CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER 

PROTECTION

Improved Planning 

Needed to Strengthen 

Trade Enforcement

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2017

GAO-17-618

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-618, a report to 

congressional committees

June 2017

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

Improved Planning Needed to Strengthen Trade 

Enforcement

What GAO Found

Two offices within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforce U.S. trade 

laws and protect revenue. The Office of Trade develops policies to guide CBP’s

trade enforcement efforts, while the Office of Field Operations conducts a range 

of trade processing and enforcement activities at U.S. ports. CBP’s previously 

port-centric approach to trade enforcement has shifted to a national-level, 

industry-focused approach with the establishment of the Office of Field 

Operations’ 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise. These Centers represent a 

shift in trade operations, centralizing the processing of certain imported goods on 

a national scale through a single Center rather than individual ports of entry. 

Counterfeit Goods Seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at a Port in New York

CBP conducts trade enforcement across seven high-risk issue areas using a 

risk-based approach, but its plans generally lack performance targets that would 

enable it to assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities. Violations in 

the high-risk issue areas can cause significant revenue loss, harm the U.S. 

economy, or threaten the health and safety of the American people. CBP’s trade 

enforcement activities reduce risk of noncompliance and focus efforts on highrisk imports, according to CBP. For example, CBP conducts targeting of goods, 

conducts audits and verifications of importers, seizes prohibited goods, collects

duties, and assesses penalties. However, CBP cannot assess the effectiveness 

of its activities without developing performance targets as suggested by leading 

practices for managing for results.

Over the past 5 fiscal years, CBP generally has not met the minimum staffing 

levels set by Congress for four of nine positions that perform customs revenue 

functions, and it generally has not met the optimal staffing level targets identified 

by the agency for these positions. Staffing shortfalls can impact CBP’s ability to 

enforce trade effectively, for example, by leading to reduced compliance audits 

and decreased cargo inspections, according to CBP officials. CBP cited several 

challenges to filling staffing gaps, including that hiring for trade positions is not an 

agency-wide priority. Contrary to leading practices in human capital 

management, CBP has not articulated how it plans to reach its staffing targets 

for trade positions over the long term, generally conducting its hiring on an ad 

hoc basis. 

This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that GAO issued in 

April 2017. Information that CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted.

View GAO-17-618. For more information, 

contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-

8612 or GianopoulosK@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2015, CBP processed 

more than $2.4 trillion in imports 

through more than 300 ports of entry, 

collecting around $46 billion in 

revenue. CBP facilitates legitimate 

trade coming into the United States

and enforces U.S. trade laws. CBP is 

tasked with collecting revenue and 

identifying harmful and noncompliant

imports, such as counterfeit goods and 

goods that evade duties.

In February 2016, Congress passed an 

Act that included a provision for GAO 

to review the effectiveness of CBP’s 

trade enforcement activities. In this 

report, GAO examines (1) CBP’s

structure for carrying out trade 

enforcement, (2) how CBP conducts

trade enforcement across its high-risk 

issue areas and ensures that its 

enforcement activities are effective, 

and (3) the extent to which CBP meets 

its staffing needs for trade 

enforcement. GAO reviewed agency 

documents, interviewed agency 

officials, and conducted field work at 

ports in Baltimore, Maryland; Los 

Angeles/Long Beach, California; and 

New York, New York. GAO selected 

ports to visit based on factors including 

volume of imports and number of trade 

enforcement units at each port.

What GAO Recommends

To strengthen its trade enforcement 

efforts, CBP should (1) include 

performance targets in its plans 

covering high-risk issue areas, and (2) 

develop a long-term hiring plan specific 

to trade positions that articulates how it

will reach its staffing targets. CBP 

concurred with both recommendations.
Page i GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Letter 1

Background 4

Two of CBP’s Six Offices Conduct Trade Enforcement, with New 

Centers Changing the Way CBP Carries out Trade Operations 

Nationally 11

CBP Enforces Its Priority Trade Issues through a Layered, RiskBased Approach but Generally Does Not Have Performance 

Targets for Its Activities 22

CBP Has Not Met Its Staffing Targets for Some of Its Trade 

Positions, Which Can Impact CBP’s Trade Enforcement Efforts 36

Conclusions 42

Recommendations for Executive Action 43

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Appendix I Past Audit Findings and Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, Fiscal Years 2011-2016 45

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 60

Appendix III Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 

Office of Trade and Office of Field Operations 66

Appendix IV Status of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Seven Priority Trade 

Issue Plans 68

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 69

Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 71

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Tables

Table 1: CBP’s Priority Trade Issues as of February 2017, with 

Examples of Violations and Potential Enforcement Actions 7

Table 2: Directorates in CBP’s Office of Trade 12

Table 3: CBP Office of Field Operations’ Trade EnforcementRelated Directorates 14

Table 4: Positions in CBP that Perform Trade Functions, Including 

Trade Enforcement 15

Table 5: Comparison of Mandated, Optimal, and Actual Staffing 

Levels for CBP’s Mandated Trade Positions, End of Fiscal 

Years 2012–2016 37

Table 6: Optimal and Actual Staffing Levels for CBP’s 

Nonmandated Trade Positions, as of October 2014 38

Table 7: U.S. Government Accountability Office Audits Pertaining 

to Trade Enforcement, Fiscal Years 2011-2016 46

Table 8: Open GAO Recommendations and Their Status, as of 

October 2016 49

Table 9: DHS Office of Inspector General Audit (OIG) and 

Inspection Reports Pertaining to Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016 52

Table 10: Open DHS Office of Inspector General 

Recommendations and Their Status, as of October 24, 

2016 56

Table 11: Status of CBP’s Strategic or Annual Plans for the Seven 

Priority Trade Issues, as of February 2017 68

Figures

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection 9

Figure 2: Simplified Process by Which Goods Can Flow into the 

United States through Different Stages, and CBP’s Role

at Each Stage 10

Figure 3: Organizational Chart for the Trade Policy and Programs 

Directorate in CBP’s Office of Trade 13

Figure 4: Management Locations of CBP Centers of Excellence 

and Expertise and Industry Sectors 17

Figure 5: Generalized Example of Processing of Imported Goods, 

Before and After CBP Established the Centers of 

Excellence and Expertise 19

Figure 6: Staff Distribution of CBP’s Los Angeles Electronics 

Center of Excellence and Expertise 21
Page iii GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 7: CBP Trade Enforcement Activities by Stage of Entry of 

Goods into the United States 23

Figure 8: Example of Targeted Goods Seized by CBP 28

Figure 9: Example of Products Seized by CBP That Were Sent 

through International Mail 31

Figure 10: Number of GAO Recommendations by Topic Related 

to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Trade 

Enforcement, Fiscal Years 2011-2016 47

Figure 11: Number of DHS Office of Inspector General 

Recommendations by Topic Related to Trade 

Enforcement, Fiscal Years 2011-2016 54

Figure 12: Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Office of Trade 66

Figure 13: Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Office of Field Operations 67
Page iv GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Abbreviations

AD/CVD Antidumping and Countervailing Duties

AQI Agricultural Quarantine Inspection

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

COAC Commercial Customs Operations Advisory 

 Committee

CTAC Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center

C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FTZ foreign trade zone

HSI Homeland Security Investigations

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ISA Importer Self-Assessment 

ITC International Trade Commission

NTAG National Targeting and Analysis Groups

OFO Office of Field Operations 

OIG Office of Inspector General

SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 

 2006

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 12, 2017

The Honorable Orrin Hatch

Chairman

The Honorable Ron Wyden

Ranking Member

Committee on Finance

United States Senate

The Honorable Kevin Brady

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Neal

Ranking Member

Committee on Ways and Means

House of Representatives

International commerce is an important component of the U.S. economy. 

In fiscal year 2015, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processed more than $2.4 trillion 

in imports coming into the United States through more than 300 ports of 

entry. In fiscal year 2015, CBP collected around $46 billion in revenue, 

making it the second-largest revenue collection agency in the United 

States. While CBP facilitates trade coming into the United States, it must 

also enforce U.S. customs and trade laws that protect the nation’s 

economy and the health and safety of the American public. CBP utilizes 

resources at its ports of entry across the United States to process the 

legitimate trade of goods and at the same time identify any harmful and 

noncompliant cargo1 coming into the country, such as counterfeit goods, 

goods that are misclassified to evade duties, and goods that were made 

using forced labor.

 1“Cargo” refers to goods or items that are being transported by air, land, or sea.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (the Act) was 

signed into law in February 2016 and codified the establishment of CBP.2

According to CBP, the Act codified many existing CBP capabilities to 

enforce U.S. trade laws and regulations, streamline and facilitate the 

movement of legitimate trade, and interdict noncompliant trade. The Act 

defines trade enforcement as the enforcement of customs and trade laws 

of the United States.3 Enforcing trade also includes protecting revenue, 

which means ensuring that the duties and taxes owed on goods imported 

into the United States are collected. The Act contains a provision for GAO 

to report on the effectiveness of CBP’s trade enforcement activities and, 

among other things, to provide a description of CBP’s organization, use of 

resources, and trade enforcement activities covering all priority trade 

activities (to include targeting of goods), as well as previous 

recommendations related to trade enforcement and the implementation 

status of those recommendations.4

In this report, we examine (1) CBP’s structure for carrying out trade 

enforcement, (2) how CBP conducts trade enforcement across its highrisk issue areas 5 and ensures that its enforcement activities are effective, 

and (3) the extent to which CBP meets its staffing needs for trade 

enforcement. We also provide information on audits related to CBP’s 

trade enforcement and the implementation status of any 

 2Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122. Prior to the Act, CBP had been created through a 

presidential reorganization. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Homeland Security Act) 

transferred various functions to the Department of Homeland Security and established 

numerous bureaus therein including the United States Customs Service. In 2003, a 

Presidential Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department of Homeland Security 

renamed the Customs Service to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. The 

reorganization plan modification also specified that the “Bureau will include the resources 

and missions relating to borders and ports of entry of the Customs Service, the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, including the Border Patrol and inspections 

program, and the agricultural inspections function of the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection 

Program.” See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 411, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178; and Reorganization 

Plan Modification for the Department of Homeland Security, H. Doc. 108-32, p. 4 (Feb. 4, 

2003).

3Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 2(6).

4Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 102. The Act stipulates that GAO submit a report to the 

appropriate congressional committees no later than 1 year after the enactment of the Act. 

5CBP defines “high-risk issue areas” as areas in which trade violations can cause 

significant revenue loss, harm the U.S. economy, or threaten the health and safety of the 

American people and refers to these areas as Priority Trade Issues.
Page 3 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

recommendations made in such audits, including some recommendations 

that pertain to training related to CBP’s trade enforcement (see app. I).

This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that we 

issued in April 2017. CBP deemed some of the information in our April 

report to be sensitive but unclassified, which must be protected from 

public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about 

targeting. Although the information provided in this report is more limited, 

the report addresses the same objectives as the sensitive report and uses 

the same methodology.

To examine CBP’s structure for carrying out trade enforcement, we 

reviewed organizational charts for CBP and interviewed officials 

representing directorates and branches that have a trade enforcement 

component within CBP to better understand their role and organizational 

structure. To examine how CBP conducts trade enforcement across its 

high-risk issue areas and ensures that its enforcement activities are 

effective, we reviewed CBP documents pertaining to trade enforcement 

and high-risk issues, as well as strategic and annual plans and other 

documents. We also interviewed CBP officials who formulate trade policy 

and carry out trade enforcement. In addition, we visited CBP field offices 

in Baltimore, Maryland; Long Beach, California; and New York, New York, 

to observe trade enforcement activities and interview CBP officials 

located at air and sea ports. We selected the CBP ports and field offices 

to visit based on a number of factors, including the volume of imports 

coming through the ports and the number of relevant trade enforcementrelated units at the port. To examine the extent to which CBP meets its 

staffing needs for trade enforcement, we assessed staffing data covering 

fiscal years 2012-2016 for the 15 trade positions that carry out trade 

functions identified in CBP’s Resource Optimization Model—a tool that 

provides information on the optimal staffing levels necessary to carry out 

trade activities and adequately staff offices to address Priority Trade 

Issues. The minimum staffing level for 9 of these 15 trade positions was 

set by law in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Homeland Security 

Act).6 To provide information on audits related to CBP’s trade 

enforcement and the implementation status of any recommendations 

made in such audits, we analyzed trade enforcement-related audits 

published between fiscal years 2011 and 2016.7 We selected audits that 

 6Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2180.

7We determined that audits published in the past 5 years would be most relevant to 

describing CBP’s current state.
Page 4 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

were conducted during this time period, that followed generally accepted 

government auditing standards or similar standards, and that contained 

recommendations made to DHS or CBP. See appendix II for a complete 

description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

We conducted the performance audit on which this report is based from 

May 2016 to April 2017 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

subsequently worked with CBP in May 2017 to prepare this public version 

of the original sensitive but unclassified report for public release. This 

public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards.

Historically, the U.S. Customs Service under the Department of the 

Treasury was responsible for collecting revenue from trade in the form of 

customs duties, taxes, and fees.8 However, these functions were 

transferred to DHS under the Homeland Security Act when the U.S. 

Customs Service was merged with parts of the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service and the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service to form CBP in March 2003.9 At that time, 

CBP’s priority mission was homeland security, but the agency was also 

responsible for facilitating the movement of legitimate trade and people.10

 8The U.S. Customs Service was created in 1789, and its mission was almost entirely 

focused on revenue collection.

9Pub. L. No. 107-296, tit. IV, and Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department of 

Homeland Security, H. Doc. 108-32, p. 4 (Feb. 4, 2003). Although the Homeland Security 

Act transferred the functions of the United States Customs Service to DHS, the act 

specified that the Secretary of the Treasury would retain the authority related to the 

customs revenue functions that was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by law before 

the effective date of the Homeland Security Act. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403. 

10CBP’s 2005 to 2010 Strategic Plan stated that CBP’s priority mission is homeland 

security. The plan articulated two missions: (1) preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons 

from entering the United States while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel, and 

(2) ensuring homeland security.

Background

History of CBP and Key 

Legislation Related to 

Trade
Page 5 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Congress required in Section 412(b) of the Homeland Security Act that 

the Secretary of DHS, at a minimum, maintain the level of staff and 

associated support staff in certain customs revenue functions,11 which 

was in part defined as those functions performed by staff in nine positions 

that were present in the U.S. Customs Service when it became part of 

DHS in 2003.12 These customs revenue functions involve trade functions, 

including trade enforcement. For the purposes of our report, we refer to 

these as the nine mandated trade positions.

Since the creation of CBP, Congress has passed additional legislation 

that relates to CBP’s trade functions. For example, the Security and 

Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) requires CBP to 

prepare a resource model to determine the optimal staffing levels that are 

required to carry out commercial operations, including inspection and 

release of cargo and the revenue functions described in Section 412(b) of 

the Homeland Security Act.13 Accordingly, CBP developed the Resource 

Optimization Model for trade positions. In its model, CBP identified the 

staffing levels for 15 positions, of which 9 were the mandated trade 

positions from the Homeland Security Act, and 6 were nonmandated 

trade positions that also perform trade functions. According to CBP, the 

Resource Optimization Model generated a staff level range that projects 

the optimal staffing levels necessary for each of the 15 positions to 

conduct trade processing and enforcement across the seven Priority 

Trade Issue areas for a given fiscal year. CBP’s Resource Optimization 

 11Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412(b). Although the Homeland Security Act transferred the 

functions of the United States Customs Service to DHS, the act specified that the 

Secretary of the Treasury would retain the authority related to the customs revenue 

functions that was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by law before the effective date 

of the Homeland Security Act. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412. We previously reported on 

staff resources for customs revenue functions in GAO, Customs Revenue: Customs and 

Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability, GAO-07-529 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2007).

12The Homeland Security Act specifies that customs revenue functions are those 

functions performed by the following staff and the associated support staff for nine 

positions: Import Specialists, Entry Specialists, Drawback Specialists, National Import 

Specialists, Fines and Penalties Specialists, attorneys of the Office of Regulations and 

Rulings, Customs Auditors, International Trade Specialists, and Financial Systems 

Specialists. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412(b).

13Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 403, 120 Stat. 1884, 1926.
Page 6 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Model is based on projected workloads, staffing needs, and attrition levels 

for trade positions, according to officials from CBP’s Office of Trade.14

The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 acknowledged 

many existing CBP trade practices and enforcement processes, such as 

Priority Trade Issues and partnerships with the trade industry, and also 

placed additional requirements on CBP, such as enforcing revised U.S. 

laws concerning imported goods made using forced labor. The Act covers 

trade facilitation and trade enforcement issues such as import safety, 

protection of intellectual property, and prevention of evasion of duties. 

The Act also requires the development and implementation of Centers of 

Excellence and Expertise (Centers) that CBP had already been piloting 

and, among other things, centralizes CBP’s trade enforcement and trade 

facilitation efforts. According to CBP officials, the Act complements and 

bolsters CBP’s existing initiatives to enhance trade enforcement and 

facilitation.

According to CBP officials, two strategic documents inform the agency’s 

approach to trade enforcement.15 CBP Trade Strategy, Fiscal Years 

2009-2013 is the most recent CBP trade-specific strategy, according to 

CBP officials. The strategy lays out four trade goals: (1) facilitate 

legitimate trade and ensure compliance, (2) enforce U.S. trade laws and 

collect accurate revenue, (3) advance national and economic security, 

and (4) intensify modernization of CBP’s trade processes. According to 

officials in the Office of Trade, CBP’s current trade priorities are reflected 

in CBP’s Vision and Strategy 2020 document.16 The document lays out 

four overarching strategic goals with objectives for CBP and addresses 

 14CBP issued its first resource allocation model report in fiscal year 2015. This model 

reflected the optimal staffing level ranges estimated for fiscal years 2015 to 2022 and 

actual staffing levels as of October 4, 2014. CBP is required to submit a resource 

allocation model report to the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on 

Ways and Means of the House of Representatives every 2 fiscal years. GAO did not 

independently assess and validate the optimal staffing models’ ranges. 

15CBP strategic frameworks related to trade are also reflected in DHS strategic plans. For 

example, the Fiscal Years 2014-2018 Strategic Plan for DHS lists “Secure and Manage 

Our Borders” as one of its missions,with trade priorities reflected in a goal focused on 

“Safeguard and Expedite Lawful Trade and Travel.” 

16CBP, Vision and Strategy 2020: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan

(Washington, D.C.: March 2015). 

CBP’s Strategic 

Framework for Trade
Page 7 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

the agency’s dual security and trade mission. Two of these four goals 

address trade enforcement.17

CBP’s Priority Trade Issues are high-risk issue areas in which violations 

can cause significant revenue loss, harm the U.S. economy, or threaten 

the health and safety of the American people, according to CBP. Priority 

Trade Issues focus CBP’s actions and resources to better direct an 

effective trade facilitation and enforcement approach, according to CBP.18

Table 1 provides information on CBP’s Priority Trade Issues and 

examples of violations and enforcement actions that can occur. The Act 

required CBP to establish seven Priority Trade Issues, of which five 

already existed prior to being mentioned in the Act, according to CBP.19

Table 1: CBP’s Priority Trade Issues as of February 2017, with Examples of Violations and Potential Enforcement Actions 

Priority Trade Issue Objective(s) Example(s) of violation 

Example(s) of potential 

enforcement action

Agriculture Programs Facilitate the lawful importation of 

agriculture products and ensure that quotas 

are not exceeded. 

Agricultural goods, such as dairy 

products, claim false country of 

origin to evade agriculture quotas 

and receive lower duty rates.

The poundage quota for a good, 

such as peanuts, is exceeded.

Target high-risk 

shipments for screening.

Demand duties owed.

Issue penalties. 

Antidumping and 

Countervailing 

Duties(AD/CVD)a

Facilitate the lawful importation of 

merchandise subject to antidumping and 

countervailing duty laws, enforce 

requirements, and promote the timely and 

accurate collection of these duties without 

placing an undue burden on importers and 

international trade.

Goods, such as garlic, are 

misclassified to evade antidumping 

and countervailing duties.

The price of goods is falsified to 

reduce the amount of antidumping 

and countervailing duties owed.

Target high-risk 

shipments for screening.

Issue penalties.

Demand additional bond 

coverage and/or duties 

owed.b

 17The two strategic goals for CBP that address trade enforcement are goals 2 and 3. Goal 

2 covers advancing comprehensive border security and management and focuses on 

safeguarding and managing air, land, and maritime borders through the active 

administration of U.S. laws to include cross-border criminal activity, screening and 

scanning at ports, and comprehensive trade enforcement. Goal 3 covers enhancing U.S. 

economic competitiveness by enabling lawful trade and travel and focuses on advancing 

U.S. economic competitiveness and promoting economic prosperity with public, private, 

and international partners.

18Later in this report we discuss CBP strategic and/or annual plans that support each 

Priority Trade Issue.

19Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 117. Revenue has been periodically designated as a Priority 

Trade Issue for CBP since the agency was created in 2003, according to CBP officials. 

Agriculture programs became a Priority Trade Issue for CBP in February 2016.

CBP’s Priority Trade 

Issues
Page 8 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Priority Trade Issue Objective(s) Example(s) of violation 

Example(s) of potential 

enforcement action

Import Safety Develop import safety strategies that 

expand and emphasize a cost-efficient, 

risk-based approach to import safety.

Goods, such as a hover board with 

explosive batteries and toys with 

lead, pose a safety hazard to the 

consumer.

Target high-risk 

shipments for 

examination.

Seize or deny entry of 

unsafe goods.

Issue penalties.

Intellectual Property 

Rights (IPR)

Facilitate the lawful importation of IPRprotected merchandise and improve the 

effectiveness of IPR enforcement by 

ensuring a single, uniform approach and 

focusing on known or alleged violators with 

high aggregate values or whose infringing 

products threaten national security, health 

and safety, or economic security.

Goods infringe on U.S. patents, 

trademarks, and copyrights, such 

as counterfeit pharmaceuticals, 

batteries, apparel, and electronic 

games.

Target high-risk 

shipments for 

examination.

Seize counterfeit and 

pirated goods or deny 

entry of goods covered by 

exclusion orders.

Issue penalties.

Textiles and Wearing 

Apparel

Facilitate the lawful importation of textiles 

and wearing apparel and ensure the 

effective enforcement of the 

anticircumvention laws, trade agreements, 

and trade legislation regarding the 

importation of textiles and wearing apparel.

The duties on textiles or wearing 

apparel are improperly paid by the 

importer for a variety of reasons, 

such as misclassification, 

undervaluation, or unsupported 

trade agreement preference claims 

to receive a lower duty. 

Target high-risk 

shipments for 

examination.

Issue penalties.

Demand duties owed.

Trade Agreements and 

Preference Programs

Facilitate legitimate trade and address 

areas of noncompliance while effectively 

communicating the terms of U.S. free trade 

agreements and preferential trade 

legislation. The Trade Agreement’s Priority 

Trade Issue is limited to goods other than 

textiles and apparel.

An importer makes a false free 

trade agreement claim to receive a 

lower duty rate for a good that did 

not meet the rules of the 

agreement.

Target high-risk 

shipments for 

examination.

Issue penalties.

Demand duties owed.

Revenue Maximize collection efforts by ensuring 

strong controls over the revenue process 

and by focusing on material revenue risks.

The duties on goods are improperly 

paid by the importer for a variety of 

reasons, such as misclassifying 

goods to receive a lower duty.

Issue penalties.

Demand duties owed.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information. | GAO-17-618

Notes:

a

To remedy injurious foreign trade practices, the Department of Commerce assesses antidumping 

duties on products imported at unfairly low prices (i.e., dumped) and countervailing duties on products 

subsidized by foreign governments.

b

To ensure payment of unforeseen financial obligations to the U.S. government, most importers are 

required to post a security, usually a customs bond. The bond is like an insurance policy protecting 

the U.S. government against revenue loss if an importer defaults on its financial obligations.

CBP is led by a Commissioner who oversees CBP’s dual mission of 

protecting national security objectives while promoting economic 

CBP’s Organization
Page 9 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

prosperity and security, according to CBP documents.20 This mission was 

being carried out by more than 60,000 employees as of March 2017, with 

less than 20 percent working on trade-related issues, according to CBP 

officials. Two of CBP’s six offices are involved in carrying out trade 

enforcement: the Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations (see 

fig. 1). Two other CBP offices, Enterprise Services and Operations 

Support, provide the Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations 

with technical and administrative support for trade enforcement.

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border Protection

The flow of imports, or goods, into U.S. commerce is a regulated, 

multifaceted process that CBP is responsible for facilitating and enforcing. 

Imported goods enter at over 300 ports by air, land, or sea. The flow of 

goods can be characterized by three stages: pre-entry, entry, and postentry (see fig. 2).

 20The President of the United States nominates the CBP Commissioner,and the position 

is filled after confirmation hearings in the Senate.

Flow of Goods into the 

United States and CBP’s 

Role
Page 10 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 2: Simplified Process by Which Goods Can Flow into the United States through Different Stages, and CBP’s Role at 

Each Stage

• At pre-entry, before goods leave their country of origin and prior to 

goods arriving at a U.S. port of entry, importers and carriers file 

paperwork and provide required advance electronic information for 

CBP to review.21

• At entry, importers or brokers file entry documents when goods reach 

a U.S. port of entry where CBP scans 22 and possibly examines 23 them 

for import security and trade enforcement purposes before they enter 

into U.S. commerce. In some cases, CBP may target cargo for 

examination based on a risk assessment. Cargo that is scanned or 

inspected may be deemed as nonadmissible because of trade law 

violations, among other things. If CBP finds such violations, it may 

seize the cargo and issue penalties and/or fines. If the goods pose a 

 2119 C.F.R. § 4.7(b). CBP reviews the manifest and other information for security and 

trade-related purposes. Specific filing requirements differ, depending on a number of 

criteria, including the mode of entry (air, land, or sea) or the country of origin of the goods.

22For security purposes, CBP uses nonintrusive inspection technology, such as imaging 

and radiation detection devices, to scan cargo arriving by air, sea, or mail. 

23CBP uses the term “exam” to refer to a range of actions, including paperwork reviews, 

nonintrusive exams, and physical exams in which CBP examines all or a portion of the 

cargo.
Page 11 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

risk of nonpayment of duties, and the shipment meets certain 

requirements, CBP may require additional bond coverage. Admissible 

goods are released from the port and enter into U.S. commerce.

• At post-entry, importers or brokers file an additional set of entry 

summary documents that CBP reviews to ensure trade compliance, 

after entry of the goods has been authorized. CBP verifies the 

importer’s cargo classifications and calculation of customs duties, 

taxes, and fees owed, taking action when needed. For example, CBP 

may determine that an importer misclassified cargo in an attempt to 

pay lower duty rates, such that the agency issues the importer a bill 

for a greater amount based on the proper classification and possibly 

applies a penalty. CBP also continues to review and process trade

information provided by the importer. For example, CBP may conduct 

audits and reviews and validate information provided by the importer 

to check for importer compliance.

CBP’s trade policy, processing, and enforcement are primarily carried out 

by two offices—the Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations. 

The Office of Trade develops policies to guide trade enforcement efforts, 

while the Office of Field Operations conducts a range of trade processing 

and enforcement activities at ports. CBP staff in a variety of positions, 

including import specialists and CBP officers, conduct a range of trade 

processing and enforcement activities. CBP’s previously port-centric 

approach to trade enforcement has shifted to a national-level, industryfocused approach with the establishment of the Office of Field 

Operations’ 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise. These Centers 

represent a shift in trade operations, centralizing the processing of 

imported goods on a national scale through a single industry-related 

Center rather than individual ports of entry.

Within CBP, the Office of Trade is the lead entity for trade policy and 

operational guidance. The Office of Trade is responsible for developing 

policy and practices to ensure that importers comply with U.S. trade laws 

and regulations, directing enforcement when compliance does not occur, 

and facilitating processes with industry partners. The Office of Trade 

guides the Office of Field Operations’ trade enforcement efforts at the 

ports through policy documents and directives, according to CBP officials. 

The Office of Trade is composed of six directorates: five are focused on 

trade issues, and one provides human capital and financial support to the 

office (see table 2 for a description of the directorates and app. III for an 

organizational chart of the Office of Trade).

Two of CBP’s Six 

Offices Conduct 

Trade Enforcement, 

with New Centers 

Changing the Way 

CBP Carries out 

Trade Operations 

Nationally

The Office of Trade 

Develops Trade Policies 

and Guides the Office of 

Field Operations’Trade 

Enforcement Efforts
Page 12 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Table 2: Directorates in CBP’s Office of Trade

Directorate Description

Regulatory Audit Conducts compliance audits of entities, such as importers and customs brokers, and 

audits in support of criminal and civil investigations, and provides nonaudit services to 

facilitate legitimate trade.

Regulations and Rulings Supports conformance and compliance with customs and trade laws, including revenue 

protection. Provides administrative rulings and protest decisions, issues enforcement 

decisions on civil violations of trade laws, and develops and drafts CBP’s regulations for 

the agency.

Resource Management Division Provides human capital and financial support for staff and resources.

Trade Policy and Programs Develops policy guidance and drives enforcement efforts. 

Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Develops and implements processes for detecting fraudulent activities and supports 

immediate enforcement action. 

Trade Transformation Office Coordinates CBP’s technology modernization efforts, including planning, development, 

and maintenance of the Automated Commercial Environment, the primary system 

through which the trade community reports import information. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information. | GAO-17-618

The Trade Policy and Programs directorate oversees CBP’s seven 

Priority Trade Issues, according to CBP officials. Each branch within this 

directorate is headed by a director who oversees components covering 

policy, enforcement, targeting, and operations as they relate to 

enforcement of the Priority Trade Issues at the field office and port level. 

See figure 3 for an organizational chart of the Trade Policy and Programs 

directorate and its branches.
Page 13 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 3: Organizational Chart for the Trade Policy and Programs Directorate in CBP’s Office of Trade

While the Office of Trade focuses solely on trade, the Office of Field 

Operations is responsible for both border security and the facilitation of 

lawful trade and travel at U.S. ports of entry.24 The Office of Field 

Operations operates 20 field offices located throughout the United States. 

The field offices, which are organized by regions, manage over 300 ports 

where cargo enters.

The Office of Field Operations is composed of seven directorates, six with 

responsibility for trade enforcement and border security, and one that 

provides human capital and financial support. According to CBP, four of 

the seven directorates and relevant divisions are involved in carrying out 

CBP’s trade enforcement. Table 3 describes the four directorates that 

carry out trade enforcement as well as one directorate that carries out 

human capital and financial support. (See app. III for the organizational 

chart of the Office of Field Operations.)

 24Border security includes antiterrorism, immigration, and antismuggling. 

The Office of Field 

Operations Conducts 

Trade Operations and 

Enforcement at Ports 

throughout the United 

States
Page 14 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Table 3: CBP Office of Field Operations’ Trade Enforcement-Related Directorates 

Directorates Description Divisions with a trade component

Cargo and Conveyance 

Security

Oversees multiple divisions, including Non-Intrusive 

Inspection, Radiation Technology, Cargo Security, 

Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism, Trusted 

Trader Programs, and Trade Operations. 

• Cargo Security and Control

• Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures

• Trade Operations Division

• Manifest & Conveyance Security 

National Targeting Center Collaborates with partners to identify, target, screen, 

and interdict inbound and outbound passengers and 

cargo.

• Cargo Targeting

Operations Safeguards the borders by strengthening the frontline 

through information sharing, collaboration, and 

integration.

• Directors, Field Operations

• Field Programs

Planning, Program Analysis, 

and Evaluation

Transforms Office of Field Operation’s business 

practices and processes through strategic planning and 

program management. 

• Strategic Transformation Office

• Enterprise Reporting Data Systems

Mission Support Provides human capital and financial support to all of 

the Office of Field Operation directorates.

• Budget

• Human Capital 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information. | GAO-17-618

Within the Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations, trade 

operations and enforcement are carried out by CBP staff in various 

positions at ports located throughout the United States and CBP 

headquarters. In the Resource Optimization Model, CBP’s Office of Trade 

identified 15 positions that carry out trade functions, including the 9 

mandated trade positions and 6 nonmandated trade positions that may 

perform security functions in addition to trade functions. In this report, we 

refer to these 15 positions as trade positions. Thirteen of the 15 trade 

positions are located within the Office of Trade or the Office of Field 

Operations, one is in Enterprise Services, and one is in Operations 

Support (see table 4).

Trade Enforcement 

Activities Are Carried Out 

by CBP Staff in Various 

Positions in the Office of 

Trade and the Office of 

Field Operations
Page 15 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Table 4: Positions in CBP that Perform Trade Functions, Including Trade Enforcement

Position Position description

Office of Trade

Customs auditor Examines internal and external records to determine the extent to which an entity meets 

regulatory, legal, and other requirements. Provides technical expertise to design and lead 

audits and delivers nonaudit services to facilitate legitimate trade.

International trade specialist Provides technical expertise to develop and implement statutes, regulations and policy. 

Conducts trade analysis to enforce policy and addresses risks in the Priority Trade Issues.

National import specialist Addresses tariff classification, value, and other import related issues pertaining to the 

Harmonized Tariff Schedule. Advises import specialists and provides training on a nationwide 

basis on specific industries for uniformity of Harmonized Tariff Schedule application.

Regulations and Rulings attorney Assists Regulatory Audit by providing advice and guidance and/or participating during an 

audit with respect to valuation and classification issues. Adjudicates and provides advice on 

cases involving fines, penalties, seizures, and forfeitures and liquidated damages for 

violations of customs laws, regulations, and policies. Provides legal/policy advice, 

recommendations, and enforcement determinations with respect to classification, valuation, 

and entry processes, among other things.

Office of Field Operations

Agriculture specialist Addresses animal and plant health risks associated with agricultural imports. Inspects 

commercial importations of agricultural products.

CBP officer Reviews shipment data and holds and examines high-risk shipments to enforce customs, 

immigration, and agriculture law and regulations and prevent illegal entry of prohibited goods.

Drawback specialist Reviews drawback claims submitted by importers by comparing, verifying, and matching 

documentation to these claims. A drawback is a remittance, in whole or in part, of duties, 

taxes, or fees previously paid by an importer.

Entry specialist Processes entry packages and assists in collection of revenue or issuance of penalties. 

Performs additional activities, such as broker management, walk-in inquiries, document 

filings, and collections.

Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures 

specialist

Receives and verifies penalty payment submissions, monitors penalty cases, and ensures the 

accuracy of revenue records prior to closing out penalty cases.

Import specialist Receives, collects and analyzes data on the imported merchandise to assess the risk to the 

security of the nation. Develops plans to detect and deter violations. Serves as a point of 

contact for the industry on resolving import issues.

National account manager Serves as a point of contact for importers that participate in CBP’s trusted programs, such as 

the Importer Self-Assessment program. Monitors and guides importers on appropriate 

internal controls to ensure compliance with CBP laws and regulations.

Seized property specialist Manages property seized by CBP, including storage, maintenance, and disposal.

Office of Trade and Office of Field Operations

Paralegal specialist Establishes that trade violations are present by reviewing and evaluating records. Develops 

and evaluates all evidence, facts, and circumstances relating to penalty cases and makes 

determinations as appropriate.

Assists Regulations and Rulings attorneys and branch chiefs with making determinations on 

various subject matters including but not limited to reviewing and processing applications to 

record trademarks and copyrights with CBP including processing of payments; making 

determinations on manufacturing and substitution drawback contracts and supporting efforts 

on trade litigation.
Page 16 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information. | GAO-17-618

CBP’s 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise have changed the way in 

which CBP conducts trade operations, centralizing the processing of 

imported goods on a national scale through a single industry-related 

Center rather than through individual ports of entry. Within the Office of 

Field Operations, the Centers of Excellence and Expertise are organized 

by industry, with staff located in ports across the United States (see fig. 

4).25

 25The Office of Field Operations established the first two Centers in 2011 after the 

introduction of two pilot programs. As of March 2016, all 10 Centers were operational, 

according to CBP. 

Enterprise Services

Financial systems specialist Provides technical guidance and administrative coordination within functional areas. 

Interprets and applies laws or other guidance to functional processes, ensuring that 

procedures and automated systems are in compliance.

Operations Support 

Chemist Provides technical advice and inspects imported and exported merchandise to ensure that 

they are properly identified.

Centers of Excellence and 

Expertise Change the Way 

CBP Conducts Trade 

Operations by Enhancing 

Industry Focus at a 

National Level
Page 17 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 4: Management Locations of CBP Centers of Excellence and Expertise and Industry Sectors

Note: CBP’s Centers of Excellence and Expertise are managed out of CBP field offices, indicated by 

stars and city names on the map.

Each Center is responsible for performing trade functions related to its 

industry sector, such as the processing of entry summary and post-entry 

summary documentation and account management, regardless of the 

cargo’s port of entry. Each Center is located within a CBP field office and 

has a Center director. Each Center is organized into three divisions –

Validation and Compliance, Enforcement, and Partnership Programs –
Page 18 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

each covered by an assistant Center director. Center staff are located at 

ports across the United States.26

The Centers have made it easier for CBP to gain a national perspective 

on the movement of trade, compliance issues, and enforcement patterns; 

they also have enhanced commodity expertise and industry-based 

knowledge for import specialists, according to CBP officials. Before CBP 

established the Centers, documents associated with the imported goods 

were processed by import specialists at the ports where the goods 

physically entered, so importers had to communicate with multiple import 

specialists at ports across the United States to process goods if they 

imported goods into more than one port (see fig. 5). As a result, it was 

harder for CBP to uniformly process entries and detect import patterns 

across the nation. For example, a potential trade violation caught by an 

import specialist at one port might not have been caught by an import 

specialist at another port. Now, after the establishment of the Centers, 

goods are processed by import specialists assigned to specific Centers, 

and importers work with one Center. In addition, the Centers have 

centralized CBP’s support for the trade community; now the trade 

community can reach out to one Center instead of multiple ports with 

questions about the import process, according to CBP officials.

 26The assistant Center directors may be located in other field offices, not at the location 

from which their Center is managed. 
Page 19 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 5: Generalized Example of Processing of Imported Goods, Before and After CBP Established the Centers of Excellence 

and Expertise
Page 20 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

With the 10 Centers fully operationalized, Center staff are adjusting to a 

new work environment that involves remote teams. Prior to the creation of 

the Centers, import specialists were reporting to and managed by a 

supervisor and port director located at their port, while national account 

managers reported to the Office of Trade. Now, import specialists and 

national account managers are reporting to and managed by the Center 

they are assigned to, even though they may not be physically co-located 

with their supervisors or Center director.27 According to CBP officials, 

entry specialists are currently reporting to their local port supervisors and 

managers, but will be reporting to and managed by 1 of the 10 Centers 

later in fiscal year 2017. Figure 6 illustrates an example of the remote 

management environment of the Electronics Center.

 27According to CBP, at the end of fiscal year 2016, there were 917 import specialists and

27 national account managers reportingto the 10 Centers rather than to over 300 ports.
Page 21 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 6: Staff Distribution of CBP’s Los Angeles Electronics Center of Excellence and Expertise

According to CBP officials, Centers and their staff face challenges that 

stem mainly from the transition to working in a remote environment and 

are making efforts to address these challenges:

• Virtual communication. Management and staff are increasing their 

usage of technology, teleconferences, and webcams and undergoing 

training to facilitate building remote teams. In addition, division 
Page 22 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

directors and supervisory import specialists may teleconference once 

a month to discuss challenges in remote management.

• New policies and procedures. Managers are learning different 

administrative policies such as leave policies as well as union rules 

that vary by port and operating across different time zones. In general, 

managers cover one geographic region, so they do not need to learn 

every port’s policies.

• Funding and support structure. While the Centers do not have a 

separate budget to support activities such as travel and do not have 

mission support staff, the field offices have generally been supportive, 

according to CBP officials. The CBP field offices that house each of 

the Center directors have discretion on budget matters and mission 

support for the Centers. The Centers also find alternatives to activities 

that may require funds, such as attending webinars instead of inperson training.

CBP uses a layered, risk-based approach to guide its trade enforcement 

activities across its Priority Trade Issues but generally does not set 

performance targets to assess the effectiveness of its activities. CBP’s 

trade enforcement activities leverage many different units within CBP and 

at other government agencies, according to CBP officials.28 See figure 7 

for examples of these activities by stage of entry of goods into the United 

States. CBP has created plans to set goals and objectives for its Priority 

Trade Issues; these plans contain some performance measures but 

generally lack targets to measure achievements and effectiveness.

 28CBP defines “risk” as the degree of exposure to the chance of noncompliance that 

would result in loss to trade, industry, or the public. Risk management is the integrated 

process for identifying and managing risk in trade compliance, according to CBP.

CBP Enforces Its 

Priority Trade Issues 

through a Layered, 

Risk-Based Approach 

but Generally Does 

Not Have 

Performance Targets 

for Its Activities
Page 23 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 7: CBP Trade Enforcement Activities by Stage of Entry of Goods into the United States
Page 24 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

CBP focuses on creating partnerships with industry to support its goal of 

increasing compliance among importers, according to CBP, and thereby 

reducing the risk of allowing noncompliant goods to enter the United 

States.29 According to CBP, partnership with industry helps expedite the 

flow of legitimate trade shipments and reduces the examination rate of 

low-risk importers, allowing CBP to focus its trade enforcement efforts on 

higher-risk importers. Examples of CBP’s partnership programs include 

the following:

• The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 

program. Through this public–private partnership program, members 

of the trade community volunteer to adopt tighter security measures 

throughout their international supply chains in exchange for enhanced 

trade facilitation, such as expedited processing. According to CBP, 

over 50 percent of the imports into the United States by value in 2016 

are C-TPAT imports.

• The Importer Self-Assessment (ISA). Current members of C-TPAT 

can apply to be ISA-certified, which means that importers have 

developed and implemented internal controls and assessed risk 

based on self-testing.30 The benefits of ISA to industry, according to 

CBP, include importers’ exemption from comprehensive CBP audits, 

 29According to CBP, informed compliance is premised on the idea that in order to 

maximize voluntary compliance with trade laws and regulations, the trade community 

needs to be clearly and completely informed of its legal obligations. The importer is 

responsible, among other things, for using reasonable care to enter, classify, and 

determine the value of imported merchandise and to provide any other information 

necessary to enable CBP to properly assess duties, and determine whether other 

applicable legal requirements, if any, have been met. CBP is then responsible for fixing 

the final classification and value of the merchandise. Failure of an importer to exercise 

reasonable care could delay release of the merchandise and, in some cases, could result 

in the imposition of penalties.

30CBP’s Regulatory Audit conducts the evaluation to assess the readiness of ISA 

applicants to manage and monitor their compliance with CBP laws and regulations 

through importer self-assessments. 

CBP’s Trade Enforcement 

Activities Focus on HighRisk Imports and 

Reducing Risk of 

Noncompliance

Partnering with Industry to 

Reduce Risk of 

Noncompliance
Page 25 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

fewer cargo exams, and faster clearance of cargo at the ports of 

entry.

• The Trusted Trader Program (currently in a pilot phase).31 The 

Trusted Trader Program’s goal is to unify the current C-TPAT and ISA 

processes in order to integrate supply chain security and trade 

compliance and further increase the low-risk importer population, 

which allows CBP to focus on the high-risk importers. The 

development of Trusted Trader is a coordinated effort with members 

of the trade community, CBP, and partner government agencies.32

The program is carried out by the Partnership Divisions of the Centers 

of Excellence and Expertise, which is composed of national account 

managers, import specialists, and entry specialists who work with the 

Trusted Trader accounts. According to CBP, this arrangement 

enables CBP and partner government agencies to provide additional 

incentives to participating entities and enhance efficiencies by 

managing supply chain security and trade compliance within one 

partnership program.33

In addition to partnership programs, according to CBP officials, staff at the 

Centers work closely with company representatives through meetings and 

seminars to enrich their knowledge of products and better understand the 

nuances of a particular industry to enhance their ability to identify highrisk importers. According to CBP, such partnerships with the private 

sector include participation in the Commercial Customs Operations 

Advisory Committee (COAC) to U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

working groups, roundtable meetings with industry representatives, and 

 31Announcement of Trusted Trader Program Test, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,334 (June 16, 2014). 

32CBP collaborates with 47 partner government agencies including the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture, the Consumer Safety Product Commission, and the Department of 

Transportation.

33CBP and partner government agencies work on other initiatives as well.According to the 

Office of Trade, the Border Interagency Executive Council was established by executive 

order to streamline the import/export process for American businesses and implement the 

International Trade Data System’s single window system,which will allow businesses to 

submit the data required by CBP and its partner government agencies to import cargo 

through a single window concept.
Page 26 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

educational seminars.34 Another partnership is through E-allegations, 

CBP’s online referral process for alleging trade violation(s) by importers, 

which provides a means for industry and the public to report to CBP any 

suspected violations of trade laws or regulations related to the importation 

of goods into the United States.

CBP’s targeting efforts are carried out by different targeting groups at the 

national and port levels, and can support or help identify enforcement 

actions that are carried out on high-risk shipments. Targeting involves 

obtaining information about the shipment entering U.S. ports and those 

parties involved in moving the cargo and goods, such as the importer. 

Targeting groups develop user-defined rules (targeting rules) based on 

advance data, research, and other information that might show trends or 

emerging trade issues.35 The targeting rules are generally entered into 

CBP’s Automated Targeting System and flag certain cargo and goods for 

CBP officials responsible for trade enforcement to inspect or review 

documentation for potential trade violations.36 The targeting rules are 

ranked as mandatory, or high-, medium-, or low-risk, providing CBP 

officials some discretion on the need to take action.

At the national level, CBP’s targeting efforts are carried out by different 

units, according to CBP.37 Within the Office of Trade, the National 

Targeting and Analysis Groups (NTAG) and Commercial Targeting and 

Analysis Center (CTAC) target for further review high-risk imports that are 

related to the Priority Trade Issues. Currently there are five NTAGs, 

 34The COAC is an advisory committee made up of industry members who have regular 

meetings to discuss and consider issues such as global supply chain security and 

facilitation, CBP modernization and automation, air cargo security, customs broker 

regulations, trade enforcement, revenue modernization, one U.S. government approach to 

trade and safety of imports, and protection of intellectual property rights. The COAC 

advises CBP and Treasury components. 

35According to CBP officials at a port we visited, in addition to user-defined rules, CBP 

uses random samplings to assess trade compliance. This sampling provides an additional 

level to ensure that all imports, not just targeted high-risk imports, are checked.

36CBP’s Automated Targeting System is a decision support tool that compares traveler, 

cargo, and conveyance information against law enforcement, intelligence, and other 

enforcement data using risk-based targeting scenarios and assessments. 

37According to the Office of Trade, CBP established a Trade Enforcement Task Force in 

May 2016 that leverages government partners to develop and deploy tools to improve 

CBP’s ability to detect and disrupt high-profile and emerging trade evasion schemes and 

interdict products derived from forced labor. 

Targeting High-Risk Shipments
Page 27 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

located in various locations across the country and staffed mainly by 

international trade specialists who specialize in targeting mainly at postentry for their respective Priority Trade Issue.38 The CTAC facilitates 

information sharing among partner government agencies on targeting and 

enforcement at all stages of the import process – pre-entry, entry, and 

post-entry – focusing on a variety of issues, including import safety and 

environmental crime, natural resources, wildlife trafficking, and cultural 

property, according to CBP.39 These targeting groups also collect 

information to develop targeting rules from import specialists who are 

assigned to 1 of the 10 Centers that cover their respective industry.

Also at the national level, the Office of Field Operations’ National 

Targeting Center provides advance targeting, research, and coordination 

for CBP field units, the intelligence community, foreign counterparts, and 

investigative and law enforcement agencies in support of CBP’s 

antiterrorism mission and includes a cargo component focused on trade 

called the Tactical Trade Targeting Unit. This unit provides a national 

targeting perspective and is focused on developing user-defined rules 

that have a high probability of leading to investigations, according to 

National Targeting Center officials. The National Targeting Center 

established an integrated operational network, known as the Integrated 

Trade Targeting Network (the network), between all of CBP’s national 

level trade targeting assets in the Office of Trade and the Office of Field 

Operations. According to CBP officials, the purpose of the network is to 

improve communication, coordinate actions, and standardize procedures 

for more effective trade targeting. The network provides training to 

enhance the knowledge of relevant CBP field and headquarters 

personnel in the areas of automated targeting and reporting systems and 

targeting techniques.40

At the port level, CBP’s targeting efforts are also carried out by CBP 

officers who utilize user-defined rules to identify high-risk cargo coming 

through the port for examination, according to CBP officials. CBP officers 

 38NTAGs are located in the following cities and specifically target the following Priority 

Trade Issues: revenue (Chicago, Illinois), antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD)

(Miami, Florida), trade agreements (Dallas, Texas), textiles (New York, New York), and 

intellectual property rights (Long Beach, California). 

39CTAC is located in Washington, D.C.

40Training is geared to further expand the cargo targeting for trade purposes expertise of 

CBP field and headquarters personnel, such as CBP officers, agriculture specialists, 

import specialists, and international trade specialists. 
Page 28 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

located at ports must examine all shipments that have a mandatory rule in 

the Automated Targeting System, but are given discretion to examine or 

not examine cargo for all other nonmandatory rules, according to CBP.41

For example, the targeting rules may trigger a requirement that CBP hold 

up the movement of a specific shipment at a port (called “holds”) until 

CBP officers can examine the shipment or import specialists can review 

documentation to determine whether there are possible trade violations. 

CBP may also conduct targeting based on advance information it 

receives on shipments coming into ports (see fig. 8 for an example of 

goods seized as a result of targeting).

Figure 8: Example of Targeted Goods Seized by CBP

CBP’s targeting efforts can support enforcement operations that are 

carried out by numerous CBP entities such as import specialists, 

 41The mandatory targeting rules also apply to other CBP officials, such as import 

specialists, who are asked to review post-entry information based on user-defined rules.
Page 29 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

agriculture specialists, and CBP officers as well as U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Department of Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI), a partnering component agency of CBP under the 

Department of Homeland Security, and other partner government 

agencies. For example, CBP reported in December 2016 that it 

conducted several operations in the last quarter of fiscal year 2016 

focused on targeting counterfeit goods—such as apparel, footwear, auto 

parts, and handbags—coming through express consignment and 

international mail facilities. CBP reported that these operations resulted in 

seizures of 948 shipments of counterfeit goods with an estimated 

manufacturer’s suggested retail price of over $20 million for the goods.

CBP conducts post-entry audits and validation activities to assess trade 

compliance and identify possible trade violations across the Priority Trade 

Issue areas. Customs auditors in the Regulatory Audit directorate within 

CBP’s Office of Trade reported that they use a risk-based approach to 

select candidates for assessment.42 According to officials from Regulatory 

Audit, their audit plans tend to focus on examining importers with high 

dollar value shipments and potential risk to revenue—generally large and 

midrange importers. Regulatory Audit conducts various types of audits 

and reviews, including the following:

• Focused assessment–comprehensive audits of major importers. 

These audits assess internal control over import activities to 

determine whether the importers pose acceptable risk for complying 

with CBP laws and regulations. Such assessments can look at value, 

classification, free trade agreements, intellectual property rights, free 

trade zones, prior disclosures, and antidumping and countervailing 

duties.

• Quick response audits–targeted compliance audit with narrowly 

defined objectives. These audits focus on a single issue or specific 

concern referred to Regulatory Audit by CBP’s NTAG or ICE, and 

cover Priority Trade Issues and other areas. Such audits can cover 

antidumping, intellectual property, import safety, textiles and wearing 

apparel, drawback, and foreign trade zone issues.

• Surveys of importers. These surveys are performed as a result of an 

assertion or allegation, such as an e-allegation, with an objective to 

 42CBP has 10 Regulatory Audit field offices in addition to its headquarters in Washington, 

D.C. 

Conducting Audits and 

Validating Trade Compliance
Page 30 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

obtain an understanding of a company’s importing practices to 

determine if there are concerns that merit future CBP consideration.43

Regulatory Audit officials we met with in Los Angeles and New York told 

us that the majority of their assignments are made up of quick response 

audits and surveys. According to CBP officials, the audits and reviews 

can result in the collection of additional revenue. For example, Regulatory 

Audit in headquarters reported that for fiscal year 2015, it identified, 

through its audit recommendations, over $109 million of revenue owed by 

importers and was able to collect almost $60 million that year.44 The 

audits and reviews also provide informed and enforced compliance to the 

trade community and act as a deterrent by discouraging potential 

violators.

In addition to activities carried out by Regulatory Audit, the Centers also 

conduct validation and compliance checks by reviewing post-entry 

importer records. All Centers have a division that conducts validation and 

compliance checks to ensure importer compliance. The checks are 

mainly carried out by teams of import specialists that specialize in 

different commodity types within their industry section. For example, by 

reviewing an importer’s post-entry summary records, the Center may 

validate that the entry complied with all conditions to be treated as a 

specific commodity under free trade agreements in which the United 

States is a party. When prompted by mandatory targeting rules, import 

specialists at the Centers are also responsible for reviewing the importers’

post-entry documentation and recording in the Automated Targeting 

System whether any potential violations were found. Some officials from 

targeting groups that we met with told us that import specialists are 

inconsistent about recording the results of the reviews they conduct, 

which impedes the targeting groups’ ability to assess the effectiveness of 

their targeting rules. According to Center procedures, import specialists 

are responsible for working with importers to ensure future compliance if 

violations have occurred and goods are seized or penalties are issued.

 43According to CBP, when significant concerns or issues of noncompliance or violations 

are identified in a survey, CBP may request that Regulatory Audit proceed with an audit or 

may take other enforcement action against the company. 

44The collections amount includes all monies collected for fiscal year 2016 as of June 8, 

2016, including monies collected related to assignments from prior years, according to 

Regulatory Audit.
Page 31 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

CBP can take actions against noncompliant importers when applicable.

For example, CBP can seize imported goods if it believes there is a 

violation of a trade law. The types of seized shipments range across the 

different Priority Trade Issue areas such as intellectual property rights, 

textiles, wearing apparel, and import safety (see fig. 9). For instance, 

according to CBP, 28,865 shipments were seized based on intellectual 

property rights violations in fiscal year 2015. The top five categories for 

intellectual property rights seizures include consumer electronics and 

pharmaceuticals, each of which often involve shipments that pose threats 

to consumer safety. According to CBP, as part of the seizure process, the 

Office of Field Operation’s Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures office will 

send the importer or another relevant party a notice of seizure. Any 

interested party may file a petition for relief from seizure within 30 days, 

according to CBP. CBP stores the seized goods until a final decision is 

made; if it does not return the goods to the importer, it generally destroys 

or sells the goods, as appropriate.

Figure 9: Example of Products Seized by CBP That Were Sent through International 

Mail

Seizing Unlawful Goods and 

Issuing Penalties
Page 32 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

CBP also has the authority to issue penalties and/or fines against 

importers, brokers, and other entities bringing goods into the United 

States that violate the law.45 Penalties may result, for example, if products 

are not properly marked with the country of origin, trademarks are 

violated with counterfeit goods, or illegal goods such as controlled 

substances are found. Penalties are monetary and are established by 

statute, according to CBP. In fiscal year 2015, CBP assessed over $237 

million in penalties for violations related to its Priority Trade Issues and 

collected $3.5 million, according to CBP.46

CBP officials collaborate with officials from the HSI directorate within ICE 

on civil and criminal cases involving trade fraud, according to CBP and 

HSI officials.47 CBP and HSI coordinate at the field office level through 

regularly scheduled meetings, according to HSI officials. At these 

meetings, according to HSI and CBP officials, HSI special agents meet 

with CBP officials, such as import specialists, customs auditors, and 

international trade specialists, to discuss potential and active cases and 

upcoming operations. While HSI officials have traditionally worked with 

local import specialists, they have had to adjust to working with import 

specialists located in other cities because of the virtual nature of the 

import specialists at the new Centers of Excellence and Expertise. For 

example, HSI officials in one city may be working on a case that involves 

a commodity assigned to a particular Center, but CBP no longer has a 

local import specialist that works for that Center—so the HSI officials 

must work with the import specialist located in another city who works for 

that Center, according to HSI officials. This has caused a decrease in 

cooperation and communication between CBP and HSI resulting in fewer 

investigations, according to HSI.

 45According to CBP, its authority to assess penalties is established by statute. The 

language of each statute dictates the amount to be assessed and the party or parties 

against whom the penalty is assessed. Examples of penalties are found in sections 1584 

(Manifest), 1592 (Commercial Fraud), and 1641 (Broker) of title 19 of the United States 

Code.

46However, the penalty amounts initially assessed in fiscal year 2015 may change 

because of a variety of factors, such as time extensions to file mitigating factors and 

supplemental petitions, and may not close out until the following fiscal year, according to 

CBP.

47HSI has the authority to investigate and enforce violations of criminal laws and 

regulations. HSI’s fiscal year 2016-2020 strategic plan includes protecting the homeland 

against illicit trade as one of its strategic goals. 

Conducting Investigations 

Stemming from Trade 

Violations
Page 33 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

CBP officials will share information on suspected activities or importers 

that are noteworthy based on their own trade enforcement efforts, which 

may lead to an HSI investigation. For example, while processing 

shipments entering the United States, import specialists at the Centers 

may identify unusual trade patterns or documentation discrepancies for 

shipments of significance, such as large volume or value, with the 

shipments having health and safety or national security concerns, 

according to CBP officials. In addition, according to CBP officials, 

customs auditors from Regulatory Audit may send referrals to HSI if they 

find potential fraud or other significant issues during their audits of 

importers. Officials from CBP’s Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures office 

might also work with HSI on cases that may include seizures of goods. 

According to Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures officials at one of the ports 

we visited, more than 50 percent of their time is spent working with HSI 

on cases involving seized property. According to CBP and HSI officials, 

other U.S. partner government agencies may also be involved in 

investigations involving trade violations.

CBP also conducts investigations stemming from allegations brought forth 

by industry and pertaining to the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015.48

According to the Office of Trade, such investigations draw upon the 

expertise of resources that include the Centers, targeting groups, and 

Regulatory Audit to look into the allegations and share the outcomes of 

investigations with industry.

 48Pub. L. No. 114-125, tit. IV. According to CBP, the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015 was 

initiated by industry partners who were concerned that they (1) did not know the resolution 

of allegations pertaining to trade violations that they had brought to CBP’s attention and 

(2) did not have a role in the investigative process.
Page 34 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

CBP has created strategic or annual plans that contain strategic goals for 

its Priority Trade Issues and some performance measures but generally 

lack targets to measure achievements and effectiveness. Leading 

practices for managing for results note, among other things, that a plan 

should identify goals and measures covering each of its program activities 

and contain targets to assess progress toward performance goals.49

Numerical targets or other measurable values facilitate further 

assessments of whether overall goals and objectives were achieved 

because comparisons can be easily made between projected 

performance and actual results.50 The Act mandates CBP to develop by 

February 24, 2017, a joint strategic plan with ICE that incorporates 

enforcement activities and performance measures.51 However, the Act 

does not require that the strategic plan include targets. Currently this plan 

is in draft form, according to CBP and, because the plan is still changing, 

CBP declined to share a copy and declined to discuss the extent to which 

the plan would identify performance measures and targets that would 

enable CBP to gauge the effectiveness of its activities by Priority Trade 

Issue.

We asked CBP to provide us with strategic or annual plans for its seven 

Priority Trade Issues to determine how the agency measures its 

effectiveness in carrying out its trade enforcement efforts for each Priority 

Trade Issue area.52 CBP provided us with various plans for its Priority 

Trade Issues. While one of these Priority Trade Issues had plans that 

were current, the other Priority Trade Issues either did not have a plan or 

were using plans that had not been updated in several years. According 

to officials from the Office of Trade, CBP is in the process of finalizing 

plans for those Priority Trade Issues with outdated plans or no plans (see 

 49GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance 

Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington, D.C.: April 1998).

50When goals are not self-measuring, performance measures should translate those goals 

into observable conditions that determine what data to collect to learn whether progress 

was made toward achieving goals. GAO, Tax: Administration: IRS Needs to Further 

Refine its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 22, 2002).

51Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 105. The Act stipulates that CBP and ICE submit the joint 

strategic plan to appropriate congressional committees no later than 1 year after the 

enactment of the Act, which is February 24, 2017, and every 2 years thereafter. 

52According to CBP, a strategic plan is a multiyear plan that covers all goals and activities 

across the Priority Trade Issue, while an annual plan covers 1 year and focuses on goals 

and activities of the Priority Trade Issue. 

CBP Articulates Some 

Performance Measures 

but Generally Lacks 

Targets for Trade 

Enforcement Activities, 

Which May Impede Its 

Ability to Assess 

Effectiveness
Page 35 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

app. IV for the status of strategic or annual plans by Priority Trade Issue, 

as of February 2017).

Our analysis of all the Priority Trade Issue plans provided to us shows 

that they generally lacked performance targets that would enable CBP to 

assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities.53 While we found 

that most plans identified strategic goals, some plans had performance 

measures but generally did not contain performance targets that would 

allow CBP to assess its actual performance against planned performance 

or compare to past performance. For example, the AD/CVD annual plan 

for fiscal year 2017 has a number of performance measures that pertain 

to enforcement and these include reporting the number of AD/CVDrelated audits, nonaudit services, surveys conducted, and importers 

removed from a targeting rule.54 However, CBP did not set a target level 

for performance for these measures in the plan, such as the target 

number of AD/CVD-related audits and surveys to be conducted. Without 

targets, CBP may not be able to determine the effectiveness of its trade 

enforcement activities, particularly to see if its projected performance for 

an activity met its actual results.

CBP also reports on some trade enforcement performance measures 

related to its Priority Trade Issues in various documents, including reports 

mandated by Congress and annual reports prepared by various CBP 

entities. For example, a textiles report to Congress describes the types 

and number of enforcement actions taken, such as the number and value 

of seizures and penalties and the number of cargo examinations 

conducted by fiscal year. Also, in its first annual report covering its 

operations and programs for fiscal year 2015, CTAC—which covers 

CBP’s import safety Priority Trade Issue—reported on the number of 

seizures by operations that were conducted with U.S. partner government 

agencies, ineligible products that were prevented from entering the United 

States, and the number of enforcement operations conducted, among 

other things. However, while these metrics allow yearly changes to be 

identified and tracked, none of the two reports we reviewed included 

targets that would help officials with oversight responsibilities assess 

performance and the effectiveness of the CBP’s enforcement activities.

 53We reviewed plans for the Priority Trade Issues that were current, outdated but being 

used, or in the process of being finalized.

54User-defined rules maytarget certain importers. If CBP officials do not identify trade 

violations or noncompliant activity, the importer flagged as part of the rule is removed from 

the rule, according to CBP. 
Page 36 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Over the past 5 fiscal years, CBP generally has not met the minimum 

staffing levels set by Congress for four of nine positions that perform 

customs revenue functions, and it generally has not met the optimal 

staffing level targets set by the agency for these positions. The Homeland 

Security Act set mandatory minimum staffing levels for nine mandated 

trade positions. CBP’s Resource Optimization Model projected optimal 

staffing levels for the 15 identified trade positions, 9 mandated and 6 

nonmandated, for the period of fiscal years 2015 through 2022. Staffing 

shortfalls can lead to decreased effectiveness of trade enforcement. CBP 

faces several challenges to hiring and filling staffing gaps, according to 

CBP officials. We found that CBP has not articulated how it plans to 

address challenges to filling staffing gaps for trade positions.

Our analysis of CBP data from fiscal years 2012 through 201655 shows 

that the numbers of staff in four of the nine mandated trade positions –

import specialist, customs auditor, national import specialist, and 

drawback specialist – were generally below the minimum mandated 

staffing and optimal staffing levels. In addition, staffing levels for these 

positions generally declined during this period. Staffing levels for import 

specialists provide an example. The Homeland Security Act set the 

minimum mandated staffing level for import specialists at 984, and CBP’s 

Resource Optimization Model calculated an optimal staffing level range 

from 984 to 1,748 import specialists for fiscal years 2015 through 2022. 

However, the actual staffing levels were below the mandated levels for 4 

of the 5 years, consistently declining in the last 3 years from 954 import 

specialists at the end of fiscal year 2014 to 917 import specialists at the 

end of fiscal year 2016.

The actual staffing levels for customs auditor, national import specialist, 

and drawback specialist were also generally below the minimum 

mandated staffing levels from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 and below 

the optimal staffing level targets in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. In 

addition, the staff levels for the financial system specialist position were 

below the mandated levels for 2 out of the 5 fiscal years and below 

optimal staffing levels for both fiscal years 2015 and 2016. For the four 

other mandated trade positions, CBP met or exceeded the mandated 

staffing levels. See table 5 for a list of mandated trade positions and their 

 55CBP provided data that represent actual staffing level data as of the end of each fiscal 

year for fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

CBP Has Not Met Its 

Staffing Targets for 

Some of Its Trade 

Positions, Which Can 

Impact CBP’s Trade 

Enforcement Efforts

CBP Has Not Met Its 

Staffing Targets for Some 

of Its Trade Positions
Page 37 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

mandated and optimal staffing levels compared to actual staffing levels as 

of the end of fiscal years 2012 through 2016.56

Table 5: Comparison of Mandated, Optimal, and Actual Staffing Levels for CBP’s Mandated Trade Positions, End of Fiscal 

Years 2012–2016 

Mandated trade position

Mandated 

staffing level

(March 2003)a

Optimal staffing 

level range

(fiscal years

2015- 2022)b

Actual staffing levels

(As of end of fiscal years 2012-2016)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Import specialistc 984 984-1,748 983 987 954 936 917

Entry specialist 409 433-463 455 451 453 441 431

Customs auditorc 364 397-699 376 357 341 330 321

Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures 

specialistd 203 101-201 296 299 299 295 286

National import specialistc 97 94-135 94 87 86 83 77

Regulations and Rulings attorney 90 103-158 112 107 106 106 105

International trade specialist 74 125-199 144 132 126 130 135

Drawback specialistc 37 38-48 38 37 35 33 36

Financial systems specialist 5 6-12 5 5 2 5 4

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data. | GAO-17-618

Notes:

a

In the Homeland Security Act, Congress required the maintenance of the staffing levels for these 

nine trade positions. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412(b).

b

The optimal staffing level ranges are based on a calculation by CBP to reflect trade activities and 

associated w orkload.

c

Bolded text represents those positions that w ere generally below mandated and optimal staffing level 

targets.

d

The Homeland Security Act mandated Fines and Penalties specialists. CBP uses the title Fines, 

Penalties and Forfeitures specialist for this position.

For the six nonmandated trade positions identified in CBP’s Resource 

Optimization Model, CBP reported that actual staffing levels for five of the 

positions, as of October 2014, were below the optimal staffing range.57

 56The Homeland Security Act also stated that staffing levels for the associated support 

staff that are assigned to these nine key positions could not be reduced, but CBP officials 

could not provide any information on the types of positions or staffing levels in response to 

our request for data. 

57While we asked for the percentage of time spent on trade functions performed by the 

staff in the six nonmandated trade positions for fiscal years 2012-2016, according to CBP 

officials, CBP was able to report data only for fiscal year 2014 because it does not track 

the actual time spent on trade functions for these positions on an annual basis. 
Page 38 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

For example, the actual level of staff for the CBP officer position, as of 

October 4, 2014, was significantly below the optimal staffing range, with 

an actual staff level of 6,889, representing about 1,800-2,800 fewer CBP 

officers on board than the model’s optimal staffing level. See table 6 for 

the optimal and actual staffing levels for nonmandated trade positions as 

reported by CBP, but not mandated by the Homeland Security Act.

Table 6: Optimal and Actual Staffing Levels for CBP’s Nonmandated Trade 

Positions, as of October 2014 

Nonmandated

trade positiona

Optimal

staffing level range

(fiscal years 2015-2022)b

Actual staffing level

(October 2014)c

Agriculture specialistd 1,167-1,365 862

CBP officerd 8,658-9,682 6,889

Chemistd 162-222 148

National account managerd 30-50 28

Paralegal specialist 11-13 12

Seized property specialistd 121-162 117

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data. | GAO-17-618

Notes:

a

The nonmandated trade positions are the six positions identified in the agency’s Resource 

Optimization Model but not in the Homeland Security Act.

b

The optimal staffing level ranges are based on a calculation by CBP to reflect trade activities and the 

associated w orkload.

c

The actual staffing level is as of October 4, 2014. CBP w as able to report data only for the end of 

fiscal year 2014 because it does not track the actual staffing levels for these positions on an annual 

basis, according to CBP officials.

d

Bolded text represents those positions that w ere generally below optimal staffing level targets.

The optimal and actual staffing levels for the nonmandated trade 

positions, according to CBP officials, are based on an estimated 

percentage of time that staff spend on trade functions. For example, while 

there were 22,000 CBP officers overall in fiscal year 2014, CBP reported 

that the full-time equivalent of 6,889 staff spent time on trade activities.58

 58CBP determines percentage of hours attributed to trade activities by trade function 

activity codes in their Cost Management Information System. To determine trade 

activities, the total number of hours charged to trade activities is divided by the total 

number of hours for all activities. This percentage is then applied to the total number of 

staff in a given position to estimate a full-time equivalent performing trade-related 

activities. We did not independently assess and validate the optimal staffing models’ 

ranges.
Page 39 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

All of the nonmandated trade positions, except the Chemist position, 

assigned to Operations Support, are assigned to the Office of Field 

Operations.

Staffing shortfalls in certain key trade positions can also impact CBP’s 

ability to identify and address risk in trade operations. For example, 

according to officials from Regulatory Audit in headquarters, if CBP met 

the mandatory staffing levels for customs auditor, Regulatory Audit would 

be able to more effectively address risk in the multitude of trade areas. 

Specifically, they told us that Regulatory Audit would be able to increase 

the number of importers it audits and expand the scope of their work. In 

addition, according to Office of Field Operations officials, if CBP met the 

mandatory staffing levels for import specialists, Centers could conduct 

more enforcement operations and focus on specific trade issues.

Staffing shortfalls in trade positions can impact CBP’s trade processing 

and enforcement efforts, including CBP’s ability to enforce trade 

effectively. For example, staffing shortfalls can lead to decreased cargo 

inspections, according to several CBP officers at three ports we visited. 

According to these CBP officers, CBP officers at ports respond to rules 

from targeting groups to inspect cargo for trade violations, particularly 

when the instructions are mandatory. CBP officers have discretion to 

inspect cargo that is characterized as nonmandatory, which may be 

helpful in gaining new information about potential trade violations 

according to CBP officers. However, according to CBP, with staffing 

shortages of CBP officers, some CBP officers told us that they focus their 

efforts on addressing the mandatory inspections and may not be able to 

conduct any additional inspections, contributing to missed opportunities 

for assessing risk.

Shortfalls in CBP officers may also lead to reassigning CBP officers 

during high periods of traffic volume, as we found in a 2013 report.59 In 

2013, at three of the six land borders visited, CBP field and port officials 

reported to us that CBP had insufficient staff to process cargo arriving by 

commercial vehicles. As a result, CBP had to reduce the number of CBP 

officers assigned to secondary inspection to open up additional primary 

 59GAO, U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait Time Data and 

Measure Outcomes of Facilitation Efforts, GAO-13-603 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2013).

Trade Position Staffing 

Shortfalls Can Impact 

CBP’s Trade Enforcement 

Efforts
Page 40 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

inspection lanes for commercial traffic.60 We reported that staffing 

shortages were caused in part by budget constraints and time needed to 

train and assign new CBP officers. In addition, during our port visits, 

some CBP officers told us that they were pulled from trade functions, 

such as examining air consignment cargo, to temporarily fill shortages of 

CBP officers needed to screen air passenger traffic, particularly during 

the holidays and summer.

CBP faces a number of challenges to hiring staff for trade-related 

positions, such as other hiring priorities and limited numbers of staff 

focused on hiring for trade positions, according to CBP officials we met 

with. Some of the hiring challenges identified by CBP officials we met with 

include the following:

• Hiring priorities focused on security positions. CBP has focused on 

hiring staff for security positions, such as border patrol agents and 

CBP officers, and hiring for trade positions is not an agency-wide 

priority. Furthermore, trade positions with mandated staffing levels, 

such as import specialists, have not been hiring priorities.

• Limited numbers of staff focused on hiring trade positions. CBP’s 

hiring centers have limited numbers of staff dedicated to hiring for 

trade positions. As a result, they have a backlog in hiring for trade 

positions.

• Lengthy hiring process. Filling trade positions within the Office of 

Trade and the Office of Field Operations is a lengthy process. 

Potential candidates tend to drop out because of the time it takes to 

process an applicant. All positions require lengthy background 

investigations, and some positions, such as CBP officers, require a 

polygraph and additional clearances, which can take a long time.

• Location-based issues. Some positions, such as customs auditor, are 

harder to fill because other government agencies or the private sector 

are competing for the same pool of applicants with specialized 

knowledge, or because the positions are in locations that are less 

desirable for applicants. CBP does not offer incentives to recruit 

 60According to CBP, trucks are referred to secondary inspection for numerous reasons, 

such as a CBP officer’s discretion, targeted inspection, or random inspection. 

CBP Faces Challenges to 

Hiring for Trade Positions
Page 41 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

potential candidates for mandated trade positions, according to CBP 

officials.61

CBP has not articulated how it plans to address gaps in staffing for most 

of its trade positions. While CBP has established targets, it has not 

articulated a plan to attain those numbers or how budgetary constraints, if 

any, impact its ability to meet staffing levels. Leading practices in human 

capital management indicate that agencies, through strategic workforce 

planning, should address developing long-term strategies for acquiring, 

developing, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals.62

Specifically, leading practices suggest that agencies have a plan to 

identify strategies for recruiting staff that includes customized strategies 

to recruit highly specialized and hard-to-fill positions.63 Such a plan would 

help CBP to ensure that it meets its staffing targets for trade positions, 

particularly those positions where it has not met its mandated staffing 

levels for a number of years. However, we found that CBP has not 

developed such a plan and, during the course of our audit, we found that 

it generally conducts hiring for trade positions on an ad hoc basis. For 

example, officials from the Office of Field Operations told us that CBP 

hired for import specialist positions, as well as most other trade positions, 

on an as-needed basis based on requests coming from specific port 

locations.64

Officials from the Office of Field Operations told us that they are planning 

to take some actions to meet its staffing targets for trade positions. In 

December 2016, these officials said that CBP would post general import 

specialist job announcements starting in December 2016 and renew the 

announcements as necessary throughout fiscal year 2017. CBP officials 

 61CBP can request recruitment and relocation incentives to help staff hard-to-fill locations 

for CBO officers, according to CBP officials. 

62GAO, Human Capital:Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

63GAO, Human Capital: Transforming Federal Recruiting and Hiring Efforts, GAO-08-762T 

(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008).

64According to CBP’s hiring centers, CBP utilizes an open continuous announcement for 

CBP officers and border patrol agents to try to meet the hiring targets for these positions. 

According to CBP, this process allows a job opportunity announcement to be open at all 

times but gives the program office flexibility to make location adjustments as necessary. In 

addition, according to CBP, this approach allows CBP to place as many eligible applicants 

in process as timely as possible.CBP has not posted continuous vacancy announcements 

for mandated trade positions, according to CBP officials in the hiring centers.

CBP Has Not Articulated a 

Long-Term Plan for 

Addressing Staffing 

Shortfalls in Hiring for 

Trade Positions
Page 42 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

indicated in March 2017 that several announcements were posted in late 

December and that there were over 4,000 applicants for the external 

announcement pertaining to general import specialist. These officials also 

stated that CBP plans to track and facilitate the Office of Field Operations’

progress toward selecting a sufficient number of applicants by June 2017 

to fill all import specialist vacancies, but made no mention of recruiting or 

retention strategies in general or in hard-to-fill locations. In addition, in 

February 2017, officials from the Office of Trade told us that they are 

planning to create a hiring plan for customs auditors and are seeking 

incentives, but did not provide any time frames.

As an agency tasked with collecting revenue and identifying harmful and 

noncompliant imports, such as counterfeit products and goods that are 

misclassified to evade duties, CBP needs to ensure that it effectively 

enforces U.S. customs and trade laws while at the same time facilitating 

legitimate trade. In 2015, CBP officials processed more than $2.4 trillion 

in imports through more than 300 ports of entry and collected around $46 

billion in revenue, making CBP the second-largest revenue collection 

agency in the United States. In 2016, Congress passed the Trade 

Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act, which codified the establishment 

of CBP and highlighted the numerous units within CBP’s Office of Trade 

and Office of Field Operations that play a critical role in CBP’s trade 

enforcement process. CBP’s strategic and annual plans for its Priority 

Trade Issues are intended to help focus the agency’s actions and 

resources on high-risk issues and direct its trade facilitation and 

enforcement approach. These plans identify goals and contain some 

performance measures. However, these plans generally lack 

performance targets, contrary to leading management practices. Without 

performance targets, CBP cannot assess its actual performance against 

planned performance or the effectiveness of its trade enforcement 

activities.

Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, directing CBP to 

maintain, among other things, a minimum level of staff and associated 

support staff in certain customs revenue functions.65 In 2006, Congress 

directed CBP in the SAFE Port Act to prepare a resource model to 

determine the optimal staffing levels that are required to carry out 

commercial operations, including inspection and release of cargo and the 

 65Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412(b). 

Conclusions
Page 43 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

revenue collection and trade functions described in section 412(b) of the 

Homeland Security Act. In its model, CBP outlined optimal staffing levels 

for 15 positions needed to perform trade functions and adequately staff 

Priority Trade Issues; 9 of the 15 are congressionally mandated trade 

positions. Our analysis of CBP staffing data over the past 5 fiscal years 

shows that CBP has generally not reached the optimal and mandated 

staffing levels for some of the 15 trade positions that carry out trade 

enforcement and protect revenue, such as import specialists, CBP 

officers, and customs auditors. CBP officials cited several challenges to 

filling staffing gaps, including that hiring for trade positions is not an 

agency-wide priority. Contrary to leading practices in human capital 

management, CBP has not articulated how it plans to reach its staffing 

targets for trade positions over the long term. Without adequate numbers 

of staff to carry out its numerous trade enforcement activities, CBP faces 

challenges to effectively carrying out its mandated mission to enforce 

U.S. trade laws.

To strengthen CBP’s trade enforcement efforts, we recommend that the 

Commissioner of CBP direct relevant CBP units to take the following two 

actions:

• The Office of Trade should include performance targets, when 

applicable, in addition to performance measures in its Priority Trade 

Issue strategic and annual plans.

• The Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations should develop 

a long-term hiring plan that articulates how CBP will reach its staffing 

targets for trade positions set in the Homeland Security Act and the 

agency’s resource optimization model.

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to CBP and 

ICE. CBP provided technical comments for the sensitive but unclassified 

version of the report, which we also incorporated in this report, as 

appropriate. ICE also provided technical comments on this report, which 

we incorporated, as appropriate. CBP provided formal agency comments, 

which are reproduced in appendix V. In its comments, CBP concurred 

with both of our recommendations and identified actions it intends to take 

in response to the recommendations. In response to our first 

recommendation, CBP indicated that it will work to identify applicable 

performance measures with performance targets to include in the fiscal 

year 2018 annual and strategic plans for its Priority Trade Issues. In 

response to our second recommendation, CBP indicated that the Office of 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 44 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Trade and the Office of Field Operations will partner with the Office of 

Human Resources Management to identify stakeholders and define 

challenges that have resulted in hiring gaps in trade-related positions and 

to develop a long-term hiring and resource plan.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Acting Commissioner of CBP, and the Acting Director of 

ICE. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website 

at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8612 or GianopoulosK@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VI.

Kimberly M. Gianopoulos

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 45 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

We identified a total of 24 reports issued between fiscal years 2011 and 

2016 that are related to trade enforcement and contain recommendations 

to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP).1 Nine of these reports were audits conducted by 

GAO, while 13 were audits and 2 were inspections conducted by the DHS 

Office of Inspector General (OIG).2 This appendix provides an overview of 

key findings and relevant recommendations from these reports, as well as 

the status of actions taken to implement the recommendations.3

We identified nine GAO audits, issued between fiscal years 2011 and 

2016 and related to trade enforcement, that have recommendations to 

DHS or CBP. Of the nine audits, two reviewed antidumping and 

countervailing (AD/CV) duties; three reviewed targeting; two reviewed 

other topics; and two reviewed the agricultural quarantine inspection 

(AQI) program, a program that guards against harmful agricultural pests 

and diseases by inspecting imported agricultural goods, products, 

passenger baggage, and vehicles at ports of entry. Table 7 lists the nine 

GAO audits.

 1These audits adhere to professional standards such as the Generally Accepted 

Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) or the Council of the Inspectors General on 

Integrity and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

2DHS OIG audits include independent auditors’ reports on CBP’s consolidated financial 

statements. Besides GAO and DHS OIG, no other private and nonprofit entities or 

government agencies have published trade enforcement audits or inspections from fiscal 

years 2011 to 2016 that adhere to a professional standard and pertain to trade 

enforcement and contain recommendations made out to CBP or DHS.

3“Relevant recommendations” are those pertaining to trade enforcement and addressed to 

DHS or CBP.

Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Key Findings and 

Recommendations from 

GAO Audits Issued 

between Fiscal Years 2011 

and 2016
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 46 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Table 7: U.S. Government Accountability Office Audits Pertaining to Trade Enforcement, Fiscal Years 2011-2016 

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: CBP Action Needed to Reduce Duty Processing Errors and Mitigate Nonpayment Risk. 

GAO-16-542. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2016.

Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments. GAO-15-294. 

Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2015. 

Intellectual Property: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Could Better Manage Its Process to Enforce Exclusion Orders. GAO-15-78. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2014.

U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait Time Data and Measure Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Efforts. 

GAO-13-603. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2013.

Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Fees: Major Changes Needed to Align Fee Revenues with Program Costs. GAO-13-268. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2013.

Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: 

October 25, 2012.

Homeland Security: Agriculture Inspection Program Has Made Some Improvements, but Management Challenges Persist. 

GAO-12-885. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2012.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: Management Enhancements Needed to Improve Efforts to Detect and Deter Duty Evasion. 

GAO-12-551. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2012.

Live Animal Imports: Agencies Need Better Collaboration to Reduce the Risk of Animal-Related Diseases. GAO-11-9. Washington, 

D.C.: November 8, 2010.

Source: GAO analysis of GAO audits. | GAO-17-618

These nine GAO audits contain a total of 46 recommendations, 33 of 

which concern trade enforcement and are addressed to DHS or CBP.4

Topics of these 33 recommendations fall into four general categories: 

AD/CV duties, agriculture (specifically the AQI program), targeting and 

cargo examination, and other (see fig. 10 for a breakdown of 

recommendations by topic).

 4Thirteen recommendations are addressed to agencies other than DHS or CBP and 

therefore are not included in our analysis.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 47 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 10: Number of GAO Recommendations by Topic Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Some of these 33 GAO recommendations address weaknesses 

concerning adequate data reliability, guidance, or performance measures 

as they relate to the four topics.

Recommendations for addressing data reliability include, among other 

things:

• improving the reliability of AQI data on arrivals, inspections, and 

interceptions across ports;

• developing a better national estimate of compliance with maritime 

cargo targeting policies by calculating compliance rate differently; and

• developing an enhanced methodology for selecting samples to check 

compliance with policies on examining high-risk shipments.

Recommendations for addressing guidance include, among other things:

• revising guidance to include how targeters are to correctly enter data 

in targeting systems;
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 48 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

• updating guidance on how ports are to conduct work studies to 

determine the correct allocation of staff time; and

• updating guidance with requirements to establish time frames for 

issuing trade alerts for exclusion orders, which are notices that the 

International Trade Commission (ITC) issues to not allow certain 

imports that infringe upon certain intellectual property rights or other 

unfair import practices into the United States.

Recommendations for addressing performance measures include, among 

other things:

• reviewing performance against established time frames; and

• identifying performance measures for monitoring effectiveness in 

targeting, AD/CV duty collection, and protecting U.S. agriculture from 

introduction of foreign pests and disease.

In the nine reports issued between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, GAO 

made 33 recommendations to DHS or CBP, of which 24 have been 

closed as implemented, and 9 remain open (see table 8 for the status of 

GAO’s open recommendations, as of October 2016).5 Most of the open 

recommendations come from two GAO reports. Three of the nine open 

recommendations are found in GAO’s July 2016 report on $2.3 billion in 

unpaid AD/CV duty bills.6 In addition, another three open 

 5GAO follows up on the status and closure of its work by identifying and documenting the 

results of recommendations at least annually after a report is issued. Within 1 month 

following a report’s issuance, GAO updates each recommendation’s status to reflect 

agency comments, including whether the agency agreed or disagreed with the 

recommendation. For at least 4 years thereafter, GAO updates the agency’s 

implementation efforts on an ongoing basis but follows up at least annually by discussing 

and obtaining documentation from appropriate agency officials on the actions taken to 

implement the recommendations. Recommendations may be open, closed as 

implemented, or closed as not implemented. Recommendations generally remain open if 

(a) the product was recently issued and the agency has not yet taken action, or (b) the 

agency has actions underway to implement the recommendation. Recommendations are 

generally closed as implemented if (a) the agency took the specific action(s) GAO 

recommended, or (b) the agency took actions other than what GAO specifically 

recommended that essentially met the recommendation’s intent. Recommendations are 

generally closed as not implemented when sufficient time has passed and, in our 

professional judgment, the agency is unlikely to implement the recommendation. 

According to GAO guidance, past experience has shown that if a recommendation has not 

been implemented within 4 years, it is not likely to be implemented. The status of GAO 

recommendations can be found on GAO’s public website at www.gao.gov. 

6GAO, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: CBP Action Needed to Reduce Duty 

Processing Errors and Mitigate Nonpayment Risk, GAO-16-542 (Washington, D.C.: July 

14, 2016).
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 49 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

recommendations are found in GAO’s July 2013 report on U.S.-Mexico 

border wait times.7 This report on U.S.-Mexico border wait times stated 

that CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) could help CBP better 

ensure that scarce staff resources are effectively allocated to fulfill 

mission needs across ports by improving transparency, that is, 

documenting the methodology and process OFO uses to allocate staff to 

land ports of entry on the southwest border.

Table 8: Open GAO Recommendations and Their Status, as of October 2016

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

Antidumping and 

Countervailing Duties: CBP 

Action Needed to Reduce 

Duty Processing Errors and 

Mitigate Nonpayment Risk. 

GAO-16-542. Washington, 

D.C.: July 14, 2016.

Antidumping and 

countervailing 

duties

To better manage the antidumping and 

countervailing (AD/CV) duty liquidation 

process, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) should issue guidance 

directing the Antidumping and 

Countervailing Duty Centralization Team to 

(a) collect and analyze data on a regular 

basis to identify and address the causes of 

liquidations that occur contrary to the 

process or outside the 6-month time frame 

mandated by statute, (b) track progress on 

reducing such liquidations, and (c) report 

on any effects these liquidations may have 

on revenue.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation and said it would 

take steps to implement it. When GAO 

confirms that CBP has taken action, 

GAO will close the recommendation, 

as implemented. 

GAO-16-542 Antidumping and 

countervailing 

duties

To improve risk management in the 

collection of AD/CV duties and to identify 

new or changing risks, CBP should 

regularly conduct a comprehensive risk 

analysis that assesses both the likelihood 

and the significance of risk factors related 

to AD/CV duty collection. 

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation and said it would 

take steps to implement it. When GAO 

confirms that CBP has taken action, 

GAO will close the recommendation, 

as implemented.

GAO-16-542 Antidumping and 

countervailing 

duties

To improve risk management in the 

collection of AD/CV duties, CBP should, 

consistent with U.S. law and international 

obligations, take steps to use its data and 

risk assessment strategically to mitigate 

AD/CV duty nonpayment, such as by using 

predictive risk analysis to identify entries 

that pose heightened risk and taking 

appropriate action to mitigate the risk.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation and said it would 

take steps to implement it. When GAO 

confirms that CBP has taken action, 

GAO will close the recommendation, 

as implemented.

 7GAO, U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait Time Data and Measure 

Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Efforts, GAO-13-603 (Washington,D.C.: July 24, 2013).
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 50 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

Intellectual Property: U.S. 

Customs and Border 

Protection Could Better 

Manage Its Process to 

Enforce Exclusion Orders. 

GAO-15-78. Washington, 

D.C.: November 19, 2014.

Targeting and 

cargo examination

To improve CBP’s management of its 

process for enforcing exclusion orders, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security should 

direct the CBP Commissioner to update 

CBP’s internal guidance with requirements 

to routinely identify any orders whose 

changed conditions merit a CBP request 

that the International Trade Commission 

(ITC) rescind them.

Open

CBP told GAO that it did not concur 

with GAO’s recommendation. CBP 

noted that there is no statutory or 

regulatory authority mandating that it 

monitor the ITC’s list of exclusion 

orders to determine if changed 

conditions of law or fact would warrant 

the rescission of any of the orders. 

GAO continues to monitor any CBP 

efforts to address this 

recommendation.

U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP 

Action Needed to Improve 

Wait Time Data and 

Measure Outcomes of 

Trade Facilitation Efforts. 

GAO-13-603. Washington, 

D.C.: July 24, 2013.

U.S.- Mexico 

border wait times

To improve the usefulness of southwest 

border crossing wait time data for informing 

public and management decisions, the 

Commissioner of CBP should identify and 

carry out steps that can be taken to help 

CBP port officials overcome challenges to 

consistent implementation of existing wait 

time estimation methodologies. 

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation.As of October 2016, 

CBP officials reported that in order to 

avoid further investment in a manual 

wait time methodology, the agency 

planned to focus resources on 

developing an enterprise-wide solution 

for automating the measurement of 

border delays. CBP estimated that this 

recommendation will be addressed in 

September 2017. GAO continues to 

monitor CBP efforts to address this 

recommendation.

GAO-13-603 U.S.- Mexico 

border wait times

To better ensure that CBP’s Office of Field 

Operations’ (OFO) staffing processes are 

transparent and to help ensure that CBP 

can demonstrate that these resource 

decisions have effectively addressed CBP’s 

mission needs, the Commissioner of CBP 

should document the methodology and 

process OFO uses to allocate staff to land 

ports of entry on the southwest border, 

including the rationales and factors 

considered in making these decisions.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation.As of October 2016, 

CBP’s Office of Field Operations 

reported that they have drafted a CBP 

Office Staffing Allocation Process 

Standard Operating Procedure that 

documents, at a high level, CBP’s 

staffing allocation process. CBP 

officials reported that they plan to 

further refine and pilot the 

documented process in the fiscal year 

2017 staffing allocation cycle. CBP 

estimated that this recommendation 

will be addressed in March 2017. 

GAO continues to monitor CBP efforts 

to address this recommendation.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 51 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

GAO-13-603 U.S.- Mexico 

border wait times

To improve the usefulness of southwest 

border crossing wait time data for informing 

public and management decisions, the 

Commissioner of CBP should, in 

consultation with the Federal Highway 

Administration and state Departments of 

Transportation assess the feasibility of 

replacing current methods of manually 

calculating wait times with automated 

methods.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. As of October 2016, 

CBP’s Office of Field Operations 

reported working to identify a feasible 

and cost-effective wait time solution to 

measure commercial vehicle delays 

along the southern border. CBP 

officials reported that further work is 

required to verify the accuracy of the 

automated wait time data. CBP 

estimated that this recommendation 

will be addressed in September 2017. 

GAO continues to monitor CBP efforts 

to address this recommendation.

Agricultural Quarantine 

Inspection Fees: Major 

Changes Needed to Align 

Fee Revenues with 

Program Costs. 

GAO-13-268. Washington, 

D.C.: March 1, 2013.

Agriculture To better align the distribution of 

Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) 

fee revenues with AQI costs, the 

Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland 

Security should work together to allocate 

AQI fee revenues consistent with each 

agency’s AQI costs.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. In October 2015, 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS) published a final rule 

adding new AQI fee categories and 

adjusting the rates of some of the 

existing fee categories. CBP and 

APHIS updated their revenue-sharing 

agreement to reflect the new AQI fee 

structure. GAO continues to monitor 

CBP efforts to address this 

recommendation.

GAO-13-268 Agriculture To ensure that inspection fees are collected 

when due, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security should establish internal controls 

to alert personnel when fees are not paid, 

and use available information to verify that 

arriving trucks, private aircraft, and private 

vessels pay applicable inspection user 

fees.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. In a May 3, 2016, 

notice in the Federal Register, CBP 

announced a pilot test program to 

automate truck user fee payments by 

allowing truck carriers to pay fees 

online prior to arriving at the border. In 

November 2016, CBP announced that 

it had expanded the pilot to all 

commercial land border crossings and 

implemented an outreach campaign to 

publicize the availability of this 

payment option. GAO continues to 

monitor CBP efforts to address this 

recommendation.

Source: GAO analysis of GAO audits. | GAO-17-618
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 52 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

We identified 15 reports, which include 13 audits and two inspections 

issued between fiscal years 2011 and 2016 by DHS OIG related to trade 

enforcement that have recommendations to DHS or CBP. Six of the DHS 

OIG audits were independent auditors’ reports on CBP’s financial 

statements. Of the remaining nine reports, three reviewed targeting and 

cargo examinations, and the other six each reviewed different topics: the 

bonding process; the Office of Regulatory Audit; the penalty process; the 

workload staffing model; bonded facilities; and the Automated 

Commercial Environment, the central trade data collection system used 

for, among other things, receiving users’ standard data and other relevant 

documentation required for the release of imported cargo. See table 9 for 

a list of these DHS OIG reports.

Table 9: DHS Office of Inspector General Audit (OIG) and Inspection Reports Pertaining to Trade Enforcement, Fiscal Years 

2011-2016 

Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements. OIG-16-54. 

Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2016.

CBP Is on Track to Meet ACE Milestones, but It Needs to Enhance Internal Controls. OIG-15-91. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2015.

Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2014 Financial Statements. OIG-15-76. Washington, D.C.: 

April 21, 2015.

CBP’s Houston Seaport Generally Complied with Cargo Examination Requirements but Could Improve Its Documentation of Waivers 

and Exceptions. OIG-15-64. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Did Not Effectively Target and Examine Rail Shipments from Canada and Mexico. OIG-15-39. 

Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2015.

Inspection of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Miami Field Office Ports of Entry. OIG-15-13. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 

2014.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model. OIG-14-117. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2014.

Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2013 Financial Statements. OIG-14-59. Washington, D.C.: 

March 27, 2014.

Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2012 Financial Statements. OIG-13-53. Washington, D.C.: 

March 22, 2013.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Penalty Process-Statute of Limitations. OIG-12-131. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2012.

Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Regulatory Audit. OIG-12-117. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2012.

Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2011 Financial Statements. OIG-12-65. Washington, D.C.: 

March 27, 2012.

CBP’s Management Controls over Bonded Facilities. OIG-12-25. Washington, D.C.: January 6, 2012.

Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection’s Bonding Process. OIG-11-92. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2011.

Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2010 Financial Statements. OIG-11-61. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2011.

Legend: ACE=Automated Commercial Environment and CBP=U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General reports. | GAO-17-618

Key Findings and 

Recommendations from 

DHS OIG Reports Issued 

between Fiscal Years 2011 

and 2016
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 53 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

The 15 DHS OIG audits and inspections contain a total of 142 

recommendations, 103 of which pertain to trade enforcement and are 

addressed to DHS or CBP.8 Eighty-five of these 103 recommendations 

originate from the six independent auditors’ reports on CBP’s financial 

statements and cover recurring topics. Topics of the recommendations 

fall into 11 general categories.9 For a breakdown of DHS OIG 

recommendations by topic, see figure 11.

 8Fourteen recommendations from independent auditors' reports on CBP’s consolidated 

financial statements pertained to information technology or property, plant, and 

equipment, and are therefore not included in our analysis.Another recommendation was 

redacted by OIG.

9Recommendation topics from independent auditors’ reports include drawback, entry 

reports, in-bond program, trade compliance measurement (TCM), and bonded 

warehouses and foreign trade zones (FTZ). TCM refers to a primary method by which 

CBP measures risk in the areas of trade compliance and revenue collection.Bonded 

warehouses are facilities under CBP’s supervision used to store merchandise that has not 

made entry into U.S. commerce for up to 5 years. FTZs are secure areas under CBP 

supervision considered to be outside CBP territory, in which merchandise may be 

admitted for operations such as storage, exhibition, assembly, manufacturing, and 

processing.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 54 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Figure 11: Number of DHS Office of Inspector General Recommendations by Topic Related to Trade Enforcement, Fiscal 

Years 2011-2016

Some of these 103 DHS OIG recommendations addressed weaknesses 

concerning guidance or strategy or procedures, as they relate to the 11 

topics.

Recommendations addressing guidance include, among other things, 

providing guidance to ports and field offices to ensure that employees

• resolve reports during the in-bond process,

• review bonded warehouses and foreign trade zones facilities, and

• use the correct targeting criteria for rail shipments.

Recommendations addressing strategy and procedures, among other 

things, include establishing written procedures or conducting assessment 

for

• developing, changing, and using the Workload Staffing Model, an 

Excel spreadsheet-based model that CBP uses to identify staffing 

needs for CBP officers at ports of entry; and
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 55 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

• determining whether resources are appropriately allocated to ensure 

effective penalty case management at Fines, Penalties and 

Forfeitures field offices.

Of the 103 DHS OIG recommendations pertaining to trade enforcement 

and addressed to DHS or CBP, 85 have been closed and 18 remain open 

(see table 10 for a list of DHS OIG reports with open recommendations 

and their status as of October 24, 2016). DHS OIG officials report that the 

agency concurred with these open and closed recommendations.10 The 

18 open recommendations originate from five reports. In one particular 

report,11 the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KMPG) 

recommended that CBP implement additional training at ports and/or 

additional oversight controls to ensure that risk assessments for bonded 

warehouses and foreign trade zones (FTZ) are consistently performed in 

accordance with required guidelines.12 KMPG had found that CBP was 

unable to provide evidence of completing compliance reviews to support 

the assessed risk level for certain bonded warehouses and FTZ reviews, 

and improperly recorded the risk level of an FTZ based on the compliance 

review that was conducted. KMPG found that the problem was that CBP 

personnel did not consistently adhere to bonded warehouses’ and FTZs’

 10OIG follows up on the status and closure of its work by identifying and documenting the 

results of recommendations at least semiannually after product issuance. After releasing 

the report for agency comment, OIG updates each recommendation’s status to resolved 

or unresolved. Statuses are resolved if the agency concurs with the recommendation, and 

unresolved if the agency does not concur. After report issuance, OIG updates the 

agency’s implementation efforts on an ongoing basis but follows up on resolved 

recommendations semiannually and unresolved recommendations quarterly by discussing 

and obtaining documentation from appropriate agency officials on the actions taken to 

implement the recommendations. 

Recommendations may be resolved and open, resolved and closed, or unresolved and 

open. Recommendations generally remain resolved and open if the agency concurred 

with the recommendation, but (a) the product was recently issued and the agency has not 

yet taken action, or (b) the agency has actions underway to implement the 

recommendation. Recommendations are generally resolved and closed if the agency 

concurred with the recommendation and (a) took the specific action(s) that OIG 

recommended or (b) took actions other than what OIG specifically recommended that 

essentially met the recommendation’s intent. Recommendations are generally unresolved 

and open if the agency did not concur with the recommendation and has not yet taken 

action.

11OIG, Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2014 

Financial Statements,OIG-15-76 (Washington,D.C.: Apr. 21, 2015).

12According to DHS OIG officials, KPMG is currently responsible for conducting 

independent auditors’ reports on CBP’s financial statements. The KPMG reports have 

been reviewed and accepted by DHS OIG.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 56 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

policies and procedures for completing compliance reviews. These 

conditions increased the risk that imported goods awaiting entry into 

commerce may not be secure, which could result in a loss of revenue.

KMPG also recommended that CBP implement additional training at port 

locations on tracking in-bond entries for compliance. An in-bond entry 

allows for the movement of cargo through the United States without 

payment of duty or appraisement prior to entry into either domestic 

commerce or exportation to a foreign country, and CBP oversees in-bond 

compliance using the In-Bond Compliance Module. However, KMPG 

found that port personnel did not have a clear understanding of how to 

operate the compliance module, which, according to OIG-15-76, may 

result in missed opportunities for CBP to assess fines and penalties and 

collect the associated revenues.

Table 10: Open DHS Office of Inspector General Recommendations and Their Status, as of October 24, 2016 

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

Independent Auditors’ Report on 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s FY 2015 

Consolidated Financial 

Statements. OIG-16-54. 

Washington, D.C.: March 21, 

2016.

Entry reports Implement monitoring controls and review 

procedures to ensure case information is 

accurately updated.

Open

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) concurred with 

this recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-16-54 Entity-level 

controls

Enhance the current process implemented 

over the entity-wide risk assessment, 

information and communication, and 

monitoring of the organization. Specifically, 

CBP personnel should strengthen the 

Office of Management and Budget Circular 

No. A-123 process throughout the 

organization by establishing program risk 

assessments and continuous monitoring 

processes.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

Independent Auditors’ Report on 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s FY 2014 Financial 

Statements. OIG-15-76. 

Washington, D.C.: April 21, 

2015.

Drawback of 

duties, taxes, 

and fees

Continue with the implementation of 

drawback functionality in the new system 

as scheduled.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 57 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

OIG-15-76 Drawback of 

duties, taxes, 

and fees

Dedicate sufficient resources to effectively 

perform compensating manual controls 

over drawback claims, including 

implementation of a statistical method for 

identifying potential revenue loss until CBP 

systems can be updated to implement an 

automated solution.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 Drawback of 

duties, taxes, 

and fees

Continue to pursue congressional action in 

order to have the statutory requirement set 

by Congress changed.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 Drawback of

duties, taxes, 

and fees

Include requirements to automate bond 

sufficiency for drawback in the 

development of drawback functionality in 

the new system. Additionally, until such 

time as the automated functionality is 

operating in the new system, CBP should 

develop manual control procedures to track 

the sufficiency of continuous bonds.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 Drawback of 

duties, taxes, 

and fees

Institute a periodic monitoring control to 

ensure that accurate and timely 

reconciliations are performed, including the 

redistribution of relevant directives to 

personnel that communicate the required 

steps for completing the reconciliations.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 In-bond 

program

Implement additional training at port 

locations over in-bond tracking and 

compliance, as well as develop a process 

to ensure effective oversight of the in-bond 

process. Additionally, CBP should 

implement policies and procedures that 

resolve the insufficient document retention 

capability of the system.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 Bonded 

warehouses and 

foreign trade 

zones

Complete the process of reconciling codes 

for bonded facilities.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 58 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

OIG-15-76 Bonded 

warehouses and 

foreign trade 

zones

Implement additional training at ports 

and/or additional oversight controls to 

ensure that risk assessments for bonded 

warehouses and foreign trade zones are 

consistently performed in accordance with 

required guidelines.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 Entry reports Redistribute to all ports of entry the relevant 

directives communicating the steps for 

completing report reconciliations. 

Additionally, CBP should institute a 

quarterly monitoring control by local port of 

entry management to ensure the timely 

completion of reconciliations.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-15-76 Bonds Implement a centralized approach to 

monitoring Single Transaction Bonds.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Workload Staffing

Model. OIG-14-117. Washington, 

D.C.: July 24, 2014.

Staffing Establish written procedures for developing 

and using the workload staffing model. 

Include procedures to catalogue, track, and 

validate all data sources.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-14-117 Staffing Conduct an independent verification and 

validation of workload staffing model 2.0, 

after its completion to ensure that it 

satisfies CBP’s requirements and functions 

as CBP intended.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

Independent Auditors’ Report on 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s FY 2011 Financial 

Statement. OIG-12-65. 

Washington, D.C.: March 27, 

2012.

Drawback of 

duties, taxes, 

and fees

Continue to pursue alternative 

compensating controls and measures that 

may ultimately identify the potential 

revenue loss exposure to CBP

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.
Appendix I: Past Audit Findings and 

Recommendations Related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Trade Enforcement, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2016

Page 59 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Report Topic Recommendation Recommendation status

DHS OIG, Efficacy of Customs 

and Border Protection’s Bonding 

Process. OIG-11-92. 

Washington, D.C.: June 27, 

2011.

Bonds Appoint a centralized office with the 

responsibility for developing and 

implementing a single transaction bond 

policy, reporting on activities, and 

monitoring results.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-11-92 Bonds Develop formal policies and procedures for 

the validation, approval, sufficiency, and 

storage processes for single transaction 

bonds.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

OIG-11-92 Bonds Improve revenue risk management by 

developing a risk-based bonding 

methodology for use on high-risk revenue 

imports that incorporates continuous bonds 

and single transaction bonds.

Open

CBP concurred with this 

recommendation. The OIG will 

close the recommendation once 

CBP implements responsive 

corrective action and provides 

applicable supporting 

documentation.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General reports. | GAO-17-618
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 60 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

This report examines (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) 

structure for carrying out trade enforcement, (2) how CBP conducts trade 

enforcement across its high-risk issue areas and ensures that its 

enforcement activities are effective, and (3) the extent to which CBP 

meets its staffing needs for trade enforcement. We also provide 

information on audits related to CBP’s trade enforcement and the 

implementation status of any recommendations made in such audits.

To examine CBP’s structure for carrying out trade enforcement, we 

reviewed organizational documents for CBP, specifically for the Office of 

Trade and the Office of Field Operations. We also spoke with CBP 

officials in headquarters representing directorates and branches that have 

a trade enforcement component within CBP to better understand their 

role and organizational structure. We interviewed CBP officials in the field 

who carry out trade enforcement to learn about their roles and 

responsibilities. The trade enforcement staff we spoke to in the field 

include the following positions: Customs and Border Protection officer; 

entry specialist; import specialist; national account manager; drawback 

specialist; customs auditor; international trade specialist; agriculture 

specialist; paralegal specialist; Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures specialist; 

and seized property specialist. We also interviewed officials at all 10 

Centers of Excellence and Expertise (Centers)1 and asked most Centers 

questions pertaining to the Center’s organizational structure and 

resources, the benefits of having Centers, and any challenges that they 

have faced since the Centers became operational.

To examine how CBP conducts trade enforcement across its high-risk 

issue areas and ensures that its enforcement activities are effective, we 

reviewed CBP documents pertaining to trade enforcement and Priority 

Trade Issues, as well as planning documents. We interviewed CBP 

officials who set policy and conduct enforcement activities for Priority 

Trade Issues in headquarters as well as CBP officials in the field who 

carry out trade enforcement activities. Specifically, we met with officials 

representing units within the Office of Trade and the Office of Field 

Operations: National Targeting Center; Regulatory Audit; Fines, Penalties 

 1The 10 Centers and their management locations are Agriculture and Prepared Products 

(Miami); Apparel, Footwear and Textiles (San Francisco);Automotive and Aerospace 

(Detroit); Base Metals (Chicago);Consumer Products and Mass Merchandising (Atlanta);

Electronics (Los Angeles); Industrial and Manufacturing Materials (Buffalo); Machinery 

(Laredo);Petroleum, Natural Gas and Minerals (Houston); and Pharmaceuticals, Health 

and Chemicals (New York).

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

and Forfeitures Office; and Trade Operations Division. We also spoke 

with CBP officials representing every National Targeting and Analysis 

Group and the Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center to learn about 

their role in trade enforcement by Priority Trade Issue and to understand 

their coordination with other units within CBP. We visited CBP ports and 

field offices in Baltimore, Maryland; Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; 

and New York, New York to observe trade enforcement activities and 

interviewed CBP officials located at the sea and air ports. We visited an 

international mail facility at John F. Kennedy airport to learn about trade 

enforcement in the mail environment and observed cargo being inspected 

at a DHL facility at the Los Angeles airport. We selected the CBP ports 

and field offices to visit based on a number of factors, including the 

volume of imports coming through the ports, the number of relevant trade

enforcement-related units at the port, the port environment (locations with 

cargo arriving by air, sea, and through international mail), and the 

proximity of the port to our location. We interviewed officials at all 10 

Centers of Excellence and Expertise and asked questions pertaining to 

the Centers’ coordination within and outside of CBP, strategy, and data 

collection. We did not visit and observe any land ports of entry because of 

limited time frames. However, during our interviews, CBP officials 

discussed trade enforcement processing and other activities that occur at 

the land borders. We spoke with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) officials in Washington, 

D.C., and in New York to learn about ICE and HSI’s role in trade 

enforcement as well as to understand how HSI coordinates with various 

CBP components. We requested copies of CBP’s strategic or annual 

plans for each of the seven Priority Trade Issues. We initially received 

three plans, one of which was current and two that were outdated but still 

being used by CBP. In addition, in February 2017 we received seven 

Priority Trade Issue plans, of which one was final and six were still in draft 

form. We reviewed and compared all plans we received against leading 

practices for managing results, specifically those focused on performance 

planning. These leading practices noted that a plan should identify goals 

and measures covering each of its program activities and contain targets 

to assess progress toward performance goals.2

To examine the extent to which CBP meets its staffing needs for trade 

enforcement, we reviewed CBP documents and reports related to trade 

 2GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance 

Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington, D.C.: April 1998).
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 62 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

enforcement positions and staff levels, such as CBP’s Resource 

Optimization Model.3 We obtained information on trade enforcement 

staffing, budgeting, hiring process, and any challenges to hiring trade staff 

by interviewing officials from the Office of Trade’s Resource Management 

Division, the Office of Field Operations’ Human Capital and Budget 

offices, the Enterprise Services’ Finance division, and the Minneapolis 

Hiring Center. We also spoke to CBP officials in the field about the impact 

of staffing shortfalls and challenges to meeting optimal staffing levels. We 

requested copies of CBP staffing plans or strategies related to trade 

enforcement positions and discussed with CBP officials whether they had 

any hiring plans for trade positions. We reviewed leading practices in 

human capital management, which indicated that agencies, through 

strategic workforce planning, should address developing long-term 

strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff to achieve 

programmatic goals.4

We requested staffing data covering fiscal years 2012-2016 for the trade 

positions that carry out trade functions identified in CBP’s Resource 

Optimization Model. Nine of the 15 trade positions were mandated in the 

Homeland Security Act.5 To identify positions with staffing shortfalls, we 

compared actual staffing data for the nine mandated trade positions 

against the minimum staffing levels set in the Homeland Security Act. In 

addition, we compared actual staffing data for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 

to the optimal staffing levels identified in CBP’s Resource Optimization 

Model. Although the Homeland Security Act also required CBP to 

maintain minimum staffing levels for the associated support staff for the 

nine mandated trade positions, we did not assess CBP’s ability to meet 

these staffing targets because CBP officials could not provide any 

information on these positions or the staffing levels in response to our 

request for data. To identify staffing shortfalls for the model’s six 

nonmandated trade positions, we compared the actual staffing data CBP 

reported for these positions in October 2014 against optimal staffing 

 3CBP, Resource Optimization Model for Trade Positions, FY 2015: Fiscal Year 2015 

Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2015). Section 403 of the Security and 

Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 requires CBP to prepare a resource model to 

determine the optimal staffing levels that are required to carry out trade functions, 

including inspection and release of cargo. Pub. L. No. 109-247 120 Stat. 1926. 

4GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003) and GAO, Human Capital: Transforming 

Federal Recruiting and Hiring Efforts, GAO-08-762T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008).

5Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 412(b).
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 63 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

levels identified in the Resource Optimization Model. While we asked for 

the percentage of time spent on trade functions performed by staff in the 

six nonmandated trade positions for fiscal years 2012-2016, CBP was 

able to report data only for the end of fiscal year 2014 because it does not 

track the actual staffing levels for these positions on an annual basis. We 

did not independently assess and validate the optimal staffing models’

ranges. To assess the reliability of the actual staffing levels reported by 

CBP, as of October 2014, for the six nonmandated trade positions we 

compared and corroborated staffing information provided in CBP 

reporting and spoke to CBP officials regarding the methodology used to 

determine the actual staffing levels for these positions. On the basis of 

the checks we performed, we determined these data to be sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of indicating the staffing levels for the 

nonmandated positions. To assess the reliability of the staffing data for 

fiscal years 2012-2016 for the nine mandated trade positions, we 

compared and corroborated information provided by CBP with staffing 

information in the Congressional Budget Justifications for that time period 

and spoke to CBP officials regarding the processes they used to collect 

and verify the staffing data. On the basis of the checks we performed, we 

determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

comparing actual to mandated staffing levels.

To provide information on audits related to CBP’s trade enforcement and 

the implementation status of any recommendations made in such audits, 

we identified audits that (1) were published between fiscal years 2011 

and 2016,6 (2) followed a professional auditing standard such as the 

generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS),7 (3) 

contained recommendations made to the Department of Homeland 

 6Since CBP was stood up in 2003, we determined that audits published in the past 5 

years would be most relevant to describing CBP’s current state.

7We included two DHS OIG inspections - CBP's Houston Seaport Generally Complied 

with Cargo Examination Requirements but Could Improve Its Documentation of Waivers 

and Exceptions, OIG-15-64 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2015) and Inspection of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Miami Field Office Ports of Entry, OIG-15-13 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2014) - that follow the Council of the Inspectors General on 

Integrity and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. According to 

DHS OIG, the evidence for these inspections was gathered and reported in a fair, 

unbiased, and independent manner; their findings, conclusions, and recommendations are 

valid and supported by adequate documentation; and the recommendation follow-up for 

these two inspections is conducted in the same manner as the follow-up for audit 

recommendations.
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 64 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Security (DHS) or CBP, and (4) were related to trade enforcement.8 To 

identify these audits, we searched databases such as ProQuest, Lexis 

Market and Industry News, and the National Technical Information 

Service to include sources representing think tanks, academics, trade 

industry, and government. We also searched the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG)’s external 

website and GAO’s internal database, the Engagement Results Phase. 

By systematically narrowing down the search results from the DHS OIG 

external website and GAO’s Engagement Results Phase, we identified 

nine GAO audits and 15 DHS OIG reports that met our criteria. We 

corroborated our DHS report searches with the DHS Office of Inspector 

General. Based on our searches, we did not find that any other private or 

nonprofit entities or government agencies had published trade 

enforcement audits between fiscal years 2011 and 2016 that pertained to 

trade enforcement, adhered to a professional auditing or inspection 

standard, and contained recommendations addressed to CBP or DHS.

We obtained the status of GAO audit recommendations from GAO’s 

external website and GAO’s Engagement Results Phase database, and 

the status of DHS OIG audit recommendations from DHS OIG officials. 

For both GAO and OIG reports, we only included trade-relevant 

recommendations made out to CBP or DHS—136 recommendations out 

of a total of 188 (33 out of 46 recommendations for GAO reports, 103 out 

of 142 recommendations for OIG reports).9 The sources of these audits 

and inspections varied; the sources for GAO and DHS OIG may have 

been work initiated under agency authority, congressional mandates, or 

congressional requests. Other sources of DHS OIG audits included 

annually conducted independent auditors’ reports on CBP’s consolidated 

financial statements or part of a series of audit, inspection, and special 

 8We considered audits to be related to trade enforcement if they focused on trade 

enforcement relevant terms, which include: Agriculture, Agriculture Quarantine Inspection, 

antidumping and countervailing duties, cargo, Customs and Border Protection, import 

safety, Priority Trade Issue, revenue, staffing, targeting, textiles, trade agreements, trade 

revenue, automated commercial environment, automated targeting system, bonded 

facility, bonded warehouse, bonding process, Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking 

System, drawback, entry process, foreign trade zones, in-bond, Office of Field Operations, 

Regulatory Audit, penalty process, shipments, single transaction bond, and trade 

compliance measurement.

9DHS OIG redacted the third recommendation from DHS OIG, CBP's Houston Seaport 

Generally Complied with Cargo Examination Requirements but Could Improve Its 

Documentation of Waivers and Exceptions, OIG-15-64 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2015), 

so this recommendation is not included in our analysis.
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 65 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

reports prepared as part of DHS OIG’s oversight responsibilities to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department.

To analyze the content of the recommendations, we coded each 

recommendation made in GAO and OIG audits by a topic that reflected 

our reporting objectives, information in the Trade Facilitation and Trade 

Enforcement Act of 2015 (the Act) related to GAO’s mandate, and/or 

recurring themes and pre-existing topics identified in the audit reports. We 

identified 13 topics in the recommendations made by the GAO and OIG 

audits. Recommendation topics covering both the GAO and OIG audits 

included: agriculture as well as targeting and cargo examination. 

Recommendation topics unique to GAO audits included: antidumping and 

countervailing duties and an “other” category that includes U.S.-Mexico 

border wait times. Recommendation topics unique to OIG audits included: 

bonds, bonded warehouses and foreign trade zones, drawback, entry 

reports, in-bond program, obligations, staffing, and trade compliance 

measurement.10 To ensure the consistency and accuracy of coding the 

recommendations according to these topics, an independent verifier 

coded some topics independently, and a supervisor reviewed coding for 

other selected recommendations.

We conducted the performance audit on which this report is based from 

May 2016 to April 2017 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

subsequently worked with CBP in May 2017 to prepare this public version 

of the original sensitive but unclassified report for public release. This 

public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards.

 10We derived many of the topics found in OIG audits (bonded warehouses and foreign 

trade zones; drawback of duties, taxes and fees; entry reports; in-bond program; 

obligations; staffing, trade compliance measurement; and others) from pre-existing topics 

in DHS OIG’s independent auditors’ reports on CBP’s financial statements.
Appendix III: Organizational Structure of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s Office of 

Trade and Office of Field Operations

Page 66 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

The Office of Trade is composed of six directorates (see fig. 12).

Figure 12: Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Trade

Appendix III: Organizational Structure of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s Office of 

Trade and Office of Field Operations
Appendix III: Organizational Structure of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s Office of 

Trade and Office of Field Operations

Page 67 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

The Office of Field Operations is composed of seven directorates, each 

with a number of divisions (see fig. 13).

Figure 13: Organizational Structure of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Field Operations
Appendix IV: Status of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection’s Seven Priority Trade Issue 

Plans

Page 68 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Table 11 provides a status of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 

(CBP) strategic or annual plans by Priority Trade Issue, as of February 

2017.

Table 11: Status of CBP’s Strategic or Annual Plans for the Seven Priority Trade Issues, as of February 2017 

Priority Trade Issue Status of strategic plan or annual plan

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties The Priority Trade Issue has an annual plan for fiscal year 2017 and a current 

5-year strategic plan that covers fiscal years 2013-2018.

Intellectual Property Rights The Priority Trade Issue is using an outdated 5-year strategic plan that 

covers fiscal years 2010-2014.

CBP is in the process of finalizing a 3-year strategic plan that covers fiscal 

years 2017-2019.

Textiles and Wearing Apparel The Priority Trade Issue is using an outdated annual plan that covers fiscal 

year 2011.

CBP is in the process of updating and finalizing an annual plan for fiscal year 

2017. CBP is in the process of developing a 5-year strategic plan that covers 

fiscal years 2017-2021.

Trade Agreements and Preference Programs The Priority Trade Issue is using an outdated annual plan that covers fiscal 

year 2011.

CBP is in the process of updating and finalizing an annual plan for fiscal year 

2017. CBP is in the process of developing a 5-year strategic plan that covers 

fiscal years 2017-2021.

Revenue The Priority Trade Issue is using an outdated annual plan that covers fiscal 

year 2009. 

CBP is in the process of finalizing a 3-year strategic plan that covers fiscal 

years 2017-2019. 

Import Safety The Priority Trade Issue does not have a strategic or annual plan.

CBP is in the process of finalizing an annual plan for fiscal year 2017. CBP 

officials stated that once an annual plan is completed, an import safety plan 

covering 3-5 years might be created.

Agriculture Programs The Priority Trade Issue does not have a strategic or annual plan.

CBP is in the process of developing an annual plan that covers fiscal year 

2017.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information. | GAO-17-618

Appendix IV: Status of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection’s Seven Priority Trade 

Issue Plans
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 69 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 70 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 71 GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement

Kimberly M. Gianopoulos, (202) 512-8612 or GianopoulosK@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Christine Broderick (Assistant 

Director), Andrea Riba Miller (Analyst-in-Charge), Debbie Chung, Martin 

De Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Joyce Kang, Grace Lui, and Edith Yuh made 

significant contributions to this report.

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102044)
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