capacity to patrol and administer their territorial waters. I am, however, concerned over the impact that across-the-board budget cuts and related uncertainty will 

have on these important programs and U.S. projection in the region. I look forward to hearing our panelists’ views on the immediacy of the threat posed by maritime disputes and the effectiveness of the U.S. policies in the region along with your own thoughts 

on how the United States might more effectively press claimants 

to peacefully resolve their differences. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are joined by Mr. Lowenthal, but, Mr. 

Stockman, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Just briefly. To our detriment, in the 1940s, we 

ignored Asia and didn’t pay attention to it. And I think that was 

obvious when Pearl Harbor happened. Well, theoretically it caught 

7

us by surprise. And now again we seem to be putting the Asia 

problems on the back burner. 

When we visited with the Prime Minister from Japan, he expressed concern that America is losing its interest in Asia and its 

will to defend Asia and our allies, such as Japan. I also remember 

in 2008, the Olympics. One young man got up and screamed out,—

this was in Tiananmen Square—‘‘We are a nation of slaves. Where 

is America?’’ And he was hauled off. 

And the reporter glibly said, ‘‘Well, we don’t know whatever happened to that young man.’’ I think it is high time that we take 

more of a look at what is going on in Asia and be more sensitive 

and be more alert. I think down the road, by not following that 

path, we are going to end up in big trouble. And it will be very 

much like 9/11, where we wonder what happened, where were we. 

It will catch us off guard. Why didn’t we connect the dots? Well, 

the dots are all there. We need to connect them. 

And I appreciate these gentlemen coming forward today and actually connecting the dots. And this is going to be part of the record 

that we are going to have. So when we look back on it, we can look 

at this record. And a lot of you will probably say, ‘‘We told you so.’’ 

So I appreciate you coming out today and giving your testimony. 

And I yield back the balance. 

Mr. PICKERT. No. I am just pleased to be here. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. I am pleased he is here, too. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you, Mr. Lowenthal. 

Our witnesses, we have some very significant witnesses today. 

And what I am going to do is ask, with permission of the panel, 

that we place their very lengthy backgrounds and their credentials 

into the record. And so if we could just put their bios in the record? 

I am just going to announce them. And then we will proceed. And 

I would ask that you would be giving us about 5 minutes and then 

the rest of your testimony for the record. And then we will have 

some questions and answers. 

So first we have Mr. Perry Pickert. He is a Ph.D. and a retired 

intelligence officer and I guess a very continuing intelligent person. 

So, Doctor, would you please proceed? And then we will introduce 

the other witnesses. And your lengthy bio will be made a part of 

the record. 

Mr. PICKERT. Thank you very much for inviting me. 

STATEMENT OF PERRY PICKERT, PH.D., RETIRED CAREER 

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER 

Mr. PICKERT. But I wonder how we can wake up my PowerPoint, 

which has been put to sleep. I will start. They should be able to 

push a button and turn on the computer, but I don’t know what 

happened. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Has someone hacked into our system? 

Mr. PICKERT. Yes. The Chinese are here already and shutting me 

out. But I will begin anyway without the PowerPoint. I can run 

through it fairly quickly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It has showing up on a television set. 

Mr. PICKERT. The term ‘‘Great Game’’ was coined in the early 

18th Century to describe the strategy and tactics to protect India, 

the jewel of the crown of the British Empire, from a rising Russia. 

8

Beginning with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the United 

States has advocated substituting universal international organizations and the rule of law for the great power competition and war. 

President Obama at the U.N. General Assembly this fall, stepping into the stage of one of the Great Games of this century, said, 

‘‘There is no Great Game to be won.’’

In this century, the United Nations system provides the normative and institutional structure for relations as well as the language of diplomacy. While Russia, China, and the United States 

have never fought a war against each other, the United Nations 

have provided the legal rationale and cover for actions of their military and clandestine services. 

This morning, I will survey the strategic landscape in Asia focused on a rising China’s territorial claims and the implications for 

the United States. China and Russia view the world from a longterm perspective of the Russians as a chessboard, and the Chinese 

play Go. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There you got it [referring to PowerPoint 

presentation]. 

Mr. PICKERT. I got it up but not connected to this yet. There we 

go. Now we have got it. Now it should work. 

I will use the traditional Chinese game of Go, which is played by 

placing stones on a board, black and white stones. They are not 

like chess pieces, which can go anywhere, but they essentially capture territory. Territory in this game is really the space between 

points, and the Go pieces are placed on the intersection of the 

squares. 

Traditional China is at the center of its own universe and over 

the centuries has grown from a very small tribe in central China 

to the outside. Its international relations were handled as family 

relations. And the outlying princes were ruled as if in a family, 

with the closer relatives closer and the further relatives further 

away. But on the outside, we’re the barbarians who were ruled 

liked dogs, being rewarded and punished with bones, rewards; and 

sticks. The Ming dynasty extended throughout the whole of East 

Asia and established a system of tribute whereby the rituals of 

kowtowing and coming to the center with presents. Today the center is a U.N. General Assembly in New York, every year from October until December. 

Now, if you look at this map, we will go to look at the Senkaku 

Islands, which are the first territorial dispute. You will notice they 

can hardly be seen on this map. That exaggerates their size drastically. This is what the Senkakus look like in the picture. There 

are three small little islands. 

In Go terms, this would be played as a three-sided game of Go 

with a space. This game is almost completely finished. The contesting space out there now is the blank spaces between the lines. 

And those are called points. So that there is no real territory as 

ground. It is territorial space. 

This is what Taiwan looks at from this perspective. You can 

hardly find Quemoy and Matsu on a map, but you can see Taiwan 

off of the islands, a distance of the straits away. As a Go problem, 

this is the Goggle map of Quemoy and Matsu. It is on Google because it is Taiwanese territory and, therefore, is open to the word—

9

but it is, you will see, completely surrounded on three sides, leaving only one open. In Go terms, this is called atari. When you bring 

someone into position where they are about to be surrounded, you 

are supposed to inform your opponent that they are in atari. Generally it is not necessary to put another stone there because you 

don’t need to finish that off. You have got that territory able to be 

captured by one stone. 

These are fuel air explosives shot from artillery rounds in Syria 

today. The reason I say, ‘‘Welcome to Grozny’’ is that with this 

method, after Putin got tired of having an inconclusive battle in 

Chechnya, he used fuel air explosives to essentially level the town 

in 2000. Fuel air explosives are like napalm, which is blown by artillery shells. It spreads out and then is ignited after the cloud is 

lighted. That not only makes a big explosion, but it also sucks out 

the oxygen from the area. And, of course, they could use fewer explosives to blow Quemoy off the face of the Earth in 2 seconds. 

These are China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. In 

this case, the empty spaces usually are the specks out in the middle of the lake, which are the essentially disputed islands. The far 

red line shows where the disputes are. Viewed it as a Go game, you 

will see that these are the six parties about to contest over a little 

spot in there. The Chinese way of handling this will be to do it bilaterally, waiting for weakness on the part of one side, then taking 

the space. 

This is the Chinese latest surface-to-sir intermediate-range ballistic missile. It has a fuel air explosive warhead and is called the 

aircraft carrier killer because, in fact, if it hit right on the aircraft 

carrier, it would be able to kill everyone on it and surround, and 

that would be the end of it. Of course, it is really just a big SCUD. 

And the Russians and the Chinese do not use single missile tactics. 

They use mass tactics. So they would fire eight to ten of these. This 

is the range of the missile, the intermediate ones. And that shows 

the range of all of the other. In the game of Go, this would essentially put the entire area that we were talking about under the 

range of non-nuclear ballistic missiles that can be fired. And they 

are mobile. So we have no clue where they are. And a response is 

preempted by the longer range potential of nuclear missiles which 

as you can see can hit the United States easily. 

This is the Tibetan Plateau. And you can see on this map that 

the center, the one little corner, of Tibet is the source of all of the 

rivers of Southwest Asia: India, China, Vietnam, Burma. The Chinese tactic with respect to this is to dam part of these rivers up 

in China. So at any time, they can simply turn off the water for 

Southeast Asia or let it out, causing floods. They have a series of 

dams in China. And there are quite a few dams that are built in 

cooperation with the other countries, which they are sponsoring. 

The India-China border is the furthest west. This is an area 

where the Go strategy is to ‘‘seize the high ground.’’ It’s not really 

necessary for them to have forces on the area and if they were at 

Aksai Chin, they would be up at about 14,000 feet needing oxygen 

equipment. So nobody ever actually sits up there, but they have 

skirmishes all of the time. 

Now we will turn to the U.N. system as a place for the competition of the Chinese world view. First you can see that the Russians 

10

also have a view of the U.N. That is the U.N. flag with a hammer 

and a sickle and the territory that they used to think they controlled. This is the way the Chinese view the U.N. system as they 

expand their influence over it. 

Now I will go through the specific organs of the U.N., but I am 

going to drop the Go analogy because it is a little complicated. The 

General Assembly is what I would call ‘‘liars’ poker.’’ If you look 

on there, you will see Khrushchev with his boot on the table. He, 

of course, actually had two very fine Italian shoes on at the time 

and brought that along only as a prop. He didn’t take off his shoe 

and pound it on the table. And Deng Xiaoping announced his strategy for the next 20 years. I will be through in 2 seconds here. 

The Security Council is strip poker. You go in, think one thing. 

And by the time that the Russians and Chinese get finished with 

the resolution, you get another. 

The Shanghai Cooperative Organization was created by the Chinese and the Russians for central Asia. You can see its logo is essentially the trace of Mongol Empire. I call this the KGB officers’ 

and agents’ traveling crap game. 

The Law of the Sea Convention has been signed by China and 

Russia. And the U.S. is not a member. So we don’t participate. This 

will show you how the U.N. system allows you to stretch to the Pacific where you can see the Law of the Sea pioneer investors, the 

Chinese, the Russians, and the French, having staked out territory 

at the bottom of the ocean. The competing claim is the Clipperton 

Island claim, which the U.S. has based on the economic zone. 

Finally, my conclusion is how do you capture Kim’s gun, which 

is in Lahore, Pakistan? And the answer is to recruit the Lama—

as you see, he was sitting there—because you control the space by 

having the person who was controlling the person on the space. 

And this was Kipling’s statement about the Great Game, the 

final bottom line, ‘‘When everyone is dead, the Great Game is finished,’’ not as we have seen the American view that it has been 

subsumed into the U.N. system. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickert follows:]

11


85315a-1.eps

The Great Game in 21st Century Asia 

Perry L. Pickert 

"There's no Great Game to he won." 

- President Obama at the UN General Assembly 

The term "Great Game" was coined in the 1800's to describe the strategy 

lndia. in the crown of the British from a 

with Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points the States has 

based on the rule of law for 

and war 

In the 21 ,[ Century, the United Nations system 

institutional stmcture for international relations as well as the ""''''u,''~,~ 

While Russia. China and the United States have never 

ofNatiolls and the United Nations have 

ofthe][ forces and clandestine services. 

This 1 will survey the of Asia focused on a 

China's tenl10rial and maritime disputes and considerthe implications for the United 

States. China and Russia view the world from the 111 

the Great Game. The Chinese play gQ umUhe Russians chess. wbile at UN thi s fall 

President Obama asser1ed l;niled States was not in a "zero-sum endeavor." 

For a nexl few minutes, T will try 10 gel within Chinese by 

sketching the terri10riai disputes on China's periphery as if they were 10 he played on a gQ 

board. T wi II eonsi def the traditi onal mix of hard and soft power as it has been lIsed over 

the centuries as the Chinese played the Great Game first in Central Asia and now across 

the world within the UN sys1em, 

China at the Cenier 

The word for China means central The state as feudal 

lords finally dominated hy the most powerful among them. Endless conl1icl eventually 

I cad to the dominant the country and a centralized 

govemment based on a model of hierarchical family relations with the emperor at the top 

He was considered the ruler of ' 'all under heaven" which meant the world as civilized by 

Chinese culwre. Those outside were considered barbarians and were managed by bones 

(rewards) and sticks Written in China is traced to the 

Shang Dynasty which tells of Chill a's first Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang (259 BC - 210 

BC). International relations evolved through Zhou, Qin, Han. Sui. Tang, Song, Yuan, 

Ming, and Qing dynasties with a highly ritualized system of diplomacy and trade 

described as tribute to the Emperor. 
12


85315a-2.eps

The Game ofgQ as Strategic Model 

The source of power in ancient China was agricultural land so gQ is played on a 

plane grid of 19 horizontal and 19 vertical1ines called a board. The players are given as 

many black or white stones as necessary. Unlike chess or checkers the opposing stones 

are not killed or counted. instead stones are the 

opposing players stones. It generally takes five or six moves to surround even empty 

and many more to capture an stone. All moves take 1Il 

plain sight so strategy and deception are keys to victory. 

Asia as a Go Board 

In order to consider China's tenitorial disputes as a strategic game it is merely 

necessary to a map of China with a of horizontal and vertical lines. Chinese 

military forces and those of the bordering countries will be for the sake of the game 

UtUHJV"'U as are For the sake discussion, the 

rapprochement between Russia and China in the early 1990's settled the various 

territorial claims. [t was followed withdrawal forces both 

sides. To begin with the gQ board will be focused on the Asian continent and the 

sUlTounding waters: 

1. The China-India Border Vl;,IYUC\', - Seize the 

2. Tibet Send Han, recmit the monks 

3. The River- Grab them the throat 

4. The South China Sea Divide and Conquer 

s. islands Just a Point 

6. Kinmen (Quemoy) - Atari 

7. Taiwan· East Wind 

Tihet is another 

a horder and are 

as reflected in !ill. the 

are critical to China's 

hewleen lndia 

its autonomous zone as 

The game is between two players. China's traditional impelia! diplomacy 

with China at the center would treat each of the separate spaces so 

that the would have to deal one··one where China has a huge relative advantage. 

In the Century China is one of 190 or so states to have 

equality. Yet each has a unique territorial space on the globe with a unique contlguration 

of relations with every other stare. 
13


85315a-3.eps

Global QQ 

China's participation lathe CUlTent system of international relations may also be 

viewed as projection oC the Great Game strategy on to a gQ board to the UN system. Over 

Churchill's objections, Presidenl Roosevelt insisted the Chinese be included in the 

wartime alliance and as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The PRC took 

the UN seat from Taiwan in J 971 and now pursues China's traditional Great Game 

objectives within the legal and institutional framework of the UN system. 

co PCDnanent Membership on the UN Security Council granted automatic great 

pmver status and veto over any UN binding resolution or anti-Chinese coercive 

action 

.. was created with the Russians and 

some fonner Soviet satellites in 2001- it is a within the UN 

system the to cmmlerbalancc the EE and NATO 

" UN General and other de!iberativIJ and distributive UN 

the caucus to form their own 

Group to press their programs prolect their interests 

.. in the UN Law of the Sea Treaty China 

UN forums 

Each of the UN organizations has different functions and political cultures so it is 

necessary to consider China's territorial within each 

--India Boarder China's veto otTers IJlCm"~U~",but UK and US 

nn,,,t,,,,,, on Tibet so PRC 

but 

consensus but China is 

to both the PRe 

and 

- Peaceful at the moment 

(7) Taiwan the u;~ battle was lost when the PRe took the China seat 

TO territorial issues it has the veto power and 

with countries on a bilateral basis. 

in the UN. It used its veto 
14

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are going to now go to the last witness 

because he happens to be the witness who was invited by the ranking member, and I would like Ranking Member Gideon to introduce 

his witness today. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I won’t go into great detail because time is precious today, but 

I do thank Dr. Sandby-Thomas for joining us today and to testify 

on these issues. I do think his own expertise will be self-evident. 

And, rather than delay with an introduction, I will just introduce 

Dr. Sandby-Thomas. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF PETER SANDBY–THOMAS, PH.D., VISITING 

LECTURER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS DARTMOUTH 

Mr. SANDBY-THOMAS. All right. Thank you. 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating, members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats on this 

topic of vital national and geopolitical significance. 

Sort of to frame the discussion, I think it is important to consider 

the question of whether China’s recent behavior, both maritime 

and beyond, should be construed as a threat. In sort of making that 

point, the purpose is to draw attention to the fact that China is 

emerging as a reasonable and possibly global power. And so in such 

a context, it is necessary to determine what types of behavior and 

conduct are justifiable and commensurate with this increasing 

power when you clarify this and do not provide the benefit in terms 

of assessing China’s behavior in terms of what’s threatening and 

what is, say, permissible. 

If we turn to China’s military capabilities, it is clear that they 

have expanded rapidly in recent years. And that is aided in large 

part through a concerted effort to allocate increasing budget spending toward their military. And if we looked sort of within this, you 

can see that the People’s Liberation Army has navy capabilities. 

They have been notably expanded. You have seen sort of significant 

milestones in terms of China’s first aircraft carrier, plans for a second one, sort of details indicating that they have other sort of hightech equipment, sort of guided missile destroyers, et cetera, et 

cetera. One of the aspects of this is that it is not always entirely 

clear how to determine the veracity of such reports, which in and 

of itself can be perceived as an issue in terms of transparency. And 

sometimes that leaves a void that gets filled by increased speculation. 

But, regardless of that, I think it seems clear that the navy is 

rapidly developing and is on course to be the dominant maritime 

power in east Asia. The time frame is not exactly clear, but it 

seems within the next 10 to 20 years. There doesn’t appear to be 

another rival that is capable of sort of challenging it. The only sort 

of reasonable one would be Japan, but it is obviously sort of hobbled by constitutional restrictions. 

At this point, I think, though, the focus is often sort of solely on 

the hardware. And that is, of course, important, but it is also important to consider sort of how seaworthy China’s vessels are. That 

is not exactly clear. These things aren’t obviously battle-tested. 

15

They also have a limited schedule of sea operations. And I think 

another aspect to consider is, say, the sort of quality of the mariners that China has. Again, that is something that can be put 

down to a lack of practice, certainly when you compare it to, say, 

the U.S. naval capabilities. 

Nevertheless, the expansion of naval capabilities has raised concerns, particularly over China’s intentions. And this has led to, you 

know, a different—I was drawing different conclusions. Some make 

the point that this expansion definitively reflects an intention to 

exert regional dominance. And I think that this—it is not obviously 

something that can necessarily be ruled out. 

Certainly, you know, why does China invest all of this money 

and certainly equipment if it doesn’t intend to use it? That is certainly the prevailing logic. But I think the more lightly explanation 

is that China’s strategy, certainly in the near to medium term, is 

primarily defensive in nature, rather than offensive. 

If we look at the region that it is located in, it is corrupted by, 

say, a number of conflicting and competing challenges. It is a region that is filled with historical grievances. You have competing 

powers, such as Australia also has a naval fleet. And Japan has 

impressive capabilities, even if, to a degree, limited. You also have, 

say, unpredictable actors that are in the region. And so the conclusion that I would draw is that China’s naval expansion would appear to be more geared toward ensuring their own territorial security as well as ensuring that sea lanes of communication remain 

open for commercial interests. 

And while this assessment does run counter to prevailing orthodoxy and it is clear that in the past few years, a label of ‘‘assertive’’ 

has been attached to China, particularly with regards to the East 

China and South China Seas and while the nature of this claim I 

think is, say, ambiguous, sort of elastic, if you will, isn’t clearly 

grounded, I think you can look that China’s behavior in these situations has not significantly deviated from past practices. You can 

argue that there has been provocation on the part of others. So 

other actors need to be taken into account. 

And I think you can make the point that, you know, China has 

been, say, more forthright in pressing its own claims, but whether—I don’t think that you can argue in both cases that the claims 

are significantly new. Generally China uses a designation of core 

national interest to determine if it regards a particular territory as 

non-negotiable. And that has not been the case on both the 

Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute or the dispute in the South China 

Seas. 

So, because of time, I will sort of wrap up and just say in terms 

of implications for the U.S. in these regional developments, the particular concern seems to be, say, a security point of view. I think 

that you can make sort of arguments about sort of the assertiveness of China’s behavior, but, regardless of that, I think the dispute between China and Japan appears to be the more serious. I 

don’t think that the intention is to engage in conflict, but it is clear 

that there are increased Chinese incursions, increased Japanese responses. And so that increases the likelihood or the potentiality for 

some sort of conflict. And obviously that, then, brings in the U.S. 

and its security obligations. In terms of the South China Sea, it 

16

seems that negotiated compromise is more likely and possible and 

something that the U.S. should certainly press for. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sandby-Thomas follows:]


85315d-1.eps

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Hearing on "China's Maritime and Other Threats" 

October 30, 2013 

Written Statement 

By 

Peter Sand by-Thomas, PhD 

Visiting Professor in Political Science 

University of Massachusetts Dartmouth 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating, members of the Committee: Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

on a topic of such national and geopolitical significance. 

Turning to this topic, I would like to begin by considering the question of whether China's 

recent behavior, maritime and beyond, should be construed as a "threat". In so doing, the 

purpose is to draw attention to the obvious fact that China is an emerging regional and, 

possibly, global power and, in such a context, to determine what types of behavior and conduct 

are justifiable and commensurate with this increasing power. The need for clarification on this 

point will be of benefit in assessing the threats, if any, posed by China. 

China's military capabilities have clearly expanded in recent years, aided in large part through 

year-on-year double-digit increases in budget allocations. Within this, investment in the 

upgrading of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) capabilities has been notable, with the 

launch of China's first aircraft carrier viewed as a significant step forward. Moreover, 

speculation suggests that a second carrier is already underway along with the approval of 

designs for gUided-missile destroyers (DOGs). Leaving aside the veracity of such reports, the 

prevailing view is that the PLAN is rapidly developing and is on course to be the dominant 

maritime power in the East Asia in the next 10-20 years. A couple of points can be interjected at 

this point, namely the full extent and seaworthiness of China's vessels are difficult to accurately 

gauge, both due to a limited schedule of sea operations as well as a lack of engagement i.e. 

conflict. An additional consideration-hardware is an important aspect of naval expansion but 

not the only one-an extremely important part. Nevertheless, the significant investment in the 
17


85315d-2.eps

expansion of naval capabilities has raised concerns over China's intentions. For some, the 

conclusion to be drawn is that this expansion reflects an intention to exert regional dominance 

in the East Asia region. And while such a conclusion cannot be ruled out, it appears that the 

more likely explanation is that China's strategy in the near- to medium-term at least is primarily 

defensive in nature than offensive. The region in which China is located features historical 

grievances (e.g. Vietnam, Japan), competing (naval) powers (e.g. Taiwan, Australia, Japan) as 

well as unpredictable actors (e.g. North Korea). As such, China's naval expansion would appear 

to be more geared towards ensuring its own territorial security as well as ensuring Sea Lanes of 

Communication remain open for commercial interests, including trade and energy. 

The above assessment does run counter to the prevailing orthodoxy concerning China in the 

past few years, in which it has repeatedly been labeled as "assertive". This has been particularly 

the case in its pressing of territorial claims in both the East China and South China Seas. Leaving 

aside the inherent ambiguity of such a label, it is possible to argue in both situations that 

China's behavior did not significantly deviate from past practices and that the role of other 

actors in these situations must be taken into account. In the case of the East China Sea and the 

dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the decision by Japan to accede to the 

purchase of three of the islands from a private Japanese citizen was the most recent catalyst for 

action and reaction. Indeed, though the Japanese government's action did not, in practice, 

change anything i.e. Japan still administers the Islands and its territorial waters, it did, from the 

Chinese point of view, undermine the status quo. And while the Chinese response has taken the 

form of repeated incursions into Japanese waters, it has not determined the islands to be a 

"core national interest" while leaving open the possibility of negotiating the status of the 

Islands. That said, it seems clear that part of the strategy engaged in by Beijing is to successively 

undermine the legitimacy of Japan's claims over the Islands. The Islands themselves hold little 

intrinsic value, their ownership is being contested because of the location of energy reserves in 

the seabed adjacent to the islands and, from China's point of view, offering a strategic access 

point through the "first Island Chain" that would enable it to reach the Western Pacific Ocean. 

On the first point, negotiations have taken place on the possible joint exploration of the energy 

resources; however, on the second point, it is unclear what form a resolution will take, 

particularly given the current state of political relations between China and Japan. As for the 

South China Sea, the dispute in this region was prompted in part by the deadlines imposed by 

UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS). In its submissions, China's claims to the entire 

South China Sea region are not entirely new and not as comprehensive as commonly thought. 

Moreover, in response to the actions of other states, notably Vietnam and the Philippines, 

China maritime agencies has increased patrols of this area and engaged in acts including 

detention of fishing boats and the cutting of cables in survey boats. China's interest in this 

region appears to be both security- and commercially-related. Indeed, given that the South 

China Sea is a major shipping route for many countries, including the US, it is an area of 
18


85315d-3.eps

strategic significance. Considering the possibility of resolution, China's recent actions 

notwithstanding, it remains involved in the process to build on the Declaration on the Conduct 

of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that was signed between ASEAN and China in 2002. 

As for the implications for the US in these regional developments, the area of particular 

concern from a security point of view is with the dispute between China and Japan in the East 

China Sea. The reasoning for this is twofold: firstly, the US has affirmed its commitment to 

defend Japan following the passage of the 2013 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act; and 

secondly, this leaves US security, to some extent, being determined by other actors, in this case 

China and Japan. As the comments by Prime Minister Abe in the Wall Street Journal over the 

weekend, this situation is still inflamed. Moreover, with increased incursions by China and 

Japanese responses, the likelihood for clashes, accidental or otherwise, is increased. 
19

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. And we will have 

questions for the panel as we finish our testimony. Next we have 

Rick Fisher, who is a senior fellow, Asian Military Affairs at the 

International Assessment and Strategy Center, as well as a 

lengthy bio as well, which will be submitted for the record. 

Mr. Fisher, you may proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICK FISHER, SENIOR FELLOW, ASIAN 

MILITARY AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND 

STRATEGY CENTER 

Mr. FISHER. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating, 

and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I would also like 

to thank you for this privilege to offer testimony to aid your deliberations. I would also like to offer my compliment to your leadership in looking beyond Europe and Eurasia to examine concerns 

with China. 

Just 2 weeks ago, I was called to address a NATO parliamentary 

committee on Chinese military modernization. And my experience 

at this meeting was that, indeed, there is great concern, especially 

when considering how China is pursuing its territorial claims in a 

way that is increasing the chances for conflict, either accidental or 

by design. I will just offer that just this past weekend, the Japanese Air Force had to scramble three times 3 days in a row to 

intercept threatening Chinese bombers that were conducting coordinated ship, submarine, and aircraft anti-ship exercises south of 

the Sakashima Islands, which if the Chinese ever succeed in grabbing the Senkaku Islands will be the next meal on the menu. 

In my testimony, I try to describe how China is building a force 

to achieve regional dominance. I estimate that absent a countervailing effort by the United States and its allies, that China could 

have its regional dominance by early in the next decade. This dominance is going to be expressed not just in hardware, expansive 

space control, missiles, expanded regional nuclear forces, fourth 

and fifth generation aircraft, naval forces with multiple aircraft 

carriers, a large amphibious projection capability, but China will 

practice and will have the skills to use this hardware to achieve its 

aims. 

Japan, of course, as I mentioned, is the target of the moment. 

Since the Japanese Government moved to purchase the Senkaku 

Islands in the Summer of 2012, a move which we have just found 

out was designed to try to ameliorate conflict with Beijing, the Chinese have put on an expanded paramilitary campaign to try to intimidate Japan into making concessions. It is not going to work. 

And my prediction is that the Japanese are going to rearm significantly because of this pressure and we will have a much more dangerous and more well-armed East China Sea by the end of this decade. 

But China probably believes that it can have more success in the 

South China Sea. It is succeeding in the last year in pushing the 

Philippines away from areas near its economic exclusion zone. Mr. 

Chairman, as you pointed out, in a recent New York Times article, 

Chinese Coast Guard ships are trying to dissuade the Philippines 

from supplying men on a beached LST on the Second Thomas 

Shoal. 

20

In the future, China is going to be building the means for global 

power projection. And it is going to be able to weigh in on other 

people’s, other countries’ territorial disputes. I would just offer that 

this year, I was able to find out by visiting arm shows that Argentina and China are considering the co-production of a Chinese 

fighter, a fighter that could be armed with a new Chinese 

hypersonic missile at a speed at which you can’t shoot it down. 

China fully supports Argentina’s claim to the Falklands. By the 

next decade, by the end of the next decade, will China be able to 

send aircraft carriers or amphibious groups to respond to a British 

attempt to defend the Falklands again? 

I conclude by noting that while the Obama administration’s recent pivot to Asia over the last 2 to 3 years has been welcomed in 

the region, the momentum that the administration has built up is 

being undermined significantly by uncertainty surrounding our 

ability to pay for new programs to make good on our pledges and 

continue to ensure pledges that we have made to our allies, our 

military allies. We are not able to afford aerial exercises that we 

have planned. We are threatening to cut back our number of carrier battle groups and eliminate whole types of combat aircraft. 

This is very disturbing. And it will only encourage the Chinese to 

press harder. 

I believe we can deter China. I think we have it within our capability to encourage our allies to join a regional information-sharing 

network: Radar, space assets and the such, and then eventually tie 

this network to new ballistic missile capabilities: Short-range and 

medium-range systems that perhaps we share with our allies, intermediate-range systems that we deploy ourselves. If we can prove 

to China that, like on Dr. Pickert’s Go board, that if they use their 

Navy, they can lose their Navy, then we can sustain deterrence 

and suggest to our Chinese friends that violence will not pay. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fisher follows:]

21


85315b-1.eps

China's Maritime and Other Geographic Threats 

Testimony by Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, 

International Assessment and Strategy Center 

Before The Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats, 

Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives, 

October 30, 2013 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of this Subcommittee: 

The People's Republic of China has active and/or dormant territorial disputes with practically all 

of its neighbors. China is today using paramilitary or military force to assert its territorial or 

economic zone claims against Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and India. China also 

continues its more than two-decade long preparations for war against democratic Taiwan. 

Despite a relative peace that exists between them today, there is sufficient indication that China 

could in the future opt to pursue latent territorial claims against Russia, Mongolia and Korea. 

China's key goal in the pursuit of its claims is to improve its geostrategic position in order to 

strengthen the dictatorship of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But as the Party's 

insecurity increases, it cannot be determined how much it will "externalize" its internal 

contradictions by pursuing aggression, which then further justifies internal repression. 

Fundamental to the CCP's pursuit of its territorial goals has been the buildup and increasingly 

assertive employment of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and associated paramilitary forces, 

especially the newly reformed Chinese Coast Guard. China's use of military pressure in pursuit 

of its territorial claims is increasing the prospect for military clashes, especially with Japan and 

the Philippines. This testimony will largely focus on two concerns I) how China is building up 

and using its military forces to pursue its regional goals; and 2) how China is now building the 

framework for global military projection capabilities. 

While China and the United States do not have direct territorial or resource disputes, Beijing's 

military buildup and intimidation of US. allies is intended to challenge Washington's ability to 

defend its allies, and thereby diminish the credibility of US. alliance commitments in East Asia. 

For most of the last year Japan has been in a near constant state of non-violent engagement with 

China's military and paramilitary forces over control of the SenkakulDaiyou Islands, but the 

chances of a military incident are increasing. The Philippines is also being pushed by Chinese 

forces from areas in or near its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). While the US. has become 

more critical of China's aggressiveness, it maintains a strict neutrality toward conflicting 

maritime territorial claims in East Asia. This neutrality was more convenient when the US. had 

an excess of military superiority, which is now eroding as China builds up its military. The 

Obama Administration's "Rebalance" or "Pivot" of2011 to 2013 has been welcome. However, 

the impact of sequestration and other budget cuts and pressures have damaged the credibility of 

Washington's ability to prevail in the ongoing arms race with China. 
22


85315b-2.eps

When Will China Be Satisfied? 

When examining the number of China's territorial conflicts with its neighbors, and especially the 

degree to which it willing to undertake aggression against both powerful and weak neighbors, it 

is necessary to ask: at what point will the leadership of China be satisfied? China does not 

specify what level of control it desires over the South China Sea, the East China Sea or Taiwan. 

While "unification" or the conquest of Taiwan has long been called a "core interest," or an 

interest which China is willing to fight for, the term "core interest" has in recent years also been 

loosely applied to the South and East China Sea. China also has a policy of domestically 

cultivating resentment and of reaching back into history, when previous Chinese Emperors 

allegedly controlled areas far beyond present-day China, to justify current claims. 

One ominous indicator from the deep well of nationalist sentiments in China is a list that has 

been posted and refined on Chinese web pages since at least 2008, called, "The Six Wars To Be 

Fought By China In the Coming 50 Years." Most recently it was posted in July 2013 on the web 

forum of the pro-Beijing and prominent Hong Kong newspaper Well Wei Po, It includes: 

1. The Unification of Taiwan (2020 to 2025) 

2. "Reconquest" of the SpratJy Islands (2035 to 2030) 

~. "Reconquest" of Southern Tibet (2035 to 2040). Further goal of dismembering India. 

4. "Reconquest" ofDaiyou and Ryukyu Islands (2040 to 2045) 

5. Unification of Outer Mongolia (2045 to 2050) 

6. Taking back of lands lost to Russia (2055 to 2060) 

This "Six Wars" list itself cannot be linked to any formal Chinese government policy or strategy. 

It is also somewhat assuring that on Chinese web pages, as many Chinese readers seem to 

condemn this list with horror as seem to support it. It may be tempting to dismiss this list as 

nationalist ranting. But it is also a fact that by means short of war, China is now trying to 

accomplish the first two, while the second two are being pursued partially. 

Until July 2012 it could easily have been considered an extreme assessment to state that China 

would want to "reconquer" the Ryukyu Islands -- which China abandoned its claims to as part of 

the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, after its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War In July 2012 

PLA General Luo Yuan, known for voicing hard-line nationalist opinions, questioned Japan's 

sovereignty over the Ryukyus, and repeated this opinion to Chinese journalists in May 2013. 

Then on 9 May 2013 a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman rejected Japanese protests that 

China's state-controlled media would challenge Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyus, but did 

not disavow that challenge. While it may not be possible today to determine the extent of 

China's future territorial ambitions, it is possible to assess the kind of military they are 

developing that could employed to that end, how it is using its forces today to pursue territorial 

goals, how its neighbors are reacting, and what risks China's actions pose for the U.S .. 

2 
23


85315b-3.eps

Building Forces For Regional Dominance 

Soon after the June 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, the Chinese Communist Party leadership quietly 

abandoned fonner paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's 1980s policy of putting military 

modernization at a 4th level of national priority and very likely raised to a top level of priority. 

The stellar U.S. perfonnance during the 1990-1991 Gulf War against Iraq further confirmed this 

CCP decision. Today, after 20 years of sustained effort, it can be said that the People's 

Liberation Anny has largely accomplished a transition to a 4'h Generation level of technology 

and is quickly mastering the strategies, operational tactics, modem training regimens and logistic 

support capabilities to begin to fonnulate a 4'h Generation level of operational capability. In East 

Asia today, the PLA has the dominant forces in space, the air, and very soon, the sea. While this 

combine of forces is often viewed as "Anti-Access" or "Area Denial" (A2AD) in purpose, China 

is also gathering regional force projection capabilities. When considering its access to civilian air 

and sealift, the PLA may have the ability to invade Taiwan early in the next decade and within 

the next two years, may be able to undertake a rapid amphibious assault against the Senkaku 

Islands. 

Space, C4ISR, missile and regional nuclear forces fonn the vanguard of China's growing 

regional capabilities. China now has over 100 satellites in orbit and may soon exceed Russia's 

number. Nearly 20 optical and radar surveillance satellites, plus an eventual 30+ ('ompass 

navigation satellites will fonn tbe core space portion of a C4ISR (Command, Control, 

Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) system that connects 

"sensors" to "shooters" and allows the PLA to develop new "j oint" operations. Ground elements 

include new Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar, passive radar and other radar with counter-stealth 

capabilities. The PLA also operates effective electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals 

intelligence (STGTNT) which also assist targeting. 

These targeting systems are enabling precision missile and air strikes beyond 1,000km from 

China, such as by the PLA Second Artillery's much vaunted 1,700km range DF-21D Anti-ship 

Ballistic Missile (ASBM). Even though there have been no open source reports of a successful 

test against a moving target, this missile may be operational. After 2015 it may be supplemented 

by the ASBM version of a new 4,000km range intennediate range ballistic missile (TRBM). The 

Mach 2-3 speed and 200km range YJ-12 anti-ship missile now arms PLA Naval Air Force 

(PLANAF) H-6G bombers, which can be cued by PLANAF Y-8J/Searchwater and KJ-200 radar 

aircraft. 

Regional nuclear forces. China also maintains a sizable regional nuclear force. In 2012 retired 

Russian General Victor Esin, fonner chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, 

estimated that the PLA may have up to 700 tactical nuclear warheads for missiles and bombs. 

Esin estimates there may be as many as 150 tactical nuclear warheads allocated to short range 

ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles. 

By 2020 the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLANAF may have close to 1,000 4th Generation and 

4+ Generation multirole fighters armed with advanced air-to-air missile and a range of precision 

t,'Uided munitions (PGMs). The 5

th Generation Chengdu J-20 may enter service by 2020 and may 

soon be joined by other 5

th Gen types. In 2013 the PLAAF and PLANAF began operating 

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medium altitude/medium endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the latter 

conducting patrols near the Senkakus. The PLA is now developing strategic high-altitude/longendurance (HALE) UAVs and is testing its first turbofan-powered unmanned combat aerial 

vehicle (UCAVs) - which eventually will equip future Chinese aircraft carriers. 

At sea, the PLA Navy (PLAN) may have over 100 submarines due to their apparent retention of 

about 30 older Type 033 non-nuclear submarines for training and lesser missions such as mining 

and Special Operations troop transport. But its modem non-nuclear submarine complement 

includes about 20 Type 035 Ming class, 12 Russian-build Kilos anned with the effective Novator 

Cluh missile family, about 13 indigenous Type 039 Song class and 10-12 of the newest Type 

039B Yuan class, with air independent propulsion (ATP) for longer periods submerged. About 20 

Yual1.~ are expected to be built. In 201 0 the first Type 032 non-nuclear ballistic missile 

submarine was launched to test new strategic submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) but 

this class could be developed to carry ASBMs and multiple types of cruise missiles. The PLAN 

is expected to acquire about five Type 092 nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) before 

production of the 3'd Generation Type 095 begins. 

The PLAN began its aircraft carrier era with the September 2012 commissioning of the 

T.iaonillg, which in three to four years may reach operational status with an air wing of 24 

Shenyang J-15 carrier fighters which are about as effective as the Boeing F/ A-18E/F. In the last 

decade the PLAN has aC3uired five new types of air-defense capable destroyers. The latest, 

Type 052D, features a 2" Generation active phased array radar and launchers for 64 missiles, 

surface to air, anti-ship and anti-submarine. By 2020 the PLAN's complement of modem 

combat ships may include 25 destroyers, 40 frigates, 40 corvettes and 80 fast attack craft. While 

long a weakness, the PLAN's new ships will be increasingly capable of anti-submarine warfare 

(ASW), aided by new Y-8 based ASW patrol aircraft, powerful sonar array-towing catamaran 

ships and new bottom-moored sonar sensor networks. 

Both formal amphibious and airlift capabilities are also increasing. The PLAN's three 25,000-

30,000 ton Type 071 landing platfonn dock (LPD) amphibious assault ships may be joined by 

three more, and then by up to six 40,000 ton landing helicopter dock (LHD) assault ships. 

Existing amphibious lift ofLPD and landing ship tank (LST) vessels could allow the PLA to 

transport about one division of troops and equipment. In May 2013 the PLAN took delivery of 

its first of four Ukrainian Zuhr hovercraft, which can carry 500 troops each, orup to 150 tons of 

equipment, up to speeds of 40 knots. One or two prototypes of the Xian Y-20 heavylift transport 

are in testing. Eventually it will be able to carry about 65 tons of cargo, comparable to the US 

C-17. 

To exercise strategies short of war China has built up its maritime paramilitary forces. In early 

2013 China completed the expected consolidation of seven maritime police and surveillance 

agencies to fonn the Chinese Coast Guard. In 2013 this service controls about 43 large patrol 

ships, but is now in the process of building about 56 more for an eventual total of about 100 

ships. These ships are unanned or lightly-armed, but sufficient for "presence" or "pushing" 

missions. Where it has none today, the Chinese Coast Guard will soon acquire a new long-range 

maritime patrol aircraft based on the twin-turboprop Xian MA60, with about a 10 hour 

endurance, increasing its ability to sustain an aerial presence in contested areas. 

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Pressuring Japan 

China is using both paramilitary and military forces to pressure Japan into making territorial 

concessions-both in the maritime and air realms. Maritime territorial disputes include 

differences over their EEZ in the East China Sea, and who has sovereign control over the 

SenkakuIDaiyou Islands. China is also challenging Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone 

(ADIZ) as too large for their region. For China, control or neutralization of the Senkakus would 

undennine the utility of the "First Island Chain" as a means to contain Chinese military power. 

It is thus ominous that in July 2012, and in May 2013, China's state controlled media allowed 

commentary that the Ryukyu Island chain, to include Okinawa, belongs to China, not Japan. 

In a new book published on 22 October 2013, former Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko 

revealed his government secretly but vigorously sought to defuse a potential crisis with China 

over the Senkakus by preemptively purchasing the islands to prevent their purchase in an effort 

led by Tokyo Mayor Ishihara Shintaro. But China shut down secret negotiations and instead of 

averting a crisis, China used the purchase as an excuse to create one: a campaign of maritime 

intimidation against Japan that could facilitate a deliberate attack by Chinese forces or lead to an 

unintended military conflict with Japan. 

Through most of2013, Chinese Coast Guard ships have maintained a near-continuous presence 

around the 12 nautical mile territorial zone surrounding the Senkakus, and on several occasions 

(April 2013; 14 September; 27 September; 28 October) they have entered this zone. This has 

required the Japanese Coast Guard, which has about 121 large patrol ships, to maintain constant 

multi-ship patrols to meet Chinese incursions, resulting in a strain of Japanese resources. In 

early October, Japan's Ministry of Defense reported that Japanese Air Self Defense Force 

(ASDF) fighters had to scramble 149 times against Chinese aircraft in the six months from April 

to September 2013 - that is almost daily. 

China's recent use ofa PLANAF BZK-005 UAV, intercepted flying over the Senkakus on 9 

September, has sparked a recent military escalation. Given their low cost, about $1 million for a 

UAV the size of the BZK-005, China could soon inundate Japan's ADIZ with UAVs that might 

overwhelm the ASDF. On 20 October, Japanese reports indicated that current Prime Minister 

Abe Shinzo had approved a Defense Ministry plan for shooting down UAVs, which on 26 

October a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman said could be "an act of war." This statement 

also occurred during the PLAN's "Maneuver-5" exercises, which saw destroyers and frigates 

pass through the Miyako Strait, and then the PLAN dispatched Y-8J radar aircraft and H-6G 

bombers through the Miyako Strait, very likely to conduct coordinated combat exercises with 

PLAN ships. 

When the PLAN's Zubr large hovercraft enter service, this will add to the temptation for China 

to strike the Senkakus, as they can carry thousands of troops or hundreds of tons of equipment to 

these islands in about 4 to 5 hours. An attack on the Sekakus may be quickly followed by attacks 

on the larger Sakashima Island group just to the south, which has ports and airfields and would 

better position the PLA to strike Taiwan from an Eastern axis. 

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Today, it is the ability of24 Okinawa-based U.S. Marine MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft to put 

500 troops or over 100 tons of equipment on these islands in about one hour that provides the 

margin of deterrence. In response, Japan is considering developing a short-range ballistic missile 

(SRBM), and is going to assemble its own 3,000 member "Marine" group with up to 20 MV-22s. 

Japan's army and navy have started amphibious assault exercises with the U.S. Marines-Navy 

forces. Japan may also have to consider purchasing U.S. F-35B short take-off fighters to equip 

its larger LHDs or future aircraft carriers. 

As there is little chance that Japan will surrender control of the Senkakus or other disputed areas, 

the optimal outcome may be a Japanese buildup ofISR, missile, fighter and Marine forces to 

pose an armed deterrent to China, essentially meeting China's militarization of the East China 

Sea. However, such a buildup may also tempt China to strike before Japan completes its military 

force expansion. 

Continued Preparation for War To Conquer Taiwan 

Despite improving relations since the election of President Ma Ying Jeou in 2008, China has not 

abandoned its goal of controlling Taiwan. This ambition has not waned since Mao's intended 

1950 invasion was dissuaded by Josef Stalin, and is motivated by the CCP's intolerance of any 

competing center of power in the Greater Chinese world -- a matter made more urgent by 

Taiwan's evolution into an ideologically competitive democracy. While the early part of the 

previous administration of Chen Shui Bien was marked by Chinese military posturing and 

threats, recent years have seen an emphasis on political and economic warfare against Taiwan. 

But China's military preparations to take Taiwan by force have not abated. Beijing would rather 

intimidate Taipei into "Peace Treaty" that opens the road to submission, but even such a strategy 

requires that its threats have credibility. And regardless of whether the Kuomintang (KMT) or 

the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins elections scheduled for 2016, China will be in far 

stronger position to apply coercive pressures if it so choses. 

In addition to ending a major ideological threat to the power position of the CCP, control of 

Taiwan would also yield spectacular military-strategic benefits. Taiwan sits in the middle of the 

"First Island Chain" and its immediate access to some of the deepest waters of the Pacific Ocean 

on its East Coast would be ideal for basing SSBNs. With military forces on Taiwan, the PLA 

could isolate Japan and South Korea from the Middle Eastern petroleum and sea lanes to global 

commerce which sustain their economies, forcing them to abandon their alliances with the 

United States. 

In early October 2013, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MNO) issued a report estimating 

that the PLA could achieve "comprehensi ve military capabilily to successfully deter any foreign aid 

that comes 10 Tai\van's defense by 2020." This statement was as meaning thm TaIwan's 

l'viND assesses that by 2020 the PLA wIll be able to detcr attempt to thwart a Chinese attack 

against Taiwan. The MND report also noted that the PLA is targeting Taiwan with 1,400 

missiles. This nnmber conld include 400-500 land attack cruise missiles, new types ofmedinm 

range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) like the DF-16 and the new DF-12 SRBM. The PLA Air Force 

today has more 4th Generation combat aircraft than does the Taiwan Air Force, and the growing 

PLA Navy submarine forces is more capable of seeking to blockade Taiwan. 

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However, from conversations with numerous Taiwanese military officials over the last five 

years, it is clear that their concern is shifting from threat of blockade to the threat of PLA 

invasion. The PLA maintains about 300,000 troops in the Taiwan Theater of Operations, but 

500,000 may have some experience with amphibious operations. While PLAN formal 

amphibious lift may only be able to transport one division of troops, the PLA has access to 

growing lift in dual-use civil large and fast ferries. Tn 2006 Taiwan's MND estimated the PLA 

could mobilize 800 ships to transport 5 to 7 infantry divisions. One port, Dalian, may soon have 

ten new large 20,000 ton to 3S,000 ton ferries which in combination could transport up to five 

armored brigades, including over 600 tanks. Chinese civil airlines, which are integrated into the 

PLAAF militia structure, could make about 120 large cargo aircraft (mainly Boeings) available 

for PLA use-about 4x the formal PLA Air Force heavy lift. 

PLA ground forces include an estimated 7,000 to 14,000 Special Forces, three divisions of the 

15th Airborne Corp (35,000 troops), and two brigades ofPLA Navy Marines (12,000 troops), all 

of which could be used to capture strategic ports and airfields to enable access for follow-on 

forces Future regiments ofY-20 transports will be able to lift new wheeled medium-weight 

armored vehicles, which can also be more easily transported by civilian ferries, and take 

advantage of Taiwan's excellent road network. 

Taiwan's strategic response to China's continued military buildup has been to stress the 

development of "innovative and asymmetric" capabilities that do not match China's forces but 

instead target specific elements to maximize deterrence. Despite continued budgetary pressures 

and the more recent challenge of building an all-volunteer force, this strategy has had bi-partisan 

support in Taiwan. Perhaps the highest-profile program has been Taiwan's development of 

"offensive" cruise and ballistic missiles that can more efficiently deter China than can expensive 

programs like missile defense Taipei's top procurement priority is to gather technology 

necessary to build a new class of 1 ,SOO ton submarines. Taipei is also signaling that it would like 

to purchase the Sth Generation F-3S to eventually replace its 4th Generation F-16s purchased in 

the early 1990s. 

Consolidating Control of the South China Sea 

China's decades long effort to establish and then consolidate control over the South China Sea is 

also motivated in large part by strategic goals. Perhaps the most important strategic goal for 

China in the South China Sea is to consolidate control over the area within its Nine/Ten Dash 

Line to ensure that Hainan Island becomes a growing base for global military and space power 

projection. Tn the last decade the PLA has built a major new naval base in the Sanya/Yalong Bay 

area to maintain a future squadron of SSBNs and SSNs and a future aircraft carrier and 

amphibious assault group. The SSBNs based at Sanya will likely comprise half of the PLA's 

undersea nuclear missile force, and the carrier-amphibious group will be responsible for 

projecting power in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and to Africa. In about 

two to three years, China will also complete a new space launch center at Wencheng on the 

Eastern Coast of Hainan, which will be responsible for heavy space launch vehicles. China's 

tuture space station, space shuttles, and manned Moon missions of the 2020s will be launched 

from Wencheng. 

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China's gradual constriction of the South China Sea has included its taking the Paracel Islands 

from South Vietnam in 1974, its grabbing reefs in the Spratly Island Group from Vietnam in 

1988, and its stealthy occupation of Mischief Reef in late 1994 to early 1995. China now has a 

useful air and naval base on Woody Island in the Paracel Group, and has built facilities on seven 

shoals and reefs in the Spratly Group. Periods of aggression have been modulated by periods 

when Beijing appeared to favor negotiation, but always on a bi-Iateral basis to maximize gains, 

and always rejecting multilateral negotiations with the members of the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (A SEAN). Despite a decade of imploring by ASEAN members, Beijing refuses to 

sign a Code of Conduct which might impede its consolidation of control. 

In June 2009 a then recently-retired PLA Army General, Zhang Li, gave a speech that provided a 

possible glimpse of China's plans for the South China Sea. He advocated a major buildup of 

paramilitary and naval ships for enforcing claims in the region-which is now happening. He 

also proposed a "Three Dimensional Reconnaissance Observation System" ofland based radar, 

aircraft and undersea sensors to better monitor all traffic under, in and over the South China Sea. 

Finally he called for a new airbase to be built on Mischief Reef, which is 240km from the 

Philippines, but 1, 145km to China's Hainan Island. 

In 2012 and 2013, China decided to bear down on the weakest of its competitors, the Philippines. 

In April and May 2012 Beijing essentially used its paramilitary ships to stand down Manila in a 

confrontation over control of Scarborough Shoal, which is about 244km from the Philippines and 

about 900km from China's Hainan Island. China used its ships to deny Philippine ships access 

to the shoal, which is often used by small fishing vessels as a shelter from poor weather. 

Also in 2012 and 2013 China has targeted for harassment a Philippine Navy landing ship, ER? 

Sierra Madre, beached on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 and used as an outpost manned by 

Philippine Navy and Marine personnel, about 40km from Chinese-garrisoned Mischief Reef. In 

July 2012 the PLA Navy briefly beached a frigate on HalfMoon Shoal. In August 2012 

Philippine military officials on Palawan Island told the author that this beaching was likely in 

reaction to Philippine interest in exploring for petroleum in this area. But may also have been 

exercise in pulling a ship off of a reef, as Second Thomas Shoal was only 100km to the North. It 

appears that through the Summer of2013 Chinese Coast Guard ships have maintained a vigil at 

Second Thomas Shoal, seeking to intimidate the Philippines from keeping personnel on the ER? 

Sierra Madre. Should the Philippine military personnel abandon this ship, it is likely that China 

will drag it off Second Thomas Shoal or destroy it 

What is disturbing is that China's increasing assertiveness against Manila has come at a time 

when Philippine-US. military relations are experiencing a revival from the depths of the early 

1990s, following the US. departure from Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base. The last decade 

has seen a steady increase in US. military engagement with Manila, to include counterinsurgency assistance and increasing conventional military training via regular exercises. In early 

October 2013, had President Barack Obama visited the Philippine as planned, there may have 

been an agreement which would allow for US. forces to again have "rotational", vice permanent, 

access to Philippine bases. Having largely ignored its needs since the 1980s, Philippine 

President Benigno Aquino is leading the re-equipment of the Philippine Air Force and Navy for 

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external defense. While the U.S. has so far given Manila two former U.S. Coast Guard frigates, 

Manila may buy more modem combat ships and small F/A-50 trainer-fighters from South Korea. 

As remaining Communist Party-led regimes, Vietnam and China have significant shared 

interests, but their historic enmity, and more recent conflict in the South China Sea significantly 

colors their relations. In short, Vietnam also opposes China's effort to assert control over the 

South China Sea, but in contrast to the Philippines, it is devoting significant resources to building 

up its South China Sea outposts and its military forces. Later this year the Vietnamese Navy 

may take delivery of the first of six Russian-built Kilo class submarines. Vietnam is on its way 

to acquiring 44 Russian Su-30 and Su-27 4th Generation fighters, Russian S-300 4th Gen surfaceto-air missiles, and Novator Cluh anti-ship missiles. 

Building For Power Projection 

As stressed in this testimony, one of the key reasons that China is pressing for territorial gains in 

the East China Sea and South China Sea, and remains focused on conquering Taiwan, is that 

China's leadership seeks to sunnount maritime barriers to its projection of global military power. 

In late 2004 the CCP began to describe "New Historic Missions" for the PLA, one of which was 

to increasingly defend the Party's growing international interests. This has included greatly 

increased participation in United Nations' peacekeeping missions, and the dispatch since 

December 2008 of 14 naval groups for anti-piracy patrols off of Somalia. Thiss, and an 

increasing program of naval diplomacy, has seen the PLA Navy establish the beginning of a 

periodic, if much wider, near-global presence which so far has been largely benign. Even the 

United States is starting to include China in parts of its large bi-annual RIM PAC exercises. 

However, China's goals are not always in concert with the West. As the Libyan Civil War was 

gathering in 2011, China contemplated sending large quantities of arms to the embattled 

Muammar Gadaffi. Had the Syrian crisis of September 2013 lasted longer, China may have had 

the opportunity to send one of its largest ships, a Type 071 LPD, to join Russian forces in tilting 

against the U.S. and Europe. As China accumulates the means for naval and air projection, it 

may become more active in defending its radical or authoritarian allied regimes, such as North 

Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Cuba and perhaps Venezuela. 

Today, China fully supports Argentina's claims to the Falklands Islands and is now discussing 

co-production in Argentina of China's FC-1 fighter, which can be anned with the hypersonic 

speed CM400AKG anti-ship missile. If conflict were to erupt anew in the next decade, would 

China send naval forces to support Argentina and counter Britain's expected Navy and Marine 

deployments? 

To project direct military assistance, by the late 2020s the PLA Navy could have a force of four 

to tive aircraft carrier battle groups and up to 12 large amphibious transport-assault ships. China 

will likely equip its carriers with 5th Gen fighters, capable UCAVs, and may have a short take-off 

tighter for its LHDs. These battle groups will also include modem escort ships and logistic 

support ships. By the late 2020s the PLA Air Force could have significant numbers ofY-20 

transports and will likely have developed a larger "C-5" size air transport. These will be able to 

carry light and medium weight mechanized units to distant exercise or battle fields. 

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Into the 2020s the PLA will also deploy more offensive strategic nuclear missiles and a new 

missile defense system. The large DF-41 ten-warhead road mobile intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM) is near deployment. The PLA will also deploy layers of tactical, regional and 

strategic missile defenses, which when added to China's current estimated 5,000km 

Underground Great Wall of missile basing and storage facilities, will greatly challenge U.S. 

nuclear deterrence calculations. By the 2020s the PLA will control a large dual-use space 

station, a dual-use space shuttle, and very likely have a dual-use Moon Base -- all in order to 

expand China's ability to deny and control access to outer space. 

Conclusion 

Again, while the Obama Administration has earned deserved praise for its Rebalance to Asia 

"pivot" policy, a new momentum set in 2011 and 2012 of improving and tightening Asian 

alliance relations could be undermined by the fiscal uncertainty that may prevent the US from 

preserving and building upon its position in Asia. In addition to the conspicuous absence of 

President Obama from an important Asian diplomatic schedule in early October, the Department 

of Defense has had to cut back on important bi-Iateral and multilateral exercise activity with 

Asian partners in 2013. Adding to uncertainty are suggestions from the Department of Defense 

that sequestration may force a reduction to 8 U.S. Navy carrier battle groups and the elimination 

of whole types of aircraft from the US. Air Force, including the A-IO ground support fighter and 

the KC-1 0 aerial tanker. In addition, there are new doubts about whether the U. S. can afford 

critical future developments such as an effective UCA V, or a new nuclear attack submarine 

missile module extension, both for the U.S. Navy. 

In 2010 the Administration learned the hard way that it had to stand up to China's pressure and 

did so on the Korean Peninsula and in Southeast Asia. But it also became clear that new military 

strategies and capabilities must be pursued to counter quickly-emerging Chinese A2AD 

capabilities. If Washington is to sustain a leadership role in deterring pressure now, and perhaps 

aggression later from China, it must demonstrate that determination by regularly identifying 

Chinese threatening behavior, be it the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. It 

must be stated that China's behavior is increasing the chances for military incidents and that the 

US. will defend its allies if they are attacked. Washington must also back that determination by 

leading an Asian military coalition with modem US. forces at its core. 

This is simply not the time for the United States to be considering additional reductions in its 

nuclear forces or in its principle power projection capabilities. Instead the US should 

reintroduce secure tactical nuclear weapons on its submarines. It is essential that the US. join 

with Japan and others to build an Asian regional ISR network that provides all partners with a far 

better real-time picture of Chinese military activities. It is also critical that the US. develop new 

classes of missiles, from short- to intermediate-range, to target Chinese Naval forces as a means 

of deterring aggression. Many of these missiles should be offered to allies facing Chinese 

pressure, like Japan and the Philippines. It is also critical to help Taiwan build new asymmetric 

military capabilities that can target PLA invasion forces and have a better chance of sustaining 

deterrence on the Taiwan Strait. 

10 
31

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that testimony. We 

now have Steven Mosher, director of the Population Research Institute. And, again, all of our witnesses have lengthy resumes that 

will be included in the record. 

Go right ahead, Mr. Mosher. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN MOSHER, DIRECTOR, 

POPULATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Mr. MOSHER. Well, I commend the chairman, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Keating, for holding this timely 

hearing. As Rick just mentioned, there have recently been renewed 

incursions by Chinese assets into Japanese territorial waters 

around the Senkakus and the Ryukyus in general, and I would 

note that a top Chinese general has actually questioned the legitimacy of Japanese claims, not just to the tiny Senkakus but to the 

entire Ryukyu Island chain, including Okinawa with its U.S. military bases. And knowing the situation in China, knowing that people rarely speak out of turn without being punished, I take such 

warnings, such suggestions by Chinese generals as tantamount to 

diplomatic announcements. 

Seemingly, everywhere we look, we see evidence of China’s increasing aggressiveness. And I think it is past time to ask. I think, 

as the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did many 

years ago, why this ongoing military buildup when China faces no 

external threat? Why these provocative acts? What, after all, does 

China want? I think to suggest that Australia somehow poses a 

military threat to China is vastly overstating rather underpopulated Australia’s desire to defend its own territorial waters from a 

country which now is in the process of trying to annex the entire 

South China Sea, which is a territorial claim roughly equivalent to 

as if Nazi Germany had declared before the outset of the conflict 

in World War II that it owned the entire Mediterranean. I mean, 

it is an extraordinary territorial claim. 

In May this year, Chinese troops intruded nearly 12 miles into 

Indian territory. It withdrew only after India agreed to withdraw 

its own troops from the area. And so this high-altitude border dispute continues to simmer. The Indian Prime Minister is going to 

China, to Beijing, in a couple of days, apparently to sign a border 

cooperation agreement on Chinese terms, which I believe is what 

one Indian analyst called an exercise in course of military diplomacy, or bullying in short. 

China is sowing new seeds of conflict by continuing to expand its 

military presence in the South China Sea, where I know, Mr. 

Chairman, you have been personally. Last year, it seized the Scarborough Shoal, which lies off the coast of the Philippines, by force. 

When the Philippines protested, the PRC reacted by saying that 

the Philippines’ claims were illegal and that it would never agree 

to international arbitrary over the shoal or any other claims. Now, 

that is important because the Philippines is now seeking U.N. assistance against China. And we, at least the current administration, seem to be extremely reluctant to back U.S. allies in the face 

of Chinese aggression. We have only said in the person of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry that all countries have a right to seek 

arbitration to resolve competing territorial claims. We have not vigVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Feb 12, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\103013\85315 HFA PsN: SHIRL
32

orously backed the obvious claim of the Philippines to territory 

which lies very close to its own homeland. 

I see China’s behavior as reflecting something fundamental about 

the Chinese Party state. A government that rules its own people 

by brute force—we all remember Tiananmen—is naturally inclined 

to treat its smaller, weaker neighbors the same way, especially if 

they were, as in the past, tributary states of China. I think this accounts, in part, for the palpable disdain with which it treats the 

other claimants in the South China Sea dispute, including Vietnam 

and the Philippines, both of which have stronger claims for the 

Spratlies and Paracels than does China itself. 

I would also add to the death toll that you, Mr. Chairman, mentioned at the outset of this hearing in your remarks, to the death 

toll caused by the one-party dictatorship that rules China, we must 

add the 400 million eliminated by China’s infamous one-child policy. I was an eyewitness to women being arrested and forced to be 

aborted at 7, 8, and 9 months of pregnancy in China in 1980. And 

those atrocities, those kinds of atrocities still continue today. 

Only the continued presence of U.S. assets, the U.S. Seventh 

Fleet in the Far East, stays China’s hand. China has actually suggested that we withdraw to Hawaii and cede everything west of 

Hawaii to China. There is little doubt if that happened that China 

would then occupy the remaining islands in the South China Sea 

by force, ejecting the garrisons of other nations, and begin to demand the ships transiting its ‘‘interior waters’’ would first seek permission to do so or run the risk of being boarded and quarantined. 

This is actually now the official policy of the Chinese Government 

as of last November. Beijing announced last November that Chinese authorities will board and seize control of foreign ships that 

‘‘illegally enter’’ the area that he claims is part of the Province of 

Henan. That is the entire area inside the 9-line. 

Now, seizing ships in international waters is an act of war under 

international law. I believe that China has been clear about its intentions in this regard. 

We could talk about continued double digit increases in the 

PLA’s budget. We could talk about other new capabilities. But I am 

really less worried about China’s capabilities than its intentions. I 

am concerned that China, which lacks transparency in terms of its 

military budget and in stating its intentions, is only emboldened by 

our careful and measured and nuanced and oftentimes too quiet response to acts of aggression. I think that emboldens the Chinese 

leadership and open society relies on comprehensive and accurate 

information to inform both its citizens and its allies of the common 

threats that they face. 

I believe we need another commission. And I realize there are a 

couple of commissions that serve to alert us to happenings in China 

now. But I believe we need another commission that focuses specifically on China’s intentions. There is a precedent for that. I 

served on the U.S. Commission on Broadcasting for the PRC back 

in the ’90s, which specifically looked at the question of whether or 

not we needed a radio-free broadcast system broadcasting into 

China news and information that was denied the Chinese people 

themselves by their state-censored media. The answer that we on 

33

the commission reached was yes, we did need such a broadcasting 

service. And it does yeoman work today. 

I believe we need another commission to look specifically at China’s intentions. It would review; evaluate; and, if necessary, correct 

any understatements that are reached by other intelligence agencies. Such a check on the current administration consensus on 

China would be invaluable. Such reviews proved to be such during 

the Soviet era when a number of independent commissions reviewed Soviet military capabilities and intentions. This way we can 

get a timely, independent assessment of China’s military intentions 

because in a few years, it will have the hardware it needs to undertake aggression, both in Asia and in different parts of the world. 

It is vital that we understand now before it gets that hardware 

how they intend to use it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mosher follows:]

34


85315c-1.eps

What Does China Want? 

Why, as China grows more powerful, does it become more 

bellicose? 

by Steven W. Mosher 

Testimony submitted for a Hearing on 

"China's Maritime and other Geographic Threats" 

to be held before the 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, 

October 30,2013, 

Room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building. 

I commend the Chairman for this timely hearing. Less than 48 hours ago, Chinese 

vessels recklessly entered Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands 

Seemingly everywhere we look, we see evidence of China's increasing aggressiveness 

and it is past time to ask, Why this ongoing military buildup when China faces no 

external threat? Why these provocative acts? What, after all, does China want? 

Since last September, China has been vigorously asserting its new--and historically 

groundless--claim to the Senkaku Islands by sending a constant stream of naval 

vessels and planes to harass Japanese patrol boats there. The most recent such 

encounter, as I mentioned, occurred a mere two days ago. No only that, but a top 

Chinese general has questioned the legitimacy of Japanese claims not just to the tiny 

Senkakus, but to the entire Ryukyu Island chain, including Okinawa with its U.S. military 

bases. 
35


85315c-2.eps

Then in May, Chinese troops intruded nearly 12 miles into Indian territory, withdrawing 

only after India agreed to withdraw its own troops from the area. The high-altitude 

frontier dispute, which has been simmering since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, involves 

territory the size of Greece with a population of over a million. India is apparently 

prepared to sign a border cooperation agreement on Chinese terms, an exercise in 

coercive military diplomacy that Brahma Chellaney, an Indian analyst, calls bullYing. 

And then there is the South China Sea, where China has been aggressively asserting 

its sovereignty over the 1.4 million-square-mile stretch of open ocean. Last November, 

Beijing announced that Chinese authorities will board and seize control of foreign ships 

that "illegally enter" the area that it claims is part of the province of Hainan. Seizing 

ships in international waters is an act of war under international law. 

China has also sowed new seeds of conflict by continuing to expand its military 

presence in the area. Last year it seized the Scarborough Shoal, which lies off the coast 

of the Philippines, by force. When that country protested, the PRC reacted by saying 

that the Philippines' claims were illegal, and that it would never agree to international 

arbitration over the Shoal or any other claims. In January it issued a new map that, for 

the first time, precisely delineates its grandiose new claim. What is shows is the largest 

attempted land grab since the Second World War. It is rather as if Nazi Germany had 

claimed the entire Mediterranean Sea as sovereign territory. 

And so it goes. Nearly every month China is making a new territorial claim or bullying its 

neighbors over an existing one. Worse yet, it is defining these new claims, like its 

longstanding claims to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, as "core interests," vital to national 

survival and are emphatically not up for negotiation. 

The Obama administration has proven extremely reluctant to back U.S allies in the face 

of such Chinese aggression. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, for example, offered 

only tacit backing to the Philippines' efforts to seek UN assistance against China, saying 

only that all countries had a right to seek arbitration to resolve competing i?JritolLql 

claims. Perhaps they had imagined that China's opening to the West would result in a 

modernizing, democratizing China that would willingly take its place in the existing 

international system. A younger, foreign-educated leadership would renounce force in 

favor of negotiation. The kinds of armed conflict that marred the PRC's first three 

decades would be a thing of the past, and any remaining territorial disputes would be 

resolved peaceably. 

But China's integration into the world economy has apparently not defanged the 

Chinese Party-State, nor led it, metaphorically speaking, to beat its swords into 

plowshares. Instead, it is taking the money that it has made from selling cheap, statesubsidized "plowshares" around the world and using it to make "swords," which it is now 

brandishing with increasing frequency. 
36


85315c-3.eps

I see China's behavior as reflecting something fundamental about the nature of the 

Chinese Party-State. A government that rules its own people by brute force--remember 

Tiananmen--is naturally inclined to treat its smaller, weaker neighbors the same way. 

Especially if they were, in the past, tributary states. This accounts in part for the 

palpable distain with which it treats the other claimants in the South China Sea dispute, 

including Vietnam and The Philippines, both of which have stronger claims to the 

Spratlys and Paracels than does China itself. 

Only the continued presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Far East stays China's 

hand. Were that force to be withdrawn to Hawaii, as China has suggested, there is little 

doubt that China would then occupy the remaining islands in the South China Sea by 

force, ejecting the garrisons of other nations, and begin to demand that ships transiting 

its "interior waters" first seek permission to do so or run the risk of being boarded and 

quarantined. 

Deng Xiaoping once advised his immediate successors, who ruled a much weaker 

China, to "bide your time and hide your capabilities." But that was then. Now China 

capabilities are on track to approach parity with the U.S. in the Pacific theater in a few 

years, and already far, far exceed those of all of its nearest maritime neighbors except 

Japan. 

Continuing double-digit increases in the PLA's budget are fueling China's military 

buildup. While the exact amount that China spends on its military is unclear, what is 

obvious is that the more funding the PLA receives, the sooner it will achieve parity with 

the U.S. military. China is building a nuclear arsenal, along with a range of delivery 

systems, that could match or even exceed that of the United States in the coming 

decades. A blue water navy, along with components of China's first indigenously 

produced aircarft carrier, is under construction, and naval bases in Burma, Pakistan, 

and Sri Lanka will enable its resupply. As the latest Pentagon report confirms, China 

already "has the largest force of major combatants, submarines, and amphibious 

warfare ships in Asia" Moreover, China is constructing its own GPS satellite network, 

has developed a ground-launched anti-satellite missile to improve its counter-space 

capabilities, and is building the Shenlong spaceplane with advanced propulsion 

characteristics for possible military use. 

Emboldened by their new capabilities, and firmly in control of the Chinese polity, the 

next generation of Chinese leaders have apparently decided that it it no longer has to 

bide its time although it still prefers to hide its capabilities. 

I have long believed that the Chinese leadership holds an expansive view of Chinaese 

place in the world, and that it is interested in reestablishing its historical role as the 

Hegemon of Asia. It is imperative that we educate the American people in this regard. 

An open society relies on comprehensive and accurate information to inform both its 

citizens and its allies of the common threats that they face. The annual Pentagon 

Report on Chinese Military Developments does not go far enough in this regard. In a 
37


85315c-4.eps

time of economic uncertainty, and in the face of an ongoing Chinese military build-up, it 

is especially important that U.S. taxpayers understand the importance maintaining both 

a quantitative and qualitative lead in military capabilities over China. It is equally 

important that allied and friendly governments, along with their citizens, be informed of 

military developments in China. China needs to know that its continuing military buildup 

has not gone unnoticed, and that the U.S. and its allies are well aware of its larger 

designs. 

Ascertaining both China's capabilities and its intentions is critical. I therefore 

recommend that the U.S. Congress establish a commission to review, evaluate and, if 

necessary, correct any shortcomings in the Pentagon Report. Such a "check" on the 

current administration consensus on China would be invaluable, as such reviews 

proved to be during the Soviet era when a number of independent commissions 

reviewed Soviet military capabilities and intentions. 

Such a review would be a timely and substantive way to get an independent, overall 

assessment of China's military development. The public hearings that it would hold, not 

less than its annual report, would add to the constructive debate over China's intentions, 

as continues to engineer double digit increases in its military budget, and develop 

specific capabilities that not only put U.S. allies and assets in Asia at risk, but the 

American homeland as well. 
38

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to thank all of my witnesses, all 

of our witnesses, today. And what we will have now is just some 

questions and answers. All right. And that is good. All right. As my 

staff recommends, I would suggest that I would like—well, first of 

all, let me just note this for the record. Our subcommittee focuses 

on Europe and Asia, central Asia, but it also in its definition talks 

about emerging threats. 

That is why we are here today. This is part of a discussion on 

what some of us believe is an emerging threat to the peace of the 

world and the security of the United States of America. And from 

the witnesses today, I would say we do have one voice of disagreement. And we will get into that discussion. And we are very happy 

to have you with us to promote that type of discussion because, of 

course, in countries like China, they don’t have people on the other 

side of issues where they are being discussed, the other side of 

issues that the state has taken a stand on. 

I would like to ask the panel very quickly if you might mention 

any specific weapons systems that China is building that threatens 

America’s naval or air or space assets. And maybe just go down the 

line just very quickly. Dr. Pickert, can you think of a weapons system that they are developing that you might warn us against? 

Mr. PICKERT. I think specifically the sea power aspect is under 

the envelope of strategic conventional weapons. And the East Wind 

system of—these are essentially huge SCUD missiles that can operate from the bases in China to essentially any of these things 

which are being disputed can be blown off the face of the Earth 

without even leaving China. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are they accurate enough to be——

Mr. PICKERT. They don’t have to be accurate. You just shoot 20 

of them, and they will knock off a whole corner of the universe. I 

don’t know if you have ever seen an arc-light strike by B–52s, they 

take out a whole grid square of territory. This is a SCUD tactic. 

It is using mass attack on a particular place. And you have 20 missiles, all shooting at the same thing. And these islands are in specific areas where you have naval forces are simply deterred from 

using that space if it escalates to anything beyond local conflict. 

And the trouble with each of these areas is they cannot be held as 

territory because they can be obliterated. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Fisher? 

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I would call to your attention the 

system of weapons that the Chinese are developing and beginning 

to deploy, starting with a dual-use space program, both manned 

and unmanned, that provides targeting and communications and 

data links for missiles, like the anti-ship ballistic missile, new supersonic anti-ship missiles that are being carried today by Chinese 

bombers, future hypersonic anti-ship missiles, not to mention what 

they will be putting on their aircraft carrier. As soon as that starts 

service in about 2 to 3 years, it will have a fighter that is about 

as good as our F–18 Super Hornet. And submarines are being built 

like dumplings. And they are good, and they have air-independent 

propulsion so that they can stay underwater for a long time. 

And this is just what is going to be hitting us in Asia. In the next 

decade, China will have the wherewithal to project force around 

the world, both mechanized airborne and mechanized amphibious 

39

infantry supported by aircraft carriers and an even more robust 

space architecture. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Mosher? 

Mr. MOSHER. Well, I believe Mr. Fisher has hit on the key points 

here. And I would just say that China has rapidly upgraded the capabilities of its navy. And it has now a navy the largest force of 

major combatant submarines and amphibious warfare ships in 

Asia. And many of them are first-rate. China is constructing its 

own GPS satellite network. It has a ground-launched anti-satellite 

capability capable of taking out our communications satellites and 

is developing a space plane, the Shunlong, which may have military capabilities. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Here is your chance. 

Mr. SANDBY-THOMAS. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are these not a threat, Dr. Thomas? 

Mr. SANDBY-THOMAS. Well, I think they are fairly comprehensive. I think the big concern is, sort of as I noted, the guided missile destroyers in terms of how that impacts U.S. Navy operations, 

particularly for providing support, whether they could take out aircraft carriers. But some of it seems to be developing or being developed, probably close to production. I am not entirely clear. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note that one of the sad aspects 

of the answers that we just got is that the source of research and 

development for many of the weapons systems that you are talking 

about are the American taxpayers. I mean, many of the weapons 

systems that China is developing are based on information that 

they have stolen and hacked and gotten from American industry. 

And sometimes they have actually stolen from our own Government operations. Is there any doubt about that? Can we comment 

on that? Yes, sir? 

Mr. FISHER. Acquisition of foreign technology is essential to the 

Chinese military research and development process. From the 

opening of our relations with China, Mr. Chairman, China has deployed tens of thousands of engineering students to the United 

States to study at our best schools and largely for the purpose of 

taking that information and experience back to China to apply to 

weapons programs. I can offer numerous citations of experts that 

work for NASA, went back to China, and are now helping to develop space planes, which will be used for military purposes. 

When China was developing its current fourth generation fighter, 

the J–10, it had to develop new composite materials for the air 

frame. It actually came to California and had those composites validated by an American company. It went back to China and put 

them into production. They work very fine. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that says it all. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. Keating? 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Given our focus as a 

committee on Europe—and Mr. Fisher referenced NATO—I would 

just like to know how our European partners are responding to the 

recent developments in Asia. And should we be asking them to do 

more? And if so, what do you think the contributions they could 

bring might be? 

40

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Keating, it is a very important question. For 20 

years, the United States Government has been engaged with our 

European allies over the issue of arms sales to China. The European Union established an embargo, as did the United States, after 

the Tiananmen massacre. The Europeans have, unfortunately, defined and redefined their embargo to allow more and more dual-use 

technology to go to China. And this is going directly in the People’s 

Liberation Army. 

Eurocopter, for example, has a new full-up helicopter co-development program, to include the engine with the Chinese helicopter 

industry. This will be a new modern, state-of-the-art 6- to 7-ton 

helicopter. The Europeans tell me when I see them at numerous 

arms shows that no, this helicopter will never go into the PLA. But 

every other European helicopter that the Chinese have co-produced—and there are about four or five of them—they have all 

gone into the military. And naval engines, all Chinese non-nuclear 

submarines and new combatant ships use European-designed naval 

engines, large German-designed engines. 

I just found a citation a few weeks ago that the Chinese shipbuilding industry has purchased a state-of-the-art Spanish ship design three-dimensional software. And this is already helping the 

Chinese to develop better combat ships. 

When we find these examples, we should be quite insistent with 

our allies that this is not helpful, that this is actually creating 

problems for them because the sooner that China has the ability 

to wage war against Taiwan, which it is still building tremendously 

to conquer Taiwan, perhaps early in the next decade, attack Japan 

over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or enforce its outrageous and expansive claims in the South China Sea. Those could all possibly engage American forces in support of allies and detract, either in the 

short term or very likely also in the long term, to assist our European allies from threats that are growing against them as well. 

Mr. KEATING. So you mentioned that there might be compromise 

because of their sales. When you gave your address, was there any 

concern from any of those countries about what was occurring 

through China’s actions? 

Mr. FISHER. Oh, yes, a great concern, many questions. And the 

information that I was giving, surprisingly, was viewed as new. 

Many of the parliamentarians from our NATO ally countries who 

attended this conference simply did not have an understanding 

that China was at a point where it was threatening to start and 

cause wars. 

Our annual PLA military power report that the Pentagon has 

been issuing since early in the last decade really needs to be translated into multiple languages. It needs to be upgraded. It needs to 

be published as a book with pictures and charts. Yes, that may look 

like the old Soviet military power report of the 1980s, but that is 

what our friends and our allies are looking for from the United 

States. We have to identify these threats in order to ask and encourage our allies to take them seriously and then respond appropriately. 

Mr. KEATING. And I think all of our panel has addressed this in 

one way or another, but just to have a concise, you know, answer 

to this, if I could just go across our panel and just ask, how immeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Feb 12, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\103013\85315 HFA PsN: SHIRL
41

diate is the threat for the China’s maritime and territorial disputes? And could you just, you know, in very short language describe it as either short, medium-term risk of armed conflict? What 

is the time frame and how real is it, if we could just quickly go? 

I just want to zero in on that. 

Mr. PICKERT. I will start at this end by saying that all of these 

disputes are essentially traps for points of opportunity for regional 

and local conflicts, one on one with small countries that cannot respond to them. 

Mr. KEATING. So short, medium? 

Mr. PICKERT. That is present right now all over the place. It is 

happening every day. And their strategic overview of that is to protect, to make sure that we do not interfere in that process. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Fisher? 

Mr. FISHER. In the last 3 weeks, Japan has threatened to shoot 

down Chinese unmanned aircraft that would violate Japanese air 

space. A Chinese unmanned aircraft basically did that in early September, and it was intercepted. The Chinese have responded just 

this past weekend that the shoot-down of a UAV by Japan would 

be an act of war. This act of war could actually transpire at almost 

any time, Congressman. 

Mr. KEATING. Short-term. Mr. Mosher? 

Mr. MOSHER. The threat is immediate and ongoing. That is why 

Japan is building now its own brain expeditionary force to protect 

the Senkaku Islands and also the Ryukyus. It never felt the need 

of doing that before. It does now. So Japan feels an immediate 

threat. It is in the neighborhood. And I think we ought to look to 

Japan’s response to calibrate our own. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Sandby-Thomas? 

Mr. SANDBY-THOMAS. Yes. I would think the likelihood of conflict 

is higher now than, say, it was a year ago. In terms of immediacy, 

it seems that the potential for provocation on both sides is there, 

but I still don’t think that war will break out, I guess. 

Mr. KEATING. No, but there is consensus among all four of you 

that there could be conflict in the short-term that is escalating. 

And that is an interesting point that we should bear in mind and 

seek out our Europe allies and our partners in Europe so that there 

is better understanding of that. So I thank you very much. That 

was very helpful. 

And for the purpose of the rest of the hearing, Representative 

Lowenthal will be assuming the ranking membership. And I thank 

him for doing that and thank you because I think that last series 

of things put a time frame on some of the urgency of what we are 

facing. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Lowenthal, who represents the district next to my district in Southern California and he also now represents a city that 

includes the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. And these ports, 

of course, tie us to China. And events in China are very significant 

to Southern Californians. And we welcome his participation today. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do agree 

that we have figured out ways between you and I to settle our disputes peacefully, not that we have that many. 

42

I just want to follow up on that last question about, really, the 

level of tension in terms of the maritime disputes and what really 

specifically at this moment should be the U.S. role. And I would 

like to start with Mr. Sandby-Thomas and then ask all of the 

panel, what now? Where do we go now for the United States in 

terms of this? If tensions have escalated, what specifically should 

we be doing today besides holding this hearing and learning about 

what is really going on and not denying the existence of the problems that are going on? 

Mr. SANDBY-THOMAS. Well, in terms of the East China Sea disputes, it is unclear necessarily an unsafe China strategy, but obviously there is this issue of energy around the islands. I think the 

islands in and of themselves don’t really hold a huge amount of 

value. They are sure these barren rocks are uninhabitable. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Right. 

Mr. SANDBY-THOMAS. So there is energy, but that seems that 

that could be something of joint negotiation. There have been negotiations in the past. We jointly developed these. So that could be 

resumed. 

In terms of the Chinese position, it seems that the decision by 

the Japanese Government to purchase the islands may be, on the 

one hand, sort of changed how the islands are administered but, on 

the other hand, maybe indicated that Japan was—it kind of 

changed the status quo. And so the Chinese actions in that context, 

maybe I think they have a strategic value. If the Senkaku Islands 

weren’t part of this first island chain, the Chinese incursion seems 

to be sort of testing Japanese resolve on this. I think they are testing both Japanese resolve, how far can China get, can it kind of 

break this chain, does it have an opportunity to do so, and how 

strong is the resolve between the U.S. and Japan. So would the 

U.S. defend Japan if there were a sort of conflict with the breakout? 

I think on the latter part, the U.S. has reiterated its obligations 

under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. So that seems fairly clear. 

The difficulty really resides in sort of the Japanese and the Chinese. And they have various competing sort of interests and aims. 

They have different audiences that they are playing to. Sort of obviously in terms of, say, Chinese domestic politics, negotiation with 

Japan is not so easy. And, particularly, I think some of the politicians in their statements have linked the Senkaku Island back to 

sort of Japan’s sort of wartime actions within China. 

And on the Japanese side, it seemingly is the China threat is 

being sort of amplified to sort of push forward demands for increases in naval capability. So I think that is what contributes to 

the volatility. 

In terms of the U.S., I think it has sort of gone as far as it can. 

You know, I am not sure that it—I think, you know, it is important 

to indicate that the U.S. would intervene. And, you know, the likelihood of conflict I think is an immediate threat, but I wouldn’t expect conflict to break other than through the sort of accidental 

issue. I don’t think the intention of either side is to engage in conflict, but that is something that could change, hopefully, going forward. 

43

Mr. MOSHER. Well, I would have to disagree, at least in part, 

with that assessment. I believe that China’s leaders since 

Tiananmen massacre have deliberately stoked patriotism. They installed in the early ’90s a patriotic education program in the 

schools. So that from kindergarten through college, the Chinese 

history textbooks are full of great Chinese Shogunist sentiments, 

talking about how China was once a great nation and will be again, 

how the Japanese, who are called in colloquial parlance in China 

‘‘dwarf barbarians,’’ which is not a happy phrase, have periodically 

invaded and ravaged China. And they use this anti-Japanese sentiment in order to reinforce their own control over China. The appeal 

of communism in China has long vanished, but the appeal of patriotism still has a strong hold on the Chinese people. 

So, in part, these aggressive acts enable the Chinese leadership 

to say to the Chinese people, ‘‘We are in the process of building a 

great and glorious China, equivalent to those in the Song, the 

Tang, the Ming dynasty.’’ You see how we are asserting Chinese 

rights overseas in the Senkakus and the South China Sea and elsewhere. We are going to bring these tributary states to heal. 

I happen to believe that without the calming presence of U.S. assets in Asia, that Chinese open aggression would have already occurred vis-a`-vis the Philippines, for example, last year in Scarborough Shoal. Were it not for the possibility of U.S. intervention, 

the Chinese might well have sank the Philippine patrol boats. Instead, they drove them off a water cannon. 

Last year they cut the towed sonar arrays of Vietnamese survey 

vessels. They were trying to survey waters immediately off Vietnam’s coast, but that is part of the extraordinary territorial claim 

made by China. They cut the survey cables and drove the Vietnamese ships back to port. They might have behaved even more aggressively were they not worried about the possibility of the U.S. 

intervention. The same thing with regard to their last November 

claim that they had the right to intercept, interdict, and board 

ships in the South China Sea. We guarantee freedom of the seas, 

freedom of navigation. And as long as the U.S. remains engaged in 

Asia and reassures its allies that we will be there in the event of 

conflict, China gets that message loud and clear. 

So I think for us to equivocate or not state clearly what our position is encourages aggression and that, as in the 1880s, when we 

faced a different kind of threat, we can achieve peace in Asia 

through strength but certainly not by telegraphing weakness. 

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, I would like to answer your question 

by also saying that if we do nothing today, then we risk the danger 

in the short term of having our allies possibly defeated in skirmishes around Senkakus, in the South China Sea, but that this is 

simply unacceptable. If our allies are undermined, if they lose confidence in their alliances with the United States, they have alternatives. And in my opinion, they will develop their own nuclear 

missiles, Japan perhaps, followed by South Korea, followed by Vietnam and Australia. It could happen rather quickly. And after that, 

the prospect of a skirmish, being one that escalates to a nuclear exchange that we are drawn into, is real. 

So, sir, I would suggest that, as Steven suggests, we have to be 

very clear to the Chinese about what we consider unacceptable beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Feb 12, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\103013\85315 HFA PsN: SHIRL
44

havior. And we have to support our friends and allies. We have to 

make clear that we are there to back up our alliances, that we are 

there to support our longstanding friendship with Taiwan by selling them the systems that they need to deter war because if we fail 

to do this, we are, as Steven, I would agree completely, inviting 

conflict. And those conflicts very well could consume our own. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PICKERT. Well, I think the most important thing is to maintain relationships over a long period of time with the peripheral 

states, especially ASEAN in this case, because that was developed 

as a counter-alliance to China almost 50 years ago and still is. The 

problem is our relationships bilaterally with those countries are not 

really integrated into a comprehensive strategy. They are only oneon-one meetings, photo ops at a certain time wearing some kind of 

ridiculous outfit in a photo op. Our relationships have to go beyond 

that into long-range ties with the countries, which, especially in the 

cases where we don’t have those ties, like Vietnam, it is important 

to build them. And in places where we have had long ones and are 

essentially neglecting them now, such as with Thailand, which is 

a very big and important country, cutting back on our military relations, which I know we are doing, is a bad, bad sign. And, therefore, we should spend a little money on the relationships as more 

important than hardware, which is essentially really checkmated 

by the strategic missile systems that are being built. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. I thank our witnesses today and my colleagues. I will just do a summary. And 

then we will bring this to an end. 

Let me just—we live in a changing world. This is a very changing world. My father flew the first DC–3s into Shanghai in the 

final months of the Second World War. And he always told me how 

he was sent there from the Philippines, where they have been flying up and down from the Philippines. And when they landed, their 

job was to make sure that that airport was available so that we 

could now have input into Shanghai, which had been under Japanese occupation. And things had broken down there. And so they 

were sent in. And when he got to Shanghai with a number of DC–

3s and filled with Marines and equipment, set up communications, 

et cetera, an American presence in that city, the first thing he did 

was get off the airplane and grabbed what appeared to be a Chinese official or someone who knew what was going on and said, 

‘‘Where is the home of the Japanese commanding officer?’’

And he said, ‘‘Oh, it is a big house over there.’’

And then my father lined up his Marines and marched up to the 

house and knocked on the door. An older man, Japanese man, answered the door. And my father said, ‘‘This house is now being confiscated by the United States Marine Corps. You will vacate within 

1⁄2 hour and not come back.’’ My father was 24 years old, had never 

been out of North Dakota before World War II. It is the kind of influence that we were exercising throughout the world. 

And I saw a thing about last night I was up watching a documentary on the Battle of the Bulge. And he had all of these 18- 

and 19-year-old Americans. They were facing the German Army. 

And America since that time period has spread out from the heartland of our country to be this huge force in the world. We no longer 

45

have that ability. We no longer can afford to be the dominant force 

in the planet militarily. We don’t have the capability of having our 

young men go to a foreign country and knock on the door and tell 

the aggressor to get out of the building or to send 18- and 19-yearolds as cannon fodder to stop an invasion by a totalitarian force in 

Europe. 

We were mentioning we are not spending as much money. Well, 

if we do, we have to borrow it from China in order to spend it. 

What does that tell you? The world is a changing situation. We 

have to come up with a strategy that works to promote peace in 

the world and also freedom in the world, which I believe peace and 

freedom go together. They are two sides of the same coin. And that 

is why we need to talk about these serious challenges. And I believe that as we develop a strategy for the future, we have to understand the threat in Asia and the threat that China plays to our 

planet, first to the Pacific and to our planet. 

The testimony we had today on the expansion of Chinese missile 

and space power; the expansion of the submarine fleet, Chinese 

submarine fleet; and the utilization of Chinese air power expanding 

by utilizing Western technology, perhaps Argentineans, et cetera, 

this means that we have a challenge, but at the same time, we 

have our limitations. All of this has to be put into given a lot more 

thought, given a lot more discussion, as we have had today. 

Let me just note that when I hear that the Germans are working 

with the Chinese to develop certain weapons systems, I can’t help 

but not be so upset that some of our people might be listening in 

to the German Government’s conversations. I know Mrs. Merkel 

may not like to hear that, but the fact is that our intelligence systems need to keep us informed of the development of this type of 

threat. 

And, finally, let me just say we don’t live in a world where a 24-

year-old young man goes and confronts a Japanese general who is 

engaged in an aggressive act in China. We live in a world, instead, 

that you have an aggressive posturing by China and a bullying of 

its neighbors by a government in Beijing that is the world’s worst 

human rights abuser. 

I think the most important statement made in today’s hearing 

was that a country, a government that so tortures its own people, 

so represses them and murders them, how can we expect them to 

treat other neighboring weak countries any better than they treat 

their own people? And if that does not forbode us or to warn us, 

what does? The fact is the way they treat their own people, they 

will treat the rest of the world. 

And Japan, we need to make sure Japan, which can be a very 

positive force, that we need to not be afraid of Japan anymore. We 

need to make sure that where we cannot afford to balance off this 

expansion of Chinese power and military power in the Pacific, we 

can’t afford that, but we can afford to work with Japan, who with 

their contribution can help balance off that shift in power and, 

thus, help ensure the peace of the world. We should be working 

with the Japanese for that end. 

With that said, this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

Octobcr 28.2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing ofthe Committee on Foreign Affairs to 

be held by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats in Room 2255 of the Raybum 

House Oftice Building (and available on tbe Committee website at wwv:Jorcignaffam.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, October 30, 2013 

10:00 a.m. 

China's Maritime and other Geographic Threats 

Perry Pickert. Ph.D. 

Retired Career Intelligence Officer 

Mr. Rick Fisher 

Scnior Fcllow 

Asian Military Affairs 

Intemational Assessment and Strategy Center 

Mr. Stcvcn Mosher 

Director 

Population Research Institute 

Peter Sandby-Thomas. Ph.D. 

Visiting Lecturer of Political Science 

Uni versity of Massachusetts Dartmouth 

By Direction of the Chairman 

111<: C0111mittee 011 Foreign Attairs seeb to make its tacilitie:-, acce:'>sible to p~S01lS \",ith disahl1itie:'>. If you arlO: in need of :'>pecial 

accommoda1ions. plea~e call 202/22."-5021 at lea~t fOllr busines~ days in advance of lhe evenL_ ,vhent!vd[" prachcable. Ques1ions with regard 10 

special accommodations in general (including availability of Comnllttcc materials in alternative formats and as~istive listening device~) may be 

directed to the Committee. 
49

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ E_II_I'O'-'P-'e,_E_II_/'{/_SI_·II,c...II_II_d_E_III_el .. "Ii_ill .. "Ii_T_11l'_e_lIl_s ____ HEARING 

Day Wednesdav Date. __ ~1,-,()"-V.",3",O!-"'2",O-"1",3 ___ Room_--",22=55",-,,R,,,a,-,"v!'.b,,Il,-,1"1"-,_ 

Stal,ting Time flJol04M Ending Time ll'39AM 

Recesses ( __ to~ ( __ to __ ) ~to __ ) ~to __ ) ~to __ ) ~to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Dalla Rohrahacher 

Check all of lite following thai apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised [Z] 

Electronically Recorded (taped) D 

Stenographic Record [Z] 

"China's Maritime and otller Geographic Threats" 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Ste!'e Stockman, TX; William 1(mtil1g, MA; Alal1 S. Lowenthal, CA 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Marklllith an * (lthey are not members aflid! committee.) 

None. 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ No 0 

(If "no ", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organizatiun.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Usl anyslalemenls slIbmilledfiJl'lhe record.) 

QFR - Rep. red Poe 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 1_1_:3_9 __ 

C-:-~- ~ l.-_.//~~ Subcommittee Staff Director ' 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Ted Poe 

Chinese aggression in the South and East China Sea is alive and well. In February, a Chinese war 

ship targeted a Japanese destroyer and helicopter over a territorial dispute involving the Senkaku 

Islands. In May, a Vietnamese fishing boat was surrounded by Chinese boats and intentionally 

rammed. In June, 18 Chinese vessels were reportedly carrying out surveillance operations in 

Philippine territory, as Chine has sought to consolidate its control of the West Philippine Sea. 

If China continues to operate like the bully of the Pacific, the security risks threaten to get out of 

hand. China's growing military capabilities and modernization has raised a lot of questions about 

their objectives and how they might pursue them. We also need to pay as much attention to 

civilian ships-China's small stick-as we do to big-stick platfonns that dominate headlines. It's 

not hard to see how a minor dispute could tum into a catastrophic event. 

The administration has talked a lot about a pivot to the Pacific in recent years. Over the past 

decade, our military has been consumed with the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The U.S. 

wants freedom of access to the South China Sea and we want to maintain regional peace and 

stability in Southeast Asia. 

Enforcing global rules and norms while protecting our economic interests are also a top priority. 

A blue water navy allows us power projection and the ability to pursue free trade. The Chinese 

have the greatest capacity and more of a willingness to set nonns and enforce its will. This is a 

deliberate strategy on their part. 

Since at least 2007, we've seen Beijing increase its diplomatic and not-so-diplomatic actions to 

protect their interests. They've been more aggressive toward their neighbors, bullied commercial 

vessels and encroached on disputed territory. This has caused serious friction between China and 

its neighbors. No one country in the region can match the Chinese by themselves. Instead, we 

need a balancing effort among interested and like-minded parties. The Association of South East 

Asian Nations or ASEAN might be the best way to do this but it's no silver bullet. 

Unfortunately, if hi story is any guide, member countries have been too busy fighting amongst 

themselves. 

We need to find a better way to curb the worst aspects of China's behavior while working with 

our friends and allies in the region to protect our mutual interests. I look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses. 
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Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Ted Poe 

To Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D., Visiting Lecturer ofTolilical Science, University 

of Massachusetts TJartmouth 

QUESTION 1: 

Given the South China Sea's importance for shipping and China's reliance on trade, how 

likely is it that China would start a military conflict in the area? Wouldn't this hurt 

China's economy just as much as any other country's economy? 

Answer: As the question points out, the importance of the South China Sea for China's economy 

would suggest that it is unlikely to start a military conflict in the area. However, such thinking 

assumes that the initiation of military engagement would be solely based on rational calculations 

and, though history has demonstrated that this is normally the case, it is not always so. Indeed, if 

one looks at China's actions vis-a-vis Japan since the latter's nationalization ofthe 3 of the 

Senkaku Islands in September 2012, it was long assumed that economic interdependence 

between the two countries and likely negative economic etfects of any dispute would likely deter 

the outbreak of hostilities. The subsequent escalation of tensions since September 2012 was, 

therefore, unanticipated and has resulted in economic damage. Notably, however, the damage 

has been on both sides-something that would also be the case in the South China Sea-and yet the 

situation shows no sign of abating. At this stage, there are two possible explanations for this. One 

would be to conclude that the economic damage caused by the dispute is not yet significant 

enough to prompt a change in strateb'Y. Alternatively, it may be that the economic damage is 

considered to be oflesser importance to other strategic goals. And if this second explanation is 

valid, that would suggest that we cannot necessarily assume that China will not launch some 

form of military engagement to achieve strategic control of the South China Sea. 

Of course, it should be pointed out that, at this stage, China has given no direct indication that it 

is prepared to use force to gain control of the South China Sea. It has made extravagant claims to 

the area but, then again, so have a number of other countries in that region. The more disquieting 

aspect is that China claims otfer the potential to alter the existing status quo in a vital Sea Lane 

of Communication and its intentions for doing so are unclear. The military option still looks 

unlikely at this stage and the process 
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QUESTION 2: 

What is your analysis of the U.S.'s current efforts to relieve tensions? What are we doing 

that works and does not work? 

Answer: Unfortunately, T do not feel that T have sufficient expertise to comment directly on US 

efforts in this matter, other than stating that the US' commitment to ensuring a multilateral 

solution agreed upon by all the claimants represents the most efficacious outcome. Moreover, its 

military and naval presence in the area also seems to be necessary in preventing the escalation of 

military tension. Given the importance of this area for the US economy, it has clear grounds for 

exercising national interest and greater active involvement in any resolution, unlike the current 

disputes between China and Japan, and China and the Philippines 
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Questiou 1: 

Question for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Ted Poe 

To Perry Pickert, Ph.D., Retired Career Intelligence Officer 

Do these acts of Chiuese aggression threaten our national security interests? 

Answer: The United States strategic interests as a Pacitic power will not be directly impacted by 

the projected growth of Chinese naval power. The Chinese will need to acknowledge and support 

the basic rules concerning the treed om of the sea because they will need to use these rules to 

assert their status a great power. Their future access to 98% of high sea, its resources and the 

seabed depends on universal rules. 

Problems will arise because China will take a bilateral approach to each of the territorial issues 

on their periphery. Starting with the Senkakus and stretching the bottom of the South China Sea 

the Chinese will take a patient approach, waiting for an opportunity to use their maximum 

asymmetric leverage to gain acceptance of a particular claim, no matter how dubious, by the 

weaker country. The risk of war with any of these countries is minimal. Since the United States 

is not party to any of these disputes, the Chinese do not consider US intervention as likely. The 

threshold for international action would be a "threat to international peace and security" under 

the UN Charter and the Chinese veto and even double veto would prevent Security Council 

action and maybe even consideration of the issues. 

Thus the United States can anticipate years even decades of tempests in the China's teapots. 

Chinese acquisition oflonger range and highly lethal and accurate tactical missile system make 

these island disputes even more dangerous. The landmass of the vast maj ority of these disputed 

islands means they cannot be occupied and held by military force. The islands value really 

depends on the potential for exploiting the undersea resources in the surrounding waters. The 

expense of a single oil or gas platform runs into hundreds of millions of dollars - hardly a risk 

protlle likely to attract investors. 

The primary usefulness of these territorial confrontations is to demonstrate the expanding scope 

of China's new regional status as hegemon and kindle the fire Chinese nationalism to validate 

the legitimacy of the Chinese leadership. 

US bilateral and multilateral diplomacy will only have marginal impact as it is the status quo on 

the ground and surrounding waters that matters. Bilateral military support for Japan and the 

ASEAN countries so they have the capability to independently provide continuous monitoring 

and quick reaction by air and sea to Chinese provocations is the most practical contribution the 

US can mal,e. 
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Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Ted Poe 

Page 10f2 

To Mr. Rick Fisher, Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International 

Assessment and ,'I'trategy Center 

Question 1: 

How developed is China's navy? How does it compare to ours? 

Answer: It is a pleasure to answer Congressman Poe's questions. The People's Liberation Army 

Navy (PLAN) is currently in an extended transition from assembling a balanced fleet necessary 

to support regional combat and support missions in the Asian theater, to acquiring the balanced 

capabilities needed to support significant global power projection. This transition may occur as 

early as the mid-to-Iater 2020s. 

While modem PLAN ships may not be as capable as comparable ships in the U.S. Navy, the 

PLAN is improving and singular comparison is becoming less relevant, as in terms ofa 

combined force, the PLAN is increasingly able to pose a credible threat to U.S. carrier battle 

groups operating in East Asia. While this combined capability is an early stage, during the week 

of21 October 2013 the PLAN practiced combined submarine, surface ship and bomber exercises 

south ofJapan's Sakashima Island Group, or east of Taiwan. This is not easy to do that far from 

shore bases and it marks significant achievement for the PLAN. When you add the unique PLA 

capability of long range anti-ship ballistic missiles and the new YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship 

missiles launched from bombers to this level of combined force, then it has to be said that the 

PLAN does have a growing capability for successfully attacking U.S. Navy forces in this theater. 

Just a few observations: The PLAN is making non-nuclear submarines that are approaching the 

acoustic and tactical flexibility of the Russian Kilo, but with air independent propulsion (AlP). 

Chinese sources suggest that a new 200km range version of the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile 

may soon enter service, which is approaching the capability of the U.S. SM-2 SAM. Longer 

range BMD naval SAMs are also to be expected. The J-IS carrier fighter that is entering service 

on the PLAN carrier [jaoning-will be as capable as the U.S. Boeing F/A-18E/F once it is 

upgraded with an electronically scanned array radar, which may happed fairly soon. The U.S.has 

a clear superiority in nuclear attack submarines, but the problem is that they are not sufficient in 

number to counter a surge of PLAN submarines, and still prosecute surface and land targets. 

Question 2: 

Qut of all these acts of aggression, do any of them cross any red lines in your mind? 

Answer: In te1111s of maintaining the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments in Asia, the year 

2012 was a year of significant set-back. In April-May of2012 China successfully bullied the 

Philippines from Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea and then later in the year sent 

multiple Chinese Coast Guard ships into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands. This, 
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Page 20f2 

unfortunately, has emboldened China to believe that it can increase pressures to push the 

Philippines and Japan out of areas that it either claims or occupies. In tenns of the paramount 

US. interest in deterring contlict in Asia, we have allowed China to cross a red line, as having 

allowed "aggression" to go unanswered, we have only encouraged China to expand the scope of 

its aggression. We are not paying the price in 2013: Chinese harassment of the Philippine rusting 

ship "base" on Second Thomas Shoal and an increasing campaign of intimidation against Japan 

in the Senkakus 

The self-inflicted problem is that since the 1970s has been the consistent US. policy toward both 

regions to maintain strict neutrality regarding competing claims to territory in the South and East 

China Seas. Washington should have cast China's expansive claims to the South China Sea as a 

threat to regional peace since this claim was being fonnulated in the 1980s and affinned in the 

1990s. While former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has tried to modify US. policy to object 

to the use of war to enforce claims, this policy has not been backed up by real responses to 

Chinese aggression. The right response to China's bullying in the last two years would have 

been to transfer ATACMS short range ballistic missiles to the Philippines and to offer them to 

Japan as well. Even ifneither took up that option it still would have sent a clear message to 

China that the U.S. is quite willing to help check its aggression.