IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 14, 2023

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT W. PITT, II

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County

No. 2020-CR-540 Dee David Gay, Judge

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No. M2022-01730-CCA-R3-CD

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This appeal concerns sentencing issues only. Defendant, Robert W. Pitt, II, pleaded guilty 

in the Sumner County Criminal Court to five counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, 

involving one victim. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 

six years in confinement on each conviction and ordered the sentencesto run consecutively, 

for an effective thirty-year sentence. Defendant argues on appeal that his sentences are 

excessive and that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing. 

We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

John D. Pellegrin, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert W. Pitt, II.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney 

General; Lawrence Ray Whitley, District Attorney General; and Tara Wyllie, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural History

12/14/2023
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M.B.1

Defendant married M.B.’s mother when M.B. was 11 or 12 years old. The two were 

married for approximately two years and had a son before they divorced in 2010 or 2011. 

The divorce involved a contentious custody dispute over their shared son. Though 

Defendant was her stepfather for only a short time, M.B. regularly went to Defendant’s 

home after the divorce and spent the night because she felt pressure to “rais[e]” her halfbrother. M.B. was “scared to leave [her half-]brother alone with [Defendant]” because she 

feared that “if [her half-brother] was left alone with [Defendant] something might happen.”

Defendant’s and M.B.’s sexual relationship began around December 2011 when she 

was 15 years old. Defendant provided M.B. with marijuana during her visits to his home

and the two regularly smoked together. As the two smoked marijuana together one 

evening, Defendant told M.B. he “needed a back rub” and “was pretty insistent.” M.B. 

complied with his request. When she finished, Defendant told her he would “repay the 

favor and give [M.B.] a back rub.” Defendant’s “hands got lower and lower until he was 

essentially sexually assaulting [M.B.], and then that was the first time there was any sort 

of sexual intercourse.” M.B. felt that she could not refuse Defendant’s advances.

M.B. stayed with her biological father’s family in Arkansas for a period in 2012. 

Defendant and M.B. exchanged several phone calls during this time; however, Defendant 

instructed M.B. to hide their communications. M.B. disguised Defendant’s contact 

information in her phone as a peer from school. Defendant expressed his desire to come 

to Arkansas to visit M.B. Despite Defendant’s admonition to hide their communications, 

M.B. wrote of their conversations in her private journal. M.B.’s grandmother discovered 

the journal entries about M.B.’s conversations with Defendant. In several of the journal 

entries, which were admitted as an exhibit at the sentencing hearing, M.B. wrote that she 

loved Defendant. M.B.’s grandmother contacted the Hendersonville Police Department 

(“HPD”) out of concern that M.B. and Defendant were engaged in an inappropriate 

relationship.

At one point in 2013, when M.B. was 16 or 17 years old, Defendant was in custody 

for a probation violation. While in custody, Defendant called M.B. several times. 

Defendant asked M.B. in one phone call if she remembered to take her “medicine,” which 

M.B. understood to mean birth control pills. Defendant told M.B. he would “get in trouble” 

if she did not “take [her] medicine like [she] was supposed to.” Defendant told M.B. that 

when he was released from custody, he would “stop at Taco Bell[,] . . . come home, take a 

shower, and then play with [M.B.].” M.B. understood this to mean “something sexual.” 

 

1

It is the policy of this Court to protect the privacy of victims of sexual offenses by using their 

initials.
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HPD Detective Jim Bachman questioned M.B. in 2013 about the nature of her 

relationship with Defendant. M.B. and Defendant’s sexual relationship was ongoing at this 

time, but she did not disclose this to Detective Bachman. M.B. wanted “everyone to 

essentially go away and not ask [her] about it at the time.” Detective Bachman recalled at 

the sentencing hearing that M.B.’s mother was concerned that M.B. and Defendant were 

engaged in an inappropriate relationship.

During his 2013 investigation, Detective Bachman spoke with Mr. Adam 

Druckenmiller, one of Defendant’s friends, about Defendant’s relationship with M.B. Mr. 

Druckenmiller told Detective Bachman that he did not recall “seeing anything odd at the 

time,” but that Defendant said some things Mr. Druckenmiller considered strange, such as 

that “[Defendant] wanted to marry someone like [M.B.].”

M.B. also denied an inappropriate relationship with Defendant in an affidavit she 

executed during her mother and Defendant’s custody dispute and testified in a deposition 

to the same effect near that time. M.B. testified at the sentencing hearing that she signed 

the affidavit “out of fear.”

Defendant and M.B. engaged in sexual intercourse “probably hundreds” of times 

before M.B. turned 18 years old in April 2014. In addition to marijuana, Defendant 

provided M.B. with alcohol, and M.B. recalled one occasion where Defendant forced her 

to use cocaine so she “wouldn’t be able to tell on anybody else.” 

Defendant was also violent toward M.B. and threatened her. Defendant “dr[ove] 

drunk” with M.B. in the vehicle. Defendant told M.B. that “he was going to either take the 

bolts out of [M.B.’s] tires or [her] mom’s tires on her car and ma[k]e sure that [they]

wrecked on the interstate and no one would know how it had happened and [Defendant] 

would be able to get away with it like that.” Defendant kept weapons hidden around his 

home and bragged about “how he could kill people with them and the different ways that 

he could kill people with them.”

Defendant’s sexual relationship with M.B. continued until 2018, when M.B. was 22 

years old. M.B. “escape[d]” from Defendant under the guise of a school trip. Sometime 

after M.B. escaped, Defendant tried to ram her car while she was driving.

M.B. received counseling from Christa Yandell, a licensed professional counselor 

in Tennessee, for approximately a year and a half beginning in 2019. Ms. Yandell recalled 

at the sentencing hearing that M.B. had night terrors, panic attacks, depression, suicidal 

ideation, and general feelings of hopelessness and anxiety stemming from the years of 

sexual abuse and Defendant’s behavior after M.B. escaped. 
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A.C.

A.C. met Defendant in 2011 through their involvement at Hendersonville 

Performing Arts Center (“HPAC”). A.C. was 16 years old at that time. Defendant’s 

mother was the director at HPAC, and though Defendant held no official role, “he felt like 

he ran everything” because of his mother’s position, and A.C. perceived that he had 

authority.

Defendant asked A.C. to babysit his son in the spring of 2012. This was the only 

time A.C. “actually babysat” Defendant’s son. Defendant later asked A.C. again if she 

would babysit his son, but this time, Defendant’s son was not there when A.C. arrived. 

Defendant gave A.C. an alcoholic drink, but A.C. could not remember whether they had 

sexual intercourse that evening. A.C. estimated that she and Defendant had sexual 

intercourse three times in the course of their relationship, all occurring before A.C. was 18 

years old.

Facebook messages between A.C. and Defendant were admitted at the sentencing 

hearing. Messages from 2013, when A.C. was 17 years old, show Defendant asking A.C. 

whether she had disclosed to anyone the sexual nature of their relationship.

A.C. worked with Defendant in several theatrical productions, including at a church, 

at a zoo, and at HPAC. A.C. recalled at the sentencing hearing, “there was, like a certain 

group of [girls] that [Defendant], like, brought [them] to work everywhere. So it was just 

a lot of abusive and aggressive behavior toward [A.C.] and the other girls, not necessarily 

like sexual, but just emotional and physical and that kind of behavior.” A.C. specifically 

recalled an incident at a rehearsal where Defendant “had some kind of explosion” and got 

into a physical altercation with another cast member. 

A.C. “got away from [Defendant]” in 2018 after M.B. came forward with her 

allegations. A.C. testified at the sentencing hearing that she helped M.B. get away from 

Defendant.

F.N.W.

Defendant and F.N.W. met in 2012 when F.N.W. was 16 years old. F.N.W. went 

with A.C. to Defendant’s home “under the guise of babysitting his son,” but they truly went 

to “hang out with” Defendant. A fourth person was in the home, as well, whom F.N.W. 

recognized as an acquaintance from church. Defendant gave them alcohol and marijuana. 

F.N.W. did not see Defendant’s son that evening. F.N.W. and Defendant did not have 

physical contact that evening, but they exchanged phone numbers.
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A week or two later, Defendant texted F.N.W. that his back hurt and that he needed 

a back rub. Defendant offered to come pick up F.N.W. Defendant took F.N.W. back to 

his home, and the two drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. Defendant progressively 

“[got] more flirty” with F.N.W. Defendant “pulled at the back of [F.N.W.’s] pants and 

asked [her] what kind of underwear that [she] was wearing.” F.N.W. began to panic, and 

Defendant laid her on the bed “like he was trying to calm [her] down.” “[T]he next thing 

[F.N.W.] knew, [her] clothes were being taken off . . . and [F.N.W.] kind of knew what 

was happening, but [she] didn’t really have very much control over [her] thoughts and [her]

body together” due to the marijuana and alcohol. Defendant inserted his penis into 

F.N.W.’s vagina. F.N.W. told Defendant that it hurt, but Defendant told her that “if [she] 

just kept doing it, it would feel good.” F.N.W. recalled at the sentencing hearing that “it 

was hard to even form words at that point.”

Another time, Defendant coerced F.N.W. and A.C. into having a “threesome” with 

him, in which Defendant performed oral sex on A.C. and penetrated F.N.W.’s vagina with 

his penis. F.N.W. recalled that she was 16 years old when this occurred. All told, F.N.W. 

and Defendant had four or five sexual encounters, all occurring before F.N.W. was 18 years 

old.

Guilty Plea and Sentencing Hearing

The Sumner County Grand Jury indicted Defendant in 2020 for six counts of 

statutory rape by an authority figure. All of the charges stemmed from sexual encounters 

with M.B. Defendant entered a guilty plea without a sentence to five of the six charges in 

2022 pursuant to an agreement with the State not to pursue charges related to A.C. and 

F.N.W. 

The trial court heard testimony at the sentencing hearing from M.B., A.C., F.N.W., 

Ms. Yandell, and Detective Bachman relating the above facts, as well as an allocution 

statement from Defendant in which he expressed his remorse. The trial court received 

written victim impact statements from M.B., A.C., and F.N.W., as well as letters from 

several friends and family members supporting Defendant.

The trial court noted that Defendant was a Range I, standard offender and that 

statutory rape by an authority figure was a Class C felony in 2011 when the charged crimes 

occurred; as such, each conviction was subject to a sentence range of three to six years. 

See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-532 (2011) (statutory rape by an authority figure); 40-35-112(a)(3)

(2011) (sentencing range for Range I, Class C felony). The trial court also noted that 

statutory rape by an authority figure was not eligible for probation in 2011. See id. § 40-

35-303(a) (2011). 
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The trial court stated that Defendant’s expressions of remorse were “a day late and 

a dollar short.” As to enhancement factors, the trial court found that there were multiple 

victims based on the uncharged offenses involving A.C. and F.N.W. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

114(3). The trial court found that all three victims were especially vulnerable because of 

age. See id. § (4). The trial court found that Defendant committed these crimes to gratify 

his desire for pleasure or excitement. See id. § (7). The trial court stated that Defendant 

made M.B. his “sex slave” and expressed its shock that such a thing could happen in 

Sumner County. The trial court noted that Defendant had a long history of criminal conduct 

in the form of the “hundreds of times” Defendant and M.B. engaged in sexual intercourse 

before M.B. turned 18 and that “[e]very time [Defendant] used [marijuana or cocaine] it

[was] a violation of the law.” See id. § (1). The trial court did not find that any mitigating 

factors applied. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in confinement on each 

conviction.

As to consecutive or concurrent service, the trial court considered the factors 

outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115. The trial court found that 

Defendant was convicted of “two or more statutory offenses involving the sexual abuse of 

a minor” and considered that M.B. was Defendant’s stepdaughter, the nature and scope of 

the sexual acts, and the extent of the residual physical and mental damage to the victims. 

Relying on this factor, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run consecutively, 

for an effective sentence of thirty years to serve at 30% release eligibility. The trial court 

stated, “[i]f there was a poster child for consecutive sentence[s], [Defendant], you are it.” 

The trial court noted on the judgments its recommendation that Defendant not be paroled.

This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

Length of Sentence

Defendant argues first that his sentence is excessive, describing it as “manifestly 

unjust.” Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly applied 

enhancement factor (4), that the victims were vulnerable due to their age. The State 

counters that the trial court properly sentenced Defendant. We agree with Defendant that 

the trial court improperly applied enhancement factor (4), but agree with the State that the 

trial court properly sentenced Defendant.
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“[S]entences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to 

be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). Stated differently, this Court is “bound 

by a trial court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed 

in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out” in the Sentencing Act. 

State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn. 2008). “‘A trial court abuses its discretion 

when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling 

on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice 

to the complaining party.’” State v. Gevedon, 671 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting 

State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010)). The party challenging a sentence 

bears the burden of demonstrating its impropriety. T.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentencing 

Comm’n Cmts.; see also State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

As to enhancement factors, we note that a trial court’s misapplication of an 

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the presumption of reasonableness, 

so long as the trial court articulates reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of 

sentencing. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705-06. Additionally, “‘[t]he application of a single 

enhancement factor can justify an enhanced sentence.’” State v. Rollins, No. E2022-

00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4078700, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2023) (quoting 

State v. Banks, No. M2019-00017-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 5888, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Aug. 25, 2020)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2023).

As described above, Defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of statutory rape by an 

authority figure, which were Class C felonies in 2011 when the charged offenses occurred. 

See T.C.A. 39-13-532 (2011). The appropriate sentencing range was thus three to six years. 

Id. § 40-35-112(a)(3) (2011). The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years on each 

count. The sentence ordered by the trial court was within-range, which entitles it to a 

presumption of reasonableness. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 708. We therefore will not disturb 

the trial court’s sentencing decision unless the trial court abused its discretion in reaching 

it. Id.

Defendant complains that the trial court improperly applied enhancement factor (4), 

that the victims were particularly vulnerable because of age. The State characterizes the 

trial court’s statements regarding the victims’ vulnerability as a “passing description.” We 

agree with Defendant that the trial court’s reliance on this enhancement factor is more than 

a “passing description” of the victims. We also agree with Defendant that the trial court 

misapplied this enhancement factor. The record shows that the trial court focused 

exclusively on the victims’ age in its reliance on this factor. Reliance on the victim’s age 

alone is insufficient to support application of this enhancement factor. State v. Poole, 945 

S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997). Proper application of this enhancement factor focuses on the 

victim’s inability, because of age, to resist, summon aid, or testify against the perpetrator. 
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See State v. Kissinger, 922 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. 1996) (citing State v. Hayes, 899 

S.W.2d 175, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). 

We part ways with Defendant, though, in his belief that he is entitled to relief on 

this basis. The enhancement factors are advisory only, and misapplication of an 

enhancement factor is not enough, standing alone, to reverse a sentence. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 

at 705-06. Additionally, though Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s application 

of enhancement factors (1), (3), and (7), there is ample evidence in the record to support 

the trial court’s reliance on them. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (3), (7). The record here 

shows that the trial court considered all of the relevant statutory factors, the evidence, and 

the purposes and principles of sentencing in reaching its decision as to the length of 

Defendant’s sentences. As a result, Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Consecutive Service of Sentences

Defendant also challenges the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing. The 

State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive service. 

We agree with the State.

Trial courts are vested with discretion as to whether to align sentences concurrently 

or consecutively. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tenn. 2013). As relevant here, 

trial courts may order consecutive service if “[t]he defendant is convicted of two (2) or 

more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor[.]” T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5). 

In applying this factor, the trial court must consider “the aggravating circumstances arising 

from the relationship between the defendant and the victim or victims, the time span of 

[the] defendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope of the sexual acts and the 

extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to the victim or victims.” Id.

Defendant pleaded guilty to five statutory offenses involving the sexual abuse of a 

minor. The trial court considered the relationship between Defendant and his victims, the

time the sexual activity went undetected, the nature and scope of the sexual acts, and the 

extent of the residual effects of Defendant’s crimes in the victims’ lives. The trial court 

found that all four factors were aggravating factors under the circumstances of this case. 

Defendant attempts to portray his victims as “willing participant[s]” in their sexual 

relationships, but the trial court rejected that depiction of the relationships, as was its 

prerogative. The record supports its determination. Defendant also claims that the trial 

court should have ordered concurrent sentencing because Defendant “apparently is not one 

who is attracted to pre-pubescent girls,” but we fail to see how this amounts to an abuse of 

discretion on the trial court’s part. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 

imposing consecutive sentences. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant at the maximum 

of the relevant range and in imposing consecutive sentencing. The judgments of the trial 

court are accordingly affirmed.

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 TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE