DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

10th Anniversary 1998 - 2008
Responding to War, Terrorism, and WMD Proliferation: History of 

DTRA, 1998-2008

By

Bianka J. Adams

Joseph P. Harahan

DTRA History Series

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

U. S. Department of Defense

2008
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Adams, Bianka J.

Harahan, Joseph P.

Responding to War, Terrorism, and WMD Proliferation: History of DTRA, 1998-2008

DTRA History Series

Reference Data

1. War – United States – Afghanistan – Iraq

2. Terrorism – United States – Domestic Counterterrorism – Technology

3. WMD Proliferation – Arms Control Treaties – Cooperative Threat Reduction – International 

Counterproliferation Programs

4. Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons Reductions – Russian Federation – Biosecurity and 

Biosafety Programs

ii
FOREWORD

Anniversaries are times of reflection and rededication. On October 1, 2008, the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency commemorates its 10th anniversary. This history explains why the Secretary of Defense 

established a new defense agency in the late 1990s to counter a major new threat to the nation: international 

terrorists groups with the capacity to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The proliferation 

of these weapons across the globe required a more concentrated approach to the department’s nonproliferation 

efforts. At the same time, the new agency was charged with responsibility for supporting and sustaining the 

nation’s nuclear deterrence forces. 

When the people of DTRA and the public read this history, they will appreciate the people who 

created, initiated, developed, and managed the diverse programs and projects that prevented, protected, and 

responded to WMD proliferation in the past decade. They will recognize the initiatives by the research 

scientists and technical specialists who anticipated and responded to the needs of the combatant commanders 

and the forces during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. They will see its engineers and managers developing 

new technologies and programs to meet the nation’s needs for securing the homeland. They will appreciate 

the skills of its program managers and contract specialists working with Russian and foreign governments on 

cooperative threat reduction projects. They will understand the critical role of its inspection and escort teams 

in monitoring arms control treaties and agreements. The sum of their activities is far greater than the parts 

... this history records and explains their work. 

In the American constitutional system, federal agencies involved in significant, contemporary missions 

have a special obligation to inform the public of their activities. The government is accountable to the people. 

This history helps meet that obligation by explaining the decisions, events, and activities of the people of 

DTRA during the past decade.

 JAMES A. TEGNELIA

 DIRECTOR, DTRA

iii

Authors

Bianka J. Adams is a historian at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. She received her master’s degree in 

Political Science from the Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany, and earned her Ph.D. in U.S. 

Diplomatic History from The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. Before joining DTRA 

in July 2005, she worked as a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where she focused 

on researching and writing about the United States Army in Europe, 1945-1952. She is the author of a 

forthcoming book, entitled, The Denazification of Bremen, Germany, 1945-1947.

Joseph P. Harahan is the senior historian at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He received a doctorate in 

American History from Michigan State University. Prior to joining the agency in October 1998, he served 

as the historian at the On-Site Inspection Agency, special assistant to the Historian of the Air Force, staff 

historian at the Strategic Air Command and faculty member at the University of Richmond, Virginia. He 

is the author of two books, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (1993), and On-Site Inspections Under 

the CFE Treaty (1997), several reports, including, Creating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (2002), and 

coeditor of a multi-volume (12 books) Air Force history book series, Warrior Studies.

v
Table of Contents

Part One:

Creating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.............................................................................1

Terrorism becomes a National Security Threat......................................................................................................2

Sustaining the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent Forces ......................................................................................6

Strengthening the Department’s Emerging Nonproliferation 

 and Counterproliferation Missions .........................................................................................................7

New Agency’s Core Elements ...................................................................................................................10

Planning Year, 1997-1998 .......................................................................................................................12

Establishment Day: October 1, 1998 ......................................................................................................16

DTRA’s Official Mission .........................................................................................................................18

Organizing the Work: Eight Mission Directorates ...................................................................................18

Leading the Agency in New Directions .....................................................................................24

Focusing on Advanced Systems and Concepts ........................................................................................25

First Status Report: Davis to Hamre.........................................................................................................27

First Strategic Plan...................................................................................................................................29

The Missions: Developing CTR Programs, Verifying Arms Control Treaties ............................................31

The Missions: Certifying DTRA as a Combat Support Agency ..........................................................34

The Missions: Developing New Consequence Management Concepts ................................................36

The Missions: Chemical-Biological Defense Focuses on Restoring Operations .......................................40

Reorganizing the Agency......................................... ...................................................................42

Consolidating and Relocating the Agency ...............................................................................................45

Status Report: October 2000..............................................................................................................47

New Opportunities in the New Century .........................................................................................48

Strategic Plan 2001..................................................................................................................................57

Leadership Changes and Institutional Challenges.....................................................................................57

September 11, 2001: Terrorists Attack the United States .........................................................................59

Part Two: 

DTRA Responds to the War Against Terrorism: At Home and Abroad..................................................62

Technology Development in the Fight Against Terrorism..................................................................64

Augmenting Liaison Officer Programs to the Combatant Commands ..................................................67

Amidst International Terrorist Threats: New Arms Control Treaties.....................................................70

Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia....................................................................73

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM...................................................................................................77

Strategic Plan 2003...........................................................................................................87

R&D: New Technologies Against the WMD Threat......................................................................88

Ground Breaking for the Defense Threat Reduction Center..............................................................90

Removing Radiologial Sources from Iraq................................................................................................. 92

vi
New National Strategy Increases CTR Commitments ................................................................ 93

CTR Develops Emphasis on Biosecurity and Biosafety.........................................................................96

New Partnership and New Leadership...................................................................................98

Research & Development Enterprise: Nuclear, Biological, and Basic Research Initiatives....................102

Defense Threat Reduction Center..................................................................................... 104

Establishing the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD................................................. 106

Challenges and Campaigns.................................................................................................107

Using Advanced Systems and Concepts to Understand WMD Threats.............................................. 109

Supporting the Nation’s Nuclear Forces: Major Challenges with the Air Force................................... 111

Disseminating the Agency’s WMD Knowledge and Expertise:

 at Home and Abroad.................................................................................................113

DTRA at Ten: Broader, Deeper, and Focused

 on Responding to WMD Terrorism.................................................................................117

Reference Materials

DTRA Key Leadership, 1998-2008....................................................................................................124

DTRA Operating Locations ..............................................................................................................125

Lineage and Honors...........................................................................................................................127

DTRA Seal.........................................................................................................................................128

Chronology, 1998-2008.....................................................................................................................129

End Notes..........................................................................................................................................138

Glossary............................................................................................................................................. 148

vii

D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 1

Part One:

S

trategy precedes structure. Major changes in strategy, especially ones leading 

to shifts in institutional focus, funds, and resources, often lead to the creation 

of new organizations. This was the case as Secretary of Defense William S. 

Cohen presided over the establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

on October 1, 1998. The new agency’s origins lay in three national security issues 

that came to the forefront in the mid-1990s. Each had strategic implications, and 

each was discussed at senior levels in the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, National Security Council, and Congress.

The first issue was terrorism. By 1995, it had become the major new threat 

facing the nation, its people, and military forces. Within the Department of 

Defense (DoD), senior civilian and military policy officials were studying, briefing, 

coordinating, and recommending strategies and programs for responding to the 

new terrorist threats. There were many fundamental questions. What was the 

greatest threat—an attack on the United States homeland or its military forces 

abroad using nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional explosive weapons? 

Did the department have a strategy and programs for responding to each type of 

attack? Would the counter-terrorism mission be assigned to one of the military 

services? Would it be given to a specified combatant command? What about 

homeland defense? What command or agency would be assigned responsibility for 

training, equipping, and deploying DoD’s resources to support Justice Department 

and Federal Bureau of Investigation officials responding to major terrorist 

incidents in the United States? Or would it be best if the Defense Department’s 

responsibilities were shared with the military commands and a new agency with a 

specific threat reduction mission in the Office of the Secretary of Defense? From 

1995 to 1998, these and other questions were actively analyzed, discussed, and 

decided by the secretary of defense and his senior civilian and military advisors.

The second issue, also occurring in the mid-1990s, was a major critique of 

DoD’s capability to sustain the nation’s existing nuclear deterrent forces in the 

coming decades. This critique urged the department’s senior leaders to revitalize 

its institutional focus on the policies, people, and programs needed to keep the 

strategic nuclear forces strong and credible. The third issue was the perception that 

the department’s growing nonproliferation and counterproliferation missions had 

to be strengthened. Senior leaders in the Department of Defense examined ways 

to consolidate existing agencies, organizations, programs, and administrations that 

dealt with the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Consolidation, 

they believed, would lead to a more focused management of the department’s 

nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies and programs.

Creating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
2 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Initially unrelated, these issues became intertwined as the secretary of defense 

and his senior advisors acted in 1997 and 1998 to change defense strategy, policy, 

and organizations. They began with the Defense Reform Initiative announced 

publicly in November 1997. Then nearly a year later, on October 1, 1998, the 

secretary of defense established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Terrorism Becomes a National Security Threat

Terrorism became a national security issue in the early 1990s following a 

series of attacks resulting in destruction, deaths, and mass casualties. The 

initial domestic terrorist incident occurred in New York City on February 

26, 1993, when terrorists drove a rental truck, laden with explosives, into the 

World Trade Center complex. Remotely, they triggered a massive explosion that 

blew apart an underground parking garage, killing six people, injuring more than 

1,000, and causing 50,000 people to be evacuated from the trade center complex 

and surrounding buildings.1 Seven months later, in October 1993, American 

Special Forces on a peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu, Somalia were caught 

in a murderous crossfire with local armed guerillas. Eighteen U.S. soldiers died; 

seventy-five were wounded.2 While not a classic case of terrorism, this dramatic 

incident demonstrated the military’s need for force protection and for better 

local intelligence of terrorist factions. Three years later, in April 1996, terrorists 

detonated a truck laden with 20,000 pounds of TNT near a fence in the American 

military section of Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia. The explosion killed 19 U.S. 

Air Force members and wounded hundreds of service men and Saudi Arabian 

citizens. Known as the Khobar Towers bombing, this terrorist incident triggered 

a major investigation which changed the way that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

combatant commanders, and the military services viewed force protection.3

Terrorism was a real threat, both to American citizens at home and to U.S. 

military forces abroad. During the mid-1990s, violent terrorist acts continued. 

Individual terrorists, religious sects, and political cells carried out conventional, 

chemical, and biological weapons attacks and threats in Oklahoma City (1995), 

Tokyo (1995), Saudi Arabia (1996), Washington, D.C. (1997), Nairobi, Kenya 

(1998), and Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania (1998).4

The Oklahoma City bombing shocked the nation. On April 19, 1995, a single 

American citizen exploded a parked, rental truck filled with a fertilizer-chemicalexplosive compound, blowing up the Oklahoma City federal office building and 

killing 168 people.5 It was the worst terrorist act ever committed in the United 

States and it revealed the American public’s vulnerability. Within weeks, the 

president requested that Congress fund 1,000 new federal officials to investigate, 

deter, and prosecute terrorist activity. A new Domestic Counterterrorism Center 

was established, headed by the FBI. A presidential directive assigned the Justice 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 3

Department and the FBI specific responsibility for developing and implementing 

the administration’s domestic antiterrorism effort.6 Richard A. Clarke, a senior 

National Security Council (NSC) official, was given new powers as the chairman 

of the NSC Interagency Counterterrorism Committee. In 1996 Congress acted, 

authorizing the expansion of the FBI, funding the new counterterrorism center, 

and enacting the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment to the Defense Against 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act. This amendment established the 

Department of Defense as the lead federal agency in the Emergency Response 

Assistance program and provided $100 million annually for training courses, new 

equipment, and exercises to improve the federal, state, and local governments’ 

ability to respond to WMD incidents in the civilian population.7

Another terrorist attack, the release of the chemical nerve agent sarin in Tokyo 

in March 1995, profoundly influenced U.S. Senator William S. Cohen. In 1997, 

Senator Cohen became secretary of defense. In the Tokyo attack, followers of a 

religious sect, Aum Shinrikyo, released six canisters of sarin gas into three subway 

trains, killing twelve and injuring over 5,000 people. Thousands of people 

jammed the city’s emergency medical system. The culprits were caught and when 

the police raided the sect’s compound they seized two tons of chemicals used to 

make sarin.8 The potential for mass casualties was apparent. This Tokyo subway 

incident demonstrated the far-reaching consequences of urban terrorism. In the 

United States, defense analysts became concerned about a terrorist attack using 

chemical weapons on an American city or military institution. When Senator 

Cohen was sworn in as secretary of defense in January 1997, he made international 

terrorism a priority. In public speeches, Congressional testimony, NSC meetings 

with the president, and in senior departmental meetings, Secretary of Defense 

Cohen repeatedly raised the issue of terrorists using nuclear, chemical, biological, 

or high-explosive weapons in a sudden attack on U.S. forces or the American 

people.

“As the new millennium approaches,” Cohen wrote to Congress, “the United 

States faces a heightened prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate armies, 

terrorist cells, and even religious cults will wield disproportionate power by 

using—or even threatening to use—nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons 

against our troops in the field and our people at home.”9 During the three years 

that he served as secretary of defense (1997 to 2000), Cohen pushed senior defense 

officials and the commanders of the military services to think more seriously about 

international terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, he told 

them to rethink their intelligence, planning, training, organizations, resources, 

and their mix of scientists, technologists, and military officers working through 

this complex issue. It became, over time, one of Cohen’s most significant policy 

initiatives and, in retrospect, it was a major impetus leading to the creation of 

DTRA.
4 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Four days after Cohen took office on January 24, 1997, a principal deputy, 

Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, authorized a new Defense Science Board (DSB) task force 

to define the new transnational terrorist threats. The task force would assess 

the nation’s vulnerabilities, examine the department’s capabilities to respond, 

identify available and potential technologies for protecting U.S. armed forces, 

and recommend specific actions.10 Dr. Robert J. Hermann served as chairman, 

with General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired), serving as vice-chairman. More 

than 225 defense experts, organized into five panels, concentrated on defining the 

capabilities of international terrorist organizations, international crime syndicates, 

transnational religious sects, and radical political groups that might use nuclear, 

chemical, or biological weapons against U.S. military or civilian populations. The 

final report, known as the “DSB Summer Study of 1997 on DoD Responses to 

Transnational Threats,” became a seminal document in the Defense Department 

for defining the new threats and recommending a range of responses. General 

Welch was a key figure in this study. In his opinion, it led senior defense officials 

to consider establishing a new defense agency. “The Defense Science Board’s report 

on transnational threats simply reinforced a subject [WMD terrorism] that was 

obviously already on his mind,” Welch said of the secretary of defense.11

Influenced by recent terrorist incidents, this Defense Science Board study, 

and other departmental reviews, Cohen asked Dr. John J. Hamre, his new deputy 

secretary of defense to examine over the summer of 1997 all DoD support 

agencies and organizations that were dealing with threats from weapons of mass 

destruction, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation.12 According to Hamre, 

Cohen’s request was based on threat analyses drawn from real-world intelligence 

and the probability of a catastrophic terrorist incident in the United States or 

against American forces abroad. “[It was] deeply on his mind, deeply on his 

mind.... During that first year, he was becoming more aware of the problems 

caused by chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism.”13 By the summer of 1997, 

Hamre said that they believed “that the biggest threat we were going to face in 

this decade was the proliferation of materials that constitute weapons of mass 

destruction—and that the agenda for nonproliferation and counterproliferation 

was not well focused in terms of an institutional center of gravity [within DoD].”14

Further, Hamre thought that the DSB study, in particular, had demonstrated that 

the department lacked an intellectual underpinning to understand, evaluate, and 

recommend a course of action against a biological or chemical terrorist attack.

This was an important point. The military services had shown little interest 

in tackling these new threats. The combatant commands had their specific 

missions and regional responsibilities. But the new threats included proliferation 

of nuclear weapons and materials, the possibility of biological or chemical attacks, 

and even attacks on the information systems of the U.S. military commands. 

According to both Hamre and Welch, these new threats fell into the “too hard” 

to solve category for the U.S. military commands and existing DoD agencies.15

There were no easy answers. Hamre, in particular, believed that the department 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 5

DTRA’s

Founding

Leadership

Major changes in the 

Department of Defense’s 

strategy for responding to 

terrorism led Secretary of 

Defense William S. Cohen 

to establish the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, 

on October 1, 1998. Dr. 

John J. Hamre and Dr. 

Jacques S. Gansler were 

responsible for crafting 

the new organization. 

Dr. Jay C. Davis served as 

DTRA’s first director, with 

Major General William F. 

Moore, USAF, as deputy 

director.

President

of the United States

Mr. William J. Clinton

Secretary of Defense

Mr. William S. Cohen

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gen. Harry M. Shelton

Deputy

Secretary of Defense

Dr. John J. Hamre

Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy

Mr. Walter B. Slocombe

Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition

& Technology

Dr. Jacques S. Gansler

Director, Defense Research 

& Engineering

Dr. Hans Mark

Director, 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Dr. Jay C. Davis

Deputy Director, Defense

Threat Reduction Agency

Maj. Gen. William F. Moore
6 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

lacked the “intellectual depth” of knowledge to deal seriously with biological 

terrorism. Welch and his colleagues in the DSB Transnational Threat study had 

concluded that the department needed a better biological and chemical scientific 

base, new technologies and countermeasures, new detection capabilities, new 

hard target penetrating weapons, better coordination across federal departments 

and agencies, and significantly, new international cooperative threat reduction 

programs.16 Given this substantive critique, Hamre asked the question: Who in 

the department was going to take on these “too hard” problems?

Sustaining the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent Forces

Another “hard” problem was how to reform and revitalize the Department 

of Defense and the Department of Energy’s institutional focus on 

sustaining the nation’s nuclear forces. By the mid-1990s, there was a 

perception among defense experts that the programs and infrastructure needed 

to sustain the nation’s strategic nuclear forces and weapons were in decline. A 

combination of elements supported this conclusion: mandatory strategic force 

reductions under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II); 

cancellation in the early 1990s of many strategic modernization programs; and 

the disestablishment of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which had been a 

powerful advocate for all of the strategic nuclear programs. In 1993 the Congress 

directed the president and secretary of defense to conduct a major review of the 

nation’s nuclear deterrence forces, weapons, and programs.

Known as the Nuclear Posture Review of 1994, it defined U.S. policy for 

nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation.17 Approved by the 

president as policy in September 1994, the review reconfirmed the nation’s 

commitment to implementing the START I and II treaties. It defined the size of 

strategic forces, specifying the mix of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It directed the 

Department of Energy to pursue a stockpile stewardship and management program 

and it recommended to Congress a series of new strategic force modernization 

programs.18

From 1996 to 1998, General Welch led a Defense Science Board (DSB) 

Study on Sustaining the Nuclear Deterrent. Formerly, Welch had served as the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and then as president of the influential Institute 

for Defense Analyses, a federally funded research and development center. The 

new DSB Study examined many of the issues taken up in the earlier Nuclear 

Posture Review. According to Welch, there had been little progress in revitalizing 

institutional support within DoD for maintaining a vigorous nuclear deterrent 

force. He said that the study “disabused many people of the idea that this deterrent 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 7

[force] was going to survive in a healthy manner for a long period of time without 

senior defense attention.”19 Among several substantial influences, “this [study] 

was one of the contributions to engaging the deputy secretary of defense, Dr. 

Hamre, on the issue,” Welch remembered.20 Hamre confirmed that judgment 

in an interview in February 2001. He said that fixing the nuclear sustainment 

program through a departmental reorganization was one of the major reasons for 

creating a new senior-level agency—the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

“We were dealing,” Hamre recalled, “with a basic collapse of institutional 

interest in nuclear weapons.”21 “When the Cold War ended,” he continued, 

“and the department disbanded SAC, for all practical purposes the intellectual 

underpinnings for nuclear weapons started to disappear. The Defense Nuclear 

Agency, which was the repository of [nuclear] skills inside the department, was 

still there, but it was more as a vestige.”22 The military services had stopped 

sending their best people to the nuclear agency. “It was seen as sunset mission,” 

Hamre observed, “not as a sunrise mission.”23 By 1997, senior defense leaders 

had concluded that the nuclear deterrent force and supporting organizations 

not only needed restructuring, but also redirection in order to respond to new 

WMD threats facing the nation.

Strengthening the Department’s Emerging 

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation 

Programs

The third national security issue began with an assumption that it was in 

the United States’ interest to control or limit the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction throughout the world. A second assumption held 

that if states or terrorist groups succeeded in developing or acquiring weapons of 

mass destruction, then the United States needed counterproliferation weapons 

and countermeasures in order to act decisively. According to Deputy Secretary 

of Defense Hamre, the department was already implementing a number of major 

nonproliferation measures—international arms control treaties and agreements 

with more than 150 nations, significant cooperative threat reduction programs 

with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and a technology security review 

process that monitored export licensing of critical exports. The people and 

organizations carrying out these nonproliferation measures, he believed, would 

fit into a new Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-level threat reduction 

agency. Regarding the department’s efforts in developing WMD countermeasures, 

Hamre thought that the current programs needed to be refocused to concentrate 

on the threat from terrorism.24

 General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired), the first 

 Chair, Threat Reduction Advisory Committee
8 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

DTRA conducts escort training in preparation for inspections under 

chemical weapons agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

By September 1997, the main ingredients for the defense reorganization 

that led to the creation of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency were in place. 

“Fundamentally,” Hamre recalled, “it was a recognition that nonproliferation/

counterproliferation is the agenda for this decade. That we did not have an 

intellectual underpinning for [understanding] biological or chemical weapons. 

That the nuclear mission had collapsed, or was collapsing, and that we needed 

to basically get a new institutional focus. That is what drove it [DTRA’s 

establishment].”25 Hamre’s closest associate in crafting the new agency was Dr. 

Jacques S. Gansler. A senior defense management and acquisition specialist, 

Gansler had served on many Defense Science Board studies, and in the summer of 

1997, he had been nominated to be the under secretary of defense for acquisition, 

technology and logistics. Together, these two senior defense leaders assembled 

the pieces of the new agency.

After studying the issue and discussing it at length with Hamre, Gansler said 

that they wanted the new agency to implement all of the department’s programs 

for the nonproliferation and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

“There are two sides,” he explained, “to the story of how you control weapons of 

mass destruction. First, you try to cut back on proliferation. Then, you try to 

emphasize the defensive techniques that could be used.”26 This two-sided concept 

became, in every iteration of the reorganization, the core organizing principle: 

to establish an institutional center in the Department of Defense responsible for 

the WMD nonproliferation/counterproliferation mission. Hamre was even more 

emphatic, declaring that Cohen believed the new agency (DTRA) would become 

“one of the things he was known for—creating a new institutional focus for the 

mission of this new century.”27

The next set of questions concerned which specific organizations within the 

department would make up the new agency. By late summer 1997, Hamre and 

Gansler had identified three existing defense agencies that fit into the broader 

WMD nonproliferation/counterproliferation mission area. As Hamre explained, 

each of these organizations was already “dealing with this 

new emerging [post-Cold War] world.”28 First, there was 

the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), formerly the 

Defense Nuclear Agency. While acknowledging that it had 

“tremendous technical skills,” Hamre thought that DSWA was 

“locked mentally” into the Cold War and needed to change its 

outlook. Next was the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), 

which was responsible for conducting the on-site inspection and 

escort provisions of nine arms control treaties and agreements. 

He thought that OSIA had “by far the most creative and vibrant 

bureaucratic culture,” but it lacked “technical expertise.” Finally, 

there was the Defense Technology Security Administration 

(DTSA), an organization responsible for the department’s 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 9

review of export licenses. Hamre believed that this organization lacked both 

technical expertise and a strategic vision. Specifically, he wanted to refocus the 

entire export control effort around the “real security issues,” rather than the current 

“thankless” role of looking through “all kinds” of licenses.29

Hamre also thought that the department needed to develop a “stronger 

program” for counterproliferation. To these existing organizations, the two 

senior DoD leaders added the department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

program office, which was then carrying out the major U.S. nonproliferation effort 

with new nations of the former Soviet Union. “We need all these activities,” Hamre 

concluded, “but they were stuck off in some suboptimal ways by themselves, and 

they weren’t growing. Our goal was, frankly, to get them to have a clearer vision 

of the future, which is counterproliferation in general—to counter all forms of 

weapons of mass destruction.”30

Gansler set these organizational changes into context: “This happened at 

a time when we were considering a major reorganization and major initiatives 

during the second administration. Secretary Cohen was going to come out with 

his Defense Reform Initiative—the DRI.... It seemed like an ideal time to create 

this new organization.”31 The DRI was a major reform effort by the secretary of 

defense to change the department’s business practices and to reduce the managerial 

overhead within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and fifteen separate defense 

agencies. The reform initiative had real substance and it developed into a major 

effort, especially in the areas of defense acquisition, program management, and 

defense business practices.32

When Cohen publicly announced the DRI on November 7, 1997, Vice 

President Albert Gore, Jr. attended the ceremony and participated in a press 

conference. The vice president linked DoD’s Defense Reform Initiative to the 

Clinton administration’s Reengineering Government effort. He also spoke about 

the importance of implementing “best business practices” throughout the Defense 

Department.33 Following the vice president’s remarks, the secretary explained 

the initiative’s four basic pillars: reengineering, consolidating, competing, and 

eliminating. In the area of consolidation, Cohen said that combining selected 

defense agencies could lead to a 21 percent reduction in personnel, and that by 

incorporating selected DoD program offices and smaller organizations into the 

newly consolidated agencies, they could reduce their personnel by 36 percent. 

Then Cohen announced that he had directed the combination of three existing 

defense organizations and the specialized cooperative threat reduction program 

office into a single new agency—the Threat Reduction and Treaty Compliance 

Agency.34
10 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

New Agency’s Core Elements

Three organizations, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the On-Site 

Inspection Agency, and the Defense Technology Security Administration, 

along with the Cooperative Threat Reduction program office in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, formed the core elements of the new agency. Each 

of these major components had a specific mission focus and cadre of experienced 

personnel.

The Defense Special Weapons Agency, formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency, 

had existed for almost fifty years as DoD’s center for nuclear and advanced weapons 

effects expertise. It tested, analyzed, and provided assistance in developing new 

technologies for modernizing the nation’s strategic weapon systems. The agency 

worked closely with the nation’s combatant commands, and in recent years 

developed monitoring technologies for arms control treaties and agreements. 

It had been assigned managerial responsibility throughout the Department 

of Defense, in coordination with the Department of Energy, for assuring the 

safety and accountability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The agency 

had created an innovative, multi-layered program for countering the effects of a 

chemical weapons attack on U.S. military bases and forces. In addition, DSWA 

had provided skilled contracting officers and staff to carry out the CTR program, 

in which the United States assisted the nations of the former Soviet Union in 

reducing their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.35

The On-Site Inspection Agency had been established in the Department 

of Defense in January 1988 to carry out the on-site inspection and escorting 

responsibilities of the U.S. government under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty. In the next three years, the agency would monitor the 

elimination of nearly 2,700 nuclear weapon systems under that treaty. In May 

1990, President George H. W. Bush directed an expansion of the agency’s mission 

to include preparing for and implementing five new arms control treaties: the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START), Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 

Treaty (PNET), and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Subsequently, 

OSIA was designated in 1991 as the DoD Executive Agent for the United 

Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was charged with monitoring 

the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In 1992, the agency was 

assigned responsibility, along with the U.S. Air Force, for preparing and training 

to implement the Open Skies Treaty. The following year, it received mission 

responsibility for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II). In its 

ten-year existence, the On-Site Inspection Agency had been assigned mission 

responsibility for nine major arms control treaties and several significant arms 

reduction agreements.36
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 11

The Defense Technology Security Administration had been established 

in 1985 as a field activity under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy. Its mission was to manage the DoD license review process for the 

export of dual-use technologies and munitions. It represented the Defense 

Department in implementing the U.S. government’s export control policy in 

coordination with the State and Commerce Departments. In the international 

arena, defense technology security specialists worked closely with representatives 

of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), a 

multinational organization formed in the 1970s to monitor and limit the export 

of advanced military technologies to communist nations. In the 1990s, the 

organization gained new missions and responsibilities as it began screening export 

licenses for sensitive technologies and materials to a broader array of nations. As 

weapons proliferated, especially in third-world nations, DTSA personnel stepped 

up their efforts to deny the export of critical technologies that could be used in 

developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction.37

Another element of the new agency was the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

program office, which was transferred from the Office of the Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs 

to the new amalgamated agency. The CTR office’s mission was to implement, 

consistent with international arms control treaty requirements and U.S. 

government acquisition laws and practices, the Nunn-Lugar program to assist the 

The

Legacy

Organizations
12 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

nations of the former Soviet Union in reducing their weapons of mass destruction 

subject to international arms control treaties.38

A few months after the announcement of the Defense Reform Initiative on 

November 7, 1997, Hamre transferred the Chemical Demilitarization Program 

from the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, 

and Biological Defense Programs to the U.S. Army. At the same time, he directed 

the small OSD program management office for Chemical-Biological Defense 

programs be placed into the new agency.39 Combined, the new agency would 

have nearly 2,000 people, and a projected budget of $1.9 billion.

Planning Year, 1997-1998

Afew weeks after the early November announcement of the Defense Reform 

Initiative, Hamre asked Larry Lynn, director of the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency, to lead a small team that would define the 

new agency’s mission, organization, budget, and reporting relationships within 

the department and the federal government.40 “He took four weeks to give us 

a blueprint,” Hamre recalled.41 Lynn and his team studied the missions of the 

core organizations, examined the DRI report, and incorporated directives and 

memos from Hamre and Gansler. Then they personally briefed their concept 

for the new agency to senior defense leaders in the National Security Council, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Department of 

Energy, Congressional committee staff, and selected senior retired civilian and 

military defense experts.42

In this process, Lynn and his team explained that the new OSD agency would 

have three broad mission elements. First, it would directly support maintaining the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent by providing: a) OSD/JCS expertise in nuclear weapons and 

effects; b) independent assessments of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, 

and control for the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

c) central management of nuclear weapons stockpile documentation, training, and 

records for maintenance and control; d) technical support for DoD elements on 

nuclear matters; and e) participation in the development and support for DoD 

recommendations to the Energy Department’s Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Next, the new agency would have the mission of reducing the threat of WMD 

through arms control treaty monitoring and implementation, implementation of 

the cooperative threat reduction programs, and carrying out of the department’s 

technology security programs. The third broad mission element would focus the 

new agency on countering the WMD threat by developing new programs for 

nuclear, chemical, and biological defenses. According to Lynn, these programs 

would include: force protection assessments for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and the commanders of the specified and unified commands; development 

of treaty monitoring and verification technologies; development of new weapons 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 13

to defeat hard and buried targets; and the creation of new countermeasures to 

support the Special Operations Command in combating terrorism.43

Lynn briefed his concept for the new agency to senior national security officials 

inside and outside of the department. He encountered major objections. Some 

in the nuclear community objected strongly to the loss of independence of its 

key OSD agency, the Defense Special Weapons Agency.44 Congressional staffers 

objected to the submersion of Congress’ major nonproliferation program, the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction program, into the new defense agency. Recently 

retired defense leaders objected to stripping the Office of the Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs 

of its major programs.45 Lynn briefed Gansler and Hamre. From these and other 

objections, Hamre recognized that he had made two mistakes.

First, he regretted publicly announcing the new Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency as part of the Defense Reform Initiative. By linking it to personnel 

reductions, elimination of organizations, and departmental efficiencies, he said that 

the message of the new agency got lost. He and the secretary wanted to establish 

a major new agency focused on nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and 

nuclear deterrence. Even worse, the perception had emerged that the three former 

organizations would be reduced in size in order to achieve efficiencies and personnel 

reductions. “In essence,” Hamre concluded, “we had a management reform parade, 

and into it we drove a float, called the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which 

was really about bringing intellectual vibrancy to the nonproliferation agenda.... 

[Instead] the whole story got to be about downsizing, shrinking, streamlining, 

privatizing.”46 It took many months for this perception to dissipate.

Next, Hamre thought that he had erred in abolishing the Office of the 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 

Defense Programs. While the initial decision fit with Cohen’s desire to reduce 

the number of reporting officials, the objections from Congress were serious. It 

was a Senate-approved DoD position, and the current occupant, Dr. Harold P. 

Smith, was a respected nuclear engineer, experienced defense science board analyst, 

and corporate consultant. Shortly after the new agency’s announcement, Smith 

resigned. When congressional staffers blocked the position’s abolition, Hamre 

decided to leave it vacant.47 Policy oversight for the new threat reduction agency 

was assigned to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). 

Serving in that key position was Dr. Hans M. Mark, former secretary of the Air 

Force and a strong supporter of the new agency.

Late January 1998, Lynn presented his concept for DTRA to the Defense 

Management Council.48 Dr. Hamre chaired the meeting. Lynn began by 

recommending that the new agency’s name be changed from the Threat Reduction 

and Treaty Compliance Agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He then 

laid out his basic blueprint for the new agency’s leadership, chain of command, 
14 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

and institutional relationships within the department. According to Hamre, 

Lynn told them, “You’ve done exactly the right thing, but you did it the wrong 

way.”49 When Lynn briefed the new agency’s missions, organization, personnel, 

and budget, the session turned contentious. When the council meeting ended 

without a consensus, Hamre indicated that he would consider their objections, but 

that he was convinced that the department needed a new, focused nonproliferation 

and counterproliferation agency.

Within a week, Hamre had decided to change the planning effort by 

constituting a new panel, the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT), 

with representatives from each of the merging organizations.50 Hamre asked 

George T. Singley, III (the immediate former DDR&E), to lead the new OIPT 

task force. That task force met as a committee consisting of Major General Gary 

L. Curtin, USAF, Director, DSWA; Brigadier General John C. Reppert, USA, 

Director, OSIA; David S. Tarbell, Director, DTSA; Brigadier General Thomas 

E. Kuenning, Jr., USAF (Retired), Director, CTR Program Office; and Colonel 

Edwin P. McDermott, USAF, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense Office. This 

panel used the Lynn briefing as a working blueprint in its deliberations.

Only one month into the new committee’s work, Singley resigned from the 

Department of Defense. Acting quickly, Hamre selected another senior defense 

leader, Major General Roland Lajoie, USA (Retired), to lead the committee. 

Lajoie had extensive experience during the 1990s with OSIA, CTR, and DSWA. 

In organizing and structuring the meetings, briefings, and subpanels, he worked 

closely with two key staff officers, Colonel Arthur T. Hopkins, USAF, formerly 

chief of staff at DSWA, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Slifka, USAF, a former 

executive officer at OSIA. Starting in February 1998, this task force met weekly 

to review and make recommendations on every aspect of the new agency. In the 

end, it was this committee and team that shaped, defined, outlined, and developed 

virtually all of the key elements of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency during 

the spring and summer months of 1998.51

In early March, Hamre testified on the Defense Reform Initiative before the 

U.S. House of Representative’s National Security Committee. He reported on 

the many facets of the comprehensive initiative, and then mentioned the new 

agency, DTRA, and the work of Lajoie’s new task force.52 Hamre announced at 

this committee hearing that he had decided to combine the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction program offices into a single operation at a single site: the OSIA 

Headquarters building at Washington Dulles International Airport. At the same 

time, Hamre announced that he had transferred the Chemical Demilitarization 

Program from OSD to the U.S. Army. Finally, he told the committee that he 

had authorized the transfer of the Arms Control Technology Program from the 

Defense Special Weapons Agency to the On-Site Inspection Agency, in advance 

of establishing DTRA.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 15

Although Hamre did not announce the name of DTRA’s new director 

at this congressional hearing, an informal, colleague-to-colleague search had 

been underway for months. Hamre and Gansler had decided that the top slot 

would be filled by a senior-level civilian, preferably a scientist or a technically 

competent senior manager. The deputy would be a senior military officer, one 

with experience in program management and departmental bureaucracies. In 

the early spring 1998, they interviewed several people.53 Then, on May 8, 

1998, Hamre announced publicly that he had selected Dr. Jay C. Davis, a senior 

scientific program manager at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

in California, to be the first director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

Davis was a nuclear physicist with extensive experience in building and leading 

multidisciplinary teams of scientists and engineers that developed major 

analytical programs to solve complex, contemporary technical issues.54 To 

complement Davis’ skills, Hamre selected a senior military officer to be the new 

agency’s deputy director. Major General William F. Moore, USAF, had been the 

director of special programs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. An aeronautical engineer with a degree 

from the U.S. Air Force Academy, General Moore was an experienced program 

manager, with advanced degrees in acquisition management.55

The next major development in establishing the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency was the creation of a special advisory panel, the Threat Reduction Advisory 

Committee (TRAC). According to Hamre, Gansler, and Welch, this senior 

advisory panel was extraordinarily important for the new agency’s future. Hamre 

said it would provide the new agency with an “intellectual grounding.”56 Gansler 

believed that this senior group (former defense secretaries, service chiefs, senior 

scientists, and corporate chief executive officers) would give the new agency a 

“much higher visibility.”57 Welch said that Secretary Cohen wanted a group of 

people who would help ensure that the new director and agency would concentrate 

on the “right set” of WMD issues and national problems.58

Secretary of Defense Cohen publicly announced the TRAC’s establishment on 

July 15, 1998, the same day that the new advisory committee held its inaugural 

meeting. Led by General Welch, the advisory committee was a senior-level group 

of two dozen people, drawn from the nation’s top defense experts in the academic, 

corporate, scientific, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic realms.59 At 

the inaugural meeting, Davis briefed the committee on the scope of DTRA’s 

mission, organization, funding, and immediate challenges.60 He singled out one 

new component of the organization, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

(ASCO). This office, he explained, would conduct end-to-end analysis of the 

emerging threats, develop advanced concepts, and recommend technologies to 

Dr. Jay C. Davis, first director of DTRA 

1998-2001
16 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

meet them. Davis believed that it would become a key element, since it would 

be performing modeling, simulation, analysis, program, and resource planning. 

Secretary Cohen attended this initial TRAC meeting, as did Deputy Secretary 

Hamre and Under Secretary Gansler. Gansler, in his remarks, said: “We are asking 

this new agency to deal with threat reduction in its broadest sense. We want it 

to address every conceivable approach to reducing the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction ... to prevent the spread of these weapons, to deter their use. 

To protect against them if they are used, to identify who is responsible for such 

use, and to support an appropriate response.”61 Less than eight weeks after this 

first senior-level meeting, the ceremony establishing the new agency was held at 

Washington Dulles International Airport on October 1, 1998. 62

Establishment Day: October 1, 1998

S

ecretary of Defense Cohen opened DTRA’s establishment ceremony at Dulles 

International Airport at two o’clock on October 1, 1998. Speaking to nearly 

2,000 agency personnel and invited guests, Cohen remarked that: “There is 

a great irony in this particular moment in history.... the apparent clarity of the 

Cold War has given away to the complexities that we find in today’s headlines.... 

Today’s harsh reality is too powerful to ignore ... at least twenty-five countries 

have, or are in the process of acquiring and developing, nuclear, biological, or 

chemical weapons and the means to deliver them.”63 Then, he spoke directly to 

DTRA’s military and civilian employees: “Your charge is perhaps the most vital 

national security mission ever to face our nation. To persevere in reducing the 

nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals of the world. To prevent the seepage 

into the global arms bazaar of those that remain. To protect America from those 

who would use these terror weapons against us. And to peer into the opaque 

windows of tomorrow and to avoid the future shock of unknown weapons.”64

Following his speech, the secretary departed and the official ceremony began. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre, the true architect of the new agency, 

presented the Defense Special Weapons Agency with the Department of Defense 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award. Dr. George W. Ullrich, Director, DSWA, accepted 

for the agency. Then, Hamre and Ullrich retired that agency’s flag, constituting the 

unit’s disestablishment. Next, Hamre presented the On-Site Inspection Agency 

with a Joint Meritorious Unit Award. General Reppert, Director, OSIA, accepted; 

then the two officials retired that agency’s flag. Hamre then presented the same 

meritorious unit award to the Defense Technology Security Administration. 

David Tarbell, then the Director of DTSA, accepted. Since this organization 

was an administration, it did not have agency status. Consequently, Tarbell 

simply reported to Hamre that the administration was disestablished. At that 

point, Hamre asked Davis to come forth and, unveiling the new DTRA flag, he 

presented it to the new agency’s director. That simple act, together with the DoD 

directive, established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.65 Secretary of Defense William S.Cohen
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 17

Hamre had insisted on this formal, military aspect of the public 

ceremony. “[It] was very important to me,” he recalled, “to treat 

with honor and dignity those institutions that we were retiring. We 

were going to honor those institutions ... and we did that. They 

did wonderful work.”66 He believed it was important to honor and 

celebrate these organizations for what they had accomplished in their 

long and distinguished service to the Department of Defense. He also 

hoped and expected that their commitment would carry over to the 

new institution. All of these things, he concluded, “just demanded 

a big deal. And we made it a big deal.”67 Immediately following 

unfurling of the flag, Dr. Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, welcomed the new agency 

and its employees to the ranks of the 13 other agencies in the defense 

department. Next, Vice Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN, Director of 

the Joint Staff, spoke about the special relationship of the new agency 

to the nation’s combatant commands and military services.

Jay Davis, the final speaker, began his comments with a personal observation: 

“A year ago I could not have imagined heading an agency such as this; now there 

is nothing more I would rather do in service to the nation.”68 He then addressed 

the new agency’s people: “The components of DTRA are doing, and have done, 

their current missions successfully. What is needed in the future is a degree of 

integration, of internal synergy and outreach across boundaries that was not 

required in the past.”69 He reiterated the new agency’s mission responsibility: 

to reduce the present threat and to prevent future threats from weapons of mass 

destruction. Davis then told the assembled military and civilians: “Our missions 

with respect to the present threats are well defined. To deal with future threats, a 

future that may be uncomfortably close ... we will need to build new relationships 

to other partners, both inside and outside the Department of Defense.... We 

must work with the research and intelligence communities to understand both 

the possible evolution of threats and the intentions of those who would carry 

them out.... We must work with the intelligence community and the domestic 

responders ... to make sure that speed and anticipation are possible as never 

before, indeed to the point of preemption of terrorists, if in fact that is at all 

possible.”70 He concluded by saying : “I accept the charge and responsibility of 

leading you.”

 Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre at DTRA’s establishment 

 ceremony.
18 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

DTRA’s Official Mission

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s mission, as stated in the official 

DoD directive establishing the agency, was to reduce the threat to the 

United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) 

weapons, other special weapons, and conventional weapons, through the execution 

of technology security activities, cooperative threat reduction programs, arms 

control treaty monitoring and on-site inspections, force protection, NBC defenses, 

and counterproliferation. The agency supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent and 

provides research and development and technical support on matters of weapons 

of mass destruction to components of the Department of Defense.71

DTRA’s director reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics. On October 1, 1998, the new agency was authorized 

2,110 military and civilian personnel. It had a budget of $1.9 billion for 

fiscal year 1999. Headquarters DTRA was located at the Washington Dulles 

International Airport. The agency operated offices in Alexandria and Arlington, 

Virginia; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Magna and Tooele, Utah; and San Francisco, 

California. Overseas locations included agency detachments and offices in 

Frankfurt, Germany; Minsk, Belarus; Almaty, Kazakhstan; Moscow and Votkinsk, 

Russia; Kiev, Ukraine; Yokota, Japan; and Johnston Atoll in the southern Pacific 

Ocean.

Organizing the Work:

Eight Mission Directorates

On the day after the agency’s establishment, Davis convened DTRA’s 

first senior-level staff meeting. It was routine, with operational status 

reports from each of the directors, support office chiefs, senior advisors, 

and comments from the director. However, it did reveal the new agency’s 

organizational structure, or more specifically how the real work was being done. 

On that day, October 2, 1998, the agency senior leadership consisted of the 

director, deputy director, chief of staff, and senior advisors from the Departments 

of State and Energy and the FBI. The new agency’s mission was being carried out 

in the eight mission directorates, the new advanced systems and concepts office, 

a business management office, and the director’s personal and specialized staff 

offices. The Threat Reduction Advisory Committee was not part of the agency’s 

organizational structure. It was a federally-chartered advisory panel reporting 

to the secretary of defense, although by definition, it worked closely with the 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 19

agency’s senior leaders. Most of the new agency’s people, money, and programs 

worked in the eight mission directorates. Understanding these directorates, their 

missions, programs, history, and size, in October 1998 is critical to understanding 

subsequent organizational changes in 1999 and 2000.

The Technology Security Directorate’s mission was to serve as the DoD 

agent for developing and implementing technology security policies concerning 

the international transfer of defense-related goods, services, technologies, and 

munitions. These transfers are carried out through export licenses granted by the 

U.S. government to American companies dealing with foreign governments and 

their entities. During 1998, the men and women in this directorate reviewed 

and coordinated more than 21,000 export license applications for both military 

and dual-use goods and technologies with officials in the Departments of State 

and Commerce. The Technology Security Directorate carried out four broad 

functions: license compliance, training, policy oversight, and monitoring. They 

also performed technical analyses used in developing the U.S. government’s export 

control lists and regulations. David Tarbell led the directorate, which included 

114 people as of October 1, 1998.72

 OSIA headquarters building (center-left) at Washington Dulles International Airport.
20 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate, consisting of 

59 military and civilian personnel, had the mission of managing 

and implementing a major, multinational, congressionally 

mandated program that provided financial and managerial 

assistance to former Soviet nations to destroy their treaty-limited 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction and 

associated infrastructure. This directorate’s program managers and 

staff experts worked with senior Defense and State Department 

policy officials and with national representatives in developing, 

and then implementing, specific programs, funds, equipment, 

and expertise that would assist those nations in their efforts to 

secure and protect their weapons of mass destruction against 

threats of proliferation. From 1992 through 1997, the CTR 

program provided $975 million in assistance to four states: 

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Working closely with 

senior military and government officials in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, the 

agency’s CTR program managers implemented a series of joint projects that had 

eliminated elements of those nation’s strategic weapons systems, missile silos, and 

related infrastructure by the end of 1997. This assistance was helping these three 

nations to become non-nuclear states under START I. From October 1998 to 

October 1999, the first fiscal year of DTRA’s existence, Congress appropriated 

$440 million for the CTR program. Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, 

Jr., USAF (Retired), led this directorate.73

The On-Site Inspection Directorate, with 763 people, was the largest of the 

DTRA mission directorates. Led by Rear Admiral Jacqueline O. Barnes, USN, 

this directorate’s mission was a direct continuation of the work of the On-Site 

Inspection Agency: implementing the on-site inspection, monitoring, and escorting 

provisions of the INF, START I, CFE, Vienna Document, TTBT, and CWC arms 

control treaties and agreements. Simultaneously, the directorate planned, trained, 

and prepared to implement the Open Skies, START II, and Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) once they were ratified and entered into force. From 

1998 to 1999, military and civilian personnel in this directorate, especially the 

Russian interpreters and linguists, worked closely with the program managers 

in the CTR Directorate. In implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, 

military officers and civilians worked closely with members of the Department of 

Commerce to devise policies and procedures affecting inspections of U.S. chemical 

industrial facilities. Another aspect of the federal government’s treaty preparations 

involved the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program. This program is a 

major training and educational effort that provided seminars, briefings, and data 

on arms control treaty implementation and security countermeasures to people 

working at DoD and contractor facilities.74

Three of DTRA’s new directorates—Chemical-Biological (CB) Defense, 

Counterproliferation Support, and Force Protection—had discrete missions. Each 

From 1998 to 2001, DTRA monitored the licensing and sale of critical 

defense technologies such as these five axis machines.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 21

developed specialized analytical programs, equipment, and concepts that would 

assist U.S. armed forces in countering attacks from weapons of mass destruction. 

The six people constituting the Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate were 

responsible for developing DoD’s annual Chemical-Biological Defense Program. 

Coordinated throughout the department, the final program plan was jointly 

integrated with the military services’ CB programs. The CB Defense Program 

had three critical objectives: to deter CB use against U.S. forces; to ensure that, if 

exposed to CB contamination, U.S. military forces could continue to fight; and, to 

support the military’s efforts to protect their forces continuously. During the initial 

year, this directorate more than tripled in size. Colonel Edwin P. McDermott, 

USAF, was the Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate’s first director.75

DTRA’s Counterproliferation Support Directorate had a specific DoD mission: 

to define, advocate, focus, and accelerate the acquisition of state-of-the-art 

technologies that would improve force applications modeling capabilities; provide 

the combat commands with enhanced weapons and sensors for defeating the 

enemy’s WMD facilities; and improve the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations 

Command forces. This directorate was the principal interface between the new 

agency and its military and intelligence customers concerning the development 

of sensors and intelligence systems for pre-, trans-, and post-characterization of 

targets. In another major effort, the people in this directorate developed new 

fusing and penetrating weapons for operational use by the combatant military 

commands. At the agency’s test ranges in New Mexico, weapons effects specialists 

designed and conducted integrated tests of new weapons technologies. Another 

program, the Data Archival and Retrieval Enhancement System, provided digital 

access to archived data that had been generated in special weapons effects tests 

and simulated experiments. Most aspects of the directorate’s work came under 

one umbrella program, the DoD’s Counterproliferation Support Program. Its 

customers were the combatant commanders of the unified commands, and 

especially the commander of the U.S. Special Operations 

Command. The directorate had 450 people, and it was led by 

Vayl S. Oxford.76

A specific instance during which Counterproliferation 

Support personnel worked directly with the combatant 

commanders came in the spring of 1999. The North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance, for the first time in its 

history, authorized military action against a European nation. 

Serbian aggression in Kosovo triggered an intense aerial 

campaign, designated by NATO as Operation Allied Force. It 

included aircraft, pilots, and ground support personnel from 

nineteen nations and lasted from March 25 to June 20. The 

United States committed 22,500 Air Force, Army, Navy, and 

Marine Corps personnel in support of the 78-day campaign. 

DTRA contributed to Operation Allied Force at both the Through DTRA’s research efforts, soldiers can help limit the spread of 

 nuclear, chemical, and biological contamination on the battlefield.
22 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

strategic and tactical levels. Strategically, DTRA deployed targeting teams to key 

Pentagon command centers and to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) 

headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. These teams used agency-developed computer 

programs called the Integrated Munitions Effects Assessment (IMEA) and Hazard 

Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) to provide air planners with 

information about the best way to attack specific targets and the potential for 

collateral effects on the civilian population.77

Tactically, DTRA provided the Air Force with recently developed munitions 

for use during the Kosovo air campaign. As part of the agency’s technology 

development mission, DTRA had been developing advanced penetrating weapons 

since before the merger. By the spring of 1999, munitions in this program, 

called the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), included 

Advanced Unitary Penetrators (smart bombs) and Hard Target Smart Fuzes that 

were able to strike at protected and/or deeply buried targets with precision. The 

U.S. Air Force used these munitions to attack and destroy targets that the Serbian 

leaders believed to be inaccessible and invulnerable. Following the successful air 

campaign, Lieutenant General Michael A. Canavan, USA, the USEUCOM chief 

of staff, remarked that DTRA’s contribution provided American air forces with 

“advantages from advanced technologies that, absent the ACTD program, would 

still be in development.”78

The Force Protection Directorate had responsibility for 

developing and then conducting independent assessments of 

how American forces, based worldwide, were maintaining the 

physical security of their buildings, warehouses, dormitories, 

and other properties. In June 1996, foreign terrorists bombed 

Khobar Towers, an American military dormitory installation 

in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 airmen and injuring another 

500 people. Within a year, Secretary Cohen had approved 

a new worldwide security assessment program for the 

Department of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff was designated as the single point of contact for all 

force protection programs. In 1997, the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency, because of its experience in evaluating 

the blast effects of nuclear and conventional weapons, was 

assigned responsibility for conducting antiterrorism/force 

protection assessments at U.S. military bases, worldwide. 

DSWA established five seven-person assessment teams and 

began conducting approximately 80-100 assessments per year. 

Realizing the importance of force protection to U.S. military 

forces, DTRA planners made it a separate mission directorate 

in the new agency. Colonel Richard T. Kingman, USAF, 

served as the director of this 40-person organization.79 In Kosovo, DTRA contributed to Operation Allied Force at both the strategic 

and tactical levels.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 23

The Nuclear Support Directorate, led by Brigadier 

General Thomas F. Gioconda, USAF, was an organization 

with 244 people. Its mission was to provide operational and 

analytical support on nuclear matters to the Department of 

Defense’s specified commands and organizations. Working 

to develop programs for sustaining the United States’ 

nuclear deterrent forces made this directorate’s mission one 

of the three major components of DTRA’s fundamental 

mission. Significantly, it also made DTRA a combat 

support agency, reporting directly to the chairman of the 

JCS for specific, designated nuclear weapons programs, 

and for other special weapons matters. During conflicts 

in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the people 

in this directorate provided analytical support to the 

combat commanders planning and conducting military 

operations. The directorate also had mission responsibility 

for the DoD’s nuclear stockpile stewardship obligations, 

which included providing consolidated guidance, coordination, technical advice, 

assistance, and data control for all nuclear weapons within the department’s 

custody. It also supported, through its work with the military services and the 

Department of Energy, the development and publication of the DoD standards, 

requirements, and operational procedures for dealing with the reliability, safety, 

security, use, control, logistics management, and disposal of nuclear weapons and 

their components.80

In the area of crisis response and consequence management planning for 

an incident involving weapons of mass destruction or a radiological accident, 

the Nuclear Support Directorate operated the DoD Joint Nuclear Accident 

Coordination Center. To validate this critical national emergency response work, 

the directorate devised, conducted, and participated in periodic exercises that tested 

the scope of emergency response operations, including site remediation. For the 

Chairman of the JCS, members of the Nuclear Support Directorate conducted 

independent nuclear surety inspections of units responsible for assembling, 

maintaining, and storing nuclear weapon systems and components. Finally, the 

directorate operated the Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirtland Air Force 

Base, New Mexico, providing general nuclear weapons training and specific courses 

on nuclear weapons accident responses.

The Special Weapons Technology Directorate had a unique mission—direct 

responsibility for conducting a nuclear science and technology program designed to 

sustain the department’s technical nuclear competencies. Further, the directorate 

conducted a research, development, test, and evaluation program for weapons 

of mass destruction and designated advanced special weapons. By using stateof-the-art modeling, simulation, and testing, technical experts in this directorate 

analyzed the lethality of conventional, biological, chemical, nuclear, radiological, 

DTRA’s force protection experts analyze the effects of explosives on building 

structures.
24 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

and other advanced weapons against a range of targets in combat and terrorist 

situations. This technical and analytical expertise gave U.S. military commanders 

data and options for targeting underground and/or hardened structures. It also 

enhanced the commander’s capability to evaluate and assess battle damage. The 

directorate operated DTRA’s Scientific Computing Program, which worked 

closely with the DoD’s High Performance Computing Modernization Program 

on research strategies for modernizing the department’s most advanced computers. 

In addition, the directorate served as the Defense Department’s focal point for 

development and acquisition of hardened, radiation-resistant microelectronics, 

electrical-optics, and other materials, that would be capable of operating in an 

environment of ionizing radiation and electromagnetic threats. Dr. Ullrich, a 

former DSWA director, led the 270 people who worked in this directorate.81

Leading the Agency in New Directions

This simple narrative makes it clear that the new Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency had multiple missions: designated combatant command combat 

support roles, assigned nuclear weapons responsibilities, congressionallydirected multinational cooperative threat reduction programs, legally-mandated 

monitoring of international treaties and agreements, and the implementation 

major development, acquisition, and testing programs. Leading the people 

carrying out these diverse missions, Davis thought, called for a leadership style 

that stressed decentralization of management, persuasion and consensus, team 

building, and when appropriate, the initiation of new programs outside of existing 

organizational structures.

“This job,” Davis asserted, “is not like a colonel being given an air wing to 

run. I don’t mean to be disparaging, but I am pretty sure that if I were a colonel 

and I got my first air wing, somewhere there is a four-inch book that tells me 

how to run a wing. There isn’t any book that tells you how to do DTRA.”82 He 

said that he trusted the year-long planning process that had created the agency; 

consequently, he did not make any immediate organizational changes. He did 

work to control the budget (the agency’s submission to DoD), its corporate 

communications (the agency’s identity), and the process of defining DTRA’s 

future missions. Cohen, Hamre, and Gansler had been explicit in their reasons 

for establishing a new defense agency: it was to develop analytical and conceptual 

programs to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction, to prevent their 

spread, to deter their use, and to develop programs that would protect American 

forces and society. When they established the agency in October 1998, it was 

not just to achieve efficiencies from merging defense agencies and programs, but 

to act to reduce the WMD threat.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 25

Not only was their rationale clear, but Gansler and Hamre held periodic 

individual meetings with Davis during the first year to provide advice, counsel, 

and their evaluation. “My personal role was strategic, not tactical,” said Gansler.83

In his sessions with Davis, Gansler recalled that they went over the new agency’s 

budget, resource allocations, manpower, and other broad organizational issues. 

“Primarily, I wanted to focus Jay on what was the role and the mission of the new 

organization,” Gansler explained. “How were we going to measure its success 

in four years, when we were finished.”84 They also concentrated on raising 

awareness of DTRA and its capabilities. “Getting the CINCs to recognize the 

organization, to start asking for help, was an important measure of success,” he 

thought. “Similarly, trying to run some major WMD exercises was an important 

one.”85 But perhaps the most important element of Gansler’s sessions with 

Davis came in the areas of recognizing change and then in developing a strategy 

for leading the new organization. “Leadership says you actually want to make 

significant changes in direction, and that you have to have a realignment of all 

the organizations to the new direction. Then, they need to manage within those 

new directions,” Gansler declared.86

Hamre recalled that he “tried to meet with Jay at least once a month ... he 

needed to know the building [Pentagon], and the building needed to know that this 

[mission] constituted the secretary’s highest priority.”87 In their monthly sessions, 

Hamre and Davis discussed approaches to structuring an analysis of biological and 

chemical terrorism. They examined the progress of DTRA’s Advanced Systems 

and Concepts Office. They reviewed promising new technologies, 

and went over other specific, focused programs. From the beginning, 

Hamre had wanted to establish an intellectual center for these issues 

in the department, and he looked to Davis and the new agency to 

provide it. At one point, Hamre admitted, “Frankly, I met with him 

[Jay Davis] because it was the most intellectually vibrant and interesting 

stuff I was working on [in the Department of Defense].”88

Focusing on Advanced Systems and 

Concepts

Following the direction of Hamre and Gansler, Davis concentrated 

a part of his efforts during the first six months on establishing 

and energizing the Advanced Systems and Concept Office.89 Its 

mission was to conduct end-to-end analysis of the emerging WMD 

threats and then to articulate future concepts and technologies to deal 

 TRAC Committee Members

General Larry D. Welch, Chair

Dr. Ashton B. Carter 

Lieutenant General James R. Clapper

Dr. Theodore Gold

Ms. Jamie S. Gorelick

Dr. Joshua Lederberg

Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, II

Mr. Larry Lynn

Dr. William J. Perry

Ambassador C. Paul Robinson 

Dr. James R. Schlesinger 

Dr. Harold P. Smith, Jr.

Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Jr.

Dr. George M. Whitesides 

Ex Officio Members

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller

Dr. Donald M. Kerr

Dr. Ted Warner

Mr. John A. Lauder

Mr. Eric Newsom

Rear Admiral Ed Hunter

Participants at the Inaugural Threat Reduction Advisory 

Committee Meeting, 15 July 1998. Attendees also included: 

Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Deputy Secretary of 

Defense John Hamre and Undersecretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology Jacques Gansler, as well as Dr. 

Jay Davis.
26 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

with them. End-to-end analysis meant developing a conceptual architecture 

for dealing with each type of threat—nuclear, biological, chemical, and other 

weapons of mass destruction. In Davis’ opinion, the analysis would begin with 

a thorough examination of current intelligence and warning systems, proceed to 

investigate existing prevention efforts, and continue with a review and analysis of 

contemporary crisis management concepts. Further, the conceptual architecture 

would examine all elements of existing consequence management theory and 

practices, and would consider what new technologies and applications would be 

needed for successful retaliation.90

ASCO’s first order of business was to work with the Threat Reduction 

Advisory Committee, led by General Welch. At the TRAC’s initial meeting in 

July 1998, Welch had set up five panels: intelligence, biological warfare defense, 

nuclear sustainment, domestic preparedness, and counterproliferation.91 Later, 

he and the advisory committee added an integration panel. Working in one or 

another of these panels, the advisory committee’s nearly two dozen senior defense 

experts developed analyses and recommendations. The thirty DTRA scientists 

and experts assigned to ASCO supported the work of the TRAC panels, and they 

also worked independently on specific tasks recommended by the senior advisory 

panels.92 In addition, ASCO’s analysts began working with agency scientists and 

engineers on difficult problems in counterproliferation, special weapons, and 

weapons effects.

Dr. Victor A. Utgoff, a senior analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis, 

led ASCO for its first year. He recruited scientists, bio-engineers, and specialists 

from academia, laboratories, and industry. They began analyzing the complex 

elements of the WMD threat against U.S. military and civilian populations. At 

one of ASCO’s first meetings, Davis outlined for Utgoff and his new team of 

analysts a series of specific questions:93

- What is the role of DoD in responding to domestic terrorism?

- What are the technologies and systems needed for domestic preparedness 

against WMD threats?

- How can we establish links to existing biotechnical expertise?

- How do we sustain a robust and reliable nuclear deterrent? 

- Can we adequately defeat improvised nuclear devices?

- How do we produce an integrated, transnational WMD threat 

assessment?

- How can DTRA develop as a focal point for WMD threat activities?
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 27

The director wanted these questions studied using the methodologies of 

end-to-end architecture. He knew that there were more questions than answers. 

Further, he acknowledged that turning the answers into useful new military 

products would take time, since the multi-layered DoD vetting process required 

that any new product be approved, funded, acquired, tested, produced, and fielded 

within the military services and the Defense Department. It was an extremely 

complex and time-consuming process. Consequently, Davis thought that two 

to five years would be needed for the emergence of specific new programs, 

technologies, and weapons. In his view, the entire process began with the analytical 

studies being instituted by ASCO’s scientists and analysts.

First Status Report: Davis to Hamre

On March 17, 1999, six months after DTRA’s establishment, Davis 

wrote Hamre a five-page, single-spaced, state-of-the-agency letter.94

He began by outlining the agency’s institutional progress to date. There 

were two important organizational developments which, he believed, signaled 

DTRA’s growing strength within the Department of Defense. First, General 

Gioconda, director of DTRA’s Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate, 

had been named Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Defense Programs at 

the Department of Energy. This “dual-hatting” would become significant, Davis 

thought, during the development and coordination of DoD’s Nuclear Mission 

Management Plan between the two departments. Further, the recent Chiles 

Commission Report had called for a stronger relationship between the Energy 

and Defense Departments in support of nuclear skills, missions, and personnel 

development. It had other benefits, too, as DTRA and the Department of 

Energy had begun coordinating their activities in developing new technologies 

for detecting chemical and biological atmospheric dispersion patterns.

In another dual-position development, David Tarbell, head of DTRA’s 

Technology Security Directorate, had been named DoD’s Deputy Under 

Secretary for Technology Security Policy. This change, Davis thought, came at 

an opportune time for the department, since the administration’s policies and 

practices for monitoring satellite technologies were under intense congressional 

scrutiny. In a direct response to Congress, which had legislated in 1998 new 

controls on the transfer of critical satellite communications technologies, the 

Technology Security Directorate had begun staffing and training teams to monitor 

American communications satellites that were exported under U.S. government 

licenses.95
28 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Other developments reflected growing recognition of DTRA’s technical 

expertise in WMD matters. Davis told Hamre that DTRA’s senior leaders had 

exchanged visits and command briefings with their counterparts at the U.S. 

Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska; U.S. Central Command in Tampa, 

Florida; and U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia. He and the deputy 

director also had met with the staff of the National Security Council, members 

of the Defense Science Board, and members of the Deutch-Specter Commission 

on the Organization of the Federal Government in Combating the Proliferation 

of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Meeting with Admiral Harold W. Gehman, 

USN, Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command, Davis explained DTRA’s 

experience in creating emergency response exercise scenarios. This experience, he 

suggested, might be useful to the Atlantic Command’s new Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support (JTF-CS). In February, Davis had written to all agency personnel, “It 

is clear that we are eagerly desired as a partner and viewed as a valuable player. 

As an agency, we are shifting from establishment and integration to the next 

level, outreach and accomplishment—this as a new agency, not as a legacy of 

our separate pasts.”96

In his letter to Hamre, Davis also explained his rationale for a major 

reorganization of the agency. He and General Moore had decided to reduce DTRA’s 

mission directorates from eight to six. Force Protection and Counterproliferation 

Support had been dissolved as directorates. Their people and resources were moved 

into the Special Weapons Technology Directorate, which was simultaneously 

renamed the Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate. In 

another structural change, Davis and Moore renamed another key directorate, 

Nuclear Support, as the Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate. Finally, in 

a major personnel change, they announced the reassignment of Dr. Ullrich, head 

of the former Special Weapons Technology Directorate. Henceforth, he would 

work in the director’s office as the Senior Advisor for Science and Technology.

In the same March letter, Davis said that he had decided against carrying out 

one of the DTRA’s fundamental planning assumptions—that all Washingtonbased agency personnel would be consolidated in leased office buildings at Dulles 

International Airport. He told Hamre that the Dulles buildings were unsafe, 

and that they did not even meet DoD’s minimal force protection standards. 

Consequently, he suggested one of two alternative sites—either the U.S. Naval 

Station in Washington, D.C., or a new building at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In fact, 

Davis had already acted, requesting that funds be placed in the agency’s fiscal year 

(FY) 2001 military construction budget for the initial design of a new DTRA 

headquarters facility.

Finally, Davis told Hamre of one other important institutional change—the 

creation of a DTRA Office of CINC* Support within the Nuclear Support 

and Operations Directorate. This new office would work with the combatant 

command staffs to integrate and coordinate DTRA’s operational capabilities and 

*In 2001, unified command “commander-in-chief” or “CINC” changed to combatant commander. 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 29

research and development projects in their mission areas and regions. According to 

General Welch, this was a new development. “At the time DTRA came together,” 

he recalled, “I don’t think that the CINCs were given much thought as to being 

in the loop.”97 He credited Davis specifically with recognizing the importance 

of reaching out to the combatant commands, who have the war-fighting mission 

for the nation. Hamre concurred: “Jay Davis, who is a very thoughtful and a 

smart guy, came to realize that the center of gravity in the department had shifted 

to the CINCs.”98 Hamre credited him with taking the “energy” in the mission 

areas of force protection, restoration of operations, and other programs, and 

pulling the entire agency in the new direction of working with the combatant 

commands. He concluded: “I think that was really important.”99 Finally, in the 

state-of-the-agency letter, Davis announced that he and the senior staff would 

begin developing the agency’s first strategic plan in order to define DTRA’s goals, 

strategies, and values.100

The First Strategic Plan

I

n recent years, strategic plans have been used throughout industry, government, 

and institutions as a way to express organizational goals, strategies, and values. 

Usually published and distributed widely, strategic plans provide the public, 

customers, management, and employees with a clear set of an organization’s 

Director

Chemical-Biological

Defense

Cooperative Threat

Reduction

On-Site 

Inspections

Counterproliferation

Support & 

Operations

Nuclear Support

&

Operations

Technology

Security

Directorates 1999

Director

Chemical-Biological

Defense

Cooperative Threat

Reduction

On-Site 

Inspections

Special Weapons

Technology

Force

Protection

Counterproliferation

Support & 

Operations

Nuclear Support

&

Operations

Technology

Security

Directorates 1998
30 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

objectives. Developing a strategic plan is a major effort, usually lasting 

months and involving dozens or more people inside and outside of 

the organization. Through group discussions, deliberations, and 

decisions about the agency’s present and future missions, DTRA’s 

first strategic plan became both a process and a product.

When he began the strategic planning process in January 1999, 

Davis explained, “In building DTRA, I had several goals for the 

planning process. Any strategic plan should express the longterm goals of the organization, those that underlie its existence 

and missions, and the operational values of its leaders.”101 The 

architects of DTRA’s first strategic plan were the director, deputy 

director, leaders of the six mission directorates, senior advisors, and 

selected senior functional managers. When Dr. Davis met with 

the senior staff, he personally briefed the proposed seven major 

goals and supporting strategies identified during the seven-month 

strategic planning process.102 He told them to review each goal and 

accompanying strategy, and then to develop specific, quantifiable 

tasks that DTRA would need to reach its objectives. Workers in the 

directorates and business management offices responded quickly; 

they submitted numerous tasks. In the end, there were so many 

recommended tasks that the director decided to hold a two-day, 

off-site meeting in mid-January 2000 to prioritize them and finalize 

the plan. Following that decisive meeting, the plan was coordinated within the 

Defense Department, and prepared for publication. In late February and early 

March, Davis, the agency’s mission directors, and office chiefs held a series of 

meetings with the employees and briefed them on the strategic plan.103

DTRA’s Strategic Plan 2000 was published on March 6, 2000. By coincidence, 

that was the same the day as a scheduled meeting for all Washington-based 

DTRA employees. Dr. Hamre was invited for a special tribute. Introduced by 

Davis as “the father of DTRA,” Hamre recalled the day in the fall of 1998 when 

the secretary of defense had established the new agency. “Among my proudest 

moments as the deputy secretary of defense,” he declared, “was to stand among 

many of you in a hanger at Dulles airport during your stand-up ceremony in 

October 1998. That day, more than any other in recent memory, represents the 

Defense Department’s resolve to shape and define the future.”104

Now, eighteen months later, he was returning to present the agency with 

a Department of Defense Joint Meritorious Unit Award. After apologizing 

for turning everyone’s life “upside down,” he then said, “I couldn’t be happier 

with the outcome.”105 Characteristically, he applauded those doing the real 

work—Technology Security’s people for specific improvements in export 

controls; Counterproliferation Support and Operations for their contributions 

to the unified commands fighting the Kosovo combat air campaign; Cooperative 

DTRA’s senior leadership worked for nearly a year developing the first 

strategic plan.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 31

Threat Reduction for continuing the managerial dialogue with Russian officials 

over weapons reductions during the Kosovo war against Yugoslavia; ChemicalBiological Defense for analyzing the future threat; Nuclear Support and Operations 

for improving the security of the nation’s nuclear stockpile; and On-Site Inspection 

for maintaining discipline in carrying out treaties with the Russian government. 

When it came time to present the award, Hamre asked Davis and Moore to accept 

it on behalf of the agency. Looking at them directly, Hamre declared, “You are 

involved in the most important work the department has to do now.”106

The Missions: Developing CTR Programs and 

Verifying Arms Control Treaties

While the departmental award and the deputy secretary’s accolades were

important, they only reflected the continuing significance of carrying 

out the agency’s day-to-day missions. In March 2000, for instance, 

senior officers in the CTR Directorate briefed the director on the President’s FY 

2001 budget request to Congress for $458.4 million to assist Russia, Ukraine, 

and Kazakhstan in accelerating the reduction of their strategic weapons under the 

START I treaty. They outlined specific programs to improve the safety, security, 

control, accounting, and centralization of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and 

to prevent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. By 2000, the United 

States’ CTR program had provided nearly $1 billion in assistance in removing 

4,918 nuclear warheads, eliminating 384 intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs), 354 ICBM silos, 390 ICBM mobile launchers, 57 strategic bombers, 12 

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 240 submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and 99 SLBMs.

In Kazakhstan, the CTR program had provided funds to seal off, and thus 

eliminate, 191 nuclear testing tunnels.107 General Henry H. Shelton, USA, 

Chairman of the JCS, wrote U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar in March 2000, 

in support of the program. “The military continues to strongly support this 

(CTR) program,” he explained, “the program is the key reason Ukraine, Belarus, 

and Kazakhstan are now nuclear free.... CTR is the critical ingredient allowing 

Russia to accelerate its reductions to START I limits, and therefore, the United 

States to do the same.” Further, the chairman told the senator that, “without 

CTR it is highly unlikely that Russia would be able to meet its START mandated 

reductions.... Critical CTR programs are decreasing the likelihood of proliferation 

by improving the safety and security of Russia’s WMD stockpile.” Finally, Shelton 

concluded: “While reaching and sustaining agreements with the Russians is at 

times challenging, the end results are worth the effort.”108
32 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

The On-Site Inspection Directorate, during the same period, was fully engaged 

in monitoring nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms control treaties. Under 

START I, the five signatory nations—United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, 

and Kazakhstan—had significantly reduced their strategic nuclear weapon systems 

by January 2000. The United States had cut its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 

from 2,246 in 1990 to 1,451 in 2000, while Russia and the other treaty states 

had reduced their total strategic arsenals from 2,500 to 1,404. Belarus, Ukraine, 

and Kazakhstan had removed all of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles from 

their respective territories. Under the CFE Treaty, the 30 signatory nations had 

eliminated more than 70,000 conventional arms, specifically tanks, artillery, 

armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and fighter aircraft by January 2000. 

When the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in April 1997, the 

United States declared that it possessed 28,566 tons of chemical weapons; by 

June 2000, it had destroyed 5,741 tons. Every destruction had been monitored 

by an international inspectorate, escorted by members of the On-Site Inspection 

Directorate. Under all these major arms control treaties, DTRA personnel 

comprised the bulk of U.S. inspectors and escorts monitoring compliance. 

Throughout the year 2000, personnel were actively training to implement another 

major agreement, the Open Skies Treaty. While awaiting final ratification of this 

27-nation treaty, the United States organized and flew joint trial flights for training. 

During the year, the United States flew major joint trail flights in Germany and 

other nations, and hosted the Russian Open Skies aircraft and inspection team 

during its joint trial flight over the United States.109

All of these international treaties required considerable nation-to-nation 

diplomatic and military coordination. DTRA maintained offices in U.S. embassies 

in Moscow, Kiev, and Almaty, working closely with the arriving and departing 

inspection teams, CTR delegations, and other official visitors. Military and civilian 

DTRA personnel provided critical, official links with the respective national 

governments, their military services, and specific government departments and 

agencies. During 1999 and 2000, the Moscow office assisted more than 100 

treaty inspection teams, and coordinated the work of over 500 CTR officials 

traveling to Russia.110

In the new nations of Eastern Europe, the Baltic, and Central Asia, there 

was a serious and constant concern about the smuggling and illicit movement of 

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or materials across borders. In response 

to this international threat of proliferation, the U.S. government developed a 

multinational program in cooperation with these new nations. Within the U.S. 

government it was a joint program of the DoD and the U.S. Customs Service, with 

DTRA’s On-Site Inspection Directorate serving as program manager. Essentially, 

the program provided equipment and training in detecting, preventing, and 

investigating the illicit movement of WMD materials across national borders. The 

program worked without fanfare until an incident on the Uzebkistan-Kazakhstan 

border in May 2000. In that month, Uzbekistani customs officials on the border 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 33

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

2001 CTR Project Sites

2001 CTR Status 
34 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

seized ten lead-lined containers filled with radioactive materials.111 This was a 

major seizure, and it focused attention on the program. Other nations receiving 

training and equipment under this program were Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 

Romania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Lithuania, 

and Slovenia.

Representatives from some of these nations, plus senior diplomats from 

Russia, Ukraine, Egypt, and United Nations, joined senior U.S. government and 

industry officials at the Ninth Annual International Conference on Controlling 

Arms, held in Norfolk, Virginia in early June 2000.112 Stressing the importance of 

technology, which was a major theme, Dr. Charles R. Gallaway, chief of DTRA’s 

Arms Control Technology division, observed that “technology must be negotiated 

into arms control treaties or it does not count. The technology community must 

show policy planners what can be done with the new technology.”113

The Missions: Certifying DTRA as a Combat 

Support Agency

Every two years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff send an evaluation team to examine 

the effectiveness of each of DoD’s five combat support agencies—the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense 

Information Systems Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Required by law, the JCS assessments 

evaluate the combat support agencies’ responsiveness and readiness to support 

operational forces in the event of war or threat to national security.114 DTRA 

was subject to its first JCS Combat Support Agency Review between February 

and March 2000. The assessment team focused on the combat support missions 

in DTRA’s Nuclear Support and Counterproliferation Support directorates. The 

results were announced in a letter from General Shelton to the secretary of defense 

on March 28.115 The JCS assessment concluded that DTRA should continue its 

WMD technology programs, and continue providing the combatant commands 

with information on emerging radiological, chemical, and biological threats. It 

further recommended that the secretary of defense reexamine the current, complex 

division of DoD’s counterproliferation roles and missions, identifying the need 

for better doctrine, improved requirements planning, more accurate assessment 

of capabilities, and better coordination with the combatant commands. To help 

define command relationships for managing the consequences of a domestic 

WMD crisis, the assessment team recommended that DTRA establish a supporting 

command relationship with the U.S. Joint Forces Command (the former U.S. 

Atlantic Command). Finally, the JCS assessment commended Davis for DTRA’s 

transformation and concluded that the agency must continue to address the 

complex WMD threat.116
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 35

The START Treaty

START Sites in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan & Ukraine

START Sites in the United States
36 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

The JCS Combat Support Agency Review coincided with publication of the 

agency’s recently completed Strategic Plan 2000, in which DTRA committed to 

supporting the “viability and credibility” of the U.S. nuclear force. Further, the 

plan stated that DTRA would “organize and prepare” to support civil and military 

responses to WMD crises by building on its relationships with the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, the FBI, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).117

In fact, considerable work had already been done. In the fall and winter of 1999, 

DTRA’s leaders, analysts, and disaster exercise experts had developed a major new 

crisis response study which influenced national policy at the highest levels of the 

U.S. government.

The Missions: Developing New WMD 

Consequence Management Concepts 

Like many influential studies, this one was drawn from reality. In August 

1999 there was a massive earthquake in eastern Turkey. More than 17,000 

people were killed and in excess of 50,000 left homeless. It shattered the 

Turkish citizens’ confidence in their national, state, and local governments. Because 

of their inept and inadequate response, all elements of the Turkish government 

DTRA Funding Components FY1999-2000

FY1999 

$1.77B

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL

EXTERNAL

DTRA TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

LEGEND

FY2000 

$2.05B

$727M

$458M

$791M

$78M

$610M

$75M

$440M

$645M
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 37

were condemned—politicians, police, fire, army, and civil disaster officials. In 

late August, President Clinton discussed the Turkish earthquake with the senior 

members of the National Security Council. The president asked what kind of 

disaster could happen in the United States that would cause American citizens 

to lose confidence in their government.118 Within a few days, the president’s 

question had arrived at DTRA. “We got a direct tasking through the NSC,” 

Davis recalled, “to go to work on a scenario of a nuclear detonation in a U.S. 

city.” Part of the tasking came directly from the President—“Don’t do it in New 

York, don’t do Washington, ...do it in the heartland ... in Cincinnati.”119 So in 

the fall of 1999, Davis, ASCO analysts, Counterproliferation Support specialists, 

and Nuclear Support exercise experts created a theoretical scenario of an urban 

nuclear terrorist disaster and the federal government’s responses. Known as 

the Cincinnati Study, it became, over the next year and a half, one of the most 

important crisis response studies of the Clinton administration.

DTRA’s director became a direct participant in the effort. He helped create 

the study’s scenario, briefed it to senior government officials, and responded 

to their direct tasking. It was a team effort, but one in which the director, 

who was educated as a nuclear physicist, was on the team. “You asked if I was 

involved,” Davis recalled. “I drove the study at one point. I told them, take 

this weapon, put it there, give us a set of timelines day-by-day: dead, wounded, 

and the consequences. The team then put together a scenario of about fifteen 

viewgraphs, and we took them to the NSC.”120 At the National Security 

Council, Richard Clarke, the president’s National Coordinator for Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, listened, asked questions, and 

then told Davis and the agency team to refine the study to better answer the 

question: What difference would the federal government’s resources make in 

responding to this crisis?

The next week, Davis and his team briefed Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Hamre. The briefing, which described the consequences of a nuclear detonation 

by a terrorist and the probable responses by local, state, and federal officials, had 

a profound effect on him. A year-and-a-half later, Hamre recalled, “First of all, 

it disturbed me terribly because of what it said about how profoundly difficult 

it would be to cope with a nuclear crisis, and how poorly we are prepared as a 

federal government.”121 Next, Hamre saw that he could use this briefing and 

its conclusions to force the department to alter how it was currently preparing 

for the new, emerging homeland defense mission. At the end of the briefing, 

Hamre told him, “Jay, just sit here,” and turning to his aide, said: “Get me 

Janet Reno on the telephone as soon as you can.” Under a presidential decision 

directive, Attorney General Janet Reno was the senior federal official responsible 

for coordinating all operations and support during a domestic crisis. Hamre 

told Reno, “I’ve just seen a briefing and you have to see it. This briefing, more 

than anything else, will give you a sense of what it is we are looking at.”122 Attorney General Janet Reno
38 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

In late January 2000, Davis traveled to the Justice Department and personally 

briefed Attorney General Reno on the Cincinnati Study. One-on-one in her 

office, they went through the nuclear terrorist scenario. At the end, the attorney 

general said that the analysis was so profound that she would convene an all-day 

session of senior civilian and military officials to go through the issues, problems, 

responses, and consequences. On a Saturday early in February, the group met in 

the secretary of defense’s conference room. Attending were the attorney general, 

deputy secretary of defense, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deputy 

director of the FBI, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, commander of 

JTF-CS, and that command’s political, legal, and public affairs officers. Senior 

FEMA officials did not attend. The group went through the study step-by-step. 

According to Davis, “We spent about six or seven hours on that Saturday stepping 

through the scenario.... At each step we asked: What political questions have 

arisen? What operational questions have arisen? Are there legal questions? What 

events have happened that we never anticipated? What resources do we need to 

have pre-planned?”123

As they worked through the operational and political issues, Davis explained, 

the group found that they had to think through and pre-plan not just the 

operational responses, but also the information flow to the media and the public. 

Public confidence in the government was critical to achieving both the operational 

and political responses. Finally, Davis recalled, “We came back to the president’s 

fundamental question: How do you keep the government from suffering a loss 

of confidence?” Collectively, the group determined that the government had 

to think through the event before it happened. Later, Davis reflected on the 

significance of these briefings for the agency. By raising these profound issues in 

front of the attorney general, deputy secretary of defense, senior law enforcement 

officials, and senior military commanders and their staffs, he concluded that, “If 

we didn’t have the answers, we sure as hell had defined 

the problem!”124

The analytical work of DTRA on crisis response 

did not end with this session. In January 2001, the 

director, agency analysts, and the exercise experts briefed 

a biological terrorism study to senior-level officials 

at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Present were the 

attorney general, secretary of transportation, director 

of FEMA, director of the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention, and other senior government managers. 

At this briefing, many of the same operational, political, 

medical, and public information questions were raised. 

Davis thought that in this session, and the earlier ones, 

his agency “had put the government on a new path. The 

problem is not solved, but we put the government on the Federal, state, and local officials set up mock command centers, like the one pictured 

 here, in several cities across the United States during Operation TOPOFF 2000.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 39

path to having answers at hand about what it can do if the event happens. Even 

more importantly, we will have explained to the National Command Authority 

what it is possible to do.”125

At DTRA, some work had already been done. On October 1, 1999, Davis had 

set up a special agency task force, called the Consequence Management Advisory 

Team (CMAT). This new team would work closely with the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command’s Joint Task Force-Civil Support and any of the combatant commands 

who requested assistance. Then in early March 2000, the agency’s CMAT team 

deployed to the Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, Virginia, in support of the 

JTF-CS for a command post exercise testing how the task force would support 

a WMD crisis.126 Two months later in May 2000, the team deployed again, 

this time to participate in a large, 10-day multi-agency crisis and consequence 

management exercise. The object was to test the capability of federal, state, and 

local officials to respond to a series of no-notice, geographically dispersed terrorist 

threats and attacks across the United States.

Named Operation TOPOFF 2000 (shorthand for top officials), the simulated 

terrorist events took place in Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Denver, Colorado; 

and Landover, Maryland. DTRA deployed twelve people to Portsmouth, where 

they worked with elements of the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s JTF-CS.127

Specifically, DTRA’s Consequence Management Advisory Team provided senior 

officials with computer modeling and simulation analysis of local weather, 

geography, and potentially hazardous gases. This analysis gave key officials a 

more precise definition of the threat than they had previously had. Using two 

agency-developed technologies, the Hazard Prediction Assessment Capabilities 

and the Consequence Assessment Tool Set, the DTRA team contributed technical 

expertise to the simulated crisis. Agency lawyers and public affairs specialists also 

augmented the JTF-CS staff throughout this significant WMD exercise. In the 

months following Operation TOPOFF 2000, a series of important joint-support 

agreements were developed and signed between DTRA and the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command.

In addition, this high-level exercise unquestionably contributed to the success 

of DTRA’s annual Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Symposium held 

in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in July 2000. More than 220 people attended, 

representing all of the military services, defense agencies, FBI, Justice Department, 

and other federal departments. Mike Evenson, deputy director of the Nuclear 

Support and Operations Directorate, opened the symposium and reminded the 

participants that, “DTRA doesn’t do consequence management itself.... We’re 

not the first responders. DTRA, however, was involved in planning, training, and 

conducting exercises for a WMD terrorist or accidental event.”128 Evenson told 

the symposium, “When we talk about a WMD event, it won’t be with 20 or 100 

people affected. It will be 120,000 people or more, with another 48,000 dying 

in about 48 hours after the event. With staggering numbers of people needing 

The Space Launch Monitoring Division of the

Technology Security directorate monitored the

March 27, 1999 launch of this Zenit-3SL

rocket off the coast of California.
40 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

assistance, we need to ensure that we in DoD don’t 

have to call more than one phone number to get help 

for our people.”129 Charles Cragin, acting assistant 

to the secretary of defense for civil support, further 

stated, “In civil support, DoD is not and does not 

want to be in charge. We are only there to support 

the local and state authorities.” 130

This WMD Response symposium was held 

at DTRA’s Defense Nuclear Weapons School. In 

1999, that school had developed a new course on 

space launch monitoring. In 1998, Congress had 

written explicit language into the National Defense 

Authorization Act for FY 1999. The act directed 

the Defense Department to establish a technology 

security program to monitor the activities of U.S. 

aerospace companies participating under federal 

license in communications satellite manufacturing and launch activities with 

foreign nations. DTRA received this new congressionally-directed mission and 

David Tarbell, director of DTRA’s Technology Security Directorate, established a 

new division, Space Launch Monitoring, to implement the law. Colonel David 

Garner, USAF, led the effort, organizing six monitoring teams, consisting of a 

team chief, launch vehicle engineer, satellite engineer, aerospace specialist, and 

a security expert. Since the newly-recruited teams had considerable technical 

experience in U.S. military and commercial space launch programs, their training 

concentrated on specific congressional requirements, the licensing process, 

program familiarization, and mission planning. It was not all training, however. 

Since U.S. corporations already had active programs with several foreign nations 

to launch U.S.-manufactured communications satellites, DTRA’s space launch 

monitoring teams were active in the program’s initial months. During 1999 and 

2000, agency teams deployed to conduct training at U.S. manufacturing plants, 

to participate in technical interchange meetings, and to monitor on-site the actual 

communications satellite missile launches in Baikonur, Kazakhstan; Plestetsk, 

Russia; and on the consortium’s launch ship in the Pacific Ocean.131

The Missions: Chemical-Biological Defense 

Focuses on Restoring Operations

I

n the area of chemical-biological defense, the agency developed and led a 

large, complex advanced concept technology demonstration program called 

Restoration of Operations (RestOps). Led by David G. Harrison of the 

agency’s Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate, this technology demonstration 

program grew out of a series of analytical studies following the 1991 Gulf War. 

 DTRA assesses the effects of various high explosive weapons through blast tests at its 

 Albuquerque test site.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 41

By the late-1990s, the U.S. military combat commands had begun demanding 

improved chemical-biological defensive technologies, and the tactics, techniques, 

and procedures to use them effectively. Harrison’s comprehensive program had 

four elements. First, prior to a chemical or biological attack, it would provide 

equipment to protect military personnel and sensitive combat material. Next, 

if an attack were imminent, it would detect, identify, and warn the command 

of the character and severity of the event. Then, if the attack occurred, it would 

decontaminate people, critical equipment and facilities, and restore operations 

rapidly. Finally, it would provide analytical computer technology to analyze 

the impact of the chemical or biological attack on operational, logistical, and 

medical operations during the attack. It was a sweeping concept, one with direct 

application for reducing real threats to U.S. military forces deployed around the 

world.

In April 1999, Lieutenant General Randolph W. House, USA, deputy 

commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Command, requested that the RestOps 

concept be tested at Osan Air Base in South Korea. DTRA was designated as the 

executive agent for the program; the U.S. Air Force was the lead military service; 

U.S. Pacific Command was the sponsoring operational command; U.S. Central 

Command was a supporting command; U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground was 

the technical evaluator; and the U.S. Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation 

Center was designated as the military utility advisor. In February 2000, Joseph 

J. Eash, III, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology, 

directed DTRA to undertake a three-year, $57 million series of exercises, tests, 

and demonstrations on the RestOps program. Since then, the U.S. Pacific 

Command reevaluated its chemical-biological defenses, and developed new 

chemical-biological components for future operational exercises. DTRA procured 

the critical technologies, and the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Ground started 

testing numerous new protection, detection, and decontamination systems at its 

Joint Chemical Trials in the summer and fall of 2000. All of this activity led to 

a decision to schedule a major RestOps baseline exercise with the Air Force’s 51st

Fighter Wing in early 2001 in South Korea.132

To summarize all of DTRA’s mission activities into a single concluding 

paragraph is impossible. Suffice it to say that the people, military and civilians, 

working in DTRA’s mission directorates continued to carry out all of the new 

congressionally-directed threat reduction programs, legally-mandated treaty 

missions, JCS-assigned combat support roles, counterproliferation measures, and 

chemical demonstration projects with the same thoroughness and professionalism 

that they had exhibited in the past. At the same time, there had been significant 

developments in the agency’s newest mission, conceptualizing and analyzing 

the WMD threat to the nation and its military forces. It had been defined and 

articulated at the highest levels of the national government. In this area, DTRA 

was now seen as a serious proponent for a rigorous national effort to analyze, 

plan, and prepare for the threat from terrorists using weapons of mass destruction 

against the United States.
42 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Reorganizing the Agency

On September 26, 2000, four days before the agency entered its third year, Dr. 

Davis and Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF, DTRA’s new deputy 

director, announced another major agency reorganization.133 In scope 

and concept, the changes constituted the largest restructuring since DTRA was 

established in October 1998. In an electronic message to all employees, Davis 

explained the external and internal pressures causing the changes. He cited the 

continuing reassessment of DTRA’s strategic plan, the favorable results of the JCS 

Combat Support Agency Review team’s report, the impact of the Clinger-Cohen Act 

on managing federal information technology, the Defense Science Board’s review 

of the agency’s simulation activities, and the continuing pressure to comply with 

DoD’s emphasis on best business practices.134 As with the agency’s first strategic 

plan, the reorganization was the product of an internal planning process.

Over the summer months, General Bongiovi had analyzed the agency’s 

existing structure and found a dilemma.135 DTRA had been created from 

multiple organizations with different identities; now it had one identity—threat 

reduction—but multiple personalities. Henceforth, DTRA would have four “core” 

missions: WMD combat support, technology development, threat control, and 

threat reduction.136 In the first area, WMD combat support, the emphasis was on 

DTRA’s mission to provide combat support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant 

commands, and the military services that were facing WMD threats to their 

forces. Accordingly, the director dissolved the Nuclear Support and Operations 

Chemical-Biological

Defense

Cooperative Threat

Reduction On-Site Inspection Nuclear Support

Counterproliferation

Support

& Operations

Technology Security

Director

Directorates 1999

Chemical-Biological

Defense

Cooperative Threat

Reduction On-Site Inspection

Technology 

Security

Director

Directorates 2000

Combat Support

Technology

Development

Acquisition

Management

Information

Systems

Resource 

Management
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 43

Directorate and replaced it with a new WMD Combat Support Directorate. This 

new directorate would inherit all of the combatant command combat support 

functions and acquire responsibility for force protection, survivability assessments, 

the agency’s operations center, and the CINC Liaison Office.

The second core mission area, technology development, represented an attempt 

by agency leaders to align into a single organization the people responsible for 

carrying out the agency’s complex research and development (R&D) programs 

and for providing the technologies used in WMD combat support and threat 

reduction mission areas. Known as the Technology Development Directorate, this 

new organization inherited most of the Counterproliferation Support Directorate’s 

R&D functions, the nuclear survivability functions and technologies from the 

former Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate, and the research programs 

associated with arms control treaties.

The third core mission area, threat control, was simply a conceptual grouping 

of two existing directorates: Technology Security and On-Site Inspection. In 

fact, these two directorates were so distinct in their functions that they retained 

their names and remained organizationally separate. The fourth core mission 

area was threat reduction. Here the existing Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Directorate retained its special mission of providing assistance to the eligible states 

of the former Soviet Union as they dismantled their weapons of mass destruction 

and reduced the threat from proliferation. A sixth directorate, the ChemicalBiological Directorate, provided direction for development and acquisition of 

DoD’s chemical and biological systems for the military services and combatant 

commands. So, after all the changes, DTRA would have four core missions: 

WMD combat support, technology development, threat control, and threat 

reduction, organized into six mission directorates: Combat Support, Technology 

Development, Technology Security, On-Site Inspection, Cooperative Threat 

Reduction, and Chemical-Biological Defense.

In early August, Bongiovi recommended that Davis set up two new agency 

leadership groups to provide the director and senior leadership with better internal 

communications, advice on strategic planning, and managerial insights.137 There 

were two reasons behind the deputy director’s recommendations. In February, an 

agency-wide survey had shown that there was a major problem with intra-agency 

personal communications, especially between mid-level and senior managers. To 

resolve it, the director established the DTRA Corporate Council in September 

2000. This new council was a large group of thirty-two senior and mid-level 

managers, consisting of the director, deputy director, chief of staff, senior advisors, 

mission directors, special and personal staff officers, and the chief of the advanced 

concepts office. It would meet monthly, addressing specific issues and advising 

the director and his senior leaders on corporate planning, policies, and agency/

program performance.138 Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF, 

DTRA’s second deputy director
44 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

The second new leadership group was designated the DTRA Board of 

Advisors.139 It grew out of Bongiovi’s and Davis’s desire to have a separate 

senior managerial group that would advise and work with them to make the 

strategic planning process the driving force in planning the agency’s future. The 

function of this smaller group of approximately 14 senior managers (the director, 

deputy director, chief of staff, mission directors, and business office chiefs) 

was to continue refining the agency’s strategic plan and to assist the director 

in defining new mission opportunities and future scenarios. Finally, when 

all of the discussions, refinements, and internal vetting had been completed, 

DTRA’s reorganization was announced to all agency employees on September 

26, 2000.

On that day, Davis and Bongiovi explained, via an agency-wide e-mail, 

the new “core” missions concept, the organizational changes in the mission 

directorates, the new managerial council and advisory board, and the elevation 

of three major headquarters functions—resource management, acquisition 

management, and information systems—to business directorate status.140 The 

last element signaled a major status change, elevating those important enabling 

divisions to directorates. The new Resource Management Directorate combined 

the functions of financial management, manpower and personnel management. 

The second, the Acquisition Management Directorate, expanded the mission 

and organizational stature of the former acquisition management division 

by including responsibilities for program management, training, and better 

business practices. The third organizational change created an Information 

Systems Directorate. This change recognized the major role that computers 

and communications now played in the agency and the conduct of its missions 

and business. Further, the action responded directly to the Clinger-Cohen Act, 

which sought to elevate the status of information management functions within 

federal government departments and agencies.

As a result of all of these changes, DTRA entered its third year with six 

mission directorates, three business directorates, an advanced systems and 

concepts office, senior advisors, a board of advisors, and a corporate council. 

The Threat Reduction Advisory Committee remained intact.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 45

Consolidating and Relocating the Agency

Upon its establishment, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency maintained 

its headquarters, business and security offices, and three mission 

directorates at Washington Dulles International Airport, located 

approximately twenty-five miles west of Washington, D.C. In March 1999, 

Davis had recommended to Hamre that the agency move its headquarters and 

Dulles-based personnel, either to Fort Belvoir in the Virginia suburbs or the U.S. 

Naval Station in Washington, D.C. He had two reasons. First, the Dulles site did 

not meet even minimal DoD force protection standards for physical security and 

safety, whereas a new building, on either military post, would meet the standards 

when placed inside a fenced area, with manned, controlled access security systems. 

Davis’ second reason grew out of his personal experience in working for nearly 25 

years at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. He believed that 

only by bringing DTRA personnel together in one location would they be able 

to achieve a level of responsiveness, creativity, and entrepreneurial spirit needed 

to thrive in a competitive world of rapidly changing defense missions and 

DTRA began moving to the McNamara Headquarters Complex at Fort Belvoir, Virginia in June 2000.
46 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

budgets. Davis believed so strongly in the necessity for this consolidation that he 

set money aside in out-year budgets for the design of a new facility for DTRA. 

Then, he requested that Dr. Hamre include in DoD’s military construction request 

to Congress for 2000 an appropriation for a preliminary building design of an 

entirely new facility for DTRA.141

In March 1999, Davis envisioned a new headquarters building with four floors, 

approximately 300,000 square feet of office space, and a price tag of about $65 

million. Following site and building design, construction estimates, contracts, 

and actual construction, the new DTRA building could be ready for occupancy, 

he estimated, by mid-2003.142 Until then, the headquarters and its directorates 

would remain in the leased facilities at Dulles. By October 1999, the situation 

had changed, senior department officials had directed that the agency headquarters 

would relocate in the next year to the McNamara Headquarters Complex at Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia. In informing all agency personnel on October 4, 1999, the 

director explained that not only would the agency relocate to Fort Belvoir, but it 

would do so quickly. The move from Dulles would start in early summer 2000, 

three years earlier than previously announced.143

The expedited schedule was possible because vacant office space already existed 

in the headquarters complex at Fort Belvoir, and another defense agency, the 

Defense Contracting Management Agency, would be vacating its offices in the 

By December 2000, Headquarters DTRA had been completely relocated from Washington Dulles International Airport to 

Fort Belvoir. Other DTRA elements remained at various sites in the National Capital Region. 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 47

same building by the end of December 2000. After examining the situation in 

the summer of 1999, David R. Oliver, Jr., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, directed DTRA to move into 

vacant office space in the headquarters complex. At the same time, Oliver said 

that DTRA would be authorized to contract immediately for the construction of 

a large, temporary 100,000 square foot modular building in an existing parking 

lot at the McNamara Headquarters Complex. It could serve as office space for up 

to 500 employees. Hamre agreed. The combination of these three developments, 

Davis told agency employees, would consolidate a majority of DTRA personnel 

at Fort Belvoir. Personnel in three directorates, Technology Development, WMD 

Combat Support, and Technology Security, would continue to work in the agency’s 

other facilities in Alexandria, Virginia.

In June 2000, the movement of people, furniture, computers, and other 

systems to Fort Belvoir began. The move was scheduled to be completed that 

same month.144 Approximately 150 people moved the week of June 13 from 

Dulles into six office suites located in the Headquarters Complex building. In 

late September, the director and deputy director led a second agency group 

into offices in the new 100,000 square foot modular building. Over the next 

three months, the special and personal staff offices, business directorates, and 

one mission directorate also moved into the building. By December 2000, 

Headquarters DTRA had been completely relocated from Dulles International 

Airport to Fort Belvoir. Only the On-Site Inspection Directorate remained at 

Dulles, and it was slated to move to the Headquarters Complex at Fort Belvoir 

when space was prepared and available.

Status Report: October 2000

I

n late October 2000, Davis wrote agency personnel, “We are now in the 

third year of this agency’s existence and my last year as director.” He 

announced that he would be stepping down as director in the spring of 2001. 

“As an agency,” he continued, “we have had significant accomplishments, both in 

building the institution that is DTRA and in executing the missions assigned to 

us. The first stage of our work is done; now it is time to ignite the second stage 

and take the Defense Threat Reduction Agency even higher.”145

In the same message, Davis enumerated DTRA’s major accomplishments. 

From implementing the nation’s arms control treaty commitments to carrying 

out the large cooperative programs which were assisting the states of the former 

Soviet Union in reducing their nuclear weapons, DTRA personnel had carried 

out the United States’ responsibilities professionally. The agency had established 

a successful partnership with the U.S. Strategic Command in creating the 
48 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

DTRA’s Operations Center provided support for the inauguration of President 

George W. Bush by assisting the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee and other 

key government agencies. 

first Nuclear Mission Management Plan and it had developed a good working 

relationship with the Department of Energy’s new National Nuclear Security 

Administration. DTRA, Davis asserted, had drafted, coordinated, and published 

the plan for the nation’s chemical-biological defense program. Technology security, 

through licensing, had been made more efficient and extended into the realm of 

monitoring space launches of U.S. communications satellites. But Davis thought 

that the agency had achieved a new identity within the federal government in the 

area of conceptualizing, planning, and executing inter-agency counterterrorism 

exercises. Davis wrote that in this area, “We [DTRA] have had a greater impact 

than that of our legacy organizations....”146 Finally, he singled out the JCS review 

of DTRA’s combat support missions and the agency’s establishment of liaison 

officers, located at combatant command headquarters around the world, as proof 

of the new organization’s commitment to the nation’s combatant commanders 

and military forces.

In February 2001, Davis announced in the agency’s newsletter that his 

appointment had been extended through June. At that time, he planned return 

to California and work at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory where 

he would become a national security fellow at the Center for Global Security 

Research.147 In the same newsletter article he explained his view of DTRA’s 

historical significance. “The Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” he wrote, “has 

been described to me by several people as the most important defense management 

innovation since the creation of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

more that 40 years ago.”148 As the agency’s first director, he took “considerable 

satisfaction” in that comparison, and then he concluded, characteristically: “You 

should as well.”149

New Opportunities in the New Century

Throughout 2001, the Combat Support Directorate 

worked intensively with the unified combatant 

commands, especially the U.S. Central Command 

(USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM), and the U.S. Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM). Combat Support personnel provided 

operational support to the combatant commands, military 

services, and other governmental agencies. They conducted 

integrated vulnerability assessments of Defense Department 

installations worldwide in direct support of the Chairman 

of the JCS’s antiterrorism and force protection programs. 

They carried out independent nuclear surety inspections for 

the JCS. In addition, they had mission responsibility for 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 49

DTRA’s Operations Center. In January, the operations center provided support 

for President Bush’s inauguration. Since the agency was seen as the defense 

department’s center for WMD expertise, the operations center developed a plan for 

supporting the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee’s operations center and other 

key government operations centers. According to Major Robert Ivy, USA, “Our 

reason for working [the event] was to shorten the response timeline in support 

of the Secret Service. We had modeling people working here, as well as subject 

matter experts, so there was a full reachback capability. DTRA is increasingly seen 

as the expert on weapons of mass destruction.”150

President Bush’s inauguration was the DTRA Operations Center’s first 

opportunity to work with the scientists and technicians at the National 

Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability Office. Based at the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory, this office provided federal and state officials with real-time 

assessments of the environmental consequences of radiological materials in the 

atmosphere. DTRA’s Operations Center personnel also worked closely with the 

members of a new command, the Joint Task Force for Civil Support, who deployed 

to Washington D.C. for the inauguration. At the end of the long week, the chief 

of the operations center, Lieutenant Colonel Laura Hill, USA, concluded, “We 

couldn’t replicate this training anywhere else.”151 Significantly, this operations 

center experience would be used later in the year in responding to the September 

11 terrorist attack, and in preparations for the 2002 Winter Olympics to be held 

in Salt Lake City, Utah.

In its first full year of operations, the Technology Development Directorate 

had the mission of developing, managing, and coordinating DTRA’s research and 

development activities. These activities focused on enhancing and enabling the 

unified combatant command’s WMD operations support, combat support, and 

threat reduction missions. In 2001, the directorate carried out complex studies, 

analyses, computer models, and simulations on the effects and impacts of weapons 

of mass destruction. The definition of what types of weapons constituted WMD 

included not only chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but also radiological 

and high explosive weapons.152 High explosives had been used extensively by 

terrorist groups, both in the United States and abroad.

DTRA’s center for testing the effects of high explosives was located on Kirtland 

Air Force Base, near Albuquerque, New Mexico. DTRA’s Albuquerque Operations 

has several hundred people experienced in planning, preparing, and conducting 

weapons effects tests. One important group of tests, the Divine Buffalo series, 

tested new techniques for retrofitting existing buildings in order to improve 

their survivability against high explosive weapons.153 The tests in this series were 

conducted over several years, using different designs for structural columns, 

different reinforcing technologies, and other means to strengthen the buildings 

against structural collapse. All of the test data was funneled into a database that 

analysts used to predict lethality and the probability of serious injury to personnel 
50 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

in the buildings. This important work had direct 

application for U.S. military and diplomatic 

personnel stationed abroad. They knew, first 

hand, the threat from terrorist groups and their 

high explosive weapons of terror.

Technology Development had numerous 

other projects which had direct application 

to commanders of the unified commands. 

In late March, Admiral Richard Mies, USN, 

Commander-in-Chief, USSTRATCOM, 

welcomed Dr. Davis, General Bongiovi, Colonel 

William R. “Ronnie” Faircloth, USA, chief of 

staff, DTRA, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, director, 

Technology Development Directorate, Dr. 

Randall S. Murch, chief of ASCO, and 20 

other senior staff and program managers, for 

a day-long conference in Omaha, Nebraska.154

According to Major Stephen Hall, USAF, who was DTRA’s project officer and 

combatant command liaison to the specified command, the purpose of this 

“focus day” was for the senior leaders to review some 20 different programs 

that the agency was executing in direct support of USSTRATCOM. Admiral 

Mies complimented DTRA for its initiative, characterizing the meeting a “good 

opportunity” to recalibrate the senior leadership on the programs.155 Technology 

Development Directorate program managers briefed the status of 17 of the 20 

agency programs reviewed. During the meeting, Admiral Mies and his staff 

explained USSTRATCOM’s perspective on specific programs. According to 

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Hann, USA, that exchange allowed the agency to begin 

a process to prioritize its future research planning to better meet the demands 

of the warfighters.156 From 2000 to 2001, DTRA had succeeded in placing an 

agency combatant command liaison officer, either on a permanent or temporary 

basis, at the headquarters of U.S. European Command (also coordinating with 

NATO and SHAPE), U.S. Strategic Command (also with U.S. Space Command), 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command (also with U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and U.S. Southern Command), U.S. Transportation 

Command, and U.S. Pacific Command.

In February 2001, the U.S. Pacific Command, DTRA, and the Air Force Test 

and Evaluation Center conducted the large-scale field exercise and technology 

demonstration, called RestOps. This exercise simulated a chemical attack at 

the U.S. Pacific Command’s 51st Fighter Wing, based at Osan Air Base, South 

Korea.157 It was a large exercise, involving more the 6,500 personnel, including 

450 technical evaluators and observers. Beginning on February 11, the exercise 

ran 24 hours-a-day for 10 days and tested new tactics, techniques, products, 

and equipment especially designed to help the wing restore its fighter aircraft, 

At Albuquerque, DTRA used the Divine Buffalo test series to measure the blast effects of high 

explosive weapons on redesigned building structures.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 51

munitions areas, command centers, maintenance centers, and logistics sections 

to combat status quickly. The comprehensive program, conceived and developed 

by David Harrison, of the Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate, had been 

identified by the secretary of defense as an Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration project.158 General Bongiovi flew to South Korea, spent several 

days observing the complex exercise which field tested 51 separate products that 

detected, mitigated, and assisted the fighter wing in restoring operations. After 

the exercise, the general concluded, “RestOps demonstrates two of our [DTRA’s] 

strategic goals - reducing the present threat and ... reducing the impact of weapons 

of mass destruction.”159 When the exercise concluded on February 21, DTRA 

program and technical managers presented a debriefing, dubbed a “hot wash”, 

for the wing command and staff. A more extensive report, one that evaluated all 

of the demonstration products and procedures, came several months later.160

By that time, DTRA’s Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate was involved 

in a similar effort with the U.S. Navy. On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was 

conducting a routine fueling stop in the port of Aden, Yemen. Suddenly, without 

warning it was attacked by terrorists who exploded a powerful bomb near the 

ship, killing 17 sailors, and wounding 42 others.161 The incident demanded 

better force protection measures. Within weeks, U.S. Navy officials began 

working with DTRA’s experienced analysts and project managers in Technology 

Development, Chemical-Biological Defense, and WMD Combat Support 

directorates to design and develop a new restoration of operations project, the Sea 

Port Protection Analysis. Under this program, DTRA assessment teams would 

travel to U.S. Navy ports and weapons depots in the United States and abroad 

and evaluate their physical vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks using weapons of 

mass destruction. These assessments became the basis for analysts in the three 

directorates—Technology Development, Chemical-Biological Defense, and 

WMD Combat Support—to devise new methods to detect, mitigate, and restore 

naval operations if a port were attacked using weapons of mass destruction.

The year 2001 was a significant turning point in 

establishing the Space Launch Monitoring division’s 

operational capability. The division reached a strength of 

28 full-time monitors, organized into six teams. Each of the 

team members had been trained at DTRA’s Defense Nuclear 

Weapons School in Albuquerque, and then had completed a 

rigorous course of certification training within the division. 

Their mission is to review the licenses, including extensive 

technical data, of U.S. corporations selling or leasing 

rocket-launched space vehicles or space technologies to 

foreign companies. Following the technical data review, 

agency monitors recommended licensing modifications, 

and supported technical interchange positions. Then, the 

teams traveled to the site and monitored the actual launch of Equipment provided under the CTR program assists Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 

 and Ukraine in eliminating their START I-limited weapons systems infrastructure.
52 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

the space vehicles. Typically, a team would be deployed to a launch site for 30 to 

45 days. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Robertson, USAF, explained that “We cover 

the program from cradle to grave. The companies used to be concerned with the 

lack of consistency ... from one program to the next, or within the same program. 

Now they see the same people each time they deal with that program.”162 During 

fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the teams monitored 16 launches of commercial 

satellites in Russia, Ukraine, and the Pacific Ocean. An additional 15 overseas 

launches of U.S. commercial satellites were projected for 2002.

From the beginning of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, one of its 

principal objectives had been to assist Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 

the elimination of their START I-limited weapons, warheads, and weapon systems 

infrastructure. By the end of 2000, Kazakhstan had eliminated, with funding, 

program management, and contractor assistance from CTR, all of its 104 SS-18 

ICBM silos and all of its 40 heavy bombers. With the elimination of these silos 

and bombers, Kazakhstan met all of its obligations under the START I treaty. 

Still underway in 2001, with direct CTR program assistance, were projects to 

eliminate the unified fill facilities in the nuclear storage areas at Sary Ozek, Chagan, 

and Derzhavinsk sites, and the elimination of nuclear testing infrastructure at the 

Degelen Mountain nuclear testing site.

Ukraine passed a major milestone in 2001. When it became a nation in 

1991, Ukraine had inherited 258 ICBMs (SS-19s, SS-24s), 176 silo launchers, 

36 heavy bombers (Tu-160s, Tu-22Ms), 487 air-launched cruise missiles, and 

1,984 nuclear warheads. In 1994, it ratified both the START I Treaty and the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus agreeing to become a non-nuclear nation. By 

December 2000, Ukraine had eliminated all of its intercontinental ballistic 

missiles, most of its missile silos, and almost all of its heavy bombers. CTR funds 

had financed the elimination of every one of these strategic offensive weapons. In 

February 2001, the final Tu-160 heavy bomber was destroyed at Priluki Air Base 

by Ukrainian firms working under a CTR contract. Previously, Ukraine’s other 

heavy bombers had been eliminated at five military air bases: Uzin, Belaya, Tserkov, 

Poltava, and Nikolaev. Commenting on the significance of eliminating the final 

Tu-160 Blackjack bomber and the first Tu-22 Backfire at Priluki, Major Donald 

E. Parman, USAF, the CTR program manager, said “The Ukrainians stand firm 

on their commitment to destroy all similar weapons and to build new peaceful 

relations with the west. The elimination of the first Backfire demonstrates that 

commitment to the world.”163 Parman spoke in February; by May all remaining 

heavy bombers and air launched cruise missiles had been destroyed.

For Ukraine to meet its START I obligations, it still had to destroy the last few 

SS-24 ICBM silos. That work had begun in 1998 and it had to be completed by 

December 5, 2001, the date for compliance with the START Treaty. On October 

30, 2001, Ukrainian government representatives, U.S. officials, DTRA program 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 53

managers, American and Ukrainian contractors, local citizens, and approximately 

150 media representatives participated in a ceremony at Pervomaysk, Ukraine. 

They observed the destruction of the final SS-24 silo, and the signing of an 

agreement that extended the U.S.-Ukrainian cooperative threat reduction program 

until 2006. Signed by Colonel-General Vladmir Mikhtyuk, Ukrainian Deputy 

Minister of Defense, and John Connell, the U.S. government’s CTR program 

manager for Ukraine, the agreement provided for the removal of all the weapon 

systems-related support and maintenance infrastructure from the Ukrainian SS24 sites.164

John Connell also participated in another significant milestone, the awarding 

of a new multi-year, multi-billion dollar CTR Integrating Contract. Prior to the 

awarding of this significant contract, each new CTR project took six to twelve 

months to complete using the U.S. government’s procurement process. In 

2000, Ann Bridges Steely, director of the Acquisition Management Directorate, 

recommended developing a new large-scale integrating contract that would be in 

place when new CTR requirements arose. Using this type of contract, the CTR 

procurement process for new projects could be speeded up to approximately 55 to 

80 days. The director and deputy director approved the new acquisition strategy 

and in November 2000, Connell and Herbert A. Tompson formed a CTRAcquisition Management team to oversee the process of soliciting, informing, 

evaluating, and selecting contractors for the largest single contract in the agency’s 

history. Following initial advertising in November, the team held an information 

day for prospective industry representatives and contractors in February 2001. 

By April, 72 bids had been solicited. For the next three months, Connell and 

Thompson led the source selection process. They followed established procedures 

of establishing separate panels to evaluate the technical merits, the performance 

reviews, and cost issues. When the source selection process and decision reviews 

were completed in late autumn, DTRA made 

the announcement of the CTR integrating 

contract award on September 7, 2001. Five 

major U.S. firms received the $5 billion, 

five-year contract, with provision for a fiveyear extension if the initial work had been 

preformed well.165

The United States reached three major arms 

control milestones during 2001: shutdown 

of the chemical munitions elimination 

facility at Johnson Atoll, completion of onsite inspections under the INF Treaty, and 

fulfillment of the START I treaty’s deadline 

for strategic offensive arms eliminations. In 

the first milestone, DTRA personnel escorted In 2001, American and Russian inspectors conducted a series of commemorative events marking the 

 completion of the on-site inspection phase of the INF Treaty.
54 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

a team of international arms control inspectors who monitored the destruction 

of the last of 13,000 land mines filled with chemical munitions at the Johnston 

Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System in November 2000. These land mines were 

part of a larger cache of more than 400,000 rockets, projectiles, bombs, mortars, 

and one-ton munitions containers that had been destroyed, starting in 1993, on 

Johnson Island. When the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in 

April 1997, international inspectors had the right to travel to Johnston Atoll and 

inspect the chemical destruction facility. Escorts from DTRA’s On-Site Inspection 

Directorate accompanied each of the inspection teams to the island. Lieutenant 

Colonel Walter H. Kamien, USAF, served as escort team chief during the final 

destruction. “We have been planning this last destruction for a long time,” he 

explained. “We ensured that we had procedures in place with the inspection on-site 

staff to witness this last destruction and to verify that there were no other mines 

on the island.” 166 Although the final land mines were destroyed in November 

2000, there were a number of subsequent shutdown activities in January and 

February 2001. This work was subject to review by the CWC inspectors, who were 

escorted by agency personnel. When the facility shutdown was completed, the 

Johnston Island facility became the United States’ first chemical demilitarization 

plant to be officially closed.

On May 31, 2001, the INF Treaty reached a milestone with the end of the 

13-year period for conducting on-site inspections. Beginning on June 1, 1988, 

the United States and Soviet Union/Russia had the right under the treaty to send 

10-person teams to inspect declared military sites. This treaty “right” existed for 

13 years, ending in May 2001. During those years, the United States sent 540 

teams (5,400 inspectors) to Soviet/Russian sites; while U.S.S.R./Russia deployed 

311 inspection teams (3,110 inspectors) to United States’ INF Treaty sites.167

In addition, each nation had a treaty right to send an inspection team of up to 

30 people to continuously monitor the exits and entrances of one INF missile 

assembly or rocket motor production factory. The American inspectors went to the 

Soviet INF missile assembly plant in Votkinsk, while the Soviet/Russian inspectors 

conducted their continuous portal monitoring inspections at an INF rocket 

motor plant in Magna, Utah. Without a doubt, the end of inspections under 

the INF Treaty was a significant historical event for both nations. Consequently, 

the leaders of DTRA’s On-Site Inspection Directorate worked with their Russian 

counterparts to plan and conduct a series of major commemorative events in 

Moscow, Votkinsk, Washington, and Magna. Attended by senior diplomats, 

defense officials, military officers, current and retired inspectors, and the media, 

these events held in May 2001 recognized the treaty’s historical significance in 

laying the foundation for a new era in U.S.-Russian relations.168

The third treaty milestone in 2001 related to the START I treaty. Signed in 

1991, the treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994, following ratification 

by the five signatory nations: United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and 

Secretary of State Colin Powell Kazakhstan. Seven years after entry into force, all parties to the treaty had to 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 55

declare that their arsenals of strategic offensive arms was below the level of 1,600 

strategic weapons and 6,000 warheads. In fact, during the ratification process, 

three nations, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, pledged to eliminate all of their 

strategic offensive arms and accede to the United Nations’ Non-Proliferation 

Treaty. As the December 2001 deadline approached, two nations, Ukraine and 

the United States, had not reported data confirming they were below their declared 

treaty limits. As noted above, Ukraine eliminated its final SS-24 silo on October 

30, 2001, thus achieving treaty compliance. On December 5, Secretary of State 

Colin L. Powell declared that the United States had met its final limits under the 

START treaty.169 Powell characterized the event as an “important milestone” in 

dismantling the legacy of the Cold War. In Moscow, Aleksandr Yakovenko of 

the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a short statement: “Russia had completely 

fulfilled its commitments under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START 

I.”170 In fact, as of the deadline all parties to the treaty had superceded their 

treaty-mandated limits in weapons and warheads. This milestone did not mean 

the end of the treaty, the end of reductions, or the end of on-site inspections. All 

provisions of the START I treaty continued as the nations prepared for significant 

reductions in their strategic offensive forces in future years.

The agency’s principle office for analyzing emerging WMD threats, developing 

advanced concepts, and recommending appropriate technologies was the Advanced 

Systems and Concepts Office. From its inception in 1998, Dr. Davis wanted this 

office to lead the intellectual debate on WMD issues within the Department of 

Defense, and possibly within the federal government.171 Leading the scientific 

and technical debate, Dr. Hamre had insisted, was especially crucial in the areas 

of biological and chemical threat reduction.172 Within the agency, Davis wanted 

ASCO’s analysts to serve as the “honest brokers” on DTRA’s policy, operational, 

and research and development issues. Further, the office had specific responsibilities 

to provide support and advice to the agency’s senior advisory group, the Threat 

Reduction Advisory Committee. During 2000, the new ASCO office expanded 

from 9 to 25 personnel under the direction of Dr. Randall Murch. The following 

year, it grew to 33 scientists, analysts, and support staff, with Dr. Charles R. 

Gallaway assuming leadership in June 2001.173

In carrying out its work, ASCO followed the model of a strategic “think 

tank” or institute. It collected ideas and recommendations for WMD analytical 

projects from OSD agencies and offices, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, 

military services, and other federal agencies and departments. TRAC members 

also recommended study topics. DTRA directorates, especially Combat Support, 

Technology Development, and Chemical-Biological Defense, submitted ideas 

for new analytical projects. Within ASCO, all of these ideas, proposals, and 

recommendations were analyzed using a metric evaluation process. Once a project 

was defined, the study was conducted by a team drawn from ASCO, agency 

directorates, outside contractors, and other government organizations. When 

completed, the team presented their study, findings, and recommendations to the 
56 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

customer in the user community. The objective was to produce focused studies 

that could be applied directly to the needs of the commands, military services, 

agencies, offices, and directorates. In 2001, ASCO published major studies 

that examined the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (classified), Naval Seaport 

of Debarkation, Amphibious Operations and BW/CW Threats (classified), 

and Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Nuclear Preventive Threat 

Reduction.174

In addition, ASCO organized and conducted a series of workshops that 

examined a single issue by asking and answering analytical questions of experienced 

scientists, physicians, senior military officers, and technologists. In December 

2000, Dr. Davis and Dr. Murch sponsored a major interdisciplinary workshop 

on, “Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communications.”175 It explored 

the relationship in a WMD crisis between the public’s trust in its government, 

and the government’s ability to provide the public with accurate, concise 

information through the media. Another workshop, organized by Dr. Peter B. 

Merkle, ASCO’s scientific advisor, examined “Chemical-Biological Modeling 

and Simulation Future ‘Desirements’.”176 In this two-day workshop, technical 

experts and government leaders examined collectively the contemporary status 

of chemical-biological models and simulations and prospects for the future. 

Other analytical methods used by ASCO-led analysts were assessment studies, 

capabilities studies, operational assessments, and detailed, realistic, consequential 

scenarios of WMD events. In Davis’ opinion, these ASCO studies, workshops, 

assessments, and scenarios fulfilled one of the secretary of defense’s reasons for 

establishing the new agency: to understand better “how” to deal with the new 

and emerging WMD threats.177

From 2000 to 2001 the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee met in a 

plenary session three times to consider the findings of its five ad hoc panels: nuclear 

deterrence sustainment, biological defense, science and technology, integration, 

and intelligence. General Welch continued to serve as chairman. The advisory 

committee’s 25 members represented some of the United States’ leading scientists, 

engineers, military scholars, nuclear experts, national security policy analysts, and 

threat reduction experts. During the year, they worked in an advisory capacity 

on specific analytical problems in one of the five ad hoc panels. According to its 

federal charter, the purpose of the TRAC was to provide timely scientific, technical, 

and policy-related advice on specific issues relating to weapons of mass destruction 

to the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, under secretary of defense 

for acquisition, technology, and logistics, and the director of the agency.

When the TRAC met in plenary sessions, the committee members discussed 

the findings of the ad hoc panels and then developed a consensus on its 

recommendations to senior DoD officials. In 2000 and 2001, DTRA’s director 

requested that the Science and Technology Panel conduct a senior-level review of 

the agency’s research and development programs. In another effort, the TRAC 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 57

completed in June 2001 a joint study with the Defense Science Board, entitled 

“Biological Defense.” TRAC also addressed the reorganization of the DoD 

biological defense program at the request of the deputy secretary of defense.178

Strategic Plan 2001

I

n January 2001, the director, deputy director, senior agency managers, and 

staff office leaders participated in a three-day off-site conference. Dr. Davis 

wanted the participants to work on two issues: a process to select specific tasks 

for inclusion in the agency’s new strategic plan 2001, and an assessment of how the 

agency was being led in the estimation of its customers and employees.179 General 

Bongiovi and Colonel Faircloth led the effort that shaped the new strategic plan. 

Bongiovi insisted that it be expanded from previous plans to provide strategic 

guidance for the next five years, until 2006. He advocated making several major 

changes, including spelling out DTRA’s four mission essential functions—combat 

support, technology development, threat control, and threat reduction,—and 

identifying explicitly its four mission enabling functions - resource management, 

business management, knowledge management, and security and intelligence 

management. When published in March, DTRA’s Strategic Plan 2001 

incorporated all of these concepts, including values, as well as a new section 

on enabling the agency’s people through participation in education, training, 

and leadership development programs.180 Davis explained, “This document is 

the agency’s most important statement to both DTRA’s staff and our external 

constituencies.”181 

Leadership Changes and Institutional 

Challenges

When Dr. Davis left in June 2001, Major General Bongiovi became

the acting director. During the spring and summer months in the 

Defense Department, Bush administration officials were examining 

all of the defense agencies, their roles, missions, and budgets. At their initial 

meeting, Michael W. Wynne, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology, asked General Bongiovi “Now, tell me why you guys 

exist?”182 Immediately the general realized that this question would not be asked 

of the older, more established defense agencies, like the Defense Logistics Agency 

or the Defense Intelligence Agency. He recognized that he had to educate the 

department’s new leadership on DTRA, its nuclear support missions, the scope 
58 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

of its international programs, its counterterrorism and consequence management 

efforts, and its scientific and technological competency. “I spent most of my 

time [that summer],” Bongiovi recalled, “talking to Mr. Wynne, writing papers 

on the potential of the agency, what it does, and bringing him up to speed.”183

Another senior DoD official, Kenneth J. Krieg, director of programs, analysis, 

and evaluation, recalled that the agency was examined, but “on close look, all of 

the functions that DTRA executed needed to be done and as long as it performed 

its responsibilities well, it would remain.”184 By the end of the summer, Bongiovi 

said that Michael Wynne “became what I would call an advocate, as much as 

an advocate that I have seen on a lot of things for the agency.” He went on, “in 

September 2001 the world changed ... from that point on, it never became an 

issue of why DTRA existed.”185

There was one exception to this conclusion. Within DTRA, the leadership of 

the Technology Security directorate, formerly the Defense Technology Security 

Administration, had argued that their function did not belong in the agency. David 

Tarbell, the director, believed that the mission of developing and implementing 

department-wide policies on issuing export licenses for the international transfer 

of defense-related goods, services, technologies, and munitions, should be located 

an independent agency. Before the merger creating DTRA in 1998, the Defense 

Technology Security Administration had been an independent defense organization 

for seventeen years, 1981-1998. Consequently, Tarbell made a convincing case 

with Bush administration officials and the Congress for reinstating independent 

status in the summer month of 2001. On 31 August, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, signed a memorandum reestablishing the Defense Technology 

Security Administration and placed it in DoD’s Office of the Undersecretary for 

Policy.186 Wolfowitz selected Lisa Bronson, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Technology Security Policy and Counter-Proliferation, to serve concurrently as 

the Director, DTSA.187 The transfer of the missions, people and funds from DTRA 

to the reestablished administration followed over the next two years. This was 

the only mission which was transferred out of the agency; all the other missions, 

people, programs, projects, and funds remained active parts of DTRA.188

For General Bongiovi and the agency’s senior management most of the summer 

of 2001 was concerned with planning, coordinating, and preparing for yet another 

major reorganization. Once again, the general, who was regarded as an expert on 

restructuring organizations, led the effort. In many ways this restructuring was an 

extension of the organizational concepts which drove the major reorganization of 

the previous year.189 There were many small, specialized staff offices in the agency 

that were not part of this earlier reorganization. In June General Bongiovi asked 

Ann Bridges Steely, director of Acquisition Management, to lead a small team that 

would examine how best to incorporate all of the specialized staff offices into the 

existing enabling directorates.190 Steely’s team was given three objectives: reduce 

the senior management’s span of control, improve efficiency, and make better use 

of time and focus of the agency’s senior executives. The results, briefed to the 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 59

Dr. Stephen M. Younger becomes the second 

director of DTRA on September 1, 2001

acting director and board of advisors in late July, was to establish a single business 

organization, led by a Senior Executive Service manager who would be responsible 

for all enabling functions. On August 31, 2001, General Bongiovi announced the 

reorganization to all employees. Effective October 1, eight staff offices were abolished 

and incorporated into the directorates of Resource Management, Acquisition and 

Logistics, Information Management, and Security and Counterintelligence. Also, 

the Albuquerque Operations staff would be realigned. The Director’s Action Group 

was disestablished, and a new Director’s Staff Group set up to assist the director 

in strategic management. Finally, the general said that he was directing the leaders 

of the four enabling directorates to report to DTRA’s senior leadership within six 

months on the efficiencies, enhanced performance, and resource savings gained 

by the new alignment.191

On September 1, Dr. Stephen M. Younger became the second director of the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency.192 A theoretical physicist, educated at Catholic 

University and the University of Maryland, he had worked for the past decade at the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory. 193 As the senior associate laboratory director, he 

was responsible for assuring the safety, reliability, and performance of the majority 

of the weapons and materials in the nation’s nuclear arsenal. The directorate had 

more than 3,000 people and a annual budget of $1 billion. At Los Alamos, Younger 

had founded and directed the Center for International Security Affairs which had 

developed the first Department of Energy laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation 

program with nuclear weapons institutes in the Russian Federation. 

Three days after he arrived in Washington, the new director addressed DTRA’s 

annual conference, “The Evolution of Threat Reduction.” Younger spoke to 

more than 400 people at the opening session, outlining the agency’s mission and 

responsibilities. He declared that “we need to develop new means of detection, 

new means of protection, and new means of defense against nuclear, chemical, and 

biological threats.”194 No one knew it at the time, but the director’s call for new 

“means” of defense took on added significance just ten days later. 

September 11, 2001: Terrorists Attack the

United States

When terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners on September 11,

2001, and flew them into the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and a 

Pennsylvania field, they killed more than 2,900 innocent people. After 

that September morning, the United States had to acknowledge that it faced a new, 

larger, and more serious threat from terrorism than previously known. Then, just 

two weeks later, terrorists sent deadly anthrax spores enclosed in ordinary postal 

letters to citizens and public officials. These anthrax-laced letters unleashed the 
60 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

specter of bioterrorism across the United States. These two events forced everyone 

--the President, Congress, federal, state, and local officials, and the public -- to 

face the new reality: the United States was now vulnerable to terrorists attacking 

its citizens, cities, and institutions with weapons of mass destruction.

In a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush 

responded to the catastrophic attacks nine days earlier with a declaration of war 

on terrorism. The president vowed to use every resource at the government’s 

command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument 

of law enforcement, every financial pressure, and every necessary weapon of war 

-- to disrupt and defeat of the global terror network. He also called on the Afghan 

Taliban Regime to hand over the leaders of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization 

they were harboring on their soil and to allow the United States full access to the 

group’s training camps. The president left no doubt that the U.S. military forces 

stood ready to enforce his demands. To stress the global nature of America’s war 

on terror, he issued a stern warning to any nation that continued to harbor or 

support terrorism that the United States would regard it as a hostile regime.195
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 61
62 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Part Two:

DTRA Responds to the War Against Terrorism: 

At Home and Abroad

Dr. Stephen Younger’s agenda as the new director of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency reflected this dramatic change in America’s national 

security policy. At his first all-hands meeting with agency employees 

the same day the president delivered his address to Congress, he explained that 

his overarching goal was to make DTRA the one place to call for advice about 

weapons of mass destruction for the combatant commanders and the U.S. 

government. To achieve this, Younger wanted to continue the integration of the 

agency so that it functioned as one team, bringing together the skills of all of its 

members. In addition to improving the existing organizational structure, Younger 

also formulated a new series of objectives for increasing the agency’s technical 

competence. While he emphasized that DTRA would continue to be the nation’s 

center of scientific and technical excellence in nuclear weapons effects, he pointed 

out that the agency should enhance its expertise in chemical and biological weapons 

of mass destruction. Younger stated, “I believe chemical and biological weapons 

represent a clear and present danger to the United States and overseas. We have 

to develop new detectors, new protective measures and new measures to defeat the 

weapons.” Turning to the agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the 

director declared that “it’s hard to think of a defense dollar that is better spent.” 

As an effective means to reduce a potential adversary’s capabilities beyond arms 

control and threat reduction activities, the director called for the development of 

new tools to reduce the threat from terrorism. He explained that DTRA should 

strive to contribute to the government’s ability to understand what the threat 

was through the study of terrorists’ motivations. Dr. Younger acknowledged that 

accomplishing this task would require the agency’s employees “to think outside the 

box” and to work with anthropologists, sociologists, and economists, who studied 

why a terrorist did what he did and what he might do next.196

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government called 

on the agency to support responses at home and abroad. At home, DTRA assisted 

the newly established Office of Homeland Security in conducting vulnerability 

assessments of the White House, Capitol, Supreme Court, Justice Department, 

Reagan Building, and other important buildings. When the president announced 

his decision to go to war against the Taliban regime, the agency adjusted priorities 

and sent liaison officer teams to U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations 

Command, the Joint Staff, and the White House. At USCENTCOM headquarters 

in Florida, DTRA’s Liaison officers filled a critical void, especially in the field 

of planning aerial attacks against hard and deeply buried targets. “A principle 

challenge in Afghanistan was the mountainous terrain and the huge number of 

caves,” explained Douglas J. Bruder, then chief, Systems Application division, 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 63

Technology Development directorate, “that a lot of the Al Qaeda network and other 

people use as hideouts. We started with practically no understanding of the type 

of facilities that we would be dealing with there. I believe within either thirty or 

sixty days, we had a complete geology template of the entire country of Afghanistan 

[...] and we immediately started giving the warfighter an understanding of what 

type of facilities, what type of rock, how well our weapons would do against those 

types of facilities.”197

Consequently, when the United States launched Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime on October 7, 2001, DTRA’s 

liaison officers at USCENTCOM headquarters “quickly became intimately 

involved in targeting tunnels.” They provided attack recommendations for 

penetrating caves to the U.S. forces in the theater and fielded questions on how 

best to deploy the weapons. Eventually, this evolved into a twenty-four hour a day 

support effort at the command’s operations center in Florida.198 Simultaneously, at 

DTRA headquarters in Virginia scientists and weapons experts focused on how to 

improve existing weapon systems survivability and lethality against targets buried 

deep in the mountain tunnels. The goal was to research, design, test, and produce 

a weapon with a high strength warhead case that was compatible with existing 

guidance kits and had improved air-blast capabilities. To accomplish the task, the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency experts assembled a large team with Department 

of Defense membership and they accelerated development of the new weapon. 

Working under wartime pressures, they produced a thermobaric bomb that was 

specifically suited to fly at a horizontal profile into tunnel openings, detonate, and 

release energy over a longer period of time to create a long-duration pressure pulse. 

Within ninety days, the team tested a warhead with a thermobaric explosive in a 

tunnel at the Nevada Test Site, a Department of Energy facility located 60 miles 

from Las Vegas, Nevada. The test proved so successful that the U.S. Air Force 

completed verification and validation of technical data and operational flight 

clearances in record time to deploy the warheads to Afghanistan before the end 

of the year.199

With U.S. forces advancing and driving Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists 

out of their strongholds and hiding places, senior political and defense decision 

makers in the U.S. government became concerned whether the extremists had 

been successful in acquiring weapons of mass destruction or had such programs. 

In response, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) established and equipped a 

Chemical and Biological Intelligence Support Team (CBIST) staffed by technically 

qualified, all-source analysts. DTRA provided the experts in radiological and 

nuclear weapons effects areas. The CBIST teams deployed to Afghanistan to search 

caves and other suspected sites and collected chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) samples.  Combining on-site observations with Washington-based 

reach-back analysis through real-time video and on-line coordination, the team 

confirmed that Al Qaeda had pursued a sophisticated, albeit limited, biological 

warfare capability.200

 Douglas J. Bruder then Chief, Special 

 Applications division, Technology Development

 directorate
64 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

The nation was at war. Within the defense 

department, DTRA reported to the Assistant 

to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. 

Within a week of the 9/11 attacks, DTRA and 

the Defense Intelligence Agency expanded their 

collaboration and formed a unique partnership 

that improved both agencies’ ability to support the 

continuing military operations in Afghanistan. On 

December 11, DTRA created a unit dedicated to 

the development and integration of state-of-the-art 

knowledge, analyses, and data concerning Hard 

and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT) and Weapons 

of Mass Destruction target-defeat technologies 

for the combatant commands and intelligence 

community in the war on terrorism. DTRA’s Hard 

Target Research and Analysis Center (HTRAC) 

worked closely with many divisions in the agency’s 

Technology Development and Combat Support directorate to provide support 

for the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Underground Facility Analysis Center with 

research on hard and deeply buried targets, understanding of their vulnerabilities, 

three-dimensional models, and geological assessments.201

Technology Development in the Fight against 

Terrorism

Long before the terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11, the agency had 

been testing the effects of explosives on building structures and facilities. 

The tests were designed, organized, and conducted by DTRA personnel at 

the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Before 9/11, the tests determined 

what were the optimal structures, the strongest types of building materials, and the 

best design features for the building surviving the effects of a massive blast. After 

9/11, current research shifted to examining the best methods of designing and 

constructing buildings that would protect people from blast effects. Massive blasts, 

either from conventional explosions or nuclear or radiation explosions, created 

overpressures inside buildings where people could experience blunt trauma, lung 

damage, or ear drum damages. The new tests were designed to provide engineers 

and scientists with a better understanding of the mechanics of the impact on people 

working in open spaces, with cubicles and partitions. To measure the effects of 

mass, velocity, various type of debris, especially glass debris from windows, DTRA 

civil engineers used test dummies that were placed in office cubicles.202

 DTRA personnel performing assessment of Afghan tunnels.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 65

Closer to home, all of the significant structural data from the Divine Buffalo 

series would be incorporated into the design of the new, planned Defense Threat 

Reduction Center in Fort Belvoir. With this new structure, the agency planned 

to bring most of its employees that were scattered in different offices across the 

Washington DC region under one roof. Plans for DTRA’s new home envisioned 

it as an addition to the south end of the McNamara Headquarters Complex that 

housed the Defense Logistics Agency. Congress funded the new Defense Threat 

Reduction Center as a military construction project in the amount of $76.9 million. 

The U.S. Corps of Engineers, Baltimore District, was the design and construction 

agent. Completion of the center was expected for mid 2005.203

With operations in Afghanistan ongoing at the end of the year, DTRA’s 

Chemical-Biological Defense directorate announced it would serve as executing 

agent and manager of new technological security program, the Contamination 

Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation (CASPOD) project. A DoD Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) project, it sought to assure 

uninterrupted supply lines to the warfighter should there be a chemical/biological 

attack on seaports used by U.S. or allied forces. While most regional combatant 

commands had access to ports near U.S. installations that had a solid command and 

control infrastructure and experienced security and protective forces in place, the 

U.S. Central Command had to rely on foreign commercial seaports. During the 

CASPOD demonstration project department of defense acquisition and operations 

experts would evaluate port facilities’ vulnerabilities in the event of a chemical 

or biological attack and make recommendations about equipment, tactics and 

techniques, and force structure to prevent an interruption of its operations.204

By the beginning of the new year, the events of September 11, 2001 and the 

military response to them had resulted in a profound shift in U.S. national security 

strategy. President Bush outlined these profound changes in his 2002 State of the 

Union Address. He named Iraq as one of the most notorious sponsors of terrorism 

and committed the United States to a global war that would seek to destroy terrorist 

organizations and prevent regimes sponsoring them from threatening the United 

States and its allies with weapons of mass destruction.205 With 

this pronouncement, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 

mission of making the world safer by reducing the threat of 

WMD received increased attention. For DTRA that meant 

continuing to support the U.S. government and the combatant 

commands with innovative programs and accepting new 

responsibilities. One of those programs was the Combating 

Terrorism Technology Program that the agency designed in 

the aftermath of the terrorist bombing of the destroyer U.S.S. 

Cole in the Gulf of Aden, Yemen. Investigation of that attack 

revealed a need for techniques and protocols for gathering 

identifying, attributing and preserving evidence in maritime 

incidents involving hazardous materials. In the beginning of Divine Buffalo Test Series
66 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

February, DTRA conducted an Integrated Technology Demonstration as part of 

its combating terrorism program in Niceville, Florida in coordination with the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard. Beyond the 

forensic aspects, the technology demonstration in Florida had the objective to avoid 

command and control problems that had bogged down the response to the terrorist 

attacks on 9/11. During the simulated large-scale coastal hazardous material 

incident, local, state and federal emergency response agencies demonstrated their 

efficiency and cooperation.206

That same month, a DTRA team with members from the Technology 

Development, On-Site Inspection, and Combat Support directorates headed to 

Salt Lake City, DTRA to provide support to the organizers for the Olympic Winter 

Games. For the duration of the Games, from February 8-24, 2002, the teams on 

location were in constant communication with their colleagues in the operations 

center in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Two days before the opening ceremony, the DTRA 

reachback center began 24 hours a day/7 days a week support operations to the 

DTRA operations center and the Consequence Assessment Center (CAC) in 

Salt Lake City. The Olympic support included comprehensive hazard prediction 

modeling incorporating the most accurate models with current weather, urban 

terrain, and transport mechanism modeling. Additional DTRA personnel joined 

the team in Salt Lake City to provide NBC decontamination and detection in the 

event of a WMD incident.207

On the frontlines in Afghanistan meanwhile, the Taliban regime had lost its 

strongholds. U.S. and coalition forces pursued dispersed groups of Taliban and Al 

Qaeda fighters in the country’s rugged terrain along the border with Pakistan and 

in the north near its border with Uzbekistan. Experiences with fighting Taliban 

forces and terrorists who hid in caves and bunkers in the mountains convinced 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps that success against these natural and manmade 

fortifications required a warhead capable of producing higher sustained blast 

pressure in confined areas. Having secured funding for the development 

of an enhanced Hellfire air-to-ground missile warhead, the Marine Corps 

turned to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to lead a multi-service 

team of experts to develop and test the thermobaric Hellfire missile. Tests 

of the new warhead, designated AGM-114N Metal Augmented Charge 

(MAC) Hellfire Missile, soon proved that it provided enhanced lethality 

and increased the probability of hitting the target. The missile was also 

highly effective in aerial attacks against urban multi-story buildings, 

fortified bunkers, ships, and lightly-armored vehicles. The Navy’s 

Command Operational Test and Evaluation Force, Norfolk, Virginia, 

conducted flight tests and provided a quick reaction assessment to support 

the early fielding decision in 2003. Tests continued and concluded in 

September 2005, when the AGM-114N Hellfire missile warhead went 

into full scale production at Lockheed Martin. Looking back on that 

project, Douglas Bruder commented, “We really made our mark in the U.S. Marine Super Cobra fires a Hellfire Missile.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 67

Commander Chris Bidwell, USN, DTRA’s first 

U.S. Central Command Liasion Officer

ability to assemble teams across the Services and the agencies and go at a very 

rapid rate from concept to R&D testing, modeling, and field testing and then 

getting it into the inventory.”208

Augmenting Liaison Officer Programs to the 

Combatant Commands

I

n addition to customizing the military’s arsenal with the most effective 

weapons for the battlegrounds, DTRA increased the size of its liaison officer 

(LNO) program manifold. Before the beginning of the war in October 

2001, the agency only had two liaison officers serving the U.S. European 

Command and the U.S. Strategic Command. By May 2002, DTRA had 

permanent liaison teams assigned to the Pentagon, the U.S. Central Command, 

the U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, 

the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command. For the 

summer and fall months, the agency expected to send more teams to serve the 

National Guard Bureau, the Homeland Security Office, and the U.S. Northern 

Command. Commander Christopher A. Bidwell, USN, DTRA’s first liaison 

officer to USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, and USSOUTHCOM, explained 

his main responsibility was “to communicate what DTRA was doing to the 

various combatant commands, pick up on what those combatant commands 

needed from DTRA, and basically keep a conversation going.” He stressed 

that the agency’s liaison officer program enjoyed a good reputation with 

combatant commanders in large part because “DTRA and the director, Dr. 

Younger, made a conscious decision that the LNOs would report directly to 

him on a regular basis.”209

Although DTRA assigned its first permanent liaison officer position with 

U.S. Special Operations Command in May, it already had been cooperating 

closely with the command for the past three years. In 1995, the secretary 

of defense assigned the task of countering the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction to the U.S. Special Operations Command. Soon after its 

founding, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency assumed responsibility for 

management oversight of all of the USSOCOM counterproliferation research 

and development programs. In 2000, the agency took steps to improve its 

support for the command and established a Special Operations Forces branch 

within the Technology Development directorate. The new branch enhanced the 

technical base of counterproliferation programs through an Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration for near-term capabilities and far-term needs. In 

late spring 2002, the branch’s budget was $20 million and the technologies it 

developed and demonstrated enabled special operations forces to better detect, 
68 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

disable, neutralize and render safe weapons of mass destruction. Its goal for the following years 

was to provide improved technologies that would allow special operations forces to identify 

and characterize an adversary’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means 

of delivery. The potential targets included fixed, above ground and underground, hardened 

and unhardened facilities, as well as transportation and delivery systems. Douglas Bruder 

commented that DTRA’s efforts in this area had been strongly recognized, “The research we 

provide Special Operations has gone right into the field and is being used today.”210

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, DTRA’s routine exercises dealing 

with security and safety of U.S. military resources and nuclear weapon accident consequence 

management took on new meaning. Shortly after the first anniversary of terrorist attacks, from 

September 26 to October 8, 2002, the Combat Support directorate led a security response 

force exercise in coordination with the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army and the Air Force 

at the Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. Codenamed Mighty Guardian V, it was 

the fifth in a series of exercises, which began in the mid-1990s, designed to test security 

forces. This exercise had been scheduled for some time and was the result of sixteen months 

of preparations. DTRA funded the exercise and the Commander Naval Submarine Forces 

- Atlantic was the operational sponsor. The exercise occurred on the Naval Submarine Base 

and in the waterways adjacent to the facility. Previous exercises had taken place at Air Force 

and Army installations. This exercise was part of the department of defense’s comprehensive 

security force exercises. It evaluated DoD, service and combatant command nuclear weapon 

security policies, standards and equipment on a U.S. coastal installation with the purpose to 

assess and strengthen procedures that could be used in other locations.211

The following month, from October 22 until 25, the agency sponsored a nuclear weapon 

accident response field training exercise in Wyoming Army National Guard Camp Guernsey 

and F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and U.S. Air Force Space Command 

in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The full scale exercise was the culmination of seventeen months 

of planning according to a building block approach. In May 2001, a mobile orientation 

team reviewed policy and procedures, followed by a seminar and mini exercise in November, 

when participants received in-depth training of policy and 

procedures. In April 2002, DTRA’s battle staff and on 

scene command and control units engaged in a computer 

assisted table top exercise. In October, the on site exercise, 

Diligent Warrior 03, involved military, federal, state and 

local response agencies throughout the U.S. with the defense 

department as lead federal agency. It was designed to test 

and validate nuclear weapon accident response procedures. 

The exercise scenario, conducted at the 90th Space Wing at 

F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, was a simulated 

collision on major highway of an Air Force truck convoy 

carrying a replacement weapon with a fuel truck loaded 

with 5,000 gallons of gasoline. Even though both vehicles 

burst into flames, the weapon did not release any radiation. 

The 90th Space Wing’s Disaster Control Group provided Crew members exstinguish the fuel truck fire during the nuclear weapons accident 

response field training exercise Diligent Warrior 03.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 69

initial command and control of the accident scene. Later, an Air Force Response 

Task Force arrived from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia and took charge of the 

federal response. A number of Washington D.C.-based Crisis Action Teams 

also participated in the exercise from their command centers in the National 

Capital Region. In addition to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, these 

crisis teams were from the National Military Command Center’s Joint Nuclear 

Accident/Incident Response Team, the operations centers at Headquarters U. S. 

Air Force, Department of Energy, and Department of Justice. Diligent Warrior 

03 was the first exercise that involved an intercontinental ballistic missile unit and 

it was the first nuclear weapon accident response exercise in which participating 

personnel and equipment deployed in near real time from home stations all over 

the country, departing at approximately the times they would do so following 

an actual incident. In spite of bad weather conditions, including snow and 

ice, participants demonstrated the ability to integrate civilian and military first 

responders, specially designated command and control elements, and specialized 

technical teams to manage the complex response effectively.212

As the year wound down, Major General Robert J. Bongiovi, USAF, DTRA’s 

deputy director, retired in the beginning of December 2002. Bongiovi had 

served as acting director from May to September 2001, and as deputy director 

for two and a half years. During that time, the general worked with the director 

in restructuring the constituent organizations into four new mission areas: 

combat support to the combatant commanders; technology development; threat 

control; and threat reduction. Bongiovi and the senior directors travelled to the 

headquarters of every combatant commanders, briefing DTRA’s capabilities, and 

developing a coordinated list of priority programs for that commander. When 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff required DTRA to return 300 military positions to the 

military services, General Bongiovi agreed, working out a deal to convert the 

billets to civilian positions, with the military services paying civilian salaries and 

benefits for three years.213
70 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Amidst International Terrorist Threats: New 

Arms Control Treaties

While several of DTRA’s directorates were actively supporting the 

nation’s war on terrorism, inspectors, escorts, and interpreters from 

the On-Site Inspection directorate began implementing a new treaty 

designed to maintain and strengthen peaceful relations between former Cold War 

enemies. Originally signed in 1992 in Helsinki, the Open Skies Treaty between 27 

member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former 

Warsaw Pact, plus Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, went into effect on January 

1, 2002. The treaty promoted openness and transparency in military activities 

through reciprocal, unarmed observation flights. In the treaty, each nation had 

the right to equip its designated and certified aircraft with optical, panoramic 

and framing video cameras, heat-imaging infrared line-scanning devices and 

sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar. All photos and images taken during 

the observation flights would be shared, upon request, with all other signatory 

states. For the United States’ Open Skies missions, the U.S. Air Force outfitted 

two OC-135B aerial reconnaissance aircraft. With a flight crew of 36, including 

a small DTRA team of treaty officers and language experts, the U.S. Open Skies 

aircraft flew in more than 100 joint training missions before the treaty entered 

into force in 2002.214 The U.S. was one of the leading nations in negotiating, 

signing, and ratifying this treaty; it organized, financed, and tested the treaty’s 

protocols and procedures during the extensive series of joint training missions. 

Now it led all other nations in implementing the new treaty. From January 2002 

to December 2003, U.S. Open Skies aircraft and inspection teams flew eight 

observation missions over Belarus and the Russian Federation states. Russian 

observation flights over the United States commenced in June 2004. DTRA 

Open Skies Treaty teams, including the U.S. treaty 

manager, flew on every Russian observation flight. By 

2006, the United States had increased its number of 

flights over Russia and Belarus to eleven, and most of 

these observation flights included treaty officers from 

other nations’ observation teams.215

At the turn of the century, the United States 

and other nations were reducing, in accordance 

with international treaty obligations, their nuclear, 

chemical, and conventional weapons amassed during 

the Cold War. Separate international arms control 

treaties for each type of weapon system established 

deadlines for eliminating the specific types and 

numbers of weapons, outlined requirements for data 

exchanges on weapon locations and movements, OC-135B Aerial Reconnaissance Aircraft
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 71

and established protocols for monitoring treaty 

compliance through use of approved technologies 

and on-site inspections. After 2001, DTRA’s 

On-Site Inspection directorate organized, trained, 

equipped, and deployed inspection, escort, or 

observation teams under the START, Open 

Skies, CWC, and CFE treaties, and the Vienna 

Document of 1999. Under U.S. legislation which 

implemented the United Nation’s Chemical 

Weapons Convention (CWC), DTRA established 

and trained escort teams, knowledgeable in all 

aspects of the complex treaty. Their mission was 

to accompany Organization for the Prohibition 

of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspection teams 

to DoD chemical weapons depots and sites and 

ensure that U.S. treaty rights were protected. 

When it ratified the United Nation’s CWC 

Treaty in 1997, the U.S. Senate declared that 

the nation had nine chemical weapons depots, 

holding approximately 28,000 tons of chemical weapons and agents.216 The 

U.S. Army was the lead agency for CW destruction. The first destruction site, 

Johnson Atoll in the Pacific, completed the elimination of 13,000 land mines 

filled with chemical munitions in November 2000.217 DTRA’s CWC escort 

teams accompanied OPCW inspection teams to the remote Pacific island as 

they confirmed destruction. In 1996, the U.S. Army began operating a chemical 

demilitarization plant at Tooele, Utah. Whenever OPCW inspectors went to 

Tooele to observe and monitor the incineration process for destroying weapons 

filled with sarin, the agency’s detachment provided escort and logistics support. 

Under the treaty, OPCW inspectors had the right to go to U.S. chemical plants 

and facilities for special inspections. DTRA’s treaty experts worked closely with 

the officials at the Department of Commerce to develop treaty information 

manuals, training programs, and a series of training inspections at American 

chemical plants and facilities.218 In December 2002, the United States announced 

to the OPCW that it had destroyed 20 per cent of its category 1 CW stockpile, 

a percentage which exceeded any other nation. This record meant that the U.S. 

had been inspected far more times than any other nation, including Russia, which 

had the world’s largest CW stockpile of 40,000 metric tons.219

The original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) reached a milestone 

in December 2001 when all five signatory states – United States, Russia, Ukraine, 

Kazakhstan, and Belarus, declared that the levels of their nuclear warheads were 

below the required treaty limits. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were nuclear 

free, having concluded diplomatic agreements with the Russian Federation 

that transported their nuclear warheads to Russia for reprocessing in return 

for compensation. From START I’s entry into force in December 1994 to 

Chemical Demilitarization Plant at Tooele, Utah
72 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

December 2001, Russia had reduced its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 

bombers from1,956 to 1,136, far below the treaty-required level of 1,500 deployed 

weapons. Russia’s strategic warheads decreased from 9,568 to 5,518, a level below 

the treaty-required number of 6,000 warheads. The United States nuclear forces 

and warheads underwent a similar reduction: its ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic 

bombers fell from 1,838 in 1994 to 1,238 in 2001; while its warheads dropped 

from 8,824 to 5,949.220 Under START I, DTRA’s inspection teams participated in 

twelve types of on-site inspections, including continuous monitoring, eliminations, 

data updates, suspect sites, and reentry vehicle inspections. DTRA’s escort teams 

accompanied Russian inspection teams whenever they came to United States to 

conduct START inspections at American military bases and facilities. When the 

five states reached or exceeded the mandatory reduction deadline in December 

2001, it did not mean an end for START I. Under Secretary of State John Bolton 

explained that the United States and Russia held firm views that “we will keep 

the START I inspection verification and compliance mechanisms in place for the 

remaining life of the treaty.”221 The Russian government agreed. These decisions 

meant that all of the complex data requirements, inspections of weapons systems 

eliminations, missile assembly production plants, and new types of strategic 

weapons would continue. In fact, all of the multiple types of treaty inspections 

continued. At the same time, diplomatic negotiations were underway for a new 

U.S.-Russia strategic arms reduction treaty. 

On May 24, 2002, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. 

Putin signed the new treaty, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 

in Moscow.222 The two nations agreed to reduce their operationally deployed 

strategic warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over ten years, following 

ratification. The two sides further agreed that START I’s verification measures 

would remain in force until 2009. At the same time, they established a Bilateral 

Implementation Commission to negotiate and agree on measures to implement 

and verify the new treaty. This was an unprecedented development, since all 

existing arms control treaties had included these major provisions as part of the 

basic treaty. Also, the new treaty did not require the elimination of any strategic 

missiles, submarines, or bombers. The U.S. Senate ratified SORT in March 

2003, the Russian Duma approved it in May, and the two presidents exchanged 

the instruments of ratification in St. Petersburg on June 1.223 At DTRA, treaty 

managers and planners waited in vain for the bilateral commission to negotiate 

verification measures for the new treaty. The commission met infrequently, made 

little progress, and lost momentum quickly. Nevertheless, all of the START 

I verification measures continued in force – the unencumbered right to use 

national technical means, regular notifications of weapon numbers, locations, 

and movements, data updates, cooperative measures, and continuous portal 

monitoring of missile assembly facilities. Since both nations continued to reduce 

their strategic forces gradually, START’s system of verification remained in place 

and functioning. As a direct consequence, DTRA’s START inspection and escort 

teams continued to carry out their missions.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 73

 Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., (USAF, ret.) and Senator

 Richard Lugar

Expanding Cooperative Threat 

Reduction with Russia

I

f there was momentum in reducing strategic nuclear forces and 

weapons, it was through U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction 

programs being carried out with the Russian Ministry of 

Defense. Within the Defense Department, DTRA managed 

and implemented the large-scale, multi-year, multi-billion dollar 

CTR program. Throughout the 1990s, CTR security assistance 

programs and projects had aided the governments of Ukraine and 

Kazakhstan, and to a lesser degree, Belarus, in decommissioning, 

dismantling, and eliminating their strategic nuclear weapons and 

ICBM launchers, operational facilities, toxic missile fuels, and even 

sealing underground nuclear testing tunnels.224 Engagement with 

the Russian government on CTR assistance programs increased 

substantially after 1997-1998. Marshall Igor Sergeev, Minister 

of Defense (1997-2001), directed a major force modernization to 

develop and deploy new strategic missiles and nuclear submarines. At 

the same time, he ordered a sweeping reduction in Russia’s strategic 

offensive missile systems and ballistic missile submarines in order to meet START 

I Treaty deadlines, and he directed major improvements in the control, safety, and 

security of warheads and materials at MOD’s nuclear weapons storage sites.225 DoD 

CTR policy and programs managers worked closely with Russian general officers 

and civilians to devise dozens of strategic offensive arms elimination projects that 

assisted the government in meeting its treaty deadlines and in improving security 

systems for the transportation and storage of the nuclear warheads. U.S. Air Force 

Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., (retired) and U.S. Air Force Colonel 

James Reid, led the agency’s Cooperative Threat directorate. They traveled to Russia 

frequently, accompanied by program managers and translators, meeting with senior 

Russian ministry officials, negotiating new projects, reviewing existing ones, and 

identifying difficulties. Suddenly in August 1998, the Russian ruble collapsed, 

causing financial panic and government retrenchment. The government had no 

money for reducing or securing its nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration 

and Congress, led by Senator Richard Lugar, responded to Russia’s financial crisis 

by expanding all of its cooperative threat reduction assistance programs, especially 

in the area of nuclear security.226

Over the next few years CTR program managers, working with their Russian 

counterparts, defined, funded, and implemented a series of new projects to 

dismantle and eliminate Russian ballistic missile submarines and their missiles at 

four Russian Navy shipyards: Zvezdochka, Zvezda, Sevmash, and Nerpa. Working 

under fixed-price direct contacts these Russian shipyards dismantled 407 SLBM 
74 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

launchers and 27 SSBN submarines by October 2003.227 CTR projects with 

Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces included dismantling SS-18, SS-17, SS-19, 

SS-24, SS-N-20, and SS-25 ICBM missiles and strategic missile fixed silos, rail 

launcher cars, and road-mobile launcher vehicles, as well as associated military 

facilities. Since these strategic missiles contained highly toxic liquid fuels, CTR 

managers worked with Russian experts to develop a major project to design, 

construct, and operate a liquid propellant disposal plant at Krasnoyarsk and a 

solid rocket motor disposal facility at Votkinsk. To accelerate the elimination 

of SS-18 missiles, the CTR program funded the renovation, equipping, and 

operation of a dismantlement facility at Survotika. Working with Russian 

missile experts, CTR program managers renovated and equipped a SS-17 and 

SS-19 dismantlement facility at Piban’shur.228 The range and scope of these 

strategic offensive arms elimination projects with Russia, which were managed 

by DTRA’s CTR program officers and their contractors, exceeded all previous 

work undertaken in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. By 2002 Congress had 

appropriated $1,068 million for these cooperative security assistance programs 

in Russia.229 The CTR program was involved with virtually every aspect of the 

Russian Ministry of Defense’s program for reducing its obsolete strategic nuclear 

forces. With U.S. assistance, CTR officials estimated that the Russian government 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 75

had dismantled over 5,800 strategic nuclear warheads from 1994-2002. The CTR 

“Scoreboard Chart” indicates the number and type of weapons system reduced 

in the program’s first decade.

All of these reductions meant that the Russian Ministry of Defense had to 

transport its excess nuclear warheads from operational military sites to central 

storage depots. The General Staff’s 12th Main Directorate was responsible for 

transporting, via the Russian rail system, thousands of nuclear warheads annually 

from operational sites to nuclear weapons storage depots. At the same time, 

the 12th Main Directorate had to transport older nuclear warheads and nuclear 

materials to a permanent national storage site at Mayak, or to one of the nation’s 

uranium reprocessing plants. In the mid-1990s, U.S. and Russian general officers 

had developed several transportation security assistance programs under the CTR 

program that provided 150 new supercontainers, emergency support equipment, 

and computer-assisted information systems to assist the 12th Main Directorate. 

Now, they initiated and funded new programs to retrofit up to 115 special 

military railcars transporting the weapons, to purchase and install heating units 

and security upgrades in all of the cars, and finally to finance replacement of older 

cars with newly built ones.230 Next, U.S. officials proposed to finance the cost 

of moving the special military trains over the Russian rail system. In 2003, the 

CTR program funded the movement of 66 military trains transporting nuclear 

weapons; in subsequent years, the shipments increased to 70-72 trains annually. 

Many of these special trains transported the weapons from the missile fields or 

submarine bases to the MOD nuclear weapons storage sites.231

As they developed projects for the Russian MOD’s nuclear weapons storage 

sites, DTRA’s CTR program managers and 12th Main Directorate general officers 

worked closely to define requirements for equipment and systems that would 

improve material protection, accounting, controls, security, and safety at the sites. 

Bill Moon, DTRA’s manager for nuclear weapons security, advocated a “quick 

fix” program to acquire and install new razor fencing, new sensors and alarms, 

and modern microwave systems at 50 sites.232 When General Igor Valynkin, 

12th Main Directorate, agreed, work began in 1998 to acquire the new materials 

and begin installation. Following Russia’s financial crisis in August of the same 

year, installation work financed by the Russian government slowed dramatically. 

The project was delayed when General Valynkin denied U.S. officials, who were 

seeking to estimate requirements for issuing installation contracts, access to the 

nuclear storage areas. The Bush administration’s decision not to certify Russian 

compliance in 2002, delayed project completion even further.233 Work resumed 

in 2003 and continued at a steady pace for the next several years. By that time, 

the Russian General Staff had moved to consolidate its warheads and materials 

in storage into larger, and fewer, national nuclear weapons storage sites. 

Russia’s largest permanent storage site, the Fissile Material Storage Facility 

(FMSF) was controlled by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). As early as 
76 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

1992, U.S. officials had agreed to a Russian government request that it finance the 

design, construction and equipping of a new modern, secure, and environmentally 

safe nuclear weapons storage facility. The Minister of Atomic Energy determined, 

after some indecision, to locate the facility at Mayak, a restricted industrial complex 

with 20,000 workers and existing nuclear weapons production and reprocessing 

plants in the southern Urals. Initially, defense department CTR and Minatom 

technical experts worked cooperatively to design fissile material containers for 

transporting highly-enriched uranium and plutonium from MOD and Navy 

storage sites to the new Mayak facility. U.S. CTR program managers funded a $69 

million project to manufacture and deliver to Russia 26,456 containers.234 The 

Mayak facility was designed to store 400 metric tons of uranium and plutonium 

for at least 100 years. Construction of the facility was held up for many months 

over a protracted series of bureaucratic misunderstandings. Once construction 

began, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Department of Defense 

managers developed a contentious relationship. After many years, on December 

11, 2003 Thomas Rutherford, DTRA’s CTR program manager, completed details 

for turning over the $309 million fissile material storage facility, capable of storing 

25,300 fissile materials containers. The same day Russian officials commissioned 

the new facility, pledging they would operate and maintain it. The Ministry of 

Atomic Energy, however, gave the United States government no assurances that 

it would store any fissile materials there.235

The CTR program experienced two major failures in 2002 and 2003. First, 

the Russian Aviation and Space Agency notified DTRA’s CTR program manager in 

January 2002 that approximately 30,000 tons of excess liquid propellant, amassed 

from the defueled strategic missiles would not be available for reprocessing at the 

new American financed, designed, and constructed Liquid Propellant Disposal 

Facility at Krasnoyarsk. Instead, all of the rocket fuel had been appropriated for 

use in the Russian space program. Since the CTR program had spent $95.5 million 

to design and construct the new facility, DoD’s IG and Congress regarded it as 

a failure.236 Next in January 2003, the Russian government halted construction 

of the CTR funded Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility at Votkinsk, citing 

local political, environmental, and land allocation issues. In view of the fact that 

the program had spent $99.7 million designing and constructing the facility, 

senior defense and congressional officials directed that DTRA managers cancel 

the program.237 As the Defense Department’s senior leadership focused on the 

war in Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003, DTRA’s CTR director retired. In 

January 2004, Rear Admiral John T. Byrd, (U.S. Navy, retired) was appointed 

to lead the CTR directorate. An experienced program manager, Admiral Byrd 

expanded a new managerial development process known as integrated process 

teams. Byrd met with Russian project and ministry managers; insisting on better 

information, better project management, and greater integrity in the conduct of 

Rear Admiral John T. Byrd (USN, ret.), all cooperative assistance projects in the future. 

Director, CTR directorate
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 77

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

DTRA’s support to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003-2004 is a 

cautionary tale, one demonstrating significant initiative, commitment, 

training, deployment, direct combat experience, disappointment, and 

in the end, institutional controversy. Less than two months after the September 

11 attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld directed General Tommy 

Franks, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command in Florida, to update 

the command’s existing plans for military operations in Iraq. General Franks 

responded within a month, presenting his “Commander’s Concept” which 

outlined a large American-led coalition force that would invade Iraq and achieve 

three strategic objectives: defeat the Iraqi army and nation, change the regime of 

Saddam Hussein, and locate, secure, and remove the weapons of mass destruction. 

The general’s concept eventually became the basis for Operations Plan 1003 Victor, 

codenamed Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.238

Subsequently in the spring and summer months of 2002 when General Franks’ 

campaign planners began examining all aspects of the war plan for Iraq, they 

discovered that there were no provisions for disarming the WMD sites. As the 

defense agency responsible for the WMD mission, DTRA analysts had arrived 

at the same conclusion. Anticipating USCENTCOM’s requirement for WMD 

combat support, they held discussions with National Defense University’s military 

experts on existing concepts for exploiting WMD facilities. They hosted former 

UNSCOM inspectors at Fort Belvoir to talk about previous WMD inspection 

and elimination operations in Iraq. They traveled to Florida and briefed 

USCENTCOM planners on DTRA’s capabilities. Analysts and contractors in 

the agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO), Stephen S. Black, 

Timothy V. McCarthy, Scott Levac, Lieutenant Colonel Mark B. Kane, USMC, 

along with planners from the Combat Support directorate, began assessing what 

the presence of weapons of mass destruction would mean for the invading forces. 

In mid-September they presented their “Concept for NBC/M Elimination and 

Site Exploitation” to the director. In it, the analysts assumed that the invasion of 

Iraq would create a requirement for the elimination of nuclear-biological-chemical 

weapons and their means of delivery. To accomplish the task, ASCO planners 

suggested that DTRA establish and deploy an Exploitation/Elimination Task 

Force with a headquarters directly reporting to U.S. Central Command (forward) 

and with several Exploitation/Destruction Teams targeting the different WMD 

programs. 239

Dr. Younger approved the concept and sent a group of planners to U.S. 

Central Command headquarters. When the DTRA officers arrived in Florida, 

they initially received a cool reception, however, as Younger recalled, that changed 

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
78 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

when USCENTCOM planners learned that the agency’s experts were prepared 

to write the WMD portion of the 1003 Victor War Plan. Once DTRA’s people 

were “inside the tent,” Younger explained, USCENTCOM welcomed the agency’s 

offer to organize, train, and equip Site Exploitation Teams, Direct Support Teams, 

Consequence Management Assessment Teams, Liaison Officers (LNOs), and 

Targeting Support Teams for inclusion in the war plan.240 By October planning 

efforts at DTRA’s On-Site Inspection Directorate had kicked into a higher gear. 

One of its most experienced inspectors, Colonel Robert Smith, USAF, led the 

planning effort. His team included Lieutenant Colonel John P. Connell, USA, 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Slifka, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonels Keith 

Harrington and Michael Urban, USA. They began by prioritizing requirements 

including personnel recruitment, administration, access to intelligence on suspect 

sites, training programs, operational planning, and procurement of equipment 

stateside and in country. As a result, the planning staff grew rapidly with the 

addition of personnel, intelligence, operations, planning, and logistics officers, and 

experts on dealing with WMD from the OS Directorate’s START/Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Divisions. Together, with assistance from the Operations 

Support division, they formed a training cell and began crafting a training program 

for Site Exploitation teams, soon to be renamed Site Assessment Teams (SAT). 

Training began at the end of October. 241

Site Assessment Training 

The officers planning the Site Assessment Teams were experienced fieldgrade military officers; they followed basic U.S. Army methodology, publishing 

a mission essential task list (METL), along with a supporting training program 

by mid-October. Everyone knew that this war mission was highly unusual for a 

defense agency; but USCENTCOM war planners had endorsed the effort, the 

agency’s director had authorized it, and the OS planners had a legacy of planning 

and implementing complex on-site inspection for strategic and conventional 

arms control treaties in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. As 

they proceeded, the group settled on a basic mission statement. The site 

assessment team’s mission was to “triage” suspect chemical, biological, 

or nuclear WMD sites in Iraq during and after combat operations, so 

that other experts could be called in to assess and recommend specific 

measures to secure and dispose of them. The teams would operate in a 

tactical environment, establish and maintain communications, conduct 

site assessments, and conduct logistical operations.242

Dr. Younger agreed to train and equip Direct Support Teams, 

Consequence Management Advisory Teams, Liaison Officers, Targeting 

Site Assessment Team Training Support Teams, and four Site Assessment Teams for deployment to 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 79
80 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Task Force DTRA’s Support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 81

Iraq. In addition, he directed that up to sixty individuals be trained for 

possible assignment to future SATs. The agency trained the original 52 SAT 

inspectors and staff elements from October to December 2002. The training 

program consisted of numerous elements: individual readiness training, special 

team needs, site assessment techniques, detection equipment operations, and 

individual training. While all teams and staff received training in use of all 

electronics, different team members were given training in skills needed in a 

combat zone – so that all teams would have at least one combat lifesaver and one 

member with advanced instruction in operating communications equipment or 

in using global positioning systems for navigation. In addition, USCENTCOM 

mandated pre-deployment training that included classes on recognition of 

explosive mines, Iraqi cultural awareness, and individual weapons qualification 

training. The Site Assessment Team members assumed that they would be 

entering the war zone, if there was to be one, right behind the combat units, 

and inspect any and all sites suspected of containing WMD. Since the invasion 

of Iraq was predicated on locating and seizing Saddam Hussein’s hidden caches 

of weapons, they prepared to find them.243

Out on a Limb

Douglas Englund, OS director, faced a dilemma. Dr. Younger had authorized 

the planning, manning, equipping, and training to move forward. Who would 

pay for it? On October 28, SAT logistics personnel presented Englund with their 

cost estimates. They assumed that the agency would have to fund significant 

equipment purchases and training program costs, but that USCENTCOM would 

provide life support, maintenance, mess and medical support. Further, they 

assumed that with proper authorization, the agency would be able to submit a 

“Department of the Army Master Priority List” requisition for vehicles, radios, 

weapons, and military protective gear. In the end, they estimated that the OS 

directorate’s total cost, including purchasing special and unit military equipment, 

would exceed $4 million. Englund was fully aware that the directorate might 

have “to eat the cost” if USCENTCOM decided not to deploy any of DTRA’s 

site assessment teams, nevertheless he approved using $2 million to purchase 

the equipment. Meanwhile, a DTRA liaison officer briefed General Franks on 

the status of DTRA’s effort to organize, select, train, and equip the WMD site 

assessment teams.244 

With the necessary funding approved, OS logistics planners now estimated 

that they would spend more than $2 million dollars to equip the first four site 

assessment teams and, if necessary, nearly $6 million dollars to equip ten teams 

with the top twelve “big ticket items.” Since DTRA was a DoD agency and 

not a unit of one of the military services, it had to procure not only specialized 

protective, measuring, and detecting gear, but also military equipment such as 

Douglas Englund, Director, On-Site Inspection 

directorate
82 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

tactical radios, weapons, and tents. The costs for AN/PRC-117 F multi-band 

tactical radios, INMARSAT mobile satellite communications devices, and AN/

PRC-148 tactical hand held radios accounted for nearly half of the equipment 

budget. Also each team was provided with two sets of highly specialized NBC 

detection equipment so that they had a spare if one set broke. 

In the fall 2002 Saddam Hussein relented, granting UN Inspectors access 

to Iraqi sites. In early December they arrived in Baghdad to resume where their 

predecessors had left off nearly five years earlier. One week later, the Iraqi regime 

complied with another provision of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and 

delivered a 12,000 page report on its WMD capabilities. While the diplomats 

and analysts at the United Nations began examining the documents, planning 

at USCENTCOM and DTRA matured for dealing with all aspects of WMD 

in Iraq. The Combat Support Directorate completed and published DTRA’s 

Support Plan for the command and briefed it to General Franks. A working 

group of action officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, USCENTCOM, DIA, DTRA, Army, and National Defense University, 

solved another piece to the puzzle: how to deal with WMD on the battlefield? 

This group developed a concept of an “Exploitation Task Force” (XTF) that 

integrated subject matter experts, specialized intelligence collection teams, and 

WMD specialists into a military unit designed to secure WMD munitions and 

disable their production facilities. When USCENTCOM senior planning and 

operational officers agreed with the concept, General Franks ordered the task force’s 

integration in late December into the command’s final deployment roster.245

In the Army Now: Forming the Exploitation Task 

Force (XTF)

General Franks’ decision set in motion intense preparations for the 

establishment of the task force. The U.S. Army directed the 75th Field Artillery 

Brigade Headquarters in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to reconfigure and provide 

command, control and support for WMD assessment and elimination operations 

in Iraq. Not only was the brigade included in USCENTCOM’s deployment 

schedule, but its headquarters was uniquely able to provide experienced battle 

space management capabilities and coordination other elements on the battlefield. 

Upon receiving orders, Colonel Richard R. McPhee, brigade commander, initiated 

a planning and equipping effort that transformed the 75th Field Artillery Brigade 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, with 200 soldiers into a ready-todeploy 75th Exploitation Task Force in a little more than a month.246 By the third 

week of January plans for the Army’s XTF had matured and Colonel McPhee 

invited members of all component organizations to a planning conference at 

Fort Sill. There, DTRA’s Site Assessment Teams learned how they would fit into 

the Army’s new task force. To begin with, some expected that each DTRA Site 

 An INMARSAT mobile satellite communications 

 device
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 83

Assessment Team would form the nucleus for a much larger brigade site survey 

team. In addition to the DTRA inspectors who provided WMD expertise, the 

Site Survey Teams would include a commanding officer and non-commissioned 

officers, drivers, security personnel, medics, and soldiers trained in explosive 

ordnance disposal, operators of tactical satellite communications, and, preferably, 

an Arabic linguist247 – eighteen members in all. Colonel McPhee envisioned 

that the 75th Exploitation Task Force would field five Site Survey Teams, and 

three Mobile Exploitation Teams. These latter teams, known as METs, included 

DTRA specialists with experience in dismantling weapons systems and inspecting 

storage facilities, along with experts from the DIA’s Chemical, Biological, and 

Intelligence Support Team (CBIST) and specialists from the Army’s Technical 

Escort Unit.248

Colonel Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Connell and the key planners at DTRA 

had developed a set of inspection procedures to be followed by teams in theater. 

Once deployed in the theater of operations, the Site Survey Teams would rely on 

the OS-developed SAT Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for conducting 

the operational missions. The TTP recapped the Site Survey Teams’ mission to 

triage the suspected WMD sites:

Site Assessment Team (SAT) elements conduct intrusive inspections of suspect weapon of 

mass destruction (WMD) sites in order to assess presence of research and development, 

production, storage, or weaponization of WMD materials for further exploitation. Teams 

gather information at suspect sites, then transfer data to technical experts via digital 

photographs, sketches, videos, interviews, or captured documents. Site information will 

be sent initially by satellite up-link then followed up with hard copy. 249

At the same time, December 2002, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center 

in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, published a handbook for commanders and staffs 

on isolating, seizing, securing, and exploiting sensitive sites. As official Army 

doctrine, Special Text No. 3-90.15, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical 

Operations Involving Sensitive Sites, characterized sensitive site exploitation as a 

series of activities that included the interrogation of personnel, the collection of 

documents and electronic data, the capture of material, and the neutralization of 

any threat posed by the site or its content.250 DTRA’s guidance focused on finding 

and assessing the presence and character of any WMD; the Army’s doctrine was 

broader, encompassing site exploitation of multiple types of suspect sites. 

Deployment, War, and Inspecting WMD Suspect 

Sites

In January 2003, the Advanced Systems Concept Office published Scott Levac’s 

and Lieutenant Colonel Mark Kane’s WMD Facility, Equipment, and Munitions 

Identification Handbook. Written with the infantryman in mind, the authors 

designed the handbook to fit into a soldier’s cargo pocket. It was waterproof and 

Lt. Col. John Connell and Colonel Robert Smith 

in Iraq
84 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

printed in a way that allowed it to be read at night with a red lens flashlight. 

Besides providing soldiers with photographs of production facilities and 

delivery systems, it provided them with identification keys for recognizing 

WMD materials, sites, vehicles, and other indicators they might encounter. 

In the back it contained standardized report forms to ease communicating 

their findings through the chain of command. The handbook was so well 

received by USCENTCOM, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps that DTRA 

printed 19,000 copies to be distributed to ground forces at the platoon and 

squad level. The following month, ASCO’s planners produced another guide, 

one that addressed the needs of commanders and their staffs. The Combatant 

Commander’s Planning Guide for WMD Elimination Operations provided 

key planning concepts and a number of checklists, templates, and notional 

planning materials for adaptation to WMD elimination missions.251

By February 2003 events were moving rapidly. USCENTCOM 

requested four Site Assessment Teams which subsequently deployed to 

Camp Udairi, Kuwait. Each 6-member team included an officer-in-charge, 

a non-commissioned officer- in-charge, two chemical weapons NCOs, and 

two NCO weapons experts. All twenty four members belonged to either 

DTRA’s START/Nuclear or the Chemical and Biological division of the 

On-Site Inspection directorate. In addition to requesting deployment of 

DTRA’s newly formed and trained WMD triage teams, the USCENTCOM’s 

request called for the deployment of three traditional DTRA teams to Kuwait 

and Bahrain - two Consequence Management Advisory Teams and one Direct 

Support Team.252

Approximately two weeks before the invasion of Iraq commenced, Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld formalized DTRA’s combat support role, designating 

the agency as the Department of Defense’s Executive Agent for Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Elimination Operations within Iraq. As a direct consequence, 

Dr. Younger established a Weapons Elimination Directorate (WE) to assume 

responsibility for DTRA’s support to USCENTCOM in all matters related to 

WMD elimination operations. Douglas Englund would serve as director, with 

Colonel Walt Kamien, USAF, as the first deputy. Captain Richard Weyrick, USN, 

the second deputy, deployed to Kuwait immediately with a small three-person 

staff. During the war, the new directorate served as a rear detachment for the Site 

Assessment Teams in Iraq. It assisted the deployed teams’ ability to access technical 

and scientific expertise and data only available in the U.S. and it managed DTRA’s 

budget for the operations.253

When American and coalition forces crossed into Iraq’s territory on March 

19, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began. Over the next five weeks, DTRA’s Site 

Assessment Teams conducted operations as part of the 75th Exploitation Task 

Force’s Site Survey Teams. Throughout the invasion and drive on Baghdad, the 

75th XTF SATs were placed under the tactical control of the I Marine Expeditionary 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 85

Force and the Army’s V Corps. Other DTRA personnel and combat support 

teams provided support to USCENTCOM and its subordinate components in 

theater. By the time major combat operations ended on May 1, the Site Survey 

Teams had inspected 65 possible WMD sites in Iraq. Throughout May and June, 

the SAT teams crisscrossed Iraq, inspecting hundreds of suspect sites. By the 

end of June the 75th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters elements of the 75th 

Exploitation Task Force had been ordered to return to the United States. The Site 

Survey Teams had conducted nearly 230 assessment missions.254

In July 2003 the Bush administration established the Iraq Survey Group, 

which carried out a much broader, more comprehensive investigation of Iraq’s 

WMD sources and capabilities. Defense Department officials expected that this 

group of WMD intelligence experts from the CIA, the Departments of Energy, 

State, and Defense, as well as the United Kingdom and Australia, would collect and 

analyze all data and develop a comprehensive picture of Iraq’s WMD programs. 

Two of DTRA’s Site Assessment Teams remained in the theater supported the 

work of the Iraq Survey Group as part of Mobile Collection Teams.255

When the 75th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company redeployed to the United States, Task Force Disablement and 

Elimination (later TF DTRA) became the command and control element for the 

remaining site assessment teams in Iraq. As TF DTRA’s organization matured, 

its mission evolved from searching for WMD at suspect sites to collecting and 

securing radiological sources and materials that posed a danger to coalition 

troops, or that were potentially hazardous to the local Iraqi population. Based 

out of Camp Slayer, a former Iraqi government palace complex near the Baghdad 

 75th Exploitation Task Force in Kuwait
86 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

airport, DTRA’s Mobile Collection Teams collected 

radiation sources in and around the city and throughout 

the country. The most secure site for storing these sources 

was Bunker B at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. 

The large Tuwaitha compound encompassed several 

square miles and was located approximately twelve miles 

southeast of the center of Baghdad. It contained two 

massive storage bunkers in addition to a heavily damaged 

research laboratory for chemical, biological, and nuclear 

weapons of mass destruction. It was well suited for the 

storage of radiological sources and nearly two metric tons 

of low enriched uranium or yellow cake that Saddam 

Hussein’s regime had left there. However, the bunker 

required significant safety and security enhancements. 

DTRA’s team members and engineers developed an 

agency-funded project, which began in August 2003, to 

install security improvements such as reinforcing gates, new fencing, and new 

lighting. Over a ten month period, TF DTRA’s mission became one of collecting, 

securing, storing, and then packaging, and assisting in the removal of the most 

dangerous radiological sources and materials from Iraq to the United States.256

In evaluating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s support for Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, Dr. Younger was convinced that it was “a real departure 

from the past.” At the height of the war, DTRA deployed over 200 personnel 

to Iraq to conduct sensitive site exploitation and weapons elimination tasks, to 

serve in command centers supporting theater and strategic targeting requirements, 

and to provide consequence management and bomb damage assessments. The 

Hard Target Research & Analysis Center (HTRAC) had been at the forefront 

of supporting the hard target defeat requirements of the combatant commands 

before and during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM. The targeting products the center provided to combatant commands 

and the intelligence community increased the lethal effects of the munitions used 

to attack Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT). Combining state of the art 

R&D engineering with intelligence data, the HTRAC team created Three-D 

and Four-D models for target characterization and battle damage assessments 

for both theaters. Additional support included two site-specific visits by DTRA 

personnel to both Iraq and Afghanistan to assess battle damage at bombardment 

sites, to validate existing methods, and to conduct geological characterizations. 

Agency personnel also served in the USAF’s Combat Air Operations Center 

advising air controllers on the most effective bombing tactics. HTRAC analysts 

continued to assist the combatant commands in Iraq and Afghanistan on a daily 

basis through on-site remote support. 

 Bunker B at Tuwaith Nuclear Research Center, Iraq
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 87

Summarizing DTRA’s role, Dr. Younger emphasized that virtually every 

directorate in the agency had contributed to the war effort, providing the full 

spectrum of capabilities of logistical, legal, communications, health and safety, 

and technological support.257 Younger put it most succinctly in a statement on 

October 1, 2003, the occasion of DTRA’s fifth anniversary:

DTRA went to war in the spring of 2003. The reason that we went to war was the 

very reason for our existence as an agency — to reduce the threat of weapons of mass 

destruction. We had unique capabilities that were directly related to the President’s 

decision to employ force against the Ba’ath regime. We were engaged at every point in 

the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Beginning last fall we worked 

side by side with U.S. Central Command planners to ensure that the capability to search 

for, find, and disable weapons of mass destruction was a component of coalition forces. 

We did detailed analyses of potential targets, especially those difficult targets that required 

special capabilities for their defeat. We even developed fundamentally new weapons to 

use against those targets. When the signal was given to advance, DTRA troops were 

among the first to cross the border. Our people endured incredibly harsh conditions 

during the advance to Baghdad: sandstorms that coated everything with a fine layer of 

brown dust, unrelenting heat, blistering sun, meals eaten on the march. But, they had 

a job to do and they did it well. What might have been a threat to all civilized nations 

is a threat no more.258

On the same day, the secretary of defense awarded the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency with the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for “greatly contributing 

to the successes of operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, 

and NOBLE EAGLE.” Dr. Dale Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, presented the award to 

Dr. Younger and several hundred of the agency’s military and civilians.259

Strategic Plan 2003

With the armed forces preparing to go to war against a regime that 

had a history of using WMD against its enemies and its own people, 

the U.S. government published its new National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002. The strategy rested on “three 

pillars” of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management. 

An important part of counterproliferation was that the U.S. military forces 

and civilian agencies possessed the capability to defend against WMD-armed 

adversaries, if necessary through preemptive military measures. The document 

further called for the government’s readiness to conduct post-conflict operations to 

destroy or dismantle and residual WMD capabilities of a hostile state or terrorist 

network.260
88 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency responded to the new national security 

policy on combating WMD with adjustments to its existing strategic plan. Leaving 

unchanged the agency’s four basic missions of combat support, technology 

development, threat control and threat reduction, DTRA’s Strategic Plan 2003 

enhanced each directorate’s management enabling functions. In addition, the 

plan redefined the agency’s business management functions into acquisition and 

logistics management; knowledge management into information management, 

and security and intelligence management into security and counterintelligence 

management. At the same time, resource management remained in the same 

configuration and strategic management was added as a new function.261

R&D: New Technologies Against the WMD 

Threat

I

n an effort to deal with the national security implications of the terrorist 

attacks of 9/11, in January 2002, the Congress established an Unconventional 

Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) program to develop and field systems 

that could detect and defend U.S. military and civilian structures and installations 

against threats posed by terrorists using WMD. The program’s goal was to leverage 

law enforcement, Department of Defense force protection, and Department of 

Energy technologies and programs to maximize the capability of designing and 

instituting new detection systems. With its proven track record in managing and 

leading large scale multi-agency projects, Congress designated DTRA as the lead 

agency to provide U.S. military installations with new technologies and systems to 

detect, identify, respond and prevent attacks employing stolen nuclear weapons, 

improvised nuclear devices, or radiological dispersal devices delivered by means 

other than missile or military aircraft or unconventional methods. Working with 

the Department of Energy’s nuclear laboratories and private contractors over a 

two year period, DTRA established demonstration test sites at installations in 

each of the four military services. 

The first demonstration took place in August 2002 at Kirtland Air Force Base 

in New Mexico. DTRA experts from the Combat Support directorate, under 

the leadership of Catherine Montie, installed government and commercially 

available radiation sensors at three of the base’s gates to test their ability to detect 

the presence of radiation sources placed inside trucks that passed by the sensors. 

Kirtland’s Technical On-Site Inspection facility analyzed the data collected by the 

sensors. The results showed that the sensors had identified correctly all “hits.” In 

January 2003, the Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Georgia hosted the second 

demonstration. This location presented the test team with special challenges 

because it had a waterfront. Larger distances between waterborne sensors resulted 

Catherine J. Montie, then Chief, Nuclear in communications, networking, and power supply breakdowns. The third Stockpile Division, Combat Support Directorate
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 89

demonstration site was the U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North 

Carolina. At the end of February, DTRA engineers and project managers set up 

sensors on country roads leading to the base and along its perimeter that included 

14 miles of Atlantic Ocean frontage. Test results showed that the sensors detected 

radioactive material moving at highway speeds, but that coordinating the different 

emergency response organizations required a better concept of operations. The 

fourth and final demonstration was held in the U.S. Army’s large mobilization 

and training base at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Located on nearly 62,000 

acres in the central Missouri Ozarks, the topography and high volume of traffic 

presented a new set of challenges to the test team. Michael Evenson, the deputy 

director of the Combat Support Directorate at that time, considered the program 

highly successful. He explained that the test teams had to develop a different type 

of approach for each military installation, “each with different vendors, trying 

to find the best combination, to be able to detect the [weapons] before they hit, 

hopefully, and stop them, and develop the CONOPS (concept of operations) 

that goes with that.”262

In the first week of February, DTRA conducted the first of a series of four 

Integrated Technology Demonstrations in Niceville, Florida. In coordination with 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and numerous 

other state and local agencies, DTRA’s team led an exercise that simulated a 

large-scale coastal hazardous material incident. The exercise scenario included 

a threat to homeland security, a simulated fuel spill, and a release of hazardous 

materials in the Niceville Boggy Bayou after a hijacked chemical barge crashed 

into fuel oil pipes and released simulated poisonous ammonia gas in the air. One 

of the objectives of the exercise was to avoid the command and control problems 

that had plagued emergency teams responding to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. 

Another was to provide DTRA with a realistic test situation for developing new 

technologies such as a mobile wireless network of chemical, meteorological, and 

video sensors and new unmanned systems designed to inspect disaster sites and 

collect evidence. Two and half years after the first exercise in Florida, DTRA 

conducted the fourth Integrated Technology Demonstration in June 2005 in 

concert with U.S. Northern Command’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability 

Demonstration, in the port of Seattle, Washington. In this demonstration, the 

agency team’s objective was to show how an interoperable suite of technologies 

supported the National Strategies for Homeland Defense, Combating Terrorism, 

and Combating WMD. During the exercise, the agency successfully teamed and 

integrated with other DoD and DOE sensor networks. This exercise demonstrated 

new methods of controlling, via the internet, unmanned systems such as multimode unattended ground sensors. Within a few months, U.S. Marines deployed 

in Iraq received this system in support of their force protection missions.263

Michael Evenson, then Deputy Director, Combat 

Support directorate
90 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Further enhancing the combating WMD toolkit, the agency prepared to 

assume responsibility for the financial management of the Department of Defense’s 

$1.1 billion Chemical/Biological Defense Program. In late April 2003, Edward C. 

“Pete” Aldridge, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

announced the Defense Department’s decision to assign DTRA responsibility for 

the management and integration of all chemical/biological science and technology 

efforts, including advanced concepts technology demonstrations. Augmenting its 

ability to support the warfighter, the agency was now in a position to provide a 

science and technology base, to develop new products, and to recommend a range 

of items such as protective equipment, chemical and biological agent detectors, 

decontamination equipment, and medical countermeasures. As a consequence 

of all of these newly assigned activities, DTRA’s Chemical and Biological Defense 

directorate’s personnel doubled in size, it welcomed a new director, and its annual 

budget grew substantially.264

Ground Breaking for the Defense Threat 

Reduction Center

During the same month, DTRA also received a clean audit opinion, 

broke ground for its new home, the Defense Threat Reduction Center, 

and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff approved a nomination for 

the agency’s new deputy director. Director Younger lauded the achievement of 

the agency’s Resource Management team as “comparable to our major mission 

successes.” To put the team’s work into perspective, he pointed out that “[o]nly 

five of the many auditable entities in the entire Department of Defense have 

achieved this status.” On April 16, Dr. Dale Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, joined the 

director and representatives of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Centex 

Construction Company for a ground breaking ceremony for the new Defense 

Threat Reduction Center. Construction of the 319,000 square foot addition to 

the McNamara Headquarters Complex and a three-level parking garage with space 

for 1,000 vehicles had already begun and was projected to be completed in two 

years. Major General Trudy Clark, USAF, the new deputy director, would oversee 

the construction project and she established strict guidelines “to get a building in 

on time and on budget.”265

For the agency, construction of the Defense Threat Reduction Center marked 

a milestone towards integrating all of its people and functions. Dr. Klein thought 

that bringing the agency’s personnel together from rented office spaces distributed 

across the capital region into one building, also meant bringing them together to 

pursue one vision.266 

Myron M. Kunka, then Director, Business Integration was the motivation behind Director Younger’s 

Directorate
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 91

decision to consolidate DTRA’s enabling functions into a new directorate. In June 

2003, he announced that he had asked Myron Kunka, the director of the Resource 

Management directorate to form a new directorate that included the Acquisition 

and Logistics directorate and the Information Management directorate in addition 

to his own organization. The new Business Directorate, with Kunka as its first 

director, was established in October.267

 Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, DTRA; Dr. Dale E. Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; Philip 

W. Grone, Principle Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment); James R. Jones, Deputy District Engineer for Programs and Project 

Management, Baltimore District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; David V. Thompson, Vice President, RTKL Associates, Inc.; and, John P. Tarpey, President and Chief 

Executive Officer, Centex Construction Company, Inc., break ground for the new Defense Threat Reduction Center.
92 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Removing Radiological Sources from Iraq

During the month of October 2003, DTRA’s mission in Iraq of collecting 

radiological sources and improving security of Bunker B at Tuwaitha also 

took a decisive turn. Concerned that the materials and sources could be 

used by terrorists in assembling radiological dispersion devices (so called “dirty 

bombs”) or diverted to support a terrorist network’s nuclear weapons program, an 

interagency policy committee in Washington requested a scientific assessment. To 

assess the contents of Bunker B, the Department of Energy sent an experienced 

advanced team under the leadership of Alexander W. Riedy, who in 1994 had 

headed the Project Sapphire team that removed from Kazakhstan enough highly 

enriched uranium to make more than twenty atomic weapons.268 Based on the 

team’s report, the interagency committee decided that certain categories of lowenriched uranium and radiological sources, ones that had no legitimate function 

in industry and research, should be removed from Iraq. Several hundred tons of 

“yellowcake” – the seed material for higher grade nuclear enrichment – the last 

remnant of Hussein’s nuclear program, would remain in the bunker. It further 

determined that the entire operation had to be accomplished by the end of June 

2004, the month that the American-led Coalition Provisional Authority would 

turn over its powers to an Iraqi government.269

In February 2004, Director Younger resigned his position and Deputy 

Director Major General Trudy Clark stepped in as acting director to oversee the 

successful conclusion of the mission in Iraq. TF DTRA participated in the joint 

Department of Defense and Department of Energy operation. Beyond collecting, 

storing, and helping to pack up the sources for removal, the task force also trained 

Iraqi teams and analysts from the Ministry of Science and Technology on the 

mission. Members of DTRA’s Task Force equipped the Iraqi teams and helped 

them establish a database for compiling a national register of radiation sources. 

To allow for secure storage of sources that would remain in the country, the State 

Department turned over control of the bunker at Tuwaitha to the Iraqi Ministry 

of Science and Technology. On June 23, 2004, the operation culminated with 

the transport of 1.77 metric tons of low enriched uranium and 

1,000 highly radioactive sources out of Iraq to the United States 

for storage at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, near Knoxville, 

Tennessee.270 Four years later, the Iraqi government sold the 

remaining 550 tons of “yellowcake” to a Canadian uranium 

producer, Cameco Corporation, for use in energy producing 

reactors in Ontario, Canada. For the transport of the “yellowcake,” 

the Iraqi government called on the United States for assistance. 

Between April and June 2008, American military personnel 

helped move 3,500 barrels of the material from Tuwaitha to its 

final destination. 271

Barrels of “yellowcake” at Tuwaitha
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 93

New National Strategy Increases CTR 

Commitments

I

n December 2002, President Bush released the National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction which stated that proliferation of WMD 

anywhere in the world was a security threat to the United States and its allies 

and interests. Senior Bush administration officials declared that all elements 

of the national government – diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and 

military assistance, would be used to counter the proliferation of WMD.272

During the year 2002, President Bush and international leaders signed a series 

of treaties and agreements aimed at reducing, securing, and eliminating weapons 

of mass destruction. In May 2002, President Bush and President Putin signed 

the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, pledging significant reductions in 

their nation’s strategic nuclear warheads.273 In June, leaders of the G-8 nations 

– United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, 

and Russia – met in Kananaskis, Canada, and agreed to fund and implement 

“The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 

Destruction.” President Bush pledged to spend $10 billion assisting Russia 

and the other nations in the dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and biological 

weapons. Leaders of the other G-8 nations pledged $10 billion collectively 

over 10 years, with President Putin committing his government to contribute 

funds and to work cooperatively with other nations in securing and eliminating 

Russian stockpiles of obsolete nuclear and chemical weapons. Included in the 

G-8 agreements were a set of guidelines in which the world leaders pledged to 

develop, coordinate, implement, and finance “new and expanded” cooperation 

projects that addressed nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and 

nuclear safety.274 

The United States’ commitments to the G-8 were embedded in the 

existing and planned Cooperative Threat Reduction programs that were being 

implemented by the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy. DTRA was the 

Defense Department’s program management office for the CTR program. The 

G-8 agreement, dubbed “10 plus 10, over 10,” gave the CTR program a legitimate 

charter for the future, especially with President Bush’s strong endorsement. It 

also provided the policy context for expanding the CTR program internationally, 

beyond the regions of the former Soviet Union. In March 2002, Senator Lugar 

introduced legislation authorizing the president to use up to $50 million in NunnLugar funds where “nonproliferation threats around the world are identified.”275

Shortly after the bill was enacted into law in 2003, the Prime Minister of Albania 

requested U.S. assistance in securing and eliminating Albania’s stockpile of sixteen 

metric tons of obsolete chemical weapons.276 The following year, a bilateral CTR 

agreement authorized and defined the project. Since transporting the chemical 
94 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

weapons out of the remote mountainous area of Albania 

was considered too dangerous, CTR managers worked with 

American contractors to design, equip, and test a small CW 

disposal facility in Germany, and then to transport it to 

the Balkan nation. The Albania stockpile included several 

chemical agents: mustard, lewisite, mustard/lewisite mixture, 

adamsite, and chloroacetaphenome. Using thermal treatment 

technology, the CW stockpile was destroyed between January 

and July 2007. When inspectors from the CWC’s inspection 

organization confirmed the destruction in early July, Albania 

became the first nation to have “completely and verifiably” 

eliminated its chemical weapons. A month later, Senators 

Lugar and Nunn, accompanied by Defense Department 

senior officials, went to Albania. Sen. Lugar praised the 

cooperative effort, the work of the national ministries, the 

American contractors, and DTRA’s CTR project managers, and then declared: “the 

Nunn-Lugar program has established a deep reservoir of experience and talent” 

which could be used for other nonproliferation projects around the world.277

The agency’s CTR program managers and staff had developed this “deep 

reservoir” of experience working for more than a decade in developing and 

implementing nuclear, chemical, and biological programs with the independent 

nations of the former Soviet Union. In January 2004, Rear Admiral John T. 

Byrd, USN (retired) became the director, CT Directorate.278 With 200 federal 

and contract employees, coordination offices in U.S. embassies in Moscow, Kyiv, 

and Almaty, the CTR program’s principal objectives remained fixed: to facilitate 

through assistance projects and programs the transportation, storage, safeguarding, 

and elimination of nuclear and other strategic weapons systems within the 

nations of the former Soviet Union. Specifically, Admiral Byrd and the staff 

managed ten major programs with 35 distinct projects and an annual budget of 

approximately $350 million. Byrd and senior program managers traveled to Russia 

and the region frequently, meeting with ministry officials, senior military officers, 

American contracting firms, and Russian enterprise managers. During formal 

nation-to-nation program reviews, several perennial issues emerged: accuracy of 

project cost estimates, adherence to projected schedules, and evaluation of job 

performance. There were serious discussions of the need for transparency and 

for maintaining best business practices. By 2004, the bulk of all CTR assistance 

programs and funds were being carried out in Russia. One major program area, 

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination, provided financial assistance, equipment, 

and program management services to Russian ministries and military forces in 

eliminating ICBMs and SLBMs and in dismantling ballistic missile submarines 

and infrastructure. In the first decade of the 21st century, the Russian General Staff 

requested U.S. CTR assistance in eliminating and dismantling SS-18 and SS-19 

ICBMs, SS-N-2 SLBMs, SS-25 ICBMs and launchers, and SS-24 rail-mobile 

CTR program assists in destruction of Albanian chemical weapons
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 95

launchers. These projects involved DTRA CTR managers in virtually every 

aspect of the Russian government’s programs to eliminate its obsolete strategic 

missiles and launchers. From FY1993 through FY2008, the CTR funds for the 

Russian Federation’s strategic missiles, submarines and bombers totaled $1.463 

billion.279

While this important work was being done in Russia’s missile fields and 

submarine naval yards, the agency’s CTR managers were developing, funding, and 

implementing another series of cooperative projects that would improve Russia’s 

chain of custody over nuclear weapons and fissile materials; improve the safety 

and security of Russia’s nuclear weapons in transit, and enhance security and safety 

in the Russian Ministry of Defense’s nuclear weapons storage sites. Without a 

doubt, the terrorist attacks of the United States on September 11, 2001 had a 

profound effect on DoD policy officials. Most concluded that future terrorist 

groups would seek WMD, especially nuclear weapons or HEU fissile materials, 

and that developing programs with Russia to assist the government in securing 

and protecting its weapons, materials, and knowledge base would be in the U.S. 

national security interests. The Bush Administration increased CTR funding for 

programs improving the chain of custody, transportation of nuclear weapons, and 

security at nuclear weapons storage sites. In February 2005 Presidents Bush and 

Putin signed the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, which expanded existing 

security enhancement programs at Russian nuclear weapons storage facilities of 

the Ministry of Defense and Russian Atomic Energy Ministry (Rosatom). “We 

bear a special responsibility,” Bush declared, “to ensure that there is no possibility 

such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist hands.”280 The administration 

assigned responsibility for implementing the U.S. programs and projects to the 

Energy and Defense departments. DTRA’s CTR program managers worked 

with the Russian MOD officials in providing materials, managerial assistance, 

and funding for security upgrades at 12th Main Directorate and Strategic Rocket 

Forces’ nuclear weapons storage sites. The Department of Energy had multiple 

programs with the Russian Ministry of the Atomic Energy and Russian Navy. 

While the CTR programs with the Russian government predominated from 

2002-2008, major assistance programs were developed with other nations. In 

Ukraine, CTR program managers worked with Ministry of Defense officials 

in defining requirements, funding and equipping local contractors who were 

eliminating TU-22 strategic bombers and cutting up nuclear air-to-surface 

missiles under the protocols of START I. In Azerbaijan, CTR project managers 

worked with the defense and interior ministries in developing and funding new 

programs to deter WMD smuggling and to enhance maritime security in the 

Caspian Sea. This project was a response by the governments of both nations 

to act against the rise of terrorism in the region. The threat was considered so 

serious that the U.S. government developed, and Congress funded, separate 

cooperative programs for combating nuclear smuggling in the Defense, Energy, 
96 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

and State departments. Under the Defense Department’s CTR program, DTRA 

developed and implemented a Bush Administration initiative against proliferation, 

known as the WMD Proliferation Prevention Program. The program sought 

to develop cooperative programs with the newly independent states to prevent, 

deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking on the borders and seas in WMD 

and related materials. As it unfolded, the program became a cooperative effort 

to define requirements, acquire and deliver specialized equipment, and develop 

training courses. In Uzbekistan, a bilateral CTR program provided American 

equipment and training to the interior ministry forces to detect and interdict 

WMD smuggling along the borders and international ports of entry. In 

Kazakhstan, CTR funded biological research to understand more clearly endemic 

diseases that could proliferate. In Georgia, CTR biological program managers 

worked closely with ministry officials to develop a disease outbreak surveillance 

network, called Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR). These latter 

two cooperative projects, in Kazakhstan and Georgia, represent a significant new 

direction for the CTR program.281

CTR Develops Emphasis on Biosecurity and 

Biosafety

For many years microbiologists, scientists, and international security experts 

had been concerned about bioterrorism in which terrorist groups would 

strike suddenly releasing lethal pathogens that could kill hundreds, if 

not thousands of people and cause widespread social and economic disruption. 

In 2001 these threat projections became reality in the United States as letters 

containing anthrax were sent to prominent elected officials. Simultaneously in 

Afghanistan, U.S. forces found plans for bioterrorism attacks in al Qaeda terrorist 

camps. Then in 2003, ricin labs were found in Chechnya, Russia. The presence 

of biological weapons in Russia was not a surprise to experts. It was widely known 

that during the Soviet Union’s existence, the government had created 

the largest and deadliest biological weapons program in the world, 

one involving 30-40,000 specialists working in 40 separate facilities. 

Russia inherited most of these facilities, but biological weapons labs 

and former production facilities existed in many other nations as 

well. For almost a decade, 1992-2002, Russian ministers, program 

directors, and scientists did not engage with American CTR policy 

officials on any cooperative programs for assisting the biological 

laboratories. That changed with the rise of terrorism in 2001 and 

2002.282

 DoD CTR policy and program managers had already developed 

In Georgia, a technician examines and classifies biological samples. a multifaceted Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP). 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 97

Following the 2001 anthrax attacks in Washington, Congress expanded funding 

for the program substantially in 2002 and in subsequent years. Within DTRA’s 

CT directorate, biological program managers developed, funded, and managed 

new Biological Infrastructure Elimination projects in Kazakhstan, Georgia, and 

on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. These projects dismantled a former 

anthrax production facility at Stepnogorsk, dismantled and destroyed a dualuse facility capable of producing viral animal pathogens at Biokombinat, and 

collected and destroyed 150 metric tons of abandoned anthrax on the Aral Sea 

island.283 In another area, program directors defined, financed, and managed a 

series of biosafety and biosecurity projects that improved the infrastructure in 

biological laboratories and scientific institutes in Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 

Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.284 Working with lab directors and scientists in 

Russia, Dr. Michael A. Balady, CTR program manager, developed projects with 

research centers and scientific institutes in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, 

Obolensk, Kazan, Kirov, Koltsovo, Pushchino, Pokrov, and Serpukov. Some 

projects set up collaborative research efforts with American biologists and microbiologists, other projects provided biological safety training programs for Russian 

scientists, and still other projects funded the acquisition and installation of new 

safety equipment in the Russian labs and institutes. Many of these projects were 

difficult to establish, manage, and sustain due to the Russian government ministry’s 

policies on limiting access and maintaining control.

In 2003 Defense Department policy directors assigned DTRA responsibility 

for developing and managing the new Threat Agent Detection and Response 

(TADR) program with the nations of the former Soviet Union, excluding Russia. 

Approximately six months before this assignment, a small team of policy and 

program experts – Andrew Weber, Roger Breeze, Mike Weaver, Shawn Cali, and 

Mike Favreau – had developed the innovative TADR concept. Rather quickly, 

it became one of the most important biological threat reduction programs 

that the United States was offering to the new nations. By 2007, bilateral 

cooperative TADR projects were underway in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 

and Kazakhstan, with funding exceeding $210 million.285 Essentially, the TADR 

program focused on engaging national biological research and production centers 

and scientists in cooperative projects that consolidated and secured especially 

dangerous pathogens. These pathogens could be human or animal viruses and 

strains. Consequently, the program had application for the recipient nation’s 

public health and its agricultural livestock. Some projects centralized pathogen 

collections into safe, secure, storage facilities. Others developed a new network 

linking disease surveillance stations and diagnostic laboratories at the national, 

state, and county level that would be tied into an existing international Electronic 

Integrated Disease Surveillance System. The objective was to facilitate across the 

region a rapid, accurate reporting of outbreaks of diseases, biological attacks, and 

emerging pandemics using scientists at the national labs, the new threat agent 

detection and response network, and the existing international disease surveillance 

system. Significantly, these new cooperative biological projects moved the CTR 
98 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

program away from dismantling and eliminating the excessive weapons of the 

Cold War era and directed it towards new collaborative programs creating new 

systems and networks to confront contemporary threats. 286

The biological threat reduction program was extremely creative. One aspect 

encouraged one or more of the nations to consider defining and planning, with 

CTR assistance, a new national central reference laboratory which would be 

equipped with state-of-the-art diagnostic capability. In 2005, Georgia became 

the first nation to request a new laboratory. The CTR program would finance the 

construction, equipping, and training for the new lab. This multiyear, $60 million 

collaborative project involved the Georgia Health and Agricultural ministries, 

U.S. Department Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, Walter 

Reed Army Institute of Research, and the CTR integrating contractor, Bechtel 

International Inc.287 In other nations, national scientific directors worked with 

American field biologists and disease specialists in planning and designing new 

epidemiological monitoring stations. These plans included extensive training 

for national lab personnel who would be able to respond and rapidly diagnose 

disease outbreaks. The CTR program would construct, equip, and maintain the 

epidemiological monitoring stations. By 2008, DoD officials projected that the 

biological threat reduction program would require congressional appropriations 

of approximately $200 million annually over the next five to ten years.288 They 

projected that biosecurity/biosafety and the threat agent detection and response 

projects in the newly independent states would account for ninety percent of 

the total funding. If successful, these CTR biological security, safety, and agent 

detection projects with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, 

could become templates for future cooperative projects with African or Asian 

nations.

New Partnership and New Leadership

Propelled by the experiences on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the U.S. Department of Defense moved in 2005 to change the way it 

approached the complex task of combating weapons of mass destruction. 

Combat operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM had exposed the U.S. 

military’s lack of preparedness to find, identify, exploit, and possibly eliminate 

an opponent’s arsenal of WMD. This convinced the Pentagon’s leadership that 

it needed to develop an integrated and comprehensive process for countering 

the threat these weapons posed to avoid what Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 

Wolfowitz had called “playing pickup games” when trying to put together forces 

General James E. Cartwright, USMC, for eliminating WMD in the aftermath of a conflict. The consensus was to hand Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 99

the task to a combatant command. On January 6, 2005, Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld assigned responsibility for integrating and synchronizing all 

of the Department’s capabilities in combating WMD to the commander, U.S. 

Strategic Command.289

When the Defense Department released the National Defense Strategy of the 

United States of America two months later, it reflected the Bush Administration’s new 

emphasis on combating WMD. The strategy distinguished between four kinds of 

challenges the United States faced in the future. Besides the traditional challenges 

from states with recognized militaries, it also listed irregular, catastrophic, and 

disruptive challenges from terrorist groups and other non-state actors. Declaring 

that even a single catastrophic attack with weapons of mass destruction against the 

U.S. would be unacceptable, the department announced that it would strengthen 

its capabilities to dissuade potential foes from acquiring WMD, to deter their use, 

and, if need be, to defeat them before they could be used.290

With national policy in place, Marine Corps General James E. Cartwright, 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, took an innovative approach to 

accomplishing his command’s new responsibilities, including planning for network 

warfare, improving intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, and for combating 

weapons of mass destruction. Not being able “to grow the requisite expertise” at 

USSTRATCOM Headquarters in Omaha, Cartwright partnered his command 

with organizations and agencies that specialized in those areas and formed joint 

functional component commands (JFCCs). Even though the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency was a civilian institution and therefore “was not fundamentally 

connected to the operational side of the house,” the general decided that his 

command had to have a direct relationship with the agency to perform its new 

combating WMD mission. The only difference between DTRA and “the rest of 

the functional components,” General Cartwright concluded, was that it had to 

become a functional center with a director, not a commander.291

As a result, a newly established Task Force DTRA – Combating WMD 

began the planning process for a dedicated element within the agency to 

support USSTRATCOM in February 2005, just a few days before Dr. James 

A. Tegnelia, became DTRA’s new director.292 An engineer with a Ph.D. in 

physics from The Catholic University of America, Tegnelia had been the vice 

president of Department of Defense Programs at Sandia National Laboratories 

in Albuquerque, New Mexico before his selection as director.293 On assuming 

his duties, he considered the agency, “technically, very competent” in the area 

of WMD prevention, protection, and response. At the same time, Tegnelia 

found that original or legacy agency stove pipes stunted communication and, 

as a consequence, prevented DTRA from becoming “one agency” and realizing 

its full potential. Based on that assessment, his vision for DTRA’s future was 

“straightforward.” He wanted to “make sure that the mission that the agency 

performs, it performed well.”294 In June, Dr. Tegnelia took a first step toward 

 Dr. James A. Tegnelia, third director of DTRA
100 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

accomplishing his goal. Anticipating the establishment of a center for combating 

weapons of mass destruction, he initiated a review of all of DTRA’s organizational 

processes and functions. He wanted to look at ways to optimize resources and 

effectiveness and to prepare the ground for changes to the agency’s organizational 

structure. Over the course of the summer, an assessment team of the agency’s 

senior leadership examined four key areas: Operations; Research, Development and 

Acquisition; Combating WMD; and Business and Support functions. Questions 

guiding discussions were how to make DTRA the operational and technological 

program leader in the detection and defeat of chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE); how to make DTRA the source 

for joint operational and technological expertise for CBRNE interdiction and 

WMD treaty compliance; how to make DTRA the operational program lead for 

Consequence Management operations; how to create an integrated agency with 

focused mutually supported programs; and, finally, how to establish DTRA as 

the leading edge of 21st century organization and support capability?295

Toward the end of the summer, on August 26, General Cartwright issued the 

basic documents leading to the establishment of a USSTRATCOM Center for 

Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). In a memorandum to the secretary of defense, 

he officially requested the appointment of the director of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency as director of the new center.296 Then in an implementation 

directive, General Cartwright delineated the center’s and his own command’s 

responsibilities to Dr. Tegnelia in his capacity as the director of the new 

USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The 

directive charged the center with integrating and synchronizing Department of 

Defense efforts in support of the combating WMD mission. To that end, the 

center had to plan, advocate and advise combatant commands on WMD-related 

matters, to include doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel 

and facilities, while its Global Operations Center had to provide situational 

awareness of worldwide WMD and related activities. The Center would further 

leverage capabilities available at DTRA to provide expertise and perspective to 

assist defense department components with preventing, deterring, detecting, 

locating, tracking, defeating, and mitigating existing or future WMD threats or 

devices.297

At the end of September, senior leadership deliberations resulted in decisions 

on a new configuration of the agency’s organizational structure. With the exception 

of the consolidation of the Resource Management, Acquisition and Logistics, 

and Information Management directorates into the Business Directorate in late 

2003, this reorganization was the first major change to the agency’s structure in 

four years. Whereas the former organization had aligned five mission functions 

with one directorate each – arms control with the On-Site Inspection Directorate; 

threat reduction with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate; chemicalbiological defense with the Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate; technology 

development with the Technology Development Directorate; and combat support 

with the Combat Support Directorate –DTRA’s new structure was organized 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 101

according to four major functions (later called Enterprises) and specialized 

elements such as Staff Offices and the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. 

As Dr. G. Peter Nanos explained, “All elements of Research and Development 

within DTRA, the Joint Science and Technology Office of the Chem-Bio Defense 

Program and the Nuclear Technology Directorate, were consolidated into the 

Research and Development Enterprise. Out of that consolidation came several 

benefits and initiatives: a Basic Research Program – 2006; an Innovation Office – 

2006; more autonomy for the directorate Senior Executive Service leadership from 

the formation of three directorates from the former NTD: Nuclear Technology; 

Basic and applied Research; Counter WMD.” The new Operations function 

subsumed the On-Site Inspection, Cooperative Threat Reduction, and Combat 

Support directorates. Another function was Business, which was now on par with 

the former mission directorates. Concurrently, Task Force DTRA – Combating 

WMD had finished its plans for the Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

function, envisioned as the DTRA enterprise dedicated to supporting the new 

USSTRATCOM center.298

Along with the reorganization of the directorates, in the fall of 2005 the 

senior leadership made decisions that created a mechanism for setting the agency’s 

budget priorities for the large number of its activities. One of the decisions was 

to charge the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office with the responsibility to 

coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the strategic planning process, and another 

decision was the establishment of campaigns as a part of a new strategic plan to 

accomplish critical agency goals. Robert Gregg, Division Chief of the Office of 

Strategic Planning, ASCO, explained, “Campaigns, for the most part, provided an 

opportunity to look at the agency through the eyes of capabilities.” 299 By October 

2005, the Agency had developed six campaigns: Campaign One: Situational 

Awareness; Campaign Two: Control WMD Material and Systems Worldwide; 

Campaign Three: Eliminate WMD as a Threat to the Warfighter; Campaign 

Four: Enable others to Protect the Homeland; Campaign Five: Transform the 

Deterrent; Campaign Six: Business Excellence. Each campaign was a set of agency 

projects geared toward achieving a single critical goal. Each campaign’s projects 

were a combination of operational and technical activities from across the new 

enterprises. The only criterion for inclusion in a campaign was whether a project 

contributed toward accomplishing the goal. Each campaign was designed to have 

a long term goal of critical national security importance and near term objectives 

that would demonstrate measuring markers for determining progress toward 

meeting the goal.300

On October 20, DTRA’s deputy director hosted General Cartwright’s 

representative, Major General John D. Dorris, Mobilization Assistant to 

the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, during his week-long tour of 

USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Commands in the Washington 

D.C. area. Catherine Montie, Associate Director of the Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction enterprise, briefed Gen. Dorris on the SCC-WMD mission, 

organization, and proposed staffing. At that point, Montie envisioned a total of Mr. Robert Gregg, Division Chief of the Office 

of Strategic Planning, ASCO
102 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

128 personnel, with USSTRATCOM providing 55, DTRA another 50, and 

DTRA’s Operations Center 23 to man the SCC-WMD’s five divisions: Operations 

Support, Situational Awareness, Strategy & Plans, Coordination, and Advocacy. 

She forecasted that the Center would reach initial operational capability by 

December 2005.301

Research & Development Enterprise: Nuclear, 

Biological, and Basic Research Initiatives

Building on decades of experience in organizing and testing weapons effects, 

DTRA provided the Defense Department with several national testbeds for 

measuring the effects of contemporary weapons, sensors, and tactics against 

Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs). Under this activity, DTRA constructed 

and maintained both hardened structures and tunnel complexes, including two 

tunnel complexes at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, a tunnel facility at White Sands 

Missile Range, New Mexico, and a tunnel facility at the Dugway Proving Grounds, 

Utah. There are no other comparable full-scale test facilities maintained by any 

other DoD agency or military service in the United States. These facilities have 

been used to develop and demonstrate HDBT sensors, and they have contributed 

directly to evaluating the performance of new weapons and tactics. They were 

also used to validate the attack planning tools used by U.S. and coalition forces in 

planning attacks against hard and deeply buried targets, specifically underground 

command posts and deep tunnels located in remote mountainous areas. Some 

of the weapons and tactics developed and demonstrated include the BLU-116 

advanced unitary penetrator, and the BLU-121 thermobaric skip bomb. DTRA’s 

engineers and scientists devised tests that evaluated how multiple weapons in the 

current inventory penetrated extremely hard structures and deep tunnels, targets 

which otherwise could not be defeated. The myriad of tests and demonstrations 

conducted at these national testbed facilities have significantly increased the 

military forces’ capability to hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk.302

The purpose of the CBRN Unmanned Ground Reconnaissance advanced 

concept test demonstration was twofold: to develop an advanced sensor 

capability to detect and identify chemical warfare agents on manned platforms; 

and to demonstrate the military utility of using unmanned platforms for CBRN 

reconnaissance. These new reconnaissance technologies will provide the combatant 

commander with continuous and critical CBRN situational awareness, while at 

the same time reducing the risk to maneuvering combat and supporting forces. 

In 2006-2007, the CBRN vehicle received a favorable military utility assessment 

following operational testing. In 2008, the program continued with the operational 

Dr. George P. “Pete” Nanos, Associate Director testing of the Joint Contaminated Surface Detector. Another CB advanced Research and Development Enterprise 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 103

technology demonstration, Expeditionary Biological Detection, grew out of a 

U.S. Marine Corps requirement for a man portable point-detector capable of 

detecting and identifying aerosolized biological weapons. None of the existing 

biological detection systems met the requirement. The Marine Corps had not 

fielded any biological detection equipment due to a lack of system suitability in a 

highly mobile operational environment and with the dedicated force structure that 

its current systems required. The Expeditionary Biological Detection technology 

demonstration was designed to support the Joint Biological Tactical Detection 

System program and its acquisition strategy. Candidate technologies were selected 

for their applicability to the joint program, the test demonstration schedule, and 

the acquisition timeline. When the new biological warfare detection technologies 

successfully completed field demonstrations in early 2008, the program moved 

into the military utility assessment phase.303

The Biological Combat Assessment System was another advanced technology 

demonstration. The objective was to demonstrate the capability to provide nearreal-time battle damage assessments to commanders and battle staff so that they 

could determine the presence of biological warfare (BW) agents in post-counterforce 

strike plumes. This technology addressed the combatant commanders’ requirement 

to determine the WMD threat resulting from combat operations against facilities 

that might be dedicated to WMD research and development, or to production or 

storage. The new BW assessment system successfully completed an operational 

demonstration in early 2008. The system demonstrated the ability to perform 

biological warfare battle damage assessments following a counterforce strike on 

WMD facilities. The data obtained on threat agent lethality released in the post 

strike plume will assist the combatant commanders as they formulate safe, effective 

battlefield tactics. Another BW assessment program developed by DTRA focused 

on assisting military forces stationed at fixed military installations. The objective 

of the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project was to improve the capabilities of 

military personnel at the installations and emergency responders to identify, assess, 

and respond to the effects of CBRNE incidents. The joint protection program, 

managed by DTRA, provided emergency response and CB equipment to nine 

installations, and provided integration, training, exercises, CONOPS refinements, 

medical surveillance, evaluations and recommended requirements for the military 

services and the Joint Requirements Office.

DTRA’s Research and Development Enterprise launched a new basic research 

program, the first new basic research program in the Department of Defense in 

more than 30 years. Initiated in the spring 2007, with Joan M. Pierre as Director, 

Basic and Applied Research Directorate, this basic research program had the 

objective of fostering farsighted, high payoff research to counter weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD). In 2007-2008, the program obtained favorable responses 

from many universities, the military service’s weapons laboratories, and the national 

laboratories. Through an innovative bulk grant award strategy, university scientists 

and researchers began working on 36 grants that were awarded in 2007. With 

Joan M. Pierre, Director, Basic and 

Applied Sciences Directorate, Research and 

Development Enterprise
104 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

increased emphasis on empowering basic research on formulating countermeasures 

against WMD, the program has exhibited growth, with another 24 grants awarded 

in FY08. Many grantees have already produced several peer-reviewed journal 

articles. In addition, this program is developing the next generation science and 

technology workforce, with typical support for each grant providing work for 

two or more graduate students.304

Defense Threat Reduction Center

As DTRA’s new organizational structure and strategic plan took shape in 

the fall of 2005, construction of its new building, the Defense Threat 

Reduction Center in Fort Belvoir was on the verge of completion. For 

the first time since its founding in 1998, the new 317,000 square-foot facility 

would bring the nearly 2,000 DTRA employees scattered across offices in the 

capital region under one roof in a state of the art facility. Designed as an open 

space with cubicles and only a small number of offices, the building would have 

a profound impact on the way DTRA operated. To prepare employees for their 

new environment and to prevent “a big cultural shock,” Major General Clark, who 

had been working closely with building program manager John Eddy, Business 

Directorate, decided that information was the key to a smooth transition. About 

a year before occupancy, General Clark instructed David Rigby, Chief of Public 

Affairs, “I want articles in The Connection every month [...] leading up to the 

building finish date. I want articles talking about the construction. I want articles 

talking about what it’s going to look like, what the feel is going to be, what the 

security’s going to be like, so that people will have a chance to start absorbing 

this [information].”305

Construction of the new Defense Threat Reduction Center was officially 

completed on September 23, 2005, when Dr. Tegnelia received the ceremonial key 

to the building. In the following three months, about 150 employees per week 

moved into their new offices. A week before Christmas, all directorates except 

for the On-Site Inspection Directorate, which remained in its old offices in the 

adjacent Defense Logistics Agency, occupied their new spaces. One month later, 

on January 26, 2006, a long list of distinguished visitors that included Senator 

Richard Lugar; Kenneth J. Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics; General James Cartwright, commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command; Dr. Dale E. Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; and Dr. Stephen Younger, former 

director of DTRA, joined Dr. Tegnelia and Major General Clark in cutting the 

ceremonial ribbon.306

Maj. Gen. Trudy H. Clark, USAF, 

Deputy Director, DTRA
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 105

Cutting the ribbon on the Defense Threat Reduction Center are, from left to right: Air Force Maj. Gen. Trudy Clark, Deputy Director, DTRA; Marine Corps Gen. 

James E. Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Indiana; Dr. James A. Tegnelia, Director, DTRA; Kenneth Krieg, Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Dr. Dale E. Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs; and, Dr. Stephen M. Younger, former DTRA Director.

“[T]hat is probably one of my proudest accomplishments while being in the 

Pentagon, was seeing the completion of the DTRA building,” reflected Dr. Klein. 

“I was there for the groundbreaking ceremony,” he continued, “but was also there 

for the ribbon cutting. And what’s interesting in the way the Department of 

Defense oftentimes works, best laid plans can get deviated. My fear always was that 

somewhere along the path, we would have the building designed, but we wouldn’t 

get to occupy it. And I think one of the great accomplishments is having DTRA 

in one location, a very nice location. And that will help us recruit and retain the 

caliber of people that is needed for DTRA and its mission.”307
106 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Establishing the USSTRATCOM Center 

for Combating WMD

At the beginning of 2006, the combating WMD mission 

took center stage at the Department of Defense. In quick 

succession, the department released two policy guidance 

documents dealing with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. 

In early February, the secretary of defense issued the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR). It declared that preventing hostile states 

and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD was one 

of the nation’s defense priorities. To accomplish this goal, the 

report reaffirmed earlier secretary of defense guidance that U.S. 

Strategic Command would be the lead combatant command for integrating and 

synchronizing the combating WMD effort, with DTRA as its primary Combat 

Support Agency. The following week, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff issued the first-ever National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. The strategy aimed at preventing enemies from threatening the United 

States, its allies, and friends with weapons of mass destruction through the three 

pillars of non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. 

At the operational level, the national military strategy identified eight mission 

areas that spanned the pillars: offensive operations, elimination, interdiction, 

active defense, passive defense, consequence management, security cooperation 

and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation.308

Shortly before the QDR and the military strategy document had reaffirmed 

DTRA’s mission as one of the nation’s top priorities, the agency’s year-long 

planning efforts had resulted in the creation of a permanent organization dedicated 

to supporting USSTRATCOM. On January 23, Dr. Tegnelia officially announced 

that the Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(SCC-WMD) had reached initial operating capability. A week later, Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed the director of DTRA to an additional 

position as director of the new center.309 With the infrastructure in place, DTRA 

and USSTRATCOM began the interview process for a deputy director, who would 

manage the day-to-day operations of the Center. Rear Admiral William P. Loeffler, 

USN, joined the SCC-WMD as its new deputy director in the beginning of April. 

“I was the first STRATCOM person in the door,” explained Loeffler, “Up until 

that time, DTRA and its Combating WMD Enterprise was the entire component 

of the Center.”310 While the personnel situation changed in the following months 

with the arrival of additional USSTRATCOM personnel, the Center continued 

to depend on DTRA’s Combating WMD Enterprise capabilities and support. 

In doing so, it capitalized on DTRA’s existing capabilities and CBRNE expertise 

and relationships with combatant commands, the military services, and other 

The DTRA/SCC-WMD operations center provides DoD with an 

around-the-clock source for WMD situational awareness.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 107

governmental agencies and organizations. Reactions among DTRA’s senior 

leadership to the Center’s creation ranged from enthusiastic support to reluctant 

toleration. While some of them were concerned that the relationship might 

impinge on the agency’s ability to perform its mission as a combat support agency 

for the other combatant commands,311 most saw it similar to Doug Bruder, who 

called it a “golden opportunity for DTRA”312 to have a direct linkage to the 

USSTRATCOM.

Declared “fully operational capable” on December 31, 2006,313 the SCCWMD initially focused on WMD elimination and interdiction missions and on 

drafting a Handbook for Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination 

Operations. Intended as a primer on joint elimination operations, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff published the handbook in May 2007. In the document, the SCC-WMD 

provided joint force commanders and their staffs with a concept of operations 

for elimination missions that identified the need for a Joint Task Force – WMD 

Elimination and a standing Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) 

assigned to USSTRATCOM.314 The Center also led U.S. Strategic Command’s 

support for the WMD interdiction mission and provided operational and 

exercise support for Proliferation Security Initiative activities. To keep track of 

the multitude of efforts, the Center established a Web-based combating WMD 

information portal. Admiral Loeffler explained, “This portal is a one stop shop for 

things of interest in the combating WMD world to the combatant commander, 

OSD, Joint Staff, and other organizations. It combines a geospatial view with 

links to the latest imagery and intelligence reports so that you don’t have to visit 

multiple sites to put a picture together of what is happening.”315

Challenges and Campaigns

Establishing the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, though demanding, was just one of several challenges that 

would test DTRA’s resilience in 2006. At the end of March, announcing 

the agency’s plan to test 700 tons of explosives at the Nevada Test Site, Dr. Tegnelia 

explained that the detonation was expected to cause a mushroom cloud of dust 

to rise over the desert. Code-named Divine Strake, the test was supposed to be 

part of the ongoing research into developing conventional weapons that could 

destroy hard and deeply buried military targets. Public outcry in the media, from 

citizen activists and Indian tribes in Nevada and “downwinders” in Utah over their 

interpretation of the director’s remarks was immediate. Well organized, politically 

influential, and with a single-minded dedication to prevent above ground tests at 

the test site, several groups brought a law suit and intense pressure on Nevada and 
108 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Utah lawmakers to bear. Unable to reach an understanding with test opponents, 

DTRA canceled the test in February 2007.316

On April 30, 2006, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency closed out of the 

15-grade General Schedule pay system for its continental United States nonbargaining unit employees and replaced it with a new National Security Personnel 

System (NSPS). The new system was based on a performance management system, 

designed to compensate and reward individuals based on their performance 

and contribution to their organization’s mission. To ensure the consistency, 

accuracy, and fairness of performance ratings, the system relied on pay pool 

processes during which supervisors’ performance ratings were reviewed by pay 

pool managers. Employees would receive rewards through performance payouts 

that included increases in salary, bonuses, or combinations of both. DTRA was 

among the first wave of 11,000 Department of Defense civil service employees 

to convert to the new pay and personnel system. Preparations for implementing 

the new pay and personnel system had been going on for over a year. Originally, 

DTRA was preparing to implement a different personnel system, the Acquisition 

Demonstration Project, but in December 2004, the Defense Department decided 

to abandon the project in favor of NSPS. In the months before adopting NSPS, the 

agency’s employees participated in training courses about the conversion process, 

position classification, compensation, and writing of objectives and assessments. 

To prepare for the first real pay pool process at the end of the year, the agency 

held a series of mock panels during the summer.317

While DTRA’s rank and file grappled with the new concepts of being “YA” 

or “YC” instead of “GS” and pay bands instead of “steps,” the agency’s leadership 

also prepared for changes in personnel. In August, Major General Clark left her 

position as deputy director and retired after 33 years of service in the Air Force. 

Her successor was Major General Randal R. Castro, USA, who had served as the 

commanding general, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, and commandant, 

U.S. Army Engineer School, both at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, before he 

joined DTRA.318 Almost as soon as he arrived, General Castro took charge of 

DTRA’s strategic planning process. In the past few years the agency had taken 

on a broader set of responsibilities. As Castro recalled, “I figured I would focus 

in on the strategic level of our leadership and bring alive the strategic plan, while 

also doing the day to day work, keeping the organization running day to day 

[...] My vision was to bring the campaigns as the driving force for the strategic 

planning for the agency, and to do everything I could to make DTRA and the 

leadership in DTRA and the organizations that are part of DTRA a better team, 

and to make the “Team of Teams” concept come true.”319

Since they had been established in fall of 2005, the campaigns largely existed 

on paper. As General Castro put it bluntly, “We were paying lip service to the 

campaigns, and we weren’t putting 100% of our energies into making those 

come alive. So it was clear to me that the campaigns did not resonate with the 

Shari Durand, then Deputy Associate Director, 

Business Enterprise
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 109

leadership.”320 In spite of skepticism about the usefulness of campaigns, Castro 

found the leadership “very responsive” when he began to work alongside campaign 

leaders to establish a structure to manage campaigns. Regular meetings served to 

define the campaigns in strategic terms of directions, intent, and a desired end 

state. These meetings also resulted in the creation of an additional campaign, 

dubbed “Campaign X: Defeat the Threat of Lost or Stolen (Loose) Nuclear 

Weapons.” This new campaign was the “brain child” of Dr. G. Peter Nanos, Jr., 

Associate Director, Research and Development Enterprise. Concerned about 

shortcomings in the agency’s nuclear detection competence, he initiated the 

formation of a campaign that focused on end-to-end capabilities, including, but 

not limited to, technologies, intelligence, operations, interaction with other U.S. 

government departments and agencies and the policy community. Its objective 

was to deliver comprehensive, integrated capability to the warfighter to detect, 

identify, locate, track, and secure special nuclear material. With the creation 

of Campaign X, the agency was already implementing the development of 

capability called for by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and 

Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack and specific recommendations 

in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006. ASCO Strategic planner 

Robert Gregg, who worked closely with the general, credited the director with 

devising the campaigns as a tool that forced the four enterprises to work together 

and to try to break down old stove pipes. In his opinion the campaigns “became 

an extremely innovative process and a way to market the agency, a way to tell the 

story as to what the agency does and how the agency conducts its business – in 

other words, strategic communication.”321

Using Advanced Systems and Concepts to 

Understand WMD Threats

From its establishment, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

provided the agency and its directors with the capability to think about 

and consider the “toughest” questions. It developed new conceptual 

frameworks for thinking beyond contemporary programs and projects in order 

to better understand the complex nuclear, chemical and biological threats facing 

the United States and its military forces. In recent years, the focus shifted to 

developing new analytical methods that examine the problems posed by nuclear 

proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Concern with biological weapons and their 

consequences had intensified. Dr. Michael O. Wheeler, who replaced Richard L. 

Gullickson as ASCO’s director in October 2006, explained that “When it comes to 

WMD, the nation must hedge against strategic surprise while working to identify 

trends that could have significant implications for national security.” Since 1998 

ASCO has sponsored close to 300 studies, conducted several hundred workshops 

Maj. Gen. Randal R. Castro, USA, Deputy 

Director, DTRA
110 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

and conferences, managed six major bilateral dialogues with Asian and Eurasian 

nations, and developed and fostered cooperative activities with universities and 

non-governmental institutions under the University Strategic Partnership and 

related programs. It initiated publication of a web-based WMD Insights and 

developed programs to assist the research efforts of the next generation of WMD 

experts. ASCO supported the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, fostered 

the agency’s history program, and coordinated strategic planning and the creation 

of campaigns for the agency. In the conceptual arena, ASCO has undertaken a 

number of studies that focused on sketching the landscape of possible strategic 

surprises. Some studies addressed the technology dimensions of surprise, for 

instance, Advanced Applications of Quantum Mechanics and Technology Surprise. 

Then after 9/11, the focus shifted and a number of its studies examined threats 

posed by terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, including the Psychology of 

WMD Terrorism, Next Generation WMD Terrorism, and the Evil Genius. Other 

areas of investigation examined potential proliferation paths, threat anticipation, 

and situational awareness.322

In recent years the director and ASCO analysts have examined ways to develop 

an accurate assessment of foreign perceptions, programs, strategies, doctrines, and 

perspectives on WMD issues. The agency developed and funded informal Track II 

dialogues involving American, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Japanese, and Russian 

strategic analysts, academic area specialists, former military officers, and agency 

program managers. These meetings examined the Asian and Eurasian security 

environment and the role of nuclear weapons. At times, the dialogue examined 

informally the security context for existing national policies on nuclear weapons. 

Related topically, but not by program, was an influential ASCO-sponsored study 

in 2006 on Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture. It influenced 

the Nuclear Weapons Council, and was disseminated widely through briefings 

and discussions in the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy. During the 

congressional testimony of former Senator Sam Nunn, the study became part of 

the Congressional Record.323 

Typical of the agency’s analytic support to defense efforts is the work, pursued 

over many years, on the problem of defeating hard and deeply buried targets 

(HDBTs). In 1999 it initiated a study on Full Dimensional Defeat of Tunnels 

and Underground Facilities in support of developing a science and technology 

strategy to advance the U.S. military’s capability to hold WMD facilities, like 

mountainous tunnels or buried command bunkers, at risk. By 2008 the analytical 

work related to defeating hard and deeply buried targets had matured into a suite 

of studies which included three influential reports: Novel Energetics Assessments and 

Roadmap, High Energy Science & Technology Assessment, and Targeting Implications 

of Enhanced Energetic Payloads. The agency, through ASCO, participated in a 

Dr. Michael O. Wheeler, Director ASCO
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 111

joint DTRA-DARPA study, Health Surveillance and Biodefense System (HSBS) 

Feasibility and Implementation Study which undertook to establish the feasibility 

of building a DoD health surveillance and biodefense system for protecting 

military forces stationed abroad, and for developing mitigating strategies against 

any biological attacks. Following this work was an effort that conducted a series 

of studies, workshops, and research efforts on Defense of a Sea Port of Debarkation 

Against Attack with Chemical and Biological Weapons. More recently, ASCO has 

sponsored work on a Bioforensics Roadmap, a Biotechnology Diffusion Study, and 

Social Resiliency Enhancement: Restoring Civil Society After a WMD Event.

324

The sum of these studies, conferences, meetings, and university programs 

is greater than any of its parts. DTRA’s current and past directors wanted to 

establish a broad and continuing dialogue on WMD issues throughout the 

Defense Department, combatant commands, armed forces, Energy, State, and 

Homeland Security departments, national laboratories, intelligence communities, 

independent analytical institutions, universities and foreign governments and 

analysts. By establishing and continuing that multi-sided dialogue, the directors 

expected to use advanced systems and concepts to better understand WMD threats 

facing the United States and the world. 

Supporting the Nation’s Nuclear Forces: Major 

Challenges with the Air Force

S

ustaining the nation’s nuclear deterrence forces was one of the reasons for 

creating the agency in 1998. At that time, senior defense leaders, including 

General Larry D. Welch and Dr. John Hamre, had concluded that the 

nuclear deterrent forces and supporting organizations needed restructuring and 

redirection. DTRA’s nuclear support mission was to provide analytical support 

on nuclear matters to DoD’s combatant commands and designated organizations. 

This mission made the agency a DoD combat support agency to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff for designated nuclear weapons programs, including nuclear surety 

inspections of operational nuclear forces that were responsible for assembling, 

maintaining, and storing nuclear weapons systems and components. DTRA’s 

nuclear surety inspection teams inspected both U.S. Navy and Air Force units. 

Scientists and senior program managers within the agency also had responsibility 

for the DoD’s nuclear stockpile stewardship obligations that included issuing 

consolidated guidance, coordination, technical advice, assistance, and data control 

for all nuclear weapons within the department. DTRA operated and maintained 
112 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

the DoD’s Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center. It operated and staffed 

the Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirkland AFB, New Mexico. Historically, 

scientists and engineers in the Defense Nuclear Agency, had organized, conducted, 

and evaluated data collected from the nation’s underground nuclear tests. These 

people worked in the new agency and they provided a corpus of knowledge and 

expertise on nuclear weapons effects found in no other defense agencies. 

On August 30, 2007, a United States Air Force unit, the 5th Bomb Wing 

at Minot AFB, North Dakota, flew a B-52H bomber, carrying cruise missiles 

to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Once the bomber had landed the crew did an 

inspection and determined that the cruise missiles contained six nuclear warheads, 

which was a direct violation of the military service’s and the defense department’s 

policies and regulations on the movement of nuclear munitions in peacetime.325 

The incident was so serious that the secretary of defense, commander of the U.S. 

Strategic Command, and chief of staff of the Air Force commissioned major 

investigations of the incident. At Minot, the wing commander and several 

senior officers were relieved of command. The wing was decertified and 65 wing 

personnel lost their certification to handle nuclear and other special weaponry. 

Following an investigation, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne directed 

the Air Force Inspector General to begin conducting immediately “Limited 

Nuclear Surety Inspections” at all of the service’s nuclear capable units, with 

oversight provided by DTRA personnel.326 General Welch led the Defense 

Science Board’s task force on nuclear weapons surety which released its report 

in February 2008. Welch and the task force members found that standards of 

competence and mission focus had eroded in the Air Force’s nuclear forces.327

Over time nuclear weapons movement procedures had been “compromised” for 

the sake of expediency. Confusion existed over the handling of the cruise missiles. 

Confusion and unnecessary access existed where the storage of nuclear munitions/

missiles was in the same facility with nuclear- training, testing, and nuclear-inert 

devices. General Welch wrote: “There is little mystery regarding what needs to 

be done and how to do it. The nuclear enterprise performed well at all levels with 

the needed competence for decades.”328

This incident, the subsequent investigations and reports, provided the 

background for a DTRA-led nuclear surety inspection of the 5th Bomb Wing from 

May 16-23, 2008. It was a large inspection, with 140 inspectors from DTRA, 

Air Combat Command and other organizations. When the press reported that 

the wing failed the much-anticipated inspection, Colonel Joel Westa, 5th Bomb 

Wing commander, acknowledged that he was “disappointed in the findings” 

and concluded that the wing was “still doing business and it does not affect our 

certification.”329 During the next week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates received 

another investigative report evaluating the Air Force’s handling of nuclear weapons 

technologies, specifically the service’s inadvertent shipment of ICBM parts and 

electronic fuses to Taiwan. Citing the Air Force leadership’s lack of urgency in 

securing the nation’s nuclear arsenal, Gates asked for the resignations of Secretary 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 113

of the Air Force Michael Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael 

Mosley.330 While other issues were involved in the secretary’s decision, the lack 

of service attention to the nuclear forces and missions constituted one part. At 

DTRA, preparations were underway in the summer months of 2008 to provide 

additional support and assistance to the Air Force, and to organize and conduct 

subsequent nuclear surety inspections. Dr. Tegnelia believed that the agency 

should use its resources to help the Air Force restore high standards of competency 

throughout its nuclear forces. 

Disseminating the Agency’s WMD Knowledge 

and Expertise: At Home and Abroad

I

n 2006-2007, DTRA expanded and elevated its principal institution for 

disseminating knowledge and expertise of weapons of mass destruction: 

the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The 

school’s history began with the Manhattan Project that built the first atomic 

bomb under the auspices of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Since 

that time, the nuclear weapons school and its legacy organizations provided 

unique academic training in nuclear weapons, radiological accident response, 

and WMD proliferation issues for the Department of Defense and other federal 

and state agencies. In fall 2006, Dr. Tegnelia initiated the founding of a Defense 

Threat Reduction University to incorporate agency-wide training programs. 

Collocated with the historic nuclear weapons school, the university’s mission 

was to collaborate with other organizations that conducted combating WMD 

and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) 

training. He envisioned the new institution as a system integrator for all WMD/

CBRNE training and education courses at the international, federal, state and 

local levels.331

A year later, the Defense Threat Reduction University had evaluated its 

training and overhauled its courses to better fit its mission. The new courses 

were “capabilities-based” and designed to anticipate DoD’s or other customers’ 

requirements. To make the course offerings available online, the new university 

teamed up with U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Knowledge Development 

and Distribution Capability network, which funded the conversion of the 

existing classroom materials to a distance learning format and then hosted them 

on its internet server. The agency’s new university also absorbed the Defense 

Threat Reduction Information and Analysis Center to function as the university’s 

research center and knowledge management repository. On November 13, 
114 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

2007, Dr. Tegnelia and Dr. James Tritten, university director, commemorated 

the new Defense Threat Reduction University’s initial operating capability with 

a ceremonial ribbon cutting.332

As outlined in the QDR, the Department of Defense launched a 

Transformational Medical Technology Initiative (TMTI) in December 2006, 

designed to protect the warfighter from conventional or genetically engineered 

biological threats. TMTI’s goal was to implement one of the QDR’s key decisions: 

to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-terror 

threats, including genetically engineered, intercellular bacterial pathogens and 

hemorrhagic fevers.333 To develop innovative management approaches that linked 

transformational scientific breakthroughs with innovative business practices, 

DTRA’s Chemical-Biological Defense directorate, serving as the Joint Science 

and Technology Office, partnered with the Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense. The resulting Joint Program Management 

Office for the TMTI was responsible for the day-to-day execution of the $1.6 

billion program with the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical 

and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs providing 

oversight. Dr. Tegnelia judged TMTI to be the largest single program in the 

agency and stated that its impact on the biological defense of the nation could 

be revolutionary.334

The goals of the TMTI were to develop two or more platform technologies 

within five years that could be used to identify unknown pathogens and rapidly 

develop countermeasures to newly identified threats; to identify the genetic 

sequences for all pertinent threat agents against which to screen, characterize 

and identify potential biodefense threats; to develop and submit two or more 

Investigational New Drug broad spectrum countermeasures.335 In 2008, the 

secretary of defense’s special assistant guided the direction of TMTI to develop 

a series of capabilities to include genetic sequencing, chem-bio informatics and 

accelerated manufacturing for DoD with an initial operational capability by 

2014.336

An important recent development is the growth of DTRA’s “reachback” 

services to the Defense Department, military services, and other departments 

and organizations of the government. Located in the agency’s Combating WMD 

Enterprise, this service provided CBRNE technical information and decision 

making support on WMD situations to combatant commands, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. 

government organizations. In 2005, the reachback function responded to 700 

user requests; in 2007 they answered almost 900 requests for information and 

advice. In essence, the reachback service functioned in near real time, providing 

answers quickly to its customers, usually through the electronic media via 

software and visual data. Customers contacted the agency’s Operations Center 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 115

by telephone or computer and the reachback service worked 24 hours/7 days a 

week on the problem until it was answered to the customer’s satisfaction. Since 

technical expertise of CBRNE was shared by many offices and individuals in the 

federal government, DTRA’s reachback service worked collaboratively with other 

DoD organizations and branches of the government on providing accurate and 

timely data. Many users of the service were organizations who were preparing 

for, training in, or participating in CBRNE events, usually WMD consequence 

management exercises. They worked with the agency’s experienced reachback 

experts on understanding the WMD situation and in developing a course of 

action. The largest numbers of users who engaged the reachback services were 

WMD civil support teams, units from every military service, and the staffs of 

the combatant commands. In 2007, DTRA reachback staff responded to 898 

requests for information. Paul Boren, a senior manager, believed that “this 

operational concept is the wave of the future for DTRA. It emphasizes the use of 

telecommunications, software modeling and situational awareness of the problems 

of the COCOMs, so that DTRA can provide them better support.”337

Abroad, disseminating DTRA’s expertise and knowledge on countering the 

effects of weapons of mass destruction, known as CBRNE, usually occurred 

in planning, training, and participating in agency-sponsored international 

consequence management exercises or nonproliferation training courses. In recent 

years, 2005-2008, the Emergency Management division of the Combat Support 

directorate initiated and implemented a Foreign Consequence Management 

Program. It satisfied critical requirements of four combatant commanders and 

it was also responsible for strengthening the WMD consequence management 

capabilities of American allies. The new program was revolutionary in concept, one 

with innovative planning and cooperative operational approaches. In planning 

and conducting the exercises, the processes were tailored and considered the host 

nation’s cultures, laws, capabilities, sensitivities, and anticipated their tolerance 

for change. Additionally, the host nation’s first responders and civil officials were 

involved from the beginning, along with military commanders of the installations 

in the area of operations. The results were impressive as combatant commanders 

saw their capability to deal with CBRNE events significantly improve; and the 

host nation’s agencies have seen their consequence management activities with 

the United States military commands increase tremendously. In addition, all of 

parties acknowledged that partnerships had developed a new national and regional 

response capability. In recent years DTRA personnel organized and conducted 

foreign consequence management exercises and seminars around the world: in the 

United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Russia, Iraq, Qatar, 

Saudi Arabia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Panama and Singapore. In 2008 this DTRA 

initiative became a combatant command priority item.338

The agency’s counterproliferation teams were planning and implementing 

complex WMD exercise scenarios with military and interior forces of other nations. 

One of the largest DTRA exercises occurred when military officers and government 

Command Sergeant Major Patrick Z. Alston, 

USA, DTRA’s first Command Senior Enlisted 

Leader
116 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

officials from five nations – Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, 

and the United States – participated in a joint crisis management 

WMD exercise from September 24-28, 2007. Involving more 

than 390 military officers, interior police, and ministry officials, 

the Black Sea Regional WMD Exercise was organized and run 

by DTRA’s International Counterproliferation Program (ICP).339

The agency served as the ICP executive agent for the secretary 

of defense, responsible for program management, planning, 

execution, budgeting, and logistics. According to the charter, the 

DoD International Counterproliferation Program received policy 

guidance and direction from the OSD Global Security Affairs 

and OSD Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global 

Threats offices. Specific requests for counterproliferation training, 

assistance, and exercises came from the Joint Staff, combatant 

commands, NSC interagency committees, or the U.S. embassies in 

the region. DTRA was responsible for planning, scheduling, and implementing 

the program.340 

In fact, DTRA had been extraordinarily active, organizing and conducting 

more than 330 training courses and seminars with over 8,000 participants in 26 

nations since 1997. These courses involved command center exercises, border 

incident training, and integrated WMD exercises. DTRA’s ICP training teams 

consisted of representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs 

and Border Protection Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, fire and 

emergency response specialists, and WMD national security and policy experts. In 

addition to training courses and exercises, DTRA provided specialized equipment 

including chemical and radiological detection and monitoring devices, WMD 

evidence collection kits, photography equipment, decontamination equipment, 

and even portable shelters. In 2005, Congress authorized the secretary of defense 

to institute ICP programs with nations where there exists a “significant threat of 

the unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons or related materials.”341 As a consequence, the Black Sea Regional exercise 

included Bulgaria and Romania, two nations that were not part of the former 

Soviet Union. The five-day exercise opened with a videoconference connecting 

the capital cities of the respective nations. What began as a routine traffic stop 

at the border by the Romanian police developed into a complex exercise scenario 

involving WMD command post response procedures, crime scene management, 

investigative procedures, international notifications and technical assistance, and 

response capabilities. The multinational exercise concluded with a videoconference 

exchanging after action review comments from personnel of all five nations. Dr. 

Tegnelia followed the Black Sea events carefully, and in March 2008 he testified 

to Congress, “We initiated this concept in the Black Sea region by hosting 

conferences, sponsoring the regional exercise, and developing links to regional 

organizations.”342 

DTRA led a large Black Sea Regional WMD exercise.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 117

In his testimony the director also stated the agency’s support for “the 

establishment of USSTRATCOM’s Joint Elimination Coordination Element 

(JECE) to perform activities and operations necessary to train and prepare joint 

forces and the command and control elements to conduct WMD elimination 

missions.”343 The first JECE achieved interim operational capability in August 2007 

when it supported the U.S. Army’s 20th Support Command during Ulchi Focus 

Lens, an annual readiness exercise led by U.S. Forces Korea. In January 2008, the 

Department of Defense authorized funding to USSTRATCOM for a 30-person 

standing organization for FY09. Administered by the U.S. Strategic Command 

Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, the JECE was expected to 

move to the home of the 20th Support Command in Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland, in the near future. While the new element would train with the 20th, 

its structure as a stand-alone headquarters unit would also allow it to “plug-in” 

as part of a joint task for elimination where it could provide direct augmentation 

to a combatant command for planning and provide operational expertise in a 

WMD elimination area.344

DTRA at Ten: Broader, Deeper, and Focused on 

Responding to WMD Terrorism

During 2008 the nation went through a long presidential nominating 

campaign and national election. Every one of the twenty or so 

presidential candidates agreed that a sudden, unexpected WMD terrorist 

attack against the United States was among their worst fears. President Bush had 

already declared publicly that “the greatest threat before humanity today is the 

possibility of secret or sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological 

or nuclear weapons. [...] What has changed in the 21st century is that, in the 

hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be the first resort – [...].”345

General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, testified before 

Congress that he worried about preventing and responding to a sudden terrorist 

strike using WMD. The general told Congress that he had “no WMD forces” 

but relied on defense agencies for support and expertise.346 The Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency “alone” among all U.S. government organizations and agencies 

had a mandate to provide combat support, operational support, and research and 

development to the combatant commands and domestic security departments 

across all three WMD threats – chemical, biological, and nuclear. Alone among 

DoD agencies, DTRA supported all three pillars of the Bush Administration’s 

2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction – nonproliferation, 

counterproliferation, and consequence management.347 When Dr. Tegnelia, 

DTRA director, looked to the future in early 2008 he said “I absolutely believe General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
118 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

that this organization ought to be ... providing services to all 

branches of the federal government.”348 He was referring to 

the agency’s knowledge, expertise and capability in providing 

support for WMD counterproliferation programs, exercises, 

and materials. Further he thought that the agency’s mission 

“needs to expand its overseas reach,” because “WMD defense 

starts early in the nonproliferation process and as far away 

from our borders as we can make it.”349 In the future, Tegnelia 

declared the agency would continue its support of the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

That major international initiative, launched by Presidents 

Bush and Putin during the St. Petersburg Summit in July 

2006, included a statement of principles committing 

the United States, the Russian Federation, and other participating nations to 

developing partnerships and programs to combat nuclear terrorism.350 The 

statement of principles stressed adherence to existing international laws and 

agreements, specifically the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 

Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 

and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540. In addition, participating 

nations were encouraged to join the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Program, the G-8 

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the 

Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Based 

on international law and cooperative agreements, many nations quickly joined the 

new global initiative. Within three months, the initiative included 12 nations, 

within two years, there were 75.351 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s CT 

directorate had fifteen years of experience in instituting and managing cooperative 

threat reduction programs, many with nuclear weapons and materials. These 

programs became models as its program managers developed new initiatives 

with the Russian government in nuclear weapons safety and security, nuclear 

weapons transportation, and nuclear decontamination and demilitarization. 

Other CTR efforts set up cooperative WMD proliferation prevention programs 

with Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Still other multinational 

programs, carried out by DTRA’s OS directorate, planned, organized, financed, 

and conducted WMD exercises with the nations of the Black Sea region and 

Eastern Europe. 

This was the context when Dr. Tegnelia commissioned a senior level review 

panel in late summer 2007 to conduct an independent review of the agency 

and make recommendation on its directions for the future. One of their major 

recommendations was that DTRA should “heighten” its involvement in the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Led by Dr. Ashton B. Carter 

and Ambassador Robert G. Joseph, the panel’s final report in March 2008 began 

“WMD in the hands of hostile states or terrorists constitute the preeminent threat 

to the United States, our allies and friends. While the WMD danger may not be 

Presidents Bush and Putin at the G-8 Summit 2006
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 119

as immediate, on a day-to-day basis, as the other threats now facing U.S. forces 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is likely to be far closer than commonly realized, with 

political, military, economic and social consequences more devastating than any 

the United States has had to face to date.”352 They examined the Department 

of Defense and the U.S. government’s record of implementing the President’s 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, issued in 2002. They 

concluded that the government had “fallen short” in implementing the three 

major areas of the national strategy: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and 

consequence management. Within Defense Department responsibility for these 

three activities were spread across the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, Offices 

of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, and the military services. Within the federal government, responsibility 

for combating WMD, especially consequence management, was spread across 

multiple power centers and departments: White House, State, Energy, Homeland 

Security, Health and Human Services, and the intelligence agencies. While all 

senior officials acknowledged that combating WMD was a critical, national 

mission, Carter, Joseph and the review panel concluded that within the Defense 

Department and across the government, collectively the roles and responsibilities 

were “not well defined.”353

In examining the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, they began with a 

declaration of its uniqueness: “It alone in the U.S. government has a mandate 

for combat support, operations, and research and development which extends to 

all three pillars of the National Strategy and all three WMD threats – chemical, 

biological and nuclear.”338 They endorsed a major expansion of the agency’s 

programs, projects, exercises, research, technology development, and its leadership 

role in combating WMD. Again and again, Joseph and Carter observed that the 

U.S. government was not well focused or organized for this critical mission. At one 

point they concluded, “DTRA appears to be the only organization within DoD 

that is able to take on many of the technical aspects of this responsibility.” They 

recommended that the department develop a new, 

more detailed strategic plan for combating WMD, 

one which would include DTRA’s unique strengths. 

Further, they recommended that USSTRATCOM 

and USNORTHCOM, aided by DTRA, consider 

developing a new departmental plan for domestic 

and international WMD consequence management, 

including programs, training, and exercises.354

In examining the department’s leadership 

structure, the panel recommended that the secretary 

of defense create a new assistant secretary of defense 

for WMD. The position would be held by a senior 

civilian official who would be responsible for 

focusing the department’s senior leadership on the The Defense Threat Reduction Center at the McNamara Headquarters Complex, 

 Fort Belvoir, Virginia
120 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

mission. To strengthen the department’s combating WMD structure even further, 

the panel suggested that DTRA’s director could be designated as the principal 

deputy to the new assistant secretary. After weighing the pros and cons, the 

Carter and Joseph report concluded that the DTRA’s director should be changed 

to a three-star military position. This change would “strengthen” and facilitate 

the relationships with the military services and the combatant commands which 

were “critical” for the agency’s combat support missions. The review panel also 

called for an examination of the current legislative and regulatory restrictions 

on the agency’s budget. Although the Department of Defense had experienced 

significant growth since the nation was attacked by terrorists on 9/11, the agency’s 

budget for its critical WMD missions had not grown beyond the annual rate of 

inflation. Consequently, the panel concluded that for DTRA to meet its mission 

responsibilities, its budget would need to grow.355

Beyond these organizational and budgetary recommendations, Carter and 

Joseph focused on how the nation and department would be combating WMD 

in the next decade. In protecting the nation’s military forces from nuclear, 

chemical, or biological attacks, the combatant commands in future years had 

to devote more attention in their war planning, exercises, and theater security 

cooperative programs to states and terrorist groups threatening to use weapon 

of mass destruction. DTRA was a combat support agency and its assistance to 

the combatant commands, already well established, should be expanded. In the 

nuclear area, DTRA should heighten its involvement with the Global Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism through exercises, knowledge dissemination, and 

other capacity building activities with other nations. The USSTRATCOM 

Center for Combating WMD at DTRA needed to work closely with the nations 

involved with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and develop measure 

to improve operational interdiction capabilities. DTRA’s reachback services 

provided “essential” support for WMD-related interdictions and should be 

expanded. In providing support for the nation’s nuclear deterrence forces, the 

review panel acknowledged the loss of focus by the department, but it declared 

that the agency should help reverse the decline by maintaining and strengthening 

its nuclear surety programs. Maintaining the CTR program, which had been 

the key element for more than fifteen years in U.S. WMD nonproliferation and 

arms reduction policies with Russia and other nations of the region, should be 

continued. However, the CTR program should be refocused and expanded to 

eliminate, reduce, consolidate, secure, and detect WMD and related materials 

across the globe. One area of CTR assistance, biosafety and biosecurity, could 

be expanded with many nations participating in regional or bilateral programs. 

The review panel examined consequence management at home and abroad, 

recommending it concentrate on working with the combatant commands and 

military services in preparing their installations and personnel to plan and prepare 

for WMD incidents. Finally, Carter and Joseph closed the report, characterizing 

their recommendations as “ambitious, but realistic.”356
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 121

Vice President Richard B. Cheney; Ambassador Robert G. Joseph; Dr. Ashton B. Carter; Dr. Susan J. Koch; Mr. Bruce Miller; and, Dr. James A. Tegnelia discuss strategies 

to counter WMD and the future of the Agency’s missions.

While proscriptive reports are numerous in the Department of Defense, this 

one was influential. Following consultation with Dr. Tegnelia, the review panel’s 

two chairmen, Carter and Joseph, briefed the report on the future of the agency, 

and more significantly, the future of the department’s efforts to combat WMD, to 

senior civilian and military leaders. They met and briefed Vice President Richard 

Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, several undersecretaries of 

defense, General James E. Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, USSTRATCOM.357 By June, the 

panel’s report had been disseminated to the public via the internet. Consequently, 

report had become part of the current policy recommendations that a new 

administration would consider after the national elections in November 2008.

These briefings and policy recommendations were current as Dr. Tegnelia 

reflected on the agency’s present and future missions for this history:

DTRA is a unique organization. It has a very important mission that I think transcends 

political parties and presidential administrations, and I think it represents the difficult 

strategic problem of the 21st century, at least the first part of the 21st century. I think 

that DTRA’s got a great future as long as it can keep its competencies up and keep its 

technical skills up and make sure that it’s got great people who have good educations, 

good backgrounds and the kind of drive and desire to provide that counter WMD 

service. And so I see a bright future for it [...].358

2
122 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 123

DTRA Reference Materials
124 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

DTRA Key Leadership

(October 1, 1998 through October 1, 2008)

DIRECTOR

Dr. James A. Tegnelia February 9, 2005 – 

Maj. Gen. Trudy H. Clark, USAF February 28, 2004 – February 8, 2005

(Acting Director)

Dr. Stephen M. Younger September 1, 2001 – February 27, 2004

Maj. Gen. Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF June 25, 2001 – August 31, 2001

(Acting Director)

Dr. Jay C. Davis October 1, 1998 – June 24, 2001

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

BG Randy E. Manner, USA July 21, 2008 – 

MG Randal R. Castro, USA September 5, 2006 – July 3, 2008

Maj. Gen. Trudy H. Clark, USAF June 1, 2003 – August 1, 2006

Maj. Gen. Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF June 1, 2000 – December 13, 2002 

Maj. Gen. William F. Moore, USAF October 1, 1998 – May 31, 2000

CHIEF OF STAFF

COL Carlton B. Reid, USA August 1, 2008 – 

COL John P. Connell, USA October 1, 2007 – July 31, 2008

Col Michael R. Hargrove, USAF April 14, 2006 – September 30, 2007

Ms. Deborah Walls November 2, 2005 – April 13, 2006

Mr. William R. Faircloth December 17, 2001 – November 1, 2005 

COL William R. Faircloth, USA May 13, 2000 – December 16, 2001

CAPT Richard L. Towner, USN February 1, 1999 – May 12, 2000

Col Arthur T. Hopkins, USAF October 1, 1998 – January 31, 1999

COMMAND SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER

CSM Patrick Z. Alston, USA July 8, 2008 – 

SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR

Chief Master Sergeant Kenneth M. Smith, Jr., USAF April 28, 2006- July 7, 2008 

Chief Master Sergeant Valerie Jackson, USAF May 11, 2003 – April 27, 2006

Chief Master Sergeant Lewis L. O’Bryant, USAF September 1, 2000 – May 10, 2003

SGM Steve Crawford, USA October 1, 1999 – August 31, 2000

SGM Clinton Adams, USA October 1, 1998 – September 30, 1999

DEPUTY DIRECTOR U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION:

Maj. Gen. John M. Howlett June 1, 2008 –

RDML William P. Loeffler April 1, 2006 – May 31, 2008
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 125

DTRA Operating Locations:

Headquarters, DTRA, Fort Belvoir VA

Albuquerque Operations, Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque NM

Counter WMD Technologies, Weapons and Capabilities Division, Eglin AFB FL

European Operations Division, Darmstadt, Germany

DTRA European Field Office, Chievres Belgium

DTRA Pacific Field Office, Honolulu HI

Dulles International Airport, Herndon VA

Hard Target Research and Analysis Center, Herndon VA

Nevada Test Site, Mercury NV

START Nuclear Detachment, San Francisco CA

START Nuclear Detachment –Yokota Air Base Japan 

Defense Threat Reduction Office – London United Kingdom

Defense Threat Reduction Office – Moscow Russia

Defense Threat Reduction Office – Kyiv Ukraine

Defense Threat Reduction Office – Tashkent Uzbekistan

Defense Threat Reduction Office – Baku Azerbaijan

Defense Threat Reduction Office – Astana Kazakhstan

Defense Threat Reduction Office – Tblisi Georgia

Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility (VPMF), Votkinsk Russia

Treaty Escort Teams at Chemical Demilitarization Facilities: 

• Anniston AL

 • Pine Bluff AR 

• Newport IN

 • Umatilla OR

 • Tooele UT

Liaison Locations:

U.S. Africa Command Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart-Moehringen, GE

U.S. Central Command MacDill Air Force Base, FL

U.S. Joint Forces Command Norfolk, VA

U.S. Joint Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, NC

U.S. Pacific Command Camp H.M. Smith, HI
126 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

San Francisco,

California

Albuquerque,

New Mexico

Mercury,

Nevada

DTRA HQ

Washington D.C.

Kyiv,

Ukraine

Darmstadt,

Germany

London,

England

Moscow,

Russia

Astana,

Kazakhstan

Tashkent,

Uzbekistan

Baku,

Azerbaijan

Tbilisi,

Georgia

Votkinsk,

Russia

Yokota,

Japan

White Sands

Missile Range, NM Honolulu,

Hawaii

Chievres ,

Belgium

Eglin AFB,

Florida

 Major Operating Locations (Headquarters at Fort

Belvoir, Virginia)

Chem Demil sites 

2008 - DTRA Operating locations

U.S. Northern Command & North American Aerospace Defense Command

 Peterson Air Force Base, CO

 U.S. Southern Command Miami, FL

 U.S. Special Operations Command MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

 U.S. Strategic Command Offutt Air Force Base, NE

 U.S. Transportation Command Scott Air Force Base, IL

 Joint Staff Washington, DC

 National Guard Bureau Washington, DC

 U.S. European Command Patch Barracks,Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany

 U.S. Mission to NATO Brussels, Belgium

 Defense Intelligence Agency Bolling AFB, Washington, DC

 Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 127

Manhattan Engineering Project, 1942-1947

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 1947-

1959

Defense Atomic Support Agency, 1959-1971

Defense Nuclear Agency, 1971-1996

Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1996-1998

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1984

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1995

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1998

On-Site Inspection Agency, 1988-1998

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1988

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1993

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1996

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 1998

DTRA formed October 1, 1998

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 2000

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 2003

USSTRATCOM Center For Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 Joint Meritorious Unit Award, 2007

Lineage & Honors
128 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

DESCRIPTION: On a sphere azure (oriental blue) gridlined in deep azure an eagle displayed overt and 

proper is grasping an olive branch in dexter talons and a bundle of thirteen arrows in sinister talons. Charged 

upon its breast a target bordered with azure chief to gules surmounted by three bolts. All within a designation 

band deep azure bordured or with inscription argent DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY chief 

to UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 

SIGNIFICANCE: The globe represents the worldwide importance and implications of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency’s mission. The designation band reflects the Agency’s service to the Department of Defense. 

The eagle is adapted from the Great Seal of the United States. The colors of the shield reflect the Agency’s central 

task: to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, while preparing for future and uncertain threats. The 

three arrows, adapted from the Seal of the Department of Defense highlight the military departments of the 

United States; they appear in parallel, symbolizing unity and direction.

Approved July 1999

DTRA Seal
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 129

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

1998-2008 Chronology

1997 

November 7 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen releases the Defense Reform Initiative 

(DRI), proposing the consolidation of three existing Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

agencies into a new “Threat Reduction and Treaty Compliance Agency” in the Defense Reform 

Initiative Report. 

1998 

May 8 Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre selects Dr. Jay C. Davis of Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory as first Director, DTRA. 

May 22 President William J. Clinton signs Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63, which 

expand the role of the Department of Defense in WMD consequence management operations. 

DTRA is assigned selected tasks to accomplish missions delineated in these directives. 

July 15 Threat Reduction Advisory Council established by Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Hamre. 

October 1 DTRA established in ceremony at agency headquarters at Washington Dulles 

International Airport, Dulles, Virginia. 

December DTRA deploys Open Skies OC-135B in support of humanitarian operations in 

Honduras following Hurricane Mitch. The aircraft is used to map mud flows and assists local 

officials in efforts to target relief to affected areas. 

December 16-21 DTRA modeling and simulation teams support U.S. forces during 

Operation DESERT FOX, a series of air raids against Iraq. 

1999 

January Ethnic tensions in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Serbs result in deployment 

of diplomatic observers sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe. DTRA deploys inspection teams to support the United States Kosovo Diplomatic 

Observer Mission. 
130 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

February 1 DTRA reorganizes. The Force Protection, Special Weapons and 

Counterproliferation directorates are combined to form the Counterproliferation 

Support and Operations Directorate under the leadership of Colonel Arthur T. 

Hopkins, USAF. 

February 26 DTRA completes a Cooperative Threat Reduction program initiative 

in Ukraine, destroying the last of 130 SS-19 missile silos. 

March 25 – June 20 Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO’s air campaign against 

Yugoslavia, takes place. DTRA provides input to European Command and 

Pentagon target lists. 

April 23-25 NATO holds its 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., 

and DTRA provides summit staff with modeling and simulation support for 

potential crisis response or consequence management. 

October 1 DTRA’s Technology Security Directorate establishes the Space Launch 

Monitoring division to monitor the launch of U.S.-owned satellites on foreign 

boosters. 

November 1 Russia opens the Nuclear Weapons Security Assessment and Training 

Center at Sergiev Posad, Russia. Designed and constructed with CTR funds, 

the facility will enable Russia to better protect its strategic nuclear warheads and 

materials.

December 31 DTRA participates in DoD contingency consequence management 

planning for the national millennium celebration, 2000. 

2000 

January 27 Secretary Cohen announces consolidation of DTRA at Fort 

Belvoir. 

February 1 DTRA and the Arnold Engineering Developing Center at Arnold 

Air Force Base, Tennessee, open the Decade Radiation Test Facility (DRTF). 

The facility provides data on how a nuclear explosion in outer space would affect 

sensitive optical and electronic equipment. 

February 3 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology 

Joseph J. Eash III, tasks DTRA to conduct an Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration entitled Restoration of Operations (RestOps). RestOps is a 

large-scale program designed to better prepare military sites from a chemical or 

biological attack. 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 131

March 6 Dr. Davis announces the agency’s Strategic Plan 2000, which outlines 

a new strategic vision and direction for the agency. 

March 6 Secretary Cohen awards DTRA Joint Meritorious Unit Award for the 

period October 1, 1998 to March 5, 2000. 

March 15-25 DTRA participates in exercise TOPOFF 2000, a large-scale 

congressionally-mandated domestic counterterrorism response exercise designed 

to test national leaders’ capability to respond to a domestic WMD incident. 

June 1 DTRA activates consolidated operations center at Telegraph Road facility, 

Alexandria, Virginia. 

June 15 The first 150 DTRA employees, including the Chemical-Biological 

Defense Directorate and Manpower and Personnel offices, move into the 

Headquarters Complex at Fort Belvoir.

July 5 DTRA turns over a CTR financed Central CW Destruction Analytical 

Laboratory to the Russian Ministry of Defense. 

July 29 In Kazakhstan, Deglen Mountain, once the world’s largest nuclear test 

sites, is closed with CTR assistance. The event removed Kazakhstan, a NPT Treaty 

signatory state, from the list of nations capable of conducting nuclear weapons 

test. 

August 14-18 DTRA conducts exercise Dingo Dawn at Bangor Sub Base, 

Silverdale, Washington. The interagency nuclear weapons accident exercise attracts 

over 500 participants from national, state, and local agencies. 

September 26 DTRA reorganizes. The Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate 

becomes the WMD Combat Support Directorate, the Counterproliferation 

Support and Operations Directorate becomes the Technology Development 

Directorate, and three new directorates are formed: Resource Management, 

Information Systems and Acquisition Management. 

September 27 DTRA headquarters moves into a modular structure on the DLA 

Headquarters Complex grounds at Fort Belvoir. 

2001 

February 2 The final Soviet Blackjack bomber (Tu-160) is eliminated at Priluki 

Air Base, Ukraine. 

February 11-21 DTRA participates in the Restoration of Operations (RestOps) 
132 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Exercise in South Korea. More than 6,700 U.S. Air Force, South Korean Air 

Force, and DTRA personnel are involved in the 10-day exercise. 

April 18 The Russian Duma ratifies the Open Skies Treaty. Belarus follows, ratifying 

on May 3. Both Russia and Belarus deposit their instruments of ratification on 

November 2, 2001, clearing the way for entry into force in January 2002. 

May 31 The on-site inspection protocols of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 

cease, 13 years after they began. During May, ceremonies are held at Washington, 

D.C., Magna, Utah, and Votkinsk and Moscow, Russia. 

June 24 Dr. Jay C. Davis ends his tenure as DTRA’s first director. Deputy Director 

Major General Robert P. Bongiovi becomes the acting director the following 

day. 

September 1 Dr. Stephen M. Younger becomes the second director of DTRA. 

Dr. Younger was a senior associate laboratory director at the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory. 

September 7 A $5 billion CTR Integrating Contract is awarded to five major 

U.S. firms. It is the largest contract award in DTRA’s history. 

September 11 The United States is stunned by a series of terrorist attacks in 

Washington, D.C., New York, and Pennsylvania. Immediately, DTRA contributes 

directly to U.S. combat commands and domestic agencies that are responding 

to the terrorist attacks. 

October 1 DTRA undergoes an agency-wide reorganization. The most notable 

of the changes had eight staff offices being absorbed into four new enabling 

directorates. 

October 7 The United States launches Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.

November 8 Dr. Dale E. Klein is confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Assistant to 

the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. 

Dr. Klein is responsible for DOD oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency.

December 5 Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that the United States had 

met its final limits outlined in the START Treaty. All five signatory nations—the 

United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—were in compliance 

with the treaty. 

December 11 DTRA creates the Hard Target Research and Analysis Center 

(HTRAC).
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 133

2002

January 1 The Open Skies Treaty between twenty seven member states of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact goes 

into effect. 

February 24-28 Salt Lake City, Utah hosts the Olympic Winter Games. For the 

duration of the games, DTRA teams from the Technology Development, On-Site 

Inspection, and Combat Support directorates provide support to the organizers 

on location in Salt Lake City, Utah and from DTRA’s Operations Center in 

Virginia.

May 24 President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin sign the 

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

May – July Ukraine, under the assistance of the CTR program, begins eliminating 

TU-22 strategic bombers, air-to-surface missiles, missile fuels, and other 

equipment.

September 26 – October 8 Combat Support directorate leads a security response 

force exercise in coordination with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines at the Naval 

Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. Codenamed Mighty Guardian V, the 

exercise evaluates DOD, service and command nuclear weapon security policies, 

standards and equipment at a U.S. coastal installation.

October 22-25 DTRA sponsors a nuclear weapon accident response field training 

exercise in Camp Guernsey and F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, 

and U.S. Air Force Space Command. It involved military, federal, state and local 

response agencies throughout the U.S. with the Defense Department as lead federal 

agency. The exercise, Diligent Warrior 03, tests and validates nuclear weapon 

accident response procedures. 

October 23 The U.S. Congress allots funding for the construction of DTRA’s 

permanent home, the Defense Threat Reduction Center at the south end of the 

McNamara Headquarters Complex at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

December 13 U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Robert Bongiovi, DTRA Deputy Director, 

retires.

2003

January DTRA’s Strategic Plan 2003 provides direction for the agency’s efforts 
134 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

for the next six years. It reiterates the DTRA’s four mission essential functions of 

combat support, technology development, threat control and threat reduction, 

but refined the enabling functions designed to fulfill them. The plan introduces 

strategic management as a new function, maintained resource management, 

and redefined business into acquisition and logistics management, knowledge 

into information management, and security and intelligence into security and 

counterintelligence management. 

January 16 As preparations for the war in Iraq advanced, DTRA planners brief 

final Site Assessment Teams concept of operations to U.S. Central Command.

February 4-5 DTRA conducts an Integrated Technology Demonstration as 

part of the Combating Terrorism Technology Program in Niceville, Florida in 

coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. 

Coast Guard.

February 18 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formally directs DTRA to 

support U.S. Central Command in the conduct of WMD disablement, targeting, 

elimination, and site assessment operations in Iraq.

February DTRA’s Site Assessment Teams 1-4 deploy to Kuwait.

March 7 DTRA designated as DoD Executive Agent for WMD Elimination 

Operations within Iraq.

March 19 DTRA establishes the Weapons Elimination (WE) Directorate to 

oversee WMD Elimination Operations in Iraq. 

March 19 – May 1 DTRA Site Assessment Teams conduct nearly seventy sensitive 

site surveys during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

June 1 Major General Trudy Clark, USAF, joins DTRA as Deputy Director.

May – August Task Force DTRA conducts more than 130 assessments of possible 

WMD sites in Iraq.

2004

February 28 Dr. Stephen M. Younger, DTRA’s second director since its founding, 

departs the agency. Maj. Gen. Trudy Clark becomes acting director.

June In concert with U.S. Northern Command’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability 

Demonstration, DTRA conducts the fourth Integrated Technology Demonstration 

in the port of Seattle, Washington. 
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 135

June 23 In Iraq, Task Force DTRA provides support to DOE experts to package 

and transport 1.77 metric tons of low enriched uranium and 1,000 highly 

radioactive sources out of Iraq to the United States for storage at Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory, near Knoxville, Tennessee.

November As part of its Hard Target Defeat Program, DTRA funds and manages 

a Massive Ordnance Penetrator program to develop a 30,000-pound class weapon 

that would effectively defeat and destroy hard and deeply buried targets such as 

bunkers and tunnels. The new weapon would be ten times more powerful than 

the U.S. Air Force’s current weapon, the BLU-109.

2005

January 6 U.S. Marine General James E. Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command, becomes lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing 

combating WMD capabilities across the Department of Defense. 

February 8 Dr. James Tegnelia succeeds Dr. Younger as DTRA’s third director. 

Before he assumed his new post at the agency, Tegnelia had been the vice president, 

DoD Programs, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M.

August 26 USSTRATCOM Commander General Cartwright established a Center 

for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) within DTRA.

September DTRA reorganizes from seven “two-letter” directorates to four 

enterprises that comprise several of the old directorates. Aiming to improve 

cooperation of enterprises to accomplish common goals, the agency developed 

six campaigns: Campaign 1: Situational Awareness, Campaign 2: Control WMD 

Materials and Systems Worldwide, Campaign 3: Eliminate WMD as a Threat to the 

Warfighter, Campaign 4: Enabling Others to Protect the Homeland, Campaign 5: 

Deter the 21st Century WMD Threat, and Campaign Six: Business Excellence.

September 23 Dr. Tegnelia receives the keys for the newly constructed Defense 

Threat Reduction Center on Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

2006

January 26 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency officially moves into its new 

headquarters, the Defense Threat Reduction Center on Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

January 26 Dr. Tegnelia becomes director of the USSTRATCOM Center for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD).
136 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

January 31 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appoints Dr. Tegnelia director 

of the SCC-WMD.

February 6 The Secretary of Defense releases the report of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review. In it, the Department announces DTRA’s designation as the 

primary Combat Support Agency for U.S. Strategic Command in its role as 

Combatant Commander for integrating and synchronizing combating WMD 

effort.

April 1 Rear Admiral William P. Loeffler, USN, becomes the first deputy director 

of SCC-WMD.

April DTRA employees come under the new National Security Personnel 

System.

April DTRA publishes its 2006 Strategic Plan. The new plan reflects the agency’s 

broader set of responsibilities as the Defense Department’s principal agency for 

integrating intellectual, technical, and operational capabilities for national and 

military strategies to fight WMD and to support soldiers fighting the nation’s wars. 

To enhance its ability to respond to WMD threats in traditional, but even more so, 

irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive scenarios DTRA creates six campaigns.

August 1 Major General Trudy Clark leaves her position as DTRA deputy director 

and retires from the U.S. Air Force. 

September 5 Major General Randal R. Castro becomes DTRA’s new deputy 

director.

October DTRA creates Campaign X: Defeat the Threat of Loose Nuclear 

Weapons.

2007

February Under the framework of the CTR program, DTRA oversees the 

incineration of approximately sixteen tons of bulk chemical agents in Albania. 

Beginning in February, the elimination process was completed on 10 July.

February 22 Dr. Tegnelia decides to cancel Divine Strake, an experiment to 

measure the effects of 700 tons of conventional explosives at the Nevada Test Site. 

The test would serve to advance understanding of how to defeat underground 

facilities. Following public protest, the test explosion is cancelled.

March 15 More than two years after the program first began in November 2004, 

DTRA conducts the first test of a new 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator 

conventional weapon at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 137

April DTRA contributes people and resources to a new Defense Department 

Center of Excellence for Air Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, 

Development & Acquisition, Test & Evaluation located at Eglin AFB, Florida. 

This action developed from a study by the 2005 BRAC, resulting in the agency 

creating a new division in 2007, and to initiate the transfer of people and resources 

from Ft. Belvoir to Eglin AFB in 2008.

September 24-28 DTRA’s International Counterproliferation Program organizes 

and runs the largest Black Sea Regional WMD Exercise to date.

October 3 General Kevin P. Chilton assumes his duties as Commander, 

USSTRATCOM.

November 13 The Defense Threat Reduction University in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico achieves initial operating capability. 

2008

March Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Ambassador Robert G. Joseph, co-chairs, present 

the report of the “Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency Mission and Capabilities to Combat WMD” to Dr. Tegnelia. Key points 

in this report briefed to senior officials in DoD, NSC, and the U.S. Congress.

May 16-23 DTRA’s Nuclear Surety teams conduct an inspection of the U.S. Air 

Force’s 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB, North Dakota. 

May 31 Rear Admiral Loeffler leaves his position as Deputy Director of SCCWMD. 

June 1 Major General John M. Howlett, USAF, becomes Deputy Director of 

SCC-WMD.

July 3 Major General Randal Castro leaves his position as DTRA Deputy Director 

and retires from the U.S. Army.

July 21 Brigadier General Randy E. Manner, USA, assumes his duties as Deputy 

Director, DTRA.

October 1 DTRA achieves its tenth anniversary as a Defense Department 

agency. 
138 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

Endnotes 1

 For a case history of this attack see, Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap (Bloomington, Indiana, 1994), pp 13-21; Bruce Hoffmann, Inside Terrorism (New 

York, 1999), pp. 199-205, and Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, (New York, 1999), pp. 76 & 186. 2

 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, (New York, 1999), pp. 3-20 & 32-67. 3

 “Independent Review of Khobar Towers Bombing,” Lieutenant General James F. Record, USAF, October 31, 1996, www.af.mil/current/khobar/record.htm. 4

 A good survey of these terrorist incidents is, Wayman C. Mullins, A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, 

Tactics, and Responses (Springfield, Illinois, 1997); see also, “The Covert NBC Threat in Historical Perspective,” in Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, 

et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998), pp. 27-96, and Judith Miller, 

Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs, and Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs, Biological Weapons and America’ Secret War, 

(New York, 2001), pp 151-154, 160-163, 200.

5

 David Hoffman, The Oklahoma City Bombing and the Politics of Terror, (Venice, Calif., 1998). 6

 See Presidential Decision Directive 39, cited in Report, Dr. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995, www.

fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 7

 Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Congressional 

Record, vol. 142, no. 114, Part II (July 30, 1996), pp. H-9073-9078. 8

 Mullins, A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses; see also, Miller, Engelberg, Broad, 

Germs, pp 202-203, 213-220. 9

 Secretary Cohen’s statement cited in Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, “The Defense Science Board’s 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD 

Responses to Transnational Threats,” Volume I, Final Report (Washington, D.C., October 1997).

10 Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, “The Defense Science Board’s 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats,” 

Volume I-II, Final Report (Washington, D.C., October 1997).

11 Interview, General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired), with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, DTRA, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2001, p. 1.

12 DoD News Briefing, Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 1, 1998, www.defenselink.mil/news/oct1998. In his remarks, Dr. Hamre 

explained the historical and policy origins of the new agency.

13 Interview, Dr. John J. Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, DTRA, Washington, D.C., March 13, 2001, p. 2.

14 Interview, Hamre, p. 1.

15 Interview, Hamre, pp. 7-11, & 31-32; Interview, Welch, pp. 3-4; See also, DSB, “1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational 

Threats,” Volume I, pp. 40-55.

16 DSB, “1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats”, Volume I, pp. 40-55.

17 Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council PDD/NSC-30, “Nuclear Posture Review Implementation ,” September 1994, http://dn.net/irp/

offdocs/pdd30.htm. 18 Ibid.

19 Interview, Welch, p. 1.

20 Ibid.

21 Interview, Hamre, p.2.

22 Ibid.

23 Interview, Hamre, p. 5.

24 Interview, Hamre, pp. 1-6.

25 Interview, Hamre, p 5.

26 Interview, Dr. Jaques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, 

DTRA, Washington, D.C., February 8, 2001, pp. 1-2.

27 Interview, Hamre, p. 6.

28 Interview, Hamre, p. 7.

29 Interview, Hamre, 7 - 13.

30 Interview, Hamre, p. 18.

31 Interview, Gansler, p. 2.

32 Dr. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Defense Reform Initiative Report,” (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1997). 

This was a large, comprehensive report; the defense agency consolidation was only one aspect. The creation of DTRA discussed on pp. 19-20.

33 DoD News Briefing, Vice President Albert Gore, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, and others, “Defense Reform Initiative Briefing,” November 10, 

1997, www.defenselink.mil/news/nov1997/b1110. 34 Ibid.; See also, Cohen, “Defense Reform Initiative Report,” pp. 19-20.

35 Historical Report, “Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-1997: The First 50 years of National Service,” (Washington, D.C.: Defense Special Weapons 

Agency, 1997).

36 Master Sergeant David M. Willford, A Brief History of the On-Site Inspection Agency, (Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1998); Joseph P. 

Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, (Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1993). 37 Department of Defense, DoD Organizations and Functions Guidebook, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 1996). 38 Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., “Department of Defense Reform 

Initiative Directive 30: Initial Organizational Activity Regarding the Establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” February 25, 1998. 

39 Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Statement to the House National Security Committee,” March 11,1998, www.defenselink.mil/

speeches/1998/di1315.html. 40 Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., “Department of Defense Reform 

Initiative Directive 6: Appointment of the Team to Create the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” December 3, 1997.

41 Interview, Hamre, p. 11.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 139

42 Briefing Summary, Larry Lynn, Colonel James Etchechury, Colonel Daniel McCorry. For the Defense Management Council, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” 

January 28, 1998.

43 Ibid, p.16-17

44 Interview, Hamre, p. 11

45 Interview, Hamre, p. 12.

46 Interview, Hamre, pp. 4-5.

47 Interview Hamre, pp. 12-13; Interview, Gansler, p. 3.

48 Lynn, Etchechury, and McCory, Briefing to the Defense Management Council, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”

49 Interview, Hamre, p. 14.

50 This team was established by a departmental memoranda, see George T. Singley, III, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 

“Memorandum: Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” February 11, 1998. 

51 For the process and progress of this major committee, see OIPT Weekly Briefing Charts, March – July 1998. Two other sources for developments during these 

important weekly meetings are the memos to their staffs and agency people from Major General Gary L. Curtin, Director, Defense Special Weapons Agency, and 

Brigadier General John C. Reppert, Director, On-Site Inspection Agency.

52 Hamre, “Statement to the House National Security Committee,” March 11, 1998.

53 Interview, Gansler, pp. 3-4 & 23-25; Gansler said that Hans Mark had been instrumental in recruiting Jay Davis; Interview, Hamre, pp. 15-17. Hamre said it was 

not possible to get the military service to give up a 3-star billet for the new agency’s director, and that he wanted the position to be at that level because of the serious 

nature of the new agency’s mission and its significance.

54 Biographical Fact Sheet, “Dr. Jay Davis,” DTRA, Office of Public Affairs, April 25, 2000.

55 Biographical Fact Sheet, Major General William F. Moore, USAF, DTRA Office of Public Affairs, May 15, 1998.

56 Interview, Welch, p 4-5, Interview, Hamre, p. 27; Interview Gansler, p. 12. 

57 Interview Gansler, p. 12

58 Interview, Welch, p. 10

59 Briefing, General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired), TRAC Chairman, “DTRA TRAC Concept of Operations,” July 15, 1998; See also, Briefing, Dr. Jacques S. 

Gansler, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, “Threat Reduction Advisory Committee,” July 15, 1998.

60 Briefing, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, DTRA, “DTRA’s Mission, Organization, and Challenges,” July 15, 1998; Interview, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, DTRA, with 

Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, DTRA, DTRA Headquarters, Dulles, Virginia, July 10, 2000.

61 Briefing, Gansler, July 15, 1998.

62 Ibid. 

63 Dr. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Remarks on the Standup Ceremony of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” October 1, 1998, www.defenselink.

mil/speeches/1998/r19981101-secdef.html. 64 Ibid. 65 Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Remarks at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Rollout Ceremony,” October 1, 1998, www.defenselink.mil/

speeches/1998/r19981101-depsecdef.html. 66 Interview, Hamre, p. 18.

67 Ibid.

68 Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, DTRA, “Remarks at the Defense Threat Reduction Standup Ceremony,” October 1, 1998, www.dtra.mil/spch_jd.html. 69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Department of Defense, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),” Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.62, September 30, 1998.

72 DTRA Fact Sheet, “Technology Security,” www.dtra.mil/st/ts; DTRAnet Item, “Technology Security directorate history,” http://dtranet/directorates/pa/

connection/3_99/shistory.html. 73 DefenseLink, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” November 1998, www.ctr.osd.mil; Report, “The Nuclear Roundtable, April 28, 1997,” Henry L. Stimson 

Center, Washington, D.C., www.stimson.org/rd-table/apr97sum.htm; Program Review Briefing, CTR Program Office, OSD, “Cooperation Threat Reduction 

Program,” May 20, 1997; For a larger perspective see John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997). 74 Willford, A Brief History of the On-Site inspection Agency, 1998; Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, (Washington, D.C.: On-Site 

Inspection Agency, 1993); Dr. Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty, (Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1997). 75 Brochure, “The Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” DTRA Office of Public Affairs, October 1998; Pat Snyder, “Chemical-Biological defense: A deterrent to the use 

of chemical and biological agents,” DTRA Connection, vol. 1, no. 3, (March 1999), pp. 12-14. 76 DTRA Fact Sheet, “Counterproliferation Support Directorate,” http://dtranet/directorates/cp/default.html; Brochure, “The Defense Threat Reduction Agency”; 

DoD Directive 5105.62, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).” 

77 Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Lykins, Counterproliferation Directorate, “Counterproliferation ACTD UPDATE,” July 23, 1999.

78 Ibid. General Canavan quote, p. 25.

79 Pat Snyder, “Force Protection: Worldwide Vulnerability Assessment,” DTRA Connection, vol. 1, no. 6 (June 1999), pp. 18-21; Brochure, “The Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency.”

80 Briefing, DTRA Nuclear Support and Operations directorate, “The Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate,” no date (c. February 1999); Brigadier General 

Thomas F. Gioconda, USAF, “Guest Commentary: Directorate for Nuclear Support and Combat Operations,” DTRA Connection, vol. 1, no. 7 (July 1999), pp. 1 & 

24; DoD Directive 5105.62, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA);” Briefing, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, DTRA, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” to U.S. 

Commanders in Chief, National War College, September 1998.

81 DoD Directive, Number 5105.62, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),” September 30, 1998; Brochure, “The Defense Threat Reduction Agency.”

82 Interview, Davis, p. 28-29. 

83 Interview, Gansler, p. 8.

84 Ibid.

85 Interview, Gansler, pp. 8-9.
140 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

86 Interview, Gansler, pp. 18-19.

87 Interview, Hamre, p. 19.

88 Interview, Hamre, p. 20.

89 Interview, Davis, p. 38-39. 

90 Briefing, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, DTRA, “Candidate TRAC and ASCO Topics,” to the Threat Reduction Advisory Council, July 15, 1998.

91 Interview, Welch, p. 15.

92 Briefing, Welch, “DTRA TRAC, Concept of Operations,” July 15, 1998; Interview, Welch, p. 21.

93 Briefing, Davis, “Candidate TRAC and ASCO Topics,” July 15, 1998; For information on this new office’s initial cadre of scientists see article, Cindy 

McGovern, “ASCO serves as pathfinders for agency,” DTRA Connection, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 18-19. 94 Letter, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “Director’s Six-Month Status Report to the Secretary of Defense,” March 17, 1999, http://dtranet/directorates/pa/news&info/

dtra6mon.html. 95 Ibid.; For the space launch monitoring mission, see DTRA Fact Sheet, “Space Launch Monitoring Division,” http://dtranet/directives/pa/public-info/

factsheets/spacelanch.html. 96 Letter, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “Director’s Six-Month Status Report to the Secretary of Defense,” March 17, 1999, http://dtranet/directorates/pa/news&info/

dtra6mon.html; For quote, see article, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “From the Director: Connecting to the Strategic Plan,” DTRA Connection, vol. 1, no. 2 (February 

1999), pp. 2 & 16.

97 Interview, Welch, p. 6.

98 Interview, Hamre, p. 21.

99 Ibid.

100 E-mail, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “Reorganization Announcement,” to All Personnel, January 19, 1999. 101 Davis, “From the Director,” February 2000. 102 Ibid., quote on p. 2. 103 See Defense Threat Reduction Agency Strategic Plan 2000, no date (c. March 2000); For the planning process, see article, Diana Nickels and Paul Murphy, 

“The DTRA Off-Site,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 2000), pp. 3 & 14. 104 Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “A New Agency for a New Era,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 2000), pp. 2 & 20. 105 Ibid. 106 Hamre quote cited in article, Cindy McGovern, “Agency Receives Joint Meritorious Unit Award as Hamre bids farewell,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 3 

(March 2000), p. 3.

107 Briefing, CTR directorate, “Cooperative Threat Reduction, FY 2001 President’s Budget,” March 15, 2000. 108 Letter, General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Senator Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senate, March 31, 2000. 109 For the START Treaty figures see, Arms Control Reporter, 2000, pp. 611, E-1.1-611, & E-2.2; for the CFE Treaty see, Harahan and Kuhn, On-Site 

Inspections Under the CFE Treaty, 1997; for the CWC reductions see, Arms Control Reporter, 2000, pp. 704 & E-1.9; For preparations for the Open Skies 

Treaty, see Staff Sergeant Kirk W. Clear and Steven E. Block, The Treaty on Open Skies, (Washington, D.C., April 1999) and an article, Clem Gaines, “Open 

Skies Mission brings Russian team to US,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 8 (August 2000), pp. 1-4. 110 Colonel William Smith, USAF, “Guest Commentary: Defense Threat Reduction Office – Moscow,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 1 

& 23; See also article, Cindy McGovern, “Moscow Office is ‘out in front’ for agency in Russia,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 1 & 4-13; 

Article, Cindy McGovern, “Arms Control Implementation units provide critical agency link,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 7 (July 2000), pp. 1 & 4-7. 111 “Stopping ‘dirty’ bombs,” U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 2000; Cindy McGovern, Interagency program receives international acclaim,” DTRA 

Connection, vol. 2, no. 5 (May 2000), pp. 16-17. 112 Agenda, DTRA’s 9th Annual Conference on Controlling Arms, Norfolk, Virginia, May 30-June 2, 2000, with reference materials; See also, Report, 

“Summary of DTRA’s 9th Annual Conference on Controlling Arms, Globalization of the Security Environment, May 30-June 2, 2000,” (Washington, D.C., 

2000) pp. 1-95.

113 Clem Gaines, “Globalization of the Security Environment is theme of annual conference,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 7 (July 2000), pp. 8-9. 114 General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman, JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessment of the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” March 28, 2000.

115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 See, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Strategic Plan 2000, no date (c. March 2000). 118 This account is based on an interview by the author with Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA Headquarters, March 20, 

2001.

119 Interview, Davis, p. 14. 120 Interview Davis, pp. 14-15. 121 Interview, Hamre, p. 23. 122 Interview, Hamre, p. 24. 123 Interview, Davis, p. 15-16. 124 Interview, Davis, pp. 16-17. 125 Interview, Davis, p. 20. 126 Keith J. Costa, “Pentagon Developing Joint Task Force to Support Domestic WMD Defense,” Inside the Pentagon, March 11, 1999; For DTRA 

participation see article, Captain Robert J. Bennett, “Agency team supports Joint Task Force-Civil Support Exercise,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 4 (April 

2000) pp. 19-20.

127 Jason Tudor, “DoD Supports nationwide exercise,” and “Agency’s modeling efforts track dangerous materials,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 2000), 

pp. 2-3.

128 Kay Peterson, “WMD Symposium plays to a full house,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 3 (August 2000), pp. 8-9 & 16. 129 Ibid., quote from DTRA Connection, p. 8.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 141

130 Ibid. 131 DTRA Course Notebook, “Space Technology Safeguard Monitoring Course,” DTRA Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Pilot Course, October 25-29, 1999; Pat 

Snyder, “Space Launch Monitoring division: A watchful eye over satellite technology,” DTRA Connection, vol. 1, no. 12 (December 1999), pp. 1, 4, 5, & 24; DTRA 

Fact Sheet, “Space Launch Monitoring Division, December 14, 2000, http://dtranet/directives/pa/public-info/factsheets/spacelanch.html. 132 Briefing, David G. Harrison, DTRA Chemical-Biological Defense directorate, “Restoration of Operations (RestOps), Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration,” October 6, 2000; Article, Captain Robert J. Bennett and David G. Harrison, “Technology demonstration approved for chemical/biological attack,” 

DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 2000), pp. 12-13; DTRA Fact Sheet, “Restoration of Operations – Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration,” http://

dtranet/directorates/pa/public%finfo/factsheets/restorationops.html. 133 E-mail, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “Adjustments in Assignments and Organizational Functions,” to All Personnel, September 26, 2000. 134 Ibid. 135 Briefing, Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF, Deputy Director and Colonel William R. Faircloth, USA, Chief of Staff, “Analysis,” to DTRA Off-Site 

participants, August 4, 2000.

136 E-mail, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “Adjustments in Assignments and Organizational Functions,” to All Personnel, September 26, 2000; Briefing, Major General Robert 

P. Bongiovi, USAF, Deputy Director and Colonel William R. Faircloth, USA Chief of Staff, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” to the DTRA Board of Advisors, 

September 22, 2000.

137 Author’s discussion with Colonel William R. Faircloth, USA, Chief of Staff, December 18, 2000. 138 DTRA Corporate Council Minutes, September 5, 2000. See page 2 for discussion of the corporate council’s charter. 139 Author’s discussion with Colonel William R. Faircloth, USA, Chief of Staff, December 18, 2000; Briefing, Bongiovi and Faircloth, “Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency,” September 22, 2000.

140 E-mail, Davis, “Adjustments in Assignments and Organizational Functions,” September 26, 2000; Briefing, Bongiovi and Faircloth, “Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency,” September 22, 2000.

141 Letter, Dr. Jay C. Davis, “Director’s Six-Month Status Report to the Secretary of Defense,” March 17, 1999, http://dtranet/directorates/pa/news&info/dtra6mon.

html; See also, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Memorandum for All Employees, (no subject), December 11, 1998. 142 Dr. Jay C. Davis, Memorandum for All Employees, (no subject) December 11, 1998. 143 Dr. Jay C. Davis, Memorandum to all DTRA Personnel, “Move Update,” November 16, 1999. 144 Article, “Agency begins move to Ft. Belvoir in earnest,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 10 (October 2000), p. 19. 145 Dr. Jay C. Davis, “From the Director: Igniting the Second Stage,” DTRA Connection, vol. 2, no. 10 (October 2000), pp. 2-3. 146 Ibid. Quote on p. 2. 147 Dr. Jay C. Davis, “From the Director,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no 2 (February, 2001), pp 2-5. 148 Ibid, p. 5 149 Ibid. 150 Cindy McGovern, “Agency employees support presidential inauguration,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no.2 (February 2001), p 6. 151 Ibid., p 7. 152 DTRA, Strategic Plan 2001, March 2001, p.5. 153 “Divine Buffalo tests focus on protecting the public,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no 10, (October 2001), pp 12, 16. 154 Cindy McGovern, “Focus Day serves as model for future,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no 4, (April 2001), p. 2, 15. 155 Ibid, p 2. 156 McGovern, “Focus Day,” April 2001, p. 15. 157 David G. Harrison, Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate, Briefing, “RestOps , Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration,” August 29, 2000. See 

also, John Norgren, “Wing Begins RestOps Saturday,” The MIG Alley Fighter Newspaper, Osan Air base, February 9, 2001, p.1, and James Lea, “Osan exercise testing 

base’s reaction to chemical attack,” Stars and Stripes, p. 2, February 12, 2001. 158 David G. Harrison, Chemical-Biological Defense Directorate, RestOps Project Description, www.restops.net/restops-pd.htm 159 See Clem Gaines, “Restoration of Operations exercise looks at new technologies,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no.3 (March 2001), pp 4-6. Quote on p. 4. 160 Harrison, RestOps Project Description, www.restops.net/restops-pd.htm 161 See Washington Post, October 12, 2000, p 1. 162 Cindy McGovern, “Agency team travels to Arctic Circle to monitor satellite launch,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no. 5 (May 2001), pp 1, 5-7, 12. Quote on p. 7. 163 Cindy McGovern, “Final Blackjack heavy bomber destroyed in Ukraine,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no.3 (February 2001), pp 1,4,5. Quote on p. 4. 164 Marcus J. Wilson, “Last SS-24 missile destroyed in Ukraine,” DTRA Connection, vol. 4, no. 1, (December 2001). 165 Department of Defense, “Contracts”, September 2, 2001, www.defenselink.mil/news/sep2001/c09072001html . For an account of the process see, Cindy 

McGovern, “Billion dollar contract is new way of doing business for CTR,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no. 10 (October 2001), p 1,4. 166 Pat Snyder, “Chemical weapons destruction completed on Johnson Atoll,” DTRA Connection, vol.3, no. 1 (January 2001). pp 7-8. 167 Brochure, “Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: On-Site Inspections, 1988-2001,” DTRA Office of Public Affairs, May 2001. 168 “Missile Monitoring Ends, “ Washington Post, May 22, 2001, p.18; Cindy McGovern, “On-site inspection under the INF Treaty comes to an end,” DTRA 

Connection, vol.3, no. 6 (June 2001), pp 1-15; John Russell, “On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty: A Post-Mortem,” Report, Verification Research, Training, 

and Information Center, London, England, August 2001. 

169 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, “Statement on the Achievement of the Final Reductions under the START Treaty,” Press Release, U.S. Department of State, 

December 5, 2001.

170 Walter Pincus, “Nuclear Warhead Arsenal Trimmed,” Washington Post, December 6, 2001, p. 36. 171 Interview, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, DTRA, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, DTRA Headquarters, Dulles, Virginia, July 10, 2000, pp. 38-40. 172 Interview, Dr. John J. Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, DTRA, Washington, D.C., March 13, 2001, p. 19-20. 173 Briefing, Dr. Charles R. Gallaway, Chief, ASCO, to Agency Newcomers, “Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,” October 2001. 174 Interview, Colonel Timothy J. Lampe, USAF, Deputy Director ASCO, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, 19 December 2001. For a list of the ASCO studies 

and workshops see, DTRA Brochure, “Perceiving, Achieving, Conceiving DTRA’s Advanced Systems Concept Office,” no date (c. 2001).

175 Workshop, “Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communications,” Dec 11-12, 2000, Washington DC. For an account see article, Cindy McGovern, 

“Workshop explores human dimension of potential WMD incident,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no. 1 (January 2001), pp 12-13.
142 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

176 Workshop, “Chemical-Biological Modeling and Simulation Future ‘Desirements’ ,” January 30-31, 2001. See also, Dr. Peter B. Merkle, “Conference looks at 

modeling chemical-biological hazards,” DTRA Connection, vol.3, no. 2 (February 2001), p. 19. 177 Interview, Davis, March 20, 2001, p 5. 178 Interview, Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, with Lieutenant Colonel Donald Culp, USAF, TRAC Executive Secretary, December 18, 2001. 179 Dr. Jay C. Davis, “From the Director,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no 2 (February 2002), p 2. 180 DTRA, Strategic Plan 2001, March 2001, pp. 1-21. 181 Dr. Jay C. Davis, “From the Director,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no 2 (February 2002), p 2. 182 Interview, Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, Deputy Director, DTRA with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, 19 December 2002. 183 Ibid. 184 Notes, Dr. James A. Tegnelia, Director, DTRA, from meeting with Kenneth J. Krieg, Director, Programs Analysis and Evaluation, February 2005. 185 Interview, Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, Deputy Director, DTRA with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, 19 December 2002. 186 Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments ...,” August 31, 2001. 187 Ibid. 188 E-mail, Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF, Acting Director, to DTRA-ALL, “News from the Deputy Director,” October 1, 2001. 189 E-mail, Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF, Acting Director, to DTRA-ALL, “Reorganization and Other News from the Acting Director,” August 31, 

2001; See also, “Realignment streamlines agency,” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no.9 (September 2001), p.3. 190 E-mail, Dr. Jay C. Davis, Director, to DTRA-ALL, “Adjustments in Assignments and Organizational Functions,” June 1, 2001. 191 E-mail, Major General Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF, to DTRA-ALL, “News From the Acting Director,” July 30, 2001. 192 U.S. Department of Defense, News Release, “New Director Selected to Head Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” August 9, 2001 www.defenslink.mil/news/

releases/.

193 DTRA Office of Public Affairs, “Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Biography,” DTRA Fact Sheet, August 2001. 194 Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, “DTRA’s threat reduction conference brings WMD experts together.” DTRA Connection, vol. 3, no.10 (October 2001), pp 6-7 195 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September 2001, p. 3, accessed on 29 May 2008 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

196 Cindy McGovern, “Younger articulates his goals for the agency at first all-hands,” pp. 2-3, DTRA Connection, Vol. 3, No. 10, October 2001 197 Interview, Stephen M. Younger, Director, DTRA, with Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 9 July 2002, p. 3; 

Interview, Douglas J. Bruder, Director, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise, DTRA with Bianka J. Adams, 3 March 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 

pp.3-4.

198 Interview, U.S. Navy Commander Christopher A. Bidwell, Former DTRA Liaison Officer to U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, 

with Bianka J. Adams, 29 April 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, p. 6; George W. Bush, “Presidential Address to the Nation,” 7 October 2001, p. 1, accessed on 29 May 

2008 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.

199 Interview, Bruder, 2008, p. 4; Interview, Younger, 2002, p. 4; David Gai, “New weapons prove successful in Nevada test,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 4, No. 2, 

February 2002 p. 4; DTRA Fact Sheet, Thermobaric ACTD, p. 1, July 2007, accessed on 8 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/fs_includes/pdf/Thermobaric_ACTD.pdf .

200 Interview, Bidwell, 2008, pp. 7-8; Central Intelligence Agency, Annual Report 2002, Support to Military Operations, p. 2, accessed on 2 June 2008 at https://

www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/Ann_Rpt_2002/smo.html; Jack Boureston, “Assessing Al Qaeda’s WMD Capabilities,” Strategic Insight, 2 September 

2002, p. 3, accessed on 2 June 2008 at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sept02/wmd.asp. 

201 Interview, Bruder, 2008, p. 11; Hard Target Research and Analysis Center (HTRAC), Research and Development (RD), 25 February 2008, n.p. 202 “Divine Buffalo tests focus on protecting the public,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 3, No. 10, October 2001, p.12. 203 “Agency permanent home moves closer to becoming reality,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 2001, pp. 10-11. 204 Cindy McGovern, “New ACTD addresses chemical-biological defense of seaports,” p. 12, DTRA Connection, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 2001; CASPOD ACTD 

kick-off meeting held at CENTCOM HQ, DTRA Weekly Activity Report (WAR), 11 January 2002, n.p.

205 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002, p. 3, accessed on 6 February 2008 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 

206 DTRA Fact Sheet, Combating Terrorism Technology program Integrated Technology Demonstration, July 2007, p. 1, accessed on 8 November 2007 at http://

www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/fs_includes/pdf/CT_Tech_Pgm_Integrated_Tech_Demo.pdf ; “Agency participates in major emergency response exercise in 

Florida,”, DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 2003, p. 8. 207 Cindy McGovern, “Agency team supports 2002 Olympic Winter Games,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 2002, pp.1, 4-9; Winter Olympics Support: 

Reachback, Smart Building and NBC Decontamination, DTRA WAR, 8 February 2002, n.p.; Olympics Support: Reachback and Smart Building, DTRA WAR, 

15 February 2002, n.p.

208 DTRA Fact Sheet, AGM-114N Metal Augmented Charge (MAC) Hellfire Missile, pp. 1-2, July 2007, accessed on 8 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/

newsservices/fact_sheets/fs_includes/pdf/AGM-114N_Metal_Augmented_Charge_(MAC)_Hellfire_Missile.pdf ; Thermobaric Hellfire Missile, Research and Development (RD), 25 February 2008, n.p.; Interview, Bruder 2008, pp. 5-6.

209 Interview, Bidwell, 2008, p. 3; Cindy McGovern, “Liaison officers are agency’s link to combatant commands,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 4, No., 5, May 2002, pp. 

8-9.

210 Interview, Bruder, 2008, p.12; Juan Ariel Cuadrado, “DTRA’s SOF Programs Branch ... R&D Support for Special Operations Forces on the Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 22 March 2002, pp. 1-4, Technology Development Directorate, DTRA; “Branch provides direct support to the military’s 

Special Operations Forces,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 4, No. 5, May 2002, pp.2-3; Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification, Appropriation/Budget Activity 

RDT&E, Defense-Wide/Advanced Technology Development - BA 3, February 2002, pp. 5-21, accessed on 10 June 2008 at http://www.js.mil/descriptivesum/

Y2003/DTRA/0603160BR.pdf.

211 Clem Gaines, “Combat Support directorate leads joint service exercise Mighty Guardian V,” pp. 1, 4-5, DTRA Connection, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 2002, pp. 

4-5; Draft Public Affairs Guidance, Security Forces Exercise Mighty Guardian V, 22 July 2004, n.p.

212 90th Space Wing Public Affairs Communication Plan Diligent Warrior 03, 11 October 2002, p. 3; Combat Support Directorate, Lt. Col. Michael Arnold, 

“DTRA NUWAX Program & Exercise Diligent Warrior,” April 2002. The PowerPoint presentation is a detailed description of the exercise; DoD Talking Points, 

18 October 2002, n.p.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 143

213 Major General Robert Bongiovi, Deputy Director, DTRA, interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, DTRA, 19 December 2002, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, pp. 

18-19; “DTRA deputy director retires,” p. 2, DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2003; E-mail Message, Stephen Younger, DTRA Director to DTRA-ALL, 9 

December 2002, Subject: Retirement of Maj Gen Bongiovi.

214 Kirk W. Clear and Steven E. Block, The Treaty on Open Skies, (Washington DC), 1999. 215 For text of Open Skies Treaty, see, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/openski1.html accessed on 3 June 2008; Cindy McGovern, “Open Skies 

division trains for treaty entry into force in ’02,” p. 5, DTRA Connection, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 2001; DTRA Fact Sheet, Treaty on Open Skies, pp. 1-3, July 

2007, accessed on 8 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/fs_includes/pdf/Treaty_on_Open_Skies.pdf ; “Open Skies Treaty: Russian 

Observation Mission in the U.S.,” In The News, pp.1-2, 16 June 2005, accessed on 1 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/in_the_news/display.

cfm?in=openskies. 

In 1992 President George H.W. Bush assigned responsibility for the international treaty leadership, management, training, coordination and support to the On-Site 

Inspection Agency, one of DTRA’s legacy organizations.

216 Official Text, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, see http://

www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cwc html Arms Control Reporter, 1998, pp.704A1-A-16 ; SIPRI Yearbook 1999, Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, (Stockholm, Sweden, 1999) pp. 571-572. 217 For an account of these destruction activities see this report, pp 58-59. 218 See, “United Stated Chemical Weapons Convention Web Site”, at http://www.cwc.gov accessed on 10 June 2008. 219 Arms Control Reporter, 2002, “Chemical Weapons Convention,” pp 704e1CWC02. See also, OPCW Press Release, October 7, 2002, The Hague, Netherlands. 220 Final START I Treaty Strategic Offensive Arms levels, as of December 5, 2001, cited in Arms Control Reporter, 2002, p. 611eST102p1. 221 Arms Control Reporter, 2002, “Chronology, 22 March 2002”, pp 611bST102p1. 222 Text of U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 24 May 2002, http://statelists.gov/scripts.

Accessed 2 February 2008. See also, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Web Site, “WMD 411: The SORT Treaty,” http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411 ccessed 11 June 2008.

223 Ibid. 224 See John M. Shield and William C. Potter, eds. Dismantling the Cold War, (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), and Jason D. Ellis, Defense By Other Means, The Politics of 

US-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation, Westport, Conn., 2001. 225 Interview, N. Shumkov, Director (retired), Department of Missile Technologies, with Joseph P. Harahan, DTRA, Moscow, July 20, 2005; Interview, Lieutenant 

General Vasily F. Lata, Director, Strategic Plans, SRF, Russia, with Joseph P. Harahan, DTRA, Moscow, January 25, 2005. See also, Ivan Sfranchuk, “ESOA Program in Russia: Results and Problems of Implementation,” I. Safranchuk, Editor, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: How Efficient? (Moscow, 2000), pp 24-34. 226 See DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress 1998, DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year 

Program Plan, FY 2001, DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2003. 227 Ibid., Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2003; see also, Briefing, Commander Mark A. Baker, US Navy, “CTR Program SSBN Dismantlement Project,” to Director, CTR directorate, DTRA, 17 July 2002.

228 DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report, “Cooperative Threat Reduction,” December 18, 2003. 229 DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2003. 230 DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2001. 231 DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2003; Briefing, CTR directorate, “Nunn-Lugar, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Russia,” June 2002. DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2006. 232 Interview, William M. Moon, Chief, Safe, Secure, Nuclear Weapons Division, Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate, DTRA, with Joseph P. Harahan, 

DTRA, Washington, 20 July 2004; Interview, Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., Director Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, August 6, 2004. The “Quick Fix” project is reported in DOD Report to Congress, 

Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2003. 223 Briefing, William Moon, Program Manager, Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security Program, 27 June, 2002, Interview William Moon, 20 July 2004. 234 DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report, “Cooperative Threat Reduction,” December 18, 2003. 235 Briefing, Thomas R. Rutherford, DTRA, “Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, October 2003; Interview, Thomas R. Rutherford, Chief, Fissile Material Control Division, CTR Directorate, DTRA, with Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, 6 October 2003. See, DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction Report to 

Congress, FY 2005. 236 DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report, “Cooperative Threat Reduction,” December 18, 2003. 237 Ibid. 238 Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier. General Tommy Franks. (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2004), pp. 328-330 and 361. 239 Stephen S. Black, Timothy V. McCarthy, both MIIS-CNS, Scott Levac, and Lt. Col. Mark B. Kane, both Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, “Concept for 

NBC/M Elimination and Site Exploitation,” 26 bid NBCM Eliminat.ppt, 16 September 2002, pp. 2, 6-7, and 13; Lt. Col. Michael Slifka, United States Air Force, 

Planner, European Command; Central Command Fusion Cell; Lt. Col. Carleton Geary, Training officer/pre-deployment/METL/TTP/specialty training; Lt. Col. 

Lawrence Jones, United States Army, V Corps, SAT Team; Lt. Col. Lawrence Northrup, United States Army – Site Assessment Team; Col. John P. Connell, United 

States Army, Executive Officer, SAT, Group Response on a standardized interview questionnaire, 23 September 2003, p. 1.

240 Dr. Stephen M. Younger, Director, DTRA, interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 24 February 

2004, p. 4.

241 Interview # IFIT-30-046, LTC(P) John Connell, DTRA SAT XO, At 75th XTF AO at Palace Grounds near Baghdad Airport, 23 May 2003, pp. 2-3 and 5-7, 

by MAJ Annette Hoffman, 30th Military History Detachment (MHD), U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, D.C. (CMH); individualskill.rft, 

undated, provides a list of SAT members’ individual skills. 

242 Site Assessment Team (SAT) Pre-deployment Training, 16 OCT dummy.ppt, 16 October 2002, pp. 5-9.; Memorandum, Abbreviated Site Assessment Team 

(SAT) Training Plan, Maj. Michael Yuschak, OSS, to Director, DTRA, 22 October 2002; Colonel Randle Scott, Chief, Combat Support Division (CSO), Answers 

on a standardized interview questionnaire, 22 September 2003, p. 1; Interview # IFIT-30-046, LTC(P) John Connell, pp. 7-10.

243 Douglas Englund, Acting Director of the On-Site Inspection Directorate, 21 December 2005, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, Rosslyn, Virginia, DTRA 

Historian’s Files; IFIT-30-106: MAJ Keith Andrew Detweiler, Operations Officer, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, On-Site Inspection Directorate, Baghdad, 

Iraq, 23 June 2003, p. 6, by MAJ Annette Hoffman, 30th MHD, CMH; Site Assessment Team (SAT) Pre-deployment Training, 16 OCT dummy.ppt, 16 October 
144 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

2002, pp. 21-22.

244 Douglas Englund, 21 December 2005; Logistics, 28 October 2002, ryan28OCTifneeded.ppt; Site Assessment Team (SAT) Revised Pre-Mobilization Training Schedule, 28 October 2002, REVISED Pre-Mob Training Schedule.2.ppt; LTC Mike Slifka, LTC Geary, LTC Larry Jones, LTC Larry Northrup, COL 

Connell, 23 September 2003, p. 4; Interview # IFIT-30-046, LTC(P) John Connell, pp. 33-34; U.S Army Lt. Col. Joseph Keith Johnson (ret.), Comments to 

Adams, 15 May 2006; EquipCost.ppt, 20 November 2002, p. 4. In addition to detection equipment, the deployment packages included item such as handheld radios, weapons, and night vision devices.

245 Raymund T. Van Pelt and Jim Currie, “JTF – WMD Elimination. An Operational Architecture for Future Contingencies.” The Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort McNair, D.C., 28 April 2004, pp. 7-10.

246 IFIT-30-005: CPT Richard William Corner, II, S-4, 75th Exploitation Task Force, 12 May 2003, p. 10 and IFIT-30-083, COL Richard R. McPhee, 

Commander, 75th Exploitation Task Force, Baghdad, Iraq, 4 June 2003, pp. 2-4, both in Baghdad, Iraq, by MAJ Annette Hoffman, 30th MHD, CMH.

247 Lt. Col. Johnson pointed out that DTRA’s SAT planners proposed adding an Arabic linguist but failed to gain support from USCENTCOM. Johnson, 

Comments to Adams, 15 May 2006.

248 75th FA Brf 24 January 2003, CD ROM, IFCS-30-021, IEB Sill Prep, 28-30 January Conference, DTRA Brief, CMH. MET SST Force Structure, 

27 February 2003, CD ROM, IFCS-30-021\MET SST Force Structure, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, D.C

249 Site Assessment Team Deployment Handbook, DTRA On-Site Directorate, 20 December 2002, p. 5. The differences between the Army’s broader and DTRA’s 

narrower interpretation of the term ‘sensitive site’ became important during the deployment in Iraq. When the Site Survey Teams of which DTRA’s SATs were 

an integral part did not discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, they received orders to search for war crime sites and prisoner of war camps. 

250 Special Text 3-90.15, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive Sites, Headquarters, United States Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 2002.

251 DTRA Handbook DTRA-AR 40H-4, WMD Facility, Equipment, and Munitions Identification Handbook, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia, January 2003; Markus J. Wilson, Sr., “Handbook aids troops in the field,” DTRA Connection, August September 2003, p. 48; DTRA-AR 40H-5, 

Combatant Commander’s Planning Guide for WMD Elimination Operations, 2 vols., Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 27 February 

2003.

252 TF CDR Outbrief, 30 January 2003, pp. 8-9 and 75th FA Brf 24 January 2003, pp. 5-7, CD ROM, IFCS-30-021, IEB Sill Prep, 28-30 January Conference, DTRA Brief; IFIT-30-106: MAJ Keith Andrew Detweiler, Operations Officer, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, On-Site Inspection Directorate, 

Baghdad, Iraq, 23 June 2003, p. 8, by MAJ Annette Hoffman, 30th MHD, CMH; Email Msg., Stephen Younger, DTRA Director, to DTRA-ALL, 7 February 

2003.

253 Email Msg., Stephen Younger, DTRA Director to DTRA-ALL, 20 March 2003, Subj.: Disarmament of Iraq; Douglas M. Englund, Director, On-Site 

Inspection Directorate, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, DTRA historian, 24 April 2006, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, pp. 8-10; Secretary Rumsfeld’s memorandum 

designating DTRA DoD’s Executive Agent for WMD Elimination Operations is still classified.

254 SST Action Tracker 22 Mar – 11 Jun 03.xls. 255 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, 30 September 2004, 3 vols., I: p. 1. 256 Interview, Englund, 2006, pp. 6-7; Tuwaitha Talking Paper, 22 Dec 2003; Cindy McGovern, “Project Maximus wraps-up in Iraq,” DTRA Connection, pp. 

4-7.

257 Interview, Younger, 2004, pp. 5-6.; Operations Enterprise Draft, 22 February 2008, p. 2. Daniel Sullivan, Target Assessments Division, Research and Development Enterprise, DTRA, HTRAC Support to OIF and OEF, 22 July 2008, n.p., (unpublished).

258 Dr. Stephen Younger, “From the Director,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 8, August/September 2003, p. 3. 259 Cindy McGovern, “DTRA Celebrates 5-year anniversary,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 10, November 2003, p. 10. 260 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp.1-3, December 2002. 261 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Strategic Plan 2003, pp. 6-7. 262 Michael Evenson, Associate Director, Operations Enterprise, DTRA, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 15 April 2008, p.5, [brackets added by Adams]; 

Cindy McGovern, “Third successful demonstration held in UNWD program at Camp Lejeune,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 2003, pp. 6-7; Narrative Description, JMUA Narrative Jul 03.doc, 21 July 2003, p. 3.

263 DTRA Fact Sheet, “Integrated Technology Demonstration,” p. 2, July 2007, accessed on 8 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/

fs_includes/pdf/Integrated_Technology_Demonstration.pdf; “Agency participates in major emergency response exercise in Florida,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, 

No. 3, March 2003, pp.8-9.

264 News Release No. 270-03, “Defense Program Implementation Plan Approved,” 24 April 2003, p.1, accessed on 4 February 2008 at http://www.defenselink.

mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3780; Cindy McGovern, “Mission of Chemical-Biological Defense directorate expands after DoD decision,” DTRA 

Connection, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 2003, p. 4; Michael Keifer, Former Military Assistant to DTRA Director Dr. Stephen Younger, interviewed by Bianka J. 

Adams, 9 April 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, p. 4. Keifer pointed out that Under Secretary Aldridge’s decision to transfer the chemical weapons programs and 

funds from the U.S. Army to DTRA was “highly controversial” at the time. 

265 Email Messages, Stephen Younger, DTRA Director, to DTRA-All, Subject: DTRA One of Few DoD Entities to Achieve Clean Audit Opinion, 7 April 

2003, p. 1; Stephen Younger, DTRA Director, to DTRA-All, Subject: 23 April DTRA-ALL, 23 April 2003, n.p.; Stephen Younger, DTRA Director, to DTRAAll, Subject: Deputy Director of DTRA, 6 May 2003, p. 1; “Ground broken for Defense Threat Reduction Center,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 

2003, pp.1 and 4; U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Trudy Clark, (ret.), interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 1 May 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, p. 19.

266 Dr. Dale Klein, Former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Chairman of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 25 April 2008, White Flint, Maryland, p. 18.

267 Email Message, Stephen Younger, DTRA Director, to DTRA-ALL, 18 June 2003, p. 1; Cindy McGovern, “Business directorate off to a running start,” 

DTRA Connection, Vol. 5, No. 11, December 2003, p. 8. 268 “One Threat at a Time,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2006, p. 6, accessed on 23 June 2008 at http://www.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v39_1_06/v39_no1_06review.pdf .

269 Claesen Dirk Wyckoff, On-Site Inspection Directorate, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 18 July 2006, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, p. 5. 270 Cindy McGovern, “Project Maximus wraps-up in Iraq,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 2004, pp. 4-5; Operations Enterprise Draft, 22 February 

2008, p. 2; Email Message, Stephen Younger, DTRA Director to DTRA-ALL, Subject: Future Plans, 10 December 2003, p. 1.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 145

271 Bryan Murphy, “AP Exclusive: US removes uranium from Iraq,” 5 July 2008, pp. 1-2, accessed on 22 July 2008 at http://ap.google.com/article/

ALeqM5gUzCIe4JyTofL4u4RnaUn-75BV2QD91NRH480; Allissa J. Rubin and Campbell Robertson, “U.S. helps remove Uranium from Iraq,” New York Times, 

7 July 2008, pp. 1-2, accessed on 24 July 2008 at http://dtranet/ttparticle/display.cfm?id=28338. 

272 Ambassador Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, “The Bush Administration Approach to Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, November 7, 2007 http://www.state.gov

273 Test of U.S. Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 24 May 2002, see http://www.statelists.state.gov. See also, NTI, “The SORT Treaty,” December 

2006, http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411.

274 Statement by G-8 Leaders, The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Kananaskis Summit, Canada, 27 June 

2002, http://www.feo.gov.uk Fact Sheet, White House, G-8 Summit, “Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 27 June 2002, http://www.

whitehouse.gov; Stimson Center, “The Global partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 1 June 2007, http://www.stimson.

org.

275 US Senator Richard G. Lugar, Statement of Introduction, “The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act: Authorization for Nunn-Lugar to be used outside of the states 

of the Former Soviet Union,” 18 March 2002. 

276 US Senator Richard G. Lugar, Trip Report, “Nunn-Lugar to destroy Albanian WMD, First Time Nunn-Lugar Used outside former Soviet Union,” August 2004, 

pp1-4.

277 US Senator Richard G. Lugar, Speech, “An Albanian Success,” 1 September 2007, published in Nunn-Lugar Report, August 2007, see http://lugar.senate.gov; 

DTRA Fact Sheet, “Chemical Weapons Eliminated in Albania,” August 2007; Press Release, OPCW, The Hague, “Albania – First Country to Destroy all of its 

Chemical Weapons,” 12 July 2007. 

278 DTRA, Biographies, “John T. Byrd,” 19 December 2006. 279 Amy F. Woolf, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet 

Union,” 3 January 2008, p17-18. 

280 President Bush quote in article by Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire, “Experts Praise U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Enhancements, Say More Must be 

Done,” May 6, 2005. See also, DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fact Sheet, “Presidential Initiatives,” 2005, http://www.nnsa.energy.

281 DTRA, “CT Program Overview,” 2008. See also DOD Report to Congress, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Multi-Year Program Plan, FY 2008 for an explanation 

of these projects and programs.

282 Report, National Research Council. National Academies, “The Biological Threat Reduction program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to 

Sustainable Partnerships”, (Washington DC, 2007), p.15-23.

283 Briefing, Dr. Michael A. Balady, Program Manager, Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program, “Overview of the CTR Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program,” no date, (@2005).

284 Ibid. 285 Dr. Michael A. Balady, Program Manager, Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program, “TADR Brochure,” no date. See also, Report, National 

Research Council, “The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense,” (2007) pp. 33-34.

286 Briefing, Dr. Michael A. Balady, Program Manager, BWPP, “Overview of the CTR Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program, no date, (@2005). 287 Briefing, Michael A. Balady, BWPPW Program Manager, CT Directorate, DTRA, “BioSecurity and BioSafety/TADR Georgia” 6 May 2005. 288 Report, National Research Council, “The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships”, (2007) p 67.

-289 Remarks as delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C., 13 May 2003, p. 5, accessed on 22 July 2008 at http://

www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=391; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Subject: Designation of Responsibilities for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Commander, US 

Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), 6 January 2005, np.

290 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, pp.2-4, March 2005. 291 General James E. Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 4 June 

2008, Pentagon, Virginia, pp.10-11.

292 William R. Faircloth, Chief of Staff, DTRA, Memorandum for Distribution B, Subject: Establishment of Task Force (TF) DTRA – Combating WMD 

(CbtWMD), 2 February 2005.

293 Dr. James E. Tegnelia, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities, Hearing on FY2006 Budget, 10 March 2005, p. 12; DTRA New Release, “DoD appoints new director of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency,” p. 1, 8 February 2005, accessed on 14 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/press_releases/display.cfm?pr=tegneliaappoints .

294 Dr. James A. Tegnelia, Director, DTRA, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 1 February 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, pp. 4-5. 295 Email Message, James (Jim) Tegnelia, Director, to DTRA-ALL, Subject: Message From the Director, 28 June 2005, p. 1; Campaigns 24 May 05 BOA.xls, np; . 296 U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James E Cartwright, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Subject: Request Appointment of the Person Serving as Director, Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, as Director, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC), 26 Aug 

2005.

297 U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James E Cartwright, Memorandum for the Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Subject: 

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) – Implementation Directive, 26 August 

2005, pp. 1-4.

298 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: combating weapons of mass destruction, DTRA Overview for DSD Nominee Orientation, 9 Apr 2005, DTRA Overview DEPSECDEF transition rev1.ppt, np.; The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: combating weapons of mass destruction, Agency Brief version September 26, 

2005, DTRA Agency Brief 0926.ppt, np.; Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.62, issued on 28 November 2005 codified DTRA’s updated mission; 

Dr. G. Peter Nanos, Handwritten Note to Adams and Harahan, 11 August 2008.

299 Robert B. Gregg, Deputy Director for Operations, Division Chief, Office of Strategic Planning, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, DTRA, interviewed by 

Bianka J. Adams, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 19 December 2007, pp. 6-7.

300 James A. Tegnelia, Memorandum for Distribution C, Subject: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Strategic Planning and Campaigns, 7 November 

2006, p. 6.
146 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

301 DTRA News Release, “DTRA hosts STRATCOM exec,” 10 October 2005. 302 Memo, “National Testbeds (NTB) for Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs),” R&D Enterprise to Public Affairs Office, 28 February 2008. 303 Memo,”CBRN Unmanned Ground Reconnaissance Program (FY 03-09)”, and “Expeditionary Biological Detection (EBD) ATD (FY05-08),” R&D Enterprise to 

Public Affairs Office, 28 February 2008.

304 Memo, “Basic and Applied Sciences Directorate, Basic Research Program,” R&D Enterprise to Public Affairs Office, 28 February 2008. 305 Interview, Clark, 2008, pp. 18-19; Brackets added by Adams. 306 DTRA News Release, “DTRA holds ceremony to open new building,” p. 1, 26 January 2006, accessed on 14 November 2007 at http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/

press_releases/display.cfm?pr=dtrcRelease ; Cindy McGovern, “DTRC ready to open its doors,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 7, No. 9, pp. 1, 7-8. 307 Interview, Klein, 2008, p. 18. 308 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006, p. 52; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 

13 February 2006, Washington, D.C., pp. 1, 18-24.

309 James A. Tegnelia, Director, DTRA, Memorandum for Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Subject: Declaration of Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23 January 2006, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Donald 

Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Director Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Subject: Appointment of the 

Director, United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC), 31 January 2006, Washington, D.C.

310 U.S. Navy Rear Admiral William P. Loeffler, Deputy Director, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, interviewed by Bianka 

J. Adams, 1 May 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, p. 5; The position was authorized as a “Chairman’s 10 plus one” billet for a reserve component officer, who was recalled to 

active duty on a full time basis to serve in a joint-duty assignment. Priscilla Offenhauer, “General and Flag Officer Authorizations for the active and Reserve Components: A Comparative and Historical Analysis,” (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, December 2007), pp. 12-13.

311 Interview, Clark, 2008, p. 13. 312 Interview, Bruder, 2008, p. 18. 313 James A. Tegnelia, Memorandum for Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Subject: Declaration of Final Operating Capability (FOC) 

for the United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 December 2006. 

314 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Handbook for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination Operations, 18 May 2007, pp. II-1-4; James A. Tegnelia, “A New Era in 

Combating WMD,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46, 3rd Quarter 2007, pp. 66-67. 315 Interview, Loeffler, 2008, p. 21. 316 Ann Scott Tyson, “Pentagon to test a huge conventional bomb,” Washington Post, 31 March 2006; CBS News Transcript of The Charles Osgood File, “Cancellation 

of Divine Strake,” 23 February 2007; DTRA News Release, “Cancellation of Proposed Divine Strake Experiment,” 22 February 2007, accessed on 1 November 2007 at 

http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/press_releases/display.cfm?pr=divine_strake_cancelled .

317 Interview, Clark, 2008, pp. 22-23; “With the end of April, DTRA begins using new pay and personnel system,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 2006, p. 4. 318 Sarah Thuman, “Maj. Gen. Trudy Clark retires after 33 years of service,” p. 6 and Jennifer Redding, “New Deputy Director arrives, barber chair not far behind,” p. 2, 

DTRA Connection, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 2006. 319 U.S. Army Major General Randal R. Castro, Deputy Director, DTRA, interviewed by Bianka J. Adams, 26 March 2008, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, p. 5. 320 Ibid. 321 Briefing, “Loose Nukes Coordination Meeting 18 Jan 2007,” pp.2-8; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of 

the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack, June 2004, accessed on 6 August 2008 at http://www.acq.osd.

mil/dsb/reports/2004-06-Clandestine_Nuclear_Attack.pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, pp. 34-35; Interview, Gregg, 2007, pp. 8-9.

322 Memo, Dr. Michael O. Wheeler, Director, ASCO, “Advance Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) 10-year Accomplishments,” 3 March 2008. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid. 325 Michael Hoffman, “Air Force Investigates Alleged Nuclear Transfer, Pentagon Spokesman Say,” HYPERLINK “http://defenselink.mil/news/” 326 Michael Hoffman, “Wing decertified, CO’s sacked for nuke mistake,” Air Force Times, October 21, 2007. 327 The Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, “Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons,” February 2008, 

released from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

328 Ibid. 329 Michael Hoffman, “Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing Flunks Nuclear Inspection,” Air Force Times, 30 May 2008, and Walter Pincus, “Air Force Unit’s Nuclear Weapons 

Security Is “Unacceptable,” Washington Post, 31 May 2008. 330 Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, “Defense Secretary Robert gates fires Air Force’s top 2 officials,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2008. 331 Defense Threat Reduction University, Course Catalog 2008, p. 4, accessed on 7 July 2008 at http://www.dtra.mil/documents/oe/FY08_DTRU_CATALOG.pdf ; 

Defense Threat Reduction University, FY09 to FY14 Strategic Plan, 2 July 2007, n.p.; Patricia Chavez, “DNWS commandant ready for new challenges,” DTRA 

Connection, Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2006, p. 24. 332 Patricia Chavez, “Defense Threat Reduction University achieves a great deal in two years,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 9, No. 12, pp. 6-7. 333 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, pp. 52-53; Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI), OUSD(AT&L) 2007, pp.3 and 13; 

“New Chemical-Biological Defense program centered on protecting the warfighter,” DTRA Connection, January 2007, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 5-6. 334 Dr. James E. Tegnelia, Comments to Harahan and Adams, 20 July 2008, p. 1. 335 Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI), 2007, p. 4. 336 David E. Hough, Chief, Business Execution Office JSTO, Chem Bio Directorate, DTRA, Email Message to Adams, Subject: DTRA History_TMTI, 23 July 2008. 337 Memo, Paul Boren to Joseph P. Harahan, DTRA, “CW CBRN Reachback,” 25 July 2008; and Combating WMD Enterprise (CW) directorate, DTRA, “Record of 

WMD Enterprise Programs and Activities,” 28 February 2008.

338 Combating WMD Enterprise (CW) directorate, DTRA, “Record of WMD Enterprise Programs and Activities,” 28 February 2008. 339 Beth Alber, “DTRA Sponsors Black Sea Regional WMD exercise in four nations,” DTRA Connection, October 2007; See also, US Embassy, Sofia, Bulgaria, Press 

Release, MOI and Black Sea Regional Exercise together with Moldova, Georgia and Romania to respond the potential WMD incidents,” 24 September 2008, http://

bulgaria.usembassy.gov

340 LTC Jeff Predmore, ICP Chief, OS-directorate, DTRA, Briefing, “DOD International Counterproliferation Program”, April 3, 2008. 341 The new authority was contained in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, see LTC Jeff Predmore, Briefing, “DOD International Counterproliferation 

Program,” April 3, 2008.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 147

342 For basic facts on the exercise scenario see, Beth Alber, “DTRA Sponsors Black Sea Regional WMD exercise in four 

nations,” DTRA Connection, October 2007. For Dr. Tegnelia’s statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed 

Service, see “Statement of Dr. James Tegnelia, Director, DTRA before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,” March 12, 2008. 

343 Tegnelia Statement, 12 March 2008, p. 9. 344 Clem Gaines, “Agency steps up to support new STRATCOM unit,” DTRA Connection, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 8 and 

20; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-90.10 “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

yield Explosives Operational Headquarters,” January 2008, Appendix F Joint Elimination Coordination Elements, p. 

F-1.

345 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, National 

Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C., February 11, 2004. p. 1, accessed on 11 July 2008 at http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html. 

346 General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, USSTRATCOM, “Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,” February 28, 2008, accessed on July 14, 2008 at http://www.acessmylibrary.com/

congressionaltranscript .

347 For these analytical points see, Report, Ashton B. Carter and Robert G. Joseph, co-chairs, “Review Panel on Future 

Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 2008.

348 Interview, Tegnelia, 2008. 349 Ibid. 350 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” 

July 15, 2006, see http://www.state.gove/r/pa; The White House issued a fact sheet as well, see Fact Sheet, Office of the 

Press Secretary, The White House, “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” July 15, 2006, http://www.

state.gov/t/isn.

351 See, Jacquelyn S. Porch, “Nations Meet in Morocco on How to Counter Nuclear Terror Threat,” 30 October 2006, 

U.S. State Department, International Information Programs, http://usinfo.state.gov; and “The Global Initiative to 

Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” July 9, 2008, U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Security and 

Nonproliferation, http://www.state.gov/t/isn.

352 Report, Ashton B. Carter and Robert G. Joseph, co-chairs, “Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency Missions and capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 2008.

353 Ibid. 354 Ibid. 355 Ibid. 356 Ibid. 357 Notes, Dr. James A. Tegnelia to Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, August 4, 2008. 358 Interview, Tegnelia, 2008.
148 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

- A -

ABC..................................................................................Atomic, Biological, and Chemical

ABM.....................................................................................................Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACTD..........................................................Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

ALCM.....................................................................................Air-Launched Cruise Missile

AO..........................................................................................................Area of Operations

AOR...................................................................................................Area of Responsibility

ARCENT......................................................................................Army Central Command

ASCO.....................................................................Advanced Systems and Concepts Office

ASD.......................................................................................Assistant Secretary of Defense

ASM...................................................................................................Air-to-Surface Missile

AT&L.........................................................................Acquisition Technology and Logistics

ATSD(NCB) .......................................................Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

 (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs)

- B -

BE..........................................................................................................Business Enterprise

BW...........................................................................................Biological Warfare/Weapons

- C -

CASPOD...........................................Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation

CB.........................................................................................................Chemical-Biological 

CBIST..........................................................Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team

CBRN........................................................Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CBRNE....................................Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives

CFE.....................................................................................Conventional Forces in Europe

CFLCC.........................................................Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CIA............................................................................................Central Intelligence Agency

CINC..................................................................................................Commander in Chief

CMAT.................................................................Consequence Management Advisory Team

COCOM........................................................................................Combatant Commander

CONOPS.........................................................................................Concept of Operations

CONPLAN..............................................................................................Contingency Plan

CONUS......................................................................................Continental United States 

CP...........................................................................Command Post or Counterproliferation

CPA.....................................................................................Coalition Provisional Authority

CS..............................................................................................................Combat Support

CSA...............................................................................................Combat Support Agency

CSART.....................................................................Combat Support Agency Review Team

CTBT..................................................................................Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTR..............................................................Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar)

CW.........................................................................................................Chemical Warfare

CWC................................................................................Chemical Weapons Convention

- D -

DARPA..........................................................Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

GLOSSARY
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 149

DCI...................................................................................Director of Central Intelligence

DHS.............................................................................Department of Homeland Security

DIA.........................................................................................Defense Intelligence Agency

DLA.............................................................................................Defense Logistics Agency

DNA.............................................................................................Defense Nuclear Agency

DNI.................................................................................Director of National Intelligence

DNWS...........................................................................Defense Nuclear Weapons School

DoD.............................................................................................Department of Defense

DOE................................................................................................Department of Energy

DRI............................................................................................Defense Reform Initiative

DSWA.............................................................................Defense Special Weapons Agency

DTRA............................................................................Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRIAC................................Defense Threat Reduction Information and Analysis Center

DTRU.......................................................................Defense Threat Reduction University

DTSA............................................................Defense Technology Security Administration

- E -

EOD.....................................................................................Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EUCOM......................................................................United States European Command

- F -

FAB..................................................................................................Field Artillery Brigade

FEMA.................................................................Federal Emergency Management Agency

FY.......................................................................................................................Fiscal Year

- G -

GLCM............................................................................Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

GPS...........................................................................................Global Positioning System

- H -

HDBT..............................................................................Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

HE..............................................................................................................High Explosive

HEU..........................................................................................Highly Enriched Uranium

HPAC..........................................................Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 

HTRAC............................................................Hard Target Research and Analysis Center

- I -

IAEA..........................................................................International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM...............................................................................Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICP..................................................................International Counterproliferation Program

IED (“Road bomb”)...............................................................Improvised Explosive Device

INF...............................................................................Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

IOC......................................................................................Initial Operational Capability

IPA.....................................Intergovernmental Personnel Appointees or Intergovernmental 

 Performance Agreement or Intergovernmental Personnel Act

ISG........................................................................................................Iraq Survey Group

IT....................................................................................................Information Technology

ITD............................................................................Integrated Technology Demonstration

- J -

JCS.........................................................................................................Joint Chiefs of Staff

JECE......................................................................Joint Elimination Coordination Element 
150 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

JFC. ..............................................Joint Force Commander or Joint Functional Capabilities 

 or Joint Functional Concepts

JFCOM............................................................................................Joint Forces Command

JSIVA........................................................Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessment

JTF...............................................................................................................Joint Task Force

- L -

LANL.................................................................................Los Alamos National Laboratory

LEU.................................................................................................Low Enriched Uranium

LLNL....................................................................Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LNO..............................................................................................................Liaison Officer

LTBT................................................................................................Limited Test Ban Treaty

- M -

MCT Mobile Collection Team

MEF...........................................Marine Expeditionary Force or Mission Essential Function

MOAB.......................................................................................Massive Ordnance Air Blast

MOD ....................................................................................................Ministry of Defense

MOP............................................Massive Ordnance Penetrator or Measures of Performance

MoST....................................................................Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology

MOU.................................................................................Memorandum of Understanding

MTCR..........................................................................Missile Technology Control Regime

- N -

NATO............................................................................North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC.......................................................................................Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NBC/M........................Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons and their Means of delivery

NNSA..................................................................National Nuclear Security Administration

NSA...............................................................................................National Security Agency

NSC.....................................................................National Security Council (“Interagency”)

NSPS..............................................................................National Security Personnel System

NTS............................................................................................................Nevada Test Site

NUWAX...........................................................Nuclear Weapon Accident Training Exercise

NWE..............................................................................................Nuclear Weapons Effects

- O -

OC...........................................................................................................Operations Center

OIF.................................................................................................Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMB..............................................................................Office of Management and Budget

OPCW.............................................Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OS..........................................On-Site Inspection Directorate, DTRA or Open Skies Treaty

OSCE................................................Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSD.................................................................................Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSIA...........................................................................................On-Site Inspection Agency

OUSD(AT&L)...................................................Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for

 Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

- P -

- Q -

QDR......................................................................................Quadrennial Defense Review
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 151

- R -

Rad Sources....................................................................Radiological Sources and Material

RD...........................................................Research and Development Directorate (DTRA)

R&D........................................................................................Research and Development

- S -

SAT....................................................................................................Site Assessment Team

SC....................................................................................Security and Counterintelligence

SCC-WMD.................................................. United States Strategic Command Center for 

 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

SECDEF..............................................................................................Secretary of Defense

SLBM.........................................................................Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile

SNL.......................................................................................Sandia National Laboratories

SOAE........................................................................Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination

SORT........................................................................Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SSE.............................................................................................Sensitive Site Exploitation

SSBN............................................................Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines

START..............................................................................Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

STRATCOM.................................................................United States Strategic Command

- T -

TADR......................................................................Threat Agent Detection and Response

TD.............................................................Technology Development Directorate (DTRA)

TF D/E or DTRA.................................................Task Force Disable/Eliminate or DTRA 

TPFDL...............................................................Time-Phased Force and Deployment List

TRAC....................................................................Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

TTBT.........................................................................................Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Tuwaitha...............................................................Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, Iraq

- U -

UN.............................................................................................................United Nations

UNSCOM...................................................................................UN Special Commission

UNWD............................................................. Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense

USA......................................................................................................United States Army

USAF..............................................................................................United States Air Force

USCENTCOM...............................................................United States Central Command

USD...........................................................................................Undersecretary of Defense

USD(P)......................................................................Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

USEUCOM.................................................................United States European Command

USJFCOM................................................................United States Joint Forces Command

USMC.....................................................................................United States Marine Corps

USN.....................................................................................................United States Navy

USPACOM.......................................................................United States Pacific Command

USNORTHCOM........................................................United States Northern Command

USSOCOM...................................................United States Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM.........................................................United States Southern Command

USSTRATCOM............................................................United States Strategic Command

- W -

WE.......................................................................Weapons Elimination Directorate, DTRA

WMD.....................................................................................Weapons of Mass Destruction
152 D E F E N S E T H R E A T R E D U C T I O N A G E N C Y, 1998-2008

- X -

XTF.................................................................................................. Exploitation Task Force

- Y -

Yellowcake......................Uranium concentrates; represent intermediate step in processing of 

 uranium ore.
D T R A H I S T O R Y S E R I E S 153