alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
June 30 , 2015

Mr. Joseph Capone

Sky Has No Limits Productions

Webi er Consulting

22 River Stres Suite 10

Braintree, MA 02184

Dear Mr. Capone :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from

Title 14, C ode of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can No t Process Your Request

We entered your March 26 , exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA

- 20 15

- 0767 ),

b ut we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does no t

comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any

further, you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or s ections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional inf

ormation, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you t o send your

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do No t Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you

further. If you have any questi ons or require additional time, you may call (202) 267

- 9677.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brenda Robeson

Program Analyst , Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
733 P.2d 14

#### Rogelio REYES, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jacqueline L. REYES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 8563.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Jan. 13, 1987.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 18, 1987.

W.H. Greig, Van Soelen, Greig & Gutierrez, Clovis, for petitioner-appellant.

Robert G. Marcotte, Albuquerque, for respondent-appellee.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

Petitioner and respondent were divorced in Colorado. The decree awarded alimony to respondent but made no mention of petitioner’s military retirement. Subsequently, petitioner filed the decree in New Mexico and attempted to terminate the alimony obligation. Respondent answered and also requested that the trial court award her a portion of petitioner’s military retirement. The trial court refused to terminate the alimony and awarded respondent a portion of the military retirement.

Petitioner appeals from the award of part of his military retirement benefits to respondent. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in reopening the Colorado divorce decree and awarding military retirement benefits to respondent, *384some five and one-half years after the grant of divorce. One other issue, listed in the docketing statement but not briefed, is abandoned. *State v. Fish,*102 N.M. 775, 701 P.2d 374 (Ct.App.), *cert. denied,*102 N.M. 734, 700 P.2d 197 (1985). We agree with petitioner and reverse.

The authority to modify a division of property in a prior divorce action depends on the law of the jurisdiction that granted the award. *See Corliss v. Corliss,*89 N.M. 235, 549 P.2d 1070 (1976); *Dunning v. Dunning,*104 N.M. 296, 720 P.2d 1237 (Ct.App.1985), *rev’d on other grounds,*104 N.M. 295, 720 P.2d 1236 (1986). Thus, since the divorce decree in this case was granted in Colorado, that state’s substantive law is to be applied in any modification.

In a Colorado proceeding, *In re Marriage of Ellis,*36 Colo.App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975), *aff'd,*191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976), the court held that military retirement benefits do not constitute property and are not subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. Because Colorado’s substantive law must be followed, the New Mexico trial court was without authority to award respondent part of petitioner’s military benefits. Although respondent contends that she is not attempting to modify the Colorado decree but, rather, is filing a separate action under NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-20 (Repl.1986), still she is not entitled to do in New Mexico what she could not do in Colorado. *See Dunning.*The language of Section 40-4-20 provides for a post-decree division of property “which *could*have been litigated in the original proceeding for dissolution of the marriage.” (Emphasis added.) Here, respondent’s military retirement benefits could not have been litigated in the original proceeding since such benefits are not recognized under Colorado law as marital assets. For these reasons, the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for the court to amend its order to conform with this opinion. Petitioner is awarded his appellate costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BIVINS and FRUMAN, JJ„ concur.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed July 12, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-322

Lower Tribunal Nos. F07-32644, F07-43306, F04-14535

________________ 

Tarresse Leonard,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from 

the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Cristina Miranda, Judge.

Tarresse Leonard, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 18, 2012 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN HOWARDS, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. DANIEL MCLAUGHLIN, in his individual and official capacity; ADAM DANIELS, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants - Appellants. VIRGIL D. "GUS" REICHLE, JR., in his individual and official capacity; DAN DOYLE, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.

----------------------------- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE STATES OF COLORADO, OKLAHOMA, UTAH, WYOMING, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND VERMONT, Amici Curiae.

___________________________ STEVEN HOWARDS, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-1201 (D.C. No. 1:06-CV-01964-CMA-CBS) (D. Colo.)v. VIRGIL D. "GUS" REICHLE, JR., in his individual and official capacity; DAN DOYLE, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants - Appellants, DANIEL MCLAUGHLIN, in his individual and official capacity; ADAM DANIELS, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.

------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Curiae. No. 09-1202 (D.C. No. 1:06-CV-01964-CMA-CBS) (D.Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , SEYMOUR , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. **

*This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

** After considering the Supreme Court’s opinion remanding this case, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The causes are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. -2-This matter is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. In Howards v. McLaughlin , 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011), we reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to all Secret Service Agents on Mr. Howards’ Fourth Amendment claims, id. at 1143. We also reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Mr. Howards’ First Amendment claim as to Agents Daniels and McLaughlin, but affirmed such denial as to Agents Reichle and Doyle. Id. at 1149-50. The Supreme Court has now reversed our judgment, holding that Agents Reichle and Doyle also are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. Reichle v. Howards , 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2097 (2012). Accordingly, all these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to these defendants and REMAND for entry of judgment in favor of these defendants. Entered for the Court, Paul J. Kelly Circuit Judge

-3-
# C_2016335EN.01000901.xml

| 12.9.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 335/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.9.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 335/9

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 14 July 2016 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Belgium) — TNS Dimarso NV v Vlaams Gewest

(Case C-6/15) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Public supply contracts - Directive 2004/18/EC - Article 53(2) - Award criteria - Most economically advantageous tender - Method of evaluation - Weighting rules - Obligation for the contracting authority to specify in the call for tenders the weighting of the award criteria - Scope of the obligation))

(2016/C 335/11)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TNS Dimarso NV

Applicant:

Defendant: Vlaams Gewest

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 53(2) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, read in the light of the principle of equal treatment and of the consequent obligation of transparency, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a public service contract to be awarded pursuant to the criterion of the most economically advantageous tender in the opinion of the contracting authority, that authority is not required to bring to the attention of potential tenderers, in the contract notice or the tender specifications relating to the contract at issue, the method of evaluation used by the contracting authority in order to specifically evaluate and rank the tenders. However, that method may not have the effect of altering the award criteria and their relative weighting.

---

(1)  OJ C 118, 13.4.2015.

1

---
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED OC TOBER 5, 2018

NO. 03

- 18

- 00502

- CV

F. M. J., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF WILLIAMSON COUNT Y

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GO ODWIN, AND BOURLAND

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the order of termination signed by the tr i a l court on July 12, 2018.

Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no

reversible error in the trial court’s order of termination . Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial

court’s order of termination

. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no

adjudication of costs is made.
J

- A02007

- 16

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v. JOSE LOUIS NEGRON
No. 1165 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 8 , 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 06

- CR

- 0003826

- 2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J. * CONCURRING STATEMENT BY PANELLA, J. FILED JANUARY 04, 2017 I join in the Majority’s admonishment of the Commonwealth’s agents in this matter. Furthermore, I also conclude that Negron is not entitled to a new trial. However, my reasoning differs from the Majority’s. I therefore

concur. The Majority finds that Negron failed to establish that the murder identified by the CS was the same with which Negron had been charged. However, this Court reviews the decision of a trial court to grant a new trial on the basis of after

- discovered evidence to determine if the court committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. See Commonwealth v. Padillas , 997 A.2d 356, 361

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.J

- A02007

- 16

- 2

-

(Pa. Super. 2010). Here, the trial court found that it was “more likely than not that CS was referring to this incident.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/15, at 6. I can discern no abuse of discretion in this finding, given the circumstances as set forth by the Majority at pages 7

- 8. However, I conclude that Negron did not establish that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s obstruction. “ A Brady violation is established by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel , 30 A.3d 1111, 1130 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). I reach this conclusion based upon a review of the testimony at trial, which reveals that investigator Driesbach’s testimony was not of prime importance. During dir ect examination, investigator Driesbach did not offer any independent evidence of Negron’s guilt. To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s case was largely dependent on the testimony of eyewitnesses to the murder and the testimony of Negron’s neighbor. See , e. g. , N.T, Trial, 1/12

- 15/15, at 216

- 217, 239

- 240, 292

- 295. These witnesses placed Negron at the murder, involved in a fight with the victim, and in possession of a firearm. Furthermore, these witnesses testified that Negron fled the scene of the crime whil e acknowledging to his girlfriend that he had done what he “needed to do.” It was clearly this testimony that the jury believed in convicting Negron.J

- A02007

- 16

- 3

-

As a result, I conclude that Negron failed to undermine confidence in the verdict. I would therefore reve rse the trial court’s order granting a new trial on this basis.
IV

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 137

Expressing the sense of Congress that mediators should be used in discussions

between Congress and the President to produce a balanced budget.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 31, 1996

Mr. MINGE (for himself, Mr. BLUTE, Mr. BROWDER, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. KLUG,

Mr. LIPINSKI, Ms. MCKINNEY, and Mr. QUINN) submitted the following

concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress that mediators should be

used in discussions between Congress and the President

to produce a balanced budget.

Whereas Congress and the President have proposed budget

reconciliation plans that balance in 7 years as scored by

the Congressional Budget Office;

Whereas negotiations have been suspended and may not be

resumed because of disagreements over the details of how

to balance the budget;

Whereas the American people have called on the President

and Congress to resolve their differences;

Whereas the benefits of balancing the budget may be lost if

differences between the parties are not resolved;
2

•HCON 137 IH

Whereas our Nation has successfully mediated disputes in

other regions and it is common practice in the private

sector to appoint a mediator when negotiations reach an

impasse: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the

3 President and Congress should use mediators to resolve

4 differences over the task of balancing the budget in 7

5 years.

Æ
Exhibit 31.2CERTIFICATIONI, David Cohn, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Milestone Scientific Inc.(“the Registrant”).2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respectto the period covered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluations; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.Date: August 14, 2007           /s/ David Cohn   David Cohn   Acting Chief Financial Officer   
22
-----"Richard Ramsdell" <RRamsdell@ebensburgpower.com> wrote: ----- 

To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA 

From: "Richard Ramsdell" <RRamsdell@ebensburgpower.com> 

Date: 07/08/2010 02:36PM 

cc: "Gary Anderson" <ganderson@TRAINING.rtp.epa.gov> 

Subject: ICR Extension Request 

Plant ID: 05183

Ms. Alicea,

Ebensburg Power Company (EPC) recently received an Information Collection Request (ICR) that will be used 

to develop effluent limitation guidelines and standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Industry. EPC 

has started the process of compiling the information requested, but due to extensive amount of information 

requested, it will take some time to complete all the forms. 

EPC respectfully requests a 90 day extension for the submittal; of the data.

If you should have any questions or comments please contact me via the contact information below.

Thank you

Richard A. Ramsdell

Plant Engineer

Ebensburg Power Company

PO Box 845 

Ebensburg, PA 15931 

Tel: (814) 472-1140 Ext. 305

Fax: (814) 472-1143

Email: RRamsdell@ebensburgpower.com

Page 1 of 1

file://C:\Documents and Settings\TMedley\Local Settings\Temp\XPgrpwise\4C371982DO... 8/24/2011
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage Servicing**D1086-120, 12th Floor550 South Tyron StreetCharlotte, NC 28202 1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of November 1, 2015, by and among DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE & ASSET RECEIVING CORPORATION, as Depositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, LNR PARTNERS, LLC, as Special Servicer, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, Paying Agent and Custodian, and PARK BRIDGE LENDER SERVICES LLC, as Operating Advisor with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, COMM 2015- LC23 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.11 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1. A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from November 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 4th March 2016.

 

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
III

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 96

To authorize the President to proclaim the last Friday in April 1993 and

1994, as ‘‘National Arbor Day’’.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 19, 1993

Mr. BRADLEY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

To authorize the President to proclaim the last Friday in

April 1993 and 1994, as ‘‘National Arbor Day’’.

1 Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized and

2 requested to issue a proclamation designating the last Fri3 day of April 1993 and 1994, as ‘‘National Arbor Day’’

4 and calling upon the people of the United States to

5 observe such a day with appropriate ceremonies and

6 activities.

Æ