PROJECT 1721

A U.S. Army War College

Assessment on Russian Strategy 

in Eastern Europe and Recommendations 

on how to Leverage Landpower to Maintain 

the Peace

Douglas Mastriano 

Project Leader U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

PROJECT 1721

A U.S. Army War College Assessment on Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe and 

Recommendations on how to Leverage Landpower to Maintain the Peace

Douglas Mastriano

Project Leader

March 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy 

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Project 1721 was produced under the purview of the USAWC to foster dialogue on topics with strategic ramifications. This study drew upon the expertise of hand selected USAWC faculty and students from 

across the services and from six nations to provide a thought-provoking discourse of a topic of timely 

relevance—the reemergence of Russian strategic Landpower. 

*****

This research project was written to provide insightful and thought provoking discourse on the daunting security challenges facing the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Project 1721 would not be possible without the support and advice of numerous experts from around the 

world. Special thanks to the former Minister of Defense of Lithuania, Rasa Jukneviciene, for her excellent 

advice on this project. Appreciation also goes to the following members of the Lithuanian Land Forces 

for their support: Colonel Dalius Polekauskas, Chief of Staff of the Lithuanian Army, Lieutenant Colonel 

Arturas Jasinskas, Major Eugenius Lastauskas, and Major Tomas Balkus. This research project is also 

indebted to Mr. Rolands Henins, Director of Latvian Defense Policy, and Lieutenant Colonel Raimonds 

Kursitis (Armed Forces of Latvia). Special thanks to Estonian Lieutenant Colonel Vahur Murulaid for his 

research for the chapter addressing national security questions raised in the United States. Thank you 

also to Mr. Jonas Ohman for his exceptional insight on Ukraine. Appreciation to U.S. Army Europe G2 for 

their support, especially Mr. Steven Boltz. Colonel Tarn Warren, the Chair of the Department of Military 

Strategy, Planning, and Operations (DMSPO) also provided excellent analysis and support. Lieutenant 

Colonel Mike Adelberg, USAWC, SSI, was a vital part of Project 1721, providing the final review of the 

study. Additionally, Project 1721 would not be possible without the editorial and formatting skills of Ms. 

Donna Ferry, USAWC.

*****

Cover Photo: second Cavalry Regiment in Torun, Poland, on February 6, 2016. (U.S. Army photo by 

Staff Sgt. Jennifer Bunn, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Public Affairs).
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ISBN 1-58487-745-6
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CONTENTS

Foreword...................................................................................................................................xi

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Contributors and Researchers.................................xiii 

Preface and Historic Context.................................................................................................xv

Putting a Price on Blood and Allies: America’s Commitment to the 

 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance..................................................xix 

Russia’s Sword of Damocles................................................................................................xxv 

Chapter 1: Cat and Mouse: Putin’s Complex Application of 

 Russian Strategic Landpower...............................................................................................1

 Putin’s Complex Application of Russian Strategic Landpower......................................3

Chapter 2: European Security and Russian Expansionism................................................11 

 European Security, Russian Expansionism, and Cyberwar...........................................13 

Chapter 3: The Crisis in Ukraine: Russian’s War to Control the Soul of 

 Europe....................................................................................................................................17 

 Ukraine Crisis: Testing the Security and Stability of Europe and 

 Beyond................................................................................................................................19 

 The Conflict in Ukraine: Its Implications on Armed Forces 

 Development......................................................................................................................23 

Chapter 4: Russia and the Baltic Nations.............................................................................29 

 Putin’s/Russia’s Objectives in the Baltics.........................................................................31 

 Latvia in the Crosshairs: Russian Information Warfare and 

 Countermeasures..............................................................................................................37 

 Baltic Bastion!?......................................................................................................................43 

Chapter 5: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 

 New Russian Strategic Environment.................................................................................49 

 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Understanding and 

 Sustaining Its Relevance to the United States ...............................................................51 

 Back to Business: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 

 Its Concept of Collective Defense ...................................................................................63 

 Will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Survive 

 the New Strategic Environment? ....................................................................................73 

 Can Cyber Trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty? ................................................79 
Chapter 6: A New North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Approach: 

 The Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF)...................................................................83

 Deterrence, Provocation, or Assurance: Is the North Atlantic Treaty 

 Organization’s (NATO’s) Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF)

 the Right Answer? ............................................................................................................85 

Chapter 7: Adapting Policy to the New Russia ..................................................................97 

 Adapting U.S. Policy Toward the New Russia................................................................99 

Chapter 8: Vanquishing the Sphinx....................................................................................109 

 Vanquishing the Sphinx: Answering the Hard Questions Facing the 

 Baltics................................................................................................................................111 

Chapter 9: The Way Ahead and Recommendations ........................................................125 

 Five Smooth Stones: How the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

 Can Deter the “Goliath” Russian Threat to the Baltics..............................................127 

 Final Thoughts and Recommendations ..........................................................................137 

Endnotes.................................................................................................................................141 

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FOREWORD

In early 2015, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), at the request of the former 

Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, published Project 1704, a study that 

discussed the changing strategic environment in Europe spawned by Russian aggression against Ukraine. The chief questions addressed by Project 1704 included: (1) What 

is the Russian strategy in the region? (2) What is the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) and U.S. response? (3) What are the implications for NATO and 

U.S. Landpower?

The positive response to Project 1704 across NATO and the U.S. made it one of those 

rare assessments used to inform and shape strategy. Although much of Project 1704 is 

still relevant in its view of the emerging Russian strategy toward NATO, the environment has changed. Since the publication of Project 1704, Vladimir Putin announced the 

modernization of the Russian armed forces and deployed forces to Syria, Russian aircraft aggressively buzzed a U.S. Navy vessel in the Baltic Sea, and Putin’s political proxies threatened NATO members with nuclear war. Project 1721 takes up where Project 

1704 left off.

The geo-strategic situation continues to change. Although many trends are disconcerting, there are points of light in the darkness. Chief among these is that Putin’s aggressive tone and approach is forging a greater unity among NATO members hitherto 

not seen since the 1980s. Although many in NATO are facing divergent dangers (i.e., 

immigration/refugee influx), Moscow poses an existential threat to much of Europe. 

However, NATO is far from ready to meet this threat. Using defense spending as a measure of resolve, only 5 of the 28 NATO members are spending the pledged 2% of Gross 

Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. The majority of NATO nations have a long way to 

go in “paying their fair share.”

Another by-product of Putin’s aggressive and hostile strategy is evident in Ukraine. 

Ukraine has a rich history, with much in common with Russia economically, culturally, 

and religiously. Yet, Putin’s war against a once stalwart friend is working against him. 

A truly Ukrainian identity is emerging from this, something not evident since before the 

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This identity is increasingly less friendly to Moscow.

The increasingly bombastic rhetoric and actions of the Kremlin is disconcerting and 

is placing European peace in a precarious situation—where one misstep by Moscow or 

Washington, D.C. could plunge the world into a costly war. Yet, weakness and lack of 

resolve from “the West” is not the answer. The world experimented with appeasement 

when faced with another nationalistic leader in the form of Adolf Hitler. The cost of capitulation and appeasement was a costly world war. The lesson of this experiment with 
xii

appeasement is best summed up by the aforementioned quote by Winston S. Churchill: 

“An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” Project 1721

offers a way on how to preserve the peace in these turbulent and uncertain times.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
xiii

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (USAWC) CONTRIBUTORS AND RESEARCHERS 

Project 1721 1 

COL Kevin Copsey

British Army

COL Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D.

USAWC Project 1721 Leader & 

Senior Editor

LTC Vahur Karus

Estonian Defence Forces

LTC Algimantas Misiunas

Lithuanian Land Forces

COL Peter Nieuwenhuis

Royal Netherlands Army

COL Markus Kreitmayr

German Army

COL Robert Hamilton, Ph.D. 

USAWC Department of 

National Strategy and Security

COL Postrybailo Volodymyr

Ukrainian Army
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Project 1721

LTC George Hammar

United States Army

COL Joseph Barber

United States Army

LTC Chris Briand

United States Army 

Lt. Col. Corey Collier

United States Marine Corps 

LTC Eric Zimmerman

Pennsylvania National Guard

COL Ryan Wolfgram

United States Army LTC Jeffrey Setser

West Virginia National Guard

COL Gary Graves

United States Army

LTC Vahur Murulaid

Estonian Defense Forces
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PREFACE AND HISTORIC CONTEXT

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 

enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.1

 Winston Churchill, October 1, 1939

The Great Northern War began in 1700 after Russian Czar Peter forged an alliance 

with Denmark and Poland to contest the supremacy of Sweden in the Baltic region. The 

Swedish Army initially prevailed in the war, winning the first battle for Narva (located 

in northeastern Estonia).2 However, after rebuilding his army, Czar Peter returned 4 

years later to lead a successful Russian siege of Swedish Narva in 1704. The victory was 

a remarkable reversal of Russia’s fortune and put it on the path to becoming a European 

power.3

Czar Peter on horseback is depicted as trying to stop his army from committing atrocities against the 

people of Narva in 1704 after it was seized from the Swedes. By Nikolay Sauerweid.
The Great Northern War lasted until 1721, with various Swedish and Russian victories and defeats. Yet, Russia broke Sweden’s power in the Baltic region. The war ended 

in 1721 with the Treaty of Nystad where Sweden gave up its Baltic territories to Russia. The 1721 Treaty of Nystad made Russia a European power, placing it in a position 

to influence not just the Baltics, but also Scandinavia and Eastern and Central Europe. 

Seizing on the new strategic environment achieved by this victory, Czar Peter moved 

his capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg, formally establishing the Russian Empire. 

The designation of St. Petersburg as his capital was a pivotal moment that symbolically 

declared that Russia was looking toward Europe.

The legacy of 1721 echoes across the centuries to us today. Since then, Russia has 

been an influential player in European affairs. Its first two centuries in Europe (1721-

1917) were largely cooperative. Unfortunately, the greater portion of the past 100 years 

has been less than cordial. Ironically, as if symbolically turning back the clock on its relations with the West, the Russian capital was moved back to Moscow after the Bolshevik 

Revolution in 1917. The subsequent 84 years of atheistic Soviet rule unleashed one of 

the bloodiest epochs in human history, with genocide, ideological purges of those who 

disagreed with the government, ethnic cleansing, massed imprisonment, and the forced 

migration of entire populations. The Baltic nations felt the brutality of this period in unimaginable ways. Latvia typified the Baltic experience of living under Soviet rule when 

its population suffered mass executions, imprisonment for anyone perceived as a threat 

to the regime, and the deportation of one-third of its people to Siberia where many died. 

This deportation of ethnic Latvians dovetailed with a sinister Soviet policy of resettling 

ethnic Russians to the Baltic region. Although there was an economic incentive to this 

policy, it also had an ethno-political design. As a result, the percentage of ethnic Russians in Latvia increased from 10% to 30%.4

 Moscow’s goal was to colonize the nation 

with enough Russians to keep it forever under its influence by stripping away their 

Latvian national identity.5

The 20th-century Russian dark ages ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 

1991. From the view of the West, a refreshing decade of cooperation and collaboration 

between Moscow, Europe, and the United States ensued, bringing hope that the century 

of Russian hostility was at long last over. Russia was viewed as a partner, and there 

was even serious discussion about it being offered North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) membership. However, the Russians tend to view these years with less fondness. For them, the 1990s was when their country was “on its knees,” with a shrinking 

economy, declining life expectancy, rampant social chaos and a president (Boris Yeltsin) 

who was not respected abroad. The rise of Vladimir Putin, viewed in the West as the 

beginning of a period of revanchist and reactionary ethno-centric nationalism, is considered in Russia as the beginning of its regaining respect and great power status. 

The U.S. and the major European powers were slow to adapt to the new strategic 

reality of growing Russian hostility toward the West. Even after the 2007 cyberattacks 

against Estonia, and the 2008 war against Georgia, there were hopes of a reset of relations with Russia. It was not until the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and its ongoxvi
xvii

ing war against Ukraine that Europe and the United States grasped the re-emergent 

Russian strategy that was determined to exercise its power and influence over the region 

(described by Moscow as the “near abroad,” the states of the former Soviet Union). It 

seems like the old threat to European peace is back. Yet, as history demonstrates, this is 

not a new dilemma. As Dr. John Lennox, a Professor of Oxford University says, “New 

things are old things happening to new people.” This rings true today for many of the 

senior officers in NATO still on active service, who began their careers facing a powerful 

Russian-led Soviet threat. Indeed, new 

things are old things happening to new 

people.

NATO nations have divergent 

views of how to contend with the aggressive Russian approach. The nations 

near Russia seek assurance and deterrence measures, while those further 

away often call for moderation. Yet, the 

notion that accommodation will reduce 

the threat is viewed more in hope than 

reality. Of this Winston Churchill brilliantly said, “The appeaser feeds the 

crocodile hoping that it will eat him 

last.” The U.S. and its NATO allies have 

hard decisions to make. Will it take sufficient action to deter further Russian 

aggression? Or, will the nations deliberate and delay action until it is too late?

Project 1721 offers a way for the 

United States and NATO to preserve 

the peace without sacrificing the Baltic Nations to the territorial ambitions 

of Vladimir Putin and an expansionist 

Russia. Any strategy and operational 

approach to providing assurance to the Baltics and deterrence of Russia must encompass a whole of government approach that includes all aspects of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power (DIME). A successful strategy 

must be accompanied with an approach that leverages not just the military instrument 

of power. It must also include the “Joint Force” of air, land, sea, cyber, and space, and 

the participation and support of NATO allies and its partners. As a USAWC assessment,

the focus of Project 1721 is what contributions Strategic Landpower can provide to maintain the 

peace in the Baltic region. Any Landpower decision must be integrated in the NATO approach to the region. Having proved itself in the Balkans and demonstrated resolve in 

Afghanistan, NATO has never been stronger or better positioned to maintain the peace 

Peter the Great (1672-1725). Russian Tsar and founder of the 

Russian Empire. Painted in 1837-1838 by Paul Delaroche
xviii

and stability in Europe. Although beset by numerous challenges, with the chief being 

diminishing defense spending, the United States must integrate its strategy and operational approach with that of NATO to ensure continuity and consistency. 

President Obama and Estonian Prime Minister, Taavi Roivas, address American and Estonian Soldiers in Tallinn. 

(U.S. Army Photo)
xix

PUTTING A PRICE ON BLOOD AND ALLIES: 

AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION (NATO) ALLIANCE

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting 

without them.

 Winston S. Churchill

Soldiers from across NATO during exercise Iron Sword 2014, in Pabrade, Lithuania. (U.S. Army Photo)

The advent of NATO is rooted in a century of conflict. The Alliance emerged after 

two bloody world wars. World War I (1914-1918) witnessed the transformation of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa at an appalling price in blood and treasure for people 

around the globe. Although entering the war late, the United States made a decisive contribution to the Allied victory. A horrific price was paid in that war. Yet, it was higher 

than it ought to have been due in large part to emerging technologies (i.e., tanks, chemical warfare, air power) and the failure of the Allies to accept unified command under 

one supreme leader. It took 4 painful years for the western nations to finally embrace the 

idea of a Supreme Allied Commander in the person of French Marshal Ferdinand Foch. 

It was Foch who led the Allies to victory in 1918.
xx

After World War I, the nations met at Versailles to discuss how to prevent another 

world war. The United States led the discussion of forming international organizations 

and institutions as a way to prevent another calamity. Thus was born the League of 

Nations that would serve as an international forum to peacefully resolve disputes. However, the United States abandoned the lessons of World War I and decided to return to 

a form of isolationism (non-interventionism). Meanwhile, in Europe the recovery from 

the horrors of World War I was daunting. Entire generations of men had perished and 

the rapid withdrawal of the United States from Europe weakened the fledgling League 

of Nations. Additionally, Europe was besieged by hostile ideologies ranging from 

Bolshevism to Socialist Fascism. The Russian-led Soviet Union was the first to threaten the post-World War I peace by invading its neighbors in the Baltics and Poland. 

Although the Poles beat the Soviets back, peace would not endure for long, after fascist 

governments emerged in Spain, Italy, and Germany. 

The resolve of the Allies and the League of Nations was put to the test throughout 

the 1930s. This included the Spanish Civil War, Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia, and 

others. Yet, the greatest challenge to peace came with the rise of Adolf Hitler. Hitler defied the mandates of Versailles and the resolve of the League of Nations and Allies. The 

first challenge was the rearmament of Germany, which was forbidden by the Versailles 

Treaty. This was followed by the seizure of the demilitarized (international zone) Rhineland. Despite these flagrant violations, the League and Allies took no action, emboldening Hitler to annex Austria in the 1938 Anschluss. This was followed by a demand to 

control the border (Sudetenland) of Czechoslovakia so that Hitler could “protect” ethnic 

Germans living there. In the now infamous Munich Conference, the Allies, led by British 

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, granted Hitler his demand (without consulting the 

Czechoslovakians) in exchange for a pledge for peace. Hitler promised peace, and Prime 

Minister Chamberlain returned to Great Britain saying he had achieved “peace in our 

time.” 

The “peace” lasted less than 6 months, ending with the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Allies did little more than give long speeches of condemnation. Seeing 

nothing but weakness within the Allies, Hitler continued his expansionist agenda with 

the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. At long last, the Allies declared war, but 

did nothing until Hitler unleashed his machines of war against the Low Countries and 

France in the spring of 1940. The United States entered the fray in 1941 and, at considerable cost in blood and treasure, worked closely with the Allies to defeat the Nazi and 

Fascist forces. The second Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

seemed to have adopted the strategy and approach of Ferdinand Foch in winning World 

War II, demonstrating the value of learning from the past. 

The United States was eager to demobilize its Armed Forces after World War II, and 

it appeared that once again it would withdraw militarily from the world scene. Yet, the 

impending danger of a Soviet invasion of Central and Western Europe was rising, and 

the United States altered its strategy to keep a robust military presence in Europe. The 

bulwark to maintain the peace was NATO, founded April 4, 1949. The key tenant of the 
xxi

NATO Alliance remains Article 5, which declares that an attack upon one member shall 

be considered an attack upon all. Although greatly outnumbered conventionally by Soviet forces throughout the Cold War, the United States, acting with its allies, provided 

an unprecedented era of peace across Europe not experienced since the Roman Empire. 

The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the end of the Cold War in 1991 brought questions as to whether there was still a need for NATO. As deliberation continued on the 

future of NATO, instability exploded in the Balkans as Yugoslavia fragmented along 

ethnic lines. Horrific scenes of genocide were broadcast around the world to the dismay 

of modern viewers. The United Nations (UN) endeavored to bring peace through negotiations and by deploying inadequately armed forces to the region; yet, the atrocities 

continued. In the end, the bloodshed only ended when NATO deployed to the region 

with the power and might of its members’ armed forces. Even then, commentators predicted that the Balkans would prove the end of the Alliance. They were proven wrong, 

and NATO emerged from the Balkan crisis stronger and unified.

The world changed suddenly when the United States was attacked on September 

11, 2001. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5. It is ironic that when 

Article 5 was adapted in 1949, the belief was that it would be invoked when the Soviets attacked Europe. Yet, Article 5 was used to come to the support and defense of the 

United States. With the declaration of Article 5, soldiers from across NATO deployed to 

help the United States in its hour of need and went to Afghanistan under the banner of 

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

During its commitment to the mission in Afghanistan, political scientists again 

wrongly predicted that this would be the end of NATO. The forecasts of NATO’s demise 

endured throughout its 13-year commitment to helping the United States in Afghanistan. To this end, Afghanistan was labeled by some commentators as “the graveyard 

of empires,” and with such a specter in mind, the ISAF mission would put NATO to 

a difficult test. Even the Taliban believed that NATO was vulnerable and commenced 

their counteroffensive in 2006. The timing of their attack was not an accident. Early in 

2006, the United States began to transition the southern portion of Afghanistan to the 

ISAF (NATO-led) mission. The Taliban believed that some NATO nations lacked resolve. Their goal was to kill enough NATO soldiers from any given country, so that in 

the face of unsustainable casualties, that nation would quit ISAF. It would be a strategic 

blow to the Alliance if a nation retreated from Afghanistan in the face of high casualties.
xxii

NATO Image

The fighting in 2006 was the worst since the end of the 2001-2002 American-led invasion. During the initial push, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld decided to restrict 

the number of ground forces deploying to Afghanistan. Due to this, the Taliban leadership was able to flee to safe havens in Pakistan. They used 2002-2006 to rearm, retrain, 

and recruit. When the opportunity to strike arrived in 2006, the Taliban was ready. The 

spring campaign kicked off with ferocity in April 2006, with the Canadian forces receiving the brunt of the attacks. This was arguably the greatest test of NATO’s resolve. Yet, 

in the end, the combined forces of Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), 

Denmark, and the United States and their Afghan partners prevailed. The Taliban failed 

to drive a NATO nation out of the ISAF mission, and the Alliance came out of Afghanistan stronger. 

As the ISAF mission ended, a new challenge arose threatening both the security of 

Europe and North America—Putin’s Russia. The Russian annexation of Crimea, its war 

against Georgia and Ukraine, and its cyberattack against Estonia threaten the peace and 

stability so hard won. NATO is gradually taking measures to deter Russian aggression 

from being directed against the eastern member states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 

It is at this point in the geo-political discourse that the question of America’s commitment is being debated.

From an American perspective, it is troubling that many in Europe and Canada have 

ungraciously taken advantage of the security umbrella provided by the United States to 

slash their defense spending to create societies rife with government benefits. The spec-
xxiii

ter of tiny military expenditure is amplified by short workweeks and long vacations by 

those nations reaping the benefits of an America providing for their security concerns. 

This misuse of American good will should end and every nation must do more. Yet, is 

the sacrifice and commitment to NATO solely from the United States? Some commentators in North America seem to believe so. What is not mentioned is that the NATO allies 

made incredible sacrifices fighting America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would be 

hard for the citizens of nations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to justify their soldiers 

being deployed to Afghanistan from an economic or other perspective. The simple fact is 

that the United States was attacked, Article 5 was invoked, and they came to our aid. Of 

the 3,407 soldiers killed in Afghanistan during ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom, 

1,136 were from NATO or partner nations. This does not include the tens of thousands 

wounded allied and partner-nation soldiers. How does one place a price tag on such a 

commitment? Additionally, most of the NATO nations also deployed their soldiers to 

Iraq, which was not a NATO mission. They came, and many died to honor their commitment to the United States in friendship and in fulfillment for the ideas for which it 

stands.

It is not new to hear debates about whether NATO is obsolete. Yet, the outcome of 

the Cold War, the Balkans, the ISAF mission, and the deterrence effect on an aggressive 

Vladimir Putin demonstrates that the Alliance is more relevant than ever and central to 

maintaining the peace. It took two horrific world wars for Europe and the United States 

to realize the need for a viable military alliance. It would be a costly and irreversible mistake to undercut and weaken the one military alliance in world history that has so long 

held back death and destruction from a continent so familiar with war. It has been the 

greatest guarantor of democracy and defender of capitalism. NATO has made it possible 

for both Europe and the United States to enjoy unprecedented prosperity and security. 

History demonstrates that weakness results in war. It would be the greatest of calamities 

to telegraph weakness and doubt about America’s commitment to NATO. How does 

weakening the Alliance benefit the United States? How does this make Europe safe and 

secure? What Russia hears from the political discourse in the United States could be 

catastrophic and may result in a risky gambit by Putin to try to seize the Baltic region. 

This would not be some far-away war, but something that would result in a conflict that 

would cause the collapse of the American economy and in the end, lead to another horrific world war. 

NATO has immense value and enduring worth to Europe, Canada, and the United 

States. The Alliance has come out of difficult missions in the Cold War, the Balkans, and 

Afghanistan stronger. Yet, this strength can be undone by doubts of America’s commitment to it. All 28 nations must do more from a defense perspective, but such negotiations should be conducted behind closed doors. A public debate could be misread in 

the Kremlin as a sign of weakness. Too much is at stake to telegraph lack of resolve and 

could result in a war of unimaginable proportions. President Ronald Reagan captured 

the importance of maintaining strength, saying in 1986:

We know that peace is the condition under which mankind was meant to flourish. Yet peace does not 

exist of its own will. It depends on us, on our courage to build it and guard it and pass it on to future 
xxiv

generations. George Washington’s words may seem hard and cold today, but history has proven him 

right again and again. ‘To be prepared for war,’ he said, ‘is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.’

NATO is a bulwark of strength to avert war only as long as the commitment of its members to honor Article 5 exists. Weakness invites war.
xxv

RUSSIA’S SWORD OF DAMOCLES

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

Researcher: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Setser, West Virginia Army National Guard

In early 2015, the USAWC, at the request of the former Army Chief of Staff, General 

Raymond Odierno, published Project 1704, a study that discussed the changing strategic environment in Europe spawned by Russian aggression against Ukraine. The chief 

questions addressed by Project 1704 included: (1) What is the Russian strategy in the region? (2) What is the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. 

response? (3) What are the implications for NATO and U.S. Landpower? 

The positive reception of Project 1704 across NATO and the United States has made it 

one of those rare assessments used to inform and shape strategy. Although much of Project 1704 is still relevant in its view of the emerging Russian strategy toward NATO, the 

United States, and the European Union (EU), the geo-strategic environment has changed 

significantly. Since the publication of Project 1704, Vladimir Putin announced the modernization of the Russian armed forces and deployed forces to Syria, Turkey shot down a 

Russian aircraft after it violated its airspace, Russian aircraft aggressively buzzed a U.S. 

Navy vessel in the Baltic Sea, and Putin’s political proxies threatened NATO members 

with nuclear war. The assessments of Project 1721 take up where Project 1704 left off.

The geo-strategic situation continues to change. Although many trends are disconcerting, there are points of light in the darkness. Chief among these is that Putin’s aggressive tone and approach is forging a greater unity among NATO members hitherto 

not seen since the 1980s. Although many in NATO are facing divergent dangers (i.e., 

immigration/refugee influx), Moscow poses an existential threat to much of Europe. 

However, NATO is far from ready to meet this threat. Using defense spending as a measure of resolve, only 5 of the 28 NATO members are spending the pledged 2% of Gross 

Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. The majority of NATO nations have a long way to 

go in “paying their fair share.” 

Despite the slow response in material action by NATO members, there are trends 

working against Putin’s expansionist designs. One of the startling developments is in 

Finland and Sweden, two traditionally neutral nations in the Baltic region. Moscow’s 

aggression against Ukraine and in the Baltic Sea is pushing these two nations closer to 

NATO and the United States. A realignment of one or both of these countries into the 

NATO camp would dramatically alter the strategic environment and give the West considerable leverage to prevent Russian aggression. 

Another by-product of Putin’s aggressive and hostile strategy is evident in Ukraine. 

Ukraine has a rich history, with much in common with Russia economically, culturally, 

and religiously. Yet, Putin’s war against a once stalwart friend is working against him. 

A truly Ukrainian identity is emerging from this, something not evident since before the 

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This identity is increasingly less friendly to Moscow.
xxvi

The increasingly bombastic rhetoric and actions of the Kremlin is disconcerting and 

is placing European peace in a precarious situation where one misstep by Moscow or 

Washington, D.C. could plunge the world into a costly war. Yet, weakness and lack of 

resolve from “the West” is not the answer. The world experimented with appeasement 

when faced with another nationalistic leader in the form of Adolf Hitler. The cost of capitulation and appeasement was a costly world war. The lesson of this experiment with 

appeasement is best summed up by the aforementioned quote by Winston S. Churchill: 

“An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.”

BLUNTING RUSSIA’S SWORD OF DAMOCLES IN THE BALTIC REGIONS6

Richard Westall’s 1812 painting depicts a sword hovering over Damocles, held in place by a single horse hair. 

The saga represents impending doom or the not knowing of when the sword will fall.

The ancient Roman philosopher, Cicero, told a story of how King Dionysius answered 

a courtier, Damocles, who thought that ruling a realm was merely pleasure and leisure. 

In response to this naive view, King Dionysius offered Damocles to switch places with 

him. However, King Dionysius had a large sword suspended above Damocles’ head, 

suspended by a mere hair from a horse’s tail. Upon realizing the danger that came with 

ruling a kingdom, Damocles gave up his envy of King Dionysius and happily remained 

a courtier. The moral of the story is that imminent danger often “hangs by a thread” and 

a simple misstep or miscalculation could let the sword fall and unleash death.
xxvii

Thus was the case a century ago when a complex web of alliances maintained the 

European balance of power. On one side: Russia, France, and the United Kingdom (UK); 

and on the other: Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Italy (Italy’s allegiance 

was, however, in doubt). The Serbian assassin, Gavrilo Princip, shattered this delicate 

balance of power on June 28, 1914, after he murdered the Austro-Hungarian Archduke 

Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie. So precarious was the complex system of alliances that, 

in just over a month, World War I would engulf Europe. The irony was that the very 

system that was created to guarantee peace ended in bringing war. Such a precarious 

situation is developing in the Baltic region today, where a sign of weakness by NATO 

or a misstep by Russia could let the Sword of Damocles fall and unleash the horrors of 

another catastrophic war. 

“The European Balance”: A 1914 German postcard depicting the precarious European Balance of Power that led 

to World War I.

The idea of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania being under a looming danger by a Russian “Sword of Damocles” is evident. The indicators of this growing peril are manifested 

in the Kremlin’s increasingly harsh rhetoric toward NATO, the aggressive and often 

reckless behavior of Russian military aircraft in the Baltics, and the dramatic increase 

in scale and tempo of Russian military exercises in the region. These events makes it 

appear that indeed a “Sword of Damocles” hangs over the NATO nations of Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania. 
xxviii

A Russian SU 24 buzzes the USS Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea on April 13, 2016. 

(U.S. Department of Defense Photo)

Vladimir Putin’s grand strategy is to reassert Russian influence in the region and to 

make it a dominant player in international affairs. To achieve this end, Putin needs to 

diminish the credibility of NATO, especially in the Baltic nations. There are two military 

approaches that Putin can pursue to pushing NATO out of the Baltics: (1) a direct attack or (2) apply pressure in the form of ambiguity (often called hybrid warfare). The 

“unthinkable option” of a direct attack on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be a 

high-risk move that could only come if American leadership is weak and NATO’s commitment to its Baltic allies diminished. In such an all-or-nothing gamble, the goal for 

Russian forces would be to quickly seal off land, air, and sea access to the Baltic region within 36-48 hours. The narrow Suwalki Gap, just 65 km wide, is where Russian 

troops would easily sever all land access to the Baltic nations from Poland and the rest of 

NATO. Once the land route is cut, Russian anti-aircraft and anti-shipping assets would 

make it too risky for U.S. and other NATO forces to arrive to expel the invaders.

The second, and more likely, option for the Kremlin is to use ambiguity. This would 

take the form of fomenting a “local” (exported from Moscow) ethnic Russian separatist 

movement similar to what was witnessed in Ukraine. Such an eventuality would occur 

in an area with a high ethnic Russian population in either Estonia or Latvia (Lithuania’s ethnic Russian population is but 6%). These would not be the little green men of 

Crimea. The separatists, who would really be Russian Special Forces, would appear as 

civilians seeking independence for the “discrimination” that they suffer from Estonians 

or Latvians. Moscow’s goal would be to destabilize the region in a way where no direct 

connection between the Kremlin was evident. The purpose of this ambiguity is not just 
xxix

to provide Putin plausible deniability, but, more importantly, to cause the NATO Alliance to dither and delay on taking action. NATO, not known for quick action, would act 

slowly to determine if the crisis was foreign or domestic.

The Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn, Estonia. When a decision was made to move the Soviet era statue, 

pro-Russian protestors violently took to the streets, followed by a massive Russian cyberattack that debilitated 

the nation. (Photo: Douglas Mastriano)

As NATO dithers, debates and delays a decision, the opportunity for a low risk move 

to destroy the Alliance would begin. Moscow would order a large force along the borders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to intimidate the Alliance and to provide covert 

support to their separatist movement. As security deteriorates and the local population 

suffers depravations, Putin would announce a humanitarian mission to end the distress. 

Of course, Moscow would pledge that the army would be withdrawn from the disputed 

area once security is restored. However, before the Russian troops depart, there would 

be a referendum with the ethnic Russian population appealing to Putin to remain. This 

would be followed by an annexation of the land by Moscow. Thus, without firing a shot, 

the NATO Alliance could be undermined with a simple act of annexing a modest piece 

of Baltic land without going to war with NATO. The brilliance of this strategy of ambiguity is that, should NATO respond in uncharacteristic rapidity, Putin could merely 

deny any involvement and wait for another opportunity to try such an action when and 

where the environment was more favorable. However, there are concerted steps that 

NATO, and specifically the United States, can take to prevent either of the dangerous 

actions delineated above from coming to fruition. 
xxx

The Armed Forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania must be capable, survivable, 

and maneuverable. This is why acquiring mid- to long-range weapons could make these 

nations less appetizing to Moscow. If attacked, these offensive weapon systems could 

wreak havoc to Russian command and control nodes and transportation hubs and disrupt the movement of Russian forces.7

 This would provide the Baltic nations with a 

credible military capability and a “capacity to deter by denial as well as to deter by 

punishment.”8

Concurrently, the United States should help reduce the anxieties of our allies by 

stationing robust military assets in the region. This would complement USAREUR’s 

campaign plan of making “30,000 American Soldiers look like 300,000.”9 The genius of 

USAREUR’s plan is to blend the Active Army with the Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve to support the European Theater.10 Part of this expansion is what should be 

called Deploy Forces to the Baltics (DEFORTIC). Using the Return of Forces to Germany 

(REFORGER) model from the Cold War, the goal is to have units rapidly fly soldiers 

into the region to use American equipment already staged there. This reduces the arrival 

time of “over the horizon” forces considerably. 

Another key to forward defense of NATO includes permanently stationing American 

and NATO forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The 2016 NATO Summit made a 

historic announcement, with the UK deploying a battalion to Estonia, the Canadians 

deploying a battalion to Latvia, Germany committing a similar force to Lithuania, and 

the Americans doing the same for Poland. This is a good start to deterring a possible 

Russian invasion of the “eastern flank” NATO nations, but more should be done. The 

multinational force deployed in the Baltic region should be increased to a three-brigade 

element, one in each nation. Estonia should host an American-led multinational mechanized brigade combat team and Latvia a regional Baltic Brigade that should include forces from Sweden and Finland (if they are willing to participate as non-NATO partners). 

The brigade in Lithuania should be a multinational NATO force permanently stationed 

in the Suwalki Gap. Keeping this gap open is imperative to prevent any ideas in Moscow 

that it could easily cut this essential land route from the rest of NATO. 

This three-brigade model for the Baltic nations borrows from the Berlin Brigade concept from the Cold War. Although the American, British, and French Brigades stationed 

in West Berlin could not stop a Soviet invasion, these served as a guarantee that, should 

there be an attack, three powerful nations would fight to defend Germany. Additionally, 

these brigades would have made the Soviet invasion bloody and difficult to accomplish. 

Simply put, the cost/benefit analysis would be too high for Moscow to try a violent seizure of West Berlin. This is the same end desired for the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, 

and Lithuania—making an attack on them too risky for Moscow to contemplate. 

As the final element of a strategy to deter Russia from threatening the Baltics, NATO 

should also assist Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in developing a robust unconventional warfare capability. If deterrence fails and Russian forces overpower NATO forces 

stationed there, waging unconventional war could be key. Simply the knowledge that 
xxxi

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have a robust capability to wage unconventional war 

against an occupying force would give Russian military planners pause, since it would 

trigger memories of the Forest Brotherhood that waged an insurgency against Soviet 

occupation forces from 1944-1956. This movement killed over 15,000 Soviet military and 

security forces and significantly hindered Moscow’s ability to establish control over the 

Baltics.11

Should Putin contemplate taking an area of the Baltics with a high ethnic Russian 

population, the question is if NATO will act quickly enough to deter aggression. For 

example, Narva, Estonia, is more than 80% ethnic Russian. If Putin’s strategy of ambiguity is attempted, would the United States be willing to risk New York for Narva? 

Indeed, the lack of an adequate forward force presence makes such an eventuality feasible. However, should the United States and NATO embrace the three-brigade concept 

for the region, the calculus for a Russian ambiguous attack on Narva, Estonia, changes 

the strategic calculus. A forward U.S. Army-led brigade deployed to Estonia reverses 

the strategic calculus from, “is New York worth Narva” to, “is Moscow worth Narva.” 

This would not be a replay of 1940, as NATO would already be there to deter Russian 

aggression. This is the power of a modest forward presence of American soldiers and 

other NATO ground soldiers deployed permanently in the Baltic region. It changes everything from a strategic point of view and in the end will save lives and money.

Yet, there are voices in Western Europe and North America warning against doing anything to provoke Vladimir Putin. These often suggest that forward positioning 

forces in the Baltics will cross a Kremlin redline. Much is spoken of the Russian fear of 

invasion and that it should be given a buffer to demonstrate good will. The recklessness of such a view was demonstrated by how the French and British approached the 

demands of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. With the horrors of World War I in their thoughts, 

the Western European leadership did all it could to accommodate and appease Hitler. 

This weakness encouraged Hitler to continue his aggression. Had the Allies exercised 

strength earlier in this epoch, perhaps the horror and devastation of World War II could 

have been averted.

Another example is the Emirate of Kuwait. In 1990, Saddam Hussein sought an excuse to invade Kuwait to ameliorate his economic and financial woes. Being confronted 

by a massive buildup of Iraqi forces on his border, the Emir of Kuwait ordered his forces 

to stand down as a gesture of goodwill. Instead of convincing Saddam Hussein of calling 

off his invasion of Kuwait, it simply made his mission easier, with the Iraqi Republican 

Guards rapidly seizing the nation on August 2, 1990.

The idea that Russia should be given buffer states to make it feel more secure is 

not unique in history. The Japanese Empire’s strategy in the 1930’s was to establish a 

Co-Prosperity Sphere. This was to not only to serve as an economic zone dominated 

by Tokyo, but also a buffer zone to protect Japan militarily. Although this was a sound 

theory from a Japanese perspective, life for the people in those nations included in this 

economic and military buffer zone was abysmal. The idea of allowing Russia economic 
xxxii

and military domination over any region is contrary to American strategy and ideals. 

What nations do the appeasers wish to surrender to Vladimir Putin to provide such a 

buffer zone? 

Rasa Jukneviciene, a Member of Parliament and former Lithuanian Minister of Defense, brilliantly stated, “The biggest provocation for Putin is empty security promises. 

Lithuania’s policy in 1940 was not to provoke Stalin and Russia. Look at what that got 

us.”12 The Baltic Nations had a policy of not provoking the Soviet Union in the late 1930s 

and in 1940. History demonstrated that weakness encouraged aggression. In 1940, Stalin demanded that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania open their borders to the Red Army, 

which they did, in an endeavor not to provoke or antagonize Moscow. This weakness 

resulted in the invasion and occupation of these lands that within a year would suffer unimaginable horror and depravations at the hands of Moscow. This is yet another 

example of appeasement inviting aggression.13 The idea that inaction and weakness is a 

reasonable course of action for the United States and NATO is a hazardous and dangerous approach that historically has only resulted in costly and bloody wars. Indeed, the 

“[c]osts to deter Russia now is far cheaper than the costs later,”14 as “Russia always goes 

for the weak one.”15

“There is a race for the Baltics, the side which comes first with substantial forces 

will prevail. To prevent conflict, there must be strength and resolve.”16 If NATO acts 

with determination, war can be averted and peace preserved. However, the window of 

opportunity for the allies is closing. 

The emerging Russian “strategy of ambiguity” is a direct threat to the NATO Alliance. Yet, it can be deterred now with resolve and a modest forward deployment of 

American Forces in the region. The United States can change the calculus in the region 

and avert a perilous move by Russia with a simple commitment of a brigade in the Baltic 

region. NATO has an opportunity to prevent the unthinkable from happening. There is 

a Russian “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the Baltic region, yet the impending doom 

can be blunted by the physical commitment of NATO landpower to Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania.
xxxiii

1

CHAPTER 1: CAT AND MOUSE: PUTIN’S COMPLEX 

APPLICATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

Military Parade on Red Square in 2016. (Kremlin Photo)

3

PUTIN’S COMPLEX APPLICATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC LANDPOWER17

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive methodology being employed 

by Russia to exercise its influence over areas of Europe. The changing face of Russia’s 

operational approach began in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyberattack on Estonia. This was in retaliation of an Estonian decision to move a Soviet era Red Army 

monument, something that Moscow opposed. This was followed by a large Russian 

conventional attack against the country of Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas 

of the nation (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). In 2014, the world witnessed the Russian 

annexation of Crimea using soldiers in unmarked uniforms. In only one week, Russia 

seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly 

followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in Eastern Ukraine.18 A common 

thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and 

confuse decision makers in the West. 

RUSSIAN LANDPOWER

The 2008 invasion of Georgia and the ongoing intervention in Ukraine demonstrates 

Russia’s reliance on the military and security services as instruments of its grand strategy. The application of the Russian military instrument of power has taken various forms 

over recent history. For instance, the Russian operation in Georgia was largely conventional. The 2014 Russian operation in Crimea diverged from the conventional approach 

by manipulating a sympathetic population and using a robust security infrastructure 

built up for the Sochi Olympics. Finally, Moscow inspired and is leading a separatist 

movement in Eastern Ukraine hidden behind a cloak of ambiguity and backed by the 

powerful capabilities of its army.19

These operations exhibit common features of Russia’s use of military force. Russia depends on Landpower to achieve its strategic military objectives. This Landpower-centric 

approach is part of a broader Russian strategy to roll back Western influence—especially 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)—from 

the former Soviet republics. Russia has adjusted the use of its army to conduct hybrid, 

irregular warfare as the primary means of warfare against its neighbors so as not to provoke a decisive response from either the United States or other European nations. With 

this in mind, Information Operations (IO) and cyber-capabilities have emerged as key 

components of Russian military operations. 

The importance of modernization is an ongoing concern for Moscow and its armed 

forces. These reforms are directed to developing a capability that can act decisively in 

the region, capable of anything from small special purpose forces missions to largescale conventional operations. It is this ability to tailor forces across the range of operations that makes it uniquely adaptive and capable. To do this, Russia is concentrating 

resources on a small number of elite units, primarily airborne and special operations 

forces (SOF) that make up the core of its emerging Rapid Reaction Force. 
4

THE EMERGING RUSSIAN OPERATIONAL APPROACH OF AMBIGUITY

Moscow uses deception and disinformation to prevent a quick response from the 

West. When Putin believes that employing conventional forces is too risky, he resorts 

to using unconventional forces, scaled and adapted to the strategic environment to confound American and European decision-makers. This “strategy of ambiguity” was used 

to great effect in Crimea; such was the case where, despite evidence to the contrary, Putin denied that the “little green men” were his soldiers until after he annexed the region. 

By doing this, he operated inside the decision-making cycle of NATO and thus retained 

the strategic initiative. This approach exploits fissures in NATO and the EU. 

Putin’s adaptable approach encompasses two phases, comprised of eleven factors. 

The goal of Phase 1 is to shape an environment favorable to Russian strategic interests. 

Phase 2 exploits cleavages in the NATO Alliance created during Phase 1 and attempts to 

alter the strategic environment through an ambiguous/hybrid intervention. The following delineates this adaptive, multi-faceted “strategy of ambiguity”:

Phase I: Shaping a strategic environment favorable to Russian interests.

1. Consolidate political power and use nationalism to maintain domestic support. 

At the core of the strategy of ambiguity is the maintenance of Putin’s powerbase 

and his need for popular support. Putin secures his base by casting the West as 

the enemy of Russia and thus fuels the engine of nationalism. Staying in power is 

at the core of Putin’s “strategy of ambiguity.”

2. Modernize and leverage Russia’s nuclear arsenal to bully neighbors. The modernization of Russia’s already massive nuclear arsenal is a threat to regional stability. Yet, a greater concern is the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin threatening 

to use nuclear weapons against any European nation that challenges its national 

interests. Such was demonstrated when Moscow threatened Denmark with nuclear targeting should it join NATO’s missile defense shield. The use and threat 

of nuclear strikes is part of Russia’s emerging strategic/operational approach to 

bully and intimidate nations to submit to its desires. 

3. Modernization of Russian conventional land forces. The May Victory Parade in 

Moscow showcased Russia’s intent to replace its fleet of armored vehicles with 

modern systems. Although facing economic challenges, it seems that the Western 

Military District will benefit from this boost to conventional land force capability and capacity. When completed, this will alter the strategic dynamics of the 

continent. 
5

4. Apply economic incentives and blackmail to pressure neighboring countries’ 

economic well-being. Although this tactic has been applied against Ukraine, the 

dynamics of doing this against other European nations is a bit more complex. 

However, it is unlikely that Germany and other NATO members, who rely on 

Russian energy, are willing to have their economic well-being put at risk and 

therefore are not willing to take a hard stand against Russian expansionist activities in the east.

5. Capitalize on long-term IO campaign. The tools of the IO campaign include highquality Russian cable and television, radio programming, hockey clubs, youth 

camps, and the internet. These export Moscow’s strategic message across Europe, 

specifically targeting the Russian Diaspora. This brilliant campaign barrages the 

viewers/listeners with an unrelenting one-sided view of the world.

Phase II: “Invade” an Eastern European nation through a hybrid mix of irregular forces, 

augmented by Russian intelligence and Special Forces personnel and supported by a 

gradual introduction of conventional forces when the conditions are right.

6. Use subversive activity to create instability in ethnic Russian areas. With a 

continuous IO campaign brewing in the background, the groundwork is laid to 

manipulate disgruntled ethnic Russians where Putin chooses. As in Crimea and 

Eastern Ukraine, these movements start as peaceful protests, but ultimately lead 

to taking over government buildings and armed insurrections. Once engaged in 

low-level combat, the rebels proclaim their right to self-determination and eventually appeal to Moscow for aid. However convenient it is to have local support 

in an uprising, the Kremlin does not need popular support in the Russian Diaspora to achieve its strategic ends. Should the local populace not support an uprising, Moscow can simply export a separatist movement from Russia to provide the 

pretext for an intervention as in evidence in Eastern Ukraine.

7. Move a large conventional force along the borders to dissuade action against 

the subversives. As in Eastern Ukraine, Moscow responded to the instability by 

deploying a large conventional force along the border under the guise of aiding refugees and containing unrest. The real reason, however, was to intimidate 

Ukraine, which hesitated out of fear of provoking a response from Moscow. 

8. Leverage ambiguity to maintain strategic flexibility. Deception and disinformation are the key ingredients of this approach, and Putin uses these tools to sow 

ambiguity and thus obscure his strategy. As a result, the Kremlin remains a step 

ahead of NATO’s decision-making process and quickly adapts its actions to keep 

the Alliance off balance. 

9. Violate international borders and support pro-Russian insurgents. As the 

Ukrainian Army launched its offensive to subdue the rebels in Eastern Ukraine, 

the Russian Army was poised to provide support to their comrades. “Volunteer” 
6

soldiers provided armor, artillery, and air defense assets that blunted Ukrainian 

offensive action. Meanwhile, the Kremlin equivocated about its intentions and 

denied involvement in the conflict. Had there been a determined international 

response against Moscow, Putin could have withdrawn support from the separatists, denied complicity in the violence, and waited for a more opportune time 

to try again. 

10. Seize an area to achieve a limited strategic end. When the security of a targeted 

region collapses, and the international response is mired in debate, and a humanitarian crisis ensues, the conditions are set for Russian forces to intervene. 

The forces would arrive with aid, food, and provide security to the embattled 

people of the region. This intervention would be characterized as a temporary effort to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis Moscow created. By doing this, Russia 

can attain limited strategic objectives with minimal risk. The ultimate goal of this 

would be to discredit NATO by seizing a piece of a member state’s territory. 

11. Nuclear blackmail to blunt a coherent NATO response. As Russian forces move 

to bite off a piece of territory for “humanitarian reasons,” the Kremlin would 

threaten to use nuclear weapons against any nation acting against its interests. 

Should the West have a weak political class ruling NATO’s lead nations, the 

threat might just work and trigger a period of appeasement and surrender.

This two-phased, eleven-part plan demonstrates an adaptive strategic approach. Yet, 

despite the flexibility inherent in Putin’s two-phase and multi-faceted approach to impose his influence in the region, concerted action now can preserve European security. 

The only way to do this, however, is through decisive and comprehensive action. 

There are advantages that Russian strategic Landpower enjoys in the region. Foremost of these is geography. Although NATO expansion into Eastern Europe has deprived Moscow of buffer states, it has “interior lines of communication.”20 This is the 

ability to rapidly shift or move forces along its western frontier. This makes the so called 

unannounced “snap exercises” that Russia conducts close to NATO’s eastern borders a 

serious concern.

Another factor working in favor of Russian strategic Landpower is the traditional, 

and at times extended, presence it has had across broad areas of the region. For instance, 

Russian domination over Estonia began in 1704 with the defeat of the Swedish Army in 

Narva at the hands of Czar Peter the Great. Russia completed its occupation of Estonia 

by 1710.21 It would not be until 1917 that Estonia shook free from Russian occupation, 

but then had to contend with the German Army and, after World War I, the Red Army. 

Independence was finally secured in 1920; but this would end with another Soviet occupation (interrupted by a brief Nazi occupation) in 1940. During the Cold War, the 

region was a key location for the Soviet Armed Forces, with Russian troops remaining 

in the country until 1994. This extended and enduring presence of Russian troops and 

influence, spanning a greater portion of nearly 200 years in Estonia, is something that 
7

should not be so easily ignored. This is why Putin, in part, is so belligerent toward the 

Baltic integration into NATO and why Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (an attack on 

one NATO member is an attack on all) is integral to their security. 

However, the greatest advantage that Russian strategic Landpower retains is the 

application of a hybrid mix of forces to befuddle and confuse Western decision making. 

As the West prevaricates during a crisis, Russian troops move toward achieving their 

objective, which can be rapid, as in the case of Crimea, or slower and messier, as in the 

case of Eastern Ukraine. Yet, the appearance of Russian intelligence and Special Forces 

in Eastern Ukraine pretending to be a local independence movement would be laughable if it did not so brilliantly confuse and baffle Western politicians, who continue to 

lack unanimity and resolve on how to contend with this threat to European security. 

Yet, one should not be lulled into a false sense of security, even if NATO should 

figure out a way to deter or mitigate the hybrid application of Russian forces. In the 

background remains the real threat of its conventional attack, which is poised to support 

cross border hybrid operations. However, “supporting” a hybrid effort is just one course 

of action. Another outcome, often viewed unthinkable but not out of the realm of the 

impossible, is the hybrid war morphing into a conventional effort should the strategic 

environment prove opportune. This could even start off as a conventional fight if the 

United States becomes weak internationally. It may be just this that is in the back of Putin’s mind with his stunning announcement to modernize and expand Russia’s nuclear 

arsenal and armed forces.22 In just a few years, Moscow will have both a modernized 

conventional ground force and robust unconventional force, backed by a large nuclear 

arsenal.23

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D.

US Army War College
The Western Military District includes Kaliningrad, the Russian land mass wedged 

between NATO members Poland and Lithuania along the Baltic Sea. Looking at a map, 

Kaliningrad appears as a wedge partially thrust between Poland and Lithuania, and, 

therefore, between Central Europe and the Baltic region. Such geography makes the 

land bridge between Poland and Lithuania key terrain and something that must be jealously guarded, as any Russian move would include quickly blocking NATO land access 

to the Baltic region (air and sea access also, thanks to the Kaliningrad isthmus).24 This 

“unsinkable Russian aircraft carrier” is a boon for Russian strategic Landpower. Foremost, however, is the “forward” presence stationed there. 

The emerging hybrid cat and mouse application of its military force makes it complicated for the West to come up with a coherent response to any Moscow inspired 

aggression. Yet, behind this hybrid approach is a capable conventional force that enjoys 

interior lines of communication, the benefits of operating on familiar terrain, and the 

promise of being provided with modern equipment. 

Then there is Russia’s nuclear force. We can safely assume that any future Kremlin operation against Eastern Europe will be backed by a real threat of a nuclear strike 

against any nation acting contrary to Moscow’s interests. This is a consideration that 

completely changes the strategic calculus for NATO. Russian Landpower remains the 

centerpiece of any actions it takes in the future to expand its influence across the region. This is an increasingly capable and adaptive force, which has come a long way 

since its invasion of Georgia. The question remains: Should the United States and NATO 

respond when confronted by a sophisticated and adaptive foe?

8
9

11

CHAPTER 2: EUROPEAN SECURITY AND 

RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM

Russian Military Parade in Red Square, 2016. (Kremlin Photo)

13

EUROPEAN SECURITY, RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM, AND CYBERWAR

Researcher: Lieutenant Colonel Chris Briand, U.S. Army

The European security environment has changed dramatically. With Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, the invasion of Ukraine, and militarization of the High North, the 

question of collective security and the core purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are priority topics with the European allies. Russia’s destabilization 

of Ukraine has triggered detrimental effects both politically and economically in the 

region. Additionally, this has created fear among its neighbors that Russia will continue its “land grab” and take measures to weaken their independence and territorial 

sovereignty. As stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), “Russia’s violation of 

Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its belligerent stance toward 

other neighboring countries, endangers international norms that have largely been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War.”25

Russia’s aggressive behavior is a national security concern for the United States and 

works against its national interests to ensure a stable international order and prosperous 

economy. Former President Obama’s strategy states:

American diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future acts of inter-state aggression and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing 

costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms, and 

embedding U.S. actions within wider regional strategies.26

On the other side, The Russian National Security Strategy, released in December 2015, 

describes an existential security threat from NATO’s expansion and military buildup in 

Eastern Europe and the Baltics:

The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 

the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international 

law, the galvanization of the bloc countries’ military activity, the further expansion of the 

alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating 

a threat to national security.27

Additionally, the Russian National Security Strategy states that the European Union (EU) 

and the United States are a threat to its political goals, economic well-being, and national 

security by continuing:

State policy in the sphere of the safeguarding of national security and the socioeconomic 

development of the Russian Federation contributes to the implementation of the strategic 

national priorities and the effective protection of national interests. A solid basis has been created at this time for further increasing the Russian Federation’s economic, political, military, 

and spiritual potentials and for enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world.28
14

The U.S. and Russian national strategies are diametrically opposed in their desired end 

states, which puts the nations at odds. These opposing ends could lead to a clash should 

diplomatic or other missteps transpire.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of Eastern Ukraine is a political 

move rooted in Russia’s traditional view of its sphere of influence (what the Kremlin 

dubs as the “near abroad”). Moscow has long viewed this regional geographic area as 

part of their Eurasian empire.29 This is why a Wilsonian like Liberal Democracy threatens 

Putin’s vision of his managed democracy (authoritative capitalism). Putin cannot have 

a successful open democracy on his border. This would create the potential for other 

nations to gravitate toward an open democracy and might even encourage Russians to 

advocate for a similar system. Hence, politically, Kiev’s Western orientation and their 

attempt to align themselves with the EU creates, in the view of the Russian Government, 

a political instability to their vision of managed democracy in the former Soviet space.30

More ominous for the Baltic States is Putin’s statement that it is his duty to defend ethnic 

Russians wherever they live. 

Vladimir Putin in 2015. (Kremlin Photo)

Ukraine poses several strategic concerns for Russia, one being the reliance on 

Ukraine’s aerospace and defense industry. Russia’s biggest strategic concern would be 

if Ukraine joined NATO, which would challenge Russia as a Eurasian Power. There are 

long-term implications for the west centered on security, stability, arms control, and 

trade in relation to Russia. The EU is dependent on energy from Russia and exports 

agricultural products to it.31 In fact, during the crisis in Ukraine, the EU did not wish 

to impose a new set of sanctions on Russia until it was forced to do so after the MH-17 

civilian airline was shot down.32 Politically, as Putin is faced with more pushback and a 

downturn in the economy, he may face discontent. This is because his rule is hinged on 
15

providing economic growth and social stability for the Russian people. These are key to 

Putin’s legitimacy, which in turn can be undermined by the sanctions and the downturn 

in the oil price. Appealing to Russian patriotism against foreign (Western) threats is the 

tool he is using to survive the economic challenge to his regime. Based on his character 

and previous actions, he will continue to appeal to Russian nationalism and intensify 

military confrontation with Ukraine, if not the Baltic States, to secure his position as 

Russia’s leader.

Vladimir Putin did not consider the economic implications of his actions in Ukraine. 

Crimea, which had been a major source of tourism and farming under Ukraine, is now 

an economic strain on the Russian economy.33 “In April 2014, Ukraine shut off the spigot for the main irrigation canal, depriving the peninsula of water essential for many 

crops.”34 With Ukrainian banks closed, farmers can’t secure credit, can’t purchase seeds 

or fertilizer, and the tourist industry is down by 35%.35

These issues, coupled with the pressure of lower oil prices, are negatively impacting 

the Russian economy and the Ruble. In 2014, the Ruble lost half its value due to not only 

financial concerns, but also geopolitical concerns that Ukrainian separatists backed by 

Russia were planning a new offensive in Eastern Ukraine. Inflation is rising as the sanctions on food imports from the west aggravate the situation.36 These are also negatively 

impacting the EU internally. Many European countries are facing declining exports and 

industrial output because of the sanctions. As the Russian economy slows as a result 

of lower energy prices and sanctions, business and wealthy individuals have begun 

sending money overseas.37 In 2014, capital flight from Russia totaled $152 billion.38 A 

downturn in defense spending because of the economic situation is projected, and these 

economic hardships will add to the pressure on Putin at home and abroad.

Suggestions that the United States is pulling back in Europe—due to its “rebalancing” and focus on Asia—is causing unease in Europe, especially in light of the inability 

to formulate a common foreign policy, which is concerning to the United States and the 

Baltic nations.39 The United States maintains approximately 67,000 U.S. Armed Forces in 

Europe with many on a rotational basis in Poland and the Baltic nations. This was recently bolstered by the deployment of military equipment in Eastern Europe. Yet, NATO 

military members have significant capability gaps that they rely on the United States to 

address. These gaps in strategic air and sealift, as well as aerial refueling, intelligence 

surveillance, and reconnaissance require more U.S. resources. At the NATO Summit in 

2010, NATO partners adopted the latest strategic concept which consists of “three core 

tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security which addresses 

the concern of unconventional security threats and collective territorial defense.”40 This 

Article 5 commitment of collective defense has reaffirmed NATO’s primary purpose, 

which is the defense of its members. However, things are not as “simple” as they were 

when the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949 establishing the concept of collective 

security. The economic concerns compound an already tenuous strategic environment 

and could force Putin to act in a manner that could threaten European peace.
16
17

CHAPTER 3: THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE: 

RUSSIA’S WAR TO CONTROL 

THE SOUL OF EUROPE

Ukrainian Soldiers Advance to Secure a Perimeter. (U.S. Army Photo)

19

UKRAINE CRISIS: TESTING THE SECURITY AND STABILITY 

OF EUROPE AND BEYOND

Researcher: Lieutenant Colonel Eric Zimmerman, U.S. Army

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is a fundamental disregard of national sovereignty 

that threatens security and stability in Europe and U.S. national security interests. Russia’s actions not only violate basic and accepted international norms regarding state 

sovereignty, but they also violate numerous signed agreements to include the United 

Nations (UN) Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Founding Act, and the Budapest Memorandum.41 The crisis in Ukraine also 

threatens a foundational U.S. national security interest: “the security, confidence, and 

reliability of our allies,”42 most notably the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 

Furthermore, the crisis is testing the resolve of NATO and the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The end of this crisis will have lasting implications 

concerning stability in Europe and U.S. interests in the region. 

The Ukraine crisis provides an opportunity to demonstrate the post-Cold War relevancy of these organizations by exhibiting solidarity, cooperation, and resolve against 

a re-emergent regional threat. Conversely, should Russian actions in Ukraine continue 

to be met with inaction and indecision, the seeds may well be sewn for perpetual impotence or even eventual dissolution of both NATO and the OSCE. The Ukraine crisis 

entered its second year in March 2016. 

While much of the world’s attention has shifted, the crisis in Ukraine continues to 

smolder and even flare up on occasion. During 2016, Ukraine was the target of a significant and sophisticated cyberattack against its power grid.43 OSCE observer movement 

is being restricted in areas not controlled by the Ukraine Government44 and cease fire 

agreements have largely failed to take hold. Additionally, the Ukrainian military alleged 

that the “combined Russian-separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine continue to violate a 

ceasefire, including 28 occasions in [a] day.”45 The cease fire referenced here is commonly referred to as the “Minsk II” agreement, negotiated through multi-lateral talks 

involving Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine, and put in place after the first round 

of agreements completely collapsed in the face of immediate violations and continued 

escalation of hostilities.46

As a result of Russia’s unwillingness to fully support the implementation of the Minsk 

II peace deals, the European Union (EU) and U.S. sanctions were extended through the 

end of January 2017.47 The sanctions, targeted primarily at Russian banking, energy, and 

defense sectors,48 are having a modest direct effect, shaving “about 1.5 percent off Russian economic output in 2015.”49 While these sanctions are more than a symbolic gesture, 

they are not likely to have the desired effect of changing Russia’s actions and policies 

in respect to the Ukraine crisis.50 Given the inadequacy of narrow multi-lateral political 

pressure and economic sanctions, a stronger, broader, and more unified approach is 

required. Enter NATO and the OSCE.
20

NATO’s response to the crisis has been to reassure its allies in the Baltic, Central, 

and Eastern European countries. This includes the establishment of temporary bases, 

the deployment of additional forces and capabilities, an increase in NATO-sponsored 

military exercises, and direct military assistance (training and funding) to the Ukrainian 

Armed Forces (UAF).51 NATO action has been understandingly complicated and limited 

as Ukraine is not a NATO member. Despite this, some suggest that the perceived “ineffectiveness of the NATO response to Russian action in Ukraine might encourage aggressive Russian action elsewhere, including against the three Baltic states.”52

Despite these criticisms, one could argue that NATO is performing exactly as advertised. After achieving success in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, what is preventing 

Putin from widening his campaign to the Baltics? What is preventing him from seizing 

a narrow fifty-mile swath of Lithuanian and/or Polish sovereign soil to establish a land 

bridge that unites Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast to Russian-friendly Belarus? Clearly, there 

is a reason that Russia’s recently published national security strategy names NATO as 

a threat. Namely, that NATO is preventing Russia from bullying their way back into 

former Warsaw Pact states—states that are now members of the Alliance. This is not to 

say that there isn’t room for improvement. 

Additional NATO actions recommended by a study completed at the U.S. Army 

War College (USAWC), called Project 1704, includes: (1) the implementation of the September 2014 Wales Summit agreement to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task 

Force as both a deterrence and an effective fighting organization; and, (2) clearly stating 

that NATO member Article 5 declaration “will be triggered not only by a conventional 

attack, but also by an ambiguous threat to destabilize member governments, such as cyberattacks or civil disorder inspired by external actors.”53 These are both very important 

and effective measures that would continue to send a message of unity and resolve. 

OSCE response has been more active and hands-on than that of NATO. While this 

can be attributed to a wide variety of reasons, the most prominent is that not only do 

all 28 NATO members also belong to the OSCE, so do Russia and Ukraine. Additionally, while both NATO and the OSCE strive to maintain a secure and stable Europe, the 

OSCE strives to do so through means beyond military action:

The OSCE is a forum for political dialogue on a wide range of security issues and a platform 

for joint action to improve the lives of individuals and communities. Through its comprehensive approach to security that encompasses the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions and its inclusive membership, the OSCE helps bridge differences 

and build trust between states by co-operating on conflict prevention, crisis management, 

and post-conflict rehabilitation.54
21

Ukrainian Marines with a BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carrier at a Checkpoint in July 2015. (U.S. Army Photo)

This “whole of government” approach to regional affairs, coupled with both the resources and the necessary political backing of the nations that have direct interests in the 

Ukraine crisis,55 make the OSCE an invaluable part of any solution in Ukraine. 

OSCE response to the crisis has been multi-faceted. The most visible and publicized 

missions are the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the Observer Mission at the 

Russian Checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk, but the OSCE is doing considerably more. 

Additional efforts include facilitating high-level diplomatic and multilateral dialogue 

that includes Russian and Ukrainian political leaders, activities to strengthen Ukraine’s 

democratic institutions and practices (including election support and observers), and 

activities to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.56
22

But, like NATO, the OSCE is not without its critics. The OSCE has the usual criticisms of any large international organization—inefficiency, indecisiveness, and taking 

too long to respond. However, Russia asserts that it is biased toward Ukraine and that 

OSCE monitoring efforts were “aimed at helping and supporting one side of the conflict—the authorities in Kiev”57—and, from the “Ukrainian side,” that “up to 80 percent 

of the mission’s observers worked for Russian intelligence.”58 Despite these and other 

criticisms, OSCE efforts are helping keep the crisis from escalation and have created 

time and space to allow political discussions to proceed, albeit painstakingly slowly.59

Both NATO and OSCE are important in achieving U.S. national security interests, 

and are particularly relevant given the threat to these interests posed by Russia’s actions 

in Ukraine. It is also evident that NATO and the OSCE have a long-standing tradition of 

cooperation, having worked alongside one another in the Balkans and, more recently, in 

Afghanistan.60 As a member of both organizations, the United States should encourage 

NATO and OSCE leaders to find ways to deepen their cooperation in areas where their 

goals overlap. Ukraine is certainly one of those areas, and remarks by leaders from each 

organization reinforce this notion. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently 

thanked OSCE for “renewing dialogue and strengthening the OSCE’s instruments and 

discussion forums,”61 and he called for increased information sharing between the two 

in order to increase transparency on military activities in Europe.62 Newly appointed 

OSCE chairman, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, stated that solving 

the Ukrainian crisis was one of his top priorities. Given these statements against the 

backdrop of the Ukraine crisis, increased cooperation as a publicly stated common goal 

should be well within reach.

Russia’s actions in Ukraine threaten European security and stability, as well as directly and indirectly threaten U.S. national security interests in the region. While NATO 

and the OSCE are each conducting independent activities and missions in response to 

the Ukraine crisis, both Europe and the United States can benefit from deeper cooperation between the two. Fortunately, recent statements from leaders in both organizations 

indicate that they also share this belief. Strong support from the United States, a member 

of both organizations and a respected global leader, would advance this concept from 

a mutually held idea to a formally agreed upon and publicly announced common goal.
23

THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: ITS IMPLICATIONS ON ARMED 

FORCES DEVELOPMENT

Researcher: Colonel Volodymyr Postrybailo, Ukrainian Army

I would like to remind you that Alexander III, our emperor, once said that Russia has just 

two allies, the army and the navy.

 Vladimir Putin, April 2015

The Revolution of 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian history. For the first time 

since its independence, the country seized the opportunity to join European civilization and determine its own destiny on the basis of freedom and democracy. However, 

Ukraine’s aspirations were not acceptable to Russia because they contradicted its imperial ambitions and geopolitical objectives. As a result, Russia has utilized all instruments 

of national power in an endeavor to keep Ukraine under its sphere of influence. However, neither political, nor economic, nor informational pressure has achieved the Kremlin’s objective. As a last resort, having violated fundamental principles of international 

law and bilateral agreements, Russia occupied Crimea and launched military aggression 

in Eastern Ukraine.

In this frustrating strategic environment, Ukraine revised its approach to national 

security and defense. Starting at the strategic level down to operational and tactical, 

Ukraine developed a new National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine, in addition 

to reevaluating its operating doctrines. This resulted in a series of ambitious comprehensive reforms of its armed forces based on lessons from the annexation of Crimea and 

anti-terrorist operations in Eastern Ukraine. Many lessons have already been identified, 

but the main one is best expressed in a famous Latin quote: “Si vis pacem, para bellum,” 

or “If you want peace, prepare for war.”63 Despite concerns in the National Security 

Strategy of Ukraine that any permanent reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces capabilities was a threat to national security, nothing was done to improve Ukraine’s shrinking 

military capacity prior to the conflict.64

While Russia prepared for war, Ukraine did not. Between 2001 and 2014, Russia 

tripled its military expenditure; and in 2015, planned to increase its military procurement budget by 60%.65 Russia’s armed forces modernization, a key priority since 2011, 

is aimed at rearming 70% of troops with new equipment by 2020.66 In contrast, in 2012, 

Ukraine planned to downsize its armed forces almost 50% by 2017, from 193,000 to 

100,000.67 The average defense spending between 2006-2011 was about 1.0% of Gross 

Domestic Product (GDP), with a modest increase to 1.1% of GDP in 2012.68 Ukrainian 

military expenditures in 2014 increased by 65% compared to 2005, but the armed forces 

remained ill-equipped because the financial resources were spent on personnel rather 

than modernization and acquisition.69 In this poor condition, Ukraine faced the Russian 

invasion.
24

Furthermore, for the first time in history, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) is fighting a “hybrid war” on its territory. This is characterized by the insurgent’s disregard of 

humanitarian law, moral principles, human rights, and the needs of the civilian population. Additionally, there was massive use of artillery and multiple launch rocket systems 

(MLRS) by the insurgents, including targeting populated areas to discredit the UAF. 

There are cases where insurgents forcibly embroiled the local population in military 

actions, using them as human shields. They also use large-scale sabotage warfare, including mining, sniper, and radio-electronic and informational warfare. In addition to 

operations in Eastern Ukraine, terror was spread to the other regions of the country 

(Odessa, Kharkov, Mariupol, etc.). Quite often there was an absence of a continuous, 

clearly defined front line, with heavy fighting in urban areas. 

In response to these “hybrid challenges,” the reform of the UAF assumes, among 

other things: (1) improvement of C3 (command, control, and communication) structure, 

efficiency, and effectiveness; (2) creation of Joint Operational Staff (JOS), an analog of 

which (Joint Operational Command) was created in the recent past with U.S. support, 

but illogically dismissed during the Yanukovych presidency; (3) development of special 

operations forces (SOF); (4) strengthening the Army’s firepower; (5) enforcement of intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities; and, (6) enhancement of the logistic and 

medical support system.70

What is the military threat to Ukraine, and what is its adversary’s strength? During 

the summer of 2015, Russia developed a powerful ground force in Eastern Ukraine. 

This force consisted of two army corps totaling up to 35,000 troops and supported by 

a reserve component of 21 tactical battle groups of regular Russian troops with a total 

strength of over 9,000 personnel.71 In addition, along the Ukrainian eastern border, Russia mustered another 53 tactical battle groups numbering over 50,000 people.72

In such conditions, Ukraine needed to double its armed forces strength, which currently is about 250,000 personnel.73 Moreover, here is another lesson: the idea of a professional all-volunteer force alone does not work if a country is faced with such a strong 

adversary, extended front line, sizable area of operation (AO), and with a long-lasting 

conflict. There is a critical requirement for a highly qualified, trained, and motivated 

reserve component. During 2014-2015, the UAF managed to increase its combat strength 

and capabilities through six waves of partial mobilization. In total, 210,000 men were 

mobilized, every sixth being a volunteer.74 This approach provided a sufficient amount 

of troops in the AO, with up to three brigades simultaneously being deployed. Therefore, 

Ukraine will keep a mixed manning system of military professionals and conscripts.

Analyzing the conflict from the domains perspective, it can be concluded that they 

are being mostly conducted in land and cyber. Due to the adversary’s substantial air-defense capabilities and remarkable Ukrainian Air Force and Army aviation combat losses, 

the airspace is being used for medevac and transportation purposes only. At the same 

time, the conflict revealed the importance of UAVs. Prior to the conflict, the UAF did not 

have this technology. This gave the adversary a great advantage in this sphere. This is 
25

another lesson, which is reflected in a number of the UAF conceptual documents. Due 

to the annexation of Crimea, the UAF lost the majority of their naval assets and capabilities. A new Maritime Doctrine was developed to ensure the revival of the Ukrainian 

Navy. The UAF does not have any space capabilities, but the space domain is definitely 

being used by Russia for intelligence and communication purposes.

To improve C3 structure, efficiency, and effectiveness, the UAF created four Operational Commands (North, South, East, and West) and the JOS. At the beginning of the 

conflict there was a shortage of digitally encrypted communication systems. C2 at all 

levels was mainly accomplished through analog Soviet-origin communication systems 

and often even via commercial cell phones. Not surprisingly, such communications 

were frequently eavesdropped upon by adversaries, which resulted in the breach of one 

of the fundamental principles of C2—concealment. This was another lesson learned. 

Therefore, communication is conducted via encrypted digital systems. The use of cell 

phones is restricted or prohibited.
26

Early stages of the conflict revealed critical weaknesses of the UAF sustainment capabilities. After 3 to 4 months of intensive combat engagement, the UAF did not have 

enough weapons and equipment to recover losses and activate reserve units. The existing battle dress uniform was of low functionality and poor quality. There was a lack of 

modern helmets and a limited amount of bulletproof jackets. Provision of food resources 

was inefficient. However, due to unprecedented support by civilian volunteers from 

all over the country, numerous NGOs, and enormous efforts made by the state defense 

industrial complex in close cooperation with the UAF, it became possible to improve the 

UAF logistic and medical support. As an example, in 2014 alone, about 20,000 weapon 

systems were repaired, restored to a state of combat readiness, and provided to the 

UAF.75 Many weapon systems and military equipment are being manufactured, modernized, and supplied to the UAF, including the main battle tank “Bulat,” BTR-3 and 

BTR-4 armored personnel carriers, the “Stugna-P” anti-tank missile system, and small 

armored gunboats, etc.76

Highly mobile airborne troops have proved to be the most mission capable combat 

arm of the UAF Army. However, the early combat engagements revealed a shortage of 

their firepower. Taking into account this lesson, airmobile brigades were transformed 

into air assault brigades. A typical airmobile brigade is now reinforced by a tank company, self-propelled howitzer battalion, missile artillery battalion, and air defense artillery battalion.

At the beginning of the conflict the adversary had superiority over the UAF in cyber 

and informational warfare. Pro-Russian separatists supported by Russian armed forces 

made many efforts to demoralize not only Ukrainian soldiers and officers but also their 

family members. Massive mail outs of text messages to cell phones and e-mail inboxes 

of the UAF military personnel and their dependents is just one example of such informational influence. Therefore, the importance of strengthening the psychological fortitude of military personnel became another vital lesson learned. As a result, battle mind 

training is now fully integrated into the combat training system. There is, however, a 

great potential to capitalize on the UAF’s unique advantages. We defend our motherland against separatists and external aggressors; we are supported by the vast majority 

of the Ukrainian population as well as the international community; and, UAF morale 

and patriotism are very high.

Another important issue realized during the conflict was the necessity of establishing productive cooperation with governmental organizations, NGOs, volunteers in the 

capital and all over Ukraine as well as with local authorities in the AO, and building 

friendly trust-based relations with the local population in the AO. As a result, the UAF 

developed an effective and efficient system of civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), 

which did not exist at all prior to the conflict. It spans from strategic (General Staff) 

down to operational and tactical levels. This not only harmonized all joint civil-mil activities and remarkably improved support of Ukrainian troops by the local population, 

but also increased situational awareness and quite often allowed for the receipt of valuable intelligence information.
27

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership is a long-term aspiration 

for Ukraine. Kiev wants complete “interoperability between the UAF and the Armed 

Forces of NATO countries by 2020.”77 In this context, there is an ambitious plan to transit 

the entire Ukrainian military to NATO standards by 2020.78 Not surprisingly, the fundamentally new SOFs being created in Ukraine are in full accordance with NATO standards, approaches, and best practices. The best proof of the benefits of NATO-Ukraine 

military cooperation, and another lesson, is provided by those UAF units that participated in NATO-led exercises, initiatives, and programs such as Planning and Reviewing 

Process and Operational Capability Concept. These units, including the 95th airmobile 

brigade and 30th mechanized brigade, proved to be the most organized and capable of 

executing their missions and suffered fewer casualties compared to other military units 

and formations. This positive experience at the tactical level has to be shared, promoted, 

and brought to the operational and strategic levels.

Ukraine has a powerful defense industrial complex: this is another unique advantage 

the state has to capitalize on to strengthen the UAF. According to the Stockholm Peace 

Research Institute, Ukraine was among the ten largest exporters of major weapons in 

2010–2014.79 Doubtless, this industry requires foreign investments and modernization. 

The task for Ukraine’s strategic leaders, including military ones, is to make this attractive and mutually beneficial for Ukraine and NATO. The signing of the “Roadmap of 

Military-Technical Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO” on December 18, 2015, is 

the first promising step on this path.80

Military cooperation with NATO has great undiscovered potential and is the way 

ahead to further develop the UAF. The conflict has already revealed many gaps in 

Ukrainian doctrines and concepts, mistakes made during planning and execution of 

combat missions, and shortages in a number of joint functions that could have been 

avoided and overcome if the UAF had utilized the best practices and experience of the 

NATO countries’ Armies prior to the conflict. Nevertheless, because of its battlefield experience, high readiness, and enhanced operational capabilities, Ukraine’s Army is now 

one of the five strongest in Europe.81 It is willing to share this experience with NATO 

countries, cooperation which would doubtlessly be mutually beneficial. Hopefully, the 

new National Security Strategy expenditure on security and defense totaling 5% of the 

country’s GDP will drive continued progress of the UAF’s development.82

In April 2015, Russian president Vladimir Putin stated, “I would like to remind you 

that Alexander III, our emperor, once said that Russia has just two allies, the army and 

the navy.”83 This is unequivocal evidence that the military is the topmost instrument of 

national power Russia relies upon. Therefore, despite a number of institutional regional 

and global security systems, any country’s neglect of defense capabilities in the contemporary world is unacceptable.

29

CHAPTER 4: RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC NATIONS

Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė (center) watches a battle demonstration with Lithuanian Chief of Defense 

Major General Jonas Vytautas Žukas (right) and Lithuanian Land Forces commander, Major General Almantas 

Leika, during the final day of Saber Strike 2015 at the Great Lithuanian Hetman Jonusas Radvila Training Regiment, 

June 18, 2015. (U.S. Army Photo)

31

PUTIN’S / RUSSIA’S OBJECTIVES IN THE BALTICS

Researcher: Lieutenant Colonel Algimantas Misiunas, Lithuanian Army

There are three distinctive strands of Russian revanchist policy. One is directed toward Western countries, one toward the former Soviet republics that were not able to 

end Russian influence, and one is aimed toward the former Soviet republics that managed to break away from Russia and are steadily headed to the West. The Kremlin views 

the latter two categories as the “near abroad”84 and employs all instruments of national 

power to communicate this to the West.

The wars in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate that President Putin follows this policy, and also demonstrates that Europe has been waiting for his next step in pursuing 

this. After the Russo-Georgian war and the annexation of Crimea, Western observers 

and policymakers have expressed worries that Moscow’s next step will be the Baltic 

States. Furthermore, Russia is likely to employ a hybrid war strategy because the United 

States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have no effective strategy to 

counter it. On the other hand, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 

clearly announced that if Russia intervenes in the Baltics it will be crossing a red line, 

and NATO will respond.85 Determining whether it is worth it to Russia to attack the 

Baltic States, and what Putin’s real intentions are, is difficult to discern. 

Since the Russo-Chechen wars, one of the goals for President Vladimir Putin has 

been the restoration of Russia’s former status as a global power with unlimited access to 

the oceans. In the late 1990s, the Warsaw Pact countries and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR) had disintegrated into independent countries, each with divergent national strategic interests and objectives. In fact, overnight Russia had been thrown back 

to its 17th-century borders, with limited access to the Black86 and the Baltic Seas. The 

collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the balance of power in the world. Therefore, 

it can be stated that Russia needs to control the Baltic nations for the following four reasons: (1) to build a land bridge with Kaliningrad,87 (2) to ensure full access and control of 

the Baltic Sea; (3) to restore the former Russian Empire’s and Soviet Union’s boundaries 

in the western direction; and, most importantly, (4) to restore Russian influence in Europe by facilitating the collapse of NATO.

Swedish defense researcher Alpo Juntunen noted that “geography makes [Russia] a 

continental nation, however for centuries Russia has striven to become a sea power.”88

The Naval bases in Kaliningrad and Crimea have provided Russia with the ability to 

project power in and around the Black and Baltic seas, while also providing the Russian 

Navy with access to the oceans. However, those bases, from the military perspective, 

can also be easily cut off from the mainland’s support. Russian military strategists view 

this as a critical vulnerability. Therefore, ensuring control of the Black Sea remains a top 

priority for Putin and was a driving factor guiding Russia’s strategy in its incursions into 

the territories of Ukraine when pro-Russian Ukrainian President, Victor Yanukovych, 
32

was ousted from power. The strategic importance of Kaliningrad is almost the same, and 

there is no doubt that Moscow has prepared plans to reestablish lost access to the Baltic 

Sea and consequently to build a land bridge with Kaliningrad. 

Russian revanchist political ideologists argue that Russia has to evoke its imperial 

ambitions and undermine American influence.89 The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and 

the ongoing Ukrainian conflict are messages from Moscow that Russia will preserve its 

vital space and influence in the “near abroad.” Moreover, the annexation of Crimea and 

the separation of Eastern Ukraine was promoted as a “reunification of Russian lands 

and Russian souls, mirroring the process of German re-unification in 1990 . . . [and] can 

be seen as revenge for the humiliation of Russia in the early 2000s.”90 Therefore, many 

Western observers have argued that Moscow’s next step will be “ensuring security” of 

the Russian minorities in the Baltic States, in other words, regaining control over the 

Baltics. 

The most important reason would be the collapse of NATO. The Russian National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine describe NATO as a threat, and that the dissolution 

of NATO would be a great political-strategic victory for Putin. Given the complexity of 

the NATO decision making process and the versatility of the interests of the members 

of NATO, there is a strong possibility that NATO would fail to respond to possible Russian aggression against the Baltic States. There is no doubt that NATO would collapse 

if it failed to respond to armed aggression against one of its members. Therefore, from 

Moscow’s perspective, a limited scale intervention or other disguised operation in the 

Baltics might be worth the risk to test the unity of NATO.

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment on a road march across the Baltic region. (U.S. Army Photo)
33

The Russian National Security Strategy lists a range of threats, which assert that the 

United States and its allies are seeking to contain Russia to maintain dominance in world 

affairs, which challenges Russia’s foreign policy.91 The document asserts that an entire 

spectrum of political, financial, economic, and informational instruments could be applied to gain influence in the international arena, and that Russia will only use force 

when other options to protect its national interests fail.92 Furthermore, Russia’s 2014 military doctrine considers the expansion of NATO military infrastructure toward Russia’s 

border as a military danger. Large-scale military exercises in Russia’s neighborhood, 

which NATO and the United States conduct to deter Russia, are described as threats.93

An important nuance in the doctrine is that Russia perceives a need to defend what it 

sees as its vital sphere of interests. According to Polina Sinovets and Bettina Renz, two 

associate professors who studied Russia’s 2014 military doctrine, Russia does not outline the perimeter of its sphere of vital interests and does not explicitly name the states 

in the sphere. A likely explanation for this is the wish to create some strategic ambiguity 

for potential opponents, including NATO.94

Moscow’s strategy against the Baltic countries is clearly defined in the so-called 

“Gerasimov doctrine.”95 According to Gerasimov, Russia may at first employ non-military measures against potential adversaries, such as political and diplomatic pressure, 

information campaigns, economic sanctions, and show of force. Non-military measures 

would be applied in order to disrupt the opponent’s political decision-making processes 

and to weaken the unity of military and political alliances.96 Military measures such as 

unconventional and covert actions could be initiated in the opponent’s territory before 

the beginning of military conflict. Moreover, local protests and the opposition would 

actively be exploited during the crisis. When the crisis escalates into an open military 

conflict, it is planned to launch unexpected and rapid operations in the territory of the 

adversary, to destroy its critical civil and military infrastructure with the aim to break 

the political or social will to resist. In addition, simultaneous information operations and 

cyberattacks would be applied extensively.97 The figure below depicts Gerasimov’s view 

of present day conflicts.
34

Gerasimov’s view of the present day conflicts.98

Furthermore, recent Russian military operations in Georgia and Ukraine reveal that 

Russia relies on landpower to achieve its military objectives, relies on decentralized special operations forces (SOF) to conduct irregular warfare, and incorporates extensive 

information operations that link strategic messaging to operations on the ground.99

Since Russian Tsarist times, Russia’s expansionist policy has been based on the principle “divide and rule.” Today’s political and military analysts call such a policy “Hybrid 

strategy or Strategy of Ambiguity.”100 However, Russia’s “ends and ways” have never 

changed, only the means have varied. Russia’s “end-state” has always been maintaining 

the role of a superpower in Eurasia. The ways have focused on using all the instruments 

of national power to intimidate and by using the strategy of ambiguity to disrupt the 

opponent’s political decision-making processes; and, if this does not work, to change 

the opponent’s policy toward Russia, to launch a massive and rapid land attack into the 

opponent’s territory. Later, depending on how internal and external audiences react to 

this action, Russia will either maintain counterinsurgency warfare or will enjoy a quick 

and incredible victory.
35

CONCLUSION

In Putin’s and his supporters’ view, NATO enlargement and the membership of the 

Baltic States in this organization has been the main geo-strategic failure of former Russian Governments. First of all, it is because the separation of the three Baltic States had 

left Russia with limited access to the Baltic Sea. Secondly, Russia again lost territories, 

which former Tsarist Russian and Soviet leaders had occupied in the 19th and 20th centuries. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of NATO has changed the 

balance of power and has damaged Russian imperial ambitions. Therefore, Putin’s main 

objectives are to ensure permanent control in the Baltic Sea region, and if the situation 

permits, reestablish former power and influence over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Analysis of the Russian wars against Georgia and Ukraine, the published Russian 

strategies, and “Gerasimov’s” doctrine indicates that a Russian occupation of the Baltic States would be executed by employing a combination of non-military and military 

measures. Any military or non-military actions will be supported by the employment of 

all the instruments of national power along with simultaneous information operations 

and cyberattacks. Furthermore, the Kremlin will use ambiguity, deception, and disinformation to prevent a quick response from the Western Community. And, due to the fact 

that Baltic countries have very small defense forces, the Russian campaign could turn 

quickly into another frozen conflict, which allows Putin to achieve his main objectives.

37

LATVIA IN THE CROSSHAIRS: RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE AND 

COUNTERMEASURES

Researcher: Lieutenant Colonel Corey Collier, U.S. Marine Corps

The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence among the republics 

ushered in an era that many believed spelled the end of tensions between Russia and 

the West.101 Unfortunately, this ship of dreams shattered on the rocky shoals of reality. 

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia experienced a new tide of nationalistic 

fervor, casting its old nemesis, the United States, as the raison d’être for nationalistic security concerns and citing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a prominent 

example of U.S. encroachment.102 Over the last decade, Russia has increasingly tested 

the resolve of Europe and the West, inciting and then intervening in manufactured crises in Georgia and Ukraine.103 The Baltic States, particularly Latvia, could be the next 

target of Russian enlargement, a move that represents a direct threat to NATO.104 Latvia’s strategic geographic position, large ethnic Russian population, small professional 

military, and distance from major NATO countries like Germany and France present 

unique challenges to the state. However, it is possible for Latvia to survive this storm 

by understanding how Russia uses information warfare in combination with economic 

pressure and energy dependence to create tension. Likewise, it is important to recognize 

how Russia could change its approach to undermine Latvian independence due to Latvia’s NATO membership. Finally, by implementing a few specific strategic initiatives, 

Latvia can counter these destabilizing forces and strengthen its position with regard to 

its Russian neighbor to the East. 

A study of the events leading up to the 2014 Russian incursion into Ukraine provides insight into Russian strategy and understanding of what can happen without an 

effective counterplan. After the Ukrainian president took steps that would distance the 

country from the West and realign it with Russia, popular unrest broke out, leading 

to the ouster of Ukrainian President Yanukovich.105 Using disinformation as part of a 

hybrid warfare strategy to destabilize Ukraine, Russia manufactured unrest further by 

sending plainclothes soldiers, later referred to as “little green men,” across the border 

into Ukraine to seize key locations and act as instigators among the local ethnic Russian 

population.106 After annexing Crimea and as tensions rose, Russia used the unrest as a 

pretext to invade, claiming an obligation to protect ethnic Russians.107 Russia continues 

to provide thinly veiled support to separatists in the Eastern region of the country in a 

struggle that has no clear end in sight.108

In a controversial 2014 study of Russian strategy, authors Michael Weiss and Peter 

Pomerantsev describe how Russia has redefined the use of information as a key component of its hybrid warfare strategy.109 According to the authors, Russia long ago abandoned the Cold War method of releasing information to counter the message of the West. 

Russia now exploits the freedom of speech its former republics enjoy to implement an 

intricate blend of disinformation using television, social media, and nongovernmental 
38

organizations.110 Using every medium available, Russia creates confusion, sows discord 

between ethnic Russians and other ethnicities, undermines political initiatives, and infuses doubt about the intentions of state governments while extolling Russian pride.111

Russia used these techniques leading up to the 2014 incursion into Ukraine, and many of 

them are evident in Russia’s strategy with other states today.112 A look at recent history 

in the region bears witness to this reality, from the 2007 riots and cyberattacks in Estonia to the recent but limited internet campaign calling for independence in the Eastern 

Latvian region of Latgale.113

Although the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are European Union (EU) 

and NATO members, there is growing concern they are the newest targets for Russian 

expansionism.114 Due to its geographic location, Latvia represents an especially lucrative 

objective. Reestablishment of Russian dominance in Latvia would isolate Estonia and 

bring Kaliningrad closer to the Russian mainland. Once achieved, Estonia and Lithuania, virtually surrounded by Russia’s influence, would have little choice but to reconsider NATO membership and economic alignment with the EU. Although Lithuania’s 

position would be tenuous, the country’s shared border with Poland would provide 

contiguous connectivity with other NATO nations. Estonia would become a veritable 

fortress, and economic benefits the country may enjoy otherwise would be consumed 

with military expenditures to defend the state.

Latvia’s social makeup provides fertile soil for Russian information operations.115

Caught between imperial powers, the Baltic States spent most of the last century consumed by competing world powers.116 Accordingly, Latvians tend to view each other as 

either pro-Russian (with the communist baggage that comes with it) or as pro-Western 

(which to ethnic Russians means either sympathetic to Nazism or NATO aggression).117

Latvia has a small population of only two million people, but one-third of that population identify themselves as ethnic Russian. Ethnic division carries with it social division, 

creating enclaves of predominantly ethnic Russian people.118

After independence, Latvia took measures to establish their national identity that 

added to these ethnic tensions. To gain citizenship in Latvia, ethnic Russians must pass 

an exam that tests their knowledge of Latvian history and their proficiency in the Latvian language.119 Many ethnic Russians have neither the desire nor the skills to pass the 

exam. Compounding the matter, the Latvian Government rebuffed efforts in 2012 to 

establish Russian as the country’s second language and removed the Russian language 

from the classroom throughout the education system, further dividing the population.120

Latvian efforts designed to distinguish the country and its people as unique from Russia 

resulted in a large disaffected ethnic Russian population without citizenship, the ability 

to vote, hold public office, or even apply for a passport. Many ethnic Russians in Latvia 

view these initiatives as discriminatory.121

Russian news media, easily accessed via the internet and satellite television, pounced. 

Seeking to exploit the opportunity and reinforce the idea that Russia is the only state 

that cares for the concerns of Russians at home or abroad, the Russian news message 
39

resonates well with many of the Russian diaspora in the region. Throughout these communities, Russian news stations portray state policies as an attempt to diminish Russian 

ethnicity while portraying Russian policy, and specifically Russian leaders like Putin, as 

protectors of Russian citizens and their rights.122

Bolstering this message, Russia offers counterproposals. Ethnic Russians – even 

third-generation Latvian-born ethnic Russians – can acquire Russian citizenship, Russian passports, and retire on a Russian pension years earlier than Latvian citizens.123 The 

effects of these efforts are tangible, as demonstrated by the opinion polls of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States. The preponderance of ethnic Russians view Moscow’s actions 

in Ukraine as acceptable to protect Russian citizens; and view sanctions by the West 

against Russia for actions in Ukraine to be unacceptable.124 The rise of social activist 

groups and nongovernmental organizations promoting Russian views provides another 

venue for Russian information to flow. Fueled by Russian money and acting as spokespersons for Russian initiatives in the Baltics, groups, like the Fund for the Support and 

Defense of Compatriots Abroad, act as proponents of Russian policy and provide a voice 

to ethnic Russians throughout the Eastern European area.125 Exploiting the free society 

in Latvia, these organizations, many of which are Kremlin-funded, take advantage of 

the hard-won freedoms of fledgling democracies to undermine unity and exacerbate 

differences among ethnic groups.126

Information is not, however, a unilateral approach in Russia’s strategy, but is used 

in conjunction with other instruments of power. After the world reacted to Russian aggression in Ukraine with sanctions on Russian oil, Moscow reacted by emplacing an 

embargo on foodstuffs imported from the EU, an action that put a strain on the economies of the Baltic States and their political leadership.127 Another issue the Baltic States 

recognized as key to future security after Russian actions in Ukraine is increased independence from Russia in the energy exchange market.128 Thus far, their efforts have 

produced limited success.

In all of these efforts, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia recognize the need to bolster 

their ability to provide for their collective security. Although the Baltic States share a 

common concern of Russian incursion and violation of sovereignty, cooperation has 

been slow in developing.129 As if the destabilizing actions of Russia were not enough, the 

Baltic States are also concerned with the validity of NATO promises to respond if threatened.130 Even if Georgia and Ukraine were NATO members, the strategy of instigation 

and misinformation used by Russia to intercede never rose to the level that would have 

triggered a NATO collective defense response until it was too late. Under the distracted 

eye of the world, Russia pulled the levers of national power to manipulate events until 

intervention seemed to carry too much risk for the West. Although Latvia recognizes 

the need to provide better security, economic strain hinders the state’s ability to enact 

change. Latvia’s 2015 defense budget measured a paltry 1% of Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP)—it since has increased to 1.7% with the 2% threshold being achieved in 2018.131

Likewise, with conscripted service no longer required, the number of active and reserve 

soldiers in the Latvian military rests at just over 13,000 soldiers in all.132
40

Although the Russian model of incursion previously used would have to be modified given Latvian NATO membership, a different avenue for Russian influence in Latvia exists—one that Latvia’s own constitution allows. With political party divisions and 

strong ethnic Russian unity, the possibility exists for Russia to use its information instruments to influence election results and empower pro-Russian leadership in the highest 

political offices.133 With divided Latvian political parties unable to counter this threat 

by forming effective coalitions, a pro-Russian Party could form the government and be 

able to turn Latvian politics away from NATO and the EU. Unrest in the same vein as 

what occurred in Ukraine could result, opening the door for Russia, poised at Latvia’s 

doorstep and proclaiming its obligation to protect ethnic Russians, to become involved 

and leaving the United States and NATO to decide if intervention and possible escalation is worth the cost. 

Nevertheless, there is still time to create an effective response to this threat, but serious steps must be taken soon. First, Latvia must find a way to close the gap of ethnic 

division in the country. Regardless of the country’s dark history over the last century, 

ethnic Russians will only feel animosity and disassociation with the country until they 

are embraced as part of the social makeup of a united Latvia. There is danger in making this move too quickly, because ethnic Russians gaining citizenship also immediately transition to voting constituents and could empower pro-Russian political parties. 

However, this move immediately counters the pro-Russian information campaign and 

undermines the message that only Russia is the protector of this large ethnic group.134

Second, permanent NATO forces should be stationed in the Baltic region.135 This move 

would strengthen the legitimacy of NATO in the region and provide an immediate 

counter-response to tensions and potential Russian incursions of “little green men.”136

This move would immediately overcome the tyranny of distance in NATO’s ability to 

respond to a threat in the region.

A third course of action must include a dedicated increase in the defense forces of 

each Baltic State, and a serious effort to develop and exercise a unified defense plan 

that combines their forces as one in times of need.137 This move would require regional 

cooperation and serious consideration for reinstituting compulsory service in order to 

provide an immediate improvement to the collective defense of the region. A fourth 

course of action includes an effective counter to Russian disinformation.138 This effort 

must extend beyond the Baltic region to all of NATO and the EU in order to present a 

unified information campaign that presents a unified message of resolve and collective 

security while removing the ambiguity and divisiveness of the Russian message. The 

establishment of the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence is a good 

first step, but more must be done to unify the message and the effort.139 To be effective, 

Baltic States like Latvia must ensure this message is presented in Latvia in the Russian 

language to the ethnic Russian population to counter Russian propaganda and create 

a national identity that conveys understanding while building unity. A final course of 

action must include progress in energy independence throughout the Baltics. A plan 

for continued development must include more energy sharing with EU partners while 
41

further integrating the Baltic economies with Western Europe and Scandinavia to remove threats to energy resources as a way for Russia to intimidate Latvia and the Baltic 

States.140
42
43

BALTIC BASTION!?

Researcher: Lieutenant Colonel Vahur Karus, Estonian Defence Forces

Following Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) rushed to secure and reassure its vulnerable Eastern flank and, 

more specifically, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Since then, these 

three states have been the focus of debates in NATO, the European Union (EU), and in 

the United States concerning how to defend the Baltics against Russian aggression. Most 

of the discussion has centered on what NATO, the EU, and the United States will do to 

protect their interests in the Baltics. However, there are specific steps these countries 

can take to better prepare for potential future Russian aggression. To recognize the way 

ahead, it is important to understand the current composition of the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as the planned development of those three armed 

forces. Second, given Russian tactics in the region, correctly analyzing what capabilities 

these countries need to effectively counter conventional Russian forces is critically important. Finally, some recommendations are provided for the future forces of the Baltic 

States.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each have small populations and limited land area, 

restricting their freedom of choice in every aspect of statehood. With 1.2, 2.0, and 2.9 million inhabitants respectively, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are together smaller than all 

of the other neighboring states.141 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are members of NATO 

and the EU and greatly emphasize bilateral relations with the United States.142 Consequently, these factors have impacted how these countries organize their armed forces. 

All three countries’ armed forces heavily emphasize land forces (while naval and air 

forces have only niche capabilities); and they heavily rely on NATO to cover the essential gaps in each countries’ military limitations.143

The land forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are built around the Infantry Brigade concept as their primary maneuver force supported by a volunteer defense organization, which provides a territorial defense component. However, all three countries 

have different principles of manning, equipping, and organizing their brigades. Estonia 

relies heavily on the reserve army concept with mandatory military service as the primary system for producing wartime units for the brigades.144 Estonian brigades are combined arms formations with all-around capability for independent operations. Estonia 

has two infantry brigades—one mechanized (wheeled armored personnel carriers) and 

one light infantry brigade—and territorial defense units provided by the volunteer Defense League.145 The Estonian Navy specializes in counter-mine operations, consisting of 

three mine countermeasure (MCM) vessels and auxiliary ships.146 The Air Force consists 

of Ämari Air Base and Air Surveillance Wing, and contributes to the NATO Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense System (NATINAMDS) with robust early warning and air defense mission command and control, and facilitates the NATO Air Policing Mission.147
44

The future development for Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) shows no changes to the 

existing organization, but concentrates on equipping units with state of the art equipment (CV-9035NL Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and self-propelled artillery systems) and creating a larger high readiness reserve.148 Even though 

Estonia invests 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense, this level of investment does not allow for the further expansion of the EDF.149

The Latvian military is built around one infantry brigade, consisting of two maneuver battalions and a combat support battalion manned by an all professional force and 

supported by volunteer Zemessardze (equivalent to U.S. National Guard) divided into 

three territorial regions consisting of one light infantry battalion each.150 Recently, the 

Latvian Brigade’s capability was greatly enhanced with the procurement of Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked)—or CVR(T)—light armored vehicles from the United 

Kingdom (UK); previously, Latvia only had light infantry units.151 Latvian Naval and 

Air Forces only possess niche capabilities like their Estonian counterparts, with similar 

tasks.

Budget cuts during the recent economic recession impacted the Latvian Armed 

Forces. However, this dynamic changed following the Russian occupation of Crimea. 

The Latvian Government has announced that the defense budget will reach 2% of GDP 

by 2018, an indication that Latvia is heading in the right direction.152 However, as with 

Estonia, Latvia’s GDP is too small to provide for the purchase of new capabilities or to 

expand their force structure. Likewise, the high personnel costs attached to a having a 

standing professional army will likely eat up Latvia’s defense spending, leaving little for 

operations and maintenance (O&M) or the procurement of new capabilities.153

An Estonian and American Soldier at the Tapa, Estonian Training Area. (U.S. Army Photo)
45

Lithuania abandoned conscription in 2008, but reestablished this practice in 2015 to 

create reserves and manning for its second infantry brigade. Currently, Lithuanian land 

forces consist of an “Iron Wolf” mechanized brigade manned with professional soldiers 

and equipped with M113 armored personnel carriers. The development of a second infantry brigade is on the way, and, when ready, will primarily be a reserve formation 

with a professional cadre.154 For territorial defense, Lithuania, like Estonia and Latvia, 

relies on its volunteer defense organization (in Lithuanian, Krašto apsaugos savanorių 

pajėgos [KASP]) of roughly six light infantry battalions.155 The Lithuanian Navy and Air 

Force are very similar to its northern neighbors, and they possess niche capabilities like 

MCM vessels and air surveillance, with the exception that the Lithuanian Air Force has 

more rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft than either Latvia or Estonia.156

According to guidance from its Minister of National Defense, Lithuania will reach 

the 2% of GDP defense budget by the year 2020, and will purchase infantry fighting 

vehicles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, weapons for fire support, and protective 

equipment.157 This program is already under way, with Lithuania’s recent purchase of a 

new self-propelled artillery system from Germany in 2015.158

Despite achieving a defense budget of 2% GDP, Lithuanian defenses will be plagued 

with the same problems as the Latvian Armed Forces, due to reliance on professional 

soldiers, which cuts into the investment needed for new equipment and O&M. In both 

Latvia and Lithuania, and to a smaller degree in Estonia, the problem stems from the 

need to recruit well educated personnel for defense and pay salaries which are competitive with the rest of the society, while also securing enough available resources for the 

development of new capabilities, and maintaining the existing ones. Another result of 

these small military budgets is the inability to purchase the necessary all-around capabilities for initial self-defense such as air defense, electronic warfare, and an integrated 

fire support system. 

The Baltic countries primarily rely on their ground forces for their defense. This is 

partly due to the fact that air forces and navies, with all their technical capabilities, are 

too expensive for small states to maintain; and partly due to the historical legacy of 

starting the build-up of armed forces from scratch. The economic recession at the end of 

the last decade drove most countries toward a reduction of their defense budgets, many 

by at least one-third. This fact, combined with pressure from NATO for deployable 

units, led Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania toward the development of a military primarily centered on a light infantry capability.159 Despite this, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 

pushed for the development of mechanized forces, and each state has, or soon will have, 

a mobile brigade with some level of protection. The acquisition of Javelin anti-tank missiles in 2015 improved the short-range defensive capabilities against Russia’s mechanized forces. Likewise, all three countries have a very short range air defense systems 

(VSHORAD) capability, some form of fire support system, and their maneuvers are supported by combat engineers.160 However, the land forces are missing a multilayered 

air-defense, self-propelled fire support capability, and the means to deploy scatterable 

minefields with fire support means. In addition, there are no coastal defense systems to 

protect the vulnerable coastline of these states.
46

Although the Russian Federation is not signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, all of the 

Baltic countries are, which restricts the use of certain artillery ammunition and mines.161

Given the combination of the tactical effectiveness of landmines in canalizing and delaying an adversary’s movements combined with its cost-effectiveness, all three would 

benefit by withdrawing from the treaty as long as there were no penalty for doing so. 

With the scarcity of forces available to counter possible Russian aggression, mines could 

prove critical in neutralizing Russian advantages. To multiply the effectiveness of mines, 

all three countries should purchase medium range anti-tank systems to maximize their 

range of employment.

Since Baltic countries do not possess the air assets to guard their air space and instead 

rely on NATO support, they must build up a layered, integrated air defense to at least 

have some sort of capability to counter Russia’s air advantage. VSHORAD is effective 

against low and slow flying assets like helicopters and satisfies the needs of maneuver 

units, but to facilitate joint operations these Baltic States need medium range and long 

range air defense systems to influence enemy air operations. Also, a multi-layered air 

defense will have the added benefit of further facilitating air defense in support of the 

brigade’s maneuver on the ground.

Fire support systems are yet another area which all three countries must build upon, 

with both fire support and counter fire assets. Lithuania’s purchase of PzH 2000 is a step 

in the right direction, but Estonia is still relying on towed systems while Latvia does not 

possess any fire support assets which can tactically support the maneuver brigade. In 

purchasing new artillery systems, all three countries also must acquire artillery tracking 

systems, which will enable them to conduct counter-battery missions.162 Along a similar 

vein is the need to develop coastal artillery. Since all three Baltic countries have small 

navies, they need to have a means to defend their coastlines against the formidable Russian Navy. Modern mobile coastal artillery or missile systems will at least give pause to 

an opposing navy, diverting additional resources away from enemy capabilities, and the 

smart use of coastal artillery will help all three states to minimize the risk of envelopment from the sea.

This leads to an additional capability the Baltic region must consider pursuing—effective electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures. Lessons learned from Russian aggression in Ukraine demonstrate that all the Baltic countries must develop and 

acquire electronic warfare systems to assist in countering enemy’s C2, unmanned aerial 

vehicles, and certain weapon systems, which Russia is currently actively using.163 Using 

drones or certain ammunitions for delivery will greatly enhance the effect achieved by 

non-lethal means.

Foremost, however, is the need for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to continue to 

build mechanized forces, since mobility and protection with direct firepower are the 

only means to delay Russia’s mechanized forces. However, acquiring and maintaining 

the aforementioned capabilities, even if defense budgets doubled, will be impossible 
47

unless foreign military sales to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania come with “friendly prices” or leasing options. And, even if obtained, the challenge of manning these new capabilities still exists. Therefore, the need for deployment of NATO troops continues, but 

must be viewed more from the perspective of special capabilities than from maneuver 

forces. This focus will allow the Baltic States to concentrate on the mechanization and 

development of maneuver formations while NATO forces fill the gap of some of the 

technical shortfalls. 

Defending European security architecture has always been the task of NATO and 

is measured in the sum of all alliance members’ capabilities. The security situation has 

not changed this, and the Baltic States need help from other NATO countries to secure 

their part of the collective responsibility. As stated above, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 

must concentrate their scarce resources to develop conventional capabilities that will act 

as a deterrent and, if need be, to counter Russia’s conventional forces until the whole 

of NATO can mobilize and restore security. The alliance must agree to provide specific 

capabilities until the Baltic countries are able to acquire and apply these capabilities 

themselves, to include ballistic missile defense and subsequent air defense layers along 

with allied air forces.

The development of mobile fire support systems together with coastal artillery will 

be part of developing brigades as main maneuver forces and must be accompanied by 

the passive means of fire support to execute effective counter-battery or counter-asset 

missions. Access to special munitions like scatterable minefields for their counter-mobility advantage against armor and tanks will help brigades to shape the conventional 

battlefield in their favor. Electronic warfare and electronic counter-measures capabilities 

will further multiply the effect of fires.

The current Latvian force posture of territorial defense and only one maneuver brigade leaves them vulnerable against a Russian conventional attack. Accordingly, Latvia would benefit by reestablishing mandatory service, thereby creating one additional 

maneuver brigade in the region. Furthermore, mandatory military service would help 

Latvia to integrate their Russian minorities into Latvian society and possibly undermine 

the threat of hybrid warfare. Although Estonia and Lithuania already have mandatory 

service and are well ahead in this regard in effectively applying more manpower toward 

their defense forces, all three countries require the assistance of the remainder of the 

alliance to effectively convert the Baltics into a reliable NATO bastion.

49

CHAPTER 5: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) 

AND THE NEW RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

NATO Exercise Anakonda. Multinational Exercise in Poland from June 7-17, 2016. This exercise included 25,000

 participants from 21 nations. (U.S. Army Photo)

51

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO):

UNDERSTANDING AND SUSTAINING ITS RELEVANCE 

TO THE UNITED STATES

Researcher: Colonel Gary Graves, U.S. Army

In the post-World War II climate of 1949, the United States and 11 other like-minded 

Western nations committed themselves to the creation of the greatest modern-day alliance the world has ever seen—NATO. In the decades following NATO’s formation, the 

global environment changed drastically from that established after the 1945 Potsdam 

Agreement. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and 

modern globalization allowed the U.S. economy to grow beyond transatlantic-markets 

of trade and commerce. At the same time, terrorism and unconventional warfare became the modus-operandi of transnational threats attempting to abolish world order. 

With these changes in the global environment, some argued that NATO was no longer 

relevant, or even needed by the United States for the advancement of its national interests. Moreover, the world has become more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Therefore, it is highly probable that the United States, because of its longstanding 

political, military, and economic commitment to NATO, could befall the same fate as 

ancient Athens during the Peloponnesian War—a super-power drawn into war by its 

alliances, not for its own political or military objectives. Essentially, history predicts 

the United States will enter into a conflict, not of its choosing, or in support of its national interests, but because of its obligations to its allies in a continuously changing and 

unknowable global environment.

From a U.S. economic and military perspective, this risk does not outweigh the benefits NATO provides the United States. Due to U.S. fiscal constraints and reductions in 

U.S. Department of Defense force structure, the alliance remains vital and necessary to 

the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS).164 As a “formal institution of leading democracies that provides a forum for discussion and a vehicle for action,” NATO is a strategic 

enabler for the United States.165 Essentially, the NATO alliance is a means to balance the 

expenditure of finite U.S. national resources (blood and treasure) against U.S. national 

interests, while at the same time promoting global, international order.166

In view of this changing geopolitical environment, and an increasingly aggressive 

Russia, the NATO alliance remains not only relevant, but an essential component to the 

protection and advancement of U.S. national interests in Europe, with ancillary effects 

globally. This paper acknowledges NATO’s outdated mandate, which does not account 

for the complexities of the global security environment or the modern-day character of 

war, and will address these concerns through specific recommendations for the mitigation of these issues. This proposal advances U.S. national interests, while at the same 

time supporting the international order in the 21st century, by maintaining a strong 

collaborative security approach between the United States and its closest and strongest 

allies—the member nations of NATO. Furthermore, this paper also stipulates that the 
52

United States must continue to: assist NATO in increasing its overall capabilities (Means);

respond to a multitude of threats, by applying interoperable resources across all of the 

warfighting domains (Ways); and, achieve the desired political end states—deter, and 

if required, defeat regional sources of instability, while promoting political integration 

and economic interdependence (Ends).

NATO has a direct effect not only on U.S. policy, but also on a variety of U.S. national interests. By continuing to invest in the success and growth of the alliance, the 

United States will influence its national, diplomatic, and economic destiny. Moreover, 

by strengthening NATO, the United States guarantees continued access and influence 

in Europe and the around the world. From a U.S. perspective, NATO is not exclusively 

about mutual defense. While defense is a fundamental pillar, with respect to U.S. national interests, the alliance is arguably more focused on international access, the stability 

and economic prosperity created from U.S. involvement in Europe, and legitimacy. The 

NATO alliance has been at the center of U.S. foreign policy and power projection, while 

concurrently maintaining the backbone of the European security apparatus.167 This assertion remains valid largely because of the potentially devastating effects a decline in 

either European security, or U.S./European international relations, could have on a variety of U.S. national interests.168

The United States profits from a free, democratic, and peaceful Europe.169 Equally, 

Europe benefits from the security umbrella NATO affords its members, of which the 

United States contributes more than 70% of the total defense expenditures of the alliance’s 28 members.170 This security, provided primarily through its collective defense 

principle stipulated in Article 5 of its mandate—a military attack against any is an attack 

against them all—has correlated directly into the political and environmental stability of 

Europe. A safe and secure Europe benefits the economies of both the United States and 

the European Union (EU). More specifically, “The transatlantic economy . . . accounts for 

half of the global GDP [Gross Domestic Product] and nearly a third of global trade.”171

For the United States, which represents 28.10% of the global economy, this translates 

to roughly $17.4 trillion of U.S. national resources.172 Through this staggering financial 

portfolio, the economic power of the United States, enriched by its sustained access to 

secure and stable European markets, continues to be a key foundational principle of U.S. 

NSS and a vital source of continuing influence overseas.173

Furthermore, the geopolitical access NATO provides is a significant strategic advantage with respect to U.S. influence and global reach. For instance, as the United States 

increases its interests in Africa and continues its commitment to the Middle East, “Europe’s proximity to the Middle East [and Africa] lends it geo-strategic value for American power projection.”174 As stated in the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS): “The 

presence of U.S. military forces in key locations around the world underpins the international order and provides opportunities to engage with other countries while positioning forces to respond to crises.”175 For example, U.S. aircraft stationed at military 

installations in the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Italy supported military action 

(Operation Odyssey Dawn) in Libya in 2011. Additionally, with respect to U.S. opera-
53

tions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Ramstein Airbase in Germany remains a vital logistical 

supply hub for both personnel and equipment entering those theaters of operation for 

more than a decade.176 In this respect, a military presence facilitates the U.S.’ ability to assure its allies, cultivate new partners, and maintain a stabilizing presence globally. This 

enables the United States to protect Europe’s populace and borders through security 

collaboration.

Elements of the Lithuanian Iron Wolf Brigade in 2015. (U.S. Army Photo)

From a U.S. security standpoint, NATO addresses the risk that, in “an interconnected 

world, there are no global problems that can be solved without the United States, and 

few that can be solved by the United States alone.”177 By accepting this conviction, and 

understanding the complexities and dangers of today’s global security environment, 

NATO provides the best solution to this dilemma: a credible, multilateral political, economic, and military mechanism to deter, and if required, defeat current and emerging 

threats. 

This understanding highlights that NATO is, first and foremost, a political organization. NATO not only demonstrates transatlantic cooperation and solidarity between 

the United States and Europe, but also represents a mechanism for burden sharing as it 

correlates to the expenditure of national resources (blood and treasure).178 From Iraq to 

Afghanistan, and Libya to Eastern Europe, the past decade of persistent conflict demonstrates that no nation-state alone, including the United States, can independently defeat 

the range of diverse threats threatening the international order.179 Just as it did during 

the Cold War, NATO “can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries to provide for the 

common defense.”180 Examples include efforts to address the Ebola pandemic, Russia’s 

aggression against Eastern Ukraine, “the rise of IS [Islamic State] in Syria/Iraq, halting 
54

Iran’s nuclear program, the postwar stabilization of Afghanistan and Central Asia, and 

the United States ‘pivot’ to Asia.”181 The complexity and enormous cost of these efforts 

has necessitated the United States to reorient its geostrategic priorities and expenditures 

in order to address increasingly dangerous regional instabilities. The success of these efforts is not dependent on the United States alone; it is also reliant on the other members 

of the alliance to refocus their foreign policy and security costs, to achieve an equitable 

sharing of the transatlantic security burden (financial, diplomatic, and military). 

From a validity/authority rational, NATO offers the U.S. international legitimacy 

to act, within the framework of international law and norms, inside the global security 

system to protect and advance its national interests and those of its allies and partners.182

As stated by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2009-2014):

The combined and voluntary will of 28 of the world’s strongest, sovereign democracies is an 

extremely powerful source of political legitimacy. Something that unilateral action or coalitions of the willing simply cannot enjoy. This carries over into our missions and operations. 

It attracts partners whose political support and military contributions add to our broader 

international legitimacy.183

“With Europe’s record on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, NATO contributed to advancing global public goods that fell outside its narrow security interests.”184 In essence, the alliance conveys international legitimacy and authority of action 

(political, military, or economic) that would not, or could not, achieve sanction by the 

politically polarized United Nations (UN). This is possible because of the relationship 

between the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty; in its creation, the NATO mandate reaffirmed the alliance’s belief and support of the principles established by the UN.

Like the 20th-century, the 21st-century global security environment is complex, unpredictable, fiscally constrained, and comprised of multiple interconnected weak and 

failing states, including powerful armed groups, some of which maintain the ability to 

violently alter the geopolitical/strategic landscape within their own nations and in other 

various regions.185 Because of these influences, “the United States can ill-afford to act 

unilaterally in such an age of advancing globalization and hybrid threats.”186 The United 

States and its policy makers can no longer focus predominantly on power politics and a 

position of dominance in the international system.187 On the contrary, focus must be on 

evolving the fidelity of the international system itself, a structure of moral global citizens 

that endorse and advance U.S. core values, and the UN Charter.188

Former Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, reinforced this position with the following underpinning message to the Institute of Peace in 2012:

In order to advance security and prosperity in the 21st century, we must maintain and even 

enhance our military strength. But I also believe that the United States must place even greater strategic emphasis on building the security capabilities of others. We must be bold enough 

to adopt a more collaborative approach to security both within the United States Government 

and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations.189
55

This not only validates the necessity of the NATO alliance, but also mandates a U.S. 

obligation to assist in the enhancement of ally/partner capabilities and capacities that 

are increasingly effective and interoperable. By doing so, the United States promotes the 

ability to shape the global security environment, while enhancing the collective ability 

of NATO to respond and defeat any source of regional instability. 

REDEFINING NATO . . . ENDS, WAYS & MEANS

NATO is a vital component of U.S. strategy and foreign policy with respect to the 

protection and advancement of U.S. national interests in not only Europe, but also 

the international community. While NATO’s mandate may be dated, its foundational 

philosophy—to safeguard freedom, common heritage, civilization, and principles (democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law)—allows the alliance to endure, despite 

the current complexities of the global security environment.190 Although NATO maintained the peace in Europe throughout the 20th century, for it to remain pertinent and 

effective, it needs to adapt to the threats of the 21st century.191 For this to occur, the 

United States must continue to lead, through financial investment, and political commitment and mentorship, in order to influence the following evolution and ratification 

of NATO’s mandate and strategy (Ends, Ways, and Means) to shape the global security 

environment. 
56

Ends.

Comparable to the original three foundational purposes stipulated in the 1949 North 

Atlantic Treaty, there are three over-arching resolutions for NATO. If implemented, 

these will concentrate and focus the efforts of the alliance, specifically with respect to 

a vision for collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management—the alliance’s three core tasks. More importantly, these suggested resolutions demonstrate an 

enduring commitment to a multilateral approach rather than unilateral, with respect to 

core national interests, by each member of NATO.192

Principle #1: NATO should continue to encourage political dialogue and diplomacy 

between its members and foster a comparable interface and collaboration with the rest 

of the international community. This is indispensable because, similar to the global 

environment surrounding post-World War II Europe, reshaping: 

the global order [today] will be more difficult than it was in the 1940s. [There are] . . . more 

countries today and norms of equality and democratic participation mean that most will 

demand a seat at the table. The U.S. remains the preeminent power but the gap between the 

U.S. and the rest is narrowing. We [the United States] . . . benefit enormously from the rise of 

the rest, but we [the United States] are no longer the undisputed leader of the ‘free world.’193

Even in today’s global security environment, NATO represents, figuratively, a finite 

geopolitical table. In literal or factual terms, the alliance is a viable mechanism for political discourse among a multitude of diverse nations which have drastically different 

political identities and cultures, and who view the world through very different geopolitical lenses. 

Fortunately, the ability of NATO to assimilate and synergize the varied cultural beliefs of its members, focusing on common values and interests, is one of its greatest 

strengths. This contextualizes NATO’s soft power with respect to international relations: 

the ability to shape the will of other nations and actors, typically through the appeal of 

its access to political, military and economic institutions, and/or cultural values, to support and advance core national interests and objectives.194 Although the character of the 

global security environment continues to evolve, international relationships, and the 

agreements that transpire between nations, remain a diplomatic endeavor.

Principle #2: NATO must enhance its ability to deter, and if required, defeat regional 

sources of instability, not just the military prowess of a common enemy. Unlike the Cold 

War, NATO no longer faces a single communist threat embodied by the Soviet Union. 

On the contrary, the alliance confronts modern dangers such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberwarfare, piracy, narco-trafficking, hybrid 

warfare, radical nationalism, and more recently, mass immigration. These problem-sets 

exemplify an assortment of regional sources of instability that severely influence global 

security, economic prosperity, and international order, and may necessitate a situationally dependent strategic response. 
57

Conceptually and practically, in the context of a NATO strategic response, today’s 

global security environment exemplifies the necessity for an effective response capability, namely, NATO’s hard power. This entails the ability to compel or coerce the will of 

a state or nonstate actor, typically through the threat, or actual use, of forceful action.195

Furthermore, NATO’s hard power illustrates the prerequisite to expand its mandate: 

specifically, understanding the character of war, its impact within the different warfighting domains, and defining what constitutes an act of aggression. For example, in the 

framework of Article 5, “any action initiated by an external state or nonstate actor that 

threatens the political and economic security or territorial integrity of a NATO member 

will engender a collective response.”196 This means that NATO should maintain not just 

an effective military deterrent, but also a broader response capability that accounts for 

the potential threats that may operate in the virtual realms (i.e., cyber). 

Principle #3: NATO needs to foster domestic governmental stability among its members. NATO’s profile has transformed, especially with the incorporation of former Warsaw Pact countries into the alliance following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although 

the West perceived this NATO enlargement as a mechanism to provide greater stability 

to all of Europe, this expansion propelled multiple transitional, and somewhat weak and 

fragile, newly democratic states into a very mature and demanding political/military 

arena—a precarious position for states struggling to provide for the basic needs of its 

populace.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the last two decades, the proliferation of weak and failing states has been the principal source of regional instability and 

conflict.197 These states:

are unable to control all their territory, maintain a monopoly over the instruments of force 

or perform core functions beginning with providing security for significant sections of their 

populations. Moreover, they also suffer from high degrees of corruption. When these conditions become severe, a state’s legitimacy seriously erodes and it can even vanish.198

Because NATO draws strength and legitimacy from its partnerships, the alliances’ 

founding members (the original 12) should work closely with new and emerging allies to ensure the sustainability of membership criteria. By doing this, NATO not only 

shapes the global security environment by facilitating internal stability of its member 

states, but also provides an assembly of legitimate governing bodies, dedicated to the 

global advancement of security, freedom, prosperity, and order for the international 

community to emulate.

Ways.

NATO’s core tasks of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management, are the Ways by which the alliance applies the wide-ranging, yet finite, capabilities 

and resources (Means) to achieve the desired political objectives (Ends). However, in 
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these times of fiscal austerity, NATO members need to work more efficiently together 

to “develop, acquire, operate and maintain [unrivalled] military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in NATO’s Strategic Concept.”199 NATO 

interoperability is a vehicle for the alliance to enhance this effectiveness and efficiency, 

through shared understanding of each member’s capabilities and capacity, and mutual 

trust within the organization, to “swiftly react to crises in a multilateral manner with 

unity of purpose and effort.”200

Although NATO interoperability does not demand “identical military systems 

(hardware and software) or corresponding operational approaches between leading 

and supporting nations,” it does require a collective understanding of the entire multinational PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure) 

landscape, of both adversary and ally/partner equally.201 This is essential to equip leaders, both political and military, at all levels, with the comprehension and forethought to 

make decisions, mitigate risk, and account for 2nd/3rd order effects.202

The United States has operated as part of NATO for over 65 years; however, NATO 

interoperability remains far from perfect.203 Numerous challenges—typically manifested by a myopic and parochial approach toward multinational understanding, focusing 

solely on friendly/enemy capabilities, the political/military objective, and the physical 

characteristics of the operational environment—continue to hinder the overall effectiveness of NATO.204 This inadequate approach does not account for the complexities of the 

present-day global security environment or NATO interoperability. It reflects outdated, 

linear practices and a conventional Cold War mindset mistakenly applied to the current 

global security environment, categorized as complex, asymmetric, and hybrid.205

To achieve NATO interoperability, members of the alliance must go further than the 

old adage: “See yourself, see the enemy, and see the terrain.”206 Rather, member nations 

need to appreciate additional strategic and operational aspects not traditionally considered to operate successfully as a multinational force.207 For example, alliance members 

must understand the standard forms of operational employment, mission command 

and signal/communication capabilities, and overall logistical/sustainment capacity.208

Furthermore, NATO must recognize that many of the allies and partners operate under national caveats restricting their acts while deployed.209 Alliance members may also 

preserve historically engrained frictions, shaped by common and sometimes contested 

national histories, which may impede operational participation and cooperation.210 This 

multinational understanding is vital for NATO members, as it relates directly to planning considerations, collaboration, and the ability of the alliance to interoperate during 

the execution of its missions.211

The ability to communicate this knowledge is as important as this detailed multinational understanding between nations. Although this poses a challenge due to the 

nature of the alliance itself, i.e., various operating systems/procedures and language 

barriers, it is an integral requirement for success. By sharing essential collective knowledge, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) empowers its members by increasing situational 
59

understanding thereby facilitating the resolution of possible misconceptions of ally or 

partner capabilities.212 This enables informed decision-making to support the desired 

political end state, but more notably, builds greater trust in the alliance.213

While achieving a shared collective multinational understanding in NATO is demanding, building trust between its members is even more challenging.214 As stated by 

General (Retired) Martin E. Dempsey, former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

“Building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action a commander will perform.”215 In the context of NATO operations, building trust correlates 

to social discourse, personal relationships, and common understanding, all of which 

require time to mature in a diverse alliance such as NATO. 

When operating in conjunction with NATO allies and other joint, interagency, intragovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners, diversity is the modus-operandi; 

a common language, doctrinal terminology, planning process, collective operating system, and other military equipment are not.216 These dissimilarities can lead to biases, 

creating fissures in alliance solidarity and hindering NATO collaboration, integration, 

and unity of effort.217 It is crucial that all NATO members place these parochial preconceived biases aside.218 Although difficult to accomplish, successful implementation will 

allow better incorporation of the distinctive capabilities and capacities of each NATO 

ally and JIIM partner; interoperability is not about achieving congruency, rather, it is 

about compatibility and understanding how to integrate each contributing nation.219

This cultivation of trust allows NATO to operate more effectively and efficiently, achieving synergistic effects, correlating directly to strategic, operational, and tactical success. 

Once established, trust becomes the foremost advantage binding contrasting units or 

organizations together, empowering the many to act as one, and forging a unity of effort 

and purpose toward the accomplishment of the desired political end state.220

Means.

Symbiotic to NATO’s desired political end state, the alliance requires adequate resources—financial investment, political support, and military/non-military capabilities—from its members to operate effectively in the global security environment.221 This 

equates to the assertion that NATO must continually reorganize itself to have the necessary conventional/unconventional and select “niche” capabilities available to proactively prepare for and respond to the wide-range and varied contingencies currently 

confronting the alliance.222 For example, the dangers range from the complex, multidimensional hybrid warfare employed by Russia in Ukraine, to the cost-efficient, yet 

potentially devastating threat of cyberwarfare by any capable actor who has the ability 

to interface with the cyber-domain.223

Unfortunately, of the 28 NATO nations, more than 70% of European land forces do 

not have the means to deploy equipment or personnel significant distances or to sustain 

them; this is primarily shouldered by the United States.224 Furthermore, although NATO 

has developed a cyber-aggression response capability, there are “insufficient techno-
60

logical capabilities in the organization to respond to cyberwarfare.”225 In essence, the alliance’s ability to respond to security challenges can only be as successful as its capabilities; NATO can maintain a strong defense, but only with adequate fiscal investment.226

This investment equates to a 2% of GDP benchmark for defense spending, of which 

only Estonia, Greece, Poland, the UK, and the United States achieved in 2015.227 As stated 

by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter: 

The Transatlantic relationship and Transatlantic security is, as ever, a two-sided affair. . . . As 

allies, we must all accept our fair share of security responsibility to each; and as allies we all 

must choose to invest in, develop, and field new capabilities now and in the future.228

This emphasizes for NATO that, to effectively address the challenges and threats of the 

21st century, it must modernize its response capabilities while developing new and improved technologies. To accomplish this, alliance members must increase their national 

defense spending to at least the 2% GDP benchmark unanimously agreed upon by alliance members at previous NATO summits, such as the Wales Summit in 2014.229 Furthermore, the alliance should look to external, yet complimentary organizations, such as 

the EU, private industry, and other supporting alliances and partnerships, which have 

the expertise and resources available to augment the NATO Strategic Concept.230 These 

investments are a critical requirement to the enduring relevance of the alliance and will 

provide NATO the political strength and military capability to defend its members and 

share the cost-burden through a multilateral, transatlantic approach to cooperative security.

It is apparent that the United States and Europe each benefit from an unequalled, 

mutually supporting and dependent alliance, actualized by NATO.231 In today’s global 

security environment, the alliance faces a multitude of diverse challenges and dangerous threats, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, piracy, mass migration, and hybrid warfare.232 Yet, the greatest danger facing the alliance is the growing sentiment 

of ‘American Indifference’ toward NATO, especially among the U.S.’ political elite; a 

result from the growing transatlantic gap between members “willing and able to pay the 

price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of 

NATO membership . . . but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.”233

As stated by Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, to the North Atlantic 

Council on June 10, 2011:

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—

and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf 

of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.234

This speech predicts a bleak and irrelevant future for NATO; however, the nature of the 

21st-century global security environment demonstrates that the United States needs to 

“operate as a closely integrated joint team with interagency and multinational partners 
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across the range of military operations.”235 A fundamental component of this conviction, 

especially during these times of fiscal austerity, military downsizing, and increasing 

globalization, is NATO—a strong and proven network of military allies capable of operating together multilaterally toward common political end states and interests.236 For 

this reason alone, the United States should continue to invest politically, militarily, and 

financially in the alliance.237

Furthermore, although the U.S. military remains the world’s most resourced and 

accomplished fighting force, capable of sustained unilateral action virtually anywhere 

in the world, NATO provides the United States with the undeniable benefits of geopolitical/strategic access, burden/cost sharing, and legitimacy.238 Because of this, for more 

than seven decades, NATO operations have been the United States’ preferred manner 

of applying military power toward its goals of protection and advancement of core U.S. 

national interests and projecting power and U.S. influence globally.239

According to the 2015 U.S. NSS, the United States is committed to leading “the world 

through a shifting security landscape toward a more durable peace and new prosperity”; however, in today’s global security environment, the United States requires the assistance of its strategic transatlantic allies.240 The crucial multilateral capacities contained 

in NATO enable it to face not only the current challenges of the 21st century, but also 

those yet to surface. As the United States “increasingly takes a more indirect [multilateral] security role in the years ahead, NATO will continue to serve as a source of interoperable military forces that are unavailable anywhere else.”241 By accepting this enduring 

importance and relevance of NATO, the United States will control its political, military, 

and economic destiny within the global security environment today and into the future.

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BACK TO BUSINESS: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 

(NATO) AND ITS CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

Researcher: Colonel Markus Kreitmayr, German Army

We face enormous challenges both in our Eastern and our Southern neighborhoods. People 

across the Alliance are understandably worried about their security. And their security is 

NATO’s responsibility. We must be fully committed to doing collective defence and crisis 

management both at the same time. We do not have the luxury to choose our challenges. 

We must face them all. North America and Europe must continue to stand together. To 

defend our common values. And to keep future generations secure.

—NATO Secretary General

Jens Stoltenberg242

In a speech at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels on October 28, 2014, Jens Stoltenberg, the new Secretary General of NATO, outlined his three priorities based on the 

key decisions taken at the September 2014 Wales Summit. Thus, focusing on the solidarity and resolve of an alliance of democracies, Stoltenberg said that he was resolved to 

“keep NATO strong” as a political and a military alliance.243 Moreover, building on the 

success of partnership and enlargement programs, he added that NATO would “work 

with partners to bring more stability to [its] neighborhood.”244 To achieve these two 

goals, Stoltenberg said that he was determined to “keep the bond between Europe and 

North America rock solid.”245

Stoltenberg described NATO’s new direction in this speech and provided a vision for 

NATO’s long-term growth in the changing 21st-century security environment. Thus, to 

remain strong, the Alliance “must preserve and strengthen collective defense.”246 To address security challenges, NATO must send “strong signal[s] of solidarity and deterrence 

and engage to prevent and manage crisis [and] to stabilize post conflict situations.”247

To these ends, “Allies on both sides of the Atlantic must play their full part [and] invest 

in [the] Alliance politically and financially.”248 With this analysis, Stoltenberg addressed 

NATO’s historical strength—its adaptability.

According to Stoltenberg, the nature of security challenges may change, however, 

the “winning combination” is “working together in a strong NATO.”249 This incorporates three key tenets of NATO’s enduring principles—cohesion, consensus, and collectiveness—and thereby links it to the centerpiece of NATO’s founding document, its 

principle of collective defense laid down in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. According to this principle, NATO member states consider “an attack against one or several 

members as an attack against all.”250

To remain relevant in the changing 21st-century security environment, NATO must 

leverage its historical strength and focus on adaptation. It should implement a revolutionary approach that builds on the lessons of the previous 65 years and that proactively 
64

addresses the challenges of the emerging strategic environment. NATO’s successful adaptations during and after the Cold War suggest that the Alliance’s two distinct, but 

revolutionary, approaches helped it to overcome a direct confrontation with the Soviet 

Union and Warsaw Pact and developed NATO to a political and military Alliance that 

took on contemporary security challenges. NATO’s strategic adaptation at the outset 

of the 21st century was an important step that preserved the Alliance’s relevance and 

concludes that, to remain relevant, NATO must adapt more comprehensively in the immediate future.

NATO is also challenged by the crisis in Ukraine and a “Russia [that] has profoundly 

readjusted its position in the international system.”251 Thus, “Russia’s annexation of 

Crimea, invasion of Donbas, and threats to Ukraine and other European countries not 

only menace the stability of the post-Cold War order in Europe, but also pose a fundamental challenge to the assumptions about the strategic environment that have undergirded the NATO alliance for the past quarter of a century.”252

In “opposing NATO” and the European Union (EU), defining “NATO as an opponent,” and changing “borders in Europe,” Russia has overturned the 2010 assessment 

that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of conventional attack against 

NATO territory is low.” Additionally, this has spelled the end of NATO’s goal of a 

“true strategic partnership” with Russia, at least for the mid-term.253 Although a major 

conventional attack on NATO territory seems unlikely, the threat of a limited hybrid 

aggression including military means against the Baltic States has increased, and with it, 

the risk of escalation.254

Since such a development can undermine NATO’s credibility and cohesion, threatening its relevance and challenging the core principles of its existence, NATO as a whole 

has “to come to grips with this reality.”255 This new reality in Europe has not come as 

“a sudden change” or “a full surprise”; as the 2008 events in Georgia indicate, it represents a “fundamental climate change” in NATO-Russia relations.256 Moreover, this reality indicates Russia’s application of a revised strategic approach. A core element of this 

emerging Russian approach leverages a “strategy of ambiguity.”257

The seven components of this strategy turned out to be: “(1) consolidate political 

power and use nationalism to maintain domestic support; (2) capitalize on [a] long-term 

Information Operations (IO) campaign; (3) use subversive activity to create instability in 

ethnic Russian areas; (4) move a large conventional force along the borders to dissuade 

action against the subversives; (5) leverage ambiguity to maintain strategic flexibility; 

(6) violate international borders and support pro-Russian insurgents; and, (7) seize an 

area to achieve a limited strategic end.”258
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This strategy is based on “three common features of Russia’s use of military force.”259

These include: leveraging “IO and cyber-capabilities,” the conduct of “hybrid, irregular 

warfare,” and a “landpower-centric approach.”260 Moreover, as the “nuclear saber-rattling” during the annexation of Crimea demonstrated, this strategy of ambiguity seems 

to be backed by a nuclear element that calls for the “use of nuclear weapons early in a 

crisis to offset NATO’s conventional superiority” and to de-escalate the situation.261

Following the events in Ukraine, the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales changed its expected focus from the evaluation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

operations and its transition to the new Resolute Support Mission, to what was called 

“a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security.”262 According to the Wales Summit Declaration, “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged 

[NATO’s] vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”263 Consequently, these actions 

required clear signals of NATO’s resolve and cohesion directed toward Russia, but also 

to keep open the door for future dialogue and consultations. Thus, the Alliance’s deliberations in Wales resulted in several decisions with regards to Russia, but also built the 

starting point for a comprehensive review of NATO’s future tasks and goals.264

Although scholars agree that the Wales Summit was one of the most important summits in NATO’s history, there are differences in the evaluations of the outcome.265 There 

are critics arguing that the meeting unveiled NATO as incapable to act as a whole within 

the breadth of crisis management and collective defense missions. The reason is a flawed 

policy of financial cuts and military reductions paired with political unwillingness to 

use the military instrument of power resulting in an under-resourced and weak Europe with insufficient military capacity and capabilities. As such, initiatives launched in 

Wales seem to be a cosmetic patchwork of loosely connected activities.266

Others argue that decisions made in Wales are of particular significance since NATO’s reaction on Russia’s aggression, despite the diverse security interests of the allies, 

indicated great consensus and comprehension of a flexible framework of political and 

military activities.267 Moreover, the initiatives launched indicate a fundamental reorientation of NATO far beyond the Russia-Ukraine crisis toward the role of a global security 

actor that has been “rejuvenated with a sense of purpose and intent,” synonymous with 

the notion of “NATO’s rebirth.”268
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In response to Russia’s aggressive behavior, NATO members agreed on a Readiness 

Action Plan (RAP) that provides a balanced set of actions and sub-initiatives—ranging 

from maritime surveillance and air policing in the Baltics, to forward positioning of 

equipment and small units, to increased exercise activities and the creation of a Landpower-centric brigade size Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)—as a spearhead force of the NATO Response Force (NRF).269 However, the RAP goes beyond the 

challenges presented by Russia “in areas further afield that are of concern to allies” and 

“seems aimed at satisfying all of NATO’s various constituencies.”270

NATO also agreed on a Defense Planning Package (DPP) that seeks to improve NATO’s military capabilities, including “cyber-defense” and “land forces readiness,” and 

reaffirms the already existing Framework Nations Concept (FNC) that was proposed by 

Germany and that seeks “to develop capabilities and forces, particularly in Europe.”271

Moreover, a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative was launched, 

aiming to formalize security cooperation activities in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of 

NATO’s Cooperative Security pillar. Furthermore, in terms of defense spending, allies 

repeatedly stressed the “importance of both quantity and quality” and “agreed to redouble efforts to achieve the respective targets.”272 However, the less ambitious timeline 

in regards to the existing targets, as well as the debate over more appropriate ways to 

achieve an “equitable burden sharing,” indicated a lack of urgency.273

Moreover, the Alliance started a Partnership Interoperability Initiative to “enhance 

[NATO’s] ability to tackle security challenges together with [its] partners.”274 Finally, 

the Alliance introduced a revision of its integrated command structure in recognizing 

“the need to expand, modernize, and invest in [its] security tools” and “to adjust the 

command structures directing those military assets.”275 This appears to be a step in the 

right direction, although scholars caution about a simplified “back to basics” approach 

that focuses narrowly on Article 5. Hence, the rapidly changing and complex security 

environment as well as its members’ diverse interests require a NATO with a balanced 

approach to collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security that integrates regional and global perspectives.
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German Soldiers off-loading their vehicles at railhead in Poland. (U.S. Army Photo)
68

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO’S STRATEGIC APPROACH

Secretary General Stoltenberg framed NATO’s strategic environment and defined its 

problem. His speech at the German Marshall Fund stressed that NATO does “not have 

the luxury to choose [its] challenges” and therefore cannot focus on one pillar of its threefolded set of tasks.276 Moreover, in his foreword to the first annual report, the Secretary 

General recognized the need for NATO’s adaptation since its strategic approach does 

not address the breadth of challenges in the emerging security environment.277 Hence, in 

accordance with John Kotter’s Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change, Stoltenberg 

must strive for “Establishing A Sense Of Urgency” among NATO officials and its member nations’ policymakers to enable NATO to adapt in the ever changing international 

security environment.278

This lack of a sense of urgency suggests that several members are satisfied with the 

initiatives agreed on in Wales and do not envisage a comprehensive overhaul of NATO’s 

strategic concept. Otherwise, they would have commissioned a new concept to be developed for the 2016 Warsaw Summit. In addition, there is a tendency in the Alliance to 

“call failure success and weakness strength.”279 Hence, NATO as a whole has to develop 

a common sense of urgency for a third revolutionary adaptation to make NATO “fit for 

purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges.”280

To implement this change, creating the “Guiding Coalition” is the next important 

step.281 This strategic leadership team should encompass Stoltenberg and at least the 

secretaries of state and defense from the United States, United Kingdom (UK), France, 

and Germany. Such a group would demonstrate cohesion through a collaborative transatlantic approach, strong European commitment, inclusion of diverse strategic cultures, 

and representation of regional and global perspectives on security and defense. Based 

on its history in NATO and its geostrategic location, Germany could play a major role, 

in particular, in terms of collective defense. It entered NATO when the country was divided and benefitted from NATO’s solidarity and cohesion during the Cold War, eventually resulting in its unification in 1989. Moreover, Germany by “shaping the Wales 

decisions,” is expected to contribute more to NATO based on “its economic strength,” 

and has committed itself through the FNC.282

Furthermore, in developing a “Vision And Strategy,” the Alliance has to review its 

current approach and provide a new Strategic Concept by 2018 that is embedded in a 

long-term NATO Vision 2030 Plus.

283 The latter cannot only focus on a Europe “whole, 

free, and at peace.”284 Instead, it must define the kind of NATO that can and should 

achieve this goal. In turn, this goal has to be expanded to a Europe that is whole, free, 

and at peace in a stable world, since in the 21st-century globalized security environment 

the former is not achievable without the latter, as the developments in the Middle East, 

North Africa (including the Mediterranean) and the Asia-Pacific (in particular, the South 

China Sea) demonstrate.
69

Based on the idea of “Communicating the Change Vision,” both the emerging new 

strategy and its long-term vision must be articulated and communicated to explain 

NATO’s “purpose, will, and intent” providing the Alliance’s strategic narrative as the 

“essential glue that holds [NATO’s] elites together.”285 As such, the new strategy, the 

vision, and its supporting narrative have to be fully implemented through a set of substrategies and its related actions and activities. All of this must be based on NATO’s 

enduring principles of cohesion, consensus, and collectiveness. 

Moreover, as described in Kotter’s Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change, 

“Empowering Broad-Based Action” through member countries’ initiatives, “Generating Short-Term Wins” through the successful implementation of agreed on programs, 

“Consolidating Gains And Producing More Change” through continued “renewal of 

[the] Alliance,” and eventually, “Anchoring New Approaches In The Culture” through 

a step-by-step development of a “NATO Common Collective Security Identity and Culture” should determine follow-on activities of the Alliance.286

NATO’s initial activities should focus on what Stoltenberg articulated as the core 

of his vision of “keeping NATO strong.”287 The centerpiece and foundation of a strong 

NATO is its comprehensive ability to collectively defend its members. Hence, in the 

realm of deterrence and defense, and based on its Cold War experience, NATO has 

to adopt a 21st-century version of its Flexible Response strategy linked to the idea of 

deterrence and détente. Critics will argue that such an approach would risk a new Cold 

War.288 However, such a view indicates a lack of urgency, since Russia already chose 

this path and initiated the new confrontation.289 Thus, the recommended approach will 

be understood by Russia, and will seek to deter a further escalation, while aiming to 

overcome tensions by guiding both sides out of a security dilemma.290

This approach should incorporate not only conventional activities based on the RAP, 

but also elements that reinforce a broader approach to collective defense stressing countermeasures against Russian IO, cyberattacks, and landpower centric, hybrid aggression. 

Thus, in “regaining the strategic initiative” through a comprehensive whole of NATO’s 

governments approach, the Alliance should emphasize to “develop intelligence capabilities in the region; decrease energy dependence on Russia; focus information operations 

and cyber-capabilities; position long-term U.S. Landpower in the Baltics; [and] maintain 

credible NATO land forces in theater.”291

The EU could be an essential partner in providing soft power elements to a broader 

collective defense approach. Both organizations should therefore review their “Berlin 

Plus” arrangement and develop it into a mutually supporting agreement. Moreover, 

Germany could be the framework nation to comprehensively enhance NATO’s collective defense based on its existing commitments, military cooperation programs, and its 

landpower centric armed forces.292 In addition, a review of NATO’s nuclear strategy—

including its nuclear posture—is inevitable to provide a flexible, survivable, reliable, 

and accurate nuclear deterrence against the already existing threat posed by Russia.293

With the United States in the lead for this component of deterrence and defense, a “rock 
70

solid” transatlantic bond and the cohesion of the Alliance would be most effectively 

demonstrated.294

In addition, NATO should consider another round of enlargement for those countries already in the process and should include Georgia and Ukraine. NATO must not 

allow Russia to undermine this process by threat or use of force to prevent membership. 

Although the standards for all members must be the same, historic events, such as Germany’s acceptance during the Cold War, provide evidence that their flexible and prudent 

application can improve Euro-Atlantic security in the long-run. However, NATO must 

come to terms with acceptable security guarantees to potential new members during 

their application process. Recent experience indicates that “NATO cannot invite countries to join the Alliance if it is unwilling or unable to defend them.”295 Existing agreements like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework document may be a starting point. 

In all of these crisis management activities, the EU could be an essential partner 

based on its own interests, articulated ambitions, and available soft power capabilities. 

This would reinforce the 2010 Strategic Concept’s aim to “fully strengthen the strategic 

partnership” of both organizations.296 Moreover, these activities would also be in line 

with the goal of enhanced “cooperation between NATO and the [UN]” and would build 

on the founding principles of NATO.297 However, crisis management as well as collective defense have to be strengthened by cooperative security activities that build on 

NATO’s partnership programs. 

Hence, NATO has to reframe its partnership concepts, aiming to offer interested 

global democracies a formal way of cooperation based on the experience of the ISAF 

mission, to support existing partners with security assurances adjusted to their strategic situation and mutual interests, and to integrate existing programs; however, these 

should be adapted to the changes in the emerging security environment.298 A starting 

point for such a reframing process could be the approach proposed by a 2013 Atlantic 

Council report that utilized “the concepts of strategic differentiation and flexible structures” and recommended to take actions in four realms, outlined as “Military Operations; Global Commons and Transnational Threats; Education, Training, and Mentoring; [and] Strategic Cooperation.”299 In any case, the adaptation of NATO’s approach to 

partnerships has to take into account the recent developments in the Alliance’s Eastern 

flank and has to build on or transition from successful existing formats.

NATO must leverage its historical strength and has to go back to the business of 

adaptation. Thereby, it has to develop and implement a third revolutionary approach 

that builds on the lessons and success of the previous 65 years and that proactively addresses the challenges of the emerging strategic environment in the 21st century. Thus, 

to preserve its relevance, the Alliance has to strengthen its credibility through enhanced 

effectiveness built on the foundation and modern interpretation of collective defense. 

As Stoltenberg pointed out, “working together in a strong NATO” still is the “winning 

combination” for NATO’s success.300 This combination rests on the Alliance’s enduring 

principles of cohesion, consensus, and collectiveness. NATO must adapt successfully 
71

again, because this time not only is Euro-Atlantic security at stake, but also the international order that NATO has taken responsibility for, whether the Alliance likes it or 

not.301

U.S. and Lithuanian armored forces on the move. (U.S. Army Photo)

73

WILL THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) SURVIVE 

THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT?

Researcher: Colonel Peter Nieuwenhuis, Royal Netherlands Army

There is no contradiction between increasing the strength of NATO and engaging with 

Russia. Indeed, it is only by being strong that we can develop a cooperative and constructive relationship.

 —NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg302

NATO faces considerable challenges, in particular regarding its relationship with 

Moscow. It is clear that the crisis in Ukraine is a low point in its relationship with the 

Russian Federation. The “pivot to Asia” by the United States and the decrease of its 

Armed Forces’ budget, raises questions about America’s commitment to the Alliance. 

This apprehension is particularly felt by NATO members in the eastern part of the 

Alliance’s territory, especially those on the Russian border, who fear a shrinking U.S. 

commitment. Finally, eroding shared values, divergent national interests, and maybe 

even the tradition of mutual trust,303 have the member states lacking a unified view and 

strategy. NATO should reconsider its policies and approaches for Europe in light of the 

current strategic environment. The question is whether NATO’s founding principles, 

procedures, and processes are suitable and strong enough to persuade the members to 

invest in the organization. 

On April 4, 1949, 12 founding nations established NATO with the signing the North 

Atlantic Treaty304 in Washington, DC.305 The foundational principles for the creation of 

NATO were intended to deter Soviet expansion, prevent the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a North American presence on the continent, and encourage 

European political integration.306 The basis of the treaty was Article 51 of the United 

Nations (UN) Charter, which gives independent states the right for individual or collective defense. Collective defense is at the core of the North Atlantic Treaty and provides a framework for member states to protect each other if attacked (Article 5).307 The 

Treaty gives other European states the possibility to accede for membership and thereby 

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. However, new members are by 

invitation of the seated members, after a unanimous agreement (Article 10).308 Since its 

establishment in 1949, NATO has invited 16 nations to join, for a total of 28 member 

states today.309

The 2014 Ukraine crisis changed the European security environment. Although 

Ukraine is not a NATO member, the subsequent NATO initiatives, especially the leading 

U.S. role, remains significant. The United States took the lead to reassure East European 

allies and moved to strengthen the Alliance cohesion. Yet, this, combined with NATO’s 

December 2015 decision to invite Montenegro to start accession talks to become the 29th 

member of the Alliance, brought the relationship with Russia to a new low point.
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In 2014, the relationship changed dramatically with the Russian annexation of Crimea 

and its involvement in the violent unrest in Ukraine. Although Ukraine is not a NATO 

member, there is a close relationship between the country and the Alliance. As a result, 

NATO implemented immediate assurance measures. These measures are:

a series of land, sea, and air activities in, on, and around the territory of NATO Allies in 

Central and Eastern Europe, designed to reinforce their defense, reassure their populations, 

and deter potential aggression.310

To counter the threat that Russia poses to the region, NATO approved the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) during the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit to improve its ability 

to respond to hostile moves by Moscow.

Implementation of the RAP is not only challenging, but demonstrates NATO’s credibility and therefore it may influence its future. The question remains, however, if all 

member states are willing to make the RAP a success. RAP requires a long lasting irreversible (financial) commitment and that all member states understand and accept 

each other’s point of view or even a different approach toward solving issues. The next 

question is if the internal NATO processes and structures sufficiently support implementation and execution of the RAP. It needs an analysis of the financial process and the 

military structures to answer this question. Will the consensus decision-making model 

and the Open Door Policy stand the test of time? Or will Russia succeed in its strategy to 

break the NATO cohesion and be the winner in the end? 

The transatlantic NATO link between the United States and Europe has, since the 

birth of the organization in 1949, been one of its strongest points. Today this seems 

to be its Achilles heel. NATO appears to be a strong and cohesive Alliance, but under 

the surface, sometimes emotions run high. Disagreements about the participation in the 

war in Iraq in 2003 and the disproportional contribution of the United States to NATO, 

compared to the European member states, are chief concerns. The question is if member 

states are willing to solve these issues at all. Are they willing to carry the burden of longlasting, irreversible commitment? Are they politically willing to understand and accept 

each other’s differing points of view?311

During the Cold War, the United States provided a security umbrella for Europe 

to deter Soviet aggression. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States was the 

undisputed victor and world leader. An illustration of its power at that time was the 

first Gulf War in 1991. With its political and economic power, the United States was 

able to create an impressive multinational coalition. Its strong military power enabled 

the United States to turn its words into deeds at any particular moment. A focused 

information campaign supported its efforts to influence the domestic and international 

powerbrokers. It even felt strong enough to use the UN to provide the legal authority 

to take military action. Its strength and confidence ensured a positive result in the UN 

Security Council with its normally annoying VETO rule. Europe had the possibility to 

grow under the U.S. umbrella. 
75

However, the geopolitical, economic, and military environment has changed drastically. There is a rise of new and strong political, economic, and military powers in the 

form of China and Russia. New alliances like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 

South Africa) are important.312 Non-state actors, without Westphalian structures, are 

starting to gain global influence. More interstate and intrastate conflicts arising throughout the globe, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) issue, the Ukraine 

crisis, tension in the South China Sea, transnational terrorism, the Russian application 

of ambiguity, and non-traditional war, have transformed the global environment.313 It 

seems there is less political and economic appetite in the United States to project global 

power, and the decreasing defense budget supports this policy. Although the United 

States still wants to lead, building and empowering alliances is one of the solutions to 

set priorities and share the burden.314 Meanwhile, Europe continues to take advantage of 

the American security umbrella by skimping on their own defense spending.

NATO Soldiers during the opening ceremony of Exercise Saber Strike 2015. (U.S. Army Photo)
76

Meanwhile, the European view of Russia tends to diverge from that of Washington, 

D.C. Some Europeans view their relationship with Russia as of strategic importance for 

bilateral relations, especially trade. “They know that it would be shortsighted to engage 

in permanent confrontation with Russia because it is not sustainable and it would damage European interests.”315 This is different for the United States, which does not share a 

continent, nor has strong cultural or social links, and is economically less connected with 

Russia. Therefore, it is easier for the United States to impose sanctions against Russia.316

These opposing opinions collide behind the scenes of the most important transatlantic 

organization.

NATO must expand its strength and cohesion by implementing the RAP. Simultaneously, it is situated in the complex and stormy love-hate relationship between the 

United States and Europe. Think tanks in the United States tend to assert that NATO 

is “an institution not enhancing America’s strategic power.”317 They urge the United 

States to “stop treating national security as a form of welfare for other states.”318 But it 

is not a one way street; the United States has regional interests in Europe, too. These are 

the continuation of their leading role in the region, a decrease of the financial burden 

to NATO to more equality, a stronger burden sharing Europe, and projecting a strong 

counterweight policy against a rising Russia. Conversely, European interests are the 

continuation of U.S. involvement, especially its resources, a strong(er) and long-lasting 

relationship with Russia, and more focus on the European cooperation in, for example, 

the European Union (EU). And, by analyzing the interests of the United States and Europe, the differences become clear. 

To keep NATO relevant, both entities must show willingness to change and to invest politically, financially, and also mentally. To stay a global leader, the United States 

must accept that it has to share power with other power centers. In the case of Europe, 

it “has to be ready to accept that structures of power will develop independently of its 

influence.”319 Besides this, it has to guarantee the Alliance its focus and resources until 

the European allies increase their commitment. Finally, it must be prepared to accept 

to sometimes “agree to disagree” with the European partners. The European countries 

must show the willingness to increase their financial contribution to the agreed upon 

2%. They need to take responsibility for their security as they do for their economic development. And, like the United States, the European countries also must be prepared 

to accept to “agree to disagree.” NATO needs increased political dialogue and public 

diplomacy; Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides a perfect basis for this.320

NATO can support national interests both in the United States and in European NATO 

countries. If the parties manage to overcome the differences and muster the willingness, 

it is possible that “NATO in the twenty-first century could be an even more significant 

actor on the international scene than it was in the second half of the twentieth.”321

In this environment, NATO is trying to keep a grip on the situation. This is not easy. 

Russia is resisting NATO’s enlargement policy. Meanwhile, NATO is seen as under-performing and too slow. There seems to be dissatisfaction about the consensus decision-
77

making policy and questions about its ability to respond with military quickly. Therefore, scholars question the internal structures, like the Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe’s (SACEUR) role and the budgets, especially the way NATO covers its military 

missions and operations. Simultaneously, there also seems to be less commitment for 

enhanced engagement and participation, according to the United States, especially with 

NATO’s European members. On the other hand, there has been commotion in Europe 

since the United States’ “pivot to Asia” declaration. The European NATO members, 

especially those in Eastern Europe, question the United States’ commitment to NATO. It 

looks like NATO is situated in a political impasse with no visible incentive from countries to change. The sudden deterioration of the relationship with Russia, after the annexation of Crimea and its interference in Ukraine, makes conditions even more difficult. This is especially true for the European NATO members, because for them a stable 

relationship with Russia is essential.

Against this background, one wonders if NATO is able to take control of the situation. Can it still be as important as in the years after its foundation? Is it able to implement the RAP and thus improve its readiness and responsiveness, and show cohesion 

and willingness to invest in the future of the Alliance? The relationship between NATO 

and Russia is essential for NATO’s future and still central to defining the EuropeanTransatlantic regional and global security configuration. To achieve this, NATO needs 

adjustments not only in the military domain, but also in the political, financial, and 

cultural domains.

To increase readiness, responsiveness, and commitment to contribute, NATO should 

reconsider some of its internal affairs. A better way to share the financial burden for 

missions and operations amongst all member states needs a review of the financial process. Probably more “common funding” in those cases will increase into a willingness 

to contribute. Without the loss of civilian decision power, NATO should consider empowering the role and authority of SACEUR in the military process. For example, they 

should be able to execute an alert-exercise for the NATO Response Force (NRF)/Very 

High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) once a year or start a planning process without 

North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval. NATO, together with its member states, must 

start the discussion about quicker national approval processes for force employment 

and the use of force. It is understandable that a national NRF/VJTF contribution does 

not mean a complete transfer of authority to NATO without any restrictions. However, 

these processes need to be streamlined and better aligned with the current readiness and 

environmental requirements.

Finally, NATO should make clear to all member countries that its survival depends 

on their willingness to make it a success. The organization seems stymied due to transatlantic political differences and disagreements. Both the United States and Europe should 

understand the vital importance of this transatlantic link, and they must act and contribute accordingly. For the United States, this means accepting Europe’s different view 

and the importance of including Russia in future solutions. They should agree to disagree. Europe should show that they can cope with some issues themselves, and show 
78

their willingness to commit. That makes it possible for the United States to decrease 

its disproportionate contribution. However, it is essential to increase all European defense budgets to at least 2% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as soon as possible, as was 

pledged during the Wales Summit in 2014. Together, with the continuing U.S. commitment and its unique capabilities, NATO not only stays relevant, but can be an even more 

significant actor than it was before.
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CAN CYBER TRIGGER ARTICLE 5 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY?

Researcher: Colonel Joseph Barber, U.S. Army

The principle of collective defense is at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) founding treaty. The principal is enshrined in Article 5. NATO 

invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the 

United States; NATO has also taken collective defense measures on several occasions 

without invoking Article 5, for instance in response to the situation in Syria and in the 

wake of the Ukraine crisis. What is similar in all of these instances is that the attacks or 

incursions were conventional from one state to another state. With the recent increase 

in cyber-threats, espionage, and activities, especially by states unfriendly to NATO, the 

question is if NATO will invoke Article 5 for a cyberattack, and what constitutes such an 

attack. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a key alliance planning summit in 

mid-March of 2015 that “cyber is now a central part of virtually all crisis and conflicts. 

NATO has made clear that cyberattacks can potentially trigger an Article 5 response.” 

To accomplish this, “the alliance needs an innovation strategy for the coming decade.”322

This has prompted much debate from the NATO members as to what constitutes a cyberattack and what type of investment this will cost each country in the mutual defense 

of NATO. Some view Stoltenberg’s comments as bravado in invoking Article 5 over 

cyberattacks. Yet, the 2007 cyberattack against Estonia demands action. As NATO develops its cyber-strategy, it will need to take into account several key aspects of cyber to 

get at the core of the problem: Defining Nation State Cyber-Espionage; Defining Nation 

State Cyberattacks; and Development of Defense Strategies.

One of the most difficult problems concerning cyberwarfare is actually defining what 

it is: cyber-espionage, cyberattack, or malicious mischief. Many NATO nations and international bodies abroad have their own definitions, but none have narrowed it down 

to a single consensus. Factors like the extent and nature of the damage caused by the 

attack (material versus physical), the identity of the attack, and how the stolen information is used all influence the perception of cyber. One set of guidelines for nation-state 

cyberwarfare, the Tallinn Manual, attempts to provide definitions, procedures, and rules 

governing international cyber-operations.323 This manual, published in 2013 as a result 

of a conference hosted by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in 

Tallinn, Estonia, defines cyber-espionage as “an act undertaken clandestinely or under 

false pretenses that uses cyber-capabilities to gather (or attempt to gather) information 

with the intention of communicating it to an opposing party.”324 While most nations 

characterize cyber-espionage as specifically targeting secret information for malicious 

purposes, this definition does not address the intent of the attack, the nature of the information stolen, nor the damage done to the nation or business within the nation. For 

the purposes of International Law, the Tallinn Manual definition is appropriate and provides the basis to build upon and be ratified under International Tribunal. However, 

the obstacles facing nation-states now are legal and political ones, which is making it 

difficult for nation-states to defend themselves against cyberattacks. Cyberattackers are 

exploiting legal and political loopholes to conduct attacks against weaker nation-states 
80

without consequence. The Tallinn Manual definition needs to be updated to become an 

all-encompassing definition to allow victim states to take appropriate countermeasures 

for even the slightest cyber-intrusion. This will assist in providing a definition to the difference between a host nation and individual cyberattack.

Although, in science fiction movies, cyber is used to conduct physical harm to a 

nation-state, which is a clear attack, in reality, 99% of cyberattacks are not physical and 

deal with loss of service, information, or communication. Additionally, it is hard to ascertain in many instances (without further investigation) where and who exactly conducted the attack. There are several types of attacks; one type of these is Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), which is mainly used to disrupt a nation-state’s communication 

systems. DDoS is favored as it requires little resources against a larger, more powerful 

victim. Another type of attack encompasses using malware, such as viruses, worms, 

Trojan horses, etc., for disrupting or destroying information, collecting information, or 

disrupting normal operations. Another type of cyberattack uses “logic” bombs, which 

lie dormant until a specific time or are triggered by an event, disguising themselves to 

access private information without the users consent. The final type of cyberattack is the 

manipulation of video/audio technology to listen in on conversations or watch operations in real time. 

Open sources suggest that the most famous cyberattack in recent years is the Stuxnet 

virus, which was discovered in 2010. Stuxnet allegedly targeted Iranian nuclear facilities and was unique because it was the first major cyberattack that could inflict damage 

on the physical world as well as the digital world.325 Russia in recent conflicts has used 

cyber effectively. In 2007, in response to Estonia removing a Soviet-era World War II 

monument, Russia launched a massive DDoS attack on Estonia that shut down service 

to major websites and disrupted communications nationwide. In 2008, before Russia 

sent troops into Georgia, it used DDoS to shut-down communication systems, cutting off 

Georgia from the outside world. Lastly, in 2014, Russia used DDoS to disable Ukraine’s 

mobile phone communications network before employing traditional battlefield methods.326 Cyber-espionage and cyberattacks do not take place in the realm of warfare. They 

may be seen as criminally based, but NATO, under the grand strategy, needs to take aim 

at making all cyber-intrusions illegal and look for countermeasures to prevent attacks.

Deterrence is a useful counter-cyber/espionage strategy for NATO and its nationstates, provided under Article 5, as long as they garner the authority and the resources 

to carry it out. Deterrence in reference to cyber is when a nation or NATO convinces its 

enemy that it is willing and able to respond to cyber-intrusions using military force.327

The purpose for most nation-states is to use NATO’s might, under Article 5, to scare other nation-states from committing cyberattacks in the first place and thus preventing the 

need for retaliation. However, in the case of Russia and their use of cyber, the advantage 

clearly lies in an active defense. According to Article 5, defensive force must be “necessary and proportionate” to the attack that gave rise to the right.328 An active defensive 

network with counter-attack capabilities could provide a deterrence for Russia, if NATO 

responded quid pro quo. The response does not always need to be large-scale to be 
81

successful. For example, in 2007, Estonia responded to Russia’s DDoS attack simply by 

suspending certain services to computers with Russian Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. 

This simple defensive measure completely stopped all Russian cyber-incursions. 

For NATO to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty due to a cyberattack, it must 

first clearly define cyber-espionage/activity and have Jeffits definitions written into International Law. Second, they need to clearly articulate what constitutes an attack as 

defined by International Law. Lastly, they need to develop a playbook of defensive and 

offensive strategies to protect NATO countries from cyber-threats, with the invocation 

of Article 5 being a last resort. NATO has a way to go, especially just to catch up with 

the technology of modern times. Cyber has become an inherent form and part of warfare that nation-states are actively using and will into the future. Understanding this 

medium of warfare is inherent to establish International Law to prosecute individuals 

and hold nation-states accountable for transgressions. Getting all of NATO on a grand 

strategy will be the first step in being able to invoke Article 5 against a hostile nation. 

NATO will set a precedent when they do.

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CHAPTER 6: A NEW NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) 

APPROACH: THE VERY HIGH READINESS TASK FORCE (VJTF)

Lithuanian Soldiers at the 7th Army’s Joint Multinational Training Command’s 

Hohenfels Training Area. (U.S. Army Photo)

85

DETERRENCE, PROVOCATION, OR ASSURANCE: IS THE 

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION’S (NATO’S) VERY HIGH

 READINESS TASK FORCE (VJTF) THE RIGHT ANSWER?

Researcher: Colonel Kevin Copsey, Officer of the British Empire (OBE), British Army

NATO is facing a complexity of security challenges that threatens the alliance and 

the security of those countries who contribute to its collective defense. Russia’s interest 

in Ukraine altered the security landscape in Eastern Europe, and NATO has once again 

returned to its core task, Article 5—the ability to unite 28 countries if a member is attacked.329 NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg summarized the challenges now 

facing the Alliance: 

Today, Europe’s security environment is more complex and more unpredictable than for a 

generation. We live in an age of instability. With complex and interconnected challenges. We 

face a more assertive Russia which is destabilising the European security order. And we face 

extremism and violence across the Middle East and North Africa [MENA]. Fuelling the worst 

refugee and migrant crisis in Europe since World War Two.330

The Lithuanian Iron Wolf Brigade during a NATO Exercise. (U.S. Army Photo)

The rise in global tension led NATO to develop a strategy to realign the Alliance with 

the challenges stated by the Secretary General. One vital initiative is the generation of 

the VJTF, a “5,000 strong multinational land-based force, equipped with the appropriate 

air, maritime, and Special Forces, some of which are able to deploy within 2-3 days.”331

The VJTF is designed to ensure NATO remains a “strong, ready, robust and responsive 

Alliance.”332 Tasks for the VJTF include offensive operations, close air support, and responding to an attack from weapons of mass destruction. The concept is that NATO will 

sanction the immediate deployment of the VJTF as a crisis emerges to act as a deterrent 
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to further escalation,333 by countering Russia’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare tactics.334 The VJTF concept reached its full operating capability in June 2016. Led by Spain, 

the Task Force was successfully tested during Exercise Trident Juncture, a major NATO 

exercise consisting of 36,000 troops, over 140 aircraft, and more than 60 ships drawn 

from 36 countries.335 The United Kingdom (UK) has declared it will contribute 3,000 

personnel to the VJTF when it assumes the lead of the Task Force in 2017.336

In addition to the VJTF, NATO will place a non-permanent and constantly rotating Brigade-size force of approximately 3,000 personnel deployed to the Baltic States, 

Poland, Bulgaria, and Germany.337 The VJTF, and the increase in rotational forces, is designed to deter Russia. NATO’s Secretary General put it simply: “we will have as much 

presence in the east as needed.”338

COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, the Alliance agreed to a Readiness Action Plan 

(RAP), which outlined a “coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures,” 

to largely counter an assertive Russia following Moscow’s involvement in Crimea and 

its “subversive activity in eastern Ukraine.”339 The RAP has two pillars: adaptation and 

assurance. Adaptation, as outlined in the Secretary General’s 2015 report, is to “urgently 

implement long-term changes to NATO’s forces and command structure” and enhance 

the Alliance’s capability to react “swiftly and decisively.”340 The second theme, assurance, is the continual presence of land, sea, and air capability in those territories within 

the Alliance that are most vulnerable, such as the Baltic States and Poland.341 The creation of the VJTF is a result of NATO’s adaptation, which not only provides deterrence, 

but also a strategic level of assurance to those states that are susceptible to Russia’s 

aggressive, authoritarian, and nationalistic activity. The VJTF will meet this challenge 

by demonstrating the three core tasks of the Alliance: “collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.”342

The VJTF concept is not new. From 1961 onwards, NATO’s answer to the threat on 

its flanks rested on an often forgotten multinational unit called the Allied Mobile Force 

(AMF). Although designed as a Joint force, the AMF was based around a land component of Brigade strength. It had the ability to deploy rapidly to Norway or Turkey to 

swiftly deter any Russian aggression. Like the VJTF, the AMF was a political tool to 

demonstrate Alliance solidarity.343 An attack on the AMF was an attack on the Alliance. 

The VJTF is a modified concept of the AMF, designed to counter the security challenges 

in the North. However, NATO has now expanded, making the deployment and employment of this multinational force a possible strategic vulnerability to NATO. Conversely, 

the VJTF is an important statement of political unity that is part of a larger and more 

capable force that can deter or intervene in a crisis. 
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WHAT IS NATO’S VJTF RESPONSE FORCE TO DO? 

The VJTF is at the heart of a graduated reaction capability called the NATO Response 

Force (NRF), which comprises approximately 40,000344 personnel. The VJTF is the lead 

brigade in one of three multinational brigades within the NRF construct, with each one 

rotating annually into the high-readiness role.345 Once the VJTF brigade is deployed, 

the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will authorize the deployment of the two remaining 

NRF brigades (called the Immediate Follow-On Forces Group [IFFG]).346 In addition, the 

VJTF/NRF is augmented by a further Standing NATO Maritime Naval Group (SNMG), 

an increased air component (in the case of the Baltics, this force is based on the current 

Baltic Air-Policing Mission), a special operations force (SOF), and finally a chemical, 

biological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense regiment.347 The NRF fills the gap in ability to 

swiftly deploy to a crisis on the Alliance’s extremities (Scandinavia, Baltics, or Turkey) 

since the disbandment of the AMF. 

The NRF is touted as a “highly ready and technologically multinational force,”348 that 

is based on a framework nation for 12 months at a time. Once deployed, it will operate 

under a NATO Joint Force Headquarters at Brunssum or Naples with the capability to 

conduct three distinct roles. Firstly, the VJTF is to provide an immediate collective defense response capability prior to NATO ordering a full mobilization. Secondly, the Task 

Force could conduct “crisis management [and] peace support operations,” or “[d]isaster 

relief and the protection of critical infrastructure.”349

The NRF initiative is messaging two different audiences. The VJTF is a deliberate 

show of force and deterrent aimed directly at the Russian Government. Secondly, the 

Task Force provides assurance to those smaller NATO countries in Eastern Europe that 

are most concerned about Russia’s stance in international affairs – a move that is painfully evident in the Ukraine crisis.350 The VJTF is clearly a political instrument. Should a 

crisis continue to escalate, thereby requiring the NRF to deploy, then it would no longer 

be political symbolism, but warfighting, where the capability and not the nationality of 

the force will count.351

The VJTF and NRF are tools to ensure escalation dominance, and implicit deterrence, 

similar to those used during the Cold War. Escalation dominance, as defined by the European historian Xavier Pinat, is when a nation (or NATO) can deploy dominant capability “at each successive rung up the escalation ladder, all the way up to the top rung of 

nuclear weapons.”352 At its lowest rung, it is hoped that a multinational force such as the 

VJTF is able to act as a “tripwire” deterrent, which if crossed, and the VJTF is attacked, 

it is deemed an attack on the Alliance as a whole. A “tripwire” approach is nothing new, 

as the American economist and foreign policy advisor, Thomas Schelling, highlighted 

during the Cold War: “The garrison (of American troops) in Berlin is a fine collection of 

soldiers as has ever been assembled, but excruciatingly small. What can 7,000 Americans 

do. . . . Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically and in a manner that 

guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”353 The similarities between the multinational Berlin brigades as a tripwire and the VJTF are stark. The VJTF is but one activity 
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within a larger NATO demonstration of solidarity – but these notable initiatives are not 

part of a long-term strategy. 

NATO—TACTICS WITHOUT STRATEGY: THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN 

NORTH AND SOUTH

“NATO is a political organization with a military purpose”354 that is increasingly 

focused on providing political assurance to the new NATO members in Eastern Europe. 

Not all European countries share the same enthusiasm. Key Western European allies are 

“disinterested in adding fuel to Putin’s fire,”355 and would rather have NATO resources 

focused on combating terrorism and mitigating the flow of refugees from MENA and 

affecting NATO’s Southern flank. Despite this threat emerging from MENA, NATO officials admit, “There is no southern strategy, not yet.”356 The U.S. European Command 

and NATO’s Allied Command have provided negligible military support to the south, 

such as supporting the deployment of a NATO Maritime Task Group in March 2016 

to “tackle criminals responsible for smuggling refugees and migrants across the sea 

between Turkey and Greece.”357 Turkey, who is a key NATO member, recognized the 

threat emerging from MENA by requesting an Article 4 meeting to discuss amongst 

the allies how to address the crisis.358 Although the crisis has been debated amongst the 

NAC, there is little political appetite for NATO to become embroiled with European 

Union (EU) domestic concerns. This view is perhaps short-sighted.

Until now, NATO has been expanding without identifying the capabilities needed to 

defend its new Alliance partners.359 The Alliance’s newest members (such as the Baltic 

countries) “lack a large military on their soil and as a result they depend upon NATO 

(predominantly United States) assistance.”360 The rapid expansion to 28 countries, with 

Montenegro joining in 2016, is exposing a vulnerability within NATO caused by the 

divergent security perspectives amongst the Alliance’s European members and that of 

the United States.

FACING THE THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY NOT TERRITORY

The Wales Summit in September 2012 focused on avoiding an unlikely scenario—an 

unprovoked Russian military attack against a NATO member.361 However, they did not 

address two larger security concerns: “non-military exploitation by foreign actors of 

NATO members’ internal vulnerabilities and the security vacuum of European countries 

not belonging to NATO.”362 These two threats warrant some form of response, given 

Russia’s ability to avoid confrontation by inciting an “inner decay” within a European 

society—Eastern Ukraine is a constant reminder of that strategy. Yet, NATO believes its 

new VJTF can address these threats, asserting: “Any attempt to violate the sovereignty 

of one NATO member nation will result in a decisive military engagement with all 28 

allied nations.”363
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Russia’s strategy of targeting sovereignty and not territory is called “hybrid war,” 

which the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg defines as “the wide range of overt 

and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures designed to disrupt, confuse, 

damage, or coerce.”364 Ultimately, hybrid warfare seeks to exploit the seams and cracks 

within a society and its alliances. For NATO, this could mean that Russia is able to 

exploit the seams between the three core roles of the Alliance, which are “collective 

defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.”365

NATO leadership—a demonstration of political unity.366

NATO has yet to refine how it will address the advent of hybrid threats. It is perhaps 

here that the EU can take the lead. The EU has many soft levers of power to deal with hybrid challenges: socio-political, economic, trade and energy policies, and financial and 

economic sanctions. In terms of capacities, the EU is able to focus on a crisis where the 

state is threatened and extremist fighting continues.367

The VJTF could play an important supporting role in a hybrid scenario. Conceptually, NATO has three tasks in a hybrid security crisis: deterrence, defense, and de-escalation. The reinvigorated NATO that emerged from the 2014 Wales Summit is already 

expanding to include intelligence, early warning, increased cyber-defenses, and an efficient decision-making process for the Alliance.368 These developments will complement 

any EU initiative that is designed to counter a hybrid threat. In addition, the deployment of the VJTF will reduce pressure on a host government, theoretically allowing that 
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government to concentrate on non-military aspects of the threat it faces.369 For example, 

the VJTF could bolster domestic police forces to maintain internal security, provide improved border defenses, SOF, or humanitarian support, thereby denying an actor, such 

as Russia, the pretense it needs to “protect” the Russian diaspora.370

NATO needs to refine the VJTF and RAP strategy to counter the hybrid threats in the 

north and south. The Alliance should also seek to broaden its perspective and cooperate 

with civilian organizations and be less militarized in its thinking. However, NATO must 

not try to replicate those civilian capabilities and tasks that the EU is able to implement 

to counter a hybrid threat.371 Addressing the hybrid threat will be a significant challenge 

for NATO, as the last Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Philip 

Breedlove cautioned, the VJTF “should not militarize hybrid warfare,”372 over concerns 

that NATO’s actions may escalate beyond an irreversible tripwire into conflict. Such 

concern is warranted, hence the need to ensure any decision to deploy the VJTF/NRF is 

swift, well-thought-out, and legitimate. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE VJTF

Analysts question if the 2-7 days to deploy the VJTF is quick enough, especially since 

it took only 30 hours for Russia to seize its operational and strategic objectives in Crimea. 

Given the operational agility demonstrated by Russia, a week to decide if NATO should 

deploy to reinforce a member of the Alliance is simply too long. This plays to Putin’s 

strategic ambiguity,373 his unity of command, and interior lines of supply and reinforcement.374 Therefore, NATO must find a way to speed up its decision-making process. 

As Putin reportedly said, “If I wanted, Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two 

days, but [also] in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest too.”375 With such a stark 

warning, NATO must devise a way to seize or quickly regain the initiative. 

The decision to deploy the VJTF lies with the NAC, a 28-nation political decisionmaking organization based in Brussels, Belgium. The VJTF consists of many countries, 

with each one providing a vital capability that is interdependent on the other. The force 

is so integrated that, should an Alliance VJTF member veto the mission, the deployment of the Task Force is stopped in its tracks.376 The NAC is aware of this challenge, 

and as a result, SACEUR has been granted the authority to “alert, stage, and prepare” 

forces prior to seeking NAC approval.377 The NAC would then assume political control 

of the escalating situation and give direction on the deployment of the remaining NRF 

brigades. Although encouraging, this move does not compress the lengthy decisionmaking process. One option is to delegate the deployment of the VJTF to the Secretary 

General. This would be a variation to the 1999 Kosovo crisis where the Secretary General 

was delegated the authority to expand the target lists.378

Despite the challenges, there are reasons to be optimistic—NATO took less than a 

day to agree on an Article 5 response following 9/11. However, should the Alliance 

be faced with less stark aggression, the need for consensus may slow any appropriate 

military response against a quicker adversary.379 As the NATO Secretary General Jens 
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Stoltenberg warned, “It doesn’t help to have a force ready to move in 48 hours if it takes 

48 days to take a decision to make it move.”380

Lastly, there needs to be a frank discussion on how NATO can swiftly operate without United Nations (UN) legitimate authorization. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 

is supported by Article 51 of the UN Charter—the right of individual or collective selfdefense in the event of armed attack. Conversely, any NATO sub-Article 5 deployment 

(to address a hybrid threat for example) must be kept away from the UN where Russia 

could use its veto against military activity.381 The absence of UN legitimacy to deploy 

may concern some European NATO members. 

HOW TO OVERCOME THE LOGISTICAL COMPLEXITY

A rapidly deployable intervention force is needed to project NATO’s power quickly. 

Creating the VJTF is a good start; however, the follow-on forces are just as critical.382

Like other expeditionary operations, the initial force package must have the ability to be 

self-sustainable for a period before it requires replenishment. The arrival of a larger follow-on force will only increase the demand on NATO’s logistical apparatus, as well as 

stretch the patience and capability of whichever NATO country Task Force is deployed. 

This issue has been partially resolved through the generation of eight new NATO Force 

Integration Units (NFIU) that have been established in Eastern European countries to 

support planning, training, and reinforcements.383 Multinational Corps North East, a 

revitalized NATO headquarters based in Szczecin, Poland, is coordinating NFIC implementation.384 However, as NATO learned during the Cold War, the pre-positioning of 

stock can also hamper the allies since it determines an area of deployment and a key 

node that may be targeted.385 In addition to pre-positioning stock, the force must have 

the ability to swiftly deploy once the NAC gives authorization. Here the United States 

plays a key role. The United States currently does not provide forces for the VJTF (these 

are European only), although the Pentagon has pledged to deploy the Task Force using 

American strategic airlift if required. Hopefully, with the provision of U.S. airlift and the 

recent commitment by NATO countries to develop airfields and ports, the NFIUs will be 

able to ensure the swift arrival and integration of the VJTF and NRF.386

Hopefully, NATO has learned from the troubled history of the AMF. The strategic movement of the AMF was a significant weakness—one that was never resolved.387

The AMF did not have troops rotating through the commitment; some NATO countries 

designated them, with each one operating in nationally defined areas of operation.388

Conversely, the VJTF consists of multinational forces that rotate every year with little 

or no consistency in the capabilities being offered. Also, being multinational, the force 

must deploy from various countries and come together as a coherent force. As a result, 

the multinational VJTF organization not only makes the logistical burden significant, 

but it may also undermine the overall deterrence effect of the VJTF.389 It will simply 

take too long and is too complex. Although there are concerns, the VJTF is necessary to 

face NATO’s uncertain security dilemmas. Importantly, the VJTF demonstrates Alliance 

cohesion and resolve at a time when NATO may be deemed irrelevant.
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NATO’S RELEVANCE AND THE NEED FOR THE VJTF

The seizure of Crimea and Russian activity in Ukraine acted as an awakening for 

NATO, which until then was an Alliance that won the Cold War and was concluding its 

mission in Afghanistan. The 2014 NATO Summit in Wales brought the Alliance together 

once again to face the multiple security challenges through “resources, capabilities, and 

the political will required to ensure our Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge.”390

The new SACEUR, General Curtis Scaparrotti, recently reinforced this position as he assumed his new appointment in April 2016. He said, “even with the end of the Cold War, 

our NATO Alliance . . . remains vital as we face a new set of challenges,” identifying 

one of them as “a resurgent Russia, striving to project itself as a world power.”391 The 

agreement to generate a VJTF is only one response by NATO toward Russia’s belligerent 

stance and the wider insecurity facing the Alliance. Secretary General Stoltenberg also 

announced in May 2016, “an increase to NATO presence in the eastern part of [the] Alliance” (predominantly Turkey), in addition to “more air patrols, aerial surveillance, and 

deployment of anti-missile defenses.”392

The role of the U.S.: strategic airlift.393
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If NATO is to remain relevant, it must also address the blurred area between Article 

5 and Article 4, and the rise in hybrid threats. Articles 4 and 5 of the 1949 Washington 

Treaty are:

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 

America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 

such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 

self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 

Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 

Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 

maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council 

has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.394

As Russia has ably demonstrated in Ukraine, it is able to create an “inner decay” of a 

victim country, which negates the need (possibly) for a conventional Russian incursion. 

NATO should end the distinction between the two Articles, not in legal and decisionmaking terms, but in the ways and means to fulfill its strategic objectives. Moreover, 

NATO should move away from the pure military style of deployment and seek a more 

whole-of-society approach, in order to have greater interaction and coordination with 

the EU, which is better suited (in a complimentary way) to work alongside NATO in the 

European neighborhood.395 As a result, a more robust and adaptable VJTF is needed to 

tackle the kaleidoscope of security challenges the Alliance now faces.

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES LEAD THE VJTF?

The role of the United States—politically and militarily—in NATO is vital for the 

existence of the Alliance. The primary contributors of the VJTF are European nations, 

with the United States providing high-end military assets, such as: airborne intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), combat sustainment, mid-air refueling, and strategic lift to deploy the force.396 These capabilities are already based in Europe and would 

be re-assigned from the U.S. European Command as part of a larger military investment 

in Europe. Indeed, NATO’s new “deterrent” posture coincided with a recent announcement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, that the Pentagon will provide $3.4 

billion of funding for forces stationed and training in Europe.397 Carter believes, “This is 

the first chapter of a very good book for Europe in terms of U.S. commitment.”398

Given the likely slow decision-making of the NAC to launch the VJTF, it is possible 

that a large part of the Task Force could be American.399 Such a move would be easy to 

implement. The SACEUR is also the commander of the U.S. European Command. He 
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has the requisite legal authorities to reduce readiness and commence a deployment of 

U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR) elements, with its commander assuming the immediate 

role of NATO Land Component Commander, which would be augmented by NRF elements as they deploy. This move would ensure NATO maintains its edge over Moscow 

should other NATO members hesitate to deploy the VJTF.400

It is pivotal the United States remain involved in Europe, despite recent American 

domestic criticisms over some European countries “free-loading” or “not pulling their 

weight.”401 Such comment is perhaps unfair. The VJTF is primarily focused on a deployment to the Baltics. Each Baltic State has a small military (although Estonia exceeds the 

NATO standard of spending 2% of its Gross Domestic Product [GDP] on defense). Yet, 

despite their size, these NATO members have demonstrated their commitment to the 

Alliance by contributing significantly to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and the generation of the VJTF and the NFIUs. Elsewhere, other NATO countries such as Turkey, 

Italy, Greece, and Spain have all deployed significant assets to stem the consequences of 

the protracted conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. It is because NATO’s European states 

are distracted by the migrant and Eurozone crisis that it is important the United States 

plays an active role in the strategic deterrence of Russia. The United States should not 

undermine its deterrent posture by reducing its forward presence in Europe or their 

overall military commitment to NATO. Although maintaining such a presence is expensive, the rewards of peace and stability in Europe is worth it.402

MANAGING THE RUSSIAN REACTION TO THE VJTF

The deployment of the VJTF and its exercises in Eastern Europe will lead to a direct 

increase in the NATO military footprint, which is a particular sore spot for Russia.403

Some European countries worry that Russia will see the RAP as a provocative measure 

that will only escalate the already high tension in the region.404 The Russian’s claim that, 

ever since the re-unification of Germany, NATO has abandoned the agreements made 

in the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty, which states that forces would not be based 

alongside Russia’s border. The NRF/VJTF and other NATO initiatives are, as Moscow 

sees it, a breach of trust.405 In addition, the expansion of NATO members and recent 

U.S. announcement to increase rotational deployments along NATO’s eastern flank is 

playing to Putin’s mindset of being right.406 As a result of NATO action, Russia has responded.

NATO conducted over 300 exercises in 2015.407 The larger exercises consisted of 

6,000 personnel. Over the same period, Russia had deployed 100,000 across the Russian 

border with Europe. Added to this impressive figure is an unknown number based in 

Crimea and subversively operating in Eastern Ukraine. Although a considerable force, it 

is assessed that the Russian military operating along Europe’s border include significant 

numbers of unmotivated, non-paid or scarcely trained conscripts. However, it is still a 

large force that could easily ignite a crisis.408

The implementation of the VJTF has been called “destabilizing” by the Russian 

Foreign Ministry, which claims the NATO Alliance is “designed to contain Russia.”409
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Indeed, Russia describes NATO’s RAP as “a major threat that requires Russia to acquire 

new weapons, modify its military doctrine, and take other expensive and unneeded responses.”410 NATO may feel Russia’s reaction is expensive and unnecessary, but in early 

May 2016, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Moscow will establish 

up to three new military divisions in the West and South by the end of 2016 to counter 

“the buildup of NATO forces in close proximity to Russia’s border.”411

Russia’s military transformation.412

A major issue is that Russia doesn’t have the same strategic culture as NATO. On 

one hand, NATO’s RAP, which includes the VJTF, sends a strong message of assurance 

to the newer members of NATO such as the Baltic States and Poland. Conversely, Putin 

does not see the RAP as a reason to de-escalate in the region, hence the Russian military 

transformation. Therefore, NATO must continue to engage in a transparent manner and 

maintain a balance between being “convincing” without “provoking” Russia.413

Clearly, the RAP must not be abolished because of Russia’s sensitivities. To do so 

would demonstrate a sign of weakness amongst the Alliance, a fracture that Putin would 

exploit. Instead, Russia should be encouraged to look inwards for its security threats; 

it has “demographic challenges, intermittent terrorist threats, and an economy overly 

dependent on natural resource exports.”414 These areas are the source of Russia’s instability, not the 3,000 personnel as part of NATO’s VJTF. 
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As Colonel Douglas Mastriano, a U.S. Army military historian observes, “of concern, 

Moscow need not confront NATO to get what it wants. By leveraging deception, the 

Kremlin can retain strategic agility and gradually assert influence over its neighbors 

without actually going to war with NATO.” He adds, “With such an approach, Russia can secure its strategic objectives with minimal risk.” The ultimate goal, however, 

would be to discredit NATO, thereby threatening the security of the Baltic States.415 To 

do so would drive a wedge between NATO and the EU, a strategy advocated by the 

ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu as follows: “when he is united, divide him . . . attack 

his strategy, disrupt his alliances.”416

CONCLUSION: ISSUES FOR NATO TO CONSIDER

Although NATO has been involved in costly adventures in Afghanistan, Libya, and 

the Balkans, the Alliance has now returned to its original core role of Article 5 of the 

Washington treaty. VJTF/NRF commitment is the most significant initiative by NATO 

in adapting to its security challenges. Although preparing for the Article 5 contingency, 

NATO must recognize that most risk occurs at the Article 4 level through hybrid activity. To counter the hybrid threat, the VJTF/NRF can help alleviate the pressure of 

domestic governments and the EU. To make the VJTF credible, more work is required to 

mobilize the full diplomatic, military, economic, finance, and law enforcement capabilities of NATO, especially if faced with a hybrid threat. NATO understands “its need to 

change—change the way it operates, change the way it invests, change the way it plans, 

and change the way it makes decisions to deal with these new security circumstances.”417

Given Russia’s involvement in Crimea and Ukraine, and its mounting assertiveness 

in the Baltic States, the VJTF/NRF will be a vital capability in the defense of NATO allies. Key is the political cohesion to ensure the VJTF can swiftly deploy. There must be 

unity, confidence, and resolve in meeting the challenge, such as delegating appropriate authorities to NATO Secretary General and SACEUR. The challenges of command, 

control, and logistics of a diverse multinational force are formidable, but NATO has 

continually adapted over its 65-year history. However, with Russia-NATO relations at 

their lowest point since the Cold War, it is critical the Alliance reiterates the intentions 

of the NRF to ensure no Russian backlash. 

NATO has already proven itself in the most demanding of operational environments. 

The Alliance brought peace and stability to the Balkans and Kosovo, and came out of the 

Afghan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission stronger and refined by 

fire. Here, on the Afghan fields of battle, the new NATO members proved their military 

capability and political resolve as dedicated supporters of the Alliance. Moreover, the 

ongoing training and deployments taking place amongst the Alliance members means 

that the VJTF, although it may have its challenges, will demonstrate a reinvigorated and 

capable NATO. 
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CHAPTER 7: ADAPTING POLICY TO 

THE NEW RUSSIA

Russian Military Parade at Red Square in 2016. (Kremlin Photo)

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ADAPTING U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEW RUSSIA

Researcher: Colonel Ryan Wolfgram, U.S. Army

When former President Obama took office in 2009, he instituted a new approach toward Russia. This was evident in former Vice President Biden’s visit to Munich, where 

he declared, “it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we 

can and should be working together with Russia.”418 Ruth Deyermond suggested that 

“the reset aimed to reverse the severe decline in U.S.-Russia relations which had taken 

place during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush.”419 Although Russia was under the leadership of Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin really retained the 

key to power. Yet, President Medvedev and President Obama seemingly advanced this 

so-called reset and promoted a foreign policy that appeared somewhat neoliberal. For 

the moment, it seemed that the reset was working. As Ms. Dreyermond declared, “The 

signing of a new arms control treaty, Russian assistance on Afghanistan, greater Russian 

cooperation on Iran, the Russian decision not to block United Nations (UN)-sanctioned 

action in Libya in spring 2011, and Russia’s accession to the WTO [World Trade Organization] are all indicators of this success.”420

However, the failures from this policy outweigh the achievements, thereby making 

the reset an inhibitor to an effective strategy for countering Russian aggression. For example, the annexation of Crimea, violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty,421 and the shoot down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17,422 stand as a stark testimony 

in the failure of this policy. These forced the United States to reevaluate its foreign policy 

toward Russia. Two actions conducted by Russia’s military have validated Vladimir 

Putin’s agenda as well as provided some insight into his grand strategy. Gustav Gressel says that, “Russia’s military modernization and re-emergence as an expansionist, 

revisionist actor on Europe’s eastern borders has profound strategic consequences for 

Europe.”423 These actions are a precursor of how Vladimir Putin intends to achieve his 

strategic ends.

The first action occurred as a result from the war with Georgia. The effects of this 

affected the Russian economy, as noted by Jacek Wieclawski: 

Quite surprisingly for the Russian governing elite the intervention in Georgia generated a 

massive outflow of capital from the Russian market resulting in a huge drop of indexes on the 

Moscow Stock Exchange and depreciation of the Russian ruble. The outflow reached about 

$130 billion at the end of 2008 and Russian attempts to stabilize ruble largely failed.424

Mr. Gressel says that, “Russian forces were slow in mobilising and deploying to the 

theatre. . . . Tactical and operational planning was poor and inflexible, as was leadership. 

Situation awareness was poor, and led to many incidents of ‘friendly fire’.”425 Therefore, 

while Russia took some time to learn from its military blunders, it openly challenged 

U.S. foreign policy in one area—the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). 
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Josh Rogin, a senior correspondent for the Daily Beast on national security affairs, 

reported the first documented occurrence:

November 27, 2012, two top Obama administration officials held a closed-door hearing . . . 

acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller 

and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon told lawmakers that Russia had violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).426

This was, in many ways, the true reemergence of Vladimir Putin as the President of 

Russia and his exercising of control that even threatened the civil liberties of its citizens. 

BBC News wrote, “US state department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the US was 

‘concerned about both the verdict and the disproportionate sentences . . . and the negative impact on freedom of expression in Russia’.”427 This violation and others directly 

challenged U.S. interests as listed in the National Security Strategy (NSS): “American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the world—including 

the freedoms of speech . . . [the right to] choose leaders democratically; and the right to 

due process and equal administration of justice.”428 These events, along with the modernization of Russia’s military, adaptation of tactics, and the education of its leaders to 

confront the West, was the beginning of the end for President Obama’s reset policy. The 

policy completely collapsed with the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing Russian-led 

war in Eastern Ukraine.

EXPANSIONIST AGENDA REVISITED

The encroachment of Eastern Ukraine was the next step in Mr. Putin’s grand strategy 

for an expansionist, revanchist agenda. To gain insight as to why Vladimir Putin is pursuing this agenda, it is helpful to consider a recent study that looked at the population 

of ethnic Russians now living in Ukraine. The study stated, “Most people living in the 

eastern part of the country hardly knew any Ukrainian and preferred to speak Russian. 

All these people suddenly became strangers in their own land.”429 Mr. Putin wants to 

reconnect Russians to Russia, saying in a recent interview with 60 Minutes:

In an instant 25 million Russian people found themselves beyond the borders of the Russian 

state, although they were living within the borders of the Soviet Union. Then, all of a sudden, 

the [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] USSR collapsed—just overnight, in fact. . . . And all 

of a sudden, they turned out to be outside the borders of the country. You see this is a huge 

problem. . . . Do you think it’s normal that 25 million Russian people were abroad all of a 

sudden? Russia was the biggest divided nation in the world. It’s not a problem? Well, maybe 

not for you. But it’s a problem for me.430

The Russian president is using the diaspora to exploit a vulnerability in the region via 

a proxy separatist movement. With this in mind, Russian General Valery Gerasimov 

(Army Chief of Staff) asserted, “that the involvement of the population’s protest potential was becoming a new method for carrying out combat operations.”431
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Stephen R. Covington goes on to say, “Russia today is a system change power. Putin’s 

breakout strategy is designed to destabilize, and the approach seeks to unfreeze frozen 

conflicts, break rules, and foster tensions where useful to accelerate the melting away 

of Europe’s proven security principles and rules.”432 The Russian Chief of Staff agrees 

with this emerging Russian military approach; Gerasimov states that non-military versus military methods are his focus:

He makes the important comment that non-military measures are occurring at a rate of 4:1 

over military operations. This is an important point, and one that encourages the use of surrogates. Covert operations, to include information warfare measures and special operations 

forces [SOF], accompany such methods.433

Though this strategy is not new, it brilliantly exploits ethnic divides to create a line of 

buffer zones around Russia’s borders. This is what Dmitri Trenin calls, “liberating the 

territory of Novorossiya.”434

The vision Mr. Putin has for Russia is as a powerful regional hegemony with the 

ability to threaten the very stability of Europe. Understanding this expansionist agenda, 

in light of the insolvent U.S. reset policy, demonstrates that the West is overdue for a 

viable policy and strategy. This reevaluation is necessary not only because of the war in 

Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea, but also Russia’s continued violation of treaties 

and agreements. The growing list of Moscow’s broken promises and treaty violations 

include the Budapest Memorandum, the INF, and the Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe (CFE), among others.

U.S. POLICIES

In light of the breach of treaties and violations of international borders, the United 

States must act swiftly to counter this assertive Russian policy. Before being able to 

grapple with this, however, the United States needs to act to get its own house in order. 

Among the chief obstacle is its annual budget as encapsulated by sequestration or better 

known as the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011.435 Mr. Kogan, a senior fellow with the 

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, states that, “The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 

2011 imposed caps on discretionary programs reducing funding by more than $1 trillion over the ten years from 2012 through 2021.”436 Though a budget passed, providing 

the Department of Defense the necessary funds to meet identified requirements, it will 

expire in 2017. If a follow-on budget does not pass, then the constraints listed in the 

BCA of 2011 will reduce the Department of Defense’s ability to accomplish U.S. objectives during the remaining years. This will affect modernization and training and trigger 

additional reductions in force structure, thereby creating an opportunity for a potential 

adversary to challenge the United States.

Russia has demonstrated that it will no longer abide by the INF. Of this, The New 

York Times reporter Michael Gordon said: “The United States has concluded that Russia 

violated a landmark arms control treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched cruise 
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missile.”437 This undermines cooperation for nuclear arms control,438 and can trigger an 

arms race. A recent article published in Russia Direct stated:

that the head of the Russian delegation at negotiations discussing military security and arms 

control, Anton Mazur, announced that as of March 11, Moscow will cease its participation 

in the Joint Consultative Group within the framework of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (CFE). In this manner, Russia has withdrawn from the treaty that it suspended back in 2007.439

The CFE limits military force structure and thereby prevents the United States and 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the ability to counter Russian aggression.440

With Russia no longer limiting its behavior within the confines of the INF, and if the 

remaining signatories continue to abide by the treaty, they are not only risking the credibility of U.S. policy, but also leaving exposed the credibility of NATO.

The U.S. NSS is clear on its position regarding security and unequivocally states that, 

“The first is the security of . . . allies/partners and the second is the international order 

advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity.”441 These 

core interests highlighted in both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), soon to be 

called the Defense Strategy Review (DSR), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) show 

our written resolve to pursue two of the six national security interests nested within the 

NSS. 

The two interests listed in the QDR and the NMS, “the security, confidence, and reliability of our allies; and the preservation and extension of universal values,” are vital to 

the United States.442 In reviewing these documents, there is a consistent theme of building partner capacity (BPC). BPC is the U.S. military working with allies and partners to 

provide for the defense of their interests while protecting the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of their homeland. The United States enables this capability through exercises 

and training designed to assist in raising the level of proficiency for these militaries. 

Another consideration in regards to BPC is assisting in the acquisition of military equipment; for example, “approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of 

Lithuania for Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles and associated equipment,”443 and “approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Estonia for Javelin missiles.”444 BPC allows 

for broad latitude in the protection of U.S. interests abroad while providing for the assurance that the United States is a valuable partner in the protection of sovereignty and 

the territorial integrity of our allies and partners.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

In reviewing these three separate policies, it is clear how each can have a direct or indirect impact on the overall U.S. foreign policy toward Russia. What does require a little 

more explanation is how all the elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, 

military, and economic instruments [DIME]) have proven ineffective in addressing Russia’s aggression. Concerning the diplomatic element, President Putin has continually 

shown a nuanced interpretation for every violation of a treaty, violation of sovereignty 

and territorial integrity, and disregard for human rights.
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An example is evidenced with Russia’s interpretation for its non-support of the CFE 

and the INF; its continual ignoring of requests for a withdrawal from Georgia, Crimea, 

and Eastern Ukraine; and finally, a disregard for the civil liberties of its civilians, such 

as freedom of speech. In each of these, the diplomatic element of power, whether it is 

the U.S. President, Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, produced nothing and 

actually strengthened the image and popularity of Vladimir Putin.445 With the informational element of power, Russia presents Western powers as the evildoers by continually spinning the information and creating a common enemy for the people of Russia to 

unite.446 The United States struggles to dominate the information domain and has little 

success in moving public opinion unless Mr. Putin miscalculates and crosses a line with 

his own population.

The economics involved have amounted to sanctions against Russia, but when asking the average Russian citizen about the effect of sanctions on the economy, “86% stated 

it was having an effect.”447 In a recent blog by Mr. Wilson, a former chief economist for 

Ernst & Young, he said that:

The economic sanctions imposed after the invasion of the Crimea peninsula have produced 

deeper damage than anyone expected . . . western countries prevented Russian companies 

from raising money in Europe and the United States and have also blocked arms trades.448

Gustav Gressel confirmed this by commenting, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and 

collapsing energy prices, have caused severe setbacks for Russian rearmament programmes.”449 However, he adds, “Although the low oil price, among other factors, 

may cause delays, most modernisation programmes should yield their first results by 

2020.”450 Though rearmament is suffering, Russia’s military modernization continues. 

The last element of national power is that of the military. It is noteworthy that military 

actions carried out by the United States continue to assure our allies and partners in the 

region of its commitment to create a capability focused on interoperability between national militaries. Exercises such as these have “sent a signal to Russia regarding NATO 

resolve.”451 However, Russia is also signaling to the Western powers: 

A Russian ‘snap exercise’ conducted in March 2015, which brought together 80,000 military 

personnel. . . . The NATO ‘Allied Shield’ exercise conducted in June 2015, which brought under one framework four distinct exercises taking place along the Eastern flank of the Alliance, 

totaling 15,000 personnel from 19 Members states and three partner states.452

The large number of soldiers and assets the Russians employed validated what 

Gressel highlighted as the culmination of training months prior: “All of the exercises 

involved the quick mobilisation of Russian transport to the theatre and the earliest possible ‘resuming’ of offensive operations.”453 These exercises, whether the Zapad or the Lagoda, “indicate that Russia’s military thinking is offensive in nature and geared toward 

expansion, not defence.”454
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Mr. Gressel goes even further to say that the lack of modernization of forces in Europe will do little to counter the technological advances of the Russian military.455 Specifically, he states, “During the post-Cold War ‘interbellum’ (1989-2014) the readiness of 

some European member states’ armies degraded considerably.”456 After considering the 

military element of national power, to include taking a glimpse at our allies and partners 

capabilities and capacities, it is evident that the period from 2008 to 2014 saw the initial 

reform of the Russian military while the United States reduced its footprint in Europe 

and embraced a policy of BPC. Gressel sums it best: “European armies in particular are 

not large enough to practise combined arms manoeuvre warfare on their own, still less 

to carry out larger joint operations.”457

Vladimir Putin during the May 9, 2016 Victory Day Parade. (Kremlin Photo)

THE DRIVERS OF INSTABILITY

Western economic sanctions are having an effect on the Russian way of life for its 

citizens. Pew Research demonstrates this, and the articles from Wilson and Gressel validate the impact to society and the military. The concern is in the identification of the 

tipping point, for this driver of instability. What will transpire when Russian economic 

conditions deteriorate too much and if Vladimir Putin decides to color the issue by stoking national pride with the annexation of one of the Baltic States? Mr. Wilson states, 

“The drop in the value of trade is indicative of the collapse in economic activity. During 

the first eight months of [2015], imports have declined by 39 percent while exports have 

dropped by almost 30 percent.”458 Could this be an indicator of future aggression? 
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Mr. Gressel adds, “unforeseen events in world politics might persuade Russia that 

its European export market might collapse anyway or that the chances for expansion are 

now better than they will be.”459 The struggling Russian economy could be the trigger 

that drives President Putin to continue his expansionist agenda.

This leads to the next driver of instability—President Vladimir Putin. He was the 

master puppeteer of Russia during his first two terms as president. Then, Putin worked 

behind the scenes as the Prime Minister of Russia before re-ascending to where he is 

again president. Mr. Putin is a driver of instability because of how he views the region. 

Of this, Covington says, “Putin’s choice reflects a view that Russia can only address 

its non-competitiveness by changing the world around Russia, and most critically, by 

changing the European security system.”460

Covington continues, “His policy requires a changed Europe to enhance Russian 

strategic competitiveness and requires a changed Europe to avoid political change inside Russia.”461 Therefore, no matter what the policy, it is a necessity that the current 

European security structure must change.462 A recent RAND study stated, “Putin’s view 

of foreign policy is deeply shaped by his own experience, including as a former KGB 

[Soviet Committee for State Security] officer, and that a zero-sum, strictly realpolitik 

view of the world permeates all his interactions with the West.”463 Putin is a realist, who 

not only sees opportunity, but also is waiting for the appropriate time to realize his 

expansionist agenda. His overall end state is the establishment of Russia as a de facto 

regional hegemony.

RISK

There are three risks that challenge the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. The first 

of these is not implementing a coherent strategy that safeguards the credibility of the 

NATO alliance. The second risk is Russian exploitation of disparate U.S. policies. The 

final risk is not implementing an improved strategy. The impact of these risks, if not 

properly addressed, will have disastrous consequences and will open the door for Russia to openly challenge NATO’s Article 5 and the global reach of the United States.

Former President Obama reaffirmed the U.S. position on NATO in 2014, during a 

visit to Estonia, saying:

Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever 

ask again, ‘who will come to help,’ you’ll know the answer—the NATO Alliance, including 

the Armed Forces of the United States of America. We’ll be here for Estonia.464

To ensure the credibility of the United States and its obligations under Article 5 of the 

NATO Treaty, it is imperative that a comprehensive strategy materialize. Yet, Russia 

continues to prepare its military for rapid notice deployments against NATO members 

in Eastern Europe.465 In mitigating this risk, BPC will enable our partners in defending 
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against gray zone conflict, specifically hybrid warfare.466 Any action initiated by Russia 

requires a response, and if the U.S. action is slow or perceived as a show of non-support 

to its NATO members, then the credibility of U.S. foreign policy is threatened.

Risks of disparate or contradictory policies, when taken collectively, reduce the effectiveness of an overarching U.S. foreign policy. The recurring congressional policy on 

funding unnecessarily threatens the U.S. military by placing self-induced domestic pressure that reduces the combat effectiveness of the U.S. military. This caustic policy limits 

the readiness of our armed forces, reduces the training readiness of the total force, and 

cripples its ability to provide a timely response in defense of NATO.

U.S. Defense Policy and Russia’s disregard for the CFE and INF treaties places selfimposed constraints on the other treaty signatories and limits the United States’ ability 

to show assurance in times of conflict by not providing a substantial force to ensure a 

credible deterrence. Then there are the U.S. national strategic documents that mention 

how the approach of BPC limits deterrence through increased assurance. Some believe 

the reason for this approach is the common belief that this is a cost saving measure 

created by “budget hawks on the hill”467 to work in the confines of the BCA mentioned 

earlier.

The remaining risk is in not implementing a revised strategy that allows a whole of 

government approach to work toward a clear strategic end state. This end should counter Russian aggression in a proactive manner, vice the typical reaction to Russian acts 

of violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity after the fact. What adds to this risk 

is the element of time. It is this researcher’s assessment that for the next 12 months the 

United States is vulnerable to belligerent actors testing the will of the political leaders of 

this country. With this being an election year, and the President’s constructivist view,468

President Putin may see an opportunity to achieve an easy win.

RISK MITIGATION

To mitigate the risks delineated above, there is a requirement to synchronize all 

factors affecting U.S. foreign policy toward Russia. There must be a unifying effort by 

the National Security Council (NSC) to support the synchronization of these policies 

through the development of a strategy to focus the elements of national power. To bring 

these disparate policies in line, there must be discussion on dissolving the CFE or at least 

modifying it to allow for the movement and basing of military forces and equipment in 

the Eastern European region to better assure our allies threatened by the Russian Zapad

and Lagoda exercises.

The United States needs to reinforce the Budapest memorandum with its own style 

of hybrid warfare. This will reestablish the damaged credibility of the United States by 

not conducting a visible counter action to Russia’s violation of Ukrainian and Georgian 

sovereignty and territorial integrity. This strategy should incorporate all the elements 

of national power. There has been sufficient use of the diplomatic and the economic ele-
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ments of power, but what is lacking is the use of military force and an effort to counter 

Russia’s antagonistic information campaign. A recent RAND study stated:

Western media proved to be particularly vulnerable to Russian information warfare operations because, in line with the principle of providing balanced opinions, enough airtime had 

to be provided for the Russian narratives as well, even if they were blatantly false, often selfcontradictory interpretations.469

The next year is one of increased vulnerability, and if the United States is going to remain 

a leader on the world stage, then it must not fall victim to what Henry Nau phrased as 

“the malaise of multilateralism.”470

CONCLUSION

U.S. foreign policy requires coordination to be credible in countering Russia’s expansionist agenda in Eastern Europe. The policy of reset has failed, and the current U.S.-

Russia policy of assurance, deterrence, and cooperation needs expansion. In reviewing 

all three disparate policies affecting foreign policy, it is easy to see the impact, but it was 

not until this discussion that the seams became visible; and therefore, U.S. credibility is 

at stake. In discussing the risks, the articulation of a few mitigation actions can suggest 

ways for incorporating two underutilized elements of DIME—the information and military elements. The current U.S. foreign policy is ineffective because of the constraints 

established in these underlying policies. This produces an uncoordinated effort preventing the credibility of an effective and comprehensive foreign policy. This, along with 

the element of time, presents a vulnerability for the United States and a corresponding 

opportunity for belligerent actors to capitalize on an assessed weakness.

To salvage the credibility of U.S. foreign policy, senior leaders must address the lack 

of synchronization. Policy fratricide will continue if there is no unifying effort orchestrated by the NSC to support the synchronization of disparate policies. For example, 

with an unsupported CFE, the United States could move and base military forces and 

equipment in Eastern Europe and thereby ensure the NSC addresses all three disparate policies by modifying each to support the overall foreign policy of assurance and 

deterrence. The NSC Deputies meeting is the appropriate entity to ensure a coherent, 

coordinated, and credible foreign policy because the appropriate leaders in attendance 

can represent the interests for the underlying policies affecting the overarching foreign 

policy. At this meeting, identification of the seams will show the gaps requiring corrections. Sending these corrected gaps to the NSC Primaries meeting will guarantee implementation actions ensuring that underlying policies are correct and produce a focused 

comprehensive foreign policy.

The second area to ensure credibility is by incorporating the U.S. media establishment and social media conglomerates to join in the fight and contribute to blocking 

Russian narratives. A way to implement this recommendation is through the creation of 

joint venture between the Department of Defense and U.S. companies. This would most 
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likely require a revision of existing rules and regulations allowing the access of private 

companies to sensitive military events or situations so the creation of an effective counter information campaign can produce a viable strategy to counter Russian narratives. 

This acknowledges that the U.S. military cannot win in the information arena without 

the assistance of industry. 

The final recommendation is to protect against the element of time by immediately 

supporting the two previous recommendations. With a non-supported CFE, the United 

States can permanently base a division headquarters, with enablers, in Eastern Europe 

to provide the appropriate synchronization of forces and efforts within the region. This 

might look like a Division Tactical Action Center (DTAC) under the command of a onestar general officer forward positioned in Latvia. This will send the appropriate message 

to Russia and reinforce the U.S. foreign policy of deterrence. The NSC should convene to 

approve the moving and basing of a DTAC to Latvia while ensuring it has the requisite 

enablers to be a credible and effective tool for the President to counter any expansionist 

agenda by Russia.

Protecting the credibility of the United States requires the implementation of the 

aforementioned mitigation strategies and recommendations by the senior leaders within 

the government. Otherwise, President Putin will continue with his expansionist agenda, 

and the United States will lose its standing as a global hegemony. This will forever 

change the security situation in Europe and undermine the 70 years of general peace 

and stability that the United States, in concert with its allies, has provided the region. 

Failure to act with determination could forever damage U.S. and European relations and 

cooperation. Such a breach of trust could have catastrophic economic effects that would 

be impossible for Washington, D.C. to overcome.
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CHAPTER 8: VANQUISHING THE SPHINX

Russian RS-24 Yars Mobile Nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missile on parade in Moscow to mark the 

70th anniversary of the end of WW II. (Kremlin.ru)

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VANQUISHING THE SPHINX: ANSWERING THE HARD QUESTIONS

FACING THE BALTICS

Researchers: Officers and Soldiers of the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF)

 Headquarters, under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Vahur Murulaid

In ancient Egyptian and Greek mythology, a fearsome beast called the Sphinx roamed 

the region around Thebes wreaking havoc and killing any who could not answer its 

riddle. At long last, the tragic Greek hero Oedipus faced the Sphinx, answered its riddle 

and secured his throne.

Oedipus defeats the Sphinx by answering its riddle. Painting by Francois-Xavier Fabre, 1808.

In a similar fashion, the Baltic nations face difficult questions. If these go unanswered, or 

incorrectly responded to, there could be severe consequences. Lieutenant Colonel Vahur 

Karus answers the top five questions facing the region created by a hostile aggressive 

Russian foreign policy.
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1. What would Russian hybrid war look like, and what can be done to prevent 

ethnic minorities from being used in the Baltic region to advance Moscow’s strategy?

The Kremlin does not disguise its hostility toward the West and its main institutions: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). 

After all, Western values such as democracy, pluralism, transparency, human rights, 

freedom, and the rule of law would be a death knell to a kleptocratic authoritarian regime. Moscow viewed with great alarm the “color revolutions” that led to freedom in 

Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Fearing that this was in store for the regime in Russia, 

the Kremlin set out to delegitimize, discredit, and undermine Western policies and institutions as well as the entire post-Cold War security order. With such a perspective, the 

Russian National Security Strategy describes NATO and the West as a threat to its regional 

and global ambitions.

The Kremlin’s strategic end state is to restore Russia’s status as a great power with 

the associated benefit of dominating Eastern Europe. Leveraging its military power is 

central to this objective. Moscow uses its military to not only flex its muscles, but to also 

deflect attention from Russia’s economic troubles and the regime’s growing domestic 

repression. Not unlike how Hitler used military adventurism to rally Germany, or when 

Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands; Putin is leveraging his military to exploit Russian patriotism to foster national unity and continued political support. 

European and transatlantic institutions and the entire European security architecture 

stand in the way of fulfilling Russia’s main strategic aim—so Moscow is determined to 

abolish them. With such an antagonistic strategy, Russia is the most serious geopolitical 

and military threat to NATO. Paradoxically, Moscow accuses NATO of encircling Russia and preparing for a military aggression against it, even though its military footprint 

is modest, particularly in comparison with Russia’s military forces. 

Russia has demonstrated its penchant for dangerous adventurism, while it manages 

to keep the West off balance and continuously scans for and exploits weaknesses. Moscow is aggressively opportunistic when advancing its interests, and its modus operandi 

is to seize the initiative and achieve a fait accompli that the West would be unwilling 

or unable to challenge. It is weakness rather than strength which provokes Russia into 

action, just as it was in the case of Crimea, where the Ukrainian state, weakened by 

domestic turmoil, was unable to defend itself. However, the regime respects strength 

and tends to back down to avoid a direct collision with determined and resourceful opponents. A case in point is the swift and determined U.S. response to Russia’s invasion 

of Georgia in 2008, when Russian troops stopped their march toward Tbilisi after the 

United States deployed its warships to the Black Sea, while also promising substantial 

logistical support to the Georgian armed forces. 

Russia has demonstrated a penchant to use military force, or its threat, when exploiting weaknesses. This happened in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, in 2014 to Ukraine, and 
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now in Syria. This also involves provocative military behavior to test the responses of 

the Alliance and individual allies, as in the case of dangerous overflights of USS Donald 

Cook in the Baltic Sea in April 2016. It is a matter of great concern that, when it comes 

to the use of force, Moscow’s decision-making circle has shrunk to just President Putin 

and no more than two or three of his most trusted members of the regime. When making 

decisions, he is not constrained by constitutional checks and balances or the rule of law. 

Putin has the military and security apparatus ready to execute his will. This provides 

Moscow with flexibility and agility.

Russian military parade during the May 9, 2016 Victory Day Celebration in the Red Square. (Kremlin Photo)

Russia’s use of a wide range of instruments in recent conflicts has generated discussions in NATO on how best to deter future aggression. “Hybrid warfare” has become a 

moniker of Russia’s approach in the West. It is often considered in NATO capitals that 

Russia would not dare attack a NATO member by means of a direct and overt act of 

military aggression, but would rather choose an indirect approach described by its Chief 

of General Staff, or ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics, to challenge the Alliance and its collective 

defense guarantees.

Moscow retains an immense advantage with military force in the Baltic region. Its 

military power is the hard currency that poses a serious or even existential threat to the 

most exposed of NATO allies—the Baltic States. In this regard, five elements stand out: 

(1) Russia’s military modernization and build-up (particularly in the Western Military 

District); (2) its Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities; (3) nuclear strategy; (4) 

continuous exercises; and, (5) the uncertainty surrounding the Kremlin’s intent.
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RUSSIA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND BUILD-UP

Russia is pursuing its most ambitious military modernization program in recent history and has earmarked a budget of around 19.3 trillion Rubles to rearm its Armed 

Forces by 2020. Its priorities are modernizing nuclear weapons, introducing new systems into the Aerospace Forces, and the Navy and Ground Forces units, in that order. 

This push for military modernization by President Putin is underpinned by significant 

investments into developing, producing, and fielding new weapon systems, or upgrading legacy systems, which are steadily giving a new qualitative edge to Russia’s Armed 

Forces. Although economic woes may force Russia to reassess some of its choices, cuts in 

military spending are a last resort, and their effect on the re-armament program would 

only come after years of recession. Western sanctions that restrict access to certain technologies certainly act as a factor to slow the pace of the military modernization, but they 

are unable to stop it. 

Russia’s ability to apply lessons learned from past operations, such as the war against 

Georgia in 2008 or more recent campaigns in Ukraine and Syria, is also noteworthy. As a 

result, Russia has made steady advances in improving command and control, increasing 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, making various units 

and formations more cohesive and effective in warfighting, and improving logistics. 

Militarily, Russia is certainly no longer a decaying post-Cold War power with obsolete 

or vanishing capabilities.

Qualitative improvements are accompanied by significant quantitative increases. The 

ground forces established eight new brigades in 2015, and in January 2016, the Defense 

Minister Sergei Shoigu announced plans to form three new divisions in the Western 

Military District adjacent to the Baltic States. These changes signal a move back to a Cold 

War-like military posture, where it was in preparation for high-intensity large-scale 

combined arms warfare. Although, at the Munich Security Conference, Russia’s Prime 

Minister Dmitri Medvedev accused the West of taking the world back to the Cold War, 

it is Russia that continues to do this in terms of ongoing changes in its military posture. 

Some of the most capable formations in Russia’s Armed Forces are located in the 

Western Military District, and in any actions involving the Baltic States they could 

quickly bring considerable force to bear. In addition to the existing maneuver brigades 

and the announced formation of new divisions, a number of niche force developments 

are especially relevant regarding the Baltic region. These include greater use of Special 

Forces; lightly armed but more rapidly deployable airborne forces; naval infantry and 

other specialist units combined with support from battalion tactical groups; reformed 

Aerospace Forces; and ongoing development of C4ISR. This increases the speed, agility, 

and flexibility of the forces that can be employed against the Baltic States.

Many of these units and capabilities are positioned in the immediate vicinity of the 

Baltic States, making it easy for the Kremlin to launch a short or no-notice attack on one 
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or all three of the Baltic States. Even if a larger concentration of forces are deemed necessary for an overwhelming attack, Russia’s military campaigns (i.e., Syria and Ukraine) 

demonstrate its ability to move substantial forces across vast distances and to sustain 

them for prolonged periods of time. 

ANTI-ACCESS AREA DENIAL (A2/AD)

Russia has an array of stand-off weapons systems including multi-layered air defense, 

mobile coastal defense, land, sea, and air-launched cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic 

missile platforms that give it an ability to implement an A2/AD approach. In conjunction with its naval, submarine forces, electronic, cyberwarfare, and other capabilities, 

Russia can turn areas falling within range of these weapons into isolated “bubbles.” A2 

is a strategic and game-changing problem as it means that those zones are difficult to 

penetrate—by land, sea, or air. This would make moving NATO reinforcements into the 

Baltic region dangerous and costly. The AD part is the operational side of the problem, 

as it makes it more difficult to operate forces inside such zones. Countering A2/AD is 

fraught with a high risk of escalation, as well as with significant loss of lives, time, and 

capabilities. 

The Baltic States, parts of Poland and Finland, and large swathes of the Baltic Sea 

are areas under A2/AD threat due to Russia’s capabilities in the Kaliningrad enclave 

and along Russia’s border with Estonia and Latvia as well as Russia’s alliance with Belarus. Russia’s advanced air defense systems S-300/S-400, deployed in the Kaliningrad 

enclave and near St. Petersburg in Russia, and the integration of these systems with the 

corresponding air defense systems in Belarus, create an overlapping air defense engagement area over the Baltic States capable of threatening aircraft flying in this airspace. 

Given the importance of air superiority in any conflict, this is a serious impediment to 

reinforcing and defending the Baltic States. In addition, Russia’s Baltic Fleet based in St. 

Petersburg and Kaliningrad is capable of contesting maritime lines of communication 

between the Baltic States, Poland, and the rest of NATO. 

Russia’s short-range ballistic missiles “Iskander” (SS-26 “Stone”), if positioned in 

Kaliningrad, are capable of targeting infrastructure, bases, and troop concentrations in 

Poland, Lithuania, and southern Latvia. In conjunction with the same type of systems 

based on the western fringes of the Western Military District, this capability extends to 

targets in Estonia and the rest of Latvia. Such systems can destroy critical nodes (ports, 

airports) and infrastructure required for the reception, staging, onward movement, and 

integration (RSOI) of the Allied forces deployed to the Baltic States, thus further complicating NATO’s rapid deployment operations. Taking also into account the air- and 

sea-launched cruise missile capability, Russia has the capacity to significantly raise the 

costs of reinforcing the Baltic States. It is also worth pointing out that Russia would be 

capable of not just sealing off the Baltic States in the “bubble” that covers air, naval, 

and land dimensions, but it would also be capable of fiercely contesting other spaces of 

critical importance to military operations—in the electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, 

and even outer space (by using anti-satellite capabilities). 
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Last, but not least, in the event of conflict, Russian land forces operating from the 

Kaliningrad enclave and Belarus could close the so-called “Suwalki gap”—a narrow 

land corridor from Poland to Lithuania. While sharing about 1000 km of land border 

with Russia and Belarus, the Baltic States are linked to the rest of the Alliance just by a 65 

km-wide gap between the Kaliningrad enclave and Belarus, which has only two roads 

and one railway line passing through it from Poland to Lithuania. Establishing control 

over this gap would cut the Baltic States from the rest of the Alliance. 

NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Moscow places great stock on its nuclear deterrent and uses it to dissuade opponents 

from intervening in the conflicts where Russia has important interests at stake or from 

pursuing policies seen as detrimental to Russia’s geopolitical interests. Moscow will use 

the threat of nuclear escalation to dissuade NATO allies from attempting to reinforce 

and defend the Baltic States. The Alliance would be confronted with a dilemma of either 

honoring its collective defense commitments and thus possibly entering an escalating 

nuclear war, or stepping back and negotiating a settlement under the terms dictated by 

Moscow and thus dissolving NATO.

MILITARY EXERCISES 

The Kremlin uses military exercises for launching operations and intimidating its 

neighbors. These exercises represent a way of camouflaging intent, should Moscow decide to launch a surprise attack. Turning exercises into an operation against the Baltic 

States would give very little or no early warning time for NATO. The exercise tempo of 

the Russian military demonstrates that they are continuously readying themselves for 

conflicts of varying scale and intensity. A striking feature is that many of the military exercises conducted by Russia are offensive scenarios, including the invasion of the Baltic 

States and Poland and targeting the Nordic countries. Attention is being paid to improving interoperability with the armed forces of Belarus.

The large exercise Zapad (West) 2013 is a good example of Russia’s focus on developing synergy rehearsing joint actions using modern technologies, which combine civilian 

agencies and the military in a mobilized format that heavily features the experimental 

use of automated command and control. The exercise was staged jointly with Belarus 

and followed an established pattern by rehearsing offensive operations in a Western 

direction, including against the Baltic States. Above all, Northern Fleet submarine activity (timed to coincide with Zapad 2013), with the nuclear forces exercise that President 

Putin ordered, demonstrates that Moscow includes first use of nuclear weapons as a 

“demonstration strike” to induce an enemy to negotiate—in other words, the operational use of tactical or other nuclear weapons to “de-escalate” a conflict. 
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2. What should NATO do to prevent Russian hybrid war in its member States?

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the allies assumed that Russia was interested 

in a partnership with NATO and therefore sought a dialogue. However, as Estonia’s 

President Toomas Hendrik Ilves has pointed out, dialogue is not a policy (least of all a 

strategy). Despite the progress made since 2014, NATO lacks a cohesive strategy and 

suitable deterrence and defense posture to deal with a resurgent Russia, and the problem is most severe in the Baltic area. There are four fundamental challenges that NATO 

as an Alliance must address.

(Kremlin Photo)

STRATEGY

NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted in 2010, while not perfect, is adequate in the current environment. Furthermore, allies have made it clear that NATO’s focus is on collective defense, reducing the need to open this document to time-consuming discussions. 

NATO’s strategy toward Russia, however, needs revising. The Alliance is returning to 

the dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue first introduced by the Harmel report of 1967. While the notion of combining dialogue and deterrence is valid, the circumstances faced today differ significantly. 

In the 1960s, the threat to NATO was the Soviet Union over-running the entire European continent. The threat to NATO today is a miscalculation by Russia that it could 

achieve a quick but limited fait accompli inside NATO’s borders, while not triggering 
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an Article 5 response. This is based on the Russian assumption that it has a time advantage over NATO. The focus of NATO therefore needs to be on deterrence, because 

Russia’s military aim is no longer to over-run Europe. There are fears that strengthening 

deterrence would increase the likelihood of escalation, while history tells us a different story—weakness emboldens Russia and strength deters Russia. Russia employs an 

aggressive anti-Western narrative and accuses NATO of escalating the situation and 

encircling Russia—a claim that is unfounded but effective in influencing some NATO 

allies. The bottom line is that Russia portrays NATO as its main enemy, which means 

that tensions between NATO and Russia will continue regardless of what actions the 

Alliance undertakes. The safest course for NATO is to demonstrate, both in words and 

deeds, its resolve and ability to defend every ally against every form of aggression while 

remaining open for dialogue.

The Russian state-of-the-art Tank Armata, May 2016. (Kremlin Photo)

STRATEGIC ANTICIPATION

There is both a cognitive and a resource-related side to NATO’s limited strategic 

anticipation. The Alliance appears to be surprised by Russia time and again. This is due 

to difficulties associated with reading the intent and plans of the Kremlin regime. On 

the other hand, Russia rarely disguises its true political and grand strategic intentions. 

Quite to the contrary, it has proclaimed them publicly, but the West has chosen to not 

believe Russia’s declarations. The West misunderstands Russia by thinking that it will 

obey the rules. We essentially project on Russia our way of thinking about international 
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relations and security. However, Moscow’s logic is that, when given a chance to further 

its interests, it will use the opportunity to carry out its plans without hesitation. Doing 

this is rational behavior for Russia as long as it can assume the West will opt for cooperation rather than confrontation. 

The decrease in Allied Land Forces is particularly troubling. Combat forces with 

firepower were replaced with light capabilities better suited for expeditionary crisis response and counter-insurgency operations. Meanwhile, NATO’s maritime efforts have 

been focused to the southern part of the Alliance. Nuclear deterrence lacks coherence 

and credibility. 

Defense expenditures across NATO are not sufficient to rebuild the range of capabilities necessary to deter a resurgent and aggressive Russia. (During the Cold War, most 

European countries spent 3-5% or more of Gross Domestic Product [GDP] on defense.) 

Consequently, there is a tendency in some parts of NATO to make the threat fit our 

existing posture and capabilities. It is easier to make the threat look less acute so as to 

not have to undergo changes in capabilities and raise defense expenditures. This is a 

dangerous path. Although tasks of the NATO Command Structure have proliferated 

since the end of the Cold War, its size has shrunk drastically. 

NATO’S POSTURE IN THE BALTIC STATES

The numbers of host nation and Allied forces in the Baltics are far inferior to the Russian forces in Western Military District. The Baltic States lack strategic and operational 

depth, which makes giving up space for time impossible. A limited incursion creating a 

fait accompli in the Baltic States could be undertaken by Russia with the forces already 

stationed in the vicinity of their border and hence with limited early warning. NATO’s 

conventional military posture in the Baltic States should be able to convince Russia that 

it is able to delay and bog down an invading force and inflict unacceptable damage to 

it. This force is not required to win the war, but it must be able to fight alongside the 

host nation forces to buy NATO time for reinforcements. NATO’s presence in the Baltic 

States is not large enough to this end. The length of the shared border between Russia 

and the Baltic States offers the Russians the ability to claim territory without possibly 

even having to fire a shot at NATO forces, thus rendering the value of the forward-based 

forces void. 

The stance of non-NATO countries in the region (Sweden and Finland) matters. The 

uncertainty surrounding their decisions and actions—with regard to both Russia and 

the Alliance—complicates NATO’s plans and response options in the Baltics. Without 

these two countries in NATO or having very close cooperation with the Alliance in 

the context of collective defense, NATO lacks strategic and operational depth in the 

region. Should Russia compel Stockholm and Helsinki to stay out of a conflict, NATO’s 

response options, particularly given the A2/AD threat, would be limited even further.
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3. What would make the unthinkable happen—that is, a Russian Conventional Attack 

on the Baltic Nations? 

Even if Moscow has no intent to challenge NATO directly, this may change overnight and can be implemented with great speed, following already prepared plans. The 

capability to do so is, to a large extent, in place. It is hard to predict as to what may 

trigger Russia’s action. This might come at the time NATO and the EU are distracted 

by another crisis or a misperception of NATO’s activities and miscalculation of the Alliance’s resolve. Whatever confluence of circumstances might trigger the action, Moscow 

would come up with any pretext that suits its propaganda narrative—from “defending 

the oppressed Russian-speaking population” to “pre-empting NATO’s military attack” 

or “defending access to Kaliningrad.” Russia is capable of surprising the West, as happened in Ukraine and Syria. A military fait accompli in the Baltic States could easily 

become one of such surprises—with fatal consequences to the Alliance.

However, the intent would not materialize in the face of a show of strength, cohesion, and solidarity by NATO. Credible deterrence is thus key, but the critical question 

is how NATO’s deterrence posture fares in its most vulnerable spot—the Baltic States.

4. What size force from the United States and NATO should be stationed in the Baltic 

region? Should these forces be permanent? 

The Alliance should move toward a threat-focused rather than a capability-focused 

approach. It should concentrate on what capabilities are needed, not what capabilities 

are available. In addition, we must look at asymmetric (including cyber), conventional, 

and nuclear weapons as part of a single strategy, and strengthen NATO-EU cooperation 

to make deterrence more credible. This integrated approach must be reflected in planning and exercises.

NATO must regain capabilities lost after the Cold War and develop new capabilities 

taking into account Russia’s military modernization and build-up. They must invest 

in the necessary R&D and cutting-edge technology, especially in the framework of the 

U.S. “Third Offset” Strategy in which a proper link with the European allies should be 

developed. Allies should step up their investments on capabilities that are required to 

counter the A2/AD challenge, deal with asymmetric threats, as well as conduct largescale combined arms warfare. 

To resource this re-generation of capabilities, NATO must increase defense spending. Eastern flank states should consider going over the 2% benchmark in their defense 

spending like Estonia has. This would send a message to the United States that they are 

serious about facing the real threat that Russia poses to them. Other allies should make a 

clear statement of intent to move toward the 2% benchmark significantly faster than the 

promise of trying to do so within a decade. 
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The Alliance’s planning should be coordinated with the possible contribution of 

Sweden and Finland, as well as of the EU as a whole. It will be necessary to work with 

Sweden and Finland to secure overflight permissions, gain access to the use of their air 

bases, and develop Host Nation Support arrangements already in peacetime. The Alliance should also conduct prudent planning for defending Sweden and Finland, as a way 

of reassuring them that their support to the Alliance would not leave them exposed to 

Russia’s punitive military action.

PRESENCE

The only way to guarantee the security of the Baltic States against a conventional 

Russian military threat is by having a capable military force in these countries. They 

must be able to prevent a fait accompli by Russia and, should an attack occur, delay 

the opposing forces for NATO to deploy additional units and capabilities to the region. 

While we agree with both the former and current Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

(SACEUR), General Breedlove and General Scaparrotti, who would prefer permanent 

forces in Europe, the debate about permanence should not be at the forefront if the 

continuous presence of combat-capable forces can be ensured through rotations. As the 

saying goes, “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.”

LAND FORCES 

The U.S. units rotating through the Baltic States, while strengthening assurance, are 

not enough for credible deterrence and defense. They can be bypassed and hence neutralized. Ideally, this would require one brigade in each of the Baltic States that would, 

along with host nation forces, be able to significantly delay the opposing forces and help 

counter the Russian A2/AD threat—if Russian forces are unable to act with impunity 

on land, they are more vulnerable to Allied air power. Allied brigades in Estonia, Latvia, 

and Lithuania would be able to cover more territory by having their constituent battalions conduct simultaneous independent operations. This would make a quick Russian fait accompli unlikely. Furthermore, since a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 

(VJTF) is not regionally focused, an equivalent-sized force in each of the Baltic States 

would hedge against the possibility of VJTF being unavailable due to it being deployed 

elsewhere. 
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Russian helicopters during the May 2016 Victory Parade in Moscow. (Kremlin Photo)

AIR FORCES

Air force capabilities are needed to provide protection for Baltic and Allied forces, 

and to prevent Russian aircraft from freely operating over NATO’s territory. The Alliance’s aim must be to maintain or establish conditions for local (at first), and then general, air superiority in the airspace of the Baltic region.

NAVAL FORCES

As significant Allied reinforcements are brought by sea, it is crucial that access to the 

Baltic Sea is maintained or re-established quickly. The Baltic States need capabilities in 

and adjacent to the Baltic Sea that could effectively limit Russia’s freedom of maneuver 

and degrade their capabilities. This requires a continuous combat-capable presence with 

high firepower, high survivability, and the plans, rules of engagement, and authorization to act immediately in response to aggression. To effectively counter Russia’s A2/

AD, for example, sea-based air defense (SBAD), anti-submarine warfare capabilities, 

as well as surface ships and submarines with long-range strike capabilities are needed. 

Allocating an AEGIS-equipped ship for the Baltic Sea area would significantly enhance 

deterrence. 
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MARINES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

Marines and special operation forces are some of the most capable fighting forces in 

NATO. They would be of high importance in defending the Baltics and, therefore, their 

presence would send a strong deterrent signal to Moscow. As the Baltic States are in the 

most vulnerable situation in NATO, we propose relocating some of the U.S. Marines 

Black Sea rotational force to the Baltic States. In the Baltics, the footprint and familiarity 

with local conditions of the U.S. Marines is modest and mainly gained through the Baltic 

Operations (BALTOPS) exercise. SOF would have a significant affect in the Baltic States 

and an important role in de-masking Russian actions, which Russia might try to conceal 

as “green men” or “soldiers on vacation.” As the SOF troops are able to operate behind 

enemy lines and conduct special reconnaissance missions, they would be instrumental 

in providing information both to the Allied defense establishments as well as to the 

wider public. We, therefore, propose embedding strategic communication/information 

officers with the SOF teams operating in the region who could record and disseminate 

information.

REINFORCEMENT

NATO’s high readiness forces need to be more robust and adequately trained to 

stand the rigors of war. There can be only one criterion for the VJTF: it must be ready for 

a violent and sustained war. This means a well-trained and highly cohesive force able 

to operate in a non-permissive environment with proper enablers, well-drilled and taut 

command and control, and the soundest logistic foundations. Above all, it requires the 

right mindset. A multinational force containing up to 14 nations that have never trained 

together will not be capable of deterring, let alone fighting. The VJTF must be less focused on hybrid conflicts and more suited for high-end warfare.

PREPOSITIONING

Prepositioning the stocks of armaments and munitions is needed to speed up the Allied reinforcements. We recommend that at least a battalion-worth of heavy equipment 

be prepositioned in each Baltic State to be able to quickly surge the presence of Allied 

troops when necessary. As a priority, heavy maneuver vehicles, artillery, anti-armor 

and air defense assets, and munition stocks should be prepositioned.

5. What are the plans to modernize the Baltic armed forces to increase their mobility, 

survivability, and lethality?

The Alliance’s success in defending the Baltic States depends on the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as much as on the contribution of the other allies. The socalled “porcupine” strategy should be employed by the Baltic States, so that their armed 

forces could act as “speedbumps with spikes” and gain time for mobilizing additional 

national reserve forces as well as for the incoming Allied forces:
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• Development of self-defense and RSOI capabilities of the Baltic States should be 

supported both financially and by offering favorable conditions for purchasing 

the necessary armament, equipment, and supplies. 

• In addition to the acquisition of defensive assets such as anti-armor, air defense, 

and anti-ship weapons, the allies should also support development of the Baltic 

offensive capabilities and help increase the survivability of their forces. 

• The Baltic States should continue doing their part. This entails ensuring high 

readiness of their defense forces; conducting frequent exercises to test this readiness; investing into new capabilities; and, working to facilitate freedom of movement of the Allied forces into and between the Baltic States.

• As the most exposed and vulnerable NATO allies facing growing demand for 

resources—to ensure host nation support, greater investments into defense infrastructure and armaments as well as to support larger force structure—all the 

Baltic States should steadily increase their defense spending above the 2% benchmark (as Estonia has already done).

• Particular attention should be paid to the development of the infrastructure necessary for the reception and movement of the Allied forces in the event of a crisis 

in the Baltic States. Since most of it (airports, harbors, railways, roads, and bridges) is the responsibility of the civilian authorities, they should pay greater attention to the additional requirements for handling movement of large and heavy 

military forces. As fulfilling those requirements can be very costly and since a lot 

of civilian infrastructure development is done with the help of the EU funding, 

there should be an agreement on the permissibility of including those requirements into the projects co-funded by the EU.

Although the security challenge that NATO faces is formidable, it is not impossible to 

overcome. The key is taking concerted measures now to prevent a war later. There is no 

doubt that Moscow has hostile intentions toward NATO. Yet, peace can be maintained 

by strength. The assessments of this section offer a way for NATO to preserve the peace 

for a bright and prosperous future. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE WAY AHEAD AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A Bradley Fighting Vehicle of the U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division at Tapa, Estonia. (U.S. Army Photo)

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FIVE SMOOTH STONES: HOW THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION (NATO) CAN DETER 

THE “GOLIATH” RUSSIAN THREAT TO THE BALTICS471

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

Then he took his staff in his hand, chose five smooth stones from the stream, put them in 

the pouch of his shepherd’s bag and, with his sling in his hand, approached the Philistine.

 I Samuel 17:40

David prepares to fight Goliath in a wood carving by Maerten van Heemskerck (1498-1574).

The world is in turmoil; the geostrategic security environment is rapidly changing as 

witnessed by the new and adaptive threats facing the NATO Alliance. On the southern 

periphery are the expansive Islamic State (IS) and a refugee/migration crisis of Biblical 

proportions. Meanwhile, the unparalleled peace and stability experienced by most of 

Europe since 1945 is at risk with the rise of a hostile Russia. Each of these security chal-
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lenges are a threat to the Alliance. However, it is the peril posed by the Kremlin that 

should keep NATO senior leaders up at night. Indeed, Russia’s advantage in geography 

in Eastern Europe and its emerging adaptive, hybrid approach to war poses an existential threat to the Alliance.

Russian Soldiers during the May 2016 Victory Day Celebrations. (Kremlin Photo)

The key component of the Kremlin’s emerging adaptive approach to conflict is the 

application of ambiguity. This cloak of ambiguity has been used to confound North 

American and European decision makers. Thus was the case in 2014, when so-called 

“little green men” appeared in Crimea. Although there was no doubt that these were 

Russian forces, Vladimir Putin denied the obvious, with key leaders in the West dithering on how to respond. Moscow’s gambit worked, with Putin declaring the annexation 

of Crimea only a month after the “little green men” appeared. This was followed by 

a separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine that was inspired and led by Moscow. Although Russia’s involvement in this conflict is indisputable, the response from Europe 

and the United States has been sluggish and inconsistent at best. Even after the downing 

of a civilian airliner (Malaysian Air MH 17) in July 2014, the resolve of Western leaders 

to blunt Russian aggression in Ukraine is still in question. 

More than 2 years later, Ukraine remains in the midst of a bloody war, and an increasingly frustrated Putin is turning up his bellicose rhetoric. Targeting both his domestic 

audience and the Russian ethnic populations residing in NATO nations, Putin blames 

his woes on “the West” and has put together a powerful information operations campaign to manipulate the minds of his people. In the midst of this, Moscow announced 

that it will modernize both its nuclear and armed forces. The region to benefit first from 
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this modernization will be the Russian Western Military District, the only one with a 

land border with NATO . . . in the Baltics.

Although the Russians today have a large conventional force, Moscow has demonstrated for the moment that it would rather avoid a direct confrontation with the West 

by employing a “strategy” of ambiguity. This ambiguity undercuts decision making 

and provides Putin with plausible deniability of being behind any crisis. Using Eastern Ukraine as the example, Russia employs “local” proxy forces, bolstered by Russian 

Special Forces in ethnic Russian zones. These are supported by small groups of conventional assets to wage its war. 
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Feeling threatened by Russia’s increased meddling in the region and its belligerent rhetoric, the NATO member states in Eastern Europe, especially Latvia, Estonia, 

and Lithuania, have called for increased measures to deter the danger to their nations. 

The Baltic States suffered terrible depravations and ethnic cleansing under the Soviets 

and do not want a repeat of this. Faced with this threat, the 28 NATO member nations 

continue to wrestle with an appropriate response to the belligerent Russian behavior in 

the region. The United States took the first action in early 2014 by rotating small units 

of Army Soldiers through the region. Now dubbed “Atlantic Resolve,” this force is designed to reassure the Baltic States of NATO support. This was followed by a NATO announcement in September 2014 that it would create a force capable of rapidly deploying 

anywhere in the region. Most recently, at its July 2016 summit in Warsaw, the Alliance 

announced the deployment of four battalions of NATO forces by early 2017. These battalions will be stationed in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Despite these steps, 

the questions remain: should a crisis unfold in the region, can sufficient NATO forces 

arrive in a timely and credible manner, and how prepared will they be to operate in a 

dynamic hybrid environment?

The Russian Victory Day Commemoration Parade, May 9, 2016. (Kremlin Photo)

There are specific measures that NATO should take to mitigate the rising threat that 

Russia poses to the Alliance. The recommendations in this article focus on the military 

element of power. However, any strategy must apply a comprehensive approach that 

includes diplomatic, economic, and informational aspects of power. The following five 

proposals are a starting place to build credible deterrence in the Baltics.
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Early Warning: The nature of the Russian threat to the sovereignty of the Baltic nations goes beyond a hybrid ethnic uprising. There is also a formidable Russian conventional capability literally on the border of each state. The Kremlin has demonstrated this 

capability through aggressive activities by its air, sea, and ground forces. However, the 

most provocative of its actions are so-called “snap exercises.” These unannounced training events have increased in scope and scale over the past year and demonstrate that 

NATO would have virtually no early warning to prepare for the unthinkable.

The reality of the changing strategic environment demonstrates the need for NATO 

to take concerted action to reduce the element of surprise. This can be done by stationing 

forward a modest early warning intelligence capability. This should include a linguist 

element, equipped with electronic warfare intercept capability, UAVs, and other intelligence assets to monitor military activity in both Russia and Belarus. 

NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC) should provide the oversight and synchronization of this forward Baltic Intelligence Center (BIC), which would reduce duplicative and costly “national” capabilities. The focus of the collection and analysis would 

be on the regional Russian military activities of the Western Military District. Although 

the idea of employing so-called “reach-back” capability from headquarters in Western 

Europe is popular, nothing can surpass having a forward presence, where analysts will 

be able to both see and feel the Russian threat. There must be a forward and robust intelligence and early warning capability in the Baltic region.

The BIC should be commanded by a U.S. Army Colonel with extensive intelligence 

and NATO experience. All too often, senior U.S. officers with little to no experience 

working with NATO are assigned to key positions in the Alliance, which puts them and 

the Alliance at a distinct disadvantage. This U.S. Army Colonel will also serve as the senior intelligence officer (G2) in the forward U.S./NATO division headquarters assigned 

to the region (discussed later). The focus and mission of the G2’s task is to provide both 

real world analysis and long range reporting on the disposition, capabilities, and assessment of Russian forces in the region. This G2 will not only need to provide more than 

near-term intelligence, but also long-range forecasting that understands and predicts 

the application of both its conventional and hybrid capabilities. The bottom line is that 

the BIC will be NATO’s expert on Russia’s emerging doctrine and approach to war.

Build Capacity—increase the size, survivability, mobility, and lethality of the Baltic armed forces: All three of the Baltic States have increased their defense spending 

since Russia’s invasion of Crimea and its subsequent war in Ukraine. Estonia is making 

great strides to improve the size, mobility, survivability, and lethality of their forces; 

Latvia has also increased its defense spending; and Lithuania has taken the bold decision to reintroduce conscription. However, all three of these nations must have a robust 

force capable of responding to both conventional and unconventional threats to create 

strategic depth. The greatest disadvantage of the Baltics is geography. The place to begin 

is here to create time, space, and depth for a larger, survivable, and mobile force. Such 

a force must be capable of contending with an “ethnic uprising,” while also being able 

to secure vital infrastructure (air/sea ports, major roads, etc.) from conventional threats. 
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Defense spending is a place to start to measure a nation’s commitment to building capacity. However, of the Baltic nations, only Estonia is exceeding the agreed upon 2% of 

its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. The increase in national defense is of key 

importance in that it provides tangible evidence of the Baltic Nation’s commitment to 

their own defense. Additionally, it will enable them to expand their military infrastructure to support the modest increase of forward stationed forces and assets. Key to this 

is building partner capacity (BPC). The United States could provide the nations in the 

Baltic region surplus U.S. Military equipment sitting in depots in North America. These 

can be provided at a cost and used to improve the lethality, survivability, and mobility 

of their indigenous forces. However, maintaining and employing these assets comes 

with a cost, something that the increase in national defense spending could compensate.

Special Forces Capability: The nature of the emerging Russian use of hybrid warfare 

makes a purely conventional capability ill-suited. In addition to building a robust conventional force, the Baltic States must also have a complimentary Special Forces capacity. This should be an adaptive element that works effectively with local security forces 

(which includes civilian law enforcement and national counter-intelligence services) 

and other NATO Special Forces, and is interoperable with NATO conventional units. 

Additionally, this force should build relationships in the ethnic Russian zones of their 

respective countries and thus be positioned to detect an exported Moscow inspired ethnic Russian separatist movement. 

NATO should also establish a permanent forward multinational NATO Special 

Forces presence in the region. These can support the training and development of a local Special Forces capability, while also building relationships that can be leveraged in 

a crisis. Additionally, these forward assets should be tied into local security units, and 

can provide an early warning should Putin set his gaze upon the region in the form of 

some sort of Moscow directed exported “ethnic” uprising. Finally, if deterrence fails, 

Baltic Special Forces could form the core of an unconventional warfare capability that 

would keep occupying Russian forces off-balance and insecure until NATO can mount 

a conventional effort to liberate its Baltic allies.

Forward NATO Presence: Although the United States and several other nations are 

rotating small military units through the region, there should be a decision by NATO to 

create a permanent forward presence of ground forces. There is no greater deterrence 

than for NATO nations to commit a modest force forward in the Baltics. This would 

dramatically alter the strategic calculus for Vladimir Putin, so that if he should ever seek 

to assert influence over the Baltics, the price would perhaps be too high. Any Russian 

adventurism would have to contend with the reality of having NATO troops already 

forward, and an attack on them would guarantee a response. This permanent forward 

force would have far-reaching ramifications beyond deterrence and would also serve as 

the nucleus for follow-on NATO forces to build and expand.
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Soldiers of the Danish 1st Tank Squadron on an exercise in Poland in 2015. (U.S. Army Photo)

Building on NATO’s decision to station a battalion in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and 

Estonia, an expanded permanent forward force should be a three-brigade element, one 

in each Baltic nation. Estonia should have an American-led mechanized Brigade Combat 

Team, and Latvia a regional Baltic Brigade that should include forces from Sweden and 

Finland (if they are willing to participate as non-NATO partners). The brigade in Lithuania should be a multinational NATO force permanently stationed in the Suwalki Gap. 

Keeping this gap open is imperative to prevent any ideas in Moscow that it could easily 

cut this essential land route from the rest of NATO. 

This three-brigade model for the Baltic nations borrows from the Berlin Brigade concept from the Cold War. Although the American, British, and French Brigades stationed 

in West Berlin could not stop a Soviet invasion, these served as a guarantee that, should 

there be an attack, three powerful nations would fight to defend Germany. Additionally, 

these brigades would make their task bloody and difficult to accomplish. Simply put, 

the cost/benefit analysis was too high for Moscow to try a violent seizure of West Berlin. 

This is the same end desired for the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The three-brigade Baltic force will not stop a Russian attack, but it would make their 

task difficult to accomplish. More importantly, however, the risk of attacking the Baltic 

nations, and thereby fighting professional ground forces from the United States and the 

rest of NATO, would be too risky and would ensure the commitment of the entire Alli-
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ance to come to the defense of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There would be no question of resolve and no chance of a successful gamble from the Kremlin with a forward 

ground force in the region. 

To support planning and coordination of this three-brigade multinational force, the 

United States should create a permanent two-star headquarters in the Baltic region. The 

headquarters would serve as the command and control of the division size multinational force in the Baltics and would oversee contingency planning, coordination, and 

integration of NATO forces into this organization. Additionally, this would serve as the 

basis to expand from a division level headquarters to a Combined Joint Forces Land 

Component Command (CJFLCC) should there be a large multi-division exercise or contingency in the region. The headquarters should be centrally located in Riga to facilitate 

command and control, but prepared to move to either Estonia or Lithuania to support 

NATO training. This U.S.-led headquarters would work closely with Multi National 

Corps Northeast (located in Szczecin, Poland) to ensure integration and synchronization 

with NATO. 

REFORGER-like exercises and capability: During the Cold War, the most important 

annual training event was “Return of Forces to Germany,” or REFORGER in military 

language. REFORGER exercised the ability of forces from outside of continental Europe 

(mostly the United States) to arrive in Western Europe, receive their equipment at the 

ports or man their forward equipment sets, and then rapidly deploy to the region of Germany where the large exercise culminated with a force-on-force training scenario. The 

REFORGER units would join forward deployed units (those forces already stationed in 

Germany) in a complex series of training events that replicated a NATO response to a 

Soviet attack into West Germany.

In the spirit of REFORGER, an annual exercise of a deployment of “over the horizon” forces from across NATO should be implemented in the Baltics. Perhaps naming it 

“Deploy Forces to the Baltic (DEFORTIC),” this annual training event would encompass 

a robust force (albeit much smaller than REFORGER) that would arrive from Western 

Europe and North America to exercise and demonstrate the ability to quickly respond 

to a threat to the sovereignty of the East European allies. 

There are three concerns related to any DEFORTIC like force: (1) Rapidity; (2) Interoperability; and, (3) NATO Strategic Depth. The lack of geographic depth in the Baltics means that NATO must respond to any crisis with exceptional rapidity, which is not 

normally a characteristic of NATO decision-making. The second concern is the actual 

composition of the force. After a force arrives, which forces bolster/support them in 

the region? The concern is that it will be in the midst of a crisis that a NATO forward 

joint and multinational force will have difficulty operating as a joint and multinational 

team. Additionally, the ever-shrinking defense budgets in most of Europe mean smaller 

armies, which equals a lack of strategic depth from the Alliance at large. 
135

DEFORTIC addresses two out of the three of these concerns. An annual DEFORTIC would allow NATO’s Very High Readiness Task Force and follow-on NATO Response Forces (NRFs) to exercise their ability to deploy forward into the Baltics. As to 

interoperability, an annual DEFORTIC exercise would help deployable NATO forces to 

refine this important skill set and build a team able to operate in a joint/multinational 

environment.

137

FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Colonel Douglas Mastriano, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

Rolands Henins, the Director of Latvian Defense Policy, identified three chief concerns that make the Baltic nations vulnerable:

1. Speed of recognition to identify threat

2. Speed of assembly [of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces]

3. Speed of decision [by NATO]472

Former Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene agreed with Henins concerns 

and added a brilliant summation that the region faces, saying, “We need two things, 

#1, a realistic approach, because it is impossible to have the right treatment if you do 

not know the diagnosis, and #2, we need deterrence to end Putin’s idea that he can test 

NATO. He needs to know that he can’t control the Baltic Sea.”473

The nature of the threat that Moscow poses to the sovereignty of Latvia, Estonia, and 

Lithuania is a near and present danger. Yet, it need not remain a point of vulnerability 

for the West. As previously discussed, there are concerted measures that the Baltic nations and NATO should take now to deter Russian aggression. The question is whether 

NATO will take advantage of its window of opportunity to prevent the unthinkable 

from happening. With ever-decreasing budgets and shrinking military forces, a preponderance of NATO nations are facing the changing security environment from a position 

of weakness. It is such weakness that historically results in war—with a cost far higher 

than what prudent defensive measures in peace could have otherwise averted. It seems 

that “Russia understands only one language, the language of power”;474 meaning that, 

through concerted action to maintain a sufficient force in the Baltics, peace can be preserved.

The response from Moscow regarding any measures that NATO takes to ensure the 

security and independence of the Baltic nations will be predictably filled with umbrage 

and condemnation. So-called Russian trolls and their boosters in the West already attack 

anyone advocating Baltic defense as warmongers. However, even if NATO adopts the 

recommendation of stationing a 3-brigade division in the region comprised of 9 maneuver battalions, it will be out-numbered, facing nearly 30 Russian ground maneuver 

battalions. The idea that this force is provocative or a threat to Russia is preposterous. 

The purpose of this forward multinational NATO division is to both assure the Baltic 

allies and to deter Russian aggression. It is not designed to defeat a major Russian attack. However, should the unthinkable happen, it would make any adventurism from 

Moscow costly and bloody. More importantly, this force guarantees that there would be 

no chance of Russia permanently reasserting control over these NATO members. 

The saying that freedom requires eternal vigilance seems particularly pertinent to 

us today. The NATO Alliance should take decisive action to deter the Kremlin from 
138

meddling in the Baltics. Such deterrence should come in the form of forward deployed 

forces, an early warning capability, larger and more lethal Baltic forces, a Special Forces 

presence, and an annual Deploy Forces to the Baltic (DEFORTIC) exercise that demonstrates a NATO capability to defend its eastern allies. 

Vladimir Putin meets with President Barrack Obama during the 70th session of the UN General Assembly 

in New York City, September 28, 2015. (Kremlin Photo)

These recommendations are realistic and achievable. The key is that these prudent 

measures can avert World War III by materially demonstrating resolve and strength that 

would remove any doubt or uncertainty of NATO’s commitment to protect its members 

from any sort of foreign intervention, whether conventional or hybrid. The Western 

powers experimented with appeasement in the 1930s, and the result was a horrific and 

costly war that placed the world on a precipice of peril. The cost of half measures and 

weakness is too much to bear. Now is the time for resolve and strength in the face of an 

aggressive and assertive Russian foreign policy bent on dominating the region.

The measures recommended in this paper are not provocative; in fact, they are defensive in nature. Indeed, a little action now can go a long way to assure the eastern 

allies, and deter Russian aggression. History demonstrates that the certain path to war 

is passivity and appeasement. This is not the time for hesitating and weakness. Now is 

the time for all of the NATO members to demonstrate resolve and strength. The simple 

measures offered in this paper lay out a clear path for the alliance to prevent war and 

to maintain the security and stability of the continent. More importantly, it will protect 

entire populations from depravations and destruction. The map of Europe has been the 

battlefield of countless battles and wars. Often, those who pay the ultimate price are 

not the leaders who give into weakness and indecision; it is the people. America and its 

allies stand for freedom and against all forms of tyranny. Will we falter now in the face 

Putin’s hostile regime, as Prime Minister Chamberlain did in 1938 when confronted by 
139

another hostile leader; or, rather, stand firm on the principles written in our founding 

documents and preserved by sacrifices of those who went before us? Indeed, what we 

do in life matters, it echoes across the generations and into eternity. Our challenge today 

is to make decisions that will pass on to our heirs a better and safer world. This can only 

be achieved by eternal vigilance and responsible strength. 

The idea that “[n]ew things are old things happening to new people” (Dr. John Lennox) remains true. This is not the first time that the United States and NATO have faced 

a rising foe in the east. The old foe was held at bay by vigilance and strength. This is a 

proven strategy and our answer for the modern version of this old adversary. History 

indeed gives a long list of lessons that weakness and appeasement invite war. The answer is peace through strength. As Ronald Reagan brilliantly stated in 1964:

You and I know and do not believe that life is so dear and peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price 

of chains and slavery. If nothing in life is worth dying for, when did this begin—just in the face of this 

enemy? Or should Moses have told the children of Israel to live in slavery under the pharaohs? Should 

Christ have refused the cross? Should the patriots at Concord Bridge have thrown down their guns and 

refused to fire the shot heard ‘round the world? The martyrs of history were not fools, and our honored 

dead who gave their lives to stop the advance of the Nazis didn’t die in vain. Where, then, is the road 

to peace? Well it’s a simple answer after all. 

You and I have the courage to say to our enemies, ‘There is a price we will not pay.’ ‘There is a point 

beyond which they must not advance.’ And this—this is the meaning in the phrase . . . ‘Peace through 

strength.’ Winston Churchill said, ‘The destiny of man is not measured by material computations. 

When great forces are on the move in the world, we learn we’re spirits—not animals.’ And he said, 

‘There’s something going on in time and space, and beyond time and space, which, whether we like it 

or not, spells duty.’ 

You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. 

We’ll preserve for our children this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we’ll sentence them to take 

the last step into a thousand years of darkness.475
140

American and Hungarian Soldiers on a NATO exercise in Lithuania in 2014. (U.S. Army Photo)
141

ENDNOTES

1. Radio broadcast given by Winston Churchill, October 1, 1939, available from www.churchill-societylondon.org.uk/RusnEnig.html, accessed on August 3, 2016.

2. Richard Cavendish, “The Battle of Narva,” History Today, Vol. 50, Iss. 11, November 2000, available 

from www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/battle-narva, accessed on February 25, 2015.

3. Ibid.

4. The Three Occupations of Latvia: 1940-1991, Occupation Museum Foundation, Riga, Latvia, 2005, 

available from www.mfa.gov.lv/data/file/e/P/3_okupacijas.pdf, accessed on October 3, 2014.

5. Douglas Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy of Ambiguity,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 

2014, available from https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/defeating-putins-strategy-of-ambiguity/, accessed on 

January 10, 2017.

6. This section is an expanded version of an article published by The Foreign Policy Research Institute 

(FPRI). Douglas Mastriano and Jeffrey Setser, Blunting Moscow’s Sword of Damocles Policy in the Baltic Region, 

FPRI, June 1, 2016, available from www.fpri.org/article/2016/06/blunting-moscows-sword-damocles-policy-balticregion/. More of Lieutenant Colonel Setser’s portion of this article is included in the Recommendation and 

Conclusion section of this research project. 

7. Ibid., pp. 40-43.

8. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, quoted in Jakub Grygiel, “Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities,” 

Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 2015, p. 42.

9. Department of the Army, United States Army Europe, “Memorandum for All Army in Europe 

Leaders,” USAREUR 2020 Base Plan, September 9, 2014, available from www.eur.army.mil/2020/files/

USAREUR2020_SignedMemo.pdf, accessed on January 25, 2016.

10. Department of the Army, United States Army Europe, USAREUR 2020: Prevent • Shape • Win, 

Ver. 1.2, May 28, 2014, available from www.eur.army.mil/2020/files/USAREUR_2020_v1-2_28May2014.pdf, accessed on January 25, 2016.

11. Paragraph by Colonel Robert (Bob) Hamilton. Also see Jan Osburg, “Unconventional Options for 

the Defense of the Baltic States: The Swiss Approach,” RAND Corporation Study, available from www.rand.

org/pubs/perspectives/PE179.html, accessed on August 1, 2016; Lieutenant Colonel Sean Berg, “Countering 

Russian Aggression in the Baltics and Eastern Europe,” Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, April 1, 2015.

12. Interview with Rasa Jukneviciene by Douglas Mastriano, June 28, 2016.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Interview with Jonas Ohman by Douglas Mastriano, June 28, 2016.

16. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Eugenius Lastauskas, Lithuanian Army by Douglas Mastriano, 

June 27, 2016.
142

17. Go to the following for the complete article: Douglas Mastriano, “Putin’s Army and the 

Complex Application of Russian Strategic Landpower,” Infantry Magazine, January-March 2016, pp. 

22-27, available from www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2016/JAN-MAR/pdf/9)%20Mastriano_

Russian_txt.pdf, accessed on July 27, 2016.

18. See Colonel Robert (Bob) Hamilton’s assessment of the emerging Russian Approach found in Chapter 2 of Douglas Mastriano, Project Leader, Project 1704: A U.S. Army War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, an Appropriate U.S. Response, and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, March 26, 2015, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1274, accessed on June 20, 2016.

19. Ibid.

20. John LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831, New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2004, pp. 48-51.

21. Frank Smitha, “Sweden, Russia and the Great Northern War,” available from www.

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20, 2016; Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Add 40 New ICBMs; Should the West be Worried?” The Diplomat, 

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23. Tony Wesolowsky, “Kaliningrad: Moscow’s Military Trump Card,” Radio Free Europe / Radio 

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24. Ibid.

25. Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The 

White House, February 2015, p. 10.

26. Ibid.

27. Vladimir Putin, Russian National Security Strategy, Moscow, Russia, December 2015, p. 15.

28. Ibid.

29. F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter A. Wilson, and John Gordon IV, The Ukrainian Crisis and European 

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30. Ibid., p. VII.

31. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

32. Ibid., p. 18.

33. Ibid., p. 7.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.
143

36. Ibid., p. 20.

37. Ibid., p. 24.

38. Rebecca M. Nelson, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of 

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Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 3, 2015, pp. 2-3.

40. Ibid., p. 7.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 2.

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49. Ibid.

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53. Mastriano, Project 1704.

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62. Ibid.

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66. Ibid.

67. “Ukraine: Military Budget,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/

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68. Ibid.

69. Blenckner, “Military spending in Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis,” p. 1.

70. “The National Security Strategy of Ukraine,” approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine, 
145

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75. Ibid., p. 25.

76. Ibid., p. 24.

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146

85. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Putin could attack Baltic states warns former NATO chief,” The Telegraph, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11393707/Putin-could-attack-Balticstates-warns-former-Nato-chief.html, accessed on May 20, 2016. 

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87. The Kaliningrad region is surrounded by Lithuania and Poland, two NATO and EU members.

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95. Though widely known, the title is unofficial. This is how in early 2013 the media dubbed the ideas 

presented by Valery Gerasimov, a Russian general and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 

of Russia.

96. Donatas Eidintas, “Regional Security. Russia,” Assessment of Threats to National Security, Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius: Publishing 

Section of the General Affairs Department of the Ministry of National Defence, 2015, p. 18.

97. Ibid.

98. Translation from Russian language provided by this chapter’s researcher, Lieutenant Colonel Algimantas Misiunas, Lithuanian Army. The chart was published in a Russian weekly newspaper; see “The 

Military Industrial Complex. The Armed Forces,” VPK News, available from www.vpk-news.ru, accessed on 

February 18, 2016. 

99. Mastriano, Project 1704, p. 46.
147

100. Ibid., p. 63.

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110. Ibid.

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October 31, 2014.

112. A. Yakovenko, “Information Warfare: The Ukraine Crisis from a UK Angle,” International Affairs, 

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113. Andrew Higgins, “Latvian Region Has Distinct Identity, and Allure for Russia,” The New York 

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114. Tal Kopan and Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Deploys Predator Drones to Latvia,” CNN, August 31, 2015, available from www.cnn.com/2015/08/31/politics/u-s-deploys-predator-drones-latvia/, accessed on February 1, 2016.

115. Matthew Luxmoore, “Latvia Struggles with Restive Russian Minority Amid Regional Tensions,” 

AlJazeera, June 13, 2015, available from america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/13/latvia-resists-russian-softpower.html, accessed on February 1, 2016.
148

116. Damien McGuinness, “Crimea Crisis Sharpens Latvia Ethnic Tensions,” BBC News, March 26, 

2014, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26720549, accessed on January 27, 2016.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. Olga Pisarenko, “The Acculturation Modes of Russian Speaking Adolescents in Latvia: Perceived Discrimination and Knowledge of the Latvian Language,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 5, 2006, 

pp. 751-73.

121. The Central Election Commision of Latvia, “Referendum Procedure,” available from https://www.

cvk.lv/pub/public/28029.html, accessed on January 28, 2016.

122. Paul Shinkman, “Russia’s Round 2: A New Conflict in Eastern Europe?” U.S. News and World 

Report, April 9, 2015, available from www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/09/russias-round-2-a-new-conflictin-eastern-europe, accessed on January 31, 2016.

123. Higgins.

124. Ibid.

125. Luxmoore.

126. Agnia Grigas, “Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States,” The 

Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad Series, Briefing Paper, London, UK: Chatham House, August 

2012, available from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20

Eurasia/0812bp_grigas.pdf, accessed January 28, 2016.

127. Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, “The Baltic States On the Conflict in Ukraine,” Warsaw: The Center for 

Eastern Studies, January 23, 2015, available from www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-01-23/

baltic-states-conflict-ukraine, accessed January 29, 2016.

128. Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania 

Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure, 1992-2012, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.

129. Hyndle-Hussein.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Peter Baker and Steven Erlanger, “Russia Uses Money and Ideology to Fight Western Sanctions,” 

The New York Times, June 7, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/world/europe/russia-fightswests-ukraine-sanctions-with-aid-and-ideology.html?_r=0, accessed on January 28, 2016.

134. Ibid.

135. Hyndle-Hussein.
149

136. Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Elliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson, “Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council Report, Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 

October 15, 2015, pp. 1-40, available from www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-plain-sightputin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war, accessed on January 28, 2016.

137. Piotr Szymański, “The Baltic States’ Territorial Defense Forces in the Face of Hybrid Threats,” 

Warsaw: The Center for Eastern Studies, March 20, 2015, pp. 1-8, available from www.osw.waw.pl/en/

publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-03-20/baltic-states-territorial-defence-forces-face-hybrid-threats, accessed on 

January 28, 2016.

138. Frederik Van Lokeren, “Countering the Information War in the Baltic States,” Baltic Defense blog, 

April 2, 2015, available from balticdefense.blogspot.com/2015/04/countering-information-war-in-baltic.html, 

accessed January 28, 2016.

139. NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence website, available from www.stratcomcoe.

org/, accessed January 29, 2016.

140. European Dialogue, “Energy Independence—Common Goal of the Baltics,” available from www.

eurodialogue.eu/energy-security/Energy-Independence-Common-Goal-Of-The-Baltics, accessed February 1, 2016.

141. See “Estonia,” in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/

en.html; “Lithuania,” in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

geos/lh.html; “Latvia,” in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/

lg.html, accessed on May 21, 2016.

142. Riigikogu, “National Security Concept of Estonia,” May 12, 2010, available from www.kmin.ee/

sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_of_estonia.pdf, accessed on May 21, 2016, p. 11; 

Seimas, “Resolution: Amending the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution on the Approval of 

the National Security Strategy,” June 26, 2012, available from www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_

id=433830, accessed on May 19, 2016; Artis Pabriks, “The State Defense Concept,” available from www.

mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2012_va_EN.ashx, accessed on May 19, 

2016, p. 6.

143. NATO Air Policing mission being the preeminent example of NATO covering such gaps.

144. “Estonian Defense Forces,” EESTI KAITSEVÄGI: Estonian Defense Forces website, n.d., available 

from www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces, accessed on May 21, 2016.

145. “Land Forces,” EESTI KAITSEVÄGI: Estonian Defense Forces website, n.d., available from www.

mil.ee/en/landforces, accessed on May 21, 2016.

146. “Naval Flotilla,” EESTI KAITSEVÄGI: Estonian Defense Forces website, renewed March 3, 2016, 

available from www.mil.ee/en/navy/Naval-Flotilla, accessed on May 21, 2016.

147. “Air Force,” EESTI KAITSEVÄGI: Estonian Defense Forces website, n.d., available from www.mil.

ee/en/air_force, accessed on May 21, 2016.

148. Republic of Estonia Defense Forces, “Estonian National Defense 2022,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Forces website, available from www.kaitseministeerium.ee/riigikaitse2022/

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150

149. Kristine Rudzite-Stejskala, “2% of GDP for Defence,” Analysis, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, December 5, 2014, available from liia.lv/en/analysis/2-of-gdp-for-defence-414, accessed on May 

19, 2016.

150. Latvian Armed Forces website, available from www.mil.lv/Par_mums/Sastavs.aspx, accessed on 

May 19, 2016.

151. Piotr Szymański, “Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and 

armed forces,” OSW Commentary, No. 190, November 23, 2015, p. 4.

152. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Latvia, Lithuania To Raise Defense Spending,” Defense News, July 29, 

2015, available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/07/29/latvia-lithuania-raisedefense-spending/30843863/, accessed on May 21, 2016.

153. Pabriks, p. 19.

154. Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, “Guidelines of the Minister of National Defense for 2016-

2021,” December 29, 2015, p. 2.

155. Lithuanian Armed Forces website, available from kariuomene.kam.lt/en/structure_1469/national_

defence_volunteer_forces_1357.html, accessed on May 20, 2016.

156. Szymański, “Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed 

forces,” p. 8. 

157. Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, p. 3.

158. Nicholas de Larrinaga, “Lithuania orders German PzH 2000s,” IHS Jane’s 360, September 30, 2015, 

available from www.janes.com/article/54876/lithuania-orders-german-pzh-2000s, accessed on May 20, 2016.

159. Szymański, “Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed 

forces,” p. 8.

160. Ibid.

161. International Campaign to Ban Landmines Home Page, available from www.icbl.org/en-gb/home.

aspx, accessed on February 12, 2017.

162. Phillip Karber and Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New-Generation Warfare,” 

Army: The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army, Vol. 66, No. 6, June 2016, published online 

May 13, 2016, available from www.armymagazine.org/2016/05/13/russias-new-generation-warfare/.

163. Ibid.

164. Colonel Gary R. Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share . . . Multinational Understanding,” Fires 

Bulletin, May-June 2015, p. 1.

165. James M. Goldgeier, The Future of NATO, New York: Council on Foreign Relations—International 

Institutions and Global Governance Program, February 2010, p. 20.

166. Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share,” p. 6.

167. Goldgeier, p. viii.
151

168. Jeffrey Mankoff and Andrew Kuchins, Russia, Ukraine, and U.S. Policy Options: A Briefing Memo, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, Russia and Eurasia Program, January 

2015, p. 3.

169. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 25.

170. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Press & Media, June 22, 2015, p. 6, available from www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/

assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150622_PR_CP_2015_093-v2.pdf, accessed on January 6, 2016.

171. Daniel Keohane, Does NATO Matter for U.S. Defence Policy? Madrid, Spain: FRIDE, A European 

Think Tank for Global Action, May 2012, p. 2.

172. “United States GDP: 1960-2017,” Trading Economics, n.d., available from www.tradingeconomics.

com/united-states/gdp.

173. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Introduction.

174. Keohane, p. 2.

175. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015, p. 9.

176. Keohane, p. 2.

177. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 3.

178. Mankoff and Kuchins, p. 8.

179. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2014, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, March 4, 2014, p. vii.

180. Goldgeier, p. 3.

181. Mankoff and Kuchins, p. 5.

182. Colonel Gary R. Graves, “Multinational Operations: Understanding Multinationalism to Shape the 

Operational Environment,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 2016, p. 6.

183. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Why NATO Matters to America,” 

Speech at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, March 19, 2014, available from www.brookings.edu/~/

media/events/2014/3/19%20rasmussen%20nato/20140319_nato_rasmussen_prepared_remarks.pdf, accessed on 

March 15, 2016.

184. Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” Survival: Global 

Politics and Strategy, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 30, 2015, p. 52, available from dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.

1008295, accessed on May 11, 2015.

185. Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, Querine Hanlon, and Samantha Ravich, “The Sources of Instability in the Twenty-First Century: Weak States, Armed Groups, and Irregular Conflict,” Strategic Studies 

Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2011, p. 73.

186. Graves, “Multinational Operations,” p. 7.
152

187. Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 10th ed., Lanham, MD: 

Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, pp. 370-371.

188. Ibid.

189. Former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Dean Acheson Lecture, “Building Partnerships in 

the 21st Century,” Speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace, June 28, 2012, available from www.thefreelibrary.com/

Dean+Acheson+Lecture%3A+%22Building+Partnership+in+the+21st+Century%22.-a0299062044, accessed on 

March 15, 2016.

190. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” signed in Washington, D.C. on 

April 4, 1949, last updated March 21, 2016, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.

htm, accessed on January 12, 2017.

191. Goldgeier, p. vii.

192. Philip H. Gordon, “Why NATO Matters to U.S. Security,” DIPNOTE: U.S. Department of State 

Official Blog, May 14, 2012, available from cc.bingj.com/cache.aspx?q=Why+NATO+Matters+to+U.S.+Secu

rity&d=4737535276884216&mkt=en-US&setlang=en-US&w=mOvnKrWXHIpqYeIndfE9EXKkRw1F3QQN,

accessed on February 12, 2017.

193. Thomas Fingar, “Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence and National Security, Using Intelligence to 

Anticipate Opportunities and Shape the Future,” Lecture held at Stanford University, Stanford, CA, on 

October 21, 2009, transcript available from https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/evnts/media//lecture_text.

pdf, p. 7.

194. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction 

to Theory and History, 8th ed., Boston, MA: Longman, 2011, p. 40.

195. Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Operating 

Concept: Win in a Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014, pp. iii-iv, 9, 25.

196. Goldgeier, p. 7.

197. Shultz et al., pp. 2-3.

198. Ibid., p. 3.

199. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Smart Defence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

website, September 1, 2015, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm, accessed on 

October 30, 2015.

200 . Colonel Stephen J. Maranian, NATO Interoperability: Sustaining Trust and Capacity within the 

Alliance, Research Paper, Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, Research Division, June 2015, p. 2.

201. Graves, “Multinational Operations,” p. 2; Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share,” p. 4.

202. General Martin E. Dempsey, Mission Command, White Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, April 3, 2012, pp. 3-5, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers.htm, accessed on 

October 19, 2015.

203. Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share,” p. 2.
153

204. Ibid., p. 4.

205. Colonel Gary R. Graves, “Mission Command: Instilling Cultural Change through the U.S. Army 

Combat Training Centers,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 2015, p. 4.

206. Adela Frame and James W. Lussier, eds., 66 Stories of Battle Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

School for Command Preparation, Command and General Staff College Press, 2001, p. 19.

207. Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share,” p. 4.

208. Ibid., p. 5.

209. Ibid.

210. Ibid.

211. Ibid., p. 4.

212. Ibid.

213. U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of the Army, May 2012, includes Change 2, March 12, 2014, p. 3.

214. Graves, “Mission Command,” p. 5.

215. Dempsey, Mission Command, pp. 3-6.

216. Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share,” p. 8; Graves, “Multinational Operations,” p. 2.

217. Howard J. Ross, Reinventing Diversity: Transforming Organizational Community to Strengthen People, 

Purpose, and Performance, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 177; Maranian, p. 2.

218. Graves, “Seek, Develop, and Share,” p. 6.

219. Ibid.

220. U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, p. 3; Graves, “Mission Command,” p. 6.

221. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for 

the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of 

State and Government in Lisbon,” November 19, 2010.

222. Goldgeier, p. 14.

223. Ibid., p. 7.

224. Ibid., p. 14.

225. Ibid.

226. P. Gordon, “Why NATO Matters to U.S. Security.”

227. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence.
154

228. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Remarks at Atlantik Brücke: ‘U.S., Germany, & NATO Are 

Moving Forward Together’,” Speech given in Berlin, Germany, June 22, 2015, transcript available from 

https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606684/remarks-at-atlantik-brcke-us-germany-natoare-moving-forward-together, accessed on March 15, 2016.

229. P. Gordon, “Why NATO Matters to U.S. Security.”

230. Goldgeier, p. 15.

231. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 25.

232. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “Hybrid Wars: The 21st-Century’s New Threats to Global Peace 

and Security,” South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2015, p. 78, available from eprints.

bournemouth.ac.uk/22002/1/1110-2624-1-PB.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2016.

233. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Remarks to the North Atlantic Council, “The Security and Defense Agenda,” Speech given in Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011, transcript available from 

archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839, accessed on March 15, 2016.

234. Ibid.

235. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, p. i.

236. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 1, 9.

237. Jeffrey H. Michaels, “NATO after Libya – Alliance Adrift,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 6, 

December 22, 2011, p. 61.

238. Graves, “Multinational Operations,” p. 5.

239. David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan, Montreal, Quebec: Department of Political Science, McGill University, September 2009, 

p. 1, available from shape.nato.int/resources/1/documents/nato%20at%20war.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2016.

240. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1.

241. Michaels, p. 61.

242. Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO: a Unique Alliance with a Clear Course,” Speech by NATO Secretary 

General at the German Marshall Fund, given in Brussels, Belgium, on October 28, 2014, p. 4, available from 

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114179.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on October 28, 2014.

243. Ibid., p. 2.

244. Ibid., p. 3.

245. Ibid., p. 4.

246. Ibid., p. 2.

247. Ibid., p. 4.
155

248. Ibid.

249. Ibid., p. 2.

250. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “What Is NATO?” Basic Points, 2.2 Collective Defence, North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization website, n.d., available from www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html, accessed 

on April 20, 2015; Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty states: 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 

considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each 

of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter 

of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 

concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 

and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty.” 

251. Karl-Heinz Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Future beyond the Ukraine Crisis,”

American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 36, No. 6, p. 362.

252. Kroenig, p. 49.

253. Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw,” p. 362; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” p. 10.

254. Kroenig, p. 56.

255. Ibid.; Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw,” p. 362.

256. Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw,” p. 362.

257. Mastriano, Project 1704, p. 7. Project 1704 describes the application of this strategy as follows: 

Moscow effectively uses deception and disinformation to generate ambiguity as a means to prevent a quick 

response from the West. Such was the case in Crimea, where despite evidence to the contrary, Putin denied 

that the ‘little green men’ were his soldiers until after he had completed annexation of the region. With 

this approach, Putin operated inside the decision-making cycle of NATO and thus gained the initiative. 

This approach exploited fissures between NATO and the EU, as each European nation must conduct a costbenefit analysis on the prospect of responding to Russian aggression and enduring the potential economic 

consequences. When Putin believes that employing conventional forces is too risky, he resorts to using forces 

unconventionally, scaled and adapted to the strategic environment.

258. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

259. Ibid., p. 6.

260. Ibid., pp. 6-8.

261. Kroenig, p. 55.

262. John R. Deni, “NATO’s Rebirth: NATO’s New Trajectories after the Wales Summit,” Parameters, 

Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2014, p. 57; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 

Wales, on September 5, 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, para. 1, available from www.nato.

int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#RAP, accessed on May 12, 2015; North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
156

tion, “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, updated 

October 13, 2016, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm, accessed on May 12, 2015:

Following the completion of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 

2014, a new, follow-on NATO-led mission called Resolute Support was launched on January 1, 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions.

263. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 1.

264. Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Die NATO vor neuen Herausforderungen” (“NATO faces new challenges”),

Deutschland.de, October 14, 2014, p. 2, available from https://www.deutschland.de/de/topic/politik/frieden-sicherheit/die-nato-vor-neuen-herausforderungen, accessed on May 12, 2015.

265. Ruediger Hulin, “NATO Gipfel in Wales: Zurueck zur Buendnisverteidigung” (“NATO Summit 

in Wales: Back to Alliance defense”), Newsletter Verteidigung, Vol. 8, No. 36, September 9, 2014, p. 1; Kamp, 

“Die NATO vor neuen Herausforderungen,” p. 1.

266. Ruediger Hulin, “NATO Gipfel in Wales: Zurueck zur Buendnisverteidigung,” p. 1.

267. Kamp, “Die NATO vor neuen Herausforderungen,” p. 2; Deni, p. 57.

268. Kamp, “Die NATO vor neuen Herausforderungen,” p. 2; Deni, pp. 57-58.

269. Kamp, “Die NATO vor neuen Herausforderungen,” pp. 1-2; Deni, pp. 60-61; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s new spearhead force gears up,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, 

April 28, 2015, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_118642.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 

May 12, 2015:

NATO has a new ‘spearhead force’, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which the Alliance has started to test. The VJTF is a brigade that will be able to deploy within 48 hours and will eventually 

include 5,000 troops. It is part of the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO’s high-readiness force comprising 

land, air, sea and Special Forces units capable of rapid deployment wherever needed. Both the NRF and its 

new ‘spearhead force’ aim to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defence capability and ensure that NATO 

has the right forces in the right place at the right time. They are a key component of what has been called the 

‘Readiness Action Plan’ agreed by NATO leaders at the Wales Summit in September 2014.

270. Deni, p. 60; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 5.

271. Deni, pp. 61-62; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 64.

272. Deni, pp. 62-63; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” paras. 89, 14.

273. Deni, pp. 63-64. 

274. Ibid., p. 64; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 88.

275. Deni, pp. 64-65; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 9.

276. Stoltenberg, “NATO: a Unique Alliance with a Clear Course,” p. 4.

277. Jens Stoltenberg, “Foreword: Keeping NATO Strong,” in Jens Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s 

Annual Report 2014, Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Public Diplomacy Division, 

January 2015, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116854.htm, accessed on May 18, 2015.
157

278. John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996, pp. 20-23, 35-49.

279. Julian Lindley-French, “NATO’s Post-2014 Strategic Narrative,” Conference Report, Rome: NATO 

Defense College, Research Division, July 29, 2014, p. 11, available from www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.

php?icode=705.

280. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” p. 35.

281. Kotter, pp. 20-23, 51-66.

282. Claudia Major, “NATO’s Strategic Adaptation: Germany Is the Backbone for the Alliance’s Military Reorganisation,” SWP Comments, Vol. 16, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute 

for International and Security Affairs, March 2015, p. 1.

283. Kotter, pp. 20-23, 67-83; “NATO Vision 2030 Plus” is a term recommended by this chapter’s researcher, Colonel Markus Kreitmayr, German Army, that articulates the need for a comprehensive NATO 

vision. 

284. Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore, eds., “Introduction: Missions in Search of a Vision” in 

Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore, eds., NATO: In Search of a Vision, Washington, DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 2010, p. 2.

285. Kotter, pp. 20-23, 85-100; Lindley-French, p. 11.

286. Kotter, pp. 20-23; “NATO Common Collective Security Identity and Culture” is a term recommended by the researcher of this chapter, Colonel Markus Kreitmayr, German Army, to articulate the 

need to harmonize NATO members’ diverse security interests, assessments, and cultures as a baseline for 

consensus in collective security and defense matters.

287. Stoltenberg, “Foreword,” in Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014; Stoltenberg, 

“NATO: a Unique Alliance with a Clear Course,” p. 2.

288. Kroenig, p. 65.

289. Ibid., pp. 53-55.

290. Francois Heisbourg, “Preserving Post-Cold War Europe,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 

57, No. 1, 2015, pp. 40-43, available from dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008293, accessed on May 18, 

2015; Kroenig, p. 65.

291. Mastriano, Project 1704, p. 99.

292. Major, pp. 2-4.

293. Kroenig, pp. 62-65.

294. Stoltenberg, “NATO: a Unique Alliance with a Clear Course,” p. 4.

295. Kroenig, p. 58.

296. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” p. 28.

297. Ibid., p. 27; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty.”
158

298. Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw,” pp. 363-364.

299. Franklin D. Kramer, “NATO Global Partnerships: Strategic Opportunities and Imperatives in a 

Globalized World,” Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 2013, p. 3.

300. Stoltenberg, “NATO: a Unique Alliance with a Clear Course,” p. 2.

301. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 1; Stoltenberg, “Foreword,” in Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014.

302. Jens Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, Public Diplomacy Division, January 2016, p. 7, available from www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf, accessed on January 30, 2016.

303. Edgar Buckley and Kurt Volker, “NATO Reform and Decision-Making,” Strategic Advisors Group 

Issue Brief, Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, February 23, 2010, p. 1, available from www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/nato-reform-and-decisionmaking, accessed on December 29, 2015.

304. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty.”

305. The founding nations are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the 

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

306. “A Short History of NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, available from www.

nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm?selectedLocale=en.

307. Ibid.

308. Ibid.

309. Next to the founding nations, as of January 1, 2016, the NATO member states were Greece and 

Turkey (1952); Germany (1955); Spain (1982); Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, 

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); and Albania and Croatia (2009). 

310. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe website, available from www.shape.nato.int/, 

accessed on January 2, 2016.

311. Justin Huggler, “Russian President Vladimir Putin Trying To Destroy NATO: US Commander,” 

The Age, March 5, 2015, available from www.theage.com.au/world/russian-president-vladimir-putin-trying-todestroy-nato-us-commander-20150304-13vm69, accessed on December 28, 2015; Stephen Szabo, “Divide and 

Conquer,” U.S. News & World Report, March 5, 2015, available from www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2015/03/05/vladimir-putin-wants-to-break-up-the-us-german-partnership, accessed on December 28, 2015.

312. BRICS is an acronym based on the initial letters of the names of five countries: Brazil, Russia, India, 

China, and South Africa. These countries are situated in a comparable stage of development and represent 

in the current global environment a political and economic organization of growing importance.

313. Mastriano, Project 1704, pp. 5-9.

314. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 3, 23-24. 

315. Alexey Khlebnikov, “For Europe, a relationship with Russia is of vital importance,” Russia Direct, 

April 14, 2015, available from www.russia-direct.org/qa/europe-relationship-russia-vital-importance, accessed on 

January 24, 2016.
159

316. Ibid.

317. “NATO/Transatlantic Issues,” Cato Institute website, available from www.cato.org/research/natotransatlantic-issues, accessed on January 31, 2016.

318. Doug Bandow, “Why Are America’s Allies So Persistently Pathetic?” The National Interest, January 11, 2016, available from nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/why-are-americas-allies-so-persistently-pathetic-14870, accessed on January 31, 2016.

319. Khlebnikov.

320. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Article 4: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or 

security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

321. Jamie Shea, “NATO Going Global—Or Almost,” Brussels Journal of International Studies, 

Vol. 2, 2005.

322. Paul McLeary, “NATO Chief: Cyber Can Trigger Article 5,” Defense News Webinar, March 25, 2015, 

available from https://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/03/25/nato-cyber-russiaexercises/70427930/, accessed on January 27, 2016.

323. Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare: Prepared 

by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, 

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, available from https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html.

324. Ibid.

325. Henry Dalziel, “The Four Amigos: Stuxnet, Flame, Gauss, and DuQu,” Concise Courses Security 

Blog, 2013.

326. Murdoch Watney, “Challenges Pertaining to Cyber War Under International Law,” IEEE Xplore: 

2014 Third International Conference on Cyber Security, Cyber Warfare, and Digital Forensics, pp. 1-5.

327. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “The Militarization of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be Better,” IEEE Xplore: 

2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON), pp. 1-13.

328. Major Arie J. Schaap, “Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International 

Law,” Cardoza Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 64, 2009, pp. 122-124.

329. Margriet Drent, Rob Hendriks, and Dick Zandee, “New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Institute the Hague, the Netherlands, July 2015, p. 7, available from www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/New%20Threats_New%20EU_

Nato%20Responses_Clingendael_July2015.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2016.

330. Khalid Mahdi, “Adaptation and Assurance: NATO’s Response to the 21st Century Security Environment,” The NATO association of Canada, April 3, 2016, available from natoassociation.ca/adaptation-andassurance-natos-response-to-the-21st-century-security-environment/, accessed on May 3, 2016.

331. Ibid.

332. Ibid.
160

333. Ibid.

334. Xavier Pintat, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Assurance and Deterrence for the Post-2014 Security Environment Draft Report,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defense and Security Committee, 

August 21, 2015, p. 3, available from www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.asp?FILE=4084, accessed on May 3, 2016.

335. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 6.

336. George Allison, “UK Increases Contribution to New NATO Task Force,” UK Defense Journal, 

June 12, 2015, available from https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-increases-contribution-to-new-nato-task-force/,

accessed on May 3, 2016.

337. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “NATO says it’s adding a significant number of troops in Eastern Europe,” 

The Washington Post, February 10, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/

wp/2016/02/10/nato-says-its-adding-a-significant-number-of-troops-in-eastern-europe/, accessed on May 3, 2016.

338. Ibid.

339. Mahdi.

340. Ibid. 

341. Ibid. 

342. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 6.

343. Martin Zapfe, “NATO’s ‘Spearhead Force’,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 174, May 2015, 

p. 2, available from www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/

CSSAnalyse174-EN.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2015.

344. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 15.

345. Pintat, p. 4.

346. Ibid., p. 4.

347. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 15.

348. Mahdi.

349. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “Fact Sheet: NATO Response Force,” January 2016, 

available from www.shape.nato.int/page349011837, accessed on May 3, 2016.

350. Drent et al., p. 25.

351. Zapfe, p. 4.

352 . Pintat, p. 10.

353. John-Michael Arnold, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Strategic Benefits and Outstanding 

Challenges,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2016, p. 81.

354. Drent et al., p. 30
161

355. Håvard Sandvik, “Two reasons why the NATO Spearhead still matters,” Young Professionals in 

Foreign Policy, Brussels, December 3, 2015, available from www.ypfp.org/two_reasons_why_the_nato_spearhead_still_matters, accessed on May 3, 2016.

356. Brooks Tigner, “NATO agrees to boost NRF, but lacks ‘southern’ strategy,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 

October 9, 2015.

357. “NATO Secretary General welcomes expansion of NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea,” Press 

Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 6, 2016, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

news_128833.htm, accessed on March 11, 2016.

358. Pintat, p. 10.

359. Richard Weitz, “Russia vs. the new NATO,” Russia Direct, September 12, 2014, available from 

www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russia-vs-new-nato, accessed on May 3, 2016.

360. Ibid.

361. Ibid.

362. Ibid.

363. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “Fact Sheet: NATO Response Force.”

364. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 14.

365. Drent et al., p. 30.

366. Photo source, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112460.htm, accessed on 

May 23, 2016.

367. Weitz.

368. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 6.

369. Pintat, p. 6.

370. Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy Of Ambiguity.”

371. Drent et al., p. 56.

372. Jim Garamone, “NATO Commander Breedlove Discusses Implications of Hybrid War,” Small 

War Journal, March 15, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nato-commander-breedlove-discussesimplications-of-hybrid-war, accessed on May 16, 2016.

373. Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy Of Ambiguity.” 

374. Paul Bernstein, “Countering Russia’s Strategy for Regional Coercion and War,” Fort McNair, DC: 

National Defense University, March 2016, available from https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Countering_

Russia_Strategy_for_Regional_Coercion_and_War.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2016.

375. Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy Of Ambiguity.” 

376. Weitz.
162

377. Arnold, p. 74.

378. Ibid., p. 95.

379. Ibid., p. 86.

380. Ibid., p. 86.

381. “Implementing the NATO Wales Summit: From Strategy to Action,” Chatham House, The Royal 

Institute of International Affairs, October 31, 2014, available from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/

chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141030NATOWalesSummit.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2015.

382. Drent et al., p. 31.

383. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 6.

384. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “Fact Sheet: NATO Response Force,” p. 6.

385. Drent et al., p. 32.

386. Pintat, p. 5.

387. Zapfe, p. 3.

388. Ibid., p. 4.

389. Ibid.

390. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration.”

391. Associated Press, “New NATO Commander Says Military Alliance Still Vital,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, May 4, 2016, available from www.rferl.mobi/a/nato-new-commander-says-alliance-stillvital/27716164.html, accessed on May 6, 2016.

392. Gibbons-Neff.

393. Photo source, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm, accessed on May 23, 

2016.

394. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty.”

395. Drent et al., p. 57.

396. Pintat, p. 4.

397. Gibbons-Neff.

398. Ibid. 

399. Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy Of Ambiguity.” 

400. Ibid. 
163

401. Ashley Parker, “Donald Trump Says NATO is ‘Obsolete,’ UN is ‘Political Game’,” The New York 

Times, April 2, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/04/02/donald-trump-tells-crowdhed-be-fine-if-nato-broke-up/, accessed on May 4, 2016.

402. Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy Of Ambiguity.” 

403. Drent et al., p. 27.

404. Pintat, p. 10.

405. Drent et al., p. 27.

406. Ibid., p. 27.

407. Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, p. 15.

408. Drent et al., p. 26.

409. Gibbons-Neff.

410. Weitz.

411. Associated Press, “Kremlin Creating New Military Divisions To Counter ‘NATO Buildup’,”

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, May 4, 2016, available from www.rferl.mobi/a/russia-new-militarydivisions-nato/27715405.html, accessed on May 6, 2016.

412. Photo source, available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zapad-2009_military_exercises.

jpg, accessed on May 23, 2016.

413. Drent et al., p. 56.

414. Weitz.

415. Mastriano, “Defeating Putin’s Strategy Of Ambiguity.” 

416. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 

1971, p. 78.

417. Pintat, p. 11.

418. Joe Biden, “Remarks at the 45th Munich conference on security policy,” 2009, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-45thmunich-conference-security-policy, accessed on 

April 17, 2012.

419. Ruth Deyermond, “Assessing the reset: successes and failures in the Obama administration’s Russia policy, 2009–2012,” European Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2013, p. 501, available from dx.doi.org/10.1080/0966

2839.2013.777704, accessed on December 12, 2015. 

420. Ibid.

421. Kingston Reif, “Russia Still Violating INF Treaty, U.S. Says,” Arms Control Today, July/August 

2015, available from https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_0708/News/Russia-Still-Violating-INF-Treaty-USSays, accessed on November 21, 2015.
164

422. “US president blames Russian backed separatists for Malaysian jet crash,” The Herald Globe, July 

19, 2014, available from www.heraldglobe.com/index.php/sid/223906785, accessed on November 21, 2015.

423. Gustav Gressel, “Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution, and what it means for Europe,” Policy Brief, 

London, UK: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), October 2015, p. 13, available from www.ecfr.

eu/page/-/Russias_Quiet_Military_Revolution.pdf, accessed on December 12, 2015.

424. Daisy Sindelar, “2008 In Review: Was This The Year That Russia Peaked?” Radio Free Europe / 

Radio Liberty, Features, January 3, 2009, quoted in Jacek Wieclawski, “Challenges for the Russian Foreign 

Policy—the Lesson of the Georgian Conflict,” Asian Social Science, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 2011, p. 15, available 

from search.proquest.com/docview/886544825?accountid=4444, accessed on December 12, 2015.

425. Gressel, p. 2. 

426. Josh Rogin, “US Reluctant to Disclose to All NATO Allies that Russia is Violating INF Treaty,” The 

Atlantic Council, December 7, 2013, available from www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/us-disclosed-tosome-but-not-all-nato-allies-that-russia-violated-inf-treaty, accessed on December 12, 2015.

427. “Pussy Riot jail terms condemned as ‘disproportionate’,” BBC News, August 18, 2012, available 

from www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19302986, accessed on December 12, 2015.

428. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 20.

429. Artem Kureev, “Russian Diaspora: A tool of soft power?” Russian Direct, November 11, 2015, 

available from www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russian-diaspora-tool-soft-power, accessed on November 21, 2015.

430. Vladimir Putin, “Putin, Once a KGB Spy, Always a KGB Spy?” interview by Charlie Rose, CBS 

News, 60 Minutes, aired on September 27, 2015, available from www.cbsnews.com/videos/once-a-kgb-spyalways-a-kgb-spy/, accessed on September 30, 2015.

431. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking 

the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 

26, 2013, available from vpk-news.ru/articles/14632, quoted in Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Military Strategy 

& Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric—and Putin Led,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 28, September 

2015, p. 454.

432. Stephen R. Covington, “Putin’s Choice for Russia,” Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and 

International Affairs, August 2015, p. 14.

433. Gerasimov quoted in Thomas, “Russia’s Military,” p. 455.

434. “Novorossiya” was the name of the northern coast of the Black Sea conquered from the Ottomans 

in 1768–1791 and annexed by the empire during the reign of Catherine II. Most of Novorossiya is in present-day Ukraine. Dmitri Trenin, “A Eurasian Story,” Post-Imperium, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, p. 100, available from carnegieendowment.org/pdf/book/post-imperium.pdf, 

accessed on November 21, 2015.

435. Budget Control Act of 2011, Public Law 112-25, 112th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, DC, August 2, 

2011, available from https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/365?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%

5B%22s.365+budget+control+act+2011%22%5D%7D, accessed on December 12, 2015.
165

436. Richard Kogan, “How the Across-the-Board Cuts in the Budget Control Act Will Work,” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised April 27, 2012, available from www.cbpp.org/

research/how-the-across-the-board-cuts-in-the-budget-control-act-will-work, accessed on December 12, 2015.

437. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,” The New York Times, 

July 28, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-cruise-missile-inviolation-of-treaty.html?_r=0, accessed on December 12, 2015.

438. Carter.

439. Artem Kureev, “The real reason why Russia finally left the CFE Treaty,” Russia Direct, March 

17, 2015, available from www.russia-direct.org/opinion/real-reason-why-russia-finally-left-cfe-treaty, accessed on 

December 12, 2015.

440. Ibid.

441. Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 2.

442. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2014, pp. 60-61. 

443. “Lithuania—M 1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICV) with 30mm cannon and M2 Machine 

Guns, and Related Support Equipment,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency News Release, Transmittal No. 

15-78, November 5, 2015, available from www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/lithuania_15-78.pdf, accessed on 

December 12, 2015.

444. “Estonia—Javelin Missiles,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency News, Transmittal No. 14-54, 

October 7, 2014, available from www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/estonia_14-54.pdf, accessed on December 

12, 2015.

445. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian 

Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid: In Russia, Anti-Western Views and Support for Putin Surge,” 

Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 2015, p. 28.

446. Ibid., p. 30.

447. Ibid., p. 27.

448. William T. Wilson, “Russia’s Economy: What Do the Numbers Tell Us?” The National Interest, November 10, 2015, available from nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-economy-what-do-the-numbers-tellus-14300, accessed on December 13, 2015.

449. Gressel, p. 5.

450. Ibid.

451. Ian Kearns, Łukasz Kulesa, and Thomas Frear, “Preparing for the Worst: Are Russian and NATO 

Military Exercises Making War in Europe More Likely?” Policy Brief, London, UK: European Leadership 

Network, August 2015, p. 4.

452. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

453. Gressel, p. 11.

454. Ibid., p. 12.
166

455. Ibid., p. 14.

456. Ibid.

457. Ibid.

458. Wilson, “Russia’s Economy: What Do the Numbers Tell Us?”

459. Gressel, p. 12.

460. Covington, p. 2.

461. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

462. Ibid.

463. Olga Oliker, Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Olesya Tkacheva, and Scott Boston, “Russian 

Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment,” Perspectives, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2015, p. 21.

464. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia,” Nordea Concert Hall, Tallinn, Estonia, 2014, transcript available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/

remarks-president-obama-people-estonia, accessed on February 8, 2017.

465. Gressel, p. 3.

466. Captain Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” White Paper, MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States 

Special Operations Command, September 9, 2015.

467. Discussion with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-Policy (P) personnel, telephone 

discussion, Washington, DC, November 2, 2015.

468. Henry R. Nau, “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” Policy Review, April-May 2010, p. 36.

469. Andràs Ràcz, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist,” FIIA 

Report No. 43, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015, p. 52.

470. Nau, p. 29.

471. This section of Chapter 9 is an abridged and re-edited version of Douglas V. Mastriano, “Five 

Smooth Stones: How NATO Can Deter the ‘Goliath’ Russian Challenge to the Baltics,” Small Wars Journal, October 24, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/five-smooth-stones-how-nato-can-deter-the-

%E2%80%9Cgoliath%E2%80%9D-russian-challenge-to-the-baltics.

472. Interview with Rolands Henins, Director of Latvian Defense Policy, June 27, 2016.

473. Interview with Rasa Jukneviciene by Douglas Mastriano, June 28, 2016.

474. Interview with Colonel Dalius Polekauskas, Chief of Staff of the Lithuanian Army, June 28, 2016.

475. Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” Televised Campaign Address for Goldwater Presidential Campaign, aired October 27, 1964, transcript available from https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/

reference/timechoosing.html, accessed on August 3, 2016.

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