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S. HRG. 114–652 

CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UNITED 

STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

DAVID GRANNIS, Minority Staff Director 

DESIREE THOMPSON SAYLE, Chief Clerk 

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CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 12, 2015 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .......... 2 

WITNESS 

Hon. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center ........... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba ............................................................................................................. 37 

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CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE 

UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Feinstein, Risch, 

Coats, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Warner, 

and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. Good afternoon. We’re going to get the hearing 

started. I want to welcome Director Nick Rasmussen from the National Counterterrorism Center. Nick, we’ve invited you here today 

in an open session. I think there were some of the news outlets, 

Vice Chair, that said this would never happen with me being 

Chairman, that everything would be closed, and I just want to 

point out we are having an open session. 

This is to provide the Senate and the American people with an 

update on the current threat from terrorism. The Committee remains concerned about the expanding, evolving nature of this 

threat and the challenges facing the intelligence community and 

the evolving nature of the threat. 

This is the first of what I hope will be a number of open hearings 

that should give the intelligence community an opportunity to better inform the public of its current efforts and challenges. As Mr. 

Rasmussen and I have talked about: Here’s what we do; here’s sort 

of how we do it; as much as we can tell; but more importantly, 

here’s why the American people should understand why this is important to them. It’s about their defense. 

Given the nature of the material we’re here discussing and the 

fact that this is an open hearing, I want to remind everyone to use 

extreme caution to protect intelligence sources and methods. While 

this is an excellent venue to engage Nick Rasmussen, I reserve the 

right to immediately suspend any questions or comments that may 

be sensitive in nature or whose response could disclose classified 

information. 

The Congress is currently debating several matters that impact 

our counterterrorism efforts, including an AUMF on the conflict in 

Iraq and Syria. As we take up these issues, I want to make sure 

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that our members and the public understand the serious and credible threat that many of these groups present to the security of the 

United States and to our allies. 

In addition to addressing the threat itself, I hope you’ll discuss 

the impact that media leaks, encryption, and other collection challenges are having on your ability to detect and to thwart terrorist 

attacks. 

Nick, I’m afraid that your job is getting harder at a time when 

we can least afford it. I’ve spent more than ten years as a member 

of the House and Senate Intelligence Committee, as has the Vice 

Chairman, and have watched closely the threat environment as it’s 

evolved since the attacks of 9–11. 

The threats we face today are much greater than those we faced 

since 2001. Al-Qaeda in 2001 was estimated to have less than a 

thousand members. The group was relatively geographically contained, and plots against our interests were infrequent by today’s 

standards. Today we face groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant, which is often described as a terrorist army, with memberships estimated to be in the tens of thousands. 

We face terrorist safe havens spanning North Africa, the Middle 

East, and South Asia and are confronted by a host of different plots 

almost daily. We have evacuated our embassies in Libya and 

Yemen due to threats against our personnel, and terrorist groups 

are becoming more creative, threatening our citizens and allies 

with non-metallic IED’s and massive truck bombs; in addition, 

their mastery in the use of the Internet and social media to disseminate propaganda, to recruit fighters that often already have 

access to western countries, like we have seen in Europe, Canada, 

and even in New York. 

One of the biggest lessons we’ve learned from the September 

11th attacks was that we cannot give terrorists a sanctuary from 

which to plan attacks against us. Arguably, ISIL now has control 

of the largest territory ever held by a terrorist group. This safe 

haven provides ISIL and other extremists with the time and space 

they need to train fighters and to plan operations. It also has provided them with the access to weapons and a network that can be 

used to support external operations. 

We knew about the threat we faced from al-Qaeda prior to 9–11, 

but we failed to act. I just hope we don’t make the same mistake 

again. 

Nick, I once again thank you. I welcome you here, and I now 

turn it over to the distinguished Vice Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Rasmussen, welcome. Let me say that I’ve been reading 

a number of your intelligence products, and particularly on threats 

yesterday. I think your agency is doing a very good job. I think 

you’re outwardly bound and just the way we think it ought to be. 

So I want to thank you for that good work. 

Today provides us an opportunity for the Committee, as the 

Chairman has said, to discuss in unclassified terms the terrorist 

threats to the United States and to the rest of the world. This is 

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really particularly important, that the American public understand 

these threats, because they provide the necessary context for a 

number of policy decisions that the United States Government is 

facing and that we have to help make. These threats affect whether 

we authorize the use of force against ISIL, the need for our continued military deployments to counter terrorism efforts, and the need 

to reauthorize intelligence tools necessary to keep our country safe. 

I believe that the terrorist threat facing the United States is as 

diverse and serious as at any time in our history. I have never seen 

more serious threats. These come from both inside our country and 

outside. More so than any other terrorist organizations we’ve seen 

in the past, ISIL is seeking to radicalize followers around the world 

and inspire attacks in our homeland. 

They are extraordinarily visible. If you look at AQAP, just as 

much a danger to us, but much more invisible. The uniforms of 

ISIL, their equipment, their taking over the city, the children that 

have been beheaded, the Christians who have been sacrificed, the 

Iraqi Army that’s been—700 frog-walked and then shot down in 

cold blood, all of this has been on television. So Americans have 

come to know the threat that ISIL is. 

The guidance from ISIL to potential terrorists is clear. It wants 

westerners to come to Syria and to Iraq to fight. ISIL instructs 

them how to carry out attacks at home, and that’s what we’re up 

against. There are more than 100 Americans who have either traveled to Syria or attempted to travel there. There are 20,000 foreign 

fighters who have traveled to Syria and who will return home. At 

least 3,400 of them are from Western Europe, and that includes 

visa waiver countries, where they are a plane ticket away from the 

United States. 

What we don’t know is how many people are inside the United 

States following ISIL on the news and on social media and who are 

becoming inspired to carry out their own attacks. 

Separately, al-Qaeda remains focused on conducting attacks 

against our homeland. While AQ in the ungoverned areas of Pakistan may be as weak as it has been in many years, al-Qaeda in 

the Arabia Peninsula, or AQAP, still poses a clear threat. The 

group is enjoying a safe haven in Yemen with the Houthi overrun 

of the government there. 

Remember, AQAP was behind the attacks against Charlie Hebdo. 

The group has already attempted to send non-metallic and essentially undetectable bombs into our country on four occasions, beginning with the Christmas Day 2009 Abdulmutallab ‘‘Underwear 

Bomber.’’ They do have a bomb that can go through a magnetometer. And AQ has published step by step directions for building 

that bomb in the latest ‘‘Inspire’’ magazine. 

Our efforts to confront AQAP are significantly diminished with 

the removal of President Hadi of Yemen. The Houthis may have no 

love for AQAP, but over time the Yemeni government had become 

a strong counterterrorism partner that we no longer have. Closing 

our embassy in Sanaa was the right choice, but the instability in 

Yemen presents AQAP with new freedom to roam and kill. 

Elsewhere, there is a power vacuum in Libya, maybe even civil 

war. In much of northwest Africa groups are using that territory 

for a safe haven. I could go on and on. 

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But let me just conclude with one remark that I hope Director 

Rasmussen will address. On June 1, three provisions of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act, which we call ‘‘FISA,’’ will expire. 

They are the business records authority, the roving wiretap, and 

the lone wolf. If these authorities expire, the intelligence community will lose key tools to identify terrorist groups and to protect 

the homeland. This includes NSA’s phone metadata program as 

well as the authority for domestic FBI investigations, but also 

other important authorities. 

So I look forward to your testimony, Director Rasmussen, and 

again I thank you for the excellent work that you are doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Let me say for the purposes of members, it’s my intent once the 

testimony has been received that we will go to five-minute questions based upon the order of attendance. Hopefully, that has been 

shared with everybody. 

We will at this time turn to the Director for as much time as 

your testimony might take, Nick. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS RASMUSSEN, DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Director RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice 

Chairman, and members of the Committee. I have submitted for 

the record a much longer statement that has gone around the 

world and discussed in some depth the threat picture as we see it. 

Thank you first for inviting me today to discuss the terrorist 

threat the United States is facing worldwide and also to discuss 

NCTC’s particular efforts to counter that threat. As both the Chairman and Vice Chairman have noted, today’s threat environment is 

increasingly diverse and dynamic, as is the wide array of terrorist 

actors that is driving this environment. Those actors are located 

across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and they can increasingly 

reach into the West, even into the United States. 

The emergence of Iraq and Syria as extremist battlefields and 

ISIL’s related expansion in reach has brought about changes in 

that terrorism landscape. The emergence of new groups in the 

wake of the Arab uprisings since 2011 has also altered the threat 

picture, as most of those groups are focused more on achieving local 

gains in their regions. 

We’re also experiencing a new level of specialization and fragmentation within that larger terrorism landscape. We believe we 

might be entering into an era in which the centralized leadership 

of terrorist groups matters less than it did previously. We may be 

entering a time in which group affiliation and identity is more fluid 

and extremist narratives are more focused on a wider range of alleged grievances and enemies. As Paris showed us, this may also 

be a time in which personal connections among individual terrorists may be more relevant to their plotting than their individual 

group affiliation or identity. 

Now, even in this dynamic and increasingly complex threat environment, I still believe it is possible to differentiate to some degree 

the threat we are facing in the U.S. and in the West from the 

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versaries are located. As we look at that global terrorism picture, 

we are trying to be careful not to paint that picture with a single 

broad brush, and I’ll try to explain. 

In the United States and in the West—and by ‘‘the West’’ I traditionally mean Western Europe—the threat of catastrophic attack 

has been significantly reduced as we and our partners have been 

able to apply consistent counterterrorism pressure to some of the 

most dangerous groups that we face. Now, clearly sustaining that 

counterterrorism pressure and the key elements of that counterterrorism pressure in those key places around the world is an essential condition to preventing the reemergence of some of the more 

complex threats that would aim to have catastrophic impacts on 

our homeland. 

But in this current environment, our assessment is that we face 

a much greater, more frequent recurring threat from lone offenders 

and probably loose networks of individuals. Measured in terms of 

frequency and numbers, it is attacks from those sources that are 

increasingly the most noteworthy feature of the terrorism landscape. 

Since May of last year, 10 of the 11 attacks we’ve seen in the 

West were in fact conducted by these individual extremists, two 

here in the United States and the nine others occurring in Europe, 

Canada, and Australia. Now, the majority of these attacks, these 

11 attacks, look more like what we would expect from random acts 

of violence rather than the effort at large-scale destruction that we 

saw in terrorist plotting immediately after 9–11. 

In going forward, we believe that both individuals and smaller 

networks will try to mount similar attacks, to try to capitalize on 

and build momentum from the media coverage that these kinds of 

attacks generate. 

Now, it’s also important to note that what I would call these 

smaller-scale or lower-level attacks still can cause amazingly tragic 

human suffering. They can clearly generate fear among local populations, and they clearly have profound political effects on the societies in which these attacks come. And I’m in no way seeking to 

minimize the impact that such attacks can occur. 

Furthermore, our increasing focus on these smaller-scale, morefrequent, lower-level attacks in the West should not in any way 

suggest that we’re no longer concerned with the ability of established terrorist groups and even some individuals to target western 

aviation, which would certainly constitute a large-scale and potentially catastrophic attack. Mitigating that threat to aviation remains at the very top of our priority list in terms of disruption efforts. 

It also remains true that we still face moderate and small-scale 

threats from groups that are more structured and cohesive, like 

traditionally al-Qaeda was and some of the traditional al-Qaeda affiliates and allies. And although the number of groups posing that 

truly transnational threat is somewhat smaller and our efforts to 

place pressure on them have met with some success, it’s important 

to remember that these groups are persistent and they’re patient 

with their desires and their plans to strike the homeland. 

Now, in contrast to the threat we face here at home and in western capitals, our allies and partners in Africa, Asia, and the Middle 

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East are facing in some ways a much different threat. As you 

know, some of the most ambitious and active terrorist groups are 

located in countries that are continuing to work through the effects 

of the Arab uprisings in recent years, places like Egypt, Iraq, 

Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Other terrorist groups are very active in 

countries undergoing insurgencies, places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and again Yemen. In all 

of these countries, terrorist groups are trying to displace weak governments or to make significant territorial gains. 

In other countries, terrorists are contributing to population displacements that are affecting millions of people on a huge scale. 

This is happening in places like Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. Some of these terrorist groups are also responsible for stoking 

sectarian tension and contributing to the proliferation of Sunni on 

Shia violence. 

Now, amidst all of this insecurity, violence, and political instability around the world, terrorists are carrying out ever more violent attacks much more frequently in these countries and often on 

a much greater scale than what we’ve seen recently conducted here 

in the West. In the last year alone, we’ve assessed that there have 

been hundreds of attacks in these countries that have, unfortunately, caused thousands of deaths. Just last month, as the world 

focused its attention on Paris and the attacks there, at the same 

time, as this Committee well knows, attacks on local populations 

by Boko Haram in Nigeria, AQAP in Yemen, were taking place on 

a significantly larger scale. 

Now, despite the fact that I’ve tried in some small way to differentiate between the threat environment in the West and the 

threat environment we see in Africa, the Middle East, and South 

Asia, there is one phenomenon which draws those two separate 

threat pictures tightly together. That phenomenon is the continued 

flow of foreign fighters to Syria, and particularly those fighters who 

come from western countries. While the majority of the roughly 

20,000 foreign fighters have in fact come from the Middle East and 

from North Africa, more than 3,400 have, we assess, come from 

western countries. 

Now, at NCTC we’re working to advance a broad effort across 

our Center to track foreign fighters, working very closely with the 

rest of the intelligence community and with our partners around 

the world. NCTC compiles information on known and suspected 

terrorists who travel to Syria, and we house that data in our Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, known as ‘‘TIDE.’’ That effort has created a valuable forum for identifying, tracking, and 

sharing information on known or suspected terrorists with key 

stakeholders, and that includes the law enforcement community, 

the counterterrorism community, the screening, and the watch-listing communities. 

Also, this TIDE effort has also directly helped to resolve inconclusive identity information, enhance TIDE records with more information, and, most importantly, upgrade watch list status for 

several hundred known or suspected terrorists. 

NCTC officers are also working to fully identify foreign fighters 

who potentially have access or connections to individuals in the 

homeland so that they, too, can be watch listed. 

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Now, to do all this my officers are using NCTC’s unique access 

to a wide range of IC and law enforcement information, wider than 

anywhere else in the IC. This access includes our own data holdings as well as our embedded officers from ten other intelligence 

organizations. 

Now, to prevent individuals from traveling to Syria in the first 

place, my officers are also working to diminish the appeal of terrorism. In partnership with the Department of Justice, with Department of Homeland Security, and with the FBI, we have helped 

develop tools to counter violent terrorism and raise awareness 

among our law enforcement and community leaders across the 

country. We have tried to tailor these tools to address foreign fighter recruitment, particularly in this updated ISIL context, and we 

have received a significant amount of positive feedback from the 

communities with whom we have worked. There’s definitely a demand signal for more of this across the country. 

Now, despite these concerted efforts, the nature of today’s threat 

is, as we discussed at the beginning and was evident in both the 

Chairman and the Vice Chairman’s statements, the nature of today’s threat is challenging significantly our ability to identify and 

disrupt terrorist plots. This is coming at a time when we are, unfortunately, losing capability. 

Today the terrorist-related communications of our terrorist adversaries are increasingly intermingled with communications that 

are not relevant to our terrorism work, but they are not separate 

and easily identified streams of information. Signals intelligence is 

increasingly important in denied areas around the world where we 

face challenges with getting information from human sources. It’s 

difficult for us to operate in places like Syria and Libya and increasingly now in Yemen, and terrorist groups are watchful for the 

possibility that they could be infiltrated by human sources. 

Due to the Snowden leaks and other disclosures, terrorists also 

have a greater understanding of how we seek to conduct surveillance, including our methods, our tactics, and the scope and scale 

of our efforts. They have altered the ways in which they communicate, and this has led to a decrease in collection. We have specific 

examples, which I believe we have shared with the Committee and 

the Committee staff in classified session, specific examples of terrorists who have adopted greater security measures, such as using 

various new types of encryption, terrorists who have dropped or 

changed email addresses, and terrorists who have simply stopped 

communicating in ways they had before, in part because they understand how we collect. 

Leaks have also driven a wedge between the government and 

providers and technology companies. Some companies that were 

formerly recognizing that protecting the Nation was a valuable and 

important public service now feel compelled to question or oppose 

our efforts. 

Now, these challenges that I just described in the collection environment—and they go to the question you raised, Mr. Chairman— 

all of this places a huge, huge premium on information-sharing 

among governments who all face this challenge. This informationsharing gives us the best chance to identify potential lone actors 

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and loose networks of the sort that are carrying out the most frequent attacks. 

Now, while the sheer number of foreign fighters that I talked 

about earlier threatens to overwhelm the law enforcement and intelligence capabilities of some of our key partners around the 

world, the problem has actually spurred information-sharing to a 

level that we have rarely seen, if ever, and that’s a positive development. So I would argue that this is one tiny bit of good news embedded within a threat picture and a foreign fighter problem that 

is of increasing concern, as I hope I have made clear. 

I’ll stop there now for now, Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice Chairman, and I look forward to your questions and the rest of the Committee. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Director Rasmussen follows:] 

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Chairman BURR. Director, thank you very much. 

I’ll restate: We’ll go to five-minute questions based upon the 

order of attendance, and that’s Burr, Feinstein, Wyden, Warner, 

Cotton, Coats, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, and Risch. 

Mr. Director, I’m going to go right to the issue that the Vice 

Chair raised with you, and that’s the three FISA provisions that 

are set to expire the 1st of June, and specifically: If they were to— 

if we allowed those to expire, what would be the impact on the 

NCTC’s ability to discover and thwart terrorist attacks here at 

home? 

Director RASMUSSEN. As I know the President and the DNI have 

stated, Director of National Intelligence have stated, it is essential 

that we retain these important capabilities. The ability to have insight into what our adversaries are doing, the connections they 

may have both internationally and potentially into the homeland, 

is an essential part of the business of identifying individual terrorists and then building out the picture of the networks in which terrorists operate. 

So fundamentally, reauthorization is something that we are 

counting on in the intelligence community as an important part of 

our work. 

Chairman BURR. Director, earlier this week the Administration 

announced the creation of a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration 

Center, or they referred to it as CTIIC, within the ODNI. The national center will reportedly be modeled after NCTC and the National Counterproliferation Center, which have struggled under the 

ODNI management. I’m hesitant to authorize the creation of a new 

center until some of these lingering management challenges can be 

resolved, not least of which is NCTC’s inability to fully hire. 

Can you assure the Committee that NCTC will be able to fill the 

majority of your open vacancies by the end of the year? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I believe I can, Mr. Chairman. I’m happy 

to report that since, I would say, over the last five, six months we 

have taken significant strides forward in addressing just that concern and problem, not only improving our ability to hire analysts 

and officers from outside of government, outside the intelligence 

community, to bring new blood into our center, but also increasing 

the level and the inflow of detailees, officers detailed from other intelligence community entities, into NCTC, which, as you well know, 

Mr. Chairman, that’s part of the lifeblood of NCTC, having that 

contribution of officers from FBI and from CIA, from NSA, from the 

Defense Department, DIA, every member of the community. 

We’re making I think tremendous progress. If we had had this 

discussion a year ago, I would have given you a much more cautious and hedged response because I wasn’t necessarily confident 

that we could get to where we needed to be. But just in the last 

few months, I’ve had tremendously productive engagements with 

FBI, with CIA, to get our numbers with FBI and CIA to the levels 

we need them to be. So I’m pretty confident I can give you the assurance that you’re looking for, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Nick, in many ways the threat from terrorism 

is growing, it’s not declining. The number of threat streams you are 

facing is shocking, and your ability to collect intelligence on those 

threats is waning. As the principal adviser to the President on 

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counterterrorism, are you concerned about the trend and the impact it’s having on our security? 

Director RASMUSSEN. In my statement I certainly talked about 

the wider array, the more diverse array of threats and terrorist actors that we’re seeing around the globe. Clearly, that puts increasing pressure on our capacity to respond and to react in all of those 

different places, to develop effective strategies in all of those places. 

As we’ve talked about in closed session as well, it’s not always 

possible for the United States to transform the environment in 

some of these areas where the terrorism threat is growing. So we 

have to develop an approach that allows us to mitigate and disrupt 

the terrorist threat networks that are most particularly aiming at 

U.S. interests, while also looking to see if there are ways in which 

we can over time develop stronger partnerships with countries in 

particular regions, so that we don’t own the burden ourselves of 

doing that mitigating and disrupting. 

But unfortunately, while you are doing that long-term work to 

establish a more sustainable counterterrorism framework with our 

partners, you have to deal with, as you said, Mr. Chairman, every 

day a constant inflow of new terrorism-related threats. So you’re 

trying to keep up with every one of those most recent threats at 

the same time you’re trying to build a more sustainable CT partnership, network of CT partnerships around the world. 

So doing that long-term work while we’re also managing the day 

to day is increasingly a challenge, I will admit. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rasmussen, I think last year when we had our worldwide 

threat hearing—this is a little different than that—the Khorasan 

Group was sort of put out there as a group that could really be effective in launching an attack against the United States. As I’m 

reading your written remarks, particularly on page 8, you talk 

about two highly capable AQIM offshoots, Belmokhtar’s alMulathamun Battalion and Tawhid wal-Jihad in West Africa, 

merging to form the violent extremist group al-Murabitun, which 

is one that we really haven’t heard of before. 

How big is this? That’s the first part of the question. Secondly, 

how do you rank the groups and their threats toward the homeland? Which one should we be the most wary of? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Let me try to bite that off in a couple different chunks, Madam Vice Chair. We did point in our statement 

this year to the emergence of this group in North Africa, which is 

an offshoot of a group we’ve long known and which you’ve long 

known about, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. But one of the offshoots of that group that grew out of a leadership dispute and internal fights about direction is a group that we know as the alMurabitun Battalion, which includes known individuals with links 

to al-Qaeda, but again, as I’ve said, they have engaged in a little 

bit of internal feuding that has put them into separate organizations, at least from the way we look at it. 

We look at that grouping as a pretty significant threat to our interests in and across North Africa. As far as an ability to project 

a threat potentially to the homeland, I would describe that as more 

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potential than actual at this point. But they certainly have taken 

note of what has happened in Western Europe, and I would over 

time be concerned about the ability of groups like this in North Africa having the ability to project into Europe. 

Of course, I consider attacks that could happen in Europe potentially as attacks that could involve significant U.S. interests. We 

have significant diplomatic, business, and other presences in most 

Western European capitals. So I don’t take for granted that Americans would not be a part of any attack that took place in Europe. 

To your question on the Khorasan Group, as we’ve talked about 

before, that is a group, a loose network of individuals affiliated, 

long a sense of affiliation with core al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of 

Pakistan, and we’ve long worried about their ability to potentially 

not only engage and impact the fighting in Syria, which they’re engaged in doing, but also, while they’re engaged in that activity, also 

looking for opportunities to engage in external operations against 

U.S. interests, western interests, into Europe and ultimately even 

the homeland. 

There’s not much more I can say about that in this session, as 

you well know. But this is among the very, very highest counterterrorism priorities for the intelligence community, is to try to understand this network with more granularity, with more specificity, 

and to develop disruption options to go after it. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is AQAP still number one in terms 

of—I’m talking about the homeland now. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I guess I try to avoid number one, number 

two, number three, because as soon as you say that someone who 

isn’t watching the picture as closely as you are and as we are says: 

Well, your number three must not be getting the right attention. 

And they’d be right to think that, but I think they’d also be missing 

something. 

As I said in my statement, even though what we’re seeing more 

frequently in the West are these low-level attacks conducted by individuals who aren’t networked necessarily, we still are absolutely 

fixated and focused on AQAP’s efforts to develop an aviation attack 

against the United States, for all of the reasons that were mentioned in both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman’s statements: 

the attempt to propagate the recipe for putting explosives on an 

airplane; the continued effort, even amidst all the fighting in 

Yemen for AQAP, to mount an external operation. That is all still 

very much at the top of our counterterrorism priority list from an 

analytical perspective, from a collection perspective, and from a disruption perspective. 

So when something like ISIL seizes—or rises to the forefront of 

concern, we don’t have the luxury of downgrading our effort, our 

level of effort against some other threat stream or set of terrorism 

actors that we already had at the top of our list. 

I hope that responds. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, it’s great to see you again. I think you’ve done a good 

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mittee, we’ve seen the threats move from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 

to insurgents in Iraq to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So 

these are very real threats, very real threats. 

The question then becomes, how do we focus on ways to deal 

with these threats, rather than in effect use approaches that waste 

time and resources? We’ve got to focus on approaches that work. 

The bulk collection, the bulk phone records collection that has 

been widely debated, has been described by the President’s review 

group—and I’ll just quote here—as ‘‘information that could readily 

have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional Section 

215 orders.’’ So these are all public documents, public reports. Mike 

Morell, for example, a veteran of the CIA, supported this document. 

My question to you is, first: If Congress passes the legislation 

ending bulk collection, would intelligence agencies still be able to 

collect the information you and they need to protect our country 

against terrorist operations? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I look at this in terms of, as the President 

said last year, making sure that we’re in a position to preserve the 

capability that that bulk collection gave us. That’s why I support, 

as did the Director of National Intelligence, the legislation that 

would transition the program to one that would preserve that capability without requiring the Federal Government to hold the 

records in the way that it had previously. 

Senator WYDEN. So you’re proposing that we end the bulk collection program, but in effect the phone companies can still keep their 

recordkeeping practices, right? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I’m comfortable that that capability 

would—that step would preserve our capability if that became—— 

Senator WYDEN. Very good. One other question. Mr. Director, my 

understanding is—and it would be very helpful here—that there 

are some questions about whether the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has provided you at the National Counterterrorism Center with a copy of the full classified version of the Committee’s report on the use of torture. Have they provided you that 

report? 

Director RASMUSSEN. A select number of my officers had access, 

I’m certain, to the executive summary. I’d have to get back to 

you—— 

Senator WYDEN. Have you seen it? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I’ve seen portions of it, Senator. 

Senator WYDEN. Have you asked for a copy of the report? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I have not personally asked for a copy of 

it, no. I asked that I be allowed access to it in order that we perform the role that we did perform at the tail end of last year when 

we were asked to participate in the effort to develop threat assessments. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, there are some additional details in the 

classified version that I think are relevant. So I hope that you will 

ask for a copy and review it. But I look forward to working with 

you. I think it is helpful to have on record that if the Congress 

passes the legislation ending bulk collection you and the other intelligence agencies can go forward doing the important work to deal 

with the threats to this country. They are very real. I’m interested 

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in working with you on the matter of the report as well. I hope that 

you will ask for a copy of the report and review it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rasmussen, nice to see you again. Thank you for your great 

service. 

I do think I want to make a brief comment on Senator Wyden’s 

comment. We’ll have a spirited debate, I think, on that FISA issue. 

I do think there are challenges, as we’ve discussed before, both privacy and security-related, around holding data at the telcos, and 

that’ll be the subject of, I know, ongoing conversations. 

I want to raise—ISIL–AQAP has been the focus of most of your 

testimony, but I’d like to raise one other area I think in your testimony you’ve touched on, but I’d love to hear before the group. 

When we think back to last year in April, when we were all at that 

moment astonished by the actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria, seizing 300 girls from a school, 200 of which I believe are still missing, 

and subsequent actions of the United States in sending troops and 

advisers to that region. 

We’ve seen since that time about a million and a half people displaced, north of 3,000 killed in 2014, and a coalition arise. I think 

just recently Niger joined with Nigeria, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon for an 8,700-person force. 

Could you give us an assessment whether these countries have 

the capability, whether the tide is swaying? Obviously, Nigeria has 

postponed their elections. The first question would be: Can they 

take on this threat of Boko Haram? It’s remarkable that, with the 

atrocities they commit, they’re still pushed off the front page because of the extraordinary atrocities of ISIL and others. And what 

type of potential threat that poses beyond that immediate region? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Senator. I think you’re on to 

something with the question, by raising the question of regional 

partners. There’s no question but that Nigeria faces significant, serious challenges to mounting on its own a response against Boko 

Haram. Even in the most stable political environment, they would 

face those challenges. As the Committee well knows, right now Nigeria is in the midst of a potential political transition that will test 

even further their ability to mount a coherent response among 

their political, intelligence, and military communities. 

So one solution to that is to try to get regional partners, as you 

described, more involved: Niger, Cameroon, other partners. They 

are increasingly stepping up to that challenge with their admittedly limited resources, but their shared sense of threat. 

I think we will be in a position to try to enable these partners, 

to try to develop a regional approach against Boko Haram, and 

doing what we can, principally through advising and assisting and 

in providing intelligence where it’s appropriate. I think that can increase their effectiveness. 

I think it remains to be seen—it certainly isn’t the case yet that 

the tide has been turned against Boko Haram, and it remains to 

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thing. This is a part of the world where we do not have the largest 

resource footprint, so we do what we can. But we may have to reevaluate Boko Haram’s trajectory over time if we see that the regional partners are overmatched. 

Senator WARNER. Do you see any evidence of—there has been 

some reported evidence of Boko Haram’s reaching out to other 

groups in terms of network. Could you comment on that? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Exactly. The increased intercommunication 

between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the northern 

part, northwestern part of Africa, and even with ISIL, all of that 

just adds to the picture of an interconnected terrorist network with 

the ability to share resources, personnel, expertise, and tradecraft 

in a way that serves as a multiplier for their own capabilities, and 

that’s a disturbing trend. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area that we 

need to keep our eye on as well. Obviously, there’s huge challenges. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

In response to the questions that Senator Wyden raised, you indicated that you and the Director of National Intelligence have assessed that ending the bulk collection program and transferring it 

to communication companies would not impede in any way doing 

the necessary tracking and usage of that to reach the information 

that you want. But since that hasn’t been done and since we 

haven’t really laid out a procedure, the procedures how we’re going 

to do that, and we don’t know exactly how it’s going to be collected, 

and so forth and so on with a much shorter period of time of holding that information, how can you be so certain that this is not 

going to degrade in any way your ability to access that information? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I guess I would say I can’t say anything 

with complete certainty, Senator. But looking at the provisions as 

we understood them, we believe the legislation would have maintained the essential capability that we were requiring that we 

maintain. 

Senator COATS. Well, the legislation calls for a shortened period 

of time for holding that information. We’ve seen in Paris and some 

other instances where we need to go deeper than that in order to 

determine the connections and the network that we need to assess. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I certainly agree. But—— 

Senator COATS. Well then, how can you say with assurance that 

ending that bulk collection is going to not leave you short-handed 

in terms of what you need to assess? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I can’t predict in the future exactly how, 

what information requirements we would have. 

Senator COATS. Well then, how can you come to a conclusion? 

Don’t you leave a little, well, we’re not sure, Senator, exactly how 

this is going to work, so we can’t guarantee that it’ll give us the 

same access as we have under the bulk collection program? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Again, I look at this in terms of capability, 

and my understanding of the legislation is it would have provided 

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cause as NCTC Director, I follow in the footsteps of two previous 

NCTC Directors, Mike Leiter and Matt Olsen, who were distinguished national security lawyers, who lived this architecture in 

ways that I haven’t. So I’m less in a direct position to speak on exactly how these programs work in the same way that my predecessors were. 

Senator COATS. That’s why I raised the question in my mind 

about your answer to Senator Wyden, who I think took that as a 

definitive yes, the DNI thinks this is fine and NCTC Director 

thinks it’s fine, and therefore why in the world would we ever question it? As you know, there’s a difference of opinion in the intelligence community among the different agencies as to whether or 

not this is the right thing to do. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I understand that, and that’s why I’m relying on my experts, who have assured me that preservation of this 

capability gives us what we need. As with anything, it certainly involved giving and taking, give and take on particular provisions. I’d 

be happy to talk about it further with you in closed session or I 

can come to you with—— 

Senator COATS. I understand, and I think we should do that, Mr. 

Chairman, because I think there’s still some major questions that 

need to be resolved here. 

In the remaining time that I have, do you—through your agency 

or somewhere in the IC community, what is the appeal to the thousands of westerners that fall prey to the appeal of engaging in this 

depravity, which they obviously are all aware of and are so attracted to this? I’m trying to get to the source, get my head around 

the fact that, how could someone who has perfect capability, seeing 

exactly what they’re walking into, think that’s the thing to do? 

Now, if you’re of the same ideology perhaps from certain countries in the Middle East, but coming from Western Europe and 

coming from America, more civilized and cultured societies—‘‘civilized’’ might not be the right words, but I think you know what 

I mean—are you looking at that? Is there a way for us to counter 

with social media saying, this is what you’re getting into, which is 

a pretty tough situation? 

Director RASMUSSEN. That’s a terrific question, Senator. ISIL’s 

propaganda runs the gamut. You’re absolutely right to point to 

some of these horrific videos involving executions of hostages or opposing fighters on the battlefield. That clearly sends a signal and 

that attracts its own element. 

But ISIL’s propaganda also includes a fair number of messaging 

examples in which they paint a very bucolic, fulfilling life in the 

caliphate, that they project to individuals who may be 

disenfranchised, disadvantaged, dissatisfied in their home environments. So that—so the range of factors that grab people who end 

up going to a place like Syria right now ranges from the ideological, 

which you pointed to, but also to the psychological, catering to 

some sense of wanting to belong to something, no matter how depraved that thing that they would be belonging to is. Then for others there is just the sheer sense of adventure and a chance to 

throw your hat in with the winning side, is a part of the calculation. 

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We’ve tried to disaggregate all of these different factors in the 

messaging that we’re seeing, so that we can try to develop some 

counter-messaging strategies to go at it. The President is convening 

this CVE summit next week, drawing in all of our European partners, many of our Middle Eastern partners, to try to get a better 

handle on this, to try to—unfortunately, as we all know, the government is probably not the best platform to try to communicate 

with the set of actors who are potentially vulnerable to this kind 

of propaganda and this kind of recruitment. That’s something we 

deal with all the time. 

We try to find ways to stimulate this kind of counter-narrative, 

this kind of counter-messaging, without having a USG hand, a U.S. 

Government hand, in it. People who are attracted to this don’t go 

to the government for their guidance on what to do, not the U.S. 

Government and certainly not their governments in the Middle 

East. So statements from senior religious figures in Middle East 

capitals are useful, but it’s pop culture that is going to get—in 

many cases the voices of pop culture or voices more relevant to 

these experiences of these young people is going to have a far more 

profound impact on them than anything we say. 

Senator COATS. Yes, I think so, too. We need to take the same 

advantage of social media that they’ve taken. And I agree, it 

shouldn’t be government-directed. It ought to be coming from other 

areas of the culture reaching out to these people and letting them 

know exactly what they’re getting into, which is not the promise 

that’s being made during the recruitment. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Coats. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I want to follow up on the issue of the telecommunications companies holding the data in two different ways. First of 

all, there are hundreds of telcoms in this country and, by contrast, 

very few people—the number of people who had access to the database in this country, as has come out in recent months, was strictly 

limited, and they were well trained. 

If more people have access to the database, isn’t that likely to 

raise additional privacy problems and questions? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I’d have to understand exactly how that architecture is going to look. I’d ask if I could take that for the 

record, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. A related question: Would you be troubled if 

there is no requirement for the telecommunications companies to 

retain the data for a certain length of time? 

Director RASMUSSEN. It’s obviously in the interest of the intelligence community to try to maintain the capability to access that 

data for as long a period of time as we can. In terms of specific provisions to compel, I can’t speak to that. I can only speak to the interest we have in maintaining that capability, which of course is 

to have that access. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me turn to the issue of home-grown terrorism and countering violent extremists. You said in your testimony today, and I completely agree, that we face a much greater 

recurring threat from lone wolves and loose networks of individLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

29 

uals, and you talked about the number of attacks since last May, 

but ten of them were from violent Islamic extremists. 

As you may have seen, former Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Flynn recently commented that he could not identify 

which agency or individual in the U.S. Government is in charge of 

the fight against radical Islamic extremists. Obviously, DHS, the 

FBI, DOD to some extent, the Department of State, NCTC are all 

important players. Who’s in charge? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I would argue, Senator, that, as with most 

elements of our counterterrorism effort, we’re approaching it on a 

whole of government effort, without a single agency with lead or 

overall responsibility. In the effort against home-grown violent extremists here in the United States, we have a very tight-knit community focused particularly among Homeland Security, the Justice 

Department, FBI, and NCTC. Along with the deputy directors of 

those organizations, I meet, Matt Olsen before we met, every other 

month at that director or deputy director level to synchronize and 

coordinate all of our activities aimed at dealing with the homegrown violent extremist phenomenon, working to make sure that 

we coordinate and partner with each other, so that when we go to 

a community—and I used Denver in my testimony as an example 

of a community we had gone to in the wake of the arrests there 

last year of the three young Somali-American women who were disrupted on their way to Syria—we go arm in arm, lockstep with 

each other, all four of us together, working hand in hand with the 

special agent in charge of the local FBI office, the U.S. attorney in 

that capital, and all of the Homeland Security elements in that 

city, so that we are speaking with one voice as a Federal Government. 

Now, when we get there we’re dealing with the widest possible 

array of community leaders and community organizations, because 

most of this home-grown violent extremism, effort to counter homegrown violent extremism effort, is going to be carried out by those 

communities. Our role in many cases is to empower and provide information. 

One of the things we did in that experience in Denver was provide a community awareness briefing that explains exactly what 

Senator Coats was talking about: the appeal of this narrative, the 

kinds of things that their kids might be seeing on the Internet if 

they weren’t supervised or if their parents were not involved with 

or engaged with what their children were doing. 

So I’m very comfortable that we are working well and harmoniously together. Could I make the case for one single agency being 

given a lead role? I don’t think I could right now. If we had somebody—if we had a bunch of discord and disharmony, I might make 

that case, Senator. Could we do better? I’m not going to sign up 

to the idea that we couldn’t do more and do better, and we’re trying, and we’re looking to resource this more robustly. But I don’t 

think the problem we face is a result of not having a lead Federal 

agency. 

Senator COLLINS. I guess from my perspective the problem is if 

no one’s in charge it’s very difficult for us to assess the effectiveness of a program, to budget appropriately, to hold people accountable, to assess whether what we’re doing is making a difference. 

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When we did the Fort Hood investigation in 2010, one of our major 

recommendations from the Homeland Security Committee was that 

there needed to be a strategy, but there needed to be a lead agency 

or person in charge. 

It’s not that these efforts aren’t worthwhile, but we can’t budget 

for them, we can’t assess them, if there isn’t a person who can 

come and report to us. My concern is that the National Security 

Council appears intent on trying to exercise the role of policy implementer rather than just policymaker. 

Director RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Senator. We are all trying to 

operate the four agencies I mentioned under the rubric of the 

President’s home-grown CVE strategy for here in the homeland. 

We are, though, looking at ways, in keeping with your suggestion, 

to try to come up with funding mechanisms that cross departmental lines so that we can do exactly what you describe, give 

some sense of the jointness, the joint work that is going on, without 

relying solely on department budgets and Department stovepipes. 

I’ll certainly make sure we get more information to you on that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Rasmussen, let’s talk about Yemen a little bit. I understand 

our embassy there is closed, most of the people we had there, certainly from the State Department, at the embassy are all out of the 

country; cars left with keys in them at the airport or whatever it 

took to get out of there. 

It’s just been a few months ago that Yemen was supposedly a 

great example of how our efforts were working, how the plan was 

working. How do you think that changed so quickly and what, looking back, do you think that you and others might have seen to give 

more warning than we got of that? 

Director RASMUSSEN. The situation in Yemen for some period has 

been stable—unstable politically, and for a long period of time the 

Yemeni government faced this problem of a Houthi conflict emanating out of the northwestern part of Yemen. But that was not a 

new phenomenon and for many years the influence of the Houthi 

community there was largely contained to that northwestern part, 

corner of Yemen, along-stride the Saudi border. 

That changed rather dramatically when the Houthis moved out 

of that historical location they held and moved towards Sanaa. 

Much as we saw in dealing with the ISIL phenomenon, the one 

thing that’s very difficult to assess from an intelligence perspective 

is the ability of a military organization to actively confront another 

insurgency. Director Clapper I know has talked about the challenge 

the intelligence community faced in predicting whether the Iraqi 

security forces would have melted away the way they did in the 

face of ISIL’s advances last summer. 

I would say on somewhat of a smaller scale something like that 

happened in Yemen, with President Hadi, who already faced a 

complicated political environment in managing his military and 

managing his security organizations, as the Houthi advances toward Sanaa took place, it simply became the case that they were 

unopposed in many cases. That’s something that we’ve got to try 

to find a better way as an intelligence community to understand, 

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the willingness of fighters to fight, because when you match up orders of battle and read about the resources available to the various 

sides, you would look at that and say there’s no way that might 

happen, but obviously it did. 

And it’s left us in a position now where, on relatively short notice, just over the past few months the security situation deteriorated far more rapidly than we expected and, particularly because 

we could not assure the safety and security of our officers there, 

the decision was made to leave. 

Senator BLUNT. I don’t want to get into any kind of ongoing discussion with you about the specifics of how I’d see these things 

now. But we’ve got an example in ISIL or ISIS where they’re the 

JV one day and they’re virtually a nation-state 90 days later, or 

Yemen, which is a great example of our successful foreign policy 

and six months later it appears to be a total disaster. 

But I think you’re now—is it fair to say that the intelligence 

community has to begin to reevaluate how we—what you answered, reevaluate how those insurgencies may match up against 

the ability to face them? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I think that’s fair, Senator. 

Senator BLUNT. Another question I have. I noticed in the information the President sent up yesterday for the Congress to look at 

the focus was against ISIL or associated persons or forces. How 

would you define the second part of that? Is that another terrorist 

group who actually is somehow fighting? What does that mean? Is 

that al-Nusrah? Is that some of these al-Qaeda groups that don’t 

appear to be that much in line with ISIL? How would you define 

‘‘associated persons or forces’’ if you were me? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I guess I look at it and take it pretty much 

at face value, Senator, in concluding that that language likely allowed for the possibility that other networks, maybe not even formal groupings but other networks, might align themselves with 

ISIL. As we know, right now ISIL–ISIS is in conflict with core alQaeda and with al-Nusrah Front, the designated al-Qaeda affiliate 

operating in Syria. 

Senator BLUNT. So core al-Qaeda or al-Nusrah would not be included in that definition, because they’re actually not associated 

with ISIL? I mean, that’s my belief, and I think that’s what you 

just said. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I’d have to check, but I guess what I’m saying is when I looked at the words ‘‘associated forces’’ I was thinking 

ahead to maybe the development of new alliances, new alignments, 

that we can’t necessarily foresee today. I wasn’t trying to suggest 

that anybody was today in or out of that particular definition, inside or outside that particular definition. 

Senator BLUNT. I don’t want to take more time than I should 

here, but today—we have to base this looking at this on what we 

do foresee today, and I think what you’ve said are there are significant terror groups that are clearly not associated with ISIL. Would 

that be right? 

Director RASMUSSEN. There are certainly terrorist groups that 

have not affiliated or associated at this point with ISIL. ISIL has 

reached out and developed affiliated relationships or endorsementlike relationships with groups outside of Iraq and Syria, including 

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in North Africa, including in Algeria, and including in I believe 

Yemen as well. 

Senator BLUNT. I’m out of time. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

I need to ask you, on page 10 of your written report you use the 

statement here ‘‘Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism,’’ and then a couple of notes on that. I’d like to get some additional details on that. When you talk about Iran being the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, how far does that extend? How 

many countries are they engaged in or terrorist groups are they engaged in sponsoring? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Iranian sponsorship and association with 

particularly Lebanese Hezbollah gives—provides a global reach to 

that organization. So I could not give you a direct answer as to how 

many countries, but I would certainly argue it is global. It extends 

to pretty much every single region of the world. 

Senator LANKFORD. Can you give me some examples of places 

that we know there are clear lines, where Iran is engaged in terrorism and advancing that ideology or being a state sponsor? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Certainly in portions of West Africa, portions of Southeast Asia, portions of Latin America. I could go into 

more detail in a classified setting. 

Senator LANKFORD. It begs the question here as well, the foremost non-state sponsor. Are we able to identify individuals and 

groups of individuals as well that are—you identify Iran as the 

foremost state sponsor. A lot of these groups obviously have to get 

funding, support, coordination from somewhere. Are we able to 

identify some of those non-state sponsors? 

Director RASMUSSEN. We certainly have a robust effort across the 

intelligence community to try to understand particularly where individuals play a role in the financing of terrorist organizations, and 

where we can identify through intelligence those individuals developing an approach, using every tool we have, whether it’s designation by the Treasury Department, other law enforcement or intelligence action, any tool we have, to try to shut down that financing 

pipeline. 

That is an area where it is a constant, constant struggle because 

these organizations are ubiquitous in their efforts to fundraise. I’d 

be happy to talk in closed session about the work the community 

is doing in that area. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. Is there a sense for Iran as a 

state sponsor of terrorism? Is that on the decline? Is it consistent? 

Has it continued to increase? Have we noticed a significant change 

in Iran and their behavior in the last several years? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I guess I would describe it as consistent 

and steady. The degree of concern we face has been consistent and 

steady over time. We’re particularly mindful of their support for 

militant groups in places like Iraq, where that front line activity, 

where Shia militant groups that have connections to Iran could be 

potentially threatening to our personnel on the ground in Iraq. 

Senator LANKFORD. Let me ask about one other country and location. Libya has fallen into total chaos, with no functioning government any more, and every time they form a government it collapses 

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within months, and borderline, as the Vice Chairman mentioned 

earlier, near-civil war at this point. Terrorist groups seem to enjoy 

a vacuum. What do we see as on the rise in Libya, and what’s our 

status there as far as terrorist organizations and the spread of terrorism there? 

Director RASMUSSEN. You’re absolutely right, Senator. If I had to 

identify one of the greatest areas of emerging concern with respect 

to counterterrorism, it would be Libya. We were already facing the 

chaotic political environment there, in which the resident North African-based terrorist groups that we’ve talked about before—AQIM, 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Al-Sharia—were already 

active and potentially threatening in Libya and with the potential 

ability to threaten U.S. interests across North Africa. 

What’s changed more recently and what’s made the environment 

there even more different is that ISIS–ISIL has looked to also take 

advantage of the chaos in Libya and establish a foothold there as 

well. We are still looking to try to assess whether that capability 

will manifest itself in external operations outside the region of 

North Africa or if the intent is simply to give themselves the capability to attack western interests in places like Cairo or Algiers or 

Tunis or Morocco. 

That by itself would be significant, a sufficient concern to warrant our attention. But we’re obviously mindful of what they might 

try to do to expand into Europe as well and potentially threaten 

our interests there. 

Senator LANKFORD. One final question. If Iran stopped supporting terrorism, what effect would that have on the region and 

on our terrorist operations? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Well, if Iran got out of the business of providing state sponsorship to terrorist organizations, it would obviously lower our potential level of concern about the capabilities of 

some of the groups that we worry about. I don’t necessarily know 

that it would look like an on-off switch, though. These are in some 

cases relationships and capabilities that have developed over decades and decades. So I don’t know that that would all be unraveled 

and unspooled by just flipping a switch. 

Senator LANKFORD. Obviously that’s not a switch that we have 

access to, but there are lots of connections there. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I understand. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Mr. Rasmussen, just to take on what Senator Lankford said, I 

want to go a little bit deeper into Libya. Isn’t it a fact there has 

now been multiple open source reports in the media that Darnah 

in Libya has emerged as a central and important and growing hub 

for ISIS; is that not right? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I think that’s right, yes, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. And in addition, they’ve now been linked to many 

of the groups now in Benghazi. In essence, there are now open 

source reports that ISIS is the predominant group in Benghazi. 

Director RASMUSSEN. That’s correct. 

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Senator RUBIO. And there has also been open source reporting 

that ISIS was behind a terrorist attack at a hotel in Tripoli that 

killed an American citizen. 

Director RASMUSSEN. Yes, the Corinthia Hotel. 

Senator RUBIO. And in addition, there was open source reporting 

this week that ISIS—an ISIS commander was killed in Afghanistan. 

Director RASMUSSEN. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. So there is now an ISIS presence as well in Afghanistan, including open source reports of terrorist training camps 

being set up in portions of Afghanistan. 

Director RASMUSSEN. That’s correct. We’ve seen in recent months 

ISIS–ISIL has looked to expand its reach into a number of different 

places around the world, and you’ve highlighted two of the most recent examples in Afghanistan and Libya. I would also highlight, 

though, Algeria and Egypt as other places where that has happened. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, let me just point out on the Libya front, 

Darnah is a port city, is it not, a port region, where they now 

have—which is a perfect—and there’s no—there’s no Assad bombing them there. There’s no air strikes. My concern is that that’s becoming one of their most important hubs, because it’s completely 

uncontested. They have access to shipments and foreign fighters to 

take in. 

I just think that’s an area of growing emergence and I’m surprised there’s not more discussion about it because of how serious 

a threat that poses, including to the Sinai. Would it not be a great 

spot from which to launch attacks into the Sinai or get ISIL groups 

involved in the Sinai Peninsula? 

Director RASMUSSEN. That’s exactly right. Again, the Ansar Bayt 

al-Maqdis, which is the Egyptian-based terrorist group that recently affiliated with ISIS, we worry about the threat they would 

pose to western interests in Egypt and the Sinai—tourists, American businesses, but also our troop presence. 

Senator RUBIO. It would be a mistake in your opinion to simply 

focus on our fight against ISIS as simply being Syria and Iraq? 

This group is increasing its footprint and presence in multiple 

stages now, including Afghanistan, throughout North Africa, and in 

particular Libya. 

Director RASMUSSEN. That’s correct, they’ve certainly expanded 

their reach. 

Senator RUBIO. I want to ask you about Guantanamo. Prior to 

President Obama’s executive order to determine the disposition of 

Guantanamo detainees, 101 former detainees were confirmed to 

have reengaged in terror. Then in the latest report that we got in 

July 2014 it stated that from 2009 to July of 2014 88 detainees 

transferred out of Gitmo. Out of the 88 detainees transferred out 

of Gitmo, 6 of them had been confirmed to return to terror activity, 

and one additional one was suspected. 

So by my calculation, that means 107 of the 620 total detainees 

transferred from Gitmo have reengaged in terror and another 77 

are suspected of doing so, in addition to the 107. 

So can you tell us, since July of 2014 when that report came out, 

how many more have returned in our estimation to terror? 

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Director RASMUSSEN. We are just on the cusp within the next 

couple of weeks of providing the next iterated version of that unclassified report, the one you received last July. So those numbers 

will be out very, very shortly. 

Senator RUBIO. But as it stands now, one out of six of those that 

have been returned—— 

Director RASMUSSEN. What I wanted to say is, while we don’t 

have that report finalized yet, what I expect is that the trend 

line—the proportions will be roughly in line with what we reported 

last July as well. 

Senator RUBIO. As it stands right now before the report comes 

out, it looks like it’s approximately close to one out of six individuals released from Guantanamo have reengaged in terrorism, 

maybe more. 

Director RASMUSSEN. As a net figure, that’s correct. But the population released since 2009, that number is a lower number. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. Lastly, on the question of Iran, I want to 

return back to kind of the threat that Senator Lankford was pursuing. We know that Iran uses its proxy relationship with 

Hezbollah, for example, and we also are aware now that the Shia 

militias that are in Iraq as we speak are heavily indebted and controlled by them as well. Do we have any evidence that you can discuss here of Iran trying to set up similar type groups in places like 

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I’d have to address that in a closed session, 

Senator. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. Thank you. 

Director RASMUSSEN. We’d be happy to provide you that answer. 

I wouldn’t wait for a closed session. We’ll provide you that answer 

through the Committee staff. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Nick, somebody stops you on the street. They know you’re the Director of NCTC and they say: Mr. Director, what does NCTC do, 

and why should I care? What would your answer be? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I would tell that person that NCTC strives 

every day to be a center of gravity for our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts, not the center of gravity because to say that would 

be a disservice to all of our partners that do counterterrorism work 

as well, but a center of gravity that provides information, analysis, 

strategic planning in support of our national counterterrorism efforts. 

So if they asked I’d say that they have a large number of officers 

who come to work every day to assess, analyze, and provide information aimed at defeating our terrorist adversaries. That’s what 

I’d say. 

Chairman BURR. And why should I care? 

Director RASMUSSEN. You should care because, as we talked 

about in my opening statement and in your opening statement, Mr. 

Chairman, the threat environment we face, we face right now, is 

the most multifaceted, diverse, dynamic threat environment we’ve 

ever faced and could manifest itself in communities all around this 

country. It’s not simply a threat that manifests itself in far-flung 

places around the world. 

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The kinds of low-level, potentially small-scale attacks I talked 

about from ISIL-inspired or other terrorist group-inspired individuals are the kinds of attacks that could literally happen in any of 

our 50 states. 

Chairman BURR. In part this hearing was because you said to me 

when we first met: You know, I believe America needs to know 

something about what we do, and the intelligence community can’t 

be this black hole forever. I just want to thank you for what your 

organization does, for all the employees, because when you hear 

the intelligence community described it’s not NCTC first, but everybody who’s in the intelligence community is a customer of yours. 

They look to the analytic product that your folks produce. We look 

to the analytical product that you produce from the standpoint of 

being policymakers. They look at it more from a standpoint of actionable information. 

I think you’ve got some of the most talented folks working for 

you that you possibly could, but I do want to reiterate something. 

If for some reason you feel that there are constraints that don’t 

allow you to build out your workforce to the degree we have authorized and to the degree I think we both agree you need, I hope 

you will share that with the Vice Chairman and myself so that we 

can help to try to remediate that. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I will certainly do that. Again, I’m enormously grateful to both you, Mr. Chairman, and the Vice Chairman 

for your sustained support of our workforce over time. I think one 

of the biggest contributions the Congress could make to that end 

would be to not put us in a position where we’re dealing with a sequestration environment going into the future, because obviously 

that impacts all Federal agencies and their budgets and their ability to operate. But our organization in particular, where we were 

so reliant on detailed personnel from other organizations, that kind 

of a budget approach has a ripple effect because it reduces the ability of other organizations to do the hiring and developing of personnel that we need to fill our ranks. So it ends up having a double 

whammy effect on an organization like NCTC when there’s an uncertain budget environment that affects our partners the way that 

does. 

Chairman BURR. I thank you, Mr. Director. 

I would turn to the Vice Chairman if she had any follow-up questions that she might want to ask. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. I would like to put a paper in the 

record if I might, since Senator Rubio mentioned the recidivism 

rates of former Gitmo detainees. And I’d like to put—the problem 

is really that, whether it’s Bush or Obama, people learned more, 

the recidivism rates changed dramatically. 

Pre-January of 2009, the recidivism rate was 101 of 532. That’s 

19 percent. Now, since the Obama Administration it’s 6 out of 88. 

That’s 6.2 percent. So you have to look at it in versions of time. 

I’d like to put this paper in the record if I may, Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman BURR. Without objection. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. So everybody could see it. 

[The material referred to follows:] 

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Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. I have one other question to ask the 

Director. Director, days before the public release of our report on 

CIA detention and interrogation, we received an intelligence assessment predicting violence throughout the world and significant 

damage to sanctions relationships. NCTC participated in that assessment. Do you believe that assessment proved correct? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I can speak particularly to the threat portion of that rather than the partnership aspect of that, because I 

would say that’s the part NCTC would have the most direct purchase on. I can’t say that I can disaggregate the level of terrorism 

and violence we’ve seen in the period since the report was issued, 

disaggregate that level from what we might have seen otherwise, 

because, as you know, the turmoil roiling that part—those parts of 

the world, not that part of the world but those parts of the world, 

the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, there’s a number of factors 

that are going into creating the difficult threat environment we 

face. 

So the assessment we made at the time as a community was that 

this would increase or add to the threat picture in those places. I 

don’t know, looking backwards now, that we can say, aha, it did 

by X percent or it didn’t by X percent. 

We were also, I think, clear in saying that there’s parts of the 

impact that we would not know until we had the benefit of time 

to see how it would play out in different locations around the 

world. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Oh, boy, do I disagree with you. But 

that’s what makes this arena, I guess. The fact in my mind was 

the threat assessment was not correct. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. 

Let me go back to where I was when I ran out of time earlier, 

Mr. Rasmussen, on just trying to in my mind figure out where the 

AUMF that’s proposed and how it relates to these various terror 

groups. I think the further language on ‘‘associated persons or 

forces’’ it says means ‘‘individuals and organizations fighting for, on 

behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely related successor entity 

in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.’’ 

List for me just a few of the terrorist groups that would not be 

associated in that way with ISIL? You mentioned two earlier. Are 

there others that immediately come to mind? I’m not asking you for 

an exhaustive list, by the way. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I don’t think Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, would qualify as an associated force. Terrorist groups we see 

operating in Latin America I don’t believe would qualify under that 

definition of ‘‘associated force,’’ or some of the al-Qaeda-affiliated 

groups operating in Southeast Asia, for example. Those are just 

some examples off the top of my head. 

Senator BLUNT. So if we just take that definition, does that mean 

ISIL and its associated groups are the only people we’ve authorized 

the President to go and do whatever is necessary within the restrictions of that? Or does the 2001 AUMF give the President authority 

to go after other terrorist groups? 

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Director RASMUSSEN. I’d have to get you an answer on that, sir, 

because I’m just not confident that I know enough about the design 

of AUMF, of the new authorization of force—— 

Senator BLUNT. How about the old one? You surely, as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, you surely know 

about the 2001—— 

Director RASMUSSEN. Right. 

Senator BLUNT [continuing]. What authorization that gives us. 

Director RASMUSSEN. That allowed us to carry out operations 

against al-Qaeda and associated forces. So I’m sorry; could you refresh me? 

Senator BLUNT. No, that’s the one. I think that’s right, though 

I think it also said ‘‘or future terrorism against the United States.’’ 

And that’s the one that the President proposes we let stand and 

we eliminate the 2002 that’s more Iraq-specific and then add this 

one to it, is I believe the proposal. 

But what I guess I’m thinking is, what do we really add by adding this complicated definition of terrorists that associate with ISIL 

when—is ISIL covered under the 2001 AUMF? 

Director RASMUSSEN. I would defer to my lawyer friends, but I 

believe not. 

Senator BLUNT. You believe not. So how are we engaging with 

ISIL now in Syria? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Let me provide you with an answer for the 

record, sir, because I want to be precise and correct in what I provide you. 

As the Administration has stated, we believe that the 2001 

AUMF provides legal authority to use military force against ISIL 

in both Iraq and Syria. 

Senator BLUNT. All right. Do you have any follow-up on—do you 

understand the question—— 

Director RASMUSSEN. Yes. 

Senator BLUNT [continuing]. I assume we might be able to pursue ISIL or ISIS in Iraq through the 2002. If the 2001 is—I guess 

my point, Mr. Chairman, if the 2001 is broad enough to cover ISIL 

now, I don’t know what we add to it when we add another authorization and leave that one on the books. But I think we do lead to 

significant complication here of who’s a closely related associate of 

ISIL when we begin to define this. 

These groups—like core al-Qaeda is generally not anywhere what 

it was at one time, but various renamed or affiliated groups have 

sprung up everywhere from the Philippines to all over the world. 

I’m going to be very interested in how we define and why we would 

specifically begin to define individual groups, as opposed to—and 

how broad the 2001 authorization was, which is I guess the beginning of that question, Mr. Rasmussen. 

So thank you. I look forward to your response on that. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Blunt. I think it gets even 

more confusing when in the same geographical battle space it 

would be the 2001 AUMF that provides us the ability to go after 

Khorasan, but next door in the same geographical area it would 

take a new AUMF to actually go after ISIL. 

Senator King, we’re glad you could join us. 

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Senator KING. Thank you. I appreciate that. We just completed 

a markup in the Armed Services Committee. Senator McCain acted 

with some dispatch. 

Hopefully, I won’t confuse this discussion further, but I think it’s 

important to talk about this 2001 AUMF. Actually, the term ‘‘associated forces’’ doesn’t appear anywhere in it. That’s a gloss upon a 

gloss. The 2001 AUMF is very clear the President can use necessary and appropriate force against ‘‘those nations, organizations, 

or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th or harbored 

such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 

of international terrorism.’’ 

That has been used very, very broadly, and I think that’s one of 

the concerns. I think the President has realized that to stretch it 

into attacking an organization that didn’t even exist in 2001, operating in a country that was at least partially stable in 2001, is 

quite a stretch. I think that’s why we’ve got the new authorization 

that’s been brought forward to cover the ISIL situation. 

So I think that’s a matter for the Foreign Relations Committee. 

But the 2001 has been stretched very far, and I’m frankly one 

who’s glad to see that the President has brought forward a new authorization. 

Mr. Rasmussen, a couple of questions. Counterterrorism we always think of in terms of killing people, striking, intercepting communications, drones, all of that kind of thing. And yet we’re now 

learning that what we—part of what we have to do is intervene before people get radicalized. And yet when you raise that the FBI 

says, well, we’re not social workers; the county sheriffs say, we’re 

not social workers. 

If it isn’t going to be law enforcement that does that kind of 

intervention, and through the social media, for example, who’s 

going to do it? And do you see that as part of the counterterrorism 

mission? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Certainly the effort to counter violent extremism and, especially, most particularly here in the homeland, is 

part of the counterterrorism mission. And I would argue that our 

law enforcement partners like FBI do embrace that mission, even 

if some individuals may have said exactly what you said, Senator 

King. 

Earlier in the discussion we talked about some of the work that 

NCTC is doing along with FBI, Homeland Security, and the Justice 

Department to try to do exactly what you just described. From the 

Federal Government, the effort, though, is to enable and empower 

local communities to carry out this kind of intervention in their 

own communities, and to enable them to do that in a way that does 

not scream a law enforcement context, because, as you know, that 

can have a chilling effect on the kind of community engagement 

and community dialogue that would help you get at the underlying 

causes that lead to violent extremism. 

So the role we’ve taken from the Federal Government has been 

a little bit more circumscribed, aimed at providing communities 

with the tools to do this kind of work, information so they understand how terrorists, and now particularly these days ISIL, is 

using social media to go after their children in their communities, 

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to let parents and teachers and schools and other authority figures 

understand what is coming at them and where intervention might 

be necessary to prevent a foreign fighter from developing. 

What we’re doing in this area is useful and important, but it is 

thus far not scalable or scaled on a size that I would say has the 

impact we want all across the country. At the President’s Countering Violent Extremism Summit during part of next week, three 

pilots cities—Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Boston—will report to 

the group on their efforts in this area. Those are three tremendously important cities that the Federal Government has been 

working very closely with to try to do this kind of work. 

But those are only three cities, and so the purpose of a pilot is 

to demonstrate whether this can be done on a scale that will have 

impact far beyond just those three cities. 

Senator KING. I take it that you’re concurring that this kind of 

effort has got to be part of the overall counterterror strategy? 

Director RASMUSSEN. Absolutely. And in particular as part of the 

counter-ISIL strategy, we’re trying to do this work both at home, 

but also abroad, because, as you well know, Senator, most of that 

foreign fighter population that we’re potentially worried about emanates from countries other than the United States. So we need to 

help other countries be more effective at this. 

I don’t want to sound condescending. We need to also learn. I 

shouldn’t say they need to do it the way we do. We need to learn 

from them. In many cases some of our European partners are doing 

tremendous work on a community engagement level to try to 

counter the work—counter the spread of violent extremism in their 

communities. I think that’s going to be one of the other sidebars 

at next week’s CVE summit, is to get some of the lessons learned 

out of our partners on that. 

Senator KING. I understand the United Kingdom has developed 

a program for dealing with this problem in prisons, which is where 

a lot of radicalization takes place. 

Director RASMUSSEN. That’s certainly true. The Paris example 

kind of brought home just how dangerous a radicalizing environment prisons can be. I know our Department of Justice has engaged on that issue, along with the Bureau of Prisons, in an effort 

to make sure that we’ve got that identified and, where possible, 

under control here. But I’d have to get you more detail on that. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator King, thank you. Thank you for your 

willingness to spend an hour and a half with Senator McCain and 

still come to this hearing. 

Senator KING. I’m a patriot, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. You’ll be rewarded in heaven, I can assure you. 

[Laughter.] 

Director, thank you so much for being here today, for sharing 

your insight with us, and please carry back to your employees how 

grateful we are for the great work that the employees at NCTC do. 

Director RASMUSSEN. I will certainly do that, Senator. Thank you 

for having me. 

Chairman BURR. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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